Bi-weekly press review 16-30 June 2016

Review no. 117
Press Review
16—30 June 2016
Table of Contents
Pages
Terrorism in Africa
- Panafricanisme : une stratégie gagnante pour renforcer l’Afrique
- Time to rethink the role of women in terrorism
- Internet Security Firm: 'Cyber Jihad' Is Coming
- Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to Early Action
- Militant Islamist attacks in Africa growing
Egypt
- Assessing the Jihadist Threat in Egypt: The Sinai Peninsula
Mali
- Comment L’Insécurité S’est-elle Transportée du Nord au Centre du Pays
Nigeria
- Boko Haram est en train de laisser tomber Daech pour al-Qaida
- Boko Haram's buyer's remorse
Somalia
- Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Down but Far from Out
- Displacement, terrorism and FGM in Somalia
4
6
9
12
16
18
23
30
32
35
40
Tunisia
- Attentats en Tunisie : un an après Sousse, le pays est-il encore une cible de choix de Daesh ?
- Analysis: Why Jihadists Fight?
42
44
International Organizations
EU
- Après le Brexit, que faire ?
49
Terrorism in the World
France
- LUTTE CONTRE LE TERRORISME : Les priorités de l’Etat français en France et en Afrique 53
- How Do You Stop a Future Terrorist When the Only Evidence Is a Thought?
58
Turkey
- After attack at Istanbul airport, experts say wider security may not be the answer
- Islamic State Aimed Istanbul Airport Attack at Turkish Economy: Analysis
- External attacks rise as Islamic State fortunes fall
2
63
65
66
USA
- Un algorithme peut-il prévoir les attaques de l’Etat islamique?
- Researchers use algorithms to analyse how ISIS recruits through social media
- New Report Confirms Analysis on Spread of Islamist Terror
- Where does ISIS come from?
3
69
71
75
77
Terrorism in Africa
Panafricanisme : une stratégie gagnante pour renforcer
l’Afrique
22 juin, 2016
Confrontée à des défis majeurs en matière d’éducation, santé, gouvernance et environnement, l’Afrique doit aujourd’hui plus que jamais rester unie. La coopération
étroite entre Etats est indispensable à la sécurité et la prospérité économique du continent.Les performances économiques de l’Afrique se sont maintenues en 2015,
comme le signale le document sur les «Perspectives économiques en Afrique 2016
», diffusé récemment par la Banque africaine de développement (BAD). D’après ce
rapport, le continent africain est la région économique du monde ayant enregistré la
deuxième plus forte croissance en 2015, derrière l’Asie de l’Est. « Les pays africains, parmi lesquels figurent des champions de la croissance mondiale, ont fait
preuve d’une résilience exceptionnelle face à l’adversité économique internationale
», souligne la BAD.
Mais elle garde une certaine prudence quant à l’avenir et table sur une croissance «
modeste » à 3,7 % en 2016 puis 4,5 % en 2017. Pour la BAD, le continent doit encore faire des efforts afin que cette résilience se transforme en une amélioration des
conditions de vie des Africains. Elle plaide en particulier pour une intervention dynamique des pouvoir publics visant à promouvoir une croissance plus rapide et inclusive.
Jean-François Daguzan : la nécessité d’une « action concertée » contre le terrorisme
Car si les chiffres de la croissance sont encourageants, ils ne sont pas suffisants.
Comme le rappelait le ministre du commerce du Ghana, Eksow Spio-Garbrah, «
c’est à 7 % que les experts fixent la barre pour que l’Afrique commence à absorber
les millions de jeunes qui arrivent chaque année sur le marché du travail et à faire
reculer de manière significative une pauvreté qui demeure massive ». De nombreux
pays africains sont trop dépendants des matières premières et doivent engager une
4
véritable transformation de leur économie par l’industrialisation. L’Afrique doit également faire face à une fuite massive de capitaux. Du fait de complexes systèmes de
surfacturation, l’argent tiré de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles prend trop en
effet souvent la route de l’étranger.
La violence terroriste constitue également un défi majeur pour le continent. La menace du djihadisme plane désormais sur la presque totalité des pays africains. Pour
Jean-François Daguzan, directeur adjoint de la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, « la violence extrémiste islamiste forme désormais un continuum stratégique
africain de l’Atlantique à la mer Rouge et au nord vers la Méditerranée, avec désormais la transversale saharo-sahélienne comme fil conducteur ». Face à cette situation, le renforcement de la coopération entre les Etats africains est indispensable. «
Lutter contre ce défi majeur demande désormais une analyse partagée et une action
concertée », soutient le chercheur.
Guillaume Soro : il faut « construire des politiques publiques en faveur des
jeunes »
Mais la réponse politique et sociale est également nécessaire. Comme l’affirme
Guillaume Soro, président de l’Assemblée nationale ivoirienne, dans une interview
accordée au Point, « il faut absolument, et de manière croisée, construire des politiques publiques en faveur des jeunes, de leur éducation, de leur formation, de leur
intégration harmonieuse dans le tissu économique et social » afin de lutter contre la
violence. Comme lui, de nombreux analystes et hommes politiques estiment que la
réponse sécuritaire ne s’oppose pas aux stratégies visant à atteindre un développement économique plus inclusif et une meilleure répartition des fruits de la croissance. Au contraire, la lutte contre la pauvreté participe pleinement de la lutte contre
le terrorisme, qui se nourrit de la précarité de la population.
Or, pour le président de l’Assemblée ivoirienne, l’intégration économique des pays
africains est essentielle face à l’étroitesse de leurs marchés et la faiblesse de leurs
économies. « Une union panafricaine permettra d’améliorer considérablement notre
capacité de gestion intégrée de nos ressources, d’assurer notre indépendance énergétique et céréalière et d’apporter à nos populations des facilités de transport des personnes et des biens qui ont pour elles un nom sacré : liberté », clame Guillaume Soro.
La tâche n’est pas simple. L’Afrique est constituée de plus de 50 Etats, s’étend sur
plus de 30 millions de Km2 et compte plus d’un milliard d’habitants, soit près de 16
% de la population mondiale. Une pluralité qui interdit tout repli identitaire mais qui
exige des stratégies de développement ambitieuses et cohérentes afin que les Africains puissent profiter pleinement des nombreuses richesses de leur continent.
http://www.financialafrik.com/
5
Time to rethink the role of women in terrorism
It’s often assumed that women involved in terrorist acts are passive participants even victims of domineering husbands and e tremist ideologies. Recent
case studies from Islamist militant groups around the world tell a different
story. y JASMINE OPPERMAN and DANIE
E OWIT .
When it comes to analysing the role of women in terrorism, they are often portrayed as victims. They are seen as the prey of extremist propaganda, with little
choice or different reasons for supporting an extremist ideology than those of men.
However, a look at their roles in recent attacks in Europe and US presents a different reality: female participation in attacks, directly or indirectly, is usually a matter
of conviction, and demonstrates a willingness to engage in violence, full understanding of the consequences of their actions, and little empathy for the targets.
The role of women in terrorist attacks varies from active participation in attacks to
less direct involvement as couriers, financiers, propagandists, and trusted accomplices.
Ironically, involvement in attacks, whether as part of an extremist cell or as partner
to a lone wolf attacker, allows the woman to gain the kind of gender equality
often assumed to be lacking in traditional religious relationships. Empowerment is
redefined in an extremist context.
Africa is no exception. Boko Haram’s use of female suicide bombers is well recorded, with women presumed to face less scrutiny in public places. On 4 July
2014, the Nigerian military announced the arrest of three suspected female terrorists whom it accused of covertly recruiting females for the women wing of Boko
Haram The three suspects, Hafsat Bako, ainab Idris and Aisha Abubakar, were
detained while travelling in Adamawa State. The arrested females’ reported goal
was to recruit more women into Boko Haram. Hafsat Bako was reportedly married
to a member of Boko Haram, Usman Bako, who was killed by the military.
6
On 3 May 2016, Kenya’s Inspector-General of Police, Joseph Boinnet, announced
that members of an East African terror network with links to Islamic State had
been arrested on 29 April 2016. The cell of medical interns, which included females, was, according to the Inspector-General, planning large-scale attacks akin
to the Westgate Mall attack with the intention of killing innocent Kenyans They
also planned to use their medical expertise to use the pathogen anthrax in a biological terror operation. The cell members are also accused of involvement in the
radicalisation and recruitment of university students and other Kenyan youth as
well as facilitating Kenyans to join Islamic State in Libya and Syria.
In the US, Tashfeen Malik played a central role before, during and after the San
Bernardino attack. She was raised in a conservative, religious household in both
her native Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and did not show signs of radicalisation until
her college years. Before her marriage to Syed Farook in 2014 it was reported that
they discussed jihadism and martyrdom. The couple stored pipe bombs in their
home, and were capable marksmen due to frequent trips to shooting ranges. Prior
to the attack on 2 December 2015, she reached out to Islamist groups online. During the attack, she opened fire first while her husband hesitated, according to witnesses. In the ensuing car chase and prior to her death, she pledged allegiance to
Islamic State.
Most recently, in the aftermath of the attack on an Orlando LGBTI club, details are
emerging that shooter Omar Mateen’s wife may be complicit. It should be noted at
this point that investigations are ongoing. From what we know, however, it seems
that her role was one of loyal wife. She accompanied her husband while he purchased ammunition, helped him scout Disney World as a potential target, and allegedly drove him to the Pulse nightclub a number of times prior to the attack. She
texted him her love as the massacre unfolded. When questioned by the FBI, she
gave conflicting accounts of what Mateen planned the day of the mass shooting.
The couple were married in 2011 and have a three-year-old son. Like Malik, Salman was raised in a conservative Muslim household, though in a small town in
California.
These case studies – and there are plenty more – show that women are by no
means typical jihadi brides a conception of submissive, sexualised wives whose
sole job is to bear children, keep the house, and satisfy their mujahideen husbands
(whether this conception is true even within the Islamic State’s Caliphate is debateable). These women were either active participants in terrorist incidents, or at
the very least auxiliary supporters of their significant other’s plans.
These women show that categorising female participation differently based on preconceived gender roles is a mistake. Counter-terrorism policies therefore have to
treat women as equally threatening to men when it comes to carrying out terrorist
attacks.
Interestingly, the Islamic State propaganda machine has already reached that point.
Its spin doctors make no distinction between men and women when they call for
terrorist attacks in the wider world. Neither should we. DM
7
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/
8
Internet Security Firm: 'Cyber Jihad' Is Coming
16 Jun 2016
A magnifying glass is held in front of a computer screen in this picture illustration.
Islamic terrorists are arming themselves with the technical tools and expertise to
attack the online systems of Western companies and other infrastructure, warns a
study from the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology.
The goal of the report was to bring awareness to "a hyper-evolving threat," James
Scott, ICIT co-founder and senior fellow, told CN C.
A large-scale attack could be just around the corner. "These guys have the money
to go on hacker-for-hire forums and just start hiring hackers," he said.
Much of the chatter on jihadi chat boards comes from Europeans and Americans,
often social outcasts living vicariously through the online reputation of their handle — including disenfranchised teens or jailhouse Muslim converts turned radicals, Scott said, CNBC reported.
"They may not have strong coding skills, but they have access to Western institutions and businesses and are looking to leverage that access to serve ISIS," CNBC
reported.
9
"It is obvious that cyber jihadists use dark web forums for everything — from discussing useful exploits and attack vectors, to gaining anonymity tips and learning
the basics of hacking from the ISIS cyber help desk," he said. "Setting up properly
layered attacks is incredibly easy even if one has a modest budget. All one needs is
a target and a reason."
Meanwhile, security experts issued yet another warning to back up the ICIT study's
claim:
A major underground marketplace acting like an eBay for criminals is selling access to more than 70,000 compromised servers allowing buyers to carry out widespread cyber-attacks around the world.
Researchers at Kaspersky Lab, a global computer security firm based in Moscow,
said the online forum appears to be run by a Russian speaking group. It offers access to hacked computers owned by governments, companies and universities in
173 countries, unbeknownst to the servers' legitimate owners, Reuters reported.
Access goes for as little as $6 for a compromised server. Each comes pre-equipped
with a variety of software to mount denial-of-service attacks on other networks,
launch spam campaigns, illicitly manufacture bitcoin currency or compromise
online or retail payment systems, the researchers said.
Starting at $7, buyers can gain access to government servers in several countries,
including interior and foreign ministries, commerce departments and several town
halls, said Costin Raiu, director of Kaspersky's research and analysis team.
He said the market might also be used to exploit hundreds of millions of old, stolen
email credentials reported in recent months to be circulating in the criminal underground.
"Stolen credentials are just one aspect of the cybercrime business," Raiu told Reuters in an interview. "In reality, there is a lot more going on in the underground.
These things are all interconnected."
The marketplace goes by the name xDedic. Dedic is short for dedicated, a term
used in Russian online forums for a computer under remote control of a hacker and
available for use by other parties.
XDedic connects sellers of compromised servers with criminal buyers. The market's owners take a 5 percent up-front fee on all money put into trading accounts,
Raiu said.
Kaspersky found the machines run remote desktop software widely used by network administrators to provide technical support for Microsoft Windows users. Access to servers with high capacity network connections may cost up to $15.
Low prices, searchable feature lists that advertise attack capabilities, together with
services to protect illicit users from becoming detected attract buyers from entrylevel cybercriminals to state-sponsored espionage groups.
An unnamed Internet service provider in Europe alerted Kaspersky to the existence
10
of xDedic, Raiu said.
High-profile targets include a U.S. aerospace firm, banks in the United States, Philippines, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Ghana, Cyprus, South Korea and Saudi Arabia, chemical firms in Singapore and Thailand and oil companies in China and the United Arab
Emirates, Kaspersky found.
(Newsmax wire services contributed to this report).
http://www.newsmax.com/
11
Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to Early Action
22 Jun 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After a period of relative calm, an upsurge of crises is testing the international system, pitting major powers and regional players against one another and highlighting
the weaknesses of preventive diplomacy. Governments and international organisations were taken by surprise by the Arab uprisings in 2011 and slow to react to crises
in South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) in the years that followed.
Global and regional rivalries have weakened diplomacy over Syria, Ukraine and the
South China Sea. Policymakers, stretched by the symptoms of this wave of instability, including mass displacement and the spread of transnational terrorism, struggle
to focus on conflict prevention.
Yet, preventive diplomacy is not necessarily dead. The Iranian nuclear deal, progress toward peace in Colombia and the high-level push to avoid election-related
chaos in Nigeria in 2015 have been reminders of what intensive international engagement can deliver. If politicians, diplomats and international officials invest in
key dimensions of early warning and early action – analysing conflict dynamics
closely, building sensitive political relationships in troubled countries and undertaking complex framework diplomacy with other powers to create political space for
crisis management – they still have a chance to avert or mitigate looming conflicts
and ease existing wars.
This report, drawing on Crisis Group’s field-centred analysis and policy recommendations from the past five years, sets out a broad strategic framework for preventive
diplomacy. Its primary focus is on conflicts, like those in Ukraine and Syria, which
12
directly involve outside powers. While classical inter-state conflicts remain rare, internationalised civil wars are a leading source of regional and global frictions. Building frameworks to address both the internal and external tensions that shape them is
likely to be a recurrent challenge for big powers, regional players and multilateral
organisations in the years ahead.
The first half of this report focuses on the internal drivers of recent and current crises. It argues that while it is exceedingly hard to identify specific triggers of future
conflicts, it is possible to identify likely threats to peace and work out how they may
play out if left unaddressed. It emphasises the need to understand the political dimensions of conflicts and, especially, the leaders and elites whose choices for or
against violence are pivotal. Grasping how such leaders make these decisions is essential for effective early warning, but it must be buttressed by much broader political analysis covering, inter alia, the dynamics of ruling parties, opposition groups
and civil society, not just at the national but at all levels of society.
Building anticipatory relations with all these actors constitutes a bedrock for effective early action by outside partners, once a crisis looks set to break. It is impor-tant,
too, to grasp the politics and strategies of militaries and internal security forces in
cases such as Egypt, or of non-state armed groups in chaotic environments like Libya. The report also highlights the sources of many conflicts in countries’ marginalised peripheral regions. Local rebellions in Yemen, Mali, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), Pakistan and CAR, to name a few, have expanded unexpectedly
and exponentially, causing widespread violence and overthrowing a number of governments.
A focus on the internal players in countries at risk must be complemented by efforts
to engage and balance the interests of external actors, while recognising that the distinction between internal and external actors is moot in many crises. In the Middle East and Central and West Africa, conflicts frequently flow across borders, and
regional powers simultaneously fuel conflicts and position themselves as peacemakers. Ethnic groups such as the Kurds in the Middle East straddle multiple countries,
while organised criminal networks and transnational extremist groups are not restricted to individual states. This means that experts engaged in early warning and
early action must treat regional and wider international factors as integral to their
conflict analysis and development of appropriate policy.
The report goes on to look more closely at the varieties of framework diplomacy
that can facilitate the requisite engagement. In many crises it is necessary to look
beyond established multilateral frameworks – important though these can be – and
pull together case-specific groupings of states and institutions to manage a problem,
or at least minimise frictions. Sometimes neither formal nor ad hoc inter-gov-ernmental arrangements will be suitable: back-channel diplomacy led by local insider
mediators specialised international NGOs or other actors may be the best initial
way to handle looming tensions.
The remainder of the report reviews the means available for directly engaging in
conflicts as they escalate or in anticipation of their outbreak. It emphasises the need
for inclusive approaches to political dialogue, meaning not only outreach to civil
society, women’s groups and other constructive forces, but also marginalised minorities and armed groups – including some highly controversial actors such as Islamist
extremists. In addition to mediation and other diplomatic options such as deploying
13
high-level envoys, tools include a range of coercive measures and incentives for
peace. Coercive tools include diplomatic naming and shaming threats of international legal action in response to atrocities and the use of sanctions. All have significant limitations and can worsen rather than alleviate crises if not well coordinated
and aligned to a broader political strategy.
At least equal caution should be applied to the use of force. As the Arab intervention
in Yemen has underlined, like many interventions before it, military action can
prove costly and counterproductive. This caution also applies to deployments of military peace operations, which have become a standard part of international crisis
management (especially in Africa) and increasingly tend toward more robust forms
of peace enforcement. While such missions can and do save lives, they can also become entangled in local conflicts, get bogged down in situations from which they
have no exit strategy and become overly aligned with governments that do not always enjoy much popular support.
Whatever direct or indirect means of engagement states use, they should set explicit
and limited political goals and communicate these clearly to other actors (including
their opponents) to avoid violence spiralling beyond control. While coercion may
have a role to play in management of a specific crisis, it should be balanced with
clear incentives for leaders, elites and their supporters to follow paths away from
violence. These may include aid for post-crisis demobilisation, governance reforms
and reconstruction.
More strategically, the best peace incentives that outsiders may be able to offer are
ideas and advice to actors in a crisis on how to structure mutually-beneficial arrangements to share power and resources. In Libya, for example, the interest all
sides ultimately have in a functioning energy sector could be a point of consensus
even while political disputes create friction.
No one group of analysts and forecasters is consistently right in its early warnings
(Crisis Group included), and no early action strategy is foolproof. Tackling conflicts
as they emerge and develop is an inherently chancy business, and governments and
international organisations that engage in it inevitably risk failure. Nevertheless, early, strategic, well-designed engagement predicated on the discipline of close analysis, development of anticipatory relationships and framework diplomacy may help
prevent conflict or limit its escalation. To the extent that their resources permit, governments, regional bodies and international organisations should invest in four key
areas:
Knowledge and relationships. Policymakers, working directly or through others,
should develop the closest possible knowledge of troubled countries’ polit-ical
systems and cultivate channels for frank discussions with leaders, elites, secu-rity
forces and civil society over the risks of crisis. Early warning should, in sum,
rest not only on economic and other indicators of danger (although these are useful), but also on in-depth political links with crucial actors.
Framework diplomacy. Given the dangers of international and regional tensions
exacerbating a crisis, policymakers should make early and concerted efforts to
bring international players to the table to assess their interests, hear their analyses
and develop common positions on how to act. This can take place in formal multi-
14
lateral settings or ad hoc, but it is essential to choose mechanisms that enable real
bargaining, resulting in frameworks for handling a conflict, rather than formal exchanges or public recriminations.
Strategic planning and communication. It is easy for policymakers to stumble
into crises without a clear grasp of what they aim to achieve. The constant need
to make statements, launch initiatives and satisfy calls for action makes strategic
thinking and planning difficult. It is crucial that governments and international
organisations invest in laying out clear overall goals for engaging in crises and
communicate these clearly both to the players involved in a conflict and other
international actors with interests at stake.
