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Project No : FP7-610713 Project Acronym: PCAS Project Title: Personalised Centralized Authentication System Scheme: Collaborative project Deliverable D3.1 State of the art of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Due date of deliverable: (T0+4) Actual submission date: 31st January 2014 Start date of the project: 1st October 2013 Duration: 36 months Organisation name of lead contractor for this deliverable: UPM Final version Collaborative Project supported by the 7th Framework Programme of the EC Dissemination level PU Public PP Restricted to other programme participants (including Commission Services) RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including Commission Services) CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including Commission Services) X Executive Summary: State of the art of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection This document summarises deliverable D3.1 of project FP7-610713(PCAS), a Collaborative Project supported by the 7th Framework Programme of the EC. This document reports an overview of the state of the art of biometrics in mobile phones, describing the current works, results, limitations, advantages and disadvantages of using them as authentication systems in mobile devices. In addition, this deliverable also covers the study of voluntary or involuntary approaches to detect non-coercion and liveness. This report provides an essential support in the decision of the technologies to be deployed in WP3 of the project. Full information on this project, including the contents of this deliverable, is available online at http://www.pcas-project.eu. List of Authors Carmen Sánchez Ávila (UPM) Javier Guerra Casanova (UPM) Francisco Ballesteros (UPM) Lorenzo Javier Martı́n Garcı́a (UPM) Miguel Francisco Arriaga Gómez (UPM) Daniel de Santos Sierra (UPM) Gonzalo Bailador del Pozo (UPM) 2 Document History Version v0.1 v0.9 v1.0 v1.1 Date 1-11-2013 13-1-2014 26-1-2014 31-1-2014 Comments First draft Version for internal review Version for incorporating feedback Final version 3 Contents List of figures 6 List of tables 7 1 Introduction 1.1 General concepts on biometrics . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 General biometric systems . . . . . . . 1.1.2 Functions of general biometric systems 1.1.3 Fundamental performance metrics . . 1.2 Related European Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Mobile biometrics 2.1 Fingerprint recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Relevant works on mobile fingerprint recognition . . . . . 2.1.3 Public databases for fingerprint recognition . . . . . . . . 2.1.4 Liveness detection on fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Keystroke dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Public databases for mobile keystroke dynamics . . . . . . 2.2.3 Relevant works on mobile keystroke dynamics . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Liveness detection on mobile keystroke dynamics . . . . . 2.2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Face recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Public databases for mobile face recognition . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Relevant works on mobile face recognition . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Multimodal identification using face recognition . . . . . . 2.3.5 Liveness detection on mobile face recognition . . . . . . . 2.3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Signature recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Relevant works on signature recognition on mobile phones 2.4.3 Public databases for mobile signature recognition . . . . . 2.4.4 Liveness detection on mobile signature recognition . . . . 2.4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Hand recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 9 10 11 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 16 16 18 22 23 26 27 27 29 29 31 31 32 33 35 36 39 40 41 42 42 43 48 48 48 49 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection 2.5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 Relevant works on mobile hand recognition . . . 2.5.3 Public databases for mobile hand recognition . . 2.5.4 Liveness detection on mobile hand recognition . 2.5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Voice recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2 Relevant works on mobile speaker verification . . 2.6.3 Public databases for mobile speaker recognition . 2.6.4 Liveness detection on mobile speaker verification 2.6.5 Commercial applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iris recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2 Template aging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3 Relevant works on mobile iris technique . . . . . 2.7.4 Liveness detection on mobile iris recognition . . . 2.7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gait recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8.2 Public databases for mobile gait recognition . . . 2.8.3 Relevant works on mobile gait recognition . . . . 2.8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fusion of biometrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9.2 Multimodal information fusion techniques . . . . 2.9.3 Multimodal databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9.4 Recent related works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Non-coercion techniques 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Involuntary approach . . . . 3.2.1 Physiological signals 3.2.2 Voice . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Face . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4 Movement . . . . . . 3.3 Voluntary approach . . . . 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 52 55 55 56 56 57 58 61 61 66 66 67 68 69 72 74 74 74 75 76 77 80 81 81 82 83 85 89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 91 91 92 93 93 93 93 94 4 Conclusion 95 Glossary 96 Bibliography 101 5 List of Figures 1.1 Components of general biometric systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Hand shape/Hand geometry approaches. (Left) Contour-based approach. (Right) Distance-based approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Palmprint. Principal lines of the hand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hand Veins. Dorsal palm veins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iris. (Left) Iris picture from CASIA database under IR wavelength. (Right) Iris picture from NICE1 database under visible wavelength. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of Iris Biometrics publications till 2013, searching “iris biometrics” and “iris biometrics mobile phone” into Google Scholar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data fusion paradigms at sensor level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 6 10 50 51 52 68 68 82 List of Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 Summary of relevant works in mobile fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of relevant works in mobile fingerprint liveness detection . . . Summary of relevant works in keystroke dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . Commercial face detection available systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Most popular face datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Face detection algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of relevant works about face recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . Live detection algorithms based on face analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of relevant works in mobile signature recognition . . . . . . . Hand biometrics into mobile devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A comparative overview of several aspects from different hand databases Summary of relevant works in voice recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public databases for mobile voice recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iris template aging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of relevant works in mobile iris biometrics . . . . . . . . . . . Relevant works in gait authentication for mobile phones . . . . . . . . . Summary of relevant works in multimodal recognition. . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 25 31 34 35 37 39 41 47 54 55 62 63 71 73 79 89 1 Introduction This document is the deliverable 3.1 of PCAS project, regarding the state of the art on mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection techniques. This deliverable is part of WP3, named “Biometric recognition”. The main objectives of this WP are the development and evaluation of several biometric techniques applied to portable devices and the fusion of them in order to deploy a biometric authentication process in the PCAS device. Additionally, this device should also include methods to detect the liveness of the captured samples and a non-coercion method to notice when the user is under a very stressed situation. Both subsystems are also carried out in this WP. The first task of WP3, “Identification and analysis of technologies and sensors” is focused on reviewing the state-of-the-art in mobile biometrics and other relevant technologies such as liveness detection and non-coercion systems. Deliverable 3.1 has been created as a result of this task, according the following objectives: • Reviewing the state of the art on biometrics that can be used in portable devices, concentrating on the advantages, disadvantages, problems and solutions related to apply the biometrics methods in standalone mobile devices. • Reviewing the state of the art on liveness detection in biometrics focused on solutions that can be used in mobile devices. • Reviewing the state of the art on non-coercion and stress detection systems based on voluntary or involuntary user actions. • Understanding the advantages, disadvantages, problems and solutions of each biometric technique. Accordingly, the document consists of the following chapters: • Chapter 1: Introduction: In this chapter, the objectives and scope of the document are presented. A general description of biometric terminology is included in order to facilitate the understanding of the rest of the document. In this chapter, an overview of the related FP7 projects is also presented, as many of the research works analyzed subsequently result from these projects. • Chapter 2: Mobile biometrics state of the art: This chapter includes a review on the state of the art of several biometric techniques that can be used in mobile devices. For each biometrics, a section on liveness detection is also included to examine how the spoofing detection can be performed in each technique. In particular, the following techniques have been inspected: fingerprint, keystroke dynamics, face, signature, hand, voice, iris and gait. Furthermore, a section regarding the fusion of several biometrics in mobile devices has also been incorporated. 8 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Chapter 3: Non-coercion techniques: This chapter reports the state of the art of techniques to detect coercion. These techniques have been organized in two different approaches: voluntary and involuntary. The former approach regards procedures where users can voluntary send alarms meaning that they are under a coerced situation. The latter, involuntary approaches, refer to techniques where systems detect the stress of a person through signals that appear involuntarily when people are under stressful situations. • Chapter 4: Conclusions: This chapter contains a summary of the main advantages, disadvantages and limitations of each biometric technique applied to standalone devices. 1.1 General concepts on biometrics This section presents general concepts on biometrics, obtained from the ISO 19795 norm [37]. This norm provides definitions and explanations on general biometric systems that are used in the rest of this document. In addition to this, the purpose of this norm is to present the requirements and best scientific practices for conducting technical performance testing. This is necessary because a wide variety of conflicting and contradictory testing protocols have been used in biometrics over the last two decades or more. Test protocols have varied not only because test goals and available data are different from one test to the next, but also because no standard has existed for protocol creation. Therefore, even though in this document there are references that use different test methodologies, this section provides an overview of how the experiments and performance measures are commonly obtained or how they should have been done. 1.1.1 General biometric systems Given the variety of applications and technologies, it might seem difficult to draw any generalization about biometric systems. All such systems, however, have many elements in common. Biometric samples are acquired from a subject by a sensor. The sensor’s output is sent to a processor which extracts the distinctive but repeatable measures of the sample (the features), discarding all other components. The resulting features can be stored in the database as a template, or compared to a specific template, many templates or all templates already stored in a database to determine if there is a match. A decision regarding the identity claim is made based upon the similarity between the sample features and those of the template or templates compared. Figure 1.1 illustrates the information flow within a general biometric system consisting of data capture, signal processing, storage, matching, and decision subsystems. This diagram illustrates both enrolment and the operation of verification or identification systems. The following subclauses describe each of these subsystems in more detail. It should be noted that, in any real biometric system, these conceptual components may not exist or may not directly correspond to the physical components. • Data capture subsystem: The data capture subsystem collects an image or signal of a subject’s biometric characteristic that has been presented to the biometric sensor, and outputs this image/signal as a biometric sample. • Signal processing subsystem: The signal processing subsystem extracts the distinguishing features from a biometric sample. This may involve locating the signal of the subject’s biometric characteristics within the received sample (a process known as segmentation), feature extraction, and quality control to ensure that the extracted features are likely to be distinguishing and repeatable. Should quality control reject the received sample/s, control may return to the data capture subsystem to collect a further sample/s. In the case of enrolment, the signal processing subsystem creates a template from the extracted biometric features. Often the enrolment 9 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Figure 1.1: Components of general biometric systems process requires features from several presentations of the individual biometric characteristics. Sometimes the template comprises just the features. • Data storage subsystem: Templates are stored within an enrolment database held in the data storage subsystem. Each template is associated with details of the enrolled subject. It should be noted that prior to being stored in the enrolment database, templates may be re-formatted into a biometric data interchange format. Templates may be stored within a biometric capture device, on a portable medium such as a smart card locally, on a personal computer or local server or in a central database. • Matching subsystem: In the matching subsystem, the features are compared against one or more templates and similarity scores fo ahead to the decision subsystem. The similarity scores indicate the degree of fit between the features and the compared template/s . In some cases, the features may take the same form as the stored template. For verification, a single specific claim of subject enrolment would lead to a single similarity score. For identification, many or all templates may be compared with the features, and output a similarity score for each comparison. • Decision subsystem: The decision subsystem uses the similarity scores generated from one or more attempts to provide the decision outcome for a verification or identification transaction. – In the case of verification, the features are considered to match a compared template when the similarity score exceeds a specified threshold. A claim about the subject’s enrolment can then be verified on the basis of the decision policy, which may allow or require multiple attempts. – In the case of identification, the enroled identifier or template is a potential candidate for the subject when the similarity score exceeds a specified threshold, and/or when the similarity score is among the highest k values generated for a specified value k. The decision policy may allow or require multiple attempts before making an identification decision. 1.1.2 Functions of general biometric systems There are three main functions in biometric systems: 10 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection 1. Enrolment: In enrolment, a transaction by a subject is processed by the system in order to generate and store an enrolment template for that individual. Enrolment typically involves: sample acquisition, segmentation and feature extraction, quality checks, (which may reject the sample/features as being unsuitable for creating a template, and require acquisition of further samples), template creation (which may require features from multiple samples), possible conversion into a biometric data interchange format and storage, test verification or identification attempts to ensure that the resulting enrolment is usable, and should the initial enrolment be deemed unsatisfactory, enrolment attempt repetitions may be allowed (dependent on the enrolment policy). 2. Verification: In verification, a transaction by a subject is processed by the system in order to verify a positive specific claim about the subject’s enrolment (example “I am enrolled as subject X”). Verification will either accept or reject the claim. The verification decision outcome is considered to be erroneous if either a false claim is accepted (false accept) or a true claim is rejected (false reject). Note that some biometric systems will allow a single end-user to enrol more than one instance of a biometric characteristic (for example, an iris system may allow end-users to enrol both iris images, while a fingerprint system may have end-users enrol two or more fingers as backup, in case one finger gets damaged). Verification typically involves: sample acquisition, segmentation and feature extraction, quality checks, (which may reject the sample/features as being unsuitable for comparison, and require acquisition of further samples), comparison of the sample features against the template for the claimed identity producing a similarity score, judgement on whether the sample features match the template based on whether the similarity score exceeds a threshold, and a verification decision based on the match result of one or more attempts as dictated by the decision policy. 3. Identification: In identification, a transaction by a subject is processed by the system in order to find an identifier of the subject’s enrolment. Identification provides a candidate list of identifiers that may be empty or contain only one identifier. Identification is considered correct when the subject is enrolled, and an identifier for their enrolment is in the candidate list. The identification is considered to be erroneous if either an enrolled subject’s identifier is not in the resulting candidate list (false-negative identification error), or if a transaction by a non-enrolled subject produces a non-empty candidate list (false-positive identification error). Identification typically involves: sample acquisition, segmentation and feature extraction, quality checks, (which may reject the sample/features as being unsuitable for comparison, and require acquisition of further samples), comparison against some or all templates in the enrolment database, producing a similarity score for each comparison, judgement on whether each matched template is a potential candidate identifier for the user, (based on whether the similarity score exceeds a threshold and/or is among the highest k scores returned) producing a candidate list, an identification decision based on the candidate lists from one or more attempts, as dictated by the decision policy. This report is focused on verification applications, where the identity of the user is known a priori (because user provided it by a name, a card, an identification number or because there is only one user enrolled in the system). For this purpose, only enrolment and verification functions are used. 1.1.3 Fundamental performance metrics The norm 19795 proposes to evaluate biometric algorithms through the following rates: • Failure-to-enrol Rate (FTE): The failure-to-enrol rate is the proportion of the population for whom the system fails to complete the enrolment process. The failure-to-enrol rate shall include: 11 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection those attempts in which the user is unable to present the required biometric characteristic; those unable to produce a sample of enough quality at enrolment; and those who cannot reliably produce a match decision with their newly created template during attempts to confirm the enrolment is usable. Attempts by users unable to enrol in the system shall not contribute to the failure-to-acquire rate, or matching error rates. • Failure-to-acquire Rate (FTA): The failure-to-acquire rate is the proportion of verification or identification attempts for which the system fails to capture or locate a sample of sufficient quality. The failure-to-acquire rate shall include: attempts where the biometric characteristic cannot be presented (e.g. due to temporary illness or injury) or captured; attempts for which the segmentation or feature extraction fails and attempts in which the extracted features do not meet the quality control thresholds. • False Non-Match Rate (FNMR): The false non-match rate is the proportion of samples, acquired from genuine attempts, that are falsely declared not to match the template of the same characteristic from the same user supplying the sample. • False Match Rate (FMR): The false match rate is the proportion of samples, acquired from zero-effort impostor attempts, that are falsely declared to match the compared non-self template. • False Rejection Rate (FRR): The false reject rate is the proportion of genuine verification transactions that will be incorrectly denied. It is calculated as: F RR = F T A + F N M R ∗ (1 − F T A). • False Acceptance Rate (FAR): The false accept rate is the expected proportion of zeroeffort non-genuine transactions that will be incorrectly accepted. It is calculated as: F AR = F M R ∗ (1 − F T A). • Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve: It is a curve plot of the rate of false positives on the x-axis against the corresponding rate of true positives (genuine attempts accepted) on the y-axis plotted parametrically as a function of the decision threshold. • Detection error trade-off (DET) curve: It is a modified ROC curve which plots error rates on both axes (FAR on the x-axis and FRR on the y-axis). In this curve, the value where FRR is equal to FAR is denoted as Equal Error Rate (EER). In addition to this, sometimes researchers also use other rates to evaluate biometric systems. Some of the most common, that have been referred in this report, are: • Half Total Error Rate (HTER): Is the average between FAR and FRR. • Genuine Match Rate (GMR): It is the proportion of accepting a genuine sample (1-FRR). • Correct Classification Rate (CCR): It is the proportion of samples correctly classified independently of the class. • Correct Identification Rate (CIR): It is the proportion of samples correctly identified independently of the identity. 12 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 1.2 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Related European Projects In this section, the most related European projects regarding biometrics are presented. Most of them make research on biometrics with no specific application. Some of them try to use biometrics in mobile devices, but in most of these initiatives the authentication process is performed out of the device. Many of the research work analyzed in chapters 2 and 3 have been produced in these projects. A brief description of each project and its objectives is introduced as follows: • BIOSECURE 2004-2007 [10] This is a FP6 project from 2004 to 2007 with 30 core partners. The main focus of the project was to provide reliable evaluation platforms for different biometric modalities as well as for systems that combine multiple biometric modalities. The mainly academic organizations involved in BioSecure covered a wide range of research activities in the area of multimodal biometrics with extensive experience in database acquisition and performance evaluation campaigns. The project addressed scientific, technical and interoperability challenges as well as standardization and regulatory questions which are critical issues for the future of biometrics and its use in everyday life. • BEAT Biometric Evaluation and Testing 2012-2015 [8]: BEAT is dedicated to the development of a framework of standard operational evaluations for biometric technologies. It includes the development and the proposal for standardization of a methodology for Common Criteria evaluations of biometrics systems. • MOBIO Mobile Biometry 2008-2010 [20]: MOBIO addresses several innovative aspects relative to bi-modal authentication systems in the framework of mobile devices (focusing on face recognition and voice), in embedded and remote biometrics. • TABULARASA Trusted Biometrics under Spoofing Attack 2010-2014 [29]: The focus of this project was to address solutions to the recently shown vulnerabilities of conventional biometric techniques, such as fingerprints and face, to direct (spoof) attacks, performed by falsifying the biometric trait and then presenting this falsified information to the biometric sensor. In this project, there are two main issues: analyzing the effectiveness of direct attacks to a range of biometrics and exploring appropriate countermeasures. • SENSATION Advanced Sensor Development for Attention, Stress, Vigilance and Sleep/wakefulness 2004-2007 [6]: SENSATION aims to explore a wide range of micro and nano sensor technologies, with the aim of achieving unobtrusive, cost-effective, real-time monitoring, detection and prediction of human physiological state in relation to wakefulness, fatigue and stress anytime, everywhere and for everybody. • SECUREPHONE 2004-2006 [26]: SECUREPHONE is a project enhanced with a “biometric recogniser” in order to permit to users to mutually recognise each other and securely authenticate. They propose to use voice speaker verification, face recognition and On-line handwritten signature verification biometrics, discarding others like fingerprint and iris recognition due to their physical and social intrusive. • BITE Biometric Identification Technology Ethics 2005-2007 [7]: BITE aims to prompt research and to launch a public debate on bioethics of biometric technology. • BioSec 2009-2012 [9]: The project is not just looking at each of the traditional technological components (sensors, algorithms, data fusion, network transactions, data storage), but is also considering operational (security framework, interoperability, standardization ) and user centered (usability, acceptance, legal framework compliance) issues. Some of the technological and 13 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection research challenges the project is addressing include aliveness detection of biometric samples, match-on-card solutions, personal biometric storage, interoperability, multiple biometrics, etc. However, the project also recognizes the importance of dealing with the non-technological issues of biometric deployment, such as usability, acceptance, data protection and business cases. • ACTIBIO Unobtrusive authentication using activity related and soft biometrics 2008-2011 [30]: ACTIBIO targeted a multimodal approach fusing information from various sensors capturing either the dynamic behavioural profile of the user (face, gesture, gait, body dynamics) or the physiological response of the user to events (analysis of electroencephalography and electrocardiography). ACTIBIO also researched the use of unobtrusive sensors, either wearable (in garments of uniforms to capture body dynamics) or integrated in the infrastructure (sensing seat sensors capturing the anthropometric profile of the user, sound-based activity recognition sensors, etc.). In this way ACTIBIO developed novel activity related and soft biometrics technologies for substantially improving security, trust and dependability of “always on” networks and service infrastructures. In many of these initiatives, some biometric databases for research have been released. Additionally, some biometric evaluation campaigns have been carried out in order to let the research community to improve the performance on biometrics. Many of their results will be commented in the next chapter, separated by each biometric technique. 14 2 Mobile biometrics With the increasing functionality and services accessible via mobile telephones, there is a strong argument that the user authentication level on mobile devices should be extended beyond the Personal Identification Number (PIN) that has traditionally been used. One of the principal alternatives where the industry has focused is the usage of biometric techniques on mobile phones as a method to verify the identity of a person accessing a service. The author of the recent report on biometrics forecasts in [211] believes that there will be a rush by smart mobile device manufacturers to emulate Apple by embedding and integrating biometrics technology into their next generation devices, not only fingerprint sensors but other biometric technologies as well. In addition to this, the report in [131] also suggest that the iPhone 5S deployment, with an embedded touch fingerprint sensor, was a pivotal moment for the biometrics industry and will accelerate the consuming of biometric products. The report estimates that biometrics on mobile devices will generate about $8.3 billion worth of revenue by 2018 for the biometrics industry, not just for unlocking the device but to approve payments and as part of multi-factor authentication services. However, the adaptation to the mobile devices of the most of the biometric technologies is still challenging and full of difficulties. In this chapter, the eight most significant biometric technologies are described, pointing out their characteristics and the most relevant works regarding the adaptation of each technology to be used in a mobile phone. Each technique will be presented in a section, including an introduction of the technique and the relevant works in order to apply this biometrics to a mobile phone. Additionally, for each biometric technique it is also commented if there is any public database with samples captured from a mobile device. These databases can be used to evaluate the algorithms deployed, making the results comparable to other algorithms. As it was introduced before, the evaluation of many biometric research works often is not presented following a standard protocol, so having a public database of biometric samples with a specific testing protocol and performance measures to compare with is quite useful. The performance on biometrics is usually measured by error rates. However, most of the biometric technologies have a vulnerability on the use of fake biometric samples, such as photographs, gummy fingers, contact lens, etc. This is a very relevant vulnerability, since it is quite simple to produce a fake characteristic. In general, this problems are solved by including a liveness detection module in the verification process, in order to be sure that the biometric characteristic presented belongs to an alive person. Liveness detection techniques are different for each biometrics. Accordingly, for each biometrics, the relevant works related to liveness detection are included. In particular, the biometric techniques applied to mobile devices that have been included in subsequent sections or this chapter are: • Fingerprint. • Keystroke. 15 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Face. • Signature. • Hand. • Voice. • Iris. • Gait. All these biometric techniques include a list of advantages and disadvantages of using them in mobile phones. These conclusions represent the main ideas to consider when selecting the most appropriate techniques for the project, in accordance with the requirements, scenarios, hardware limitations, experience and marketing research. In addition, there are also many initiatives aiming to join several biometric techniques in a multifactor authentication system. Accordingly, at the end of the description of each biometric technique, a multibiometrics review is added. 2.1 Fingerprint recognition This section describes the most important works regarding fingerprint recognition in mobile phones. First, the section 2.1.1 presents an overview of fingerprint biometrics in classic systems. Next, the section 2.1.2 gathers the most recent and relevant works to use fingerprint recognition in mobile phones. In this section, there is a special focus at the recent iPhone 5S device, since it is the first successful initiative using fingerprints in mobile phones. Further section 2.1.3 presents the most significant public databases used to evaluate fingerprint systems. Following this, a description of the current works about the liveness of the fingerprints is presented in section 2.1.4. This is one of the main difficulties of this biometric technique, since it is quite easy to forge a fingerprint from a latent sample released anywhere the user touch. Finally, the conclusions of this section are presented in 2.1.5. 2.1.1 Introduction Fingerprint recognition refers to the automated method of identifying or confirming the identity of an individual based on the comparison of two fingerprints. Fingerprint recognition is one of the most well known biometrics, and it is by far the most used biometric solution for authentication on computerized systems. The reasons for fingerprint recognition being so popular are the ease of acquisition, established use and acceptance when compared to other biometrics, and the fact that there are numerous (ten fingers) sources of this biometric on each individual. There are many research articles, books and state of the art regarding mobile fingerprints, where the main characteristics of these systems are deeply explained [325], [385], [307]. A brief review of the conventional fingerprint technique is presented as follows. A fingerprint is the pattern of ridges and valleys on the surface of a fingertip. There are different levels of information when representing a fingerprint: • Level 1 (Global): There are three basic patterns of fingerprint ridges: arch, loop, and whorl. 