Priority responses to the 2006 Guimaras oil spill, Philippines: Will

Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Ocean & Coastal Management
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ocecoaman
Priority responses to the 2006 Guimaras oil spill, Philippines:
Will history repeat itself?
~ a*
Rex Balen
College of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences, University of the Philippines Visayas, Miagao, Iloilo 5023, Philippines
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 15 June 2011
Received in revised form
5 November 2014
Accepted 7 November 2014
Available online 19 November 2014
The Guimaras oil spill of 2006 was the worst environmental accident of the Philippine and coincidentally
happened during a period of rapid progress in nationwide communication technology. This study took
advantage of the massive media coverage of the incident to answer questions about the priority needs of
the affected population, the prominent disaster response, and the rationale for the response. Techniques
were combined to implement a descriptive analysis of the available information-interview of key respondents and news survey, substantiated by a document analysis of hardcopy and online materials, and
content mapping in the integration and analysis.
The priority needs of the oils spill victims were few and basic-a plain consequence of economic and
physical dislocations. Yet, these needs were inadequately met because the many forms of disaster
response “diluted” the relief operation and further spawned unwarranted issues that aggravated the
situation. Habitat assessment and rehabilitation, especially of mangroves, emerged as the prominent
response. Aggressively pushed by experts and advocates, it competed with and overshadowed the priority action on the distressed population.
The environmental response is linked to a lingering foreign crusade. The environmentalism is unregulated and turning adverse, but it continually succeeds because, apart from its domineering advocacy,
as foreign imposition, the society is naturally resilient to it, Philippine laws support it and, particularly,
even intellectuals espouse it. Moreover, there exists a large pool of potential environment advocates in
the country with hardly 1% of which being development-oriented.
Other failures of the disaster response are discussed. The aftermath rippled with issues on litigations,
irregularities and continuing research.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Guimaras
Oil spill
Priority needs
Disaster response
Mangroves
Research
Rehabilitation
Environmentalism
1. Introduction
On 11 August 2006, an 18-year old tanker sank just south of
Guimaras island in the Philippines and began spilling 2,162,230 L of
bunker oil owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC)
or Petron (Olavario, 2009). Dubbed as the Guimaras oil spill, it
became the worst environmental accident in the country (Puyat,
2010). The spill wreaked havoc to the southern coastlines of the
island (28 barangays1 in 4 towns) and then spread to the coastlines
of Panay (22 barangays in 2 towns of Iloilo Province), Negros (1
barangay) and Bantayan islands (Fig. 1). In Guimaras alone, the
incident distressed 23,635 individuals (4727 families) (RDCC-6,
* PO Box 249, Iloilo City 5000, Philippines.
E-mail address: eastlife_007@bigfoot.com.
1
The smallest political unit or administrative division in the Philippines; a local
counterpart to a village.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2014.11.007
0964-5691/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2006). Its second largest town of Nueva Valencia sustained the
worst impact involving 12,600 individuals or a hefty 40% of the
town's population (RDCC-6, 2006; BFAR, 2005). Later field counts
were higher, suggesting that the actual number of residents being
affected was increasing (Burgos, 2007a).
The nation was thrown into disarray, ironically, despite the fresh
memory of the 18 December 2005 incident, wherein 364,120L of
bunker oil polluted the coasts of Semirara island in Mindoro
(Magramo, 2007). Task Force Guimaras, the body of lead and support agencies mandated to deal with the present incident, mobilized late on Day 13 (23 August) (UN-OCHA, 2006a) and mainly as a
consequence of the fateful Day 11 meeting of the local government
units (LGUs) of Iloilo Province. Prompted by the threat of the
westward spread of oil pollutants across the Guimaras Strait, executives rushed a disaster action plan and declared the province
under a “state of calamity.” On Day 16 (26 August), the President of
~ o and
the Republic declared a “national calamity” (Avendan
Napallacan, 2006).
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
43
Fig. 1. The study domain (left), centered on the island province of Guimaras (G, shaded), is situated at the central portion of the Philippine archipelago (top right). Dotted lines
enclose the Guimaras Strait (G.S.). A triangle marks the approximate location of the sunken tanker, MT Solar-1, in what is popularly called the Panay Gulf. The strait is bounded
northwest by the coastlines of Iloilo Province in Panay Island and southeast by Negros Island. The small island of Bantayan (B) is located further northeast. The northern coastal
towns of Iloilo are: A e Ajuy and C e Concepcion. Nueva Valencia (bottom right) is the second largest of the five municipalities of Guimaras with a population of at least 31,996 at the
time of the incident (11 August 2006). Its hardest hit barangay of Lapaz is shaded. Source of coastline data: GEBCO Digital Atlas Centenary Edition (IOC, IHO and BODC, 2003).
No less devastating was the nature of the disaster response: While
the needs of the oil spill victims were few and basic, the responses
were many and diverted focus on other priorities. As a consequence,
there emerged a host of extra conflicts arising from, among others,
goods allocation and distribution, funding, cleanup, recovery operations, and even the conduct of investigations. Similarly with the
previous (Semirara) incident, the plight of the human population
was, again, masked by an overwhelming outcry for marine habitats
(notably the mangroves), their assessment, cleanup and rehabilitation2 (Burgos, 2007b; Ramirez, 2007). The government could not
come up with a livelihood plan or alternative agenda on lost incomes,
hence, desperate claimants embraced existing compensation offers
including the controversial ones (Sinay, 2007a,b; Panay News, 2007).
The tanker remains sunken to date, and there is no unequivocal information about oil leakage, the extent of pollution, and the hazard
posed by the not-so-visible oil contaminants. Only the following
emerged as definite: a disgruntled population (Punongbayan, 2010;
Reyes et al., 2010), oil residues in Nueva Valencia (Pahila et al.,
2
“Rehabilitation” denotes the reparation of ecosystems or non-human habitats.
This context is retained throughout this study unless otherwise specified.
2010; Subong, 2011; Fernandez, 2011), and various problems and
issues generated by a frantic disaster response.
The disaster response was the more colorful part of the oil spill
history and, fortunately, there was massive information available to
shed light on the following questions:
1. Were the priority needs of the affected population satisfied?
2. What emerged as the prominent response?
3. What caused the prominent response?
The next section discusses the sources of information of this
study, the data collection, processing methods and certain limitations. The findings and analyses are discussed at length in the last
section, which also incorporates the conclusion. Discussions begin
with a brief recount of the incident and its impact, followed by a
historical portrayal of the disaster response and the bundle of issues that emerged out of the extra responses. Foreign support is
elaborated to emphasize that external entities had extensive footprint in on-going and planned activities. The final discussions are
about the disaster analysis, the underlying forcing by global environmentalism, and the conclusion. In general, the disaster analysis
reveals about the failed government action, the prominence of
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
44
environmental efforts that focused on mangroves, the “dilution” of
relief priorities, and other failed responses. An explanation follows
about the success of global environmentalism as the underlying
force of the disaster response. The conclusion wraps up with a few
key points about the incident and a general sentiment about the
visible impact of environmentalism in the Philippines in the light of
strong government support.
2. Data and methods
The oil spill incident coincided with the period of dramatic
improvement in Philippine media capabilities brought about by
maturing information technologies and intensifying applications.
Particularly, radio and print media began webcasting, and government advisories were being posted online. Aided by the widespread
use of cellular communication, the coverage of the incident turned
remarkable.3 The daily news that was emanating from various print
and online sources, radio, television and portable/digital gadgets
allowed a multimedia mode of access that reduced reporting bias.
Cross-referencing (validation) was simplified especially with assistance from ubiquitous media reporters. Therefore, to a large extent, a
researcher could “observe” the events unfold through the media. It
was further fortunate that the author was actually involved as
consultant and public lecturer, thus knowledge acquired of the events
was extensive from diverse interactions with media men, the active
ecumenical group of the Archdiocese of Iloilo, concerned professionals, field workers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
legal aids, government officials, and relatives and victims from Guimaras. In particular, executives provided firsthand information about
government plans and policy focus during consultations.
Descriptive analysis was used in this study because copious
factual accounts were available to answer the study questions. A
combination of data acquisition techniques was employed: Convenience survey (interview method) was used to categorize the
priority needs of the affected families of southern Guimaras.
Similarly, a tally of the daily radio and television news topics was
used to form the categories of the popular responses. The data was
enriched with a document analysis of the print media, online materials, and accounts of contacts in the field. In the main, content
mapping was utilized in analyzing the lavish information. This
analytical technique helped the integration while substantially
reducing the volume of irrelevant and duplicate information. Historical analysis was employed to find for the common disaster
response during the 2005 (Semirara), 2006 (current) and 2013
(Estancia) oil spill incidents.
This study adopted the position that the oil spill story must not
be confined to official reports because many witnessed the incident
and their number far exceeded those of government personnel in
the field. However, this study could not also offer a total recount of
the incident. The evolution of events was very fast, in a manner that
the information generated was voluminous, frequently repetitive
and, in some cases, varying inconsistently or unsettling. Indeed,
selective gathering and analysis had to be imposed mindful of data
consistency and reliability. Further, focus was delimited to the first
120 days of the incident because, thereafter, the general public
interest on events was waning. Besides, the extensive research
required had to be restrained by the author's resources.
Lastly, damages compensation was actually the previous subject
of this study because a need was identified of Guimaras claimants
to deal with proscriptions against “intangibles” (IOPCF, 2005).
Accordingly, a valuation method was developed from critical suggestions (Hausman, 1993; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Bowers,
3
Filipinos are heavy users of mobile technologies.
1997) and the tenet that any objective method must avoid
costing the complexity of the environment and the manner that it is
utilized (Pearce and Moran, 1994). The product was an indigenous
tool, which banked on verified (notarized) claimants data and a
technique of grounding estimates via triangulation. Unfortunately,
the equally interesting subject can no longer be discussed here
inasmuch as damages claims had become a major issue of ligations.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. A synopsis of the incident and impact
At about 4:00 pm on 11 August 2006 (Day1), the Depot Manager
of PNOC4 at Iloilo City reported that Motor Tanker (MT) Solar I,
manned by a crew of 20, capsized due to inclement weather and sea
conditions, and it sank approximately 639 m deep, 24.6 km south of
Lusacan Point in Guimaras island (122 29.15940 E,1015.51360 N). The
18-year old tanker was chartered by PNOC from Sunshine Maritime
Development Corporation (SMDC) to transport 2,162,230 L of industrial fuel oil (IFO 217 intermediate bunker fuel oil) from Lamao,
Bataan in Luzon to Zamboanga City in Mindanao. Two crewmembers were missing, and the tanker was already spilling more
than 200,000 L of oil along a stretch of 7.5 km, although the path and
the flow rate could not be determined. Within the next few days,
similar accounts were repeatedly broadcasted through the media
highlighting on the spread of oil emanating from the tanker. Soon,
concern about the spill eclipsed the rescue operation and the incident investigation. A description of tanker characteristics, routes
and other technical details about the incident can be found in a
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) report by Olavario (2009).
Portrayal of the oil spill impacts varied widely. Initial reports by
the local media revealed that the spillage distressed 23,635 individuals (4727 families) (RDCC-6, 2006). Later field counts
increased to 26,740 individuals (Burgos, 2007a). Soon thereafter,
the oil spill was being depicted as a widespread devastation, not
only to human population but to ecological habitats.