Creating pathways to peace. The ultimate goal of all this relationship-build-ing,
framework diplomacy and strategic planning is not simply to guide early action,
but to signal to the parties at the centre of a conflict that they can take paths to
peace rather than wade into violence. Outside actors can rarely compel leaders
and factions on the brink of conflict to step back. But if they are able to engage in
well-informed political and diplomatic work and sketch out ideas for lasting
peaceful solutions to a conflict, they may persuade their interlocutors to pause
before escalating – and perhaps follow an alternative political route that avoids,
or at least limits, all-out violence.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/
15
Study: Militant Islamist attacks in Africa growing
y Kristina Wong - 06/27/16 03:40 PM EDT
The number of militant Islamist attacks in Africa has more than quadrupled in just
the past six years, according to new research published Monday.
Militant Islamist attacks grew from just 171 across Africa in 2009, to 738 attacks in
2015, according to new analysis by IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.
Deaths from the attacks have grown from 541 in 2009 to 4,600 fatalities — an increase of more than 750 percent.
Experts say there are three new trends causing this rise: Collaboration between Boko
Haram and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS); competition between al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS for territory and recruits; and the continuing resilience of al Qaeda's Somalia branch, al-Shabab.
Since Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015, there has been an increase in the number and lethality of suicide bombings in Nigeria and neighboring
countries, said Matthew Henman, head of the Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.
ADVERTISEMENT
"The punitive nature of such violence and the calculatedly shocking use of young
females as suicide bombers echoed key tactical and operational practices of the Islamic State," he said.
He also said the Nigerian terrorist group's propaganda immediately grew more sophisticated to match ISIS's.
Henman also said there are multiple indications that ISIS has created links between
its affiliates in Libya and West Africa and has sought to exploit longstanding smug-
16
gling routes through the Sahel between North and West Africa.
At the same time, Henman said a "revitalized" AQIM is seeking to outdo ISIS in
West Africa, which could see violence spread to Senegal and Ghana.
The increased competition between the Islamic State and AQIM raises terrorism
risks in West Africa and indicates that attack numbers are unfortunately likely to rise
in the six month outlook, Henman said.
There is also a growing risk of further attacks in countries that have not previously
been the target of militant Islamist violence, particularly Senegal and Ghana," he
added.
Meanwhile, al-Shabab has expanded its capabilities over 2015 and 2016 and has increasingly begun attacking and overrunning African Union Mission in Somalia
peacekeeper bases and inflicting substantial casualties, the research said.
In May, U.S. forces called in an air strike after Ugandan soldiers they were advising
as part of the African Union mission got into a firefight with about 15 to 20 alShabab fighters. The airstrike killed five al-Shabab fighters, according to the Pentagon.
The United States has about 50 military personnel inside Somalia and has repeatedly targeted the group and its leaders in recent months.
http://thehill.com/policy/
17
Egypt
Assessing the Jihadist Threat in Egypt: The Sinai Peninsula
JUNE 29, 2016
Tactics used by the Islamist militancy in the Sinai Peninsula, which included this
2015 bombing of a police station in El Arish, resemble an insurgency more than a
terrorism campaign. (AFP/Getty Images)
Forecast


'
-
A comprehensive counterinsurgency approach will be needed to truly address
the deep issues that make Sinai an ideal jihadist recruitment and operational
area.
Analysis
The history of radical Islamism in Egypt is long and bloody. But in the past few
years, the threat posed by Egyptian jihadists has reached new heights. Many of the
country's jihadists, held captive under former President Hosni Mubarak, were freed
during the revolution that led to his ouster in 2011. These militants went on to play
a leading role in forming groups such as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, which by late 2013
had become the most active and deadly terrorist group in Egypt.
Interactive: Terrorist Incidents: Egypt & the SinaiFREE
Of course, any attempt to examine Egypt's militant threat must first acknowledge
the vast difference between the threat environment on the Sinai Peninsula and that
of mainland Egypt. The former is far more of an insurgency; Sinai militants employ hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, roadside bombings and indirect-fire attacks
with rockets and mortars. By contrast, the militant threat on the mainland tends to
more closely resemble urban terrorism.
Much of the reason for this difference stems from the long history of tension between the government in Cairo and the Bedouin tribes inhabiting the peninsula.
Strong tribal networks in Sinai have limited the government's control there, as
haverestrictions placed on government forces allowed into the peninsula under the
Camp David Accords. The Bedouins have a number of grievances, including allegations that the government has not provided much-needed services or encouraged
economic development in the territory. They also accuse the government of using
18
excessive force in response to the tribal uprisings engendered by those perceived
shortcomings. The Egyptian government's often-harsh responses to dissent bear out
those complaints and have helped make Bedouin tribes ripe recruiting grounds for
jihadist groups.
INTERACTIVE
The Rise of Ansar eit al-Maqdis
From 2004 to 2006, a violent campaign of suicide bombing attacks against tourist
targets in Sinai shook resorts in Taba, Sharm el-Sheikh and Dahab. The group behind
the attacks was mostly made up of radicalized local Bedouins who had been heavily
influenced by the actions of Abu Musab al- arqawi, so much so that they named
their group Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) — the name of al- arqawi's
group before it adopted the al Qaeda in Iraq moniker in October 2004.
The Egyptian government came down hard on Tawhid wa al-Jihad, killing many of
its leaders and fighters. But the military response only suppressed the simmering mil-
19
itant problem; it did not extinguish it. In the wake of Mubarak's overthrow, Sinai
militancy again roared to life, giving rise to Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. Although the
group used a new name, many of its members, especially those in Sinai, were veterans of the defunct Tawhid wa al-Jihad. Initially, the group focused on Israel, conducting a string of rocket attacks against Eilat from Sinai as well as a number of
bombing attacks on natural gas pipelines running from Egypt to Israel. In 2012,
however, the group beganassassinating tribal leaders in Sinai who were important
mediators with the government. By removing them, the jihadists sought to deny the
government a means to rein in jihadist activity on the peninsula.
Following the July 2013 coup that overthrew former President Mohammed Morsi, a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis began to increasingly
target Egyptian security forces. Though the group had conducted such attacks in late
2012, they became much more frequent in 2013. Using roadside bombs, suicide vehicle bombs, small arms and rockets, the group launched numerous attacks against
buses transporting Egyptian security personnel. In January 2014, it shot down an
Egyptian army helicopter in Sinai using an Igla-class, man-portable surface-to-air
missile, presumably received from Libya.
The Jihadist Schism
After a schism developed between al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq in 2013,
and the Islamic State declared a caliphate in June 2014, many of Ansar Beit alMaqdis' members chose to ally themselves with the Islamic State. Some members of
the militant group had previously traveled to Syria to fight alongside jihadists there
who formed the core of the Islamic State. In November 2014, the group was accepted as part of the Islamic State's Wilayat Sinai, or Sinai Province. But a capable portion of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, led by former Egyptian special operations forces officer Hisham Ashmawy and operating in the Egyptian mainland, did not break from
al Qaeda.
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis' propaganda operations had shown some similarity to those of
the Islamic State before November 2014, but after that point they showed even
more, indicating close collaboration between the two organizations. Their cooperation also began to manifest itself in the Wilayat Sinai's battlefield tactics. For example, on July 1, 2015, the group launched a large-scale attack on the northern Sinai
town of Sheikh uweid, using hybrid tactics that combined suicide bombings with
an armed assault by a large number of gunmen. Those tactics were similar to the
ones employed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to successfully overrun defenses and capture military bases and cities. Although the assault on Sheikh uweid was
eventually repelled, resulting in heavy losses for Wilayat Sinai, it nonetheless signaled the danger posed by the group. Not long after the Sheikh uweid incident,
Wilayat Sinai claimed responsibility for an attack against an Egyptian navy patrol
boat near Rafah using an anti-tank guided missile. Then, in October 2015, it also
claimed credit for the bombing of Metrojet Flight 9268 shortly after it took off from
the Sharm el-Sheikh airport in southern Sinai.
20
Wilayat Sinai's attempts to capture and hold territory in the peninsula have been unsuccessful, and it has suffered heavy casualties in its attacks against Egyptian military and security forces. It nevertheless retains the ability to conduct frequent attacks
against security forces and checkpoints. But its tactics have shifted back toward employing roadside bombs and occasional hit-and-run attacks with small units, limiting
the group's losses and permitting it to sustain operations for longer.
Efforts have been made on the peninsula, which has long been a corridor for smuggling weapons to Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip, to stop the flow of
weapons from Libya to Wilayat Sinai. But militants do not need external sources of
weapons to cause mayhem in Sinai. There are large uncleared minefields in the area
left over from the wars between Egypt and Israel. Though the mines are now antiques, they nonetheless provide Wilayat Sinai bombmakers with a valuable source
of military-grade high explosives. One dismantled anti-tank mine can provide more
than 5 kilograms (11 pounds) of TNT.
Wilayat Sinai also has conducted armed assaults and indirect-fire attacks against the
Multinational Force and Observers base in Sinai. The assaults have led to the closure
of some smaller outposts and a reduction of the number of personnel posted there.
Wilayat Sinai's attacks have also reduced tourism in Sinai, an important source of
revenue for Egypt's economy and jobs for the peninsula's residents.
The Egyptian military frequently trumpets the number of Wilayat Sinai militants it
kills, a list that includes several prominent group leaders, but it is unlikely that Cairo
will be able to kill its way out of this problem. As in previous waves of Sinai militancy, Egypt's heavy-handed response may actually serve to radicalize more young
21
Bedouin men. Until the Egyptian government begins to address problems in Sinai
using a more comprehensive counterinsurgency program, the underlying social, economic and political issues there will continue to spur regional militancy. Aware of
the threat, Saudi Arabia has proposed a $1.5 billion economic development plan for
Sinai; the plan is pending final approval by the Egyptian parliament. But if and
when it is implemented, the plan will be only one small step of many that will be
required to provide the security, sound governance and economic opportunities
needed to stabilize the peninsula. In the meantime, jihadists will continue to recruit
and operate in the peninsula.
https://www.stratfor.com/
22
Mali
Mali : COMMENT ’INSECURITE S’EST-E E
TRANSPORTEE DU NORD AU CENTRE DU PAYS
27 juin 2016
Analyse des causes profondes de la violence et comment agir pour prévenir
l’insécurité et le radicalisme des jeunes pasteurs nomades ?
a multiplication d’épisodes violents dans le centre du Mali depuis la moitié
de l’année 2015 démontre à quel point la pai reste fragile. a signature de
l’accord pour la pai et l’amorce d’un processus de réconciliation ont certes
marqué une avancée pour le gouvernement mais la stabilité demeure précaire
dans les régions Centre et Nord comme en témoignent la naissance récente de
l’alliance nationale pour la sauvegarde de l’identité peulh et la restauration de
la justice (ANSIPRJ). ’e trémisme violent gagnant du terrain chez les communautés nomades du centre du Mali il s’agit de trouver quelques e plications empiriques à ce phénomène avec une analyse discursive à l’appui. Comment l’insécurité s’est-elle transportée du nord au centre du pays ? Pourquoi
la région de Mopti est-elle considérée comme l’une des plus insécurisée de nos
jours ? Quels sont les acteurs qui animent les violences dans le centre du Mali ?
Quelles sont les causes profondes de ces violences ? Comment agir pour prévenir l’insécurité et le radicalisme des jeunes des pasteurs nomades ?
’occupation du centre du Mali par les mouvements rebelles et djihadistes en
2012
La rébellion de 2012 est la cinquième du genre dans le septentrion malien. La particularité de cette dernière révolte réside dans sa capacité à déstabiliser un État déjà
affaibli par les allégations de corruption et perçu comme injuste et laxiste par une
23
partie de l’opinion malienne. La chute du régime de Mouammar Kadhafi en Libye,
a été un facteur important dans le déclenchement de cette crise au Mali. Si au départ, la rébellion visait à chasser des régions nord les forces armées et les agents de
l’État en vue de proclamer « l’indépendance de l’État de l’Azawad », ses objectifs
ont finalement été détournés par des djihadistes et des narcotrafiquants ayant fini
par chasser le MNLA des principales villes du nord. Entretemps, la région de
Mopti est entrée dans la danse avec l’occupation entière du cercle de Douentza par
les rebelles touaregs du MNLA, puis par les djihadistes du Mouvement de l’Unicité du Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). Traditionnellement, les Peuls exerçant le pastoralisme ont toujours été en tension avec les Touareg, autour des questions liées à l’exploitation des ressources pastorales et le vol de bétail, dans cette
région. Beaucoup de Peuls nomades, dans le cercle de Douentza se souviennent
amèrement des razzias conduites par le nommé Marouchal, un guerrier touareg de
la fraction Ibogholitane de la zone de Inadiafane, dont les fils étaient les représentants du MNLA pendant l’occupation. Craignant la restauration d’une hégémonie
touarègue dans la région, les pasteurs peuls ont vite fait allégeance au MUJAO.
Ces alliés du MUJAO seraient majoritairement constitués de Peuls Toleebé du Niger et Jelgoobé du Burkina Faso. Le fil identitaire a été le principal facteur mobilisateur des Peuls du Hayré et du Seeno en faveur d’une intégration dans les rangs
du MUJAO en 2012. En plus de cela, cette communauté semblait être assoiffée de
justice. La justice étatique perçue par bon nombre de gens comme corrompue en
laquelle les communautés nomades ne se reconnaissent pas. Le MUJAO, dès ses
premières heures d’occupation du cercle de Douentza, a tenu à délivrer une « justice équitable » pour davantage gagner la confiance des pasteurs nomades peuls.
L’insécurité grandissante, qui s’est traduite par les multiples vols de bétails, les
braquages pendant les jours de foire et les assassinats ciblés, est le principal motif
qui a poussé d’autres Peuls à rallier les rangs du MUJAO.
De la reconquête du nord à la nouvelle crise du centre
Le 11 janvier 2013, la reconquête des régions nord et centre du Mali débuta à travers l’opération Serval menée par l’armée française. Ainsi, les djihadistes furent
déroutés et leur rêve de faire de Mopti la capitale de leur éphémère « État islamique » fut brisé. Après les bombardements des positions des djihadistes par les
troupes de l’opération Serval, l’armée malienne procéda au « ratissage », en combattant les djihadistes, ainsi qu’aux enquêtes et arrestations des personnes ayant
rejoint les rangs des djihadistes ou rebelles.
Plusieurs personnes ont été interpelées dans les campements peuls, dont les leaders
de pasteurs nomades qui avaient rejoint ou envoyé leurs proches dans les camps
d’entrainement du MUJAO à Gao. Des témoignages concordants affirment que
des proches des chefferies traditionnelles (élites locales) auraient facilité la mise
en relation entre vendeurs d’armes et pasteurs peuls souhaitant s’armer. Ces
mêmes élites sont accusées par les pasteurs d’être leurs dénonciateurs auprès de
l’armée malienne après la reconquête.
Depuis la signature de l’accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation, excepté les conflits intercommunautaires ayant opposé différentes fractions touarègues (Imghads
du GATIA aux Ifoghas voire Idaksahaq ou Daoussahak de la CMA) et quelques
attaques ciblant les forces militaires onusiennes et maliennes, les régions nord du
Mali connaissent une certaine accalmie. Les mouvements armés du nord, après
24
s’être livrés pendant des mois à une guerre fratricide autour du contrôle territorial de
certaines localités avec des enjeux économiques énormes, se sont donnés rendezvous à Anefis (région de Kidal) pour enterrer la hache de guerre par un dialogue intercommunautaire. À ce sujet, International Crisis Group, dans son der nier r apport paru à la mi-décembre 2015, s’interroge sur les chances d’aboutissement de
cette « Paix d’en bas». Dans le prolongement de cette initiative, un forum a été organisé le 28 mars 2016 à Kidal par la CMA, sur financement du gouvernement malien
destiné à entériner le processus déclenché à Anéfis. Il est à noter que ni le gouvernement du Mali ni la plateforme, actrice principale de la rencontre intercommunautaire
d’Anefis, n’ont pris part à cette rencontre de Kidal.
Entretemps, le centre du Mali est devenu le nouveau théâtre des violences liées à la
crise depuis quelques mois. Si les attaques perpétrées contre les forces armées maliennes et quelques élites locales dans la région de Mopti sont souvent attribuées au
Front de libération du Macina, certains de nos interlocuteurs affirment tout le contraire. Un pasteur nomade de la région de Mopti témoigne ainsi : « N
é
M
N
’
q
é
j
é
N
’ x
’
é
é
MN
M
é é
’
q ’
é
q ’
q ’
q ’
’
N
’
!
é
é
è
q ê
’
é
x q é
’
’
q
’
à
é
q
’
é
à
ê
à
à
é
à
» Depuis l’annonce en janvier 2015 sur les médias occidentaux de la création
du Front de libération du Macina (FLM), dont le principal leader serait le prédicateur peul Hamadou Diallo, dit Hamadou Kouffa, issu du nom de son village natal
Kouffa, les Peuls de la région de Mopti sont devenus une cible potentielle pour les
forces armées pendant leurs opérations anti-terroristes. L’analyse que font les journalistes et les chercheurs sur le Front de libération du Macina est très différente de
celle des communautés sur le terrain. Les populations rencontrées dans la région de
Mopti (Mopti, Douentza, Boni, Mondoro, Ténenkou) lors de nos enquêtes pensent
que le FLM, en tant que mouvement structuré avec des combattants et des armements lourds, n’existe pas. Elles mettent la plupart des récentes violences sous le
coup des règlements de compte et de la frustration. Un cadre peul, ancien président
de l’Assemblée nationale du Mali et fervent défenseur de la cause peule, soutient à
propos du FLM : « N
H
K
q
K
x
ê
é
ê
q
q q ’
x é
Q
’
é
’
!
M ’
q ’
ç ».
Selon sept jeunes pasteurs nomades, ressortissants du cercle de Douentza arrêtés à la
mi-janvier par les militaires de l’Opération Seeno et transférés à Bamako sous le
soupçon d’une appartenance aux groupes djihadistes : « Nous avons été arrêtés sans
25
preuve et transférés dans une prison à Bamako. Depuis des mois, c’est le même
scénario qui se poursuit dans notre zone. Les Peuls sont accusés à tort et à travers
d’être des djihadistes. Tous les campements peuls se sont vidés de nos jours. Tous
nos parents sont partis se réfugier au Burkina Faso par crainte de se faire arrêter
par l’armée malienne. »
Les forces gouvernementales ont mené des opérations militaires contre les groupes
armés islamistes qui ont fréquemment débouché sur des arrestations arbitraires, des
mauvais traitements et des actes de torture. Les FAMA ont souvent été impliquées
dans de graves abus, prenant pour cible des civils des communautés peule et dogon.
Ces abus ont généralement cessé après que les militaires ont remis les détenus aux
mains des gendarmes, soutient une analyse de Human Rights Watch.
Par ailleurs, il ressort de nombre de témoignages que les violences qui touchent le
centre du Mali ont pour causes les clivages intercommunautaires et les frustrations
des communautés, en majorité nomades, contre leurs propres élites au niveau local,
et contre les agents de l’État. Avec le retour des représentants de l’État, en effet, les
communautés nomades armées sous l’occupation djihadiste ont été contraintes par
les services de sécurité (gendarmerie) à se désarmer. Selon la plupart de nos informateurs, certains gendarmes, en complicité avec des élites locales, ont exigé le paiement de contraventions aux détenteurs d’armes. Ces sommes s’élèveraient en
moyenne entre cent mille FCFA (152,45 EUR) et six cent mille (914,7 EUR). Les
opérations de ratissage menées par les forces armées maliennes dans le cadre de
l’Opération Seno, ciblant les Peuls suspectés d’être des djihadistes ou de collaborer
avec le Front de libération du Macina, semblent cependant n’avoir aucun impact sur
la sécurité et la lutte contre le terrorisme dans le centre du Mali. Elles ont, au contraire, à en croire les témoignages recueillis auprès des victimes de ces arrestations,
poussé les communautés nomades à se radicaliser davantage. Pendant l’occupation
djihadiste, la plupart des leaders peuls ayant fait allégeance au MUJAO avaient
avoué que leur intention n’était pas de combattre l’État. Même s’il faut souligner au
passage que certains d’entre eux reprochaient aux agents de l’État d’être corrompus
et partiaux lors de la gestion des conflits inter et intracommunautaires. Par conséquent, c’est souvent en réaction aux exactions des forces armées que certains ressortissants des communautés locales se positionnent désormais en ennemis de l’État
malien et s’en prennent à toute personne soupçonnée de collaborer avec les représentants de l’administration. Beaucoup d’entre eux ont également rejoint les djihadistes pour avoir accès aux armes, savoir les manier à des fins d’autoprotection.
