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Quality and Capacity Document
2009
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Gas Transport Services B.V.
Quality and Capacity Document 2009
Foreword
We are pleased to present the 2009 Quality and Capacity Document prepared by Gas Transport Services B.V. (GTS).
This document has been produced in accordance with the requirements set by the Ministerial Decree on Quality
Aspects of Transmission System Operation (Electricity and Gas). It has been compiled for the Office of Energy Regulation of the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) and for others who are interested in our company.
GTS forms part of the European infrastructure company N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie. Gasunie has one of the largest
high pressure transmission networks in Europe. As operator of the Dutch gas transmission network, GTS provides
gas transport services in the interests of ensuring a smooth operation of the gas market in the Netherlands and
beyond. Management of the gas transmission network comes within the statutory tasks that GTS performs on a
non-discriminatory and transparent basis. GTS is responsible for providing safe and reliable gas transport. Quality
and safety are top priorities and controlling factors and are the reason for extra attention being paid to the ageing
networks in the Netherlands. Naturally these must continue to comply with the GTS standards for safety and quality. That is why more time and money is necessary for network maintenance.
GTS anticipates developments on the gas market which may affect the gas streams in its network and the associated
demand for transport capacity. GTS does this by providing new services and by organising planning and investment
processes efficiently. Over the last few years, ‘Open Seasons’ have been held which involve asking market parties to
calculate their requirements for additional transport capacity and to commit to these requirements. The first two
Open Seasons resulted in a huge expansion in the Dutch gas transmission grid. The Integrated Open Season held
this year, together with our sister network operator in Germany, GUD, also revealed substantial requirements for
extra transport capacity. These expansions mean that numerous companies can conclude new trading contracts
at home and abroad, new power stations are supplied with gas and soon liquefied natural gas (LNG) can also be
brought to the Netherlands. The Netherlands itself is benefiting from this because more competition between gas
suppliers promotes market operations.
The investments are also necessary to secure future gas supply, because domestic production is gradually declining.
An adequate long-term supply of natural gas is also important in view of its crucial role as a transition fuel. Gas is
the cleanest of the fossil fuels that can be used to help achieve a sustainable energy supply. Even with increased
energy efficiency and the optimal use of other energy sources (such as wind energy and solar and nuclear power)
the role of gas will continue to be of immense importance as a flexible fuel in Dutch and European energy supply.
The latest investments tie in well with this strategy and will moreover ensure that the Netherlands can build on its
strong position as linchpin of the gas roundabout in the North-West European energy supply.
Geert Graaf
CEO
If you would like to comment on this document
please send an e-mail to: info@gastransport.nl
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Abbreviations
This Quality and Capacity Document uses the following abbreviations.
Abbreviation
AMvB
BBL
BRZO
CAP
CCP
CPB
CS
DCMR
DIS
EGIG
EK
EN
ESD
FMEA
GDB
GE
G-gas
GTS
GUD
GUN
GWWL
H-gas
HPSD
HTL
IPPC
ISO
KB
KCD
KLIC
KPI
LCC
LNB
LNG
LOC
LOD
LTDV
LTI
LTIF
MOC
MER
MRQ
NEN
NMa
NNO
Meaning
General Administrative Order
Bacton - Balgzand Pipeline
Major Accident Decree
Central Asset Planning
Central Command Post
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Control station (CS)
Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond
Document Information System
European Gas pipeline Incident data Group
Office of Energy Regulation (regulatory body, part of the Nma)
European Norm
Emergency Shut Down
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Geo Data Base
Groningen Equivalent (= the measurement for non-Groningen gas expressed as an equivalent
volume of Groningen quality gas)
Groningen gas
Gas Transport Services
Gasunie Deutschland
Gasunie Netherlands
Grijpskerk - Workum - Wieringermeer Pipeline
High-calorific gas
High Pressure Shut Down
Main transmission grid
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
International Standardisation Organisation
Cathodic protection
Quality and Capacity Document
Cable & Pipeline Information Centre
Key Performance Indicator
Life Cycle Costing
National Network Operator
Liquefied Natural Gas
Loss of Containment
Line of Defence
Long Term Development View
Lost Time Incident
Lost Time Incident Frequency
Management of Change
Environmental Impact Analysis
Ministerial Decree on Quality Aspects of Transmission
Netherlands Standardisation Institute
Netherlands Competition Authority
Neighbouring Network Operator
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NPR
ORA
PBZO
PIMS
PM
P90
QRA
RCM
RIVM
RNB
RO
RTL
RvA
SBUI
SCIOS
SLA
SRA
TBO
OBO
VG&M
WION
WKK
WRO
Dutch Code of Practice
Operational Risk Analysis
Severe Accident Prevention Policy
Pipeline Integrity Management System
Plant Maintenance
90% assurance that a project will be realised within budget and time schedule in accordance
with the scope and requirements
Quantitative Risk Analysis
Reliability Centred Maintenance
National Institute of Public Health and Environment
Regional network company
Spatial planning Department
Regional transmission grid
Dutch Accreditation Council
National Structure Plan for Pipelines
Dutch Foundation for Certification, Inspection & Maintenance of Combustion Plants
Service Level Agreement
Strategic Risk Analysis
Technical Management Hand-over
Operational Management Hand-over
Health, Safety & Environment (HSE)
Information Exchange on Underground Networks Act
Combined Heat and Power (CHP)
Spatial Planning Act
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Content
Foreword
Abbreviations
2
3
1.
Introduction
1.1 General points
1.2 Layout of the Quality and Capacity Document
1.3 Developments arising from the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document
7
7
8
10
2.
Capacity Plan
2.1
Market developments
2.1.1
Trends in Europe
2.1.2
Gas transport scenarios in 2016
2.1.3
2.1.4
National Structure Vision for Pipelines
2.2
Forecasts
2.2.1
Introduction
2.2.2
Exit
2.2.2.1
Estimation method
2.2.2.2
Domestic exit capacity
2.2.2.3
Exit capacity at border points
2.2.3
Entry
2.2.3.1
Estimation method
2.2.3.2
Domestic entry capacity
2.4
Bottlenecks
2.4.1
Decisions were taken in 2008 to resolve the following bottlenecks.
2.4.2
Decisions were taken in 2009 to resolve the following bottlenecks
2.4.3
Decisions will be taken after 2009 to resolve the following bottlenecks
11
12
12
17
18
20
22
22
22
22
23
24
24
24
24
26
27
27
28
3.
Quality and safety
3.1
Introduction
3.2
Indicators with target values
3.3
Quality system
3.4
Safety
3.4.1
Interest
3.4.2
External safety
3.4.3
Safety zoning
3.4.4
Risk Communication
3.4.5
Disaster management
29
29
29
31
38
38
39
42
42
42
4.
Maintenance and replacement
4.1
Preventative maintenance
4.2
Replacement
4.3
Maintenance and fault-clearing service
4.3.1
Organisation
4.3.2
Modus operandi
43
44
46
47
47
47
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5.
Cohesion between Investment Plan, Maintenance Plan and Business Plan
5.1
Relationship between Investment and Maintenance Plans and Business Plan
5.2
Planning & Control Cycle
Contents of Appendices
I.
Directives and norms applied by GTS
II.
Monitoring procedure
III.
Description of components of the gas transmission grid
IV.
Qualitative component assessment; monitoring, assessing and changing components
V.
Asset Register
VI.
Gas transmission grid changes as against the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document
VII.
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49
50
52
54
55
57
59
61
63
65
1. Introduction
1.1 General points
In accordance with article 8 of the Gas Act, Gas Transport Services B.V. (GTS) has prepared this Quality and Capacity
Document in which:
 GTS demonstrates that it has an effective quality control system for its transport services and other services;
 GTS describes the quality levels to which it aspires;
 GTS describes which safety indicators are applied;
 GTS demonstrates that it has sufficient capacity to be able to meet total gas transport requirements;
 GTS describes which investments, including replacement investments, are needed in order to maintain the
quality and continue with the expansion of the gas transmission grid in order to meet total requirements for gas
transport.
GTS has used the Ministerial Decree on Quality Aspects of Transmission (version of 20 December 2004) and the
NMa’s “Guidelines for Quality and Capacity Documents” (version of 5 February 2008) as a guide for preparing the
Quality and Capacity Document. The findings of the audit performed by the Office of Energy Regulation in December 2008 have also been incorporated. The Quality and Capacity Document is published on the website of GTS1.
GTS is an independently operating subsidiary of N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (Gasunie), the owner of the pipeline
network. Gasunie has designated GTS as the national gas transmission operator as laid down in the Network Management Agreement. Part of the operational activities relating to network management, in particular the actual
construction and maintenance of the gas transmission network, has been assigned to Gasunie by GTS through a
contract for professional services.
GTS aims to offer and perform gas transport services independently in order to contribute towards the smooth
operation of a liberalised gas market in the Netherlands and beyond. As operator of the national transmission network, GTS performs its tasks on a non-discriminatory, transparent basis with safety, reliability and efficiency being
of paramount importance. Customer orientation, cost awareness and professionalism are also key concepts in GTS’
business operations.
1 www.gastransportservices.nl
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1.2 Layout of the Quality and Capacity Document
After the introductory first chapter, chapter 2 gives an insight into long-term market trends in Europe and translates
these into possible scenarios. These are formulated in more detail by producing an estimation of total transport
capacity requirements for the Netherlands and a description of existing and anticipated capacity bottlenecks. The
document describes which investments are needed for expanding the gas transmission grid in order to meet anticipated demand for transport. The methods for estimating the demand for capacity and for determining capacity
bottlenecks are also explained.
Chapter 3 describes the level of quality to which the company aspires for its gas transport services and the safety
indicators that are applied. Quality control procedures for gas transport are also explained and the effectiveness
of these is demonstrated. Risk management relating to realising or maintaining gas transport quality in the short
term and the long term is a key element here. Particular attention is paid to risk management, specifically to safety
aspects while the gas transmission grid is being constructed, maintained or managed and while gas is being transported. The document pays explicit attention to the prevention of a major risk: pipeline damage sustained during
excavation work by third parties.
Representing a more detailed examination of this part of chapter 3, chapter 4 describes the measures that must be
taken as regards maintenance and replacement in order to realise and to maintain the quality of transport services
to which the company aspires. It also describes the working procedures and organisational measures in the event
of failures and interruptions.
Finally, chapter 5 describes the business and control cycle, which guarantees the cohesion between the compulsory
parts of the quality control system, the registration process and the annual budget. The registration process, the
procedures and the plans are also evaluated within this cycle.
The following topics are covered in appendices:
 standards, guidelines and other relevant provisions, see appendix I
monitoring procedure, see appendix II
description of gas transport components, see appendix III
description of the technical condition of components of the network, see appendix IV
description of the asset register and associated procedure, see appendix V
changes to the gas transmission grid with respect to the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document, see appendix VI
Severe Accident Prevention Policy, see appendix VII
The following table shows where the relevant sections in the Gas Act (including proposed changes to the Gas Act),
MRQ and Guidelines are covered in the Quality and Capacity Document.
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Reference
Gas Act
Article 8.2.a
Article 8.2.b
Article 8.2.c
Proposed changes to the Gas Act
Article 2b.2.b
Article 2b.2.e
Article 35.a
Article 35.a
Clarification of Gas Act
3.4.2
3.6
4.3
7.1
7.1
7.1
7.1
7.1
7.1
MRQ
Article 10.1
Article 10.2
Article 11.a, 14
Article 11.b, 14
Article 11.c, 14
Article 11.d, 14
Article 11.e, 15.2
Article 11.f, 15.3
Article 11.g, 16.1a/2
Article 11.h, 16.1b/2
Article 11.i, 16.1c/2
Article 11.j, 17.1
Article 11.k, 17.1
Article 11.k, 17.b
Article 11.l, 18.1/2a
Article 15.1
Article 18.2b/2c
Article 19
Article 20
Guidelines
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
Article 7
Subject
QCD
Quality level
Quality control system
Capacity
3.2
3.3
2
Safety indicators
Expansion investments
Changes with regard to previous year
Deviations from quality level
3.2
2.4, 2.5
1.3
3.2
National Structure Vision and assessment of use and
necessity
Quality level and target values
Planning harmonisation between network operators
Transport capacity trends
Quality level
Risk analysis
Deviation from target values
Safety and safety indicators
2.1
Indicators
Standards, guidelines, provisions
Estimation of capacity
Capacity bottlenecks
Solutions for capacity bottlenecks
Capacity estimation procedure
Risks and risk analysis
Maintenance and replacement measures
Investment plan
Maintenance plan
Plan in the event of disruption
Monitoring procedures
Description of network components
Qualitative assessment of network components
Asset register procedure
Information regarding prevention of damage to the network
Cohesion and consistency
Evaluation of indicators, procedures, plans
3.2
Appendix I
2.1-2.3
2.4
2.4, appendix VI
2
3.3, appendix VII
4
*
*
*
Appendix II, IV
Appendix III
Appendix IV, *
Appendix V
3.3
3.4
5
3.2, 3.3
Confidentiality
Target values
Estimation of demand for capacity and bottlenecks
Risk analysis
Investment plan, maintenance plan, plan in the event of
disruption
Monitoring procedure
Description of network components
*
3.2
2.1-2.4
3.3, appendix VII
*
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3.2
2
2
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.2
3.2, 3.4
Appendix II
Appendix III
Article 7
Qualitative assessment of network components
Article 8
Asset register
Article 8
Information regarding prevention of damage to the network
Article 9
Cohesion and consistency
*Information is supplied separately to the Office of Energy Regulation.
Appendix IV, *
Appendix V
3.4
5
1.3 Developments arising from the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document
During an assessment and business visit in December 2008, the Office of Energy Regulation checked whether GTS
met the requirements included in the MRQ in its 2007 Quality and Capacity Document. The 2009 Quality and Capacity Document has also been enhanced in comparison with the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document as a result of
this business visit and the assessment by the Office of Energy Regulation.
Safety indicators have been named, in accordance with proposed changes to the Gas Act, Article 2b. The previous
Quality and Capacity Document already paid ample attention to safety although this was not actually required
in the MRQ. Afterall, high levels of safety and reliability are closely interlinked with regard to the gas transmission grid.
The information supplied to the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment within the scope
of the National Structure Vision for Pipelines (Structuurvisie Buisleidingen) has been backed up by supporting
documentation. The National Structure Vision for Pipelines is in the process of being revised. This describes
large-scale expansions or modifications to infrastructure, in order to set aside scope for planning for these in
advance. The investments required for the expansion of the network in order to provide total transport capacity
requirements are described in explicit detail. This is important for preparatory work and reasoning when considering use and necessity and most suitable location for nationally significant infrastructure projects.
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2. Capacity Plan
The Capacity Plan outlines projected market developments up to 2021 and the way in which GTS is planning to run
the network and future expansions to the network for the planning period 2010 - 2016.
Long-term considerations encompass GTS’ vision of developments in Europe up to 2021 and how these can be
translated into possible scenarios. The Capacity Plan includes medium-term and short-term (planning period 2010
– 2016) projected demand for capacity and indicates how it is likely to arise. It also describes how these projections
indicate probable bottlenecks in the network and how they will be resolved.
The process involves gathering forecasts on supply and sales, identifying measures for resolving existing and anticipated bottlenecks as well as long-term market trends. It gives insight into the long-term development of network
configuration.
Performing
configuration
studies
Shippers
Directly connected
parties
Approving planning
figures
Investment and
feasibility studies
Analysing
bottlenecks
Producers/
TNO-NITG
NNO’s
Operational
planning
Open Season
In a consultation round, shippers, directly connected parties (RNBs, industrial players and power stations) and producers are approached for an indication of their future need for capacity at border points and domestic entry and
exit points. GTS consults TNO Built Environment and Geosciences (TNO Bouw en Ondergrond) on provisionally
undeveloped gas reserves in the Netherlands and on the Dutch section of the continental shelf. GTS coordinates
capacity requirements on both sides of the border point with the Neighbouring Network Operators (NNOs).
GTS then compiles the planning figures based on bookings, data from previous years, figures obtained from the
consultation round, the results of an analysis of sales and macroeconomic trends. These planning figures are used to
compile scenarios in which future developments on the Dutch and neighbouring gas markets are modelled. These
scenarios later provide major input for the Long Term Development View (LTDV) and the analysis of bottlenecks.
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Years in advance
Global, uncertain, long term
Long Term Development View
6-25
4-6
Investment study
1-4
Bottleneck analysis
0-1
Operational planning
Detailed, specific, short term
GTS follows developments on the North-West European gas market, also over the long term. The LTDV gives an
insight into the strategy to be followed for potential network expansions and the long-term investments necessary
for this. These insights mean that the gas transmission grid can be expanded to such an extent that anticipated new
capacity will also cover the capacity requirements of the market over the long term.
An investment study is compiled to translate medium-term capacity bookings from market players into a corresponding (feasible) investment programme. The measures GTS ultimately takes depend on the amounts contracted
by market players over the long-term. Major investments cannot be based on forecasts, since there is a risk that they
may be inaccurate. Individual requests from shippers are also often not enough to justify a major investment. For
this reason, it was decided to organise periodic Open Seasons. This provides a structural and medium-term picture
of shippers’ demand for transport capacity, to which a timely response can be made. By combining market demands,
economies of scale can be achieved. Open Seasons are organised every two years in principle.
The bottleneck analysis concentrates on the short term, the next 1 to 4 years, and identifies anticipated bottlenecks.
No more major network adjustments can be carried out within this period. Bottlenecks will be resolved by methods
including commercial measures and investments.
Within operational planning it is no longer possible to adjust the network configuration. Free capacity which is temporarily not being used can be made available to the market. Maintenance on the transmission grid is also planned
in such a way that existing obligations can be satisfied.
2.1
Market developments
This section describes GTS’ long-term vision of gas infrastructure development up to 2021. On the one hand, this
relates to the developments on the North-West European gas market, on the other hand to the consequences of these
developments for Dutch gas infrastructure. Different scenarios are examined within the framework of the LTDV
(compiled in mid-2008).
2.1.1
Trends in Europe
The European gas market is susceptible to continuous changes. The market has become very dynamic as a result
of the liberalisation of the gas market and increasing cross-border gas flows. The decline in production capacity in
North-West Europe is leading to the need for new imported flows. Market players have a virtually continual need
for expansion in transport capacity, which leads to adaptations to the gas transmission grid in order to be able to
satisfy market requirements permanently.
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North-West European Gas Roundabout
The gas roundabout
All involved parties are working on the development of the Netherlands into the linchpin of the North-West European gas roundabout. In order to effect this, the government is providing a beneficial investment climate, taking care
of an improvement in market operations and enhancing the international position of the Netherlands as a gas country. The country is working with neighbouring countries towards removing obstacles to cross-border trade. National
gas market operations are also being improved in a number of areas, such as the removal of barriers relating to gas
quality. Expansion of the gas roundabout is an “icon” of Dutch energy policy. This will make a positive contribution
towards the triangle of energy policy objectives: guaranteeing security of supply, energy market efficiency and the
transition towards a sustainable energy supply, in which gas will play a crucial part over the next few years. By
making the Netherlands, as an “interchange” , as attractive as possible for gas imports, exports, transit, storage and
trade, the Netherlands can earn an enduring “return” from the knowledge, infrastructure and geographic potential
already available here. The gas roundabout can also be broadened from a functional point of view: the Netherlands
may provide services to West Europe to assist in the transport of CO2 and its storage in empty gas fields (onshore
and offshore).
