The Multiple Factor Test

Transcription

Chapter 2
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2:1
2:2
2:3
2:4
2:5
2:6
2:7
The Problem
The Perspective of the Marketplace
Legal Precedent of Only Limited Value
The “Multiple Factor” Method
Flexibility and Interrelatedness of the Factors
Shifting Relevance and Weight of the Factors
The Factors As Applied to Cases of Competitive and
Noncompetitive Goods
2:8
The Factors in Registrability Proceedings
2:9
The Factors As Legal or Factual Questions
2:10 Beyond Confusion: The Factors and Equity
2:11 Preliminary Injunction
§ 2:11.1
Likelihood of Success
[A]
Evidence
§ 2:11.2
Irreparable Injury
§ 2:11.3
Balance of Harms
[A]
Harms to Plaintiff
[B]
Harms to Defendant
§ 2:11.4
Public Interest
2:12 Summary Judgment
§ 2:1
The Problem
Over a century ago the Supreme Court observed that in trademark
cases “[d]ifficulty frequently arises in determining the question of
infringement. . . .”1 The difficulty persists.2 For many the likelihood
of confusion issue is “like a tangle of underbrush” in the already
1.
2.
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1878).
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1164 (1995).
(Kirkpatrick, Rel. #24, 11/10)
2–1
§ 2:1
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
“rather swampy area of unfair competition.”3 “Razor-thin judgment
calls are indigenous to the law of trademark protection.” Often lines
must be drawn in “fuzzy areas.”4 Determinations of likelihood of
confusion are necessarily subjective and impressionistic. 5 “Results in
trademark cases are fact driven but individuals have different reactions
to the facts which makes trademark litigation highly unpredictable.” 6
3.
4.
5.
6.
Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1225, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1541, 1547 (2d Cir. 1987) (“tangle of underbrush”); Jellibeans,
Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 222 U.S.P.Q. 10, 16 (11th
Cir. 1983) (“rather swampy area”); see Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872, 230 U.S.P.Q. 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1986)
(“quagmire”); Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1907, 1915 (2d Cir. 1991) (“tangled morass”); Roy Exp. Co. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1105, 215 U.S.P.Q. 289,
297 (2d Cir. 1982) (unfair competition an “adaptable and capricious”
tort). “[T]rademark law is imbued with numerous idiosyncracies [sic]. . . .”
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449,
1451 (4th Cir. 1996).
Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 225 U.S.P.Q. 124, 127
(2d Cir. 1985) (“Razor-thin”); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178,
207 U.S.P.Q. 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1980) (“fuzzy”); see Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1447, 221 U.S.P.Q. 97, 109 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (“As in many areas of the law, there can be no ‘bright line.’ Many case
records may present a situation where the determination of a trial judge or
a jury, either way, would not present clear or reversible error to an appellate
court.”); Butterick Co. v. McCall Pattern Co., 222 U.S.P.Q. 314, 317
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“no bright line”).
In re Electrolyte Labs., Inc., 929 F.2d 64, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1239, 1240 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1371, 211
U.S.P.Q. 415, 445 (D.N.J. 1981) (“An analysis of likelihood of confusion
can be a complex process . . . because of the subjective and conjectural
nature inherent in the process”); Citibank N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc.,
215 U.S.P.Q. 884, 908–09 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (“After the court has mixed a
pinch of ‘this’ and a cup of ‘that’, there is still no precise way to tell if a
likelihood of confusion cake has been baked. One court has suggested that
the ultimate determination is based on the judge’s ‘visceral reaction’. . . .
The ultimate conclusion of necessity involves a partially objective and a
partially subjective analysis. Even the ‘objective’ factors involve a partially
subjective evaluation.”), aff ’d, 724 F.2d 1540, 222 U.S.P.Q. 292 (11th Cir.
1984); Blacks in Gov’t v. Nat’l Ass’n of Blacks Within Gov’t, 601 F. Supp.
225, 229, 223 U.S.P.Q. 792, 794 (D.D.C. 1983), quoting Société Anonyme
de la Grande Distillerie v. Julius Wile Sons & Co., 161 F. Supp. 545, 117
U.S.P.Q. 257, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (likelihood of confusion “does not lend
itself to resolution by scientific appraisement or comparison. Rather, a
finding on infringement is by necessity a subjective determination by the
trial judge based on his visceral reactions.”); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v.
Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1945 (6th Cir. 1987)
(“impressionistic”).
Helen W. Nies, The Lanham Act—Looking at an Old Friend from a New
Perspective, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 793, 796 (1992); Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v.
Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359, 1363, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1782, 1786 (9th Cir. 1993)
2–2
§ 2:2
“[L]ikelihood of confusion depends on varying human reactions to
situations incapable of exact appraisement.” 7 “Likelihood of confusion
depends on consumer expectations.”7.1 Many of the cases which go to
decision are tenebrous; rarely is one “overwhelmed by the sudden
blinding light” of the correct decision.8 To say the least, likelihood of
confusion is “frequently a fairly disputed issue of fact on which
reasonable minds may differ.”9
§ 2:2
The Perspective of the Marketplace
The source of the factual complexity is that the issue must be
viewed from “the perspective of the marketplace.”10 The focus is on
the marks as used under actual market conditions.11 The court is “not
concerned with mere theoretical possibilities of confusion, deception,
or mistake or with de minimis situations but with the practicalities of
7.
7.1.
8.
9.
10.
11.
(“these kinds of cases are fact-driven”); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of
Am., 110 F.3d 234, 241, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1997) (likelihood of
confusion is “an inherently factual issue that depends on the facts and
circumstances in each case”); see Source Servs. Corp. v. Chicagoland
JobSource, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1523, 1528, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1048, 1051
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (“‘likelihood’ is by definition a prediction, not a slice of
history. It is a function of many discrete factors, each of which tends to
show confusion is more or less likely to occur.”).
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1489 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, 244 F.3d 88, 101, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
1969 (2d Cir. 2001).
King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 454 F.2d 66, 69, 172 U.S.P.Q. 321
(2d Cir. 1972); Mother ’s Rests., Inc. v. Mother ’s Bakery, Inc., 498 F. Supp.
847, 855, 210 U.S.P.Q. 207, 215 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (“As is usual in most
trademark cases, the court is not struck immediately with the rightness of
one side’s position.”).
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
1502, 1504 (4th Cir. 1992), quoting Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
720 F.2d 231, 246, 222 U.S.P.Q. 101 (2d Cir. 1983); see In re E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567–68
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (“Reasonable men may differ as to the weight to give
specific evidentiary elements in a particular case. In one case it will
indicate that confusion is unlikely; in the next it will not.”) (emphasis in
original).
Shakey’s, Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426, 431, 218 U.S.P.Q. 16, 20 (9th Cir.
1983).
Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Homeowners Group, Inc. v.
Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1106, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587,
1592 (6th Cir. 1991); Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 759 F.2d 1261,
1266, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1169, 1172 (6th Cir. 1985) (the U.S.P.Q. text is corrupt
at this point).
2–3
§ 2:2
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
the commercial world, with which the trademark laws deal.”12 The
realities of the marketplace control “because that is where confusion of
prospective purchasers would or would not occur.”13 The public’s
perspective controls, not the court’s.
Likelihood of confusion concerns the “probable or actual actions
and reactions” of people, making it fundamental to understand how
they make their decisions to buy or not to buy.14 “A realistic evaluation
of consumer confusion must attempt to recreate the conditions in
which buying decisions are made, and the court should try to determine not what it would do, but what a reasonable purchaser in market
conditions would do.”15 “[O]ur comparison of the similarity between
12.
13.
14.
15.
Witco Chem. Co. v. Whitfield Chem. Co., 418 F.2d 1403, 1405, 164
U.S.P.Q. 43, 44–45 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.,
94 F.3d 376, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1990, 1994 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Consistent with
the economic focus of trademark law, the likelihood of confusion must be
determined with reference to the realities of consumer behavior in the
relevant market.”); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1687,
1692 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (dissent, citing cases); see, e.g., Elec. Data Sys.
Corp. v. EDSA Micro Corp., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1460, 1465 (T.T.A.B. 1992)
(rejecting “scenario that applicant’s product will fail and cause a city-wide
blackout” with resultant bad publicity affecting opposer); CMM Cable
Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 192, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
1458, 1465 (D. Me. 1995), aff ’d, 97 F.3d 1504, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (1st
Cir. 1996).
Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569, 218
U.S.P.Q. 390, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Johnson & Johnson v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 345 F. Supp. 1216, 1222, 175 U.S.P.Q. 287, 291
(D.N.J. 1972) (“totality of the circumstances”).
McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1167, 229
U.S.P.Q. 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1986), quoting Am. Int’l Group, Inc. v. London
Am. Int’l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351, 212 U.S.P.Q. 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1981);
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Lever Bros., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1027, 1032
(E.D. Wis. 1991); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 687
F.2d 563, 215 U.S.P.Q. 662, 665 (2d Cir. 1982).
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 504, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987); Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical
Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 1987); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086,
1091, 207 U.S.P.Q. 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1980) (“resolution of this issue does
not hinge on a single factor but requires a consideration of numerous
factors to determine whether under all the circumstances there is a
likelihood of confusion”); Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d
208, 214, 225 U.S.P.Q. 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The wisdom of the
[Polaroid] likelihood of confusion test lies in its recognition that each
trademark infringement case presents its own unique set of facts. Indeed,
the complexities attendant to an accurate assessment of likelihood of
confusion require that the entire panoply of elements constituting the
relevant factual landscape be comprehensively examined.”); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872, 230 U.S.P.Q.
831 (2d Cir. 1986) (apply the infringement test with due regard for the
2–4
§ 2:2
marks and products must occur in a context that recognizes how
consumers encounter the products and how carefully consumers are
likely to scrutinize the mark.”15.1 “An informed analysis of whether
the likelihood of confusion exists cannot rest solely upon
a ‘side-by-side’ comparison of the marks without regard to the
marketplace in which they are used.” 15.2 “Logic alone” does not
necessarily yield the correct answer,16 particularly after prolonged
consideration and “increasing sensitivity” to the differences between
the marks.17 Nor should likelihood of confusion be found on the basis
of “pure conjecture or a fetching narrative.”17.1 Yet decision makers
must draw on their own experience and observation to make inferences about the likelihood of confusion of others. The “judgment of
eye and ear” may ultimately be “more satisfactory” than evidence from
any other source.18
15.1.
15.2.
16.
17.
17.1.
18.
“peculiar circumstances” of each case); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen,
513 F. Supp. 1339, 1371, 211 U.S.P.Q. 415, 445 (D.N.J. 1981) (“An
analysis of likelihood of confusion can be a complex process because of
the variety of factors to be considered. . . .”).
Kemp v. Bumble Bee, 398 F.3d 1049, 1054, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 2002, 2007 (8th
Cir. 2005).
What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 450, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d 1829, 1835 (4th Cir. 2004).
Source Servs. Corp. v. Chicagoland JobSource, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1523, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d 1048, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081, 1091 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Lord Jeff Knitting Co. v. Warnaco, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 579, 581, 225
U.S.P.Q. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Never an easy chore. . .”); see Precision
Tune, Inc. v. Tune-A-Car, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 360, 366, 225 U.S.P.Q. 870,
874 (W.D. La. 1984) (“If the distinctions are difficult to find in an atmosphere of intense concentration, how much more complicated is the task
faced by the average consumer who relies upon his memory. . . .”).
Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1363, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1751
(7th Cir. 1995).
Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 464, 134 U.S.P.Q. 266 (1st Cir. 1962)
(“[i]t appears that in this class of case it is open to a trial judge, drawing on
his own experience and observation, to make an informed judgment”);
Citrus Grp., Inc. v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 386, 390, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1031 (D. Md. 1991), quoting Warner-Hudnut, Inc. v. Wander
Co., 280 F.2d 435, 436, 126 U.S.P.Q. 411, 412 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“[i]n
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists between trademarks
the judgment of eye and ear is more satisfactory than evidence from any
other source”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co. v. Houston Ice & Brewing Co., 250 U.S. 28, 30, 39 S. Ct. 401, 63 L. Ed.
822 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“[b]eyond stating the principles to be applied there
is little to be said except to compare the impression made by the two”);
Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 629, 226 U.S.P.Q. 483, 493
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), quoting Marquis Who’s Who, Inc. v. N. Am. Adver.
Assocs., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 139, 142, 194 U.S.P.Q. 441, 443 (D.D.C.
1976) (the issue is “one for the court to decide through its own analysis,
comparison and judgment”), aff ’d, 574 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Amoco
2–5
§ 2:3
LIKELIHOOD
§ 2:3
OF
CONFUSION
Legal Precedent of Only Limited Value
The law, like the facts, can be confusing. According to the Seventh
Circuit appeals court: “Trademark law may create as much confusion
in the courts as it eliminates in the marketplace. Its hallmarks are
doctrinal confusion, conflicting results, and judicial prolixity. In this
subtle area of the law, generalizations are especially dangerous.” 19
With a comic touch, the Second Circuit echoes the Seventh:
Review in this area of the law is similar to when those old time
radio comedians, Fibber McGee and Molly, opened their closet and
out would pour a welter of miscellany from hub caps and baby
carriages to broken umbrellas. The equivalent outpour in trademark law reveals complex statutory provisions, numerous factors
that trial judges must consider and an appellate court review,
definitions of the various kinds of marks, which overlap and shade
into one another, and a jumble of adjectives describing the trade20
mark review process.
Courts struggling to move mountains often find they have only
affected minuscule changes in trademark jurisprudence and occa21
sionally have created their own likelihood of confusion.
Because each case is factually unique,22 and between cases “the
differences are often subtle ones,” the value of prior decisions about
19.
20.
21.
22.
Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 662, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1403,
1408 (10th Cir. 1987) (factors “require that the fact finder reach conclusions based on personal evaluation of evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom”); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway &
Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342, 186 U.S.P.Q. 436, 445 (2d Cir. 1975) (decision
must “[i]n the final analysis . . . rest on the court’s conviction as to
possible confusion”); MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther
Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1208, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(“A court may use common sense inference from established facts to
determine whether confusion is likely, even if proof of such existing
confusion has not been offered.”).
TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 884, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d 1912 (2d Cir. 1997), quoting Walt-W. Enters., Inc. v. Gannett
Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1055, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1206, 1212 (7th Cir. 1982), and
HMH Publ’g Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716, 183 U.S.P.Q. 141, 143 (9th
Cir. 1974).
Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d 1583, 1584 (2d Cir. 1993); see Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9, 189 U.S.P.Q. 759, 769 (2d Cir. 1976)
(legal principles in trademark law “tend to become lost in a welter of
adjectives”).
Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1907, 1915 (2d Cir. 1991).
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
1502, 1504 (4th Cir. 1992) (“the likelihood of consumer confusion is an
2–6
§ 2:3
other marks is limited “except insofar as they show the general
pattern.”23 Naturally, “[i]f the point is thoroughly researched, case
law can be found tending to support either side. . . .”24 “Each case must
finally be decided on its own merits. Prior decisions do, however,
establish an intellectual framework from which this subjective determination can be more readily made.”25 Otherwise, “[a] discussion of
the many cases in which similarities have, or have not, been thought
infringements, serves no end . . . no two cases are alike.”26 Over time,
23.
24.
25.
26.
‘inherently factual’ issue that depends on the unique facts and circumstances of each case”); ConAgra, Inc. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 990 F.2d
368, 371, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316, 1318 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Each case turns on
its own unique facts.”); Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. Hamilton Beach, Inc.,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1993, 2001 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (likelihood of confusion “a
heavily fact-based inquiry”); TMEP 1207.01 (2009) (“Each case must be
decided on its own facts.”); see note 5, supra.
Jacobs v. Int’l Multifoods Corp., 668 F.2d 1234, 1236, 212 U.S.P.Q. 641,
642 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (subtle differences), quoting Indus. Nucleonics
Corp. v. Hinde Eng’g Co., 475 F.2d 1197, 1199, 177 U.S.P.Q. 386, 387
(C.C.P.A. 1973); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281
F.2d 755, 757, 126 U.S.P.Q. 310 (2d Cir. 1960) (“general pattern”);
McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137, 202
U.S.P.Q. 81 (2d Cir. 1979) (“every product has its own separate threshold
for confusion”); In re Mars, Inc., 741 F.2d 395, 222 U.S.P.Q. 938 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Henri’s Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 355, 220
U.S.P.Q. 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1983) (“reference to decisions as to other
trademarks is not of great help because each case is dependent on its own
facts”); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356, 228
U.S.P.Q. 346 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting “the limited precedential value of
likelihood of confusion decisions, each of which stands upon its own
facts”); Faultless Starch Co. v. Sales Producers Assocs., Inc., 530 F.2d 1400,
189 U.S.P.Q. 141, 142 (C.C.P.A. 1976), and Curtice-Burns, Inc. v. Nw.
Sanitation Prods., Inc., 530 F.2d 1396, 1399, 189 U.S.P.Q. 138 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (“we shall evidently have to continue saying ad nauseam . . . prior
decisions on other marks for other goods are of very little help one way or
the other”); Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Can., Ltd.,
452 F. Supp. 429, 445, 199 U.S.P.Q. 470, 485 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (“Although
not conclusive, a review of prior cases does reveal, in a general fashion, the
benchmark by which similarities have been judged.”); Spaulding Bakeries,
Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 209 U.S.P.Q. 355, 356 (T.T.A.B. 1980)
(“‘established’ principles in trademark cases must not be literally and
indiscriminately applied without regard to the particular marks and the
particular record involved in any given case”).
In re Johnson Prods. Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. 539, 540 (T.T.A.B. 1983); Best
Flavors, Inc. v. Mystic River Brewing Co., 886 F. Supp. 908, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
1247, 1249 n.2 (D. Me. 1995) (cautioning against use of “case precedents
to justify (or reject or overturn) factual findings”).
Id.
Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chem. Corp., 219 F. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
1915) (Learned Hand, J.); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1878)
(“What degree of resemblance is necessary to constitute an infringement is
incapable of exact definition, as applicable to all cases.”).
2–7
§ 2:4
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
rigid rules relating to likelihood of confusion of marks used in various
product fields have been jettisoned. (See section 5:5.)
§ 2:4
The “Multiple Factor” Method
While “[t]here is no litmus rule which can provide a ready guide to
all cases,” there is a generally accepted method of analyzing the
likelihood of confusion issue.27 The method consists of applying a
number of different “factors” to the totality of the facts of the case. “In
every case turning on likelihood of confusion, it is the duty of the
[decision maker] to find, upon consideration of all the evidence,
whether or not confusion appears likely.”28 The old Restatement
initially framed the factors in two lists, the first in section 729:
(a)
the degree of similarity between the designation and the
trade-mark or trade name . . . ;
(b)
the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c)
the relation in use and manner of marketing between the
goods or services marketed by the actor and those marketed
by the other;
(d)
the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers;
and the other in section 731:
27.
28.
(a)
the likelihood that the actor ’s goods, services or business
will be mistaken for those of the other;
(b)
the likelihood that the other may expand his business so as
to compete with the actor;
(c)
the extent to which the goods or services of the actor and
those of the other have common purchasers or users;
(d)
the extent to which the goods or services of the actor and
those of the other are marketed through the same channels;
In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.
563 (C.C.P.A. 1973); M. Bierman & J. Wexler, Toward a Reformation of the
Test for Determining Trademark Infringement, 80 T RADEMARK REP. 1
(1990).
Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 718, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1388, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1992), quoting In re E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 568 (C.C.P.A.
1973) (emphasis in original); Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d
1135, 1140, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1707 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Although the
Sleekcraft test [see note 40, infra] plays an important role in the analysis of
whether a likelihood of confusion exists, it is the totality of facts in a given
case that is dispositive.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see notes 13
and 15, supra.
2–8
(e)
the relation between the functions of the goods or services
of the actor and those of the other;
(f)
the degree of distinctiveness of the trademark or trade
name;
(g)
the degree of attention usually given to trade symbols in the
purchase of goods or services of the actor and those of the
other;
(h)
the length of time during which the actor has used the
designation;
(i)
the intent of the actor in adopting and using the
designation.
§ 2:4
The new Restatement in section 21 presents the following list of
factors:
(a)
the degree of resemblance between the respective designations . . . ;
(b)
the similarity of the marketing methods and channels of
distribution used for the respective goods or services;
(c)
the characteristics of the prospective purchasers of the
goods or services and the degree of care they are likely to
exercise in making purchasing decisions;
(d)
the degree of distinctiveness of the other ’s designation;
(e)
when the goods, services, or business of the actor differ in
kind from those of the other, the likelihood that the actor ’s
prospective purchasers would expect a party in the position
of the other to expand its marketing or sponsorship into the
product, service or business market of the actor;
(f)
when the actor and the other sell the goods or services in
different geographic markets, the extent to which the
other ’s designation is identified with the other in the
actor’s geographic market.
The multiple factor analytical approach to likelihood of confusion
received its prime judicial impetus from the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.: 29
29.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495, 128 U.S.P.Q.
411, 413 (2d Cir. 1961) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 729–31
(1938)); Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
1420, 1424 (2d Cir. 2003) (“landmark case”); adopted, e.g., in Paddington
Corp. v. Attiki Imps. & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1189,
1193 (2d Cir. 1993); N.Y. Stock Exch. v. N.Y. Hotel, 293 F.3d 550, 555, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d 1250, 1263 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Judge Friendly ’s venerated Polaroid
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The problem of determining how far a valid trademark shall be
protected with respect to goods other than those to which its
owner has applied it, has long been vexing and does not become
easier of solution with the years. . . . Where the products are
different, the prior owner ’s chance of success is a function of many
variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity
between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion,
and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own
mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of
the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the
possibilities—the court may have to take still other variables into
account.