Ainsi, le djihad est devenu un alibi pour ces communautés nomades en vue d’atteindre leurs objectifs d’autodéfense. Aussi, les assassinats du chef de village de Dogo, du commerçant dogon dans le village d’Issèye (Mondoro), du conseiller de village de Boni, du fils du chef de village de Wouro Allaye Tème (Mondoro) etc., survenus tous dans la région de Mopti, sont à considérer comme des règlements de
compte à la suite de conflits anciens mal ou non gérés par la justice étatique.
Impossible de clore ce chapitre sans évoquer les affrontements intercommunautaires,
entre Peuls et Bambaras, qui ont eu lieu dans la commune de Karéri (Cercle de Ténenkou) faisant une trentaine de morts dans le rang des Peuls. Selon plusieurs
sources concordantes : « Deux Bambaras du village de Karéri, dont le 3e adjoint
au maire, ont été tués par des djihadistes qui seraient des Peuls de la zone. En re-
26
présailles, les Bambaras se sont constitués en milice d’auto-défense pour faire
face aux attaques des Peuls. À cet effet, ils ont tué six Peuls le samedi 30 mai et
une vingtaine le dimanche 1er mai. ».
Le gouvernement a rapidement dépêché une délégation ministérielle sur place pour
réconcilier les deux communautés. À noter que le président de Tapital Pulaaku, un
mouvement dédié à la promotion de la culture peule et à la défense des intérêts de la
communauté peule, faisait partie de cette mission gouvernementale. Le gouvernement était une fois de plus interpelé pour restaurer la sécurité sur tout le territoire
national afin de prévenir la multiplication d’affrontements intercommunautaires qui
mettent en péril les avancées en matière de réconciliation et de vivre ensemble au
Mali.
a revendication politique des pasteurs peuls du Hayré et du Seeno via l’Association Dewral Pulaaku
L’Association Dewral Pulaaku a été créée pendant les premières heures de la reconquête des régions centre et nord du Mali. Elle est une initiative des pasteurs nomades
du Hayré et du Seeno (région de Mopti). Selon les textes réglementaires de ladite
association, elle a pour objectifs de promouvoir le pastoralisme, prévenir les conflits
inter et intracommunautaires, défendre et protéger les droits des pasteurs nomades
etc. Dewral, malgré qu’elle soit officiellement une association à but apolitique, pourrait être considérée comme une organisation défendant les intérêts politiques, sociaux et économiques des Peuls du Hayré et du Seeno. Elle est essentiellement constituée de Peuls dont des Seedoobé (pasteurs nomades), des Weheebe (élites locales)
et des Diawambé. Dès sa création, elle a été dénoncée par certaines élites politiques
(Weheebe) comme une organisation djihadiste cherchant à se légaliser puisque son
président lui-même avait rejoint le MUJAO en 2012. À la question de savoir pourquoi il avait rejoint le MUJAO, le président de Dewral Pulaaku et non moins chef de
village de Boulekessi (situé à la frontière Burkinabé) soutient :
« Au moment de l’occupation de la zone par le MNLA, les Touaregs nous ont fait
souffrir. Ils nous ont interdit l’accès à des pâturages dans la brousse, de cultiver
nos champs et ont tué un de mes cousins en violant également sa femme. J’avais
été menacé de mort et il a fallu que je fuie de chez moi pour aller me réfugier au
Burkina Faso puis à San (région de Ségou). C’est ce qui m’a motivé à identifier
des bras valides dans ma zone pour les amener à s’entrainer dans les camps du
MUJAO à Gao. Moi-même j’étais avec eux à Gao. C’est avec le déclenchement de
Serval que nous avons été dispersés et on a même perdu un jeune lors des bombardements de l’opération française. Je tiens à préciser que nous n’avons pas pris
les armes pour attaquer l’État malien mais pour nous défendre contre nos ennemis. C’était dans le but de l’autoprotection. … C’est pourquoi avec la reconquête,
nous avons créé Dewral Pulaaku pour défendre et protéger les intérêts des pasteurs nomades. Notre association est loin d’être une organisation terroriste. »
La création de Dewral est stratégique et semble avoir été mûrement réfléchie. Les
nomades qui ont rejoint ou soutenu moralement le MUJAO se sentaient menacés par
le retour de la « normalité ». Des menaces qui allaient de la discrimination aux arrestations, ce malgré les plaidoyers des cadres peuls et de la section Droits de l’homme
de la MINUSMA pour innocenter les personnes ayant possédé des armes pendant la
crise. La stratégie de Dewral a consisté à unifier les nomades pour éviter qu’ils
27
soient confrontés individuellement aux défis qui les attendaient. Entre temps, les tensions entre élites et pasteurs dans les communes de Boni (Haïré) et de Mondoro
(Seeno) ne fléchissent pas. D’une part, les élites accusent les pasteurs d’être les auteurs des attaques et des assassinats ciblés dans la région. D’autre part, les pasteurs
accusent les élites d’être leurs dénonciateurs auprès de l’armée. Les multiples arrestations des pasteurs nomades par l’armée malienne ont frustré beaucoup d’entre eux.
Ces arrestations, tortures et parfois assassinats commis par l’armée sont perçus
comme des abus par les pasteurs peuls et nourrissent désormais un ressentiment envers toute personne proche de l’État. Les opposants politiques locaux dans la commune du Haïré ont saisi l’opportunité que leur offrait cette association, à travers sa
forte capacité de mobilisation de pasteurs nomades qui constituent un électorat important, en se faisant élire dans le bureau de ladite association pour pouvoir bénéficier de l’électorat des nomades pendant les élections locales prochaines.
La première assemblée ayant abouti à la création de Dewral s’est tenue à Simbi dans
la commune du Haïré (région de Mopti) en juin 2014 et a regroupé des Peuls venant
de neuf communes du cercle de Douentza. L’existence de Dewral est très menacée
par des enjeux de leadership. Un conflit latent qui ne dit pas son nom menace la survie de l’association. Deu camps se disputent le contrôle de Dewral : le camp de
Amirou oulekessi (président de l’association et chef de village de oulekessi)
et celui de Amirou Grimari (trésorier de l’association et chef de village de Grimari). e second reproche au premier de s’engager dans des négociations pour
l’intégration des membres de l’organisation dans le DDR. Alors qu’à l’origine
elle n’est pas un mouvement armé.
Enjeu de l’escalade de la violence dans la région de Mopti
Les personnes rencontrées pendant nos dernières visites, entre janvier et mars 2016
dans la région de Mopti, sont très pessimistes sur l’amélioration des conditions sécuritaires dans la zone. La menace est présente des deux côtés : les communautés sont
menacées par les forces armées à la recherche des djihadistes et par ces derniers, qui
mènent des représailles contre les populations après chaque visite des FAMA dans
leur zone.
Le Delta central du Niger (Bourgou) s’affirme depuis 2014 comme le nouveau
théâtre des violences commises par les mouvements djihadistes. Cette région a été
choisie par les djihadistes comme lieu de refuge pendant la période de crue du fleuve
Niger à cause de son accès difficile. Son accès pendant l’hivernage est conditionné à
l’emprunt des moyens de locomotion fluviaux. La plupart des écoles sont fermées
dans les cercles deTénenkou et de Youwarou.
Les services administratifs ne fonctionnent pratiquement plus dans la plupart des
localités touchées par la menace djihadiste. La menace est actuellement beaucoup
plus récurrente dans les cercles de Ténenkou et de Youwarou (Delta intérieur du Niger) et dans celui de Douentza (communes du Haïré et de Mondoro) faisant frontière
avec le Burkina Faso. Les traditionnels conflits autour des bourgoutières constituent
un enjeu pendant les périodes d’exploitation des bourgous (pâturages). Les disputes
entre villages voisins sur la propriété des bourgous ont toujours été fréquentes entre
novembre et mars de chaque année. Les djihadistes ont interdit la taxation des bourgous et soutiennent que le pâturage n’appartient qu’à Dieu. Les dioros (détenteurs de
droits sur les bourgous) payent le service des agents de sécurité (gendarmerie) pour
28
sécuriser les bourgous et exigent le paiement de taxes d’exploitation. À la fin de janvier 2015, trois gendarmes ont trouvé la mort à Dialloubé (à une soixantaine de kilomètre de Mopti). Selon nos informateurs, ils auraient été tués par des djihadistes
peuls en cavale dans le delta.
es Peuls et la sortie de crise au Mali
La question peule s’est, de nos jours, invitée dans le processus de sortie de crise au
Mali. Il est difficile d’envisager une paix durable au Mali sans résoudre le problème
d’insécurité au centre du Mali dont les animateurs sont majoritairement issus de la
communauté peule. La solution militaire a pourtant montré ses limites. Des centaines de personnes arrêtées, par les FAMA dans la communauté peule, et suspectées
d’être des djihadistes ont presque tous été relâchées par la justice par manque de
preuves tangibles. Certains pensent que la solution serait de réparer l’erreur commise par l’accord en démobilisant les jeunes Peuls armés, qu’ils soient djihadistes ou
non, et en les intégrant dans le processus de DDR. Des responsables peuls, au niveau
national, sont engagés dans ce processus en partenariat avec la MINUSMA et des
leaders communautaires dans la région de Mopti. D’ores et déjà, les leaders Peuls
dans la zone inondée ont pu convaincre 186 jeunes armés prêts à déposer les armes
et à être cantonnés. Dans le Hayré et Seeno, soixante-dix jeunes armés sont prêts à
rallier le processus de DDR. Le but est d’avoir au moins quatre cent jeunes armés
peuls et les cantonner sur un site qui sera identifié de commun accord avec les partenaires.
D’autres estiment que tant que les conditions de vie précaires des pasteurs nomades
peuls ne sont pas améliorées, le centre du Mali connaîtra toujours cette instabilité. À
noter que la région de Mopti demeure l’une des dernières au Mali en termes d’accès
aux services sociaux de base. Pour une sortie de crise dans le centre du Mali, la réconciliation entre élites et pasteurs peuls, entre Peuls et leurs voisins sédentaires
(dogons, bambara), entre Peuls et Touaregs est nécessaire. Ces dialogues intra et intercommunautaires doivent se faire sous l’impulsion des leaders communautaires.
S’il y a une épine dans le pied de l’État malien dans le cadre global de la sortie de la
crise, c’est bien la question de la stabilité du centre du Mali. La compartimentalisation de la résolution de la crise malienne a montré ses limites. Il n’y a pas un conflit
du nord et un conflit du centre. Le conflit malien doit être géré dans son entièreté.
L’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation est certes un acquis mais il lui est reproché, par certaines communautés, de favoriser les régions nord au détriment du
Centre, qui a vécu la crise au même titre que celles du nord. Les violences intra et
intercommunautaires qui sévissent dans la région de Mopti sont officiellement attribuées au Front de libération du Macina (FLM) mais nos investigations sur le terrain
nous révèlent que la plupart d’entre elles sont des actes isolés de banditisme et de
règlements de comptes. Sans nous prononcer sur la question de l’existence du FLM
dans la région de Mopti, force est de constater que ceux qui agissent, au nom ou pas
du « djihad », ont souvent une conviction :
j
Les attentes sont
très grandes en matière de justice. Le Mali nouveau devait réformer le secteur de la
justice en facilitant un accès équitable à la justice à tous les maliens.
http://maliactu.net/
29
Nigeria
oko Haram est en train de laisser tomber Daech pour alQaida
mis à jour le 22/06/2016 à 18:08
e groupe terroriste nigérian est en perte de vitesse dans son fief.
Une patrouille de soldats nigérians dans la région de Bosso, le 17 juin 2016. ISSOUF SANOGO / AFP
En un an, le groupe terroriste Boko Haram a perdu beaucoup de terrain. Une coalition régionale menée par les armées nigériane, camerounaise et tchadienne a réduit à
quelques poches les territoires contrôles par les combattants djihadistes dans le nordest du Nigeria.
Un déclin qui coïncide, hasard ou pas, avec la date où Boko Haram a choisi de prêter
allégeance à l'Etat islamique («Daech» en arabe). C'était en mars 2015. À cette période, l'alliance entre les deux groupes djihadistes inquiétait fortement les puissances
occidentales, qui y voyait un moyen pour la secte nigériane de recruter de nouveaux
soldats, d'acquérir des armes plus perfectionnées et d'apprendre des techniques de
guérilla enseignées par Daech. Dans sa revue officielle, Dabiq, l'Etat islamique conseillait d'ailleurs aux volontaires d'aller grossir les rangs de Boko Haram.
Mais depuis tout a changé. «
é à
é
j
à '
Foreign Policy dans une longue analyse.
H
ê
q », explique le magazine
Une «marque» sur le déclin?
En effet, avant de s'allier avec l'Etat islamique, Boko Haram nouait des alliances
avec des groupes terroristes locaux, dont al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi),
qui lui permettait par exemple de s'approvisionner en armes à travers des réseaux
30
noués dans la zone désertique du Sahel, de la Mauritanie à la Somalie, analyse
Foreign Policy. Mais en prêtant allégeance à Daech, Boko Haram s'est mis à dos
Aqmi et les autres groupes locaux.Comme nous le racontions sur Slate.fr, c'est en
sous-traitant ses attaques à des groupes armés locaux qu'Aqmi a fait son retour au
premier plan sur le continent depuis le début de l'année 2015.
Pour Samuel Nguembock, chercheur à l'Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques (Iris), les alliances nouées par Aqmi en Afrique sont des actes très rationnels.
« '
' éé
é
é
ç éé '
q
à
é é
û
é
», expliquait à Slate.fr ce spécialiste du terrorisme au Sahel.
Retour dans le giron
Surtout, Daech n'a pas apporté l'aide escomptée à Boko Haram. Comme le pointe
Foreign Policy, le «califat» a depuis un an largement concentré ses efforts sur la Libye en Afrique, plutôt qu'au Nigeria. Aujourd'hui, Boko Haram pourrait donc bien
revenir dans le giron d'al-Qaida, qui a tristement accru son pouvoir de nuisance en
Afrique de l'Ouest depuis quelques mois, avec des attaques terroristes de grand ampleur menées à Ouagadougou, Bamako et Grand-Bassam.
«
'
H
q
q
x
à
é
http://www.slateafrique.com/
31
'
é à -Q
», conclut Foreign Policy.
q
' é q
oko Haram's buyer's remorse
When Boko Haram pledged loyalty to the Islamic State in March 2015, it seemed to
signal that the jihadi world was bending in the direction of the self-proclaimed caliphate. At the time, Boko Haram held more territory than any other Islamic State
"province" outside the group's stronghold in Syria and Iraq, and it looked poised to
expand from Nigeria into Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. The pledge of allegiance was
also seen as a deep blow to al-Qaida, the traditional jihadist standard bearer, with
whom Boko Haram had enjoyed a long if undeclared relationship. Islamic State, itself once an al-Qaida affiliate, was not just eating into al-Qaida's potential pool of
recruits - it was attempting to gobble up entire branches of the organization.
The tables have turned dramatically since then. Today, al-Qaida has an opportunity
to bring Boko Haram back into its orbit, a move that would cripple the Islamic
State's already faltering global expansion efforts. Factions within the Nigerian militant group appear to have significant buyer's remorse when it comes to the group's
defection to the Islamic State's camp.
Despite the occasional spectacular attack or bloody offensive, Boko Haram today is
substantially weaker, and controls much less territory, than when the group was rechristened as the Islamic State's West Africa Province. And its relationship with the
group bears a healthy portion of the blame.
Consider Boko Haram's presence in Borno State, which is where the group was
founded and where it has carried out more than 75 percent of its attacks. Boko Haram was the dominant military force in Borno State at the time of its pledge to the
Islamic State, and it was bearing down on the regional capital of Maiduguri. Today,
by contrast, it reportedly holds only two medium-sized towns in the state, although
large parts of northern Nigeria remain insecure.
The loss of territory has coincided with a decline in high-profile attacks - there hasn't been one in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, since October 2015 - and the arrest of a
number of the group's key leaders by Cameroonian security forces. Meanwhile, the
escape last month of one of the more than 200 schoolgirls kidnapped two years ago
from the town of Chibok - and Boko Haram's apparent willingness to negotiate the
release of the others - suggests that the group is finding it difficult to hold hostages
as its stronghold shrinks and the pressure from a regional military coalition grows.
Boko Haram's current weakness can be attributed in part to its decision to join the
Islamic State. As the militaries of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad bore down
on the Nigerian Islamists last year, one might have expected the group's fighters to
find shelter outside their home country. This is what they did the last time Boko Haram came under significant pressure from the Nigerian military. From 2009 to 2010,
when Nigerian security forces were in the midst of a bloody crackdown on Boko
Haram members and sympathizers, the militant group was able to melt away into
neighboring countries as well as into more distant troubled states - such as Mauritania, Sudan, and Somalia - with the help of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
and to a lesser extent the Somali militant group al-Shaabab, which publicly pledged
allegiance to al-Qaida in 2012.
But since it can no longer rely on the support of al-Qaida, which is the dominant
32
force in the Sahel region, Boko Haram has lost its nearby safe havens and been
forced to seek help in far-away Libya, where the Islamic State has carved out a de
facto regional capital in Sirte. (Even this base is not assured, since Islamic State in
Libya has come under increasing pressure from Libyan government-allied and antiIslamic State forces.)
Even Boko Haram's propaganda efforts have faltered since it hitched its wagon to
the Islamic State. In early 2015, the group's media capabilities took a noticeable leap
forward, almost certainly as a result of the Islamic State's assistance. But since then,
Boko Haram's propaganda department has actually taken several steps backward. So
far this year, the group has released only two videos of unimpressive quality: one
affirming loyalty to its leader, Abubakar Shekau, and to Islamic State caliph Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi; and another chronicling an attack in Bosso, Niger. And in an apparent slight, videos released by the Islamic State's flagship province in Libya no
longer encourage West African fighters to wage jihad in Nigeria. Instead, they call
on these foreign militants to travel to Libya. Meanwhile, al-Qaida affiliates have upgraded their media capabilities across the board. Improvements in the propaganda
produced by AQIM, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Syria-based
Nusra Front are striking.
Boko Haram's record of failure as an Islamic State affiliate offers al-Qaida an opening to win back its former partner -or at least persuade it that its allegiance to the
Islamic State has become more of a liability than an advantage. Elsewhere al-Qaida
has contested the Islamic State's encroachments on its territory through a combination of military force, intelligence work, crafty propaganda, and effective coalition
building.
Take for example its role in bringing about the implosion of the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Afghanistan. After the IMU joined the budding caliphate in
August 2015, the Taliban, which has resumed close cooperation with al-Qaida,
launched a major offensive against its erstwhile ally that killed over 100 IMU fighters, as well as its emir, Usman Ghazi. On Twitter, one IMU supporter marveled that
"what America and its agents could not do in 14 years, the Taliban did in 24 hours."
Al-Qaida has likewise helped publicize and accelerate the internal implosion of the
Islamic State's Yemen affiliate, which at its height managed to carry out spectacular
attacks on Yemeni soil but never controlled territory. That affiliate has been
wracked by several waves of defections, including one in December 2015 that saw
some 70 fighters and senior leaders announce their break with the group on Twitter.
AQAP, which until recently controlled a considerable amount of coastal territory,
capitalized on the flop by tirelessly working to publicize these defections from the
Islamic State. For example, it posted a video of one Islamic State defector detailing
the group's fabrications in its propaganda videos, including its use of actors to play
dead enemy soldiers. Particularly amusing to the online jihadi community was the
defector's claim that the group used the soft drink Vimto as fake blood.
The stage has been set for a similar al-Qaida resurgence in Nigeria. One potential
strategy for the group would involve building up a new pro-al-Qaida jihadi network
in Nigeria that is designed to eclipse Boko Haram or pry away its members. To this
end, AQIM could try to unite its Fulani members in Mali with Fulanis in Nigeria
under a charismatic figure like Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Massina Liberation
Front, an AQIM-created Malian faction that counts many West African Fulanis
33
among its ranks. This could achieve a unified AQIM framework that stretches from
Mali to Nigeria, allowing the group to exploit the grievances of Muslim Fulani
herdsman, who have long felt abandoned and exploited by the governments of both
countries.