Demand for transport capacity
The increasing demand for transport capacity in North-West Europe is leading to adaptations to the gas transport
system. This growth in demand for capacity is arising from:
Increase in international gas flows (imports2 and exports)
Gas demand trends
Increasing demand for gas storage
Diversification
Arbitrage (trade)
These five market developments are explained below. Different scenarios for capacity demand in 2016 and 2021
have been defined based on these developments. These scenarios and the consequences for the gas infrastructure
are reproduced in sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4.
2 Increase in imports through falling domestic supply.
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Increase in international gas flows
The combination of declining local production and a slight growth in the gas market is resulting in an increase in
import flows for North-West Europe. Connection to gas flows from outside North-West Europe is necessary, either
via pipelines, or in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). As a result of this change to the gas supply, the composition of the gas that is being brought to the market in the Netherlands is gradually changing. The joint network
operators have alerted stakeholders to the fact that gas consumption equipment must possibly be adapted in order
to be ready to cope with fluctuations in gas composition.
As far as GTS is concerned, the decline in local production (low-calorific gas) and the increase in high-calorific imported gas possibly mean that considerably more must be invested in quality conversion in order to meet market
demand.
Volume [bcm/year]
Additional import requirements for North-West Europe in 2020 compared to 2005
90
80
Market growth
70
Decline in production
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
United
Kingdom
the Netherlands
Germany
France
Denmark/
Sweden
Belgium
Source: GTS, based on National Grid, Global Insight, CERA and Wood Mackenzie
The decline in local production within North-West Europe is manifesting itself particularly in the United Kingdom,
Germany and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands this mainly represents falling volumes produced from the “small
fields”. A fall in local supply will be compensated for by an increase in imports. We are also seeing a trend where
more gas is flowing to neighbouring countries at the exit points.
Gas demand trends
GTS assumes moderate long-term growth of 1% to 1.5% per annum. The financial crisis has lead to a temporary
decline in economic growth resulting in a decrease in gas consumption by industrial customers and a decrease in the
volume of gas transit to neighbouring countries. However, this has a very limited effect on the necessary transport
capacity. The reason for this is that the volume decrease is manifesting itself mainly with buyers with a flat profile.
The demand for gas from so-called profile customers, such as the domestic market in the Netherlands and neighbouring countries, is not showing any decline and continues to claim the largest proportion of the system capacity.
- 14 -
As an indication, a volume decrease of 5% relating to ‘flat’ buyers results in a decrease in total capacity load of less
than 0.5%.
An economic recovery is anticipated in 2010. On balance it is expected that the effect of the economic crisis will
lead to a 5 to 6 year stagnation in gas volumes required. However, it is anticipated that the growth in demand for
transport capacity will remain almost unchanged. New market demand for additional transport capacity is clearly
present in the current Integrated Open Season.
The emergence of sustainable energy sources will lead to a possible future drop in the volume consumed by gasfired power stations. However, no fall in transport capacity is expected because this capacity remains necessary as a
back-up for sustainable sources, such as wind.
Increasing demand for gas storage
As domestic supplies are steadily dwindling, it is necessary to connect to gas flows from outside North-West Europe.
Generally these gas flows will originate from distant sources, requiring major investment in infrastructure.
180
Iran
Nigeria
tu
re
120
90
Fu
Proven gas reserves [Tcm]
150
Russia
(at present)
Qatar
Algeria
60
Russia (in
the future)
30
Today
0
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Norway
Distance [k m ]
Source: Based on Global Insight; BP Statistical review
New imported gas coming from greater distances
In order to provide gas transport in an economically responsible manner, gas with a high utilisation period will be
supplied, i.e. a constant supply during the whole year. Absorbing seasonal variations in demand within the market
must be carried out by using storage facilities close to the market. This means that the increasing requirement for
imports is leading to a need for additional storage.
- 15 -
Capacity
1/3 van
1/3
of jaarvolume
annual volume
2/3 of annual volume
Baseload supply: load factor 1
Baseload supply delivers to storage facilities
Market demand with seasonal profile
Storage facilities deliver to the market
1-Dec
1-Nov
1-Oct
1-Sep
1-Aug
1-Jul
1-Jun
1-May
1-Apr
1-Mar
1-Feb
1-Jan
2/3 van jaarvolume
Baseload supply delivers to the market
Storage facilities to convert baseload supply to a seasonal profile (example)
The potential for building suitable storage facilities for the North-West European market is localised in a restricted
area. This area extends over North Germany, North and West Netherlands and the North Sea. Storage facilities are
going to be offering an increasing number of services across national borders. In this way, seasonal flexibility from
Dutch storage facilities will also be used for the neighbouring countries Germany, Belgium, France and the United
Kingdom and vice versa. Exporting (and importing) flexibility requires considerable (winter) capacity at border
stations.
Diversification
As the share of imported gas becomes greater, the desire to diversify supply arises i.e. to have as many different and
independent suppliers as possible, thereby minimising the risk of failure of supply.
In addition to the role it plays as a source of additional imports, liquefied natural gas (LNG) also makes a contribution towards the diversification of supply. Liquefied natural gas comes mainly from areas where the intended
markets cannot be reached with gas pipelines, such as Nigeria, Qatar, Angola and Libya. LNG represents a flexible
transport route compared to transport through pipelines.
Given the situation where the global receiving capacity for LNG exceeds production capacity by a factor of 2, it is
technically possible to shift LNG transport. This means that LNG trading becomes increasingly global in nature, with
market prices also determining where LNG is purchased and supplied. This can make the LNG supply changeable
and uncertain. In any case there must be sufficient capacity in order to transport the gas from the terminal towards
the transmission grid or sales market.
- 16 -
Diversifying transport routes and markets also applies for gas producers. Different considerations, including geopolitical issues, can play a role here. In order to be able to accommodate the different supply situations that arise here,
additional transport capacity will be necessary for the coming years.
Arbitrage (trade)
The liberalised gas market, with an increasing number of trading parties, has created the need for transport capacity
to facilitate this trade. Gas suppliers contract extra transport capacity in order to have access to the market with
the highest price. Gas buyers contract extra transport capacity in order to have access to the market with the lowest
price. The volatility in the commodity market offers opportunities for trading. Market players’ behaviour is unpredictable and is chiefly defined through optimisation of trading activities. When reserving transport capacity, gas
transport costs play a subordinate role, because these only form a fraction of the commercial value of the gas. The
demand for extra transport capacity due to increasing trade will lead to more infrastructure.
Developments in the gas market will lead to an increase in transport capacity. In addition to the physical necessity
for additional imports, flexibility and flows to neighbouring countries, the desire for diversification and arbitrage
also play a part. Investments from prior years have been based on capacity contracted by market customers.
Taking account of the aforementioned developments, transport scenarios for 2016 and 2021 were compiled in mid2008. The names of the scenarios are different to those used in the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document. The low
capacity scenario is equivalent to the basic scenario of 2007. This low capacity scenario includes all the capacities
considered to be commitments as at mid-2008 for which investments shall be made, if necessary.
2.1.2
For 2016 the ‘low’ scenario consists of the existing commitments3. The many market plans (LNG, storage, power
stations, imports, exports), for which GTS (as at mid-2008) has not yet undertaken any commitments, are listed and
ranked in a medium and high capacity scenario. The terms low, medium and high indicate the estimated level of
the capacity, not the possibility of it occurring. The medium capacity scenario includes, in addition to the capacities
from the low capacities scenario, market plans with a high probability of occurrence. In the 2007 Capacity Plan,
these additional market plans formed what was then the high probability scenario. The high capacity scenario contains, in addition to the capacities from the medium capacity scenario, market plans with a lower probability of occurrence. In the previous Capacity Plan, these components with a lower probability were subdivided and classified
in a medium and lower probability scenario.
Based on a transport analysis performed according to the aforementioned scenarios, a growth in entry and exit capacity in North-East and North-West Netherlands and a growth in entry capacity in West Netherlands (Maasvlakte)
are expected for 2016. The basic principle is that domestic production capacity will decline sharply.
Investments must be made if the demand for transport in the ‘medium’ and ‘high’ scenarios for 2016 are to be met.
It should be noted that these relate to expansions for which no investment decision has yet been made. In the figure
below, the red/yellow bars represent extra pipeline capacity and the circles extra compression capacity. Expansion
programmes via the West and East route have been taken into account. The most efficient solution will be implemented on the basis of concrete contracts.
3 Commitments present as at mid-2008, including the contracts and infrastructure for Open Season 2005, Open Season 2012 and
the first LNG terminal.
- 17 -
Medium
High
West-route
East-route
Possible expansion programmes to the gas transmission grid in 2016
2.1.3
As various currently prevailing contracts will have expired by 2021, and it is impossible to identify concrete projects
over a period of more than 10 years, another approach has been chosen for compiling scenarios for 2021. Using a
transport simulation model for the whole of Europe as well as existing long-term market data as at mid-2008, a representative cold year has been simulated on a daily basis. Capacities for the Dutch gas transmission grid have been
derived from this. This leads to the following scenarios: medium (with extra entry in North-East and West Netherlands in order to compensate for the decline in domestic production) and high, in which extra gas flows via SouthWest Netherlands to United Kingdom. In high capacity scenario 1, this extra gas will come mainly from North-West
and West Netherlands. In high capacity scenario 2, this extra gas will come mainly from North-East Netherlands.
For the medium scenario, extra transport to United Kingdom via BBL or Interconnector (IUK) has been simulated.
In order to meet demand for transport in 2021, investments must be made in pipeline capacity and compression
capacity. Just as with the scenarios for 2016, it should also be noted here that this relates to possible expansions for
which no investment decision has been taken. In the figure below, the bars represent extra pipeline capacity and
the circles extra compression capacity. Expansion programmes for the West and East route have been taken into
account just as for 2016. The most efficient solution will be implemented on the basis of concrete contracts.
- 18 -
Medium
Medium BBL
Medium IUK
Possible expansion programmes for the gas transmission grid, ‘medium’ scenarios in 2021
High1+High2
High1
West-route
East-route
High2
Possible expansion programmes for the gas transmission grid, ‘high’ scenarios in 2021
More measures are also necessary in 2021 for the high capacity scenarios than for the medium capacity scenarios.
Supplying gas from North-East Netherlands (‘high’ 2) also requires more measures than supplying gas from NorthWest and West Netherlands.
GTS’ approach is that investments are based on capacity contracted by customers. Based on capacity bookings, for
example within the scope of an Open Season, a business case is drawn up, which leads to a proposed expansion programme for the network. An assessment is made, by specific business case, regarding which expansion programme
is the most effective and efficient and to what extent this fits within the long-term vision of network development,
- 19 -
as laid down in the potential expansion programmes of the LTDV.
2.1.4 National Structure Vision for Pipelines
There are approximately 18,000 kilometres of underground pipelines in the Netherlands which transport hazardous
substances, mainly natural gas and flammable liquids. Pipelines are a relatively safe and reliable means of transport.
They can transport large quantities of gas or liquids quickly and take up little space. Good connections also strengthens the economic position of docklands and industrial areas and can relieve the burden on roads and railways.
Having said this, pipelines are difficult to reposition or adapt and constructing new pipelines requires substantial
investment.
The State is responsible for making pipeline transport possible if that is in the national interest and wishes to reserve space for the future for pipelines.
The state policy for new transport pipelines is laid down in the National Structure Plan for Pipelines (SBUI) from
1984. However this expired on 30 December 2008. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
(VROM) is currently working on a successor to the national structure plan: the National Structure Vision for Pipelines. This allocates space for future pipelines for hazardous substances in the Netherlands for the next 20 to 30
years. For the natural gas network, this involves pipelines that form part of and will, in future, form part of the main
transmission grid (HTL). Expectations are that the new National Structure Vision will be finished at the beginning
of 2011.
Having an efficient pipeline infrastructure for the transport of energy, raw materials and products (chemicals/oil)
is important for:
Industry and docklands at home and abroad;
The Netherlands as an important (logistical) interchange for the import and export of gas;
The capture and storage of greenhouse gas CO2
In the National Structure Vision, the State will give a broad outline of where provinces and municipalities must reserve space. Provinces and municipalities can be involved in joint decisions about the precise locations of pipelines.
They must combine these pipelines with existing pipelines as far as possible, which will ensure optimal use of the
scarce space.
On the basis of the National Structure Vision for Pipelines and accompanying legislation still to be formulated (General Administrative Order on Spatial Planning (AMvB Ruimte), 3rd tranche); activities subject to Environmental
Impact Analysis (MER) will ultimately be permitted in municipal Land-Use Plans. Pursuant to the Spatial Planning
Act (WRO), a MER plan should be performed for such activities. A social cost/benefit analysis should also be compiled. Land reservation and choices of pipeline route should be considered from the point of view of use and necessity. It is essential to provide proper substantiation for proposals, for land is scarce and, once reserved for pipeline
building, cannot be used for other purposes in the coming decades. It is important to ensure that all this connects
up as well as possible with anticipated spatial developments at local level.
At a request from VROM, GTS clarified its long-term vision of gas transport infrastructure developments in the Netherlands, the Long Term Development View (LTDV)4 as input for the National Structure Vision for Pipelines. The
LTDV describes potential expansion programmes for the gas transmission grid up to 2021.
The actual optimal investment choice depends strongly on changes in market conditions and/or development of
related infrastructure such as gas storage and LNG facilities. In the end, in order to be able to make the optimal
investment choice which guarantees transport security, it is necessary, at this point in time, to reserve the defined
4 Main outlines described in sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.3
- 20 -
transport options of the ‘high’ scenarios in 2021. Restricting defined transport options in advance can entail suboptimal investments in the future. Transport security cannot be guaranteed as firmly, gas transport services, such as
gas storage, entry of LNG gas and quality conversion, become possibly less accessible and future investment costs
are much higher.
For the even longer term, the following developments must be considered:
Dutch production capacity of natural gas is declining further. An increase in imports and natural gas transit is
to be expected.
German production capacity of natural gas is declining further. German demand for low-calorific gas from the
Netherlands may possibly increase.
Demand for flexibility in neighbouring countries is increasing. Even under the circumstances that there is
scarcely any more of the country’s own production capacity available, the fluctuating demand for gas must be
met. It is possible that flexibility from or via the Netherlands will be increasingly exported to neighbouring
countries.
Consideration is also given to the measures possibly necessary for expansion of the transmission grid for the period
after 2021 in respect of the aforementioned developments.
The defined transport options (via the West route and the East route) must be kept open to ensure gas transport
security (including international transport security), so that the specific transport capacity demanded by the market
can be realised through the aforementioned developments. Depending on concrete market demand for transport
capacity it will be shown in the future which expansions to the infrastructure are the most opportune for continuing
to guarantee transport security and the accessibility of gas roundabout services.
Within the scope of the National Structure Vision for Pipelines, all these developments result in the total space
reserved for pipelines over the long term shown below. The numbers in the figure represent the number of (new)
pipelines for gas transport, which must be taken into account in the National Structure Vision for Pipelines.
4
33
1
3
22
33
33
11
11
22
33
3
11
Total space reserved for pipelines over the long term
- 21 -
2.2 Forecasts
2.2.1 Introduction
In this section, GTS forecasts likely demand (as at October 2009) for the transport of gas through the national transmission grid in the 2010 – 2016 period. This relates to all capacities seen as commitments for which (if necessary) investments will also be made by GTS. The forecasts relating to the bottlenecks mentioned in section 2.4 about which
decisions were taken in 2008 and 2009 are already included as commitments in this set. These represent concrete details for part of the expected amounts stated in the LTDV scenarios (mid-2008). The commitments made by shippers
(Precedent Agreements) in the context of the Integrated Open Season are not included in these forecasts. These will
only be deemed commitments after the internal Final Investment Decision (expected in the second half of 2010).
2.2.2 Exit
2.2.2.1 Estimation method
To estimate exit capacity, GTS makes a distinction between domestic exits and exits at border points. Both are described below.
Domestic exits
All parties directly connected to GTS will be sent a letter asking them to indicate their short-term capacity requirements. These statements will be analysed and used to compile capacity forecasts. In addition to short-term information, GTS also gathers material from a variety of sources (including the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (CPB)) for the medium-term forecasts. With the help of a macroeconomic model, this data will be processed
and used to compile medium-term market forecasts (for each market segment). In this model, GTS distinguishes
the following market segments: households, commercials, horticultural sector, industrial sector (including combined heat and power station) and power stations. Market growth in the electric power stations category has been
transferred to the additional scenarios category, due to the increased uncertainty in this segment. Combined with
realisations, capacity already booked and short-term information for each exit point, this yields a series of capacity
forecasts per exit point for the next few years. Realisations are not always directly usable as a basis for compiling forecasts. In particular, realisations at exit points for the public gas supply are heavily dependent on the temperature.
GTS applies a design temperature (average effective daily temperature at De Bilt) of -17 °C. GTS is specifically responsible for peak-period delivery to small scale consumers (households, large buildings and small industrial consumers) in the -9°C to -17°C temperature range. This is set down in the AMvB of 13 April 2004, which contains rules
governing provisions relating to security of supply (Decree on Security of Supply (Gas Act)).
Exits at border points
Forecasts for exit and entry capacities at borders are determined through capacity bookings from market players.
Consultations are also held with the NNOs. Market requirements and changes thereto are also gauged by GTS on a
regular basis via Open Seasons.
Section 2.2.2.3 describes the total exit commitments at border points for the 2010 - 2016 period. The capacity
ensuing from Open Season 2005 and Open Season 2012 (phases 1 and 2a) are added to the currently contracted
capacity. The network already has sufficient transport capacity or will be expanded to such an extent as to be able
to meet these entry and exit contracts.
- 22 -
2.2.2.2 Domestic exit capacity
The figure below indicates demand for exit for the domestic market. Major shifts in this demand are not expected
in the 2010 — 2016 planning period.
Capacity [mln m 3/h GE
25
20
15
10
5
0
2010
2011
2012
Industry
Horticulture
Power stations
Households
2013
2014
2015
2016
Commercials
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
households
9.2
9.1
9.1
9.0
9.0
8.9
8.9
horticulture
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
commercials
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.4
power stations
2.5
2.7
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
industry
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.8
3.9
4.0
4.1
19.2
19.5
19.8
19.8
19.8
19.8
19.8
Total
Capacity in mln m3/h GE
Demand for exit capacity for the domestic market shows a slight growth up to 2012. Growth is expected for the
industry and power station segments and a slight drop in the household and commercial segments. Growth for the
industry segment is assumed to be from 1% to 2% in accordance with information from the CPB.
The 2007 Quality and Capacity Document applied the market growth from the ‘medium’ scenario to the power
stations segment. The exit capacities shown above reflect only commitments undertaken. This adjustment makes
the power stations segment come out lower in the later years of the period under consideration. GTS performed a
sales analysis in 2009 for the public gas supply, based on the maximum hourly capacities measured in the previous
winter. This produced a somewhat lower planned capacity. The totals are 0.2 to 0.3 mln m3/h GE lower across the
board compared to the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document.
- 23 -
2.2.2.3 Exit capacity at border points
Contracted demand for exit capacity at border points is shown in the table below.
Exit border points
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
KCD 2009
13.9
13.9
14.7
14.7
14.5
14.3
14.1
KCD 2007
12.1
12.4
12.1
12.1
12.1
The exit capacities at border points in this Quality and Capacity Document are higher than the corresponding figures from the basic scenario set out in the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document. This is due mainly to additional
bookings and (from 2012) extra exit capacity sold in the context of Open Season 2012 phases 1 and 2a.