The multi-factor test is not embodied in any statute. 30 The factors
have been “refined, supplemented and applied” in a long train of
cases.31 Many courts, “through study of the individual facts of the
cases, and the factors suggested by the facts of those cases, came to
develop gradually over time a non-exclusive list of factors that can help
courts in making [the] determination” of infringement issues.31.1 Now
every federal appellate court has a fountainhead case and progeny
setting forth one variation or another of the test:
First Circuit: “[T]he similarity of the marks; the similarity of the
goods; the relationship between the parties’ channels of trade; the
relationship between the parties’ advertising; the classes of prospective
purchasers; evidence of actual confusion; the defendants’ intent in
adopting its mark; and the strength of the plaintiff ’s mark.”32
30.
31.
31.1.
32.
test”); see Munsingwear, Inc. v. Jockey Int’l, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146,
1149 n.4 (D. Minn. 1994) (“While not identical, these [Eighth Circuit]
factors are substantially similar to the ‘Polaroid Test’ accepted in several
other circuits.”), aff ’d, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).
Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 226 U.S.P.Q. 123, 126
(11th Cir. 1985); cf. Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d
380, 383, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A list of factors designed
as proxies for the likelihood of confusion can’t supersede the statutory
inquiry. If we know for sure that consumers are not confused about a
product’s origin, there is no need to consult even a single proxy.”)
(emphasis in original).
Lord Jeff Knitting Co. v. Warnaco, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 579, 581, 225 U.S.P.Q.
671, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Nabisco v. PF Brands, 191 F.3d 208, 217, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1882 (2d Cir.
1999).
Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487, 212
U.S.P.Q. 246, 250 (1st Cir. 1981), relied on, e.g., in Boston Athletic Ass’n v.
Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1690 (1st Cir. 1989); supplemented
by DeCosta v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 513, 186 U.S.P.Q.
305 (1st Cir. 1975) (“the degree of defendant’s necessity to use his mark,
and the trend towards expansion in the respective trade or industry as to
territory or line of merchandise”).
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Second Circuit: “(1) the strength of the plaintiff ’s mark, (2) the degree
of similarity between the plaintiff ’s and the defendant’s marks, (3) the
proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will ‘bridge
the gap’ between the two products, (5) actual confusion between the two
marks, (6) the defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark, (7) the quality
of the defendant’s product(s), and (8) the sophistication of buyers of the
plaintiff ’s and defendant’s goods or services.”33
Third Circuit: “(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark
and the alleged infringing mark; (2) the strength of the owner ’s mark;
(3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and
attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length
of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual
confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark;
(6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods, competing or
not competing, are marketed through the same channels of trade and
advertised through the same media; (8) the extent to which the targets of
the parties’ sales efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in
the minds of consumers, whether because of the near identity of the
products, the similarity of function, or other factors; (10) other facts
suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to
manufacture both products, or expect the prior owner to manufacture
a product in the defendant’s market, or expect that the prior owner is
likely to expand into the defendant’s market.”34
Fourth Circuit: “a) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark; b) the
similarity of the two marks; c) the similarity of the goods/services the
marks identify; d) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in
their business; e) the similarity of the advertising used by the two
parties; f) the defendant’s intent; g) actual confusion.”35 Additionally,
33.
Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1511, 1513 (2d Cir. 1996); W. Publ’g Co. v. Rose Art Indus., 910 F.2d 57,
61, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1547 (2d Cir. 1990).
The competitive proximity factor [No. 3] has two elements, market
proximity and geographic proximity. Market proximity asks whether
the two products are in related areas of commerce and geographic
proximity looks to the geographic separation of the products. Both
elements seek to determine whether the two products have an overlapping client base that creates a potential for confusion.
34.
35.
Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 134, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
1939, 1945 (2d Cir. 2004).
A&H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 237 F.3d 198, 215, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1105–06 (3d Cir. 2000).
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527, 224 U.S.P.Q. 185, 187
(4th Cir. 1984), applied in Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of
Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1489 (4th Cir. 1995); George &
Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d
1786 (4th Cir. 2009).
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“the quality of the defendant’s product, . . . the sophistication of the
consuming public,”35.1 and “the similarity in scope of the parties’
geographic markets.”35.2
Fifth Circuit: “(1) the type of mark allegedly infringed, (2) the
similarity between the two marks, (3) the similarity of the products
or services, (4) the identity of the retail outlets and purchasers, (5) the
identity of the advertising media used, (6) the defendant’s intent, and
(7) any evidence of actual confusion.”36 “Courts also consider (8) the
degree of care exercised by potential purchasers.”36.1
Sixth Circuit: “1. The strength of the plaintiff ’s mark; 2. the relatedness of the services; 3. the similarity of the marks; 4. the evidence of
actual confusion; 5. the marketing channels used; 6. the likely degree of
purchaser care; 7. the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and
8. the likelihood of expansion of the product lines.”37
Seventh Circuit: “[T]he degree of similarity between the marks
in appearance and suggestion; the similarity of the products for which
the name is used; the area and manner of concurrent use;37.1 the
degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; the strength of the
35.1.
35.2.
36.
36.1.
37.
37.1.
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 45, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1454
(4th Cir. 1996).
U.S.P.Q.2d 1829–35 (4th Cir. 2004).
Westchester Media Co. L.P. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 2000). The seminal case was Roto Rooter
Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975)
(footnotes omitted), supplemented by Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan
Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189, 213 U.S.P.Q. 91, 93 (5th Cir.
1981) (“previous contractual or business relations between the parties . . .
and the degree of care purchasers are likely to exercise when selecting
products of the type sold by the parties”). The “type of trademark”
factor was treated as the “strength” of the mark in Sno-Wizard Mfg.,
Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428, 230 U.S.P.Q. 118, 121 (5th
Cir. 1986). An additional factor was suggested in Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v.
Cmty. Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 n.9, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197, 203 n.9
(5th Cir. 1984) (“lack of present competition as well as the likelihood that
one party will expand its product line to compete with the other”).
Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 478, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 2008).
Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111,
38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1163 (6th Cir. 1996); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839
F.2d 1183, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944 (6th Cir. 1988); Hensley Mfg., Inc. v.
ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1003, 1007 (6th Cir. 2009).
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, 237 F.3d 891, 900, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1617 (7th Cir.
2001) (combining channels of trade and product relatedness, the court
noted the following factors (or sub-factors) for “area and manner of
concurrent use”: “(1) the relative geographical distribution areas;
(2) whether there exists evidence of direct competition between the
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§ 2:4
complainant’s mark; actual confusion; and an intent on the part of the
alleged infringer to palm off his products as those of another.” 38
Eighth Circuit: “1) the strength of the owner ’s mark; 2) the
similarity between the owner ’s mark and the alleged infringer ’s
mark; 3) the degree to which the products compete with each other;
4) the alleged infringer ’s intent to pass off its goods as those of the
trademark owner . . . ; 5) incidents of actual confusion; and 6) whether
the degree of purchaser care can eliminate any likelihood of confusion
which would otherwise exist.”39
Ninth Circuit: “1) strength of the mark; 2) proximity of the goods;
3) similarity of the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) marketing channels used; 6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be
exercised by the purchaser; 7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark;
and 8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.” 40
Tenth Circuit: “(a) the degree of similarity between the marks,
including the mark’s appearance, pronunciation, suggestion, and manner of display; (b) strength or weakness of the plaintiff ’s mark; (c) the
intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark; (d) similarities and
differences of the parties’ goods, services and marketing strategies;
38.
39.
40.
products; (3) whether the products are sold to consumers in the same type
of store; (4) whether the products are sold in the similar section of a
particular store; and (5) whether the product is sold through the same
marketing channels”) (citations omitted).
Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1387
(7th Cir. 1993), quoting Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight,
560 F.2d 1325, 1330, 195 U.S.P.Q. 218, 220 (7th Cir. 1977); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381–82, 188 U.S.P.Q.
623, 637 (7th Cir. 1976) (“the type of trademark in issue, the similarity of
design, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and purchasers,
identity of advertising media utilized, defendant’s intent, and actual
confusion”); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 128 F.3d
1111, 1115, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (7th Cir. 1997); AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick,
543 F.3d 923, 929, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 2008).
SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091, 207 U.S.P.Q. 897, 900 (8th
Cir. 1980); see Hubbard Feeds v. Animal Feed Supplement, 182 F.3d 598,
602, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1999); Life Techs., Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific,
Inc., 826 F.2d 775, 776, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795, 1796 (8th Cir. 1987), and
ConAgra, Inc. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 990 F.2d 368, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316,
1317 (8th Cir. 1993); Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d
1094, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1937, 1939 (8th Cir. 1996); Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech
Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1965–66 (8th Cir. 1996)
(giving as factor six “the type of product, its costs and conditions of
purchase”); Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 569 F.3d 855, 860, 91
U.S.P.Q.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 2009) (referring to “intent to confuse”).
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808, 814
(9th Cir. 1979). “Proximity” of products covers both similarity of products
and spatial proximity of sales. Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d
1126, 1136, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 2006). See note 33, supra.
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(e) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers of the goods or
services involved; and (f) evidence of actual confusion, if any.” 41
Eleventh Circuit: The Eleventh Circuit adopted Fifth Circuit deci43
sions as binding precedent42
and so essentially follows the Fifth
44
Circuit’s factors. The current Eleventh Circuit list is as follows:
“1. Type [strength] of mark, 2. Similarity of mark, 3. Similarity of the
parties’ retail outlets (trade channels) and customers, 5. Similarity of
advertising media, 6. Defendant’s intent, 7. Actual confusion.” 44.1
Federal Circuit: “(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in
their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. (2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or
services. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels. (4) The conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, that is, ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising,
length of use). (6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods. (7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion. (8) The
length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion. (9) The variety
of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, ‘family’ mark,
product mark). (10) The market interface between applicant and the
owner of a prior mark. (11) The extent to which applicant has a right to
exclude others from use of its mark on its goods. (12) The extent of
potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial. (13) Any
other established fact probative of the effect of use.”45 The PTO applies
the Federal Circuit factors (known as the du Pont test) in both the
examination of applications46 and the adjudication of contested cases.47
41.
42.
43.
44.
44.1.
45.
46.
47.
Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481,
1483 (10th Cir. 1998); cf. Vail Assocs. v. Vend-Tel-Co, Ltd., 516 F.3d 853,
863, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1971 (10th Cir. 2008).
[Reserved.]
John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 972 n.9, 219
U.S.P.Q. 515, 521 n.9 (11th Cir. 1983).
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 1164, 216
U.S.P.Q. 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1982); the Roto-Rooter factors (see note 36)
were used, e.g., in Dieter v. B&H Indus. of Sw. Fla., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326,
11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1721, 1723–24 (11th Cir. 1989).
Frehling v. Int’l Select Group, 192 F.3d 1330, 1335, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1447
(11th Cir. 1999).
In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.
563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), quoted, e.g., in G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes &
Geddes, Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292, 1295, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1637–38 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
TMEP 1207.01 (2009).
Carl Karcher Enters., Inc. v. Stars Rests. Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1125, 1128
(T.T.A.B. 1995). The T.T.A.B. regards the Federal Circuit as its “primary
reviewing court.” Id. at 1133.
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§ 2:4
District of Columbia Circuit: As yet, there is no appellate court
precedent on the issue. The district court has looked for guidance, for
example, to the Ninth Circuit;48 the Seventh Circuit;49 and to the Second
Circuit.50
The lists of factors vary from one court of appeals to another (and
sometimes from one panel of judges to another within a court 51), but
basic factors common to virtually all include:
•
•
the strength of the senior mark;
the similarity of the marks;
•
the relatedness of the products and marketing channels;
•
the consumers and their degree of care;
•
actual confusion; and
•
the junior user ’s intent.
There is “no necessary sequence” to the analytical factors.51.1
Related factors may be consolidated for consideration,52 and some
factors may be considered as subcategories of others.53 In addition to
ordinary likelihood of confusion cases, the multi-factor test may be used
in more unusual cases, such as those which involve false endorsement;54
48.
49.
50.
51.
51.1.
52.
53.
54.
Delmatoff, Gerow, Morris, Langhans, Inc. v. Children’s Hosp. Nat’l Med.
Ctr., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1136, 1139 n.9 (D.D.C. 1989) (citing AMF, Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808 (9th Cir. 1979)).
Am. Ass’n for Advancement of Sci. v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244, 259,
206 U.S.P.Q. 605, 618–19 (D.D.C. 1980) (citing Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v.
Church & Dwight, 560 F.2d 1325, 195 U.S.P.Q. 218 (7th Cir. 1977)).
House of Hunan, Inc. v. Hunan at Pavilion, 227 U.S.P.Q. 803, 807 (D.D.C.
1985) (citing Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 967, 209
U.S.P.Q. 969, 975–76 (2d Cir. 1981)).
E.g., Accuride Int’l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1589, 1590 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989).
Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 15, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d
1385 (1st Cir. 2008) (taking “strength” first, it being relevant to both
protectability and infringement).
As commonly done in First Circuit cases, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan,
867 F.2d 22, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1690, 1696–97 (1st Cir. 1989) (channels of trade;
relationship between the parties’ advertising; classes of prospective purchasers).
E.g., prior relationship of the parties and intent, Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Cmty.
Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 n.9, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197, 203 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984).
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 926, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1072
(6th Cir. 2003) (Tiger Woods); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007,
1018–20, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (3d Cir. 2008) (with tailored multi-factor test);
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 812, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1189 (9th Cir.
1997); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
1583, 1587 (9th Cir. 1992) (Vanna White); Abdul Jabbar v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1397, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1694, 1699 (9th Cir. 1996).
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parody;55 comparative use of another’s mark;56 and use of the originator’s mark on rebuilt57 or modified58 goods.
The factors are not “necessary and sufficient conditions” of infringement.59 They focus attention and organize the analysis of the relevant
facts drawn from the totality of circumstances.60 The test is a “useful
guide” through the quagmire; a path through the thicket; 61 “an
analytical framework designed to add structure to this nebulous
inquiry.” “[T]here is nothing magical about these ‘factors’; they operate
only as a heuristic device to assist in determining whether confusion
exists.”61.1 The analysis is “superimposed upon what would otherwise
be an entirely subjective reaction,” and helps “to grapple with the
‘vexing’ problem.”62 “Using such a list [is] a check against jury
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
61.1.
62.
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
1516 (2d Cir. 1996); Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1993); Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp.
48, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (D. Mass. 1993); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci
Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1296, 1299 (8th Cir. 1994); Lyons v.
Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1999) (factors to
be evaluated each in light of a finding that defendant’s use was a parody).
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d 1498, 1500 (8th Cir. 1987) (“If you like OBSESSION you’ll love
CONFESS”).
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Prudhomme, 765 F. Supp. 1551, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
1561, 1571 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (applying traditional factors and adding new
factors).
Gen. Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1444
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1450, 1453–54 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 840, 222
U.S.P.Q. 10, 16 (11th Cir. 1983); Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech.,
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 211 U.S.P.Q. 75, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Soc’y of Fin.
Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Exam’rs, Inc., 41 F.3d 233, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d 1328, 1332 n.15 (5th Cir. 1995).
Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 226 U.S.P.Q. 123, 126
(11th Cir. 1985); Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,
8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633, 1647 (D. Md. 1988); Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Cosmair,
Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1547, 1553, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1013, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 230
U.S.P.Q. 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1986) (“quagmire”); Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v.
A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541, 1547 (2d Cir.
1987) (thicket); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc.,
43 F.3d 922, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1489 (4th Cir. 1995) (“guide”).
Sullivan v. CBS, 385 F.3d 772, 778, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1586, 1590 (7th
Cir. 2004).
Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1266, 225 U.S.P.Q.
1169, 1172 (6th Cir. 1985) (“superimposed”) (the U.S.P.Q. text is corrupt
at this point); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d
1033, 1043, 1044, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1992) (“analytical framework . . . ”; factors are “merely tools designed to help grapple with the
‘vexing’ problem of resolving the likelihood of confusion issue”).
2–16
§ 2:4
irrationality.”62.1 The factors “are simply objective aids for reaching a
subjective conclusion as to whether the consuming public is likely to
be genuinely confused. . . .”62.2 One is not left simply to “trust one’s
own sense of the likelihood of confusion.”63 The multi-factor test
brakes simplistic comparisons made in judges’ chambers or in courtrooms,64 and ensures “a broad examination of the central issue of
whether consumer confusion is likely.”65 When the factors are disregarded, “the potential for a judge to elevate his or her own subjective
impressions . . . is great.”65.1
Law requires predictability; trademark cases are unpredictable. The
multi-factor test does not necessarily make the outcome of a case more
predictable. It does settle the general pattern of proof and argument,
and it makes the decision process more uniform and predictable.66
The steady application of Polaroid is critical to the proper development of trademark law, for it is only when the Polaroid factors are
applied consistently and clearly over time that the relevant distinctions between different factual configurations can emerge. Litigants
are entitled to the illumination and guidance this common-law
process affords, and appellate courts depend on it for the performance of their assigned task of review. As Judge Friendly recognized
[in Polaroid], the ‘problem of determining how far a valid trademark
should be protected . . . has long been vexing and does not become
easier of solution with the years.’ The efficacy of the multi-factor
approach that Judge Friendly wisely set out to address this difficult
situation depends on thorough, careful, and consistent application
67
of the doctrine by district courts.
62.1.
62.2.
63.
64.
65.
65.1.
66.
67.
Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 73, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194
(1st Cir. 2008).
Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, 227 F.3d 619, 627, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1294
(6th Cir. 2000).
Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chem. Corp., 219 F. 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
1915) (Learned Hand, J.).
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987); Homeowners Group, Inc. v.
Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1106, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587,
1592 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The appearance of the litigated marks side by side in
the courtroom does not accurately portray actual market conditions”;
factors “help to pierce the unreality of simple comparisons and reveal
the operative facts of the real world.”).
Yankee Publ’g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 273, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d 1752, 1756 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1591 (9th Cir. 2007).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1168 (2d Cir. 1992); see Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v.
Prudhomme, 765 F. Supp. 1551, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1561, 1571–72 (N.D. Tex.
1991).
Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449,
1460 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
2–17
§ 2:5
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
Likelihood of confusion is evaluated by reference to the same basic
factors in all cases of conflict of trade symbols, whether of trade names or
trademarks, service marks or trade dress, registered or unregistered—
all are tested the same way.68 Courts apply the factors to cases of
source confusion as well as sponsorship confusion,69 although the
significance of the factors may vary depending on the type of infringement claimed.69.1
§ 2:5
Flexibility and Interrelatedness of the Factors
“Unless properly used, this long list of factors has the potential to
befuddle the inquiry. The list of factors is not a score-card—whether a
68.
69.
69.1.
Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1327, 1330, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying Eleventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit
recited an identical set of factors for analysis of both trade dress and word
mark infringement); Children’s Factory, Inc. v. Benee’s Toys, Inc., 160 F.3d
489, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826, 1829 n.6 (8th Cir. 1998), and Publ’ns Int’l Ltd. v.
Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1139, 1140 (7th Cir. 1998),
both citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (1992); First Sav. Bank FSB v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 101
F.3d 645, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1869 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996) (trademark/
service mark); Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1963 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) (trade dress; trademark); Nutri/
Sys., Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1809,
1810–11 (9th Cir. 1987) (service mark/trademark); Imagineering, Inc. v.
Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1526, 1529 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (trademark/trade dress); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966, 219 U.S.P.Q. 515, 521, 528 (11th Cir. 1983) (trademark/
trade dress); Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, Inc.,
841 F. Supp. 1339, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1965 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (unfair
competition; service mark; trade name); see Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville
Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 616, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1740, 1745 (9th Cir. 1989) (trade
dress); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186,
213 U.S.P.Q. 91, 96 (5th Cir. 1981) (trade dress); Accuride Int’l, Inc. v.
Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589, 1591–92 (9th Cir.
1989) (trade name); W. & Co. v. Arica Inst., Inc., 557 F.2d 338, 340 n.1,
195 U.S.P.Q. 466, 467 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (service mark); see Country
Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1584 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1991) (trademark/service mark); Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Cycles USA,
Inc., 765 F.2d 1502, 226 U.S.P.Q. 879, 880 (11th Cir. 1985) (factors the
same under both 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a)); cf. Walt-W. Enters., Inc.
v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1054, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1206, 1211 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1982) (noting that application of the standards to service marks “often
presents peculiar conundrums”); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d
189, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801 (3d Cir. 1995) (adapting factors to product shape
trade dress).
King of the Mountain Sports v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1091, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1999); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1128, 1131 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Therma-Scan v. Thermoscan, 295 F.3d 623, 631, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659 (6th
Cir. 2002).
2–18
§ 2:5
party ‘wins’ a majority of the factors is not the point.”69.2 Although
sometimes characterized as “digits” or the variables of a “calculus,” the
factors imply no mathematical precision and are not to be tallied. 70
The factors are to be “consulted.”70.1 “[W]e do not count beans.”70.2
The trademark owner need not prove all factors or even a majority to
prevail,71 but neither does the newcomer need to refute each and every
factor.72 The factors should not be set rigidly or pedantically as
“requirements or hoops that a (trial) court need jump through to
make the determination.”73 While the factors guide the analysis, “the
69.2.
70.
70.1.
70.2.
71.
72.
73.
Thane Int’l v. Trek Bicycle, 305 F.3d 894, 901, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1564, 1567
(9th Cir. 2002).