On Day 18 (28 August 2006), the United Nations Resident
Coordinator Office, the National Disaster Coordinating Council
(NDCC), and the media reported a reduced impact to 17,435 individuals in 26 barangays in four of five municipalities. Eleven of
said barangays were in the hardest hit municipality of Nueva
Valencia, where oil contaminated 239 km of coastline comprising
1.8 km2 of terrestrial land, 9.6 km2 of brackish/marine waters of the
Taklong Island National Marine Reserve (TINMAR),5 15.8 km2 of
coral reefs, 1.0 km2 of mangroves, and 0.4 km2 of seaweed farms
(UN-OCHA, 2006a). An additional stretch of 74 km covered 2.1 km2
of mangroves and 0.2 km2 of seaweed farms in the towns of
Sibunag and San Lorenzo (Olavario, 2009). About a week thereafter
(Day 26), UN-OCHA raised the number of affected barangays to 46,
involving 30,780 individuals, and added to the list the towns of
Buenavista, and Ajuy and Concepcion in Iloilo (recall Fig. 1). The
added damages to Nueva Valencia, San Lorenzo and Sibunag in
Guimaras and Ajuy in Iloilo involved 0.2 km2 of coral reefs, 8.2 km2
of mangroves and 8.2 km2 of fishponds. The total affected shoreline
4
The Philippine National Oil Company or Petron Corporation is the largest oil
refining and marketing company in the country. Its 180,000 barrel-per-day oil refinery produces a full range of first-rate petroleum products supplying nearly 40% of
the country's total fuel requirements. The company has over 2000 service stations
nationwide and is the largest service station network retailing gasoline, diesel and
kerosene to motorists (Petron Corporation, 2011). Notably, Petron is also 40%
government-owned (40% by Aramco Overseas Company B.V. and 20% by 200,000
individual stockholders) (Petron Corporation, 2006).
5
TINMAR is a marine reserve, mainly of mangroves, comprising of 41 islets with
an area of 11.4 km2.
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
45
Fig. 2. Schematic of the disaster action plan discussed with the Governor and mayors of Iloilo Province on Day 11 (21 August 2006). The plan was envisioned to operate using field
information gathered by media reporters and volunteers. Relief operation is the highest priority action followed by oil recovery/containment. Oil trajectory forecasts prompted
executives to switch position to disaster preparation, identify “calamity areas,” and lobby for the immediate creation of a national task force. Task Force Guimaras soon formed on
Day 13 (Olavario, 2009).
was revised from 313 km to 245 km, but 39 more towns and cities
in the provinces of Guimaras, Iloilo and Negros Occidental were
reported as being threatened by the oil spill (UN-OCHA, 2006b).
The many evolving narratives of the incident had the following
uniform suggestions: a) The actual count of affected individuals
was increasing, b) Nueva Valencia, the second most populous
municipality in Guimaras (NSCB, 2014), sustained the worst impact
affecting 12,600 individuals (2520 families in 11 of 58 barangays),
or almost 40% of the town's population of 31,996 (RDCC-6, 2006;
BFAR, 2005) and c) oil was continually leaking and spreading
away from the sunken vessel. Consequently, it was believed that the
oil spill was yet the worst environmental disaster of the country
(Senate of the Philippines, 2006a,b; Puyat, 2010; Macairan, 2006a).
3.2. Of responders and responses
Immediately on Day 2 (12 August 2006), the PCG activated its
National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP).6 The next day (Day 3),
the PCG conducted an aerial surveillance to confirm the oil spill and
then deployed a vessel with MARPOL and OSRT capabilities.7 By Day
6
Later revised and promulgated in May 2008.
MARPOL (Marine Pollution) is the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution From Ships, the treaty adopted by the International Maritime Organization
or IMO in 1973 and updated in 1978 OSRT is short for Oil Spill Response Training.
(http://www.dnv.com/industry/maritime/servicessolutions/statutoryservices/
marpol/).
4, the PCG had mobilized private contractors to the site of the
incident (Olavario, 2009).
The academe was likewise quick to act. The Oil Spill Program
(OSP) was created by reactivating the same team that responded to
the Semirara incident of 2005. Thus, similarly, the goal was to
restore and improve the marine environment and coastal communities in the affected areas. Within Days 4e10, discussions were
held with the University of the Philippines (UP) System (the only
national university) and the Department of Science and Technology
(DOST). Immediately, site assessment of TINMAR was initiated, and
by Day 11, project proposals were being generated as OSP partnered
with DOST. Proposal preparations lasted until Day 17 (UPV Oil Spill
Program, 2006a). Meanwhile, foreign and local entities, to include
private contractors, were struggling with oil containment and
cleanup, apart from those being led by PNOC (Petron Corporation,
2006).
Yet, there was no realization that the spillage would spread
westward across the Guimaras Strait, until the Provincial government of Iloilo called for a meeting on Day 11. The fortuitous gathering involving town mayors, other officials, PCG, professionals and
media reporters helped shape the thrust of the disaster response
for three pivotal reasons: First, forecasted threats of oil spill to
Iloilo8 convinced executives to shift plans from giving aid to
7
8
Forecasts refer to pollutant trajectories simulated by the author's coastal circulation model developed as a DOST project in 1996 at the Ocean-Weather Laboratory, University of the Philippines Visayas, Iloilo, Philippines.
46
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
Guimaras to disaster preparation, i.e. before oil reaches the shorelines of Iloilo. Vulnerable towns in Iloilo were promptly declared as
“calamity areas.” Second, and more significant, the body lobbied for
the immediate formation of a national task force (next). It was
conceivable that both moves were directed at mobilizing for bigger
contingency funds. Third, executives agreed to adopt a systematic
action plan to effectively deal with the incident. The plan in Fig. 2,
which also appeared in a popular newspaper (Panay News, 2006a),
emphasized relief and oil recovery/containment operations as two
priority actions that, if promptly pursued, could prevent the
widespread consequences of the oil spill.9
On Day 13, indeed, NDCC created Task Force Guimaras to oversee the oil cleanup and retrieval of remaining oil from the sunken
tanker.10 In particular, the mandate was to integrate the following
tasks: strategic communications (led by NDCC), oil spill response
operations (PCG and PNOC), retrieval of oil and sunken vessel
(PNOC), investigation and policy reviews (Department of Transport
and Communications or DOTC), mitigation and restoration of
environment (Department of Environment and Natural Resources
or DENR), early recovery and alternative livelihood (BFAR), reparation and compensation due to economic loss (PNOC), and request
for international assistance (NDCC) (Olavario, 2009). Noticeably,
none of the primary tasks was assigned to DOST being the science
and technology agency. The government advanced $391.39T from
donors to the provincial disaster coordinating councils (PDCCs) of
Guimaras, Negros Occidental and Iloilo to augment their cleanup
funds. In addition, a PCG Rear Admiral was ordered to lead the 11member Special Board of Marine Inquiry (SBMI) to investigate the
~ o and
sinking incident and determine culpability (Avendan
Napallacan, 2006). Overall, it appeared that the necessary responses were covered, at least in principle. However, on Day 14, the
government of Guimaras already threatened SMDC and PNOC with
a class suit, demanding the re-floating of the tanker or suctioning of
the remaining fuel and the shipping out of debris recovered from
coastal cleanup (Pamonag, 2006). Apparently, therefore, NDCC
acted late, notably, even on obtaining foreign assistance on the
crucial oil recovery.
On Day 16, the directives changed. The President declared the oil
spill as a “national calamity,” calling on PNOC and SMDC to deal
with the cleanup while Task Force Guimaras attend to environmental and health issues. The declaration was meant to address
problems on a wider scope of prioritization, and this was necessary
because the ramifications of the oil spill could not be ascertained
for as long as the tanker was submerged. Any use of national government funds was said to be in the form of a cash advance
~ o and Napallacan, 2006).
chargeable to PNOC and SMDC (Avendan
The President further ordered the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
lead the investigation of the liability of PNOC and SDMC (Romero,
2006). Unfortunately, it became apparent that the succeeding efforts would be remedial in nature.
On Day 18, the Philippine Senate activated its Oversight Committee to conduct a parallel investigation of the incident (Senate of
the Philippines, 2006a). The Committee aimed at consolidating the
bills on anti-marine pollution and creating an oil spill liability fund.
Thus, compliance was laid to the 1992 International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation on Oil
Pollution Damage, particularly, to the provisions of the “Ship
9
The plan was also sent on request to The Hon. Secretary of DOE, who led the
initial government delegation in Guimaras.
10
After about a year of existence, Task Force Guimaras was abolished on 09
August 2007 (its functions subsumed by the NDCC) by virtue of Administrative
Order 191 of the Philippine President. The length of service suggests that problems
in the field lasted for a considerable time.
Pollution Prevention Act of 2006” regarding the creation of an Oil
Spill Liability Fund for cleanup and damages claims. As required by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), single hull tankers
were to be phased out starting 2015 (Senate of the Philippines,
2006b). (Much later, on 02 June 2007, the Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007 [RA9483] was passed to impose strict liability for
oil pollution damage and facilitate prompt compensation using
Regional Trial Courts (Congress of the Philippines, 2007).)
Meanwhile, on the same day, the OSP presented its initial
assessment to the Philippine President and immediately secured
approval of its rapid assessment research and 10-year research and
monitoring program. (After a second meeting with the President on
Day 27, funds from the UP System began to arrive on Day 39 (UPV
Oil Spill Program, 2006a,b)). The OSP program proponent was aptly
designated to head the science-based response of Task Force Guimaras. The OSP was presumably the earliest official scienceacademe response to the incident and, remarkably, its long-term
research was approved within only a week of the incident.
On Day 19, the Guimaras government ordered the evacuation of
residents from three southern barangays (Cabalagnan, La Paz, and
Tando). The memorandum order was based on the study by the
Department of Health (DOH) and the UP National Poison Management and Control Center, which found high levels of hydrogen
sulfide, a highly toxic gas that already downed 29 people, including
four children, in the polluted areas (Rivera and DalanginFernandez, 2006). (The evacuation order to 10 badly hit coastal
villages was lifted only on Day 90 (Laude, 2006).)
On Day 27, during the second visit to Guimaras, the President
chaired the NDCC, resulting to a comprehensive update of the
incident. The Office of Civil Defense (head of NDCC), collated the
following data from RDCC-6, Guimaras PDCC, DOH, Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), PNOC, BFAR, DENR, PCG
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Rabonza,
2006): The total affected areas currently stood at 59 barangays
involving 39,004 individuals in all five towns of Guimaras plus the
towns of Ajuy and Concepcion in Iloilo. More towns (38) remained
under threat-1 in Guimaras, 16 in Iloilo and 21 in Negros Occidental.
There were already 607 individuals in eight evacuation centers,
apart from those who opted to stay with relatives. The affected
ecosystems, within a coastal stretch of 234.84 km, comprised of
15.8 km2 of coral reefs, 5.53 km2 of mangroves, 0.58 km2 of seaweeds, 8.24 km2 of fishponds and 11.43 km2 of the DENR marine
reserve, mainly, the TINMAR. DENR's rapid assessment of the loss
from the 3.67 km2 area of Nueva Valencia alone amounted to
$20.92T. Thus, assuming uniform pricing of habitats, the overall
affected area of about 41.58 km2 suffered a loss of $237.06T.
The NDCC report as of Day 29 completed the scenario of the
national disaster response (Rabonza, 2006). The Council pursued
the following action points: a) complete the cleanup, b) recover oil
in the sunken vessel, c) continue cash-for-work (CFW) program,
doubling the daily workers to 1,700, d) continue the scientific
response by the DOST, the academe, and the World Wildlife Fund
for Nature (WWF), e) complete rehabilitation plans in the island, f)
DSWD and PDCC will develop the economic plans, f) DOH will
monitor and treat oil spill related symptoms and diseases, g) IOPCF
will cover damage to property, profit losses, rehabilitation of the
affected areas, and cleanup expenditures, and h) pass a bill on
environmental protection vis-
a-vis oil spills. Details of the relevant
activities can be found in separate PNOC and IOPCF reports (Petron
Corporation, 2006; IOPCF, 2007). Moreover, aside from government
sites, numerous side accounts are compiled online, e.g. at http://
sludge.wordpress.com/.
By Day 39, the oil containment effort had formally failed. The
PCG made the announcement citing reasons that the leak from the
sunken tanker had not been determined. Moreover, the seas were
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
reportedly rough and the area too large for the effective use of spill
booms, which were also inadequate for the purpose. Hence, in a
last-ditch effort to contain the spread of oil, the agency, aided by
private contractors, resorted (again) to spraying large amounts of
chemical dispersants. Spraying was continuous during daytime and
was deemed as the only recourse that could help keep the oil from
reaching the shoreline (Romero, 2006).