16 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Level 2 (Local): The major minutia features of fingerprint are ridge ending, bifurcation and short ridge. The representation of a fingerprint by their minutiae is not only the type and position of the feature, but also the direction and the angle of the ridge, the distance between two consecutive ridges. • Level 3 (Fine): Ridges details as the wide, shape, inholes, etc. There exist four main types of fingerprint reader sensor. All of them require to place the fingerprint on the surface of the sensor (in contact): • Optical readers: They are the most common type of fingerprint readers. The type of sensor in an optical reader is a digital camera that acquires a visual image of the fingerprint. These sensors are very impacted by dirty or marked fingers and this type of fingerprint reader is easier to fool than others. • Capacitive readers: A Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) reader uses capacitors and thus electrical current to form an image of the fingerprint. An important advantage of capacitive readers over optical readers is that a capacitive reader requires a real fingerprint shape rather than only a visual image. This makes CMOS readers harder to trick, although they are more expensive than optical. • Ultrasound readers: They are the most recent type of fingerprint readers, they use high frequency sound waves to penetrate the epidermal layer of the skin. They read the fingerprint on the dermal skin layer, which eliminates the need for a clean surface. This type of fingerprint reader is far more expensive than the first two, however due to their accuracy and the fact that they are difficult to fool the ultrasound readers are already very popular. • Thermal readers: These sensors measure, on a contact surface, the difference of temperature between fingerprint ridges and valleys. Thermal fingerprint readers have a number of disadvantages such as higher power consumption and a performance that depends on the environment temperature. There are two main matching techniques of fingerprint features: • Minutiae matching: relies on recognition of the minutiae points, this is the most widely used technique for verification and identification purposes, and the one with best performance rates. • Pattern matching: compares two images to see how similar they are, often used in fingerprint systems to detect duplicates or reply attacks. One of the most accepted methods to evaluate the performance of fingerprint recognition system is by means of the FVC-onGoing initiative [14]. It is a web-based automated evaluation system for fingerprint recognition algorithms where the tests are carried out on a set of sequestered datasets. Results are reported on-line by using well known performance indicators and metrics. The aim is to track the advances in fingerprint recognition technologies, through continuously updated independent testing and reporting of performances on given benchmarks. FVC-onGoing is the evolution of FVC: the international Fingerprint Verification Competitions organized in 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. At present, 2684 algorithms have been evaluated from 645 registered participants. The best algorithm, based on minutiae matching, obtained an EER of 0.108% for quality samples and 0.7% with a relevant number of difficult cases. Both benchmark characteristics are explained next. However, using fingerprints in mobile devices is a hot topic at present, since Apple included a fingerprint recognition system in their iPhone 5S. This fact, has changed the world of mobile biometrics, 17 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection since for the first time in history they have been included at the same time in a huge amount of mobile devices. In the next section, the iPhone’s fingerprint and all their consequences will be introduced. Additionally, other initiatives to include fingerprint in mobile phones will be also commented. 2.1.2 Relevant works on mobile fingerprint recognition In the last years, there have been some research on using fingerprints in mobile phones. Depending on the sensor used, we can distinguish between two different approaches: • Using the camera of the phone to capture an image of the fingertip. No contact is required between the finger and the camera. • Integrating a contact sensor, usually capacitive or thermal, in the mobile phone to use the technology of traditional fingerprint techniques. There are some examples of research work following the first approach: For instance, in [45] a mobile, contact-less, single-shot, fingerprint capture system is proposed. This approach described captures high resolution fingerprints and 3D information simultaneously using a single camera. Liquid crystal polarization rotators combined with birefringent elements provides the focus shift and a depth from focus algorithm extracts the 3D data. This imaging technique does not involve any moving parts, thus reducing cost and complexity of the system as well as increasing its robustness. Data collection is expected to take less than 100 milliseconds. A more recent work on mobile phone camera based fingerprint recognition was carried out in [315]. In this article, the authors evaluate the feasibility of fingerprints recognition via mobile phone camera under real-life scenarios including (1) in-door with office illumination, (2) natural darkness, and (3) out-door natural illumination with complicated background. For this experiment, they selected three popular smartphones (Nokia N8, iPhone 4, Samsung Galaxy I) to capture fingerprint images. NeuroTechnology and NIST functions were adopted to generate ISO standard minutiae templates and compute the comparison scores among different subsets of the generated templates. The evaluation results (EER over 25%) indicate that, unlike the in-lab scenario, it is a very challenging task to use mobile phone camera for fingerprint recognition in real life scenarios and thus it is essential to control the image quality during the sample acquisition process. They realized that it is different from the laboratory environment that camera and hands are both fixed. In real life scenarios, it was impossible to avoid hand and camera shaking during taking photos. And also, the cameras usually focused on the background in the outside scenario, so it is quite hard to get stable and good quality images. The same authors continued their work on the quality assessment for fingerprints collected by smartphone cameras in [314] and [313]. They extracted a set of quality features for image blocks. Without needing segmentation, the approach determines a sample’s quality by checking all image blocks divided from the sample and for each block through a Supported Vector Machine (SVM). Then a quality score is generated for the whole sample. Experiment showed this approach performed well in identifying the high quality blocks (0.53 Spearman correlation coefficient) with a 4.63 percent of false detection (background blocks judged as high-quality ones). The idea of using a mobile device camera for fingerprint recognition was also followed by the authors in [306]. In this work, the authors propose a method to find valid regions in focused images where valleys and ridges are clearly distinguished. They propose a new focus-measurement algorithm using the secondary partial derivatives and a quality estimation utilizing the coherence and symmetry of gradient distribution. In this work, the authors created a database with a Samsung mobile where the fingerprints of 15 volunteers were captured through their camera. With this database, the best EER obtained by the authors is around 3%. 18 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Additionally, in [405] the authors also suggested the idea of using fingerprint with mobile cameras or webcams. In this work, the authors claimed that the images produced by these kinds of sensors during the acquisition of human fingertips are very different from the images obtained by dedicated fingerprint sensors, especially as quality is concerned. In the literature a paramount quantity of methods which are extremely effective in processing fingerprints obtained by classical sensors and procedures is presented, so in their work they investigated new techniques to suitably process the camera images of fingertips in order to produce images which are as similar as possible to the ones coming from dedicated sensors. Results presented in this work considered a scenario evaluation with a limited number of volunteers, where the systems obtained a performance of 4%. Furthermore, in [234] the authors propose a touch-less fingerprint recognition system as a viable alternative to contact-based fingerprint recognition technology. It provides a near ideal solution to the problems in terms of hygienic, maintenance and latent fingerprints. In this paper, the authors present a touch-less fingerprint recognition system by using a digital camera. In this work, the authors addressed the constraints of the fingerprint images that were acquired with digital cameras, such as the low contrast between the ridges and the valleys in fingerprint images, focus and motion blurriness. The system comprises of preprocessing, feature extraction and matching stages. The proposed preprocessing stage shows the promising results in terms of segmentation, enhancement and core point detection. Feature extraction is done by Gabor filter and the verification results are attained with the SVM. They obtained a best EER value of 2% with a database of 100 fingers and 10 image per finger. Finally, a review of fingerprint pre-processing using a mobile phone camera is presented in [279]. In this work, the authors showed the pre-processing state of the art in mobile fingerprint recognition, as well as many other research articles related to mobile camera fingerprint recognition. The authors claimed this area to be in maturity but with promising results, as well as they anticipate much future work on this field, specially in mobile camera focusing, fingerprint processing, and fingerprint template security. All these works are summarized in Table 2.1. Publication Sensor Subjects Result [45] [315] [314] and [313] [306] [405] [234] Birefringent lens Mobile camera (Nokia N8, iPhone 4, Samsung Galaxy I) Camera phone Samsung camera phone Webcam Microsoft LifeCam VX-1000 Digital camera (Canon PowerShot Pro1) 25 100 (real life) FRR = 4.2% EER=25% FD = 4.63 % EER = 3% EER = 4.7% EER = 2% 15 15 10 Table 2.1: Summary of relevant works in mobile fingerprint There is a second approach regarding fingerprint biometrics in mobile phones consisting in incorporating a contact sensor into the phone, instead of using their already embedded camera. This approach let the systems use most of the techniques already known in the literature to process the fingerprints. However, even though the same sensor could be used in traditional fingerprint recognition systems and mobile phones, the performance results in mobile phones should decrease as these kinds of sensors are very influenced by environmental conditions (as temperature and humidity), oily fingers, dirty, dust, etc. that happen more often in the mobile context. Additionally, the conservation of the sensor in a mobile context is usually worse than in a static access control scenario. Actually, Xia and O’Gorman [487] have reviewed some touch-based devices that commonly were used in the market in 2003. They categorized into two types, which are optical sensors and solid-state sensors. According to their review, fingerprint biometrics has high chance to be used as the solution for personal authentication. The important key to implement this solution is the device should be 19 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection economical and built-in on personal devices such as mobile phone. In this work, they claimed that embedding a touch-based device in a mobile phone will add more cost and complexity to the phone, which is not desired, and was the main reason to make research on camera-based solutions. However, the cost has been reduced and phones have increased a lot their capacities, making possible the use of contact sensors. For example, in [455], the authors propose a fingerprint authentication system for mobile phone security application. The authors developed a prototype with external fingerprint capture module, composed of two parts. One is the front-end fingerprint capture sub-system, and the other is back-end fingerprint recognition system. A thermal sweep fingerprint sensor is used in the fingerprint capture sub-system to fit the limitations of size, cost, and power consumption. In the fingerprint recognition sub-system, an optimized algorithm is developed from the one participated in the FVC2004. The performance of the proposed system is evaluated on the database built with a thermal sweep fingerprint sensor, obtaining an EER of 4.13%. Another similar approach was conducted in [425], where the authors describe a BioAPI compatible architecture for mobile biometric fingerprint identification and verification based on a XML Web Service and a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). They present a client-server system that uses a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) with a built-in CMOS thermal fingerprint sensor. They partially implement some of the processing functions by hardware. No performance results are reported. Although there are not many research articles regarding the use of contact fingerprint sensors in mobile phones, the most important telephone manufacturer companies have tried to do this since 1998. A summary of these initiatives can be found in [12]. As follows, the first initiative of each of the most important companies is presented, including also the events on 2013. These works, however do not refer to experimental approaches nor performance rates, but only to initiatives of incorporating a contact fingerprint sensor in a mobile device. • Siemens (1998): Siemens PSE and Triodata developed a phone prototype with a Siemens/Infineon fingerprint sensor on the back. • Sagem (2000 Jan): Sagem MC 959 ID with a ST/Upek fingerprint sensor on the back. • HP (2002 Nov): The HP iPAQ h5450 is the first PDA with a built-in fingerprint sensor, the FingerChip AT77C101 from Atmel. • Casio (2003 Feb): Casio & Alps Electric unveil a new fingerprint optical sweep sensor designed for cellphone such as the Casio cellphone prototype. • Fujitsu (2003 Feb): The Fujitsu F505i cell phone contains an Authentec sensor. • (2013 Oct): The Fujitsu Arrows Z FJL22 is announced with a round swipe fingerprint sensor. • Hitachi (2004 July): An Hitachi G1000 PDAphone prototype containing the Atrua swipe sensor is shown in Japan. • LG TeleCom (2004 August): LG-LP3800 camera phone containing the Authentec AES2500. • Yulong (2005 Feb): Yulong announces the Coolpad 858F GSM with the Atrua swipe fingerprint sensor. • Samsung (2005 Oct): Samsung unveils the SCH S370 Anycall cellphone using the Authentec swipe fingerprint sensor. • Samsung (2013 Jan): Validity demonstrate a modified Galaxy S2 with a swipe fingerprint sensor. 20 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Lenovo (2005 Oct): Lenovo unveils the ET980 using the Authentec swipe fingerprint sensor. Seems to be an option of the prototype. • Toshiba (2007 Feb): Toshiba unveils at 3GSM the G900 with an Atrua ATW310 sweep fingerprint sensor. • HTC (2006 Mar): Release the HPC Sirius P6500 with an Authentec sensor. • HTC (2013 Nov): HTC One Max with a swipe sensor is announced. • Asus (2008 Mar): Asus unveils the M536 PDA phone. • Motorola (2008 Jul): Motorola unveils the Q9 Napoleon with an Atrua swipe fingerprint sensor. • Sharp (2008 Aug): Sharp unveils the SH907i (aka SH-01A) with an optical swipe fingerprint sensor. • Lexun / Leson (2008 Sep): Lexun / Leson unveils the G2 phone. • Acer (2009 Feb): Acer unveils the Tempo M900 phone. • Philips (2010 July): Philips unveils the Xenium X712 phone with an Authentec AES2260 sensor. • Apple (2013 Sep): Apple unveils the iPhone 5S with a fingerprint sensor from their own (as they bought Authentec one year ago). • Bull (2013 Oct): Bull unveils the Hoox m2 with a Upek TCS5 fingerprint sensor (2008 According to this, there are many important companies who tried to deploy a fingerprint sensor in their mobile phones. The most surprising part is that all of them, except Apple failed, selling very few unities. In [24] there is a discussion about why HTC and many others manufacturers failed in this work. The author concludes that HTC’s fingerprint sensor was difficult to use and it was not well integrated with the software of the device so it made the perception of being uncomfortable for users. In addition o this, HTC made people to use their fingerprints for many actions they did not require such security, so they became very unpopular and unaccepted. In this article, the author also anticipates a new fail of the HTC fingerprint sensor, included again in their new One max phablet, since it is very uncomfortable to swipe any other fingertip through the sensor other than the index finger of the hand you’re holding the phablet with. Opposite to this, the author explains the success of Apple in terms of the usability of the sensor, that seems almost transparent for daily actions. The story of the fingerprints in iPhone 5S is perfectly summarized in [3]. It began with the acquisition of Authentec, responsible for the recognition software and Upek, responsible for the hardware part. In addition to this, Apple obtained several patents to protect their fingerprint system. Some of them can be consulted in [23]. The Apple technology uses a capacitive contact sensor built into the home button of the phone to take a high-resolution image from small sections of the fingerprint from the sub-epidermal layers of the skin. However, the iPhone 5S has been cracked by Germany’s Chaos Computer Club, just two days after the device went on sale [11]. The group took a fingerprint of the user, photographed from a glass surface, and then created a “fake fingerprint” which could be put onto a thin film and used with a real finger to unlock the phone. They released a tutorial on how to fake fingerprints in [16]. Actually, they 21 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection showed that there was no liveness detection included in their fingerprint system, and they claimed that the security of the fingerprints was only a matter of resolution that can be accomplished today with many different technologies. This can be a big problem in terms of security since users leave latent fingerprints in many places (in a glass, a bottle, in the screen of the mobile, etc.). They also introduce the problem that someone can easily be forced to unlock their phone against their will, even easier than a passcode. Additionally, people can not change their fingerprints, so they claimed that if someone fingerprint is compromised once then it is compromised forever. Furthermore, there are no official false acceptance and false rejection rates in the iPhone 5S fingerprint. The author of [3] suggested that this systems gets a 0.05% FAR with a FRR of 2-10%. However, even tough these vulnerabilities, the fingerprint technology on iPhone has found a big success. In [13], the authors suggest that it is a matter of convenience, not security. This means that users like fingerprints just because they are easier and faster than writing a PIN code, even though they know it is not secure enough and can be faked. Actually, the author of this report indicates that when users would need to perform a very secure action they could prefer other options but it was very useful for quotidian operations, such as multi-factor authentication. This was indeed the main failure reason of the rest of companies, since they provided a fingerprint sensor which was not very naturally (it was on the back of the phone) and it was required to be used to assure too many actions the users did not need that security becoming this technology quite uncomfortable and unaccepted. In addition to the location of the sensor and the non acceptance of using this technology when it is not used naturally, there are some environmental limitations that must be considered. It is known that the quality of fingerprints decreases with lower ambient temperature [213] and also with wet fingerprints [166]. Also in [285] some experiments were made to analyze the impact of the temperature and humidity in fingerprint recognition systems, showing that quality decreased when then temperature goes below zero due to dryness of skin. In this work, it was also showed that the pressure of the finger in the sensor is a factor on the performance of these systems. In addition to this, the age of the population is also important for the quality of the fingerprint images. For example, in [365] the authors studied the impact of fingerprint image quality of two different age groups: 18-25, and 62. The results showed that the performance of the system degraded significantly when used by the elderly population. Furthermore, in the last years it has been quite accepted that one of the reasons of the fingerprint lack of acceptability by typical users is that fingerprints have traditionally been associated with criminal investigations and police work [259]. Furthermore, it is also known that a small part of the population can not use them because of genetic, aging, environmental and occupational reasons. Finally, the dirt of the sensor or a dirty finger is also an important limitation on using fingerprints [260]. Actually, the dirt of the fingers could remain in the sensors for a long time if not maintained properly. This is one of the main problems of deploying traditional fingerprint systems in many places (for example cash machines), where the sensors are located anywhere but not maintained and cleaned regularly. In the case of fingerprint in mobile phones, it is expected that only the authorized person use the device and he should be responsible for cleaning the sensor properly. However, this is a limitation of the contact fingerprint sensors that can be highly influenced by how people use and maintain them. 2.1.3 Public databases for fingerprint recognition To the author knowledge there are no public databases for evaluating fingerprints on mobile devices. However, one of the most accepted process to evaluate traditional fingerprint recognition systems is the FVC-onGoing initiative, leaded by the Biometric System Lab of the University of Bologna. They provide three benchmarks with the following characteristics: 22 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • FV-TEST: A simple dataset useful to test the algorithm compliancy with the testing protocol. It is made up with 280 genuine attempts and 45 impostor attempts. • FV-STD-1.0: Contains fingerprint images acquired in operational conditions using high-quality optical scanners. Results should reflect the expected accuracy in large-scale fingerprint-based applications. In this database there are 27720 genuine attempts and 87990 from impostors. • FV-HARD-1.0: Contains a relevant number of difficult cases (noisy images, distorted impressions, etc.) that makes fingerprint verification more challenging. Results do not necessarily reflect the expected accuracy in real applications but allow to better discriminate the performance of various fingerprint recognition algorithms. It is composed of 19320 genuine attempts and 20850 impostor attempts. Only the data of the first benchmark are released for developers. The organizers of the initiative keep the rest of the data and perform the evaluation of the algorithms the developers send. Accordingly, all the results follow the same evaluation protocol and performance measures, and the evaluation is performed by an independent entity, not by the developer. As a consequence, results are reliable and comparable. 2.1.4 Liveness detection on fingerprints As it was seen before, liveness detection is one of the main problems of fingerprint recognition. Fingerprints are left in many places as residues of oil or sweat when tapping fingers on a touch screen or surface. From these fingerprints it is quite easy to build a fake fingerprint that would forge most of the biometric systems. This vulnerability implies a big security problem in these kind of systems. There have been many works trying to deal with fake fingerprints in order to detect them and not approve their access. Actually, there are several recent research articles making a review of the state of the art on fingerprint liveness detection [49], [122] gathering together the most important related works. There have been many works demonstrated that fingerprint systems are vulnerable at sensor level attacks. Some of these spoof attacks are presented as follows: In [343] the authors made gummy fingers from gelatine and studied spoof attacks on 11 commercial fingerprint systems that used optical or capacitive sensors. Their experiments proved that all 11 commercial fingerprint systems enrolled the gummy fingers and accepted them in verification with high probability (68-100 for cooperative user, 67 for non cooperative user) Also in [275], the authors conducted an experiment against four commercial fingerprint systems that used different sensing mechanisms: optical, capacitive, thermal and tactile using two different artificial fingerprints: gelatine and silicon-rubber fingers. The results showed that gelatine fingers spoofed all of the mechanisms but these fingers last for only 24 hours since the gelatine becomes dry. When using the silicon-rubber fingers only the system that use thermal sensor was spoofed. Furthermore, in [199] described an easy method to create gummy fingers from fingerprints with silicone. Authors use these fake fingers to test two fingerprint verification systems (minutiae based and ridge pattern based) over images captured by optical and thermal sweeping sensors. The results of their experiment showed that both verification systems were vulnerable to spoof attacks. The same authors, studied in [198] studied the robustness of an ISO minutiae-based system against attack from fake fingerprints that were created. The results showed that the tested system accepted fake fingers by 75%. Moreover, at present there are even tutorials in Internet explaining how to fake fingerprints easily and with very simple materials [16]. This tutorial belongs to the group that forged iPhone 5S fingerprint in two days. 23 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection According to the works presented in this section, it is quite easy to generate fake fingers that forge current fingerprint systems. This is the reason why a liveness detection module must be included to avoid fake fingers to access the protected systems. There are some works dealing with fingerprint liveness detection. In [122] the authors present a taxonomy to classify the liveness detection systems on fingerprints depending on the technology used. There are mainly two groups of approaches: • Hardware-based: These methods required special hardware integrated with the fingerprint system to acquire life signs such as fingerprint temperature, pulse, pulse oximetry, blood pressure, electric resistance and odor. • Software-based: These methods require extra software added to a fingerprint recognition system. These solutions are cheaper than hardware approaches and are more flexible to future adaptation. In [49] the authors propose five categories. As follows, an explanation of each type of technology and the most relevant work is presented. – Perspiration based: These works try to detect the perspiration pattern change between two or more fingerprints captured separated by some seconds. This is a time consuming method since the user is required to present his finger twice and it is not efficient for real-time authentications. For example, in [392] the authors tried to detect the perspiration pattern change from two fingerprint images captured over time and separated by 2 seconds as a sign of fingerprint vitality. They used ridge signal algorithm that map the two-dimensional fingerprint images into one-dimensional signals which represents the grey-level values along the ridges. They used a dataset of fingerprints from 33 live subjects, 30 spoof fingerprints created with dental material and 14 cadaver fingers. Two measurements were derived from the images and were used in classification; static patterns and dynamic changes in the moisture structure of skin around sweat pores caused by perspiration. The CCR obtained was 90%. – Skin deformation-based: These systems use the flexibility properties of the skin to detect whether a fingerprint is fake or not. In general, the elasticity when pressing the sensor at different pressures can distinguish between spoofing and real fingerprints. For example, in [266] the authors developed a method based on skin elasticity and achieved an EER of 4.78% with a dataset of 30 real fingerprints and 47 fake fingers of gelatin. A sequence of fingerprint images was captured to extract two features that represent skin elasticity without any special finger movement. Also in [499] the authors asked the users to rotate his finger with some pressure in four angles 0, 90, 180, 270 to capture a sequence of frames to extract relevant features related to skin distortion, showing that when real fingers move on a scanner surface they mostly produce a larger distortion than the fake fingers. They obtained an EER of 4.5% with their approach with a database of 200 real fingers and 120 fake fingers made of silicone. – Image quality-based These techniques analyze the quality of the fingerprint image, looking for features representative of alive fingerprints. For example, in [379] the authors focused on the uniformity of the gray-levels along ridges, since fake fingerprints were quite uniform and alive ones not due to several reasons like sweat pores, perspiration and skin quality (dry, wet and dirty). Their method achieved an CCR between 92% and 97%, with a database of 185 real and 150 gummy fingers. 24 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Also the coarseness of the fingerprints can be detected, as in [368] where the authors realized that the surface of a spoofed fingerprint is coarser than a live fingerprint because artificial material consists of large organic molecules that usually agglomerate during processing. The authors claim that this characteristic can be used in liveness detection when a high resolution sensor is used but do not provide performance rates. – Pore based The pores of the fingerprint can also be used to detect liveness, even though pores can be reproduced in fake fingerprints [161]. In this work, the authors prepared 78 fake fingers with thermoplastic and silicon and another 78 with an acetate sheet poured with latex and glue. The fingermarks were left on glass and photographed. They also used 26 real fingers in their experiments, where they obtained a FAR of 21.2% and FRR of 8.3%. In addition, in [332] the authors deployed a liveness detection method based on pore distribution between two images captured between 5 seconds based on the idea of frequency of pores in live fingerprint is less than that in fake fingerprints, due to fabrication steps necessary for replica. In this case, the database was made up with 224 live fingerprints and 193 fake replicas made of silicon. They provide ROC curves of the results, with a FAR (fake as live) of 20% when FRR (live vs fake) of around 8%. – Combined approach The former techniques are also used together in order to get their benefits and improve the liveness evidence. For example, in [265] the authors extracted five features from a sequence of fingerprint images to detect skin elasticity and perspiration pattern. Two static features were used to detect perspiration pattern by measuring the differences in gray levels along the ridges due to the presence of perspiration around pores. Three dynamic features were used to measure skin elasticity and temporal change of the ridge signal due to perspiration. The EER of their method was 4.49% with a database of 30 real and 47 fake fingers made of gelatin. A summary of the works deploying liveness detection countermeasures with fingerprints is presented in Table 2.2. Publication Sensor Subjects Technique Result [392] 33 live, 14 cadaver, 30 fake Perspiration CCR = 90% 30 real, 47 fake fingers 200 real, 120 fake fingers 185 real, 150 gummy 23 real, 10 gelatin, 24 plastic 26 real, 156 fake 224 live, 193 fake 30 real, 47 fake Skin Skin Image quality Image quality Pore Pore Combined EER = 4.78% EER = 4.5% CCR = 92-97% FAR = 21.2%, FRR = 8.3% FAR = 20%, FRR = 8% EER = 4.49% [266] [499] [379] [368] [161] [332] [265] Optical, electro-optical, CMOS CMOS Optical Optical Optical Optical Optical CMOS Table 2.2: Summary of relevant works in mobile fingerprint liveness detection In general, the conclusions of all these works is that there are promising techniques but a lot of more research should be done in order to deploy a liveness detection system with high performance in fingerprints. 25 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.1.5 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Conclusion Traditional fingerprint recognition systems stand out on the performance obtained in independent evaluation methods. There have been innumerable research works on fingerprint recognition technologies, and they have been used to identify people for many years. According to this, there have been many initiatives trying to make fingerprint recognition in mobile phones since 2000. Some of them were based on capturing the fingerprint through the camera of the mobile phone, without touching any contact sensor. The results obtained by this approach are promising, although not as good as traditional contact sensors. In order to get better performance, many mobile phone manufacturers have tried to incorporate a contact fingerprint sensor in the hardware. There have been many attempts to deploy mobile phones with fingerprints, but most of them were unaccepted by their clients. In general, the use of the fingerprints was quite uncomfortable (sensors were located at the back of the phone) and it was used for many tasks the users did not require that security. However, in 2013 Apple launched their iPhone 5S including a fingerprint of high success and acceptability. Their main characteristic is that it is not a security system but a usability system as it was quite comfortable to use (it was located in a front button). In spite of their acceptability success, it was hacked only two days after they sold them by using a fake fingerprint on a thin film. Fingerprints present a big vulnerability based on the fact that they are released in many places when touching or holding things, and from those rests a fingerprint can be easily rebuilt and used to forge the system. There are some works trying to detect the liveness of the fingerprint, but they are still not mature enough. Consequently, using fingerprints in mobile phones presents the following advantages: • If locating appropriately, it is a fast authentication method. • It provides competitive performance rates when using in controlled situations. • It is quite accepted that fingerprints can be used to authenticate people. However, the following disadvantages or limitations of fingerprints in mobile phones have been found: • Do not work for a small part of population due to age and occupational reasons. • Present limitations to the environment conditions, specially dry and cold. • Lack of acceptability because of fingerprints are usually associated with criminal investigations. • Require a contact sensor to be integrated in the mobile phone. Approaches that use the camera of the phone to capture a fingerprint image do not work yet properly. • The location of the fingerprint sensor in the mobile phone limits the acceptability. It succeeded only when the fingerprint sensor was including in the home button in the front of the device. All other approaches from the most important mobile phone manufacturers since 1998 failed. • Require a maintenance of the sensor. • It is vulnerable to gummy fingers, that can be easily built from latent fingerprints released in glass or even in the screen of the phone. 26 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.2 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Keystroke dynamics This section presents the most important works related to keystroke dynamic in mobile devices. The outline of this section is consistent with the rest of the document. In section 2.2.1 main typical keystroke dynamic features are provided, in addition to the different situations that can be acquired. Also a list of the most used methods to classify data is shown and explained. Next, in section 2.2.2 a list of public databases with keystroke dynamics is presented. As not much work with mobile devices is done comparing it with the work done in computers, there are more public databases related with computers. Part of the data extracted in computers can be a part of the first approach of developing an authentication system in mobile devices. The relevant work about the study of keystroke dynamics is presented in the section 2.2.3. These works are related with authenticate a user using mobile devices through a wide variety of techniques. The starting point are the classical studies done in computers, where users are being tracked when they are typing with a computer keyboard. The only feature that can be extracted from a computer keyboard is the time between pressing and releasing keys. Different classifiers techniques had been applied to identify and authenticate users from their keystroke dynamics, so these techniques can be extended to keystroke dynamics in mobile devices. Finally, the conclusions of this section are summarized in section 2.2.5. 