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 1989); Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Cmty. Rice Mill, Inc.,
725 F.2d 336, 345, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197, 203 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Although
the factors are sometimes characterized as ‘digits’ which are ‘added
together’ to reach a ‘sum total’ conclusion whether likely confusion is
established . . . it is clear that some of the factors are more important than
others and that they may have different weight in different cases.”);
Varitronics Sys. v. Merlin Equip., 682 F. Supp. 1203, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789,
1186 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Salton, Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F. Supp. 975,
989, 205 U.S.P.Q. 428, 440 (D.N.J. 1979) (“A variety of variables must be
sifted and weighed.”); TMEP 1207.01 (2009) (“There is no mechanical test
for determining likelihood of confusion.”).
Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 73, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194
(1st Cir. 2008) (“this circuit has resorted to the consultation of a series of
factors”).
Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1561, 1563 (9th Cir. 1998).
Physicians Formula Cosmetics, Inc. v. W. Cabot Cosmetics, Inc., 857 F.2d
80, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1136, 1140 (2d Cir. 1988); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating
Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 222 U.S.P.Q. 10, 17 n.17 (11th Cir.
1983); Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 225
U.S.P.Q. 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1985); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-Am., Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 125, 216 U.S.P.Q. 812, 834 n.45 (D.N.J. 1982), aff ’d, 775 F.2d
70, 227 U.S.P.Q. 716 (3d Cir. 1985); Playtex v. Georgia-Pacific, 390 F.3d
158, 167, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1127, 1133 (2d Cir. 2004).
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 1989); cf. Life Techs., Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific, Inc.,
826 F.2d 775, 777, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795, 1796 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Because the
burden of proof rests on [plaintiff], each of the SquirtCo. factors which it
fails to prove necessarily supports [defendant’s] position that there was no
infringement.”).
Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d 1885, 1888 (9th Cir. 1990); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross
Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir. 1989);
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872, 230
U.S.P.Q. 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1986); Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality
King Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d 1317, 1323, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1778, 1783 (2d Cir.
1987) (“We reject appellants’ contention that the district court must jump
through the Polaroid hoops every time it considers compliance with an
2–19
§ 2:5
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
likelihood of confusion issue is always one that is unique to each set of
facts.”74
The factors are “not immutable”; they are “variable and relative.”75
The list of factors is not exclusive and the court may have to take still
other variables into account.76 “All evidence tending to prove or disprove
a likelihood of confusion between two marks must be considered.”77
That different panels of judges within the same appellate court may
generate somewhat different lists of factors for no articulated reason (for
example, five factors in one case, eight in another) is immaterial since
the basic list, whatever it may be, is not exclusive.78
Generally, none of the factors by itself is always decisive or even
preeminent.79 (See section 2:6.) Nor should any systematically receive
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
earlier order.”); cf. Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1460 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the district
judge to engage in a deliberate review of each factor, and, if a factor is
inapplicable to a case, to explain why.”).
Stern’s Miracle-Gro Prods., Inc. v. Shark Prods., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1077,
1089, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1267, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1264, 225 U.S.P.Q.
1169, 1170 (6th Cir. 1985); Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d 1097, 1099, 162 U.S.P.Q. 67 (2d Cir. 1969); Playboy
Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In the Internet context, courts must be
flexible in applying the factors, as some may not apply.”).
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 n.3, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
1314, 1316 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832
F.2d 513, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, 1503 (10th Cir. 1987); Falcon Rice Mill, Inc.
v. Cmty. Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 n.9, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197, 203 n.9
(5th Cir. 1984); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 n.11, 204
U.S.P.Q. 808, 814 n.11 (9th Cir. 1979); Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring,
Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1998); Beer Nuts,
Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940, 221 U.S.P.Q. 209, 215
(10th Cir. 1983); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495,
128 U.S.P.Q. 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1961); In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
476 F.2d 1357, 1361–62, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. Great Plains Bag Co., 614 F.2d 757, 760, 204 U.S.P.Q.
697, 699 (C.C.P.A. 1980); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Winship Green
Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1251, 1255 (1st Cir. 1996) (“any
other factor that has a tendency to influence the impression conveyed to
prospective purchasers by the allegedly infringing conduct may be weighed
by the judge or jury in gauging the likelihood of confusion”); Shakespeare
Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 241, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266 (4th
Cir. 1997) (“a district court must consider any factor relevant to whether
confusion is likely between the two marks”).
Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
1885, 1887–88 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).
Playtex v. Georgia-Pacific, 390 F.3d 158, 162, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1127, 1130
(2d Cir. 2004); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128
F.3d 1111, 1115, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (7th Cir. 1997); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1288 (8th
2–20
§ 2:5
undue emphasis or excessive importance.80 The factors are interrelated
and must be considered together as an “amalgam.”81 They are not to be
applied serially or mechanically as if they were independent of one
another.82 “The likelihood of confusion test is an equitable balancing
test.”82.1 “The proper approach is to weigh each factor in the context of
the others to determine if, on balance, a likelihood of confusion
exists.”83 “A word of caution: this [multi-] factor test for likelihood of
confusion is pliant. Some factors are much more important than others,
and the relative importance of each individual factor will be casespecific.”83.1 Neither the presence nor absence of one factor should
determine likelihood of confusion without analyzing the others that are
relevant and weighing their “cumulative effect.”84 As one court mixed
80.
81.
82.
82.1.
83.
83.1.
84.
Cir. 1987); Volkswagenwerk AG v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 817, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1264, 1267 (1st Cir. 1987); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787
F.2d 1163, 1168, 229 U.S.P.Q. 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1986); Marathon Mfg. Co.
v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 218, 226 U.S.P.Q. 836, 837 (5th Cir.
1985); Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1004, 222
U.S.P.Q. 373, 377 (2d Cir. 1983); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co.,
711 F.2d 934, 940, 221 U.S.P.Q. 209, 215 (10th Cir. 1983); Lever Bros. Co. v.
Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 253, 216 U.S.P.Q. 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1982).
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero,
Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 934, 223 U.S.P.Q. 202, 208 (7th Cir. 1984).
Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189,
213 U.S.P.Q. 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1981); Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1930, 1932 (10th Cir. 1994).
Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
1010, 1013 (2d Cir. 1994) (“the analysis of the factors is ‘not a mechanical
process’”); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931
F.2d 1100, 1107, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 (6th Cir. 1991); Beer Nuts, Inc.
v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925, 231 U.S.P.Q. 913, 916 (10th
Cir. 1986); Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1004, 222
U.S.P.Q. 373, 377 (2d Cir. 1983) (“each must be considered in the context
of all of the other factors”); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870
F.2d 1176, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 1989); TMEP 1207.01
(2009) (“no mechanical test”).
Barbecue Marx v. 551 Ogden, 235 F.3d 1041, 1044, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307
(7th Cir. 2000) (“court must weigh the evidence pertaining to each likelihood of confusion factor and balance the seven factors against each
other”).
W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 572, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1593,
1596 (2d Cir. 1993).
Brookfield v. W. Coast, 174 F.3d 1036, 1054, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (9th Cir.
1999).
(2d Cir. 1985); Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 253, 216
U.S.P.Q. 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1982); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles,
Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir. 1989).
2–21
§ 2:6
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
its metaphors, the factors are “meant to be weighed against each other,
not individually viewed in a vacuum.”85
Since each factor represents only a facet of the single dispositive
issue of likely confusion, the factors, not surprisingly, tend to
overlap and interact, and the resolution of one factor will likely
influence the outcome and relative importance of other factors.
* * * [T]he determination of one factor is often, in essence, only
another way of viewing the same considerations already taken
into account in finding the presence or absence of another
85.1
one.
§ 2:6
Shifting Relevance and Weight of the Factors
Not all the factors are present or “equally emphasized” in each case.86
“[B]ecause the inquiry is case-specific,”86.1 different factors may play
“the dominant role” in different cases.87 The appropriate weight to be
given to each varies with the circumstances.88 Each factor must be
evaluated in the context of how it bears on the ultimate question of
85.
85.1.
86.
86.1.
87.
88.
Life Techs., Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific, Inc., 826 F.2d 775, 777, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
1795, 1796 (8th Cir. 1987). See Kos v. Andrx, 369 F.3d 700, 722, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1892 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We do not discount the strength of
plaintiff ’s case in one area because of weakness in another; we weigh each
factor separately.”) (omitting brackets, etc.) and Autozone v. Tandy, 373
F.3d 786, 795, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1391 (6th Cir. 2004) (“the fact that a
mark is strong does not impact our analysis of the similarity of the marks,
the relatedness of the products and services, or any of the other factors in
the likelihood of confusion test”).
Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
1705, 1708 (9th Cir. 2002).
Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
1592, 1599 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Not all of the factors are present in every
case.”); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527, 224 U.S.P.Q.
185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984).
Kemp v. Bumble Bee, 398 F.3d 1049, 1054, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 2002, 2007 (8th
Cir. 2005).
Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 889 F.2d 1070, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
1901, 1903 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Cmty. Rice Mill, Inc.,
725 F.2d 336, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197, 203 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984); Interstellar
Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1514,
1518 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the relative import of each factor is case specific”).
Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
1592, 1599 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The weight given to each factor in the
overall picture, as well as its weighing for plaintiff or defendant, must be
done on an individual fact-specific basis.”); Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc.
v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1983 (7th
Cir. 1988); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 218,
226 U.S.P.Q. 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1985); AmBRIT, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812
F.2d 1531, 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 1986); G.H. Mumm
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likelihood of confusion.89 A factor ordinarily comes into play only to the
extent that the record contains competent evidence pertaining to it.90
Lack of evidence on a factor may preclude any useful conclusion on it.91
“Our determination of likelihood of confusion . . . must be based on an
analysis of all the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion issue.”91.1 Findings as to
each disputed factor, plus analysis leading to the decision on likelihood
of confusion, are important for purposes of appellate review.91.2
Not all the factors are always relevant or particularly helpful. 92
Certain factors may play more or less of a role, or no role, depending
on the type of case; for example:
89.
90.
91.
91.1.
91.2.
92.
& Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635,
1637 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d
1565, 1568, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The cumulative
effect of all contributing factors must be weighed, as each case is decided on
its own facts.”); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
1591 (9th Cir. 2007) (“while a likelihood of confusion determination may
ultimately rest on a subset of factors, evidence of relatively important
factors must be considered as part of that set”).
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872, 230
U.S.P.Q. 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1986); Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v.
Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1339, 1346, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961,
1965 (E.D.N.Y.), reconsideration denied, 847 F. Supp. 18 (1994).
In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 483, 486 (T.T.A.B. 1985).
Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1345, 1352 (2d
Cir. 1988); see Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 889 F.2d 1070,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1901, 1903 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (factor evidence taken into
account “when of record”). (See sections 7:7–7:8.)
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Elsea, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400, 1407
(T.T.A.B. 1998).
Champagne Louis Roederer S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concurring opinion) (“once it set
forth its findings of fact with respect to each of the . . . Du Pont factors it
considered, the Board was further obligated to provide some brief analysis
regarding the relatively little weight it chose to afford the pro-confusion
factors in determining, ultimately, no likelihood of confusion”); Barbecue
Marx v. 551 Ogden, 235 F.3d 1041, 1044, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307 (7th Cir.
2000); Cunningham v. Laser Golf, 222 F.3d 943, 946–47, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000); New Kayak Pool v. R&P Pools, 246 F.3d 183, 185, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d 1475 (2d Cir. 2001) (remanding for application of multi-factor
test); Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1675 (6th Cir. 1998); GoTo.com v. Walt Disney, 202 F.3d
1199, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1652, 1660 (9th Cir. 2000).
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 933,
33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1489 (4th Cir. 1995), citing Pizzeria Uno Corp. v.
Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527, 224 U.S.P.Q. 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984);
Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,
1107, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 (6th Cir. 1991); Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v.
Cmty. Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 n.9, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197, 203 n.9
(5th Cir. 1984); Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1998); Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v.
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Post-sale confusion. Pre-sale factors such as purchaser care and
channels of trade may carry little or no weight.93 (See section 1:7.)
Reverse confusion. The strength factor, the actual confusion factor
and the intent factor “must be reworked in the context of a reverse
confusion case.” (See section 1:4.3.)
Nominative fair use. The similarity of marks factor and the
strength factor have been held to be inappropriate where a defendant
deliberately uses a plaintiff ’s mark to refer to plaintiff ’s product.93.1
Confusion of sponsorship. Purchaser care has been said to have
“diminished importance” in confusion of sponsorship cases, as
opposed to confusion of source cases.93.2 (See sections 1:4.1–1:4.2.)
93.
93.1.
93.2.
SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1561, 1564 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998)
(focus on “pivotal” factors, disregarding factors that “don’t provide much
insight in this case and thus carry little weight”); cf. Merch. & Evans,
Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 637, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1730,
1737 (3d Cir. 1992) (“the likelihood of confusion analysis ‘requires’ the
evaluation of a number of factors”); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d
189, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1810 (3d Cir. 1995) (evaluating applicability of
factors to product shape trade dress).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 357, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d 1456 (6th Cir. 2006); Abercrombie & Fitch v. Moose Creek,
486 F.3d 629, 635, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1845 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing cases);
T. Anthony, Ltd. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1214, 1217
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d
985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Ferrari S.p.A. v. Roberts,
944 F.2d 1235, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1010 (6th Cir. 1991); Nat’l Info. Corp.
v. Kiplinger Wash. Editors, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 460, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1948
(D.D.C. 1991); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776
F. Supp. 1454, 1461, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1368, 1371 (W.D. Wash. 1991);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-Am., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 216 U.S.P.Q.
812, 835 (D.N.J. 1982), aff ’d, 775 F.2d 70, 227 U.S.P.Q. 716 (3d Cir.
1985).
Century 21 v. LendingTree, 425 F.3d 211, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769 (3d Cir.
2005).
Frosty Treats v. Sony, 426 F.3d 1001, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1575, 1576 (8th Cir.
2005).
2–24
§ 2:6
Less than all, even one, may suffice to decide likelihood of confusion.94 (See section 2:5.) None is indispensable.94.1 One panel of the
Second Circuit appeals court went so far as to say with respect to the
“long list of factors”:
To reach a principled conclusion in a trademark case, it is just as
essential to recite the right formulas as it was for Ali Baba to say
‘Open Sesame’ in order to open the door to the treasure cave of the
95
Forty Thieves.
But another panel of the same court hastened to add:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that district courts must slavishly
recite the litany of all eight Polaroid factors in each and every case.
94.
94.1.
95.
1999) (“it is often possible to reach a conclusion with respect to likelihood
of confusion after considering only a subset of the factors”); Nora Beverages
v. Perrier Group, 269 F.3d 114, 119, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038, 1041 (2d Cir.
2001) (“Although no one factor is necessarily dispositive, any one factor
may prove to be so.”); Abercrombie & Fitch v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 280
F.3d 619, 648, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1788 (6th Cir. 2002) (“When the trade
dresses are so clearly distinguishable and would appear so to all but the
most obtuse consumer, that a court may resolve the issue of the dresses’
similarity as a matter of law, the defendant’s resounding success on this
factor makes plaintiff ’s burden of prevailing on the seven other . . . factors
effectively insurmountable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nabisco
v. Warner-Lambert, 220 F.3d 43, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051 (2d Cir. 2000);
U.S.P.Q.2d 1459, 1460–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“one DuPont factor may be
dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis, especially when that
single factor is the dissimilarity of the marks”); Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em
Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 333, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1142, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“We know of no reason why, in a particular case, a single DuPont factor
may not be dispositive”); cf. In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“the thirteen du Pont factors
‘must be considered’ ‘when [they] are of record’”); TMEP 1207.01 (2009);
Ziebart Int’l Corp. v. After Mkt. Assocs., Inc., 802 F.2d 220, 231 U.S.P.Q.
119, 125 (7th Cir. 1986). But some courts routinely enumerate all factors,
e.g., Volkswagenwerk AG v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 817, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264
(1st Cir. 1987) (“No one factor is necessarily determinative, but each must
be considered.”); accord Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1205, 220 U.S.P.Q. 786, 789 (1st Cir. 1983);
Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961,
1965–66 (8th Cir. 1996) (error for court to fail to apply all factors; no one is
determinative, but each must be analyzed).
Mktg. Displays v. TrafFix Devices, 200 F.3d 929, 933, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1335
(6th Cir. 1999) (“None of these factors is a sine qua non.”), rev’d on other
grounds, TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 121 S. Ct. 1255,
58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2001).
Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1219,
4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541, 1542 (2d Cir. 1987).
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A district court need only consider sufficient factors to reach the
ultimate conclusion as to whether or not there is likelihood of
96
confusion.
The court currently makes it “incumbent upon the [trial] judge to
engage in a deliberate review of each factor, and, if a factor is
inapplicable to a case, explain why.”96.1
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals requires that, if the trial court
“finds certain of the [standard] factors are inapplicable or unhelpful in
a particular case, that court should explain its choice not to employ
those factors.”96.2
So it is unnecessary to consider all the factors if some decide the case,97
but the court should not completely disregard the multi-factor analysis.98
96.
96.1.
96.2.
97.
98.
Orient Express Trading Co. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d 1308, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988); see Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v.
A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1230, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541, 1551 (2d
Cir. 1987) (Sprizzo, J., concurring) (taking issue with “mechanistic”
application of factors).
Natural Organics, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 426 F.3d 576, 579 (2d Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Kos v. Andrx, 369 F.3d 700, 711, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1884 (3d Cir. 2004).
Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1542, 225 U.S.P.Q.
1122, 1128 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The fact that the court did not discuss the
other five factors may indicate only that the court found those factors
insignificant under the circumstances.”); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine
& Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 152, 222 U.S.P.Q. 770, 773 (3d Cir. 1984)
(“it should not be necessary to consider all six [factors] when some are
dispositive”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, 281 F.3d 1261, 1265,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Swatch Watch, S.A. v.
Taxor, Inc., 785 F.2d 956, 229 U.S.P.Q. 391, 392 (11th Cir. 1986), and
Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
1885, 1888 (9th Cir. 1990).
Compare Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
1870, 1875 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction),
and Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d
1484, 1489 n.7, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1190, 1194 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987) (“the
district court completely disregarded the proper analysis”); Oakley, Inc. v.
Int’l Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1404 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (district court’s legal conclusion of confusing similarity “essentially
unreviewable”); see Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser ’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d
903, 223 U.S.P.Q. 982, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (trial court’s failure to discuss
factors no bar to appellate review where the evidence is overwhelmingly
undisputed); Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1493, 1501 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming under Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a), as long as the findings are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent
to provide a basis for the decision, or if there can be no genuine dispute
about omitted findings); Montcalm Publ’g Corp. v. Alternate Periodicals
Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400, 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (although trial court did
not use multifactor test, appellate court may review whether the facts as
found “are sufficient to compel a conclusion via the multifactor analysis”).
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§ 2:6
A lesser showing may be required on motion for preliminary
injunction.98.1
Within this flux, there is, to be sure, considerable latitude and a
“wide range” of discretion in considering and weighing the factors. 99
One court skillfully deployed the factors as follows:
[T]he Court is of the view that certain of the Polaroid factors are
probative of likelihood of confusion, others assist analysis of the
balance of the equities, and still others serve to aid both inquiries.
The Court also believes that it is important, in making use of the
various Polaroid factors, to consider not merely whether any
particular factor is implicated in the given case at hand, but the
degree to which that factor is implicated. Finally, the court notes
that it views the individual Polaroid factors only as indicia of, and
not as necessary conditions for, infringement. As a result, the fact
that one or more of the Polaroid factors is not implicated by a given
case does not determine the infringement issue, particularly if
other of the Polaroid factors are strongly implicated by the situation presented. At the same time, no single factor is a sufficient
condition to finding infringement. Rather, all the factors must be
considered together according to the degree to which each is
100
implicated by the case at hand.
Courts in some instances have categorically assigned relatively
heavier weight to certain factors, despite the general principle that
no one factor is supposed to be preeminent:
Actual confusion is often highly rated as the “best” or “most
persuasive” evidence of likelihood of confusion, making it the “most
important” factor for some.101 Such emphasis has led a few courts
98.1.
99.
100.
101.
First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1779,
1783 (9th Cir. 1987); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731
F.2d 148, 151–52, 222 U.S.P.Q. 770 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Meridian Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1119, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
1545 (7th Cir. 1997).
Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d
1317, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1778, 1784 (2d Cir. 1987) (Altimari, J., concurring);
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Prudhomme, 765 F. Supp. 1551, 1565, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1561, 1570 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (“There is, to be sure, considerable latitude available to the factfinder in considering and weighing the
traditional ordinary factors.”).
Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 211 U.S.P.Q.
75, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (emphasis in original).
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 216 U.S.P.Q.
599, 604 (11th Cir. 1982) (“most important” single factor); SunAmerica
Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 890 F. Supp. 1559, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
1865, 1877 (N.D. Ga. 1994), citing cases, remanded on issue of equitable
relief, 77 F.3d 1325, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (11th Cir. 1996); Lyons P ’ship v.
2–27
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OF
CONFUSION
close to presuming likelihood of confusion if meaningful actual confusion is proved. But that result is not followed by all. (See section 7:2.)
Strength of the mark is said in certain Fourth Circuit appellate cases
to be the “first and paramount factor,” and it often plays a dominant
role in Federal Circuit cases.102 To the contrary, the Second Circuit has
stated:
[I]f the determination of a mark’s strength were to stand as the
centerpiece of the Polaroid analysis, with the remaining factors
relegated to positions of lesser significance, weak marks would
automatically be found unlikely to cause confusion among purchasers as to source; strong marks would invariably be deemed to
cause confusion. The likelihood of confusion test would then
merely become a variation of the ‘trademark classification’
103
approach.
Similarity of marks: This has been called the “seminal factor”;
however, the overall likelihood of confusion analysis should not be
collapsed into the similarity factor. Overwhelming dissimilarity of
marks may, however, abruptly end the analysis. (See section 4:1.)
Intent: This factor is considered so important by some courts that a
showing of intentional infringement actually shifts the burden to
defendant to prove that there is no likelihood of confusion. Other
courts expressly disagree, but still give considerable weight to the
factor. (See section 8:3.2.)
102.
103.
Morris Costumes, 243 F.3d 789, 804, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“the seventh factor—actual confusion—is often paramount”); George &
Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d
1786 (4th Cir. 2009).
Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1054
(4th Cir. 2006); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1444, 1445 (4th Cir. 1987); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1457–58 (4th Cir. 1996); Recot v.
Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kenner Parker
Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 352, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453,
1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The fifth duPont factor, fame of the prior mark,
plays a dominant role in cases featuring a famous or strong mark.”); see
Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
1633, 1641 (D. Md. 1989); CBS, Inc. v. Liederman, 866 F. Supp. 763, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d 1333, 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The strength of a mark is the
central issue as it will determine the breadth of the mark’s protection.”),
aff ’d, 44 F.3d 174, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1640 (2d Cir. 1995).
(2d Cir. 1985); Am. B.D. Co. v. N.P. Beverages, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 387, 389
(T.T.A.B. 1981) (“whether a mark is strong or weak is only one of a number
of factors”).
2–28
§ 2:6
Trade channels: Said by the Sixth Circuit to be very significant and
of special importance where other factors are not particularly
probative.104
Conversely, a court may relegate certain factors to a lesser role, for
example, intent and the quality of the defendant’s product. 104.1
Certain combinations of factors have from time to time been
identified categorically as the more important for consideration:
•
•
strength of the prior user ’s mark and actual confusion;105
similarity of the marks and of the goods especially in registrability proceedings (see section 2:8);106
•
similarity of the marks, intent and actual confusion; 107
•
strength of the prior user ’s mark, similarity of the marks, and
proximity of the goods;108 and
104.
104.1.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,
1110, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1595 (6th Cir. 1991).
Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1420, 1428
(2d Cir. 2003).
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 122 F.3d
1379, 1382, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1997); Dieter v. B&H Indus. of
Sw. Fla., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1721, 1724 (11th Cir.
1989); Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 226 U.S.P.Q.
123, 130 (11th Cir. 1985); Aronowitz v. Health-Chem Corp., 513 F.3d
1229, 1240, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1604 (11th Cir. 2008) (“type of mark and
actual confusion”); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1458 (4th Cir. 1996) (the “alpha and omega”; the
“inquiry ends almost as soon as it begins”); Lyons P ’ship v. Morris
Costumes, 243 F.3d 789, 804, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 2001).
In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 U.S.P.Q. 749, 750 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“[t]he basic principle”); In re Big Pig, Inc., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436,
1438 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“two key considerations”); Time Warner v. Jones, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 1658 (T.T.A.B. 2002), quoting Federated Foods, Inc. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 U.S.P.Q. 24, 29 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (the cumulative differences between the respective goods and the
respective marks); In re Opus One, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1812, 1813 (T.T.A.B.
2001); In re Jakob Demmer KG, 219 U.S.P.Q. 1199, 1201 (T.T.A.B. 1983)
(“the predominant consideration”); In re Johnson Prods., Co., 220
U.S.P.Q. 539, 540 (T.T.A.B. 1983); TMEP 1207.01 (2009) (“In [PTO] ex
parte examination, the issue of likelihood of confusion typically revolves
around the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the relatedness of
the goods or services.”).
Barbecue Marx v. 551 Ogden, 235 F.3d 1041, 1044, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307
(7th Cir. 2000); Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., 237 F.3d 891, 898, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
1617 (7th Cir. 2001); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
873 F.2d 985, 999, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1813 (7th Cir. 1989).
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1677, 1680 (2d Cir. 1987) (“perhaps the most significant”).
2–29
§ 2:7
LIKELIHOOD
•
OF
CONFUSION
(in Internet cases) similarity of the marks, relatedness of the
products, and the parties’ simultaneous use of the Internet as a
marketing channel.108.1
Among a particular combination of factors, “[t]here is no hard and
fast requirement that all . . . must weigh in a plaintiff ’s favor for that
particular party to prevail. . . .”108.2
§ 2:7
The Factors As Applied to Cases of Competitive and
Noncompetitive Goods
The Second Circuit appeals court in Polaroid expressly related the
factors to cases involving marks for different goods.109 In a later case
involving competitive goods, the court said that the decision did “not
require a weighing of the many conflicting considerations necessary in
trademark cases where the products are different.”110 The Second
Circuit and most other courts now, however, freely apply the full
sets of factors to cases of both kinds.111 Of course, such factors as
product relatedness, including expansion of product lines, are superfluous where the goods are competitive.112 (See section 5:10.)
Some courts hold open the possibility that likelihood of confusion
may be found simply on the basis of similar marks being used for
competitive goods; they would refer to all the factors only in cases of
108.1.
108.2.
109.
110.
111.
112.
Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the three most important
Sleekcraft factors. . . . When this controlling troika or internet trinity
suggests confusion is likely, the other factors must weigh strongly against a
likelihood of confusion to avoid the finding of infringement.”) (quotation
marks, citations omitted). The Interstellar court further noted: “If the
internet trinity does not clearly indicate a likelihood of confusion, a
district court can conclude the infringement analysis only by balancing
all the Sleekcraft factors within the unique context of each case.” Id. See
also PACCAR v. TeleScan, 319 F.3d 243, 254–55, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1761,
1768 (6th Cir. 2003); cf. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354
F.3d 1020, 1026, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In the
Internet context, courts must be flexible in applying the factors, as some
may not apply.”).
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, 237 F.3d 891, 902, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1617 (7th Cir.
2001).
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495, 128 U.S.P.Q.
411, 413 (2d Cir. 1961).
A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692, 176
U.S.P.Q. 15 (2d Cir. 1972).
(2d Cir. 1985).
See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 228 U.S.P.Q. 346,
351 n.8 (9th Cir. 1985).
2–30
§ 2:7
noncompetitive goods.113 Put more strongly, likelihood of confusion is
“inevitable” or “must be assumed” when the identical mark is used for
the same goods or services.114 The two-factor analysis in such cases
does not so much make consideration of the other factors improper as
it as it reflects “the obvious conclusion that a likelihood of confusion is
more readily found when the goods compete and the marks are very
similar.”115
In an exhaustive review of the issue, the Third Circuit has held that
the full range of its factors are available, but not compulsory, for use in
cases of both competing and noncompeting goods.115.1 The Second
Circuit has stated that “[i]n no case have we determined a senior
user’s right to injunctive relief solely on the basis of the similarity of
113.
114.
115.
115.1.
1999); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
1641, 1645 (9th Cir. 1993), citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d
341, 348, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1979) (“When the goods
produced by the alleged infringer compete for sales with those of the
trademark owner, infringement usually will be found if the marks are
sufficiently similar that confusion can be expected. When the goods
are related, but not competitive, several other factors are added to the
calculus. If the goods are totally unrelated, there can be no infringement
because confusion is unlikely.”) (footnote omitted); accord Homeowners
Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 n.4, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 n.4 (6th Cir. 1991).
Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1990) (“inevitable”); Polo Fashions, Inc. v.
Fernandez, 655 F. Supp. 664, 669, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1296, 1300 (D.P.R. 1987)
(“a likelihood of confusion must be assumed”); Aris-Isotoner Gloves, Inc.
v. Fownes Bros. & Co., 594 F. Supp. 15, 222 U.S.P.Q. 489, 492
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (presumptive confusion); Birthright v. Birthright, Inc.,
827 F. Supp. 1114, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081, 1095 (D.N.J. 1993).
Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 796 F.2d 254, 255, 230 U.S.P.Q. 791, 793
(9th Cir. 1986); R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF U NFAIR C OMPETITION
§ 21 cmt. e, at 233 (1995) (“When the designations are used on competing
goods, services, or businesses, the likelihood of confusion will depend
largely on a comparison of the similarities between the two designations as
used in the marketplace.”); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1041, 1042
n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (“similarity of the marks in one respect—sight, sound
or meaning—will not automatically result in a finding of likelihood of
confusion even if the goods are identical or closely related. Rather, the rule
is that taking into account all of the relevant facts of a particular case,
similarity as to one factor (sight, sound or meaning) alone ‘may be
sufficient to support a holding that the marks are confusingly similar.’”)
(emphasis added). Cf. Cohn v. Petsmart, 281 F.3d 837, 843, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
1688, 1692 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This is an unusual case where there is no
likelihood of confusion even though the parties use the same mark for
similar goods and services.”).
A&H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 237 F.3d 198, 214–15, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1103–06 (3d Cir. 2000). The court cited Second, Sixth,
Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases said to be in accord. Id. at 214.
2–31
§ 2:8
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
the marks and the proximity of the products. . . . [A]llowing a senior
user a premonitory lien on a future or adjacent market could lead to
great injustice.”116 Likewise the Seventh Circuit has cautioned that
there would be no infringement—even though the marks are identical
and the goods very similar—if the evidence overall nonetheless indicates no likelihood of confusion.117
§ 2:8
The Factors in Registrability Proceedings
In PTO proceedings where likelihood of confusion is asserted with
respect to a mark in a registration or application, the likelihood of
confusion inquiry is restricted in some ways, broadened in others.
Registrability is decided primarily with respect to the mark and goods
or services as shown and described in the registration or application,
regardless of the manner of actual use in the marketplace.118 This
practice is justified by the benefits afforded to registered marks. (See
section 1:8.2.) The registrant, or the would-be registrant, which enjoys
the benefits must bear their burden as well.119
Also, since the T.T.A.B. decides only registrability and has no power
over actual use of the mark, its decisions are governed more by what is
shown in the registration or application than by the circumstances of
actual use in the marketplace.120 The applicant and registrant as
defendants cannot rely on distinguishing trade channels or marketing
methods not stated in the application or registration, because such
channels or methods might change at any time.121 Nor can they
rely on trade dress or other distinguishing features, which, although
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 209 U.S.P.Q. 969, 974, 976
n.4 (2d Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted; noting that injury
“might be inevitable when the marks and products are practically identical
and the products are interchangeable for all or at least all significant uses”).
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274, 192
U.S.P.Q. 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1976).
TMEP 1207.01(a)(iii) (2009).
RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. 960, 964–65
(T.T.A.B. 1980); San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elec. Components
Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 U.S.P.Q. 1, 2 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (exemplifying the
benefit of the presumption).
In addition to the cases cited below, see Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal
IG Co., 225 U.S.P.Q. 190, 191 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (Allen, Member, dissenting); see Volkswagenwerk AG v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264,
1269 (1st Cir. 1987).
In re Crompton Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. 471, 472 (T.T.A.B. 1983); Freedom Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Fid. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 224 U.S.P.Q. 300, 304 (T.T.A.B.
1984); Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194
U.S.P.Q. 419, 421 (C.C.P.A. 1977); CBS, Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218
U.S.P.Q. 198, 199 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
2–32
§ 2:8
used with a mark, are not shown in the application or registration. 122
The T.T.A.B. leaves the extrinsic issues of trade dress infringement and
unfair competition to the courts.123 These strictures profoundly affect
the relevance of evidence offered in cancellation and opposition
proceedings.124
The Goods/Services. Absent specific limitations in the application
or registration, and even if marketplace realities in fact involve
limitations or qualifications, the T.T.A.B. will assume for the goods
or services all normal and usual types of purchasers, uses, prices, sizes,
channels of trade, advertising and methods of distribution on a
nationwide basis.125 Where “the goods are legally identical, they
must be presumed to travel in the same channels of trade, and be
sold to the same class of purchasers.” 125.1 Limitations that are
“inherent” in the “nature” of the goods can be considered, given proof
122.
123.
124.
125.
125.1.
“[A] necessary premise—albeit a false one—is that the trade dress which
is now associated with the parties’ marks has no source distinguishing
effect.” Miles Labs., Inc. v. Naturally Vitamin Supplements, Inc., 1
U.S.P.Q.2d 1445, 1452 (T.T.A.B. 1986).
Po Folks, Inc. v. Kountry Folks Rests., Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. 313, 315 (T.T.A.B.
1986).
For example, if there are no restrictions as to purchasers, then evidence of
the care or sophistication of certain classes of purchasers may be irrelevant.
Hercules, Inc. v. Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. 1244, 1250
(T.T.A.B. 1984). With the service specification “restaurant services,” it is
presumed that all kinds of foods are served. In re Appetito Provisions Co.,
3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1553, 1556 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
In re Big Pig, Inc., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436, 1438 (T.T.A.B. 2006); SquirtCo. v.
Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 U.S.P.Q. 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (goods
and channels); Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d
1490, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1813, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Penguin Books Ltd. v.
Eberhard, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280, 1286 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (registration for
“books” deemed “broad enough to encompass books of all types, including
books on the very subject matter [in issue]”); Peopleware Sys., Inc. v.
Peopleware, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 320, 321 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (classes of
purchasers); Block Drug Co. v. Den-Mat, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1315, 1317
(T.T.A.B. 1989) (goods), aff ’d sub nom. Den-Mat Corp. v. Block Drug Co.,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Opus One, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1812,
1817 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (prices); Balmain v. Bernstein & Sons Shirt Corp.,
223 U.S.P.Q. 1148, 1149 n.7 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (price ranges); In re Shawnee
Milling Co., 225 U.S.P.Q. 747, 748 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (no restriction as to
size of packaging); Coach House Rest. v. Coach & Six Rests., 934 F.2d
1551, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1407 (11th Cir. 1991) (nationwide scope); Carl
Karcher Enters., Inc. v. Stars Rest. Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1125, 1133 (T.T.A.B.
1995), quoting Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d
1565, 218 U.S.P.Q. 390, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (nationwide scope); TMEP
1207.01(a)(iii).
In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1531, 1532 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
2–33
§ 2:8
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
of what such limitations might be.126 Specifications and fields of use
will be evaluated with particularity.126.1 Limitations in the channels of
trade of one party’s goods do not preclude conflict absent corresponding limitations in the other party’s channels, avoiding overlap.127 The
applicant’s description of goods will be construed in the manner most
favorable to the opposer,128 and a registrant must clarify through
evidence any indefiniteness in its own description of goods.129 When
the description of goods in a registration is vague, it can be interpreted by
reference to extrinsic evidence such as the official file or trade usage.130
Providing an escape from abstractions, the T.T.A.B. is now empowered to limit the goods and services specified in an application or
registration in order “to base determinations of likelihood of confusion
on marketplace realities rather than on hypothetical facts.” 131
When there are multiple goods or services within a particular class,
a finding of likelihood of confusion as to any will defeat all within that
class.131.1
126.
126.1.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
131.1.
Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209
U.S.P.Q. 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Triumph Mach. Co. v. Kentmaster
Mfg. Co., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826, 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1987); see Packaging Indus.
Group, Inc. v. Great Am. Mktg., Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 734, 735 (T.T.A.B. 1985).
M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1383, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Box Solutions Corp., 79
U.S.P.Q.2d 1953 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
In re Pierce Foods Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. 307, 309 (T.T.A.B. 1986); In re Diet
Ctr., Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1975, 1976 (T.T.A.B. 1987); Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc.
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1655, 1656 (T.T.A.B. 1988). But if
one party’s goods are restricted to sales through that party’s own stores,
the channels will differ even though the other party ’s goods are unrestricted if such goods would not normally be sold through the first party ’s
stores. In re Shoe Works, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1890, 1891 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
CBS, Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 U.S.P.Q. 198, 199 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209
U.S.P.Q. 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); David Crystal, Inc. v. Soo Valley Co.,
471 F.2d 1245, 176 U.S.P.Q. 326, 327 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
Pharmacia, Inc. v. Asahi Med. Co., 222 U.S.P.Q. 84, 86–87 (T.T.A.B.
1984).
Phoenix Closures, Inc. v. Yen Shaing Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1891, 1894
(T.T.A.B. 1988); Stouffer Corp. v. Health Valley Natural Foods, Inc., 1
U.S.P.Q.2d 1900, 1901 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1986); In re Trackmobile, Inc., 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1152, 1154 (T.T.A.B. 1990); cf. In re RSI Sys. LLC, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d
1445, 1449 (T.T.A.B. 2008); TMEP 1207.01(a)(iii) (2009).
S. REP. NO. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1988), on 15 U.S.C.
§ 1068, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5603. The T.T.A.B. will exercise
this power if the requesting party has given fair notice to the applicant or
registrant. Pers. Data Sys., Inc. v. Parameter Driven Software, Inc.,
20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863, 1865 (T.T.A.B. 1991); Space Base, Inc. v. Stadis
Corp., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1220 (T.T.A.B. 1990); Penguin Books Ltd. v.
Eberhard, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280, 1286–87 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Rodriguez, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1500, 1507 (T.T.A.B.
2007).
2–34
§ 2:8
The Marks. Likewise, if the mark shown in the registration or
application “drawing”132 is in typed or block letter form or even has
minor design elements, then the mark is to be considered regardless of
typeface, stylization, size, proportions or other features (such as trade
dress or an accompanying house mark) that may actually be used with
the mark.133 Registration in plain form gives rights in all reasonable
manners or forms, even that of an opposing party.134 Where the
drawing is lined for a color, all shades and hues of that color
are assumed.135 As for the sound of marks when vocalized, “absent
evidence to the contrary, [the T.T.A.B.] must consider all of the
possibilities that are reasonable, considering the nature of the goods
and their purchasers.”136
Distinguishing features in the setting of the mark as actually used,
for example, on labels or in advertisements, may be considered to the
extent they reveal the mark’s likely significance to consumers. 137
Specimens of actual use may help to visualize the forms in which a
mark may appear.138 Also, a newcomer ’s actual trade dress, while not
shown in the drawing, may indicate copying and so be relevant on the
issue of intent to cause confusion.139
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
TMRP 2.21(a)(3) (requiring that every application be accompanied by a
drawing of the mark sought to be registered).
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Harvard Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1075, 1077 (T.T.A.B. 1990); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stagecoach
Props., Inc., 685 F.2d 302, 216 U.S.P.Q. 480, 484 (9th Cir. 1982); Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639, 1640 (T.T.A.B.
1988) (size); In re Fisher Tool Co., 224 U.S.P.Q. 796, 797 (T.T.A.B. 1984)
(minor design elements include underlining or geometric figures).
Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1204,
1207 (9th Cir. 1987); In re L.C. Licensing, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1379, 1381
(T.T.A.B. 1998); INB Nat’l Bank v. Metrohost, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1585,
1588 (T.T.A.B. 1992); Piccolo Sportswear, Inc. v. Mast Indus., Inc., 227
U.S.P.Q. 710, 711 (T.T.A.B. 1985); Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality
Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1511, 1514 (2d Cir. 1996); TMEP
1207.01(c)(iii) (2009).
Amsted Indus., Inc. v. W. Coast Wire Rope & Rigging, Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1755, 1760 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Brutting E.B. Sport-Int’l GmbH, 230 U.S.P.Q.
530, 533 (T.T.A.B. 1986).
Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 223
U.S.P.Q. 1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Stubenberg Int’l,
Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1310, 1312 (T.T.A.B. 1998); Tiffany & Co. v. Classic
Motor Carriages, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1835, 1842 (T.T.A.B. 1989); In re
Nationwide Indus., Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1882, 1883–84 (T.T.A.B. 1988); Nw.
Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. 240, 244 (T.T.A.B. 1985).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. C.J. Webb, Inc., 442 F.2d 1376, 170 U.S.P.Q. 35,
36 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
Roger & Gallet S.A. v. Venice Trading Co., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1829, 1832
(T.T.A.B. 1987); Am. Rice, Inc. v. H.I.T. Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. 793, 797
(T.T.A.B. 1986).
2–35
§ 2:9
§ 2:9
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
The Factors As Legal or Factual Questions
Likelihood of confusion cases are fact-driven (see section 2:1), and
courts generally treat each factor as a question of fact. Most courts
label the ultimate “likelihood of confusion” issue a question of fact,
but a few label it an “ultimate” question of law. The difference is
most relevant to the standard of appellate review and summary
judgment.140
140.
In the majority (treating likelihood of confusion as an issue of fact) are the
following: FIRST CIRCUIT: Keds Corp. v. Renee Int’l Trading Corp., 888
F.2d 215, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1813 (1st Cir. 1989); THIRD CIRCUIT:
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting differentiation between
“subsidiary” factual issues and an “ultimate” legal issue); FOURTH
CIRCUIT: Petro Stopping Ctrs. L.P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc., 130
F.3d 88, 91–92, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1921 (4th Cir. 1997); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v.
Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1526, 224 U.S.P.Q. 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984);
FIFTH CIRCUIT: Sunbeam Prods. Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1169 (5th Cir. 1997); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite
Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 217, 226 U.S.P.Q. 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1985);
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d
1423, 1428–29, 227 U.S.P.Q. 138, 141–42 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
differentiation between subsidiary factual issues and an “ultimate” legal
issue, and disagreeing with the Federal Circuit); Rust Env’t v. Teunissen,
131 F.3d 1210, 1216, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1997); see Libman Co.
v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1751, 1756–58 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Coffey, J., dissenting); EIGHTH CIRCUIT: Everest Capital v.
Everest Funds, 393 F.3d 755, 760, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1580, 1583 (8th Cir.