2.2.3 Entry
2.2.3.1 Estimation method
As with the exit capacities, a distinction is made in respect of the entry capacities between the estimation method
for domestic entries and entries at border points. The sources used are described below.
Domestic entries
For the domestic entry points, GTS consults with the producers of gas supplies from domestic fields. These producers supply GTS with forecasts for future production. Future small field supply, which is expected on geological
grounds but for which no production plans have as yet been drawn up, are compiled annually by TNO Built Environment and Geosciences and included by GTS in the long-term forecasts.
Entries at border points
Entry capacities are determined in a similar way to the calculation of exit capacities at border points. Please refer to
section 2.2.2.1 for a description of this.
2.2.3.2 Domestic entry capacity
The table below shows the forecast for domestic entry capacity. This domestic entry capacity is a combination of the
capacity in the Groningen field, capacity from storage facilities and capacity from the small fields.
Domestic entry
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
KCD 2009
24.5
26.2
26.7
26.3
25.6
24.5
23.7
KCD 2007
27.3
25.6
24.4
23.3
23.0
Where, as to be expected, overall production from Groningen and the small fields is declining over the years, entry
capacity from the storage facilities is showing an increase. New storage capacity is being contracted in particular for
supplies in neighbouring countries, which are connected to the GTS network (among others).
Compared to the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document, the forecast for domestic entry capacity is higher in the
main. It should be mentioned that domestic supply from the small fields consists of a broad composition of different
gas qualities. The ability to off-take this gas often requires more than simply providing sufficient entry capacity. It
is also necessary to consider what combinations constitute a suitable average composition at the exit side, and under what operational conditions the various gases can be taken off. The report on the supply of gas from the small
fields, which was sent to the Minister of Economic Affairs in October 2009, gives a more detailed explanation of
these forecasts.
- 24 -
Green gas
At the beginning of 2007, SenterNovem updated the 2004 study on green gas at the request of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In its report, SenterNovem concludes that the long-term potential for green gas (post 2010) is almost
10% of existing gas consumption. This potential is made up of green gas from biomas-gasification (a technique
which is currently applicable) of 1,500 million m3 per annum and of green gas from gasification (a technique which
will be available in 5 years’ minimum) of 3,500 million m3 per annum. If the production of green gas is encouraged
to the same degree as green electricity was by the Environmental Quality Electricity Production (MEP) scheme, then
a potential 300 million m3 per annum can be expected by 2010. If green gas is not promoted, then production will
remain at its current level of 13 million m3 per annum.
Sustainable practices are high on GTS’ agenda. It is an important issue for society and for the company. Natural gas
will play a crucial role in the energy supply for the future. It is the cleanest fossil fuel and indispensable in the transition towards a sustainable energy supply. Gasunie’s transmission grid can serve as a carrier of other sustainable
fuels such as green gas.
GTS is conducting a project in Zwolle together with Natuurgas Overijssel and Enexis, in which green gas is injected
directly into the GTS grid. The results will be used in order to be able to take off green gas on a larger scale in the
future in an economical and technologically responsible manner. The project is expected to start in the first half of
2010.
2.2.3.3 Entry capacity at border points
Maximum entry capacity at border points deemed by GTS to be a commitment is shown in the table below.
Entry at border points
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
KCD 2009
3.9
5.5
8.6
9.5
9.2
8.9
8.0
KCD 2007
3.5
4.5
5.2
5.7
5.5
The entry capacity at border points in this Quality and Capacity Document are higher than the corresponding
figures from the basic scenario from the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document, mainly due to extra entry capacity
booked in the context of Open Season 2012 Phases 1 and 2a.
- 25 -
2.4 Bottlenecks
Using transport calculations, GTS then examined whether it had enough transport capacity in its grid to accommodate the entry and exit capacities outlined in the previous chapter. The summary below includes a list of identified
bottlenecks for which decisions have been taken since the previous Quality and Capacity Document or will soon be
taken. The projects which were approved in this regard in 2009 or earlier and which are currently being implemented, are shown in the figure below.
Overzichtskaart (totale scope) Gasrotonde projecten
Approved projects
Completed projects
Oude
Statenzijl
Rysum
Tunneltrace
CS-Scheemda 1
RS-Tripscompagnie
N2 Heiligerlee
Workum
Wieringermeer
Emmeloord
CS-Ommen
Bornerbroek
Hattem
Esveld
Maasvlakte
CS-Wijngaarden
RS-Angerlo
RS-Beuningen
MS Botlek
Locatie Odiliapeel
Westerschelde Oost
Afsl. locatie
Cambron
Afsl. locatie
Westerschelde West
0
10
20
30
40
50
Kilometers
Hommelhof
RS-Schinnen
Outline map (total scope) Gas roundabout projects
- 26 -
Epe (D)
All expansion projects are followed centrally from the study phase to the completion phase. This involves monitoring the scope, progress and costs of the projects.
2.4.1 Decisions were taken in 2008 to resolve the following bottlenecks.
1
Open Season 2012 (phase 1)
In July 2007, GTS started a survey among shippers to find out their demands for entry and exit capacity for 2012.
It emerged from this Open Season that the demand for transport capacity among shippers is continuing to grow.
The demand for extra capacity is intended to supply both domestic and foreign customers. Consultations have
been held with Neighbouring Network Operators (NNOs) in order to coordinate infrastructure developments in
neighbouring countries as far as possible. This has led to a phased approach for this Open Season, in order to
meet the market’s capacity requirements as well as possible. A decision was taken about phase 1 in 2008. A decision will be taken later (2010) about phase 2, as this will depend on developments in neighbouring countries.
It has been shown that around 100 km of gas pipeline needs to be built for phase 1.
2
Pipeline switch, Spijk – Ommen route
Extra transport capacity was realised on the Spijk–Ommen route by means of grid separation and switching
pipelines. Gas with a high CO2 percentage and low Wobbe can be transported to Ommen by doing this, separated from the gas with a high Wobbe.
3
Measures to be taken in the Noordoostpolder
GTS regularly studies the transport of gas to the Noordoostpolder. The capacity of the regional transmission grid
(RTL) in the Noordoostpolder was insufficient and various measures have been taken.
4
N2 peak installation at Heiligerlee
It has been established that, in the future, peak demand for N2 (with short operating times) will occur above
available structural capacity. Peak storage of N2 in a salt cavern, including associated facilities, would appear to
be the best solution.
5
RTL
The lead time for investments in the RTL is shorter than for the main transmission grid (HTL). Modifications
can usually be made within a year. An analysis of bottlenecks is carried out annually for the RTL. The bottlenecks that are likely to arise in the following year are then resolved. Efforts are made to ensure that the measures
applied are robust, that is, adequate for the next ten years. Decisions have since been taken concerning identified
bottlenecks.
2.4.2 Decisions were taken in 2009 to resolve the following bottlenecks
1
Connection of caverns in Germany (near Hengelo)
In 2012, caverns in Germany (near Hengelo) will be connected to the GTS grid, for which modifications to the
grid are required. A pipeline will be constructed from the border to Hengelo, the Hengelo–Bornerbroek route
will be reinforced and Ommen blending station will be modified.
2
Connection of caverns in North Germany
A new connection will be made at Oude Statenzijl in order to connect caverns in North Germany directly to the
GTS network.
- 27 -
2.4.3 Decisions will be taken after 2009 to resolve the following bottlenecks
1
Current and future (international) Open Season projects
Supplementary Open Season projects are anticipated in order to facilitate greater import flows due to declining
domestic production as well as increased transit. Please refer to chapter 2.1.1 for a more detailed explanation.
The following issues are currently being investigated
 
Pipeline projects, mainly in East and South Netherlands.
 
Compression projects, primarily the expansion of existing stations.
2
Gas storage facilities *
New storage facilities are under development and existing storage facilities are being expanded.
New: Project Bergermeer, consisting of an expansion to compression facilities at CS Grijpskerk
and pipeline reinforcement in Friesland / Groningen.
Expansion: Zuidwending. This will result in a connection to the existing network. Pipeline projects for this
capacity are included in the open season projects (see point 1).
3
LNG import *
There is potential to expand Gate terminal. New terminal projects are also under investigation (Liongas, Eemshaven). An expansion in pipeline capacity in the relevant areas is anticipated for GTS.
4
Quality conversion *
The demand for additional nitrogen capacity will increase as a result of the decline in the Groningen gas. A study
is being performed to look at expanding existing facilities and building new ones.
5
Power stations and large-scale industry *
A number of new power stations and large-scale industries are being planned for South Holland (Rotterdam/
Moerdijk area). This may result in projects to connect these installations to the GTS network and to expand the
network capacity.
NB: Pipeline and compression projects are interchangeable to a certain extent. All this will be clarified in the LTDV
(see chapter 2.1).
* = These projects may also form part of the Open Season Projects.
- 28 -
3. Quality and safety
3.1 Introduction
Pursuant to the Gas Act, GTS is responsible for providing safe, efficient and reliable gas transmission, in a way that
spares the environment as much as possible. Performance of maintenance on the infrastructure itself associated
with this is contracted out to Gasunie in accordance with the contract for professional services. The actual control
of the network and hence transport is carried out by GTS. Safety is a top priority for GTS and Gasunie. Processes in
this area are tested continually from the point of view of technology and policy and, if possible, improved.
GTS’ quality system is aimed at controlling risks so as to effect and maintain the safety, quality and integrity of gas
transport. The most significant risks are established on the basis of a risk analysis. Section 3.2 describes the level
of quality (expressed via performance indicators) to which GTS aspires and which safety indicators are applied.
Section 3.3 examines the quality system and the risk analysis in more detail. Section 3.4 describes how safety is guaranteed. GTS, via Gasunie, pays particular attention to influencing the behaviour of third parties (“excavation contractors”) to prevent damage as a result of excavation work. Intensive consultations are also held with government
bodies about legislation and regulations in order to ensure that pipelines retain a safe and undisturbed location
amidst other spatial planning interests.
GTS monitors the integrity of the transmission network through a system of measures designed to control risk.
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe the maintenance and replacement measures necessary in order to preserve the quality
and safety of the gas transmission grid. Transport security does not just depend on the design criteria for the infrastructure and proper maintenance, but also on the way in which the transport system is controlled. The balance
between these elements ensures efficiency and transport security.
In the event of any interruption in the supply, a round-the-clock on-call service available at both GTS and Gasunie
and a well equipped fault-clearing service at Gasunie ensure that problems are solved effectively. In this way, GTS
limits the scope of the possible consequences of an interruption. This is described in more detail in section 4.3.
3.2 Indicators with target values
In order to achieve GTS’ objectives, processes have been defined within the organisation that must lead to the
desired results. The output of the processes is established and can be quantified by using performance indicators.
Realistic standards or target values (later: signal values) are associated with these performance indicators in order
to be able to test the results achieved against the objectives. The performance indicators, with their associated signal
values, thus form for GTS a cohesive system of quality indicators.
The MRQ requires that the Quality and Capacity Document reports on the following indicators: annual downtime,
average length of interruption and frequency of interruption. These indicators relate to interruptions affecting the
end user and are orientated towards the RNBs. To express the performance of the LNB, GTS considers the following
indicators relevant to security of supply: non-delivery, off-spec deliveries and failure to reach the required pressure.
The following indicators are relevant to safety: pipeline damage and lost time accidents.
The majority of the end users are connected to one of the networks of the regional network operators (RNBs). In
compiling signal values and reporting on indicators relating to interruptions affecting the end user, GTS is dependent on statements from these RNBs.
In contrast to the electricity sector, GTS has no anticipated interruptions as defined by the MRQ. This would relate
to interruptions of which the end user has been informed at least three working days in advance, but which have
- 29 -
not been notified in writing. In principle GTS does not experience this type of interruption. A discussion is held two
months in advance to ascertain how the maintenance work can be the least onerous for the end user. Often the company looks for a collective maintenance period. If necessary, transport is preserved by using emergency measures.
As GTS does not have any anticipated interruptions, the company does not use any signal values for this.
Annual downtime
The number of minutes that an end user has been without gas (averaged over all end users).
The signal value of the performance indicator for annual downtime was established as being 2.9 minutes per user
per annum for 2008. The actual value for 2008 came out at 0.00015 minutes.
Average length of interruption
The number of hours that an end user has been without gas (averaged over all end users experiencing an interruption).
The signal value of the performance indicator for average length of interruption was established as being 48 hours
per user per annum for 2008. The actual value for 2008 came out at 2 hours and 22 minutes.
Frequency of interruption
The frequency with which an end user experiences an unforeseen gas interruption.
The signal value of the performance indicator for frequency of interruption was established as being 0.001 times per
user per annum. The actual value for 2008 came out at 0.000001.
The signal values from the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document are reconsidered on the basis of actual values for
the period covering the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 inclusive. The conclusion of this reconsideration is that the signal values of the indicators for unforeseen interruptions are at an acceptable level. There are no
grounds for adjusting the signal values on the basis of this analysis.
Non-deliveries
Non-delivery means that a customer is completely cut off from the gas supply during a certain period, however that
might occur, or is not in a position to take off gas due to the low pressure. Disruptions which must be attributed to
the customer are not counted here.
The signal value of the performance indicator for non-deliveries was determined at 9 per annum for 2008. The
actual value came out at 10 non-deliveries. The non-deliveries arose due to different reasons. The departments concerned are working on various improvements in order to limit the number of non-deliveries.
Off-spec deliveries
Number of incidents that have led to off-spec deliveries with regard to gas quality, odorisation and liquids and which
can lead directly to a safety risk for individuals or objects. Disruptions which must be attributed to the customer
are not counted here.
The signal value of the performance indicator for off-spec deliveries was determined at 11 per annum for 2008, the
actual value came out at 9 off-spec deliveries. The actual value gives no cause for performing analyses.
Failure to reach required pressure
Number of incidents where the delivery pressure has been lower for a certain period than the contract specification
and where the NNO has indicated that it has problems with the deviation that has occurred. Disruptions which must
be attributed to the customer are not counted here.
- 30 -
The signal value for the performance indicator for failure to reach the required pressure was determined at 6 per annum for 2008, the actual value for this performance indicator came out at 2 occasions of failure to reach the required
pressure. The actual value gives no cause for performing an analysis.
Pipeline damage with gas outflow caused by mechanical excavation work
A pipeline incident where active excavation work caused such damage to the pipeline that this led to gas outflow.
The signal value for 2008 for this performance indicator, pipeline damage, was 1, the actual value was 1.
Pipeline damage caused by mechanical excavation work
A pipeline incident where active excavation work could have caused such damage to the pipeline that this could
have led to gas outflow.
The signal value for 2008 for this performance indicator, pipeline damage, was 12 per annum, the actual value was 9.
Injury to company’s own staff involving lost time (= LTI – Lost Time Incident).
An incident involving injury as a result of which those concerned did not resume work within 24 hours, or no replacement work was arranged.
The signal value for the performance indicator for LTIs was determined at 0 per annum for 2008, the actual value
came out at 1 LTI. More detailed analysis clearly showed that supplementary measures or adjustments to the signal
value would not be meaningful.
Injury to third parties involving lost time, frequency index
Number of accidents suffered by contractors and third parties per one million hours worked over twelve months.
The signal value for the performance indicator for accident frequency (= LTIF) is less than 1.4, the actual value is 1.5.
3.3 Quality system
GTS considers the attainment of a safe and reliable gas transport system to be one of its core tasks. Striving for
an effective and efficient organisation means continually improving all aspects of the organisation. GTS’ business
activities are subject to a lot of uncertainty. These uncertainties involve risks at all levels: strategic, operational, legal
and regulatory risks. Policies are developed to manage these risks, which ensure that risk management forms an
integral part of our activities.
GTS applies a clear internal risk management and control system. This system aims to provide a reasonable degree
of certainty that the achievement of targets is being monitored, that risks associated with business activities are
being managed, that financial accountability is reliable and that legislation and regulations are being observed. Our
internal risk management and control system was further optimised in 2008.
The document entitled “Kwaliteitszorg bij Gasunie: Minimum Requirements voor Management Control” (“Quality
Assurance at Gasunie: Minimum Requirements for Management Control”) stipulates the requirements set of the
Management Control System. These minimum requirements apply in full to GTS, as a subsidiary of Gasunie. The
Minimum Requirements for Management Control are also based on quality standard NEN ISO 9001 and were updated in 2008. Departmental managers are responsible for the structure and operation of the system in their own
business units, within the framework of the risk management and control system. Management efficiency is reviewed periodically. A control plan sets out the manner in which the review takes place.
- 31 -
Periodically, the Board of Directors of Gasunie and the management of GTS also arrange for an independent investigation (operational audit) to specify whether the structure and operation of administrative measures is sufficiently
effective. The “Minimum Requirements” and any relevant specific standards serve as benchmarks in this regard.
Based on the same approach, for each organisational unit or process a risk profile is formulated, which applies as a
basis for the audit plan. The Audit Committee, consisting of three members of the Supervisory Board, fixes the audit
plan for a period of five years. The audit plan is evaluated annually and revised if necessary. This framework ensures
that management usually re-examines the Operational Risk Analyses (ORAs) in force in between the two audits. Not
updating an ORA leads automatically to an audit comment. Based on risk profiles, an audit frequency of once every
three years applies to GTS processes and departments. The Board of Directors discusses the structure and operation
of the total risk management and control system every year with the Audit Committee. Areas discussed include to
what extent GTS interprets the requirements of the Management Control System and to what extent the Minimum
Requirements for Management Control are still adequate as a benchmark for Management Control.
Management also provides cascaded reports on risk management annually to the Board of Directors. This is accounted for by means of a “Document of Representation”.
In fact the company uses a process of continuous review and, where necessary, improvement. GTS does not evaluate
its Management Control System once every six years as required by the MRQ, but does this continuously.
The Management Control System can be shown as follows.
parties concerned
requirements
Policy
adjusting
Administration
Management
evaluating
and improving
Performance
Business activities
Standards
Documentation
Auditing
- 32 -
The Management Control System rests on three pillars:
Management is supported by standards which enable it to make the right decisions.
Documentation/reports ensure that all measures taken are explicit, transparent and verifiable.
Auditing ensures independent assessment of the structure and operation of the measures.
The basic principles for the Management Control System are the relevant standards and target values (see section
3.2) of the organisation. The interested parties are: customers (external and internal), management, the shareholder,
the Supervisory Board, staff, the government and society. Decisions are taken at the following four levels in order to
satisfy the requirements and standards:
Policy:
Decisions about the products and services on which the organisation focuses, about the objectives it wants to
achieve and about the way in which these are achieved.
Administration:
Decisions about the structure of the organisation and the choice of people and resources.
Management:
Control of the processes which results in them being effective and reliable and performed efficiently. Performance and risk management are important elements for process management. A broad range of administrative
measures is possible.
Performance:
Directly managing employees in the performance of their duties and controlling how these are carried out.
Reports are made about the results of the business activities so that the accuracy of the decisions can be assessed
at all levels and adjusted where necessary. Pointing out improvement actions is the responsibility of all employees.
All employees are bound by a code of conduct. Manuals, guidelines and procedures are compiled for all important
processes and these are evaluated periodically.
The external accountants conduct, in the context of the annual accounts, periodic assessments of the most important aspects of the structure and operation of the administrative organisation and the internal controls it comprises.
They report on these to the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board.
- 33 -
Risk analysis diagram
Process description
linked to objective
Which
measures
have
been taken?
How serious
are the
consequences?
Suggestions for improvement
What can
go wrong?
Are the risks and measures in balance?
