A Review of the Threats of an Oil Tanker Spill

SPIRIT BEARS UNDER SIEGE
A REVIEW OF THE THREATS OF AN OIL
TANKER SPILL FROM THE PROPOSED
NORTHERN GATEWAY – ENBRIDGE PROJECT
on GRIBBELL ISLAND – Mother Island of the White
Bear (Ursus americanus kermodei)
September 2012
By:
Wayne McCrory, RPBio
Report to:
Valhalla Wilderness Society
Box 329
New Denver, BC. VOG 1SO
www.savespiritbear.org; www.vws.org
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Wayne McCrory, is a registered professional wildlife biologist in the Province of British
Columbia and has been practicing for over 40 years. He began his career working for the
Canadian Wildlife Service and then became a private consultant. He has a wide range of
research and management oriented experience with governments, private industry, law firms,
film crews, First Nations, and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). He
has produced over 80 professional reports and publications, some in peer-reviewed journals.
He has been doing bear research on the BC coast since 1985 and served on the BC
government Grizzly Bear Scientific Advisory Committee for four years. He has worked on
numerous environmental impact assessments (EIAs) starting with one of the first
environmental studies on the Alberta tar sands on Sycrude Lease # 17 (Syncrude Canada
Ltd. 1973). He also worked on EIAs on the proposed Gas Arctic Pipeline, the proposed
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Highway, the Chief Mountain-Waneta, BC gas pipeline, the
proposed Moran Dam, and other projects. He is an authority on the impacts of lineal
disturbances (i.e. roads) and clearcut logging on bears and other wildlife. The findings of his
cumulative effects review of the impacts of the proposed Prosperity Mine (in the BC
interior) on the West Chilcotin Ranges grizzly bears (McCrory 2010) was accepted by the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) panel that reviewed the first mine
proposal.
COVENANT
All professional conclusions and opinions expressed throughout this report are mine alone
and are to a reasonable degree of scientific probability based on the best information
available at the time. Considerable background information on oil tanker spills as quoted in
my report was obtained on-line and also from an anonymous source and generally was not
referenced. I was careful to accurately represent the information as obtained but some could
be subject to error since I did not have time to thoroughly check out some of the relevant
source on-line materials used. The author reserves the right to supplement or amend this
report should new information or evidence become available.
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Elongated Gribbell Island (middle) sits astride the intersection of two of BC’s central coast
marine shipping lanes, the Inside Passage and Douglas Channel. This small but rugged
20,690 ha island is evolutionarily significant as over 40% of its small isolated population of
Kermode bears, a geographic race of the North American black bear, are white. The distinct
variations in the occurrence of the white bear allele between islands and the adjacent
mainland can be said to represent Canada’s Galapagos. A background cumulative effects
review (McCrory 2012) shows that island insularity, past over hunting and collection of white
hides for museums, clearcut logging, declining salmon runs, and climate change have likely
stressed the small and genetically unique bear population that eke out a living on Gribbell
Island. If the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline is approved, a major tanker oil spill poses
a major conservation threat by likely causing mortality to most if not all of this rare genetic
subpopulation on Gribbell Island, found nowhere else in the world. White bears would be
more affected than black individuals (Photo by Ian McAllister).
“One thing is for sure, black oil will not look good on a white coat.” Dr. Kermit
Ritland. 2011. The Spirit Bear: A swirl of scientific, management and ethical issues.
Branchlines. UBC Forestry. Vol. #22-3. Pp. 16-17.
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Map 1. Estimated BC distribution (red dotted line) of the geographic
race of the spirit or Kermode bear (Ursus americanus kermodei), showing
Gribbell Island.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 6 1.0 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 10 2.0 METHODS AND APPROACH USED ........................................................................................... 12 3.1 RELEVANT BACKGROUND ON THE PROPOSED ENBRIDGE NORTHERN GATEWAY PIPELINE (ENGP) PROJECT & OIL TANKER TRAFFIC ......................................................................................................................... 13 3.1.1 Background on the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) ....................................................... 13 3.1.2 The proposed Enbridge overland pipeline and central BC marine tanker route in relation to the range of distribution of BC’s white-­‐phased Kermode bear population, including Gribbell Island ................................................................................................................................. 14 3.1.3 Proposed ENGP tanker traffic routes, tanker type & volumes and double hulls in relation to Gribbell Island .............................................................................................................................. 15 3.1.4 Enbridge oil spill risk probabilities for the central BC Inside Marine Channel Ecosystem. How accurate and reliable are they? ................................................................................ 18 3.1.5 ENGP ESA (2010) oil spill scenarios and areal projections in comparison to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) ........................................................................................................................ 19 3.1.6 ENGP ESA oil spill projections on duration of marine shoreline contamination and comparison to the EVOS .................................................................................................................................. 21 3.2 DIRECT EFFECTS ON GRIBBELL ISLAND BEARS IN SHORELINE HABITATS FROM VISUAL, NOISE, AND WAKE DISTURBANCES OF TANKER TRAFFIC ....................................................................................................... 22 3.3 POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AN ENBRIDGE OIL TANKER SPILL ON THE UNIQUE SPIRIT BEAR GENETIC POPULATION OF GRIBBELL ISLAND ..................................................................................................................... 23 3.3.1 Documented effects of oil/hydrocarbons on bears .................................................................. 23 3.3.2 Analysis of the various individual impacts of a major tanker spill to the Kermode bears of Gribbell Island? ................................................................................................................................. 26 3.3.3 What will be the cumulative effects of the various impacts of a major tanker spill on Gribbell Island Kermode bears? ................................................................................................................... 28 3.3.4 Effects of an oil-­‐induced population decline on the Gribbell Island Kermode bear gene pool ................................................................................................................................................................ 30 3.4 REVIEW OF ENBRIDGE’S ESA (2010) CONCLUSIONS ON EFFECTS OF AN OIL SPILL ON COASTAL BEARS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 31 4.0 LITERATURE CITED, REVIEWED OR USED IN THE ADJUNCT MCCRORY 2012 CONSERVATION STATUS REPORT ON GRIBBELL ISLAND ...................................................... 32 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline (ENGP) will pass through a significant
portion of the putative range of the geographic race of the spirit or Kermode bear (Ursus
americanus kermodei) between Hazelton and Kitimat, BC. About one in ten Kermode bears
have a white coat, the rest are black. The proposed Enbridge tanker route from the terminal
at Kitimat to the outer sea will pass through narrow and convoluted marine passageways that
border islands of great evolutionary significance and variation of the genetic pool of the
Kermode bear.
Nowhere else on the BC coast is evolutionary biology better represented than the different
genetic occurrences of the white bear allele on these different Kermode islands and adjacent
mainland, with particular emphasis on the high number of white bears on Gribbell Island.
Genetic studies show that small Gribbell Island, some 20,690 hectares, has the highest
incidence of white versus black Kermodes of any known area on the coast, with over 40% of
its small isolated population of 100-150 Kermode bears being all-white. Conservation
biologists believe Gribbell Island to be the “mother island” of the white bear, and the
location where the gene for white-coated bears likely evolved. For these reasons, the central
coast of British Columbia archipelago through which Enbridge’s oil tankers will pass is part
of a region known as “Canada’s Galapagos.” Gribbell borders one of the main proposed
tanker routes as well as the high-risk collision area in Wright Sound.
Besides the unique Kermode bear, there are other reasons the BC central and north coast
archipelago is referred to as Canada’s Galapagos. For example, there are other genetically
distinct races of black bears in the region, such as the one that occurs on Haida Gwaii
(Queen Charlotte Islands) to the west. This distinct subspecies has no white bears. To add to
the evolutionary significance of this region, the central coast has a unique subspecies of the
grey wolf. All of this is only part of the story of the unique island biodiversity of the Great
Bear Rainforest through which will pass annually 220 large Enbridge-related tanker trips
laden with generous volumes of bitumen.
Although there are serious concerns regarding the threats to Kermode bears and their main
food resource, salmon, of a pipeline rupture or tanker spill throughout much of their known
central coast range, due to limited time and resources, it was not the intent of this report to
examine the full extent of potential environmental damage that could occur to Kermode
bear populations and their food resources where the pipeline and tankers cross their habitats,
but rather to do an environmental impact assessment (EIA) using Gribbell Island as the
focal area. Here we have the most available habitat and genetic inventory and which we
believe represents the most vulnerable and genetically unique subpopulation of the Kermode
bear subspecies.
