Front Cover

House of Commons
Culture, Media and Sport
Committee
Online safety
Sixth Report of Session 2013–14
Volume I
Volume I: Report, together with formal
minutes, oral and written evidence
Additional written evidence is contained in
Volume II, available on the Committee website
at www.parliament.uk/cmscom
Ordered by the House of Commons
13 March 2014
HC 729
Published on 19 March 2014
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£20.00
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to
examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for Culture,
Media and Sport and its associated public bodies.
Current membership
Mr John Whittingdale MP (Conservative, Maldon) (Chair)
Mr Ben Bradshaw MP (Labour, Exeter)
Angie Bray MP (Conservative, Ealing Central and Acton)
Conor Burns MP (Conservative, Bournemouth West)
Tracey Crouch MP (Conservative, Chatham and Aylesford)
Philip Davies MP (Conservative, Shipley)
Paul Farrelly MP (Labour, Newcastle-under-Lyme)
Mr John Leech MP (Liberal Democrat, Manchester, Withington)
Steve Rotheram MP (Labour, Liverpool, Walton)
Jim Sheridan MP (Labour, Paisley and Renfrewshire North)
Mr Gerry Sutcliffe MP (Labour, Bradford South)
The following members were also a member of the committee during the parliament:
David Cairns MP (Labour, Inverclyde)
Dr Thérèse Coffey MP (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)
Damian Collins MP (Conservative, Folkestone and Hythe)
Alan Keen MP (Labour Co-operative, Feltham and Heston)
Louise Mensch MP (Conservative, Corby)
Mr Adrian Sanders MP (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)
Mr Tom Watson MP (Labour, West Bromwich East)
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are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These
are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.
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Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.
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Committee staff
The current staff of the Committee are Elizabeth Flood (Clerk), Grahame Danby
(Second Clerk), Kevin Candy (Inquiry Manager), Emily Gregory (Senior Committee
Assistant), Keely Bishop (Committee Assistant) and Jessica Bridges-Palmer (Media
Officer).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Culture, Media and
Sport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone
number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6188; the Committee’s email address is
cmscom@parliament.uk
Online safety
1
Contents
Report
Page
Summary
3
1
Introduction
6
2
Child abuse images
8
Nature and scale
8
3
4
The law
Enforcem ent
Surveillance
9
10
12
Internet service providers
Internet Watch Foundation
Deterrence
14
15
16
Other material
17
Adult content
19
Nature and scale
19
The law
Enforcem ent
Age verification
20
21
24
Site blocking
Filters
Media literacy and education
26
27
31
Social media
34
Nature and scale
34
The law
Enforcem ent
Reporting
35
36
39
Advice and support
Anonymity
40
42
Formal Minutes
48
Witnesses
49
List of printed written evidence
50
List of additional written evidence
50
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament
52
Online safety
3
Summary
The internet has revolutionised communications and information sharing. It provides an
ever increasingly important platform for creativity and economic growth. Online social
media services are providing new ways of interacting and keeping in touch. Online
communications enable expressions of human behaviour both positive and negative;
sometimes downright criminal. Our inquiry has focused on three disparate aspects of
online content and behaviour, all of which are of widespread concern: illegal content,
especially images of child abuse; harmful adult content being made freely available to
children; bullying and harassment on social media.
Both the publication and possession of child abuse images are rightly illegal. While these
offences are bad enough, it must not be forgotten that such images represent crime scenes,
often of the most horrific kind. There is a clear need to ensure that the police have
adequate resources to track down and arrest online paedophiles in sufficient numbers to
act as a meaningful deterrent to others. If necessary, additional funding should be
provided to recruit and train a sufficiently large number of police officers adequate to the
task.
The Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Command, now part of the new
National Crime Agency, has a well-deserved reputation as a lead body in tackling child
abuse. It has been increasingly effective not least because it is not solely a criminal justice
organisation: its education and social care work has also been very important in increasing
public understanding of the problem of child abuse and in offering means of countering
abusers. All three elements of its mission – education, social care and criminal justice –
need to be actively pursued and publicised.
The Internet Watch Foundation, too, has played a crucial role in removing and blocking
child abuse images online. We very much welcome their new commitment to embark on
proactive searching for online child abuse images. The sooner these can be found and
removed, the better. However, we are concerned that the additional staff resources being
allocated to this task could prove woefully insufficient to achieve substantial progress
towards what must be an important intermediate goal: the eradication of child abuse
images from the open internet. Tracing paedophiles who share images on peer-to-peer
networks and the so-called hidden internet continues to challenge both the police and the
internet service providers; it is a challenge that, by working together, they must overcome.
Legal adult pornography is widely consumed. This includes explicit “hard core” material
that attracts an R18 certificate from the British Board of Film Classification. Parents and
carers clearly have a key role, not to mention interest, in preventing harmful material of
this kind becoming available to children. However, they should have access to more
information and help where and when they need it. In the off-line world, it is the
newsagent, not the parent, who voluntarily places some adult magazines on a top shelf out
of reach of children. It is the local authority, not the parent, which administers the licensing
of sex shops selling R18 pornography to which children may not be admitted. Some level of
analogous protection ought to be provided in relation to online material. At the moment,
4
Online safety
little is.
Legal adult sites could restrict access by children in a number of ways. In general a robust
age verification process should be in place; as part of this, sites could use a combination of
the following: requiring payment by a credit card linked to an adult; shielding the content
behind a warning page; attaching metadata to the website to make it easier for filters to
operate and for search engines not to return the material when operating in a safe search
mode.
Filters may not be failsafe, but they continue to improve and are an important way of
protecting children from harmful content. We very much welcome the introduction of
whole home filtering solutions that prompt account holders with a choice to apply them.
The main internet service providers should have contacted all their customers by the end
of the year to offer this valuable service. We want to see all other ISPs following suit.
Publishing adult pornography in a way that makes it readily available to children is likely to
be an offence under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. We do not believe the police
should be deterred from bringing to book publishers of adult pornography who make little
attempt to shield children from their product. While acknowledging that the enforcement
of obscenity legislation is fraught with difficulty, not least in the context of the internet, we
believe there is scope for greater enforcement in this area to provide some deterrent effect.
There may also be scope for blocking particularly harmful adult websites that make no
serious attempt to hinder access by children.
As part of its existing media literacy duties, Ofcom has an important role in monitoring
internet content and advising the public on online safety. However, we are anxious to
avoid suggesting a significant extension of formal content regulation of the internet.
Among the unintended consequences this could have would be a stifling of the free flow of
ideas that lies at the heart of internet communication. Rather, more needs to be done to
signpost the advice and educational resources available to both parents and teachers. This
is all the more pressing given the growing use of social media and its misuse by some –
both adults and children. Today, one in five 12–16 year-olds think being bullied online is
part of life.
Social media providers should offer a range of prominently displayed options for, and
routes to, reporting harmful content and communications. They should act on these
reports expeditiously, keeping the complainant and—where appropriate—the subject of
the complaints informed of outcomes and actions. Given that Facebook and Twitter are
aware of the extent to which their services are accessed by younger children, thanks to age
verification processes that are at best flimsy, we expect them to pay greater attention to
factoring this into the services provided, the content allowed and the access to both. The
same applies to other social media companies in a similar position.
Some of the worst online bullies and trolls are being brought to book in the courts. Much
of the abuse and bullying that takes place online is covered by existing laws, but these need
to be clarified with guidance updated for the online space. Young people especially are
distinguishing less and less between their lives on the internet and in the real world.
Bullying that takes place in the playground can merge seamlessly with bullying on smart
phones and tablets. Sometimes this ends with the tragedy of teenage suicide. It is just one
Online safety
reminder that staying safe off-line includes staying safe online too.
5
6
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1 Introduction
1. The internet is changing the way we communicate and modifying the way we behave. A
wealth of information and a platform for myriad interactions, it is fostering creativity and
economic growth on an unprecedented scale. Sadly, inevitably, the darker side of human
nature finds expression too: in the commissioning, distribution and viewing of illegal
images of child abuse; in adult material unshielded from children’s eyes; in threatening and
abusive messages via social media. In the belief, sometimes mistaken, that the internet
offers anonymity, trolls and bullies hound adults and children alike, often with tragic
consequences. The internet can amplify the pack mentality of the unthinking.
2. With these disparate concerns in mind, we decided to launch an inquiry into online
safety, taking care in our terms of reference to keep distinct three very separate aspects:
•
How best to protect minors from accessing adult content;
•
Filtering out (i.e. blocking and removing) extremist material, including images of child
abuse and material intended to promote terrorism or other acts of violence;
•
Preventing abusive or threatening comments on social media.
3. We took oral evidence from the following: John Carr, Secretary, Children’s Charities’
Coalition on Internet Safety; Claire Lilley, Senior Analyst, NSPCC; Anthony Smythe,
Managing Director, BeatBullying; Susie Hargreaves, Chief Executive, Internet Watch
Foundation; Peter Davies, Director, Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP)
Command, National Crime Agency; Stella Creasy MP; Nicholas Lansman, Secretary
General, Internet Services Providers’ Association; Dido Harding, Chief Executive Officer,
TalkTalk Group; Hamish Macleod, Chair, Mobile Broadband Group; Jim Gamble,
Independent Chair, City and Hackney Safeguarding Children Board; Simon Milner, Policy
Director, UK and Ireland, Facebook; Sinéad McSweeney, Director, Public Policy, EMEA,
Twitter International Company; Tony Close, Director of Content Standards, Licensing and
Enforcement, Ofcom; Claudio Pollack, Group Director, Content Consumer and External
Affairs Group, Ofcom; Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Minister of State for Policing, Criminal
Justice and Victims; Edward Vaizey MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Culture, Communications and Creative Industries; Claire Perry MP, Special Adviser to the
Prime Minister on Preventing the Commercialisation and Sexualisation of Childhood.
4. Many other organisations and individuals submitted written evidence, among them
charities representing children and young people. Nevertheless, we felt it important to
engage directly with young people themselves. We were therefore grateful to the following
charities which, together with parents, organised a visit to the House of Commons by eight
young people ranging from ages 16 to 25: Childline Services, CARE,1 Childnet
International, Porn Scars, Safermedia and Brook. The young people each gave us
compelling and, at times, harrowing accounts of the harmful experiences they had endured
as a result of online bullying and access to age-inappropriate material, particularly adult
1
Christian Action Research and Education
Online safety
7
pornography. We are very grateful to them for speaking to us and, indeed, to all who
provided evidence to our inquiry.
8
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2 Child abuse images
Nature and scale
5. Both the publication and possession of child abuse images are illegal. This is one form of
censorship that commands near universal support. Not only do such images represent
actual crime scenes, but they are likely to be used by online paedophiles to encourage and
legitimise their criminal activities. The law in the UK recognises this by proscribing a
range of images of different types, whether photographic or not.
6. Estimating the scale of child abuse images on the internet is problematical given the
secretive nature of much online activity by paedophiles. The term “child pornography”,
while still in common use, not least in legal texts, is now largely abjured by professionals
working in child protection. In no way can images of this kind by likened to consensual
activities depicted in legal adult pornography. Paedophiles ought to be denied any comfort
when seeking to affirm their practices and preferences. Accordingly, we shall use the terms
“child abuse images” or “child sexual abuse images” to refer to the material covered in this
section of our report. Claire Lilley of the NSPCC told us:
We need to educate people that these are not just images; that by looking at these
images, they are committing an offence; that a child is being re-victimised every
single time an image is looked at; and that they are potentially affecting their own
sensitivity around the issue and escalating their own ability to go down that route
and end up abusing in the physical sense themselves. There is quite a lot of research
now about the crossover between non-contact and contact offending and CEOP
would put it at about 50%. There are a couple of studies that put it at between 40%
and 55%, which is a very high level of crossover. It is not just looking at an image; it is
much more dangerous than that.2
Peter Davies of CEOP underlined this point: “anybody who possesses indecent images of
children is a criminal, but is also somebody who might present an additional risk to
children, as if that were not enough.”3
7. As the NSPCC notes, child abuse images are a visual record of the sexual abuse of a
child. They can include pseudophotographs, animations, drawings, tracings, videos and
films which are being streamed live. In the UK images are graded on a 1–5 scale. Level 5
images involve sadism or bestiality, Level 4 will portray a child engaged in penetrative
sexual activity and so on to Level 1, where the images will depict erotic posing with no
visible sexual activity.4 In 2012 the NSPCC issued FOI requests to every local police force in
England and Wales asking them to state how many child abuse images they had seized in
arrests made in the two years ending April 2012. The five police forces (none of which had
a large metropolitan base)5 that replied had seized over 26 million such images. The
2
Q 29
3
Q 34
4
Ev 70
5
Q5
Online safety
9
Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety told us that, on one calculation, that
would imply that over 300 million illegal images may have been seized by all forces over the
same period.6 Many of the images seen by the Internet Watch Foundation have been
recycled, though one or two new images—each representing a new victim—are seen
weekly.7
The law
8. Section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 makes it a criminal offence to take,
permit to be taken or to make, distribute, show, advertise or possess for distribution any
indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under the age of 18. Simple
possession by individuals is proscribed by the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The 1978 Act
defines a pseudo-photograph as “an image, whether made by computer-graphics or
otherwise howsoever, which appears to be a photograph.” Pseudophotographs were
brought within the ambit of the Act by dint of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 extended the definition of an
indecent photograph to include a tracing or other image derived from a photograph or
pseudophotograph. Part 2, Chapter 2 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 extended the
law proscribing the possession of child pornography to include non-photographic images
such as cartoons, drawings and computer-generated images.
9. Peter Davies of CEOP told us: “it is quite remarkable to me how far the criminal
legislation, for example, around indecent images of children, which was, I believe,
conceived and passed before the internet was around, has still pretty much stood up to the
new world of child abuse online, and I do not think what we need is a basic root-andbranch piece of work.”8 He added that “the UK has just about the best suite of child
protection legislation that there is, and that we are more of an example to others than we
are in need of catching up.” 9 At a recent discussion meeting of the Digital Policy Alliance,
the Deputy Director of CEOP Command, Andy Baker, referred in general terms to child
protection legislation more widely; he suggested it would be better to “tidy it up”.10 The fact
that the Communications Act 2003 was drafted with no mention of the internet also
should be addressed. We believe that the Government should, in due course, consolidate
the law around child abuse images into a single Act of Parliament with a view to
providing even greater clarity for the purposes of law enforcement and deterrence.
10. Clearly the fight against child abuse and child abuse content on the internet is an
international one. Peter Davies referred to two conventions—the Budapest Convention
and the Lanzarote Convention—which together aim to provide a legal framework for
protecting children online. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime11 and the Lanzarote
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 12
6
Ev 66
7
Qq 34-35, 40
8
Q 48
9
Q 48
10
Recent Developments in Child Internet Safety, Digital Policy Alliance Discussion Meeting, 22 January 2014
11
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG
12
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=201&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG
10
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are both Conventions of the Council of Europe. The United Kingdom is a signatory to
both, though it has ratified only the former. Last July, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) was unable to say when the Government
expected to ratify the Lanzarote Convention; he said: “Until the work to assess the practical
arrangements is complete, it will not be possible to confirm the timescales for ratification.
That work remains ongoing.”13 Given the worldwide nature of online crime, we
recommend that the Government press for wider international adoption of both the
Budapest and Lanzarote Conventions. The Government should ratify the Lanzarote
Convention as soon as practicable.
Enforcement
11. Peter Davies of CEOP referred to an assessment, published in June 2013,14 which gives
an estimate of around 50,000 people in the UK who commit child sexual abuse offences “at
least to the level of possessing indecent images of children.”15 He went on to tell us that the
highest volume of offenders are using peer-to-peer networks rather than the open internet.
“Far fewer” offenders are using the hidden internet, “also known as Tor or The Onion
Router or something similar.”16
12. The proliferation of material which is illegal in all circumstances poses a particular
threat and a range of challenges, not least to law enforcement. John Carr of the Children’s
Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety referred to the challenge posed by the scale of online
child sexual abuse: “I think it is a profound shock to realise that so many people are
interested in that type of material. There is an appetite for it and people go and get it, and
they circulate it. They are getting away with it because we do not have the capacity to stamp
it out.” 17 Peter Davies of CEOP referred to a need for “a plan that goes beyond
enforcement”.18 That is not to diminish the vital role that law enforcement must continue
to play. The former chief executive of CEOP, Jim Gamble, emphasised the need to deter
paedophiles by applying the law as it currently stands.19 Citing figures given by Peter
Davies, Jim Gamble said:
On the 50,000 Peter talks about, those are peer-to-peer sites. Those are hard-core
paedophiles who do not stumble across anything on Google. They nest in these
places on the internet where they can share secretly. You have to infiltrate that. You
have to infiltrate it. You have to identify who they are and follow them offline and
arrest them.20
13. He went on to propose the recruitment, by each police force, of up to ten special
constables to work online. Their job would be to seek out online paedophiles with the aim
13
HL Deb, 24 July 2013, col 197WA
14
http://ceop.police.uk/Documents/ceopdocs/CEOP_TACSEA2013_240613%20FINAL.pdf
15
Q 40
16
Q 43
17
Q 27
18
Q 59
19
Qq 114, 116
20
Q 114
Online safety
11
of achieving arrests in sufficient numbers to have a significant deterrent effect. 21 Mr
Gamble puts a cost of £1.4 million on setting up such a scheme which would include the
recruitment of 12 detective sergeants and 12 trainers and coordinators. 22 He told us: “If
you did that, you would have 520 people online at any given time who could manifestly
cover 10, 20, 30 or 40 chat-room environments, where you would have people out there
protecting our children. Not rogue vigilantes, but properly vetted, properly trained and
accredited and properly supervised officers online. To me, that is what we should be
thinking about so we attack the root cause, which is people.”23
14. CEOP (Child Exploitation and Online Protection) is now one of the four commands
within the National Crime Agency, which commenced on 7 October 2013. The CEOP
centre has existed since 2006 and was previously affiliated to the Serious Organised Crime
Agency. Peter Davies told us: “Our mission, whether as a centre or as a command, as we
are now, is to protect children from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. When we were
founded, there was heavy emphasis on online protection. Our remit does not limit us to
online activity, but what we try to do is to become a national hub for intelligence, a national
contact point and a source of expertise and specialist support on any aspect of child sexual
exploitation that would benefit from that approach.” Mr Davies also highlighted the
contributions being made by online child protection units in UK police forces. 24
15. In its evidence, the Home Office praised the Child Exploitation and Online Protection
Command of the National Crime Agency for both its operational work and educational
programmes. In 2012/13 CEOP received an average of 1,600 reports per month of abuse
from the public and the internet industry, a 14% increase on the previous year. “CEOP
maintains close relationships with a wide range of stakeholders from law enforcement,
industry and the educational sectors nationally and internationally.”25 In 2012/13, CEOP
protected 790 children from sexual abuse, an increase of 85% on the previous year, and its
work led to the arrest of 192 suspects.26
16. According to the Home Office, the CEOP budget “has effectively been protected in
cash terms since 2011/12” and “there are now more people working in CEOP than at any
time in its history”.27 The Home Office also states that becoming part of the NCA will
bring advantages to CEOP (such as access to greater capacity and support from other parts
of the NCA) and that all NCA officers will receive mandatory training on safeguarding
children. The Minister of State for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, Damian Green,
described becoming an arm of the National Crime Agency as a “game-changer”28 for
CEOP because of access to increased resources. Peter Davies told us that incorporation of
CEOP into the National Crime Agency was “absolutely a good thing.”29 His predecessor,
21
Q 113
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Q 45
25
Ev 105
26
CEOP Annual Review 2012-2013 & Centre Plan 2013-2014
27
Ev 105
28
Q 204
29
Q 50
12
Online safety
Jim Gamble, clearly disagrees. He described subsuming CEOP into the National Crime
Agency as “a recipe for disaster”.30 Mr Gamble added:
To take a child protection agency and put it into a national crime agency where the
brand has now been diluted, where they will continue to have protection under
Freedom of Information, which is fundamentally wrong, how can you have a child
protection entity that is not subject to Freedom of Information? You have a child
protection entity that is answerable through the NCA to one political person, the
Home Secretary. Where is the credible reassurance around that? Where are the
lessons of serious case review around professional independence and challenge? The
fact of the matter is we had planned the three pillars to be education, social care, and
criminal justice. We now have moved to one pillar, which is criminal justice. 31
17. We recommend that the Government examines whether adequate resources are
being deployed to track down online paedophiles in sufficient numbers to act as a
meaningful deterrent to others. If not, additional funding should be provided to
recruit and train a sufficiently large number of police officers adequate to the task.
18. CEOP has been increasingly effective not least because it is not solely a criminal
justice organisation: its education and social care work has also been very important in
increasing public understanding of the problem of child abuse and in offering means of
countering abusers. We therefore recommend that CEOP continues to publish an
annual review which includes an assessment of its ongoing contribution to all three
elements of its mission—education, social care and criminal justice.
Surveillance
19. Tracing paedophiles online clearly involves allowing the police to deploy a range of
surveillance methods. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 aims to provide a
legal regime for both interception of communications and access to communications data
that is consistent with human rights legislation—specifically having regard to privacy and
proportionality. Peter Davies argued for further changes to the relevant legislation:
It is my firm operational view, and I have articulated it previously, that if there is one
piece of legislation that would most help us tackle online child abuse, it would be the
provision of a clear, consistent and properly enforced regime for retaining and
accessing communications data, because we are regularly in a situation where we are
unable to convert, for example, an IP address into a name and address for lack of that
precise thing.32
20. One potential area of operational difficulty was illustrated in evidence from the End
Violence Against Women Coalition; their evidence cites CEOP as having warned that live
streaming of child abuse through Skype and other platforms is emerging as a growing
30
Q 124
31
Q 119
32
Q 48
Online safety
13
method of abusers sharing child abuse images. 33 A government briefing on proposals on
the investigation of crime in cyberspace, prepared for the Queen’s Speech in 2013, noted:
When communicating over the Internet, people are allocated an Internet Protocol
(IP) address. However, these addresses are generally shared between a number of
people. In order to know who has actually sent an email or made a Skype call, the
police need to know who used a certain IP address at a given point in time. Without
this, if a suspect used the internet to communicate instead of making a phone call, it
may not be possible for the police to identify them.34
21. A draft Communications Data Bill was announced in the Queen’s Speech in 2012 and
it was published on 14 June 2012. It was scrutinised by a Joint Committee of both Houses
of Parliament and was also considered by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR)
and the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). The draft Bill would have extended
powers to obtain communications data covering messages sent on social media, webmail,
voice calls over the internet and gaming in addition to emails and phone calls. The data
could have included the time, duration, originator and recipient of a communication and
the location of the device from which it is made. However, it would not have included the
actual content of messages. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill published its report on
11 December 2012, concluding that the Bill’s scope should be significantly narrowed, while
recognising that more needed to be done to provide law enforcement and other agencies
with access to data they cannot currently obtain. The Bill would have sat alongside the
existing Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009. 35
22. An illustration of both the capability and concerns of internet service providers was
given us by Dido Harding of TalkTalk:
I feel very strongly the weight of responsibility as an internet service provider in that
our customers place their faith in the fact that it is their data, not our data, to choose
what to do with and, therefore, we need a clear legal framework on what we store
and what we do not store.
[...]
We do not keep browsing history of where our customers browse every day of the
week— that is their data, not ours—unless or until there was a change in legislation
that required us to.
[...]
It is very important that the ISPs do not feel like it is a free-for-all to use that data.
Our customers do not expect that of us. We have been thinking through, if it is
entirely criminal, how we get to a place where we can do that proactively with
CEOP.36
33
Ev w85-w88
34
HM Government, The Queen’s Speech 2013, 8 May 2013.
35
SI 2009/859
36
Qq 93,95
14
Online safety
23. The South West Grid for Learning told us that they have been working with the
Internet Watch Foundation and South West police forces since 2006 to flag up any
attempted access to websites containing child abuse images (CAI). This pilot project has
been managed by CEOP with Home Office approval. Its objective is to flag intelligence to
police forces if anyone in a school (specifically) attempts to access a website containing
child abuse images. This intelligence prompts the police to then undertake their normal
investigation routes and has resulted in a number of school staff being identified and
removed as a direct result of what South West Grid for Learning terms a “simple alerting
process.”37 They added: “We believe we should use technology better to identify those
accessing CAI (and extremist material) and we are involved in a project with Plymouth
University and IWF to extend and refine our existing alerting capability.”38 We welcome
the increasing use of alerting tools to identify individuals who seek out child abuse and
other illegal material online provided these tools are deployed in ways that do not
unduly compromise the privacy of the law-abiding majority.
Internet service providers
24. The scope for further practical action against illegal content is better understood by
recognising the different types of providers and how they fit within the current regulatory
framework. The Internet Services Providers’ Association identifies four main categories of
internet companies:
•
Access providers—considered to be “mere conduits” under the e-commerce
regulations39 (regulation 17).
•
Hosting providers—these include social networks; while these do not have editorial
control over content uploaded by users, they may have active or passive moderating
policies. Under Regulation 19 of the e-Commerce Regulations they are not liable for the
content they host as long as they do not have actual knowledge of unlawful activity or
information. “However, upon obtaining such knowledge, hosting providers become
liable if they do not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the
information.”40
•
Websites where operators have editorial control—content might include a news article
and user-generated content like comments on the article.
•
Search engines— considered as "caches" under Regulation 18 of the e-Commerce
Regulations; search engines “act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to any
information if they are made aware of that the fact that this information may be
illegal.”41
37
Ev w49
38
Ev w49
39
The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations SI 2002/2013
40
Ev 79
41
Ev 79-80
Online safety
15
Internet Watch Foundation
25. The UK internet industry was responsible for founding the Internet Watch
Foundation, a membership organisation that serves as the UK hotline where the public can
report child sexual abuse content, criminally obscene adult content and non-photographic
images of child sexual abuse. In 2012 alone, the IWF processed 39,211 reports and assisted
with the removal of 9,696 URLs containing potentially criminal child sexual abuse content.
A URL can be as specific as a single image or could refer to an entire website containing
potentially thousands of child sexual abuse images or videos. The majority of victims (81%)
appeared to be 10 years old or younger (with 4% 2 years old or under) and 53% of the
images and videos depicted sexual activity between adults and children, including rape and
sexual torture.42
26. When child sexual abuse content is found to be hosted in the UK, the IWF will inform
CEOP. After confirmation from CEOP that action can be taken, the IWF will notify the
hosting provider who will remove the content from its servers, typically within 60 minutes
after receiving the notification from the IWF. This process is commonly referred to as
‘Notice and Takedown’. The IWF can also act against criminally obscene adult content
and non-photographic child sexual abuse content hosted in the UK. 43
27. When child sexual abuse content is found to be hosted outside the UK (accounting for
99% of known content), the IWF will inform its counterpart hotline in the hosting country
through INHOPE, the international association of hotlines, or link in directly with local
law enforcement. As other countries take significantly longer to remove child sexual abuse
content—50% of the content about which the IWF passes on details internationally is still
available after 10 days—the IWF adds the links (URLs) to the content to its URL list (or
‘blocking list’). IWF members can use this list to voluntarily block access to these URLs to
protect their customers from stumbling upon the images and videos. The Home Office
told us that such blocking arrangements apply to about 98.6% of domestic broadband
lines.44 Susie Hargreaves of the Internet Watch Foundation told us: “The most effective
way to remove content is to remove it at source. It is our view that blocking will only stop
inadvertent access and will not stop the determined.”45
28. On 18 June 2013, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Maria Miller,
hosted a summit on tackling child sexual abuse material on the internet as well as
protecting children from harmful or inappropriate content online. Participants included
internet service providers, search engines, mobile operators and social media companies.
Following the summit, the Secretary of State announced that the Internet Watch
Foundation would work with CEOP to actively seek out illegal images of child abuse on
the internet. The Internet Watch Foundation told us that, following a donation by Google
and additional funding by other members, they will be able to increase their number of
42
Ev 78
43
Ev 77
44
Ev 104
45
Q 34
16
Online safety
analysts from 4.5 (FTE46) to 11.5 (FTE) and start proactively searching for child sexual
abuse content as requested by the Government.47
29. We very much welcome the commitment by the Internet Watch Foundation to
embark on proactive searching for online child abuse images. The sooner these can be
found and removed, the better. However, we are concerned that seven additional staff
might prove woefully insufficient to achieve substantial progress towards what must be
an important intermediate goal: the eradication of child abuse images from the open
internet.
Deterrence
30. The IWF told us that, in addition to “Notice and Takedown” and the URL list, they also
compile a keyword list of terms that specifically refer to child sexual abuse content:
This list is used, for instance, by search engines to prevent people from finding
images and videos of child sexual abuse content. The keywords are very specific—or
very specific combinations of words—that carry no meaning besides the specific
reference to child sexual abuse content. This means the keywords will not prevent
access to legitimate websites such as, academic research papers into the area of child
sexual abuse or websites aimed to help or inform people in relation to child sexual
abuse.48
31. The Government has asked search engine providers to go further in restricting access
to child abuse images. According to the Home Office, they are being asked to develop
effective deterrence measures, to ensure child abuse images are not returned in search
results, and to prevent any search results being returned “when specific search terms are
used that have been identified by CEOP as being unambiguously aimed at accessing illegal
child sexual abuse images.”49 If progress is not forthcoming, the Government will consider
introducing legislation to ensure search engines comply.50
32. The IWF is also working with its members to introduce “splash pages”—these are
warning messages that appear if a user attempts to access a webpage that has been removed
for hosting illegal child abuse images. According to the IWF, “they deliver a hard-hitting
deterrence message to users seeking to access child abuse images.”51 Greater use of splash
pages and warning messages “to deter a certain class of person with a low level, opportunist
or early interest in child abuse images” is one of a number of tactics put to us by the
Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety.52 Jim Gamble reminded us that splash
screens would not result in more hard-core paedophiles being arrested: “it is a diversion of
attention and resource that does not work. We tried it.”53 The Home Office pointed out to
46
Full time equivalent
47
Ev 78
48
Ev 77
49
Ev 104
50
Ev 105
51
Ev 104
52
Ev 67
53
Ev 116
Online safety
17
us that the objective of further work by search engines and greater use of splash pages “is to
make it more difficult for unsophisticated users to find a route from open searching to
more sophisticated offending environments, make it more difficult for inquisitive nonoffenders to access indecent images of children, and make it less likely that members of the
public could inadvertently come across such images.”54
33. Search engines and other internet service providers have a vital role in ensuring that
access to online child abuse images is prevented and deterred. We expect the
Government to monitor closely their degree of commitment and success and to
consider the introduction of legislation should they fall short of reasonable
expectations.
Other material
34. Much of the evidence we took on illegal content was in relation to child abuse images.
However, in the United Kingdom at least, certain categories of extreme adult pornography
are illegal both to publish and possess. Pornographic material that explicitly and
realistically depicts a variety of non-consensual and injurious practices was outlawed (in
England and Wales) by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Similar provisions
also appear in the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, with the notable
addition of obscene pornographic images which realistically depict rape or other nonconsensual penetrative sexual activity. The Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, currently
before Parliament, would extend to England and Wales the definition of the offence of
possession of extreme pornographic images to include rape. We welcome the
Government’s decision to include pornographic depictions of rape in the definition of
extreme pornography. It has been illegal to publish such images for many years;
outlawing their possession is long overdue.
35. Evidence we received from the Home Office also considered another area within the
inquiry’s terms of reference: tackling material intended to promote terrorism or other acts
of violence online. A specialist police unit, the Counter Terrorism Referral Unit (CTIRU)
proactively seeks and takes down UK-hosted material that breaches the Terrorism Act
2006. UK law has limited application in relation to the significant amount of material
hosted overseas; such material “is filtered from parts of the public estate”55 (the
Government has prioritised schools and some libraries). The filtering can currently be
circumvented by users changing their desktop settings; the Government is considering
how they can “further restrict access to illegal terrorist material (potentially at the network
level), further aligning with the IWF’s approach.”56
36. The evidence notes inconsistencies in approach among internet companies. “Whilst
engaging with industry to ensure that their own acceptable use policies are being applied
rigorously, we are also considering the Home Affairs Select Committee recommendation
of establishing a code of conduct for internet companies, distinct from their own terms and
54
Ev 105
55
Ev 106
56
Ev 106
18
Online safety
conditions, to improve the response to terrorist material (e.g. including ‘terrorism’ as a
category under unacceptable use).”57
37. There is clearly a need to obtain wider international consensus and cooperation in
relation to combating criminally obscene adult material and terrorist material and we
urge the Government to use all the influences it can bring to bear to bring this about
within a transparent, legal framework.
57
Ev 107
Online safety
19
3 Adult content
Nature and scale
38. While child abuse images attract worldwide opprobrium, there exists less consensus—
both nationally and internationally—on what other kinds of material adults might properly
access. Tensions can, and do, arise between the proscription of obscene material and
freedom of expression. In the United Kingdom, it is perfectly legal for adults to possess
images of explicit sexual activity of a kind that attracts an R18 certificate issued by the
British Board of Film Classification. The BBFC told us that that their guidelines “are the
result of extensive public consultation with over 10,000 people across the UK being
consulted during the most recent Guidelines consultation in 2013. Research demonstrates
that the public agrees with the BBFC’s classification decisions most of the time.”58
39. The BBFC’s written evidence provides a clear reminder of the qualitative difference in
the nature and accessibility of pornographic material between the off-line and online
worlds:
The BBFC removes any material from pornographic works which is potentially
harmful or otherwise illegal. As well as policing the border between legal and illegal
pornography, the BBFC polices the border between the strongest, hardcore
pornography, and the less strong, softcore pornography. The BBFC classifies
hardcore pornography as R18, which means that it may only be supplied through
licensed sex shops, as an extra precaution against underage viewing. However, the
risk of children accessing even the strongest legal pornography is far greater online.
In addition, there are fewer effective controls on the distribution online of
pornography which the BBFC would not classify at any category.59
40. Judging from the evidence we received, pornography was the category of adult content
that caused most concern. This could be an indication of its particular prevalence on the
internet. The Authority for Television on Demand (ATVOD) told us that five of the top 50
websites most commonly accessed from the UK are “tube” websites offering unrestricted
access to hardcore pornography videos. ATVOD also cited figures which suggest that
those five sites were (collectively) visited over 214 million times by UK internet users
during January 2013.60 John Carr of the Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety
told us that “right now today within the UK, there is nothing there routinely that restricts
access to the most bizarre, the most violent and the most graphic types of pornography—
anybody can get it.”61 Pornographic material, much of it illegal, is but “two clicks of a
mouse”62 away.
58
Ev w14
59
Ev w15
60
Ev w135
61
Q7
62
Q7
20
Online safety
41. The NSPCC’s Childline service provides one indication of the harm done to young
people accessing pornography. According to the NSPCC:
During 2011–12, there were 641 counselling sessions where the young person
specifically mentioned being exposed to sexually indecent images. While these
incidents will not exclusively relate to online content, a large proportion of this
sexually explicit material will have been accessed through internet enabled devices.
Young people often told ChildLine that they felt guilty and disgusted about what
they had seen and were extremely worried about getting into trouble for accessing
these sites. ChildLine has also seen a growing trend of young people talking about
being addicted to online pornography.63
42. In January, we held a meeting at the House of Commons with eight young people,
some of whom had been harmed by exposure to adult pornography. One young man told
us how he had first encountered pornography at the age of eight; viewing pornography had
subsequently become a habit which distorted his picture of loving relationships. Another
participant told us how, as a teenager, she had been drawn accidentally into viewing
pornography from information in a fashion magazine; just one encounter had made her
feel ashamed and had affected her relationship with her father. Some girls told us how
boyfriends sometimes expected them to behave like “porn stars” and that the exchange of
sexually explicit material on mobile phones could lead to bullying.
The law
43. Online activity is subject to general offline legislation such as the Obscene Publications
Act 1959 and the Human Rights Act 1998. Publication of obscene material, including child
abuse images and extreme adult pornography, is illegal under the Obscene Publications
Act 1959 (which extends to England and Wales). An important point is that the definition
of obscene depends partly on the person who sees the material. “Legal” adult pornography
that has an R18 certificate, issued by the British Board of Film Classification, would likely
be classed as obscene if it was published in a way in which children could readily access it.
Both the Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety and the Authority for Television
on Demand (ATVOD) cited case law (in particular, R v Perrin) in support of this assertion.
The test of obscenity in section 1 of the Act leaves little room for doubt in our minds:
For the purposes of this Act an article shall be deemed to be obscene if its effect or
(where the article comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its
items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are
likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter
contained or embodied in it.64
44. The internet, where everyone with a connected computer is potentially a publisher, is
largely a free-for-all—though some audiovisual content is becoming subject to broadcaststyle regulation. The British Board of Film Classification engages extensively with the
public in reaching decisions as to what standards are acceptable. The R18 classification is
63
Ev 69
64
Section 1, Obscene Publications Act 1959
Online safety
21
given to restricted videos depicting explicit consensual sexual activity which, by definition,
excludes so-called “rape porn” and other illegal activities. R18 videos are only allowed to
be sold in licensed sex shops (to which only adults are admitted); they may not be supplied
by mail order. BBFC certification provides more than a useful yardstick as to content that
adults may legitimately choose to access:
The Government has recognised the dangers of extreme pornography and in 2008
made possession of extreme pornography an offence under the Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act. A BBFC classification is a defence against a prosecution under this
Act therefore purchasing a legally classified work is a protection against inadvertently
possessing extreme pornographic material. The BBFC regularly assists Local
Government trading standards officers in ensuring that pornographic material has
been classified by the BBFC and restricted for sale to licensed sex shops. However,
these methods of enforcement are not available online.65
45. Transposing accepted standards into the online context represents a challenge for
national institutions, not least because the internet is in many ways an international space.
Enforcement
46. Evidence from the Authority for Television on Demand (ATVOD) extensively explores
the potential use of the Obscene Publications Act. ATVOD draws attention to the current
Crown Prosecution Service guidance for prosecutors on the interpretation of the Obscene
Publications Act, which states that:
where children are likely to access material of a degree of sexual explicitness
equivalent to what is available to those aged 18 and above in a licensed sex shop, that
material may be considered to be obscene and subject to prosecution. This applies to
material which is not behind a suitable payment barrier or other accepted means of
age verification, for example, material on the front page of pornography websites and
non-commercial, user-generated material which is likely to be accessed by children
and meets the threshold. see R v Perrin, [2002] EWCA Crim 747. 66
47. ATVOD told us they could find no recent example of a prosecution being launched
under the above guidance. John Carr of the Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet
Safety told us:
That law is being honoured in the breach rather than in the observance. It is
principally because most of the publishers are based overseas and the British police
have not sought to extradite them or go after them, and that is a great pity. In our
evidence, we have made a number of practical suggestions about how we might try to
get at least companies that are based in Britain or operate from here to try to observe
that particular law. That is to say, “If you are going to publish porn, okay, that is your
65
Ev w15
66
Ev w137
22
Online safety
business, but please take concrete steps to make sure kids cannot get easy access to
it.”67
48. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Communications and
Creative Industries, Edward Vaizey said: “Obviously nothing should stop us doing the
right thing, in terms of prosecutions or clarifying the law. Nevertheless we do have to be
aware that a lot of these sites do not provide suitable identification as to who owns them,
and again ATVOD is suggesting that we clamp down on those sites by denying them their
financial support.”68 Jim Gamble did not see access to legal adult pornography primarily as
a law enforcement issue. Alluding to the “active choice” filtering solution, he told us: “I will
deal with the inappropriate material first because it is the easy one. I think inappropriate
material is a parental decision for those individuals who have duty of care of the young
people to make and I think active choice is absolutely right. If parents and others are
prompted to make a decision, I do not think you can do more than that. You are not going
to go out into their homes and look after their children for them.”69
49. ATVOD told us that they are working with the UK payments industry to design a
process which would enable payments from the UK to be prevented to foreign websites
which allow children to view hardcore pornography. However, there needed to be greater
clarity over the legality of providing unrestricted access to hardcore pornography.
50. ATVOD has an enforcement role in connection with a limited number of televisionlike services. It was designated by Ofcom in March 2010 to regulate the editorial content of
UK video on demand services. Its duties and powers derive from the EU Audiovisual
Media Services Directive, which was implemented in the UK via amendments to section
368 of the Communications Act 2003 (“the Act”). Under the Act, UK services which meet
the statutory definition of an on demand programme service (“ODPS”) must comply with
a limited number of statutory requirements which have been incorporated by ATVOD in a
set of Rules. ATVOD’s primary role in relation to protection of minors is founded in
Article 12 of the Directive, which forms ATVOD’s Rule 11: “If an on-demand programme
service contains material which might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral
development of persons under the age of eighteen, the material must be made available in a
manner which secures that such persons will not normally see or hear it.”70 ATVOD’s
evidence anticipates legislation in this area:
The DCMS strategy paper (“Connectivity, Content and Consumers”) published in
July 2013 sets out Government’s intention to legislate to make clear that R18equivalent material on ODPS must be provided only in a manner which ensures that
under 18s do not normally see or hear it. ATVOD considers that such legislation
would provide clarity for consumers and industry and better ensure deployment of
effective safeguards. Such legislation would also remove the possibility of ATVOD’s
consumer protection measures being undermined by a legal challenge.71
67
Q6
68
Q 222
69
Q 113
70
Ev w133
71
Ev w135-w136
Online safety
23
51. We believe that the existing obscenity laws already proscribe the publication of
adult material in ways that make it readily available to children. However, we are
concerned that no prosecutions have been brought despite the proliferation of
pornography sites which make no attempt to restrict access by children. We welcome
the Government’s declared intention to legislate to clarify the law in this area. However,
in the meantime, we urge the prosecuting authorities to use the existing law to crack
down on the worst offenders in order to put pressure on all suppliers of hardcore
pornography to make greater efforts to ensure that such material is accessible only by
adults.
52. A major difficulty lies in the fact that ATVOD and Ofcom can only regulate services
based in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the requirements of the Audiovisual Media
Services Directive are interpreted differently in other Member States. The Dutch regulator,
for example, takes the view that hardcore pornography does not seriously impair the
development of under 18s and such services operating from the Netherlands are not
required to ensure that under 18s cannot normally see or hear them.72 In any case, the
majority of online hardcore pornography services available to children in the UK operate
from outside the European Union (most commonly from the USA).
53. The Government should seek agreement with other European Union Member
States to ban on demand programme services that make pornography readily available
to children. We further urge the Government to engage with other international
partners, particularly the USA, with the aim of securing a similar outcome more widely.
54. Evidence from Ofcom includes a reference to a research report, ‘Protecting audiences
in a converged world’.73 This research looked at public attitudes within the context of
convergence, in order to understand the public’s expectations for protection and how
content should be regulated in the future: viewers have high expectations of content
regulation on broadcast television, and associated video on demand and catch-up services,
less so for internet content accessed through devices such as PCs and laptops. Quite how
public expectations will develop as smart TVs and other manifestations of media
convergence become more commonplace remains to be seen.
55. An independent parliamentary inquiry into online child protection (April 2012),
chaired by Claire Perry, suggested that the Government should consider a new regulatory
structure for online content, with one regulator given a lead role in the oversight and
monitoring of internet content and in improving the dissemination of existing internet
safety education materials. Ofcom already has a role in relation to internet services, though
this is largely confined to promoting media literacy and performing research. Ofcom told
us: “We regulate television channels delivered over the internet and notified ODPS when
they are established in the UK; but we have no statutory powers to regulate any other
online content.”74 We believe that, as part of its existing media literacy duties, Ofcom
has an important role in monitoring internet content and advising the public on online
safety. However, we are anxious to avoid suggesting a significant extension of formal
72
Ev w134
73
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/tv-research/946687/Protecting-audiences.pdf
74
Ev 95
24
Online safety
content regulation of the internet. Among the unintended consequences this could
have would be a stifling of the free flow of ideas that lies at the heart of internet
communication.
Age verification
56. Providers of adult content can prevent children from accessing inappropriate and
harmful material by putting in place systems that require evidence of age. In this regard,
the mobile network operators have stolen a march over the internet service providers. A
majority of children have a mobile and an increasing proportion of them go online using a
mobile phone or smart phone. The mobile operators’ work in online safety is underpinned
by a Code of Practice that was first published in January 2004, ‘The UK code of practice for
the self-regulation of new forms of content on mobile’. The second edition of the code was
published in 2009 and the third (and current) edition in July 2013. The Code was the first
of its kind and was used as the boiler plate for similar codes introduced by mobile
operators throughout the EU.75
57. The Code covers a broad range of topics: commercial and internet content, illegal
content, malicious communications, spam communications and customer education. A
distinction is made between commercial and internet content. The Mobile Broadband
Group told us: “The mobile operators’ respective responsibilities for commercial content—
where they have contractual agreements in place with content providers—as against
general content on the Internet are different.”76 Any commercial content with an 18 rating
(determined by the British Board of Film Classification) is placed behind access controls
and subject to “a robust age verification process”77 (acceptable methods of which are set
out in the Code).
58. Age verification is clearly more challenging when accessing content does not involve a
direct financial transaction and where the users have an expectation of some degree of
anonymity. There is a stark contrast between the requirements on the online gambling
industry and those on other providers of online services to adults. As the Remote
Gambling Association highlighted:
The Gambling Act 2005 allowed for a wider range of advertising of gambling
products in Great Britain. To be able to advertise a gambling operator has to hold an
operating licence issued by the Gambling Commission, or an equivalent licence
issued by an EU gambling regulator or an overseas regulator which issues licences
with equivalent standards to the UK regulator. These licences require that before bets
can be settled the customer is over 18 and has had his or her identity verified.
As far as we are aware, no other adult service providers are required by law to ensure
that their customers are over the age of 18. This puts the regulated online gambling
industry in a different position to other e-commerce sectors. Because there are
75
Ev 86
76
Ev 86
77
Ev 86
Online safety
25
mandatory safeguards in place, but especially where children are concerned we
believe that the principles at least should be applied equally.78
59. Online gambling of necessity involves a financial transaction which makes age
verification relatively easy. There are, however, difficulties in relation to the use of other
services or consumption of content which do not necessarily involve direct payment.
British Naturism told us: “Age verification is used, for example, by gambling websites
where the possession of a valid credit card forms both the financial security and implicit
verification of the person’s right to gamble. But in the general case of free access to
unsuitable websites, it is unclear to us what mechanism could be devised that verifies the
age of the individual who has made initial access, but does not block the unverifiable access
by, say, another family member or friend to whom control of the device is passed.”79
60. The Christian social policy charity, CARE, acknowledged that many adult websites
require robust age verification to access 18+ content. “However there are many more
websites that provide such content for free without robust age verification. Moreover, the
business model of these websites can be driven by their click through rate as it relates to
advertising. This means that the more clicks a website receives, the more money they make,
disincentivising the owners of these websites from applying age verification.”80 The
Authority for Television on Demand (ATVOD) provided us with further details on the
business models of hardcore pornography services, most of which are operated from
overseas: “The most frequently accessed services use a variation on the You Tube business
model (and are consequently commonly referred to as “tube sites”). Such tube sites offer
significant quantities of unrestricted free hardcore porn videos as a shop window in order
to attract large number of viewers whose visits are monetised in a number of ways: by upselling to a premium version of the free service (offering a wider choice, longer videos,
better picture quality, etc); by driving traffic to other paid (pornographic) services operated
by the provider of the tube site; by charging on a ‘click through’ basis to affiliates whose
content is featured on a ‘try before you buy’ basis on the tube site; and by selling advertising
space (eg for ‘contact’ services or penis enlargement treatments).”81
61. Among the measures recommended by CARE is financial transaction blocking of adult
websites that do not put in place “robust” age verification procedures. ATVOD provided
us with the following examples of suitable age verification methods:
78
•
Confirmation of credit card ownership or other form of payment where mandatory
proof that the holder is 18 or over is required prior to issue.
•
A reputable personal digital identity management service which uses checks on an
independent and reliable database, such as the electoral roll.
•
Other comparable proof of account ownership which effectively verifies age82
Ev w7
79
Ev w120
80
Ev w129
81
Ev w134
82
Ev w133
26
Online safety
62. The Mobile Broadband Group argues that providers of age restricted services should
themselves be putting in place their own processes to protect minors. We agree. Providers
of adult content on the internet should take all reasonable steps to prevent children
under 18 from accessing inappropriate and harmful content. Such systems may
include, but will not necessarily be restricted to, processes to verify the age of users.
63. The Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety suggested to us that more could
be done in relation to age verification. Their written evidence includes a suggestion that
refers to case law supporting the view that publishing adult material in ways that makes it
accessible by children is in breach of obscenity legislation: “Nominet should make
compliance with R v Perrin a condition of operating a .uk domain name e.g. if a site is to
publish pornography the operator must give a binding undertaking to put an effective age
verification process in place”.83 Nominet describes itself as “the trusted guardian of the .uk
domain name space, Nominet is responsible for the stability and security of one of the
largest internet registries in the world, with more than 10 million registered domain
names.”84 We have no reason to suppose that Nominet has either the resources or
inclination to police the internet. Age verification, while ideal, is not the only way of
preventing children from accessing unsuitable content. However, we believe that no
.uk site should offer unimpeded access to adult pornography to children. This should
be made a condition of registration.
Site blocking
64. The site blocking approach enabled by the Internet Watch Foundation, with the
necessary cooperation of ISPs, is one instrument—albeit a blunt one—aimed at preventing
access (by anyone) to online material. It has so far been applied mainly to images of child
abuse. Extending this approach to other material, including some adult sites, would face
challenges both of scale and cost. BCS 85, the Chartered Institute for IT, told us:
There has been much resistance to the Internet Watch Foundation’s widening its
remit to the other material in the Select Committee’s question, and BCS does not
believe that this is the way forward.
Some people say that more should be done, and imply, without saying so, that
content-based filtering should be used, so that more such material could be blocked.
This would require a major change in society’s attitude to censorship, as well as
primary legislation to enact fundamental changes to the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act. BCS does not believe that this is either feasible or desirable. 86
65. BT, a major ISP, has also expressed concerns:
In the absence of clear primary legislation from Parliament, or an EU-wide legislative
instrument, BT does not wish to police the internet beyond preventing access to
illegal material. To do so would set an unfortunate precedent in which an ISP would
83
Ev 65-66
84
www.nominet.org.uk/uk-domain-names
85
Formerly known as the British Computer Society
86
Ev w35
Online safety
27
become the arbiter of taste and decency in relation to online content. It is not for an
ISP to be placed in such a position.
Legal opinion informs us that filtering any internet material on home broadband or
public wi-fi may be illegal under RIPA 2000 and that this is so even if the purpose for
filtering is child protection, and even if the internet user has chosen to set up filters.
BT has raised with government the potential conflict between network level content
filtering and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000). We would
expect to receive clarity that our employees and or those of our wi-fi site partners
would not face a criminal prosecution under RIPA 2000 by offering filtering
activities to our wi-fi site partners for blocking unsuitable content from reaching
vulnerable individuals.87
66. The Internet Watch Foundation describes blocking of child abuse sites as “a short-term
disruption tactic which can help protect internet users from stumbling across these images,
whilst processes to have them removed are instigated.”88 Site blocking is highly unlikely
to be a suitable approach for adult pornography or violent material much of which is
legal (at least if it is unavailable to minors) and which is prevalent on the internet.
However, blocking should be considered as a last resort for particularly harmful adult
websites that make no serious attempt to hinder access by children.
Filters
67. An independent parliamentary inquiry into online child protection (April 2012),
chaired by Claire Perry, noted that “while parents should be responsible for monitoring
their children’s internet safety, in practice this is not happening”.89 The report went on to
recommend that the Government “should launch a formal consultation on the
introduction of an Opt-In content filtering system for all internet accounts in the UK” as
well as seeking “backstop legal powers to intervene should the ISPs fail to implement an
appropriate solution”.90 Following a subsequent Department for Education consultation,
the Government stopped short of proposing a default-on or opt-in filtering system, partly
on the grounds of practicality, the danger of blocking legitimate sites and the inability of
such systems to cut off other types of harmful material such as grooming and bullying.
The Perry report came on the back of a number of other studies that have looked at how
best to protect children, for example, Reg Bailey’s Letting Children be Children (June 2011)
and Tanya Byron’s Safer children in a digital world (March 2008). The latter report led to
the setting up of the UK Council on Child Internet Safety in September 2008. Our
predecessor Committee also published its report, Harmful content on the Internet and in
video games, in July 2008.
68. In its evidence, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport notes that 91% of
children live in households with internet access and that a greater proportion of children
aged 12–15 own smartphones than adults. The Government “understands that, first and
87
Ev w57-w58
88
www.iwf.org.uk/members/member-policies/url-list
89
Independent parliamentary inquiry into online child protection: findings and recommendations, April 2012, p5
90
Ibid, p8
28
Online safety
foremost, responsibility for keeping children safe online falls to parents and guardians;
however, Government is acting to ensure that parents have the tools and information they
need to be able to do so.”91 In particular, the Government has been working through the
UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) “to pursue a voluntary approach to child
internet safety and has called on industry to make the right tools available to allow parents
to protect children online.”92
69. In their submission, Intellect rehearsed the roles the technology industries have been
playing in the development of parental control tools such as filters. They also refer to a
“continual process to innovate and update these tools”. 93 Intellect added:
Thus it is clear that an irreversible momentum has developed across the industrial
ecosystem providing internet access to continually develop technology tools in
response to the fast evolving internet environment. It is this application of
technology innovation which will ensure the diverse set of tools needed to support a
safe online environment—not regulation which in contrast could freeze
innovation.94
70. In a speech to the NSPCC on 22 July 2013,95 the Prime Minister announced a range of
measures to tackle the “corroding” impact of online pornography on childhood. Some of
these would prevent children from being able to access (legal) pornography while other
measures would target child abuse images and the activities of paedophiles.
71. On access to pornography, Mr Cameron said that by the end of the year, familyfriendly filters would automatically be selected for all new broadband customers (unless the
account holder chose otherwise). Once installed, the filters would cover any device
connected to the customer’s internet account and only the account holder, who must be an
adult, would be able to change the filters. Internet service providers would be given until
the end of 2014 to contact existing customers and present them with an “unavoidable
decision” about whether or not to install family friendly content filters.
72. In March 2012, TalkTalk had become the first internet service provider to introduce a
genuine “unavoidable choice” for new customers when they signed up to TalkTalk
broadband, as per the recommendation of the Bailey Review. TalkTalk told us that
customers are asked to make a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision as to whether they want to filter access
to content that might be inappropriate for under 18s on their broadband connection or
not.96 TalkTalk then applies this to their internet connection as soon as it is live, and no
further action is required by the customer. The customer is also alerted by email and/or
text if any of the so-called Homesafe settings are changed – safeguards such as this aim to
ensure children aren’t changing settings without their parents’ knowledge.
91
Ev 108
92
Ev 108
93
Ev w140
94
Ibid.
95
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-internet-and-pornography-prime-minister-calls-for-action
96
Ev 83
Online safety
29
73. The Internet Service Providers’ Association told us: “The main consumer facing ISPs
are moving to a system where new and existing customers are presented with an
unavoidable choice of whether to apply filters or not. These filters cover the whole home ...
Some smaller consumer-facing providers are considering solutions that offer family
friendly filters but can be deployed on smaller scale and at lower costs. ISPA is currently
discussing this issue with its members.”97 Claire Perry told us that the top four ISPs are
introducing “unavoidable choice” filtering solutions. She said: “we would like the others to
commit to the same thing. They will ask you in different ways. Some might ask you when
you go to query your bill online, some may interrupt your browsing session, which is a first
for the UK to do that. This is the commitment that Ofcom will be monitoring. Every
household will be contacted and asked whether or not they would like to switch on the
filters, and the box, “Yes, please” will be pre-ticked.”98
74. We welcome the introduction of whole home filtering solutions that prompt
account holders with a choice to apply them. We encourage all internet service
providers to offer their customers this valuable service. Ofcom should monitor the
implementation of this filtering and report back on its level of success and adoption.
75. While greater use of filters is welcome, they should not be seen as a panacea. ATVOD
told us: “The usefulness of parental control software depends not only on its uptake but
also on its effectiveness. This is especially important lest parents who use parental control
software are lulled into a false sense of security about the extent to which their children
have been protected when using the internet.”99 ATVOD further cites EU Commission
research which suggests that the filters themselves when set to block “adult” content suffer
from relatively high rates of over-blocking (accidentally blocking non-adult sites) and
under-blocking (failure to block adult sites). Although the efficacy of parental controls may
have improved since that research was conducted in 2011, ATVOD told us it is clear that
both “over-blocking” and “under-blocking” still occur.100 The Internet Service Providers’
Association told us that filtering does have limitations and that over-blocking and underblocking of content “is inevitable”.101
76. When we held a meeting with eight young people in January, we heard varying views
on filtering. Some called for stronger filtering to prevent access to harmful material online,
particularly pornography. We were told of boys circumventing the filters in place in school
to access age-inappropriate content. However, others expressed concern that if filters were
too strong or inappropriately applied, young people could be prevented from accessing
websites offering advice on sexual health and online safety.
77. TalkTalk described its ‘Homesafe’ system as a “whole home parental controls system
that allows parents to protect every device connected to the home broadband and control
the types of websites their family is able to visit.”102 Homesafe has three features:
97
Ev 80
98
Q 207
99
Ev w137
100 Ev w138
101 Ev 81
102 Ev 82
30
Online safety
•
Kids Safe—parental controls that allow the account holder to block content they
don’t want to be accessed on their connection. There are nine different categories,
and customers can also choose to block other specific websites.
•
Virus Alerts—an alert system that blocks access to web pages infected with
malware103 and phishing sites.104
•
Homework Time—this allows parents to block social networking and online games
sites—common sources of distraction for children from homework—during a
specified time of day.
The Association for UK Interactive Entertainment describes as “deeply troubling” the
inclusion of games in the TalkTalk list. They told us of the “potential for this to do
significant collateral damage to the UK games industry.”105 We value the UK games
industry and the many educational and recreational benefits it provides to children. As
filtering technologies continue to develop, as they should, we trust parents will be
empowered to provide the supervision they want of what games their children play and
when.
78. In connection with filters applied by mobile network operators, the BBFC has a role in
calibration: providing advice to mobile operators on where to set their Internet filters. The
Mobile Broadband Group told us that processes also exist to remedy inadvertent or
unfounded over-blocking. The Group also told us: “The BBFC framework is binary—18 or
unrestricted. This is because 18 is the only age at which it is currently practical to
implement convenient, ubiquitous and robust on-line age verification. Stricter filters are
available in the market for parents that may want a narrower range of content for younger
users but these fall outside the Code.”106 At a recent seminar, Adam Kinsley, Director of
Policy, BSkyB, gave details of that ISP’s more granular filtering solution which has
additional age categories analogous to those used for cinema exhibition. 107
79. The Mobile Broadband Group reminded us that mobile operators have had network
filtering in place for nearly ten years. They added: “Great pressure has also recently been
put on the domestic ISPs and public wi-fi operators to do the same—and this is happening.
However, all these efforts would be complemented with the availability of better user
controls at operating system and device level. The UK, through UKCCIS and other
channels, should continue to examine closely what the manufacturers and operating
system providers are offering in the area of child safety and challenge them to be as equally
committed as the network providers.”108 We agree that the availability and performance
of filtering solutions must be closely monitored, both for efficacy and the avoidance of
over-blocking. It should also be easy for websites inadvertently blocked to report the
fact and for corrective action to be taken.
103 Malicious software
104 Phishing sites aim to obtain personal data by deception
105 Ev w92
106 Ev 87
107 Westminster eForum Keynote Seminar, Childhood and the internet – safety, education and regulation, 29 January
2014
108 Ev 88
Online safety
31
80. A recent report by Ofcom notes: “The provision of accurate content labels or metadata
by content providers would help filtering systems to categorise content correctly. However,
only a tiny proportion of websites are labelled in a way that allows easy categorisation for
the purposes of filtering.”109 Websites that provide adult content should signal the fact
clearly to enable filters better to take effect. A failure on the part of the operators of
such sites to do so should be a factor in determining what measures should be taken
against them.
81. One of the arguments given against filtering is the ease with which it can be
circumvented. According to Ofcom research, most parents report that they know enough
to keep their child safe online, but around half of parents continue to feel that their child
knows more about the internet than they do, including 14% of parents of children aged 3–
4. Ofcom also acknowledges: “In some cases, children will be able to bypass filters, either
by altering the filtering settings or by using tools to conceal the sites they are visiting from
the filtering software. The main mechanisms by which filters may be bypassed are through
the use of a VPN (virtual private network), which encrypts all internet traffic, and the use
of proxy sites.”110 Ofcom research has also established that 18% of children aged 12–15
know how to disable online filters or controls, but considerably fewer (6%) have done this
in the past year. Filters are clearly a useful tool to protect children online. Ofcom should
continue to monitor their effectiveness and the degree to which they can be
circumvented.
Media literacy and education
82. Filtering systems will in general fail to capture text and picture messages sent directly
between individuals. Andy Phippen, Professor of Social Responsibility in Information
Technology, Plymouth University, told us about some of the discussions he has had with
young people themselves:
Protection from access is an interesting concept. How can we protect them from
content they wish to access (which is certainly something I would observe from
talking to boys far more than girls)? This, again, was reflected in discussions recently
with a very mature group of 14–16 year old boys in a local school—one boy, who was
discussing the recent policy discussions around “opt-in” and filtering in the home,
made a very clear statement: “You will not prevent teenage boys from accessing
pornography”. He did not state this to be rebellious or controversial, he was stating it
from his observations of his peers. They access and share pornography and have
many ways of doing so.111
83. Comments such as this serve only to highlight the importance of media literacy and
education. The difficulty in entirely preventing access to age-inappropriate material
emphasises the importance of e-safety in the school curriculum and the availability of
advice to parents and carers. Such advice should include how to report harmful material.
Evidence we received from the DCMS did highlight the role of education in online
109 Ofcom Report on Internet safety measures: Strategies of parental protection for children online, 15 January 2014
110 Ibid.
111 Ev w111
32
Online safety
safety.112 From September 2014, the national curriculum will extend e-safety teaching to
pupils aged between 5 and 10 (11-16 years olds are already covered). The DCMS also
referred to several general educational tools and programmes: Think U Know (from
CEOP); the UK’s Safer Internet Centre (which has a hotline for internet safety
information); Get Safe Online (providing advice at the initiative of government, law
enforcement, businesses and the public sector); online resources, including Know IT All,
from the Childnet charity; the South West Grid for Learning; and ParentPort. The last of
these is a complaints portal that directs individuals to the relevant media regulator, or to
sources of advice for content that has no regulator responsible. Edward Vaizey told us:
“Ofcom was behind setting up ParentPort because it felt you needed a one-stop shop for
parents to go to get all the advice they needed.”113 We welcome the introduction of
ParentPort but believe Ofcom should seek to promote and improve it further. For
example, more use could be made of it to collect data on complaints concerning
children’s access to adult material.
84. We further recommend that Ofcom regularly reports on children’s access to agerestricted material, particularly adult pornography and the effectiveness of filters and
age verification measures. Ofcom is well-placed to fulfil this role given the work it does
on its Children and Parents: Media Use and Attitudes Report.
85. Childnet International commented on the need for further work on the education
front:
There is a need for ongoing educational and awareness work in this area ... As the
UK Safer Internet Centre, Childnet (along with the Internet Watch Foundation and
South West Grid for Learning) will be running Safer Internet Day 2014 which will
take place on 11th February. The theme of Safer Internet Day is “Let’s create a better
internet together”. This positive call to action provides all stakeholders with the
opportunity to reach out and positively work to empower internet users in the UK.
We are hoping a proposed industry-led awareness campaign, led mainly by the 4 big
ISPs, can combine with our work and help make Safer Internet Day 2014 even bigger
than last SID 2013, which reached 10% of the population, and led to 40% changing
their online behaviour as a result of the campaign.114
Safer Internet Day 2014 was subsequently celebrated by 106 countries, and early
indications are that it was a great success: over 25 million people were reached by the
“SID2014” Twitter hashtag alone.115
86. In their evidence, the sexual health charities FPA116 and Brook included the following:
“Sex and Relationships Education (SRE) guidance pre-dates recent and emerging issues on
technology and safeguarding, with no reference to addressing on-line safety, “sexting” or
pornography in SRE. Brook and FPA recommend that the Government should update SRE
112 Ev 109
113 Q 206
114 Ev w90
115 https://infogr.am/sid-2014-overview?src=web
116 Family Planning Association
Online safety
33
guidance for the modern era.”117 The young people we met in January were unanimous
that schools should be required to offer sex and relationships education. As one young
person put it, teachers are a sounder source of professional information on sex than friends
or the internet. The young people said providing them with the knowledge, tools and
confidence to navigate potential online dangers would ultimately be more beneficial than
technical measures. The NSPCC recently told us that the Government has committed to
emailing every school SRE advice developed by Brook, the sex education forum, and
others.118 We note comments on the state of, and access to, sex and relationships
education. We are aware this is a politically contested subject but believe the
Government should take into account the views of the young people who gave evidence
to us of the value and importance of good quality mandatory sex and relationship
education as policy develops. In the mean time, teachers have many opportunities to
use their professional judgement in advising children both on online safety and on
respect for each other. We believe there is scope for providing teachers with clearer
signposting of the advice and educational resources that are already available.
117 Ev w100
118 Ev 112
34
Online safety
4 Social media
Nature and scale
87. From chat rooms to Facebook, from Snapchat to Twitter, social media platforms play
to the human desire to keep in touch. Online social media provide new ways of interacting
and for modified ways of behaving. Everyone with a connected computer is now a
potential publisher and some people publish with too little regard for the consequences—
for others as well as themselves.
88. The most recent research 119 from the NSPCC shows that 28% of young people who
have a social networking profile have experienced something that has upset them in the last
year. These experiences include cyber-stalking, being subjected to aggressive or offensive
language, being sent sexually explicit pictures and being asked to provide personal or
private information. However, the greatest proportion of the group (37%) had experienced
“trolling”.120 Alongside this evidence that online bullying is clearly a problem for young
people, the latest Childline statistics show an 87% increase in 2012/13 in the number of
young people contacting the NSPCC for support and advice about being bullied via social
networking sites, chat rooms, online gaming sites, or via their mobile phones. The NSPCC
attributes this trend in part to the increasing ownership by young people of smartphones
and tablets.
89. The results of a July 2013 survey by the bullying prevention charity, BeatBullying,
provide further evidence of both the nature and scale of online bullying and the dangerous
sides of the internet:
•
One in five 12–16 year-olds have interacted with strangers online
•
More than a third of 12–16 year-olds go online most often in their own bedroom
•
One in five 12–16 year-olds think being bullied online is part of life
•
More than a quarter of 12–16 year-olds admitted to witnessing bullying online, but
only half of these did something about it
•
The primary reasons young people gave for not doing anything about the online
bullying was being worried about being bullied themselves or not knowing who to
speak to about it
•
Almost a quarter (23%) of 12–16 year-olds spend more than five hours a day online
during school holidays; more than double the number during term time (10%)
•
The majority (80%) of 12–16 year-olds said they feel safe online, compared to only
60% of the younger age group (8-11 year-olds). But worryingly, one in five (22%) of
12–16 year-olds said they think being bullied online is part of life
119 Ev 111
120 Trolling: the practice of posting deliberately inflammatory material.
Online safety
•
35
For those 12–16 year-olds who did do something about the cyber bullying, most
went to their parents for advice; however, only 38% of parents think their children
are at risk of being bullied online.121
90. Anthony Smythe of BeatBullying told us: “Our research would suggest that one in three
children have experienced cyber-bullying. More worrying is that you will find that one in
13 are subject to persistent cyber-bullying and that is what leads to the cases of suicide and
self- harm that we have seen over the recent summer months.”122 Our own conversations
with young people left us in little doubt as to the corrosive effect of bullying–often
perpetrated by “friends”.
91. Two of the best known social media platforms (there are many) provided both written
and oral evidence in the course of our inquiry: Facebook and Twitter. Written evidence
from Facebook begins by describing its mission “to make the world more open and
connected and to give people the power to share.”123 Facebook is a global community of
more than 1.15 billion people and hundreds of thousands of organisations. Facebook
works “to foster a safe and open environment where everyone can freely discuss issues and
express their views, while respecting the rights of others.”124
92. Twitter told us of their 200 million active users across the world and 15 million in the
UK alone; the platform now serves 500 million tweets a day. “Like most technology
companies we are clear that there is no single silver bullet for online safety, rather it must
be a combined approach from technology companies, educators, governments and parents
to ensure that we equip people with the digital skills they will need to navigate the web and
wider world going forward.”125
The law
93. Evidence from the DCMS makes the general point that behaviour that is illegal off-line
is also illegal online.126 Communications sent via social media are capable of amounting to
criminal offences in relation to a range of legislation, including:
•
Communications which may constitute credible threats of violence to the person or
damage to property.
•
Communications which specifically target an individual or individuals and which
may constitute harassment or stalking within the meaning of the Protection from
Harassment Act 1997.
•
Communications which may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or
false.127
121 Ev 75
122 Q 5
123 Ev 89
124 Ev 89
125 Ev 92
126 Ev 109
36
Online safety
94. The Director for Public Prosecutions published guidelines for prosecutors when
considering cases involving communications via social media. Relevant legislation
includes: Malicious Communications Act 1988; section 127, Communications Act 2003;
Offences Against the Person Act 1861; Computer Misuse Act 1990; Protection from
Harassment Act 1997; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; section 15, Sexual
Offences Act 2003 (for grooming).
95. The DCMS cites data from the Crime Survey of England and Wales which shows that,
in 2011/12, 3.5% of adults (aged 16 and over) had experienced upsetting or illegal images.
1.4% had experienced abusive or threatening behaviour. Some of these experiences are
likely not to have met the criminal threshold.128
96. BeatBullying have argued for greater clarity in the law; they told us:
More than 1,700 cases involving abusive messages sent online or via text message
reached English and Welsh courts in 2012. However, cyberbullying is not a specific
criminal offence in the UK. Some types of harassing or threatening behaviour—or
communications—could be a criminal offence. These laws were introduced many
years before Twitter, Facebook and Ask.FM, and they have failed to keep pace with
the demands of modern technology. Unfortunately, serious cases of cyberbullying,
which have often resulted in suicide, have dominated our headlines in recent
months. That is why BeatBullying have been calling on the Government to review
current legislation and make bullying and cyberbullying a criminal offence so that
children and young people have the protection they need and deserve, at the earliest
opportunity, to avoid this escalation.129
97. BeatBullying’s evidence went on to cite the recent Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and
Policing Bill as a possible vehicle for introducing bullying and cyberbullying as a form of
anti-social behaviour. Jim Gamble told us: “The Prevention of Harassment Act is bullying.
The Prevention of Harassment Act is trolling ... We need to ensure that the laws as they
exist, when they can be applied, are applied.”130 Any changes to legislation, including
consolidation of current laws, which clarify the status of bullying, whether off-line or
online, would be welcome. At the same time, much could be achieved by the timely
introduction of improved guidance on the interpretation of existing laws.
Enforcement
98. On Twitter, users “agree” to obey local laws. Twitter’s rules and terms of service “clearly
state that the Twitter service may not be used for any unlawful purposes or in furtherance
of illegal activities. International users agree to comply with all local laws regarding online
conduct and acceptable content.”131 A question that arises is how more could be done by
Twitter and other social media providers to assist in compliance with the law.
127 Ev 109-110
128 Ev 110
129 Ev 76
130 Q 116
131 Ev 92
Online safety
37
99. Facebook’s detailed Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (“SRR”) describes the
content and behaviour that is and is not permitted on its service. With respect to safety, the
SRR specifically prohibits the following types of behaviours:
•
Bullying, intimidating, or harassing any user.
•
Posting content that: is hate speech, threatening, or pornographic; incites violence;
or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.
•
Using Facebook
discriminatory.132
to do anything unlawful,
misleading,
malicious,
or
100. Both Facebook and Twitter have sensible terms and conditions attaching to the use
of their services. However, these should be made much clearer, explicit and visible.
People who might be tempted to misuse social media need to be left in no doubt that
abuses online are just as unacceptable as similar misbehaviour face-to-face.
101. Facebook encourages people to report content that they believe violates their terms.
“Report” buttons are “on every piece of content on our site.” “When we receive a report,
we have a dedicated team of professionals that investigate the piece of content in question.
If the content in question is found to violate our terms, we remove it. If it does not violate
our terms, then we do not remove it. We also take action, such as disabling entire accounts
(eg of trolls) or unpublishing Pages, if deemed necessary.”133 Reports are handled by the
User Operations team comprising hundreds of employees located in India, Ireland and the
USA. The User Operations team is separated into four specific teams covering safety, hate
and harassment, access and abusive content.
102. Facebook is aware that many under-13s are falsifying their ages to open accounts, in
violation of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. Often parents assist them in
doing so, something that Facebook’s Simon Milner has reportedly134 likened to allowing
younger children to view Harry Potter video works (some of which have a ‘12’ certificate).
Sinéad McSweeney of Twitter told us: “We do not collect age information on sign-up. I
think Twitter has established a reputation in the area of privacy. We minimise the amount
of information that we require from users to sign up so we do not collect age or gender or
other details about our users. Where it comes to our attention that somebody under the age
of 13 is using the platform, their accounts are removed.”135 She went on to imply that a
child under 13 would either have to be aware of this age rule, or read about it in Twitter’s
privacy policy.136
103. Claire Lilley of the NSPCC suggested: “Some of these sites need more human
moderators to look for the fake accounts. That is one part of it, but they also have very
sophisticated algorithms where they look at what language people are using, what sites they
are visiting and what they are talking about online. They can tell with quite a degree of
132 Ev 89
133 Ev 89
134 Facebook admits it is powerless to stop young users setting up profiles, Guardian, 23 January 2013
135 Q 166
136 Q 169
38
Online safety
sophistication a lot about the individuals. Twitter, for example, has a minimum age of 13,
but when you sign up to Twitter, you do not have to put in your date of birth. There is
nothing to stop you. Twitter would say that what it does is to look at its algorithms to spot
the children who are under 13 and therefore potentially on a site that is aimed at an older
audience and containing information, posts and so on that are not suitable for their age. Its
argument is that it uses very sophisticated algorithms, so I think there is a lot more that the
sites could do.”137
104. Twitter’s age-verification process could at best be described as algorithmic and
reactive; non-existent might be a more accurate description. Given that Facebook and
Twitter are aware of the extent to which their services are accessed by younger children,
we expect them to pay greater attention to factoring this into the services provided, the
content allowed and the access to both. The same applies to other social media
companies in a similar position.
105. BeatBullying told us that BeatBullying.org is the only e-mentoring and social
networking site to be endorsed by CEOP. “We strongly believe that our approach to online
safety must be adopted by all internet providers if children and young people are to be safe
online.”138 This website checks all content prior to it being uploaded. As a general policy,
Twitter told us that they do not mediate content. However, there are some limitations on
the type of content that can be published with Twitter. These limitations include
prohibitions on the posting of other people’s private or confidential information,
impersonation of others in a manner that does or is intended to mislead, confuse, or
deceive others, the posting of direct, specific threats of violence against others, and
trademark and copyright infringement.139 Twitter told us that users can mark their own
tweets as sensitive which by default means a warning message is posted to anyone
wishing to view these. This is a good reminder that self-restraint and self-regulation are
crucial aspects of any enforcement regime in the online world.
106. In spite of reassuring words from Facebook and Twitter, it is clear that these
platforms, in common with other social media providers, could do far more to signal
the unacceptability of abuse and to stamp it out when it arises.
107. Offensive communications via social media that do not cross the threshold into
criminal behaviour should, the Government expects, be dealt with expeditiously by the
social media companies.140 We agree. Social media providers should follow the examples
of Facebook and Twitter in having appropriate terms and conditions. We believe there
is significant scope for such providers—including Facebook and Twitter—to enforce
such conditions with greater robustness.
137 Q 22
138 Ev 73
139 Ev 92
140 Ev 111
Online safety
39
Reporting
108. A service for reporting all hate crimes online was launched by the police in April 2011.
The website, called True Vision, is supported by all forces in England, Wales and Northern
Ireland and can be accessed at www.report-it.org.uk. All reports of incitement to racial
hatred content hosted in the UK previously reported to the Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF) should now be reported directly to True Vision. True Vision takes reports about:
racist or religious hate crime; homophobic and transphobic hate crime; disability hate
crime; bullying and harassment; domestic abuse. The National Centre for Cyberstalking
Research commented: “The True Vision initiative for hate crime reporting is an excellent
example of a simple and transparent reporting mechanism, but it needs to be more widely
publicised.”141
109. Social media providers generally offer reporting mechanisms, with varying degrees of
user-friendliness and degree of follow-up. In serious cases, the access providers will also get
involved. TalkTalk told us that they investigate any abusive or threatening comments
posted on sites by their customers when provided with the log information that supports
the complaint. In severe cases, relevant data will be disclosed to the third party solicitor, on
receipt of a fully sealed court order from a UK court.142
110. As noted above, Facebook told us about their ‘report’ buttons. Twitter also told us
that they have now introduced a similar reporting facility. Twitter said that reports that are
flagged for threats, harassment or self-harm are reviewed manually. Twitter advises users
to report illegal content, such as threats, to local law enforcement and refers to working
closely with the police in the UK.143 Stella Creasy MP—who has herself been subject to
bullying and threats via social media—argued for the introduction of an “online panic
button system” to alert sites like Twitter to an emerging problem.144 She told us how she
had been subjected to graphic threats and harassment on Twitter over the course of two
weeks.145 Even this was “just a fraction” of what had been endured by Caroline CriadoPerez who had been receiving 50 rape threats an hour. These threats evidently started for
no reason other than Ms Criado-Perez’s successful campaign to keep female representation
on English bank notes. In January, two people were jailed for their roles in the abuse to
which Caroline Criado-Perez was subjected.146 Another individual has recently been
charged with sending malicious communications to Stella Creasy MP. 147 All were charged
under section 127 of the Communications Act 2003.
111. The NSPCC have suggested that providers of social media services should provide a
range of options for users to report material, with extra support for younger users. They
add that default privacy settings should be the highest possible and there should be
141 Ev w144
142 Ev 85
143 Ev 93
144 Q 70
145 Q 61
146 “Two jailed for Twitter abuse of feminist campaigner”, Guardian, 24 January 2014
147 “Man charged over MP Stella Creasy tweets”, BBC News, 23 January 2014
40
Online safety
adequate use of human moderators.148 Claire Lilley of the NSPCC told us that, even if
children report bullying to social networking sites, “they often feel like nothing is being
done as a result of that and that no action is being taken, so children, when it is happening
to them, [are] feeling extreme vulnerability and humiliation, and a sense of helplessness.” 149
These comments were borne out by one of the teenage girls we talked to in January who
told us that, with Facebook, it was hard to get bullying material taken down or blocked;
when it was eventually removed, the damage had already been done. Twitter continues to
be criticised for not doing enough to combat abusive and threatening behaviour online, 150
even in the wake of the limited and tardy corrective action it took following last year’s case
involving Caroline Criado-Perez and Stella Creasy MP.151
112. Anthony Smythe of BeatBullying said:
I would like more transparency of the websites to hear from the big websites about
how many cases of cyber-bullying are reported to them each year. What did they do
about them? How quickly did they respond to those cases? What support and help
did they offer? It is about having a bit more accountability. They will say that they
probably do that, and if you spend five hours on the internet, you might find that
information annexed somewhere. I would like that information signposted on their
main websites so that parents and young people can have access and understand the
website that they are using.152
113. Stella Creasy MP told us: “One of the other things I have asked the companies to do is
publish their data about the numbers of reports of abuse they get and the numbers of the
concerns so we can get a question of scale.”153
114. Social media providers should offer a range of prominently displayed options for,
and routes to, reporting harmful content and communications. They need to act on
these reports much more quickly and effectively, keeping the complainant and—where
appropriate—the subject of the complaints informed of outcomes and actions.
115. Ofcom should monitor and report on complaints it receives, perhaps via an
improved ParentPort, regarding the speed and effectiveness of response to complaints
by different social media providers.
Advice and support
116. Anthony Smythe of BeatBullying told us: “What is the greatest concern for children
and young people—and now for adults—is the feeling that they are helpless and are
148 Ev 73
149 Q 10
150 “Ex-footballer Collymore accuses Twitter over abusive messages”, BBC News, 22 January 2014
151 Q 61
152 Q 14
153 Q 66
Online safety
41
hopeless in terms of getting advice and support. They do not know where to go to.” 154
BeatBullying develops these points in their written evidence:
Everyone involved with children’s and young people’s use of the internet—parents,
schools, service providers, organisations and children themselves—has a shared
responsibility for online safety. That is why in April 2013 BeatBullying launched a
campaign for better anti-bullying protections called Ayden’s Law. The campaign
calls for a national strategy to tackle cyberbullying and would set out how the
voluntary and community sector, parents and schools would be equipped to (a)
protect the children in their care from harm online and (b) educate and equip
children about internet safety and responsible digital citizenship so that they
understand the issues for themselves.
Any approach to online safety must ultimately be about shaping attitudes and
changing behaviors as much as it is about teaching techniques for staying safe or for
anything else.155
117. Claire Lilley said: “I would say that what bullying on social media comes down to is
about behaviour. We can wave the long arm of the law at children, but what we need to do
is to educate them about the impact of the behaviour in which they are engaging on people
who are at the receiving end of it. We need to do much more to educate them to build their
resilience, both when they are on the receiving end, but also to build their empathy and
their sense of respect for other children.”156
118. The Home Office told us that they undertake to “work with DCMS to ensure we are
linked into initiatives such as Safer Internet Centre and Get Safe Online, which provide
internet safety information and advice alongside a wealth of internet safety resources for
schools and information for parents and children.”157
119. Social media companies could, and in some cases do, provide resources and funding
for educational initiatives. For example, Simon Milner of Facebook, referred to support
given to the South West Grid for Learning which is “particularly helpful”158 for schools
and teachers. He also indicated that a request for funds would be listened to “with a very
open mind.”159 We also heard evidence from the Government, Facebook and Twitter of the
value of the helpline operated by the UK Safer Internet Centre, which operates on
minimum and time-limited funding from the European Union. We believe it is in the
interests of social media platforms, if they wish to avoid a more regulatory approach,
to put their money where their mouths are and provide more funding for the valuable
work being done on internet safety by voluntary organisations and charities.
154 Q 5
155 Ev 73
156 Q 12
157 Ev 107
158 Q 138
159 Q 150
42
Online safety
120. A good deal of advice on the safe use of social media is available already. This
should be signposted more clearly for teachers, who are likely to be in the front line
when it comes to dealing with bullying both in the playground and in the online world.
Anonymity
121. The cloak of anonymity is a useful one for a dissident or free-thinker to wear; but it
can also mask the bully and the criminal. Evidence from Dr Claire Hardaker, a Lecturer in
Corpus Linguistics, identifies anonymity as one of the factors that can lead to harmful
behaviour online (others include detachment and entertainment). She notes: “the internet
offers a perceived anonymity that has no real parallel offline, and this appearance of
invisibility encourages the user to feel that they can do unpleasant things with a highly
reduced risk of suffering any consequences.”160 She goes on to question the feasibility of
removing anonymity:
In a nutshell, this is borderline impossible, if only because it is unenforceable, and
unworkable. Even if all countries agree to legally mandating online identity
disclosure (unlikely) the costs of setting up, administrating, and then enforcing it
would be staggering. Further, we need only consider the risks inherent in having a
child’s name, age, location, etc. available online to realise that online identity
disclosure would actually create more dangers than anonymity currently averts.161
122. These views appear at odds with those of John Carr of the Children’s Charities’
Coalition on Internet Safety. Referring to the “abuse of anonymity” he emphasised the
importance of being able to trace individuals; this would require social media providers to
take greater steps to verify the identity of their account holders. 162 He said: “So the
requirement on internet service providers would be to verify that the individual who has
just signed up with them is not in fact a dog, but an actual human being with an actual and
verified address where they can be reached. That alone would act as a major brake on a lot
of the bad behaviour.”163
123. The Open Rights Group told us: “It is too easy to assume that tackling anonymity
online is a simple solution to abusiveness.” The Group added:
In fact, people are usually not truly ‘anonymous’ when they are online. People leave
all sorts of information that can identify them. It is sometimes possible to use this
information to identify somebody with varying levels of confidence—even if the
person posts messages as an ‘anonymous’ or ‘pseudonymous’ user. For example an
ISP may try to ‘match’ an IP address with one of their subscribers. There are various
legal powers that in some circumstance, require Internet companies to disclose this
data, and which permit the use of it in various contexts for the purposes of trying to
identify a user.164
160 Ev w2
161 Ev w4
162 Qq 22-26
163 Q 24
164 Ev w126
Online safety
43
124. Nicholas Lansman of the ISPA said: “People can attempt to hide themselves online,
but there are technical ways in which they can be discovered.”165 Claire Perry MP referred
to a particularly tragic case when she told us: “I was encouraged with Ask.fm—having
spent a lot of time with Hanna Smith’s father, who was one of the young women who did
indeed commit suicide—that company did set up a facility where users could choose to be
anonymous, but you would know if the user was anonymous when you were exchanging
information with them.”166
125. Anonymity is not just a cloak for cowards who bully; it is used by others to disguise
their criminal activities. In January of this year, the National Crime Agency announced
that 17 Britons had already been arrested as a result of Operation Endeavour, spanning 14
countries. This particular case involved the live streaming of child abuse in the Philippines
for viewing across the world. The prevalence of child abuse images on the internet and the
associated activities of paedophiles provide just one of the starkest of reminders that
keeping children safe off-line includes keeping them safe online too.
165 Q 110
44
Online safety
Conclusions and recommendations
1.
We believe that the Government should, in due course, consolidate the law around
child abuse images into a single Act of Parliament with a view to providing even
greater clarity for the purposes of law enforcement and deterrence. (Paragraph 9)
2.
Given the worldwide nature of online crime, we recommend that the Government
press for wider international adoption of both the Budapest and Lanzarote
Conventions. The Government should ratify the Lanzarote Convention as soon as
practicable. (Paragraph 10)
3.
We recommend that the Government examines whether adequate resources are
being deployed to track down online paedophiles in sufficient numbers to act as a
meaningful deterrent to others. If not, additional funding should be provided to
recruit and train a sufficiently large number of police officers adequate to the task.
(Paragraph 17)
4.
CEOP has been increasingly effective not least because it is not solely a criminal
justice organisation: its education and social care work has also been very important
in increasing public understanding of the problem of child abuse and in offering
means of countering abusers. We therefore recommend that CEOP continues to
publish an annual review which includes an assessment of its ongoing contribution
to all three elements of its mission—education, social care and criminal justice.
(Paragraph 18)
5.
We welcome the increasing use of alerting tools to identify individuals who seek out
child abuse and other illegal material online provided these tools are deployed in
ways that do not unduly compromise the privacy of the law-abiding majority.
(Paragraph 23)
6.
We very much welcome the commitment by the Internet Watch Foundation to
embark on proactive searching for online child abuse images. The sooner these can
be found and removed, the better. However, we are concerned that seven additional
staff might prove woefully insufficient to achieve substantial progress towards what
must be an important intermediate goal: the eradication of child abuse images from
the open internet. (Paragraph 29)
7.
Search engines and other internet service providers have a vital role in ensuring that
access to online child abuse images is prevented and deterred. We expect the
Government to monitor closely their degree of commitment and success and to
consider the introduction of legislation should they fall short of reasonable
expectations. (Paragraph 33)
8.
We welcome the Government’s decision to include pornographic depictions of rape
in the definition of extreme pornography. It has been illegal to publish such images
for many years; outlawing their possession is long overdue. (Paragraph 34)
9.
There is clearly a need to obtain wider international consensus and cooperation in
relation to combating criminally obscene adult material and terrorist material and
Online safety
45
we urge the Government to use all the influences it can bring to bear to bring this
about within a transparent, legal framework. (Paragraph 37)
10.
We believe that the existing obscenity laws already proscribe the publication of adult
material in ways that make it readily available to children. However, we are
concerned that no prosecutions have been brought despite the proliferation of
pornography sites which make no attempt to restrict access by children. We welcome
the Government’s declared intention to legislate to clarify the law in this area.
However, in the meantime, we urge the prosecuting authorities to use the existing
law to crack down on the worst offenders in order to put pressure on all suppliers of
hardcore pornography to make greater efforts to ensure that such material is
accessible only by adults. (Paragraph 51)
11.
The Government should seek agreement with other European Union Member States
to ban on demand programme services that make pornography readily available to
children. We further urge the Government to engage with other international
partners, particularly the USA, with the aim of securing a similar outcome more
widely. (Paragraph 53)
12.
We believe that, as part of its existing media literacy duties, Ofcom has an important
role in monitoring internet content and advising the public on online safety.
However, we are anxious to avoid suggesting a significant extension of formal
content regulation of the internet. Among the unintended consequences this could
have would be a stifling of the free flow of ideas that lies at the heart of internet
communication. (Paragraph 55)
13.
Providers of adult content on the internet should take all reasonable steps to prevent
children under 18 from accessing inappropriate and harmful content. Such systems
may include, but will not necessarily be restricted to, processes to verify the age of
users. (Paragraph 62)
14.
We have no reason to suppose that Nominet has either the resources or inclination
to police the internet. Age verification, while ideal, is not the only way of preventing
children from accessing unsuitable content. However, we believe that no .uk site
should offer unimpeded access to adult pornography to children. This should be
made a condition of registration. (Paragraph 63)
15.
Site blocking is highly unlikely to be a suitable approach for adult pornography or
violent material much of which is legal (at least if it is unavailable to minors) and
which is prevalent on the internet. However, blocking should be considered as a last
resort for particularly harmful adult websites that make no serious attempt to hinder
access by children. (Paragraph 66)
16.
We welcome the introduction of whole home filtering solutions that prompt account
holders with a choice to apply them. We encourage all internet service providers to
offer their customers this valuable service.
Ofcom should monitor the
implementation of this filtering and report back on its level of success and adoption.
(Paragraph 74)
46
Online safety
17.
We value the UK games industry and the many educational and recreational benefits
it provides to children. As filtering technologies continue to develop, as they should,
we trust parents will be empowered to provide the supervision they want of what
games their children play and when. (Paragraph 77)
18.
We agree that the availability and performance of filtering solutions must be closely
monitored, both for efficacy and the avoidance of over-blocking. It should also be
easy for websites inadvertently blocked to report the fact and for corrective action to
be taken. (Paragraph 79)
19.
Websites that provide adult content should signal the fact clearly to enable filters
better to take effect. A failure on the part of the operators of such sites to do so
should be a factor in determining what measures should be taken against them.
(Paragraph 80)
20.
Filters are clearly a useful tool to protect children online. Ofcom should continue to
monitor their effectiveness and the degree to which they can be circumvented.
(Paragraph 81)
21.
We welcome the introduction of ParentPort but believe Ofcom should seek to
promote and improve it further. For example, more use could be made of it to
collect data on complaints concerning children’s access to adult material. (Paragraph
83)
22.
We further recommend that Ofcom regularly reports on children’s access to agerestricted material, particularly adult pornography and the effectiveness of filters and
age verification measures. Ofcom is well-placed to fulfil this role given the work it
does on its Children and Parents: Media Use and Attitudes Report. (Paragraph 84)
23.
We note comments on the state of, and access to, sex and relationships education.
We are aware this is a politically contested subject but believe the Government
should take into account the views of the young people who gave evidence to us of
the value and importance of good quality mandatory sex and relationship education
as policy develops. In the mean time, teachers have many opportunities to use their
professional judgement in advising children both on online safety and on respect for
each other. We believe there is scope for providing teachers with clearer signposting
of the advice and educational resources that are already available. (Paragraph 86)
24.
Any changes to legislation, including consolidation of current laws, which clarify the
status of bullying, whether off-line or online, would be welcome. At the same time,
much could be achieved by the timely introduction of improved guidance on the
interpretation of existing laws. (Paragraph 97)
25.
Both Facebook and Twitter have sensible terms and conditions attaching to the use
of their services. However, these should be made much clearer, explicit and visible.
People who might be tempted to misuse social media need to be left in no doubt that
abuses online are just as unacceptable as similar misbehaviour face-to-face.
(Paragraph 100)
Online safety
47
26.
Given that Facebook and Twitter are aware of the extent to which their services are
accessed by younger children, we expect them to pay greater attention to factoring
this into the services provided, the content allowed and the access to both. The same
applies to other social media companies in a similar position. (Paragraph 104)
27.
Twitter told us that users can mark their own tweets as sensitive which by default
means a warning message is posted to anyone wishing to view these. This is a good
reminder that self-restraint and self-regulation are crucial aspects of any
enforcement regime in the online world. (Paragraph 105)
28.
In spite of reassuring words from Facebook and Twitter, it is clear that these
platforms, in common with other social media providers, could do far more to signal
the unacceptability of abuse and to stamp it out when it arises. (Paragraph 106)
29.
Social media providers should follow the examples of Facebook and Twitter in
having appropriate terms and conditions. We believe there is significant scope for
such providers—including Facebook and Twitter—to enforce such conditions with
greater robustness. (Paragraph 107)
30.
Social media providers should offer a range of prominently displayed options for,
and routes to, reporting harmful content and communications. They need to act on
these reports much more quickly and effectively, keeping the complainant and—
where appropriate—the subject of the complaints informed of outcomes and actions.
(Paragraph 114)
31.
Ofcom should monitor and report on complaints it receives, perhaps via an
improved ParentPort, regarding the speed and effectiveness of response to
complaints by different social media providers. (Paragraph 115)
32.
We believe it is in the interests of social media platforms, if they wish to avoid a more
regulatory approach, to put their money where their mouths are and provide more
funding for the valuable work being done on internet safety by voluntary
organisations and charities. (Paragraph 119)
33.
A good deal of advice on the safe use of social media is available already. This should
be signposted more clearly for teachers, who are likely to be in the front line when it
comes to dealing with bullying both in the playground and in the online world.
(Paragraph 120)
48
Online safety
Formal Minutes
Thursday 13 March 2014
Members present:
Mr John Whittingdale, in the Chair
Ben Bradshaw
Tracey Crouch
Paul Farrelly
Steve Rotheram
** *
Draft Report (Online Safety), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 125 read and agreed to.
Summary read and agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions
of Standing Order No. 134.