2005); ConAgra, Inc. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 990 F.2d 368, 370–71,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316, 1318 (8th Cir. 1993); NINTH CIRCUIT: Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355–56, 228 U.S.P.Q.
346, 348 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); TENTH CIRCUIT: Heartsprings, Inc.
v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir.
1998); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of
Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488 n.6, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1190, 1193 n.6
(11th Cir. 1987); D.C. CIRCUIT: Reader ’s Digest Ass’n v. Conservative
Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 804, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. m
(1995) considers the majority view to be “the better view.” In the minority
(treating likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of law and fact, or an
issue of law, based on “factual” factor findings) are: SECOND CIRCUIT:
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1519 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Although we review de novo the
district court’s comprehensive application of the Polaroid factors, the
district court’s determinations as to each of the factors are factual in
nature . . . [to] be disturbed only if clearly erroneous.”); Paddington Corp. v.
Attiki Imps. & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1189, 1194 (2d
Cir. 1993); Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d 1010, 1013 (2d Cir. 1994) (mixed question of law and fact
reviewed de novo); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys.,
2–36
§ 2:9
The Tenth Circuit appeals court has discussed the difficulty of
labeling as follows:
While the “findings” may be more properly classified as conclusions derived from the fact finder ’s evaluation of the evidence and
the surrounding circumstances, such a “mixed bag” is, we believe,
inevitable in the process of determining the likelihood of confusion. . . . Determinations involving “suggestion,” “intent,” and
“the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers” require
that the fact finder reach conclusions based on personal evaluation
of evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. On appeal, our
task is to decide whether there is a reasonable basis for the trial
141
court’s findings and conclusions.
Under the majority rule, the factors are applied and the results
weighed all as a part of the determination of whether as a matter of fact
confusion is likely.142 On appeal, the factual finding is subjected to
deferential review for clear error. Under the minority rule, the process
is bifurcated: the court will (1) reverse the factor findings only if clearly
erroneous or, on appeals from the T.T.A.B., unsupported by substantial
141.
142.
165 F.3d 419, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1355, 1357–58 (6th Cir. 1999), Frisch’s
Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, 670 F.2d 642, 651, 214
U.S.P.Q. 15, 22 (6th Cir. 1982) (relying on the Ninth Circuit, which later
en banc changed its view in Levi Strauss, supra); FEDERAL CIRCUIT:
U.S.P.Q.2d 1459, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998). On this as well as other substantive trademark law issues, the Federal Circuit applies the law of the
originating circuit where trademark disputes accompany patent appeals,
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser ’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 909, 223
U.S.P.Q. 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1984), with anomalous results. Kirkpatrick,
Likelihood of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit’s Standard of Review,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 1221 (1991). A district court has criticized the minority
view because it “frees the reviewing court from being bound by what is by
logic and common sense a factual determination. By such a classification,
the reviewing court virtually mandates an appeal from every trial court
determination based on a Polaroid analysis resulting in increased uncertainty and confusion in an area which is difficult at best.” Elizabeth Taylor
Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp. 1238, 1247–48, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1403,
1407–08 (10th Cir. 1987).
AmBRIT, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1166–67 (11th Cir. 1986); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1971, 1973 (10th Cir. 1984); Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Cmty.
Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197, 203 n.9 (5th Cir.
1984) (“The weight to be given to the various factors is a matter for the
factfinder.”); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Likelihood of confusion in a
trademark case is a factual issue, and appellate review is deferential.”).
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evidence; but (2) exercise plenary (“de novo”) review in deciding the
ultimate issue: likelihood of confusion.143
143.
SECOND CIRCUIT: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973
F.2d 1033, 1043, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1168 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In this
Circuit, a district court’s determination of the individual Polaroid factors
are subject to review as findings of fact subject to reversal only if clearly
erroneous, while the ultimate balancing of all the Polaroid factors to
determine the likelihood of confusion in any given case is done de novo
by this Court”); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d
497, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1519 (2d Cir. 1996); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1228, 1233 (2d Cir. 1997). See Playtex
v. Georgia-Pacific, 390 F.3d 158, 162 n.2, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1127, 1130 (2d
Cir. 2004) (identifying a “considerably deferential” standard in Patsy’s
Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, 317 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2003)). SIXTH
CIRCUIT: Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1675 (6th Cir. 1998) (“factual findings . . . with
respect to each of these factors . . . are subject to review for clear error. . . .
However, the balancing of these findings to determine the ultimate issue of
likelihood of confusion is a question of law.”); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas,
839 F.2d 1183, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944, 1946 (6th Cir. 1988); Kellogg Co. v.
Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 622–23, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1484 (6th
Cir. 2003) (appeal from T.T.A.B.). FEDERAL CIRCUIT: Recot v. Becton,
214 F.3d 1322, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Federal Circuit
exercises plenary review of T.T.A.B.’s “ultimate conclusion” on likelihood
of confusion, and upholds T.T.A.B. factual findings unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence); Bose v. QSC Audio, 293 F.3d
1367, 1370, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Each of the
DuPont factors presents a question of fact, findings with regard to which
we test for substantial evidence when called into question on appeal.”);
On-Line Careline v. Am. Online, 229 F.3d 1080, 1084–86, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing history and nature of “substantial
evidence” standard as now applied to review of T.T.A.B. judgments); Han
Beauty v. Alberto-Culver, 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1557 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“This Court upholds the Board’s factual findings if supported
by substantial evidence.”). Examples in practice include: Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Packard Techs., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1005
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding likelihood of confusion as a “matter of law” and
reversing the Board’s decision); In re Mars, Inc., 741 F.2d 395, 222
U.S.P.Q. 938 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (court, not sharing the T.T.A.B.’s doubts,
reversed); Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713,
718, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1388, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“the Board gave too much
weight to certain DuPont factors . . . and failed to give due weight to
countervailing DuPont factors”); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas
Enters., Ltd., 774 F.2d 1144, 1146, 227 U.S.P.Q. 541, 542 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“The Board considered most of those factors. We now reconsider
the elements that apply to this case, reaching a different final conclusion
from that of the T.T.A.B.”). Cf. Champagne Louis Roederer S.A. v. Delicato
Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1459, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“We
must affirm, for [appellant] merely restates its arguments from the
opposition, which primarily concerns the appropriate weight to be given
the various findings on the DuPont factors considered by the Board, and has
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On the “similarity of marks” factor, where displays of the marks are
in evidence, a few appellate courts will rule as a matter of law, thinking
themselves “as adequately equipped” as the trial court to decide whether
there is confusing similarity.144 Most appellate courts will not substitute
their “own eyeball evaluations” for the trial court’s, absent clear error.145
On summary judgment, “[a]lthough there may be issues of fact
which arise with respect to individual factors, the application of these
factors to the likelihood of confusion analysis often presents legal
issues appropriately decided on summary judgment.”146 The court
may render summary judgment on likelihood of confusion “where no
dispute exists with respect to the facts rendered material by the [multifactor] test.”147 “The standard of ‘likelihood of confusion’ does not
change on summary judgment. . . . The fact that on summary
judgment the evidence must be construed in a light favorable to the
144.
145.
146.
147.
failed to demonstrate any reversible error in the Board’s decision or foundational factual findings.”). The Seventh Circuit has joined the Federal Circuit
in reviewing T.T.A.B. factual findings for “substantial evidence.” CAE v.
Clean Air, 267 F.3d 660, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1458–60 (7th Cir. 2001).
Woodsmith Publ’g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
1053, 1057 (8th Cir. 1990); Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. &
Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 480 n.53, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 2008).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1043–44,
24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1168 (2d Cir. 1992); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow,
Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 661–62, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1987);
AmBRIT, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 984 n.46, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1169 n.46 (11th Cir. 1986); Stock Pot Rest., Inc. v. Stockpot, Inc., 737 F.2d
1576, 222 U.S.P.Q. 665, 666–67 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA
Distrib., Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 216 U.S.P.Q. 457, 460 (1st Cir. 1982);
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1799, 1801 (1st Cir. 1987). For the Seventh Circuit, compare Ziebart Int’l
Corp. v. After Mkt. Assocs., Inc., 802 F.2d 220, 226, 231 U.S.P.Q. 119, 123
(7th Cir. 1986) (“this court can determine just as well as the trial court the
factor of similarity of the marks themselves”), with Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429, 227 U.S.P.Q. 138 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“The clearly erroneous rule now applies across the board.”).
Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1565, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1793, 1797 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“we must lay to rest [nonmovant’s] argument that because the parties dispute likelihood of confusion, the board could not resolve that ‘issue of fact’ on summary judgment. . . . The uniform precedent of this court is that the issue of
likelihood of confusion is one of law. . . . Thus, the board may unquestionably resolve that issue on summary judgment.”); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 221 U.S.P.Q. 991, 1005
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff ’d, 746 F.2d 112, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1000 (2d Cir. 1984)
(weighing of evidence a determination of law).
Brown v. Quiniou, 744 F. Supp. 463, 467, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1165
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799
F.2d 867, 876, 230 U.S.P.Q. 831, 838 (2d Cir. 1986). For the Sixth Circuit,
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non-moving party does not modify the standard itself, which requires a
showing of probability, or likelihood, of confusion.” 147.1
Issues of fact on “any one—or even a majority—of the factors” do not
necessarily preclude summary judgment, “because any one factor standing alone may not be material.” (See section 2:6.) Since a mix of factor
findings, pro and con, “does not prevent an overall finding of likelihood
of confusion in the movant’s favor, it would be illogical for a merely
disputed factor to preclude summary judgment.”147.2 Still, it is said that
summary judgment is disfavored in trademark infringement cases
“because the ultimate issue is so inherently factual [and] is routinely
submitted for jury determination as a question of fact.”147.3
§ 2:10
Beyond Confusion: The Factors and Equity
Ordinarily, likelihood of confusion causes irreparable injury to the
senior user for which there is no adequate remedy at law and which,
therefore, calls for the equitable remedy of an injunction. 148 Injunctive
147.1.
147.2.
147.3.
148.
Gibson Guitar v. Paul Reed, 423 F.3d 539, 548 n.11, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1372
(6th Cir. 2005); Abercrombie & Fitch v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d
619, 646, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1787 (6th Cir. 2002), and Therma-Scan v.
Thermoscan, 295 F.3d 623, 631, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659 (6th Cir. 2002).
Nora Beverages v. Perrier Group, 269 F.3d 114, 121, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038,
1042 (2d Cir. 2001).
Mktg. Displays v. TrafFix Devices, 200 F.3d 929, 933–34, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
1335 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, TrafFix Devices v. Mktg.
Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 121 S. Ct. 1255, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2001); Gray
v. Meijer, Inc., 295 F.3d 641, 646, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1735 (6th Cir. 2002),
Nora Beverages v. Perrier Grp., 269 F.3d 114, 125, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038,
1044–45 (2d Cir. 2001) (“two anecdotes of confusion over the entire
course of competition constituted de minimis evidence insufficient to
raise triable issues,” nor did “the mere incantation of intent or state of
mind . . . operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid [summary
judgment] motion”).
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, 251 F.3d 1252, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881
(9th Cir. 2001).
FIRST CIRCUIT: Am. Bd. of Psychiatry v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 4,
44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1517 (1st Cir. 1997); Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Casa
Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1256, 1262 (1st Cir. 1992);
SECOND CIRCUIT: Church of Scientology Int’l v. Elmira Mission of
Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, 41, 230 U.S.P.Q. 325, 328 (2d Cir.
1986); THIRD CIRCUIT: S&R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d
371, 378, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201, 1206–07 (3d Cir. 1992); FOURTH
CIRCUIT: Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43
F.3d 922, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1493–94 (4th Cir. 1995); SEVENTH
CIRCUIT: Re/Max N. Cent. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2001);
Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858, 216
U.S.P.Q. 1072 (7th Cir. 1982); EIGHTH CIRCUIT: Gen. Mills, Inc. v.
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relief is available “according to the principles of equity and upon such
terms as the court may deem reasonable.”149
However, “a finding of likelihood of confusion does not automatically compel the issuance of an injunction barring use of the junior
user’s mark.”149.1 There is no “‘all-or-nothing’ or per se rule mandating the use of an absolute injunction whenever likelihood of confusion
is found.”150 Injunctive relief is to be fashioned “on the basis of the
equities involved, and thereby requires an evaluation of the legitimate
interests of the senior user, the junior user, and the consuming
public.”151 Furthermore, the injunction should be no broader and no
greater a burden on competition than necessary to correct the
wrong.152 (See section 1:2.) Likewise, it may be necessary to craft a
limited injunction in order “to accommodate trademark remedies
with First Amendment interests.”152.1
149.
149.1.
150.
151.
152.
152.1.
Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442, 1444 (8th Cir. 1987);
NINTH CIRCUIT: Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH
& Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 2009); Int’l Jensen,
Inc. v. Metrosound USA, Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1287, 1293 (9th
Cir. 1993); TENTH CIRCUIT: Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc.,
809 F.2d 656, 663, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1987); ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT: Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d 1133, 1141 (11th Cir. 1989).
15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).
Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford, Ltd., 937 F.2d 729, 737, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1352, 1358 (2d Cir. 1991); Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v. Flint YMCA,
764 F.2d 199, 226 U.S.P.Q. 324, 325 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting any per se
rule that likelihood of confusion mandates a preliminary injunction).
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1329, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1788 (2d Cir. 1987).
Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664, 204
U.S.P.Q. 609, 617 (2d Cir. 1979); Chandon Champagne Corp. v. San
Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 536, 142 U.S.P.Q. 239, 243 (2d Cir.
1964) (“we must balance ‘the conflicting interests both parties have in the
unimpaired continuation of their trade mark use’”) (emphasis in original);
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808, 819 (9th
Cir. 1979).
55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 2000); Basile S.p.A. v. Basile, 899 F.2d 35, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex
Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1788 (2d Cir. 1987).
55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing cases pro and con); DeClemente
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 30, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1564,
1578–79 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding First Amendment interests outweigh
public interest in avoiding confusion).
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The balancing process has challenged the greatest judges. Justice
Holmes:
In cases of this sort, as in so many others, what ultimately is to be
worked out is a point or line between conflicting claims, each of
which has meritorious grounds and would be extended further
were it not for the other. It is desirable that the plaintiff should not
lose custom by reason of the public mistaking another manufacturer for it. It is desirable that the defendant should be free to
manufacture watches at Waltham, and to tell the world that it
does so. The two desiderata cannot both be had to their full extent,
and we have to fix the boundaries as best we can. On the one hand,
the defendant must be allowed to accomplish its desideratum in
some way, whatever the loss to the plaintiff. On the other, we
think the cases show that the defendant fairly may be required
to avoid deceiving the public to the plaintiff ’s harm, so far as is
153
practicable in a commercial sense.
Judge Learned Hand:
In such cases neither side has an absolute right, because their
mutual rights conflict. Thus, the plaintiff has the right not to lose
his customers through false representations that those are his
wares which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any
design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the other
hand, may copy the plaintiff ’s goods slavishly down to the
minutest detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff
in their sale. When the appearance of the goods has in fact come to
represent a given person as their source, and that person is in fact
the plaintiff, it is impossible to make these rights absolute;
compromise is essential, exactly as it is with the right to use the
common language in cases of “secondary” meaning. We can only
say that the court must require such changes in appearance as will
effectively distinguish the defendant’s wares with the least expense
to him; in no event may the plaintiff suppress the defendant’s sale
154
altogether.
In sum, the equities are often illumined by the factors, particularly
trademark strength, product relatedness, and intent. Actual confusion
and customer care may be relevant to determining the scope of an
injunction.154.1 Equity also considers factors such as “the nature of the
153.
154.
154.1.
Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141
(1899) (citation omitted).
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917),
quoted in part with approval in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1847, 1855 (1989).
55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 2000).
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senior user’s priority, the senior user ’s delay in asserting its claim, and
the harm to the junior user as compared to the benefit to the senior
user that would result from the requested injunction.” 155 Some factors
may have both legal and equitable implications in the confusion
analysis. “If the junior user has acted entirely in good faith, it will
have a powerful equitable argument against a finding of infringement.
On the other hand, if the junior user adopted the plaintiff ’s mark in
bad faith, the equitable balance is tipped significantly in favor of a
finding of infringement.”156
Injunctions may be crafted in innumerable ways—for example, as
to geographic scope or product type;157 to limit but not prohibit the use
of geographic terms or personal names;158 to preserve competition in
the marketplace;159 to require the use of notices or “disclaimers”
by the newcomer to clarify its non-affiliation with the senior user.160
Even the market value of a plaintiff ’s mark is a legitimate
consideration.161
Although the T.T.A.B. is empowered to consider equitable defenses,162 it will do so only if likelihood of confusion is reasonably
in doubt. Otherwise, equitable defenses will not bar judgment in favor
of the prior user.163 (See section 1:8.2.)
Likelihood of confusion also has a direct bearing on laches, which
consists of unreasonable delay in protesting an infringement thereby
causing prejudice to the alleged infringer.164 “(1) [D]elay is measured
from the time at which the owner knew of an infringing use sufficient
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 214, 225 U.S.P.Q. 124,
129 (2d Cir. 1985), citing Chandon Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine
Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 536, 142 U.S.P.Q. 239 (2d Cir. 1964).
Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 929, 211
U.S.P.Q. 75, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1008, 222 U.S.P.Q. 373,
381 (2d Cir. 1983) (“we find no reason to extend the injunction to the
parties’ non-competing goods”); Charles Jacquin et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria
Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1990).
Midwest Research Inst. v. S&B Promotions, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1007, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d 1269, 1276 (W.D. Mo. 1988); Joseph Scott Co. v. Scott
Swimming Pools, Inc., 764 F.2d 62, 226 U.S.P.Q. 496 (2d Cir. 1985).
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1799 (1st Cir. 1987).
See Palladino, Disclaimers Before and After “HBO v. Showtime,” 82
TRADEMARK REP. 203 (1992).
H. Lubovsky, Inc. v. Esprit de Corp, 627 F. Supp. 483, 497, 228 U.S.P.Q.
814 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (likelihood of confusion found, but “[i]t is surely not
the proper function of an equitable decree to give plaintiff ’s mark an
extortion value far beyond the value it possesses in plaintiff ’s business”).
15 U.S.C. § 1069.
Bigfoot 4 × 4, Inc. v. Bear Foot, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1444, 1448 (T.T.A.B.
1987).
RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31.
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to require legal action; and (2) legal action is not required until there is
a real likelihood of confusion.”165
The defense of laches is in some ways correlative to the duty of the
trademark owner to police third-party marks. (See section 3:6.3.) Both
laches and the duty to police begin to attach when the trademark
owner knows or should know that there is a “real likelihood of
confusion.” Likewise in both cases over a period of time the use of a
mark that at first is minor or noninfringing may “progressively
encroach” on the owner ’s mark to the point where confusion becomes
likely and legal action is required. Also in both cases the trademark
owner is excused from taking action where confusion is unlikely
because, for example, the use of the other mark is minor or remote.
(See section 3:6.1.) In contrast, however, the laches defense is personal
to the defendant on the basis of its own prejudicial reliance whereas
any defendant may argue that the plaintiff ’s mark is weak due to thirdparty uses of similar marks.
§ 2:11
Preliminary Injunction
According to traditional equitable principles, a “plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.”166 In varying degrees depending on the jurisdiction, these four basic criteria are applied in preliminary injunctions in trademark infringement cases.167 “[N]o single
factor in itself is dispositive; all of the factors must be considered to
determine whether on balance they tip towards granting injunctive
relief.”168 The “court should flexibly weigh the case’s particular
circumstances to determine whether the balance of equities so favors
the movant that justice requires the court to intervene.” 169 The
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
U.S.P.Q.2d 1829, 1836 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing cases).
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 365,
374 (2008).
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 699 n.2, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1799, 1801 n.2 (1st Cir. 1987).
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665,
667, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1498, 1500 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied); Calvin
Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1285, 1287, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied).
Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 601,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1999) (motion denied); Frisch’s
Rest., Inc. v. Shoney’s Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1263, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1169,
1170 (6th Cir. 1985) (motion denied; factors to be “carefully balanced”;
test not “rigid”).
2–44
§ 2:11.1
“ultimate weighing and balancing that makes up the decision whether
to issue a preliminary injunction is highly discretionary,” with the
district court “sitting in equity.”170
It is necessary to “strike a delicate balance between competing
interests.”171 The court may utilize a “sliding scale” which is “subjective and intuitive.”172 The evaluation is “a single continuum in
which the required showing of harm varies inversely with the required
showing of meritoriousness.”173 For example, “the more likely it is
that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the less the balance of
irreparable harms need weigh towards its side; the less likely it is that
the plaintiff will succeed, the more the balance need weigh toward its
side.”174 Or, where the balance of harms is even or does not “decidedly” favor the movant, it must show a “strong” or “substantial”
likelihood of success.175 Or, the public interest may “carry the day” if
the likelihood of success is “thin.”176
§ 2:11.1
Likelihood of Success
To succeed at trial on an infringement claim, a movant must prove
likelihood of confusion. “For purposes of a preliminary injunction,
however, the trademark holder need only show a likelihood of
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084,
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1981 (7th Cir. 1988); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac
Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 811, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 2018, 2020 (7th Cir. 2002)
(motion granted; “sitting as a court of equity”); Taubman Co. v. Webfeats,
319 F.3d 770, 774, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1834, 1837 (6th Cir. 2003) (factors
“must be balanced”); Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311,
314, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1431, 1434 (7th Cir. 1994) (motion denied; district
court has “considerable discretion”).
Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 26, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 2002,
2008 (2d Cir. 2004).
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895–96, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1617,
1619 (7th Cir. 2001) (motion granted); Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v.
Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1981 (7th Cir.
1988) (“ultimate weighing and balancing . . . is highly discretionary”).
Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1987) (motion denied).
Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311, 314, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
1431, 1434 (7th Cir. 1994) (motion denied); Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx
Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 729, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1898 (3d Cir. 2004)
(motion granted).
MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339–40, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
1278, 1280 (4th Cir. 2001) (motion denied); Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shoney ’s
Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1270, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1169, 1175 (6th Cir. 1985)
(motion denied).
August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 55 F.3d 1300, republished, 59 F.3d
616, 619, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1995) (motion denied).
2–45
§ 2:11.1
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
success. . . .”177 Thus, one must prove a likelihood of a likelihood.178
“A party with no chance of success on the merits cannot attain a
preliminary injunction. . . . [However,] bright lines do not always mark
the difference between no chance and slight chance” in courts where
that makes a difference.179 Depending on the case, a “better than
negligible chance of succeeding on the merits” may suffice,180 or
“serious questions” to be litigated at trial.181
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 115, 116, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d 1454, 1457 (1st Cir. 2006) (motion denied; the “cynosure” of
the preliminary injunction factors “is more often than not the movant’s
likelihood of success on the merits”); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles,
Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183 and n.14, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1006 and n.14
(7th Cir. 1989); WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 44,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1688, 1689 (motion denied); Ocean Garden, Inc. v.
Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 506, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1493, 1499 (9th Cir.
1991) (motion granted); Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 726, 47 U.S.Q.2d 1587, 1589 (7th Cir. 1998)
(motion denied; “threshold consideration”); Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx
Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708–09, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1882 (3d Cir. 2004)
(motion granted).
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
1652, 1655 (9th Cir. 2000) (motion granted; “at the preliminary injunction stage, [plaintiff] must establish that it is likely to be able to show . . . a
likelihood of confusion”); Corbitt Mfg. Co. v. GSO Am., Inc., 197 F. Supp.
2d 1368, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (motion denied; “[plaintiff] has failed to
show a substantial likelihood of success in proving likelihood of confusion”); Bear U.S.A., Inc. v. Kim, 71 F. Supp. 2d 237, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(motion granted; “[plaintiff] has demonstrated a likelihood of success in
proving likelihood of confusion”), aff’d mem., 216 F.3d 1071 (2d Cir. 2000).
AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804, 831,
65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1004, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (motion denied); MilMar Shoe Co. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1156, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633,
1636 (7th Cir. 1996) (motion denied; if plaintiff has no case on the merits,
an injunction will be refused regardless of the balance of harms); cf. Sardi’s
Rest. Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 226 U.S.P.Q.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1985)
(motion denied without deciding likelihood of confusion); see Fed.
Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 174, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
1345, 1349–50 (2d Cir. 2000) (“if the plaintiff does not show likelihood of
success on the merits, it cannot obtain a preliminary injunction without
making an independent showing of likely irreparable harm”).
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1981 (7th Cir. 1988).
Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Campagna Per Le Farmacie in Italia, S.P.A., 847 F.2d
53, 54–55, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1948, 1949–50 (2d Cir. 1988) (motion granted);
MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
1278, 1280 (4th Cir. 2001) (motion denied). “To qualify for a preliminary
injunction, the moving party must show either (1) a combination of
probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or
(2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips
sharply in the moving party’s favor.” Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. W. Seventh,
812 F.2d 1215, 1217, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1987) (motion
denied).
2–46
§ 2:11.1
The multiple factor confusion test applies. 182 “In determining
whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the district court must
weigh the evidence pertaining to each likelihood of confusion factor
and balance the . . . factors against each other.”183 (See sections 2:5 and
2:6.) Consideration of only some confusion factors may be excused in
the context of a preliminary injunction.184 In some cases, one factor or
subset of factors may decide the motion.185 In any event, the findings
must be “sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to
provide a basis for the decision.”186
The importance of likelihood of success is “magnified in trademark
cases because the resolution of the other three factors will depend in
large part on whether the movant is likely to succeed in establishing
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
E.g., Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442,
1445 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied).
Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1044, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
1307, 1309 (7th Cir. 2000) (motion denied); New Kayak Pool Corp. v. R & P
Pools, Inc., 246 F.3d 183, 185, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1475, 1476 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“incumbent” on court “to engage in a deliberate review of each factor, and, if
a factor is inapplicable to a case, to explain why”); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v.
Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 637, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1730, 1737
(3d Cir. 1992) (court “requires” evaluation of factors); Kos Pharm., Inc. v.
Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 709, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1884 (3d Cir. 2004)
(motion granted; “each factor must be weighed and balanced one against
the other”).
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 526, 221 U.S.P.Q.
762, 766 (9th Cir. 1984) (motion granted); Swatch Watch, S.A. v. Taxor, Inc.,
785 F.2d 956, 958, 229 U.S.P.Q. 391, 392 (11th Cir. 1986) (motion denied).
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 901, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1617, 1624
(7th Cir. 2001) (motion granted); Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v.
Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 311, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1813, 1819 (5th Cir. 2008)
(motion granted; “exact marks”); Int’l Cosmetics Exch., Inc. v. Gapardis
Health & Beauty, Inc., 303 F.3d 1242, 1249, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1212, 1217
(11th Cir. 2002) (motion granted; counterfeit); Sunward Elecs., Inc. v.
McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 25, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 2002, 2007 (2d Cir. 2004)
(former licensee); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346,
351, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 2067, 2071 (7th Cir. 1987) (motion granted; irreparable
injury “is readily found where one competitor employs the trademark of
another”); Int’l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 825,
28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993) (motion denied; “for the limited
purpose of a preliminary injunction motion, the differences in the labels
are sufficient for a finding of no likelihood of confusion”); cf. Calvin Klein
Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 504, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied; error to rely solely on
comparison of marks); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870
F.2d 1176, 1183–84, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 1989) (vacating
presumption of confusion based on copying).
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1204, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
1652, 1655 (9th Cir. 2000) (motion granted); Ocean Garden, Inc. v.
Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 509, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1493, 1501 (9th Cir.
1991) (motion granted).
2–47
§ 2:11.1
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
infringement.”187 A court’s error as to likelihood of confusion may
infect its treatment of the other preliminary injunction factors. 188 Part
of the process is to weigh “how great the likelihood is.”189 As always,
“outlier” cases are the easier to decide, for example, where confusion is
“inevitable.”190
[A] Evidence
Evidence insufficient to support a judgment of infringement warranting final injunctive relief may suffice to warrant a preliminary
injunction.191 “At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court
may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be
admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is
appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.”192 The evidentiary burden is somewhat reduced due to the
“time pressures” involved and lack of extensive discovery.193
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the
relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be
held. Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 115,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1454, 1457 (1st Cir. 2006) (motion denied).
Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 991,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311, 314 n.1, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
1431, 1434 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (motion denied); see TCPIP Holding Co. v.
Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 103, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1969, 1981–82
(2d Cir. 2001) (different levels of protection for stronger and weaker
marks).
Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1046, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
1307, 1311 (7th Cir. 2000) (motion denied; “key factors . . . strongly
militate” against likelihood of confusion) (emphasis added); Kos Pharm.,
Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 725, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1894 (3d Cir.
2004) (motion granted; facts “weigh heavily” in favor of plaintiff) (emphasis
added); Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187,
195, 196–97, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1117, 1122–24 (3d Cir. 1990) (motion granted;
confusion “inevitable,” irreparable injury “inescapable”).
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 254–55, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
1161, 1167 (5th Cir. 1997) (motion granted).
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1712, 1714 (11th Cir. 1995) (motion granted); Kos Pharm.,
Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1889 (3d Cir.
2004) (motion granted; “It is well established that a preliminary injunction
is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and
evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.”)
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1982 (7th Cir. 1988); Platinum Home Mortgage Corp.
v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 730, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1593
(7th Cir. 1998) (motion denied; in preliminary injunction proceedings,
“time is often of the essence”).
2–48
§ 2:11.1
necessary if these positions are to be preserved, a preliminary
injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that
are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on
the merits. A party is not thus required to prove his case in full
194
at a preliminary injunction hearing.
“Preliminary injunctions are, by their nature, products of an
expedited process often based upon an underdeveloped and incomplete
evidentiary record. . . . The expedited nature of preliminary injunction
proceedings often creates not only limits on the evidence available but
also pressure to make difficult judgments without the luxury of
abundant time for reflection. . . . [T]he balancing between speed and
practicality versus accuracy and fairness” is within the court’s discretion.195 “District courts must exercise their discretion in weighing all
the attendant factors, including the need for expedition, to assess
whether, and to what extent, affidavits or other hearsay materials are
appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding. The weight to which such materials are entitled may of course
vary greatly depending on the facts and circumstances of a given
case.”196
“An evidentiary hearing is required if the nonmoving party
raises genuine issues of material fact in response to a motion for
preliminary injunction,”197 at least “where facts are bitterly contested
and credibility determinations must be made to decide whether
injunctive relief should issue,”198 and the decision turns on the
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1119,
44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (7th Cir. 1997) (motion granted; quoting Supreme
Court).
Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167,
1171, 1178, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1353, 1356, 1361–62 (11th Cir. 2002)
(motion granted); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243,
251, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1761, 1765 (6th Cir. 2003) (“the district court, upon a
motion for preliminary injunction, must make a decision based upon
incomplete factual findings and legal research. Even so, that decision is
generally accorded a great deal of deference.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int’l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 526, 221 U.S.P.Q. 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1984)
(motion granted; at the preliminary injunction stage, “parties will not have
had a full opportunity to either develop or present their cases and the
district court will have had only a brief opportunity to consider the
different factors relevant to the likelihood of confusion determination”).
Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 719, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874,
1889–90 (3d Cir. 2004) (motion granted).
Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 814, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
2018 (7th Cir. 2002) (motion granted).
Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167,
1178, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2002) (motion granted).
2–49
§ 2:11.1
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
question.199 Where there is strong doubt about the facts, it is more
likely that the preliminary injunction motion will be denied, and that
denial upheld.200
Absence of evidence of actual confusion is discounted in cases
where plaintiff brings an early motion for preliminary injunction, at
a point when there has been little or no opportunity for confusion to
manifest itself.201 (See sections 7:7 and 7:8.) Even evidence which is
“not overwhelming,” may support a finding of actual confusion at the
preliminary injunction stage of proceedings. 202 Relatively isolated
actual confusion, albeit not sufficient at trial, may be enough in courts
where the likelihood of success standard is reduced. 203 Actual confusion is “exceedingly difficult” to prove where the defendant “has not
yet opened its doors. . . . However, this difficulty does not excuse
[movant] from the requirement that it must provide some evidence
if the court is to weigh this factor in favor of [movant]. [Movant]
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 719 n.16, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
1874, 1890 n.16 (3d Cir. 2004) (motion granted).
Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 883, 199 U.S.P.Q.
16, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (“strong doubt”; motion denied); MicroStrategy Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 340, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1278, 1280–81 (4th Cir.
2001) (motion denied); see Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360
F.3d 125, 129, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1939, 1941 (2d Cir. 2004) (motion denied; on
appeal, the record consisted of “mostly conclusory allegations supported by
facts that are generally contested. Infrequently will such prove to be a record
on which an appellate court will find that a district court has abused its
discretion.”).
Lobo Enters., Inc. v. Tunnel, Inc., 822 F.2d 331, 333, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1446,
1449 (2d Cir. 1987); Hasbro Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78,
8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1345, 1352 (2d Cir. 1988) (product on market a “short
time”); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1060, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1562 (9th Cir. 1999) (motion granted;
defendant had not commenced use of mark); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1208, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1652, 1658 (9th Cir.
2000) (motion granted); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,
221, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1882, 1897 (2d Cir. 1999) (motion granted); TCPIP
Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
1969, 1981 (2d Cir. 2001) (defendant’s product “not yet launched in a
serious way”); Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d
112, 121, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1454, 1461 (1) (motion granted); cf. W. Publ’g Co.
v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 57, 63, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1549 (2d Cir.
1990) (motion denied; absence of actual confusion given weight in view of
sales which “were not only substantial but occurred during a time frame
long enough for actual consumer confusion to surface”); Rodeo Collection,
Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1220, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.
1987) (motion denied; noting absence of actual confusion and intent).
Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1004, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1348, 1356 (2d Cir. 1997) (motion granted).
44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1550–51 (7th Cir. 1997) (motion granted).
2–50
§ 2:11.2
could . . . conduct[] a survey using a hypothetical question. . . .
It could . . . solicit[] testimony from an expert in marketing or
psychology.”204 Absence of surveys may be excused due to the expedited
timetable,205 yet the court retains its discretion in weighing and rejecting surveys at the preliminary injunction stage.206 (See section 7:10.)
§ 2:11.2
Irreparable Injury
Many appellate courts have for a long time presumed irreparable
injury upon of showing of likely success in proving infringement. 207
The basic theory is that infringement jeopardizes the trademark
owner ’s fundamental right to control the quality of its branded
product (see section 1:2), and that it is “virtually impossible to
ascertain the precise economic consequences of intangible harms
such as damage to reputation and loss of goodwill.” 208 The effects of
confusion on plaintiff ’s goodwill would be “unpredictable, except for
the certainty that those effects would be negative.” 209 Such a presumption effectively “conflates” the two separate factors of likelihood of
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1046, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 2000) (motion denied; emphasis in
original).
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1982 (7th Cir. 1988); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1119, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1551
(7th Cir. 1997) (motion granted); Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading
Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 121, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1454 (1st Cir. 2006) (motion
granted; no compelling reason for survey at preliminary stage); Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1882, 1897 (2d
Cir. 1999) (surveys “expensive, time-consuming, and not immune to
manipulation”).
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669
n.4, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1498, 1501 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied; permissible
not to give plaintiff ’s survey “conclusive weight”).
See Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1813, 1820 (5th Cir. 2008) (motion granted; citing First,
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). For
the Tenth Circuit, see discussion in GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676,
222 U.S.P.Q. 803, 804–05 (10th Cir. 1984).
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1617, 902,
57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1617, 1625 (7th Cir. 2001) (motion granted); Opticians
Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 196, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1990) (motion granted; inability to control marks
“creates the potential for damage to [plaintiff ’s] reputation”) (emphasis in
original); AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 831, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (motion denied; “an eventual award
of money damages would not satisfy [plaintiff ’s] injury”).
AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 831, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
2–51
§ 2:11.2
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
success and irreparable harm.210 Cascading legal presumptions may be
inequitable.211
Some appellate and district courts have noticed and in some cases
applied recent Supreme Court rulings which would seem to discourage
the presumption of irreparable injury and to require independent proof
of its likelihood.212 Thus it is advisable for movant to evidence
likelihood of irreparable harm and not rely simply on a presumption
or speculation.213 For example, objective proof that defendant’s product is “shoddy” would be “a potent basis for a finding of irremediable
210.
211.
212.
213.
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 nn.4–5,
53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1652, 1655 nn.4–5 (9th Cir. 2000) (motion granted).
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1184 n.16, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1007 n.16 (7th Cir. 1989) (“if there are presumptions of
secondary meaning based on intentional copying and of confusion based
on secondary meaning, most of the plaintiff ’s required proof for both
trademark infringement and for preliminary injunction can be accomplished by simply filing suit and proving intentional copying”) (emphasis
in original).
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have noted but not decided the issue as
raised in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
1577 (2006), a patent case involving a permanent injunction. See Paulsson
Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1813,
1820 (5th Cir. 2008) (motion granted); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom
Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227–28, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1472 (11th
Cir. 2008). Other lower courts have noted much the same issue flowing
from Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct.
365 (2008), a preliminary injunction case involving federal environmental
law, in which the court stated that granting a preliminary injunction based
only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm is “inconsistent with [the
court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy.”
Id., 129 S. Ct. at 375–76; see Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d, 1235, 1242–44 (D. Colo. 2009); Maxim Integrated
Prods. v. Quintana, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(“[A] plaintiff is no longer entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm
on the ground that it has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.”)
(citing district court cases); CytoSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617
F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he governing law has changed
in light of Winter. Now, a plaintiff is not granted the presumption of
irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits.
Indeed, in Winter, the Court emphasized that to be entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate that irreparable injury is
likely in the absence of an injunction. . . .”) (emphasis in original). The
Ninth Circuit, although citing Winter, did not notice any difference in
Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873,
877, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 2009), followed in Credit One v.
Credit One, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
See CytoSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1080–81
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (motion granted); Advanced Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Tri-Star
Petroleum Co., 4 F.3d 327, 331, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280, 1282 (4th Cir. 1993)
2–52
§ 2:11.3
injury.”214 (See section 5:8.) “[E]ntitlement to money damages, without more, rarely constitutes an adequate basis for injunctive relief.”215
§ 2:11.3
Balance of Harms
Preliminary injunctions “are extraordinary remedies involving the
exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in
limited circumstances.”216 They are “the exception rather than the
rule.”217 “The court must ensure that the issuance of an injunction
would not harm the infringer more than a denial would harm the
mark’s owner.”218 Included in the balance is the “relative size and
strength of each enterprise.”219
[A] Harms to Plaintiff
The extent of possible harms to plaintiff will vary with the product
and market.220 The principal harm is irreparable, the loss of goodwill
and control of reputation “which would be anathema to [movant’s]
entire business.”221 A movant will quantify the harm if it can and even
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
(motion denied; claimed harm “speculative”); Opticians Ass’n of Am. v.
Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1117, 1123 (3d
Cir. 1990) (motion granted; “Irreparable injury must be of a peculiar
nature, so that compensation in money alone cannot atone for it.”).
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 700, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1799, 1801 (1st Cir. 1987).
Donoghue v. IBC USA (Publ’ns), Inc., 70 F.3d 206, 219, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
1001, 1011 (1st Cir. 1995).
MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
1278, 1279 (4th Cir. 2001) (motion denied); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp.
v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir.
1987) (motion denied); Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d
1041, 1044, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307, 1309 (7th Cir. 2000) (motion denied;
“A preliminary injunction is a very serious remedy, never to be indulged in
except in a case clearly demanding it.”).
GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678, 222 U.S.P.Q. 803, 804
(10th Cir. 1984) (motion denied; “A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy; it is the exception rather than the rule.”); Four
Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205,
1210, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 2012 (7th Cir. 2003).
Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805,
46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1773 (3d Cir. 1998) (motion granted); Opticians
Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1990) (motion granted).
Int’l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 827, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
1287 (9th Cir. 1993).
Maxim’s Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 392, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d 316, 319
(7th Cir. 1985) (motion denied).
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1987 (7th Cir. 1988); Pappan Enters., Inc. v.
Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1773
2–53
§ 2:11.3
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
if compensable in money damages.222 Otherwise the movant will
point generally to its “investment” in the mark;223 “possible extinction” of its business;224 “lost confidence” of business partners due to
the infringement;225 and the compounded difficulties of enforcing its
mark against others.226 It may weigh against the movant if it “failed to
vigorously protect its trademark claim.”227
[B]
Harms to Defendant
As a practical matter, courts frequently consider the “financial
effect” a preliminary injunction would have on the defendant, 228
provided that it is not speculative.229 Irreparable harm is important
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
(3d Cir. 1998) (motion granted). The concern persists even if defendant’s
goods are presently of high quality, which may change. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1072
(7th Cir. 1982).
Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1990) (motion granted; lost business, lost
dues, lost membership); Playmakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 898,
71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1759, 1762 (9th Cir. 2004) (motion denied); Frisch’s
Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 651–52,
214 U.S.P.Q. 15, 22–23 (6th Cir. 1982) (motion granted).
Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1029, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
1133, 1141 (11th Cir. 1989) (motion granted); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess
Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 909, 230 U.S.P.Q. 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1986)
(motion granted) (plaintiff used mark for many years).
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79, 211 U.S.P.Q. 1017,
1019 (2d Cir. 1981); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville,
Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 651, 214 U.S.P.Q. 15, 23 (6th Cir. 1982) (motion
granted); Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852,
858, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1072 (7th Cir. 1982) (motion granted).
Ideal Indus., Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1025, 204 U.S.P.Q.
177, 183 (7th Cir. 1979) (“burdens of eradicating impermissible uses of
[plaintiff ’s] trademarks would be substantially increased were a preliminary injunction not granted”).
Advanced Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co., 4 F.3d 327, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1029, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
1133, 1141 (11th Cir. 1989) (motion granted; “reputational and financial
injury”); MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 340 n.3, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d 1278, 1280 n.3 (4th Cir. 2001) (motion denied); AM Gen.
Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 832–33, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
1001, 1026 (7) (motion denied); Playmakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d
894, 898, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1759, 1762 (9th Cir. 2004) (motion denied);
177, 184 (7th Cir. 1979) (large inventory).
Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858, 216
U.S.P.Q. 1072, 1077 and n.8 (7th Cir. 1982) (motion granted); E. Remy
2–54
§ 2:11.3
especially if the bond required of a plaintiff may cover defendant’s
losses if the injunction is not upheld at trial.230 There may be no
undue burden on defendant if it can sell the product in different
packaging.231 When defendant has other products not covered by the
injunction, an injunction would “not affect the continued success of
the company.”232 By the same token, little harm may be expected
where defendant has made only limited use of the accused mark at
little expense.233 Considerations include the costs of replacing the
mark; whether the mark is on the product or only ads, such that sales
could proceed unhindered;234 and whether production molds and the
like could be modified and reused without the offending elements. 235
When balancing harms, courts evidence little sympathy for intentional infringers. A “substantial indication of bad faith” weighs
against the defendant.236 “A preliminary injunction can have drastic
consequences—potentially putting a party out of business prior to trial
on the merits. A court may be less concerned about imposing such
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imps., Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1534,
225 U.S.P.Q. 1131, 1137 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting defendant’s “selfserving” statement that preliminary injunction would put him out of
business).