Finally, on Day 68, Republic Act 9358 was approved granting a
huge sum of $16.97M (₱867.40M) for the rehabilitation and livelihood projects, in decreasing amounts11: $4.89M each for the LGUs
and DSWD, $2.54M for DENR, $1.96M for DA, $1.28M for other
agencies, $0.98M for UP, and $0.43M for DOH (Congress of the
Philippines, 2006). Immediately noticeable is the relatively low
budget for human health. For instance, in contrast, the much larger
DENR and UP funds of $3.52M was earmarked for restoration and
rehabilitation of natural coastal resources. Funds had not been
actually released as of 14 December 2006 (Alberto, 2006). However,
from barely a quarter of the calamity funds released in 2007, the
largest chunk was still dedicated to research activities (Burgos,
2007a,b, 2008; Olavario, 2009). In fact, succeeding releases till
2009, the “national government calamity fund for the rehabilitation of Guimaras and Iloilo,” were actually spent on rehabilitating
the mangroves in so-called “eco parks” (Business Mirror, 2009). On
top of these was the hint to prolong research studies because experts predicted the recovery of contaminated marine life to last for
10e20 years (Burgos, 2007c; Romero, 2006).12 Therefore, it was
already perceptible that the disaster response would cater to
environmentalism, and on a long-term basis.
Indeed, the following month (Day 109e110), PNOC held a twoday “Scientific Conference” in Iloilo City.13 Supported by WWF,
the academe, NDCC and Task Force SOS, and attended by a hundred
scientists from all over the country, the big meeting aimed at
restoring and rehabilitating the environment and human communities and finalizing a contingency protocol (Petron Corporation,
2006; UPViews, 2006). Two resolutions are discernible: 1) focus
on environmental concerns and 2) another protocol (besides the
NOSCP) incorporating these concerns. It was unclear how these
reflected on the NDCC, Task Force Guimaras (created by NDCC) and
especially PCG, which was concurrently implementing an existing
protocol.
On Day 217 (15 March 2007), about seven months after the
sinking incident, and after two failed negotiations with the Norwegian and Singaporean firms, oil was finally siphoned from the
sunken tanker by the Italian firm Sonsub, which was contracted by
SMDC insurers for a 20-day operation at a cost of $6M. The much
awaited recovery operation, urged nearly a year ago on Day 11
(recall Fig. 2), happened too late for its purpose. Nevertheless, PNOC
had hoped for the outcome to ease down apprehensions in the
region (Yahoo News, 2007).
11
In October 2006, the Philippine Senate approved a ₱1.2B supplemental budget
for 2007 to be used in the rehabilitation. A conversion rate of ₱51.1 ¼ US$1 is used
throughout this study (Asian Development Outlook, 2009), which is comparable to
the rate used by the United Nations of ₱53.3 ¼ $1 (UN-OCHA, 2006a). The insurer,
IOPCF, adopted a lower exchange rate of ₱41.76 ¼ $1 on 31 December 2007 (IOPCF,
2007).
12
The 5-year research program on oil spill impact (UPV-OSP) was planned to end
in 2012 (Ramirez, 2007). Apparently, experts revised their prediction because,
within a year, they found that the mangroves were largely unharmed and recovering naturally (Yender and Lloyd, 2008).
13
PNOC being the owner of the oil cargo “immediately took the responsibility for
restoring the island to its condition Prior to the incident,” led the oil cleanup and
CFW, educational and several livelihood programs, and even sponsored the big
scientific conference (Petron Corporation, 2006). PNOC was frequently in the daily
news.
47
3.3. On external response
Local responders had extensive external assistance. At different
times during the incident, foreign entities extended help to both
the beleaguered government and population of Guimaras. Notably,
the major responders were also influential environment advocates,
and they were extensively involved in the incident. Foreign intervention further proved the country's helplessness against maritime
disasters (Senate of the Philippines, 2006c).
On Day 7, SMDC's foreign insurer sent two British oil experts to
conduct an aerial survey of the extent of oil pollution (Aglionby,
2006). On Day 13, a four-man team from the U.S. Coast Guard and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
arrived to determine the exact location of the tanker and evaluate
possible forms of assistance (Nito, 2006). Eventually, on Day 23, the
Japanese remotely-operated vehicle, Shinsei Maru, located the
sunken tanker. The PCG announced that no bodies were found, the
oil release was minor, and oil sheen spanned only1.5 km from the
tanker. Task Force Guimaras met with Norwegian underwater experts to prepare for recommendations to NDCC (Rabonza, 2006).
The Japanese Coast Guard and Maritime Disaster Prevent Center
likewise dispatched a team to conduct assessment and offer recommendations (UN-OCHA, 2006a).
WWF, a global environment foundation, was extensively
involved in marine work with PNOC, the Department of Energy
(DOE), DENR, PCG, LGUs, NGOs, communities, and academic institutions. News about WWF was sporadic, although its involvement encompassed a variety of activities: rapid damage assessment
of Guimaras, the process to draw up, fund, implement and monitor
medium-term rehabilitation and livelihood initiatives, and the
promotion of prevention-related future options including, but not
limited to, routes of hazardous cargo, enhancement of response at
key local sites and the establishment of a new trust fund that will be
contributed into by oil companies for quick response to oil spills
covering expenses beyond insurance. The Foundation's GIS unit
processed near real-time satellite data for national decision makers.
Additionally, the Foundation was exploring front line alliances with
the Red Cross and Save the Children (UN-OCHA, 2006a).
On Day 9, Greenpeace's ship, M/Y Esperanza, en route to its
“Defending the Oceans” world tour, upon request by the PCG, made
a 3-day side trip to Iloilo to help transport donated relief goods and
oil containment equipment and join the visual survey. The pressure
group also organized volunteers and worked with marine ecologists on oil impact especially to sanctuaries and coastal ecosystems
(Macairan, 2006a). Notably, the group advocated the use of hair and
chicken feathers as oil absorbents via the slogan “hair cut today
could save the environment tomorrow” (Macairan, 2006a). Philippine authorities, notably the city government of Manila, made
repeated appeals to the public to donate the recommended materials. Public response was enthusiastic from, among others, barber
shops, beauty salons, markets, inmates, young students, a hairdressers' association and a beverage company (MSNBC.com News
Services, 2006; Macairan, 2006b).
The UNDP secured $100T for CFW/food-for-work and damage
assessment. It provided technical assistance to PCG on the cleanup
and to DENR on consolidating damage claims and the rehabilitation
of ecosystems (UN-OCHA, 2006a). A UNDP assessment team was
also working alongside with the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF). UNDP helped review alternative livelihood support,
while UNICEF distributed emergency health kits, drugs, waterpurifying tablets and tarpaulins to evacuees (UN-OCHA, 2006b).
The UN-OCHA Joint Environmental Unit and UNOSAT triggered the
International Charter on Space and Major Disasters permitting the
collection and dissemination of satellite images of the disaster area.
UNOSAT monitored the oil slick via satellite and produced the first
48
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
image of the oil spill on Day 14. Thereafter, images were issued to
national authorities, stakeholders and donors (UN-OCHA, 2006a).
The IMO, through the Partnerships for Environmental Management
for the Seas of East Asia (a $16M UNDP program) helped provide
information and technical assistance related to oil containment and
cleanup. The Food and Agricultural Organization offered to hire a
consultant to conduct initial assessment, particularly, on rehabilitation and livelihood strategies (UN-OCHA, 2006a,b). The various
activities of UN agencies and programs were rarely heard and
mainly circulated thru official consular reports which, occasionally,
appeared online.
3.4. Pandora's box of issues
Indeed, the disaster response was colorful. For one, issues
emerged almost simultaneously with every form of response.
Eventually, the mismatch between the priority needs of the victims
and the many responses stacked more problems and issues on top
of the on-going disaster. A rundown of these issues will help
portray the chaos (see also Table 1).
The oil spill was not exactly as told by authorities. Their optimistic
reports tended to mask the impacts of the incident creating suspicions including media bribe (Delilan, 2006; Gomez, 2006). There
were apprehensions of a gag order to control the situation especially
that the publicized release of conflicting information interfered with
on-going efforts on rehabilitation and eco-tourism. Consequently,
the RDCCs were barred from issuing statements about the oil spill, a
decision thought of as ill-advised and only exacerbated fears and the
prevailing negative public perception. In particular, the PCG, a
working agency in the field, was precluded from issuing updates, the
task subsumed instead by the NDCC (Espina, 2006a; Manila Standard
Today, 2006; Guinto, 2006). On top of this predicament, politics were
hampering the relief operations (Sinay, 2006b).
Controversies arose from the cleanup, containment and recovery
operations. Hair and feathers were already being utilized in oil spill
booms as advocated by Greenpeace, and DOST's reaction was to
Table 1
The more prominent responders and the issues, listed chronologically as they, more or less, first appeared in the news (Day 1 refers to the tanker incident of 11 August 2006).
The chaotic situation is evidenced by the preponderance of issues (not necessarily in direct correspondence with the responders). Note that the responses were only more
frequent during the first two weeks of the incident. The specific law on damages claims was enacted nearly a year thereafter on Day 295. The aftermath of lingering issues on
litigations, irregularities and continuing (long-term) research projects indicates that the affected population remained indefinitely as the victims. Due to ambiguous dates,
among others, the DOH, private donors, international donors and responders, and the litigations are excluded from the list.
Responders
PNOC, media
PCG
Academe (OSP, research proposal), private contractors (cleanup)
SDMC insurer (survey assistance from foreign experts)
Iloilo Province (the crucial meeting), DOST-Academe (partnership)
NDCC (Task Force Guimaras)
Guimaras Province (class suit)
Day
1
2
4
7
9
11
13
14
15
President (first field visit, “National Calamity,” change of directives)
Senate (parallel probe)
16
18
Guimaras Province (evacuation)
19
22
President (second field visit, NDCC official update)
27
28
29
30
32
33
PCG (declares failed oil containment); UP system (funds OSP)
Congress (2006 supplemental appropriation-₱867.40M)
PNOC (big conference)
SDMC (contracts Italian firm to siphon oil)
Congress (Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007)
39
68
102
106
109
111
159
196
217
218
295
363
478
Beyond
Issues
oil spillage and cleanup issues
some aids divert to unaffected areas
proposals for research projects
WWF condemns dispersants
authorities confiscate PNOC power sprayers
government realizes oil spill threat to Iloilo
late action; foreign aid on oil recovery wanting
government threatens to sue SMDC and PNOC
criticism of mangroves cleanup; Senate finds irregularities on
tanker/crew, PNOC, SDMC, MARINA; sluggish action on oil leakage
oil spill publicity escalates
“hairy” solution and DOST criticized; Petron is 40% government-owned;
Semirara oil spill investigators criticize MARINA and PCG
high levels of hydrogen sulfide cause evacuations
politics/control of reliefs and operations; early practical advice-humans
over research activites
President, PNOC (optimitic declarations)
news of media bribe; sluggish government action on tanker recovery;
PNOC denies bribing media
gag order; barring of PCG and RDCCs; government denies media bribe;
questions on PNOC's commitment
sluggish government action on cleanup; lawmaker criticizes the
sluggish ₱2B release
PNOC hires laborers directly; distribution of CFW funds; channeling
of funds irks Guimaras government
Guimaras Province halts manual cleanup by affected residents,
demands for gears; high official claims minimal leaks
dispersants as PCG last-ditch effort; oil containment and anomaly;
rumor-mongering
“wrestle” for the big funds
barge carrying last batch of oiled debris sinks
PNOC denies hiring sunken barge
“experts” still clueless on costing damages
Guimaras Governor makes known his separate plans for his province
12-week time frame of payments by IOPCF
₱800M for rehabilitation wanting; Guimaras still awaits funds for
rehabilitation
(Norwegian then Singaporean transactions fail)
Italian firm finally siphons oil from sunken tanker, recovers barely 0.5% of oil cargo
the law late and ineffective (even in the case of the next 2013 Estancia oil spill);
many other relevant laws exist, but not only applied
payments of damages claims; doubtful claims; payment biases and conflicts
IOPCF rejects 80.63% of claims application; of the total ₱908M
compensation-80.88% goes to mangroves and reservation areas,
only 0.31% to human victims
litigations; news of irregularities; long-term research projects continues
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
dispose of the same through burning as alternative fuel (Romero,
2006). Although public response to Greenpeace's “hair” campaign
slogan was phenomenal, eventually, the “hairy” idea (Macairan,
2006a,b; MSNBC.com News Services, 2006) was widely criticized
due to the non-biodegradability of the materials, plus the foul smell
that they generate when incinerated. Meanwhile, after weeks of
spraying oiled waters with dispersants, more influential nonprofits
like WWF questioned the PCG and PNOC about the hazards posed
by their cleanup method to human health and the environment (e.g.