2.2.1 Introduction The classical definition of keystroke dynamics is the study of whether the people can be distinguished by their typing rhythms, often associated to a computer keyboard. This technique also receive the name of typing dynamics and it is fundamentally based in measure the press, hold and release times when typing a Personal Identification Number (PIN) code. Keystroke dynamics is a behavioural biometric technique and can be implemented in a few different manners, depending of the moment that users are being monitored: The user typing manner can be measured only at login or in a continuous way, through all the time he/she is using the computer. The classical keystroke recognition method is based on typing a PIN, a password between four to eight numbers that users must type at the start. This is the most extended and used over last twenty years. Although it has been the most used it is very insecure because the mobile device is not protected all the time user is using it. Te PIN is typed once and then everyone has free access to the contents until it is switched off. ([443]) classifies the methods in the following manner: • Static at login: The user data is acquired when he/she types his/her PIN just when mobile phone is switched on. • Periodic dynamic: The data is taken more than once since user switch on the mobile phone. For example, when he/she types a PIN code in order to unlock the screen or he/she is placing or answering a phone call. [457] • Continuous dynamic: Measures are taken continuously when user is typing using a physical keyboard or a touchpad. It can be done running a background application that detects the movements of an user. [84, 125] • Keyword specific: Not always a numeric PIN is necessary to identify users. It is also possible to make users type a word or draw a graphical pattern. • Application specific: There are mobile applications developed in order to identify and authenticate users using images or graphical patterns. [56, 112, 375] 27 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection In all of these situations the feature most measured is the time between keystrokes. • Di-Graph: Timing information of two consecutive keys pressed. It is the major feature represented in keystroke dynamics domain and it is widely categorized in two types, namely, dwell time and flight time. – Dwell time: This time refers to the amount of time between pressing and releasing a single key. – Flight time: In this case the feature measured is the time between pressing two successive keys. It is also named latency time. • N-Graph: Time between three or more consecutive keystroke events is measured. There a lot of different ways to classify users using the data extracted that have been used in the last thirty years, so far, the most important methods are the following: • Statistical approach: The first used, easiest and with the lowest overhead, in this technique the common generic statistical measures include mean, median and standard deviation which are classified using statistical t-test and k-nearest neighbour. • Probabilistic modeling: It is another variant of statistical approach that assumes that each keystroke feature vector follows Gaussian distribution. Some models used are Bayesian, Hidden Markov Model (HMM), Gaussian Density Function and weighted probability. • Cluster analysis: This technique gathers similar characteristics pattern vectors together. Feature data categorized within a homogeneous cluster are very similar to each other but highly dissimilar to other clusters. • Distance measure: It is the most popular technique and consists in calculate the pattern of the claimant login to determine the similarity/dissimilarity associated with a reference in the database. The most used distances are the Euclidean, Manhattan, Bhattacharyya, Mahalanobis, degree of disorder and direction similarity measure. • Machine learning: It is very common in the pattern recognition domain, not only in keystroke dynamics. The objective is to classify and make correct decisions based on the data provided. In this category Neural Network (NN) are contained , which can produce better results than the statistical methods. In the work of [466], the authors study the viability of using a backpropagation NN in keystroke dynamics. They used the database created by [282] and concluded that this kind of networks are viable to perform reasonable results. The main disadvantage of this technique is that genuine keystroke patterns are needed but also intruderś to train the network and sometimes it can not be possible. Keystroke dynamics have big advantages like uniqueness, its low implementation and deployment cost and non-invasiveness and because of this it has been cause of a big amount of research articles between 1980 to the present. Of course, it has also some disadvantages like that it has lower accuracy than other biometric techniques because keystroke patterns may change because of injury, distraction or fatigue, between others. The consequence of this is that the classification system need to be retrained periodically to follow the changes of the keystroke patterns. Keystroke dynamic in computers has been studied deeply with good results as seen in the works of [422, 67, 248, 123, 208, 283, 462]. 28 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection At present people use much more devices that the computer every day and thanks to the fast evolution of the technology most of people own a smartphone and use it daily for a variety of things. Smartphones are used to access to important information such as email, bank account, calendar or agenda, consequently, it is very important to protect these information. Most of the smartphones incorporate a touchscreen, which for most of the people is more comfortable than the classical keyboard but it is more sensible to attacks techniques as shoulder surfing or reflection surfing [416]. Similarly than in computers, the keystroke patterns typed on a mobile phone are unique, the way in which uses key the PIN can be used to recognize them. This means that most of the techniques developed with computer keyboards can be extended to mobile phones [276, 182]. The previous devices to smartphones were the PDA which incorporated a touchscreen that can provide useful information about users behaviour apart of the time between typing keys [431, 249, 293]. There are many differences between computer keyboards and smartphones. Computer keyboards are limited to its keys, so only the time of pressing and releasing keys can be measured. This means that the only information that can be extracted to differ one user to other is him/her speed of typing. In the other hand, smartphones incorporate much more devices that can be taken in advantage in order to differ one user to other. One user do not type his/her PIN at the same speed than other, but also, he/she does not take his/her smartphone with the same strength, orientation and has a different finger size. All these features and much more can be measured trough a smartphone and can be very helpful to design a biometric system. 2.2.2 Public databases for mobile keystroke dynamics As far as the authors’ knowledge there are no public databases regarding mobile keystroke recognition. However there are several publicly databases that are obtained from a computer and can be useful to develop a mobile keystroke recognition system. • BioChaves project: This is a multimodal database which mixes voice recognition with keystroke dynamics. It is formed by 10 users that in two sessions separated by one month had to utter and type the same four words five times. Related with keystroke data, they recorded the down-down time intervals from two keystrokes, namely the time between two consequent keys are pressed. This database has been presented in [367] and it can be found in [179] • Anomaly-Detection Algorithms: [282] compared the performance of classifiers used in keystroke dynamics collecting data from 51 users typing 400 passwords over 8 sessions (50 repetitions per session) separated by a time of one day. The database url is [281]. It is necessary to mention the work of [504]. They have developed a verification system based using tapping behaviours through a smartphone. The collected data consists of 80 users typing five different 4-digit and 8-digit PINs at least 25 times each one. 2.2.3 Relevant works on mobile keystroke dynamics First mobile phones had a physical keyboard in order to allow users to key contact numbers and names. The most common feature to protect mobile phones from intruders is the PIN, a usually short number that the phone owner must remember. As mobile phones incorporate much more critical information, more secure techniques are necessary. The use of a keyboard in mobile phones can help to extend the techniques developed with computers. The authors of [262] studied the feasibility of develop an authentication system based in keystroke dynamics over touchscreens. They took ten people to perform a database and adopt a Bayesian network classifier where the best result had a FAR of 2% and a FRR of 17.8%. Other kind 29 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection of studies that can be found related with keystroke dynamic with mobile phones is the work of [42], where a two-factor authentication as an enhanced technique for authentication, is proposed. They compare three classifiers and their result concludes that statistical classifiers reach better results with the mobile phones. Also in [98], the authors authenticate users using keystroke dynamics acquired when typing fixed alphabetic strings on a mobile phone keypad. Additionally, in [496], the authors developed a keystroke-based user identification on smartphones with a fuzzy classifier using Particle Swarm Optimizer and Genetic Algorithms. They took into account not only the time of pressing and releasing keys, but also the relative position between keys. Following this technique a FAR of 2% and a close to zero after PIN verification were reached. With the advance of technology smartphones incorporate better capabilities like touch screens. Using them a new way to unlock the screen appeared: lock patterns. Users must draw a pattern with their fingers in order to unlock the screen. As people have a unique way of typing in a keyboard, they have a unique way to draw the lock pattern. [55] studied the lock pattern given by Android to extract biometric features in order to avoid shoulder-surfing and smudge attacks([59]). They used Random Forests (RF) machine learning classifier and achieved an average EER of approximately 10.39%. Other graphical lock patterns are studied by [112, 321], where they compared the usability of two different graphic techniques: Touched Multi-Layered Drawing (TMD) or Draw A Secret, concluding that TMD gives much better results in order to enhance user authentication. A new one based in gestures by [83]. In this work the authors studied if it is possible to perform user identification on multitouch displays without additional hardware. The description of touchpoints with coordinates were the information used to extract features like distances, angles and areas between touchpoints. Also a hybrid method based on tap and gestures in the studies of [56]. In this hybrid method a classical PIN is combined with gestures with a numerical keyboard. This technique enhance the security and eliminates the need for switching between different techniques. An Anderson-Darling test revealed that the date they collected was not normally distributed, therefore they used nonparametric test for the analyses reaching Average Error Rate (AER) of 1.31, 5.28 and 3.93% respectively for each technique tested. At present smartphones incorporate a variety of sensors in order to measure different magnitudes: acceleration, angles, pressure, proximity, location, orientation between others. The most used in keystroke dynamics are the sensors capable of detection the movement and the position of users. The main reason is that users have different manners of holding smartphones while they are typing, so can e very helpful to authenticate them. These kind of sensors receive the name of motion sensors. Accelerometer, gyroscope and orientation sensor are contained in this group. These sensors can be exploited to improve and invent new biometric systems. [317, 457] propose two systems to authenticate users using accelerometers. They obtained 53 different features based in accelerations and angles that classified using K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) as the classification algorithm. This allowed them to reach an EER of 6.85%. The main advantage of these systems is their transparency: Users can use their phone normally while the learning classifier takes data. Related to enhance the capacity of authentication using the PIN, the authors of [360] developed TapPrints, a framework for inferring the location of taps on mobile device touchscreens using motion sensors combined with machine learning analysis. This system was developed in order to demonstrate that an attacker can launch a background process in a mobile device and silently monitor the user’s input, such as keyboard presses and icon taps. To classify the data they trained a variety of classification algorithms: KNN, Multinomial Logistic Regression, SVM and RF. They showed that identifying tap locations on the screen and inferring English letters could be done with an accuracy of 90% and 80%, respectively. They also compared the effectiveness of accelerometers and gyroscopes and concluded that gyroscope are the sensors that produce most useful results in order to authenticate an user and to reduce the resources needed. In [504] the authors combine keystroke dynamics and motion sensors extracting four features: 30 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection acceleration, pressure, size and time of typing. They collected data from 80 users that had to type PIN of 4 and 8 digits. They trained a classifier based in the distance of the nearest neighbour that in terms of accuracy the maximum ERR reached was 3.65%. This experiment has two issues to be solved: The way in which the phone is handed and the body positions of the users. Because users had to type PIN number holding the phone with two hands and in a fixed body position. A summary of all the relevant works is presented in Table 2.3. 1 2 Publication Sensor Subjects Technique Result [262] [42] [98] [496] [55] [112] [321] [83] [56] [317] [457] [360] [504] Tc Keypad Keypad Keypad Tc Tc Tc Tc Tc Tc Tc, Ac Tc,Ac,Gy Tc, Ac, Gy 10 users-10 sessions 16 users 25 users 32 users-50 sessions 31-90 users 48 users 34 users 12 users-3 sessions 55 users 50 users 10 users 80 users BN Euclidean,Mah, MLP SN PSO and GA RFM Mann-Whitney U Test DTW SVMs,lineal Kernel Friedman test WkNN DTW kNN,MLR,SVM,RF Euc normalized distance FAR = 2%, FRR = 17.8% FRR = 2.5%, FAR = 0% EER = 13% AER = 2% EER = 10.39% TMD better than DAS Accuracy = 96% Accuracy = 94.33% AER = 1.31%,5.28%,3.93% EER = 3.5% – – EER = 3.65% Table 2.3: Summary of relevant works in keystroke dynamics To design a biometric system that can be used in real life, a variety of situations must be taken into account. Users can type their PIN while they are walking, running, driving and more. In some cases these situations can be a trouble to get keystroke data free of noise. To solve these problems, classifiers should be trained in the most part of all the different scenarios in order to get enough data to recognize the behaviour of users along all the daily actions. It should be also noticed that this biometric technique is not affected by environmental conditions such as light or temperature. 2.2.4 Liveness detection on mobile keystroke dynamics Due to keystroke dynamics is obtained as a result of keys typing of a user, it is hard to imagine about use them in order to identify if keys are being pressed by a human or by a machine. As far as the author’s knowledge, there are not machines or artificial systems designed to broke the lock of a mobile device, therefore at this moment liveness detection is a feature to considerate in keystroke dynamics. 2.2.5 Conclusion Because the fast evolution of smartphones and mobile devices over last years, the techniques based in timing features used with computers can be extended to them. Also much more benefits are available. The main advantages of using this technique are: • No extra hardware is needed. The information required can be got from the sensors all mobile phones embed. Acceleration in each moment can be measured by accelerometers. Acceleration 1 Sensors: Tc=Touchscreen, Ac=Accelerometer, Gy=Gyroscope. Techniques: BN:Bayesion Network, Euc:Euclidean, Mah:Mahalanobis, MLP:Multi-Layered Perceptron, SN:Score Normalization, PSO:Particle Swarm Optimizer, GA:Genetic algorithms, RFM:Random Forest Machines, DTW:Dynamic Time Warping, SVM:Support Vector Machines 2 31 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection can be very helpful to identify users and its measure does not require a big effort. The same can be done with gyroscopes and angles, and with much more features that can be crucial to identify an user like finger size or pressure while touching the screen. • A small amount of data is needed to train a recognition system. If keystroke dynamics system is compared with other techniques, e.g. face recognition, the data matrix extracted is quite smaller. This size means a short time of processing, therefore a Computer Processing Unit (CPU) and battery low consumption. • It can be implemented transparently to the user, providing a complementing security to the access based on PIN. • Environmental conditions do not affect the verification process. Although this technique has important advantages comparing it with other biometric techniques, some points must be taken into account. The next disadvantages can be found: • Not all keystroke dynamics techniques used in computers can be extended to mobile devices. Processing speed and memory is much bigger in computers. This is the main limitation and has to be taken into account if a fast and reliable system is required. • It depends on user states (sitting down, walking, standing, etc.) can affect the performance of the verification process. • It requires users to remember and use frequently their PIN code. Considering all advantages and disadvantages it is reasonable to think that keystroke recognition techniques can me successfully applied to mobile devices, obtaining as good performance as computer keystroke dynamics. As the objective is to identify users in all the environmental conditions, an adaptive system, which get trained along all the different moments users type their PIN, is adequate to develop this technique. 2.3 Face recognition During the last decades, face biometrics has become a very popular recognition and verification technique, due to the fact that face recognition is one of the most remarkable abilities of human and primate vision. Indeed, over the last 20 years, several different techniques have been proposed for computer recognition of human faces. Face recognition systems must be able to identify a person’s face, even when some variations have been introduced. The most common variations include appearance variations (such as the use of glasses or make-up, the presence of beard, or differences on the skin tan), morphological variations (mainly due to user’s age or other changes through the time) and image capturing variations (illumination, pose, rotation, distance or scale). Image capturing from video stream involves also the face detection problem. Nowadays, face recognition at coarse resolution is possible. However, current automatic systems are still far away from the capability of human perception. Although machine recognition systems have reached a certain degree of development, their success is still limited by the conditions imposed by many real applications. In fact, the system global performance is very sensitive to the FAR target. In this document we offer a general view of face biometrics, and we focus on face identification or identity verification of individuals with mobile telephones. The main peculiarities of these devices are 32 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection the limitations of their memories and processors. Mainly, the number of operations per second they can afford is smaller than that of the state-of-the-art processors, used to develop the best algorithms currently available. 2.3.1 Introduction The face recognition problem has been formulated as recognizing three-dimensional objects from twodimensional images. In lately developed face recognition and identification techniques, automatic systems use bidimensional facial images of the user with any old surrounding. Although 3D images can also be used, the performance improvement is not worth the higher computational effort. The captured image offers a huge variability. That is why its information must somehow be reduced before its storage. The 2D image space is transformed into a face space, in order to manage lower dimensional data in the system. Different techniques provide this size optimization and are generally classified in 3 categories ([257]): 1. Holistic approaches: which use global representations of the complete image for face identification. 2. Feature based approaches: which process the input image to measure certain facial features such as the eyes, mouth, nose, and other characteristic traits, as well as geometric relationships among them. 3. Hybrid approaches. The face pattern obtained from every preprocessed face image is then stored in the system user database. The general face recognition technique consists in several stages where many design decisions must be taken: • Face detection consists in determining if there are any faces in the image and, if so, return their locations and extents. – Image capturing: The image can be obtained from a static photograph or from a video stream. – Image preprocessing: A variety of methods allow the isolation of faces within an image. • Face recognition consists in linking a face image to an enrolled user of the system. – Feature extraction can be performed in many ways. The set of relevant features must be previously defined. – Learning algorithm decisions condition the way the features are analyzed in order to obtain user patterns. – Similarity measures: the suitability of the measures depends on the pattern structure. – Similarity thresholds can be experimentally defined, according to the real environment of system usage. A deeper description of the general technique can be found in [250]. Face recognition and identification systems require a medium cooperation, as the user’s face must be placed directly in front of a camera while the photograph or video is being taken. In some situations of false rejection, higher user collaboration could be required. Nevertheless, the technique is highly accepted, as it is not invasive. Furthermore, compared to other biometric techniques, face recognition is a cheap technique. 33 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection In addition, face recognition presents some interesting constraints (like bilateral symmetry) that we can take advantage of in the restoration of facial features. Another set of constraints derives from the fact that almost every face has a very similar layout of its features. In the last years, many works about general face recognition techniques have been published: Ahmad et al. [47] propose an assessment of classical techniques over the five ”Face Recognition Data” datasets provided by the computer vision research group of the University of Essex, namely: Face 94, Face 95, Face 96, Grimace and PICS. These are very rich databases, in terms of subjects, poses, emotions, races and lighting conditions. Zhao et al. offer in [502] a review of many systematic empirical evaluations of face recognition techniques, including the FERET [397], FRVT 2000 [81], FRVT 2002 [398], and XM2VTS [356] protocols, as well as a list of many commercial available systems, shown in Table 2.4. The AppLock application recently developed by Visidon [474] offers face recognition on Android mobile phones. Commercial system Viisage Technology FaceKey Corp. Cognitec Systems ImageWare Sofware BioID sensor fusion Biometric Systems, Inc. SpotIt for face composite Description [369] [165] [121] [251] [78] [79] [253] Table 2.4: Commercial face detection available systems. Jafri and Arabnia [257] divide face recognition techniques into three categories according to the face data acquisition method: methods that operate on images intensity; methods dealing with video sequences; and methods that require other sensory data, such as 3D information or infra-red imagery. More recently, Chauhan et al. [108] provided an exhaustive summary of all the general face techniques developed. Maurya and Sharma analyze current image classification techniques in [345]. The related task of face detection has direct relevance to face recognition because images must be analyzed and faces identified, before they can be recognized. Given an image, the goal of face detection is to determine if there are any faces in it. The main difficulty of face detection is due to variations in scale, location, orientation, pose, expression, lighting conditions and/or occlusions. Zhang and Zhang [497] establish a survey of recent advances on face detection. The different approaches are grouped into four categories: • Knowledge-based methods, which use predefined rules, based on human knowledge. • Feature-invariant approaches, which search for face structure features robust to variations. • Template matching methods that use pre-stored face templates to judge if there is a face in an image. • Appearance-based methods that learn face models from a set of training face images. According to Jafri and Arabnia [257], there are numerous application areas in which face recognition can be exploited for verification and identification: • Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring and surveillance (to look for known criminals and notify authorities), as the system doesn’t require human cooperation [47]. 34 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Image database investigations (searching image databases of licensed drivers, missing children, immigrants and police bookings). • Video indexing (labeling faces in video). • Witness face reconstruction. • Gender classification. • Expression recognition (intensive care monitoring in the field of medicine). • Facial feature recognition and tracking (tracking a vehicle driver’s eyes and monitoring his fatigue or detecting stress). Face recognition is also being used in conjunction with other biometrics such as speech, iris, fingerprint, ear and gait recognition in order to enhance the recognition performance of these methods [120], as seen in section 2.3.4 2.3.2 Public databases for mobile face recognition During the assessment stage of new techniques, in order to compare the performance of several methods, it is recommendable to use a standard testing data set. There are many databases currently in use and each one has been developed under a different set of requirements. Therefore, according to [220], it is important to decide the capability we want to test in the system before choosing the appropriate database to assess the technique. In Table 2.5 we offer a brief compilation of the most referenced face datasets3 ,4 . A complete list can also be found in [214]. Name Year Images Subjects Environment Dataset features Reference Website MOBIO SecurePhone PDA FERET AR CAS-PEAL Face Recognition Data SCFace M2VTS Yale B CMU PIE FIA MIT-CBCL 2010 2006 1996 1988 2003 1996 1996 1998 2001 2000 2004 1999 193620 12960 14051 3288 30900 7900 41260 N/A 5850 41368 12960 31022 152 60 1199 116 2747 395 130 295 10 68 200 10 U C S C C U U C C C C/U S Mobile Video, Mobile L, P, T L, O P, A, L Ethnic Video T, P, Multimodal P, L P, L P NF [331] [370] [399] [334] [201] [451] [215] [356] [205] [221] [209] [246] [329] [26] [400] [335] [164] [451] [216] [103] [124] [219] [350] [102] Table 2.5: Most popular face datasets More detailed information about these databases is also available in the related description paper and in the download web page. The most appropriate database for our purpose (training and testing the Personalised Centralized Authentication System (PCAS) device) would be the MOBIO dataset because of its features: • It is composed of video frames (with audio included). • The database was captured with a NOKIA N93i mobile and a standard 2008 MacBook laptop. 3 4 Environments: U=Uncontrolled, S=Semi-controlled, C=Controled Dataset features: L=Light, P=Pose, T=Time, A=Accesories, O=Occlusion, NF=Non-faces 35 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • The samples have been registered at six different sites, from five different countries, and include native and non-native English speakers. • There are 12 samples registered from each individual. The SecurePhone PDA dataset is also very interesting, as it offers phone-registered multimodal patterns. Ivanov presents in [255] an application which enables the development of image databases, which could be used for training and testing mobile face recognition systems. 2.3.3 Relevant works on mobile face recognition With the improvement of mobile devices capabilities, security of data stored on them has become very important. In this context, face recognition schemes avoid user to remember pin codes or passwords, providing with higher and more flexible security than former systems (biometric security is based in something the user is, instead of something the user has or knows). As stated in [491], most current face recognition systems work well under constrained conditions. However, their performance degrades rapidly under non-regulated conditions. Face identification in mobile phones is an emerging research topic. During the last years, some commercial systems have been developed [474]. However, adapting desktop applications (Section 2.3.1) to mobile devices is not a trivial task. Robust face recognition involves a considerable amount of computation due to the image processing. If additional image preprocessing is necessary, it can also slow down the system. These requirements make it difficult to implement a robust and real-time mobile phone based face recognition system. Most mobile devices’ CPUs run at less than 1,5 GHz and don’t have an Floating Point Unit (FPU). Floating point operations are emulated by the CPU, which can reduce the overall running speed. Finally, mobile phone memory resources are also limited, so developing algorithms that consume too much memory (for data storage) is not recommended. Therefore very few of the reported general face verification algorithms are suitable for real-time deployment on mobile devices. Nevertheless, there are many relevant works on mobile face identification techniques recently published. In most of the works, the image training and testing sets come from a standard database. The related description paper (Section 2.3.2) offers details about these datasets’ construction. A High Resolution (HR) camera is often used to capture the photographs, but there are some works, as [226], in which infrared cameras are used. Socolinsky and Selinger [449] analyse face recognition performance using visible and thermal infrared photographs. Other proposals use also the mobile phone camera to build the database. Some works exist, such as [107, 88, 43], in which 3D models are constructed by using structured light sensors, passive stereo sensors and range scanners. Finally, [312] proposes a player identification using the Kinect device. This techniques, however, are not very suitable for mobile devices. Other approaches that make use of additional sensing devices, such as thermal imaging sensors or cameras with high-spectral sensitivity, or other biometric features, like vein patterns, are considered out of the scope of this work, as these technologies are not available over mobile devices. Attending to the face detection approach, we can find two different types of techniques: • Skin color segmentation techniques. • Simple feature extraction techniques. Most of the recent works are based on the Viola-Jones algorithm ([473]), which has become the main reference in face detection techniques since 2001. This approach for visual object detection uses the simple feature extraction approach and it is capable of achieving high Detection Rate (DR) levels 36 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection with extremely quickly processed images. The detector runs at 15 video frames per second, what makes it very suitable for real-time applications. Hadid et al. [225] present a mobile environment approach, based on the Viola-Jones detector, which uses Local Binary Patterns (LBP) with Histogram Intersection (HI) dissimilarity measure in the authentication phase. With a speed of 2 frames per second, this configuration detects 129 faces and 2 false positives in 150 test images containing 163 faces. They also propose an alternative using a Skin Color Based (SCB) face detector. After obtaining 117 correct detections with 12 false positives (processing 8 frames per second), the authors conclude that a static skin color model based approach to face detection in mobile phones is interesting in terms of speed but may not be very satisfactory in terms of detection rates. In [419], Ren et al. present some software optimizations to implement a real-time Viola-Jones face detection in mobile platforms using only the device processor (Due to the computational complexity of these algorithms, often a hardware coprocessor is used for their real-time operation). These steps include data reduction (image spatial subsampling, subimage shifting, size escalation and minimum face size definition), search reduction (use of key frames and narrowed detection areas) and numerical reduction (fixed point processing). The resulting accuracy is around 99%, the data reduction reduces also the processing time by around 90%, and the use of fixed-point arithmetic generates about 3 to 5 times speedup. Another proposal is Pachalakis and Bober’s Face Detection and Tracking System in the context of a Mobile Videoconferencing Application [393]. This algorithm is based on subsampling, skin color filtering and detecting/tracking user faces. It reaches high speed performance (over 400 frames per second at 33 MHz) with a limited computational complexity (and less than of 700 bytes of memory), while offering robustness to illumination variations and geometric changes. These advantages, facilitate a real-time implementation on small microprocessors or custom hardware. A summary of face detection algorithms is shown in Table 2.6. The Rowley-Baluja-Kanade algorithm (previous to Viola-Jones most referenced method) is also shown, in order to stablish a more complete comparison. Publication Technique [429] Artificial Neural Network (ANN) [473] [225] [225] [419] Haar features + Integral image + Cascade boosting LBP + HI [393] Subsampling + Skin filtering Data/Search/Numerical reduction Reported results Processor DR=90%, False Positive Rate (FPR)=27%, Speed=0.003 fr/s. DR=91%, FPR=10%, Speed=15 fr/s. DR=79%, FPR=1.5%, Speed=2 fr/s. DR=72%, FPR=9.3%, Speed=8 fr/s. Speed=15 fr/s. 200 MHz. R4400SGI Indigo 2 700 MHz. Pentium III Nokia N90 Nokia N90 TI OMAP Mobile Plat. ALTERA EP20K1000EBC652-1 DR=99%, Speed=400 fr/s. Table 2.6: Face detection algorithms Ng et al. [376] introduce a new verification system for mobile phones, which includes noise and distortion-tolerant Unconstrained Minimum Average Correlation Energy (UMACE) filters, as well as Fixed Point 2D Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) in the recognition phase. The UMACE filters improve the performance of learning algorithms under illumination variations, while the fixed point arithmetic reduces the computation time to a 50%, in relation to floating point arithmetic in mobile face recognition scenarios. This evaluation results are obtained from a private dataset composed by 24 users from which 15 training images and 15 test images have been captured with a cell-phone. A similar idea is related in [226], where Han et al. propose a new multimodal method which improves face detection by Near-Infra-Red (NIR) lighting (to detect corneal specular reflections) and integer-based Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method for face recognition excluding floating point operation. The use of NIR lighting reduces the PCA lighting sensitivity. Although the recog37 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection nition accuracy does not increase, the performance is more than three times better, as the processing time falls from 255.66 ms using floating-point to 79.55 ms using integer-point arithmetic. Tao and Veldhuis [461] propose an authentication method that uses subspace metrics and a Parzen classifier combined with a Viola-Jones-based face detector. The Viola-Jones detector is trained only once and in offline mode and the user’s sample set is obtained by extensive exposition of the user to the sensor. The resulting EER is of 1,2% over the BioID database. In [169], Faundez-Zanuy et al. address the processor limitation problem with a new approach, based on the use of a transformed domain. The Walsh-Hadamard Transform (WHT) can be easily implemented on a fixed-point processor and achieves a good trade-off between storage demanding, execution time and performance. On one hand, the WHT face detector uses less coefficients than the statistical methods based on the Karhunen-Loève Transform (KLT). This fact allows a decrease of the Detection Cost Function (DCF). In addition, the transformation is not data dependent. On the other hand, the nearest neighbour classifier (using the mean absolute difference) happens to be a good performance low-complexity face recognition system, as revealed from evaluation tests over the FERET and ORL databases. Jung et al. [274] propose another real-time face detection system consisting of a boosting algorithm for detecting faces and a Symmetry Object Filter and Gradient Descent algorithm to locate eyes in a face image. An image reduction method is adapted by using a pre-calculated look-up table. Finally, the associated verification process consists of geometric and illumination normalization, face testing by using the relative brightness between the face parts, Energy Probability and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) methods to extract the features from a Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) transformed image and a nearest neighbour classifier. The reported recognition rates obtained with the ORL and ETRI datasets are over 96%, and the processing time running 2 or 3 frames per seconds is between 243-412 ms. The system proposed by Rahman et al. [417] is based on the idea that, in any color space, the human skin color (of different ethnicity forms) can easily be represented by a Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) with help of look up tables. After this step, a shape processing scheme applying probability scoring can be used to determine any face location in the image. The improvement method introduced to achieve real time implementation is very similar to that of [274]. The new algorithm’s performance reaches a overall detection rate of 88.5% (whereas the Viola-Jones algorithm reaches only a 59.3%) and requires an average time of 52.9 ms to process a frame (lower than the 90.1 ms. needed by Viola-Jones). A way to boost the face authentication system’s performance based on the use of multiple samples obtained from a video stream is proposed by Poh et al. in [409]. In [134], Dave et al. present an analysis of the most popular face detection and recognition techniques, implemented on the Droid phone. Face detection is carried up by a combination of color segmentation, morphological processing and template matching. All this process is performed under three basic assumptions (correct illumination conditions, user facing the camera and closely photographed user) which simplify the algorithms. Regional labeling algorithms are applied in cases of bad illumination conditions or dark skin colors. Eigenfaces and Fisherfaces schemes are employed in face identification. For the implementation of the Fisherfaces scheme in the Motorola Droid phone, Android Application Programming Interface (API)’s face detector was used instead of the face detection algorithm. Both the KLT and the Fisher LDA matrices for the training dataset were computed with MatLab and the stored in the Droid device. Finally, to reduce the overall computation time, high resolution camera pictures were downsampled by a factor of 8 and the text files containing the KLT and LDA matrices where transformed into DataInputStreams. The training set was made up of 45 images, containing 9 classes and 5 images per classes. With a simple user interface, the algorithm can detect and recognize a user in no more than 1.6 s. With eigenface scheme, the system is able to achieve a total correct rate of 84.3% (with an EER of 35%), whereas with fisherface, the correct rate 38 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection goes up to 94.0% (and an EER of 25%). The fisherface scheme worked better for recognizing faces under varying lighting conditions, as expected by the authors. Finally, Reng et al. [418] focus on face alignment accuracy to present an improved face and eye detector. This system proposes an attentional cascade structure, inspired in Viola-Jones face detector, to speed-up the detection phase. The resulting method is known as Cascade Asymmetric Principal Component Discriminant Analysis (C-APCDA). The eye location makes the face alignment easier. To build the subspace-based face verification system, a new approach to calculate a Class-Specific Threshold is also proposed. Subspace approaches have the disadvantage of the speed limitation due to large matrix multiplications. On the other hand, these approaches need less memory and perform better on low-resolution images. The CST turns out to provide better performance than a global threshold. The system performance is assessed over the O2FN database (created for this purpose), and then it is compared with other systems over the AR and CAS-PEAL databases. Using the CAPCDA detection algorithm with class-specific threshold and the Eigenfeature Regularization and Extraction (ERE) face recognition approach, the system achieves a 96.98% face DR, a 98.73% eye detection rate and an EER of 1.90% over the AR dataset. Using the same database, the Adaboost detector gets a 91,27% face DR, a 95.71% eye detection rate and an EER of 3.37%. A brief summary of all relevant works is shown in Table 2.7. Publication Sensor Database Technique [376] [226] [461] [169] [274] [417] [134] [134] [418] Cell Phone camera NIR Camera Camera Camera Camera Camera HR Camera HR Camera Camera Private (720 images) Private BioID FERET, ORL ORL, ETRI Bayer Private (45 images) Private (45 images) O2FN, AR UMACE filters + FFT Integer-based PCA Parzen classifier WHT + ANN LDA + DCT + ANN GMM Regional labelling + PCA Regional labelling + LDA C-APCDA + CST + ERE Reported results EER=8.49 EER=14.79%, Processing time=79.55 ms. EER=1.2% DCF=5.45 DR=96%, Time=243-412 ms. DR=88.5%, Time=52.9 ms. DR=84.3%, EER=35%, Time=1,6 s DR=94%, EER=25%, Time=1,6 s DR=96.98%, EER=1.9% Table 2.7: Summary of relevant works about face recognition As we have seen in this section, face recognition systems’ performance is highly conditioned by environmental conditions. Jafri and Arabni point out in [257] many general difficulties that can arise with the use of these techniques in mobile devices. For instance, frontal face images form a very dense cluster in image space, which makes it hard for traditional pattern recognition techniques to accurately discriminate among them with a high degree of success. In this sense, slight variations in the so-called extrinsic factors (like illumination, pose, rotation, distance, scale, expressions and occlusions) can alter the appearance of the face and reduce the location procedure efficiency. In addition, the face appearance may also vary due the intrinsic factors, caused by the physical nature of the face, which are independent of the observer and can be intrapersonal factors (age, facial hair, glasses, cosmetics, etc.) or interpersonal factors (ethnicity and gender). 2.3.4 Multimodal identification using face recognition The efficiency of face biometrics techniques is very dependent on environmental conditions, such as illumination. Although face recognition has shown an acceptable identification and verification performance, the combined use of two or more biometric techniques (biometrics fusion or multimodal biometrics) can enhance their individual efficiency. In this sense, we can find some relevant works in which face biometrics are used together with any other techniques. This works are presented in section 2.9.4 39 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.3.5 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Liveness detection on mobile face recognition Face recognition on mobile phones has turned out to be a reliable user authentication method. However, it is susceptible to security attacks that could compromise the system robustness. Kollreider et al. [288] consider three kinds of face spoofing attacks: • The presentation of a user’s face photograph to the identification system. • The use of a photographic mask by an intruder. • The presentation of a user’s face video. and propose certain security countermeasures as well: • Analyzing eyes-blinking. • Tracking mouth movements. • Studying head 3D features. It is also possible to fool a face recognition system using 3D face models, as explained in [287]. Besides the use of multimodal techniques, many proposed spoofing detection systems are based on detecting face motion on video streams: The analysis of the images’ Fourier spectrum to detect the difference between live and fake images was firstly proposed by Li et al. [316]. Fronthaler et al. propose in [186] a system that uses real-time face tracking and the localization of facial landmarks as liveness assurance technique within a fingerprint authentication process. The face-tracking system calculates face features with a retinoptic grid. In order to achieve real-time performance, only 69 features are computed and modelled with support vectors. The face alignment is controlled by machine-experts. A Gabor feature vector is computed at each point if the grid, and the tracking system models several facial regions. Different frequency channels are used for locating facial landmarks. In order to assess the system, 10 different people’s faces where tracked. From each person, 30 frames were automatically acquired. The eyes area was properly tracked on 96.6% of the frames, and the facial landmarks were correctly localized on 97%. Kollreider’s system [288] consists on evaluating face 3D features while checking for at least one eye-blink or mouth movement. The tracking algorithm exploits motion to refine the effective neighbourhood by a differential approach, which also provides motion estimates to the liveness detection system. A motion vector is calculated by using consecutive video frames and it is used for computing a rasterflow vector, which encodes the spatiality of the face image. A live face presents peaks on its center, while a photograph doesn’t. An eyeflow vector is also computed and used for calculating a liveness score, which is expected to be positive in case of a live face, and negative or zero otherwise. The system evaluation was carried out over the Zhejiang University (ZJU) Eyeblink database ([390]) which consists on 80 face videos registered from 20 different individuals in 4 sessions. The average false positive rate was 0.04+0.12%. The Kim et al. system [287] segments each input video frame into foreground and background regions. The foreground image includes the user’s face. The motion amount between foreground and background regions is then compared. In a live face video, foreground motion is supposed to be higher than background motion, whereas in a fake one the so called Background Motion Index is supposed to be high. During the evaluation stage of the system 373 fake video and 37 live video were recorded. Only 4.1% of fake video streams on a 7 inch LCD and 0.73% of high resolution photographs were labelled as live user’s samples. There are also some works in which liveness detection uses only a single image: 40 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Bai et al. [62] establish that the difference between recaptured images and the original ones can be decided from the spatial distribution of their Bidirectional Reflectance Distribution Function. The Specular Component provides information about microtextures on the surface that generates an image. The texture differences between a live face and a fake one can be detected on the specular component gradient histogram. This liveness detection method was evaluated over a 65 natural and 65 recaptured images dataset. The best reported result is a 2.2% FAR and a 13% FRR with a 6.7% EER. The interest on defeating identity spoofing on face recognition systems motivates the international Competitions on Counter Measures to 2-D Facial Spoofing Attacks on 2011 [104] and 2013 [113]. The aim of this competitions is to evaluate different techniques over the same dataset (Print-Attack database [328] and CASIA-FASD database [500]) and with the same protocols. Recently, Komulainen et al. [289] have introduced the dynamic texture to the spoofing detection systems by the use of Spatiotemporal Local Binary Patterns. This idea allows to analyse simultaneously the structure and the dynamics of microtextures on facial regions and provides with better results than those reported on the first Competition on Counter Measures to 2-D Facial Spoofing Attacks. A summary of the considered techniques is shown in Table 2.8. Publication Technique [186] [288] [287] [62] [289] Face Tracking + Landmarks 3D features + Blinking Video frame segmentation 1 image texture differences 1 image dynamic textures Reported results DR=97% FPR=0.04+0.12% FPR=4.1% (Video), FPR=0.73% (HR Photo) FAR=2.2%, FRR=13%, EER=6.7% FAR=0%, FRR=0% Table 2.8: Live detection algorithms based on face analysis. As we pointed out previously, more precise anti-spoofing techniques involving advanced sensors are out of the extent of this work. 2.3.6 Conclusion Face biometrics is turning out to be a reliable personal identification and verification method. The most outstanding properties of this technique are: • High performance rates. • Non-intrusive technique. • Existence of many successful implementations of face recognition basic techniques over mobile devices, as summarized in section 2.3.3. • These techniques do not require a high investment in hardware, as they use cheep sensors. In fact, most of current mobile phones comprise cameras with enough resolution. • Incorporating face biometrics to day-to-day cell-phone features would provide them with new capabilities, such as verification for access control, identification for on-line transactions or facial feature tracking. • System evaluation and performance measurement is somehow standard, since some programs, such as FERET [399, 397], provide system and algorithm testing protocols. 41 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Many face identification systems could be easily enriched by their combination with other biometric techniques, in order to improve the individual techniques’ performance. This multimodal systems could also be integrated into a mobile phone, as seen in section 2.3.4. • Face techniques offer great ways (discussed in section 2.3.5) to verify user’s liveness. On the other hand some disadvantages of using this technique on a mobile phone are: • The performance of face recognition is very sensitive to non-regulated environmental conditions. • Image processing is usually a time and memory consuming operation. Algorithm optimization is often required, to adapt the methods to limited resources devices. • Face appearance is a very variable feature across time, due to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, as discussed in section 2.3.3. In conclusion, face biometrics is a trustworthy and non-intrusive identification technique that can be adapted for use in mobile phones, either on its own or as part of a multimodal system. The system’s false acceptance rate can be improved by integrating a liveness detection algorithm, achieving high performance levels. The performance of these systems depends on their application, as well as of the device’s characteristics. Although many general face recognition algorithms have been created, it is important to pay attention to hardware limitations when designing a image-processing-based recognition system for a mobile phone. 2.4 Signature recognition This section presents the challenges and most important works related to signature recognition in mobile handheld devices. Firstly, in section 2.4.1 an introduction to the signature recognition technique is provided in addition to the problems and challenges of the adaptation to a mobile environment of this technology. Next, in section 2.4.2, the most recent and relevant works of mobile signature recognition are presented. This includes three different approaches consisting in making signatures on the mobile screen, utilizing special pens with specific hardware to make signatures, in a surface or in the air, and making signatures holding the mobile phone in the hand. The public databases that are used in these works are summarized in section 2.4.3, including their characteristics and references to download them. Following this, in section 2.4.4 some comments regarding liveness detection in this technique are presented. Finally, the conclusions of the state of the art of mobile signature recognition are presented in 2.4.5. 2.4.1 Introduction Biometrics based on signature has been used since centuries as a method to authenticate the veracity of documents. At present, most of legal or banking documents must be signed in order to be accepted. People are very used to sign as there are many common situations where they should make a signature so the document or the transaction is accepted. Actually, people must make a signature in order to receive a valid national identification document. In general signatures are used to verify the identity of a user, not to identify a user from a database. 42 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Most of the signatures made at present are handwritten signatures, where users take a pen and write in a paper their signature. However, the penetration of new technologies have made improvements on the type of sensors used and it has become usual to make a signature in digitalized screens with special pens. Since many years, there has been a big effort on making automatic the verification of a signature. Actually, in [406] and [147] and [252] the authors made a fully complete work of gathering together the most important articles related to classic handwritten signature until 2008. More recent survey articles [481], [501], [435] and [158] summarize the most important works until 2013. In these works there is a separation between two kinds of signatures: • Offline signatures: Where the signatures are written with ink in paper, meaning an image processing problem. • On-line signatures: Where many temporal signals are captured when making a handwritten signatures (usually speeds, accelerations, pressures, angles, etc.). This is a signal-processing problem. Of course, on-line signature systems require specific sensors to capture these signals but the performance improves considerably with respect to offline systems. In general, the main focus of these works is to improve the performance of the handwritten signature verification algorithms in systems where the signature is performed in a tablet with a pen, able to capture many different temporal signature features. However, this approach is different than the one presented in this document, where on-line signatures are captured in handheld devices, such as a PDAs or a mobile phones. Including signatures in these kind of devices is quite interesting because of the big amount of operations related to legal, monetary and others that might make use of mobile signature recognition. This is the reason why there are many works trying to incorporate signature biometrics specifically on mobile devices. However, to the authors’ knowledge, there no exists a complete document gathering the present mobile signature biometrics state of the art, which is the goal of this section. 2.4.2 Relevant works on signature recognition on mobile phones Signature verification systems must face many challenges to adapt their techniques to the mobile environment. Some of the most important challenges are the following: • Handheld devices are affected by size and weight constraints because of their nature. Usually, mobile phones or PDAs present small input areas and poor ergonomics that increase the variability of the signatures. • The quality of the touch screen on mobile phones must also be considered. In these devices, in general, only position signals in time are available, but not pressure, azimuth and other signals that may improve the verification performance. • The sensors that capture the signature are not the same. There are some works, presented as follows, working with touch screens with special stylus, fingers or accelerometers. Finding the most appropriate sensor to capture the signature feature is a requirement to be fulfilled. • The processing capacity and the battery of the mobile phone are also constraints that limit the complexity of the verification algorithms that can be used. The research works related to mobile signature recognition try to face all these issues in different manners, obtaining different performance results. Next, the most important approaches in adapting 43 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection handwritten signature in mobile devices are presented. These approaches can be divided in three groups: 1. Signatures are made in a mobile device which is the responsible of capturing the position signals along the time. 2. Signatures are made anywhere but using a special pen that captures the accelerations of the signature. 3. Signatures are made in the air holding the mobile phone that captures the accelerations of the gesture movement. The first approach is the most similar with the not-handheld device technique. This is the most common approach, since most of the work done in classical handwritten signature can be adapted easily. One of the most important initiative is the BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation Campaign, where independent research institutions studied the verification results for handheld devices in comparison with other databases captured using a pen tablet [494]. In this comparison, it was concluded that the verification algorithms with handheld devices had lower performance than when using a pen tablet. Following this initiative, the BioSecure multimodal database was created [387] including a specific subdatabase of signatures obtained through a handheld device. A part of this database, consisting on 20 genuine signatures of 120 users, with 20 skilled forgeries per user, was used in [336]. In this work the authors extracted 100 features of time, speed, acceleration, direction and geometry per signature sample. Then they used a Fisher Discriminant ratio to select the most appropriate features for each user and classify them using a HMM. They obtained an EER of 4% for random forgeries and 11.9% for skilled forgeries. They suggested that the ergonomics, an unfamiliar surface and the signing device may affect the signature performance. The BioSecure database is also used in the “ESRA11: Biosecure signature evaluation campaign” [244], which is, as far as the knowledge of the authors, the last evaluation campaign performed with the BioSecure mobile signature subdatabase. In this competition, 11 teams presented their verification algorithms to be evaluated in the subdatabase obtained through handheld devices. This database was made up of 2 sessions in 4 weeks with 15 genuine repetitions and 10 skilled falsifications with the information of the static signature. They provided 50 subjects to the training of the algorithm and 382 users to the test. The best performance algorithm presented in this competition obtained an EER around 6% against skilled forgeries. This approach consisted on obtaining the pen coordinates and a number of extra points in Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithms. Then they got a score by the average DTW distance between the test samples and 5 reference signatures with user-based normalization [492]. There are other important works related to mobile phone signature, although they make use of private databases that are created specifically for their research works. For example, in [296] the authors use a Samsung Galaxy Note to capture the signatures of the people signing with a special pen. They obtained a database of 25 users with two sessions. The temporal signals captured were the position of the pen in X and Y. From those signals they extract features related to time, speed, acceleration, direction and geometry. They select the best features through a sequential forward algorithm and they normalize them using the tanh method. Finally, they obtain the Mahalanobis distance from the feature vector and they made a fusion between this distance and the DTW score. Using this approach and this database, they obtain an EER of 0.525% (with random falsification samples). In [354], the authors use 4 different handheld devices of different technologies. They use two capacitive devices (Samsung Galaxy S and Samsung Galaxy Tab) and two resistive devices (HTC 44 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Tattoo and Geeksphone ONE) to capture the signatures performed with a pen. Each database is composed of 25 users with two sessions of 14 genuine signatures and 14 skilled forgeries. Depending on the database, they obtain an EER from 1.5 to 4% with an algorithm based on DTW. The former work is complemented in [82] where the authors add 4 new devices, including an iPad. Additionally, in four of the devices studied, the signature is performed with the finger not with a stylus. The authors created a database of 11 users with 3 sessions and 20 repetitions with a separation of two weeks and 10 forged signatures. They obtained an EER of 0.5-2% in random samples and 8-18% in skilled samples. They found out interesting conclusions, such as the smallest devices except iPad get better performance and the stylus signatures are slightly better than the finger signatures. The second approach of mobile signatures is based on using a specific pen which embedding several sensors to make the signatures. Following this approach, the authors of [71] create a Biometric Smart Pen Device (BiSP) able to record different temporal signals when a person is making the signature in any solid pad or even in free air. In particular, the device captures the acceleration, tilt angle, grip forces of the fingers holding the pen and forces and vibrations during writing. They use these devices for different purposes. One of them is the work of [72] which studies the signature recognition with this device. In this work, they create a private database of 40 people who wrote a private id word composed by 7 characters. They wrote the word in the air with the elbow resting on a table or directly on a surface. They obtained a 99.99% of score rate with no forgeries attempts with a fast adaptation of DTW. Similarly, in [444] the authors build a different pen by attaching a tri-axis accelerometer and two gyros to a pen. With this device, they make a private database of 4 people with skilled falsifications. They propose an algorithm based on HMM obtaining an EER of around 1.5%. Related to this approach there are some works where the authors attach a tri-axial accelerometer close to the tip of the pen and a gyro in the middle, sampling at 1000 Hz. With this hardware, in [95] the database AccSigDb2011 is presented, composed of 600 signatures from 40 authors including 10 genuine samples and 5 forgeries each. In all these samples, only acceleration values are captured. This database is extended by the Gyrosigdb2012 database presented in [127] by similar authors. In this extension they add signatures of 20 people more and this time they capture the signals from the gyros. In their works, the authors claim these databases to be public but, as far as the authors’ knowledge, the link to download them is not available. The intersection of both databases are used in [217], where the authors propose Legendre approximation with SVM for classification obtaining a 90% of accuracy with a database of 10 people. The third and last approach to make signatures on mobile phones presented in this document is based on making an identifying gesture in the air. There are some research teams working on this issue or similar, obtaining competitive results. In [394] the authors present an authentication protocol based on making gestures on a mobile phone with a two-axis accelerometer embedded. The identifying signature is a combination of different simple gestures separated by a pause. However, the authors do not indicate how these gestures are analyzed nor the results obtained. A similar approach is presented in [118] where the authors present a vocabulary of 10 simple gestures in order to be combined to create complex signatures. The authors use a private database of 18 people concluding that this kind of signatures can be easily falsified. On the other hand, in [386] the authors propose that users could create a personal gesture to be identified in the mobile phone. In this case the gesture is a movement based on get the phone from the table and then shake it in a particular manner. The gestures are captured by a 3-axis embedded accelerometer. The authors create a private database of 22 users, obtaining an EER of 5% with random falsification samples. The processing of the signatures is based on a dynamic programming technique similar to DTW. 45 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection The former work is complemented in [344]. Using the same algorithm, it studies the performance of the technique along the time. For this purpose the authors create a private database of 12 people making their gesture during 6 weeks. With an updating method, they obtain an EER of 4%. Nevertheless, in [319] the authors propose to use an algorithm based on DTW with template adaptation to analyze the performance of signatures composed by a vocabulary of eight simple gestures. They use a database of 5 people in different sessions, obtaining a correct rate of 93.5%, which became 98.4% when analyzing only the samples of one session. In this work also, the authors propose the signature to be created by each individual, obtaining in this case a correct rate of 99.5% with a database of five people. The same authors in [320] complete their work adding real falsification attempts. For this purpose they create a private database of 10 people who create a personal signature in the air. Then, four people tried to repeat their signature only knowing the “draw” the authentic user made and another four people tried to forge the signature through a video record of the user making his/her signature. An EER of 3% and 10% was obtained in each scenario. Finally, in [222] the authors presented the “in-air signature” biometric technique, based on authenticating people when they make an identifying gesture (a signature) in the air while holding the mobile phone in the hand. In this work, the authors use the tri-axis accelerometer embedded in most of current mobile phones to capture the acceleration signals of the signature. The authors obtained an EER of 2.5% analyzing a database of 34 users who repeated 7 times their signature and skilled forgeries obtained through the study of video-recordings of the genuine users making their in-air signature. Following this work, in [63] the authors evaluated a private database composed of the samples of 96 genuine individuals and the skilled forgeries of six different people who tried to repeat all of the authentic gestures. The best algorithm was the one based on DTW that obtained an EER of 4.5% against the skilled forgeries. The same database was used in [100] where the authors proposed different algorithms based on sequence alignment, obtaining an EER under 2%. Additionally, the same team in [101] presented a work where they analyzed the performance of the in-air signature technique along the time. For this purpose they obtained a database of 20 sessions and 22 people who repeated 5 times their signature in the air each session. They proposed an updating strategy of the template that derived in a 1.67% FAR and 5.32% FRR. Finally, a recent article in [115] demonstrated that using gyroscopes in the in-air signature method could improve the performance of the system to a FAR of 0.63% and a FRR of 0.97%. The relevant works presented in this section are summarized in Table 2.9: 46 47 Mobile in-air Mobile in-air Mobile in-air Mobile in-air Mobile Mobile Mobile Mobile [344] [319] [320] [222] [63] [100] [101] [115] in-air in-air in-air in-air Mobile in-air Pen in-air Pen in-air Pen in-air mobile mobile mobile mobile [386] [72] [444] [217] [82] [354] [296] [492] EER= 4.5% (skilled) EER= 2% (skilled) FAR=1.67%, FRR=5.32% FAR=0.63%, FRR=0.97% EER=3-10% (skilled) EER = 2.5% (skilled) EER = 99.5% EER=4% EER = 6% (random) CCR = 99.99% (random) EER = 1.5% (skilled) CCR = 90% EER=0.5-2% (random), 18% (skilled) EER=1.5-4% EER=0.525% (random) 8- EER=4% (random), 11.9% (forgeries) EER = 6% (skilled) Result DTW DTW DTW DTW DTW DTW DTW DTW DTW DTW HMM Legendre+SVM DTW DTW Mahalanobis + DTW DTW HMM Technique Table 2.9: Summary of relevant works in mobile signature recognition 96 96 24 (20 sessions) NA 10 34 5 12 22 40 4 10 11 25 25 382 120 mobile [336] Pen on screen Pen on screen Pen on screen Pen on screen Pen on screen Users Publication Approach Accelerometer Accelerometer Accelerometer Accelerometer + gyros Falsifications from video Accelerometer Own signature 4 weeks Get phone from table and shake Biometric Smart Pen Device Accelerometer + gyros Accelerometer + gyros 4 devices EER of 4 devices Samsung Galaxy Note ESRA11 database BioSecure database Comments PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.4.3 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Public databases for mobile signature recognition As follows, a summary of the public databases found in the state of the art is presented: • BioSecure multimodal database [387]: This database can be downloaded in [10]. In this database there is a subdataset (Mobile Dataset (DS3)), at a price of 1500$ focused on capturing signatures through mobile devices (PDA HP iPAQ hx2790) under degraded conditions. There were two sessions and 240 participants with skilled forgeries. Only temporal position signals are captured with this device. • GB2SGestureDB2 [222]: This is a database of 40 gestures performed by their truthful users and 3 impostors trying to forge them [15]. Each original user has been recorded on video while carrying out his/her gesture 8 times. From the study of these records 3 different people have attempted to imitate each gesture in 7 trials. Accelerations of gestures on axis x-y-z have been obtained at a sampling rate of 100 Hz. • GB2SGestureDB3 [101]: This is a database of 20 people performing their identifying gestures holding an iPhone on their hand [15]. 10 sessions of 5 repetitions of their gesture separated along a month have been obtained for each user. Accelerations of gestures on axis x-y-z have been obtained at a sampling rate of 100 Hz. As far as the authors’ knowledge, there are no more available databases to make research on biometric signature recognition. In the rest of works related to this technology, the databases employed are not available. 2.4.4 Liveness detection on mobile signature recognition As far as the authors’ knowledge, there no exist any work on this issue. At present, the research is focused on improving the performance of the algorithms and sensors in order to be able to discard better skilled forgeries. At present, there are no works trying to make machines replicate the genuine signatures of people. This does not mean that technically it could be possible to have machines able to hold a pen and replicate a signature if enough information is provided. According to this, it is accepted that this biometric technique involves liveness detection, since as a behavioral characteristic it implies to perform an action that connote the person is alive. 2.4.5 Conclusion At present, there are some works trying to incorporate the signature to mobile devices. However, when they make a mobile adaptation of the classical handwritten signature systems, the performance decreases. The reason of this is because in general, the number of signals that can be captured from a mobile device are reduced to position in time, losing the information of the pressure or the azimuth that usually reach a better performance. In addition to this, the difficulty of the skilled signatures in this kind of devices remain the same, since the signature process is not modified. This means, that the information received by a forger is the same in the mobile context than in the classical context (the skilled forgeries are obtained from trying to repeat copies of authentic signatures). These two factors, less information but same forgeries, are the reasons of the decrease of performance in the mobile adaptation of classical signatures made with a pen on the surface of the mobile device. 48 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection In order to increase the performance, there appear two different approaches to accomplish this goal. The first approach is based on using a special pen allowing to capture much more signals of each signature, like pressure on the pen, accelerations, azimuth, etc. However, this technology requires buying this specific pen in order to be used. A second approach is based on employing the accelerometers and gyros already embedded in a mobile phone. In this case, no additional hardware should be bought and the performance beats the results of the classical handwritten. The cause of this is that it is much more difficult to forge a 3D signature from a video-camera than repeating a 2D handwritten signature with a copy of it in front of the forger. The performance results of this technology mean that it is an interesting option to carry out signatures on the mobile phones. According to this report, the following advantages regarding signatures in mobile phones have been perceived: • Signature is a very accepted technique. People often make signatures in their daily life. • It is quite accepted that signatures are used to authenticate people or assure the veracity of documents or transactions. • Making a signature is an easy and comfortable action. • Signature performance are not limited by environmental constraints. • In-air signatures only use sensors embedded in mobile phones, obtaining good performance against skilled falsification attempts. However, some disadvantages have been also found in these types of techniques: • Signatures with pens in mobile phones do not provide good performance. • Special pens should be bought additionally to the device. • Signatures depending on accelerometers should be made still, without any movement that can include other accelerations. • In-air signatures require to move the arm and the wrist , so people with injuries in these parts could not use it appropriately. 2.5 Hand recognition Biometric recognition based on hand features are becoming more interesting due to acceptability between users and high-level accuracy. There are multiple techniques based on hand features. In this section we will focus on three of them: hand shape or hand geometry, palmprint and hand vein. Other techniques like knuckle recognition or verification based on hand thermal images would be briefly introduced. Multimodal techniques by mixing hand features, like hand geometry and palmprint or hand vein in dorsal and in palm, are a natural form to create multibiometric systems with a higher accuracy based on the same source. 49 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.5.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Introduction Recognition systems based on hand features have been widely used the last decade as one of the systems with higher accuracy and higher acceptability by the user [297, 148, 143, 290, 181, 500, 154]. This section is intended to explain three of the most important biometric techniques based on hand features: hand shape or hand geometry, palmprint and hand veins. Hand shape / Hand geometry Hand biometrics can be divided into two different approaches: • Contour-based approaches, where the aim consists of extracting information from the contour of the hand, carrying out the identification of an individual based on its hand shape, [258, 351, 384, 150, 323, 489, 495, 138, 458, 485]. • Distance-based approaches, where the aim consists of extracting measures from fingers and hand (widths, angles, lengths and so forth), in order to collect the geometrical information contained within the hand [433, 210, 61, 85, 298, 299, 503, 151]. α β Figure 2.1: Hand shape/Hand geometry approaches. (Left) Contour-based approach. (Right) Distance-based approach. Hand geometry biometrics usually has made use of a flat platform to place the hand, facilitating not only the acquisition procedure but also the preprocessing (image segmentation) and posterior feature extraction. This technique is evolving to contact-less, platform-free scenarios where hand images are acquired in free air, increasing the user acceptability and usability. However, this fact provokes an additional effort in preprocessing, feature extraction, template creation and template matching, since these scenarios imply more variation in terms of distance to camera, hand rotation, hand pose and unconstrained environmental conditions. This evolution can be classified into three categories according to the image acquisition criteria: • Constrained and contact-based: Systems requiring a flat platform and pegs or pins to restrict hand degree of freedom [258, 432]. • Unconstrained and contact-based: Peg-free scenarios, although still requiring a platform to place the hand, like a scanner [46, 174]. 50 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Unconstrained and contact-free: Platform-free and contact-less scenarios where neither pegs nor platform are required for hand image acquisition [503, 138]. In fact, at present, contact-less hand biometrics approaches are increasingly being considered because of their properties in user acceptability, hand distortion avoidance and hygienic concerns. Also their promising capability to be extended and applied to nowadays devices with less requirements in terms of image quality acquisition or speed processor. Palmprint The hand palm print has distinguishable features like ridges and valleys, minutiae, and so forth. Although the three main creases are genetically dependent, most of the wrinkles (secondary creases) are not. In [291] is shown that even identical twins present different palm prints. So that, palm print biometrics is a promising biometric recognition system. Figure 2.2: Palmprint. Principal lines of the hand. Palm print biometric can be divided into three different sets of features according to the palm print image resolution. • Less than 150 Dots per inch (dpi), extracted features are principal lines, wrinkles and texture. • Less than 500 dpi, extracted features are ridges, singular points and minutia points. • More than 1000 dpi, extracted features are pores and ridge contours. The latter two are related to forensic applications while the first one is related to commercial applications such as access control [500, 290]. The survey [290] from 2009 and [500] from 2012 could be used as a recent state-of-the-art of this technique. As shown in hand geometry section, the palm print biometric could be also classified into the same categories according to the image acquisition criteria: • Constrained and contact-based: CCD-based scanners and pegs • Unconstrained and contact-based: Digital scanners • Unconstrained and contact-free: Digital and video cameras Iula proposed an alternating method [254] where “the hand is properly aligned by marks and is completely immersed in water with the palm facing upwards” to 3D ultrasound imaging data acquisition. In our opinion, user acceptability could be affected due to the immersion into water. 51 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Hand veins Hand vein patterns present some advantages regarding other biometrics. Veins are considered as an inner body feature that can’t be falsified, they don’t need contact to image acquisition and they remain stable over time [148, 297, 374]. Figure 2.3: Hand Veins. Dorsal palm veins. Briefly, in the circulatory system, first, the hemoglobin in the blood is oxygenated in the lungs, then, the oxygenated hemoglobin is sent to the body tissues where the oxygen is released. The deoxygenated blood returns to the heart by the veins. Deoxygenated hemoglobin is able to absorb NIR light (about 760nm) so that when veins are illuminated with NIR light and they are captured with a IR sensor, they appear as a dark pattern [434, 126]. In [434], the authors combined the palmar and dorsal vein patterns to obtain an EER of 0%. Some works in the literature use thermography cameras. A thermographic camera captures infrared radiations from skin [318, 476, 126, 297]. The need to use specific cameras for hand veins detection makes this technology difficult to counterfeit. However, veins could be used to detect liveness [126, 297, 77]. Others Hand Thermal Images [130] are acquired by “1012 thermal sensors arranged in 23 columns and 44 rows”. The user places his/her hand above the sensor plate with pegs to guide the hand position. “Each sensor measures temperature within a range of 0-60 o C with an accuracy of 0.1/0.3 o C”. They study several feature selection methods (minimum Redundancy Maximum Relevance (mRMR), PCA and PCA+LDA) and different classification methods (KNN and SVM). Best results with an EER of 6.67% are obtained with PCA+LDA (25 principal components are used) and KNN. 2.5.2 Relevant works on mobile hand recognition We will devote this section to show the relevant work produced in these techniques. Must be noted that these techniques are coming into use in mobile devices and, as far as the author’s knowledge, there are not too much work in this field, indeed, no works were found in vein recognition with mobile devices. 52 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Hand shape / Hand geometry De Santos Sierra et al. [138] proposed a silhouette-based hand recognition with images taken with mobile devices. Best results (3.7% EER) were obtained with the alignment of two sequences where one sequence defined as the variation along the hand contour and the other sequence defined as the distances of each point in the hand contour to the hand centroid. De Santos Sierra et al. [137] used a Gaussian multiscale aggregation method to hand segmentation. This method improves previous work in the segmentation field. It is able to be used against different background without worsening the results. They used a synthetic database to test results with 408000 images. In terms of F-measure, worst results were obtained with parquet background with 88.3% and best results were obtained with sky background with 96.1% De Santos Sierra et al. [437] proposed a new set of features based on fingers’ widths and curvatures. The EER obtained was 6.0%. De Santos Sierra’s thesis [139] shows a complete study of the unconstrained and contact-less biometric systems based on hand geometry. The author gives a complete evaluation of his proposed method based on multiscale aggregation applied to image segmentation and fingers feature extraction/classification which has been assessed with different public/private databases. Hsu et al. [245] proposed an architecture to unlock the vehicle with the mobile phone based on hand geometry features. The authors take four triangles areas formed by different hand points as fingertips and valleys to check the user identity. Their method obtains an accuracy of 80%. Palmprint The early works in palmprint with mobile device cameras were performed by Han et al [226]. The author used a PDA with a built-in camera with 100 dpi resolution. They proposed a sum-difference ordinal filter to extract principle lines and wrinkles. With this filter, they obtained an EER of 0.92% with a short-time process to extract the features (180 ms). Methani et al. [357] proposed a method for palmprint recognition with poor quality images by the combination of multiple frames of a short video (up to 0.5 seconds). Frame combination was realized by line combination and they obtained an EER of 12.75% to 4.7% depending on the number of frames used. They also proposed a method to avoid low quality images that enhances the EER to 1.8%. Choras et al. [119] used texture mask-based features for palmprint recognition. They proposed three methods to create these masks: random masks, user masks (where the user must label some areas of his/her hand) and eigen-palms by PCA. Best results were obtained with eigen-palm approach (1.7% of FAR and FRR). 53 HTC Camera HTC Camera De Santos Sierra et al. [437] De Santos Sierra’s thesis [139] 54 40 subjects 100 subjects 84 subjects Syn [139, 137] Syn [139, 137] Syn [139, 137] Subjects/Database Palmprint Palmprint Palmprint Hand geometry Hand geometry Hand geometry Technique Table 2.10: Hand biometrics into mobile devices PDA camera (100 dpi) webcam mobile device HTC Camera De Santos Sierra et al. [137] Han et al. [226] Methani et al. [357] Choras et al. [119] Sensor Publication F-measure: 96.1% EER: 6.0% Complete evaluation of different methods EER: 0.92% EER: 1.8% FAR and FRR: 1.7% Results PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection However, the accomplishment of these techniques are strongly related to the acquisition of the image with the required feature. Hand biometrics in mobile devices could be classified as unconstrained and contact-free and it has to deal with non-controlled conditions, that we briefly resume next: 1. Must work under any light condition: indoor, outdoor, day light, flash, etc. 2. Poor quality of cameras 3. Any kind of background, so the user can employ it anywhere 4. Blur, motion, noise, skin’s specular reflections, and so forth 5. Hand pose: the user can vary his/her hand pose from one picture to another 6. Hand items, like rings and watches 7. Battery and time consumption 2.5.3 Public databases for mobile hand recognition In this section we show a table (Table 2.11) that overview databases with contact-less images of hands. This table represents in its columns respectively the name of the database; references; whether the database contains samples from Females (F), Males (M), Both (F/M); the population size; whether rings are allowed: Yes(Y) or No(N); which hand is involved: Right(R), Left(L) or Both(B); number of samples per user; the illumination of the image: Colour (C) or gray-scale(BW); the image size and whether there exist variation in hand rotation during acquisition: Yes(Y) or No(N). Name ID Syn UST IITD Ref. [139] [139, 137] [300] [297] F/M Size R. H. nSamp. Ill. Im. Size Rot. F/M F/M F/M F/M 110 120 287 235 Y Y Y Y B B B B 20 20 10 7 C C BW BW 640x340 640x340 1280x960 800x600 Y Y Y Y Table 2.11: A comparative overview of several aspects from different hand databases These databases are oriented to hand geometry technique but in our understanding, these databases could be used also to palmprint technique oriented to mobile devices. The PolyU [232] palmprint database [25] “contains 8000 samples collected from 400 different palms. Each sample contains a 3D Region of Interest (ROI) and its corresponding 2D ROI”. 2.5.4 Liveness detection on mobile hand recognition As far as the author’s knowledge, there exist no much work on this issue. Some works in hand vein biometrics start from the assumption that veins are inner features of the body that couldn’t be falsified due to they are not visible to the naked eye [126, 297, 77]. Then, this technique could be used to live detection because veins couldn’t be falsified easily. Future works in this issue could be oriented to video recordings, e.g., hand motion, heart rate (as shown in Section 2.3.5) and human-machine interaction (the machine asks to the subject to do a specific task, e.g., close and open the hand, rotate the hand or show a number of fingers.) 55 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.5.5 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Conclusion Hand biometrics in mobile devices is a work in progress that is emerging as a good solution that has a compromise between user acceptability and system performance. Nowadays with the improvement of the mobile phones, the possibility to add these biometrics techniques to increase security with these devices is reachable. Much work remains to be done in order to obtain similar results to other biometrics techniques as iris, by this reason, the merging between different techniques related to hand must be studied, e.g., hand geometry and palmprint techniques could start from the same hand picture then could be noted that the merging of these two techniques will be a natural process that will increase the system performance without disturbing the user acceptability. Consequently, using hand in mobile phones presents the following advantages: • It provides competitive performance rates when using in controlled situations. • One picture could be analyzed from different points of view (e.g. hand geometry and palmprint) and the results could be merged in order to enhance the performance rate. • It is highly accepted because hand is not associated with criminal investigations. In addition to this, it is not easy to steal an image of an open hand for someone else (in comparison with fingerprints that keep latent in many surfaces.) • Hand geometry and palmprint do not require high quality cameras or additional hardware to be integrated in the mobile phones. • It is very comfortable to use, since the user can take the photograph of their hand directly from the mobile phone using the back camera without making contact with any sensor. However, the following disadvantages or limitations of hand in mobile phones have been found: • It presents limitations to the environments conditions, e.g. light condition, background, etc. • Vein recognition requires thermographic cameras to acquire an image of the veins. This is a very expensive technology. • It is vulnerable to fake hands, that can be easily built by printing a picture of the hand. 2.6 Voice recognition This section presents the most important works related to voice biometrics in mobile handheld devices. The outline of this section follows the structure of the rest of the document. In section 2.6.1 an introduction to the current speaker recognition techniques is provided in order to align the scope of this document to the objective of the PCAS project. Next, in section 2.6.2, the most recent and relevant works on speaker recognition systems are presented, mainly those working on mobile environment or at least, focused on solving some of the limitations of mobile phone systems (low storage and consumption). In addition, the main concern of this document lies in works in which a text-dependent approach is implemented. The public databases that are relevant in mobile speaker recognition techniques are summarized in section 2.6.3, including their characteristics and how to download them. Following this, in section 2.6.4 some comments regarding liveness detection in voice biometrics are presented. 56 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Then, the most important companies providing voice biometric systems are presented in Section 2.6.5. Finally, the conclusions of the state of the art of mobile signature recognition are presented in 2.6.6. 2.6.1 Introduction Voice biometrics is focused on detecting the speaker identity in verification or identification systems. In general, the sensor required is a microphone that captures the voice at a sampling rate and sends these data to a computer, responsible for analyzing it. Automatic speaker recognition systems have been studied for many years. There are thousands of research articles regarding this biometric technique. Some of the most complete review articles of voice biometrics are [421], [97], [428]. In addition, more recent surveys can be found in [171], [324] and [106]. Usually, the speech features can be divided into high-level and low level characteristics. The former are related to dialect, emotion state, speaker style and others, that are not usually adopted due to difficulty of extraction. The latter, to spectrum, are easy to be extracted and are almost always applied to automatic speaker recognition [187]. By far, Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) and GMM are the most prevalent techniques used to represent a voice signal for feature extraction and feature representation in speaker recognition systems [421]. There are two main scenarios of speaker recognition systems: • Text dependent: The user is recognized when saying the specific word or phrase he/she was enrolled with. This means that the Speaker Recognition Systems (SRS) knows a priori the sentence the person is going to say, giving a lot of information to the system. In general, these systems have better performance and are simpler than text-independent systems. • Text independent: The user is recognized when he/she is having a conversation, no matter which words are being pronounced. This is a much more complicated scenario but more flexible. It is quite used for transparent and forensic identification. Nowadays, the research on speaker recognition techniques is not so focused on adapting the technology to mobile phones, but on improving the performance of text dependent and independent scenarios in real and noisy conditions. At present, text dependent speaker verification systems are more commercially viable for applications where a cooperative action is required, but text independent SRS are more useful for background recognition and liveness detection. As the scope of this document is to make an overview of the relevant technologies for the PCAS project, the speaker recognition text-dependent scenario is more useful for verification purposes, since a cooperation of the user is expected to accomplish the authentication. Consequently, the relevant works presented in next section are focused on this scenario. In 2008 the authors of [231] presented a complete overview specifically for text-dependent speaker recognition. Additionally, as far as the authors’ knowledge, works related to mobile speaker verification often make the mobile phone adaptation only in the sensor and the communication modules. This implies that these works use the mobile phone to get the signal, then they send it to an external computer where the analysis is carried out. So, in these works, the mobile adaptation of the techniques are translated as a different kind of noise in the communications and acquisition module. In spite of these works, which are quite interesting and presented as follows, there are several works where the focus of the research is mainly in the low consumption time and storage required, allowing the development of real speaker verification system on a mobile phone. 57 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.6.2 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Relevant works on mobile speaker verification One of the main challenges of speaker recognition systems is their high computational cost, that must be reduced in order to be incorporated into a mobile phone. Many researchers are focused on reducing the computational load of recognition while keeping the accuracy reasonably high. For this purpose, optimizing Vector Quantization (VQ) has been proposed in many works [450]. This method consists of reducing the number of test vectors by pre-quantizing the test sequence before matching. Consequently, unlikely speakers can be easily rejected. Another very used option for this is using a generalization of GMM [420]. As it was introduced before, this section is focused on describing the most relevant and recent works regarding speaker verification by means of a mobile phone, mainly in the text-dependent scenario where an active cooperation of the user is expected. As there are a lot of related works, the articles with an experimentation section with a database of 10 users or less will be discarded in this document unless they have a very important impact in the literature. One of the most relevant initiatives is the First Mobile Biometry (MOBIO) Face and Speaker Verification Evaluation, carried out in the projects MOBIO [20] and TABULA RASA [29], to make a competition to recognize people from their face and voice through their mobile phone. The results of this competition were presented in [330], making use of the first version of the MOBIO database, described in the same work. This database was composed by text-dependent and text-independent voice samples. However, in this evaluation there is not any separate evaluation for both scenarios. The best results of this evaluation, regarding only voice biometrics, were obtained by the Brno University of technology, achieving an EER of 10.47% (male) and 10.85% female. The winner algorithm was composed by the fusion of two systems. The first system is a Joint Factor Analysis (JFA), described in [278]. The second system was published in [142] and it is based on an i-vector system that describes the subspace with the highest overall variability. Both systems use 2048 Gaussians. The MOBIO database was completed some years later and it was presented in [346]. The authors of [371] used this database to evaluate their voice algorithms in mobile environments. In this work, the authors presented a session variability model based on GMM. For speaker authentication, the speech segments are first isolated using energy-based voice detection. Then MFCC features are extracted for 25ms frames with 10ms overlap and a 24-band filter bank. The resulting 60-dimensional feature vectors contain 19 MFCC together with energy, delta and double delta coefficients. These feature vectors are examined by Inter-session Variability (ISV) and JFA methods, obtaining an HTER of 8.9% in males and 15.3% in females. Additionally, in [233] the authors propose a verification system based on password phrase with voice authentication. For this purpose they use the “BioID: A Multimodal Biometric Identification System” database [185]. In this work the authors claim the robustness and accuracy of the system to be the most important requirements in order to be used by the society. For this reason they propose to train the verification system with limited samples and make the system consume very low time and memory. They use DTW for classification of MFCC features. Robustness is increased with speech enhancement and cepstral mean subtraction. In order to decrease the storage requirements, they use VQ with speaker specific codebooks to obtain a 2.7% EER with limited training. Another relevant work in terms of mobile text-dependent speaker recognition is the one of [305], where the authors release the RSR2015 database, for Text-Dependent Speaker Verification using Multiple Pass-Phrases. This database is composed of 300 users who said 30 phrases in different sessions with 4 mobile phones and 2 tablets. In this work, the authors use the ideas of the system proposed in [308] to evaluate its performance in this database, obtaining an EER around 1% per males and females. However, they required 3 sessions with 30 phrases per user to make the enrolment. They propose a hierarchical multilayer acoustic model based on three layers, the first one to detect the gen58 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection der, the second to choose some candidates and the third to detect the identity. The authors extract 50 features per sample (19 Linear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (LFCC), their derivatives, 11 second derivatives and the delta energy). They use HMM to the classification. The same main author together with other team presents a recent work proposing a text speaker verification system with constrained temporal structures [304]. There, the authors describe these constrains as the limited enrolment data and the computing power typically found in mobile devices. They propose a client-customized pass-phrases and new Markov model structures. They also work on a hierarchical multilayer model, where the first layer detect the gender, the second the speaker candidates based on text-independent techniques and the third one with HMM to make the decision on the text-dependent system. In this work the authors make use of the MyIdea database [152], obtaining an EER of 0.84% when impostors do not know the pass phrase and 4.11% when impostors use the authentic pass phrase. Another text-dependent speaker verification for mobile devices was suggested in [50]. In this work, the authors propose to verify all the people when saying the Arabic word “Naam” (“Yes” in English). They extract the MFCC for each sample and train the model of each user by means of an ANN through a batch gradient descend algorithm. For training each model, they use samples of other users and other pass phrases. They work with a private database of 15 different speakers recorded from an Android HTC Nexus One, obtaining an EER of around 7-8%. Also the authors in [110] present a text-dependent speaker recognition scenario in Android platforms. In this case they suggest to make a preprocessing step, consisting on normalization, silence removal and end-pointing techniques. Then, they extract LFCC features and make a classification based on DTW. In order to decide whether a sample belongs to a user, they propose to use personal thresholds for each user based on their training samples. At enrolment, they suggest two different types of training: a sequential training that gets the first sample and the rest are aligned to it through DTW and a collective training where they get all the training samples and choose the one with the median length as the reference for the DTW. In this work, they use a private database of 16 people with 15 records of the same passphrase (the same sentence for all the users). They use 10 samples for training and 5 for testing, obtaining a FAR of 13% and a FRR of 12%. Additionally, the authors of [54], propose an implementation of a real-time text dependent speaker identification system with recording equipments similar to the ones integrated in mobile devices and algorithms prepared to consume a low amount of memory and processing power. The speaker identification is based on the MFCC and the derived Dynamic Coefficients, while classifying features using a DTW approach. They constructed a private database with 23 speakers with the Romanian equivalent word for “airplane”. The recordings were captured using a low cost microphone attached to a low cost MP4 player at a sampling frequency of 8kHz and 8 bits per sample. The authors claim a CIR of 80% in their database and answering each identification request with less than one second. The CIR was increased to 96% when using Dynamic Coefficients, but the time required also rose by a factor of 3. Another similar work is introduced in [295]. In this case, the authors present a door phone embedded system and a platform with speech technology support for recognition, identification and verification. There was an emphasis in noisy environments. They use the database BioTechDat, captured from telephone speech in noisy environments at the KEYSPOT project [18]. As far as the authors’ knowledge, this database is not publicly available. The algorithm proposed is based on modelling each speaker with a GMM. To minimize the influence of background sounds, they used background modelling, in which they trained a single speaker independent GMM background model, also called Universal Background Model (UBM). Also in this work, the voice signals are converted to MFCC features. In order to enhance the speaker verification accuracy, a cepstral mean normalization is carried out. This algorithm obtains an EER of 4.80%. Another initiative to study the speaker verification on mobile phones was carried out by the MIT in 2006 [483]. In this work the authors presented a corpus and some preliminary experiments. The 59 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection database was captured with a handheld device provided by Intel. There were three different environments with different noise conditions (office, lobby, street) and two different types of microphones. Since recording in noisy environments, this corpus contains the Lombard effect (speakers alter their style of speech in noisier conditions in an attempt to improve intelligibility). This effect is missing in databases that add noise electronically. They captured a list of phrases for 48 speakers and they extracted MFCC features in segment regions of the voice and speaker models based on GMM. The EER obtained is 7.77% in office scenario, 10.01% in lobby and 11.11% in the street. The former database was also used in [361] to make a comparative study of methods for handheld speaker verification in realistic noisy conditions. In this case, the authors use Decorrelated Log FilterBank Energies (DLFBE) features as an alternative to MFCC features. The best algorithm evaluated is based on the implementation of a Wiener filter by estimating the power spectrum of the noise at the beginning of each voice sample to remove the noise and a universal compensation process using simulated noise. With this approach, they obtain an EER of 10.19% reducing the EER for the baseline model (19.96%). The same team of authors presented one year later the work in [362] where they continued working on robust speaker recognition in noisy conditions. They used data at the office scenario to train the system and at the office and the street to test it. They also used DLFBE features but modelled voice with GMM, obtaining a 6.50% of EER in office-office and a 12% in office-street scenarios. The problems of noisy environments in the text dependent speaker identification were also studied in [301]. In this case, the authors prepared a synthetic database, adding speech and F16 noises at -5dB, 0dB and 10dB Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) levels to a clean database of 50 speakers and 10 Hindi digits. They compared MFCC and LFCC features with classification using GMM, with best results in the first type of features. They obtained a 96.65% speaker identification rate in the clean database. However, this rate is reduced to 88.02% (10dB SNR), 79.42% (0dB SNR) and 76.71% (-5dB) respectively. A different approach in smart environments is proposed in [383], where they use Multi-layer perceptron (MLP) to classify the voice samples. They use low-level features, such as intensity, pitch, formant frequencies and bandwidths, and spectral coefficients in order to train a MLP of each user. In this case, they use the CHAINS corpus [128], made up of 36 speakers recorded under a variety of speaking conditions. The best approach of MLP obtains an accuracy of 80%. This corpus was also used in [218] to develop a speaker identification system using instantaneous frequencies. In this case, the authors propose to use an AM-FM framework to compute the instantaneous frequency of the speech signal, instead of MFCC features. Using these features in this database with a GMM classifier improves the accuracy of the system to around 90%. One relevant initiative regarding mobile speaker recognition is “The 2013 speaker recognition evaluation in mobile environment” [280] conducted in the BEAT project [8]. This is a text-independent competition but with conversations obtained from real mobile phones. For this competition, they completed the MOBIO database with a mobile scenario, composed by samples of face and voice captured from mobile phones at a sampling rate of 16KHz. The speech segments are acquired with real noise and some of them are shorter than 2 seconds. The competition has been conducted by 12 teams with the requirement of not using information of other clients at enrolment phase. Accordingly, the template of each user is only composed by his/her own voice. The ALPINEON team obtained the best results in this evaluation in terms of EER: around 10% females and 7% males [141]. The authors of [280] proposed to make a fusion between all the 12 systems evaluated, obtaining an EER of 7% females and 4.8% males The Alpineon KC OpComm system [141], which won the competition is made up of 9 different total variability models, with a score fusion combination. These kind of approach is also known in the literature as i-Vector based subsystems. All the subsystems are identical but use different acoustic features. 3 different cepstral-based features (MFCC, LFCC, Perceptual Linear Prediction (PLP)) are 60 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection extracted over 3 different frequency regions (0-8 kHz, 0-4 kHz and 300-3400 Hz). A gender independent training is performed with a low dimensionality of the voices. Furthermore, in [268] and [269], the authors propose a verification protocol, called Vaulted Voice Verification (V 3 ) by means of text dependent and independent speaker recognition. The experimentation developed used also the MIT database [483], obtaining an EER of approximately 6%. They created the models of each person by means of MFCC and GMM. Finally, a prototype of an Android implementation working on a mobile phone has been recently presented in [94], obtaining an EER of 4.52% using a text-independent speaker recognition system based on MFCC and VQ. Additionally, they confirmed that different mobile devices will have different parameters and therefore different performance, so they suggest a preliminary step of calibration on the mobile device. A summary of all these works is presented in Table 2.6.2. According to these works, a lot of research has been carried out in voice verification systems. However, some environmental limitations have been 2.6.3 Public databases for mobile speaker recognition There are some databases publicly available to develop and improve the algorithms of the state of the art on mobile voice recognition biometrics. As it has been previously said, the research on voice biometrics is enormous; accordingly, the amount of public database is also large. Actually, in [353], the authors presented an overview of 36 public speech databases available before the year 2000. In this century, there is also an important number of public databases. In this review, the authors present the most relevant ones in terms of mobile phones and text-dependent scenarios, which are the most relevant in the PCAS project. No databases before year 2000 are presented. The summary of all the relevant databases, according to the authors’ opinion, is presented in Table 2.13, where there is the following information for each database: • Bibliographic reference. • Name of the database. • Number of people in the database, separated by males and females if this information is available. • Number of sessions and repetitions on each session. • Link to download the database. • Type of speech in the database. • Additional comments. 2.6.4 Liveness detection on mobile speaker verification Speaker recognition has one intrinsic vulnerability based on the fact that anyone can record the voice of the authentic person in order to forge the biometric system. Nowadays, there are many available devices able to record voices or even conversations on the phone. Furthermore, voice is a biometric characteristic that is often exposed, even more than fingerprints. There are different cases of spoofing attacks in automatic speaker verification systems, perfectly summarized in the recent work of [162]: 61 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Publication Database Result Technique Comments [330] MOBIO JFA + i-vector 1st Mobio Evaluation [371] MOBIO [233] BioID EER = 10.47%(male) and 10.85% (female) HTER = 8.9% (males), 15.3% (female) EER = 2.7% MFCC + DTW + VQ [305] EER = 1% LFCC + HMM [304] RSR2015 database MyIdea database Hierarchical Multilayer Model Constrained temporal structures [50] [110] 15 HTC ONE 16 EER=0.84% (impostor not know the passphrase) EER=4.11% (impostor knows) EER= 7-8% FAR=13%, FRR=12% MFCC + ANN LFCC + DTW Same word Same passphrase [54] 23 CIR = 96% MFCC +DTW [295] BioTechDat MFCC + GMM + UBM EER of 4.80% [483] EER=7.77% (office), 10.01% (lobby) 11.11% (street). EER=10.19% MFCC + GMM DLFBE + Wiener filter Lombard effect EER= 6.50% (office-office), 12% (office-street) MFCC+ GMM DLFBE + GMM Lombard effect [301] 48 (Three environments) 48 (Three environments) 48 (Three environments) 50 Same word (“aeroplane”) Noisy environment Lombard effect Synthetic added [383] CHAINS CIR = 80% CIR=96.65% (NO noise), 88.02% (10dBSNR), 79.42% (0dBSNR) MLP [218] CHAINS CIR = 90% AM-FM Different environment conditions [280] MOBIO Database EER=7% (males) Fusion of 12 systems Real noise, textindependent [141] MOBIO Database EER=10% (males) i-Vector MFCC, LFCC, PLP Real noise, textindependent [268] MIT database EER=6% MFCC + GMM [94] 18 EER=4.52% MFCC + VQ Fusion of textindependent and dependent Android implementation [361] [362] (females), (females), 4.8% 7% 19MFCC + ISV + JFA Table 2.12: Summary of relevant works in voice recognition 62 Session variability model Long enrolment noise Different environment conditions PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Ref Name #people #sessions Sensors Speech Comments [185] BioID 22 1x10 Camera [330] [346] MOBIO 152 ( 52F + 100M ) 12 Nokia N93i Face, lips and voice Real noise and short speeches [305] RSR2015 300 (143F + 157M) 9 [483] MIT 40 (17F + 23M) 2 Samsung Galaxy, Samsung Neuxus, HTC Desire Intel Name and free speech Response questions and free speech 30 short sentences [152] MyIdea 30(M) 3 No mobile [128] CHAINS 36 (12F + 16M) 2 Profesional studio [66] BANCA 208 (104F + 104M) 12 [177] BIOSEC 200 2 High and low quality microphones Headset and webcam microphone [183] Valid 106 (30F + 76M) 5 Camera [202] BIOMET 91 (45F + 46M) 3 Camera short phrases 25 sentences Short fables and individual sentences 1 fixed digit sequence fixed digit sequence fixed digit sequence personal information Table 2.13: Public databases for mobile voice recognition 63 4 to 8 words Lombard effect Controlled acoustic conditions Different speaking styles Multimodal (face, fingerprint, iris, and voice) Noisy office Multimodal (voice, fingerprint, hand, signature) PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Impersonation: Implies spoofing attacks with human-altered voices, involving mostly mimicking of prosodic or stylistic cues rather than aspects related to the vocal tract. Impersonation is therefore considered more effective in fooling human listeners than a genuine threat to today’s state-of-the-art Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) systems [395]. The same conclusion was obtained in [333] with an experiment of a professional imitator, providing access to the recordings used in the experiment that can fool human listeners but not ASV systems. • Replay: Involves the presentation of speech samples captured from a genuine client in the form of continuous speech recordings, or samples resulting from the concatenation of shorter segments. Work in [472] investigated vulnerabilities when replaying far-field recorded speech to forge a ASV system. They proposed a baseline ASV system based on JFA and they concluded that using these recordings the equal error rate (EER) increased from 1% to almost 70%. The same authors showed that it is possible to detect such spoofing attacks by measuring the channel differences caused by far-field recording [471], reducing the error rates to around 10%. However, today’s state-of-the-art approaches to channel compensation leave some systems even more vulnerable to replay attacks. • Speech synthesis: ASV vulnerabilities to synthetic speech were first demonstrated over a decade ago, using a HMM-based, text-prompted ASV system and an HMM-based synthesizer where acoustic models were adapted to specific human speakers [340]. Experimental results showed that FAR for synthetic speech reached over 70% by training the synthesis system using only 1 sentence from each genuine user, however, this work involved only 20 speakers. Larger scale experiments using the Wall Street Journal corpus containing 300 speakers and two different ASV systems (GMM-UBM and SVM using Gaussian supervectors) was reported in [135]. Using a state-of-the-art HMM-based speech synthesizer, the FAR was shown to rise to 81%. They proposed to use a new feature based on relative phase shift to detect synthetic speech, able to reduce the FAR to 2.5%. The same authors complement the previous work in [136], by analyzing words which provide strong discrimination between human and synthetic speech, resulting in a 98% of accuracy in correctly classification between humans and synthetic speech. Spoofing experiments using one single HMM-based synthetic trial against a forensics speaker verification tool were also reported in [200], presenting the huge vulnerability and the obligation of including a synthetic voice detection to avoid speech synthesizers present a genuine threat to ASV. Successful detection of synthetic speech has been presented in [109], with a system based on prior knowledge of the acoustic differences of specific speech synthesizers, such as the dynamic ranges of spectral parameters at the utterance level and the variance of higher order parts of MFCC. In their experiments they demonstrated that as the synthetic speech is generated from HMM parameters, and the training stage of HMM parameters can be looked on as a smoothing process, then, the variance of synthetic speech in higher order of MFCC is smaller than in real voices so it can be used to detect the synthetic speech. Other approaches to synthetic speech detection use fundamental frequency (F0) statistics [311], based on the difficulty in reliable prosody modelling in both unit selection and statistical parametric speech synthesis. F0 patterns generated for the statistical in the speech synthesis approach tend to be over-smoothed and the unit selection approach frequently exhibits ’F0 jumps’ at concatenation points of speech units. Results showed 98% accuracy in correctly classifying human speech and 96% accuracy in correctly classifying synthetic speech. 64 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Voice conversion: Voice conversion is a sub-domain of voice transformation which aims to convert one speaker’s voice towards that of another [454]. When applied to spoofing, the aim with voice conversion is to synthesize a new speech signal such that extracted ASV features are close in some sense to the target speaker. This type of spoofing attacks have been deeply studied by the authors of [53]. In this work, they noted that certain short intervals of converted speech yield extremely high scores or likelihoods in ASV, even though these intervals are not representative of intelligible speech. They showed that artificial signals optimised with a genetic algorithm provoked increases in the EER from 10% to almost 80% for a GMM-UBM system and from 5% to almost 65% for a factor analysis (FA) system. Two approaches regarding artificial signal detection were reported in [52] by the same authors. Experimental work shows that supervector-based SVM classifiers are naturally robust to such attacks whereas all spoofing attacks can be detected using an utterance-level variability feature which detects the absence of natural, dynamic variability characteristic of genuine speech. An alternative approach based on voice quality analysis is less dependent on explicit knowledge of the attack but less effective in detecting attacks. A related approach to detect converted voice has been recently proposed in [51], also by the same authors. Probabilistic mappings between source and target speaker models are shown to yield converted speech with less short-term variability than genuine speech. The threshold average pair-wise distance between consecutive feature vectors is used to detect converted voice with an EER of under 3%. Additionally, the authors of [486] studied how to distinguish natural speech and converted speech, showing that the performance of the features derived from phase spectrum outperform the MFCC tremendously, reducing the EER from 20.20% of MFCC to 2.35%. Some of these attacks can be found together, so the solutions provided by the ASV should treat with all of them at the same time. For instance, in [447] the authors propose a CAPTCHA system that asks the user to repeat a random sentence. The reply is analyzed to verify that it is the requested sentence, not a recording, and said by a human, not a speech synthesis system. Using an acoustic model trained on voices of over 1000 users, their system can verify the user’s answer with 98% accuracy and with 80% success in distinguishing humans from computers. The same authors have recently presented an article in [448] proposing two implementations of the CAPTCHA system in mobile devices, concluding that a CAPTCHA where the sentence is shown and then read aloud is much more comfortable for users than a sentence heard and repeated. Another approach to detect liveness of users regards the fusion of voice and face recognition systems. In this case, the movements of the lips are often used as the features to detect whether the face is talking or not [111]. Actually, not only the movement of the lips is important to detect the liveness of the person, but also the synchrony between the speech and the lip movement, as presented [163]. This synchrony can be measured by the correlation of the speech energy versus the mouth openness, as proposed in [91]. Regarding this approach, there was an evaluation campaign in the The BioSecure Network of Excellence project [10], where some face-voice systems were evaluated against different forgeries [170]. The most relevant forgery in this document is the audio replay attack where the impostor access uses speech from the outdoor session of the targeted speaker and the video from someone else. In these conditions (an in the rest of forgeries studied), the best systems obtained a high EER (around 30%). 65 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.6.5 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Commercial applications At this stage, there are some commercial applications to authenticate a user by means of their voice. Actually, Barclays Bank made some commercial tests claiming 95% of users correctly verified [75]. However, in this work it is suggested that in addition to the solution’s scalability and the vendor’s reputation, organisations also should look for: • Algorithms sophisticated enough to work around problems such as crosstalk and background noise. • Anti-spoofing safeguards and liveness detection to become aware of changing in speakers or playback recordings. • Automated fraudster detection to build fraudster databases and detect malicious individuals as they interact with a smartphone. At present, there are several companies offering voice biometric solutions. The most important, as far as the authors knowledge, are cited in [359]: • Auraya Systems [4]: Their voice solutions have been implemented in New Zealand Banking and Government services. • Nuance Communications[22]: Their voice biometric solutions are based on repeating a sentence (text-dependent) and also in free speech. This company deploys the Barclays bank solution. • Agnitio S.L.[2]: Provides a voice biometric method to be deployed in any device. It includes spoofing detection methods. It provides commercial and governmental solutions • SESTEK[27]: This company implemented a voice authentication method based on passphrases in DenizBankÕs call centre, the first voice verification project of Turkish banking industry. • Speech Technological Centre[28]: The Criminal Investigations Unit of the Nepalese Police has selected their technology to handle its audio forensic and voice identification needs. They also provide an authentication method based on face and voice recognition. • ValidSoft[32]: They provide a patented voice-based Out-of-Band authentication and transaction verification and also a secure mobile authentication method for real-time transactions. These technologies have been deployed in several UK banks. • Voice Biometrics Group[33]: They provide a core of voice biometric technology that can be applied to many use cases, including bank, mobile, time and attendance, etc. • Voice Trust[34]: They implement a verification system to authenticate the identity of customers and employees. They claim to have more than 500 global customers around the world. • VoiceVault[35]: They provide scalable voice solutions in the healthcare and banking fields in 40 countries. 2.6.6 Conclusion There are many works in the state of the art regarding voice biometrics. In general, the adaptation of speaker verification systems to the mobile devices is carried out in the capture sensor, since a mobile phone microphone is often used. However, there are not so many works trying to accomplish all the 66 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection verification process in the device but usually voices are sent to a central authentication server where speech signals are analyzed. There are two main types of speaker verification systems: text-dependent systems, which are easier and obtain better performance, and text-independent that are much better in terms of liveness detection. At present, most of speaker verification systems can be spoofed by replay attacks, voice conversion and speech synthesis, unless a special liveness detection module is implemented in the system. This module usually is implemented through text-independent mechanisms, requiring a lot of time of conversation to work properly. There are several companies providing many commercial solutions related to speaker verification systems. Most of them use the mobile phone to capture the voice of the people but the verification process is not carried out in the device. In addition, it has been shown in the document that the performance rates of this technique are not so low, the consuming time is high and it is quite easy to forge with spoof samples. However, this technology is very useful in phone banking in order to verify an action carried out from a phone conversation, improving the current methods to verify people when making a phone call (usually ask them for passwords or personal information), and giving people a higher security feeling. At present, this is the main application of this technology, where the voice is captured from the mobile device and processed in an external authentication server. According to the report presented in this section, the following advantages of using voice biometrics in standalone mobile phones have been found: • All the mobile phones already have a microphone to capture voices. • Natural and comfortable way of communication, specially in mobile phones. • Promising performance results. • If using while asking for information to a call center, it can be transparent to the user. However, the following limitations or disadvantages have been also noticed: • It is very constrained with noise. • Voice of the people can change depending on sickness, the time of the day or aphonia. • The most comfortable systems and those with best performance are based on passphrases, but FAR increases a lot when impostors know the sentence. • Systems based on text-independent require long conversations to train and access. The processing of this signals is hard. • Voice is quite easy to capture or replicate. There are many possible attacks to these systems and countermeasures do not work well enough yet. 2.7 Iris recognition The iris is the colored region in the eye that control the size of the pupil and therefore the amount of light that reach the retina. The pigmented layer of the iris is known as stroma. The stroma is a fibrovascular layer of tissue connected to the sphincter muscle which contracts the pupil. 67 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Figure 2.4: Iris. (Left) Iris picture from CASIA database under IR wavelength. (Right) Iris picture from NICE1 database under visible wavelength. The pattern generated by the fibers in the stroma layer is considered different for each person, even twins and eyes of the same person have different patterns. This pattern is used in biometrics systems to recognize people. 2.7.1 Introduction 350 Iris biometrics Mobile phone 300 Number of publications 250 200 150 100 50 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 <1990 0 Figure 2.5: Number of Iris Biometrics publications till 2013, searching “iris biometrics” and “iris biometrics mobile phone” into Google Scholar. Iris biometrics technique is an expanding field as depicted in Figure 2.5 where it is shown that the number of publications keeps growing, reaching 337 publications in 2012. The research in Iris Biometrics has to solve multiple fundamental issues in order to improve the applicability of this technique into real environments. The survey [89] covers the literature produced from the origin of this technique until 2007. The period from 2008 to 2010 is covered by [90]. In these two surveys Bowyer divides up in sections the different advances in the processes carried out in a typical iris biometric system: Image Acquisition, 68 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Iris Segmentation, Feature Encoding and Matching. Sheela’s survey is focused into methods to extract the iris pattern for iris recognition [445]. Hansen explores into his survey [228] different methods for eye detection and gaze estimation. Let us summarize the state of the art up to 2010 and expand up to 2013. The use of iris for person identification was first introduced in 1885 by an ophthalmologist named Alphonse Bertillon [76]. The first patent was established in 1987 by Leonard Flom and Aran Safir, where they offered a conceptual design but not a system implementation [180]. In 1992, Johnston made a study of the feasibility of using the iris pattern for identifying people (in verification and identification scenarios). He studied 650 persons during 15 months to conclude that the iris pattern remains unchanged over this period [270]. In 1994, John Daugman’s patent [133] and early work [132] described a system for iris recognition. The integro-differential operator proposed by Daugman in his patent has become a mainstay on the field. Indeed, most of the iris commercial systems are based on this patent. From 1996 to 1998, Wildes used binary edge map and a Hough transform to detect circles to accomplish iris recognition, [479, 478, 480]. In his patents [479, 480], Wildes proposed an acquisition system based on “a diffuse source and polarization in conjunction with a low light level camera”. In 2001, the United Arab Emirates started to use an iris recognition procedure of foreigners entering the country. Other cities as Amsterdam and UK also started to introduce this system in their airports. In order to do more flexible systems, Sarnoff Labs created cameras, in 2005, to capture “iris-onthe-move” and “iris-at-a-distance” [341]. There are some studies using different distances: beyond 1 meter [342], beyond 1.5 meters [477] and up to 3 meters [341], [149]. On these issues, noteworthy is the work done by Proenca et al. which covers most of the advances in iris recognition based on visible wavelength and non-cooperative environments [412, 414, 415, 413, 411]. In 2010, the Indian Government started the Aadhaar[1] identification project where the main goal is to assign a national identification number to each India’s resident. The enrolment of all their citizens (about 1.2 billion) would be completed by February 28, 2014. The obtained biometric samples consist of two iris, ten fingers and a facial photo. The Noisy Iris Challenge Evaluation is a competition focused on performing Iris biometrics on visible wavelength pictures. In 2007, the Noisy Iris Challenge Evaluation (NICE) - Part I was focused on Iris segmentation. Best results are published on the special issue [40]. In 2010, the NICE - Part II was “focused on performance in feature extraction and matching”, [87]. Best results are published on the special issue [41]. Cardoso et al. [99] developed a software named NOISYRIS that is able to simulate irises acquisition under different light sources, iris occlusions (eyelids, eyelashes and glasses), motion, and so on. 2.7.2 Template aging Biometric template aging was defined by Mansfield and Wayman [326] as follows – “Template ageing refers to the increase in error rates caused by time related changes in the biometric pattern, its presentation, and the sensor.” Since the beginning of the iris biometrics research, the assumption of the iris pattern immutability was a fact for many authors [132, 133, 478, 230]. The eye and iris are subject to different changes with age [482, 80, 57], but changes produced in iris patterns were not measured until 2008 by Tome-Gonzalez [464]. Tome-Gonzalez et al. [464] used two 4-month time lapse databases, BioSec and BioSecurID, to study how time affects the iris template. The author concluded that template aging causes a degradation on the FRR while FAR doesn’t change. Baker et al. [69] used a 4-year database and they studied the mean hamming distance (HD) for a long-time-lapse (LT) and short-time-lapse (ST) and they showed that the HD for LT is bigger than 69 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection for ST for match scores. Baker et al. conclude that FRR is increased by 75% with time. Fenker et al. [172] and [173] studied deeply how the FRR changes with time and how the FAR is not affected. In [172], they studied the increase of FRR in long-time-lapse when a threshold is fixed, and in [173], they focused on a longitudinal study of the increase in FNMR. Baker et al. [438] compared three different algorithms to behold how the template aging affects their performance. They noted that in all of them a FRR increment takes place being the Cam-2 the best behaved algorithm. Ellavarason et al. [155] made a comparison between six different algorithms implemented in USIT (University of Salzburg Iris Toolkit) for feature extraction. They conclude that the best behaviour corresponds to the algorithm proposed by Ma et al. [322]. 70 71 et ND-IrisTemplate- Aging2008-2010 2006 Ellavarason al [155] al ICE [402][403] et Fenker [173] al NIST. ICE [38] Baker et al [438] et Fenker [172] Baker et al. [69] BioSec [178] Tome-Gonzalez et al. [464] BioSecurID [256] Database Article IrisBEE modified version 4 years weekly during academic semester 43 subjects 4 years 120 days between sessions timelapse 2008-2010 23 subjects timelapse 2008-2011 - FRR increase - FRR increase - study of the FNMR increase at 1,2- and 3-Year Time Lapse - In depth study of the increase in FRR with different thresholds - changes detected in the Hamming distance threshold for matching irises - no effects in FAR - increase FRR more than twice Conclusion Table 2.14: Iris template aging Six different methods in USIT [31] VeriEye [39] 2 commercial systems IrisBEE modified version [403] VeriEye [39] Cam-2 [403] IrisBEE VeriEye [39] IrisBEE + 1D-Log-Gabor 2 sessions 1-4 weeks between sessions 254 subjects 4 sessions 1-4 weeks between sessions 13 subjects 2 sessisons: 2008 and 2010 322 subjects Libor Masek [337],[338] Iris recognition method 200 subjects Info PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.7.3 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Relevant works on mobile iris technique Nowadays, mobile phones (cell phones) computational power has been enhanced from 200 MHz processors in 2005 to 1.5 GHz quad-core processors and 2GB RAM in 2013. This improvement allows us to adapt or develop classical or new algorithms for biometric identification into mobile devices. Iris biometrics could be divided into two branches. The first branch gather those authors using Infrared (IR) wavelength in order to extract the rich iris structure more easily [132, 479]. The second branch is for these authors using Visual Wavelength (VW) [412, 40, 41]. Most of the works on Iris Biometrics with mobile devices were done with IR wavelength. Cho et al. [238] use an halogen lamp and IR pass filter to acquire iris images. They use a binarization process to locate corneal specular reflections and the pupil. To find iris boundary Cho et al. use a Modified Edge Detector that measures the difference between ten points around a given radius and ten points around a bigger radius. They ensure that this method obtains similar results than that Daugman integro-differential operator in less time. They improved their Modified Edge Detector in [239] to perform better at indoor and outdoor environments. To do so, they focus the boundary search at specific angles where iris occlusion with eyelid and eyelash are less probable. Jeong et al. [264] use an IR-illuminator and IR pass filter to take the iris image. They use the algorithm proposed by Cho et al. [239] to detect iris boundaries. To end the segmentation process they detect eyelid and eyelash regions. They propose an “Adaptative Gabor Filter based on the measured image brightness and focus value” obtaining an EER of 0.14%. Park et al. [391] search eye region into a face picture using a modified AdaBoost method based in corneal specular reflections. They use the Edge Detector proposed by Cho et al. and eyelid and eyelash detector. Iris feature extraction was done by the division of the polar iris representation into eight tracks and 256 sectors and 1D Gaussian filter to extract the gray level to each one. Before, they apply a 1D Gabor Filter. Kurkovsky et al. [302] briefly introduce an adaptation of a classical algorithm for iris recognition based on a threshold pupil localization and a edge detection and Hough transform to iris boundaries detection. Lu et al. [247] use an “EyeCup” to achieve the same iris-to-camera distance and the same illumination conditions for all collected iris. They analyze the histogram in order to find the pupil, iris and sclera areas and then they apply a pixel-oriented method for the iris boundaries detection. Mobbeel [19] offers a commercial product that implements one solution to iris recognition based on a client-server solution where “the server receives the sample taken by the client”. They ensure that “Mobbeel never stores the biometric templates obtained from users so there is no risk of a user’s credentials being compromised” OKI [17] Electric Industry develops a technology based on “OKI’s original iris recognition algorithm using standard optical cameras that are equipped in mobile terminals”. 72 Cho et al. [239] 73 Lu et al. [247] Samsung Ericsson P800 EyeCup by pixel-oriented method Hamming distance Hamming Distance Template Matching Table 2.15: Summary of relevant works in mobile iris biometrics - Edge Detector Hough transform Histrogram analysis Pupil detection threshold 1D Gabor Filter division of polar image into 8 tracks and 32 sectors IR + IR pass filter division of polar image into 8 tracks and 256 sectors Adaptive Gabor Filter 1D-Gaussian Eye region search by AdaBoost based on specular reflection Improvement of iris and pupil search Cho et al. [238] Cho et al. [238] Modified Edge Detector Threshold Feature Extraction + dual IR-LED + IR pass filter SPH-S2300 Kurkovsky et al [302] Park et al. [391] IR IR + IR-illuminator + IR pass filter SPH-S2300 + halogen lamp IR al. et + halogen lamp + IR pass filter SPH-S2300 Jeong [264] IR SPH-S2300 Cho et al. [238] IR Segmentation VW Mobile & HW Article FAR 0.13% EER 3.5% perform. non-glasses glasses EER 0.05% pupil 99.5% 99% iris 99.5% 98.9% method improvement for indoor and outdoor environments EER 0.14% Error performance similar to Daugman’s method Quicker than Daugman’s method Results PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Iris Biometrics with mobile devices have to deal with the problem of “non-controlled conditions” meaning a final user can use these technology at any time and any where. These non-controlled conditions add some problems to the technique: image quality, indoor and outdoor conditions, specular reflections, blurring and so on. We have to add some others like battery consumption, pattern safety (mobiles could be lost or stolen), liveness detection and non-coercion. 2.7.4 Liveness detection on mobile iris recognition As far as the author’s knowledge, there exist no work on this issue. At the moment, researchers are focused on the improvement of iris segmentation and feature extraction methods using IR wavelength and visual wavelength. 2.7.5 Conclusion At the moment, there are not too many work on this issue. That is because best results in iris recognition systems are obtained with IR wavelength, what force to use additional hardware in mobile devices. The use of additional hardware makes this technology less attractive for the final user. In addition, most of commercial mobile phones have good cameras at the backside but a poor quality front camera when available, forcing to use the back camera. That makes the image capture uncomfortable for the user. In order to increase user acceptability, the improvement of iris recognition methods with visible wavelength is needed, as well as the front cameras. Furthermore, the use of others biometric techniques, as face recognition, in combination with iris recognition could increase the system’s performance. Consequently, using iris in mobile phones presents the following advantages: • It provides very competitive performance rates when using in controlled situations. • It is quite accepted that iris can be used to authenticate people. • Template aging problem does not affect to the performance rate due to the template can be constantly updated. However, the following disadvantages or limitations of iris in mobile phones have been found: • It requires a high quality front camera. • It requires a IR camera to obtain the best accuracy. Approaches that use visible light cameras do not work yet properly. • Present limitations to the environment conditions: light conditions, specular reflections. • Deal with “non-controlled conditions” like blur and image quality. 2.8 Gait recognition In biometrics, the term “gait” is used to describe a particular manner or style of walking which is distinctive for each individual. Although gait shows a common pattern for everybody, it also presents some interpersonal differences which make possible individual identification. This fact may be observed in our ability to recognize a person only by observing his/her gait. The state of the art of gait recognition technologies is introduced in section 2.8.1, presented an overview of the biometric technique and the challenges of applying it in mobile devices. 74 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Next, section 2.8.2 presents a summary of the public databases of gait biometric samples, used in the literature to evaluate the works on this field. The most relevant works are gathered in section 2.8.3. Finally, some conclusions on the technique are presented in section 2.8.4. 