Belarus` Foreign Policy: Evolution, Driving Forces, Choices*

Transcription

Belarus’ Foreign Policy:
Evolution, Driving Forces, Choices*
1)
Hong, Wan suk**
차 례
Ⅰ.
Ⅱ.
Ⅲ.
Ⅳ.
Introduction
Evolution of Belarus’ Foreign Policy
Driving Forces of Belarus’ Foreign Policy
Conclusion: Belarus’ Foreign Choices
<Abstract>
The objective of this study is to analyze the foreign policy
that Belarus, located in the geopolitically gray area between East
and West, pursues for its national survival and prosperity, in
terms of evolution, driving forces and choices.
Since its declaration of sovereignty in 1991, Belarus’ foreign
policy has gone through the dialectic evolution process of the
following four stages: the so‐called “period of pro‐western neutral
line” (Aug. 1991‐Jul. 1994) by the Stanislav Shushkevich regime
in the early years of independence; “the pro‐Russian period”
* “This paper was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of
2013.” It is a revised version of the paper, presented at Jagiellonian University
International Conference (July 17th, 2012) in Krakow, Poland, organized by the Korean
Association of Central & Eastern European and Balkan Studies.
** Professor, Dept. of Russian & CIS Studies at the Graduate School of International &
Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
교보문고 KYOBO Book Centre
340 『동유럽발칸연구』 제35권
corresponding to the first period under the rule of Alexander
Lukashenko (Jul.1994‐Sep.2001); “the period of independence
from Russia” corresponding to the second period under the rule
of Lukashenko; “the period of East‐West equilibrium policy in the
third period under the rule of Lukashenko.
The establishment and change of Belarus’ foreign policy have
been affected by the following four key factors: 1) Russia’s
taming of Belarus; 2) the West’s coaxing and pressure for taking
Belarus out of the influential area of Russia; 3) Lukashenko’s 18‐
year iron‐fist dictatorship; 4) difference in national identity
between the eastern and western parts of Belarus. They act as
the complex driving forces for deciding foreign policy by mutual
actions rather than separate functions for deciding foreign policy.
It is above all diplomatic flexibility that the current
Lukashenko government needs to expand in order to overcome
the offensives of foreign powers on the one hand and to continue
social integration and economic development on the other, while
consolidating
its
power
and
national
sovereignty.
More
specifically, it is necessary to make every effort for not only
“the external balancing” of offsetting foreign pressures by coping
with the policies of the foreign powers that have relations of
deep interests with Belarus but approach Belarus with different
purposes, but also “the expansion and strengthening of the
diplomatic cooperation relations with the countries friendly
toward Belarus. To sum up, the current conditions require “multi‐
vector, multi‐faceted foreign policy.”
Keywords: Belarus, East and West, Foreign Policy, Evolution,
Driving Forces, Choices
Belarus’ Foreign Policy: Evolution, Driving Forces, Choices
341
Ⅰ. Introduction
As the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, Belarus attained its
independence, escaping from the long‐year influence of Russia. This has
enabled Belarus to act as a sovereign state in the new international relations
of Europe, but the country is not in the position of pursuing its independent
foreign policy. This can be explained in various ways, but is closely related,
above all, with the fact that Belarus is located in the geopolitically sensitive
area. Napoleon said, “Knowing the geography of a country makes it possible
to know its foreign policy.”1) In the light of Napoleon’s remark, Belarus’
geopolitical environment gives an important clue to understand Minsk’s
current foreign considerations and strategic choices.
In terms of geography, Belarus borders with Russia, Lithuania and Latvia,
Poland and Ukraine to the east, north, west and south, respectively, and is
located in the gateway to the Black Sea from the Baltic Sea. In terms of
history, Belarus was ruled by Poland and Lithuania in the Catholic area and
Russia in the East Greek Church area. Accordingly, western and Russian
identities are mixed with each other, and the collisions among local
identities make it difficult to set the directions of its foreign policy.
Even in terms of geopolitics, Belarus is located in the grey zone between
‘east’ and ‘west’.2) The grey zone refers to a situation or area which does
not completely belong to any influential area, but is at a loss in the midst of
the power struggle between Russia and Western Europe.3) In practice,
Belarus is continuously influenced by the East and the West in terms of
1) Brzezinski, Z. (2000) 58.
2) ‘The East’ and ‘the West’ are limited to Europe in space and multi‐level in meaning. In
religious terms, ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ refer to the influence sphere of the East
Orthodox Church and Catholic Church and Protestantism, respectively. In international
political terms, ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ include Russia and the US as well as Western
Europe, respectively.
3) Legvold Robert, Wallander Celeste A. (2004) 227.
politics, economy and security, while playing an important role in attaining
power equilibrium between Russia and the Western world.4)
EU and NATO were joined by 10 central‐eastern European countries,
including Poland, Czech, three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania) in May 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in January 2007. As a
result, the security map of Europe was completely changed and Russia lost
the central‐eastern Europe which is a buffer security zone. If Belarus and
Ukraine is separated from Russia under such circumstances, it assures the
Western world of the influential expansion of NATO and the spatial
expansion of EU. In addition, it builds up a containment network against
Russia reaching from the Baltic Sea toward the Black Sea and the Caspian
Sea, thus driving out the geopolitical move of Russia to Asia and making it
difficult for Russia to revive empirically in the end.