Yan, 2006). Cautioned by the findings of Silliman University against
the use of chemicals in cleanup, DOST echoed the hazards associated
with dispersants (Flores, 2006). Eventually, responding to widening
protests, law enforcement agencies began confiscating PNOC's power sprayers (Sinay, 2006a). By Day 33, the Guimaras government
also halted the manual cleanup by 1459 residents of 11 affected
coastal villages, demanding that PNOC must provide first for the
protective gears prescribed by DOH (Burgos, 2006a). Regarding oil
recovery, public unrest and apprehension of leaks from the unrecovered tanker were being confounded by inconsistent scientific
claims on the degree of oil impact to habitats, for instance, a high
official's claim of a reduced leak (5 L/h) based only on a robotic
survey (Espina, 2006b). The unrelenting clamors for the unconditional removal of the vessel directly contradicted PNOC's pronouncements that the worst was over (Gomez, 2006). There were
still issues on what method to use: siphoning, re-floating of the
tanker, or cementing it to its current location (Espina, 2006c). In fact,
the recovery effort began already five months into the incident and
with much difficulty-two failed transactions with a Norwegian and
~ o, 2006) before an Italian firm
then Singaporean companies (Grin
siphoned the remaining oil from the tanker (Yahoo News, 2007). At
last, only 9 m3 (9000 L) of oil was recovered, i.e. barely 0.5% of the
tanker cargo (Gomez and Burgos, 2007; Olavario, 2009). Regardless,
PNOC announced that it was already completing the second phase
of its cleanup, which was to ferry out the collected oiled debris
~ o, 2006; Solinap, 2006). Then, suddenly, another bad luck-On
(Grin
Day 102 (20 November 2006), the barge carrying the last 59,000
sacks of debris sank (5 km off Misamis Oriental). PNOC denied hiring
the barge (Philippine Star, 2006), which allegedly sailed against PCG
advice (Bondoc, 2006), but it appeared that the country's attempt at
mitigating its worst environmental disaster already spawned
another catastrophe of its own (Mariano, 2006). Indeed, oil spills
kept occurring, one after another, as if there were no lessons learned
(Ombion and Lachica, 2006; Salamat, 2013).
Furthermore, on the cleanup, PNOC's financial help to Guimaras
was not being channeled through the provincial administration but
elsewhere, through other agencies like DSWD and DOH. PNOC
likewise directly hired daily laborers to clean the beaches and also
paid them directly. These protocols were perceived as humiliating
yet, on one hand, and any delay on assistance also spawned suspicions of bribery (Panay News, 2006b). A circulating suspicion was
that matters could not be sorted out because the government owns
40% of PNOC's assets (Petron Corporation, 2006; Romero, 2006).
PNOC's commitment to help the victims and rehabilitate Guimaras
was finally questioned (Panay News, 2006c).
Even the probes into the incident were laden with issues.
Summing up the Senate press release of Day 15 (25 August 2006):
The tanker was overloaded at the time of the incident. The captain
of the vessel did not have a safety training certificate; the same was
suspected of his crew. These were not revealed either by SMDC
(ship owner) or PNOC (cargo owner). As the agency (under DOTC)
that oversees the development, promotion and regulation of the
maritime industry in the country, the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) was aware that MT Solar 1 was an aging converted
vessel, initially a tanker in 1988 that changed names and classification several times ever since. Further, the tanker was one of three
49
vessels acquired in 2001, only a year after SMDC was incorporated;
thus, it was puzzling how a corporation with a paid up capital of
only $0.20M acquired all three vessels. Another body must assume
the investigation because, by allowing the registration of a badly
modified vessel, MARINA cannot remain as the investigator, judge
and executioner at the same time.14 “Floating coffins” could still be
sailing the Philippine waters; the incident was abetted by neglect
and corruption, the worst kind in the world (Senate of the
Philippines, 2006a). A history of the formal complaints is logged
in Philippine Senate Resolution 138 (Senate of the Philippines,
2007). Notably, three cabinet secretaries (DND, DENR and DOTC)
did not appear in the Senate hearing of 28 August 2006 until
threatened by arrest (Labog-Javellana, 2006).
In addition, by Day 18, the same team that investigated the 2005
Semirara oil spill concluded about the lack of preparedness and
limited capability of government agencies in dealing with major oil
spills. In particular, MARINA and PCG failed to anticipate better
measures since the Semirara incident (Senate of the Philippines,
2006b). In general, it was unclear how the promulgated law, the
Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007, actually worked, even in
the case of the more recent incident in Estancia, which sustained
damages due to 200,000 L of oil spilled from the National Power
Barge at the height of typhoon Yolanda (Burgos, 2013). In fact, there
was no dearth of pollution laws prior to the Guimaras incident,15
notably, the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA9275) and the
Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 (PD979), which deals specifically
with marine pollution.
Certainly, there were criticisms of scientific and political nature,
particularly, regarding the excessive attention on mangroves. Only
a week after the incident, among others, a rehabilitation expert
already ridiculed the cleaning of mangroves as a waste of time
because they act as natural traps and filters of pollutants, and no
amount of cleansing could bring oil-covered trees back to life (Villa,
2006). Apparently, the clamors were disregarded, and the scientific
conference of November 2006 continued pushing for rapid habitat
assessment and rehabilitation (UPViews, 2006). Yet, banking on 101
experts, 180 stakeholders, 43 paper presentations, and all the assessments reports to include those prepared by DENR, BFAR and the
universities (Rivera, 2006), still the big meeting could not solve its
puzzle: experts were still “clueless” and groping for the actual
damage and cost of rehabilitation. The Guimaras Governor was not
around during the press meeting and alleged to have separate plans
for his province, which could just be “enriched by the scientific
data” (Angelo, 2006). A range of political/legal issues already
emerged including the competition and control of relief operations
(Sinay, 2006b), distribution of CFW funds (Panay News, 2006b), oil
spill publicity (Villanueva, 2006; Dalipe, 2006; Galford, 2006;
Guinto, 2006), “oil spill fund” anomaly (Hibionada, 2009),
“rumor-mongering” (Balnig, 2006), delayed release of $15.66M
rehabilitation funds16 (Espina, 2007), and even the diversion of
funds to unaffected areas (Burgos, 2006b). In fact, within a month
of the incident, many sectors were already clamoring about the
snail-paced government action especially on the oil leakage and
14
The deputy administrator of MARINA was also Vice Chair of the PCG's SBMI. The
11-member SBMI was chaired by the PCG and had as representatives the Philippine
Ports Authority, the Professional Regulation Commission, master mariners, chief
~ o and Salaverria, 2006).
engineers and lawyers (Avendan
15
Among other relevant laws: PD 1067 (Water Code), PD 856 (Sanitation Code),
RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act), RA 8749 (Clean Air Act), RA
9003 (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act), PD 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy of 1977), RA 7586 (National Integrated Protected Areas System Act), and RA
8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code).
16
The equivalent of about ₱800M and which could be alluding to the more accurate figure by the Congress of the Philippines (2006) of ₱867.40M or $16.97M.
50
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
human sufferings (ABS-CBN News, 2006; Ho et al., 2006; Espina,
2006c). A lawmaker complained of the slow implementation of
the 2007 national supplemental budget of $39.14M, supposedly for
the Guimaras population and the rehabilitation of ravaged areas
(Dalipe, 2006). Particularly, the Guimaras administration was
waiting for the release of $15.66M promised for the rehabilitation
(Espina, 2007). The plethora of political and environmental issues
already eclipsed the plight of the real victims of the catastrophe
(Panay News, 2006d).
Meantime, thousands of residents were demanding for damages
compensation (Sinay, 2007a,b). However, there was no livelihood
plan or any alternative agenda on lost incomes. A method of costing
damages appeared only a year after the incident (Ramirez, 2007) and
without indications that it actually found use in claims settlement.
Consequently, desperate claimants embraced prevailing offers (Sinay,
2007a,b), a recourse that encouraged biases and further conflicts in
payments. Other issues involved the case of non-fishermen victims,
the inadmissibility of “intangibles,” and the 12-week time frame
adopted by IOPCF in estimating lost incomes (Panay News, 2007).
These worsened by 31 December 2007, when the IOPCF rejected
80.63% of the total 146,280 claims applications. Further, of the 28,339
approved cases, 98% was strictly limited to fishing (capture fisheries,
mariculture, and paraphernalia) and only 2% to relief assistance,
which was further restricted to 5400 most adversely affected
households. Overall, direct human assistance consumed only 0.31% of
the total compensation of $17.77M (₱908.12M), in startling contrast
to the huge 80.88% that was spent on cleaning the mangroves and
reservation areas (IOPCF, 2007, p. 106e115; Sinay, 2007a). Hundreds
of disgruntled victims opted for litigation.
Finally, adding complications, foreigners intervened in or
dabbled with internal affairs. In particular, the so-called “international advisors” went to the extent of downplaying the roles of the
local DOH and the media (Yender and Lloyd, 2008) that were, in
fact, much earlier on the scene and more directly in touch with the
affected population. Further, undisputed, influential environment
groups left extensive imprints on the overall disaster response (cf.
UN-OCHA, 2006a).
On the other hand, certain allegations were categorically denied
citing the possibility of misinterpreting reports or simply because
the net consequence of conflicting reports were no longer painting
a positive picture of the recovery of Guimaras (Delilan, 2006;
Legaspi, 2006; Manila Standard Today, 2006).
3.5. A disaster analysis
Two priority actions are imperative at the onset of an oil spill:
relief and oil recovery operations (recall Fig. 2). Relief operation is
necessary by the time the news scare of an oil catastrophe begins
disrupting people's livelihood. The response becomes critical if oil
spillage is not promptly contained. Certainly, recovery operation is
most crucial because, once it fails, containment will turn increasingly difficult. Neither of the crucial responses was successfully
implemented in the case of Guimaras. Yet, the literature is replete
with protocols built from a history of more than a hundred oil spill
cases, about a dozen of which have been dubbed as “large” events.
NOAA alone has comprehensive online guides (plus links) on
disaster response (Jeansonne, 2010).
The PCG promptly activated NOSCP on Day 2, surveyed the area
on Day 3, and immediately sent out a MARPOL and OSRT capable
vessel to contain the spill. Unfortunately, the necessary tools,
materials and supplies were inadequate, the reason why private
contractors were also mobilized to the incident area. It could be
that the magnitude of spillage was not anticipated but, in either
case, some knowledge of oil trajectories was indispensable in
tracking the movement of pollutants, before they landed onshore.
Ironically, the Iloilo provincial government finally learned about
early trajectory forecasts, but it was already Day 11. By then,
powered by wind-driven currents, the spillage had begun to
contaminate the Guimaras coastlines and threatened to cross the
channel towards Iloilo. Simply, the government response was late,
and it remains a puzzle why obtaining foreign assistance to
promptly contain the spillage was late as well.
Indeed, Task Force Guimaras only formed on Day 13. By Day 16,
when a “national calamity” was declared, there was already the
admission that the oil spill impacts could not be ascertained because
the vessel was still under sea. This was seconded on Day 39, when
the PCG conceded failure of containing the spillage for reasons that
the leak had not also been clarified. In short, the spillage was already
unstoppable. Indeed, oil retrieval materialized only in 2007; it was
no longer of any consequence to the pollution problem other than to
insinuate that most of the oil in the tanker was already gone.
The crucial science input, e.g. oil trajectory forecasts, was wanting.
