The Basic Aims of Discourse - Center for Digital Humanities
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The Basic Aims of Discourse - Center for Digital Humanities
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For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 1DWLRQDO&RXQFLORI7HDFKHUVRI(QJOLVKis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to &ROOHJH &RPSRVLWLRQDQG&RPPXQLFDWLRQ http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions §beBasicAimsof Discourses JAMES E. KINNEAVY for whom it is intended. It is the intent as embodied in the discourse, the intent MOST OF US MAKE IMPLICIT ASSUMP- of the work, as traditional philosophy TIONS about the aims of discourse when called it. Is the work intended to delight we loosely distinguish expository writing or to persuade or to inform or to demonfrom literature or creative writing, and, strate the logical proof of a position? no doubt, there is some validity to the These would be typical aims. The determination of the basic aims distinction. Many college composition textbooks often assume a similar distinc- of discourse and some working agreetion and address themselves to the pro- ment in this area among rhetoricians vince of expository writing. But it may would be a landmark in the field of be that this simple distinction is too sim- composition. For it is to the achievement ple and that other aims of discourse of these aims that all our efforts as teachought to be given some consideration. ers of composition are directed. Yet a classification of diverse aims! of It is this question which I would like to discourse must not be interpreted as the investigate in this paper. First, at least one working definition. establishing of a set of iron-clad cateI am concerned with complete discourse, gories which do not overlap. Such an not individual sentences or even para- exercise must be looked upon as any graphs. It is often impossible to deter- scientific exercise-an abstraction from mine the aim of an individual sentence certain aspects! of reality in order to or paragraph without its full context. focus attention on and carefully analyze The same sentence or even paragraph in the characteristics of some feature of another context may have a very differ- reality in a scientific vacuum, as it were. ent aim. "Discourse" here means the full The scientist who is attempting to formutext, oral or written, delivered at a speci- late the law of gravity isolates the gravific time and place or delivered at several tational forces from air resistance, from instances. A discourse may be a single surface variations, from electric attracsentence, "Fire," screamed from a hotel tion, etc., and hopefully postulates a window, or a joke, or a sonnet, or a principle of gravity. The re-insertion into three-hour talk, or a tragedy, or Toyn- real situations wherein wind, surface bee's twelve volumes of A Study of His- variations, electricity and other forces tory. Sometimes the determination of intervene comes later. Similarly, an attext is difficult: a conversation may trail tempt to formulate the nature of inforoff into another one; a novel like Sanc- mation, as such, must operate in a distuary may pick up years later in course vacuum which momentarily abRequiem for a Nun; there are trilogies stracts from the fact that information can in drama and novel, etc.; but usually the be used in propaganda or be a comdetermination of text is a fairly simple ponent of a literary discourse. In actual matter. practice such pure discourses as informaaim of is discourse meant the tion devoid of persuasion, or persuasion By effect that the discourse is oriented to devoid of information, or literature withachieve in the average listener or reader out some personal expression, and so INTRODUCTION 297 This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 298 COLLEGE COMPOSITIONAND COMMUNICATION forth, are almost non-existent or as rare as the laboratory concept of gravitation. But that does not destroy the validity of the classifications. THE DETERMINATION OF THE AIMS OF DISCOURSE SOME NEGATIVE AND SOME EXTERNAL NORMS There are some useful cautions about determination of aims made in literary theory by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley which can be extended to discourse theory. It is dangerous in literature (and even more in persuasion) to assume that what the author says he is trying to do is actually what the work really accomplishes. To determine the aim by author intent is to run the risk of the "intentional fallacy." A parallel danger is to assume that the reaction of a given reader is an accurate indication of purpose. This fallacy has been termed the "affective fallacy" by Wimsatt and Beardsley.' The stated intentions of the author and the reactions of a given reader are useful markers that can point to significant evidence in the discourse itself, as the linguist Michael Riffaterre points out;2 for this reason they should not be disregarded. Similarly, many authors advise us to take into account the cultural conventions of the genre employed; anthropologists like Malinowski warn of the importance of the immediate historical context; McLuhan emphasizes the significance of the medium used; Kenneth Burke writes a whole book on the influence of the semantic range, the grammar he calls it, of the motivational field; and even the grammatical choices offered by the language can restrict and 1 For the treatment of both fallacies, see W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, The Verbal Icon (Lexington, Kentucky, 1965), pp. 3-18, 21-39. 