Route Clearance Company Leader`s Handbook

Transcription

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
Route Clearance Company
Leader’s Handbook
ANA 3-34.220
This is a draft document and should not be considered doctrine until approved by the Ministry of
Defense.
ANA 3-34.220 (Interim Draft)
Route Clearance Company Leader’s Handbook
Introduction
The Route Clearance Company represents an improved capability for the Afghan
National Army in finding and defeating Improvised Explosive Devices employed on or along
routes. The route clearance company mission is to conduct route reconnaissance and clearance
to detect, investigate, mark, report and neutralize explosive hazards and other obstacles along
defined routes within the corps boundaries to enable assured mobility for the maneuver
commander. Because Afghanistan is in a state of badly needed recovery and in the throes of
fighting counter-insurgency, the route clearance company provides vital service to the civil
populace by removing potential hazards. Doing so garners popular support for the government
and blunts the effect of one of the insurgent‘s most powerful weapons. Safe passage between
villages means better commerce, access to better medical and economic facilities as well as
access to family throughout the provinces. Once major conflict has subsided, route clearance
companies can use many of the same skills and techniques in an area clearance role which will
benefit Afghanistan well into the future. Commanders at all levels from the Corp down to
Company must understand that the route clearance company and it‘s route clearance platoons are
not stand-alone route clearance capable. They must be employed as part of a combined-arms
route clearance team to be effective.
This manual will explain in detail the fundamentals of route clearance in the Afghan
National Army and how to properly task organize for route clearance operations. It will further
describe the roles and responsibilities of each key person in the route clearance company
organization, as well as, the roles and responsibilities of the higher headquarters they will work
for.
This manual will also describe the combined-arms approach to route clearance operations
to include task organization, team roles and responsibilities, command and control, and
reporting. This manual will lay out the fundamentals of route clearance under the established
framework of breaching tenants and fundamentals.
Finally, this manual will address the fundamentals of Improvised Explosive Device
defeat at the tactical level. It will include scanning techniques, actions on contact with possible
Improvised Explosive Devices, identification of Improvised Explosive Device indicators, cordon
procedures, and reduction methods, render safe procedures, and route sanitation.
While the introduction of the route clearance company into the Afghan National Army is
a significant step in the right direction for providing force commanders a route clearance
capability, the critical importance of proper training and support for the route clearance company
and platoons cannot be understated.
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Table of Contents
1. Organization
1-1.
Personnel…………………………………………………………………6
1-2.
Roles of Key Personnel…………………………………………………..6
1-3.
Equipment………………………………………………………….……10
1-4.
Capabilities and Limitations…………………………………………….11
2. Mission
2-1.
Mission…………………………………………………….…..…………14
2-2.
Mission Essential Tasks……………………………………..….………..14
2-3.
Methods of Clearance…………………………….……….…….……….17
2-4.
Route Clearance Techniques……………………………………..………19
2-5.
Route Clearance Planning………………………………………………..20
2-6.
Predictive Intelligence………………………………..………...……….21
2-7.
Explosive Hazard Indicators……………………………………………..21
2-8.
Ambushes………………………………………………………………22
2-9.
Battlefield Operating System Planning Considerations…………………22
2-10.
Battlefield Operating System Techniques/Procedures…………………..23
2-11.
Task Organization……………………………………………………….25
2-12.
The EOD Mission………………………………………………………..27
3. Threat
3-1.
The Proliferation of IEDs Afghanistan…………………………………31
3-2.
Threat Tactics…………………………………………………………..32
3-3.
Device Placement……………………………………………………….36
3-4.
Secondary Devices………………………………………………………37
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3-5.
Explosive Main Charge…………………………….……………………37
3-6.
Home-Made-Explosives……………………………...………………….37
3-7.
Threat Motivation and Construct………………………………………...38
4. Logistics
4-1.
Logistics………………………………………………………………..44
4-2.
Classes of Supply………………………………………………………44
4-3.
Unit Resupply Techniques……………………………………………..48
5. Command and control
5-1.
Command and Support Relationships……………………………………51
5-2.
Command Relationships…………………………………………………51
5-3.
Support Relationships……………………………………………………51
5-4.
Troop Leading Procedures……………………………………………….51
6. Communication
6-1.
Communication………………………………………………………….55
6-2.
Arm-And-Hand Signals and Pyrotechnics………………………………56
6-3.
Local Telephones………………………………………………………...61
7. Navigation
7-1.
Navigation Equipment and Methods…………………………………….63
7-2.
Types of Compasses……………………………………………………..63
7-3.
Mounted Land Navigation……………………………………………….66
7-4.
Global Positioning System………………………………………………68
Appendix A.
Sweep Team Operation………………………………………….73
Appendix B.
Calls for Fire…………………………………………………….83
Appendix C.
Medical Evacuation……………………………………………..89
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Appendix D.
Reports…………………………………………………………95
Appendix E.
Movement……………………………………………………105
Appendix F.
Route Clearance Equipment…………………………………113
Appendix G.
PCC/PCI Checklist…………………………………………..122
Appendix H.
Weapons Data……………………………………………….127
Appendix I.
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization…………131
GLOSSARY……………………………………………………………………...136
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………142
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Chapter 1 Organization
ANA Route Clearance Company Organization
RC
RC
RC
RC
Figure 1-1 Route Clearance Company Organization
1-1.
Personnel. The Afghan National Army route clearance company has a total of 81
personnel assigned. The company is organized into 3 three route clearance platoons, a
headquarters section and a maintenance section. Each route clearance platoon consists of
22 personnel. They are further organized into a platoon headquarters, two engineer
squads and an Explosive Ordinance Disposal team. The organization chart in figure 1
shows the task organization of a standard ANA route clearance company.
1-2.
Roles of Key Personnel.
a. The company commander is the senior leader of the route clearance
company. He advises the brigade commander on the employment of engineer
route clearance assets. The route clearance company commander has dual
responsibilities as both a commander and special staff officer. He is the
primary engineer advisor to the brigade commander on route clearance. He is
responsible for all route clearance missions within the brigade‘s area of
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operations. He provides the purpose, direction, and motivation necessary for
his company to accomplish the mission. His leadership is normally vital to
the route clearance company‘s command and control. The company
commander is ultimately responsible for:
 Providing Route Clearance and IED Defeat expertise to the BDE Staff
during the execution of Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Field and
during execution of the Military Decision Making Process
 Writing the company operations order that supports the maneuver
commander‘s intent and concept of the operation and the brigade‘s
engineer annex.
 Providing mission-oriented command and control to his route clearance
company.
 Supervising the execution of his units‘ route clearance support within the
supported unit areas.
 Advising the supported commander and staff on the proper employment of
route clearance assets and support requirements based on priority of effort.
 Planning, preparing, executing and evaluating the training of the Company
b. The company Executive officer is second in command of the route clearance
company and must be ready to assume command. He is primarily responsible
for tracking current operations with the assistance of his operations sergeant.
He coordinates route clearance missions with the Corp staff and ensures route
clearance assets are properly task organized for success. His responsibilities
include—
 Receiving and consolidating unit and mission reports from the platoons
and submitting them to the Corp tactical operations center and the
company commander, as required.
 Ensuring that pre combat inspections are complete throughout the
company.
 Planning and coordinating all logistical support with the support kandak
and other agencies outside the company.
 Preparing or assisting in the preparation of the company operations order,
specifically focusing on paragraph 4.
 Coordinating with higher, adjacent, and supporting units. This function is
vital when the company receives support from other units (equipment,
maintenance, or medical assets) or other engineers.
 Coordinating training resources
c. The company first sergeant is the senior enlisted soldier in the company. He
advises the company commander on all enlisted matters. He also provides
necessary logistic coordination for the company. The company first sergeant
is the senior enlisted trainer and is responsible for ensuring individual training
is completed to standard. He supervises the platoon sergeants in the
preparation for missions prior to the company commander‘s pre-combat
inspection. His responsibilities include:
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









Being involved early in the planning process to provide quality control in
the execution of engineer missions and the logistics operations to support
them.
Checking on the welfare of the soldier, as a second set of eyes for the
commander.
Enforcing the tactical standing operating procedures.
Planning and coordinating individual training.
Coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions.
Supervising supply, maintenance, communications, field hygiene, and
medical evacuation (medical evacuation) operations.
Ensuring that combat service support priorities are requisitioned and
replenished.
Monitoring logistics status and submitting reports to the company
executive officer and the brigade command post, as required.
Supervising, inspecting, and observing matters the commander designates.
He may observe and report on the status of obstacles and mobility within
the company‘s area of operation.
Assisting and coordinating with the executive officer. He should also be
prepared to assume the executive officer‘s duties, as required.
d. The Route Clearance Platoon leader is the senior leader of the route
clearance platoon. He is responsible for planning, preparing, rehearsing and
execution of route clearance missions. He reports platoon activity to the
executive officer and to the supported unit commander.
e. The Route Clearance Platoon sergeant is the senior enlisted member of the
platoon. He is second in command and must be prepared to assume command
of the platoon in the absence of the platoon leader. He is responsible for
coordinating all logistical support to the platoon. He is the senior enlisted
trainer and responsible for training individual tasks and platoon collective
tasks.
f. Squad leader is responsible to lead his squad as part of platoon collective
tasks and missions. He is responsible for the individual training of all squad
members. He reports to the platoon leader for missions and to the platoon
sergeant for training and logistic maters.
g. Explosive Ordinance Disposal team chief is the senior explosive ordinance
disposal expert in the platoon. He is responsible to train the EOD team in
render safe techniques.
h. Explosive Ordinance Disposal technician assists the explosive ordinance
disposal team chief in render safe operations.
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i. Maintenance and Recovery section provides limited recovery and
maintenance support to the route clearance company.
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1-3.
Equipment
The route clearance company is equipped with 17 M1151 Up-armored HMMWVs, 2
cargo HMMWVs, and a wheeled wrecker. Platoons are outfitted with AN-PSS/14 Mine
detectors and specialized explosive ordinance disposal equipment that enables them to detect,
and neutralize explosive hazards along routes. Figure 1-3 shows the basic mounted configuration
for a route clearance company.
a. Each vehicle in the platoon is equipped with electronic countermeasure, FM and
HF radio communication equipment and either a .50 caliber M-2 or M240B
7.62MM Machinegun on a top-mounted gun turret. Additionally, each vehicle
has an electronic warfare system to protect from radio controlled IEDs. The
current system is the SYMPHONY. One vehicle in each platoon is equipped with
a mine-roller. The mine-roller is designed to help detect and defeat pressure
activated IEDs and provide the crew limited standoff. CAUTION: Once the
enemy determines the standoff distance they can easily space the trigger and
explosives for a direct hit on the vehicle. Effort must be made to vary routines
and TTPs to avoid enemy counter tactics.
b. Although the route clearance platoon is comprised of engineers and EOD soldiers
they function much like any other mounted Afghan Army element while moving
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from one mission location to the next. To best perform their route clearance tasks
they must operate dismounted.
1-4.
Capabilities and Limitations
a. Route clearance companies represent an afghan national army capability to defeat
the current explosive hazard threat in Afghanistan. While this organization is a
significant step in the right direction, it must also be understood by commanders
and staff that this capability must be appropriately allocated to missions using the
MDMP and IPB process to ensure proper match of resources to task.
b. Each Route Clearance Company has three route clearance platoons and one
maintenance and recovery team. With current equipment and manning, a single
Route Clearance Company can support one to three route clearance operations.
However, maintenance and recovery assets can only service one platoon at a time.
Each Route Clearance Platoon is capable of scanning 15-20 Km of road
mounted or clearing 1-3Km of road dismounted per day.
NOTE: It is important for commanders and staff to realize that a route
clearance company has no capability to conduct mounted route clearance. They can
conduct mounted scan as any other mounted unit.
c. Each route clearance platoon has an explosive ordinance disposal team consisting
of three personnel. The explosive ordinance disposal team represents the only
neutralization capability in the platoon and enables the platoon to conduct
neutralization and render safe operations. This explosive ordinance team must be
considered a critical pacing item in the company organization. Each explosive
ordinance disposal team is equipped with a vehicle, robot, bomb suits and
explosive ordinance disposal kit. The skill level of the team determines the level
of neutralization capability the platoon possesses.
d. As previously mentioned, the Tashkil for the route clearance company currently
lists no specialized route clearance equipment that enables mounted detection of
explosive hazards. Therefore, route a clearance company can only perform
dismounted route clearance operations with a high degree of success. Like any
other mounted unit the route clearance company or platoon can scan for and react
to explosive hazard indicators. The mounted scan must be done at reduced speeds
to allow a reasonable chance of visual detection. Additionally, the company
maintenance and recovery team has one wrecker and can only support one platoon
at a time.
e. Route clearance companies and platoons are not stand-alone route clearance
capable. They rely heavily on a task organization that includes infantry, military
police, and medical, recovery, and fire support assets. The mission of route
clearance should be assigned to a maneuver commander based on the
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commander‘s priorities. Commanders and staff must clearly define priorities of
effort in their area of operations and focus route clearance assets to those areas
most critical to mission accomplishment. Once given the mission of route
clearance in a specific area, route clearance assets are assigned to maneuver units
for the duration of that mission. Task organization for route clearance operations
will be discussed in detail later.
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Mission
2-1.
Mission: On order, route clearance companies conduct route reconnaissance and
clearance to detect, investigate, mark, report, and neutralize explosive hazards and other
obstacles along defined routes within Corps boundaries to enable assured mobility for the
maneuver commander. This is the reason for being of the route clearance company. In
order to maximize the capabilities of the Afghan National Army route clearance company
the concept of route clearance needs to be discussed in detail.
2-2.
Mission Essential Tasks: Battle focus drives the Mission Essential Task List
(METL) development process. The METL is based on the wartime mission; the unit must
train as it plans to fight. Commanders develop METLs because units cannot obtain
proficiency on every possible task. The METL development process allows the
commander to narrow the training requirements to an achievable number.
a. Mission Essential Tasks: The route clearance company has six mission essential
tasks. They are listed below:
i. Route Reconnaissance and clearance
ii. Clear obstacles using demolitions
iii. Conduct Minesweeping Operations
iv. Clear obstacles with engineer (counter-mine) equipment
v. Conduct deliberate route reconnaissance
vi. Conduct engineer reconnaissance
b. Route reconnaissance and clearance is a key task to the mission of providing
mobility support to the commander. This task is what the route clearance
company is designed to do.
c. Clearing obstacles using demolitions or engineer counter-mine equipment clearly
support route clearance but can also apply to breaching operations should the
situation dictate.
d. Conducting minesweeping operations can be done on a route or in a designated
area. Although the route clearance company will focus on routes the techniques
can also be used in support of area clearance operations should the commander
determine this to be of higher importance to mission accomplishment.
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e. Conducting deliberate route reconnaissance and engineer reconnaissance are both
highly technical and time consuming. They are essential in providing intelligence
about a specific route or infrastructure. The data captured on these missions can
assist many operations. Local commanders use the data for immediate tactical
decisions and the local or national governments use the data to assess growth and
stabilization needs of the province or entire country.
f. Each mission essential task is comprised of sub-tasks and battle/crew drills. All
supporting battle/crew drills can be found in ANA 5-Drill. The key for the
leadership is to select those supporting tasks that impact the most essential tasks.
For instance troop leading procedures will impact all tasks where as determination
of a slope will only impact a few. Table 4-1 shows an example of essential tasks
and subordinate or supporting tasks.
Mission Essential Task
Route Reconnaissance and clearance
Clear obstacles using demolitions
Conduct Minesweeping Operations
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Supporting Tasks
Conduct Troop Leading Procedures
Conduct Pre-Combat Checks
Conduct Pre-Combat Inspections
Move Mounted
Move Dismounted
Call for and Adjust Indirect Fire
Evacuate a Casualty
Break Contact
React to an IED
React to Contact
Detect Mines with a Probe
Operate AN/PSS-12
Prime Explosives
Construct an Initiating System
Construct a Firing System (Electric)
Construct a Firing System (Non-Electric)
Prime Explosives
Clear a Lane Through a Minefield
Mark a Lane
Read a Map
Organize a Squad Size Sweep Team
Organize a Platoon Size Sweep Team
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Clear obstacles with engineer (countermine) equipment
Conduct deliberate route reconnaissance
Conduct engineer reconnaissance
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Prime Explosives
Clear a Lane Through a Minefield
Detect Mines with a Probe
Operate AN/PSS-12
Mark a Lane
Read a Map
React to an IED
React to Contact
Evacuate a Casualty
Operate Mine Roller
Prime Explosives
Operate M1151 HMMWV
React to an IED
React to Contact
Evacuate a Casualty
Move Mounted
Move Dismounted
Read a Map
Determine Radius of a Curve
Classify a Water Crossing
Classify a Ford
Determine Slope
Determine Stream Velocity
Determine a 6-digit Grid Coordinates
Determine an Azimuth
Move Mounted
Move Dismounted
Read a Map
Determine Radius of a Curve
Classify a Water Crossing
Classify a Ford
Determine Slope
Determine Stream Velocity
Determine a 6-digit Grid Coordinates
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Determine an Azimuth
Classify Engineer Equipment
Identify Engineer Resources
Table 4-1Example Mission Essential Tasks to Supporting Tasks Crosswalk
2-3.
Methods of clearance. There are three methods of route clearance – contiguous,
combat, and combined.
a. Contiguous clearance is a deliberate clearance of a route from a start point to an
end point. The Route Clearance Patrol proceeds along the designated route at a
deliberate pace, scanning, detecting, and clearing any explosive hazards or
obstacles. Although effective, it is not the most secure method in a high-threat
environment. It is also time-intensive and constrains the maneuver commander‘s
operation due to the pace of a deliberate clearance. The contiguous clearance
method is the primary method for initially clearing a route that has not been
recently cleared or when the sanitation phase has not been conducted. The
commander accepts risk based on the pace of the movement of the route clearance
patrol along the route.
b. Combat clearance focuses on specific named areas of interest. It is reliant on the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield process to produce event templates that
identify key clearance objectives for the route clearance patrol. These would
focus on the likely points of IED emplacement along the route. The route
clearance patrol will move at a hasty (15-20 kilometers per hour) pace between
named areas of interest. Upon encountering the named area of interest or any
suspect area, the sweep elements will then dismount and deliberately clear. When
the named areas of interest are cleared, the route is considered clear. The combat
method targets key IED hot spot locations which allow the most efficient use of
route clearance assets. The commander assumes risk along the hastily cleared
sections of the route, and must ensure that the route clearance patrols do not set
identifiable patterns during clearance operations.
c. The combined method is a combined arms operation where key points along the
route are secured and cleared ahead of a deliberate route clearance patrol. Once
the key named areas of interest are cleared, the Route clearance patrol clears the
entire route at either a hasty or deliberate pace. The named areas of interest
require overwatch during this operation – a manpower intensive activity. The
commander again assumes risk based on the route clearance patrol‘s rate of
movement.
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d. Each method can be conducted in either a deliberate or hasty manner. The
method is dependent on the commander‘s objectives and the elements of mission,
enemy, troops available, terrain, time available, and civil considerations. Below
is a chart that shows the different variations of clearance methods with some
advantages and disadvantages associated with each.
Tactic
Contiguous
(Hasty)
Description
―Drive-By‖
clearance using
all available
sensors – move
through route at
15-20
kilometers per
hour or less.
Advantages


Dismount
soldiers in an
inverted ―V‖ /

OP Barma
Contiguous

formation –
(Deliberate)
working with
supporting
vehicles to
identify ambush
sites and IED‘s
Combat
(Hasty)
Combat
Clear Key
named areas of
interest to
ensure passage
of friendly
forces. Once
named areas of
interest are
clear, route is
considered
clear
Occupy Key
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


Disadvantages
Rapidly clears large
areas with little force
commitment (clears
20 kilometers per
hour, 100 kilometers
per day)
Confirms/Denies
reconnaissance



High success rate
Gathers other route
related intelligence
leading to follow-on
operations

Intelligence driven,
targeted operation
leads to moderate
success.
Maximizes troop
economy, allowing a
completed clearance
of an area as large as
the intelligence
picture supports

Intelligence

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
Low percentage
of success
Easy pattern
development and
avoidance by the
enemy
Very slow
method of
clearing a route
(clears 3
kilometers per
hour – 15
kilometers per
day maximum)
Very High
Troop
Vulnerability
Intelligence
driven, targeted
operation
depends upon
good intelligence
Easily countered
once the enemy
understands the
pattern.
May demand a
(Deliberate) named areas of
interest and
ensure
clearance to
consider route
clear.


