Border Conflict, Border Fences, and the "Tortilla Curtain" Incident of

Transcription

Border Conflict, Border Fences, and the "Tortilla Curtain" Incident of
Journal of the Southwest
Border Conflict, Border Fences, and the "Tortilla Curtain" Incident of 1978-1979
Author(s): Oscar J. Martinez
Source: Journal of the Southwest, Vol. 50, No. 3, Fences (Autumn, 2008), pp. 263-278
Published by: Journal of the Southwest
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BorderConflict,BorderFences,and the
"TortillaCurtain"Incidentof 1978-1979
Oscar J. Martinez
The currentdebate in the United States over proposalsto build an
impenetrablebarrieralongthe U.S.-Mexicoborderforsecurityreasons
and to stop undocumentedimmigrationis the latestchapterin a long
historyof manyinitiativesto erectborderfences.Some of these initiatives actuallyled to the buildingof realfenceswhile othersnevergot
off the drawingboard.
This article focuses the notorious "TortillaCurtain"episode of
1978-1979 thatresultedin the erectionof new fencesin El Paso,Texas,
andin SanYsidro,California,
oppositeCiudadJuarez,Chihuahua,
opposite Tijuana,BajaCalifornia.Heated controversybrokeout when the
publiclearnedof the designof the fences,whichincludedbarbedwire
with sharprazorsthatwould havethe potentialto maimclimbers.The
disputeover the proposednew barriers,which lastedseveralmonths,
assumedinternationalproportionswhen the Mexican government
expressedoutrageat the physicalharmthat would befallimmigrants
attemptingto enterthe United States.
Part1 of thispaperprovidesa historicalsketchof boundarymaking
and borderconflict.The descriptionand analysisprovidecontext for
understandingthe tensionsgeneratedby the TortillaCurtain.Part2
chroniclesfence buildingon the borderbeforethe late 1970s to the
extent that extantfragmentarydatahavepermitted.In part 3, 1 relate
the storyof the TortillaCurtainfrommy own perspectiveasan observer
of eventsas they unfoldedin El Pasoand as a professorandresearcher
at the time at the Universityof Texasat El Paso.
Legacy
of Border
Conflict
Safeguardingthe border from unauthorizedhuman intrusion and
smugglingof goods has been an ongoing concernfor both the United
Oscar J. Martinez
is Regents' Professor in the Department of History at
the University of Arizona.
Journal of the Southwest50, 3 (Autumn 2008) : 263-278
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States and Mexico since the early nineteenth century, when the formal
relationship between the two countries began.1 When Mexico won its
independence from Spain in 1821, Mexicans and European Americans
had no choice but to contend with problems arising from a shared
boundary line. From the early 1820s to the early 1850s, the biggest
issue had to do with the actual location of the boundary. The United
States wanted to acquireland that Mexico refused to sell. Determined to
significantlyincrease its national domain, the U.S. government aggressively and successfullypursued an expansionist agenda against its weaker
neighbor, eventually forcing the movement of the border south to the
Rio Grande and west to the Pacific Ocean. As a result Mexico lost half
of its national territory.
The process of forced border change began in the 1820s with the
legal and illegal entry of tens of thousands of European Americans into
Texas, a Mexican frontier province whose boundary with Louisiana
and its coastline along the Gulf of Mexico could not be adequately
secured by the Mexican government for lack of resources, including
insufficient militaryforces. Dissatisfactionwith Mexican rule and ethnic
tensions drove the newly arrived European Americans to launch an
insurgency that culminated in the creation in 1836 of the Republic
of Texas. During the rebellion, volunteers and arms from the United
States poured illegally into Texas, assuring the success of the movement. Mexico, however, refused to recognize Texas' independence. In
1845, the United States annexed Texas, an action that greatly alarmed
the Mexican government. For Mexico, annexation constituted an act
of war because Texas was still considered part of its national domain.
Yet Mexico did not declare war on the United States over the Texas
question.