On the contrary, Belarus constitutes a “defense line”5) to shut off the
influential infiltration of EU and NATO toward the CIS region for Russia
which is molested by the eastward move of the Western world, and has an
important strategic meaning as a shield thwart the anti‐Russian united front
which reaches from the Baltic Sea toward the Black Sea. Practically, Belarus
4) Suk‐woo, Hong. (2001) 189‐190.
5) Belarus gets its strategic value of curbing the eastward expansion of NATO confirmed
by the recent US‐Russian sharp war of nerves over the construction of missile defense
(MD) bases in Eastern Europe. The US Obama government pushed ahead with the
deployment of the MD system in Czech and Poland directly in front of Russia under
the pretext of protecting Europe from the missile attacks from Iran and North Korea,
and signed the agreement on MD base construction with Poland in August 2008. Russia
regarded the construction as NATO’s attempt at expanding its influence while keeping
Russia in check, and sought to take strong military countermeasures in two directions.
In February 2009, Russia pressurized the West by declaring the forward deployment of
attack missiles in Belarus and concluding the agreement on combined anti‐air defense.
Furthermore, Russia decided to deploy Iskander short‐range missiles (SS‐26 Stone)
toward Western Europe in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave surrounded by Poland and
Lithuania. In the face of Russian strong response, the Obama government cancelled the
plan on construction of MD bases in Eastern Europe in September 2009 in order to
improve the relations with Russia.
343
eases up the geopolitical isolation of Russia, since it is located in the middle
area of the anti‐Russian belt, so‐called GUAM, which reaches from Estonia in
the north of the Baltic Sea via Ukraine and Moldova toward Georgia and
Azerbaijan on the coast of the Black Sea.6) Furthermore, pro‐Russian Belarus
functions as an important catalyst leading the integration of CIS for Russia
that takes the initiative in construct a political, economical and security
community against EU and NATO. To sum up, Belarus is a crucial target of
diplomatic offensive that both the Western world and Russia should not fail
to win over and control in order to expand and defend their influential areas.
Then, what kind of foreign policy will Belarus, shrunk by both east and
west powers, work out and adopt to achieve national integration, national
reconstruction, territorial security, economic prosperity etc., while securing
the perpetuity of sovereignty? This question is enough to stimulate our
intellectual curiosity, when we take the geopolitical position of Belarus into
consideration and make the current sanctions of the Western world against
Belarus and the annual energy conflicts between Belarus and Russia overlap
with such position.
The objective of this study is to analyze the foreign policy that Belarus,
located in the geopolitically gray area between East and West, pursues for
its national survival and prosperity, in terms of evolution, driving forces and
choices. To this end, Chapter II will review the evolution of the foreign
policy Belarus has implemented since its independence. Chapter III will
analyze a series of key factors, which provided the opportunities to change
diplomatic lines, as the driving forces for Belarus’ foreign policy. Chapter IV
will address the foreign choices and strategies of Belarus to overcome the
multiple pressures which are applied from the East and the West.
6) Byung‐ho, Kim. (2007) 311.
Ⅱ. Evolution of Belarus’ Foreign Policy
As the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, Belarus attained its
independence, escaping from the long‐year influence of Russia. However,
Belarus is faced with the numerous heavy tasks that should be urgently
solved to secure the perpetuity of its sovereignty. They are, as it were,
enhancement of degraded national identity, establishment of full stateness,
the territorial security, economic prosperity, social stability etc. The foreign
policy has been focused on creating the external conditions which are
favorable for attaining such national goals effectively.
Since its declaration of sovereignty in 1991, Belarus’ foreign policy has
gone through the dialectic evolution process of the following four stages:
First, the first stage is “the period of a pro‐Western neutral line” the
Stanislav Shushkevich regime took in the early years of independence
(August 1991‐July 1994). In this period, the pro‐Europe nationalistic forces,
which seized power, put stress on establishing Belarus’ independent identity
differentiated from Russian one, while seeking to build a pro‐Western
“neutral nation” as an alternative to get over national disasters in which the
Belarusian people experienced the rule and domination by east and west
powers. However, the alternative lost its validity due to the immaturity in
domestic and foreign conditions, which gradually increased the longing for
the Soviet system and the necessity for improved relations with Russia.
The second stage is “the pro‐Russian period” that corresponds to the first
period of the Lukashenko regime (July 1994‐September 2001).