Combined
(Hasty)
Uses more than
one element to
clear key
named areas of
interest while
another does a
―Drive-By‖
contiguous
hasty clearance
Use multiple
elements to
occupy key
named areas of
Combined
interest while
(Deliberate)
others do a
dismounted
deliberate
clearance.

preparation of the
battlefield driven
operation with
moderate success
rate.
Can lead to
interdiction
operations verses
deterrence.
Leads to great
deterrence of
obstacle/IED
emplacement
Uses both force
economy and
intelligence
preparation of the
battlefield and
targeting to
maximum
effectiveness.






Outstanding rate of
success.
Demonstrates
friendly presence,
and will both deter
and interdict.

large troop
commitment for
a long route.
High risk
operation, may
either lead to
destruction of
IED cell or
catastrophic
―miss‖
Requires slightly
more troops (2
platoons
minimum)
May still project
a pattern for the
enemy to avoid
Requires a large
troop
commitment
Troop
vulnerability
mitigated, but
still moderate
risk.
2-4.
Route clearance techniques. With limited mechanical means at their disposal,
route clearance companies and platoons conduct route clearance using basic counter-IED
techniques typical to convoys. The route clearance platoon is the detection and
neutralization element of a route clearance patrol. The route clearance platoon moves
mounted along a specified route, detecting explosive devices by visual means, assisted by
optics. Upon encountering danger areas like culverts, choke points, template or obvious
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ambush sites, the route clearance platoon uses dismounted elements to deliberately clear
the areas while covered by a security element. Route clearance company dismounts play
the critical detection role in Afghan National Army route clearance operations. The tasks
include:
 Locating command wires and tracing them back to triggermen locations.
 Spotting poorly-camouflaged and sited IEDs
 Spotting hoax and secondary devices.
 Using mine detectors to conduct deliberate sweeps at targeted named areas
of interest.
 Using mine detectors to search for caches near IED sites
e. The critical reduction element is the EOD team within each route clearance
platoon. This asset represents the only organic neutralization element within the
route clearance company. Doctrine requires that commanders and staffs plan 50%
redundancy of detection and reduction assets. The commander assumes
tremendous risk without proper planning for redundancy of detection and
neutralization assets.
2-5.
Route clearance planning
a. Planning: A critical step in every military operation is the planning process.
Planning a route clearance mission is no exception. The primary planning tool for
the supported battalion or higher is the military decision making process. The
role of the route clearance company and platoon leadership is to assist their
supported maneuver commander in planning the operation with regard to their
role and capabilities. This should include:
i. Current unit strength
ii. Equipment mission capable
iii. Unit capabilities
iv. Levels of supply
b. Afghan National Army units must recognize route clearance as a combined arms
operation. Units routinely attempt operations to clear lines of communication
without the required planning, task organization, rehearsals and battle-tracking.
As a result units routinely drive roads and trails at 30 km/ph, or greater, hoping to
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see explosive hazards. This can lead to situations where units sustain unnecessary
loss of manpower and equipment by running headlong into IEDs and ambushes.
Proper mission planning and addressing shortfalls in unit training leads to proper
execution of route clearance missions.
c. While current Afghan National Army counter-explosive hazard technology and
detection equipment remains extremely limited, there are planning and training
measures units can implement that will allow them to maintain their mobility and
avoid unnecessary casualties. These techniques and procedures can result in more
successful route clearance and counter-explosive hazard operations, both at the
training centers and, more importantly, during combat operations. Successful
route clearance and counter-explosive hazard operations result from a
combination of predictive intelligence, Battlefield Operating System planning,
and then the employment of the appropriate route clearance methods using the
most appropriate route clearance technique. Finally, units must battletrack before
and during mission execution.
2-6.
Predictive Intelligence
2-7.
A technique Units need to use to better prepare for route clearance operations is
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Intelligence preparation of the
battlefield products in conjunction with the Engineer Battlefield Assessment
establishes an explosive hazard/ambush situation template. The corps or brigade
S2 and the engineer can use this situation template to identify the most probable
danger areas, and designate them as named areas of interest. Engineers should
work with scouts, military police, and infantry to conduct enemy obstacle and
route reconnaissance. This effort should confirm the presence or absence of
ambushes and explosive hazards along a given route. Use these and other
indicators as visible signs for explosive hazard locations, as well as starting points
for finding the enemy and/or his cache sites.
Explosive Hazard Indicators
 damaged vehicles
 dead animals
 avoidance by local population
 signs of digging
 signs of concrete removal
 disturbance in road, such as holes or grooves
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 boxes or parcels placed along the road/shoulder
 parked vehicles, bicycles, without operators
 wires on the road surface, or extending onto the shoulders
 evidence of vegetation disturbance along the shoulders
 evidence of mine-peculiar supplies: wrenches, shipping plugs, wrapping
paper, safety collars from fuses, and so on
 signs posted that covertly alert the local populace to the presence of
explosive hazards
 disturbances in previous tire tracks
2-8.
In Afghanistan, terrain permits the enemy to cache explosive supplies anywhere from
50-500 meters from any given route. It is common for the enemy to "reseed" an
improvised explosive device along a military supply route once a vehicle or a sweep
team has destroyed the previously laid explosive hazard. In most cases, this takes no
more than 30 minutes. As the brigade loses more equipment and personnel to
improvised explosive devices, brigades and kandaks divert more combat power to
convoy escort. This results in command and staff frustration, and saps the brigade's
maneuver initiative.
Ambushes
2-9.
Ambushes, executed in conjunction with improvised explosive hazards, are another
major threat in route clearance operations. Predictive intelligence can pinpoint
potential ambush sites so they can be cleared and secured. Ambushes can occur at
almost any portion of a specified route. Typically they center in areas of limited
trafficability and they generally require effective fields of fire, cover and
concealment. Small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades are the preferred
weapons used in complex ambushes by the enemy. Several three-to-five-man teams
with small arms can effectively neutralize a brigade's convoy operations using wellplaced ambushes. Typically the enemy will use an improvised explosive device to
stop an element along the route and trigger an ambush to cause more casualties to the
convoy.
Battlefield Operating System Planning Considerations
Predictive intelligence can help focus where to best use the resources necessary for
route clearance and counter-explosive hazard operations. Planning route clearance
requires extensive coordination and the prudent use of all available combined arms
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assets. Route clearance operations are very similar to breaching operations; use
breaching fundamentals suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA) as a
basis for planning route clearance operations. The task organization is also very
similar:
BREACHING ELEMENT
ROUTE CLEARANCE
assault
security
breach
sweep
support
support
Figure 2-1 Breach and Route Clearance Task organization Comparison
The significant difference is that breaching usually occurs during an attack, under
enemy fire. Route clearance carries the ongoing risk of enemy contact at any point in
the route. However, if the results of predictive intelligence and the subsequent
reconnaissance effort are solid, units can reasonably know where risk is the greatest.
2-10.
Battlefield Operating System Techniques/Procedures
a. Intelligence:
 Focus intelligence of the battlefield on routes to identify high threat areas,
such as chokepoints, bridges, culverts, tunnels, intersections, and so on.
 Identify the most probable locations as named areas of interest for the
reconnaissance effort.
 Coordinate over flight by unmanned-aerial vehicles and attack helicopter
teams to provide daily intelligence updates; film route by fly-over if
possible.
 At Kandak level, maintain an explosive hazard incident map and chart to
facilitate pattern analysis. Compare explosive hazard incidents to situation
templates and adjust accordingly.
 Actual incident information is used to confirm or deny the situation
template.
Provide intelligence updates to company and convoy team leaders before
departure.
b. Maneuver:
 Clear and secure flanks (at least 100 meters out as the terrain and preexisting explosive hazard allows).
 Clear and secure the far side of suspected and known obstacles before
marking and clearing of obstacle or route.
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 Identify and clear potential sniper positions before clearing obstacles.
 Provide over watching fire for sweep team element.
c. Fire Support:
 Prepare to fire obscuration and suppressive fire along route on reported
and suspected obstacles and sniper positions.
d. Mobility/Survivability:
 Conduct engineer battlefield assessment in conjunction with the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield of the routes.
 Provide clearing and sweep teams for routes.
 Conduct coordinated route reconnaissance to update map information.
 Provide detailed obstacle intelligence on all known explosive hazards
from both pre-existing and templated hazards.
e. Combat Service Support:
 Provide Military Police (preferably with explosive sniffing, military work
dogs) to assist in route clearance and convoy security during and after
clearing operations.
 Plan for both air and ground evacuation of casualties (CASEVAC).
f. Command and Control:
 Plan centralized (brigade level) or decentralized (Kandak/task force level)
route clearance operations according to Mission, Enemy, Troops, Time,
Terrain and Civil considerations (METT-TC).
 Task-organize appropriately for the mission and to ensure unity of effort.
 Determine routes with definable start and end points.
 Fix clearance responsibility between brigade and Kandak-level elements.
 Establish clearly identifiable checkpoints along routes to control traffic
and monitor route clearance progress.
 Coordinate with adjacent units.
 Coordinate additional support forces with unit(s) occupying the
surrounding terrain if the operation is conducted from the brigade level.
 Track progress and then revise/adjust maneuver/combat service support
plan accordingly.
 Ensure ground commanders have communication with indirect fire
systems, scouts, higher headquarters and adjacent units.
 The maneuver platoon leader or company/team commander should be the
controlling element on the ground.
These battlefield operating system planning considerations demonstrate the necessity
for integrated staff planning that result in combined arms mission execution.
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g. Preparation: While planning is being conducted the unit should be preparing for
the mission. Most of the initial preparation will be routine in nature in regard to
equipment maintenance, gathering supplies, and initial troop leading procedures.
As more details become known through the use of warning orders additional
preparation can be made. It is also critical during preparation to link-up with
other units that will be conducting the mission. If coalition partners are involved
this will become even more important.
h. Execution: The mission should be under the command of a maneuver commander
who will coordinate the actions of all mission elements. The role of the route
clearance leader at this point can be dual in nature. On one hand he is leading his
unit in the mission. On the other hand he is advising the maneuver commander on
the fundamentals of breaching and adjusting the rate of movement for the route
clearance patrol based on his assessment of the situation. The route clearance
leader or the EOD team leader on site will take charge in the event an IED is
identified. Once the IED is neutralized or breached or when there is enemy direct
contact the maneuver commander will resume control of the mission.
i. Assessment: All actions of both friendly and enemy forces should be evaluated
and captured at the end of every mission. This is usually done in the form of an
end of mission debrief. The end of mission debrief is most effective when it is
done immediately upon mission completion and when all personnel participate.
The information taken from this process can help the unit get better in areas of
weakness and help refine areas of strength. It is also valuable in detecting enemy
trends and possible adjustments in future operations based on those trends.
2-11.
Task Organization: The key to success in operations is a well organized unit that
is tailor made for a specific task or mission. A task organization places the proper
manpower, organizations and equipment into a mission specific package. Task
organizations for route clearance should be formed around habitual relationships as much
as possible to take advantage of group learning and familiarization with tactical standing
operating procedures.
a. All assets necessary to conduct a route clearance operation are resident within
each Afghan National Army brigade. The brigade commander assigns a
maneuver kandak with a task to secure or clear an area or route within his battle
space. Ideally, the kandak commander and staff will analyze the mission and
determine the forces and resources needed to accomplish the task. Once mission
analysis is complete the kandak commander can request the needed assets from
the brigade commander. If the kandak requires additional assets from the brigade
to conduct the mission, they are provided by the brigade based on availability and
priority. Figure 2-1 below shows an example task organization for a route
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clearance package and describes the possible missions or tasks for each part of the
organization.
Figure 2-1 Example Route Clearance Patrol Package Task Organization
b. Route clearance is a combined-arms mission. It is a mobility sub-task to the
overall scheme of maneuver or combat operation. A maneuver element such as
an infantry company or platoon should be the nucleus of the task-organized route
clearance package. Subordinate attachments or supporting units will be given
tasks and take overall command guidance from the maneuver commander and
operate as a single team. Each organization in the example provided in Figure 2-1
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Above, has a nested mission statements provided below: The basic function of
each organization is highlighted in RED.
i. 1/1/201 Infantry Kandak: Mission; Secure lines of communication
between village A and village B to deny insurgent access to the local
population and allow friendly forces and local populace freedom of
movement no later than 1200 hours 6 May 2010.
ii. A Company 1/1/201: Mission; Secure route Blue from Village A to
Village B from grid TS123654 to grid TS 127645 to prevent insurgent
access to local population and allow friendly forces and local populace
freedom of movement No Later Than 1200 hours 6 May 2010.
iii. 1/201 RCC: Mission; Conduct Route Clearance of route Blue from
Village A to Village B from grid TS123654 to grid TS 127645 to allow
friendly forces and local populace freedom of movement No Later Than
1200 hours 6 May 2010.
iv. MP: Mission; Conduct Traffic Control operations along Route Blue
from Village A to Village B from grid TS123654 to grid TS 127645 to
prevent insurgent access to local population and allow friendly forces and
local populace freedom of movement No Later Than 1200 hours 6 May
2010.
v. 1/4/201 EN: Mission; Conduct Route Sanitation of Route Blue from
Village A to Village B from grid TS123654 to grid TS 127645 to prevent
insurgent access to local population and allow friendly forces and local
populace freedom of movement No Later Than 1200 hours 6 May 2010.
c. Note that the maneuver task is to secure while the supporting tasks are more
specific to specialized capabilities of the supporting units. The entire operation is
under the command and control of the maneuver element commander. In this
way the brigade and kandak commanders exercise their influence over the
successful completion of the operation and ensure that they support their overall
scheme of maneuver. Also, notice how the basic mission purpose is the same or
nested in each subordinate element‘s mission statement. This ensures unity of
effort and makes it clear what the commander‘s desired end state is. Remember,
mission analysis and the elements of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Time, Terrain and
Civil considerations (METT-TC) will drive the unit makeup and task organization
as well as the tasks assigned. There is no single answer.
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2-12.
The EOD Mission; ―to effectively cope with incidents involving explosive
ordnance items in support of both Military and Civil populace, in order to minimize the
hazard to life, property, and the progress of operations inherent in incidents involving
ordnance or IEDs, in peace or war‖.
a. Explosive Ordnance Defined: The term: ―explosive ordnance‖ includes bombs
and warheads, guided missiles, artillery, mortar, and rocket ammunition:
demolition charges, pyrotechnics, grenades, torpedoes and depth charges; and all
similar or related items or components, explosive in nature, designed to cause
damage to personnel or material. This definition includes all ammunition
containing high explosives; nuclear fission or fusion material, and biological, and
radiological agents.
b. Secondary Mission:

