Criterion Vol 4 No 4.indd

Transcription

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Criterion
July/September 2009
Volume 4, Number 3
Terrorism and the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan
Editorial
3
Notes on the Financial Crisis, Global
Faizullah Khilji
Imbalances, Recovery and the East Asian
Response: What We Know and What We Do Not Know
8
The SINO-PAK Boundary Agreement
The Afghan Turmoil From 1747 to 2001
Internal Security Challenges for Pakistan
A.G. Noorani
49
S. Iftikhar Murshed
86
Shahwar Junaid 133
Promoting Political Parties and an Independent
Legislature in Afghanistan
Niloufer Siddiqui 149
Institutional Role Behind Civil-Military
Equation
Muhammad Ismail Khan 186
Essays
A Strategy to Fight Militancy?
Cyril Almeida 211
Between Dreams and Realities
Iqbal Ahmad Khan 222
Cooperative Mechanism to Save Kashmir
Environment and Water Wars
The Price of ‘Sea Blindness’
Iftikhar Gilani 228
Muhammad Azam Khan 242
Editorial
TERRORISM AND THE BLASPHEMY
LAWS OF PAKISTAN
“Oh Liberty, what crimes are committed under thy name,” exclaimed
Madame Marie-Jeanne Roland as she mounted the platform to be
guillotined during the Reign of Terror at the height of the French
Revolution. More than two hundred years later, a similar reign of terror
but this time in the name of religion was unleashed, particularly against
the minorities of Pakistan, under the blasphemy laws introduced by
General Zia-ul-Haq. In 1982 Section 295 B was added to the Penal
Code prescribing life imprisonment for “defiling the Holy Qur’an” and
in 1986 Section 295 C was incorporated mandating the death penalty for
the “use of derogatory language in respect of the Holy Prophet.”
Blasphemy laws have existed in the statute books of British India
since 1860 and in 1927 Section 295 was included to deal with “deliberate
and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class
by insulting its religion or religious belief.” Thus the law was nondiscriminatory and designed to protect equally all faiths. Furthermore,
conviction depended exclusively on proof that the accused had
deliberately injured or insulted another individual’s religious feelings.
This was the law that prevailed in Pakistan during the first forty years of
its existence and there was relative inter-faith harmony till the 1980s.
Zia-ul-Haq’s blasphemy laws are vaguely formulated and cater only
to the sensibilities of Muslims. Even worse, they have been arbitrarily
enforced. After its meeting in Geneva from 26 August to 2 September
2009, the World Council of Churches issued a statement which noted that
Editorial
“on the testimony of a complainant, a person charged with blasphemy
is immediately placed in detention. The penalty includes a mandatory
death sentence for defaming the Prophet Mohammed and life sentence
for desecrating the Holy Qur’an. Under the provisions of the present
law, conviction is made possible without proof of deliberate attempt
on the part of the accused. This is a violation of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the constitution of Pakistan.”
Edmund Burke believed that bad laws are the worst form of tyranny
and this has been vividly demonstrated by the blasphemy laws of
Pakistan. Though 50 percent of the victims have been Muslims, it is
the impoverished and under-privileged Christian minority, constituting
a little more than 1 percent of the population, which has faced the
brunt of the fanatical cleric-instigated violence. They have undergone
imprisonment on frivolous unproven accusations, many have been
killed and some even been burnt alive. Their homes have been razed
to the ground, their places of worship destroyed, their sacred scriptures
desecrated through an endless night of terror.
So intense has this persecution been that in desperation the Reverend
John Joseph, the first Roman Catholic bishop from the Punjab, shot
himself to death in a Sahiwal court on 6 May 1998. A few years earlier
he had kissed the feet of a murdered Christian during the latter’s funeral
and swore that his would be the next death because of the blasphemy
laws.
Eleven years after Bishop John Joseph took his own life, a 22year-old Christian, Fanish (Robert) Masih, was imprisoned in Sialkot
for allegedly desecrating the Holy Qur’an. He was kept in solitary
confinement even though it had been established that the charges against
him were fabricated. He hanged himself in his cell on 15 September
2009.
Though innocent civilians have been ruthlessly killed in blasphemyrelated mob hysteria as in the Gojra outrage of 30 July 2009 and also
in cold-blooded pre-meditated violence, the two suicides poignantly
demonstrate the loss of all hope. In the first, a learned man of the frock,
4
CRITERION – Volume 4 No.4
Editorial
who had taught his flock that all life was sacred, ended his own in the
hope that this supreme sacrifice would rekindle the conscience of those
in power and spur them to rescind the infamous blasphemy laws. In the
second, a terrorized poverty-stricken youth had convinced himself that
he could not escape the gallows for a crime he had never committed.
Justice cannot prevail if judges are intimidated and fear for their
lives. In an editorial after Fanish Masih’s death, the Daily Times of
Lahore recalled that a few months earlier hundreds of clerics wreaked
havoc in a court after the judge had granted bail to a Christian couple who
had been sent to prison for merely possessing a Qur’an. The accusation
against them was that they had defiled the scripture because they were
unclean as a community. Their plea that they had kept the holy book in
their home out of respect for its teachings fell on deaf ears. They were
subsequently charged with blasphemy but this did not deter the mob
from ransacking the court.
The few judges who dared to oppose the tidal-wave of fanaticism
became its victims. On 19 October 1997, Justice Arif Iqbal Hussain
Bhatti was gunned down in his office in Lahore because in 1995 he had
acquitted two Christian brothers accused of defaming the Prophet. So
intense and immediate was the clerical reaction to the ruling that the
brothers had to be smuggled out of the country and sent to Germany.
The police did nothing to protect Justice Bhatti though they were aware
that he had been receiving threatening letters from extremists who were
so convinced about the righteousness of their cause that they had no
hesitation in disclosing their identities and contact particulars.
In several instances the law enforcement authorities not only abetted
but also participated in the violence which they regarded as retributive
justice for insulting the Prophet or desecrating the Qur’an. In 1997 a
frenzied mob of 20,000 which included 500 policemen went on the
rampage in the Shantinagar-Tibbi Christian colony following reports
about defiling the Qur’an.
On 24 May 2004 a police constable bludgeoned Samuel Masih to
death as the latter had been accused of spitting on a mosque wall. The
CRITERION – October/December 2009
5
Editorial
policeman had no qualms of conscience, no sense of guilt, no remorse.
He said that as a Muslim it was his duty to kill Masih. This cannot be
brushed aside as an aberration or as the outpourings of a demented, semiliterate mind because the contagion of religious extremism has spread to
all levels of society. The constable was probably aware that barely four
years earlier none other than a judge of the Lahore High Court, Justice
Nazir Akhtar, had publicly declared that blasphemers should be killed
on the spot.
Since the introduction of the blasphemy laws in the 1980s, the
senseless slaughter of ordinary citizens, vandalism, arson and the
destruction of churches - all brewed from an alarmingly fascist religious
narrative - keep recurring with startling frequency. The symbiotic
relationship between religion-motivated extremist violence and terrorism
is obvious. The 30 July 2009 carnage in Gojra was the work of the
banned anti-Shiia terrorist outfit Sipah-e-Sahaba and with each such
incident the authority of the state is being progressively subverted.
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is
no longer the exclusive breeding ground for terrorist outfits. Southern
Punjab, the home of the Sipah-e-Sahaba and its offshoot the Lashkar-eJhangvi as well as other extremist groups notably the Jaish-e-Mohammad,
shares that distinction with FATA. The seminaries in south Punjab,
sponsored by these and other groups, churn out ideologically motivated
diehards who have been responsible for sectarian killings, the slaughter
of minorities and Muslims alike on concocted allegations of blasphemy
as well as many of the most dramatic terrorist attacks in recent years.
The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has not only earned a fearsome reputation as Al
Qaeda’s foot soldiers in Pakistan but is also acquiring a global jihadist
agenda.
The hackneyed refrain that Pakistan does not tire of reiterating ad
nauseam in every international forum is that it condemns terrorism “in
all its forms and manifestations.” However it has still not come to terms
with the reality that violence against innocent civilians in the name of
religion is one of these “forms” of terrorism which the government
professes to staunchly oppose. Al Qaeda, the Taliban of FATA and
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Editorial
the extremist groups of southern Punjab are mutually supportive and
collectively constitute a triangle of terror that has been responsible
for more than eight thousand deaths in the last one year. Indoctrinated
youths from the madrassahs of the Punjab are trained to become suicide
bombers in the tribal belt under the tutelage of Al Qaeda.
The nexus between blasphemy-related violence and the recurring
incidents of terrorism is obvious. The ideological motivation is a distorted
interpretation of religion. So long as the blasphemy laws remain in the
statute books, vigilante death squads and terrorist groups like the Sipahe-Sahaba will not be deterred from their criminal activities.
It is a shame that successive governments after the death of Zia-ulHaq in 1988 have done nothing to repeal this law which is repugnant
to Islam. The Qur’an does not prescribe punishment for blasphemy
which, like apostasy, though a grievous sin will be punished only in
the hereafter. The worldly punishments specified in the Holy Scripture
are for crimes against society not for sins against God. The nineteenth
century reformer Jamal ad-Din Afghani observed, “Every Muslim is
sick, and the only remedy is the Qur’an.” Till the true teachings of the
Qur’an are clearly understood, obscurantist clerics will continue to
preach hatred and violence in the name of religion. There can scarcely
be a greater blasphemy.
7
NOTES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS,
GLOBAL IMBALANCES, RECOVERY
AND THE EAST ASIAN RESPONSE:
WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DO
NOT KNOW
Faizullah Khilji1*
Abstract.
These notes are an attempt to lay out what we know and what we do
not know about the financial crisis, global imbalances, the “recovery”,
and how the East Asian response to the crisis is shaping up. We begin
with a brief recapitulation of events, and then consider the mechanics of
the crisis, and in that context, consider the concerns relating to global
imbalances. A discussion of how this crisis might unwind follows. The
present financial crisis occurred chiefly in the United States and the
United Kingdom, New York and London, but soon enough the impact
of these developments was being felt in other financial centres of the
developed market economies. East Asia though faced the crisis from
a different perspective and with somewhat different concerns: chiefly
as an exporter to the developed market economies where demand was
slowing down on account of the crisis, and as a major investor in dollar
and dollar denominated securities. We briefly consider the East Asian
response. In particular we consider the proposition that there may be
informal arrangements being improvised by the East Asians to solve
issues in real time.
* Faizullah Khilji is a former Chairman of the Tariff Commission of Pakistan. Email fkhilji@
gmail.com
Financial Crisis, Global Imbalances...
The man walking slowly by my side is haunted by something more
than the uninterrupted revolution; by a gigantic conception of which
neither of us has spoken …Three hundred years of European energy
are now on the wane; the Chinese era is dawning… Behind our entire
conversation the hope of a twilight world stood watch.
Andre Malraux, 19672
Introduction
“How could this happen?” begins the recent Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) annual report,3 which seems to date the onset of the
crisis from August 2007 when, in its words, the interbank market was
“disrupted”, i.e., the beginning of the credit crunch.4 The BIS though is
not alone in expressing a loss of understanding. The Queen of England,
a well informed person briefed weekly by the British Prime Minister and
with enviable access to other equally well informed persons including
heads of state, asked of a London School of Economics professor of
management “If these things were so large, how come everyone missed
them?”5 And Professor Garicano of LSE too was in good company in
his inability to offer a satisfactory explanation to his monarch about
the limitations of economists: Alan Greenspan had earlier expressed
his inability to comprehend both the nature of financial engineering as
well as to regulate the markets because the two phenomena surpassed
his understanding.6 Indeed that venerable spokesman for the “financial
times” that we reportedly live in, did tell us that “unfettered finance”
was “fast reshaping the global economy”. But our concerns were allayed
because it had “proved possible to tame domestic finance in the US”;
the “emerging economies” though, lacking in the sophistication found
in US financial system, needed to “manage their involvement with the
global financial system cautiously”; that is where there was something
to really worry about, and naturally so!7
These notes are an attempt to lay out what we know and what we do
not know about the financial crisis, global imbalances, the “recovery”,
and, finally, how the East Asian response is shaping up. We begin
with a brief recapitulation of the widely known chronology of events,
and then consider the mechanics of the crisis, and in that context, the
9
Faizullah Khilji
issue of global imbalances, which of course has further ramifications.
A discussion of what lies ahead for the world economy, and how this
crisis might unwind follows. It is an important aspect of the present
financial crisis that it occurred chiefly in the United States and the United
Kingdom, New York and London. Soon enough though the impact of
developments in New York and London was being felt in other financial
centres of the developed market economies. East Asia though faced the
crisis from a different perspective, the perspective of a region which had
methodically prepared itself to cope with any repeat of the Asian crisis
of 1998. And East Asia faced the new crisis also with somewhat different
concerns: chiefly as an exporter to the developed market economies
where demand was slowing down on account of the crisis, and as a major
investor in dollar and dollar denominated securities; a currency which
surely looked like losing some of its sheen, if not some of its credibility.
We briefly consider the emerging East Asian response. In particular we
consider the proposition that the institutions of international economic
relations may have lagged in their ability to cope with developments,
and that there may be informal arrangements being improvised by the
East Asians to solve real issues in real time.
Chronology of events8
It was in the summer of 2007 that sustained reporting on what was
then seen as the emerging “sub-prime” problem began to appear in the
press. Interest rates had risen and defaults were expected on some home
loans as a result. On the face of it this did not seem to be an alarming
development to a lay observer as some loans do go bad whenever
interest rates rise, and also because not much change was evident in
the behaviour of the banks to suggest any impending crisis. The term
“sub-prime” was not until then understood sufficiently well outside the
banking community: the term “sub-prime”, it turned out, broadly means
a loan made without much scrutiny because serious scrutiny would
not justify lending. Thus the gravity of the situation did not quite filter
through to the public for some time, even though some of the news
reports did mention that the mortgage defaults were sending ripples
through the financial system.
10
Public policy in the United States had contributed to the growth in
housing ownership. House ownership was seen as helpful in enlarging
the “Republican tent”, i.e., vote bank, and it also reportedly furthered
the business interests of major donors to the Republican party.9
The first unmistakable signs of a definite turn in the public
confidence and that we might be living through extraordinary times
came in September 2007 with queues forming outside Northern Rock,
a United Kingdom home loan mortgage institution turned bank. It had
been well over a hundred years since something like this had been seen
in Britain.10 For the British, this was a live example of the oft mentioned
but never seen (by any living soul) textbook case of a run on the bank.
By Autumn of 2007, a deepening of the crisis was quite visible with
Fed sharply reducing interest rates as bank after bank in the United States
announced losses, and attributed these to “sub-prime” loans gone bad.
By January 2008 the stock market movements reflected the depth of the
crisis: the NYSE dutifully crashed. Later that year in March, Bear Stearns,
one of the institutions that defined success on Wall St, imploded like
those old buildings that look so formidable and then suddenly disappear
in a puff of dust.11 In July 2008 Fed and Treasury, in a move that could
only be anathema to the very spirit of the United States, nationalised the
two well known home loan institutions, i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac; the word nationalisation was never mentioned, and, indeed, there
was, some felt, a sense of pathos and sad irony on seeing the Treasury
Secretary, Hank Paulson, make the announcements: this ex head of
Goldman Sachs - for Wall St provides both the market makers and the
regulators to regulate the market makers, hence setting up a situation
where it is both judge and jury in its own cases – saying that the Treasury
would backstop the two institutions then on the brink of bankruptcy.12
By the summer of 2008 the credit crunch was a full one year old as far
as newspaper reporting went, but a belief also began to shape up that the
measures taken by the central banks and the governments had largely
contained the crisis. There was nothing in living memory to suggest that
this was only a pit stop for what Alan Greenspan was to subsequently
refer to as the financial tsunami.
11
Faizullah Khilji
It was against this backdrop in September 2008 that the Fed and the
Treasury decided to selectively apply their belief in the rationality and
efficiency of market outcomes: it was judged best in the public interest
not to bail out Lehman Brothers, a pillar of Wall St but also a noted
rival of Goldman Sachs. Lehman Brothers duly collapsed forthwith, (as
indeed would have any other bank in the United States that fateful day
if the government had publicly withheld support), and with this collapse
public confidence in the financial system went in to a free fall.13 The
public obviously did not share the authorities’ faith that the markets
were working for the best. For the public, collapse of Lehman Brothers
was tantamount to Wall St, the very citadel of capitalism, coming apart.
The crisis had turned into a global meltdown, nothing less. With the
total collapse of public confidence in the financial system staring in the
face, Treasury and Fed worked non-stop to launch bail out plans. But
the Congress approved the bailouts only rather reluctantly, (for many
in Congress too have great faith in the “magic of the market” whilst
others in Congress saw these plans as handouts of “taxpayers money”
to bankers), and only after President George W Bush talked at them
with his usual rough-hewn man-of-authority turn of phrase: “this sucker
could go down”!14
A stock market crash, greater in relative intensity than 1929,
followed. The autumn and winter of 2008 witnessed the design and
implementation of rescue and stimulus plans. Bank after bank was
being rescued through an infusion of equity capital as well as through
extension of loans at near zero rates, debt service burdens were being
reduced through lowering of interest rates, and the economy was being
boosted directly through policies that increased public expenditure. By
December 2008 US interest rates had fallen to between zero and 0.5
percent. Interest rates in the UK were approaching zero by March 2009.
Nonetheless, as 2009 unfolded, the public saw unemployment and
bankruptcies going up.
The mechanics of the crisis
The alleged causes of this financial crisis were diverse. Press reports
initially referred to greed and dishonesty as causes, perhaps because
12
these two “capabilities” are easily understood by the average reporter
as well as the general public; but both these factors are also an intrinsic
part of the human condition, and that is why we have regulators and
watchdogs. Another alleged cause was inadequate regulation,15 and that
goes to the heart of the philosophy that guides present day economic
policy in market economies. Some argued that the problem had its
source in ”global imbalances”. And others attributed the difficulties to
“complexity” of financial engineering, and markets, use of mathematics
“too difficult to understand”, etc. No one though attributed the crisis to
the incompetence of the bankers, or accused them of getting involved in
matters way beyond their competence.
The story properly begins with the concepts and principles that
guided the market makers and players as well as the regulators.
The underlying economic concepts
The conceptual framework under which the finance sector operates
goes by the rubric of “efficient market hypothesis”, EMH for short. The
essence of EMH is captured in the definition attributed by the Economist
to Eugene Fama, of the University of Chicago, “that the price of a
financial asset reflects all available information that is relevant to its
value”.16 The far reaching implications of EMH are that markets would
always price financial assets correctly. If the price of a share seemed low,
investors (well-informed by definition) would buy it forthwith to their
profit. If it looked too high, they could sell it and again end up making
money. It also followed that bubbles could not form, as these would
be immediately perceived by investors who would profitably prick
them. Trying to beat the market was therefore futile, and, importantly,
regulation was by and large superfluous.17
As the EMH did not admit of bubbles building up, it is not much
help in explaining or understanding the crisis, and in an EMH world
any crisis therefore must logically be on account of interference in the
markets by the authorities. This sounds (and is) too simplistic, reflecting
only an insistence on viewing developments through the prism of EMH;
but a more plausible, albeit “non-standard”, explanation owed chiefly to
Hyman Minsky goes something like the following.18
13
Faizullah Khilji
The post 9/11 part of Alan Greenspan’s stewardship at the Fed was
a time when the economy was in a situation of low interest rates and
experiencing good returns on equity. Banks were awash with funds.19 It
follows that firms and individuals with relatively higher proportion of
debt were earning relatively higher returns because of low interest rates.
The advantage of contracting increasing amounts of debt to enhance
the return on equity was evident. “Financial engineering” by devising
instruments such as the CDOs and CDSs gave a boost to the process:
CDOs by further lowering the perception of risk, and the CDSs by
enabling an increase in leverage and hence increasing the funds available
for investment in housing and elsewhere.20
It is worth digressing briefly to see as to how CDOs and CDSs worked
to reduce, or spread, or transfer the risk element underlying a loan.
The CDO instrument, a collaterised debt obligation, bundled together
different loans into one package (which could be sold in parts or as a
whole). By bundling together loans that were in principle uncorrelated,
the risk of any one default was reduced as it was spread over the larger
bundle of loans, and as all loans (being uncorrelated) were most unlikely
to default at the same time. Once this logic was accepted, it was a small
step to use the CDO “technology” to rationalise extending credit to
persons with a poor or no credit history, i.e., the “sub-prime” loan.
The other instrument was the CDS, the credit default swap. This
CDS made it possible for the bank to transfer the risk attaching to a
loan or other asset either by paying someone to carry the risk, or by
insuring against the risk of default, whilst retaining the loan as well
as its income stream. The implication was that if the risk attaching to
default was transferred, then the capital that the regulator required of the
bank to keep as a reserve against the loan had been freed and could be
“re-used” for advancing more loans. In the event the regulators found
the proposition in keeping with “markets know best” concept, and hence
acceptable. And those among the regulators who did not quite see it like
this were shown the door.21 The result was two-fold. Firstly, insurers
such as the AIG insured the risk of default and thus took on huge risks
even though this particular insurer had no previous experience of
such business! Just the lure of profit was enough: the premiums were
14
trivial but the immensity of the volume of business raked in a large
income. And insurers did not face the capital reserve requirements that
were reining in the banks. Secondly, as a bank transferred the risk but
retained the loan, the loans made by a bank kept growing as a factor of
that bank’s capital and leverage shot up. At the time the crisis became
evident, these leverage ratios for the main investment banks had reached
levels associated with hedge funds!22
The lowered perception of risk encouraged optimism about returns
on proposed projects, and this caused the value of assets to increase.23
The bubble
It is important to remember that one of the defining characteristics
of the market economy in the present context is the relentless pursuit
of profits.24 In the circumstances therefore it is clearly advantageous
to contract higher debt at the prevailing low rate of interest so as to
increase the returns.25 Firms and individuals were therefore motivated
to undertake riskier projects and ventures, and to contract more debt
to enable them to do so. The decline in risk aversion set of an increase
in the volume of investments being undertaken. As investment volume
increased, there was a consequent increase in asset prices. Rising
asset prices raised the prospect of capital gain, encouraged yet more
investment, and speculative behaviour gained strength. Finance was
increasingly sought from the banks to fund investments and asset
purchases. The banks were very willingly forthcoming with loans as
they shared the general optimism of the borrowers regarding rising asset
values and potential capital gains.
All these forces worked themselves out to increase home loans
in the US economy, and indeed elsewhere too. The housing industry
experienced a boom of such extraordinary dimensions that houses were
being built even though demographic and other data showed that there
would be no demand as far as one could see for these units for habitation
purposes.26
This is also the euphoric moment in Minsky’s formulation. Lenders
as well as borrowers feel that the future is assured. In the build up to the
15
Faizullah Khilji
present crisis the regulator too felt that the future was assured and the
economy and its financial sector had shifted to a new trajectory, where
risk had been correctly priced so that the system worked safely.27
In this situation, which is characterized by rising asset prices and
high investor excitement, a particularly risky type of investor appears.
This investor trades on a market where asset prices are rising sharply, and
in the process incurs substantial debt, in the widely shared expectation
that expected capital appreciation on the assets far exceeds the servicing
costs of the debt, even though these costs are well in excess of the net cash
inflows of the business. The first round consequences of this act include
pushing up asset prices to yet higher levels, pushing up the demand
for credit yet another notch, and consequently maintaining the upward
momentum in the rate of interest, and thus increasing the fragility of the
system to any reversal in the growth of asset values. This configuration
of events is referred to as a Ponzi scheme, and the investor is referred to
as Ponzi financier, in deference to one of the better known practitioners
of this particular art form.28
Liquidity though tightens as the indebtedness of the economy,
and its debt / equity ratios (i.e., leverage) increase. As growth in credit
accelerates, ceteris paribus, the ratio of interest payments to profits also
rises.
Highly liquid but relatively low yield financial instruments such as
bonds fall in price; in response, the purveyors of these instruments raise
interest rates to help them compete better for investor funds. Thus the
interest rates in the market rise, without any intervention on the part of
the authorities. With increasing leverage and interest rates also moving
upwards, a situation of tight liquidity develops and the vulnerability of
the business and the economy to any further upward shifts in credit,
leverage or the rate of interest increases dramatically. But the increase
in borrowing to invest in assets continues even at higher interest rates,
as long as the expected returns from investment significantly exceed the
cost of such borrowing.
With time this dynamics of high interest rates combined with high
16
leverage begins to tell. The upward drive of credit and asset prices falters,
and these stumbles render sound business speculative,29 speculative
business begins to resemble a Ponzi scheme, and the Ponzi financier
needs to sell assets immediately to cover the current debt service, as
perhaps do others.
The asset sales prick the asset price bubble and the prices of assets
come under pressure to move down. With a downward move in asset
prices, investors other than the Ponzi financier also wish to sell. If an
investor is levered up, even modest market movements can force a sale
in a hurry to stop losses becoming catastrophic.
The Ponzi financiers find themselves with assets that can only be
sold at a loss, and levels of debt that simply cannot be serviced. Banks
find that customers cannot pay back the loans, and this prospect of losses
causes the banks to further jack up the interest rates. Credit becomes
dearer, liquidity in the system tightens, and this squeeze, combined
with the continuing need for funds, further intensifies the need to offload assets, specially the illiquid ones. The asset market is flooded with
sellers. A state of panic exists. The boom is fast turning into a slump.
The credit crunch
The credit crunch in the present crisis was characterized first and
foremost by the extreme reluctance of the banks to lend to each other,
and even overnight loans disappeared. This reluctance was arguably
owed to the likelihood that the banks simply did not trust each other’s
valuation of assets as the crisis unfolded.30 They did not trust one
another’s valuations because the assets in question were the CDOs and
products derived from the CDOs. The credibility of these assets, (which
caught the label toxic), suffered on two counts. Firstly, these assets were
derived from “sub-prime” mortgages in whole or part, and in the light
of day “sub-prime” loans were finally recognised for what they always
were: loans advanced to a punter (often with no income or assets or a
job) gambling on a continuing increase in the price of the house (the
underlying collateral).
And, secondly, CDOs were bought and sold by banks, not individuals.
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The prices at which these transactions occurred were kept private, known
only to the transacting parties. The assets were never publicly traded and
their prices were not a public fact.31 It was therefore impossible to judge
whether the CDO transactions met some market criteria. Frequently, the
extent of SPV or SIV operations was also not disclosed by the investing
bank in its balance sheet.32 Hence, in a situation of a crisis when there
was no evident demand for CDOs, one could not realistically attribute a
market value to them. And if the assets of a bank were a mystery at best
and worthless at the other extreme, how could one lend money to such
an entity. Eventually, the fair value accounting or the mark to market
condition, a requirement with the consequence that a bank acknowledge
and therefore write off the implicit losses on the assets it owns, was
relaxed.33 Even though the continued application of this rule would show
the banks to be in a far worse situation than is now being reported, and
the crisis to be far more grave, the dangers of this relaxation are only
obvious and have been noted.34
The carry trade
There was at least one other factor deepening the crisis as it
unfolded. The ease of flow of capital and investments across national
borders that characterises the world increases the scope and range of any
developments in the markets, making them increasingly interlinked. Such
free flow of capital combines with instantaneous flow of information,
and enables the markets to respond to policy and other developments
almost immediately, arbitraging in the process between the differences
in applicable prices or regulations such as might obtain in different
countries. An “investor” capable of profiting from these differences is
always lurking on the scene.
In this context, one set of developments (that are quite apart from
the developments related to the asset bubble that originated with the
United States non-banking financial sector, but have added to the
gravity of what followed) is the “carry trade” issue. “Carry trade”
involves borrowing in a low interest currency regime and investing in
a high interest currency regime. In the present situation such traders
were borrowing in Japanese yen to invest in New Zealand, Iceland and
Hungary in particular. Investing borrowed money in a different currency
18
exposes the borrower-investor to foreign exchange risk, and the critical
assumption is that any exchange rate variation would not wipe out the
gains. The unexpected appreciation of the Japanese yen, chiefly reflecting
a flight to safety once the crisis set in, turned the tables on this trade,
and traders moved out of Hungary, Iceland and New Zealand currencies
very very fast so as to meet their yen liabilities and hence limit their
yen losses. Problems naturally ensued for Hungary, Iceland and New
Zealand banking systems (and consequentially economies), as capital
outflows accelerated. Even Iceland with its traditional remoteness from
the news made the front page repeatedly at one point.
Thus there were elements unrelated to the CDO and CDS
developments, particularly on the foreign exchange markets, that
furthered the sense of financial fragility and crisis, but these constituted
only a sideshow in the larger scenario.
Profits and bonuses
The combination of high leverage with low interest rates and lowered
perceptions of risk made possible the unusually high profits for the banks
as well as others in the financial sector. Profits were booked even when
the underlying assets could not be sold because there was no market for
them. This was done through applying mathematical formulas.35 These
formulas were fraught with unrealistic assumptions inherent to the EMH
world. But high profits attract negative attention, and one approach
adopted to lower the profile of these profits was to jack up costs. The
easiest of the costs to jack up were the salaries and bonuses; the share
of salaries and bonuses for the finance sector in the national economy
has shot up over the years.36 The profits, as has been widely reported,
reached new heights, and even after meeting these higher salary and
bonus costs, the profits in the finance sector significantly increased their
share in national income!37
Global imbalances
Background
“Global imbalances” is often mentioned as an answer to why
the banks were flooded with funds. But the label global imbalances
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Faizullah Khilji
covers a range of narratives, old as well as new, and the issue of global
imbalances may well be at the heart of the continuing problems with
the international monetary system, including the financial crises that we
see from time to time. The history here though is not the simple kind,
i.e., the kind that repeats itself in varying forms, or even the kind where
historians repeat each other. Indeed, part of the problem is that we do
not have enough history; and, even where we have history, perhaps it
has not been studied carefully enough.
There are two basic issues, and these have been with us at least
since the gold standard was abandoned. The first issue is that of the
nature of a world currency. Ideally a world currency should be a super
sovereign and stable unit, and not subject to vicissitudes of a national
economy and its policies. A stable super sovereign unit imposes a
certain monetary and fiscal discipline on national policies. The second
issue is a consequential one. Some economies save relatively more than
others whilst some other economies are not able or willing to save very
much. Yet others are more inclined to spend against future income, i.e.,
dis-save for the present and perhaps also dis-save for the foreseeable
time horizon. Given that the world economy is a closed system (i.e.,
expenditure by one country in excess of its income must be balanced
by savings of another country), those who save lend to those who dissave on a world scale, and these balances are reflected in trade and
capital flows. The existence of a super sovereign world currency would
impose a certain discipline on these balances. In the absence of such a
currency, the balances are held in dollars by default (and these balances
are variously described as “global imbalances”, “savings glut”, and in
an earlier era, the 1960s, as the “dollar glut”), and this aspect gives rise
to all the concerns that relate to United States economic policy as well
as behaviour.
Even as the Bretton Woods system was being contemplated, the
issue of policies that would impose adjustment on a country that was in
external surplus for long periods was on the table along with proposals
to counter such an eventuality (the scarce currency clause). The surplus
country at the time was the United States, which also then accounted
for half the world economy. The United States as the surplus country
20
was not willing to accept potential constraints on its monetary conduct,
and the rest of the world had neither the will nor the authority to include
such conditions in the IMF articles. Preparations for the Bretton Woods
conference also included discussion on a super sovereign international
currency unit defined in terms of a bundle of commodities, which could
in principle be used for reserves as well as to settle international balances,
i.e., the Bancor.38 But such a currency too would have constrained
national policy, and was not in keeping with the spirit of the times, being
inconvenient for the United States.
What finally emerged from the Bretton Woods deliberations was
the gold-dollar standard. Countries would peg their currencies to the
dollar, and the dollar would have a stable value in relation to gold. With
two-thirds of the world’s gold in the coffers of Fort Knox,39 the United
States undertook to convert dollars held in official accounts into gold
on demand. The dilemma in due course of time for countries holding
dollars was that if a demand was indeed made for gold, and a sufficient
supply of gold was not forthcoming from the United States, then the
dollar might well be devalued against gold.40 But a demand for gold
leading to a devaluation of the dollar would mean a loss in gold value
of reserves held in dollars, and could thus be counterproductive. In any
event “gentlemen” were clearly not expected to make such demands for
converting their official dollars into gold.41
Alas, the concept of a gentleman made little sense in a republic
founded on the creed: Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. President Johnson’s
preference for financing the Vietnam war through printing dollars rather
than raising taxes or curtailing expenditure brought matters to a head with
France.42 President Charles de Gaulle, advised by Jacques Rueff, saw the
dollar-gold system as a sort of expropriation of his country’s business
firms and as exposing him to the charge of financing the United States
war in Vietnam, financing United States assistance to Chiang Kai-Shek,
financing the ill fated US intervention in the Dominican Republic, etc.43
Thus there were picturesque moments in 1971 when a French battleship
lifted anchor off New York with gold from Fort Knox in exchange for
the paper dollars in its hold. The French demand to exchange what they
saw as paper IOUs for gold had indeed been honoured by the United
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States.44 But in the wake of this battleship, the world witnessed a turning
point in the international monetary system: President Nixon announced
the de-linking of the dollar from its gold peg, the world went on to a
new paper dollar international monetary regime, and the United States
entered an era of continuing external deficits and mounting accumulation
of dollars overseas. “Global imbalances” had arrived, but in a time when
the United States Treasury Secretary John Connolly could still credibly
say to the Europeans who were holding the dollars: the dollar is our
currency but your problem.45
The situation now
Today it is no longer just the Europeans who are holding the dollars.
A number of countries have been following export-led growth policies.
This is not a particularly novel development, and such policies are
frequently attributed to successful East Asian economies, beginning
with Japan, then Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and more
recently to China among others. In addition, Germany too continues
to be the major net exporter. As a result of such export orientation of
the economies, receipts for exports well exceed payments for imports,
leading to surplus in the balance of payments. Equally, exporters of
natural resources, chiefly oil, also generate trade and balance of payments
surpluses.
These balance of payments surpluses, in turn, add to reserves, and a
substantial build up of reserves thus comes about over a period of time.46
These piles of reserves do not yield any income unless invested. One
relatively secure investment is the United States government debt, also
referred to as United States Treasury Bonds. Purchase of these bonds
raises the price of these bonds, and hence lowers the interest rate in
the United States economy. These purchases of United States Treasury
Bonds by the surplus economies thus inject additional liquidity into the
United States economy. It is in this manner that the overseas trade and
balance of payments surpluses facilitate credit in the United States, and
as the influx of funds lowers the rate of interest, it is argued that credit
at low rates of interest is facilitated. The argument though short circuits
logic at this point and attributes the surfeit of lending by the bank to
these deposits. It is a strange argument: just because money has been
deposited in a bank, it is not reason enough for the banks to lend it
22
out to borrowers with no jobs, no incomes, and no assets! The bank is
expected to hold the deposits in trust.
Thus a good part of what the United States pays for its imports is
voluntarily handed back to the United States as a loan at relatively low
rates of interest, making it possible for the United States to acquire yet
more goods and services with the same funds. One might surmise that
the United States would not be unhappy with living beyond its means
in this manner, and therefore has little reason to tinker around with
an international monetary system that works so well to its advantage.
Indeed, the fact that this phenomenon has endured for so long is some
testimony to the likelihood that these arrangements must suit all involved
politically, if not in terms of finance and economics. In his time Jacques
Rueff had summed up the “system” and its advantages quite admirably
in simple prose that is difficult to match in its brevity and effect.47 A
positive adjustment out of this for the United States would be one of
high and sustained growth that increasingly diminishes the debt and
creates confidence in the economic performance of the United States. In
such an eventuality, the dollar may quite naturally acquire even greater
authority as a world currency.
But if the United States were to continue on the present path, the
question whether a country could go on borrowing year after year and
pile up debt with no suggestion as to how these sums are to be eventually
settled would be pursued with increasing vigour, and, also, as the share
of the United States in the world economy shrinks, with increasing
relevance. It is important to remember that this is no longer simply a
matter of getting the arithmetic right. These imbalances represent deeply
ingrained lifestyles. Forcing a change of lifestyle towards a lot more
frugality has political consequences as well as implications for trade
policy and openness. Given the size of the United States economy, its
engagements with respect to a global socio-economic agenda as well as
a global security agenda imply that the world would be greatly affected
by any developments involving curtailment of expenditure in the United
States. Indeed, the big question is whether the required discipline can be
imposed; can it be done at all. Jacques Rueff’s answer was a definite no;
not in a democracy.48
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Nonetheless there is a view shared by informed and reputed
academics in the United States that a change in the role of the dollar to
a more modest stance is essentially an adjustment of asset portfolios in
financial markets,49 and, indeed, if it were to decline as an international
currency it may follow the path of sterling, and similarly settle down to
a more affordable existence.50 This view increasingly looks simplistic
and questionable.
The “recovery”
With economics in disrepute,51 more so the prevalent “efficient
market hypothesis” version of economics, it would be a brave
economist indeed who would try and predict what comes next for the
world economy. What we do know is that the some major economies,
particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, now face a gross
mismatch between debts incurred to purchase assets, and the cash flows
generated by these assets to service the debts. The business firms and the
households therefore need to reduce their respective debt to bring it more
nearly in line with their respective ability to meet interest payments. The
debt, it would seem, may only be brought down through frugality and
higher savings: a policy of inflation, an option for lowering the real debt
burden, if pursued, may help reduce its real value only up to a point,
before debasing the currency altogether and hence landing the economy
in a different ballpark of problems. Any frugality by households also does
not spell well for the business sector that produces goods and services,
and hence for the economy and employment. In addition, banks would
be cautious in lending until they have rebuilt their capital base, and this
too would take time. This configuration appears to be the reality that
may of necessity have to be faced; and efforts at changing sentiment by
“talking up the economy” may not be sufficient to undo this reality, no
matter how authoritative and credible the speakers.
How long might such an adjustment of debt reduction take: the
answer is that one does not really know any where near enough about
the behaviour of economies through time to predict with confidence.
Economic change does not occur in isolation, there are invariably political
and social consequences. And when change involves a potentially
24
downward adjustment in an economy the size of United States, there are
surely implications for the working of international economic relations
as well.
Comparison with Japan’s lost decade
One previous situation of an economy finding its way out of a real
estate bubble is that of Japan in the 1990s. Japan’s bursting of the real
estate bubble and collapse of its property market was followed by long
years of stagnation, commonly referred to as Japan’s “lost decade”;
many years were taken up with “repairing the balance sheets”, i.e.,
deleveraging or reduction of debt. In this respect Paul Krugman has
made a comparison of United States now with Japan then. Krugman’s
comparison shows leveraging up to the bubble (the borrowing frenzy) in
the case of the Japanese and American economies, and he also displays
the trajectory of deleveraging, i.e., adjusting the level of debt, that
followed in the Japanese case.52 The chart below illustrates.
Source: Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics Part 2: The eschatology of lost
decades, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lecture, London School of Economics, June 9, 2009.
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In considering the comparison charted by Krugman, it needs to
be borne in mind that the financial system that suffered the present
crisis is arguably more complex than the Japanese one of the nineties,
and the United States trajectory of leveraging up too is indeed some
what different, showing a concave profile. The chart shows that the
Japanese build up of leveraging was convex in shape, and the Japanese
deleveraging process seems to have mirrored in time scale the pace
of its leveraging process. It would not be wise to hazard a guess on
how long United States might take to deleverage, American social and
cultural practices differ appreciably from those of the Japanese, but the
unspoken implication behind Krugman’s comparison is that the crisis
will only be behind us once the deleveraging has taken place; the logic
of this proposition is difficult to fault. Any comparison with Japan has at
least one other important limitation though: the Yen was not the world’s
currency; the dollar is! And this latter fact has deep implications for
international economic relations.
Comparison with the great depression
Another historical situation with which the present crisis is frequently
compared is that of the great depression, chiefly 1930s. Eichengreen
and O’Rourke have made a comparison of the movement of a range of
economic indicators in the present crisis with the great depression.53 The
charts below show how industrial output and trade volume compare for
the two periods, i.e., the great depression and now.
Source: Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H O’Rourke, A tale of two depressions, June 4, 2009,
at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3241.
Consider first the world industrial output. Thus far this indicator
seems to be following the great depression trajectory rather faithfully,
26
as the chart shows. One important qualification to be considered is that
industry accounted for a substantially larger share of the economy at
the time of the great depression than it does today. Hence movements in
an indicator on industrial output may have less relevance to the overall
state of the current world economy, and this fact might arguably reduce
the relevance of the indicator as a predictor of how long the crisis might
last. Equally, the question may be asked as to why a services indicator
might follow a different trajectory. There is no clear answer.
Consider next the volume of world trade. As is clear from the chart,
world trade volumes have plummeted much more sharply now than
was the case at the corresponding stage in the great depression.54 This
is an extremely disturbing development; one would expect a negative
feedback loop from this fall in trade volumes to output of goods and
services. It is worth recalling that in the 1930s, protectionism was on the
rise and contributed to deepen and prolong the depression.
Eichengreen and O’Rourke also review the policy response in the
two situations, i.e., the present crisis and the great depression. Here the
developments differ significantly between the two episodes as the charts
below illustrate in respect of interest rates and fiscal deficits.
World
budget
surpluses
Source: Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H O’Rourke, A tale of two depressions, June 4, 2009,
at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3241.
In the case of interest rates we find that the present crisis started at a
much lower level of rates, and there has been a sharper reduction since
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Faizullah Khilji
then. With interest rates well below 1 per cent, there is little scope left
for further easing now as there is not much further to go! Equally, the
fiscal deficit has been building up much faster in the present case. The
fiscal action too has been quicker and much larger.
There is a sense of alarm arising from the sharp decline in trade
volumes, as shown in the illustration above, and proposals have been
made to relax some of the trading rules so as to facilitate trade flows as
well as to use moral suasion to deter any overt or covert protectionist
measures.55 Again one cannot be overly optimistic on this count; trade
negotiations tend to be extremely contentious and drawn out even at the
best of times, and actual developments are not encouraging. In course
of the current crisis, the area of trade relations seems to have suffered
policy neglect at best and stirrings of protectionist sentiments if not
implementation of actual measures at the other end of the scale (support
to auto and finance sectors undertaken recently in a number of economies
may be recalled, as may the recent safeguard measures taken by the
United States against the import of Chinese tyres). Trade environment
could well suffer if the high levels of unemployment continue for some
time.
Given the nature of the processes leading up to the current crisis,
the Eichengreen and O’Rourke graphical comparison with the great
depression does not hold out much hope of an early sustained recovery
either; the considerable macroeconomic easing notwithstanding.
Looking at the underlying factors at work, it is not difficult to see
why the trends may continue downwards for a while before reversing
direction. We may recall that consumers are indeed saddled with debts
and a good number are without jobs and incomes. Businesses too have
accumulated debt and need to repay. Business may be reluctant to invest
until the finances have been sorted out. To repeat, banks too need to
rebuild the capital base, and are cautious in making new loans in an
uncertain environment.
Some other considerations in a recovery
An important consideration, which may weigh increasingly with
time, is the impact on any recovery of the present policies of monetary
28
expansion and fiscal stimulus in the drive to overcome the crisis. The
major economies are awash with money as a result of monetary policies
to combat the crisis, and sooner or later this will fuel demand but it
would also likely engender inflation. The fiscal burdens, that are a
consequence of stimulus packages and are also to be settled in the future,
are unprecedented, and imply hefty taxation in the years to come. Hence
there may be tight macroeconomic policies on the extended horizon.56
If the events take this likely turn towards strong contractionary policies
to counter inflation and to achieve fiscal balance, there would be plenty
of scope in the ensuing political milieu of hardship for developing a
case for protectionism. And it may be difficult to counter this because
an organised anti-protectionist lobby, quite unlike the finance sector,57 is
simply non-existent outside the ranks of academics.
Another aspect of the stimulus packages is whether the “green
shoots” would remain green when the existing measures come to an
end, or whether new stimulus packages would be necessary. There is no
clarity on this point, and it would take considerable political courage to
make an informed statement.
It follows if an economy was not highly leveraged then it should not
have suffered the financial crisis to the same extent that the United States
and the United Kingdom did. This provides one important explanation
why the financial sectors in the Asian economies have fared better thus
far, and may be expected to survive the global downturn much better.
But a slowdown in the United States impacts Asian economies through
two obvious channels. Firstly, the slowdown in the United States, on
account of the financial crisis, chokes demand for Asian exports, and
thus far Asian exports, along with the rest of world’s exports, have
indeed suffered (as noted above). These negative effects may be offset or
at least minimized with some foresight, and one approach towards that
objective could be for Asia to further increase intra-regional commerce
as well as domestic demand. China’s reflationary package aims at the
latter aspect, as do similar albeit more modest measures by other East
Asian countries. The second channel through which the crisis affects
Asia is investment by Asians of their savings in “toxic” assets in the US
financial system.58
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The East Asian response
And it is indeed the East Asian59 context of international economic
relations that offers a particularly interesting study. It is important for
East Asia that output growth and employment in the region and its
rapidly expanding intra-regional and international trade not be hostage
to speculators or any lack of visible capability on the part of East Asia
to respond to speculation as required. Views as well as institutional
arrangements have been evolving for some time in East Asia on how
best to cope with the instability arising from speculative capital flows, as
well as with the quandary of global imbalances and consequent reliance
on the dollar as a world currency.
The East Asian riposte to the Asian crisis of 1998
With the benefit of hindsight, it would seem that the experience
with the financial crisis of 1998 deeply influenced East Asian thinking
on the existing international monetary arrangements, and added a sense
of urgency to its concerns. The East Asians saw the crisis as an outcome
of the failure of the international monetary system (centred on the IMF)
to check investors and currency speculators profiteering at the expense
of public welfare. By contrast, the IMF saw the Asian crisis as gross
mismanagement on the part of Asian governments, and there were
widespread references in the media to the event being an outcome of
long standing policies of “crony capitalism”. In the event wrenching
contractionary policies were applied, on the insistence of the IMF, as a
condition of the latter’s support. Having developed some understanding
through the disruptive experience over 1998-2000 of how the international
monetary arrangements really worked out for those in trouble, the East
Asian then seem to have proceeded in a quiet and determined manner
to develop regional mechanisms (in addition to national measures) that
would help defend their economies and societies from the impact of
currency speculators, and also avoid what they perceived as unjustified
public humiliation of the governments and peoples, and unnecessary
disruption of their economies in the future. Two regional measures in
particular need mentioning.
The first of these developments was the Chiang Mai currency swap
arrangements. These arrangements facilitate drawing upon another’s
30
foreign exchange resources in the event of a foreign exchange crisis, and
were put in place in 2000; subsequently the size of the potential facility
was expanded.60 The creation of these swap arrangements for a good
part also expressed the view that the IMF could not be reliably counted
upon to either correctly diagnose the problem or to provide really useful
and timely relief. The Asian crisis had shown that damage would be
done by the time IMF came around to help, and because the IMF might
diagnose the developments differently (“crony capitalism” rather than
speculation) such help would likely be accompanied with conditions
that might worsen the prospects of output and income growth for some
time, apart from imposing unnecessary humiliation on the nation.
One important feature of these Chiang Mai arrangements was that
agreement had been reached without any protracted negotiations, or
without numerous well publicised ministerials, etc., as is generally the
case.
The second development of note was the build up of reserves by
the East Asian economies, almost in concert; this arguably is again
work to develop self-help capability, being the only kind of help one
can count on, in case of a financial crisis. Thus, in the event of need,
these economies would not go hat in hand to the IMF for assistance,
and be obligated to follow policies, counterproductive in the East Asian
reading, that are a condition of any IMF support.
Wittingly or otherwise, in instituting these policies of regional
currency swaps and large reserves, the East Asians have reduced much
the applicability and relevance of the international monetary system
centered on the IMF to East Asian economies! The East Asians have
effectively put in place a substitute informal regional monetary system
of their own for some limited purposes. This though was not the intent of
the IMF efforts in 1998, and the IMF, it seems, had misjudged both the
seriousness of the mood and the effectiveness of capabilities with regard
to the East Asians. IMF thus overplayed its hand this one time too often,
and now finds itself without its traditional role in East Asia! This view
of developments is lent some credence by the discussion amongst East
Asian central bankers.61
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The East Asian response to the current crisis
Thus with the deterrent of large reserves and the regional swap
arrangements in place, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 passed Asia
by,62 except for the worrying thought that their reserves were for a large
part composed of dollar related securities, albeit chiefly government
debt; and that it was the United States and hence the dollar that was
in the eye of the storm. In this environment the East Asians voiced
two related concerns, albeit in a moderate tone. The first concern was
security and safety of dollar denominated assets.63 The second concern
was the need for stable international monetary arrangements that would
be independent of the vicissitudes of political and economic cycles
such as may characterise any world currency that is primarily a national
currency. Such an approach would also provide a neutral means to help
equilibrate any global imbalances. In itself the issue was not a novel one,
having been brought to prominence as noted earlier, by Robert Triffin
in the 1960s. This issue resurfaced publicly in the East Asian context in
2009.64
A reflective piece by Zhou Xiaochuan appeared in China Daily.65
The argument was broadly as follows. The existing system of using the
dollar, a national currency, presents problems; even though the “crisis
may not necessarily be an intended result of the issuing authorities, it is
an inevitable outcome of the institutional flaws” noted the article, and
went on to make the point that, in any event the “acceptance of creditbased national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is
the case in the current system, is a rare special case in history”.66
The problem with the use of a national currency is the existence of
the well known “Triffin Dilemma67, i.e., the issuing countries of reserve
currencies cannot maintain the value of the reserve currencies while
providing liquidity to the world”. Therefore the issuing country “may
either fail to adequately meet the demand of a growing global economy
for liquidity as ..(it tries).. to ease inflation pressures at home, or create
excess liquidity in the global markets by overly stimulating domestic
demand.” And the “frequency and increasing intensity of financial crises
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system suggests the costs of
such a system to the world may have exceeded its benefits”. What was
32
being said was that in the East Asian perception it was the inadequacy of
the existing international monetary arrangements centred on the dollar
that were leading to creation of excess liquidity and hence contributing
to the occurrence of financial crises; the excessive quantities of dollars
in the world economy were causing problems. The Zhou Xiaochuan
article pointed out that the need is for a “super-sovereign” international
reserve currency that “not only eliminates the inherent risks of creditbased sovereign currency, but also makes it possible to manage global
liquidity”. Such a reserve currency “managed by a global institution
could be used to both create and control the global liquidity”. Arguably,
a world monetary authority is being proposed, and this authority and
the global currency it issues would naturally impose a discipline on
national currencies. And when a country’s currency is no longer used as
the yardstick for global trade and as the benchmark for other currencies,
the exchange rate policy of the country would be far more effective in
adjusting economic imbalances. This will “significantly reduce the risks
of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability.” The East
Asians seemed to be recalling Rueff’s concerns as well as the Triffin
plans of 1960s!
The proposal by Zhou Xiaochuan goes on to advocate short run
and long run measures to address the reserve currency question. “In
the short run, the international community, particularly the IMF, should
at least recognize and face up to the risks resulting from the existing
system, conduct regular monitoring and assessment and issue timely
early warnings.” In the present circumstances, one can surmise that in
the article it is the United States economy that the IMF is being asked to
monitor and issue early warnings about, and that the suggestion is that
IMF should proceed to do so immediately.68 The proposal then says that
“special consideration should be given to giving the SDR a greater role”
and for this purpose SDR allocations be increased. And such measures
could also “lay a foundation for increasing SDR allocation to gradually
replace existing reserve currencies with the SDR”.
In the long run, the proposal suggests, the best course would be
to create an international reserve currency. The example of Keynes’s
Bancor is recalled.69 The proposal recognizes that any scheme that aims
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Faizullah Khilji
to create “an international currency unit, based on the Keynes’s ideas, is
a bold initiative that requires extraordinary political vision and courage”.
Then there is the three-fold criteria to be met by any international
reserve currency and this is laid out in the proposal: the international
reserve currency should firstly be anchored to a stable benchmark and
issued according to a clear set of rules in order to ensure orderly supply;
second, its supply should be flexible enough to allow timely adjustment
according to the changing demand; third, such adjustments should be
disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of any
single country. There is also mention of using SDR in the long run, but
one may infer that the character of the SDR would change significantly
if it were to resemble Keynes’s Bancor, and meet the three-fold criteria.
This aspect of matter is not spelt out in any detail in the proposal.
Whether the East Asians were seeking support for a change in the
existing international monetary arrangements, or just seriously airing
an idea, this scheme for an international reserve currency has found
some support outside Asia as well; in particular Brazil as well as Russia
have responded positively.70 The United States response was initially
to consider the proposal, but no sooner had Secretary Geithner uttered
these words that the markets saw the dollar plummeting, and plummeting
very, very fast. Within fifteen minutes of the announcement, no more,
Geithner “corrected” the “misunderstanding” created by his remarks.71
Governor Bernanke followed up to further set the record straight, and
then President Obama himself spoke to remove any remaining doubts
about the dollar’s future. The Chinese officials too confirmed that the
intent was not to undermine the dollar. And, finally, Richard Cooper, the
Keynesian éminence grise of international monetary affairs, wrote up
a brief to say that dollar would continue in its present role for years.72
Thus calm has returned for now.
Aspects of this East Asian currency proposal have been explored
by Fred Bergsten.73 Bergsten suggests the creation of an open-ended
SDR-denominated fund at the IMF into which dollar balances could be
exchanged for SDRs, instead of converting unwanted dollars through
the market.74 There is also awareness now in the United States for
“a large increase in China’s voting rights at the IMF, where Europe
34
is so heavily over-represented”, and the need “for China and the US
to develop the informal ‘G2’ partnership… needed to provide global
economic leadership”.75 Whilst American scholarship on China is no
doubt first rate, and those at the Peterson Institute are behind none, yet
the Bergsten proposal seems to interpret China as a different kind of
United States, and, for this reason, seems to be off the mark. For the
foreseeable future at least, the East Asians are seeking nothing more
than measures to defend their economies from the uncertainties of the
world economy; to this end they feel the discipline of an international
currency should be created and applied. And they feel that they have
the capability to live and work within the discipline of an international
currency. The East Asians certainly do not appear to be seeking to run
the world or pursue global agendas.76 Furthermore, the Bergsten idea of
using SDRs and a SDR based fund fall short of the three-fold criteria
specified in the East Asian proposal: the dollar/sterling combination on
which the SDR is inter alia based does not perhaps amount to being
“anchored to a stable benchmark”, and it also does not offer a unit that
is “disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of
any single country”.
Whilst the East Asian idea of an international currency germinates,
at an immediate policy level three recent measures taken in East Asia
seem to be aimed at reducing the recourse to dollar as an international
currency.
The first development is the East Asian effort to use currencies other
than the dollar in international transactions. China, the largest trader in
East Asia, is reportedly discussing a number of agreements to conduct
bilateral trade in the currencies of the countries involved,77 and, once in
place, such arrangements may help to insulate some of the trade flows
from the effects of fluctuations in the value of the dollar.
Secondly, China has also authorized some of its corporations to
conduct their trade in Renminbi. The latter measure is said to aim at
providing stability for local exporters buffeted by the dollar’s fluctuating
value.78
35
Faizullah Khilji
It needs mentioning here that the significance of using a particular
currency in actual trade has to be seen in context of China’s large
external trade and the importance of China’s trade in the East Asia
region. There are two aspects to this. First is the remarkable fact that
even in the absence of formally binding agreements, the intraregional
trade for the five economies of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, two
Koreas, and Taiwan Province) now accounts for 52 percent of the total
trade of these economies. This integration has been achieved in a natural
fashion, without formal agreements a la the EU to force integration and
harmonization. By comparison, the EU intra-trade is 60 percent of the
total EU trade, and it took the EU countries protracted negotiations
leading to formal agreements, besides a period of over fifty years, to
get to this 60 per cent statistic. The intra-trade volume is both large and
seems to be growing in an organic manner. Second, in this intraregional
trade, China is a net importer from most of the trading partners in the
East Asian region, and regional exports to China have expanded at
record rates over the past 20 years. In this manner China’s situation with
regard to bilateral trade balances in East Asia may be somewhat akin to
that of Germany in EU.