Risk Assessment
A Risk Assessment involves systematically setting out and quantifying strategic, operational risks. A risk consists
of two factors, i.e. the chance of an undesirable event and the consequences of the undesirable event. A Risk Assessment can be used both for analysing risks at strategic level in new or existing processes and for redesigning
processes. The Risk Assessment methodology ties in with the way in which the Audit department assesses risks in
the context of an operational audit.
At operational level, management identifies possible threats with the help of an Operational Risk Analysis (ORA)
and specifies adequate administrative measures to cover the risks, based on the gravity of the consequences. The
following table sets out an assessment of the consequences.
- 34 -
Category
Assessment of ‘gravity’ of consequences
Financial consequences
- > € 500,000
V
- > € 50,000 – 500,000
Operational consequences
Safety
Health
Environment
on annual basis
H
- > € 5,000 – 50,000
M
- Serious disruption to primary business function
V
- Limited disruption to primary business function
H
- Serious disruption to supporting business function
H
- Limited disruption to supporting business function
M
- Accidents involving serious injury, serious injury to
V
health, serious damage to the environment
- Minor injury, minor injury to health,
H
limited damage to the environment
Legislation
Regulations
Ethics
Public image
- Serious fraud, deception, breach of contract, invasion
V
of privacy, misuse of non-commercial business
information, insufficient security against liabilities
- Minor theft, private use of
H/M
business assets, inaccurate/late information
Gas Act Article 37
- Unauthorised use of commercially sensitive
V
information
- Handling commercially sensitive
V/H
information negligently
- Insufficient protection/security for
H
commercially sensitive information
Customer-orientation
- No research into requirements/wishes, no
V/H
agreements about products/services, no customer
satisfaction surveys, no complaints registration
with regard to external customers
M = medium H = high V = very high
The administrative measures are then listed and evaluated. When evaluating the measures, the company always
looks explicitly at whether it has tipped the balance too far. Whether there’s an ‘onverkill‘ of measures or too stringent measures have been taken with regard to the risk run by Gasunie. Threats with serious consequences are countered, in principle, with preventative action. Controls are also built into the process at critical points, in addition to
preventative measures. Location and frequency of controls depend on risks and feasibility.
Finally an evaluation is made of the extent to which the administrative measures fully cover the risk or whether
there is a remaining risk. This remaining risk is then supported by a recommendation (see example below).
- 35 -
Threat
Consequence
Unauthorised individu-
Misuse of commer-
Measures
als have access to
cial sensitive infor-
SAP authorisation procedure
contracts/
mation,
Physical security
contract data
Contravention,
Clean desk
Gas Act,
Code of conduct
V
Secure access to data on servers
Chance
Risk
Recommendation
N
-
None
Fraud,
Financial loss
How serious are the
Risk (not covered)
consequences
V x H = C (Critical)
V = Very high
V x L = H (High)
H = High
H X H = H (High)
M= Medium
H x L = M (Medium)
M x H = M (Medium)
Chance of a threat (in spite of the measures)
H = High (happens regularly)
L = Low (has happened/not inconceivable)
N = Nil (virtually impossible)
Example of an ORA form
From the point of view of a cost/benefit analysis, not all risks will be 100 percent covered. Where risks are consciously accepted, the following rules for approval apply for these:
C-risks (Critical) by the Board of Directors (of Gasunie, not GTS);
H-risks (High) by the unit manager;
M-risks (Medium) by the department head.
The accepted risks will be mentioned in the final report.
GTS’ risk management focuses mainly on safety aspects and on preventing unwanted interruptions to gas transmission or on minimising the likelihood of this occurring. This is extremely important given the potential scope of the
consequences.
The likelihood of an unwanted interruption occurring can be minimised in two ways. Firstly, by preventative maintenance and, secondly, by applying a back-up philosophy when designing components for the gas transmission grid.
Interruptions are minimised as far as possible by controlling gas transport in a robust manner.
GTS has assigned most of the construction and maintenance work on the gas transmission grid to Gasunie through
the contract for professional services. Gasunie performs the necessary inspections and preventative maintenance
in order to be able to satisfy the requirements for safety and reliability set by GTS. This is specified in more detail
in chapter 4.
Specific risks
Market risks
The European gas market is being liberalised. The underlying idea is that, by offering independent gas transmission, every supplier has the same opportunities for bringing the gas to the market and that the gas market
will operate better through being competitive. European directives in this sphere have been incorporated into
national legislation; European regulations have direct effect within the member states. The Dutch government
has appointed the Office of Energy Regulation as the regulator in order to monitor compliance with the Gas
- 36 -
Act and gas regulations. This concerns regulated sections of the gas market, including gas transmission. GTS
faces significant risks associated with permitted tariffs for transport and related services in relation to the costs
of maintenance, implementation and, where necessary, expansion. This does not only concern the new infrastructure, but also the existing infrastructure, of which a large proportion has already been operating for 40
years (below and above the ground). Increasing amounts will have to be invested in maintaining and replacing
obsolete sections of the gas transmission grid in the near future so that the company can continue to guarantee
its safety and reliability in the coming years. That is why it is very important to set the tariffs at a level that will
ensure preservation of a beneficial investment climate.
The permitting procedures constitute a risk to the large-scale infrastructure projects. These often laborious procedures can cause projects to be seriously delayed.
Operational risks
Personal and external health, safety and the environment are prime focuses of GTS policy. A system has been
created that controls the processes, analyses performance and identifies points for improvement. GTS currently
manages around 12,000 kilometres of underground pipeline network and numerous installations in the Netherlands. An increase in built-up areas and intended changes to regulations makes it an ever greater challenge
to position all our pipelines in locations such that parties concerned accept the level of safety. In addition to
monitoring RO developments, continuous attention is required to prevent damage to the gas transmission grid
and the possible consequences of any such damage. The integrity of the transmission grid is safeguarded by
an extensive preventative system, including cathodic protection and monitoring to ensure pipelines are located
safely. Where necessary adjustments to the network will take place timely in order to continue to guarantee its
safe location. The online system KLIC, which is coordinated by the land registry office, must guarantee that no
dangerous excavation work takes place in the vicinity of the gas pipelines without GTS being able to supervise
this. You will find more information about this in the following section.
Legislation and regulations relating to zoning, which are under development, and interpretation of the IPPC
directive relating to emissions, can also lead to modifications to the gas transmission grid. GTS will conduct
talks with the competent authorities in order to have clarification on the consequences of new legislation and
regulations.
With an ageing infrastructure it is necessary to have sufficient financial resources to perform the required maintenance work or modifications in good time. This demands substantial efforts at a time when there is pressure to
adjust the tariffs downwards. The transport tariffs determined recently are not sufficient to cover the mounting
maintenance costs.
Insurance policies for liability, fire and loss of profits have been concluded. The internal procedures, preventative measures and physical status of the different business locations are assessed periodically.
Financial risks
The current large-scale investment projects lead to substantial borrowing requirements. The current situation
on the financial markets means that there is a risk that financial deals available will be insufficient or too expensive. Hence the importance of monitoring the creditworthiness of market players and it is necessary for GTS to
seek extensive information regarding the opportunities on the money markets and capital markets in order to
meet its borrowing requirements.
- 37 -
3.4 Safety
GTS is responsible for managing the gas transmission grid, which makes it also responsible for the safety of gas
transport and safety of the network. GTS has assigned part of the maintenance work on the transmission grid to
Gasunie through a contract for professional services. As a subsidiary of Gasunie, GTS follows Gasunie’s safety regime in full. This section describes Gasunie’s safety regime.
3.4.1 Interest
Gasunie gives health, safety and environment top priority because it is the condition for the continued existence of
the company. This interest fits in with Gasunie’s mission to provide safe, reliable and sustainable gas transport. Avoiding risks during the performance of work is a core element in all Gasunie’s activities. Gasunie aims continually to
improve its performance with regard to health, safety and environment and applies newly developed technologies
and knowledge for that purpose.
No accidents, serious incidents or pipeline damage
Gasunie’s aim is to prevent all accidents, incidents and pipeline damage. When performing activities, Gasunie first
analyses the safety, environmental and health risks and takes adequate measures to remove the risks. Gasunie maintains the safety and reliability of the gas transmission grid at the level of its own standards and in accordance with
statutory requirements for external safety. Gasunie will reduce the number of incidents of pipeline damage caused
by third parties by working together with all parties concerned. In order to be able to monitor the quality level and,
where necessary, to make adjustments, a number of quality performance indicators have been developed that are
also the subject of periodic reports to the Board of Directors of Gasunie. See also section 3.2.
Responsibility and accountability
The Board of Directors keeps up to date about important events relating to health, safety and environment and
oversees that the management system for health, safety and environment functions properly and that the rules are
observed. The Board of Directors ensures that the individuals and resources are deployed in such a way that these
arrangements can be fulfilled. The Board of Directors reports on the extent to which the safety policy has been observed via the annual report. Management is responsible for the development of employees’ knowledge, skills and
motivation. Management oversees compliance with the safety policy and the legislation and regulations. Every Gasunie employee and every employee of a third party working for Gasunie is personally responsible for compliance
with the safety policy and with the legislation and regulations. This is an important condition of an employment
or a contract.
In order to interpret the prevailing legislation and regulations properly, Gasunie has the following:
Certificate ISO 14001, no. 25798-2008-AE-NLD-RVA, 28 November 2008
Pressure Vessel Inspection Certificate (Certificaat Afdeling Drukhouders Inspectie), no. I068, 28 September 2009
RvA assessment report part B, report I068-C02.4, dated 13-10-2008
Recertification audit report ISO 14001, report template ARM NLD 2008-02, dated June 2008
In order to be able to fulfil the aforementioned accreditations and certificates, GTS has a documented Management
Control System for Health, Safety and Environment as well as various department manuals. These manuals also
form part of the (annual) internal and external audits.
Appendix I includes an overview of the most relevant European directives and standards used by GTS, together with
their (global) areas of application.
- 38 -
3.4.2 External safety
External safety concerns the safety of third parties. Gasunie manages a gas transmission grid through which large
quantities of gas are transported at high pressure. There is a risk, admittedly very small, that gas will escape as a result of pipeline damage. This presents a risk to the surrounding area. The most significant causes of pipeline damage
are external causes, in the form of excavation work performed by third parties.
The external safety policy aims to minimise such risks. Gasunie pursues an active policy in which it alerts professional excavators to the importance of giving notice in good time to the cable and pipeline information centre (KLIC)
of proposed excavation work. Gasunie has actively contributed towards the new legislation pursuant to which excavators are obliged to report damage to pipelines (WION). This legislation came into force in February 2008.
When a report is made via KLIC that an excavator is planning to carry out excavation work, someone at Gasunie
works out, according to procedures, whether any Gasunie pipelines are involved. The excavator is then informed
and given further guidance. The excavation work is supervised.
Gasunie also actively informs excavators of any possible risks and of the correct locations of the pipelines. Gasunie
keeps an updated internal record of all incidents of damage in order to be able to take measures on structural aspects
in good time, where possible.
Gasunie itself bears responsibility for the integrity of the system through an effective inspection, prevention and
maintenance programme. Safety zoning is also retained in line with government policy. Attention is also paid to
transparent communication with regard to risks and finally, in collaboration with government bodies, plans are
developed and drills performed in order to cope with potential disasters rapidly and safely.
The integrity of the system
In order to safeguard the integrity of the system, installations and pipelines have been and will be constructed according to national and international standards as well as standards determined by the international sector itself.
In the Netherlands these have been translated into NEN 3650 and for Gasunie, where relevant, supplemented with
requirements laid down in the Gasunie Technical Standard. Requirements made of systems are continually adapted
to experience, based on research and new developments.
A considerable number of procedures focussing on safety apply for the design, construction, commissioning and
management of the installations and pipelines. The Safety Department, which is accredited by the RvA for inspection and supervision and appointed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, is involved in all activities
in that connection where technical integrity plays a part. The Pressure Vessel Inspection department bases its activities on a list of all conceivable risks. These risks are, together with the measures taken, placed in a risk assessment
matrix, assessed periodically and, if necessary, revised. The Pressure Vessel Inspection department is, together with
the inspectors from the Procurement department, involved in all phases of the life cycle of pressurised equipment
as regulatory body and adviser.
Production of
components
Construction
Commissioning
- 39 -
Operation
Decommissioning
Production of components
Areas that are assessed include: design, construction, choice of materials, welding methods, non-destructive
testing of welds, pressure regulating. Suppliers are also audited and inspected.
Construction
An assessment is made regarding whether the implemented work is being carried out in accordance with the
agreed technical rules.
Commissioning
Putting a new structure into operation will not take place before the issue of a Commissioning Agreement/ Declaration of Inspection for Commissioning (Akkoord voor Ingebruikname/Verklaring Keuring voor Ingebruikneming). When all the formalities have been settled, a “Statement of Conformity on Safety & Environment,
Safety of Pressure Vessels section” (“Conformiteitverklaring Veiligheid & Milieu deel Veiligheid Drukhouders”)
will be issued.
Operation
During the operative phase, all pressurised parts of the system such as pressure vessels and also the pipelines
are inspected. The frequency of inspection follows from legislation and regulations, permit conditions as well as
the company’s own experience and is usually based on risk analyses. Inspection activities are coordinated with
the Asset Management department and laid down in an annual plan. Verification of the inspection results and
the final assessment of the integrity including the subsequent inspection interval are laid down in the Pipeline
Integrity Management System (PIMS) and the SAP Plant Maintenance module (= an Enterprise Resource Planning system).
Decommissioning
Decommissioning pipelines and installations in a safe and environmentally responsible manner is regarded as a
modification and also comes within the working area of the Pressure Vessels Inspection department.
Managing many areas of expertise enables the Pressure Vessels Inspection department to perform its duties properly.
Damage investigation
Defect assessment
Non-destructive
testing
Legislation
Pressure vessel inspection
&
Procurement-Inspectors
Materials
Welding
Inspection/risk
management
Pressure control
Constructions
Production processes
- 40 -
Prevention of damage as a result of excavation work
Excavation work by third parties is the most significant cause of possible damage to underground pipelines. Pipelines are designed in such a way that they are highly resistant to the pressure of the transported gas but a heavy
excavator or pile driver can affect the integrity of the pipeline. Gasunie has, therefore, over the last few decades,
pursued a three-pronged policy aimed at preventing pipeline damage:
The creation, together with other cable and pipeline owners, of KLIC and the promotion of this service at all
sorts of appropriate “excavator events” like agricultural fairs, making KLIC more accessible via web-based
applications etc. Every KLIC notification is also followed up and supervised by us free of charge when Gasunie
pipelines are involved.
Agreements with landowners with whom Gasunie has a real right agreement for the location of
pipelines across cultivated land deeper than 30 centimetres.
The recording of planned pipeline routes in prepatory land use plans and similar plans and pro-actively keeping
up with Article 19 and similar procedures.
New legislation has been in force since February 2008 (WION, or the excavation regulations). In accordance with
this, excavators are obliged to make a KLIC notification to the land registry for intended excavation work. Then the
excavator receives drawings from the network operators, which are relevant to the excavation activities. The excavator is obliged to give notification of any pipeline damage, subject to sanctions if incidents are not reported. Pipelines
are usually laid at such a depth that most excavation work cannot harm them. Moreover, pipelines are visibly marked, the direct surroundings of a pipeline are periodically inspected and, where excavation work is to be performed
in the vicinity of a pipeline, Gasunie employees will supervise. The whole network is recorded in the description of
the components of the gas transmission grid (see Appendix III).
Gasunie collects incident data in order to check the results of its efforts. In this respect it should be noted that the
Netherlands sets the standard for preventing the most significant cause of pipeline damage, excavating. Gasunie
uses an extensive defensive system in order to prevent irresponsible excavation work. A serious accident, i.e. a pipeline fracture, has not occurred for more than ten years, although data from less serious incidents (see the graphic
below) are used to follow trends.
Comparison of Gasunie and EGIG
Number of incidents per 1000 km per year
(Moving average of number of incidents involving gas outflow)
0,5
0,4
0,3
2004
2005
EGIG
2006
Gasunie
- 41 -
2007
2008
Odorisation of gas
Natural gas is odourless by nature. For safety reasons, an artificial odour is added so that any escape of gas is quickly
noticed by customers. Gasunie odorises all gas intended for public supply. This takes place at the Control stations
and at some gas delivery stations that are directly connected to the HTL.
3.4.3 Safety zoning
The Dutch government applies a system of so-called risk criteria to all high-risk industrial activities. The risks are
calculated according to standard methods and, based on a verification of the criteria, a check is performed to see
whether safety zoning is necessary. The safety zoning can be affected by supplementary measures. With around
1200 stations and installations and more than 12,000 kilometres of pipeline, Gasunie is directly concerned with this
risk standardisation in the Netherlands and, for that reason, is also involved in the preliminary process of the risk
policy. There are consultations on how risks arising from gas installations and pipelines are calculated.
Risks are calculated in the first instance at the planning stage for new infrastructure. External safety risks are
calculated with the assistance of advanced models and specialist knowledge and tested against criteria set by the
government as early as the engineering phase (whether or not in combination with the so-called Environmental
Impact Analysis, MER).
However it can also be necessary to calculate the risks associated with existing infrastructure. Changes to Land-Use
Plans can lead to a change in the (future) population near to the infrastructure and consequently a change to the
risks. The re-specified risk levels should be tested against the criteria in order to see if the planned developments
are permissible or not.
3.4.4 Risk Communication
In the light of the MER obligation and the issuing of permits, it is important to communicate openly with the country’s citizens. In doing so, we cannot use figures that are merely approximations. There are many reasons why a given risk will be realised in a different way from another. Such factors are defined in the Severe Accident Prevention
Policy (PBZO), see Appendix VII. That document gives a detailed description of the way in which Gasunie deals with
such risks: what these risks mean for staff and for the locality surrounding our installations, what steps are being
taken to identify those risks and naturally what Gasunie is doing, overall, in order to minimise the risk that a severe
accident will occur, as well as its consequences.
The PBZO also constitutes an important link between Gasunie and the supervisory authority. Since such considerations are of very great societal significance, the PBZO is always brought up for discussion by the relevant agency when
inspection tours are made of installations. In addition, all the measures that have been taken will be discussed in the
PBZO, and an explanation must be given of the ways in which Gasunie has guaranteed safety, and the mechanisms
it has put in place to that end. Gasunie continues to cast a critical eye over the safety policy that is implemented
within the company, improves this policy where possible, and continuously adapts it to any new regulations that
are introduced by the authorities.
A statutory general reporting obligation has existed since 2007 whereby, for the whole of the Netherlands and thus
also for the infrastructure managed by Gasunie, risks are listed and recorded centrally (at the RIVM, the National
Institute for Public Health and the Environment). Gasunie is obliged to provide information about the risks associated with all its installations and pipelines.
3.4.5 Disaster management
Being prepared for a potential disaster situation is the cornerstone of our safety policy. To this end, Gasunie holds
consultations centrally with the emergency services, draws up manuals and information sheets, supplies information to local fire services and takes part in regular exercises.
- 42 -
4. Maintenance and replacement
As stated in Paragraph 3.3 above, GTS has entrusted Gasunie with a large proportion of the management and maintenance procedures that are required, on the basis of a contract for professional services. Within Gasunie, it is the
Asset Management and Operations Departments that are responsible for this work. Amongst other things, since it
owns the infrastructure, Asset Management’s operating activities consist in the elaboration of a long-term strategy
with a view to guaranteeing the safety and transport security of that infrastructure, in a sustainable manner and in
accordance with the applicable legal provisions, and in the application and maintaining of a governance system for
projects. Amongst other things, since it actually operates the technical infrastructure, the Operations Department’s
activities consist in keeping it fully operational in technical terms, and in the identifying of potential exploitation
and investment projects and their initiation and implementation.