Destruction of unserviceable ammunition both Afghan and foreign,
which has become hazardous through damage or deterioration.
 Collection of EOD technical intelligence data and material for intelligence
exploitation.
 Basic Consideration: The EOD Technician sees a piece of ordnance, from
his point of view he asks, ―How do I prevent it from functioning‖ All
explosive ordnance and IEDs are inherently dangerous.
c. Estimate of the Situation:
 An Explosive ordnance incident is a situation where unexploded ordnance
(UXO) or Improvised Explosive Device (IED) presents a hazard, either
actual or potential, to life, material, property, or the conduct of operations.
 The degree of existent hazard is expressed by assigning the incident to a
certain Category on the basis of reconnaissance, which is often conducted
by personnel other than EOD. As a result of the reconnaissance,
evacuation, security and other protective action may have been initiated
prior to the arrival of EOD personnel.
d. Upon assignment of and EOD Team to the incident, the ―EOD reconnaissance‖ is
conducted. This leads to an ‗ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION‖, and will
usually result in one or more of the following actions:
 Determine that no incident exists, and consequent cancellation of
assignment.
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 Change in categorization to bring a category assigned into alignment with
the EOD estimate of the hazard.
 Disposal operations necessary to eliminate the hazardous situation.
e. The disposal operation begins with EOD reconnaissance, and ends with the
positive elimination of the threat created by the UXO/IED causing the incident.
Final disposition of the UXO/IED may not be effective at the time.
f. Disposal Consideration:
 The disposal operations should include consideration of all the following
elements; those applicable to the particular situation shall be acted upon:
 EOD Reconnaissance based on physical evidence and the history of the
incident in all its aspects.
 Gaining access to the UXO/IED.
 Determination of the method of disposal to be employed. This will be
governed largely by the category assigned to the incident.
 Determination of whether rendering safe procedures (RSP) are requires
prior to disposal.
 Determination of the RSP, to be used, based on the ordnance/IED
involved and the equipment available.
 Conduct of action required by step 3 through 5.
 Field evaluation.
 Ultimate disposal of the recovery ordnance/IED.
 Collection, Exploitation and reporting of the incident.
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Chapter 3 The IED Threat
3-1.
The Proliferation of IEDs Afghanistan
a. The proliferation of IEDs on the battlefield in Afghanistan has posed the most
pervasive threat facing Afghan and coalition forces to date. The persistent
effectiveness of this threat has influenced unit operations, government policy, and
public perception. IEDs are a weapon of choice and are likely to remain a major
component of the Afghan conflict for the foreseeable future.
b. Recently, with the development of sufficiently powerful, stable, and accessible
explosives, a bomb or IED has become a preferred weapon for terrorists and has been
used extensively in Afghanistan. IEDs are characterized as obstacles to movement
and maneuver but can also serve as a close contact weapon, depending on the intent
of individual or group employing the IED. As an obstacle, the IED is typically
emplaced to fix, turn, block, or disrupt the movement or maneuver of Afghan
military, coalition forces, or civilians. When used in conjunction with other obstacles
or as a close contact weapon, IEDs are typically used to ambush military forces;
assassinate key military, government, or civilian figures; or to target a particular
group or organization. When an IED is used as a close contact weapon, the event is
often recorded and later televised in an effort to maximize the psychological (and
perhaps political) effectiveness of the IED and distract Afghan efforts at the strategic
level. However the IED is used, as an obstacle or close contact weapon, the approach
to IED defeat is the same.
c. The sophistication of the IED depends on the maker. IEDs range from being very
simple to very complex with booby traps, anti-handling devices, and sophisticated
electronic-initiation devices to prevent disarming.
d. IEDs may be encountered as a singular explosive hazard or as multiple devices daisychained together (such as secondary, tertiary, or more) per tactical encounter.
Generally, IEDs can be triggered in a variety of ways. A timer is common and can be
set hours in advance. Remote-controlled detonators with a limited range allow the
exact timing of the detonation. IEDs can be manufactured out of many household
products (including fertilizer and batteries), but most sophisticated IEDs use a small
amount of explosive to trigger a larger quantity of explosive material. IEDs do not
have to be large to be effective. Most IEDs are small and are directed at individual
targets, such as military personnel or civilians. Often these are planted along a
roadside and detonated as a vehicle passes. Larger devices can be placed in vehicles
parked along the roadway or driven into the target by suicide bombers willing to give
up their lives for their cause.
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3-2. Threat Tactics: Threat tactics are different in each region of Afghanistan. Depending on
the terrain, availability of materials, knowledge of the bomb makers and even the makeup
and tactics of friendly forces the enemy tactics can vary greatly. However, there are basic
systems and functions of IEDs that are universal.
a. Triggering the IED can be accomplished in several ways with the most common
being command detonated, victim operated, timed and suicide.
i. Command detonated devices are triggered by the enemy when he wants it to
go off either by direct command wire or by remote control.
1. Command wire devices are those devices that send a current of
electricity from a power source to the IED through a command wire.
The wire will lead from the IED to the firing point and can be
anywhere from 50 meters to several hundred meters from the IED.
Figure 3-1 Example command wire triggers
2. Remote control devices are much more diverse and can use any device
that sends a radio signal over a given distance. These devices range
from a simple key device for unlocking cars to cellular phones. The
major advantage to the enemy is that there is no wire leading to his
hiding position.
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Figure 3-2 Example Remote control triggers
ii. Victim operated devices rely on the intended victim or target of the IED
actually triggering the device. The trigger is not always obvious but can be
seen by the unassisted eye in many cases. Common varieties include trip
wire, pressure plate and pull pin triggers.
1. Trip wires are common in areas where there is moderate to high
vegetation and easy concealment is available above ground. Trip
wires will be very close to the IED and can be detected early with
optics or grapnel.
2. Pressure plate devices are usually employed at the surface of the
ground or just beneath it. They are harder to detect with visual means
and are common on roads where the surface is not paved or solid.
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Pressure plate devices rely on the target applying enough weight on
the pressure plate to connect an electric circuit.
Figure 3-3 Example crush wire pressure trigger
Figure 3-4 Example pressure plate trigger
3. Pull pin or pressure release devices are common in a secondary or antihandling role. This type of device usually requires the target to lift or
move an object connected to the pull pin resulting in the detonation of
an explosive. When pull pin or pressure release devices are suspected
the use of grapnel or remote lifting arms are preferred.
iii. Timed devices are set to detonate at a predetermined time using a simple
clock or mechanical timer. These devices are most effective when the enemy
can determine where the target will be at a precise and predictable time. Some
of the most damaging IED results can be achieved with a timed device
because the explosive can be much larger or the target can be much more
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vulnerable or less protected. There are two general employment methods for
timed devices, stationary and attached.
1. Stationary timed devices are highly reliant on the target being in a set
location at a predictable time such as a patrol or checkpoint. The
enemy simply determines the pattern and sets the explosive to go off at
the predetermined time. This method is almost impossible to detect by
visual means.
2. Attached devices are generally small packages that can be placed on
unsuspecting targets and detonate once the bomber has had plenty of
time to escape. This method can be easily averted by maintaining
standoff and close security on vehicles and personnel while on patrol
or missions.
Figure 3-5 Example Timer trigger
iv. Suicide devices are guided to their intended target by a suicide bomber either
carrying the explosive on their person or in a vehicle ranging in size from a
bicycle to a large truck. Suicide devices are most effective against stationary
or slow targets. They can be triggered by the bomber directly or by a second
bomber by remote control.
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Figure 3-6 Example of Suicide vest
3-3. Device Placement. IEDs are generally placed where the enemy thinks the intended target
will hit them. In Afghanistan movement in many places is restricted to roads, trails and
paths. This is partly because of the rough and mountainous terrain and reinforced by the fact
that many years of war and land mine placement by warring factions and the former Soviet
Union. The enemy uses this to his advantage. Other factors such as ease of access, good
escape routes, tight turns or steep grades, and good hiding spots determine likely locations
for placement of IEDs. There is not a complete list of possible locations. However, looking
at past events and placements can give clues to future and most likely placements.
a. Culverts, ditches, and pre-existing holes (pot-holes) are ready made places where
explosive devices are placed often. These locations allow the rapid placement of
devices minimizing the threat of capture for the bomber.
b. Tight corners, steep grades, and narrow passages (choke points) are favorable
placement locations because they make the target more vulnerable, predictable and
slower. This makes the target easier to hit.
c. Cement barriers, bridges, tunnels are likely placement locations because explosive
devices can be camouflaged in plaster material or even cement to blend with the other
cement structures making them harder to detect.
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d. High trafficked routes used by coalition forces. The enemy is more likely to place
devices where he knows the intended target will travel. The enemy bomber observes
patterns of travel to figure this out.
3-4. Secondary Devices: Secondary devices are more and more common. A secondary device
is any additional device with a separate triggering mechanism usually designed to attack first
responders such as police or medical aid or target specialized forces like EOD. The use of
additional devices makes IEDs extremely dangerous and should only be handled by highly
trained explosive ordnance disposal technicians.
3-5. Explosive Main Charge: IEDs are by definition improvised usually containing military
explosive ordnance. However, in Afghanistan some organizations have begun making large
quantities of Home-Made-Explosives out of agricultural and household chemicals.
a. Examples of military ordnance include bombs, rockets, mines, grenades, and artillery
rounds. Most IEDs that contain military ordnance can be detected with metal
detection equipment because of the metal casings of most military ordnance. Figure
(3-7) shows examples of military ordnance.
Figure 3-7 Example of military ordnance
3-6. Home-Made-Explosives: Home-Made-Explosives range from ammonium nitrate to
nitrogen phosphate based explosives. They are more difficult to detect with metal detection
equipment because they don‘t usually have the metal content in the casings normally found
in military ordnance. Figure (3-8) shows examples of home-made-explosives.
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Figure 3-8 Examples of Home-Made-Explosives.
3-7.
Threat Motivation and Construct:
a. Rarely are only two sides involved in modern conflicts. More often, one group
opposes other groups with conflicting interests. This is also the case in the
Afghanistan Theater of operation. Religious and tribal differences are but two
conditions that fuel conflict. This poses a significantly more complex set of potential
adversaries or entities that leaders must understand.
b. Threat forces try to create conditions to defeat Afghan, coalition, and police forces
and to slow the support those forces obtain. Threat forces often disregard the law of
war. They have used human shields, targeted innocent civilians, and occupied
religious and health facilities as sanctuaries. These actions and techniques offset
military advantages and make it more difficult to locate and defeat the threat. Afghan
and coalition reaction to these tactics can also have tremendous information operation
appeal.
c. The threat may manifest itself in a variety of forms. These forms may range anywhere
from loose cells to highly orchestrated cellular networks or to other more military-like
organizations. When the threat is constructed in a cellular formation, the activities
which take place within the cellular structure are only known to the members of that
specific cell and the command structure which controls the cell. This type of structure
is typical of a threat network structure. This type of structure allows for operations to
take place without worrying about compromise from members of other cells, thus
providing security. The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the
identity, location, or actions of other cells.
d. A cellular organizational structure makes it difficult for an adversary to penetrate the
entire organization. Personnel within one cell are often unaware of the existence of
other cells and, therefore, cannot divulge sensitive information to infiltrators. These
small cells form the foundation for a much larger threat organization. The cellular
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structure of the threat organization may be based on functionality, geographic
location, or family or tribe affiliation. The number of cells and their composition
depend on the size of the threat organization.
e. Regardless of the structure or type of group that systematically employs IEDs, key
functions must be performed. These functions can be described as a noncontiguous
system, and critical personnel, actions, and resources determine the enemy IED
system. The enemy IED activity model in Figure 3-9 describes the key nodes in a
sample system designed to conduct IED attacks. Many of these nodes are part of the
operation of a larger group. Successful IED defeat requires the commander to
influence a subset of these functions to defeat the IED threat. The interconnections
depicted in Figure 3-9 represent the impact one node may have on another. For the
route clearance company the focus is where the IED is prepared for execution and
encountered, highlighted in the red box in figure 3-9. Descriptions of enemy nodes
are listed below and also shown in figure 3-9.

International leadership. International leadership is a person or group that
provides the overall direction and purpose for the group if it is transnational in
nature. This leadership may coordinate the relationship between the nodes and
conduct strategic planning.

Regional and local leadership. These nodes describe the leadership required to
carry out the operations delegated by the overall group leadership. A network can
also be made up of many splinter organizations carrying out specific orders from
a larger, more centralized coordination group.

Recruitment. Recruitment includes the activities related to the act of building a
force of operatives, trainers, financers, and technicians to carry out the campaign
of the group.

Training. Training is the act of providing a means to educate recruited personnel
in a skill needed to perform a role in the overall effort. Some personnel may be
trained as engineers, while others may be trained to emplace IEDs.
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Figure 3-9 Example IED Activity Model

Target selection and planning. Planners must first select a target before mission
planning can begin. Through observation, the enemy collects valuable
information on troop movement, times of vulnerability, target vulnerability, and
areas of approach and escape. IED operations will become more complex as
friendly security and IED defeat capabilities grow.

Surveillance. Surveillance entails observing potential targets to collect
information used in the planning of IED operations. These observations aid the
enemy planner with critical information (such as ideal IED emplacement
locations; high-traffic areas; concealment data; observation points; avenues of
escape and reinforcement; and insight into friendly tactics, techniques, and
procedures).

Attack rehearsal. A rehearsal both prepares the IED team for its actions and tests
and evaluates the plan of attack.
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
Regional and local support. Active local support consists of citizens and other
locals assisting with enemy IED efforts (such as looking out for troops while
IEDs are being placed or donating supplies). Passive local support for insurgent
IED efforts consists of the refusal of citizens and other locals to give Afghan or
coalition forces information or assistance. Passive local support of IED efforts
results in part from fear of reprisal, and may also be attributed to sympathy with
enemy objectives.

Movement. Movement is the physical movement of devices, supplies, and
personnel into and out of an area of operations during pre-detonation and postdetonation phases.

Funding. Funding is the means and methods used to underwrite the cost of IED
operations.

Supplies. Supplies are the materials and the availability of materials used to
accomplish IED operations.

IED makers. IED makers are the persons involved in the design and fabrication
of an IED.

Orders group. An orders group (which may have no formal name) is a small cell
made up of one or more members of the regional and/or local leadership and
possibly the IED makers. It is designed to coordinate the IED effort while
compartmenting information in case of infiltration or discovery.

International support. International support is support in the form of funding,
training, organization, recruiting, publicity, and planning assistance that is
provided to the group from non-local sources, to include foreign nations and
states, non-governmental organizations, terrorist organizations, media outlets, and
other organizations or individuals. The
f. The IED team is the focus of the route clearance company. This portion of the IED
activity node is where the route clearance company will have the most influence in
the Counter Improvised Explosive Device fight. The activities of the IED team are
conducted at the small unit level generally no more than two to six personnel. It is
highly likely that the route clearance element will come in contact with one or more
of these personnel in the vicinity of an IED that is either found or detonated.

IED team. An IED team is comprised of the personnel who emplace, monitor,
and detonate the IED.
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
Emplacement. Emplacement entails the positioning of an IED for the purpose of
conducting an attack.

IED monitoring and detonating. Monitoring and detonating IEDs involves
observing the area of emplacement so that the IED can be command detonated.

Battle damage assessment. Battle damage assessment involves observing the
detonation or aftermath of an explosion to evaluate the destruction of the IED and
record the information. This may be a decision point for the enemy to initiate a
follow-on attack or egress out of the kill zone.

Infrastructure. IED makers require an infrastructure of safe houses, work areas,
and storage facilities.