The third development, that may be read as lessening the importance
of the dollar, is the use to which official reserves are being put. China
appears to be articulating a position that has been fairly common
historically, i.e., substituting real assets for financial assets through
the export of capital as direct foreign investment. Premier Wen JiaBao is reported to have said recently that China should hasten the
implementation of its ‘going out’ strategy and combine the utilisation of
foreign exchange reserves with the ‘going out’ of its enterprises.79 ‘Going
out’ refers to China’s direct foreign investment policy, and includes
efforts of the larger state-owned industrial groups such as Petro China,
Chinalco, and China Telecom. This policy appears to aim at “reserve
diversification in a broader sense”.80 In this manner more of overseas
long-term corporate real assets substitute for dollar foreign exchange
reserves. To a considerably lesser extent India and other Asian surplus
countries too seem to be pursuing similar policies.
36
It is a reasonable and prudent inference that the East Asians take
this crisis at least as seriously as the Asian crisis of 1998, and wish to
develop capacity to meet any recurrence of another event such as the
2007-2008 crisis. And given that the response in the case of the Asian
crisis of 1998 was to solve the problem, there is every reason to believe
that international reserve currency issue would be pursued further to
some logical and practical conclusions. Given the determination and
persistence, which have been evident characteristics of the East Asians
thus far, some solution that meets the regional East Asian requirements
would be found, even though it may be short of the Bancor concept and
its usefulness may largely lie in East Asia.81 If the lesson that East Asia
drew from the Asian crisis was to build up reserves and put in place
currency swap arrangements, then the lesson it is drawing from the
present crisis is to gradually lower its exposure in terms of the dollar.82
This may also be interpreted as a pragmatic and evolutionary approach to
further lessening the region’s dependence on the international monetary
system centred on the IMF.
The fact that the Asian economies faced the present crisis fairly
confidently may partly, if not wholly, be owed to the credibility that
the reserves and swap arrangements offered. Taken together, the
recent moves in East Asia, from which the United States as well as the
EU appear to be absent, aim to reduce the role of traditional reserve
currencies, for China as well as its trading partners, and lend something
of a new significance to the Renminbi in the region. These arrangements
also further reduce the potential need for recourse to the IMF and its
facilities, should there be another crisis. Change is afoot, even though
the shape of things to come is far from clear.
References:
1
S M Naseem first raised the idea of writing on the theme of the financial crisis and
reviewed draft versions, making pertinent comments on each occasion on how it might
be improved. Apart from making relevant and useful suggestions to sharpen the text and
improve the content, Wei Liang also very generously undertook the painstaking task
of reviewing some of the citations. Stephen Browne, Khalil Hamdani, Gary Hufbauer,
Nasir Khilji, Taimur Khilji, Changlin Ma, Hafiz Pasha, Eric Rahim and Yang Guotao, all
provided helpful suggestions on the draft version. The author is deeply indebted to all of
the above, but remains solely responsible for the opinions and views expressed.
37
Faizullah Khilji
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
38
Andre Malraux, account of a conversation with Mao Zedong in Beijing, in Antimemoires,
Paris 1967, translated by Terence Kilmartin, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1968), p. 395.
Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, Basel 29 June 2009, p. 3.
Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, Basel 29 June 2009, p. 15.
And, Professor Garicano is reported to have replied that “at every stage, someone was
relying on somebody else and everyone thought they were doing the right thing.” See
Alan Beattie, Good question, Ma’am Financial Times, November 14 2008.
Alan Greenspan writes “Markets have become too huge, complex, and fast moving
to be subject to twentieth century regulation. No wonder this globalized financial
behemoth stretches beyond the full comprehension of even the most sophisticated market
participants…Only belatedly did I, and I suspect many of my colleagues, come to realize
that the power to regulate administratively was fading…Since markets have become too
complex for effective human intervention, the most promising anticrisis policies are those
that maintain maximum market flexibility – freedom of action for key participants.” See
Alan Greenspan, The age of turbulence (New York, Penguin, 2007), p. 489.
Curiously, the belief about the incomprehensible complexity of the financial system
is shared by others in authority, even though the social usefulness of such complexity
is not subjected to any searching or critical examination. Thus we have the Bank for
International Settlements annual report saying the following: “ The modern financial
system is immensely complex – possibly too complex for any one person to really
understand it. Interconnections create systemic risks that are extraordinarily difficult to
figure out.” See Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, Basel 29 June
2009, p. 4.
See Martin Wolf, Unfettered finance is fast reshaping the global economy, and Risks
and rewards of today’s unshackled finance, Financial Times, June 18 and 27, 2007,
respectively.
Tables summarizing the chronology may be seen in Bank for International Settlements,
79th Annual Report, Basel 29 June 2009, and 78th Annual Report, Basel 30 June 2008,
pages 15 and 18-19, and 95-96 respectively.
Joe Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Stephen Labaton, The reckoning: White House
philosophy stoked mortgage bonfire, The New York Times, December 20, 2008. This
news report carries a telling photograph of President George W Bush looking pleased
as he speaks with a banner behind him carrying the evocative text “A Home of Your
Own”.
Niall Ferguson notes that the last run on a bank in Britain was in 1866. See Niall Ferguson,
The ascent of money, (New York, Penguin, 2008), p. 336.
The building still stands in good shape.
One wit on a television newscast saw it as “Chinese socialism with American
characteristics”.
The “permitted” collapse of Lehman Brothers presents something of a “mystery”. No other
institution of this size was allowed to collapse, even though some of these institutions
such as AIG may have been in even worse shape. One view is that Mr Fuld of Lehman
Brothers “did not help matters by riling Hank Paulson, the former boss of Goldman Sachs
turned treasury secretary, at a private dinner in early 2008” (see Lehman Brothers and
the crisis: A year on, in The Economist, September 10, 2009). Another view, attributed to
Kenneth Rogoff is that “the standard playbook is to let the fourth or fifth largest bank go
under and you save everybody else”, without offering any credible reasoning for a such
a “playbook” rule, or, indeed, why Lehman Brothers was chosen (see Economic focus:
What if??, in The Economist, September 10, 2009).
14 As cited in Andrew Gamble, The spectre at the feast, (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2009), p.
33.
15 With the benefit of hindsight, regulation, or rather inappropriate regulation, did not work
in public interest.
Firstly, the Glass Steagall Act was repealed in 1999 to permit deposit-taking institutions
to conduct investment business. This brought the banks in a big way into this - CDO
package, slice and dice, CDS, spread the risk - business, without an appropriate regulating
framework. Whilst this state of affairs is often referred to as “too complex”, etc., for
the human mind, no credible reasoning is forthcoming as to why this complexity was
permitted to build up by the regulator, or as to its social usefulness.
Secondly, leverage built up very fast. One reason was that the regulator accepted the
transfer of the risk that attaches to a loan (via CDS) and the consequent idea that such
transfer meant that the bank could “re-use” the capital earlier tied up with the loan; the
regulator also accepted that some of these activities (which, to remind, involved funds
held in public trust by the banks) could be carried on outside the reporting framework,
i.e., off balance sheet. This led directly to the high leverage ratios for the banks, and the
missing piece here is the need for clarity on the prudent capital ratio for the bank and the
need to bring “off balance sheet” activity on to the balance sheet. There is nothing here
that can really be labeled as too difficult or complex to be understood.
Thirdly, conflict of interest situations were “over-looked”: the remuneration of the
mortgage broker who helped arrange the loan was directly dependent on the volume
of lending furthered by that broker, and that a good quantum of loans was being made
to persons without income or jobs or assets was glossed over (one cannot conceive of
any “complex mathematics too difficult to understand” that would make such loans safe
- in such cases at least it is more likely that the “complex mathematics too difficult to
understand” may have only helped conceal the poor nature of lending); and, the credit
rating agency was paid by the party whose risk was being assessed, hence raising an
obvious conflict of interest.
Fourth, there are factors that engender herd behaviour. The ratings industry is dominated
by a couple of firms. Their assessments, i.e., ratings, are highly correlated, causing
investors and speculators to act in unison, and thus generate a procyclical movement
causing euphoria or pessimism as the case may be. Another aspect that creates herd
movement is that the models used by different financial institutions to assess risks and
to guide buy and sell decisions, tend to be homogeneous, giving broadly similar results.
This is probably owed to the fact that modeling work is generally outsourced and there
are only a few firms that provide this service: if a firm is modeling for half a dozen banks,
the models it produces would likely give similar directional results in a given situation.
This factor thus leads to a number of different institutions buying the same asset at a
given time (and vice versa), quite unlike the concept of a market, which has optimists
and pessimists in relation to any given situation. (See Zhou Xiaochuan, Changing procyclicality for financial and economic stability, People’s Bank of China website: http://
www.pbc.gov.cn/english/hanglingdaojianghua.)
Fifth, and most importantly, the Fed believed that asset bubbles were not on its watch.
The only development the Fed needed to monitor, as a part of its function, was the price
level, more specifically the consumer price index. In the event, the Fed provided a big
push to the whole process by following an easy monetary policy for extended periods,
boosting the demand for financial and other assets in the process, and hence contributed
39
Faizullah Khilji
to the bubble.
16 See Financial economics, Efficiency and beyond, in The Economist, July 16, 2009.
Robert Lucas in a subsequent article in The Economist offered a more nuanced definition
of EMH:
“One thing we are not going to have, now or ever, is a set of models that forecasts sudden
falls in the value of financial assets, like the declines that followed the failure of Lehman
Brothers in September. This is nothing new. It has been known for more than 40 years and
is one of the main implications of Eugene Fama’s “efficient-market hypothesis” (EMH),
which states that the price of a financial asset reflects all relevant, generally available
information. If an economist had a formula that could reliably forecast crises a week in
advance, say, then that formula would become part of generally available information and
prices would fall a week earlier. (The term “efficient” as used here means that individuals
use information in their own private interest. It has nothing to do with socially desirable
pricing; people often confuse the two.)”
See Economic focus: In defence of economics, guest article by Robert E Lucas, in The
Economist, August 6, 2009.
17 Alan Greenspan seems to have shared this conviction, as did Ben Bernanke. See
Alan Greenspan, The age of turbulence, cited above, and Ben Bernanke, The great
moderation, February 20, 2004, http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/
SPEECHES/2004/20040220/default.html
18 With prescience, Minsky had noted his reservations about the applicability of EMH-like
propositions of neoclassical economics in the following words: The major theorems of
the neoclassical synthesis are that a system of decentralized markets, where units are
motivated by self-interest, is capable of yielding a coherent result, and in some very
special cases, the result can be characterized as efficient. These main conclusions are true,
however, only if very strong assumptions are made. They have never been shown to hold
for an economy with privately owned capital assets and complex, ever evolving financial
institutions and practices. Indeed we live in an economy which is developing through
time, whereas the basic theorems on which the conservative critique of intervention rests
have been proven only for “models” which abstract from time. See Hyman P Minsky,
Inflation, recession and economic policy, (Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1982), p. xii.
19 This point is discussed at greater length later in the essay.
20 See discussion in Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, Basel 29 June
2009, as well in earlier issues of the annual report.
21 Alan Greenspan, as one important guardian of public interest, frequently affirmed that
Wall St had mastered risk, in contradiction to the assessments by George Soros and
Warren Buffett (two persons perhaps forced into thinking with greater clarity because
their own funds were on the line). Greenspan’s views seem at best to be unfounded
articles of faith combined with goodwill towards Wall St. “Not only have individual
financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but
also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient”, said Greenspan in 2004,
and his book “The age of turbulence” (cited earlier) is replete with expressions of similar
sentiments. There were others among the regulators though who were more aware and
alert and less caught up with the charms of Wall St bankers. One such reported case is of
Brooksley E Born who was heading the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. She
testified before Congress that unfettered, opaque trading in derivatives could “threaten
our regulated markets or, indeed, our economy without any federal agency knowing
about it”, and called for greater disclosure of trades in derivatives and reserves to cushion
40
22
23
24
25
26
against losses. These views drew fierce opposition from Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin
(the then Treasury Secretary), and Larry Summers (then Deputy Treasury Secretary).
Greenspan is reported to have told Born that she did not know what she was doing and
would cause a financial crisis, Rubin saw the move as threatening to the markets, and
Summers phoned her to chastise her. The two principals, Greenspan and Rubin, then
called on Congress on June 5, 1998, to prevent Born from taking any further action.
Congress obliged, and duly froze Born’s authority for six months, and, shortly thereafter,
she departed from the Commission. Evidently, Ms Born was not among those who are
born to be a Treasury Secretary or even a Treasury Secretary’s adviser. She did however
get the JFK Profiles in Courage award in 2009. See Peter S Goodman, Taking a hard
look at a Greenspan legacy, The New York Times, October 8, 2008. Also see http://www.
jfklibrary.org/JFK+Library+and+Museum/News+and+Press/2009+Profile+in+Courage
+Award+Recipients+Announced.html
An extreme ratio of 134:1 was reported for Bank of America in a talk in London by Niall
Ferguson on November 8 2008; the video link is: http://www.thersa.org/events/vision/
vision-videos/niall-ferguson. Also, Philip Augar gives the following data in this respect:
Goldman Sachs 24:1, Morgan Stanley 25:1, Lehman Brothers 32:1, Bear Stearns 33:1.
See Philip Augur, Chasing Alpha, (London, Bodley Head, 2009), p. 169.
For a fully reasoned statement of how a financial crisis develops, see Hyman P Minsky,
The financial-instability hypothesis: capitalist processes and the behavior of the economy,
in Charles P Kindleberger and Jean-Pierre Laffargue, editors, Financial crises: Theory,
history and policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 13-47. This volume
puts together the proceedings of a conference. The three well known and distinguished
discussants of Minsky’s paper at this conference rejected his hypothesis. The first, J
S Fleming, stated that he was “rejecting claims implicit in Minsky’s exposition”. The
second, Raymond W Goldsmith, did not believe that Minsky’s hypothesis “provides
an explanation of the financial development of a modern economy”. The third, Jacques
Melitz, said that some of Minsky’s arguments “evade me completely”, and then went on
to express his disagreement with bits that did not evade him completely.
Also see Hyman P Minsky, Inflation, recession and economic policy, Wheatsheaf,
Brighton, 1982, and Stabilizing an unstable economy, McGraw Hill, New York, 2008.
In relation to the current crisis, the bonuses of those who worked in the financial sector
and the banking industry were tied to profits. There was a clear incentive to show as high
a profit as possible and as soon as possible as this work force tends to be footloose. In
some cases this quest for high and quick profits also led to playing with the accounting
definitions and rules as well as taking on risks that ordinarily would not be seen as
prudent. Giving the labyrinthine nature of the transactions, it is not uncommon for the
higher management to be unaware of all the operations in the field.
See discussion in Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, Basel 29 June
2009
For example, Robert Solow has written that “By 2005 the country had clearly built
many more houses, maybe two or three million more, than it could afford to occupy and
finance”, and that “this housing boom was enhanced by riskier and more opaque financial
products that entangled a wider variety of highly leveraged financial institutions. The
word “bubble” is often misused; but there was a housing bubble. Rising house prices
induced many people to buy houses simply because they expected prices to rise; those
purchases drove prices still higher, and confirmed the expectation. Prices rose because
they had been rising.” See Robert M Solow, How to understand the disaster, New York
41
Faizullah Khilji
Review of Books, May 14, 2009.
27 See Alan Greenspan, The age of turbulence, cited earlier, and Ben Bernanke, The great
moderation, also cited earlier.
28 In the present crisis the Bernard Madoff case offers a good example of the Ponzi financier
on a grand scale. See for example discussion in Diana B Henriques, Madoff is sentenced
to 150 years for Ponzi scheme, New York Times, June 29, 2009.
29 This would be true of the major banks in the present episode. They had borrowed to the
hilt. See leverage ratios cited in footnote 22 above.
2009
31 This point has been discussed in a number of articles. Jeff Madrick writing in the New
York Review of Books says: “One problem was that the Fed did not have adequate
information about these markets because derivatives were not traded openly and the
latest CDOs, including mortgage-backed obligations, were mostly on the books of the
shadow banking system. It was a serious lapse of judgment, not to mention responsibility,
on the part of the Federal Reserve under Greenspan and the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Christopher Cox to fail to seek more comprehensive information far
earlier about the surge of lending.” See Jeff Madrick, How we were ruined and what we
can do, New York Review of Books, February 12, 2009. A more detailed discussion of
the relevance of public facts for functioning of financial markets may be seen in Donald
MacKenzie, End-of-the-World Trade, London Review of Books, May 8, 2008.
32 SPV and SIV are widely used acronyms for Special Purpose Vehicle and Structured
Investment Vehicle. These were names given to entities set up by the banks outside
the ambit of their balance sheets to transform loans and other receivables into CDOs.
The Bank for International Settlements notes as follows: “Beyond the problems with
incentives and risk measurement was the fact that financial institutions found it relatively
easy to move activities outside the regulatory perimeter. Inside the supervisors’ sphere
of influence, banks are required to hold capital in order to engage in risky activities.
While it may be hard to believe, the regulatory capital requirement did limit the build-up
of leverage on bank balance sheets. However lower leverage meant lower profitability,
so bank managers found ways to increase risk without increasing the capital they were
required to hold. That is the story of the structured investment vehicle.” See Bank for
International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, Basel 29 June 2009, p.10.
33 A striking perspective on the change of rule is offered by Benjamin M Friedman who
notes that “the Financial Accounting Standards Board—the independent organization
designated by the SEC to set accounting standards—acting at the strong urging of
Congress, recently changed its rules to allow banks more latitude to claim that assets
on their balance sheets are worth more than what anyone is willing to pay for them.
(Next time you apply for a loan, try mentioning FAS 157-4 and telling your banker that
you should be allowed to calculate your net worth with your house priced not at what
comparable houses are selling for now but at what you paid for it and what you hope
you’ll get for it if you hold on to it for some years. The banker will laugh, even while the
bank applies just such standards to its own balance sheet.)” See Benjamin M Friedman,
The failure of the economy & the economists, New York Review of Books, May 28,
2009.
34 See, Robert Kaplan, Robert Merton and Scott Richard, Disclose the fair value of complex
securities, Financial Times August 17 2009
42
2009, p. 8.
36 The finance industry’s share of US wages and salaries is reported to have increased
from 3 percent in the early 1950s to 7 percent in the current decade. See Benjamin M
Friedman, The failure of the economy & the economists, New York Review of Books,
May 28, 2009.
37 Benjamin M Friedman reports that the “share of the ‘finance’ sector in total corporate
profits rose from 10 percent on average from the 1950s through the 1980s, to 22 percent
in the 1990s, and an astonishing 34 percent in the first half of this decade.” See Benjamin
M Friedman, The failure of the economy & the economists, New York Review of Books,
May 28, 2009.
38 J M Keynes, Proposals for a currency union, December 15, 1941, in John Maynard
Keynes, The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, volume XXV, Activities 194044, Shaping the post-war world, The clearing union, (London, Macmillan, 1980), pp.6994.
39 Barry Eichengreen, Global imbalances and the lessons of Bretton Woods, (Cambridge,
MIT Press, 2007), p. 15.
40 Those with large holdings of dollars today are said to experience a similar fear: any
efforts to diversify out of dollars involves selling dollars and may cause a flight from the
dollar with the consequent fall in the value of their dollar assets.
41 Robert Triffin wrote: “Our old friend, Sir Roy Harrod, was the first to characterize these
moves, many years ago, as institutionalizing the inconvertibility of the reserve currencies
through gentlemen’s agreements.” See Robert Triffin, The international monetary system,
Yale University, Economic Growth Center, Center paper no 76, 1966, p. 4.
42 Robert Triffin, The paper exchange standard 1971-19??, in Paul A Volcker, et al,
International monetary cooperation: Essays in honor of Henry C Wallich, Essays in
international finance no 169, Princeton University, December 1987, p. 80.
43 See Robert Triffin, The international monetary system, Yale University, Economic
Growth Center, Center paper no 76, 1966, p.6.
44 Following the French, the British, notwithstanding their gentlemanly characteristics, too
sent out a battleship to obtain gold for dollars but Nixon’s announcement came through
before the exchange could materialise.
45 Some see this statement of the problem as quite valid in our time. See William Buiter, Our
currency and our problem, November 17, 2007 at http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/11/
our-currency-anhtml
46 Unlike the time when Connolly had firmly stated that the dollar was America’s currency
but the rest of the world’s problem, the large dollar balances currently outside the United
States are sometimes seen as conferring power on those who hold these balances. It is
also recognised that the holders cannot exercise their power without inflicting damage to
their own positions. In this context, Larry Summers introduced a new phrase and spoke
of the “balance of financial terror” as between the United States and those who have
the large dollar balances. See Lawrence H Summers, The US current account deficit
and the global economy, Per Jacobsson lecture 2004, (Washington DC, Per Jacobsson
Foundation, 2004). But concerns, which visualise East Asian governments as a kind of
currency speculator, are, as anyone observing these matters would judge, far from the
truth. Such scenarios are closer to plots of those odd Hollywood movies such as might
centre on evil foreigners with bent minds who are keen on damaging good honest America.
The inexplicable fact is that persons in authority sometimes do indulge in propagating a
“Hollywood scenario” of the evil other.
43
Faizullah Khilji
47 “It is when a key currency has a deficit in its balance of payments – that is to say, the
United States for example – it pays the creditor country dollars, which end up with its
central bank. But the dollars are of no use in Bonn, or in Tokyo, or in Paris. The very
same day they are re-lent to the New York money market, so that they may return to
their place of origin. Thus the debtor country does not lose what the creditor country has
gained. So the key-currency country never feels the effect of a deficit in its balance of
payments. And the main consequence is that there is no reason whatever for the deficit to
disappear, because it does not appear.
“Let me be more positive: if I had an agreement with my tailor that whatever money I
pay him he returns to me the very same day as a loan, I would have no objection at all to
ordering more suits from him.”
Jacques Rueff quoted in Fred Hirsh’s interview of Jacques Rueff in The Economist,
February 13, 1965, cited in Filippo Cesarano, Monetary theory and Bretton Woods, The
construction of an international monetary order, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2006), pp. 191-192. The text of the whole interview, also issued as a Princeton essay in
international finance (Jacques Rueff and Fred Hirsch, The Role and the Rule of Gold:
An Argument, Essays in International Finance 47, Princeton University, International
Finance Section 1965) may be seen at http://goldismoney.info/forums/showthread.
php?t=7281
48 “And they (the United States) have had for five years an enormous deficit in their balance
of payments. If they have not done by credit policy what the gold standard would have
done by automatically restricting purchasing power, it is proof that it is not possible. And
why is it not possible? I cannot imagine any parliamentary country with a democratic
regime in which you could do such a difficult thing.”
Jacques Rueff cited in Fred Hirsh’s interview of Jacques Rueff in The Economist,
February 13, 1965.
49 Paul R Krugman, Currencies and crises, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992), pp. 179-183.
50 Barry Eichengreen, Global imbalances and the lessons of Bretton Woods, (Cambridge,
MIT Press, 2007), pp. 123-148.
51 It is revealing that the discussion about the limited usefulness of the “efficient market
hypothesis” has reached newspapers, and that most of this discussion reflects negatively
on the economics that is taught and on the common sense of those who choose to believe
in the doctrine. See for example discussion in the Financial Times http://blogs.ft.com/
economistsforum/ and the newspaper articles cited there. See also the extensive discussion
in The Economist, July 16, 2009.
52 Also see Dick K Nanto, The global financial crisis: Lessons from the Japan’s lost decade
of 1990s, CRS report for Congress, Washington DC, May 2009.
53 Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H O’Rourke, A tale of two depressions, June 4, 2009, at
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3241.
54 One point of note is that in the great depression trajectory, for both the world industrial
output and trade volume indicators, shows momentary upward ticks in what was a
essentially a downward movement. The question whether these upward ticks qualified as
“green shoots” at the time does arise, and the answer we believe is that they did.
55 See for example discussion in Gary Hufbauer, Trade policy in a time of crisis: Suggestions
for the developing countries, lecture at the Geneva Institute of Graduate Studies, Geneva,
July 9, 2009, and Jeffrey J Schott, Trade and the global economic crisis: If it’s not part
of the solution, it’s part of the problem, Remarks presented at the APEC symposium,
“Addressing the economic crisis, preparing for recovery,” Singapore, July 17, 2009.
44
56 Richard Koo has put forth an argument that in a recession, that is marked by excessive
debt, private expenditure would not recover until the private debt comes down to more
manageable levels. And, public expenditure, Koo argues, must therefore continue to
substitute for any “shortfall” in private expenditure until the latter recovers. A policy
based on these ideas would naturally imply fiscal deficits for some time to come. The
obvious question then would be whether the economies suffering the downturn would
have the fiscal space. See Richard C Koo, The holy grail of macroeconomics, Lessons
from Japan’s great recession, (Singapore, Wiley, 2009), especially pp. 253-293.
57 To take some recent examples, Rubin and Paulson have worked in the major banks as
well as the government. Tony Blair has been affiliated with one of the banks since the end
of his tenure in the government.
58 Japan is reported to present a case where a large volume of savings had been invested in
“toxic” CDOs and CDSs. See Anton Brender and Florence Pisani, La crise de la finance
globalisee, Editions La Decouverte, Paris 2009 (translation by Francis Wells distributed
as Anton Brender and Florence Pisani, Globalised finance and its collapse, Brussels,
Dexia, 2009)
59 The term East Asia is used here in a broad sense to connote China, the Asean economies,
Taiwan province, Hong Kong SAR, Japan and Republic of Korea.
60 As at the end of April 2009, these arrangements provided access to US $ 92 billion in
total.
See http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/CMI_0904.pdf
61 At the 50th Anniversary ceremony of Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, February
10, 2009, People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s remarks included the
following:
We notice that the drastic increase of imbalance of savings and trade started after 1997. It
is therefore worthwhile looking at the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the savings
behavior of these countries.
Asian countries were seriously shocked and alarmed by the Asian financial crisis. The
attack of speculative capital led to plunging exchange rates and capital flight and nearly
exhausted all foreign reserves, leaving a great sense of vigilance for East Asian countries
in macroeconomic management. In the years that followed, countries in the region
boosted exports, amassed trade surplus and accumulated large foreign reserves. It is fair
to say that the high savings ratio and massive accumulation of foreign reserve in recent
years in East Asian countries reflect the lessons learnt from, and the natural reaction to
the Asian financial crisis.
The large savings and foreign reserves of these countries are also the result of defensive
reactions against predatory speculation. At the time, large capital inflows and the ensuing
sudden stop and reversal as well as the rampant speculations of the hedge funds exacerbated
the situation. People were shocked and frustrated by these speculative behaviors. At the
onset of the crisis, Malaysia saw a weakening export, plummeting stock market and
sharply depreciating currency. Despite criticism from some countries and international
institutions, the Malaysian government imposed temporary capital restrictions and
safeguarded currency stability. In Hong Kong SAR, which was also attacked by hedge
funds, stock prices plunged, and its linked exchange rate regime was severely tested.
The belief prevailed in the region that unregulated predatory speculation was an
important factor behind the crisis, and it highlighted tremendous potential risks to the
international financial system. It was hoped that the international community would bring
it under necessary regulation. However, for some reason, the authorities of the countries
45
Faizullah Khilji
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
46
concerned were against regulating predatory speculative capital flows, and failed to see
the need to adjust the regulatory frameworks. At the same time, international financial
institutions failed to perform its regulatory responsibility over abnormal capital flows.
East Asian countries are thus forced to amass foreign reserves to defend themselves.
To some extent, the increase of savings ratio and current account surplus in East Asian
countries are a result of the rescue plan of the international financial institutions. The
rescue plan kept silent on international speculative capital flows, which otherwise
should have been put under scrutiny. Instead, excessive and stringent conditionalities
were imposed, demanding that the crisis countries adopt stringent fiscal and monetary
policies, raise interest rates, cut fiscal deficits and increase foreign reserves. In the decade
thereafter, East Asian countries have learnt the lessons, increased savings and foreign
reserves and successfully enhanced their resilience to financial crisis.
See People’s Bank of China website: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/hanglingdaojianghua/.
The view is widely shared across East Asia; for example, Governor Dr Zeti Akhtar
Aziz expressed broadly similar sentiments in his keynote address at the same
ceremony. See the Bank Nagara Malaysia website: http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.
php?ch=9&pg=15&ac=310
The concerns about exports and toxic assets have been discussed earlier. The financial
sectors of the East Asian economies have not suffered and these economies seem to
be maintaining growth. See David Pilling, Asia banks for a world turned upside down,
Financial Times, September 16 2009, and Martin Wolf, Wheel of fortune turns as China
outdoes west, Financial Times, September 13 2009.
Premier Wen Jiabao is reported to have said: “We have lent a huge amount of money to
the United States and of course we’re concerned about the security of our assets and,
to be honest, I am a little bit worried, … That’s why … I would like to urge the US to
keep its commitment and promise to ensure the safety of Chinese assets.” See Olivia
Chung, Wen puts US honor on the debt line, March 14, 2009, Asia Times Online. Also
see Michael Wines, China’s Leader Says He Is ‘Worried’ Over U.S. Treasuries, New
York Times, March 14, 2009.
Discussion of a reserve currency is an ongoing matter. This is the first time though that
central bankers publicly discussed the matter since the 1970s.
Zhou Xiaochuan, Reform the International Monetary System, China Daily, March 23,
2009. Also see: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=182
The article by Zhou Xiaochuan brought to mind the more summary assessment by
General Charles de Gaulle in his press conference of February 4, 1965. “We consider that
international exchanges must be established, as was the case before the great worldwide
disasters, on an unquestionable monetary basis which does not bear the mark of any
individual country.”
Robert Triffin wrote extensively on these issues, from 1950s to 1970s, and first formulated
the specific issue, just as the Bretton Woods system was coming apart because of an
excess of dollars. Triffin identified the problem for the US Congress in 1960 but it took
another 10 years before the system came apart.
There has been some development in context of monitoring economies by the IMF
since Zhou Xiaochuan’s article appeared. At the recent G 20 meeting in Pittsburgh “The
leaders pledged to rethink their economic policies in a coordinated effort to reduce the
immense imbalances between export-dominated countries like China and Japan and
debt-laden countries like the United States, which has long been the world’s most willing
consumer.
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
“The United States will be expected to increase its savings rate, reduce its trade deficit
and address its huge budget deficit. Countries like China, Japan and Germany will be
expected to reduce their dependence on exports by promoting more consumer spending
and investment at home.
“The ideas are not new, and there is no enforcement mechanism to penalize countries if
they stick to their old habits. But for the first time ever, each country agreed to submit its
policies to a “peer review” from the other governments as well as to monitoring by the
International Monetary Fund.
“That in itself would be a big change, given how prickly national leaders have often been
toward outside criticism of their policies.”
See Edmund S Andrews, Group of 20 Agrees on Far-Reaching Economic Plan, New
York Times, September 26, 2009
The Economist though noted that the “Developing countries are uneasy about formalising
such a realignment. They are publicly supportive, but that may only be because they
suspect it will be impossible to police.” See The G20 summit, Regaining their balance,
Economist.com, September 26th 2009.
Back in the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed the introduction of an international
currency unit named “Bancor”, based on the value of 30 representative commodities.
Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system,
which was based on the White approach, indicates that the Keynesian approach may have
been more farsighted.
Andrei Denisov, Russia’s first deputy foreign minister, said: “This proposal is aimed
at a practical realisation of the idea about a new global accounting unit or a new
global currency. It is a question that should be discussed to create a consensus.” See
Julia Kollewe, Global currency flies with push from Russia and slip from Geithner, the
Guardian, March 26, 2009.
See Anahad O’Connor, Geithner Affirms Dollar After Remarks Send It Tumbling, The
New York Times, March 26, 2009
See Richard N Cooper, The future of the dollar, Peterson Institute Policy Brief, September
2009.
C. Fred Bergsten, We Should Listen to Beijing’s Currency Idea, Financial Times, April 8,
2009.
The SDR, as Bergsten notes, “is denominated in a basket of currencies – 44 per cent
dollars, 34 per cent euro and 11 per cent each of yen and sterling”, and this would not
appear to meet the criteria laid down in the Zhou Xiaochuan article (see discussion above).
Bergsten also notes that this is “essentially the substitution account idea negotiated in
the IMF in the late 1970s and for which detailed blueprints were developed. Similar
anxieties about the dollar at that time prompted its sharpest plunge in the postwar period,
intensifying the double-digit inflation and soaring interest rates that brought on the
deepest US slowdown since the 1930s, until now”. See Fred Bergsten, We should listen
to Beijing’s currency idea, Financial Times, April 8 2009
See Fred Bergsten, We should listen to Beijing’s currency idea, Financial Times, April 8
2009
As noted above ‘Wen told a press conference after the conclusion of a two-week meeting
of the country’s legislators that he was “a little bit worried” about the safety of Chinese
assets in the US, and called on the US “to maintain its good credit, to honor its promises
and to guarantee the safety of China’s assets.”’ See Olivia Chung, Wen puts US honor on
the debt line, March 14, 2009, Asia Times Online.
47
Faizullah Khilji
77 See Michael Hudson, Washington cannot call all the shots, Financial Times, June 14
2009
78 See Richard McGregor, China to allow Renminbi trade payments, Financial Times, July
2 2009.
79 See Jamil Anderlini, China to deploy foreign reserves, Financial Times, July 21 2009.
Also see for a specific example, Justine Lau and Geoff Dyer, CNPC boosts war chest with
$30bn loan, Financial Times, September 9, 2009
80 Remarks made by the Chief Economist, HSBC, cited in Jamil Anderlini, China to deploy
foreign reserves, Financial Times, July 21 2009.
81 “China is a country with a record of continuous self-government going back 4,000 years,
the only society that has achieved this. One must start with the assumption that they must
have learnt something about the requirements for survival, and it is not always to be
assumed that we know it better than they do.
“It is imperative to realise that we cannot do in China in the 21st century what others
thought to do in the 19th, prescribe their institutions for them and seek to organise Asia…
…and though we need not agree with every action taken by Chinese leaders, we cannot
simply set ourselves up as their critics.”
Henry Kissinger cited in Stephen Graubard, Lunch with the FT: Henry Kissinger,
Financial Times, May 23 2008.
More recently, Kissinger wrote in context of China and the current crisis:
“China has a major interest in a stable -- and preferably growing -- U.S. economy. But
China also has a growing interest in reducing its dependence on American decisions.
Since American inflation as well as deflation have become for China nightmares as
grave as they are for America, the two countries face the imperative of coordinating
their economic policies. As America’s largest creditor, China has a degree of economic
leverage unprecedented in the U.S. experience. At the same time, the quest for widening
the scope of independent decision exists in ambivalent combination on both sides.
“A number of Chinese moves reflect this tendency. Chinese officials feel freer than
they did previously to offer public and private advice to the United States. China has
begun to trade with India, Russia and Brazil in their own currencies. The proposal of
the governor of China’s central bank to gradually create an alternate reserve currency is
another case in point. Many American economists make light of this idea. But it surfaces
in so many forums, and China has such a consistent record of pursuing its projects with
great patience, that it should be taken seriously. To avoid a gradual drift into adversarial
policies, Chinese influence in global economic decision-making needs to be enhanced.”
See Henry A Kissinger, Rebalancing relations with China, Washington Post, August 19,
2009.
82 See Peter Garnham, Beijing’s dollar trap, Financial Times, July 30, 2009.
48
THE SINO-PAK BOUNDARY
AGREEMENT
A. G. Noorani*
Abstract
The agreement of 1963 is, thus, based on a history that stretched to the
19th century. If India had consulted the records in the spirit as Pakistan
did, an accord could have been reached in April 1960. For India, as
it did for Pakistan in 1963, the McDonald’s Note of 14 March 1899
provides a key to the resolution of the India-China boundary dispute.
Author.
On 15 July 2009, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs,
Preneet Kaur, made a statement in the Lok Sabha in reply to a question
on the dimensions of India’s perceived loss of its territory. Both the
question and the reply are repeated seasonally. She said India has been
raising with China the issue of Pakistan’s illegal cession of part of the
territory, under its occupation, in the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir
under the China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963.
She replied: “The Government’s position is that this so-called
‘Boundary Agreement’ is illegal and invalid. This has been reiterated to
the Chinese side in the on-going discussions on the boundary question.”
Under “the so-called ‘Boundary Agreement’ of 1963, Pakistan illegally
ceded 5,180 km. of Indian territory in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir to
China.” Pakistan, she added, was in “illegal and forcible occupation
of approximately 78,000 square kms. of Indian territory in Jammu and
Kashmir since 1948 while 38,000 square kms. were under the occupation
of China.”
* A.G. Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar and expert on constitutional issues.
A.G. Noorani
The Press Trust of India’s report, published in The Tribune of 16
July 2009, faithfully put the words boundary agreement within quotes.
One is sick of the Indo-Pak lingo about “Pak-occupied Kashmir” for
Azad Kashmir and “Indian-occupied Kashmir” for the rest. The BBC
and better informed print media in the West prefer the more sensible
word “administered” to describe each half of what is undoubtedly a
disputed territory. But one cannot expect any better of either New Delhi
or Islamabad in such matters. Fifteen years ago, on 10 August 1994,
the Minister’s predecessor in office, R. L. Bhatia had used identical
language. Pakistan had “illegally ceded approximately 5,120 sq. kms.
of Indian territory” in Kashmir to China (The Hindu; 11 August, 1994,
italics mine throughout).
Cession is a legal concept with a precise connotation. One looks in
vain for any mention of cession in that agreement. It defines, instead, a
procedure for reconciling conflicting maps. It is, therefore, an agreement
on a boundary settlement a distinction recognized by the Supreme Court
of India in a case challenging the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal on the
Rann of Kutch Dispute (Maganbhai J. Patel vs. Union of India (1969) 3
Supreme Court Reports, (1970) 3 Supreme Court Cases 400); AIR 1969
S.C. 783). The Court drew a clear distinction between cession of territory
and the settlement of a boundary dispute. (H. M. Seervai; Constitutional
Law of India; N. M. Tripathi, Bombay; 4th Edn; Vol. 1; p. 311).
More recently, on 12 July 2001 the Minister for External Affairs,
Jaswant Singh, alleged that “the Shaksgam Valley of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir has been illegally and wrongly ceded by Pakistan” (Dawn;
13 July 2001). This statement was made on the eve of the Agra Summit.
This narrows down the issue as to whether the Shaksgam Valley was
indeed part of the State of J & K. on 15 August 1947.
Involved in the controversy are two distinct issues. One concerns
the law; namely, Pakistan’s legal capacity to conclude that agreement.
The other concerns the history of the area. Was it comprised in the
territory of undivided India of which the State was a part? If one were
to go by the maps published in the West, one will find, for the most part,
a legend indicating that the area was ceded to China. But almost every
50
scholar holds that, to the contrary, it was Pakistan which acquired 750
sq. miles of administered territory. This is an issue which the facts of
history alone can resolve.
The legal issue must not be evaded, however. On this the Indian
stand is valid. Pakistan itself does not claim sovereignty over the area in
question. The Preamble to the Agreement describes it as “the contiguous
areas” – that is, contiguous to “China’s Sinkiang” – “the defence of
which is under the actual control of Pakistan.” This is similar to the
description and proportions in the Resolutions of the U.N. Commission
for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 6 January 1949 which,
both, India and Pakistan accepted.
The Resolution of 13 August 1948 mentions in Part II A para 3 that
the territory “evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by
the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.” They
did not withdraw because the troops withdrawals schedule provided
by India did not comprise “the bulk of its forces” as Para 1 of Part B
required.
However, the legal status of the two parts of the State is not
identical. Josef Korbel, the UNCIP’s Chairman, assured Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru on 25 August 1948 that the Resolution will not be
“interpreted or applied in practice, so as (a) To bring into question the
sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of
their territory evacuated by Pakistan.” Korbel described the evacuated
territories as those “which are at present under the effective control of
the Pakistan High Command.” (UNCIP’s First Report S/1100, Para 79;
The Kashmir Question edited by K. Sarwar Hasan with the cooperation
of Zubeida Hasan; Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi;
1966; p. 186).
The Plebiscite Resolution of 5 January 1949 (The UNCIP’S Second
Report S/1196, para 51; Hasan; p. 212) provides that the Plebiscite
Administrator “will be formally appointed to office by the Government
of Jammu and Kashmir” (Para 3(a) ) and shall report the result of the
plebiscite to, both, the UNCIP “and to the Government of Jammu and
51
A.G. Noorani
Kashmir” (Para 9).
Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) says: “When the
people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan,
the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined
in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.” Article 203
of the Constitution of 1955 was identically worded. This was not an
assertion of sovereignty over that State, but its disavowal.
This is Pakistan’s supreme law. Its terms cannot be overridden
by an ordinary statute. On 24 August 1974, the Assembly of Azad
Kashmir adopted the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution
Act, 1974, with the concurrence of the Government of Pakistan. It
establishes a Council presided over by the Prime Minister of Pakistan
and comprising federal as well as Azad Kashmir’s ministers. In effect
the Constitution rivets Azad Kashmir to Pakistan administratively. The
issue of sovereignty remains.
International law permits a State in de facto and effective possession
of an area to conclude agreements of a limited local character to maintain
peace and tranquility. It has, however, no right to conclude a definitive
boundary treaty. The Sino-Pak agreement is a definitive agreement
though it is termed “Provisional.” It provides for the appointment of
a Boundary Commission, setting up of boundary pillars and drawing
up of protocols; the characteristics of a definitive boundary agreement.
Article 6 of the Agreement does not alter the fact for it forecloses any
significant revision of its terms or the reopening of the accord: “The
two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute
between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will
reopen negotiations with the Government of the People’s Republic
of China on the boundary, as described in Article Two of the present
agreement, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present
agreement, provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being
Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and of the aforesaid
protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed
between the People’s Republic of China and Pakistan” (For the text vide
China, India, Pakistan, edited by K. Sarwar Hasan; Pakistan Institute of
52
International Affairs, Karachi, 1966; pp. 378-383).
The Agreement thus envisages that, “sovereign authority” competent
to sign a boundary agreement will emerge only after the settlement of
the Kashmir dispute. But that authority, if it is India, can do no more
than “reopen negotiations” with China “so as to sign a formal Boundary
Treaty to replace the present Agreement.” This does not bar revision
of its terms explicitly, but the hint of finality is clear. The Press Note
issued by the Government of Pakistan on 22 February 1963 announcing
Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s visit to Peking to conclude the
agreement mentioned that “on attaining a common understanding of
the boundary alignment, an agreement of a provisional nature will be
signed” (ibid., p. 378).
The Agreement is anything but “provisional” and was beyond the
legal competence of the Government of Pakistan to conclude.
Pakistan’s retort does not help it; namely, that nor had India any
right to conclude such an agreement in respect of a disputed territory.
The UNCIP’s Resolutions treat both parts of the State of J & K and both
Governments differently.
There is, however, something rather unreal and arid about this
undoubted legality. In law the British Parliament could have replaced
the Indian Independence Act, 1947, but it could not have regained
its sovereignty over the subcontinent. The Privy Council considered
precisely such a denouement in respect of the Dominions and gave a
sensible answer; “The Imperial Parliament could as a matter of abstract
law repeal or disregard the Statute (of Westminster). But that is theory
and has no relation to realities” (British Coal Corporation & Ors. vs. The
King (1935) Appeal Cases 500). Courts prefer to reckon with “realities”
when the “abstract” law runs counter to them.
India’s private offers of settlement of Kashmir on the basis of the
status quo (1948 – 1955) were followed by Nehru’s offer at a public
meeting in New Delhi on 13 April 1956, “I am willing to accept that the
question of the part of Kashmir which is under you should be settled
53
A.G. Noorani
by demarcating the border on the basis of the cease-fire line. We have
no desire to take it by fighting.” The Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972
replaced the cease-fire line with the line of actual control. Indeed the
Agreement itself was preceded by the Swaran Singh-Bhutto talks from
26 December 1962 onwards in which India reiterated its proposal
offering some 3,000 square miles more in the bargain (Vide the writer’s
article Bilateral Negotiations on Kashmir, Criterion, Vol. 1 Vol Oct-Dec.
2006, pp 26-52).
The law, however relevant once, is relevant no longer, nearly half a
century since the Agreement was signed and confronts us with the issue
of its soundness. History alone can answer the question and it does so
decisively.
It all began when the British created the State of Jammu and Kashmir
by the Treaty of Amritsar. In a Collection of Treaties, Engagements and
Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries compiled by C.U.
Aitchison, Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign
Department, Volume XI of the 1909 edition. He wrote: “The present
State of Jammu and Kashmir was created by the British government
when Gulab Singh was established as Maharaja under the Treaty of
Amritsar.” The British first signed the Treaty of Lahore with the Lahore
State on 9 March 1846 after the First Anglo-Sikh war, and acquired
“in perpetual sovereignty” inter alia the province of Kashmir. This was
in part-payment of the equivalent of “one crore of rupees” which the
British demanded as “indemnification for the war expenses.”
A week later, on 16 March 1846, the British ceded to Maharaja
Gulab Singh the lands it had thus acquired – the territories of Jammu,
Kashmir and Ladakh “for the sum of seventy-five lakhs of rupees.”He
“acknowledged the supremacy of the British government.” Article 4
said: “The limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall not be
at any time changed without concurrence of the British government.”
There was reason for this.
The Treaty of 16-17 September 1842, between Ladakh and Tibet,
one of non-aggression rather than boundary treaty, marked the collapse
54
of Zorawar Singh’s ambitious Dogra venture with Tibet and an equally
unsuccessful retaliation that brought the Tibetans to Leh. It is in three
separate, but essentially identical, versions. One each between Tibet
and Ladakh, and another between their principals: the Sikh Darbar and
China. The Persian text in Tibet’s possessions reads: “We shall remain
in possession of the limits of boundaries of Ladakh and the neighbours
subordinate to it, in accordance with the old customs, and there shall
be no transgression and no interference in the country beyond the oldestablished frontiers” (emphasis added, throughout). The Tibetan text in
Kashmir’s possession was of the same tenor.
On 17 October 1842, the Sikhs and the Chinese concluded a treaty
which said (Article 1): “That the boundaries of Ladakh and Lhassa shall
be constituted as formerly, the contracting parties engaging to confine
themselves within their respective boundaries, the one to refrain from
any act of aggression on the other” (An ‘Agreed’ Frontier: Ladakh
and India’s Northernmost Borders 1846-1947) by Parashotam Mehra:
Oxford University Press, 1991; pp. 167-170). The British did not want
to be saddled with a war by Gulab Singh’s ambitions.
They made earnest efforts to seek a boundary accord with China,
five months after the Treaty of Amritsar; they failed. China was weak
and suspicious. Two Boundary Commissions were set up. The first
comprised R.A. Vans Agnew and Alexander Cunningham. Its task was
to determine a boundary between British territory (the districts of Lahoul
and Spiti in Himachal Pradesh) and Ladakh. The second, set up in 1847,
comprising Cunningham, Henry Strachey and Dr. Thomas Thomson,
was to define the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet on the east. The
northern boundary divided Kashmir and East Turkestan (now Xinjiang).
The first task was accomplished; not so, the second. However, Vans
Agnew wrote a memorandum dated 13 May1847, defining a boundary
which he thought was clear with the exception of its extremities.
Aitchison wrote: “On the appointment of the second commission
steps were taken to secure the cooperation of Chinese and Kashmir
officials; but no Chinese delegate appeared and the demarcation had
to be abandoned. The northern as well as the eastern boundary of the
55
A.G. Noorani
Kashmir State is still undefined.” (Aitchison, Vol. 12, 1929; p. 5).
Nothing happened thereafter to alter this position till India became
independent on 15 August 1947. The Governor-General of India, Henry
Hardinge’s letter to China and to the authorities in Tibet, dated 4 August
1846, sought their cooperation “to lay down the boundary” between the
two countries. China did not respond.
Surveys of the frontier regions proceeded apace. The first was
by Henry Strachey of the 1847 Commission. W. H. Johnson of the
Trignometrical Survey of India came next (1865), followed by G. W.
Hayward (1868) and T.D. Forsyth (1874). A century later, India relied
on Johnson’s map since its alignment for the Aksai Chin supported its
claim. He was, however, censured by the British; resigned and was
made Governor of Ladakh by the Maharaja who was pleased with the
map. Col. Walker, Surveyor-General in 1867, ridiculed Johnson’s map
as published. It differed from the original.
Since official maps had to be printed the question continued to nag
as to how the boundary in this sector was to be depicted. Nor could the
boundary be left undefined. Russia had begun to expand in Asia. The
British were anxious lest its influence reached India’s frontiers. They
were careful to have the Wakhan corridor extended to touch China’s
territory to avoid a gap there but were anxious also that no gap should
exist between the frontiers of India and China in the no-man’s land
that existed. China’s passivity did not inhibit cartographic exercises in
Calcutta, Simla and London. The details are not relevant. Suffice it to
say that two schools of thought emerged. One favoured the Mustagh –
Karakoram range, the other the Kuen Lun range further to the north. A
large majority favoured the former. The problem was complicated by
the ambiguous status of Hunza (or Kanjut as it was also called) as a
vassal of China, since at least 1847, if not earlier, and also of Kashmir.
The Mir of Hunza concluded a treaty with Kashmir before his death in
1864. In 1891-92 British and Kashmiri forces occupied Hunza.
Sir John Ardagh, Directory of Military Intelligence in the War
Office in India and formerly Military Secretary to the Viceroy (188856
1894) wrote a Memorandum on New Year’s Day 1897 which set the
alarm bells ringing in Calcutta, then capital of the British Raj in India. It
was on “The Northern Frontier of India from the Pamirs to Tibet” and it
advocated the Kuen Lan line, for strategic reasons, not on the merits, as
a desirable boundary (For the text vide Dorothy Woodman; Himalayan
Frontiers; Barrie and Rockliff, 1969; pp. 360-363).
It was “denounced” by one and all in Calcutta who studied it. The
Viceroy Lord Elgin wrote to the Secretary of State for India Lord George
F. Hamilton on 23 December 1897 setting out the objections (ibid. pp
364-365).
Captain A. H. McMahon, then Political Agent in Gilgit, wrote
an elaborate Report, dated 10 May 1898, on the claims of the Kanjut
tribe (the people of Hunza) to territory beyond the Hindu Kush in the
Tagdumbash Pamir and the Raskam valley. Chinese officials had begun
to obstruct the cultivation of the Raskam valley by the Kanjutis.
McMahon’s Report, running into 32 paras covering 11 closely printed
pages, is a locus classicus on the Hunza boundary. “The first point to be
noticed in the history of the Kanjut tribe is its dual vassalage to both
China and Kashmir. Both states consider it to be their vassal state. China
claims that Hunza has paid tribute to her since the time of the emperor
Chien-lung (1736-1796), while the vassalage to Kashmir is first proved
by a treaty made by Shah Ghazanfar, Raja of Hunza, at sometime prior
to his death in 1864. In Central Asia it is not an uncommon thing for one
state to pay tribute to two or more other States.” (Foreign Department
Secret Frontier; July 1898, Proceedings 327 Nos. 306-47; National
Archives of India, for the text, vide Mehra pp. 94-97).
Vassalage to China survived British invasion in 1891. “The
boundaries of Tagdumbash, Khunjerab and Raskam, as claimed by the
Kanjuts, are the following: The northern watershed of the Tagdumbash
Pamir from the Wakhirjrui pass through the Bayik peak to Ilijilga,
about a mile above Dafdar, thence across the river to the Zankan nullah,
thence through Mazar and over the range to Urok a point on the Yarkand
river between Sibjaida and Itakturuk. Thence it runs along the northern
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A.G. Noorani
watershed of the Raskam valley to the junction of the Bazar Darya river
and the Yarkand river. From thence southwards over the mountains to
the Mustagh river leaving Aghil Dewan Aghil pass within Hunza limits.
… On no less than three occasions the Mirs of Wakhan have asked the
Mirs of Hunza to allow them to occupy Raskam, and were refused. …
“Hunza claims, as stated above, the territory beyond the Hindu
Kush. … China has definitely recognized their right to the portion of
this tract, including the Taghdumbash Pamir, and the Khunjerab and
Oprang Valleys, by acknowledging their right to revenue in those
tracts. It matters little what reason or reasons they may assign for this
admission – the fact remains, the Hunza rights are acknowledged and
recognized with regard to the remaining portion of the above territory,
i.e., Raskam, the Chinese have, while verbally denying that it belongs to
Hunza, practically admitted their right to it by giving them permission
to re-occupy it. The question now about to be settled is that of the terms
on which are to occupy it. …
“The necessity for contending for a sphere of influence, however
limited in area, beyond the Hindu Kush and Mustagh ranges, will,
perhaps, not be readily conceded ; but, however strong the arguments
may appear at first sight for restricting ourselves to a definite frontier like
the Hindu Kush and Mustagh ranges on strategic grounds, it would be
wide, I venture to think, before irrevocably committing ourselves to such
a frontier, to carefully consider the wisdom of gratuitously surrendering,
in doing so, territory which belongs to the people on whom we will have
to depend for active assistance in defending that frontier. … I earnestly
trust that what I have written above will suffice to show how matters
now stand. If our present position on this side of our so-called strategic
frontier of the Hindu Kush and Mustagh ranges is to be maintained, it is
absolutely necessary to take timely action regarding territory claimed by
Hunza beyond those regions.”
British concern on the Taghdumbash Pamir was confined to
China’s possible cession of the tract to Russia. Raskam was a different
preposition. Hunza needed its grazing pastures for its livestock to feed
a growing population.
58
After prolonged deliberation Elgin sent a dispatch to Hamilton on
27 October 1898 defining the line to be offered to China. “The following
is a description of this line: beginning at the north end at the peak Povalo
Schveikovski, the line takes a south-easterly direction, crossing the
Karachikar stream at Mintaka aghazi, thence proceeding in the same
direction till it joins, at the Karachanai Pass, the crest of the main ridge
of the Mustagh range which it then follows passing by the Kunjurab
Pass and continuing southwards to the peak just north of the Shimshal
Pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur
running east approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal to the
Hunza post at Darwaza. The line, turning south through the Darwaza
post, crosses the road from the Shimshal Pass at that point and then
ascends the nearest high spur and regains the main crests, which the
boundary will again follow, passing the Mustagh, Gusherbrum, and the
Saltoro Passes to the Karakoram. From the Karakoram Pass the crest of
the range runs nearly east for about half a degree and then turn south to
a little below the 35th parallel of North Latitude. Rounding then what in
our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be
followed runs north-east to a point – east of Kizil Jilga and from there, in
a south-easterly direction follows the Lak Tsung Range until that meets
the spur running south from the Kuen Lun Range which has hitherto
been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a
little east of 800 east Longitude. …” (Alastair Lamb; The Sino-Indian
Border in Ladakh; Australian University Press; 1973; p. 45-46).
The line included two tracts beyond the watershed. One was the
western end of Taghdumbash, the other was a “small deviation from the
main crest of the Mustagh near the Shimshal Pass to Darwaza. This is in
accordance with actual possession.” A Kanjuti post at Darwaza existed
as late as in 1899.