Yet, experts swiftly catered to assessment studies and habitat
(mangrove) rehabilitation. In effect, public attention detoured from
the relief operations. Thus, though the needs of the victims were
mandated of Task Force Guimaras, in reality, the relief efforts were
turning inadequate. The task force itself was not only late on the
scene, but it was also redirected to refocus on cleanup, mainly, of oiled
mangrove areas. On top of the predicament, influential environmentoriented entities were applying pressures, interventions, and they
were extensively involved in both ground activities and top policy
decisions. While helpful, foreign assistance was, at the same time, a
complication to the overall disaster response.
The emergent policy focus was made apparent when Republic
Act 9358 spelled out the budget allocations-in essence, human
victims had to share the big funds with habitat rehabilitation.
Thus, the disaster response officially acquired an environment
thrust that was high priority and, worse, persistent and lasting.
Indeed, a cursory historical analysis of three consecutive oil spill
incidents, the Semirara incident of 2005 (Magramo, 2007), Guimaras of 2006 and Estancia of 2013 (e.g. Burgos, 2013), revealed
that mangroves have consistently been a focal point, remarkably,
even amidst the vastly catastrophic typhoon Yolanda in 2013
(USAID, 2014).
There were non-trivial contraindications to mangrove rehabilitation. First, a scientific uncertainty occurred that already
obliged Task Force Guimaras to suspend cleanups for at least three
months just to give time for debating parties to determine the
safest method of mangrove decontamination (Labiste, 2006).
Second, paradoxically, by 2007, little cleanup actually happened
because monitoring by experts revealed that the mangroves were
recovering naturally with minor mortality (less than 1.5% or ~510
trees). The mortality further decreased to only 0.168% by October
2007 (Ramirez, 2007). Thus, the hysteric cleanup died down with
the realization that the mangroves were not truly a matter of prime
exigency (cf. Villa, 2006). Third, the mangrove experts and international advisors concurred that monitoring and natural recovery
was the best response strategy for oiled mangroves, followed by
restoration, if needed (Yender and Lloyd, 2008), coincidentally,
repeating the advice given only weeks of the tanker incident
(Panay News, 2006a,d):
“… a common sense approach … Just clean enough, and allow
some mangroves to die if they must e they have served their
good purposes … allow nature to do the rest of your job … afterwards, when there is an opportunity, plant new trees …”
It was ironical that an old advice found use a month ahead of the
formal protocols on assessments, monitoring and rehabilitation
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
(Yender and Lloyd, 2008; NDCC, 2006). Finally, the disappointing
indication was that the many experts of the national conference
went home “clueless” about the damages and cost of rehabilitation
(Angelo, 2006; Rivera, 2006; UPViews, 2006). Their “cluelessness”
was a vital cue for re-thinking actions but, apparently, it was
ignored.
Two years later, the dusts cleared showing an enduring
dismal condition. First, the water conditions were still far from
normal: The averaged oil concentration of 31.54 mg/l at 13
coastal stations in August 2006 decreased to 9.45 mg/l (30% of
previous value), as measured at 11 stations in MayeJune 2008
(Lipayon, 2008).17 Only one station registered a near normal
value of 2 mg/l to 3 mg/l (6.3e9.5%) (EMB, 1990, 2006). Traces of
oil were still visible in several places as evidenced by residual
hydrocarbons (Pahila et al., 2010) and biota indicators (Subong,
2011). Non-normal conditions persisted for another three years
(Fernandez, 2011). Second, the PCG recovered barely 0.5% of the
oil cargo (Gomez and Burgos, 2007), yet the costly recovery
operation (Petron Corporation, 2006) did not confirm the details of the spillage. Finally, according to PNOC, payments for
Guimaras claimants were made in March 2007 and partially for
Iloilo claimants in the second week of April 2007 (Petron
Corporation, 2006). However, these did not cause relief on the
part of claimants. Stressing government neglect, an exasperated
priest exclaimed (Sinay, 2007a), “From the beginning, I know
these people (from the IOPCF) will never compensate …
maximum amount. They haggled to the lowest bargain until we
just collapse in exasperation.” In startling contrast, in January
2007, P105M of PNOC's P122M expenses as of 31 December
2006 was already refunded by IOPCF.18 People were dismayed
that the rehabilitation efforts did nothing to the affected population any more than the mangroves (cf. Punongbayan, 2010;
Reyes et al., 2010). It is mind-boggling, but the priority
response to the disaster was no longer about people but mainly
about eco-tourism and marine life. The hapless victims were
riddled by more issues than when the incident started. Life
according to the victims will never be the same (Alimen and
Alimen, 2013).
Two simple surveys will clarify the relationship between
priority needs and disaster response. The data in Fig. 3 were
obtained from 89 informants, turned interview respondents, who
were asked to list down the priority needs of affected families in
Guimaras. A total enumeration of 414 formed the basis of categorization. The priority needs fall under eight categories and are
basic in nature. Within a week of the incident, field reports were
still describing more coherently about the basic needs being also
the regular topics of radio and television newscasts. Small individual donors were particularly attentive to these, as they offered
hints of what could serve as useful donations. Mainly, the needs
of the victims resulted from the disruption of their means of
livelihood (economic dislocation), jointly caused by pollution of
the coasts and the scare created by the rapidly spreading news of
devastation. In similar manner, other means of livelihood were
disrupted, including those not directly dependent on the coastal
resources. Moreover, because the oil pollutants and associated
fumes were considered as health hazards, health threats obliged
the massive evacuation of the affected families (physical dislocation), creating a new set of needs. On the other hand, Fig. 4
shows the result of the news survey of the corresponding
disaster response. A total tally (338) was made of the daily radio
17
Official measurements were conducted by the Laboratory Services Section of
the Environmental Management Bureau of DENR.
18
PNOC filed a total claim of ₱188M against the IOPCF (Petron Corporation, 2006).
51
Fig. 3. The 8 priority needs of the affected families in Guimaras as determined from a
chance interview of 89 informants. The respondents gave an average maximum of 4
enumerations. Plotted categories are percentages of the total 414 enumerations. The
priority needs of the affected families are basic with relief items being the topmost
priority.
and television news topics for the period from Day 4 to Day 39,
and the data was utilized to establish the response categories.
The bar charts were artificially scaled to match the earlier figure
for direct comparisons. Immediately noticeable in Figs. 3 and 4 is
the fact that the priority needs (8) were matched by responses,
only that there were far more responses (22) than absolutely
needed. This situation “diluted” the priority response as shown
by the decimation of percentages originally assigned to priority
needs into other “less priority” needs. The categories on “Scientific/Technical Activities” and “Popular Controversies” are among
those that significantly consumed the redistributed percentages.
In effect, therefore, the disaster response shifted from the basic
needs towards scientific and other concerns that were, in fact,
predominantly about the environment.
Fig. 4. The 22 forms of disaster response derived from a daily log of 338 news topics
aired over 3 radio and 1 television stations for the period from Day 4 to Day 39. Plotted
values (%) were artificially nudged by a factor of 1.22 in order to match those in Fig. 3.
Nudging allowed a direct comparison of the two sets of bar charts without distorting
the essential information from the data. Note the correspondence of the lower bar
charts in the two figures. However, relief items are no longer the topmost priority.
Several other priorities emerged, notably, “Scientific/Technical Activities.”
52
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
3.6. Forcing by global environmentalism
Thanks to global warming,19 the costliest and most controversial
issue of all time (e.g. Weart, 2003), voluminous materials now exist
elucidating on the various facets of environment advocacy, which
underlay the Guimaras oil spill response. Mainly espoused by international and local organizations, or nonprofits, environmental
crusades apply relentless pressures on governments to take proactive actions against unknown e versus actual e dangers to the
environment which, in the case of global warming, are depicted as
impending worldwide holocausts. Worse, humans are being
blamed as culprits (e.g. Snodgrass, 2012).
Environmentalism is an overpowering foreign imposition that has
been shown to impact the Philippine society mainly because of ini~ a,
tiatives from key sectors-the government and intellectuals (Balen
2012). Success is reflected in no less than Republic Act 9512 s.2008
(Environment Awareness and Education Act of 2008), which stipulates “the vital roles of the Filipino youth and environmental awareness and education in national development” (Congress of the
Philippines, 2008). But with success comes adversity. In the case of
climate change advocacy, Republic Act 9729 s.2009 (Climate Change
Act of 2009) quickly followed mandating the incorporation of climate
change in children's curricula (Congress of the Philippines, 2009). This
was in accord with Agenda 21 of the United Nations but, sadly, not
with reality. For one, elementary educators are non-specialists and ill~ a, 2012; cf.
prepared to teach the subject to young children (Balen
Michaels, 2007, p. 22). More worrisome is the impact of highly
controversial ideas. Strong countries like Britain had successfully
shielded their young from the negative facet of propaganda, but the
same is being securely entrenched in the Philippines (cf. The Lord
Monckton Foundation, 2012; Dimmock v. Secretary of State for
Education and Skills, 2007; Sheppard, 2009).
Nonprofits are conceivably for good purposes, yet many are
aggressive influencers of environmentalism, and they are not
exempt from criticisms (ADB, 2007; Fortes, 2000; Riedmiller, 2000;
Wiener, 2000; Gomez, 1999; Edwards, 1998). A major concern is
that they are hardly scrutinized and that their free form (selfregulation) is potential to abuse (ADB, 1999; Runyan, 1999; Kandy,
1997). Hawks (1997) even puts forward the bold idea that “doing
good deeds has become big business,” revealing that nonprofits
merely transformed into a fast growing industry controlling assets
in excess of a trillion dollars. There is no similar critical study in the
country, but the quite recent pork barrel scandal, involving lawmakers, executives and bogus nonprofits (e.g. Mangahas, 2012)
should be sufficient a motivation to probe into the accounting and
accountability of advocacy/pressure groups (cf. Tilt, 2005).
Remarkably, the number of nonprofits in the Philippines has been
estimated to be at 500,000 (ADB, 2007),20 i.e. roughly one organization for every 150 Filipinos. They greatly outnumber the barangays (42,028), but hardly 1% of them are perceived as truly
“development-oriented” (ADB, 1999, 2007; NSCB, 2014).
Moreover, global impositions succeed because the nation has
developed resilience from its long history of foreign domination.
Centuries of imperialism already destroyed traditional institutions
and ways of thinking, replacing them with habits and mentality,
mainly, of the western world (cf. Mastanduno, 2008). The same
contributed to the formation of weak, subservient values that
renders the Philippine society susceptible to further interventions
19
Anthropogenic Global Warming or Climate Change, which context already
departed from the pure scientific study of climate.
20
Only a fraction of 500,000 are registered as non-stock, nongovernment institutions. Among those citing the figure is Mayan Quebral, Executive Director,
Venture for Fundraising (www.allavida.org/alliance/mar04b.html) (ADB, 2007).
or abuse (cf. De la Cruz, 2012). Colonial mentality (internal
oppression) and subservience have an indelible historical basis (cf.
David, 2011, 2012; Quito, 1994; De la Cruz, 2012; Dancel (2005);
Gripaldo, 2009), and their net effect is glaringly significant: Since
1521,21 less than about 15% of Philippine history can be considered
as truly Filipino (De la Cruz, 2012). Therefore, it is no wonder that
foreign advocacies in the country proceed hardly opposed. Recent
examples are the adoption of the K-12 curriculum (Congress of the
Philippines, 2013) and the no less controversial move by academic
elites to embrace an international calendar (Diola, 2014).
3.7. Conclusion
Response to the Guimaras oil spill began with a poorly organized
ensemble of responders. Nationwide centralization proved effective as demonstrated by the creation of a national task force and the
personal intervention by the President. Unfortunately, both moves
were late. Additionally, the late foreign assistance on the oil recovery proved fatal to the containment response. Existing legislations were abundant but likewise ineffective. The incident
highlighted not just the absence of an effective contingency plan
but the lack of serious attention to it. Apparently, the sole legacy
from the previous Semirara incident was the mangroves response.