The study approach included a partial review of the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project
(ENGP) Environmental Social Assessment (ESA) report (2010) and status reports by the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC). The scientific literature was reviewed for
effects of hydrocarbons on bears. Interviews were conducted with four northern bear
biologists familiar with oil spills and effects on bears. A status report summarizing
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cumulative effects and conservation concerns on the Kermode bears of Gribbell Island
provided the main baseline for this review of the impacts of an potential oil spill from the
Enbridge project. The status report outlined that most if not all of the Kermode bears on
Gribbell Island make important use of the marine foreshore for feeding on marine
invertebrates and other foods and for travel. Up to 10 white bears have been observed in
one day feeding and travelling in the marine intertidal shoreline of Gribbell Island, including
small cubs.
White Kermode cub feeding on barnacles
and mussels on Gribbell Island. [Photo:
Trish Boyum]
Using the best information possible, my professional review concluded that a major oil spill
from a tanker carrying Enbridge bitumen along the BC inside marine channels will have
significant, cumulative, adverse, and immitigable impacts at the individual-level, populationlevel, and genetic-make-up level of the Kermode bears of Gribbell Island. This is primarily
because of the likelihood that all of the estimated 100-150 Kermode bears on Gribbell Island
would come into direct and fairly lengthy and toxic contact with stranded oil on the seashore
during the active bear season. Kermode bears here would also ingest toxic quantities of oil
through feeding on contaminated fish, seabirds, and marine mammals killed by the spill, and
also be affected metabolically from feeding on contaminated spawning salmon and marine
invertebrates for which these bears are seasonally reliant.
Studies on Alaskan brown (grizzly) bears suggest that bears exposed to minor oil
contamination may not sustain long-term effects, but the same studies as well as several on
polar bears indicate that bears exposed to more intensive contamination would suffer
physically and physiologically for a variety of reasons, including a reduction of the thermoregulation mechanisms through loss of fur (alopecia) caused by oiling, kidney failure from
ingestion of too much oil, disturbances to red blood cell production (erythropoietic
dysfunction), and other toxicological impacts; often leading to mortality. There is every
reason to conclude that Kermode bears on Gribbell Island will suffer the same mortality
effects from extensive oil exposure as documented for Alaskan brown (grizzly) bears and for
polar bears. Younger Kermode bears that use the marine intertidal would likely be the first
to suffer serious toxic effects and mortality. An unknown effect would be bears entering
hibernation with oil-caused fur loss and oil-contaminated body tissue, but it is likely going to
cause den mortality. Many Kermode bears are thus expected to die.
Further, oil-caused reductions in marine food resources (salmon, mussels, barnacles, etc.)
will add to the impact and population stress. Such damage will likely be long term. Some 20
years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the marine ecosystem is still suffering substantial and
persistent contamination of mussel beds.
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This oil-spill-generated population stress and reduction will also be magnified by the known
vulnerability of small island populations to extinction; in this case, the isolated or semiisolated nature of 100-150 Kermode bears on Gribbell Island, combined with cumulative
effects on food resources already occurring from habitat reductions from logging and marine
over-fishing of the salmon resource. The fact that one-third of the island is non-vegetated
rock and that it lacks the normal productive estuarine marine habitats found elsewhere in
more productive Kermode islands, adds to the population stress.
In conclusion, based on all of the evidence reviewed, there is every reason to believe that
Kermode bears on Gribbell Island will cumulatively suffer high mortality and a severe
population decline from a major oil spill within perhaps 100-200 km or more of the island.
This rare and unique gene pool will also be seriously affected. Studies show that white
Kermodes eat more salmon and marine invertebrates than black Kermodes. A major oil spill
will thus have the likelihood of causing a higher rate of mortality to white Kermodes,
significantly altering the gene pool over time, as the population declines.
The net result from a Kermode bear population decline caused by a major Enbridge oil spill
on Gribbell will be to push the bears over the “extinction threshold” as identified by
Bascompte and Sole (1996), from which the population may never recover, either in
numbers or genetic make-up. And this is just one small focal area of a much larger impact
zone, not just for Kermode bears but the whole unique marine-terrestrial ecosystem on
British Columbia’s central coast.
In contrast to my findings, while acknowledging that toxic effects from an Enbridge related
oil spill scenario would occur to bears and other mammals, the Enbridge ESA (2010)
concluded that only a limited number of coastal grizzly and Kermode bears would be
affected. The Enbridge study provided no systematic analysis as evidence to support such a
conclusion for such a high risk project, with so much biologically at stake. As near as I could
determine, none of the scientific literature on the effects of hydrocarbons on bears that I
have cited was referenced in the ENGP ESA (2010). The northern bear biologists I
interviewed for my study, who are well familiar with the effects of oil contamination on
Alaskan brown (grizzly) bears and/or polar bears, said they had never been approached by
any Enbridge-commissioned scientist working on the ENGP ESA. These are glaring
technical omissions for such a high risk and high profile project. The end result of this
obvious lack of scientific rigour in the Enbridge ESA study, is, in my professional opinion,
speculative, misleading and erroneous.
The ENGP ESA is accurate in that it acknowledges that past oil spills indicate the potential
for large effects on only some aspects of the biophysical environment on the BC Central
Coast. They then claim that the 1989 EVOS lasted only a generation or more for some
organisms. To support this contention, they cite a study (Harwell and Gentile 2006) that
these effects have not damaged the structure, function, and overall health of regional
populations. There is now important new research by Landis (2007), EVOSTC (2009, 2010),
and other independent research that demonstrates this conclusion about no long-term
population effects is seriously flawed. This is not cited by the Enbridge ESA.
In my professional opinion, there are other glaring technical deficiencies and omissions in
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Enbridge’s 2010 ESA. Data from the Exxon Valdez oil spill studies suggests that the
Enbridge review underestimates the areal extent, severity, and longevity of the oiling of the
BC central coast from a spill from a large tanker spill carrying their oil. Also seriously lacking
are detailed and accurate maps of oil spill trajectory models.
It is my recommendation that the ENGP ESA (2010) conclusions on the effects of the
project on coastal bears not be accepted by the Joint Review Panel.
It is also my recommendation that the project not be approved at all by the Joint Review
Panel or any provincial, federal or First Nation governmental body. The risks are simply too
high. Again, nowhere else on the BC coast is evolutionary biology better represented that the
different genetic occurrences of the white bear allele on the different Kermode islands and
adjacent mainland, with particular emphasis on the high number of white bears on Gribbell
Island. How could the loss from an oil tanker spill of such a rare and unique bear
population, which took eons to create, ever be mitigated?
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Enbridge Corporation proposes to construct a 1,172 kilometre twinned pipeline called
“Northern Gateway” to carry bitumen from Bruderheim, Alberta, extracted from the tar
sands, to the seaport of Kitimat, BC. The bitumen, diluted with a condensate to make it
more fluid, will be shipped through a large diameter (36”) pipeline. The condensate, a
petroleum thinner very similar to white gas, will be piped to Alberta through a smaller (20”)
adjacent pipeline. The project involves the construction and operation of the Kitimat Marine
Terminal. From Kitimat, very large deep-sea tankers will take the bitumen to Asia, making
an estimated 220 trips annually. Enbridge will not own the tankers.
This project has become very controversial and has generated considerable public and
scientific debate. It is currently the subject of a federal Joint Review Panel comprised of the
National Energy Board (NEB) and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency
(CEAA). This is an independent body mandated by the Minister of the Environment and the
National Energy Board. The Panel will assess the environmental effects of the proposed
project and review the application under both the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
2012 and the National Energy Board Act. The Panel is anticipated to complete its final
report at the end of 2013.
In 2010, Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline (ENGP) submitted its environmental and
social impact assessment (ESA) to the Joint Review Panel. It devoted one concluding
paragraph to the potential effects of an oil tanker spill scenario on coastal bears on the BC
central coast. The ENGP ESA (2010) claimed a spill would only affect a limited number of
bears. As a result of 30-year involvement of the Valhalla Wilderness Society (VWS) on bear
research and conservation on the BC coast, bear biologist Wayne McCrory was
commissioned to do an independent review of the impacts of an Enbridge-related oil spill
on Kermode bears, with particular reference to Gribbell Island and as well, critique the
Enbridge ESA findings on bears and submit the report to the Joint Review Panel by August
31, 2012.
Why Gribbell Island as a focal area for an independent Environmental Impact
Review?