In this
period, President Alexander Lukashenko, who succeeded in seizing power by
stimulating the longing for the past stable Soviet system in the first election
under the direct presidential election system since the independence in July
1994,7) put forth a thoroughly pro‐Moscow policy by identifying Belarus’
7) In March 1994, when conflicts became intense between the conservatives and the
progressives, the new Constitution, which focused on the establishment of the
345
national interest with Russian one rather than promoting the relations with
Europe and seeking the national integration with Russia. In the first period
of the Lukashenko regime, pro‐Western nationalistic forces were avoided by
the public, and great stress was put on the Soviet identity and the sense of
unity with Russia. Meantime, the relations with US and EU began to
deteriorate with the reinforcement of Lukashenko’s dictatorship and the anti‐
Western trend.
The third stage is “the period of independence from Russia” that
corresponds to the second period of the Lukashenko regime (September
2001‐Septemeber 2006).
The integration between the both countries
slowed down, giving birth to disharmony gradually, as discords appeared
over the maintenance of national sovereignty, i.e. the key condition of
integration between Belarus and Russia since the emergence of the Putin
regime in May 2000. Disappointed at Lukashenko’s rhetoric of integration,
Putin put indirect pressure on Lukashenko by hinting at the disintegration of
the preferential model based on guardianship, i.e. asked Lukashenko for the
economic reform based on market principles,8) but Lukashenko responded to
such request lukewarmly and passively, since he was aware that the market
reform might shake his political power basis.
As a reaction to Putin’s coercive national integration, Lukashenko began
to escape from the pro‐Russian line gradually and seek the domestic and
foreign policies that are democratic and independent. He began to emphasize
Belarus’ own ideology and identity rather than Soviet identity little by little,
refused to introduce the Russian ruble as a nominal currency in 2003, and
raised a different voice from Russia on the Iraq conflict in 2003.9) The
presidential system, was enacted by plebiscite and thus the first direct presidential
election was held in July of the same year.
8) As Lukashenko did not consent to the national integration terms on sovereignty
limitation proposed by Russia, Putin attempted to shake the Lukashenko regime and
occupy the economic sovereignty of Belarus by requesting the market reform that is
summarized into the privatization of key industries in Belarus.
market reform requested by Russia remained partial for fear that Moscow
should use it to deprive Belarus of regime stability and economic
sovereignty.
The last stage is “the east‐west equilibrium period” that corresponds to
the third period under the rule of Lukashenko (September 2006‐December
2010). Moscow’s policy toward Minsk, which attempted to shake
Lukashenko and to control Belarus’ economic assets through the political
request for market economy reform and thus to make Belarus’ sovereignty
dependent on Russia, was frustrated by Lukashenko’s intelligent reaction and
a series of color revolutions in CIS. While the effort for national integration
gradually lost its energy due to Lukashenko’s passive strategy, Putin took
stronger and more direct diplomatic measures by cutting the energy subsidy,
“the Achilles heel of Belarusian economy” in order to force Minsk to agree
to the integration terms proposed by Moscow.
Having succeeded in seizing power for the third time, Lukashenko
powerfully coped with Putin’s powerful pressure, thus leading to the gradual
deepening of the crack in Russian‐Belarusian relations. At this time, the
Western world transformed their isolation policy toward Belarus into the
engagement policy, using the conflicts between Moscow and Minsk. As
Western powers crept into Belarus step by step using the Russian‐Belarusian
relations, Lukashenko, in the third period of his rule, sought to take an east‐
west equilibrium policy by the improvement in the relations with the
Western world in order to hold Russia in check, especially protect Belarus’
sovereignty and expand its range of foreign activities.
9) Jung‐ho, Park. (2010) 184.
347
Ⅲ. Driving Forces of Belarus’ Foreign Policy
As mentioned above, Belarus’ foreign policy has been influenced over the
last 20 years since its independence by the diverse external and internal
factors often referred to in foreign policy‐making theories, such as the
dynamic relations among powers over Eurasian new order, the policies of
the major countries concerned, including the US, EU and Russia, toward
Belarus, and the politico‐social forces’ competition, economic driving forces
and conscious selections (preferences of elites, power maintenance and
expansion of national interests) of policy‐making groups in Belarus.
Among them, this study focuses on the following four key factors: 1)
Russia’s “taming” of Belarus; 2) the West’s coaxing and pressure for taking
Belarus out of the influential area of Russia; 3) Lukashenko’s 18‐year iron‐
fist dictatorship; 4) difference in national identity between the eastern and
western parts of Belarus. They act as the complex driving forces for
deciding foreign policy by mutual actions rather than separate functions for
deciding foreign policy.
1. Russia’s “Taming” of Belarus10)
Russia can be referred to as a structural factor that exerts continuous and
the strongest impacts on the formation and change in Belarus’ foreign policy
since its independence. Inversely, this means that Belarus is so much
important in the foreign political area of Russia. Minsk occupies a special
position in the foreign relations of Moscow for the following reasons.