On 14 March 1899 Britain’s Ambassador Sir Claude MacDonald
gave a Note to China’s Foreign Office. It was the first time that India
offered a precise boundary line to China as a basis for a settlement. It
said “It is now proposed by the Indian Government that, for the sake of
avoiding any dispute or uncertainty in the future, a clear understanding
should be come to with the Chinese Government as to the frontier between
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A.G. Noorani
the two States. To obtain this clear understanding, it is necessary that
China should relinquish her shadowy claim to suzerainty over the State
of Kanjut. The India Government, on the other hand, will on behalf of
Kanjut, relinquish her claims to most of the Taghdumbash and Raskam
districts.”
He defined the proposed boundary: “Commencing on the little
Pamir from the Peak of which the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission
of 1895 ended their work, it runs south-east, crossing the Karachikar
stream at Mintaka Aghazi; thence proceeding in the same direction it
joins at the Karchenai Pass the crest of the main ridge of the Mustagh
range. It follows this to the South, passing by the Kunjerab Pass, and
continuing southwards to the peak just north of the Shimsahl Pass. At
this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running east
approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal to the Hunza post
at Darwaza. The line turning south through the Darwaza post crosses the
road from the Shimshal Pass at that point, and then ascends the nearest
high spur, and regains the main crests which the boundary will again
follow, passing the Mustagh, Gusherbrun, and Saltoro Passes by the
Karakoram. From the Karakoram Pass the crests of the range run east
for about half a degree (1001i), and then turn south to a little below the
thirty-fifth parallel of north latitude. Rounding then what in our maps
is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed
runs north-east to a point east of Kizil Gilga, and from there in a southeasterly direction follows the Lak Tsung range until that meets the spur
running south from the K’un-lun range, which has hitherto been shown
or maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 800
east longitude.” (ibid.; p. 49).
Once again, as in 1846-47, China ignored the offer. In Calcutta the
Note’s phrasing was criticized. Britain did not possess sovereignty over
the Raskam lands which it could relinquish; only the grazing rights.
Matters were brought to a head by a far-sighted Viceroy, Lord Curzon,
in a despatch to the Secretary of State for India John Brodrick on 24
March 1904. Curzon reminded Brodrick that the 14 March 1899 Note
on the boundary proposal had not been answered by China. He proposed
“it would be well to sever the connection between Hunza and China
60
without further delay. We should hardly be likely to make anything out
of the presence of a few Kanjuti cultivators along the Raskam Daria –
even if we did succeed in reinstating them …
“We accordingly recommend that a formal notification be made to
China that since the Chinese Government have been unable to fulfill their
promises to the Mir of Hunza, that State, under the advice of the British
Government withdraws from all relations with China, and henceforth will
own suzerainty to the Kashmir State and the British Government alone.
As regards the boundary between Kashmir and the New Dominion, we
strongly recommend that the Chinese Government should be informed
that, as they have not shown any reasons for disagreeing with the
proposals placed before them in Sir Claude MacDonald’s despatch of the
14th March, 1899, we shall henceforward assume Chinese concurrence
and act accordingly.” (ibid.; p. 61).
A despatch was prepared and sent by Curzon to Brodrick on 26
January 1905. It responded to his query on effective control of the
lands by sending him the correspondence with the Resident in Kashmir.
Control over the Taghdumbash was impossible. “The circumstances in
regard to the tract about Darwaza are different. Though this lies beyond
the watershed, and would probably be claimed by the Chinese, the Mir
of Hunza has for many years past maintained there a regular post of
four men without, as far as we are aware, any objection being raised by
the Chinese. According to information now furnished by the Resident
in Kashmir, the people of Shingshal depend for their grazing almost
entirely on the valley between the Shingshal Pass and Darwaza. They
are in the habit of going twenty miles beyond Darwaza for grazing,
and there is a place about five miles beyond Darwaza from which they
fetch salt. The inclusion of the Ghorzerab valley, which lies eight miles
below the junction of the Shingshal stream with the Mustagh River,
and four miles above the point where the Oprang joins the Mustagh,
is a matter of considerable importance to the Shingshalis, who mainly
depend on their flocks for their livelihood. The Mir of Hunza states that
the grazing in the Ghorzerab has been enjoyed since time immemorial
by the Shingshalis, and he doubts whether the Kirghiz or Sarikolis even
know of the existence of the valley. We consider it very desirable to
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A.G. Noorani
retain this tract on the British side of the boundary line, and we trust that
it will be possible to do so, when a settlement is come to with China.”
Such an opportunity was not arise till 1963.
Finally Curzon sent to Brodrick, on 10 August 1905, a map indicating
both the 1899 and the 1905 lines and explained the difference between
the two. “The proposals of 1899 contemplated that the line after leaving
the crest of the Mustagh range in the vicinity of the Shingshal Pass,
should run in an easterly direction, and then turn southwards so as just
to include the part of Darwaza within the Hunza frontier. Thereafter it
was to continue its southward trend until it regained the main crests.
We now recommend that the boundary should run from the Khunjerab
Pass south along the main watershed, as far as a point about six miles
south-west of the Oprang Pass. At this point the line should leave the
main watershed, run due east for about five miles, and then continue in a
south-easterly direction until it strikes the Mustagh River at Kuramjilga.
The Mustagh River would then form the boundary up to a point about
four miles above the junction of the stream from the Shingshal Pass;
from this point it would ascend the nearest high spur to the west and
regain the main crest, which it would then follow on the lines indicated
in Sir Claude Macdonald’s dispatch to the Tsungli Yamen of the 14th
March 1899.” (ibid., p. 62).
In 1907 when the question of which line to show on the map arose,
the Secretary of State for India’s cable of 1 August 1907 to the Viceroy
gave clear orders. The map “should indicate the frontier as following
the line described in Notification of 1899 to China with addition of the
deviation in neighbourhood of Shimshal which was proposed in your
secret Despatch No. 153 of August 10th, 1905.” (Mehra; p. 130).
Foreign Secretary Denys Bray’s letter of 7 September 1917 to J.
E. Shuckburgh, Secretary Political Department, India Office discussed
the boundary at length and constitutes an authoritative statement of
perceptions of the border in 1917.
“These limits however exist only on paper and have been indicated
by us not as the result of any treaty or engagement with China nor as
62
finally and definitely marking the bounds of our sphere of influence,
nor altogether as forming a scientific or strategic border, but partly
because they follow a lofty and well-defined watershed and partly in
order to assign some limit to China’s indefinite political relations in
that neighbourhood. The Chinese Government were invited to accept
the line in Sir Claude MacDonald’s dispatch dated the 14 March, 1899,
but as nothing resulted, it was proposed in Lord Curzon’s dispatch,
No. 70 (Secret-Frontier), dated the 24th March 1904, to inform the
Chinese Government that we assumed their concurrence. His Majesty’s
Government however demurred in their telegram dated the 10th August
1904. The line was slightly modified in Lord Curzon’s despatches Nos.
20 and 153 (Secret – Frontier), dated 26th January and 10th August
1905. …
… We cannot therefore regard ourselves as absolutely bound by a
border line which we have ourselves laid down without the concurrence
of the other party concerned, which we have already more than once
altered without reference to this other party, and the substantial pushing
forward of which we have already advocated should a certain chain of
circumstances render this desirable.
“Hunza’s claims to Raskam by right of conquest were never
questioned and were frequently recognized by China up to 1897, when,
for political reasons, we advised Hunza to make terms with China for
the occupancy of the tract. Since then the Chinese twice cancelled the
agreements which gave these lands to Hunza under certain conditions
(Lord Curzon’s dispatches Nos. 158 and 21 (Secret-Frontier dated the
17th August, 1899 and 8th February, 1900) and the Mir at the request of
the Chinese withdrew from Raskam. The lands remained uncultivated
till 1911, when some Kirghiz started cultivation – a step which the Mir
regarded as a breach of faith on the part of China, there having been a
tacit understanding that if the Karjutis were prevented from cultivating
Raskam no one else would be allowed to cultivate there. With our
approval the Mir resumed cultivation in 1914 and was advised to hold
the lands unless forced by superior numbers to vacate (weekly letter
No. 21-M, dated the 27th May 1915). The Chinese Government did not
interfere and the Mir’s men have occupied Raskam and cultivated the
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A.G. Noorani
valley ever since. … The position then would appear to be that though
the Chinese have deliberately cancelled the agreements which gave
the land to Hunza conditionally, their responsible officials have on two
occasions acquiesced in Hunza occupying the land unconditionally and
that till China definitely asserts the Mir’s actual status with respect to
Hunza there is justification for recognizing his de facto possession. “
(Mehra, PP. 225-227).”
In 1936, on British advice, the Mir of Hunza stopped sending the
annual tribute to China and abandoned his rights beyond the border
in Raskam as well as the Taghdumbash Pamir. China retaliated by
expelling the Kanjutis from the Shimshal Valley near Darwaza. In the
controversy that ensued it was pointed out that the legendary Francis
Young Husband’s book The Heart of A Continent published in 1896
supported Hunza’s case. At p. 259 he referred to “a Kanjuti outpost
called Darwaza or ‘the gate.’” The Kanjutis continued to enjoy grazing
rights across the Shimshal Pass.
After independence the Government of India published two White
Papers on Indian States in July 1948 and February 1950. Both showed
the entire northern boundary from the India-China-Afghan trijunction,
the subject of the Sino-Pakistan agreement to the India-China-Nepal
trijunction as “undefined,” in contrast to a clear depiction of the
McMahon Line in the east.
This was the position when India and China signed the Panchsheel
Agreement on Tibet on 29 April 1954. In June that year Zhou Enlai
came to Delhi. Nehru paid a return visit to China in October. Between
the two visits Nehru wrote a fateful document. He first wrote to the
Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs on 12 May 1954:
“We should establish checkpoints at all disputed points wherever they
might be, and our administration should be right up to these borders”
(Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Volume 25; page 470).
The details of why, how and when the Sino-Indian boundary dispute
arose need not detain us. We are concerned with its eruption in the open
in 1959, its impact on relations between Pakistan and China, culminating
64
in 1963 in the boundary agreement.
On 1 July Nehru wrote a 17-para Memorandum in which he gave
a fatefully explicit directive. Paras 7 to 10 read thus: “7. All our old
maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where
necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern
and North Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line.’ These
new maps should also not state there is any un-demarcated territory.
… this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is
not open to discussion with anybody. There may be very minor points
of discussion. Even these should not be raised by us. It is necessary that
the system of check-posts should be spread along this entire frontier.
More especially, we should have check-posts in such places as might be
considered disputed areas. ….” (SW JN. Vol. 26 p. 481).
He shut the door to negotiations on the boundary – “not open to
discussion with anybody.” India unilaterally revised its official map.
The legend “boundary undefined” in the Western (Kashmir) and middle
sectors (Uttar Pradesh) in the official maps of 1948 and 1950 were
dropped in the new map of 1954. A firm clear line was shown, instead.
Accordingly, when, in response to Nehru’s demarche on the maps on
14 December 1958, Zhou Enlai squarely raised the border issue on 23
January1959, Nehru’s letter of 22 March 1959 cited the Treaty of 1842
to assert that the boundary was a settled issue.
Zhou’s letter of 23 January 1959 offered “to take a more or less
realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line.” He offered an overall
settlement and was concerned with the boundary “particularly its
western section.”
Fundamentally, Zhou said “All this shows that border disputes do
exist between China and India.” Nehru’s reference to the Treaty of 1842
was historically incorrect. That was a treaty of non-aggression after a
war; it did not define a boundary. If it had, the British would not have
proposed negotiations in 1846-47, made the offer of 14 March 1899
and racked their brains on where the line should be drawn. Nehru’s
reply of 22 March 1959 was sent, two months after Zhou’s letter of 23
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A.G. Noorani
January 1959, evidently after full deliberation in which the Historical
Division of the Ministry of External Affairs was also involved. Beneath
the historical error lay his riposte to Zhou “there is no room for doubt
about our frontiers as shown in the published maps.” This reply based on
his decision in 1954, foreclosed compromise. (Notes, Memoranda and
Letters exchanged and Agreements signed between the Government of
India and China 1954-1959, White Paper I, Ministry of External Affairs
Government of India; 1959; pp. 52-57 for both letters).
Nehru’s initial demarche of 14 December 1958 centred on the
McMahon Line in the eastern sector, which was drawn up in 1914.
Zhou’s reply of 23 January 1959 raised the issue of the western sector
in the Ladakh province of Jammu and Kashmir; precisely it was Aksai
Chin. “The Sinkiang – Tibet highway built by our country in 1956 runs
through that area.” (ibid. p. 53).
Contrary to the stand he took in his letter of 22 March 1959, on as
many as six occasions later in the year Jawaharlal Nehru admitted that
Aksai China was very much a territory in dispute.
28 August 1959: “The Aksai Chin area, that is an area about parts of
which, if I may say so, it is not quite clear what the position is.”
31 August 1959: “It is Indian territory and we claim it so because
we think that the weight of evidence is in our favour, maps, etc., but
the Chinese produce their own maps, equally old, which are in their
favour.”
4 September 1959: “So far as the corner of the Aksai Chin area is
concerned, that has been claimed by the Chinese as their territory and
I believe in their maps too, not the new maps, but the old maps, that is
shown as their territory. That is disputed and there are two viewpoints
about that…”
4 September 1959: “The actual boundary of Ladakh with Tibet
was not very carefully defined. It was defined to some extent by British
officers who went there, but I rather doubt if they did any careful
66
survey.”
10 September 1959: “We have always looked upon the Ladakh area
as a different area, if I may say so, some vaguer area so far as the frontier
is concerned because the exact line of the frontier is not at all clear as
in the case of the McMahon Line … Nothing can be a more amazing
folly than for two great countries like India and China to go into a major
conflict and war for the possession of a few mountain peaks, however
beautiful the mountain peaks might be, or some area which is more or
less uninhabited.”
12 September 1959: “This place Aksai China area is in our maps
undoubtedly. But I distinguish it completely from other areas. It is a
matter for argument as to what part of it belongs to us and what part of it
belongs to somebody else. It is not at all a dead clear matter … I cannot
go about doing these things in a manner which has been challenged
not today but for a hundred years. It has been challenged to (sic) the
ownership of this strip of territory. That particular area stands by itself.
It has been in challenge all the time…. I cannot say what parts of it may
not belong to us, and what parts may. The point is there has never been
any delimitation there in that area and it has been a challenged area.”
(Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations VOl. I, Part I, MEA; 1961;
pp. 84, 99, 105, 119-120, 134-135, 148-149, respectively).
When Zhou met Nehru in New Delhi in April 1960, he was prepared
to yield on the McMahon Line if Nehru conceded the Aksai Chin. Nehru
refused. Already by then China had recognized the Line, in so far as
it extended to Burma in the boundary agreement with Burma on 25
January 1960.
At the first meeting of the summit on 20 April, Zhou told Nehru:
“The one common feature in the boundary between China and Burma
and India is the presence of the McMahon Line. We stated that we do
not recognize the McMahon Line but that we were willing to take a
realistic view with Burma and India.”
At the press conference in New Delhi on 25 April, Zhou defined
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the boundary in the west as “the line which runs from the Karakoram
Pass south eastward roughly along the watershed of the Karakoram
Mountains to the Kongka Pass.” He also said: “China has no boundary
dispute with Sikkim and Bhutan.”
Zhou formulated these six points at the press conference: “(I) There
exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides. (II)
There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to
which each side exercise administrative jurisdiction. (III) In determining
the boundary between the two countries certain geographical principles
such as watersheds, river valley and mountain passes, should be equally
applicable to all sectors of the two sides. (IV) A settlement of the boundary
question between the two countries should take into account the national
feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram
Mountains. (V) Pending a settlement of the boundary question between
the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to the line
of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as preconditions, but individual adjustments may be made. (VI) In order to
ensure tranquility on the border so as to facilitate the discussions, both
sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the
boundary.”
These were, in fact, an elaboration of five points he had put forth
to Nehru on 22 April in private after two days of sterile debate on the
rights and the wrongs. The six points were in fact an elaboration of
four because a crucial point was omitted. “(IV) Since we are going to
have friendly negotiations, neither side should put forward claims to an
area which is no longer under its administrative control. For example,
we made no claim in the eastern sector to areas south of the McMahon
Line, but India made such claims in the western sector. It is difficult to
accept such claims and the best thing is that both sides do not make such
territorial claims. Of course, there are individual places which need to
be re-adjusted individually; but that is not a territorial claim.”
He repeated them in crisp formulations in a meeting with Nehru the
next day as forming “a common ground.” They were: “(i) our boundaries
are not delimited and, therefore, there is a dispute about those; (ii)
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however, this [sic. there?] is a line of actual control both in the eastern
sector as well as the western sector and also in the middle sector; (iii)
geographical features should be taken into account in settling the border.
One of the principles would be watershed and there would be also other
features, like valleys and mountain passes, etc. These principles should
be applicable to all sectors, eastern, western and middle; (iv) each side
should keep to this line and make no territorial claims. This does not
discount individual adjustments along the border later; (v) national
sentiments should be respected. For both countries a lot of sentiment is
tied around the Himalayas and the Karakoram.”
Nehru’s approach was radically different. “We should take each
sector of the border and convince the other side of what it believes to be
right” – an impossible exercise in international politics. It is unreal even
in domestic politics. On the fourth point, renunciation of territorial claims
by both, Nehru responded on 24 April: “Our accepting things as they
are would mean that basically there is no dispute and the question ends
there; that we are unable to do.” Nehru’s stand was unsupported by the
facts of history; was politically unwise and diplomatically disastrous.
Two Chinese pronouncements should have alerted India to the
course events later took. One was a Statement by Ambassador Pan
Tsu-li to the Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt on 16 May 1959 couched
in language so unusual, with proverbs and all, as to suggest Mao Tsetung’s draftsmanship: “We cannot have two centres of attention, nor can
we take friend for foe … Friends! It seems to us that you too cannot
have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is, here then lies the meeting part of
our two sides.”
He ended with his “best regards” to Nehru who replied in a manner
appropriate to his Headmaster at Harrow. On 23 May, Dutt read out
a statement, drafted by Nehru, upbraiding the Ambassador for breach
of “diplomatic usage and the countries due to friendly countries.” He
sharply attacked China (White Paper I; pp. 73-78 for both statements).
The other pronouncement was direct. Zhou’s delineation of China’s
boundary began from the Karakoram Pass eastwards. He pointedly
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A.G. Noorani
omitted the boundary to the west of the Pass. In 1960 Chinese officials
refused to discuss this sector with their Indian counterparts at Peking on
27 June 1960.
Chang Wen-Chin, Director First Asian Department in China’s
Foreign Ministry interrupted, a junior colleague to make his stand clear;
“It is necessary for both sides to adopt a matter of fact attitude and avoid
serious political questions unrelated to our work.” (Parshotam Mehra;
Negotiating With the Chinese 1846-1987; Reliance Publishing House,
New Delhi, 1989; p. 222) A Sino-Pak settlement was very much on the
cards.
It was not China which pressed Pakistan for a settlement. On the
contrary it dragged its feet. It obviously preferred to settle with India
first. It was Pakistan who pressed for an accord, not to forge an alliance
with China – and thus wreck its alliance with the United States – but to
profit by India’s experience and secure peace and tranquility in the area.
It had been disturbed by China’s patrols.
On 23 October 1959, President Ayub Khan disclosed at a press
conference that Pakistan’s Foreign Office had received a map showing
certain areas of Pakistan as part of China. Pakistan would therefore, in due
course, approach China “for a peaceful settlement of the border question
by demarcating the northern frontiers.” (Dawn, 24 October 1959, Vide
S.M. Burke; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; Oxford University press, 1973;
p. 290 and Altaf Gauhar; Ayub Khan, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore;
1993; pp. 234-5).
Ayub Khan’s memoirs record how and why he went about this task
in some detail. In August and October 1959 there were armed clashes
between the troops of India and China in Longju, in the east, and at
the Kongka Pass in Ladakh, respectively. Ayub Khan was concerned at
the risks of patrolling. “A similar situation could arise on our own undemarcated borders in the Sinkiang and Baltistan areas. We had been
receiving reports from time to time that Chinese patrols were coming
up to Shamshal. There had been no shooting incident, but the Chinese
had driven away some cattle in certain areas. I thought it might be a
70
good idea to approach the Chinese and suggest to them that the border
be demarcated. After all, neither side had anything to gain by leaving
the border undefined. I inquired whether any attempt had been made
in the past to demarcate this border and I was shown the relevant maps
and papers. Some attempts had been made by the British. I asked our
experts to mark what from our point of view constituted the actual line
of control on the map, and this was done. We also found that we could
legitimately claim control up to a point opposite the Shamshal Pass.
The people of Shamshal village could, according to custom, take their
cattle for grazing in a fertile valley on the other side of the Pass where
the Chinese had established a couple of posts. They also used to get salt,
a rare and valuable commodity, from the soil in that area. I mentioned
this matter at a Cabinet meeting, but the feeling was that the Chinese
were unlikely to respond to any suggestion for the demarcation of the
border. I felt that there would be no harm in preparing a memorandum
and getting in touch with the Chinese authorities. This happened towards
the end of 1959.
“There was no response from the Chinese government for a long time.
…. On my return from the United States in December 1961, the Chinese
Ambassador came to see me. He asked for our support for the proposition
that the Chinese entry into the United Nations should be decided on
the basis of a simple majority rather than a two-thirds majority. I asked
him about our suggestion of demarcating the undefined border between
China and Pakistan. He said that that was a very complicated matter.
I told him that if border demarcation was a very complicated matter,
China’s admission to the United Nations was even more complicated.
I suggested to him that we should look at the two problems on merit
regardless of whether they were simple or complicated. We should be
prepared to do what was right and sensible. …
“Our Foreign Minister, Mr. Manzur Qadir, later took up the matter
with the Chinese Ambassador and asked him pointedly whether they
were refusing to discuss the demarcation of the border because of the
disputed nature of the Kashmir territory. The Foreign Minister got the
impression that that was the real reason, and that China at that time
did not want to get involved in another argument with India. We were
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A.G. Noorani
able to explain to the Chinese government that all we were asking for
was the identification of the line between two stated points. The area
to the north of the line would constitute Chinese territory; the status of
the area to the south of the line did not have to be determined. China
would be responsible for the defence of the area north of the line and the
defence of the area south of the line would be Pakistan’s responsibility.
Soon after this the Chinese told us that they were prepared to discuss the
problem of demarcation of the border with us. The two sides nominated
their teams of experts to examine the problem. …
“Formal discussion with the Chinese started soon after. The Chinese
were very difficult in the beginning, but once they realized that we were
there not to outwit them but to seek an honourable solution their attitude
changed. They produced a map on the basis of which they claimed certain
areas on our side of the actual line of control, the valley of Khanjarab
and some areas near K-2. Eventually they agreed to the actual line of
control as shown on our map and it was adopted as the demarcation line
with certain marginal adjustments. The watershed of the Indus Basin
rivers was shown on our side and the watershed of the rivers of Yakang
and certain adjoining areas on their side. There was some argument
about K-2 and it was agreed that the line of control should be put right
on top of K-2, thus letting the mountain peak belong to both sides as had
been done for Mount Everest with Nepal. Once we had agreed on the
demarcation line, aerial surveys were undertaken and the whole matter
was settled amicably and without any difficulty.
“We raised the question of the grazing ground which covered several
hundred square miles on the other side of the Shamshal Pass. We proved
to the Chinese representative that this area had been traditionally under
the use of the people of Shamshal and that if they were denied access
to the area it would cause them great hardship. The Chinese said they
would check with the people of Sinkiang but agreed, in principle, that
the matter be resolved on merit. They finally agreed to let us have the
area.” (Friends not Masters; Oxford University Press; 1967; pp. 161164).
Pakistan proposed border talks on 23 October 1959, Foreign Minister
72
Manzur Qadir announced on 15 January 1961 that China ”had agreed in
principle to the demarcation of its border with Pakistan.” This was over a
year after Pakistan had approached China for talks on the matter. It took
another year and more for China to agree to conduct formal negotiations.
On 28 March 1961 Pakistan sent a Note formally proposing talks. China
replied only on 27 February 1962. An announcement was made by both
sides on 3 May 1962 apparently as a result of Ayub Khan’s talk with
China’s Ambassador in December 1961. The two sides affirmed that
“the boundary between China’s Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the
defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan, has never been
formally delimited and demarcated in history. With a view to ensuring
tranquility along the border and the growth of good-neighbourly relations
between the two countries, they have agreed to conduct negotiations so
as to attain an agreed understanding of the location and alignment of
this boundary and to sign on this basis an agreement of a provisional
nature.” Maps were exchanged in July 1962.
Talks were started in Peking on 12 October 1962, “Upon reaching
agreed views on the procedural matters concerning the talks, the
representatives of the two parties exchanged plain topographical maps,
which were checked technically by map experts of both parties and on
which an agreed understanding was attained. Following that, the two
parties exchanged maps depicting the boundary line and held formal
meetings as well as friendly consultations in a spirit of equality, cooperation, mutual understanding and mutual agreement. And now an
agreement in principle has been reached on the location and alignment
of the boundary actually existing between the two countries.” (China,
India, Pakistan; edited by K. Sarwar Haroon, Pakistan Institute of
International Relations, Karachi; 1966; pp 366-367). The de facto
boundary was legitimized but with significant changes.
China treaded the path cautiously after its experience with India’s
stand on boundary talks. It indicated on 27 February 1962 its readiness
to conclude with the Government of Pakistan “an agreed comprehension
of the location and alignment of this boundary so as to prevent the
tranquility on the border from being adversely affected on account of
misunderstanding.” The note made it clear that any agreement that
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A.G. Noorani
might be reached between China and Pakistan would be of a provisional
nature on the location and alignment “actually existing between the two
countries” pending the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
In his report to Ayub (24 October, 1962), the Pakistan Ambassador
gave his evaluation of the position China was likely to adopt during the
boundary talks. The Chinese, he indicated, would treat the traditional
customary boundary as the de facto boundary line.” (Altaf Gauhar; pp.
236-238).
A former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, who had also served as
Ambassador to China disclosed to this writer that China sought to
know the basis on which Pakistan proposed to determine the boundary.
Pakistan’s response clinched matters. The basis would be the facts of
history and existing realities.
If India had adopted such a stand the boundary dispute would have
been settled in April 1960. It is hard to think of any other boundary
dispute which is as easily susceptible to a fair compromise with each
having its vital, non-negotiable interest securely under its own control
– India has the McMahon Line and China the road through the Aksai
Chin.
Nehru’s reaction to these developments was inconsistent and shortsighted. He expected Pakistan to adopt India’s stand that the boundary
was defined; ergo, no dispute existed. He came to Pakistan to sign the
Indus Waters Treaty and had extended discussions with Ayub Khan at
Murree on 21 September 1960 after their talks in Karachi.
Ayub Khan records: “He asked me whether we had approached the
Chinese to demarcate the border and I informed him of the position. He
wanted me to show him the map on which we were basing our claim
and wanted to know exactly the area to which our claim extended. I told
him quite frankly that we had no intention of claiming any area which
we did not honestly believe to be covered by the actual line of control
as determined by our experts. We might ask for certain areas beyond the
line of control to provide facilities for the local population.
74
“Mr. Nehru asked me to let him have a copy of the map and I agreed
to this in principle. As soon as he went back to India, he started criticizing
us for having approached the Chinese to demarcate the border. He
mentioned the map I had shown him and said that we did not even know
where the border was and that we were acting in a childish manner”
(Ayub Khan; p. 163).
Nehru’s version corroborates this, though not quite the language
Nehru was said to have used. Shortly after his return to Delhi, Nehru
said at his press conference on 18 January 1961 “The fact of the matter
is, so far as I know, Pakistan does not know very much about that border
to which you refer. It is a remote border for them on the west of the
Karakoram and their knowledge of that is extremely limited.” He said
also, “In our opinion, we have nothing to negotiate, our minds are quite
clear.” (PMSIR; Vol. II, Press Conferences; pp. 100-101).
In a speech in the Rajya Sabha on 3 May 1962, Nehru elaborated
on the theme “In Murree and Pindi I thought that I might discuss this
Chinese question with President Ayub Khan and let him know – I did not
want to discuss so much on our border – what the position was on that
part of the Kashmir border on which they were at the present moment;
having occupied a part of Kashmir, they have to face the Chinese. So I
told them of our maps, I showed them our confidential maps as to where
we thought the Chinese were and where we were, and asked them what
the position of the Chinese was on their side of the border.
“Well, I did not get much help from them because I found they knew
less than I did even on that side of border. But we did discuss it, and it is
most surprising that the Foreign Secretary who, I think, was present at
that time, said that he knew nothing about those matters at all.” (PMSIR,
Vol. 1 Indian Parliament, Part II; p. 87).
On 7 May 1962 Nehru spoke at length, after the announcement of
boundary talks between Pakistan and China on 3 May “the acceptance
by the Government of Pakistan of the Chinese Government’s view
that this boundary has never been delimited and demarcated in history
and their willingness to demarcate it now is – I do not know – sounds
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A.G. Noorani
rather an opportunist attempt to take advantage of a particular position,
even though this might involve changes in the well-known boundary
which has been known to exist for a long time. Obviously in these high
mountain ranges boundaries are not demarcated on the ground. There
are some places which have not been reached by the human beings,
some mountain peaks, and others have been reached occasionally.
Therefore, they are not demarcated. They are divided by various
features and various understandings like watershed, etc. We have made
it perfectly clear even in the past both to the Pakistan Government
and the Chinese Government about those parts of the frontier now in
possession of Pakistan that we would not recognize any arrangements
arrived at between them and Pakistan. I have stated the other day in
the other House that a little more than a year and a half ago when I
was in Pakistan I discussed this question or I raised this question with
President Ayub Khan with his Foreign Minister and others present in
a friendly way, because China was encroaching upon us and part of
that boundary was at present under occupation of Pakistan. I wanted to
know exactly where the Chinese were on that part of the boundary, and
if they had given any trouble to Pakistan, what steps Pakistan had taken
to meet the situation. There was an area – Hunza area – and the Mir of
Hunza claimed it: he had called upon the Pakistan Government – and
protested to the Pakistan Government that the Chinese had occupied
some grazing areas there belonging to his original State, Hunza, which
is part of Kashmir territory.
“This matter had come up before us too before, and we had examined
all the old papers and we had found that this was an old dispute between
the then Tibet Government and the Government of India through the
Kashmir Government. The British Government, after due enquiry, had
not accepted the Mir of Hunza’s claim to that particular grazing area,
and therefore had refused to intervene in this matter. That refers to a
particular spot, the grazing area, and not to the whole frontier…
“I wanted to know what Pakistan’s attitude was in this matter.
Therefore, I raised it with President Ayub Khan and told him of the old
papers we had. He agreed with that – that particular area – the grazing
area of Hunza. He said we cannot lay claim to that in the circumstances
76
when the British Government had given it up.
“Nevertheless, the major question remained about the border there,
- what the Chinese authorities were doing to it. It seemed to me that
both sides were not fully cognizant of the facts of the situation. Such
facts as we knew were a little more than they knew. We knew that area.
We discussed it. I showed them our maps and later they sent their maps
which slightly, not much…
“Anyhow, I have given this past history just to keep the House
informed, that we treated the Pakistan Government in a friendly way in
this matter because we thought that any action which they might take
should be in line with the action we were taking in regard to this border,
and should not conflict. Unfortunately for various reasons they have
come to this agreement with the Chinese which is an interference on both
sides with India’s legal rights in the matter.” (ibid. pp. 89-91). Nehru
clearly wanted Pakistan to emulate India – and refuse to negotiate.
In a statement in Parliament on the agreement on 5 March 1963
Nehru cited the very maps on which he had poured scorn to say “If one
goes by these maps, Pakistan has obviously surrendered over 13,000
square miles of territory” – which, never belonged to it or to undivided
India at all. He added “Running south of the traditional alignment the
Pakistan line of actual control surrendered about 1,600 square miles to
China” – surrendered is fundamentally is different from “ceded.” Waived
is a more appropriate word as we shall see. (Sino Pakistan “Agreement”
March 2, 1963; Some Facts; External Publicity Division, MEA 1963;
pp. 32-34).
This excellent brochure contains the texts of the protest notes
exchanged between India and Pakistan and between India and China. It is
unnecessary to study the polemics especially since they are conducted in
execrable English. However, a Note on the “Historical basis for traditional
frontiers of north Kashmir with Sinkiang (West of the Karakoram Pass)”
is noteworthy for its inconsistencies and inaccuracies. “Both the upper
valley of the Khunjerab river and the upper valley of the Shaksgam river,
lying south of the Aghil mountains, have always been parts of Hunza.
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A.G. Noorani
The people of Hunza exercised various rights including cultivation
and pasturage and grazing in this area. The Shimshalis of the Darwaza
area in particular used the entire area up to the Shaksgam for grazing
and extracted salt at various places in the valley. On the other hand, no
one from China had ever used this area. The Mir of Hunza exercised
authority in this region, maintained posts and collected revenue. … The
Mir of Hunza, who became the feudatory of the Maharaja of Kashmir in
about 1864, had been utilising regions north of the traditional boundary
for grazing and cultivation. In some British maps a colour wash had been
used reaching further north into Sinkiang and covering this area north
of the traditional frontier where such grazing and cultivation took place.
The British Government, however, recognized the correct traditional
frontier in this area and in 1899 authorised Sir Claude McDonald, their
Minister in Peking, to make proposals to the Chinese Government for
a realignment. These compromise proposals envisaged the inclusion
within Hunza of the Taghdumbash region, north of both Hunza and the
traditional alignment, where the Mir had exercised grazing rights, in
return for concessions south of the alignment between the Aghil and the
Karakoram ranges. The Chinese Government refused to enter into such
an agreement and preferred to abide by the traditional alignment.
“In 1927 as a result of an examination on the ground by officials
of the Government of India, it was reaffirmed that administration only
extended up to the traditional boundary, and consequently in 1936 the
Government of India asked the Mir to abandon his grazing rights in the
Taghdumbash area.” The rectification of the alignment was duly carried
out in all maps published by the Government of India after 1947.
At the talks of the Officials of China and India in 1960 the Chinese
side presented a map which showed their claim line as running well to the
south of the traditional alignment and including an area of about 3,700
square miles of Kashmir. The Chinese, however, refused to discuss this
matter on the plea that this area was not under India’s control.
It was pointed out to the Pakistan Government that India had no
claims to territories north of the traditional frontier in Sinkiang, but the
Government of Pakistan continued thereafter to show an alignment far
78
north into Sinkiang, including about 11,000 square miles of territory.
This alignment admitted that the frontier was “Undefined.” (ibid. pp.
1- 2). The record shows that the Mir had grazing rights while Curzon
unilaterally created a loop over the Shimshal Pass.
The New Delhi correspondent of the Times (London) then was
Neville Maxwell. In two despatches he threw much light on why
Pakistan revised its out-dated maps. Since they are hard to come by, they
are quoted here in extenso: “Analysis of the terms of the border treaty
shows, however, that in fact both sides have made concessions. The
area in dispute from the overlapping borders shown on Pakistan’s and
China’s maps was about 3,400 square miles. The compromise border
now agreed upon leaves about two-thirds of it (2,050 square miles) on
China’s side; but while Pakistan has given up only claims on maps.
China will be withdrawing her frontier forces and administration from
about 750 square miles.
“The Chinese and Pakistan claims diverged from a point just south
of the Khunjerab pass. According to China’s maps, the border there
should run almost due south to the Karakoram mountains before turning
eastward; Pakistan’s maps showed the border running roughly south-east
from that point to the sharp bend in Mustagh (or Shaksgam) river. The
agreed border will follow Pakistan’s claim, thus including in Pakistan
territory to the west of the Mustagh river, where it bends sharply around
the town of Sokh Bulaq.
“In order to accommodate Pakistan in her desire for that pocket.
China has diverged from the principle of the watershed on which she
has based her claim in this area. For a stretch west of the Sokh Bulaq
bend the compromise border will be the Muztagh river which runs
into Yarkand river in Sinkiang. Then from the point at which the first
significant tributary joins the Muztagh river the compromise border
drops abruptly south to rejoin the Karakoram watershed.
“It is at the point here the compromise border meets the Muztagh
river where Pakistan begins to give up the claimed territory in her part
of the compromise. Pakistan’s maps (which were given to her by India
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A.G. Noorani
in 1960) show the border crossing the river at that point picking up
another crest line and running through Aghil Pass.
“Unless the borders not yet formally delimited in these remote and
desolate marches are to be considered precise and absolute, the settlement
now reached between Pakistan and China would seem to be an equitable
compromise. Pakistan was able to enter into these negotiations free of
passionate rhetorical commitments to which the Indian Government has
been tied since 1959.
“Indian criticism today of Pakistan’s “surrender” of territory
ironically and even tragically underlines the fact that just such a settlement
as this would have been fully acceptable to India before the news of
China’s furtive and deceitful occupation of territory which Peking knew
that India claimed aroused a cry of “aggressive” here.” (The Times, 4
March 1963). In his book India’s China War published in 1970 Maxwell
abandoned his assessment “of China’s furtive and deceitful occupation
of territory which Peking knew that India claimed.”
Two days later he explained why Nehru alleged that Pakistan
surrendered more than 13,000 sq. miles of territory to China. “This
suggestion is based on the fact that Pakistan was slower than India in
correcting the official maps. In 1927 the British Government of India
decided that a claim of the Maharaja of Kashmir that his domains
were bounded to the north by the northern watershed of the Kuen Lun
ranges was insupportable, but did not correct the survey of India maps
accordingly. Finding that decision in the files after independence, the
Indian Government acted upon it and corrected their maps.
“As late as 1962, it appears from Mr. Nehru’s statement, Pakistan
continued to use the maps showing the Maharaja’s old claim as the
international frontier. According to these maps, as the Prime Minister
pointed out, Pakistan would have surrendered about 13,000 square
miles; but, in fact, Pakistan began negotiations on the border with China
from the basis of corrected maps.” (The Times 6 March, 1963). Every
reputable work on the subject relies on this report which was published
much before the MEA’s brochure on the agreement which also referred
80
to the revision of the maps in 1927.
W.F. Van Eekelen, a Dutch diplomat who served in New Delhi and
London, delved into the archives in both places to write an excellent study
Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute With China (Martinus
Nijhoff; The Hague, 1966) concurs with the view that while Pakistan
waived claims on maps, China withdrew from 750 square miles (p. 131);
(Vide also R.R.V. Prescott; Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty; Melbourne
University Press, 1975; p. 230-237).
Dr. B. N. Goswami of the Universities of Calcutta and North
Burdwan opined, against the “patriotic” consensus that “to a limited but
knowledgeable section of people, the agreement appears to be just and
fair to both sides. … Neutral observers do not find much substance in the
Indian allegations of Pakistani concessions to China” (B. N. Goswami,
Pakistan and China; Allied Publishers; 1971; pp. 89-90).
Significantly a few weeks after the announcement on 3 May 1962 of
an agreement to commence negotiations, Major-General N.A.M. Raza
was appointed Ambassador to China with full powers to negotiate a
boundary agreement (Pakistan-China boundary agreement; Department
of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi; August
1963; p. 5).
In an interview in Peking on 8 April 1963 Raza made an authoritative
exposition rich in details (Pakistani’s News Digest; Karachi, 15 April
1963, Vol. II No. 8). He rejected India’s charge that Pakistan ceded
about 2,000 square miles Shaksgam Valley in the Tarim River Drainage
System across the Karakorum Range in deciding the boundary question
with China.
The line, which Sir Claude McDonald suggested, followed the main
watershed of the Karakorum Range dividing the Indus River System
on the south from the Tarim River system in the north, except that it
included 455 square miles of the western portion of the Taghdumbash
Pamir and 470 sq. miles of Shimshal Valley, also in the Tarim River
Drainage System, in the British India territory.
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A.G. Noorani
The McDonald proposal did not, however, include the 2,000 square
miles of Shaksgam Valley, defined by India as lying between the Agil
Range and the Karakorum Ranger in the Tarim River Drainage System.
In any case the Chinese Government did not accept the proposal and
never replied to the British communication.
If the British proposal were examined, it would be very clear that
the British made absolutely no mention of the Shaksgam valley while
pitching their claim on the Tagdambash Pamir. Besides, the portion of
Tagdambash claimed by the British was 455 square miles, while the
area of the Shaksgam Valley is about 2,000 square miles. Following,
however, of the non-acceptance of the McDonald proposal by China,
the British Government continued correspondence with British India
concerning the boundary which it would be best to propose to China.
Subsequently, another proposal was made by the Political Agent of
Gilgit, Maj. Galbraith, in 1939, which could not be presented to the
Government of China due to the outbreak of World War-II. According
to this proposal, Gujrab Valley and the Kutchin Salt Mines were added
to the British claim of 1899 and the claim to the Tagdambash Pamir was
again left out, as already suggested by the Viceroy in 1905.
From these facts, he was clear, Gen. Raza said that: “Firstly, the
original claim, which the British made on a portion of the Tagdambash
Pamir in 1899, had definitely been dropped. Secondly Shaksgam Valley
was never included in various British claims and on the contrary when
the British wanted to go to the Shaksgam Valley for survey, they asked
for a visa from the Chinese Government; and consequently there was
never any idea of exchanging the Shaksgam Valley for Tagdambash
Pamir. India did not claim the Tagdsambash Pamir in the line it gave to
China during their talks in 1960.
Raza asserted that the boundary now agreed upon between China and
Pakistan coincided exactly with the line which covered the maximum
territory which the British were to claim as late as 1939.
On 28 November 1998 Agha Shahi, former Foreign Minister said,
82
as one involved in the negotiations, that a study of the archives failed
to reveal credible evidence of any plausible claim to territory beyond
the watershed of the Karakoram mountain range (News; 29 November
1998).
The scholar Alastair Lamb subjected the Agreement to a rigorous
analysis based on historical records. (The Sino-Pakistani Boundary
Agreement of 2 March 1963; Australian Outlook; Vol. 18, No. 3;
December 1964; pp. 299-312).
The Agreement reconciles conflicting maps. Article 2 defined “the
alignment of the entire boundary line” between the two in detail noting
the discrepancies between the two maps. Para III of Article 2 read: “In
view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are not fully identical
in their representation of topographical features, the two parties have
agreed that the actual features on the ground shall prevail, so far as
the location and alignment of the boundary described in Section I is
concerned; and that they will be determined as far as possible by joint
survey on the ground.”
A Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission was to be set up to
conduct surveys and delineate the boundary line on jointly preferred
maps. A protocol would be drawn up to define the agreed boundary with
agreed maps attached to it (Art. 4).
Lamb drew up a sketch map on which he plotted the 1963 boundary,
based on the definition in Article 2, as well as the line offered to China
in 1899 and opined that “the 1899 line coincided for much of its length
with the 1963 alignment…. the 1963 line concedes to Pakistan some
territory north of the Shimshal Pass which would have been excluded
from British India by the 1899 line; but the tract in question was brought
on to the British side by the modification of 1905. .. Thus by 1905 the
British had accepted a boundary with Sinkiang which coincided almost
exactly … with the alignment negotiated in 1963. … The 1899 line,
by definition, began at the point on the Russo-Afghan border where
the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission left off in 1895. Its starting
point, in fact, marked a meeting place of British, Chinese, Russian and
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A.G. Noorani
Afghan territory. To connect the terminal point of the 1895 Boundary
Commission with the main Karakoram watershed, however, involved
running the line north of the watershed and including within British
India territory which the Indian Government had no intention of ever
administering. By the end of the First World War the western end of
the border had been pulled back on maps, as it always had been in fact,
to the main watershed crossed by the Kilik and Mintaka Pasases. …
therefore, the 1963 boundary coincides with the alignment in practice
and in theory of the British Indian border from at least 1918 until 1947
and the transfer of power.”
In 1937 or 1938 the Chinese authorities in Kashgar went so far as to
send a patrol right up to Shimshal to expel cultivators who were subjects of
the Mir of Hunza. During the Second World War the Indian Government
evidently concluded that it was pointless to maintain the fiction of Hunza
rights beyond the watershed, except for the Shimshal tract; and the Mir
was persuaded to abandon his rights in the Taghdumbash Pamir and
Raskam in exchange for a Knighthood. “By the time of the transfer of
power in 1947, therefore, the Indian Government had abandoned any
claims north of the Karakoram watershed, except in Shimshal; and had it
been necessary in 1947 to draw a line which represented the real limit of
the British Indian Empire here, that line would certainly have followed
exactly the same alignment as did the line of the 1963 Sino-Pakistani
boundary agreement.”
Lamb wrote a further study on a wider canvas in 1973 entitled The
Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh (Australian National University Press,
Canberra). He held that in the agreement of 1963 “the area of Pakistani
occupation has been increased considerably when compared to the 1898
proposals” (p. 47). The agreement “was little more than a confirmation
of the western part of the 1899 line as it was unilaterally modified by
Lord Curzon’s government in 1905” (p. 74).
Curzon’s modification was based on Hunza’s needs. This fact
prompted Pakistan’s negotiators, evidently in response to disquiet in
Hunza, to seek a meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai though the
alignment had been agreed and finalised. The meeting was held well
84
past midnight. Zhou’s first question was whether the visitors were
otherwise satisfied with the deal. They replied that they were but sought
a concession on humanitarian grounds. Zhou readily agreed.
The veteran diplomat Abdul Sattar, who served as Foreign Minister
records : “Pakistan remembers with gratitude an extraordinary gesture
by Premier Zhou Enlai: after the alignment was agreed, the Pakistan
government belatedly realized that some grazing lands along the
Mustagh River in the Shimshal Pass on the other side of the watershed
were historically used by inhabitants of Hunza. It then appealed for an
exception to the watershed principle to save hardship to the poor people.
Zhou generously agreed to the amendment of the boundary so that an
area of 750 square miles remained on the Pakistan side. (Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History, Oxford University press,
Karachi, 2007; p. 71).
The agreement of 1963 is, thus, based on a history that stretched
to the 19th century. If India had consulted the records in the spirit as
Pakistan did, an accord could have been reached in April 1960. For India,
as it did for Pakistan in 1963, the McDonald’s Note of 14 March 1899
provides a key to the resolution of the India-China boundary dispute.
85
THE AFGHAN TURMOIL FROM 1747
TO 2001
S. Iftikhar Murshed*
Abstract
Since the establishment of the kingdom of Afghanistan by Ahmad Shah
Abdali in 1747, the country has seldom known peace. It has been ravaged
by conflict before the emergence of the Taliban, during their harsh rule
from 1996 to 2001 and after their ouster. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic
country and it is the quest for national cohesion in a heterogeneous
population that defines the Afghan problem. The 20 August 2009
presidential election was fraud-tainted. Whatever dispensation finally
emerges, it is essential that it should reflect the ethnic composition of the
country or else durable peace and stability will not return even if the Al
Qaeda-supported Taliban insurgency comes to an end. Author).
Through history, Afghanistan has seldom known peace. Its ethnic
heterogeneity has shaped and influenced its violence-ridden past.
Peaceful coexistence among the ethnic groups has been alien to the
Afghan experience. The ethnic map of the country, with the groups
separated and confined to clearly defined areas, has also militated against
national unity. The Hindu Kush range, which translates as the “slayer of
Hindus,” has served as the rough divide.
In the historical context, the term “Afghan” was probably first used
in the fifteenth century during the reign of Mahmud of Ghazni, a ruler
of Turkish descent, while the name of the country, “Afghanistan,” was
coined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Moguls. History
contains no record of an Afghan state before 1747. Eastern Afghanistan
*
Iftikhar Murshed is the publisher of Criterion. Email: simurshed@yahoo.com.
formed part of the Mogul Empire while its west was controlled by the
Safavids of Iran. Kabul became the capital of Mogul territory west
of the Indus. The second major Afghan town, Kandahar, was contested
between the Mogul and Persian empires till it was taken by the latter
during the reign of the Mogul emperor, Shah Jahan. The shahs of
Iran continued to treat Afghanistan a province of their empire till the
nineteenth century.
The quest for national cohesion in a heterogeneous population
defines the Afghanistan problem. The difficulties are compounded
because the disparate groups of the country were brought together,
through the centuries, more by accident rather than any shared desire
to live together. The urge for unity was absent from Afghan society
because one group, the Pushtuns, imposed itself on the others. The
ethnic minorities were subjugated and treated as second class citizens.
The Pushtuns monopolized economic and political power with the
encouragement of imperial Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Thus uni-racial rule in a multiracial society, and its attendant
backlash, unleashed violence among a people who had never wanted to
be united into a single nation.
The Great Game
In 1747, Ahmed Shah Abdali founded the Kingdom of Afghanistan
and extended it up to Kashmir, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan of present
day Pakistan. He was conferred the title Durr-i- Durran (Pearl of Pearls)
and from this his tribe, which was to play so prominent a role in Afghan
history, became known as the Durrani. After Abdali’s death in 1773,
the empire fragmented into independent city states and spurred rivalry
between the British and the Russians for dominance of the country.
The emergence of Afghanistan as a state in the last two centuries
owed itself more to Britain’s imperial ambitions than any desire among
its peoples to forge national identity. British writers claimed that
their country had contributed significantly to give “a national unity
to that nebulous community which we call Afghanistan (which the
Afghans never called by that name) by drawing a boundary all round
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it and elevating it into a position of buffer state between ourselves and
Russia.”1 External compression was, therefore, applied by the advancing
empires of Britain and Russia to foster effective cohesion among the
Afghan groups.2 The conflicting interest of the two imperial powers did
not permit either to establish itself in Afghanistan. The alternative to an
armed clash over the territory was to transform it into a buffer state. It
was also in their interest, if Afghanistan was to play this role, to ensure
that chaos and anarchy did not prevail in it. A strong ruler was, therefore,
needed in the country. Britain and, to an extent, Russia feared chaos in a
leaderless Afghanistan more than the unfriendliness of an Afghan ruler.3
The British were also conscious that there was nothing to guarantee
Afghanistan’s continued existence as a buffer between England and
Russia as no other country cared about its survival.4 This generated a
disproportionate British interest in Afghanistan which played itself out
as the “great game” in the nineteenth century. The attempt to incorporate
Afghanistan in the British sphere of influence led to two Anglo-Afghan
wars from 1839 to 1842 and 1878 to 1880. The first resulted in defeat
for the British while the second enabled them to control Afghanistan’s
foreign policy and annex sizeable territory. These lands, stretched from
the Indus to the Durand Line, which demarcates the present day border
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The result was the delimitation of
the frontiers of Afghanistan in the west, south and east by the British,
and in the north by the Russian and British governments.
After bringing Afghanistan into existence, the need for a strong
ruler to hold the country together thus became of paramount concern
to the British who, on occasions, played a decisive role in the selection
of the amir. So deep was their involvement that British support became
essential to ensure any particular amir’s continued occupation of the
Afghan throne. They provided him the subsidies and weapons to build an
army and consolidate power. Furthermore, the subjugation of the ethnic
minorities by the Pushtun amirs was carried out with the encouragement
and support of the British. In the words of a Russian historian “after
1849 Dost Muhammad turned to the conquest of non-Afghan peoples
living north of the Hindu Kush (Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen) with the
support of the British India Company.”5
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With British subsidies, amir Abdur Rahman, who ruled from 1880
to 1901, sought to establish an absolute monarchy. He was succeeded by
his grandson, Amanullah Khan, who tried to modernize the country in
the ten years that he reigned from 1919 to 1929. He won Afghanistan’s
independence in the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 but lost the subsidy
as a consequence of which he failed to establish a resource base or build
a reliable army. An insurrection supported by extremist clergy ensued
and Kabul was taken by the rebels in January 1929. An ethnic Tajik
rebel ruled for the next nine months when the capital fell, yet again, in
October 1929 to the Pushtun tribes led by Nadir Khan, a member of the
royal family.
As was perhaps inevitable under the circumstances, the power
base in Afghanistan has constantly remained extremely narrow. Its
exercise has been the privilege of the Pushtuns, within the Pushtuns of
the Durranis, and within the Durranis of the Barakzais. For almost half
a century during which power rested with the Mohammadzai branch
of the Barakzai clan, Afghanistan was controlled by an inner cabinet
consisting of important members of the royal family and a few of their
trusted associates. Command positions in the army were invariably
held by members of the royal family and, in some instances, by staunch
supporters of the monarchy. The successful coup by Sardar Mohammad
Daud Khan in July 1973 against his cousin, King Zahir Shah, merely
ended the monarchy but did not result in any diffusion of power. In
effect, power was transferred from the former oligarchy to a single
individual.
These factors which included the imperial rivalry of Britain and
Russia, geographical separation of the Afghan ethnic groups and a
traditionally narrow power base, combined to prevent the peaceful
growth of Afghanistan into a state in the true sense of the word. Founded,
as it was, as a loose confederation of Pushtun tribes under Ahmad Shah
Abdali, the Afghan national identity became synonymous with Pushtun
nationalism. Despite the presence of other ethnic groups, Afghanistan
has been a country run by the Pushtuns and for the Pushtuns. The other
groups have, with considerable justification, been described as “the
victims of an internal colonisation.”6 Afghan governments have been
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generally preoccupied with exclusively Pushtun issues such as the
Afghan irredentist campaign and the advancement of Pushtu as the state
language. The latter has included “the required learning of Pushtu in the
schools, support for research in Pushtu literature, and the enshrining of
Pushtu as the national language in article 35 of the 1964 constitution.”7
Without exception, Afghan cabinets have been dominated by Pushtuns
completely out of proportion to the population ratio. For instance, in a
cabinet of sixteen, the number of non-Pushtuns hardly exceeded one
and very rarely two. Even this meagre representation was not always
ensured. Pushtuns were appointed governors in most provinces, even
where the population was predominantly of other ethnic groups “but a
non-Pathan has never been appointed governor of a Pathan province.”8
It is, therefore, interesting that when the Taliban were in control over
the major part of Afghan territory from 1996 to September 2001, they
appointed eleven non-Pushtuns as governors, some of them in Pushtun
provinces, and included four or five members of the minority ethnic
groups in the cabinet.
Economic development was equally unbalanced. Practically
all development projects were concentrated in the Pushtun areas.
Agricultural programmes were to be found in Khost and the Helmand
Valley, forestry schemes at Ali Khel, hydroelectric power generation and
irrigation in Nangarhar - all Pushtun provinces. Even when development
took place in regions where other groups were dominant as with cotton
ginning and processing in the north at Kunduz and along the Oxus, it
was “often in an area with a Pushtun settler population dating from the
government’s deliberate shifting of Pathans to these areas before the
Second World War.”9 Similarly, the great majority of Afghan industrial
workers were “often members of those families who were moved into
the non-Pushtun provinces and were never quite able to fit happily
into the local community.”10 Thus the growing industrial elite was as
Pushtun-dominated as was the administrative elite.
The Process of Pushtun Domination
The most comprehensive accounts of Pushtun subjugation of the
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens and the Hazaras of Afghanistan are mainly to
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be found in the works of Soviet historians. This process, which involved
conquest followed by persecution and ethnic cleansing, reached its peak
under amir Abdur Rahman who is often described as the Bismark of
Afghanistan.11 The enormity of the Afghan tragedy, both historical as well
as contemporary, cannot be overstated. It raises fundamental questions
such as whether the people of Afghanistan can, and in particular the
minority groups, be expected to forget the past and begin a process of
genuine reconciliation, or will the legacy of interracial disharmony and
hatred continue to define the country’s post-Taliban future?