Al-Qaida might also choose to negotiate directly with the leaders of friendly Boko
Haram elements like the splinter group Ansaru, which could serve as a vehicle for
sparking mass defections from Boko Haram. Although the top Ansaru commander,
Khalid al-Barnawi, was arrested earlier this year, there are still key figures within
the splinter group who maintain high-level contacts with AQIM and al-Shabaab,
such as Mamman Nur, who masterminded the 2011 bombing of the United Nations
headquarters in Abuja. The task of prying away Boko Haram's foot soldiers might
be made easier by Shekau's alleged flight to Libya, together with a key cadre of Islamic State loyalists, after facing increased pressure from the Nigerian-led regional
military coalition.
Should Boko Haram ultimately turn its back on the Islamic State, it would send an
enormous shockwave through the global jihadi movement. The Nigerian militant
group is by far the highest-profile organization to leave an existing terrorist network
to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. If it were to suddenly cut ties with the Iraqand Syria-based caliphate, it would send a powerful message to other al-Qaida affiliates toying with the idea of Islamic State membership: Baghdadi's caliphate is a dying brand. But as brutal as it is, the Islamic State's implosion would not herald an
overall diminishment of the global jihadi threat. On the contrary, it would underscore that an even thornier problem remains: al-Qaida, during its time under the radar, has become an even more formidable foe.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/
34
Somalia
Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Down but Far from Out
27 June 2016
A Somali soldier takes position at the scene of a suicide attack by al Shabaab militants in capital Mogadishu on 21 June 2015. REUTERS/Feisal Omar
Somalia’s militant group, Al-Shabaab, has often defied its adversaries’ claims that it
is in decline. In recent months, however, the movement has suffered setbacks, including territorial losses, high-ranking commanders killed and defections. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) and its internal, regional and international allies
need to be clear-sighted about the reasons for these, and what they can do to stop
another Al-Shabaab recovery.
Al-Shabaab’s set-backs – and fewer attacks by the movement during the Ramadan
holy Muslim month of fasting than in previous years – are the result of three distinct
and unrelated factors. First, an enhanced and largely externally directed and funded
campaign including drone strikes has eliminated high-profile leaders and diminished
its military capacity. Second, some of Somalia’s new federal units are demonstrating
greater military effectiveness, even if they and the government still rely primarily on
clan-based militias. Third, the Islamic State (IS) has challenged Al-Shabaab’s greatest internal vulnerability – its ideological cohesion.
Whether the Somali government and its allies can advance their cause will largely
depend on greater agreement on priorities and coordination of action – no easy task,
given the wide and diverse range of external and internal actors.
The Impact of U.S. Strikes
35
The U.S. has already stepped up its longstanding campaign against individual AlShabaab commanders and attacking the group’s military capacity. Drone strikes and
ground operations have killed at least five Al-Shabaab leaders: Abdirahman
Sandhere Ukash from the combat operations wing (j
), in December 2015;
Hassan Ali Dhore, from the security and intelligence wing (
) in March 2016;
Daud Ma’alim (also known as Yusuf Haji), also from the
, in May 2016; and
Ma’alim Aden Hassan, a military instructor, in June 2016.
The U.S. army also claims that a drone strike in March this year killed 150 militants
in a training camp in the Hiiraan region. Other successful assaults were launched by
the U.S. contractor-trained Somali Thunder (
Brigade – an elite, 570strong commando force – from its Baladogle military air base in the Lower Shabelle
region. Most recently the brigade killed Mohammed Mahmoud Ali Dulyadeen or
Kuno a leading commander reportedly responsible for the attack on Kenya’s
Garissa university college that killed 147 students.
36
Map of Somalia. CRISIS GROUP 2016
The Clan Resistance and Islamic State Encroachment
Another important strike against Al-Shabaab came from some Somali clans, a reversal of Al-Shabaab’s usually deft management of clan relations. In February 2016,
Abgal clan militias forced the group out of several locations in the Middle Shabelle
region following resistance against alms (
) demands; Gugundhabe Ma’awis
Lei clan militias did the same in Hiiraan, as did the original clan-based Sufiinspired anti-Al-Shabaab militia Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a in Gedo (with the help of
Ethiopian forces). The now more substantive federal states and interim administrations have also used their clan-based militias. In March 2016, for example, AlShabaab units were caught between the Somali National Army, Puntland’s
Darwiish forces and Galmudug Interim Administration militias as they attempted
to enter the Mudug region and its port town of Gara’ad.
The March 2016 losses in Mudug were the result of Al-Shabaab’s botched attempts
to move fighters toward their Golis mountain stronghold between Puntland and Somaliland as the group tried to eliminate a dissident faction that had declared allegiance to the so-called IS. The IS factor is the latest playing into a number of
longstanding internal divisions – including reports of internal criticism of the current
Emir Ahmed Diriye Abu Ubaidah – that are arguably more deadly to Al-Shabaab
than the military forces pitted against it. The prominent Sheikh Abdulqadir
Mumim’s October 2015 pledge of loyalty ( ’ ) to IS was the most high-profile of
at least four different pro-IS dissident factions across Somalia, which AlShabaab’s
security wing ruthlessly began to exterminate in November 2015.
The internal purge against suspected IS sympathisers may explain a wave of AlShabaab defections to Somali government forces. These include the April defections
of Ahmed Mohamud Afrah, a senior commander responsible for collecting tax
(
) contributions and Mohamed Hooley, a district commander in Galgadud
region, as well as the defection of
security officer Hassan Isaq Nuur in May.
It may also explain a reshuffle of Shabaab’s governors (
) in Lower Shabelle,
Hiiraan and Mudug.
A Still- ethal Punch
Despite these setbacks, the group can still hit hard against the Somali Federal Government and its allies, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
Soft targets like government offices and hotels in Mogadishu are regularly subject to
Al-Shabaab complex attacks the latest against the Naasa Hablood Hotel on 25
June and the Ambassador Hotel on 1 June, killing civilians and a number of SFG
officials, ministers and members of parliament with whom both venues were popular. An AMISOM base manned by an Ethiopian National Defence Forces contingent
near the town of Halgaan, in Hiiraan region, was overrun on 9 June with significant
casualties. Unlike the devastating attack on the Kenya Defence Force contingent in
AMISOM’s base in El-Adde in January 2016, (Ethiopian) air power and reinforcements came quickly to Halgaan and inflicted heavy casualties on Al-Shabaab.
37
x
7
Worryingly, however, AMISOM has appeared to have disengaged somewhat on the
ground. Despite its critical role and sacrifice in removing Al-Shabaab from strategic
locations and opening the space for political progress, it has taken both a physical
and political beating over the last eighteen months. Reduced European Union funding and domestic issues are making some troop contributing countries threaten a
draw down, with Uganda announcing its planned exit in late 2017.
The Double-edged Sword of Regional Peace-support
AMISOM’s role as both an operation against Al-Shabaab and as a peace-support
force increasingly suffers from being dominated by nearby powers. It could almost
be called IGADSOM : Burundi aside, all troop contributing countries are members
of East Africa’s regional peace and security organisation, the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD). Kenya and Ethiopia are Somalia’s direct neighbours; part of a wider trend on the continent of neighbours participating in stabilisation or peace operations. A troop contributor that is a neighbour can more directly
support the new federal entities with whom it shares borders and knows intimately.
But this also risks sidelining the development of the still weak Somalia National Army, and may indirectly risk friction between the Somali Federal Government and
federal entities, as well as between the entities themselves.
The heavy presence of neighbouring states in the newer federal entities of Jubaland,
South West State and Galmudug can look like a partisan foreign occupation, especially where they are still internally disputed. Al-Shabaab can easily appeal to disgruntled Somali clans by charging that foreigners are manipulating internal affairs,
then portray its role as Muslim resistance to non-Muslim powers, and implicitly, the
defender of Somalia’s sovereignty.
-
x
Ethiopia’s deployment to Somalia of the auxiliary (Ogaden) clan militias – from its
own federal Somali National Regional State – has also led to clashes with nonOgadeni Somali clans in the shared border regions. In the medium term, with betterarmed federal entities and clans taking the fight to Al-Shabaab, AMISOM may be
faced with more conventional tasks of inter-communal peacekeeping, tasks for
which governments and electorates in the troop contributing countries may have little appetite.
Sustaining Gains Against Al-Shabaab
Any strengthening of Somalia’s federal states represents a threat to Al-Shabaab.
This includes the coming elections, where local clan-based electoral colleges in each
of the federal states will directly select MPs. This should garner greater local buy-in
for the federal government model, if not for centrally directed government. Greater
stabilisation support to the more substantive federal entities will also help. But to
win back the political space and undermine Al-Shabaab’s ideology, Somali actors
38
must create and act on a coherent narrative.
Al-Shabaab has been a tough survivor and one of its easiest wins is that it has been
able to split the internal and external threats it faces. The divisions that IS prompts
within Al-Shabaab are worth nothing if the Somali Federal Government does not
offer a third way for political dialogue and accommodation, enhancing the current
policy of individual amnesty.
riefing | Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will e a ong War
Despite effective U.S. training for specialised commando units, overall attempts to
rebuild the Somali National Army could be strengthened by better coordination
among the large number of other states – at least eleven others – involved in their
training. The reality of stronger federal entities and clan-based militias also demands
a rethink of how Somalia’s security forces are to be rebuilt from a less centralised
starting point. Above all, there is an urgent need for a concerted program of reconciliation at all levels, without which federal states and their clan militias are still as
likely to fight one another (and the Somali National Army) as they are to take on AlShabaab itself.
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/
39
Displacement terrorism and FGM in Somalia
No longer a failed state, though struggling to rise from the ashes. Mohamed Omer
Arteh, Somalia's Deputy Prime Minister, is Michel Friedman's guest on Conflict
one this week.
Somalia's current political and security crisis is no longer just affecting its own population. After a civil war that lasted for 25 years, the domestic failure to deal with
the al Qaeda-linked militant group al-Shabab is spreading to neighboring states like
Kenya and Ethiopia.
Mohamed Omer Arteh, Somali Deputy Prime Minister, acknowledged the problem
but refused to take the responsibility for his government's shortcomings in an exclusive DW interview: "[There's] an instability in the whole region simply because for
a very long time, there hasn’t been a proper intervention that was done by the international community, leaving Somalis alone to solve all these problems."
Missed opportunities in the fight against terrorism
The Dadaab camp in Kenya is the world's largest refugee camp just 90 km from the
Somali border. Kenyan authorities have announced plans to close Dadaab citing an
increasing terrorist threat. Where will the camp’s 350,000 inhabitants—many of
them refugees go? Can Somalia cope with this massive influx? "They are Somalis,
and they have every right to return back to their homes. And this is something that
we as a government have to abide by, " Arteh told Conflict one.
Out of a population of 10 million, two million Somalis were already forced to flee
their homes. Half of them was displaced within Somalia, another million left the
country and is scattered around the region. Most fled because of fighting in Somalia.
Formed in 2004, the Islamist group al-Shabab, seeks to create an Islamic state in Somalia and has waged an insurgency against the transitional governments there. Tensions between terrorist and government forces have increased since 2009.
A breeding ground for extremism?
40
Mr. Arteh himself came dangerously close to terrorism in February 2015, when an al
-Shabab attack wounded him at the Central Hotel in Mogadishu. Somalia’s Council
of Ministers has been seeking to counter radicalization and then root out extremism.
But Somalia isn't in this alone: Some 22,000 African Union peacekeepers
(AMISOM) support the government in its effort to stabilize the country and to deliver humanitarian aid. They are however struggling to protect its population from the
deadly threat by Al-Shabaab.
http://www.dw.com/
41
Tunisia
Attentats en Tunisie : un an après Sousse le pays est-il encore une cible de choi de Daesh ?
En un an le pays a essuyé quatre attaques terroristes sanglantes et certains
estiment que la Tunisie reste une cible favorite des hommes de l'État islamique.
é
H
Quelques jours après l'attentat qui a fait 39 morts et 39 blessés le 26 juin 2015, la
police tunisienne surveille la plage de Sousse
La Tunisie a beaucoup souffert des attentats terroristes en 2015. Avec trois attaques
meurtrières l'an dernier, plus un nouvel assaut en mars 2016, le pays est une des victimes favorites de Daesh. Il y a un an jour pour jour, il essuyait la plus violente attaque jihadiste de son histoire sur la plage de Sousse, où 39 personnes ont trouvé la
mort et autant on été blessées, le 26 juin 2015.
Principalement des touristes britanniques venus se détendre au bord de la mer et profiter du soleil. Des vacances qui se sont transformées en véritable cauchemar. Le
sable en véritable bain de sang. Douze mois plus tard, la menace ne semble pas
avoir baissé, plutôt l' inver se. D'apr ès une r evue amér icaine spécialisée dans la
politique internationale et le renseignement, N
la Tunisie est encore
au centre du viseur de l'organisation terroriste et serait même sa prochaine cible.
Une cible à relativiser
Selon le magazine, il y aurait une volonté de la part de l'État islamique (EI) d'établir
un "califat global" en Tunisie. D'où les attentats qui se sont multipliés, et récemment
42
encore à Ben Gardane, le 7 mars dernier. N
croit savoir que la
"prochaine attaque terroriste d'ampleur" aura lieu sur le sol tunisien. Il par ticiperait ainsi à la déstabilisation du territoire en touchant directement le tourisme, et
donc l'économie du pays. Car pour la revue, le moment n'est pas propice tant que le
pays est si stable et capable de riposter militairement mais l'opération serait en
bonne voie vu que les revenus du tourisme - au cours des deux premiers mois de
l'année 2016 - étaient en chute de 54% par rapport à la même période un an plus tôt.
"Dans l'idée c'est possible", répond Wassim Nasr, joint par
, qui nuance tout
de même ses propos. Selon le spécialiste des mouvements jihadistes et journaliste à
France 24, l'EI n'a "pas besoin de la Tunisie pour être global", d'ailleurs, il ne considère pas vraiment que le pays soit une cible de choix de Daesh. " a Tunisie n'est pas
une cible prioritaire en tout cas moins que le Nigeria la Libye la Syrie
l'Ir ak... Elle n'est pas plus ciblée que d'autres zones où ils sont bien installés". Si on
parle beaucoup du pays et de ses blessures liées aux attentats, c'est "parce que l'on
est ethnocentré et que des occidentau sont morts dans ces attaques" , soupir e-til. Mais en comparant également les attentats en Tunisie à ceux de Paris, Wassim
Nasr fait remarquer qu'ils y ont mis beaucoup moins de moyens qu'en France.
"Quand ils sont déterminés, ils mettent les moyens, et là ils ne sont pas à leur investissement ma imum en ce qui concerne la Tunisie" , ajoute-t-il.
Un terreau néanmoins fertile
D'autant que les rangs de Daesh sont peuplés de Tunisiens, explique le spécialiste,
surtout des kamikazes, notamment en Libye (qui partage une frontière avec la Tunisie) et qu'ils pourraient facilement attaquer sur leur sol d'origine. Donc si Daesh ne
vise pas particulièrement la Tunisie, du moins pas plus que d'autres pays, ses
membres sont inévitablement liés au territoire. " es enjeu et problématiques tunisiennes deviennent des problématiques de Daesh" par la for ce des choses, analyse Wassim Nasr qui rappelle d'ailleurs que le 7 mars, quand des hommes de l'organisation terroriste se sont emparés de la ville de Ben Gardane, ils ont assassiné le
chef du renseignement à son domicile.
Alors comment expliquer une telle présence des Tunisiens parmi les combattants de
l'État islamique ? Premièrement, le salafisme dans le pays n'est pas en marge de la
société mais pratiqué librement. "Tunis ce n'est pas la Tunisie, dans les campagnes
il y a un terreau salafiste. Ce n'est pas étonnant qu'ils puissent r ecr uter là-bas",
selon Wassim Nasr. Même s'il y a une frontière entre salafisme et jihadisme, l'idéologie d'un islam radical reste la même. Mais ce n'est pas la seule raison. "C'est aussi
un problème de société, comme dans beaucoup d'autr es pays, oùles jeunes n'ont
pas de projet politique" , explique le spécialiste des mouvements jihadistes.
Quand les anciennes générations se battaient pour le panarabisme ou contre le colonialisme, "aujourd'hui il n'y a rien. Ils aspirent donc à autre chose". Alors quand
Daesh promet gloire et vie éternelle au paradis, les jeunes sont séduits et rejoignent
ses forces. Des jeunes souvent déçus de l'échec du printemps arabe et avec lui,
celui de la démocratie.
http://www.rtl.fr/
43
Analysis: Why Jihadists Fight?
15 June 2016
It is easy to get excited about Tunisia. Despite deep ideological conflict, the democratic transition has survived, flawed yet intact. With every passing day -- as Iraq,
Syria, Libya, and Yemen imploded -- Tunisia looks all the better.
Yet in Tunisia there are darker undercurrents, if you know where to look. Ideological divides haven't been resolved, only postponed. But there is something else, and it
confounds analysts and activists alike. As the democratic transition sputters along, a
disproportionately large number of Tunisians looked elsewhere for hope and inspiration. More than 3,000 Tunisians have found that inspiration on the battlefields of
Syria, forming a shockingly high percentage of the more than 25,000 foreign fighters who have traveled there.
This is a different world, shrouded in silence and mystery, in the back alleys of an
otherwise bustling capital city. One could spend days in Tunis and not see a single
sign of it, except perhaps a fleeting mention or a muffled conversation. But if you
are a young Tunisian, you almost certainly know friends, acquaintances, and perhaps
even family members who had gone to fight, or at least got stopped trying.
For the average Westerner, the idea of knowing an Islamic State fighter -- or knowing the brother, father, or sister of an Islamic State fighter -- is the height of the exotic. For many young Tunisians, it has become the new normal. It is just something
that (some) people did. Friends and family of foreign fighters spoke to me matter-offactly, sometimes nonchalantly, about it. They might as well have been talking about
a relative who had gone to backpack in Europe or study in the United States. Then
again, was there ever a "right" way to speak of someone you knew, and even loved,
going to fight for a terrorist group?
I met Yassine in a quiet coffee shop in the Bardo neighborhood, near the Tunisian
Parliament. We found a seat tucked away in the corner. Like all coffee shops in Tunisia, the air was layered with smoke, billowing up to the ceiling, creating a vaporous cloud above our heads. I have to admit that I was in somewhat new territory. I
asked my friend and fixer, Jihed: What was the appropriate thing to say to someone
whose son had died fighting for the Islamic State in Syria?
Yassine's son, a student at Manouba University whom I will call Hichem, had been
killed in August 2013.
"It happened all at once," Yassine recalled. Hichem began spending a lot of time at
the mosque and going to the fajr, or dawn prayer. He grew a short beard and started
wearing a thawb, the telltale dress of Salafis hoping to replicate the unadorned desert
garb of seventh-century Arabia. "I told him this isn't how we Tunisians dress, and he
took it off. But he got a passport without telling us. He would tell his mother everything, except this one thing. One day, it was a Sunday, he didn't come home. He
called to say he was staying with a friend, although that's not something he ever
did."
Of course, Yassine told me, he was surprised. Clearly, their son was becoming more
44
conservative. He was keeping to himself, spending a lot of time on the computer, but
it never occurred to them that he might want to travel to Syria, first joining the Nusra
Front, an al Qaeda affiliate, before moving on to the Islamic State.
It was this puzzle that intrigued me. How did a father, or anyone else for that matter,
make sense of such a tragedy? Yassine had a number of hypotheses, ranging from
the lure of jihadist forums on the internet to a Salafi preacher at the local mosque
who "brainwashed" his son.
In what would be a recurring theme, Yassine said that his son and other young Tunisians were initially attracted to Syria because of the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. Watching the slaughter of their Syrian brethren at the hands of President Bashar
al-Assad's regime, they were moved to act. The groups that were most hospitable to
foreign fighters tended to be the Islamist rebel factions, the most powerful of which
was the Nusra Front. Far from the usual al Qaeda franchise, Nusra, directing its fire
against Assad and fighting alongside mainstream Free Syrian Army factions, enjoyed considerable legitimacy among Islamist and non-Islamist Syrians alike. After
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham, in an attempt to wrest control of Nusra away from the local leadership there,
Hichem defected to the new organization.
Hichem's views hardened. "In those final months, he was asking his mother to pray
for him to join the ranks of the martyrs," Yassine recalls.
-The hope has always been that democratization and political participation would offer disaffected citizens peaceful outlets to express economic and political grievances.
This notion -- that the only way to effectively undermine Middle East terrorism is to
promote democratic openings -- was the animating premise behind President George
W. Bush's Freedom Agenda in the 2000s. A growing body of evidence suggests that
this is at least partly true in the long run. But Tunisia hasn't, and won't, reach the
long run anytime soon.