IO campaign. The enemy can be very effective using information operations as a
method of promoting group success, which fuels recruiting efforts and encourages
support by portraying a positive image of the operations of the group.
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Chapter 4 Logistics
4-1.
Logistics is the art and science of creating and maintaining a military capability.
Its purpose is to create weapons and forces and provide sustained support of these
weapons and forces in combat. For the Afghan National Army Route Clearance
Company, logistics is the life blood of the unit. No unit can function for long without
fuel, food, medical, maintenance and repair parts.
4-2.
Classes of supply: Table 4-1 shows the classes of supply. Table 4-2 shows an
alternate view depicting the classes and subclasses of supply. Detailed information about
the classes of supply can be found in ANA Decree 4-0 Logistics.
Description
Grouping
Class of Supply
Sustenance
Food / Rations
Class I
General Supply Items, items consumed in use, Clothing,
material, uniform items, office equipment, furnishings,
supporting sets, kits, outfits, general equipment
Clothing, Stationary, Supplies and
Equipment, General Supply
Class II
Petroleum Products transported and stored in bulk, such as
aviation fuel, heating oil, diesel, benzene or petrol /
Petroleum Products transported in consumption size
containers or packages
Fuel / Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants
Class III
Material normally only associated with construction
Construction Materials
Class IV
Ammunition and Explosives
Ammunition and Explosives
Class V
Weapons, vehicles, airplanes, Como,
And automatic equipments.
End Items
Class VII
Consumables to support the health care
Items required to be replaced on class VII end items.
Includes the ground support and air support
Medical Material
Spares / Repair Parts
Table 4-1 Classes of Supply.
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Class VIII
Class IX
.
Table 4-2 Classes and Subclasses of Supply
a. The route clearance company has limited resources and personnel to perform the
logistic functions. Many personnel have multiple jobs with one or more requiring
them to function in a logistic capacity. The company XO is the senior logistician
for the company assisted by the company first sergeant, the company supply
sergeant, unit armorer and maintenance team. Additionally, each platoon sergeant
functions as the platoon logistician.
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b. Feeding the company can be a challenge even in a garrison environment. The
company XO must submit ration requirements to the supported command S4
section in order to be supplied. Usually meals will be provided in a dining facility
environment while the unit is on a Forward Operating Base (FOB) or outpost. If
the unit must remain outside or away from these facilities for extended periods
they must either bring food with them or be supplied food periodically by the
company supply sergeant or the supported unit. In either circumstance a resupply
technique such as tailgate or service station should be used to expedite the
process. Resupply techniques will be discussed in greater detail later in this
chapter.
c. Fixing or conducting unit maintenance is a key component for sustained and
effective staying power of forces for every modern army. Most equipment such
as vehicles, radios, weapons, mine detectors and so on must be cleaned, inspected,
repaired and maintained routinely to remain useful on missions. Fixing in this
sense also refers to medical supplies to maintain the health of the personnel in a
unit. Again, the company XO is the senior maintenance officer in the route
clearance company and is assisted by the unit‘s maintenance and recovery team.
Preventive maintenance, checks, and services (PMCS) must be performed on all
equipment without fail to prevent mission failure. Preventive maintenance checks
and services is a unit responsibility. The unit maintenance and recovery section is
limited in capability and can only assist one platoon at a time with recovery
assets. When the company commander deems it necessary to split the platoons
into separate mission areas he must also request maintenance and recovery
support from his higher or supported commander.
 Repair parts (Class IX) are not kept on stock within the route clearance
company so they must be requested with a MoD form 14 when needed.
These repair parts requests must go through the brigade S4. The company
XO with the assistance of the unit supply sergeant and maintenance team
sergeant must track requisitions for repair parts on company equipment
and report status to the company commander. If a mission essential piece
of equipment is not functioning it is considered to be dead lined. Too
many dead lined items can make a unit unable to do its mission. The
following items are mission essential to the route clearance company:
1. M1151 HMMWV
2. AN/PSS 12 mine detector
3. SYMPHONY ECM System
4. Mine Roller
5. EOD Tool set
6. EOD Bomb Suit with Helmet
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7. Trailer M105 ¾ ton
8. Radio set
9. M2 .50 Cal Machine Gun
10. M240b 7.62mm Machine Gun
11. Robot
12. Demolition Kit
 Major end items (Class VII) such as weapons, vehicles, and radios may be
destroyed as a result of combat action or accident. These items must be
replaced in a timely manner for the company to remain mission capable.
The company XO and unit supply sergeant must requisition major end
items through the brigade S4. In the case of major end items,
accountability of the item is essential. In order to replace an item it must
be removed from the property book and company hand receipt with a
change document. This is usually a loss or damage statement from the
responsible person or witness and verified by the unit commander. If
there is negligence involved then the commander may choose to
investigate the loss or damage to determine liability, Report of Survey
(MoD ANA Form 4697).
 Medical supplies (Class VIII) such as aid bags and first aid kits can be
obtained from the CSSK medical company. In some instances limited
medical resupply can be obtained through local aid station or medical
clinics.
d. Fuel (Class III) is required for all forces that have vehicles such as tanks, trucks,
aircraft or boats as a means of transportation. The route clearance company has
no organic fueling capacity. It is reliant on the brigade S-4 for fuel. The
company XO with the assistance of the unit supply sergeant must request fuel
based on mission needs. The fuel can either be brought to the unit (Tailgate) or
the unit can go to where the fuel is (Service Station). Fuel is accounted for like
any other supply item and there is risk of personnel stealing fuel for unauthorized
use. Most units safeguard their fuel by keeping their unit equipment in a motor
pool and provide for guards.
e. Arm refers to ammunition (Class V) and demolition items. The route clearance
company has a variety of small arms and machineguns as well as a need for
demolition material to perform their mission as intended. Each weapon system
has a basic load, a combat load, and a training load requirement that must be
forecast and requested through the Brigade S4.
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 The company XO with the assistance of the supply sergeant gathers
ammunition resupply requirements from each platoon through the platoon
sergeant. These requirements are consolidated and forwarded to the
brigade S4. Ammunition can be delivered as part of the daily logistics
package or LOGPACK with any other items such as meals, fuel, and
repair parts. The unit first sergeant supervises the company supply
sergeant in the operation of the LOGPACK.
 Demolition material is essential to the route clearance mission of
neutralizing explosive hazards. The Afghan National Army holds very
tight control on demolition material and will only issue it to units with
specialized skills such as EOD. The biggest concern is that the material
will end up in insurgent hands and used as IEDs against friendly forces or
civilians. The company XO, platoon leaders, and EOD team chiefs are
required to maintain strict accountability of all demolition material. When
not being used on missions all demolition material must be stored and
guarded in a secure facility at a safe distance from personnel and property.
f. Equipping a unit has a range of supply classes from personal items (Class VI)
clothing (Class II). Major end items (Class VII) are also considered in the
equipping category of supply on initial issue. Clothing items (Class II) such as
soldier personal equipment and uniform items must be accounted for and from
time to time replaced or repaired. Unit leaders assist their soldiers and report
replacement and repair requirements to the unit supply sergeant for action.
Generally they are treated like other unit supplies but remain accounted for on a
unit hand receipt. Uniform items, helmet, protective gear and other essential
items are issued to individual soldiers based on their duty position. The
individual is responsible for the maintenance and accountability of these items.
Unit leaders at the squad and platoon level inspect these items frequently to insure
the individual is properly maintaining his equipment by the use of pre-combat
inspections.
4-3.
Unit Resupply Techniques:
The company first sergeant establishes the companies resupply point using either the
service-station or tailgate issue technique. The commander or XO, if delegated, will
decide on the technique to be used and inform the first sergeant. The first sergeant will
brief each LOGPAC vehicle driver on the resupply method to be used. He will also
establish the company resupply point and notify the commander that it is prepared. The
commander will direct the platoons to conduct resupply based on the tactical situation.
Either of these techniques or variations is used for emergency resupply.
a. Service station method:
 Tactical vehicles enter the resupply point following one-way traffic flow.
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 Only those vehicles requiring immediate unit or higher maintenance stop
in maintenance holding areas before conducting resupply.
 If not already evacuated, wounded in action, killed in action, and enemy
prisoners of war are removed from platoon vehicles once they stop at the
refuel or rearm point.
 Vehicles will rearm and refuel rotating to each point.
 Crews rotate individually to feed, pickup mail, pickup supplies, and refill
or exchange water cans.
 Once all vehicles have completed resupply, they move to the holding area,
where the platoon leader or platoon sergeant will conduct a pre-combat
inspection (time permitting).
 Based on the enemy situation, vehicles will pull out of their positions one
vehicle at a time per platoon, by section, or by platoon. They will be
resupplied and return, rotating until the company has been resupplied.
NOTE: Medical evacuation vehicles are positioned an equal distance between the refuel
and rearm points. This decreases the number of stops that a vehicle has to make.
b. Tailgate Method:
 Combat vehicles remain in place or back out of their position a short
distance so the resupply vehicle is not exposed. Fuel and ammunition
trucks go to each vehicle position in turn.
 Crewmen rotate individually through feeding areas and pick up supplies,
water, and mail.
 Killed in action and personal effects are brought to the holding area by
platoon personnel. Note: Commanders at all levels are responsible for the
recovery, identification, and evacuation of Afghan martyrs. This activity
is for unit members only. Medical evacuation units should not accept nor
transport the remains of non-unit members. Remains should not be
transported in ambulances under any circumstances. Remains should be
transported in "non-medical" vehicles.
 Ambulances pick up critically wounded; other injured are carried or walk
to the ambulances for first aid.
 Enemy prisoners of war are centralized and guarded.
 Vehicles requiring maintenance are brought to the maintenance area.
 Inspections are completed by the chain of command at each vehicle
position.
NOTE: The tailgate issue method is normally used only in an assembly area. If it is
employed in forward positions, resupply must be masked by terrain. This procedure takes
much longer than the service station method.
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Chapter 5 Command and Control
5-1.
Command and Support Relationships:
a. Army commanders build combined arms organizations using command and
support relationships. Command relationships define command responsibility and
authority. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired
when one capability supports another.
b.
A command or support relationship is not a mission assignment; mission
assignments go in paragraph 3b or 3c of the basic operation order or operation
plan. Operation plans and orders state specifically the command and support
relationships that place the unit under a commanding headquarters. If possible,
show all command and support relationships in the task organization.
c. The route clearance company is under the command and control of the infantry
brigade. It is organic to each infantry brigade meaning that is where it was
designed to function and be supported from. There is one route clearance
company in each infantry brigade. If the brigade commander deems it necessary,
the route clearance company or platoons can be assigned to subordinate units
within the brigade. Usually this will be determined by the brigade staff as a
mission requirement and published in an operation order or operation plan. the
scope and duration of the mission has an impact on the command and support
relationship assigned.
5-2.
Command Relationships: Command relationships establish the degree of
control and responsibility commanders have for forces operating under their
control. Army command relationships include assigned, attached, operational
control (OPCON), and TACON. Detailed description of these terms can be found
in ANA 1-3.5 Plans and orders.
5-3.
Support Relationships: Support relationships define the purpose, scope,
and effect desired when one capability supports another. Support relationships
establish specific responsibilities between supporting and supported units (see
figure 5-2). Afghan National Army support relationships are direct support (DS),
general support (GS), general support reinforcing (GSR), and reinforcing (R).
Detailed description of these terms can be found in ANA 1-3.5 Plans and orders.
5-4.
Troop Leading Procedures: The eight steps of Troop Leading Procedures are:

Receive the mission

Issue a warning order
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
Make a tentative plan