The Tajiks lost their state with the fall of the Samanids, but continued
to fight stubbornly to preserve their independence. It was only in the
eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries that the Afghan
feudal lords defeated the Tajik peasants of the Kabul, Kandahar and
Ghazni regions. In the 1830s a bitter struggle between the Tajiks and the
Pushtuns began, which culminated in the 1880s when Abdur Rahman
succeeded in finally breaking the Tajik resistance. The establishment of
Pushtun authority in the Tajik areas was accompanied by the confiscation
of land from the local aristocracy, the forcible seizure of small holdings
from the peasantry, and the transfer of un-worked lands to the state. The
vast state holdings thus acquired were distributed among the Pushtun
immigrants who formed military colonies in these areas. The indigenous
population was strangulated economically through the imposition of
exorbitant taxes from which the Pushtuns were exempted. Crippled
economically and ostracized politically, a sizeable number of local
Tajiks were forced to move to Turkestan in search of a living.
The process was repeated with the Uzbeks. In the first half of the
nineteenth century the Uzbeks, who were settled in northern Afghanistan,
constituted the feudal khanates of Kunduz, Mazar, Shibberghan and
Maimena. They were dependent to a greater or lesser degree on the amir
of Bokhara. However, as early as the accession of Dost Muhammad,
the Afghan government began to conquer southern Turkestan including
the Uzbek khanates. The bloodshed continued for several decades till
Abdur Rahman was able to capture all the territory between the Amu
Darya (the Oxus) and the Hindu Kush. Again excessively high taxes
were imposed on the local population forcing them to migrate. Their
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
land holdings were proclaimed state property and an intensive process
of Pushtun colonization of the area commenced.12
The Turkmen experience was no different. At the dawn of the
nineteenth century, the greater part of their principalities had become
vassals to Bohkara and it was not till the conquest of Andkhoi,
Shibberghan and Maimena by Abdur Rahman that these areas were
assimilated into Afghanistan. This was in fact facilitated by the RussoEnglish demarcation of 1885-1887. Property was again confiscated from
the local population thus making them wholly dependent on the mercy
of the Pushtun aristocracy. Many reverted to nomadic ways while others
became shepherds and herded the flocks of the new landowners.13
However, it was the Hazaras who suffered the most because, as
Shiias, they were detested not only by the Pushtuns but also by the other
ethnic minorities. This sectarian bias against them has always been and
continues to be one of the most shameful aspects of Afghan society.
Jealousy and envy also played a role because, unlike the other ethnic
groups, the Hazaras had guarded their independence and did not submit
for a prolonged period to any outside power for six centuries. The people
of the Hazarajat accepted only their own leadership till the 1890s when
they were finally subjugated, after a long and fierce conflict lasting several
decades, by Abdur Rahman. Not only did they lose a considerable portion
of their land to the Pushtun feudal lords but also suffered persecution,
the barbarity of which has few parallels even by Afghan standards. The
heads of slaughtered Hazaras were placed on pillars along the highways
as a warning to those contemplating rebellion. The bazaars of Kandahar
and other major towns were filled with Hazara prisoners who were sold
at cheap prices as slaves. A foreigner who happened to be in Kabul in the
1890s observed: “a short while ago a Hazara baby was bought for halfa-crown, and the purchaser got the mother for fifteen shillings.”14 On
other occasions, prisoners were traded for guns, ammunition and horses.
The possession of Hazara slaves became a status symbol for prosperous
Pushtuns.15 Even after slavery was abolished by king Amanullah, the
Hazaras continued to live as outcasts possessing neither wealth nor any
rights.
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In the 1960s, a second infiltration of the Hazara areas took place
when about sixty thousand Pushtuns from the plains were settled in the
Hazarajat. The local population meekly accepted this as they were too
weak to offer any resistance. In this period they also became the victims
of wealthy Pushtuns who lent them money at interest rates that verged
on extortion.
Seldom have minority communities in any society suffered so
much. This aspect of Afghan history will continue to cast a shadow on
the prospects of sustainable peace in the country. But the problem is far
more complicated because the ethnic minorities also distrust and even
despise each other as the tragic tale of Afghanistan has so frequently
demonstrated.
The Afghan Political Structure and the non-Pushtun Groups
After their “colonization,” which was completed by Abdur Rahman,
the non-Pushtuns became mere bystanders as their country underwent
political change. They were unable to even express their grievances. Their
subdued anger at Pushtun political, economic and social predominance
became increasingly pronounced and instilled parochial rather than
national loyalties. The indignities and the persecution that the Hazaras
suffered made them particularly bitter.
The subjugation of the ethnic minorities of Afghanistan was, in a
sense, also a conflict between Pushtun tribesmen and the non-Pushtun
urban population. The conquest of the towns, which had previously been
controlled by merchants and artisans, resulted not only in the loss of
urban political influence, but also in “the collapse of organization, skills,
and economic activity. Their markets constricted and they suffered from
plundering and heavy taxation imposed by tribally and rurally oriented
rulers...The picture presented until the late nineteenth century was that of
dying urban communities. The subsistence orientation of the peasant and
the nomad made them virtually independent of the towns economically,
while their numbers and organization gave them political control in both
town and countryside.”16
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
Contemporary writers have described the effects of the “rapacity”
of the victorious Barakzai forces. The burden of their demands fell
mainly on the Tajik section of the population with the result that “in the
immediate vicinity of towns no human voice greets or curses the visitor.
Once rich vineyards are dried up and all around is desolation. This is
specially the case in the Qandhar district where every fresh change of
rulers has only brought increased taxation, until the population has been
decimated and tax gatherers, enraged at not being able to squeeze money
out of the mud walls, seized and sold into slavery the last inhabitants of
once prosperous towns and villages.”17
The urban centres of eastern and southern Afghanistan, rather than
the Afghan tribes, were the worst sufferers of the two Anglo-Afghan wars
of the nineteenth century as well. While the country’s meagre economy
as a whole was undoubtedly damaged seriously, the urban population
was badly hit by inflation and the scarcity of basic commodities. The
population and the economy of Kabul and of the Kandahar regions
declined sharply; the province of Herat also suffered enormous material
losses.
No relief was in sight for the non-Pushtuns because the amirs of
Afghanistan faced difficulties of their own. The consolidation of power
was never an easy task for them. The threat to their position came mainly
from their own kinsmen or other Durrani chiefs. Amir Habibullah Khan
and King Zahir Shah have been the only two rulers to ascend and occupy
their thrones (the latter for four decades) without a challenge. Whenever
the throne was contested, which was generally the case, the issue was
decided by the Pushtun tribesmen. In the conditions prevailing at the
time, involvement in these dynastic contests represented the only form
of political activity in the country. The non-Pushtuns were in no position
to play any role in these contests and had no influence on their outcome.
Thus they were denied all means for political advancement.
Furthermore, the evolution of Afghanistan’s international
personality also militated against the interests of the ethnic minorities.
With the demarcation of Afghanistan’s international frontiers and the
guarantee of its territorial integrity by Britain and Russia, the Afghan
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rulers became relatively free from worries about foreign intervention
and they used this breathing space to deal with their people. The amirs
had always suspected Persia of irredentist designs in the western part
of Afghanistan, and Russia of expansionist interests in the north. In
the perception of the Afghan rulers, these were the two areas most
vulnerable to foreign ingress. To an extent, they could now count on
British support in containing these threats. Despite this, the amirs were
unable to break away out of a mind set that the country’s neighbours
were inherently hostile and sought to annex Afghan territory. They,
therefore, deliberately chose an isolationist foreign policy as that would
not only reduce external threat but also enable them to pursue vigorous
domestic measures. This helped them in particular to insulate the nonPushtun areas in the north and the west, and consolidate their grip on
these regions. This could not have been achieved without the help of the
Pushtun tribesmen. Thus, the authority of the state was identified with
the rule of the Pushtuns and opposition to it with the ethnic minorities.
The latter were, therefore, to remain suspect in the eyes of the Pushtun
rulers of Afghanistan.
Reform Measures
The Afghan political structure has undergone fundamental changes
since 1747. Though the amir has always been at the top of the power
pyramid, his support base has varied under different rulers. Ahmed Shah
Abdali’s “election” represented tribal consensus and his kingdom was,
in essence, a Pushtun tribal confederation. Incessant dynastic struggles
and internecine warfare within the Durranis and between them and
other Pushtun tribes, particularly the Ghilzais, dominated events in
Afghanistan after Abdali’s death till amir Dost Mohammad Khan finally
succeeded in uniting the country. He was able to rally national support
largely because of the British invasion and occupation of Afghanistan
from 1839-1842. However, after his death internal conflict resurfaced
and continued with ferocity till Abdur Rahman seized Kabul and
declared himself amir in 1880. It was during his reign, which lasted till
1901, that Afghanistan began to acquire the semblance of a nation state.
Till his ascension the central government was dependent on support, in
descending order of importance, from the Pushtun tribes, the religious
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leaders, the settled population in both rural and urban areas and the
economic interest groups. Abdur Rahman took consequential measures
to alter the power structure by trying to make the government less
dependent on tribal support. Besides keeping the tribes under control, he
institutionalized the bureaucracy, the army and the monarchy. Till then,
provincial governments were primarily organized along tribal lines with
each tribe ruling in its own area autonomously. Whatever little control
the government was able to exercise was usually through the army.
To strengthen central authority, Abdur Rahman demarcated provincial
boundaries that cut through tribal territory and doubled the number of
provinces. Subsequent rulers stabilized the new system so that pure tribal
government was done away with. Abdur Rahman further weakened the
authority of the tribal chiefs by appointing them to seemingly important
but innocuous posts in Kabul.
Claiming to rule by divine right, Abdur Rahman virtually eliminated
the influence of the religious leaders by incorporating them into
government service and appropriating their endowments.
On a parallel track, measures were taken to establish a professional
army loyal to the central government and insulated from tribal influence.
This experiment was entirely new to the Afghan experience. The tribal
levies, who constituted the backbone of the army, were encouraged to
pledge fealty to the amir rather than their own tribes. Abdur Rahman
also introduced western military technology and organization. The
modernization process was continued by his son, amir Habibullah, who
set up a military academy for the officer corps.
These efforts were only partially successful because tribal rather than
national loyalty continued to be the dominant impulse within the army.
This was evident from the successful revolt against Amanullah, which
was led by the Shinwaris of eastern Afghanistan, while his successor,
king Nadir Shah, was able to capture Kabul only with the assistance of
the Wazirs and the Mahsuds from the British-India side of the frontier.
Thus the supremacy of the tribes had never really been diminished.
The new rulers, the Muhammadzais, were conscious of the influence
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of the tribes and also recognized the need for eliminating the dependence
of the government on tribal military support. They understood only too
well that a well-equipped and disciplined army, which could protect
the state from the tribes, was desperately required. However, such a
force was eventually only to emerge, with Soviet military assistance,
during Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan’s first tenure as prime minister
from 1953 to 1963. Thus for the first time in Afghan history, the central
government had acquired the capability to respond decisively to any
tribal or religious insurrection.
Two primary elements are identifiable in the complex relationship
between the government in Kabul and tribesmen on the east. First,
urban economic weakness and the autocratic and feudal character of
the monarchy itself made the Afghan amirs increasingly dependent on
the Pushtun tribes for the defence of the country and the preservation
of their dynasty. The tribes were also the only obstacle in the way of
British incursions into Afghanistan. Thus those in the British-India side
of the frontier not only played a decisive role in determining who among
the various Durrani contestants was to hold power in Kabul, but also
provided the surest guarantee of Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. The
amirs, therefore, wanted to at least influence, as they could not control,
the movement and direction of tribal enterprise. Second, despite the
support that they derived from the tribes, the amirs, conscious of their
own weakness, did in fact welcome British control over the tribesmen
as that provided them the opportunity to consolidate internally without
tribal interference. With the departure of the British from South Asia,
Afghan rulers feared that the attention of the tribesmen east of the
Durand Line would be diverted towards Kabul.
Managing the relationship with the tribesmen in British-India was a
major preoccupation of the rulers in Kabul. The process for the imposition
of the central government’s authority over the tribal chiefs, which was
started by Abdur Rahman, ended during the first premiership of Sardar
Mohammad Daud Khan. The changed political structure was incorporated
into the Afghan constitution of 1964. Article 2 of the constitution, which
abolished tribal territory, stated: “all territories and localities which are
under the sovereignty of the king constitute a homogenous whole, and
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in no respect can any distinction be made between parts of the country.”
Article 9 was directed against the membership of tribes and read “all
persons residing within the kingdom of Afghanistan are to be treated
as Afghan subjects.” Article 13 proclaimed the equality of all Afghan
subjects. Article 26 dismantled tribal administration and forbade the
collection of duties or taxes by anybody except the government. The
methods introduced by Abdur Rahman were used for the implementation
of these constitutional provisions. Tribal chiefs were appointed to
harmless posts in the executive, the upper house of the legislature or
the judiciary. In other instances, they were made governors of provinces
far from their own regions. Tribal administration was replaced by new
regional organizations under government appointed officials. This
process started at the top of the tribal hierarchy and stretched down
to the smaller administrative units. However, in the more remote and
smaller centres the administration was left to the local chiefs.
The modernization efforts were primarily focussed on the armed
forces. However, the military reforms spilled over into other sectors
and contributed to the establishment of a bureaucracy, an educational
system and a few basic political institutions. In time, the bureaucracy
was restructured and expanded to play a more assertive role in Afghan
society. The civil servants exercised a liberalising influence. Like them,
the intellectual elite which included teachers, doctors and college students
also gave voice to the need for political liberalization, broadening of
the base of government, and the establishment of an egalitarian socioeconomic system. Thus modernists were pitted against traditionalists and
the former became more influential after Daud Khan’s retirement 1963.
Through all this, the most significant political force to emerge was the
military. It became the only organization in the country capable of acting
effectively on a nation-wide scale. Its command positions were, however,
held by members of the royal family and by its most loyal and trusted
supporters. But that was as far as the reforms were intended to go.
To an extent the reform programme of the Afghan rulers was helped
by the influence of Islam on Afghan national life. Though the disparate
Afghan groups had little in common, the sense of community and
brotherhood instilled by Islam provided a much needed unifying force.
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It was used by the Afghan rulers to mobilize opposition first against the
Sikhs and later the British. However, although the principles of Islam
permeated the 1964 constitution and it was declared the state religion,
official policy emphasized nationalistic rather than religious ideology.
Unfortunately, the former continued to be equated with Pushtun
supremacy. In the early 1950s, king Zahir Shah declared publicly that
“the strength of the Muslim faith did not necessarily guarantee stability
and national unity.”18 As a result, the country’s traditional institutions
were progressively secularized through the years.
It was not till the early 1970s that employment opportunities in
government were opened up for non-Pushtuns as a measure to promote
national unity. Though recruitment into the armed forces was mainly
from the Pushtun tribes, representatives from other ethnic groups were
also gradually taken into the military. Conscription helped to bring
persons from different communities together and contributed to the
lowering of barriers between them.
Simultaneously, even economic development projects were initiated
in various non-Pushtun regions. Substantial investments were made in
industry and agriculture north of the Hindu Kush and in areas far away
from the capital such as Herat. A special effort was made to improve
the overall infrastructure particularly the up-gradation of roads and
modernization of communications.
The Afghan Dilemma
Well into the twentieth century, the framework within which the
rulers of Afghanistan tried to promote unity before the communist revolt
was a combination of two major but contradictory principles. The first
was encouraging the gradual growth of a national Afghan, rather than
as in the past, a Muslim identity. This was to be achieved by overriding
ethnic and linguistic divisions, through legal and administrative reforms
and by increasing the participation of non-Pushtun groups in the
government and bringing economic development to their regions. The
second was preserving the strength of traditional forces, in other words,
respecting Pushtun domination.
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Pushtun dominance continued to be equated with national and
cultural unity, and in this sense there was no change from the past. The
army, modernized and equipped with the latest weapons, remained
the principal instrument for imposing national unity and maintaining
the authority of the central government. However, it was totally under
the control of the Pushtun leadership. There was also no change in the
approach towards the cultural autonomy of the other groups. In fact, for
the first time in the basic law of the country itself, Pushtu was declared the
national language. It was made compulsory in schools and proficiency
in the language was required for appointment to senior government
positions. The Pushtun Academy and Afghan Historical Society were
set up to sponsor research in Pushtun history and culture. Although
Darri was also the official language, Pushtu was allowed to develop at
its expense.
Only limited reforms were thus carried out through a modernized
bureaucracy and military but these did not have any impact on the
political power structure. The reforms were imposed from above and
did not originate from the masses. Political activity was generally
suppressed or at best severely restricted as the formation of political
parties was prohibited. After the promulgation of the 1964 constitution,
a political parties bill was passed by parliament. King Zahir Shah,
however, withheld his consent on the ground that political parties would
emerge from the ethnic groups and militate against national unity. Thus
the continuance of Pushtun domination could only be ensured if the other
ethnic groups were kept away from any organized political activity. The
irony is that the absence of legitimate party organizations encouraged
parochial loyalties and by the 1970s resulted in the formation of political
parties along ethnic lines.
The rivalry between the imperial powers of the earlier centuries,
the cruel process of Pushtun domination and the superpower rivalry
in the Cold War period ensured that peace and stability would elude
Afghanistan. The turmoil of today has its roots in the past. Previously,
external powers were to an extent responsible for the chaos, but in
the contemporary era the Afghans themselves are mostly to blame.
The competition for power and wealth between the Pushtuns and the
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ethnic minorities continued to generate violence in Afghan society and
became alarmingly pronounced by the time the Taliban captured Kabul
in September 1996. When the on-going post-9/11Taliban insurgency
comes to an end, the deeper problem of promoting reconciliation among
a people who have always refused to be reconciled will have to be
addressed.
II. THE FOUR PHASES OF RECENT AFGHAN HISTORY
At another level, religious extremism coloured by the conservative
traditions of tribal Afghanistan has always been resistant to change and
at variance with contemporary values. Thus the socialist Afghanistan of
the PDPA encountered domestic violence for attempting to transform
the country through progressive reforms while the Taliban, during their
rule from 1996 to 2001, faced international condemnation for clinging
senselessly to tribal customs which were often far removed both from
civilized conduct as well as from the spirit and the true teachings of
Islam.
Centuries of conflict, internal upheavals and dislocations thus
brought unparalleled misery to the Afghan people who, it seemed, had
become accustomed to suffering.
Four distinct phases in recent Afghan history have also singly and
collectively contributed towards the unending turmoil in the country.
The first, the coup by the PDPA on 27 April 1978; the second, the Soviet
invasion and occupation from 29 December 1979 to February 1989; the
third, the prolonged resistance against the Moscow-installed Najibullah
regime till 28 April 1992 and; the fourth, the emergence and rule of the
Taliban from 1996 to 2001. The post 9/11 Al Qaeda-supported Taliban
insurgency is influenced by the four previous phases.
Phase one: After the PDPA Coup
Zahir Shah succeeded his assassinated father, Nadir, as king of
Afghanistan in 1933. He ruled for almost forty years till his overthrow
in 1973 by prince Daud. In 1953 Daud, then Prime Minister, launched a
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modernization programme that was later to prove consequential, albeit,
in the negative sense. Daud resigned in 1963, prompting Zahir Shah to
promulgate a new constitution that sought to encourage political freedom
and envisaged an elected consultative parliament. With the ouster of
Zahir Shah, Daud abolished the monarchy, established a republic and
proclaimed himself president. He was assassinated on 27 April 1978
by the same officers who were behind him in the 1973 coup. However,
this time they handed over power to the Marxist-Leninist PDPA. With
Daud ended two hundred and thirty-one years of rule by the Durranis of
Kandahar.
The cause of Daud’s downfall lay in his own reforms. He depended
heavily on assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union
without developing domestic consensus. This phase in Afghanistan’s
history saw the development of the infrastructure, the strengthening of
the army and the expansion of education. The elite went to the academic
institutions of the West, the military officers were sent to the Soviet
Union while the Islamists were trained in Egypt’s Al-Azhar University.
This was to bring about a transformation of the country’s political
structure. Previously, the struggle for autonomy by ethnic minorities had
dominated Afghan politics. The Persian speaking Tajiks and Hazaras as
well as the Turkish speaking Uzbeks and Turkmen had been equally
active in ridding themselves of Pushtun domination. Actual power even
among the Pushtuns, however, vested only with the tribal elite and
this resulted in a loose unity of the underprivileged. The marginalized
and frustrated intellectuals thus joined radical groups ranging from the
Marxists to the Islamists. The stage was thus set for a power struggle
between the two which led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The
conflict that ensued would hasten the collapse of the Berlin Wall and
bring the Cold War era to an end.
The PDPA was created in January 1965 in Kabul at the residence
of Nur Muhammad Taraki. Its thirty-three founding members elected
Taraki, a Pushtun, secretary general and Babrak Karmal, a Persianspeaking Kabul resident, his deputy. Serious differences, however,
developed between the Taraki-led Khalq (masses) faction and the
urbanized Persian-speaking group, the Parcham (flag), under Karmal.
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By 1967 the party had split.
Though both factions were staunchly pro-Soviet, Moscow was
partial to the Parcham which it found more pliable and receptive to
advice. The Khalqis were considered self-opinionated and unpredictable.
Ideologically, they were orthodox Marxist-Leninists representing the
economically and socially under-privileged Pushtuns. Taraki, a tenthgrade drop out, was projected by his group as a man of letters because he
spoke English which he had learnt in the early 1930s while working for an
Afghan merchant in Bombay. In contrast, many among the Parchamites,
with their upper class backgrounds, had received higher education
abroad while Karmal, the son of an army general, had graduated from
the Kabul University’s faculty of Law and Political Science.
The next twelve years saw the rift between the Khalq and Parcham
factions widen into pervasive enmity. The former derided the Parchamites
as bourgeois and, therefore, unfit to represent the proletariat. During his
days in parliament, Karmal was said to have had connections with the
king and thus all Parchamites were described by their rivals as “royal
communists.” In turn, the latter looked upon the Khalqis with ill-disguised
contempt because of their low social standing, lack of education and
their inability to comprehend the intricacies of statecraft.
To pre-empt the Khalq-Parcham tensions from exploding into street
violence, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union intervened in May
1977. The two factions were merged and Taraki once again became
Secretary General and Karmal, his deputy. The new thirty-member
unified central committee was divided equally between the two groups.
However, this new found PDPA unity was cosmetic and proved shortlived. Each faction acted independently of the other. They recruited their
own men to the army and police, a task which the Khalq entrusted to the
ruthlessly ambitious US-educated Hafizullah Amin and the Parcham,
to Mir Akbar Khyber.
The April 1978 coup resulted in Hafizullah Amin’s emergence as
the second most powerful man in the Khalq group. His rise undid the
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feeble Soviet attempt of the previous year to restore PDPA unity. Karmal,
as the party deputy secretary general, became increasingly sidelined.
Amin claimed that the coup had been masterminded and executed by
the officers that he had recruited, therefore, Karmal was not entitled
to occupy the number two slot in the new dispensation. For the same
reason, he also rejected, with the support of the newly established Khalqdominated Revolutionary Council, Karmal’s demand that cabinet posts
and key military positions be shared equally between the two factions.
The Soviets attempted yet again to restore PDPA unity. In April 1978
a high-level KGB delegation led by Vladimir Khrychov arrived in Kabul
and persuaded Amin to accept equal Khalq-Parcham representation in the
cabinet. The trade-off was that the office of president and prime minister
would vest in Taraki. Karmal was thus relegated to the backwaters and
appointed deputy president of the Revolutionary Council. Amin became
foreign minister and the first deputy prime minister.
Even this arrangement did not last long. With Taraki’s support,
Amin secured the approval of the PDPA Politburo to send Karmal and
six of his close associates to ambassadorial exile. On Moscow’s request,
Karmal was assigned to Prague. However, despite this, tension between
the Khalq and Parcham groups continued to simmer beneath the surface
till August when the Parchamite defence minister and two generals were
arrested on charges of plotting a coup that was to have taken place on 4
September.
The purge of the Parchamites thus began with a vengeance. They
were dismissed from government and hundreds were imprisoned. Orders
were issued to Karmal and the other recently appointed ambassadors to
return home immediately to face trial. As expected, they sought political
asylum. Karmal continued to live in Prague till October 1979 when
he moved to Moscow. Thus the Parchamites were, at least temporarily,
side-lined.
Like the Taliban, the Khalqis did not take easily to enlightened
educated opinion particularly of those who had attended academic
institutions of the west. They went even further and persecuted men of
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learning, whom they looked upon as counter-revolutionaries. Intellectuals
were hounded on flimsy pretexts and even the possession of an English
dictionary was enough to invite the wrath of the establishment.
Educated Afghans, especially those who were not members of the
PDPA prior to the coup, were branded anti-proletariat and excluded from
government. Amin, Mansoor Hashmi and Salim Masudi were the only
US-educated ministers in the first communist cabinet. The rest, barring
three who had studied in Soviet institutions, were either graduates of
the Kabul University or had merely completed high school education.
Abdul Karim Mesaq, the finance minister, had only attended primary
school.
The semi-literate and inexperienced Khalq government then
embarked on ill-thought-out reforms which were to have disastrous
consequences. These socialist measures were far removed from the
religious beliefs, customs and traditions of the Afghan people and
generated a violent reaction. Thus, even those whom the reforms were
meant to benefit turned against the government.
The starting point of the reform process was the implementation of
the Basic Lines of the Revolutionary Duties of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan, a thirty-point programme, that had been announced a
fortnight after the coup. Its stated purpose was to “transform the traditional
Afghan society into a new flourishing one based on the principles of
socialism and equality.” Towards this end, eight revolutionary decrees
were hastily issued. Of these, three - the sixth, seventh and the eighth
- dealt with social and economic reforms.
Decree six had two aims. The first provided debt relief to peasants
by exempting them from repayment of loans incurred prior to 1974. The
second sought to restore mortgaged land to owners in return for a small
payment. Contrary to expectations, these measures led to resentment
among the peasants because the repayment of debt is obligatory in
Islam. Furthermore, those in desperate need of money could not even
secure a small loan.
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Decree seven, promulgated in October 1978, aimed at the
emancipation of women. Taraki proudly announced: “The Afghan
women from now are free in the real sense of the word and have equal
rights with men.” Despite its progressive spirit, the decree contained
clauses which alienated not only the conservative elements of society
but also, surprisingly, women.
The feminists were embittered by article three which fixed the
maximum amount for dowry or mahr at three hundred Afghanis. The
article read: “The girl or her guardian shall not take cash or commodities
in the name of the dowry in excess of ten dirhams according to Shariat.”
The decree also gave the right of divorce to women. The result was that
the stability of the family structure in a traditional society was ruined
while women were deprived of financial security in the event of divorce.
Article four of the same decree permitted women, contrary to Afghan
traditions, to terminate their engagements if they so decided. This dealt
a further body blow to the family unit.
The social reforms also obliged Afghans to send their women to the
newly established adult literacy institutions. This caused commotion in
many parts of the country notably Herat where it was first introduced. In
March 1979, massive demonstrations were held in the streets of the city
and resulted in two weeks of violent clashes with the law enforcement
authorities, particularly the army.
Thus, apparently well-intentioned reforms, ignited rebellion
because of the perception that they were contrary to tribal Afghanistan’s
obscurantist interpretation of Islamic doctrines. The Khalq regime came
down with a heavy hand. Disappearances, torture, custodial killings and
summary executions were carried out with abandon by Amin’s secret
police which was controlled by his nephew and son-in-law, Assadullah
Amin. This intensified the resistance forcing the regime to move even
closer to the Soviet Union. The latter’s presence in government became
all pervasive. In December 1978, a treaty of friendship and cooperation
was concluded with the Soviet Union under which Moscow was to
provide assistance to Kabul in the event of internal instability or external
threat.
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Though the resistance to the Khalq regime in Kabul was inspired by
the single objective of restoring an Islamic government in Afghanistan,
it was divided into seven Sunni Muslim groups based in Peshawar,
Pakistan, and eight Shiia parties headquartered in Iran. The latter were
united, under Iranian pressure, into the Wahdat-e-Islami (later to be
known as the Hizb-e-Wahdat) while the former continued to operate
individually as distinct groups. These parties were to have a profound
impact on subsequent events in Afghanistan.
Among the seven Peshawar-based parties, four were fundamentalists
and three moderates. The former consisted of:
(i) Jamiat-e-Islami: a Tajik party formed by Burhanuddin Rabbani,
the subsequent leader of the Northern Alliance, in 1970. Ahmed
Shah Masood was, till his assassination on 9 September 2001, the
head of its military component known as the Shura-e-Nazar;
(ii) Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar Group): a Pushtun-dominated party
created by Gulbadin Hikmatyar. It sought to initiate an Iranianstyle revolution and to establish a one-party fundamentalist state
(Hikmatyar was subsequently associated off and on with the
Northern Alliance);
(iii) Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis Group): a splinter group of the Hizb-eIslami (Hikmatyar) established by Yunis Khalis in 1979. Most of
its fighters later joined the Taliban; and
(iv) Itehad-e-Islami: a Saudi-backed party, again primarily Pushtun,
formed in 1980 by Professor Abdul Rasool Sayyaf (he is also
associated with the Northern Alliance and is said to have brought
Osama bin Laden back to Afghanistan during the four years that
the Rabbani regime controlled Kabul).
The moderates included:
(i) Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami: a Pushtun-dominated party founded by
Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi in 1978. It also included a sizeable
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number of Uzbeks. It advocated free elections, agricultural reform
and non-alignment;
(ii) Mahaz-e-Milli: It emerged in 1979 under Pir Syed Ahmad Gillani. It
was Pushtun-dominated and monarchist (Gillani’s was represented
by his son, Hamed, at the UN-sponsored meeting of Afghan groups
in Bonn and signed the agreement of 5 December 2001 establishing
an interim post-Taliban administration under Hamid Karzai); and
(iii) Jubba-e-Nijat-e-Milli: a Pushtun party established in 1978 by
Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddadi. It favoured representative
government based on Islamic principles and Afghan traditions. It
did not oppose the participation of the monarchists in any future
government.
The fundamentalists were inspired by the political teachings
of Hasanul Bana and Sayyid Qutub of Egypt as well as Maududi of
Pakistan. Their objective was to restructure Afghan society in accordance
with Quranic injunctions and the Sunnah or Islamic traditions. They
were anti-west and, in particular, anti-US because of its support for
Israel. Though they received American assistance for their fight against
Soviet and Afghan communism, they did not conceal their hatred of
Washington. Hikmatyar, who was later to join the anti-Taliban Northern
Alliance, refused to meet President Reagan when he was in New York in
1986 to address the UN in his capacity as the president of the resistance
alliance.
The moderates, in contrast, were conservative nationalists who
favoured a role for the monarchy and whose objectives included the
safeguarding of national independence and the defence of Islam. They
were inclined to establish a strong relationship with the West, particularly
the United States.
The fundamentalists and the moderates remained apart throughout
the war despite attempts to bring them together. Their differences
contributed to the chaos that engulfed Afghanistan long after the
communists were ousted from Kabul.
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The repression of the Afghan people by the regime in Kabul resulted
not only in the intensification of the resistance but also led to divisions
within the PDPA. Taraki and a number of PDPA leaders, encouraged by
the Soviets, wanted to slow down the pace of reforms and to also include
non-communists in the government. This was, however, staunchly
opposed by Amin.
Because of his independent approach, Amin alienated the Soviet
Union. He not only rejected Moscow’s advice on slowing down the
reforms but also blocked further Soviet involvement with the running
of the secret police and the military. The Kremlin began to suspect
him of pro-Washington leanings because of his American educational
background.
During Taraki’s meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow on 10 September
1979, it was widely believed that he was asked to eliminate Amin. Taraki
lost no time in carrying out the assassination plan on his return to Kabul
the following day. He summoned Amin to the presidential palace but
the latter refused to comply because he had been forewarned by his
protégé, Taroon, Taraki’s aide-de-camp. Amin was, however, prevailed
upon to change his mind on being assured of his personal safety by
Ambassador Pazanov of the Soviet Union. On reaching the palace there
was a shootout resulting in several deaths. Amin, however, escaped
but Taroon, who shielded him during the firing, was killed. Shortly
afterwards Amin returned to the palace with his supporters, arrested
Taraki and later strangled him despite reported appeals from Brezhnev
to spare his life. The stage was thereby set for the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and thus began the second phase of the Afghan conflict.
The Second Phase: the Soviet Invasion
On 27 December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with
an initial eighty-five thousand troops. Amin was killed and Babrak
Karmal, whom they brought from exile in Moscow, was installed in his
place.
The anti-Khalq insurgency which had spread to the entire country
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rapidly transformed into a full-fledged war of liberation. A jihad or holy
war was declared.
Moscow justified its incursion into Afghanistan by declaring that it
was “entirely defensive” and designed to provide security to a friendly
neighbouring Marxist regime as well as to protect its southern flank
from Islamic fundamentalists and American imperialism.
Karmal’s mission was to slow down the pace of the Amin-Taraki
reforms, to correct the mistakes of the past, to broaden the political base
of the regime and to reorganize the armed forces and the secret police
with the active involvement of the Soviets.
To fulfil his mission, Karmal initiated several measures. One of
his first acts was the release of all political prisoners who numbered
in the tens of thousands. He also announced the abolition of all antidemocratic and anti-human rights regulations, declared a ban on arrests
and persecution, decreed respect for Islamic principles and freedom of
conscience, promised the protection of lawful property, upheld the right
of individual and collective security and guaranteed the restoration of
peace to Afghanistan.
On advice from Moscow, Karmal also pledged not to change Afghan
society rapidly and to broaden the base of his government by including
non-communists. He proclaimed a provisional constitution titled, the
Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in
April 1980. It defined the rights and duties of the citizens as well as the
functions of the branches of state. In the face of the Islamic resistance,
the constitution guaranteed “complete freedom in the performance of
Islamic religious rites.” Drafted by the Soviet advisers, translated by
their Tajik specialists and refined by the Legislative Department of
the Ministry of Justice, the provisional constitution was in form and
substance similar to those of the Soviet Republics of central Asia.
Another Karmal initiative was the creation of the National Fatherland
Front (NFF) in 1981 which, his regime claimed, was a coalition of
“nationalist, patriotic, democratic and progressive forces.” Its primary
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objective was the mobilization of support against the opposition and it
was projected as “an important step to give the masses of the people a
say in running the affairs of the country.” The provincial branches of the
NFF tried to establish offices in the countryside but no one dared come
near them for fear of reprisal by the Islamic resistance.
A sizeable public sector-led economic revival programme involving
an investment of about thirteen billion Afghanis was also launched. The
major part of the funding was to come from the Soviet Union and the
rest from its East European allies.
These economic and social measures further intensified the
determination of the Afghan people to resist the occupation and the
communization of their country. Except for Kabul, the provincial
capitals and a handful of centres in some of the provinces, the country
was in the control of the resistance. Militarily the Soviets employed all
the might at their disposal short of using nuclear weapons to eliminate
the opposition.
Moscow soon realised that the deeply entrenched hatred among
the masses for communism was reinforced by their determination to
free their country from foreign occupation which no amount of military
force could defeat. Accordingly, pressure on Karmal to fulfil his
promise of broad-basing the regime was increased. His reluctance to
deliver, prompted the Soviets to oust him and to establish a government
which was not outwardly communist. This, they felt, would also give an
impetus to the Geneva proximity talks which had begun in June 1982
because Karmal was considered the symbol of Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.
Furthermore, by the mid-1980s the Soviets were convinced that
their intervention into Afghanistan had been a major blunder. They
wanted an exit but Karmal would not even hear of it and this provided
yet another reason to get rid of him. Thus six years after he was installed
as the General Secretary of the communist party of Afghanistan, he was
replaced on 4 May 1986 by Dr. Najibullah, the chief of the notorious
secret police. The latter also had the advantage of belonging to the
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majority Pushtun community.
Najibullah was instructed to facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan by including non-communists in the government. Dr.
Hassan Sharq was accordingly appointed Prime Minister and other noncommunists were also included in the cabinet.
Najibullah also launched a programme of national reconciliation.
He invited the leaders of the opposition to join the PDPA in a coalition
government and made concessions to the armed groups operating in
different parts of the country. Only an insignificant few took the bait.
Otherwise these overtures had no impact on lessening the strength of
the resistance. To appease the feudal elements in the opposition, Najib
suspended the land reforms. This again was of little consequence as the
reforms had no significance in the face of the conflict and chaos that had
gripped the entire country.
Thus Najibullah failed to restore peace to Afghanistan which
continued to bleed from the lashes of internal turmoil. Nothing had
changed with the replacement of Karmal. The resistance continued to
control almost the entire countryside. All the highways except the one
from Kabul to the north were inoperative. The Soviets and their protégés
controlled, as before, only Kabul and the provincial capitals as the
resistance became progressively strong. The Soviet losses were heavy.
There was also the financial crunch. Thus the only option available to
them was to withdraw from Afghanistan. This process which began,
under the Geneva Accords, in the summer of 1988 was completed by 15
February 1989.
According to one estimate, the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan
cost them US dollars 29 billion. About 26, 000 Soviet soldiers died
and 1,200 aircraft and helicopters and tens of thousands of armoured
vehicles were destroyed.
The Islamic resistance was vigorously supported by the US, the west
and moderate oil-rich countries of the Islamic world, particularly Saudi
Arabia. In addition to Afghans, thousands of Arabs, including Osama
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bin Laden, were indoctrinated in madrassas or religious seminaries in
Pakistan and provided military training by the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI). They were regarded by all, including the
west, as the mujahideen or holy warriors who were waging a “heroic”
jihad to rid their country of foreign occupation and the “ungodly”
communists who controlled Kabul. After the defeat of the Soviet
forces, the world abandoned Afghanistan and forgot its people who had
struggled so valiantly and sacrificed so much in the cause of the free
world. Pakistan was left alone with more than three million refugees on
its soil and thousands of highly motivated and militarily trained Islamic
extremists.
The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan signified the end of the
Brezhnev and the Reagan doctrines which had dominated the final years
of the Cold War. The former sought to protect neighbouring communist
regimes while the latter was built around support to insurgencies against
such governments. In Geneva the Soviets undertook to end their presence
in Afghanistan in support of the Najibullah regime while the US agreed
to end its assistance to the mujahideen.
The Third Phase: after the Soviet withdrawal
The Geneva Accords were flawed in as much as the Afghans were
left out of the proximity talks which had dragged on for years. Therefore
no agreement was reached on a successor government in Kabul.
The Soviets were soon to begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan
but continued to support Najibullah for whom they left behind huge
quantities of weapons and ammunition for the fight against the
mujahideen. In this period there were frequent Afghan Scud missile
attacks on the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.
The seven Peshawar-based mujahideen parties, who had resisted
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, formed an anti-Najib interim
government in exile with Pakistan’s backing and encouragement. The
most powerful person in this setup was Gulbadin Hikmatyar. It was
Islamabad’s hope that the leaders of the mujahideen parties would
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sit together and work out the modalities for establishing a post-Najib
government in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people.
Pakistan, which was under the military rule of general Zia-ul-Haq
through the decade-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, was staunchly
supported by the US-led west and became the third largest recipient
of American economic and military assistance after Israel and Egypt.
Islamabad’s clandestine nuclear weapons development programme
and the reality that the country was under a military dictatorship were
ignored. The conclusive defeat of communism was considered far more
important than pious concerns about non-proliferation and democracy.
With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the expectation
was that the Najib government would collapse and to hasten this, the
mujahideen intensified their attacks against the regime. Their first
target was Jalalabad, the capital of the eastern province of Nangarhar.
It was expected that the city, which is near the Pakistan border, would
be captured with ease. Some seventy soldiers of the regime defected
to the mujahideen who, instead of receiving them with open arms,
slaughtered them and mutilated their bodies which they sent back to
Jalalabad in sacks. The barbarity convinced the city’s defenders that
they would meet the same fate and strengthened their resolve to fight.
The mujahideen laid siege to the city which continued for three months
and ended in their defeat. This boosted the morale of the regime which
launched counter-offensives in which the mujahideen suffered further
setbacks.
The fortunes of the Najib regime continued to rise till an abortive
coup attempt in March 1990 by general Tannai, the Khalqi Defence
Minister. Thus the old rivalry between the Khalqis and the Parchamites
surfaced again. Several Khalqi officers subsequently fled Kabul and
many of them sought and were given asylum in Pakistan.
There were two immediate consequences of the attempted coup.
Najib could no longer trust the Khalqis regardless of whether they had
been associated in the coup attempt. They were accordingly purged from
the army. This created confusion in the defence forces and destabilized
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the regime even further. The second consequence was that it prompted
the Karmal loyalists who were furious at his ignominious ouster to
resume their intrigues against the regime. Kabul thus became a hotbed
for intrigue and tension which was to continue till the capture of the city
by the Taliban.
Najib’s position became progressively weaker. His principal
supporter, the Soviet Union, was on a steep nosedive to elimination.
Thus, he could no longer count on Moscow’s military and economic
assistance. The powerful ethnic Uzbek warlord, Rashid Dostum, who
had hitherto extended support for purely selfish reasons, also abandoned
him. Whereas previously Najib had been willing to take non-communists
into the government, he was now ready to step down and transfer power
to the mujahideen. Accordingly, in April 1992, he informed the UN
of his intentions and the latter devised a mechanism for the transition.
It envisaged an interim dispensation consisting of a fifteen-member
committee of non-controversial Afghans, living in the US, Europe, the
Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The committee, in turn, would
transfer power to the mujahideen within six months. In mid-April 1992,
the UN asked the committee members to assemble in Pakistan from
where they were supposed to move into Afghanistan.
Most of the committee members thus gathered in Islamabad and
were about to proceed to Kabul when on 18 April a coup, backed by
Ahmed Shah Masood and Abdul Rashid Dostum, was staged by Karmal
loyalists. A number of Najib’s supporters, including the Minister of
National Security, were killed. Najib, however, managed to escape and
took asylum at the UN office in Kabul. The organizers of the coup, all
of whom were Persian speaking Parchamites, requested Masood, who
was at the time in Charikar sixty-five kilometres to the north of Kabul,
to take over. Masood instead asked the seven leaders of the mujahideen
factions, who were in Peshawar evaluating the committee’s nominees,
to form a government in Kabul. The leaders, however, could not agree
on its composition or even what the next step should be.
The Peshawar Accord. To facilitate the formation of the government,
Pakistan intervened. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to Peshawar on
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24 April 1992 and invited the Afghan leaders for talks at the Governor’s
house. The six mujahideen groups led by Mujaddadi, Rabbani, Sayyaf,
Gillani, Nabi Muhammadi and Yunis Khalis attended. The proceedings
were, however, boycotted by Hikmatyar who was considered the most
important of the resistance leaders because of his military strength and
his extensive control of Afghan territory. The talks nevertheless resulted
in an agreement which provided a mechanism for a peaceful political
transition in three phases. Under the first phase, Mujaddadi, the head of
the weakest mujahideen party, became president for two months from
28 April. In the second phase Mujaddadi was to be succeeded on 28
June by Rabbani who was to remain in office for four months. Phases
one and two were successfully implemented albeit with difficulty. The
third phase envisaged the drafting of a constitution to be followed by
election in the six-month combined presidential terms of Mujaddadi and
Rabbani. If the interim government failed to accomplish these tasks
within the stipulated time-frame, Rabbani was to step down and hand
over power to a Jihadi Council consisting of the leaders of the seven
resistance parties.
Hikmatyar was furious that minor leaders had been chosen to lead
Afghanistan in the six month interim period. He also suspected, and in
hindsight he was right, that Rabbani would not relinquish power when
his term expired. He, therefore, entered Kabul, captured key positions
including the presidential palace and the Ministry of Interior. Ahmed
Shah Masood retaliated by immediately attacking the capital with a
combined force of his own men, the remnants of the communist elements
and Dostum’s Uzbek militia. Hikmatyar was driven out of Kabul but he
established himself in Charasiab, a district some twelve kilometres to
the south of the capital. Charasiab was to remain his headquarters till it
fell to the Taliban two years later. Thus began another sad and violent
episode of Afghan history.
Hikmatyar’s expulsion from Kabul enabled Mujaddadi to move
to the capital on 28 April 1992, four days after the conclusion of the
Peshawar Accord, to become the first president of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan.
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The replacement of the communist regime with an Islamic
government was a cause for which the Afghan people had fought for
fourteen long years. The cost was enormous. More than a million and
a half people were killed, half a million were maimed, a third of the
population became refugees and about two hundred thousand faced
even more hardship as internally displaced persons. Thousands more
were to die from the land mines planted by the Soviet occupation forces.
The infrastructure of Afghanistan had been completely destroyed. There
was hardly a building that had not been hit during the brutal conflict.
There was no longer any irrigation system and agricultural production,
the mainstay of the economy, was at a standstill. The tragedy had few
parallels in human history. The violence, which was now being inflicted
on the country by the Afghans themselves, continued. The peace that
was breaking out worldwide did not visit Afghanistan.
The government in Kabul existed only in name. The state structure
had broken down. The institutional collapse was demonstrated by
the disappearance of the army virtually overnight. Huge quantities of
weapons which included tanks, aircraft, armoured personnel carriers
and massive ammunition dumps were left by the departing Soviet forces
for their protégés. In the eastern zone alone, Najib’s corps commander
abandoned 633 tanks and thousands of vehicles. Weapons, therefore,
were never to be in short supply for the power-hungry Afghan factions.
The authority of the interim government did not extend beyond
Kabul as the warlords established their own centres of power in the
provinces. The Tajik, Ismail Khan of Rabbani’s Jamiat-e-Islami,
governed eight south-western provinces from Herat. Dostum, who had
previously supported Najib with his Uzbek militia, established himself
in the six northern provinces with headquarters in Mazar-e-Sharif. Haji
Qadeer, a Pushtun, ruled the three eastern provinces adjacent to Pakistan.
Hikmatyar was entrenched in Charasiab. Other local commanders were
dominant in Kandahar and the southern provinces. The Shiias, in turn,
became the masters of Bamyan and a few central regions. The warlords
accepted neither instructions nor advice from the feeble coalition in
Kabul and administered their areas as personal fiefdoms.
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
This was accompanied by a countrywide breakdown of law and
order. Rape, brigandage, theft and murder brought yet more suffering
to ordinary Afghans. The commanders, down from the warlords to the
local chiefs, ruled as though by divine right. Each was the law unto
himself.
During his two month tenure, Mujaddadi tried but failed to have his
term of office extended. Rabbani’s assumption of power on 28 June 1992
began with intense shelling of Kabul by Hikmatyar on the pretext that
remnants of the communist army including those loyal to the famous
Parchamite general, Baba Jan, as well as Dostum were in control of the
city. This was denied by Masood and Rabbani.
Severe sectarian violence soon erupted in Kabul. Ali Mazari’s
Shiias Wahdat-e-Islami based in the western part of the city and the
Saudi backed Ittehad-e-Islami of Professor Sayyaf attacked each other.
This resulted in thousands of deaths and the destruction of the western
part of the capital.
As Hikmatyar had anticipated, Rabbani refused to step down at the
end of his four month tenure and had his term extended for a further
two years through a council he convened on 29 December 1992 with
the support of Nabi Mohammadi, Sayyaf and Pir Gillani - the three
principle leaders of the mujahideen coalition. It was claimed that the
council was attended by 1,335 delegates from all over Afghanistan and
was, as such, genuinely representative. This was roundly rejected by
Hikmatyar and other non-partisan Afghans. Radio Message of Freedom,
run by the Hizb-e-Islami of Hikmatyar, described the proceedings as a
“declaration of war against the nation.”
Hikmatyar resorted to intense rocket attacks on Kabul and the regime
retaliated by strikes against Charasiab. This continued for two months
resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and the complete destruction
of the southern and eastern part of the capital. Tens of thousands fled
the city to take refuge in camps established by the UN in the eastern
province of Nangarhar.
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Hikmatyar, who had earlier rocketed Kabul on the flimsy pretext
of the presence of communist remnants in the armed forces, now had
an excuse to resume his attacks. He claimed with good reason that
Rabbani had fraudulently usurped power through a non-representative
council and vowed to oust him through military means.
The Islamabad Accord. Pakistan intervened again. Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif invited Hikmatyar, Rabbani and the other leaders to
Islamabad and the talks resulted in a power-sharing agreement on 7
March 1993 under which Rabbani continued as president and Hikmatyar
was appointed Prime Minister. The new arrangement was to last till
July 1994 and in this period the regime was to draft a constitution, hold
parliamentary and presidential elections and create a national army and
police force. The leaders went to Mecca and, in front of Islam’s holiest
shrine, the Kaaba, pledged to honour the agreement. However, shortly
afterwards differences broke out between Hikmatyar and Rabbani on
the formation of the cabinet and the distribution of ministries.
In this period Pakistan, which had been preaching the need for
political stability to the Afghans, was itself in chaos. President Ghulam
Issaq Khan dissolved the national and provincial assemblies on 18 April
but the decision was overturned by the Supreme Court and Nawaz Sharif
was reinstated on 26 May only to be dismissed again by the president
on 18 July because of corruption. Moin Quershi, who had served for
many years in the World Bank, headed the interim government till
Benazir returned to power for her second term on 19 October 1993. Her
government was, in turn, dismissed by President Farouk Leghari three
years later and Nawaz Sharif became prime minister again, with a huge
parliamentary majority, in February 1997.
The Jalalabad Accord. The inability to form a government under the
Islamabad understanding led to a resumption of fierce fighting till 29 April
1993 when the leadership of nine mujaheeden groups including Rabbani
and Hikmatyar met in Jalalabad at the initiative of the Nangarhar shura
led by governor Haji Abdul Qadeer. After protracted negotiations and
under pressure of the Nangarhar shura an accord was signed on 20 May
which involved some modifications to the Islamabad understanding.
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
The government thus formed included each of the seven Peshawarbased Sunni parties and the Shiias groups. However, despite being the
prime minister, Hikmatyar did not dare enter Kabul as he feared that he
would be killed by his archenemy, Ahmed Shah Masood, who had become
Defence Minister. He, therefore, established himself in Charasiab and
ministers were thus obliged to shuttle between the two cities. Cabinet
decisions were never implemented. Hikmatyar soon realised that he was
prime minister only in name and that actual power vested with Rabbani
and Masood. He initially remained silent but when Rabbani refused to
endorse a cabinet recommendation that an agreement with Russia under
which the latter printed the national currency be abrogated, he reacted
sharply and the ill-disguised tensions within the government came into
the open.
At this point in time Hikmatyar, who barely eighteen months earlier
had rocketed Kabul on the mere presumption that Dostum was in the city,
reconciled his differences with the latter. The two seemingly implacable
ideological enemies thus became allies and forged an anti-government
alliance which also included the Shiia Wahdat party of Ali Mazari and
the Islamic National Liberation Front of Mujaddadi. The new alliance,
which was called the Shura HamAhangi ( the Supreme Coordination
Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan), thus started a war
against the Rabbani regime on the first day of 1994 which continued
sporadically till February 1995, when the Taliban overran Hikmatyar’s
headquarters at Charasiab.
Rabbani was to hold office till July 1994. However, he secured a
decision from the Afghan Supreme Court, while the chief justice was
out of the country, extending his term to December 1994. Even this
decision was not respected by him and he continued in office till the
Taliban takeover of Kabul in September 1996.
The impression that Pakistan was partial to Hikmatyar in this period
is not borne out by the extent of financial support disbursed by Islamabad
to the individual mujahideen factions. For instance, between 1990 and
April 1992, the largest recipient of this assistance was in fact the Jamiate-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani. He was paid rupees 460 million (the
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value of the rupee was approximately thirty to the US dollar) for the
Jamiat while Ahmed Shah Masood, who headed the military wing of
the party, received 142 million rupees. Thus the total assistance given
by Pakistan to the Jamiat was 602 million rupees. The Hizb-e-Islami of
Younis Khalis was given 496 million rupees. Next in line was Gulbadin
Hikmatyar whose party was provided 366 million rupees; professor
Sayyaf was paid rupees 244 million; Pir Gillani rupees 241 million;
Nabi Mohammadi rupees 240 million; Mujaddadi rupees 160 million
and Mohseni rupees 60 million. During the period of Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan five to ten times this amount was paid to the factions
annually in addition to weapons, ammunition and other supplies. This
was, of course, in coordination with the US, Saudi Arabia and other
countries who had supported the mujahideen in their struggle against
the communists.
Phase Four: The Emergence and the rise of the Taliban
The Taliban movement was a reaction to the prevailing anarchy after
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent misrule
of the Rabanni regime. The assumption that they first emerged in the
summer of 1994 is erroneous. The Taliban are the product of madrassas
or seminaries that have existed in Afghanistan since the coming of Islam
into that country. In Afghan history, students from these seminaries have
always risen at the time of national crises either to fight invaders or to
oppose unpopular regimes within the country. The brunt of the resistance
to the British during the Afghan wars of the nineteenth century was from
the Taliban of the time. Similarly, the struggle to rid the country of Soviet
occupation through the 1980s was spearheaded by the Taliban and, in the
second half of 1994, it was again the students from the madrassas who
set forth to restore order in the country. In previous times the Taliban
always returned to their seminaries after achieving their objectives. This
was not to be so after 1994 because on defeating the local warlords, they
decided to form the government themselves.
In the last week of August 1994, Mulla Omar Akhund set out with
forty-five followers from a madrassa in Maiwand, Kandahar, to punish
a commander who had molested a local family. It was neither ideology
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
nor religious fervour that accounted for their subsequent success. It was
the war-weariness of the populace which made them welcome any force
that could deliver them from the hands of brigands. They hungered for
the restoration of peace and the semblance of an honest administration
no matter how harsh its system of justice.
Local warlords had created fiefdoms owing nominal loyalty to one
political leader or the other, but imposing in fact their own arbitrary fiat
in the areas that they controlled. In Kandahar, the main road to Herat
on the one hand, and to Chamman in Pakistan on the other, had toll
posts and barriers at virtually every kilometre, where local commanders
exacted fees and whatever other extortions they decided upon on any
passing traffic. The lives and honour of ordinary citizens were at their
mercy.
Initially even Rabbani sought to use the Taliban to eliminate his
opponents and to quell the unrest that had been generated by his failure
to abide by the Islamabad Accord. He offered them assistance and there
is sufficient evidence to show that his emissaries frequently contacted
the Taliban to offer financial and other support. Rabbani is on record as
saying: “The Taliban and some mujahideen from Kandahar asked us to
help them to open roads and improve law and order in their province.
We supported them.”19
The Taliban, however, did not need such assistance. The local
commanders who surrendered brought with them substantial quantities
of weapons and ammunition. With each success the ranks of the Taliban
swelled with veterans who had fought against the Soviets. However, it
was not through force of arms but the persuasiveness of their message
that the Taliban were able to triumphantly sweep first the eastern and then
the western part of Afghanistan. This was accompanied by surprisingly
few casualties.
By late October 1994, the Taliban movement gained victories one
after another in their war against the mujahideen and, within a short time,
captured the whole province of Kandahar, from where they spread their
influence to the other parts of the country. During this phase, the Taliban
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were loosely allied to Dostum who controlled six provinces in the north,
Hikmatyar who was in place in a small area in eastern Afghanistan, the
Hazara Shiias who were predominant in central Afghanistan and also
other small groups who had little control of territory. Rabbani declared
“jihad” against Dostum and persuaded the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia
to issue a “fatwa” or religious injunction against him.