Democracy is no easy fix, and there tends to be a short-term trade-off. The fall of a
dictator -- and the euphoria of long-awaited regime change -- raises expectations, yet
institutions are too weak to meet rising popular demands.
In conversations with young Tunisians who have friends or relatives who went to
fight in Syria, I would often point out that Tunisia, unlike its neighbors, is relatively
democratic and provided channels for participation within the system. My claims
were often met with skepticism and cries of "What democracy?"
When I met with the Tunisian rapper DJ Costa in a run-down district of Manouba, I
suggested it is something of a paradox that Tunisia, the Arab world's democratic
"model," could produce so many foreign fighters. He scoffed: "You, because you
live outside, you feel that it's a contradiction, but we know that we don't have democracy in Tunisia. It's like a man whose skin is dirty. For months he hasn't washed
himself, and then, one day, he puts on nice, expensive clothes. But you know him,
who he really is."
45
DJ Costa's brother, Youssef, had gone to fight in Syria but quickly became disillusioned by growing rebel infighting. He managed to return to Tunisia, but discovered that there was no place for someone like him. After constant police harassment, he went back to Syria, where he was killed in an airstrike. "Even after he
died, they're still harassing our family," Costa told me.
In the city of Kairouan, a Salafi "stronghold," I unexpectedly met a young Tunisian filmmaker whose cousin was, as of writing, in Syria fighting with the Islamic
State. "I am against his decision, but I respect it," he told me over a bottle of Tunisian beer and a seemingly unlimited supply of cigarettes.
I asked him if he thought that going to fight for the Islamic State was normal. It
seemed to me like a big deal. "You're living in America, habibi, not in Tunisia," he
said. "But if you lived in Tunisia and you're experiencing daily subjugation and
injustice, and you have ideas, and you have principles, and you have objectives,
and you have a vision for the future, and if you live in a state that doesn't embrace
you, then it's the opposite. It's very normal."
By the time we were winding down the conversation, he was on his fourth or fifth
bottle. The seriousness of the conversation had given way to something lighter, if
only because that was the easier way, maybe the only way to live with it. There
were three of us at the table, and we all knew it. This was their reality, and what
could they do but laugh at the absurdity? "Normal? What's normal?" he asked me
playfully. "A woman walks in the street wearing a bikini. Here, it's not normal. In
America, it's normal."
Democracy as an abstract concept is well and good, but for many Tunisians, the
democratic transition hasn't translated into positive changes on the ground. The
economy continues to struggle, and those on the fringes -- secular revolutionaries
and Salafi radicals alike -- feel that the political process, moving slowly because of
polarization and gridlock, stifles the dramatic change that was necessary.
As DJ Costa and the Tunisian filmmaker well knew, history didn't begin in 2011.
Tunisia was the only country in the Arab world that experienced both forced secularization and brutal authoritarian rule, a particularly noxious combination. Under
Ben Ali, the secret police would grow suspicious if they saw an apartment with the
lights turned on every morning. This could only mean one thing -- that someone
was waking up early for the fajr prayer, a sign of particular piety.
For decades, Tunisia had little space for overt expressions of religion. This has had
a distorting effect on the social fabric in ways that are difficult to measure. If we
want to understand why this country has a seemingly exceptional problem with
young men fighting abroad, this unusual context -- which no other country in the
region shares -- is at least part of the story.
Despite winning by a landslide in the country's first ever democratic elections, Tunisia's Islamist Ennahda party, because of overwhelming secular opposition, wasn't
able to include a mere mention of the word "sharia" anywhere in the constitution.
When it came to incorporating ultraconservative Salafists in the political mainstream, the task was even harder: The things that Salafists wanted simply weren't
on the table. If anything, the example of Ennahda was a cautionary tale of how po-
46
litical compromises could undermine the Islamic identity of Islamists.
Like so many of its mainstream Islamist counterparts across the region, Ennahda's
successes have highlighted its failures. It has succeeded in being and becoming a
"normal" actor. That is a kind of victory for a movement that wants nothing more
than to be accepted as part of political life. But, for those of a more radical bent,
being and becoming normal isn't nearly enough.
-What, exactly, could Ennahda offer someone like Hichem? There was a time when
mainstream Islamist groups had quite a lot going for them. They eschewed revolution and direct confrontation with the state, which meant that joining Muslim
Brotherhood-inspired groups was risky, but not nearly so risky as some of the other options. Perhaps more important, these movements took pride in their pragmatism (mawdu'iyya) and their grasp of the domestic and international realities, however unsavory.
One way of understanding Islamism is as an effort to apply Islam. This is what
makes it both important and relevant. But this also makes it vulnerable to charges
of impotence. Applied Islam must be able to move beyond the wages of selfimprovement and spirituality. It needs to be practical, which raises the question of
what happens when efforts to apply Islam in the realm of law and governance fail,
and fail repeatedly?
The rise of the Islamic State, then, is a new kind of threat, fundamentally different
from what had come before. Since its abolition in 1924, there had never been a
serious, sustained attempt to reestablish the caliphate. Now, the Islamic State -and its branches in Libya, the Sinai, and Nigeria -- can claim to have been the first.
Its model of governance might be terrifying in any number of ways, but it is a distinctive model nonetheless. The Islamic State and its ilk, in stark contrast to the
Brotherhood and other mainstream Islamists, had little interest in existing state
structures. These, to them, were precisely the problem.
The Islamic State offers a vision for what the new Islamic caliphate could actually
mean in practice. Unlike the Brotherhood, which believes in accepting the existing
state and "Islamizing" it, the Islamic State believes in building on top of an entirely
different foundation. To achieve fidelity to the text, the logic goes, one has to start
from scratch, since whenever Islamism and the modern state attempted to reconcile, it has always been at the expense of the former.
Even if the Islamic State is defeated tomorrow, the damage cannot be undone. The
Islamic State has set a new standard for extremist groups, demonstrating that capturing and holding large swaths of territory is possible and that it can be achieved
without the benefit of widespread popular support. This, in addition to the terror
and barbarism, is what the Islamic State means. And what the Islamic State means
is ultimately more important than what the organization is or what it does. The Islamic State succeeded in establishing a recognizably "religious" state -- something
that nearly every mainstream Islamist group before it had failed to do. Moreover,
its image of a caliphate, however much it distorted the spirit and intent of Islam,
aroused the imagination of a small but significant number of Muslims.
47
Mainstream Islamist movements like the Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia's Ennahda,
or Morocco's Justice and Development Party hope to accommodate Islam and Islamic law within the modern nation-state, accepting many if not most of the state's
basic assumptions. They have grown comfortable using terms like "civil state,"
"popular sovereignty," "women's rights," and "citizenship." This doesn't mean they
are liberals - there is, after all, quite a gap between believing in women's rights and
gender equality - but they are keen to be recognized as legitimate and "normal" actors in the international system.
The model of the Islamic State is to ignore, dismiss, or supersede all such considerations entirely. Not only that, the group revels in its disregard for modern norms.
At the heart of debates over the future of the Islamic State is a set of questions
about what we, as human beings, really want and what we really crave. In 1940,
before the full severity of Adolf Hitler's crimes had become apparent, George Orwell reviewed Hitler's Mein Kampf. He captured what to many of us today seems
unfathomable: that Hitler came to understand something deep, unsettling, and ultimately terrifying about human nature. In the parlance of Islamists, he understood a
powerful element of the fitra -- the innate character, or instinct, of men. Orwell
wrote:
"[Hitler] has grasped the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life. Nearly all western
thought since the last war, certainly all 'progressive' thought, has assumed tacitly
that human beings desire nothing beyond ease, security, and avoidance of pain. ...
The Socialist who finds his children playing with soldiers is usually upset, but he is
never able to think of a substitute for the tin soldiers; tin pacifists somehow won't
do …
"... Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a grudging way, have said to people
'I offer you a good time,' Hitler has said to them 'I offer you struggle, danger and
death,' and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet."
I will always struggle to understand this, whatever this is. Although I believe in
certain things, and believe in them passionately, I have never longed to join an army, militia, or rebel force. But more than 25,000 foreigners from outside Syria
have flowed into the country to fight for a cause they clearly believe in.
The Islamic State revels in death. Alongside news of its imposition of sharia law
and its military victories on the field, the Islamic State's public relations team publishes celebratory photos of its own soldiers: young men, bloodied, slumped over
their weaponry, dead. I sincerely hope that the desire to kill, destroy, and die for
something greater than ourselves dissipates. But I am well aware that, although
those desires can be mitigated, constrained, and channeled more constructively,
they won't -- and cannot -- disappear.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/
48
International Organizations
EU
Après le re it que faire ?
27/06/2016
)
Crédits : DR)Répondre aux attentes des européens pourrait passer par la constitution
d'une Europe de la sécurité, au sens large: sécurité aux frontières, sécurité énergétique, environnementale, monétaire et financière... Par Pierre-Yves Cossé, ancien
commissaire au Plan
Il était inévitable qu'un choc aussi violent engendre une multitude de réactions et
de propositions. Elles vont dans tous les sens et sont souvent inspirées par des préoccupations tactiques de politique intérieure ou par des présupposés idéologiques,
qui ignorent les contraintes du possible. S'il faut laisser un temps pour les réactions
à fleur de peau et les imprécations, il est possible d'esquisser dès maintenant
quelques lignes directrices, entre lesquelles il faudra faire un choix.
Un processus long
La première serait un prudent « Wait and See » Beaucoup de facteurs vont dans ce
sens. La sortie est un processus long, à rebondissements, d'autant qu'il faudra parallèlement négocier un dispositif de remplacement. Le gouvernement britannique
veut prendre son temps, alors que Bruxelles, Paris et Berlin veulent aller vite. Mais
les Anglais ont pour eux la lettre du traité et ils sont des juristes expérimentés et
des négociateurs retors. Durant cette période discussion qui durera au moins trois
ans les prochaines années, les opinions comme les positions vont évoluer.
Les « leavers » vont constater que les promesses qui leur ont été faites étaient des
songes creux et que les changements annoncés sont toujours renvoyés au futur. Les
« remainers » ne se seront pas résignés. Le gouvernement britannique, s'appuyant
49
sur un Parlement probablement composé en majorité d'adversaires du brexit, pourrait faire valoir son impossibilité à parvenir à une solution favorable pour la
Grande-Bretagne. Le dispositif de remplacement, à la suisse ou à la norvégienne,
n'allègerait guère les contraintes imposées par le système actuel. Il constaterait son
incapacité à empêcher la sécession avec l'Ecosse et le retour à l'instabilité en Irlande. Tirant les conséquences de cette impasse, il organiserait un second référendum. Il s'agit que moins de 2% des électeurs changent de camp.
A la recherche d'un projet de relance de l'Europe
Pendant ce temps, les 27 et Bruxelles défendraient avec fermeté et sans agressivité
les intérêts de l'Union. Ils chercheraient à améliorer son image, en se donnant un
code de bonne conduite : cesser de faire de Bruxelles le bouc émissaire de leurs
échecs et des politiques impopulaires dans leur pays et trouver des compromis positifs sur les problèmes pendants les plus difficiles, comme les migrations.
Cette patience, prudente mais active, serait justifiée par le fait qu'il n'existe aucun
projet de refondation de l'Europe, susceptible de recueillir rapidement une adhésion de la part des peuples et des gouvernements et que l'ouverture d'un débat institutionnel est de nature à accroître la confusion actuelle.
La seconde, qui s'oppose à la première, serait « Plus d'Europe »Les insuffisances
de l'Europe auraient pour origine un début de paralysie de l'Union qui serait au milieu du gué. L'intégration des économies européennes est plus avancée que ce que
croient les Européens et ce que disent leurs gouvernements. La seule sortie satisfaisante est par le haut. Il faut définir un ensemble d'actions nouvelles à la fois
pour les vingt-sept et pour la zone euro. De nombreuses propositions sont sur la
table, il suffirait de les hiérarchiser et de fixer un calendrier: politiques de l'environnement et de l'énergie, programmes d'investissement, politique de voisinage,
consolidation de l'euro par une politique budgétaire et fiscale soumise à un contrôle parlementaire…
Si cette stratégie est pertinente, ce que je crois, elle n'est pas réaliste, une bonne
partie des Européens rejetant le « plus d'Europe » Le brexit s'inscrit dans un mouvement plus large de « décrochage » des opinions par rapport à l'Union Européenne.
Inverser le courant dominant vers "moins d'Europe"?
Le courant dominant est celui de « moins d'Europe » Les tentatives anglaises pour
définir ce moins d'Europe, qui ont abouti à un accord boiteux et juridiquement
contestable, n'ont convaincu personne.
Il faudrait des leaders d'envergure, pédagogues et prêts à prendre des risques, pour
inverser le mouvement. Ni les présidents de la Commission et du Conseil des Ministres européens ou du Parlement n'ont l'aura et l'autorité nécessaire. L'affaiblissement durable du pôle franco- allemand : intérêts économiques divergents à court
terme et proximité des élections (2017) est source de paralysie. Ni la chancelière ni
notre président ne sont prêts, en supposant qu'ils se mettent d'accord, à se lancer
dans une telle opération.
Une attente de sécurité
La troisième ligne directrice « Priorité aux attentes des Européens ou Europe-
50
Sécurité » serait un prolongement de la première, tout en ajoutant quelques unes
des actions mentionnées plus haut. La gestion active et prudente serait complétée
par une prise en en compte de l'attente majeure des Européens. Cette attente majeure, c'est la « Sécurité » Il est impératif que dans un monde de plus en plus dangereux, les Européens associent Europe et Sécurité et que cette association repose
sur des réalités et des institutions visibles.
Cette « Sécurité » se décline.
Sécurité à l'intérieur des frontières, c'est la lutte contre le terrorisme. La coordination doit être renforcée et un FBI européen créé.
Sécurité aux frontières, ce qui suppose un très fort renforcement de Frontex, sans
lequel les accords de Schengen disparaitront définitivement.
Sécurité avec les pays du voisinage, ce qui implique une analyse commune des
menaces et leur traitement, en particulier celles qui viennent du Moyen-Orient et
d'Afrique.
Sécurité de notre environnement, incluant une fixation d'un prix du CO2 au moyen
d'un marché efficace ou d'une taxation fiscale
Sécurité énergétique, qui passe une coordination étroite des nos approvisionnements et de nos relations avec la Russie.
Sécurité monétaire et financière, c'est-à-dire un renforcement de l'euro et de
l'union bancaire. Elle ne se fera sans un compromis entre la France et l'Allemagne ; soit pour la France, un minimum de politique budgétaire associée à un
transfert de souveraineté et à un contrôle parlementaire ; et pour l'Allemagne un
minimum de solidarité financière.
Cette énumération est volontairement ambitieuse. Elle peut être allégée, certains
volets étant provisoirement mis de côté faute d'un consensus suffisant.
Une grande conférence internationale
Une fois fixée la ligne directrice de « l'Europe-Sécurité » des procédures d'explicitation et de mises en œuvre sont à inventer.
La première étape serait la tenue d'une grande conférence internationale sur La Sécurité des Européens dont le tiers des membres viendrait de la société civile. L'annonce de cette conférence serait faite simultanément dans les six pays fondateurs
de la Communauté Economique Européenne. Cette conférence articulerait des réunions plénières et des ateliers pour chaque « sécurité » sélectionnée. Certains ateliers seraient décentralisés et présidés par de « grands européens » venant également de la société civile, selon des modalités propres à chaque thème. Le
Royaume Uni serait invité comme observateur. Les ateliers pourraient procéder à
des consultations ouvertes, en utilisant les possibilités offertes par le numérique.
L'association des opinions est d'autant plus nécessaire qu'un « plus de sécurité
« aura un coût. Si les Européens sont convaincus de la nécessité de ce « plus de
sécurité » et de l'efficacité des dispositions adoptées, ils accepteront l'effort.
51
Il est d'autant plus urgent d'annoncer la conférence internationale sur la sécurité
que sa mise en œuvre demandera quelque temps. Pour convaincre que l'orientation « Sécurité » est vraiment prioritaire, il serait sage de mettre en stand by des
dossiers qui n'entrent pas directement dans ce cadre. Un peu de « moins » pourrait
rassurer. Cette « Europe Sécurité » ne sera comprise que si les principaux dirigeants la préconisent partout en Europe, avec intelligence et conviction. Est-ce
dans le domaine du possible ?
http://www.latribune.fr/
52
Terrorism in the World
France
UTTE CONTRE E TERRORISME : es priorités de
l’Etat français en France et en Afrique
21 juin 2016
es actions de lutte contre le terrorisme de la France sont multiples et variées et
vont au-delà de ses frontières. A la faveur du programme d’invitation des journalistes sur le terrorisme du ministère français des Affaires étrangères et du
développement international cinq hommes de médias africains dont un urkinabè ont eu du 4 au 10 juin 2016 à Paris de riches entretiens avec des acteurs
bien imprégnés des questions relatives au terrorisme et au moyens que déploie
l’He agone pour lutter contre ce fléau. A la lumière de ces échanges on retient
surtout que la France œuvre quotidiennement pour sécuriser son territoire
mais mène également des actions fortes sur le continent africain pour endiguer
le terrorisme qui menace sa stabilité et son développement économique et social.
Si la France a mis un accent particulier sur la prévention de la radicalisation sur son
sol au regard du nombre important (2000 selon les chiffres du ministère de l’Intérieur) de ses citoyens qui se sont engagés aux côtés des terroristes en Syrie et en
Irak, elle a plutôt opté de sécuriser la bande sahelo-saharienne fortement en proie
aux actes terroristes. De sources proches du dossier, de gros moyens sont déployés
pour la sécurisation de cette zone. La première priorité, c’est de renforcer les capacités des pays de cette bande afin de leur permettre de faire face aux terroristes de tous
poils qui l’écument. Il s’agit également de donner des moyens conséquents aux pays
de cette partie de l’Afrique pour le développement de l’éducation, de l’économie,
53
etc. C’est dans cette vision que la France accompagne le G5 Sahel et plaide sa cause
auprès de ses partenaires. Et à en croire des sources proches du dossier, les réponses
sont bonnes car 400 millions d’euros seront débloqués chaque année pour le développement du G5 Sahel et du Sénégal. Selon toujours les mêmes sources, après les
attaques terroristes de Ouagadougou et de Grand Bassam en Côte d’Ivoire, la coopération s’est davantage renforcée et les échanges au niveau des services français et
africains en charge de la gestion des questions liées au terrorisme, sont permanents.