** *
[Adjourned till Tuesday 18 March at 10.00 am
Online safety
49
Witnesses
Tuesday 15 October 2013
Page
John Carr, Secretary, Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety, Claire
Lilley, Senior Analyst, NSPCC, Anthony Smythe, Managing Director,
BeatBullying
Ev 1
Susie Hargreaves, Chief Executive, Internet Watch Foundation, and Peter
Davi es, Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Centre
Ev 11
Tuesday 29 October 2013
Stella Creasy MP
Ev 20
Nicholas Lansman, Secretary General, Internet Services Providers’
Association, Dido Harding, Chief Executive Officer, TalkTalk Group, Hamish
Macleod, Chair, Mobile Broadband Group
Ev 28
Mr Jim Gamble, Independent Chair, City and Hackney Safeguarding
Children Board
Ev 36
Tuesday 19 November 2013
Simon Milner, Policy Director, UK and Ireland, Facebook and Sinéad
McSweeney, Director, Public Policy, EMEA, Twitter International Company
Ev 44
Tony Close, Director of Content Standards, Licencing and Enforcement,
Ofcom and Claudio Pollack, Group Director, Content Consumer and External
Affairs Group, Ofcom
Ev 52
Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Minister of State for Policing, Criminal Justice
and Victims, Mr Edward Vaizey MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries and Claire Perry MP,
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on Preventing the Commercialisation
and Sexualisation of Childhood
Ev 57
50
Online safety
List of printed written evidence
1
Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety
Ev 65
2
NSPCC
3
BeatBullying
Ev 73
4
Internet Watch Foundation
Ev 76
5
Internet Service Providers’ Associ ation
Ev 79
6
TalkTalk
Ev 82
7
Mobile Broadband Group
Ev 86
8
Facebook
Ev 89
9
Twitter
Ev 92
10
Ofcom
Ev 94
11
Home Office
Ev 103
12
Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Ev 107
Ev 68; Ev 111
List of additional written evidence
(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/cmscom)
1
Dr Peter Dawe OBE
Ev w1
2
Dr Claire Hardaker
3
Remote Gambling Association
4
Ann Farmer
Ev w10
5
Kirsty Hopley
Ev w10
6
Dr Peter Nelson
Ev w11
7
British Board of Film Classification (BBFC)
Ev w13
8
Arqiva
Ev w18
9
James Griffiths
Ev w22
10
Christopher G. H. Thomas
Ev w22
11
John Edgar Cameron Lowe
Ev w23
12
Norfolk Library and Information Service
Ev w23
13
Phil Alexander
Ev w25
14
Ben Hardwick
Ev w25
15
John R Edwards
Ev w26
16
Chris Evershed
Ev w27
17
EE Limited
Ev w28
18
BCS The Chartered Institute for IT
Ev w32
19
Dudley Friend Clayson
Ev w36
20
PAPY RUS Prevention of Young Suicide
Ev w37
21
EU Kids Online
Ev w38
22
Rolf Smith
Ev w43
23
Mediawatch-UK
Ev w45
Ev w2 ; Ev w7
Ev w7
Online safety
51
24
South West Grid for Learning
Ev w47
25
British Sky Broadcasting Limited (‘Sky’)
Ev w51
26
Big Brother Watch
Ev w53
27
BT
Ev w56
28
Russell Hopwood
Ev w59
29
Stuart Taylor
Ev w60
30
Richard Browning
Ev w61
31
Timothy Michael Johnston
Ev w62
32
Lloyd Johnston
Ev w62
33
John Carruth
Ev w63
34
Rob Barry
Ev w64
35
Barry Saltmarsh
Ev w65
36
Safermedia
Ev w66
37
John Reiner
Ev w69
38
Family Online Safety Institute
Ev w69
39
Terry James
Ev w72
40
Film Distributors’ Association
Ev w73
41
Information Commissioner’s Office
Ev w74
42
Virgin Media
Ev w77
43
The Police Federation of England and Wales
Ev w84
44
End Violence Against Women Coalition
Ev w85
45
Childnet International
Ev w88
46
Ukie
Ev w92
47
The Children’s Society
Ev w96
48
Eric and Esme Bricknell
Ev w97
49
Stonewall
Ev w98
50
FPA and Brook
Ev w100
51
Michael J Smaldon
Ev w109
52
Prof Andy Phippen
Ev w110
53
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community UK
Ev w113
54
Sex Education Forum
Ev w117
55
Net Children Go Mobile
Ev w119
56
British Naturism
Ev w120
57
Open Rights Group
Ev w122
58
Russell Pillar
Ev w126
59
CARE (Christian Action Research and Education)
Ev w127
60
Malcolm Holmes
Ev w130
61
Microsoft UK
Ev w131
62
The Authority for Tel evision on Demand
Ev w132
63
Intellect
Ev w139
64
Telefonica UK Ltd
Ev w142
65
National Centre for Cyberstalking Research
Ev w143
66
Ethos Capital Ltd
Ev w145
52
Online safety
List of Reports from the Committee during
the current Parliament
The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the
HC printing number.
Session 2012-2013
First Report
The Gambling Act 2005: A bet worth taking?
HC 421
Second Report
Racism in football
Third Report
Library Closures
Fourth Report
Football Governance Follow-Up
Fifth Report
Scrutiny of the Draft Public Bodies (Merger of the
Gambling Commission and the National Lottery
Commission) Order 2013
Sixth Report
Pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Gambling
(Licensing and Advertising) Bill
HC 905
First Special Report
Football Governance Follow–Up: Government
Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of
Session 2012–13
HC 156
First Report
Scrutiny of the draft Public Bodies (Abolition of the
Registrar of Public Lending Right) Order 2013
HC 506
Second Report
Scrutiny of the draft Public Bodies (Merger of the
Gambling Commission and National Lottery
Commission) Order 2013
HC 256
HC 89
HC 587
HC 509
HC 1104
Session 2013-2014
Second Special Report Scrutiny of the draft Public Bodies (Merger of the
Gambling Commission and National Lottery
Commission) Order 2013: Government Response to
the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2013-14
HC 646
Third Report
Supporting the creative economy
HC 674
Fourth Report
Nuisance Calls
HC 636
Third Special Report
Supporting the Creative Economy: Government
Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session
2013-14
HC 945
Fifth Report
Pre-appointment hearing with the Government’s
preferred candidate for the Chairman of Ofcom
HC 933
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 1
Oral evidence
Taken before the Culture, Media and Sport Committee
on Tuesday 15 October 2013
Members present:
Mr John Whittingdale (Chair)
Mr Ben Bradshaw
Angie Bray
Tracey Crouch
Philip Davies
Paul Farrelly
Mr John Leech
Steve Rotheram
Mr Gerry Sutcliffe
________________
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: John Carr, Secretary, Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety, Claire Lilley, Senior
Analyst, NSPCC, and Anthony Smythe, Managing Director, BeatBullying, gave evidence
Q1 Chair: Good morning. This is the Committee’s
first session examining issues around online safety and
I would like to welcome John Carr of the Children’s
Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety, Claire Lilley
of the NSPCC and Anthony Smythe of BeatBullying.
Perhaps you could begin by just giving us your view
of the scale of the problem now, because obviously
this has been an issue that has been of concern for
some time. There are measures that have been taken
and there are more measures that are potentially in
prospect, but it would be helpful for you to tell us first
of all what the volume is, how many people are
involved and how easy it is to access images of child
abuse or inappropriate material. Who would like to
start?
John Carr: I will go first. The question of volume is
absolutely central to this whole debate. Like with all
areas of crime, it is impossible to get any precision as
to the real volumes. There are various straws in the
wind that give us reliable indicators. The NSPCC, for
example, did a series of FOI requests to all the police
forces in England and Wales asking them to report
back to them how many child abuse images they had
seized in arrests that they had carried out in the twoyear period ending April 2012. In the time frame that
the NSPCC was working to, only five forces replied,
but those five forces reported that they had seized 26
million images in that two-year period. I spoke to a
professional statistician and he looked at them—sorry,
go ahead.
Q2 Chair: On the 26 million, just to clarify in my
own mind, is that 26 individuals with 1 million images
each, or is it a million individuals with 26? How does
it work?
John Carr: That is an extremely good point—I was
going to get to it later. The numbers themselves can
sometimes conceal more than they reveal. There was
one man, for example, in Cambridgeshire who was
arrested with 5 million images on his machine. It is
not uncommon to find individuals now with a million
or more images. You are absolutely right; it is possible
that those 26 million images represented the activity
of no more than half a dozen highly obsessive
individuals who were downloading large quantities. It
is very unlikely. Just to finish on the point about
numbers, because I do think they tell a story—albeit
not the whole story, definitely—if you gross that up
to assume broadly similar levels of activity by all of
the police forces in England and Wales, that would
have led you to a number in the region of 300 million
that would have been seized by all police forces in
England and Wales in that period.
Now, putting that on one side for the moment, we then
have the revelations by Peter Davies, who I know you
are going to see later today, on ITN at the end of May
this year when he acknowledged that between 50,000
and 60,000 individuals had been identified by CEOP
as being involved in downloading child abuse images.
The period was not very clear, but none the less the
key point that Davies made in that TV interview—I
think it was very courageous of him to do it—was that
that is simply beyond the capacity of the police to deal
with this in any reasonable way. At no point since
records began—for these purposes, by the way, that
was around the mid-1980s—have British police ever
arrested more than about 2,500 individuals for child
abuse image-related offences. If you do the maths and
assume that there are no new offences committed
relating to images, the last individual on that list of
50,000 to 60,000 individuals who are known about
now would not be arrested until 2032.
The answer is not that we simply throw our hands up
in despair and say, “Nothing can be done.” Something
can be done, but it must involve industry in deploying
ever-smarter, better technical tools to deal with it,
because even if we were living in times of
superabundance as opposed to times of austerity, with
those kinds of volumes and those kinds of numbers of
offenders, it is impossible to imagine how we would
ever be able to, or want to, employ the right number
of police officers, and to have the right number of
prisons, courtrooms, judges and all those things to
deal with the volumes that we now know exist. We
have to find better technical solutions for addressing
some of this.
Chair: Thank you. Just before I bring in the other
two witnesses, we have two quick questions on what
you said.
Q3 Mr Leech: Mr Carr, in relation to the scale of the
problem, I think people would be amazed by the sheer
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Ev 2 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
numbers that you are talking about. Do you get a
sense that the problem is massively on the increase,
or is it simply that the detection of the problem is now
far more straightforward and we are becoming more
aware of what has always been a problem of this
scale?
John Carr: It could be a bit of both. Certainly,
obviously, we are lot better now at detecting it; we
have better tools for spotting it. If we can’t arrest
them, at least we know they are doing it, so that
definitely accounts for part of it. Internet penetration
is not going to go much further, or it does not have
much further to go in this country, so I doubt that
mere growth will lead to increase, but we are getting
better at detecting it. Around the world, that is a
different picture. There are lots of countries that are
coming online only now for the first time, where we
can expect to see similar patterns developing. That, of
course, does in a way pose a threat here, because if
the volumes are increasing elsewhere on the internet,
they could in the end none the less find their way to
the UK.
Q4 Tracey Crouch: Mine is a very quick one. With
reference to the 26 million images, what percentage
were of the level 5, I think it is, which is serious, and
how many were level 1? Can you give some sort of
breakdown of the kind of levels?
John Carr: I do not know exactly. The data was not
broken down in that way, but I would guess,
particularly with volumes of that kind, that they would
probably correspond roughly with the kinds of images
that the IWF is seeing in general, so a very substantial
proportion. I think 70% of the images that IWF deals
with depict children under the age of 10 being
sexually abused so, almost by definition, a very high
proportion of those will be level 5 or level 4—the
worst kind.
Q5 Chair: Sorry to have cut you off, but let me come
back now to Claire and Anthony.
Claire Lilley: Thank you. I just want to add to what
John said about the freedom of information requests
that the NSPCC did, and just to emphasise that that
was five forces, none of which had a large
metropolitan base, so that is not including London,
Manchester or Birmingham, where the figures are
likely to be even higher. I just add that caveat as well.
John has talked a lot about child abuse images. What
I would like to touch on is the other issues and
bringing the children’s voice into the session in terms
of what the NSPCC hears via ChildLine from
children. In 2012–13, we had almost 11,000
counselling sessions from children where the main
thing that they wanted to talk to us about was a
problem that they had had in relation to the internet.
That was a 65% increase on the previous year. In
terms of what children are telling us that they are
experiencing, much greater volumes of children are so
distressed that they are phoning ChildLine to talk
about a problem on the internet. That can be anything
from online bullying, so-called sexting or online
grooming—all those sorts of issues covered within
that.
Specifically in relation to online bullying, for
example, that saw an 87% increase in contacts from
children over the last year. That corresponds with a
4% decrease of wanting to talk about face-to-face
bullying. We are seeing that children contacting
ChildLine about bullying is massively increasing, and
obviously it is an issue about the conduct of children,
but the internet and access to smart phones, tablets
and all these things are facilitating and exacerbating
the problem.
Chair: That probably brings us neatly on to Mr
Smythe.
Anthony Smythe: Yes. I represent an anti-bullying
charity and my main interest is peer-on-peer abuse,
cyber-bullying and trolling. Our research would
suggest that one in three children have experienced
cyber-bullying. More worrying is that you will find
that one in 13 are subject to persistent cyber-bullying
and that is what leads to the cases of suicide and selfharm that we have seen over the recent summer
months. What is the greatest concern for children and
young people—and now for adults—is the feeling that
they are helpless and are hopeless in terms of getting
advice and support. They do not know where to go to.
Our work with practitioners would suggest that a lot
more needs to be done in strengthening roles and
responsibilities and clarifying that so that we have an
approach to tackle cyber-bullying and bullying, and
realise that cyber-bullying does not always happen
online. It sometimes can reflect what is happening in
communities, schools and vice versa now. Children
experience cyber-bullying online, and it is reflected in
the playground, so you have to see those as
overlapping circles with a great deal of movement
between the two.
Claire Lilley: May I come back? Sorry, I meant to
mention as well that I know the Committee is also
looking at the impact of online adult content on
children’s behaviour, and I wanted to mention that
ChildLine has seen a 70% increase in the number of
boys contacting the service because they have been
upset by online pornography specifically, so seeing
pornography and being distressed or feeling guilty
because they have watched it, or feeling somehow
dirty or ashamed because they have seen it, whether
accidentally or deliberately. Also there is an increase
in children being referred to our services that we run
around the country that are for children with harmful
sexual behaviour and watching pornography, with
easy access to online pornography, is playing a part in
their sexualised behaviour.
Q6 Chair: Can you just say a little more about what
evidence you have of the sort of harm that is done by
children either accidentally coming across, or
deliberately coming across, material that is clearly
adult and should not be seen by them?
Claire Lilley: The evidence base, it is fair to say, is
growing. In the past 10 years, we have seen such an
explosion in access to the internet and online
pornography being freely available within a few
clicks—it is very easy to get hold of. While the
evidence base is still growing, the NSPCC would say
that a precautionary approach would be the best
approach, because essentially we are conducting a big
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 3
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
experiment at the minute with our young people
where they have access to all this online pornography
very easily and we do not know what the influence
will be. We have evidence from ChildLine that
children are being pressurised to watch porn by their
peers and they don’t necessarily want to do it. Girls
are telling us that they are being pressurised to act
out sex scenes from porn movies that they or their
boyfriends might have watched, and there is the
sexualisation of women and girls that is being caused,
we believe, by these large numbers of porn being
easily available over the internet.
John Carr: I will just come in on that. I think the
word “pornography” when we discuss it in this
context is in many ways very unhelpful, because
certainly for people of a certain age, the word
“pornography” is mentioned and images of a Playboy
centrefold or pictures of ladies dancing without their
bras on the beach or something spring to mind. Then
this whole thing starts going about, “Well, aren’t you
just being a bit old-fashioned or prudish?” Whatever
view you take about that, the sort of material that we
are in fact talking about that is available at the click
of a mouse on the internet is light years away from
anything of that kind. This is, in essence, violence. It
is sadistic, and very often quite bizarre.
To go back to Claire’s point about the biggest
experiment we have ever undertaken, porn has been
around since time immemorial. Anybody who has
been to Pompeii and visited the House of the Vettii
can see it there in stucco on the wall. But never
before, ever, including in the 1960s and 1970s, when
a lot of the studies on porn were initially done, has
the kind of material that is there now been available
24 hours a day, seven days a week in graphic colour,
with full sound and free. In our evidence, we refer to
the decision in the case of the Crown v. Perrin, which
was decided in the Criminal Court of Appeal in 2002.
This was a case of a man who was publishing extreme
pornography on a website and had taken no steps to
try to keep it away from kids. He had no age
verification system—nothing in place—and he went
to jail, but the judges said, “It is okay for you to
publish porn. Nobody is saying you cannot or should
not, but if you do, you must take steps to keep kids
away from it”.
That law is being honoured in the breach rather than
in the observance. It is principally because most of the
publishers are based overseas and the British police
have not sought to extradite them or go after them,
and that is a great pity. In our evidence, we have made
a number of practical suggestions about how we might
try to get at least companies that are based in Britain
or operate from here to try to observe that particular
law. That is to say, “If you are going to publish porn,
okay, that is your business, but please take concrete
steps to make sure kids cannot get easy access to it.”
Anthony Smythe: Can I just add some statistics? In
terms of bullying and cyber-bullying, the Department
for Education produced some statistics a number of
years ago that suggested that for those who are
persistently bullied, their attainment drops by on
average two GCSEs. Our research looked at persistent
bullying and the link to suicides, and what we found
when we looked back at the records was that 44% of
child suicides had bullying as a contributing factor.
That does not mean that they committed suicide
because they were bullied. It could be that they
suffered a bereavement and were bullied and cyberbullied because of the bereavement, and the totality of
what they were facing led to the suicide. But it is a
major contributing factor to child suicide—peer-onpeer abuse.
Chair: That neatly brings us on because Tracey
Crouch wants to explore this area.
Q7 Tracey Crouch: It does. I am just going to go
further into cyber-bullying, if I may, but can I just
follow up on a couple of the issues that John has
raised with regard to pornography? Could you just
explain to me: are there already certain restrictions in
place for some of the pornographic content that you
were referencing, such as, for example, the more
bizarre or perhaps violent images? Does that already
exist, or can you just go on to any pornographic
website and have easy access to the more bizarre
images?
John Carr: Two clicks of a mouse. In the UK, the
mobile phone networks have, since 1 January 2005,
all blocked access to adult content accessible either
over their own networks or the internet without you
first going through age verification process. If you are
accessing through a mobile phone in the UK, broadly
speaking, only adults should be able to access porn in
that way. But of course there are lots of other ways
that you can do it. Our wi-fi providers—all the larger
ones—have said that they are going to block access
to porn as well. That is a great achievement, by the
way. It is a world first, so we can be very pleased with
that. The only people who are not yet currently taking
steps to block access to those types of sites are the
ISPs. But, as we know, thanks to Mr Cameron’s
efforts, there are currently discussions going on
between all the large ISPs and the Government about
introducing steps to limit access to that type of
material. But right now today within the UK, there is
nothing there routinely that restricts access to the most
bizarre, the most violent and the most graphic types
of pornography—anybody can get it.
Q8 Tracey Crouch: But is the age restriction process
just a case of saying, “I am over the age of 18,” and
ticking the box?
John Carr: No. With the wi-fi, you will not be able
to lift it—it will be fixed. By the way, that will apply
only in public places where children and young people
are present, so if you go to Spearmint Rhino, a casino
or some place that is essentially wholly populated by
adults and access the wi-fi there, you will be able to
get anything that is on the internet. But ordinarily in
Starbucks, at the Odeon, in a railway station and so
on—places like that; public places where children and
young people are going to be—you will not be able
to get access to porn full stop, so you cannot prove
you are over 18 and get it lifted. But with the ISPs,
the process is being debated right now, and we do not
quite know how that is going to pan out yet.
Q9 Tracey Crouch: But it will not impact on those
accessing content at home?
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Ev 4 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
John Carr: Yes, it would. Sorry, I lost my thread
slightly. The mobile phone companies have quite a
robust age verification system. You have to go through
the same process that the online gambling companies
use, and you have either to be on the electoral roll or
to have a credit card that one of the credit reference
agencies can get. There are a number of bits of
information they collect from you as a mobile user to
determine that you are in fact an adult. What the ISPs
are going to do in the end at home, we do not know.
We have heard what the Government have said they
want them to do. We have not yet heard from them
what they are in fact going to do, and they have until
31 December to tell us. But they could introduce age
verification as well, if they wanted to, because it is
tried and tested technology.
Q10 Tracey Crouch: Thank you. Can I just go back
to cyber-bullying, please? We heard from Anthony
about the scale of the statistics and what they see as
the problem of cyber-bullying. I know that both the
NSPCC and yourself, Mr Carr, have referenced cyberbullying in your written submissions as well. Could
you just expand on what you are seeing from your
own organisations about cyber-bullying, please?
Claire Lilley: In terms of calls to ChildLine, we have
seen an 87% increase in the last year, and huge
volumes of children under extreme pressure, mainly
as a result of bullying from their peers. I think the
characteristics of online bullying that set it apart from
traditional bullying are that because children very
often have phones and access to the internet at home
and in their bedroom, it is not something that stops
when they go home and close the door. They no
longer have that sense of safety, so it is literally 24/7.
Some children are telling us that if they do not
respond to a message within 20 minutes at 4 am, the
bullying will increase—a sort of pack mentality
sometimes where it is no longer just six children
involved in the bullying, but perhaps the whole year
group or going out to the whole school, so the child
is feeling very vulnerable in terms of their exposure,
feeling a huge degree of humiliation, not knowing
who knows, whatever the rumour is, and feeling it is
totally beyond their control and that they are very
unable to do anything to combat it. If it is happening
on social networking sites, for example, it will quite
often be replicated via email and instant messaging,
and even if they report it to social networking sites,
they often feel like nothing is being done as a result
of that and that no action is being taken, so children,
when it is happening to them, feeling extreme
vulnerability and humiliation, and a sense of
helplessness.
Q11 Mr Bradshaw: Do you take up individual cases
with social networking sites at your organisation?
Claire Lilley: No, we do not, because the service that
ChildLine operates is confidential, so we never
disclose anything, except in the case that a child tells
us that they were about to commit suicide. Only then
would we breach that confidentiality.
Q12 Tracey Crouch: Section 127 of the
Communications Act describes the improper use of
the public electronic communications network. Do
you think that more could be made of the
Communications Act to combat bullying on social
media?
Claire Lilley: I would say that what bullying on social
media comes down to is about behaviour. We can
wave the long arm of the law at children, but what we
need to do is to educate them about the impact of the
behaviour in which they are engaging on people who
are at the receiving end of it. We need to do much
more to educate them to build their resilience, both
when they are on the receiving end, but also to build
their empathy and their sense of respect for other
children. There may be things that we could do in
terms of the law, but what we need to do is to build
in much more education of children about the impact
of their behaviour on others and get parents involved
in talking to their children about how they behave
online, how they conduct themselves and how they
treat other people online.
Q13 Tracey Crouch: Anthony, do you think there
should be further legislative change to combat
bullying?
Anthony Smythe: I completely agree. The first
priority is about prevention and education. Sometimes
that does not work, though, so the question is what do
you do next? What you want is a well-trained
workforce around the child—a workforce that
understands their roles and responsibilities and that
can provide that support. As Claire says, bullying is
24/7, so we need infrastructure around the child that
sees bullying from a child’s point of view. For too
long, we have seen bullying as a school issue or a
cyber-bullying issue. Children don’t see it like that.
They do not have an online and offline world; it is
just their world.
I would like the Government to reform their approach
to bullying in the same way as they have reformed
their approach to child protection, where they have
seen child protection from the child’s point of view
and had services rallying around that child. If you do
that, you will get good early intervention, and that
brings in the third sector, teachers and the police. If
we share the responsibility, we will reduce the
workload on one another because capacity is an issue.
In terms of the law, it is not fit for purpose. It does
not protect children from cyber-bullying; it does not
protect adults from cyber-bullying. The Children’s
Commissioner for Wales this morning, I believe, made
a recommendation to make cyber-bullying a criminal
offence. I would endorse that because I think we need
to give out a message that bullying is unacceptable in
our society, whether it be cyber-bullying or bullying.
Under the current legislation, the Communications
Act and what have you, the thresholds have been set
really high. I have not seen many cases in my time
where it has been used to address bullying, so I think
we need updated legislation that is fit for purpose.
Most of the legislation that deals with cyber-bullying
was drafted many years before the likes of Twitter and
Facebook. There needs to be a fresh look at this. There
needs to be a legal definition of bullying, cyberbullying and trolling because we all talk about these
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 5
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
things, yet we are often working off a different
definition. That needs to be embedded into legislation.
In answer to your question, yes, there need to be
stronger safeguards in place. There needs to be an
anti-bullying strategy and an anti-cyber-bullying
strategy for this country, which would set out the
measures for education, prevention, intervention and
support, and how we can strengthen the current
criminal justice system.
Q14 Tracey Crouch: Thank you. A final question:
do you think that social media providers could do a
little bit more to stamp out bullying? You saw the
recent very sad and tragic situation of the Ask.fm
suicide and I just wondered whether you think that
they should be doing more to try to prevent cyberbullying.
Anthony Smythe: A lot of the big ones have done a
great deal of work over recent years and that should
be recognised.
Each time my teams that go into schools do a straw
poll and ask, “What websites are you using?”—my
teams are quite young people, so they are relatively
up to speed with what is going on out there—they find
that children and young people are using new websites
and each time the dynamic of the website changes.
There is a new one now where a bit of chat is posted
straight away and deleted within a short period of
time. The new websites are playing catch-up a great
deal, and we heard a lot over the summer about
Ask.fm.
Ultimately what I would want from websites is for
them to know their customers. Why do people cyberbully? First, because they can; secondly, because they
haven’t had the education to understand the impact it
has on other people. How do we deal with the first
point, which is going back to John’s point about
having verification about the user’s identity? You can
go on to Twitter and set up any account, and you can
go on to all the other websites and by and large set up
an account that allows you to go in and say things
without fear of being suspended or caught. There
needs to be a lot more done at the point of registration
and a lot more investment into moderation of their
websites.
I would like more transparency of the websites to hear
from the big websites about how many cases of cyberbullying are reported to them each year. What did they
do about them? How quickly did they respond to those
cases? What support and help did they offer? It is
about having a bit more accountability. They will say
that they probably do that, and if you spend five hours
on the internet, you might find that information
annexed somewhere. I would like that information
signposted on their main websites so that parents and
young people can have access and understand the
website that they are using.
John Carr: Just to make a quick point, I hope.
Education and awareness—what goes on between a
child’s left ear and their right ear—are always going
to be the best defence for them in life in general,
including on the internet, no question. However, let
me just point you to the results of research published
by Ofcom in August or September, I think: 37% of
three and four-year-olds are now regularly going
online in the UK, with 9% of three and four-yearolds seemingly having their own tablets. Both those
numbers are going to go up, not down. There is a limit
to how much education and awareness can do in the
context of three and four-year-olds.
We have a choice. We can either wag our fingers and
say, “Parents, don’t be so irresponsible. Don’t let your
kids go online at that age,” or whatever, or we can
accept that that is the reality of modern parenting,
which therefore pushes us to looking towards the
industry again for more and better technical support.
Education and awareness are always the best possible
option, no question, but that will not work for very
young children and for vulnerable children. In that
context, I think we do need to see more and better
technical solutions coming into play to help.
Q15 Mr Bradshaw: Mr Smythe, you called for
cyber-bullying to be made a criminal offence. Forgive
my ignorance, but are there any other jurisdictions
where it is already a criminal offence, or where noncyber-bullying is a criminal offence?
Anthony Smythe: Yes. A number of countries around
the world are having this very same debate. Australia
and New Zealand are bringing in new legislation;
Canada is about to bring in new legislation; Ireland is
currently looking at it. There is an element of
everyone is playing catch-up. What I would like to
see is not just legislation around cyber-bullying, but a
criminal offence on bullying and cyber-bullying. As I
mentioned earlier, a child will be bullied in the
playground and that continues online. We need to
make that link because a child will not just see it as
cyber-bullying; they will see it as consistent,
persistent bullying. A number of countries are looking
at this. Every time I have looked at a review, the
recommendation always comes out to make cyberbullying a criminal offence. I think they are just going
through those procedures, so that is happening right
now.
Q16 Mr Sutcliffe: It was interesting to me that the
first mention of parents came in 34 minutes since you
started—that was the first mention of parents. A bit of
context to my contribution: I am 60 years old, and I
have children and grandchildren. My oldest
grandchild is 13. I am trying to come to grips, John
Carr, with the size and scale of this issue. I think that
Anthony’s survey was in terms of one in five 12 to
16-year-olds having interacted with strangers online,
and 33% of 12 to 16-year-olds going online in their
own bedrooms. The size and scale of the problem is
something that we need to get out into the open in
terms of where we are. I do believe that there is
something for the law to do, but I do think there is an
issue around parenting and also content.
Again, as a 60-year-old fuddy-duddy, with the
sexualisation and violence on TV now, I think the
watershed has gone by the bye. If you look at some
of the soaps—look at some of the storylines on
Coronation Street, Emmerdale and things like that—
and the violence and sexual innuendo, is there an issue
for society here around how we deal with these things
in terms of context and content? There are two
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Ev 6 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
questions: size and scale; and the inevitability of what
is going on in terms of the availability.
John Carr: On the wider point you make about the
sexualisation of society, I think with how what used
to be considered unusual is now considered normal or
typical, there has definitely been a shift, but however
far you look across that spectrum, we are a very long
away off accepting some of the stuff that is on
PornHub or YouPorn, for example, or some of the
more gross sites that are out there. They are a very,
very long away from anything that you might see on
a music video or at 10 am on Channel 4—or even at
1 in the morning on Channel 4. Of course the context
has shifted, and things are not considered to be quite
so outrageous today as they were so long ago, but the
kind of things that we have been concentrating on are
still way outside any spectrum of what would be
considered to be generally normal.
The size and scale is part of the problem. I have been
speaking to legislators and investigators as well,
which is what you are now. In the past, a lot of people,
when they have thought about what to do about the
internet, have said, “It is too difficult. It is global.
Nothing can be done”. A lot of people have a vested
interest in getting everybody to believe that is true.
They want people to believe that nothing can be done,
that Governments are impotent and that all we can do
in the end is to trust big business or all these internet
companies to do the right thing. But time and time
again, we see signs that they do not, and it is only
when they are pressed by legislative measures or
Governments very often, sadly, that they will act.
There are things that can be done. Even if every
country in the world does not do them at the same
time as we do, that is not a reason for us not doing
them. Leadership and showing an example is also an
important part of this whole equation. There are lots
of things that we did first in Britain. Look at what I
was mentioning earlier on wi-fi and mobile phones.
We were the first in the world to do that. Does that
make us mad? No. Other people will catch up; other
people will copy us. There is a normative aspect of
this, isn’t there? There is a question about what are
the right things or what we ought to expect companies
to do? We ought to articulate them and our
Government should press for those things to happen,
however difficult they might appear on the surface.
Claire Lilley: Just on the question of parents, there is
a very good tracker that Ofcom does of parents’ and
children’s attitudes to media. Of the parents of 12 to
15-year-olds, 63% said that they felt that their child
knew more about the internet than they did. I think,
particularly with older children, that that is a problem,
but it is a problem that we can address by encouraging
parents to think of the internet as an extension of their
parenting and that what they have to do is use their
common sense and the same principles and guidelines
that they would use in the so-called offline world and
just apply those from a very early age, as the child
grows, to the online world. We need to give parents
confidence and empower them to think that they can
deal with these issues, because the evidence does
show—work by Sonia Livingstone at the LSE—that
when parents lay down boundaries and guidelines for
their children, children will adhere to those. That is
where the point comes in again about educating
children about how to behave.
Anthony Smythe: Can I just add to that? In my paper,
I said that the most useful parental control is parental
responsibility. There is a need to get more information
and advice out to parents so that they can have those
discussions. They often feel intimidated when it
comes to tech and children. They need not, because
ultimately it is about, as Claire says, having those
discussions about empathy for other users online and
being responsible online. Often you find with cyberbullying that they don’t often realise the damage on
the victim—the person on the other end of the
bullying. When you address that, they start to change
their behaviours.
Q17 Mr Sutcliffe: On that, Anthony, in your survey,
22% of 12 to 16-year-olds thought that being bullied
online was part of life. It has become the norm, hasn’t
it, in terms of there being an acceptance of bullying
by that 20%?
Anthony Smythe: I found that statistic to be quite sad
because they have just given up and we need to make
bullying and cyber-bullying unacceptable. The reason
why people tend to troll and join in with the cyberbullying is because they feel it is okay to do it. Again,
it goes back to that programme about education, about
empathy for other people online and about the fact
that it will have an impact on that person. You may
not be the only person saying it; you may be person
No. 1,000 and they have probably been hearing that
abuse for six months or a year. That is why we see
the self-harm. That is why we see, unfortunately, in
recent months, the suicides. We do need to educate
people online. The internet providers have a role in
there in the social networking sites. They also have a
role pointing users to help and support that they can
get as soon as they make a referral to them. My
charity has counselled over 3,000 children over the
last year on bullying and cyber-bullying, but I have
not received many referrals from the big internet or
social networking sites—they come to us direct. That
is something we need to improve on.
Claire Lilley: I would just like to build on that by
saying that in terms of educating children about these
issues, it is definitely parents, but also the industry.
There is a lot more they could do in terms of the
number of human moderators they have enforcing
their terms of service, being very clear about what
their terms of service are, having terms of service
written in very basic language that is child-friendly—
all these things—and being much more transparent.
At the minute, we have no idea of how many reports
they are getting of online bullying or online grooming
per year. They could be much more transparent about
what they are seeing and what they are doing to deal
with it, and about what the rest of us could do in
partnership with them to help deal with it as well.
Q18 Angie Bray: If I could just continue a little bit
along the lines of my colleague, Gerry Sutcliffe, about
the role of parents in this, because what I see at the
moment is an army of people marching into family
life, in a sense, whether it is the Government or
organisations like your own. It is changing laws and
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 7
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
having to put filters on this, that and the other—which
is information to other people—all because
effectively, it would seem to me, you are saying that
there is a shift in the relationship between parents and
their children. Call me old-fashioned, but there was a
debate many years ago about whether children should
have televisions in their rooms precisely because of
what they might be watching that was not being
monitored. Fundamentally, isn’t the point that parents
should have the confidence—I understand what you
are saying about online and internet and all that—as
they have done in the past and make the time to take
an interest in what their children are doing in the
privacy of their own rooms, however intrusive they
might be worried that might seem to be?
Claire Lilley: I think that is the ideal scenario: parents
who are engaged, who are confident, who understand
their children and who make time for their children.
Unfortunately, that is not always the reality. Some
parents are not confident and don’t feel equipped, and
there are some children who, as a result, are
particularly vulnerable. There are also children who
do not have an active adult in their life, or perhaps
their parents might be substance misusers, for
example. There are quite a lot of children in that
bracket. I think we have a duty to spread the load.
Parents definitely have a big role, but there is a lot
that the rest of us can do. We have mentioned the
sexualisation of society. It is a broader problem than
just within families and the family unit; it is a problem
for the whole of society, so we all need to play a role
in that.
It is why we have had rules and laws about this type
of thing in relation to cinema, for example, and there
was for a very long time. In a way, some of the things
that we are describing are us as a society catching up
with the consequences and impact of the new
technology, and trying to recreate in the virtual space
rules and laws that we have had—not quite since time
immemorial, but certainly for a very long time. I do
not hear anybody arguing, for example, that we should
get rid of the rules about 18-rated movies and make
them open to everybody and anybody. In essence, all
we are doing—certainly when you talk about porn—
is trying to recreate in the reality for children’s lives,
which is a virtual one, the same rules that we have
applied for a long time in cinemas.
Another aspect of this as well, by the way, is the
knowledge gap. There was a debate many years ago
about whether it should be legal for parents to buy
their children a computer or a mobile phone until they
had passed a test like for a driving licence or
something to show that they had at least a rudimentary
understanding of the types of things they were
handing over to their kids. That never got anywhere.
Certainly the industry did not like the idea that this
could act as a brake on the sales of these brand-new
shiny devices. We absolutely put parents front and
centre, but what we also acknowledge is that,
particularly because of the speed at which these things
have changed, a lot of parents—even very dedicated,
loving, nurturing and supportive parents who would
fit any ideal paradigm that you could construct—feel
they need that little bit of extra help, and that is where
I think the state can play a role.
Q19 Angie Bray: I take that point, but fundamentally
the family unit is there. It is, most people would argue,
the most successful start for a child’s life. I just feel
that the stress is now all on what the state can do to
deal with this problem, but there is much less about
what can be asked of parents to take responsibility for
their own children. I wonder whether your messaging
should not start by talking about parents, rather than
talking about changing laws and applying more
regulation. Shouldn’t it start, where it possibly can—
I accept that it cannot always—in the home with a
proper relationship, where the parents expect to be
able to go in, knock on the door and say, “Hi. What
are you up to this evening?”
Claire Lilley: Yes, absolutely.
John Carr: First of all, a lot of this activity is not
taking place in the child’s room. Bear in mind that
internet access is now essentially ubiquitous. You can
walk out of your house with a tablet, a mobile phone
or a games console and connect to the internet
essentially anywhere. The things I was referring to
earlier about the wi-fi providers are an example of
them doing the right thing and essentially helping
parents to create an environment that they would want
their children to be in. What parent would be happy
with the thought that their child can go into a
restaurant or Starbucks and sit next to a dirty old man
looking at porn on his laptop? Nobody would, because
there is a reasonable expectation that that type of
material ought not to be in public view in places
where children and young people are going to be.
Q20 Angie Bray: What you are saying
fundamentally is that this new technology has
fundamentally altered the relationship between
parents and their children because it is—
John Carr: The same potential for control and
intervention simply does not exist. Some parents
think, “Oh, little Johnny is up in his room. He is safe.
He is upstairs. He is not out on the street playing with
the bad boys and the bad girls. He is not behind the
bicycle shed smoking. He is up in his room online.”
In other words, there is a fundamental gap in the
knowledge that we need, and a lot of this you can see
as a way of trying to help bridge that gap.
Anthony Smythe: I can only repeat what John just
said. Even the best parents need help and advice in
terms of addressing this issue and having those
conversations. Ultimately, I do not think it is for
parents alone to do this. Peer-to-peer support is
sometimes the best way to tackle online abuse. The
approach cannot be top-down, because top-down
approaches from Government probably will not work,
but we do need better leadership so that we can help
to clarify roles and responsibilities so that when a
child is cyber-bullied in the middle of their summer
holidays, either the child or the parents know where
to go to get support, to feel safe and for that cyberbullying to stop. I do not think that scenario is an
easy one for people to answer yet. The Department
for Education did a lot of good work in terms of
clarifying roles, responsibilities and powers for head
teachers to deal with bullying in schools. We have not
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Ev 8 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
seen the same in terms of cyber-bullying, and while it
would be good to get that leadership, it needs to
involve everyone—it cannot be top-down. It needs to
be a conversation; a joint plan, if you like.
John Carr: Sadly, many of the big internet companies
that are not British—they are not based here; their
jurisdiction is elsewhere—do need to be encouraged,
let us put it that way, to act. No business that I have
ever heard of willingly steps up and says, “Please
regulate me. I do not know what to do, so please
would you, Government or politicians, tell me what
to do?” They do not do that. Businesses will go on
ploughing their own furrow unless and until
something cuts across their pathway. That is what we
do, in essence. We try to raise these issues and that is
what Governments do as well.
Q21 Steve Rotheram: Just following on from Angie
Bray’s questions, it would be fantastic to believe that
all parents are responsible and do have that
relationship with their children. While I genuinely
believe that education and awareness are primarily the
ways to tackle the issue, that is not always the case.
There are parents who are absolutely fearful of IT and
do not understand it, and therefore do not understand
the content that can be accessed via it. But you also
mentioned that there are potential technical solutions
to it. There are flash screens that can come up that
say you are about to access a site of adult content or
whatever. There are restrictions that can be put on to
these, such as for anything that is over 18, you have
to opt in rather than out of it. There are blockages, I
believe, that you can do to adult content coming into
the home. I do not think this is all an either/or
solution.
John Carr: Correct.
Steve Rotheram: I think with the education, fantastic,
but there may well be other things that can be done.
What are the most effective ways and what more
could be done to curtail children’s access to adult
content or age-restricted material, including
pornography and graphic depictions of violence?
John Carr: We have never said that porn should not
exist or should not be on the internet. If it is legal,
there is no reason why it should not be published, but
companies that make pornography available should
take steps to make sure that kids cannot access it.
They should employ age verification. The British
gambling industry has done it with tremendous
success. We never hear of cases of kids getting online
and gambling. Why? Because Parliament, through the
Gambling Act 2005, introduced a law making it
obligatory. The Gambling Commission can give you
a licence to operate as an online gambling company
only if you prove to the commission that you have an
age verification system in place that works and that is
robust. That could be done in any other area, including
this one.
There are technical tools available, but they are not
being used—they should be. I do not want to argue
against myself because I am a great believer in
technical tools helping parents to put in place stuff
that they would want, even if they do not know that
it is what they would want, if you see what I mean.
Technical tools can do a great deal to supplement
good parental support and guidance. They will never
be 100% perfect. Nothing in life is 100% perfect. No
self-respecting parent would delegate their parental
responsibilities to a piece of software, but they
definitely can help, and in some situations that
software might be the only help that exists to keep
that child safer than it would otherwise be. There are
tools available. They can be done. They will not solve
everything, but they could do a lot to help.
Claire Lilley: Just to add to that, one of the arguments
we hear against the use of these parental controls and
against the active choice or the opt-in is that it will
lull parents into a false sense of security. If that is the
case, as John has said before, there has been an awful
lot of non-lulling going on for a long time. The
parents who are already using these parental controls
are the parents who are already engaged and therefore
are not complacent and probably already doing a
range of other things to support the use of those tools,
like having conversations with their children and
looking at their children’s browsing history and so on.
But for the parents who are not already having those
conversations and not already using the tools, the optin system will provide a nudge to make them think
about it and engage with this subject, so we think that
is valuable.
Anthony Smythe: My main concern with filtering is
that there is a danger it may filter out useful
information for children and young people, so it could
be information on sex advice or health conditions and
so on, such as anorexia.
John Carr: But that is bad filtering.
Anthony Smythe: That is bad filtering, but there is a
risk that it will happen. The most important thing we
can do regarding technology in terms of social
networking sites is for social networking sites to know
who is on their site at any one time and to have that
verification in place so that people cannot set up fake
websites, because it is those fake websites that allow
you go on and abuse others without fear of being
caught. If people knew that there were stronger laws
in place and that they could be traced online, they
would behave differently. The filtering is fine to a
certain degree, as long as it doesn’t block useful
information. What filtering will not do is prevent peeron-peer abuse.
Q22 Chair: How exactly do you envisage that
happening? Anybody can set up a Facebook account
with an alias just by creating an email address. What
more do you expect them to do?
Anthony Smythe: That is my concern—that it is too
easy at the moment. John has mentioned how it has
been done in other parts of the online world. We need
to look at that age verification. I know DFE was doing
a lot of work in looking at ways to take that forward.
Ultimately, I think that is a job for industry to take
forward. They are earning billions and billions of
pounds. They can find a way, I am sure, if they were
told to and this is where pressure from Government
would be useful. But as a starter for 10, it may be the
use of credit cards—that type of thing—so that you
know who that user is and that they are at a certain
age. At this moment in time, for example, in my
charity, we have a Twitter account for our resident dog
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 9
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
and that is how easy it is to set up these accounts.
There is no point threatening somebody that you will
suspend their account because they know they can set
up a new one straightaway. We just need to review
the whole situation.
Claire Lilley: Some of these sites need more human
moderators to look for the fake accounts. That is one
part of it, but they also have very sophisticated
algorithms where they look at what language people
are using, what sites they are visiting and what they
are talking about online. They can tell with quite a
degree of sophistication a lot about the individuals.
Twitter, for example, has a minimum age of 13, but
when you sign up to Twitter, you do not have to put
in your date of birth. There is nothing to stop you.
Twitter would say that what it does is to look at its
algorithms to spot the children who are under 13 and
therefore potentially on a site that is aimed at an older
audience and containing information, posts and so on
that are not suitable for their age. Its argument is that
it uses very sophisticated algorithms, so I think there
is a lot more that the sites could do.
John Carr: I will just make a fairly obvious point.
The abuse of anonymity lies behind most of the
enduring problems on the internet that we are
concerned about. I do not care if people sign in as
Donald Duck or Ronaldo or whatever. What matters
is not how you sign on, and not necessarily how you
present yourself in a public space on the internet, but
that you are traceable. If people were traceable and
knew that, should they cross a certain line, the cops,
the courts or whatever could fairly rapidly ascertain
who they were and reach out to them, I think that
would have a tremendously beneficial effect across the
internet in all sorts of different ways.
Of course immediately you then get thrown back at
you, “What about political dissidents in North Korea?
What about whistle-blowers? What about people
dealing with sensitive subjects of one kind or another
who need or can benefit from anonymity?” Two things
to say about that: I have no desire to make it more
difficult for political dissidents in North Korea to
overthrow their Government, if that is what they want
to do. I have no desire to make it harder for whistleblowers to do their public service or for people who
deal with sensitive information. But it cannot for ever
be a question of either you make your children safer,
or you make it impossible for political dissidents to
log on.
Q23 Chair: So how do you do it? What is it that you
would like to happen?
John Carr: One potential route would be to develop
a trusted third-party institution of some kind in whose
integrity one could have a very high degree of
confidence that could issue IDs that would not be
disclosed to anybody unless and until due process had
been followed. If you were dealing with a sensitive
health issue or you were a whistle-blower, or if you
were a political dissident in a particular country or
whatever—although God knows, after the revelations
of what the NSA gets up to with Mr Snowden,
whether you would ever trust the internet again
anyway—you would be able to be behind a shield of
anonymity without putting yourself entirely beyond
the pale.
Q24 Chair: So you have that, but what I am asking
is what are you expecting Facebook, for instance, to
do to satisfy themselves?
John Carr: Sorry, right. So the requirement on
internet service providers would be to verify that the
individual who has just signed up with them is not in
fact a dog, but an actual human being with an actual
and verified address where they can be reached. That
alone would act as a major brake on a lot of the bad
behaviour.
Q25 Chair: At the moment, I go on to Facebook and
call myself Donald Duck, I have created
donaldduck@hotmail.com or whatever—
Steve Rotheram: No, I did Donald Duck.
Chair: Oh, Steve has Donald Duck. But whatever it
is, I have a Facebook account. What is that you want
Facebook to do before signing me up?
John Carr: What the gambling companies do now is
to say, “If you want to place a bet, that is fine; that is
what we are here for. We just need to check that you
are who you say you are”. They ask you for various
bits of information—four or five different pieces of
personal information that they confirm—and
assuming everything holds up they give you your
account. You can then call yourself Donald Duck; it
does not matter. That particular Donald Duck will be
traceable back to John Whittingdale, SW1 and you
will behave accordingly, one assumes.
Q26 Chair: Do you think there is any prospect of
Facebook or Twitter agreeing to do this?
John Carr: Not voluntarily, no, but with all the
revelations Mr Snowden has made and continuing
escalation in criminal behaviour online, and law
enforcement around the world feeling more and more
beleaguered and besieged, I do not think the current
situation is sustainable in the very long run. Will big
companies on the west coast of America seek to resist
this? Yes, they will. It will be a tussle of will between
political institutions and Governments as to who wins
that battle or how quickly it will be won, but I have
no doubt the current situation is not tenable in the
long run.
Q27 Steve Rotheram: Chair, I think there could be
an evidence session just on that one aspect of what
we are looking at. I have met Facebook, Twitter, the
police, the Home Office and the DPP on trolling as an
issue. I thought I had a simplistic solution whereby the
verification could be done with somebody’s national
insurance number, but it costs to go through the
verification process and the likes of Twitter and
Facebook are not prepared voluntarily to cost
themselves several billions of pounds because there
are literally billions of people who are on social media
platforms, so it would take something from the
Government to force their hand.
There are also issues of death threats and certainly
rape threats that happened to a Member of Parliament,
and the algorithm did not quite pick that up because
it was a little bit more subtle. There were issues about
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Ev 10 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
that, so that had to be monitored by an individual over
a two-week period and somebody was arrested for
that. The laws are in place. The laws around this are
very complex. We have picked up on seven different
pieces of legislation that can be covered for what
happens online and offline, so it might be time for
Parliament to look at this as an issue and to take it
seriously. There is something called the Trolling
Academy that promotes individuals specifically to
troll MPs, for instance. After this, who knows? We
might all get what I got last time I mentioned this,
which was lots and lots of Twitter feeds or whatever
they are called—tweets—and Facebook feeds on our
statuses attacking us. But there you go, that is part
and parcel.
If we could just move on to the issue about child
abuse images, given that these images are illegal
throughout the world, to what do you attribute the
apparent prevalence of the material that was
mentioned before? Was it 300 million pieces that are
known to exist in the UK alone?
John Carr: I think it is a profound shock to realise
that so many people are interested in that type of
material. There is an appetite for it and people go and
get it, and they circulate it. They are getting away with
it because we do not have the capacity to stamp it out.
Q28 Steve Rotheram: We do not have the capacity.
John Carr: We do not at the moment, for sure. I do
not know if Peter Davies has arrived in the room yet.
Look at Peter Davies’ interview on TV at the end of
May. He said he would like to arrest all 50,000 to
60,000 people who CEOP had identified as being
involved in exchanging or trading these images, but
that is not the situation we are in, so they go after
the—
Q29 Steve Rotheram: Is it lack of capacity or
resource? We have the ability, because we can detect
them.
John Carr: I suppose if Peter had 100,000 police
officers and an unlimited budget, he could probably
get them all, but we have not, and I do not see any
scenario where that is going to happen.
Claire Lilley: The internet has caused a huge growth
in the number of people who are looking at these
images. It has removed a lot of the key inhibitors that
would have once stopped men looking at it. You can
now get these images completely anonymously, they
are free or very affordable, and they are very easily
accessible. Because of those three things, we have
seen a growth in men—it is usually men—who once
would not have gone down this route, but now they
are looking at it. That is why the NSPCC believes
there is a need for a public education campaign. From
studies of offenders, their motivations and the reasons
why they have done it, quite a lot of them will
maintain that they have not done anything wrong, that
it was just an image and that they did not touch a
child, so they did not actually commit child abuse. We
need to educate people that these are not just images;
that by looking at these images, they are committing
an offence; that a child is being re-victimised every
single time an image is looked at; and that they are
potentially affecting their own sensitivity around the
issue and escalating their own ability to go down that
route and end up abusing in the physical sense
themselves. There is quite a lot of research now about
the crossover between non-contact and contact
offending and CEOP would put it at about 50%. There
are a couple of studies that put it at between 40% and
55%, which is a very high level of crossover. It is not
just looking at an image; it is much more dangerous
than that.
Q30 Steve Rotheram: You said that they are easily
accessible images. Does that in some way excuse the
fact that people might innocently stumble on them?
My understanding is that it is not easy to click on
something and then for these graphic images that we
are talking about, even though there are 300 million
of them, to be readily accessible—there are other
things that you would have to click on to. So if you
just put a name up or something and a whole list of
images came up, they would not be of the graphic
nature, surely, of child images.
John Carr: It depends. You can get pretty quickly to
some of them. Some of the ostensibly legal adult sites
will have sections with names like “jail bait” or
“barely legal” and very often that is a code for saying
if you keep going just a couple of clicks through there,
you will find stuff that is not legal and definitely is
jail bait. If you go on to peer-to-peer networks, you
can type in certain words and pretty quickly get at
them. You are right that you need a little bit of
determination, but not a great deal.
Claire Lilley: Anyone who innocently stumbles across
them accidently should be reporting them immediately
to the IWF. Lots of people do, though not everyone
by any means. I am sure the IWF will talk about that
in the next session.
John Carr: Just be clear, we are not blaming the
internet for this. People do things, not machines. What
the internet has done is open pathways that have
allowed people to walk down them in a way that just
was not there before. That is the shocking and
surprising thing—the numbers of people who have
decided to walk down that path.
Q31 Steve Rotheram: But internet providers cannot
abrogate responsibility completely for those images
being on their systems. Surely there must be some
people who could block those images.
John Carr: Absolutely; I 100% agree. We do have a
fundamental issue with the law, of course, which is
that the EU-wide e-commerce directive expressly says
that you have no legal liability or responsibility for
anything on your network unless and until you have
actual knowledge of its existence. Some companies
take that as a get out of jail card. They say, correctly,
“We are not accountable. We cannot be prosecuted or
pursued for failing positively to go forward to try to
block things.” To their credit, many choose to,
certainly in the UK, but not all do. That is because
our law says there is no liability for this material
online unless and until you have actual knowledge.
Q32 Steve Rotheram: Even though the content itself
is illegal.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 11
15 October 2013 John Carr, Claire Lilley and Anthony Smythe
John Carr: To be honest, they must know that that
illegal content is on their network, but unless they
have actual knowledge of it, they cannot be held
liable. I get that, up to a point—you cannot find
somebody guilty of something if they do not know
specifically that it is there—but I think it is a shield
that scoundrels can hide behind. We ought to simply
acknowledge that this stuff is out there and there
should be an expectation that companies running
internet access providing services or internet ISPs
ought to have an obligation to try to intervene to
minimise or reduce this type of material, even if you
do not hold them legally liable.
Q33 Steve Rotheram: Do we know how many sites
or images are taken down on a regular basis?
John Carr: You have the IWF appearing in a minute.
Chair: Absolutely; that is for our next panel.
Claire Lilley: Just one last point. There is a lot of
information we do not know and one of the things that
we do not have in this area is some sort of high-level
strategic information-sharing forum. There is a lot of
partnership working going on, but there is no one
place in which it is held in the same way as I believe
there is for terrorism, for example. We obviously have
UKCCIS, but it does not deal with child abuse images
online because it largely takes the view that those are
illegal and therefore that is dealt with. I think we do
need some sort of more strategic forum at which
industry—CEOP, IWF, everyone—gets around the
table and shares information and best practice about
what can be done.
Chair: That very neatly leads us to our next panel, so
may I thank the three of you very much?
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Susie Hargreaves, Chief Executive, Internet Watch Foundation, and Peter Davies, Child
Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Centre, gave evidence
Q34 Chair: May I welcome our next two witnesses:
Susie Hargreaves, Chief Executive of the Internet
Watch Foundation, and Peter Davies, the Chief
Executive of CEOP?
Perhaps we can continue from the point we reached
with the last panel: can you first of all give us your
idea of the volume, the scale of the problem and the
number of people who are involved; and perhaps
address Claire’s point about the need for greater coordination in gathering information?
Peter Davies: After you.
Susie Hargreaves: Thank you very much, Mr
Chairman. Would it be useful if I just gave a brief
summary of how the IWF works and the key areas in
which we operate?
Chair: Yes.
Susie Hargreaves: The IWF is the UK hotline for
reporting criminal content, specifically child sexual
abuse content hosted anywhere in the world, nonphotographic images of child sexual abuse hosted in
the UK and obscene adult content hosted in the UK.
We are a self-regulatory body founded by the UK
internet industry 17 years ago. We are an independent
charity with an independent board and independent of
law enforcement and Government. Our operations are
covered by a memorandum of understanding with the
Association of Chief Police Officers and a service
level agreement with CEOP. We work very closely
with CEOP on a day-to-day basis. Very quickly, we
are funded by the internet industry—80% of our
money comes from them and the remaining 20%
comes from the EU as the Safer Internet Centre for
the UK along with Childnet International and the
South West Grid for Learning.
Specifically, the way we work is that we currently take
reports from the public—although this is about to
change—and assess those reports, and if we find that
child sexual abuse content is hosted in the UK, we
issue a notice and takedown. We typically have the
content removed in under 60 minutes. If it is hosted
outside the UK, which the majority are, we notify the
sister hotline in that country or international law
enforcement, and until such time as that content is
removed, we place it on a blocking list, which is used
across the UK and in many other countries. It is a
very dynamic list and it is updated twice a day, and
the content stays on the blocking list until such time
as it is removed at source. The most effective way to
remove content is to remove it at source. It is our view
that blocking will only stop inadvertent access and
will not stop the determined. We also have a
keywords list.
My final point is to say that 17 years ago, when we
were founded, 18% of child sexual abuse content was
hosted in the UK. It is now down to less than 1%
and that is because of the tremendous relationships we
have. It is about partnership working. It is about the
UK and international internet industry, and our
relationship with law enforcement, the Government,
the public and civil society.
To answer specifically your question about the extent
of the problem, the truth is that nobody knows how
many images are out there. John has mentioned a
number of images, but we do not know. Nobody
knows how many unique images are out there. The
majority of the images we see are duplicates and I
imagine that the majority of the images within those
numbers that John quoted were also duplicates. To
give you an indication, we see about one to two new
images a week. The scale of the problem to us is that
last year we had about 40,000 reports of which we
actioned just under 9,500 individual webpages. A
webpage can contain from one image up to thousands
of images or videos. Of those just under 10,000, 35
were hosted in the UK. In terms of the type of content,
81% were of children who appeared to be 10 and
under; 4% were under 2; and 53% were levels 4 and
5, which are the rape and sexual torture of children.
Q35 Chair: Just before Peter Davies comes in, I have
a couple of questions. You said one or two new
images a week. That does not sound very many, given
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Ev 12 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
that previously we have been talking about millions
and millions of images. These are just the same
images being circulated round and round? You are not
suggesting that only one or two new images are taken
every week; it is just the ones that you happen to
stumble across, is it?
Susie Hargreaves: Yes. The majority of images that
our analysts see are images they have seen many,
many times because images are recirculated. This is
one of the issues that we try to get across, particularly
in terms of young people’s behaviour on Sex Teen, is
once an image is out there, it is out there for ever
because it will just be recirculated and redistributed.
What it means is that when we do see a new image,
we can immediately work with the police to notify
them, because if it is an unidentified child, we can say
it is a new image and pass it on to the police.
Just also to clarify, our role is around the removal of
content, and we pass on and share intelligence with
the police, but we are very much not part of the police
side of the work. We are not about the child protection
side or the safeguarding of that child, or in fact the
investigation of the perpetrators. But in terms of the
new images, we see very few new images, but we see
an awful lot of recycled images.
Q36 Chair: You said the best way of dealing with
this is at source and that you talk to your sister
organisations. But in the world where there is no
equivalent of you, where people are likely to host this
material, are the particular countries where it is hosted
that you cannot get to?
Susie Hargreaves: There are 42 hotlines in 39
countries. The majority of them are in Europe and
North America and Australia—those sort of countries.
We are working with the Commonwealth and with
ITU, the UN International Telecommunications
Union, to look at ways in which we can provide a
back-office solution for countries without a hotline
where they are having increasing internet penetration
to be able to report. We provide them with some
support to do that, because what we are seeing, as
John Carr talked about, is that as internet penetration
grows in developing countries, people are starting to
access these images.
In terms of where the content is hosted, about 50% of
it is in North America—the US and Canada. We are
seeing less content hosted in Russia than we saw in
previous years. Patterns change slightly—we are
seeing some emerging markets out in Asia, Cambodia,
Vietnam—but the majority is hosted in the United
States.
Q37 Chair: Yet the United States presumably has
pretty tough laws about this, does it not?
Susie Hargreaves: One of the reasons we are so
effective in the UK is because we self-regulate, so we
do not have any mandatory powers to enforce internet
companies to remove the content, but they do it on a
voluntary basis, which means they can remove the
content very quickly. In the States, internet companies
are obliged to notify the National Centre for Missing
and Exploited Children—Peter will be able to answer
this much better than I can—and they then have to go
through a quite lengthy judicial process to have the
content removed. That means that it takes a lot longer.
Since we have been in operation, it used to take 20
days to remove the content in the US. It is now down
to 10 days. We are working very closely with them.
We now have permission to go directly to
organisations that are members of ours and are based
in the States and simultaneously to alert them to the
fact that they are hosting content at the same time as
we tell the police in the States. We are trying to bring
that time down, but it is to do with the judicial system
and how law enforcement works in the States, but I
defer to Peter’s expertise on this.
Q38 Mr Bradshaw: You just implied that the speed
of taking content down is part of the reason why a lot
of it is hosted in the US. Did you mean to suggest
that connection?
Susie Hargreaves: No, I do not mean to do that. The
reason why a lot of it is hosted in the US is, first of
all, that a lot of companies are based there. The
internet industry is very big in the States. Also, there
is all sorts of legislation around freedom of
information and ability to host certain sites, which is
to do with their judicial systems. But, Peter, you
would probably answer that better.
Peter Davies: Chairman, thank you. Should I perhaps
wind back to an introduction, if that is okay?
Chair: Yes, I think that would be helpful.
Peter Davies: But I will happily address any questions
raised. I am grateful to Susie for leading off.
My name is Peter Davies. I am now the Director of
CEOP, which is one of the four commands within the
National Crime Agency, which commenced last
Monday, 7 October. The CEOP centre has existed
since 2006 and was previously affiliated to the Serious
Organised Crime Agency. Our mission, whether as a
centre or as a command, as we are now, is to protect
children from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.
When we were founded, there was heavy emphasis on
online protection. Our remit does not limit us to online
activity, but what we try to do is to become a national
hub for intelligence, a national contact point and a
source of expertise and specialist support on any
aspect of child sexual exploitation that would benefit
from that approach. We still have a very strong
heritage and a very high level of expertise in child
abuse imagery and other related forms of harm.
Our threat assessment, which is published every year,
was most recently updated in June this year and in
that we identified four key threats to which we address
our minds, two of which are specific to online. One
of those is the proliferation of indecent images of
children. Images, as I am sure you will know, are a
harm in themselves. They are scenes of crime. They
are depictions and recordings of children being very
seriously raped and sexually abused and the
possession of these is a crime—and rightly so. The
possession of these is also, as Claire Lilley referred
to, quite a strong indicator of a sexual interest in
children that also extends to physical abuse, and so
anybody who possesses indecent images of children
is a criminal, but is also somebody who might present
an additional risk to children, as if that were not
enough.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 13
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
I can go back to talking about the overall level of
prevalence, but I also want to highlight the other
aspect of threat that we are very concerned about,
which is what we call online child sexual exploitation.
This is less well understood. I would not estimate the
prevalence of it, but what we can say is that this
appears to be an emerging trend of offending and its
consequences for the victims extend to fatal
consequences and are in many cases very severe. This
is not so much about taking an interest in indecent
images of children as about using the medium of the
internet to contact, ruthlessly manipulate and exploit
and sexually abuse children to the point of causing
them physical and psychological harm, and in some
cases pushing them towards suicide either because of
the acts they have been compelled to do, or in some
cases because they have carried out acts online that
are then used to blackmail them for money—money
they do not always have. So these are the two key
areas of threat.
We have excellent relationships with a number of
external bodies, including the Internet Watch
Foundation, which I think is a world-leading
organisation at doing what it does.
Our remit does not extend to all the issues that I know
you are examining because we have to focus in.
Everybody has a view about the risks associated, for
example, with children accessing adult pornography
online. We have to restrict our interest in that
professionally to the extent to which it makes them
more vulnerable as victims, or maybe increases the
possibility that they will be offenders in future.
Turning to prevalence, on the second threat I referred
to, online child sexual exploitation, we do not know
and we would not pretend to know. We deal with a
number of cases, and a growing number of cases, of
increasing severity. The type of offending is hugely
harmful and also complex to investigate because it
necessitates no physical contact at all between the
offender and the victim. It is not uncommon for us to
encounter situations where offenders in one country
will target and harvest victims in a completely
different part of the world. The complexities that
presents are obvious. But we do not know how much
is going on and it is in the nature of any form of
child sexual abuse or exploitation that it will be underreported by the victims because the whole process is
designed to minimise the risk that they will report and
designed to induce shame and embarrassment and all
the things that might stop a young or vulnerable
person coming forward and saying what has happened
to them.
Q39 Chair: Where is it principally happening? Is it
Facebook?
Peter Davies: It is important to identify that what we
are trying to tackle is appalling aspects of human
behaviour, to some extent facilitated by the internet.
At the moment we are seeing roughly half of this kind
of activity—online child sexual exploitation—taking
place through social networking sites. Of course
Facebook is a major one, but not the only one. We are
also seeing it taking place through chat environments
and other forums. But it is important to realise, as I
think John Carr said previously, that the medium is
not to blame. The medium might be managed better
so that it is safer for its users, but what is to blame is
human behaviour, albeit through the internet
amplified, multiplied and in some cases almost
industrialised to a quite remarkable degree.
In terms of the proliferation of indecent images of
children, we are a little bit clearer about this. I would
not estimate a total number of indecent images
circulating on the internet; I would not estimate the
number that are duplicates or unique. I would
probably observe that regrettably there are more now
than when you started sitting this morning and that is
one of the major challenges that we have. You don’t
need me to explain what has to happen for an image
to be created.
Q40 Chair: That does not quite equate with the one
or two new ones a week, if you see what I mean.
Peter Davies: Our experience is different, because of
course we are a different organisation and we receive
reports through different routes. It is absolutely true
to say that the majority of images that we encounter
are repeats. I do not have a figure on the proportion
that are new, but a lot of our investigations are not so
much into the images themselves but into the child
abuse they portray or the child abuse that they give us
an opportunity to interdict, and so it is understandable
that we may not come up with the same figure. As I
say, I would not estimate the total number circulating.
There are always more being produced and obviously
that again is a harm in itself.
Where we have got somewhere as a centre over the
last two years is getting a sense of how many
offenders there are in the UK, and I think John Carr
has already referred to this. In our thematic
assessment published in June, we estimated that there
may be around—I use that term carefully—50,000
people in the UK who commit offences at least to the
level of possessing indecent images of children, which
is quite a stark figure to contemplate. But I am firmly
of the view that it is not enough to deal with a handful
of cases—and deal with them well, which I believe
CEOP and our colleagues in law enforcement,
supported by our partners, do—but have a sense of
the overall scope of the problem, because it is that
sense of the overall scope that drives a lot of other
people who can help to want to do something as well.
I would echo roughly what Susie says about the trends
in images. We check trends in images every year and
our experience recently has been that the victims
appear to be getting younger and younger and the
level of abuse portrayed appears to be getting worse
and worse. So there is no comfort in any of these
aspects of our analysis.
In terms of reporting, if I may just cue in based on
Susie’s point, we do receive reports from the Internet
Watch Foundation. We have a very clear service level
agreement and we are looking to revise and update
that into a collaboration agreement very shortly. We
are keen to work together with the IWF every step of
the way. We also have partnerships with other
organisations that report incidents to us, the most
high-volume one being the one that Susie referred to,
which is the National Centre for Missing and
Exploited Children in the United States, from whom
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Ev 14 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
we receive on average maybe 800 reports per month.
We also have reports from UK organisations
including, very importantly, the IWF. We are also
available for any member of the public who wishes to
report any concerns to us online. That public reporting
has probably doubled in volume over the last year or
year and a half, and we generally expect 300-plus
reports into CEOP online from the public every month
about incidents of concern.
Susie Hargreaves: Mr Chairman, could I clarify the
issue around the number of new images? When we
talk about new images, it might be a series of images,
but you have to remember that that means two new
children who have been sexually abused. So it is not
just an image, it is two new children who have been
sexually abused in itself, and it will be the worst of
the worst stuff.
Also, I just wanted to say there is a lot of information
out there about potentially how many images there are
and of course it is a changing field from day to day,
but I do think there is still a need for some very robust
research. I would certainly echo what Claire was
saying earlier on. Although we have the UKCCIS
board, of which we are both members, that is very
much around the whole field of child internet safety
and online protection. In the field of online child
sexual abuse content, we do need a kind of high-level
strategic thinking body to get together a couple of
times a year to start to share that high level of
intelligence. It only works in the UK because we work
in partnership and all do our specific bits, but it is
really important that we understand the whole and
the context.
Q41 Mr Bradshaw: If most of this content is being
generated in the States, who are these children? Have
they been—
Susie Hargreaves: Sorry, could I clarify? It is not
necessarily generated in the States; it is hosted in the
States.
Peter Davies: If I can help, the process by which it is
identified is a specific piece of legislation that exists
in the United States called the Protect Our Children
Act 2008. It places an obligation on communications
and internet service providers to identify and report to
NCMEC, the National Center, incidents that appear to
depict child sexual exploitation. There is a piece of
legislation in the States that places this obligation and
it is in the discharge of that obligation that they report
everything—well, the performance varies, but they
report things to the National Center and the National
Center identifies the location of these through internet
protocol addresses and so on. What we receive in the
UK is effectively, for want of a better expression, the
UK slice of all that which is reported to the National
Center.
Q42 Mr Bradshaw: So where is it being generated?
Who are these children? Have they been kidnapped?
Are they within families?
Peter Davies: It is hard to tell. There is one more
thing I could add. There are very few internet
transactions that we can do that do not travel through
more than one country, and because a great deal of
the internet is hosted or serviced in some way in the
United States, that is why this piece of legislation is
so powerful. It may well be that it is a UK individual
sending to a friend an indecent image of a child, but
because of the way that the internet works, it passes
through the US. Depending on the extent to which the
service providers are attentive and surveil these
things, that is where it might get picked up.
Q43 Chair: IWF, you have been talking about
content hosted on websites that people can access.
You have just mentioned direct peer to peer. Is it
possible to give us a rough estimate of what
proportion is done peer to peer and what proportion is
done through a website?
Peter Davies: Yes, it is. We do not share all the
information we have or the means by which we
acquire it, for reasons I am sure you will understand,
but our estimation is that the highest volume of
offenders is in the peer-to-peer category, which means
they are not offending on the open internet. They are
in groups of people whom they know, or think they
know, and they have an increased level of trust and
confidence that within those groups they can share
child abuse imagery, child abuse material and so on.
So the highest volume of offenders is in the peer-topeer area.
There are offenders who use what is called the hidden
internet, also known as Tor or The Onion Router or
something similar. This is harder to penetrate, but I
believe not impossible. These offenders are far fewer
in number. The issue with them is they quite possibly
pose the most serious risk because they are technically
sophisticated and some of the harm that we see taking
place in that part of the internet is some of the worst
that we see.
Q44 Chair: And Tor, do I need a computer science
degree to use it? I know you cannot find—
Peter Davies: Absolutely. I do not want to advertise
it, but it is possible to download it and start using it
on a normal home computer. It was designed by the
US Navy in the 1980s, I believe, and released to the
world. Some of our most sophisticated offenders use
Tor. It is also important to realise that some other
serious organised criminals use Tor as well. People
may be aware of the arrest of somebody who was the
proprietor of something called The Silk Road, so Tor
is also used for drugs distribution, distribution of other
criminal materials and obviously communication
between criminal groups.
Q45 Steve Rotheram: IWF and CEOP have
demonstrably been successful, if we have gone from
a fairly high proportion of the images being generated
in the UK to 1%. That in itself is a success rate.
However, behind each of these individual images
there is a victim. How successful are the police in
pursuing the perpetrators of the crime against the child
who has ended up on the internet?
Peter Davies: An excellent question, and I am not
going to be able to provide a simple answer. As a
centre and as a command, CEOP is getting more
successful year by year in converting the intelligence
that is derivable from the internet into outcomes in
terms of safeguarding children. Last year we put out
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 15
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
more intelligence packages than ever to law
enforcement and also to children’s services in the UK,
precisely with that intent. It is also important to
highlight that within police forces there are very often
technically proficient and committed online child
protection units, so it is not as if CEOP is the only UK
law enforcement asset in this area. The larger forces,
particularly, often have real experts doing great work.
I think we are in a transitional phase at the moment
where we need to understand better what the overall
capability and capacity is of the whole of UK law
enforcement in order to tackle this kind of offending,
and there is a plan in place to do that. We do not have
the sufficiently high-quality robust data for me to give
you proper arrest figures and things like that, and I
can only really tell you at the moment that which gets
reported back to CEOP. Again, there is a plan to
improve and develop that because I think it is
important for me, or the person sitting in my chair, to
have a really good answer to that question and to be
able to provide it for you. My observation is that there
is a lot more law enforcement activity going on than
it is possible to capture at the present time. This is
something that HM Inspectorate of Constabulary has
picked up on and noticed, and is working on.
John Carr has a way of putting things very simply and
of course if there are 50,000 offenders out there and
they are detectable, we should not really be resting
until they have been detected. What we have to do in
the face of a gap between provision and what we
would like to do is prioritise, and that is what law
enforcement and others charged with public safety
always do. What we try to do is prioritise the people
who do pose the highest risk to children by bringing
in risk factors that help us identify them. We focus on
the worst offenders—the people who are at the heart
of networks that cause greater harm—so numbers are
not the whole story; it is the seriousness and the
numbers put together. The best evidence of whether
we are arresting the right people of those that we can
arrest is the number of children who are safeguarded
as a consequence. I can tell you that in the annual
report that we published in May this year, it was very
clear that we are getting more successful than ever at
doing the most important thing I think we can do,
which is safeguarding children who are at serious risk.
Q46 Steve Rotheram: Is there any way that we can
quantify that? While I absolutely accept the success
of taking down images and the fact that it is
demonstrably and obviously a criminal act to
distribute the images, surely identifying the poor
child—the individual who has been exploited—should
be the primary concern.
Peter Davies: Absolutely, it is.
Q47 Steve Rotheram: Do you work with
international law enforcement agencies? If we can
identify an image that might not have been taken in
the UK but might have been taken outside, do we still
pursue that outside of our boundaries?
Peter Davies: Very much so, apologies. We have a
victim identification unit in CEOP that has huge
expertise in looking at images and looking for clues
within them about how to track back to the child. This
was a specialist unit that was featured relatively
recently on Crimewatch, for example.
We always seek to cultivate the best possible
relationships with law enforcement partners in other
countries. CEOP was a founding member, and is still
a board and management member, of an organisation
called the Virtual Global Taskforce, which now
comprises eight different countries from around the
world. Well below that strategic level, there are really
good relationships, and indeed technically facilitated
virtual private networks that enable, for example, my
victim identification team to deal directly with
colleagues around the world.
Some of our best successes have been quite
remarkable regarding the speed with which we have
received intelligence on UK activity from another
country. We have seen opportunities to identify where
that is taking place from the image and we have dealt
effectively with the local police force concerned.
There are occasions within my time at CEOP where
that whole process from end to end has taken less than
a day, and as a result children who were definitely
at serious risk have been safeguarded and offenders
arrested. That is the ideal. That is what we would like
to happen every day. It is in the nature of the fluidity
of these things and the complexity of international
relationships that that does not always work, but it
works sufficiently often to make us believe that it is
worth pressing on with that. There is no occasion
when we would not share information with law
enforcement elsewhere that might give them the
opportunity to do the right thing in their country as
well.
Susie Hargreaves: We work also in the field of victim
identification. We work very closely with CEOP; we
are trained by CEOP. When our analysts see a new
child, they look for particular clues within the picture
and do some analysis of those new children. As a
result, we also work very closely with international
law enforcement—with Interpol; with Europol; with
international locally-based law enforcement—and
certainly through our work over the last three years,
12 children have been rescued. There are statistics that
we can show in relation to rescuing children. It is
about a partnership approach, but very much working
very closely with law enforcement on an
international level.
Q48 Steve Rotheram: Are there any changes that
either organisation would like to see to either the law
in this country or international law that would help
you to do your jobs better?
Peter Davies: Yes. In terms of international law, we
need to start from the point of recognition that the
UK has just about the best suite of child protection
legislation that there is, and that we are more of an
example to others than we are in need of catching up.
But when you are in the business of child protection,
that gives you no cause for complacency, but it is
important to note at a Committee such as this. There
are two conventions, details of which I would rather
supply separately, but they are the Budapest
Convention and the Lanzarote Convention. One is
mainly about online matters and one is about child
protection. My sense is that if countries sign up to
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Ev 16 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
and work up to both these conventions combined, that
provides probably the highest straightforward level of
assurance you can have that they will be equipping
themselves to protect children online.
Turning to the UK, it is quite remarkable to me how
far the criminal legislation, for example, around
indecent images of children, which was, I believe,
conceived and passed before the internet was around,
has still pretty much stood up to the new world of
child abuse online, and I do not think what we need
is a basic root-and-branch piece of work. It is my firm
operational view, and I have articulated it previously,
that if there is one piece of legislation that would most
help us tackle online child abuse, it would be the
provision of a clear, consistent and properly enforced
regime for retaining and accessing communications
data, because we are regularly in a situation where we
are unable to convert, for example, an IP address into
a name and address for lack of that precise thing. I
appreciate that it has been under consideration. I am
merely repeating an operational view that I have
articulated previously.
Q49 Chair: You can get a court order to get an ISP
to divulge the address.
Peter Davies: It is possible. The issue is that it is
not always an ISP; it can be a communication service
provider. They are sometimes configured differently.
My experience is that some are more able to provide
the information we need than others, and when this
legislation was under debate a little while ago, I took
the view that our general attrition rate—the proportion
of questions we would like an answer to that we do
not get—is roughly 25%. Now, if you are dealing with
a repeat victim or repeat offender, there are ways of
getting around some of those, but it is implicit in that
missing 25% that there will be lost opportunities for
us to do the right thing. At the expense of sounding
repetitive, I still think that is the most important single
piece of legislation that would be of assistance to us.
Susie Hargreaves: Three things, if I may. One is that
we do have some of the most robust legislation in the
world in the field of child sexual abuse online, and
certainly this is one of the reasons why we are setting
up a back-office solution for countries without a
hotline, because we will assess it under UK law and
it means that it will be dealt with very thoroughly. So
on that front, we do not feel that we need new
legislation.
What we do feel though is that it is very important
that people do not conflate the two issues between
people accessing criminal content, which is what we
deal with, and young people’s access to adult content,
and this is not particularly helpful. Certainly within
Westminster, the issues need to be kept totally
separate. Where, as a citizen and a mother, I might
care that my teenager has access to adult content, it is
entirely different to anybody having access to criminal
content. We need to keep these very separate. We also
need to have an awareness that we are a world model
in relation to the internet industry support for the IWF,
and in terms of the internet industry’s commitment to
support the removal of child sexual abuse content.
They are currently working with us on a membership
review to look at ways that they can step up that
support, and it is being done in a very positive frame
of mind, and certainly it is one in which the industry
does take its role very seriously. We only exist
because of the industry.
The third thing I just wanted to say was that in relation
to tackling this, it is our experience that young men
aged between 18 and 25 are the most likely to stumble
across it in the first place, and they will do that
through the open internet, not through peer-to-peer
networks. Because it is such a huge issue, we need to
do much more to raise people’s awareness to report
and do the right thing, and to know that it is wrong.
It is not just a question of looking at an image; it is a
child who has been sexually abused. It is criminal.
The consequences of looking at it are potentially
extremely serious for everyone concerned, so it is to
raise awareness to stop people going there in the first
place.
Q50 Mr Sutcliffe: As a Home Office Minister in
2006, I visited CEOP under the leadership of Jim
Gamble and, as you quite rightly said, Peter, it was
set up as a unit because there seemed to be no
consistency of approach across the 42 forces in
relation to this issue. Seven years later, with all the
experience that CEOP has gained, is the incorporation
of CEOP into the National Crime Agency a good
thing or a bad thing?
Peter Davies: I think it is absolutely a good thing.
You will no doubt have followed our progress in the
meantime and be aware that when I came in three
years ago, it was very much a major issue. Since then,
we have set about the business of contributing to the
construction of the National Crime Agency, and also
to making sure that we were absolutely able to dock
into it effectively. There are a number of different
aspects that I can offer up as evidence that it is a good
thing, but the simple answer is, “Yes, absolutely no
question.” However, may I just offer one or two
examples none the less?
Firstly, SOCA, and therefore CEOP, when you visited
us, were never subject to a piece of legislation called
the Children Act 2004, which places an obligation on
public bodies—and others where appropriate—to
have regard to the safeguarding and welfare of
children in all their activities. Every police force was
subject to that expectation, but not SOCA and
therefore not CEOP. The new National Crime Agency
has asked to be and is subject to that obligation, and
I can tell you, as the Director of the CEOP command,
that is influencing not just how we do the work that
CEOP has traditionally done, but also influencing the
way that the Agency thinks about the interests of
children in its other activities, and that is quite a
significant difference.
During the time I have been Chief Executive and now
Director, the resources and the number of people
available to do CEOP’s work have increased, and that
increase will continue into the NCA. There are aspects
of what we have been doing in the past that are a
major test of resilience, and the NCA is taking on
some of those aspects in order precisely to help to
take some of the load that that creates. The alternative
is, as we have had to do in the past, that we have to
move people from other parts of CEOP to support
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 17
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
some of these functions, which is not the best use of
their time.
Another major gain is that it is not just about CEOP
any more. Our mission is shared by the whole
National Crime Agency and the structure of the
agency is such that where the intelligence is
sufficiently compelling and where the balance of risk
dictates, the NCA can mobilise 2,000 of its own law
enforcement officers to carry out operations to do with
child sexual exploitation. One of the first tasks, other
than set up the agency, that its Director General, Keith
Bristow, was asked to do was to conduct a further
investigation into child abuse at the Bryn Estyn
children’s home in north Wales, which was an
operation carried out under the operational name
Pallial, and there have been a number of releases of
information and updates about that.
I could go on, but all those things point to the NCA
being the right place for CEOP to be, and also to the
major gain that it is not just about CEOP against the
world—we are part of an agency that shares our
objectives and ethos, and that is keen to help.
Q51 Mr Sutcliffe: I am heartened by that, because
clearly it was a high-profile agency when it was set
up, but what you are saying now is, with maturity, it
is now back within the family, if you like. That then
leads me on to the relationships with police forces
in terms of whether CEOP just seen as, “You refer
everything to CEOP,” or do forces actively deal with
this as an issue in their parameters?
Peter Davies: I think forces have actively dealt with
this for a long time. It has not always been fully
acknowledged. I myself, before I came to CEOP, was
involved in a major crime inquiry to do with a news
group permitting the sharing of indecent images
online, which we did in partnership with CEOP, but
that was a local police force doing the right thing, and
there is a fair bit of that going on.
Another aspect of the agency, which we have to
approach with caution, is that ultimately it has a
responsibility not just to manage how it uses its own
4,500 officers, but for making sure that the collective
efforts of UK law enforcement deal with the risk in
the most efficient and effective way possible. There is
no big problem there, because we experience very
good relationships with police forces. We co-operate
very well, we try to find the right balance of resources
so they can do what they do best and we can support
them, or sometimes co-ordinate them—or very
occasionally lead them, as appropriate. So the picture
was never that bleak.
My experience, more anecdotal than out of
certainty—refer to my previous answer—is that police
forces are investing in the skills to do this area of
work. Where I am less clear and less well able to
answer with the accuracy I would like is on exactly
how much capacity is invested in this across those 42
forces, the extent to which it looks similar and the
extent that it can be interoperable, which means that
officers from one force use the same systems and have
the same approach as officers from another and can
easily work together when possible. We have a plan
for how we are going to learn that. The architecture
of the NCA allows us to pursue that sense of national
consistency in a way we were never able to do before,
and that is another significant gain.
Q52 Mr Sutcliffe: May I just follow that through
because when I have briefings from our local police
forces about what goes on within their force, it is
about robberies or a variety of different things that are
there, but this never gets reported, in the sense that
they do not tell me about what work they are doing in
this area. What I am slightly worried about is how we
get—because a lot of this is about education and
making sure that people understand the nature of this
crime—the information out there? What are the
mechanisms for raising the awareness of those forces
to raise awareness within their communities?
Peter Davies: Yes. I think there is a whole variety of
things. You may have seen when you visited CEOP
that we have an education team and we have a very
strong internet presence. We have a website to which
the public are more than welcome to get advice and
to access materials. We also have a network of
ambassadors and volunteers, and we create new
education packages every year with the intention that
our ambassadors and volunteers can convey them to
children. This is a real success story for CEOP,
because out of a team of maybe three or four people,
we manage to reach over 2.5 million children a year
directly in a structured classroom or similar setting.
Our website regularly attracts more than a quarter of
a million unique visitors per month and recently, when
we did an information campaign about online child
sexual exploitation, the number of people coming to
our website was higher than it has ever been before.
Of course, there is always a gap, and there are far
more children out there who receive the message. This
is one of the success stories, and we engage with any
police force that wants to, in the same way as we
engage with teachers or others to use the materials
and take them out.
In terms of what police people talk about as their
priorities, which is another aspect of what you were
saying, I genuinely believe that child protection—
online and offline—has never been closer to the
mainstream of law enforcement in the UK than it is
now. The police service has always been populated by
experts—hugely passionate, committed people who
make immense sacrifices to do the work that they do.
But it is not just that. It is inescapable for police forces
to have noticed the increased number of cases of what
is called street grooming or localised grooming,
another form of child sexual exploitation. There is a
national policing plan in place to make sure every
force has the proper capability and capacity to deal
with that, and I am involved in overseeing the delivery
of that, but that plan comes from Chief Constables
and is being implemented by local Chief Constables,
supported by their PCCs. This is an interesting area,
because it is quite technically difficult and it requires
a lot of innovation and flexibility and quite a lot of
expertise to get. Generally speaking, law enforcement
does not lack that, but keeping up with internetenabled crime is always going to be a challenge.
I look forward to the day—I do not think it is far off—
when police people talk just as much about the child
sexual exploitation operations they are doing and what
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Ev 18 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
a great result they had safeguarding children through
an online inquiry as they would be talking about
armed robbery and so on. Probably, in some police
forces, we are already there.
Q53 Tracey Crouch: A lot of my questions have
already been asked, but could I just ask: do you think
that the social media providers could do more to help
combat illegal behaviour?
Susie Hargreaves: I would say that all the internet
industry regardless of social media—search engines,
ISPs, mobile operators—are all extremely aware of
their responsibilities in the field. We work very closely
with all of them. Following the Secretary of State’s
summit earlier in the summer, we were asked to look
at proactively seeking content in the future, which
means we will be the first hotline in the world with
the powers to do that, and that will mean we will need
many more analysts. In order to support that, we have
been working with the internet industry to look at
ways that they will adjust their fees accordingly. We
are in the middle of some very, very positive
discussions and everybody has stepped up. In terms
of their responsibility generally, I think all of them are
really aware of what their responsibilities are and they
are all doing what they can.
Certainly, I speak regularly at child online protection
conferences and safety conferences, and you will have
Facebook and Twitter there, and you will have those
organisations talking about what they are doing to
address the problem. I think they are aware—there are
always things that all of us could do—of what they
need to do and they are stepping up. But it is very
much a group approach and a partnership approach,
and in the same way as the police cannot solve it on
their own and we cannot solve it on our own, we all
have the responsibility to solve it. Facebook can do
so much, but people also have to adjust their
behaviour and so the education and awareness side
is absolutely crucial—young people knowing how to
protect themselves online. All these messages are
really important, and that is part of our partnership
in terms of the Safer Internet Centre with Childnet
International, which goes out to schools and do all the
awareness raising, and South West Grid for Learning,
which gives support to professionals in terms of
making sure that people can keep themselves safe. It
is part of the overall picture, so I do not think it is
enough just to say that one organisation needs to do
more. Collectively, we all need to do more.
Q54 Tracey Crouch: Do you have support networks
in place for your staff because this is pretty horrific
stuff?
Susie Hargreaves: Yes, we do. We are currently
recruiting for seven analysts, and we go through a
very intensive recruitment process. We have a threestage interview that culminates in them having a
session where they see some of the images. We have
quite a good dropout rate at that level. Anybody who
sees any of our images has very intensive training.
They cannot work on their own for six months—well,
no one can ever work on their own, but they cannot
take assessments without a second person looking at
their work for six months. They have mandatory
monthly counselling, mandatory group counselling on
a quarterly basis and an annual psychological
assessment. So we do an awful lot on the welfare
front, because obviously it is a real worry to us
because they are looking at this content all day.
Of course, the public report to us stuff that is outside
our remit and they still have to look at it. Sometimes
they might look at something—they have to open a
video to have a look at it—and it might be something
very distressing, but is kind of outside of our remit,
so that is the stuff that takes them by surprise. Yes,
they are constantly seeing really very, very distressing
stuff, but they are the most incredibly sane group of
people and they do it because they are very committed
to the issue. Certainly, when we rescue a child or we
are involved in the rescue of a child, it is the greatest
feeling in the world, and they do it because of their
commitment. But we do protect them, yes.
Q55 Tracey Crouch: I assume it is the same at
CEOP as well?
Peter Davies: Yes. I feel like saying, “What she said,”
but that is not quite adequate. We have a very similar
approach. People are psychologically assessed before
they start at CEOP, regardless of what job they are
doing. That is refreshed on a basis that is
proportionate to the level of exposure they have to
material. It is really important that people have an exit
strategy if it just becomes too much for them, and that
is one of the huge virtues of CEOP being part of a
larger organisation. People do not have to leave and
find a new job; they can simply transfer to a different
kind of duty, and that way they can move on and
develop professionally, and continue to contribute in
some other way to public safety.
We also have compared our provision with provision
in similar law enforcement units around the world
because—I am sure Susie would say the same—only
absolutely the best is good enough in terms of taking
care of our people. They do an exceptional job that
most people would understandably shy away from,
and we should be thankful that they are there to do it.
Susie Hargreaves: Absolutely.
Q56 Tracey Crouch: My very final question is
probably relevant to you, Mr Davies. I have recently
been doing quite a lot of work on modern-day slavery
and saw quite a shocking statistic for someone who
represents a south-eastern constituency: 49% of all
instances of modern-day slavery are in the south-east.
Are you able to give a figure as to perhaps what
percentage or what proportion of modern-day slavery
would be related to some sort of child sexual
exploitation?
Peter Davies: I can give you a rough figure. Of
course, as with all these things, it is based on that part
of it that we can see, and while I may be getting it
wrong by a few per cent, we would be looking at
maybe 15% to 20% of human trafficking, which is
probably our previous definition of what we now call
modern-day slavery, to have a sexual exploitation
element. Of course, some exploitation or slavery has
more than one dimension to it and there is an overlap.
We have dealt in the past with child trafficking cases.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 19
15 October 2013 Susie Hargreaves and Peter Davies
There are other parts of the National Crime Agency,
including the UK Human Trafficking Centre, which
has a specific lead on that and is part of the Organised
Crime Command, which is one of the other commands
in the agency. More generally, our view is that we
want to support those efforts precisely because the
element of it that is child sexual exploitation is not
the majority of it. There are a number of other factors
to it: forced labour; street crime; organ harvesting;
relationship abuse; domestic servitude. All those need
to be taken into account, so the issue of modern-day
slavery is something where we would like to support
national efforts on it, but where we do not own it, and
that is where I think it should be.
Q57 Tracey Crouch: So you would welcome the
Government’s intention, albeit it is very early days, of
bringing in a piece of legislation that will help to give
you those resources?
Peter Davies: I am not familiar with the proposed
piece of legislation.
Tracey Crouch: Not yet, but it is an intention.
Peter Davies: From an operational point of view, I
welcome the intention to take a very serious look at
this issue and to do more, because within that thing
that we call modern-day slavery are some of the most
vulnerable people in this country, in desperate need of
rescue—some will be children, some will not—by a
law enforcement officer, not just a child protection
person. Those people need help, so anything that puts
the spotlight on that, and that challenges us to do
better and do our best at that, is welcome to me.
Q58 Chair: Can I just ask you a couple of quick
questions? Reference has been made to your
comments about how you had identified 50,000 to
60,000 individuals but you just did not have the
resources to arrest them all. Can you give us an
indication of how far short your resources fall from
being able to pursue all those leads?
Peter Davies: It is not just our resources; it is
everything. This is an extremely large body of
offenders and we have never been able to attach a
number in which we had sufficient faith to that body
of offenders before this year. I am told that there are
a total of 85,000 prison places in the UK, and that
gives you some indication of what would happen if
we got up one morning and arrested all these people.
Q59 Chair: Is it at 5% or 10% you are able to—
Peter Davies: To be honest with you, I am really not
able to tell you at the moment. One of the things we
are doing as a command within the NCA, and
obviously with the support of our colleagues in NCA
and so on, is to identify how many of those people we
can take on, but to have a plan for what we would do
with the rest as well. Because I meant what John
quoted me on, if I could, I would arrest all 50,000 of
them, and I think that is what people would like. But
it is not just about law enforcement capacity; it is
technical capacity, the courts, the prison system and
the child protection system. None of this is resourced
for a volume of offences of that nature, which means
that we need a plan that goes beyond enforcement.
The truth is that for most high-volume or serious
crime, you have to have a strategy that goes beyond
enforcing it. You cannot enforce your way out of it,
which is why our partnerships with the IWF and
others, our work with industry to make the internet a
tougher place to commit crime and our work with
children to make sure they are less vulnerable to this
kind of criminality all matters, because it is an issue
for society as a whole and the solutions lie in lots of
different places. Our contribution is to be absolutely
focused in pursuing the worst of the worst—pursuing
as many as possible within the obvious resource
constraints that the whole of UK law enforcement has.
Q60 Chair: Can I just follow up your point about
pursuing the worst of the worst? Susie Hargreaves
rightly warned us to distinguish between material that
is illegal and extreme and material that is not illegal
but should be viewed only by adults. John Carr was
suggesting that the police should be taking advantage
of the Perrin judgment to pursue websites that are
hosting adult content and taking insufficient measures
to protect their content from being viewed by minors.
That is a whole new area of operation. Would you
have sympathy with the idea that the police should
also be looking at that, or is your view that we should
just concentrate on the really bad stuff?
Peter Davies: I do not think I entirely caught that part
of his evidence. We have to prioritise. In law
enforcement—in public protection—we have to
prioritise every day. That is a simple fact of life.
Anybody who suggests that you do not have to and
that anybody has enough resources to do everything
you would like to do is not unfortunately in the same
world as the one I occupy. In terms of priorities, I
would view the existence of child abuse imagery, with
all the harms that it brings, and the existence of online
child sexual exploitation, as a higher priority in terms
of protecting the public than seeking to stop people
who are below a certain age accessing things that we
think are inappropriate for them. I make no apology
for considering that as a priority. I am not entirely sure
that John was suggesting that that is an area of work
the police should get seriously into, but I was not here
to hear his evidence.
I would certainly sympathise with the idea that given
that it may not be something that law enforcement
is necessarily able to prioritise, or that CEOP would
prioritise, that somebody somewhere, if they are
sufficiently concerned about that as a source of harm
and have the ability to do something about it, should
certainly do something about it. It may well be that
age verification or active verification by the
organisations that benefit from these people using
their services is a way forward.
Chair: I think that is all we have. Can I thank the two
of you very much for coming this morning?
Peter Davies: Thank you very much.
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Ev 20 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 29 October 2013
Members present:
Mr John Whittingdale (Chair)
Mr Ben Bradshaw
Tracey Crouch
Philip Davies
Paul Farrelly
Mr John Leech
Steve Rotheram
Jim Sheridan
Mr Gerry Sutcliffe
________________
Examination of Witness
Witness: Stella Creasy MP gave evidence.
Q61 Chair: Let us get straight in. This is the second
session of the Committee’s inquiry into online safety.
We have three sessions this morning, and I would like
to welcome for our first session Stella Creasy, the
Member of Parliament for Walthamstow, Shadow
Minister for Business. Stella, once you have your
breath back, perhaps you would just like to begin by
telling us your experience.
Stella Creasy: Sure. Can I start by thanking the
Committee for inviting me to address you this
morning? I come very much in a private capacity, as
somebody who has experienced both the positive and
the negative elements of online engagement.
I presume the Committee is familiar with what
happened over the summer. A brief précis is this: I
got involved in a campaign to keep female
representation on bank notes—not a particularly big
issue, but one that nevertheless we felt was
important—led by a young lady called Caroline
Criado-Perez. When that campaign was successful, we
had a day where there was a lot of national press
attention about it. Twenty-four hours later, Caroline
contacted me to say that she was receiving threatening
and abusive messages on Twitter. I contacted her to
check that she was all right. She said that she felt she
was. Twenty-four hours after that, she said, “Actually,
I’m not okay”. I then began reviewing the messages
that she was getting and it was absolutely horrendous.
She was getting 50 rape threats in an hour. It was an
avalanche of abusive, very, very explicit, threatening
messages from a wide range of accounts.
At that point, which was the Friday of that week—we
had the campaign success on the Wednesday; by the
Friday this was happening—I felt a duty of care to
Caroline, having been involved in that campaign with
her. I contacted the police that I had been working
with in my shadow ministerial capacity when I was in
the Home Affairs team to say, “Look, this is
happening. We need to do something to protect this
young lady”. I was extremely worried because these
people were trying to post up her home address and
they were trying to find out personal information
about Caroline.
We then also tried to contact Twitter to say, “Look,
can you help?” I have to say, Twitter’s response, of
all the accounts that we could find for Twitter, was to
block Caroline and then to claim that they were the
victims of harassment. Twitter has since apologised
for that and I think they recognise that that was a
completely inappropriate response; that, when
somebody was reaching out for help because they
were under that kind of attack, it was right for them
to get support.
Over the course of that weekend, I continued to liaise
with the police to try to identify the level of risk that
Caroline was at, because the threats were relentless
and escalating by that point, and also to try to hold
the companies to account for their failure to act.
Unfortunately, on the Sunday evening I then became
a target for these people because I had spoken out
publicly, both in the media and online, to say that I
thought it was inappropriate. I then, along with a
number of other women in the public eye, was
subjected to the same sorts of threats over the course
of the next two weeks. These threats were very
graphic, very explicit.
I have always been a passionate defender of free
speech. I also think you have to recognise that free
speech comes when everybody feels that they can
participate and the nature of these threats was that
they were absolutely designed to intimidate, to harass,
to close down Caroline and myself. They were very
graphic, very specific. They were the sort of language
that would be illegal offline and the argument that I
made, and still make, is that there should be no
distinction about this kind of behaviour. Indeed, one
of the challenges we have here is to understand how
what we have learnt about these sorts of activities
offline can be translated into making sure that our
online spaces are safe.
It continued for about a week and a half. There have
now been a number of arrests. That case is ongoing,
so I do not think it is appropriate for me to talk about
that per se today, but I can tell you, from a personal
perspective, however tough you think that you are, to
get that kind of relentless onslaught—and I have had
just a fraction of what Caroline has had, and Caroline
is an amazingly brave young lady—is horrific. It is
absolutely harassment. This is absolutely designed to
intimidate, to scare, to frighten you, and it is
absolutely an issue that we need to see that both the
technology companies and the police understand is
part of the modern world.
I think it is inevitable when you do this job that, while
you might personally be affected by something, you
feel, “What can we do to fix this?” You start looking
at where the legislation can help and also where the
culture needs to change to understand that, just
because it is online, it is not somehow trivial. This is
part and parcel of modern day life and indeed it is not
Twitter or Facebook or Ask.fm that makes people say
these things. It is something in these people that
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 21
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
makes them say these things and so we need to be
able to identify these people and engage with them
and hold them to account for their behaviour because
if we do not, the consequences could be quite severe.
In many ways, it was an odd series of events because
I had covered both the Data Communications Bill in
my previous job and also the protection from
harassment law and the stalking legislation. I felt both
sides of the concern, which was why it was important
what information the police could be asking of these
companies and what possibly the risk could be to
Caroline. The concern I had on that Friday night was,
“Well, is this one person sending 50 rape threats,
trying to find her home address, trying to target this
woman, or is this 50 people?” We have to find a way.
Just as offline, if you were in a pub, say, and it was
one person who was persistently aggressively talking
to somebody in that way, or 50 people, it would be a
different type of risk. We do not have the capacity and
the protocols in place as yet to identify those different
ranges of risk and, therefore, there is a very real
danger that we could miss something very serious as
a result.
All the way through this, both as a politician and as
somebody who was being affected by it, I had those
two things in mind. We do not know what the risk is
that we are facing and if people focus on the online
element of it, they miss that fundamental question:
what is the danger that we are trying to deal with
here?
Q62 Chair: Were you able to get an answer to the
question of how many people were involved in this?
Stella Creasy: No. As I say, there have been some
arrests. It is an issue I have raised with the companies.
The internet has come from the 4chan culture. We can
have a long academic discourse about the gendered
nature of that 4chan culture, but there is a very strong
thread of concern that there should not be intervention
in the internet, that what is wonderful about the
internet is that it is creative. I absolutely agree. What
that should not stop us doing is saying to the
companies, “But, look, the way in which people are
using these technologies is evolving and you
yourselves say that you want to make sure they are
safe spaces”. One of the arguments I have made to
the companies is that they themselves could identify
whether the same IP address was being used to send
threats without having necessarily to pass that
information on to the police.
If you recognise that there are different ranges of
threats, if you stop thinking this is about online and
offline, and start thinking that this is a range of
offences that might be created—one of my bugbears
about this is people kept trying to say this is about
malicious communications and, therefore, the content
of the messages being sent. I pushed back and said,
“No, you need to understand this is about protection
from harassment and the fact that these messages are
being sent at all and the impact they are designed to
have on the victim. Why does it matter whether it is
50 different people or one person?” If this person has
said, “Please stop sending me messages”, and they
continue to get these messages, that is harassment.
This concept of escalation—somebody who does not
leave somebody alone because they are fixating on
them, which we know very well from all the research
into stalking and into domestic violence and intimate
violence—we have not yet translated that
understanding to online behaviour. We know that 50%
of stalking cases involve online activity. To
understand what was happening to Caroline and then
to myself for those companies was not just a question
of, “Is somebody sending a message that is
malicious?” but, “Is their behaviour something that
could be escalating?” They could, in the way that they
have emergency protocols for dealing with reports of
somebody who has gone missing, have emergency
protocols where they do not necessarily have to share
that data with the police, but they could themselves
identify whether it is different people or the same
accounts or the same IP address.
One of the things that we kept seeing was people
taunting. They would get shut down. We know that
Twitter was then monitoring my account and
Caroline’s account, and Hadley Freeman and
Catherine Mayer, other women who then proceeded to
get these messages in that 10-day period. They were
immediately suspending accounts, only for an account
to open up two seconds later. I had a gentleman who
was “killcreasynow”—I apologise for using these
words at this time in the morning—“slutcreasynow”,
“eatcreasynow”. He set up a whole series of accounts
where he was targeting me with messages and
taunting the police that they could not catch him
because he could just set up new accounts. If you were
the companies, you could identify whether that is
different people all spinning off each other because
they are caught up in this moment, or one person
using the same IP address or even a very similar IP
address to be able to say, “This is a different type
of threat”.
Q63 Chair: Do you have any view as to whether
there was a co-ordination taking place, that somebody
was encouraging others to follow suit and send you
similar messages?
Stella Creasy: No. That is interesting because, in
terms of the actual messages that I would classify as
relevant for the police, and I was always very clear
that there were some I was reporting to the police, and
there were some people I was just sending pictures of
kittens to because they needed to calm down because
they were being hysterical about the idea that
somehow this was going to be the end of internet
freedom if somebody did something about it. Within
that there was a morass of people talking about the
issue, because the wonderful thing about Twitter and
all sorts of online channels is that we can
communicate. Certainly there were people sending
messages and badgering other people to get involved
in the debate.
There were one or two accounts that were goading
people to attack Caroline, certainly; whether those
were the same people—Then, two-thirds of the way
through, we came across a particularly nasty
phenomenon, which was the faux friend. I had people
sending me messages, going, “I think I know who is
doing this to you and if you follow me I can send you
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Ev 22 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
details of them. I am really trying to help you. Look,
why are you ignoring me when I am trying to help
you, save you from these people? Oh, look, Stella
Creasy does not want to be helped. It is all about
publicity. Oh, look, Caroline is not taking help”.
There is a wonderful academic called Claire Hardaker
at Lancaster, who has just received some money—she
was sat behind me—and who is just about to do some
work on this about that element of behaviour. There
was certainly an element of unconscious
collaboration, I would argue, in that people identified
it. Some people certainly felt it was sport to get
involved in that debate and say, “You are obviously
not tough enough. Can’t stand the heat, get out of the
kitchen”, this kind of rubbish. There were other
people who were seeing it as an opportunity to express
what they thought was important about the internet,
this concept that it is without boundaries. I would
argue as someone who is a passionate defender of free
speech that is a misunderstanding about the concept
of free speech and how it operates.
There was no suggestion, as far as I am aware, that
the people who have been arrested knew each other,
but that is something, if this proceeds to trial, that
perhaps might come out. Certainly you could see in
some of the online communication the storm effect;
that people get drawn into it and people become aware
that you are responding to it. I think that is something
people have noticed with trolling—that there is an
element where people are trying to get people’s
attention, what my mum used to call a professional
wind-up merchant. I think that is slightly different
from this behaviour, which was, “We want, in an
aggressive, difficult fashion, to cause you pain, to
cause you harassment”.
Certainly some people who were involved were
enjoying the idea and, therefore, were drawn into it,
because here was an opportunity to get pleasure from
somebody else’s pain. Whether they had seen the
conversations and, therefore, felt—sorry, I am not
being very clear. There were the people who began it,
then there were the people who got involved in it, and
then the people who kept it going. I would say that
there are probably three different groups in that and,
within that, probably those latter two categories are
people that you are talking about; who wanted to be
co-ordinated by what was going on, but perhaps were
not necessarily in touch with each other. I am not
entirely sure. Maybe they were all direct messaging
each other. I do not know. There was certainly that
sense that they were being drawn into it by each other.
Q64 Tracey Crouch: Stella, you are high profile,
prolific tweeter and obviously this level of abuse has
gone too far. What sort of abuse have you been
subjected to prior to this latest event?
Stella Creasy: What, by my mother or just in general?
Tracey Crouch: On Twitter.
Stella Creasy: We are all extremely conscious, I am
sure, as all people around here who use Twitter and
who are in public forums know, that you get a degree
of banter, a degree of offensiveness, a degree of
people trying to get a rise out of you. I respond
robustly. I think I have had robust debates with a lot
of people around this table as well. This is very, very
different. When I looked at what was happening to
Caroline, it was very, very different. This was not
people saying, “I disagree with you”, or even using
colourful language to say they disagree with you or
even just being trite and telling you that they think
you are an idiot or using more colourful language to
say that they think you are an idiot. These were very
specific threats to do very, very graphic things that
were repetitive; that were matched to, as I say, trying
to identify someone’s address, trying to identify where
you could find this person to carry it out. I got an
email from one of these people, saying, “My accounts
have all been suspended. If I apologise to you, can I
have them back?” I looked at what this man had been
sending and thought, “No, I’m just going to help the
police make sure they have this information about
you” because it was so different.
Prior to this, I have had one gentleman who, I would
say, had edged on this sort of behaviour and indeed
went after my mother, who was also on Twitter. That,
for me, was an absolute red line, and prior to this
summer he was the only person I had ever blocked. I
think that is one of the things I really want to get
across. As much as it is very easy in this debate to
think this is about people not wanting to hear negative
messages or not wanting to hear people disagree with
them, for me there is a very clear divide. Prior to this
summer, I had never blocked anybody, except for this
gentleman who had been so utterly offensive to my
mum, because I felt it was important to be open.
I felt, as much as it is sometimes unpleasant what
some people might say to you, it was important to
show that you are willing to debate and discuss and
engage with people. A rape threat is not debate,
discussion or engagement. A repeated rape threat or
a repeated bomb threat, is not debate, discussion or
engagement. It is designed to shut down and it is
designed to intimidate, and we need to treat these
things differently, just as we would in a pub. If
someone came and said this stuff to you, you would
draw a line between that sort of behaviour and banter
and maybe someone being a bit off. You would make
those clear distinctions.
Q65 Tracey Crouch: I have not had anything as
similar to this experience as you, but I have had death
threats and lots of abuse in that sense. Like yourself,
I have never blocked anybody, but Twitter’s response
to you from this was to just block people. Your
response to that was that a rape threat is not a matter
of bad manners. Do you think that Twitter were quick
enough to respond to your concerns? Do you think
they were helpful? Do you think they could have
done more?
Stella Creasy: I think Twitter themselves would say
they did not get it right. What is interesting, having
spent some time now talking to them about these
issues, is they are on a journey themselves about how
different people in different countries are using their
technology. I think they absolutely get that that
weekend, where people were reaching out and saying,
“Look, this is an attack”—the initial thing was, “Well,
report abuse.” There was a lot made of an abuse
button. If you are getting 50 rape threats an hour, it is
not feasible to ask somebody to report every single
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 23
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
message. That pressure alone on somebody, let alone
the technology, even if it is reporting, “Here is another
one, here is another one”, it is not feasible to do it.
Twitter are on a journey of recognising that that is
how people are using their platform, as are Facebook,
as are Ask.fm; that these things are evolving and how
people can use them to send those messages.
What I was very clear about is that if somebody is
willing to say that stuff online, we should not treat
it any differently from its being said offline, and if
somebody is thinking in that way, there is potentially
a problem because it is about this concept of
escalation. The argument I had with both the police
and the companies was not that it was for us to cope
with this or to just block people. There was something
about those people that needed to change. Therefore,
we needed to be able to identify those people to work
out whether they were on that path of escalation; that
the kind of person who was trying to post up a young
woman’s postal address so that she could be found
obviously had some issues, and to simply say it was
the responsibility of that young woman to keep herself
safe, rather than to deal with the threat that this person
posed, was not acceptable. You had to see it in the
context of what we know about violence against
women and what we know about that escalation
process.
Q66 Tracey Crouch: You said there were 50 rape
threats in an hour. That surely is an unusual event, or
do you think this is commonplace behaviour on
Twitter?
Stella Creasy: One of the other things I have asked
the companies to do is publish their data about the
numbers of reports of abuse they get and the numbers
of the concerns so we can get a question of scale. I
know that the Metropolitan Police over the summer
have said, since this all happened, they had had an
increase of 1,500 reports from people about this. I
welcome that because I think we have to recognise
the scale of what is going on and, therefore, the
potential risk. Talk to Women’s Aid or talk to Refuge
about the numbers of people they might deal with who
have been victims of violent assault or victims of a
former partner who is using this technology to commit
the crime, who is using it to continue to harass people.
I think to see that as somehow separate, or not to
have ways of identifying if somebody is using online
forums to harass and to continue a programme of
harassment misses a trick, because we would not let
that go offline. Women are subjected to a particular
type of misogyny online and I think that comes from
that culture of the internet. That has to change as
women come online and I do think that will change.
What I would say is that, as much as these
technologies have these problems, there are also great
opportunities to redress some of that and to have a
public debate about these issues.
There are also other victims of this behaviour. We do
not know the scale of how people are using these
technologies. My point is that it is not the technology;
it is the person underneath it we have to get to grips
with. If the technology allows us to identify that
person, that is a positive move to me because it allows
us to intervene at a much earlier stage. When you look
back at some of the histories of people who have been
victims of intimate violence, you can see points where
they have had this behaviour and everyone has said,
“Well, just don’t go on Facebook” or “Don’t go on
Twitter”. Leaving aside their own personal freedoms,
that is a missed opportunity to understand that the risk
to that person is escalating.
Q67 Mr Leech: I do not think any reasonable person
could try to justify the sort of abuse that you and
others have received in this case. It has clearly stepped
over a line, but there is also a very grey area on social
networking about what one person might think is
overstepping the line and what others do not. I
suppose my question is, how do we come to a
conclusion about what is acceptable and what is not?
How much of it is important for us to make sure what
we are doing online is very much on the right side of
the line, rather than the wrong side of the line, to set
a good example?
Stella Creasy: Could I just flip that back to you, John?
You said there is a grey area online. Do you think
there is a grey area offline?
Mr Leech: Yes, I do, absolutely.
Stella Creasy: That is exactly the point. It is not that
the online world is somehow different or separate or
distinct in terms of these questions about what is
offensive speech or what is a threat. We have laws
and we have guidance that the CPS and the police are
supposed to use offline. That we do not necessarily
think about how we can apply them online is the
challenge here, not that those debates do not exist
offline as well.
Q68 Mr Leech: Is it not the case, though, that more
people are prepared to overstep the line online, rather
than offline, because they feel a lot braver behind their
computer, rather than face-to-face with someone?
Stella Creasy: I think that is absolutely true. That does
not negate the point that this concept of a grey area is
not distinct to the online world. I do not think we
should be drawing distinctions between online and
offline behaviour. I think we should be trying to
understand how people are using different forums,
whether in person—I have had poison pen letters; I
am sure other members of the Committee have as
well—or whether online people are sending these
messages. There is a risk that we trivialise something.
One in five people in the world are on Twitter. That
is only going to grow.
This is not a separate, distinct world in which we have
to make up new rules. We have to make this work in
reality, in the messy reality, of the lives we live. You
are absolutely right that anonymity makes it easier to
be offensive to somebody, easier to threaten
somebody. Someone threatening to rape you or to put
a bomb under your house or posting up your address,
or coming around to your house, is as threatening and
as intimidating online or offline.
Q69 Mr Leech: Do you not think, though, when
people stretch boundaries online, it then encourages
some people who do not recognise boundaries to
overstep the line?
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Ev 24 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
Stella Creasy: I agree, but I do not think that is to do
with being online. I think that is part of modern
culture. That is why we have guidance and we need
to make sure that we are able to understand the risk
that people might face and also to be robust about
defending the right to be offended. We have also
recently changed the laws around the right to be
offended, haven’t we? That will apply online as well.
We should not let the technology get in the way of
saying these are live debates in our society. What
people will say to each other in any different context
could be offensive or could be designed to intimidate
and we need a protocol and way of understanding
what that is.
Q70 Mr Leech: Changing the subject slightly, you
said earlier that it was not clear whether it was one
person making 50 threats or 50 people making one
threat. Do you think there is a problem with the
systems that the likes of Twitter or other social media
sites have in place, that they cannot necessarily
distinguish between whether it is one person with 50
threats or 50 people with one threat?
Stella Creasy: No, I think it is perfectly technically
possible to do that. Justin Bieber gets millions of
tweets a day. You would expect that account to get a
lot of traffic. I have talked to Twitter about the concept
of an online panic button. Because of this, I have now
had a panic button installed in my house. I have a
button that if I feel in distress, I can press and the
police know, because of the history of what has gone
on, that possibly my property might be at risk and,
therefore, to come around. Online, if you say, “I am
being attacked”, and your account is getting a high
level of traffic compared with what you might expect
it to get—so say the numbers of followers you have
or the number of people you follow, or the type of
language being used—those algorithms are not
particularly difficult to put in place. You have to have
the culture as a company that says, “We need to be
scanning. We need to be looking for that”.
One of the things I have tried to follow up with
Twitter is obviously if they are going to have an abuse
button and there is every concern, rightly, that people
might then—in fact, quite a few of the people on
Twitter said, “Right, we are going to tag everything
you tweet as an abusive message to see how you like
it”. But if people are going to use these technologies,
what do you do with the information? They hold an
awful lot of information about people already, in terms
of the account that you set up, where it was set up,
what kind of messages it is sending, for them to be
able to do that kind of analysis; to be able to say,
“There is a distinction between the Justin Bieber
account, which we expect to get millions of tweets a
day, and what suddenly is happening here. Is that a
cause for further investigation?” If my property was
getting a lot of reports, the police might flag it up and
go, “Hang on a minute, we might need to investigate
this a bit further”. An online panic button system
would allow someone to say, “Look, this is a
problem”, and for Twitter to say, “Oh, you seem to be
getting a lot of information here. Yes, maybe there is
something going on. Can we help you?”
Q71 Mr Leech: But my question was not about
whether it was technologically possible. It was
whether Twitter and others were using the technology
to its full potential and whether you think there are
other things that they could be doing to make that—
Stella Creasy: The equivalent of an online panic
button is absolutely something I have discussed with
Twitter. I would like to see other technology
companies having it. The answer to your question is
no. As far as I am aware, none of them do this at the
moment, although I think they are all thinking about
it because this is an evolving debate, particularly in
the UK, about how people are using these
technologies.
Still now somebody sends me an abusive message that
crosses that line. I still get one or two of these. Those
accounts get suspended very quickly. That process of
a kind of online temporary restraining order,
essentially, seems to me to be something that these
companies can explore, again if they have protocols
in place. One of the things I am concerned about is
for that not to be abused. In order for that not to be
abused, there needs to be a protocol for it. None of
these companies have this in place at the moment. I
think they are all starting to look at it because of this
public debate.
Q72 Mr Leech: Why do you think they have been
so reluctant to put these sorts of things in place? Is it
just because of an attitude about free speech or is it
more about the cost?
Stella Creasy: I think we have all seen these issues as
issues around malicious communications, rather than
understanding that there could be other forms of
behaviour at stake here. How you would then act and
how you then, as a company, would abide by local
laws, as they all say they would, is very, very
different. If you are only being asked to deal with one
type of offence, which is malicious communications,
then you need a protocol to be able to look at the
communication and decide whether it is malicious. If
you are being asked to deal with a harassment case
where somebody might be sending the most
innocuous messages, but it is the contact and it is the
fact that somebody is continuing to contact somebody,
continuing to set up accounts, continuing to pursue
somebody that is the problem, that is a very different
type of issue.
I do not think these companies have even begun to
scratch the surface of how their technologies are being
used to commit those sorts of offences and so what
they might be able to do to help protect their users to
make it a safe space. The question for all of us as
public policymakers is, can we get them to have that
conversation and do it in a way that is fair and
proportionate so that we do not close down the
internet; we open it up for more people because it will
be a safer space for more people?
Q73 Steve Rotheram: There is not a country in the
world where freedom of speech is absolute. Before we
get those people perhaps who are listening or reading
the transcript claiming that somehow we are trying to
close down freedom of speech, let me say it is
absolutely not the case, and, in fact, as you just
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 25
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
mentioned, we are trying to defend freedom of speech
and encourage more people to take part in the likes of
Twitter debates and stuff. You spoke earlier about
your personal experiences of being a victim of
harassment on Twitter. In your view, are the laws to
tackle harassment fit for purpose in the online world?
Stella Creasy: Thank you, Steve, and I just want to
pay tribute to the work I know you have been doing
about trolling as well, because it was you and I who
first started, well before this ever happened to me, and
I never ever thought I would need to know quite as
intimately and directly what the law would be. I think
the honest answer is we do not know. Obviously the
protection from harassment law was updated about a
year ago. We have seen the first initial statistics about
it. That is not just about online behaviour. I think there
is a way to go for matching that understanding of what
forms of behaviour online are similar to behaviour
offline and, therefore, potentially problematic for our
police and for the technology companies. I think we
have to press to do that because one of my concerns
is, from a public value-for-money perspective, the
sooner we identify these challenges, the sooner we
can get the right training in and the sooner we can
prevent some of the crimes that might end up being
very, very costly. There is a real value in getting
everybody up to speed in the way in which these
technologies can be used.
I think the Protection from Harassment Act has a way
to go in terms of its application. There are concerns
for me about the 4A, 4B—I apologise to the
Committee if that is too technical—about how it can
be implemented. We have to see. The initial figures
look a bit mixed about whether that has been used to
truly tackle these problems. I think we have legislation
at the moment, but we do not necessarily have the
culture at a local level to be able to put it into practice.
Certainly I found, when I was trying to get the police
to engage in this debate, that I kept getting put through
to the person who held the Twitter account for a
particular part of the police rather than somebody who
could understand that on a Friday evening there was
potentially a young girl whose address could be on
the web and she could be the target of all sorts of
malicious behaviour.
That is not about having separate departments or
separate specialist people when this is so much a part
of everyday life. You want your police to know the
rules of the road. You want your police to know how
the internet is being used and to be able to understand
it, because that is what they are going to have to
police.
Q74 Steve Rotheram: Do you believe it is a problem
with shortcomings, in effect, of enforcement, rather
than in the legislation itself?
Stella Creasy: I think we will not know whether the
legislation matches what we need to be able to deal
with until we have more enforcement of it. It is just
too early to tell. I think there is a wider point about
understanding both the concept of escalation, the
concept of harassment, and then how that might
happen online as well as offline and what you can do
about it, and what you can ask companies to do about
it already. What I would say is that, since the summer,
I have noticed the police are willing to engage with
those threats. They need help. I think that is why we
have talked about having cyber specialists coming into
the police, because this is about a set of skills
matching a cultural change.
Q75 Steve Rotheram: You mentioned Claire
Hardaker earlier, who is doing some fantastic work on
looking at perhaps the reasons behind why the culture
is so different online and offline. Just to broaden that
out a bit, are there any changes to legislation you
would like to see to combat harmful or illegal content
on the internet, and not just in the social media field?
Stella Creasy: From a personal perspective, I think
some of this is about the CPS and how they respond
to the powers that they have. I would like to see the
CPS being very proactive about drawing distinctions
and defending that right to be offended, that right for
people to be close to the bone—what is lovely about
British culture is that we have that stream of quite
out-there comedy, out-there satire and out-there debate
and discussion—and, in order to defend that, saying,
“Here is the stuff that crosses the line. Here is the stuff
that we have to be clear is unacceptable, is illegal. It
is illegal offline. It should be dealt with the same way
online and we will act on that to make sure that we
draw that boundary”, so that we can have all the
lovely banter, the jokes, the debate, the discussion and
the humour that is so much part of British culture.
It is genuinely difficult for me to tell on a personal
level, until we have seen this case through, whether
the law matches that standard. The messages that
Caroline has received, for me, certainly breach that
level. I would want to see action and I want to see the
people who sent those messages being held to account
because I have seen the damage that it has done. I
have seen how affected she has been personally by it
and that is what those people were trying to do, and
that is an offence. It is an offence offline and it should
be an offence online.
Q76 Steve Rotheram: I agree with that critique of
current legislation. I am beginning to believe perhaps
there is slightly too much in regard to things falling
between the cracks. I have identified at least seven
different Acts of Parliament that can be used in the
online world for those people who are trolls or who
do these despicable acts. Obviously all that legislation
was before Facebook and Twitter and there is no
mention of trolling. It is not identified. The word
“troll” is not even identified in the legislation. Perhaps
what it needs is just a clarification, rather than a
reworking of any of the laws we currently have.
Stella Creasy: Yes. I have been repetitive with the
Committee about this. I do not want to draw a
distinction between online and offline because that
makes it somehow mean that, if these people were
doing it offline, it would be easier to do something
about it than online. That is just about ease of access
to them, rather than necessarily the technology. We
have laws. If they are not necessarily being applied,
we have to work out what it is about the way in which
the online world operates that makes it harder for
people to see the connections between those things. I
am also resolute that it is not for those people using
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Ev 26 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
the internet, like Caroline, to cope with this pressure.
It is for us to find a way of helping to bridge that gap
and change the debate on it.
Q77 Mr Bradshaw: Do you know how many arrests
there have been?
Stella Creasy: I believe there have been five arrests.
Mr Bradshaw: Do you expect there to be
prosecutions?
Stella Creasy: On a personal level I think the case is
there, but it is for the police and the CPS to make that
decision. I absolutely respect that. The evidence and
the behaviour seems to me to fit everything I have
ever seen but, again, I am the victim here in that sense
and so it is not for me to make that judgment call.
Mr Bradshaw: But you agree that an important part
of the law is to act as a deterrent and that prosecutions
could act as a deterrent in this case?
Stella Creasy: Prosecutions would be about holding
people to account for their behaviour. I do not think
there is any disagreement about this, that that kind of
behaviour over the summer was absolutely horrific,
was completely illegal. The question for all of us is
whether we are able to meet the test to make an
effective prosecution.
Q78 Mr Bradshaw: What this case seems to have
exposed to me, which is very depressing, is an
underlying current of violent misogyny that is still
there in society. The way you deal with expressions
of this is, in other media, through the law. It is not an
exact parallel, but I suspect that people are now much
more careful about what they say about other people
following the action against the Speaker’s wife, for
example. We are learning how to use Twitter. What I
am saying to you is I hope what this case achieves is
a change and that is what I am looking to see: whether
you are optimistic, whether this could act as a
positive change.
Stella Creasy: I have great optimism about the future
being more equal online and offline, because one of
the things these technologies and communications do
is allow us to have those debates. It is like the No
More Page 3 campaign. It has been entirely run online
and that has opened up a space to say, “The impact of
seeing these images on women is X and this voice
needs to be heard”. We would not have had the
capacity to communicate in that mass way before. As
much as, yes, prosecutions can act as a deterrent, I
also think what has been positive is that there has been
a broader debate that says, “This is completely
unacceptable”.
I found it very striking that, in retweeting the
messages that I considered to be illegal, quite a lot of
people said, “I had no idea this was happening”; in
the same way that the EverydaySexism Twitter
account and all that campaign—again, which is all
online—has allowed people to see a side of society
and to see some of that misogyny that people had
never really engaged with or become aware of. I
would love to think that a prosecution would be—
and I do not think addressing misogyny, addressing
inequality, is going to take that cultural debate. What
is fantastic about these technologies and why I am so
passionate about making sure we have free speech is
that they allow a vehicle for some of that change to
take place as well.
Q79 Jim Sheridan: Stella, many, if not all of us, are
discovering the nature of our job attracts through
social media and emails some of the unsavoury
characters in the world.
Stella Creasy: Yes, I am sorry about that. My mum
just gets bored. She sends emails. I have told her.
Jim Sheridan: Does she send them to me?
Stella Creasy: I would rather she was sending them
to you than me, I tell you; some of the things she
tells me.
Jim Sheridan: No, but seriously, as I say, we do
attract so many nutcases in the country, but what you
have described goes way beyond anything that should
be allowed. Just in terms of legislation and to follow
on from Steve’s point, the 2008 Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act, it sounds to me—this was before
social media kicked off—that it is something we could
revisit and look at again and the value of it, if indeed
that is still working. The main question I am asking is
about the international scene; for instance, in countries
where this kind of behaviour may be legal. What can
we do to stop it coming from countries that might find
this sort of behaviour acceptable?
Stella Creasy: I have no reason to believe that any of
the people sending messages to myself or Caroline or
indeed any of the other figures over the summer were
from anywhere other than the UK and, indeed, all the
prosecutions have been in the UK. One of the
suggestions that one of the reasons why we can’t
bridge that gap between what our law does offline and
online is the global nature of the internet. I do not
necessarily think that is the case. For these technology
companies, the awareness of how people are using
their tools to create crime is an interesting question
because that then could apply to other jurisdictions in
terms of if you were to see escalating behaviour. It is
interesting. The woman who is in charge of online
safety at Twitter comes from a domestic violence
background and said to me, “Oh, yes, I totally get the
point you are making”, and you are thinking, “Okay,
so why don’t you have the systems in place to then
be able to address this?”
I think we have to be wary of the idea that, because
the internet is global, there can be no local response
or no local engagement on any of these issues.
Nothing has disproved that to me so far. We also have
to be very careful and one of the things that is so
important about the internet remaining a space where
people can have freedom and anonymity is that it has
also been a force for good in terms of human rights
issues. It has been a force for good in terms of giving
a space for people speak freely, where they are not
given freedom in their own countries.
We have asked Twitter to make it clearer that
harassment was not acceptable in their guidelines.
That cuts across all their jurisdictions. At that point,
Toby Young accused me of being like a Chinese
dictator for suggesting that harassment should not
happen online. I wanted to point out to him that this
was already illegal in this country. What is harassment
may well be in the eye of the beholder in some
countries and, therefore, it is about the systems that
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 27
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
these companies have to assess the complaints that
they get, which is why we need to see the scale of the
complaints. In the UK they say they comply with local
laws. We have the Protection from Harassment Act.
The question is, how are they then using that
information to be able to make sure that they are
responding to any concerns that are raised with them?
They have a way to go yet. So do a lot of companies.
That Twitter are engaging in this debate for me is very
welcome. I would like to see that then develop.
Q80 Jim Sheridan: If you are receiving horrific
emails or tweets or whatever it may be, for me it does
not matter where it comes from. Do you think there
is anything more that the providers can do to stop this
in a global market?
Stella Creasy: As I say, what is interesting is whether
it is happening in other countries and I think there
are cultural variations in how people are using these
technologies around the world. These companies are
also growing. Twitter did not exist five or six years
ago, so it is growing as an organisation to have the
capacity to deal with it. They now have a new team
of people looking at online safety. I would expect
them to take the lessons they are learning from the
UK and think about whether they can be applied to
any form of behaviour on their platform around the
world. That will be a question for Twitter. It would be
a good question if you guys are speaking to them
about it. What we have to focus on is how we keep
our systems safe in the UK. How do we make sure
that every system in the UK has the freedoms that we
want them to have, online and offline? How do we
make sure, when we get instances like this, that our
own local laws are being used to best effect to open
up that space?
Q81 Philip Davies: I would like to think of myself
as a great champion of free speech, but clearly what
you and Caroline and others have faced is beyond
what anybody would hopefully think was acceptable.
I just wondered whether you felt, given the scale of
Twitter and the pressures on, for example, the police,
this is something that is just going to be in many
respects unsolvable through the normal course of the
law in the sense that, if Twitter is already at the extent
it is and is going to grow further and police resources
are so stretched, is it going to be the case that the
police, even with the best will in the world, will
simply not have the resources to be able to pursue all
these particular cases?
Stella Creasy: I appreciate what you are saying,
Philip, about recognising that this is about the freedom
of speech of people like myself and Caroline to not
be subjected to this kind of behaviour.
Philip Davies: Absolutely, yes.
Stella Creasy: I think the question for all of us is,
what does that behaviour embody? The person who
uses this platform to repetitively send those kind of
messages—what else might they escalate to do? How
else is this connected to other forms of crime? That is
the way to look at it, which is not to say that somehow
there is something unique about online behaviours but
to ask where they interact with offline behaviours.
When you do that and, as I say, when you look at
some of the cases around stalking and harassment and
you see people getting messages online and people
saying, “Well, just don’t go on to Facebook” or “Don’t
use these forums”, rather than recognising that the
person who is sending those messages is fixating on
somebody, could then become an even more severe
risk to that person, and the sooner we intervene, the
sooner we might be able to address that person’s
behaviour, prevent in the future much more damaging
and indeed more expensive and resource-intensive
crime from taking place.
Keeping people safe—there is a gender issue in this
and it is disproportionately women who face these
challenges—will be both better for the public purse
and receive better outcomes. I understand the concern
about resources. What I am saying is that the online
world is an opening to seeing and identifying crime
and detecting it quicker. We should see that as an
opportunity both to save money and get better
outcomes, rather than another set of issues to deal
with.
The other example from this for me was that the EDL
were using Twitter and Facebook to organise coming
to cause problems in Walthamstow. There was a timelag between the police understanding that, seeing that
information and engaging with it—in the same way
during the riots we saw a time-lag between the police
engaging and interacting with that information—to be
able to then use the online world to detect and prevent
crime. There is a big value-for-money argument about
how, if you understand that is how people are using
these technologies and you have a way of dealing with
them, you can get things at source in a way that if you
wait until much later on, they will become much more
expensive. We are nowhere near there yet, and in fact
what people are trying to say to me is, “Well, don’t
we need specialist units?” which to me is a bit like
saying, “Don’t the police need a specialist unit for
dealing with the telephone?” This is so much a part
of everyday life, we need our police to be able to use
their own personal experience of it to understand how
it might then lead on to further crime.
Philip Davies: Obviously I am delighted that there
have been some arrests and I hope there will be
prosecutions and convictions and, like Ben Bradshaw,
I hope that that will act as a deterrent so that people
realise that they can’t get away with this. Hopefully
that will be the case. I just wondered whether, when
you have received these threats and people like
Caroline have received these threats, which must be
horrendous, you felt—and do you know whether
Caroline felt—that they were genuine threats in terms
of people were intending to carry out these things that
they were saying or whether they were just
unacceptable abuse?
Stella Creasy: I think if someone is trying to post up
your home address, Philip, that is pretty frightening
and that is very, very distressing to somebody. To then
receive continued threats, continued aggression,
continued details about what someone is going to
do—these people went into tremendous detail about
what they might do to my dead body once they had
killed me and once they had done horrible things to
me and how they might do it again. I defy anybody
not to find that deeply threatening, deeply unpleasant.
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Ev 28 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Stella Creasy MP
This is the thing about the Protection from
Harassment Act. It is not about the content. It is about
the impact on the person. Nobody can be unaffected
by receiving that kind of avalanche of threatening
behaviour over a persistent period of time, to not
think, “Actually, is that person outside, who I don’t
know, the person who has been sending those
messages?” The thing about the anonymity of the
internet is that it could be anybody sending those
types of messages to you. It becomes even more
distressing in a way, because you do not know who it
is who feels the need to send you that sort of message.
Q82 Philip Davies: No, I do not disagree with any
of it. I am simply playing devil’s advocate. I am trying
to think about some of the defences that some of the
internet social media sites might give. I was just
anticipating what you thought if they were to argue
that, if there are these people out there and they are
serious about these threats, it is better for the law
enforcement agencies that they are out there in public
so they are able to be traced, rather than to be still
there but untraceable and unknown; that in some
respects it would be easier for the law authorities to
deal with these people, if they are serious about doing
this thing, if it is up there for them to trace.
Stella Creasy: We should use people as bait to draw
these people out?
Philip Davies: I am merely asking for your response
to what may be a line of defence that these social
media companies give.
Stella Creasy: Here is the thing, Philip. Surely what
matters here is the victim. The victim was Caroline
and her life was dramatically changed by the
behaviour of these people. Our job is to make sure
that nobody’s life should be curtailed and nobody’s
free speech should be curtailed by the behaviour of
these people; that it is not for Caroline to cope because
“at least we know who these people are”, as a
containment strategy. It is for us to say both in law
and in culture, “This has to change, because it is not
part of the society we want to live in”.
Philip Davies: No, I agree. I was not giving you my
opinion. I was trying to pre-empt what people might
say.
Chair: I think we had better call a halt at this point.
We have another two panels. Stella, can I thank you
very much for coming?
Stella Creasy: Yes, and can I just thank the
Committee for looking into this? I think it is difficult
to get right, but it is welcome that you guys are
looking at how you could get it right and how you
could support both the police and the technology
companies to work with us.
Chair: Thank you.
Examination of Witness
Witnesses: Nicholas Lansman, Secretary General, Internet Services Providers’ Association, Dido Harding,
Chief Executive Officer, TalkTalk Group, and Hamish Macleod, Chair, Mobile Broadband Group, gave
evidence.
Q83 Chair: For our second session, can I welcome
Dido Harding, the Chief Executive of TalkTalk Group,
Hamish Macleod, the Chair of the Mobile Broadband
Group, and Nicholas Lansman, Secretary General of
the Internet Services Providers’ Association, and
invite Gerry Sutcliffe to start off?
Mr Sutcliffe: The topic of our inquiry is online safety
and, notwithstanding the evidence we have just
received, we recognise we are talking about a growing
situation here, not a closing down, and that is not our
intention. Clearly there are responsibilities and there
are issues that flow from that in terms of what needs
to happen. It would be interesting to hear, right from
the start, what you do already to prevent access to
harmful or illegal material online; just a general
flavour of what it is about at the moment. Whoever
wants to start off.
Nicholas Lansman: Shall I kick off with some
general points?
Mr Sutcliffe: Yes.
Nicholas Lansman: First, you have to treat illegal
material very separately from legal, which might be
age-appropriate. With illegal material, right across the
industry, whether mobile or internet, have done a lot
of work over many years here, primarily setting up
the Internet Watch Foundation in 1996, and illegal
material is dealt with in a variety of ways. The priority
is to remove illegal material from the source. In the
UK we now have much less than 1% of illegal
material that is hosted in the UK. Secondly, to try to
remove it even when it is abroad and, thirdly, to
create, with the IWF, a blocking list so that ISPs can
block illegal material before people can stumble
across it. That is illegal material and what I mean by
that is child abuse material, but also terrorist material.
I think the industry has been extremely effective in
dealing with that side of things.
In terms of age-appropriate material, there have been
huge developments more recently and I will allow
Dido to contribute to that discussion. Principally, there
have been developments in terms of creating an active
choice for customers when they purchase broadband
to make that decision of whether they want to engage
filtering. Filtering is now going to be provided for free
and a whole-home solution. It is very important that
it applies to all devices in the home, whether it is PCs,
laptops, tablets or indeed smartphones. Those filtering
technologies will be easy to use.
Q84 Mr Sutcliffe: Easy to use, but is there not an
education and development process to go alongside
that? It is all right having the technology to deal with
it, but how do you encourage people to be active?
Nicholas Lansman: That is a very good point.
Technology alone is not the only solution and
education and awareness is fundamental to the
process. ISPs over many years have provided material
on websites, on leaflets. They have also been visiting
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 29
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
schools to educate teachers and parents. There is also
the UK Council for Child Internet Safety. We also
have Safer Internet Day. A great deal is being done to
educate. Still more needs to be done and this is about
creating the tools to ensure that parents become
confident with the use of the internet and that they can
also communicate that and have that dialogue with
their own children.
Dido Harding: I have said a number of times that I
think internet safety is the road safety of our
generation. When I was a child, my parents were
advertised that with Clunk Click. We had the Green
Cross Code. Seatbelts were just being rolled out into
cars. The airbag had not yet been invented. You had a
whole load of technology innovation, public
awareness and education in schools. I can remember
the Green Cross man coming to my school. Internet
safety is as broad an issue, if not broader, than road
safety for our generation. There is a lot that is
happening on the technology front. There is a lot that
is starting. We in TalkTalk have lobbied heavily to see
internet safety in the primary curriculum and we are
delighted to see that it will be coming in. There is
a lot that needs to happen in education and public
awareness. There is not one single bullet. We all have
a role to play in making sure that the digital world is
safer than it is today.
Q85 Mr Sutcliffe: I like the analogy of the road
safety because I think you are right, but part of the
problem that we have, in terms of the evidence and in
our own lives, is that parents do not go in to watch
what the kids are watching online and things like that.
The analogy about if a child had a TV set in the
bedroom, years gone by, there would be an issue about
what they were watching. What is concerning me is
that the technology is there, but there is not the
cultural change in terms of parents being able to
understand what they need to be doing.
Dido Harding: Nicholas mentions filtering. At
TalkTalk we have had a whole-home filtering product
called HomeSafe available now for just under 2.5
years. We have about 1.2 million of our 4 million
customers use it and 400,000 customers have
activated the Kids Safe element of that, choosing to
block certain content in their home. Just as you say,
we have learnt that it is important to keep it simple
because most of us find the technology baffling. You
do have to have something that covers the whole
home and you also have to work hard, and all four of
the major ISPs have committed to work on a public
awareness campaign, because all of us are learning
how to use this. It is not just enough as an ISP to
provide the gadget. You have to help people
understand how they might use it. The most valuable
thing you can do as a parent with young children, and
I say this as one, is talk to your children about what
they do online. If you don’t engage with what they
are doing online, no technology is going to help them.
Mr Sutcliffe: I think that is spot-on.
Hamish Macleod: Can I just make a mobile
contribution? As far as the Internet Watch Foundation
and the illegal side of things goes, our approach is
very similar to the fixed ISPs. We take the list. It gets
updated twice a day and any attempt to access sites
on the illegal list will be frustrated. As far as the ageinappropriate content is concerned, people first started
to use the mobile to access the internet about eight or
nine years ago. At that time we published a code of
practice and part of the code was that we offered a
filter for the internet browsing service on the mobile.
For all prepaid phones, though, the filter was put in
by default. For most contract phones it was also put
on by default and in the next 12 months for all
contract phones it will be put on by default.
Mr Sutcliffe: The filters will be basically free? They
will come as standard?
Hamish Macleod: Absolutely, there is no charge for
them.
Q86 Mr Sutcliffe: Is there a need for consistency of
approach across the range of providers and is that
happening?
Hamish Macleod: The approach we have taken on the
mobile is that, when we first published the code back
in 2004, we appointed a body called the Independent
Mobile Classification Body to achieve this level of
consistency. It was a subsidiary of the premium rate
regulator, who was called ICSTIS at the time. The
reason for that was that most of the content about
which there might have been some concern was
premium rate adult content, so it made sense to work
hand in hand with the premium rate regulator. We
carried out a review of that earlier this year and, as a
result of that review, we have appointed the British
Board of Film Classification as our independent body
who give us editorial advice as to how we should
calibrate the filters.
Q87 Mr Sutcliffe: What are the linkages like with
law enforcement agencies and trying to help them
with the speed of the technological changes that are
taking place? Do you think that is working well or
could more be done?
Nicholas Lansman: I think it is working very well.
There is a long-standing process in place where,
according to the regulations, ISPs will be approached
by law enforcement to hand over data and that is done.
It seems to work well and we know that, in a variety
of cases, law enforcement have taken and followed
those investigations and will make prosecutions where
people are behaving illegally online.
Hamish Macleod: Can I make one point on that,
though? A few months ago there was a summit held
with the major ISPs and mobile companies about the
work of the Internet Watch Foundation and whether
they should be more proactive in seeking out illegal
images on the internet because, up to that point, the
memorandum of understanding specifically with the
CPS was that you could only respond to public reports
and then you could go and look for the stuff. Now we
are moving to a point where they will go out and look
for the stuff. That should be more efficient because,
of the level of public reports coming in, only about
one in 10 of them are illegal. That should be more
efficient and should lead to fewer public reports, we
hope, because they are getting to the content before
the public does.
However, the IWF is part of a safeguarding
ecosystem. They are not an island. They are being
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Ev 30 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
more proactive and generating more intelligence to
pass either to our own law enforcement agencies or
internationally, to overseas. That will generate more
work in other parts of the ecosystem. If we are going
to put more resources into the IWF, more resources
need to go into other parts of the system too,
otherwise we are just creating traffic jams in other bits
of the net.
Q88 Mr Sutcliffe: It is good to hear that there is a
level of consistency there now. You have talked about
the easy work, if you like, the illegal, which is clearly
identified as illegal and, therefore, it has to be stopped.
One thing that concerns me is the cultural issues that
are around. In evidence at the last session, 30% of
children under the age of 12 thought it was okay to
be bullied or had experience of being bullied on the
net. Notwithstanding the massive amount of work that
it has done to deal with the illegal situation, how do
you deal with the cultural changes and trying to get
different responses across because of some of the
problems that people are already facing through the
surveys that already exist?
Dido Harding: I think step by step would be my
rather simplistic answer. The number of things that
can happen to a child online are just as many as can
happen in the playground, only it is more immediate
and they have the whole world at their fingertips. The
wonder of the internet, as Stella Creasy set out, is that
it has a double-edged sword element to it. That is why
I go back to road safety. We have to think about all of
the different types of behaviour that happen in the
playground.
On bullying, I do not think that the fundamental issue
is any different from being in the playground. The
adult supervising the playground has a role to play.
The children have a role to play, as do their parents,
and there is a bigger public awareness challenge on
all those dimensions because it is so much less visible
than your child being physically bullied in the
playground. I don’t think you can overstate the
importance of people such as yourselves thinking
deeply about this. The social and moral framework for
the digital world does not exist yet.
I do think there is quite an important role for
legislators to play in thinking through where the
absolute black and white rules are that we need to put
in place. There is a clear role for all of the owners or
builders of the playgrounds, whether those are the
social networking sites or the internet service
providers themselves, to think through, “How do you
provide parents, teachers and children with the tools
to make that environment safer?” There is a clear role
for all the educators to make sure that we are keeping
up with that technology, not just for our children but
in educating parents and teachers themselves.
I wish I could say that there was a magic bullet. There
is not. We are the generation that has to quite calmly
and logically think through each of these issues.
Q89 Chair: Without wishing to stray too far into the
data communications debate, which would keep us
going probably for the rest of the day, can I ask you,
first of all, how much data in terms of which
individuals are accessing sites, downloading images
and sending abusive messages do you keep and how
easy is it for the police, for instance, to have access
to it?
Dido Harding: I am very happy to answer for
TalkTalk and you can fill in the gaps. Obviously we
work under RIPA. From a TalkTalk perspective, we
currently provide call data, IP addresses, subscriber
details both for our mobile customers and our fixed
customers, session details, so how long they have
been online, IP log history and data access setup, so
how they are accessing it, and we will also provide
email addresses, payment details, customer notes and
email headers. All that is governed by RIPA. We store
those data in the same way that we would store our
own customer data. We retain data for 12 months. We
respond as quickly as all the Government authorities
accessing through RIPA require of us, and are
compensated for them for doing that. I think that
process works reasonably well. I would be
disappointed if you heard otherwise from those
authorities.
Chair: Would that cover Twitter postings?
Dido Harding: No. We do not store browsing history;
so exactly where you have gone and what you have
done, which pages you have looked at, we do not store
any of that. That is not governed by RIPA today. I do
think it is important that, in this, the ISPs are not
choosing their own rules. This is something that is
clearly for you, not for my colleagues and me, to make
the judgments. We act absolutely within the letter of
RIPA and store the data that is required of us there.
Q90 Chair: RIPA itself is now a little ancient in
terms of the speed with which things are advancing.
Do you think it needs to be revisited?
Dido Harding: I think that the debate that is currently
ongoing is very important, precisely as you highlight,
Chairman. The tools and techniques are changing so
much. Yes, I think it is very important to have that
debate and to make sure that we keep up to date.
Chair: Hamish and Nicholas, do you wish to add
anything?
Nicholas Lansman: If I can just add to that, as I was
explaining, that is a very similar setup to the other
internet service providers. I think it is important that,
with an extension to the data requirements, the Home
Office make their case and pass legislation and that is
fully debated. It is very important to note that the
ISPs, as they comply with RIPA, will comply with
amendments to it if that is the case. Hamish made a
point earlier about the fact that we have a lot of data
and I think in a previous session Peter Davies, the
CEO of CEOP, outlined the fact that there are possibly
thousands of potential investigations that perhaps
should be taking place if resources would allow. Just
collecting more and more data that may well be useful
will point out an even greater problem in the lack of
resources to follow up.
Hamish Macleod: I do not have anything in particular
to add to that.
Chair: Basically your industry follows the same
practices that TalkTalk has described?
Hamish Macleod: Yes. There are a few technical
differences but it is, policy-wise, exactly the same.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 31
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
Q91 Chair: It does not matter if I am using a mobile
device or a fixed broadband device? The same
provisions will apply?
Hamish Macleod: More or less. I am not entirely sure
what the fixed situation is. In mobile there is not
necessarily a one-to-one mapping between the IP
address that is being used and the user because we do
not have enough IP addresses to go around. We use
something called NAT, network address translation—
he says quietly—and that generates an absolutely
enormous amount of data.
Q92 Chair: If I used a mobile device in Starbucks,
are you able to identify that it is me?
Hamish Macleod: Connecting how?
Chair: On a public wi-fi system.
Hamish Macleod: I don’t know I am afraid.
Nicholas Lansman: I am pretty sure that the
providers of the public wi-fis, whether it is in
Starbucks or anywhere else, are also covered under
the legislation. Whether it is BT or other cloud
providers, they will be able to provide that data to
enforcement. It is worth underlining—
Chair: But it is not much use to know the person who
has accessed inappropriate material from Starbucks on
Victoria Street.
Nicholas Lansman: I think another discussion that we
will possibly have is the issue about anonymity and
whether that can mean you can’t trace people. That is
not the case. As we found in the previous session,
people commenting on Twitter and making comments
are subject to prosecutions, just like anyone else. It is
worth underlining that our systems have been in place
for quite some time and work well. We have single
points of contact within the Home Office. They can
be in contact with internet service providers simply.
The system effectively works well.
Q93 Tracey Crouch: Could I just follow up, just to
be clear in my mind, Ms Harding, on what you were
saying about collecting all the data and keeping it?
That is available upon request under the legislation,
but if somebody was accessing illegal content, such
as child abuse images, does that flag up in your
systems and you can then pass that over, or does it
have to come from the enforcement agencies before
you give that material?
Dido Harding: As it currently works, we respond
reactively to requests from CEOP. It is one of the
things that we have been discussing with the Internet
Watch Foundation as part of moving the IWF
activities to being more proactive; so proactively
identifying sites and then potentially proactively
identifying offenders. This is all fraught with moral
hazard and, in doing something like that, I would only
want to consider it with the full legal authority and
not as an ISP decide for myself that I fancy doing it
with my customers.
I feel very strongly the weight of responsibility as an
internet service provider in that our customers place
their faith in the fact that it is their data, not our data,
to choose what to do with and, therefore, we need a
clear legal framework on what we store and what we
do not store. That is why I say we store the
information that we are required to by RIPA and we
store the information that we need in order to serve
our customers. We do not keep browsing history of
where our customers browse every day of the week—
that is their data, not ours—unless or until there was
a change in legislation that required us to.
Q94 Tracey Crouch: But you are able to keep
internet browsing and other communications data
under the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations
2009, I believe. You could, if you wanted to, keep
that data.
Dido Harding: Technically we could. There are
different views from the lawyers on whether our
customers would be expecting us to store browsing
history. For example, when we launched HomeSafe
and when we first trialled HomeSafe, which is, based
on where you are browsing in your home, you have
set a series of filters that in your home, for example,
suicide and self-harm sites can’t be seen. That requires
us to store for you that you want suicide and selfharm sites blocked. A number of organisations and
the ICO themselves were very concerned that that did
not mean we were storing the history of where you
were browsing. We went through a number of stages
to give the ICO confidence that we were not storing
unnecessary information that our customers would not
necessarily want us to. That is why I say I am very
cautious about what data we store, if it is our
customers’ data as opposed to stuff that we need in
order to run the business for them.
Q95 Tracey Crouch: While I completely understand
the moral issues that you highlight about people
accessing sites that they want to—I can appreciate that
around, for example, online pornography—the issue
about illegal images of child abuse, for example, is
something completely separate.
Dido Harding: Yes, I agree. I do agree.
Tracey Crouch: If you are seeing information or data
from your customers, who are accessing sites that are
illegal, does that not have a moral duty on you as
a provider?
Dido Harding: I completely agree. If you are starting
to think through the stages at which it would be
appropriate to expect ISPs to pass that information
through, the easiest and most obvious is illegal child
abuse images, which are illegal to look at, illegal to
create, illegal to pass on, and it is a criminal rather
than a civil offence. I do agree with you and that is
why, through the IWF, we are working through a
process to do that. It is much less obvious as you work
your way back, because I do not think our customers
want internet service providers to store their history
of which car sites you have visited so that we can sell
it to car manufacturers for you to be bombarded with
emails about buying cars. It is very important that the
ISPs do not feel like it is a free-for-all to use that data.
Our customers do not expect that of us. We have been
thinking through, if it is entirely criminal, how we get
to a place where we can do that proactively with
CEOP.
Q96 Tracey Crouch: In our first oral evidence
session, we heard some shocking statistics about child
abuse images on the internet, talking about millions
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Ev 32 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
of images. 81% of those images involved children
under the age of 10, 4% of children under the age of
two, and over half of them were level four or level
five images. Do you think that the ISPs are being
effective at blocking these sites, these images?
Dido Harding: We are only as effective as
collectively through the IWF we are effective at
identifying the images. I think we all recognise that
the reactive approach, although it has taken the UK to
a much better place than a number of other countries,
has not solved the problem. Hence all the ISPs are
committing to increasing the funding of the IWF so
that the IWF can proactively go out and identify sites
that we could all block. No, I do not think anyone
working in the industry can say, “Yes, this is a job
well done”. It is a job that we know we have to do a
lot more.
Tracey Crouch: Do you have anything to add?
Nicholas Lansman: I think it is fair to say that there
is no complacency in this area. While the internet
industry is quite proud of having set up the Internet
Watch Foundation, it is an ongoing battle and I think
that several changes are taking place over time to
make the IWF more effective. It is true to say that, of
child abuse images, less than 1% are hosted in the
UK, but they are still going around the world. The
IWF also works with bodies abroad to make sure they
are trying to get them blocked at the source, because
I think that is the priority. Blocking is part of the
solution, but for the internet industry it is more
important that we try to remove this content at the
source, whether it is in the UK, more likely to be
elsewhere, in the US and so forth.
In addition to the extra resource that the IWF will be
getting through additional membership payments from
members, there is also a development in terms of
delivering splash pages. If someone accidentally
comes across child abuse images, rather than getting
an error message that just stops them accessing the
site they will now start to get splash pages that will
identify it is illegal material and they should not look
at it. These are some of the developments that are
taking place, but you are right. There is no
complacency and the internet industry continues to
work with the IWF, but also with CEOP and under
areas of law enforcement to make sure that the battle
to get rid of child abuse images and protect children
online continues.
Hamish Macleod: The Government has announced
that it is joining various international alliances to
tackle the problem. At the moment, the impression I
get is that it is all still a little bit aspirational and they
are just finding their feet. Those alliances need to have
clear deliverables and a clear action plan to improve
the situation because, for a great number of years now,
the vast majority of these sites have been hosted
outside the UK and international action and cooperation is what is going to lead to them being
removed and the people who are putting them up
there prosecuted.
Tracey Crouch: Do you think that requires a will or
money, or both?
Hamish Macleod: I am sure it will require both, yes.
Q97 Tracey Crouch: I understand that TalkTalk
automatically downloads the blocked list of known
websites containing illegal images on a daily basis. Is
that right?
Dido Harding: Yes.
Q98 Tracey Crouch: Two related questions. First, do
you think that a daily basis is fast enough and what
time of day do you do it? In my mind, if you are doing
it in the morning, by the time people are accessing in
the evening, probably new sites have popped up or
been created. It is just out of interest.
Dido Harding: I am ashamed to say I do not know
what time of day. I will check for you.
Tracey Crouch: I would be interested to know,
because it is such a fast-moving beast. Maybe I have
some sort of prejudice that these things are only being
accessed in the evening, but I just wonder—
Dido Harding: You are quite right. Let me go back. I
will get that for you. I can’t speak for the other ISPs.
For TalkTalk, it is currently a manual process. There
is a temptation to believe that telecoms companies are
all entirely automated. I wish we were. My goal is to
be able to automate it. Then I should be able to
consume it much faster.
Nicholas Lansman: I will check, but I understand that
twice a day there is an update to the list.
Chair: That is updated twice a day?
Nicholas Lansman: Yes.
Dido Harding: Then we consume it once a day.
Chair: You only do it once a day.
Q99 Steve Rotheram: I think Tracey has elicited a
response for the first question I had, so if we move
on. Is there a case for more effective filtering of legal
adult content, which could be obscene if it was viewed
by a child?
Hamish Macleod: The mobile filtering has been in
place since 2005 and it covers what we describe as
age-inappropriate. The framework that decides if it is
age-inappropriate or not is given to us by the BBFC
and it covers violence, pornography-type stuff,
behavioural stuff such as promotion of suicide,
promotion of anorexia, those sorts of sites; all the
topics that are of major public policy concern are
covered by their framework, whether that is obscene
or just 18-type content that you would see in the
cinema.
Q100 Steve Rotheram: Information is filtered. There
are filters. How effective are the filters?
Hamish Macleod: I believe they are very effective.
The accusations that are thrown at us more often are
about over-blocking of content, where we get a
handful of reports each month about accidentally
over-blocking. Again, part of the reason for the move
to the BBFC is to make that process a little bit more
slick so that if a website owner or a member of the
public believes that a site is being over-blocked, or
under-blocked, they are able to report it and the first
port of call is for their mobile operator to look at that.
Most of the time it is accidental and it is fairly easy
to speak to the filtering company and say, “Please can
you just change the categorisation of that website so
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 33
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
that it either is not blocked or is blocked, as
appropriate?”
Q101 Steve Rotheram: They are filtered at network
level?
Hamish Macleod: Yes, that is right.
Steve Rotheram: How about at mobile device level?
Hamish Macleod: Not very often, no. The products
that are available in the market to filter it at device
level tend to be a bit blunt. It is either about “turn on
the internet” or “turn off the internet”, or they
whitelist a very few sites or blacklist a very few sites.
From our point of view, it is an area that we would
like to see discussed a little more in the public domain
because a lot of the focus has been on what can be
done at network level, but what can be done at
browser level, what can be done at operating system
level, what can be done at the content provider level
or what can be done at device level? They all have a
contribution to make to this so that people can tailor
the services and the protections they want as best they
can, but we do the filtering at network level in
accordance with the framework that is independently
provided for us.
Dido Harding: I would say that there is still an awful
lot to do to improve the quality of filtering tools that
you give parents. We have had HomeSafe in the
market for 2.5 years. I would be the first to say that it
is not perfect and that there is a lot more to do to
make it something that is easier for parents to
understand and give some of the tools. Firstly, I think
it is important to remember that parents are not just
interested in blocking adult content. They are, if
anything, more worried about suicide and self-harm.
They want to block gaming or gambling. At certain
times of the day they want to block access to social
networking so that their children do their homework.
It is important to look at this more broadly than
simply the, admittedly, very serious issue of the
wealth of adult content online.
First, thinking about different types of content. Then
also we think whole-home network-based solutions
play a very important role, but they are not the only
solution. If you have teenagers and very young
children in the same household with multiple different
devices, you will want a more sophisticated filtering
solution that enables your 16-year-old to do their
homework, while it absolutely ensures that your threeyear-old cannot stumble on something that they are
not expecting. The parents themselves may want
access to some of those different sites.
We get customers complaining that they have turned
on HomeSafe and all the filters, one of which is for
alcohol-related sites, and that blocks Waitrose wines.
We know that the technology is not quite there yet.
When my competitor ISPs launch their network
blocking solutions, I am expecting that they will be
better than mine in some ways and that will be a good
thing. This is still an area where innovation can get
you a march against your competitors and there is real
consumer demand for tools that are simple to use but
meet their needs. I would want the Committee to feel
that both mobile and fixed-line telcos recognise this is
something that we have to keep working at, because
our consumers tell us loud and clear that we do not
quite have it right yet.
Nicholas Lansman: Just a couple of issues. I have
previously mentioned over-blocking and underblocking, which is taken very seriously, but I think
it is important to note that, while the technology is
improving and will continue to improve to make sure
that parents have a tool that they can use in their
homes to make sure it is age-specific and to ensure
their children see only content that is appropriate for
them, technology is not a replacement for good
parenting.
I know the industry is working with Government and
charities to ensure that parents have adequate
information and that they can feel confident about
how the internet works and also confident in using the
technologies, but also to have that dialogue with their
children, which is very important. These are some of
the points that came out of various Government
reviews such as the Byron Review and indeed the
Bailey Review more recently, where it talked about a
partnership approach to child safety. Industry has an
element of responsibility to provide those tools, but
equally there is the responsibility for parents and the
responsibility for Government also to help with that
education process.
Dido talked about how we have had many decades of
education to deal with how you drive, use seatbelts,
drive safely and do not drink and drive. Equally, there
have been campaigns for years about learning to
swim, children playing safety with matches, how to
climb ladders safely and even recently how to
barbecue your sausages. I think it is important to note
that this education, which some of your questions
earlier referred to, is how you get this change in how
we understand the technology and use it safely. The
answer is it will take time and industry is certainly
stepping up to the mark and providing those tools and
some of the education. We feel it is also incumbent
on parents, teachers and the Government to also assist
with that education role.
Dido Harding: What we have learnt is that parents
value being prompted to think about this. Since we
adopted active choice, if you go on to your account
page with TalkTalk and you have not turned
HomeSafe on, it will pop up and prompt you to say
you haven’t and, if you have children in your house
at any time, we strongly recommend you do. We find
that the vast majority of our customers welcome that
interruption and the vast majority of them with
children at home turn it on as a result. I do think this
is a space where proactive action from all the
participants is required. It is not just going to happen
by osmosis.
Q102 Steve Rotheram: But any parent of a certain
age will know that if you have a technological
problem then the first person you go to is the 12-yearold or 13-year-old. How easily can children
circumvent these filters?
Dido Harding: Nothing in life is perfect. We lock the
doors of our houses, even though we know a burglar
could get in. I would not want to pretend that our
safeguards are 100% perfect, but if you change the
HomeSafe settings the account holder gets an email
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Ev 34 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
immediately saying that you have done this. The only
way, in our system, that your 12-year-old could get
control of the filtering is if your 12-year-old is also
paying the bill for your home phone and broadband.
In order to do that they will have to set up a direct
debit, which they will not be able to do at at age 12.
Clearly, some very clever 12-year-olds may well have
masqueraded as 25-year-olds and be paying the home
phone bill, but all our analysis suggests that is very
tiny percentage. That closed loop where the
accountholder is automatically informed if any of the
settings are changed and you can only set them if you
are in the account space where you pay your bill is
our closed loop.
Hamish Macleod: In mobile, you would go through
an age verification process before you can take the
filters off. On the education point, this something we
have been again plugging away at for years and years
and years, both individual operators and collectively;
distributing materials within the schools to support
teachers. It is not just about inappropriate content, of
course. It is about inappropriate behaviour. It is about
making sure you have physical security of your
device—do you have a PIN number on your mobile
to prevent unauthorised use, to prevent from people
going on to it and spoofing you—and protecting your
personal data and all that sort of thing.
For years we have been putting this stuff into the
schools. I am not fully convinced that the Government
is giving it enough support within the school system,
because that is the easiest point to access children in
a formal setting. It should not just be about the ICT
doing it. It is about all teachers. Through the teacher
training programme, teaching them how to use
technology in the teaching environment, but also how
to use it responsibly and safely and encouraging
children to behave responsibly because it is their
behaviour that is so critical.
Q103 Mr Leech: Can I just ask why TalkTalk
decided to become the first ISP to have this
unavoidable choice?
Dido Harding: We decided to build HomeSafe about
five years ago before I became the chief executive. It
was my chairman and my chief technology officer’s
brainwave that we could build a whole-home networkbased solution. We have a much younger, simpler
telecoms network—techno-babble for a second, an
all-IP network—that makes it technically simpler and
easier for us to do it and our customers told us that
they were really worried about it.
Unashamedly, we launched HomeSafe because we
thought it was brilliant for us as a business, that it
made good business sense to offer our customers
something they wanted, and to bundle it in for free
with our product. I can’t take any of the credit for
that. It was my chairman, before I even joined. We
stand by it. It cost us of the order of £25 million to
build and a lot of people thought it was not possible
to do. There are not many things, to be honest, where
in TalkTalk I am saying I have done something that
my competitors are about to do. We think it stood us
in very good stead, that our customers who use it are
much more loyal to TalkTalk as a result. It has been a
good investment.
Q104 Mr Leech: What stopped other providers from
doing it before now?
Dido Harding: I am probably not the right person to
answer that question.
Nicholas Lansman: I do not want to speak on behalf
of the other three main providers.
Mr Leech: You can have a guess.
Nicholas Lansman: The point is now that this code
of practice has been agreed by four of the main
consumer-focused ISPs. They all agree that active
choice or this unavoidable choice—so when you have
a new customer, they ring up or contact you on the
internet, they have to make that decision about
whether they want to turn on parental controls—is
now agreed across the board. It is good that TalkTalk
were the pioneers, in that sense, but I know the other
players in the industry are stepping up to the mark.
We have introduced a whole range of child protection
measures. We have talked about choice. We have all
talked about the filtering for free, right across the
board, through the whole home. These are just some
of the developments that have been taking place over
the last year and will continue into 2014. There has
been a huge investment and some major developments
of which the whole industry is quite proud.
Dido Harding: I would say, on a broader topic, what
you have in the UK telecoms market, both fixed line
and mobile, is two very highly competitive markets.
The BBC ran something yesterday on, “Why is it that
in the US you have to pay so much more for your
broadband?” and the basic answer is because there is
no competition. What you have in the UK, in both
fixed and mobile, is two very competitive markets.
Fundamentally, we did this in TalkTalk because it was
something that we were willing to take a risk on that
our much bigger, maybe slightly more bureaucratic—
you never know—competitors were focused on other
things. As you as a Committee are looking at this
industry as a whole, recognising the power of
competition to make sure that you have technological
innovation is important in this sector.
Q105 Mr Leech: You said it cost you £25 million
and, from what you said, I guess that it would have
cost more if you did not have such a simple system.
Dido Harding: Yes.
Mr Leech: So, is it cost that has put off the other
providers before now?
Nicholas Lansman: I do not think it is. I do not know
what the costs have been for the other systems put in
place by the other main consumer ISPs, but it is a
very competitive market. All ISPs will have different
priorities in terms of where they are in the
marketplace. Obviously providing good, fast
broadband is an absolute priority to all the companies
and providing it at a price that people can afford.
There are still 7 million people that are not yet
connected to the internet in the UK; not all of those
have children. There is a range of issues that
companies focus on to deliver fast broadband at a
price that is affordable for the UK market.
Q106 Mr Leech: One of the issues of debate at the
moment is whether the active choice should be about
whether you opt in to adult content or opt in to filters.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 35
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
From TalkTalk’s perspective, do you have a difference
in take-up of filters from people who buy broadband
face to face or buy broadband over the telephone, as
opposed to over the internet where it is all far more
anonymous and people perhaps are less embarrassed
to take a particular view on whether they should
have filters?
Dido Harding: 99% of our customers are buying over
the telephone or online, rather than physically face to
face. We do not see any difference in the take-up of
HomeSafe based on whether it is an online sale or a
telephone sale. As a general rule, in all things we sell,
we see much higher customer satisfaction when they
buy it online, when they are in control of their own
settings and it is easier for customers to configure
online than it is to have an agent. As we have just
been grappling with in the last hour, the technology is
quite complicated. Describing it to somebody who is
not hugely digitally savvy over the telephone is not
easy. I always worry that people buying the product
over the phone might not understand what filters they
have turned on as clearly as someone buying it online.
Q107 Mr Leech: Do you find, once people have
opted in for filters or not opted in for filters, they often
change their mind and change it at a later stage?
Dido Harding: Yes. They turn them on and they turn
them off again. I remember keenly when my husband
was at DCMS himself discovering that the Racing
Post was default blocked in our house because I had
blocked all of their HomeSafe categories and, as
racing was one of his areas, he was a bit cross.
Immediately you will want to change that.
Mr Leech: It is one of your areas as well, though,
isn’t it?
Dido Harding: Yes. You see, that is what our
customers tell us. They do want to be able to change
the filters because their children change, their lives
change and, to keep the tools simple enough—it is
still quite blunt. As I say, you blocked alcohol because
you do not want your 12-year-olds going on to alcohol
abuse sites but then discover that wine retailers are
blocked, so you want to change that.
Q108 Mr Leech: You have recognised that the filters
are getting better?
Dido Harding: Yes.
Mr Leech: Have you seen a decrease in the number
of complaints or queries about a site being blocked or
not being blocked, in the time that you have been
offering the service?
Dido Harding: As the base has grown and our
customers are getting better at understanding it, we
are seeing an increasing desire for us to make the
product better. Our customers would love us to have
the ability for them to white-list a particular site
within a category. For example, the national lottery
would count as a gaming site. There are an awful lot
of families who are buying a lottery ticket each week.
They want to check the winning numbers, but they
want gaming sites and gambling sites to be blocked.
At the moment, our HomeSafe tool does not enable
you to do that. We have seen an increase and I think
it is a good thing that our customers are engaging in
the product, because the thing you do not want is that
they set the filters and think that the internet is safe
now for their family and they do not need to worry
about it.
Q109 Mr Leech: How far are you away from being
able to white-list individual sites?
Dido Harding: Not very far.
Mr Leech: How far is not very far? Six months, six
years, 60 years?
Dido Harding: With some of my competitors in the
room, I would rather not give you a specific timing,
but we are a pretty entrepreneurial business that tries
to do things quite fast.
Mr Leech: I am guessing it is quite technologically
difficult, then?
Dido Harding: No. I am not an engineer, so I bat
away all the hard work, which is very unkind of me,
but a lot of this is more around the amount of changes
you can make at any one time to a stack of code. It is
not that it is technically difficult to block a specific
site and give a customer permission. It is just hard to
get all the work done that everyone would like to do
in it.
Q110 Mr Leech: Turning to social media, how easy
is it to trace people who set up fake identities on social
media sites?
Nicholas Lansman: I know you are taking evidence
from some of the social media companies later, so I
do not want to go too much into this area. I mentioned
before that I think there is a difference between
anonymity online and that does not mean you cannot
trace people. In the previous session with Stella
Creasy we had good examples of where people try to
hide their identity online, yet they have been in the
process of prosecution. People can attempt to hide
themselves online, but there are technical ways in
which they can be discovered. We talked about IP
addresses and so forth.
Mr Leech: Is it straightforward, though,
technologically?
Nicholas Lansman: I do not think it is
straightforward. I am not technologically competent
enough to give you a direct answer to that, but we can
go away and perhaps provide some further evidence
to the Committee on this point. A lot of this is
possible, but some of the issues that were considered
by Stella Creasy about people creating multiple fake
identities is an issue the social media companies are
looking at, at the moment.
Q111 Mr Leech: Do any of you have a view on
whether social media companies could do more to
combat illegal behaviour?
Dido Harding: I would take the view that all of us
participating in this space can do more. I would not
pretend to know enough about what social companies
could do specifically, but I think you should be
pushing us all.
Mr Leech: What, in your view, is the reason why
they are not doing more at the moment? Is it because
of this view about freedom of the internet or is it
about money?
Dido Harding: I thought that, in the earlier session,
Stella Creasy was right. She was talking specifically
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Ev 36 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Nicholas Lansman, Dido Harding and Hamish Macleod
about Twitter. These social media companies are just
very young and they have grown exponentially fast
and they are catching up with some of these issues. I
do not think you should just label it, “Is it money or
is it technical ability?” A chunk of it is immaturity of
an industry, that we are all learning how to do this.
That is why you should be holding us all to account
to think it through.
Q112 Mr Leech: When you say, “Immaturity of an
industry” though, is it something to do with the
uniqueness of social media companies that seem to be
able to grow exponentially with a very small number
of staff and just literally do not have the capacity to
do the work that needs to be done without a vast—
Dido Harding: If you take my road safety analogy, it
is the sheer speed at which these organisations have
gone from being a garage business with a group of
people in their early 20s to being a Fortune 100
company. The speed of that growth does put pressure
on any organisation to catch up, in a world where the
moral and social framework does not exist yet.
Nicholas Lansman: Added to that also is that many
of these social network companies are global and the
Committee is also looking at this concept of how
companies can know how to comply—well, they need
to—with the law and to interpret it. It is not so much
that the companies are not willing. It is a complex
situation where, even where laws apply online as well
as offline, it is how to get to grips with them and how
they can work with law enforcement as well. As Stella
Creasy said previously, it is an evolving area and I
think technology companies, whether social network
or otherwise, are part of this learning process.
Hamish Macleod: The volume is high. A number of
years ago, I appeared in front of this Committee and
I remember quoting a statistic that something like 10
hours of YouTube video goes up every minute. I heard
that statistic the other day and I believe it is now 10
times that going up every minute. It is an enormous
volume that is being dealt with.
Dido Harding: In all the work that I do with the social
media companies, I see no lack of willingness to
tackle these issues. It is a scale and scope challenge
for all of us.
Chair: I think that is all we have. Thank you very
much.
Examination of Witness
Witness: Mr Jim Gamble, Independent Chair, City and Hackney Safeguarding Children Board, gave evidence.
Q113 Chair: For our third sessions, I welcome back
before the Committee Jim Gamble, who is now
Independent Chairman of the City and Hackney
Safeguarding Children Board, but whom we also
remember as the first chief executive of CEOP. You
will have heard some of the evidence that we have
taken, both this morning and in our previous session.
Can you give us your view of the current degree of
the problem both of the extreme child sex abuse-type
images and also on the problem of children having
access to inappropriate material that is more
appropriate for adults?
Jim Gamble: I will deal with the inappropriate
material first because it is the easy one. I think
inappropriate material is a parental decision for those
individuals who have duty of care of the young people
to make and I think active choice is absolutely right.
If parents and others are prompted to make a decision,
I do not think you can do more than that. You are not
going to go out into their homes and look after their
children for them. We are not going ensure that they
do not drink more alcohol than they should or
whatever else. I think active choice means that you
are prompting a decision that a parent must take.
Apart from that, the reason that it is inappropriate and
not illegal is because it is not against the law and
thereby it is quite appropriate for the parent or carer
or person with the duty of care to make that decision.
There is far too great a focus and emphasis on that
side of the debate at the minute and it is clouding
other issues. If you look at Miley Cyrus or if you look
at some of the other pop stars and their behaviour,
that has a far greater and much more easily accessibly
influence on young people today than seeking out
adult or hard-core pornography for that matter. There
is no debate or discussion of any value on that because
you have young pop stars who young people want to
emulate behaving in a highly sexualised way, whereby
there is no filter. That is that issue.
On the second one, I think we have stood still for a
number of years because of inertia in Government.
Let me say before I start that I am going to speak on
the basis of the Laming principles, following his
review after Baby P, and that is that we must have lots
of professional curiosity and appropriate and
respectful challenge. Anything I say is not to offend
anyone. It is simply to bear in mind those principles.
You have too many images still on the internet. We
have too few people deterred from going on and
looking at those images. We have diverted the debate
from how we stop people from accessing, abusing and
capturing images of our children to how we manage
an internet industry that has not stood still; who have
blocked images for as long as I have been involved in
this, from 2002, 2001; who have put in place
processes, perfect or imperfect, to deal with those.
What we need to do now is address the issue that we
are not being creative or imaginative enough in how
we turn the tables. Let me give you an example of
that.
Peter Davies, in one of his statements to the media,
talked about 50,000 to 60,000 people downloading
indecent abuse images at any given time. What we
know about the propensity of those individuals to go
on and commit hands-on offences is sufficient that, if
you are a parent, you should be extremely concerned.
Ultimately, though, we are not having the debate
about how we resource child protection teams and
how we identify, locate and rescue the children
trapped in these images. I have read the previous
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 37
29 October 2013 Mr Jim Gamble
evidence. I do not accept, and I have rung around, that
very few of the images are new. Too many of the
images are new. The images that you talk about that
IWF will access are not hidden on peer-to-peer. That
is where paedophiles nest to share their images. How
do we identify, locate and rescue those children and
how do we identify, locate and hold to account those
predators that represent a threat?
You talked about education earlier. Unless you have a
deterrent—in other words, we arrest 2,500 people and
prosecute them for this—you have no deterrent to
point to that is credible in the classroom. Young
people understand that. There is a case in America
at the minute where two girls have been arrested for
bullying. It will be an interesting case to look at later.
But let us accept that we have a problem with finance.
What I would propose is the Government would be
better investing £1.4 million in recruiting 12 detective
sergeants, 12 trainers and co-ordinators and using the
enthusiasm that is on the ground, because we have
seen organisations like Let’s Go Hunting. Is that a
good thing for them to do? No. Does it represent the
manifestation of the frustration that we talk about one
issue while our children continue to be abused? Yes,
it does.
Let us for one second be a little bit imaginative and
take the special constables’ role. Why can we not have
special constables online? The figures I have given
you are ready-reckoner figures, so they take account
of not just the salary but also the on-costs of the
equipment. If you had that for each region, every
police force could recruit up to 10 special constables,
just in theory, in their area that would be trained,
vetted and supported to come in and give of their time.
As a retired police officer, I might say, “Well I’ll
actually go into Belfast to the PSNI, and I will give
X amount of nights a week”, the same way as specials
do anywhere. If I had worked in IT or currently do
that, I might want to give up time.
If you did that, you would have 520 people online at
any given time who could manifestly cover 10, 20, 30
or 40 chat-room environments, where you would have
people out there protecting our children. Not rogue
vigilantes, but properly vetted, properly trained and
accredited and properly supervised officers online. To
me, that is what we should be thinking about so we
attack the root cause, which is people. Not get
involved in what I see in the one instance as trying to
cover up the fact that—and I have read your evidence,
that everything is fine in CEOP. Well, I would suggest
you scratch the surface on that if you think that CEOP
has not been diminished by going into the National
Crime Agency.
To move the argument to, “How can you deal with
this problem?” We have all become seduced by the
technology. So we talk about filters and we talk about
blocking. We have been doing that for a long time. I
sat and listened to friends from the internet industry.
They have been doing a good job for a long time. I
have not always been their greatest fan because they
should be pushed and they should be challenged, but
I have not heard any talk about the Click CEOP button
that children can go to in Facebook if their parents
have downloaded it, and report, and we fought long
and hard to get that put in there.
In 2004, when I was deputy director general of the
National Crime Squad, we created a site that was
bogus. When you came to it looking for child abuse
images, it popped up and said, “This is a law
enforcement site. Your IP address is—. You have
committed a criminal offence.” Those issues were
okay in their day, but it seems to me we have stood
still. Matt Bishop, vice president from Microsoft who
sat on my board in CEOP, said, “The thing you must
remember”, and I would challenge you to remember
as you go through this, “is that in the world of
technology, standing still is falling rapidly behind”.
I believe we have fallen behind. I believe the early
success of CEOP—not because of me but because of
people like Helen Penn and the education team, who
is now working for some other unit in SOCO, not
dealing with children, a fabulous child protection
expert, developed all the early CEOP training and
education materials, had worked for Childnet charity,
but is now working in some other part of an organised
crime entity. It does not make sense. We need to
reflect that this is about people. The internet industry
can be attacked for so long, but we have to get to
the point where we say, “How can law enforcement
do more?”
Chair: Thank you. We are going to come on to the
CEOP incorporation issue but before we do, I will
bring in Steve Rotheram.
Q114 Steve Rotheram: Before we do that, I
followed the line of questioning last week about the
victims in this. It is surprising that Jim has come up
with a very different explanation of that from Peter
last week, which is very concerning because one of
the priorities for me was what we do about trying to
prevent other people from becoming victims and what
we do to help those people who are the victims. How
far do we pursue that? Perhaps my line of questioning
did not go far enough, but you are saying that we do
not do enough in that respect?
Jim Gamble: We do not do anywhere near enough.
CEOP now have—I will estimate—two people
working on victim identification. Police forces are
dealing with 101 other issues out there. How many of
them do you think have dedicated resources right now
looking at these issues? I have read the statistics, the
26 million. That is five forces. You are looking at
millions upon millions.
In one investigation we did, Operation Cathedral,
there were 750,000 images, but they related to 1,232
or 1,233 individual children. On peer-to-peer, these
are being created. On the 50,000 Peter talks about,
those are peer-to-peer sites. Those are hard-core
paedophiles who do not stumble across anything on
Google. They nest in these places on the internet
where they can share secretly. You have to infiltrate
that. You have to infiltrate it. You have to identify who
they are and follow them offline and arrest them.
During Operation Ore there was massive controversy,
but you know what? In the UK, we identified, located
and arrested more than anyone did anywhere else in
the world. I am now more convinced than ever that
what we did was right because, for a short period,
people were afraid to go online and download these
images because they could be arrested and exposed to
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Ev 38 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Mr Jim Gamble
the full glare of daylight, and they do not like that.
You do not have an active deterrent. If you look at the
last two years’ CEOP reports, the arrests are lower
than they were for any year except our first year of
operation. That cannot be right. That is not a deterrent.
Q115 Chair: Just on that point, we came to visit
CEOP when you were running it and you ran a
programme over 24 hours, peer-to-peer file sharing,
and I think you came up with something like 20,000
sites making available hard-core images. Those are
20,000 IP addresses that you could identify and you
could go and raid them or arrest them, if you chose to
do so. Is it simply a lack of commitment or resources
that is preventing that?
Jim Gamble: It is not lack of commitment anywhere.
Peter Davies and everyone in CEOP are absolutely
committed to doing the right work, as are people in
all the police forces around the country. I think we
become seduced by all this and, because of the
volume, we say we can’t do anything. To use the CEO
of TalkTalk’s example, if we did not enforce speed
limits on the roads we would have hundreds of
thousands of people committing those offences, but
when they see a picture of a speed camera on the side
of the road they slow down because they realise that
the deterrent is real and they may in fact collect points
and lose their licence. We need to get to a position
where we stop dealing with some of the technological
issues that have seduced us for so long and attack the
issues, which are people.
To come back to your point about victims, we need to
get into the images to identify those children who are
new victims, those children based in a particular
geography, so we can share that with law enforcement
abroad or do more. Two people working all the hours
that God sends are not going to make that difference.
I am recognising the financial restrictions and
everything these days hides behind austerity, but for
about £1.4 million, giving the public, retired officers
and others the opportunity to engage you could make
a huge step-change and difference. That is about being
child focused and not being organisationally or
politically focused, in my opinion.
Q116 Steve Rotheram: Moving on to the other
aspects of it, we know that possession and publication
of child sex images is illegal. Are there any changes
in legislation that you think could help the police do
their job better?
Jim Gamble: You can always tweak legislation. I
heard your earlier comments on that and I would not
disagree that you might want to refresh the language.
My issue is that we do not need new legislation. We
need new thinking and we need people to apply the
law as it currently exists.
When I listened to the Member of Parliament giving
evidence earlier, Stella Creasy, I was struck by how
well she encapsulated it all. The Prevention of
Harassment Act is bullying. The Prevention of
Harassment Act is trolling. But we do not have
examples that we can take into the classrooms and say
to kids, “Don’t bully a friend to death. Don’t join in
this bullying because of these two 15 and 16-year-olds
who have been prosecuted.” When I say that at public
events and venues people, especially from the third
sector, will say to me, “That’s not right. You cannot
criminalise children.”
If a 15-year-old walked up to the bus stop and
punched you in the face, we would not say, “Well,
you’re only 15 or you’re only 16. That’s okay.” There
would be consequences. The internet is just like a
public place. We need to ensure that the laws as they
exist, when they can be applied, are applied. In my
experience you can track back. The thing is the child
who uses their phone or their laptop or if they are old
enough to have one of those old stationary computers
that three people would lift onto a desk in a bedroom,
they are leaving an evidence trail that is ultimate very,
very easy, to follow once you pull the first strand.
Educating children in the classroom is key. Where you
have two people at the minute—two people, I am
told—in CEOP who are currently qualified to deliver
the ambassador training, because focus is now
criminal justice and NCA rather than education and
social care, how do you get into the classroom? None
of the resources that are going out at the minute
include workshops on Snapchat, on Vimeo, on Vine,
on Ask.fm.
While you might have two or three lines on the
internet, getting into the classroom where you engage
in a virtual cycle: the teacher, the child, and critically,
their parent. Parents will complain and bang the table
for the three days after something terrible has
happened and then they go back to their normal lives
because they do not want to think of it happening to
their children. The psychology of it is you think,
“Well, that is terrible”. That is why I think we have
had all of this from those poor children that were
murdered by Stuart Hazell and—I am trying to
remember the other guy’s name, but after Tia Sharp
and April Jones’ murders.
What we have is this reaction, this overwhelming
urge, because we are all so emotionally engaged with
our children, to demand that something is done; but
rather than demand that the right thing is done and we
deal with people, we begin to deal with technology.
That is a huge problem about focus. We have to look
at how we get to the root cause, identify, locate and
hold to account as many of those people as you can,
which will deter the vast majority from coming online.
They do not want to be caught. They can walk into a
police station if they want to be caught. The only time
you ever hear a paedophile saying, “This was a cry
for help”, is after they have been caught.
We need to see more being arrested and you are not
going to do that with splash screens. If you are a hardcore paedophile and you search for an image and a
splash screen says, “You can get in trouble”, I do not
know—do you think these people grew up in a society
where they did not realise the stigma involved? Do
you think they kept the secret about the way they
engaged and abused children all those years because
they thought it would be somehow acceptable, that
they need a prompt to remind them that it isn’t? That
just does not make sense and it is a diversion of
attention and resource that does not work. We tried it.
Q117 Steve Rotheram: Again, I am for splash
screens, but not for the reason that you are say; not
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 39
29 October 2013 Mr Jim Gamble
for the hard-core paedophiles out there. They are far
more sophisticated than that anyway. That would not
make a blind bit of difference, but as a warning to
others perhaps and to try to change the culture online,
because I think that is very different to what happens
offline.
We all know these sorts of images are illegal
throughout the world. For me, I wonder why there is
such a prevalence of them if everyone knows they are
illegal. Is there a lack of resource from the police to
try to tackle it or, as I asked Peter last week, is there
a problem with international co-operation so that we
need to clamp down on those people who are the main
purveyors of these sorts of images?
Jim Gamble: In 2003–2004 we created the Virtual
Global Taskforce, which is an alliance across
international territory: the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, the Australian Federal Police, Department of
Homeland Security, Interpol and others. I was its first
chair. In one operation, over 357 hours, I think it was
132 children that we rescued. You need to be online.
You need to be patrolling 24/7. I come back to
imaginative cost-effective solutions. If a police officer
in the UK is working an 8-hour shift, they hand the
baton to an officer in Canada, who hands the baton to
an officer in Australia, you have 24-hour coverage for
an 8-hour shift. We need to go back to those basics,
because it seems to me we have stood still. The
deterrent that existed during Operation Ore, the
deterrent that existed during Operation Chandler—to
put the splash screens in context, I would not be
against them if the splash screen was saying, “122
people have been arrested this year. Do you want to
be 123?” While I was in CEOP, we took an ad out at
Christmas in The Times saying, “Go online and search
for indecent images of children and we will present
you with a criminal record”. I am not against that per
se, but it becomes laughable if you do not have the
publically visible deterrents of people being held to
account in court.
Q118 Steve Rotheram: Is the real problem that if
there were 50,000 people who were accessing these
images, which are all illegal, and those people could
be charged and, if they go through the judicial
process, could be fined or imprisoned—hopefully
imprisoned—that we just do not have the
infrastructure anyway?
Jim Gamble: Here is the question. Can they all be
identified, located and held to account? How do you
know that Bridger was not online looking for those?
The issue for me is always this. In my role in
safeguarding now, in the work that I do as a consultant
and elsewhere, you see people popping up all the time
as teachers or in other roles who were downloading
these images six or seven years ago. The courts have
to take it more seriously. You have a situation now
where you will still see teachers, for example, getting
prosecuted for this and not going to prison.
At one stage, before my clash with the Home
Secretary, in an interview I did say that I recognise
that there was a role for cautions and managing some
people, but that is about the risk assessment of them.
There was a hue and cry that I should have resigned
then and many years earlier. I recognise that there is
a role to be played around that management, but the
more I have watched the situation develop the more I
believe we need to see substantial numbers of people
held to account. Courts need to apply meaningful
sentences. Courts need to avoid making statements
that diminish or trivialise the issue because it is an
image.
They need to be asking questions about whether these
images have been interrogated, whether we have
exhausted every opportunity in the images you have
to identify and locate the child, because I will bet if
you go out to the police forces who have millions of
images they have not all been viewed. If that was one
of your children, would you be more interested in that
being viewed so that they could be rescued from the
abuse that they are probably not telling you about or
would you rather that we had a splash screen? For me
it has to be children first. That is why this debate is
so important, because we have become seduced by
statistics and technology and they become images.
I have heard people like Claire Perry talk about the
fact that these are all crime scenes. Well, yes, great.
We coined that phrase in 2004–2005, but the fact of
the matter is we are still having the same
conversation. It is getting into that. Let us find the
kids. If you find the kids, you will find the people who
did it. If you hold those people to account, they will
not be doing it any more. We have seen in the Savile
case that there is never just one victim. There are
always multiple victims with these people. If you are
able to do that, you are going to create a more active
deterrence because the only way to manage
paedophiles is through fear, in my experience: fear of
capture, fear of exposure.
Q119 Mr Sutcliffe: At the risk of trying to reopen
old wounds, Jim, I asked Peter Davies last week if it
was a good thing that CEOP had been incorporated
into the National crime Agency. He said he thought it
was absolutely a good thing. His argument was that
CEOP had evolved and that the National Crime
Agency brought in wider resources. Clearly, I do not
think you see that as the case. Given the solution in
terms of how you see a potential solution in terms of
where we are, what are your concerns and worries and
do you still have those worries now about what has
happened to CEOP?
Jim Gamble: I came in from Victoria this morning. I
took a taxi across to the hotel where I am staying and
we drove past CEOP. As we drove past, there is a big
wall where the CEOP sign used to be and we used to
have all the photographs of kids who came in from
schools. There is now a big sign on the wall that says
“National Crime Agency”. The Home Secretary, of
course, said that the Government would invest in
CEOP and build on its success and that it would not
dilute or diminish its operational independence or
brand. I have done a lot of work in the last couple of
years as a consultant around brand, around social
media and everything else. Putting up a National
Crime Agency sign is not about not diluting the brand.
That is about the bigger brand suppressing the smaller
brand because it needs now to establish itself, which
is a good example of why it is not right. Child
protection in every other sphere has to fight its corner.
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Ev 40 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Mr Jim Gamble
The idea in CEOP under The Way Forward paper
presented by the previous Government was to build on
its early success as a consolidated centre, not around
criminal justice, but around child protection. I do not
disagree that CEOP could have been consolidated
somewhere else, but it would have been much better
consolidated as an agency of the Department for
Education than in the National Crime Agency. If you
want to consolidate like-for-like resources, then put
counterterrorism in there because, as a former Head
of Counterterrorism in Belfast and Deputy Director
General of the National Crime Squad, I do know a
little bit about organised crime and terrorism. There
are many things that are familiar.
To take a child protection agency and put it into a
national crime agency where the brand has now been
diluted, where they will continue to have protection
under Freedom of Information, which is
fundamentally wrong, how can you have a child
protection entity that is not subject to Freedom of
Information? You have a child protection entity that
is answerable through the NCA to one political
person, the Home Secretary. Where is the credible
reassurance around that? Where are the lessons of
serious case review around professional independence
and challenge? The fact of the matter is we had
planned the three pillars to be education, social care,
and criminal justice. We now have moved to one
pillar, which is criminal justice.
I read the evidence of last week with real interest to
see where the statistics are—let us drill into them and
see where it is—and I could not see any because it
was, “We are not sure about this number, we are not
sure about that number, but this is improving and that
is much better”. Where is the evidence? Two people
qualified to deliver ambassador training in the UK. I
do not know how many hundred thousand teachers
there are in the UK, but it is a lot.