First, Belarus is an east Slavic brother country that can push ahead with
the imperial revival of Russia along with Ukraine. As the same Slavic
cultural area, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus constituted a political, economic,
10) Won‐ho, Joh. (2010) 3.
national, cultural and religious community that shared the myths and
symbols of the first ancient state “Kievan Rus.”11) In 1991, the collapse of
the Soviet Union, however, divided the Slavic community for the second
time after the invasion of Mongolia and Tatar in the middle 13th century. As
a result, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus emerged as independent players in
international relations.12)
The three countries take different ways, but Ukraine and Belarus are the
targets Russia should control to seek the position of a power in Eurasia.13)
This is because the both countries with a population of 60 million population
(Ukraine: 50 million; Belarus: 10 million) and an area of 810,000㎢ lay the
important material, human and psychological groundwork for the future
restoration of the Russian empire.
Second, Belarus is the driving force behind the integration of CIS led by
Russia. Belarus plays the pivotal role of supporting the leadership of Russia
in the CIS as a fixed member of the multilateral cooperation organizations,
such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the EurAsEC,
and the Common Economic Space (CES), which were organized under the
leadership of Russia. It symbolically reflects the leading role of Belarus in
the CIS integration that the CIS office was established in Minsk.
Third, Belarus is a key country of energy transport to Europe for Russia,
like Ukraine. Russia exports 20% of gas (45 billion㎥) and 30% of oil (60
million tons) to Europe, using the pipelines passing through the territory of
11) Wan‐suk, Hong. (2007) 376.
12) In 1240, when Mongolians and Tatars invaded their territory, East Slavs were divided
into Russian, Ukraine and Belarusian peoples. Ukraine and Belarus, which were under
the rule of Poland, were isolated from Russia for about 4‐5 centuries, until they were
annexed by the Romanov dynasty in 1654 and 1796, respectively. During the period,
linguistic, religious and cultural differences occurred among the three peoples, leading
to the constitution of different national identities in different historical circumstances.
13) According to the 2007 survey, 68% of Russians preferred to strengthen the friendly
relations with Belarus, 61% of Russians did not consider Belarus as a foreign country,
and 64% of Russians were in favor of national integration in case of a plebiscite.
349
Belarus. For the time being, it is impossible to replace the gas and oil
pipelines, which are key “strategic assets” guaranteeing the national interest
and efficient foreign policy of Russia, with any other alternatives. Belarus is
also an important traffic hub which covers about 30% (about 100 million
tons) of Russian total export and import to Europe. Moreover, Belarus plays
a pivotal role in connecting logistics and power supply to Kaliningrad, the
Russian exclave surrounded by Poland and Lithuania.
Fourth, Belarus, located in the west wing of Russia, forms a security
buffer zone against EU and NATO, acting as an important factor for the anti‐
air system against the West. Russia and Belarus are closely linked to each
other in military terms, building an integrated anti‐air network against the
military invasion of NATO. Currently, Russia operates two military bases14)
and gets multiple high‐tech weapons produced by subcontract in Belarus.15)
As mentioned above, Belarus is particularly important for Russia in
geopolitical terms as an east Slavic brother, a driving force for the CIS
integration, a main channel for energy logistics toward Europe, a strategic
buffer zone against the West, a bridgehead for expanding influence on
Eastern Europe, and an important traffic hub. Accordingly, it is necessary to
put Belarus under strong control or to incorporate the country into Russia.
The very fact drives Russia to try to organize a national union in a way that
limits the sovereignty of Belarus, taking a carrot‐and‐stick approach.
There are some reasons why Moscow has a strong influence on Minsk in
foreign policy‐making. First, Belarus is excessively dependent on Russia in
14) Two leased military bases are Volga Radar Station near Baranovichi and Antey Long‐
range Radar Center near Vileyka. According to the Russian‐Belarusian military
cooperation agreement in January 1995, the Russian Federation is qualified to use the
bases free of charge for 25 years. Konoƒ'czuk, Wojciech. (2008) 47.
15) Since the middle 1990s, Russia has used Belarus as a broker to avoid the direct sales
to the specific countries designated as arms embargo countries (especially African
countries, Iran and Iraq). As a result, Belarus became the sixth largest world
exporter of weapons in 2001, and the returns accounted for 4.5% of the Belarusian
total GDP.
external economic terms.
Such dependence is a legacy from the Soviet
Union in which the both countries were organically linked to each other.
Belarus was a center of petro‐chemical industry in the Soviet Union and a
production base for trucks, buses and machinery, including agricultural
machines. Most of Belarusian products are still exported to the former
Soviet Union countries, such as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, of which
Russia accounts for 47% of the export as of 2004.
Belarus’ dependence on Russia is severe especially in the field of energy.
It would not be wrong to say that Russia dominates Belarusian economy.
This is so in two terms. First, Belarus imports almost the total amount of
oil and gas necessary for its industry from Russia. Second, Belarus’s
economy is chiefly supported by the trading profit obtained by importing
Russian crude oil at a much cheaper “friendly price” than other CIS countries
and then exporting refined oil to foreign countries at a high price. In 2006,
oil products accounted for almost 40% in Belarus’ export, making it possible
for Belarus to record a trade surplus of more than 5,400 million USD. This
enables to understand why Russia greatly influences Belarus.