The Asset Management and Operations Departments endeavour to achieve a sustainable but dualistic mutual relationship, their primary goal being the operation of the infrastructure involving the achievement of a high level of
safety and reliability, but at minimal life cycle costs. As a basis for the overall management and control and maintenance process, the Operations Department has drawn up a management and maintenance plan to span several
years whereby - besides its own contribution – input is sought from specialists in a range of areas such as safety, the
provisions of law and regulations and the environment. An annual plan is “lifted” from the long-range plan every
year for the conducting of maintenance activities to supplement the regular programme. This programme is then
presented for approval and for the clearance of the budget.
The Asset Management Department reports to GTS in relation to the performance of the infrastructure, inter alia,
by means of performance indicators that have been agreed in advance, such as those that have been included in the
contract for professional services. Asset Management monitors the services provided by Operations, for example,
through a more extensive scheme of performance indicators. Asset Management also reserves the right to ascertain,
itself, using technical spot checks and process checks, that the modus operandi and processes within Operations,
insofar as they are linked to the services covered by the Service Level Agreement (SLA), are being properly pursued
by the Operations Department.
- 43 -
4.1 Preventative maintenance
The initial maintenance regime was based on the best practice of part suppliers. In addition, some aspects of the
system were derived from experience gained by associate companies and, where necessary, the provisions of law
and regulations. Over the years, this regime developed into what it is now, in the mean time having been set up as a
computerised information system, i.e. the SAP Plant Maintenance Module (called the ‘PM Module’ in what follows).
This system generates maintenance orders and the instructions associated with them. The findings gleaned and, for
example, the consumption of materials, are determined by this system. In their turn, the actual values serve as input
for the Maintenance Engineering process. This process is shown below in diagrammatic form.
Maintenance Engineering
Requirements
(Costs, legislation)
Cause Analyses
Requirements of the
maintenance concept
Other parameters
(working
conditions,
health, safety
and environment,
Netherlands
Standardisation
Institute...)
Structure created,
components
Data collection
and analysis
Planned,
performed
and processed
Other sources
(incl. market info)
Analyses of the actual values versus the performance requirements (measured, for instance, by means of KPIs) can
give rise to adjustments in the maintenance concepts. Examples of the analysis methods used would be Life Cycle
Costing (LCC), Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). By doing so,
the regular maintenance activities and the related use of materials are more or less constant over a longer period of
time. This is shown below in diagrammatic form.
- 44 -
Adapting the maintenance plan
Findings
relating to
SAP
maintenance
LCC
RCM
Optimisation
Replacement
FMEA
of
policy
maintenance
activities
Changes in health, safety &
environment
External influences
New products
The starting points for optimisation in maintenance are as follows:
Retaining functionality at minimal expense (Total Cost of Ownership);
(Ongoing) compliance with the requirements that have been imposed for security and availability of transport;
Getting the right balance between preventative work, work arising from inspections and corrective work;
Making maintenance as effective as possible;
The right level of supplies or other fall-back positions, such as contract with supplier or service organisation;
A proper balance between replacement and maintenance.
The maintenance concept for existing systems is thus subject to continuous critical testing and, where necessary,
adjusted in the light of the results of the analysis in question. A maintenance concept is also set up for new products
or systems well before they are put into operation.
Appendix II describes the main features of the preventative maintenance that is carried out on Gasunie’s infrastructure.
- 45 -
4.2 Replacement
In addition to the system’s current performance, Gasunie has to take into account ageing on components and the
ceasing of suppliers’ aftercare with respect to specific components or systems. Because of this, at a given time, its
compliance with the performance requirements that are applicable could become impossible. In this regard a proactive policy is followed. Altered legislation or regulations can also provide the impetus for replacement projects.
Where possible, in the context of replacement projects of this nature, a Total Cost of Ownership philosophy is followed.
An important point for consideration when the timing of replacements is being determined is the execution time
of the projects required in this connection, which will normally be between one and a half and three years. For
example, on the basis of findings obtained during maintenance and the performance of the gas transmission grid,
an optimal replacement programme spanning several years is drawn up.
The replacement process that is completed is shown in the following diagram:
Yes
Technical
integrity
Emergency
value?
Overview:
standards
Functionality
Economy
Emergency
scenario
Yes
Evaluation
Indicators
Legislation
Investment
decision
Signal
value?
No
Retire
Repair
Replace
Safety &
Environment
Influence
Miscellaneous
Yes
Successful
PLAN
No
EVALUATION
The process is administered on the basis of indicators that give rise to replacement. An indicator is a value or pointer
that provides information about the condition of the equipment. Through the monitoring of indicators that give
rise to replacement, information is acquired about the remaining lifetime of the equipment concerned. Amongst
other things, these indicators relate to performance levels that are measured (KPIs), findings obtained during maintenance (SAP-PM), legislation (relating to areas such as safety, the environment etc.), information providers, the
modification of functionality and financial/commercial data.
- 46 -
4.3 Maintenance and fault-clearing service
4.3.1 Organisation
GTS aims to transport gas safely and without interruptions. For this reason, the infrastructure that is required has
redundancy built into it. Nevertheless, during both preventative maintenance and inspections and during normal
operations, situations can arise that demand human intervention.
The actual monitoring and conducting of the activities relating to “management, maintenance and the management
of failures” is undertaken by Gasunie’s Operations Unit. This unit reports to the Asset Management Department.
The Operations Department is organised into a number of Sub-Units enabling the prompt maintenance of and, if
necessary, repairs to the relevant parts of the infrastructure.
The Installations Sub-Unit is established at five vital installations within the infrastructure, and it manages these
and the installations in the area (Oldeboorn, Spijk, Grijpskerk, Ommen, Ravenstein, Zweekhorst, Alphen,
Schinnen c.a., LNG-Maasvlakte and Wieringermeer, Beverwijk, Anna Paulowna).
The Pipelines & Stations Sub-Unit is divided up into two districts, i.e. East and West Netherlands. Each district
has around six so-called “areas”. Consequently twelve areas have been formed, each having an established failure
base at a strategic point. In this way, every Gasunie station can reasonably be reached by engineers within a
specific time, enabling unexpected repairs to be carried out and failures remedied. Both East and West have their
own Planning Department, which is responsible for the effective and efficient day-to-day deployment of engineers. The different areas collaborate for the management and control and maintenance of specific equipment.
For national and complex activities, support is provided by the staff departments in Groningen. The operational
maintenance process is also directed from there.
For the conducting of specialist tasks (including the managing of disasters) and the employment of temporary
measures, the Special Assignments Department exists within the Pipelines & Stations Sub-Unit; it is located in
Deventer. Contracts with relevant contractors ensure additional support in serious situations.
GTS’s Central Command Post (CCP) in Groningen acts as the reporting and coordination centre for all the work
carried out on the infrastructure in relation to the safety and upkeep of the gas transmission grid. Gas transport is
managed from there, and it monitors for deviations via telemetry. The general public can also reach the CCP on its
“alert line.” This telephone number is widely publicised: +31 (0)50-5211500.
If events actually occur, the CCP can block or divert the flow of gas. Personnel from the Operations Unit can be called
in to take action in situ. The CCP is manned continuously. Via an on-call organisation, engineers from the Operations Unit are available 24 hours a day and seven days a week throughout the year to enable gas to be transported in
safe conditions. There are specific procedures to upscale decision making within the organisation
4.3.2 Modus operandi
The organisation of the maintenance and fault-clearing service described above is such that failures and interruptions in the transmission of gas can be resolved as efficiently and effectively as possible. The design philosophy
followed by GTS, in which very considerable importance is attached to the unforeseen failure of parts of the infrastructure through the allocation of reserve capacity (n+1 philosophy) and the use of a “spare parts” policy, supported
by availability and reliability analyses, reduces the likelihood that failures and interruptions will occur.
Alerts of failures are sent in various ways and, depending on their (possible) consequences, failures will be upgraded
to a specific priority level. The CCP will receive information via telephone or telemetry about deviations that could
indicate a failure.
In particular, interruptions are reported directly to the CCP, usually automatically. As far as possible, failures with
a low level of urgency are forwarded to the CCP and, during office hours, reported directly to the Planning Departments in East and West Netherlands; there will be no further discussion of alerts in this category here, since they
- 47 -
involve minimal risks.
Using alerts that have been received, and any more precise data that it has at its disposal, the CCP will assess the
severity of the alert. If personal safety is at risk, on the basis of set criteria, a decision will be taken to call in the emergency services so that evacuation can be requested as necessary; this will take place if and insofar as the emergency
services are not already in situ and have not introduced any measures, themselves. As the next phase, the Operations
Unit failure-clearance service will be called in. Depending on the severity of the failure, engineers and managers will
be called in during this phase. The criteria and mechanism for the upgrading of an event are described in the procedures section of the Operations Emergency Control Manual. In the light of the findings gleaned in situ, measures
will be taken at the outset in order that safety might be guaranteed and environmental damage kept to a minimum,
and so that the gas that is required can be transported.
The actual repairs will not begin until absolute safety can be guaranteed. The Special Assignments Department is
responsible for conducting specialist tasks, including the managing of disasters and the introduction of temporary
measures. This unit has a range of disaster management resources at its disposal. In addition, one of the CCP’s main
tasks is to ensure that gas continues to be transported to end-users via alternative means, and that contractual commitments are met. Interruptions in gas transport and significant failures will be evaluated by the Disaster Management Committee and, as necessary, procedures and instructions will be improved still further.
- 48 -
5. Cohesion between Investment Plan, Maintenance Plan and Business Plan
GTS has ensured the cohesion of the components of the quality system, the estimation of capacity, the recording
process for quality indicators and the annual budget in the Minimum Requirements of the Management Control
System.
Objectives
GTS’s objectives emanate from its statutory responsibilities. These objectives have been defined in greater detail for
each of the departments concerned.
Performance indicators
Performance indicators have been established for said objectives. Realistic norms have been linked to the performance indicators, so that the results obtained in relation to those particular objectives can be tested. The most important performance indicators are reported regularly in the form of management information.
Business Plan
Every year GTS draws up a Business Plan defining the work that must be carried out in order for the objectives to
be achieved within the budget that has been designated/that has been requested for that work.
Consistency
The objectives and planning are harmonised with each other and form a coherent whole.
Risk management
In the light of the principal objectives, the business risks are identified in the course of a Strategic Risk Analysis
(SRA). Then, for each process, it will be decided whether or not an operational risk analysis is required. The administrative measures will be mapped out in that analysis.
Requirements/standards
Policy
objectives + KPIs
Adjusting the process
Administration
organisation
Management
procedures
Performance
work instructions
Business activities
Adjusting the plan
Business plan (investments, maintenance and replacement)
Evaluating and improving
Reporting
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5.1 Relationship between Investment and Maintenance Plans and Business Plan
As stated in Chapter 2, GTS makes forecasts for entry and exit points. Tests are then conducted to ascertain whether
the network has sufficient capacity to transport the gas required in a range of circumstances. If bottlenecks are anticipated, GTS will introduce measures leading to investment projects. If the market requires additional transport
capacity GTS will establish, in an investment study, what measures will be necessary to facilitate that level of transport. The investment projects emanating from such studies will be included in the Investment Plan, which forms
part of the Business Plan.
By means of maintenance analyses, the technical condition of the network is assessed. Using as a basis the maintenance concepts for the various components of the network, the technical condition of the network will be monitored
(monitoring). During the operational lifetime of the equipment within the gas transmission system, this means that
the system is maintained through a combination of “preventative maintenance” (Standard Maintenance Scheme),
“work arising from inspections” (technical defects resolved by this means) and “corrective maintenance” (failures).
The resources required for this are included in the Business Plan.
Assessment of the risks
Strategic Risk Analysis, Operational Risk Analysis (per sub-group)
Businessplan
Infrastructure
Investments
Investment
planning
plan for new
Capacity estimation:
construction
investment study,
(construction)
Adapting the process
bottleneck analysis
Analysis of
Maintenance
Maintenance
maintenance
concept
replacement
requirements
Monitoring
Onderhoudsplan,
Qualitative
Maintenance plan,
assessment of
investment plan
the condition of
(replacement)
Adapting the plan
components
Reporting Performance indicators
For some of the equipment, the time will come (see Paragraph 4.2) when a “normal” maintenance regime is no
longer sufficient, and it has to be replaced other than through one-on-one replacement by reason of inspection findings or failures. This will take place within Gasunie on a project-by-project basis by means of so-called replacement
projects, carried out by the Technical Construction Department. These replacement projects are included in the
Business Plan.
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The strictest governance system is described below. For smaller projects, less stringent requirements will apply in
terms of verification. This system came into force in September 2009.
Study phase
Within GTS’s Planning Department, bottlenecks within the gas transmission system are defined. The Planning
Department will conduct investigations to ascertain how the bottlenecks can be resolved. A range of options
will be examined. On the basis of a Business Development Plan, the management will decide whether one of the
alternatives should be taken further and, if so, which one. The project will be formally reviewed for this purpose
(Mobilise Team for Study) and then, if a positive recommendation is made, the assignment will be allocated in
order for the proposal to be developed further.
Project establishment
In the next phase, the documentation relating to the study will be expanded. An updated Business Development
Plan, in combination with a contractual agreement (a precedence agreement or the equivalent) will be presented
for review (Project Establishment Decision). If a positive recommendation is made, the assignment will be allocated in order for the proposal to be further developed in a business case.
Business case
The main features of the various solutions that are possible will be defined. These features will be the project’s
scope, an order-of-magnitude cost estimate, a plan (completion period) and a cost/benefit analysis. The preferred
option will be investigated further. For installations and pipelines, a functional specification will be drawn up.
For new pipeline routes this means that, inter alia, a thoroughgoing route study must be conducted to determine
possible bottlenecks, for example, areas of natural interest, waterways and limitations affecting the proposed
construction by reason of conservation directives. The result of this phase will be the more precise elaboration
of the scope, a cost estimate with a 40% inaccuracy margin and an improved plan. At the end of this phase,
the management will decide whether the project should be taken further (Commercial Investment Decision).
If a positive recommendation is made, the assignment will be allocated in order for the proposal to be further
developed in a project specification.
Project specification
In the specification for the project, everything that is necessary will be done definitively to determine its scope,
as well as the plan and quantified risks. Then, a budget with a 25% inaccuracy margin for regular projects, or
a so-called P90 reliability level for large projects, will be submitted for approval. For this purpose, it may be
necessary for quotations to be sought for materials and services. For pipeline projects and large installation
projects, the procedures for the obtaining of permits (including a MER and Land-Use Plan) will be initiated. For
technically complex designs, a design review will also be conducted. At the end of this phase, final approval will
be given by the management (Final Investment Decision) and the project budget (exclusive of contingency) will
be made available to the project manager.
Detail engineering
In the detail engineering phase, the specifications will be formulated in such a detailed manner that the construction phase can be initiated using them as a basis.
Construction and delivery
In this phase, the project will be executed. When it is finished, the installation or pipeline will be inspected by a
dedicated inspection service (see Paragraph 3.4.2). After that, the project will be put into service. A formal review
will take place promptly to ascertain whether the project is fully ready and has been sufficiently tested for handover (Ready for Operation). It will be commissioned in accordance with Gas Transport Services’s deployment
plan, in combination with the technical and operational management hand-over (TBO/OBO).
- 51 -
5.2 Planning & Control Cycle
The preparation of the Business Plan and the monitoring of the manner in which it is implemented form part of the
Planning & Control Cycle. This cycle will be completed according to a strict time schedule, (planning calendar), and
will be directed by Gasunie’s Control Department. The various phases will be explained below.
Planning
Budgeting
Monitor performance
Reporting
Drawing up
strategic plan
Concrete plan for
the coming year
Second opinion,
record progress
Analysis, evaluation,
accountability
Planning
Every year, all the departments draw up a Unit Business Plan. This plan will describe the objectives, policy, principal
activities, projects and performance indicators that the unit is intending to achieve.
Budgeting
For investment projects that are mentioned in the Business Plan, an investment budget will be drawn up. Furthermore, on the basis of the Business Plan for the next three years, the work that must be carried out will be planned
for, and the associated costs and staffing requirements will be set down. Once it has been approved, the budget will
form the terms of reference for the project, and will imply authorisation to carry out the work that has been agreed
to, apart from work to be done on a project-by-project basis.
Monitoring of execution
Before execution can commence, the work to be done on a project-by-project basis must first be assessed and approved on the basis of an authorisation document that has been submitted. Execution will be monitored and recorded
with the assistance of the project managers. A review will be held regularly to check the progress of the project’s
execution as against the plan (budget). Deviations will be highlighted and analysed.
For the purpose of the execution of projects, project structures will be laid down and administered. Project budgets
will be assessed, costs will be recorded and expectations will be incorporated into the discussion. Reviews will take
place regularly, and progress will be reported on. Projects will be designated as technically ready and closed in financial terms, and final reports will be drafted.
Reporting
Once a month, the units will draw up a unit report concerning the progress that has been made with the projects,
the history of the running costs and the personnel deployed. On the basis of these reports, the unit manager will
assume responsibility for the progress that has been achieved in the work and results that have been obtained. The
unit reports will form the basis for Gasunie’s quarterly reports, in which a description is given of the stage reached
in the execution of the work contained in the Business Plan that is in force. In addition, a separate report is submitted at least once a month concerning the status of large projects involving a great deal of risk, and this report will
include both financial and operational figures. On the basis of monthly and quarterly reporting, if necessary, a more
precise analysis will be conducted, and the Business Plan adjusted. Each year, the implementation of the previous
Business Plan will also be evaluated.
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Appendices
Contents of Appendices
I. Directives and norms applied by GTS
II. Monitoring procedure
III. Description of components of the gas transmission grid
IV. Qualitative component assessment; monitoring, assessing and changing components
V. Asset Register
VI. Gas transmission grid changes as against the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document
VII. Severe Accident Prevention Policy
- 53 -
57
58
60
62
64
66
69
Appendix I. Directives and norms applied by GTS
Below is an overview of the most relevant European directives and norms that GTS follows, with their (global) scope
of application.
European regulations
- Low Voltage Directive
- EMC Directive
- Gas Appliances Directive
- Pressure Equipment Directive
- Simple Pressure Vessels Directive
- ATEX Directive
- Machinery Directive
Gas pipeline installations
BEVI
External Safety (Establishments) Decree
BRZO ‘99
1999 Major Accident Decree
NEN-EN 1775
Gas pipes in buildings – max. operating pressure < 5 bar
Gas supply systems – Gas pressure regulation stations for gas transmission and distribution – Func-
NEN-EN 12186
tional requirements
EN 13480
Metallic industrial piping systems
Requirements for gas pressure control stations with an inlet pressure of less than 100 bar; Dutch
NEN 1059
version based on NEN-EN 12186 and NEN-EN 12279
NEN and 15001, Part 1
Gas installation pipelines with operating pressures of greater than 0.5 bar for industrial and non-
and Part 2
industrial gas installations
Safety requirements for steel gas transport pipelines with a design pressure of greater than 1 bar
NEN 1091
and less than or equal to 16 bar.
NEN 3650
Requirements for steel transport pipelines
NEN 3651
Extra requirements governing steel pipelines in crossings of important public works
NPR 2760
Mutual influence of pipelines and high-voltage circuits
NPR 6912
Cathodic protection
NEN-EN 13480
Metallic industrial piping systems
Zoning along high-pressure natural gas transport pipelines – Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning
VROM Zoning Regulation
& the Environment – 26 November 1984
WION
Information Exchange on Underground Networks Act, February 2008
Gas consumption installations
NEN-EN 656
Gas-fired central heating boilers with an atmospheric burner with a nominal heat input of between
70 kW and 300 kW
NEN-EN 676
Gas burner with ventilator
NEN-EN 746
Industrial thermoprocessing equipment
Explosion safety
NEN 10079-10
Danger zone classification with respect to gas explosion hazard
NPR 7910
Explanation of NEN 10079-10
It must be noted that the above list gives a global overview of the most relevant acts, directives and norms. Gasunie
also has a very detailed and wide-ranging regime of technical operating norms (the so-called Gasunie Technical
Standards), that are described in greater detail in the Severe Accident Prevention Policy (PBZO), which is attached to
this document as Appendix VII. Moreover, within Gasunie, there is a specific department that coordinates internal
and external standardisation and which, to some extent, conducts monitoring in this connection as regards content.
- 54 -
Appendix II. Monitoring procedure
In what follows, an overview is given of the preventative maintenance programme that Gasunie implements in
relation to the following components:
1. Transmission grid
2. Valve stations
3. Gas delivery stations (GO)
4. Control stations (CS)
5. Reducer stations (RS)
6. Border stations (ES, IS)
1. Overview of the transmission grid
Transmission grid
HTL
RTL
Fly inspection
Every two weeks
Every two weeks
Drive inspection
Every two weeks
Every two weeks
Walk the route with drawings
Every four years
Every four years
Walking inspection of equipment, including driving inspection
Annually
Annually
Settlement blocks, structural works
Dependent on licensing
Dependent on licensing
requirements
requirements
Via programme
Via programme
Inspection
Inspection (Pigging or Direct Assessment)
2. Overview of valve stations
Valve stations
HTL
HPSD
RTL
PRESSURE
RELIEVE
Inspection
Including
Mechanical engineering
Functional test
Condition test valves
Replacement oil/grease
-
Annually
Annually
Funct.test
Every three years
Every three years
Condition test
Inspection/review pres-
Every four years
sure relieve
Pressure boiler inspection
Every eight years
buffer tanks
Electro and instrumentation
Calibration
Twice a year
Pressure transmitters,
HPSD
Instrumentation CCP
Annually
Annually
check
Functional test HPSD
Calibration
Annually
pressure
transmitters
Low-voltage inspection
Every five years
General
Health and safety and
Annually
Every five years
environment tour
- 55 -
Every five years
3/4/5/6 – Overview of gas delivery stations (GO), control stations (CS), reducer stations (RS), border stations (ES,
IS)
Preventative maintenance excl. heating boilers
Inspection
Including
GAS DELIVERY STATIONS
CONTROL STATIONS
GO
CS
RS-RTL GO-type
RS-HTL
ES with P-REGULATION
RS-RTL MR-type
ES without P regulation
IS/MS/CS (telemetry)
A1-W
Every three weeks
Every three weeks
stand-by
Lapses when station is on stand-by
Lapses when station is on stand-by
A2-W
Every three months
Every three months
B-W
A2 -W
B1-W
A2-W
B2-W
B1-W
Annually
Annually
Every two years
AV-H
Every five years
D-W
A2-W
Every eight years
D1-W
A2-W
Every five years
D2-W
A2-W
Every five years
Every five years
Every eight years
KT-W
Annually
BE-E
Annually
Annually
BV-W
ES: Every three months
BV-E
ES: Annually
E-K
Every five years
Every five years
WI-W (MR)
Only when indicated by GTS
Description of inspections
A1-W:
THT-metering + Odorant-injection check
A2-W:
GO->Visual check + section take-over test
MR->Visual check
B-W:
Functional test GO
B1-W:
Functional test MR (to be conducted in the Autumn, before the winter!)
B2-W:
Check Orifice Plate Unit
AV-H:
Safety check (by CG)
E-K:
E-mark NEN 3140, explosion safety, earthing, safeguarding against lightning. Carried out by “Authorised Person”
WI-W (MR):
CS - putting on stand-by
D-W:
Inspection of pressure boilers by TVK
D1-W:
Inspection of odorant tank by TVK
D2-W:
Inspection of pressure boilers by TVK
KT-W:
Check customer telemetry
BE-E:
Check instrumentation, process computer, transmitters and quality measurements
BV-W:
Function test conducted in accordance with STS 20-01 “Fencing and surveillance systems”
BV-E:
Check conducted in accordance with STS 20-02/03 or “Fencing and surveillance systems (E&I) and “Surveillance and safeguarding systems (E&I)”
Procedures and work instructions related to the maintenance programmes are laid down in SAP-PM.
- 56 -
Appendix III. Description of components of the gas transmission grid
In this Appendix, GTS will describe the principal components of the gas transmission grid. This description is more
extensive than the description in the 2007 Quality and Capacity Document, since more detail is given about function
and configuration.
Transmission grid: 12,000 kilometres (i.e. HTL: 6,000 km and RTL: 6,000 km)
The gas is transported using two pressure regimes. In the high-pressure transmission grid (HTL), gas is transported
at a maximum pressure of 66 bar and, sometimes, 80 bar. In the regional transmission grid (RTL), gas is transported
at a maximum pressure of 40 bar.
HTL and RTL valve stations (i.e. HTL: 600 and RTL: 2,800)
The valve station is designed to create links within the gas transmission system. On the one hand, the purpose of
these links may be to close off sections of pipeline or, on the other hand, gas flows can be piped through links via
alternative routes.
Gas delivery stations: 1,100
The ultimate delivery of gas takes place via the gas delivery stations (System Connection). The majority of the latter
are connected to the RTL system, but also directly to the HTL system, in some instances, depending on the end-user.
Because the gas delivery station is the end-point of a Gasunie transport pipeline, this is also the place where the
accountable metering of the quantity of gas that has been delivered takes place. The gas is usually delivered at 8
bar. The pressure is reduced by means of regulators. At a gas delivery station, the gas is heated to prevent the drop
in temperature, as a result of pressure reduction, from causing the formation of condensate or hydrate. In order
to prevent the pressure regulators and turbine meters from becoming polluted, the gas is cleaned by being passed
through a filter.
Control stations: 79
The most important function of a control station is to reduce the gas pressure to 40 bar. This is necessary in order
for a connection to be made between the HTL and the RTL. The pressure regulation unit at the station consists of
several control sections that are linked in parallel. Besides pressure reduction, the control station also has another
function, namely to odorise the natural gas.
Reducer stations: 27
A reducer station ensures that pressure is lowered within the gas transmission grid. It may be necessary to reduce
pressure when two or more high-pressure pipelines are connected. In such cases, a reducer station will reduce the
highest pipeline pressure to the lowest pipeline pressure. From the standpoint of control, through the deployment
of reducer stations, the flow of gas can be regulated and controlled.
Border stations: 15
Border stations are entry or exit stations on the borders of Germany, Belgium and the UK (BBL). A border station
receives natural gas from or supplies it to other countries, which is why they are only located at a national border.
The function of the border station is to measure the quantity of natural gas that is supplied to buyers abroad.
Blending stations: 17
The HTL system breaks down into two partial systems. In one system, gas of Groningen quality is transported.
Most of this (G-)gas comes onto the public market via the RTL system, and becomes available for export via the HTL
system. In addition, an HTL system exists in which H-(high calorific)gases of various qualities are transported. This
gas is delivered to recipients within large-scale industries, and electricity power stations, and a proportion of it is exported. In addition, Gasunie is dependent upon the gas that is supplied from the various onshore and offshore fields
which, overall, can provide a range of qualities of natural gas. At blending stations, the three kinds of gas, possibly
- 57 -
with bought-in or self-produced nitrogen having been added to them, are blended to form a Groningen quality gas
for the domestic market, or an enriched Groningen quality gas for export. As a rule, blending stations are located in
the same place as compressor stations.
Compressor stations: 17
The function of a compressor station is to maintain the level of pressure within the HTL. After every 80-100 km of
the principal transport system, the pressure of the gas can be increased (compression). The compression of the G-gas
mainly takes place in winter. In the principal transmission grid, 17 compressor stations ensure that the pressure is
maintained at the right level.
In the previous Quality and Capacity Document, 16 stations were mentioned. The “newly built installation” relates
to Grijpskerk.
In addition, however, it must be noted that Anna Paulowna is owned by BBL Company, a joint venture between
Gasunie, Fluxys and Eon Ruhrgas. Gasunie is responsible for the management and maintenance of this installation.
LNG installation: 1
A peak shaver is located on the Maasvlakte. At this station, a large quantity of liquid methane (LNG) and nitrogen
is stored in tanks. In periods when external temperatures are low, from this installation, liquefied gas can be made
gaseous in its turn to supplement the supply in De Randstad (mid-West Netherlands). In such cases, the transport
capacity originating in Groningen is inadequate.
Nitrogen installations: 2
At a number of stations H-gas is rendered suitable for the Groningen gas market by being blended with nitrogen.
Gasunie also has two nitrogen installations, which extract nitrogen from the atmosphere and then inject it into the
regular flow of gas. These installations are located in Ommen and Kootstertille. In addition, at the IJmuiden and
Rotterdam stations, nitrogen is obtained from third parties for the purposes of quality conversion.
- 58 -
Appendix IV. Qualitative component assessment; monitoring, assessing
and changing components
The age of the different parts of the Gasunie transport system, as a whole, ranges from one to forty-four years. The
system complies with the requirements that have been imposed as concerns safety and availability. Compliance is
monitored through, inter alia, performance recording and inspections. A system also exists to establish whether
component parts are still available and thus whether the system, or a part of it, is still capable of being maintained
for some time to come. For each main item, a regular capacity check will take place which, where necessary, will
give rise to changes. Changes that are made to the provisions of law and regulations are monitored centrally. When
required, this will cause adjustments to be made to the system.
The findings obtained during maintenance are recorded in the SAP Plant Maintenance Module. As required, more
precise analyses of these findings will give rise to corrective maintenance or replacement. Analyses can also cause
the maintenance concept to be altered. The way in which GTS establishes the condition of the network is not qualitative, but it is established in terms of the actions to be taken. By this means, GTS ensures that the components’
technical condition is such that the level of gas transport reliability and safety that is required is guaranteed.
A more detailed discussion follows of the characteristics of each constituent part.
Transmission grid
The present status of the transport pipelines is verified, amongst other things, by means of an extensive internal
inspection programme (intelligent pigging), and coating surveys. Accordingly, the basis of the latter is to address
the risks in question. Depending on the results, a date will be set for a repeat inspection. Continuous protection is
afforded by the KB (Cathodic Protection) system. Monitoring is conducted, for example, through the six-monthly
metering of rather more than 10,000 measuring points, as well as checks on drainages and rectifiers. Some of these
procedures are managed and established on the basis of the SAP PM Module (see Appendix III). Damage-prevention
policies are implemented, for example, by means of inspections by helicopter and the KLIC system, and the passing on of information to excavators and landowners. Moreover, activities are carried on in the context of Spatial
Planning. From time to time this necessitates projects aimed at changing the location of certain constituent parts.
HTL and RTL valve stations
The stations are normally unmanned. Maintenance is managed and established on the basis of the SAP PM Module.
Failures and solutions to them are also established in the SAP PM Module. A number of stations are monitored 24
hours a day using telemetry systems. Via the SAP PM Module, failure alerts are forwarded automatically to the local
maintenance organisation, which can also be reached 24 hours a day via an on-call organisation. This also applies to
alerts that are sent, by telephone or via the alarm system, to the Central Commando Post. When necessary – whether
or not by reason of analyses of read-backs in SAP - proposals are made for adjustments to the maintenance concept,
or projects devised for the achievement of further improvements in performance. As concerns the permit situation,
there is regular contact with local authorities. Projects may also be initiated by the latter.
Gas delivery stations/control stations/reducer stations/border stations
The stations are normally unmanned. Maintenance is managed and established on the basis of the SAP PM Module.
Failures and solutions to them are also established in the SAP PM Module. The stations are monitored 24 hours a
day using telemetry systems. Via the SAP PM Module, failure alerts are forwarded automatically to the local maintenance organisation, which can also be reached 24 hours a day via an on-call organisation. This also applies to alerts
that are sent, by telephone or via the alarm system, to the Central Commando Post. The Operations Department
prepares reports and analyses on the basis of the SAP PM Module, for which the availability requirements that have
been formulated (KPIs) serve as the norm. When necessary, proposals are made for adjustments to the maintenance
concept, or projects devised for the achievement of further improvements in performance. As concerns the permit
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situation, there is regular contact with local authorities. Projects may also be initiated by the latter.
Compressor and blending stations and LNG installation
Some of the compressor and blending stations are continuously manned, some are manned from Monday to Friday,
and some are unmanned. The modus operandi for maintenance and failures is identical to the modus operandi for
the smaller stations that has been described. As concerns the permit situation and the BRZO legislation, there is
regular contact with the provincial authority. Projects may also be initiated as a result of this contact.
Nitrogen installations
The two nitrogen installations form part of existing stations (Ommen and Kootstertille) and, as such, also fall within
the same management and maintenance regime.
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Appendix V. Asset Register
The computerised systems used by Gasunie, and the internal environment in which they are used, are represented
in the diagram below.
AUTO
CAD
MICRO
STATION
CASTOR
GEO
LINK
Manual input
Data
Drawing
DDS
GDB
DIS
SAP
Data
Data
mail
KB
DATA
KLIC /
VLIEG
Publication
GIGI
(viewing)
PIMS
PIGGING
DATA
Recording and drawing management process
Using Autocad, Microstation and, in particular, Castor, drawings showing the position and layout of the infrastructure are prepared and updated. This process commences as early as the pipeline’s design phase. After having been
aligned, these drawings are stored in DDS (the drawing management system). All the versions of all the documents
are kept in this system permanently, and so it is always possible to retrieve the relevant history.
From Castor, the drawing numbers are inputted into SAP (manually). This is the reference for the elaboration of
the various work assignments, the aim of which is the management of the pipeline routes. Furthermore, the data in
Castor are transferred to the so-called GDB (GeoDatabase). Every change in Castor will be shown there on the following day. The GDB supplies its data to a number of other systems.
Integrity process
In order to ensure that the pipelines remain in good condition, Gasunie has set up two main processes. Pipeline
Integrity Management is intended to monitor the condition of the pipelines and to prevent them from presenting a
hazard for the surrounding area. This process is supported by the PIMS system. Monitoring Safe Position is inten- 61 -
ded to prevent damage caused externally (by third parties). To this end, a number of sub-processes have been set up,
including the processing of KLIC alerts. The integrity of the installations and stations is directed out of SAP Plant
Maintenance by means of work assignments that originate in the maintenance programme.
Pipeline Integrity Management
The pipeline network is analysed by means of PIMS. This system makes use of (current) internal data from the GDB.
These data comprise, in particular, position data (x,y,z coordinates), and also pipeline data (diameter, wall thickness,
type of material). Furthermore, use is made of pigging data, for example, which have been acquired during the socalled pigruns, and data from the Cathodic Protection Network (the system that ensures that the pipelines benefit
from cathodic protection).
Monitoring Safe Position
In order to monitor a given pipeline’s safe position, Gasunie employs a number of procedures. Firstly, Gasunie processes KLIC alerts. Excavation contractors are obliged to send a so-called KLIC alert to the KLIC office. On the basis
of the data delivered periodically by Gasunie, they establish whether or not Gasunie is likely to be affected by an
excavation. If so, Gasunie will receive a report to that effect. This report will be stored in the GDB, in DIS (Document
Management System) and in SAP. Using the Geolink application, the follow-up procedure will be determined by
Gasunie. This may consist of the sending of a letter containing the notification that excavation is permissible (only
within the area stated and within a specific period of time). But it is also possible that Gasunie will want to supervise
the excavation work. In this situation, the excavation contractor will be informed, and a work order will be drawn
up in SAP, so that said supervision can be included in the relevant planning.
Every two weeks, the whole of the transmission grid is inspected in a flying inspection. The reports that emanate
from these inspections are dealt in the same way as KLIC alerts, the difference being that there will always be supervision. Where necessary, the helicopter will land in situ to ensure that the work in question ceases. Finally, regular
route inspections are also conducted; during these inspections, inspectors walk (or drive) along the pipeline. Any
changes that have occurred in the area around it (and, for example, changes in the pipeline covering) will be recorded, and adjustments made in Castor.
Work which, by reason of Spatial Planning consultation with third parties, gives rise to excavation activities in the
vicinity of pipelines, will be discussed and, in the execution phase, will give rise to supervision in situ. As necessary,
in the course of the project, certain sections of pipeline in situ will be given additional signage (yellow signs bearing
the wording, “High-pressure gas pipeline - DANGER OF DEATH”) in addition to the existing pipeline signage that
takes the form of aerial, cathodic protection and indication markers.
The processes designed to guarantee that the data are up-to-date, reliable and complete, as well as the maximum
working time, are covered by a number of procedures, i.e. in the Asset Data Management5 Manual for pipelines and
the Operations Management6 Manual for other installations.
Additionally, SAP data are verified once a month and GIS data are verified every two months. Inter alia, during this
process, an investigation is conducted to ascertain whether all the database fields have been completed properly
(logically and in full). The findings thus obtained will be reported to Data Management, which will be able to modify
the errors in Castor and SAP.
5 Asset Data Management Manual: ADM_3-02,
6 Operations Management Manual: OMH 4.4.4-07
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Appendix VI. Gas transmission grid changes as against the 2007 Quality
and Capacity Document
This overview contains the changes of which the Minister of Economic Affairs is notified every year in accordance
with Article 4.1 of the Gas Act. It deals with the changes made in 2007 and 2008 to the gas transmission grid that is
managed by GTS. The changes contained in this overview relate to the HTL network.
Expansion of the transport capacity of the North-East Netherlands – West Netherlands section
Description
This project comprised the following works:
The laying of approx. 80 km of 48” gas transport pipeline (A-652) between Grijpskerk and Workum,
including the facilities required.
The laying of approx. 30 km of 48” gas transport pipeline (A-653) between Workum and Wieringermeer,
including the facilities required.
The construction of a compressor station near the NAM underground storage facility in Grijpskerk.
The construction of a reducer station at the Workum location.
Reasons
It was necessary to expand the transport capacity of the section running from North-East Netherlands to West
Netherlands in order to resolve certain bottlenecks that had arisen because the inflow of gas had shifted from
Balgzand to Groningen, and as a result of additional transit flows.
36” gas transport pipeline, Wieringermeer – Oudelandertocht
Description
This project was related to the laying of approx. 2.6 km of 36” gas transport pipeline (A-656). The pipeline is
located between the Wieringermeer and Oudelandertocht stations.
Reasons
With the laying of this pipeline, a second connection between Wieringermeer and Oudelandertocht was
achieved, and so, at the same time, H-gas can flow from Norway, via the ‘North-East Netherlands − West Netherlands’ section to the UK (via the BBL), and the H-gas of lesser quality can flow from West Netherlands to the
Wieringermeer blending station. As a result of this new pipeline, nitrogen can be used more efficiently at the
Wieringermeer blending station.
Off-take of Middelie gas
Description
This project was related to the laying of approx. 1.9 km of 10” gas transport pipeline, including the facilities
required. The pipeline is located between the NAM Middelie-300 station and the existing A-563 gas transport
pipeline within the Beemster local authority area. The existing blending station in Beverwijk has been modified
so that it can take the gas.