2"Criteria for Style Analysis," in Essays on the Language of Literature,eds. Seymour Chat- man and Samuel R. Levin (Boston, Massachusetts, 1967), pp. 419 ff. modify the aim, as Sapir and Whorf caution us. All of these, external to the discourse, are nonetheless weighty determinants of aim and are so many arguments against the mythical autonomy of the text. INTERNAL NORMS OF AIM Among the writers who have sought to establish the aims of discourse by norms internal to the discourse there is considerable variation in the kind of norm singled out. Yet there is a surprising measure of agreement among the analysts on so fundamental an issue. In Figure I, I have attempted to show some of these various approaches, together with the principle of division and the resulting classifications of aims of discourse. The parallel classifications of the various systems are indicated in the horizontal rows. All of the authorities whom I have analyzed could not be presented on a single page, so I have only indicated typical representatives of various approaches. The eldest and most persistent approach in western civilization is that beginning in Plato, codified by Aristotle, continued by the medieval Arab philosophers Averroes and Avicenna, Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, and passed on to modern times by the classical tradition and some comparative philologists, like Joshua Whatmough. Aristotle and Aquinas distinguish a scientific use of language achieving certainty, a dialectical use of language operating in the area of probability, a rhetorical or persuasive use of language based on seeming probability, and a poetic use of language incorporating a rigid but internal probability. The principle of division is obviously a scale of diminishing probability.3 3For a historical survey of this school, see J. Craig LaDriere, "Rhetoric and 'Merely Verbal' Art," in English Institute Essays, 1948, ed. D. A. Robertson (New York, 1949), pp. 123-153. This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Figure 1 A COMPARISON OF SOME SYSTEMS OF AIMS OF DISCOURSE SCHOOL Aristotle and Aquinas PRINCIPLE Level of OF Probability DIVISION Scientific -certain Morris Miller Behavioral Reactions of Animals to Stimuli Socio-Psych. Motives for Communications Grammar (Kinds of Sentences) Faculty Addressed to Informative -to increase uniformity of information Informative -declarative Communicative (thoughts to be believed) Valuative Opinion -to increase uniformity of opinions Questioning -interrogative Pragmatic -practical use by Sophists Incitive Status Change Imperative -imperative Promotive (actions to be accomplished) Mythological -expressive of aspirations Systemic Emotive Suggestive (emotions to be aroused) Cassirer Historical Sequence in Greece Metaphysical Informative -representative of the world Dialectical -probable Rhetorical -seemingly probable Russell Reichenbach Poetic -internally probable Expressive (Of emotion) -exclamatory Interjectional This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 300 COLLEGE COMPOSITIONAND COMMUNICATION Ernst Cassirer, examining the historical sequence of Greek views on the functions of language, sees first a mythological view of language as a medium for expressing the aspirations of early Greek society. This partially (though not at all totally) corresponds to Aristotle's poetic function. This was followed by a period in which it was felt by the philosophers that language was admirably suited to mirror or represent the universe. This metaphysical period, as he calls it, corresponds to Aristotle's scientific use of language. The practical or pragmatic use of language by the sophists and rhetoricians came next. Finally, Democritus pointed to a basic and initial interjectional or emotive use of language -to which Aristotle has no direct parallel.4 In the next column of Figure I, C. W. Morris, the semiotician, bases his aims of discourse on a behavioral analysis of how animals react to stimuli. The animal first informs itself of the features of its environment, then evaluates the seemingly useful features, then responds to these as incitive "stimuli," and finally systematizes his signs in order to achieve the purpose for which he engaged in this expressive activity. There is a rough approximation here to Aristotle's scientific, dialectic, and rhetorical functions. Morris' systemic has some affinity with the expressive function of the others on the chart.5 George Miller, a communication theorist, establishes his distinctions on the socio-psychological motives for the communications which are revealed in the discourse. The informative use of language attempts to increase uniformity of fact and information in the community; the opinion use of language attempts to increase uniformity of the probable in 4See Ernst Cassirer,An Essay on Man (New Haven, 1944), pp. 109 ff. 5See C. W. Morris,Signs, Language and Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1946), pp. 95 ff. the society; the status change use of language is oriented to improve one's societal position; and the emotive use is oriented to individual satisfaction in an expressive use of language. The similarities to the preceding systems are fairly obvious.6 In an interesting chapter on "The Uses of Language" in Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, Bertrand Russell takes issue with the dominant logical positivist view of a simple dichotomy of referential and emotive uses of language and distinguishes the informative, the questioning, the promotive and the emotional uses of language. These correspond quite naturally to the kinds of rhetorical sentences in the language: declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamatory. These image quite closely Miller's, Morris' and Aristotle's categories, though the principle of division is different in each.7 Hans Reichenbach, a logical positivist, in a brief introduction to his book on symbolic logic, differentiates functions of language by the faculty appealed to in the discourse. He therefore distinguishes a communicative use emphasizing thoughts to be believed by the intellect, from a promotive use directed to actions to be accomplished, from a suggestive use oriented to emotions to be aroused.8 Both Reichenbach and Richards take the logical positivist position as their springboard. Richards emphasizes the kind of reference found in the discourse. In his various books, Richards suggests various categories of discourse. I have followed here the distinctions to be found in How to Read a Page and Principles of Literary Criticism rather 6See George A. Miller, Language and Communications (New York, 1951), p. 253. 