I do know, from feedback I get at the conferences
where I speak and the other work that I do, that there
is a frustration that they are no longer able to get the
resources. Two fantastic people trying to do a difficult
role, but with no resource and no support. Why are
there no Ask.fm workshops coming out of what they
do? Why are there no Snapchat lessons for the
classroom? Why is there not a programme of work
that joins up with schools, children and parents
together so that you capture the digital footprint of the
family and you understand how you then engage, so
that the child learns to block, report, do privacy
settings with the parent?
Those were all the plans, the 24/7 command and
control centre that should have been in CEOP manned
by child protection professionals where you could
phone in if you had a child trafficking, child
exploitation or child abduction issue. Where is that?
Gone, subsumed into something else. CEOP’s brand
was important because it delivered reassurance and it
had a high profile brand. Do you think that brand is
still as high profile today? The places that I am going
to and the people I am speaking to are saying that it
is not. I was at the Police and Crime Commissioners
Conference in West Midlands, several hundred people
dealing with child protection, not three weeks ago.
Bob Jones was there. I asked, “Do you think it would
be easier for a child to approach the NCA or CEOP
as old?” Of course, maybe they just want to make me
happy and I accept that, but I do not think everybody
is that keen on making me happy; not a single person
in the audience, and there were some from the Serious
Organised Crime Agency as it was then.
I will give you one other example. CEOP’s academy,
partnership with Lancashire University, looking at the
psychology of offending, because we need to
understand why these people do what they do, so we
can interdict it earlier. Where is it? It has gone. It is
not happening. For the last three years it has been
suspended. Why? Why do we not have that learning
being distilled from those interviews and shared with
all of the police forces that are engaging and
interviewing these people on the ground? It is about
having a child protection focus and not having an
organisational one that is about facing drugs, facing
all other forms of organised crime.
One of the reasons I resigned was because 32
organisations made submissions about CEOP going
into the National Crime Agency. None of them, as far
as I am aware, supported it from the Association of
Directors for Children’s Services through the NSPCC
and everybody else. Today, with the gift of hindsight,
they may say, “Well, it is not too bad”. Do you know
why? The Government of the day is the Government
of the day and nobody likes to fight with them, but
why have those reports never been released? We tried
to get them several years ago and under Freedom of
Information they could not be released. It is not
plutonium poisoning. This is about child protection
and what experts’ opinions were at the time.
I think we suffered because of a bloody-minded
approach of the present Home Secretary at a time
when Government was new. They did not, as
everyone in child protection knows, do that critical
thing, which is pause, reflect and plan before you
change anything around child protection. I think what
we have seen is an increase in the number of images
available, an increase in confidence of offenders and
a decrease in deterrence.
Q120 Mr Sutcliffe: I am grateful for that and, not
surprisingly, would support all that you have said. The
issue for me when I was Probation Minister was the
multi-agency approach of dealing with offenders who
came out and had to be monitored under licence or
whatever. We seem to have lost that link in terms of
online safety with those perpetrators, who usually
have multiple convictions, who come back out into
society and have to be monitored by the different
agencies. Has that work diminished or is it still there
in terms of the relationships with the other parts of
the criminal justice system?
Jim Gamble: I do not know. All I can say is the plan
was, in the 24/7 command centre that was envisaged
under The Way Forward, that there would be, for
those critical high-risk offenders, a means for lifetime
monitoring them. We were looking at a number of
providers around that, so that you would have a
centre. Whether a family was in Portugal when a child
went missing or somewhere else, they could get expert
advice. Secondly, somewhere where there was a child
protection ethos; that if something was happening in
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 41
29 October 2013 Mr Jim Gamble
a particular Facebook environment or elsewhere,
someone could go and take an immediate look at it.
I am working with the Isle of Man police at the minute
and looking at how they can integrate their digital
strategy both on and offline that allows them, in a
recognised form, to patrol for their citizens online.
Rather than say, “Do not report crime to us”, say,
“You can engage this Twitter patrol and you can ask
it questions and it will give you professional answers
and help you, because it can be in your pocket”;
looking at how you do that. That opportunity has
been missed.
I think Keith Bristow is an outstanding police leader;
I think Peter Davies has had a very difficult job to do.
A lot of people left CEOP. I hear all the time that the
numbers are much bigger now and that is great if they
have been able to do that on a budget that is largely
the same, of £6.4 million in their annual review. If
they have done that by reallocating, fantastic, but
when I was there and I gave evidence to Home Affairs
Select Committee the week I resigned, we took a
headcount of who we had. It is about 120 now. I know
they say then it was 86. I am a bit concerned about
the difference.
I read with interest the phrases used, because I think
everything here is “more resources and number of
people available for CEOP’s work”. What does that
mean: number of resources and people available?
How many people do you think are in CEOP right
now? How many people do you think are working
right now for child protection in the country? If I were
you that is the question I would want to know. I also
understand that you have heard about the
psychological support that staff get. Let us look at
psychological. How many staff are in CEOP today,
working for CEOP, that have had psychological
support? That will give you an idea of the true number
who are working directly for CEOP; those people who
have had that psychological support who are working
in child protection today.
You have to get beneath the rhetoric of “there are
more”. Apparently, there is 145. Apparently, it is 175.
If “access to resources” means that they can use
Serious Organised or National Crime Agency
resources, are they the right resources? In my
experience in education, I came in as a hard-core
police officer. I did not come in thinking, “Well, we
will go down this education road”, but over the sixyear period what I saw was, “Educate and empower
young people. They can protect each other. Educate
and empower those who are in a role to protect them.
Support social care. Support teachers. You will have
a far greater opportunity of target-hardening those
people who are vulnerable while you do it”. I get no
sense that that has been captured.
When we talked about statistics of children rescued,
we defined a child protected as someone who—if you
are a paedophile and you are engaging two children,
we would count those two children because we would
know the name of the social worker, the name of the
paedophile and the law enforcement officer engaged.
In the broader safeguarding, we would not, if you
were a martial arts instructor that held a whole load
of classes, count 130 children because we had arrested
you. We would count those children that you may
potentially have engaged with. You have to look at
statistics and say, “Are we improving? Are we getting
better? Where have all these things gone?”
You can bring someone in from the National Crime
Agency who is a grade six analyst and put them on a
desk to look at child abuse images. Is that what you
want or do you want someone with a child protection
background who specialises in that and who has built
a history in doing it to be looking at that; who will
consider not just the issues about viewing the images
and the trauma and that, but some of the other
evidential issues and some of the safeguarding issues?
I said at the time I would love to be coming back to
say I had been proved wrong. I am not being
malicious or malign when I say that I think I have
been absolutely proved right. The brand has been
diminished
and
diluted.
The
operational
independence, do you get a sense that CEOP is
operationally independent of the National Crime
Agency? It is not even independent of politics and the
Home Secretary. That is not a good place for child
protection to be. If you were a safeguarding board, I
think you would be heading for trouble.
Q121 Tracey Crouch: I apologise for having to
whizz off straight after the question. My mother was
a social worker in Children & Families for many
years. I have to say I thought I was pretty immune
from stories about child abuse, but some of the
statistics that we have been hearing I have found quite
distressing. You talk about the role of linking up the
agencies for child protection. Do you think that our
current flock of social workers are being adequately
trained to deal with this kind of abuse on the internet
and how can we improve, not just awareness among
our enforcement agencies, but within our protection
agencies as well?
Jim Gamble: That is a great question. I am chair in
Hackney. What you have there is a blended staff. We
talk about the frustration and the problems. You have
young staff who grew up with Bebo, then MySpace,
then Facebook, who use Instagram every day. Those
young social workers bring a skillset with them that
the older ones do not have, but what the older ones
have is experience of dealing with families living in
complex situations, facing issues around alcohol
misuse, mental health and all the other safeguarding
issues that are there.
Do I think that the training is good enough? No, I
think it could be improved. Do I think we are in a dire
situation? No, I do not. My eldest daughter is a special
needs teacher. She is 28. She grew up with Bebo. So
in the classroom she understands all those issues. My
son who lives and works in London, when his younger
sister was coming of age he was the one who did not
want her to go onto social networking sites. Maybe
that was because he did not want her to see what he
was doing, but at the end of the day it was also about
protection. The youngest is training to be a social
worker as we speak and so from that point of view
I agree.
What I would say is we need to get this right again.
The NSPCC ran a survey—I think it probably links to
your question—where they said just about 50% of
social workers were not confident that they would be
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Ev 42 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
29 October 2013 Mr Jim Gamble
able to identify a child whose abuse had stemmed
from the internet. The problem with that question was
it was put the wrong way around. The question was
about technology first and harm second. If you ask if
a social worker could identify a child who had been
the subject of neglect, abuse or mistreatment, then the
statistics would have been a lot higher.
Now, there are 85,000-odd social workers on the
general social work care consult register. There are
about 45,000 in local authority care and about 24,000
or 25,000 delivering children’s services. That survey
looked at 327 or 329. Some were from the NSPCC
themselves. Is it representative? I am not sure. Social
workers are like the rest of us. I would think you
would be au fait, if I am being stereotypical, with
social media whereas some of the rest of us would
not. Training needs to be updated and improved. It
needs to be in the workplace as well. We should be
delivering that training online. It has to be
contemporary, because if you develop a training
package now and you do not take account of the new
social media sites, the new trends, the new dos and
don’ts, then you lose sight of it.
It is like RIPA. I was chair of the UK Data
Communications Group. The problem with the
legislation is, when you make it too specific, you
cannot apply it generally enough. Training needs to
be about how you communicate, how you create risks.
Q122 Tracey Crouch: It goes back to your original
premise right at the start about professional curiosity.
Do you have any statistics or evidence or even just
any suspicions as to what proportion of children who
are victims of child abuse images that are posted on
the internet are also on the at-risk register in terms of
general protection?
Jim Gamble: No. If we go back to one of the Ofsted
reports—not the last one but before—I think there was
only about 12% of children who were on the Children
At Risk Register who were known to authorities in
any way. Those children who were dealt with, the
other percentage, the adults in the house were known
to create a risk.
One of the other problems is ContactPoint. How do
you identify and locate a child who is subject to a risk
that is being investigated by social care, by policing,
by health or problems with education? ContactPoint
was the mechanism by which we did that. It was
scrapped on 26 August by the present Government
and never replaced. That was technology that you
could turn all this on its head. The former Head of
Intelligence in CEOP had said to me at the time,
“Look, this has made it easier and quicker for us to
identify some of the children because we get partial
information. You can then look for the specifics.” It
was seen as a Big Brother database, which it was not.
Should there be better training? Yes, but I think the
training needs to always concentrate on the abuse. The
mechanism and means, whether it is child sexual
exploitation on the street, whether it is a child being
trafficked, or whether it is a child being groomed will
have two things in common: people first and
technology second.
Q123 Mr Leech: I do not think any of us can be in
any doubt on your views as to the change from CEOP
coming under the National Crime Agency but, given
that it is, are there any changes that you would like to
see that you think would improve the situation that
have not been introduced so far?
Jim Gamble: Yes. I accept the situation as it is. If it
was within my gift, I think there should be far greater
engagement with the Department for Education. The
education teams should be bolstered. CEOP should
have absolute operational independence from the
National Crime Agency, because children’s voices
must be heard and must come first. I am not sure how
you can do that, given the present format. They will
have an advisory board, but an advisory board is like
an ashtray on a motorbike. It does not make a lot of
difference once you start moving if people are not
using it. I think they need to re-engage education
much more. They need to invest in education.
They could still do what I have suggested around
creating special constables who would work
regionally with their local police forces for £1.4
million. Recruit, train, and accredit through CEOP,
attached to the National Crime Agency. None of that
would be stopped, but I think they also need to take a
step back and learn the lessons about brand. Taking
down signs, changing the CEOP website to put under
it “A command of the National Crime Agency”, that
is not the spirit of children first. That is evidence of
the organisational ego of the larger diminishing the
presence of the smaller simply because the larger is
now new and wants to create a profile.
I would put the CEOP media team back in CEOP, not
integrate it into the NCA. If you are going to be
“children first”, then you need to be advocating and
saying to the NCA, “No, you are wrong. We are going
to take on these cases. We are going to do it in this
way and we are going to invest this amount of our
budget in education”. I do not believe that that can
happen.
Q124 Mr Leech: Does the NCA offer anything to
CEOP?
Jim Gamble: Yes, it offers a capability around
technology when it comes to in-depth investigations
into the likes of the onion router, but the NCA should
have been a good and active partner of CEOP. I
believe the NCA as an entity is an excellent idea. As
far back as 2001, when I joined the National Crime
Squad as an assistant chief constable, the director
general said to me after three months, “What would
you change if you could?” I said, “I would drop the
‘s’ and put an ‘a’ on it and make it the National Crime
Agency and consolidate resources around organised
crime within it”. Now, the fact of the matter is it is a
good idea, but putting things like CEOP in it will
force CEOP, as it has done, to submit to its image, not
allow CEOP to thrive as an independent environment.
How many people are looking for missing children
now? That is a CEOP responsibility. How many
people do you think in CEOP are working on missing
children? The Prime Minister was asked on Channel
5, on the news programme, how many people he
thought were searching for images. I know when they
put to him “between two and five” he was shocked.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 43
29 October 2013 Mr Jim Gamble
The fact of the matter is, if you want to see the real
difference you need to get into CEOP and you need
to ask some questions because, as far as I am aware,
everything that I have said to you is absolutely true.
If you accept everything I have said to you as true and
you are not deeply concerned, then there is a huge
issue.
National Crime Agency is great. Organised crime,
terrorism, money laundering, fantastic. Child
protection in Hackney, child protection in
Northumbria, child protection in Humberside, that is
about local child protection teams, local safeguarding
boards, local police. It is about how you support them,
about how you create materials that go into their
schools. A national hub that had teachers in it, that
had social workers in it, that had those people that
create those imaginative products that children can
engage with in the classroom so that they learn the
importance of friendship and supporting a friend who
is being bullied online, who are able to work through
real life cases to say, “If that had been one of my
friends, I would have wanted them to report. Who
would you report to?”
You can be scared of your own shadow in this game,
because nobody wants to attack any of the big social
media providers. I will not name the charity, but I
heard someone from a charity who is on the advisory
body to one of the social media organisations that has
just changed its default settings for 13 to 18-year-olds
say, “We will need to learn more about it”. I think,
“Well, if you are learning more about it after the fact,
you are not an advisory body, if your advice was not
being taken before the fact”. What can I say? The
National Crime Entity is a great entity but subsuming
CEOP into it is a recipe for disaster. You can bring
however many people you want in, but while they are
still working there do you honestly think they are
going to come in and say, “No, I do not think it is a
good thing”? Do you think that will be careerenhancing or career-inhibiting?
Chair: It is 1pm. We had better draw this to a halt.
Jim, thank you very much.
Jim Gamble: Thank you.
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Ev 44 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 19 November 2013
Members present:
Mr John Whittingdale (Chair)
Mr Ben Bradshaw
Angie Bray
Conor Burns
Tracey Crouch
Paul Farrelly
Jim Sheridan
Mr Gerry Sutcliffe
________________
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Simon Milner, Policy Director, UK and Ireland, Facebook, and Sinéad McSweeney, Director,
Public Policy, EMEA, Twitter International Company, gave evidence.
Q125 Chair: This is the further session of the
Committee’s inquiry into online safety and we have
three panels this morning and I would like to welcome
our first witnesses, Simon Milner, the Policy Director
of Facebook, and Sinéad McSweeney, the Director of
Public Policy at Twitter.
Q126 Tracey Crouch: Good morning. I will start by
asking if you could outline what it is that you already
do to prevent harmful or illegal material online.
Sinéad McSweeney: In terms of illegal content we
have a zero tolerance for any child sexual exploitation
material on the platform. So when that is reported to
us, we review those accounts. They are suspended and
they are, in addition, reported to the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children in the US and they
then have channels of communication with the
relevant law enforcement agencies, who can take
action both on the offenders but also ensure that if
there is a child at risk, that they can be identified,
located and rescued as well. We also have
relationships with law enforcement and police in
different countries. So we have good working
relationships with the police here in the UK not only
so that they are aware of our processes and procedures
in order to request information of us and work with
us, but also so that we would participate in some
education and awareness raising with them about how
the platform works and how to contact us when they
need to, whether that is in an emergency or when they
are investigating crime.
Q127 Tracey Crouch: What about harmful content,
before I move to Simon?
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes. Sorry, did you say Simon?
Tracey Crouch: No, no.
Sinéad McSweeney: Okay. In terms of content
generally, clearly, there are rules as to the type of
content that is allowed on the platform. So when
content is reported to us that is in breach of our rules,
we take action on those accounts. In addition, because
there is such a diverse range of discussions and
contact that take place on the platform, we also have
built into the product the ability for users to label the
media that they may be uploading as sensitive, and
the default setting for every user is that they do not
see sensitive media without a warning.
Q128 Tracey Crouch: You do not have a report
abuse button though, do you?
Sinéad McSweeney: We do, we do.
Tracey Crouch: Okay.
Sinéad McSweeney: We have it within each tweet
because Twitter is built around the small bursts of
information that are tweets. But right within each
tweet there is a report button and once the user hits
that, it takes them to the range of possible issues that
they may be reporting, whether that is abusive
behaviour, impersonation or illegal content.
Tracey Crouch: Okay. Simon?
Simon Milner: From our own perspective, we also
have a zero tolerance approach towards both illegal
and harmful material. On the illegal side, as well as
having clear policies about what people can and
cannot use our platform for, we also use technology.
So there was much talk yesterday in terms of the
announcements made at the PM Summit around
technology. We use one of the pieces of technology
that people are talking about, photo DNA, a piece of
technology created by Microsoft, and we use that to
scan every photo uploaded to Facebook. That are
some 350 million photos a day against a database of
known images of child exploitation imagery, and we
will not allow those to be uploaded and will take
action against those accounts, including notifying the
authorities about them. Then we work closely with
CEOP in respect of their access to that data via
Netmec in order to track down the offenders. When it
comes to harmful material, that is pretty much very
hard to spot by technology so that is where our
reporting processes come in, and we too have
extensive reporting processes via both our Help
Centre, which anybody can access—they do not have
to have a Facebook account for that—or from
individual pieces of content. They can report it to us
or indeed report it to somebody else who can help
that user take action so, particularly, in the areas, for
instance, of bullying and harassment, we do not
tolerate that. Those reporting processes are incredibly
useful to someone either who themselves is feeling a
risk of harm or if somebody sees somebody else on
the platform who they think is at risk, then they can
use those reporting processes.
Q129 Tracey Crouch: This week, as I am sure you
are aware, is anti-bullying week and there has been a
great deal of discussion about cyber bullying over the
past few months, especially as a consequence of some
rather tragic events. What are you doing to work with
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 45
19 November 2013 Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
organisations to try to raise awareness about cyber
bullying in particular?
Simon Milner: So perhaps if I take that one first. We
work with a number of anti-bullying organisations.
Indeed, yesterday, I was at an event in London with
450 schoolchildren and their teachers with the Diana
Award. The Diana Award has an anti-bullying work
stream and they have a fantastic champion there in a
young man called Alex Holmes. He does great work
around the UK, working with schoolchildren, enabling
them to become anti-bullying champions so we
support that work. We help to fund what they do and
I was there yesterday to talk mainly to teachers to
help them understand how to deal with these issues on
Facebook, because it is something that we absolutely
recognise they need help with. But we also provide
lots of help via other people who reach out to schools.
So Childnet are another great charity for doing this,
because we recognise bullying typically does not just
happen on one platform and will happen across a
range of different media as well as in the school.
Therefore, working with people who can not only talk
to the schools about Facebook but also about Twitter,
about Snapchat, about Ask.fm and other services that
young people are using is much more effective than
having Facebook necessarily coming to the schools.
Sinéad McSweeney: I think we would have a similar
approach in terms of partnering with the people who
are talking to children all the time in this space, so the
South West Grid for Learning, the UK Safer Internet
Centre, participating not just in the Safer Internet Day
or the anti-bullying weeks but on an ongoing basis,
highlighting the resources that are available both
within the platform and more generally in terms of
breaking down the advice that we have to ensure it is
suitable for each different category of people who
need to know and understand what is happening. So,
for example, in our Safety Centre we would have tips
for teachers, tips for parents, tips for teens,
recognising that the language and the context may
need to be slightly different for each audience. That is
material that we have highlighted again, as I say, to
organisations who are working in this space on a daily
basis, whether it is Parent Zone or BeatBullying or
whatever, so that they can link to our material and
also so that we can link to their material so that there
is a constant shared learning. Also, as Simon says,
recognising that the context for the behaviour that you
may be seeing on one platform may be behaviour and
activity that is occurring in other platforms and also
in the offline world, it also about encouraging how to
deal with online conflict, encouraging empathy and
also trying to educate young people that the
consequences of their online behaviour are the same
as offline. If you say something online, it has an
impact on somebody in the real world although for
young people it is their real world, so sometimes we
have to be careful even in terms of that kind of
language. But it is a question of ensuring that we are
using our own communication channel effectively by
working with people like the Safer Internet Centre on
their Connect with Respect campaign but then also
getting into the other worlds in which young people
are accessing information and ensuring that those who
are guiding them through the world, whether it is their
teachers or parents, are as equipped to deal with the
questions and activities that they are involved in as
the young people themselves.
Q130 Tracey Crouch: You both mentioned that quite
often harmful behaviour is happening across multiple
platforms. Do you think that all social media providers
are equally good at dealing with this or do you think
some are better than others? I have in mind, obviously,
the controversy that came out over the summer about
Ask.fm and I just wondered what your views are on
that. Do you think that that, perhaps, poor or
lacklustre response from Ask.fm had a very negative
impact on the wider social media providers?
Sinéad McSweeney: I think we can only speak for our
own platforms but I know that our experience,
whether it is ourselves and Facebook who are here
today, is that it is an area that we work on together.
We are not territorial or proprietary about the way in
which we work with young people to ensure their
safety online. We all participate together in, for
example, the planning day for next year’s Safer
Internet Centre and there is another planning day
coming up in December. So, from our point of view,
it is about sharing the expertise and ensuring that
together we are giving young people the skills and
resources they need.
Simon Milner: In fact, we work so closely that when
Sinéad and her colleagues recruited our Head of
Safety for Europe, we were genuinely pleased. We
thought this was good for her in terms of her
development but also good that Twitter sees the value
in having somebody who has been working on safety
for four years come and become part of their team. I
think that we have to recognise one of the things about
young people is they love new services and they love
to try them out. Usually, they are the first ones to
adopt new services. It would be unrealistic to expect
that those new services have invested to the extent
that our two companies have in safety. Nonetheless, I
think we have a duty as citizens but also as part of
this industry to help them, so that is what we try to
do. I certainly do that around, for instance, the
UKCCIS Board that I sit on. We are always trying to
share intelligence around what are young people using
and how can we help them to be well-educated in
using those services.
Q131 Tracey Crouch: How many people do you
employ to combat illegal or harmful content?
Simon Milner: We have a user operations team of
several hundred people. It is not a public number. I
am afraid I cannot tell you. Our company as a whole
has 5,500 people. We have several hundred people
who work in user operations, including hundreds of
safety experts, so we have people who have seen
everything before and know how best to deal with
it. We are always also looking to work with outside
organisations to try to ensure that we are consistently
learning about what is the best way of helping our
users.
Sinéad McSweeney: Similarly, we are a much smaller
company obviously. We have 2,000 employees
worldwide. We have trust and safety teams based in
San Francisco and also here in Europe in Dublin, so
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Ev 46 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
those teams are providing 24/7 coverage right across
the globe across the different time zones. The trust
and safety and user services teams are divided into
sub-teams to address the different issues that can arise
across the platform, the different rule breaches. There
is a team looking at abusive behaviour or user safety
behaviour through to impersonation through to illegal
content. So those teams are covering, as I say, the
different time zones on a 24/7 basis.
Q132 Tracey Crouch: Final question, Mr Chairman.
Clearly, although you might like to think so, neither of
your platforms are perfect in dealing with particularly
harmful content. What do you think you can do better
to try to stop or prevent future harmful content,
because I recognise that illegal is very different and
probably being dealt with quite well?
Simon Milner: That is a really tough question. I
would say we never rest on our laurels. We are always
looking to innovate and I think the moment when we
start to think we have this cracked, it would be an
unfortunate moment. It certainly would not fit with
the culture of the organisation, which is to constantly
innovate. So I really would be reluctant to predict
what is the next best thing we could do but I would
be very surprised if I came back here in a year’s time
and said, “We are just doing the same as we did last
year”. We are always looking to innovate.
Sinéad McSweeney: I think like anything in life, there
is always the potential to do something more
effectively, more efficiently and in a better way for
users. I spent 10 years working in police
communications and in that context, of course, you
also in some ways have the division between what
was illegal and things like antisocial behaviour, which
was harmful. So it is about constantly working with
the community, and in our case that is our users, to
know and understand how they want the platform to
be a safer and better place because at the end of the
day, it is there to enrich their lives. It is connecting
people to events and information and news and so on.
Q133 Tracey Crouch: But you both recognise that
you still have weaknesses?
Sinéad McSweeney: It is a question of understanding
that as the technology evolves, just like in the world
of crime or antisocial behaviour, people think of new
ways to breach your rules so you have to ensure that
you are one step ahead. So we have a dedicated
engineering team on the trust and safety side
constantly alive to the possibility that there are issues
within the product that we will need to address when
somebody finds a new way of using the platform. So
I do not think anybody would ever put their hand up
and say, “We are done on safety”, and particularly not
when it involves children.
Q134 Chair: You said you each have lots of people
sitting there who are safety experts. If I push the
report abuse button, how long before somebody looks
at what I am reporting?
Simon Milner: In Facebook, it would depend frankly
on who you are and what you are reporting. So if you
were reporting that somebody you know is suicidal,
we are going to look at that very, very quickly. It
could be within minutes. If you were reporting that
there is some spam that you are seeing, we may not
get to that for a week so it would depend on the
seriousness of the harm that you are reporting. Also,
frankly, how old you are. So teenage reports we are
going to look at more quickly than we do others. But
one of the things we always hesitate is to make those
hard-and-fast rules because, otherwise, we might find
that people think, “I have this problem. I will report
myself as being suicidal because that means I will get
looked at sooner”. So we always aim to get to reports
within 48 hours and most of them we do that. As I
say, for those that are most serious we will get to them
very quickly.
Sinéad McSweeney: Similarly, depending on the
nature of the abuse or harm that is being reported.
Again, threats of self-harm, suicide, threats of
violence and anything under child sexual exploitation
category is looked at within a very short period of
time. Again, other issues may take longer.
Chair: Are we talking minutes again?
Sinéad McSweeney: It can depend. It could be a
minute to an hour. Again, you cannot be hard-and-fast
in terms of the issues but we do respond to those first,
before other issues.
Chair: For instance, there is a choice. If I press the
report abuse button, I am given the choice of
different categories?
Simon Milner: Yes.
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes.
Q135 Chair: I see, and depending which I choose
will determine how long it takes to get back to me?
Simon Milner: It could be that but, also, it may be
dependent on what is going on in certain events. One
of the things about our teams is they are national
teams so they are interested in what is going on in the
news. So, for instance, around the time of the August
riots 2011, the team was on high alert for content
associated with those riots. So antisocial behaviour or
people organising that kind of thing might not have
been flagged otherwise but because we were
particularly on the lookout for that, then we will
deploy more resources. So it will depend on the
circumstances, the public circumstances as well as the
circumstances of the individual who is reporting.
Q136 Angie Bray: In terms of antisocial behaviour,
the debate has also moved on to whether you should
be showing certain footage of things like beheadings,
which I think, probably, just showing that does cross
into what I would consider to be fairly abusive. I
know that Facebook has taken quite a strong line on
that. Has it Facebook’s view changed as this debate
has raged or are you still adamant that this is freedom
of information and people should be allowed to see
these?
Simon Milner: I think the way I would put it is that
we have refined our approach to this kind of content.
I am sure we are grateful every day is that we live
in a country where beheadings are abnormal, where
random acts of violence do not happen to most people
we know, but there are lots of people who are using
our platform in countries where this is a normal part
of life. They want to use our platform to highlight
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 47
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what is going on in their neighbourhood, in their
country, in their city. Sometimes that means posting
graphic content because that is the only way to get the
world’s attention. We recognise there is a place for
graphic content when people are condemning it, so
absolutely not to glorify it and not to take pleasure in
it. When people are using our platform to condemn
this and to bring the world’s attention to it, then we
should be able to do that. However, we also recognise
that given that we are a platform that also has young
people, people under 18, we need to enable people to
get more prior warning and we are taking steps to
ensure that people share responsibly. There are
different ways in which we can do that on the platform
and we are developing those, frankly, in the light of
some recent events. So you are right to highlight it
and I am glad I have had the opportunity to address it,
but it is something where we are refining our approach
because we think there is a place for people to share
that kind of content in the right context and with
appropriate warnings.
Q137 Angie Bray: But do you set the context? It is
one thing to show footage but you are not suggesting,
are you, “We are showing this because it is
demonstrating what terrible things are happening”?
You are simply showing it, so are you setting an
adequate context?
Simon Milner: We are not setting any context.
Angie Bray: That may be the problem.
Simon Milner: No, just to be clear, because we do
not post anything to Facebook, it is our users that post
things to Facebook and it could be a government, they
could be a parliamentarian, they could be a
campaigning organisation and they could be an
individual. An example is after the terrible bombings
in Boston at the Boston Marathon, a number of people
who were witnesses posted footage to say, “Oh my
God, look at this horrendous thing that has happened”.
We enable people to do that and we enable people to
share that with the world, and we think that is part of
how we bring the world’s attention to some horrible
things that are going on. What we do is provide the
tools to enable them to share responsibly and we are
refining those tools as we speak to enable people to
put warnings, and also to share in a way that young
people are much less likely to see it. But just to be
clear, if you go on to Facebook and search for
beheadings, you would never have found them. Our
search facility does not allow you to do that whereas
if you go into many other parts of the internet and
search for things like that, you can very easily find it.
In the recent examples, we had no incidence of reports
to us from young people or others with responsibility
of looking after young people saying, “Oh, my
goodness, this young person has seen this video”,
because it was not being shared in that way.
Q138 Angie Bray: Twitter, of course, has been under
some kind of criticism for the fact that it was quite a
useful vehicle during the recent terrorist outrage in
Kenya where it would seem that some terrorists were
using Twitter to get all sorts of messages out. Again,
does that make you uncomfortable that Twitter can be
used in that way?
Sinéad McSweeney: As a platform, we do not
knowingly allow terrorist organisations to maintain
accounts on Twitter.
Q139 Angie Bray: But were you aware that it was
being used?
Sinéad McSweeney: Where we have reports to us
from law enforcement, where it is brought to our
attention that terrorist organisations are maintaining
accounts on Twitter, we take action on those accounts.
We do not allow accounts to be used for direct threats
of violence or for unlawful purposes. I think the flip
side of the events in Egypt, in Kenya and events right
across areas of conflict is that Twitter is used by
human rights activists and by the media to get
information out to the world about events like those
and ensure that people in real time can follow the
events. But to make it clear, we do not knowingly
allow terrorist organisations to maintain accounts on
Twitter.
Q140 Angie Bray: But it was over a period of two
or three days, not just a flash in the pan, that these
terrorists were able to send out to the world what they
were going to do, what they were not going to do, that
they were coming again, and they were basically using
it to send out their philosophical message. So at what
point would Twitter have woken up to the fact that
they were being used in this way? Really, the world
does not need to know about that, does it?
Sinéad McSweeney: Drawing on my experience from
policing and the way in which police approach the
investigation of certain types of crime, there are
different approaches to the existence of information in
the public domain and the way in which it can assist
investigation. So, as I say, we work closely with law
enforcement. Where we receive reports of terrorist
organisations maintaining reports on Twitter, we take
the action that is required of us.
Q141 Angie Bray: Did you get any reports on that,
because it was certainly all over the newspapers?
Sinéad McSweeney: I am not going to talk about
individual accounts. We do not talk about anybody’s
individual accounts or indeed individual engagements
that we have with law enforcement.
Angie Bray: So was action taken?
Sinéad McSweeney: Action was taken in those
circumstances but we do not comment in detail about
the interactions or communications we have with law
enforcement.
Q142 Mr Sutcliffe: If I can just turn to the antibullying theme, in the evidence that is given to us,
30% of youngsters under 16 expect to be bullied on
social media. What do you say about that? What is
your view of that?
Simon Milner: I think it is sad that young people feel
that. I expect if you ask them also, “Do you expect to
be bullied at school?” probably a similar number
would. Most bullying that we see on Facebook starts
for young people in the classroom, on the school bus,
in the canteen. I have spent a lot of time travelling
around the UK meeting with teachers and that is a
regular thing that they tell me. Indeed, because of that,
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19 November 2013 Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
we have allowed a feature to enable teachers to
resolve issues on Facebook. They can both report
things to us without having an account but, also, a
young person who is feeling bullied by somebody else
in school can report that person to a teacher. All they
need is an email address and that teacher will get a
report saying, “Simon Milner feels he is being bullied
by—forgive me—Sinéad McSweeney and this is the
content that he feels is bullying”.
Q143 Mr Sutcliffe: But does that happen?
Simon Milner: Roughly half of all the young people
who report bullying use social reporting and that is a
global number. They find it very effective for
resolution. The reason we introduced this was often it
was very difficult for us to understand the context of
a relationship between young people and, typically,
bullies are friends of those who have been bullied.
Therefore, it was very hard to understand why that
person felt a particular piece of content was bullying
because we did not understand the wider context of
their relationship, and that is why we enabled this
feature for somebody who does understand that
context to be able to get involved in it.
Q144 Mr Sutcliffe: Is it just teachers? One of the
other things that concerns me is that children or young
people are on the internet without their parents being
involved. What do you do to help parents identify
potential problems?
Simon Milner: I am a parent of teenagers. I absolutely
understand where you are coming from although, like
fellow parents, one of the things you recognise as
children grow older is they do become more
independent. I do think part of their digital citizenship,
indeed their general citizenship, is about having an
ability to be independent online, particularly around
teenagers. One of the things we do provide is, firstly,
parents can report to us. So if they think there is a
problem on Facebook, they do not have to have a
Facebook account to report to us. They can do that
through the Facebook Help Centre. We provide
information through Parent Zone. You mentioned the
good work that Vicki Shotbolt and her team do earlier.
I have done a video for Parent Zone explaining to
parents about how they can deal with issues if they
have concerns about what is going on on Facebook.
But as with everything, including some of the things
that we have discussed yesterday in the Prime
Minister’s Summit, the key thing is getting young
people to talk to someone. That is where we found the
biggest problem in the terrible events of young people
committing suicide. Typically, they have not told
anybody about the problem and we cannot help
somebody who does not tell us, just the same way as
a teacher cannot help a pupil if they do not tell them.
So that is the main message we give to parents, “For
goodness sake, even if your child will not tell you, get
them to tell someone who can help”.
Q145 Mr Sutcliffe: I think the point I am trying to
get to, Simon, is that because we have social media,
it has not suddenly become a problem. That problem
has always been there, as you say, bullying at school,
that sort of thing. I think that is the issue that I am
trying to get across, that you have mechanisms in
place for people to get to.
Simon Milner: Also, I think one of the things that
distinguishes bullying online from bullying offline is
that there is a footprint. There is a record so this
business of being able to report to a teacher is not
saying, “Sinéad said this”. It is, “Here is what Sinéad
has said to me. Here is the photo she has posted”, and
that is physical evidence that can be used then to help,
not to necessarily punish the bully but to help educate
the bully about, “This is the consequence of what you
are saying and the words that you think may be funny
actually are very hurtful”.
Q146 Mr Bradshaw: Sorry, I am having trouble
finding your report abuse button. Could you help us?
Report abuse, where is it?
Sinéad McSweeney: It is within the tweet. If you are
in a tweet the three dots indicate more content. At the
bottom. It depends on which operating system you
are using.
Mr Bradshaw: Don’t worry. Perhaps you can show
us later.
Sinéad McSweeney: At the bottom, it says, “Report
tweet”. I am happy to talk you through it.
Q147 Mr Bradshaw: It did not seem to me to be in
an obvious place. You said earlier that you felt you
did respond in a timely and effective fashion to reports
of abusive tweets but that was not the experience of
our colleague Stella Creasy and the woman who was
involved in the save a woman’s face on the British
bank note campaign. They are quite high-profile
people so how can we have confidence—they were
very unhappy about how this particular issue was
responded to and the abuse they suffered—that
ordinary people who do not have that level of profile
and voice are having their reports taken seriously and
dealt with quickly enough?
Sinéad McSweeney: I think without getting into too
much detail of individual accounts—I appreciate that
while Ms Creasy has given evidence in public here
that Ms Criado-Perez, while she has spoken publicly,
has not given evidence in this forum—in some ways,
what was experienced in that number of days in
August is not the commonplace normal experience of
a Twitter user. The levels of activity that were directed
at those individuals were unprecedented in my time
with Twitter, so that is the first thing to mention. Since
then we have done a lot of work to highlight the
reporting resources that are there because part of the
issue was accessing the reporting forums. It was not a
case of non-responsiveness to our report. I think the
issue that they were talking about was the ability to
report so the in-tweet reporting, greater ease of access
around forums, better tools for users are things that
we have improved since and continue to improve,
going back to the other member’s question, that that
job is not done.
We have increased the resourcing around our trust and
safety team. Simon already made reference to the
person we have recruited to head up user safety for
Europe and she has started on our team since then.
In addition to that, again, we are working with the
organisations in this space like South West Grid for
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Learning, UK Safer Internet Centre, so that when
people contact them about issues, they immediately
are able to give them the advice and the resources that
they need. But publicly at the time there were a
number of statements from Twitter about what
happened and the fact that we took on board the
responses that we received. I have spoken personally
on numerous occasions in the time since to the people
involved in that and I continue to take on board the
feedback they have.
Q148 Mr Bradshaw: You mentioned the South West
Grid for Learning as part of the UK Safer Internet
Centre—in fact, both of you have more than once—
and in your evidence you have been full of praise for
this organisation. How important do you think their
role is in helping to mediate and report abusive
comments and getting them taken down?
Simon Milner: I think they are particularly helpful for
schools so there are professional hotlines. They are
there mainly for teachers and they can help people
understand problems because they have seen them
before and, particularly, Laura Higgins, who runs the
helpline there—it is a shame you are coming to the
end of your evidence, she would be a great person to
bring in to talk about it—she is an expert in all the
different services that young people are using and she
has seen every different kind of issue in the school
before. I was with her yesterday at this event with the
young people and their teachers and not one of those
teachers had heard of her helpline, so it was a great
opportunity for her to tell them about it and it is
wonderful for me to have this opportunity to tell
people about her helpline. They have a phone number
that teachers can call and say, “We have this problem.
Can you help us?” Then what she has is a hotline to
us. Often she can help people resolve their problems
without needing to come to Facebook but sometimes
she cannot. She has a hotline to our team in Dublin to
help resolve things where she cannot do it.
Sinéad McSweeney: That is the same approach that
we have, that we ensure that she has all the
information she requires and in the situations where
she cannot in the moment resolve the issue that the
school is bringing to her, she can contact us and we
give her the additional information she requires.
Q149 Mr Bradshaw: I should perhaps declare an
interest, Mr Chairman, because she is a constituent of
mine. Given the high praise that you both have for her
and her organisation, is it not surprising that it is run
on a shoestring funded by the European Union?
Simon Milner: Indeed, I was talking with her about
this yesterday. We have provided some resources to
help her and her colleague David Wright run a road
show around the country, so we helped to support that.
But I think you are right in saying this is something
that we as an industry should look at, as Laura is
looking to develop that helpline, as in, “Can we help
her further, including giving additional resources?” It
is a good point to raise.
Sinéad McSweeney: Similarly, we have assisted them
with training workshops for hotline managers and so
on, so we have been asked and have been able to
contribute to the way in which they provide their
service.
Q150 Mr Bradshaw: But this valuable service, I
think, is being done by one and a half people with
very little money. It is running out next year. You have
deep pockets. Is this not the kind of thing that you
should be funding as a matter of course?
Simon Milner: Laura has not actually asked us for
money to do that yet but I am sure when she does,
possibly as a result of this, we shall be listening with
a very open mind.
Q151 Paul Farrelly: You are both global businesses
so, presumably, you share with each other in your
organisations experiences from around the world.
Simon Milner: Yes.
Paul Farrelly: Presumably, if something happens in
one part of the world, as with any big global
organisation, if you are approached by the press or
committees like this, you will have notes on how to
deal with questions?
Simon Milner: I will not put it as strongly as that. We
tend to talk about what are the issues we think might
come up and, frankly, who is going to answer the
question first.
Q152 Paul Farrelly: Sinéad, if you were asked about
things that are happening in one part of the world,
would you expect to be briefed by an organisation?
Sinéad McSweeney: It depends. My responsibility
goes beyond the UK so I would be familiar with issues
that are going on in the EMEA region, which is
Europe/Middle East basically.
Q153 Paul Farrelly: Okay. I was following the
build-up to the All Blacks match at the weekend and,
as we were doing this inquiry, I was asked whether
we have come across the case that is causing huge
controversy in New Zealand called the Roast Busters.
Have you come across that case?
Simon Milner: No, I was at the recent Family Online
Safety Institute conference in Washington DC with
NetSafe, the New Zealand equivalent of the UK Safer
Internet Centre, and they did not mention it, so I am
not aware of that, I am afraid.
Q154 Paul Farrelly: Have you come across it?
Sinéad McSweeney: I am not familiar with it.
Q155 Paul Farrelly: No. I am just reading from a
CNN report and reports have been all over New
Zealand press over the last two weeks so this is from
a couple of weeks ago. Just a synopsis of this case, it
is about a group of teenage boys who were boasting
online about raping drunk and underage girls, getting
so incoherent they did not know what they were
doing. What came to light, which was exposed by a
Channel 3 television programme in New Zealand, was
that for some months they have had a Facebook site
on which they were posting these boasts. Days after
the exposure of the site, it was shut down and there
was apparently another site that had started on
Facebook. Facebook is not the only social medium to
be used by this gang. Just again from the CNN reports,
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19 November 2013 Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
Twitter was also a conduit for their boasts, Ask.fm
and also YouTube. I clearly cannot ask you what
lessons you are currently learning from that
experience because you do not know about it.
Simon Milner: Mr Farrelly, I am not aware of that
case. I am happy to ask my colleague, who does my
equivalent role in that part of the world, about it and
see whether there are some lessons we might learn. I
do not really want to comment further. It is clearly not
appropriate because I do not know any more about it.
Q156 Paul Farrelly: Would you both drop us a note
on it?
Simon Milner: Sure.
Q157 Conor Burns: Can I just ask in relation to this
report abuse facility within Twitter, does it alarm you
that you have three relatively sophisticated and regular
tweeters on the Committee and we cannot find it? I
was not aware that it existed. When did you launch it?
Sinéad McSweeney: It was rolled out at the end of
July and the plan was to roll it out across all the
platforms by Christmas but, in fact, we achieved that
by the end of September. If you are saying to me that
we need to highlight it more, that is something that I
can take away. We have done blog posts. We have
tweeted about it. We have spoken to various safety
organisations who work in this space. I think every
time that I have been at a meeting, I have mentioned
it but as I know only too well, having spent 10 years
in Comms, that you can never tell people something
often enough so we will keep telling people about it.
Q158 Conor Burns: I think the message from us is
that with the nature of what we do, we are probably
slightly more prone to abuse sometimes than your
average user and I was not aware that it existed.
Sinéad McSweeney: It is not the only means by which
you can report abuse. You can also report abuse
through the Help Centre.
Conor Burns: I know. I have just googled that. I have
seen that there is another mechanism to do that.
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes.
Q159 Conor Burns: Facebook. When we were in
California, I raised an instance where someone had
posted something that was profoundly libellous
against someone else. It was reported and absolutely
nothing happened. Facebook came back and said they
deemed that it was legitimate comment. Would you
like to comment on that?
Simon Milner: I do not know the details of the
individual case but, as you can see, we looked into it
and we do not always agree with reports that we get.
Frankly, a lot of the reports we get are frivolous. The
classic one is somebody says they like Justin Bieber
and other people report them as being suicidal so I am
not belittling it but we have looked at it.
Q160 Conor Burns: What about somebody saying
that they believe somebody else is a child abuser?
Simon Milner: Again, we will look at the context and
because one of the things we have learnt is just
because somebody has said it, that this is suicidal or
child abuse, does not mean it is. We have to look at
the context and the details.
Q161 Conor Burns: No, I am putting to you that
when somebody posts that they believe somebody else
to be a child abuser and that was not taken off.
Simon Milner: I do not know the circumstances to
the individual case, and perhaps you and I can
correspond on it afterwards, but one of the key things
that is open to people if they think we have made the
wrong decision is they can go to the courts.
Conor Burns: Which is out of reach for a lot of
people.
Simon Milner: That is a matter for Parliament as to
how the defamation process works in the United
Kingdom. I do not think that is a matter for me.
Q162 Conor Burns: But there are often instances
where there are lovely, warm words that come forward
about procedures, hundreds of people on help desk,
but we encounter real people who are finding that
there are no options open to them and you hide
behind, “That is a matter for Parliament”. But you are
the publishers. You are allowing these things to be
published and said about other people.
Simon Milner: We are a platform for free expression.
We have a mechanism for somebody to report to us
something that they think is defamatory or libellous.
We look at those very carefully, we are risk-averse as
a company, so I am sure that the team that have made
that decision have done so with full knowledge that
having made that decision to leave that content up that
things are open to an individual to not only take action
against the person who posted it but also against us.
But on the matter of, “These are warm words”, these
are not just warm words. We see examples week in
week out of particularly young people and people in
distress being helped as a result of reports by their
friends—young people who are reporting that they are
feeling suicidal or indeed that they have taken some
pills or cut themselves. In situations where we see that
somebody who thinks somebody is in imminent risk
of harm, we will alert the local law enforcement who
would go and find that person. Quite typically, they
would get to them before they do the deed or in order
to help them so we help people in the real world
enormously week in week out.
Q163 Conor Burns: Yet, as a publishing platform,
you allow comments to remain up that a newspaper
would not in 100 years dream of publishing.
Simon Milner: I do not think that is fair in the context
of I do not know the details of this case but I am
absolutely certain that a team would have properly
looked at that and made the decision based on the
available evidence in the context. It is open to that
individual to take action if they wish.
Q164 Chair: Can I pursue with you some of the
measures that you have in place? First of all, what is
the minimum age for somebody to subscribe either to
Facebook or Twitter?
Simon Milner: It is 13 for Facebook.
Chair: 13.
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19 November 2013 Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes, our services are not directed
at under-13s.
Q165 Chair: 13, and how do you verify that
somebody is 13?
Simon Milner: With our platform, when people sign
up for Facebook, there is quite an extensive new user
process and one of the things we require people to do
is provide their date of birth. If somebody puts in a
date of birth that is under 13, we will not allow them
to open an account and we will also use technology
to prevent them from trying to put in a new age from
the same device, trying to change their age, so that is
one mechanism. We recognise that people,
unfortunately, lie about their age. Did you see this
recent report from the NSPCC, which came out on
Friday, about this? They reported a pattern that we
have seen in other studies that in the majority of cases
of 11 and 12-year-olds joining Facebook, their parents
have helped them set up the account so the parent
knows that their child has a Facebook account. One
imagines typically the deal is, “You can have a
Facebook account but you will be my friend on
Facebook so I can look after you”. In those situations,
it is very difficult for Facebook to spot that that person
is an underage user. We still also encourage and
indeed find reports from our users of underage
accounts incredibly helpful and indeed when teachers
ask me about this, I say, “You can report it. You can
let us know that somebody is underage”.
Q166 Chair: Okay and what about on Twitter?
Sinéad McSweeney: We do not collect age
information on sign-up. I think Twitter has established
a reputation in the area of privacy. We minimise the
amount of information that we require from users to
sign up so we do not collect age or gender or other
details about our users. Where it comes to our
attention that somebody under the age of 13 is using
the platform, their accounts are removed.
Q167 Chair: You say you have to be 13 to use
Twitter but you are also saying you do not ask
anybody if they are 13 or over 13?
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes. That is a balancing between
the premium that we put on our users’ privacy and the
issues that you are raising.
Q168 Chair: How does somebody know they have
to be 13?
Sinéad McSweeney: Sorry?
Chair: If I joined Twitter, am I told that, “You have
to be 13”? How do you make people aware?
Sinéad McSweeney: It is in our privacy policy that
this service is not directed at people who are under 13.
Q169 Chair: So you have to go into your privacy
policy and read it and then you discover that you are
supposed to be 13?
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes.
Q170 Chair: Right, okay. What about fake identities,
people who open accounts in false names?
Simon Milner: With Facebook, that is against our
rules. You have to use your real name on Facebook
and, indeed, we think that is the core of Facebook’s
success. We would not have reached 1.2 billion
monthly active users had we not have that policy
because Facebook is all about connecting with people
you know in the real world. So it is against our terms
and we very much encourage people if they see
somebody who they think is not using their real name,
they are an imposter, to tell us about it and we will
then look into those accounts and remove them if we
conclude that is the case. We may require people to
prove their identity if they claim that this name that
appears very fake is real. That is something that we
take seriously and indeed is at the heart of our
mission.
Sinéad McSweeney: We do not require users to use
their real name. Most people do because they want
other people to be able to find them and connect with
them on the platform. We allow people to use
pseudonyms. We allow people to set up parody
accounts that range from emergency cute puppy
accounts through to political satire. More importantly,
we have seen the platform used in areas of conflict by
human rights activists, journalists, people who are at
risk of harm from the information that they are
attempting to get out into the world publically. That
is very important to us and that is why we facilitate
that kind of political activism and content on the
platform.
Chair: As I understand it if I set up as Donald Duck
there is no problem with Twitter.
Tracey Crouch: That has already been taken.
Chair: Donald Duck the 52nd. Twitter, you are
perfectly content. Facebook, it is only if somebody
tells you that I am not Donald Duck and then you will
do something.
Simon Milner: No, it is not if somebody tells us they
are not Donald Duck, it is if somebody else tells us.
Chair: Yes, I understand.
Simon Milner: There are also certain names that we
will look out for so you cannot set yourself up as
David Beckham, for instance. We also, like Twitter,
provide a process for people to have their accounts
verified. This is particularly useful for people in
Government, for instance, so you know that when you
look at David Cameron’s page on Facebook it is
David Cameron and not somebody pretending to be
David Cameron. That is something that we are rolling
out to help people who are public figures to ensure
that people understand yes, this is the real person.
Q171 Chair: Let us assume Donald Duck52 indulges
in highly offensive behaviour, trolling or even posting
child sex images, how do you identify them? Do you
keep records and ISP addresses?
Simon Milner: If somebody is using our platform to
try and distribute child abuse imagery then that is
going to be spotted through photo DNA assuming it
is a known image. As you may be aware, we are
working together with other technology companies to
try and ensure that we share even more intelligence
around these known images.
Chair: I am asking how you identify whose account
it is.
Simon Milner: Reports are incredibly powerful. We
kind of have a neighbourhood watch community of
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Ev 52 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
scale, and our users really care about their safety and
the safety of others in the platform. They will be
reported to us and then we will deal with it.
Chair: You retain IP addresses?
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes, we retain communications
data.
Q172 Chair: That does not address my question. It
may be important to you, you may find it but if it is
being posted by somebody who claims to be Donald
Duck52, how would you identify it in that instance?
Simon Milner: I see, I am sorry. In the situations
where, for instance, law enforcement are on to
somebody like that and they want to find out who they
are and where they are living and what have you, we
have a process for them to request communications
data from us to enable them to do that. That would
include the IP address.
Chair: You will be storing the IP addresses and the
messages for how long?
Simon Milner: We store the IP logs for a period. I
would have to come back to you to tell you exactly
how long. The messages, it will depend. Typically it
depends on how long a person wants to retain those
messages but most of the time law enforcement will
have the messages because somebody has come to
them saying, “Look at this thing on my account”.
They have the messages, they have the content, what
they need to know is who is this person and that is
when they can come to us to ask for the
communications data.
Chair: Twitter, do you keep that same data?
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes, we also retain
communications data. We have protocols and
guidelines for law enforcement on how they can work
with us to request information, and they can also
request that we preserve information pending receipt
of further requests from them.
Q174 Chair: You would allow law enforcement
access to that with a court order, would you?
Sinéad McSweeney: We receive law enforcement
requests. They range from emergency situations where
if there is an immediate threat of life we respond to it
straight away, and also in other areas of serious crime
we deal with requests from law enforcement on a case
by case basis.
Chair: Civil actions?
Sinéad McSweeney: Civil actions, again it would
depend on circumstances. It is difficult to talk about
hypotheticals but on receipt of valid legal process we
deal with those requests.
Chair: I would need to get a court order.
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes.
Q173 Chair: But you are keeping records of tweets
and IP addresses from where they originate.
Sinéad McSweeney: The tweets are public anyway.
Chair: They might get removed or deleted.
Sinéad McSweeney: In the main most of the activity
is public and remains public, and we will retain a
certain amount of communications information.
Q175 Chair: A court order from the UK, would you
accept that?
Sinéad McSweeney: Again it is not my exact area of
expertise the actual legal process that is required. I
would need to come to you on that but we would need
valid legal process.
Chair: It was suggested to me you had to get a court
order in California, which is not always terribly easy
for a civil action for say privacy invasion or
defamation.
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes, but there are various treaties
and so on that cover civil litigation and co-operation
between jurisdictions also that would be invoked in
those circumstances.
Chair: I think my colleagues have exhausted their
questions so thank you very much.
Simon Milner: Thank you very much.
Sinéad McSweeney: Thank you.
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Tony Close, Director of Content Standards, Licensing and Enforcement, Ofcom, Claudio Pollack,
Group Director, Content Consumer and External Affairs Group, Ofcom, gave evidence.
Chair: For our second session this morning may I
welcome Tony Close and Claudio Pollack both
representing Ofcom?
Q176 Tracey Crouch: Could you perhaps just start
by telling us what regulatory powers you do have in
relation to the internet, please?
Claudio Pollack: Yes, our role is limited to television
and television like content broadcast over the internet
in the UK, originating from the UK. We do not have
any powers that go beyond that, the regulation of
content.
Q177 Tracey Crouch: That would include video
content for example, child abuse videos or rape
pornography, or something like that? That would
include that?
Tony Close: If that content was included in a regulated
service. If it was included in a linear television service
provided over the internet or if it was included in an
on demand service provided over the internet and
established in the UK, yes, it would include any
content.
Tracey Crouch: But if somebody posted up a
homemade video, for example, this would not be
included within your regulatory powers?
Tony Close: Probably not, no. Not if it is not part of
a broader regulated offering, a broader service is
regulated.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 53
19 November 2013 Tony Close and Claudio Pollack
Q178 Tracey Crouch: Given the extent of Ofcom’s
powers and the obvious expansion over time as
technology has changed, do you think there will be a
greater role for Ofcom in the future regulating
internet content?
Claudio Pollack: Shall I take this one? I think at the
moment there are a mix of instruments around making
the internet safer for people. There may or may not
be a different role for us in the future, and that is
obviously a matter for Parliament. What I would say
though is that the mechanism that exists today, the
long established mechanism that exists today for the
regulation of television services, which has been very
effective, I do not think it would be appropriate or
possible to extend that form of regulation across all of
the content on the open internet. I think a different
mix of instruments will be required over time to make
the internet safer for those people that use it.
Q179 Tracey Crouch: You do have people working
at Ofcom on harmful and illegal content on the linear
platforms that you were talking about?
Tony Close: Yes.
Tracey Crouch: How many people do you have
working on it?
Tony Close: Within the standards enforcement team
within Ofcom we have around 40 people but I think
if you included some of the other teams within Ofcom
that have a role in monitoring, researching or
developing policy around potentially harmful content,
it would be around 50 people. They, of course, work
on a range of different content related issues at any
one time.
Q180 Tracey Crouch: If your powers are extended
into wider internet use, perhaps like draft
Communications Bill at the moment in front of the
House, do you foresee any problems with Ofcom
having further powers or wider powers to do with
this issue?
Claudio Pollack: It really depends what it is that that
extension means.
Q181 Tracey Crouch: Given obviously this inquiry
has been looking at harmful and illegal content on the
internet, and yet you by far the most powerful
regulator on these matters in general terms for
television and radio do not have any regulatory
powers, do you think that it is time that you did and
that you were able to help in terms of regulating
content in a way that is obviously very much needed?
Claudio Pollack: I wonder if it is worth saying a little
bit about how we carry out protection on television
and radio services and then maybe we can explore
whether there are aspects of that that would be
appropriate or relevant in the open internet.
Tony Close: Yes, I think it is worthwhile reflecting
just quickly on that. We do have powers in this area.
They are limited by statute. They do require us to
regulate linear television or on demand services when
provided over the internet as well as via other
mediums or platforms.
Chair: This is what you delegate to ATVOD?
Tony Close: In relation to video on demand, yes.
Across those services that we currently regulate on the
internet we have a comprehensive set of rules. We are
required in relation to video on demand with ATVOD
to implement those rules. We continuously monitor
compliance with those rules through complaints or
proactive monitoring. We refresh those rules where
we think that the industry has moved on or public
policy concerns have moved on. We have very
significant powers currently to either fine providers
who have broken the rules or to stop or to suspend
their services online or not online. So we have a
comprehensive set of powers and a comprehensive set
of rules that apply to these services even when
provided over the internet already. I think the
challenge is identifying the best aspects of the way
Ofcom currently operates and identifying the best
aspects of the existing framework and seeing how
they could be applied to a broader set of services
potentially online.
They are obviously limited by geography, our powers,
and there is a significant challenge around regulating
content over the internet that comes from outside the
EU of course.
Claudio Pollack: For example it is not possible at the
moment, as I understand it, to broadcast in the United
Kingdom without a licence that is granted across
Europe. On the open internet content can come from
anywhere in the world. of course.
Q182 Tracey Crouch: The on demand services, so
the XXX channels for example that are broadcast on
Freeview, presumably if, for example, they have
specific licensed agreement that they can only provide
programmes after midnight or something, if they were
to bring that forward to 10.00pm that is where you
would step in and remind them of their duties?
Tony Close: Yes, in relation to both linear and on
demand
adult
services,
services
providing
pornography that are regulated by Ofcom and by
ATVOD as well there is a broad range of interventions
and measures based on time, based on preventing
access to children, double, triple PINs and obstacles
for gaining access. Obviously there are limits on the
content as well that are already in place, limiting the
explicitness in particular environments. For example,
you cannot have hardcore pornography on Freeview
even behind considerable PIN and other access
restrictions.
Q183 Chair: In terms of what is and what is not
possible, there has been a lot of press speculation
about the need to have greater control over the internet
and I suspect a lot of it simply is not possible but one
of the things that particularly you have looked at in a
different context is website blocking, URL blocking
particularly. When you last looked at that you threw
up a whole lot of technical reasons why it was very
difficult to do. Is that still the case in your view?
Claudio Pollack: We looked at it in the context of
online copyright infringement and whether website
blocking could play a role in that. We absolutely did
highlight a number of technical challenges and
limitations but for me the report was very clear in
saying that, to making it more generic and applicable,
if this about lessening the availability of content that
is considered harmful, harmful in different ways, that
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Ev 54 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Tony Close and Claudio Pollack
website blocking can play an important in that. It is
not the answer to everything. It is not 100%. It is not
watertight. It can be bypassed and it is not perfect in
the sense that, given the amount of content out there,
it can over block. It could block things that you did
not mean to block and it can under block, it can allow
certain things through.
In both of these examples, public policy examples, if
you take blocking or filtering as part of a suite of
measures then it absolutely can have an impact and
can play a role.
Q184 Chair: It can play a role but if I am a
technologically literate child abuser seeking to
overcome technical measures, can I do so?
Claudio Pollack: I am hesitating because the
conversation I was having was focused more on
content that is generally lawful but accessed by
children that we do not want children to access. If we
are talking about illegal content, for example child
abuse content access on the internet that is slightly
further outside our area of expertise. The simple
answer is at the moment, yes, my understanding is
that there are technologies in place that allow those
that wish to access these images to bypass controls
that are put in place.
Chair: We are told that a lot of this material is now
lurking in the dark net as they call it, Tor is
particularly indentified. Is it your understanding that
is something that it is possible to intercept and identify
or is it so hidden that it cannot be reached?
Claudio Pollack: I think we are reaching the limits of
our expertise in terms of what Ofcom does. We are
far more focused, as I say, on understanding how
people can be protected or protect their children from
content that they do not want to be viewed in terms
of this aspect, these two aspects of child protection.
Tony, your turn.
Tony Close: The only thing I would add—and Claudio
is right, this is outside our remit—there have been
some limited but notable examples recently of
prosecutions or investigations of people using Tor or
other dark web browsers and routers. It is possible and
it has happened on very limited occasions.
Claudio Pollack: It is obviously a big, big area of
focus for CEOP, as was, and the IWF. When I have
met with them we have explored and also assisted
with some of the technology expertise that exists
within Ofcom in understanding the mechanisms
around identification and blocking. There will be,
given the current state of technology, imperfect
mechanisms but I suspect they have a very strong role
in law enforcement as well.
Q185 Chair: In terms of the role Ofcom plays
therefore in encouraging the provision of child
protection filters and that kind of thing, how much
power do you have to lean on the ISPs for instance?
Claudio Pollack: Beyond the areas of broadcast and
on demand content on the internet, our role is not
about powers. We do not have any powers to mandate
or in particular we do not even have a function, I
would say, to engage with internet service providers.
The real legal route and where our remit fits here is
around our media literacy duties. It is very much
about understanding and encouraging media literacy
among, in this case, children and parents, and we will
carry out a lot of research and therefore be the keeper
of the facts. I would add that as part of that role, our
main role on online safety, we have a seat on the
executive board of UKCCIS, which is the main
institution that leads activity in this area. As part of
theirs and the Prime Minister’s negotiation or
agreement with the main internet service providers to
provide network level filtering by the end of the year,
they have asked us to carry out a particular role in
understanding how that implementation goes.
Tony Close: Shall I add something to that? Before
talking about the specific reports that we are carrying
out into parental views of online behaviour and safety,
it is worthwhile just making absolutely clear that in
our role as a board member of UKCCIS we provide
all of the data that we harvest as part of our media
literacy programmes so that public policy can be
developed, public debate can be had about the risks
and benefits of the internet and of child internet use.
Claudio touched upon some reports that we will be
doing over the next year for the Government around
child internet safety.
Next month we hope we will be reporting to
Government on parental awareness of, take up of and
confidence in parental controls and other strategies,
mediation strategies, available for parents to protect
their children in an online environment. We will be
following that up in one year’s time with a follow
up report to look at how things have progressed. Just
quickly in between the two reports we will be
producing a third report for the Government that looks
at progress made by the four major ISPs in
implementing network level filtering.
Q186 Chair: You say you do not really have much
control over the ISPs, that your main area is TV
companies and radio, but the Government has said
that it wants to ensure that internet enabled devices
are supplied with filters and that you are going to be
involved in overseeing this. What does that mean?
Tony Close: I think it is what I was just talking about.
I do not think we have a specific role.
Chair: But this suggests that you are going to have
one in the future.
Tony Close: I think that that is just another way of
saying that at least for the next year we will provide
a number of reports that provides the Government
with our insights into how network level filters have
been implemented, whether or not ISPs have delivered
on the promises. More than that they will provide our
insights on how parents feel about the level of
protections that are available to them and whether or
not they are confident or not confident in protecting
their children in an online environment.
Chair: You see Ofcom’s role essentially as one of
research and opinion surveys.
Claudio Pollack: Within the current statute that is
exactly right. Beyond the areas that we have identified
and described, there is no regulation of the internet in
this country in the statute and we do not have a role
in that nor do we have a role, a formal role in policing
or mandating filtering. The conversations that
happened were all about a voluntary commitment to
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 55
19 November 2013 Tony Close and Claudio Pollack
deliver a form of network level filtering and Ofcom,
because of its media literacy duties and because of its
expertise in networks, has been called upon by the
Government to help in a degree of evaluation of the
extent to which the filters have been properly
introduced and also the impact that that is having on
the way that parents and children use the internet.
Q187 Chair: But you do have a role in licensing
telecoms companies, do you not?
Claudio Pollack: We have. I was going to say that
when you said we only do television and radio that is
in terms of protection of UK citizens from harmful
content on radio, television and TV like content on
the internet. Separately, of course, we have a role
around the regulation of telecommunications
companies as providers of electronic communications,
networks and services. It is not through a licensing
regime, it is through a general authorisation regime
but that explicitly does not cover regulation of the
content that is delivered by those networks.
Q188 Chair: It does not but if the Government chose
to say, “We are now going to make it a requirement
that you also have child protection measures”, you
could do that?
Claudio Pollack: Yes. To be very clear, what we are
describing is what our role is within the existing
statute. Of course there could be a different role if the
statute was changed but that is obviously a matter for
Parliament, not for us.
Chair: That would require primary legislation to
change the terms of the regulatory regime for
telecoms.
Claudio Pollack: I believe so, yes.
Q189 Mr Sutcliffe: Just on that theme, I think you
are pointing out you are a regulator without powers in
terms of this area and clearly that is a decision for us
as Parliamentarians to make, but I think your point us
to a direction. What concerns me then is if the ISPs
know that you do not have any regulatory powers
what is your relationship like with them in terms of
how are you seen by the ISPs in this sort of area? Do
they work with you in a proactive way or do you have
to react to what the agenda is? I am trying to get a
feel really in terms of what the relationship is like
without you having the powers to be able to say to
them, “You must do this, that or the other”.
Tony Close: I wonder if I might answer first in
relation to the specific task we have ahead of us in
the next year, and whether Claudio may want to add
anything about our broader relationship. We are
conscious that because we are limited by statute that
we do not have specific powers to require ISPs to do
certain things for us in order for us to carry out a
process of reporting to Government on network and
filtering. As part of the agreement with Government
on doing this work, we secured agreement that the
Government would contact the major ISPs themselves
and ask them to co-operate with us in order for us to
deliver this set of reports. I think we all agree that it
is important and we cannot do it without the
co-operation of the ISPs. We have no broader role
with ISPs but, Claudio, I wonder whether you want to
add anything?
Claudio Pollack: I have a lot of experience in dealing
with the internet service providers in those areas
where we do have power and that is a particular type
of relationship as you would expect. In this area it is
quite straightforward. We do not have any powers but
nor do we have any duties or functions so there is not
a gap if you see what I mean. Where we would be
coming in and saying, “There is a problem here in
terms of what we are expected to deliver”, would be
if there is a gap between our duties and our powers to
deliver that.
To be very clear, the provision by the four largest ISPs
of network level filters to be used by parents by the
end of this year was an agreement between the Prime
Minister and the internet service providers. That
agreement is about what they deliver but also as part
of that agreement and in the exchange that we have it
must be that they are required to co-operate in any
form of evaluation of whether they have delivered to
what is essentially a voluntary deal. If there is not
co-operation, for example if we find that it has not
been implemented properly or substantively or there
is not co-operation in our ability to carry out that task
then of course it is an agreement between the
Government and the ISPs and it is for the Government
to decide, if this voluntary arrangement has not
delivered what it hoped to deliver, whether it wants to
consider other avenues as well. At the moment it is a
voluntary agreement in which we are assisting.
Q190 Mr Sutcliffe: Tony, to go back to the survey, I
think, you are doing of parents, this report on parental
involvement, which I am pretty keen on because I
think that part of the problem is that parents do not
know what is going on in their own households. How
do you go about it? What are the terms of reference?
What is the background to it?
Tony Close: You are going to have to forgive me if I
cannot provide you with full details of this because I
am the guy at Ofcom that looks after setting rules and
enforcing those rules. I am not the guy that looks after
the quite complex and comprehensive programme of
research that we do but I will have a stab at answering.
Claudio, you might want to follow up.
We carry out a range of different quantitative and
qualitative pieces of work. We are doing them on an
ongoing basis so that we can benchmark and track
changes in parental attitudes. The qualitative pieces
are obviously limited in terms of numbers of people
that we talk to but really gets under the skin of
parents’ and teens’ attitudes to internet use, online
safety, what concerns them or worries or distresses
them, what they like about it, what they understand
about parental controls. The quantitative piece is
obviously different. It is bigger, it is less detailed but
tries to canvass a significant range of views and
attitudes to what the risks are online, what steps
parents take to mediate or mitigate those risks, what
strategies that they develop. It is quite comprehensive.
I cannot go through all of it.
Q191 Mr Sutcliffe: I think somewhere in the report
it talks about there is evidence now that people are
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Ev 56 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Tony Close and Claudio Pollack
more aware of what the issues are because of
experience, if you like, online. How often are these
reports commissioned? How often are the surveys
changed?
Tony Close: Okay, one of the reasons the Government
were probably keen for us to do the work is because
they are aware that we already do this on an annual
basis as part of our media literacy programme. Those
two reports, and there are other reports, programmes
of work that we carry out as well that might feed into
this are a rolling programme of work. I cannot tell
you how long we have been carrying them out for but
I think it is a considerable period of time.
Claudio Pollack: I think it is since 2005, so annual
surveys since 2005.
Mr Sutcliffe: There is an opportunity now to see a
pattern of things happening.
Tony Close: Yes. It enables us to track people’s
behaviours and attitudes as their internet experience
changes, as they become more confident or as they
become less confident, as they become more aware of
risk or less aware of risk.
Mr Sutcliffe: I do not know whether it is feasible,
Chairman, but it might be worthwhile getting a copy
of the sort of questions that are asked of parents, if
that is possible.
Claudio Pollack: Under the media literacy duty every
year we have a research report, a very, very
comprehensive research report one on adult media use
and attitude and one on children and parent media use
and attitude. It is the primary source, as Tony said,
used by UKCCIS to understand changes and it is
absolutely vital in understanding how things are
moving in this area, with limitations. There are a
number of things that it shows around attitudes. One
of them is that most parents are doing something,
there is a number of things they could do, but most
parents are also reporting some difficulty in using
certain tools. No majority is using, for example,
filtering but a combination of using filters, being in
the room when the child is using the internet, talking
to their children once a month, the combination of
those three mechanisms is 85%. So 15% are doing
nothing, but within that 85% there are a number of
people that are doing just one or just two of those
things.
The other thing that I think is fascinating—and, yes,
we will absolutely share the questions of what we are
doing annually—is the specific targeted report that we
have been commissioned to do using that data. What
makes this area so difficult is just how quickly it
moves. One thing that I am going to quote to is if
parents were saying and taking comfort from the fact
that the PC was in the room that they were in and they
could observe what was happening, in just 12 months
tablet computer use at home among five to 15-yearolds between 2012 and 2013 has gone up from 14%
to 42%, and that gives you a real sense of the
challenge of protecting children. Even when parents
are investing the time and effort to do so, it is very
difficult because things move so quickly. There is a
lot in the research that will help understand that better.
Tony Close: Just very quickly, Chairman, of course
we will share the questions with you and we will share
the report once we have finished it as well.
Q192 Chair: Just to be clear, the Government has
waved sticks at Google, at Microsoft and at the ISPs.
The Prime Minister has basically said, “Report back
to me within so many months” with the implicit threat
that unless they do these things action is going to be
taken against them. The position is that at the moment
there are not any powers to take action.
Claudio Pollack: Sorry, say that again?
Chair: The powers do not exist at present to take
action.
Claudio Pollack: In the area of regulating internet
service providers in having a role in policing content
the powers do not exist today. Of course if there are
individuals who have the capacity to introduce
legislation then they have a different response.
Chair: Of course, but therefore the Prime Minister
and Ministers’ implicit threats are that they will have
to introduce new legislation to take powers to require
internet companies to do these.
Claudio Pollack: Yes, that is right.
Q193 Chair: You do not have at the moment really
any provision within the licensing requirements that
would cover this kind of area?
Claudio Pollack: There is nothing. It is the general
conditions of entitlement that is through legislation
that derives from Europe around electronic
communications. Not only is there nothing in the
general conditions nor do we have the capacity to
introduce regulation that is around content using that
instrument.
Q194 Chair: Television like material is covered by
ATVOD?
Tony Close: Yes. The powers are vested in Ofcom.
Ofcom contract out the function of regulating
television like video on demand services to our coregulator, ATVOD.
Chair: Would that cover YouTube?
Tony Close: It would cover parts of YouTube.
YouTube is a mix of services. It is in large part and
most notable for user generated content and hosting
user generated content but increasingly it is a platform
for professional services provided from different
corporate entities. There are a number of professional
YouTube channels that are established in the UK that
meet the definition of a television like service and are
regulated by Ofcom and ATVOD.
Claudio Pollack: To be clear, in order to be regulated
they both have to be TV like and they have to be
established in the UK. Content that is visible on the
internet that is neither TV like nor established in the
UK, we would not have jurisdiction.
Q195 Chair: But if I post a video on YouTube that I
filmed on my handheld camcorder or whatever, is that
covered by ATVOD?
Tony Close: No, probably not, not if it is user
generated content and it is just a part of broader
offering. It will be covered by YouTube’s own
community standards.
Q196 Chair: Sure, so how do you draw a line
between YouTube content that is covered and
YouTube content that is not covered?
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 57
19 November 2013 Tony Close and Claudio Pollack
Tony Close: Partly on terms of jurisdiction, to put
them on to the site you have to be established in the
UK.
Chair: All right, so assume we are in the UK.
Tony Close: Then you have to identify a service that
exists, something that you can see, feel, something
that is whole, and then you have to run through a
series of potential criteria or characteristics to
determine whether or not it is TV like or whether or
not its principal purpose is the provision of TV like
material to consumers. This statute, I think, contains
a number of conditions, all of which need to be passed
in order for us to determine, or ATVOD in the first
instance, if something should be subject to regulation.
Q197 Chair: Do you feel that this whole area needs
further Parliamentary examination, because I was
involved in the Bill that set up Ofcom and none of
these services existed at that time?
Tony Close: I think it is fair to say that there is a
challenge. There are different degrees of protection
offered for different types of service online, very
comprehensive rules set for linear services online, less
comprehensive rules set for television like on demand
services, and no statutory rule set or intervention for
certain other types of material. There is a challenge
there. It is a legitimate debate to be had about whether
that is an ideal scenario for consumers or whether or
not we should be thinking about a more coherent
framework for media standards that spans a greater
set of audio visual media. I think there are certainly
some benefits in thinking about that.
Q198 Chair: Will this feature in the Communications
Bill, do you think?
Claudio Pollack: You have someone giving evidence
shortly that I think would be better able to answer.
Chair: Indeed, and that is a question we might put to
him. I think that is all we have, thank you.
Claudio Pollack: Thank you very much.
Tony Close: Thank you.
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Minister of State for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, Mr
Edward Vaizey MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Communications and Creative
Industries, and Claire Perry MP, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister on Preventing the Commercialisation
and Sexualisation of Childhood, gave evidence.
Q199 Chair: Good morning, thank you for attending
our third panel this morning. It is afternoon now. May
I welcome Damian Green, the Minister of State for
Policing and Criminal Justice from the Home Office,
Ed Vaizey, Minister for Creative Industries and
Communications, and Claire Perry, the Special
Adviser to the Prime Minister on Preventing the
Commercialisation and Sexualisation of Childhood?
We have just been having a discussion with Ofcom
about what powers are available to them should ISPs
and other internet involved companies not voluntarily
adopt some of the measures that we have been
encouraging them to take, to which the answer was
there were very little powers. Do you think we need
to give Ofcom more powers in this area?
Mr Vaizey: We await your guidance, Chairman, on
who you would like to answer.
Chair: I think possibly, Mr Vaizey, you are best
placed.
Mr Vaizey: I knew I should not have said anything. I
think Ofcom obviously has some powers in this area.
It is clearly a regulator of broadcast services and
co-regulates what we call video on demand with the
Association of Television and Video On Demand.
Anything that is a broadcast like service that is
broadcast over the web, Ofcom has the powers to
regulate. As you know, it has also been asked by the
Secretary of State to report on parental awareness and
how comfortable parents are with the safeguards that
are now being put in place. They were also behind
creating ParentPort as a one stop shop to allow parents
to get the kind of guidance they need. We are working,
related back to video on demand, on common media
standards because we take the view that as television
and internet services converge anyone, parents,
consumers of any kind, will assume that the same
standards apply to what appears on their living room
screen, which I think you can still call a television for
these purposes.
Ofcom also sits on the UKCCIS Board so they have
a great amount of input into what we are doing in this
area. I would be open to any discussion on an
extension of their powers. I have taken the view that
we can achieve a lot without necessarily imposing
legislation or widely extending Ofcom’s powers at the
moment, for example the whole issue of filters where
we, I think, have made some rapid progress, has been
by engaging in a dialogue with the ISPs. Self
regulation, if I can put it that way, seems to me a way
of making the kind of rapid progress one needs, not
only just rapid progress but also keeping the flexibility
so that we can react quickly to events. Some of the
changes that Google have made, for example, would
not necessarily have succeeded, I think, as quickly if
we had had endless debates about the appropriate
legislation and so on.
But it is quite clear that Ofcom has a role in this space.
The key issue, I think, will be always to be open to
ideas and suggestions about whether or not Ofcom
should have its powers extended and if so how, what
its remit will be, particularly considering you are
dealing with global companies who effectively deal
with different regulations all across not just Europe
but across the globe. I do not know whether Claire
wants to add anything to that?
Claire Perry: Thank you. The independent
parliamentary inquiry that I chaired raised the issue
that there are numerous regulators in this space and I,
like the Minister, think it is an interesting and valid
question as to whether Ofcom’s remit should be
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Ev 58 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Edward Vaizey MP and Claire Perry MP
extended. The two areas where, I think, the issue most
arises is one around to whom does one complain if
one has problems around content or treatment, and of
course ParentPort is a good attempt to try to centralise
the complainant process. Perhaps more work could
and should be done around publicising that. Indeed
we will move onto the internet safety campaign that
is being funded by the ISPs. One of the asks is to
direct parents where to go, users where to go, when
there is a problem.
I think it is right and good that Ofcom has been given
an implementation role in the roll out of the policy
around filter adoption. One of the questions on the
filter process is what does success look like? With a
sense of about 30% of the households in the country
being those with children one might argue that is a
good, soft target though there are not, of course,
official targets for this. Asking Ofcom to look at the
implementation of that and also perhaps to distinguish
between ISPs and the success of their implementation
is a very valid thing to do.
Like the Minister I am very minded to think that if
we were trying to regulate such a fast moving space
in any form we would still be sitting round looking
for parliamentary time on the first debate on filtering
implementation. Instead of which we have
extraordinarily effective and dynamic filter roll out,
and indeed companies are competing to offer their
customers the best filters and the most family friendly
packages. I think an extended role is possible, and I
welcome the Minister’s commitment to looking
potentially at how that could look.
Q200 Chair: The whole thrust of the pressure that
has been placed on internet companies to date has
been rather, “Unless you agree to do this then the
Government will make sure you have to do it”. Do
you see any advantage perhaps, and we have a
Communications Bill coming, in the Government
taking powers rather as the Government took powers
in the Digital Economy Act to require ISPs to do
something if they failed to do it voluntarily?
Mr Vaizey: As I say I am open to any suggestions and
I am looking forward to the Select Committee’s
report. I think one has to be careful. If one took too
wide a reserve power, if I can put it that way, to
“regulate the internet” that would create an element of
uncertainty. Businesses need certainty and need to
know what regulations they would be required to
comply with. We need to know what problem needs
to be fixed and why legislation rather than working
with organisations and encouraging them would be the
answer. As you say, Mr Chairman, I do think that the
potential of legislation, and the Prime Minister made
that clear on a number of issues in terms of his speech
in July and continuing dialogue he has with the
industry, is always there.
My message to all the companies in this space is that
there is potentially an appetite in Parliament for
regulation and that they should not be blind to that
and therefore co-operation—and to use a terrible
American expression—getting ahead of the curve is a
much better place for them to be but they must
understand that is, as it were, the mood in Parliament
that I don’t think MPs would shy away from
legislation should they feel that they were not getting
the adequate results that they needed.
Claire Perry: Mr Chairman, just on that point, if I
may challenge you slightly, sir. The idea that
companies are doing this or else I think perhaps is
something that we felt a couple of years ago. I may
just be starry-eyed through lack of sleep after
yesterday but I genuinely think that the growth of
corporate social responsibility among those who are
making their living from anything to do with internet
activity is really quite impressive. Certainly the
British ISPs are well ahead of the ask in terms of
delivering and, with yesterday announcements, we can
see that some of the global internet companies who
perhaps dance to a very different legislative tune have
also woken up to that. So again perhaps we are in an
awakening of a new dawn of social responsibility on
the web, which is to be welcomed, but I would
perhaps slightly challenge that the companies are
living in fear of regulation. I think we are beyond
that point.
Q201 Chair: That is encouraging. Can I turn to the
illegal material because that is particularly going to be
I suspect more for the Home Office. The area of data
retention in order to identify perpetrators of
distribution of child abuse images and so on, that
strays into what has been a difficult territory for the
Government in recent months. Are you satisfied that
enough data is being retained and is available to the
police to identify people?
Damian Green: I think in this instance it is not a
problem of data retention because the civil liberties
aspect of the debate does not pertain here. If people
are producing, exchanging, storing child abuse images
then they are committing a serious criminal act. So,
as I say, both legally and morally it does not seem to
me that whatever civil libertarian arguments one may
wish to adduce about data retention in other spheres
apply in this case. I think the key is identifying the
images, blocking them, trying to get into some of the
more hidden networks, moving on peer-to-peer
exchange and so on. Those are the areas where
activity both by the industry and by this Government,
and indeed Governments overseas with whom we act
in concert, is concentrated.
Q202 Chair: Are you getting complete co-operation
from every single internet service provider for
instance?
Damian Green: In a sense this is more a matter for
search engines than ISPs and obviously it is both
because the ISPs will host the sites. One of the parts of
yesterday’s announcement after the Prime Minister’s
summit, was that Google and Microsoft have changed
their algorithms so that they can now both identify
and block child abuse images. People are using search
terms, 100,000 search terms and more, so they now
have a dynamic algorithm that will be much more
effective than original ideas of just producing search
terms and saying block all of those. People who both
produce and search for child abuse images are not
only evil, they are cunning and it does not take much
cunning to decide to change a search term slightly. So
you do need the full extent of the technological
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 59
19 November 2013 Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Edward Vaizey MP and Claire Perry MP
expertise that is available to companies like Google
and Microsoft to ensure that the algorithms can cope
with that. The tests that the Child Exploitation Online
Protection Centre and other bodies have been running
show that these are very effective, what is coming in.
Perhaps most encouragingly we learnt from Google
yesterday that instead of getting back a child abuse
image, getting back a warning page saying, “What
you are seeking may well be illegal and do not do
this” essentially, that has already reduced the amount
of searching by 20%. So it has had a very significant
immediate effect.
Q203 Chair: Obviously the progress that has been
made through search engines is welcome but a lot of
the distribution of material that is being done by the
hard core is not going to be done using search engines.
Do you think enough has been done and to what
extent can you assess the scale of the distribution that
is occurring either through peer-to-peer networks or
through the dark net?
Damian Green: You are absolutely right, Mr
Chairman, there are three elements to it. There is the
blocking of the initial search, which we should not
dismiss because what it will do is stop people
embarking on this particularly horrible journey so it
is worth doing in its own right. But you are right,
people who are hardened may well be using peer-topeer or may well indeed, for the worst type of abuse
images, now be using now the dark net, in the current
jargon. The answer to your question is yes in both
those areas. One of the other things we announced
yesterday was a pilot project that CEOP, along with
the Internet Watch Foundation and the industry
companies will be working on to see how we can deal
with peer-to-peer. That is obviously different from
using a search engine algorithm for reasons the
Committee will understand. So that is one project.
One of the key areas where the UK/US taskforce, that
I will coach here with an Assistant Attorney General
of the American Government, will be to bring together
the best industry technologists along with the best
people, GCHQ and their American equivalents who
are actually very good at encrypting and therefore
decrypting secret networks, to use all those skills
precisely to get in to the dark net and so on. So we
are working on all three of those areas.
Chair: I think that probably leads neatly in to Gerry
Sutcliffe’s area.
Q204 Mr Sutcliffe: I do not know if Mr Green has
had the opportunity to read the evidence that was
given to us by the existing Chair of CEOP and the
former Director of CEOP, quite opposing views about
where CEOP sits. An interesting perspective from the
Minister about how CEOP’s role is developing and
what are the strengths and what are the weaknesses?
Damian Green: The big change, I agree, having read
the evidence, there was a difference in emphasis, if I
can put it like that, between the former view and the
current view of CEOP, is that CEOP has changed very
radically over the past couple of years and has had its
most radical change in the last few months by
becoming an arm of the National Crime Agency. That
is a game-changer for CEOP because it is not now a
small very effective, very good outfit, it is now a very
effective good outfit that is part of a very large outfit.
For example, the NCA will have 4,000 officers, all of
whom will be trained in child protection because it
has its national links, it has a border arm as well as
taking over many of the international policing
functions that we need in this country. It can, if you
like, look the FBI in the eye and say we can now work
with you as an equal, and since this is clearly a global
problem it requires global solutions. The fact that
CEOP itself is now part of a global size police
organisation, the NCA, I think gives it opportunities
and access to expertise that it did not have in the past.
Q205 Mr Sutcliffe: Regardless of others’ personal
views, what they were unanimous on was that there
were about 50,000 potential areas where people could
be convicted on internet abuse. What are the resources
going to be like for CEOP in terms, and I accept what
the Minister is saying in terms of being part of that
bigger organisation, there may be some possibilities
of it being not downgraded but diluted in terms of its
ambition and in terms of where it needs to go?
Damian Green: Absolutely not. You are quite right
that the CEOP threat assessment, which it inevitably
has to be—it is the best guess we have that is what it
is—was up to 50,000 individuals involved in
exchanging child abuse images. That was this year’s
threat assessment. But, no, I think the exact opposite
of dilution is happening. It is being amplified that
CEOP now has access to people, expertise, resources,
international access in a way that it did not have by
itself.
Claire Perry: Just to add some colour to the point
the Minister made about exchanging, the interesting
behavioural factor of those engaged in this traffic is
that they connect. They seek reaffirmation for their
desires from connection and in a way that makes the
problem easier in that if you are going after a
particular node or interrupting a particular site, and
we have seen this in several busts recently, you have
potentially access to a large group who have
connected through, even in the dark internet, a node.
Mr Chairman, if I may just throw back a point about
the issue of the dark net, I mean things like Tor, The
Onion Router, these are often set up by Governments
and indeed funded by Governments as a way of
providing anonymity to people for various reasons.
One thing that would be very interesting to flag up to
those Government departments who are setting up
these organisations is what the unintended
consequences may be. Internet anonymity is both a
blessing and a curse, particularly if people are using
it for illegal purposes. I don’t think we think enough
about that when we are looking schematically at the
internet.
Q206 Mr Sutcliffe: If I can just return to the
regulation point with Ed and Ofcom. What was
interesting this morning, Ofcom’s evidence was that
the regulations were not there but one can understand
that for the rate of progression and rate of change that
takes place. I think the negotiated route is probably
the best route to be taken and it is heartening to hear
that the ISPs are dealing with that. One of the things
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Ev 60 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Edward Vaizey MP and Claire Perry MP
that I think that we need to look at is parental
involvement in all of this. Again, Ofcom this morning
said that they are conducting surveys of parents going
back perhaps to 2005. What can the Department do or
what can Government do in general terms to try and
raise awareness of the potential of these issues
affecting vulnerable young children?
Mr Vaizey: As I say, Ofcom was behind setting up
ParentPort because it felt you needed a one-stop shop
for parents to go to get all the advice they needed.
The Secretary of State has asked Ofcom to report
regularly, three times over the next year or so, on
parental awareness. The other thing that I think has
been of benefit from the negotiated route is that we
have got the ISPs to agree on a marketing campaign.
I took the view these are organisations that know their
customers, they have to sell them services, they will
know them back to front and, dare I say, each
company will have pretty well paid marketing
directors who should know their trade. So I think it is
a massive opportunity to have the four of them work
together. I know what Claire says about internet
service providers competing in terms of providing
services to parents, that is good because it will mean
innovation, but there needs to be a strong degree of
co-operation and to have them come together for a
marketing campaign is a good thing. My
understanding is that it is about £25 million worth of
advertising that they are planning to put in place and
I think next Spring is the target date. Hopefully there
will be a strong and high profile campaign to make
parents aware of the filters and the kind of things they
can do to protect their children from inappropriate
content. It is also important to say that should not be
a one-off, you cannot just have a blitz once and then
forget about it and assume that people will know
about it for ever and a day. One has to keep refreshing
and reminding parents of what issues are out there.
Again Claire, who has been involved in talking to
them, might have something to contribute.
Claire Perry: I think it is interesting that this question
comes up as to why is this not a Government sort of
public health campaign. Indeed the last Government I
believe spent £3 million on the same campaign, which
was called, “Zip it, block it, something it” and frankly
nobody can remember what it was. It almost sank
without trace I would submit, and part of the problem
was it was written by us, by people who are not out
there every day working at how to get marketing
messages to their users. There is a collective
commitment of the ISPs to do a £25 million campaign
over three years to alert parents to the new filtering
technology and what they can do but also the broader
issue of conduct questions. Technology only solves
some problems, it does solve cyber bullying, it doesn’t
solve sexting. There is a lot of stuff out there. I have
always felt that parents on the one hand tell us that
they are technologically overwhelmed and they do not
understand but on the other hand are paying for these
contracts. It is like, “If you do not want your children
to be sexting then take their mobile phone off them
and stop paying for the contract or switch the router
off at night”. We somehow have abrogated this space
to our kids and I think it is time to remind parents that
they are part of the solution as well.
I will say that one of the big breakthroughs on
technology—forgive me for talking so much—is
moving device level filters to the home network level
is a massive step forward in making life easier for
parents. The ask now for parents to install a filter on
every single internet enabled device in their home is
a joke. The fact that we have persuaded the ISPs to
implement a home network level filter, which we were
told initially could not be done for technical reasons,
until TalkTalk did it, is massive because it means that
parents will only have to set the safety settings once
and know that everything in the home is protected.
That is an enormous step forward in helping parents
in my view.
Q207 Chair: Where are we on your suggestion that
there should be a default setting that is a strong filter
and that people should then be required to opt in to
receive stronger material?
Claire Perry: Having proposed that, we of course had
the Government consultation on that, which was very
welcome. We heard that people were all over the place
on this default on. What we have arrived at is that we
are going to ask every account holder in the country,
which is 20 million accounts, so this is a very
significant ask, whether or not they would like to
activate parental filters. Of course two thirds of them
will not be parents, so they are going to be asked for
something that perhaps is not relevant. We will have
the box, “Would you like the filters installed?” preticked. To me, in a way, that satisfies the desire to
have people make a choice. We basically present them
with an unavoidable choice.
Chair: Who is presenting them?
Claire Perry: I do not know who your internet
account is with, but you will have an interrupt at some
point in the next year and they will say, “You can now
install fantastic family friendly filters would you like
to come and install them?” The box will be pre-ticked,
“Yes”. You can’t just do nothing, you have to choose
to get off that page. That to me satisfied this
requirement to ask people to choose, which is the
classic tension. Do you ask people to choose or do
you make the choice for them in quite an elegant way.
It was a proposal from the industry that I felt satisfied
where we wanted to go. We ask everybody and if you
do nothing the filters are automatically installed or
you cannot move on.
Chair: Just to be clear, one day over the course of the
next year or perhaps—
Claire Perry: One year.
Chair: Right. Every single customer of every single
ISP is going to turn on their computer and suddenly
get a page come up saying, “Do you want filters?”
Claire Perry: To be clear, the top four ISPs who have
around 85% of the market, we would like the others
to commit to the same thing. They will ask you in
different ways. Some might ask you when you go to
query your bill online, some may interrupt your
browsing session, which is a first for the UK to do
that. This is the commitment that Ofcom will be
monitoring. Every household will be contacted and
asked whether or not they would like to switch on the
filters, and the box, “Yes, please” will be pre-ticked.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 61
19 November 2013 Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Edward Vaizey MP and Claire Perry MP
Q208 Chair: You have conducted your inquiry, you
have talked about the change in attitudes of the
companies who are now much more willing to pursue
these kinds of things, are you pretty much satisfied
that everything you wanted to see happen has
happened?
Claire Perry: Well, yes and more in some ways. For
example, the Google commitment yesterday,
hopefully to be matched by Microsoft, to block illegal
returns for search terms globally was huge. So we will
basically be protecting the global internet with those
changes. However, I think one can never declare
victory because the technology moves on at pace,
which is why regulation of the space is so difficult. I
think we have a solution that is going to be what
parents have been asking for, what the country’s been
asking for. There may be a new way of accessing the
net or a new form of conduct or a new device that
pops up in the next couple of years that changes again,
which is why having the company self- awareness and
involvement is so important. You want them to be
thinking about these dangers rather than relying on
politicians to constantly be jumping up and saying,
“What about this?”
Q209 Chair: Given we expect more and more
internet browsing to be done on mobile devices, can I
check, are the mobile providers also going to be
putting up this question of saying, “Do you wish to
fit filters?”
Claire Perry: Interestingly, they already do that. The
mobile operators had an opt in system where you had
to prove you were over 18 in order to have that filter
dropped. They have both expanded that, so Three has
become involved and also they have moved to BBFC
filtering technology, so their filters are even better and
some of the issues like false positives have been
removed. In a way we have layers of protection
around young people now with mobile devices in the
home, and of course with public wi-fi.
Q210 Chair: Damian, can I come back to the
hardcore that you are concentrating on, the figure that
Gerry quoted and you confirmed, up to 50,000, when
we took evidence on this earlier it was suggested to
us that a number of those 50,000 who can expect a
knock on their door is pretty small. Is that satisfactory
or should we not be deploying more resources into
this?
Damian Green: Yes, and we are is the brisk answer
to that question. That is one of the points of having
CEOP as part of the NCA is precisely to improve our
enforcement capability. You understand that that
50,000 figure is a pretty broad brush. One of the
interesting things, as Claire just alluded to in another
context, is that you do tend to break open groups of
people, it is not a question of 50,000 isolated
individuals. The successful law enforcement
operations that take place, both here and overseas,
have two characteristics: firstly, lots of people are
involved, and, secondly, there may well be lots of
people in lots of different countries. You break open
networks.