One of the commonly recognized limitations of any environmental impact review is the
general lack of information on cumulative or overall effects on a species assemblage and/or
ecosystem combined with the often lack of reliable baseline or background information on
population numbers and habitats of fish and animal species. To reliably estimate and
measure the environmental impact of a development such baseline information is generally
necessary but often not available whether it involves impacts after development of small,
cumulative environmental effects or a large, catastrophic event such as a major oil spill. This
baseline information prior to any development should include key data on the habitat
requirements/inventory and population numbers of sensitive biota or species at risk that
could be affected. Most often in a province as large and biologically diverse as British
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Columbia, baseline information based on reliable species habitat maps and population-level
inventory just does not exist except at a very broad-based level, and with no ground-truthing.
For this reason, conservation biologists use a small number of focal species, often keystone
in the ecosystem, to make a professional judgement on impact assessments, assuming that
the focal species selected can act as an “umbrella” to help understand impacts on the
ecosystem that could result from adverse human changes to the environment. The spirit bear
or Kermodei geographical race of the North American black bear was one of the focal species
used by scientists working with the Valhalla Wilderness Society (VWS) for their conservation
assessment of the Spirit Bear Conservancy Proposal Project, starting in 1987. This included a
review of the impacts of clearcut logging should it be allowed in this near-pristine oldgrowth ecosystem. During the initial assessment phase, VWS biologists and consultants
developed 11 inventory-level reports, some based on field level assessments. These were
used as the foundation for a proposal for a 262,000 ha Spirit Bear conservancy protected
area on the BC Central Coast (McCrory et al. 2001) that saw some 80% of the proposal
protected in 2006. In 2001 time genetic studies done out of the University of British
Columbia under the directorship of the lab of Dr. Kermit Ritland provided a scientific basis
for understanding the evolution of the gene for the white-coat colour variation of the spirit
bear and the differences of the frequency of white bears between islands and the adjacent
mainland. Gribbell Island was identified as the island with the highest proportion of white
versus black bears and thus the most important from an evolutionary point of view (Ritland
et al. 2001).
This information comprised part of a large body of biological technical data that was
submitted to and considered by First Nations and Provincial-level land use planning
processes that culminated in 2006 with approximately 1/3 of the “Great Bear Rainforest”
being protected including approximately 211,000 hectares of key spirit bear habitats in 11
different protected conservancies.
As Gribbell Island was not protected in the landmark 2006 BC coastal land-use agreements,
VWS biologists continued working on field level bear habitat mapping of the island in
cooperation with the Gitga’at (Hartley Bay) First Nation. This culminated in a cumulative
effects report (McCrory 2012) that not only looked more closely at the genetic structure of
the Kermode bear population, but examined what ecological condition this small island is in
and what are the threats. Clearcut logging, over-fishing of pink and chum salmon, (on which
the bears and other biota are highly dependent), climate change and a possible oil spill from
the proposed Enbridge pipeline tanker traffic (that would go right past Gribbell Island) were
identified as significant threats to the rare and unique spirit bear subpopulation of Gribbell
Island. Clearcut logging and commercial over-fishing of small salmon stocks have likely
already stressed out this small, insular island population of Kermode bears. The highest level
of protection is highly recommended (McCrory 2012).
Lacking the resources to do a full-fledged critique of the 2010 Enbridge Northern Gateway
Pipeline (ENGP) Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESA), VWS decided to use
Gribbell Island and the Spirit or Kermode Bear to develop our own environmental impact
assessment (EIA) statement and then compare it to the conclusions of the ENGP
ESA(2010).
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In conclusion, Gribbell was chosen as a focal EIA for the following reasons:
Ø VWS just completed a baseline cumulative effects assessment of Gribbell that
includes a habitat mapping database (McCrory, op. cit). This study showed that the
island biota and productivity had already likely been impacted by extensive clearcut
logging/roading combined with diminished salmon runs.
Ø VWS worked with Dr. Kermit Ritland to help refine the interpretation of the genetic
study on Gribbell Island (Hedrick and Ritland 2012) and extrapolate the genetic
frequencies of the white bear allele to Gribbell and other distinct Kermode subareas
to the subpopulation level. Gribbell Island was found to be the most genetically
significant of the four known central coast “Kermode” islands. About 40 % of the
semi-isolated small Kermode population of 100-150 individuals is white-phase.
Ø Gribbell Island is the smallest of the four known Kermode Islands, well representing
island biogeography including being considered by evolutionary scientists as the
likely birth place of the white bear gene.
Ø Being the smallest of the four known Kermode islands, and lacking some of the high
productivity as is found on some of the other islands in terms of salmon biomass
and estuarine habitats, with about 30% of the island surface non-vegetated rock,
Gribbell was considered to have a high vulnerability to continued man-made
disturbances.
Ø Gribbell Island is more adjacent than other Kermode islands to the narrow marine
channels that will be used by Enbridge oil related tanker traffic and adjacent to a
high-risk marine collision area identified in the ENGP ESA (2010). Although nearby
Hawkesbury Island is more in the marine traffic zone, it has a very low incidence of
the white bear allele.
Ø Use by bears of the marine intertidal has never been studied in this area of the
central coast, although telemetry and field studies of grizzly bears in the
Khutzeymateen Inlet on the BC north coast have shown these bears to make high
use of the marine intertidal in the spring (see McCrory and Paquet 2009). Gribbell
Island is the one central coast Kermode island where there are sufficient anecdotal
observations of Kermode bear use of the marine foreshore to draw a subjective
assessment of its importance.
2.0 METHODS AND APPROACH USED
The general approach was to use the conservation oriented cumulative effects report
(McCrory 2012) on the spirit bears of Gribbell Island as the baseline database to make an
environmental impact assessment (EIA) on the effects of a large oil spill on Kermode bears
and then compare the results to the conclusions of the ENGP ESA (2010) or Enbridge ESA
of an oil spill on central BC coast bears.
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A partial assessment was first made of the ENGP ESA (2010) to determine projected tanker
traffic, spill risk scenarios, areas of concern and potential impacts. This was then compared
to the 2009/2010 status reports of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC),
and other background information. No evaluation of the risk of an oil spill to bears and
other biota of the central coast inside channel ecosystem and other areas would be complete
without a review of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) as background.
A search was then made of the scientific literature to determine existing information on the
direct and indirect effects of hydrocarbons on bears and their marine food resources
(salmon, marine invertebrates, and marine mammal carcasses). Information was also
acquired from interviews with bear biologists knowledgeable about the effects of
hydrocarbon exposure to grizzly (brown) bears (Urus arctos) and polar bears (Ursus maritimus).
Four bear biologists were interviewed. This information was then extrapolated to the
existing database on the Kermode bears of Gribbell Island and an EIA assessment made on
the impact of a large tanker spill in the vicinity of Gribbell Island on the population and
genetic make-up of the Kermode bears.
Finally, the results and conclusions were compared to the Enbridge ESA (2010) concerning
the impacts of a tanker spill on central coast bears in order to test its validity and degree of
scientific rigour based on all available information.
Considerable background information on oil tanker spills as quoted in my report was
obtained on-line and also from an anonymous source and generally was not referenced. I
was careful to accurately represent the information obtained but some could be subject to
error since I did not have time to check out some of the relevant source materials. I
therefore reserve the right to make revisions to this document should that be necessary, or
add new information as it becomes available.
3.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Relevant background on the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline
(ENGP) project & oil tanker traffic
The basic pipeline proposal is outlined in the introduction
3.1.1 Background on the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS)
Exxon is just another name for Esso, and Alyeska is the name of the bitumen pipeline from
Prudhoe Bay on the north slopes to the tanker port of Valdez in the Gulf of Alaska.
I am satisfied that tanker traffic to and from Port Valdez, and operation of an oil port there will not cause
any significant damage to the marine environment or to fisheries interests. --L.R. Beyon, British
Petroleum Environmental Studies, speaking for Alyeska in 1971
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An important and instructional part of this analysis involves the EVOS and the subsequent
research done on environmental impacts on bears and other aspects.
The largest oil tanker spill in US history occurred on March 24, 1989, when the tanker Exxon
Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. Approximately 11.5
million gallons (41,600 m3), some 22% of a total volume of 53 million gallons of North
Slope crude oil carried by the tanker subsequently moved through south-western Prince
William Sound and along the western coast of the Gulf of Alaska (Map 5). The spill caused
widespread impacts to both natural resources and services in the area. Approximately 780
km of shoreline among the islands of Prince William Sound, and 1,315 km of shoreline in
the Gulf of Alaska were oiled in varying degrees (Map 5).