2. West’s Coaxing and Pressure
Another important factors affecting Belarus are the coaxing and pressure
from the West represented by EU and NATO. Belarus was incorporated into
the magnetic field of EU, as Poland and three Baltic countries joined EU in
2004. EU has continuously endeavored to separate Belarus from Russian and
induce Belarus into the Western area of influence. Such effort has been
made in three ways.
First, EU organized the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as a liberalistic carrot
policy to lead Belarus into the reform to market economy and the
establishment of democracy. In May 2009, EU officially started “Eastern
351
Partnership” with six former Soviet Union republics, including Belarus in
Praha.16) The chief goal of EaP is to promote Belarus’ access to EU by
inducing the six countries to political and socio‐economic reforms, using the
provision of various conveniences, such as free trade, economic aid, periodic
security consulting, economic integration, and visa waiver.17)
As part of the EaP policy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) decided
to provide the SBA of a total of 2.4 billion and 60 million USD under the
condition that the Belarusian government will faithfully fulfill the economic
reform plan proposed by the IMF in January 2003 and has hitherto paid 2.1
billion USD three times. Thereafter, Belarus made efforts to keep promises,
such as belt‐tightening currency policy, stability in foreign exchanges and
commodity prices and economic privatization, evaluated the results
positively, and increased the financial support by 1 billion USD in June
2009.18) The West included Belarus in EaP for the purpose of inducing
Minsk to pro‐West orientation by promoting the disharmony between Russia
and Belarus.19) Belarus accepted the appeasement policy put forth by the
West, because it was urgent to secure the financial support to overcome
economic difficulties, but more importantly, because it was necessary to
secure a lever to strengthen the bargaining power toward Russia from which
Belarus is estranged over time,
Second, EU worked out a kind of a realistic stick policy, i.e. the
international pressures and sanctions to force Belarus into a Western
democratization. EU motivates Belarus to carry out a reform to market
democracy on the one hand, and pushed Belarus to approve political
conditions on the other. The West continued to urge Minsk to take
16) The Eastern Partnership was joined by 6 countries, i.e. Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
17) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8040037.stm(retrieved date: 2012. 03. 15).
18) Yonhap News, (Oct. 22, 2009).
19) http://thefastertimes.com/foreignpolicy/2010/06/10/the‐belarus‐dilemma(retrieved date:
2012. 05. 10).
corrective measures against the Lukashenko government’s dictatorship and
human rights problems, such as prolonged one‐man rule, strict press control,
suppression of opposition parties and NGOs, presidential election corruption
and execution. If such request was refused by Belarus, EU imposed
economic and political sanctions along with international criticism. In
February 2011, the West took measures against Lukashenko and 158
Belarusian high‐ranking officials who had committed illegalities and
suppression of opposition parties in the presidential election in December
2010: entry prohibition into 27 EU member countries,20) Belarusian asset
freezing in the US and EU, export prohibition of weapons or commodities
available for political pressure, delay in IMF loan, non‐participation in
Lukashenko’s inauguration ceremony, etc.
Third, EU formulated a policy to promote the market reform and the
democratization from the bottom in Belarus. The policy included eliminating
pro‐Russian Lukashenko from power. The streets in Minsk were filled with
the citizens who protested illegalities in the presidential elections in 2006
and 2010, which indicated that Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule was
increasingly losing its power. Ten thousands of people participated in
protest rallies, which was unprecedented in number.21) Seeing Belarusian
people turn their backs on the Lukashenko regime, the West is seeking a
policy to actively support the democratic groups in Belarus. In practice, the
West is supporting NGOs and opposition parties financially and technically.
Such strategy gives the most ideal opportunities, given a series of
international accidents in which dictators were recently ousted by civil
revolts in the authoritarian countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
20) In 2006, when the presidential election was held in Belarus, EU forbade more than 40
personalities, including Lukashenko, suspected of ballot rigging, from entering EU
countries, but in 2008, EU interrupted the sanctions against most of them for the
time being. “EU ‐US Impose Sanctions against Belarusian Leadership,” Yonhap News,
(Feb. 1, 2011).
21) Doran, Peter B. (2011) 1.
353
However, Lukashenko is compelled to work out an appropriate policy to
provide against the “ousting from within”
22)planned
by the West.
As mentioned above, the West attempts to secure its influence on Minsk
by expanding trade and strengthening economic support, while inducing
Belarus into democratization by imposing international pressures and
sanctions on Minsk for infringement on human rights. At the same time, the
West tries to bring down the Lukashenko regime by supporting NGOs and
opposition parties. Belarus’ foreign policy is continuously affected by EU’s
eastward policy to induce Minsk into the pro‐Western area of influence.
3. Lukashenko’s Prolonged One‐Man Rule
Today, Lukashenko’s long‐term dictatorship can be referred to as another
factor that greatly influences the direction of Belarusian foreign policy.
Belarus has a typical authoritarian control system that curbs political choices
and rights as well as the freedom of the press or expression. Lukashenko’s
long‐term iron‐fisted rule causes international isolation and severely restricts
external choices.