Start necessary movement

Reconnoiter

Complete the plan

Issue the complete order

Supervise
a. Each Troop Leading Procedure step is critical to the overall successful completion
of the mission. If the platoon leader omits any step from the planning process, he
greatly increases the odds that a mission will not accomplish its full objective or
will result in the loss of soldiers and equipment.
b. Step one - Receive the Mission. Once staff planning is initiated from higher
headquarters down through the chain of command to the platoon leader,
information concerning the operational mission is gathered and disseminated.
Commanders at all levels thoroughly analyze factors such as intelligence
preparation of the battlefield and mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time
available, and civil considerations.
c. Step two - Issue a warning order. The platoon leader issues a warning order
based on information received from the company commander's warning order or
OPORD.
d. Step three - Make a tentative plan.
e. Step four - Start necessary movement. Even though it is listed as step four,
necessary movement can begin as soon as the mission is received.
f. Step five - Reconnoiter (conduct reconnaissance). This step, although listed
fifth, can occur at any time and as often as possible during Troop Leading
Procedures.
g. Step six - Complete the plan.
h. Step seven - Issue the order. If movements are conducted late or linkups are late,
the mission timeline will suffer. A platoon leader trying to rush through an
OPORD will inadvertently leave important information out.
i. Step eight - Supervise. Rehearse, rehearse, and when finished, rehearse
again.
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i. Plan time for redundant rehearsals.
ii. Conduct final pre-combat inspections. If there are any last-minute
concerns, they should be satisfied during this time.
j. Detailed discussion of Troop Leading Procedures can be found in ANA 1-3.5
Plans and Orders.
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Chapter 6 Communication
6-1.
Communication: Being able to communicate during route clearance operations is
critical to maintaining security, safety, and situational awareness. The route clearance
patrol leader must be able to communicate with each element in the patrol, higher
headquarters and adjacent or supporting units. Communication can be classified as
internal or external.
a. Internal communication can be done by several means depending on the distances
involved. Within a vehicle communication can be verbal or visual and is usually
called crew communication. All route clearance platoon vehicles are equipped
with intercommunication systems. Examples of crew communication :
 Intercom system
 Hand signals
 Voice
b. Vehicles in a convoy or tactical formation also need to be able to communicate
with each other. Examples of communication between vehicles:
 Radio
 Visual signals such as hand and arm
 Vehicle lights or turn signals
 Colored flags
 Pyrotechnics
c. External communication is usually between two units or entities separated by long
distances and terrain. This distance makes any type of visual communication
impossible. Most external communication will be limited to talking on a radio.
All route clearance platoon vehicles are equipped with PRC-77/1077 Single
Channel Radio. Figure 7-1 shows the 1077 radio in man pack mode and vehicle
mounted.
Figure 7-1 PRC 1077 Radio
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d. In Afghanistan, the terrain is very mountainous and can create areas of limited
radio communication. Units should consider the use of radio relay or
retransmission stations in areas where direct radio communication is not possible.
Figure 7-2 shows an example retransmission configuration with vehicle mounted
radios and Figure 7-3 shows an example retransmission configuration using man
pack radios. Note the retransmission station must have clear line of sight to both
stations to be effective. Usually a retransmission sight is placed on a high hill that
has clear line of sight to both station locations. A route clearance company has
the assets to configure a retransmission site from their organic equipment but it is
more effective to request retransmission support from the supported unit
headquarters.
Figure 7-2 Example retransmission configuration (Vehicle Mounted)
Figure 7-3 Example retransmission configuration (Man Pack)
6-2.
Arm-And-Hand Signals and Pyrotechnics: Arm-and-hand signals and
pyrotechnics are other methods used to communicate. Arm-and-hand signals are common
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throughout the Army. They are used primarily to control small elements. Pyrotechnics are
used to indicate messages and when arm-and-hand signals are inappropriate.
a. Arm-and-Hand Signals. Leaders use arm-and-hand signals to control movement
and initiate specific action by the viewer. All members of the platoon should be
familiar with both mounted and dismounted arm-and-hand signals.
Rally or Assembly:
Raise the arm vertically over head with the
palm of the hand to the front and wave in large
horizontal circles. Signal is normally followed
by the signaler pointing to the assembly area or
rally site.
DOUBLE TIME: Raise the hand to the shoulder with the fist closed; thrust the fist upward to
the full extent of the arm and back to the shoulder rapidly several times.
Freeze: Raise the hand to the shoulder with the
fist closed.
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Danger Area: With the fingers and thumb
extended forming a knife edge, raise the hand
to the neck and thrust the arm vigorously left
and right. This is the same signal as for Stop
Engines; the difference is the context in
which the signal is used.
Take Cover: Extend the arm to the side at a 45
degree angle and raise and lower the arm.
Send RTO: With the small finger and thumb
extended bring the hand to the mouth, simulating a
radio/telephone handset.
Conducting map Check: With the left palm
up at waist level, touch the right index finger to
the left palm repeatedly.
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Head Count: With the right hand palm facing down, touch the top of the head repeatedly.
File Formation: Raise the arm to the vertical
position and swing it to the rear ending with
the hand pointing in the direction of
movement.
“Eyes On”: 1. Soldier signals that he sees movement or area of interest. 2. Then points to
location with index finger.
3. Thumbs down indicates enemy
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4. Thumbs up indicates friendly
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Halt: Raise the hand to the shoulder with the
thumb and fingers extended and joined.
Cease Fire: Raise the hand in front of the forehead, palm to the front, and swing the hand and
forearm up and down several times.
b. Pyrotechnics. Pyrotechnics produce either smoke or light and are consumed in
the process. When used for communications, prearranged or prescribed signals are
developed and used throughout the force. These signals are developed based on
the color and characteristics of the pyrotechnic device used. Pyrotechnic signals
supplement or replace normal means of communication and allow a large number
of soldiers and or forces to be signaled quickly. They can be used for friendly
identification, maneuver element control, fire support control, target marking, and
location reports. When pyrotechnics are used, the signal and its meaning are
included in the command and signal portion of the operation order and in the
signal operating instructions. The following types of hand-held signal rockets are
available:
 Star clusters. Star clusters are used for signaling and illuminating. They
are issued in an expendable launcher that consists of a launching tube and
a firing cap. These signals produce a cluster of five free-falling
pyrotechnic stars. Star clusters are available in green, red, and white.
 Star parachutes. Star parachutes are used for signaling and illuminating.
They are issued in an expendable launcher that consists of a launching
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tube and a firing cap. These signals produce a single parachute-suspended
illuminant star. Star parachutes are available in green, red, and white.
 Smoke parachutes. Smoke parachutes are used for signaling only. They
are issued in an expendable launcher that consists of a launching tube and
a firing cap. The device is a perforated canister that is parachutesuspended. They are available in green, yellow, and red smoke.
c. Smoke grenades are available in white, green, yellow, red, and violet smoke.
These colors are provided by two types of grenades:
 White-smoke hand grenade. The white-smoke hand grenade is a burningtype grenade used for signaling and for laying smoke screens. When
ignited, it produces dense white smoke for 105 to 150 seconds. It will not
normally injure exposed troops. Troops should avoid lingering in heavy
concentrations of white smoke due to oxygen depletion and carbon
monoxide buildup.
 M18 colored-smoke grenade. The M18 colored-smoke grenade is similar
in appearance to the white-smoke hand grenade, but its top is painted the
color of the smoke it produces. Its filler is a burning-type mixture
containing a dye; only four are standard: red, green, violet, and yellow. As
a burning-type grenade, it has an igniting-type fuse and burns 50 to 90
seconds. Unit Tactical standing operating procedures will be used to
identify the purpose for distinctive smoke colors.
6-3.
Local Telephones:
a. The platoon often finds that radio communications are not a feasible means of
relaying information, especially if the platoon is too far away to use FM radio, the
mission requires radio-listening silence, or the platoon's equipment is inoperable.
An option, other than messenger, is the use of the local telephone. In some areas
of operation, telephone communications are incorporated as part of an overall
plan. In other situations, soldiers should be briefed on and know a few simple
requirements for possible use of local telephones. It is not a secure method and
should not be relied on as a primary means of communication. Soldiers should
adhere to the following guidelines regarding use of local telephones:
 Have local currency or cell phone available.
 Know (as part of the plan) the telephone number of higher head-quarters.
 Know that the enemy can be listening.
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Chapter 7 Navigation
7-1.
Navigation Equipment and Methods. Compasses are the primary navigation tools
to use when moving in an outdoor world where there is no other way to find directions.
Soldiers should be thoroughly familiar with the compass and its uses. To complement
these techniques, a mastery of field movement techniques is essential. This chapter
describes the lensatic compass and the M2 Artillery compass, their uses.
7-2.
Types of Compasses. The lensatic compass is the most common and simplest
instrument for measuring direction. The artillery M2 compass is a special-purpose
instrument designed for accuracy. The wrist/pocket compass is a small magnetic
compass that can be attached to a wristwatch band. It contains a north-seeking arrow and
a dial in degrees. A protractor can be used to determine azimuths when a compass is not
available. However, it should be noted that when using the protractor on a map, only grid
azimuths are obtained.
a. Lensatic Compass. The lensatic compass (Figure 8-1) consists of three major
parts: the cover, the base, and the lens.
Figure 8-1 Lensatic Compass
 Cover. The compass cover protects the floating dial. It contains the
sighting wire (front sight) and two luminous sighting slots or dots used for
night navigation.
 Base. The body of the compass contains the following movable parts:
(1) The floating dial is mounted on a pivot so it can rotate freely when
the compass is held level. Printed on the dial in luminous figures
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are an arrow and the letters E and W. The arrow always points to
magnetic north and the letters fall at east (E) 90° and west (W)
270° on the dial. There are two scales; the outer scale denotes mils
and the inner scale (normally in red) denotes degrees.
(2) Encasing the floating dial is a glass containing a fixed black index
line.
(3) The bezel ring is a ratchet device that clicks when turned. It
contains 120 clicks when rotated fully; each click is equal to 3°. A
short luminous line that is used in conjunction with the northseeking arrow during navigation is contained in the glass face of
the bezel ring.
(4) The thumb loop is attached to the base of the compass.
 Lens. The lens is used to read the dial, and it contains the rear-sight slot
used in conjunction with the front for sighting on objects. The rear sight
also serves as a lock and clamps the dial when closed for its protection.
The rear sight must be opened more than 45° to allow the dial to float
freely.
b. M2 Compass. The M2 compass (Figure 8-2) is a rustproof and dustproof
magnetic instrument that provides slope, angle of site, and azimuth readings. One
of the most important features of the M2 compass is that it is graduated in mils
and does not require a conversion from degrees to mils as does the M1 compass.
It can be calibrated to provide a grid azimuth or it can be used uncalibrated to
determine a magnetic azimuth.
Figure B-2 M2 Compass
c. Magnetic needle. Except for the magnetic needle and its pivot, the compass is
made of nonmagnetic materials. When the cover is closed, the magnetic needle is
automatically lifted from its pivot and held firmly against the glass window.
When the compass is open and leveled, the needle floats freely upon its pivot and
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points to magnetic north. Note that both ends of the needle are shaped like an
arrow, and that one arrow is painted white and the other is black. It is the white
end of the needle that points to magnetic north. Because the needle is magnetic, it
will also be attracted to large iron or steel objects in the near vicinity, to electrical
power lines, and to operating generators. Magnetic compass readings measured
near such objects are apt to be in error due to the magnetic attraction of these
objects.
d. Circular level. The M2 compass has a circular level that is used to level the
instrument when measuring azimuths. The circular level bubble must be centered
before reading the azimuth. The compass is equipped with front and rear sights
for aligning on the object to which the azimuth is desired.
e. Compass azimuth scale. The compass azimuth scale is a circle divided into 6400
mils. Beginning with zero, the graduations are numbered every 200 mils. The
long, unnumbered graduations appearing halfway between the numbered
graduations are the odd-numbered hundreds (100, 300, 500, and so forth). Short
graduation marks divide each 100-mil segment into equal portions of 20 mils.
(1) Reading the Azimuth Scale. Azimuths are read from the azimuth
scale from the black end of the compass needle.
(2) Setting Up the Compass. To set up the M2 compass, open the
cover and fold the rear sight holder out parallel with the face of the
compass. Fold the rear sight up, perpendicular with its holder. Fold
the front sight up, parallel with the mirror. Then fold the cover
(mirror) toward the compass until it is at an angle of approximately
45 degrees to the face of the compass so that, with your eye behind
the rear sight, the black end of the compass needle can be readily
viewed in the mirror. The compass is now set up for measuring an
azimuth.
(3) Measuring an Azimuth. Once the compass is set up and all steel
objects are at least 18 meters away from your position, you are
ready to measure an azimuth. Hold the compass in both hands at
eye level with your arms braced against your body and with the
rear sight nearest your eyes. Sight through the rear sight and the
window in the mirror and align the hairline at the reflection of the
face of the compass. Center the circular level bubble. With the
bubble centered and the hairline aligned on the object, look at the
mirror reflection of the compass scale and read the azimuth to
which the black end of the needle is pointing. Remember, magnetic
attractions or movement by you may cause errors in your readings.
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7-3.
Mounted Land Navigation. A vehicle commander should be able to navigate
from one point on the ground to another with or without a compass. If separated from his
unit and given an azimuth and distance from their position to his, he should be able to
reach the unit and continue the mission. To move effectively while mounted, he must
know the principles of mounted navigation.
a. Principles. The principles of land navigation while mounted are basically the
same as while dismounted. The major difference is the speed of travel. Walking
between two points may take one hour, but riding the same distance may only
take 15 minutes. To be effective at mounted land navigation, the travel speed
must be considered.
b. Using a Lensatic compass. Magnetic azimuths are determined with the use of
magnetic instruments, such as lensatic and M2 compasses. The techniques
employed when using the lensatic compass are as follows:
c. Using the Center hold Technique. First, open the compass to its fullest so that the
cover forms a straightedge with the base.
 Move the lens (rear sight) to the rearmost position, allowing the dial to
float freely.
 Next, place your thumb through the thumb loop, form a steady base with
your third and fourth fingers, and extend your index finger along the side
of the compass.
 Place the thumb of the other hand between the lens (rear sight) and the
bezel ring; extend the index finger along the remaining side of the
compass, and the remaining fingers around the fingers of the other hand.
 Pull your elbows firmly into your sides; this will place the compass
between your chin and your belt.
 To measure an azimuth, simply turn your entire body toward the object,
pointing the compass cover directly at the object. Once you are pointing at
the object, look down and read the azimuth from beneath the fixed black
index line. Figure 8-3 shows the center hold technique.
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Figure 8-3 Center hold technique
This preferred method offers the following advantages over the sighting technique:
 It is faster and easier to use.
 It can be used under all conditions of visibility.
 It can be used when navigating over any type of terrain.
 It can be used without putting down the rifle; however, the rifle must be
slung well back over either shoulder.
 It can be used without removing eyeglasses
d. Using the Compass-to-Cheek Technique. Fold the cover of the compass
containing the sighting wire to a vertical position; then fold the rear sight slightly
forward. Look through the rear-sight slot and align the front-sight hairline with
the desired object in the distance. Then glance down at the dial through the eye
lens to read the azimuth. Figure 8-4 shows the compass-to-cheek method.
e. The compass-to-cheek technique is used almost exclusively for sighting, and it is
the best technique for this purpose
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Figure 8-4 Compass-to-cheek method
f. Regardless of the navigation method or equipment used it is always important for
the route clearance element to know exactly where they are on the route at all
times. The methods described above are intended to be used in combination with
or in the absence of global positioning systems.
7-4.
Global Positioning System. The Global positioning system is a space-based,
global, all-weather, continuously available, radio positioning navigation system. It is
highly accurate in determining position location derived from signal triangulation from a
satellite constellation system. It is capable of determining latitude, longitude, and altitude
of the individual user. It is available in hand-held, man pack, vehicular, aircraft, and
watercraft configurations. The Global positioning system receives and processes data
from satellites on either a simultaneous or sequential basis. It measures the velocity and
range with respect to each satellite, processes the data in terms of an earth-centered,
earth-fixed coordinate system, and displays the information to the user in geographic or
military grid coordinates.
a. The Global positioning system can provide precise steering information, as well
as position location. The receiver can accept many checkpoints entered in any
coordinate system by the user and convert them to the desired coordinate system.
The user then calls up the desired checkpoint and the receiver will display
direction and distance to the checkpoint. The Global positioning system does not
have inherent drift, an improvement over the Inertial Navigation System, and the
receiver will automatically update its position. The receiver can also compute
time to the next checkpoint
b. Specific uses for the GPS are position location; navigation; weapon location;
target and sensor location; coordination of firepower; scout and screening
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operations; combat resupply; location of obstacles, barriers, and gaps; and
communication support.
c. Additional information for land navigation can be found in ANA 25.26 Map
Reading and Land Navigation.
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Appendix A Sweep Team Operations
A-1. Sweep team operations are the central dismounted method of detecting and clearing
explosive hazards along routes. Sweep teams are organized at the squad level but can be
platoon size as well.
A-2. Squad size sweep team organization begins with an (NCOIC) (2) Non-commissioned
Officer in Charge who is responsible for organizing the team and making sure each member
of the team is properly trained. Figure A-1 depicts the location of each team member in the
lane to be cleared.
a. The electronic mine detector operator (Soldier 1) leads the sweep team and covers
a 1.5-meter-wide (4.9-foot-wide) path. When trip wires are a threat, neutralize
them using other techniques such as grapnel before sweeping the area. Caution:
the fatigue level of the mine detector operator determines the time duration for
operating a mine detector. As a rule, 20-30 minutes is the maximum amount of
time an individual can use a mine detector effectively. Maintain 30 meter spacing
between personnel during sweep operations.
Figure A-1 Squad-Size Sweep Team
b. The prober/marker (3) follows 30 meters behind Soldier 1 and is centered in the
cleared lane. The prober/marker is responsible for marking the cleared lane on
both sides.
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c. Soldiers 4 (radio operator) and 5 (demolition man) follow 10 meters behind
Soldiers 2 and 3 and are centered in the cleared lane. The radio operator assists
the NCOIC in maintaining contact with the platoon leader or the route clearance
patrol leader. The demolition man is prepared to place an explosive charge next
to an explosive hazard on the direction of the NCOIC. Note that the method of
disposal or neutralization of explosive hazards will be determined by the route
clearance patrol leader with advice from the onsite explosive ordnance disposal
technician.
d. Soldiers 6 (relief mine-detector operator) and 7 (relief prober/marker) follow 30
meters behind Soldiers 4 and 5. If the squad cannot use seven team members, the
relief prober/marker position can be eliminated from the formation.
A-3. Platoon size Sweep team organization is similar to squad size organization. In platoon
sweep team organization each squad size team is employed in echelon. Figure A-2 depicts
the positions of all soldiers in a platoon size sweep team organization. Figure A-3 depicts an
alternate method for teams deployed in echelon.
Figure A-2 Platoon Size Sweep Team
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a. Soldiers 1, 2, and 3 (mine-detector operators) lead the sweep team in echelon.
Each sweep team covers 1.5 meters of front, and sweep teams are spaced 30
meters apart to prevent fatalities from accidental detonation by other mine
detector operators. If required, a fourth mine-detector operator can be added to the
detection column.
b. Soldiers 4 (NCOIC) and 5 (prober/marker) follow 30 meters behind the last minedetector operator (Soldier 3) and are centered in the cleared lane. The
prober/marker is responsible for marking the cleared lane on both sides.
c. Soldiers 6 (radio operator) and 7 (demolition man) follow 10 meters behind the
NCOIC.
d. Soldiers 4 and 5 and are centered in the cleared lane. Soldiers 8, 9, 10 (relief
mine-detector operators), 11 (relief prober/marker), and 12 (reserve demolition
man) follow 30 meters behind Soldiers 6 and 7. If a fourth mine-detector operator
is added to the column, an additional relief mine-detector operator must also be
added.
e. The remaining platoon members help the support force or act as a reserve force,
as required. They should first be integrated into the sweep team as a relief element
and then moved forward as needed.
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Figure A-3 Sweep Teams in Echelon
A-4. Alternate methods and techniques are being developed and used all the time. The
elements of Mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time available, and civil considerations
will dictate changes to sweep team organization and operations. Figures A-4 and A-5 depict
alternate sweep organizations.
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Figure A-4 Example Deliberate IED Reconnaissance
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Figure A-5 Example Deliberate IED/UXO Reconnaissance Dismounted
A-5.
Principles of Improvised Explosive Device Combat
There are nine general principles to guide units in combating the use of Improvised Explosive
Devices. These principles are general in nature. They apply to all missions. This is not the only
set of considerations unit leaders must use in conducting operations. However, this is a good
foundation. The principles are as follows: The nine principles are as shown in figure A-6.
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Figure A-6 Counter-IED Principles
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A-6. Have an offensive mindset. An offensive mindset is simply being ready for any contact
at all times. When you look like you are well armed, highly alert and ready for action it is
less likely the enemy will choose to attack you. Gunners on vehicles equipped with gun
mounts or turrets are especially important in demonstrating offensive mindset. They must
continually scan their sector for possible threats. They cannot let their weapon point in the
air with no purpose. Gunners are often the first person in a mounted convoy to detect
indicators of improvised explosive devises on or along the route. Everyone in the unit must
have an offensive mindset. Not just the gunners.
A-7. Develop and maintain situational awareness. Situational awareness development
begins before the mission and continues throughout the mission. Leaders must seek out all
information about the area they are ordered to operate in. This information can come from
many sources. The list of sources is endless but a few to consider are:
a. Area maps and photos.
b. Local or higher headquarters S-2 briefings.
c. Previous mission reports from the same area.
d. Historical files of incidents from the area. (These can help to discover possible
enemy patterns.)
While doing the mission, everyone in the unit must maintain situational awareness. This is often
the most important aspect of any mission. Keep alert to the changing situation. Look for things
that are out of place. Look for things missing that should normally be there. Look for things that
are unusual or should not be there. Most improvised explosive device indicators are detected in
this way. Another source of valuable information is the local population. The local people in the
area are probably aware of any suspicious activity. Talk to them. Let them know you are there
to help. Ask them if they know of any activity that could pose a threat to the local population or
your unit.
A-8. Avoid setting patterns. This is a difficult thing for most people and units to practice.
Many improvised explosive device attacks have an intended target. The key to avoiding
attacks in many cases is to be unpredictable. Some examples of pattern avoidance include:
a. Choose different routes to travel on.
b. Choose different times of the day to depart and return to your base camp.
c. Choose different methods of conducting reaction drills.
d. Choose different locations to halt or turn around.
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e. Change the order of movement in convoys.
By changing your routine and being conscious of possible patterns you can greatly increase your
level of security and protection.
A-9. Maintain 360 degree security. This includes all weapons systems and sectors of scan.
It also includes any electronic countermeasure and other devices used to protect your unit.
The world is a three dimensional place. When you look all around you also look above and
below. For example, trees, walls, power poles, and high roof tops can conceal dangers from
above. Culverts, ditches, water-crossings and underpasses can conceal dangers from below.
Make sure all available systems overlap and support each other.
A-10. Maintain standoff. Standoff is generally the distance between you and a potential
hazard. This distance has several advantages. First, it allows more reaction time. Time to
decide on a course of action. Time to determine the proper force needed. Standoff distance
also gives protection from the effects of a possible improvised explosive device detonation.
The farther away from a blast you are the less severe the effects. Standoff is also an
advantage when the weapons systems you have can shoot farther that your enemy. However,
you must know what weapon systems the enemy possesses and their capabilities to figure out
the best standoff distance. In the case of improvised explosive devices, the minimum safe
standoff distance is 300 meters. In some cases this distance should be increased if the
amount of explosives is large. It is also possible to use hard cover when standoff distance
cannot be reached. Hard cover from a building, armored vehicle or existing terrain will
provide protection from fragmentation and projectiles.
A-11. Maintain tactical dispersion. Leaders must always consider how far apart vehicles and
dismounted personnel should operate. Tactical dispersion helps decrease the effect of
improvised explosive devices by reducing the number of vehicles or personnel in the blast
area. The farther apart vehicles and personnel are the better. Fewer are affected by a single
blast. Leaders must also balance tactical dispersion with the need for overlapping security,
weapons systems, and electronic countermeasures.
A-12. Use armor protection. Armor protection is a good way to decrease the damage done by
an improvised explosive device. Use personal armor protection such as armored vest and
helmet. Armor protection is also provided by some military vehicles. Armor protection of
vehicles should not override the need to get on the ground to perform duties.
A-13. Employ Technology. Technology is always providing new ways for ANA forces to
defeat IEDs. Some are as simple as mine rollers placed on the front of vehicles others are
much more complicated and require specialized training to operate. Many improvised
explosive devices can be defeated by interrupting the command signal from reaching the
device. Electronic countermeasures seek to interrupt or block radio controlled device
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detonation. Always consider how the enemy uses these devices in your area and place your
electronic countermeasure equipment where it can best disrupt the enemy. For example, if
the enemy in your area often attacks the lead vehicle then place electronic countermeasure
equipment more forward in your formation to prevent this.
A-14. Remain Observant. Many IEDs can be spotted with the naked eye if you know what to
look for and are able to determine the presence of the abnormal and the absence of the
normal. The presence of the abnormal simply means things in the environment that look out
of place. Examples of things that look out of place may be a cart abandoned on the side of
the road, a stack of rocks off the side of the road, or a cloth hanging from a tree just above
head level. Figure A-7 shows an example of wire along the side of a road presence of the
abnormal.
Figure A-7 Example presence of the abnormal (Wire in the side of the road)
The absence of the normal is a little more difficult to determine. In this instance you are
looking for things in normal life that should be happening or present such as busy market
places, crowded streets, and farmers in their fields. When these things are not present you
should be asking yourself why?
A-15. The principles of improvised explosive device combat should be used in planning and
conducting all operations. They all have benefit. Sometimes leaders must apply one
principle over another because of a particular situation. The important thing to remember is
that using these principles can save lives and prevent unnecessary damage to property.
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Appendix B Call for Fire
B-1.
A call for fire is a concise message prepared by the observer. It contains all
information needed by the Fire Direction Center to determine the method of target attack.
It is a request for fire, not an order. It must be sent quickly but clearly enough that it can
be understood, recorded, and read back, without error, by the Fire Direction Center
recorder. The observer should tell the radio/telephone operator that he has seen a target so
the radio/telephone operator can start the call for fire while the target location is being
determined. Information is sent as it is determined rather than waiting until a complete
call for fire has been prepared.
a. Regardless of the method of target location used, the normal call for fire is sent in
three parts consisting of six elements. The six elements, in the sequence in which
they are transmitted, are discussed in paragraphs B-2 through B-9. They are as
follows:

Observer identification.

Warning order.

Target location.

Target description.

Method of engagement.

Method of fire and control.
b. The three transmissions in a call for fire are as follows:

Observer identification and warning order.

Target location.

Description of target, method of engagement, and method of fire and control.
c. There is a break after each transmission, and the Fire Direction Center reads back
the data.
d. Figure B-1 shows an example call for fire.
B-2.
OBSERVER IDENTIFICATION
a. This element of the call for fire tells the Fire Direction Center who is calling for
fire.
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B-3.
WARNING ORDER
a. The warning order clears the net for the fire mission and tells the Fire Direction
Center the type of mission and the type of target location that will be used. The
warning order consists of the type of mission, the size of the element to fire for
effect, and the method of target location. It is a request for fire unless prior
authority has been given to order fire.
B-4.
Type of Mission.
a. Adjust Fire.
b. Fire for Effect.
c. Suppression.
d. Immediate Suppression and Immediate Smoke.
B-5.
Size of Element to Fire for Effect. The observer may request the size of the unit
to fire for effect; for example, KANDAK.
B-6.
Method of Target Location.
a. Polar Plot.
b. Shift from a Known Point.
c. Grid.
B-7.
Target description
The observer must describe the target in enough detail that the Fire Direction
Center can determine the amount and type of ammunition to use. The Fire
Direction Center selects different ammunition for different types of targets. The
observer should be brief but accurate. The description should contain the
following:
i. What the target is (troops, equipment, supply dump, trucks, and so forth).
ii. What the target is doing (digging in, in an assembly area, and so forth).
iii. The number of elements in the target (squad, platoon, three trucks, six
tanks, and so forth).
iv. The degree of protection (in open, in foxholes, in bunkers with overhead
protection, and so forth).
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v. The target size and shape if these are significant.
B-8.
METHOD OF ENGAGEMENT
a. Danger Close. DANGER CLOSE is included in the method of engagement
when the target is (rounds will impact) within 600 meters of friendly troops for
mortar and artillery.
b. Mark. MARK is included in the method of engagement to indicate that the
observer is going to call for rounds for either of the following reasons:
i. To orient himself in his zone of observation.
ii. To indicate targets to ground troops, aircraft, or fire support.
B-9.
METHOD OF FIRE AND CONTROL
The method of fire and control element indicates the desired manner of attacking
the target, whether the observer wants to control the time of delivery of fire, and
whether he can observe the target.
B-10.
CORRECTIONS OF ERRORS
a. Errors are sometimes made in transmitting data or by the Fire Direction Center
personnel in reading back the data. If the observer realizes that he has made an
error in his transmission or that the Fire Direction Center has made an error in the
read back, he announces CORRECTION and transmits the correct data.
b. When an error has been made in a sub element and the correction of that sub
element will affect other transmitted data, CORRECTION is announced. Then
the correct sub element and all affected data are transmitted in the proper
sequence.
B-11.
AUTHENTICATION
When nonsecure communications are used and excluding unique fire support
operations (such as suppressive fires posture), challenge and reply authentication
is considered a normal element of initial requests for indirect fire. The Fire
Direction Center challenges the Forward Observer after the last read back of the
fire. The Forward Observer transmits the correct authentication reply to the Fire
Direction Center immediately following the challenge.
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Appendix C Medical Evacuation
C-1.
Medical support during route clearance missions is essential. Since the Route
Clearance Company has no organic medical assets it must be supported by either the
medical company of the combat support kandak or by the corps medical company. If the
route clearance company or platoons are task organized to a maneuver kandak then they
should get their medical support from the kandak medical platoon. Units without organic
ambulance assets are provided medical evacuation support on an area support basis. Units
must develop techniques which facilitate the effective employment of their combat
medics/company/platoon medics, enhance the ability to acquire patients in forward areas,
and rapidly request medical evacuation support. The techniques developed should be
included in the unit (TSOP) Tactical Standing Operating Procedures. As a minimum, the
TSOP should include the:

Vehicle assignment for the organic medical personnel.

Vehicles designated to be used for casualty transport and/or patient evacuation.

Procedures for requesting medical evacuation support (during routine operations
or during mass casualty situations).

Role of the company bridmal, platoon bridmals, and CLSs in casualty evacuation.