One of the points made at the summit yesterday was
that the big sites that are effectively child sex abuse
image multiple sites, there are probably not that many
of them. There might be 10 or 12 of them based
around the world and when you get the law
enforcement capability to break into them you may
well find very large numbers of people who are
attached to them. That is in a sense the way you will
get the greater number that I accept we want to see.
Chair: Jim Gamble suggested to us that you could
perhaps have special constables who would receive
training and then be sent out to look for this material
and identify it.
Damian Green: To some extent a lot of that work, in
terms of identifying where the images are and from
then to the individuals is now being done more and
more by the Internet Watch Foundation, and the IWF
has a significant increase in its capacity coming with
the extra money from the industry. The big change
that will happen in the coming months is that instead
of being passive and receiving information from the
public the IWF will be able to go out there and
actively search. The key from that will be to make
those searches active, in terms of the individuals as
well as the individual images. I think we are meeting
this desire to have more pairs of eyeballs looking at
these images and from that will flow through the
information that hopefully enables us to go and finger
the individuals.
Q211 Mr Bradshaw: Damian, do you know how
many prosecutions there have been for threatening and
abusive behaviour online?
Damian Green: I don’t off the top of my head, I am
sorry.
Mr Bradshaw: Would it be possible for you to let
us know?
Damian Green: Certainly, yes. We will find out
about that.
Q212 Mr Bradshaw: Do you think it is a serious
issue?
Damian Green: Yes. It is a different part. I suppose it
develops out of cyber bullying in a way, so in a sense
it will be networks. Facebook is obviously the biggest
one, but we have seen a lot of the other ones where
this kind of behaviour has become—prevalence is the
wrong word, but we have all become more aware of
it simply because that is the arena in which people
exchange views and information. Therefore those who
are predisposed to be threatening and abusive can now
be threatening and abusive online.
Q213 Mr Bradshaw: Do you think it is important
that the criminal law is used as a deterrent, in terms
of our learning process and how we view this sort
of behaviour?
Damian Green: The principle one has to operate is
that if something is illegal in the real world then it is
illegal online as well. You can cause as much distress
to someone by threatening behaviour online as you
can offline. To that extent, yes, absolutely. There are
various stages one can go through online, and just as
criminals can use technology, therefore law
enforcement can use technology against criminals as
well. Similarly, the social networks know their
audience very well, they have the capability at the first
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Ev 62 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Edward Vaizey MP and Claire Perry MP
sign of this of enabling people to switch individuals
off, to report bullying and those kind of instant buttons
on screen that you can press. They seem to me to be
very good trip wires. At the end you need the criminal
law, but I think you need all those trip wires on the
way up as well.
Q214 Mr Bradshaw: Do you think the CPS shares
the seriousness with which you take this problem?
Damian Green: Yes. I think across law enforcement.
The CPS will be the recipient, that is what it is for. It
receives reports from the police. Again, you have to
go through the procedure, the police have to know it
is happening, you have you be able to collect the
evidence, they have to receive complaints, they have
to have people who are prepared to give evidence, all
those kinds of things. If they have cases that are best
resolved, as it were, at the end, as a criminal law case
then they will approach the CPS.
Mr Bradshaw: I have a question for Mr Vaizey, I do
not know if anyone else wants to come in before that?
Chair: Conor, do you want to come in now?
Q215 Conor Burns: I just want to ask very quickly
on the social media, do you think the social media
companies—Facebook, Twitter in particular—could
do more than they are currently doing?
Damian Green: They are now much more aware than
they were even a few months ago of the importance
of that. I have been dealing with this portfolio for
about four or five months and I am struck by the
change throughout the industry of some of these very
big companies—based and with their origins in the
USA with its different tradition—where freedom of
speech is such an absolute right that any kind of
reduction of it is regarded with extreme suspicion. The
journey that the companies, including Facebook and
Twitter, have taken over the past few months is to
realise that in these areas, particularly with child sex
abuse where there is no argument, but also in terms
of bullying and abuse that we have seen can lead to
tragic incidents of teenage suicide and so on, they do
now get it in a way that I suspect, until it was brought
to their attention, they didn’t quite.
Q216 Conor Burns: Earlier this morning when we
had evidence given from Twitter we were told that
there is a report abuse function now on Twitter that
was brought in in the end of July. None of us on the
Committee who use Twitter were aware that that had
been brought in. Do you think there is more they can
do to promote how to report abuse, because the
reporting of abuse means it is taken more seriously if
it is in volume?
Damian Green: Yes, I think that is a very good point.
The timing is interesting, it was in July Twitter had
got the point. All these companies have the
technological capacity to solve these problems, the
trick is to get them to recognise them as a problem.
There is then a further problem of letting users know.
I suspect in that world, once you have established
something new, so much of it does get out by osmosis
that people just know it. It may reflect our age that we
are not instantly aware that something new is
available on Twitter now, but you can guarantee that
around the world hundreds of billions of Twitter users
probably do know about it now, just because that is
the way things operate. But, yes, a bit of marketing to
the elderly might be useful.
Claire Perry: Could I come in with a couple of points
of reassurance and perhaps a suggestion? One is I had
a meeting with the Solicitor General on this very issue
because obviously I have attracted quite a lot of third
party cases on particularly bullying or stalking and
harassment issues. He may be worth taking a
statement from. I was very reassured that the law has
been looked at and expanded wherever necessary to
include online conduct as well as offline conduct.
Having been on the receiving end of quite a storm of
Twitter abuse over the summer relating to my
campaign, I have to say I don’t think companies do
do enough. I think part of the problem is the
anonymity of usage.
I was encouraged with Ask.fm—having spent a lot of
time with Hanna Smith’s father, who was one of the
young women who did indeed commit suicide—that
company did set up a facility where users could
choose to be anonymous, but you would know if the
user was anonymous when you were exchanging
information with them. People Tweet, people post
abuse about how they would like to rape you and kill
you because they think you do not know who they
are. If there was some way of the company knowing
and being prepared to verify that identity and to show
you that that identity was verified I think it would lead
to a diminution in that sort of behaviour. I don’t think
the companies do enough and there is a great concern
around it, as the Minister said, given the US legal
framework within which much of the global
companies operate.
Q217 Mr Bradshaw: Do you think it is important
that we see some prosecutions so that there is a
deterrent out there?
Claire Perry: Yes, I do. I think it is deeply
misogynistic as well and it was interesting over the
summer because there was a bit of flurry of push back
from a number of people in the public over this. I
don’t know that we saw prosecutions, we saw cautions
and we saw apologies but prosecuting, for what is
pretty vile behaviour, would be helpful.
Q218 Chair: On the point you raised, we explored
this point with both Facebook and Twitter, Twitter
basically told us they are perfectly happy for you to
use any alias you choose and there is no requirement
for you to tell them who you really are. Facebook said
to us that it was their policy that you should use your
real name and if somebody told them that somebody
was not doing so then they might take action about it,
but they would not take any action themselves to
check. Are you saying that you think that those two
companies should be doing some kind of verification
process?
Claire Perry: I think a way around squaring the circle
would be for them to indicate to other users those
users that have chosen to stay anonymous. I have no
issue, as I am sure many users of Facebook and
Twitter do, with my identity being public because I
am obviously there as a public person and I think most
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 63
19 November 2013 Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Edward Vaizey MP and Claire Perry MP
people would feel the same way. If you are aware that
so and so has chosen to remain anonymous and sit
behind their funny little avatar picture then it is your
choice as to whether you engage with them or indeed
accept communications from them. Perhaps the
companies could give us the choice of who we engage
with, but certainly flag up who is choosing to remain
anonymous. My sense is that might start to drive
down some of this abhorrent behaviour across all the
social communities.
Chair: I think it was John Carr who suggested to us
that Facebook should be required to verify the
identity. I am not sure that is practical, but is this an
area where the Government feels more could be done?
Mr Vaizey: Again, this is an area where you can work
with the organisations. I certainly think there is
mileage in sitting down with the social media
companies.
You made the point earlier, Chairman, about the
different approach of Twitter and Facebook in terms
of verifying identities, and I think there are a whole
range of issues that the layman would take as
important in a straightforward way, “How do I report
abuse? How quickly will they respond to me about
the abuse? How can I challenge a decision?” If they
decide that the neighbour’s Facebook page saying that
you are a such and such and a so and so is fair
comment rather than abuse, “How do I appeal that?”
Also, do the same principles apply across different
social media sites? Obviously individual social media
sites should have the freedom to have their own
approaches, but I think there is a way of joining things
up. Neelie Kroes, the Digital Commissioner, put
together some safer social networking principles a few
years ago. She asked some of the CEOs that work
with her on those to look at them again and update
them and my understanding is that they are going to
come out with a statement in early 2014. It will be
interesting to see that. I certainly do think there is an
opportunity for the Government to broker a dialogue
between different social media sites and also to
examine how effective their protocols are.
Q219 Chair: As I understand it, in terms of
identifying criminality the police would have to first
of all obtain an order to obtain an IP address off
Facebook or Twitter, you then have to go and probably
get a second order in order to get the ISP to reveal
whose the IP address is. Are you content that that
system is sufficient?
Damian Green: It does work.
Chair: It does work?
Damian Green: As Claire said, that there were at the
height of the particularly horrible trolling that is going
on over the summer, people were visited and the
police found out who they were and went and knocked
on their door. I just observe as a fact that it is possible
to identify individuals, even when they are trying to
be anonymous and saying repellent things using things
like Twitter.
Q220 Mr Bradshaw: Mr Vaizey, in your evidence
you singled out for praise the South West Grid for
Learning, part of the UK Safer Internet Centre that
happens to be based in Exeter, for the work it does in
mediating reports of abuse and threatening behaviour
and getting stuff taken down. I do not know whether
you are aware that they run on a shoestring and the
only money they get is from the European Union. I
just wondered whether you thought there might be
grounds for doing the same kind of thing with abusive
and threatening behaviour as already happens with
child abuse and there needs to be some sort of industry
scheme to fund an organisation like that, and perhaps
some national recognition from Government?
Mr Vaizey: Yes, I have met with the South West Grid
for Learning and I am aware that they run as a lean
machine and the vast majority of their funding comes
from Europe. I would certainly happily look at that.
That is a very good suggestion of the wider principle
that the ISPs and social media sites support the work
that is being done to mitigate some of the harms. The
mantra is there is a huge amount of good that comes
from the internet, but there is a significant degree of
harm. In terms of supporting the Internet Watch
Foundation and also working with CEOP, particularly
into supplying skilled engineers and technicians, I will
certainly look at that on your behalf.
Q221 Conor Burns: I would just like to go back to
what we were talking about earlier, about the filtering.
Claire, you say that people will have in the course of
the next year, possibly their browsing session
interrupted and you conveyed that as though that was
a very good thing. In pursuing the aim of clamping
down on illegal abhorrent content on line that is a
good thing, but would you agree that we have to be
slightly cautious that we do not step over the line into
seeming to be moralising people who do wish to
continue to access material that is perfectly legal
whatever one’s personal moral judgment about it
may be?
Claire Perry: I completely agree. A big question for
the ISPs was how do you get to people who most need
the filters. To be clear, we know that only four out of
10 families currently employ any sort of filtering
device at home. This is Ofcom data. It may have gone
up slightly in the last six months, but we have a real
problem in that the companies have worked quite hard
to generate filters and we know that the take up is
very poor. Browser interrupts is one of several ways,
other companies who have a very substantial amount
of online billing say that they can do it in the “my
account” space. But, of course, one question is if there
is a kid surfing at that time when the interrupt comes
up how does that satisfy the requirement, the adults
are the ones who should be putting on the filter. This
is for the companies to deliver.
One of the questions, and we did test this quite heavily
in focus groups, was do people mind being interrupted
or being asked about filters and is it too much to ask
them to unclick the “Yes, please” box, which is
effectively what you are asking. The response was
actually no. The analogy given was that it is a bit like
slowing down for a lollypop lady, that you may not
have school age children and you might be in a hurry,
but because of the general question of child safety you
are prepared to slow down and potentially even stop
for that school crocodile to pass. Again, there has been
a little bit of push back since the announcement was
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Ev 64 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
19 November 2013 Rt Hon Damian Green MP, Edward Vaizey MP and Claire Perry MP
made, but not as much as one might think. I think
people think it is reasonable and unobtrusive. One of
the challenges was people then said, “Oh, but people
will know if I have said I don’t want the filters”,
which is sort of mad, because in a way they know
now. The ISPs know now because you do not request
to download them. There has been this sort of air of
are you invading people’s privacy. Well, of course
Google knows every single keystroke and every single
search that everybody is conducting, so it is slightly
bizarre that people are prepared to give up their
anonymity to private companies who sell it and are
concerned that somehow they will end up on some
sort of list. There is no list, there is no Government
mandate of this, this is the companies basically
interacting with their customers and saying, “Would
you like to download the filters? Yes, please or no,
thanks”. I think it is a very valid point.
By the way, the tone of this has always been about
among consenting adults not an issue, this is
absolutely fine. Although of course with closing the
rape pornography loophole there are some rather
unpleasant areas of currently legal material that the
Government rightly has decided should be illegal.
Again, it does not seem to be problem so far, and I
think we need to see with implementation and
Ofcom’s feedback if people do think it is
unreasonable, because it may be companies have to
revisit how they market their products.
Q222 Chair: Can I just pursue this point, which may
be best for Damian, of material that is just about legal
for adults, so it is pretty hardcore but it is legal. It was
pointed out to us that a successful prosecution had
been brought on the basis that the material could be
viewed by children. They did not have to prove that
it had been, just the fact that children could view it
had allowed a successful prosecution. Is that a sort of
route you think could be used again?
Damian Green: As you say, it is extremely unusual
and Claire has made the point about pornography
depicting rape, which I think one can regard in the
same way as hate speech if you like, speech that will
incite violence or something like that, because that
might incite criminal behaviour. The issue that I know
DCMS have been dealing with is pornographic
content that is entirely legal and that nobody would
be disturbed, or most people would not be disturbed
with adults viewing. But it is age inappropriate and
the ability to stop normally young boys repeatedly and
incessantly watching that kind of material is both a
technical issue and a policy issue of what you should
stop and where you draw the lines. It is not criminal
material so it does not fall under the criminal law, but
it is clearly age inappropriate for normally young
boys.
Chair: I think that was the point that was put to us,
which was that it could be deemed criminal under the
Obscene Publications Act if insufficient safeguards
have not been put in place to prevent young people
accessing it.
Mr Vaizey: It is an interesting issue. Obviously these
are the points put forward by ATVOD, the Association
for Television on Demand, and I think they have made
some significant progress on this. As was indicated
earlier by Claire, we are moving to outlaw R18
material. At the moment ATVOD can step in where
sites are offering R18 material, but we want to remove
any ambiguity because there is some discussion about
whether one has to show that there has been harm,
and obviously rape porn as well.
The question arises about the Obscene Publications
Act and whether or not a website that effectively
doesn’t have any mechanism for identifying the age
of the user and no kind of pay wall that you have to
get behind to access the material breaches the
Obscene Publications Act. I am not sure it is for me
to say in terms of whether sufficient prosecutions have
been conducted, because that would obviously be
something for the CPS. I do know that ATVOD, in
a rather imaginative way, is looking at working with
financial services providers and to say to them—
because obviously a lot of these websites offer you
free access and then hope to make you pay later—that
they should not provide payment facilities for sites
that do not offer robust age verification. That is issue
number one.
Obviously nothing should stop us doing the right
thing, in terms of prosecutions or clarifying the law.
Nevertheless we do have to be aware that a lot of
these sites do not provide suitable identification as to
who owns them, and again ATVOD is suggesting that
we clamp down on those sites by denying them their
financial support. That is something we need to
continue to work closely with ATVOD on, they do
have a serious point. We are also in UKCCIS—the
United Kingdom Council for Child Internet Safety—
looking at robust age verification measures, technical
measures, whether it is the unique pupil identifier that
is used in schools to enable children to get access to
the web, or the digital wallet that I think is a line
pursued in Demark to ensure that you can identify the
age of someone by effectively giving them a digital
wallet to use on the internet. I also think, and ATVOD
say it in their evidence submitted to you, that there is
a role for the European Union—sorry to keep coming
back to Europe—of working across all these
territories, because again one of the issues here is
what is acceptable in this country or not acceptable in
this country, in terms of culture, if you like, is
acceptable in other countries across the EU. It is
something we need to continue to look at and I think
it is an important issue.
Chair: Thank you. I think we have exhausted the
questions, thank you very much.
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 65
Written evidence
Written evidence submitted by the Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety
Thank you
—
—
—
for giving us the opportunity to submit evidence to your Committee’s enquiry into:
How best to protect minors from accessing adult content.
Filtering out.....images of child abuse.....
Preventing abusive or threatening comments on social media.
Our fuller views are set out in the following pages and summarised as follows:
1. Protecting children from accessing adult content on the internet can be done most effectively through
educating and empowering children to look after themselves though with very young children there are obvious
limits. Filtering programmes have an important supplemental role to play in supporting good practice.
2. Every internet enabled device or internet based service sold or supplied into the consumer market and
likely to be owned or used by children and young people should, by default, come with protective software
preinstalled and operational.
3. Law enforcement should step up its efforts to enforce the decision in R v Perrin.
4. Nominet should make compliance with R v Perrin a condition of registration. UK-based web hosting
companies should be required to ensure pornography sites serving the UK have age verification.
5. CHIS supports ATVOD’s call for banks and credit card companies to refuse to process payments to sites
that do not comply with R v Perrin.
6. The BBFC should establish transparent industry standards in relation to blocking online adult content.
7. The scale on which child abuse images are now circulating on the internet, and the number of people
involved in downloading or exchanging them, have outstripped the capacity of law enforcement to deal with
them adequately. It is vitally important that the internet industry is enlisted to help find new or better technical
solutions to combat the problem.
8. There needs to be a specific push on eliminating or reducing the number of child abuse images circulating
on Peer2Peer networks and we need to invest more in victim identification work.
9. Social media sites where significant numbers of children and young people congregate should be expected
to employ an appropriate number of human moderators and to deploy sophisticated software which can help
moderators spot and stop bullying and grooming.
10. There is a strong case for an major enquiry into the use of anonymity or unverified identities in social
media where children and young people are major users.
How Best to Protect Minors from Accessing Adult Content
1. With the spread of WiFi and laptops, tablets or other mobile devices which are internet enabled it is
wholly unrealistic to expect parents, teachers and carers to be able to supervise everything their children do
when they go online.
2. Protecting children from accessing adult content on the internet can be done most effectively through
educating and empowering children to look after themselves although with very young children there are
obvious limitations to this approach. Filtering and blocking programmes can play an important supplemental
role underpinning parental guidance and good practice. Such software may be especially useful supporting
younger or particular groups of vulnerable children.
3. Every internet enabled device or internet based service sold or supplied into the consumer market and
likely to be owned or used by children or young people should, by default, come with filtering and blocking
software preinstalled and operational to provide protection against exposure to adult content. An age-verified
adult ought to be able to modify the preinstalled protective programmes’ settings or abandon them altogether.
4. Filtering and blocking software is still far from perfect but it continues to improve. However, any and all
technically-based safety measures should only ever be seen as an adjunct to and not as a replacement for
educational and awareness initiatives. Parents and children need to understand the nature of potential online
hazards and appreciate both what safety software can do and what its limitations are.
5. The decision in the case of R v Perrin is honoured more in the breach than in the observance although it
is recognised that most if not all of the offending web sites are owned by publishers based overseas.
6. The police should be more vigorous in applying R v Perrin, perhaps seeking to extradite overseas web
site owners who make no attempt to shield minors from adult content.
7. Nominet should make compliance with R v Perrin a condition of operating a .uk domain name eg if a
site is to publish pornography the operator must give a binding undertaking to put an effective age verification
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process in place before the site goes live or within a reasonable timeframe. It should be noted that the UK’s
online gambling industry has used age verification with great success.
8. UK-based web hosting companies should ensure publishers making pornography available within the UK
have an effective age verification process in place.
9. CHIS supports ATVOD’s proposal for banks and credit card companies to refuse to process payments to
any pornography sites that do not have an effective age verification process in place.
10. CHIS congratulates the UK’s mobile phone networks for sustaining their policy of, by default, putting
adult content behind a bar which can only be lifted by the user completing an age verification process. CHIS
welcomes the recent engagement of the BBFC to oversee the administration of this scheme including setting
standards governing which content should go behind the adult bar.
11. CHIS also commends the UK’s largest WiFi companies for deciding that, when they are asked to provide
WiFi access in a public space where children and young people will normally be present, by default they will
put pornographic content behind an (immovable) adult bar. Several of the WiFi companies have already
implemented this decision. CHIS calls on the remainder to make a statement making clear when they will have
done the same. Smaller WiFi suppliers should follow a similar path within a reasonable timeframe.
12. The BBFC should be encouraged to develop a kitemark scheme and associated standards in respect of
public WiFi and WiFi providers ought to adopt and advertise their compliance with it.
13. A child should not be prevented from accessing certain types of adult content while they are using their
mobile phone company’s network only to find they are able to access identical material via the same device
simply by switching to WiFi. There needs to be a high degree of consistency as between the standards set by
mobile operators and those being applied by WiFi providers. The BBFC would be well placed to help establish
such consistency and also ensure transparency in relation to the content standards and processes being used.
14. CHIS welcomes the announcement by the UK’s major ISPs of their intention to upgrade the level of
protection against adult content offered to new customers and their support for the “one click” approach. The
ISPs have pledged to have their new offerings in place by the end of 2013. Existing customers will be put in
an equivalent position by the end of 2014.
15. Since none of the ISPs have yet disclosed what their final offerings will be CHIS does not propose to
comment further at this stage other than to say CHIS believes ISPs should, as closely as possible, implement
a system similar to that which exists on the mobile networks.
16. The logic of this approach points towards the need for individual accounts for each household member.
By default adult content would therefore be inaccessible to the whole household and remain inaccessible unless
and until a responsible adult has authorised a change, account by account. The worry otherwise is that in
households with people of widely differing ages it will prove unworkable for everyone’s internet access to be
configured to be suitable only for a child. There are routers on the market which have been built precisely to
allow for this type of arrangement. Alternatively it could be achieved on the network.
17. The BBFC once more could play a useful role in helping ISPs roll out a solution while providing
consistency with other platforms and transparency as to the processes.
18. In relation to adult content not directly accessed from the internet but obtained in other ways eg via
Bluetooth, USB sticks, memory card exchanges, emails, disc swaps or downloads CHIS looks to the wider
deployment of technical tools to deter or deflect such activities and thereby help protect minors from age
inappropriate content.
Filtering out.....Images of Child Abuse.....
19. The UK has done extremely well in more or less eliminating the hosting of child abuse images on UKbased web servers. The deployment of the IWF’s url blocking list has also been important in limiting web
access to that kind of material. Images found in Newsgroups are swiftly dealt with. However, whilst it is
important to retain a strong focus on the web and Newsgroups, technology has moved on and we are now a
long way from coping with more modern manifestations of the problem.
20. In 2012 the NSPCC issued FOI requests to every local police force in England and Wales asking them
to state how many child abuse images they had seized in arrests made in the two years ending April, 2012.
Within the NSPCC’s timeframe only five forces replied but it emerged that between them they had seized over
26 million. On one calculation that would imply that over 300 million illegal images may have been seized by
all forces over the same period. Numbers like these are unprecedented and while numbers do not by any means
tell the full story, they most certainly tell a story.
21. On ITN News on 28th May, 2013, Peter Davies, the Head of CEOP, acknowledged that the UK police
had identified between 50,000 and 60,000 individuals who appeared to have been exchanging or downloading
child abuse images, principally over Peer2Peer networks. Davies said the police do not have the capacity to
arrest all of these people although he said “I wish we could”.
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22. In no year since records began, including at the height of Operation Ore, has UK policing arrested more
than 2,500 individuals for child abuse image related offences. Thus, even if there were no new offences from
now on, and assuming the maximum rate of arrests was sustained year on year, conservatively the last person
off the current list would not be picked up before 2032. This has worrying implications both for the abused
children depicted in the images and children who may yet become victims of individuals whom the police
have identified as being engaged in downloading.
23. The technology has outstripped the current capacity of UK law enforcement to cope with the volumes
of images in circulation and with the numbers of offenders involved in downloading or distributing them. Most
police forces around the world are in the same position.
24. However, even if the UK was living through times of super abundance, as opposed to times of austerity,
it is hard to imagine how we would ever be able to manage criminal behaviour on the sort of scale indicated.
Society therefore has a stark choice. Either we settle back and accept that substantial numbers of people living
among us are routinely accessing child abuse images, that it has become, so to speak, part of the background
music of 21st Century Britain, or we look for new and better ways to enlist the internet industry’s support in
finding technical measures to address the problem. CHIS does not think anyone in a position of responsibility
is ready to go with the first option. We strongly favour the second.
25. There is no single measure which will get rid of child abuse images from the internet. A range of tactics
are needed. CHIS puts forward the following for consideration:
(a) Greater use of splash pages and warning messages to deter a certain class of person with a low
level, opportunist or early interest in child abuse images.
(b) Greater use of algorithms to prevent search engines being used to locate child abuse material
or locate information helpful to paedophiles.
(c) Greater use of tools capable of comparing hashes of known illegal images with images in
remote storage locations and, wherever possible, in transit.
(d) The development of botnets or other crawler technologies capable of locating images or sites
of possible interest which have not yet been reported.
(e) Establish a national initiative to give a specific focus to eliminating or at any rate hugely
reducing the volume of images being exchanged over Peer2Peer networks and increasing the
numbers of individuals arrested for this type of activity.
(f) British companies should strengthen their engagement with measures designed to address the
traffic in child abuse images eg by stepping up the work they do with their employees.
(g) Ask British policing to strengthen its engagement with victim identification work and
investigate if there is a case for helping to establish a strong internationally based victim
identification resource.
h. Ask British policing to construct a national database of images which will be used by all UK
forces and will also integrate into Interpol’s international initiative.
(i) Mount a campaign to heighten awareness of the harms associated with this type of offending
and inform people how to report online child abuse images.
(j) Broaden participation in the UK-US Taskforce announced by the Prime Minister on 22nd July.
Preventing Abusive or Threatening Comments on Social Media
26. Clearly this is an area where educating people about the importance of behaving in a civilized and
responsible way when using social media, and explaining the potential consequences of not doing so, will have
an important part to play in combatting some of the worst excesses which have attracted the media’s attention
in the recent past.
27. Peer-based support networks which develop a sense of social solidarity among the users of social media,
which encourage people to intervene to support someone being bullied or victimized and to bring an end to
another person’s bad behaviour are the sorts of initiatives which all social media sites should support.
28. However, unless social media services decide to pre-moderate every post, be it of images or text, it is
difficult to imagine how they could ever “prevent” abusive or threatening comments being made.
29. Many online companies, including some small or niche social media sites, do pre-moderate everything
or almost everything that goes up. They do so for a range of reasons at least one of which is a concern for
their own reputation but also they are keen to minimise any potential legal liability for libel. In some instances
a concern to protect younger users from possibly harmful self-disclosures has been a motivation for using premoderation. There may be some situations where pre-moderation is essential eg on services specifically directed
at young or vulnerable children.
30. That said, the scale on which sites like Twitter and Facebook operate probably renders pre-moderation
impracticable even if it was thought desirable. However, it is a myth to assume that all pre-moderation systems
inevitably slow down chat or interactive environments to a point where it is impossible to maintain a sense of
real time or swift action.
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31. Nonetheless technological solutions are available which can analyse text streams and help identify “hot
spots” connected with bullying or other types of abusive behaviour including grooming, some of which may
lead on to the creation of child abuse images or sexual assaults of a different kind. The software ought to flag
up potential problem areas to human moderators who should be working 24/7 and employed in sufficient
numbers to be able to intervene rapidly if necessary. Measures of this type should be in place from the start of
a site’s operations. Companies should not wait for a tragedy before doing the right thing. Someone in the
company should sign off confirming that full consideration has been given to all child safety aspects before
any new online product or service is launched, especially on to the so-called “free” internet where it is known
children and young people will have ready access.
32. There seems little doubt that the ability to hide behind an apparent cloak of anonymity, in particular the
ability to manufacture an entirely bogus or opaque online identity which is then used on social media sites,
lies at the root of much of the problem, even on sites which ostensibly specify a “real names” policy.
33. In principle CHIS has no problem with individuals signing in as “Donald Duck III” or “Diana Dors”.
There may be many situations where not using your real name will be positively helpful or beneficial. What
matters is traceability. In an environment where everyone’s real world identify had been robustly verified the
log in they used would be less important but one would expect people’s behaviour to improve because they
would know that if they crossed particular lines police or the civil courts would be able to identify and locate
them extremely quickly if required.
34. CHIS accepts that the implications of the view expressed here are major and radical. For that reason
CHIS would like separate and specific detailed consideration to be given to the issue of online anonymity,
perhaps focusing specifically on social media sites which are known to be particularly popular with children
and young people.
35. CHIS has no desire to make it harder for whistleblowers to continue to perform an important public
service. Nor does CHIS wish to require political dissidents or persons dealing with sensitive issues to disclose
their true identities before they can log on to any online service.
36. However, equally, CHIS finds it difficult to accept this is a zero sum game where advances in online
child protection are forever seen as being made at the price of imperilling political dissent, whistleblowing or
the position of others with a genuine need for anonymity.
37. The internet is now many different things to many different people. Perhaps it is simply expecting too
much for all of it to be governed by a single perspective, a single set of principles or priorities. In other words
not all social media sites or online services need to be governed by the same rules. Perhaps those that are used
by large numbers of children and young people could reasonably be expected to conform to different standards.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by the NSPCC
Introduction and Summary
1. The NSPCC applauds the Culture, Media and Sport (CMS) Select Committee for launching an inquiry
into Online Safety and we welcome the opportunity to respond. The NSPCC recognises the internet has brought
considerable benefits to society. However, alongside these benefits, the popular use of the internet has brought
unique challenges to young people and can present some significant risks to the safety of children.
2. In 2011–12 ChildLine dealt with 3,745 counselling sessions where the young person mentioned either a
mobile phone or internet issue.1 We also know from the ChildLine messaging board that negative experiences
online can have a harmful impact on young people, from affecting a child’s school work to self-harm. In some
of the most extreme cases, cyber-bullying in particular has resulted in young people taking their own lives.
3. Additional to these challenges, the internet has provided some adults with a new vehicle for sexually
abusing children and young people—most notably, the use of some social media sites and platforms as a tool
for sexual grooming and the extremely worrying proliferation of child abuse images.
4. The NSPCC believes children have a right to an abuse free experience online and that Government,
industry, the voluntary sector and the public all have a role to play in achieving this aim. As such, this
submission responds to the three topics set out by the CMS Select Committee with a focus on how the internet
is used by and could be made safer for children and young people. Most notably, this document includes
recommendations for:
Age-Inappropriate Material:
— All Internet Service Providers to create simple ways for all internet customers to regularly make
clear and meaningful choices around content controls for internet-enabled devices in the home,
and for the effectiveness of these filters to be evaluated frequently.
1
ChildLine “online issues” statistic 2011/12
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—
Digital judgement and e-safety to be a component of sex and relationship education that is a
compulsory part of the national curriculum.
Child abuse images:
— Industry to act swiftly to find and put into implementation a technological solution to block
more searches for child abuse images.
— Greater police prioritisation and resources to bring offenders to justice.
— International collaboration in combatting the making, viewing and sharing of abhorrent child
abuse images across the internet.
Harmful contact online:
— A dual response from the education system and the internet industry to prevent and respond to
harmful online behaviour like cyber bulling and online sexual grooming.
Topic One: How to Best Protect Minors From Accessing Adult Content
5. The NSPCC would like to encourage the CMS Committee to consider how best to ensure children and
young people are accessing content that is appropriate for their developmental age rather than simply looking
at this challenge as a binary under 18/over 18 problem.
6. For instance, research the NSPCC is about to launch shows that while many of the biggest social
networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, require users to be over the age of 13 to have a
profile, large numbers of children under the age of 13 are active users of these sites and, therefore, potentially
exposed to content that is not appropriate for their developmental age.
What we know from ChildLine
7. During 2011–12, there were 641 counselling sessions where the young person specifically mentioned
being exposed to sexually indecent images.2 While these incidents will not exclusively relate to online
content, a large proportion of this sexually explicit material will have been accessed through internet enabled
devices. Young people often told ChildLine that they felt guilty and disgusted about what they had seen and
were extremely worried about getting into trouble for accessing these sites. ChildLine has also seen a growing
trend of young people talking about being addicted to online pornography.
Filters and parental controls
8. In June 2011 the government published the Bailey Review of the Commercialisation and Sexualisation of
Childhood. This Review recommended that it should be made easier for parents to block adult and agerestricted material from the internet. In response, the UK’s four biggest internet service providers (ISPs)
announced a new voluntary code of practice and the adoption of “active choice” systems for new customers
which was rolled out in October 2012. The NSPCC was broadly supportive of this initiative, but at the same
time felt that this progress did not represent a panacea, especially as the companies’ existing customers would
not be encouraged to make a choice about filters and parental controls.
9. Following an independent Parliamentary inquiry into “Online Child Protection” led by Claire Perry MP
and a Government consultation on parental controls, both in 2012, most recently the Prime Minister came to
the NSPCC main London office to announce a package of measures to make the internet safer for children and
young people. One key call of the Prime Minister’s speech was for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to ensure
that not only new but also existing customers are asked to make a choice about applying content filters, with
the “filters on” button pre-checked (“active choice plus”) by the end of 2014. The NSPCC welcomes this
proposal and that a clear deadline for delivery has been set.
10. The ISPs are expected to report back to the Government at the end of October on progress towards this
goal. The NSPCC considers it is important that the major service providers are developing uncomplicated and
meaningful mechanisms for ensuring customers are making active and informed choices about the filters they
apply in their homes. We are, however, keen to see that after the initial decision is made by the customer about
the filter package they want in place, the ISPs will ask them to reconsider their choices on a regular basis and
that the effectiveness of the filters is evaluated frequently. We believe this would help to ensure the filters
remain relevant for children’s digital needs and habits over a sustained period of time. We also want to see a
commitment from the smaller ISPs to implementation of similar processes to ensure their customers have
access to the same level of meaningful choice
Education
11. We believe building children’s e-literacy and digital judgement is essential for helping children and
young people to understand the challenges they may face when accessing content that is inappropriate for their
developmental age and encourage them to make an active choice about avoiding material that might upset
2
Ibid
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them. The responsibility for this falls on both parents and the schools. However, the NSPCC understands that
not all parents, carers and teachers feel equipped to deliver these messages. As such, we believe there is a role
for Government to encourage the delivery of this education by:
— Making e-safety an aspect of sex and relationship education which should be a compulsory part
of the national curriculum. Teachers should be given suitable training and teaching aids to
deliver these lessons.
— Supporting the launch of a national awareness raising campaign aimed at parents to help them
understand the risks the internet poses in relation to their children accessing material online
that is inappropriate for their developmental age, and to direct them to information to support
them to have conversations with their children about this content.
12. We are disappointed that the Government does not plan to update the sex and relationship guidance for
schools, which remains unchanged since 2001. We support the Daily Telegraph campaign asking Government
to reconsider this position.
Topic Two: Filtering out Extremist Material, Including Images of Child Abuse and Material
Intended to Promote Terrorism or Other Acts of Violence
13. The NSPCC would like to challenge the CMS Committee’s use of the word “filtering” in the context of
tackling the making, sharing and viewing of child abuse images online. Filters are tools which should be
applied to manage access to content which is legal but possibly not appropriate for younger audiences, not as
mechanisms for hiding content which is wholly illegal and should not exist on the internet. Instead we believe
the Committee should be talking about “combatting” and “eradicating” child abuse images from the internet
as there should be no place on the web for this abhorrent material.
An overview of child abuse images and prevalence
14. Child abuse images are a visual record of the sexual abuse of a child. They can include pseudophotographs, animations, drawings, tracings, videos and films which are being streamed live. In the UK images
are graded on a 1–5 scale. Level 5 images involve sadism or bestiality, Level 4 will portray a child engaged
in penetrative sexual activity and so on to Level 1, where the images will depict erotic posing with no visible
sexual activity. Please note that the sentencing council is currently reconsidering the definition of level 3.
15. The number of separate child abuse images in circulation is unknown. In 2010, an NSPCC Freedom of
Information request revealed that nearly 26 million child sexual abuse images had been confiscated in the
preceding two years from just five of the 43 police forces in England and Wales which were able to check
their records. Most forces said it would take too long to interrogate files to see how many pictures of children
being sexually abused they had accumulated during investigations. However, estimates of the number of online
child abuse images confiscated by police in England and Wales each year in the UK range from 100–360
million.3
16. In the past producers of child abuse images were limited in the extent to which they could obtain and
disseminate images. However, advances in technology, including the popularisation of the internet has made
child abuse images available to a far greater number of people than ever before. Now, once an image has been
uploaded to the internet it may be replicated and downloaded an unlimited number of times. The knowledge
that images of abuse cannot ever be fully deleted has a profound effect on the victims involved and this may
follow them into their adult lives. Victims may also become aware that the material involved can be used to
groom and to abuse other children. Perpetrators of sexual abuse have also been known to use sex abuse images
as part of the grooming process, in order to desensitise children and young people to the idea of sexual contact.
A proactive response to the challenge
17. The NSPCC was pleased when, in June 2013, it was announced that for the first time the Internet Watch
Foundation (IWF) will be working with Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) to proactively
seek and block online child sexual abuse images. We hope this will help to significantly reduce the number of
images available on the web. The commitment shown by the UK’s leading internet providers, who donated to
the project £1 million of extra funding and a signed a “zero tolerance” pledge to help tackle the creation and
distribution of child sexual abuse images, was also welcome.
18. While we are pleased that more resource and capacity is being dedicated to the search and take down of
child abuse images, the NSPCC does have concerns that there is currently insufficient police resourcing to
proactively identify, arrest and seek prosecution of people who are making, sharing and viewing child abuse
images. We believe, however, that there is a unique opportunity with the launch of the National Crime Agency
(NCA), within which CEOP will now sit, for the tackling of child abuse images to become a key UK
policing priority
19. The NSPCC understands Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) intends to conduct a
programme of Child Abuse related inspections in 2013–14, the first of which will focus on the police service’s
3
NSPCC, https://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/research/questions/people_convicted_of_child_abuse_images_2010_wda83579.html
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response to child sexual exploitation facilitated or caused by use of the internet. We hope that the inspection
will address the capacity of forces to investigate crimes relating to child abuse images. More specifically, it is
vital that the NCA and local forces have both the necessary expertise and sufficient resources to find and bring
to justice people who make, share or view child abuse images.
Deterring potential perpetrators
20. The NSPCC is pleased that the major search engines are implementing “splash pages” warning internet
users of the crime they are trying to commit and its implications when they try to view a page already know
to the IWF to contain illegal or indecent images. We are also pleased to understand that there is commitment
from some part of the “search industry” to also developing advice pages offering people clear routes to
legitimate sites on the web when terms are used that could be interpreted as a potential searches for images of
child abuse.
21. The Prime Minister’s online safety speech in July also included a challenge to search companies to take
one further step and deliver “no returns” in certain instances were searchers are unequivocally looking for child
abuses images. The NSPCC fully supports the Prime Minister’s call to action and wants search companies to
pledge to deliver swiftly meaningful and effective technological solutions to this challenge at the Autumn
summit on online safety the Government has committed to host. We also call on the search companies and
Government to agree together a robust monitoring process to scrutinise the efficacy of the solution and an
approach to tracking and making public progress achieved through these technical solutions.
22. In addition, we welcome the resource the Government has committed to creating a new National Database
of Child Abuse Images to work as a central repository for online child abuse images that have been identified
and confiscated. We are keen that the Government now sets out a clear timeline for delivery of the database
and make public more information about how it will be used in the fight against child abuse images.
23. Lastly, we ask the Government to explore the potential of creating a public awareness campaign aimed
at people who might consider making, viewing or sharing child abuse images informing them on the possible
consequences of their actions and directing them to support services, like Stop It Now!
The international dimension
24. The UK Government has shown leadership in the battle against child abuse images. However, the
NSPCC, like others, regards the issue to be a global problem. We believe to make significant inroads to tackling
the dissemination of child abuse images online, greater international cooperation and activity is required with
more countries buying-in to the need for effective search and take down mechanisms. We are pleased that a
UK/US taskforce has been established to look at the international dimensions of this challenge and we urge
the taskforce to look into the feasibility of:
— The new UK National Database of Child Abuse Images playing a role as part of a bigger global
network of image databases and from this network a global process for proactively searching
for, reporting and removing child abuse images being established
— Greater prioritisation of technological solutions to disrupt peer-to-peer networks and sharing
across the darknet
— Relevant internet companies agreeing to an accord of information sharing in the name of
disseminating best practice in the field of search and take down technology
Topic three: Preventing Abusive or Threatening Comments on Social Media
25. As well as issues around the content that is available on the internet, either inappropriate or illegal, a
significant challenge young people face is learning how to behave in a responsible and socially acceptable way
while online and knowing how to respond to unwanted contact or engagement via the internet.
26. The main issues about which young people talked to ChildLine counsellors when discussing online
safety were cyber-bullying, online sexual abuse, sexting and social networking issues. The NSPCC has found
that almost a quarter (23%) of 11 and 12 year olds who have a profile on a social networking site say that they
have been upset by something on it over the last year. We respond to this section of the inquiry by focusing
on two distinct aspects of abusive and threatening behaviour on social media that affects children and young
people: a) peer to peer cyber bullying and b) online sexual grooming. We then explore the policy solutions
that could be used to tackle both online dangers.
Cyber bullying—the extent and impact
27. The ChildLine website describes online bullying to young people as: “when a person or a group of
people uses the internet, mobile phones, online games or any other kind of digital technology to threaten, tease,
upset or humiliate someone else…” The perpetrator can be known to the victim or they can make themselves
anonymous by setting up fake accounts or by using public computers so that their own personal IP address
can’t be traced.
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28. It can happen at all times of the day and inside the young person’s home or somewhere they may have
previously felt safe. As a result the young person may feel trapped and that they are unable to escape.
Traditionally guidance given to young people on how to handle bullying would be “to walk away”; however
this advice has now become redundant. In a world dominated with technology a young person is no longer
able to walk away from the situation.4
29. In 2012–13 Childline saw an 87% increase in counselling session about online bullying. We’ve also seen
from the ChildLine messaging board just how significant an impact this experience can have on young people.
“she gets all her friends against me…every time I look at my messages it’s something about
the way I look or my personality- swearing at me and telling me to kill myself. I’m tempted to
commit suicide”. ChildLine message board user
“The lad who bullies me has made a new Facebook account and was spreading rumours about
me which everyone believes. Everyone began writing status’s about me/calling me ‘twisted’
‘sick in the head’ ‘waste of space’. I was even told to kill myself…I’m scared to go to school
tomorrow. I’ve been crying all weekend…I don’t know what to do”. ChildLine message board
user
Online grooming—the extent and impact
30. Grooming can be defined as actions that deliberately establish an emotional connection and trust with a
child or young person, with the aim of engaging them in sexual behaviour or exploitation.5 Online grooming
is exactly the same, but done through the internet, and using technology such as smart phones, laptops, tablets
and computer game consoles. The exact numbers of children who are subjected to online grooming is unknown.
However, we do know that in 2011–12 The NSPCC’s ChildLine service had 413 contacts from children where
the primary concern was grooming. Sixty% of these specifically mentioned online grooming.6
31. Many young people will not disclose the offences against them online because they feel shame and guilt
about the way they have been made to feel, and mistakenly, that they are somehow responsible for their own
abuse, for example when they have posted explicit images or had conversations online that can never be
erased.7 While other victims deny the abuse happened or are unaware that they were being abused, thinking
that they were chatting or meeting up with their “boyfriend”.
A solution—education
32. As mentioned above, online bullying and online sexual exploitation are very distinct and separate
challenges. However, education has a role to play in helping to prevent both problems.
33. In the case of online grooming children and young people need to be taught about how to be resilient—
keeping personal information safe, blocking unwanted sexual approaches, talking to a trusted adult about
contact they have received online that they are uncomfortable with. While with online bullying, children need
to understand more about pro-social and respectful behaviour both in their face-to-face contact with their peers,
but also in their virtual interactions.
34. Re-emphasising what we called for previously in this submission, the NSPCC wants to see sex and
relationship education being taught as a compulsory part of the national curriculum and for online safety
featuring the components listed above to be included as a key part of these lessons.
A solution—monitoring and reporting
35. The NSPCC also believes social networking sites and others who provide online services and products
to children have a corporate social responsibility/duty of care for protecting children and young people from
harmful contact with both peers and adult sexual predators. More specifically we would like to see:
4
5
6
7
—
Providers should ensure that there are a range of options for how site users report illegal,
offensive or abusive content, and these are easy to find and use
—
Social networking sites in the UK to provide a simple route for younger users to seek support
and help via ChildLine.
—
Default privacy settings should be set to the highest levels possible and any avenues for
anonymous contact set to “off” for children under 18.
Digizen (2013) “Understanding Cyberbullying”, available from:
http://www.digizen.org/resources/cyberbullying/understanding/how-is.aspx [Accessed on 27 August 2013]
Turnbull, M (2012). Caught in a Trap: Impact of Grooming in 2012. London: ChildLine
Ibid
Palmer, von Weller and Loof. (2010) The impact of internet abuse on children and how best to intervene; The Link—The
Official Newsletter of the International Society for the Prevention of Child Abuse in Neglect (ISPCAN) Colorado USA
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—
Adequate use of human moderators on social networking sites so that appropriate and timely
action can be taken in response to a) breaches in the sites’ codes of conduct b) abusive or
threatening behaviour c) potential illegal activity.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by BeatBullying
1. Introduction to BeatBullying
1.1 BeatBullying is the UK’s leading bullying prevention charity, creating a world where bullying, violence
and harassment are unacceptable. BeatBullying empowers people to understand, recognise, and say no to
bullying and cyberbullying, violence and harassment, by giving them the tools to transform their lives and the
lives of their peers.
1.2 As an organisation with children’s and young people’s safety (both online and offline) at its heart,
BeatBullying’s online programmes have embedded user protection mechanisms at several levels from the
beginning. Users have access to all the functions of a social networking site—email-style private messaging,
instant messaging chat in real time, a customisable profile page, the chance to upload content including blogs,
and a chatroom—but with the safety and wellbeing of its users built in as a core priority across every aspect.
The BeatBullying site is fully moderated for language and content both by software and by human moderators;
all content is checked and approved before being uploaded; the site has clearly stated rules for safety and
behaviour which users are expected to follow, with a system of sanctions for breaking them; staff and
moderators can eject, ban and block any user whose behaviour is unacceptable; there are extensive reporting
systems in place both for users to report issues such as bullying by others on the site and for staff to share
information, including the reporting of users who appear to be adults. BeatBullying.org is the only e-mentoring
and social networking site to be endorsed by CEOP. We strongly believe that our approach to online safety
must be adopted by all internet providers if children and young people are to be safe online.
2 Summary
2.1 BeatBullying’s online programmes all utilize a combination of approaches to keeping children and young
people safe online, of which the technical safeguards outlined above are a fundamental part. However, these
cannot be considered in isolation from the other aspects of our work—education, support, attitude and
behaviour change, and empowerment—which are just as fundamental.
2.2 BeatBullying is completely in agreement with the principle of preselecting to block genuinely harmful
content such as pornography but could not endorse any system that might deny access to legitimate information,
advice and support around sensitive issues due to over-zealous and inadequately nuanced filtering.
2.3 The most useful “parental control” is parental responsibility and, inseparable from this, the commitment
to developing their children’s own sense of responsibility as they grow up.
2.4 Blocks and filters can only block and filter; they cannot educate children about how to deal with the
kind of content and behaviour they might encounter online, how to manage their own behaviour responsibly
or why certain material is harmful.
2.5 Everyone involved with children’s and young people’s use of the internet—parents, schools, service
providers, organisations and children themselves—has a shared responsibility for online safety. That is why in
April 2013 BeatBullying launched a campaign for better anti-bullying protections called Ayden’s Law.8 The
campaign calls for a national strategy to tackle cyberbullying and would set out how the voluntary and
community sector, parents and schools would be equipped to (a) protect the children in their care from harm
online and (b) educate and equip children about internet safety and responsible digital citizenship so that they
understand the issues for themselves.
2.6 Any approach to online safety must ultimately be about shaping attitudes and changing behaviors as
much as it is about teaching techniques for staying safe or for anything else.
3 How Best to Protect Minors from Accessing Adult Content
3.1Findings from our recent survey of children and parents9 show that the majority of parents and children
(78% and 48%) agree that parents should mainly be responsible for controlling what children access online
with two thirds (66%) of parents feeling confident enough to advise their children where to go online.
3.2 Whilst we understand that parents have a responsibility to protect minors from accessing adult content
online, we would argue that parental controls are only part of the wider issue of responsibility. The most useful
“parental control” is parental responsibility and, inseparable from this, the commitment to developing their
children’s own sense of responsibility as they grow up. It is imperative that children and young people are
8
9
Launched May 2013 with The Sun Newspaper following the tragic death of Ayden Olsen Aged 14
The Online Behavioural Habits of Young People Today, which questioned a 1000 8–16-year-olds and 1500 parents
from Parentdish and BeatBullying, July 2013
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encouraged to take appropriate responsibility for themselves and their own behaviour increasingly, so as they
grow up but beginning in small ways at an early age. In this way, while parents and other adults will still be
highly involved, children can be supported to grow up with the idea of responsibility as something integral to,
rather than entirely outside of, themselves. Our peer mentoring system works on the premise that children and
young people can and do rise to the challenge of appropriate responsibility, properly supported at every stage
by older peers and trained adults. Of course online safety cannot be the responsibility of children in isolation,
but neither can it be the responsibility of parents alone.
3.4 Over half (57%) of the 11—18 year old respondents surveyed in 201210 told us their parents talk to
them about online safety and what they should or should not look at on the internet as a way to keep them
safe online. As the largest category of response this indicates that among our respondents a majority of parents
are actively engaged in their children’s use of online technology. Over a quarter (27%) say that their parents
do not use any methods (technological or otherwise) of keeping them safe online and a fifth (20%) say that
they use technological filters. Almost the same proportion (17%) report that their parents encourage them to
use websites about internet safety, and 12% say that their parents sit with them while they are online and watch
what they do. Further written responses included “offering non-intrusive advice” and “trust”, which illustrate
an aspect of the online safety debate which is often overlooked: the relationship between parent and child and
its bearing on the development of trustworthiness. This reinforces the argument for increased education for
children/young people and parents, ideally helping them to develop a continued dialogue about the use of
the internet.
3.6 Under 18 is a broad category; while we agree that there is some material that no-one under this age
should be able to access, there are also many grey areas: some things that would be completely off-limits to a
primary-school child might be fine for a 14 year-old. Just as in the offline world, older teenagers are expected
to have much more independence than young children; what would be appropriate for a seven year-old and for
a 17 year-old to view or engage with online are going to be very different. CHIS (Children’s Charities Coalition
on Internet Safety) suggests the possibility of allowing different user accounts to be set up for users of different
ages in a single household, via routers that are built for this specific purpose; BeatBullying supports this, with
the caveat that age verification systems need to be more advanced in order to ensure that it works as it should.
4 Filtering out extremist material, including images of child abuse and material intended to promote
terrorism or other acts of violence
4.1 Leading on from parental responsibility, it is important to recognise that the technical safety features of
these sites are integral to the sites themselves. It does not matter where a user accesses them from, on what
device, or through which network, the safety features remain consistent.
4.2 BeatBullying is completely in agreement with the principle of blocking genuinely harmful content such
as pornography but could not endorse any system that might deny access to legitimate information, advice and
support around sensitive issues due to over-zealous and inadequately nuanced filtering. It would be valuable if
categories subject to filtering were broken down into more meaningful neutral, positive and negative subgroups, such as: “Eating disorders—general information” (neutral), “Eating disorders—advice and support for
prevention or recovery, such as the charity Beat” (positive) versus “Eating disorders—pro-anorexia (negative)”
and parents could make a separate decision in each of these distinct categories.
4.3 BeatBullying is in favour of the Government’s “pre-select to on” approach to filtering. This option has
the virtue of simplicity for parents, setting up blocks as the default and requiring a conscious and deliberate
opt-in for certain content. However, as explained above, we would welcome more detailed scrutiny of what is
or is not acceptable: categories such as “violence” or “anorexia/bulimia” in themselves tell us nothing.
4.4 Implicit in having certain things ready-blocked is a “social norm” of what is and is not acceptable. The
assumption inherent in pre-blocked content is that parents will not want their children to access pornography
etc., and the idea is that this acts as a prompt to conform to this expectation. While we believe that the majority
of parents are responsible, there is a minority who might lack either the capacity or the will to make informed
decisions in this area. That is why we take the view that having automatic blocks on some content, which can
be removed by adults if they choose, would be the best option to ensure a balance between guidance and
freedom, thereby protecting children more effectively.
4.5 It is important that in a time where technology has outstripped the capacity of law enforcement, filtering
and blocking is not just at the feet of parents; it is imperative that search engines and ISP’s actively challenge
themselves to work towards an advancing solution to an on-going problem. In July this year the Prime Minister
threatened legislation if internet providers failed to commit to a blacklist of CEOP search engine terms which
we support and hope that progress is swift.
4.6 Since 2008 the UK Council for Child Internet Safety has tried but failed to introduce meaningful selfregulation. BeatBullying would therefore introduce regulations on internet safety that would:
— Ensure clearer and simpler mechanisms for children to report cyberbullying or abuse.
— Agree protocols in response to reports of cyberbullying or abuse. This includes initial response
times and timescales on the removal of harmful content.
10
Parental Internet Controls Survey: Children and Young People’s (2012)
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—
—
—
Ensure robust moderation of user generated content.
Request prominent signposting to sources of expertise, advice, support and help.
Require independent monitoring of a code of practice for industry, with results promoted to
parents and children.
5. Preventing Abusive or Threatening Comments on Social Media
5.1 Our latest survey11 of children and parents found:
— One in five 12–16 year-olds have interacted with strangers online.
— More than a third of 12–16 year-olds go online most often in their own bedroom.
— One in five 12–16 year-olds think being bullied online is part of life.
— More than a quarter of 12–16 year-olds admitted to witnessing bullying online, but only half
did something about it.
— The primary reasons young people gave for not doing anything about the online bullying was
being worried about being bullied themselves or not knowing who to speak to about it.
— Almost a quarter (23%) of 12–16 year-olds spend more than five hours a day online during
school holidays. More than double the number during term time (10%).
— The majority (80%) of 12–16 year-olds said they feel safe online, compared to only 60% of the
younger age group (8–11 year-olds). But worryingly, one in five (22%) of 12–16 year-olds said
they think being bullied online is part of life.
— For those 12–16 year-olds who did do something about the cyber bullying, most went to their
parents for advice, however only 38% of parents think their children are at risk of being
bullied online.
5.2 Whilst there are technological advances that allow streams of text to be analysed and flagged up for
bullying behaviour, BeatBullying works to educate and empower children and young people to take
responsibility for their actions and understand that bullying in any form is unacceptable.
5.3 Among primary-school children who participated in our 2012 research,12 6% of those who had
experienced cyberbullying had been targeted on a hate site or hate group (often referred to as Trolling), 9%
had had embarrassing images circulated and 10% had had a photo edited to make fun of them. There are also
qualitative accounts of children this age experiencing death threats and sexual harassment online. Among 11—
16 year-olds who had been cyberbullied, 6% reported receiving a message or image on the subject of sex
which had made them feel uncomfortable or upset. Of those who knew who had sent it, the vast majority
(80%) said that it had come from someone around the same age.
5.4 This research found that one in 13 secondary-school and one in 10 primary-school-aged children had
been subjected to an intensive, relentless campaign or online attack over a period of weeks, months or even
years by other children or young people. Many online phenomenon’s such as “sexting”—sending sexual
pictures and messages via mobile phone—is overwhelmingly peer-to-peer; it is an instance of children and
young people victimising each other and unknowingly victimising themselves, by sharing photos that can be
used as weapons for bullying or end up in the hands of adult predators. This perfectly illustrates the point that
a significant proportion of negative online content is generated by young people themselves. Given this, it is a
concern that any discussion of technological blocking and filtering systems in isolation does not take into
account the interactive and user-generated nature of some harmful material, which is likely not to come within
the scope of a filter anyway. To our knowledge, it is not possible completely to block interactions such as
bullying or “sexting”, although, as outlined above, there are both technological and human ways of curtailing
these and limiting the harm done. Blocks and filters can only block and filter; they cannot educate children
about how to deal with the kind of content and behaviour they might encounter online, how to manage their
own behaviour responsibly or why certain material is harmful.
5.5 That is why BeatBullying has been calling for several years for education programmes focusing on
behaviour and addressing issues such as cyberbullying and e-safety, to be introduced into all schools. We
support and welcome the proposed changes on e-safety to be introduced in the 2014 national curriculum across
all key stages. It is clear that education for safety and good behaviour online needs to begin as early as possible,
before cyberbullying even becomes an issue.
5.6 Everyone involved with children’s and young people’s use of the internet—parents, schools, service
providers, organisations and children themselves—needs to be seen as sharing responsibility for online safety.
In April 2013 BeatBullying launched a campaign for better anti-bullying protections called Ayden’s Law.13
This campaign called on the Government to produce a national anti-bullying/cyber bullying strategy which
would, for the first time, set out the role of teachers, parents, local authorities, the public, the voluntary &
community sector and children and young people themselves in preventing and intervening when bullying and
11
12
13
The Online Behavioural Habits of Young People Today, which questioned a 1000 8–16-year-olds and 1500 parents
from Parentdish and BeatBullying, July 2013
Virtual Violence II Part II: (2012) BeatBullying
Launched May 2013 with The Sun Newspaper following the tragic death of Ayden Olsen Aged 14
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cyber-bullying takes place. Without the introduction of this strategy, progress in tackling online bullying and
other safety threats will always be frustrated by the lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities by those
charged with keeping children safe online.
5.7 A national strategy to tackle cyber-bullying would set out how the voluntary and community sector,
parents, schools, LAs and the police would be equipped to (a) protect the children in their care from harm
online and (b) educate and equip children about internet safety and responsible digital citizenship so that they
understand the issues for themselves. The implementation of this can be greatly facilitated by a solid technical
framework of support from business, such as Claire Perry’s work with internet providers to introduce
preselected parental controls or the adoption of the measures listed in para 4.6 above.
5.8 More than 1,700 cases involving abusive messages sent online or via text message reached English and
Welsh courts in 2012. However, cyberbullying is not a specific criminal offence in the UK. Some types of
harassing or threatening behaviour—or communications—could be a criminal offence. These laws were
introduced many years before Twitter, Facebook and Ask.FM, and they have failed to keep pace with the
demands of modern technology. Unfortunately, serious cases of cyberbullying, which have often resulted in
suicide, have dominated our headlines in recent months. That is why BeatBullying have been calling on the
Government to review current legislation and make bullying and cyberbullying a criminal offence so that
children and young people have the protection they need and deserve, at the earliest opportunity, to avoid this
escalation. This year we have worked with Tracey Crouch MP to introduce bullying and cyberbullying as a
form of anti-social behaviour, which will result in victims and perpetrators benefiting from earlier interventions
and support outlined in the current Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act Bill.
5.9 For BeatBullying, the approach to online safety must ultimately be about shaping attitudes and changing
behaviors as much as it is about teaching techniques for staying safe or for anything else; it is about equipping
young people with the inner resources that will keep them safe, and responsible, long-term. Some negative
online behaviors such as cyberbullying and sexting are most likely to be a form of child-on-child aggression
rather than adult-generated; in order to tackle this successfully, it is crucial to work with perpetrators as well
as victims to address the attitudes that underlie the behaviour.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by the Internet Watch Foundation
—
“Online Safety” is a very broad concept that covers a wide and diverse range of issues. When
addressing this topic, it is important to clearly identify the issue at stake as different problems
will require different solutions, from a technical as well as a procedural perspective.
—
The Internet Watch Foundation is concerned that the issues relating to legal adult content
filtering and the fight against criminal child sexual abuse images become conflated.
—
The Internet Watch Foundation has been very successful in fighting child sexual abuse images
and videos on the internet and has become one of the most successful hotlines in the world.
—
The success of the Internet Watch Foundation is mainly due to its specific focus on child sexual
abuse content and the continuing support from the online industry.
The Importance of Clearly Defining the Problem
1. Different problems require different solutions and it is therefore important to clearly distinguish between
the different issues under consideration. Combatting illegal online content (which is content that by definition
should not be uploaded or viewed by anybody) is different from protecting minors from accessing harmful
content (for instance adult content), which is content that in itself is not necessarily illegal. Preventing abusive
or threatening comments on social media might be considered a problem related more to conduct rather than
content, notwithstanding that the result of this conduct leads to abusive or threatening online content (ie the
actual comments).
2. The merit of taking into account the various aspects of online safety lies in the fact that each of these
specific issues opens up a different range of possible solutions, both on a technical as well as a procedural
level. Other actors can be involved, other safeguards and processes developed. The most effective solution in
one area of online safety could therefore be very different from the preferred solution in another. Equally, an
effective solution in one area might have negative implications for the effectiveness in another area.
Considering the various different challenges individually will protect against developing general, however wellintentioned, solutions that might have an unforeseen negative impact in particular areas of online safety.
Combating Illegal Content on the Internet
3. Even in the area of combating illegal online content, it is important to keep in mind the differences
between various types of illegal content, for instance the difference between child sexual abuse content and
material intended to promote terrorism or violence.
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4. For different types of illegal content different questions have to be considered and depending on the
answers different solutions can be formulated. Issues to consider include:
(i) “What is the nature of the content?” (What is the “level” of illegality? What is the impact on
the people viewing the content? What is the impact on the victims of the original crime?);
(ii) “How is the content available on the internet?” (Where can this content be found? Where is the
content hosted? What is the pervasiveness of the content on the internet? How easy is it to find/
stumble upon the content?);
(iii) “What is the preferred solution?” (How important is it to make the content unavailable as
quickly as possible? How can this content be found and identified? Who can decide whether
the content is potentially illegal? Which involvement of law enforcement/the judiciary is needed
at each stage of the solution—identification, investigation, removal?).
5. The answers to these questions will be different when considering material intended to promote terrorism,
material constituting a copyright infringement or child sexual abuse material. Depending on the answers,
different solutions will be available to effectively deal with the issue and different procedures, actors and
safeguards might have to be considered.
Fighting Online Child Sexual Abuse Content—The Internet Watch Foundation
6. The UK has currently one of the most effective systems in the world for dealing with child sexual abuse
content on the Internet. This success is based on the efficiency and experience of the Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF), the support it receives from the online industry and its close cooperation with law enforcement, in
particular with CEOP, the UK’s Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre.
7. IWF Background: The IWF is the UK hotline where the public can report child sexual abuse content,
criminally obscene adult content and non-photographic images of child sexual abuse. The IWF is a charity
founded in 1996 by the UK Internet industry and it is therefore independent from Government and Law
Enforcement. However, the IWF has very close working relationships with law enforcement and its operations
are covered by a Memorandum of Understanding with the Crown Prosecution Service and the Association of
Chief Police Officers and a Service Level Agreement with the Association of Chief Police Officers.
8. The IWF is a membership organisation and is funded by over 100 global members, including internet
service providers (ISPs), mobile operators, content providers, hosting providers, filtering companies, search
providers, trade associations and the financial sector, as well as by the EU as part of the UK Safer Internet
Centre together with Childnet International and South West Grid for Learning. As an independent body,
transparency and accountability is of the utmost importance and the IWF is governed by an independent Board
and the Hotline is independently audited by a highly qualified team every two years. The IWF also operates a
thorough complaints procedure and has commissioned an independent Human Rights Review.
9. IWF processes: When the IWF receives a report from the public, its analysts assess the content to confirm
whether it is within its remit and potentially in breach of UK legislation. If the content is considered to be
potentially criminal, the IWF can take action against the child sexual abuse images and videos hosted anywhere
in the world. It can also act against criminally obscene adult content and non-photographic child sexual abuse
content hosted in the UK.
10. Depending on where the content is hosted, the process for dealing with potentially criminal images and
videos differs. When child sexual abuse content is found to be hosted in the UK, the IWF will inform CEOP.
After confirmation from CEOP that action can be taken, the IWF will notify the hosting provider who will
remove the content from its servers, typically within 60 minutes after receiving the notification from the IWF.
This process is commonly referred to as “Notice and Takedown”.
11. When child sexual abuse content is found to be hosted outside the UK, the IWF will inform its
counterpart hotline in the hosting country through INHOPE, the international association of hotlines or link in
directly with local law enforcement. As other countries take significantly longer to remove child sexual abuse
content—50% of the content the IWF passes on internationally is still available after 10 days—the IWF adds
the links (URLs) to the content to its URL list (or “blocking list”). IWF members can use this list to voluntarily
block access to these URLs to protect their customers from stumbling upon the images and videos. The URLs
on the list are as targeted as possible, often comprising a single image or video. This is done in order to prevent
the blocking of anything outside the criminal images or videos.
12. In addition to “Notice and Takedown” and the URL list, the IWF also compiles a keyword list of terms
that specifically refer to child sexual abuse content. This list is used, for instance, by search engines to prevent
people from finding images and videos of child sexual abuse content. The keywords are very specific—or very
specific combinations of words—that carry no meaning besides the specific reference to child sexual abuse
content. This means the keywords will not prevent access to legitimate websites such as, academic research
papers into the area of child sexual abuse or websites aimed to help or inform people in relation to child
sexual abuse.
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13. Finally, the IWF also monitors newsgroups and can issue notices for removal of individual postings
where child sexual abuse content is identified or entire newsgroups if these are being used to specifically
distribute child sexual abuse content.
14. IWF achievements: In 2012, the IWF processed 39,211 reports and assisted with the removal of 9,696
URLs containing potentially criminal child sexual abuse content. A URL can be as specific as a single image
or could refer to an entire website containing potentially thousands of child sexual abuse images or videos.
The majority of victims (81%) appeared to be 10 years old or younger (with 4% 2 years old or under) and
53% of the images and videos depicted sexual activity between adults and children, including rape and sexual
torture. Over the past 17 years, the IWF has assessed over 400,000 webpages and assisted with the removal of
100,000 URLs containing potential child sexual abuse content. By sharing intelligence with the police, the
IWF aided with the identification and rescue of 12 children in the past three years.
15. IWF success: In the past decade, the UK has become the world leader for dealing with child sexual
abuse content and the IWF is considered as one of the most successful hotlines in the world. Both the amount
of reports received/processed by the IWF and the speed with which action is taken is amongst the best within
Europe and beyond. As a result, the share of child sexual abuse content that is hosted in the UK is less than
1% of the total amount of known content, down from 18% in 1996 when the IWF first started. This means
that—because of the efficiency of the current system—the UK has become an extremely hostile territory to
host child sexual abuse content.
16. The success of the IWF is foremost due to its very clear and specific remit. Because of the strong focus
on child sexual abuse content, the IWF has accumulated a very thorough and extensive knowledge on how to
deal with this content effectively. On the one hand, this means the IWF’s analysts have become experts in this
area, often recognising images and even victims/perpetrators within the images. They can pass on this
information to law enforcement to aid the investigation into the sexual abuse. On the other hand, the IWF has
been able to develop a strong network to fight the availability of child sexual abuse content. This multistakeholder approach is crucial for successfully dealing with child sexual abuse content and the IWF has built
a very strong network, both with law enforcement, the online industry and international partners, for specifically
dealing with child sexual abuse images. In addition, the success of the IWF is also a result of its self-regulatory
model which allows the IWF to adapt quickly to new developments and of the strong support it has received
from the online industry over the past 17 years.
17. IWF future: The online environment is ever changing and the IWF is committed to continue developing
in order to fight child sexual abuse content effectively in the future. Following a donation from Google and
additional funding from other Members, the IWF will increase its number of analysts from 4.5 (full-time
equivalents) to 11.5 (full-time equivalents). In addition, the IWF was asked by Government to start proactively
searching for child sexual abuse content rather than working only from public leads. The IWF will continue
its role as the UK hotline but will be able to add-on the proactive work in order to increase the amount of
child sexual abuse images it can take action on. An ongoing membership review is addressing the need to
improve IWF’s resources in order to ensure a sustainable future for the IWF and its increased activities.
18. A final aspect of IWF’s future development concerns its international activities. As 99% of the known
child sexual abuse content is hosted abroad, it is of the utmost importance that international cooperation is
further developed to remove the child sexual abuse images and videos at source. The IWF is actively engaging
with international partners to share its expertise. It has developed “OCSARP”, its “Online Child Sexual Abuse
Reporting Portal”, which countries without child sexual abuse content reporting facilities can implement, while
the IWF provides assistance with the assessments of the reports.
Conclusion
19. The area of “Online Safety” is very broad and very volatile, with risks as well as possible solutions
developing constantly. It would be worthwhile to clearly frame the debate and break up the overall topic in
clearly defined aspects of online safety. Online conduct is different from online content. Criminal or illegal
content is different from legal but potentially harmful content and an image of a child being sexually abused
is different from the promotion of terrorism. This is not to say there is necessarily a hierarchy between the
“severeness” of different types of illegal content, but different types of content will require different procedures,
different checks and balances and the involvement of different actors.
20. The IWF—and the online industry—has been very effective in fighting child sexual abuse content over
the past 17 years. The IWF’s very specific self-regulatory and multi-stakeholder model is extremely effective
for dealing with child sexual abuse content and the IWF remains committed as ever to continue developing
and improving the fight against child sexual abuse content in the years to come.
September 2013
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Written evidence submitted by Internet Services Providers’ Association (ISPA)
Introduction
The Internet Services Providers’ Association is the trade association for the internet industry in the UK.
ISPA has over 200 members from across the sector, including a large number of access provider ISPs from
small to large, content platforms, hosting providers and others. ISPA therefore works across the areas in which
the Committee is looking and we welcome the opportunity to provide input into the Committee’s inquiry.
We believe that the Committee’s terms of reference for the inquiry identify the key issues that are currently
of relevance in relation to online safety. However, we would like to emphasise that the issues that have been
identified should not be conflated. The issue of tackling child abuse content, which is clearly illegal, requires
a different response from industry and Government than the availability of extremist material which may or
may not be illegal. Protecting children from accessing potentially harmful content again requires a different
response as it may cover content that is clearly legal but simply not appropriate for children and young people
under 18.
We further welcome that the Committee considers that any potential dangers of the internet are a “correlation
of the immense benefits provided by unimpeded communication and free speech” and that “any attempts to
mitigate harms have to be proportionate and, where possible, avoid disadvantageous consequences.” We believe
that the recognition of this correlation is of vital importance but are concerned that policy-makers sometimes
disregard it which often leads to disconnected and potentially harmful policy-making.
Variety of Internet Companies
It is important that the Committee understands that there is a considerable diversity of companies that operate
internet services. When considering the steps that industry can take, it is important to consider that each type
of company may be playing a different role, and they will have varying degrees of ability to deal with
potentially illegal or harmful content. The below description provides a rough guide14 to the various kinds of
companies that are involved in making the Internet work. If it were felt to be helpful, we would be happy to
brief the Committee in more detail about the position of each company type in the internet value chain.
Access Providers
Access providers are commonly referred to as Internet Service Providers. They connect customers to the
Internet—either through fixed or wireless connectivity. As the ISP does not initiate or modify their users’
communications and is only passing traffic across a network, they are deemed “mere conduits” under the ECommerce Regulation 17 which grants limited liability.
Hosting Providers
Hosting providers store others’ content online, often for a charge. Traditionally hosting providers have hosted
complete websites of individuals and companies and even Government hosts some of its websites with these
private hosting providers.
More recently, new types of hosting provider have emerged. These providers, eg social networks, generally
provide a platform on which users can upload content (videos, blog posts, images etc.) which they themselves
have created. These kinds of hosting provider do not have editorial control over what is posted on their services,
but may have active or passive moderating policies that allow them to remove content or restrict its availability.
Under Regulation 19 of the e-Commerce Regulations both traditional and modern hosting providers are not
considered to be liable for the content they host as long as they do not have actual knowledge of unlawful
activity or information. However, upon obtaining such knowledge, hosting providers become liable if they do
not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
Websites Where Operators Have Editorial Control
Individuals, companies and other organisations that run their own websites can be regarded as having
editorial control over content that is available via their website and so are considered to have more direct
responsibility. However, it is important to point out that websites can contain both content where the operator
of a website has editorial control, eg a news article, and user generated content, eg comments about that
news article.
Search Engines
Search engines index web pages by scanning the Internet. They use algorithms to display relevant results
based on what search terms users input but generally do not exercise editorial control over the links that they
present to users. Search engines can be considered as “caches” under Regulation 18 of the e-Commerce
14
We merely consider the e-Commerce Regulations and online companies may have duties and defences through other legislation.
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Ev 80 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
Regulations and act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to any information if they are made aware of
that the fact that this information may be illegal.15
How does this apply in the real world?
It is worth considering three different examples:
1. A website hosting child abuse images
2. A person who posts a potentially illegal message on a website operated by the same person
3. A person who posts a potentially illegal message on a forum operated by a third party
In relation to the first example, ideally the hosting providers who provides the space for the website should
be notified that illegal material is being hosted on a website on one of its servers. This notification is being
done on a regular and effective basis by the IWF. If the operator is based outside of the UK and responds
slowly or not at all to a notice from the IWF or its international partners, the IWF can add this page to its list
of illegal websites. Access providers accept the judgment of the IWF, which has great expertise in this area,
and use the IWF’s list to filter out the relevant page (ie they make the URL of that website inaccessible, and a
user would see an error message if they attempted to access it).
In relation to the second, the person should be approached directly as they have editorial control of the
comment and the website on which it can be found. If the person does not respond then it may be necessary
to contact the hosting provider who provides the space for the website who may then need to make an
expeditious assessment of the content and take it down if appropriate. The access provider would theoretically
be able to block access to the website but this would be less timely and cost efficient than approaching the
hosting provider and generally requires a valid takedown notice.
In relation to the final example, again, the person who posted the content should be approached directly.
However, if the person does not respond, or cannot be identified, the third party who operates the forum should
be approached who will then need to make an expeditious assessment of the content and take it down if
appropriate. If the third party does not react then it may be necessary to approach the hosting provider, however,
this should be a matter of last resort as the provider would generally only be able to remove the whole forum,
thereby curtailing the service and rights other forum users. The same would be true if an access provider would
block access to the forum.
In all these examples it is important to note that it is often not clear cut whether content is illegal or not and
online companies cannot be expected to be the judge and jury of others’ content.
Industry has a Role to Play
We strongly believe that the industry has a vital role to play in protecting minors from accessing inappropriate
content and would like to emphasise that the UK is widely regarded as having one of the most advanced online
safety frameworks.
Family Friendly Filters
—
The main consumer facing ISPs are moving to system where new and existing customers are
presented with an unavoidable choice of whether to apply filters or not. These filters cover the
whole home, ie apply to all the devices used on a connection, put users in control and allow
parents to choose from a list of content that should be filtered including adult content, extremism
and self-harm. This has involved significant investment, both financially and time.
—
Some smaller consumer-facing providers are considering solutions that offer family friendly
filters but can be deployed on smaller scale and at lower costs. ISPA is currently discussing
this issue with its members.
Child Sexual Abuse Content
15
—
ISPA and many ISPs have helped to setup the IWF and have consistently supported the
organisation which is considered to be world class in preventing people from access child abuse
content and facilitating the removal of that content at source.
—
Many ISPs have committed to increase funding of the IWF to enable a proactive remit to
identify and remove child abuse content online. Further funding for education and awareness
campaigns from industry has been forthcoming.
Regulation 18 defines providers as “caches” if the information that is processed by them is “the subject of automatic, intermediate
and temporary storage where that storage is for the sole purpose of making more efficient onward transmission of the information
to other recipients of the service upon their request”, ie, the provider merely processes information and only stores it temporarily.
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Allegedly/Potentially Illegal Content
—
Industry has worked with the Home Office and law enforcement regarding the CounterTerrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) which members of the public can report potentially
unlawful terrorist material from the internet. If hosted in the UK the content is removed and
this framework is underpinned by the Terrorism Act 2006. So far approximately 6,500 pieces
of online content have been removed through CTIRU action.16 However, what constitutes
terrorist material is not always clear cut.
—
Providers of social media platforms and websites that contain user generated content will
remove illegal content whenever they are made aware of it and can apply their terms and
conditions to other types of content that may not be illegal. They also often provide their
consumer with report facilities to flag up any inappropriate behaviour.
—
Providers have been working alongside Government and Parliament to reform the defamation
law to ensure that online freedom of speech is adequately balanced with the right of those who
feel they have been defamed online.
Industry Cannot Solve These Issues on its Own
However, we are concerned that the current policy debate is sometime too strongly focused on finding a
technological fix to a problem that often has societal roots and is sometimes present in both the offline and
online world.
For example, in the relation to the accessibility of adult content, we accept that ISPs should play a role in
empowering their customers to better determine what content should be available in their household. However,
even the most comprehensive filtering solution cannot guarantee that adult content will be unavailable. Over
and underblocking of content is inevitable and it is important that filtering tools are viewed as part of a wider
package alongside education and parental mediation. There needs to be more emphasis on enabling parents
and teachers to teach children how to behave responsibly online, one possible action could be the updating of
sex education in the curriculum so that it keeps pace with technological and societal developments.
In relation to abusive or threatening comments online, we would like to emphasise that ISPs should not be
used as proxy for enforcing the law and perceived societal standards. Social media networks can and often
take action against users that behave inappropriately. However it has to be taken into account that the Crown
Prosecution Service’s Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media state
that “[j]ust because the content expressed in the communication is in bad taste, controversial or unpopular, and
may cause offence to individuals or a specific community, this is not in itself sufficient reason to engage the
criminal law.” This should not be regarded as a get out clause for providers but it is important to point out that
providers cannot be expected to go beyond what is required by the law. In this context, it worth highlighting
that Parliament has recently amended the Defamation Act which encourages hosting providers to assist the
resolution of disputes between users that cannot be resolved by the hosting provider themselves
Conclusion
We have shown that industry has made available a number of tools, services and advice to help protect
minors from accessing adult content. There is cooperation between industry and law enforcement to tackle
extremist material when legal thresholds are crossed. Websites have in place mechanisms to prevent abusive
behaviour and the law had been used to prosecute individuals in some instances.
The Internet has had a significant impact on modern societies. It has changed how we do business,
communicate, educate and consume content. These changes came about because internet companies developed
innovative products and consumers have found even more innovative and sometime unexpected ways of using
these products. As such the Internet is an extension of the established offline world and it would be wrong to
simply ask ISPs to fix any issues that may arise.
Technological fixes can play a role and support customers but we will only be able to comprehensively
tackle the problems that the Committee outlined in its terms of reference by involving industry, Government,
parents and users and by looking at both the symptoms and causes. The Internet industry has reviewed and
improved its offering to customers in recent times. It is willing to actively engage with the online safety agenda
but we hope that this can be done in a more positive environment based on collaboration.
October 2013
16
HL Deb, 23 September 2013,c421W.
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Written evidence submitted by TalkTalk
Summary
1.1 As the first internet company to introduce a whole home parental control solution, TalkTalk welcomes
the Committee’s Inquiry into Online Safety. We firmly believe that everyone should be able to enjoy the
benefits of the internet, but that as an ISP we have a duty to provide our customers with simple and effective
tools to ensure that they are able to search, download and utilise the internet in as safe a way as possible,
especially when it comes to parents wanting to help protect their children online.
1.2 TalkTalk is currently the only ISP in the UK to offer a whole home parental controls system that protects
every device connected to the home broadband. Built into the broadband network itself, HomeSafe gives
families the ability to control the types of websites they want their household to access across all devices using
the connection and restrict access to content like pornography, gambling, and suicide and self-harm. So far
over 1.2 million homes are using HomeSafe, and of these 400,000 have chosen to activate parental controls.
In March 2012, we launched so called active or unavoidable choice for all new customers signing up to
broadband and in June of this year, we extended this to existing customers and began the process of asking all
our existing customers to make a choice about using parental controls.
1.3 1 in 3 customers—roughly equivalent to the number of UK homes with children in—are choosing to
use filtering when presented with a choice. Whilst much of the debate on internet safety has focused on children
accessing pornography, suicide and self-harm remains the biggest category that customers are choosing to
block, followed by pornography which is then followed narrowly by weapons and violence. This reflects the
range of concerns that parents have when it comes to their child’s safety online and indeed many of their
concerns aren’t about accessing inappropriate content, but are behavioral such as cyber bullying, sexting and
grooming.
1.4 When it comes to filtering, our research shows our customers like being asked to make a choice—80%
think it’s a good thing and 60% wouldn’t have activated controls if they hadn’t been prompted. We support
this approach and believe that it is critical that parents make an engaged decision, appropriate to their individual
family, about the use of filtering tools. We would never filter access to content that is legal (even if it is agerestricted) unless our customers asked us to. Parents should make the decision as part of their approach to
helping keep their children safer online.
1.5 As a member of the IWF, TalkTalk does take the IWF list and voluntarily block this at network level so
none of our customers can access websites that they have identified to contain illegal child abuse images. In
the summer, we—and other ISPS—also implemented a new form of wording on the block pages to act as a
stronger deterrent. We are also big supporters of the IWF’s move to proactive detection.
1.6 There is no silver bullet when it comes to internet safety, and much relies on education and awareness.
TalkTalk conducts extensive marketing and communications to customers about HomeSafe and internet safety
and we have also partnered with the likes of the The Parent Zone, Girl Guiding UK and the UK Safer Internet
Centre on various educational initiatives. Along with other ISPs, we have committed to launch of a national,
sustainable education campaign targeted at parents in the New Year.
1.7 We have long called for internet safety to be included in the Primary curriculum and we are really
pleased that will be the case going forward. We think of internet safety as the road safety of our children’s
generation, in that it required a range of different inventions including the Green Cross Code, air bags and
mandatory seat belt wearing, and required us all to play our part. Internet safety requires the same approach
where use of technical tools needs to be supported by awareness raising and education for parents and young
people alike.
2. How Best to Protect Minors from Accessing Adult Content
2.1. TalkTalk shares the commonly held belief in the importance of protecting children online. The internet
is an integral part of people’s lives now and has been transformational in terms of the benefits that it brings.
However, as with life offline, there are unfortunately risks associated especially for children and young people
and we believe we have a role to play in trying to protect them from harm.
2.2. TalkTalk thinks of internet safety as the road safety of our children’s generation; it requires a range of
different inventions, and the use of technical tools needs to be supported by awareness raising and education
for parents and young people alike. We think technical tools have a really important role to play, but alone
they will not solve the issue. We believe the most important thing a parent can do is take an active role and
talk to their children about what they do online, and combine this with using controls as appropriate.
HomeSafe
2.3 Back in May 2011, TalkTalk introduced HomeSafe, the UK’s first and still only whole home parental
controls system that allows parents to protect every device connected to the home broadband and control the
types of websites their family is able to visit. From our own customer research we found that parents want an
easy to use system that allows them to activate their chosen filters across all devices with one click without
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having to do this separately on each device in the home. We also found that many parents found existing
device level controls confusing and we developed HomeSafe to fill that gap.
2.4 HomeSafe has three simple features; Kids Safe, Virus Alerts and Homework Time.
—
Kids Safe—parental controls that allow the account holder to block content they don’t want to
be accessed on their connection. There are nine different categories, and customers can also
choose to block other specific websites.
—
Virus Alerts—an alert system that blocks access to web pages infected with malware and
phishing sites.
—
Homework Time—this allows parents to block social networking and online gaming sites—
common sources of distraction for children from homework—during a specified time of day.
2.5 The most commonly blocked categories are, in order, Suicide & Self-Harm; Pornography; Violence &
Weapons; Dating; Drugs, Tobacco and Alcohol; Gambling; File-sharing; Gaming Websites; and Social
Networking.
Asking our customers to make a choice
2.6 In March 2012, TalkTalk became the first internet service provider to introduce a genuine unavoidable
choice for new customers when they signed up to TalkTalk broadband, as per the recommendation of the Bailey
Review. Customers are asked to make a “yes” or “no” decision as to whether they want to filter access to
content that might be inappropriate for under 18s on their broadband connection or not. TalkTalk then applies
this to their internet connection as soon as its live and no further action is required by the customer. If the
customer wants this on, then Suicide and Self Harm; Pornography; Weapons and Violence; Dating; Drugs,
Alcohol and Tobacco; and Gambling will be blocked. The settings can be easily changed at anytime through
the customer’s online My Account facility.
2.7 At the beginning of June of this year we extended this unavoidable choice to existing customers and
began the process of asking all of our existing customers who haven’t yet engaged to make a choice about
using Kids Safe filtering. We are doing this via the use of a pop-up screen when a customer who isn’t using
parental controls logs into their My Account. As with new customers, they have to make a decision either way
before they progress any further and access their My Account. We have already asked a million of our existing
customers to decide about using Kids Safe.
2.8 We currently have 1.2 million customers who have activated HomeSafe and over 400,000 customers
have activated Kids Safe filtering. 1 in 3 customers are choosing to turn on Kids Safe when presented with an
unavoidable choice. This is about equivalent to the number of households with children in and so we believe
represents the level of uptake that one should expect, given that not all parents will want to use filtering but
other customers, like grandparents or those who simply want to filter content out due to personal beliefs, might
want to.
2.9 By the end of 2013 we will move to pre-ticking the “yes” option, which we believe is a strengthening
of our current position. It is incredibly important however to note that this does not constituent default blocking
and all customers will still be asked to make a decision about filtering; we would not filter without them
requesting it. We think it is critical that parents make an engaged, informed choice about whether or not they
wish to use filtering as part of their approach to helping keep their children safer online.
2.10 Our customers agree with this and our research shows they like being asked to make a choice. A survey
of our customers found:
—
Around 80% felt that being prompted to set up parental controls was a good thing.
—
60% of those who set up controls said they wouldn’t have done it if they hadn’t been prompted.
—
Of those who didn’t activate parental controls 60% said they didn’t turn them on because they
didn’t have children and 30% said they didn’t want/need them.
Closed feedback loop
2.11 There are a number of safeguards in place to help ensure that children aren’t changing the settings
without their parents’ knowledge. Firstly, the initial set up is done during the sign up process for fixed line
broadband where a customer will likely be credit checked, have to provide bank details and be arranging for a
new broadband service to be installed/an existing service to be taken out. They are also entering into a 12 or
18 month contract and our terms and conditions state our customers must be aged 18 or over. Secondly, the
log in details for a customer’s My Account—where they make any subsequent changes to their HomeSafe
settings—are set up during the joining process by the account holder. At any time, from anywhere, the account
holder can log in to My Account to check the status of their home’s filtering preferences. Every time a change
is made to the settings an email is sent to the email address the account holder signed up with confirming the
changes. Finally, every customer can also opt in for free additional notifications via SMS to their mobile.
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Over-blocking
2.12 We know that there are concerns about over-blocking of websites in relation to whole home filtering
systems. Firstly we think it is really important to remember that filtering systems have been in place for years—
they were just applied at the device level rather than at the network level. When it then comes to issues around
inaccurate blocking, we think there are two key things; firstly obviously that the filtering technology itself is
being constantly improved and refined, and secondly that there are clear reporting mechanisms which are
actioned.
2.13 In developing HomeSafe we deliberately tried to take a more holistic approach to website categorisation
which looks at the website in its entirety—so for example an article on the BBC website which mentions
pornography wouldn’t be blocked. Similarly, a website like Frank which offers advice for those suffering from
drug addiction wouldn’t be blocked, whereas a website advising on how to make drugs would be. We think
this is a more pragmatic approach. Clearly no technology is 100% perfect and so we continue to work to
improve the filtering. We have clear reporting mechanisms, either directly via a large “report” button on the
block page itself or through a feedback form in the customer’s My Account. Website owners can also contact
us via email. This enables us to address any issues of misclassification and also employ any learning to avoid
other instances. The volume of this is respectively low and we aim to action reports within five days.
2.14 We have also formed partnerships with a number of companies to either “white” or “black” list. Papyrus,
the suicide prevention charity, provides us with a list of websites that promote suicide and we include those in
the suicide and self-harm category. Similarly, we have an agreement with the British Association for Shooting
and Conservation (BASC) to ensure that websites with content about lawful shooting interests aren’t blocked.
Marketing, advice and guidance
2.15 HomeSafe is actively supported by comprehensive marketing and communications that aim to educate
our customers about internet safety and the things they can do to help protect themselves and their children
online. We have a dedicated internet safety hub (talktalk.co.uk/security) that provides a wealth of guidance.
This is currently being updated, including aligning with the UKCCIS guide on child internet safety—which
we helped to develop. We also send regular communications about HomeSafe and internet safety to our
customers. Other marketing has included extensive television and outdoor advertising; we believe TalkTalk is
the only company to have advertised about child internet safety on television. We have also run dedicated
security workshops for our customers in London and the key insights and advice from the day are then shared
back to the rest of our customer base. For Safer Internet Day this year we ran an internet safety road show
which visited 5 locations around the country and offered advice and guidance on internet safety to the public.
2.16 In addition to the above, we run or are involved in a number of additional initiatives to educate and
raise awareness about internet safety. We have been working with The Parent Zone to develop The HomeSafe
Family Challenge’, a three-term programme of activity for schools to help them engage parents on child
internet safety. Each term covers a specific theme—Digital Footprint, Digital Know How and Digital Living—
and within each theme there are a range of topics covered for parents and teachers. The HomeSafe Family
Challenge is designed to get parents to engage with the issue and take action. Each theme will have a challenge
associated with it to engage parents and encourage action, for example getting a certain number of parents to
take the “HomeSafe family challenge quiz” with a prize for the school if they do. We have been trialing this
with a number of schools and are now rolling this out to more schools across the UK.
2.17 We have also partnered with Girl Guiding UK to help them redevelop their Computer badge for
Brownies and as part of this will produce supporting educational materials on internet safety for both the
Brownies and their volunteers as internet safety forms one of the elements of getting the Computer badge.
This will be supported by a significant communications campaign about internet safety to the Brownies and
their volunteers.
2.18 We have also worked with The Parent Zone to develop a very simple guide to parental controls which
has been sent to schools across the UK and is available for free download from their website, and also with
the UK Safer Internet Centre to create and promote a video on setting up HomeSafe.
2.19 Finally, along with the other ISPs, we have committed to launch of a national, sustainable education
campaign targeted at parents in the New Year.
3. Filtering out extremist material, including images of child abuse and material intended to promote
terrorism or other acts of violence;
3.1 Like other industry members, TalkTalk takes a zero tolerance approach to illegal child abuse images
online. Currently our efforts are focused on helping prevention. We are a longstanding member of the Internet
Watch Foundation and pay the maximum membership fee. This summer we, along with the other ISPs,
committed to a further £1 million of funding for the IWF to continue its work in identifying illegal child abuse
images on the internet. TalkTalk also chaired the working group that supported the membership review of the
IWF which has led to their move to proactively seeking out illegal child abuse images online in addition to
following public reports.
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3.2 We automatically download the block list of known websites containing illegal images from the IWF on
a daily basis, and apply it to our filtering system, which means that every customer is blocked from accessing
those websites across the whole network.
3.3 Customers who try and access these websites are presented with a splash page informing them the
content is blocked because it has been found to be illegal by the IWF. In the summer, a group comprising the
IWF, CEOP and Lucy Faithful Foundation, a charity who work with offenders, agreed a new stronger set of
wording that TalkTalk implemented in August, along with the other three major ISPs. The wording is:
Access has been denied by your internet access provider because this page may contain indecent
images of children as identified by the Internet Watch Foundation.
Deliberate attempts to access this or related material may result in you committing a criminal
offence.
The consequences of deliberately accessing such material are likely to be serious. People arrested
risk losing their family and friends, access to children (including their own) and their jobs.
Stop it Now! can provide confidential and anonymous help to those with concerning or illegal
internet use. They have helped thousands of people in this situation.
0808 1000 900 | help@stopitnow.org.uk | www.stopitnow.org.uk
If you think this page has been blocked in error please contact iwf@talktalkplc.com or visit:
http://www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/complaints/content-assessment-appeal-process
3.4 We also work closely with CEOP, and our Chief Executive sits alongside CEOP on the UKCCIS Board.
We fully cooperate with their requests for information under RIPA and are currently in discussions about other
ways in which we could support their work further. We signpost customers to their helpline via the “Report
Abuse” button that sits on our customer safety information centre.
3.5 We belive the issue of extremist material and material intended to promote terroism or acts of violence
is predominatly a matter for law enforcment agencies and should be addressed via a joined up, multi-pronged
approach to tackling extremism and terroism. As an ISP we adhere to requests to remove content that has been
found to be illegal under current UK legislation. This may include material found to be extremist or material
intended to promote terroism or acts of violence. We are also in the process of finalising an agreement with
the Home Office to include their filtering list of known terroist websites that breach Terrorism Act 2006 but
that the policing Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit have been unable to get taken down, for example
because they are hosted abroad. We intend to add this into our “weapons and violence” category within
HomeSafe, so that our customers can choose to filter access if they want.
4. Preventing Abusive or Threatening Comments on Social Media
4.1 Our own research supports that cyberbullying is one of the main concerns for parents and children alike
when it comes to the internet and it is clear that more needs to be done both to prevent cyberbullying and
support the victims. Predominantly however we believe that the issue of cyberbullying is a behavioural issue
and therefore one that needs to be tackled through education, and then those websites owners and as oposed
to action we can take technically as an ISP.
4.2 In terms of what we are able to do, we investigate any abusive or threatening comments, posted on sites
by our customers when we are provided with the log information that supports the complaint. In these cases
where we can, we will identify the account and contact the account owner to make them aware of the complaint.
We inform the customer that this action is undertaken because of a breach of our Terms and Conditions of
supply. Depending on the severity of the abuse, some cases may result in court action. In these instances, we
would not contact the customer to make them aware, but we will disclose relevant data to the third party
solicitor, on receipt of a fully sealed court order from a UK court.
4.3 We do provide customers with the option of blocking social media via HomeSafe however we do not
think that this solves or helps the issue of cyberbullying. Our safety centre also includes a range of information
about cyberbullying for parents and we signpost to organisations like BeatBullying for further support.
About TalkTalk Group
TalkTalk is the UK’s leading value for money TV, broadband and phone provider with 4 million customers
across the UK. TalkTalk operates the UK’s largest Next Generation Network that covers 95% of UK homes.