7 See Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits (New York, 1948), pp. 58 ff. 8 See Hans Reichenbach,Introductionto Symbolic Logic (New York, 1947), pp. 17 ff. This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE BASIC AIMS OF DISCOURSE than some of his other works. Discourses exist in a continuum with decreasing referential and increasing emotive affirmations. Pure reference discourse is scientific, pure emotive discourse is poetic. Any appreciable mixture of the two is rhetoric. Further subdivisions of the mixed area (rhetoric) are generally useless.9 The equating of poetry with emotive discourse in Richards is a common phenomenon among these classificatory systems-a fact the figure illustrates. Sometimes poetry is subsumed under emotive, sometimes poetry is equated to the emotive (as in Richards). Sometimes there is no provision for one or the other-thus Aristotle makes no room for expressive discourse as such, though emotion is important for his concept of catharsis in poetry and in the whole second book of his Rhetoric. The last column of the figure distinguishes aims by the focus on the component of the communication process which is stressed in a given discourse. At one time I thought that this principle of classification was original with me, but I later found that Karl Biihler, a German psychologist, had used it in depth in the 1930's and that Roman Jakobson, acknowledging Biihler as his source, had also used it to classify aims of discourse in the early 1960's. The beginnings of this norm can be found in Aristotle who calls science language directed to things and rhetoric language directed to persons. Alan Gardiner, the linguist, had also suggested this principle of classification in the 1950's.10 This principle can be seen illustrated in Figure 2. If one represents the components of the communication process as 9See I. A. Richards, How to Read a Page (London, 1943), p. 100; and Principles of Literary Criticism (London, 1925), p. 261. 0 See Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in Essays on the Language of Literature, eds. Seymour Chapman and Samuel R. Levin (Boston, 1967), pp. 299 ff. 301 a triangle composed of an encoder (writer or speaker), a decoder (reader or listener), a signal (the linguistic product), and a reality (that part of the universe to which the linguistic product refers), then a focus on one of these tends to produce a specific kind of discourse. Discourse dominated by subject matter (reality talked about) is called referential discourse. There are three kinds of referential discourse: exploratory, informative, and scientific. These correspond to elements in the first and second rows across Figure I. Here, however, it seems important to distinguish the merely informative kind of writing (such as news stories in journalism, simple encyclopedia or textbook presentations) from the strictly scientific, though few authorities make the distinction. Aristotle, for example, has no theory of information, though he has one of science. And Miller has provision for informative, though he has no specific provision for the scientific. And it is equally important to distinguish a kind of discourse which asks a question (exploratory, dialectical, interrogative in some formulations) from discourse which answers it (informative) and proves the answer (scientific). Yet all three of these kinds of discourse are subject-matter or reference dominated. Examples of all three are given in Figure 2. These subdistinctions of reference discourse are my own and differ somewhat from Jakobson's. Secondly, as Biihler, Jakobson and Aristotle point out, discourse which focusses on eliciting a specific reaction from the decoder and is dominated by this request for reaction emerges! as persuasion or rhetoric. In this use, the encoder may purposely disguise his own personality and purposely distort the picture of reality which language can paint in order to get the decoder to do something or believe something (as in dishonest advertising or some political propaganda). These distortions are not This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Figure 2 THE BASIC PURPOSES OF COMPOSITION I I I r--"' -- -JLAl JX I I I EXPRESSIVE REFERENTIAL LITERARY Examples: Examples: Examples: Of Individual Conversation Journals Diaries Gripe sessions Prayer Of Social Minority protests Manifestoes Declarations of independence Contracts Constitutions of clubs Myth Utopia plans Religious credos Exploratory Dialogues Seminars A tentative definition of ... Proposing a solution to problems Diagnosis Scientific Proving a point by arguing from accepted premises Proving a point by generalizing from particulars A combination of both Informative: News articles Reports Summaries Non-technical encyclopedia articles Textbooks This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Short Story Lyric Short Narrative Limerick Ballad, Folk Song Drama TV Show Movie Joke THE BASIC AIMS OF DISCOURSE essential to persuasion, however. What is essential is that encoder, reality, and language itself all become instrumental to the achievement of some practical effect in the decoder. Obvious examples of such aims of discourse are given in the last column of Figure 2. Thirdly, when the language product is dominated by the clear design of the writer or speaker to discharge his emotions or achieve his own individuality or embody his personal or group aspirations in a discourse, then the discourse tends to be expressive. The expressor or encoder here dominates the communication process. Sometimes in such uses the decoder and the referential components even become negligible-as with curse words uttered in private. But often such uses carry strong sub-components of information and persuasion, as in the Declaration of Independence. Some examples of such uses are given in the first column of the figure we have, been analyzing. Finally, the product or text or work itself may be the focus of the process as an object worthy of being appreciated in its own right. Such appreciation gives pleasure to the beholder. In this use of language, language calls attention to itself, to its own structures, not as