After the spill, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC) was formed to
oversee restoration of the injured ecosystem through the use of a $900 million civil
settlement. The Council consists of three state and three federal trustees (or their designees).
The Council is advised by members of the public and by members of the scientific
community (www.evostc.state.ak.us). Annual status reports published by the EVOSTC have
proved invaluable in helping to analyze the effects of a possible Enbridge-related oil spill on
the biota of the BC central coastal archipelago.
3.1.2 The proposed Enbridge overland pipeline and central BC marine tanker route in relation to the range
of distribution of BC’s white-phased Kermode bear population, including Gribbell Island
The proposed Northern Gateway pipeline would pass through a significant area of the
putative northeastern range of the Kermode bear subspecies. This would include the
mountainous area where the proposed route runs in a southwesterly direction from south of
Hazelton (which is in the Skeena watershed) to Kitimat. Hazelton is actually about the
eastern limit of the estimated coastal range of Kermodes. The proposed inside channel route
for oil tanker traffic from Kitimat to Hecate Strait includes known Kermode bear range as
far as the north-western side of Princess Royal Island. Haida Gwaii (Queen Charlotte
Islands) to the west involves a very different and quite unique geographic race (subspecies)
of the North American black bear.
Map 2 shows the two very approximate Kermode bear genetic centres within the putative
range of the subspecies where white-phased Kermode bears are known to be more abundant
than elsewhere. The northernmost hypothetical genetic centre, for which there is very little
genetic information, is centred around Terrace and the southernmost is focused on
Hawkesbury, Gribbell, Princess Royal and Roderick-Pooley islands and adjacent mainland
habitats, for which there is significant genetic information.
As noted previously, due to limited time and resources, it was not the intent of this report to
examine the full extent of potential damage that could occur to Kermode bear populations
and their food resources where the pipeline and tankers cross their habitats, but rather to
focus on the Gribbell Island area, which is the small arrowhead shaped island at the northern
tip of the southern genetic ecocentres on Map 2. This island is more clearly denoted on Map
15
1.
Map 2. Approximate range of Kermode bear showing putative genetic
Ecocentres (red cross-hatching). VWS Map.
3.1.3 Proposed ENGP tanker traffic routes, tanker type & volumes and double hulls in relation to
Gribbell Island
The ENGP ESA (2010) stated that the current commercial marine traffic in and out of
Kitimat is approximately 250 to 300 deep-sea vessels per year, including tankers, tugs in tow,
general cargo vessels, and bulk carriers. The Enbridge project would add between 190 and
250 deep-sea tanker trips annually, with a yearly average of 220 or 1.2 tanker transit per day
going near Gribbell Island. Of the 220 ENGP tanker shipments annually from Kitimat, 79
will be condensates and 149 bitumen. Some of these will be the largest in the world, called
Very Large Crude Containers (VLCCs) and possibly Ultra Large Crude Containers (ULCCs),
which are over one kilometre long. Although Enbridge claims the tankers will be doublehulled, one confidential source has indicated to me that the construction of these, though
“double hulled” will, in fact, be fabricated with steel that is much thinner and lighter than
16
tankers made in the 1970s. However, this needs to be verified.
Double hulls do not necessarily prevent oil spills.
According to the 2009 EVOSTC status report (2010), if the Exxon Valdez had a double-hull
structure back in 1989, the amount of the spill would have been reduced by only half. In
other words, the Exxon Valdez would still have leaked a significant amount of oil into Prince
William Sound that would have still wreaked significant damage to the marine ecosystem.
On the BC central coast, the narrow, convoluted north-south marine channel that will be
plied by tankers from Kitimat to the open sea is about 100 km long and intersects with the
well-used Inside Passage marine traffic lane on the south side of Gribbell Island in what is
known as Wright Sound. To the west of Gribbell and from the vicinity of Gil Island, Map 3
below shows the different tanker routes by which tankers will reach the open Pacific. The
northern route will pass through Unimak Pass (not on Map 3) on the outer extremity of the
Alaskan Aleutian Islands, as this is the shortest route to Asia.
Map 3. Proposed Enbridge marine tanker routes from proposed
Northern Gateway terminus at Kitimat, BC.
Map 4 shows more detailed routes (purple) in relation to Gribbell Island. At the outer end of
Douglas Channel tankers will actually use two routes around Hawkesbury Island, which is
the unlabelled island just to the west of Gribbell Island. One route will be on the west side
of Hawkesbury along Douglas Channel and the other along the narrower and more
convoluted Devastation Channel-Verney Passage. This narrower passage is bordered for
about 20 km on the east by the rocky western shoreline of Gribbell Island. However, tankers
that use the west side of Hawkesbury will still pass in open waters to the west of Gribbell
near its south end as they enter Wright Sound, which lies just south of Gribbell. Wright
17
Sound is a critical section of the proposed tanker route, since it intersects the major
northwest-southeast oriented Inside Passage shipping route. Map 4 illustrates the congested
current situation in Wright Sound, with the Inland Passage shown as blue dashed lines.
Map 4. Enbridge tanker routes (purple)
intersecting with Inside Passage marine
highway (blue). Map from Enbridge
ESA (2010).
From Wright Sound, southward tankers have two options, one passing southwest on the
west side of Gil Island. The north end of Gil is where a BC passenger ferry went off course
several years ago and sank, remaining on the sea floor today and leaking small amounts of
hydrocarbons into the sea environment. The other proposed tanker route is along the east
side of Gil through Whale Channel. On this side, tanker traffic will for about 30 km border
important Kermode habitat on the northwest mountains and marine inlets of Princess Royal
Island. Here there are two new (2006) large protected areas for spirit bears.
18
3.1.4 Enbridge oil spill risk probabilities for the central BC Inside Marine Channel Ecosystem. How
accurate and reliable are they?
The ENGP ESA (2010) provides what appears to be very speculative probabilities about
how many centuries it would take for a spill to happen on the BC central coast. Interestingly,
the ENGP ESA (2010) mentions that one of the principal factors influencing the risk of
tanker grounding is not only adverse weather but the number of manoeuvring operations
(course changes) required to navigate between open water and the Kitimat terminal.
However, they make no comparison of the number of course changes of the proposed
Kitimat-based tanker operations relative to tanker operations elsewhere. In fact, the Kitimat
tanker route would have a higher probability of grounding than the Exxon Valdez because it
has five fairly sharp turns and a much more narrow approach (or departure) for tankers at
Kitimat compared to the Exxon Valdez, which had only one shallow turn between the
loading dock, as well as a much shorter distance between the port, and the open sea.
In the high potential collision area in Wright Sound, which has several sharp turns, the
ENGP ESA (2010) states there will be two large tugboats tethered to the tankers as they
transit this region. Map 6 shows a conceptual model of this. Wright Sound is just off the
south end of the genetically important Kermode islands, Hawkesbury and Gribbell.
Map 5
I view the ENGP ESA spill predictions as wildly speculative and deliberately intended to
downplay the seriousness of the threat. In other words, such projections have a very low
degree of confidence. My own professional opinion based on a review of available
information and my direct experience of the severe weather systems in around Gribbell
Island and other areas of the BC central coast is that an Enbridge-related oil spill or multiple
spills will be inevitable within a number of decades if the project is approved and
constructed. This is due to a number of factors, including human error, the inner marine
19
channels being far longer and more difficult to navigate than those used by the Exxon Valdez
in the Gulf of Alaska, the notoriously extreme weather patterns on the BC central coast, as
well as oceanographic conditions including the twice-daily inflow and outflow tidal currents
in the region, some of them forming what locals call temporary “ocean rivers.” My opinion
is also based on the fact that similar misleading projections were made for a tanker oil spill
for the Valdez, Alaska marine traffic. Studies done two years before the EVOS predicted
there would be one spill every 241 years. The Exxon Valdez accident occurred 12 years after
the commencement of North Slope oil tanker traffic, and after almost 9,000 tanker trips had
been successfully run in and out of port. According to one source, this created a safety track
record that likely helped create a sense of complacency similar to the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico after the offshore drilling industry had been through
a similarly good run. Deepwater was the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of
the petroleum industry.