L’objectif de la France étant d’accompagner les Etats africains pour la montée en
puissance des Forces spéciales dont le rôle est d’intervenir vite en cas d’attaques terroristes. Toutefois, l’atteinte de cet objectif ne devait pas empêcher les Forces françaises et africaines de s’épauler lorsque cela s’avère nécessaire pour déjouer des attaques terroristes. Mais pourquoi la France se préoccupe-t-elle tant de la sécurité de
l’Afrique? Ne défend-elle pas ses intérêts? La réponse de nos sources à cette question est non. Si la France s’est engagée aux côtés d’un pays comme le Mali, ce n’est
pas à cause de ses richesses. Il y a certes des intérêts à défendre mais pas d’ordre
économique.
a sécurité de 5 000 Français au Mali était en jeu
L’intervention de Serval puis de Barkhane au Mali est, d’après nos sources, une manière de renvoyer l’ascenseur aux Africains dont certains ont payé de leur vie en aidant la France à combattre le nazisme. Au-delà de ce devoir de reconnaissance, le
réalisme obligeait la France à agir. En effet, en plus du peuple malien dont la vie
était menacée par la progression fulgurante des islamistes vers Bamako, il y a que la
sécurité de 5 000 Français aujourd’hui 7000 au Mali, était également en jeu. La
France est intervenue au Mali en 2013 pour libérer un pays démocratique dont le
président lui avait fait appel. Quant à ceux qui estiment que la France a une position
ambiguë sur l’occupation de Kidal par le Mouvement national pour la libération de
l’Azawad (MNLA) et compagnie, nos sources répondent que la France n’a pas de
préférence. D’ailleurs, en intervenant au Mali, le souhait de la France était que ce
pays puisse recouvrer l’intégrité de son territoire, le stabiliser et de le contrôler entièrement, foi de sources proches du dossier. Le souhait actuel de la France, est que
l’accord d’Alger soit mis en application car cela permettra de mieux lutter contre le
terrorisme. S’il y a toujours des attaques terroristes à Kidal malgré le nombre important de forces qui s’y trouvent, c’est parce qu’il y a une porosité entres celles-ci mais
aussi un manque de sincérité de certains acteurs. C’est du moins, l’avis de nos
sources. Selon d’autres sources proches du dossier, le président François Hollande
veut que toutes les interventions de son pays en Afrique soient soutenues par
l’Union africaine (UA) et les pays partenaires. Et celles qu’il mène actuellement,
notamment au Mali, le sont. Du reste, la France n’est pas le seul pays à envoyer des
soldats au Mali. 23 nations dont l’Allemagne y sont pour former ses forces de défense et de sécurité et l’aider à renouer avec une paix durable. En tout état de cause,
si la France intervient dans divers pays africains, c’est parce que ceux-ci n’ont pas
encore les capacités nécessaires pour faire face à la nouvelle menace terroriste, en
l’occurrence les engins explosifs. D’ailleurs, il est bon de savoir que dans le cadre de
la lutte contre le terrorisme, l’essentiel du soutien de la France aux pays africains se
résume, selon ces sources, à la formation des forces armées et à leur dotation en matériel militaire, l’objectif étant de les rendre plus opérationnelles pour qu’elles puissent, plus tard, assurer elles-mêmes la sécurité du contient. Selon les révélations de
nos sources, tous les pays africains qui participent aux différentes missions de maintien de la paix, ont reçu du matériel militaire. Mais, quel est le rôle exact des forces
françaises présentes sur le sol africain? La réponse des sources proches du dossier à
cette question se veut plutôt rassurante. Barkhane au Mali a pour mission essentielle
54
de neutraliser les djihadistes et d’aider les forces armées du pays de Soundiata Keïta
à mieux défendre l’intégrité du territoire malien. Le 43e Bataillon d’infanterie de
marine (BIMA) en Côte d’Ivoire, lui, joue un rôle de formation, d’accompagnement
et de réunification de l’armée ivoirienne mais aussi de protection et de sécurisation
du matériel militaire qui transite par le port d’Abidjan. Quant aux quelques éléments
des Forces spéciales basées au Burkina, ils ont pour mission d’intervenir rapidement
pour neutraliser un terroriste identifié. S’agissant du pôle de N’djamena au Tchad, il
a pour but de fournir des renseignements aériens au Nigeria et à ses voisins pour une
meilleure traque des combattants de la secte islamiste Boko Haram. Les hommes
que le Niger et la Mauritanie reçoivent n’ont autre rôle que de renforcer les capacités
des forces de défense et de sécurité de ces pays afin qu’elles puissent lutter efficacement contre les ingénieurs du mal et les trafiquants de tout genre. Mais en plus de
ces appuis militaires, la France fait de la prévention à travers des actions de développement surtout au Nord Mali pour éviter que les jeunes de cette partie du pays ne
soient des proies faciles pour les rabatteurs djihadistes.
Aider les pays africains à gérer avec plus d’efficacité les questions sécuritaires
Selon les explications de nos sources, la France n’intervient pas militairement sur le
terrain pour combattre Boko Haram car le Nigeria n’a pas sollicité un tel type de
soutien. Par contre, il a demandé à la France d’accompagner ses voisins et de faciliter la coopération entre ces différents pays. Et c’est ce que fait l’Hexagone, révèlent
avec fierté des sources proches du dossier qui estiment que ces différents efforts visent principalement à aider les pays africains à gérer avec plus d’efficacité les questions sécuritaires. Du reste, le vœu de la France est d’œuvrer à ce que les actions
soient menées en Afrique de façon régionale, car la menace terroriste ne concerne
pas un seul pays, mais tous les Etats de la bande sahelo-saharienne et au-delà. C’est
dans cette optique qu’un projet de création d’une école de guerre régionale en
Afrique est en cours. En plus de l’Afrique, la France entretient des relations de coopération avec des pays d‘Europe comme l’Espagne dans le cadre de la lutte antiterroriste. Et si l’on s’en tient aux déclarations des sources proches du dossier, la
coopération avec ces pays est très développée car, elle aura permis d’alpaguer certains individus auteurs d’attentats terroristes sur le sol français. Il est à reconnaître,
selon nos sources, qu’en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, la France ne fait pas
dans la dentelle. Elle mène des actions multiples et multiformes aussi bien à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur. Si le ministère de l’Intérieur fait de la prévention de la radicalisation liée à l’islam son cheval de bataille, le Premier ministère lui, développe à
travers des services comme la mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte
contre les dérives sectaires (MIVILUDES), des actions pour prévenir la radicalisation sectaire qui peut s’apparenter à une dérive sectaire. De sources proches du dossier, les individus qui développent ce comportement ne viennent pas forcément des
milieux pauvres en éducation. Bien au contraire, certains d’entre eux, ont reçu une
bonne éducation. A ce jour, on dénombre plus de 2000 radicalisés sur 10 000 signalés par leur famille, selon les chiffres de la MIVILUDES. Conscients du danger que
représentent ces personnes, les services en charge du dossier ont élaboré un plan de
formation des écoutants de la plateforme téléphonique du Centre national d’assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation (numéro vert pour signaler les cas de radicalisation: 0.800.005.696) et des agents de l’Etat dans les préfectures et dans les départements chargés de suivre et d’accompagner les familles des personnes radicalisées ou en voie de l’être.
55
Améliorer la prise en charge des victimes des attentats terroristes
Dans le respect des libertés publiques et individuelles, la MIVILUDES analyse
l’évolution des mouvements à caractère sectaire et exerce sa vigilance sur les agissements attentatoires aux droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine ou contraires
aux lois et règlements. Cette structure joue également un rôle de prévention, notamment en informant le public sur les risques, et le cas échéant, sur les dangers auxquels les dérives sectaires l’exposent, et d’aide aux victimes des dérives sectaires.
Elle favorise aussi la coordination de l’action préventive et répressive des pouvoirs
publics et dénonce, auprès du procureur de la République, les agissements présentant un caractère pénal et en avise le garde des sceaux. En plus des actions de prévention, l’Etat français a décidé d’améliorer la prise en charge des victimes des attentats terroristes. Pour ce faire, une cellule interministérielle d’aide aux victimes
(CIAV) a été créée. Elle est placée sous l’autorité du Premier ministre et activée par
lui. La CIAV centralise en temps réel l’ensemble des informations concernant l’état
des victimes et coordonne en temps réel l’action de tous les ministères intervenant,
en relation avec les associations et le parquet anti-terroriste, etc. Tirant leçon des
dysfonctionnements constatés lors des attentats terroristes du 13 novembre 2015, les
autorités en charge de la lutte contre le terrorisme ont réuni plusieurs acteurs de divers profils qui ont travaillé durant deux jours au terme desquels ils ont proposé des
solutions innovantes. Et pour tester leur efficacité, des exercices de simulations
grandeur nature ont été menés et les résultats, aux dires de sources proches du dossier, se sont révélés probants. Ces exercices avaient pour but, selon ces dernières, de
préparer tous les services concernés afin qu’ils puissent intervenir avec promptitude
et efficacité en cas d’attaque terroriste. Si des autorités en charge des questions liées
au terrorisme pensent que les différentes mesures prises, peuvent contribuer à mieux
faire face au terrorisme, à la radicalisation islamique et sectaire ou à une meilleure
prise en charge des victimes des attentats terroristes, certains spécialistes en la matière pensent le contraire. En effet, ils jugent inappropriée la communication des
pouvoirs publics français sur le terrorisme. Pour eux, il faut éviter les discours stigmatisants. Par ailleurs, ils trouvent que la télévision contribue à la radicalisation de
certains jeunes du fait des messages qui y sont diffusés. Quid de la police? Contrairement à ce qu’elle fait, son rôle devrait consister en l’empêchement des leaders terroristes de poser des actes, autrement dit, les séparer de leurs sympathisants. Quant
aux médias occidentaux, ces spécialistes trouvent qu’ils ont un grand rôle à jouer
dans la lutte contre le terrorisme car, la communication a un effet sur ces terroristes.
Mais très souvent, les médias tombent dans le piège de ces derniers en exagérant
leurs menaces ou en reprenant leurs menaces. Les médias doivent, selon lesdits spécialistes, éviter de dénigrer les terroristes. Pour eux, contrairement à ce que certains
pensent, ces terroristes ne sont pas des fous. Cela est d’autant plus vrai, font-ils remarquer, qu’ils justifient toujours leurs actes. « Ils ne disent jamais avoir attaqué,
mais plutôt répondu à une attaque. Toute chose qui rend difficile la condamnation de
certains de leurs actes », ont laissé entendre ces spécialistes qui conseillent d’attaquer les terroristes sur le terrorisme car après tout, ils constituent à leurs yeux, des
groupes politiques.
a résilience meilleure arme contre le terrorisme
Selon eux, les terroristes cherchent l’engrenage et il faut les empêcher d’atteindre
leur objectif. La meilleure arme pour lutter contre le terrorisme, d’après ces spécia-
56
listes, c’est la résilience et la cohésion. Il ne faut, ni céder à la peur ni se diviser,
conseillent-ils. Du côté des chercheurs, certains critiquent la manière dont certains
gouvernants africains mènent la lutte contre le terrorisme. Pour étayer ses propos, un
chercheur affirme qu’en 1990, on a enregistré 32 000 Nigérians tués dont la moitié
par l’armée nigériane au nom de la lutte contre Boko Haram. Or, lorsque les populations sont victimes d’exactions des forces gouvernementales, elles ont plus tendance
à rejoindre les terroristes avec l’espoir de bénéficier d’une protection. Ces violations
graves des droits de l’homme sont dues au fait que les présidents qui se succèdent à
la tête de l’Etat nigérian ne contrôlent pas l’armée. Pour ce chercheur, l’assassinat de
l’ex-chef spirituel de Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf en 2009, a été une grosse erreur. Car en décapitant le mouvement, on a contraint ses membres à entrer dans la
clandestinité. Ce qui les pousse à commettre des attentats meurtriers. S’agissant de
la principale cause des violences au Nigeria, le chercheur pointe du doigt la mal
gouvernance. L’application de la charia que revendiquent les éléments de Boko Haram, n’est qu’un prétexte car, la charia existe au Nord du Nigeria depuis belle lurette, l’islam y ayant apparu au XIe siècle. Et de faire noter que lorsqu’une personne
est condamnée par la loi islamique, la sentence peut être cassée par la Cour suprême.
S’il y a une chose sur laquelle chercheurs et autres spécialistes des questions relatives au terrorisme sont unanimes, c’est bien la mise en place du G5 Sahel. En effet,
ils trouvent que ce cadre permettra aux pays de la bande sahelo-saharienne de mutualiser les moyens et de lutter plus efficacement contre les trafics de tout genre qui
se mènent dans cette bande. Ce sont ces trafics qui constituent d’ailleurs, ont-ils révélé, la source de revenus de certaines organisations terroristes comme Al-Qaïda au
Maghreb islamique (AQMI). Et tant qu’on ne mettra pas fin à ces trafics, surtout de
cigarette et de drogue, le terrorisme aura de beaux jours devant lui dans la bande sahelo-saharienne. Mais, il n’y a pas que la sécurisation de cette seule zone qui préoccupe la France en Afrique. Elle a aussi à cœur la pacification de la Libye, véritable
sanctuaire de groupes terroristes dont Daesh. Mais la non entente des fils de ce pays
rend difficile l’intervention de la communauté internationale pour l’aider à se débarrasser des terroristes, révèle une source proche du dossier. Mais l’espoir n’est pas
perdu, rassure-t-elle. Car le gouvernement d’union nationale qui affermit de jour en
jour son autorité sur le terrain, pourrait constituer cet embryon d’Etat sur lequel la
communauté internationale va s’appuyer pour sortir la Libye du chaos dans lequel
elle est plongée depuis l’assassinat de Mouammar Kadhafi.
http://lepays.bf/
57
How Do You Stop a Future Terrorist When the Only Evidence Is a Thought?
JUNE 21, 2016
French soldiers on patrol in Paris in January. For France, a nation that has one of the
largest numbers of citizens fighting for the Islamic State, the caseload of potential
jihadists to monitor is becoming unmanageable. CreditDmitry Kostyukov for The
New York Times
themselves slaughtering the rabbits, bought so the men could grow used to the feel
of killing.
When he and seven others were later arrested, the authorities found that several of
the men had saved the video of the slaughter on their cellphones, alongside footage
of soldiers being beheaded, according to French court records. Mr. Abballa was
eventually convicted on a terrorism charge and spent more than two years in prison.
In hindsight, it is not hard to see how that first act of brutality foreshadowed what
happened last week: Armed with a knife, Mr. Abballaattacked a couple in northern
France in the name of the Islamic State and left them to bleed to death.
But at the time of his arrest in 2011, investigators were not able to definitively show
that he was a permanent threat to France. After his prison stint, he was placed under
surveillance. Just months after the wiretaps stopped, he committed the double murder last week.
Across Europe and the United States, law enforcement officials are struggling to
reckon with attackers like Mr. Abballa and Omar Mateen, whose shooting rampage
this month at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Fla., left 49 dead. They are men who clearly seemed to be building toward violent acts, and whose names had surfaced in ter-
58
rorism investigations, but who avoided crossing legal lines that could tip off the authorities until it was too late.
With thousands of terrorism surveillance cases running at any given time, the European authorities say they are swamped and are in the difficult position of trying to
head off attacks of which the only forewarning is often in the form of what someone
thinks or what they are overheard saying.
A man is in a shop and thinks about stealing an object, said Georges Sauveur, a
Paris lawyer who has defended several terrorism suspects, including one of the men
who accompanied Mr. Abballa to the forest in 2011 to slaughter the rabbits. What
do you do? You put him in jail?
Mr. Sauveur added, You can’t put him in jail unless he takes the next step and attempts to steal something.
In late 2010, France’s domestic intelligence agency began watching Mohamed Niaz
Abdul Raseed, 33, who was living in the Val d’Oise region of northern France and
who the agency suspected was a recruiter for Al Qaeda. The investigation revealed
that he had lured seven adherents, the youngest of whom was Mr. Abballa.
Under the older man’s instruction, the young men met in a public park to do calisthenics, enrolled in a kung fu class and gathered for lessons on extremist Islam.
They also took their day trip to the forest in Cormeilles-en-Parisis with the rabbits,
which they had pooled their money to buy.
‘Thirsty for Blood’
By the spring of 2011, two members of the group had gone to Pakistan, where they
were met by a facilitator for Al Qaeda, according to French court records obtained
by The New York Times.
As the most junior member of the group, Mr. Abballa was not chosen to go, and that
frustrated him. I’m thirsty for blood, Allah is my witness, he wrote in an email
intercepted by the authorities. In another, he begged, Please let me go, pls, pls, pls.
When it appeared that he would not be sent to Pakistan, he turned his rage toward
France, writing on Feb. 19, 2011, With Allah’s will, we will find a way to raise the
flag here. A week later, he wrote that his cell would wipe away the infidels.
He was arrested on May 14, 2011, and like the other members of the cell was convicted on a charge of belonging to a criminal or terrorist organization, carrying a
maximum sentence of 10 years, said Sébastien Bono, the lawyer representing the
accused leader of the group.
Considered the group’s least influential member, Mr. Abballa spent more than two
years in prison and was released in 2013. He was kept under surveillance until the
end of 2015.
It’s very easy retrospectively, with hindsight, to say that law enforcement, or government, should have known about someone’s intent. But obviously there’s a big
difference between motivation — someone being radicalized — and then going out
and actually acting on that, said Richard Walton, who MAGNANVILLE, France
59
— The first time Larossi Abballa appeared on the radar of French terrorism investigators, the only act of violence they could pin on him was killing bunnies.
He had joined a small group of men, all bent on waging jihad, on a trip to a snowy
forest in northern France five years ago, when he was 19. There, they videotaped
to a summary of their interrogation.
led the counterterrorism unit for the London Metropolitan Police during the 2012
Olympics. At any one time, in any country, there will be many hundreds, if not several thousand suspects, that fit this profile.
Among the difficulties for the authorities in 2011 was that Mr. Abballa had aggressively denied any connection to terrorism. He told investigators he was an atheist.
He denied that he had taken part in the practice-beheadings of rabbits — he was not
seen on the video — even though the seven other men in the cell all said he had participated. And the members of the group contradicted one another. When pushed,
one of Mr. Abballa’s accomplices explained that they had slaughtered the animals in
order to have halal meat to eat during the Islamic holiday of Eid, according
It took investigators time to spot the hole in that claim: The forest slaughter was in
January, and the Eid al-Adha holiday had been celebrated two months before, in November.
Photo
From left, Omar Mateen, Larossi Abballa and Amedy Coulibaly, all of whom were
known to the authorities before killing in the name of the Islamic State.
Needles in a Haystack
While the legal systems may be different, the United States faced many of the same
problems in their interactions with Mr. Mateen, who when questioned by the author-
60
ities about earlier threats of violence insisted that he had said those things because
he was angry after facing discrimination.
After Mr. Mateen’s massacre, James B. Comey, the director of the F.B.I., said the
file on Mr. Mateen had been one of hundreds and hundreds of cases all across the
country, and compared the task of weeding out those who are expressing extremist
ideas from those who may act on those ideas to looking for needles in a nationwide
haystack
For France, thought to have among the largest numbers of suspected Islamic State
loyalists in Europe, the haystack is at least as big, and some say the caseload has become unmanageable.
We are in fact drowning in intelligence, said Alain Bauer, a professor of criminology at the National Conservatory of Arts and Crafts in Paris.
He and others said there were structural problems, including the fact that France’s so
-called S List, a database of people believed to have been radicalized, has over
10,000 names and is not ranked according to threat level.
Though most on the list never commit violence, others have now been responsible
for gruesome headlines. Eight of the 10 men who staged the deadliest European terrorist attack in over a decade — the Paris killings on Nov. 13 — were on the S List
and several had spent time behind bars, yet were able to sneak back into France and
Belgium from Syria. Another suspect on the list, Amedy Coulibaly, had also been
imprisoned on a terrorism conviction. Eight months after his electronic bracelet was
removed by the French authorities, he killed a police officer and opened fire in a kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015, leaving four more people dead in the Islamic State’s name.
If you take your daily agenda, and you were to note down the birthday of every single person you know, it would be unmanageable to try to wish them all a happy
birthday, Mr. Bauer said. You need to make a selection. We don’t know how to do
that with the profiles of these people.
Those kinds of suspects have created an awkward middle ground for the French authorities, and after a series of plots or attacks linked to the Islamic State over the past
two years, there is more urgency to find new legal tools to deal with the problem.
After Mr. Abballa killed the couple in Magnanville, France, last week, a deputy in
Parliament, Éric Ciotti, introduced a bill creating the status of administrative detention for those representing a security threat.
In effect, he was calling for rapid prioritization of the S List, and he said the bill
would be aimed at immediately detaining hundreds of those deemed to pose the
highest risk, placing them under house arrest or in a detention center.
He called the measure necessary because the penal code is based on proving that an
individual is not just talking or thinking about committing an act of terrorism, but
has taken steps toward carrying out the act.
61
These people are known to us, he said. I want to be able to take preventive action.
Prime Minister Manuel Valls said last week that he would consider the proposal, but
that there would be no Guantánamo in France, the French newspaper Libération
reported.
Jean-Charles Brisard, the chairman of the French Center for the Analysis of Terrorism in Paris, called the idea absurd and said France could not jettison civil liberties.
He added that putting everyone on the S List under surveillance was impossible, because there are more than 10,000 names and fewer than 5,000 agents. It takes 20
agents per suspect for 24-hour surveillance, he said, meaning France could perform
round-the-clock surveillance of only a small fraction of those suspected of being
radicalized.
My profound conviction is that unfortunately we need to get used to living with this
new threat, Mr. Brisard said. It’s permanent, it’s diffuse and it can erupt at any
moment.
Jihad and Vengeance
The streets in Magnanville, a community of about 5,600 people less than 40 miles
from Paris, are lined with neatly trimmed hedges. It was here that Mr. Abballa waited last week for an off-duty police officer, Jean-Baptiste Salvaing, to come home.
As neighbors watched in horror, Mr. Abballa stabbed Mr. Salvaing in the street and
left him bleeding in the driveway, then forced his way into the house. There he
stabbed to death Jessica Schneider, the officer’s longtime partner, as the couple’s 3year-old son watched.
In the time it took the police to close in and shoot Mr. Abballa dead, he paused to
upload a Facebook Live video. He had prepared a long speech, and the sound of flipping pages could be heard as he spoke.
First of all, I pledge allegiance to Emir al-Mumineem Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, he
began, referring to the leader of the Islamic State using a similar formula to the
pledge uttered by Mr. Mateen, who called 911 from inside the nightclub to dedicate
his violence to the terrorist group.
In a long rant captured on the video, Mr. Abballa’s thoughts returned to the frustration he felt in 2011, when he begged to be allowed to go abroad to wage jihad.