The Afghan situation in mid-1994 was very different from what
Pakistan had expected after the collapse of the communist regime in
Kabul and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The peace accords
between the resistance factions attempted by Islamabad had come to
naught and Afghanistan remained in the grip of turmoil and factional
fighting. Islamabad was understandably anxious to see the centuries old
trade routes to the resource-rich central Asian region reopen. Soon after
the establishment of the mujahideen government in Kabul, Pakistan
sent a survey team to examine the possibility of reactivating the KabulSalang Pass-Hairatan road to Uzbekistan. However, this route was found
to be unfeasible because of the fighting between the Afghan groups. The
other route available, the Quetta-Kandahar-Herat-Ashgabat road, was
considered more viable. A delegation headed by General Naseerullah
Babar, the minister of interior in Benazir Bhutto’s second government,
embarked on a journey along this route on 21 September 1994 and
completed its travel via Ashgabat, Tashkent, Almaty, Kashghar and Gilgit
on 5 October. Special security arrangements were made by Amir Imam,
a retired army colonel who was serving as Pakistan’s consul general in
Herat. This task was assigned to him because he was known to most
of the mujahideen commanders. He claimed that he had trained about
eighty thousand of them during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
The entire route inside Afghan territory that Babar used was under
the control of warlords. The delegation was able to confirm that there
was an absence of central authority except in Herat where commander
Ismail Khan, who was loyal to the Rabbani regime in Kabul, controlled
the road from Dilaram onwards. The delegation met all the major power
groups who assured safe passage. Colonel Imam’s assessment, which
was rejected by Babar, was that it would be difficult to use this route on
a regular basis because of the war lords.
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
Immediately after returning to Islamabad, Babar decided to send
a good will caravan which would deliver medical supplies to hospitals
along the route. He wanted the caravan to reach Ashgabat in time for
Benazir Bhutto’s visit to Turkmenistan from 30-31 October 1994 for
that country’s independence day celebrations. What Babar did not
realize was that the situation had completely changed since his own
transit through Afghanistan the previous month. Kandahar was about
to be captured by the Taliban. The convoy consisting of thirty 5-ton
military trucks was delayed and was only able to leave Pakistan on 31
October. The journey was hazardous and the convoy was captured on
several occasions by local warlords only to be rescued by the Taliban
who had taken Kandahar around the time that the caravan reached the
city.
The despatch of the convoy was an ill-advised decision by the
publicity-hungry Babar. The drama and fanfare that went into the whole
episode was for no better motive than to project this foolhardy venture
as an achievement of the Bhutto government. The lives of the caravan
members were unnecessarily risked and their safe return to Pakistan
can only be attributed to luck. The same gifts to the four south-western
provinces of Afghanistan could have been sent through the traders
and would have earned enormous goodwill. Furthermore, the sending
of a military convoy at a time when the Taliban were ascendant was
interpreted as support for the movement. The erroneous belief that
emerged was that the Taliban were a Pakistan-created entity. Islamabad
was never able to live down this ill-founded reputation. Babar’s visit to
the area just thirty days before Kandahar fell to the Taliban lent further
credence to the assumption that they were sponsored by Pakistan. Babar
also did little to dispel the rumours at the time that the Taliban owed
their existence to him. In actual fact, Babar had never met the Taliban
and was surprised to learn about their emergence. His reference to them
as “our boys” after their initial successes fuelled vicious and unrelenting
propaganda against Pakistan and resulted in regional tension which
was to last several years. Lastly, though the Rabbani regime had long
outlived its legality, it was still recognized by Pakistan. However, Babar
did not think it necessary to obtain Kabul’s permission for sending the
convoy. This was clearly a violation of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and
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was justifiably resented by the Rabbani government.
In 1994 and 1995 there were several international initiatives aimed at
promoting a political settlement in Afghanistan. Pakistan supported the
idea of proximity talks which was proposed during 7th Islamic Conference
of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Islamabad from 7-9 September 1994.
The first round of such talks was held during the ICFM between the
different Afghan groups and the secretary general of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC). This was followed by a second round
in Tehran from 29 November to 7 December in which Pakistan, Iran
and the UN participated. These meetings like so many others achieved
nothing.
In March 1995, Mehmoud Mestiri, the UN secretary general’s
special envoy for Afghanistan proposed the establishment of a council
to discuss the modalities of a peace settlement. He envisaged that the
council would consist of two representatives from each of Afghanistan’s
thirty-two provinces and, to balance its composition, also include
fifteen to twenty eminent personalities both from inside as well as
outside Afghanistan. The proposal remained on the drawing board and
never got off the ground. Rabbani, however, visited Pakistan from 1315 March to attend a summit meeting of the Economic Cooperation
Organization.20 The participants did nothing more than take “serious
note” of the situation in Afghanistan and unanimously agreed to support
a UN-sponsored peace process.
On 10 March 1995, Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Qazi
Humayun, assumed charge of his post but the mission was temporarily
relocated to Jalalabad the following day because the embassy had been
ransacked by the Rabbani regime the previous year. The mission finally
reopened in Kabul on 3 May 1995. Around this time, the unrepresentative
nature of the Rabbani regime was acknowledged by Mehmoud Mestiri,
when he declared: “General Masood, Professor Rabbani and others
associated with him have been arguing that by pushing the Taliban out
of Kabul they have achieved victory all over Afghanistan. In fact, the
reality is that the base of the government has become narrower and could
be said to represent only the Tajik ethnic group. The Pushtuns, Uzbeks
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
and Hazaras have been alienated. These three ethnic groups represent
about 60 percent population of Afghanistan.”21
The special representative on Afghanistan of the OIC secretary
general, Ibrahim Saleh Bakr, visited Pakistan from 11-12 June 1995 and
proposed the formation of a group of a hundred persons representing
all the provinces of Afghanistan as well as representatives of political
parties and neutral personalities which would meet in Jeddah to discuss
the establishment of a transitional government. This proposal was
preceded by a visit to the region by prince Faisal Al-Turki, the Saudi
minister for intelligence services (several years later he became the
Saudi ambassador to Britain), in the last week of May. Again, like the
Mestiri proposal, it was a non-starter.
General Abdul Wali, the son-in-law of ex-King Zahir Shah, arrived
in Pakistan on 29 June 1995 for a six-week visit. He proposed the
convening of a grand assembly, known in Afghan traditions as a loya
jirga, for the transfer of power to a transitional government. The proposal
for a loya jirga has been made time and again, as well as after the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, to resolve
the problems of Afghanistan. However, the three requirements for a loya
jirga are that it can only be convened by a head of state recognized by
all Afghans, it can only be held on Afghan soil and it is called at a time
of grave national crisis. The first of these preconditions posed a serious
problem as, for the past several decades, the country did not have a
leader acceptable to all segments of Afghan society.
On 6 September 1995, the Pakistan embassy in Kabul was burnt by
a mob of three thousand instigated by the ruling junta. A Pakistan-based
sanitary worker, who the crowd mistook for ambassador Humayun,
was killed. The ambassador, the defence attaché, other diplomats and
embassy personnel received serious injuries. The defence attaché was
stabbed several times and was left bleeding on the floor because it was
assumed that he had died. Despite this, which was the second attack on
the embassy in a year, Pakistan did not break diplomatic relations with
the Rabbani regime. Islamabad’s policy has always been to recognize
the entity that controlled Kabul. Thus Pakistan recognized the regimes
126
of Sardar Daud, Tarakki, Hafizullah Amin, Karmal, Najibullah and
Rabbani long after the latter had lost its legitimacy and even after it
had ransacked and burnt the Pakistan embassy. The reason is Pakistan’s
porous and more than two thousand kilometre-long border with
Afghanistan, makes it impossible not to have dealings with any regime
in Kabul, no matter how hostile. In the case of the Taliban, however,
Pakistan withheld formal recognition for nine months, even though the
movement had taken Kabul and was in control of most of Afghanistan.
The reason for this was that Islamabad hoped to encourage the Taliban
to include all other ethnic groups in its government using the bait of
recognition to achieve such an outcome. Nevertheless, regular contact
and day-to-day dealings with the Taliban continued unhindered.
In the winter of 1995-96, the Tajik-dominated regime took a strategic
decision to broaden its base by inviting other leaders to join it. In January,
Rabbani’s representative, Dr. Abdul Rahman, met Hikmatyar in Sarobi,
Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif and the Shiia opposition groups in Bamyan.
These initial meetings achieved nothing. Instead, in February, all the
opposition groups with the exception of the Taliban established a tenmember council for negotiating with Kabul.
In the interim, the other groups began to gravitate towards Kabul.
On 27 March the council of the Hizb-e-Islami gave Hikmatyar the
power to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with Kabul. By the first
week of May approximately one thousand Hikmatyar troops arrived
in the capital to help in its defence against the Taliban. On 26 June,
Hikmatyar entered Kabul to assume the post of Prime Minister and his
party was given nine portfolios in the new coalition. The same day the
Taliban launched a massive rocket attack on the capital in which sixtyone people were killed and more than a hundred injured.
The political breakthrough induced Rabbani to visit Jalalabad in
an endeavour to persuade its shura which controlled the three eastern
provinces to abandon its policy of neutrality and to join his government.
Rabbani offered to step down in favour of any moderate leader and
proposed a meeting of all Afghan groups to elect a new head of state.
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
On a parallel track, negotiations were intensified with Dostum while
Masood kept the Taliban at bay outside Kabul. Through December 1995,
Dostum came under considerable Iranian pressure, which included
financial inducements, to reconcile with Rabbani. The Iranian expert
on Afghanistan, deputy foreign minister Alaeddin Broujerdi, visited
Dostum several times during the month to persuade him to receive
Rabbani in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Dostum was double minded. He was half inclined to meet Rabbani
through Iranian good offices because he had been promised financial
support but feared that such a move might not be in his interest. Rabbani,
he felt, was isolated and this militated against any compromise with
him. On the other hand Dostum also thought that he could gain political
mileage if Rabbani came to Mazar-e-Sharif to apologize to him for the
Saudi “fatwa” and the declaration of the “jihad.” Iran’s efforts achieved
some success as Dostum agreed to a truce at the end of August1996
and the Salang highway connecting Kabul to the north was opened
for civilian traffic for the first time in over a year. However, Dostum
refused to join the government till greater autonomy was guaranteed to
the provinces.
There were also problems within the Shiia Hizb-e-Wahdat which
had split into two factions headed respectively by Karim Khalili and
Akbari. Broujerdi, therefore, visited Bamyan in December 1995 and
established a commission to reconcile the differences between Khalili
and Akbari. Iran’s obvious objective was to get the ethnic minorities to
unite under the Shiias and the Persian speaking groups of the north in
support of Rabbani.
For their part, the Taliban refused to negotiate with anyone nor did
they come forward with any power-sharing proposal of their own. They
adamantly insisted on the overthrow of the Kabul regime and convened a
meeting of more than a thousand notables in Kandahar on 20 March 1996
to chalk out the future strategy while they continued to shell and rocket
Kabul. The meeting, which ended on 4 April, nominated Mulla Omar
as amirul momineen (the commander of the faithful) and the undisputed
leader of the “jihad” against the Rabbani regime. This confirmed that the
128
Taliban had no intention of returning to their seminaries after achieving
their objectives because the amirul momineen, like absolute monarchs,
continues in office for his entire life unless he becomes mentally or
physically incapacitated.
In April 1996 alone the Taliban fired 866 rockets on Kabul killing
180 civilians and injuring an estimated 550. Their onslaught resulted in
the fall of Jalalabad with less than twenty casualties. In Sarobi, where
Rabbani and Masood had sent their own commander to strengthen
its defence and mine the approaches, the local Ahmadzai tribe joined
the Taliban, and the commanders around Sarobi either surrendered
immediately or fled to Kabul. It had been claimed that the capital could
sustain a siege for more than a year but its surrender came virtually
overnight on 27 September 1996 with only 200 casualties. Almost
immediately after entering Kabul, the Taliban killed Najibullah and kept
his body hanging for several days in the centre of the city.
The capture of Kabul by the Taliban and the retreat of the Rabbani
government north of the Hindu Kush resulted in the formation of the
Northern Alliance and threw Dostum into prominence. He emerged as
the strongman and the leader of the minority ethnic groups. The factions
within the Northern Alliance decided to set aside their differences which,
nevertheless, continued to simmer beneath the surface as subsequent
events would demonstrate. Their immediate priority was to work
out a joint political and military strategy against the Taliban. On 4
December 1996, a parallel government was set up in Mazar-e-Sharif
by the Northern Alliance. Though it consisted of many parties, the
alliance was dominated by three elements which, in descending order of
importance at the time, included Dostum’s Uzbek Jumbish-e-Milli, the
Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the Shiia Hizbe-Wahdat headed by Karim Khalili.
Initial International Reaction to the Taliban. The US reaction to the
Taliban soon after they had taken Kabul was one of cautious support. The
first formal American pronouncement on them came on 18 November
1996 during a UN conference in New York of countries with interest
in Afghanistan. Three elements in the statement of the US delegate,
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
assistant secretary Robin Raphel, were particularly interesting. She said:
( i ) the Taliban were purely an indigenous movement; (ii) their success
had little to do with military prowess (implying that they were preferred
by the Afghan people to the chaos that had been prevailing); and ( iii )
some of the policies pursued by the Taliban were extreme but this could
be moderated by engaging with them.
The Russians also wanted to establish contact and develop relations
with the Taliban. Deputy foreign minister Mamedov, who attended
the same UN conference as Raphel, requested the Pakistan delegate
to facilitate a meeting between senior Taliban functionaries and
representatives of the Russian government. Moscow had earlier told
Washington that it would never again repeat the mistake it had made
in 1979 of intervening into Afghanistan. Russia had no problems with
Taliban control of Kabul and 75 percent of Afghan territory so long as
the movement did not advance north along the borders of Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan because Moscow feared the export of extremist religious
ideology, the influx of refugees and the spill-over of the conflict into
these central Asian states.
Tehran alone was bitterly opposed to the Taliban. One of the reasons
for this was that the Sunni majority areas of Iran were contiguous to
Afghanistan. Iran feared that the Taliban might instigate a Sunni uprising
on its territory. This apprehension turned to hysteria after the capture of
Herat by the Taliban. Furthermore, Tehran considered the Taliban an
impediment to its own ambitions in Afghanistan.
Perhaps the greatest initial external success which the Taliban met,
due to no effort of their own, was the decision of the OIC to adopt the
vacant seat formula in respect of Afghanistan. This entailed the expulsion
of the Rabbani regime from the OIC where Afghanistan would not be
represented till an internationally recognized government was in place
in Kabul.
After their capture of the Afghan capital, the Taliban leadership
repeatedly affirmed that their agenda was purely domestic and that they
posed no threat to any country and in particular their neighbours. For
130
their part, they expected external powers not to interfere in Afghanistan’s
internal affairs. This was never to be because some of the neighbouring
countries were determined to replay the great game of the nineteenth
century in order to carve out their respective areas of influence inside
Afghanistan.
Instead of engaging with the Taliban, as Robin Raphel had
recommended in the UN conference, the international community
isolated their regime. The vacuum was filled by Al Qaeda and Afghanistan
became the breeding ground for terrorism.
With the post-9/11 ouster of the Taliban, the Karzai regime was
installed in Kabul under the Bonn Accord of December 2001. The
government was dominated by the Tajiks. Though Karzai himself is a
Pushtun, he was rejected by his own ethnic group. Despite the elections
in 2004, the Al Qaeda-supported Taliban insurgency spread like wildfire
through the country. The fraud tainted 20 August 2009 presidential
election, which Karzai is said to have won, has further deepened the
political crisis and the violence is likely to continue.
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M.G.Aslanov, E.G. Ghaffarbeg, N.A. Kisliakov, K.L. Zadykhin, and G.P. Vasilyeva,
“Ethnography of Afghanistan, a Study,” translated by Mark and Greta Slobin in
“Afghanistan, Some New Approaches,” published by the Centre for Near Eastern and
North African Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1957.
Aslanov, et.al,op.cit; pp.44-45 and 69-77.
Aslanov, et.al, op.cit., pp. 44-45 and 69-77.
Quoted in Gregorian, op.cit., footnote, p.34.
131
S. Iftikhar Murshed
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Holdich, “Gates of India,” quoted in Gregorian, ibid.
Newell, op.cit., p.33.
Lumsden, H.B.Major, “Mission to Candahar,” quoted in Tate, op.cit. p.154.
Interview to the “Middle East Journal” (winter 1952 edition).
“Afghan News” of May 1995, published by the Jamiat-e-Islami of Rabbani.
The ECO was established in 1985 by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as a successor to the
Regional Cooperation for Development. It was expanded in 1992 to include Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
21. Speech at the Afghan Support Group meeting in Stockholm, 2 June 1995.
132
INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
FOR PAKISTAN
Shahwar Junaid*
Abstract
Pakistan has faced serious internal security challenges since its inception,
therefore any review of the present situation must be considered in a
historical perspective. Several security problems were embedded in
various dispensations at the time of Partition and were never resolved
satisfactorily. A number of security challenges Pakistan has faced, and
will continue to face, are a result of fault lines created by the nature of
the geographical and administrative division of the sub-continent into
two independent states. The administrative machinery, physical assets
and economic and human resources available to Pakistan, as well as the
manner in which they were utilized by successive political and military
governments, have been an important factor impinging on internal
security. The discourse that follows should reveal how cleverly the future
of the Muslims of the sub-continent was shackled to the limitations within
the dispensations of Partition and how astutely the limited potential of
the political leadership that would be available to Pakistan after the
physically frail Quaid passed away, was judged. Author.
Pakistan has faced serious internal security challenges since its
inception therefore any review of the present situation must be considered
in a historical perspective. The forces that contributed to the evolution
of a national character after Partition must also be considered for they
continue to influence the security environment: the internal security
problems encountered by Pakistan today have been compounded
*
The writer is a former Communications and Media Consultant to the Pakistan Government.
Her book, Terrorism and Global Power Systems, was published by the Oxford University
Press in 2006. Email waqil42@hotmail.com
Shahwar Junaid
by the weaknesses and the vagaries in its leadership. Some of the
internal security problems Pakistan faced at the outset were the result
of the environment created by the Partition of the sub-continent into
two independent dominions, and had to be dealt with urgently. These
problems included the influx of about two million refugees, lawlessness,
loot and arson, killing and civil disturbance by those displaced as a result
of the boundary awards. The civil administration lacked the competent
personnel to deal with the situation.
Disorderly accession and delays in the division of assets meant severe
economic limitations that made it extremely difficult to deal with the
immediate needs of the population. Defence capability was almost nonexistent. Soldiers assigned to protect the trains and convoys of refugees
moving towards Pakistan often ran out of ammunition when fending off
attackers while the civil authorities of the Indian Union in the areas
through which these refugees were passing did not extend any help to
them.1 This is illustrated by the following report datelined Amritsar, 23
September 1947: “Another Muslim Refugee Train…At about 5 p.m.
the second train went through but was halted near Khalsa College as
it was found that the lines had been removed by the mob. Immediately
the train had halted a Sikh-Hindu Jatha of about 8000 in number made
determined attacks on the train with rifles, Stens, kirpans, spears and
other weapons. The military picket with the help of escort…..were able
to hold them off, but it was soon found that the picket was running short
of ammunition, so they had to withdraw after expending all but one Sten
magazine.
“A Dogra company of the Baluch Regt. was sent out as soon as
possible but by the time they had arrived at the scene the mob had
overpowered the escort…attacked the evacuees, killing and injuring
almost all.
“It may be noted that the civil authorities here had done absolutely
nothing in the way of organising medical aid or giving the few remaining
live evacuees any water….I and another officer assisted. I do not think
I have ever witnessed such cold-bloodedness by any human beings as I
witnessed last night from the civil authorities.”2
134
This was the situation at the time of Partition.3
At the time Pakistan was governed by the amended Government
of India Act of 1935.4 This amended version was called the India
Independence Act of 1947.5 It provided for a Governor General and
head of state to succeed the British Viceroy. This Governor General
was to have authority over both the newly independent countries. The
Constituent Assembly of each country was given the task of preparing
a constitution and was to serve as the federal legislature until the new
constitutions of each country became effective.
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was of the view that the
British Viceroy would not be able to secure the interests of Pakistan
while serving as Governor General of India. One concern was that
adjustments advantageous to India might be made after Independence
under such a Governor General. He was a statesman and he had learnt
during negotiations leading up to Partition, that any territorial or other
demands he made had to be carefully calculated and timed otherwise the
entire plan for the creation of a nation state for the Muslims of the subcontinent could be called off at any point prior to the actual announcement
of Partition. Mr. Jinnah enjoyed a unique position by virtue of having
spearheaded the political movement that led to the creation of Pakistan
within a short while. He decided to become Governor General as
well as the President of Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the country in order to
safeguard its interests. Because he was discreet about his intentions his
demand shocked the British.
Under the India Independence Act of 1947, a plebiscite was held to
decide the future of areas directly administered by the British (British
Provinces) but the 562 princely states were at liberty to accede to either
of the two independent dominions in the sub-continent. They were
expected to be mindful of the wishes of their people. However, their
decisions were influenced6 by many other considerations including the
advice of the British Agents assigned to them. By August 1947 nearly
all of these had formally opted for either India or Pakistan. However, the
princes of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir had not. Under the law in
135
Shahwar Junaid
force they also became independent on 15 August 1947. A month later
Junagadh, with a predominantly Hindu population, opted for Pakistan
- India annexed the territory pending a plebiscite. Hyderabad Deccan,
with a predominantly Hindu population, postponed a final decision and
began negotiations with both India and Pakistan; it was asking for a
semi-independent status with direct links to the Commonwealth when
it was annexed by India in September 1948. The Hindu ruler of Jammu
and Kashmir, which had a predominantly Muslim population (85%)
decided to opt for India after signing letters of accession to both India
and Pakistan: Pakistan objected and war broke out. On 24 October
1947 Muslim volunteers, including those from the North West Frontier
Province, announced the establishment of a ‘Provisional Government
of Kashmir.’ The United Nations intervened and resolved to hold a
plebiscite under UN auspices. India agreed to a plebiscite. Subsequently,
New Delhi refused to honour its pledge and continued to occupy twothirds of the state.7 This and a number of other disputes that were
born with the territorial dispensation at the time of Partition, created
a regional environment in which the destabilisation of civil order and
the manipulation of the internal security situation in Pakistan became
possible.
A boundary commission was established prior to Partition but a
rough outline of the swathes of territory that were to be a part of Pakistan,
was on official maps and being studied long before that. Mr. Jinnah was
aware of all this and appeared to go along with the plans being made. He
kept his counsel while developing a strategy to safeguard the future of
Pakistan. Plebiscite or no plebiscite, regardless of the expressed future
intentions and the negotiations of the princely states with representatives
of the Muslim League and Congress, the territories assigned to Pakistan
were initially in three large patches that were separated from each other
by Indian territory.8 The status of the Northern Areas and Kashmir was,
ostensibly, not decided: theoretically the princely states were free to opt
for either country. However, there was no doubt that the British could,
and would, use their influence and advise the princes to go one way or
the other in order to create a new power equation in the independent
sub-continent. The princely states of Dir, Chitral, Amb and Hunza
were well-advised by the British agent there and acceded to Pakistan
136
promptly. They retained substantial autonomy in administration and
customary law and continue to be a bulwark against conspiracies against
Pakistan. According to off-the-record accounts, it did not appear to be
the intention of the British government to allow these areas, particularly
Kashmir, to become part of Pakistan as this would have strengthened the
new state territorially and politically to an extent that did not fit in with
their plans for the future of the sub-continent.
According to the territorial dispensation at the time of Partition the
source of rivers supplying water to argi-based Pakistan’s vital irrigation
system was to remain under Indian control. During the first few years,
waters were apportioned under the 4 May 1948 inter-dominion accord
which met immediate needs: after intense negotiations that were broken
off several times, the World Bank facilitated dialogue, a limited settlement
of the water dispute was reached and the Indus Basin Waters Treaty
was signed (16 September 1960).9 The terms of the Treaty were such
that without building a number of medium-sized dams and reservoirs
at strategic locations, West Pakistan could not safeguard its interests
with regard to water security. Instead of building medium-sized dams
and reservoirs, Pakistan built the mammoth Tarbela Dam, which besides
being a drain on the economy for decades, is a security risk: according to
one calculation, if anything were to happen to it a large part of Pakistan
would be under water. East Pakistan was surrounded by Indian territory
on three sides and buffeted by Bay of Bengal cyclones on the third.
Bahawalpur and Khairpur also acceded to Pakistan. The people of
the North West Frontier Province voted for Pakistan in the plebiscite
that was held there but the Congress government in the province was
hostile to the concept of Pakistan: it had even asked its followers not
to take part in the plebiscite. Afghanistan and the Indian government
cultivated hostile elements within the province and to this day, they
continue to use the remnants of such elements to destabilise the area and
weaken Pakistan from within. The only country to cast a vote against the
admission of Pakistan to the United Nations in 1947 was Afghanistan.
Afghanistan was a problem. Its claims on Pakistani territory were based
on the ethnic proclivity of tribes on both sides of the border. Pakistan
upheld the treaties that Afghanistan and Britain had signed and refused
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Shahwar Junaid
further discussion on the Durand Line. The issue of a porous western
border with an ethnically related population has plagued Pakistan since
it came into existence: there appears to be little doubt that it has been
used by a number of external forces, both national and sub-national, to
influence the security environment in Pakistan.
In Balochistan the Khan of Kalat exploited some clauses of Kalat’s
1876 treaty with the British and declared independence on 15 August
1947. His real objective in doing so appeared to be the negotiation of
favourable terms with Pakistan. A number of other sardars followed
suit. In 1948 the matter was settled when the Khan signed formal merger
documents. This was followed by his final removal from power and
abolition of the state’s boundaries in 1955. In 1958 the Sultan of Oman
sold Gwadar, which had been given to one of his ancestors by the Khan
of Kalat, back to Pakistan.10
After Partition the Quaid sent official emissaries and then travelled
to Balochistan to meet the erstwhile sardars himself. These included
Nawab Akbar Bugti, with whom he was photographed shaking hands.
Those government officials who went to Balochistan for the first time
after Partition and were more familiar with the developed provinces of
the sub-continent, were shocked by the inertia and total lack of economic
activity in the province and resolved to do something about it: it was not
by chance that the Quaid spent his last days in Ziarat.
The development of Balochistan with its rich natural resource base,
unspoiled coastline, sparse, economically weak population and feudal
environment, has remained problematic. The sardars have enduring
personal and political links with the states of the Gulf, Afghanistan and
Iran and informal trade with all three which is an important source of
income in the area.11 This continues to create foreign policy issues for
the federal government. It also makes policing the area difficult.
The recommendations of the Boundary Commission were a refined
version of earlier maps and met little opposition in Bengal, where
Mahatma Gandhi was present and used his influence to control communal
violence. He hoped that by avoiding bloodshed there would be a chance
138
for some degree of reunification of the sub-continent at some point in
the future. Mahatma Gandhi could not be in two places at the same
time: demarcation in the Punjab was resented by the Sikhs. Although the
actual boundaries of the two states were not known until the 17 August
announcement by the boundary commission, large scale violence began
soon after the announcement of the date for independence. Muslim
majority areas were expected to go to Pakistan and Hindu majority
areas were to be merged with the Indian Union but the demarcation lines
left large segments of the Muslim population in India and Hindu and
Sikh population in territory that was to be Pakistan. Vicious communal
rioting, massacres and a mass movement of population began shortly
after the 3 June 1947 announcement of the date of the transfer of power
on 14-15 August 1947.
The administrative machinery, physical assets and economic and
human resources available to Pakistan, as well as the manner in which
they were utilized by successive political and military governments, have
been an important factor impinging on internal security. The division of
the assets of British India between Pakistan and the Indian Union was at
a ratio of 5:17 respectively by decision of the Viceroy’s Council in June
1947.12 Division was difficult to negotiate and implement. Although
an agreement was reached in December 1948, the actual settlement
of various financial disputes went on till 1960. Division of the Indian
Civil and Police service was also hard on Pakistan: only 101 of the
1157 officers of the Indian civil service were Muslims. Of these just 95
opted for Pakistan. One Christian, eleven military officers transferring
to the civil service and fifty British officers also came to Pakistan as
did a small number of professionals. Most had less than ten years of
experience.13 The weakness of the administrative setup, relative lack of
oversight and poor possibility of recourse to the law due to the chaotic
conditions prevailing in the new country, was tempting for the corrupt.
In the civil disorder that followed the migration of about two million
Muslims from the territories of the Indian Union to Pakistan and the
departure of Hindus and Sikhs for Indian Union territories, the plunder
and unauthorized occupation of evacuee properties came to the notice of
the Quaid, who warned civil servants not to succumb to greed.
139
Shahwar Junaid
There were few Muslim officers in the British Indian army. One
major-general, two brigadiers and six colonels opted for Pakistan.
Including the middle and junior ranks there were just 2500 officers. 500
British officers were retained by Pakistan during the period of transition.
Most of those in the technical services were under qualified. The first
two commanders-in-chief of the Pakistan army were British. Similarly
the navy and the air force were commanded by British officers until
1953 and 1957 respectively. There were only nine regular officers in the
navy and sixty-five pilots in the air force. The army was expected to be
150,000 strong. Most of the ordnance factories were in areas that became
part of the Indian Union. Pakistan’s share of military material had to be
wrested from India despite the division of assets agreement. There were
no ships and only two of the ten squadrons of the Royal Indian Air
Force were given to Pakistan. In fact, during the first few months after
Partition, Pakistan had no armed forces to speak of and was not really in
a position to counter India’s aggressive takeovers of territory, hence the
need to call for volunteers to counter Indian aggression in Kashmir.
Prior to Independence, the police and paramilitary forces of British
India were used to further the political objectives of the government
besides being responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Their
duties were specified in Article 23 of the Indian Police Act of 1861 with
revisions made in 1888 and the Police Rules of 1934. By and large these
legal instruments continue to be the basis for internal security services
in Pakistan.14 Law and order continues to be the responsibility of the
provincial governments and there is no doubt that the police is still
used to further the political objectives of sitting governments. Centrally
administered areas and the tribal areas in the north and northwest are
under the Frontier Crime Regulations that have been amended recently.15
The central government controls a number of forces such as the railroad
police and airport security force, anti-corruption and anti-narcotics force.
The central government also has a number of paramilitary organizations
such as frontier corps, frontier constabulary, rangers and other
paramilitary organizations that have a link with government intelligence
agencies and the military, and these tend to serve the political interests
of governments in power.
140
Traditions in law enforcement handed down by the British colonists
of the sub-continent continued in the worst possible form in Pakistan,
an independent state: protection of the public and law enforcement
have taken second place to enforcement of the political agenda of the
government in power. Successive governments have established police
agencies with special powers, such as the FSF (Federal Security Force)
set up by Z. A. Bhutto and the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) set
up by Musharraf in order to intimidate any opposition to their rule and
further their own political agenda under the guise of law enforcement.
Each successive military government was more brutal than the previous
one in its efforts to break the spirit of the civilian public - and all used
the police and paramilitary forces to intimidate and harass the people.
This was the strength of the administrative core that had to deal
with complex internal and external security problems in the new state
of Pakistan. At the outset there were severe economic, logistic and
administrative challenges since the territorial dispensation did not
allow for complementarities in the division of assets. Food security
was an enormous issue. Excess wheat produced in West Pakistan was
traditionally used in areas that were now part of the Indian Union.
Cotton produced there was used by mills in Bombay and other Indian
cities. Out of the four major ports in British India, Pakistan got only
Karachi. Commodities were in short supply. Initially, Pakistan and the
Indian Union allowed the free movement of goods, persons and capital
for a year but this agreement broke down in November 1947. Pakistan
levied export duties on jute, India on other items.
When the British Pound was devalued in September 1949, India
followed suit but Pakistan did not; India severed trade relations with
Pakistan. There was a rise in the prices of commodities produced in
Pakistan after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. These commodities
included jute and cotton. Pakistan quickly constructed jute and cotton
mills and established trade relations with new partners. Although trade
relations with India were restored in 1951 they were never critical
to Pakistan’s existence. Those early years saw the construction of a
powerful, self-sufficient economic base - but restraint and self-sacrifice
was required to strengthen it. Similar opportunities to strengthen the
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Shahwar Junaid
Pakistan economy have arisen during the past three decades as a result of
changes in the global and regional security environment. Unfortunately,
politicians working with the military in the country have only used such
opportunities to increase their own personal wealth, not the wealth of
the nation. The common civilian has been left with a bankrupt economy
where only occasional pockets of prosperity exist.
Several security problems were thus embedded in various
dispensations at the time of Partition and were never resolved
satisfactorily. A number of security challenges Pakistan has faced, and
will continue to face, are a result of fault lines created by the nature of
the geographical and administrative division of the sub-continent into
two independent states. Studies reveal that, from time to time, these fault
lines have been activated, exploited and manipulated to create crises and
security issues. This has been done by highly motivated and ambitious
individuals and groups working with external forces in order to seize
control of and exploit the country, its resources and the geo-strategic
environment in their own interest: the poor quality and moral corruption
of the leadership has been, and continues to be, a major cause of security
problems in Pakistan. The discourse that follows should reveal how
cleverly the future of the Muslims of the sub-continent was shackled to
the limitations within the dispensations of Partition, and how astutely
the limited potential of the political leadership that would be available
to Pakistan after the physically frail Quaid passed away, was judged.
The economic, political and external security challenges faced
by Pakistan during the early years were compounded by the swift
degradation of the political environment after the death of the Quaid.
By that time about 50 percent of the population in urban areas consisted
of Muslim refugees. Even before the assassination of the first Prime
Minister of Pakistan, his Muslim League was losing control of the
country and was unable to meet the expectations of the people. The
politicians and bureaucracy alike had become absorbed in enjoying the
trappings of office and power instead of pursuing the public weal. As
early as 1949 the need to use laws of preventive detention and those
prohibiting the gathering of more than five persons were being used
again. In 1949 the Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act
142
(PRODA) was enacted to allow the government to disqualify persons
found guilty of ‘misconduct,’ a broad term that could be interpreted in
many ways. In 1952, the Security of Pakistan Act expanded the powers
of the government in the interests of public order. The first attempted
military coup d’etat in Pakistan took place in March 1951. The Chief
of General Staff of the Army and fourteen other officers were caught in
Rawalpindi, conspiring to overthrow the government. They were tried
and convicted but subsequently set free.
By April 1953, in a wrangle over limitations on executive power, the
Governor General had installed a cabinet in which one serving General
and one Major General on civilian duty, were ministers. This provided
the military with an opportunity to play a direct role in politics. Twenty
days after his appointment on 7 October 1958 as Chief Martial Law
Administrator, General Ayub replaced Iskander Mirza and took control
of the country. Thereafter a cycle of long periods of oppressive, spiritshattering military dictatorship followed. These were interspersed by
intervals of managed democracy characterised by carefully engineered
crises and chaos.
The results of the indirect presidential elections of 2 January1965
were revealing because only the younger sister of the Quaid-e-Azam,
Miss Fatima Jinnah, was the candidate of the Combined Opposition
Parties (COP) and was seen to enjoy overwhelming support in both
East and West Pakistan. But she had to be defeated, one way or other
(she eventually died in mysterious circumstances in Karachi on 8 July
1967) in order to keep Ayub Khan in power. This was done by rigging
the elections. Language riots during the 1960s targeted the so-called
Mohajir community which had sided with the Miss Fatima Jinnah and
the COP during the 1964 election campaign.16
The September 1965 war with India, for which the ground had not
really been prepared in Kashmir, and from which few expected results
by way of territory in Kashmir, was aimed to win goodwill for the Ayub
regime and bolster support for the armed forces. However growing
discontent compelled Ayub Khan to step down and he handed over power
to General Yahya Khan who organized elections in 1970. However he
143
Shahwar Junaid
refused to allow the Awami League of East Pakistan which had won a
majority of the seats in the National Assembly to form the government.
This and the unpopularity of the regime paved the way for the uprising
in East Pakistan that would eventually lead to war and an ignominious
defeat at the hands of the Indian army that landed more than 90,000
Pakistanis, including approximately 60,000 hapless soldiers, in Indian
prisoner of war camps and the break-up of the country.
During the 1950s and 1960s Pashtun nationalist elements continued
to be active in the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA). Some elements on both side of the Pak-Afghan border
favoured the creation of a Pashtun state regardless of the impractical
nature of such a proposal. However, Pashtuns were well represented in
the civil service as well as the armed forces and succeeding generations
had relatively moderate political views.17 The collapse of the Afghan
state, its invasion by the Soviet Union, the influx of 1.5 million Afghan
refugees, the cross-border US war with the Soviets, the radicalization of
the Jihadis and the disorder they created in the area, as well as India’s
increasingly intrusive policy created an environment in which the most
radical demand in recent years has been for a change of name for the
province. Nationalist elements themselves are in power, and they are
now responsible for controlling the activities of militants in the area.
The military operations in the tribal areas, as well as Swat and
Dir have been viewed with scepticism in some quarters. Many locals
are of the view that the problem was created by elements within the
military itself, as a strategic diversion within the war on terror. Others
believe that the radicalization of Islam in this area has taken place under
military patronage. About two million people were displaced as a result
of the military operation in Swat and Buner and are now moving back
to rebuild their shattered lives.18
In Baluchistan there were periods of armed conflict in 1948 and
1958. Between 1973 and 1977 there was a nationalist insurgency that
was subdued by the army and this resulted in thousands of deaths. India
and Afghanistan were accused of providing support to the nationalists.
144
The Baluchistan Liberation Army established in 1980 by Khairbux
Marri has re-surfaced recently. All this should never have happened.
Once the gas fields had been discovered the local population should have
been closely involved in their development and subsequent operation. A
settlement on royalty should have been based on formulae acceptable to
all parties: in many parts of the world electricity, oil and gas produced
in one region is utilized at subsidized rates in other parts of the country
but exported at higher rates. The construction of the Gwader port was
another opportunity to provide the fruits of development to the people
of Baluchistan but that opportunity was also lost when even the semiskilled labour for the task was brought in from other provinces and the
local population was ignored. The same thing happened when deep sea
fishing contracts were awarded to foreign firms. This not only depleted
the marine resources, but also impoverished the local population still
further because they were deprived of their traditional source of food and
income. This intolerable situation has been compounded by repression
and even target killing of those who voiced their opposition and sought
redress of their grievances.
The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti resulted in bitter resentment
among the people of the area against the Pakistan government. Tensions
continue to simmer and a war-like situation prevails. The Lal Masjid
operation in Islamabad was another avoidable episode. The religious
seminary attached to the mosque had been constructed with the
knowledge of the government. It was surrounded by the armed forces
and hundreds of its resident students, men, women and children died in
the subsequent firing. The two men running the seminary had obviously
been brainwashed over a period of time and did not appear to be in
their senses. The intervention of religious scholars who had offered
to mediate was rejected just as it was about to bear fruit. There was a
spate of suicide bombings after the tragedy. The people who came to
collect the bodies of their dead children were mostly from the NWFP
and FATA. Most were very poor. They were broken and shattered. This
again generated bitterness and the society was further radicalized.19
Sectarian tension was exacerbated and found expression in bomb
attacks time and again on Shia and Sunni mosques, as well as target
145
Shahwar Junaid
killing of scholars and religious leaders of both sects. It was suggested
that the Ulema of the two sects should, without reservation, condemn
any such incident and be seen standing together for instance, at funeral
prayers for the victims of sectarian violence to pre-empt serious civil
disorder. This did not materialize.
The Islamic Revolution of Iran had an enormous impact on
the political psyche of the West Asian region. In essence, the region
moved out of the effective sphere of influence of Western governments.
Afghanistan became a crucible of international intrigue during the late
1970s and 1980s. The Soviet Union had occupied Afghanistan and
the United States launched cross-border operations from Pakistan to
dislodge the Soviets. This cross-border military activity radicalized the
culture of the tribal belt and the Muslim mercenaries entering to wage
Jihad under the United States acquired the military sophistication and
the technical know-how that they never could have acquired in any other
way. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan was left in
the lurch and had to contend with armed jihadis who sought to impose
their own interpretation of Islam in the region. This continued till the
fateful events of 9/11.
September 11, 2001 was a heaven-sent opportunity for the military
rulers who seized power in 1999 from the elected government of
Nawaz Sharif. The Musharraf regime had been shunned by the Clinton
Administration. 9/11 provided the military-dominated government an
opportunity to ingratiate itself with the Bush Administration by offering
unconditional support for its war on terror and invasion of Afghanistan.
The regime could now ask for restoration of assistance that had been
blocked when the country conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, in
response to those of India earlier in that month. It could also look forward
to years of fruitful and rewarding cooperation in security in the style of
Zia-ul-Haq. The beneficiaries were the members and associates of the
regime. The cost, of course, would be paid by the demonising the tribal
belt and Islam. The new regime was ruthless in enforcing corporate
values in governance for ‘profit maximisation’ and returns that it then
applied in its own interest. However, their activities discredited the
armed forces in the eyes of the civilian public.
146
In an introduction to a research paper on Pakistan’s political and
security challenges 20 (House of Commons Library, London), the authors
state, ‘Pakistan has had a central role as an incubator of militant Islam
since the 1980s. Equally, despite the fact that there have been several
periods of civilian rule, democracy has failed to put down roots in
the country. The military has been a powerful player within the polity
and economy since independence.’ The truth of the matter is that the
people of Pakistan have, time and again, dislodged military dictators
through street power only to find a new one prepared and ready in the
wings. The desire for justice, a democratic dispensation and a belief
in representative rule, one vote for one person, is very powerful in
Pakistan and has enabled the public to strive for these goals under the
most oppressive conditions. What we need to check is who, or what,
emboldens adventurers who create internal security crises in Pakistan.
In the same research paper (quoted above) the authors observe, ‘The US
and EU member Governments have been strong supporters of President
Musharraf since September 11, 2001, donating billions in military,
humanitarian and development assistance….’ Since a record numbers of
civilians live below the poverty line today none of the humanitarian and
development assistance appears to have reached the civilian public in
Pakistan. According to one report virtually all the money, USD 5 billion,
was routed through the Department of Defence Coalition Support Funds
to reimburse key allies in the global war on terror and there is little
documentation of how the money was used.21 There are several other
US programs with little oversight, under which the Pakistan military
leadership is said to have benefited enormously.
The answer to internal security challenges in Pakistan lies in
identifying a statesman who has never taken anything from Pakistan,
who needs nothing from Pakistan, who has everything and who is
only interested in the public weal. In fact the real answer to Pakistan’s
internal security challenges is another Quaid. Only then will the games
that lesser men have been playing in this country stop.
References:
1
Tuker, Lieut- General. Sir Francis, While Memory Serves: Cassell & Company LtdLondon:1950. P.481-484.
147
Shahwar Junaid
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
148
Tuker, Lieut- General. Sir Francis, While Memory Serves: Cassell & Company LtdLondon:1950.
The Transfer of Power Documents, 1942-1947,India Office Library: London
Parliament and India, 1858-1947, U.K. Parliament: 2008.06.02,
Indian Independence Act 1947 (c.30). Revised Statute from the Uk Statute Law Database, Office of Public Sector Information, National Archives, UK. Retrieved 2008.06.02
(subsequent enactments and amendments to the text are incorporated with annotations).
V.P.Menon: The Transfer of Power in India; 1957:Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey.
UN Security Council Resolution 47 (1948) of April 1948; 51 (1948) of June 3 and 80
(1950) of March 14, 1950 and the UN Commission for India and Pakistan Resolution of
13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and 91 0f 30 March 1951..
V.P.Menon: The Transfer of Power in India; 1957:Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey.
Michel Aloys Arthur, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition; Yale University Press: New Haven, 1967
Hasan, Mushirul, ed. India’s Partition
Porter, Gareth (June 21, 2007) US-Iran Arms Claim reveals Cheney-Military Rift. Inter
Press Service.
Library of Congress: Country Profile Pakistan, Retrieved August 24, 2009
Library of Congress Country Profiles: Pakistan. Retrieved September 02, 2009
Kantikar, V.P. Partition of India: East Sussex: Wayland, 1987
Philips and Wainwright:eds.The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935-1947.
Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1970
August 13, 2009
Mohajirs, Karachi and Pakistan Politics (part 1). www.gbytes.gsood.com: 2007-07-25.
Retrieved September 01, 2009
C.Jaffrelot (ed), Nationalism Without a Nation? New Delhi (2002) P.25
A Job Well Done, Editorial, The Nation, July 20, 2009
International Crisis Group, Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia report No.131, 2
April 2007.
House of Commons Library, Research Paper 07/68; 13 September 2007.
The Center for Public Integrity: Billions in Aid With No Accountability Pakistan receives the most post 9/11 U.S military funding; 5/31/2007.
REFORMING A CULTURE
OF POLITICAL AMBIGUITY:
PROMOTING POLITICAL
PARTIES AND AN INDEPENDENT
LEGISLATURE IN AFGHANISTAN1
Niloufer Siddiqui*
Abstract
Effective and democratic political parties have failed to develop in
Afghanistan as a result of legal and constitutional constraints instituted
in the post-Bonn era. Already shrouded with a historical burden of
illegitimacy, political parties are held responsible by the Afghan populace
for the destruction unleashed during the communist and muhajideen
eras. The Single Non-Transferrable Voting (SNTV) System under which
the Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Councils operate today has simply
served to worsen this situation. This system has ensured the persistence
of political patronage. Despite the relatively successful parliamentary
elections of 2005, the Wolesi Jirga has retained an ultimately conservative,
undemocratic outlook due to the predominance of personality-driven
‘proto parties’ associated with previous eras’ power-brokers. However,
the relationship of these parties to the legislature is tenuous – Members
of Parliament continue to vote and act as individuals, resulting in the
atomization of the parliament. The need for a cohesive and representative
legislative agenda is particularly critical in a transitioning democracy;
the impression that little is being achieved by Parliament simply
diminishes the legitimacy of the government. Failure to provide the
appropriate legal channels for political parties to air their views or
*
Niloufer Siddiqui is a scholar and works in an Islamabad-based international organization.
Email niloufersiddiqui@gmail.com
Niloufer Siddiqui
be represented carries the risk that sub-state actors and more extreme
groupings could begin to dominate the system. Afghanistan is in the
nascent years of its democratic endeavor; yet as it struggles to maintain
security in the face of a growing insurgency, priority must be given
to halting this trend towards personalistic politics and simultaneously
moving towards internally democratic, issue-based politics.
Introduction
In establishing a democratic framework for Afghanistan, the 2004
Constitution provided answers to years of debate surrounding how best
to initiate a new era of governance in this conflict-ridden country. In
doing so, however, it was recognized that the system being selected
was – at least in part – a product of its time. When Karzai stated, “If
five or ten years down the line we find that stability improves, proper
political parties emerge, and we judge that a parliamentary system
can function better, then a Loya Jirga can at a time of our choosing be
convened to adopt a different system of government,”2 he was implicitly
suggesting that the decisions being made were dictated by circumstance;
the Constitution, therefore, did not necessarily represent the best longterm political system for Afghanistan. Inherently, as in other postconflict situations, there was a choice to be made between security and
governance, representation and stability.
This dichotomy has proven particularly relevant to the debate
surrounding the role of political parties in Afghanistan’s future, and
how best to encourage the development of these parties. With one
set of elections firmly under its belt, Afghanistan is looking ahead to
presidential elections scheduled for August 2009, and parliamentary
elections likely to take place in 2010. While the 2005 parliamentary
elections were widely hailed as a success, they also served to isolate
the teething problems that Afghanistan faced in the nascent years of its
new government. Not least of these was the realization that the Single
Non-Transferrable Voting (SNTV) System that had been chosen was
not suited to the development of political parties, and was leading
Afghanistan down a path of individualistic, personality-driven politics
rather than issue-based, party politics. Few would disagree today that
political parties form an integral part of the democratic endeavor; yet, in
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Promoting Political Parties and an Independent Legislature in Afghanistan
transitional democracies, the question of sequencing plays a key role. In
an ethnically divided nation such as Afghanistan, many policy-makers
fear that political parties will form along ethnic and religious lines,
their presence, thereby, working merely to exacerbate existing societal
tension and sectarian strife. Case studies of post-conflict situations have
suggested that, particularly in situations where ethnic divides overlap
with unequal distribution of economic resources, the presence of political
parties can, in fact, harden existing cleavages.3 Nonetheless, as political
parties have been formally excluded from the political system, elites
and power-brokers from previous eras have continued to dominate the
political scene in Afghanistan. In this way, the existing system has not
so much dissuaded the creation of political parties as it has worked to
strengthen existing factions and benefited armed factions-turned-parties,
mostly led by warlords.
The fractious nature of politics in Afghanistan has ensured the
historic absence of a space in which political parties can effectively
develop. Nonetheless, it is possible to trace the development of political
parties through Afghanistan’s various periods of turmoil leading up to
the post-Bonn era. The parties currently operating in Afghanistan are not
conventional parties in the sense that Western countries are accustomed
to – Thomas Ruttig refers to them instead as “proto parties,” a term
which captures their lack of institutionalized mandate, hierarchy and
consistent system of membership.4 While their existence provides a
template from which further mobilizing along democratic lines may be
possible, these parties face a severe crisis of legitimacy and are distrusted
by most segments of society. Many Afghan citizens view them as having
wrought destruction during the communist era, or as having been mere
fronts for warlords during the contentious years under the mujahideen.
This distrust is compounded by the parties’ linkages to external players;
in the 1980s, regional intervention by countries with vested strategic
interests in Afghanistan helped prop up political parties – Pakistan’s
involvement resulted in the creation of the “Peshawar Seven” and
Iran’s in the “Tehran Eight.” That these parties lack legitimacy is clear
from local discussions taking place within the country, which indicate
resentment at the “mushrooming” of political parties. Detractors argue
that their steep increase in society is an indication that they are “nothing
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more than NGOs in political disguise.”5 A study conducted in 2005
quoted a Provincial Council candidate as stating, “The word ‘parties’ is
hated by Afghans. People keep themselves away from parties.”6
Political parties thus face both institutional and pragmatic constraints
in Afghanistan, made even more difficult by a system which has
inadvertently favored undemocratic parties that have caused contention
in the legislature and halted the democratic endeavor. As the country
moves forward, it must, with international support, seek to provide the
legal and institutional basis necessary for the development of centrist,
inclusive parties. In the absence of such parties, politics in Afghanistan
will remain personality-driven and merely serve to harden, rather than
ease, societal cleavages. The undemocratic and largely conservative
parties and blocs which have started to stamp their authority in the
legislature must face effective competition from forward-looking,
moderate parties, before the former become increasingly entrenched.
Existing political parties must be provided incentives in order to moderate
their discourse and work effectively towards a democratic Afghanistan,
particularly as – in the short run at least – they are likely to continue to
determine the course of events.
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Democracy and Political Parties: Is the Multi-Ethnic Afghanistan
Ready?
Map taken from Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (Stratfor).Accessed March 23, 2009. <http://
web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/Afghan_ethnic_800.jpg.>
E.E. Schattschneider has argued that “political parties created
democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of
parties,”7 a claim that has been supported in one form or another by
theorists ranging from Alexis de Tocqueville to Seymour Lipset to
Larry Diamond. Samuel Huntington has similarly argued that “violence,
rioting and other forms of political instability are more likely to occur in
political systems without strong parties than in systems with them.”8 The
existence of an organized opposition, functioning within the governmental
apparatus, provides an avenue through which to institutionalize dissent,
restrain incumbents9 and establish democratic norms through conflict
between parties. When examining future prospects for political party
development in multiethnic countries searching for a unifying national
identity, the question of how to prevent fractionalization along ethnic
or sectarian lines becomes increasingly important. Lipset has argued
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Niloufer Siddiqui
that parties must have an “almost permanent base of support among a
significant segment of the population if they are to survive electorally.
Parties in new electoral democracies will be inherently unstable
unless they become linked to deep-rooted sources of cleavage .”10 In
Afghanistan, these sources of cleavage are largely ethnic and sectarian.
Although recent statistics are difficult to obtain, data from the CIA
World Factbook indicates an ethnic composition in which Pashtuns
form the majority with 42% of the population, Tajiks 27%, Hazaras 9%
and Uzbeks 9%.11 Sunni Muslims make up 80% of the population, while
Shia Muslims make up about 19%.
The question in a political context such as Afghanistan’s remains
one of whether stable and internally-democratic political parties will
emerge when an electoral system which caters to them is in place, or
whether the choice for an electoral system should be dictated by the
type of parties that are currently in existence. A conference examining
the development of political parties in post-conflict scenarios found the
following:
Traditionally, constitutionalists have attempted to avoid
political parties, the assumption being that parties should
be left to develop freely. . however . . unbridled party
formation in conflict-prone societies may contribute to
the emergence of ethnic parties and . . the formation of
aggregated interests, bridging societal groups, is a long
process.12
Thus, political parties “have the capacity to bridge or worsen cleavages
in societies” and can act as either instigators or managers of conflict.13
Given their role, it becomes apparent that managing the activities of
political parties is essential, and harnessing their advantages for the
benefit of the country should remain a priority of the government.
Marvin Weinbaum agrees that the strongest affinity in Afghanistan
would inevitably be along ethnic lines; however, while the strengthening
of parties along these schisms might be potentially dangerous to the
creation of a stable national state, it is essential to recognize that ethnic
154
parties will not necessarily be monolithic.14 Manipulating the electoral
system in a way which prevents a ‘natural’ movement towards the
formation of parties or blocs simply makes these blocs “unaccountable,
less democratic and less able to respond to voters’ interests.”15 As the
results of the 2005 parliamentary elections have demonstrated and
as discussed in the following section, the official absence of political
parties has not prevented association along ethnic lines in Afghanistan
– if anything, the fractionalization or atomization of the parliament has
been broken largely by ethnic alliances. The current Parliament’s ethnic
composition is largely equivalent to the ethnic distribution of Afghan
society, a situation which may work to replicate society’s divisions but
ultimately ensures the Parliament’s legitimacy. With Pashtuns, at 47.4%,
forming the largest individual ethnic grouping, the Parliament has also
not been dominated by any one ethnic group.16 Andrew Wilder argues,
“The main way political parties in Afghanistan today have to mobilize
support, other than through intimidation or financial incentives, is
through appeals along religious or ethnic lines.”17
Nonetheless, where party fractionalization exists on the grounds
of ethnic fractionalization, the preponderance of political parties in
Afghanistan may not be helpful for future development. Benjamin Reilly
argues that democracies can prove problematic for ethnically divided
societies as candidates attempt to “outbid” one another in displaying
loyalty to their own groups, thereby further exacerbating ethnic tension.
However, he explains that electoral engineering has become a popular
way by which to decrease ethnic tensions in emerging democracies; this
includes the provision of electoral incentives for politicians to reach
out to other parties, the presence of an area for bargaining, and the
development of centrist and inclusive parties.18 This can prevent the
outbreak of violence among different segments and groups in society –
a destructive manifestation of ethnic divisiveness. Thus, it is ultimately
electoral incentives at both the local constituency level and national
level, and the way these interact, which determine both where and when
ethnic violence against minorities will occur and the way in which the
state chooses to respond to it.
The presence of ethnic violence in only certain areas of India is
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Niloufer Siddiqui
particularly illustrative for the purposes of this paper. In arguing that
the key factor in preventing ethnic violence is the central government’s
capacity and willingness to do so, Wilkinson states, “democratic states
protect minorities when it is in their governments’ electoral interest to do
so.”19 This is particularly the case if the government has to negotiate or
form a coalition with parties supported by minorities, or when minorities
are an important source of support for the government itself. What
Horowitz refers to as “vote-pooling” ensures that parties are provided an
incentive to moderate their policies and make appeals along cross-ethnic
lines.20 Additionally, Wilkinson argues that the greater the level of party
competition in a region, the greater the incentives to appeal to minority
votes, especially when victory depends on votes from the margins. This
is particularly the case when the minority group is large enough to count
politically – as is the case with Muslims in India, and with many of the
ethnic and sectarian groups in Afghanistan. This argument requires a
moderate leadership and electorate-at-large and works most effectively
when operating in a Single Transferrable Vote or Alternative Vote system.
Still, it demonstrates that ethnically heterogeneous societies and ethnic
parties do not necessarily imply greater levels of ethnic discontent or
division, and could be consistent with the greater goal of democracy.