Guimaras' population of 162,943 subsists on tourism, fruit processing, coconut processing, fish farming, handicrafts making, mining, quarrying and lime production (NSCB, 2014; Alimen and Alimen,
2013). Informants revealed that the average family income in 2006 of
about $127.20/mo (₱6.50T/mo) barely met the minimum prescribed
by law for individual income (NWPC, 2010) and far less than the actual
national family average of $282.13/mo (National Statistic Office,
2009).22 Survey respondents further revealed that only about 28% of
55 means of livelihood is able to generate earnings exceeding the
average family income. Guimaras is basically agricultural and has
remained a Category IV province in terms of revenue (NSCB, 2014).
Accordingly, the needs and expectations of the affected residents were simple and well defined-their economic and physical
dislocations redounded only to demands for basic items such as
food, safe drinking water, shelter, medical attention and, certainly,
any substitute for lost livelihood. The population had constant
anxieties about these, as to when help would come, and until when
help would last. Unfortunately, human welfare was not as conspicuous as the promotion of marine habitats.
The government banked on a science-based response to the
incident only that experts pursued an environmental agenda that,
in turn, competed with the plans for relief operations. Espoused by
influential nonprofits and the academe, environmental concerns
intensified until they masked the plight of the oil spill victims.
There was comprehensible politics, but the wrestle for funds ended
with definite gains for habitat rehabilitation and eco-tourism. Thus,
“history repeats itself.” Indeed, the mangrove (environment)
response was found as the commonality that threads through the
Semirara, Guimaras and Estancia23 incidents; mangroves had
become a byword for oil spill. Policy regulation is imperative,
especially in times of calamities, but three oil spill experiences
already suggest implausibility. Beyond 2006 were only rippling
news of litigations, irregularities, and continuing (long-term)
research projects.
21
Year of discovery of the Philippine islands by Ferdinand Magellan, a
Portuguese-born Spanish explorer.
22
The minimum wage law specifies a monthly range of ₱6,690 e ₱7,950 or an
average of ₱7,320 (~$143) (NWPC, 2010).
23
The most recent news about the investigations of the oil spill still focuses on
mangroves and cleanup.
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
It sounds unpalatable, but still it is hard to imagine what sort of
regulation, debate or plain critical opinion will actually thrive in an
overpowering atmosphere of environmentalism. The environment
crusade is welcome in the country and lingers as an effective societal force. As a foreign imposition, the nation has tolerance for it,
intellectuals espouse it, and the government enacts laws to protect
it. In fact, the government leads a relentless promotion, to illustrate,
the World Water Day (March), Earth Day (April), Environment
Month (June)24 (EMB, 2014; Sallave, 2014), etc. A Filipino born since
the enactment of Republic Act 9512 is likely to acquire an imbalanced perception of his society as Republic Acts 9729 further
nudges his education towards environmental advocacy. Therefore,
it is imperative for the government to re-think policy review and
evaluation because the crusade has turned adverse, and its gains
have neither been evident nor tangible. In the main, the nation will
benefit from being cautious of its precious assets, how to conserve
and protect them, inasmuch as certain “non-priorities” may
consume them.
Sadly, in times of calamities, poorly equipped nations are the
same ones plagued by problems related to policy focus, compensation (cf. Adewale, 1989) or funds allocation (cf. Doocy et al., 2006).
Acknowledgment
Many good-natured fellows offered assistance to this study in
several ways, most significantly, as key informants and respondents
to a casual survey. Interactions with lawyers, media reporters and
field contacts resulted to a comprehensive understanding of the
incident and situation in Guimaras. Atty. Myra Duremdes and law
firm colleagues were simply generous of their time and factual
materials about the oil spill. Mr. Tadeo Portal helped validate model
trajectories by confirming the appearance of oil pollutants at
several coastal towns. Meetings with the K-11 ecumenical group led
by Msgr. Meliton Osu clarified issues pertinent to, among others,
the tanker incident, the investigations, litigations, cleanup and relief efforts. The NDCC Chair was guest in one of the meetings. The
Governor and town mayors of the Province of Iloilo were very accommodating during the conference of 21 August 2006; they
magnanimously welcomed all forms of advice and critical suggestions. A meeting with the Mayor of Nueva Valencia and staff proved
valuable in verifying the status of the most distressed victims. Prof.
Victor N. de Jonge was most patient and understanding of the
intermittent preparation of this manuscript. Comments from two
anonymous reviewers greatly improved the presentation. There
were many other concerned but nameless individuals, who aided in
the research. This study is dedicated to them, the hapless victims of
the oil spill, and the unsung volunteers, who epitomized genuine
relief operation. All forms of assistance are gratefully
acknowledged.
References
ABS-CBN News, 2006 (09 September). Guimaras Residents Hit Sluggish Cleanup.
Manila,
Philippines.
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storyPage.aspx?
storyId¼49907 (accessed 10.06.11.).
Adewale, O., 1989. Oil spill compensation claims in Nigeria: principles, guidelines
and criteria. J. Afr. Law 33 (1), 91e104.
Aglionby, J., 2006 (18 August). Philippines Appeals for Help with Oil Spill. The
Guardian, London. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/aug/18/
internationalnews.pollution (accessed 21.06.14.).
Alberto, A., 2006 (14 December). 4 Months After the Oil Spill Still No Funds for
Guimaras Rehabilitation, Say Officials. INQ7.net, Manila, Philippines. http://
24
Proclamation No. 1149, s.1973: The 5th day of June was declared on 01 June
1973 as World Environment Day, in consonance with the UN General Assembly's
Resolution No. 2994, dated 15 December 1972.
53
www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page¼news5_dec15_2006
(accessed
12.05.11.).
Alimen, R., Alimen, M.C., 2013. The after effects of oil spill in Guimaras. Int. J. Mar.
Ecol. 1, 1e21.
Angelo, F., 2006 (29 November). Experts Still ‘clueless’ on Oil Spill Damage, Rehab.
The Guardian Iloilo, Iloilo City, Philippines. http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/
bac/2006/11/29/news/scientists.can.t.ascertain.timetable.for.rehabilitation.of.
guimaras.html (accessed 10.05.11.).
Asian Development Outlook, 2009. Table of Comparison: Asian Countries Exchange
Rates over the Recent Past. http://www.business-in-asia.com/asia/asia_
exchange_rate.html (accessed 20.05.11.).
Asian Development Bank, 2007. Overview of NGOs and Civil Society e Philippines.
Manila, p. 12. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Civil-Society-Briefs/PHI/
CSB-PHI.pdf (accessed 11.01.12.).
Asian Development Bank, 1999. A Study of NGOs-Philippines. Manila, p. 71. http://
www.adb.org/NGOs/docs/NGO Philippines.pdf (accessed 11.01.12.).
~ o, C., Napallacan, J., 2006 (26 August). National Calamity Declared. PhilAvendan
ippine Daily Inquirer. Manila, Philippines. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/
article-1G1-150160886/natl-calamity-declared.html (accessed 08.02.13.).
~ o, C., Salaverria, L., 2006 (24 August). Who Will Pay? Gov't Forms Body to
Avendan
Probe Sinking. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Manila, Philippines. http://www.
inquirer.net/specialreports/theenvironmentreport/view.php?
db¼1&article¼20060824-16965 (accessed 25.02.13.).
~ a, R., 2012 (October). Impacts of Global Warming Advocacy on the Philippine
Balen
Educational System: the Case of Elementary School Educators. Unpublished
Doctor of Education (Curriculum, Instruction and Evaluation) Dissertation. West
Visayas State University, Iloilo City, Philippines, p. 288.
Balnig, J., 2006 (18 September). Governor Vows to File Libel for Petron Rumormongering. http://sludge.wordpress.com/2006/09/18/governor-vows-to-filelibel-for-petron-rumor-mongering/. Previous link. http://www.sunstar.com.
ph/static/ilo/2006/09/18/news/governor.vows.to.file.libel.for.oil.dispersant.
issue.html (accessed 06.07.14.).
Bondoc, J., 2006 (24 November). Defying Law and Logic. Philippine Star, Manila,
Philippines.
http://www.philstar.com/philstar/NEWS200611242603.htm
(accessed 04.05.11.).
Bowers, J., 1997. Sustainability and Environmental Economics: an Alternative Text.
Addison Wesley Longman, Singapore, Harlow.
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), 2005. Municipal Fisheries Profile
e Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. BFAR-6, Iloilo City, Philippines.
Burgos Jr., N., 2013 (02 December). Iloilo Oil Spill Reaches Mangroves. Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/539181/iloilooil-spill-reaches-mangroves (accessed 21.06.14.).
Burgos Jr., N., 2008 (11 August). Guimaras Recovering But Non-release of Funds
Stalls Rehab. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://newsinfo.
inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/regions/view/20080811-153872/Guimarasrecovering-but-non-release-of-funds-stalls-rehab (accessed 15.06.11.).
Burgos Jr., N., 2007a (13 August). Groups Score Delay in Release of Guimaras Rehab
Funds. The News Today, Iloilo City, Philippines.
Burgos Jr., N., 2007b (08 August). GMA Help on Speedy Release of Guimaras Rehab
Funds Sought. The News Today, Iloilo City, Philippines.
Burgos Jr., N., 2007c (30 August). Group Doubts DENR Report on Mangrove Recovery in Guimaras. The News Today, Iloilo City, Philippines.
Burgos Jr., N., 2006a (12 September). Manual Cleanup of Oil Sludge Ordered
Stopped. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://newsinfo.inq7.
net/breakingnews/metroregions/view_article.php?article_id¼20578 (accessed
15.06.11.).
Burgos Jr., N., 2006b (12 August). DENR Scored for Diverting Funds for Guimaras.
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/
inquirerheadlines/regions/view/20080812-154027/DENR-scored-for-divertingfunds-for-Guimaras (accessed 24.02.13.).
Business Mirror, 2009 (03 May). Guimaras Oil-spill Survivors Recover But Scarred.
http://brucegordon.posterous.com/spill-consequences-one-year-on-gimarasisland (accessed 04.05.11.).
Congress of the Philippines, 2013. Republic Act No. 10533 (Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013). Metro Manila. http://www.gov.ph/2013/05/15/republic-actno-10533/ (accessed 26.06.14.).
Congress of the Philippines, 2009. Republic Act No. 9729 (Climate Change Act of
2009). Metro Manila. http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/7650_73018_
PhilippinesClimateChangeAct.pdf (accessed 05.09.12.).
Congress of the Philippines, 2008. Republic Act No. 9512 (Environmental Awareness
and Education Act of 2008). Metro Manila. http://www.senate.gov.ph/republic_
acts/ra%209512.pdf (accessed 05.09.12.).
Congress of the Philippines, 2007. Republic Act No. 9483 (Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007). Metro Manila. http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/
ra2007/ra_9483_2007.html (accessed 20.05.11.).
Congress of the Philippines, 2006 (17 October). Republic Act 9358 (2006 Supplemental Appropriation). http://www.google.com/url?sa¼t&rct¼j&q¼&esrc¼s&
source¼web&cd¼1&cad¼rja&uact¼8&ved¼0CB4QFjAA&url¼http%3A%2F%
2Fwww.senate.gov.ph%2Frepublic_acts%2Fra%25209358.pdf&;ei¼qUikU5y
LEJSKuAS-xIKoDw&usg¼AFQjCNGxmUNp3c9BpjWJDcwFfdilOoj10w (accessed
20.06.14.).
Dalipe IV, G., 2006 (09 September). ‘Slowpoke’ Implementation of ₱2B for Oil Spill
Irks Escudero. Panay News, Inc, Iloilo City, Philippines. http://www.panaynews.
com.ph/ (23.01.13).
54
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
Dancel, F., 2005. Utang na loob: a philosophical analysis. In: Gripaldo, R. (Ed.),
Filipino Cultural Traits. Claro R. Ceniza Lectures. Council for Research in Values
and Philosophy, WA, D.C., p. 205.
David, E., 2012. The Colonial Mentality Project: the Psychological Study of Colonial
Mentality or Internalized Oppression Among Filipino Americans and Other
Marginalized Groups. http://www.colonialmentality.com/CM.html (accessed
30.08.12.).