1896 (3d Cir. 2004) (motion granted). “District courts should consider
financial damages when establishing and setting the bond for an injunction not when deciding whether to grant it.” A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess
Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 909, 230 U.S.P.Q. 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1986)
(motion granted).
Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1005–06,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1348, 1358 (2d Cir. 1997) (motion granted).
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1987 (7); Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263
F.3d 1297, 1304, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1051 (11th Cir. 2001) (motion
granted); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 526,
221 U.S.P.Q. 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1984) (motion granted; affected sales only
“a minor percentage” of total sales); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages,
Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 909, 230 U.S.P.Q. 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1986) (motion
granted).
44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1552 (7th Cir. 1997) (motion granted); A.J. Canfield
Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 909, 230 U.S.P.Q. 441, 445 (7th
Cir. 1986) (motion granted; noting defendant’s “minimal investment and
promotional activities”); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1406, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 1997)
(motion granted).
Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858–59,
216 U.S.P.Q. 1072, 1077 (7th Cir. 1982) (motion granted).
Charles of the Ritz v. Quality King, 832 F.2d 1317, 1324, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1778, 1783 (2d Cir. 1987) (motion granted).
2–55
§ 2:11.4
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
drastic consequences on a party that had conducted itself in bad
faith.”237 “[T]he injury a defendant might suffer if an injunction
were imposed may be discounted by the fact that the defendant
brought the injury on itself. Indeed, a different rule would allow a
knowing infringer that constructs its business around its infringement
to avoid an injunction by claiming it would have a ‘devastating effect’
on that business.”238 When a defendant proceeds “knowing full well it
may face legal challenges to its product and in turn negative financial
consequences,”239 it “cannot . . . complain that having to mend its
ways will be too expensive.”240 Defendants have unclean hands in
equity when they “creat[e] the all-or-nothing predicament in which
they . . . find themselves.”241
§ 2:11.4
Public Interest
“Public interest can be defined in a number of ways, but in a
trademark case, it is most often a synonym for the right of the public
not to be deceived or confused.”242 (See section 1:2.) Accordingly,
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102–03,
57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1969, 1981 (2d Cir. 2001).
Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 728–29, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
1874, 1897 (3d Cir. 2004) (motion granted; defendant took a “deliberate
risk”); Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187,
197, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1990) (motion granted; “[defendant]
brought any and all difficulties occasioned by the issuance of an injunction
upon itself”); Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846
F.2d 1079, 1091, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1977, 1987 (7th Cir. 1988) (“the defendants
brought any alleged harm onto themselves”).
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 903, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1617, 1625
(7th Cir. 2001) (motion granted).
177, 185 (7th Cir. 1979); Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
675 F.2d 852, 859, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1072, 1077 (7th Cir. 1982).
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1406, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997) (motion granted); Pappan Enters.,
Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 806, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769,
1773 (3d Cir. 1998) (motion granted; “self inflicted” harm); see LeSportsac,
Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 79, 225 U.S.P.Q.2d 654, 660 (2d Cir.
1985) (motion granted; “the equities of the situation are quite different than
they would have been had [defendant] placed the proposed tags on the bags
when they were first offered for sale”).
U.S.P.Q.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir. 1990) (motion granted); Int’l Kennel Club
of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092 n.8, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
1977, 1988 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988); Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys.,
Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 807, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1774 (3d Cir. 1998) (motion
granted); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 909, 230
U.S.P.Q. 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1986) (motion granted); Davidoff & CIE, S.A.
v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1304, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1051 (11th
Cir. 2001) (motion granted).
2–56
§ 2:11.4
courts often find that the public interest favors a preliminary injunction when there is a likelihood of confusion. “Weighing the public
interest in preliminary relief is often fairly routine.”243 There is the
“societal value of full disclosure and fair competition, together with
the policy of the law to provide at least minimal protection to
established trade names.”244 Trademark protection does not “frustrate
competition, but will foster it.”245
On the other hand, it is important to consider the “broader
economic implications” of granting a preliminary injunction. “By
the very nature of a trademark action, the value placed on free
competition must be weighed against any individual’s property interest in that trademark, so that the analytic focus should also be on the
consumer ’s ability to obtain the lowest priced goods.” 246 “[T]he
general public is . . . a great beneficiary from competition. . . . Damages
in trademark cases are hard to measure, but the possibility of compensation offers sufficient protection to a trademark owner, when an
injunction bids fair to stifle competition and injure consumers in order
to ward off occasional confusion.”247 In particular, there are public
interests in avoiding monopolies; not depriving consumers of choice of
goods; not passing along to the consumer the added costs of redesign
imposed by an injunction; and not putting companies out of business.248 Public interest in free speech, including parody, may outweigh
the public’s right not to be misled.249
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
1898 (3d Cir. 2004) (motion granted); Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll.
Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1029, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1133, 1141 (11th Cir. 1989)
(motion granted).
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 700, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1799, 1801 (1st Cir. 1987).
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 260, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
1161, 1172 (5th Cir. 1997) (motion granted).
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 505,
2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied).
August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 55 F.3d 1300, republished, 59 F.3d
Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 505,
2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied; “avoiding
monopolies”); Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311, 316,
29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1431, 1435–36 (7th Cir. 1994) (motion denied; “added cost
to consumers”).
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 497, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289, 1293 (2d Cir. 1989) (motion denied);
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1834, 1840
(6th Cir. 2003).
2–57
§ 2:12
LIKELIHOOD
OF
CONFUSION
Courts caution that a preliminary determination of a party ’s likely
success does not compel the same result at trial,250 where there will be
“a more substantial record” with an opportunity for the court “to make
more extensive and reliable findings of fact.”251 From the standpoint of
a defendant that has been preliminarily enjoined, however, the “prospects” will rarely “appear bright.”252 In most cases, it is “probably
unrealistic to expect [defendant] would change the name back . . . again
if he won on the merits.”253 The court may consider a preliminary
injunction to be “an act of kindness to the party enjoined. It cuts him
off from a business life which, from all the portents, would involve a
series of trademark frustrations.”254 For this reason, “[t]he burden on
the party seeking a preliminary injunction is especially heavy when the
relief sought would in effect grant plaintiff a substantial part of the
relief it would obtain after trial on the merits.”255
§ 2:12
Summary Judgment
Some courts say that the “intensely factual nature” of trademark
cases (see sections 2:1 and 2:3) makes them unsuitable for summary
judgment.256 At the least, summary judgment is to be approached
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 702, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1799, 1803 n.6 (1st Cir. 1987); Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg
Co., 824 F.2d 622, 628, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442, 1445 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion
denied); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d
665, 671, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1498, 1503 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion denied);
Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598,
603, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1999) (motion denied).
Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 129, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
1939, 1941 (2d Cir. 2004) (motion denied).
Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Mrs. Am. Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1452,
8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1988) (motion denied). “[Defendant] at
the very least would face the Hobson’s choice of designing and producing . . .
[a] new package or taking its product off the market until a decision on the
merits might be had.” Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311,
315, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1431, 1435 (7th Cir. 1984).
GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 679, 222 U.S.P.Q. 803, 805 (10th
Cir. 1984) (motion denied).
E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imps., Inc., 756 F.2d 1525,
1534, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1131, 1137 (11th Cir. 1985).
GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 679, 222 U.S.P.Q. 803, 805 (10th
Cir. 1984) (motion denied); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs.,
Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987) (motion
denied).
1705, 1707 (9th Cir. 2002) (motion denied); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.,
496 F.3d 974, 978, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1591, 1593 (9th Cir. 2007) (motion
denied); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d
1062, 1075, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1293, 1303 (9th Cir. 2006) (confusion likely;
2–58
§ 2:12
“with great caution” in infringement cases.257 “Failure to strictly
observe the principles governing summary judgment becomes particularly significant in a trademark or trade name action, where summary judgments are the exception.”258 All appellate courts, however,
recognize that traditional summary judgment principles apply to a
trademark case as any other, summary judgment being “a salutary
method of disposition designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”259 Courts “retain an important authority” to summarily adjudicate likelihood of confusion “in
appropriate cases.”260
257.
258.
259.
260.
courts “generally reluctant” to decide likelihood of confusion on summary
judgment); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 08-56291, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 3258703, at *3 (9th Cir.
Aug. 19, 2010) (motion denied; “summary judgment is generally disfavored in the trademark arena”); cf. Univ. Bookstore v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of
Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1389 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (“as a general rule, the
resolution of Board proceedings by means of summary judgment is to be
encouraged”).
Autozone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 929, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1229 (7th
Cir. 2008) (motion denied) (quoting AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart
Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 616, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1758, 1762 (7th Cir. 1993)
(motion denied)).
Country Floors, Inc. v. P’Ship Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056,
1062–63, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1583 (3d Cir. 1991) (motion denied).
Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1793 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (confusion unlikely; quoting Supreme
Court; internal quotation marks deleted); Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor
Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 630, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1621, 1623 (9th Cir. 2005)
(motion denied); Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1324 (10th Cir. 2002) (motion denied); Daddy ’s Junky
Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 280, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1173, 1175 (6th Cir. 1997) (motion denied); WSM, Inc. v.
Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1086, 220 U.S.P.Q. 17, 19 (6th Cir. 1983)
(confusion likely); Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209,
216, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442, 1447 (2d Cir. 2003) (confusion likely; “Nothing
in our prior holdings suggests that a district court deciding a motion for
summary judgment in a trademark infringement case has any greater
discretion than it would have in a non-trademark case to resolve disputed
issues of fact or draw inferences against the non-moving party.”);
Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 170, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
1054, 1058 (4th Cir. 2006) (confusion likely).
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad., 720 F.2d 231, 246, 222 U.S.P.Q. 101, 113
(2d Cir. 1983) (confusion unlikely); Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found.
for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1055, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865,
1871 (10th Cir. 2008); Country Floors, Inc. v. P’ship Composed of Gepner
& Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1063, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1583 (3d Cir. 1991)
(motion denied); D. Barton, Summary Judgment in Trademark Cases, 75
TRADEMARK REP. 497 (1985).
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Summary judgment is rendered as a matter of law when there is
no genuine issue of material fact.261 Likelihood of confusion, being
an element of infringement, is a “material fact” in most courts.262
(See discussion below of confusion as a question of fact or law.)
The likelihood of confusion standard does not change on summary
judgment.263 The basic multiple factor method applies.264
At trial, judge or jury finds facts as to likelihood of confusion; on
summary judgment, the judge determines whether there are any
genuine issues about those facts.265 The fundamental issue on summary judgment is whether there are “genuine factual disputes concerning those of the . . . factors which may be material in the context of
the specific case.”266 Since some factors are bound to be in dispute in
any given case, “[t]he only question is whether the differences between
the parties with respect to any of these factors create a genuine,
material issue of triable fact as to the likelihood of confusion.” 267
“If a factual inference must be drawn to arrive at a particular finding
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
Woodsmith Publ’g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1248, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir. 1990) (confusion unlikely).
Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 161, 73
U.S.P.Q.2d 1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely); Nora Beverages
Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am. Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 121, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038,
1044 (2d Cir. 2001) (confusion unlikely).
Lang v. Ret. Living Publ’g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 580, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1041,
1044 (2d Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely); Coach House Rest. v. Coach &
Six Rests., 934 F.2d 1551, 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1409 (11th Cir.
1991) (motion denied); Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833
F.2d 1560, 1565, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1793 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (confusion unlikely);
Flatley v. Trump, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1284, 1291 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (motion
denied).
Hornblower & Weeks Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
1733, 1735 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (confusion likely).
Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,
1107, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 (6th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) (motion
denied; question on appeal was “whether the District Court correctly held
that no genuine issues of material fact were presented regarding the
likelihood of confusion factors”); Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v.
Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 646, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1787
(6th Cir. 2002) (confusion unlikely); Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices,
Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 934, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1335, 1338 (6th Cir. 1999) (confusion
likely), rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 23, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2001);
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623, 639 U.S.P.Q.2d
1181, 1184 (6th Cir. 1996) (confusion unlikely).
AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 616, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d 1758, 1762 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original) (motion
denied).
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on a . . . factor, and if a reasonable trier of fact could reach a different
conclusion, the district court may not properly resolve that issue on
summary judgment.”268 A factor is not made material simply by
submitting evidence on the point; rather, “the factor must be shown
to be material or relevant in the particular case.”269 On the other hand,
conclusory or speculative assertions unsupported by facts do not create
a genuine issue, for example, as to strength of the mark, likely
expansion of product lines, or defendant’s intent.270 The multi-factor
test remains as flexible on summary judgment as in other phases
of infringement litigation; there is “nothing magical” about it.271 (See
sections 2:4, 2:5, and 2:6.) The “factors do not operate in a mathematically precise formula; rather, we use them at the summary
judgment stage as a guide to determine whether a reasonable jury
could find a likelihood of confusion.” 272 Most courts routinely
review all the factors on motion; some do not when fewer than all
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d 474, 478, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
1508, 1511 (2d Cir. 1996) (motions denied).
Octocom Sys. v. Houston Computer Servs., 918 F.2d 937, 943, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1783, 1788 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (confusion
likely); Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Moquet Ltd., 230 U.S.P.Q. 626, 628
(T.T.A.B. 1986) (confusion likely; description of goods unrestricted).
Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc., 739 F.2d 624, 627, 222 U.S.P.Q.
741, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (confusion unlikely; “A non-movant runs the risk
of a grant of summary judgment by failing to disclose the evidentiary basis
for its claim. . . . Mere conclusory assertions do not raise a genuine issue of
fact.”); Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 460, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1273,
1285 (2d Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely; bare assertion, unsupported by
other evidence, “fails to raise a genuine issue that Plaintiff is likely to enter
Defendant’s corner of the marketplace”); Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor
(confusion unlikely; “Although [plaintiff] expressed interest in expanding
his product line, mere speculation is not evidence.”); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 414, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1612 (6th Cir.
2006) (confusion likely; “no real proof that [plaintiff] is seriously considering this possibility [of expansion]”); cf. Daddy’s Junky Music Stores v. Big
Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 287, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173, 1175
(6th Cir. 1997) (motion denied; plaintiff ’s “preliminary negotiations
regarding possible purchase of a company” created issue of fact on likely
expansion). See text below for “speculation and conjecture” on intent
factor.
Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 778, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1586, 1590 (7th
Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely).
Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001,
1008, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1570, 1575 (8th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely);
Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 763 (8th
Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely).
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are dispositive.273 Usually courts will at least identify the “more
important” factors274 or “most significant considerations” supporting
the decision.275
None of the factors is a sine qua non . . . so the [nonmoving party]
does not necessarily establish a genuine issue of material fact
merely by disproving the existence of any one—or even a majority
of—the factors. . . . [A]ny one factor standing alone may not be
material. Indeed, the district court is apt to find . . . that at least
one factor favors the nonmoving party. Since that does not prevent
an overall finding of likelihood of confusion in the movant’s
favor, it would be illogical for a merely disputed factor to
preclude summary judgment. . . . [T]he nonmoving party’s burden
is to identify a dispositive factor or set of factors whose resolution
would necessarily be dispositive on the likelihood of confusion
276
issue.
In some summary judgment cases, courts identify “one factor or set of
factors” principally pointing to the result:
•
“overwhelming” similarity of marks and defendant’s intent;277
•
“virtual identity” of marks and “extensive” actual confusion;278
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
Compare Volkswagenwerk AG v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 817, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1264, 1267 (1st Cir. 1987) (confusion likely; no one factor is necessarily
determinative, but each must be considered) with Playtex Prods. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 167, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1127, 1133 (2d
Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely; court may grant summary judgment even
without considering all the factors) and Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Certified Fraud Exam’rs, 41 F.3d 223, 228 n.15, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1328,
1332 n.15 (5th Cir. 1995) (motion denied; not all factors required).
Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 167 n.5, 73
U.S.P.Q.2d 1127, 1133 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely).
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 640, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 933–34, 53 F.3d
1335, 1338 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (confusion likely), rev’d on
other grounds, 532 U.S. 23, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2001); Heartsprings, Inc.
v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1483 (10th
Cir. 1998) (confusion unlikely); AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale
Co., 1 F.3d 611, 616, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1758, 1762 (7th Cir. 1993) (motion
denied); Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., 426 F.3d 1001,
1008, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1570, 1575 (8th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely).
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 483, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1338, 1347 (5th Cir. 2008)
(confusion likely).
Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572,
1580, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424, 1430–31 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (confusion likely).
2–62
•
•
•
•
•
•
§ 2:12
minimal actual confusion (“most significant factor”); plaintiff ’s mark weak; marks dissimilar; no predatory intent;279
dissimilar marks and goods;280
very unrelated goods;281
substantially dissimilar marks;282
plaintiff ’s mark weak;283
extremely sophisticated buyers.284
“[A] single . . . factor may be dispositive in a likelihood of confusion
analysis, especially when that single factor is the dissimilarity of the
marks.”285 The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute” is not
enough to defeat summary judgment.286 “A fact is material if it may
affect the decision, whereby the finding of that fact is relevant and
necessary to the proceedings. However a dispute over a fact that would
not alter the . . . decision on the legal issue will not prevent entry of
summary judgment.”287 A dispute is genuine if the evidence would
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 400, 91
U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1796 (4th Cir. 2009) (confusion unlikely; “we are aware
of no case where a court has a allowed a trademark infringement action to
proceed beyond summary judgment” under such circumstances).
Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 584, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1799, 1803
(2d Cir. 1990) (confusion unlikely; “Normally, the likelihood of confusion
is a factual question, centering on the probable reactions of prospective
purchasers of the parties’ goods. Claims, however, may be dismissed as a
matter of law where the court is satisfied that the products or marks are so
dissimilar that no question of fact is presented.”).
Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc., 739 F.2d 624, 222 U.S.P.Q. 741
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (confusion unlikely).
Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 333, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely).
First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. First Bank Sys., 101 F.3d 645, 655, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
1865, 1873 (10th Cir. 1996) (confusion unlikely; weakness of mark
“strongly suggests that a reasonable jury could only conclude that the
marks are not confusingly similar”).
Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 128, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289,
1294 (4th Cir. 1990) (motion denied; “in a market with extremely
sophisticated buyers, the likelihood of consumer confusion cannot be
presumed on the basis of the similarity in trade name alone, particularly
without the benefit of trial”); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith
Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 n 13, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1372, 1378 n.13 (6th
Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely; plaintiff conceded that there would be no
point-of-sale confusion because consumers were “very sophisticated”).
Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc. v. FF Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 1343,
1346–47, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 2030 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely; marks
“unquestionably different”).
Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1108, 1113 (6th
Cir. 2006) (confusion likely) (emphasis in original).
TBMP 528.01 (emphasis added).
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permit a reasonable fact finder to rule for the nonmovant.288 Doubts as
to whether or not particular factual issues are genuinely in dispute are
likely to be resolved against the moving party.289 If there are genuine
issues, either way, motion denied.290 If there are not, summary judgment is rendered as a matter of law.291 Where a plaintiff argued that
summary judgment is improper “if any one factor suggests that there
could be a likelihood of confusion,” the Eleventh Circuit stated:
This is not the law. The likelihood-of-confusion multifactor test
presupposes that various factors will point in opposing directions.
The role of the court in reviewing a motion for summary judgment
is to determine the ultimate question of whether, in light of the
evidence as a whole, there is sufficient proof of a likelihood of
292
confusion to warrant a trial of the case.
Regardless of the factors, which are primarily intended to organize
the universe of relevant facts, the ultimate question is whether the
evidence “as a whole” presents triable issues.293
The fact/law dichotomy on summary judgment is “somewhat
awkward” in tribunals where the factors are treated as questions of
fact but the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion as a question
of law (the Second, Sixth, and Federal Circuits and the T.T.A.B.). 294
(See section 2:9.) The dispute in such cases is often “not over the
underlying facts, but over the legal question whether this given set
of foundational facts establishes a likelihood of confusion.” 295 Even
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Exam’rs, 41 F.3d
Flatley v. Trump, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1284, 1287 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (“All doubts as
to whether or not particular factual issues are genuinely in dispute must be
resolved against the moving party.”).
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d
619, 629, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1787 (6th Cir. 2002) (confusion unlikely).
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 548
n.11, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1372, 1377 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005) (motion denied);
CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 676–77, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
1449, 1460 (7th Cir. 2001) (confusion likely); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line
Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 173, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1771, 1775 (7th Cir.
1996) (confusion unlikely).
Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 775 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) (confusion
unlikely).
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr, 103 F.3d 196, 201,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1251, 1256 (1st Cir. 1996) (confusion unlikely).
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 548
n.11, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1372, 1377 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely).
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 641, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
2–64
§ 2:12
at the factor level, there may be uncertainty as between the “factor
itself” and “historical facts that were the predicate for the finding
as to each . . . factor.” Furthermore, the court’s latitude may be
enlarged when there is a “considerable component of law” in certain
factors.296 In considering likelihood of confusion, an “all fact” court
will avoid weighing of evidence of confusion on summary judgment,297 but a mixed “fact/law” court will feel free to balance the
factors on the way to deciding likelihood of confusion. 298 In practice,
most courts, even while viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the nonmovant, do not “refrain from examining the evidence
altogether.”299
It is easiest, of course, to grant summary judgment in cases on the
“outer limits” where the facts are plain:300 “foreordained” cases,301
which seem to “compel” a certain outcome,302 or where the outcome is
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 216 n.2, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d 1442, 1447 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (confusion likely).
Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 488, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d 1011, 1018 (5th Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely; “a court may
not weigh evidence . . . when reviewing a motion for summary judgment”);
Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1535, 1537 (9th Cir. 1999) (motion denied; “the . . . remaining . . . factors require the weighing of conflicting evidence. Because a court
should not weigh evidence on a summary judgment motion, we remand
for trial”); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1013, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1548 (3d Cir. 2008) (motion denied); cf. Tana v.
Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 775 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely;
“our circuit has routinely ‘weighed’ the likelihood of confusion factors on
summary judgment”).
Playtex Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 162, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d
1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely; giving “considerable
deference” to “findings with respect to predicate facts underlying each . . .
factor” but balancing the factors de novo); Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill
Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1565, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1793, 1797 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (confusion unlikely); Therma-Scan v. Thermoscan, 295 F.3d 623,
630–31, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659, 1670 (6th Cir. 2002) (confusion unlikely);
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d
619, 646, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1787 (6th Cir. 2002) (confusion unlikely).
Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 557, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246, 222 U.S.P.Q. 101, 113
(2d Cir. 1983), Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221,
230, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 2009) (motion denied; summary
judgment may be appropriate in “outlier” cases).
Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 174, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 474, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1338, 1349 (5th Cir. 2008)
(confusion likely).
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“obvious,”303 “inescapable,”304 “preordained,”305 “beyond reasonable
controversy,”306 where the analysis is “easy” or “heavily favors” one of
the parties,307 where “almost every single factor” favors one party,308
where the evidence is “so one-sided that there can be no doubt,”309 or
where confusion is “highly unlikely”310 or virtually certain.311 On the
other hand, it is equally easy to deny summary judgment where
“uncertain and outright disputed facts permeate” the record.312
Some factors are more likely than others to be problematic in
deciding summary judgment motions.
Actual confusion. The general principles of admissibility of actual
confusion evidence do not change on summary judgment. 313 For
example, evidence of misdirected phone calls and mail may be
disregarded as “hearsay of a particularly unreliable nature given the
lack of an opportunity for cross-examination of the caller or sender
regarding the reason for the ‘confusion.’”314 (See section 7:6.) Even if
the evidence of actual confusion is admissible, it is inappropriate for
the court to weigh issues affecting witness credibility,315 for example,
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 928–29, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1299, 1304 (2d Cir. 1990) (confusion unlikely).
George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 400, 91
U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1796 (4th Cir. 2009) (confusion unlikely); Nat’l Cable
Television Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1580, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1424, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (confusion likely).
Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 231, 91
U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 2009) (motion denied).
Woodsmith Publ’g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247, 15
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1078,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1293, 1303 (9th Cir. 2006) (confusion likely).
Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, ___ F.3d ___,
2010 WL 3120043, at *13 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2010) (confusion likely).
Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 637, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245,
1250 (7th Cir. 2001) (confusion unlikely); CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g,
Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 677, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1460 (7th Cir. 2001)
(confusion likely).
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
1257, 1270 (9th Cir. 2003) (fair use).
Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., ___ F.3d
___, 2010 WL 3278404, at *16 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (confusion likely;
“difficult to fathom a situation where a customer would not be confused”).
Mid-State Aftermarket Body Parts, Inc. v. MQVP, Inc., 466 F.3d 630, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d 1534, 1537 (8th Cir. 2006) (motion denied).
Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 124, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 2001) (confusion unlikely).
Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1098, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1937, 1941 (8th Cir. 1996) (confusion unlikely; evidence
showed “inattentiveness . . . rather than actual confusion”).
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bias.316 There is no “bright-line rule precluding summary judgment
when the plaintiff in an infringement action presents an instance of
actual confusion.”317 “Because it is inappropriate to assess credibility
of an affiant at the summary judgment stage, we do not consider the
appellees’ arguments that the affidavits should be discounted because
most of them were authored by supporters of [plaintiff ’s company] . . .
and/or [plaintiff ’s] friends and family members.”318 Courts avoid such
fact issues in different ways. Frequently, actual confusion evidence is
dismissed as “minimal” (de minimis), nothing more than a “scintilla,”
thus inadequate to block summary judgment as a matter of law. 319
“[Plaintiff] strives to persuade us that, no matter how paltry the
evidence of actual confusion, it is nonetheless adequate to survive
testing on summary judgment where we must accept all reasonable
inferences favorable to the nonmovant. We are not convinced.” 320
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1289, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 1992) (motion denied; testimony by
plaintiff ’s owner).
Caliber Auto. Liquidators, Inc. v. Premier Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge, LLC, 605
F.3d 931, 937, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1866 (11th Cir. 2010) (motion denied).
Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 905 n.4, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1309,
1312 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely).
Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 638, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 1999) (two instances “minimal”; confusion unlikely); Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d
114, 124, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 2001) (two instances “de
minimis”; confusion unlikely); Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d
628, 645, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir. 2001) (“de minimis”;
confusion unlikely) (citing Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83
F.3d 169, 173, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1771, 1775 (7th Cir. 1996) (confusion
unlikely; “even if admissible and credible”)); Duluth News-Tribune, Inc.
v. Mesabi Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1098–99, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1937, 1939
(8th Cir. 1996) (single probative instance); Sensient Techs. Corp. v.
SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 768 (8th Cir. 2010) (confusion
unlikely; “negligible confusion”).
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196,
205, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1251, 1256 (1st Cir. 1996) (confusion unlikely;
secondhand testimony of a single witness about a “lone inquiry”); King
of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1092, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1999) (confusion unlikely; seven instances de minimis); Tana’s v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 779 (11th Cir.
2010) (confusion unlikely; inquiry by two customers “so minimal as to be
practically insignificant”); Woodsmith Publ’g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904
unlikely; half dozen “isolated” instances, reasonably explained as mere
inattentiveness by defendant; evidence insufficient as a matter of law);
U.S.P.Q.2d 1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely); Surfvivor
Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 633, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1621,
1623 (9th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely; single customer and single
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Actual confusion may be disregarded as a matter of law if it was not
experienced by relevant persons.321 Actual confusion evidence is often
dismissed as ambiguous. “The summary judgment paradigm requires
us to draw and respect only reasonable inferences; we need not infer
that which is farfetched or fantastic.”322
Other courts caution against casual disregard of actual confusion
evidence on summary judgment. Due to the importance of the factor
(see section 7:2), dismissing an instance of it “is inappropriate and
suggests that the court engaged in weighing the evidence, which is
improper on a motion for summary judgment. . . . The decision of how
much weight such evidence should be given is the province of the fact
finder, not the court on a motion for summary judgment.”323 “To
ignore this evidence as anecdotal or irrational tramples upon the
province of the trier of fact.”324 “[E]xtensive” evidence of actual confusion may suffice to defeat summary judgment of noninfringement325
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
retailer “scant evidence”); Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t
Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1005, 1009–10, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1570, 1575,
1576 (8th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely; “ambiguous testimony of an
interested person that there were several inquiries over a two year
period”—a “scintilla” of evidence insufficient to raise a triable issue);
Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 905, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1309, 1311
(8th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely; “some evidence” of actual confusion
does not bar summary judgment of noninfringement); Freedom Card, Inc.
v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 478–79, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1515,
1527 (3d Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely; “even if credited,” one instance of
actual confusion “de minimis”).
1046 (2d Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely; 400 phone calls and several letters
did not reflect “consumers’ purchasing decisions”); Heartsprings, Inc. v.
Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 557, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir.
1998) (confusion unlikely; evidence did “not indicate confusion among
consumers”) (emphasis in original).
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196,
206, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1251, 1259 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original)
(confusion unlikely; “inherently implausible to infer” actual confusion
from inquiries).
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 297, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
1026, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (motion denied).
Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 230, 91
U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1389 (5th Cir. 2009) (motion denied; three instances
of actual confusion of origin not to be dismissed as isolated); Venture Tape
Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 62, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051,
1055 (1st Cir. 2008) (confusion likely; absence of actual confusion
evidence does not preclude summary judgment especially where other
factors indicate infringement).
Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1511, 1516 (2d Cir. 1996) (motion denied); Country Floors,
Inc. v. P’Ship Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1064, 18
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or affirmatively support plaintiff ’s burden of showing likelihood of
confusion.326 Where plaintiff proves substantial actual confusion, it is
“incumbent on [defendant] to produce evidence that [plaintiff ’s]
affiants were unrepresentative consumers and thereby convince the
trial court that there [is] a genuine triable issue.”327
Plaintiff ’s failure to evidence significant actual confusion may
contribute to summary judgment of noninfringement.328 The absence
of such evidence may, at least, create genuine issues as to whether
confusion is likely, helping defendant resist summary judgment of
infringement.329 However, where the other factors show “overwhelming” proof of likelihood of confusion, the absence of actual confusion
evidence may be “insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to a
material fact.”330 Lack of actual confusion may not count against
plaintiff when “nothing suggests that the lack of evidence of confusion
should be particularly noteworthy.”331
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1584 (3d Cir. 1991) (motion denied; four instances
preclude summary judgment); Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins.
Grp., 376 F.3d 8, 10, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641, 1647 (1st Cir. 2004) (motion
denied; 249 instances of actual confusion).
Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 422–23,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465, 1468 (4th Cir. 1998) (confusion likely; “substantial
and largely uncontested” evidence of actual confusion; fifteen misdirected
phone calls per week; misdirected shipments).
Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415,
419, 222 U.S.P.Q. 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1984) (confusion likely; seven
affidavits re confusion).
Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594, 598, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d 1050, 1054 (4th Cir. 1992) (confusion unlikely; “significant”
lack of actual confusion over twenty-five years and millions of dollars of
sales).
Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n, 41 F.3d 223, 228, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1328,
1332 (5th Cir. 1995) (motion denied); Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy ’s,
Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 204, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(motion denied; lack of actual confusion evidence over eighteen years);
Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 974, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1325 (10th Cir. 2002) (motion denied; actual confusion evidence “de
minimis”); cf. Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162,
170, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1907, 1914 (2d Cir. 1991) (motion granted; actual
confusion not needed).
Volkswagenwerk AG v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 819, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264,
1269 (1st Cir. 1987) (confusion likely) (emphasis in original); Venture Tape
Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 61–62, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d
1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 2008) (confusion likely; absence of actual confusion
evidence does not preclude summary judgment especially where other
factors indicate infringement).
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1076,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1293, 1303 (9th Cir. 2006) (confusion likely).
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To support or substitute for anecdotal evidence of actual confusion,
plaintiffs often successfully proffer surveys to block summary judgment
of noninfringement.332 (See section 7:10.) Failure to do so may be
fatal.333 A survey showing “substantial” confusion may support summary judgment of infringement.334 However, a survey showing confusion may fail where the factors overall support summary judgment of
noninfringement.335 A defense survey showing “absence of significant
confusion” favors summary judgment of noninfringement.336 A “badly
flawed” survey would not necessarily raise a genuine issue of fact.337
“Otherwise, any survey, no matter how tendentious would force the
parties to trial.”338
Intent. Due to its subjective nature, the issue of intent to confuse
has been called “singularly inappropriate for determination on summary judgment,” 339 since the court is not supposed weigh the
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 813–14, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1189, 1193
(9th Cir. 1997) (motion denied; survey combined with anecdotes); Insty*Bit Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., 95 F.3d 663, 671, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1966–
67 (8th Cir. 1996) (motion denied; survey raises genuine issue); AHP
Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 618, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
1758, 1763 (7th Cir. 1993) (motion denied; survey creates triable issue);
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1889 (9th Cir. 2001) (motion denied); Sally Beauty Co.
v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 980, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1329 (10th Cir.
2002) (motion denied; “strong survey”).
1142, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely; plaintiff “presented no
facts showing actual confusion, such as a customer survey”).
Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 423, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d 1465, 1468 (4th Cir. 1998) (confusion likely).
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246, 222 U.S.P.Q.
101, 112 (2d Cir. 1983).
Survivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 633, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118, 223
U.S.P.Q. 1000, 1004 (2d Cir. 1984) (confusion unlikely); Gen. Motors v.
Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 414, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1612 (6th Cir.
2006) (confusion likely; flawed survey fails to show actual confusion);
Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., 426 F.3d 1001, 1010, 75
U.S.P.Q.2d 1570, 1575 (8th Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely; no triable issue
based on survey which “fails to address the relevant inquiry”).
DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 27, 217 U.S.P.Q. 307,
309 (2d Cir. 1982) (motion denied); Copelands’ Enters. v. CNV, Inc., 945
F.2d 1563, 1567, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (fraud); Giant
v. Standard, 229 U.S.P.Q.2d 955, 962 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (fraud).
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credibility of witnesses.340 Intent issues do not automatically block
summary judgment, however.341
[Plaintiff ’s] creative attempt to link events and acts in order to
ascribe . . . a bad motive rests only upon speculation and
conjecture. We have not hesitated to affirm summary judgment
when the only proof proffered in opposition amounts to nothing
more than speculation and conjecture. The fact that the defendant’s state of mind is in issue does not alter the result where only
speculative allegations are offered to demonstrate the existence of
state of mind after ample opportunity to engage in relevant
discovery. While we are well aware that caution must be exercised
in granting summary judgment when state of mind is in issue, the
summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile if the mere
incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman
342
to defeat an otherwise valid motion.
“[C]onclusory assertions” of intent unsupported by evidence in the
record fail to create a genuine issue of material fact.343 Nor does the
court need to draw “unreasonable” inferences in favor of the nonmovant.344 Facts that “cut both ways” on intent must go the fact
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
Autozone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 934, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1232 (7th
Cir. 2008) (motion denied) (quoting AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart
Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 619, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1758, 1764 (7th Cir. 1993)
(motion denied)); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1024, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1557 (3d Cir. 2008) (motion denied).
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246–47, 222 U.S.P.Q.
101, 114 (2d Cir. 1983) (confusion unlikely); Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 119, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1000, 1006 (2d Cir.
1984) (confusion unlikely; deriving ideas from plaintiff not determinative
“where no question of fact exists as to the likelihood of confusion”);
Freedom Card, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 479, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d 1515, 1527 (3d Cir. 2005) (confusion unlikely; unrealized
intent).
Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d
134, 141, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842, 1846 (2d Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely);
see Nora Beverages Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 125,
60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038, 1044, 1045 (2d Cir. 2001) (confusion unlikely); EMI
Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d
56, 61, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1270, 1273 (2d Cir. 2000) (motion denied; “some
caution” to be exercised with respect to intent on summary judgment).
Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 645, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245,
1250 (7th Cir. 2001) (confusion unlikely); Tana’s v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d
767, 778–79 (11th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely; “bald assertion”);
Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 767
(8th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely; “no support in this record . . . other
than speculation”).
Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 545, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1108, 1113 (6th
Cir. 2006) (confusion likely).
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finder.345 A defendant’s prior knowledge of plaintiff ’s mark receives
variable treatment depending on the case. Proof of knowledge alone
may not suffice as a matter of law, or it could be considered circumstantial evidence to support an inference, which the fact finder may or
may not draw, of intent to confuse.346 (See section 8:2.) Other facts
which alone or in combination have been deemed to present triable
issues as to intent are:
•
copying by defendant;347
•
defendant’s design process;348
•
defendant’s intent to parody;349
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991) (motion denied; intent relevant to
damages and attorney fees).
N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 556, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d 1260, 1264 (2d Cir. 2002) (confusion unlikely; awareness does
not amount to bad faith deception); Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170
unlikely); Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d
754, 767 (8th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely); Sweats Fashions, Inc. v.
Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1565, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1793, 1797–98
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (confusion unlikely; “an inference of ‘bad faith’ requires
something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark”); Savin
Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 460, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1273, 1285–86
(2d Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely); cf. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor
(confusion unlikely); Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s
Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 287, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173, 1175 (6th Cir.
1997) (motion denied; defendant’s awareness of plaintiff ’s mark was
“circumstantial evidence” which, if proven, could support an inference of
intentional copying); Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d
1107, 1111, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1535, 1537 (9th Cir. 1999) (motion denied;
evidence of awareness of plaintiff ’s mark permits inference of intent to
deceive); Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284,
1286 & 1289, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 1992) (motion denied;
awareness is sufficient for trier of fact to find intentional infringement). Of
course, without knowledge, the intent issue is immaterial. King of
the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1091, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1999) (confusion unlikely; “no evidence
to suggest that the defendants were even aware of plaintiff ’s existence, let
alone that they intentionally attempted to trade on plaintiff ’s reputation or
goodwill”).
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1266, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1889 (9th Cir. 2001) (motion denied); Sally Beauty
Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 976, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1327
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 813, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1189, 1193
Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1231, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385,
1390 (7th Cir. 1993) (motion denied).
2–72
•
•
•
•
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defendant’s failure to search or obtain advice of counsel;350
continued expansion by defendant after notice of plaintiff ’s
mark;351
prior relationship of parties;352
availability to defendant of alternative designs.353
Similarity of marks. Some courts decline to decide debatable similarities and dissimilarities between marks or dress on summary
judgment.354 Issues as to similarity may be enough to require a
trial.355 For example, different connotations and commercial impressions may create an issue of fact despite phonetic similarity.356 The
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
Sports Auth. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1511, 1516–17 (2d Cir. 1996) (motion denied); cf. Savin Corp. v. Savin
Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 460, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1273, 1285–86 (2d Cir. 2004)
(confusion unlikely; failure to search does not raise genuine issue); King of
the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1091–92, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1999) (confusion unlikely); Lang v.
Ret. Living Publ’g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 583, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1041, 1047
(2d Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely; search and advice of counsel indicate
no intent).
Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1511, 1517 (2d Cir. 1996) (motion denied).
Compare Insty*Bit Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., 95 F.3d 663, 671, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1966 (8th Cir. 1996) (motion denied) with Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1179–80, 1182, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
2034, 2034 (9th Cir. 1988) (confusion likely; former franchisee).
Insty*Bit Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., 95 F.3d 663, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1966
Autozone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 930, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (7th Cir.
2008) (motion denied) (quoting AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale
Co., 1 F.3d 611, 619, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1758, 1763 (7th Cir. 1993)) (motion
denied; triable issue as to similarity of combined name and packaging);
Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 976, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1327 (10th Cir. 2002) (motion denied; “dissimilarity” alone not dispositive); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974, 979, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
1591, 1593 (9th Cir. 2007) (motion denied; error to rely on dissimilarity
alone).
Country Floors, Inc. v. P’Ship Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056,
1064, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1584 (3d Cir. 1991) (motion denied; “Visual
comparison . . . indicates likelihood of confusion”); Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did
It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1230, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1388 (7th Cir. 1993)
(motion denied; “Yes, they are similar, but similarity alone does not end
the inquiry. A jury could find that [the marks] in text, meaning, and
pronunciation, are not so similar as to confuse consumers. . . .”); Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 967, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
1861, 1866–67 (6th Cir. 1987) (motion denied; “strong resemblance”).
Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 203, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (motion denied).
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court is generally not “equipped at summary judgment” to assume
how purchasers might perceive the mark in issue or an accompanying
house mark.357 There are, of course, exceptions.358 Many courts are
willing to compare marks on summary judgment especially in cases
where, in combination with other factors, they are “unmistakably”
different,359 “significantly” different,360 “substantially” different,361
“overwhelmingly” different,362 “materially different,”363 “greatly” different,364 or otherwise so different as to “eliminate[] virtually any
possibility of confusion,”365 to make confusion “wholly unlikely,”366 or
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1288, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1992) (motion denied); Thomas & Betts
Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 296, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1026, 1040 (7th
Cir. 1998) (motion denied; where each party “embosses its name on the
[products] in the same color as the rest of the [product] . . . our difficulty in
discerning the names upon a close inspection” creates a fact issue “as to
whether the names . . . prevent the [products] from being confused”).
1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely based on dissimilarity, the
“sole issue upon which [defendant] based its motion for summary
judgment”); Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods., 866 F.2d 1386, 1390,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1736, 1736 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (confusion unlikely; dissimilar
commercial impressions).
Leathersmith of London, Ltd. v. Alleyn, 695 F.2d 27, 30, 220 U.S.P.Q. 204,
206 (1st Cir. 1982) (confusion unlikely; common portion of marks had
“descriptive significance”).
1045 (2d Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely).
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246–47, 222 U.S.P.Q.
101, 113 (2d Cir. 1983) (confusion unlikely; lack of “substantial
similarity”).
Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1208–09,
70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1707, 1713–14 (11th Cir. 2004) (confusion unlikely, even
where other factors favor plaintiff).
Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d
134, 141, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842, 1847 (2d Cir. 1991) (confusion unlikely;
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the court is satisfied that the product
or marks are so dissimilar that no question of fact is presented.”).
King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1090,
1093, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1349, 1355 (10th Cir. 1999) (confusion unlikely;
“great dissimilarity” between marks “heavily favors” defendant).
Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 424, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1355,
1358 (6th Cir. 1999) (confusion unlikely; combined with “very high degree
of care”; a “great deal” of care).
Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., 83 F.3d 169, 173, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
1771, 1775 (7th Cir. 1996) (confusion unlikely; “vivid and individual”
name prefixed to the “blandly descriptive” mark in issue made “it wholly
unlikely that any significant number of consumers would be misled”).
2–74
§ 2:12
to “negate any possibility” of confusion. 367 By the same token,
summary judgment of infringement may be granted in cases where
there is “no question” about similarity.368
367.
368.
Nora Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am. Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 123, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 2001) (confusion unlikely; “the presence of the
prominent and distinctive labels alone negates any possibility of a likelihood of confusion and provides sufficient basis for affirming the district
court’s grant of summary judgment [to defendant]”).
Volkswagenwerk AG v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 817, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264,
1268 (1st Cir. 1987) (confusion likely).
2–75

The Multiple Factor Test

Transcription

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