As Wilkinson argues, “politicized ethnicity depends on a whole range
of factors, such as federal boundaries and government policies, and not
just on underlying census categories.”21
An equally grave problem faced by Afghanistan is its lack of party
system institutionalization at all levels, which is necessary for parties
to be perceived as legitimate by the general populace. As Mainwaring
explains, “more institutionalized party systems are ones in which parties
have strong roots in society, . . enjoy considerable stability” and in
which “patterns of party competition manifest regularly.”22 Afghanistan
lacks many of these preconditions – its electoral market is unstable
since parties are not supported by the electoral system, few people
know which candidates belong to which parties, and there is little faith
in the long-term continuity of elected candidates. In order for political
parties to become widely established and widely known, so there “is
stability in who the main parties are and how they behave,” Afghanistan
needs more than just a change in law.23 A civil servant interviewed by
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AREU explained, “Setting up parties has become a business here. Some
people just set up parties to make money.”24 This trend towards political
parties being viewed as NGOs or as indistinct from civil society must be
arrested. Like other facets of state-building, building the legitimacy of
political parties will take time; as political parties begin to operate more
effectively in parliament, they will be able to develop greater support
and linkages.25 The role of political parties is greatly different from that
of civil society, precisely because the latter works outside of the political
establishment and legislatures. Ivan Doherty argues that civil society
cannot be perceived as a substitute for political parties, and that in fact,
“strengthening civic organizations, which represent the demand side of
the political equation, without providing commensurate assistance to
the political organizations that must aggregate the interests of those very
groups, ultimately damages the democratic equilibrium.”26
Legal and Constitutional Constraints: The Best Electoral System
for Afghanistan?
While analysts can not agree on whether the greater problem facing
the development of political parties in Afghanistan is the electoral
law or more pervasive sociopolitical factors, such as the lack of party
legitimacy, most, however, tend to agree that the first step is doing away
with the SNTV system. Andrew Reynolds argues that an appropriate
electoral system is the single most important institutional factor in the
success of transitioning democracies.27 Carol Riphenburg, on the other
hand, while acknowledging the powerful role of parties in democracies,
concludes that electoral systems should not be viewed as a “panacea”
for deep-rooted cleavages in society.28
The SNTV system, which was the electoral system chosen for the
2005 Wolesi Jirga29 and Provincial Council elections and is likely to
still be in effect for the next set of elections, permits individuals to stand
for elections only as independent candidates and not as members of
a party list. While candidates can stand for election in multi-member
constituencies (provinces), voters can only vote for one candidate – even
if the constituency has more than one seat allocated to it. This creates
a situation whereby parliamentary elections are effectively “popularity
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Niloufer Siddiqui
contests,”30 with the more well-known personalities proving victorious,
but not being held accountable to anyone or any party. Candidates are
elected merely by winning the most votes; thus, if a district has 33 seats
allocated to it – as was the case in Kabul – the top 33 vote-getters will
gain a seat, even if they have only received a miniscule proportion of the
vote. Because candidates only require a small number of votes in certain
provinces, there is no incentive for them to join parties or appeal to a
broad base of voters. In this way, the SNTV system does not produce
a clear relationship between a political party’s vote share and their seat
shares in parliament, causing a “lottery effect” and a high percentage
of “wasted vote.”31 Prior to the elections, Barnett Rubin argued, “This
system, in fact, virtually guarantees the formation of an unrepresentative
parliament of local leaders with no incentive to cooperate with one
another or the government.”32 He was proven right as the 2005 Afghan
legislature brought in individuals who did not campaign on an ideological
basis, but rather were well-known personalities or allied with regional
strongmen. In addition, a remarkable 68% of the votes were cast for
candidates who ultimately lost. Thus, the notion that the SNTV system
would create a more representative system, where voters would feel
directly linked to their representatives, failed in its implementation.
That this rarely-used system with such obvious failings was chosen
warrants some analysis in itself, pointing as it does to deep-seated
prejudices within the Afghan political scene. Reynolds argues that the
decision-making process was rooted “in the transitional government’s
own interests and presented to the public largely as a fait accompli.”33
The ostensible reasons for the choice were simplicity, transparency and
direct representation. A report by constitutional experts published at
the time stated, “Given the factionalized nature of Afghan politics, the
primary goal should be to produce reasonable proportionality . . voting
procedure will also need to be simple and transparent; illiteracy and
innumeracy limit the complexity of possible voting systems.”34 Yet,
political commentators have pointed towards a fear of political parties
shared by both Karzai and the Afghan populace, stemming from their
experiences with communist parties during the Soviet era and foreignsupported parties following the Soviet defeat, which influenced the
electoral choice. Cythia Maass outlines three possible explanations for
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Karzai’s vehement opposition to political parties: “election tactics; the
desire to keep several options open and a fundamental power preservation
strategy.”35 Marvin Weinbaum agrees with the latter argument, stating
that the choice of electoral system was largely a result of President
Karzai’s calculation on how best to retain unrestrained power and his
fear that the opposition would be able to organize against him in the
parliament.36
It is essential to recognize at the outset that the SNTV system
in Afghanistan does not achieve what it sets out to in preventing the
establishment of political parties or in dissuading ethnic factionalism.
Islamist parties, including the Jamiat-e-Islami and the Hezb-i-Islami, as
well as other similarly conservative former mujahideen groupings, were
able to “out-maneuver the constraints of the system” through coercion or
vote-buying in the 2005 elections, and created blocs in the legislature.37
Additionally, voting blocs during the 2005 elections did form along
ethnic lines, despite the purported absence of parties; even those parties
which were not explicitly ethnic in nature received the majority of their
support along ethnic and regional lines. The NDI argues that most parties
had “limited reach beyond narrow ethnic, linguistic, or geographical
boundaries.”38 While this was less pronounced for leftist and communist
parties – which received a surprising number of seats in parliament –
even these parties were aided by tribal and ethnic linkages.39 Support
within the Parliament also remains ethnically-determined: Karzai’s
support today stems primarily from Pashtuns and Tajiks. According to
Wilder’s categorization of the parliament, none of the 20 Uzbek MPs,
and less than 20% of Hazaras, are categorized as pro-government.40 Even
if one were to make the case that the SNTV system has not exacerbated
divisions along ethnic lines, it still fails to encourage cooperation across
these lines, thereby working within a status quo rather than making
any progress towards changing it. While a system of party competition
could provide the grounds from which to build cross-cutting coalitions
or provide the need to appeal to multi-ethnic constituencies, the SNTV
system requires no such thing.
Wilder argues that ethnic minority groups in particular found that
political parties helped them in organizing for the elections. In nonCRITERION – October/December 2009
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Niloufer Siddiqui
Pashtun areas, a high percentage of winning candidates were affiliated
with political parties.41 For example, the endorsement of candidates by
the leader of the Hazara party, Hezb-i Wahadat, reportedly played a
large part in these candidates’ victories. Where official political parties
did not exist, the Shi’a community banded together and functioned as a
type of party in itself; community members met and agreed together on
the candidates which would stand for election in the WJ and Provincial
Council elections.42 However, that these groups were ultimately unable
to strategically take advantage of the SNTV system is indicative of
the extent to which newer parties were at a disadvantage relative to
groups with pre-existing networks. Thus, older parties affiliated with
the conflicts over the preceding years were able to take advantage of
their organizational apparatus, resources and internal communication to
succeed in a manner in which post-Bonn groupings were unable to.
The SNTV system also appears to violate the 2003 Political Parties
Law, as Article 12 of the law gives parties the right to introduce candidates
at all elections. While many political party leaders argue that problems
exist not with the law but with the implementation, there are nonetheless
certain lacunae which allow for the law to be interpreted in a manner
which works against the development of parties. For example, the law’s
prohibition of political parties which are “opposed to the principles of the
holy religion Islam” creates a situation whereby influential Islamists are
able to block the formation of parties to which they are opposed.43 The
vague nature of the article leaves too much space for interpretation, and
therefore limits the independent nature of political parties, particularly
new groupings.
Similar problems exist with paragraph 3 of Article 6 which states,
“Political parties shall not incite violence on ethnic, racial, religious
or sectarian grounds.”44 While this article goes some way to tackling
the fear of factionalism along ethnic and religious lines – a fear that
has to a large degree dictated the legal architecture of the country – it,
nonetheless, leaves room for influential politicians to limit the creation
of new parties. Additionally, as Riphenburg argues, despite this law,
“internal fragmentation remains in evidence as the country’s ethnic
groups, tribes, and local warlords exercise power in their respective
160
localities.”45 By attempting to prevent a situation which is already
in existence, the law is therefore not merely ineffective but works to
discourage political parties from organizing on the grounds of ‘national
unity.’
Over 80 parties had nonetheless registered under this law between
2004 and 2005. Parties are obliged to register with the Ministry of
Justice, under the Office of Political Party Registration (OPPR). They
are required to have a constitution and a minimum of 700 members.46
The ICG has expressed concern with the Ministry of Justice’s role in
registering parties and requesting their dissolution, as this system doesn’t
guarantee due process and leaves the parties at the whim of the ministry.47
Controversy surrounded the decision to register parties led by former
warlords which maintained links to armed elements. Parties that were
formed in opposition to Karzai, such as the Hezbe-Afghanistan Naween,
led by interim Education Minister Mohammad Yonus Qanooni, also
encountered difficulties while registering, but were eventually permitted
to do so. Thus, while a comprehensive law is in place, it is clear that the
influence of political strongholds, including the former warlords and
President Karzai, remains strong. The Political Parties Law should thus
be clarified in order to prevent it from being manipulated by power elites
and to eliminate unnecessary curbs on party formation.48
Arendt Lijphart has argued that the most attractive electoral
combination for emerging democracies, particularly those with
religious and ethnic minorities, is a combination of parliamentarianism
and proportional representation (PR). Such a system, Lijphart argues,
facilitates better minority representation and less economic inequality.49
While there is little chance of a switch away from the current presidential
system, and the advantages and disadvantages of this are beyond
the scope of this paper, a system of proportional representation with
open lists, which has been proposed by electoral experts, would work
to prevent some of the problems created by the SNTV system. In a
PR system, voters cast ballots for party lists which then gain seats in
proportion to their vote. The seats are allocated to candidates with the
most votes on the list.50 As opposed to closed lists, where the parties
assign the seats to the candidates, this system enables voters to reject
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corrupt individuals. According to Rubin, this system “creates incentives
for cooperation among candidates and ethnic groups across a province.”51
It also limits the use of bribery and intimidation. Changing from the
SNTV to proportional representation system should be a goal set by
the Afghanistan government, with assistance from the international
community.
Political Parties: Historically and Today
The historical development of political parties in Afghanistan points
towards a situation of sustained and deliberate stifling; this inheritance is
significant to the political landscape in existence today. While it would
be unfair to suggest that no significant political parties have existed over
the course of Afghanistan’s fractious history, these parties have faced
legal constraints under successive regimes in the 20th century, which have
prevented the creation of national constituencies and an organizational
apparatus. This absence is being felt today, as “no leader [can] validate a
claim to represent a national constituency through past electoral results
or through any other form of activity.”52 King Zahir Shah’s failure to
legalize political parties under his tenure – despite having introduced a
more representative form of government in 1963 – simply served to make
more difficult the task of party building. The nascent years following the
adoption of the 2004 constitution are eerily reminiscent of those following
the 1964 constitution, and should be referred to in garnering lessons for
the future. Writing in 1972, Weinbaum explained that “a persistent fear
in government circles is that the freedom to organize political parties
will most benefit the country’s extremist political groups, offering them
respectability and an unrestricted opportunity to proselytize.”53 Thus,
while Article 36 of the 1964 Constitution emphasized the importance of
political parties, a law to institutionalize them was never passed; rather,
it was deferred to give time to “incipient parties . . to formulate policies
and groom responsible leaders,” an argument that has been echoed by
Karzai in recent years.
Zahir Shah’s actions ultimately proved disastrous, as leftists and
Islamic radicals continued to be active, upsetting the political order and
bringing about its downfall. By keeping these parties out of the political
162
system, the King gave them no incentive to work within established
boundaries or moderate their views. In fact, potentially moderate
parties, including a social-democratic party, ceased to be active when
the Political Parties Law remained unsigned, indicating that these
parties paved the way for extremist ones with which the government
was no longer able to effectively interact.54 A variety of communist
parties were formed in the 1960s, most significant of which proved to
be the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), or Hezb-e
Demokratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan. The party could not refer to itself
as a party publicly and many of its actions had to be clandestine in
nature. In its secret party constitution, the PDPA described itself as the
Marxist-Leninist party of the working class of Afghanistan.55 The legal
restrictions on the party’s functioning did not prevent a PDPA-assisted
coup overthrowing Zahir Shah in 1973, and then ultimately, the Saur
Revolution of 1978. PDPA leaders had feared that Mohammed Daoud
Khan was planning to exterminate them all, which led them to organize
an uprising and overthrow him.
The system of non-party parliamentary democracy evident in the
1960s and 1970s is similar to what we are seeing today. Weinbaum wrote
in 1972 that “the Wolesi Jirga, in effect, houses 216 distinct parties –
one for each member,”56 resulting in disorganization and chaos and a
failure to conform to legislative programs. In 2007, he similarly argued
(referring to the legislature’s 249-seat lower house) that: “what you have
in effect are 249 different parties so it [parliament] has not functioned as
a legislature, but as a forum to register complaints.”57
During the course of the 1970s and 1980s, external interference
by neighboring countries worked to prevent the creation of legitimate
parties and hardened distrust; parties were now seen by the public as
mere proxies for foreign powers or fronts for warlords. Mujahideen
parties formed with the goal of resisting Soviet rule were assisted by antiSoviet international powers. The Iranian revolutionary regime that came
to power at the end of the 1970s trained and armed Hazara Islamists;
it merged the various Shi’a parties into Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party)
after the Soviets withdrew in 1988. Similarly, in 1980, the Pakistani
military regime under General Zia ul-Huq propped up seven mutually
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hostile Islamic parties (the “Peshawar Seven”) as the representatives of
Afghani refugees in Pakistan and the mujahideen.58 It was made explicit
that membership in these parties was a precondition for assistance from
the ISI. A system of interparty rivalry served Pakistan’s goals; “a unified
Loya Jirga would threaten Pakistan’s control over Afghan refugees and
over the military and political conduct of the war.”59 In an attempt to
prevent growing Pashtun nationalism, Pakistan did not recognize the
Afghan Millat, a Pashtun nationalist party still operating today, and
together with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, provided aid and
weapons only to the recognized Islamist parties, none of which had large
followings among the local populace. Rubin describes the patronage:
Commanders could belong to several networks at once,
and no party corresponded completely to a particular social
network. Opportunism and pragmatism played a role in
party membership, and each network was also segmented
by language and qawm. If a prominent leader of one
organization belonged to a particular qawm, members of
that qawm tended to join that group.60
When the Soviets were ousted in 1989, most of these factions became
hardened rivals in the resulting civil war. Alliances which did evolve
between these groups were seen as avenues to military success; they had
little to do with clear-cut ideological goals.61 Sometimes alliances were
formed along ethnic lines, even when the parties were politically at odds
with one another; for instance, alliances between former communist
groups and Islamist parties helped create power centers along geographic
or ethnic lines.62 Although the parties began initially as military factions,
they soon established organizational structures and communication
apparatuses.63 This structure and experience proved significant after the
Taliban fell, as these parties were able to take advantage of the new
political space through their pre-existing access to resources.
Many analysts contend that there have been three large categories
within which political parties in Afghanistan can be grouped
historically. These categories remain to this day: politico-religious or
Islamist parties; the communist left; and ethno-nationalists or ethnic
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and sectarian groups.64 Within each broad category exist numerous
cleavages, and often there is little that ideologically distinguishes
one party from another, other than the leadership. Each category of
groups has dominated, and proved problematic, at different times in
Afghanistan’s history. The debates in the current parliament, thus far,
suggest that parties with a conservative outlook have emerged as the
strongest contenders, as is indicated by the table to the left. [Table taken
from Wilder, Andrew. “A House Divided. Analysing the 2005 Afghan
Elections.” AREU. December 2005. Page 7.]
Most accounts indicate that the post-Bonn period was accompanied
by the emergence of a whole host of new pro-democracy parties, whose
activities were dampened once the SNTV system was chosen. Given the
institutional constraints, these parties were unable to develop. Parties
that had existed prior to the Taliban’s rule, however, found their way out
of the woodwork and have come to dominate the Wolesi and Meshrano
Jirgas. In particular, Rabbani’s Jamiat party, Dostum’s Junbesh party,
and the Mahaz-e-Milli party have all received a large number of seats
in the WJ. The NDI estimates that there are approximately 15 preTaliban parties represented in the WJ, and that these members have
approximately 93-123 seats. Post-Taliban parties are 10 in number and
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only account for between 19-31 seats.65
The Role of Parties in the 2005 Parliament: Irreconcilable Cleavages
or Experiment in Alliance-building?
The September 18, 2005 elections brought candidates from a wide
political, religious and ethnic spectrum to power in the WJ and Provincial
Councils. The Parliament has been described alternatively as an atomized,
fragmented institution and one in which numerous parties with fluid
and often indistinguishable membership and platforms operate; the
Parliament exists somewhere between the two descriptions.66 Estimates
indicate that there are anywhere from 22 to 33 parties represented
in the parliament, with additional parties looking to organize for the
upcoming elections.67 While some heralded the surprising success of
political parties against all odds during the elections, their relationship
to the legislature is at best tenuous.68 Firstly, the lack of an official
acknowledgment of political parties has ensured that only larger, more
well-established parties with strong internal communication have been
able to influence their Members of Parliament (MPs). Secondly, the lack
of a “functional structure” has prevented the parliament from forming or
maintaining legislative majorities, which are essential both for necessary
political discussion as well as quick and effective legislating. Instead,
the plethora of small factions and individuals with no constituency to
answer to has resulted in “an environment of constant deal making and
horse-trading.”69
Attempts were made early on at establishing a Parliamentary
Groups system, where individual MPs were invited to form issue-based
groups, rather than those based on religion, ethnicity, or language. The
Parliamentary Groups were required to have a minimum of 21 members,
and each MP was to be a member of only one group. However, the
system failed to take off largely due to leadership struggles between
various members of the parliament and because the decision to join
parliamentary groups was based on who the other members were rather
than on the group’s platforms. Thus, each MP continues to effectively
function, and vote, as an independent. This provides ample room for
vote-buying and intimidation within the legislatures. The Afghanistan
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Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) highlights a “self-perpetuating
problem” here: “while the functioning of parliament is highly limited by
the lack of political parties, the ways in which it does operate provides
no incentive for parties to consolidate their connections to it, or to form
in the first place.”70 MPs’ votes are not recorded and as they have no
public to whom they are accountable, there is no incentive to “formalize
their connection with Parliament.”71
Since a culture of political parties has eluded Afghanistan throughout
its history, there is no system in place whereby parties disseminate
information about their goals and mandates. Most parties operate simply
as underground groups bent on organizing and mobilizing, rather than
working within a system which would provide them the space in which
to operate and mobilize. In fact, interviews conducted by the AREU
demonstrate that MPs which are members of newly-formed political
parties are unwilling to name the party with which they are affiliated.
The AREU suggests that this hesitancy may be a result of parties
continuing to operate as vehicles of patronage; that is, MPs may agree to
represent a party in exchange for some concession.72 Thus, membership
to a party is contingent upon personal gain and not upon the desire to
put forward certain issues or instill social change. Equally significant is
that membership to parties is not formalized which allows MPs to attach
themselves to “successful” parties as they wish. According to AREU
findings, respondents view parties “outside” the WJ, as “separate entities
from the workings of parliament,”73 a sentiment which is supported by
that fact that many MPs, despite being members of a certain party, are
free to make their own alternative coalitions within the parliament.
In a detailed assessment of the backgrounds of candidates elected to
the Wolesi Jirga of 2005, Andrew Wilder divided the parliament into progovernment, pro-opposition and non-aligned (or uncertain alignment)
groupings. This division demonstrates little by way of actual common
interests, and has not pointed towards the actual voting pattern in the
parliament. Party policy does not dictate voting behavior, and one can
not accurately determine an individual’s political leanings by the party
to which they belong. Wilder explains, for example, that the Jamiate-Islami, a traditionally Islamic fundamentalist party with Muslim
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Brotherhood linkages, now includes members with a leftist orientation.
The Jamiat faction led by former president Burhanuddin Rabbani
currently has ten seats in the Wolesi Jirga, but about 10 related factions
and off-shoots have members represented in the WJ as well. “It appears
that any ‘politics of ideas’ is overruled by a politics of ethnic identity
and personal interest, in spite of measures . . to counteract this.”74
Karzai’s decision to operate independent of a political party has
itself backfired. By holding the Presidential and Parliamentary elections
at separate times, despite the initial joint timetable, Karzai began his
presidency with a weak legislative base of support. While he received
55% of the presidential vote, less than a third of the Wolesi Jirga can be
categorized as pro-Karzai – and this percentage is further reduced by the
tenuous nature of political allegiances.75 Thus, one of the most significant
results of the composition of the 2005 Parliament has been the extrajudicial and undemocratic means that Karzai has had to resort to in order
to exert control. This has occurred despite the presence of a system
that was created in order to bolster his position and disable effective
opposition mobilization. The lack of a presidential party, which could
potentially have brought in a broad support base from myriad sectors
of society, has instead left a gaping void in the center. The Mahaz-eMilli led the campaign for Karzai in the presidential election, and he
was supported by a number of other smaller parties, but no effective
alliances have been formed in parliament since.76
Karzai stated in an October 2003 BBC interview, “Afghanistan was
destroyed, tormented, put through lots of suffering because of the infighting, because of the political agendas of the parties that were not
national. Afghanistan needs to have a day off on that.”77 However,
Karzai made no attempt at creating this national party which, even
if it had resulted in single-party dominance along the lines of India’s
Congress Party post-independence, could have prevented the currentday fractionalization. In 2005, Wilder predicted, “President Karzai’s
skill at being all things to all people – to appear relatively moderate or
liberal to the liberals, respectful of the jihad to the Islamic conservatives,
and to have at least some support from within most ethnic groups –
will certainly help in this regard.”78 Instead, today Karzai finds himself
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appealing to extremist parties at all ends of the ethnic and ideological
spectrum; his recent signing of the Shia family law, which regulates
personal matters among the Shia minority community and effectively
“legalizes the rape of a wife by her husband” according to the UN, is
indicative of this trend.79 A prominent Shia leader was quoted as saying,
“It’s electioneering. Most of the Hazara people are unhappy with Mr.
Karzai.”80 Additionally, a female MP argued, “There are moderate views
among the Shia, but unfortunately our MPs, the people who draft the
laws, rely on extremists.”81 Hence, parliamentary debate and discussion
has excluded more moderate voices, with the more conservative ideas
finding their way into the law. Karzai can be seen to be operating more
as a tribal chief than as the head of a modern democratic state.
The former mujahideen – while initially, and still largely, proponents
of Karzai – have nonetheless demonstrated their willingness to band
together in opposition to Karzai if so needed. The opposition alliance
in the Parliament, composed of 12 members and called the National
Understanding Front of Afghanistan (NUF), was initially headed by
Qanooni who sought to “crystallize the anti-Karzai opposition around
his own person.”82 This multi-ethnic alliance aimed to run together for
the elections and eventually merge into one reformist party. This pact
failed, both in running joint candidates for parliament, and in providing
a common front in Parliament. Qanooni was eventually replaced by
Rabbani as the opposition leader in the WJ. This period was marked
by shifting allegiances between parties and the creation of new offshoots. The presence of these groups nonetheless has ensured a harsh
conservative streak, with Qanooni advocating for the implementation
of Shariah Law. The NUF vowed to weaken the grip of Karzai and give
more influence to political parties. Their first attempt in challenging
the presidency took place in September 2005 as the Parliament voted
overwhelmingly to oust the foreign minister “on the grounds of
incompetence.”83 The vote proved ineffective, as Karzai deemed it
illegal and politically motivated; Foreign Minister Spanta had alienated
the warlords by opposing a blanket amnesty for war crimes committed
during the years of conflict. Members of the NUF threatened to quit the
Parliament. One of the members stated, “If the executive doesn’t pay
attention to our decisions, what can we do? If 60 M.P.’s resign, definitely
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Parliament will collapse,”84 indicating the degree to which coalitionbuilding was proving effective for certain members of the Parliament.
That this ultimately failed to take off demonstrates the difficulty of
ensuring an independent and sovereign Parliament. In March 2006, after
the Parliament ruled that a 41-year old Christian convert should not be
allowed to leave Afghanistan to seek asylum abroad, as doing so would
have violated Shariah law and the Constitution, Western pressure on the
new government to honor freedom of religion halted this ruling.85 Both
Karzai and the international community must balance the need for an
independent legislature and one which promotes moderate, democratic
ideals – which at the moment, appears irreconcilable. A system that
encourages the formation of political parties would assist in promoting
this independence, by encouraging groups to mobilize around specific
issues.
Former Mujahideen, New Democrats and the ‘Unaligned’:
Competing for Legislative Control
Wilder argued in 2005 that the major political divide that would be
witnessed in the functioning of the new parliament would be between
“religious conservatives” and “liberal, left-leaning members, allied
with some independents and members from the more secular, ethnicbased nationalist parties.”86 The events of the last four years have
demonstrated that the religious conservatives have largely won this
battle. Former mujahideen groupings form a stronghold in the parliament;
these warlords have created their own parties, in an attempt to reassert
their legitimacy and to assert their right to national prominence and to
bear arms. Candidates with “jihadist” credentials had a 60% success
rate in the 2005 elections in the Wolesi Jirga and an 80% success rate
in the provincial councils.87 Despite representing different factions and
parties, “each of these commanders remain unified in a shared sense
of privilege and a right to rule.”88 Thus, while the former mujahideen
are admittedly a diverse group, and are divided along ethnic lines,
they nonetheless possess a similar conservative outlook. A law which
banned the broadcast of Indian soap operas as un-Islamic, as well as
the prohibition of music and dance performances, indicates the type of
socially conservative agenda which is being promulgated.89 Recent
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news reports further indicate that the type of issues with which the
Parliament has been involved have remained largely trivial and “out of
touch” with the needs of the populace.90
In Afganistan’s war dominated history political parties have
often changed shape, oscillating between armed militias governed by
warlords to parliamentary parties with ostensible party mandates and
agendas. Political-military parties have tended to dominate post-war
politics for a number of reasons: these armed groups possess greater
organizational capabilities than other groups, their role in previous
armed resistance imbues them with a sense of entitlement, and more
“traditional” elements have lost legitimacy through their affiliation with
the previous regime.91 The presence of these parties has done little by way
of increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the majority of
which continue to view parties with suspicion and as remnants of either
the communist or jihad era. Whether or not the presence of warlords
and drug commanders in the Parliament should be used as a reason to
marginalize the body is a question many pondered over immediately
after the 2005 elections. Bhatia argues that while some commanders
attempt to retain the mythology of the mujahideen’s fight against the
Soviets, lower-ranked members are looking to break from the party
leaders.92 And the former mujahideen are not homogenous in their own
right. Bhattia distinguishes between three types: the political-military
parties, strongmen-warlords and community militias. “Here, there is a
clear divide between those commanders linked to (and drawing their
power from) communities or solidarity groups (qawms), and those that
draw their power from political parties.”93
Certain parties have indicated a willingness to transform from
parties dominated by a single warlord to political parties with a relatively
progressive social agenda. Dostum’s Junbesh party has been one such
example.94 Dostum is an Uzbek warlord and former communist militia
commander who allied with the mujahideen to help them take control
of Kabul in 1992. He played an active role in the U.S.-led campaign
against the Taliban, and held the position of Deputy Defense Minister
briefly.95 According to a report by the Jamestown Foundation:
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Niloufer Siddiqui
[Given] Dostum’s role as a popular secularist leader in the
north (he is generally well liked by the Uzbek, Turkmen,
and Hazara population of the north who are grateful to
him for protecting their liberal mini-state of six northern
provinces . .), his multi-ethnic Junbish Party might actually
play a positive role in the prevention of the reemergence
of Islamic extremism in northern Afghanistan.96
Junbesh is said to consist of members from both ends of the ideological
spectrum - both leftist and Islamist. Thus, international actors looking to
promote democratic parties in Afghanistan should recognize that while
parties led by former warlords may not always be amenable to change
and that while their presence does point towards a conservative political
orientation, in the short-run, working with them to push certain agendas
could prove effective. Working to reform the existing system is a policy
path that should be adopted along with providing support to new and
upcoming democratic parties. An Afghan analyst further indicates the
folly of dismissing these parties in an ad hoc manner: “When we talk
about the typology of the Mujahedin parties, there are the liberal and
open-minded parties among them, the parties that are able to place the
national interest of Afghanistan at the top of their political agenda, and
the parties which see Islam as entirely compatible with modernism.”97
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Map Taken from Global Security. Accessed March 5, 2009. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/afghanistan/images/afghan-map_warlords_2004.gif>
Nonetheless, the influence of these warlords has prevented newer,
more moderate parties from exercising control or expressing their views
in the WJ. The presence of women – who, before 2005, had a limited,
if not non-existent, role in politics – showed that lesser-known, and
generally more liberal, parties had been able to enter the WJ. However,
when these women attempted to challenge the legitimacy of these
warlords, they have been silenced and dismissed. This was the case with
Malali Joya, an MP from Farah province, at the first session of the new
parliament, when she referred to the former mujahideen as “criminal
warlords” and said that their hands were “strained with the blood of the
people.”98 Joya was subsequently suspended from the Wolesi Jirga, on
the grounds that she had violated Article 70 of the Parliament which
banned WJ members from openly criticizing one another. A discussion
of the success of the quota for women in the WJ is beyond the scope
of this paper, but it is important to emphasize here that the women,
while present, have failed to effectively function as a united caucus.99
Many of the women were elected with the backing of an influential male
figure, and have not united on issue-specific grounds. The atmosphere
of intimidation, further, remains a major hurdle to successful politics.
Shukria Paikan Ahmadi, a deputy from Kunduz, explained:
“The mujahedin are always intimidating us and we can’t
say what we want. When one of the women was speaking,
a commander from Herat told her to be quiet, otherwise
they’d do to her what they did to Malalai… The warlords
are a majority in parliament. And even though they are all
from different factions, in this they are together. They are
all against us, against the women.”100
Recently, political activists – mostly from the leftist camp, but also
including members of the former mujahideen – have formed into a
grouping now being referred to as the New Democratic Parties (NDPs).
The new democrats belong to distinct parties, but 13 of these have formed
a tentative coalition, the New Democratic Front, which recent reports
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indicate may potentially prove to be powerful in the next Parliament.
Many of these parties consist of young activists who are distanced from
the bloodshed and trauma of the wars of the last few decades. These
parties possess a commitment to democratization, and a professed
“anti-fundamentalist” stance.101 Candidates from these parties failed to
capture any seats in Parliament during the 2005 elections – partially a
result of class cleavages, with most NDPs consisting of the educated
elite – losing out to the former mujahideen and Islamists. Nonetheless,
their presence and efforts at organizing provide an appropriate template
from which further mobilizing is possible.
Looking Ahead: Parliamentary Elections 2010 and the Long Road
Forward
While in-depth analysis on the manner in which the parliament had
functioned over the last four years still remains to be done, the general
consensus appears to be that it exposed structural deficits rather than
introduce a process of legislative democracy in Afghanistan. It retained
an ultimately conservative, undemocratic outlook as a result of the
predominance of personality-driven parties associated with previous
eras’ power-brokers. Nonetheless, it is important to analyze these
developments in the context of the overall security and sociopolitical
impact. A praiseworthy development is that the Parliament is making
key appointments and operating in a generally free and fair environment.
Younger members of society have also benefited and their participation in
parties is a promising sign for the future. The importance of the Parliament
as a legislative and democratic body cannot be overemphasized. With
the political environment in Afghanistan evolving at a critical time, the
legislature can alter the political landscape. Ensuring the strength of
these key institutions is integral to long-term development. As the ICG
points out, “in the absence of legal channels for political representation,
sub-state actors could once again resort to violent means to further the
interests of the communities they represent.”102
A general sense of dissatisfaction with the current parliamentarians
means that the next elections may see a vote against the incumbents,
which would bring in new actors.103 While the New Democratic Parties
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are being trained by international organizations as a means by which to
promote internally-democratic and progressive parties, a mix of power
politics, lack of expertise and resources and unfavorable legal and
constitutional constraints nonetheless indicate that they are unlikely, in
the short run, to become major power brokers in Afghan society. Rather,
power is likely to remain with parties dominated by former warlords.104
However, this in itself may not be an irresolvable problem – some
warlords have transformed their political groupings into political parties
with socially progressive agendas.
Much depends on the upcoming presidential election, which current
President Karzai is expected to win. Karzai’s resistance to political
parties is “fundamental and not merely tactical in nature,” with some
indication that he is choosing to govern Afghanistan like a traditional
tribal leader rather than along Western lines.105 Karzai’s own lack of
desire to form a political party on the basis of which he could act and
mobilize support indicates a personalistic rule, based on client-patron
relations. He must recognize that his power is dwindling, due to, amongst
others, a lack of support base in the legislature. If Karzai wants to effect
change along the democratic ideals that he has been espousing, he must
discontinue making deals with conservative elements in the legislature,
or, alternatively, using his executive authority to prevent bills from being
passed. Ultimately, electoral incentives are key to crossing ethnic lines
in a democracy. Until the President himself operates from a centrist
and inclusive position, this void will continue to be filled by extremist
parties.
The following policy recommendations are intended for both
the international community and the Afghan government. Both must
continue to work in partnership to tackle this issue. Andrew Wilder
explained in an interview that ultimately, the problem of political parties
is more political than technical in nature. Thus, the policy approach must
be two-pronged. On the one hand, technical assistance must continue to
be provided to individual parties and blocs to help them develop into
progressive and internally-democratic political parties that will aid in
the independent and successful functioning of the Parliament. On the
other hand, the SNTV system must be replaced and electoral incentives
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must be provided to give parties a reason to reach out across societal
divides.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
For the Afghan government
1) Change the SNTV electoral system to a proportional
representation system.
The development of political parties in Afghanistan faces historical,
legal and pragmatic constraints, of which changing the SNTV
system is merely a first – albeit important – step. The SNTV system
has shown itself unsuited to Afghanistan not only because it has
retarded the development of democratic political parties along the
lines of Western parliamentary systems, but also because it has
inadvertently benefited conservative blocs and personality-driven
parties. The SNTV system must be replaced as soon as possible with
a proportional representation system, with open lists. As opposed
to a closed-list system which could benefit potentially corrupt
leaders. An open-list system ensures that voters know precisely
who they are electing. Under this system, candidates can stand as
independents or as part of a party list. Seats would be allocated to
lists in proportion to the vote, ensuring that Afghan voters would be
represented better.106 This system would also encourage candidates
and groups to cooperate across regions and ethnicities. Afghanistan
will no doubt experience initial difficulty in instilling this change,
as voters will have to be re-educated about the electoral system, but
long-term democratic and political development will not be possible
without it.
2) Amend the Political Parties Law and the registration process to
prevent powerful elements from manipulating the system.
The Political Parties Law should be amended as soon as possible
to clarify any vague wording which could be used to prevent the
formation of new and important political groupings. In particular,
the Afghan government should clarify Article 6 of the law which
prevents the formation of parties on the grounds of national unity.
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In addition, the government should simplify the registration process
and move it from the purview of the Ministry of Justice to an
independent commission, which would prevent the politicization
of the process.107 The Ministry lacks the legitimacy and the means
to verify that parties are adhering to the law, particularly in areas
outside of Kabul.
3) President Karzai should consider forming, and operating on the
basis of, a centrist, inclusive political party.
President Karzai lost an opportunity to form, and stand for election
on the basis of, an issue-based, multiethnic political party at the time
of the first election. He must recognize the importance of political
parties for the democratic future of the country and for an effective
functioning of the Parliament. Importantly, his own support base
could be cemented were he to fill this centrist void, and ensure that
it is not filled by voices from the margins.
For the International Community
4) Continue to provide technical training and assistance to political
parties in Afghanistan.
The international community must assist with the development of
parties and alliances, through technical assistance and training. The
New Democratic Parties provide the opportunity for engagement,
and organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI)
and International Republican Institute (IRI) have already begun
providing them training and support. However, in providing such
training, organizations should continue to reach out to parties
across the political spectrum and at all levels of party membership.
This would ensure that particular parties aren’t seen as too closely
associated with foreign actors (which could discredit them with
sectors of the populace) and also ensure that democracy is being
generated from the ground. Emphasis should be placed on creating
internally democratic parties, and thus support should be provided
to more than a few key leaders.
This support and training should include both short-term and longCRITERION – October/December 2009
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Niloufer Siddiqui
term assistance. Helping with message and platform development
so parties can effectively convey their mandates to the voters, and
assisting with the 2010 election campaigns and fundraising are
necessary, but so is helping party leaders develop strategic visions
for where they want their parties to be in 5 to 10 years.108 Thus, while
focusing on the 2010 elections will be a necessary part of the training
for political parties, international organizations must recognize that
political party development is a long-term goal which will require
both time and finances. A USAID report states, “Assistance programs
need to be strategic. Different parties are at different points along
the development continuum, or have different interests. Providing
a one-size fits all recipes across the board for all parties may be
efficient, but it is neither appropriate nor appreciated.”109 Working
to support parties at the local and regional levels, where resources
and expertise are even scarcer, is also essential.
Given that the SNTV system is likely to still be in place by during
the next parliamentary elections, currently scheduled for 2010, it
is imperative that political parties looking to gain power attempt
to work within the system. The benefits of this are limited, and
long-term change will only come through a change in the electoral
system, but the New Democratic Parties can learn forming alliances
and presenting candidates strategically to ensure that they populate
the WJ and Provincial Councils from the former mujahideen
groupings.
5) Improve the legitimacy and reputation of political parties among
the general populace.
As political parties continue to be viewed with suspicion, particular
attention must be paid to improving their reputation and legitimacy.
This can be achieved in part by ensuring that the parties rely on
legitimate party financing, which will have the additional benefit of
weeding out “unworthy political players.”110 Building stronger parties
based on ideas stabilizes the political system, as representation is
based on shared beliefs and values that do not change with a single
person’s situation or reflect only one person’s values.
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At the same time, more political parties should not be confused
with greater democracy. Wilkinson has found that the most effective
party politics take place when there are three parties competing for
electoral success. The plethora of political parties in Afghanistan
indicates the formation of groups not along ideological grounds,
but often based on personality and power-driven mandates; Kit
Spence refers to these as “vanity projects.”111 Given this scenario,
the international community should be wary of encouraging ad hoc
and general party formations. They should provide targeted aid and
assistance to parties.
6) Begin a media campaign to educate voters on the importance of
political parties.
International organizations should work with the political parties
in utilizing media sources to explain their goals and mandates.
Additionally, assistance should be provided to improve the
capacity of the media itself to better discuss and participate in the
democratization of the country.
Bibliography
Bhatia, Michael. “The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in
Post-Bonn Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2007, Page 90
-107.
Coglan, Tom. “Afghan MP says she will not be silenced.” BBC News. January 28, 2006.
Doherty, Ivan. “Democracy Out of Balance: Civil Society Can’t Replace Political Parties.”
Policy Review. April and May, 2001.
Goodson, Larry P. “Lessons of Nation-Building in Afghanistan.” Nation-Building Beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq. Ed. Francis Fukuyama. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
International Crisis Group. “Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work.” Asia
Report No. 116. May 15, 2006.
International Crisis Group. “Political Parties in Afghanistan.” Asia Briefing No. 39. Kabul/
Brussels. June 2, 2005.
King, Orla and Jeroen de Zeeuw. “Political Party Development in Conflict-Prone Societies.”
Seminar Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations. December 2006. Page 5.
Accessed April 12, 2009.
<http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061200_cru_conf_ppd.pdf>
Kippen, Grant. “Elections in 2009 and 2010: Technical and Contextual Challenges to Building
Democracy in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan and Research Evaluation Unit. November 2005.
Kucera, Joshua. “New Movement in Afghanistan Strives to Offer Ideological Alternative to
the Taliban.” Eurasia Insight. March 8, 2007. Accessed March 22, 2009.
<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020807.shtml>
179
Niloufer Siddiqui
Larson, Anna. “Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties: A Means to Organize Democratisation?” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). March 2009.
Lijphart, Arendt. “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies.” In The Global Resurgence
of Democracy. Eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
1996.
Lipset, Seymour. “Indispensability of Political Parties.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 11, No.
1, 2000.
Mainwaring, Scott. “Party Systems in the Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 9, No. 3.
1998. Pages 67-81.
Maass, Cithia. “Afghanistan without Political Parties: Can the New Parliament Function?”
German Institute for International and Security Affairs. March 2006.
MacKenzie, Jean and Wahidullah Amani. “Afghanistan’s Buzkashi Parliament.”
Institute for War & Peace Reporting. Accessed March 30, 2009. <http://www.iwpr.
net/?p=arr&s=f&o=261895&apc_state=henh>
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. “Political Party Assessment:
Afghanistan.” Spring 2006.
Parenti, Christian. “Who Rules Afghanistan?” The Nation. November 15, 2004.
Reynolds, Andrew. “The Curious Case of Afghanistan.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 17, No
2. April 2006. Pages 104-117.
Riphenburg, Carol J. “Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan.”
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 34, No. 1. April 2007. Pages 1-21.
Reilly, Benjamin. “Dealing with Divided Societies.” In Electoral Systems and Democracy.
Eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National
Endowment for Democracy. 2006.
Ruttig, Thomas. “Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center. Afghanistan’s Political Parties
and where they came from (1902-2006).” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 2006.
Rubin, Barnett. “Afghanistan: The wrong voting system.” International Herald Tribune.
March 16, 2005.
Rubin, Barnett R. “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 15
No. 3. July 2004.
Rubin, Barnett. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan; State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University, USA. 1995.
Semple, Kirk. “In Afghanistan, Anger in Parliament Grows as President Defies Majority’s
Wishes.” The New York Times. September 26, 2007.
Starkey, Jerome. “Afghan leader accused of bid to ‘legalize rape’: UN and women MPs say
Karzai bowed to Islamic fundamentalists before poll.” The Independent UK. MARCH 31,
2009.
Tarzi, Amin. “Afghanistan: Government Turns its Sights on Northern Warlords.” Radio
Free Europe. August 21, 2006. Accessed April 17, 2009. <http://www.rferl.org/content/
Article/1070709.html>
USAID Afghanistan. “Assessment of Political Party Programming by USAID in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan.” May-June, 2008.
Weinbaum, Marvin G. “Afghanistan: Nonparty Parliamentary Democracy.” Journal of
Developing Areas. Vol. 7, No. 1. 1972. Page 57-74.
Wilder, Andrew. “A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Afghan Elections.” AREU.
December 2005.
Wilkinson, Stephen. Votes and Violence. Cambridge University Press, USA. 2004.
Williams, Brian Glyn. “Rashid Dostum: America’s Secular Ally in the War on Terror.”
180
Terrorism Monitor. Vol. 1, No. 6. August 2003.
Wordsworth, Anna. “A Matter of Interest: Gender and the Politics of Presence in Afghanistan’s
Wolesi Jirga.” AREU. June 2007.
“Afghanistan Parliament Bans Indian Soap Operas.” IBN Live. April 15, 2008. Accessed
March 30, 2009. <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/afghanistan-parliament-bans-indian-soapoperas/63351-8.html>
“As problems pile up, Afghan lawmakers debate words.” Reuters. August 11, 2008. Accessed
April 2, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/idUSISL208419>
“Asylum-seeking convert must not escape: MPs.” Gulf Times. March 30, 2006. Accessed
March 22, 2009. <http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_
no=79247&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23
References:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
The phrase “culture of political ambiguity” was used in a March 2009 report by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) to describe the environment in which
political parties operate in Afghanistan today. Larson, Anna. “Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties: A Means to Organize Democratisation?” AREU. March 2009.
Quoted in Rubin, Barnett. “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 15 No. 3. July 2004.
“Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties.” Ibid. Page 2.
Ruttig, Thomas. “Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center. Afghanistan’s Political
Parties and where they came from (1902-2006).” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 2006.
Ruttig. Ibid.
Quoted in Wilder, Andrew. “A House Divided: Analyzing the 2005 Elections.” AREU.
December 2005. Page 9.
Quoted in Lipset, Seymour. “Indispensability of Political Parties.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 11, No. 1, 2000. Page 48.
Quoted in Wilkinson, Stephen. Votes and Violence. Cambridge University Press, USA.
2004. Page 69.
“Indispensability of Political Parties.” Ibid.
Ibid. Page 49.
CIA World Factbook: Afghanistan. Updated March April 9, 2009. Accessed April 17,
2009. <http://www.cia.gov/library/publilcations/the_world_factbook/Geos?af.html>
King, Orla and Jeroen de Zeeuw. “Political Party Development in Conflict-Prone Societies.”
Seminar Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations. December 2006. Page
5. Accessed April 12, 2009. <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061200_
cru_conf_ppd.pdf>
Ibid. Page 4.
Author interview with Marvin Weinbaum, Middle East Institute. March 23rd, 2009.
Reynolds, Andrew. “The Curious Case of Afghanistan.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 17,
No. 2. April 2006. Page 104-117.
Wilder. Ibid. Page 8.
Reilly, Benjamin. “Dealing with Divided Societies.” In Electoral Systems and Democracy. Eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. The Johns Hopkins University Press and the
National Endowment for Democracy. 2006.
181
Niloufer Siddiqui
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
182
Votes and Violence. Ibid. Page 6.
Ibid.
Wilkinson. Ibid. Page 177.
Mainwaring, Scott. “Party Systems in the Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 9,
No. 3. July 1998. Page 69.
Ibid.
Author interview with Andrew Wilder. April 5th, 2009.
Doherty, Ivan. “Democracy Out of Balance: Civil Society Can’t Replace Political Parties.” Policy Review. April and May, 2001. Page 2.
Reynolds. Ibid. Page 105.
Riphenburg, Carol J. “Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan.”
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 34, No. 1. April 2007. Pages 1-21.
The Wolesi Jirga (WJ), or the lower house, consists today of 249 members, all of whom
are elected through the SNTV system, with 215 chosen at the provincial level in proportion to the various provincial populations and 34 elected to fill nationwide “compensatory” seats. 68 seats are reserved for women (2 from each province). Two-thirds of the
members of the Meshrano Jirga, or upper house, are appointed by elected provincial and
district councils, and the remainder are appointed by the President. Goodson, Larry P.
“Lessons of Nation-Building in Afghanistan.” Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and
Iraq. Ed. Francis Fukuyama. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Page 163.
Interview with M. Weinbaum. Ibid.
Rubin, Barnett. “Afghanistan: The wrong voting system.” International Herald Tribune.
March 16, 2005.
Ibid.
Maass, Cithia. “Afghanistan Without Political Parties: Can the New Parliament
Function?” German Institute for International and Security Affairs. March 2006. Page
2. In examining the causal relationship between electoral systems and the formation of
party systems, Riphenburg similarly argues that “politicians and parties will make choices
about institutions such as electoral systems that they think will benefit themselves.”
Riphenburg. Ibid.
Interview with M. Weinbaum. Not everyone agrees with this interpretation. Reynolds
explains that the SNTV system was ultimately chosen because it was the “least bad” of
all other systems and that “it is important to note that Karzai did not choose SNTV with
any understanding of its consequences of history.” Reynolds. Ibid. Page 106.
“Political Party Assessment: Afghanistan.” National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Spring 2006. Page 12.
Wilder. Ibid.
International Crisis Group. “Political Parties in Afghanistan.” Asia Briefing No. 39.
Kabul/Brussels. 2 June 2005.
Political Parties law, Article 6, paragraph 3.
Riphenburg. Ibid. Page 6.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
“Political Parties in Afghanistan.” Ibid. Page 5.
“Political Parties in Afghanistan.” Ibid. Page 1.
Lijphart, Arendt. “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies.” In The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. The Johns Hopkins
University Press. 1996. Page 162-174.
Rubin, Barnett. “The Wrong Voting System.” International Herald Tribune. March 15,
2005.
Ibid.
Rubin, Barnett. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan; State Formation and Collapse in the
International System. Yale University, USA. 1995. Page 192.
Weinbaum, Marvin G. “Afghanistan: Nonparty Parliamentary Democracy.” Journal of
Developing Areas. Vol. 7, No. 1. Page 70.
Ruttig. Ibid. Page 6.
Rubin. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Page 85.
Weinbaum. Ibid. Page 61.
Kucera, Joshua. “New Movement in Afghanistan Strives to Offer Ideological Alternative to the Taliban.” Eurasia Insight. March 8th, 2007. Accessed March 22, 2009. <http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020807.shtml>
These parties were the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), the Afghanistan
National Liberation Front (ANLF), the Movement of the Islamic Revolution (HAR) the
Islamic Party of Afghanistan, Hikmatyar (HIH), the Isalmic Party of Afghanistan (HIK),
the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (JIA) and the Islamic Union of Afghanistan (ITT).
Rubin. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Ibid.
Rubin. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Ibid. Page 198.
Rubin. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Ibid. Page 202.
“Political Party Assessment: Afghanistan.” Ibid. Page 3
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ruttig. Ibid.
“Political Party Assessment: Afghanistan.” Ibid. Page 7.
Grant Kippen explains that this “resulted in a parliament comprised of numerous contending voices with limited formal organization of political interests, but with large parties informally represented in significant numbers nonetheless.” Kippen, Grant. “Elections in 2009 and 2010: Technical and Contextual Challenges to Building Democracy in
Afghanistan.” AREU. November 2005. Page 7.
“Political Party Assessment: Afghanistan.” Ibid. This NDI report argues, “While many
observers were concerned that the parliament would be largely composed of independent
candidates, the result has proved to be somewhat more complex.” Page 7. See also Reynolds. Ibid.
Ibid. Page 5.
Ibid. Page 15.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Wordsworth, Anna. “A Matter of Interest: Gender and the Politics of Presence in Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga.” AREU. June 2007. Page 19.
Ibid. Page 24.
183
Niloufer Siddiqui
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
184
“Political Party Assessment: Afghanistan.” Page 6.
Quoted in Ruttig. Ibid. Page 40.
Starkey, Jerome. “Afghan leader accused of bid to ‘legalize rape’: UN and women MPs
say Karzai bowed to Islamic fundamentalists before poll.” The Independent UK. MARCH
31, 2009.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ruttig. Ibid. Page 20.
Semple, Kirk. “In Afghanistan, Anger in Parliament Grows as President Defies Majority’s Wishes.” The New York Times. September 26, 2007.
Ibid.
“Asylum-seeking convert must not escape: MPs.” Gulf Times. March 30, 2006. Accessed
March 22, 2009. <http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_
no=79247&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23>
Bhatia, Michael. “The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimicay, Legacy, and Demobilization
in post-Bonn Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 14, No. 1. January 2007.
Page 100. Wilder explains, “The terms mujaheddin or jihadi are now used to describe
those jihad party leaders and their commanders and supporters who still politically
and ideologically closely associate themselves with the jihad. They generally share a
conservative outlook on social, cultural and religious affairs, and many have a shared
objective of “defending the jihad” and establishing a more conservative Islamic state
governed by Islamic laws.” Page 6.
Bhatia. Ibid. Page 91.
“Afghanistan Parliament Bans Indian Soap Operas.” IBN Live. April 15, 2008. Accessed
March 30, 2009. <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/afghanistan-parliament-bans-indian-soapoperas/63351-8.html>
A recent debate over which word to use for ‘university’ indicates the extent to which
the WJ remains ineffective, and also the manner in which ethnic and linguistic divisions
remain significant. “As problems pile up, Afghan lawmakers debate words.” Reuters.
August 11, 2008. Accessed April 2, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/
idUSISL208419>
Bhatia. Ibid. Page 92.
Ibid.
Ibid. Page 95.
Interview with Andrew Wilder. Ibid.
Tarzi, Amin. “Afghanistan: Government Turns its Sights on Northern Warlords.” Radio
Free Europe. August 21, 2006. Accessed April 17, 2009. <http://www.rferl.org/content/
Article/1070709.html>
Williams, Brian Glyn. “Rashid Dostum: America’s Secular Ally in the War on Terror.”
Terrorism Monitor. Vol. 1, No. 6. August 2003.
Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. Interview with Sarwar Jawadi. July 2008. Accessed
April 16, 2009. <http://www.kabulcenter.org/index_files/Page13477.html>
Coghlan, Tom. “Afghan MP says she will not be silenced.” BBC News. 28 January,
2006.
For a detailed discussion regarding gender politics in the Afghan Parliament, see Words-
worth. Ibid.
100 MacKenzie, Jean and Wahidullah Amani. “Afghanistan’s Buzkashi Parliament.” Institute
for War & Peace Reporting. May 19, 2006. Accessed March 30, 2009. <http://www.iwpr.
net/?p=arr&s=f&o=261895&apc_state=henh>
101 “Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties.” Ibid. Page 6.
102 “Political Parties in Afghanistan.” Ibid. Page 13.
103 Interview with Andrew Wilder. Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Maass. Ibid. Page 2.
106 Rubin. “The Wrong Voting System.” Ibid.
107 “Political Parties in Afghanistan.” Ibid. Page 5.
108 USAID Afghanistan. “Assessment of Political Party Programming by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” May-June, 2008. Page 26.
109 Ibid. Page 25.
110 “Assessment of Political Party Programming by USAID.” Ibid. Page 24.
111 Ruttig. Ibid. Page 17.
185
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF
PAKISTAN – INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
BEHIND CIVIL-MILITARY EQUATION
Muhammad Ismail Khan*
Abstract
In the political history of Pakistan, both civilian and military rulers
have used intelligence agencies to further their goals. In this game of
political snakes and ladders, the key players have employed intelligence
outfits to spy on each other. Defining the purpose of an agency, this
paper starts by identifying the main intelligence agencies of Pakistan
which have played a role in the major developments of the country.
These events, which are dealt with extensively in the next section, have
tainted the image of the agencies. The focus is on the years following
1988 and the impact of developments in this period on the course of the
country’s history. Author
Introduction:
Pakistan’s security agencies, not least its primary spy outfit the InterServices Intelligence (ISI), have caused grave international concern.
Presently, the main worry of the global community is the on-going war
against terror, where there is a perception of alleged ISI collusion with
the Taliban. Just as President Barack Obama announced the new Af-Pak
policy, the US Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen,
expressed his concerns over the perceived support of Pakistan’s main
military intelligence agency to radical elements.1 Such allegations have
repeatedly been voiced after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in order
to flush out the Taliban from Kabul. The fleeing militants, it is argued,
*
Muhammad Ismail Khan is a research scholar.
Institutional Role Behind Civil-Military Equation
found their way to the tribal areas of Pakistan where the country’s secret
agencies helped them establish safe havens.
Not only the United States, but nations within the south and central
Asian regions are wary of alleged ISI support to militants inside their
countries. New Delhi has repeatedly asked Pakistan to cut off ties with
the militants which have supposedly carried out terrorist attacks in India.
Similarly, in February 2009 Afghan intelligence officials blamed ISI for
sponsoring the attack on the Justice Ministry in Kabul.2
Not only other countries, but also segments of domestic opinion
in Pakistan have blamed the agencies for manipulating the political
climate of the country in the past. Although their external role is not
significantly different from those of other agencies of the world, it is
their domestic activities that have imbued them with notoriety within
the country. The political leadership as well as the intelligentsia has not,
therefore, adequately defended the security services against external
allegations.