Alexander Lukashenko (Алекса́ндр Григо́рьевич Лукаше́нко) was a
manager at a state‐run farm, but was elected president with six‐year
consecutive terms by pleading to consolidate the solidarity with Russia, curb
the increase in commodity prices, forbid privatization, eradicate corruption
and crack down on organized crimes at the first direct presidential election
in July 1994. After seizing power, he faced a political crisis of being
impeached by the opposition camp, but broke through the crisis by
plebiscite. In November 1996, he accomplished his plan by putting the
constitutional amendment, which focuses on extending the presidential term
to 7 years, to a national referendum to consolidate his weak power basis.
22) Doran, Peter B. (2011) 5.
From then on, he revealed his ambition, thus facing the harsh criticism and
ostracism from the Western countries, such as the US, OSCE and EU.23)
Having performed his presidency for 7 years until 2001, Lukashenko
succeeded in reelection in the second presidential election by pleading to
maintain the planned economy, stabilize prices and achieve a national
integration with Russia. After reelection in September 2001, he attempted at
a perpetual rule by putting the second constitutional amendment, which
abolishes the prohibition of being elected for the third time instead of
returning to the 3‐year term, to a plebiscite. Under the new Election Act, he
was successful in being elected for the third and fourth terms with
overwhelming approval ratings at the presidential elections in March 2006
and December 2010, respectively,24) but was subjected to the severe
criticisms from the West for the suppression of opposition parties and the
press as well as fraudulent elections.
As shown by the processes of seizing power, he has maintained his iron‐
fisted rule by controlling the press and watching the movements of anti‐
government personalities and opposition parties using secret service
agencies. Accordingly, the West calls Belarus and its leader “the outpost of
tyranny”25) and “the last dictator in Europe.”26)
Given such circumstances, it is necessary for Lukashenko to stabilize and
strengthen his power by shutting off the geopolitical and geoeconomic
pressures from the West on the one hand and obtaining protection in
23) Duncan, Peter J.S. (2002) 24.
24) Lukashenko recorded the high approval ratings of 82.6% and 79.67% at the
presidential elections in March 2006 and December 2010, respectively.
25) “The outposts of tyranny” refer to 6 long‐term dictatorial countries, i.e. Belarus, Cuba,
Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Zimbabwe. The term was used for the first time by
the US Secretary nominee of State Condoleezza Rice at the hearing of the Senate
Committee for Foreign Relations in January 2005. “Outposts of Tyranny: Belarus,”
The Washington Post, (Apr. 12, 2005).
26) Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Lukashenko “the last dictator
in Europe” prior to the visit to Russia in 2005.
355
politics, economy and security on the other. This is because he made clear
a pro‐Russian diplomatic policy, unlike Ukraine and made an attractive
proposal of “national integration” to Moscow.
Still, it is noteworthy that Lukashenko basically does not consent to
Moscow’s excessive interference in domestic affairs and infringement of
sovereignty, though he is voluntarily loyal to Moscow for the purpose of
power protection, national security and economic interests.27) In May 2000,
Putin asked Lukashenko for a national integration that involves the limitation
of Belarus’ sovereignty, which was flatly refused. To accomplish its plan,
Russia gradually increases energy prices crucial to the economy of Belarus,
but Lukashenko strongly resists such pressure in various ways28); almost
every year, energy conflicts have occurred between the both countries since
2006.
In recent years, Moscow tightens its political control of Minsk under the
pretext of political, economic and security patronage, and implements a
policy to restrict the economic and security sovereignties of Belarus. It is
necessary for Belarus to improve the relations with the West in order to
mitigate or overcome such kind of integration, but Lukashenko’s dictatorship
makes such improvement difficult.
Lukashenko has no alternative but to pursue a so‐called diversified
diplomacy by strengthening the relations with Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine,
China, Venezuela etc., while taking advantage of the competition between
the East and the West properly, as his dictatorship makes it difficult to seek
the maximization of national interest by the balanced diplomacy between the
East and the West. Like this, Lukashenko’s iron‐fisted rule determines the
direction of Belarus’ foreign policy.
27) Byung‐ho, Kim. (2007) 307.
28) Specific examples are the refusal to pay energy fees to Russia, the closing of gas
pipelines to Europe, and the unauthorized discharge of gases to Europe.
4. Difference in Identity between Eastern and Western Parts of
Belarus
Minsk’s foreign policy‐making is influenced by another important factor in
domestic politics: identity difference, competition and collision between the
eastern and western parts of Belarus, which have been revealed in the
process of forming a new national identity since independence. Political
leaders use the problem of defining a Belarusian identity as a tool to
reinforce their power and transform an external image of Belarus.
For Belarus, the recovery of sovereignty from Russia was a national
occasion to celebrate. Hence, Belarus has focused on state‐building for the
goal of achieving a new national system, territorial security and economic
prosperity, while reviving a faded nationalism, in order to secure the
perpetuity of sovereignty since its independence.
Immediately after its independence in 1991, the first‐priority task of the
fledgling nation was to establish an independent national identity and a
direction of national development by national consensus. This problem is
closely related to an external policy‐making. However, it was not easy to
reach national consensus in the light of the geopolitical location between
east and west and the difference in identity between eastern and western
parts of Belarus.