Evacuation of martyrs
C-2.
Additional steps can be taken to provide for immediate medical assistance on
missions. It is highly recommended that the company assign and train combat lifesavers
to every vehicle and provide them with aid bags. The presence of combat lifesavers does
not relieve the command of assigning medical support.
C-3.
Treatment of casualties on the battlefield should occur as fast as possible at the
point of injury. The faster an injured soldier receives first aid the higher his chances of
survival. In most cases severely wounded soldiers have a significantly higher chance of
survival if they receive medical treatment within the first hour of injury. This is
commonly referred to as the golden hour.
C-4.
Commanders at all levels are responsible for the recovery, identification, and
evacuation of Afghan martyrs. This activity is for unit members only. Medical
evacuation units should not accept nor transport the remains of non-unit members.
Remains should not be transported in ambulances under any circumstances. Remains
should be transported in "non-medical" vehicles.
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C-5.
Medical evacuation must be planned for in every operation. If rotary assets are
not available then ground ambulance or aid vehicles should be designated as evacuation
vehicles. Depending upon the combat situation, the modes of evacuation may include
walking soldiers who are wounded, manual and litter carries, nonmedical transportation
assets (CASEVAC), or dedicated medical evacuation platforms. Evacuation in the
kandak area normally depends on the organic ambulances assigned. Evacuation by air
CASEVAC is dependent upon the patient‘s medical condition, availability of air assets,
tactical situation, air superiority, and weather conditions.
C-6.
The determination to request medical evacuation and assignment of precedence is
made by the senior military person present or, if available, the senior medical person at
the scene. This decision is based on the advice of the senior medical person at the scene
(if available), the patient‘s condition, and the tactical situation.
C-7.
When casualties do occur and evacuation is needed there is a basic 9-line
MEDEVAC request format that should be used. The information on the 9-line
MEDEVAC request allows for rapid response and prioritization of limited MEDEVAC
resources. Figure B-1 shows an example 9-line MEDEVAC request format. A
technically capable enemy may be able to intercept a nonsecure 9-line request and strike
at the pickup zone causing additional harm to the patients and the medical evacuation
crew. In combat and when directed by higher headquarters, always use secure
communications if available when requesting medical evacuation.
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Figure B-1 Nine Line MEDEVAC Request Format
a. Line 1 is the location of the pickup site. This should be a 6 digit grid coordinate.
Note this is not the location of the point of injury but where the unit will link up
with the evacuation asset.
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b. Line 2 is the contact information for the unit requesting the MEDEVAC. This is
usually the radio frequency and call sign of the person who will be directly
contacted by the MEDEVAC asset to coordinate final approach instructions and
any changes to the request.
c. Line 3 is the number of patients by precedence. This information is critical in
determining priority of MEDEVAC assets and determining how many assets are
required. Precedence is divided into categories based on the severity of injuries.
Category A urgent is the highest priority and represents loss of life or limb within
2 hours. Category B is urgent surgical meaning that the casualty requires
immediate surgery to stabilize them for further movement. Category C represents
loss of life or limb within 4 hours. Category D represents routine evacuation for
minor injuries. The casualty can be evacuated within 24 hours. Category E is the
lowest priority and represents convenience. If two or more categories must be
reported in the request, insert the word "BREAK" between each category.
Example: ―Line 3, Alpha 2, BREAK, Bravo 3‖.
d. Line 4 is special equipment requirements. A is used if nothing is required. B is
used when a hoist is needed. C is used if extraction equipment is needed.
Extraction equipment usually refers to equipment needed to remove a casualty
from the wreckage of a vehicle such as the Jaws of Life. D is used when a
ventilator is needed to help the casualty breath.
e. Line 5 is number of patients by type. There are two types in this case, Litter and
Ambulatory. A litter patient is a casualty who is unconscious or cannot sit up.
They are usually being carried in a litter lying down and take up more room than a
casualty who can sit up. An ambulatory patient is a casualty whose injuries allow
them to be able to sit upright. Ambulatory patients require less room than a litter
patient. This information is used to determine how many vehicles are needed to
conduct the evacuation. If both categories are used in the same report insert the
word "BREAK" between the number of litter patients and the number of
ambulatory patients. Example: ―Line 5, Litter 2, BREAK, ambulatory 3‖.
f. Line 6 is the security at the pickup site. Is the enemy able to shoot at you or the
evacuation vehicles at the pickup site? If there is no threat then let that be known.
If there is a threat describe it. For example: ―Line 6, three insurgents with small
arms and RPGs‖. By describing the enemy situation at the pickup site additional
steps can be taken to protect the MEDEVAC assets such as assigning firepower
support.
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g. Line 7 is the method of marking the pickup site. The categories are A Panels, B
pyrotechnics signal, C Smoke signal, D none, or E Other. It is important to keep
the color of the signal undisclosed until the proper time. It is possible for the
enemy to listen to your communication and discover the signal color. If this
happens the enemy can possibly use the signal to misguide or ambush your
MEDEVAC assets. To avoid this problem wait until the MEDEVAC asset is in
visual range or final approach and tell them you are using your signal. Allow the
MEDEVAC crew to identify the color. If they identify the color correctly let
them know that it is the correct color and it is safe to proceed. It is also important
to make sure you have the marking materials you intend to use on hand.
h. Line 8 is patient nationality and status. The information on this line is used to
establish priority of MEDEVAC assets. The categories are A ANA, B ANP, C
coalition, D civilian, and E EPW. It is important to distinguish EPWs because
they must be escorted. Sick, injured, wounded enemy EPW, and detainees are
treated and evacuated through normal medical channels but are physically
segregated from ANA, or Allied patients. Personnel resources to guard EPW or
detainee patients are provided by the senior commander. Medical personnel do
not guard EPW or detainee patients. If more than one category is used in the
same request use the word BREAK between each category. Example: ―Line 8,
Alpha 3, BREAK, Charlie 2‖.
i. Line 9 is NBC contamination. If no contamination is present then state ―none‖ on
this line.
A-16. For additional detail about medical evacuation refer to ANA 4-02.2 Medical Evacuation,
February 1, 2009.
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Appendix D Reports
D-1.
Contact Report
a) Internal to patrol/ convoy:
 Alert: The soldier points to enemy position, or indicates direction with
signal if not compromised. If compromised the soldier engages the enemy
with accurate fire. The soldier will yell ―CONTACT!‖, or report contact to
Convoy Commander if mounted.
 Direction: The soldier who identified the enemy position gives a clock
direction to the enemy position. Direction of travel is always 12 o‘clock.
 Distance: The soldier indicates the distance from his position to the
enemy position in meters.
 Description: The soldier gives a description of the enemy; indicating size
and disposition (example: 2-man listening post or observation post).
 Contact report usually leads to a Battle Drill depending upon METT-TC,
unit SOP, or the OPORD.
b) External to patrol/ convoy:
 Identification: Patrol Leader/ Convoy Commander calls higher and
identifies his unit.
 Alert: ―Contact, contact…wait…out!‖
1. Higher unit Commander alerts/ prepares additional resources (e.g.
Indirect fire support, QRF, etc.).
 Patrol Leader/ Convoy Commander usually follow-up an initial Contact
report with a SITREP.
D-2.
Spot Report (SALUTE-A):
a) S- Size: Number of personnel, vehicles, etc. sighted, or an estimate of the size of the unit
(e.g. Squad, Platoon, Company, etc.).
b) A- Activity: What are they doing (e.g. moving, digging in, attacking, etc.)? If they are
moving, what direction and how fast?
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c) L- Location: Minimum 6-digit UTM grid if possible. If you use a SPOTREP to report
an artillery strike, enter the location the shells landed here. If you have done crater
analysis, enter the azimuth to the firing position here as well.
d) U- Unit or Uniform: Description of any distinctive dress the enemy may be wearing.
Identify the group (e.g. Taliban, HIG, warlord, etc.) if possible.
e) T- Time: The time and time zone the activity was observed (e.g. 1030 local).
f) E- Equipment: Description of the number and type of equipment, tools, vehicles,
weapons, etc.
g) A- Action taken: What did you do? If you engaged the enemy, list any battle damage
assessment (BDA) here.
SALUTE-A
SIZE
ACTIVITY
LOCATION
UNIT/
UNIFORM
TIME
EQUIPMENT
ACTION
h) MEDEVAC Request (9-Line):
i) Line 1: 6-digit UTM grid to location of pickup site.
j) Line 2: Radio frequency, call sign, and suffix of requesting unit.
k) Line 3: Number of patients by precedence:
i) A: Urgent (loss of life or limb within 2 hours)
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ii) B: Urgent Surgical
iii) C: Priority (loss of life or limb within 4 hours)
iv) D: Routine (evacuation within 24 hours)
v) E: Convenience
l) Line 4: Special equipment
i) A: None
ii) B: Hoist
iii) C: Extraction
iv) D: Ventilator
m) Line 5: Number of patients by type
i) Litter
ii) Ambulatory (sitting)
n) Line 6: Security of pickup site (What known or suspected threat in the area?)
o) Line 7: Method of marking pickup site
i) A: Panels
ii) B: Pyrotechnics
iii) C: Smoke signal
iv) D: None
v) E: Other
p) Line 8: Patient nationality and status
i) A: ANA
ii) B: ANP
iii) C: Coalition
iv) D: Civilian
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v) E: EPW
q) Line 9: NBC contamination (non-applicable)
MEDEVAC
LOCATION
CONTACT
INFORMATION
# PATIENTS BY
PRECEDENCE
SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT
# PATIENTS BY
TYPE
SECURITY AT
SITE
METHOD OF
MARKING
PATIENT
NATIONALITY
AND STATUS
CBRN
D-3.
IED/ UXO Report (9-Line):
a) Line 1: Date-time group (DTG) (The date and time the item was discovered.)
b) Line 2: Reporting unit and location (The unit identification code (UIC) of the reporting
activity unit and the location of the explosive hazard in an 8-digit grid coordinate.)
c) Line 3: Contact method (Provide the radio frequency, the call sign, the point of contact,
and the telephone number.)
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d) Line 4: Type of Munition (Note the size, quantity, type of ordnance (dropped, projected,
placed, or thrown), and subgroup, if available. Note if anti-handling devices were used.
Indicate the emplacement method and type of initiation device.)
e) Line 5: CBRN Contamination (If present, be as specific as possible. Soldiers are
experiencing symptoms of Nerve agent, etc.). If no CBRN is present put not applicable
(N/A) on line 5.)
f) Line 6: Resources Threatened (Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that are
threatened.)
g) Line 7: Impact on Mission (Provide a short description of your current tactical situation
and how the presence of the explosive hazard affects your status (for example, delayed,
diverted, or cancelled)).
h) Line 8: Protective Measures Taken (Describe measures taken to protect personnel and
equipment. (E.g. Personnel evacuated to 300M, marked, Sandbag barrier constructed
etc.))
i) Line 9: Recommended Priority (Recommend a priority for response by EOD. Ensure
that the priority requested corresponds with the tactical situation you described on line 7
of the report (Impact on Mission). These priorities refer only to the explosive hazard‘s
impact on your current mission. A priority of MINOR or NO THREAT does not mean
that the explosive hazard is not dangerous. (See PRIORITIES below))
i) Immediate. This priority stops the unit‘s maneuver and mission capability, or
threatens critical assets vital to the mission.
ii) Direct. This priority restricts the unit‘s maneuver and mission capability, or threatens
critical assets important to the mission.
iii) Minor. This priority reduces the unit‘s maneuver and mission capability, or threatens
non-critical assets of value.
iv) No threat. This priority has little or no effect on unit capabilities or assets.
IED/ UXO REPORT FORMAT
DTG
UNIT/ LOCATION
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CONTACT METHOD
TYPE OF MUNITION
CBRN STATUS
RESOURCES
THREATENED
IMPACT ON MISSION
PROTECTIVE
MEASURES
PRIORITY
D-4.
Situation Report (SITREP)
a) Identification: Unit will provide call sign.
b) Location: Unit will provide location with a minimum 6-digit UTM grid coordinate.
c) Disposition: Unit will provide its current disposition (e.g. defending, moving, attacking,
etc.).
d) Other: Unit will include any other information pertinent to the situation.
SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)
UNIT
LOCATION
DISPOSITION
OTHER
D-5.
EOD Report (3265)
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EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INCIDENT REPORT
1. UNIT NUMBER
2. CONTROL NUMBER
__________________________________________
3. IED _____
4. ORD_____
SECTION A: INITIAL INFORMATION
5. DATE/TIME REPORTED
9. INCIDENT LOCATION
11. ITEM (S) REPORTED
6. REPORTED BY
7. PHONE/FREQ NUMBER
10. POINT OF CONTACT ON SITE
8. ADDRESS/UNIT
SECTION B: ACTION BY EOD
12. PERSONNEL DISPATCHED
13. DATE/TIME
A. DPRT:_________________________
14. VEHICLE MILEAGE:
A. START:__________________________
TL:____________________________
B. ARRIVE:_______________________
TM:____________________________
B. FINNISH:________________________
C. COMPLETE:_____________________
15. CONFIRMED IDENTIFICATION
16. DISPOSITION
17. INCIDENT NARRATIVE (INCLUDE ALL SIGNIFICANT DETAILS AND PROBLEM(S)
[Narrative: Start to
finish]:_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
18. EXPLOSIVES USED:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
All explosives drawn were consumed in this incident, and confirmed consumed by the undersigned:
TEAM LEADER: ___________________________________________________________________
TEAM MEMBER:___________________________________________________________________
TEAM MEMPER:___________________________________________________________________
SECTION C: AUTHENTICATION
19. NAME AND GRADE AND SIGNATURE OF UNIT COMMANDER
20. TELEPHONE #
21. DATE
COMMANDER:______________________________________________________________________________________________
DA F0RM 3265-R-E, FEB 89
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D-6.
Status Report (ACE):
a) A- Ammunition: Amount of ammunition in hand by type. The number is per weapon
system.
b) C- Casualties: Number of WIA and KIA. WIA is specified by number of walking/ litter
cases and urgency, if known.
c) E- Equipment: Number and type of broken or missing equipment.
STATUS REPORT (ACE)
AMMUNITION
CASULTIES
EQUIPMENT
D-7.
End of Mission Debriefing:
a) Unit S-2s or Commanders will debrief all patrols, convoys, flights, and any other
personnel moving throughout the Unit area of operation. Personnel involved in this
activity should not wait for their S2or commander to come to them, but should actively
seek them out to provide the debriefing information. Be prepared to provide the following
information:
i) Description, size, and composition of your patrol, flight, convoy, etc.
ii) Your mission.
iii) Your departure location and date-time group (DTG).
iv) Your arrival date-time group.
v) The route(s) you took.
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vi) Any new information, such as changes to current map data or intelligence products
(obstacles, etc.), and the observed effects of operations.
vii) Enemy activity you observed (use SALUTE-A format).
viii)
Results of enemy contact.
ix) The condition of your unit.
x) Your assessment/ comments and recommendations for future operations.
b) Remember, even if nothing happened, that may mean something to the unit intelligence
analysts. ALL OBSERVATIONS ARE IMPORTANT!
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Appendix E Movement
E-1.
Movement techniques. The unit leader selects from the three movement
techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch) based on several
battlefield factors.





The likelihood of enemy contact.
The type of contact expected.
The availability of an overwatch element.
The terrain over which the moving element will pass.
The balance of speed and security required during movement.
a. Traveling. Continuous movement characterizes the traveling technique by all
elements. It is best suited for situations in which enemy contact is unlikely and
speed is important.
b. Traveling overwatch. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling that
provides additional security when speed is desirable but contact is possible. The
lead element moves continuously. The trail element moves at various speeds and
may halt periodically to overwatch movement of the lead element. Dispersion
between the two elements must be based on the trail element's ability to see the
lead element and to provide immediate suppressive fires in case the lead element
is engaged. The intent is to maintain depth, provide flexibility, and maintain the
ability to maneuver even if contact occurs, although a unit should ideally make
contact while moving in bounding overwatch rather than traveling overwatch.
c. Bounding overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is expected. It is
the most secure, but slowest, movement technique. The purpose of bounding
overwatch is to deploy prior to contact, giving the unit the ability to protect a
bounding element by immediately suppressing an enemy force. In all types of
bounding, the overwatch element is assigned sectors to scan while the bounding
element uses terrain to achieve cover and concealment. The bounding element
avoids masking the fires of the overwatch element; it never bounds beyond the
range at which the overwatch element can effectively suppress likely or suspected
enemy positions. Units can employ either of two bounding methods: alternate
or successive.
i. Alternate Bounds. Covered by the rear element, the lead element moves
forward, halts, and assumes overwatch positions. The rear element
advances past the lead element and takes up overwatch positions. This
sequence continues as necessary with only one element moving at a time.
This method is usually more rapid than successive bounds.
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E-2.
ii. Successive Bounds. In the successive bounding method the lead element,
covered by the rear element, advances and takes up overwatch positions.
The rear element then advances to an overwatch position roughly along
side of the lead element and halts. The lead element then moves to the
next position, and so on. Only one element moves at a time, and the rear
element avoids advancing beyond the lead element. This method is easier
to control and more secure than the alternate bounding method, but it is
slower.
Formations
a. Mounted movement formations
i. Column. The column formation allows the unit to make contact with a
small element and maneuver with the larger trail elements. It is a flexible
formation, allowing easy transition to other formations. It provides good
all-round security and allows fast movement. It also provides good
dispersion and aids maneuver and control, especially in limited visibility.
The unit can deliver a limited volume of fire to the front and to the rear,
but a high volume to the flanks. Figure 3-6 shows an example of
the column.
ii. Staggered Column. The staggered column formation is a variation of the
column formation where every other vehicle alternates on either the left or
the right side of the route being traveled. This provides slightly better
fields of fire and dispersion than a column formation but requires more
training and slightly more difficult to control.
iii. Offset. The offset formation is simply selecting either the far right or far
left side of the route to travel on based on a real or perceived threat. The
offset provides greater standoff from probable threats and allows for
increased security of the moving element.
b. Dismounted movement formations
i. Wedge. The dismounted wedge is used when the enemy situation is vague
and enemy contact is likely. This formation allows a large volume of fire
around the formation. Generally, at least one platoon or element will be
free to maneuver from the wedge after contact.
ii. Column. The column formation is the primary movement formation. It
provides good dispersion both laterally and in depth and simplifies
control. The lead platoon or element is the base for fire control.
iii. Line. The line formation allows the delivery of maximum fire to the front
but little fire to the flanks. This formation is hard to control and does not
lend itself well to rapid movement. It is the basic assault formation during
an attack.
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iv. Vee. The vee formation has two elements up front to provide a heavy
volume of fire on contact. It also has one element in the rear that can either
overwatch or trail the other elements. This formation is hard to control and
movement is slow.
v. File. The file formation gives maximum control to leaders and is used for
speed during movement.
Dismounted
Movement
Formations
Movement
Use
Column
Movement Characteristics
Control
Flexibility
When the unit
performs primary
movement
formations
When the enemy
situation is
unknown and the
leader wants all
soldiers forward
for maximum
firepower to the
front
When the enemy
situation is vague,
but contact is
expected from the
front
Good for
maneuver (fire
and movement)
Provides good
dispersion
laterally and in
depth
minimal
Wedge
when the enemy
situation is vague,
but contact is not
expected
Difficult but
better than the
Vee and the
line
File
When visibility is
poor due to terrain
or light
Easiest
Line
Vee
Difficult
Difficult
Provides two
elements up front
for immediate
firepower and
one element to
the rear for
movement upon
contact from the
flank
Enables the
leader to make
contact with the
smallest element
and still have two
elements to
maneuver
Is the most
difficult
formation from
which to
maneuver
Fire
Capability/Restriction
March
Rate
Allows limited firepower to the
front and rear, high volume to the
flank
Good
Allows maximum firepower to the
front, little to the flanks and rear
Slow
Allows an immediate heavy
volume of firepower to the front or
flanks
Slow
Provides a heavy volume of
firepower to the front or flanks
Slow but faster
than the Vee
Allows immediate fires to the
flanks; prevents focused fires to the
front and rear
Fastest
Table E-1 Movement characteristics
E-3.
Actions on contact: Actions taken in response to a likely enemy action or event.
They are usually executed in the form of battle drills. Some basic battle drills are listed
in the following text. All leaders must understand that the elements of mission, enemy,
terrain, time available, troops and civil considerations will impact their unit standing
operating procedures and the battle drills they involve. Don‘t be afraid to make
adjustments as necessary.
a. React to an Improvised Explosive Device (IED):
i. React to the presence of a suspected or known IED by using the security,
move, always, attempt, cordon, and report procedures.
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ii. Maintain a 360 degree security perimeter and scans close in, far out, up
high, and down low (security).
iii. Move a minimum safe distance of 300 meters and use mission, enemy,
terrain, troops, time available, and civil considerations.
iv. Scan the immediate surroundings for more IEDs (always).
v. Attempt to confirm suspected IEDs while staying back as far as possible.
Use optics like binoculars (attempt).
vi. Cordon off the area, direct people out of the danger area, and allow only
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel to enter. Use existing rules
of engagement (ROE) to question, search, and detain suspects (Cordon).
b. Report the situation to higher HQ using the 9-line Explosive Hazard (EH) report
format (Report).
c. Secondary devices: there is always a possibility of more than one IED in a given
area. It is very important for all personnel to look around their vehicles and scan
for these possible devices. The 5-25-200 method is useful for this.
E-4.
The 5-25-200 scan technique should be used any time the unit comes to a halt.
a. The 5 meter scan is done automatically by all personnel every time the vehicle
comes to a halt. Each passenger or crew has a designated sector of scan that they
are responsible for:
i. Truck commander is responsible for right flank to the left side of the
traveled way. He also collects the report information from the rest of the
crew.
ii. Driver is responsible for left flank to the right side of the traveled way.
Note the driver is more focused on the operation of the vehicle and what is
to the direct front.
iii. Right side passenger is responsible for right flank view.
iv. Left side passenger is responsible for left flank view.
v. Gunner is responsible for 360 degree view and has the best vantage point
on the vehicle. Note that the gunner‘s primary mission is protection of the
vehicle by maintaining standoff from other vehicles.
vi. All crew members report the result of their scan to the truck commander.
if nothing is seen then they will announce‖ Clear‖
b. The 25 meter scan is conducted on order of the vehicle commander or the patrol
leader based on their assessment of the situation after all clear is given for the 5
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meter scan. If the unit is going to be halted for more than a few minutes then the
25 meter scan should be conducted. If the scan is not directed by the patrol leader
then the vehicle commander should inform the patrol leader that he is initiating a
25 meter scan.
i. Note that all vehicles have a 360 degree blind spot about 1 meter out from
the vehicle.
ii. The vehicle commander designates one or more soldiers to dismount the
vehicle and conduct a 25 meter scan. The number of soldiers should be
balanced by the risk of exposure to the time required to conduct the
search. If the search needs to be done more quickly then two soldiers can
dismount. If more than one soldier dismounts they should always move in
opposite directions from each other so they do not make a better target for
the enemy.
iii. The gunner conducts a 25 meter visual scan 360 degrees. Once completed
he must return to his sector of fire. The gunner should also watch the
dismounted personnel for signals that they may have seen something.
iv. The designated soldier or soldiers will first open his door and look down
on the ground where he must step for any signs of IED or other hazards.
Once he determines that the area is clear he will dismount the vehicle and
immediately close the vehicle door behind him. This is key in protecting
the rest of the crew from possible threats.
v. The soldier then checks all blind spots around and under the vehicle. Note
when the soldier is in front of and behind the vehicle it is important that
the driver of the vehicle not move the vehicle.
vi. Once the blind spots are cleared then the soldier moves 25 meters away
from the vehicle scanning in front for signs of IEDs. At different intervals
along the move and at the 25 meter point the soldier should stop and look
back toward the vehicle for signs of IEDs that may only be visible from
the enemy point of view.
vii. Once at the 25 meter point the soldier will then begin moving in a 360
degree circle around the vehicle maintaining a 25 meter distance scanning
for IEDs and periodically looking toward the vehicle.
viii. If at any point in the scan the soldier sees a sign of IED threat he should
alert the crew by a pre-arranged signal. Note that any signal that the
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soldier uses to alert his crew should be discreet enough as to not alert any
observing enemy. The soldier should not move any closer to the IED and
should move in a direct route back to his vehicle or a covered position.
The soldier should take care not to run or alert the possible enemy
observers that he has seen a device.
ix. Once the scan is complete the soldier will return to the vehicle or begin
another mission based on direction from the vehicle commander or patrol
leader. Note if there is a high threat of sniper activity then the vehicle
should be moved either forward or backward 2 to 3 meters before the
soldier re-enters. This is an attempt to disrupt any possible sniper from
having a good sight picture on the returning soldier.
c. The 200 meter scan is conducted by the gunner and the vehicle commander
usually with the aid of optics like binoculars. This search is intended to detect the
presence of any enemy that may be close to the unit. There is always the
possibility of enemy observers, trigger men, camera men, or fighters lying in
ambush positions. The gunner should be scanning for far threats continuously.
E-5.
Complex attack: A complex attack is any combination of multiple weapon
systems and formations not limited to those listed below. Generally a complex attack
will be initiated by a large caliber weapon or explosive device. And be followed by a
high volume of small arms, RPG, and machinegun fire. In most instances this will be
concentrated in a small area known as the kill zone or engagement area.
d. Small arms fire is usually one or more enemy firing 17.62 millimeter and below
weapons. Generally ineffective against hardened vehicles.
e. Indirect fire is usually launched or fired from long distance. They can be either
rockets or artillery. Indirect fire is usually a greater threat to soldiers in the open
than to those mounted in hardened combat vehicles. In most cases if the unit is in
vehicles and moving they should continue to move out of the affected area and
report that they observed indirect fire impact never associating that impact with
their own position.
f. Rocket propelled grenade are direct fire weapons that are moderately effective
against hardened vehicles. Usually employed in volley fire for a greater chance of
hit.
E-6.
Ambushes are addressed in two distinct categories, near and far.
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g. Near ambush requires immediate action to either break contact and exit the kill
zone or immediately conduct an assault in the direction of the attack. Soldiers in
the kill zone in a near ambush immediately return fire, take up covered positions,
and throw concussion or fragmentation and smoke grenades. Immediately after
the grenades detonate, soldiers in the kill zone assault through the ambush using
fire and movement. Soldiers not in the kill zone locate and place suppressive fire
on the enemy, take up covered positions, and shift fire as the assault begins.
h. Soldiers in the kill zone in a far ambush immediately return fire and take up
covered positions. The leader identifies the enemy's location and soldiers place
accurate suppressive fire on the enemy's position. Soldiers not in the kill zone
begin fire and movement to destroy the enemy. The unit moves out of the kill
zone, forces the enemy to withdraw, or destroys the ambush.
i. In the case of ambush while mounted, vehicles in the kill zone immediately return
fire, move out of the kill zone, or move to covered positions and return fire.
Soldiers on disabled vehicles in the kill zone dismount, immediately assume
concealed positions, and provide suppressive fires. The unit disengages the
element in the kill zone. The unit forces the enemy to withdraw.
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Appendix F Route Clearance Equipment
F-1.
The AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector system comes equipped with an electronics unit, a
search head with a telescopic pole, headphone, a carry bag that carries all the parts
needed to operate the detector and a transport case.
Figure F-8 AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector
F-2.
The AN/PSS-12 mine detector (Figure F-8) is a man-portable metallic minedetection system that is used to detect Anti-Tank and Anti-Personnel land mines. Its
search head contains two concentric coils--the transmitting coil and the receiving coil.
During operation, the transmitting coil is energized with electric pulses to build up a
magnetic field. The magnetic field induces currents in metal objects near the search head,
and the currents build up a magnetic field in the metal objects. Depending on the metal's
composition and quantity, the magnetic field may be strong enough to be picked up by
the receiving coil. The signals from the receiving coil are processed in the AN/PSS-12's
electronics. When a signal is considered positive, the electronic unit provides an audible
alarm to the operator.
F-3.
The AN/PSS-14 Mine detector is a hand held variant of the AN/PSS-12.
However, the AN/PSS-14 is designed with GPR Ground penetrating radar that can detect
the presence of non-metallic explosive hazards buried below the ground.
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Figure F-9 AN/PSS-14 Mine detector
a. The AN/PSS-14 Mine Detecting Set weighs approximately eight pounds with its
standard (NiMH) nickel-metal hydride batteries. The self-contained handheld
mine detector system is operated by a single soldier. It is a dual sensor system,
consisting of a Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) and improved Metal Detector
(MD) whose readings are combined by an internal computer with detection
algorithms in software. This provides a greatly enhanced capability over the
AN/PSS-12 or earlier fielded detectors. Figure F-9 shows the AN/PSS – 14 Mine
Detector.
b. The AN/PSS-14 detects the full spectrum of land mines including metallic, lowmetallic and non-metallic mines of all fuse types and in all soil types with a
detection probability of over 95 percent. The hardware and software combination
in the AN/PSS-14 reduces false alarms much more effectively than with any prior
mine detecting equipment.
F-4.
Panama City Generation III Mine Roller System
a. The Panama City Generation III Mine Roller System (PC Gen III MRS) is a
track-width coverage, front-roller system. The wheel-banks can are configured to
provide track-width coverage for the HMMWV.
b. There are 3 mine roller Kits in each route clearance company with one distributed
to each route clearance platoon.
c. The mine roller kit is designed to provide some standoff protection against
pressure plate triggered IEDs or explosive hazards. CAUTION: the enemy is
recognizing the distance between the roller and the vehicle and making
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adjustments to placement of explosive charges. Vary the use of the roller vehicle
so that it is not as predictable. Figure F-10 shows the Panama City Generation III
Mine Roller System installed on the front of a M1151 HMMWV.
Figure F-10 Panama City Generation III Mine Roller System
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F-5.
Robots: Robots enable personnel to perform hazardous jobs from protected
positions. They can be used to perform initial interrogation of suspected devices, detailed
explosive device reconnaissance, and placement of disruptive or demolition charges.
Robots come in many designs and sizes. The EOD team within a route clearance platoon
is authorized one robot.
a. PackBot® EOD is equipped with an OmniReach® manipulator system to allow it
to extend over two meters, when examining suspicious objects on Explosive
Ordnance Disposal missions. Typical low profile of this platform allows
PackBot® to operate effectively under vehicles or inside sewers. Figure F-11
shows a PackBot® EOD.
Figure F-11 PackBot ® EOD
b. TALON robots are powerful, durable, lightweight tracked vehicles that are widely
used for explosive ordnance disposal, reconnaissance, communications, sensing,
security, defense and rescue. They are man-portable and have all-weather,
day/night and amphibious capabilities and can navigate virtually any terrain.
Figure F-12 shows a TALON Robot.
Figure F-12 TALON Robot
c. MARCbot: The MARCbot IV is a small robotic platform used for visual
inspection of possible improvised explosive devices and other suspicious objects.
Units use the MARCbot as a remote inspection platform, allowing Soldiers to
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achieve standoff when trying to determine if an object is an IED. Unlike the Talon
robot, the MARCbot has no physical investigation capabilities. Figure F-13
shows a MARCbot.
Figure F-13 MARCbot
F-6.
The MMP 30 Robot is currently being fielded to the ANA and ANP EOD units.
Figure F-14 shows the MMP 30 Robot left and the remote control unit right.
Figure F-14: MMP 30 Robot (left) and the remote control unit (right).
F-7.
EOD specialized tools and kits: There are a wide variety of specialized kits and
tools EOD teams use to neutralize explosive hazards. Many are designed to minimize the
exposure of the EOD technician to hazards by enabling remote actions such as disruption
or disarming. Yet others provide an unobtrusive way of looking inside objects to
determine the best way to attack them.
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a. The Kit Disruptor EOD Cased L22A1 (Pigstick) has been designed as a means of
disrupting thin walled Improvised Explosive Devices with a high probability of
avoiding detonation or explosion of these devices. It is lightweight and is capable
of being fired remotely. Figure F-15 shows a picture of the Kit Disruptor EOD
Cased L22A1 (Pigstick).
Figure F-15 Kit Disruptor EOD Cased L22A1 (Pigstick)
b. The purpose of the ABL900 Dragon De-Armer Projector is to render an
Improvised Explosive Device or Unexploded ordnance safe, either by damaging
or destroying the fuse mechanism so that the firing device or trigger is prevented
from coming in contact with the detonator and/or completing the firing circuit.
Figure F-16 Shows the ABL900 Dragon De-Armer Projector in its storage case.
Figure F-16 ABL900 Dragon De-Armer Projector
c. Bomb Suit: The EOD Suit Series II and Helmet was designed as a means of
protection against detonation of an Improvised Explosive Devices with some
degree of safety. It is not intended to make the EOD technician invulnerable to
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explosive blast effects. It is intended to provide a large degree of protection on
the approach and the return movement to and from an explosive hazard. Figure
F-17 shows a soldier in the EOD Suit Series II and Helmet.
Figure F-17 The EOD Suit Series II and Helmet
d. X-Ray machine RTR-4: The X-ray machine in a device that allows a skilled
technician an inside view of a device without having to open or expose the object.
There are two setup configurations for the standard RTR-4, the wired
configuration and the wireless configuration. In the wired configuration of the
RTR-4 Imaging System, cabling is used to interconnect the various components.
Figure F-18 shows the basic wired configuration for X-Ray machine RTR-4.
Figure F-18 basic wired configuration for X-Ray machine RTR-4
e. In the Wireless configuration of the RTR-4 Imaging System, radio components
are used to interconnect the various components. Figure F-19 shows the basic
wireless configuration for X-Ray machine RTR-4.
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Figure F-19 basic wireless configuration for X-Ray machine RTR-4
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Appendix G Pre-combat Checks and Pre-Combat Inspections
G-1.
Pre-Combat checks are the things a soldier or crew checks prior to going on any
mission. It is part of troop leading procedures and should be done routinely. The checks
are general in nature for common items such as uniform, protective equipment and
weapons. Some checks may be more specialized for items unique to the organization
such as mine detectors, mine rollers, and EOD equipment.
G-2.
Pre-Combat Inspections are things a leader will check to make sure the soldiers
and crews are prepared for missions. This task is primarily done by non-commissioned
officers and platoon leaders. Company commanders should also conduct spot checks. In
all cases if deficiencies are found they are fixed immediately.
G-3.
It is recommended that soldiers and crews develop a checklist for their precombat checks. Most uniform and protective gear needs to be serviceable and clean.
Weapons and specialized equipment usually have a maintenance manual or operator‘s
manual that describes the preventive maintenance checks and services steps required.
Figure G-1 shows an example pre-combat checklist for individuals and crews where
figure G-2 shows an example vehicle operator pre-combat checklist.
Item
Individual/ Crew Pre-Combat Checklist
Inspection
Weapon
Cleaned, function check, lubricated
Magazines/ Ammunition
Clean, serviceable, tracer-ball mix correct
Helmet
Serviceable, present
Body armor
Clean, serviceable, plates present
Notebook/ writing device
Present
Eye protection
Clean, serviceable, worn in accordance with standing
operating procedure
Clean, serviceable, worn in accordance with standing
operating procedure
Serviceable, full of water
Load bearing equipment
Canteens/ Camelback
First aid pouch/ blowout kit
Identification card
Present, serviceable (minimum. 2 x dressings, 1 x
tourniquet)
Carried
Driver qualification or license
Current and carried
Vehicle keys
Stored in accordance with standing operating
procedure
According to OPORD/ mission requirement
Packing list
MREs or other food supplies
Weapon cleaning kit, lubricant
procedure
Complete, serviceable
Gloves
Serviceable, present
Binoculars
Serviceable, present, stored in accordance with
standing operating procedure
Figure G-1 Example Pre-Combat Checks Checklist
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GO
NOGO
Item
Vehicle Operator Pre-Combat Checklist
Inspection
Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services
complete
Vehicle dispatch
Fuel/ fluids
Additional POL
Basic issue Items
Fire Extinguisher
Tow bar, chains, straps
Pyrotechnics
Road guard vest/ belt
Vehicle flashlight/ spotlight
MEDEVAC 9-line format
Strip map
Convoy execution matrix
Vehicle windows, mirrors, lights
Cargo straps, loads
Warning triangles
Casualty litter
Hasty recovery system
Ammunition
Communication checks
Spare batteries
Destruction plan
Additional MREs
Additional water
Crew served weapons/ mounts
Spare tire, jacks
Vehicle load plan
GO
NOGO
Issues?
Expiration date
Full, any unusually low?
procedure
Inventory, serviceable, stored in accordance with
Correct model/ size, serviceable, stored in accordance
with standing operating procedure
Clean, serviceable, stored in accordance with
Present, stored in accordance with standing operating
procedure
Serviceable, stored in accordance with standing
operating procedure
Updated, stored in accordance with standing
operating procedure
Current, stored in accordance with standing operating
procedure
procedure
Clean, serviceable
Inventoried, stored in accordance with standing
operating procedure
procedure, unit basic load
Radios serviceable, correct frequency, call signs per
OPORD
Correct batteries for radio, charged/ serviceable
As directed in OPORD or in accordance with unit
Clean, serviceable
Serviceable, stored in accordance with standing
operating procedure
Figure G-2 Example Vehicle Operator Pre-Combat Checks Checklist
G-4.
Leaders should also check for items they expect their subordinate leaders to have
such as operations orders, overlays, strip-maps, compass, binoculars, signal operating
instructions and other items specific to the mission. It is also common for leaders to ask
mission specific questions of soldiers, crews, and subordinate leaders to confirm they
understand their role in the mission. Figure G-3 and G-4 show examples of Pre-combat
inspection checklist.
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PCC's and PCI's
MEDICAL
LZ Marking Bag
CLS Bags
Medic Bag Accountability
1 Litter Per Truck
VEHICLES
Fully Fueled
Radio Checks
Maps with Graphics
Binos
MANPACKs Ready
Towbar
DEMO
TEAMS
MINE
DETECTOR
TEAMS
EPW
TEAMS
Bags Inspected by Team Leaders
Demolition at the Ready
Mine Detectors PMCS'd
Battery's installed
Mine Probes Ready
Mine Marking Kit Prepped
Zip Ties are on Uniform
Empty Sandbags at the Ready
100mph Tape Available
Markers are on Uniform
COMBAT
LOADS
All Loads Strapped Down
Basic Load for Everyone
Ammo Ready for Crew Served
2 Cases Water / MRE's
Sensitive Item Jump Bag Stored
Medivac Card in Window w/Freqs
Pyro at the Ready
S-2
BRIEF
and
MISSION
BRIEF
Updated Maps
New Threats
Upcoming Events
ROE Briefed
Enemy Activity in the last 24hrs
Mission Brief Restated
Figure G-3 Example Pre-Combat Inspection Checklist
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Pre-Combat Inspection Checklist
Inspection
Item
GO
Binoculars
Clean, serviceable
Convoy brief/ OPORD
Issued, briefed back, rehearsed
Strip map/ execution matrix
Copies with each vehicle, key leaders
Leader book/ writing device
Mission coordination checklist
procedure
Current, all phases of mission
Map of area of operations (AO)
Current overlay
Unit(s)/ frequencies
Current, all phases of mission
Risk analysis
Reviewed, signed by appropriate level of command
Signal operating instructions (SOI)
Communications checklist
procedure
Internal, higher, adjacent, support
Rules of engagement (ROE)
Briefed, back briefed, rules of engagement cards
Combat lifesavers
UXO marking kit
Aid bags issued, personnel distributed in accordance
with standing operating procedure / OPORD
Complete, serviceable, report format
Weapons inspection
Test fire, function check
Rehearsals
Thorough, complete, battle drills
Spot check
Conduct spot check of subordinate leaders/ units
Figure G-4 Example Pre-Combat Inspection Checklist
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NOGO
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Appendix H Weapons Data
H-1.
Former Soviet Bloc Weapons
Max
Range
(Meters)
Weapon System
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Max Effective
Range (Meters)
Area
Rates of Fire (Rounds per Minute)
Caliber
Point
Cyclic
Rapid
Sustained
2500
300
7.62x39mm
600
100
40
2500
300
7.62x39mm
600
150
50
4000
2000
1000
7.62x54Rmm
650
250
100
7850
2000
1000
12.7x108mm
800
600
100
500
500
300
40mm
6
n/a
n/a
60
5000
100-5000
82mm
7100
480-7100
120mm
21900
300-21900
122mm
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40
10
H-2.
NATO Weapons
Max
Range
(Meters)
Weapon System
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Max Effective
Range (Meters)
Area
Point
3600
800
550
3600
800
3725
Rates of Fire (Rounds per Minute)
Caliber
Cyclic
Rapid
Sustained
5.56x45mm
90
45
12-15
600
5.56x45mm
850
200
100
800
600
7.62x51
950
200
100
6764
1830
1500
12.5x102mm
550
200
100
400
350
150
40mm
6
n/a
n/a
5608
83-5608
82mm
30
15
19000
19000
105mm
6
3
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30000
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30000
155mm
4
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2
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Appendix I Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
Note that the organizations listed in this appendix are not all in place neither in the
Afghan National Army Tashkil nor within the Afghan national defense infrastructure. The
organizations described in this appendix are intended to put in place a framework developed
from other countries like the United States in which Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
operations have been successful. These organizations do exist within the coalition force and
should be mirrored by the Afghan National Army to have a greater chance of success in the fight
against Improvised Explosive Devices.
I-1. Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. There are two basic approaches for
organizing Improvised Explosive Device defeat operations. The first involves creating
specialized cells within the intelligence staff section (J-2), operations staff section (J-3),
and engineering staff section (J-7) to plan and oversee the conduct of Improvised
Explosive Device defeat operations. This approach is normally used in small-scale, shortduration operations when supporting technical specialist forces are limited. The second
approach is to create a separate headquarters (a combined joint task force) to manage the
Explosive Ordnance Disposal assets, associated technical specialists, and other
specialized organizations that may be attached to the joint force for the Improvised
Explosive Device defeat fight. This approach is appropriate to large-scale, long-duration
operations with a large specialist presence.
I-2. At the kandak and brigade echelon and the Corps level, a single integrated Improvised
Explosive Device defeat cell is typically created to optimize the available assets and
respond to the requirement for very rapid synchronization of staff interaction. What is
referred to in this appendix as the Improvised Explosive Device defeat cell may actually
be as many as three separate cells at the coalition and echelons-above kandak and brigade
level.
Selected Units and Personnel
I-3. Engineer Units
a. The specific combat engineer missions concerning explosive hazards are
breaching, clearing, and proofing minefields. In extreme high-operational tempo
or high-intensity combat missions, Afghan engineers or other non- Explosive
Ordnance Disposal units may conduct limited reduction or clearing of non-mine
EH and Improvised Explosive Device hazards, under the technical guidance of
Explosive Ordnance Disposal forces.
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b. During the post-conflict phase, engineers may also assist Explosive Ordnance
Disposal forces in battlefield Unexploded Ordnance cleanup operations, as
required.
I-4. Route Clearance Company. A route clearance company (Afghan National Army only)
conducts detection and Improvised Explosive Device reduction along routes and within
areas of support to enable force application, focused logistics, and protection. It provides
training readiness and oversight of assigned route clearance platoons.
I-5. The company provides battle command for three to five route clearance platoons. It is
capable of clearing a total of 3 to 9 kilometers of two-way routes per day (three routes of
1 to 3 kilometers each) or scanning 45 to 60 kilometers of two-way routes per day (three
routes of 15 to 20 kilometers each) depending on the enemy situation, terrain, and
weather conditions.
I-6. Route Clearance Platoon. The mission of a route clearance platoon is to conduct route
reconnaissance, minesweeping, enemy or unobserved minefield clearance operations, and
deliberate route clearance. It clears obstacles with engineer (countermine) equipment or
uses demolitions and performs engineer reconnaissance. The platoon provides hazard
area data to other units at the objective and is fully mobile using organic assets. It is
capable of:
a. Clearing and marking 1 to 3 kilometers (daylight only) of route (4 meters wide)
per day (enemy capability, terrain, and weather dependent).
b. Scanning 15 to 20 kilometers (daylight only) of route (4 meters wide) per day
(enemy capability, terrain, and weather dependent).
c. Identifying and neutralizing mines, Improvised Explosive Devices, and
Unexploded Ordnance on routes.
d. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (organic EOD team)
I-7. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Levels of Authority: the EOD team must have at least one
technician qualified as IEDD Operator to function at full capacity. There are three levels
of authority for the EOD technicians based on their level of training and qualification.
The highest is IEDD Operator followed by the level 4 operator assistant finally the lowest
qualification EOD level 4. Each has specific roles and capabilities explained below.
a. The level 4 EOD technician can rapidly deploy to an area and once there, locate,
identify, render safe and dispose of UXO. He can conduct and supervise the
transportation and storage of explosives and ordnance items. He can advise
commanders on precautions and actions necessary when UXO is located in their
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area of responsibility. He is able to direct, supervise, and conduct battle area
clearance and demining operations. The level 4 EOD technician is not trained nor
qualified to conduct IEDD operations. The Level 4 EOD technician is authorized
to perform the following:

Identify UXO items and advise on safety precautions

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct Demolition Operations

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct a UXO Operation

Plan and Supervise preparations, for the Disposal of UXO items by detonation

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct the Preparation, Safe Handling and Transport
of Explosives and UXO items

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct the disposal of Small Arms Ammunition by
Burning

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct UXO Sweep and Search Operations

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct the Render Safe and Disposal of UXO items
b. Level 4 Operator Assistant (OA): A Level 4 Assistant Operator is able to conduct
all the operations of the Level 4 EOD Technician, as well as being able to assist
the IEDD Operator in IED related tasks. The Level 4 Operator Assistant is not
trained nor qualified to conduct IEDD operations. In addition to the level 4 tasks
the level 4 operator assistant is authorized to perform the following:

Assist with the Planning and control of an IEDD Operation

Assist with the Planning and Control of IEDD Search Operations

Assist with the Planning and Control of a Render Safe and Disposal of an
IEDD
c. IEDD Operator: The IEDD Operator has under gone training which qualifies him
to the highest level of EOD. An IEDD Operator is qualified to undertake all
operations of the Level 4 and Level 4 Operator Assistant, as well as being able to
conduct IEDD operations. In addition to the level 4 and level 4 operator assistant
tasks the IEDD Operator is authorized to perform the following:

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct an IEDD Operation
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
Plan, Supervise, and Conduct IEDD Search Operations

Plan, Supervise, and Conduct the Render Safe and Disposal of an IEDD
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GLOSSARY
Administrative control (ADCON): Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other
organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of service forces,
control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit
training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the
operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.
Articulating Arm: a technology that allows for remote interrogation or hazards by a remotely
controlled robotic arm. This allows an operator to manipulate objects from a protected position.
Assigned: The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is
relatively permanent. Unless specifically stated, this relationship includes administrative control
(ADCON).
Attach: The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is
relatively temporary.
Battlefield Operating Systems: (BOS) are the major functions performed by the force on the
battlefield to successfully execute Army operations (battles and engagements) in order to
accomplish military objectives directed by the commander. They include maneuver, fire support,
air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and combat service
support.
CBRNE: (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear), the ―e‖ in this term represents the
enhanced (improvised) explosives threat.
Cellular Organization: an organization comprised of many small parts with limited or no
connection with the other parts.
Command relationships: A method to establish and describe the degree of control and
responsibility commanders have for forces operating under their control. Army command
relationships include assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON), and TACON.
Combat clearance: A method of route clearance focuses on specific named areas of interest. It
is reliant on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process to produce event templates that
identify key clearance objectives for the route clearance patrol.
Combined-Arms: is an approach to warfare which seeks to integrate different arms of a military
to achieve mutually complementary effects.
Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell: (CEXC) a joint agency team tasked with the
collection and exploitation of Improvised Explosive Devices.
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Combined method: A combined arms operation where key points along the route are secured
and cleared ahead of a deliberate route clearance patrol. Once the key named areas of interest
are cleared, the Route clearance patrol clears the entire route at either a hasty or deliberate pace.
The named areas of interest require overwatch during this operation – a manpower intensive
activity.
Command wire: A method used to control the detonation of Improvised Explosive Devices by
connecting the explosive initiation system with an electric charge at the time intended by the
bomber.
Contiguous clearance: A deliberate clearance of a route from a start point to an end point. The
Route Clearance Patrol proceeds along the designated route at a deliberate pace, scanning,
detecting, and clearing any explosive hazards or obstacles.
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device, Remote Controlled Electronic Warfare: (CREW) a
technology used to interrupt or overpower the remote-control radio signals use to trigger
improvised explosive devices.
Direct support: (DS) A support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force
and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force‘s request for assistance.
Electronic Counter-measure: (ECM) are a subsection of electronic warfare which includes any
sort of electrical or electronic device designed to trick or deceive radar, sonar, or other detection
systems like infrared and LASER. It may be used either offensively or defensively in any method
to deny targeting information to an enemy. Most often employed against Radio Controlled
Improvised Explosive Devices in the context of this publication.
Engineer battlefield Assessment: (EBA) an extension of the military decision-making process.
It is a logical thought process conducted by the engineer concurrently with the supported
maneuver force's tactical planning process. The engineer-estimate process generates early
integration of the engineer plan into the combined-arms planning process. It drives the
coordination between the engineer, the supported commander, and other staff officers and the
development of detailed engineer plans, orders, and annexes.
Explosives Hazard Awareness Training: (EHAT) the training given to personnel that makes
them more aware of explosive hazards they may face on their missions.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal: (EOD) the techniques and skills used to eliminate explosive
ordnance hazards. Also refers to personnel trained and organized for the purpose of eliminating
explosive ordnance hazards and improvised explosive devices.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team: The critical reduction element within each route
clearance platoon. This asset represents the only organic neutralization element within the route
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clearance company. They are also present in the engineer company in each combat support
kandak and in the Afghan National Police Force.
Forward Looking Infra Red: (FLIR) a technology used to see into the infra-red spectrum of
light which can detect subtle changes in temperature not visible to the naked eye. It can be used
to detect the presence of improvised explosive device indicators.
General support: (GS) a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole
and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
General support-reinforcing: (GSR) a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the
force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit.
Ground Penetrating Radar: (GPR) a technology based on radio waves directed at the ground
than can penetrate the surface and send reflective signals back to the operator. These reflective
signals can paint a picture to skilled operators of objects buried under ground.
High Explosive Anti-Tank: (HEAT) a type of ammunition designed to defeat armored vehicles.
These rounds are usually fired from direct fire weapon systems such as recoilless rifles and tank
main guns. They are also found in rocket propelled grenade and missile warheads.
Illumination round: A type of ammunition used for temporary light during limited visibility. It
can also be used as a signal. Primarily fired by mortars or artillery but can also be fired from
grenade launchers or hand held projectiles.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED): A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner
that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals which is
designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is
normally devised from non-military components.
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Cell: (IEDD-Cell) An organization within a kandak or
higher staff that is specifically designed to synchronize and disseminate counter Improvised
Explosive Device defeat activities and information.
Information Requirement: (IR) evidence required for commanders and staff to confirm or deny
assumptions or presumptions about a selected target, enemy or friendly activity.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: (IPB) is a systematic, continuous process of
analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area.
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: (JIEDDO) an organization that
combines local, military, and national assets in a consolidated effort to identify and attack
Improvised Explosive Device networks.
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Military Decision Making Process: (MDMP) is a seven-step process for military decision
making in both tactical and garrison environments. It is intended as a planning tool for the
primary staff of kandak sized units and larger. Troop Leading Procedures are used to guide units
subordinate to kandaks.
Mine-roller: A device with heavy wheels usually attached to the front of a vehicle designed to
help detect and defeat pressure activated Improvised Explosive Devices and provide the crew
limited standoff.
Mission, Enemy, Troops, Time, Terrain and Civil considerations: (METT-TC) a list of items
for consideration that have a direct impact on planning processes at all levels.
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected: (MRAP) a vehicle design technology that incorporates
design features such as vee-shaped hull and armored crew compartments that substantially
increase crew survivability against improvised explosive devices and small arms attacks.
Named Area of Interest: (NAI) The geographical area where information that will satisfy a
specific information requirement can be collected. Named areas of interest are usually selected to
capture indications of adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions of the
area of operation.
Operational Control: (OPCON) Transferable command authority that may be exercised by
commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is
inherent in combatant command (command authority).
Police Intelligence Operations: (PIO) an extension of the Military Police field-craft that links
findings and observations synonymous with other Military Police operations.
Pre-Combat Checks: (PCC) items checked by individual soldiers and crews to insure they are
prepared for a mission.
Pre-Combat Inspection: (PCI) items checked by unit leaders to ensure unit readiness for a
mission.
Preventive Maintenance, Checks, and Services: (PMCS) the checks, service and maintenance
performed before, during, and after any type of movement or the use of all types of military
equipment.
Priority Information Requirement: (PIR) evidence the commander or staff needs to confirm or
deny a significant course of action or decision. This evidence requirement is a top priority and is
usually supported by several subordinate information requirements.
Protective works: barrier construction around an explosive hazard to contain, reduce or redirect
the blast effect of a controlled detonation.
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Reinforcing :( R) A support relationship in which the supporting unit assists the supported unit
to accomplish the supported unit's mission. Only like units (for example, artillery to artillery,
intelligence to intelligence, armor to armor) can be given a reinforcing/reinforced mission.
Retransmission Station: (RETRANS) a method of extending radio communication distance by
setting up two radios in a key location that can relay signals between two remote points that
would otherwise be unable to communicate.
Route Clearance Company: (RCC) An organization designed to conduct route reconnaissance
and clearance to detect, investigate, mark, report, and neutralize explosive hazards and other
obstacles along defined routes within brigade boundaries to enable assured mobility for the
maneuver commander. Each company has a total of 81 personnel assigned. The company is
organized into 3 route clearance platoons, a headquarters section and a maintenance section
Route Clearance Platoon: (RCP) An organization within a route clearance company consisting
of 22 personnel. They are organized into a platoon headquarters, two engineer squads and an
Explosive Ordinance Disposal team.
Route Clearance Patrol: (RCP) A task organized unit capable of conducting route clearance
along a specified length of road. This task organization is built upon a maneuver element such as
infantry or armor as the nucleus.
Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, and Assault: (SOSRA) the breaching fundamentals for
combined-arms breaching operations. They are also applied to route clearance operations.
Support relationships: A method of defining the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one
capability supports another.
SYMPHONY: An electronic warfare system to protect from radio controlled Improvised
Explosive Devises.
Tactical control (TACON). A command authority over assigned or attached forces or
commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the
detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: (TTPs) are those things a unit does which are inherent to
conduct of their mission and are directly or indirectly designed in response to an opposing force
or circumstance.
Targeted Area of Interest: (TAI) a geographical area where a military action is planned based
on the confirmation or denial of a template enemy or friendly course of action. Whether the
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action is executed or not it must have resources allocated. Targeted areas of interest usually
begin as named areas of interest.
Tashkil: an official listing of personnel and equipment authorized by the Afghan Ministry of
Defense.
Task Organization: assigning to responsible commanders the means with which to accomplish
their assigned tasks in any planned action.
Technical Intelligence: (TECHINT) evidence and information about the physical components of
a device.
Troop Leading Procedures: (TLP) are a sequence of actions that enable a company commander
(or platoon leader) to use available time effectively and efficiently in the planning, preparing,
executing, and assessing of combat missions.
Weapons Inspection Team: (WIT) an organization that responds to explosive hazard sites to
conduct detailed inspection and secure forensic evidence about explosive hazards or weapon
systems.
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References
ANA 5-DRILL Combat Engineer Drills
ANA 4-02.2 Medical Evacuation
FM 21-60 Visual Signals
FM 24-19 Radio Operator's Handbook
ANA 3-25.26 Map Reading and Land Navigation
ANA 1-3.5 Plans and Orders
ANA 6-22.2 Unit Leader‘s Handbook
ANA Decree 4-0 Logistics
ANA Decree 1-0 Personnel Administration
ANA 4-30.51 UXO
ANSF EOD Task Book
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Route Clearance Company Leader`s Handbook

Transcription

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