Mexico's refusalto accept the loss of Texas to the United Stateswould
play a centralrole in the U.S. declarationof war against Mexico in 1846.
The United States claimed the Nueces River-Rio Grande land strip as
a part of Texas, and ordered troops to that location, precipitating the
skirmishwith Mexican troops that started the war. President James Polk
justified the declaration of war on the grounds that "American blood
had been shed on American soil." In reality,the armed encounter took
place on Mexican soil, since the site in question was part of the state of
Tamaulipas and not Texas. Subsequently, U.S. military forces invaded
Mexico by land and sea and in 1848 imposed the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, by which Mexico reluctantly accepted the loss of Texas and
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Border Conflict -0- 265
further agreed to cede New Mexico, Arizona, California,and other territories long desired by the United States. In 1853 the United States
purchased from Mexico portions of northern Chihuahua and northern
Sonora through the Gadsden Treaty.
After these events, the boundary assumed relative permanence,
although threats to border integrity originating in the United States
continued for decades, causing recurringworry in Mexico that more of
the northern frontier might be lost. But, except for minor adjustments
arising from a constantly shifting Rio Grande, the new border would
remain an unchanged line of demarcation.
Unfortunately, disorder and bloodshed continued for decades after
the signing of the Gadsden Treaty, shattering the hope of a peaceful
border region. One of the greatest sources of strife arose from recurring trans-boundary Indian raids, while problems with slave hunters,
smugglers, robbers, cattle thieves, and desperate charactersof all shades
that congregated in the borderlandsincreased the friction between the
two countries. Moreover, many European American adventurersdefied
Mexico's statutes and territorialintegrity, engaging in repeated filibustering expeditions into various northern Mexican states. Tensions rose
so high over the volatile border conditions that another war seemed a
possibilityin the 1870s. With the arrivalof the railroadsin the 1880s and
the influx and expansion of law-abiding citizenry, however, lawlessness
declined. During the next three decades the borderlands experienced
relative peace and order.
The 1910 Mexican Revolution introduced a new era of hostilities
when Mexican insurgents and bandits raisedhavoc in the Texas and New
Mexico borderlands.Bullets often flew into U.S. territorywhen Mexican
federal troops and revolutionaries engaged in battle in several Mexican
border towns. For a time residents in the U.S. border states lived in fear
that extremistsfrom Mexico and Chicanos north of the boundarywould
attempt to retake lands lost by Mexico in the nineteenth century. The
crisis spawned acts of brutality by rogue Texas Rangers against Mexican
Americansin south Texas and also occasioned severalillegal crossings of
U.S. troops into Mexican territory,including the unsuccessful chase in
Chihuahua by General John J. Pershing of revolutionary leader Pancho
Villa.
War seemed likely again between the two countries in 1916, but
the crisis abated as the violent phase of the Mexican Revolution waned
and as the United States turned its attention to World War I. By 1920
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266 * Journal of the Southwest
stabilityreturnedto the borderlands,andinternationalarmedconfrontationsceased.But borderissuescontinuedto troublethe relationship
betweenthe two neighbors.New problemsspurredbygrowingeconomic
interdependence,namelymigrationanddrugtrafficking,wouldtrigger
recurringcrisesfor generationsto come. From1920 to 1933, U.S. Prohibitiondrovebooze-seekingtouriststo Mexicoandprecipitatedliquor
smugglingfrom Mexicoto the United States.Tensionsensued,along
with attendantviolence.Betweenthe 1930s and 1970s, undocumented
heroin,and
immigrationandsmugglingof narcotics,namelymarijuana,
became
intractable
international
tensions
to high
cocaine,
issues,raising
levelsperiodically.