I address this also to the French infidel authorities. This is the result of your work.
You closed the door to my Hijrah, he said, using an Arabic term for a pilgrimage
that for some Islamic State devotees has come to mean traveling to Syria and Iraq to
join the group. You closed the door toward the lands of the caliphate? Well, good
then, we have opened the door of jihad onto your territory.
http://www.nytimes.com/
62
Turkey
After attack at Istanbul airport e perts say wider security
may not be the answer
28 Jun 2016
Ahern: We need to do more onintelligenceTuesday, 28 Jun 2016 | 7:11 PM ET|01:50
‹Experts debated what security measures should be taken, after anattack at Istanbul's
Ataturk airport left at least 28 people dead and dozens injured. Tuesday's attack was
the latest in a spate of bombings in Turkey this year.
Jayson Ahern, principal of the Chertoff Group, told CNBC that the current challenge
is figuring out how to adapt to the evolving tactics of terrorists.
"We're dealing with a very adaptive adversary that continues to move and react to
what moves that the government makes here in the United States," he said.
The presence of enforcement personnel has pushed terrorism efforts outside security
checkpoints, so airports now need to figure out how to secure the arrivals, departure
and curbside areas as well as transportation networks, according to Ahern.
It was reported that suicide bombers at Ataturk airport detonated themselves before
reaching a security checkpoint in the arrivals hall.
"As you move the layers of security around, you have got to be careful about having
areas where you are going to have significant numbers of people dwelling because
63
that becomes a soft target, a target of opportunity when you're dealing with the type
of adversaries that we're looking at today," Ahern said.
Osman Orsal | Reuters
Paramedics push out a stretcher after a reported explosion.at Turkey's largest airport,
Istanbul Ataturk
Ahern said, however, that in order to truly progress counter-terrorism efforts "more
on the intelligence front" needs to be done, and authorities need to be "more proactive."
General Barry McCaffrey agreed, saying that "the only way you really confront this
is good intelligence followed by good law enforcement."
The four-star general said that he believes "ISIS has actually been confronted fairly
effectively" and that "there's a major effort underway to mitigate this threat overseas."
http://www.cnbc.com/
64
Islamic State Aimed Istanbul Airport Attack at Turkish
Economy: Analysis
J U N E 29 2016
GUEST BLOGGER
Tuesday’s bloody suicide bombings at Istanbul Airport were most likely carried out
by Islamic State (IS) to undermine the Turkish economy by sowing mayhem ahead
of the summer months, when tourism peaks, according to Ege Seckin, an analyst
at IHS Country Risk. Others note that IS’ possible involvement and motivations for
the terror strike remain murky.
Seckin says the attack, which killed 41 and wounded 239, was also likely intended
to pressure Turkey into preventing Kurdish forces and the Syrian government in
northern Syria from shutting down its last access point to the Syrian-Turkish border,
through their advances on the towns of Manbij and al-Bab, respectively.
The capability of the Islamic State and similar Sunni militant groups in Turkey is
likely to continue to expand so long as Turkey permits domestic political Islamism
to grow unchecked, Seckin wrote in a post-attack analysis. He added that the semiautonomous and non-hierarchical nature of Islamic State cells in Turkey renders the
pre-emption of their attacks by the security forces difficult.
Turkey’s reconciliation with Israel, announced on June 27, is also expected to help
reinforce the Islamic State’s narrative that apostate governments of Muslim majority countries are aligned with Jews, Crusaders and unbelievers against the true Islam it claims to represent.
Other analysts and reports question whether the attack was tied to the deal with Israel.
IS’ ties to the airport attack also remain problematic. The group typically doesn’t
claim credit for its attacks on Turkish targets for reasons that are still unclear. This,
despite earlier bombings in Turkey in which IS was clearly involved, and the fact
that its forces regularly shell the Turkish border town of Kilis. The dead from Tuesday’s attack also appear to have been budget travelers from Turkey and Middle East
countries, travelling at unaccustomed hours, rather than western tourists, according
to an analyst who asked not to be identified
https://scitechnation.com/
65
E ternal attacks rise as Islamic State fortunes fall
June 29, 2016
By EINA KARAM The Associated Press
BEIRUT – International terror attacks seemingly inspired by the Islamic State group
are increasing as its fortunes fall in Syria and Iraq.
The attack on the Istanbul airport was still unfolding Tuesday night when Turkish
authorities said IS is the likely culprit, although no group has claimed responsibility
so far.
If IS is behind the latest carnage, it would be in keeping with its accelerated campaign of exporting terror, a tactic which appears aimed at deflecting attention from
mounting territorial losses in Syria and Iraq.
Here’s a look at what the Islamic State group would hope to gain from such an attack:
PROJECTING STRENGTH
Two years after it declared a caliphate across large parts of Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is in crisis. In the past few weeks, the group has suffered major territorial
losses in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and is fighting hard to defend major strongholds.
VIDEO: #VETERANS ATTEND THE 29TH ANNUAL PICNIC FOR HOSPITALI ED VETERANS.
Iraqi forces have retaken the key city of Fallujah west of Baghdad, and Libyan forces have swept into the IS stronghold of Sirte. In Syria, IS militants are fighting off
U.S.-backed forces in Manbij, a town on a key supply line from Turkey to the
66
group’s de facto capital, Raqqa. The losses can be added to a growing list of defeats,
including the historic Syrian town of Palmyra in March, the Syrian border town of
Kobani and the Iraqi city of Tikrit.
The tempo of international attacks has increased with each military defeat, from the
Paris attacks in November and the Brussels attacks in March to a suicide attack on
the Syrian-Jordanian border last week that killed seven Jordanian soldiers, the deadliest attack in the kingdom in years.
Such attacks help the group project strength and reassure supporters who might be
demoralized by the shrinking borders of its self-styled caliphate. Attacks also can
give a boost to propaganda and fundraising efforts, which are increasingly important
as IS loses oil wells and other sources of revenue in Syria and Iraq.
At least in the near-term, the threat of inspired external attacks will rise as the
group’s fortunes fall, according to an analysis Tuesday by the Soufan Group security consultancy.
PROPAGANDA FACTOR
For the same reasons, IS has an interest in taking credit for attacks carried out by
self-radicalized loners. Orlando gunman Omar Mateen said he acted on behalf of IS,
which claimed him as a soldier of the caliphate, but there is no evidence he was in
contact with the group.
Elias Hanna, a political studies instructor at the American University of Beirut, said
the Istanbul airport attack follows the group’s modus operandi of using multiple suicide bombers to attack soft targets, as it did in Brussels earlier this year. Such random attacks against civilians instill fear in the hearts of its enemies, something
which the group thrives on.
The Istanbul attack also comes during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, when
radicals believe martyrdom holds special significance. IS has ordered stepped up
attacks during Ramadan, calling for its supporters to strike wherever possible.
Some of the biggest battlefield victories by Muslims in the time of the prophet Muhammad in the 7th century came during Ramadan, and hard-line clerics tout the
month as a time for victory in jihad.
STRIKING TURKEY
Turkey was long seen as a jihadi highway for allowing thousands of foreign fighters
to join the war against Syrian President Bashar Assad. But it has become a target for
IS in the last year, after shutting down border crossings with Syria and cracking
down on smuggling.
A European security official said intelligence has indicated IS is also getting less
money from oil smuggling in Turkey, and suggested that there have been growing
tensions between IS and the Turkish government. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the sensitive topic publicly.
IS had not claimed responsibility for the airport attack by Wednesday evening, but it
issued an infographic celebrating two years since announcing its caliphate. It
claimed to have covert units in Turkey, among other places, according to the SITE
67
Intelligence Group.
Interestingly, the group has not claimed responsibility for any attacks in Turkey, except for the slaying of Syrian activists there, even when the Turkish government has
blamed the group.
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
Analysts say that reflects some unique dynamics between IS and Ankara.
Mohamed Noureddine, a Lebanese University professor who specializes in TurkishArab relations, said he does not believe IS is behind the attack unless it claims it in
an official announcement.
Turkey and IS swap artillery shells across the Syrian border, but neither side threatens the other’s core interests, he said.
NATO member Turkey shares global concerns about the extremist group’s ambitions, but may also see it as a counterweight to Assad’s forces and Kurdish insurgents in Syria. Ankara is part of the U.S.-led coalition against IS, but may be wary
of a full-scale confrontation with the group, which has thousands of fighters dug in
along the border and likely has sleeper cells within Turkey.
The absence of claims of responsibility indicates that the group doesn’t fully consider itself at war with Turkey yet, but it is using these attacks to give it a stronger
hand in negotiations over border access and the flow of oil and other materials, said
Matthew Henman, managing editor at IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.
Hanna said the ambiguous dynamic between IS and Turkey is governed by the push
and pull of overlapping short-term interests and clashing long-term ones.
Ambiguity is very important in war, said Hanna. It creates chaos and anxiety.
http://www.nwherald.com/
68
USA
Un algorithme peut-il prévoir les attaques de l’Etat islamique?
20 juin 2016 à 18:34.
Plus d'information sur l'imageLa montée brusque du nombre de groupes pro Etat
islamique sur les réseaux sociaux est souvent signe d'une poussée de violence dans
le vraie vie.
Les djihadistes sont bien plus actifs en ligne avant de passer à l'acte, démontre une
étude scientifique. Cette activité peut être modélisée. Mais prédire une attaque terroriste par les données reste encore très difficile
Peut-on opposer à la violence sanguinaire de l'Etat islamique la puissance des modèles mathématiques? En observant méthodiquement les faits et gestes de l'Etat islamique sur le web, serait-il possible de contrer sa propagande en ligne ou même déjouer l'organisation d’attentats? Une étude menée par le physicien Neil Johnson de
l'Université de Miami et rapportée par le New York Times semble aller dans ce sens.
Pour parvenir à ces résultats, publiés par la revue Science le 17 juin, Neil Johnson et
son équipe ont élaboré un algorithme qui identifie les schémas comportementaux des
affiliés au groupe Etat islamique. Les chercheurs ont utilisé comme matériau des
données collectées sur le réseau social VKontakte entre le 1er janvier et le 31 août
2015, à partir de 108 086 individus, exploitant des termes comme «bain de sang» ou
«décapitation» en plusieurs langues.
VKontakte est le plus grand réseau social européen, sorte de Facebook multilangues, avec plus de 350 millions d'utilisateurs. Neil Johnson a choisi de baser son
étude sur ce site pour plusieurs raisons. Il possède une forte concentration d'utilisateurs d'origine tchétchène basés dans la région du Caucase, proches de la principale
aire d'influence de l'Etat islamique sur le Moyen-Orient. De plus, l'Etat islamique a
déjà utilisé cette plateforme pour diffuser sa propagande à la population russe. Enfin,
VKontakte ferme moins rapidement les groupes pro-Daech que ne le fait Facebook.
L'Etat islamique en ligne, un vrai écosystème
69
Le quotidien new-yorkais livre une synthèse de la méthodologie employée par
l'équipe de physiciens. Le but à atteindre? Jeter les bases d'une «science correcte de
l'extrémisme en ligne», expose Neil Johnson.
A la place d'étudier de grands groupes ou de tenter de traquer des millions d'utilisateurs individuels, les chercheurs estiment qu'il était plus efficace de se concentrer sur
des petits groupes car ils reflètent les lames de fond de toute nouvelle activité et,
peuvent potentiellement indiquer où va l'activité. Même si cette traque en elle-même
ne prétend de prévenir des actes individuels, comme les massacres d'Orlando ou de
San Bernardino, elle permet d'identifier quand les conditions sont mûres pour le passage à l'action, détaille toujours le New York Times. Les physiciens ont recensé
quelques 200 groupes. Leurs
sont le plus souvent des promesses d'allégeance à
des terroristes, des appels pour du financement et des astuces de survie.
Même fonctionnement que les virus
Dans une interview accordée au magazine Pacific Standard, Neil Johnson explique
ce qu'il a observé. «En traquant les groupes, nous avons montré que les rassemblements grandissent et meurent, de manière schématique, en forme d'ailerons de requin. La communauté croît de manière légèrement irrégulière, avec de nouveaux
membres qui s'y insèrent, ou en s'unissant avec d'autres agrégats (...).» Lorsque les
groupes se ferment, les gens se dispersent puis rejoignent d'autres communautés. Le
modèle permet donc de déterminer quel moment est le plus opportun pour clôturer tel ou tel groupe de réseau social, afin d'entraver efficacement l'«écosystème»
Daech sur le web. Car le chercheur affirme que si l'on clôt trop rapidement tel
groupe, ses membres risquent, tels des virus, d'aller «infecter» directement d'autres
groupes.
Quant à la question des «loups solitaires», le chercheur explique au New York
Times qu'à un moment ou à un autre, la personne cherche des informations et se retrouve en quelques semaines dans un groupe réel ou virtuel pro Etat islamique.
L'auteur de la tuerie d'Orlando, dont les relations avec l'Etat islamique demeurent
floues, fréquentait ainsi le Centre islamique de Fort Pierce et y avait côtoyé -Moner
Mohammad Abusalha, le premier Américain à avoir commis un attentat-suicide en
Syrie en 2014, rapporte Le Monde.
Un science encore balbutiante
Neil Johnson se montre toutefois mesuré sur les résultats de cette analyse, indiquant
que ce modèle statistique ne peut pas tout détecter. «Je suis toujours prudent quand
on parle de prédiction. Cela transforme presque en problème d’ingénierie le fait de
gérer l’extrémisme en ligne», traduit le magazine Slate.fr.
Dans l'article du New York Times, J.M. Berger, co-auteur de «Isis: The State of Terror», et chercheur à l'Université George Washington pour un programme sur l'extrémisme, voit le potentiel des résultats: «C'est une approche intéressante, avec une valeur potentielle. Plus de recherches devraient être faites dans ce sens. Mais pour
rendre ceci encore plus utile, il faudra plus de travail.» Une autre experte sur la question, Faiza Patel, directrice d'un programme de sécurité nationale à l'Université de
New York, explique que de multiples facteurs entrent en compte dans la préparation
des attentats, facteurs qui ne peuvent être considérés dans une simple équation. L'anticipation du terrorisme reste pour l'heure une science balbutiante.
https://www.letemps.ch/
70
Researchers use algorithms to analyse how ISIS recruits
through social media
17 June 2016
A team of University of Miami researchers has developed a model to identify behavioural patterns among serious online groups of ISIS supporters that could provide
cyber police and other anti-terror watchdogs a roadmap to their activity and indicators when conditions are ripe for the onset of real-world attacks.
The researchers, who identified and analysed second-by-second online records of
196 pro-ISIS groups operating during the
first eight months of 2015, found that even
though most of the 108,000-plus individual members of these self-organised groups
probably never met, they had a striking
ability to adapt and extend their online longevity, increase their size and number,
reincarnate when shut down-and inspire ''lone wolves'' with no history of extremism
to carry out horrific attacks like the nation's deadliest mass shooting at a gay nightclub in Orlando this week.
''It was like watching crystals forming. We were able to see how people were materialising around certain social groups; they were discussing and sharing information all in real-time,'' says Neil Johnson, a physicist in the College of Arts and Sciences
who uses the laws of physics to study the collective behaviour of not only particles
but people. ''The question is: 'can there be a signal of how people are coming collectively together to do something without a proper system in place?' ''
The answer-- - according to the study, ''New online ecology of adversarial aggregates: ISIS and beyond,'' -is yes.
Generalizing a mathematical equation commonly used in physics and chemistry to
the development and growth of ad hoc pro-ISIS groups, Johnson and his research
team witnessed the daily interactions that drove online support for these groups, or
''aggregates,'' and how they coalesced and proliferated prior to the onset of realworld campaigns.
The researchers suggest that by concentrating just on these relatively few groups of
serious followers - those that discuss operational details like routes for financing and
avoiding drone strikes - cyber police and other anti-terrorist watchdogs could monitor their buildup and transitions and thwart the potential onset of a burst of violence.
''This removes the guesswork. With that roadmap, law enforcement can better navigate what is going on, who is doing what, while state security agencies can better
monitor what might be developing,'' Johnson said. ''So the message is: 'find the aggregates' - or at least a representative portion of them - and you have your hand on
the pulse of the entire organisation, in a way that you never could if you were to sift
through the millions of Internet users and track specific individuals, or specific
hashtags,'' Johnson said.
71
While the Johnson team concentrated on the ecology of collective behaviour
not on single individuals he said their roadmap could eventually help security
officials track individuals like Omar Mateen who claimed allegiance to ISIS
and other e tremist groups while killing 49 people and wounding 53 others at
Researchers use algorithms to analyse how ISIS recruits
through social media
17 June 2016
nightclub early Sunday. Authorities say the New York-born Florida man was a lone
actor who was radicalized online.
''Our research suggests that any online 'lone wolf' actor will only truly be alone for
short periods of time,'' Johnson said. ''As a result of the coalescence process that we
observe in the online activity, any such lone wolf was either recently in an aggregate
or will soon be in another one. With time, we would be able to track the trajectories
of individuals through this ecology of aggregates.''
For the study, Johnson and his research team monitored pro-ISIS groups on VKontakte, the largest online social networking service in Europe, which is based in Russia and has more than 350 million users from multiple cultures who speak multiple
languages. Unlike on Facebook, which very quickly shuts down these groups, they
are able to survive longer on VKontakte.
The researchers began their online search of pro-ISIS chatter manually, identifying
specific social media hashtags, in multiple languages, which they used as ''signals''
to trace the more serious groups. Study co-author Stefan Wuchty, a computer science professor in the College of Arts and Sciences and member of the Center for
Computational Science, compared the hashtag search to throwing a stone in a lake,
watching the ripples, then following each one.
The hashtags were tracked to the online groups, and the data was fed into a software
system that mounted the search; the results were repeated until the chase led back to
groups previously traced in the system. The mathematical equation Johnson and his
team borrowed from chemistry and physics illustrated the fluctuation of online
groups and pointed to possible predictions.
''The mathematics perfectly describes what we saw in real-time-how big and quickly
these online groups grew and how quickly they were shut down by agencies or other
monitoring groups,'' Johnson said.
As cyber police or other anti-terror entities got better at shutting down the groups,
Johnson and his team watched the groups reincarnate by changing their names and
identities, or shutting themselves down and going quiet, as if they were in stealth
mode, only to reappear under a different identity later.
''Much of the scientific community is focusing on different explanations as to why
social media is so important, and I think we found research that presents a kind of
crystallization method, looking at the dynamics of these groups and how they crystalize, appear, and morph into other groups.''
Johnson and his team's quest to distinguish serious pro-ISIS support from casual
chatter began largely by coincidence in 2014, when he was working on a grant from
72
Opinion: E tremism efore and After 9/11
A DU RAHMAN A -RASHEDJune 19, 2016, 1:21 pm 383
Most of what is written and said about extremist Islamists today is very different
from what was written about them in the recent past. Most western commentators
and the majority of Arab intellectuals used to classify extremist groups like AlQaeda as movements that were deprived of political rights in their countries and
therefore resorted to violence.
The two main countries accused of cracking down on Osama bin Laden and his
group are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The violence that figures in the media justified as
a reaction to authorities’ violence included a series of bombings in Egypt and threats
and operations that targeted Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaeda was, and still is, an evil organisation, and Bin Laden was a terrorist years before the events of September 11 but no
one wanted to believe this at the time.
Some people think that Al-Qaeda was born with the well-known terrorist operation
9/11, and that it did not exist before. In reality, it was the image of Al-Qaeda that
changed in the media. The organisation has always been the same. Most analysis
articles that were written in the western press before 9/11, in the US and the UK specifically, insisted that the extremist organisation and its leader were the product of
oppression. The US State Department previously asked the Egyptian government to
stop prosecuting and persecuting members of Islamic groups who raised the banner
of jihad.
I used to work for the Majalla magazine and later at Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper in
London in the nineties. I was in contact with a number of media professionals and
journalists there, and I participated in various think tank activities. Many of those
interested in the affairs of the Middle East were convinced that Osama bin Laden’s
demands were political; participation and freedom of expression, and that Al-Qaeda
was merely a political opposition group that was against the Saudi government.
The same was said about his companion Ayman Al- awahiri who has a longer history of terrorism. They considered him an opponent of President Mubarak’s government and not a leader of a group with a terrorist ideology. Many did not understand
the nature of the organisation and its destructive ideas, and this applies to Western
governments that deemed the extremist organisation as a political opposition movement only and were not aware of the seriousness of its fascist ideology.