Given the secretive nature of spy agencies, there is little they can
do to defend themselves publicly. The ground further muddies as new
allegations of the agencies’ external activities are made. This creates
an impression of “rogue” elements within the ISI who act unilaterally
instead of following the directives of the state. It is even suspected
that several ideological elements within Pakistan’s security agencies
influence state policies.
Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, is lauded in
the United States for his exemplary role in maintaining the army as a
professional outfit. His gesture in resolving the confrontation between
two of Pakistan’s political rivals has been termed as “the Kayani
model.”3 Yet, it was during Kayani’s stint as Director General ISI4 that
the escaping Taliban found safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
While there has been sufficient material5 on the ISI’s alleged support
to Islamists or political players in the past, there is little that touches the
institutional role and structure of the organization. What and who makes
187
Muhammad Ismail Khan
it collude with the Islamists or manipulate the elections? What divides
and draws the sympathies of these security services?
This paper looks beyond the role of the ISI. It starts by identifying
the institutional role of intelligence agencies during important national
events and ends up concluding that the sympathies of these outfits in
Pakistan are a manifestation of civil-military imbalance in the country.
In a country with a tense past in the civil-military equation, intelligence
agencies are often used to play off one player against another. Moreover,
it is the action taken on the spying, and not spying per se, which has
made the agencies a dreaded entity in the society. Lastly, since Pakistan’s
main military intelligence outfit is an external agency, the tussle between
civilian-military intelligence has been restricted to domestic affairs. For
civilian intelligence agencies, foreign policy is unfamiliar ground. Thus,
the internal role of a military intelligence agency comes from the civilmilitary imbalance; the edge is in its being an external agency.
PAKISTAN’S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Intelligence Agencies
The primary purpose of any country’s intelligence agency is
founded on the “state’s awareness and understanding of its strategic
environment, gained by way of gathering and analyzing secret and opensource information.”6 The main task involves gathering of information,
which is then analyzed so as to secure the state against any threat. Since,
external groups are involved in acts against the state, the intelligence
agency (IA) also works on counter-intelligence. Despite their various
activities, it is in two basic areas, namely, the collection and analysis
of information that every IA concentrates. This overriding function
of information gathering, research and analysis makes an IA almost
like an academic institute. An IA’s involvement in covert actions often
makes it a controversial organization. Pakistan’s IAs are, therefore, not
exceptional.
As with many other states, Pakistan’s IAs can be divided as per
geography and specialization. IAs which can be divided along the
geographical domain include: external agency which is concerned with
188
intelligence regarding external security, and internal agency which is
concerned with intelligence regarding internal security. There are also
specialized IAs within Pakistan whose primary task include intelligence
on crime, drugs, etc. The overlapping of interests requires coordination
and cooperation yet inter-agency conflict is also part of the matrix.7 (See
Appendix ‘A’ for the structure of IAs in Pakistan.)
External agency
The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, shortened as ISI, is
involved in intelligence gathering and analysis of external threats. It
also coordinates with foreign agencies in combating terrorism. In the
1980s, together with the Central Intelligence Agency, it was actively
involved in the covert operations against the Soviet occupation forces
inside Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, the ISI retained its links
with the Afghan fighters. It is for this non-severance of links that the ISI
is being accused presently by the international community. Moreover,
within Pakistan, it has been involved in political dealings. The political
leadership, therefore, is equally skeptical of the agency. Recently, it
appeared as a dreaded organization in the infamous “missing persons”
case wherein it was revealed that people associated with ISI were
involved in the abduction of several Pakistani nationals.
In terms of line of communication, although the ISI comes under
Prime Minister, its de facto status is under Chief of Army Staff (COAS).
It reports to both the Prime Minister and the COAS. Reportedly, having
a staff of more than 10,000(other than informants)8, the ISI has been
mostly headed by a Lieutenant General though in its early days the head
of the agency was an officer of the rank of Brigadier. It is divided into
the following departments:9
1. Joint Intelligence X (JIX) – acts as a center which coordinates
with other wings; it also provides intelligence and threat
assessments.
2. Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) – considered as the most
powerful bureau; one of its subsection was devoted to India.
Since this bureau is also responsible for political intelligence,
189
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
the possibility of this bureau being the infamous “political cell
within ISI” cannot be denied.
Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) – conducts
surveillance of Pakistani diplomats stationed abroad; it is also
responsible for conducting intelligence operation in the Middle
East, South Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Muslim republics
of the former Soviet Union.
Joint Intelligence / North (JIN) – responsible for Jammu and
Kashmir operations, such as infiltration, propaganda, and other
clandestine activities.
Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) – is believed to be
conducting espionage in foreign countries, including offensive
intelligence operations.
Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB) – responsible for
signal intelligence along the border with India, and to “provide
communication support to militants in Kashmir.”
The Special Wing – responsible for liaison with foreign
intelligence and security agencies; it is this wing which is reported
to have links with the Taliban. This wing may possibly be under
JIM.
Joint Intelligence Technical – responsible for technical
intelligence such as gadgetry.10
Internal agency
Intelligence Bureau, abbreviated as IB, is Pakistan’s internal IA. It
was largely a police organization and still retains this character by and
large. Although a part of the Ministry of Interior, it also reports directly
to the Prime Minister. The primary job of IB is intelligence gathering
within the country, which may include terrorists, foreign intelligence
agents, etc. Nonetheless, it has also been used for political manipulations
in Pakistan.
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
Armed forces
The Pakistan, army, navy, and air force have their own intelligence
190
agencies. They are involved in intelligence gathering as per respective
requirements. Military Intelligence is the army’s primary IA. Since
Pakistan has for more than three decades been under military rule, this
agency has often made headlines for political reasons.
Crime
Pakistan’s law enforcement outfits also have intelligence cells
though these are normally described as “investigation” departments or
agencies. Such IAs, which deal mostly with crime, are all civilian and
come under the Ministry of Interior. Intelligence is gathered through the
Central Investigative Department and the Federal Investigative Agency
– both are policing organizations. Recently, they have been involved in
probes against militants operating inside Pakistan.
Narcotics
There is also an intelligence unit within the Anti-Narcotics Force,
which comes under the Ministry of Narcotics Control. The unit is tasked
with gathering information in order to pre-empt drug trafficking.
Law enforcement agencies
Though the activities of law enforcement agencies (LEA), such
as the police, should be confined to punitive action against criminals,
they have also developed their own intelligence apparatus. In Pakistan
paramilitary agencies notably the Frontier Corps and the Rangers also
fall within the ambit of LEAs. While IAs have become notorious for
their power and political interference, the role of the LEAs has been no
less controversial.
HISTORY AND ROLE OF PAKISTAN’S IAs
Formation and growth (1947-1977):
Given the tense equation between the rulers and the ruled during
the colonial era, the British resorted to the use of stringent, if not
repressive, internal surveillance. The intelligence apparatus which
Pakistan inherited from the British came to be associated with internal
intelligence. Along the lines of the division of other resources, the prepartition Intelligence Bureau (IB) was bifurcated between Pakistan and
191
India. During colonization, the IAs and the law-enforcement agencies,
such as the CID, had become dreaded bodies.
Almost immediately after partition, war broke out between Pakistan
and India over Kashmir. The need for an agency to coordinate intelligence
among the three branches of the armed forces was soon realized.12 Thus
in July 1948, Pakistan’s then Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. General R
Cawthome, established the ISI as a small organization under the General
Headquarters. Its placement below the GHQ ensured that from the very
beginning it would be army-dominated and, as such, it reported to the
commander-in-chief.
In 1958, Pakistan experienced its first military rule. The ISI along
with all other agencies fell under the authority of the President and C-in-C,
General Ayub Khan. Most of the intelligence structure at that time was
used for domestic spying, particularly against opposition politicians.
There was a close surveillance on politicians during the 1964 elections;
the ISI and the IB were growing “in stature and power.”13 This internal
obsession proved detrimental to the focus on external concerns.
Pakistan’s major intelligence crisis came in the form of the 1965 war
with India. The war seemed to have been planned with pre-conceived
notions instead of taking alternatives and fall-back positions into
consideration. For instance, after the launch of operation Gibraltar into
Indian occupied Kashmir, there was no revolt among the Kashmiris as
had been anticipated. It was in the expectation that an uprising would
spontaneously materialize that the war was started. Moreover, the
possibility that India could open up the southern sector by crossing the
international border in Sialkot or Lahore was also not factored. Setting
aside the policy miscalculations, the ISI proved ineffective in locating
an armored division of India during the war. Headed by Brigadier
Riaz Hussain, the ISI’s assets in the Indian sector proved ineffective
thereby “blinding”14 it to the developments. After the war, a committee
was established under General Yahya Khan to look into the working of
the agencies. The nominal control of the ISI shifted to the Ministry of
Defense.
192
By 1968 it became increasingly apparent that Ayub Khan’s days
were numbered. He soon stepped down and was succeeded by General
Yahya Khan. The latter organized general elections in 1970 but was
reluctant to accept the outcome. Earlier, he had tried to use the ISI
to infiltrate Bengali politicians but this did not work out. During the
elections, Yahya’s cabinet regularly received “briefings”15 from the head
of IB. His military operation in East Pakistan and the subsequent war
with India proved disastrous as it ended in the creation of Bangladesh.
From a purely intelligence perspective, it is obvious that this was
another complete intelligence failure in correctly assessing the ground
situation. Not only were the sympathies of Bengalis discounted but the
success of military operation was overvalued.
After Yahya Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the President and
later Prime Minister of Pakistan. Bhutto’s decision to appoint Zia-ulHaq as the army chief was influenced by General Ghulam Jilani Khan,
his appointee as DG ISI. Interestingly, it is Bhutto who is credited with
creating the notorious “political cell” within the ISI.16 For his opponents,
the dread came from Federal Security Force (FSF,) a paramilitary
organization formed by the government. Opponents of Bhutto decried
the use of FSF for political manipulation. It is believed that the aim
of the FSF was “to enable a civilian government to avoid seeking the
assistance of the armed forces in dealing with its responsibilities and
problems.”17 Whether or not the FSF was established to “counter the
influence of ISI,”18 it became an instrument for the accretion of power
in the office of the prime minister.
The access to IAs and LEAs did not help empower Bhutto in
the context of the civil-military equation. When Zia asked Bhutto to
withdraw the surveillance of “civilian IB on army officers,”19 Bhutto
complied by replacing an IB chief.20 Bhutto was removed from power in
a military coup in 1977; two years later he was sent to the gallows. Zia
retained Gen. Jilani after his retirement and dismantled the FSF.
Spectacular rise (1980s):
The emergence of the ISI as a larger-than-life agency is derived from
193
its role in key developments in the 1980s. It was during Zia’s rule (19771988) that the IAs, and in particular the ISI, became actively involved in
changing the geo-political environment.
Zia stage-managed the rise of certain politicians who, in turn,
helped him stay in power. The IAs were used to garner support for Zia
and his policy of Islamization as well as to demonize Bhutto’s Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP.) Individuals who had fallen foul with Bhutto
rallied around Zia. Thus the IAs played an active role in providing a
joint political platform to the anti-Bhutto constituency. For instance,
since Bhutto had nationalized industries during his tenure, the support
of many industrialists was sought. Army and intelligence officers played
a prominent role in this endeavour.21
What lead to the ISI’s spectacular growth was the war in Afghanistan.
Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan came into the
limelight. The ISI, with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), funded the militants known as Afghan mujahideen. The initial
secrecy maintained by the United States and the importance attached to
Pakistan gave the ISI a free hand in Afghanistan.
The Afghan war imbued the ISI with a decisive say on key foreign
policy issues. It was during this period that the direct link between
Saudi Arabia and the ISI was established.22 The latter was thus able to
secure mind-boggling amounts of financial assistance to pursue the jihad
without questions being asked.
The free hand given to the ISI remains incomprehensible. The
latter established close links with the mujahideen groups. All the funds,
weapons and ammunition for the Afghan resistance were thus channeled
through the ISI. Once the finances were secured, it was the “ISI and not
Army that took on the principal role for the execution of the covert war
against the Soviets.”23 This was fully endorsed by Zia whose protégé,
General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, headed the ISI as its director general.
General Zia-ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rehman both died
in a plane crash in 1988. Zia was succeeded by General Mirza Aslam
194
Beg as COAS; Rehman by General Hameed Gul.
Democratic control or control of democracy? (1988-1999):
The involvement of IAs, especially the ISI, in the affairs of the state
has had a negative impact and according to author Shuja Nawaz:
“The active involvement of the army high command and
intelligence services, particularly the ISI, in the conduct of the
Afghan war, the ISI’s direct and unfettered access to overseas
financing from US CIA and private and official Saudi sources,
and involvement in the making and breaking of domestic political
parties and alliances, had changed the equation between the civil
and military. This involvement and financial autonomy of sorts
also gave the ISI a permanent role in foreign policy.”24
Bhutto wins After Zia-ul-Haq’s death, fresh elections were to be held. Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by his daughter,
Benazir Bhutto, decided to take part in the polls. Already a mainstream
force, Bhutto’s party had become even more popular despite years of
persecution during the Zia-ul-Haq era. The assessment was that Benazir
Bhutto would secure a landslide victory if the elections were free and
fair.
For this precise reason, the then DG ISI, General Hameed Gul,
is said to have been against the holding of elections.25 Nevertheless,
the Army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, and the President, Ghulam
Ishaq Khan, decided to move ahead with the scheduled elections. This
demonstrated that despite its growing stature, the ISI could still not
always impose its will.
However, in order to neutralize Bhutto’s popularity, an alliance of
right-wing parties, known as the Islamic Democratic Front or the IJI26,
was cobbled together through the active involvement of the DG ISI and
the Army Chief.27
195
It was during this election that Osama bin Laden, who at that time
was known primarily as a wealthy Saudi businessman, is said to have
provided funds, according to an English newspaper published from
Lahore, through the ISI for disbursement to the IJI.28 The ISI’s links
with key figures in Saudi Arabia had developed during the Afghan war.
Despite these machinations, the PPP won sufficient votes to form the
government at the center while the IJI became the main opposition party.
The latter was, however, able to form the government in the Punjab,
Pakistan’s largest province. Given the federal structure of the country
this posed serious difficulties. Thus from day one, the journey towards
democracy was anything but smooth. In this period the IJI asked the ISI
for its support and this, in turn, pitted the latter against the PPP.
Pakistan’s military strategy is India-centric and, because of this,
it sought to establish strategic depth in Afghanistan after the Soviet
withdrawal from that country. The perception was this was not supported
by the PPP. Thus even after winning the elections, Benazir Bhutto was
asked to take the COAS into confidence on all security matters and
not to touch “sensitive” issues such as India, Afghanistan, nuclear and
defence policy.29 Hence, despite being the prime minister, she had little
say in foreign affairs.
While Bhutto seemed to have accepted these restrictions, her
problems did not end. Byzantine intrigues, with the connivance of the
IA, to destabilize her government were engineered. One such event
was the infamous “Operation Midnight Jackal” through which attempts
were made to buy off her supporters. Under the circumstances the Prime
Minister sought to set up a commission to reform the intelligence
agencies. Benazir Bhutto was also convinced that most of her troubles
emanated from one particular individual, General Hameed Gul, she
therefore had him removed from the post of DG ISI and appointed,
Shams-ur-Rehman Kallue, a retired General, in his place. Hameed
Gul’s removal demonstrated yet again the pivotal role of DG ISI in the
country’s politics. Kallue’s appointment was aimed to sever the links
between the army and the ISI.
196
It is interesting that at this juncture, the COAS started seeking
advice from the DG of Military Intelligence, General Asad Durrani.
Thus, MI became the “ears and eyes” of the army.30 On the other hand,
the ISI under Kallue, who acquired the nickname “no clue,” proved
ineffective and was of no use to the Prime Minister. Her government
was unceremoniously dismissed in 1990 after remaining barely two
years in power.
Sharif leads –
After the dismissal of the Benazir Bhutto government, fresh elections
were held. Though the tables were turned the key players remained the
same. The PPP became the main opposition party and Nawaz Sharif
formed the government. The army and the intelligence agencies are said
to have played a helpful role in clinching Sharif’s victory.
During these elections, the COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg, is
reported to have given 140 million rupees to the new DG ISI, General
Assad Durrani,31 for distribution among anti-PPP candidates. The funds
were provided by the CEO of the Mehran Bank, Yunus Habib. Whether
or not, bin Laden or any other rich mujahideen donated money to the
IJI in 1990 (as they did in 1988) is not clear. In 2006, Qazi Hussein
Ahmed, an IJI leader, said in an interview that when he was approached
by bin Laden to support IJI in the 1990 elections, he “disagreed with his
method.”32 Whether or not others also disagreed is not known; what is
certain is that unlike 1988, the ISI did not act as a mediator.
It was not till 1994 that General (Retd.) Naseerullah Babar, a PPP
leader, revealed how the ISI had disbursed money among politicians.
In 1997, a case was filed by Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan; during
the hearing of the case, General Beg admitted the supply of funds to
political leaders.
Pakistani columnist, Ardeshir Cowasjee, quoted Beg’s confession
to the Court in Dawn:
“In 1990 when the money was donated by Younas Habib, ISI was
197
acting under the directions of higher authorities. As chief of the
army staff at that time, when I was informed of this matter my
only concern was that the money received by the ISI was utilized
properly and an account was maintained and beyond that I had no
concern with the money.”33
And that,
“Although the director-general, ISI, is an officer in uniform but
the chief of army staff has no authority to take action against him.
The head of ISI was a person from army of which I was head at
the relevant time.”34
However, Durrani later signed an affidavit that he was asked by
General Beg to provide “logistic support”35 to the politicians through
“businessmen of Karachi.”36 The case is still pending in the Court.
After winning the elections, the IJI leader, Nawaz Sharif, became
the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The President and the COAS, who
had earlier colluded in the dismissal of Bhutto’s government in 1990,
remained the same. General Beg retired soon afterwards and was
succeeded by General Asif Nawaz as COAS. Though Nawaz Sharif had
been supported by the military, his relations with both the army as well
as the President were tense. For his part, General Asif Nawaz wanted to
depoliticize the army and, as such, did not interfere in politics.
After Kallue, General Durrani (DG MI) was made DG ISI. Sharif
replaced him with General Javed Nasir a born-again Muslim with a pan
Islamic worldview.37 Other than supporting Islamic groups in China and
Philippines, he is also alleged to have supplied arms to the besieged
Bosnians in the Serb siege.38 During his tenure the ambience at ISI
was “a strange non-military atmosphere” where the “corridors were
filled with bearded officers in civilian costumes.”39 The next DG ISI,
General Qazi, revamped the ISI on the orders of the COAS – making its
operations more professional.
Earlier, General Nasir was removed after a new COAS, General
198
Waheed Kakar, took over. Kakar’s predecessor, General Nawaz, had
died mysteriously. Meanwhile, the rift between the President and the
Prime Minister was growing, bringing in the army once again.40 In 1996,
without taking over the country, General Kakar asked the President
and the Prime Minister to quit and also called for fresh elections. In a
country where the President can dismiss an elected Prime Minister, such
an arrangement came to be known as the “Kakar formula.”
BB returns –
Benazir Bhutto won the general elections in 1994 and appointed a
party-member, Farooq Leghari, as president. General Kakar was offered
an extension by Bhutto, but he refused. Upon his retirement, General
Jehangir Karamat took over as COAS.
Since her first government was dismissed within two years, Benazir
went the extra mile to keep the power brokers contented during her second
term. Once bitten twice shy, she fully cooperated in the security vision
of the country that consisted of deterring India by securing Afghanistan
and the nuclear weapons.
There were however some interesting differences between her
first and second terms. For instance, the Ministry of Interior became
more important. The Minister of Interior, Naseerullah Babar, although
a retired general, was a party loyalist. Along with other key civilian IAs
and LEAs, his ministry started an operation in the port city of Karachi.
Moreover, it was during her second government that Taliban started
receiving support from Pakistan. The question whether it was Pakistan
that master-minded the creation of the Taliban remains unanswered.
What, however, is relatively certain is that the moment Taliban emerged
as a force, Pakistan established close links with the movement. Since
the 1980s, Pakistan had supported the mujahideen and this continued
even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. It was
General Babar who sought the help of Taliban to secure the release of
some Pakistani trucks that had been captured by the warlords. Later,
particularly after 9/11 the mujahideen switched to the Taliban raising
199
suspicions that they were supported by the ISI.
In her second term, Bhutto used the Interior Ministry to consolidate
political power. The LEAs and IAs were thus made answerable to the
Prime Minister. She appointed her trusted people to the Federal Bureau
of Investigations43 and Intelligence Bureau. According to FAS, “the
appointment [of DG IB] precipitated a major crisis in the Pakistani
state apparatus, because Benazir then began using the IB chief to erode
the once all powerful ISI’s base.”44 As events would show this did not
help her. She was sacked in 1996 – this time, by her own handpicked
President.
Sharif returns –
Sharif won the next general election. Not only did he appoint a
loyalist as President, he also amended the constitution, as he had the
required parliamentary majority. This was consequential because the
President no longer had the power to dismiss an elected Prime Minister.
To further consolidate his position, he appointed General Ziauddin, a
non-professional army-man from the Engineering Corps, as DG ISI.
During Sharif’s second term, Najam Sethi, editor of The Friday
Times, a leading weekly, was picked up from his house. Earlier, Sethi,
while in India, had criticized the Sharif government for corruption. While
there was confusion over his abduction, he was interrogated by ISI. The
Lahore High Court refused to take up the case as it was a military affair –
something beyond the jurisdiction of the civil courts. When Sethi’s wife
appealed to the Supreme Court, its response was that the case would be
heard by first deciding the status of ISI “once and for all”46 and if it is a
military affair then, the Court would have no jurisdiction under Article
199 (3). Nonetheless, it remarked that “prima facie, the ISI is not part
of the army.”47
The highhandedness of the Sharif government was again apparent
in the Rehmat Shah Afridi case. The latter, who was the editor of the
Peshawar-based Frontier Post was nabbed on 1 April 1999 by the AntiNarcotics Force for allegedly being in possession of 20 kilograms of
200
hashish. According to Afridi, he was arrested for his paper’s criticism
of Sharif’s administration. After his release, he stated that his paper had
published a report that then “DG of ANF and some army officers were
involved in drug smuggling.”48
In 1999, Pakistan went to war with India in Kargil, causing serious
rifts within the country’s polity. It is said that the DG ISI was unaware
of the operations; MI was colluding with the Sharif-appointed COAS,
General Pervez Muharraf. Later, Sharif was blamed for caving in to
international pressure by agreeing to the withdrawal of troops. After the
war, Sharif began to distrust Musharraf who, according to Sharif, had
never informed him of the Kargil misadventure. Eventually the prime
minister decided to dismiss Musharraf. On the evening of 12 October
1999, while Sharif was in the process of formalizing the appointment of
General Ziauddin as the new COAS, General Musharraf took over the
government through a coup.
Military returns (1999 - ):
With the October 1999 coup, the role of intelligence reverted yet
again to supporting military rule. Musharraf appointed his favorites to
the key intelligence slots – such as in the ISI and MI. These generals
had been instrumental in staging the coup as Musharraf was returning to
Pakistan from a visit to Sri Lanka at the time.
Two years later 9/11 occurred and the United States became ever
more assertive as it embarked on its global war on terror. The choice for
Pakistan was stark. Washington had made it clear with the formulation
“either you are with us or against us.”
However, there were voices of resistance within the ISI. When
Musharraf was confronted with intelligence officials who did not want
to shun the Taliban, he purged the agency of such elements. These
included DG ISI, General Mahmood who was considered a staunch
Taliban supporter and was present with American Congressmen when
9/11 happened. On his return to Pakistan, Musharraf asked General
Mahmood to convince Taliban to hand over bin Laden.50 However, it is
201
said that Mahmood asked Mullah Omer to resist the invading forces.51
There are also reports of Mahmood providing $100,000 to 9/11 mastermind, Muhammad Atta, through a middle man, Omer Sheikh.52 The Wall
Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl reported the call made by Mahmoud
to Sheikh. Sheikh was subsequently arrested by the ISI for the murder
of Pearl. Later on, the FBI is said to have interrogated Mahmood for his
role.53
As the war raged in Afghanistan, the ISI became the front line player
once again. Pakistan helped the United States in arresting and deporting
Taliban leaders.
The escaping Taliban found sanctuaries in the tribal areas of Pakistan
and were said to be actively supported by the ISI. Later, the world
would condemn the ISI for supporting the militants. This continued and
General Musharraf acquired the reputation of being a “double dealer.”
The resurgence of the Taliban in the tribal areas happened after 2004,
when General Ashfaq Kayani was made DG ISI.
Politically too, the ISI became increasingly involved. In 2002,
parliamentary elections were held in which the pro-Musharraf parties
won a majority. These elections, admitted later by ISI’s political cell
head General Zamir, were rigged in favor of Musharraf’s favorites.54
According to General Zamir, he was asked by Musharraf to do so.55
The ISI’s alleged role in abducting civilians was no less controversial.
Imbued with special powers, the agency picked up people on the pretext
that they were terrorists. The case of missing persons was taken up
by the Supreme Court. Much to the anger of General Musharraf, the
top judge took keen interest in this issue. During hearings, it became
apparent that many people were abducted for no good reason. A case in
point was of a person named Imran. According to The News, a Lahorebased newspaper, “the counsel for Imran had told the bench that Imran
had an affair with a girl who was a relative of a brigadier in the ISI.”56
This showed that the ISI had grown in size with an added responsibility
of acting like paramilitary unit or LEA.
202
Power blinds. This was as true of Nawaz Sharif during his second
term as it was of Musharraf. In March 2007, Musharraf suspended the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and this ignited a country-wide
agitation for his restoration. This finally came about in March 2009 by
which time Musharraf was no longer the president of the country.
Prior to this Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who had both been
in exile for several years, returned to Pakistan. Upon her return, the
convoy of Benazir Bhutto was attacked. Although she survived the first
attack, she died in the second one. When she was attacked the first time
in 2008, she blamed some of the leaders of the then ruling PML (Q) as
well as individuals associated within the intelligence.57
Post-Musharraf period–
In 2008, fresh elections were held. Bhutto’s party won in the Center
with Sharif’s party forming the government in the Punjab province.
While the Punjab-Center setup was nearly the same, the only apparent
difference was the absence of animosity between the two parties.
Before Musharraf’s ouster, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was
made COAS after taking the key political actors into confidence. That
both Bhutto and Musharraf expressed confidence in his appointment
showed his professionalism.58
The new civilian government unsuccessfully tried to rein in the ISI.
On 26 July 2008, a notification was issued stating that the ISI would be
under the Ministry of Interior.59 However, this was staunchly resisted
by the army forcing the government to backtrack and announce that the
original “notification has been misunderstood.”60
In November 2008, India’s port city Mumbai was attacked. As a
gesture of cooperation, President Zardari asked DG ISI, General Pasha,
to go to Mumbai. However, when this unleashed severe criticism in the
media and also resulted in expressions of resentment within the military
establishment, the ill-thought-through initiative was withdrawn.
203
As in previous civilian governments, the Ministry of Interior is again
in the limelight. As for the fight against terrorism, the organizations
associated with MoI, such as CID and other policing IAs, have also
been active. Given the fact that policing IAs are mostly reactive outfits
and without adequate means, such a division often results in wastage
of time and resources. The present war against terrorism calls for close
coordination between all IAs. The challenge is formidable as terrorism
as the foremost external and internal threat that the country faces.
As in the past, it is the civilian IAs and LEAs that are being misused
for political ends. For example, the federal government imposed
Governor Rule in the Punjab, a province ruled by Sharif’s party, to curb
the lawyers’ movement for the restoration of the deposed judiciary. It is
believed that the Lahore Chapter of the Intelligence Bureau played a key
role in the imposition of the rule.61
MAKING A CASE
Civil-military imbalance:
The political activities of the intelligence agencies in Pakistan reflect
the civil-military imbalance in the country. In this equation, civilian
rulers have opted for civilian IAs while military rulers have used the
military IAs.
The case of ISI is most interesting; although known as a “semimilitary” organization under the authority of the Prime Minister, it is
subservient to the COAS in reality. Most of ISI’s cadre also comes from
the army. Whenever a case involving ISI has been heard in Court, the
first concern has been over its status.62
It is for this reason that the civilian leadership had resorted to
using civilian IAs as well as LEAs. Although they are subjected to
parliamentary questions, the over-arching role of the Ministry of Interior
or civilian intelligence units indicate the desire to curtail the influence of
the ISI and indirectly, the military. Since the law-enforcement agencies
(LEA), like the police force, also come under the Interior Ministry, this
ministry often assumes a larger role under civilian rule.
204
Politicians dread the ISI and call it a state within a state. In 1997,
when the Mehran Bank scandal was being heard in the Supreme Court,
former COAS Beg clearly said that he “cannot take action against DG
ISI.”
Since the ISI is technically under the Prime Minister, its activities
without his approval and knowledge cannot be justified. Politicians
often criticize the role of generals in the rigging of elections and are
also suspicious of civilian intelligence for political manipulations. For
instance, the PPP leaders disliked the former Director General of the
IB for his role in the creation of a pro-Musharraf party and his ties with
Islamists.63
At another level, while the perception was that the ISI was capable of
generating independent revenues from sources such as narcotics, foreign
financiers and domestic bankers, these lucrative avenues of funding were
no less coveted by elements within the political leadership.
On the other hand, critics accuse the civilians of misusing LEAs or
IAs. This has included usage of CID to ANF for personal ends. Just as
military rulers appointed favorites in ISI, civilians too have appointed
their protégés in the civilian apparatus.
Individuals associated with civilian and military IAs have admitted
their involvement in politics. that emerges is that such agencies act
independently. There is, nevertheless, a difference of opinion about this.
Individuals associated with military intelligence institutions, like the
ISI, maintain that they are merely “operators” and not “policymakers.”
Internal-versus-external affairs:
In its purest form, intelligence is concerned with information
gathering based on which action is taken. Domestic intelligence is
largely associated with LEAs, whose activities can at times be brutal,
harsh and extreme. That the ISI became notorious for abducting citizens
during Musharraf’s time shows the evolution of an IA into a semi-LEA
outfit.
205
Civilians have used civilian agencies to ensure the writ of the state.
Political governments have tried to curtail the ISI’s role by relying on
civilian IAs and LEAs. While civilian intelligences have only remained
within the domestic domain, the ISI’s domestic spying seems to be only
an extension of its primary task of external intelligence.
Theoretically, the ISI is an external IA and this gives it an edge over
its civilian counterparts which are often crime-centric.
Sources include:
1.
2.
Background Paper on “The Structure and Role of Intelligence Agencies” by Lt. Gen
Asad Durrani for Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development (PILDAT.)
Websites of the ministries.
References:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
206
Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, March 29, 2009. “U.S. Says Agents Of Pakistan Aid
Afghan Taliban.” The New York Times.
Sangar Rahimi and Carlotta Gall. March 20, 2009. “Pakistan Accused of Links to
Kabul Attacks.” The New York Times. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/world/
asia/20afghan.html>
Jehangir Karamat, 2009. “The Power of People Power.” Spearhead Research. <http://
www.spearheadresearch.org/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=1420>
From 2004 to 2007, Kayani was Director General ISI. It was during this time that
insurgency started in tribal areas and Dr. AQ Khan Scandal was exposed.
On general idea about Pakistan, see: Stephen Cohen’s The Idea of Pakistan. On books
about the dominance of military and religion in Pakistan, see: Husain Haqqani’s Pakistan:
Between Mosque and Military or Hasan Abbas’ Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. On
links with Islamists, see: Zahid Husain’s Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant
Islam. On Afghan jihad, see: Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001; On Taliban,
see: Ahmed Rashid’s Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia;
Ahmed Rashid’s Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Central Asia; On military, see: Shuja Nawaz’s Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army,
and the Wars Within. For personal memoirs of the key players, see: Musharraf’s In
the Line of Fire: A Memoir; Benazir Bhutto’s Daughter of the East; Benazir Bhutto’s
Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West.
DCFA Backgrounder, 2006. Intelligence Services; Democratic Control of Armed Forces,
pp. 1.
Full backgrounder on intelligence can also be accessed at: <http://www.dcaf.ch/
publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=18413&nav1=5>
Such conflict may raise suspicion with regards to coordination. For instance, Pakistan’s
external IA funded its war on drug money – against which a specialized IA works on.
8. See: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi
9 See: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi
10 Frédéric Grare. Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2009); pp. 16
11 Hassan Abbas. 2007. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. Pentagon Press; pp. 245
12 Sean P. Witchell, ‘Pakistan’s ISI: The Invisible Government’, International Journal of
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, Vol 16(1), (Spring 2003) pp 374-375.
13 Nawaz, Shuja. 2008. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within. Oxford
University Press; pp. 255.
14 Sean P. Witchell; Ibid, pp. 376.
15 Nawaz. Ibid. pp. 256
16 It was shared by a future COAS, General Beg, in a Supreme Court case in 1997.
17 Attributed to Bhutto; quoted by Ardeshir Cowasjee in his article. See: Cowasjee, “The
missing chapter,” Dawn (June 28, 1997)
18 http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/pakistan/isi.htm
20 The replacement of a single person at top shows the strength associated with such a
person. This would be repeated later on, too.
21 These industrialists included Nawaz Sharif, who was picked up by General Jilani, former
chief of ISI. Sharif would later lead a mainstream political force.
25 Nawaz; Ibid. pp. 412-413
26 Its original name in Urdu is Islami Jamhooria Ittehad.
27 Nawaz; Ibid. pp. 411-413.
28 Daily Times Monitor. “Nawaz Sharif met Osama three times: ISI officials.” Daily Times,
Lahore (June, 23,2005) See: <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_236-2005_pg7_34>
29 Exact points included: no change in the Afghanistan policy, nuclear policy, defense policy,
no administrative meddling in civil service and not harassing General Zia’s family. See:
Nawaz; Ibid; pp. 415
30 Nawaz; Ibid. pp. 426
31 After Kallue’s exit, Durrani was called in to head ISI.
32 Editorial. “Qazi Hussein and Osama bin Laden.” Daily Times (March 20, 2008) See:
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\20\story_20-3-2006_pg3_1
33 Cowasjee, Ardeshir. “We never learn from history-3” Dawn (August 11, 2002)
34 Cowasjee, Ardeshir. Ibid.
35 Ardeshir, Cowasjee. Ibid.
36 Ardeshir Cowasjee. Ibid.
37 Abbas calls Nasir’s view as “worldview jurisdiction for ISI.” Abbas; Ibid. pp.148
38 Abbas; Ibid. pp. 148
39 Nawaz. Ibid. pp. 467-468
40 This power was bestowed to the President by General Zia. Benazir Bhutto was also a
victim of same power.
41 Presently too, the then-Minister General Babar often takes credit for establishing peace
in Afghanistan by nurturing Taliban.
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There is disagreement over who was the first to contact Taliban – ISI or Babar.
Rehman Malik, the present MoI, was made chief of FIA.
See: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/ib/index.html
ISPR, known as Inter-Services Public Relations
Rafaqat Ali. “ISI status to be decided once for all: Saiduzzaman.” Dawn (May 22,
1999)
Rafaqat Ali. Ibid.
Staff Reporter. “Rehmat Shah Afridi freed on parole” Dawn (May 25, 2008) See: http://
www.dawn.com/2008/05/25/top14.html
Rashid, Ahmed. 2008. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation
Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Viking Adult
Musharraf, Pervez. In the Line of Fire. Simon& Schuster (2006)
Mir, Amir. The Fluttering Flag of Jehad. Mashal Books (2008)
Meacher, Michael T. “The Pakistan Connection.” Guardian (2004)
Mir. Ibid. 2008
Umer Cheema. “The man, who rigged 2002 polls, spills the beans.” The News (February
24, 2008) See: < http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=13159>
Umer Cheema. Ibid. 2008.
Muhammad Qasim. 2008. “Five more missing persons traced, SC told” The News (May
26, 2007)
These included General Hamid Gul, former DG ISI, during Bhutto’s time from 1988 to
1990; and Brig (Retd.) Ejaz Shah, the then-DG of Intelligence Bureau.
It is important to realize that in a bumpy journey of Pakistan’s political history where
military has taken the driving seat, professionalism is associated with lack of desire to
rule directly – even if the COAS has influenced on key political events.
Raza, Syed Irfan. “ISI, IB put under interior division’s control.” Dawn. (June 27, 2008)
See: http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/27/top1.html
Report; “Notification regarding ISI has been misunderstood: PID.” The News.
Tariq Butt. “Intelligence Bureau trying to catch multilingual terrorist chatter” The News
(May 25, 2009) See: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=179355>
The cases involving hearing of Sethi’s abduction (1999) and missing persons (pending)
revolved with the legal authority of ISI.
Hamid Mir. “Why Benazir points finger at IB chief.” The News (October 20, 2007) See:
<http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=1069>
As DG of FIA, he worked actively with Bhutto, when she was PM. He was hounded after
Bhutto’s fall. Later on, he stayed in UK as security advisor of Bhutto.
Essays
A STRATEGY TO FIGHT MILITANCY?
Cyril Almeida*
EIGHT years since 9/11 rendered debate on whether Pakistan needed
a policy against militancy or not moot, the secondary question has
still not been answered satisfactorily: what is the state’s policy against
militancy? Despite notable successes against militants in Bajaur and
Mohmand tribal agencies and the Malakand division over the past year,
there are still serious questions about whether the state has a coherent,
workable strategy to fight militancy and ensure a long-term future in
which militants do not pose a threat to the writ of the state.
The doubts are fanned by two facts: one, never has the state spelled
out its strategy to fight militancy beyond the platitudes to protect
the ‘national interest’ against ‘extremists’; and two, the rising arc of
militancy inside Pakistan over much of the last decade suggests that
the strategy, to the extent that it does exist, has not been an effective
one. In the absence of a publicly articulated strategy to fight militancy,
the numbers tell a story of their own. According to the South Asia
Terrorism Portal, the total casualties from terrorist violence (civilian,
security forces personnel and terrorist/militant) in 2003 was 189. By
2006, the total had climbed to 1,471 and to 6,715 by 2008. In 2009, by
21 Sept 8,175 people had died.
In April 2009, a few days before Operation Rah-i-Rast was launched
in the Malakand division against the Swat chapter of the Tehrik-iTaliban led by Maulana Fazlullah, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army
chief, vowed that “victory against terror and militancy will be achieved
* Cyril Almeida is an editorial writer and columnist with Dawn. Email cyril.a@gmail.com
Essay
at all costs.” Gen Kayani went on to say in his comments to top military
commanders that the army “never has and never will hesitate to sacrifice,
whatever it may take, to ensure safety and well-being of the people and
country’s territorial integrity.” In the months since, the Pakistan Army
has led operations that have decimated the Swat TTP, squeezed the TTP
in its base in South Waziristan and seen Baitullah Mehsud killed by
a drone strike that was likely aided by Pakistani intelligence. But do
Gen Kayani’s words and the army’s recent actions add up to a coherent
strategy to fight militancy?
Not quite. The Pakistan Army — and it is very clear that the army
dictates the overall approach to the fight against militancy — has what
was described to the writer in a background conversation with one of the
country’s best analysts a ‘set of priorities,’ not a strategy. Depending on
the seriousness of the threat posed to the state by a particular group of
militants or the pressure from outside to act against a particular network,
the state as directed by the army has acted against it. The ‘prioritisation’
on those grounds is not very hard to detect.
Broadly speaking, the army divides militants into different categories:
Al Qaeda elements and those directly affiliated with the network;
Pakistani militants; the Afghan Taliban; and various criminal gangs and
networks that have latched on to pre-existing militant groups.
Al Qaeda and its directly associated movements have been a target
of the state the longest. In his 12 Jan 2002 speech to the nation, then
president Gen Musharraf (retd) said: “We have been taking measures
against terrorism from the beginning, not because of any outside pressure.
We were already carrying out these measures when a terrorist attack was
carried out in America on 11 September. After 11 September we joined
the international coalition against terrorism and I am delighted that the
majority of Pakistani people supported this decision.”
It is questionable to what extent Pakistan was acting against Al
Qaeda before 9/11, but successes since have been numerous. The roll212
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call of Al Qaeda leaders captured or killed is lengthy and includes
Saudi-born Palestinian Abu Zubaydah (Faisalabad, March 2002),
Yemeni Ramzi Binalshibh (Karachi, September 2002), Khalid Shaikh
Mohammad (Rawalpindi, March 2003), Abu Faraj al-Liby (Mardan,
May 2005), Abu Hamza Rabia (North Waziristan, December 2005),
Abu Laith al-Libi (North Waziristan, January 2008), Abu Khabab alMasri (South Waziristan, July 2008) and Abu Khabab al-Masri (Bajaur,
August 2008). There is little doubt that the army and the state remain
committed to finding and capturing or eliminating Al Qaeda leaders,
intelligence and operational constraints permitting. There is absolutely
no love lost between Al Qaeda and the Pakistan Army; Osama bin Laden
and Ayman al Zawahiri have themselves called for strikes against the
army and its leadership. Indeed, one of the above mentioned Al Qaeda
militants, Abu Faraj al-Liby, is believed to have been the mastermind of
the assassination attempts on Gen Musharraf (retd) in December 2003.
Action against the other three militant ‘categories’ though has been
limited, with the state ‘prioritising’ action against certain groups on
the basis of its ‘threat’ and ‘pressure’ tests. Least likely to have drawn
the state’s ire are the assorted criminal gangs and networks that have
expanded their activities under the garb of religion. But when the threat
has grown, the state has acted. Since June 2008, a series of operations
have been launched in Khyber agency against three groups, the
Lashkar-i-Islam led by Mangal Bagh Afridi, the Ansarul Islam led by
Pir Saifur Rehman and a group called Amar Bil Maarouf Wa Nahi (the
Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) led by Haji Namdar. The
earlier operations were criticised and their effectiveness and the army’s
strategy were questioned perhaps precisely because the army was acting
according to its threat test; slaps on the wrist for the troublesome, a
pounding for growing, recalcitrant threats. The latest operation launched
in Khyber in September in the Bara region against Mangal Bagh and
other criminal elements is believed to have been the most serious and
the most effective partially because Peshawar itself was coming under
threat from the activities of the criminal gangs operating in the area —
the army thereby once again showing its willingness to act once certain
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‘red lines’ have been crossed.
Similarly, within the ‘Pakistani militants’ category a clear
prioritisation is visible: militants who have crossed red lines and attacked
the state directly and repeatedly and reneged on peace offers are the ones
who have found themselves in the army’s crosshairs. Consider the most
prominent targets in recent months: Baitullah Mehsud and Maulana
Fazlullah.
Baitullah Mehsud, who emerged as militant leader following the
death of Nek Muhammad in 2004, was given the carrot-and-stick
treatment on several occasions until his death in August. From March
to July 2004, the security forces blockaded his base in South Waziristan
and entered and fought inside the Mehsud strongholds, but a peace deal
was reached in February 2005, which was renounced by Mehsud in July
of the same year. Then in August 2007, he captured 242 soldiers, leading
to the release of 24 militants in exchange for the return of the abducted
soldiers. In January 2008, another military operation was launched in
South Waziristan but it was called off within weeks and yet another deal
was reached. What finally appeared to push the state irreversibly against
Mehsud was the wave of suicide bombings and attacks on security
targets inside Pakistan proper in the last 18 months that were almost
invariably traced back to Mehsud’s network and allies in the Waziristan
agencies. By the time a drone strike killed Baitullah Mehsud in August,
likely aided by intelligence provided through Pakistani sources, he had
become Public Enemy No 1 and was openly mentioned as an enemy of
the state. Mehsud had crossed all the red lines of the Pakistan Army and
its threat assessment of his network made it impossible to not act against
him.
The same ambivalence towards Maulana Fazlullah and his rapid rise
to prominence in Swat after starting his illegal FM radio broadcasts in
2006 is also detectable. A nine-point peace deal in May 2007 and a 15point peace deal in May 2008 were interspersed with three moderately
effective phases of Operation Rah-i-Haq, beginning in October 2007.
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Then came the Malakand Accord of February 2009, which gave birth
to the controversial Nizam-i-Adl Regulation, 2009 and seemingly gave
the militants all that they had claimed to fight for. But the failure of
Fazlullah’s Swat TTP to abide by the terms of the Malakand Accord
was the last straw in the army’s analysis. With all the red lines having
been crossed and the state and the security forces themselves having
become a target of the Swat TTP, there was no choice but to place his
organisation at the top of the list of priority targets and rout it.
Other networks of Pakistani militants, however, have notably not
met a similar fate and continue to survive, if not thrive. Consider the
most prominent of the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ groups, the Lashkar-i-Taiba,
a group that has drawn international attention once again following the
terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Led by Hafiz Saeed and
currently known as the Jamaatud Dawa — periodic official ‘bans’ force
such groups to routinely change their names — the group is opposed to
fighting the Pakistani state, does not foment trouble against the security
agencies and is avowedly focused on its fight against India. It is not high
on the army’s list of priorities in the fight against militancy because it
is not a direct threat. Following the Mumbai attacks, the organisation
did become an embarrassment to the state and was the reason for
considerable pressure being brought to bear on Pakistan, so the response
was to act against those among its cadres based in Pakistan who were
directly linked to the attacks and to leave the wider network relatively
unscathed. Hafiz Saeed has recently been detained in his home once
again, but the government continues to insist that India has not provided
proof of his involvement in the Mumbai attacks and therefore cannot
prosecute him.
The Afghan Taliban appear to the lowest on the list of the state’s
priorities, something which will come as no surprise to anyone who
has heard the frequent and loud complaints of American, Afghan and
ISAF officials. Here too the state’s calculation is apparent: the Afghan
Taliban are primarily focused on the fight inside Afghanistan and they
do not threaten Pakistan at present; therefore, they do not merit pressure
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from the state here.
Gen Stanley McChrystal’s assessment of the war in Afghanistan
clearly identifies the various components of the Afghan Taliban: “The
major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are: the
Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN), and the
Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG).” The general is also very clear about
the significance of Pakistani terrain to those groups:
“Afghanistan’s insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan.
Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in
Pakistan, are linked with Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups,
and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan’s ISI. Al Qaeda
and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign
fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and
offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support. Al Qaeda’s
links with HQN have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control
could create a favourable environment for AQAM to re-establish safe
havens in Afghanistan. Additionally, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is
reliant on ground supply routes through Pakistan that remain vulnerable
to these threats.”
The Quetta shura, allegedly led by Mullah Omar, is a frequent source
of tension between the US and Pakistan (an article in The New York
Times on Sept 23 stated, “The issue of the Taliban leadership council,
or shura, in Quetta is now at the top of the Obama administration’s
agenda in its meetings with Pakistani officials.”) but there are genuine
reasons to doubt its existence as an omnipotent network and the security
establishment’s alleged support for it. What seems more likely is that
the state is turning a blind eye rather than providing active assistance to
Afghan Taliban members who are hiding out in and around Quetta and
along parts of the Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan.
Anne Patterson, the US ambassador to Pakistan, in an interview
with McClatchy Newspapers in September spoke of the “different
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priorities” of Pakistan and claimed that the state is “certainly reluctant
to take action” against the leadership of the Afghan Taliban based
in Pakistan. Ambassador Patterson went on the say: “Where we (the
US) differ, of course, is the treatment of the groups who are attacking
our troops in Afghanistan. And that comes down to Haqqani and Gul
Bahadur and Nazir, to a lesser extent Hekmatyar, and yes, of course,
there are differences there.”
Pakistan will of course deny the ambassador’s claims, but the facts
suggest otherwise. Gul Bahadur is a powerful warlord in North Waziristan
and Maulvi Nazir a powerful one in South Waziristan; both have been
courted by the state in its bid to isolate and defeat the Baitullah Mehsud
network. Similarly, the fact that the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar have bases in Fata is an open secret. Indeed, Ambassador
Patterson was sympathetic to the state’s position: “In my view the
Pakistanis don’t have the capacity to go after some of these groups.
Some they do, let me stress. But say Siraj Haqqani holds territory, huge
swathes of territory in North Waziristan, where he’s been implanted for
years.”
Given this rather clear pattern of prioritisation and sympathy for it
extended by no less than the US ambassador to Pakistan, could it not
qualify as the coherent strategy that the state requires to fight militancy
effectively? Because the army publicly denies that prioritisation is in
fact at play, the possible thinking behind it has to be deduced.
First, there are clearly operational constraints at work. The state
simply does not have the resources to fight on many fronts at the same
time. Going after the Afghan Taliban in Balochistan where a low-level
local insurgency is continuing, the Haqqani, Hekmatyar, Baitullah
Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Maulvi Nazir networks in Fata, the Swat
TTP in Malakand division, the criminal gangs masquerading as Islamic
militants in Khyber agency, the Lashkar-i-Taiba, Jaish-i-Mohammad,
Harkatul Mujahideen, etc., in the Punjab and elsewhere, Al Qaeda in the
cities and in the tribal areas, and the foreign militants with an interest in
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China or the Central Asian Republics at the same is very difficult. The
list of militant groups is seemingly endless, the targets spread out across
the length and breadth of the country and the task of defeating them so
complex (part counter-insurgency, part counter-terrorism in nature), so
it is understandable to a degree that the state is working sequentially and
dealing only with the ‘worst of the worst’ first.
Second, the India factor. Adm Mike Mullen, chairman of the US
joint chiefs of staff, told the US Senate Committee on Armed Services
in September: “It’s my view they (Pakistan) are not going to lose their
focus on India.” Explaining the Pakistan Army’s point of view further,
Adm Mullen said: “They’ve got a challenge of literally two fights, a
conventional fight or a conventional challenge and threat along with a
counter insurgency challenge which they increasingly recognise.” That
sums up the Pakistan Army’s approach: it can neither afford to commit
100 per cent of the resources at its disposal to fight militants nor zero per
cent, but the percentage of resources it does commit to fighting militants
is affected both by the severity of the threat from the militants as well
as from India.
Third, Pakistan’s stake in the Afghanistan of the future. The US’s
strategic commitment to the region is far from clear; twice in his first
9 months in office, President Obama has re-evaluated his strategy for
Afghanistan. However, there are other, regional powers — Iran, Russia,
China, India — that are jockeying for influence in Afghanistan. In this
environment of strategic uncertainty and competition, Pakistan cannot
be expected to commit to a project — the elimination of the Afghan
Taliban or at least their power to influence events in Afghanistan —
when it isn’t clear if the other powers are committed to achieving that
goal in the long term.
Seen from that perspective, the Pakistan Army’s policy of fighting
only those networks that persistently and implacably oppose the Pakistani
state and have turned their guns on the state and the people appears to
make strategic and political sense — fight only the ‘worst of the worst’
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Essay
and keep an eye on the neutral or friendly groups to in case events cause
them to turn unfriendly. A coherent, practical and eminently sensible
strategy to fight militancy, then, seems to be in hand.
The problem is that the prioritisation approach ignores a grim
reality: the various militant groups are far from discrete entities that
are insulated from each other. Cross-pollination has occurred and the
different groups work in concert and share resources to such an extent
that it would be closer to the mark to describe the universe of militancy
in Pakistan as a cocktail rather than readily identifiable discrete groups.
The evidence of this has been available for years.
On 25 Dec 2003, two suicide bombers struck Gen Musharraf’s (retd)
motorcade in Rawalpindi. One of the attackers, Muhammad Jameel, hit
the car carrying Nadeem Taj, who went from being Musharraf’s military
secretary to DG Military Intelligence and finally DG ISI. A report in
Dawn on 29 Dec 2003 explained Jameel’s background:
“Dawn’s investigation revealed that Muhammad Jameel, 23, was
affiliated with the banned Jaish-i-Mohammad, a militant organisation
that had training camps in Rishkore near Kabul in the Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan and was actively involved in the occupied Kashmir….
“Investigations revealed that Muhammad Jameel, resident of
Androot, Police Station, Torarh in Poonch district, Azad Kashmir,
had received only primary-level education and was a Hafizul Quran
(memorised the Holy Book by heart).
“Fired by fiery speeches by jihadi leaders, Jameel went to Jalalabad
via Torkham in eastern Nangrahar province in January 2001 through an
Afghan cloth merchant in AJ&K. Soon afterwards, he moved to Kabul
and lived in Darul Aman area on the outskirts of the Afghan capital.
“Jameel, however, was wounded and captured when the US-backed
Northern Alliance attacked Kabul later that year. He was shifted to a
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hospital and remained under treatment for 15 days. The transitional
government in Afghanistan led by President Hamid Karzai handed him
over to Pakistani authorities along with 29 other militants that same
month and they were flown to Peshawar in a military aircraft.
“They were re-arrested by the Pakistani authorities and charged
with entering Pakistan without travel documents.
“Significantly, though, Jameel was declared ‘white’ by security
agencies when interrogated by a Joint Interrogation Team in April last
year. The JIT had concluded that the suspect was not involved in any
anti-state activities and since nothing adverse had been found against
him, the JIT had unanimously declared him ‘white’ implying that his
custody was not required by the agencies.”
More recently, following the death of Baitullah Mehsud, it is widely
believed that Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network intervened in the
succession crisis in the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and brokered a peace
between the rival factions vying for power. Meanwhile, investigations
into the spate of suicide bombings inside Pakistan suggest that Al
Qaeda is providing the ideology and indoctrination, South Waziristan’s
Baitullah Mehsud network the training resources and the Punjabi Taliban
the ‘manpower’ to carry out the suicide strikes.
All of this makes nonsense of a strategy to defeat militancy in
Pakistan by prioritising which groups are to be fought against on the
basis of their opposition to the Pakistani state. Furthermore, it cannot
be overlooked that the present-day ‘strategy’ of defeating militancy is
geared to fight groups that in the not-too-distant past were not considered
to be a threat. And by the time they were considered to be a threat to the
state and therefore tackled — such as Baitullah Mehsud’s network and
Maulana Fazlullah’s Swat TTP — they had already caused tremendous
damage to the state and the people. It is therefore difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the Pakistan Army’s ‘red lines’ are worryingly deep,
that by the time a serious threat is recognised and challenged the harm
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caused is already intolerable.
As mentioned earlier, there are in fact operational constraints limiting
the state’s ability to open multiple fronts at the same time. However, as
also indicated, some of those limits are self-imposed; were the army to
alter its threat perception in Afghanistan and from India, more resources
could be freed to fight militancy in earnest on several more fronts than it
is being fought at present. The future could be made safer, but it remains
hostage to the past.
221
BETWEEN DREAMS AND REALITIES
Iqbal Ahmad Khan*
Pakistan’s 62 year old tumultuous history has essentially been shaped
by two factors, civil-military relations on the domestic front and our
relations with India on the external front. The lop-sidedness of the civilmilitary equation in favor of the latter led to four military interventions
and nearly 33 years of military and quasi-military rule in Pakistan.
With generals as helmsmen, we fought two wars with India and have
had to put up with its occupation of a huge portion of the Siachen Glacier. It was again the Chief of Army Staff who without “ formal approval
by the political leadership at the highest level” plunged the country in
a misadventure called Kargil. All these according to Sartaj Aziz were
negative milestones or turning points in Pakistan’s history.
In his book, “Between Dreams and Realities-Some milestones in
Pakistan’s History,” former Finance and Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz
describes the 1965 war with India as “another negative milestone brought
about by a series of ill-conceived and poorly executed strategies, (which)
not only shattered that dream but also led to the eventual break-up of
the country in 1971.” Contrary to what the succeeding generation has
been led to believe, Sartaj Aziz opines that “the seventeen-day war was
at best a draw….The longer-term economic and political consequences
of the war were extremely damaging. In many ways the war represented
the beginning of the end of the Ayub era. …In the wake of the 1965 war
there was a widespread perception that West Pakistan could not really
defend East Pakistan against an attack from India. (It) eventually led to
the crisis that led to the break-up of the country.”