The U.S. governmentrespondedto the bordersituationby (1) pressuringmillionsof Mexicansto leavethe United Statesand "repatriate"
themselvesto theirhomelandduringthe GreatDepression;(2) implementinga majorguestworkerprogrambetween1942 and 1964 to meet
renewedU.S. labordemandsarisingfrommanpowershortagesduring
and afterWorldWarII; (3) selectivelyallowingMexicansto crossthe
borderwithoutdocumentsandturningoverimmigrantsheld at detention centersto U.S. employersduringperiodsof "laborshortages";(4)
increasingthe enforcementcapacityof the ImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)andthe CustomsService;(5) constructingobservation
towersandfencesin differentpartsof the border;and(6) incorporating
temporaryvisaprogramsfor smallnumbersof guest workersas partof
the permanentimmigrationlaw.2
Border
Barriers
Prior
to the
Tortilla
Curtain
Beforethe 1970s, fenceson U.S. soil could be foundalongstretchesof
the borderin both ruralandurbanareas.Ranchers,for example,fenced
their propertiesto stop human trespassingand to preventlivestock
fromrunningloose. Beginningin the earlytwentiethcentury,the U.S.
governmenton variousoccasionsfinancedthe constructionof fences
in urbanareassuch as El Paso,Nogales, and SanYsidroto enforcethe
officialhourswhen portsof entryremainedclosedandto makeit more
difficultfor undocumentedimmigrantsand drug smugglersto cross
the border.
In El Pasoby the 1970s, variousfenceswerein evidencein the vicinity of the border.But, apartfrom obvious,aging INS fencingdirectly
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Border Conflict + 267
on the north bank of the Rio Grande, it was impossible to know which
of the other barriershad been erected to deter illegal immigrants or
smugglers, and which had been built to keep people out of irrigation
canals and away from the railroadyards, and to prevent accidents along
the new border highway. Federal agencies like the INS and the International Boundary and Water Commission, as well as the State of Texas,
the City of El Paso, and private railroadcompanies had all participated
in building fences. Unfortunately, lack of historical research regarding
the actual construction of border fences makes it impossible to provide
a comprehensive listing of all the extant fences in the 1970s and when
they were erected.
Pressreports, however, do provide useful information about the plans
of U.S. authorities as they proposed building fences in different border
locales to deter unwanted traffic.Typically,newspaperswould announce
fence-building initiatives under consideration, but lamentably would
not follow up with stories to inform readers whether such fences had
actuallybeen built. The U.S. Congress sometimes delayed appropriating
the funds for the construction of proposed fences and at other times did
not appropriatethe funds at all. Nonetheless, newspaper stories such as
the ones referredto below help us understand the historical context for
the Tortilla Curtain incident of 1978-1979.3
1924 160-mile long, 8-foot-high fence proposed for the CaliforniaMexico boundary line.
1925 (January)Constructionof "hog tight, horse high, and boot-leggerproof barbed-wirefence, possibly electricallycharged, announced
for El Paso area.
1925 (February)30-mile long, 18-foot-high barbed-wirefence proposed
for El Paso area;official adds that existing barbed-wirefence in San
Ysidro is "impenetrable."
1936 High-wire fence proposed for El Paso area.
1937 Funding for construction of eight observation towers in El Paso
areaapprovedby U.S. Congress;one tower projected to be 175 feet
high, another 125 feet high, and the rest each 75 feet high.
1948 Barbed-wire fence in El Paso reported in story, along with active
observation towers.
1955 (May) 696-mile-long fence proposed in U.S. Congress between
El Paso and the Pacific Ocean to keep out animals infected with
hoof-and-mouth disease and to enforce plant quarantines.
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1955 (July) New 14-foot-high fence proposed to replace old fence in
San Ysidro.