In reality, there are considerable differences in historical interpretation,
social environment, cultural color and political trend between the eastern and
western parts of Belarus. On the whole, the western area is so nationalistic
that it takes pride in the history and culture of Belarus, seeks national
future in Europe, hopes to be incorporated into the West, and lays emphasis
on the use of Belarusian. The Belarusian nationalists, led by pro‐Western
intellectuals, put forth the political views, such as anti‐communism and anti‐
357
colonialism, and look on the period of the Soviet Union rule as that of
national suppression and ordeal.29)
On the contrary, the eastern area is so pro‐Russian that it seeks national
development in the reinforcement of solidarity with CIS countries, long for
the former Soviet system, and recommends to use Russian as the official
language. The current power elites, including Lukashenko, who represent the
eastern part, use the Soviet identity, i.e. the past Soviet period as a positive
source for the future of Belarus. Specifically, they strive for succeeding to
the advantages of the Soviet system actively and applying them to the
current life in Belarus.30)
Such difference in the both regions causes the competition and collision
over national pending issues,31) which acts as an important motive to
promote regionalism and nationalism. Different identities collide with each
other in one territory of Belarus because the both parts went through
different historical experiences in the processes of division and integration
committed by neighboring powers, especially the Catholic and Russian
Orthodox Church forces in Poland and Lithuania.
Belarus was under the rule of Western catholic forces in Lithuania,
Poland, etc. till the late 18th century after the East Slavs had been divided
into Russia, Belarus and Ukraine by the invasion of Mongolians and Tatars
in the middle 13th century. Belarus was incorporated into the Russian Empire
as a result of the third partition of Poland among Germany, Austria and
th
Russia in 1795, and ruled by Russia more than 200 years. In the 20
century, the western and eastern parts of Belarus fell into the hands of
Poland, Germany and Russia, while powers occupied and recaptured
neighboring countries in World War I, Bolshevik Revolution and World War
II.
29) Abdelal, R. (2002) 472.
30) Leshchenko, N. (2004) 334.
31) Jung‐ho, Park. (2009) 1‐17.
Like this, the Belarusian history was a series of dominations by the
external forces representing “the East” and “the West, thereby resulting in
the disharmony in national identity between the eastern and western parts
of the country. There is no clear difference or regionalism in Belarus, unlike
Ukraine where clear political differences are seen between its eastern and
western parts which are divided by the Dnieper River flowing from the north
to the south. On the whole, the pro‐Russian Soviet identity overwhelms the
pro‐Europe nationalism in Belarus. Nevertheless, there is difference in
identity between the eastern and western parts of Belarus, and it is clear
that the competition between the both areas greatly affects the directions of
national development and foreign policy.
Ⅳ. Conclusion: Belarus’ Foreign Choices
There are some environmental and structural factors greatly influencing
the establishment of foreign policy in the evolutional process of a series of
diplomatic lines Belarus has adopted since its independence.
First, President Lukashenko, who imposes a typical Soviet‐style
authoritarian rule, is branded as “the last dictator in Europe,” and isolated
from the international society. This limits Belarus’ selection in foreign policy
‐making.
Second, Belarus has emerged as an actor in new international relations,
but prefers to adopt a foreign policy of being parasitic on other powers due
to the conspicuous weakness of its national power. In practice, Belarus
implements a foreign policy to solve its vulnerability in politics, economy
and security by being loyal to Russia (actively joining the multilateral CIS
integration movement led by Russia) or parasitic on Russia.
Third, Belarus has a problem in establishing its firm status as a sovereign
state, since it achieved its independence from the Soviet Union. Not
359
threatening Belarus or not intervening in its internal politics, Russia casts a
dark shadow over the path of Belarus through the Soviet practice of 70
years or more. Remaining at a standstill, “the Russia‐Belarus Union,”
discussed since 1996, might be an example. It is highly likely that Russia
intends to build the Russia–Belarus Union in which Moscow is responsible
for the vulnerable economy of Belarus, while making Belarus belong to the
Russian Federation and thus controlling Belarus’ sovereignty.
Fourth, Belarus is faced with the external challenges to national security
owing to its sensitive geopolitical position in the Eurasian area. In reality,
Belarus is located in a strategic position between Western Europe and
Russia, and is always exposed to various pressures and conciliations from
EU and NATO trying to expand their influences toward the east and Russia
trying to thwart such attempts.
The above‐mentioned analysis allows us to confirm that diverse factors
have complex impacts on the establishment of Belarus’ foreign policies,
which are especially under the great influence of Russia. Due to the
vulnerability of its national power, Belarus’ foreign policies are subject to
change under external conditions at all times, and the majority of its national
development problems are defined under the east‐west power competition
surrounding Eurasia. To sum up, it is not easy for Minsk to select any
foreign policy in the struggles between the east and the west.