3.1.5 ENGP ESA (2010) oil spill scenarios and areal projections in comparison to the 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill (EVOS)
The ENGP ESA reviews a number of oil spill scenarios that are relevant to this review.
Projected Kitimat River oil spill
Besides modeling five marine spill scenarios, the ENGP ESA (Volume 7B) indicates there
would be potential for a 2-million litre pipeline spill into the Kitimat River above the large
estuary and admits if this occurred it would be the largest spill in Canadian history. The ESA
also admits that they would have to burn the wetlands of the Kitimat estuary to get rid of the
oil-soaked vegetation (Volume 7A). If an upstream spill of this magnitude reaches the
Kitimat estuary, it is difficult to imagine how it would also not contaminate much of
Douglas Channel, including Gribbell Island, and also reach marine shorelines beyond.
This intricate marine labyrinth has other rich estuarine habitats, some of them in provincial
protected areas, that would also be oiled in my opinion. If these are oiled, would they
have to be burned too? These estuaries are highly important specialized marine habitats
significant to bears including spring feeding and mating, spawning and rearing salmon, overwintering trumpeter swans and a host of other species (McCrory and Paquet 2009).
However, none of this is discussed in the ENGP ESA (2010).
Similar marine concerns also relate to potential ruptures of pipelines and storage tanks at
Kitimat.
Tanker spill scenarios
Of the five tanker spill scenarios reviewed by the ENGP ESA (2010) in the area of the
confined marine channels between Kitimat and Hecate Strait, the two closest to Gribbell
Island include one at Emilio Island in Douglas Channel and one at Wright Sound. It is
beyond the scope of my analysis to discuss all of the implications of each of these, except to
say a large tanker grounding or collision anywhere in the confined marine channels between
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Kitimat and Hecate Strait, and even in the adjacent open sea, has a high potential of
contaminating the marine foreshore of Gribbell Island due to its strategic geographical
location along the proposed tanker route and adjacency to the high collision area projected
for Wright Sound.
As it is, the ENGP ESA indicates that spilled hydrocarbons from a tanker accident at Emilio
Island in Douglas Channel will reach Hartley Bay (and thus Gribbell Island), while a larger
projected spill scenario in Wright Sound (just south of Gribbell) would affect 240 km of
shoreline. This assumes a tanker collision in July involving a spill of 36,000 m3, slightly less
than the lower volume estimated for the EVOS. The Wright Sound scenario assumes the
rupture of two compartments on a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) rupture and that all the
bitumen in the two compartments would eventually drain. Bitumen would be spilled over a
period of 13 hours, with most of it released immediately, and the rest more slowly over the
next 12 hours. The ENGP ESA (2010) does not appear to attempt to develop an
oceanographic model to demonstrate the overall potential 240 km “reach” of the larger
Wright Sound spill scenario. Also, no maps are provided in the ENGP report to illustrate
the oceanic movement and distribution of each of the five oil spill scenarios over time
resulting from variations in time of year and storm, wind, and tide factors. Other
discrepancies exist. For example, if the described “hypothetical” Wright Sound spill of
36,000 m3 is stated to affect 240 km of shoreline, how is it that the Exxon Valdez spill of
similar size affected areas of shoreline over 750 km from the spill site on Map 6? The initial
EVOS spill covered a stretch of coast equal to the entire California coastline. The Enbridge
spill volumes were selected on the basis of a two holding tank spill but, notably, the Exxon
Valdez lost oil from 11 tanks when it grounded.
In conclusion, given the range of variability of how far an oil spill will spread in the marine
landscape between the projected Wright Sound simulated scenario by the ENGP ESA (240
km from the spill site) and the actual measured distance of the similar-size spill from the
Exxon Valdez (750+ km of shoreline), it is easy to assume that all of the spill scenarios
itemized in the ESA (five marine and one for the pipeline along the Kitimat River) represent
very conservative and likely erroneous estimates of oil spill trajectories; all scenarios will have
a very high potential of reaching Gribbell Island and causing heavy shoreline contamination
as well as reaching much of the Central Coast archipelago, with varying degrees of
environmental impact.
For Gribbell Island, given the twice daily reversal of large tidal flows and other ocean
currents, it is safe to assume that the entire shoreline will eventually be heavily contaminated
within a short term time frame of a major tanker spill between Kitimat and the Hecate Strait.
21
Map 6. Light blue shows oiled areas 750 km from spill site. Map courtesy
of 2009 EVOSTC status report (2010).
3.1.6 ENGP ESA oil spill projections on duration of marine shoreline contamination and comparison to
the EVOS
In none of the spill scenarios presented in the 2010 ENGP ESA does the environmental
impact report ever discuss what the effect on the Pacific marine environment would be from
not just one but two or more different spill accidents in succession, especially in the case of a
second one happening before the marine ecosystems have had a chance to partially recover
from the first one.
There have been mixed, controversial, and sometimes contradictory information on the
long-term liveability of spilled oil or bitumen in northern cold-water marine environments.
The 2010 ENGP ESA claims that the EVOS lasted only a generation or more for some
organisms.
In its recent 20-year review, the EVOSTC (2010) concluded that toxic oil still persists in the
region:
One of the most stunning revelations of Trustee Council-funded monitoring over the last ten years is that
Exxon Valdez oil persists in the environment and, in places, is nearly as toxic as it was the first few weeks
after the spill.
The Trustee Council reported that cleanup efforts and natural processes only cleaned the oil
22
out of the top 2-3 inches of the marine shoreline, but did very little to reduce the large
patches of oil that seeped downward through the substrate of beaches and/or settled on the
sea bottom. Pockets of oil - an estimated 16,000 gallons - still remain buried in small
portions of the intertidal zone in Prince William Sound that was hit hardest by the spill.
Lingering oil has also been documented on the Kenai Peninsula and the Katmai coast, some
657 kilometres away. The 2009 EVOSTC (2010) estimates that lingering Exxon Valdez oil is
decreasing at a rate of only 0-4% per year and that it will take decades and possibly centuries to
disappear entirely. The EVOSTC concluded that any risk assessment for future spills must
consider what the total damages would be over a longer period of time, rather than only the
acute damages in the days and weeks following a spill.
Biologically, the potential for long-term damage remains wherever oil persists after an oil
spill. According to one source, in the case of an Enbridge spill, the adverse effects on the
marine environment will likely be more severe than those of the Exxon Valdez because,
compared to crude oil, diluted bitumen is heavier and stickier.
3.2 Direct effects on Gribbell Island bears in shoreline habitats from visual, noise,
and wake disturbances of tanker traffic
While the physical disturbance effects may be poorly understood, they are also not
adequately addressed in the ENBP ESA (2010).
Admittedly, some bears foraging along the marine foreshore will likely habituate to any noise
and visual disturbances from large ships passing by, as we have observed on Princess Royal
Island with smaller vessels such as the BC Ferries Queen of the North (before it sank on Gil
Island), other more wary bears may be displaced, and it is these effects that are an unknown.
Another serious concern is the effect of large wakes on Kermode bears foraging at the
water’s edge in the intertidal, from the passing of very large tankers, especially on days when
the ocean is relatively calm. This could have an effect on small cubs, for example. Shoreline
erosion from large wakes is another serious concern that we feel is not adequately covered
by the ENGP ESA (2010). We do know that wake-caused shore erosion, including erosion
of a burial site at Kemano, was an issue with the large Kemano Trimaran when it was
operating for Alcan between Kemano and Kitimat (Cecil Paul pers. comm.).
Put bluntly, while there are valid but unstudied concerns about the effects of the wake of
large tankers on bears using the marine intertidal, noise disturbances, mortality or injury to
bears and other wildlife as they swim the marine channels to other islands, and other effects,
these pale in comparison to what would happen to the Kermode bears of Gribbell Island if
there was a large scale oil spill that reached the area. Therefore I have only focussed on this
one aspect for now.
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3.3 Potential effects of an Enbridge oil tanker spill on the unique spirit bear genetic
population of Gribbell Island
First this report examines what we know from the scientific literature on the direct and
indirect effects of hydrocarbon exposure to bears, then projects what each of these effects
would have on Gribbell Island bears, and then combines these for an analysis of the
cumulative effects of a tanker spill with other stresses on the population. Then a review is
made of the ENGP ESA (2010) conclusions about the effects of an oil spill on central BC
coast bear populations.
3.3.1 Documented effects of oil/hydrocarbons on bears
None of the following information is used in the ENGP ESA (2010) nor were any of the
four biologists I interviewed ever approached by the authors of the Enbridge ESA.
Polar bear research
Some research has been done on the potential effects on polar bears of oil spills and oil-well
blowouts from offshore oil and gas exploration in the Canadian and American Beaufort Sea.
Spilled hydrocarbons in the Arctic Ocean environment are considered to have significant
potential for detrimental effects on marine wildlife (Derocher and Sterling 1991). The same
authors note that considerable quantities of oil regularly enter the Beaufort Sea through
ballast water and tank washing from marine vessels. They consider that polar bears can be
impacted by an oil spill in the Arctic marine environment through the direct oiling of fur,
ingestion of oil from grooming, and from bears feeding on oiled seals or sea birds.
One of their main concerns was the oiling of fur. The authors quote from other research
that polar bear fur is important for thermo-regulation. They note that previous experimental
studies have shown that hair loss and skin damage can occur in polar bears after contact with
crude oil. They report on an adult male polar bear captured near Churchill, Manitoba in
August 1984, that had a brown oil substance matted in some areas of its coat. Tests showed
the substance to be refined lubricating oil. When sighted in October, the bear had lost a
considerable amount of fur from its neck and shoulder region. The hair loss was similar to
effects found in polar bears from exposure to crude oil. When the male bear was recaptured
four years later, no permanent damage was noted. They also reported on a subadult male
polar bear that drank about four litres of hydraulic oil from a pail at Churchill. The bear was
chased away and, although its fate was not determined, the authors feel it might have died
because of the known pathological effects on polar bears from ingestion of crude oil.
The authors concluded that:
Taken together, our observations plus those in the literature suggest polar bears will not avoid petroleum
products encountered in the wild. We predict they will actively investigate oil spills, foul their fur, which will
reduce its insulating value, and risk death by ingesting oil directly through licking oiled fur to clean it or
through consumption of oiled seals or birds.
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Another important study demonstrated lethal metabolic effects from coat contamination by
oil. Hurst et al. (1991) tested the effects on three captive subadult polar bears of short-term
immersion in an artificial pool covered with crude oil. The bears had previously been
captured as “nuisance bears” in Churchill, Manitoba. After exposure, all three bears
considerably increased the amount of time they normally groomed their fur, ingesting some
oil as a result. Monitoring showed all bears suffered thermoregulatory problems. The authors
concluded that these problems could cause polar bears exposed to oil to face increased
starvation and mortality during harsh winter conditions.
The same three subadult polar bears were also tested for toxic effects of oil ingestion to their
metabolism (Oritsland et al. 1981). The results showed that oil ingested from grooming
treated fur caused erythropoietic dysfunction and renal abnormalities (Erythropoiesis is the
process by which red blood cells or erythrocytes are produced.) Renal conditions were
the most serious under the laboratory conditions. As a result, one of the subject bears died
and another was euthanized. Physiologic symptoms in these bears peaked five to six weeks
after exposure to oil. The third bear became sick but received therapy and fully recovered
five months after being exposed to the oil. According to noted polar bear biologist Ian
Stirling (pers. comm.), there have been no hydrocarbon toxicology studies on polar bears
since the 1981 testing of the three captive subadults due to the controversy the study
generated in terms of the welfare of the subject animals.
Today, Alaskan bear biologists still use the Oritsland et al. (1981) toxicology study on polar
bears as the only baseline study available to assess the effects of a pipeline oil spill on brown
(grizzly) bears, claiming it is all they have to go on and making the assumption that the
physiology of brown (grizzly) bears is similar to polar bears (Dick Shideler, Alaska Dept. of
Fish and Game, pers. comm.).
There is good reason to use the same approach with respect to the effects of oil
contamination on Kermode bears. There is also no reason to expect that Kermode bears will
avoid a shoreline contaminated with oil. I have many times observed where black bears have
been attracted to hydrocarbon in plastic containers such as chain-saw or machine oil left in
the bush; often a bear will try to chew through the plastic. In Yoho National Park, black
bears have been killed on the railroad tracks because they were lured to lick the grease at
switches (Hal Morrison, pers. comm.).
Alaskan Grizzly (brown) bears
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) in 1989, two assessments appear to have been made
on the effects of oiled intertidal areas on Alaskan grizzly (brown) bears. Both of these studies
have limited value in assessing the effects of a large and proximal oil spill on the Kermode
population on Gribbell Island since they were very far away (400-500 km) from the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. There appears to have been no research on the effects of the EVOS on black
and grizzly (brown) bears more proximal to the spill mishap (H. Reynolds, Dick Shideler,
pers. comm.).
The two distant studies involved a detailed telemetry study on Alaskan grizzlies in Katmai
National Park from 1989-1995 by Sellers and Miller (1999), and a less intensive assessment
25
for Kodiak Island (Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game 2002). The two studies do indicate that
the effects of a major oil spill on bears are mitigated by the relative distance from the spill
and the amount of oil grounded in the intertidal. By the time oil from the Exxon Valdez
reached the shores of Katmai National Park one month after the 1989 accident, the crude oil
had weathered to an oil-water emulsion called "mousse."
Nevertheless, the two Alaskan studies are interesting. On Kodiak Island, apparently no bears
were harmed directly from the distant spill, although some were displaced by crews
attempting to clean up the grounded oil on the seashore (Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game
2002). The more detailed study in Katmai National Park by Sellers and Miller (1999)
involved a 5-year telemetry study of the population dynamics of brown (grizzly) bears and
found that that there were no chronic effects of the EVOS on Katmai brown bears. In
Katmai, brown bears feed opportunistically on salmon, and intertidal invertebrates such as
clams. Dead marine mammals and birds killed by oil in the ocean were also considered a
marine food item after the spill. The researchers compared the reproduction and survival
rates of offspring from 12 collared females whose radiolocations included oiled coastline and
21 that did not include oiled marine areas. One uncertainty of their conclusions was, of the
sample number of bears whose radiolocations included stranded oil beaches, the researchers
were not sure if any of the sample bears actually came into contact with oil. None of the
bears captured and handled in 1989 and 1990 had visible evidence of external oil
contamination. However, some contact was verified as 15% of fecal material collected from
27 brown bears captured in 1989 contained hydrocarbons. Other observers also reported
some bears along the coast stained with oil.
The researchers concluded that reproductive rates and survival of young bears during the
study period were similar for both study groups of adult females, and similar to other
unhunted populations in Alaska. However, the researchers felt that oil ingestion may have
contributed to or caused the death of two unmarked yearlings. Of these, one disappeared
and the other was found dead in the marine zone. A necropsy of the latter showed levels of
naphthalene and phenanthrene concentration in the bile at 160 and 18 ppm, respectively,
suggesting that oil ingestion may have caused or at least contributed to its death. This is
interesting because it shows that even 400-500 km from the source, grounded oil can have
lethal effects on bears if too much exposure is involved. What would have been the effects if
the EVOS had happened nearby?
The researchers considered that the potential adverse effects from the beached oil on the
brown bears along the coast of Katmai National Park were mitigated by several factors.
Katmai was 500 km from the Exxon Valdez with only a fraction (<2%) of the spilled oil
reaching the study area. By the time it arrived, the crude oil had weathered over a 5-week
period into a less-toxic mousse. Then, local conditions resulted in only intermittent, relatively
light oiling on the shorelines. As well, the oil arrived on the coast in the early spring prior to
peak bear use of coastal habitats in June. Also, the level of exposure to oil deposited along
the coast may have been reduced because many bears remained at higher elevations during
May 1989, when most oiled bird and mammal carcasses would otherwise have been available
to bears for scavenging.
In conclusion, the documented death from toxic oil exposure of one yearling grizzly in
Katmai 500 km from the Exxon Valdez spill plus the mortality of captive polar bears from
26
ingesting oil by licking their coats cited in another study, certainly suggests to me that the
longer and more intense the exposure of bears to spilled hydrocarbons, the more chronic,
severe and lethal would be the consequences.
3.3.2 Analysis of the various individual impacts of a major tanker spill to the Kermode bears of Gribbell
Island
In the following discussion I look at direct effects of oil contamination (toxicology) of
Kermode bears as well as indirect effects such as diminished food resources such as salmon
and marine invertebrates.