It is difficult to know how effective the fences and observation towers
were in stopping undesirable people, diseased animals, and smuggled
merchandise from penetrating the border. These structures certainly
slowed down the surreptitioustraffic,but in reality,the impact was minimal. The flow of undocumented migration continued at high levels in
the 1940s and 1950s, and so did the smuggling of narcotics and many
other products.4
Another important dimension of the story that has not received
due attention from historians is the public reaction to the presence of
human-made barriersin border communities. On the U.S. side, more
than likely each border fence episode before the 1970s elicited a mixed
response, just as occurred during the Tortilla Curtain incident and in
the most recent debates about the latest border wall proposal. On the
Mexican side, it is a good bet that there has always been overwhelming opposition to barriersand observation towers installed by the U.S.
government. One indication of the level of opposition in Mexico to
fences and watchtowers comes from the actions of former Ciudad Juarez
Mayor Rene MascarenasMiranda, who revealed in a 1976 oral history
interview his involvement in convincing U.S. authorities to remove the
towers in El Paso in the late 1950s.
During my term as mayor,my good friendAmbassadorRobert Hill
[U.S. ambassadorto Mexico] paid us a visit. It must have been in
the fall of 1958. At that time we were working to open the Cordova
Bridge, and I took him to Cordova Island.5 We came directly to
one of the observation towers. I had taken the road that led to
that tower purposely so he could see it. He did and without my
saying a word he asked, "Whatis that, a water tower?" "No sir," I
replied, "It is an observation tower. Pretend we are in a concentration camp, and we are under observation. Surely they are looking
at you with eyeglasses, and they must be asking themselves, 'What
the devil is the U.S. ambassador doing on that dusty road with
the mayor of Juarez?'"The ambassador said, "This is an insult
to Mexico." I replied, "It is good that you consider it an insult,
because I do too. Why don't you bring up the matter with your
State Department so those towers will disappear?"Three months
later there were no more towers.6
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Border Conflict -fr 269
With some obvious satisfaction,MascarenasMirandaalso related that
the following year he, along with the governor of Chihuahua and the
county judge of El Paso County, personally cut the barbed-wire fence
that surrounded Cordova Island when the announcement was made
that a proposed new international bridge at that spot would become a
reality. MascarenasMiranda expounded further on his feelings toward
border fences.
I don't like the idea offences. We don't live between East and West
Germany.The communist wall that is there is a slap in the face to
any nation that boasts of being democratic. We want greater fluidity and communication between us. We don't want barriers;we
don't want barbedwire fences. We brag that we are two neighborly
countries, two friendly nations, and that this is the longest border
in the world where one does not see a single soldier, a single rifle,
a single bayonet, or a single affronting or discriminatorysign.7
The
Tortilla
Curtain
Episode
The rising controversy over illegal immigration during the post-World
WarII yearsprecipitatedstronger border-enforcementactions on the part
of the INS. Between 1950 and 1955 the U.S. government successfully
pressured millions of Mexicans to leave the United States "voluntarily"
as part of an aggressive, quasi-military campaign known as "Operation Wetback."8 Those detained immigrants who rejected the option
to depart on their own suffered deportation. At the conclusion of the
campaign, U.S. officials asserted that the "wetback problem" had been
solved once and for all.
Contraryto that claim, however, undocumented immigrationactually
swelled during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
Officials calculated that at least three million unauthorized immigrants
lived in the United States in 1978, and that the number could be as high
as five million.9 The perception that a foreign "invasion"was underway
led to an increasingly acrimonious national debate in which Mexican
immigrants became the main targets. Thus the eruption of the Tortilla
Curtainincident in 1978-1979 followed yearsof frustrationin the United
States over the persistence of the border problem. What made it worse
was that in Washington, DC, attempts to find a comprehensive solution
to immigration issues failed repeatedly.