Reasons
This project creates facilities that enable the gas produced by the West Beemster, Middelie and Rustenburg stations to be taken off at the Beverwijk blending station.
Nitrogen installation at Kootstertille
Description
This project was related to the creation of a nitrogen installation at the Kootstertille blending station. The blending station has been modified in order to make nitrogen injection possible.
Reasons
In North Netherlands, the gas from small fields in the Friesland region is transferred to the G-gas market via the
Kootstertille blending station. The gas that is supplied consists of both H-gas and L-gas. The supply of L-gas is
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diminishing all the time. However, to enable the H-gas to be transferred, a nitrogen installation has been built.
Adaptation of pressure control installations
Description
This project was related to the adaptation of the pressure control system at various installations.
Reasons
When the installations were completed, they met the requirements that were applicable at the time. A decision
has been taken to improve the management and control of the pressure safeguarding systems and, on the basis
of the expertise acquired most recently, to direct efforts (e.g. the reduction of methane emissions) towards the
area of pressure control.
Expansion of the transport capacity of the Glinthaar – Bornerbroek section
Description
This project was related to the laying of approx. 28 km of 36” gas transport pipeline, including the facilities
required.
Reasons
By means of this project, Gas Transport Services is meeting the demand for transport capacity in connection
with the linking of caverns in Germany to its network. The increased demand for transport capacity within the
supply area beyond Ommen, in the direction of Enschede, is also being met.
Pressure upgrade for the Ommen – Enschede section
Description
This project was related to the modifications of eight stations, and was aimed at increasing the operational pressure of the Ommen – Enschede section for the A-646 and A-648 pipelines.
Reasons
Through this project, the transport capacity of the Ommen – Enschede section is being increased so that the
demand for transport capacity can be met.
Linking of E.on Ruhrgas pipeline to Oude Statenzijl
Description
This project was related to the linking of an E.on Ruhrgas 36” gas transport pipeline to Oude Statenzijl, and
the obtaining of the Dutch permits required for this pipeline, and the expansion of the Oude Statenzijl station.
Reasons
By means of this pipeline, the transport capacity between Bunde and Oude Statenzijl is being expanded.
Linking of RWE pipeline to Bocholtz
Description
This project was related to the expansion of the Bocholtz station. This was necessary to enable a RWE gas transport pipeline to be connected to the GTS gas transmission grid.
Reasons
This pipeline creates transport capacity between Gas Transport Services and RWE.
Off-take of Groet-Oost gas
Description
This project was related to the adaptation of the Beverwijk blending station.
Reasons
This project creates facilities that enable the gas produced by Groet-Oost to be taken off at the Beverwijk blending station.
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Connection of Flevocentrale
Description:
This project was related to the laying of a new 24” pipeline between Hattum and Lelystad.
Reasons:
Two new units of the Flevocentrale will be delivered by this pipeline.
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Appendix VII. Severe Accident Prevention Policy
N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie
Severe Accident Prevention Policy (PBZO)
Rev. 5.2
1
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Contents of PBZO document
1
PBZO document
1.1
Scope of the PBZO document
4
4
2
Starting points for the policy
2.1
General remarks
2.2
General objectives and principles for the PBZO
2.3
Specific safety objectives
2.4
Starting points for policy with respect to external safety
2.4.1 Policy
2.4.2 Standards
2.4.3 Definitions
2.4.4 Risk assessment
2.4.5 Dealing with interests involved
5
5
5
5
8
8
8
8
9
9
3
Safety Management System
10
4
Gasunie Technical Standards
13
5
Risk assessment
5.1
Risks associated with the Gasunie installations
15
17
6
Implementation of the PBZO within Gasunie
20
7
Publicising the Severe Accident Prevention Policy
21
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Abbreviations used:
Abbreviation
Stands for
ALARA
As low as reasonably achievable
In principle, the best techniques and modus operandi are applied.
ARIE
Supplementary Risk Inventory and
Working Conditions Decree, as amended on 7 February 2004 (Bulletin
Evaluation
of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2004 no. 69).
External Safety of Installations
The External Safety of Installations Decree (BEVI) imposes safety norms
Decree.
on authorities that take decisions concerning operations that consti-
BEVI
Explanation
tute a risk for persons outside the operating area.
BRZO ’99
Severe Accident Decree
CCP
Central Command Post
Governmentall decree implementing the Seveso-II EU Directive.
Control room from which the management of gas transport in the
Netherlands is controlled.
CSA
Construction Specification,General Part of internal standards (GTS).
ESD
Emergency shut-down
FMEA
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Emergency stop that has been triggered.
An FMEA investigates the consequences of potential failure in order to
introduce constructive or process measures in advance, with a view to
preventing such failure.
FMECA
Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality
The FMECA has the same basis as the FMEA except that, additionally in
Analysis
this analysis, the effects that occur are classified according to severity.
GTS
Gasunie Technical Standard
Operating norm.
HAZOP
Hazards and Operability Analysis
A systematic analysis of possible deviations from the normal process.
For these deviations, the possible causes and consequences are determined, and safety guarantees are put in place.
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
Liquefied natural gas.
LOC
Loss of Containment
Unintended escape of a hazardous substance.
LOD
Line of Defence
Safety measure.
MOC
Management of Change
Managing of changes, see VGM_4.3-26-1.
OSA
Design Specification, General
Part of internal standards (GTS).
PBZO
QRA
Quantitative Risk Analysis
RI&E
Drawing up Risk Inventory and
Quantitative analysis of the risks on the basis of the potential for and
consequences of risks defined in advance.
Investigation related to Working Conditions Decree.
Evaluation
RIVM
National Institute for Public Health
and Environment
SWIFT
Structured What-If Technique
Method of identifying hazardous situations systematically.
TRIPOD
TA Unit
TN Unit
Technical Asset Management
Technical Construction & Renovation
TO Unit
Technical Operation
TV Unit
Technical Safety
V Unit
Safety
VG&M
Health Safety and Environment
(HSE)
VBS
Safety Management System
VR
Safety Report
Supplying of more precise details for and means of implementing the
PBZO.
A detailed report relating to safety factors for all establishments for
which a BRZO ’99 Safety Report is compulsory.
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1 PBZO document
1.1 Scope of the PBZO document
This PBZO document is applicable to all Gasunie installations that fall within the scope of BRZO ’99 or the ARIE.
An overview is given in the table below.
Table 1, Classification of station type with associated documents
Station type
Documents
Stations
Volume > 200 tonnes
VR
LNG
PBZO
Ommen
VBS
Wieringermeer
QRA
Ravenstein
PBZO
Beverwijk
VBS
Zweekhorst
ARIE
Oldeboorn
QRA
Spijk
50 tonnes < volume < 200 tonnes
Kootstertille
Schinnen
Alphen
Anna Paulowna
Grijpskerk (as at 31-12-06)
1 tonne < volume < 50 tonnes
Volume < 1 tonne
PBZO
Blending stations
VBS
Export stations
ARIE
Reducing stations
QRA*
Control stations
PBZO
Gas delivery stations
VBS
Injection stations
Valve stations*
This document does not discuss occupational safety by giving a broad breakdown of such risks, but merely deals
with occupational risks that are relevant in terms of the low level of probability associated with severe accidents in
the context of the BRZO.
* Carried out at the request of the authorised agency
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2 Starting points for the policy
2.1 General remarks
Gasunie’s overall policy, is geared to Gasunie’s operating within the relevant legislation and the norms prevailing in
society, with special attention being paid to health and safety, the environment and personal integrity.
In the instruction manual entitled Health and Safety and Environment, a management declaration, lays down the
general starting points for the policy concerning health (H) and safety (S) and environment (E). In this document it
is stated that Gasunie and it’s employees will endeavour the following when carrying out their activities:
that no accidents occur (unsafe work = stop);
that no negative effects arise for the health of the company’s own personnel or the personnel of contractors or
other third parties;
that continuous improvements are made – bearing in mind the commercial pre conditions – in the following
areas:
efficient use of energy;
efficient use of raw materials;
reduction of harmfull emissions to ground, water and air.
Hereby, Gasunie will:
comply with the prevailing legislation and regulations;
follow the relevant developments and be pro-active;
achieve performance levels that exceed those achieved by other companies in its sector.
This document is updated regularly in the light of experience and/or new legislation. Since 1999, the so-called Seveso II Directive has been in force within the European Union. in the Netherlands this directive is implemented by
the 1999 Major Accident Decree (BRZO ’99). One of the obligations that has been imposed on organisations falling
within the scope of the Decree is to draft a Policy for the prevention of severe accidents (PBZO).
This PBZO document is based on the general policy starting points that N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie has hitherto
formulated in its health and safety and environment declaration, and it specifies how to prevent different types
of severe accidents. Through this document, the company is complying with the relevant legislative requirements
governing PBZO documents. This document is part of the Health, Safety and Environment Manual.
In Version 5.0 of the PBZO, the changes initiated as a result of comments made by the competent authorities have
been incorporated, up until May 2007.
2.2 General objectives and principles for the PBZO
The general health and safety and environment starting points that have been formulated also cover the prevention
of severe accidents, i.e. unwanted events involving hazardous substances, whereby a severe danger is posed to human health (whether inside or outside the installation), or to the environment. Appropriate measures will be taken,
depending on the nature of the risk.
This policy is implemented in the following ways:
The prevention of the uncontrolled escape of natural gas*7(a loss of containment; LOC) made possible by the
fact that the design of the installation is intrinsically safe, sustainable and sound, and is based on (inter)national
standards in force. In order to achieve this objective, Gasunie applies the Gasunie Technical Standards that prescribe proven technology, which are based on or make use of recently acquired experience in the areas of health,
safety and environment.
* In addition to natural gas, the emission of nitrogen or natural gas condensate may also have to be considered.
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If an LOC cannot be ruled out, adequate barriers (lines of defence; LOD) must be put in place so that escalation
can be prevented. The administrative measures are as follows, in order of priority:
Preventative administrative measures (measures aimed at the minimisation of the risks in question)
 technical administrative measures. Most of the technical administrative measures are described in the
Gasunie Technical Standards. Gasunie Technical Standards exist, for example, for the intrinsically safe
and sound designing of installations, the application of safeguards, zoning, gas detection and ESD.
 organisational administrative measures (such as work permits, open fire permits etc.)
Effect reducing measures (measures aimed at the minimisation of an effect following a disaster)
 Company Emergency Team
 Contingency Plan (laid down in the Emergency Control Manual)
  Company Emergency Response Plans
The implementation of a ‘Management of Change (MOC)’ system, whereby changes of a technical and organisational nature, relating to safety, are introduced to the extent that is required. “To the extent that is required” means that
action is taken depending on the situation, but bearing in mind the points above that relate to safety.
2.3 Specific safety objectives
In order to achieve the general objectives and follow the general principles of the PBZO, Gasunie employs the policy
objectives shown below, which are closely connected with the nature and scope of potential risks:
Prevention of an uncontrolled/unintended escape of gas.
More specifically, this implies:
application of a source-orientated approach during design, the selection of materials and construction
(application of internal GTSs, see 1.6);
adequate application and management of corrosion prevention systems;
reporting and analysing of all events that result in an uncontrolled/unintended escape of gas,
and the introduction of adequate measures.
Managing of the installation in such a way that it is and remains inherently safe.
inclusion of safety as fixed agenda point in discussions concerning progress at all levels within the
organisation;
periodically testing/inspecting and evaluating pressure vessels;
periodically testing/inspecting and evaluating (for effectiveness) pressure-safeguarding equipment, gas
detection, fire detection and extinguishing systems;
application of the Management of Change procedure when changes are made to the installation;
strict conducting of regular maintenance and inspection;
recording of cases in which there have been/are going to be departures from permit conditions
(especially safety aspects).
The maintaining of an adequate emergency organisation
having available and maintaining an adequate and professional Company Emergency Response Team
(BHV);
having available and maintaining an adequate and up-to-date Company Emergency Response Plan;
periodically testing and, if necessary, adjusting the emergency organisation and the
Company Emergency Response Plan by carrying out realistic exercises with the external emergency services.
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As far as possible, drawing lessons from unintended events. Incidents and situations involving a great deal of
risk are thoroughly investigated so that their direct and underlying causes can be ascertained, so that the recommendations that have been made can be implemented and so that feedback can be given to those who are
directly involved/interested parties.
the establishment and analysing of unsafe events and/or incidents (accident registration);
 periodically reporting on all accident registrations;
 conducting an analysis annually to ascertain possible trends in the causes of such events;
the conducting of a specific analysis of events involving high risks that have occurred
(Safety Committee, TRIPOD);
periodically conducting safety rounds.
On a regular basis, conducting of studies relating to safety and integrity.
periodically conducting SWIFT studies (see 1.5 Point 2);
 assessment of the residual risks on the basis of the risk matrix (see 1.8);
 drawing up an action plan with, possibly, additional investigations with the purpose to bring the
residual risks back down to an acceptable level;
 initiating and implementing adequate measures;
 evaluating the measures;
keeping up-to-date with national and international developments, and participating in the activities of
industry associations within the sector as concerns safety and integrity.
Ongoing supervision of the work carried out by “third parties”.
the strict use of work permits;
assessment of contractor’s safety plan for the carrying out of the work;
setting specific requirements for external personnel, depending on the nature and scope of the risks that
are considered likely to accompany the carrying out of the work concerned;
that work must be carried out in accordance with the GTS construction standards,maintenance instructions,
technical bulletins etc. that are in force
The company’s own personnel and the personnel who have been brought in must be adequately trained for the
work that is to be carried out.
More specifically, this implies that:
the company’s own personnel will complete an internal training programme;
courses involving retraining will be administered strictly;
only VCA-certified staff will be hired.
Checks concerning adherence to and implementation of the policy.
This will be assessed through:
the conducting of regular operational audits, with specific attention being paid to BRZO ’99;
the conducting of regular specific risk analyses (ORAs).
In the so-called Service Contract that exists between the Asset Management and Operations Units, performance
indicators are defined in relation to Safety and Environment. Common norm and signal values are established for
these performance indicators. Every quarter, the TO Unit reports to TA concerning the achievement of these performance indicators. The performance indicators for the Safety & Environment factor are, for example, as follows:
Accidents;
Environmental events;
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Execution of safety-related maintenance and inspection rounds;
Damage to the infrastructure;
Response time of the emergency organisation;
Compliance with the permit conditions.
2.4 Starting points for policy with respect to external safety
2.4.1 Policy
The production, storage, processing and transporting of large quantities of hazardous substances give rise to a risk
for the surrounding area: there is (low-level) probability of a (severe) accident. For this reason, in the Netherlands
the external safety policy has been developed. Our establishments constitute a point of special interest in this respect.
2.4.2 Norms
Depending on the quantity and the nature of the hazardous substances concerned, as well as the way in which they
are handled, one may have to take into account a risk for the surrounding area that requires investigation in terms
of the risk norms laid down by the state in this regard. For establishments of this kind, there exists a statutory norm
for the so-called location-related risk, as well as accountability for the so-called societal risk.
2.4.3 Definitions
Individual risk: Risk at a place externally to an installation, expressed as the annual probability that a person who
lives in that vicinity without interruption, and without protection, will die as a direct result of an unusual occurrence
within that establishment involving a hazardous substance, hazardous waste product or pesticide.
Societal risk: Cumulative annual probability that at least 10, 100 or 1000 persons will die as a direct result of their
being within the sphere of influence of an establishment and an unusual occurrence within that installation involving a hazardous substance, hazardous waste product or pesticide.
**Less vulnerable dwellings: Dwellings such as: residential properties belonging to third parties that are spread out
with a density of, at the most, two residential properties per hectare, service accommodation and company residential properties belonging to third parties, small office buildings, hotels, restaurants, shops, sports halls, swimming
pools, playgrounds, sports grounds and campsites, areas of land intended for recreational purposes, industrial or
commercial premises and objects of high value in terms of infrastructure, such as telephone exchanges or electricity
power stations or buildings housing flight control equipment.
Vulnerable dwellings: Dwellings such as: residential properties, buildings intended for accommodation, whether
or not occupied for a part of the day by minors, the elderly, medical patients or the disabled (such as: hospitals,
care homes for the elderly, nursing and convalescent homes, schools), buildings intended for daycare for minors,
buildings that are generally occupied by a large number of persons for a large part of the day (large office buildings,
hotels, shops and shopping centres) and campsites and other recreational areas intended to accommodate more than
50 persons for several consecutive days.
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA): For a given installation, the characteristic accident scenarios will be formulated,
the probabilities estimated, the effects worked out and the consequences of the effects quantified. The individual
risk will be calculated using this information. By estimating how many persons will be present in the vicinity and
for how long, within a range whereby 1% mortality could still be caused by an accident, it is possible to calculate
the societal risk.
2.4.4 Investigation of the risks
2.4.4.1 When and how must the risks in question be investigated?
Gasunie draws a distinction between the following situations in which risks must be investigated:
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1. Where the installation falls within the Major Accident Decree (BRZO ’99), thus also being covered by the scope
of the External Safety (Establishments) Decree (BEVI). This relates to all the establishments in Table 1 Paragraph
1.1 that have a volume of more than 50 tonnes. A QRA must be prepared for these installations.
2. If the permit holder or the competent authority suspects that, by reason of a new installation or new Land-Use
Plan, a substantial risk exists in the vicinity of an existing installation. The competent authorities considers that
a substantial risk is a risk is whereby the statutory norm value for the individual risk beyond the installation
boundary is exceeded, and/or that the societal risk is greater than 0.1 times the guideline value set by the government. These are all the stations connected to the gas transport network that have a delivery pipeline of at least 20
inches. A QRA must be prepared (in principle) for these installations. For installations with a delivery pipeline
that is smaller than 20 inches, only an investigation of the societal risk will be necessary.
3. The installation falls within the definition of a catagorial installation. In such a situation, for this group of
installations, a standard QRA must be prepared beforehand, and compliance with the risk norms must already
have taken place.
2.4.4.2 QRA investigation
In order to carry out a QRA, Gasunie uses a standard calculation method associated with the Risk Quantification
Manual issued by the authorities. The accident scenarios that must be calculated for will depend on the nature of
the installation.*8
The policy is designed to ensure that, within a relevant zone that might be outside the installation with a higher
individual risk than the limit value, no vulnerable dwellings are present. In this zone, only dwellings with limited
vulnerability may be present, if the situation continues to obtain after all the interests involved have been carefully
considered.
The societal risk that has been quantified will, in theory, extend to the area that is bordered by the intervening area
in which 1% of lethal harm is estimated to obtain. Measures will normally have to be introduced if the guideline
value for societal risk is exceeded. Since house-building in the affected area contributes to societal risk (in locations
that are much nearer than those where the 1% mortality contour is situated), there will be no further significant
contribution to societal risk. A practical location for this would be that of the 35 KW/m2 heat radiation contour.
2.4.5 Dealing with the various interests involved
Apart from the legal obligation to comply with the limit value of the individual risk, this means no vulnerable
dwellings within the 10-6 per year individual risk contour, the competent authorities will assess external safety in
two parts:
1. Assessment of dwellings with limited vulnerability within the zone with a higher risk level than the norm value
for individual risk (the so-called 10-6 contour).
2. The societal risk. If there is a societal risk, it will be essential to obtained advice from the fire department. Their
policy will generally relate to keep objects with a high level of vulnerability, such as flats for the elderly and
hospitals further away from the installations in question.