references to reality or as expressions of personal aspirations or as instruments of persuasion, but as structures worthy of contemplation in their own right. Of course, reference, author personality, and persuasion may and usually are involved. But they are not rigidly relevant as primary foci. Indeed the reality may be fictional or very distorted; the author may be hidden under dramatic projections; and the persuasions involved may be quite trivial on occasion. This last use of language is called literature. It appears in such varied forms as the, pun, the salacious joke, the sonnet, the novel, the TV drama, the epic, etc. If a comparison may be drawn, it could be said that language is like a 303 windowpane. I may throw bricks at it to vent my feelings about something; I may use a chunk of it to chase away an intruder; I may use it to mirror or explore reality; and I may use a stainedglass window to call attention to itself as an object of beauty. Windows, like language, can be used expressively, persuasively, referentially, and esthetically. SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT AIMS OF DISCOURSE I have not included in Figure I many of the other approaches to aims of discourse, most of which are fairly symmetrical to those given here. These would include the several groups interested in the functions of language at its origin (was: it imitative of reality, the bow-wow theory, was it a utilitarian rhetorical tool, the yo-he-ho theory, was it an expressive emotional theory, the ah-ah, pooh-pooh theory, or did language begin in play and poetry, the ding-dong theory). These theories, like the child function theories, do parallel the four functions arrived at. Some anthropologists, like Malinowski and Doob, have examined primitive societies and isolated the functions of language found there (they do not find a literary or play use, I might add, though LeviStrauss did). Nor have I mentioned the semanticists; Hayakawa's four uses of language also parallel the model sketched here. The uses of language, established by the Nebraska high school composition program and drawn heavily from the ordinary language philosophers, also closely parallel these distinctions. The important lesson to be drawn from this almost fearful symmetry is that no composition program can afford to neglect any of these basic aims of discourse. There have been periods in the history of the teaching of composition, whether in the elementary or secondary or college level, when one or the other This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 304 COLLEGE COMPOSITIONAND COMMUNICATION has been unduly prominent and others slighted or entirely neglected. The results have usually been educationally disastrous. In speech departments where persuasion was, for too long a time, too prominent, two cancerous effects have often followed: first, expository or reference discourse is assimilated into and made equivalent to persuasion and Aristotelian rhetorical proofs are extended to all discourse; secondly, even literature is reduced to persuasion, and some modern theories of oral interpretation now speak of the oral interpreter's function as one of coercing the audience into a dcesiredemotional attitude. At the elementary and secondary school during the Deweyite progressive period, the reduction of all language to self-expression destroyed alike any objective scientific or literary norms:. At the college level, in English departments during the period immediately preceding the present, the restriction of composition to expository writing and the reading of literary texts has had two equally dangerous consequences. First, the neglect of expressionism, as a reaction to progressive education, has stifled self-expression in the student and partially, at least, is a cause of the unorthodox and extreme forms of deviant self-expression now indulged in by college students on many campuses today. Secondly, the neglect of persuasion has often caused persuasion to be assimilated and absorbed into literature in many cases. Expressionism has often been similarly absorbed so that literature has become prostituted to propaganda or the most weird forms of formless selfexpression. In philosophy, with the logical positivists, interested solely in scientific statements, the ignoring of other uses of discourse has caused all of them to be lumped into the general category of nonsensical or meaningless. None of these situations is healthy. It is to the good of each of the aims of discourse to be studied in conjunction with the others. The reason for this is to be seen in the various principles of classification used in the establishing of the aims!by various writers. Scientific discourse is generally different in its logic, its level of probability, from the other aims of discourse. In fact, each aim of discourse has its own logic, its own kind of references, its own communication framework, itsi own patterns of organization, and its own stylistic norms. Sometimes these logics and stylistic principles even contradict each other. Overlaps, certainly occur but the ultimate conflation and confusion of any of the, aims of discourse with any other is pedagogically disastrous. The study of these distinct aims of discourses is only a continuation of the basic liberal arts tradition. That tradition, coalesced into the trivium of grammar, rhetoric, and logic or dialectic, simply meant the study of literature, the study of persuasion, and the study of scientific and exploratory discourse. When the English departments presided over the dissolution of the liberal arts tradition in the early 1900's by exiling persuasion to speech departments and by exiling logic to philosophy departments, only literature (grammar) remained and literature, as such, had never been the only basis of the liberal arts. My plea is simply for a preservation of the liberal arts tradition with composition as the foundation stone. College of Education University of Texas, Austin This content downloaded from 129.252.86.83 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:56:40 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions