Japanese Resistance in America`s Concentration Camps:

Japanese Resistance
in America’s
Concentration Camps:
A Re-euulzcution
Gary Y. Okihiro
The literature dealing with Japanese resistance i n t h e
concentration camps, not unlike the literature on American
slavery and European colonialism in Africa, reflect the a priori
assumptions of the writers. Resistance phenomena were filtered
through “liberal-humanitarian” eyes in an almost reflex reaction
to the accusations of enemy elements among the Japanese in
America and specificially among the internees. Thus, with slight
variations, the Japanese prisoners were depicted as downtrodden
victims of a racist America gone hysterical, as hopelessly
impotent and retiring yet ultimately rising up from the dust of
defeat to patriotic triumph when given the opportunity to prove
their basic loyalty.
Accordingly, writers have tended to minimize the importance of
Japanese resistance to white control, to treat instances of revolt a s
sporadic and uncharacteristic, and to resort to either the pressurerelease theory or the “pro-Fascist’’ trouble-making minority to
explain the anomalous (in their view] instances of open
resistance. The pressure-release theory of resistance, with its
modifications, is based upon the notion of frustration-aggression,
where an individual or group subjected to pressure regains hislits
former state of equilibrium through a release of the accumulated
tension. In this way resistance is seen as inevitable due to the
pressures exerted on the Japanese internees, a s part of the camps’
frustration syndrome and a s constructive to the community a s a
GARY Y. OKIHIRO
21
whole by regaining its stability through the act of tension release.
Thus, the WRA could report in their WRA A Story of Human
Conservation’ of the Poston “incident” of 1942. “On the whole the
incident probably provided a healthy release for pent-up emotions
and qualified observers are generally agreed that Post on emerged
as a stronger and more stable community after it was over.’’ In
addition to this notion of healthy release, the pressure-release
theory assumes initial equilibrium and a period of relative peace
during which time pressure accumulates until a catalytic event
occurs precipitating a chain of resistance phenomena.
The “pro-Fascist” troublemaking minority explanation reflected
the wider wartime American milieu in which people were seen
either as “pro-American’’ or “pro-Fascist.’’ This theory for
resistance and its variations focussed upon personalities a s the
cause for spreading discontent and engaging in resistance
activities rather than on social forces. Further, this perspective
viewed the artificially contrived communities in terms of what
they identified as the generational and educational cleavages
between Issei, Nisei and Kibei. Writings of this nature tend to
extol Nisei patriotism and cooperation, depict the Issei as
“exhibiting the p a t i e n t stoicism a n d silent resignation
characteristic of their philosophy” and identify the Kibei with the
major portion of the “malcontents” and “incorrigibles” within the
camp population.2 In this way, a major portion of the interned
Japanese was exonerated from “anti-Americanism’’ and the
resisters were seen as a minority response, sporadic and therefore
unimportant.
Within the last decade, the historiography of colonialism in
Africa and slavery in America has witnessed the appearance of
revisionist histories which emphasize the continuity of African
and slave societies, their resiliency and vitality despite European
colonialism and white overrule. Behind these histories of slave
revolts and African resistance lie the basic notions that societies
tend to resist externally imposed change of their institutions, that
these acts of resistance are continuous and that they are
e f f e ~ t i v eNothing
.~
has been written on Japanese resistance in the
camps from this point of view.
One recent historian of the Japanese concentration camps
detected this notable neglect and lamented that
Almost no attention or interpretation has been given the
implications of such significant relocation camp phenomena as the
persistence of the anti-WRA rumors, jokes about the WRA or
appointed personnel, factional and bitter conflict among the
evacuees themselves, and probably most important - t h e
extraordinary degree of nonparticipation in the WRA programs.‘
Yet even this perceptive observation was blurred by the comment:
“The absence of open revolt, however, should not be interpreted
22
AMERASIA JOURNAL
as evidence of Japanese adjustment, but rather a s the product of
the powerlessness and dependency imposed by the conditions of
concentration camp life.”s
This paper proposes that the assumptions of the revisionist
histories of slave and colonized groups provide a more realistic
basis for an analysis of Japanese reaction to concentration camp
authority than do the older notions of Japanese “loyalty” and
helplessness. It will offer two models of resistance drawn from
Poston and Manzanar, attempt to place these into a larger
framework of historical progression and suggest possible
directions for future resistance studies.6
The Poston strike and the Manzanar riot of 1942 have
traditionally been set in opposition to each other to illustrate the
variable nature of resistance and the different results obtained by
contrasting administrative handling of the crises. Generally the
Poston strike has been typified a s a more “responsible” protest,
orderly and dealt with administrative restraint, while the
Manzanar riot, a s the appellation suggests, has been seen as an
“irresponsible” protest responded t o w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
intransigence and resulting in mob action and violence. WRA
accounts7 of these “incidents” provide adequate glimpses into
what transpired from the administration’s point of view. These
descriptions furnish us with two distinguishable types of
resistance.8
Following the beating of a Kibei bachelor in Poston Unit I on
November 14, 1942,B about fifty suspects were rounded up and
questioned by the security police. Two of these were detained for
further questioning for several days pending the arrival of the
FBI. Meanwhile the family and associates of these two Kibei
sought to organize opposition to the administration’s detention of
the men. On two successive days, the 17th and lath, delegations
from blocks representing the two men met with administration
officials protesting the men’s innocence and demanding their
release. These proved fruitless and a noon meeting was called on
the 18th, attracting a crowd estimated at about 2,500 in front of
the jail where the men were being held. At this meeting the
demand for the unconditional and immediate release of the two
prisoners was read to the people after which the acting project
director appeared to offer administration guarantees that the men
would be accorded justice u n d e r t h e l a w . Despite t h e
administration’s appeal for patience, the community council,
following popular opinion, drew up a resolution demanding the
immediate release of the accused and the dropping of the charges
against them completely. Following the administration’s rejection
of these demands, the community council, Issei Advisory Board
and block managers resigned en masse.
That night, the 18th, an “Emergency Committee of 72”
consisting of two representatives from each block and its central
workingcore, the “Emergency Council of 12,” were elected at a
GARY Y. OKIHIRO
23
mass meeting. This new internee governing body called for a
general strike the next day exempting only essential services such
as the mess halls, hospital, schools and fire department.
Meanwhile the white administrators were split on their response
to the strike and the internees’ demands. The hardliners favored
calling in the military police to crush the dissidents while the
opposing view advocated moderation, bargaining for time and
some sort of honorable compromise. The resisters themselves
lacked any kind of consensus on what direction the strike should
take, yet outward forms of group solidarity were maintained by
block-organized, round the clock vigils in front of the prison and
by threats against deserters and inu.10
At the negotiations to end the strike held on the 23rd and 24th of
November, it became clear that the resisters’ objectives had
expanded to include the internees’ right to self-determination.
These included: [a] the establishment of a Public Relations
Committee to settle all “personal reputations” disputes out of
court; (b) the prerogative of the people to hire and fire all internee
labor in the administrative personnel and other important
positions; and [c] the recognition of the legitimacy of the
Emergency Council and its ability to set up, within the framework
of WRA provisions, a City Planning Board which would create the
internees’ administrative, legislative and economic structures.
The white administration responded to the resisters’ demands by
dropping all charges against one of accused in the absence of
grounds for prosecution, by releasing the second prisoner pending
his trial which was to be held inside the camp, and by accepting
the Emergency Council’s demands for recognition and selfdetermination.
Previous analysts of the Poston strike have drawn up two
typologies of resistance from this incident, both variations of the
pressure-release theory. One 11 points to the intense mental and
emotional reactions of the evacuees, the fracturing of Japanese
society and its instability all leading to a general feeling of
insecurity. The Poston strike and the internees’ demands for selfgovernment is thus seen a s the Japanese struggle for security
through recognition by the authority structure. The second12
places the strike into the authors’ “the camp as community”
framework where the crisis led to a sense of community and hence
to a stabilization of relationship between the internees and administrators following the release of built-up pressures and a period
of negotiation, communication and mutual understanding.
Rather than these, I propose an alternative Poston model of
resistance, one which recognizes a preexistent, underlying layer
of resistance potential, community mobilization a n d a n
articulation of demands, the enlargement of issues stemming from
preexistent resistance potential, resistance manifestations as
anti-administration and upon administrative compromise and
AMERASIA JOURNAL
24
indulgence of protest demands, a n acceptable modus vivendi for
the majority of resisters. Reduced to a schematic representation,
the Poston model of resistance would be:
crisis; issue
administration
1
acceptable compromise
-
interacts
Diagram 1.Poston Model of Resistance.
Within a week after the settlement of the Poston Unit I strike,
on December 5,1942, at Manzanar, a well-known JACL leader was
assaulted. One suspect was arrested for the beating and placed in
the jail at Independence, a nearby town.13 The next day, a t a mass
meeting attended by about 3-4,000 people, demands were drawn
up to be presented to the project director by an appointed
delegation of five men. These demands included: (a) the
unconditional release of the accused; (b) a n investigation by the
Spanish Consul into general conditions at Manzanar; and (c)
further action against the hospitalized JACL leader and the
rooting out of other suspected inu.
The committee of five, followed by a crowd of about 1,000
internees, marched toward the administration building to present
their demands to the director. There they were confronted by
military police armed with rifles, tear gas and machine guns. This
show of force had been arranged by the newly appointed director
in the event of camp revolt. The project director met with the
delegation, received the demands and walked among the people to
listen to their grievances following which he promised the
Negotiation Committee that the prisoner would be returned to
camp provided that the crowd would disperse and the Committee
thereafter resort to the established channels of appeal and call no
more mass meetings.
The crowd disbanded but regrouped that evening a t about 6
p.m. in front of the jail feeling convinced that the jailed internee
was being framed by the administration and their inu and that the
director’s compromise was unsatisfactory. The people demanded
to speak with the project director and insisted that the
commanding officer release the imprisoned internee. These
demands were rejected and the officer ordered the crowd to return
GARY Y. OKIHIRO
25
to their blocks. The people refused to disperse. The soldiers fired
tear gas and bullets into the crowd. As a result of this barrage,
one Nisei was dead, another internee, a nineteen year old, was
dying and about a dozen others lay wounded in the street. A short
time later a small group confronted the soldiers again, started a
car and directed it toward a machine gun emplacement. The car
struck the police station and more bullets were fired, one
ricocheting and injuring a military police corporal.
Throughout that night the bells tolled continuously and the
people held meetings while the soldiers patrolled the camp.
Despite the soldiers’ presence, more cases of inu beatings were
reported that night and accused informers and their families
threatened. The next morning, the 7th of December, t h e
Negotiating Commlttee and other leaders of the revolt were
arrested. Later that day a new committee of resisters faced the
commanding officer who was now in charge of Manzanar under
martial law and presented him with an ultimatum, threatening
further violence against collaborators if the original prisoner was
not released to them. These men, together with the earlier arrested
leaders were sent to Moab, Utah and later to the “isolation center”
near Leupp, Arizona. Suspected collaborators together with their
families were likewise removed from Manzanar to avoid further
group conflict.
Block managers distributed black armbands and it was
estimated that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the
people wore these during the period of mourning for the two dead.
The community analysts concluded their description of the
Manzanar riot in this manner: . . . two evacuees were killed, and
the center was shaken for weeks. Working relations were
reestablished and some community equilibrium restored only
after long conferences between the project director and the block
leaders ,”14
“
One general theme has emerged from the Manzanar riot of
December, 1942. Causal analyses have regarded this as a spin-off
of internal evacuee tensions and conflicts, in terms of “resisters”
against “collaborators” while analyses of its results have
emphasized a pacified concentration camp through the healing
ritual of pressure-release or through an unyielding authority and
a cowed populace.15
Instead of these, I propose a second model of resistance, one
which presupposes an undercurrent of counter-administration
sentiment among the majority of the people, community
mobilization and an articulation of demands, an enlargement of
issues which underscores the wider bases for discontent, and
upon administrative intransigence or noncompromise, the failure
of immediate protest demands accompanied by internee rejection
of the legitimacy of white overrule and its institutions, the
AMERASIA JOURNAL
26
withdrawal from these and the redirection of resistance into new
forms which would be para-administration. The Manzanar model
of resistance is schematically represented below:
-
community mobilization;
articulation of demands
__
t
administration
intransigence
unacceptable compromise;
I
administration
I
1
para-administration forms of resistance; internee withdrawal
Diagram 2. Manzanar Model of Resistance.
The Poston (hereafter designated a s type A) and Manzanar
(hereafter designated as type B) models of resistance are not
limited to chronological sequence, locality or degree of resistance.
Type A, for example, operated before and after November, 1942,
was not limited to Poston and operated on an individual as well as
group basis. Instances of type A resistances include the peoples'
demands for a J a p a n e s e menu w h i c h w e r e met w i t h
administrative indulgence and the workers' demands that certain
racist foremen be removed which were satisfied. Examples of type
B resistances include the failure of the model communities
scheme, the aborting of the coop plan and camouflage net
factories, the resegregation movement at Tule Lake and the
persistence of ad hoc peoples' leadership groups headed by Issei.
Two durable and pervasive examples of type B resistances
operated in the areas of internee labor and self-determination.
Despite the paucity of direct evidence from the Japanese
themselves, it is clear that one major premise for the deployment
to their labor was its relevance to their own self-defined needs.
Thus it was that Dillon Myer mourned the failure of WRA plans
for making the centers' industries contribute directly to America's
war effort and admitted that "The bulk of enterprises established
at the centers were of the internal consumption type to meet the
needs of the center residents or of the community management."16
This Japanese labor premise led to the enormously dissimilar
pattern of high productivity in work projects designed for the
immediate welfare of the people as in the furnishing of their own
homes, the family vegetable garden, the peoples' park, their
theatre, the tofu factory and so forth contrasted with the low
GARY Y. OKIHIRO
27
output in administration sponsored work projects such as land
subjugation, war industries production and building basic camp
necessities which many felt the administration was obliged to
provide as bricks, roads and schools.
The administration’s concern with this paradox (from their
point of view] was reflected in a Poston Official Information
Bulletin editorial17 entitled “Let Us Cooperate.” The editorial
noted that many construction projects were being delayed due to a
lack of workers and argued for increased volunteer labor from a
practical standpoint declaring that “whatever is constructed,
planted, or built here is for our benefit.” It also appealed to
Japanese pride by asking whether or not the people were lazy
reminding them that “never in the history of America1 [sic] has a
person of Japanese descent ever been on relief. Let us not spoil our
fine record at Poston by breaking this splendid precedent.”
A Jerome community analysis report 18 on labor employment at
t h a t center s u m m a r i z e d J a p a n e s e a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s
administration sponsored work by noting that: (a] overbearing
white supervisors “soon run into difficulties”; (b) the low wages
provide little incentive for work observing that “evacuees justify
slackness on the basis that they earn their wages several times
over in a month”; and (c) “there is a tendency for many evacuees to
avoid hard physical labor.” The report concluded by typifying
internee labor as inefficient having a low production output in
relation to work capacity and by noting a trend which diverted
labor away from what was perceived to be administration
projects and toward self-interest projects. “Since basic necessities
are provided whether or not the person works,” the report
explained, “some people are not anxious to work at all. They feel
that they can spend their time better in other activities.”
Analogous type B resistance patterns operating within the labor
sector can be found in the struggle for internee self-determnation.
WRA plans for Japanese “self-government” were initially outlined
in the director’s memorandum of June 5, 1942, clarified and
modified by subsequent proposals the following month and
finally hammered out at a policy meeting in San Francisco in
August. The administration’s objective for the program reflected
their paternalistic attitude toward the Japanese. Concentration
camp “self-government,” it stated, should be for “the training of
the residents of the community in the democratic principles of
civic participation and responsibility.” To extricate themselves
from this dilemma of rhetoric and practice, “democracy” was
defined as “administrative authority exercised by responsible
officials of the War Relocation Authority aided and assisted by
the evacuees themselves.”lg Thus, internee “self-government” was
envisioned by the administration not as a substitute for, but a s an
adjunct to bureaucratic control.
The resulting pattern of the peoples’ rejection of the Nisei
Community Council and its devolution into an impotent debating
28
AMERASIA JOURNAL
society, so labelled by both administrators and internees, has
been well-documented.20 The converse process of the rise of the
Issei authority structures has likewise been identified and welldocumented, yet few have seen the connection between this
development and para- and anti-administration resistances
A
Internee self-determination a s unfolded at Poston21 a n d
paralleled elsewhere illustrates the type B resistance nature of
Issei government. During the initial drive for the building of a
“model community,” a City Planning Board (CPB) was formed to
lay the groundwork for a Poston Community government. On June
23, 1942, the CPB presented to the project director i t s
recommendations for “self-government” making no franchise or
office-holding distinction between citizen and noncitizen and
providing for executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government. However, on June 26, the CPB was dissolved and
their draft constitution annulled following the issuing of the
national director’s June 5 guidelines which distinguished between
citizen and noncitizen and proscribed Issei from holding elective
office.
Despite the inane propaganda headlines of the Poston Official
Daily Press Buffetin,Zz “Election Interest Soars,” and its reports of
a “record” turnout of 99% of all eligible voters coupled with
project director Haas’ optimistic comment that “the importance of
the Community Council was realized by young and 01d,”z3critical
observers perceived the peoples’ underlying attitude towards the
administration sponsored election. “It is incorrect to assume,”
noted the WRA report cautiously, “that the residents were either
entirely in favor of or vitally interested in the establishment of
local government. The exclusion of Issei from office engendered
some opposition. The vast majority of residents, however,
remained disinterested spectator^."^^
WRA policy on internee authority structures which encouraged
the Issei-Nisei cleavage was resisted by the Issei. The Nisei
Community Council lacked any kind of firm community support
being identified with the white administration and seen as
anomalous to Japanese social custom which equated authority
with age and experience. Thus the WRA institution was never
accorded community legitimacy and was labelled as a “child
Council” and its members as inu or “stooges.”
In September, a para-administration governing group, the Issei
Advisory Board, was formed consisting of one elected Issei per
block. The legitimate basis for this organization and the true place
of the Issei within the Japanese community was evidenced in the
prominent roles its members assumed during the Poston strike of
November. The “Emergency Committee of 72,” for example,
included twenty former IAB members a s compared with twelve
former councilmen and five block managers while the central
“Emergency Executive Council of 12” excluded Nisei completely,
consisting of eleven Issei and one Kibei. In this manner, the WRA
GARY Y. OKIHIRO
29
framework of Nisei prominence in government was reversed by
the people when given a choice during a time of crisis. After
having successfully negotiated the terms for the end of the strike,
the reconstituted “Emergency Committee of 72,” its members now
consisting of one Issei and one Nisei per block, transformed itself
into “The City Planning Board of Unit I” and lay the basis for a
reordered city government. Thus, P o s t o n internee “selfgovernment” had come full circle and the original peoples’
organization, previously disbanded and its proposals rescinded
by the WRA following the June 5 memorandum, had reappeared in
disregard of the administration’s system of government.
Similar type B resistance in “self-government” was manifest at
the other centers. Manzanar retained its system of block manager
government and rejected through plebiscite the administration’s
notion of community council. Tule Lake had its Issei Planning
Board while Heart Mountain and Granada proposed a bicameral
system with the upper house comprised of Issei functioning in an
advisory capacity. Rohwer and Jerome had Issei advisory groups,
Gila River’s group of block council chairmen were all Issei and
Granada’s Nisei block managers resigned en rnasse with the
understanding that the administration would appoint Issei to
these positions.
Other variations of type A and type B resistances no doubt
existed, both within the political and economic spheres and
outside of them, in other aspects of camp life as in the resurgence
of Japanese cultural values and in religion.
One prominent deficiency in earlier analyses of resistance in the
camps is the failure of the writers to view specific instances of
resistance as ongoing processes and to place them within an
historical context. Those who have attempted this have done so
simplistically. They dichotomize camp life into an initial period of
resistance and a later period of accommodation. In this view,
resistance is seen as an early phenomenon due to administrative
uncertainties and internee anxieties. Once these had been
resolved, with the exceptions of times of individual crises such a s
during the segregation and draft periods, t h e internees
accommodated themselves to administration control.25 This
analysis, together with its explanation of the decline of resistance
phenomena remain questionable.
The pressure-release theory of resistance forwards the view
that the early proliferation of “incidents” released pent-up
emotions leading to equilibrium and stability. An extension of
this argument includes the notion of hopelessness a n d
dependency encouraged by concentration camp paternalism and
the administrations’ unlimited means for coercion. The “proFascist” troublemaking minority theory attributes decreasing
resistance to the rooting out and isolation of these elements from
the majority of internees.
AMERASIA JOURNAL
30
In opposition to the above, I propose that the general decline of
resistance w a s in fact illusory, that some aspects of resistance
potential indeed decreased through type A responses in achieving
an acceptable modus vivendi through compromise, however type
B responses led to a submergence of the traditional indices of
resistance and a rechannelling into more complex resistance
phenomena. Thus a graph plotting this proposition is not merely
of the classical Poisson distribution type but Poisson with an
ascending tangent at the joint of the tail. Japanese resistance over
time is seen a s resistance potential predating actual internment,
type A resistance as resulting in a lower level of resistance than
previously suspected while type B resistance as surpassing the
traditional apogee of resistance and continuing on into the period
of resettlement. Resistance potential a s p r e d a t i n g a c t u a l
internment is seen as Japanese reaction to white racism, the
hostile anti-Japanese campaign and the early stages of the
“evacuation” process. The median of the descending Poisson and
the ascending tangent of types A and B indicates consistently high
level of Japanese resistance against the white administration
throughout the entire concentration camp experience.
INSTANCES
OF
RESISTANCE
preinternment
resistance
\
//’
\
\
type A
resistance
I
1942
I
!
1943
I
1944
I
1945
I
TIME
Graph 1.Resistance Distribution: the Historical Context.
As a resultof this submergence and rechannelling characteristic
of type B resistance, the traditional indices of resistance are
inadequate to identify them. Admittedly type B responses are
difficult to identify. The data need to be re-examined and new
qualitative indices must be defined. Various aspects of the
GARY Y. OKIHIRO
31
administration’s “colonization” of the Japanese community
require examination. One of these which awaits definition is
Japanese parental resistance to administrative efforts to win over
the minds of their childern. WRA intentions included the
“Americanization” of the Japanese to make them “assimilable”
into white America. Thus, anything which emphasized traditional
Japanese roots was to be discouraged. The administration’s
failure to successfully combat the “regressive tendency” of the
Issei in this battle for the “possession of the children’s minds and
habits” was lamented by Poston’s community management
division in a report26 which noted that the children’s English
vocabulary had slipped four full grades since the fall of 1942. The
same report mentioned another area in which Japanese values
persisted, that of internee preference for traditional herbal and
chiropractic medicine despite administration prohibitions against
these health practices.
From these examples, it is reasonable to conclude that the
proliferation of Japanese cultural societies and clubs and sports
organizations following the peak period of traditional forms of
protest can be viewed in terms of type B responses. In addition to
these new manifestations of type B resistance, type A category
indices require redefinition for a s observed by one community
analyst at
“the use of subtle and indirect methods of
getting concessions from the administration” was employed by
the internees.
During an interviewz8 conducted by the Jerome community
analyst quoted above, held after the segregation issue, a Buddhist
priest explained his peoples’ plight, their underlying fears and
resistance potential. He observed:
Actually, most of the Issei feel a stronger loyalty to Japan than to
America, since evacuation. Before, they were pro-American. Many
would have liked to declare loyalty to Japan, but they did not do so
for practical reasons. They felt that they might be punished or
treated more severely in the center. Others had property which they
feared they would lose. Those who asked for repatriation had the
courage of their convictions, or they answered the question ‘no’ for
practical reasons too. Since the registration form was called
‘Application for Leave Clearance,’ they thought if they answered
‘Yes’they would have to go out of the center. They wished to remain
here. Many are repatriating because they feel the prejudice against
them in America is too strong. And they believe the same thing may
happen again in 25 years. I do not want my son to be subjected to
such treatment.
Given the implicit trust accorded to priests by the people,*g the
significance of the above statement is apparent. The fallacies of
the loyal-disloyal conclusions drawn from questions 27 and 28
have been exposed, still its legacy continues. The issues of loyalty
or disloyalty can not be equated with the processes of accommo-
32
AMERASIA JOURNAL
dation or resistance. At the same time, the earlier analyses of
resistance are inadequate to account for the persistence of the
traditional matrices of Japanese institutions, v a l u e s a n d
relationships. Beyond the visible forms of resistance, between the
occasional petition, strike or riot, is the true nature of Japanese
resistance to white control. It has been the contention of this
paper that therein lies the real history of the Japanese reaction to
imprisonment and colonization in America’s concentration camps.
FOOTNOTES
1. Washington, D.C., 1946, 48. Cf. ibid., 50; Carey McWilliams, Prejudice, Boston,
1944, 171-79; Alexander H. Leighton, The Governing of Men, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1945, 177-78, 232-44; Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto,
The Spoilage, Berkeley, California, 1946; Edward H. Spicer, et.al., Impounded
People, Tucson, Arizona, 1969, 22-23, 133-34, 138-39; Paul Bailey, City in the Sun,
Los Angeles, 1971, 135; and Dillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans, Tucson, Arizona,
1971.62.
2. Leonard J. Arrington, The Price of Prejudice, Logan, Utah, 1962, 19-20. See also,
Bailey, City, 124, 129; WRA, United States Department of the Interior, Legal and
Constitutional Phases of hhe WRA Program, Washington, D.C., 1946, 33-34; Allan
R. Bosworth, America’s Concentration Camps, New York, 1967; Bill Hosokawa,
Nisei: The Quiet Americans, New York, 1969; McWilliams, Prejudice; and the
various camp newspapers.
3. See, e.g., Herbert Aptheker, American Slave Revolts, New York, 1963; Nicholas
Halasz, The Rattling Chains, New York, 1966; Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over
Black, Kingsport, Tenn., 1968; Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American
Institutional and Intellectual Life, Chicago, 1968, second edition; and William F.
Cheek, Black Resistance Before the Civil War, Beverly Hills. California, 1970.
4. Douglas W. Nelson, Heart Mountain; The History of an American Concentration
Camp, a n unpubl. MA thesis, University of Wyoming, 1970, 89. Cf. Roger Daniels,
Concentration Camps U.S.A.: fapanese Americans and World War 11, New York,
1971; and “The Relocation of the Japanese Americans: A Reappraisal,” a n unpubl.
paper presented to the American Historical Association, December, 1970. Daniels
has drawn heavily from Nelson’s findings. Both Daniels and Nelson, Daniels’
former student, have attempted a reassessment of resistance in the camps, yet
their analyses do not go far enough. Both demonstrate the existence of what
Daniels terms the “left opposition,” i.e. “patriotic” Japanese Americans who
resisted. Still, resistance is seen in terms of the bankrupt “loyals” vs. “disloyals”
dichotomy and both do not suggest any definitions or give a broad rigorous
framework of resistance.
5. Nelson, Heart Mountain, 89. Another example of the powerlessness-dependence
thesis is seen in Matthew Richard Speier, Japanese-American Relocation Camp
Colonization and Resistance to Resettlement: A Study in the Social Psychology of
Ethnic Identity under Stress, a n unpubl. MA thesis, U.C. Berkeley, 1965.
6. Several terms employed in this paper require definition:
[ a ) anti-administration resistance - resistance in direct conflict with the
administration, its function, role or structure, and may be symbolized as:
---
( h ) para-administration resistance - resistance w h i c h i g n o r e s t h e
administration, its function, role or structure and seeks its own resolution,
symbolized as:
(e) administration - collective agency through which the interning and
colonizing of the Japanese during World War I1 w a s carried out. T h e
administration’s “colonizing” role includes its paternalistic treatment of the
internees, its attempts to control lapanese political and economic activities and its
GARY Y. OKIHIRO
efforts to replace traditional Japanese institutions and relationships with their
“American” counterparts, encouraging the ”colonized” to mimic the “colonizer.”
See, e.g., Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Boston, 1965; and Franz
Fanon, Black Skins White Masks, New York, 1967.
(d) resistance - behavior which is para- and/or anti-administration.
(e) potential for resistance - the causal conditions of resistance. Its theoretical
framework has been discussed in Gary Y. Okihiro, “Dysrhythmy in Political
Systems: the Example of Guinea,” an unpubl. seminar paper, UCLA, 1968, revised,
1972.
7. For example, WRA A Story of Humon Conservation, 47-51; WRA, United States
Department of the Interior, Community Government in War Relocation Centers,
Washington, D.C., 1946, 29-33. Cf. Myer. Uprooted, 61-65; Leighton, Governing,
162-210; Spicer, et. al., Impounded, 129-39; Bailey, City, 119-41; and Thomas and
Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 45-52.
8. It seems that a typology of camp resistance which views the “incident” a s part
of an ongoing process or interaction is more valid than one postulated on a
qualitative description of types a s in Norman Richard Jackman, Collective Protest
in Relocation Center, an unpubl. PhD dissertation, U.C. Berkeley, 1955; and
Norman R. Jackman, “Collective Protest in Relocation Centers,” in The American
Journal of Sociology, LXIII, 3 (November, 1957). 264-72.
9. Description of the Poston strike was taken eclectically from the sources cited
above in footnote 7.
10. The terms, inu, stooge, collaborator, etc., a s used in this paper, are not meant to
be pejorative. Rather they are employed merely as terms used by the internees
themselves.
11. Leighton, Governing. 232-44. A “pro-Fascist’’ explanation w a s given by the
Poston project director. Poston Official Daily Press Bulletin, VII, 8 (November 24.
1942).
12. Spicer, et. al., Impounded, 133-34; and Jackman, Collective Protest, 1955, 15459.
13. Description of the Manzanar riot w a s taken eclectically from, Jackman,
Collective Protest, 1955, 178-83; Spicer, et. al., Impounded, 135-37; Thomas and
Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 49-52; WRA A Story of Human Conservation, 49-51;
WRA, Community Government, 31-33: and WRA, Legal and Constitutional, 33-34.
14. Spicer, et. al., Impounded, 137.
15. Jackman, Collective Protest, 1955, 182-83; Spicer, et. al., Impounded, 138-39;
and WRA A Story of Human Conservation, 46-47, 50. A similar analysis has been
made for Tule Lake in Thomas and Nishimoto. The Spoilage.
16. Uprooted, 43. Cf. WRA, Community Government, 3-5.
17. 11, 7 (rune 19, 1942).
18. Community Analysis Section, Jerome Relocation Center, Denson, Arkansas,
Aug. 5, 1943. Field Report No. 10, mss. UCLA research library, U. S. Relocation
Centers, microfilm D 17, reel 6.
19. WRA, Community Government, 11.
20. See, e.g. WRA, Community G o v e r n m e n t , 22-24; WRA, Legal a n d
Constitutional, 32; Report on a Developing Community, mss. included in the Carr
Papers, JARP Collection 2010, UCLA reserach library, box 57, folder 2; Nelson,
Heart Mountain, 38; and Community Analysis Section, Jerome Relocation Center,
Denson, Arkansas, June 10. 1943. Interview with a n Issei block manager, mss.
UCLA research library, U. S. Relocation Centers, microfilm D 17, reel 6.
21. Description of “self-government” a t Poston w a s taken from, Leighton.
Governing, 94-95, 110-25; Spicer, et. al., Impounded, 129-35.
22. II,27 (July 12, 1942).
23. Poston Official Daily Press Bulletin, 11.35 (July 22, 1942).
24. WRA, Community Government, 22. See also, Spicer, et. al., Impounded, 129.
34
AMERASIA JOURNAL
25. As, for example, in Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage: Spicer, et. al.,
Impounded: WRA publications: Nelson, He a r t M o u n t a i n : a n d D a n i e l s ,
Concentration Camps.
26. Family Welfare Orientation Program, mss. included in the Barnhart Papers,
JARP Collection 2010, UCLA research library, box 49, folder 5.
27. Edgar C. McVoy, “Social Processes in the War Relocation Center,” in Social
Forces, vol. 22, no. 2 (December, 1943). 189.
28. Community Analysis Section, Jerome Relocation Center, Denson, Arkansas.
Interview of the Jerome Daijo Buddhist temple priest, conducted by Edgar C.
McVoy on June 21, 1943. U. S. Relocation Centers, UCLA Research library,
microfilm D 17, reel 6.
29. Community Analysis Section, Jerome Relocation Center, Denson, Arkansas.
Interview of a n Issei block manager, conducted by Edgar C. McVoy on June 10,
1943. U. S. Relocation Centers, UCLA research library, microfilm D 17, reel 6.