TalkTalk is one of seven partners behind YouView, the internet-connected TV service, along with the BBC,
ITV, BT, Channel 4, Arqiva and Five. YouView launched to UK homes in 2012 and in August 2013 TalkTalk
announced it had signed up over 500,000 customers to the service. TalkTalk is also the only provider to provide
a whole home parental controls service, HomeSafe, to its customers free of charge. HomeSafe protects every
device using the broadband from accessing inappropriate content and since launch has been activated by 1.2
million customers. TalkTalk Business has been a leading supplier of broadband and voice for almost 20 years
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to over 180,000 businesses across the UK. TalkTalk is a founding partner of charity Go ON UK, which aims
to make the UK the most digitally included nation in the world.
October 2013
Written evidence submitted by the Mobile Broadband Group
Introduction
1. The Mobile Broadband Group (“MBG”), whose members are the UK businesses of EE, Telefonica UK
(O2), Three and Vodafone, welcomes the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee’s Inquiry into online
safety.
2. We also welcome the opportunity to submit information on the significant steps that the mobile operators
have taken over the years, both individually and collectively, to mitigate risks that customers, particularly
children, may face when accessing content and services on-line.
3. The mobile operators’ work in this area is underpinned by a Code of Practice that was first published
nearly ten years ago in January 2004—“The UK code of practice for the self-regulation of new forms of
content on mobile”. The second edition of the code was published in 2009 and the third (and current) edition
in July 2013, reflecting the mobile operators’ determination to keep the code up to date and relevant to evolving
market conditions.17
4. The Code was first published in anticipation of the mass take-up of new mobile devices with enhanced
features, including colour screens, picture messaging, video cameras and Internet browsers. Today the majority
of children have a mobile and an increasing proportion of them go online using a mobile phone or smart
phone.18
5. The intention behind the Code is that parents and carers should have access to the information with which
to show their children how to use mobile devices responsibly and the tools with which to influence the type of
content accessible to children.
6. The Code was the first of its kind and was used as the boiler plate for similar codes introduced my mobile
operators throughout the EU. The UK has thus made an enormous contribution to child safety in Europe and
beyond in this field. It is a universal topic, where international co-operation can and must complement work
done in the UK.
Provisions of the Code of Practice
7. The Code covers a broad range of topics: commercial and Internet content, illegal content, malicious
communications, spam communications and customer education.
Commercial and Internet content
8. The mobile operators’ respective responsibilities for commercial content—where they have contractual
agreements in place with content providers—as against general content on the Internet are different.
9. Commercial content is classified in accordance with a framework provided by an independent body and
any content with an 18 rating is placed behind access controls. Such content is not made available to customers
until they have been through a robust age verification process (acceptable methods of which are set out in
the Code).
10. In 2013, the mobile operators appointed the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) as the provider
of the independent framework (replacing the Independent Mobile Classification Body).. The agreement took
effect on 2nd September 2013.
11. The mobile operators’ partnership with the BBFC, who have increasing expertise in the on-line arena,
enables consistent, evidence based and transparent decisions about the categorisation of commercial content
and the calibration of Internet filters.
12. The Code requires that the mobile operators offer a filter to customers. The BBFC’s role, on the basis
of all relevant evidence, is to provide advice to mobile operators on where to set their Internet filters. The
framework focuses on content that may be harmful for children (ie those under the age of 18) to view—such
as pornography, violence, hate, promotion of suicide, illegal drugs and is set here: http://www.bbfc.co.uk/whatclassification/mobile-content/framework.
13. The mobile operators, though, are not setting out to police the Internet or online providers. It is
Government’s role to set and enforce societal standards. Providers of age restricted products such as gambling,
weapons, publications and alcohol should still be putting in place their own processes to ensure that minors
are not accessing, or taking delivery of, their restricted goods and services.
17
18
http://www.mobilebroadbandgroup.com/documents/UKCodeofpractice_mobile_010713.pdf
Ofcom, Children’s media use 2012
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14. In addition to providing the independent standards framework, the BBFC has within its remit the ability
to review complaints about whether or not particular websites should or should not be placed behind the filter
and provide guidance to the mobile operators on the filtering of the sites that are the subject of the complaint.
Where there have been instances of inadvertent or unfounded over-blocking, there is a quick and transparent
process for having web-sites removed from filtering.
15. The BBFC framework is binary—18 or unrestricted. This is because 18 is the only age at which it is
currently practical to implement convenient, ubiquitous and robust on-line age verification. Stricter filters are
available in the market for parents that may want a narrower range of content for younger users but these fall
outside the Code.
16. The “18” filter is set by default for prepaid phones on all networks. For contract phones, where the
customer has to prove that he or she is at least 18, the filter is set to on by default for three of the four
networks. The operator Three will also put the filter on by default in 2014.
Measuring effectiveness
17. Obtaining robust, quantitative research as to whether the approach has been effective at protecting
children from harmful content is difficult, not least because of the practical problems associated with
researching this topic with children.
18. Ofcom and the London School of Economics led EU Kids On-line project provide two potential sources
of indicative information.
Seeing things that make me feel sad, frightened or embarrassed (%)
TV
Internet
Mobile
8–11
22
16
10
12–15
14
10
5
Fig 113
Fig 114
Fig 119
Data from Ofcom “Children and Parents: Media Use and Attitudes Report”, October 201219
Table 6: Child has seen sexual images online or offline in past 12 months, by age and gender (%)
9–12
Boys
Girls
Boys
TV/film/video
On any web site
In magazine or book
On a mobile
10
6
6
0
7
3
3
0
22
22
18
12
13–16
Girls
23
13
13
8
Data from EU Kids online project—UK report20
19. The MBG describes this data as only indicative of the effectiveness of filtering. It is not clear that content
that “makes me feel sad, frightened or embarrassed” equates to harmful or inappropriate content. Children
could be seeing age inappropriate (ie by reference to accepted standards of taste and decency) content that
does not make them feel such emotions, and vice versa.
20. Children could also be seeing content on their mobiles that is not captured by the filtering systems—
such as text and picture messages that are sent directly between individual customers or content that is accessed
over networks outside the control of the mobile operators, such as domestic and public wi-fi. However, the
providers of public and domestic wi-fi have made considerable progress recently on the provision of filters to
cover all devices in public spaces and in the home and this should go some way to mitigating the risk of
children accessing age inappropriate content on mobile devices through any network.
21. It is encouraging to note from the data that there is a degree of consistency between the two and that for
both Internet and particularly mobile, the incidence of age inappropriate content being seen is far lower than
for the regulated TV market. Anecdotally, from the hundreds of millions of contacts, both in store and on helplines, between customers and the mobile operators’ across a very broad range of topics, only a small handful
are raised in a situation where a customer has expressed concern about exposure to age inappropriate content.
22. The overriding impression is that children are being appropriately and effectively protected by the
measures being taken.
Illegal Content
23. Mobile operators work with the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) and law enforcement agencies to deal
with the reporting of illegal child abuse imagery. If illegal content were to be identified on servers hosted by
19
20
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/media-literacy/oct2012/main.pdf
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/33730/7/Risks%20and%20safety%20for%20children%20on%20the%20internet%20%20full%20report%20%28LSERO%29.pdf
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Ev 88 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
a mobile operator, including web or messaging content, it would be removed quickly, in accordance the relevant
notice and take-down provisions. It is very rare to receive such a notice.
24. Mobile operators receive the IWF’s list of URLs containing potentially illegal content and, in order to
protect customers from being exposed to such content (and thus committing an offence), block the Internet
browser from accessing any URL on the list. Any customer, inadvertently or otherwise, attempting to access
such a site would be directed to a landing page explaining the reason that the page had been inaccessible (using
one of the standard texts endorsed by the IWF).
Malicious Communications
25. Under the Code, the mobile operators commit to procedures for dealing with malicious communications
that occur on their services (ie not third party platforms and services) and are reported to them. Mobile
operators ensure that customers have ready access to mechanisms for reporting to them concerns (such as to a
specialist nuisance calls desk). It is an offence to misuse electronic communications services and, where
requested by law enforcement agencies, mobile operators can and do assist with the compilation of evidence
against perpetrators.
Unsolicited Communications (Spam Text Messages)
26. For a number of years, mobile operators have provided customers with a short code 7726 (the numbers
for S-P-A-M on an alphanumeric keypad) to which unwanted texts can be forwarded. This provides vital early
intelligence to MNOs, who can investigate the content and source of the messages.
27. In the current year, under the auspices of the global mobile trade body, the GSM Association, the UK
mobile operators and the Information Commissioner have signed an MOU with a view to sharing intelligence
about 7726 reports. This enhanced intelligence sharing is enabled through a trial of the new GSMA Spam
Reporting Service.
28. In short, the platform provides a range of tools to analyse data being sent into the 7726 shortcodes of
the UK mobile networks. Approximately 10–15k reports are received each week, resulting in approximately
500 SIM cards being disconnected weekly by the mobile networks.
29. A more detailed memorandum on this topic has been submitted to the Committee in relation to its
inquiry into Nuisance calls and texts.
Information and Advice
30. Mobile operators provide extensive advice to customers—including children, parents and carers—across
a broad range of topics relating to the use of mobile devices and services, such as: privacy, security, Apps,
billing, cost control, and all the matters covered by the content code. Mobile operators, through selected
partnerships and other arrangements also support relevant media literacy activities by others which are designed
to improve the knowledge of consumers in this area.
31. The mobile operators have demonstrated their commitment to customer safety by investing significantly
in filtering and age verification processes over the last ten years—both in terms of capital expenditure and
operating costs. We believe that our approach has been effective. But technical solutions are not foolproof and
it remains essential that all channels of communication are used to raise awareness among parents and children
of how best to stay safe online and how to behave appropriately.
Device Level Filtering
32. Beyond matters that are within the Code (and the remit of the MBG), the mobile operators would like
to see manufacturers continue to develop and improve the filtering and control mechanisms that are available
on portable mobile devices such as smart phones.
33. At present, some of the filtering tools available can be quite blunt and may only offer an “on” or “off”
ability to browse the Internet. With the increasing sophistication of operating systems for mobile devices, it
should become possible for manufacturers to install software that will aid filtering and support more
comprehensive solutions.
34. Software that enables the consumer to make more decisions about what the device can or cannot do,
particularly when browsing the Internet, would enable them to have a much clearer sense of the level of
protection they enjoy, and a greater ability to tailor protection to their own specific needs, independent of the
network through which they are connected.
35. The mobile operators have had network filtering in place for nearly ten years. Great pressure has also
recently been put on the domestic ISPs and public wi-fi operators to do the same—and this is happening.
However, all these efforts would be complemented with the availability of better user controls at operating
system and device level. The UK, through UKCCIS and other channels, should continue to examine closely
what the manufacturers and operating system providers are offering in the area of child safety and challenge
them to be as equally committed as the network providers.
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Digital Skills for Life
36. With the Government’s focus on digital skills, and the move towards the online delivery of public
services, it is important that children and adults are not afraid to use the Internet, and are equipped with the
skills they need to become confident web users.
37. The Internet makes available a wealth of information, the lack of which can put people at a significant
disadvantage in areas such as finding employment, housing, education, and making cost savings. With an
estimated 7 million people still not using the Internet, with fear being one of the strongest reasons given for
not going online, it is important that Government, industry and the media be supportive of these groups to
encourage them to get online.
38. The mobile networks welcome the Government’s changes to the education curriculum to enable children
to learn, from an early age, digital skills, including coding, from primary school. It is vital, though, that online
safety and wellbeing is taught as well, as part of the curriculum and across subjects. Teachers of all disciplines
must be trained to teach the relevant skills and appropriate on-line behaviour and young people must be
equipped to understand their responsibilities and how to respond if they ever feel uncomfortable whilst online.
39. There are also economic considerations. Research recently commissioned by Telefonica UK (O2) has
estimated that the unused digital skills among the one million unemployed young people would be worth £6.7
billion21 to the UK economy. Those born into the digital generation will have strong digital skills including
web design, coding and social media expertise. While business must do more to realise these benefits, these
skills must be coupled with appropriate skills for staying safe and behaving responsibly while online.
40. The mobile operators therefore remain committed to maintaining the constructive cross-stakeholder work
with Government, regulators, law enforcement agencies, charities and other interested parties to keep the UK
at the forefront of the Internet safety agenda.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Facebook
Summary
1. This submission sets out Facebook’s policies and actions around safety to help inform the Committee’s
inquiry into these matters.
2. Facebook’s mission is to make the world more open and connected and to give people the power to share.
Facebook is a global community of more than 1.15 billion people and hundreds of thousands of organizations.
Each person and organization that uses Facebook represents unique opinions, ideals and cultural values. With
this immense diversity, we work to foster and safe and open environment where everyone can freely discuss
issues and express their views, while respecting the rights of others.
3. The policies Facebook has adopted are designed to reflect real world interactions. While ignorance still
exists both on an off of Facebook, we believe that ignorance will not be defeated by covering up its existence,
but rather by confronting it head on.
4. We have learned that requiring people to engage in conversations and share their views using their real
names and identities promotes an environment of accountability, where contributors must take responsibility
for their own thoughts and actions.
5. Facebook’s detailed Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (“SRR”) describes the content and behaviour
that is and is not permitted on our service. With respect to safety, our SRR specifically prohibits the following
types of behaviours:
(a) Bullying, intimidating, or harassing any user.
(b) Posting content that: is hate speech, threatening, or pornographic; incites violence; or contains
nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.
(c) Using Facebook to do anything unlawful, misleading, malicious, or discriminatory.
6. Further, Facebook encourages people to report content that they believe violates our terms. We have
“Report” buttons on every piece on content on our site. When we receive a report, we have a dedicated team
of professionals that investigate the piece of content in question. If the content in question is found to violate
our terms, we remove it. If it does not violate our terms, then we do not remove it. We also take action, such
as disabling entire accounts (eg of trolls) or unpublishing Pages, if deemed necessary.
7. We want everyone on Facebook to feel well-equipped to keep themselves safe when using the service. In
particular, we have focused on educating our teenage users, their parents and teachers. We understand that
younger users warrant additional protection and we work in partnership with external audiences to educate
them on our safety tools.
21
http://news.o2.co.uk/?press-release=young-peoples-digital-skills-valued-at-6–7billion-by-uk-businesses
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How we Combat Child Sexual Exploitation
8. Facebook has a zero tolerance policy for child exploitation and abuse and we fight against these activities
aggressively. We employ advanced technology to protect minors on our site, and we deploy innovative,
industry-leading measures to prevent the dissemination of child exploitation material. We have also built
complex technical systems that either block the creation of this content altogether, including in private groups,
or flag it for immediate review by our safety team.
9. For instance, in collaboration with Microsoft and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(“NCMEC”), we utilize a technology called PhotoDNA that allows us to instantaneously identify, remove and
report known images of child exploitation content to NCMEC. PhotoDNA is a game-changing technology that
has helped enormously in preventing the sharing of abusive materials on Facebook and other services. Once a
piece of content is reported to NCMEC, NCMEC then coordinates with law enforcement authorities around
the world to investigate and prosecute people who are creating and sharing these images online.
10. In the rare instance where child exploitation content is reported or identified by our users on Facebook
(Ie, if the content is a new image of abuse which is not already in our database of known images), we similarly,
take it down as soon as possible and report it to NCMEC.
11. All related reports for the UK are referred to CEOP. CEOP is then able to evaluate each case and where
appropriate, engage local police forces for further investigation and subsequent prosecution.
12. Additionally, we provide a dedicated escalation channel for the IWF and other Internet hotlines to inform
us of illegal images being shared on Facebook,. It is a real testament to the effectiveness of our counter
measures, and particularly PhotoDNA’s technology, that very few reports of such content are received from
these hotlines in any 12-month period,
13. We also work hard to identify, investigate and address grooming behaviour—direct communication by
an adult with a minor with the objective of illegal sexual contact. We work closely with law enforcement,
external partners, expert academics and the Facebook community itself, to spot grooming and to combat it.
How we Keep People Safe
Handling reports
14. We have a comprehensive and well-resourced User Operations (“UO”) team that services all of our users
twenty-four hours each day, seven days a week. This team handles every report that is submitted to Facebook
(including by people who do not have a Facebook account). Hundreds of employees work on the User
Operations team, which is located in four offices across the globe, namely Hyderabad (India), Dublin (Ireland),
Austin (US) and Menlo Park (US). They handle reports in over twenty-four languages and cover every time
zone. Structuring the teams in this manner allows us to maintain constant coverage of our support queues for
all our users, no matter where they are in the world.
15. In order to effectively review such reports, UO is separated into four specific teams, which review
different report types—(1) the Safety team, (2) the Hate and Harassment team, (3) the Access team, and (4)
the Abusive Content team. When a person reports a piece of content, depending on the nature of the report, it
will be directed to the appropriate team. For example, if you are reporting content that you believe contains
graphic violence, the Safety Team will receive and assess the report.
16. If one of these teams determines that a reported piece of content violates our policies or our Statement
of Rights and Responsibilities, we will remove it and warn the person who posted it. In addition, we may also
revoke a user’s ability to share particular types of content or use certain features, disable a user’s account, or
if need be, refer issues to law enforcement. We also have special teams dedicated to handle user appeals for
instances where users feel Facebook might have made a mistake in taking a specific action. We recently
published an infographic, which shows the processes involved in Facebook’s user operations for handling
reports.22
17. Further, we provide all users with a tool, “The Support Dashboard,” which is designed to give a user
much better visibility and insight into the reports they make on Facebook. The Support Dashboard enables
people to track their submitted reports and informs them about the actions taken by our review team. We think
this will help people better understand the reporting process and will educate them about how to resolve their
issues in the future. As people see which of their reports result in a removal of content, we believe users will
be better equipped to make actionable reports. We posted about the Support Dashboard when we unveiled it
in April 2012, on our Safety Page.23
Keeping young people safe
18. We provide educational materials through our Family Safety Centre24 which provides information for
anyone interested in keeping children safe online. The Centre includes specific guidance for teenagers and also
provides information about our global Safety Advisory Board.
22
23
24
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/what-happens-after-you-click-report/432670926753695
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/more-transparency-in-reporting/397890383565083
http://www.facebook.com/safety
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19. Our Safety Advisory Board is comprised of five leading Internet safety organizations from North America
and Europe. These organizations serve in a consultative capacity to Facebook on issues related specifically to
online safety. The members of our Safety Advisory Board include the following:
—
Childnet International.
—
National Network to End Domestic Violence.
—
Connect Safely.
—
The Family Online Safety Institute.
—
WiredSafety.
20. We maintain a Facebook Safety Page,25 which has been “liked” by over one million people. All these
fans can therefore see the latest information on safety education directly in their Facebook Newsfeeds. We
regularly post information, tips, and articles about safety on Facebook and highlight debates on the topic of
digital citizenship, as well as links to useful content from third-party experts.
Under 13s
21. It is well understood that, like many other online services, Facebook’s SRR requires users to be 13 to
sign up for a Facebook account. We therefore require all users to provide their date of birth when signing up
for Facebook to ensure that people under 13 are not able to open an account.
22. However, we are well aware of different studies in the UK and elsewhere that demonstrate how many
under-13s are falsifying their ages to open accounts, often with their parents’ knowledge and even their help.
There is no fail-safe way of addressing the issue of under-age users and we continue to explore best approaches
to the issue with policymakers, our Safety Advisory Board, and our safety partners.
UK partnerships and schools
23. We work with a range of expert partners in the UK who go into schools to provide training and guidance
for teachers, pupils and parents. We take a partnership approach because we have found it to be particularly
effective. Organisations like Childnet, the South West Grid for Learning, the Diana Award (Anti-Bullying),
Childline and Parentzone are trusted safety and advice brands, who are able to help schools and parents
navigate the great variety of online services used by children including Facebook—from online games to
mobile devices, from Twitter to Snapchat and Ask.fm.
24. We particularly support the work of Childnet and the South West Grid for Learning, which runs the
InSafe hotline for professionals in education, and work directly in schools. In recent years, we have funded the
production of thousands of Facebook guide booklets, which these organizations distribute widely. In November
2012 we launched an anti-bullying initiative in partnership with Childline, which encouraged bystanders to
take action when they saw others being bullied.
25. We participate and support the annual “Safer Internet Day” run by the UK Safer Internet Centre,
which comprises these two organisations and the IWF.
26. Facebook was the principal sponsor of The Festival of Education at Wellington College in June 2013.
The Festival is the biggest gathering of its kind in the UK with over 2,500 delegates attending. Over 500
different schools, colleges and universities were represented at the Festival. In addition to these delegates, more
than 600 pupils from over 50 schools took part. At the Festival, the Education Foundation partnered with us
to launch an updated Facebook Guide for Educators.26 This guide provides up-to-date advice on privacy and
safety topics as well as a general introduction to Facebook. The guide features two pilot programmes where
Facebook has been used for learning in two different schools, the Wellington College and the Nautical School
in London. A short film summarising the work was premiered at the Festival (see link on the Education
Foundation website). A copy of the Facebook Guide was provided to every attendee at the Festival and is
also available to download for free from the Education Foundation website.
27. We will continue to partner with these and other relevant organisations over the coming months and
years to help equip young people, teachers and parents with the best information and tools they need to promote
online safety and healthy digital citizenship.
September 2013
25
26
http://www.facebook.com/fbsafety
http://www.ednfoundation.org/2013/06/21/facebook-guide-for-educators/
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Written evidence submitted by Twitter
Introduction
1. Twitter is an open, public platform built around small bursts of information, which we call Tweets. Each
Tweet can be no more than 140 characters long. In addition to text, Tweets can include photographs, videos,
or links. Users can control their experience on the platform by choosing who to follow and what they wish
to see.
The Twitter Rules
2. Twitter provides a global communication service which encompasses a variety of users with different
voices, ideas and perspectives. With 200 million active users across the world and 15 million in the UK alone,
the platform now serves 500 million tweets a day. Like most technology companies we are clear that there is
no single silver bullet for online safety, rather it must be a combined approach from technology companies,
educators, governments and parents to ensure that we equip people with the digital skills they will need to
navigate the web and wider world going forward.
3. As a general policy, we do not mediate content. However, there are some limitations on the type of content
that can be published with Twitter. These limitations comply with legal requirements and make Twitter a better
experience for all. These limitations include prohibitions on the posting of other people’s private or confidential
information, impersonation of others in a manner that does or is intended to mislead, confuse, or deceive others,
the posting of direct, specific threats of violence against others, and trademark and copyright infringement.
4. Our rules and terms of service clearly state that the Twitter service may not be used for any unlawful
purposes or in furtherance of illegal activities. International users agree to comply with all local laws regarding
online conduct and acceptable content.
5. Full details of Twitter’s rules and terms of service be found in our support centre:
https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules
Illegal Content—Child Sexual Exploitation Policy
6. We do not tolerate child sexual exploitation on Twitter. When we are made aware of links to images of
or content promoting child sexual exploitation they will be removed from the site without further notice and
reported to The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (“NCMEC”); we permanently suspend
accounts promoting or containing updates with links to child sexual exploitation.
7. We have established a line of communication and maintain an ongoing dialogue with the Child
Exploitation and Online Protection Centre, both in relation to its investigative work and also in its important
work around education and awareness raising. Twitter is also a member of the Internet Watch Foundation.
8. We are in the process of implementing Photo DNA into our backend technologies and, like other
technology companies, are engaged with law enforcement and non-governmental organisations on global efforts
to track and eliminate child abuse images online.
9. Twitter is part of the technology task force for Thorn (http://www.wearethorn.org), a cross industry
foundation which aims to disrupt the predatory behavior of those who abuse and traffic children, solicit sex
with children or create and share images of child sexual exploitation. Thorn exists to continue the work started
by the Demi and Ashton (DNA) Foundation in 2009.
10. In the rare instance that a user finds a Twitter account which they believe to be distributing or promoting
child sexual exploitation while using Twitter, they are asked to notify us by sending an email to cp@twitter.com.
They are also asked not to Tweet, retweet or repost child sexual exploitation for any reason and rather to report
it to us immediately so we can take steps to remove it.
Online Safety
11. Twitter provides a global communication platform which encompasses a variety of users with different
voices, ideas and perspectives. As stated above, the platform now serves 500 million tweets a day.
12. Our policy is that we do not mediate content or intervene in disputes between users but we do have a
clear set of rules which govern how people can behave on our platform. These rules are designed to balance
offering our 200 million global users, a service that allows open dialogue and discussion all around the world
whilst protecting the rights of others. As such, users may not make direct, specific threats of violence against
others; targeted abuse or harassment is also a violation of the Twitter Rules27 and Terms of Service.28
13. To help users navigate issues they may be confronted with online, we offer a number of articles in our
Safety and Security Centre29 that guide users to make better decisions when communicating with others.
27
28
29
http://support.twitter.com/entries/18311#
https://twitter.com/tos
https://support.twitter.com/groups/57-safety-security#
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14. Over the course of the next months, we will be publishing new content with more information, including
local resources provided by our partners in the safety community across the world. Some of the new content
will be aimed at bystanders—those who may witness abusive behavior, but are not sure what actions to take.
Teaching users to help each other as well as knowing when and how to contact Twitter for help is vital to
Twitter being a safe space for our users.
15. We also work with a number of safety organizations around the world to provide content to our users
that may be useful for navigating problems online, and plan to host more content from them and other safety
experts in future iterations of the site.
16. We often use the analogy of Twitter as a public town square where users are free to speak with and
interact with others; that said, just as in a public town square, there are behaviors that are not allowed.
17. In addition to reporting violations of our Terms of Service and Rules, users can control what content
they see through features like blocking and sensitive media warnings. When our users see or receive an @reply
they don’t like, they can unfollow the author of the Tweet (if they are following the user), which will remove
that user from their home timeline. They can also block the user30 which will mute the communication. When
you block a user you will not be notified when they mention you, retweet you, favourite your content, add you
to a list or subscribe to one of your lists. You also won’t see any of these interactions in your timeline. This
prevents you from receiving unwanted, targeted and continuous @replies on Twitter. Abusive users often lose
interest once they realize that their target will not respond.
18. Another option available to our users is to protect their accounts.31 Users with protected accounts can
approve requests from other users to follow their accounts on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, their tweets
are only viewable and searchable by themselves and their approved followers. As such, they can prevent any
unwanted followers from viewing their content.
19. Sometimes users see content they don’t like in the form of images or video, and for that we have settings
that allow users to label their media for the appropriate viewers, and select whose media will display on their
own Twitter homepage. We ask users to mark their Tweets as sensitive if they contain media that might be
considered sensitive content such as nudity, violence, or medical procedures.
20. For the viewer, the default setting is that if a Tweet is marked as containing media that might be sensitive,
they will be required to click through a warning message before that media is displayed to them.
21. If another user notices that Tweets have not been marked appropriately, that user may flag the image or
video for review. The content will then be reviewed and a determination made as to whether that media requires
an interstitial in order to comply with Twitter’s Media Policies.32
22. We are continuing to expand our user support and safety teams to ensure we are supporting our growing
userbase appropriately. We also continue to invest heavily in our reporting system from a technological
perspective and recently rolled out a significant update which simplified our system, allowing people to report
violations33 to us via an in-Tweet reporting button as well as via the forms in our support centre.34
23. Once a user files a report to Twitter, they are sent a ticket number and the form is routed to a team of
trained reviewers. If accounts are found to be acting in way which breaks our rules, for example posting
specific threats, then we take action, up to and including suspending accounts. At the end of the process the
specialist reviewer follows up with the person who filed the ticket to let them know that their report has
been addressed.
24. Reports that are flagged for threats, harassment or self-harm are reviewed manually. We also use
automated tools to help triage reports filed for other types of complaints, such as spam.
25. It is important to stress that where a user believes the content or behavior he or she is are reporting is
prohibited by law or if they are concerned for their physical safety, we advise them to contact local law
enforcement so they can accurately assess the content or behaviour. If Twitter is then contacted directly by the
Police, we can work with them and provide assistance for their investigation.
26. Twitter works closely with UK law enforcement. We have updated our existing policies around handling
non-emergency requests from UK law enforcement to more closely mirror our process for US-based law
enforcement requests (including providing notice to users). We have always responded to emergency disclosure
requests from law enforcement in situations involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person.
27. Twitter invokes these emergency disclosure procedures in the United Kingdom if it appears that there is
an exigent emergency involving the danger of death or serious physical injury to an individual. Twitter may
provide UK law enforcement with user information necessary to prevent that harm.
30
31
32
33
34
http://support.twitter.com/articles/117063#
https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-tweets#
https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169199-twitter-media-policy#
https://support.twitter.com/articles/15789-how-to-report-violations#
https://support.twitter.com/forms
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28. Twitter has published Guidelines for Law Enforcement (“Guidelines”; https://t.co/leguide) as well as a
webform (https://t.co/leform) through which UK Law Enforcement can file a request or make an inquiry
29. Since opening our UK office, Twitter has worked to build relationships with stakeholders in the online
safety sector. Twitter is a member of UKCCIS. The company has also established a single point of contact for
the UK Safer Internet Centre and has worked with the South West Grid for Learning.
30. We participated in Safer Internet Day for the first time in 2012 implementing our “Tweets for Good”
programme whereby we promoted safety messaging on the platform. We will continue this involvement and
our work with our safety partners and wider voluntary organisations into the future.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Ofcom
Section 1
One page summary
1.1 Ofcom welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Committee’s inquiry on online safety.
1.2 This document sets out Ofcom’s current duties and powers relevant to the Committee’s inquiry. It also
describes what we consider to be some relevant market and consumer developments captured by our research
that may assist the Committee.
1.3 The Committee’s inquiry considers three specific issues relating to online safety across a broad range of
media services. In order to identify how we may be able to assist the Committee in future, we have structured
our response to consider each of the three issues in turn; and for each we have described Ofcom’s relevant
duties and/or role across the following services:
— Broadcast television and radio.
— ATVOD notified on-demand services.
— Online content more broadly.
Main conclusions of this document:
1.4 The internet has brought significant benefits to consumers and citizens and made the media a much more
social, global and participative environment. However, the internet also brings new regulatory challenges. The
connected environment and changes in consumer behaviour can result in audience protection risks and in
particular, new challenges in securing the protection of children from potentially harmful content.
1.5 In a connected society there is particular pressure on consumers’ understanding of the increasingly
complex regulatory environment, of the practices they can expect of service providers and of their awareness
of their own responsibilities.
1.6 There is a task for the Government, regulators and industry to ensure the provision of clear information,
education and a framework of personal responsibility through which individuals and families can exercise an
informed choice.
1.7 Any approach to online safety should include a combination of the traditional content standards
protections and industry-led measures which provide the right framework of information, online safety tools
and content controls for audiences to protect themselves and their families.
1.8 It is important for consumers that online safety tools and content controls are easy to use and made
available in as many internet connected devices as possible. Consumers should also be adequately informed of
where such tools can be used.
1.9 The effectiveness and impact of online safety tools and content controls will, however, depend on actions
being taken by individuals and parents. Therefore, in order to ensure potentially harmful content is subject to
comprehensive oversight, further consideration may be needed as to the roles and responsibilities of all industry
players in the online environment.
Section 2
Regulatory context
2.1 As the United Kingdom’s independent regulator for the communications sector, Ofcom’s principal duty
in carrying out our functions (set out in section 3(1) of the Communications Act 2003) is:
(b) to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and
(c) to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting
competition.
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Television and Radio
2.2 In carrying out this duty, Ofcom has other statutory duties and powers relevant to the Committee’s areas
of inquiry. In particular, Section 3(2) of the Communications Act 2003 states that Ofcom is required to secure:
— The application, in the case of all television35 and radio services, of standards that provide
adequate protection to members of the public from the inclusion of offensive and harmful
material in such services; and
— The application, in the case of all television and radio services, of standards that provide
adequate protection to members of the public and all other persons from both:
— unfair treatment in programmes included in such services; and
— unwarranted infringements of privacy resulting from activities carried on for the purposes
of such services.
2.3 All of Ofcom’s decisions must comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates into UK
law the European Convention on Human Rights. Of particular relevance to Ofcom’s decisions are: the right to
a fair trial (Article 6), the right to privacy (Article 8) and the right to freedom of expression (Article 10). We
are also subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
2.4 Ofcom is also required to set standards in relation to TV and radio advertising.36 Ofcom established a
co-regulatory partnership with an industry body, the Advertising Standards Authority (“ASA”), in 2004. The
arrangements are underpinned by an enabling statutory instrument37 and a Memorandum of Understanding.38
2.5 Although Ofcom has devolved the exercise of this function to the ASA (in this case, through an Order
made under the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994), it remains ultimately responsible for ensuring
that broadcasters observe relevant standards.
2.6 Television services are provided over different platforms: digital terrestrial wireless transmission, via
satellite, cable or over the internet. Under Article 2 of the AVMS Directive, a broadcast service will fall within
the UK’s jurisdiction if it is either based in the UK, either editorially or by other measures. If a service has no
presence in the UK or EU then secondary technical criteria are used to determine jurisdiction, which includes
the location of the satellite uplink.
Video on Demand
2.7 The Communications Act makes provisions for the regulation of on-demand programme services
(ODPS), which are essentially services whose principal purpose is the provision of programmes the form and
content of which are comparable to the form and content of programmes normally included in television
services, ie TV-like video on demand (VOD) services. These services can be made available on any platform
and are subject to a notification scheme if the editorial control of the service is generally based in the UK.
Notified ODPS must comply with minimum content standards under the AVMS Directive, which has been
implemented in the UK by Part 4A of the Communications Act 2003.
2.8 Ofcom has formally designated the Authority for Television On Demand (ATVOD) as the co-regulator
for editorial content,39 and the ASA as the co-regulator for advertising content. Ofcom remains ultimately
responsible for ensuring that providers of on-demand services observe relevant standards.
Online
2.9 Our role in relation to internet services is much more limited. We regulate television channels delivered
over the internet and notified ODPS when they are established in the UK; but we have no statutory powers to
regulate any other online content. Ofcom also has media literacy duties which address media consumption
online. These are detailed below, along with some information on further roles Ofcom conducts in relation to
online services.
2.10 Section 11 of the Communications Act 2003 places a responsibility on Ofcom regarding the promotion
of media literacy. We fulfil this duty through the publication of Media Literacy research into adults’ and
children/parents’ media use and attitudes. We publish two substantial annual reports: “Children and Parents:
Media Use and Attitudes” and “Adults Media Use and Attitudes”. These provide detailed evidence of media
use, attitudes and understanding among adults and among children and young people aged 3–15. The children’s
report also provides evidence of parents’ concerns about their children’s media use and the ways that they seek
to monitor and mediate that use. Ofcom also publishes a range of other consumer research, exploring similar
35
36
37
38
39
Under 232 (2) of the Communications Act 2003, a service falls within a “television licensable content service” if itE+W+S+N.I.
This sectionnoteType=Explanatory Notes has no associated (a) is provided (whether in digital or in analogue form) as a service
that is to be made available for reception by members of the public; and (b) consists of television programmes or electronic
programme guides, or both.
See section 321 Communications Act 2003.
The Contracting Out (Functions Relating to Broadcast Advertising) and Specification of Relevant Functions Order 2004.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/reg_broad_ad/statement/mou.pdf.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/broadcast/tv-ops/designation180310.pdf.
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themes. We share the findings of our research widely, including with the Government, industry, academia and
the third sector.
2.11 Ofcom also has a seat on the Executive Board of the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS)40
which brings together more than 200 organisations across the government, industry, law enforcement, academia
and charity sectors, who work in partnership to help keep children safe online. Ofcom provides its research
data to UKCCIS to help inform debates about these areas and has been involved in a number of UKCCIS
initiatives, for example: the “Advice for Child Internet Safety 1.0—universal guidelines for providers”41; and
the “Good practice guidance for providers of social networking and other inter-active services”.42
2.12 In addition, the Government has recently proposed, through its published communications strategy
paper “Connectivity, Content and Consumers—Britain’s digital platform for Growth”,43that it expects industry
across the internet value chain “to ensure that all internet-enabled devices, whether a TV, a games console or
a smart phone, are supplied with the tools to keep children safe as a standard feature”. The Government has
asked Ofcom to have a role in overseeing this work and we are currently awaiting further details on this.
2.13 Ofcom was also significantly involved in developing ParentPort, which is a website with the single aim
of protecting children by helping parents make their views heard about inappropriate programmes, advertising,
products and services.44 The website makes it easier for parents to complain about material they have seen or
heard across the media, communications and retail industries.
Section 3
Market context and consumer context
3.1 Ofcom carries out research which informs the delivery of our duties and our programme of work. It also
keeps us, and others, informed about new technology developments and the impact these may have on the
sectors that we regulate. This section provides a brief overview of Ofcom’s observations on the effects of
convergence on the way consumers and industry engage with media, and the challenges this may create
for audiences.
3.2 Ofcom publish three reports that are of particular relevance to the Committee’s inquiry:
—
The UK and Nations’ Communications Market Report,45 last published in August 2013;
—
Ofcom annual report “Children and Parents: Media Use and Attitudes”46; and
—
Ofcom annual report “Adults Media Use and Attitudes”.47
3.3 Below we have set out a summary of these reports and you can find the full findings using the links
provided above. Ofcom would also be pleased to provide a deeper and wider ranging discussion of our evidence
base should the Committee require it.
Technology continues to evolve rapidly, resulting in an increasing range of new connected devices and
changing consumption of AV content services
3.4 UK household internet access rose to 80% in Q1 2013, just one percentage point higher than in Q1
2012. However, mobile internet access rose ten percentage points to 49% of adults, the second fastest growth
on record.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/safeguardingchildren/b00222029/child-internet-safety
http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/ukccis%20advice%20on%20child%20internet%20safety.pdf
http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/industry%20guidance%20%20%20social%20networking.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225783/Connectivity_Content_and_Consumers_
2013.pdf
www.parentport.org.uk. ParentPort has been jointly developed by the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), the Authority for
Television On-demand (ATVOD), the BBC Trust, the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC), Ofcom, the Press Complaints
Commission (PCC) and the Video Standards Council (VSC)/Pan-European Game Information (PEGI).
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-market-reports/cmr13/
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/media-literacy-pubs/
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/media-literacy/media-lit-research/adults-2013/
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Figure 3.1
HOUSEHOLD INTERNET ACCESS: 2005–2013
Proportion of adults (%)
100
Internet
80
60
64
60
73
68
65
67
60
75
77
79
80
76
72
75
71
65
74
67
58
52
40
42
38
41
27
30
21
32
20
12
15
17
31
20
72
50
49
Total
broadband
Fixed
broadband
Mobile data
user
39
5
13
0
2005 Q1 2006 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 2010 Q1 2011 Q1 2012 Q1
Internet on
mobile
Mobile
broadband
Source: Ofcom technology tracker, Q1 2013. Base: All adults aged 16+ (n=3750).
3.5 The power and functionality of devices connected to the internet are making them increasingly attractive
to consumers, especially the scope that they give consumers to access, create and share content across different
devices. The majority of devices continue to grow in terms of penetration.
3.6 There has been a particularly remarkable growth in the use of tablets. In spite of their relative novelty,
in February 2013 tablets accounted for 8% of web-page views, double the level in 2012. Tablets are viewed as
the main method of connecting to the internet by a third of users and just over half (56%) of tablet owners use
their device for watching audio visual content.48
There are increasing levels of take-up and usage of internet delivered services
3.7 There continues to be a demographic split in use of the internet. Younger people are more likely than
older people to use the internet for activities related to converged media and this becomes more marked the
older the age bracket. Conversely, younger people are more likely to access their media simultaneously meaning
that, while they are consuming a greater volume of media than older people, they are doing so in a shorter
time-period.49
Figure 3.2
WEB-BASED COMMUNICATION ON COMPUTERS, MOBILE PHONES, AND BOTH, AMONG 16–24
YEAR OLDS
% of 16-24 year olds using web-based communication at least daily
with friends and family on computers, mobile phones and on both
100
80
61
60
40
20
49
Computer
51
39
Mobile
33
36
26
30
27
17
16
13
1517
13
9
11 7
9
0
Source: Kantar Media Omnibus
Base: All 16–24s in UK (N=375)
Q.2A How often do you use [insert statement] to communicate with friends and family?
48
49
Ofcom Communications Market Report 2013. 51.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/811898/consumers-digital-day.pdf
Both
15
5
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Computers were defined as desktop PC, laptop, netbook or tablet
3.8 There is also evidence of growth in online video consumption. YouTube in particular has experienced
strong growth in the last year with three quarters (74%) of laptop and desktop internet users visiting YouTube.
Its unique audience grew 4% in the year to May 2013.50
3.9 One of the key observable trends in web content consumption has been the rise of social networking, in
particular among young people. Three-quarters of 15–24 year olds use social networking sites.
Figure 3.3
PROPORTION OF ADULTS WHO ACCESS SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AT HOME
Adults 16+ (%)
77
80%
69
60%
45
49
49
52
48
41
40%
37
42
24
20%
12
2
0%
UK
15-24 25-34 35-54 55-64 65-74 75+
AB
C1
C2
DE
Male Female
Source: Ofcom Consumer Research Q1 2013
Base: All adults aged 16+ (n = 5812 Q1 2008, 1581 Q3 2008, 6090 Q1 2009, 9013 Q1 2010, 3474
Q1 2011, 3772 Q1 2012, 3750 Q1 2013) QE5. Which, if any, of these do you use the internet for?
NB Question wording for QE5 prior to 2013 asked about household use of the internet at home.
In 2013 QE5 asked about individual use of the internet anywhere.
Consumers continue to have a high expectation for content standards on their television
3.10 In February 2012, Ofcom published a deliberative research report entitled “Protecting audiences in a
converged world”.51 The research looked at public attitudes within the context of convergence, in order to
understand the public’s expectations for protection and how content should be regulated in the future.
3.11 This research indicated that knowledge of prevailing content regulation is currently high for broadcast
services but lower for other services (such as catch-up and VOD). The research also suggests that viewers have
high expectations of content regulation on broadcast television, and associated VOD and catch-up services.
Converged or connected TVs, which incorporate broadcast, VOD and open internet services, are considered to
be closer to a TV-like experience. Audiences therefore expect content over these devices to be regulated more
similarly to broadcast TV, in contrast to internet content accessed through devices such as PCs and laptops.
Parents are adapting the way they protect their children from certain kinds of content in light of
technological change
3.12 Ofcom’s annual reports “Children and Parents: Media Use” and “Adults Media Use and Attitudes”
provide detailed evidence of media use, attitudes and understanding among adults aged 16 and above and
among children and young people aged three—15. Below are some of the key findings from the 2013 Adults52
and Children and Parents research.53
3.13 In 2012 79% of households (aged 16+) had internet access, this is in line with 2011. The use of devices
to go online at home, as seen among children, is diversifying with PC/laptop/netbook use remaining stable at
74%, although there were significant increases seen using other devices to access the internet at home. Mobile
phone54 access increased to 53% (up from 45% in 2011), tablet (16% vs. 6%) and games console (16%
vs. 11%).
3.14 In 2013 91% of children aged five—15 live in a household with access to the internet through a PC,
laptop or netbook and Ofcom’s research shows that children’s patterns of media consumption are changing.
50
51
52
53
54
Ofcom commissioned qualitative research earlier this year to give us a better insight into the complex and diverse phenomenon
of UGC. This provides a snapshot of the different players, types of content, business models and opportunities in this sphere.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/research-publications/content.pdf
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/tv-research/946687/Protecting-audiences.pdf
Adults’ media use and attitudes report 2013 (http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/media-literacy/media-litresearch/adults-2013/)
The Media Literacy research for 2013 is due to be published in October 2013.
Mobile phone access includes smartphones. Personal smartphone use increased in 2012 from 44% to 54%.
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Children are also increasingly likely to use a wide range of portable and personal devices, particularly
smartphones and tablets. In 2013 43% of children aged five—15 owned a mobile phone with 62% of 12 -15s
owning a smartphone. Parents’ ability to monitor what their children are doing online is becoming more limited
than it was when internet access took place at a fixed point in the heart of the family home.
3.15 Among adult internet users over half (55%) say they use the same passwords for most websites. A
quarter (25%) of users said they had problems remembering passwords, and a similar proportion (26%) said
they tend to use easy to remember passwords like birthdays or names.
3.16 For adults, take-up of Wi-Fi protection and experience of deleting cookies from the web browser have
increased since 2011. Very few internet users say they do not use online security measures or safety features
because they don’t know how they work, although a significant minority of people are unaware of a range of
security features. Awareness and take-up of the security measures we asked about is typically lower among
older users, DE adults and women.
3.17 43% of parents of children aged five—15 said that they use technical parental controls packages for
desktop PCs, laptops and netbooks.55 Uptake of controls for television is slightly higher at 45%. Use of filters
on mobile phones where the phone can be used to go online is at 42% while uptake for controls on mobile/
fixed games consoles is 16% and 19% respectively.
3.18 Parents generally view controls as an extra tool to supplement rather than a replacement for parental
mediation (rules, monitoring and talking to children). 79% of parents of five—15 year olds have spoken to
their child about staying safe online and just over half of parents have rules in relation to parental supervision.
Overall, 85% of parents employ some kind of online mediation strategy to help their child stay safe online.
3.19 Other findings from the 2013 survey show that in households where five—15s use a PC/laptop or
netbook at home 62% have some kind of technical method of control in place. 44% have safe search settings
on search engine websites; 43% have parental controls56 installed; 19% have the Safety Mode set on YouTube;
11% have software to limit the time spent online; 8% have a PIN/password set on broadcasters’ websites. The
most common reason reported by parents of older children (12–15) for not using access controls was that they
trust their child to be sensible/responsible; and parents of younger children (five—sevens and eight—11s) are
more likely to say it is because their child is supervised, or that the child is too young for a lack of controls to
be a problem.
3.20 The majority of parents (79%) report that they know enough to keep their child safe online, but around
half of parents continue to feel that their child knows more about the internet than they do, including 14% of
parents of children aged three—four. Also, parents of eight—11s are more likely to agree with this statement
now than in 2012 (44% vs. 35%).
Section 4
Protecting minors from accessing adult content
4.1 We have significant experience of regulating content that is unsuitable for children on broadcast television
and radio services. Through our co-regulatory relationship with ATVOD we also have experience of regulating
adult content on notified video on demand services. This section sets out details of some of our experiences of
regulating this type of content on these services, which may be useful for the Committee. While Ofcom has
no statutory role to regulate online services to protect children from accessing adult content, outside of
television channels delivered on the internet and notified ODPS, this section also sets out some relevant research
findings regarding adults’ and children/parents’ media use and attitudes that complements our understanding
of this sector.
Ofcom’s experience of regulating television and radio broadcast services
4.2 Under Section 319(1) of the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom has a statutory duty to set standards for
broadcast content as appear to it best calculated to secure the standards objectives. These standards are set out
in Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code (“the Code”) in the form of rules which broadcasters must comply with. These
standards objectives include: “that persons under the age of eighteen are protected”.
4.3 Ofcom considers the standards it has set for the protection of children, as set out in Section One of the
Code, to be amongst the most important. The Code includes rules which help ensure the protection of minors
from harmful content and from material that is unsuitable for them (covering content such as drugs, smoking,
alcohol, violence and dangerous behaviour, and offensive language).57 It also has rules that specifically relate
to protecting children from sexual material, including prohibiting the broadcast of material equivalent to the
55
56
57
This figure includes all available technical parental controls, for example parental controls provided by the ISP, but also parental
controls built into the computer’s operating system (windows or Mac), and third party parental controls such as net nanny or
family shield.
This includes parental controls provided by ISPs, the computers own operating system, or controls such as McAfee loaded by
other people in the household.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code/protecting-under-18s/
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British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) R18 rating and requiring “adult-sex material”58 to be shown only
between 10pm and 5.30am and behind mandatory restricted access.59
4.4 Ofcom has sanctioned a number of adult-chat broadcasters for broadcasting sexually explicit material
without the relevant protections.60 For example, in November 2010 Ofcom imposed a financial penalty on
Bang Channels and Bang Media (London) Ltd totalling £157,250 in respect of multiple breaches of the Code
and licence conditions by the adult chat and daytime programming on these services. Ofcom concluded that
the licensees had been operating a wholly inadequate compliance system which amounted to manifest
recklessness. Ofcom revoked all the licences held by these licensees on the basis that they were no longer fit
and proper to hold those licences.61
Ofcom’s experience of co-regulation for on-demand content
4.5 ATVOD has published Rules and Guidance to ensure compliance of all notified ODPS with certain
minimum standards.62 Rule 11 of the ATVOD Rules reflects section 368E(2) of the Communications Act and
states that, “if an on-demand programme service contains material which might seriously impair the physical,
mental or moral development of persons under the age of eighteen, the material must be made available in a
manner which secures that such persons will not normally see or hear it”.
4.6 ATVOD has adopted a precautionary approach to its interpretation of the wording of the Act and includes
R18 material (or material equivalent to content classified in that category) as “material that might seriously
impair”. Therefore R18 material or R18-equivalent content should only be made available in on-demand
programme services in a manner which secures that persons under the age of eighteen will not normally see
or hear it.
4.7 In the past year Ofcom has imposed financial penalties on three ATVOD notified ODPS for a breach of
Rule 11. These sanctions were imposed on the services “Playboy TV”,63 “Demand Adult”64 and “Strictly
Broadband”65 after these services provided R18 equivalent material without adequate measures in place—a
content access control system—to ensure that those under 18 would not normally see or hear it.
Relevant research findings regarding online services
4.8 Paragraphs 3.12 to 3.20 set out some relevant research findings from Ofcom’s recent Media Literacy
research into adults’ and children/parents’ media use and attitudes, which looks at the behaviour and
experiences of children and parents online.
4.9 Our research indicates that the majority of parents use a combination of mediation strategies to help
keep their children safe online. Over four in 10 parents have parental controls installed, and feel that their
children are safer as a result.
4.10 Most parents report that they know enough to keep their child safe online, but around half of parents
continue to feel that their child knows more about the internet than they do, including 14% of parents of
children aged 3–4. This may reflect the fast pace of technological change and the ease which younger children
in particular can embrace and explore new mobile technology and apps and suggests that parents need
continuing support to build their own skills and confidence.
4.11 Our research also shows that despite the vast majority of young people stating that they are confident
internet users and that they know how to stay safe online, there is an increase in 12–15s undertaking risky
activities online. A substantial minority of 12–15s have a social networking profile which may be visible to
people not known to them and this has increased since 2012 (33% vs 22%). These children are more likely to
be in the 15% who have undertaken some kind of potentially risky online behaviour such as adding people
that they don’t know in person or sending photos or personal details to people only known online.
4.12 Some of these activities may be difficult to manage through technical controls; this reinforces the
importance of developing children’s media literacy skills—to help them analyse and assess content, and manage
the potential risks and unintended consequences of online activity—irrespective of technological changes.
4.13 How to protect children from the risk of exposure to harmful content online is an issue that has been
closely considered by UKCCIS. There are already examples of industry-led approaches to support the
protection of minors from such content. For example: all major ISPs provide customers with parental control
software either for individual devices or for the whole home, via network-layer filtering. All major ISPs
recently committed to offering their customers a network-layer filtering option and search providers offer “safe”
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Material that contains images and/or language of a strong sexual nature which is broadcast for the primary purpose of sexual
arousal or stimulation.
Mandatory restricted access means there is a PIN protected system (or other equivalent protection) which cannot be removed
by the user, that restricts access solely to those authorised to view.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/enforcement/content-sanctions-adjudications/?pageNum=1#in-this-section
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/content-sanctions-adjudications/bangmedia-revocation.pdf
Under the AVMS Directive, which has been implemented in the UK by Part 4A of the Communications Act 2003.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/vod-services/Playboy_TV_Sanction.pdf
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/vod-services/Demand_Adult.pdf
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/vod-services/Strictly-Broadband.pdf
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versions of their search results, which aim to exclude sexually explicit images and video. Paragraphs 3.17 and
3.19 include data on what technical method of control parents currently use.
4.14 Controlling illegal content and protecting minors from potentially harmful content are fundamental
policy goals which require regulatory intervention, regardless of changes in technology and delivery of content.
4.15 The above findings highlight the importance of ensuring that any protection framework for online
content should include a combination of the traditional standards protections and measures which provide the
right framework for audiences to protect themselves and their families.
4.16 Convergence and the expanding consumption of connected devices will create further pressure on
consumers’ understanding of the regulatory environment, of the practices they can expect of service providers
and of their awareness of their own responsibilities.
4.17 There is therefore a task for the Government, regulators and industry to ensure the provision of clear
information, education and a framework of personal responsibility through which individuals and families can
exercise an informed choice.
4.18 Industry will need to play a vital role in ensuring consumers are provided with clear information,
education and a framework of tools and controls through which they can manage their own and their children’s
access to content. Such controls should be easy to use and find, and potentially available across all connected
devices.
4.19 It is important to recognise, however, that the effectiveness and impact of online safety tools and content
controls will depend on actions being taken by individuals and parents. Therefore, in order to ensure potentially
harmful content is subject to comprehensive oversight, further consideration may be needed as to the roles and
responsibilities of all industry players in the online environment.
Section 5
Preventing extremist and unlawful material
5.1 Ofcom has clear statutory duties to regulate extremist material on UK licensed broadcast services,
including television channels delivered on the internet. We also have statutory powers to regulate such material
for on-demand services notified in the UK. This section sets out some details of our experience of regulating
this type of content, which may be useful for the Committee. Ofcom has no statutory powers to regulate
extremist material on other online services.
Ofcom’s experience of regulating television and radio broadcast services
Material intended to incite hate
5.2 Ofcom has statutory powers to set standards to protect audiences from harm from religious extremism
broadcast on television and radio. Rule 3.1 of the Code states that “material likely to encourage or incite the
commission of crime or lead to disorder must not be included in television or radio services”. When considering
potential breaches of Rule 3.1, a key factor that Ofcom takes into account is whether the content, as it was
presented, contained a call to action which would be likely to encourage or incite the commission of crime
or disorder.
5.3 Ofcom takes the issue of incitement to crime or violence extremely seriously. On the occasions where
this issue has arisen, we have taken robust and appropriate action. For example, we have recently published four
sanction decisions relating to the broadcast of material that was likely to encourage or incite the commission of
crime (including hatred) and/or was abusive towards a religion or belief.66
Unlawful content
5.4 If a broadcast service includes unlawful content, such as child abuse images, this would clearly be a
matter for the criminal justice system. Ofcom would therefore report any such activity and the licensee
responsible to the relevant authorities. Ofcom also has statutory powers to act quickly in response to the
inclusion of any such content.
Ofcom’s experience of co-regulation for on-demand content
Material intended to incite hate
5.5 Rule 10 in the ATVOD Rules reflects section 368E(1) of the Act and states that: “An on-demand
programme service must not contain any material likely to incite hatred based on race, sex, religion or
nationality”.
66
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/content-sanctions-adjudications/Rehmatul-DM-Digital.pdf
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/content-sanctions-adjudications/regis1limited.pdf
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/content-sanctions-adjudications/noor-tv.pdf
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/content-sanctions-adjudications/takbeer.pdf
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5.6 To date there have been no cases where ATVOD has breached a notified ODPS under Rule 10.
Unlawful content
5.7 ATVOD’s Rule 11 of the ATVOD Rules reflects section 368E(2) of the Communications Act and states
that, “if an on-demand programme service contains material which might seriously impair the physical, mental
or moral development of persons under the age of eighteen, the material must be made available in a manner
which secures that such persons will not normally see or hear it.”
5.8 ATVOD’s Rule 11 captures content which is illegal, for example criminally obscene or indecent images.
If content of this nature was included in a notified ODPS ATVOD would refer the service to Ofcom
immediately. Ofcom would then immediately seek to suspend the service and notify the relevant authorities.
Ofcom’s role for online content
5.9 Other than the regulatory duties we have set out above, which relate to television channels delivered on
the internet and notified ODPS, Ofcom has no statutory powers to regulate hate material or abusive images
online.
5.10 Illegal material such as child abuse images are within the remit of two bodies in the UK. The Internet
Watch Foundation (IWF) is a self-regulatory regime funded by telecommunications and internet companies,
which works to restrict the availability of child abuse images online; and the Child Exploitation and Online
Protection Centre (CEOP), is the UK Police body dedicated to eradicating the sexual abuse of children. CEOP
tracks and seeks prosecution of offenders, such as those who create, distribute or consume child abuse images.
These bodies work closely together under a formal agreement.
5.11 Extremist material online is a substantial concern and poses significant risk to UK citizens. This will
continue to be a clear regulatory challenge for the future. Industry-led approaches and tools will continue to
play an important role in protecting audiences from such harmful content online.
Section 6
Preventing abusive comments on social media
6.1 Ofcom has experience of regulating abusive content on television and radio services, which may be of
assistance to the Committee, details of which are set out below. While Ofcom has no statutory role to regulate
abusive content, outside of television channels delivered on the internet, this section also sets out some research
findings regarding children’s behaviour and experience of online social media, which may be of both interest
and use to the Committee.
Ofcom’s experience of regulating television and radio broadcast services
6.2 Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code contains rules which aim to protect audiences from abusive content on
broadcast television and radio services. For example:
— Rule 3.1 of the Code states that “material likely to encourage or incite the commission of crime
or lead to disorder must not be included in television or radio services”;
— Rule 4.2 states that “the religious views and briefs of those belonging to a particular religion
or religious denomination must not be subject to abusive treatment”;
— Rule 2.3 states that “in applying generally accepted standards broadcasters must ensure that
material which may cause offence is justified by the context. Such material may include, but is
not limited to...humiliation, distress, violation of human dignity, discriminatory treatment or
language (for example on the grounds of age, disability, gender, race, religion, beliefs and
sexual orientation)”; and
— Rule 7.1 states that “Broadcasters must avoid unjust or unfair treatment of individuals or
organisations in programmes”.
6.3 Ofcom recently sanctioned the licensee Takbeer TV Limited for serious breaches of Rule 4.1
“broadcasters must exercise the proper degree of responsibility with respect to the content of programmes
which are religious programmes” and Rule 4.2 “the religious views and briefs of those belonging to a particular
religion or religious denomination must not be subject to abusive treatment”. In this case the broadcast
contained abusive statements about the Ahmadi Muslim community and beliefs.67
6.4 In addition, Ofcom has recorded a series of breaches of Rule 4.2 of the Broadcasting Code against the
licensee Ummah Channel Limited for broadcasting abusive content on its service, Ummah Channel. This
television channel broadcast programmes which included terms and references when taken together amounted
to “abusive treatment” of religious views and briefs.68
67
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http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/content-sanctions-adjudications/takbeer.pdf
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/broadcast-bulletins/obb167/issue167.pdf;
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/broadcast-bulletins/obb196/obb196.pdf
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Ofcom’s experience of co-regulation for on-demand content
6.5 ATVOD has no rules to regulate abusive content on notified ODPS, ie content that is not considered to
be hate speech or material likely to incite crime, or does not amount to R18 equivalent material.
Relevant research findings of online services
6.6 Our Media Literacy research into adults’ and children/parents’ media use and attitudes indicates that for
the first time there is a decrease in the number of children with social networking profiles and there appears to
be greater diversity in the types of social networking sites being used.
6.7 Other relevant findings include:
— Compared to 2012, children are less likely to know how to block messages from someone they
don’t want to hear from (53% vs. 68%) and to have done this in the past year (32% vs. 42%).
— 19% of 12–15s say they personally have had a negative experience, other than bullying, of
online or mobile phone activity in the past year, where the most likely experience is gossip
being spread (13%).
— Girls aged 12–15 are more likely than boys to have experienced gossip being spread about
them online or through texts (17% vs. 10%) or to have seen/received something troubling online
like a chain letter or something that makes them feels scared (4% vs. 0%).
— Girls aged 12–15 are more likely than boys to say they know of someone who has been bullied
through a mobile phone (33% vs. 20%) and to say they have experienced bullying in this way
(12% vs. 3%).
— Almost one in ten 12–15s and one in twenty-five 8–11s say they have experienced online
bullying in the last year.
— Since 2012, those aged 12–15 with an active social networking profile are more likely to have
a profile on Twitter (37% vs. 25% in 2012).
6.8 The above findings highlight further the importance of providing consumers with clear information,
education and the right framework through which to protect themselves and their families from potentially
harmful content of this kind.
6.9 As already stated, self-regulatory approaches will continue to play an important role in providing this
framework in order to help protect adults and children in an online world. For example, there is increasing
responsibility for industry to provide consumers with effective reporting tools, community standards or terms
of use; and the need for transparent and demonstrably effective procedures for handling complaints and
removing non-compliant content. It should be clear to consumers how to complain or what action to take if
they see or hear content that is harmful or unsuitable for children.
6.10 The research findings also highlight the importance of providing children in particular with the right
tools and media literacy skills to address this issue and understand the potential risks.
October 2013
Written evidence submitted by the Home Office
Introduction
1. This paper sets out the Home Office’s evidence to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee inquiry into
online safety.
2. Ensuring safety online, particularly for children, is a priority for Government. In a speech to the National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) the Prime Minister set out a range of measures to
ensure that the cultural challenges of protecting children from accessing potentially harmful or age
inappropriate content, and the challenges of restricting the availability of, and access to, criminal content such
as child abuse material are met..
3. The Home Office’s evidence focuses particularly on the Committee’s concerns about illegal child abuse
images online and illegal extremist materials online. It should be considered alongside evidence submitted by
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport on harmful or age inappropriate content and threatening or
abusive behaviour..
Tackling Illegal Child Abuse Images Online
4. Research by the NSPCC indicates that about 5% of children in the UK suffer contact sexual abuse at
some point during their childhood. Child abuse has many forms, one of which is online and multinational
activity using sophisticated technology and techniques to evade law enforcement attention. The internet
(including the so-called “hidden internet” which facilitates a sense of a “safe” community of offenders) is used
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for the proliferation of indecent images of children. Work to tackle this between government, law enforcement
and industry is an important part of the Organised Crime Strategy that was published on [7 October].
5. Images of child sexual abuse are illegal. It is illegal to take, make, circulate and distribute child abuse
images (Protection of Children Act 1978)—such offences carry a maximum sentence of ten years’
imprisonment. It is illegal to possess indecent images of children (Criminal Justice Act 1988)—such offences
carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. Such offences apply equally online as they would
offline.
6. The Government has worked with industry to develop some of the tightest controls in the world so that
child abuse images are removed from the internet where possible, blocked from being accessed from the UK
where they cannot be removed, and investigated so that those involved in their production, distribution or
possession are brought to justice and so that the victims of these crimes can be protected and safeguarded. The
Child exploitation and Online Protection Command of the National Crime Agency is central to this effort.
7. Tackling such abuse on the internet forms an important aspect of our wider approach to protecting children
and vulnerable people—a key priority of this Government. The Government has established a Sexual Violence
Against Children and Vulnerable People National Group (SVACV). This is a panel of experts and policy
makers brought together by the Home Office to coordinate and implement the learning from recent inquiries
into historic child sexual abuse and current sexual violence prevention issues. Tackling the misuse of the
internet by those seeking to sexually abuse children, or gain personal gratification from it, is an important
aspect of the National Group’s work. On 24 July 2013, the Government published a progress report and action
plan on the work of the SVACV National Group. This contained clear activity already delivered by the
Government to protect children online and an action plan to take forward further activity identified by the
Group. The progress report and action plan can be found at the following link:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sexual-violence-against-children-and-vulnerable-peoplenational-group.
Removing Illegal Child Abuse Images from the Internet and Preventing Access to Them
8. The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) takes reports of illegal child abuse images from the public. It has
the authority to hold and analyse these images through agreement with the Crown Prosecution Service and the
Association of Chief Police Officers. The IWF assesses images, determines whether they are illegal and, if so,
the severity of the images using Sentencing Council guidelines. Work is ongoing to expand the role of the IWF
so that it can proactively search for child abuse images rather than being reliant on reports from industry and
the public.
9. If the site hosting the image is located in the UK then the details will be passed to law enforcement
agencies and the Internet Service Provider will be asked to take down the website using the “notice and
takedown” process. In 2012, the Internet Watch Foundation found that 56% of UK child sexual abuse images
were removed in 60 minutes or less from the point at which the Internet Service Provider or hosting provider
was notified of the content. IWF Members remove 90% of such content within one hour, and 100% within two
hours. In the past 17 years, over 400,000 webpages have been assessed—100,000 have been removed for
containing criminal content. Less than 1% of child sexual abuse content is now thought to be hosted in the
UK, down from 18% in 1996.
10. Where images are hosted outside the UK, the IWF will pass the details to their equivalent body in the
country identified as hosting it so that they can take action. Often it is taken down completely, and the average
time taken to remove child sexual abuse content hosted outside the UK had reduced to ten days in 2011
compared to over a month in 2008. Until the content is taken down the Internet Watch Foundation adds the
URL to its “URL list” or “blocking list” which IWF Members can use to block access by their customers to
the identified images. Such blocking arrangements currently apply to about 98.6% of domestic broadband lines.
11. The IWF is working with its members to introduce “splash pages”—these are warning messages that
appear if a user attempts to access a webpage that has been removed for hosting illegal child abuse images,
and they deliver a hard-hitting deterrence message to users seeking to access child abuse images.
12. These arrangements have been enormously successful, but the Government is committed to going further
still in order to prevent offenders from being able to access child abuse images through the internet. That is
why the Prime Minister, in his speech of 22 July, announced a further set of initiatives.
13. Internet search engine providers have been asked to go further in restricting access to illegal child sexual
abuse images. They have been asked to do three things:
(a) To work with law enforcement to develop effective deterrence messages to target those users
who try to access child abuse images through their search engines.
(b) To ensure that illegal child sexual abuse images are not returned in search results, and to use
their search algorithms to guide users away from searches that could contain pathways to child
abuse images.
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(c) To prevent any search results from being returned when specific search terms are used that
have been identified by CEOP as being unambiguously aimed at accessing illegal child sexual
abuse images.
14. The Government continues to work with search engine providers to put these measures in place. If
progress is not forthcoming then the Government will consider bringing forward legislation to require their
compliance.
15. The objective for all of these actions is to make it more difficult for unsophisticated users to find a route
from open searching to more sophisticated offending environments, make it more difficult for inquisitive nonoffenders to access indecent images of children, and make it less likely that members of the public could
inadvertently come across such images.
Investigating Those Responsible for Illegal Child Abuse Images and Protecting Victims
16. The Child Exploitation and Online Protection Command of the National Crime Agency (CEOP) is the
national lead for tackling sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children. It is an integral part of the new
National Crime Agency, that was established on 7 October 2013 to lead the UK’s fight to cut serious and
organised crime.
17. CEOP has done excellent work over the last seven years. It is dedicated to eradicating the sexual abuse
of children, and supports both operational work to protect children and educational programmes to help children
protect themselves online. It operates a reporting centre for children who want to report online sexual threats
(in 2012–13 CEOP received an average of 1,600 reports per month of abuse from the public and the internet
industry) a 14% increase on the previous year. This will have included direct reports from children. CEOP
maintains close relationships with a wide range of stakeholders from law enforcement, industry and the
educational sectors nationally and internationally. In 2012–13, CEOP safeguarded and protected 790 children,
an increase of 85% on the previous year, and its work led to the arrest of 192 suspects. CEOP has now
protected more than 2,250 children in its seven-year history.
18. Government funding for CEOP was higher in 2012/13 (£6.381m) than it was in 2009/10 (£6.353m). The
CEOP budget has effectively been protected in cash terms since 2011/12 and there are now more people
working in CEOP than at any time in its history.
19. Becoming a part of the NCA will bring advantages to CEOP. Its existing operating principles will be
preserved as agreed when the Plan for the NCA was published, including its innovative partnerships with
private and voluntary sectors. It will also gain access to more capacity to deal with complex cases of child
sexual exploitation and abuse. It will gain greater resilience for front-line operational services and benefit from
support from other NCA specialist functions such as the National Cyber Crime Unit. Its influence, as part of
the national leadership the NCA will have across law enforcement, will be enhanced. The Crime and Courts
Act 2013 places a statutory duty on the NCA to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in England and
Wales, which means that all officers, not just those directly involved in child protection, will receive mandatory
training on safeguarding children. This means that every one of over 4000 officers will have a legal duty to
safeguard and promote child welfare so will be able to protect even more children from harm.
20. CEOP take the creation, distribution and accessing of illegal child sexual abuse images online extremely
seriously. Not only do such images capture a child being sexually abused, but the viewing of such images can
lead to an escalation in offending as well as continuing the victimisation of the child being abused in the
image. A CEOP report in 2012 (“A Picture of Abuse”) noted that research had identified a link between the
possession of illegal images of children and the contact sexual abuse of children.
21. The Government will support CEOP and the police to tackle those involved in the creation, dissemination
and accessing of child abuse images online. This includes ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the
powers that they need to investigate offenders and bring them to justice, and to develop new capabilities that
will enhance their effectiveness. The Prime Minister, in his speech of 22 July, announced plans for the creation
of a new child abuse image database that would hold a national record of the images seized by the police. This
would enable the police to identify known images more quickly on suspects’ computers, will improve their
ability to identify and safeguard victims from the images, and has the potential to enable industry to use the
unique numerical “hash values” derived from the images to search for them on their networks and remove the
before offenders can access them.
22. CEOP is also at the forefront of efforts to tackle more sophisticated offending where encryption and
anonymisation is used by offenders to share illegal child abuse images through photo-sharing sites or networks
away from the mainstream internet. This includes work in collaboration with the internet industry and the
Internet Watch Foundation to tackle the peer-to-peer sharing of child abuse images.
Working to Tackle Child Abuse Images Globally:
23. In addition to the work of the IWF considered above, CEOP work extensively with their partners overseas
to tackle the global threat from illegal child abuse images. CEOP participates in, leads and assists international
investigations into illegal child sexual abuse images and online child sexual exploitation. CEOP is also a
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founding member of the Virtual Global Taskforce which brings together law enforcement, public and third
sector partners from across the world to tackle child abuse materials.
24. The UK strongly supports the work of the Global Alliance between the EU and US, with CEOP leading
the work for the UK. The Deputy Director of CEOP is leading as the Driver on the EU EMPACT (European
Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats) Cyber Child Sexual Exploitation initiative. The first
meeting took place in October 2013 at Europol and agreed the Strategic Goals and Action Plan for 2014.
25. The Prime Minister has asked Joanna Shields, the Business Ambassador for Digital Industries, to lead
industry engagement for a new UK—US taskforce to bring together the technical ability of the industry in both
countries to tackle the use of the internet for child sexual abuse images. The Government expects to be able
to make further announcements about the work of the taskforce in due course.
Prevention—Helping Children Protect Themselves Against Becoming Victims
26. Online safety for children is of paramount importance to Government, and there are major crossGovernment efforts taking place to ensure that children learn about staying safe online both in schools and
through other initiatives.
27. CEOP’s work to educate children and young people focuses particularly on the implications of their
online behaviour, the “digital footprint” they leave, and the range of contact, content and conduct risks they
face online. CEOP has developed a specific educational programme called ThinkuKnow to tackle this issue.
The programme includes educational films and cartoons, teachers’ packs and other online resources for use
with children aged four—18. In 2012–13, over 2.6 million children saw the ThinkuKnow resources. In the
same year, over 800 professionals in education, child protection and law enforcement have been trained by
CEOP to educate children about online safety and how to respond to incidents. The Government, through
CEOP, has now trained over 25,000 professionals who deliver these key messages to children in classrooms
and other youth settings.
Tackling Material Intended to Promote Terrorism or Other Acts of Violence Online
28. Extremists use the internet to spread extremist messages to committed terrorists and those vulnerable to
radicalisation. This material covers a spectrum from illegal AI Qaeda propaganda which incites violence like
Inspire magazine, through to dedicated extremist forums and hate preacher videos on social media.
29. We know from recent attacks in Boston and Woolwich that online terrorist and extremist material remains
one of a range of variables that can contribute to an individual becoming radicalised, and/or tipping into the
acceptance of undertaking violent acts.69 Our primary focus under the Prevent Strategy (2011) has therefore
been to remove online material that breaches terrorism legislation. Proposals for going further to restrict access
to this material will be discussed at the Extremism taskforce in October 2013.
Current Approach—Limiting Access to Illegal/Terrorist Material
30. A specialist police unit, the Counter Terrorism Referral Unit (CTIRU) currently take down material that
breaches the Terrorism Act and is hosted in the UK, or—where we have strong relationships with industry.
CTIRU proactively seeks to identify illegal material, and members of the public concerned about terrorist or
extremist content online are able to refer material for investigation and potential removal by the CTIRU. In
this respect, the CTIRU acts like the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) in receiving reports and ensuring content
is removed where possible.
31. Since it was established in 2010, CTIRU have taken down over 6000 pieces of material (more than
5,000 of which in the last 12 months). Even so, we would like to take down more terrorist content. However,
a significant amount is hosted overseas and domestic law, even when it has extra-territorial jurisdiction, is of
limited use. It would be difficult to prosecute a person or service provider operating outside the UK—they
would have to be extradited to the UK to face prosecution and they could well argue that they had not engaged
in criminal conduct in the country in which they were operating.
32. Where we cannot take down material, it is filtered from parts of the public estate (we have prioritised
schools and some libraries). The filtering project has developed and our content list (of over 1000 URLs) is
assessed by both CTIRU and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to contain only URLs that are illegal. The
main drawback with filtering is that UK users are still able to choose to view this illegal terrorist content (via
desktop settings). We are considering how we can further restrict access to illegal terrorist material (potentially
at the network level), further aligning with the IWF’s approach.
33. There is no consistent global definition for what constitutes extremist material and the majority of
harmful, offensive and inappropriate content online does not meet legal thresholds for action by law
enforcement. For extremist material, this includes al-Awlaki’s series of online sermons and practical instructions
that can be of use to terrorists.
69
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) assessment 2013
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Improve the Industry Response to Terrorist Content
34. We aim to encourage the public and civil society groups to report legal but harmful content and seek to
get it removed under industry terms and conditions. We are therefore working with industry to ensure their
acceptable use policies are clear about what is tolerated on their platform and provide easy mechanisms to flag
concerns about extreme content.
35. We are keen to see a consistently effective response to terrorist content across industry. We have seen
some improvement following bilateral negotiations on individual acceptable use policies, but inconsistencies
remain. Some companies run schemes which prioritise law enforcement referrals, however others make no
explicit mention of terrorist or extremist content in their policies nor do they provide a single point of contact
for law enforcement. Whilst engaging with industry to ensure that their own acceptable use policies are being
applied rigorously, we are also considering the Home Affairs Select Committee recommendation of establishing
a code of conduct for internet companies, distinct from their own terms and conditions, to improve the response
to terrorist material (eg including “terrorism” as a category under unacceptable use).
36. We also tackle this problem from the user-end and run digital awareness projects that work with
practitioners, parents and young people to ensure they have the skills to recognise and challenge extreme
content. For example, through Prevent funding the Youth Justice Board have trained a hundred youth offending
team practitioners to ensure they have skills to challenge and report extremism online and we have worked
with Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) who have disseminated an internet safety DVD to local
prevent projects, raising awareness of the issue. We will work with DCMS to ensure we are linked into
initiatives such as Safer Internet Centre and Get Safe Online, which provide internet safety information and
advice alongside a wealth of internet safety resources for schools and information for parents and children.
Making Extremist Content Less Attractive and Promoting Positive Messages
37. We also seek to divert audiences and those vulnerable to radicalisation from extremist messages. The
Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), part of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism
in the Home Office, aims to challenge and confront terrorist ideology and provide pathways for people to
explore alternatives. Activity includes working with digital communications experts to help civil society groups
make better use of the internet to counter extremist ideology. We intend to scale up this work.
38. RICU actively shares best practice on communications through the Global Counter Terrorism Forum,
the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network, and in bilateral work with the US and other countries.
October 2013
Written evidence submitted by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport
1. Introduction
1. The Government welcomes this inquiry into online safety. The internet has transformed our lives; changing
the way we interact with one another, promoting the development of new and innovative technologies and
driving the UK’s economic ambitions for the future. The UK has built strong digital foundations, and is reaping
the benefits—it is estimated that in 2010 the digital economy accounted for over 8% of GDP, a greater
proportion than in any other G20 country.70
2. Government’s aim is for the UK to be a nation of confident and safe consumers, able to make the most
of the opportunities the digital world has to offer. However, in the face of such rapid technological and cultural
change—as well as maximising the benefits the internet brings—we must be aware of, and responsive to, the
risks it presents. In July this year, Government published a policy paper, “Connectivity, content and consumers:
Britain’s digital platform for growth”71 following its review of the media and telecommunications sectors. This
policy paper considers the issue of online safety but also sites it in the context of the wider media environment.
3. Ensuring safety online, particularly for children, is a priority for Government. In a speech72 on 22 July
to the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) the Prime Minister set out a range
of measures to ensure that the cultural challenges of protecting children from accessing potentially harmful or
age inappropriate content, and the challenges of restricting the availability of, and access to, criminal content
such as child abuse material are met. This evidence considers harmful or age inappropriate content (section 2)
and threatening or abusive behaviour (section 3). The Home Office will be submitting written evidence in
relation to illegal content separately.
70
71
72
Boston Consulting Group
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/connectivity-content-and-consumers-britains-digital-platform-for-growth
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-internet-and-pornography-prime-minister-calls-for-action
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2. Harmful Content
4. Currently, 91% of children live in households with internet access and a greater proportion of children
aged 12–15 own smartphones than adults.73 While consenting adults should be free to watch the legal content
they choose, and while children and young people are important consumers of digital content, it is the case
children’s use of the internet can be a cause of concern for parents. Government understands that, first and
foremost, responsibility for keeping children safe online falls to parents and guardians; however, Government
is acting to ensure that parents have the tools and information they need to be able to do so.
UK Council on Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS)
5. Government believes that a multi-stakeholder approach to the issue of limiting the access of children to
harmful content is the most effective way to deliver results. The Government has been working through the
UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), which brings together more than 200 organisations across
the information and communication industries, law enforcement, regulators, academia, and charities—to pursue
a voluntary approach to child internet safety and has called on industry to make the right tools available to
allow parents to protect children online.
Measures for limiting access to harmful content
6. In his speech on 22 July, the Prime Minister outlined the range of measures Government is working with
industry to deliver which will help parents and guardians limit children’s access to harmful or age
inappropriate content:
73
74
—
Domestic internet filtering: Providing parents and guardians with easy-to-use and effective tools to
help limit the content that children can access in the home is a key aspect of the overall package of
measures that should be available. Government has been working with industry to secure the
commitment that, by the end of this year, the four largest internet service providers (ISPs)—BT,
Virgin Media, Sky and TalkTalk making up almost 90% of the fixed broadband market74—will
provide, free of charge, family-friendly network-level filtering (covering all of the devices in the
home which connect to that internet service) for new customers by the end of this year. This will
mean that, when someone sets up a new broadband account, the settings to install family-friendly
filters will be automatically selected; if customers just click next or enter, then the filters would
automatically be on. ISPs have also committed to contacting existing customers through 2014 and
providing them with an unavoidable choice on whether or not to set up filters. Again, this will be
free of charge. While the technology being deployed by each of the ISPs is different, based on the
differing infrastructure they have in place, the family-friendly filtering solutions offered will include
a number of customisable options, allowing parents to select or de-select categories of content,
“black-list” or “white-list” (filter or ensure access, respectively) certain URLs, dependent upon their
own specific circumstances.
—
Verification of those setting the filters: ISPs have also committed to developing processes to ensure
that the person setting the filters are aged 18 or over, so avoiding the situation that it is a child
setting the filtering levels. It is anticipated that this will be delivered through a “closed-loop” email
system where the main account holder will be contacted to verify the setting of filters, and informed
if the settings on the filters are changed subsequently.
—
Smaller ISPs: While the largest ISPs cover almost 90% of the broadband market, Government is
exploring options for the smaller ISPs—through the Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA)—
to deliver tools and solutions to their domestic consumers which can put users in control of the
content they, and their family, receive.
—
Filtered public Wi-Fi: The six largest wireless internet providers (Arqiva, BT, Nomad, Sky, Virgin
and O2) covering around 90% of the market committed to, and have implemented, publicly available
family-friendly Wi-Fi in places where children regularly visit, ensuring that children are unable to
access pornographic content.
—
Mobile phone filtering: The Mobile Broadband Group published a UK “Code of Practice for new
forms of Content on Mobile” in 2005 which requires mobile network operators (MNOs) to provide
a filter to their internet access services. Whilst the vast majority of providers are filtering internet
services in this way, coupled with robust age verification processes, Three—as the last major operator
to fully implement these measures—has committed to doing so.
—
Public awareness campaign: The largest ISPs are working to develop an awareness campaign for
parents for next year. This campaign will provide support and advice to parents about bringing their
parenting skills into the online world and will complement plans by Government to highlight internet
safety messages in interactions it has with citizens.
Source: Ofcom Children and Parents: Media Use and Attitudes Report Oct 2012— http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/
research/media-literacy/oct2012/main.pdf
Source: Ofcom Communications Market Report 2013 http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/2013_UK_
CMR.pdf
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—
Ofcom reporting: Ofcom has been asked to report, by the end of this year, on a number of areas in
relation to child internet safety—predominantly around parental awareness of, and confidence in
using, the internet safety tools available. A further report, in a year’s time, will help assess whether
levels of parental awareness and confidence have increased as a result of these measures.
7. While these will provide a range of tools to help support parents and guardians to make sure children do
not access harmful or age inappropriate content Government is clear that technology is not the only way in
which this issue should be addressed. Ensuring that children are resilient, competent and confident when online
is important and education is a key aspect of this.
Education
8. As part of the government’s reforms to the national curriculum, it will be strengthening the requirements
to teach e-safety as part of changes to the new computing programmes of study. The existing national
curriculum only requires e-safety to be taught to 11 to 16 year olds in key stages 3 and 4. From September
2014 e-safety will be taught to pupils at all key stages, from primary pupils aged five through to secondary
pupils aged 16.
9. There is also the award-winning programme for children and parents Think U Know75 which is produced
by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP—part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency,
a Government Agency). Through trained volunteers, this programme reaches hundreds of thousands of children
each year, educating them on topics such as grooming and sexting. CEOP falls under the command of the
National Crime Agency on 7 October.
10. The UK’s Safer Internet Centre76 (supported with EU funds) has a hotline for internet safety information
and advice and provides a wealth of internet safety resources for schools and information for parents and
children. The Centre leads on activity for Safer Internet Day in February each year which attracts significant
media coverage (this year on BBC Radio 1 and 5 Live in addition to coverage on Facebook and Google).
11. Get Safe Online77 is a joint initiative between the Government, law enforcement, leading businesses
and the public sector. Their aim is to provide computer users and small businesses with free, independent, userfriendly advice that will allow them to use the internet confidently, safely and securely. Working with Get Safe
Online, the National Fraud Authority’s e-Confidence campaign begins in October.
12. Childnet is a children’s charity working in the area of policy and has developed a range of awardwinning websites and resources to help provide children, parents and teachers with the information and skills
they need to use the internet safely and responsibly. Examples of Childnet’s work include the Know IT All78
suite of resources, the guidance for schools on cyberbullying, the Let’s Fight it together film, and many more.
13. The South West Grid for Learning79 is a not for profit, charitable trust company, that specialises in
supporting organisations with online safety. It was established in 2000 to provide schools and many other
educational establishments throughout the South West of England with safe broadband internet connectivity;
broadband-enabled learning resources but especially providing professionals, parents and children with advice,
resources and support in using the internet safely across the wider UK.
14. ParentPort80 was launched in October 2011, following the Bailey Review, to make it easier for parents
to complain about material they see or hear across the media, communications and retail industries. ParentPort
is run by the UK’s media regulators and provides parents with useful information about media standards
and internet safety as well as giving parents an easy way to make a complaint and share their views with
the regulators.
3. Abusive or Threatening Behaviour
15. The issue of abusive or threatening behaviour—whether targeted at adults or children—over the internet
is an area of concern for Government. However, the legislative position in relation to this is clear; where
behaviour is illegal off-line it is also illegal on-line and there are a number of pieces of legislation which can
be, and are, used to prosecute.
Legislation and Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Guidance
16. Communications sent via social media are capable of amounting to criminal offences in relation to a
range of legislation. Including:
— Communications which may constitute credible threats of violence to the person or damage to
property.
75
76
77
78
79
80
http://www.thinkuknow.co.uk/
http://www.saferinternet.org.uk/
https://www.getsafeonline.org/
http://www.childnet.com/resources/kia/
http://www.swgfl.org.uk/Staying-Safe
http://www.parentport.org.uk/
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—
Communications which specifically target an individual or individuals and which may constitute
harassment or stalking within the meaning of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
—
Communications which may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false.
17. Communications which are grossly offence, obscene, indecent or false fall to be considered either under
section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 or under section 127 of the Communications Act 2003.
18. Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 makes it an offence to send to another person:
(a) an electronic communication which conveys:
(i) a message which is indecent or grossly offensive;
(ii) a threat; or
(iii) information which is false, and is known or believed to be false by the sender; or
(b) any electronic communication which is, in whole or part, of an indecent or grossly offensive nature,
provided that one of the purposes of sending the communication is to cause distress or anxiety to
the recipient. The offence is one of sending, delivering or transmitting, so there is no legal
requirement for the communication to reach the intended recipient.
19. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 makes it an offence to send or cause to be sent through a
“public electronic communications network” a message or other matter that is “grossly offensive” or of an
“indecent, obscene or menacing character”. The same section also provides that it is an offence to send or cause
to be sent a message that the person knows to be false “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or
needless anxiety to another”. The defendant must be shown to have intended or be aware that the message was
grossly offensive, indecent or menacing, which can be inferred from the terms of the message or from the
defendant’s knowledge of the likely recipient. The offence is committed by sending the message. There is no
requirement that any person sees the message or be offended by it.
20. Other relevant legislation includes:
—
Offences Against the Person Act 1861;
—
Computer Misuse Act 1990;
—
Protection from Harassment Act 1997;
—
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and
—
Section 15 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (for grooming)
21. In June 2013, following consultation, the Director for Public Prosecutions published guidelines81 for
prosecutors when considering cases involving communications sent via social media. These guidelines set out
that prosecutors (subject to general guidelines around having sufficient evidence and whether prosecution is in
the public interest) should, when considering whether communications sent via social media are capable of
amounting to criminal offences, make an initial assessment of the content of the communications and the
conduct to distinguish between:
—
There is a credible threat of violence.
—
Where communications specifically target an individual or individuals.
—
Where communications breach a court order.
—
Where communications may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false.
22. These guidelines seek to draw the difficult balance between protecting freedom of speech on the one
hand with acting robustly against communications which cross the threshold into illegality.
23. Data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (below) shows that whilst almost a third of adults
had some form of negative experience online, the majority were related to viruses. The proportions of people
experiencing “upsetting/illegal images” and “threatening/abusive behaviour” are much lower, and some of
those experiences are also likely not to have met the criminal threshold.
Experience of negative incidents online among adults aged 16 and over
2010–11 2011–12
Computer virus
Loss of money
Unauthorised access to/use of personal data
Upsetting/illegal images
Abusive/threatening behaviour
Any of the above incidents
Other (ie experienced no incident)
81
26.0%
2.6%
4.5%
3.1%
1.6%
30.5%
69.5%
24.6%
2.6%
5.2%
3.5%
1.4%
29.4%
70.6%
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/dpp_publishes_final_guidelines_for_prosecutions_involving_social_media_
communications/
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev 111
Acceptable use policies and reporting mechanisms
24. In the vast majority of cases communications sent via social media will not cross the threshold into
criminal behaviour but may still cause offence to other users. Where this is the case, Government expects
social media companies, and others, to have robust processes in place promptly when abuse is reported;
including acting expeditiously to assess the report, removing content which does not comply with the acceptable
use policies or terms and conditions in place and, where appropriate, suspending or terminating the accounts
of those breaching the rules in place.
25. A UKCCIS working group has been looking at the issue of transparency of reporting processes following
reports of abuse by social network users and difficulties with complaints and reporting. Parents and children
have indicated that they often cannot easily make a report, that their report may not be handled quickly and
they are given little feedback about how their reports are dealt with. Ministers will consider how this work can
best be taken forward at the next UKCCIS board meeting on 6 November.
October 2013
Supplementary written evidence submitted by the NSPCC
Introduction
1. The NSPCC welcomed the opportunity to respond to the Culture, Media and Sport (CMS) Select
Committee inquiry into online safety in September, and we were delighted to be invited to come before the
committee in October to give oral evidence.
2. Since then, the NSPCC has released further research on the issue of online safety and was the only
children’s charity to be involved in the Prime Minister’s internet safety summit in November. As such, we
have requested to submit supplementary evidence to the inquiry, to be read alongside our original response.
We hope both the statistics and perspectives included here are helpful for the Committee when making its
recommendations.
Harmful Contact Online
New Key Stats
— 10,600 young people contacted ChildLine in 2012–13 for support and advice on how to deal with
internet safety related issues—a 65% increase on the year before82
— 4,507 young people contacted ChildLine in 2012–13 for support and advice on how to deal with
being bullied online—an 87% increase on the year before83
— More than One in Four 11–16 year olds with a social networking profile have experienced something
upsetting on a social networking site.84
3. Research the NSPCC is about to launch research which shows that 28% of young people who have a
social networking profile have experienced something that has upset them in the last year. These experiences
include cyberstalking, being subjected to aggressive or offensive language, being sent sexually explicit pictures
and being asked to provide personal or private information. However, the greatest proportion of this group
(37%) told us that they had experienced “trolling”. Another alarming statistic showed that over half of these
young people said they did not know the person who was responsible for the behaviour that upset them.
4. Alongside this evidence that online bullying is clearly a problem for young people in the UK, the latest
ChildLine statistics showed an 87% increase in 2012–13 in the number of young people contacting us to ask
for support and advice about being bullied via social networking sites, chat rooms, online gaming sites, or via
their mobile phones. We believe the increasing ownership of smartphones and tablets by young people is likely
to be contributing to this trend.
5. In our original submission to the Committee the NSPCC described the need for online safety, including
information about respectful behaviours and managing upsetting experiences, to be a core part of the national
curriculum, taught through compulsory Sex and Relationships Education (SRE). We also called for social
networking sites and other technological leaders to provide straightforward and meaningful ways to report
abuse online. We continue to call for this action and in addition the NSPCC would be delighted if the
Committee could support the following asks:
— The UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) Executive Board should make tackling the risks
children experience on social networking sites a priority
— Ofcom—should play a greater role in providing easily accessible information to parents about social
networking sites
82
83
84
Can I tell you something?, ChildLine Reviewt 2012/13 (Jan 2014) http://www.nspcc.org.uk/news-and-views/media-centre/pressreleases/2014/childline-report/childline-report_can-i-tell-you-something_wdf100354.pdf
Ibid
New NSPCC research due for release end Feb 2014
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Ev 112 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
—
Social networking sites and others—should offer a range of options for how to report illegal or
offensive bullying or content and default privacy settings should be set to the highest levels possible
for users under 18. The NSPCC also believes sites should provide incentives for new users to take
safety and etiquette tutorials.
6. Additional to the issue of online bullying, the ChildLine annual review, Can I tell you something? also
showed that 1061 young people specifically talked about online sexual abuse, with girls being the most affected.
ChildLine also saw a 28% increase in contacts from young people who talked about being asked to post
sexually provocative images online, or share them via a mobile phone.
7. The NSPCC remains adamant that children should be given strategies to resist unwanted sexual
approaches, encouraged to report upsetting experiences online and be taught about online safety as part of
compulsory SRE lessons at school. We are pleased that the Government has committed to emailing out to
every school SRE advice developed by Brook, the Sex Education Forum and others. This is a helpful interim
measure to address the current shortfall in up-to-date statutory SRE guidance. However, we believe the
Government should commit to updating the official SRE guidance from 2000 to include issues children face
in today’s world, like staying safe online.
8. We do, of course, believe parents have a central role in talking to their children about how to stay safe
online. We appreciate these conversations might feel daunting, but we believe parents needn’t be experts on
the internet, but instead treat online safety as they would any other form of parenting where rules and
boundaries need to be set.
9. We also recognise that other agencies that work with children and prioritise children’s safety should play
a role alongside schools and parents in providing online safety advice and education. The NSPCC in October
2013 launched the ChildLine ZipIt app to discourage children from sending sexually explicit messages. This
has already been downloaded by 40,000 young people so far. We have also developed in collaboration with
CEOP the Keeping Children Safe Online e-learning course aimed at any organisation or professional working
with children.
Age-inappropriate Content
New Key Stats
—
63% of children aged 11–12, who use a social networking site, have a profile on Facebook, and
28% use Twitter despite the minimum age for registration on both sites being set at 13.85
—
28% of over 601 school pupils surveyed by the NSPCC think pornography definitely “influences
how young people have to behave in a relationship.”86
10. Based on our research, we estimate that half of all the 11 and 12 year olds in the UK use services that
have a minimum age of 13. The NSPCC is concerned that this leaves them vulnerable to engaging with content
and behaviours that are not appropriate for their age. In addition, ChildLine counselled 475 young people who
had been exposed to sexually explicit images or internet pornography and almost one third of children surveyed
by the NSPCC about watching pornography said it affected the way they acted when they were in a relationship.
11. We support plans by the major Internet Service Providers (ISP) to launch a national campaign to help
parents use the filters and tools that are available to them to manage the online content to which their children
have access, and more broadly help parents to understand more about internet safety. To support these efforts,
the NSPCC also calls for:
—
UKCCIS—to undertake a robust and independent evaluation of the ISPs campaign to measure its
effectiveness and push for improvements where needed
—
The Government—should evaluate the effectiveness of active choice plus and be prepared to explore
legislative solutions to children accessing adult content and services.
Child Abuse Images
12. In our original evidence to the Committee the NSPCC explained that a Freedom of Information request
we made in 2010 revealed that nearly 26 million child sexual abuse images had been confiscated in the
preceding two years from just five of the 43 police forces in England and Wales which were able to check
their records. At that time most forces said it would take too long to interrogate files to see how many pictures
of children being sexually abused they had accumulated during investigations. However, estimates of the
number of online child abuse images confiscated by police in England and Wales each year in the UK range
from 100–360 million.87
85
86
87
NSPCC, Younger Children and Social Networking Sites: A Blind Spot? (Nov 2013) http://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/
resourcesforprofessionals/onlinesafety/younger-children-report_wdf99929.pdf
NSPCC (Sept 2013) http://www.nspcc.org.uk/news-and-views/our-news/child-protection-news/telegraph-better-sex-education/
online-porn-dictates-young-people-relationships_wda98264.html
NSPCC (Oct 2012) http://www.nspcc.org.uk/news-and-views/media-centre/press-releases/2012/12–10–15-urgent-action-childabuse-images/urgent-action-child-abuse-images_wdn92344.html
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13. The NSPCC welcomed the opportunity to contribute to the Prime Minister’s internet safety summit in
November, and we were pleased by the commitment shown by the leading search engines to ensure that tens
of thousands of the most disturbing search terms will return only “clean” results and warnings about child
abuse imagery. We now urge the Government and industry to work together to monitor and evaluate the
effectiveness of these technological solutions and make improvements where needed.