2.8.1 Introduction In previous literature, different sensors have been used to capture the human gait. Many works [73, 129, 380] proposed to extract the movement of lower limbs from images recorded by a camera. In other works, the authors [358, 263] extracted the movement of the legs by using some pressure sensors incorporated to the floor of the room. However, both approaches limit the acquisition to specific indoor environments. In order to alleviate this restriction, some authors have proposed to use some wearable sensors which allow the subject to move freely. In particular, due to the miniaturization of inertial sensors, accelerometers has been used extensively to capture these body movements [48, 465]. Nowadays, most of smartphones incorporate an accelerometer to rotate the screen when there are changes in phone orientation thus gait identification using these sensors seems to be appropriate as a biometric technique for mobile phones. Furthermore, newest smartphones are including gyroscopes so the measurements of these sensors could also be used to complement the signals captured by accelerometers. The main advantage of this biometric technique is its unobtrusiveness, since it allows performing continuous authentication of the user without bothering him/her. Most authors agree that the main application of this technique is to detect whether a mobile device has been stolen by detecting changes in the gait signals in order to lock it. However, other authors have proposed to use gait identification to activate different profiles in a shared device depending on who is the current user [498]. The main problem of using a mobile phone to capture the gait is where to place it. People may wear their mobile phones in their pockets (chest or leg), attached to their belts or even inside a carrying bag. Depending where the mobile phone is worn, gait signals are completely different. In former works the authors have placed an accelerometer on the back [440, 309] or on the chest [460] in order to classify the different activities performed by a subject. Although these positions make it possible to differentiate among several activities, they are not adequate to identify subjects, as the movements captured in these positions are similar among most individuals. Furthermore, these locations are not comfortable for the user since they are not the typical places to wear the mobile phone. The first work that analysed the acceleration of the gait as a biometric technique was performed by Ailisto and Mäntjärvi et al. in [48]. They performed an experiment over 36 subjects by placing the accelerometer at their waists. This is an interesting position since it is close to the Center of Gravity (COG) of the user so the accelerations measured at this place represent a summary of the accelerations of the whole body. Other authors have proposed to place the sensor at the hip [191, 469, 241, 364], however, signals captured at this place are not well–balanced since the sensor is closer to one leg in relation to the other one. Although other authors [188, 60] have tried to identify subjects from the accelerations of their ankles, the capturing of these data requires to attach a sensor to the ankle or to wear a shoe with specific sensors. The work presented in [389] shows that measuring the accelerations at several body parts considerably increases the identification performance, however this implies that the user must wear many sensors which could be uncomfortable. Although these initial works have used dedicated hardware to capture the gait signals, recent works are using real mobile phones so they are proposing to place the sensors where users usually wear their phones. In [273, 240, 303, 271], the authors conducted experiments in which the users wore the mobile phone in their trouser pocket. Other works have proposed to attach the mobile phone to the belt of users in order to measure their gait signals at their hip [372, 68, 378], or their waists [452, 145]. Lastly, since another possible location of the mobile phone is inside of a bag, other authors have analysed the 75 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection feasibility of recognizing the gait when the mobile phone is worn in a bag [469], however this study was not performed using a real mobile phone. Some previous works using an accelerometer placed at the COG [277, 294] have described that vertical and anteroposterior accelerations repeat a discernible pattern that consists of two quasi– sinusoidal signals. These signals are produced by the typical swinging of the pelvis in both directions during the gait cycle. Therefore, these sinusoidal signals present the same frequency though there is a phase–shift between them. In the case of mediolateral acceleration, it presents a monophasic pattern since it depends on which limb is lifted. Furthermore, in contrast to the others accelerations, the authors of [58] have remarked the difficulty of finding a common pattern in this acceleration for all subjects. This means that the mediolateral acceleration is user-dependent so it may be crucial when identifying people. Several techniques have been proposed to discriminate among gait signals of different individuals, but in general two types of approaches may be identified. On the one hand, some authors propose to apply time windows to the whole gait signal in order to extract statistical or frequency features [327, 378, 68, 240]. The other approach, followed by most of researchers, consists in dividing the signal into gait cycles and then compare the gait cycles separately. Based on this segmentation several techniques have been applied to discriminate among individuals. In [191], the authors extracted the walking cycle length and some histogram statistics from the gait accelerations of each subject. The work presented in [48] compared the identification results obtained by these histogram statistics with the correlation between the walking cycles. Other works have proposed to generate templates of the gait cycles from the data captured during the enrolment phase. In [192, 196], the authors averaged all the enrolment steps to create a gait template. Usually, the amplitude and length of each step are normalized using linear interpolation in order to produce a template independent of the variations on speed and amplitude of the signals. After creating these templates, they are compared with gait signals using different metrics. Some authors proposed to use Euclidean distance [241, 190] or Absolute Distance [195] but other authors propose to use DTW since it is able to deal with non-linear time variability [426, 427, 465, 372, 65]. Other techniques not based on metrics have been also proposed, for instance in [271] the authors used time-delay embeddings networks and in [452] they applied PCA and SVM to find the best features to discriminate among individuals. Finally, many works have been devoted to identify and analyze those factors that may affect gait identification performance. Some of them analyze the differences between gaits of the same user captured during different days [452, 378] or even in different environments [241]. In this study [60], the authors affirm that the gait of the same person at different speeds can be as different as the gait of another person. Nevertheless, other works have proposed to generate several templates at different speeds in order to alleviate this problem [372] or even to create an average template for all speeds [65]. Several authors have also remarked on the great differences in the gait of the same individual when using different kind of shoes [60, 194] or carrying a backpack [195]. Furthermore, some authors have conducted several experiments in order to evaluate the robustness of gait authentication against spoofing attacks by means of mimicking the gait of other people [363, 190]. 2.8.2 Public databases for mobile gait recognition Although there are many public databases of gait biometrics based on vision, the number of public datasets based on wearable sensors is quite reduced. The reason of this small number of public databases could be that this biometric technique is on its early stages. However, as it could be observed in the table of relevant works in gait biometrics 2.16, there exist many private databases which have been used by the different research groups to test their own algorithms as in [193] where they conducted an experiment over a great number of subjects (100 subjects: 70 males and 30 females). 76 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Recently, the Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research of Osaka University (OU-ISIR) has released the largest inertial sensor-based gait database [465] composed of of 744 subjects(389 males and 355 females) at ages from 2 to 78 years. This large database was captured using three dedicated sensors placed at the waist and both hips while the subjects were walking along a flat path and two up and down slopes. Jalan Multimedia University of Malaysia has also recently made publicly available a new multimodal biometric database (MMU GASPFA) [235] which includes information about gait(GA), speech(SP) and face(FA) of 82 participants(67 male and 15 female). This database was captured using commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment, concretely to capture the gait they have used a mobile phone that was inside a hip pouch. Lastly, there is another public database collected at McGill University by Jordan Frank for the work [271]. However, this dataset is composed of much fewer subjects than previous ones, with 20 individuals performing two separate 15 minute walks on two different ways. This data was captured with a mobile phone using the HumanSense open-source Android data collection platform. 2.8.3 Relevant works on mobile gait recognition Although there are several works [364, 240, 189, 145] that summarize the state of art of gait authentication based on wearable sensors, the most complete review for this technique may be found in Claudia Nickel’s thesis [377]. Since this state of art only covered from 2005 to 2010, we have updated and complemented this review in order to include new works appeared in scientific publications until 2013 and to provide additional information about the conducted experiments. Table 2.16 summarizes the main works related to gait authentication based on wearable sensors. For each work, the following information is presented: • Publication. Reference to the publication in which appeared the presented work. • Sensor. Type of sensor that was used to capture the data of the gait: Accelerometer (A) or Gyroscopes (G). Since most of the experiments used dedicated sensors, we have also reported when the sensors were embedded in a mobile phone(P). • Position. Body parts where the sensor was placed to capture the gait signals. • Subjects. Number of subjects participating in the experiment • Scenarios. This column is divided into three subcolumns. First subcolumn indicates whether the training and test data was collected on the same day (s), different days (d), or both are mixing of several days(m). Second subcolumn shows if the subjects of the experiment were asked to walk to their normal speed (n), or at several speeds (v). Lastly, the third subcolumn distinguishes if the experiments were performed in a controlled environment or realistic environment: – (c). The experiment was conducted in a controlled environment. For example: walking a fixed distance along a corridor. – (u). The experiment was conducted in a uncontrolled environment. For example: walking on the street – (b). The experiment was conducted in a controlled environment but the subjects were carrying a backpack. – (r). The itinerary of the experiment consists of walking in different surfaces or ramps. – (s). In the different repetitions of the experiments the subjects wear different types of shoes. – (i). In the experiment some people tried to imitate the gait of others 77 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • Technique. Classification technique used to distinguish among the gaits of the users. • Result. Best result obtained in the paper without taking into account different scenarios. This result is usually expressed by means of EER, CCR or GMR. 78 79 A A A A A Acc A A A A A A A A AP A A A A AP AP A AP A A A AP AP AG AP AGP A A2P AG Ailisto [48],2005 Mäntyjärvi [327],2005 Vildjiounaite [469],2006 Gafurov [188],2006 Gafurov [191],2006 Rong [427],2007 Gafurov [195],2007 Rong [426],2007 Vildjiounaite [467],2007 Gafurov [190],2007 Holien [241],2007 Gafurov [194],2008 Gafurov [197],2008 Gafurov [189],2009 Sprager [452],2009 Mjaaland [364],2009 Bächlin [60],2009 Gafurov [196],2010 Wang [488],2010 Frank [271],2010 Kwapisz [303],2010 Derawi [144],2010 Derawi [145],2010 Yan [490],2010 Gafurov [193],2010 Mjaaland [363],2010 Nickel [378],2011 Bajrami [68],2011 Trung [465],2012 Muaaz [372],2012 Juefei-Xu [273],2012 Bailador [65],2013 Hoang [240],2013 Zhang [498],2013 Waist at back Waist at back Breast, hip and suitcase Ankle Hip Waist at back Trouser pocket Waist at back Breast pocket and hip Hip Hip Ankle Arm Foot, hip, pocket and arm waist Hip Ankle Ankle Waist at back trouser pocket trouser pocket Waist Waist Waist at front Hip Hip Hip Hip Waist at back Hip Pocket trouser Waist at back Trouser pocket Thorax, ankle and belt Position 36 36 31 21 22 21 50 35 32 100 25 30 30 30 6 50 5 30 24 25 5 60 48 10 100 50 48 45 736 48 28 34 14 20 Subjects c/v/c c/v/c c/v/c s/n/c s/n/c c/n/c s/n/b c/n/c c/n/c s/n/i s/n/r s/n/s s/n/c s/n/s c/v/c s/n/i m/v/sb s/n/s s/n/c s/n/c s/n/c m/n/c m/n/c s/n/c s/n/c s/n/i scm/n/c c/v/s s/n/r c/v/r s/v/c s/v/c s/n/c s/v/c Scenarios Correlation Frequency Analysis Correlation and Frequency Histogram similarity Cycle length DTW Absolute Distance DTW Correlation and Frequency Euclidean Distance Euclidean Distance Euclidean Distance Frequency Analysis Euclidean Distance PCA and SVM DTW Features, DTW and Frequency Cycle Matching Wavelet and DTW Time-Delay embeddings Statistical Features DTW DTW Wavelet Cycle Matching DTW Frequency and Statistical Features Statistical Features DTW DTW Wavelet 7.8% Frequency and Statistical Features Correlation Technique Table 2.16: Relevant works in gait authentication for mobile phones Sensor Publication 91.33% (CCR) 99.3% (CCR) 6.4% 7% 13.7% 5% 16% 5.6% 7.3% 6.7% 13.7% 13% 18% 5.6% 10% 5% 90.3% CCR 6.2% 21.3% 1.6% 5% 100% CCR 100% CCR 5.7% 20.1% 6.29% 7.5% ?? 6.2% 5.9%(FMR) 15.48% 8.8% 24.81% 3.6% Result PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection As it can be seen in previous table there are many different authors, however many of them belong to the same research institutes. Concretely, these are the main research teams that are currently working on gait authentication for mobile devices: • VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland [36]. H.Ailisto, J.Mäntyjärvi and E.Vildjiounaite. • Norwegian Information Security Lab. Gjovik University College. [21]. G.Bajrami, P.Bours, M.Derawi, K.Holien, D.Gafurov, B.Mjaaland E.Snekkenes and C.Nickel (Center of Advanced Security Research Darmstadt) 2.8.4 Conclusion Although gait authentication based on inertial sensors is a relatively new biometric technique since first papers appeared in 2005, there have been many relevant works that showed its viability when used to identify people. Experiments conducted in controlled environments have achieved high accuracies, however these experiments were performed in ideal conditions, usually on the same day in a flat path and using sensors that were always placed in the same position. Some works have identified several factors that may affect the performance of this technique when used in more realistic conditions as: different gait speeds, walking over slopes or other surfaces, wearing different type of shoes, placing the sensor in different orientations or even whether the user is carrying a backpack. These factors produce a high intra-variability in the gait of each subject that drastically decreases the performance of this biometric technique. Therefore, this lower performance in realistic conditions makes this technique appropriate to non critical security problems. Since the main application of mobile gait authentication is to detect whether a mobile device has been stolen by detecting changes in the gait, this lower performance will mean more false rejections, i.e., the mobile phone will get locked even whether the user is walking in a slightly different way. Lastly, another possibility to incorporate this technique in a final authentication mobile system could be complementing more accurate biometric techniques. Consequently, using gait authentication in mobile phones presents the following advantages: • Gait recognition is unobstrusive for the user since he/she does not have to perform any specific action to authenticate, except walking. • It performs a continuous authentication while the person is walking. • Most smartphones include the sensors needed for gait authentication (Accelerometers or Gyroscopes). However, the following disadvantages or limitations of gait authentication in mobile phones have been found: • The user should always wear the mobile phone in the same position since the signals captured at different parts of the body are quite different. • Wearing different types of shoe may affect the performance of this technique. • Walking at different speeds, on slopes or over different surfaces may also affect the performance. • In real conditions, the system may produce many false rejections so the user may be burdened with these authentication errors. 80 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.9 2.9.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Fusion of biometrics Introduction As seen in previous sections, there is no biometrics-based system which can warranty 100% identification rates nor 0% FAR nor FRR. This is due to the fact that the biometric traits of some individuals don’t accomplish with two main desirable features: Distinctiveness of a biometric trait (which concerns the FAR) and its permanence (which affects the FRR). On top of the situations in which the subject is not collaborative, Faundez-Zanuy [168] summarizes the main drawbacks of each technique, which have been shown in the corresponding section: • Fingerprint: Some fingerprint scanners are not able to acquire a clear fingerprint image under certain conditions (elder people, manual workers with acid, . . . ). There also exist users who don’t have fingerprints5 . • Face: User’s face can undergo many changes due to hairstyling or make-up, the use of accessories, weight variations or skin color changes. Pose and lighting changes can also reduce recognition accuracy • Iris: Cases of eye trauma exist, in which iris recognition is not possible. • Voice: Acquisition devices and illness can modify voice features and degrade recognition rates. • Hand geometry: Weight variations and mobility diseases, such as paralysis or arthrosis can make recognition impossible. A possible way of dealing with this limitations is to combine different biometric modalities. The fusion process integrates different signals from multiple sensors into a single pattern. In the PCAS device’s design the whole process must be based on mathematically rigorous methods that avoid naively error propagation in the system. Although these systems are more difficult to fool (as defeating more than one system is harder than defeating a single one) they are also more expensive (as they require more sensors) and entail higher computational load. In addition, the fusion process provides an enriched user pattern, which helps when dealing with the small sample recognition problem. Furthermore, multibiometrics can provide multi-factor authentication methods based on something the user knows, something the user is and something the user has, which are much more secure methods than those based only on one of the three factors. In general, the term Biometrics fusion is considered a synonym of Multimodal biometrics but, according to [408] it includes two general techniques: 1. Multimodal fusion: Fusion of biometric information obtained from different physiological or behavioural traits. 2. Intramodal fusion: Fusion of biometric information obtained from the same trait, but using different features, classifiers or sensors. As said before, literature generally refers to this techniques as Multimodal information fusion techniques. 5 This rare medical condition is known as adermatoglyphia and is due to a genetic mutation, as reported in [382, 96] 81 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 2.9.2 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Multimodal information fusion techniques A typical biometric system is composed by four basic modules: the sensor, the feature extractor, the matching module and the decision maker. Attending to the module in which biometric information is combined, we distinguish between four data fusion levels [168]: 1. Sensor/Data level. If the sensor signals are comparable then the raw data can be directly merged. The input signal is the result of sensing the same biometric characteristic with two or more sensors. The combination of the input signals can be carried out using different data fusion paradigms [93, 44]: • The complementary data fusion paradigm, in which the information provided by different sensors is independent from one another and can be combined to obtain a more detailed information from an object (Figure 2.6(a)). • The competitive data fusion paradigm, in which sensors provide different independent information about the same object. The fusion system establishes which sensor data has the least discrepancies (Figure 2.6(b)). • The cooperative data fusion paradigm, in which sensors provide different independent information about the same object, but the fusion system combines all the sources to obtain new information that can’t be derived from any individual sensor (Figure 2.6(c)). (a) Complementary (b) Competitive (c) Cooperative Figure 2.6: Data fusion paradigms at sensor level. 2. Feature level. The feature level provides fusion of data obtained from different features of a single biometric signal, or from different biometric signals. In this approach there is little control about each component’s contribution on the system input signal and the increase on the signal’s size clutters the system design. 3. Opinion/Confidence/Score level. There is a matching module for each biometric signal. Each matcher provides a score which represents a similarity measure. The fusion system normalizes every score and combines them into a global one in one of the following ways: • Fixed rule. The scores of all the classifiers have the same relevance on the final score. • Trained rule. The scores have a different relevance on the final result. This relevance is modified by the use of weighting factors computed using a training sequence. • Adaptive rule. In variable environments, the relevance of a single classifier’s score depends on the current moment. The most popular fusion techniques at score level are Weighted Sum, Weighted Product and Decision Trees. Garcia-Salicetti et al. make a comparative study [204] of the Arithmetic Mean Rule (AMR) and a linear SVM, in the framework of voice and on-line signature scores fusion. 82 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Their conclusion is that in the non-noisy case, the AMR with a normalization (rescaling) of scores gives the best results. In the noisy case, the SVM gives equivalent results to those obtained with AMR after scores’ normalization and only the methods that take into account the scores’ distributions are in fact efficient. Different normalization schemes are described in [229]: the min-max normalization, the Z-score normalization, the Tanh-estimators normalization and the so called Reduction-of-High-Scores normalization. 4. Decision level. In this approach, there is also one matching module for each biometric signal, but each one provides a decision about the identification or verification process. The classifiers’ outputs are then combined to obtain a final classification, overcoming the scores normalization. [237] proposes the highest rank method, the Borda Count Mathod and logistic regression as different ways to combine the classifiers’ outputs. The Borda Count Method (BCM) is a generalization of the majority vote, that assumes additive independence between individual classifiers and detects redundant classifiers. Although it is simple to implement and requires no training, the BCM treats all the classifiers equally. This advantage can be corrected using logistic regression. Other important combination schemes at decision level are serial (which improves the FAR) and parallel (which improves the FRR) combinations. The decisions of each classifier can be represented as a ranking of classes. All this rankings can be compared across different types of classifiers and different instances of a problem. The decision level is not commonly applied to identification problems, as a high number of classifiers are needed in order to avoid decision ties. For verification applications, at least three classifiers are needed. A fusion system must combine input signals in order to suppress the influence of inconsistent or irrelevant data and yield the best interpretation of information. The combination of the input signals can provide noise cancellation, blind source separation and so on. State-of-the-art data fusion bets mainly on the opinion and decision levels, even if, in general, the best results are obtained when the data fusion is performed in the first stages of the process. It is also interesting to distinguish between client-independent and client- dependent fusion approaches. According to [408], the former approach has only a global fusion function that is common to all users in the database. The latter approach has a different fusion function for each individual. Examples of client-dependent fusion approach are client-dependent threshold, client-dependent score normalisation and different weighing of expert opinions using linear or non-linear combination. It has been reported that client-dependent fusion is better than client-independent fusion in situations where there are enough client-dependent score data. In mobile environments, the captured feature’s quality strongly depends on the surroundings conditions. Image-based biometric traits’ performance decreases in outdoor locations. In addition, background noise significantly affects voice recognition systems. In these conditions, merging data from multiple sensors improves the system’s accuracy. 2.9.3 Multimodal databases There exist many multimodal datasets described in the literature. However, most of this data are extracted using desktop systems or fixed equipments. The most interesting databases for this project are those in which the biometric features are captured with a mobile phone, like the SecurePhone PDA Database: 83 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • SecurePhone PDA Database. This dataset was created in the context of the SecurePhone Project (described in section 2.9.4). It contains biometric features from voice, face, speaking face and handwritten signature. According to [370], data were recorded during three sessions separated at least one week. The video database contains 30 male and 30 female speakers, of which 80% are native speakers. Each group is divided in 3 age subgroups, and each recording session comprises 2 indoor (dark light - clean voice and light illumination - noisy voice) and 2 outdoor (light-noisy and dark-noisy) recordings. Audio recordings were made for 3 types of prompt (5-digit, 10 digit and short phrase), with 6 examples from each prompt type, which produced a total amount of 12960 recordings. Handwritten signature conditions were always good. 100 points per second were registered, with time data but no pressure or angle data. In addition, every subject in the database has 20 true signatures and 20 forged signatures from the same impostor. For voice and face forgery tests, impostor samples are taken as utterances of the same prompt by other speakers. Other multimodal databases offer information about other biometric traits, although this information is not captured with a mobile phone: • DAVID-BT. This database contains full-motion video and the associated synchronous sound records from 30 users, registered in 5 sessions spaced over several months. All videos show the talking user’s full face in different scene backgrounds and with different illumination. The utterances include the English digit set, English alphabet E-set, some syllables and phrases [339]. • XM2VTS.[103] Contains synchronised video and speech data from 295 subjects. It was recorded in four sessions separated one month. Each session consists of two recordings with a speech recording of each subject reciting a sentence and a frontal face shot [356]. • BANCA.[105] In the context of the BANCA project a face and speech database was created [74]. High and low quality sensors were used in three different scenarios (controlled, degraded and adverse) to register data during three months. Video and speech data were collected for 52 subjects (26 males and 26 females) speaking in 4 different languages (English, French, Italian and Spanish), on 12 different sessions. Each session consists of 2 recordings, a true client access and an informed impostor attack. • BIOMET.[463] This database was recorded to study how different biometric modalities can be combined in order to develop outperforming systems. It includes face (2D, infrared and 3D images), speech, fingerprint, hand and signature data that was captured in three sessions with three and five months spacing between each one [203]. • MYCT. Fingerprint and signature dataset described in [388]. • MyIDEA. This database includes talking face, audio, fingerprints, signature, handwriting and hand geometry records [153]. Data are captured in three sessions randomly spaced in time, from 104 users, using sensors of different qualities. Audio content is recorded in French and in English and impostor attempts for voice, signature and handwriting are included. • BioChaves.[179] As a part of the BioChaves project, a multimodal database including voice recognition and keystroke dynamics was created. It contains data from 10 users, registered in 2 sessions separated by one month. Each user had to utter and type the same four words five times [367]. • BioSec[9] This database was acquired in the context of the BioSec integrated project [176] and includes real multimodal data from 200 users, registered in 2 sessions. The multimodal patterns 84 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection consist of fingerprint images acquired with three different sensors, frontal face images captured with a webcam, iris images from an iris sensor, and voice records acquired both with a close-talk headset and a distant webcam microphone. An extended version comprising data from 250 user acquired in 4 sessions is also available. • BiosecurID. This dataset includes speech, iris, face (still images, videos of talking faces), handwritten signature and hand- written text (on-line dynamic signals, off-line scanned images), fingerprints (acquired with two different sensors), hand (palmprint, contour-geometry) and keystroking traits from 400 individuals (gender-balanced) divided in 4 age groups, together with some subject context information. Replay attacks for speech and keystroking and skilled forgeries for signatures are also included. The acquisition phase took place in four sessions distributed separated by one month one from each other. The acquisition set up and protocol are described in [175]. • NIST-Multimodal. [401] This is a score database which contains two face scores and two fingerprint scores from same individuals. The face scores were generated by two commercial systems (“matcher C” and “matcher G”) and fingerprint score was obtained by comparing a pair of images of the left index finger and the other score was obtained by comparing a pair of images of the right index finger, according to [229]. • MMU GASPFA. This database offers multimodal data acquired using commercial “off the shelf” equipment that includes digital video cameras, digital voice recorder, digital camera, Kinect camera and smartphones equipped with accelerometers [236]. The dataset consists of 82 people patterns made up of frontal face images from the digital camera, speech utterances recorded using the digital voice recorder and gait videos with their associated data recorded using both the digital video cameras, Kinect camera and accelerometer readings from a smartphone. • University of Notre Dame Biometrics multimodal databases.[86] This dataset contains face images (face photographs, face thermograms, 3D face images and iris images), ear and hand shape images. • FRGC. The dataset contains intramodal face data captured using a camera at different angles, with different range sensors in different controlled or uncontrolled settings. • Chimeric users datasets. The utilization of chimeric users or virtual identities is somewhat accepted in the literature and reduces the database creation time. As described in [408], this technique consists in associating different biometric features from different users to create a multimodal biometric pattern. Although this process was questioned during the 2003 Workshop on Multimodal User Authentication, it is based on the independence assumption that two or more biometric traits of a single person are independent from each other, and there is no work in the literature that strongly approves or disapproves such assumption. A example of pattern merging is used in [229]. 