In their discussion of a potential oil spill, the ENGP ESA (2010) report covering marine
scenarios for confined channels, such as Douglas Channel, and the open sea, concludes that
(p.12-1): “a liquid hydrocarbon spill could have lethal (acute) and sublethal (chronic) effects
both in the short- and long-term to the health of wildlife, fish and humans, and reduce
habitat quality.” The report outlines that adverse effects will include impacts on shoreline
vegetation, intertidal invertebrates, fish (e.g., herring, salmon), and semi-aquatic mammals as
part of the terrestrial biota along shorelines that would come into contact with oil. The
report also mentions (p.10-25) “terrestrial mammals such as river otters, black-tailed deer,
bears and wolves, or birds such as ravens or crows, which feed and scavenge along the
shoreline could come into contact with stranded oil.” In terms of damage to the biota, the
ENGP ESA (2010) appears to be accurate in that it reports that the Exxon Valdez spill
resulted in profound physiological effects to fish and wildlife. These included reproductive
failure, genetic damage, curved spines, lowered growth and body weights, altered feeding
habits, reduced egg volume, liver damage, eye tumours, and debilitating brain lesions. Only
10 of the 31 injured resources being monitored are considered recovered, including pink
salmon, bald eagles, and river otters. Ten more, including killer whales and sea otters, are still
listed as recovering. Some species are not recovering at all.
With respect to bears I concur with the following from the ENGP ESA (2010) regarding the
effects of an oil spill:
For terrestrial-based mammals such as grizzly and black bear, the effect mechanism is the same as for semiaquatic furbearers: contamination of fur, ingestion of hydrocarbons during preening and longer-term effects
from ingestion of contaminated food. Species such as grizzly and black bear-including Kermode bear (Ursus
americanus kermodei)-could ingest scavenged prey along contaminated shorelines;
As has been documented in our conservation report on the spirit bears of Gribbell Island
(McCrory 2012), a fairly high number of Kermode bears are known to utilize the marine
foreshore of Gribbell Island in the fall, and most likely at other times of the active bear
season, such as in spring. For example, in September 2008 or 2009, Gitga’at bear viewing
guide Marven Robinson and his colleagues counted 17 white bears in one survey that
included the two salmon creeks as well as the marine foreshore between Riorden Creek and
Cummins Point. Of these, 9-10 different white bears were using the intertidal.
The 2012 Gribbell Island report postulates that all 100-150 individuals of this isolated or
27
semi-isolated Kermode population make significant use of the marine foreshore for one life
requisite or another, whether as a travel route or for foraging for marine invertebrates and
dead animals and fish washed ashore. Some also forage on berries growing along the high
water mark of the foreshore. I also postulate that because of depleted salmon runs on
Gribbell Island, Kermode bears may be foraging more in the intertidal than they did in times
previous.
It is, therefore, easy to assume that as a top member of the animal food chain on Gribbell
Island, Kermode bears could receive high and potentially lethal inputs from direct ingestion
of petroleum hydrocarbons or bio-accumulated oil substances in contaminated food sources
following a major ENGP oil spill that oiled the shoreline of the island.
There are several pathways by which Kermode bears would be contaminated by stranded oil
when they frequent the marine foreshore.
Direct ingestion of oil through licking oiled fur
Grooming of oiled fur and paws would likely be the most common way that Kermode bears
on Gribbell would become oiled. A few bears also swim between islands or between islands
and the mainland and would become oiled that way as well.
Direct ingestion of oil through contaminated marine food resources
This would involve ingestion of contaminated (oiled) food , including dead salmon and other
fish, marine invertebrates, as well as dead oiled marine birds and mammals that wash ashore.
This is also likely to be a significant source of oil ingestion.
Ingestion of salmon and marine invertebrates that have absorbed hydrocarbons
Hydrocarbons bioaccumulated in salmon, mussels, barnacles and any other marine food
sources for Kermode bears will be another pathway they will become contaminated with oil
residues. The ENGP ESA (2010) report notes that 20 years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
the marine ecosystem is still suffering substantial and persistent contamination of mussel
beds. This biological pathway will be additive to bears ingesting oil from grooming and
eating foods already coated with oil.
Besides direct contamination, bears will also sustain incremental losses of marine food
resources that would suffer population declines due to hydrocarbon effects.
Losses of marine food resources
Section 8.7.2 of the ENGP ESA (2010) describes the potential effects of oil only on fish.
For salmon, hydrocarbons can affect all life stages. Juvenile salmon are highly susceptible to
contaminants when using and migrating in shoreline habitats, and adults are vulnerable in
the fall as they move into coastal near-shore areas for spawning. EVOS resulted in
contamination of juvenile pink salmon habitat, including approximately 31% of spawning
streams and much near-shore rearing habitat in southwest Prince William Sound (ENGP
ESA 2010).
28
Following the EVOS, there were reduced growth rates of juvenile salmon in the year of the
spill, and lower return numbers in subsequent years. Effects were greatest in the year of the
spill and decreased in subsequent years. Pink salmon eggs had elevated embryo mortality in
oil-affected streams during the fall seasons of 1989 to 1992, and in the lower intertidal zone
up to 1996, eight years after the spill. Elevated embryo mortalities were observed in intertidal
areas in 1990 through 1992, decreasing in severity over time; however, no difference in the
survival of embryo to pre-emergent fry was detected for the 1989 to 1991 brood years.
Juvenile pink salmon from oiled near-shore marine habitats had elevated levels of polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and cytochrome P4501A in 1989, compared to juveniles in
reference areas. PAH levels had reduced by 1990. As well, ingestion of whole oil was an
important route of contamination for juvenile salmon and contributed to the reduced
growth observed in oiled areas in 1989. According to the EVOSTC (2010), by 2009, 10 years
after the Exxon disaster, pink salmon runs were considered recovered. The EVOSTC study,
however, does not mention how the intervening negative impacts on pink salmon spawning
areas near the EVOS site affected local bear populations and other species.
Based on this information, we believe an oil spill will have devastating long-term effects on
the small and depleted pink, chum, and coho salmon runs on Gribbell Island, with
significant long-term negative consequences to Kermode bears, wolves, and other salmondependent species.
Besides the effects on Kermode bears on Gribbell from eating oil-contaminated marine
invertebrates (mussels, barnacles, etc.), as discussed in the previous section, this valuable
food resource will also be diminished because of mortality. For example, the ENGP ESA
(2010) predicts a high mortality of the blue mussel after an oil spill. Although the ESA does
not discuss barnacles per se, it is anticipated that a spill will also severely impact these
common and abundant intertidal invertebrates. This reduction, combined with the associated
contamination of critical marine invertebrate communities utilized in the diet of Kermode
bears as a survival food, particularly during periods of combined low salmon and berry
availability, will be another serious consequence of an Enbridge oil spill to the survivability
of Kermode bears on Gribbell Island. As noted earlier, mussels were still contaminated from
EVOS 20 years later.
3.3.3 What will be the cumulative effects of the various impacts of a major tanker spill on Gribbell Island
Kermode bears?
It should first be noted that—relative to some of the research cited in this report—the direct
effects of an oil spill on coastal Kermode and grizzly bears in the winter would not be the
same as it would be on polar bears in the Arctic. The difference is that polar bears do not
hibernate, but the bears in BC’s coastal rainforest do. Both coastal bear species enter a semihibernation state for up to six months to avoid the cold, wet coastal winters (and generally
den under the roots of or in the hollow insides of very old trees), polar bears hunt and live
throughout the extreme Arctic winters without hibernating, except under starvation
conditions. In these cases, polar bears will go into a state of semi-hibernation at any time of
the year, with a metabolic state similar to the hibernation of black and grizzly bears, and live
29
off of their stored fat (Craighead 2000).
However, overall, this factor makes little difference in terms of a major winter spill near
Gribbell since stranded hydrocarbons have been demonstrated to persist for a long time in
the marine intertidal zone. If a spill happens over the winter storm period, much of the oil
contamination on the shoreline will still be there to affect the bears when they wake up in
the spring; it would also remain there contaminating their habitats and damaging their food
sources for decades thereafter due to the long-term persistence of the grounded oil in the
marine substrate.