It is above all diplomatic flexibility that the current Lukashenko
government needs to expand in order to overcome the offensives of foreign
powers on the one hand and to continue social integration and economic
development on the other, while consolidating its power and national
sovereignty. Minsk needs to make diplomatic efforts for reducing its
political, economic and security dependence on powers as well as for
external balancing to offset external pressures by coping with the policies of
powers on the basis of close and precise analysis.
More specifically, Belarus should expand and strengthen the diplomatic
cooperative relations with pro‐Minsk countries, while choosing so‐called
“tight‐rope” diplomacy32) to separately cope with the United Sates and the
European Union which have different voices for Belarus and make use of
loopholes in the geopolitical dynamics between US, EU and Russia. This can
be summarized into a “multi‐vector, multi‐faceted foreign policy.”33)
The “multi‐faced foreign policy,” a self‐helping effort of Belarus to secure
national sovereignty and maximize national interest, is reflected by the fact
that Belarus joined the customs alliance led by Russia, which came into
effect in July 2010, while participating in the EU’s Eastern Europe partner
program, which began to operate in May 2009; tried to secure the
alternative energies from Venezuela, Iran and Azerbaijan to reduce the oil
dependence on Russia;34) attempted to reinforce the independent relations
with the neighboring powers, such as India, China, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
the powers out of the area.
32) Belarus’s Lukashenko to the West: What Did You Expect?. http://www.foreignpolicyi.
org/content/fpi‐bulletin‐belarus%E2%80%99s‐lukashenko‐west‐what‐did‐you‐
expect(retrieved date: 2013. 01. 11).
33) "Belarus pursues multiple‐vector peaceful foreign policy," BelTA, (Apr. 4, 2011).
34) “Belarus Announces New Foreign Policy,” Kommersant, (Apr. 25, 2007).
361
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《국문요약》
벨라루스의 대외정책: 진화, 동학, 선택
홍완석
러시아‐CIS학과
한국외대 국제지역대학원
본 연구의 목적은 ‘동’과 ‘서’ 사이의 지정학적 회색지대에 위치한 벨라루스가
국가의 생존과 번영을 위해 추구하는 대외정책을 진화, 동학, 선택이라는 관점
에서 분석하는 데 있다.
1991년 주권 선언이후, 벨라루스의 외교노선은 크게 다음 네 단계의 변증법
적 진화과정을 거쳐왔다. 이를테면 독립초기 슈쉬케비치(Stanislav Shushkevich)
정권의 ‘친서방적 중립 노선기’(1991.8‐1994.7), 루카센코(Alexander Lukashenko)
집권 1기(1994.7‐2001.9)의 ‘친러 추수(追隨) 노선기’, 루카센코 집권 2기(2001.9‐
2006.9)의 ‘탈러적 독자노선 모색기’, 루카센코 집권 3기(2006.9‐2010.12)의 ‘동·
서 균형외교 시도기’로의 변화과정이 그것이다.
독립이후 벨라루스의 대외정책 수립과 변화에 영향을 준 요인은 다양한 수준
에서 설명이 가능하지만 무엇보다도 다음 네 가지 변수 즉, 1) 국가포획을 위한
러시아의 벨라루스 ‘길들이기’, 2) 벨라루스를 러시아의 세력권으로부터 이탈시
키기 위한 서구의 포섭과 압력, 3) 18년간 철권통치를 하고 있는 루카센코의 장
기독재, 4) 벨라루스 동부와 서부 사이의 상이한 민족정체성 등이 민스크의 대
외정책 형성 및 결정과정에 가장 지속적으로 그리고 중요하게 영향을 미쳤다.
현 루가센코 정부가 자신의 권력과 주권을 확고히 유지하는 가운데 강대국의
공세를 극복하면서 사회 통합과 경제 성장을 지속하기 위해서는 외교적 유연성
의 확대가 무엇보다도 요구된다. 벨라루스에 깊은 이해관계를 투영하지만, 서로
다른 목표를 가지고 접근하는 강대국들의 정책을 정교히 분석해 치밀하게 대응
하는, 그럼으로써 대외적 압박을 상쇄시키는 외적 균형화(external balancing)
365
노력과 더불어 벨라루스에 우호적인 국가들과의 외교적 협력관계를 확대 강화
해 나가는 정책적 노력이 필요한데, 이를 정리하면 ‘전방위 다면외교’(multi‐
vector, multi‐faceted foreign policy)로 요약할 수 있다.
키워드: 벨라루스, 동과 서, 대외정책, 진화, 동학, 선택
본 논문은 2013년 5월 18일에 투고되어 2013년 7월 16일에 심사완료하고 7월 22일
에 게재를 확정했음.
35)
Hong, Wan‐suk. Professor at the Graduate School of International & Area studies, Hankuk
University of Foreign Studies. International relations in CIS Region, Russia's foreign policy,
Nuclear Issue. 130‐791 Imun‐dong Dongdaemun‐Gu Seoul. TEL: 010‐3398‐6682 / e‐mail:
evan@hufs.ac.kr

Belarus` Foreign Policy: Evolution, Driving Forces, Choices*

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