*
Iqbal Ahmad Khan is a former Ambassador of Pakistan. Email gazalakhan27@hotmail.
com
Essay
Not prepared to learn any lessons from history and possessed of an
insatiable greed for power, the rotund and promiscuous general, Yahya
Khan, who snatched the reigns of government from self-styled FieldMarshal Ayub Khan plunged Pakistan into another war with India. The
outcome of the war would have been obvious to the most casual student
of military affairs. Sartaj Aziz writes that “The tragic turning-point of
1971, when East Pakistan became Bangladesh was essentially brought
about by the failure of democracy in Pakistan….Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
won 160 out of National Assembly’s 162 seats in East Pakistan in the
1970 elections, based on his six-point formula of maximum provincial
autonomy. That gave him a majority in the National Assembly of 300
seats. Yet he was denied the opportunity to become prime minister…..
The repression that followed after the arrest of Mujibur Rahman in
March 1971, sent millions of refugees to India, giving it a good excuse
to intervene militarily in November 1971 to ‘liberate’ East Pakistan and
create the new state of Bangladesh.”
In 1984 as the usurper-general, Zia-ul-Haq, was engaged in
legitimizing his coup, consolidating his hold on power and doing
America’s bidding in Afghanistan, India taking advantage of his preoccupations occupied “30,000 sq.km in Siachen Glacier where the Line
of Control was not demarcated.”
Yet another addition to this chronicle of failures was the adventure
undertaken in Kargil by the Chief of Army Staff General Pervez
Musharraf. “The Kargil operation,” Sartaj Aziz writes, “has become an
extraordinary event in the country’s history because it not only prepared
the ground for a prolonged military takeover in Pakistan in October 1999
but also derailed the peace process between India and Pakistan, which
had started with such high hopes following Prime Minister Vajpayee’s
historic visit to Lahore on 20-21 February 1999. It also caused irreparable
damage to Pakistan’s principled and legitimate stand on Kashmir in the
international arena.” To this negative fallout should be added the adverse
impact of the Kargil operation on Pakistan’s image and its credibility and
trustworthiness as a responsible member of the international community
committed to regional and international peace and stability. Perhaps, it
was such behavior and also that related to proliferation of weapons of
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mass destruction that prompted the former United States Secretary of
State, Madeline Albright, to describe Pakistan as a case of international
migraine.
In this highly readable and lucidly written account of the major
milestones in Pakistan’s history, the author, Sartaj Aziz, laments that
those responsible for undermining the state and its national interests
have invariably escaped responsibility. Tragically, the victims have been
credible and legitimate personalities who have enjoyed the trust of the
people of Pakistan. In this context he cites the execution of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, Pakistan’s first popularly elected prime minister, and observes, “It
is one of the many ironies of our history that one of the most outstanding
political leaders, who secured a unanimous constitution for the country,
was hanged while all the military generals who created circumstances
that eventually led to the break-up of the country, lived on without much
accountability.”
If only General Zia-ul-Haq had been tried posthumously, along with
some of his principal accomplices we might have been spared of 12
October 1999. It was Mr. Bhutto who chose not to publish and implement
the strong recommendations of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission
Report for the trial of General Yahya Khan and his cohorts. This was
done in order to save the armed forces from further humiliations resulting
from the 1971 debacle. He was repaid by a scheming and duplicitous
general whose policies plunged the country into a morass from which
we are still struggling to extricate ourselves.
The author was the foreign minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif who had assumed office in 1997 with a more than twothirds majority in the National Assembly. Little did the prime minister
know at the time that he would barely have completed half his term
before the army chief would have removed and imprisoned him. Without
prior approval of the political leadership, the COAS launched the Kargil
operation which turned out to be both a military and a political disaster.
According to Sartaj Aziz, a retired army general was of the view that
“Kargil was a very badly planned and poorly executed operation for
which General Musharraf should have been court-martialed.” The
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COAS who was the mastermind of the operation should have been
held accountable and made to pay the price. But once again the irony
was that as Sartaj Aziz puts it “The leader who saved Pakistan from a
disastrous all-out war with India was deposed and then exiled from the
country and the army general who overstepped his authority and caused
irreparable damage to the Kashmir cause, became the undisputed ruler
of the country for nine long years. It is difficult to imagine a more ironic
and unjust episode in history.”
In the 1950s and the 1960s a perennial feature of Greece’s politics
was the repeated military incursions by army colonels into the prohibited
civilian domain. The coups and counter-coups by these colonels had
resulted in authoritarianism in politics, stagnation in the economy and
confrontation with Turkey. Since Greece then was a frontline state in the
containment of communism, the United States was not only indifferent
to the overthrow of democracy, it in fact preferred to deal with military
regimes rather than democratically elected bodies. The dawn of the 1970s
brought a confident and popular civilian government in Athens which
charged, tried, found guilty and sentenced some of these delinquent
colonels. The trials were held in public and under the normal laws of
the land. The purpose was to inform the public of the immense damage
and suffering that military rule had caused to the country and the people.
Three decades later Greece has remained coup free, economically and
socially vibrant, an active member of the European Community and at
peace with arch-rival Turkey.
In Pakistan none of the four generals who forcibly threw out the
established government of the time in violation of the constitution have
been hauled up. Three of them are dead. The consensus among scholars,
political analysts and the major political parties is that military rule has
caused immeasurable damage to peace, prosperity and harmony in the
country and is to be avoided like the plague. Sartaj Aziz subscribes to
this consensus. In the epilogue he contends that “the net impact of such
takeovers has been highly negative for the strength and unity of the
federation and for the growth of a sustainable political process. Military
rule invariably over-centralizes power in the executive to deliver ‘quick
results’ and then seeks legitimacy by forcing the Judiciary to sanctify the
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takeover on grounds of state necessity. It further weakens the democratic
process by weakening the role of the parliament and by manipulating
certain political parties…”
To keep the army out of politics the two major Pakistani political
parties, the PPP and the PML (N) signed the Charter of Democracy under
which they agreed to take a number of steps to safeguard democracy and
to ensure that Bonapartism would be eliminated for ever from the politics
of the country. Regrettably, one and a half years since the return of the
democratic order, precious little has been done to give practical shape
to their commitments in the Charter. Worse still, the army continues to
call the shots in times of crises. In the war on terrorism the armed forces
have been given a totally free hand, even though the civilian leadership
does not tire of reminding the nation that to defeat terror much more
than mere force is required.
Similarly, the army chief had to step in when a violent confrontation
between the government and lawyers supported by civil society
demanding the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry
seemed imminent. The government finally caved in and accepted the
populist demand for undoing the illegal acts of a military dictator.
It is yet another sad irony that opposition to the restoration of the
Chief Justice and to the trial of General Pervez Musharraf has come from
the PPP government whose martyred chairperson, Benazir Bhutto, had
hoisted the national flag at the residence of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry
and referred to him as the Chief Justice of the country. Likewise, the
founder and chairman of the PPP Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged by
the most serpentine of military dictators General Zia-ul-Haq who then
lashed and tortured workers of the party demanding democracy and
justice. If, in the tradition of the earlier three military dictators, General
(Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, violator of the fundamental law of the land,
jailer of 60 judges of the superior courts and the Kargil mastermind is
permitted to play golf and bridge in London and not brought before the
courts, there will not be any disincentive for a future coup-maker.
The main purpose of writing the book says Sartaj Aziz was to convey
to the coming generations four important lessons from the country’s
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history. Pakistan’s survival as a dynamic and viable political entity can
only be ensured through a genuine democratic framework. This can
“only be built on strong institutions and the rule of law under civilian
supremacy. Military rule under a civilian façade can never become
a substitute for genuine democracy……A democratic system and
especially a parliamentary federal system can survive only if the three
pillars of state: namely the parliament, the judiciary and the executive
function within the parameters laid down by the constitution…..The
vitality of a nation does not come only from its economic progress and
the size of its military, but also from its shared values, cultural heritage
and social energy. To these I would add an unwavering focus on the
establishment of peaceful and cooperative relations with India.”
The book couched in good English prose and containing
unprecedented information on such significant and major turning points
in Pakistan’s contemporary history such as Kargil, Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests, Kashmir and the October 1999 coup is a must read for
anybody attempting to understand present day Pakistan. It is high time that
the government of Pakistan, as provided for in the rules, systematically
declassified all important official documents from 1947 to 1979 namely
those which date back 30 years or more. This would kindle a renewed
and vigorous interest among Pakistani and international scholars and
hopefully result in high-quality publications enriching the curriculum
in our academic institutions and providing the public with an authentic
account of Pakistan’s internal developments and external relationships.
In conclusion, we recall what was stated in the introduction; the
domination of Pakistan’s history by two relationships, one between the
civil and the military and the other between Pakistan and India. The
lesson from six decades of turmoil and travail in Pakistan is that peace
and stability in the country can only be established through subjecting
the military to civilian control and establishing a cooperative and not
a confrontationist approach towards India. It is military rule and wars
with India that have undone Pakistan. Common sense and the overriding
interests of the country dictate that we reverse course. The national
security state must give way to a welfare state and war to peace with
India.
227
COOPERATIVE MECHANISM TO
SAVE KASHMIR ENVIRONMENT AND
WATER WARS
Iftikhar Gilani*
Abstract
The water issues between India and Pakistan may reach dangerous
levels in the near future. With water resources drying up fast in Kashmir,
the agriculture and economy of Pakistan will be badly hit. Pakistani
authorities have, so far, consistently focused their efforts on making
sure that India adheres to the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty
(IWT) without realizing that that their water banks, be it of Wullar Lake
or Indus line glaciers, have receded inwards by several miles since
the treaty was signed. Since these glaciers and water bodies have no
significant economic importance for India, it would be naive to expect
the Indian exchequer to invest in saving these resources which directly
benefit the Pakistani farmer. It is time that both countries address this
issue seriously by building a mechanism to save these water banks and
investing in reversing climate change affects in Kashmir. This paper
analyses the implications and attempts to sensitize experts on the
potential environmental catastrophe and calls for evolving corrective
measures.Author.
BACKGROUND
In an article published by the Washington Post on 28 January 2009,
President Asif Ali Zardari described water as a major issue between
Pakistan and India. He mentioned the serious consequences of an
environmental catastrophe. He wrote: “The water crisis in Pakistan
*
Iftikhar Gilani is an Indian scholar and columnist.
Essay
is directly linked to relations with India. Resolution could prevent an
environmental catastrophe in South Asia, but failure to do so could fuel
the fires of discontent that lead to extremism and terrorism.”
The Pakistan Indus Water Commission has been complaining of a
reduced flow in the Chenab river at the Maralla headwork which has
resulted in a loss of cropped areas in Lahore, Kasur, Okara, Sialkot,
Hafizabad, Sheikhupura, Faisalabad and Jhang districts. While Indian
experts consider this as merely another attempt by Pakistan to bring
in another catalyst for conflict, both countries have preferred to ignore
the basic issues that cause water scarcity and will eventually influence
their respective economies and diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the
water issues are directly linked with economic growth and the overall
wellbeing of Pakistan which is indirectly linked with stability – the
absence of which provides fuel for terrorism.
It is believed that Pakistan’s water availability will plunge to 800
cubic meters per person by 2020 against the current 1,200 cubic meters
per person. Just 60 years ago 5,000 cubic meters of water was available
to a Pakistani citizen.
India and Pakistan share six rivers of the Indus basin. These are
grouped into two categories – the Western Rivers (the Indus, Chenab
and Jhelum) and the Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas). Under the
Indus Waters Treaty, India has comprehensive rights over the waters
of the Eastern Rivers while Pakistan has the same over the waters of
the Western Rivers. The treaty and its annexure are detailed technical
documents which provide the guidelines to be followed on the usage of
these waters. For instance, Pakistan can use the waters of the Western
Rivers, however, India can also use them for irrigation purposes and is
allowed to build run–of–the-river projects on them.
Pakistan depends on the Indus river, which starts in Tibet and
runs through Ladakh on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, before
reaching it. There it is fed by numerous tributaries from the mountain
glaciers and swells out as it flows down towards the Arabian Sea. A
U.N. report notes that more than three-quarters of Pakistanis live in the
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Indus basin and its water irrigates 80 percent of the nation’s cropland.
DRYING UP OF WATER BODIES
Without going into an academic debate to discuss the Indus Waters
Treaty and its fallout, let us focus here on some practical aspects. Since
the signing of the treaty, water bodies in Kashmir have receded to
dangerous levels.
A horrifying example of this is the pitiable condition of the Bari
Nambal lagoon near Srinagar. Under the nose of the authorities this lake
has turned into a marsh land. The absence of conservation measures has
shrunk the area of this lagoon to just 0.50 sq kilometres during the past
three decades.
The only remnants of this once sparkling lagoon are an unending
stretch of horrible weeds, agricultural fields and muddy waters. This
problem has been enhanced by the accumulation of tons of garbage
including non-biodegradable polythene, massive encroachment and
the inflow of drains of the old city. Dumping of untreated sewage and
garbage has changed this lagoon into dry mass.
The Jammu and Kashmir state pollution control board had procured
a sewage treatment plant (STP), which has been non-functional for
a few years. A scientific study has confirmed rising phosphate levels
which confirm the sub-standard operation of the STP. Besides pollution,
the lagoon has been extensively encroached. Shops and hutments have
been constructed illegally without any proper check and nearly 17 drains
pour wastage into this lake.
An identical fate haunts other nearby wetlands like Hokersar,
Haigam, Shallabugh and Mirgund, which are the satellite wetlands of
Wullar Lake and host thousands of migratory birds every year.
The Haigam Wetland Conservation Reserve, an important refuge
for migratory waterfowls, shorebirds and trans-Himalayan species in
winters has shrunk considerably as people of adjoining the villages have
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encroached on the land and started paddy cultivation. Environmentalists
blame the government for it, as there are no conservation measures and
monitoring mechanisms in place. In fact, the authorities constructed a
road on the wetland’s boundary at Asthanpoora in 2007; disregarding
the warnings by environmentalists that the vehicular traffic on the road
will affect the habitat.
Environmentalist Mian Altaf, acknowledges deterioration of the
wetlands in the valley, many of which are under threat due to reclamation
for agriculture, development activities, contamination by sewage,
agricultural run-off and siltation. Most of the wetlands in the lower
Himalayan region are infested with aquatic weeds. The Trans-Himalayan
wetlands are becoming fragile due to anthropogenic activities, growing
tourism and faulty land management.
There is not a single water stream in Kashmir today which has not
witnessed water depletion over the years. Analysis of the data collected
from the eight districts of Kashmir, in a study sponsored by the Action
Aid, shows that the water level in almost all the streams and rivers has
decreased by about one-third, in some cases even by half, during the
last 40 years. It is the water flow in the small streams and tributaries that
finally determine the overall water availability in Kashmir’s three main
rivers, namely, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, which finally flow into
Pakistan.
DEPLETING GLACIERS
It has also been observed that the Himalyan glaciers are melting
and receding faster than in any part of the world. Muneer Ahmad of
the National Geophysical Research Institute in Hyderabad, reported that
the nose of the Kolhai glacier in Kashmir, one of the largest glaciers in
the Himalayas, had receded by almost 22 metres in 2007 while several
smaller glaciers had disappeared completely.
Ajit Tyagi, Director General of the Indian Meteorological
Department, warned that the glaciers could disappear even sooner if the
earth continues to warm at its current rate. Almost 15,000 Himalayan
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glaciers form a unique reservoir which supports perennial rivers such as
the Indus, the Ganges and the Brahamputra which, in turn, are the main
source of fresh water for billions of people in South Asian countries.
Some scientists believe that clouds of pollutants - almost two miles
thick - suspended over Asia may be a part of the problem. It was assumed
that the clouds, caused mainly by domestic wood and dung fires and
through the burning of forests and fields for agriculture, helped cool the
land by filtering out sunlight.
However, it is now known that soot particles in the cloud actually
absorb the sunlight and magnify solar heating on the ground by almost
50 percent.
While India has taken tough measures restricting tourist and pilgrim
traffic to save the Gangetic glaciers, it tends to sidestep the Kashmir
glaciers which are a source of water to the Indus and Jhelum. To whip up
communal passions on land allotment to the Amarnath Yatra Board in
Kashmir Valley last year, India’s Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party
(BJP) overlooked a report prepared by its own NDA member, Dr. Nitish
Sengupta, in 1996 asking to regulate the Amarnath-bound pilgrims in
order to preserve the fragile ecology and environment of the region. The
forest land handed over to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), at
Baltal near Sonamarg, houses the Nehnar and Thajwasan glaciers.
Ironically, the BJP government in the north Indian state of
Uttrakhand applied Dr. Sengupta’s report in Gangotri, where in May
2008 they issued a notification restricting the number of pilgrims and
tourists visiting Gomukh, the source of the holy river, Ganga, to 150 a
day. Gomukh is as important a holy shrine for Hindus as Amarnath is
in the southern mountains of Kashmir. Last year over 500,000 pilgrims
visited the Kashmir Shrine over a period of two months and over 20,000
pilgrims were at the cave shrine against the recommended 3,000 per
day.
Glaciologists have also warned of environmental degradation,
ecological imbalance and adverse impact on the Nehnar glacier, situated
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at a height of 4200 meters around Baltal near Sonamarg, being caused
by the heavy rush of pilgrims.
A paper presented in 2005 by Prof M.N. Kaul, a former principal
Investigator on glaciology in the Department of Science and Technology
in India, stated: “The ecology, the environment and the health of
the glacier can be under severe threat in case the Baltal route to the
holy cave was frequented by thousands of pilgrims.” Elaborating, he
said, “there are 6500 glaciers in the Himalayan regions in India and
out of which 3136 glaciers were in the mountain belt of Jammu and
Kashmir… these glaciers constitute 13 per cent of the state’s total land
and if allowed to assume strength year after year we can generate 80,000
MWs of electricity.”Referring to the Amarnath pilgrimage, he said “it
is for the first time the Baltal route has been exposed to heavy pilgrim
traffic which is likely to affect the ecological balance and the health of
the Nehnar glacier.”
Environmentalists have often raised concern that pilgrims not
only defecate on the banks of the Indus river but throw tonnes of nondegradable items, such as polythene, directly into the river. This has
resulted in the deterioration of its water quality. One expert, M R. D
Kudangar, observed that the chemical oxygen demand of the river has
been recorded between 17 and 92 mg/l which is beyond the permissible
level. Such enriched waters with hazardous chemical levels can in no
way be recommended as potable. It has crossed all permissible limits
due to flow of sewage and open defecation.
It has been estimated that 55,000 kg of waste is generated on a daily
basis during the pilgrimage. Apart from this waste, the degradation caused
by buses and vehicles carrying pilgrims, trucks carrying provisions and
massive deployment of security forces contribute further to air pollution.
Another fallout is the threat posed to local inhabitants from crowding of
the ecologically fragile area where they have to compete to retain their
access and rights to resources.
Most countries have regulated tourist inflows into their mountainous
regions. India’s National Environment Policy itself calls for measures
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“to regulate tourist inflows into mountain regions to ensure that these
remain within the carrying capacity of the mountain ecology.” A
UN sponsored study, ‘Mountains of Concrete: Dam Building in the
Himalayas,’ has also predicted a dramatic decrease in flows in the Indus
basin within 100 years.
The study undertaken by Sripad Dharmadhikari of Manthan
Adhyayan Kendra for International Rivers predicts extreme changes
in river flows due to global warming. As glaciers melt, water levels
in the rivers will rise and dams would be subjected to much higher
flows, thereby, raising concerns of dam safety, increased flooding and
submergence. Furthermore, with the subsequent depletion of glaciers,
annual flows would be much lower which would inevitably affect the
performance of dams. These environmental issues and their impact
should have been assessed in the planning stage before huge investments
were made in the construction of these dams.
Half a billion people in the Himalaya-Hindu-Kush region and a
quarter billion downstream who rely on glacial melt waters could be
seriously affected. The current trends in glacial melt suggest that the
Indus and other rivers may become seasonal rivers in the near future
which will be harmful for the economies in the region.
Last year, a team of “The Energy Research Institute of India” (TERI)
visited Kashmir to study some of these glaciers. The team, which was
led by Professor Iqbal Hassnain, included an expert from Iceland. The
University of Kashmir also collaborated in the study. They concentrated
their studies on the Kolahoi glacier in the Pahalgam area, the largest in
the valley. They also reported accelerated melting of glaciers and said it
would be another tragedy in this environmental downslide.
An Action Aid report has also warned that melting of the Kashmri
glaciers could trigger massive food security problems in the near future.
According to the report, some of the glaciers have already disappeared
as a result of which the discharge in streams has been significantly
reduced. The report which was basically a study that identified the
impact of climatic change at the micro-level mentioned that a 21 percent
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overall reduction had been found in the glacier surface area of Chenab,
a sub-basin of Indus. Of the major 327 glaciers in the Himalayas, 60
are in Kashmir and Ladakh. The report said while some of the glaciers
have vanished, the surviving ones are fast shrinking. In Sindh valley, for
instance, the Najwan Akal glacier has disappeared while the surviving
trio - Thajwas, Zojila and Naranag – have shrunk considerably. The one
feeding the Amarnath cave has been reduced by over 100 meters in a
year. Similarly the Afarwat glacier near Gulmarg does not exist though
once it happened to be 400 meters long.
The report further mentions that this phenomenon is not area specific
but exists everywhere from north to south. As per the locals, almost all
the major glaciers in south Kashmir – Hangipora, Naaginad Galgudi
and Wandernad – are shrinking. It carries no supporting data which, in
certain cases, was available with certain official agencies.
The report says that while snowfall and rainfall has reduced, the
temperatures have risen. Barring certain water bodies that are spring
fed, most of the streams are glacial-fed. Early-melting triggers massive
discharge in rivers. However, the water bodies lack the adequate
quantity once the peasantry starts tilling the fields. Further, early-melting
triggers flash-floods and the fall in water discharge impacts agricultural
production that, according to the report, is already affected by arbitrary
land use.
The report has tried to link the possibility of heat-trapping gases
in Kashmir’s “almost closed environment” with the melting of glaciers
and other indications of climatic change. Kashmir’s forest area has also
been considerably reduced from 37 percent to merely 11 percent.
Barely 20 years ago, the snow line in the Kashmir valley’s east was
just above areas like Pahalgam and Sonmarg (3200m). “Currently the
line has receded to Shiashnag area which is at an altitude of 5000m only.
Same is true of the Pirpanjal mountain range in the west where the snow
line was above Kongwatan and Zaznar (3000-3500m).”
Most of the glaciers of the Great Himalayan range, from Harmuk
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to Drungdrung including Thajiwas, Kolahoi, Machoie, Kangrez, Shafat,
have receded (4000-5000m) during the last 50 years. According to
testimonies of villagers in Choolan area located in the Shamasbari
mountain range in North Kashmir, the nearby glacier, namely Katha,
has reduced from 200 feet to 80 feet during the past 40 years. Similarly,
people living around Tangmarg and Gulmarg in North Kashmir say the
height of the Budrukot glacier in the area has been reduced from 16 feet
to only 5 feet.
The Khujwan glacier in the mountains of the Kichama area
has shrunk from 40 feet to only 20 feet. The Afarwat glacier around
Nambalnar Hajibal area, which used to be 300 feet long 40 years ago
has completely disappeared.
Fifty years ago, 8000 sq km of the Chenab basin was under glaciers.
Permanent and ephemeral snow cover would contribute huge quantities
of water during the summer to this river through numerous perennial
tributaries. Now it has only 4100 sq km of snow covered area. In the
Pirpanjal range there is hardly any remnant of glaciers. The terminal
morains at Akhal(Rajpora) in Romshi river, Dubjan in Rambiyara river
and Gurwatan in Veshuv river bear the testimony that the glaciers once
extended up to these places. If this situation continues then all rivers
flowing from Pirpanjal range will lose their perenniality and become
ephemeral.
WATER POLLUTION
Another source of concern along with receding water levels is the
increased level of pollutants. Gypsum mines operational in Uri, the last
station of River Jheulum before crossing LoC, have polluted the water
to such an extent that 30 percent of the population has been plagued
with water borne diseases including tuberculoses. Besides Gypsum the
series of toilets constructed on the banks of Naloosa stream by the Army
has added further woes.
A scientific study on the river Jhelum has found waters turning
acidic. When one moves from Verinag to Baramulla (downstream) there
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is a gradual increase of sodium, potassium, sulphates, nitrates, nitrogen
containing substances and iron. This is accompanied by a massive
depletion of essential chlorides. The river water has accumulated all the
harmful chemical compositions which are not only affecting the human
population but also the flora and fauna that exist within the two banks.
One species of fish has already vanished and the factors put forward by
the experts do not exclude the pollution crisis.
Out of Jhelum’s 997.79 Kms length, 241kms are in the Kashmir
Valley. The volume of contaminants added to it in this small length are
enormous. A crude assessment reveals that millions of tons of solid
waste, municipal garbage and sewage from human settlements flow
directly into the river. The valley lacks tanneries, however, the wastes
from brick kilns and other small scale industrial units are more hazardous
to the health of the river.
Hospital wastes are also being directly added to the river in all
the major towns. These hospitals and nursing homes are continuously
evading the installation of systems which would decompose and destroy
bio-degradable and other hazardous wastes.
Besides the main urban settlements - Anantnag, Bejbehara, Pampore,
Srinagar, Pattan, Baramulla, Sopore and Uri – the villages are also adding
a considerable amount of sewage. This excludes the pollution tapped by
17 of its tributaries which jointly drain a sprawling area of 11,353 Sq
Kms in south, north and the central Kashmir. Human excretions and
agricultural wastes are the main contribution to the water-body from
villages. Investigations have revealed that pesticides, insecticides,
weedicides and fertilizers have definitely added to the change of water
chemistry of the river.
In Srinagar, the Urban Environmental Engineering Division (UEED)
operates 52 de-watering units. 35 of them flow directly and the rest
indirectly into Jhelum. Usually these pumps run for five hours daily
and in wet seasons for 20 hours. Each of these units adds 3,000 cfts of
sewage to the river every second.
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A research scholar at the Department of Environmental Science in
the University of Kashmir had found that 525-575 cubic metres of solid
waste in a 35 kms area in Srinagar was drained into the river Jhelum. In
Anantnag town, 10MLD of liquid waste is pumped into the river .The
town generates 25 cubic meters of solid water every day of which only
18 cm is being treated by the authorities. Other major towns like Sopore
and Baramulla towns pour 20 and 10 MLDs, respectively, of waste water
into the river.
A survey conducted by the Jammu and Kashmir State Pollution
Control Board (JKPCB) found that the chemical oxygen demand
(COD) value was beyond permissible limits over the entire stretch due
to untreated sewage through various drains. The average COD value
does not even confirm the designated best-used criteria for drinking
purposes.
Another study by the Central Soil and Water Research and Training
Institute reveals that the Jammu & Kashmir state losses over 5,334
million tones of soil, annually. While 29 percent of the eroded land is
being permanently lost in the sea, 10 percent is deposited as silt in water
bodies and 61 percent is displaced. Only 34 percent of the overall soil
has negligible erosion.
DRYING WULLAR
For over 30 years India and Pakistan have been engaged in discussing
the Wullar Barrage or Tulbul Navigation project. They have, however,
ignored the basic health of the Wullar lake which is a major water bank
and vital reservoir for Pakistan.
The Wullar Lake is the main source of water to the river Jhelum
which is the lifeline for the Punjab and Sindh plains. India and Pakistan
are engaged in settling the disputes over the Wullar barrage and Tulbul
navigation lock, however, the health of the lake, despite the alarm bells
ringing from a shocking report prepared by the International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) in collaboration with TATA, has been
completely ignored.
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Wullar Lake is one of the largest fresh water lakes located at
34°16’N - 74°33’E, between the Sopore and Bandipur townships in
north Kashmir. It plays a significant role in the hydrographic system of
the Kashmir valley by acting as a huge reservoir and absorbs the high
annual floodwater of the river Jehlum. In recognition of its biological,
hydrological and socio-economic values, the lake was included in 1986
as a Wetland of National Importance under the Wetlands Programme
of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India for
intensive conservation and management purposes. Subsequently in
1990, it was designated as a Wetland of International Importance under
the Ramsar Convention.
The IWMI report says sewage disposal, weed infestation, catchment
problems, sedimentation and excessive willow plantation have badly
damaged this lake which is a life line for Pakistan’s water reservoirs.
Recommending more funds to preserve the lake, the report points out
that it yields a benefit to the tune of Rs 2.19 billion per annum. It is the
only source of water for approximately 60,000 villagers in Jammu and
Kashmir and helps in paddy cultivation in the catchment area of 83,000
hectares.
The report underlined that Jhelum, Kashmir’s main river, is bringing
dirt and refuge from adjoining towns and habitations to the entire south
and central Kashmir route spanning 140 km and dumping it into the
Wullar lake. Similarly, 12 different rivulets of north Kashmir that are
adding tonnes of organic and inorganic waste in the lake every day.
Moreover, the Indian navy’s only outpost in the form of highly
skilled Marine Commandos (Marcos), an elite Special Forces unit, is
located in this lake for counter-insurgency operations since 1995 but it
too has never bothered to clean up the lake.
Experts believe that the condition of the lake has already reached
a dangerous stage that stimulates the growth of aquatic plants resulting
in the depletion of dissolved oxygen. They say it is high time that both
India and Pakistan join their efforts and resources to conserve this crucial
water reservoir.
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While the Wetland Directory published by the Indian government
puts the lakes area at 189 sq Kms, the Survey of India maps reduce it to
58.7 sq kms. At the highest flood level of 1579 metres the lake area is
173 sq kms. Revenue records, however, show 130 sq kms as the lake
area, of which around 60 sq kms are under agricultural use. When out
of power, Union Minister for Water Resources Prof. Saifuddin Soz, who
had led a campaign to save this lake, divulged that the lake had shrunk
from its earlier area of 200 sq kms to barely 24 sq kms.
Through satellite imagery, the Jammu and Kashmir Directorate of
Environment and Remote Sensing (DEARS), found that the lake has
shrunk from 202 sq kms to 65 sq kms of which 30 sq kms are witnessing
massive vegetation and may result in eutrophication. Of the solidified
lake, 35 sq kms stand encroached by the state government alone.
CONCLUSION
The on-the-ground picture may be more horrific than what is
portrayed in this paper. The paper has also deliberately avoided taking
up environmental concerns emanating out of the increasing military
activities along the Siachen glacier. The paper primarily focused on
issues that have yet to be dealt with but can easily be a part of future
India-Pakistan diplomatic deliberations.
Terrorism may be a biggest threat devouring innocent lives in the
region, however, the environmental catastrophe affects generations and
costs more lives than any other calamity. Therefore, it is surprising that
these issues have not received much attention.
It is imperative for both India and Pakistan to evolve a mechanism
beyond the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and water sharing negotiations
to save the actual sources of water. There is greater need to set up a
cooperative mechanism to govern and protect resources across the LoC.
One cannot expect the Indian exchequer to invest on protecting resources
that do not directly benefit India. It is the Pakistani farmer who has a
vested interest in the protection of resources in Kashmir.
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SAARC’s mandate could also be expanded to include greater
cooperation on environmental issues. Monitoring committees for
resource management should be set up, and knowledge and data sharing
mechanisms should be enhanced in order to foster greater environmental
cooperation.
Security can no longer be confined to national security threats or
international relations. Environmental changes have now been listed
as security threats. Richard Ullman has defined threat as “…anything
which can degrade the quality of life of the inhabitants of a state, or
which narrows the choices available to people and organizations within
the state.” It is time, therefore, for both India and Pakistan to re-define
their strategies and attend to this issue which, if not addressed, will have
a devastating impact on the lives and wellbeing of their people.
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P. Stobdeon, IDSA papers Pakistan Raises Water Issues
Indus Water Treaty: Zardari ups the ante on Water Issues
Arvind Gupt January 30, 2009
Uttam Sinha, “India and Pakistan: Introspecting the Indus Treaty,” Strategic Analysis,
vol. 32, issue 6 November 2008, p. 963.
From Encroachments, Pollution, Constructions, Official Apathy ARIF SHAFI WAN,
Greater Kashmir
Log Jam Street
Ecological costs can deflate the GDP’s bounce
Perennial Floods in South Asia: Need for Environmental Diplomacy Avinash Godbole
Research Assistant
India would make Pakistan barren by 2014, says Jamaat Ali Shah, Daily Times
Himalayan glaciers ‘could disappear completely by 2035’, Daily Times
[editorial-Greater Kashmir- November 13, 2008]
Notification of Uttrakhand Government, May 28, 2008
A paper by Prof M.N. Kaul, 2005.
A study ‘Mountains of Concrete: Dam Building in the Himalayas,’
Action Aid report on Kashmir glaciers
Gypsum mining in Uri, Shabir Ibn Yusuf,, Kashmir Times
Shahid Ahmad Wani Research scholar in the Department of Environmental Science
University of Kashmir.
A survey conducted by the J&K State Pollution Control Board (JKPCB)
A report by Central Soil and Water Research and Training Institute
Richard Ulhmn Redefining Security
241
THE PRICE OF ‘SEA BLINDNESS’
Muhammad Azam Khan*
Pakistan’s military history is littered with sacrifices by the nation’s
valiant young officers - soldiers, sailors and airmen alike. But these
sacrifices could do little to avert the final outcome of conflicts since
at the strategic tier there was a universal lack of understanding on the
prosecution of war duly exacerbated by misconstrued concepts. One
small exchange narrated to this scribe by no less than a four star Admiral
goes to explain the level of military leadership’s discretion and insight
as it prevailed shortly before the outbreak of the 1971 war. The Admiral,
then a middle rank naval officer, had met the Commander Eastern
Command (General A.A.K. Niazi) at the height of military action in the
then East Pakistan. He asked the latter as to why should it be necessary
for the military government to resort to such brute force against a hapless
population particularly when they happen to be co-religionists. “You
don’t have an idea; there is a sea difference between your record and
mine; I have earned one of the highest grading in my ACRs and you
stand nowhere near me,” General Niazi mockingly responded. But, the
former Admiral retorted “Sir, wars are not fought by way of ACRs but
rather with Emaan (Faith).” Just months later, Pakistan faced the worst
military ignominy in its checkered history.
Pakistan inherited a maritime legacy whose foundation rested on
what could be called ‘sea blindness.’ Here was a population; a martial
race that had neither any knowledge nor penchant for maritime issues but
held an intrinsic fondness for land battles. The British established their
empire and ruled the far reaches of the world by enriching themselves
through sea commerce, protected and preserved by their navy. What
*
Muhammad Azam Khan, Commander Pakistan Navy (Retd), Pakistan Navy War
College
Essay
started as small time trading by the British traders in India in the early
17th century soon grew into a phenomenal trans-oceanic commerce.
The East India Company, seeking slow but sure concessions from the
Mughal rulers, took away choicest Indian merchandise thereby draining
the Empire. The British traders delighted in the delicate craftsmanship
and attractiveness of Indian manufactures particularly textiles and took
good advantage of their growing popularity in Britain and France.
Aurangzeb, who perhaps saw a connection between growing European
trade privileges and falling revenues in overland trade, attempted to
reduce these. No other Mughal ruler could grasp the machinations of the
East India Company, much less control its activities. The diminishing
land trade revenues eventually weakened the Mughals who were unable
to resist centrifugal forces. The empire crumbled rapidly.
The decline of the Mughal Empire and the concomitant ascendency
of the British in India is attributable to the former’s fixation with
landward concerns; developing outsized armies for land battles at the
expense of ignoring the Indian shores or the large coastline (7,500 Km)
which provided an ideal Mahanian strategic position in relation to major
trade routes. It was ‘sea blindness’ unsurpassed. The vacuum provided
outside powers maintaining strong merchant fleets and navies to exploit
the Indian riches, accrue advantage and establish a foothold in India.
The Portuguese were followed by the Dutch and finally the English
enslaved India.
Clever and crafty as they were, the British did not assemble any
valuable maritime infrastructure along India’s vast coast. Instead, they
relied on the previous set up established by the Portuguese and the
Dutch. Earlier, the Portuguese had sustained their Empire through a
combination of supremacy at the sea along with a chain of well-fortified
settlements on land. Goa, their capital, was linked with Malacca in the
Far East and Hormuz in the Persian Gulf in a strategic command of the
Indian Ocean.
The British Raj investments in industrial and technical infrastructure
in the areas that today constitute Pakistan were equally worthless. This
was done on purpose. The first aim was to expand crop production
243
Essay
particularly cotton in Indian Punjab in order to sustain the ever growing
textile industrial empire of Europe and secondly, to rear a soldierly race
that could be requisitioned to fight the imperial wars in Burma, Africa
and elsewhere.
Yet how well the British understood the strategic value of Karachi
and its adjoining Baluchistan (Makran) coast is summarized in an
unsigned memorandum of Lord Mountbatten dated 19 May 1948. ‘The
Indus valley, western Punjab and Baluchistan(the northwest) are vital to
any strategic plans for defense of (the) all important Muslim belt----the
oil supplies of the Middle East.--------Only through the open ocean port
of Karachi could the opponents of the Soviet Union take immediate and
effective countermeasures. The sea approaches to all other countries
will entail navigation in enclosed waters directly menaced by Russian
air fleets---not only of the sea lanes of approach, but also the ports of
disembarkation. If the British Commonwealth and the United States of
America are to be in a position to defend their vital interests in the
Middle East, then the best and most stable area from which to conduct
this defense is from Pakistan territory. Pakistan (is) the keystone of the
strategic arch of the wide and vulnerable waters of the Indian Ocean.’
As the partition drew near, such views had gained much currency.
Lord Mountbatten, the last British viceroy in India was a cousin of
King George VI who married, in July 1922, one of the richest heiresses
in England. Edwina Ashley was the most sought after girl in London,
admired as much for her brilliance as for her elegance. Mountbatten’s
father, Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, was a German migrant. He
held the top post in the British navy till the beginning of the First World
War, when he was asked to resign on account of his German birth. An
ambitious man, Mountbatten was commanding a destroyer, HMS Kelly,
which received a direct hit from German bombers in May 1941. The
ship capsized. Instead of serving as a curtain call, the incident further
benefitted Mountbatten in his naval career. The well connected sailor
was rewarded and sent to the United States on a lecturing tour to recount
British naval exploits against Germans and to cultivate useful contacts.
Mountbatten’s rise in ranks was purely by virtue of his links with
244
Essay
the Royal family and it was not on grounds of professional competence
that he was appointed by the British Raj to oversee the fate of their most
important colony in Asia.
Born in a state of insecurity and under the shadows of a large and
inimical neighbor that had forcibly annexed Kashmir, Hyderabad and
Goa, Pakistan’s defense concerns were but natural. The country’s post
partition geography with its two wings separated by India placed it in a
unique position. An unaccommodating Afghanistan to the west and an
ambitious USSR further complicated Pakistan’s security apprehensions.
The 1948 Kashmir war proved to be the proverbial ‘icing on the cake.’
Thus, external security concerns assumed an overwhelming precedence
for the fledgling state.
The Pakistan Navy started its journey with an assortment of just
sixteen ships and 92 commissioned officers. Even so, the service was
never short of stout hearts. Admiral H.M.S. Chouhdri who took over
command of the Pakistan Navy in January 1953 as the first Pakistani
C-in-C was a sagacious and erudite sailor. He wanted to lay the foundation
for a formidable naval force; a versatile armada that could operate both
in the North Arabian Sea as well as Bay of Bengal with much flexibility
and fearsome firepower to strike terror in the heart of the enemy on
whose flanks the Pakistan navy was to extend national maritime security
umbrella.
Admiral Chouhdri strongly believed that in order to safeguard the
national maritime interests including the 3000 mile sea route between
the two wings of Pakistan, (the only reliable and economical means of
communication for transportation of men and material both in peacetime
as well as in the event of hostilities), a strong navy was an indispensable
national need. It was also Admiral Chouhdri who stressed the urgency
of acquiring submarines by the Pakistan navy. But this dream could
only be realized in May 1963 when the U.S government leased a Tench
class submarine, USS Diablo to Pakistan, long after Admiral Chouhdri
had relinquished charge as C-in-C, Pakistan navy. On 1 June 1964, the
submarine was commissioned into Pakistan navy as PNS Ghazi.
245
Essay
Admiral Chouhdri’s dream could not be realized during his term
of office because of the doctrinal concept ‘the defense of east lies in
the west.’ Coined by the Army Chief, General Ayub, the concept ruled
out any need for keeping the sea lines open in the event of war with
India. Ayub, who as a junior officer had fought in Burma during WWII
conceptualized that since war with India would be short and fought from
within the existing stockpiles, keeping sea lines open protecting nearly
3000 miles of sea lines was not vital. It was then generally believed
that with a hard hitting and well trained standing army, Pakistan would
quickly reach Delhi and Indian resistance would collapse. A man of
pride and integrity, Admiral Chouhdri resigned in protest. The premise
on which the Admiral stepped down was to later to be proved by events
and the faulty reasoning on which Ayub’s defence concepts was based
was exposed.
Admiral Chouhdri and later Admiral Ahsan, who between them
shared sterling qualities of leadership, saw the Pakistan navy surface
as a formidable force during the 1965 war against India. As the sole
submarine PNS Ghazi stalking outside Bombay harbor effectively
pinned down a large and numerically superior Indian navy inside its
home port, the PN surface fleet pounded Dwarka that housed important
radar facilities. An effective maritime control over the Arabian Sea was
fully established by the Pakistan navy.
The awe-inspiring role of PN submarine Ghazi later led to the
expansion in the submarine fleet and a deal for the purchase of three French
Dauphines submarines was inked in February 1966. Consequently, these
submarines played a crucial role during the next Indo-Pak encounter in
1971. But for the flawed notion and all pervading national ‘sea blindness,’
a more balanced and vibrant Pakistan navy could have once again, to all
intents and purposes, effectively taken on a numerically superior Indian
navy in the Bay of Bengal. The valiant journey of PNS Ghazi ended in
tragedy off Vishakapatnam harbor on 4 December 1971.
Nearly 44 years after the Pakistan navy held uncontested command
in the North Arabian sea during the September 1965 war, the country
once again stands at the cross roads. This time absence of a sea based
246
Essay
strategic deterrence and the want of a nuclear second strike capability
compounds national security problems. Sadly, once more it was a tangled
doctrinal concept; the ‘strategic depth’ being sought in a neighboring
country, that came in the way and held back a timely development and
deployment of the most reliable arm in the nuclear triad with inbuilt
features of mobility and stealth.
Shrouded in secrecy and after denying its existence for years, ATV
(Advance Technology Vehicle), the project name of India’s locally
designed SSN (nuclear powered attack submarine), was finally officially
confirmed by the Indian navy chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, in the fall
of 2007. On 26 July this year the sluice gates of the naval dockyard at
Vishakapatnam were opened by the Indian Prime Minister to commission
the country’s first locally constructed SSN, INS Arihant. The 6,000
tonne, 124 m long ATV, a derivative of the Soviet 670 A Skat class SSN
(NATO designation Charlie I class) was under development since the
mid-1970s. Powered by a miniaturized 85 megawatt nuclear reactor the
SSN can reach a top underwater speed of 24 knots (44Km per hour) and
can be armed with a mix of torpedoes and ballistic missiles. With an
onboard crew of 95, INS Arihant will now undergo sea trials for about
two years. Upon completion of the trials, the SSN is expected to enter
service with the Indian navy in 2010 as a ‘technology demonstrator.’
The fielding of a nuclear powered submarine makes India the sixth SSN
operating country after China, France, Russia, the UK and the US.
In addition to the ATV, is yet another important Indian project
involving the lease from Russia of a Type 971 Akula II (Bars) class
nuclear powered submarine. The under-construction 12,000 tonne
submarine rechristened as INS Chakra was to be completed and leased
to India for 10 years under a $ 650 million deal signed in 2004. It was to
be inducted into the Indian navy on 15 August 2009 but was delayed by
a year following technical snags. ‘Project India’ as the classified lease
program is called, now seems to be back on track after being seemingly
caught in last year’s freeze in Indo-Russian ties over the escalating costs
of the aircraft carrier, Vikramditya (former Gorshkov) undergoing refit
in Russian yards. The 44,500 tonne ex-Russian carrier was negotiated
by India in 2004 at a cost of $ 2.5 billion and has since been subjected to
247
Essay
steady price increases because of the technical glitches usually associated
with used naval platforms.
Due to its design commonality with ATV, INS Chakra is being leased
by the Indians primarily to train crews to man ATVs. Accordingly, over
the past two years three Indian navy SSN crews of around 300 personnel
have undergone training at a dedicated facility near St Petersburg. Now
expected to be delivered by the end of this year, INS Chakra together
with INS Arihant will constitute the third strand of India’s strategic
deterrence supplementing air-delivered and mobile land-based missile
systems. In partnership with private industry, India’s Defense Research
and Development Organization (DRDO) plans to locally construct three
to five more SSN’s to expand its strategic deterrence capability.
India is also vigorously engaged in developing a strategic missile for
integrating with SSN’s weapon systems suite. Designed too by the Indian
Defense and Research Development Organization, the enigmatic two
stage missile dubbed K-15 or Sagarika (Oceanic) was successfully tested
in April 2007. The test was described as a technological breakthrough.
Rapidly ejected from the submarine’s launcher by igniting an underwater
gas booster, the missile rises nearly 5 km above the Ocean. Upon reaching
a pre-determined height, it ignites a solid booster and travels to a range
of nearly 750 km to deliver its lethal pay load.
Sea-launched nuclear missiles are at the core of second strike
capability and function as a stabilizer in nuclear strategy since it reduces
the necessity for a first strike. A single nuclear submarine can carry
at least 12 missiles with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry
Vehicles which could mean as many as 96 warheads. When one such
submarine goes out to sea, that many missiles are thus removed from the
country’s soil and cannot be targeted by the enemy.
Enunciated in 1999, India’s nuclear doctrine calls for its nuclear
forces to be effective and responsive to the requirements in accordance
with the concept of credible deterrence. The doctrine demands high
survivability against surprise attacks and a rapid punitive response.
A nuclear submarine, that can remain submerged almost indefinitely
248
Essay
can attain and sustain high speeds underwater without being detected.
It therefore meets all these criteria and offers an almost invulnerable
launch platform to India for nuclear weapons.
The launch of INS Arihant (Destroyer of Enemies) signals the nuclear
militarization of the Indian Ocean. It poses a formidable challenge
to Pakistan’s brown water navy. In the years ahead this potential will
reinforce India’s capability to blockade and choke the flow of trade from
the Gulf via the Suez Canal in the west and the Strait of Malacca in
the east. In a drawn out period of coercion, Pakistan’s predominantly
sea-based commerce and in turn its national economy could be dealt a
crippling blow. In the wake of the launch of INS Arihant, Pakistan duly
expressed concern and said that the move will jeopardize the security
paradigm of the entire region. It was further stated that India’s nuclear
submarine would have far-reaching destabilizing effects on the security
environment not only for Pakistan but also for all the littoral states of the
Indian Ocean and beyond.
Indeed, with one province now engulfed in war and another in a
state of political turmoil, spatial options for deployment of land-based
strategic weapons by Pakistan stand grossly reduced. The problems of
the Pakistan army, deployed on two axes, are further intensified given
the precarious internal security situation.
In October last year, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan navy, Vice
Admiral Asif Humayun, had declared that the Pakistan navy is fully
capable of deploying strategic weapons at sea but added that the
government is yet to take a clear decision in this context. It is now well
established that Pakistan is on track to ensure such a capability onboard
its conventional French submarines of the type Agosta 90B fitted with
AIP (Air Independent Propulsion). However, the AIP technology while
allowing enhanced submerged periods is not in any way a substitute for
a nuclear submarine’s underwater potential. In order to ensure nuclear
balance, Pakistan will have to respond to this ominous development
rapidly and in earnest.
Like the overt demonstration in May 1998, this time too Pakistan
249
Essay
would only be reactive. Sagacity, backed by a proactive strategy, could
have provided the Pakistan navy the lead time to steadily integrate and
mature the weapon systems as well as shape national nuclear doctrinal
concepts including Command and Control of sea-based strategic
weapons. Had the Pakistan navy been fielding sea-based deterrence in
the North Arabian Sea, the security complexion in the region would
not have registered such an enormous strategic tilt in favor of India.
Pakistan’s nuclear parity at sea would have effectively matched India visà-vis the security paradigm in the Indian Ocean Region. Furthermore, the
availability of such a platform at sea could have provided the Pakistan
army the much needed resilience and psychological ascendancy in
its battles on multiple fronts. But for the unceasing ‘sea blindness,’
Pakistan’s national security potential would have been far more robust.
Disclaimer
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily
of Pakistan Navy or the Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
250
The British government recently declassified Mountbatten papers. The unsigned
Memorandum is part of those papers. It is documented and titled “The Strategic and
Political Importance of Pakistan in the Event of War with the USSR”. Ref: Mountbatten
papers, Hartley Library, Southampton. See also, ‘The Shadow of the Great Game’, by
Narendra Singh Sarila, ADC to Lord Mountbatten.
Statistical data on Pakistan navy obtained from, ‘Story of the Pakistan navy, 19471972’.
For the statement of Chief of Staff, Pakistan navy, Vice Admiral Asif Humayun, refer to
daily Dawn of October 15, 2008.
Back Issues Available.
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Volume 1 Number 1
October-December 2006
The Contemporary Challenge to Global Peace and Security – S. Iftikhar Murshed
Bilateral Negotiations on Kashmir: Unlearnt Lesson – A.G. Noorani
Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad – Navid Zafar
Islamic Polity and the Constitutional Process in Pakistan – Walid Iqbal
Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan – Shamshad Ahmad
Pitfalls and Economic Prospects of Pakistan - Dr. A.R. Kemal
Education in Pakistan: Some Reflections – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad
Volume 2 Number 1
January-March 2007
My Vision for Pakistan – Shaukat Aziz
Problems and Prospects of Peace and Development in the SAARC Region: A
Perspective from Bangladesh – Mohammad Mohsin
Baluchistan: Pakistan’s Existential Dilemma – Tanvir Ahmad Khan
Search for a Viable Solution to the Jammu and Kashmir Problem – Anwar Kemal
On Economics and Civil War & Terrorism – Syed Mansoob Murshed
Emerging Monopolies in the Pakistani Media – Muzaffar Abbas
Iran’s Nuclear Programme – Challenge and Response – Javid Hussain
Volume 2 Number 2
April-June 2007
Causes of the Rebellion in Waziristan – Khalid Aziz
Globalization: Its Lures and Discontents in the Muslim World – S.M. Naseem
Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan – Dr. Tariq Rahman
The Death of Zia-ul-haq – Khalid Ahmed
Pakistan and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women – Sabrina Khan
Current Afghan Ground Realities – Rustam Shah Mohmand
Role of Media in National Development in the 21st Century – Javed Jabbar
The Kashmir Dispute: A Kashmiri Viewpoint – Abdul Hameed Karimi
Volume 2 Number 3
July-September 2007
Using Trade as a Driver of Political Stability: Prospects in Indo-Pak Context –
Moeed Yusuf
Pakistan: On or Off? Examining the Future of US-Pakistan Relations in the War on
Terror and Beyond – Farhana Ali
The Parliamentary System in South Asia – A.G. Noorani
Fundamentalism, Extremism and Islam – Dr. Anis Ahmad
OIC – Retrospect a Prospects – Tayyab Sddiqui
The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection – Khaled Ahmed
Turning on the Faucets of Thought – Anjum Niaz
Volume 2 Number 4
Political Uncertainty and Extremist Violence – Editorial
The Politics of Economic Policy Reforms – Ishrat Hussain
Kashmir Dispute: Is there a Viable Solution? – Zamir Akram
The Roots of Sectarianism in Pakistan – Khaled Ahmed
Need for a Pak-Afghan Treaty on Management of Joint Water – Khalid Aziz
Defining Moments: The Political Implication of State Policy – Shahwar Junaid
Iran, the United Stated and Regional Stability – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Some Reflections on Islam and Governance – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad
Volume 3 Number 1
January-March 2008
The Broken Pledge – Editorial
Pakistan Peoples Party and the War on Terror – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Pakistan – US Relations and the War on Terror – Zamir Akram
Balti Tandoori and Chicken Tikka Masala: Culture as National Power – Toheed
Ahmad
Militancy in the Pashtun Belt; Perspective of a Peace Jirga –Khalid Aziz
Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs – Mukhtar Ahmad
Should Islam Modernize Itself? - Dr. Khalid Zaheer
Stock Market Performance in Pakistan: A Scrutiny – Inayat A. Mangla
Musharraf’s Kashmir Policy: An Appraisal – Tayyab Siddiqui
Combating Terrorism through Film – Mushfiq Murshed
Volume 3 Number2
April-June 2008
New Government, Old Problems – Editorial
Governance Reforms in Pakistan – Ishrat Hussain
A Liberal Islam in South Asia – A.G. Norani
Muslim Radicalism, Western Concerns – Tanvir Ahmad Khan
The Bomber Under the Burqa – Farhana Ali
The Law of Aerial Bombardment and Civil Casualties: Kosovo and Afghanistan –
Prof. Hayatullah Khan
Security Alliances and Security Concerns: Pakistan and NATO – Shahwar Junaid
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Legacy and the Rebuilding of Pakistan – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Of Tongues and Languages: The Tao of Translation – Toheed Ahmad
Dimensions and Consequences of NATO Expansion to Eurasia: Reviewing Iran’s
Security Environment – Arif Kemal
Volume 3 Number 3
July-September 2008
Impeachment of President – Editorial
Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday – Criterion Team
Jinnah’s Worldview/Outlook on World Affairs – A.G. Noorani
The MQM and Identity Politics in Pakistan – Niloufer Siddiqui
Transformation of Al Qaeda – Khaled Ahmed
Patterns of Regional Cooperation: Options for Pakistan – Shahwar Junaid
Nations of Saints and Scholars: a Portrait of Ireland – Toheed Ahmad
The Status of Women in Pakistan: A Ray of Hope – Talat Farooq
FATA at the Crossroads – Ayaz Wazir
Volume 3 Number 4
Suicide Terrorism at the Islamabad Marriott – Editorial
How to Develop the Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Belts – Shahid Javed Burki
Jinnah & Muslims of India – A.G. Noorani
The Haroon Report - A.G. Noorani
Notes on Pakistan’s Trade and Industry Policy – Faizullah Khilji
Some Thoughts on Democracy – Kazi Anwarul Masud
Pakistan Muslim League: a Reality Check – Talat Farooq
Pakistan: Religion, Terrorism and Democracy – K.S. Dhillon
Volume 4 Number 1
January-March 2009
The Mumbai Attack – Editorial
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – Syed Rifaat Hussain
Jinnah & the Nizam of Hyderabad-A Tragic Liaison – A.G. Noorani
A Critical View of the Political Developments in Pakistan – Kazi Anwarul Masud
War and State Expansion: A Theoretical Framework – Talat Farooq
Drugs, Counter Narcotics & State Building in Afghanistan – Nazia Hussain
Economic Governance in Pakistan – Ishrat Husain
The Muslim World in a Bind-Whither the Ummah? – Khalid Saleem
Volume 4 Number 2
April-June 2009
Terrorism and Political Turmoil– Editorial
Jihad vs. Terrorism – A.G. Noorani
The USSR’s Last Gamble – The Why and Wherefore – Khalid Saleem
Islam and Western Modernism: Is There a Way Forward? – Talat Farooq
Mumbai Attacks and the North Arabian Sea – Muhammad Azam Khan
Education: the Perennial Questions – Mahvesh Khan
Navid Zafar – S. Iftikhar Murshed
India – Emerging Global Power – Tayyab Siddiqui
Minorities and Human Rights – Raja Tridiv Roy

Criterion Vol 4 No 4.indd

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