As identified in predictive studies of the effects of an Arctic oil spill on polar bears by the
US Fish and Wildlife Service (2011), extrapolating spill projections to a population of
animals is a complex process. The US Fish and Wildlife Service has attempted a number of
approaches in order to try to predict the effects of different-sized oil spills on polar bears
from specific offshore drill sites in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas in Alaska. For example,
based on aerial counts and telemetry data, they were able to develop probabilistic estimates
of how many wild animals dispersed over a seascape might be exposed to oil contamination
at different seasons if there were a spill in the marine environment. In order to do this they
also used oil spill trajectory models. They concluded that although the extent of impact from
a large oil spill on polar bears would depend on the size, location, and timing of spills relative
to their distribution and on the effectiveness of spill response and cleanup efforts,
population-level impacts could be expected under some situations. For example, a large spill
from a marine oil drilling platform could have significant impacts on polar bears if an
aggregation of polar bears came in contact with the oil spill. This was also based on the
assumption that any contact between polar bears and spilled oil would be lethal. Bears could
also be affected indirectly either by contamination of marine food or by chronic and lasting
effects caused by exposure to oil.
There is every reason to believe that a major oil spill within 100-200 km or more of Gribbell
Island could have a similar population-level impact on Kermode bears. Cumulative intake of
hydrocarbons and bioaccumulation in Kermode bears would result through the various
pathways discussed including:
•
•
•
•
licking oiled fur and paws after using their oiled marine foreshore habitat
eating oiled sea foods (barnacles and mussels),
eating oil-soaked dead sea birds and marine mammals, and,
eating salmon and marine invertebrates that have ingested hydrocarbons.
The previously discussed studies on Alaskan brown (grizzly) bears suggest that bears
exposed to minor oil contamination may not sustain long-term effects, but the same studies
as well as several on polar bears indicate that bears exposed to more intensive contamination
would suffer mortality for a variety of reasons, including loss of the thermo-regulation
mechanisms through loss of fur (alopecia) caused by oiling, kidney failure from ingestion of
too much oil, disturbances to red blood cell production (erythropoietic dysfunction), and
other toxicological impacts. Due to the seasonal dependency of Kermode bears on Gribbell
Island on marine foods, especially salmon in the fall, most if not all of the Kermode bears on
Gribbell Island would likely become contaminated inside and out with hydrocarbons.
30
Younger bears that use the marine intertidal would likely be the first to suffer serious toxic
effects and mortality. An unknown effect would be bears entering hibernation with oilcaused fur loss and oil-contaminated body tissue, but it is likely going to also cause den
mortality. Many Kermode bears are expected to die.
Also as noted previously, information extrapolated from the ENGP ESA (2010) and
EVOSTC (2010) indicates that a major ENGP oil spill could also reduce the abundance of
salmon and marine invertebrates that are critical food sources for Kermode bears on
Gribbell Island. Marine invertebrates include but are not limited to barnacle species and blue
mussels. Salmon is a critical food resource in the fall for Kermode bears to gain enough
body weight to survive through the long winter hibernation period. Such critical food supply
impacts would be additive to the toxic effects just discussed.
Gribbell Island Kermode bears are already believed to be under population stress. In the
adjunct conservation status report on the Kermode bears of Gribbell Island (McCrory 2012)
it was established that because of lack of productive marine estuarine habitats and declining
salmon resources from the two small spawning streams on the island, Kermode bears might
be relying more on marine invertebrates. The fact that one-third of the island is nonvegetated rock and that it lacks the normal productive estuarine marine habitats found
elsewhere in more productive Kermode islands, adds to the population stress. It was also
established that as a result of declining salmon runs, as well as other natural and man-made
limitations on food resources for the bears, the island population of Kermodes is likely
already under stress. The end result of high population stress means shifts in reproductive
fitness, immigration, emigration, and differential survivorship or mortality rates.
The conservation review concluded that the Kermode bears of Gribbell Island would be
highly vulnerable to any further man-made disruptions to their fragile, isolated homeland.
In conclusion, based on all of the evidence reviewed, there is every reason to believe that
Kermode bears on Gribbell Island will cumulatively suffer high mortality and a severe
population decline from a major oil spill within perhaps 100-200+ km or more of the island.
3.3.4 Effects of an oil-induced population decline on the Gribbell Island Kermode bear gene pool
As noted in the background conservation study of Gribbell Island (McCrory 2012), genetic
studies (Ritland et al. 2001, Hedric and Ritland 2012) revealed that this small but rugged
20,690 ha island is evolutionarily significant because over 40% of its small isolated
population of Kermode bears, a subspecies of the North American black bear, are white.
The island is believed by conservation biologists to be the mother island of the white bear
where the gene for white-coated bears evolved.
A stable isotope analysis of bears on Gribbell Island indicated that white Kermode bears
utilize salmon and marine invertebrates at a greater rate than black individuals (T. Reimchen
pers. comm.). One survey in the fall of 2008/2009 by the Gitga’at bear researchers
documented 10 white Kermodes using the marine foreshore of Gribbell Island, some of
them small cubs. Additionally, a behavioural study (Klinka and Reimchen 2009) showed that
white-coated Kermodes catch more salmon compared to black individuals due to a
31
camouflage advantage. It can therefore be expected that the effects of a major oil spill on the
marine diet of Kermode bears will have the likelihood of causing a higher rate of mortality to
white Kermodes, significantly altering the gene pool over time, as the population declines.
The net result from a Kermode bear population decline caused by a major Enbridge oil spill
on Gribbell will be to push the bears over the “extinction threshold” as identified by
Bascompte and Sole (1996), from which the population may never recover, either in
numbers or genetic make-up.
Nowhere else on the BC coast is evolutionary biology more represented than the different
genetic occurrences of the white bear allele on the different Kermode islands and adjacent
mainland, with particular emphasis on the high number of white bears on Gribbell Island.
How could such a loss, which took eons to create, ever be mitigated?
In conclusion, the risks of the Enbridge project are too high, the ecological consequences of
an oil spill would be too great. The rare and unique gene pool of the BC coastal Kermode
bear is not ours to destroy or alter.
3.4 Review of Enbridge’s ESA (2010) conclusions on effects of an oil spill on coastal
bears
The ENGP ESA is accurate in that it acknowledges that past oil spills indicate the potential
for large effects on only some aspects of the biophysical environment on the BC central
coast. They then claim that the 1989 EVOS lasted only a generation or more for some
organisms. To support this contention, they cite a study (Harwell and Gentile 2006) that
these effects have not damaged the structure, function, and overall health of regional
populations. There is now important new research by Landis (2007), EVOSTC (2009, 2010),
and other independent research that demonstrates this conclusion about no long-term
population effects is seriously flawed. This is not cited by the Enbridge ESA.
In my professional opinion, there are other glaring technical deficiencies and omissions in
Enbridge’s 2010 ESA. As I have documented previously, data from the EVOS suggests that
the Enbridge review underestimates the areal extent, severity, and longevity of the oiling of
the BC central coast from a spill from a large tanker carrying their oil. Also seriously lacking
are detailed and accurate maps of oil spill trajectory models.
Similar technical deficiencies and omissions were observed in the ENGP ESA (2010) review
of the potential effects of tanker spill scenarios on coastal grizzly and Kermode bears.
As noted previously, the ENGP ESA provides only one concluding paragraph on the
potential population-level effects of an oil spill on Kermode bears, as follows:
For terrestrial-based mammals such as grizzly and black bear, the effect mechanism is the same as for semiaquatic furbearers: contamination of fur, ingestion of hydrocarbons during preening and longer-term effects
from ingestion of contaminated food. Species such as grizzly and black bear-including Kermode bear (Ursus
32
americanus kermodei)-could ingest scavenged prey along contaminated shorelines; ingestion would, at
most, lead to mortality for a limited number of individuals. (Emphasis added).
The ENGP ESA provides no detailed evidence to support their conclusion that ingestion of
hydrocarbons by grizzlies and Kermode bears would at most lead to the death of only a
limited number of individuals. Such evidence should include a detailed review of the extent
of oil contamination on bear habitats such as Gribbell Island, detailed toxicological analysis
on the direct and indirect effect of hydrocarbon contamination on bears, bear population
data, bear genetic variations between islands, and habitat research on bear use of the marine
foreshore. As near as I could determine, none of the scientific literature on the effects of
hydrocarbons on bears that I have cited was referenced in the ENGP ESA (2010). The
northern bear biologists I interviewed for my study, who are well familiar with the effects of
oil contamination on Alaskan brown (grizzly) bears and/or polar bears, said they had never
been approached by any Enbridge commissioned scientist working on the ENGP ESA.
These are glaring technical omissions for such a high risk and high profile project. The end
result of this obvious lack of scientific rigour, is, in my professional opinion, speculative,
misleading and erroneous.
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