2.9.4 Recent related works Classical identification schemes use a single feature descriptor and a particular classification method to associate a concrete pattern to an individual’s identity. Sometimes, the use of a second feature speeds up the process of capturing the main feature’s pattern. For instance, the Near-Infra-Red lighting face recognition method presented by Han et al. [227] as a base of an iris and face identification system proposes the use of infrared corneal specular reflections to locate eyes and face position, image enhancement and lighting normalization by simple logarithmic methods and face recognition 85 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection by means of integer-based PCA. The reported results showed an eye-detection rate over 98.8%. The face recognition accuracy is almost the same to that with a visible face database, with a 14.8% of EER, and the processing speed using the integer-based method (79.55 ms) was more than three times faster than that using floating-point (255.66 ms). On the other hand, as established in [237], in systems with a large number of users and noisy input signals the combination of features and classifiers of different types complement one another in classification performance. The chosen fusion function should take advantage of the strengths of the individual classifiers, avoid their weaknesses, and improve classification accuracy. Several works, previous to the PCAS project, have developed multimodal systems for hand-held devices. We offer the most representative ones, classified by the fusion data level: Feature-level-fusion-based systems In [493] a face and palmprint multimodal scheme is proposed to manage the problem of the single biometric sample. The discriminant features are extracted using Gabor-based image preprocessing techniques and PCA. After feature vector normalization the fusion is done at feature level by a distance-based separability weighting strategy. Evaluation of the multimodal system employs the AR face database and a palmprint database provided by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (20 sets of 64 × 64 images from 189 individuals). Using a Nearest Neighbour classifier and assigning the same weights to face and palmprint features, a 90,73% of average recognition rate is achieved, whereas the best result obtained using unimodal techniques is 62,72%. Jing et al. also deal with the small sample biometric recognition problem in [267] by introducing a new classifier to be used with the fused biometric images. The discriminative features of the images are extracted with Kernel Discriminative Common Vectors (KDCV), and then they are classified using a Radial Base Function (RBF) network. This technique is assessed over the AR and FERET databases and the so named palmprint dataset, yielding an increased performance in small sample recognition cases. The total face recognition rate (67,32%) and palmprint recognition rate (60,88%) raise to 92,81% when using the multimodal technique. The introduction of the Gabor transform entails a 12,26% performance increase and the use of the KDCV+RBF classifier improves the total recognition rate of the DNC (Discriminative Common Vectors (DCV) + ANN) by 10,55%, and the KPNC (Kernel PCA + ANN) by a 9,99%. Score-level-fusion-based systems Fusing the score of several biometric systems before the decision module can improve system’s accuracy. Poh et al. [408] present a database of scores taken from experiments carried out on the XM2VTS face and speaker verification database. They also describe some protocols and tools for evaluating score-level fusion algorithms, as well as 8 baseline systems (feature type + classifier) which are finally assessed in terms of the HTER significance test. Choudhury et al [120] propose a recognition and verification system using face and speech from unconstrained audio and video. To detect real face presence, a 3D depth information system is also used. Varying face pose and auditory background changes are managed by face tracking and audio clip selection. Faces are detected by skin color information and classified by the eigenfaces model. The text-independent speaker identification system is based on a simple set of linear spectral features which are characterized with HMMs that adjust the speaker models to different kinds of background noise. The classifier fusion is carried out at score level, using a simple Bayes Net that assigns weights to each individual classifier in order to soften the influence of that with the worst reliability. When an Optimal Rejection Threshold is fixed empirically, the recognition and verification rates improve in relation to audio and video unimodal techniques. A recognition rate of 99,2%, with a rejection rate of 86 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection 55,3% of images/clips, and a verification rate of 99,5%, with a rejection rate of 0,3% of images/clips are reached over a private database with 26 users. Montalvao et al. [367] present biometric fusion of keystroke dynamics and speech at score level for identification in Internet applications. Although keystroke offers a weaker discrimination between users, it is almost immune to background noise. The extracted features are median pitch from structured 3-second utterances, sequences of 13-MFCC vectors from the utterances and sequences of Down-Down time intervals from the typing of 31-keystroke structured texts. Three fusion approaches are considered: a linear data fusion with Fisher’s Linear Discriminant, a linear data fusion based on Optimal Estimation (Simplified Fusion of Estimates) and a non-linear data fusion (Bayesian Classification for Normal Distribution). The Simplified Fusion of Estimates with the three features outperforms the other techniques and provides a EER of 5% (when best pair-wise EER is 6,7%). Vildjiounaite et al. [470] propose an unobtrusive method of user authentication for mobile devices in the form of recognition of the walking style (gait) and voice. Two scores are obtained from 3D preprocessed gait signals: a correlation score and a FFT score. Text-independent speaker recognition was performed using the Munich Automatic Speaker Verification environment. The normalized gaitbased and voice-based similarity scores were fused by the Weighted Sum method. The performance of gait and voice fusion is assessed in terms of EER and the multimodal system improves speaker recognition unimodal technique’s results (EER over 40%). The lowest EER (1,97%) is reached when carrying the accelerometer in a breast pocket with a surrounding city noise of 20 dB. Rodrigues et al. [424] analyse the security of a multimodal system when one of the biometric modalities is successfully spoofed and propose two new fusion schemes for verification tasks, which take into account the intrinsic security of each biometric system being fused. The extended Likelihood Ratio (LLR) scheme considers the LLR between the genuine and impostor distributions as the optimal fusion method (in the sense that it minimizes the probability of error) and estimates the true impostor distribution without the need of training spoofed samples by assuming that the similarity score in a successfully spoofed biometric system will follow a genuine probability distribution. The fuzzy-logic fusion scheme allows a linguistic description of the heuristics appeared in the previous approach. The carried out experiments show the existence of a trade-off between recognition accuracy and robustness against spoof attacks. On the other hand the fuzzy fusion scheme outperforms the probabilistic fusion scheme. The system presented by Kim et al. [284] integrates face, teeth and voice biometrics in mobile devices. The three scores are normalized by the use of a sigmoid function. Weighted-summation rule, KNN, Fisher and Gaussian classifiers are evaluated and compared over a 1000 biometric trait database collected from 50 individuals with a smartphone. The weight-summation rule turns out to be the outperforming approach with an error rate of 1,64 %. Image-based (face and teeth) authentication is performed with the EHMM algorithm. Voice pitch and MFCCs are modelled with GMM. The scores of the three techniques are normalized by using the sigmoid function and a weight-summation rule is then used as a fusion technique. The performance is evaluated over a dataset of 20 biometric compound traits from 50 individuals, and the reported authentication performance of the fusion approach is shown to be superior to each of the unimodal approaches and to the fusion methods that integrate two modalities as a pair. The error rates are around 1,64%, while the minimum error rate regarding a single technique over the same database is 5,09%. He et al. [229] present a performance evaluation of sum rule-based fusion and SVM-based fusion schemes in fingerprint, face and finger vein systems, together with the Reduction of High-scores Effect (RHE) normalization approach. This normalization technique is based on the fact that in multimodal biometric systems low genuine scores happen with higher frequency than high impostor scores. There are many reasons which can degrade the genuine score obtained by a genuine user, whereas it is quite difficult for an impostor to obtain a high score. The techniques are evaluated over the NIST databases, in terms of Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR), and confirm the outperformance of multimodal over 87 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection unimodal biometrics. In addition, the RHE normalization schemes outperforms min-max normalization, Z-score normalization, and Tanh-estimators normalization. The final conclusion is that, in the choice of the fusion technique between SVM scheme and sum rule-based scheme there is a trade-off between implementation complexity and precision. McCool et al. [347] present the implementation of a face and speaker recognition system on a Nokia N900 mobile phone. The face localisation module consists of a face detector trained as a cascade of classifiers using modified census transform, and the face authentication module divides the detected faces into non-overlapping regions which are represented using a histogram of LBP features. The Voice Activity Detection phase is performed by using Hungarian downscaled phoneme recogniser which is the cascade of 3 Neural Networks. The Speaker Authentication phase applies Probabilistic LDA to model certain features extracted from utterance. The techniques are fused at score level: similarity scores for face authentication and the log-likelihood scores for speaker authentication are turned into probabilities by logistic regression. The implemented system can process about 15 frames per second. The performance is evaluated over the MOBIO database. The bimodal system outperforms both modalities on their own. The performance is improved by 25% for female trials and by 35% for male trials. The system global EER is around 10,9%. Decision-level-fusion-based systems In [468] a cascade fusion based system is proposed to reduce frequent user’s verification effort. The goal of this technique is to require explicit verification effort (fingerprint) only if a cascade of unobtrusive biometric (voice and gait) verifications fail. In the unobtrusive verification stage three scores are computed (correlation and FFT scores for gait and voice score). When the last stage is performed, the fingerprint score is added. The scores at the first stage are combined with a Weighted Sum fusion rule and the scores from both stages are joined at decision level. This fusion of voice and gate improves recognition rates, and unobtrusive verification is possible about 70 - 40% of cases, depending on the surrounding noise and target FAR. For low noise levels (clean speech, city and car noise with SNR 20 dB and city noise with SNR 10dB) unobtrusive verification rate was not less than 80%, overall FAR was less than 1%, and FAR was in a range of 1-2%. For noise levels such as city and car noise with SNR 0 dB, and white noise with SNR 0-20 dB the technique shows FRR about 3-7% (better than with unimodal fingerprint technique) for the same FAR. The recognition rates of unobtrusive verification decreased to 40% for car noise and 60% for city noise. The SecurePhone project (2004-2006) The SecurePhone project [423, 26] was a European project that “aims at realising a new mobile communication system enabling biometrically authenticated users to deal m-contracts during a mobile phone call in an easy yet highly dependable and secure way. The SecurePhone [. . . ] will provide users with a number of innovative functionalities, such as the possibility to securely authenticate themselves by means of a ‘biometric recogniser’, mutually recognise each other in initiating a phone call, exchange and modify in real time audio and/or text files and eventually e-sign and securely transmit significant parts of their phone conversation”. This project’s biometric recogniser proposal was a multimodal system using voice, face and handwritten signature with a Qtek 2020 PDA. As part of this project, the SecurePhone database was created as summarized in 2.9.3 and detailed in [370]. This document also explains an experimental protocol and a test procedure. Jassim et al. [261] present a wavelet-based face verification system in the context of this project. The facial features are obtained from the image wavelet decomposition, so the approach does not require any training. The reported results point out an acceptable level of performance, similar to those of PCA and LDA schemes, over BANCA and ORL databases. 88 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Koreman et al. also worked on this project. They present an overview of the biometric authentication system, with a description of the PDA multimodal dataset recorded for the project (section 2.9.3). In [292], voice features are obtained from MFCC using the HMM Toolkit; face feature vectors are calculated from Haar-wavelet filters and histogram equalization and the user’s signing process is modelized with HMMs. Signal preprocessing is performed within the PDA, whereas storage and processing of the user’s biometric profile is carried off in the device’s Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card. Voice verification is based on GMM, face authentication uses the Discrete Wavelet Transform decomposition and the Manhattan distance, and signature authentication employs HMM and a fusion of normalised log-likelihood and state occupancy vectors scores. The three features are fused at score level and the joint distribution is modelled with GMM. This score fusion provides better performance than each of the individual techniques. Over the BANCA and BIOMET databases, the best reported EER is 0,57%. Using the SecurePhone PDA database [370], the best reported EER is 0.83%. A brief summary of all relevant works is shown in table 2.17 6 . Publication Fusion level Features Fusion technique [227] [493] [267] [408] [120] [367] [470] [424] [284] [229] [347] [292] [468] N/A Feature Feature Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Decision Ir+Fa Pa+Fa Pa+Fa Fa+Sp Fa+Sp Ke+Sp Fa+Fi Fa+Fi Fa+Te+Sp Fi+Fa+Fv Fa+Sp Sp+Fa+Hs (Sp+Ga)+Fi N/A Distance based separability weighting KDCV + RBF Network Baseline experts Bayes net Simplified fusion of estimates Weighted sum Extended LLR Fuzzy logic Weight Summation Rule SV + High Scores Normalization Similarity scores + log likelihood scores GMM Cascade fusion Reported results CCR=98.8%, EER=14.8 % CCR=90.73% CCR=92.81% HTER=0.511 CCR=99.2% EER=5% EER=1.97% FAR=0.01%, FRR=18.48% EER=1.64% FAR=0.01%, GAR=99.6% EER=10.9% EER=0.57% FAR=1-2%, FRR=3-7% Table 2.17: Summary of relevant works in multimodal recognition. 2.9.5 Conclusion Biometric data fusion can be done at four levels, as established in section 2.9.2, although the most common in literature is the score level. Due to rising research on multimodal biometrics, many multimodal datasets have been developed. The most emblematic, in the context on the PCAS project, is the SecurePhone PDA database, as all the data is captured with a mobile device (section 2.9.3). Therefore, as a result of the previous discussion, some advantages of multimodal biometrics are pointed out: • Multimodal biometric approaches allow overcoming some practical drawbacks of unimodal techniques, associated to distinctiveness and permanence of certain biometric features (as related in section 2.9.1). • In addition, each technique’s performance is affected, at sensor level, by environmental conditions (for example, illumination settings alter face detection, as well as background noise is detrimental to voice recognition). In this sense, fusion of techniques achieves better results, as it helps to mitigate each individual technique’s lacks. • Fusion techniques provide an enriched pattern, which reduces the effects of small sample problem, and allow techniques crossed validation. 6 Feature initials: Iris, Face, Palmprint, Speacker, Keystroke, Fingerprint, Teeth, Gait, Fv=Finger veins, Hs=Handwritten signature. 89 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection • The use of a ”second” feature speeds up the process of identifying an individual by a main feature, as shown in section 2.9.4. • Cascade fusion based systems are used to reduce frequent user’s verification effort, as detailed in section 2.9.4. • Multimodal systems can quickly be tested, as multimodal biometric dataset are publicly available. • Related works (section 2.9.4) show that, in general, multimodal systems outperform unimodal approaches. On the other hand, the main disadvantages of this technique are: • The use of several biometric traits and the fusion process increase the overall computing time. • Multimodal fusion require the use of different sensors, many of them not included in a standard mobile phone. 90 3 Non-coercion techniques 3.1 Introduction Biometrics solves the problem of user authentication in a system, however these techniques do not ensure that the person which is attempting to enter the system is not being forced by another person to perform this authentication. For example, when someone is withdrawing from a cash machine while a robber is threatening him/her. Therefore, non-coercion techniques must be also integrated into the biometric solution in order to guarantee that the user is not being coerced by anyone. Biometric systems are usually in controlled environments as border controls or banks, which are normally under surveillance by means of a camera that records the whole process of authentication. These controlled environments allow detecting possible threats to the user but they also help to prevent these attacks since they produce a dissuasive effect. Nevertheless, this review is devoted to study non-coercion techniques applied to mobile scenarios which are usually non controlled environments. This means that these techniques may not rely on external systems of surveillance but they must be incorporated in the mobile device. Therefore, the coercion attack must be detected using internal sensors of the mobile device as: camera, accelerometer, touchscreen or other wearable sensors that can be easily connected to the mobile device as health monitors. Depending on the behaviour of the user while being coerced, two different approaches may be distinguished to detect coercion. On the one hand, the user may attempt to warn the system that he/she is under threat without alerting the attacker. This approach is called “Voluntary” since the user has to perform voluntarily a specific action to inform the system. However this action should be similar to the authentication process in order not to reveal the attacker the real objective of the action. On the other hand, the user may be cooperative with the attacker since he/she is afraid of being injured. In this case the user will not try to perform a specific action to warn the system in order not to alert the attacker. However due to the user is under a stressful situation, the threat may be detected by analysing involuntary changes in his/her state or behaviour. This approach is called “Involuntary” since the user is not doing any conscious action to reveal the attack. In the following sections, both approaches will be studied in detail. 3.2 Involuntary approach In some cases when a person is under attack, he/she feels so stressed or scared that is not able to react. Therefore, he/she will not be able to perform any voluntary action in order to alert the system, however many studies suggest that it is possible to detect the emotional state of the user from different physiological signals[404]. Changes in these signals are automatically controlled by Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) so the user is not able to modify them voluntarily. For this reason, these physiological signals have been extensively used for lie detection, since the person who is under interrogation can try to deceive but cannot control the physiological reactions of the body[459]. In the following paragraphs, different physiological and physical signals that may be affected by stress or 91 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection fear of the user will be studied. 3.2.1 Physiological signals McCraty et al. [348] showed that some emotions could be distinguished analyzing the power spectrum of Electrocardiography (ECG). According to McCraty, in cases of stress, there is a increase in Heart Rate Variability (HRV) in the lower frequency ranges of the spectrum. HRV reflects the time variation of the beat-to-beat intervals. This study also suggests that other emotions may be distinguished from stressful situations since they produce high power in the medium frequency ranges. A recent study has tested the feasibility of using HRV to distinguish among five different emotions: calm, fear, stress, relax and happiness[475]. Other works have shown correlations between HRV and stressful situations, however they were more related to mental stress in cognitive tasks as preparing an exam[352] or making mental tests[116]. In order to capture the electrical signals from the heart it is necessary to wear a specific sensor such as a chest belt, which is the most typical sensor for this purpose. Although there are works that have proposed to wear this sensor during the whole day, even while sleeping, [373], this may have low acceptability by the user. For this reason, new sensors that can be integrated into the textile of the clothes have recently appeared [207]. Since our proposal is based on a mobile environment, these signals should be sent to the mobile device and then analyzed. Although this architecture has been successfully tested in different works[456, 92], its main drawback is that it requires an external sensor. Another solution proposed by [446] is to attach some contact pads to the mobile phone in order to capture the ECG while holding the device, even though this solution forces the user to hold the mobile device with both hands to measure differences between two parts of the body creating a loop with the heart. Although HRV is usually measured using ECG, it could also be captured using a Photoplethysmography (PPG) sensor which could be incorporated easily to the mobile device. This sensor is composed of an infrared led and a photodiode[453] and it measures changes in the light absorption of the skin depending on the blood volume present in the blood vessels. Furthermore some studies have shown that HRV measures using ECG and PPG sensors are highly correlated[441]. Another physiological signal strongly related to stress and other emotions is electrodermal activity, also known as Galvanic Skin Response (GSR). This physiological signal is also controlled by ANS, in particular by the sympathetic nervous system which, in case of stress, increases the secretion of sweat glands reducing the resistance of the skin. However this rising of GSR levels might also be related to a rise in ambient temperature or to physical activity [70]. For this reason, the measurements of this signal are usually calibrated with information about the ambient temperature[396] and the physical activity of the user using an accelerometer[436]. Although this signal may reflect stress[242] and cognitive load[381] of the user, the authors of [442] showed that there are patterns in the GSR signal that allow discrimination among them. Nevertheless, the main problem of using this physiological signal in a mobile environment is that GSR sensor must be continuously in contact with the skin of the user avoiding abrupt movements that could displace the contact pads[439]. The fusion of different physiological signals to provide a better estimation of the emotional status of the user has been analyzed in many different works. In [140] the authors combined HRV and GSR to provide a measurement of the stress level of the user. A wearable platform composed of many different sensors: GSR, ECG, electromyogram and respiration rate has been proposed by [117] to monitor user’s stress. Autosense is a small wearable sensor suite which measures acceleration, ECG, GSR, respiration rate and temperature that can be attached to the chest of the user to continuously monitoring his/her stress level[160]. Although most of these wearable sensors are unobtrusive for the user and users may not feel uncomfortable while wearing them, they could not be easily incorporated inside a mobile device or its sleeve since they must be placed in different parts of the user’s body to measure the physiological signals. 92 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 3.2.2 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection Voice Voice analysis has shown promising results in the classification of the emotional state of the individuals [349]. Some works have claimed that stress may affect speech production process [184, 146, 310]. For instance, in [355] the authors found a correlation between the vocal tremor and psychological stress. Even solutions for mobile environments have appeared as StressSense, which is able to detect stress in the human voice in indoor and outdoor environments with an accuracy of 81% and 76% respectively[114]. However there are also some studies that are not so optimistic about this technology[243]. One of the main advantages of this technique is that it does not need any external sensor since it can use the built-in microphone of mobile device, even though a possible drawback is that the person must speak loudly to analyze his/her voice. 3.2.3 Face There is an ancient proverb that says that the face is the mirror of the soul, which shows to what extent our face usually reflects our emotional state. Although facial expressions for different emotions may vary among cultures, some general patterns can be extracted from facial cues in order to recognize the user’s current emotion[157]. Many different techniques have been applied to automatically detect emotions from face expressions achieving recognition rates over 75% [167]. Some studies suggest the feasibility of detecting emotions even when the person is lying based on facial expressions which last milliseconds (micro expressions)[156]. Eye analysis also provides information about the emotional state of the user. When a person is under stress the pupil may change of size [366] and the blinking frequency may be altered[224]. All these techniques can be easily implemented in a mobile device since they only require a camera and they could complement the face biometric access detecting whether the user is stressed or scared. Furthermore, some studies have shown the feasibility of obtaining the heart rate from video[484] so the variability of this physiological signal (HRV) could be combined with the face emotion detection systems in order to improve their estimations. 3.2.4 Movement Emotions may also affect to involuntary movements of the body as foot or hand trembling. Former studies have shown strong correlation between anxiety states and tremor[212] but also recent works propose to measure the foot trembling to detect the stress level of the users[206]. Although hand tremor while holding a mobile device has been used to predict strokes in Parkinson[272], to our knowledge it has not been applied yet for detecting when a person is under stress. However this involuntary movement is easy to capture with a mobile phone since most of new smartphones include an accelerometer to detect the tilt of the device. In addition another work has shown that hand tremor can also be measured using the touchscreen[410]. Since the biometric technique based on keystroke dynamics relies on the data captured by these sensors (accelerometers and touchscreen), several authors have studied whether changes in these dynamics may be caused by stressful situations[223, 159]. 3.3 Voluntary approach This section is devoted to these non-coercion techniques based on the cooperation of the user to detect when is being under threat. In contrast to involuntary non-coercion techniques, in these techniques the user must perform a specific action in order to alert the system about the threatening situation. Since most of the security access controls are based on PIN, it seems appropriate to use also this mechanism to warn the system in case of attack. The idea behind this technique is to provide the user two different PINs: one to access normally to system and another one to alert about an attack. This 93 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection second PIN, besides generating an alarm, it also allows the user to access the system because otherwise the attacker will detect the subterfuge. Recently some news claimed that some banks proposed to use the PIN in reverse order to generate an alert, however this news has been reported as hoax [5] and to our knowledge this second PIN has not been implemented yet to protect any service. Finally, whether the PIN authentication system incorporates a biometric module based on keystroke dynamics, i.e. the timing among pressing and releasing each button,[430] the user could type his/her PIN with a different cadence on purpose in order to alert the system. In the case that the system detected a different pattern in the timing, it will label all the operations performed by the user as fraudulent. In-Air Signature biometrics [64] can also be complemented with a voluntary non-coercion technique in two different ways. On the one hand, as in the case of PIN, the user can define two different gestures: one for normal access control and another one to alert an attack. Other possible solution consists in making the original gesture but in a slight different way than usual. In this case the system will detect the poor performance of the gesture and will provide access to the system but tracking all the actions of the user. Another solution could be to incorporate an emergency button in the sleeve of the mobile device so that when pressed will indicate a possible attack. This solution is similar to the emergency button provided to the elderly people to detect falls or strokes[407]. However the pressing of this button could be easily watched by the attacker. Therefore this solution could be improved including some hand pressure sensors into the sleeve in order to detect changes in the hand grip of the user[286]. In this way, the user could alert about an attack by pressing the sleeve stronger than usual and the attacker will not be able to detect any strange movement. 3.4 Conclusion Non-coercion detection techniques based on the cooperation of the use can be incorporated easily to any biometric system, since they only need to provide two different keys: one for normal access and other to alert the system. However the main disadvantage of these techniques comes from the fact that they cannot detect whether the user is pretending an attack. In some situations, the user could avoid the responsibility over his/her own actions generating an alert of threat. This problem could be solved using non-coercion detection techniques based on involuntary signals since the user cannot control them. Nevertheless, the detection techniques based on physiological signals need some external sensors and for some developments this could be not affordable. Therefore, the best solution could be using those techniques based on built-in sensors of the mobile phone or sensors easily integrable in the device or its sleeve. Furthermore, the detection of stress in face, voice or movement could be done while authenticating the user in the system by means of its associated biometric technique. However, these involuntary detection techniques are not quite accurate and may produce many false positives. Therefore, the user may be frequently bothered because the system block his/her access to the device based on these errors. Although voluntary and involuntary approaches present some disadvantages, they could be used in combination in order to reduce them. For example the involuntary approach could be used only in the case that the person alert of a threat. In this way, the detection based on involuntary signals will be used only to confirm that the person is really under an attack and this would reduce the number of false positives. 94 4 Conclusion This report has provided an overview of the state of the art of biometrics applied to mobile phones, presenting the most relevant research works related to the use of different biometric techniques in mobile phones. Each biometric technique has been analyzed separately, presenting the current topics where much research is conducted in the last years in order to use these biometrics in mobile phones. This analysis has resulted in a list of advantages, disadvantages and limitations of each biometrics reported in their correspondent section. One common vulnerability of these biometric systems is the possibility of being forged by the presentation of a fake characteristic that do not belong to the authorized user, like an image, a gummy finger or a recorded speech. This vulnerability is specially important in physical biometric techniques (fingerprint, iris, hand, voice, face) rather than in behavioural ones (keystroke, signature, gait). Each biometric technique should have specific countermeasures to perceive liveness in order to detect if the biometric characteristic sample presented belongs to a person or it is a fake. The analysis presented in this report provides an essential support in order to decide which technologies have a better potential to be used in the project. This decision will be based on the conclusions of each biometric technique as well as the requirements, scenarios, experience, potential and hardware limitations. Therefore, there are many potential techniques that can be used, although separately they offer different vulnerabilities. Most of them can be solved by the use of multibiometric approaches. In addition, the use of several biometrics increases the performance and the security. An appropriate multi-factor strategy should include information from different sources: something the user is (physical biometrics), something the user has (the phone), something the user knows (a password, a sentence, a signature, etc.) and how the user does something (behavioural biometrics). In addition to biometric verification techniques in mobile devices, this report also addressed noncoercion techniques, that could be included in such systems to detect when users are under a coercion attack. In this report two different types of non-coercion methods have been recognized: voluntary and involuntary. The first ones are quite valuable practices to let users send alarms but do not distinguish whether the user is pretending an attack. On the other hand, involuntary strategies also provide information of coercion attacks although with high false alarms, but they are not controllable by users and consequently, there is no option to pretend them; specially those based on physiological signals but also those based on voice, face and movement. In this case, a smart fusion of both approaches can provide mobile phones with enough tools to detect coercion attacks. 95 Glossary ANN: Artificial Neural Network ANS: Autonomic Nervous System AMR: Arithmetic Mean Rule AER: Average Error Rate API: Application Programming Interface ASV: Automatic Speaker Verification BCM: Borda Count Method C-APCDA: Cascade Asymmetric Principal Component Discriminant Analysis CCR: Correct Classification Rate CCTV: Closed Circuit Television CIR: Correct Identification Rate CMOS: Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor COG: Center of Gravity CPU: Computer Processing Unit CST: Class-Specific Threshold DCF: Detection Cost Function 96 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection DCT: Discrete Cosine Transform DCV: Discriminative Common Vectors DET: Detection error trade-off DLFBE: Decorrelated Log Filter-Bank Energies dpi: Dots per inch DTW: Dynamic Time Warping DR: Detection Rate ECG: Electrocardiography EER: Equal Error Rate ERE: Eigenfeature Regularization and Extraction FAR: False Acceptance Rate FFT: Fast Fourier Transform FNMR: False Non-Match Rate FMR: False Match Rate FPGA: Field Programmable Gate Array FPR: False Positive Rate FPU: Floating Point Unit FRR: False Rejection Rate FTA: Failure-to-acquire Rate FTE: Failure-to-enrol Rate 97 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection GAR: Genuine Acceptance Rate GMM: Gaussian Mixture Models GMR: Genuine Match Rate GSR: Galvanic Skin Response HMM: Hidden Markov Model HI: Histogram Intersection HR: High Resolution HRV: Heart Rate Variability HTER: Half Total Error Rate IR: Infra-Red ISV: Inter-session Variability JFA: Joint Factor Analysis KDCV: Kernel Discriminative Common Vectors KLT: Karhunen-Loève Transform KNN: K-Nearest Neighbour LBP: Local Binary Patterns LDA: Linear Discriminant Analysis LFCC: Linear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients LLR: Likelihood Ratio MFCC: Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 98 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection MLP: Multi-layer perceptron mRMR: minimum Redundancy Maximum Relevance NICE: Noisy Iris Challenge Evaluation NIR: Near-Infra-Red NN: Neural Network PCA: Principal Component Analysis PCAS: Personalised Centralized Authentication System PDA: Personal Digital Assistant PIN: Personal Identification Number PLP: Perceptual Linear Prediction PPG: Photoplethysmography RBF: Radial Base Function RF: Random Forests RHE: Reduction of High-scores Effect ROC: Receiver operating characteristic ROI: Region Of Interest SCB: Skin Color Based SIM: Subscriber Identity Module SNR: Signal-to-Noise Ratio SRS: Speaker Recognition Systems 99 PCAS Deliverable D3.1 SoA of mobile biometrics, liveness and non-coercion detection SVM: Supported Vector Machine TMD: Touched Multi-Layered Drawing UBM: Universal Background Model UMACE: Unconstrained Minimum Average Correlation Energy VQ: Vector Quantization VW: Visual Wavelength WHT: Walsh-Hadamard Transform ZJU: Zhejiang University 100 Bibliography [1] Aadhaar project (accessed on 17th november 2013). http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Stategovt-to-complete-Aadhaar-card-process-by-Feb-28-next-year/articleshow/22502293.cms. 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