14. Alongside this proactive approach from industry, we want to see a tireless commitment to policing efforts
to tackle child abuse images from the CEOP command within the new National Crime Agency. Images of
child abuse was mentioned briefly in the NCA’s 2013–14 Annual Plan as an operational priority:
“To tackle the enablers of crime that have both utility and impact across several threat areas. For
example cyber-enabled criminality where access to the hidden internet can facilitate criminal acts
such as illicit drugs supply, images of child abuse and the trade in stolen credit card data.”88
15. However, we hope that the Agency’s programme of work on child abuse images will feature much more
extensively in its next annual plan, and more broadly on policing the NSPCC wants to see:
— A greater number of arrests and prosecutions for offences relating to child abuse images.
— A commitment to identifying and destabilising the criminals at the centre of child abuse image
networks.
— A greater focus on tackling child abuse images at a local level from Police and Crime
Commissioners, and in Police and Crime Plans.
16. The NSPCC also eagerly awaits the work of the UK/US taskforce on child abuse images which we hope
will encourage action from the internet and technology industries to apply their technical expertise to develop
innovative solutions to this global challenge.
January 2014
Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery Office Limited
03/2014
035254
19585
88
National Crime Agency Annual Plan 2013/14 (Oct 2013), p.7 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/33-ncaannual-plan-2013–14/file
House of Commons
Culture, Media and Sport
Committee
Online safety
Sixth Report of Session 2013–14
Volume II
Additional written evidence
Ordered by the House of Commons
to be published [date]
Published on [date]
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to
examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for Culture, Media
and Sport and its associated public bodies.
Current membership
Mr John Whittingdale MP (Conservative, Maldon) (Chair)
Mr Ben Bradshaw MP (Labour, Exeter)
Angie Bray MP (Conservative, Ealing Central and Acton)
Conor Burns MP (Conservative, Bournemouth West)
Tracey Crouch MP (Conservative, Chatham and Aylesford)
Philip Davies MP (Conservative, Shipley)
Paul Farrelly MP (Labour, Newcastle-under-Lyme)
Mr John Leech MP (Liberal Democrat, Manchester, Withington)
Steve Rotheram MP (Labour, Liverpool, Walton)
Jim Sheridan MP (Labour, Paisley and Renfrewshire North)
Mr Gerry Sutcliffe MP (Labour, Bradford South)
The following members were also a member of the committee during the parliament:
David Cairns MP (Labour, Inverclyde)
Dr Thérèse Coffey MP (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)
Damian Collins MP (Conservative, Folkestone and Hythe)
Alan Keen MP (Labour Co-operative, Feltham and Heston)
Louise Mensch MP (Conservative, Corby)
Mr Adrian Sanders MP (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)
Mr Tom Watson MP (Labour, West Bromwich East)
Powers
The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are
set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are
available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publication
The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by
Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on
the internet at www.parliament.uk/cmscom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the
present Parliament is at the back of this volume.
The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral
evidence taken and some of the written evidence are available in a printed volume.
Additional written evidence is published on the internet only.
Committee staff
The current staff of the Committee are Elizabeth Flood (Clerk), Grahame Danby (Second
Clerk), Kevin Candy (Inquiry Manager), Emily Gregory (Senior Committee Assistant), Keely
Bishop (Committee Assistant) and Jessica Bridges-Palmer (Media Officer).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Culture, Media and Sport
Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number
for general enquiries is 020 7219 6188; the Committee’s email address is
cmscom@parliament.uk
List of additional written evidence
(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/cmscom)
Page
1
Dr Peter Dawe OBE
Ev w1
2
Dr Claire Hardaker
3
Remote Gambling Association
4
Ann Farmer
5
Kirsty Hopley
Ev w10
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Dr Peter Nelson
Ev w11
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British Board of Film Classification (BBFC)
Ev w13
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Arqiva
Ev w18
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James Griffiths
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Christopher G. H. Thomas
Ev w22
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John Edgar Cameron Lowe
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Norfolk Library and Information Service
Ev w23
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Phil Alexander
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Ben Hardwick
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John R Edwards
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Chris Evershed
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EE Limited
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BCS The Chartered Institute for IT
Ev w32
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Dudley Friend Clayson
Ev w36
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PAPY RUS Prevention of Young Suicide
Ev w37
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EU Kids Online
Ev w38
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Rolf Smith
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Mediawatch-UK
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South West Grid for Learning
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British Sky Broadcasting Limited (‘Sky’)
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Big Brother Watch
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BT
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Russell Hopwood
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Stuart Taylor
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Richard Browning
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Timothy Michael Johnston
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Lloyd Johnston
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John Carruth
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Rob Barry
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Barry Saltmarsh
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Safermedia
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John Reiner
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Family Online Safety Institute
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Terry James
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Film Distributors’ Association
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Ev w2 ; Ev w7
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Information Commissioner’s Office
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Virgin Media
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The Police Federation of England and Wales
Ev w84
44
End Violence Against Women Coalition
Ev w85
45
Childnet International
Ev w88
46
Ukie
Ev w92
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The Children’s Society
Ev w96
48
Eric and Esme Bricknell
Ev w97
49
Stonewall
Ev w98
50
FPA and Brook
Ev w100
51
Michael J Smaldon
Ev w109
52
Prof Andy Phippen
Ev w110
53
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community UK
Ev w113
54
Sex Education Forum
Ev w117
55
Net Children Go Mobile
Ev w119
56
British Naturism
Ev w120
57
Open Rights Group
Ev w122
58
Russell Pillar
Ev w126
59
CARE (Christian Action Research and Education)
Ev w127
60
Malcolm Holmes
Ev w130
61
Microsoft UK
Ev w131
62
The Authority for Tel evision on Demand
Ev w132
63
Intellect
Ev w139
64
Telefonica UK Ltd
Ev w142
65
National Centre for Cyberstalking Research
Ev w143
66
Ethos Capital Ltd
Ev w145
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Written evidence
Written evidence submitted by Dr Peter Dawe OBE
1. The Flavoured Internet Foundation
Internet damage limitation. Dr. P Dawe OBE, Founder Internet Watch Foundation, 2013.
2. Introduction
Once again there is a public furore about Internet content. However, this time the debate is messy and illdisciplined, as many voices are speaking about many issues: Child protection, legality of content, censorship,
financial predation, bullying to name just a few.
Policy makers are in an impossible position! Caught between protection and censorship with the added
problems due to the global nature of the Internet.
3. This paper outlines a means of mitigating the problems based on the genesis of The Internet Watch
Foundation by the person who lead the founding of IWF.
4. A Solution
It is our view that the problem is not a legislative problem, but a market problem. Previously, there has been
a diversity of media channels with each channel being moderated by an “editor”.
The Internet needs to offer the public a choice of “flavours” of Internet, similar to how people choose their
newspaper, TV channel or indeed their preferred supermarket.
5. Why is there Market Failure in Selective Internet?
— Currently providing a moderated view (Fenced Garden) of the Internet isn’t economically viable.
— The Internet is so large as to be difficult, nay impossible, to comprehensively categorise all content.
— The choice of “flavour” is also difficult as each person has their own set of prejudices, in many
dimensions. Eg Extent of naked flesh, Violence, Religion.
— Service providers are, understandably, reluctant to be seen as the arbiters of taste and legality.
— The threat of a defamation action when a content provider is censored on the basis of an algorithm,
particularly if the censorship is due to “business morality”.
— Computer applications to implement filtering have been proprietary and not comprehensive in their
use of available tools.
— Multiple legislative jurisdictions have to be considered.
6. Several attempts have been made to provide the public with filtered content, however typically these are
from a singular view-point (eg Western liberal Christian tradition), which means the cost of creating the filter
list has to be spread over a small user base.
7. Creating a Viable Marketplace
— There is a need for an open architecture for classification.
— The problem is too big for a individual players.
— Web authors do not want to negotiate with individual classification services and editors.
— New applications can be implemented using existing infra-structure.
— Editors want to be able to choose their own filtering thresholds and classes.
8. Tactical Implementation Steps
— Political encouragement to entrepreneurs to implement diverse Internet “flavoured” services.
— Extension of the legal protection, enjoyed by newspaper editors against civil claims from content
owners, to filtering services.
— A legal requirement on Internet service providers to be network neutral in regard to providers of
Flavoured Internet.
— The implementation of a series of demonstration technologies and services.
9. Leadership not Committee
The genesis of Internet Watch Foundation should be seen as a model for deployment. Internet Watch was
founded, NOT BY CONSENSUS, but designed and implemented through the maverick leadership of Mr Peter
Dawe. The players (Service providers, Government, Police, Politicians and the Press) are individually impotent.
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Ev w2 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
Each has conflicting objectives, all consider the other players as responsible, irresponsible, ignorant, idealistic,
imposing impossible costs, ducking their responsibility etc.
10. However, with a more sophisticated set of players, it is less likely that a maverick leader will not be
able to overcome the likely barriers alone. Political endorsement of this initiative, for a finite period (two
years), would encourage many of the other players to also support the initiative. Thus allowing the model
design to be finalised, proof of concept completed and for the model to be promoted to all players world-wide.
11. Note: Other initiatives, such as consensus building committees, can still be undertaken in parallel with
this proposal.
12. Funding
For an effective team to complete the design, prove concept and importantly to sell the model internationally,
we estimate that a budget over the two years of £500,000 would suffice. A requirement of the design is that it
is ultimately self-funding in operation. (Internet Watch cost under £50,000 to set up, and was completed in less
than 12 months, a voluntary levy on the industry has funded it since.)
13. The Dawe Charitable Trust believe it can catalyse the actions needed for this global initiative, recruiting
support from the industry, government, religious, freedom-of-speech and other groups.
14. Dawe Charitable Trust already has an experienced core team committed to working on the initiative.
15. The Dawe Charitable Trust is seed-funding this initiative (£50,000), and the team will seek to design
and implement a model regardless. However adoption of the above recommendation will both speed the
initiative and improve the likelihood of global success.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Dr Claire Hardaker
Summary
In this document I discuss the following four points:
— What facilitates abusive or threatening online comments (ie what makes it “easy”?)
— What motivates abusive or threatening online comments (ie what makes people do it?)
— Measures unlikely to reduce abusive or threatening online comments (ie what won’t stop it?)
— Measures likely to reduce abusive or threatening online comments (ie what could stop it?)
Preliminary Comments
(1) Whilst my research has covered strategies of content filtering, it relates better to the discussion of
“preventing abusive or threatening comments”, and less directly to “protecting minors from adult content” or
“filtering extremist material such as child abuse imagery”. I therefore do not comment on these two areas.
(2) A crucial point note, however, is that filtering content intended to promote harmful behaviour (eg
terrorism, violence) is unlikely to deal with the online grooming responsible for inciting these behaviours.
Grooming is typically an interactive process involving a manipulator persuading a vulnerable target to
undertake action that is in the manipulator’s interest, and typically harmful to the target (eg extremist violence,
suicide, self-harm, age-inappropriate sexual behaviour, etc.).
(3) Such grooming is likely to occur in interactive environments such as chatrooms, messageboards, and via
private direct-message software (eg Windows Live Messenger) where content filtering will struggle to apply,
and where processes of moderation are likely to be far more effective. I would therefore suggest that content
filtering as a strategy for dealing with material intended to promote terrorism or other acts of violence is
unlikely to tackle this point with much success.
What facilitates abusive or threatening comments online?
(4) There are arguably three major factors (though easily more besides):
Anonymity
(5) The internet offers a perceived anonymity that has no real parallel offline, and this appearance of
invisibility encourages the user to feel that they can do unpleasant things with a highly reduced risk of suffering
any consequences. In turn, the sense of being invulnerable encourages disinhibition: the user thinks that she is
safe from repercussions, so behaves in a mildly objectionable way. Each time there is no negative consequence,
her behaviour may gradually escalate.
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(6) By itself, however, anonymity does not explain why the internet seems to bring the worst out in some,
since many of us are online and anonymous all the time, yet would never think to behave in this way. A second
issue to consider, then, is detachment.
Detachment
(7) Linked to disinhibition is the way that the internet allows us to shut down our empathy, and in particular,
our compassion. In fact, we can choose not to empathise at will, especially when dealing with someone we
dislike. The internet, however, drastically increases this ability, and allows us to emotionally distance
ourselves—not just from people we don’t like but also from those we don’t even know—in several ways:
(a) Dehumanising: Because we lose many indications of emotional response (eye contact, tone of
voice, facial expressions) it is easier to “forget” that we are communicating with another human.
Instead, we have only the words and/or images sent back and forth.
(b) Devaluing: The above means that we can downplay any emotional reaction. If they claim to be
offended or hurt, because we don’t see that reaction, it is easier to believe that they are lying
or exaggerating. It is also easier to quickly forget the incident, whilst it may linger in the other’s
mind for days.
(c) Victim-blaming: It can be easier for the bully/troll to shift the responsibility for what they are
doing from themselves, and blame their victim for what is happening, because, eg, they’re
famous, or they made a tribute page public, etc. This stance is typically also indicated by
“solutions” such as telling the victim that if they don’t like it, they should “get off the internet”.
(d) Self-vindicating: It can also easier to diminish the severity of our behaviour to ourselves.
Because we each inhabit our own heads, it seems obvious to us just how seriously we meant
something, so when trolls/cyberbullies are confronted, we tend to hear excuses like, “Stuff said
on the internet isn’t real. I was just joking. I obviously didn’t really mean that [rape-threat/
defamatory statement/etc].” Our innate bias means that we are more likely to adopt such a selfsupporting viewpoint than to judge our own behaviour as reprehensible.
Entertainment
(8) The third aspect that seems to encourage some to be deliberately mean online long predates the internet.
It is simply the human tendency to enjoy and glorify aggression. Evidence for this can be found worldwide,
stretching back over millennia. For brevity, however, we need only look at ancient military artefacts (eg the
Bayeux tapestry, Homer’s Iliad, Beowulf), the sports descended directly from warfare (javelin, archery, fencing,
boxing, wrestling, martial arts), and archaeology built especially for the enjoyment of bloodshed (eg the
Coliseum, the Hippodrome).
(9) Today, one glance at mainstream entertainment demonstrates that this interest is not remotely abated. For
instance, The Hunger Games is a book series about individuals forced to fight to the death for a reality
television show. Shawshank Redemption tells of a man wrongly convicted for the murder of his wife and
incarcerated in a brutal, corrupt prison where inmates are beaten to death, shot, and raped. The X Factor
television series places competitors into highly stressful, even cruel environments with antagonistic judges.
And many of the biggest games titles, such as the Call of Duty, Halo, and Grand Theft Auto series, involve
players simulating extreme violence and murder.
(10) The above should demonstrate that humans are entertained by violence, and that this is by no means a
new phenomenon brought about by digital media. For some, however, simply consuming aggression-based
entertainment from fiction (eg books, films) or simulation (eg games, sports) is not enough. For them, the
internet presents a virtual Coliseum where they can amuse themselves by attacking others without risk of
“injury”, since they can hide behind a cloak of anonymity, and silence their own conscience by ignoring their
target’s feelings.
What motivates abusive or threatening comments online?
(11) To reiterate a point from above, whilst many of us are frequently online anonymously and enjoy
consuming violence (it is a rare person who hasn’t watched an action movie!), it is still a relatively small
number who feel motivated to take advantage of the conditions that the internet presents, and to actually engage
in abusive or threatening online behaviour. In the same way, many of us drive, but however annoyed we may
become behind the wheel, mercifully few of us are ever turn our car into a lethal weapon.
(12) In other words, each individual needs a trigger, or motive to push them into using the internet as a
weapon. Unsurprisingly, the evidence suggests that there is no single, over-riding motive for being abusive or
threatening online, but that whilst there certainly are trends, there are also many unique cases. Some of those
broad trends include:
(a) Boredom, a need for entertainment: This is perhaps the most trivial reason (and therefore,
perhaps also the most frustrating and difficult to resolve)—simply too much free time after
school, at work, or between jobs. These are the individuals who are killing time, and even
seeking impress others of a similar mindset. Groups of trolls coalesce on sites like 4chan, post
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links to targets that might prove “fun”, and compete against each other to see who can be the
funniest, cleverest, or most extreme. They may also organise troll raids via more secure systems
(eg IRC, Torchat), and train newer recruits in how to be less identifiable online, eg by sharing
information about identity-protecting software such as TOR, I2P, and Psiphon.
(b) A need for attention: these individuals seem to display a craving for any kind of attention,
whether positive or negative. Such individuals may also post annoyingly implausible stories,
grand claims, age-inappropriate content, etc. This may be symptomatic of emotional, social,
and/or psychological problems.
(c) Revenge, disenfranchisement: these appear to be individuals who feel cheated, short-changed,
or otherwise wronged on a personal level, and appear to want to “fix” this by making the object
of their malice feel as miserable as themselves. This may be symptomatic of a struggling
economy, eg the student who can’t find work and has therefore taken to targeting his local MP.
(d) Politics, activism: whilst the motive in its own right may be good (eg fighting for racial equality)
the method may not meet that same moral standard. This said, it’s easier to comprehend why
individuals might choose this noisy, attention-grabbing route if we consider that letters to
politicians, newspapers, and economists are all too easily ignored. This may be symptomatic,
therefore, of a political system that appears (to the trolls/bullies) to ignore their voices.
(13) In summary, motivations for posting abusive/threatening content can spring from a number, and a
mixture of sources, including emotional, psychological, social, political, economical, etc. This means that there
is likely to be no single approach that will have any meaningful impact on this issue. Instead, it is far more
likely to require addressing on multiple fronts. I discuss this area next.
Measures unlikely to reduce online abuse or threats
(14) There are two classic “solutions” that have been proposed to fix online abusive comments. I deal with
them briefly since they merit very little serious consideration.
Remove Anonymity
(15) In a nutshell, this is borderline impossible, if only because it is unenforceable, and unworkable. Even
if all countries agree to legally mandating online identity disclosure (unlikely) the costs of setting up,
administrating, and then enforcing it would be staggering. Further, we need only consider the risks inherent in
having a child’s name, age, location, etc, available online to realise that online identity disclosure would
actually create more dangers than anonymity currently averts.
Stop Using the Internet (or the Site in Question)
(16) This is not only bizarrely unrealistic, since the internet is now ubiquitous, it is also ineffective (kids
don’t need a single device to be cyberbullied) and puts responsibility on the victim, rather than the attacker
(see victim-blaming, para. (7(c)) above).
Measures likely to reduce online abuse or threats
(17) There is no single answer to this complex problem, but several smaller improvements can, collectively,
advance online safety. I therefore recommend five ways forward.
Education, Resources, and Training for Children and Young Adults
(18) In a perfect world, we would always choose prevention over cure, but this requires well-informed
vigilance both from potential targets and from those responsible for protection. At present, Childnet does
outstanding work, teaching school-children to be safe and kind online, and I welcome the fact that online safety
has been introduced across the 2014 National Curriculum.
(19) For best effect, however, these lessons need to be appropriately supported (see paras. (21)–(23) below),
sufficiently detailed/thorough, and adopted across all schools (private, public, and free). These lessons also
should not be restricted purely to Computing, but should be adopted across a number of classes, including
PSHEE and Citizenship.
(20) However, in order for this to be successful, teachers themselves need to be well-trained in the safety
measures, in tell-tale signs, and in appropriate strategies of intervention. Teachers also need the support of
parents and caregivers, and this leads into a second area of improvement.
Education, Resources, and Training for Parents, Caregivers, and Teachers
(21) The assistance that Childnet currently offers teachers is also invaluable, but it could be substantially
underpinned with compulsory online safety training in all PGCEs, since NSPCC research shows that far too
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence Ev w5
many teachers currently don’t feel confident when it comes to advising pupils on safe social network
practices.1
(22) Meanwhile, parents would benefit from proactive, face-to-face training in:
(a) signs indicative of cyberbullying (whether as victim or bully);
(b) ways to keep children safe online2 (technologically, behaviourally); and
(c) the many organisations that offer help and advice (eg BeatBullying,3 Childline,4 Childnet,5
Get Safe Online,6 IWF,7 NSPCC,8 SIC,9 NHS,10 CEOP11).
(23) Whilst these organisations all do invaluable work, they cannot be a standalone solution. A third area of
improvement, then, is through sites themselves.
Site Tools, Responsibilities, and Processes
(24) We generally expect social networks to offer the tools and support to keep us safe. Indeed, the
expectation seems fairly reasonable. If Mr Smith wants to profit from people buying his goods or services, his
products and premises must meet the relevant legal requirements to protect customers from loss and harm.
However, should Mr Smith want to profit from people using his social network, in the UK at least there appear
to be no similar legal requirements.
(25) It seems reasonable to argue that the opportunity to profit from a social network should also entail a
duty of care towards that site’s users. However, whilst most social networks require registrants to enter into
agreements forbidding abusive behaviour, beyond that, sites differ widely in the availability, sophistication, and
transparency of their safety features. At the most basic level, social networks should:
(a) allow users to control their own environment (eg privacy settings);
(b) flag up content for the site to manage (eg report abuse buttons);
(c) proactively use their own management tools (eg IP blocks); and
(d) publish clear guidelines on how they will deal with complaints, handle abuse reports, and
cooperate with criminal investigations.
(26) At present, whilst some sites offer all of these and more, others provide none, and some even appear to
stonewall those trying to tackle online abuse.12 This takes us into a fourth area of improvement—enforcement.
Education, Resources, and Training for Police
(27) Where cases become too serious for a user or site to deal with, we would naturally turn to the police.
However, whilst SOCA13 does tackle cybercrime, its focus tends to divide between child sexual exploitation
and online fraud. SOCA and the Police Central e-Crime Unit14 are forming a new National Cybercrime
Unit,15 but it remains unclear whether online abuse will form part of this organisation’s remit.
(28) This means that for now at least, online abusive messages and threats are more likely to be dealt with
by ordinary police officers, and that makes it difficult for the average non-high-profile individual to find
appropriately trained police who will take their complaint seriously.16 In short, it is vital that we have the
necessary resources and training for police, including:
(a) Perception change: online offences are “real crimes” that should be taken seriously; users can’t
just resolve the problem by simply “switching off” (see para. (16) above).
(b) Basic training: unsurprisingly, non-specialist officers appear to be largely unaware of the sheer
scope of online “misbehaviours” that exist, how online attackers work, their strategies of
concealment, standard denial excuses (eg “yes it came from my computer but I didn’t send it”),
methods of gathering evidence, the investigation that needs carrying out, etc. This is an issue
that can only be resolved with extensive training. Without it, officers are likely to shy away
from or find excuses for avoiding such areas, in turn institutionally embedding the concept that
they only deal with “real” (ie offline) crime.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/resourcesforprofessionals/onlinesafety/statistics-online-safety_wda93975.html
http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/2009/12/child-internet-safety-strategy-launched/
www.beatbullying.org/
www.childline.org.uk/Explore/Bullying/Pages/online-bullying.aspx
www.childnet.com/
www.getsafeonline.org/
www.iwf.org.uk/
www.nspcc.org.uk/help-and-advice/for-parents/online-safety/online-safety_wdh99554.html
www.saferinternet.org.uk/advice-and-resources
www.nhs.uk/Livewell/Bullying/Pages/Cyberbullying.aspx
www.thinkuknow.co.uk/
www.theguardian.com/society/2013/aug/09/cyberbullying-mother-fight-askfm
www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/
http://content.met.police.uk/Site/pceu
www.gov.uk/government/policies/keeping-the-uk-safe-in-cyberspace/supporting-pages/setting-up-a-national-cyber-crime-unit
www.theguardian.com/society/2013/aug/09/cyberbullying-mother-fight-askfm
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(c) More resources: even were the above not an issue, officers also appear to be largely underresourced in terms of time. The solution to this seems to be an extension to the remit of CEOP,
SOCA, or the newly-proposed NCU (see para. (27) above).
Legislation and Guidance
(29) Assuming that a case is investigated by the police and the CPS decides to pursue criminal charges,
many of the Acts that might by employed (eg Malicious Communications Act 1988, §5 of the Public Order
Act 1986, Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Communications Act 2003) were created before the advent
of major social networks, and so are imperfectly equipped to deal with the new behaviours that these sites
have created.
(30) For instance, the most recent, relevant legislation, the Communications Act, came into force in July
2003. However, an Act of this magnitude—more than 250,000 words spanning over four hundred sections—
takes years to write and enact. The section relevant to online behaviour (§127) is therefore far more heavily
informed by the internet of the 1990s than that of the new millennium. Meanwhile, massive, ubiquitous social
networks like Facebook and Twitter were founded 2004 and 2006 respectively. As sites like these have evolved,
so too have the behaviours associated with them, yet the legislation remains largely unchanged.
(31) Whilst the CPS published guidelines17 on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social
media in June this year, like much current legislation designed for supposedly-similar offline behaviours, these
guidelines do not explicitly address the critical differences that the online environment offers:
(a) the speed with which content can be reproduced;
(b) the breadth and sensitivity (eg family, school peers) of audience that can be reached;
(c) the inability of targets to entirely eradicate malicious content in some cases; and
(d) the expense and difficulty (as outlined above) of prosecuting even very serious online offences.
(32) It is therefore worth considering whether these Acts need updating, or whether we actually need a new
Online Communications Act that specifically covers the increasing range of abusive behaviours on the internet.
(33) This difficulty is further exacerbated by a culture in which offline crime still seems to be seen as more
serious than any supposed online counterpart. For instance, the CPS provides useful guidance on behaviours
such as stalking,18 harassment,19 and school bullying,20 but if one reads these guidelines, it seems that the
offline version is considered the norm, and any online variant, where it is even acknowledged to exist, is simply
considered a sub-type.
(34) This overlooks the fact that supposedly equivalent behaviours like cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and
cyberbullying can have their own unique attributes, methods, and consequences which require dealing with in
fundamentally different ways. Indeed, what little the CPS has to say about online antisocial behaviours tends
to be vague.21
(35) In short, it appears that we need CPS guidance for the police, court system, legal practitioners, etc.
that would provide definitions for, and explanations of the various antisocial online behaviours (eg trolling,
cyberbullying, cyberstalking, etc), and information with regards to issues of jurisdiction and proof.
(36) Finally, across the European Union, the Safer Internet Programme22 is promoting self-regulation,23
and already, several high-profile corporations have signed up to a set of Safer Social Networking Principles.24
This is a great start, but these principles are purely voluntary, and whilst it would be inappropriate to enforce
such principles across all EU-based social networks, it is worth returning to the example of Ms Smith, and to
ask whether those profiting from social networks should have similar duties of care towards their site users.
Conclusion
(37) The full potential of the internet is yet to be realised. If we are to fully enjoy the benefits, and reduce
online threatening and abusive behaviour, my belief is that we must approach this in a comprehensively and
holistically. I hope the above may offer some ways in which to achieve this.
September 2013
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/social_media_guidelines.pdf
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/stalking_and_harassment/#a02b
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/stalking_and_harassment/#a02a
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/youth_offenders/#a25
www.cps.gov.uk/southwest/cps_southwest_news/news_articles/in_the_dock__prosecuting_cyber_bullying__electronic_stalking_
and_trolling/
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/self-regulation-better-internet-kids
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/self-regulation-better-internet-kids
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/sn_principles.pdf
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Further written evidence submitted by Dr Claire Hardaker
This is a brief note to add to a previous document submitted to the Culture, Media and Sport Committees
inquiry into Online Safety. In brief, the CASS Centre at Lancaster University was successful in their bid for
ESRC funding on a project that aims to investigate the rape threats sent by Twitter trolls to a number of high
profile women (ES/L008874/1). The project will investigate what the language used by those who send rape/
death threats on Twitter reveals about…
1. Their concerns, interests, and ideologies; what concept do they seem to have of themselves and
their role in society?
2. Their motivations and goals; what seems to trigger them? What do they seem to be seeking?
3. The links between them and other individuals, topics, and behaviours; do they only produce
misogynistic threats or do they engage in other hate-speech? Do they act alone or within
networks?
We’re hoping that this project will offer timely insight into an area where policy, practice, legislation, and
enforcement is currently under intense scrutiny and requires this type of research to help shape future
developments. As such, we would be pleased to pass on the results of this project as they come in, and it goes
without saying that we would be delighted to also make available all of the final, official findings, reports,
articles and so forth at the end of the project.
October 2013
Written evidence submitted by the Remote Gambling Association
Introduction
1. The Remote Gambling Association (“the RGA”) has noted that the Culture, Media and Sport Committee
has decided to investigate a number of aspects of online safety that are currently raising concerns, in particular
how best to protect minors from accessing adult content. We would, therefore, like to set out the experience
of the online gambling sector and the success we have achieved in addressing a number of key risks.
2. By way of introduction, the Remote Gambling Association (RGA) is the largest on-line gambling trade
association in the world, representing the world’s largest licensed and stock market-listed remote gambling
operators and software providers. The organisation provides the remote gambling industry with a single voice
on all issues of importance to regulators, legislators, and key decision-makers. Our members are listed on our
website which is www.rga.eu.com.
3. The members of the RGA are committed to the protection of young and vulnerable people. We promote
responsible gambling and have worked with regulators and legislators to ensure that the rules affecting
gambling are both workable and proportionate to the harm that could be caused.
Why Regulated Remote Gambling is Different to other “Adult” Products
4. The Gambling Act 2005 allowed for a wider range of advertising of gambling products in Great Britain.
To be able to advertise a gambling operator has to hold an operating licence issued by the Gambling
Commission, or an equivalent licence issued by an EU gambling regulator or an overseas regulator which
issues licences with equivalent standards to the UK regulator. These licences require that before bets can be
settled the customer is over 18 and has had his or her identity verified.
5. As far as we are aware, no other adult service providers are required by law to ensure that their customers
are over the age of 18. This puts the regulated online gambling industry in a different position to other ecommerce sectors. because there are mandatory safeguards in place, but especially where children are
concerned we believe that the principles at least should be applied equally.
The Current Requirements for Licensed Online Gambling Operators
6. The requirements of the licences held by our members mean that all operators require customers to open
accounts. As part of this process their identity and age will be verified.
7. UK and similar legislation around Europe that applies to online gambling requires very high standards of
age verification and it is commonly an offence to knowingly accept bets from minors. We support this position
and have proactively worked with third party suppliers to improve the range and reliability of data that is used
to identify whether someone is under 18 or not.
8. In practice this means that during the account opening process potential customers are asked to provide a
range of information and, amongst other things, this is checked by third parties (such as Experian) to confirm
the customer’s identity and payment details. Details will be checked against any databases (public or private)
to which they have access and they will see whether the applicant has a credit history, which of course will
not be the case for children.
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9. Under the Gambling Commission’s Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice, customers will not be able
to withdraw any winnings until the age verification process has been satisfactorily completed. In any event, if
the customer has failed to satisfactorily complete the age verification checks within 72 hours of registering a
relevant bank card and placing their first bet, the operator will freeze the account, prevent the customer from
gambling any further until they have satisfactorily completed these checks and, if upon completion of age
verification the customer is ultimately shown to be underage, the operator will return all stakes to the young
person.
10. In practice the necessary checks for the vast majority of account applicants can be undertaken almost
immediately, but the 72 hour window mentioned above allows companies if required to seek documentary
evidence of identity and age if the electronic verification does not provide the right level of assurance.
11. There are occasionally cases where people allege that a child has opened an account in their name or
has illegally used the existing account of an adult. In reality this happens very rarely and always comes to light
when funds are withdrawn from the adult’s bank account (and even then it presupposes that the minor has
knowledge of the requisite passwords etc in order to gain access). If someone believes that their credit or debit
card has been used fraudulently they should contact the operator and their bank and then the cardholder will
be able to challenge the charges made, in exactly the same way they would if the card had been used to
purchase other goods or services. Although we would suggest strongly that there should be a greater element
of parental control in these situations, if it can be proven that the bets were placed by someone who is under
18 then the bets will be cancelled and stakes returned (see para 9 above).
12. With regard to advertising, only suitably licensed operators are able to market gambling products in the
UK. This provides another safeguard and all advertising, irrespective of where the operator is based, must
comply with the relevant requirements from the Advertising Standards Authority and OFCOM which have
clear and enforceable rules to prevent the targeting of advertisements at minors. In addition, the British
gambling industry’s own advertising code of practice has put in place further protections, including the 9.00pm
television watershed, for all gambling except for betting around live events and bingo. It all bans any form of
gambling sponsorship from appearing on children’s products.
Online Gambling as an Example of Regulatory Best Practice of Online Child Protection
13. In July 2011 the European Commission sought views on these issues as part of its consultation on a
Green Paper on Online Gambling in the Internal Market.
14. Some of the questions asked how on-line age controls are imposed. A response was submitted by the
Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety, which includes Action for Children, Barnardo’s, BAAF, The
Children’s Society, NCB and NSPCC. Their response stated:
“Since the online age verification laws came into force in the UK in September 2007, the children’s
organisations have not been made aware of a single instance where a child has beaten the system
and got online to gamble. There have been instances where a child has ‘borrowed’ a parent’s credit
or debit card and has been able to pass themselves off as the parent, but that raises different issues.
There is nothing that laws can do about that, neither is there an easily foreseeable technology fix
that can solve it. However, we are not aware of any instances where a child was able to lie about
their age and get away with it in an online environment, as they used to do quite easily before the
law was changed. By comparison it may not be so difficult to ‘PhotoShop’ a fake ID to use in a real
world setting.
The law should never require an online gambling [operator] to get everything 100% right 100% of
the time. That is impossible. But society is entitled to expect gambling web sites to be able to
demonstrate that they are making reasonable efforts. Asking someone to tick a box to confirm their
age, without more, is not reasonable. It is negligent.”
15. On the 23 November 2010 Claire Perry MP speaking in an adjournment debate on the topic of Internet
Pornography in the House of Commons looked to the controls on the online gambling industry as an example
of how age verification works. She said:
“The previous Government sensibly introduced workable age-verification restrictions on online
gambling sites in 2005, an excellent model that works well and searches financial and electoral
databases to verify that users are old enough to enter the site and engage in the gambling within. It
is a workable model, the previous Government introduced it, and they are to be commended for
doing so.”
16. In September 2008 the European Commission held a forum on Cross Media Rating and Classification
and Age Verification Solutions. The subsequent report stated that:
“the British model, restricting access to online gambling sites [is] seen as the most effective in
preventing access to sites using these technologies.”
17. There are other examples that could be cited, but we hope these will suffice to show that the success of
these measures is not something that the online gambling industry is merely claiming.
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18. Following on from this, we believe that the legal requirements to ensure that all people gambling are
over the age of 18 are the most appropriate controls for the online gambling industry. We believe that the
requirements to age verify online gamblers works. There is very little evidence that young people are attracted
to, or participate in remote gambling.
Are Young People Attracted to Online Gambling?
19. There should never be any complacency about the issue of under-18s and gambling, however, in assessing
what the most proportionate controls should be it would be wrong to assume that there is a huge interest in
this activity.
20. The only significant reference we have been able to find on whether young people are particularly
attracted to on-line gambling is in Professor Gill Valentine’s report “Literature review of children and young
people’s gambling” (September 2008). In that she stated “To-date there is not enough evidence to assess
whether the advertising/promotion of gambling—including free demonstration games available on websites—
has a direct effect on gambling participation.” While she recommended that further research is undertaken no
such research has been completed as at August 2013.
21. The main research undertaken into the prevalence of gambling among young people has been undertaken
on behalf of the National Lottery Commission. As the legal age for participation in the National Lottery is 16
the research they have undertaken is on people aged 15 and under. The most recent research conducted by
Ipsos MORI and the Social Research Institute published in July 2012 showed that 18% of 11–15 year olds say
they have gambled in the past week. Rates of participation in online gambling are lower than rates of
involvement in offline gambling. Thirteen per cent% of children say they have played free online gambling
games; this is most often through Facebook. Seven per cent of children aged 11–15 say they have some
experience of playing online gambling games for money, although around half of this can be explained by
children playing alongside parents, with their parents’ permission.
Further Protections that could be Provided to Children and their Parents
22. Advertising: a review could usefully be undertaken to consider which of the advertising rules that apply
to gambling might be extended to all adult products and whether certain rules should be more product-specific.
In saying that we are mindful of the high levels of compliance where such rules are in place. From a gambling
perspective there has been close engagement by the industry with the ASA in the development of codes. In
2009 the ASA reviewed compliance by the gambling industry with the CAP and BCAP codes and found
“fewer than 1% of the gambling product advertisements [….] seemed to breach the Code, an exceptionally
high compliance rate”.
23. Raising awareness amongst parents: in order to participate in gambling on a regulated gambling website,
customers have to open an account and have their age and identity verified. Although it is not a major problem
in terms of the number of cases, a weakness in the system is where a child uses their parent’s identity and
legitimate credit or debit card to open or use an account.
24. It is self-evident that if this can happen with gambling then it can happen with other adult products.
Parents need to understand that they should keep their credit or debit card, password and pin numbers details
safe at all times and to supervise the use of credit cards for online shopping. For example if a parent allows a
child to use a credit card to purchase a non-age restricted product such as a book they should ensure that the
child returns the credit card to them and ensure that the card number is not retained by the child.
25. We also note and support proposals that have previously been made to promote awareness about the
parental controls that are available for internet-enabled devices.
26. Highlighting tools for parents to use: The RGA has produced technical guidelines to raise standards
among industry operators and regulators. As part of its work on responsible gambling it has included the
following in that document:
“The operator’s responsible gambling page should provide a link to a recognised filtering programme
to assist customers/parents in preventing underage individuals from using gambling sites.”
27. This provision has been adopted into licences issued by UK and European regulators and is now the
industry standard. It is a practical tool for restricting child access to unsuitable sites, but is not in any sense
burdensome for operators and, again, could be used for all sites offering adult products.
Conclusions
28. As an industry which is subject to statutory regulation involving an adult product it is right that
expectations and compliance should be high. However, this has led to the industry proactively seeking out
and devising practical measures to achieve the regulatory objective of preventing under-18s from accessing
gambling products.
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29. Experts in child protection have endorsed those efforts and, most importantly, their effectiveness.
Although it may not be appropriate to set the bar at such a high level for non-regulated industries, we do feel
that there might be lessons to learn from what we have done.
30. As ever, if it would be at all helpful we would be very willing to expand on any of the points made in
this letter,
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Ann Farmer
I would like the Committee to take into account the dangers of online pornography to children and young
people, especially in negatively affecting them mentally and emotionally.
My research into eugenics and population has found a significant overlap between these movements and the
campaign for “value-free” sex education; both movements have historical links with the pornography industry.
The aim of the pornography industry is to maximise profits by turning people into sex addicts, searching for
sexual material on a regular basis, often of an increasingly extreme nature. Eventually they may seek more
extreme “thrills” by acting out what they have seen online: two recent cases of rape and murder of young girls,
April Jones and Tia Sharpe, have featured the use of pornography by men unknown to police.
There is also evidence that young boys are themselves becoming child molestors, acting out the pornographic
scenarios they have seen online.
Pornography dehumanises women and children, depicting them as sex toys to be used at will, often in a
brutal manner; even those women who participate willingly do not remain psychologically unharmed. It also
dehumanises the viewers of pornography, reducing them to their sexual appetites, and encouraging them to
believe that there is a “right to sex”.
Even without these extreme negative outcomes, we must face the prospect of a society where the younger
generations have learned to view other people through the distorted prism of a perverted sexual desire; the
history of pornography shows that lust swiftly turns to cruelty, thus we must tackle this problem of easily
accessible online pornography if we do not wish society to be composed increasingly of uncaring sociopaths
who care chiefly about their own sexual appetites.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Kirsty Hopley
Online pornography is free, easily accessible and the content is extreme. Anyone can access any type of
pornography including, violence, rape, acted child pornography, s and m, extreme degradation of women and
more. There is no log in page and no age check. This is unacceptable. This is not tolerated in pubs or strip
clubs so why is it freely available online? A simple answer is to make online pornography sites operate account
only sites, the use must provide their details and have a user name. This will reduce the amount of times
people stumble upon online porn without affecting the freedom of choice for users of online porn.
Secondly, internet filters are great for parents and I am in favour of the automatic filter. It makes sense that
those who wish to view pornography should be the ones making the choice rather that everyone getting it and
then having to choose not to have access. However, there are serious concerns.
I have Talk Talk Homesafe settings which are good in theory. They allow the user to turn on and off filters.
In practice this rarely works. I need to turn filters off to read material for my work but usually when I want to
turn it back on, it freezes or takes hours. Secondly, some sites are blocked which do not contain pornography
such as rape support sites. Similarly, even with my homesafe settings on I could still type in sex or porn and
get some extreme sexual images through google images. It is crucial that this is monitored and dealt with
swiftly. Clearly the technology is already there, it just needs monitoring.
Next issue is advertising. Many sites have pop ups which can lead to sexual material. I have seen instances
of this on school approved websites and on kindle children’s books (Alice in Wonderland was one). Advertising
that is aimed at adults should never appear on sites that are aimed at children. This should be a criminal offence
as it is grooming.
Online safety is something parents need to understand to take seriously. With channels such as Cebebies
encouraging very young children to go online and the rise of little children having tablets, education of parents
is key. My suggestion is that this is discussed by Health Visitors in the early years checks. It should be a face
to face discussion of the dangers and a leaflet given of how to keep up. Every device that is sold must have
an easy to understand guide for parents to set blocks and this should be discussed at purchase. This needs to
be regulated so that it happens every time. It is not like the days when parents had to make sure toddlers didn’t
choke on a piece of lego, parents do not understand the technology that their kids do. The digital age has
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approached so quickly. Following this, schools should offer compulsory help for parents to understand keeping
children safe online. The world has moved on and parenting needs to catch up.
This is an issue which the government needs to support parents to protect children. The starting point is to
regulate the porn industry (like we do with tobacco, alcohol and gambling industries). It is unbelievable that
the porn industry is given such a free reign to provide such an unrealistic and harmful portrayal of what is
actually a wonderful act that humans should enjoy.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Dr Peter Nelson
PORNOGRAPHY: BRITAIN’S BIG PROBLEM
A young man walks into a newsagent and buys a copy of the Sun or similar newspaper. On page 3, he sees a
picture of a young woman wearing little or no clothing. What goes through his mind?
Does he think, “I must get a good job, earn a living, save some money, get married, have children, and help
bring them up”?
Or does he think, “I must go out at the weekend, have some drinks, find a woman, and have sex with her”?
If the latter is the case, then society has a big problem.
Consequences
In the first place, young men who think like this do not make good fathers. They make women pregnant,
but take little or no interest in bringing up the children. This leaves women bringing up children on their own.
While some do this remarkably well, the evidence is that children from single-parent families do less well, and
are less well-behaved, at school.1 Even in homes where a father is present, there can be domestic violence
which has an adverse effect on children. Many of the problems in education today can be traced back to poor
parenting. Teaching youngsters who lack discipline and encouragement to study is very difficult.
Secondly, the open display of sex in the media brings sex to the attention of children from an early age. This
leads them to engage in sexual activities before they are old enough to appreciate the consequences. Teenage
pregnancy rates in Britain are very high. This is despite attempts to bring them down by promoting the use of
contraceptives in schools.2 These fail because they raise children’s interest in sex still further. Even good sex
education is limited in what it can do, given the big influence the media have on young people.
A recent NSPCC study reveals that nine out of ten young people between 13 and 17 years old in England,
Scotland, and Wales have experienced some form of intimate relationship.3
Thirdly, pornography encourages men to be promiscuous. Promiscuity leads to transmission of sexually
transmitted-diseases (SDIs). Health agencies promote the use of condoms to try to stop this, but condoms are
not always used, and frequently fail. SDI levels in Britain are very high and rising. The number of new
diagnoses in the UK is now running at 1.3% of the population per year.4
Fourthly, pornography inflames men’s sexual passions. Men who cannot control these may attack women.
The incidence of rape and indecent assault on women in Britain is very high. On present figures, one in ten
women will be raped or assaulted during their lifetime.5 The NSPCC study referred to earlier found that as
many as one in three girls in Britain have experienced some form of sexual violence from a partner.3
Adult pornography may also be implicated in the development of paedophilia.6
Fifthly, sexual images of women contribute to the pressure on men to assert their masculinity. They see
women vaunting their sexuality and want to show off theirs. This leads them to engage in loutish behaviour,
drink heavily, drive recklessly, and so on. Anti-social behaviour is a big problem in Britain today, and much
of it is macho-driven.
Sixthly, pornography contributes to mental illness in society. Many mental problems have a sexual
component. Emotions are interconnected, and difficulties in one area can lead to problems in another. Some
men have so much difficulty coping with pornography that they have set up a help group, “Men and Porn”.
Many suffer on their own, and are reluctant to admit that they have sexual problems. The incidence of mental
illness in Britain today is very high and rising.
While most pornography is aimed at men, it encourages women too to think of sex as something to be
pursued as and end in itself, and not just as part of a stable relationship within which children can be brought
up. Pornography aimed at women will do this even more.
Proof
The contribution of pornography to these various problems is evidenced by the extent to which they have
grown over the last sixty years. Sixty years ago, media standards were high, and there was almost no
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pornography on sale to the public. Since then, standards have been relaxed, and the volume and explicitness
of pornography have increased. At the same time, the incidence of all the above problems has grown.
This is shown by the following comparisons, taken from my 2005 briefing paper.4 There are large rises in
all the indicators from the 1950s to the 2000s.
Teenage pregnancies
The following chart compares the number of girls in England and Wales becoming pregnant below the age
of 14 per thousand members of their age group.
1955 |
2002 |
| 0.1
| 1.1
Sexually-transmitted infections
The chart below compares the number of new cases of syphilis, gonorrhoea, herpes, and genital warts in
England and Wales per thousand members of the population. The comparison is limited to these STIs because
there was no HIV/AIDS in the 1950s, and no records were kept of chlamydia or other infections.
1955 |
2004 |
|
0.7
| 2.1
Sexual crime
The following chart compares the number of rapes and sexual assaults on women and girls per thousand
members of the female population. This is based on the number of offences reported to the police. Reporting
of sexual crimes against women has become easier since the 1950s, but against this, many women take
protective measures that they did not take then (eg avoiding going out alone at night).
1955 |
2004/5 |
|
0.3
| 1.4
Family breakdown
Sexual infidelity is one cause of family breakdown. (Other factors are money, alcohol, and drugs.)
The chart below gives the number of lone parents with dependent children in Britain as a percentage of the
total number of families with dependent children.
1955 |
2004 |
|
5
| 24
Mental illness
Sexual problems are one cause of mental illness. A measure of the level of mental illness in society is the
number of anti-depressant drugs people use. The following chart compares the number of prescription items
for these drugs in the community in England per person. Anti-depressants were introduced in 1957.
1960 |
2003 |
|
0.05
| 0.55
Macho violence
Much of the violence in society is driven by machismo. Alcohol is often implicated, but heavy drinking by
men is itself, in many cases, macho-driven. Violence in the media and drugs are other factors.
The chart below compares the number of violent offences against the person recorded by the police in
England and Wales per thousand members of the population. The comparison is only very approximate because
the police have changed the way they count violent crimes. I have doubled the 1955 figure to allow for this.
1955 |
2004/5 |
0.4
| 19.5
This evidence leaves little doubt that pornography is very harmful. This finding contradicts the conclusions
of Home Office reports on the effects of pornography, published in 1979 and 1990.7 I have discussed the
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weaknesses in these reports elsewhere.8 The biggest one is that they do not answer the question, “If
pornography is not a major cause of the sexual problems now afflicting society, what is?”
A more recent study of hard pornography by the Ministry of Justice concludes that this does have a harmful
effect on adults.9 Other recent studies, including one by Dr Linda Papadopoulos for the Home Office, similarly
conclude that exposure to pornography has a harmful effect on children.10 Dr Papadopoulos’ report is alarming.
Would that the proponents of permissiveness in the 1960s had heeded the warnings of those who predicted
what the consequences of this would be.
Remedy
The remedy for these problems is for the Government to enact legislation to restore standards in the media
to where they were sixty years ago. This will be difficult. Users of pornography will protest, and liberals will
complain about loss of freedom. The above problems are, however, huge and need to be addressed.
My suggestion is that the Government sets up a Royal Commission to re-examine the effects of pornography
and to make recommendations. Acting on a Royal Commission’s report would be easier for Government than
acting on its own.
I have answered objections to raising standards and discussed possible legislation elsewhere.11 The answer
to the objection of loss of freedom is that pornography takes away even more freedom—from women who
would like to be able to go out alone at night, from young mothers who would like to do what their other
friends do, from men who find pornography addictive, from old people shut in for fear of macho-driven yobs,
and so on.
Pornography makes for a less civilized society. It is an evil, and needs to be treated as such.
References
1. Lords and Commons Family and Child Protection Group report 1998.
2. Cf. M Henderson et al, “Impact of a theoretically based sex education programme (SHARE) delivered by
teachers on NHS registered conceptions and terminations: final results of cluster randomised trial,” BMJ, 2007,
334, 133; Meg Wiggs et al, “Health outcomes of youth development programme in England: prospective
matched comparison study,” BMJ, 2009, 339, b2534.
3. Christine Barter et al, Partner Exploitation and Violence in Teenage Intimate Relationships, NSPCC, 2009.
4. P G Nelson, Sex in the Media: Is it Harmful? mediawatch-uk, 2005.
5. Andy Myhill and Jonathan Allen, Rape and Sexual Assault of Women: the Extent and Nature of the Problem,
Home Office Research Study 237, 2002.
6. P G Nelson, Nudity and Sexual Activity in the Media, Whittles, 1998, Sect. 1.5.2.
7. Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship, chairman Bernard Williams, 1979; Dennis
Howitt and Guy Cumberbatch, Pornography: Impacts and Influences, 1990.
8. Nudity and Sexual Activity in the Media, Chap. 2.
9. Catherine Itzin, Ann Takets, and Liz Kelly, The Evidence of Harm to Adults Relating to Exposure to Extreme
Pornographic Material, Ministry of Justice Research Series 11/07, 2007.
10. Michael Flood, “The harms of pornography exposure among children and young people,” Child Abuse
Review, 2009, 18, 384; Linda Papadopoulos, Independent Review into the Sexualisation of Young People, Home
Office, 2010.
11. Nudity and Sexual Activity in the Media, Chaps. 3–4.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by the British Board of Film Classification
Executive Summary
— The British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) is the UK’s regulator of film and video. The
BBFC’s primary aim is to protect children and other vulnerable groups from harm through
classification decisions which are legally enforceable and to empower consumers through content
information and education.
— Although the ecology of the internet is different from that of the more regulated offline environment,
the risk of harm, particularly to minors, from both legal and illegal material is at least as great online.
Government, industry and regulators should work together to reduce the harm risk wherever possible.
There is a case for more joined up co and self-regulation online drawing on existing, effective, and
often industry-led models, encouraged and supported by Government.
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—
—
—
—
The starting point for co- and self-regulatory models to protect children online should be clarity of
approach and consumer and industry support. The BBFC sets out in its submission the factors for
the success of online co- and self-regulatory systems: child protection at its core; effective labelling
of content; broad coverage; low cost; efficient, flexible and innovative.
The BBFC is ready to continue to make available its expertise and experience, working with
Government, industry and other regulators to improve child protection online. Examples of the
BBFC’s involvement in this area include:
— voluntary self-regulation by the BBFC of Video-on-Demand (VOD) content applying granular
age ratings and content advice;
— the BBFC-run regulation of mobile content, including websites, using a binary classification
system based around the BBFC 18/R18 standard which enables the filtering of content and
protection of minors; and
— development by the BBFC and NICAM of a User Generated Content (UGC) ratings tool. This
self-regulatory questionnaire is tailored to reflect national differences and is designed to be
completed by those uploading the content or the audience, allowing the use of online filters to
prevent children accessing inappropriate content and the facility to report abuse.
Online pornography is an important example of where co or self-regulation has not worked well.
The BBFC removes any material from pornographic works it classifies which is potentially harmful
or otherwise illegal under the Video Recordings Act (VRA), including so-called “rape porn”. But
online, where the VRA and its harm test do not apply, harmful material including “rape porn” is
available. Greater regulation of such adult content, and content which the BBFC will not classify at
any category, would be welcome for the better protection of minors.
There are some obvious areas where Government intervention may be appropriate to better protect
children online. Lack of industry self-regulation of online pornography is leading to children being
able to access inappropriate and potentially harmful content. Equally, industry could do more, for
example through effective moderation or through the age rating of online music videos, to ensure
that their service is safe for children and the vulnerable online.
1. Introduction
1.1 The British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) is grateful for the opportunity to respond to the Culture,
Media and Sport Committee Inquiry into Online Safety.
1.2 The BBFC is an independent, non-governmental body which classifies films and videos distributed by
way of packaged media and, increasingly, on the internet. The BBFC’s primary aim is to protect children and
other vulnerable groups from harm through classification decisions which are legally enforceable and to
empower consumers, particularly parents and children, through content information and education. The BBFC
will not classify material which is illegal in the UK, including content which promotes terrorism or which
features indecent images of children. The BBFC became the independent regulator of content delivered by
mobile networks in the UK from 2 September 2013. The Director of the BBFC, David Cooke, sits on the
Executive Board of UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) in recognition of the BBFC’s role in the
protection of children online.
1.3 The BBFC classifies films and videos/DVDs according to its Classification Guidelines, with ratings
ranging from U for Universal to R18 which are restricted videos only allowed to be sold in licensed sex shops.
The BBFC’s Guidelines are the result of extensive public consultation with over 10,000 people across the UK
being consulted during the most recent Guidelines consultation in 2013. Research demonstrates that the public
agrees with the BBFC’s classification decisions most of the time. 92% of recent film viewers agreed with
classification of films they had seen recently. (Goldstone Perl, Bernice Hardie 2013); and recognises and
understands the BBFC’s symbols 89% of the time (rising to 97% for parents) (TNS, 2007).
1.4 The BBFC also publishes (on its website and Apps) more detailed information, BBFCinsight, aimed
primarily at parents, which outlines the key content issues in a film and thereby enables viewers to make fully
educated viewing decisions for themselves and their families. This information is available both when the
content is distributed by way of packaged media and online. Independent research (Slesenger, 2009) suggests
that 86% of parents of primary schoolchildren find this information useful.
1.5 The BBFC runs an extensive education programme both online and through a series of seminars at the
BBFC and throughout the country, with visits to schools and colleges, speaking to over 12,000 students in
2012 on media literacy and the classification process. The BBFC further contributes to a number of media
literacy initiatives run by industry and child protection groups, including Childnet UK, advising children and
adults on how to keep themselves and their family safe online.
2. The BBFC and Home Entertainment Industry Self-regulation Online
2.1 For historical reasons, the current statutory regime for film and video/DVDs does not cover online
content. The Video Recordings Act was originally passed in 1984 before digital downloads of videos/DVDs.
However, media convergence is increasingly blurring the distinction between physical and online material.
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2.2 Independent research commissioned by the BBFC shows that while the public considers that the internet
brings greater choice, freedom and flexibility, the majority of viewers still consider it important to be able to
check the suitability of audio-visual content they download. 85% of the public consider it important to have
consistent BBFC classifications available for Video-On-Demand (VOD) content; rising to 90% of parents of
children under 16 (Bernice Hardie, 2011).
2.3 In recognition of public demands for regulatory protection online, the BBFC has worked in partnership
with the home entertainment industry on a number of voluntary, self regulatory services which bring trusted
BBFC classification standards and well known age ratings and symbols online. BBFC digital services offers
labelling and content advice services designed for content providers and platform owners (digital video
services). These services cover all forms of video-on-demand including subscription models (SVOD) and
transactional (TVOD).
2.4 The BBFC has now rated more than 200,000 videos for online distribution by such companies as Warner
Bros, Walt Disney, 20th Century Fox, Paramount, Universal, Sony; with BBFC ratings used by platforms such
as iTunes, Netflix, Blinkbox/Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Dixons, BT Vision and Talk Talk. The new industry initiative
known as UltraViolet—which promotes the digital ownership of content—is also working with the BBFC.
Displaying BBFC labelling enables consumers to make informed choices when purchasing retail and rental
digital video, thereby empowering parents to protect their children.
2.5 BBFC digital services include a ratings service aimed specifically at content that is only available online
and that would otherwise not be provided with a rating. This service—known as Watch and Rate—is becoming
more popular and well-used. Compared with the same period in 2012, there has been a 141% increase in
industry take up as of 10 September 2013.
3. Online Pornography
3.1 It is generally accepted that exposing children to pornography is potentially harmful to them and is likely
at the very least to impair their development. This is why many countries, including the UK, have enacted
measures to prevent children from accessing pornography.
3.2 In the UK, the BBFC classifies all pornographic content released both on video and theatrically. The
BBFC removes any material from pornographic works which is potentially harmful or otherwise illegal. As
well as policing the border between legal and illegal pornography, the BBFC polices the border between the
strongest, hardcore pornography, and the less strong, softcore pornography. The BBFC classifies hardcore
pornography as R18, which means that it may only be supplied through licensed sex shops, as an extra
precaution against underage viewing. However, the risk of children accessing even the strongest legal
pornography is far greater online. In addition, there are fewer effective controls on the distribution online of
pornography which the BBFC would not classify at any category.
3.3 Online pornography is an important example of where co or self-regulation has not worked well. While
the majority of the home entertainment industry has chosen to opt for voluntary self regulation, no members
of the adult industry currently use the BBFC’s digital services. The market imperatives which in the UK have
driven the mainstream home entertainment industry to adopt best practice self regulation, work in the opposite
direction in relation to adult content. While the mainstream video industry recognises that parents want the
reassurance of trusted labels on online content, much of the adult industry wants to advertise its product
as “uncensored”.
3.4 The BBFC removes any material from pornographic works it classifies which is potentially harmful or
otherwise illegal under the VRA, including so-called “rape porn”. The BBFC intervenes to remove from a
pornographic work any portrayal of sexual activity which involves lack of consent, whether real or simulated.
The BBFC will also remove material, including dialogue, which is likely to encourage an interest in sexually
abusive activity, including rape. In short, “rape porn” does not exist in works classified by the BBFC. But
online, where the VRA and its harm test do not apply, “rape porn” is available. The BBFC believes that
consideration needs to be given into how protections that are applied to physical R18 material can also be
applied online if much of the adult industry continues to refuse to participate in self-regulatory measures. The
BBFC therefore welcomes the Prime Minister’s declaration on 22 July 2013 that Government will ensure:
“that videos streamed on line in the UK are subject to the same rules as those sold in shops. Put
simply—what you can’t get in a shop, you will no longer be able to get online.”
3.5 The Government has recognised the dangers of extreme pornography and in 2008 made possession of
extreme pornography an offence under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act. A BBFC classification is a
defence against a prosecution under this Act therefore purchasing a legally classified work is a protection
against inadvertently possessing extreme pornographic material. The BBFC regularly assists Local Government
trading standards officers in ensuring that pornographic material has been classified by the BBFC and restricted
for sale to licensed sex shops. However, these methods of enforcement are not available online.
3.6 While physical video works rated R18 by the BBFC may only be supplied to adults through licensed
sex shops, restrictions to prevent children accessing such material are not maintained online, except for UK
services regulated by the Authority for Television On Demand (ATVOD). These services form a very small
proportion of the market, making it easier for those under 18 to access potentially harmful pornography. In
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addition, ATVOD can only intervene and impose rules to require that the material must be made available in
a manner which secures that children will not normally see or hear it, if a programme distributed online by a
UK provider contains material which might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of
persons under the age of 18.
3.7 The BBFC believes that there is a case to strengthen the definition of content online likely to seriously
impair the development of minors so that it is clear that hardcore pornography constitutes such content. One
option might be an amendment to the Audiovisual Media Services Directive so that explicit depictions of real
sexual activity, or activity involving realistic infliction of pain or injury, or real or simulated lack of consent to
sexual activity, must be provided in such a manner which ensures that under 18s cannot normally see or hear
it. Such an approach would be consistent with that in the Government’s paper: Connectivity, Content and
Consumers: Britain’s digital platform for growth.
4. The BBFC and Mobile Networks’ Self-regulation of Online Content
4.1 From 2 September 2013, the BBFC became the independent regulator of content delivered via the UK’s
four main mobile networks (EE, O2, Three and Vodafone). Under this new self regulatory system, the BBFC
has created a Classification Framework, based on the trusted, transparent and consistent standards set out in its
Classification Guidelines, which specifies what content should be placed behind access controls/filters. The
Classification Framework is a living document which will be updated regularly to reflect evolving public
attitudes and societal concerns.
4.2 The standards in the BBFC’s Classification Guidelines are used to ensure content which would be age
rated 18 or R18 by the BBFC will be placed behind access controls and internet filters by mobile operators to
restrict access to that content by those under 18. This content includes pornography and other adult sexual
content, pro-smoking and pro-Ana (anorexia nervosa) websites and content which promotes or glorifies
discrimination, drug misuse or real life violence. The BBFC and the mobile operators believe that this
partnership will be trusted by the public, more transparent than the previous mobile regulatory regime and
better able to adapt to changes in societal attitudes and concerns in relation to child protection.
4.3 The BBFC believes that child protection would be improved if those operating public WiFi services in
places regularly visited by minors applied the same, consistent standards as those used by the mobile operators.
The BBFC would be able to offer assistance in setting and applying these standards, as it has done in
partnership with the mobile operators for content accessed via mobile networks.
5. User Generated Content Online
5.1 The BBFC was a third party member of the EU’s CEO Coalition to make the Internet a better place for
children. In response to a call for action from the European Commission, members of the Coalition in 2012–13
undertook to take positive action to make the Internet a better place for children in the European Union. The
Coalition aimed to make the internet safer for children and the vulnerable through action in five core areas:
simple and robust reporting tools, age-appropriate privacy settings, wider use of content classification, wider
availability and use of parental controls and effective takedown of child abuse material.
5.2 In response to this initiative, the BBFC and its counterpart, the Dutch regulator, the Netherlands Institute
for Classification of Audio Visual Media (NICAM) together developed a tool for ordinary people to age rate
User Generated Content (UGC) across different countries and platforms and according to recognised and trusted
national standards. UGC is growing in significance and needs to be addressed to allow parents the tools to
prevent children and the vulnerable from accessing inappropriate content.
5.3 The UGC tool, using a single, simple, free to complete questionnaire, instantaneously produces an age
rating which can be shown on the video hosting platform and linked to internet filters. The ratings differ from
country to country to reflect different national concerns over content. For example, strong language is an issue
for consumers in the UK but not in the Netherlands.
5.4 The tool is simple to use and understand. It contains six questions about the content of the UGC, on
behaviour (including racism and other discriminatory behaviour, self harm and suicide), drugs, horror, language,
sex/nudity and violence. Completing the questionnaire takes less than two minutes. It also includes a facility
for viewers to report content which in their view is abusive or even illegal, such as material intended to
promote terrorism or child sex abuse images.
5.5 The questionnaire is flexible. It may be completed by those uploading content or it may be completed
by those viewing the content. The ratings can then be linked to online filters. This new initiative will shortly
be trialled by Mediaset in Italy and the BBFC and NICAM are looking for trial partners elsewhere across the
EU. This initiative could make the online world safer for children and has been welcomed by the EU
Commission’s CEO Safer Internet Coalition and the UK Government.
5.6 The BBFC would be happy to demonstrate to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee how this tool
could help to make the internet safer for children.
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6. Moderation
6.1 One core area that the BBFC believes could significantly improve child protection online is effective
moderation of sites that appeal to children and teenagers. The case of instances of inappropriate behaviour on
the site Habbo Hotel and Ask.fm demonstrates the importance of robust moderation and effective follow up
action if children are to be properly protected.
7. Exemptions from the Video Recordings Act and Online Music Videos
7.1 When the Video Recordings Act (VRA) was passed over 25 years ago certain video works were made
exempt from classification by the BBFC because they were considered unlikely to be harmful. The threshold
at which music, sport, documentaries and religious works lose their exemption from the VRA remains
extremely high despite the content of these exempt works having changed beyond all recognition since 1984.
This high threshold has meant that inappropriate and potentially harmful content in such works is exempt from
statutory classification, allowing it to be legally supplied to children.
7.2 On 24 May 2013, following a consultation, the UK Government announced that it plans in 2014 to lower
the exemptions threshold for all currently exempt material in order to prevent children accessing potentially
harmful material. Once implemented, the decision will improve the protection children enjoy from potentially
harmful media content by ensuring that video content such as drug misuse, strong violence, racist language,
and certain sexual content falling short of actual sex will no longer be legally able to be freely supplied to
children. Instead, the BBFC will classify such content to keep it away from vulnerable and impressionable
children.
7.3 However, there is particular concern about the content of currently exempt music videos and online music
videos, highlighted among others by Reg Bailey in his review into the commercialisation and sexualisation of
Children which resulted in the report Letting Children be Children. The Government’s proposed amendment
to the VRA will only bring physical music videos within the BBFC’s regulatory ambit. In the Department for
Education’s Progress Report on the Bailey Review in May 2013, the Government stated:
“On music videos, we want industry to develop solutions no later than the end of the year to ensure
online videos—particularly those that are likely to be sought out by children and young people—
carry advice about their age-suitability and content.”
7.4 The BBFC hopes to work with the recorded music industry towards the goal of achieving well understood
and trusted age ratings and content advice for online music videos as we have done successfully with the home
entertainment industry in relation to other online videos. One company—Universal Music—has begun to
submit long form music video content to the BBFC for online age ratings. A number of platforms which use
BBFC ratings through BBFC Digital Services have indicated that they would carry music videos if they were
age rated by the BBFC. This would then mean that the ability to download these music videos could be
controlled by age related filters which would be an important mechanism for child protection online.
8. Conclusion: The Appropriate Regulatory Environment to Protect Children Online
8.1 In a converging media world, it is the content, and not the means of distribution, that is important when
considering protection of children. The ecology of the internet is of course very different from that of the
offline environment where harm risks are well understood and regulated for. But online, the risk of harm,
particularly to minors, from both legal and illegal material is at least as great and in some cases (for example
access to legal pornography or pro-self harming and suicide content) arguably greater because of a much
greater ease of access.
8.2 In several areas, industry and regulators have worked effectively together to reduce the online harm risk.
The initiatives outlined in this response for example, which build on the BBFC’s partnerships with, among
others, mobile operators, digital video services and content providers, and our cooperative relationships with
fellow regulators both in the UK and overseas, demonstrate this. The public should continue to benefit from
these initiatives. Drawing on its experience and expertise, the BBFC stands ready to work further with
Government, industry and other regulators to continue collectively to improve child protection online.
8.3 The key criteria for any regulation should be clarity of approach and consumer and industry support.
The BBFC believes that the public policy priority should be to create an appropriate framework enabling both
existing and future effective self, co and statutory regulation to flourish, empowering consumers to inform and
protect themselves and their families.
8.4 In the BBFC’s experience the key factors for the success of an online regulatory system are:
— child protection at its core;
— effective labelling of content so that the standards are trusted and understood and the symbols
used are recognisable;
— broad coverage so that the system creates a known standard; and
— low cost; efficient, flexible and innovative service so that it can keep pace with technological
change and not be burdensome on industry.
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8.6 The BBFC’s own self-regulatory solutions fulfil these criteria and have widespread industry and public
support. We would encourage Government to continue to encourage and support these, and other, solutions.
However, as is clear from our evidence, there are some obvious areas where more robust Government
intervention is required to ensure proper protection of children online, for example online pornography, where
currently lack of industry self-regulation is leading to children being able to access inappropriate and potentially
harmful content. Equally, industry could do more, for example through effective moderation, to ensure that
their service is safe for children and the vulnerable online.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Arqiva
Summary of Key Points and Recommendations
— Arqiva welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee’s
timely new Inquiry into Online Safety.
— Arqiva believes that children and young people should be able to enjoy the benefits of digital
technology and the internet, whilst having the right to be safe online. Indeed, the commitment to
ensure child safety online is a matter of grave importance—and should be a shared responsibility
between parents, businesses and the wider communications industry including ISPs, web publishers,
WiFi providers and government. Therefore, Arqiva is pleased to be a member of the Internet Watch
Foundation (IWF) and to have fully engaged with the UK Council for Child Internet Safety
(UKCCIS), as well as government; key stakeholder organisations, businesses, retailers and
manufacturers on this important issue.
— Children gain access to the Internet from many devices: PCs, smartphones, tablets and games
consoles; both their own and those owned by their friends and parents. Many of these devices gain
access to the Internet via multiple networks: fixed broadband at home, mobile broadband and Public
WiFi outside of the house. In simple terms, there are two main ways of filtering the Internet content
presented to children:
I. The network can filter content, for all users, or for children only, where the network can
firmly identify the user and the age of that user.
II. The device can be set to filter content, with device passwords to prevent children from
changing these filter settings.
— Arqiva believes that both measures are required to minimise the adult content available to children.
The first would benefit from a consistent approach to content filtering for all Internet access networks
that provide service in public places. The second requires education for parents and children, as well
as a policy that all devices (and internet access software on those devices) should be supplied with
adult content filtering turned on by default.
—
Arqiva recommends that government place greater emphasis on internet safety themes across the
educational curriculum.
—
We believe that policy makers should do more to research and improve online protections for more
vulnerable children; define inappropriate content and improve the means for identifying it online. In
addition, more research should be conducted to understand the many different ways that children
and young people are using internet enabled devices, especially in the home and within social
environments.
—
We also believe that media and communications companies, including the public service
broadcasters, play a key role in educating the public.
About Arqiva
Arqiva is a media infrastructure and technology company operating at the heart of the broadcast and mobile
communications industry and at the forefront of network solutions and services in an increasingly digital world.
Arqiva provides much of the infrastructure behind television, radio and wireless communications in the UK
and has a growing presence in Ireland, mainland Europe and the USA.
Arqiva was responsible for UK Digital “Switch-Over”—engineering from analogue television to Freeview—
a huge logistical exercise which touched every Parliamentary constituency, requiring an investment by Arqiva
of some £630 million and was successfully delivered to time and budget.
Arqiva is also a founder member and shareholder of Freeview (Arqiva broadcasts all six Freeview
multiplexes and is the licensed operator of two of them) and was a key launch technology partner for Freesat.
Arqiva is also the licensed operator of the Digital One national commercial DAB digital radio multiplex.
Arqiva operates five international satellite teleports, over 70 other staffed locations, and thousands of shared
radio sites throughout the UK and Ireland including masts, towers and rooftops from under 30 to over 300
metres tall.
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In addition for broadcasters, media companies and corporate enterprises Arqiva provides end-to-end
capability ranging from:
— satellite newsgathering (30 international broadcast trucks);
— 10 TV studios (co-located with post-production suites);
— spectrum for Programme-Making & Special Events (PMSE)25;
— playout (capacity to play out over 70 channels including HD); to
— satellite distribution (over 1200 services delivered); and
— Connect TV—who launched the first live streaming channel on Freeview.
Arqiva’s WiFi network includes almost every UK airport—and reaches cross the hospitality and leisure
sector, providing WiFi to 85,000 rooms in leading hotel chains, and many restaurants, retail chains and shopping
centres and local high streets.
Elsewhere in the communications sector, the company supports cellular, wireless broadband, video, voice
and data solutions for the mobile phone, public safety, public sector, public space and transport markets.
Arqiva’s major customers include the BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Five, BSkyB, Classic FM, the four UK mobile
operators, Metropolitan Police and the RNLI.
The Questions
Key, Overarching Issues:
— How best to protect minors from accessing adult content;
— Filtering out extremist material, including images of child abuse and material intended to
promote terrorism or other acts of violence;
— Preventing abusive or threatening comments on social media.
1. Arqiva welcomes the opportunity to respond to the CMS Select Committee’s timely new inquiry into
Online Safety.
2. Over the past decade the UK’s media, broadcasting, telecommunications and technology industries have
undergone unprecedented, profound and exciting change. As a result of digitisation, the traditional boundaries
between what were once separate universes: Content, Communications and Computing are eroding. Such
“convergence” has seen the blurring of boundaries between the media, telecoms and information technology
sectors.
3. Technology is becoming an integral part of both modern life and children’s lives. According to Ofcom:
90% of children live in a household with access to the internet through either a PC, laptop or netbook;26
whilst 65% of children use the internet “almost every day”.27 Young people are increasingly taking part in a
wide range of activities online, enabling them to discover and access a wide range of content, connect with
their friends and family, as well as offering the potential to create and distribute their own content. Young
people are understandably excited, stimulated and motivated by these developments. Indeed, recent research
suggests that primary age children are “highly engaged” with digital technology.28 It is essential for policy
makers and educators to continue to research and understand the many different ways that children and young
people are using internet enabled devices, especially in the home and within social environments.
4. However, as well as bringing exciting new benefits, new forms of communication and emerging platforms
bring new opportunities for misuse. Whereas, traditionally, the public service broadcasters were trusted by
parents to provide quality viewing and listening content; suitable for children and family/inter-generational
viewing and delivered in a linear fashion; and at a suitable time (ie: pre or post-9pm watershed); we have
witnessed how in recent years emerging commercial “new media” platforms and social networking, in a largely
unregulated space, have exposed young people to a range of new dangers—from the exposure to “adult
content”, to the phenomena of “cyberbullying”, “grooming”, “sexting”, “self-harm”, gaming, gambling, as well
as illegal downloading and file sharing, or online fraud.
5. Child safety (online or offline) is a hotly debated issue. As Dr Tanya Byron has noted “A focus on the
most terrible but least frequent risks can skew debate in a direction that sends out negative and fear-based
25
26
27
28
Such as the wireless cameras operated by the BBC and Sky News, and the radio microphones used in virtually all television
production and many West End shows.
Ofcom’s Communications Market Report 2013
This is split across; 38% of 5–7 year olds, 62% of 8–11 year olds, 87% of 12–15 year olds—Ofcom’s Children and Parents:
Media use and attitudes report (Oct’12)
UK Safety Internet Centre—Safer Internet Day—Have Your Say Report February 2013: 86% of 7–11s use some form of online
communication tool, such as social networks and virtual worlds (56%), chat functions in online gaming (38%) or using webcams
(28%). The internet is crucial for schoolwork, and 94% of 7–11s say they have little trouble finding information for their school
work on the internet. Secondary age children are prolific online communicators: 96% of young people age 11–19 use some form
of online communication tool, including services such as social networks (74%), emails (72%), instant messaging (68%),
webcams (52%), chat functions in online gaming (45%), chat rooms (17%) and blogs (14%). Young people are also contributing
to the production of online content: a quarter (24%) of 11–19s have created a website, 21% have created a game, 14% have
created an app and 12% have created a blog
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messages to children, young people and families.”29 In this context, it is interesting to note that Ofcom studies
suggest that parents are more concerned about the media content delivered via the television (23% very or
fairly concerned) than via a child’s access to the internet (17%).30
6. In his recent speech on Internet Safety the Prime Minister distinguished between two challenges: “the
criminal and the cultural”, namely, the proliferation and accessibility of child abuse images on the internet, and
the fact that many children are viewing online pornography and other damaging material at a very early age.31
We agree with the Prime Minister that “…these challenges are very distinct and very different. In one we’re
talking about illegal material, the other is legal material that is being viewed by those who are underage.” It is
critical that these debates are left separate, and that discussion on the latter remains proportionate and balanced.
7. Arqiva believes that children and young people should be able to enjoy the benefits of digital technology
and the internet, whilst having the right to be safe online. Indeed, the commitment to ensure child safety online
is a matter of grave importance—and should be a shared responsibility between parents, businesses and the
wider communications industry including ISPs, web publishers, WiFi providers and government. Therefore,
Arqiva is pleased to be a member of the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) and to have fully engaged with the
UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), as well as government; key stakeholder organisations,
businesses, retailers and manufacturers on this important issue.
Protecting Children through filters
8. As one of the six main public WiFi providers (with BT, Nomad, Sky, Virgin Media and O2), we provide
internet access through WiFi, which is used by the public in a variety of means. Arqiva’s recent contracts
include the provision of WiFi to UK airports (including Heathrow; Stansted; Glasgow; Edinburgh; Manchester
and Southampton); several hotels and retail environments (including Premier Inns and Enterprise Pubs); as
well as several local authorities, including Manchester City Centre; and several London Boroughs.
9. As a member of the Internet Watch Foundation we are committed to blocking access to child sexual abuse
content and other illegal material. We are also committed to blocking terrorist content, as well as intolerance
and hate, and criminal activity. This applies across our network.
10. We believe that it is particularly important to have strong protection in public places particularly where
unsupervised children might reasonably be found on a regular basis. Therefore, in the absence of a specific
request from our business customers, we commit that our standard public WiFi offering will also include
filters to block pornography. This will help prevent children and young people from accessing inappropriate
pornographic material themselves, and should also limit accidental exposure to inappropriate material that
nearby adults might be looking at in public.
11. Children gain access to the Internet from many devices: PCs, smartphones, tablets and games consoles;
both their own and those owned by their friends and parents. Many of these devices gain access to the Internet
via multiple networks: fixed broadband at home, mobile broadband and Public WiFi outside of the house. In
simple terms, there are two main ways of filtering the Internet content presented to children:
I. The network can filter content, for all users, or for children only, where the network can firmly
identify the user and the age of that user.
II. The device can be set to filter content, with device passwords to prevent children from changing
these filter settings.
Arqiva believes that both measures are required to minimise the adult content available to children. The first
would benefit from a consistent approach to content filtering for all Internet access networks that provide
service in public places. The second requires education for parents and children, as well as a policy that all
devices (and internet access software on those devices) should be supplied with adult content filtering turned
on by default.
12. It is unfortunate that, on occasion, filters can also mistakenly “over-block” and prevent access to sites
which parents would be content to let their children browse. Arqiva recognises this can sometimes be frustrating
for consumers.
13. However, it is also important to guard against a false sense of security. Parents must be made aware that
turning filters on does not immediately make the Internet “safe”. Parents should be encouraged to talk to their
children about what they do online and offline.
14. Filters can only block domains or websites—they cannot filter content or behaviour within sites such as
social media platforms. Given that these platforms are a major driver of young people using the internet, it is
important for these platforms to be vigilant themselves at combating cyber-bulling or anti-social behaviour.
29
30
31
Do we have safer children in a digital world? A review of progress since the 2008 Byron Review—Professor Tanya Byron
March 2010
Ofcom’s Children and Parents: Media use and attitudes report (Oct’12)
Speech by Rt Hon David Cameron MP, 22 July 2013—delivered to NSPCC
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Protecting Consumers through education
15. Young people’s use of the internet should be an incredibly rewarding experience—both within the school
gates, and during their extra curricula home and social life. Activities that harness new technologies can make
a valuable contribution to the wider school curriculum and to children’s learning. Arqiva recommends that
government place greater emphasis on internet safety themes across the educational curriculum. We believe
that policy makers should do more to research and improve online protections for more vulnerable children;
define inappropriate content and improve the means for identifying it online.
16. Arqiva are proud to work with government, UKCCIS and others to establish clear, simple benchmarks
and classifications for parental control solutions. We believe parents should be empowered with the skills and
knowledge to protect their children while going online at home. In particular, parental controls can help limit
the chances of children being exposed to inappropriate online content. Arqiva welcomes parental control
features that may be included in new technology such as personal computers, computer and video games,
computer software, mobile phones and digital television services. These controls can be used to limit access to
only age appropriate content, to set usage times and limits and to monitor activity.
17. There are many ways of accessing and downloading music, film, TV and video safely online and it is
important that children and young people understand how to download content legally. Copyright law applies
to downloading, sharing and streaming—just as in the world of physical CDs and DVDs. Improved “media
literacy” should make explicit that those who make music, film or TV content available to others on a filesharing network, download from an illegal site, or sell copies without the permission of those who own the
copyright, are effectively breaking the law and could face serious penalties. In addition, illegal file-sharing
programmes and websites pose greater risks to your computer or mobile phone than legitimate sites. Users
often unwittingly download viruses or spyware and can inadvertently share personal computer files and
information. Some files are purposely misnamed on file-sharing and peer-to-peer networks to trick people into
downloading them.
18. When it comes to online safety, we also believe that media and communications companies, including
the public service broadcasters, play a key role in educating the public. The BBC should be praised for regularly
commissioning innovative, multi-platform content which inspires and educates audiences. The BBC’s sixth
Public Purpose includes “Delivering to the public the benefit of emerging communications technologies and
services:” Indeed, the BBC’s content and services are perhaps the most powerful means to drive adoption as
well as to educate the public as to the risks of emerging technologies. The BBC is a trusted guide to the digital
world for the inexperienced or unsure, a safe place to be for the young, a reliable and accurate on-air and
online source for the information seeker, and a challenging and involving partner for the more advanced user.
Ultimately, “online safety” should be regarded as an important plank of the BBC’s commitment to support the
media literacy of all its audience.
The need for research
19. There is a growth in using alternative portable devices (including mobiles and portable media players)
to access online content in a variety of places and without parental supervision. Use of mobile phones continues
to grow among young people—around 90% of young people over the age of 11 own a mobile phone. There is
also a popular perception that online behaviour on shared devices in the family living room is “safer” than
behaviour on mobiles, personal tablets or portable devices. However, Arqiva notes that some experts suggest
there is little evidence on the links between using more portable devices and the online risks young people
face in using such devices.32 Therefore, it is essential for policy makers and educators to continue to research
and understand the many different ways that children and young people are using internet enabled devices,
especially in the home and within social environments. Similarly, Ofcom has estimated that 43% of children
have an active social network (Facebook, Myspace or Bebo) profile, and across social networking sites it is
estimated that children aged 8–11 years have 92 friends—and have not met 12% of them face-to-face, and
those aged 12–15 years have 286 friends—and have not met 25% of them face-to-face.33 More research is
needed to explore the links between where, with what, how often and with whom, children access the internet
and the likelihood of online risks.
September 2013
32
33
NFER Report “Children’s online risks and safety—a review of the available evidence” (2010)—commissioned by UKCCIS
Ofcom’s Children and Parents: Media use and attitudes report (Oct’12);
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Ev w22 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
Written evidence submitted by James Griffiths
1. I am writing as a concerned parent and individual in relation to the current issue being considered by the
Government relating to the safety of children from the corrupting content of adult material that can be viewed
on the internet. I have seven children and along with my wife have sort to bring the children up in a safe and
loving household while facing the everyday challenges of family life. This current threat is both disturbing and
very harmful to the fundamental basics of family life and to the moral fibre of a right foundation for our
young people.
2. We recognise that the internet has brought considerable benefits to both children and society in being used
as a tool for gathering information especially in helping them with their studies. Our older children didn’t have
the same wealth of information when they were in education as our three younger siblings have now (aged 15,
13 and 11) but whilst we have blocks and filters in place ourselves there are many many other children who
don’t have this protection which leaves them very venerable to unsuitable and corrupting content.
3. We believe that much more needs to be done by the Government, industry, parents and young people to
put in place measures to protect the youth of today and make the internet a safer place for children. It is a
basic necessity that our children are safe from cruelty and harm wherever they are and that includes when they
are on the internet.
4. When we talk about child safety online we believe two areas of greatest concern and areas that need to
be focused on are:
— Keeping children safe from harmful content online (eg grooming and sexting).
— Protecting young eyes from legal content that’s not appropriate for their age.
5. It is not a new issue facing the Government as many persons and organisations have been calling for
years for policy changes and investment of resources in both technology and policing to better protect children
and young people from online dangers
6. Along with many other concerned parents we are calling on the Government and especially this Committee
with its responsibilities in this particular matter to bring in legislation that would require default blocking of
all adult content to be a standard setting on all internet enabled devices sold in the UK. This would a way of
stopping children from seeing harmful adult content and give peace of mind to parents when the internet is
being used. There is also a need of the development and use of better age-verification software.
7. The constant attempt to water down this action being taken in the name of freedom of choice is a very
poor argument indeed and surely recent statistics from Ofcom revealing two key facts—“81% of children aged
14–16 have viewed ADULT material online” and “Only 46% of parents have filters in place on their home
internet”—only serve to illustrate the urgent need of action as to this very serious issue.
8. My wife joins with me in my grave concerns as to this matter and we would urge you as a committee to
take account of these concerns along with many other parents like ourselves in moving forward to implement
the necessary actions to give our very treasured possessions and the hope of the future in this country—our
young impressionable children—the protection and moral support they need to prosper.
September 2013
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—
—
—
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Written evidence submitted by Christopher G. H. Thomas
I wish to make a submission to the Committee as an individual, a parent and grandparent, a practising
Christian and as a user of the internet.
I understand the great advance that the internet has brought to young people in accessing the immense
wealth of information available to assist them in their studies and other areas of normal life.
However, it has unquestionably brought with it very great moral dangers and much material which
damages children and adolescents. Included with this is access to images and information which is
inappropriate for those in developing years. They are just not able to handle such things at that age.
I recognise that parents have a major responsibility to protect their children from contact with
damaging or corrupting matter on the internet, but would respectfully submit to the Committee that
the Government also has the responsibility to use its power to provide suitable protection.
Measures I would submit to the Committee as things the Government should do are:
1. Make it a legal requirement that all internet-accessible equipment and devices sold in the UK have a
default setting as standard that all adult material is blocked.
2. Software to verify the age of users should be improved, and the Government should promote its use
strongly.
3. The Government should use its authority and influence with manufacturers to ensure that they put into
practice such measures. They should not be diverted by suggestions that they are impinging on individual
freedom.
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THE PRESERVATION OF BRITISH YOUTH IS AT STAKE IN THIS MATTER.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by John Edgar Cameron Lowe
ONLINE SAFETY OF CHILDREN
Thank you for this enquiry and allowing some of us to make a submission.
I write in a personal capacity as one who, with my wife, have constant contact with children through
the church.
Sex is a very powerful force in many people’s lives.
When in its proper setting of raising children it is a good and right thing.
When out of its setting it is like fire out of control and does damage.
I have personally been damaged by adult material although this was in an age before the advent of the
internet. I have felt the effects of this damage throughout the rest of my life.
Today the chances of children being damaged are enormous compared to years ago. I therefore fully agree
with David Cameron, Michael Gove and others, that every possible effort should be made to get government,
parents, internet providers, educators and charities to work together to provide all the protections necessary to
safeguard them from the many different types of sexual corruption available online.
It is surely a crime to shatter the innocence of children and young people.
There is a solemn piece on the last page of the Bible that speaks of those that love and make a lie.
Those that make a lie are those that set up and publish these damaging and vile things.
Those that love a lie are those that delve into and watch them.
As responsible citizens, as many as possible need to do everything they can to address this massive problem.
May you all be helped in your deliberations.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Norfolk Library and Information Service
Summary
— Internet access is possible in a range of environments—a one size filtering solution will not fit
them all.
— Most library services already have internet filtering mechanisms in place.
— National standard needed to determine what type of information is acceptable in age bands—schools,
parents, internet industry and filtering software providers will all need to sign up to it.
— Standards will need to apply to volunteer run libraries, who may not have the necessary expertise.
Evidence
1. There are
—
—
—
—
—
—
a number of possible environments where children can access information online:
Home.
School.
Library Computer or authenticated library wifi access.
Internet café.
Open access public wifi hotspot (including in libraries).
Authenticated access public wifi hotspot.
Any recommendations will need to reflect on the conditions that apply in each environment—not all
conclusions can or should necessarily be applicable in all environments.
2. Further comments will be restricted to internet access in libraries.
3. Library services should be able to identify who is logging onto a public computer or authenticating onto
their library wifi access. In Norfolk this is achieved through the use of a borrower umber and PIN combination.
This means that it should be possible to require library customers to agree to abide by an Acceptable Use
Policy, which among other things would include agreement not to access sites or material that is “is obscene,
racist, defamatory or otherwise unlawful, or that would cause harassment or gross offence to others”.
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Ev w24 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
4. It is then possible to withdraw internet access privileges if this agreement is breached.
5. To prevent breaches, most library services subscribe to an internet filtering service, which is configured
to prevent access to sites falling into a range of categories. In Norfolk, this is the same product that is used for
filtering staff internet access, so any product must be capable of handling more than one filtering regime profile.
6. We use the same filtering product for our public wifi access in libraries as we do on static computers,
although we believe this is by no means a common feature in other library authorities.
7. Different filtering products categorise sites differently, so application of a national standard will be
difficult—filtering service providers regard their classification methodologies as commercially confidential.
8. Filtering is applied at the site level, not at the content level. It is therefore not currently possible to block
adult video content on YouTube without blocking all video content.
9. YouTube is the default hosting service for all Norfolk County Council public video content, so any idea
of a national block on providing access to YouTube in libraries would have significant impact on the delivery
and distribution of information about council services.
10. Norfolk Library and Information Services would like to see all websites that do or may host adult
material to be required to hold it in an easily identifiable section of their site, so filtering software rules can
be applied.
Norfolk Library and Information Service do not currently make any distinction about what a customer can
access, within the bounds of our acceptable use policy, based on age.
This is largely because there is no national standard about what is and isn’t acceptable within each age
range, or even what those age ranges should be.
Our current age categories for borrowing books are:
Under 5
5–11
12–15
16–18
Over 18
11. Norfolk Library and Information Service does not view it as the responsibility of a local library service
to determine what is acceptable at each age, nor do we have the resources to do so—that should be set
nationally and applied consistently across all filtering services so no local variation is possible.
12. Norfolk Library and Information Service does currently view it as the responsibility of the parent or
guardian to monitor and control the internet activity of their children while they are on library premises. Our
safeguarding policy states that no children under the age of 8 should be in a library unaccompanied.
13. Having said that, use of computers in libraries in Norfolk by children and young people is not that high,
according to our usage statistics. However, as more free public wifi is rolled out across Norfolk, we may find
the proportion of children accessing the internet across our wifi network (and hence our filtering regime) but
on their own devices increases.
14. Access to social media sites is one of the most popular uses of uses of public computers and is used by
customers to keep in touch with their friends and family across the world. Any recommendation to filter out
use of social media sites in public libraries would have a severe impact on the positive benefits of social
networking for library customers. For this reason we would be opposed to the principle of blocking internet
access to social media sites in libraries.
15. Management of a filtered internet service requires resources and a degree of technical expertise to provide
it. This is a skill set that will probably be unavailable to most groups who may wish to take over the running
of a local library service on a voluntary basis.
There should therefore be a commitment that the local authority will make sufficient funding available to
continue to provide a comprehensive and secure IT infrastructure in volunteer run libraries. This will also help
to support the Government’s Digital by Default policy.
September 2013
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Written evidence submitted by Phil Alexander
Children nowadays have the ability to access large quantities of very useful information effectively replacing
the large and space-taking encyclopaedias of days passing.
What ruins the good that we appreciate is the low down, corrupting content that even adults are safer without.
As a parent of four children I would welcome a large padlock on all content that was unsuitable to children,
the key to which would also be locked away.
Please could the Government urgently developing a secure firewall and legislate a mandatory download that
blocked such content and the owners of computers that feel they must defile themselves, would have to apply
to a Government watchdog?
Why do less than half of our parents have blocks on home computers? If the parents aren’t bothered, pity
help the children.
I appeal to the pity there is in the House, to have the heart to get this cracked.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Ben Hardwick
I am delighted to hear of your committee’s laudable efforts to look into the subject of the damage that
can be done to the younger generation by uncontrolled internet access—thank you very much for launching
this enquiry.
The ordered, peaceful and generally prosperous outward-looking UK society with its opportunities,
comprehensively organised education, healthcare, aid, infrastructure and defence/security arrangements are
a priceless result of the daily work of Government—something that is rarely recognised or valued like it
should be.
These benefits also extend far beyond Britain’s shores and the UK is still a beacon of tolerance and crucial
lynchpin of global peace and security as well as being an example that is frequently followed by other
Governments and States.
Little wonder then that Government is undoubtedly an instrument of God—1st Epistle of Peter, Chapter 2,
V13; it is a “giver” and “provider” as well as a “controller”—again, the Bible states in the Epistle to the
Romans Chapter 13 “for he bears not the sword in vain” along with a good deal else.
Government’s first duty is the protection of its citizens—this is an area at which HMG excels whether in
defence and intelligence matters or law-enforcement that stabilises and enhances the condition and experience
of society and its citizens and the whole global community.
I seek by these few paragraphs to set out simply how absolutely right it is for you to persist with better
control measures on internet viewing and that you may be encouraged and set forward in doing what is clearly
your duty.
I am a father of four children from three to 10 years old and revel in watching their rapid development and
willingness to absorb knowledge at an apparently impossible rate. They are very impressionable and it is a
very great responsibility as parents that my wife and I have in protecting and nurturing the next generation
into responsible citizens.
Affectionate control and unselfishness is absolutely critical in this and it is really tragic to hear figures from
OFCOM that more than 75% of 14–16 year olds have accessed adult material.
This is a situation that will cause permanent mind-scarring and a lack of fidelity and stable relationships on
which true happiness is built in our society—to say nothing of the cost to Government and the taxpayer of
broken homes because of so-called freedom to look at this content when in one’s tender teens.
HMG should move forward fearlessly with comprehensive and efficient control measures of what is currently
a lawless “wild west” of media so as not to fail the potential of following generations.
It is a most revolting and immoral thought that there are actually publishers and persons making millions
out of degrading us and ruining the moral compass of the young in our society.
I believe that there should be default blocking of all adult material on internet enabled devices sold in the
UK as soon as possible.
I wish you all the best and courage in your deliberations on this vital subject.
September 2013
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Ev w26 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Evidence
Written evidence submitted by John R. Edwards
Summary
— The present position of unlimited access to online material is morally dangerous and requires control;
— Some form of censorship should be established to determine what should be classified as “Adult
Material”;
— Parameters should be established as to what classifications of material should be eliminated from
online availability;
— Grades should be established to determine what material is acceptable for access by young people;
— Age levels should be established to determine when access should be allowed to “Adult Material”;
— Controls should be instituted which bar young people from access to material deemed unsuitable
for them;
Submission
1. The Inquiry into this subject arises from the fact that, at the present time, there is no restriction placed on
the Internet in respect of juvenile access to material widely accepted as unsuitable for them. Furthermore, such
online material is not graded and in the eyes of many much of it is regarded as being in the nature of cruel,
salacious and/or obscene. Some would go so far as to say that at least some of it is potentially harmful even
to adult viewers.
2. Concern has been increasingly evident that action is required to ensure that some kind of control is
established that will at least protect young people in particular from access to material regarded and classified
as “Adult Material”.
3. As a lifelong committed and practicing Christian, and as a parent, grandparent and great-grandparent of
a total of just on 50 children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, I have an intense interest in the moral
safety of young people and am concerned to witness to the Committee my views, with which many would, I
am sure, join, that action is urgently required to bring in a measure of protection for young people against the
existing access to the volume of unsuitable online material that is currently so freely available to them.