Al-Qaeda activity had been taking place and was known of since 1993, however this
organisation and its leader enjoyed some sympathy in the western media despite its
blatant violent rhetoric and the military operations that it carried out, particularly in
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The group’s terrorist activities in Egypt were carried out
under the names of different groups that shared the same ideology.
The danger of these groups reached central Cairo. Al-Qaeda was pursued by the security services at the time, outside of Egypt, when its links to its leadership which
had been living in Sudan was discovered, particularly its association with Bin Laden
and Ayman Al- awahiri who fled Egypt to Sudan because they were wanted for terrorist activities.
Due to these armed terrorist attacks in Egypt, the Saudi government revoked Bin
73
Laden’s nationality in the mid-nineties. As a result of their confrontation of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, the Egyptian and Saudi governments became the western media’s
favourite target in terms of defending the concepts of democracy and freedom of expression. I do not remember anyone adopting a contrary opinion to this at the time.
They continued to justify Al-Qaeda’s activities that were committed in the name of
Islam until the day when Al-Qaeda carried out the 9/11 terrorist operation in America. It was not the first crime, but it was a decisive moment that revealed to everyone
that Al-Qaeda is not a political opposition group, but rather a dangerous global terrorist organisation.
Some people want to re-analyse the September 11 attacks, and blame the original
victims like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For anyone who wants to fully understand
what happened, analysing the September 11 attacks and reading the report on it, including the 28 pages that are said to have been classified because they contain confidential information about Saudi individuals, is not enough. Rather, they should read
Al-Qaeda’s entire history.
The world’s opinion changed after those events and almost everyone agreed that the
terrorist organisation and its ideology must be fought. However, prior to 9/11, those
who fought the organisation and its members were subjected to severe criticism.
In my opinion, the world cannot confront and defeat Al-Qaeda and ISIS without understanding their ideologies and the circumstances in which they were established.
74
New Report Confirms Analysis on Spread of Islamist Terror
JUNE 23, 2016 SISPete HoekstraYemen
Prisoners are caged and drowned in an ISIS video. Photo: Screenshot.
A new Congressional report confirms forecasts by the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) concerning disturbing trends in the global spread of Islamist terror in
2016-2017.
The IPT compiled its analysis from extensive research, sources, and multiple databases such as the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database, and published it in March.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report finds that the Islamic State (ISIS)
has expanded beyond its initial base in Iraq and Syria to field six effective militias in
the Middle East, Africa and South Asia.
In addition to its declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the CRS paper counts ISIS affiliates in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Yemen as
among the most significant and capable of its 34 pledged offshoots.
The IPT’s research indicated that governments that failed to provide stability or security for their citizens became an outsized factor in determining where ISIS would
flourish, which the CRS brief reflects. The IPT found that more than half of all jihadist assaults since 2012 occurred in the failed states of Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria.
To date, the Islamic State organization and its regional adherents have thrived in
ungoverned or under-governed areas of countries affected by conflict or political
instability, stated the CRS document, titled The Islamic State and U.S. Policy.
75
Formerly known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, the Islamic State in Egypt emerged after
the Egyptian revolution in 2011, with up to 1,000 radicalized indigenous Bedouin
Arabs, foreign fighters, and Palestinian militants. It claimed credit for destroying
Metrojet Flight 9268 over the Sinai Peninsula on October 31,2015, in a strike that
killed all 224 passengers.
The Islamic State in Saudi Arabia has claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in
the kingdom since 2014, including suicide bombings against Shia mosques and assaults against Saudi security forces, according to the CRS findings. A suicide bomber connected to ISIS successfully detonated himself in a Kuwaiti mosque in June
2015, killing more than two dozen and wounding hundreds.
ISIS declared its second caliphate along the Mediterranean in Libya in 2015 following coalition airstrikes against its territory in Iraq and Syria. Western officials estimate that 6,000 ISIS fighters moved there. Its new dominion reaches as close to 200
miles from the vulnerable southern border of Europe.
Boko Haram — the ISIS affiliate in Nigeria, and perhaps the deadliest jihadist group
in the world — has destroyed large areas in Nigeria and neighboring Cameroon,
Chad, and Niger. It first appeared in 2009 when it launched its military campaign for
Islamist rule in attacks that killed hundreds. It has murdered at least 15,000 people
over the past five years, and displaced more than 1.6 million.
The Islamic State-Khorasan Province named itself after a region that once included
parts of modern day Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Initially comprised of several
small Afghan Taliban and other militant factions, it announced its affiliation with
ISIS in 2013.
It grew as additional Taliban factions broke away, and in 2015, ISIS headquarters
began sending it financial resources. US officials estimate that it supports between
1,000 and 3,000 fighters in Afghanistan.
The Islamic State in Yemen has exploited the ongoing proxy war between Saudi
Arabia and Iran to repeatedly bomb Shia mosques and target supporters of the Iranian-backed Houthi Movement in northern Yemen, the CRS report states.
Beyond the recent carnage in the US and Europe, the IPT further predicts that jihadist attacks will continue to surge in lethality and geography throughout Africa
and Middle East, as well as South and Southeast Asia. They will encompass countries such as Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, Turkey, Bangladesh, Chad, Indonesia, and
Thailand.
H
“
H
https://www.algemeiner.com/
76
j
.”
H
Where does ISIS come from?
22nd June 2016
Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate
q
5
£9 99
Rosa Luxemburg said that capitalism would end in either socialism or barbarism.
Looking at the Middle East, as hopes of democracy and social justice have been
dashed by counter-revolution and violence, and at the West’s depictions of Islamic
State or ISIS, barbarism might seem to have triumphed. Abdel Bari Atwan, editor
for 25 years of the Arabic daily Q
and now running the news website
Rai al-Youm, is well placed to give an informed account of the origins, ideology and
spread of ISIS.
His subtitle and first chapter respond to the public’s fear and fascination with the
horrific images that roll across the world’s media. Atwan says that, without digital
technology it is highly unlikely…Islamic State would ever have come into existence,
let alone been able to survive and expand 1 He does not pursue this unlikely thesis;
however, it does serve to emphasise the modernity of ISIS. He moves quickly on to
a deeper analysis of their material and ideological origins.
Atwan reminds us of the First Gulf War and the UN sanctions, which resulted in the
deaths of 1.7 million Iraqis, half a million of them children under five. In 2003 the
United States and the UK bombed, invaded and occupied—more millions died, were
injured and were displaced. Washington’s Paul Bremer proceeded to dismantle and
privatise Iraq’s state-owned industries, including the oil industry. Atwan suggests
that the US neocon focus on promoting sectarian identities was a deliberate plan to
disarm and fragment Iraq in order to eliminate the threat such a large, oil-rich country could offer both Israel and US regional hegemony 2
To understand the origins of ISIS it is essential to show how Iraqi opposition to this
Western intervention developed. In the early armed opposition Atwan identifies
Baathists, ex-Iraqi army personnel, Saddam’s ex-security forces and seven Sunni
Islamist groups. Before 2004 there were also five Shia groups fighting the occupation in what Atwan describes as a rare moment of secular unity 3 But after the installation of the Shia-dominated government, many of them swapped their arms for
jobs and influence. Some Sunni Islamists, from the start, stated their intention to expel the invaders and establish an Islamic State in Iraq. Atwan shows how the fomenting of sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni was promulgated first by Abu
Musab al- arqawi, an extremist Jordanian jihadi, and from 2004 also by Al Qaeda.
By 2006 an umbrella Sunni jihadi organisation had been formed—Islamic State in
Iraq (ISI).
Atwan describes how the success of this group arose from a number of factors. He
identifies the US Awakening campaign, when large numbers of Sunnis were successfully recruited to fight with the US against Al Qaeda/ISI extremism, as a key
turning point. He says: They believed a fair, democratic and representative regime
would emerge. This is disingenuous at best. The Awakening was based on the US
encouraging Sunni tribal and political leaders to arm themselves as long as they
fought with them against ISI. As Atwan says, they were willing to do this due to
their political marginalisation under Nouri al-Maliki, the Shia prime minister, but
they were already fighting on a sectarian basis. The US switch from Shia to Sunni
did not give an impetus to nationalism or democracy; it helped to militarise sectarian
competition. Atwan then describes how the US-imposed sectarian-based political
system continued. Having helped arm and train 100,000 Sunnis, the US left Iraq,
77
and Maliki proceeded to exclude and eliminate what he saw as a threat to his power.
His cronies grabbed wealth and jobs while the excluded US-trained Sunnis became
the backbone of IS.
In a chapter on the Taliban, Al Qaeda and IS Atwan details the divisions developing between the jihadi groups. We can get an idea of these differences in their responses to the Arab Spring. While ISI attacked un-Islamic ideologies, such as filthy
and evil secularism, infidel democracy Mullah Omar, still the Taliban leader at the
time, congratulated the Egyptian people for the victory of the historical uprising
We also learn about the allegiances ISIS gained from Islamist groups across the
Muslim world, including Al Qaeda affiliates Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Indonesia’s
Jemaah Islamiah. Atwan provides well-researched estimates on foreign recruitment
numbers and explains how the push of rising Islamophobia, alongside the pull
of fighting for one’s beliefs and joining the Umma, both served as reasons for large
numbers of Muslim youths turning to radical Islam and to ISIS as their champion.
However, by concentrating on armed factions and government actions, Atwan does
not sufficiently explain the deepening of sectarian identity among the population.
One important basis for the growth of sectarianism, especially in Iraq, arose from
material needs. Anne Alexander explains how post-invasion privatisation fed sectarianism. As state services closed down, people were increasingly forced to turn towards local mosques, Islamic charities and tribal connections to meet their basic
welfare needs. National or social identities weakened. This dynamic intensified
when protection from violence became a priority.4
Bashar al-Assad’s brutal response to the revolutionary upsurge in 2011 turned Syria
into a ferment of civil war. The crushing of democracy and the promotion of armed
groups created conditions for the growth of ISIS. Atwan leaves out the role aggressive privatisation played in laying the basis for revolt. His post-1945 history of Syria
is useful: for example, knowing about past Muslim Brotherhood opposition can explain why Assad reacted so brutally to the first peaceful protests in 2011. However,
there is no coverage of his rule since 2000. Atwan therefore ignores the exacerbation
of social and economic inequality spurred by a neoliberal privatising agenda. These
undermined the Syrian Baath Party’s social pact, whereby the government provided
services in return for total control. Jonathan Maunder has shown how dissatisfaction
with increasing poverty and state authoritarianism fed the Syrian uprising and Bassel
F Salloukh has elsewhere given an interesting example of how the uprising in Aleppo was first divided on class lines before becoming sectarian.5
Atwan describes the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Syrian jihadi opposition
groups, citing estimates of $5 billion in Saudi funding. Jihadists, who had flowed
into Iraq during the surge against occupation, now flowed back again to Syria. He
draws on information from Rai al-Youm correspondents to detail the composition of
the Free Syrian Army, the Supreme Military Council and the Islamic Front (a Saudi
initiative). These groups were meant to provide the moderate opposition the West
was so desperate to back. Atwan quotes Patrick Cockburn on moderates in Syria by
2013: there is no such thing 6 Here he brushes over the role of the many democratic organisations active in Syria. Ghayath Naisse, a member of the Syrian Revolutionary Left Current, writing in October 2013 explains how Syrians were still organising demonstrations and making democratic demands, albeit now having to protect
themselves with arms.7
78
The book has a convincing biography of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed
caliph of Islamic State. We learn how Baghdadi took part in the insurgency against
the Western occupation of his country. He is credited with establishing the branch in
Syria, creating the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and masterminding a
successful fight to gain leadership over other jihadi groups. Atwan explains how
ISIS integrated former Baath members into their command structure and made alliances with groups mobilised by Sunni tribal alliances. This combination was able to
take the city of Mosul in June 2014. The Iraqi army troops evaporated before them,
allowing Baghdadi to declare the arrival of the Islamic State with himself as caliph.
Atwan’s description of the structure of ISIS’s state machinery and councils comes
from the organisation’s own publicity. Details of daily life in the new caliphate have
also been gleaned from social media contacts. There are reports that the poor get
food and housing, and that teachers receive salaries. There appears to be improved
order, albeit owing to fear. Atwan reiterates the point that ISIS knows and benefits
from the fact that populations exhausted by violence and chaos will find relief under
anyone who can establish law and order.
This is explained further in the chapter on the Management of Savagery Here the
2004 document of the same name written by Abu Bakr Naji, an Al Qaeda ideologue,
is examined. ISIS’s media department disseminated images of high-impact violence
quickly and widely, as part of its psychological strategy. Atwan gives us Naji’s three
stages for re-establishing the caliphate. The first sees the exhaustion of the superpowers The second, the administration of savagery commences with the breakdown of regular armies enabling the mujahideen (jihadi fighters) to prevail as the
people yearn for the return of law and order. Then follows Naji’s list of actions to be
followed in stage three, the establishment of the Islamic State 8Rather than simply
join in the demonisation of ISIS, Atwan points out that all countries are established
through war; and psychological terror is part of every army’s arsenal. He reminds us
it was the Americans who used shock and awe
The problem with Atwan’s analysis is that he views Islamism as if Islamist groups
are all essentially creatures of imperialism and therefore cannot have anti-imperialist
motivations. He gives a powerful account of how Western powers worked consistently to encourage Islamism in opposition to other ideologies, whether Communist
or nationalist, but does not see the material basis for the pull of Islamism on layers
of the poor both as an ideology and a way of organising resistance.
Atwan notes: Since 1980 the US has intervened in the affairs of 14 Muslim countries, at worst invading or bombing them… Latterly these efforts have been made in
the name of the ‘War on Terror’ and the attempt to curb Islamic extremism 9 He is
unequivocal: The policies of the US and Britain—which see them supporting and
arming a variety of groups for short-term military, political or diplomatic advantage—have directly contributed to the rise of IS. A glance at British relations
with the Ottomans, then the Arabs, all in the interests of empire, precedes a post1945 analysis centring on the question of oil security for the Western powers: To
counteract the rise of pan-Arabism, the West began to support Islamist tendencies
within each country—mostly branches of the Muslim Brotherhood—and worked
hard to create strong and binding relationships with Islamic, pro-Western monarchies 10
79
Atwan quotes UK and US politicians, which serves to show the West’s arrogance,
but he appears to accept their ability to set the agenda. After the Iranian Revolution,
Margaret Thatcher said: The Middle East is an area where we have much at stake…
it is in our own interest that they build on their own deep, religious traditions. We do
not wish to see them succumb to the fraudulent appeal of imported Marxism 11 Of
the intervention in Afghanistan, US national security advisor bigniew Brzezinski
wrote: We should concert with Islamic countries a propaganda campaign and a
covert action campaign to help the rebels 12 A quote from Tony Blair in 2004 encapsulates Western policy at this time: We want moderate, mainstream Islam to
triumph over reactionary Islam… A victory for the moderates means an Islam that is
open: open to globalisation 13
Fair enough, this was the West’s aim, but Islamist movements are not mere puppets
dancing to the tune of the West. This view over-emphasises the role of US (and UK)
policy and underplays the developments of political Islam in different countries and
movements in the region itself in response to decades of economic and political
change. Whatever Western imperialist intentions, Islamist groups have developed
their own agendas and trajectories, ISIS being only one proof of this.
Atwan devotes a chapter to Saudi Arabia and their massive funding of Wahhabism
through the region and beyond, exposing them as the primary source of jihadis and
jihadism. The irony is that the monster the Saudis have done so much to create now
sees its key mission, according to Atwan’s insider contacts, as overthrowing the
near enemy —the House of Saud.
When Atwan turns to the jihadis themselves, their recent variants and the whole context of the rise of Islamism, his analysis is very limited. An explanation of the rise of
radical Islam needs reference to the long period of anti-colonial struggle and the failure in the Middle East of other ideologies, including socialist, nationalist and reformist Islam. It needs to include more recent social and economic developments.
Atwan is describing rather than analysing. This leaves many questions unexamined.
Atwan’s emphasis on how imperialist and regional powers have manipulated, funded and built Islamist groups means he does not sufficiently distinguish between reformist Islamists, those who work within the state, and jihadi Islamists, those who
want to overthrow the state. Socialists need to understand the social roots of political
Islam, why so many turn to this ideology in their hope for a better society, how reformist and radical Islam involve different social layers, and how contradictions
emerge in both.
Chris Harman, in The Prophet and the Proletariat 14 analysed the social base of
Islamism in Egypt, Algeria and Iran. Harman explains that: ‘Islamist reformism’
fits the needs of certain major social groups—the traditional landowners and merchants, the new Islamic bourgeoisie (like those of the Muslim Brotherhood who
made millions in Saudi Arabia) and that section of the Islamic new middle class who
have enjoyed upward mobility. Islamist movements, providing reforms in line with
Islamic rules, offer a cultural transformation, without challenging the system. But
these reforms do not satisfy the other layers who have looked to Islamism—the students and impoverished ex-students, or the urban poor. The more the Muslim Brotherhood [or other Islamic reformists] look to compromise, the more these layers look
elsewhere, seeing any watering down of the demand for the installation of Islam of
the Koranic years as betrayal —so there is a pull towards radical Islam.
Like many Arab nationalists Atwan’s description of Islamism sees it as reactionary
so it cannot be supported. But In Egypt this mistake led many secular leftists to side
80
with the state against the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood, leading to the
even more violent and repressive government of Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi.
Harman explains: The Islamists are not our allies. They are representatives of a
class which seeks to influence the working class, and which, in so far as it succeeds,
pulls workers either in the direction of futile and disastrous adventurism or in the
direction of a reactionary capitulation to the existing system 15 Socialists need an
approach that sees Islamism as the product of a deep social crisis which it can do
nothing to resolve, and which fights to win some of the young people who support it
to a very different, independent, revolutionary socialist perspective 16
Since Harman wrote this in 1994, years of neoliberalism have led to a massive increase in the layers of educated urban poor. The failure of the 2011 revolutions in
Egypt and Syria, and the defeat of reformist Islamism with Mohamed Mursi’s overthrow in Egypt are important factors in the turn to radicalism. In Iraq and Syria an
approach looking to a revolutionary perspective has few social forces to work with
at present. In the midst of war only armed groups seem to count. But it does not help
if in this situation analyses of Islamism are over-simplified. Socialists need to understand the social basis of radical Islam and the importance of resistance both to imperialism and to their own oppressive states to those involved in these movements.
The contradictions in reformist Islam are obvious when looking at Muslim states
like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. Reformist Islam was wiped off the agenda in
Iraq, for Sunnis at least, when they were bombed, occupied, excluded and humiliated. It is understandable why so many turned to jihadism for some hope of recovering
status and control of their lives. The contradictions in radical Islam will have started
to become obvious to those living in the Islamic State and will remain when the
fighting is over. Cultural reforms can be delivered but Islam will not challenge capitalism. Islam asks the rich for charity; it demands more social justice but presents no
challenge to private wealth and exploitation. Armed struggle, hoping for implementation of a regional state with Islamic traditions, is the limit of what ISIS offers.
Also outside the scope of Atwan’s narrative is a wider perspective, looking at how
regional powers have become more influential as a result of the decline of US hegemony. He also does not look at the dynamics and potentialities of the mobilisations by those wanting a more just, democratic and equal society. For Atwan the Arab Spring and its suppression are merely part of the power vacuum ISIS was able to
feed upon. Yet any answer to the horrors of sectarian violence or imperialist bombing needs to look to where such struggles can be developed again.
The book’s conclusion is that ISIS is with us for the long term and that Western and
regional powers fed its rise, but that the perfect storm that led to its phenomenal
success was the invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Syria. Atwan’s account gets
away from describing ISIS as irrationally evil, the depiction used to justify bombing.
It probably gets as near to the facts on the ground as possible, at the time, using internet sources and contacts. The main body of the book, explaining ISIS’s origins
and describing its development, has useful information, if not a deep political and
social analysis, and serves as a damning indictment of Western and regional intervention in Iraq and Syria.
http://isj.org.uk/where-does-isis-come-from/
81
Disclaimer of Liability and Endorsement
While the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) strives
to make the information on this publication as timely and accurate as possible, the
ACSRT makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness,
or adequacy of its contents, and expressly disclaims liability for errors and omissions in its contents. No warranty of any kind, implied, expressed, or statutory, including but not limited to the warranties of non-infringement of third party rights,
title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or freedom from computer virus, is given with respect to the contents of this publication or its links to other Internet resources.
It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors
and not of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), its
publication board, its management or any funder or sponsor of the ACSRT, nor that
of the African Union Commission (AUC),
Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and
convenience of the public, and does not constitute endorsement, recommendation, or
favoring by the ACSRT and AUC.
82