David, E., 2011. Filipino-/American Postcolonial Psychology: Oppression, Colonial
Mentality, and Decolonization: Oppression, Colonial Mentality, and Decolonization. AuthorHouse, IN, p. 332. http://books.google.com.ph/books/about/
Filipino_American_Postcolonial_Psycholog.html?id¼Hfz0qT7suTkC&redir_
esc¼y (accessed 30.08.12.).
De la Cruz, R., 2012 (04 October). Deconstructing Justifications for Filipino.
Educating the Nation. Manila Bulletin, E-2, Manila, Philippines.
Delilan, E., 2006 (07 September). Petron Denies Bribing Media. Sunstar, Manila,
Philippines.
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/bac/2006/09/07/news/petron.
denies.bribing.media.html.
http://www.projectsunshine.org/
(accessed
07.06.11.).
Diamond, P., Hausman, J., 1994. Contingent valuation: is some number better than
no number? J. Econ. Perspect. 8 (4), 45e64.
Dimmock v. Secretary of State for Education and Skills, 2007. [2007] EWHC 2288
(Admin), [2008] 1 All ER 367. http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/
2007/2288.html (accessed 06.11.14.).
Diola, C., 2014 (06 February). Ateneo, UP Move School Opening to August. Philstar.com. http://www.google.com/url?sa¼t&rct¼j&q¼&esrc¼s&source¼web&
cd¼1&cad¼rja&uact¼8&ved¼0CB4QFjAA&url¼http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philstar.
com%2Fcampus%2F2014%2F02%2F06%2F1287323%2Fateneo-move-schoolopening-august&;ei¼EcSrU-vZCsPRkQXZ0YDIDQ&usg¼
AFQjCNG7t1P4ba727oogAIDcT-CGLvqAJw (accessed 10.02.14.).
Doocy, S., Gabriel, M., Collins, S., Robinson, C., Stevenson, P., 2006. Implementing
cash for work programmes in post-tsunami Aceh: experiences and lessons
learned. Disasters 30 (3), 277e296.
Edwards, M., 1998. Are NGOs overrated? why and how to say “No.” Curr. Issues
Comp. Educ. Online 1 (1). http://www.tc.columbia.edu/cice/articles/ac161.htm
(accessed 22.05.03.).
Environmental Management Bureau Region 6 (EMB-6), 2014. News Around the
Region. http://www.emb.gov.ph/portal/r06/Home/RDsPage.aspx (accessed
01.06.14.).
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), 2006. Region 6 Water Quality Status
Report. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Manila, Philippines.
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), 1990. DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 34. Revised Water Usage and Classification e Water Quality Criteria
Amending Section Nos. 68 and 69, Chapter III of the 1978 NPCC Rules and
Regulations. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Manila,
Philippines.
Espina, R., 2007 (22 February). Where's the ₱800-M Guimaras Rehab Fund? Philippine
Star,
Manila,
Philippines.
http://www.philstar.com/philstar/
NEWS200702229907.htm (accessed 11.02.13.).
Espina, R., 2006a (09 September). Greenpeace, Mediamen Question ‘Gag Order.’.
Philippine Star, Manila, Philippines. http://www.philstar.com/philstar/
NEWS200609099906.htm (accessed 07.06.11.).
Espina, R., 2006b (12 September). Guimaras Oil Spill Continues to Bother Public.
Philippine Star, Manila, Philippines. http://www.philstar.com/philstar/
NEWS200609129905.htm (accessed 07.06.11.).
Espina, R., 2006c (07 September). It May Take Time to Address Issue of Sunken
Tanker. Philippine Star, Manila, Philippines. http://www.philstar.com/philstar/
NEWS200609079907.htm (accessed 07.06.11.).
Fernandez, L., 2011 (22 August). MT Solar I Oil Spill, 5 Years Thereafter. UPV News.
University of the Philippines in the Visayas, Miagao, Iloilo, Philippines. http://
www.upv.edu.ph/news/index.php?id¼797 (accessed 01.09.11.).
Flores, H., 2006 (27 September). Chemical Dispersant Used in Guimaras Oil Spill
More Harmful-DOST. Philippine Star, Manila, Philippines. http://www.philstar.
com/headlines/360025/chemical-dispersant-used-guimaras-oil-spill-moreharmful-%C2%97-dost (accessed 25.02.13.).
Fortes, M., 2000 (23 January). Further Questioning the Role of Some NGOsPhilippines. Wise Coastal Practices for Human Development Forum.
Galford III, J., 2006 (26 August). Villar, Scientists Visit Guimaras to Assess Oil
Damage. Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation, Manila, Philippines. http://
www.mb.com.ph/node/89515#.UPY9sfL4JGg (accessed 25.02.13.).
Gomez, C., Burgos Jr., N., 2007 (29 March). Solar I Spilled Almost 2M Liters of Oil off
Guimaras. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. https://sludge.
wordpress.com/2007/03/29/solar-i-spilled-almost-2m-liters-of-oil-offguimaras/ (accessed 18.06.14.).
Gomez, C., 2006 (06 September). Worst of the Oil Spill Is behind Us, Says Petron
Exec. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://newsinfo.inq7.net/
breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id¼19365 (accessed 08.06.11.).
Gomez, E., 1999. Environmental charade. Mar. Pollut. Bull. 38 (1), 1e2.
~ o, M., 2006 (24 November 2006). Siphoning of Remaining Bunker Oil Delayed
Grin
Anew. Visayan Daily Star, Guimaras, Philippines. http://sludge.wordpress.com/
2006/11/24/siphoning-of-remaining-bunker-oil-delayed-anew/
(accessed
27.04.11.).
Gripaldo, R. (Ed.), 2009. Bahala na: a Philosophical Analysis, Filipino Cultural Traits:
Claro R. Ceniza Lectures. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy,
Washington, D.C., p. 205.
Guinto, J., 2006 (06 September). Arroyo Says Oil Spill Contained; Cadets Tapped for
Cleanup. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://globalnation.inq7.
net/news/breakingnews/view_article.php?article_id¼19386.
http://www.
gmanews.tv/breakingnews.php?id¼14720&sec¼13 (accessed 08.06.11.).
Hausman, J., 1993. Contingent Valuation: a Critical Assessment (Amsterdam, North
Holland).
Hawks, J., 1997. For a Good Cause? How Charitable Institutions Become Powerful
Economic Bullies. Carol Publishing Group, NJ, USA, p. 240.
Hibionada, F., 2009 (02 March). Ombudsman Probe Uncovers ‘Oil Spill Fund’
Anomaly in Guimaras. The News Today, Iloilo City, Philippines. http://www.
thenewstoday.info/2009/03/02/ombudsman.probe.uncovers.oil.spill.fund.
anomaly.in.guimaras.html (accessed 06.07.14.).
~ o, C., Labor-Javellana, J., Pal, A., Napallacan, J.,
Ho, A., Quismondo, T., Avendan
Villa, H., 2006 (25 August). Bunker Fuel Still Oozing Out of Tanker. Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/archive/
435065-philippine-daily-inquirer/august-2006.html (accessed 14.06.11.).
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, 2007. Annual Report 2007
(London).
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, 2005. Claims Manual (April 2005
Edition) (London).
IOC, IHO, BODC, 2003. Centenary Edition of the GEBCO Digital Atlas. Published on
CD-ROM on behalf of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and
the International Hydrographic Organization as part of the General Bathymetric
Chart of the Oceans. British Oceanographic Data Centre, Liverpool.
Jeansonne, J. (Ed.), 2010. An FOSC's Guide to NOAA Scientific Support, second ed.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Department of Commerce, USA http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOS/ORR/1395_FOSC_
Guide.pdf. (accessed 22.06.14.).
Kandy, A., 1997 (December 1996e03 January 1997). Reforming the NGOs. Asiaweek
22 (52), 27, 7.
Labiste, M.D., 2006 (19 November). Drowning in the Oil Spill. Boloji.com. http://
www.boloji.com/index.cfm?md¼Content&sd¼Articles&ArticleID¼4670
(accessed 25.06.14.).
Labog-Javellana, J., 2006 (11 September). 3 Cabinet Execs Appear Before Hearing on
Oil Spill. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://www.inquirer.net/
specialreports/visayasoilspill/view.php?db¼1&article¼20060911-20372
(accessed 25.02.13.).
Laude, J., 2006 (09 November). Guimaras Evacuation Order Lifted. PhilStar.com.
http://www.philstar.com/nation/367783/guimaras-evacuation-order-lifted
(accessed 20.06.14.).
Legaspi, A., 2006 (08 September). Petron Staff ‘complacent’. Gov't Officials Deny Gag
Order.GMANews.TV,
Manila,
Philippines.
http://www.gmanews.tv/
breakingnews.php?sec¼2&id¼14831 (accessed 12.01.13.).
Lipayon, B., 2008. Assessment of Oil Spill, Water Quality Monitoring and Upgrading
of Laboratory Projects. Report presented by the Regional Director, Environmental Management Bureau (Region 6), Department of Environment and
Natural Resources During the 2nd Anniversary of the Guimaras Oil Spill [11
August 2008]. Guimaras Provincial Capitol Building, Guimaras, Philippines.
Macairan, E., 2006a (19 August). Donate Hair, Save the Environment. Philippine Star,
Manila,
Philippines.
http://www.philstar.com/news-feature/353628/%C2%
91donate-hair-save-environment%C2%92 (accessed 08.02.13.).
Macairan, E., 2006b (27 August). Manila to Collect Hair, Chicken Feathers for Guimaras Oil Spill Cleanup. Philippine Star, Manila, Philippines. http://www.
philstar.com/metro/354805/manila-collect-hair-chicken-feathers-guimarasoil-spill-cleanup (accessed 08.02.13.).
Magramo, M., 2007. The Semirara oil spill: its implications to maritime legislations.
In: Proc. 7th International Navigational Symposium on Marine Navigation and
Safety of Sea Transportation (Trans-nav'2007) Held on 20e22 June 2007.
Gdynia Maritime University and the Nautical Institute, Poland, pp. 579e581. In:
http://transnav.am.gdynia.pl/proceedings/pdfs/12.pdf (accessed 14.06.11.).
Mangahas, M., 2012. Pigging Out on Pork (Parts 1-5). Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. http://pcij.org/stories/pdaf-racket-rocks-daang-matuwid/
(accessed 06.11.14.).
Manila Standard Today, 2006 (08 September). Editorial: Gag Order a Mistake. Manila Standard Today, Manila, Philippines. http://www.manilastandardtoday.
com/?page¼editorial_sept08_2006 (accessed 12.06.13.).
Mariano, D., 2006 (23 November). One Disaster After Another. The Manila Times,
Philippines.
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2006/nov/24/yehey/
opinion/20061124opi2.html (accessed 02.05.11.).
Mastanduno, M., 2008. Imperialism. Microsoft Student 2009 [DVD]. Microsoft
Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA.
Michaels, P., 2007. Meltdown: the Predictable Distortion of Global Warming by
Scientists, Politicians and the Media. Cato Institute, WA DC, USA, p. 271.
MSNBC.com News Services, 2006 (30 August). Hairy Idea: Clippings Used to Absorb
Oil Spill-Philippines Recruits Inmates, Salons to Help Out with Disaster. World
Environment.
NBCNEWS.com.
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14584306/ns/
world_news-world_environment/t/hairy-idea-clippings-used-absorb-oil-spill/
#.URYPQ_IlqSp (accessed 08.02.13.).
National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), 2006. In: Discussion Papers for the
Scientific Conference on Guimaras. Iloilo Grand Hotel, Iloilo City, Philippines.
National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC), 2010 (28 July). Daily Minimum
Wage Rates e Region VI. Western Visayas (Wage Order No. RBVI-18, effective 12
August 2010). Department of Labor and Employment, Manila, Philippines. http://
www.nwpc.dole.gov.ph/pages/region_6/cmwr_table_r6.html (accessed 20.05.11.).
~ a / Ocean & Coastal Management 103 (2015) 42e55
R. Balen
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), 2014 (March). Philippine Standard
Geographic Codes. Philippine Statistics Authority. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/
activestats/psgc/province.asp?provcode¼067900000 (accessed 06.07.14.).