4. Children are the potential for the oncoming generation. We need to be thinking and planning now for the
wellbeing of that new generation. If we permit freedom of access to and do not control the supply to our
children of, morally damaging material, the next generation will, inevitably, be basically corrupt. If we are
planning and endeavouring to ensure a well educated, law-abiding, honest, principled and upright next
generation, we must act now to make as certain as we reasonably can that they are morally equipped to be
convinced of and to maintain an upright way of life and to suitably educate their next generation. If, on the
other hand, we allow the standard of life to drift whichever way it may go, the result in the oncoming generation
could be intolerable, bordering on anarchy. The fact is that people are only law-abiding because they are taught
so to be. If the reins of law become slack, the quality of life deteriorates to the point where people do what is
best in their own interests regardless of the effect it may have on others.
5. Consideration needs to be given to the ambitions and character that should characterize the oncoming
generation. Parental influence needs to be promoted and parental responsibility encouraged so that they teach
their children the basic principles of an acceptable way of life.
6. Sex education, whilst theoretically justifiable, inevitably stimulates many children to enquire into what,
in effect, is pornography. The basic thinking behind the conception of sex education is clearly the concern
that children need to understand the inherent dangers that ignorance involves. Whilst this train of thought is
understandable, the real responsibility as to sex education devolves on the parents and the fact that the
responsibility has been included in the state education system is an acceptance of and pointer to the fact that
parents have been neglecting their duty in this regard.
7. The onset of the IT age has resulted in the computer becoming an essential to life. Children become
addicted to the machine to the point where they may feel compelled to use it even to do simple calculations
that in times past would have been regarded as mental arithmetic. It has become an avenue for exploration and
inevitably children use it to satisfy curiosity in various avenues, many of which are very beneficial. As a tool
for subject research it can clearly be advantageous and valuable. Regrettably, however, the freedom of access
and the almost infinite range of material available currently enable children to attempt to satisfy their innate
curiosity by gaining access to material that could be morally damaging. This is clearly the concern of the
Inquiry.
8. The United Kingdom has established and maintained a rule of law based on democracy and the freedom
of speech. As political views have changed and the availability of information has increased and become more
widespread, it has become increasingly necessary to ensure that established media standards are maintained.
This has been generally accepted by the population and political parties have, in the main, worked together to
ensure the maintenance of the principles governing media standards.
9. In current law regarding media, there are clear standards concerning what may and what may not be
published in newspapers, journal and films. On the other hand, the development of the internet has resulted in
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a virtually uncontrolled flow of material, quite an assortment of which would not be permitted in a newspaper
or journal. What is even worse is that there is no control on the access to such material, whether by adults or
children. It is indeed questionable whether such cruel, salacious and/or obscene material, which could not
legally be published in a newspaper, should be available at all, whether to adults or children, on the internet.
10. Children generally learn the benefits of access to the internet without necessarily being taught any form
of control, leaving it to their judgment as to the limits that they should apply to their access to such material.
Indeed, such is the availability of material, that, in the absence of control, it is incredibly simple, once one
learns the method of access, for them to gain entry to such sites and to spend as much time as they wish in
digesting the stuff.
11. Voluntary controls are available. Thoughtful parents, concerned with the upbringing of their children,
can install filters on their computers that limit the availability of access. We are told that 46% of parents have
taken advantage of such methods of control and they are to be commended for their action, but that leaves
54% that have not done so, and whose children are therefore vulnerable to the range of such unsuitable material
that is so simple to access. Indeed, we are told that 81% of children aged 14 to 16 years have viewed what
would be regarded as “Adult Material” online—a very worrying fact.
12. The current law in this country grades films for public showing according to the composition of the
audience, in an endeavour to protect young people. The concern behind this Submission would be as to whether
it would be possible to apply that principle to the internet. In presenting this Submission, the concern is to
underline that the present position is morally unacceptable, to determine what controls need to be established
in order to bring about essential control and to encourage the institution of the necessary legislation as quickly
as is reasonably possible. The present position is serious and needs urgent attention. The present Inquiry is
valuable and places a huge responsibility on the members of the Committee. The concern is to support the
Inquiry and those who are appointed by drawing attention to how the present position is regarded by persons
who have for a long time carried a serious concern as to the subject.
13. When such legislation is prepared for Parliamentary consideration and enquiry, it is inevitable that some
persons and organizations will complain that people’s freedom of expression is being limited. The present law
as to libel, slander and sedition already puts certain limitations on the freedom of expression and what is being
considered is not incompatible with that. The recommendation would be that the present legal framework
should be extended to cover and include such matters as corrupting views, not only sexually explicit words
and pictures, but also violence, cruelty and the promotion of terrorism.
14. I submit therefore:
(a) That the present position of the unlimited access of young people to online material is morally
dangerous and requires a reasonable level of control;
(b) That some form of censorship should be established that reviews material available online with
a view to determining what material should be classified as “Adult Material” (and therefore
limited to viewing by adults) and what should be freely available;
(c) That the consideration of (b) above should extend to the setting of parameters as to what may
be published on the internet and to establish the necessary legal framework to ensure that
certain types of explicit sexual material and of violent, cruel, terrorist-promoting and obscene
literature should be eliminated from the internet;
(d) That, as a result of (b), grade levels should be established that determine what is acceptable
and what is not acceptable for access by young people, in respect of such material;
(e) That age levels should be established, probably in line with film viewing levels, that will
determine at what age young people may access such material;
(f) That controls should be established which bar young people from online access to material
deemed dangerous for their consumption.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Chris Evershed
Our young people are the future of the nation. Without them there is no future. How careful we need then
to be in caring for and educating them so that a generation emerges that the country can be proud of.
The internet has brought considerable benefits to children, society and the business world. However it can,
and is, being used to corrupt society and the very children that it should benefit. It is a sorrowful statistic as
stated by Ofcom, that 81% of children aged 14 to 16 have viewed adult material online, whilst only 46% of
parents have filters in place on their home internet.
Pornographic images can be viewed on the internet by young persons, so warping their minds. This can only
lead to a rapid decline in moral standards, increased delinquency, dysfunctional families, and a proliferation of
adults with no moral structure or ability to discriminate between right and wrong, good and evil. Because they
see adults engaging in such actions it must be OK.
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The government needs to act now and decisively, to address this extremely serious problem. Default blocking
of all adult content should be the standard setting on all equipment sold in the UK that is able to access the
internet, combined with robust age verification. Without this, children will continue to be damaged irretrievably.
There is also a tremendous increase in child pornography polluting the internet, and research by the Child
Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) has alleged that more than half of those who view child
abuse images go on to commit abuse themselves. This is a proof of the vicious spiral of moral decline that
sets in when such activity is allowed. Internet Search Providers should be held responsible to track down child
pornography and remove such images from the internet.
It is well to remember that the decline and fall of the Roman Empire was not due to any lack in the military
might, by which their empire was formed, but by moral decline and degeneracy.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by EE
Introduction
1. EE welcomes the opportunity to provide comments to the Culture, Media and Sports Committee inquiry
into Online Safety.
2. We treat this issue with the utmost seriousness and we recognise that, as the ways in which we all get
connected to the internet develop, we have a responsibility to ensure a safe experience for our customers and
for their children. This is a challenge which will continue indefinitely as online safety and the control of
harmful content requires unremitting effort by individual companies, as well as collective endeavour.
3. EE is a British company which provides service to 27 million customers on EE, T-Mobile and Orange
plans. In addition to voice and text, we host a variety of content services including music, games and video
clips which are available within our mobile portals (Orange World, Web n’ Walk and T-Mobile) as well as
providing general internet access. We also run a fixed ISP (EE Home) which currently has around 750,000
customers and a corporate WiFi service.
4. Turning to the particular issues raised by the Committee, this paper comments on the best approach to
protecting children from accessing inappropriate content, recognises that technical solutions are only part of
the solution and that education for children and parents is key and that both network and software filtering can
meet the requirements of family friendly and effective filtering. It then details EE’s own policies on e-safety
and addresses the issue of blocking other harmful content.
How Best to Protect Minors from Accessing Adult Content
5. EE strongly believes that the best way to protect children from accessing inappropriate content is by a
combination of parental controls and education. Blocking websites maybe sufficient protection for a young
child but will not deal with the needs of young teenagers who will use social media and other personal
communications. Teenagers in particular will always try and find material that their parents or teachers would
rather they did not see, and it’s the industry’s role to provide educational material, as well as the tools, to
ensure children and parents are well equipped to make informed choices and do not inadvertently come across
material that is not appropriate for them.
Parental Controls
6. EE supports the recommendation that came out of the Byron review of “active choice” or “unavoidable
choice” where parents are forced to make a decision on whether they wish to apply a filter, as opposed to an
across the board “default on”. The principles of “unavoidable choice” as set out in the Government’s white
paper “Connectivity, Content and Consumers” include the availability of family friendly filters that block adult
content for both new and existing customers, the need for customers to make a choice about whether they want
filtering at first connection to the internet or at point of sale, age verification of the person setting up or
removing the filter and communication of the benefits of filtering. These principles can all be met through
either network based filtering or software based filtering on devices.
7. There is no “one” right answer for all customers, across all platforms or all devices. EE supports an
approach that allows for a portfolio of network based and device based solutions to meet the needs of the tens
of millions of people in the UK that access the Internet, through PCs, mobile devices, games consoles and,
increasingly, TVs.
8. There are very good reasons why mobile and fixed operators have chosen to take different approaches to
the delivery of parental controls for mobile and home internet. On mobile phones operators filter adult content
on the network and it is on by default for all customers and can only be lifted on proof of age. On the fixed
home internet many ISPs offer all customers free parental controls and provide unavoidable choice on set up.
This difference of approach is because the way people purchase mobile and home internet differs:
— all home internet customers sign a contract and are adults;
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—
—
the home is likely to contain a number of PCs for each family member, each requiring different
levels of filtering, and some no filtering at all; and
households attempting to accommodate this mix of PCs via a single network filtering profile
are likely to experience dissatisfaction, and may well turn off filtering altogether. Allowing
different PCs to be protected via their own filtering software provides the necessary degree
of flexibility.
9. For mobile phones we filter content at a network level and it is set as on by default. This is because:
— Mobile phones unlike home computers are personal devices and so a single filtering profile
is effective.
— Filtering software is not available for all mobile devices. Different operating systems (Android,
Apple, RIM) each require a different solution which is why operators implemented a network
based approach.
— Mobiles are often bought by children who are unlikely to request at point of sale that parental
controls software should be activated.
— Many mobiles are sold through independent retailers where operators have little or no control
over how the devices are sold or who they are sold to. The purchasing decision for mobile is
very different for fixed with many indirect channels of distribution (such as supermarkets) who
are not set up to discuss the benefits of parental controls.
10. Given that the majority of children are highly technically proficient and routinely share tips and
information, it is considered that such controls would offer little or no practical protection. We continue
to evaluate options for offering greater controls on mobile devices and will revisit this if viable solutions
are identified.
11. As we have explained there are good reasons for taking different approaches for filtering mobile and
fixed traffic. In addition, we believe mandating network filters for all fixed ISPs in order to have filters which
are on by default, will be a huge expense and take considerable time to implement. The initial investment of
providing network filters on the mobile network costs millions of pounds and there are also ongoing costs for
maintenance and for the categorisation and filtering suppliers.
12. More information on the parental controls available across EE’s mobile brands, fixed business and Wifi
network is set out in Appendix I.
Education and Advice
13. Parental education and engagement is vital. As Dr Tanya Byron set out in her review on child safety,
parents have a responsibility to understand what their children are viewing and to educate themselves and their
children on how to assess the appropriateness of content.
14. Education is so important particularly for teenagers and older children who want more choice in what
they are able to access. Since access controls were put in place, content on the internet has continued to develop
and more players are involved in its delivery. This means that even with the best filters available it is
increasingly hard to block inappropriate content particularly on social networking, interactive sites and app
stores. Raising awareness of e-safety through diverse channels therefore remains of paramount importance.
15. Our research shows that parents often feel overwhelmed and unable to keep up with the pace of change
and consequently what their children are doing online.
16. Parents need to be made aware of the risks and given clear, simple signposting to sources of information
and tools to help them manage their children’s online life. This would include clear messages about what the
risks are and tools such as help with setting up parental controls.
17. We also advocate a “talk & trust” approach whereby parents are given guidance on how to open up
dialogue and have conversations with their kids so that they understand the risks. We don’t believe that blocking
and banning on every level is a sustainable solution as children will always rebel and find new ways to express
themselves. It is far more important to arm them with confidence and trust and provide them with information
to help them manage the risks as well as their parents.
18. As part of our rebranding, we recently updated our online safety information and launched EE’s Digital
Living website with dedicated pages on keeping families safe online. http://explore.ee.co.uk/digital-living/
keeping-children-safe
19. This includes a series of six short films together with activity guides, so parents can talk about e-safety
issues with their children. The films cover a variety of issues including cyberbullying, digital footprint and
posting information online and are EE branded versions of films provided in our previous award winning
Orange education programme which had reached 67% secondary school penetration by the end of 2012.
20. Our network of employee volunteers (e-Safety Champions) reached over 10,000 young people directly
with e-safety messages from 2009–12 as part of an employee engagement programme.
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21. We continue to keep our material up to date and have recently updated our advice for parents leaflet
which provides guidance on a range of issues including setting parental controls, cyberbullying, sexting, privacy
settings, social networking, downloading illegal copyright, how to report abuse and controlling costs. The
leaflet “Advice for parents” is now in all 600 plus EE stores nationwide and is also available from our Digital
Living website.
22. By the end of the year all our frontline employees in retail and customer services will receive online
training on E-Safety and Active Choice highlighting the tools and materials on offer across the brands. This
module will also be included for new employees within their induction training.
Promoting Online Safety in Schools
23. In EE’s opinion more emphasis is needed in PSHE as part of the curriculum and specific attention given
to e-safety issues. We feel that as a network operator we have a duty of care to provide information and
guidance on how to use our technology in a safe and responsible way. We can share these messages with
existing and new customers and our free education programme which is used in 67% of secondary schools
shows that we go beyond this and out into the community. However the education system plays a vital role in
equipping young people with life skills. With less emphasis on PSHE in recent years we feel the issues are not
getting the traction they need. It should not be solely up to the network providers to fill this gap but rather for
the education system to embrace the materials and resources that our organisations can offer and build them
into daily school life. EE will continue to develop new materials on e-safety in the future for our website, but
the real key to success is the way these, and other organisations’ resources can be slotted into a relevant and
robust curriculum, so that teachers can take advantage of them.
Consistent Application of Active Choice
24. ISPs no longer control all aspects in the value chain. We firmly believe that content providers and
increasingly device manufacturers have a significant part to play in child safety if controls are to remain
effective. Government should also be ensuring that the responsibility for child protection applies across the
wider value chain with manufacturers, software providers, WiFi providers, search providers and social
networks, as well as ISPs. Not only will this provide more channels to market for child safety messages and
products but it will also ensure there is a level playing field in terms of implementation costs and responsibility.
25. Furthermore WiFi providers and manufacturers of consumer electronics products such as games consoles,
smart TVs and set top boxes, which are offering an ever richer and open online experience, should also be
required to offer active choice.
Filtering Out Extremist Material
Tackling Child Abuse Images and the IWF
26. EE has been an active member of the IWF for nine years and is one of the companies that contributes
the maximum amount to the IWF. We fully support the recent extension to the IWF’s remit to allow proactive
reporting by the IWF (rather than only investigating reports made through the hotline). This will lead to a more
effective use of the IWF’s resources. Any subsequent proposals put forward by the IWF should always be
supported by detailed plans and agreed through the normal budgeting process.
27. EE has never received a notice to take down content for any of our hosted services. We have strict
guidelines on the type of content hosted on our mobile portals and our interactive services such as chatrooms,
message boards and commenting facilities are all moderated.
28. We implement the IWF’s child abuse blocking list across all our platforms each day and return a splash
page to those customers looking for or stumbling upon illegal images. We also participate in the quarterly
testing programme to confirm that the block is operational.
Blocking other Forms of Content
29. There have been increasing calls by Parliament and lobbying groups for other types of illegal or
inappropriate content such as extreme pornography, racist or anorexia sites to be subject to the same treatment
as child abuse images with ISPs blocking offending websites for all its customers. For EE there are practical
and policy concerns with extending full blocking into other areas. The challenge comes in areas where there
is no consensus on the appropriate role of providers. Asking ISPs to block content that is offensive to some
people but is clearly legal, places ISPs as arbiters in deciding what customers can access.
30. We believe it is ultimately for Parliament, not ISPs, to take a view on unpalatable content and to
determine what is illegal or whether the legislative framework requires revision. The current process with
online copyright is that the courts through a court order decides whether a website is facilitating access to
illegal material and which IP addresses should be blocked and on what terms.
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Radicalisation/Terrorism
31. EE believes that sites that promote radicalisation and terror sites (as defined in the Terrorism Act 2006)
are already filtered by our mobile parental controls under the “criminal skills” or “hate” or “violence
categories”. However to be certain we require the Home Office to send across a list of the websites so we can
check how they are categorised by our filtering supplier.
Preventing Abusive or Threatening Comments on Social Media
Social Media
32. Social media and interactive services have revolutionised the way people connect with each other and
offers tremendous benefits. However EE recognises there are concerns over potential access to inappropriate
content, bullying and grooming. Due to the sheer volume of postings moderation of all content is impossible.
However providers could publicly commit to respond to all reports of potential child abuse, grooming and
bullying with an agreed time (such as 48 hours). Furthermore greater transparency of the safeguards available
on sites should be available as these vary greatly between services. We also believe that some moderation of
content that has potentially the most harm could be implemented.
33. All user generated content that EE hosts on our portals (T-Zones, Web n’ Walk and Orange World)
including chatrooms, video sharing, picture galleries, message boards and commenting services are moderated
by trained staff working to a documented and defined set of standards that define who is able to use the service
and what constitutes acceptable behaviour. There are slightly different policies in place for different services
and between the brands however all images are pre vetted against agreed guidelines before they are posted
online. In addition we have clear policies on dealing with complaints and on notice and take down.
34. Our message boards are moderated by EE Digital Staff and we also have a Site Feedback form where
people can contact the editorial staff to flag any issues. This is monitored between 9am -5pm every day of the
week. If there is an instance where we need to take down content that is already live we aim to do it in less
than 30 minutes. However the frequency of complaints is very low.
35. For article commenting we enable customers (or anyone who is viewing the website) to report abuse.
This is sent to a live dashboard which our moderation company monitor.
Cyberbullying
36. EE’s Customer Services provide advice to customers who are concerned about bullying by text or on
calls. If the problem persists customer services can offer to change the customer’s phone number and the most
serious incidents are referred to the Nuisance Call Bureaus where dedicated staff help customers who wish to
report cases of harassment or malicious calls to the police. The Nuisance call bureaus receive around 300
enquiries per month and of these around 50 will be referred onto the police and the remaining 250 will be
provided with appropriate advice and guidance.
APPENDIX I
EE’S PARENTAL CONTROLS
Parental Controls—Mobile
All three mobile brands (EE, Orange and T-Mobile) offer the highest level of protection:
—
All prepay and contract customers are offered parental controls free of charge and this is applied
by default for new customers across all mobile devices (handsets, dongles and tablets). Age
verification (via credit card, name and address check or instore) is required to lift the controls.
—
All networks now offer three parental control settings: Strict, Moderate and Off. We are the
only mobile networks to offer a Strict setting as we recognise that parents of younger children
may want to filter some content which is not classified as “18” but that they don’t wish their
children to view.
The three settings manage visual content (both commercial content and websites) as follows:
—
Moderate—this is the default setting which will be on for all customers. It allows customers
to view user generated content but blocks “18” content as defined by the BBFC (British Board
of Film Classification) based on the BBFC’s Classification Guidelines which are the result of
public consultations held every four to five years. This is wider than pornography and also
includes criminal skills, drugs, gore, hacking, hate, self harm, suicide and violence. For more
information see http://www.bbfc.co.uk/what-classification/mobile-content
—
Strict—on request customers can select this setting which blocks all “18” content as above
plus content that is deemed unacceptable for younger children including dating, cyberbullying,
unmoderated user generated content, chat, glamour, occult, weapons and cults.
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—
Off—on proof of age (such as credit card or name and address check) customers can switch
off filtering which gives access to the open internet. The Internet Watch Foundation list is still
filtered for all customers.
EE has invested, and will continue to spend, millions of pounds in setting up and operating our parental
control systems offering the best solutions that are available to the industry. The current filtering arrangements
have been in place for nine years and work well with very few complaints about children viewing 18 classified
content on their mobile devices. Customers who believe content or websites have been misclassified can email
safeguard@ee.co.uk. This email box is forwarded to the Safeguard Product Manager and issues are dealt with
within 48 hours.
Our Digital Living website provides detailed information on our parental controls, the full list of the
categories blocked for each setting and how to report abuse or misclassified content http://explore.ee.co.uk/
digital-living/keeping-children-safe
Parental Controls—Fixed
EE Home (our fixed business) now offers all new and existing broadband customers McAfee Family
Protection software which is free of charge for 12 months. Customers can install the software on up to five
devices are protected even when they’re outside the home as the software sits on the computer.
It offers five predefined age settings (under 5, 6–8, 9–12, 13–15 and 16–18) and parents can also customise
the settings, add or delete websites and set time restrictions. It also provides activity reports detailing web
activity and it will send email or text alerts if access to inappropriate websites is attempted. It will also report
on what information is being shared on social media sites and by instant messaging and blocks the downloading
of music with explicit lyrics. The software is easy to install and we have developed a help video with McAfee
which is available on our safety website.
We actively promote parental controls at point of sale and at all points in the customer’s journey including
in the Welcome Pack, in the router guide, in the customer’s first email after activation, in the Home Mover
Pack and Online on our Digital Living Website. Twice a year, as part of the EE Broadband Newsletter, we
include information on the Family Protection Software to existing customers. We will also send a dedicated
email to all customers every six months highlighting the benefits of online security and parental controls.
By the end of the year all new broadband customers will be presented with a “splash page” when they open
their browser for the first time which will force them to make a choice on whether to download the parental
controls software. If they choose to opt for parental controls they just click on the link provided which will
take them straight to the McAfee download page.
Parental Controls—Wifi
EE offers both branded and white labelled Wi-Fi services to a range of corporate customers. We are engaged
in the UKCCIS (UK Child Safety Council) working group and we are committed to offering a Family Friendly
Wi-Fi service. All our hotspots currently block illegal child abuse images on the IWF list. By the end of the
year we plan to set Adult Content filtering as “on” by default. It is then up to the venue owners to actively
choose to disapply the filter if they want to.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT
The Institute promotes wider social and economic progress through the advancement of information
technology science and practice. We bring together industry, academics, practitioners and government to share
knowledge, promote new thinking, inform the design of new curricula, shape public policy and inform the
public.
As the professional membership and accreditation body for IT, we serve over 70,000 members including
practitioners, businesses, academics and students, in the UK and internationally. We deliver a range of
professional development tools for practitioners and employees.
A leading IT qualification body, we offer a range of widely recognised professional and end-user
qualifications.
www.bcs.org
Headline Points
— The public, both collectively and individually, hold conflicting views on the balance between privacy
and protection;
— It is impossible to prevent knowledgeable determined people accessing material, however “illegal”,
if that material is anywhere on the Internet;
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—
—
—
—
However, it is possible to make it less likely for naïve users to stumble across material that some
agency (which? and how?) has deemed to be offensive;
The question of what is offensive is one that calls for human judgement, is often context-dependent
and that human judgement may be highly controversial;
Individual cases prompt knee-jerk reactions, but “hard cases make bad law”;
Preventing someone accessing something that they regard as desirable is likely to encourage them to
adopt evasion technologies, which nullify *all* filters, not just those for material thought undesirable.
Background
1. In order to access a document/film/video across the internet one has first to know where it is (discovery)
and then have its data on one’s device (delivery). Delivery is the business of Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
while discovery is generally the business of search engines, but also of catalogues, such as Facebook links,
recommendations, word of mouth and rumour in school playgrounds.
2. The Internet Service Providers are doing business in this country, and know who their customers are (in
the sense of who is paying their bills). They are subject to various forms of UK regulation and legislation. The
search engines may or may not be based in the UK. They may or may not have any office or business in the
country and may not be subject to legal or moral pressure by the UK authorities. The Prime Minister’s speech
was somewhat confused when he said; “the search engine shouldn’t be involved in finding out where these
images are because the search engines are just the pipe that delivers the images, and that holding them
responsible would be a bit like holding the Post Office responsible for sending illegal objects in anonymous
packages”—the ISPs are the analogue of the Post Office, not the search engines.
3. It is important to understand that all documents (such as films and videos) are delivered across the internet
as if they were live broadcasts: no intermediary holds the entire document for analysis. A good analogy is that
of a service reading books aloud. There are then two fundamentally different approaches to censorship (which
is the main issue).
4. One is black-listing: analogous to “I’m not going to read you that book because it’s called ‘Lady
Chatterley’s Lover’, and I’ve been told not to read that book” or “I’m not going to show you that film because
it’s classified 18”. The major problem with this approach is that a vanishingly small proportion of the internet
has been examined for banning/classification.
5. The other is content-based filtering: analogous to “I’m going to stop reading that book now because I’ve
come across this banned word in it”, or “I’m going to stop showing this film because the last frame was more
than 40% ‘pink’ (sexualised imagery)”. There are two problems with this approach. The first is that, under the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, it is probably illegal for ISPs to do. The second is that of false
positives: many books contain occasional “banned” words, and a frame may well be “pink” because of a
sunset, or a swimming gala.
6. The same objections apply to hybrid approaches, such as “I’m going to stop reading that book now
because I’ve come across a mention of a gamekeeper called Mellors”.
7. These difficulties should not be minimised. It would be no defence under the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act for an ISP to argue that the consumer (typically the parent of the child actually using the
connection) has consented: both participants to the connection have to consent to the interception, and it is
hard to see how an automatic web-server can consent.
8. Equally, the Chinese had a significant research project as part of what is generally termed “the Great
Firewall of China” to search for “inappropriate” skin tones, but that project has apparently been abandoned.
9. A further problem is that what is “abhorrent”, or even “illegal images of children”, is context-sensitive.
It is easy to say “medical textbooks are a special case, and are not meant to be read by minors anyway”, but
the problem is far broader than that. In 1995 there was a flurry (eg http://www.independent.co.uk/news/juliasomerville-defends-innocent-family-photos-1538516.html) of stories about photograph developers reporting
parents over image of their children. The switch to digital photography has merely meant that such images do
not need developing. Many of them then find their way onto social media.
“How Best to Protect Minors …”
10. The Select Committee asks about “minors”. There is no known technology which will determine if a
computer, or other device, is being used by a minor. For a home broadband connection, it would be possible
for the purchaser to be asked whether there was likely to be a minor using the connection, but of course it is
possible for the purchaser to lie, or even be honestly mistaken, as when suddenly looking after grandchildren.
11. Greater availability of, and publicity about, “parental controls” (which in fact are not parental at all, but
the parent buying into some-one else’s controls), on the lines of that offered by UK Safer Internet Centre,34
would help. However, it is worth recalling two fundamental statements from their site: “filters can be a helpful
34
http://www.saferinternet.org.uk/advice-and-resources/parents-and-carers/parental-controls
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tool in reducing the chances of coming across something upsetting” and “remember that filtering is only part
of the solution”.
12. A more challenging problem is provided by public WiFi technologies, which are used, often without
accounts, or via accounts with no verification. Public convenience would seem to demand this light-touch
access. It would be technically possible to have parental controls, although BCS does not necessarily
recommend this would affect all users and could lead to a rapid spread of evasion technology.
13. Similar to parental controls on the connection, greater publicity about tools such as Google’s Safe
Search35 would help, but again it is worth noting a fundamental statement: “please note that no filter can
replace a watchful eye”.
“… From Accessing Adult Content”
14. One problem which complicates the issue is that there is no international agreement about what
constitutes “adult” content. Social norms vary widely and it is unlikely that there will be much consensus in
the near future.
15. Content which has been formally rated “adult” in the UK is not a major problem. That content typically
requires purchasing, for instance, via a credit card or PayPal account and the transaction will show up. A
greater problem is pirated copies of such material, which are therefore not formally classified. The worldwide
digital content industry is working hard to combat such piracy and this should be viewed as an international
problem based on the fundamentally international character of the internet. BCS therefore does not see that
UK centric action is likely to be helpful.
16. A particularly worrying development is the prevalence of truly home produced material by apparent
minors. In one four-week period, the Internet Watch Foundation36 (IWF) had 12,224 such images reported.
88% of these were on “parasite” (IWF terminology) websites, ie those that harvested such material from the
website to which it was originally uploaded.
Education
17. The Byron report made a powerful analogy: “At a public swimming pool we have gates, put up signs,
have lifeguards and shallow ends, but we also teach children how to swim”. To this one could well have added
“and we help parents to teach children to swim, and we teach parents to be lifeguards.”
18. The sort of education necessary here for children is not technology education, it is societal education.
For this reason BCS believes that it belongs in the general Personal, Learning and Thinking Skills (PLTS)
category, rather than in ICT- or Computing-specific classes. There is excellent advice at the Get Safe Online
website, and class templates such as https://www.isc2cares.org/safe-and-secure/are available.
19. The IWF’s comment on the home-produced material points again in this direction. “These findings
provide evidence to support the importance of the education work delivered by child protection agencies to
raise awareness of the permanence of information on the internet and the risks inherent to young people in
creating and distributing this type of content.”
20. A challenging question is what and how much education is appropriate for parents. Some advice and
help on “parental controls”, both on the configuration and on tools such as Google Safesearch37 and YouTube’s
SafetyMode,38 most of which have come along since parents first encountered the Internet, is also appropriate.
Similarly, parents need to become aware of the (excellent, and recommended in the Byron report) PEGI rating
system for games and the advice at http://www.askaboutgames.com/, another site which has emerged since
many parents learned about the internet and which recent learners will not necessarily come across. Schools
should probably be encouraged to facilitate and host such classes in the PTA context.
21. Such classes will certainly need to cover technology, but should probably be wider. Parenting guidance
is sometimes sought where parents would like support in terms of how to engage with their children on social
topics that children might explore on the internet. These social topics are all related to what we might class as
“growing up on the internet” and have security facets to them. Topics might include; management of friendships
mediated by the Internet, trolling and other forms of Internet mediated abuse, balancing internet mediated
activities with offline activities, identity and projection of self via the internet etc. Again, Get Safe Online has
good age-specific materials, but these need to be drawn to the attention of parents, and their attention refreshed
as the children grow older.
“Filtering Out Extremist Material, including Images of Child Abuse and Material Intended to
Promote Terrorism or other Acts of Violence”
22. This is already done to a significant extent in the area of child abuse (technically speaking, indecent
images of children, which are illegal to possess under the Protection of Children Act 1978) by use of
35
36
37
38
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/510?hl=en
https://www.iwf.org.uk/
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/510?hl=en
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/174084?hl=en-GB
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blacklisting technology. More support could be given to the people, largely volunteers, who do the initial
reporting, and to the blacklisting process, generally under the auspices of the IWF. It is worth commending the
extent to which ISPs and mobile operators already cooperate with the IWF to manage and apply these blacklists.
23. It should be noted that blacklisting is not free, and has both financial and non-financial costs:
(a) The ISPs need to install and operate substantially more powerful equipment to do filtering than
is needed to pass through requests unexamined;
(b) The ISPs, very largely, fund the IWF;
(c) There is a risk of error and “false positives”: one such prevented edits to the whole of
Wikipedia;
(d) It is difficult to get right: the Irish study of filtering in schools;39 showed that 50% of schools
reported that filtering occasionally blocked valid educational sites, with a further 20% reporting
that it regularly did so;
(e) Filtering encourages the use of bypasses.
24. There has been much resistance to the Internet Watch Foundation’s widening its remit to the other
material in the Select Committee’s question, and BCS does not believe that this is the way forward.
25. Some people say that more should be done, and imply, without saying so, that content-based filtering
should be used, so that more such material could be blocked. This would require a major change in society’s
attitude to censorship, as well as primary legislation to enact fundamental changes to the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act. BCS does not believe that this is either feasible or desirable.
Preventing Abusive or Threatening Comments on Social Media
26. There has been much publicity recently around “online bullying”. Again, the problem is largely societal
rather than technological. The recent publicity has forced some developers into adding “report abuse” buttons,
but that is of little use unless the victims have the courage to do so. Hence this really comes down to an
education question, see above.
27. Even in cases where there is not a “report abuse” button, it is important that social media service
providers provide clear guidance and support for victims of distressing communications. These should detail
methods for locating support and information on how to report the incident(s). Where possible and appropriate,
providers should maintain regular contact with support and criminal justice agencies.
28. It is vital however, that the distinction is understood between those communications which:
(a) Amount to threats of violence.
(b) Targets an individual, resulting in harassment or stalking within the meaning of the Protection
from Harassment Act 1997 (including two new criminal offences of stalking added as sections
2A and 4A to the Act by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012).
(c) Amount to a breach of a court order.
(d) Those not covered by the provision above but may be considered grossly offensive, indecent,
obscene or false.
29. In particular, given the evidence of the significant impact of the first three categories (including recent
evidence on the impact of cyber stalking) we must ensure that such actions are not simply considered as grossly
offensive and are dealt with under the appropriate legislation.
30. These categories are discussed in the Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent
via social media from the Director of Public Prosecutions published on 20 June 2013.
31. Without the public having a clear understanding of the differences in these communications the problem
is unlikely to diminish. Digital Natives have embraced technology but unfortunately without appropriate
training and education they struggle to understand the social norms of internet communication and behaviour.
32. There is a clear issue around anonymity and perceived anonymity (as well as untraceability) in social
media.
(a) In cases where senders of malicious communications have anonymity and (practical)
untraceability there can be difficulty in bringing justice and technological and legal changes
may be needed.
(b) In cases where senders have a (mistaken) perception of anonymity or untraceability they may
display fewer inhibitions and feel beyond reproach. It is important that all those who can assist
in making communications more traceable, particularly by giving up log information, do so
fully and readily when requested by those in the criminal justice system. The recent changes to
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 do give police further powers and this is a welcome
change.
39
http://tnc2007.terena.org/programme/presentations/show4fa0.html
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(c) Where receivers of abusive messages perceive (rightly or wrongly) anonymity or untraceability
of the senders they may feel there is little point in reporting the communication, even when it
has significant impact.
33. It is important all stakeholders consider the vulnerability of the victim in cases of abusive or
threatening messages.
Conclusion
34. As a charity whose mission is “to enable the information society”, BCS looks forward to being a
significant player in society’s development of answers to these questions and welcomes continued dialogue.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Dudley Friend Clayson
I write as an independent & individual contributor of evidence to this Inquiry.
I am the retired Chief Executive of a company supplying UK industry with packaging machinery &
consumables. My wife is a retired doctor. Our evidence will cover the following issues:
— How our family has taken the initiative in safeguarding against the danger of our children
accessing pornographic material online.
— How members of our church have coped with this danger and cared for those who have been
mentally and morally damaged by it.
— Measures that Government should put in place to ensure that minors are seriously protected
from accessing pornographic material.
— Regulatory initiatives which OFCOM should take to regulate & police social media which are
currently responsible for a significant volume of material totally inappropriate for exposure
to minors.
— The internet industry must unite to develop technology to prevent the covert proliferation of
such material amongst minors.
1. How did we cope? My wife & I raised our family of four children without a computer in our home. As
practising Christians we could not, with a good conscience, expose our children to the possibility of coming
in contact with the poison of adult pornographic material, which is morally destructive in its consequences and
“utterly without redeeming social value” (1966 Supreme Court ruling in the obscenity case re. Fanny Hill,
defining pornographic material).
2. Our children are now married, and have their own families. Both they and we all now have computers in
our homes which are effectively filtered to eliminate any possibility of inadvertent contact with adult material
by anyone in the household.
3. Implicit in this Inquiry is the Government’s acknowledgement that the exposure of minors to adult material
is harmful. Such exposure entails grave consequences for the child, the family and for society at large. We are
now seeing the social norms & stabilising values which have underpinned our customary way of life in this
country being threatened by the emergence of a juvenile generation whose attitudes in respect of sexual
gratification, sexual crime, violence, promiscuity and marriage are being distorted & perverted by exposure to
online pornography. Sadly we have had some first-hand experience of damage to just a very few of the young
people in our church who have temporarily had contact with this depraved material. It has required ongoing
pastoral care & counselling to help them to get through the moral distress and mental disturbance resulting
from this exposure. Pornography leaves a scarring in the mind. We trust that the effects will be short-term; but
for some it could be a lifelong trauma.
4. It is heartening to see that Government is working with internet providers to put in place measures which
will effectively protect minors from easy & instant access to adult material. The Prime Minister himself has
given an undertaking that pornography will be automatically blocked on new broadband internet accounts,
leaving viewers with the option to remove the filter if they so decide. Mr Cameron has also made a commitment
in respect of existing users: the principal internet providers will have an obligation to contact customers with
an “unavoidable decision about whether or not to install family friendly content filters”. He has indicated this
will happen by end-2014. OFCOM will be responsible for implementation of these measures. The Prime
Minister has promised to take further action if, following these steps, there is evidence that children are still
not being effectively protected. We welcome his robust stance on this issue, which will mean that the many
parents who would like to be prompted or reminded will get that reminder and will be shown very clearly how
to put on family friendly filters. This is a positive move and a valuable commitment at the highest level
in Government.
5. OFCOM should prioritise regulation of social media, such as Facebook, and chatrooms, where the content
is not infrequently pornographic. OFCOM must ensure that the regulation & monitoring of these sites are
significantly upgraded, with mandatory training & compliance regimes put in place. Social media should be
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placed under specific obligation to delete offensive material swiftly whenever a viewer complaint is received.
This is in essence a Health & Safety legislation issue and every other industry in which I have been active has
been subject to the strictest compliance with HSE. The internet should be no exception.
6. OFCOM should recognise that social media are exploited by paedophiles, prostitutes and sex traffickers
and should create an appropriately strong regulatory framework to block these criminal and anti-social abuses
of the internet. OFCOM should also require social networking sites to implement effective & inescapable age
verification checks to prevent minors accessing inappropriate material.
7. The internet industry should devote resources to develop technology to prevent the covert and currently
uncontrollable circulation of adult material within minors’ peer groups (such as school friend communities).
In conclusion, we are grateful for this Inquiry. The current situation is dire, with a reported 81% of 14–16
year olds having already accessed pornographic material online. We believe that < 50% of UK families
currently have family friendly content filters in their home computers. The Government’s commitments in
response to this situation are encouraging. We and a wide circle of our friends in this country will be
scrutinising progress and developments closely. We are very deeply concerned that the situation is rapidly
brought under effective, ongoing control—for the sake of every young person and child in this country.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by PAPYRUS Prevention of Young Suicide
Summary
PAPYRUS has campaigned since 2004 for better regulation of the online promotion of suicide.
Amongst the many dangers posed by the internet, its use to promote suicide receives relatively little attention.
Young people, for whom the internet is a primary source of information, are particularly vulnerable to
websites and chatrooms promoting suicide. For those young people who are suicidal or are vulnerable because
of a mental health concern, such platforms can pose a particular danger.
The Government has made clear that the law which prevents encouraging or assisting suicide applies online
as much as offline, but no prosecution for online assistance has been made in this country.
ISPs should block websites and chatrooms which deliberately promote suicide. In the absence of this parents
should have to “opt in” to suicide sites in the same way as is proposed for other sites posing a danger to
children and young people.
Bodies such as IWF and CEOP should include suicide within their remit—at present both exclude it.
Detail
1. PAPYRUS Prevention of Young Suicide is a national charity dedicated to the prevention of young suicide.
Originally started by parents who had all lost a son or daughter to suicide it is now open to all who share our
aims, although many of its members have personal experience of a young person’s suicide.
2. Suicide is one of the biggest causes of death amongst young people; every year in the UK between 600
and 800 young people between the ages of 15 and 24 take their own lives—a number equivalent to the
population of a small secondary school; under the age of 35, the number rises further. According to the ONS
statistics published on suicides in 2011,40 the total number of those who took their own lives before they
reached 35 years of age was over 1700.
3. In the early years of the century, PAPYRUS became aware of several young people who had killed
themselves after downloading information from websites giving specific information and advice on how to
take one’s own life and/or having participated in chatrooms where advice and encouragement was given on
killing oneself. Since 2004 it has campaigned for the removal, or at least some regulation, of such sites.
4. Much of the public concern about the dangers of the internet has centred on its use to promote
pornography, bullying, eating disorders and self harm; these are important areas of concern both in their own
right and because they may play a significant part in leading vulnerable people to consider and attempt suicide.
But the suicide sites themselves are uniquely dangerous in that they can—and do—lead directly to deaths of
vulnerable young people. They also provide information which is not available from other sources. You will
not find a book in W H Smith’s describing in graphic and lurid detail the various ways of killing yourself; you
can find this (sometimes with pictures) on the internet. And of course this can be accessed by children and
vulnerable young people 24 hours a day, in the privacy of their own home or elsewhere from computers and
other e-devices. My own son took his own life aged 17, after downloading such information from the internet.
5. For many young people the internet has become the primary source of information; coupled with the
pressures of growing up, sometimes exacerbated by mental ill-health, there is a particular confluence of danger.
And although PAPYRUS’s particular concern is for young people many others who are vulnerable, again
40
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-health4/suicides-in-the-united-kingdom/2011/stb-suicide-bulletin.html
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through mental illness or for other reasons, are also all too easily exposed to the dangers of the sites. When
PAPYRUS began campaigning it knew of four young people who had killed themselves with the aid of the
internet. Some time ago the number of internet-related suicides of which we were aware passed 50 and we are
sure that this is a considerable underestimate—no figures are collected centrally and this figure was obtained
merely through unofficial press monitoring. Many coroners have expressed concern about the impact of the
internet in cases of suicide.
6. The 1961 Suicide Act made it illegal to aid, abet, counsel or procure a suicide. The Coroners and Justice
Act 2009 amended the law by updating the language to refer simply to assisting and encouraging suicide,
whilst making it clear that the law applies to online actions in exactly the same way as it does offline.41
PAPYRUS contends that sites and chatrooms promoting suicide may be illegal in that they can—and do—
assist and encourage others to take their own lives; however no prosecution has taken place in this country.42
We believe that the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should take action to block such sites in the same way
as they do for other illegal sites, such as child pornography.
7. In his speech on 22nd July the Prime Minister called on the ISPs to provide to all new customers family
friendly filters covering all devices in a household, which can only be switched off by the householder; and to
extend this in due course to all existing customers—in effect an “opt-in” approach despite the fact that this has
previously been eschewed by the Government. PAPYRUS warmly welcomes the Prime Minister’s intervention
and believes that the filters must automatically block dangerous sites and chatrooms which promote suicide.
(TalkTalk has told us that the category most blocked by parents using their existing filters is suicide/self harm.)
We have written to the Prime Minister seeking his assurance that the suicide sites will be encompassed within
these new arrangements. We trust that this will have the support of your committee also.
8. The internet can, of course, also be beneficial in countering suicide and in providing support to those who
are suicidal; PAPYRUS’s own helpline43 provides professional advice and information by telephone, email or
text messaging, to those concerned that a young person may be at risk of suicide and to young people who are
themselves having thoughts of suicide. It has sometimes been argued than any blocking of harmful suicide
sites must of necessity also block helpful sites; we have always believed that it is perfectly possible to retain
access to the helpful sites and were pleased to note that the Prime Minister acknowledged this in his speech
and has asked UKCCISS to lead work to ensure that this is so. We stand ready to assist in this work.
9. Although these recent advances have focussed on protecting children and the young (and we warmly
welcome them as such) we believe that the dubious legality of the websites and chatrooms provides sufficient
grounds for ISPs to block them for all users. There is also a moral justification for doing so; anyone seeking
access to them is likely to be vulnerable, either generically or at that particular time.
10. One of the proven ways of reducing suicides is to limit access to the means of killing oneself. This is
highlighted in the current National Suicide Prevention Strategy in Area for Action 344 and a recent study has
confirmed the effectiveness of limiting the numbers of paracetamol sold in individual packets.45 The National
Suicide Prevention Strategy for England states (para3.3) that “The internet is a ready source of detailed
information concerning the use of lethal suicide methods.” The young and vulnerable can and should be
protected from easy access both to information on the means of killing themselves and indeed to the means
themselves, through suicide paraphernalia and kits sold online.
11. One of the difficulties in pursuing the dangers of suicide promotion online is that there is no central
body to which relevant concerns can be expressed. Neither the industry body—the Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF)—nor the Government’s Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) regards suicide as
falling within their remit. We have asked repeatedly for this to change and believe that real benefits would
ensue if this were to happen.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by EU Kids Online
Preamble
We note with interest that the Culture, Media and Sport Committee has decided to investigate a number of
aspects of online safety that are currently raising concerns, in particular:
— How best to protect minors from accessing adult content.
— Filtering out extremist material, including images of child abuse and material intended to
promote terrorism or other acts of violence.
— Preventing abusive or threatening comments on social media.
41
42
43
44
45
Ministry of Justice Circular 2010–03
A former nurse has been convicted in Minnesota of assisting suicide online, including that of one person in England
HOPELineUK 0800 068 41 41
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/216928/Preventing-Suicide-in-England-A-crossgovernment-outcomes-strategy-to-save-lives.pdf
http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f403
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This response is written by Professor Sonia Livingstone, on behalf of the EU Kids Online network.46 This
response may be made public. The address, for a copy of the Committee’s report, is S105, Department of
Media and Communications, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London
WC2A 2AE.
Much of EU Kids Online’s work has focused on scoping the nature and consequences of the online risks of
harm encountered by children aged 9–16 years old in Europe. The detailed recommendations below relate to
the European findings detailed on our website.47 For UK-specific findings, see Livingstone, S et al (2010).
Risks and safety for children on the internet: The UK report. At http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/33730/
Summary
The strength of a cross-national study is that it reveals how the UK measures against other European
countries. In many respects, the UK has been a leader in protecting children against online risk of harm.
However, EU Kids Online’s cross-national analysis also reveals that this protection has often come at the cost
of empowering children to benefit from the digital skills and opportunities of new online technologies.
Specifically, we found that European countries divide into four main groups, based on children’s risk profiles:
Supported risky explorers; Semi-supported risky gamers; Protected by restrictions and Unprotected networkers.
In Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the UK—the “protected
by restrictions” countries, parents tend to overprotect their children, significantly reducing their online
opportunities. Researchers are concerned that both too much parental restriction and the lack of support for
children’s online use might lead to higher levels of harm when risk is encountered. Hence the EU Kids Online
network consistently emphasises that policy to encourage opportunities should accompany policy to reduce
risk of harm.
Main Points
1. Children have the right to protection and safety online but they must also take responsibility for keeping
safe and respecting the rights of others online
1.1 New means of internet access, less open to adult supervision, are increasingly evident in young people’s
internet use. Nearly half of all children in Europe go online in their own bedroom where it is unrealistic to
expect parents to monitor their safety.
1.2 Children need to be encouraged to develop self-governing behaviour in which they take greater
responsibility for their own safety in the use of the internet.
1.3 Awareness-raising should emphasise empowerment rather than restriction, and appropriate, responsible
behaviour with regard to technology use.
2. A new focus is needed on internet safety for younger users
2.1 It is important to balance protection of younger users with opportunities. It is important not just to
make the online world safe by stopping their use of internet services, but also to ensure their participation in
safe ways.
3. Safety messages should be adapted to new modes of access
3.1 33% of children now go online via a mobile phone or handheld device. Laptops, mobile phones, game
consoles and other mobile devices allow children to go online anywhere, anytime, away from parental
supervision. Emerging services (such as location-based ones) may lead to new risks.
4. Children’s online opportunities and skills need human and financial investment
4.1 Not only do younger children and girls not progress as far up the “ladder of opportunities” as teenagers
and boys, many never reach the final set of activities at all. Only half of 9–10 year olds progress further than
basic content-related activities.
4.2 Promoting more creative and skilled applications is essential to ensure all children avail of online
opportunities.
4.3 Schools play a pivotal role in digital skills development, mitigating forms of digital exclusion. However,
teachers are often inadequately resourced and trained to carry out the functions entrusted. Country differences in
online skills point to the need for targeted educational interventions where there is evidence of a digital divide.
4.4 Since opportunities and risks online go hand in hand, efforts to increase opportunities may also increase
risks, while efforts to reduce risks may restrict children’s opportunities. A careful balancing act, which
recognises children’s online experiences “in the round”, is vital.
46
47
http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/EUKidsOnline/Home.aspx
http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/EUKidsOnline/Home.aspx
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5. Positive online content for children should be made a policy priority
5.1 Provision of appropriate—high quality, diverse content online should be a priority.
5.2 The “European Award for Best Children’s Online Content” is a valuable step in this direction, but such
provision could also be supported by high profile national initiatives.
6. Digital safety skills are needed to build resilience online
6.1 Inequalities in digital skills persist—in terms of SES, age and, to a lesser degree, gender, so efforts to
overcome these are needed.
6.2 Younger age groups need to be a particular priority for parents and teachers. Secondary level schools to
date have been the main providers of ICT skills training but new interventions are required at the primary level.
6.3 Encouraging children to do more online will also improve their digital skills as well as their overall
confidence and/or increasing children’s beliefs in their abilities to use the internet. Similarly, teaching safety
skills is likely to improve other skills, while teaching instrumental and informational skills will also improve
safety skills.
6.4 Given uneven digital skills, particularly safety skills, across Europe and the discussion among
stakeholders about the need to identify more precisely the kinds of skills required, an inventory and agreed
framework for digital safety training would provide a valuable resource for educators, awareness-raising and
civil society groups.
6.5 Schools are uniquely placed to reach the maximum number of children. They are regarded by parents as
the most trusted source of information and, as the second most common location for going online, they provide
children with a very important point of access.
7. Social networking service providers need to ensure that maximum protection is provided for the accounts
of minors
7.1 If SNS age restrictions cannot be made effective, the de facto use of SNS by young children should be
addressed so as to ensure age-appropriate protection.
7.2 Privacy/safety settings and reporting mechanisms should be far more user-friendly. If they remain difficult
to use, privacy/safety settings should be enabled by default.
7.3 Digital skills to protect privacy and personal data should be strongly supported among children of
all ages.
7.4 It should also be noted that one in three parents (51% of parents of 9–12 year olds, 15% of parents of
13–16 year olds) did not wish their child to use SNS.
7.5 The review of data protection legislation at a European level needs to be considered from the point of
view of children’s privacy.
8. Awareness-raising in relation to online risks should be balanced and proportionate, and targeted at those
most at risk of harm
8.1 Children are concerned about a wide range of online risks. Efforts to manage these risks, and to support
children in coping with them, should maintain a broad and updated view of these risks.
8.2 As 9% of 9–10 year olds have been bothered or upset by something on the internet in the past year, it
is important to promote awareness-raising and other safety practices for ever younger children.
8.3 Awareness-raising among teenagers and their parents and teachers remains a priority since upsetting
experiences rise with age and the array of risks keeps changing.
9. Parental awareness of risks and safety online needs to be enhanced
9.1 Without being alarmist or sensationalist, parents need to be alerted to the nature of the risks their children
may encounter online. Awareness-raising should try to encourage dialogue and greater understanding between
parents and children about young people’s online activities.
9.2 Increasing parental understanding of risks is particularly important in those countries where awareness
of children’s risk experience is lowest.
10. Responses to young people’s exposure to online sexual content needs to be proportionate and should
focus on those most likely to be distressed or harmed by such exposure
10.1 Although public concern over online sexual content is justified, the extent of children’s exposure should
not be exaggerated, and nor should it be assumed that all children are upset or harmed by such exposure.
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10.2 Although the internet makes sexual content more readily available to all, with many children reporting
exposure via accidental pop-ups, the regulation of more established media (television, video, magazines, etc)
remains important.
10.3 Private access also matters—children who go online via their own laptop, mobile phone or, especially,
a handheld device are more likely to have seen sexual images and/or received sexual messages. Similarly,
those who go online in their bedroom, at a friend’s house or “out and about” are more likely to see sexual
content online. The early advice that parents should oversee children’s internet use must be revised, and new
safety tools are needed.
10.4 It seems that popular discourses centred on teenage boys’ deliberate exposure to sexual content makes
it harder for parents and others to recognise the distress that inadvertent exposure may cause girls, younger
children and those facing psychological difficulties in their lives.
11. Sensitive responses to bullying are required with equal attention to online and offline occurrence
11.1 In countries where there is more bullying overall, there tends to be more bullying online. This suggests
that as internet use increases, so will bullying online. Thus anti-bullying initiatives should accompany efforts
to promote internet use.
11.2 Online and offline bullying should be seen as connected, part of a vicious cycle in which perpetrators
reach their victims in diverse ways and victims find it hard to escape.
11.3 Those who bully may also be vulnerable, and they are often victims themselves, so sensitive treatment
is required.
11.4 Although children have a range of coping responses, cyberbullying upsets them, and more support and
awareness-raising is needed. Fewer than half tell a parent or other adult, and fewer than half know how to
block the person or delete their messages.
12. Parents need to be more aware of the practice of offline meetings with contacts first made online
12.1 It is important to distinguish making new contacts online—a common occurrence—from going to meet
new online contacts offline. It is equally important to recognise that for the most part, meeting online contacts
offline is harmless, probably even fun.
12.2 But for a minority of children, meeting online contacts offline is harmful, and these children tend
already to be the more vulnerable.
12.3 Since their parents are often unaware of what has happened, awareness-raising efforts should be
increased so that parents of younger and/or more vulnerable children recognise the risk, but without this
undermining the chance for most children to have fun making new friends online.
13. Policy makers need to be alert to new risks that affect children and young people, especially arising from
peer-to-peer contact
13.1 As well as conducting surveys, qualitative work based on listening to children is vital to learn what
new risks they are experiencing.
13.2 Addressing risks associated with peer-to-peer conduct (user-generated content and personal data misuse)
poses a critical challenge to policy makers.
13.3 While younger children have fewer resources to cope with online risk, they are also more willing to
turn to parents for help. Meanwhile, teenagers face particular risks that worry them and that they may struggle
with alone, so they need particular coping strategies and support.
14. Awareness-raising should highlight effective coping strategies in safety messages, emphasizing social
supports such as talking to parents, friends and teachers, as well as the use of online tools
14.1 Policy makers have long advised children to tell someone if they’ve been upset online, and it seems
such messages have been heard.
14.2 Children try some proactive strategies more than others and few are fatalistic. This suggests a desire to
cope as best they can and a readiness to adopt new technical tools if these are accessible.
14.3 When asked which strategies really helped the problem, children say that reporting the problem to an
ISP was effective with sexual images but less so for sexual or bullying messages: this suggests that better
solutions are needed for peer-to-peer risks.
14.4 Mostly, children said the approach they chose helped in up to two thirds of cases, but this leaves room
for provision of better support and/or tools.
14.5 It seems that efforts to promote children’s digital citizenship—in terms of online safety and good
practice—are bearing some fruit, and should be extended. There may be many reasons why solutions children
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try, when upset, do not help the situation, but one possibility is that the technical tools are flawed or difficult
to use, and another is that adults—professional or personal—are unprepared or unable to help children.
14.6 The “knowledge gap” phenomenon—in which the information-rich learn from available advice and
guidance more rapidly than the information-poor—means that efforts to promote digital citizenship will
disproportionately benefit the already-advantaged. Targeting less privileged or more vulnerable children is
a priority.
14.7 Overwhelmingly, children tell a friend, followed by a parent, when something online upsets them.
Rarely do they tell a teacher or any other adult in a position of responsibility. Their apparent lack of trust in
those who may have more expert solutions is a concern.
15. Practical mediation skills for parents should be a part of the overall effort to build awareness among
parents of risks and safety online
15.1 Parents appear to have got the message that it is valuable for them to engage with their child’s internet
use, and they employ a wide range of strategies, depending partly on the age of the child. But there are some
parents who do not do very much, even for young children, and there are some children who wish their parents
to take more interest. Targeting these parents with awareness-raising messages and resources is thus a priority.
15.2 Cynicism that what parents do is not valued, or that children will evade parental guidance, is
ungrounded: the evidence reveals a more positive picture in which children welcome parental interest and
mediating activities while parents express confidence in their children’s abilities. It is important to maintain
this situation as the internet becomes more complex and more embedded in everyday life.
15.3 Parental restrictions carry a significant cost in terms of children’s online opportunities and skills, but
they may be appropriate if children are vulnerable to harm. Parental efforts to empower children online seem
to enhance their opportunities and skills, though there is little evidence that they reduce risk or harm. Since
there are no easy answers, parents should be supported in judging what best suits their child.
16. Filtering technologies and parental control software need to be far more usable and transparent and take
into account the needs of parents in order to improve uptake
16.1 Across the 25 countries surveyed by EU Kids Online, less than one third (28%) of parents were found
to filter the websites visited by their child. It is clear that many parents find them such software either too
complicated or ill-suited to their needs.
To be effective, parental controls need to incorporate all of the issues that concern parents about their
children’s internet use. Thus, in addition to filtering out adult or unsuitable online content for children, controls
may also need to include features such as the amount of time spent online, filtering of user-generated content
and blocking of commercial content.
While there continues to be debate about the appropriateness of parental controls in all situations, they
continue to be a valuable resource particularly for those who may lack skills or knowledge in advising on and
guiding their children’s internet use.
Parental controls are also available as an integral element of some internet services and do not need to be
separately installed. An industry-wide agreement on the design and features of safety and parental controls built
into web-based services could provide parents with better opportunities to consider adopting them. Training in
the use of tools should also be made readily available to deal with lack of confidence and knowledge on the
part of parents.
17. Levels of teacher mediation are high but could be higher, as a large minority of children are not reached
by teacher guidance. Since schools have the resources to reach all children, they should take the biggest
share of the task of reaching the “hard to reach”
17.1 The youngest children (9–10 years) report the least mediation from teachers: as this age group now
uses the internet widely, primary schools should increase critical and safety guidance for pupils.
17.2 The benefits of supporting peer mediation are easily neglected but could be constructively harnessed,
especially as children are most likely to tell a friend if something bothers them online. Peer mentoring schemes
have a valuable role to play.
17.3 When something has bothered them on the internet, 36% of children said a parent helped them, 28% a
friend and 24% a teacher. The ideal may for children to have a range of people to turn to, depending on the
circumstances. A minority of children has no-one to tell when something upsets them.
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18. Industry needs to be much more proactive in promoting internet safety awareness and education. In order
to increase trust, the management of safety, identity and privacy settings of internet services used by children
needs to be transparent and independently evaluated
18.1 The overwhelming majority of parents would like to receive information and advice about internet
safety. Most, however, get it from firstly from family and friends (48%) rather than from the providers of
internet services. Traditional media (32%) and the child’s school (27%) are the next most common sources of
information about internet safety. Internet service providers (22%) and websites (21%) are much less evident
as sources of advice.
18.2 There is considerable scope, therefore, for industry to improve its own awareness raising and provision
of safety advice. Internet safety advice should be provided in an accessible and user-friendly way at the point
of access on web services used by young people. Internet service providers (ISPs) should play a more prominent
role in providing online safety resources for parents as the primary account holders.
18.3 Traditional media sources—press, radio and television—also have a major role to play in promoting
online safety awareness as supporting greater media literacy among the adult population. They are best
positioned to reach all adults and, crucially, are influential in forming parents’ attitudes towards opportunities
and risks on the internet.
18.4 Evidence repeatedly shows that children still struggle with user tools, safety devices, privacy settings
and policies, reporting mechanisms, etc, even though the industry claims they have been improved and made
easier. Independent evaluation of progress by the industry is crucial, to measure whether improvements have
been made (against benchmarks) but more importantly, whether those improvements work—ie are they actually
sufficient for children to manage their safety, privacy, identity and risk online?
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Rolf Smith
Background to Submission
Firstly, I would like to thank the Government for giving me the opportunity to provide this submission to
the Committee.
I am 33 years old and am happily married to my wife; of whom we have two children aged seven and five.
I am writing therefore in my capacity as a father with some experience, as well as with feelings for all fathers
and mothers of children throughout the UK and across the globe. As a parent I am acutely aware of the many
potential threats to our children’s safety, of which the internet is an ever present and increasing one; hence the
reason for this submission.
Whilst I am not a professional or seasoned campaigner, I can honestly say that the following information is
given in good faith and is believed to be correct. Any data provided was taken from Ofcom reports.
Personal Experiences as Father of a Young Family
Computers and the internet are a fundamental part of life for our children, as they are for any children in
the UK today. In a way that we adults did not, they are growing up with computer technology all around them.
Indeed, it is astounding how quickly—almost naturally—they pick it up. My daughter has just turned five and
cannot yet read, but even she can navigate with remarkable speed through websites she knows to find the part
she wants, simply by memorizing the position of the links and buttons! It is abundantly clear and proven that
the internet appeals to a child’s inquisitive nature and their exploratory learning style; certainly that has been
our experience, and it won’t be long before they are better at it than us.
There is no doubt that the internet can be useful for children, particularly we have found it helpful for
improving parts of our older child’s education. But we are very thankful for the strong filters we have in place
which allows access to approved sites only. This gives my wife and I the opportunity to check the content of
sites carefully before allowing them to be visited by our children. Even so, our children are only allowed to
access the internet for timed, monitored periods and we certainly wouldn’t leave them alone during this time.
I know and they know—as we have taught them—that the internet has hidden dangers that they are not able
to cope with.
In addition, too much computer activity tends to make our children less interested in outdoor activities and
other necessary skills like writing and drawing.
The National Situation Regarding Online Safety
The Committee will no doubt be aware of the many statistics published by Ofcom on the subject of children
and safety online. Therefore it is not necessary for me to go into too much detail regarding the national
situation; however I must point out that it is very clear from data gathered that many parents in the UK, unlike
myself and my wife, are relatively unaware of how potent the hidden dangers of the internet are. While most
parents acknowledge that there should be some form of parental control, many do not view the potential
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dangers as particularly serious so are not pro-active in controlling their children’s use; therefore they allow
their children to spend long periods online alone without supervision and without controlling software. This
key fact could have a serious negative impact on UK society in the future if it is not properly addressed now.
This is of great concern to me. A few key Ofcom findings bear this out:
—
54% of parents in the UK do not use parental control software on their home internet.
—
46% of parents agree that their children know more about the internet than they do.
—
81% of children aged 14–16 have viewed adult material online.
—
Only 17% of parents say they are concerned about the internet.
—
25% of 8–11 year olds and 34% of 12–15 year olds are likely to communicate with people not
directly known to them via social networking sites, these figures rose greatly in 2012 report.
Why Online Safety for Children is an Issue which needs Action
It is undoubtedly a necessity that children are kept safe from harm wherever they are, and this must include
when they are on the internet. The proliferation of social networking, video sharing, personal smartphones etc
has made it even more vital that this issue is viewed seriously. The reality is that practically every UK child is
using the internet, and 80% of 12–15 year olds in the UK have an online profile. Therefore children must be
actively protected from the following (among others):
—
Access to explicit adult material.
—
Online grooming and other harmful communications.
—
Cyber bullying.
—
Online stranger danger.
—
Uncontrolled spending.
It seems from Ofcom data that the issue is twofold:
(a) While most parents know that the internet has dangers, many do not consider them to be serious
enough to pose a significant risk to their children. Therefore there is a lack of awareness.
(b) This has meant that parental control software, which is essential to maintain safety for children
on all online devices, is not used nearly as widely as it needs to be.
Suggestions of Actions that could be Taken to Improve Online Safety
As is the case for the care of children generally, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring children stay safe
online lies with their parents. Parents need to speak to their children about online safety, impose restrictions
and controls, and maintain supervision at all times. However, there are two things that I feel Government must
do fulfil their part in addressing the issue of Online Safety for children:
(1) Increase parental awareness—the dangers of the internet do often seem remote and
hypothetical, whereas they are in fact very real and present. Government can use its
considerable influence to help parents across the UK to realize this. Parents need to be helped
to understand that it is a basic responsibility to protect their children online, as much as it is
basic to teach them how to cross the road safely.
(2) Insist on parental control software—rather than leaving parents to investigate and install some
kind of control software, Government must insist that every online device sold in the UK for
personal use must come with parental control software pre-installed. Ofcom’s findings
absolutely support this suggestion. They found that the primary reasons given for parental
controls not being used were as follows:
(a) a lack of awareness or gaps in understanding;
(b) the perceived complexity of parental controls;
(c) the degree of effort that was expected to be required; and
(d) busy lives coupled with the absence of a specific trigger.
In addition to this, Ofcom reports that “when parents were asked whether they would install parental controls
if the process was made very easy, almost all parents said they would do so.”
I look forward to hearing the results of the Committee’s inquiry, and look forward to hearing about the
Government action which is sure to follow.
Many thanks again for the opportunity to provide this submission.
September 2013
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Written evidence submitted by Mediawatch-UK
A. Executive Summary
1. We welcome recent government initiatives designed to protect minors from accessing adult content but
are of the opinion that three key areas must still be addressed in order to provide the best possible protection.
These are:
— Education.
— Age verification.
— Statutory backing.
2. We welcome discussion of how best to prevent abusive and threatening behaviour using social media.
This is a behavioural issue and unlikely to be effectively dealt with by filtering but by collaboration between
industry and other stakeholders. We believe there are three key areas in tackling this problem:
— Education.
— Regulation.
— Real sanctions, with statutory backing if necessary.
B. Mediawatch-UK
3. Mediawatch-UK is a voluntary organisation, established in 1965 by Mary Whitehouse CBE and formerly
known as the National Viewers’ and Listeners’ Association. Mediawatch-UK has thousands of subscribing
members throughout the UK. Our membership consists of people of all ages, occupations and backgrounds
who are concerned about the overall influence of the media on the individual, the family and wider society.
4. Our Director and other spokespersons appear regularly in the media (press and broadcast) on behalf of
our members. Further information about Mediawatch-UK can be found on our website:
http://www.mediawatchuk.org.uk/
C. How Best to Protect Minors from Accessing Adult Content
5. We believe that parents and businesses have a shared responsibility for children’s online safety. Parents/
guardians have the ultimate responsibility for their children but businesses and government have a responsibility
to provide parents with the tools they need to keep their children safe.
Education
6. Many of our members have reported difficulty with installing content filters and keeping up to date with
filters across the plethora of internet-enabled devices in their homes. Coupled with this many have reported
confusion in knowing where to go to access reliable information and education on internet safety.
7. This is best illustrated by a family which recently contacted us for help. The family fostered children
whose chaotic backgrounds placed them at particular risk. They were long time carers for a child who had
suffered a history of serious sexual abuse. They were aware of the potential risks online and had taken advice
from social services and their ISP. They had set up filters on the internet enabled devices in their home and
believed their mobile devices would be protected under The Mobile Broadband Group Code of Practice. Their
child was introduced to pornography on the phone of a child at school and she soon became addicted and was
regularly accessing pornography using the wi-fi at the homes of friends using her phone. Because of this child’s
history she is particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and misadventure.
8. At the time of the Parliamentary Enquiry into Online Child Protection in 2011 we asked our members (a
group likely to be more than averagely engaged with this issue) whether their ISP had ever contacted them
with details of the parental controls available as part of their package.
— 20% reported that their ISPs had informed them about parental controls.
— 80% said their ISPs had never done this.
— Of those who had been told about parental controls 61% were with TalkTalk. Approximately
60% of TalkTalk subscribers had been alerted to their provider’s new HomeSafe service.
— Of members who subscribed to other services only 11% had been told about the parental
controls available.
Of some concern were a number of BT customers who were under the impression that installing parental
controls would cost them a further subscription.
9. There is a great need for integrated and accurate advice for parents and carers on the potential dangers of
accessing inappropriate online content and how best to protect their children. There is much good work being
done in this area by a variety of organisations but further co-ordinated work is required to ensure that all
parents are made aware of and receive access to information and assistance.
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10. We believe there should be space in sex and relationship education in schools to educate young people
about the potential dangers of accessing adult content online, how to avoid doing so and strategies to enable
them to understand what they may have seen.
Age verification
11. We welcome the Government’s efforts in this area but believe no mechanism (“active choice”, “defaulton” or “opt-in”), will work without “robust age verification”.
12. We commend efforts made in the internet gambling industry to all but eradicate underage online gambling
and we would like to see similar measures implemented with regard to adult material with appointed agencies,
possibly OFCOM or ATVOD, regulating.
Statutory backing
13. We also remain convinced that the best approach to ensure the Government’s pledges are actually
delivered on is by changing the law. The current “default-on” proposal is a voluntary agreement between the
major ISPs and, although four currently dominate the market, the Government’s plan does leave around 10%
of the market unaccounted for. If filters were legislated for then all ISPs and MPOs, regardless of size, would
have to conform which would offer a greater degree of protection.
14. Statutory backing would also remove anomalies between different providers and contracts. For example:
many consumers believe that, as a result of the Mobile Broadband Network’s code, child filters are activated
as a default for all UK mobile phone customers. This is not the case. Some providers require the filters to be
activated and provision varies dependent on whether a phone is pay-as-you-go or contract, provided by a
Mobile Phone Operator or a Mobile Phone Virtual Operator.
D. Preventing Abusive or Threatening Comments on Social Media
Education
15. There is a great need for integrated and accurate advice for users, parents and carers on the potential
pitfalls of social media use and how best to protect themselves and their children. There is much good work
being done in this area by a variety of organisations but further co-ordinated work is required to ensure that
all parents are made aware of and receive access to information.
16. We believe there should be space in PSHE education in schools to educate young people about safe and
responsible social media use including the consequences of anti-social behaviour and sources of advice and
support in case of abuse.
Regulation
17. The former Director of Mediawatch-UK, John Beyer, during the course of his work attracted much
criticism including an abusive Facebook paged entitled “I Hate John Beyer”. When this was brought to our
attention we reported it Facebook and asked for it to be removed. We reported the page three times but heard
nothing back from Facebook. Eventually, after approximately three months, the page was removed although
we were not formally informed of its removal but discovered it ourselves.
18. Although the issue was dealt with it took too long and there was not enough communication in the
process. Neither were we directed to sources of support and advice. These are issues which need to be addressed
in a code of practice for social media sites.
19. Social media is now a mature medium and it is our opinion that it should be regulated accordingly.
Recent events (such as the suicide of Hannah Smith following bulling on ask.fm) have demonstrated the
potential effect of online abuse. We believe that abusive and threatening behaviour on social media is now an
issue of health and safety and we would like to see it regulated accordingly via an industry code of practise.
20. We would like an independent regulator to ensure that sites are sufficiently moderated and that complaints
are dealt with swiftly, efficiently and within an agreed timeframe. Such a regulator could ensure the
development and implementation of an industry code of practice with the results promoted to parents and
children. This code should include:
— Clearer and simpler reporting mechanisms, especially where a service is marketed at and
provided to under 18s, making it easier for users to report abuse.
— Improved transparency and communication of protocols followed when reports of abuse are
made, including average response times, so that reporting users are able to know the timescale
for action with regards to when and if the problem will be dealt with and if and when the
content will be removed.
— Increased moderation of user-generated content. This moderation is especially important where
a service is proactively promoted and used by children.
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—
—
Prominent signposting to sources of expertise, advice, support and help for users affected by
threats or abuse.
A code of practice relating to anonymous use of sites.
21. We would also like to see service providers working more closely with the organisations dealing with
the consequences and aftermath of online threats and abuse taking place through their services, providing both
support and funding.
Real sanctions with statutory backing if necessary
22. Given the anonymity afforded online there can be a perception that abusive behaviour on social media
is without consequence. We welcome the clarification from the CPS on this issue but we would like to see
increased sanctions for abusive or threatening behaviour online which reflect those which exist offline and in
other forms of media. For maximum efficacy we believe these need to have statutory backing.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by South West Grid for Learning (SWGfL)
Summary: With over 10 years of pioneering work in online safety and as part of the UK Safer Internet
Centre, we are fully aware of emerging technologies and potential risks, the issues children and young
people, professionals and parents face, and the gaps that exist in their support; as well as stakeholders
and partner organisations working in this field. In the response below we outline strategies we feel would
improve online safety in the UK:
— For point I. How best to protect minors from accessing adult content we recommend
parent/filtering tools together with wide education campaigns, better content rating
mechanisms and more research to identify gaps in support and provision.
— For point II. Filtering out CAI material we recommend providers should be members of
IWF and the increased use of alert tools.
— For point III. Preventing abusive comments on social media we recommend a combination
of prevention and empowerment strategies such as education and information about
reporting abuse, and clear and simple reporting mechanisms from industry.
1. Background to SWGfL:48 Our esafety team of experts has national and international reputation in
safeguarding children and young people online. Our expertise is around e-safety policy guidance and
improvements and training in schools to staff, parents and pupils. We produce award winning resources such
as 360 degree safe49 used by over 4,000 schools to assess their esafety provision, pinpoint their weaknesses
and make appropriate improvements. We also collaborated with OFSTED to inform the inspection of esafety
standards in schools and early years settings.
2. Role within UK Safer Internet Centre: As one of the three partners comprising the UK Safer Internet
Centre,50 SWGfL operates a unique helpline51 for professionals to help resolve online issues about themselves
or the young people they work with. The centre also coordinates Safer Internet Day every February in the UK.
To illustrate our work from the last 12 month here is an infographic:
48
49
50
51
http://www.swgfl.org.uk/Staying-Safe
http://www.360safe.org.uk/
http://www.saferinternet.org.uk/
http://www.saferinternet.org.uk/about/helpline
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I. How best to protect minors from accessing adult content
3. Adult content presents a range of harmful risks to children and young people and a number of strategies
are required to best protect them. In this context, we are considering legal adult content. Children and young
people have many influences on their lives- their age, social & economic environment, location, family
situation, parental and peer groups etc; hence a single strategy is ineffectual. A broad complement of strategies
would include:
4. Filtering/parental controls: There has been much discussion recently in relation to filtering or parental
controls and whilst we support “Active Choice”, we think that this is not a panacea. Parental controls have
advantages to help prevent accidental access to adult content, however we know it will not prevent determined
access, especially for “tech savvy” teenagers. Over the past 14 years we have been providing network level
filtering into schools in South-West England and continue to see “loop holes” that children discover to
circumvent and bypass the filtering in place. As we move towards multi device access in the home, our
preference is for network level filters compared to device specific ones. We encourage parents to use parental
controls and advocate age appropriate filtering, however always point out that these should not be used in
isolation but alongside other strategies—filtering and parental controls are not a “fire and forget” solution.
Consoles already use content ratings like PEGI and BBFC but these need to be more sophisticated on cable,
TV services, mobile devices and app devices.
5. Safe Search: Linked to filtering, we encourage parents to use safe search functionality and age appropriate
settings for online searches. It would be worth considering applying “active choice” to these services? For
example safe search could be enabled as the “default” configuration, allowing users to “opt out” if they wish?
6. Education for young people: Education is the most important strategy. We should provide children with
age appropriate, reflective, non-moralising and non-sensationalist educational programmes, mapped across the
wider curriculum and covering the broader aspects of digital life, alongside parental support initiatives.
Integrating discussions around sexting and impact of online pornography into RSE (Relationship & Sexual
Education) is in our view the most suitable approach, ensuring that children understand the context around
online adult content. Our fears relate to the influence of adult content on children’s expectations and normal
healthy sexual development. Whilst these are high level objectives, the effective success will require additional
education and support for those raising these issues with children.
7. Education for parents: In our experience parents can often feel intimidated when discussing technology
with their children and extending this to adult online content can exacerbate the situation. Many parents will
not appreciate the extent and extremes of adult content online, well beyond the sort of content they witnessed
as children. Support in this regard will be required, perhaps using a storyline in popular “soap operas” can
help to raise the subject and allow parents to both progress discussions and to provide some messaging to
children directly.
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8. Education for teachers: Our evidence suggests that online safety training for teachers is consistently the
weakest part of a school’s wider online safety practice. The impact of adult content should be integrated into
staff training and should extend to all staff. Pedagogical methods of integrating into RSE and online safety
sessions should be provided to teaching staff.
9. Social Workers: Social workers (and social care professionals) who work with society’s most vulnerable
children should be able to access materials, resources and support in this regard. Combating CSE (Child Sexual
Exploitation) is clearly a key priority in this sector and online adult content has a significant impact. Social
workers should be able to recognise the impact of this content in particular cases.
10. Service Providers: For those service providers who do not allow or host adult content (as defined by
the terms and conditions), they should be clear about how they monitor and enforce their policy, together with
clear and transparent reporting procedures for users to report questionable content. For those service providers
who do permit adult content, it should be clearly marked as such. Perhaps the use of age rating (ie 12, 15 and
18) could have a part to play? Providers who host user generated content should consider implementing user
or community ratings.
11. Public Health: Public health campaigns should be considered to raise general awareness of online adult
content, perhaps extending or integrating with existing teenage pregnancy campaigns, with which there is an
obvious impact.
12. Research: Further research is needed to better understand the experiences, perceptions and knowledge
of children and young people when it comes to online adult content together with assessments and evaluations
of the impact of this variety of formal and informal educational programmes and resources.
II. Filtering out extremist material including CAI (Child Abuse Images) and material intended to promote
terrorism and/or other acts of violence
13. IWF membership: UK ISPs should by mandatory requirement be members of the IWF (Internet Watch
Foundation). Combating CAI in the UK through the work of the IWF has proved a particularly successful
model and one that could be considered also for extremist material.
14. Using alert tools: SWGfL has been working with the IWF and South West police forces since 2006 to
alert for any attempted access to websites containing CAI. This pilot project has been managed by CEOP with
Home Office approval and due for evaluation shortly. The objective of the project is to flag intelligence to
police forces if anyone in a school (specifically) attempts to access a website containing CAI. This intelligence
prompts the police to then undertake their normal investigation routes resulting in a number of school staff,
who have been identified and removed as a direct result of this simple alerting process. We believe we should
use technology better to identify those accessing CAI (and extremist material) and we are involved in a project
with Plymouth University and IWF to extend and refine our existing alerting capability.
III. Preventing abusive or threatening comments on social media
15. Background to Professionals Online Safety Helpline: The Professionals Online Safety Helpline, based
at SWGfL is regularly called upon to comment on abusive online behaviours, both via printed and broadcast
media and at public speaking events across the UK. The Helpline is part of the Safer Internet Centre, and is a
dedicated service for professionals who work with children and young people, including teachers, social
workers, police officers, youth workers, early years professionals and more. We have seen a large increase in
calls from parents frustrated at the lack of practical help to get abusive comments removed online.
16. How the helpline operates: The helpline is unique in its approach to resolving social media issues, with
a direct contact route in all of the major sites. Our current partners include Facebook, Twitter, Ask.FM,
Instagram, Moshi Monsters, Tumblr, Apple, 192.com, Omegle, Snapchat and others. These contacts allow us
in the first instance to ensure that the advice we give to callers about how to report, is accurate, and secondly,
where necessary, to escalate the matter directly to the policy and safety personnel in each organisation, and
have inappropriate, abusive content removed. In some cases this also leads to the perpetrator being suspended
for their behaviour.
17. More guidance on how to report and remove content: Many services already exist to provide
therapeutic support, particularly for children. What has been lacking is the practical guidance for users on
reporting issues and ability to remove content. As such the helpline has addressed this gap and through its
unique network of direct contacts to providers, supports professionals, and increasingly parents, in how to
report abusive content appropriately in order to ensure or speed its removal.
18. Prevention strategies: Prevention is more challenging, and needs to be a collaboration between everyone
involved. Schools, and even pre-school and early years settings, need to educate children about online
behaviour much earlier. Generally where we see social media discussed and embedded in curriculum, there
tend to be fewer issues and children take a more responsible approach. We believe children need to build a
level of resilience, rather than being sheltered from experiences (of course we do not mean being subject to
online abuse!). Schools should talk about how to respond to abuse, for example around blocking and reporting,
and where possible introduce confidential reporting routes.
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19. Strategies to empower young people and professionals: We know that children often do not “tell”
when they are being bullied or abused. Allowing young people to report anonymously, either for themselves
or their friends, can be very empowering. This can be simple, for example a “Whisper”52 alerting system via
SMS, or email, or even a locked comments box. Other initiatives such as Anti Bullying Ambassadors also help
discourage abusive behaviour. Schools need to act quickly and decisively when there are issues offline, often
the online abuse follows a period of face to face bullying. If this is picked up earlier, better interventions can
be put in place to support the child at risk.
20. Parental support: Parents need access to more up to date advice about specific popular sites, in how to
support their child if the worst happens, and what they can expect from the child’s school. Schools need to
alert parents of any bullying incidents at school as this can be an indicator that there or may be issues online
which the parent can assist with. Having regular, open conversations with their children about their online
activities can help to identify potential risks before they happen, help children feel more able to discuss
concerns, and also alert parents if their children are themselves engaging in bullying or abusive behaviours.
Parents need to take a more proactive response when they discover their children are perpetrators of online
abuse, including working with the school to ensure that they can support any victims who may not have already
come forward.
21. Role of industry: Industry needs to ensure that they have sufficient safeguards in place to protect users.
Our experience has been very varied, and some sites are better at dealing with issues than others. The most
effective systems use a combination of automated systems, such as language filters (although these are in no
way foolproof), automated moderation of specific phrases or search terms, and human moderation. It has been
our experience that with very rapidly growing sites, including Twitter and Ask.FM, user safety isn’t considered
as one of the priorities at the start. We are not overly critical of this, because having some flexibility around
policy decisions allows for regular review and improvements to be implemented, however it can be dangerous
to launch a site without some basic safeguards in place from the offset. An ideal approach would be a more
proactive moderation, rather than a purely “report”-based moderation. We do not support censoring of the web,
nonetheless making users aware that sites are monitoring behaviour may act as a deterrent for online abuse.
22. Clearer privacy settings and simple reporting routes: As well as working to prevent harassment, sites
must adhere to their own community standards when reports are made to them. We would like to see much
clearer advice on how to set up privacy on each site, report abuse, and clarification on what will happen once
a report has been made, eg timescale for resolution. Reporting should be a very simple process, and we are
pleased to see improvements to both Twitter and Ask.FM with the introduction of “in tweet” reports and a
more prominent report button soon coming to Ask.FM. Matters must be resolved quickly, and with decisive
sanctions, such as temporary suspension of accounts while investigations are underway. Our helpline is
undertaking a national role of mediation with providers in reporting and removing abusive content and could
be considered for national recognition like in New Zealand.
23. Accountability for anonymous services: We would also like to see more accountability to sites that
allow anonymous questions, such as Little Gossip. Although most media stories would say otherwise, Ask.FM
have been fairly proactive in dealing with cases reported to them, we have a named contact and they have kept
us informed of policy and procedures. Little Gossip however do not respond to any requests for contact and
act on abuse reports. This site allows users to report an abusive message by posting an equally abusive message
in its place, leading to significant harm to the young people named and shamed on the site. We would like
these sites to have an “opt in” to being anonymous, rather than “anonymous” being the default setting, and to
have warning messages on their landing pages.
24. Support links and help: Sites should have better links to support services which are relevant to each
country, for example Tumblr has links to self harm and suicide support services, but only in the US. Syndicated
support would be more effective, where different providers point to consistent sources of support—for example
to ChildLine, Samaritans etc.
25. Supporting organisations like the UK Safer Internet Centre: One area we would like improved is in
financial support from industry to organisations such as the UK Safer Internet Centre, to produce resources
and support operation of the Helpline, which directly tackles the issues users are facing. At present Industry
contribute financially to the IWF in tackling child abuse images, but there is no co-ordinated approach to
funding the services which resolve other problems such as removal of abusive content and in general, wider
education and awareness-raising initiatives.
26. Role of Government: Government has an integral part to play, statutory funding should be in place for
services working to resolve online harassment, and there needs to be clear direction and consistency between
departments. Too often we are given conflicting areas of focus from the Department of Justice, DCMS, DfE,
and even the Prime Minister. It would be more effective to streamline these through one distinct channel or
Department. Government should also be more active and consistent in engaging with social media sites when
there are issues in the public interest. There should be clearer guidance for the public on what legal action can
be taken, and under what circumstances.
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27. Role of media: One area often overlooked is the responsibility that Media holds. While it’s important
to openly discuss online issues, we would like to see a more responsible use of language and reporting on
behalf of the media. Often stories will have attention grabbing headlines, and very inflammatory language, for
example “Facebook bully probe after death” and “How many more teenage girls will commit suicide because
of Ask.fm”. In nearly all the cases we have been involved in, media have made sweeping statements and
assumptions about the circumstances of cases, without knowing the facts, and often while a Police investigation
is still underway. These messages are very unhelpful, distressing for the families involved and some even
contain inaccuracies about the sites which may lead to further problems. We would like to see the media
adhering to a general code of conduct about how they respond to issues involving young people, and adopting
more supportive safety advice and links to relevant resources.
28. Users responsibility: Finally, we need to consider the users themselves. In cases involving adults
particularly, we need to be clear that if they break the law they may be prosecuted, that just as inappropriate
offline behaviour may have legal consequences so may behaviour online. Young people’s issues however are
sometimes more complex, and we don’t support criminalising children, however there does need to be a point
when young people are held accountable for their behaviour. Awareness of those laws could be raised through
an advertising campaign similar to TV licence/Road safety etc.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by British Sky Broadcasting Limited (‘Sky’)
1. Introduction
1.1 We welcome the Committee’s Inquiry into Online Safety as a further contribution to a topic that Sky
has been heavily engaged in.
1.2 In June, we attended the summit chaired by the Secretary Of State for Culture Media and Sport, and
have attached a letter we sent to her ahead of this summit as an appendix to this submission.
1.3 Over the last 20 years BSkyB has established itself as a successful and responsible consumer business.
Since entering the broadband market in 2006, we have become the second largest provider in the UK with
almost 5m broadband customers.
1.4 Our growth has come by providing customers with the products and services they want, and recognising
the trust that our customers place in us to act responsibly. Over this time we have created a track record
where we have helped families keep their children safe when enjoying the content we provide them on-screen
and online.
1.5 The internet has become one of the most important sources of information, education and entertainment.
Access to the internet is now an integral and fundamental part of people’s lives, bringing with it a wide range
of benefits but also a range of challenges.
1.6 There are many positive aspects to life in the online world, but just as in the offline world, there are
services and websites that provide access to material that is not suitable for children. We have taken our
philosophy of giving parents market leading tools to protect their families on screen, and applied it to our
broadband services.
1.7 As a result, we have developed a range of tools to help parents manage how their families access
content on whichever platform they choose to use, and are looking forward to enhancing our offering in the
coming months.
1.8 There is a very important distinction to be made between content that is legal but potentially unsuitable
for children, and other content which is illegal. It is vital that this distinction is not only understood by
policymakers but highlighted at every opportunity to help ensure that there is more clarity in the debate, and
in the way in which it is reported.
1.9 Sky’s commitment to provide families with tools to choose how much of the internet gets through to
their home, is separate to any legal or regulatory responsibilities we may have. Where content is deemed illegal
by legislators or the Courts we will do everything required of us to prevent or restrict access.
2. Protecting Minors from Accessing Adult Content
2.1 As a leading consumer brand, our customers have high expectations of Sky. They expect us to provide
effective filtering products, presented clearly in an easily manageable way, which will enable parents to protect
their families from legal, but potentially inappropriate content.
2.2 In addition to the work that we are doing to use technology to help parents, we believe that believe that
industry, government and educators can work together to provide parents with the necessary information and
advice to be able to make the most appropriate choices for their children, and to guide children and young
people to make the right choices for themselves.
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In home fixed line broadband
2.3 We offer all of our broadband customers free parental controls which are easily installed on customer’s
PCs or laptops. We use a category based web filtering package, which can be configured by age.
2.4 The internet is being accessed via an increasing number of connected devices including connected
televisions, gaming consoles, tablets and smartphones. As internet use and the number of connected devices in
customers’ homes increase, so do the challenges for protecting families. Whilst the existing controls are an
important tool for parents, as technology has developed, there is more that we are able to do.
2.5 We are in the process of developing an enhanced parental control product which will protect all the
devices in customers’ home. Whilst there remains a role for device manufacturers and operating system
providers, we believe it is right for us to take responsibility and empower our customers to protect their families
so they have confidence that the internet can be enjoyed in a safe environment.
2.6 Over the past few years, there have been policy questions as to the best way of delivering parental
controls. Through our involvement in UK Council for Child Internet Safety we have engaged in Government
initiatives such as the Bailey Review and the Department for Education’s 2012 consultation, and the delivery
of our new product is consistent with the features described in the Prime Minister’s July speech on online safety.
2.7 Our enhanced parental control product will be free and available to all customers from the autumn. In
addition to making the product available we are keen to encourage take up, and we will do this in a number
of ways.
I. From launch, when customers obtain new routers (by upgrading their router, moving to Sky
Fibre or joining Sky as a new customer) they will be presented with the choice as to whether
or not to implement our parental controls product. Furthermore, the “yes” button will be
preticked. This means that unless customers opt-out, and click “no”, the customer journey will
see parents install and configure parental controls to meet the requirements of their family. We
have also introduced measures to ensure that an “age verified” adult is in control of the
installation process and any subsequent amendments to the configuration of these controls.
II. We will present all existing customers with a choice whether or not to apply the filters, and
ensure that they have all made this decision by the end of 2014.
III. We will support our new product with a major marketing campaign to encourage the adoption
of the filters.
IV. We are working with other ISPs and internet companies to highlight the importance of online
safety, the use of parental controls, and to provide parents with more information on how they
can protect their families in the online space. This will take the form of a major campaign
launched early next year.
Out of home WiFi
2.8 Increasingly connectivity extends beyond the home. Sky’s WiFi service, The Cloud, for example,
provides customers with access to over 20,000 WiFi hotspots across Britain’s High Streets, in venues such as
Pizza Express and Greggs, and other public spaces like the London Overground railway stations.
2.9 When children are accessing the internet outside of the home, it is far more difficult for parents to
monitor their activity, and our research tells us this is of concern to parents.
2.10 The Cloud pioneered offering its commercial customers the opportunity to automatically filter out
access to adult websites in public WiFi hotspots, being the first WiFi provider to do so in 2007.
2.11 The increase in children accessing internet outside the home through connected devices, has led to
parents seeking greater reassurance. That is why from September 2012, we decided to apply these filters by
default, so that sites which contain content only suitable to adults are inaccessible in the public places served
by The Cloud. As a leading WiFi provider, we think this is an important contribution to ensuring children are
protected when using the internet outside of their homes, providing reassurance for parents.
3. Illegal Content
3.1 Separate from the issue of providing tools to customers to filter legal but potentially inappropriate
content is our commitment to meet any obligations imposed on us to restrict access to content as a result of a
legal determination.
3.2 Sky, as an ISP, is not in a position to judge the legality of a website or content within a website. Instead,
Sky works with the bodies responsible for making such determinations and complies with any obligations it
may have.
3.3 Content determined to be illegal tends to fall under one of three categories, namely child abuse imagery,
material intended to promote terrorism and content infringing copyright.
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Child abuse imagery
3.4 Sky is a member of the Internet Watch Foundation (“IWF”), which is the UK Hotline for reporting
online child abuse imagery. Its key role is to get content removed at source. Where content is hosted in the
UK, the IWF is typically able to get it removed in under an hour. Where content is hosted overseas, it takes
longer to get it removed. However, the IWF provides its members with a list of URLs which contain illegal
content. Sky ensures that requests to access such webpages, regardless of where they are hosted, result in a
“splashpage” being served that informs the user that they attempted to access a page that contains illegal
content.
3.5 Sky is a strong supporter of the IWF. We are currently engaging with the IWF to see how we can
increase our support to it, both in terms of supporting the work they do and in terms of our financial support,
where we are already part of the “top tier” of financial contributors. In particular, we are keen for the IWF to
be proactive in seeking out illegal content rather than rely on public reporting.
3.6 It is worth noting that we have recently changed the splashpage served after requests from government
and after consultation with the IWF, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP), and the
Lucy Faithfull Foundation (LFF), which is a charity dedicated to reducing the risk of children being sexually
abused. The splashpage now is more explicit in highlighting the consequences of viewing child abuse imagery
linking to the LFF to provide further information.
Material intended to promote terrorism
3.7 We are keen to play our role in working with other Government departments, such as the Home Office,
and its Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) to ensure that illegal content is removed and/or
filtered.
3.8 CTIRU was set up as part of the PREVENT strategy, to ensure unlawful online content is removed from
the internet, thereby disrupting and limiting access to extremist material. Since its establishment in 2010, this
unit has removed approximately 6,000 pieces of online terrorist content.
3.9 Sky does not provide webpage hosting, and as a result has are not been requested to remove this type
of content. However, we are keen to liaise with the government to explore whether there are other opportunities
to work together.
Copyright infringement
3.10 Sky is keen to support rightsholders in seeking to restrict access to content that breaches copyright.
3.11 Although Sky is not in a position to determine which sites are making illegal content available, we
welcome decisions by the Courts to require blocking of infringing sites, and have built systems to ensure we
can comply with blocking requirements of resulting court orders.
3.12 We believe that the established process broadly works and has been accepted by our customers. Indeed,
evidence from Ofcom’s research into online copyright infringement suggests a reduction in the people using
infringing sites,53 implying that blocking is a proportionate contribution to the fight against piracy.
September 2013
Written evidence submitted by Big Brother Watch
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee has decided to investigate a number of aspects of online safety
that are currently raising concerns, in particular:
1. How Best to Protect Minors from Accessing Adult Content
Firstly, it should be asked—is it the role of Government to prevent minors accessing adult content, or
parents?
Critically—any measure must consider the privacy and freedom of speech issues involved. Given the
importance of trying to help young people appreciate the importance of protecting their personal data and to
consider what they are sharing online, intrusive “big sister” approaches should be resisted. If we raise young
children with an expectation that they have no privacy, we cannot in later life then hope they discover the
importance of privacy.
With nine in 10 parents aware that internet filters are freely available, it is clear that internet controls need
to be made easier to use rather than taking the control away from parents and handing it to the government.
53
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/telecoms-research/online-copyright/w4/OCI_MAIN_REPORT_W4_
FINAL.pdf
“Thirty-two per cent of those who consumed any content illegally claimed to use “peer-to-peer” (P2P) services…..This was the
lowest level seen during the 13 months of tracking (it was 37% in [the last set of research])”
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The first problem associated with online safety is not only are there issues trying to define adult content, but
there are differing views on what is unacceptable. For instance, some households would see topless photographs
as adult content whereas others would not. This is w