In the assessment of the competent authority, two types of interests will normally be leading: interests in the context of Spatial Planning and interests in the context of External Safety.**9
* Before the calculations are done, it is recommended that the scenarios that have been selected and the models used, as well as
the data, be discussed with the competent authorities, and that the RIVM be called in to act as arbiter if a dispute arises.
** In the future, local authorities will define their policies in an ‘Environmental Perspectives’ document. Naturally, in this connection, they may be expected to adopt a consistent viewpoint.
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3 VBS elements
In the light of the seven elements that are of significance for the Safety Management System (VBS), as mentioned
in BRZO ’99, the following policy starting points are relevant.
3.1 Organisation and staff
In order to guarantee the safety of its own staff and that of third parties, Gasunie implements the policy of defining
and setting down in manuals the necessary specific functions, responsibilities and competences with regard to
safety within the organisational structure. Communications between executive officials and the departments, and
the training of the personnel, will be organised by this means. Through advice, training, assessment, remuneration
and the provision of the resources required, responsible conduct in relation to safety, health and the environment
will be promoted. The following are examples of the manuals concerned:
Emergency Control Manual
Central Commando Post Manual
Human Resource Management Manual
Operations Manual for the establishment
Company Emergency Plan for the establishment
Training Courses
Company Emergency Response Team
3.2 Identification of hazards and assessment of risks
An extensive knowledge and understanding of the hazards that are present is essential if the company’s work is to
be accomplished safely. Inter alia, health and safety-related risks that are relevant for Gasunie personnel are described in the Risk Inventory and Evaluation (RI&E) that must be prepared regularly. Gasunie’s policy is designed to
ensure that risks that are inherent in its activities are identified and, where possible, eliminated and/or minimised
as far as possible. Because Gasunie primarily uses proven techniques and technologies, and documents them in the
Gasunie Technical Standards, the hazard identification factor is incorporated into these norms. For each project, the
MOC (Management of Change) procedure is completed. If necessary, a risk study in addition to a HAZOP, FMEA or
FMECA will form part of this.
One must highlight the low probability of risks with serious effects, such as the risks that can arise in installations
in which large quantities of hazardous substances are handled. In such situations, what comes into play is the set
of problems described in this PBZO. As far as occupational risks are concerned, the latter must be recorded by a
multi-disciplinary team using the SWIFT method (Structured What-If Technique), which has proven itself in the
past. Staff within the establishment, itself, will be closely involved in such investigations. The risks will be assessed
on the basis of the risk matrix and, as necessary, adequate measures will be introduced in order to render the risk
acceptable.
As regards external safety risks (risks affecting citizens), the risk will be determined on the basis of either a generally
applicable or a specific quantitative risk analysis (QRA) and, as necessary, adequate measure will also be introduced
in order to make the risk acceptable (or at least comply with the risk norms laid down by the authorities).
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3.3 Managing the company’s work
Gasunie’s policy is designed to ensure that work only commences if foreseeable health and safety and environmental risks have been made known and rendered manageable.
Both technical and organisational administrative measures will guarantee that work is carried out properly. To do
this Gasunie uses a number of measures with the aim to implement this policy. The latter are as follows:
Drawing up of Risk Inventory and Evaluation (RIE)
Planning for construction safety
Work permits (including the conducting of task risk analyses)
Toolbox meetings
Physical supervision
Task risk analyses
3.4 Changes
The risk associated with changes that are implemented without being thought through is recognised explicitly
within Gasunie. Therefore, it is not permissible to make changes to or build new structures for the installation that
might affect its technical integrity without prior approval having been given by the Technical Safety Department
(TV).
The processes whereby Gasunie should deal with changes of this nature are prescribed by the Management of
Change (MOC) procedure. The decision as to whether or not to conduct a safety study forms part of this procedure.
For projects that Gasunie is intending to complete, a step-by-step plan concerning the MOC procedure will form part
of the function project specification that must be drawn up in advance of the project.
3.5 Planning for emergency situations
Despite the measures that are introduced to safeguard the sustainable integrity of the transport system, it can
never be ruled out that an unintended event, such as an emergency, will nevertheless arise. The policy is designed
to ensure that Gasunie is prepared for any emergency situation both in an organisational and in a technical sense.
The realisation of this policy is governed by the following manuals:
CCP Manual
Emergency Control Manual
Company Emergency Response Plans
Procedures relating to emergency situations are tested regularly for effectiveness, in exercises carried out in conjunction with, for example, the external emergency services and, if necessary, procedures will be altered.
3.6 Monitoring of performance levels
In its policy, Gasunie defines specific objectives relating to safety. So that it can verify whether or not work is being
carried out safely enough, it monitors the realisation of these objectives constantly. This is achieved, for example,
through regular inspections and the management control systems of the various departments, the purpose of which
is to monitor maintenance. An incident management system is used to enable lessons to be derived from incidents
and near-misses.
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3.7 Audits and assessment
With a view to evaluating the effectiveness and soundness of the Safety Management System and the PBZO, Gasunie undertakes the following procedures:
Every year, an external audit is carried out for the certification of the Environment Management System
(ISO 14001).
Every year, an internal evaluation is carried out of the PBZO and the VBS elements included in it.
The PBZO document and all the VBS elements, as mentioned in the CPR-20 (PGS 6) (BRZO ’99 Information
Requirements Report), constitute one of the points dealt with in the audit of the entire VGM policy that is
carried out every 3 years. A report of the audit is prepared, and this will give a complete picture of the audit
findings, stating who is responsible for any deviations, and incorporate the points of conformity and an action
plan.
For each incident, a detailed analysis will take place. A number of potential severe incidents will be dealt with
by the Safety Committee. Every year, a trend analysis will be prepared of the incidents that have been recorded.
Every year, an analysis will be prepared of the incidents that have been recorded.
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4 Gasunie Technical Standards
An important part of the Severe Accident Prevention Policy is the compulsory use of the technical operating norms
that have come into being during the years in which the company has acquired its expertise. As has already been
noted in Paragraph 1.3., all the installations that are being operated at the present time underwent extensive checks
during their design phase in the light of these operating norms, the so-called Gasunie Technical Standards, which are
also growing in number continuously as knowledge and experience increase. New installations and modifications
are designed in compliance with these Gasunie Technical Standards. During the design process, HAZOP or other
safety studies will also take place. Because the type of equipment/installations used by Gasunie are very similar to
each other, as are the various hazardous substances that are handled, the Gasunie Technical Standards provide a
detailed basis for the Severe Accident Prevention Policy. Gasunie Technical Standards are accordingly applied as a
top priority, and one can only deviate from them with good reason.
4.1 Gasunie Policy
Within the framework of agreements made concerning performance and the security of supply of (parts of) the gas
transmission system, the policy objective for the Standardisation Process is the development and maintaining of
unambiguous regulations (rules, drawings, specifications etc.), the aim of which is to ensure that, within Gasunie,
routine technical activities are carried on safely, uniformly, effectively and efficiently, and that risks can demonstrably be kept at the right level. Here, the starting points are national (NEN), European (EN) and global (ISO) standards
as well as the standards of the supplier in question. In many instances, the Gasunie Technical Standards supplement,
or provide a more detailed elaboration of technical regulations that are accepted nationally and internationally, rules
imposed by the authorities or norms laid down by them.
In addition, Gasunie Technical Standards form the basis for the ordering of parts when they are replaced during
regular maintenance.
Compliance with the GTS rules is mandatory. Deviations are possible, but there must be good reason for them and
they must be documented and approved.
4.2 Description of the GTSs
The GTS system comprises a scheme of operating standards including specifications, standard drawings and formulae for the designing, construction and aftercare of NV Nederlandse Gasunie’s gas transmission system. It is a modular system in which the modules each relate to a particular phase in its “lifecycle”. In all, it covers approximately:
180 specifications, 1100 standard drawings and 170 forms. As far as possible, reference is made to international,
European and national standards.
The safety and environmental requirements that apply to design, construction and aftercare are specified in greater
detail in the Gasunie Technical Standards in connection with the operation-specific situation. The following are
examples of this:
CSA-38-N Safety and environmental management at construction sites.
OSA-04-N Safety Distances.
OSA-06-N Explosion Safety (e.g. ATEX Directives).
OSA-07-N Instructions regarding emergency stop systems.
OSA-08-N Pressure regulating.
OSA-12-N Fire prevention and safety equipment.
OSA-17-N Safety devices and monitoring of stations and objects.
A full overview of GTS documents is given in the Index, “Current GTS Documents”, which can be found on the
Intranet.
4.3 Elaboration of Gasunie Technical Standards
The Gasunie Technical Standards are developed by working parties in which the relevant specialist disciplines are
represented. In the case of issues relating to health, safety and environment, it is necessary to obtain mandatory
advice from the Technical Safety Department. When GTS documents are drawn up, the following factors will be
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incorporated: safety, environment, reliability, maintenance capability and costs. The working party’s draft will go
through a “comments” procedure. This procedure is comparable with the modus operandi that is followed when
European and national norms are being developed.
4.4 Management of Gasunie Technical Standards
The GTS documents are evaluated regularly (every 5 years), and amended if necessary. GTS documents can also be
changed if legislation or international or national standards change. Every six months, the references in the Gasunie
Technical Standards are compared with a body of national and international standards. The organisation and the
suppliers will also make suggestions as to how the Gasunie Technical Standards should be changed.
4.5 Deviations from Gasunie Technical Standards
As has been mentioned under 2, compliance with the GTSs is mandatory. Deviations are possible, but there must
be good reason for them and they must be documented and approved. This can be done through an entry in the
so-called function and/or project specification, or through the submission of a request for a deviation. Such deviations must be approved by the head of the specialist discipline involved. In the case of issues relating to health and
safety and environment, it is necessary to obtain mandatory advice from the Technical Safety Department (see MOC
procedure).
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5 Risk assessment
In risk assessment, there are two lines of approach: that of occupational and that of external safety.
The implications of occupational and external safety are assessed, here, with differentiation.
For the assessment of occupational (risks affecting staff) and external safety (risks affecting persons living in the
vicinity), Gasunie uses a (single) risk matrix.
For the most part, the way in which the risks relating to potential accident scenarios are assessed follows the policy
of the authorities (for occupational safety, the risks affecting staff, and for external safety, societal risk). Gasunie
considers itself to be very much responsible for the risks affecting staff, whereas the degree of societal risk is largely
determined, in practice, by the nature of the structures that have been built on the land surrounding an installation.
Probability
The matrix must be used as a tool for risk assessment. With the risk matrix, it is possible objectively to classify the
probability and potential consequences of accident scenarios that have been identified, and thus to assess the risk
in question.
5
2
1
1
1
1
4
3
2
1
1
1
3
4
3
2
1
1
2
4
4
3
2
1
1
4
4
4
3
2
A
B
C
D
E
Consequences
The criteria Gasunie has devised to enable it to assess risks are set out in the table below.
15
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Category Risk assessment
1
Not acceptable; to be brought back to at least Level 3 directly, through measures in design and operations (risk study
required). A decision to retain a Category 1 situation can only be made with the consent of the Management and
the Employee Council.
2
Not advisable; within a reasonable period of time (3 to 6 months), risk-reducing measures must be introduced until
at least Level 3 is achieved and, in the short term, an Action Plan must be drawn up (risk study required). A decision
to retain a Category 2 situation can only be made with the consent of the Construction and Maintenance Unit Manager.
3
Acceptable; applying ALARA (including risk-identification study) and on condition that safety performance monitoring and a regular evaluation of the LODs are conducted.
4
Acceptable without further conditions.
During the regular systematic recording of hazards (SWIFT analysis), for each scenario that is analysed, the residual
risk must be stated. During the VR audit, an assessment will be carried out to ascertain compliance with the measures that are required as a minimum.
The probability and consequences are estimated using the instructions below.
The consequences of an accident are allocated a type and classified in one of 5 categories (A to E), denoting increasing severity. The probability that an accident will occur is classified in one of 5 categories (1 to 5), denoting
increasing probability.
Consequences
Category
Type category
Safety-at-work
External Safety
A
Minor
No lost time
Casualties
B
Moderate
Lost time
Very serious casualties
C
Serious
Serious casualty
1 to 10 fatalities
D
Very serious
Death/permanent disablement of a maximum of 1
Dozens of fatalities
E
Catastrophic
Several fatalities
person
Hundreds of fatalities
Probability
Category
Type category
Estimated quantitative probability
1
Very unlikely
P < 10-6
2
Unlikely
10-4 > P > 10-6
3
Very low probability
10-2 > P >10-4
4
Low probability
1 > P > 10-2
5
High probability
P>1
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5.1 Risks associated with the Gasunie establishments
An overview of the risks relating to hazardous substances (as in BRZO ’99) is given in the table below.
no Instal-
Sub-System
Accident type
lation
Probability Safety-at-work
External Safety
type cate-
Effect type
Potential
Risk
Effect type Potential Risk
gory
category
effect
cate-
category
effect
Moderate
Lost time
3
Minor
Serious
gory
1
gory
Pipeline
Leakage above Very small
sor station
system at
ground, dis-
casual-
Blending
the estab-
persal
ties
station
lishment
Com-pres-
1.1
cate-
4
gas flash fire
Leakage
Unlikely
Moderate
Lost time
4
Catastro-
Very unli-
Catas-
Several
2
phic failure,
kely
trophic
fatalities
n/a
n/a
n/a
Very
Dozens of 3
serious
fatalities
under-ground,
dispersal gas
flash fire
possible
dispersal, gas
flash fire
1.2
Com-pres-
Leakage
sor casing
followed by
Very small
Moderate
Lost time
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
Unlikely
Serious
Serious
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
4
n/a
n/a
n/a
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
explosion, fire
1.3
Com-pres-
Leakage, fire
sor hall
2
Nitrogen
2.1
casualty
Fittings,
Small leakage, Very small
instal-
liquid
efflux of ni-
lation
nitrogen
trogen, cryoge-
Nitrogen
Complete fai-
tank
lure, cryogenic unlikely
Minor
No lost
time
nic effects
2.2
Very
Very
Death or
serious
permanent
effects and
disable-
oxygen sup-
ment of
pression
max. 1
person
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no Instal-
Sub-System
lation
Accident type
Probabi-
Safety-at-work
(scenario)
lity type
Effect type
Potential
Risk
Effect type Potential Risk
External Safety
category
category
effect
cate-
category
effect
cate-
4
n/a
n/a
n/a
2
Serious
Fatal-
3
gory
3
LNG instal- 3.1
Fittings,
Small leakage, Very small
lation
liquefied
efflux of
me-thane
methane, cryo-
Minor
No lost
gory
time
genic effects,
fire
3.2
Storage
Complete
Very
Catas-
Fatal-ities
tanks
failure, cryo-
unlikely
trophic
and casual-
ities and
ties
casual-
genic effects,
4
Compres-
4.1
Transfer of
dispersal, flash
ties poss-
fire, fire
ible
Rupture in the Unlikely
Serious
Serious
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
3
Minor
Serious
4
casualty
sor station
natural gas flexible suction
Blending
conden-
pipe, water
station
sate
fire, explosion
LNG instal- 4.2
Leakage
Failure fitting, Unlikely
lation
fitting,
water fire
Serious
Serious
casualty
natural gas
condensate tank
Catastro-phic
Very unli-
Very seri-
Death or
failure, water
kely
ous.
permanent
casual-
disable-
ties
fire, explosion
ment of
max. 1
person
Small leakage
Very small
Moderate
Lost time
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
fitting,
water fire
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The risks are shown in the following table for each installation or installation type.
The numbers in the table refer to the numbers that have been used in the ‘Sub-System’ column in the previous table.
Installation
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.1
2.2
3.1
3.2
Pipeline
Com-
Com-
Fittings,
N2
Fittings,
CH4 Transfer of
4.1
system at
pressor
pres-
N2 storage tank CH4 storage tank natural gas
the estab-
casing
sor hall
4.2
Fitting,
natural gas
condensate condensate
tank
lishment
LNG Maasvlakte
X
X
X
X
X
Ommen
X
X
X
X
X
Wieringermeer
X
X
Ravenstein
X
X
Beverwijk
X
Zweekhorst
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Oldeboorn
X
X
X
X
X
Spijk
X
X
X
X
X
Kootstertille
X
X
X
Schinnen
X
X
X
X
X
Alphen
X
X
X
X
X
Blending stations
X
X
X
Export stations
X
X
X
Reducer stations
X
X
X
CS
X
X
X
Gas delivery stations
X
Injection stations
X
Valve stations
X
Anna Paulowna
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Grijpskerk
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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6 Implementation of the PBZO within Gasunie
As has indeed been stated already, the Board of Directors is responsible for drafting and approving a General Gasunie Policy. The Gasunie VG&M Policy forms an important part of this General Gasunie Policy. The VG&M Policy
has been set down in the Functional Manual on Safety and Environment. On the basis of the General Gasunie Policy,
each unit must formulate its own unit policy and arrange for it to be approved. Each unit’s policy must comply with
at least the General Gasunie Policy. This policy will be set down in the Functional Manuals of each unit.
Inter alia, the operating activities carried on by the TA (Technical Asset Management) Unit involve its ensuring, in
its capacity as the owner of N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie’s infrastructure, that this infrastructure is designed and operated safely, soundly and economically.
The completion of (construction) projects is the responsibility of the TN (Technical Construction & Renovation)
Unit.
Inter alia, the operating activities carried on by the TO (Technical Operation) Unit consist in the operational management and control of Gasunie’s infrastructure.
The TV (Technical Safety) Department is responsible for assessing technical safety, explosion safety and safety-atwork within Gasunie.
The operating activities of the TA and TN Units, and those of the TO Unit, will be carried on in accordance with the
current PBZO and the applicable rules and procedures laid down by N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie; this policy is developed and monitored by the TV (Technical Safety) Unit. In this connection, the TV Unit also has specific responsibility
for the policy relating to the intrinsic safety of the gas transmission system.
The guaranteeing of the “licence to operate” for the infrastructure is a task that is shared by the TA and TO Units;
in this regard, responsibility rests with the TA Unit. In relation to safety, TA is responsible for the intrinsic safety
of the infrastructure (design starting points, designing and conformity with the provisions of law and regulations).
Because of the level of intrinsic safety that obtains, no unsafe situation should arise as a result of the operation and
management of the infrastructure. The TO Unit is responsible for operational safety (maintaining soundness and
safety, as well as employing safe working methods).
It is the responsibility of T Unit to learn from unintended events that occur both within Gasunie’s own installations
and within other similar installations (nationally and internationally).
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7 Publishing the Severe Accident Prevention Policy
Every Gasunie employee who works at an establishment falling within BRZO ’99 must keep themselves up-to-date
as to the objectives and principles that have been explained in this document. Therefore, all TA and TO Unit Managers are expected to keep the staff who report to them informed about these objectives and principles, and to ensure
that they have a good understanding of the Policy, and how to implement and act upon it.
Groningen, 5 June 2007
Mr. M. P. Kramer
Chairman of the Board of Directors
and CEO, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie
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Colophon
Design
Corporate Service Centre
N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Groningen
Publishing
P.O. Box 181
9700 AD Groningen
The Netherlands
Telephone +31 50 521 22 55
Fax +31 50 521 19 15
E-mail: info@gastransport.nl
Internet: www.gastransportservices.com
GTS has published a Dutch version of this Quality and Capacity Document to fulfil its obligation according to article
8 of the Dutch Gas Act. This English translation is published for convenience purposes only, the Dutch version shall
prevail in case of any differences. GTS assumes no responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the translation,
nor is any liability whatsoever accepted for any mistakes or omissions herein.
22
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Transcription

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