National Statistic Office, 2009. 2006 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (Manila, Philippines).
Nito, J., 2006 (24 August). Massive Philippines Oil Spill Raises Health Fears. Agence
France-Presse, Guimaras, Philippines. http://www.terradaily.com/reports/
Massive_Philippines_Oil_Spill_Raises_Health_Fears_999.html
(accessed
21.06.14.).
Olavario, A., 2009. Case study: working in the aftermath of the MT solar 1 oil spill
incident in the Philippines. In: The East Asian Seas Congress 2009. 23e27
November 2009. Manila,
Philippines.
http://pemsea.org/eascongress/
international-conference/presentation_t1-3_olavario.pdf/view
(accessed
22.06.14.).
Ombion, K., Lachica, R., 2006 (22 August). Repeating Disasters. Bulatlat.com. https://
groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.filipino/SPf37PnhB8I
(accessed
26.06.14.).
Pahila, I., Taberna Jr., H., Sadaba Jr., R., Gamarcha, L., Koyama, J., Un, S., 2010.
Assessment of residual petroleum hydrocarbon two years after the M/T solar I
oil spill in southern Guimaras, central Philippines. Mem. Fac. Fish. Kagoshima.
Univ. (Special issue), 59e62.
Pamonag, R., 2006 (14 August). Guimaras Fishermen Raring to File Class Suit over
Oil Spill. PhilStar.com. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/354401/guimarasfishermen-raring-file-class-suit-over-oil-spill. raring to file class suit over oil
spill (accessed 18.06.14.).
Panay News, 2007 (16 January). ₱100M Paid to Guimaras Oil-spill Victims. Panay
News, Inc, Iloilo City, Philippines.
Panay News, 2006a (1,12,24, and 25 August). How Would You Like for History to
Remember You? (An Oil Spill Story, Parts I and II). Panay News, Inc., Iloilo City,
Philippines.
Panay News, 2006b (11 September). Insult to Gov. Nava. Panay News, Inc, Iloilo City,
Philippines.
Panay News, 2006c (08 September). Editorial: Not Just Promises. Panay News, Inc,
Iloilo City, Philippines.
Panay News, 2006d ( 1, 12, 24 and 25 September). People-Not Research. Panay
News, Inc, Iloilo City, Philippines. http://sludge.wordpress.com/2006/10/07/
people-not-research (26, 134e135), (accessed 12.05.11.).
Pearce, D., Moran, D., 1994. The Economic Value of Biodiversity. Earthscan Publications Ltd., London.
Petron Corporation, 2011. About Us-Profile. Manila, Philippines. http://www.petron.
com/about-profile.html (accessed 26.01.13.).
Petron Corporation, 2006. Annual Report 2006, p. 64.
Philippine Star, 2006 (24 November). Petron Denies Chartering Sunken Barge (So
What Else Is New?!) (Manila, Philippines). http://www.philstar.com/philstar/
NEWS200611240413.htm (accessed 04.05.11.).
Punongbayan, M., 2010 (12 August). Protest Action Marks Guimaras Oil Spill 4th
Anniversary. Philippine Star, Manila, Philippines.
Puyat, R., 2010 (11 July). Historic Oil Spills Around the World: Guimaras Oil Spill.
The Manila Times, Manila, Philippines. http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/
component/content/article/86-special-reports/21264-historic-oil-spillsaround-the-world (accessed 11.11.10.).
Quito, E., 1994. The ambivalence of filipino traits and values, values in philippine
culture and education. In: Dy Jr., M. (Ed.), Philippine Philosophical Studies I.
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, .Washington, D.C., p. 205.
Rabonza, G., 2006 (08 September). NDCC Media Update: Situation Report on the M/
T Solar I Oil Spill Incident. Office of Civil Defense. http://sludge.files.wordpress.
com/2006/09/ndcc-media-update-090806.pdf (accessed 16.01.13.).
Ramirez, A., 2007. UPV bares impact assessment of M/T solar I oil spill. UP Newsl. 28
(10).
http://202.92.128.3/upnewsletter.php?archive¼yes&yr¼2007&mn¼10
(accessed 07.05.11.).
Regional Disaster Coordinating Council VI (RDCC-6), 2006. Oil Spillage Due to
Sinking of MT Solar I e Status Report (12 September 2006). Office of Civil Defense, Department of National Defense, Philippines.
Reyes, B., Corpuz, G., Hicap, S., 2010 (11 August). Guimaras Oil Spill Victims Demand
Justice. Remate. Manila, Philippines.
Riedmiller, S., 2000 (23 January). Questioning the Role of NGOS. Wise Coastal
Practices for Human Development Forum.
Rivera, B., 2006 (28 November). Master Plan for Oil Spill Response Mapped Out.
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/
breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id¼35248 (accessed 24.02.13.).
Rivera, B., Dalangin-Fernandez, L., 2006 (19 September). Palace Tells Guimaras Folk
to ‘Keep Out of Hazard Zones.’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines.
http://sludge.wordpress.com/2006/09/19/pollution-case-filed-vs-petron-shipfirm/ (accessed 20.06.14.).
Romero, P., 2006 (28 August). The GMA to Unveil Guimaras Rehab Plan. Philippine
Star, Manila, Philippines. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/355012/gmaunveil-guimaras-rehab-plan (accessed 08.02.13.).
Runyan, C., 1999. NGOs proliferate worldwide. In: Vital Signs 1999. Worldwatch
Institute, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., pp. 144e145.
Salamat, M., 2013. Cavite Oil Spill a Repeat of Guimaras Spill 7 Years Ago e Environmentalists. Bulatlat.com. http://bulatlat.com/main/2013/08/12/cavite-oilspill-a-repeat-of-guimaras-spill-7-years-ago-environmentalists/
(accessed
26.06.14.).
Sallave, R.J., 2014. DENR's Environment Month 2014 Celebration to Highlight
Climate Change. http://r6.denr.gov.ph/index.php/about-us/history/86-region-
55
news-items/415-denrs-environment-month-2014-celebration-to-highlightclimate-change (accessed 01.07.14.).
Senate of the Philippines, 2007 (18 September). Philippine senate resolution 138-.
Investigation: oil spill e guimaras island, First Regular Session, Fourteenth
Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. Metro Manila, Philippines. http://
www.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress¼14&q¼SRN-138
(accessed
20.06.14.).
Senate of the Philippines, 2006a (25 August). Jamby: Solar 1 e Identity Crisis Makes
Ship Not Sea Worthy. Press Release. Metro Manila, Philippines. http://www.
senate.gov.ph/press_release/2006/0825_madrigal1.asp (accessed 25.02.06.).
Senate of the Philippines, 2006b (27 August). Cayetano Leads Joint Probe of Guimaras
Oil Spill Tomorrow. Press Release. Metro Manila, Philippines. http://www.senate.
gov.ph/press_release/2006/0827_cayetano1.asp (accessed 25.02.06.).
Senate of the Philippines, 2006b (27 August). Guimaras Oil Spill Shows How
Helpless RP Is Against Maritime Environment Disasters, Laments Drilon. Press
Release. Metro Manila, Philippines. http://www.senate.gov.ph/press_release/
2006/0827_drilon1.asp (accessed 25.02.06.).
Sheppard, M., 2009 (05 February). Save the Children (From Global Warming Propaganda). AmericanThinker. http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/02/save_
the_children_from_global.html (accessed 05.09.12.).
Sinay, D., 2007a (09 August). Pay All of US! Panay News, Iloilo City, Philippines.
Sinay, D., 2007b (07 August). Doubtful Claims. Panay News, Iloilo City, Philippines.
Sinay, D., 2006a (07 September). Stop Using Chemical Dispersants e WWF. Panay
News, Iloilo City, Philippines. http://www.panaynews.com.ph/news1.htm
(accessed 15.06.11.).
Sinay, D., 2006b (01 September). Politics Hampers Relief Operations. Panay News,
Iloilo City, Philippines. http://panaynews.com.ph/news1.htm (accessed
24.02.13.).
Snodgrass, E., 2012. Climate Projections. Connexions. http://cnx.org/content/
m41580/latest/?collection¼col11325/latest (accessed 10.09.12.).
Solinap, L., 2006 (December). Oil Recovery Operation for Guimaras Oil Spill. Digital
Photographer.
http://www.digitalphotographer.com.ph/forum/showthread.
php?4672-Oil-recovery-Operaration-for-GUIMARAS-OILSPILL&s¼aa4a693b006e63c5e0aecb8161df86c0 (accessed 25.04.11.).
Subong, E., 2011 (21 August). Traces of Recovery Seen in Guimaras After Oil Spill.
Panay News, Iloilo City, Philippines.
The Lord Monckton Foundation, 2012 (06 July). Three Promising Legal Actions
Against AGW. VIC, Australia. http://lordmoncktonfoundation.com/blog/view/
236/three_promising_legal_actions_against_agw (accessed 05.09.12.).
Tilt, C., 2005. NGOs: Issues of Accountability. In: School of Commerce Research
Paper Series 05-7. Flinders University, South Australia. http://www.flinders.edu.
au/sabs/business-files/research/papers/2005/05-7.pdf (accessed 26.06.14.).
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA),
2006a. Philippines: guimaras oil Spill OCHA Situation Report No. 1 (28 August
2006). United Nations. http://www.cidi.org/report/4028 (accessed 20.01.13.).
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA),
2006b. Philippines: Guimaras Oil Spill OCHA Situation Report No. 2 (05
September 2006). United Nations. http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/
philippines-guimaras-oil-spill-ocha-situation-report-no-2 (accessed 22.01.13.).
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014 (21 April).
Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/
2013/11/20131112286248.html?CP.rss¼true#axzz35hfEnSLJ
(accessed
26.06.14.).
UPV Oil Spill Program, 2006a. Timelime. University of the Philippines in the Visayas,
Miagao, Iloilo, Philippines. http://www.upv.edu.ph/oilspill/index.php (accessed
12.05.11.).
UPV Oil Spill Program, 2006b. Colloquium on M/T Solar 1 Oil Spill Stresses UPV's
Critical Role. University of the Philippines in the Visayas, Miagao, Iloilo,
Philippines.
http://www.upv.edu.ph/oilspill/pressrelease.php
(accessed
12.05.11.).
UPViews, 2006 (November). Scientific Conference on Guimaras Integrates Rapid
Assessment Studies, Develops Rehabilitation Protocols for Solar 1 Oil Spill.
Official Publication of the University of the Philippines Visayas (7) 12, 1e2.
Villa, H., 2006 (25 August). Cleaning Mangroves Waste of Time, Says Expert. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila, Philippines. http://www.inquirer.net/
specialreports/theenvironmentreport/view.php?db¼1&article¼2006082517159 (accessed 24.02.13.).
Villanueva, M., 2006 (01 September 1). Squeezing Every Liter of Oil Spill for Publicity. Philippine Star. http://www.philstar.com/opinion/355730/squeezingevery-liter-oil-spill-publicity (accessed 25.02.13.).
Weart, S., 2003. The Discovery of Global Warming. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Wiener, J., 2000 (26 February). Self-interest Versus Environmental Interest. Wise
Coastal Practices for Human Development Forum.
Yahoo News, 2007 (15 March). Oil from Sunken Philippines Tanker Siphoned off.
Wild Singapore. http://www.wildsingapore.com/news/20070304/070315-2.
htm (accessed 18.06.14.).
Yan, G., 2006 (17 August). Large Oil Spill in the Philippines Threatens Marine
Ecosystem. WWF-Philippines. http://wwf.panda.org/?78300/Large-oil-spill-inthe-Philippines-threatens-marine-ecosystem (accessed 12.02.13.).
Yender, R., Lloyd, A., 2008. Impacts and response challenges of the tanker SOLAR 1
oil spill, Guimaras, Philippines: observations of international advisors. In: Paper
Presented at the 20th Triennial International Oil Spill Conference, Savannah,
Georgia, 04e08 May 2008. http://www.iosc.org/papers/2008%20013.pdf
(accessed 04.05.11.).