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In the absence of a legislative response to border concerns, the INS
sought support in the U.S. Congress for stopgap measures. That body
approvedfunding in 1977 and 1978 for the building offences in El Paso,
Texas;San Ysidro, California(on the boundary line south of San Diego);
and San Luis, Arizona (on the line south of Yuma). The new structures
in El Paso and San Ysidro had two purposes: (1) to replace dilapidated
fences that were full of holes, some big enough to allow cars through,
and (2) to force undocumented immigrants away from the urban areas
and into the open desert where they could be caught more easily.Thus
in late October 1978, the INS made a routine announcement that new,
twelve-foot-highfences topped with barbedwire would be built in El Paso
and San Ysidro. Fencing with barbed wire was not new on the border,
but what attracted attention was a remarkby the boastful contractor in
Houston that the new fences would "sever the toes of anyone trying
to scale [them]." The U.S. press quickly sensationalized the story by
referringto the fences as the "TortillaCurtain" and by highlighting the
featurein the builder'sdesign that called for the inclusion of sharprazors
and wires capable of cutting off fingers and toes of climbers.10
In Mexico, government officials and other leaders assailed the INS,
charging that the fences were a slap in the face to Mexico and that border crossers would face added dangers. Loud protests quickly erupted
among Mexican American organizations in the United States. Many
leaders denounced the INS for its inhumane approach to dealing with
undocumented immigrantsand for not consulting with the border community in advance. In El Paso, the Coalition Against the Fence held a
demonstration in December 1978, protesting the fence and the possible
stationing of troops along the border as well. In March 1979, an incident
involving a group of angry Mexican women whose crossing cards had
been taken by U.S. Immigrationinspectors turned into a near riot at one
of the international bridges when militant protestors arrivedto support
the women, blocking trafficand tearing down a U.S. flag and throwing
it into the Rio Grande.11
The objections raised in both countries by critics of the stepped-up
border-enforcement efforts had their desired effect. Shortly after the
initial announcement of the "TortillaCurtain," U.S. officialsdenied the
allegation that armed troops would be sent to patrol the border. They
also began to alter the design of the fence, removing the objectionable
razors that might cause physical harm to immigrants.12Meetings were
held with leaders of Mexican American organizations to explain the
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Border Conflict 4" 271
changes. Meanwhile U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo discussed the fence controversy as part of a
broader bilateralagenda in a meeting in Mexico in February 1979. The
final outcome of the debate, demonstrations, and official meetings was
the scaling back of the original menacing design of the Tortilla Curtain.
By the time construction began in the summer of 1979, the infamous
barbed-wire and razors feature had disappeared,and the lengths of the
fences had been reduced in both El Paso and San Ysidro.13
As borderlandersgrew accustomed to the new barriers,the INS in
subsequent years added more fencing in those two communities and
in other parts of the border as well. But the post- 1979 construction
structures lacked the dangerous designs that had brought notoriety to
the Tortilla Curtain, and the work proceeded with little controversy on
either side of the border.
At the beginning of the twenty-firstcentury,however, in the aftermath
of the terroristattacksof September 11, 2001, the issue of border fencing resurfaced with greater force than ever before because of the new
concern that anti-American Islamic jihadists might enter Mexico and
then sneak into the United States via stretches of the border that lacked
barriers.Thus, alarm over national security has been added to the two
traditional border concerns, undocumented migration and drug smuggling, and the pressure has never been greater on the U.S. government
to seal the border completely. But let us return to the Tortilla Curtain
incident, as the current proposed border fencing is addressed elsewhere
in this volume.
The controversy in 1978-1979 elicited interesting responses from
U.S. officials.At the time, relationswith Mexico were somewhat strained
because of disagreements between the two countries over the price of
Mexican oil and naturalgas exports. The specter of dangerous fences on
the border fueled tensions and made trade negotiations more difficult.In
an effort to lessen the friction, PresidentJimmy Carter,Attorney General
Griffen Bell, and U.S. Ambassador to Mexico PatrickJ. Lucey publicly
opposed the design of the fences, expressing surprisethat barrierswith
features that might injure immigrants were even under consideration.
Luceycharacterizedthe builder'scomments referringto the "toe-cutting"
capabilityof the fences as "outrageous."14In Texas, Governor William
Clemens spoke strongly against the Tortilla Curtain, saying, "I don't
believe that we and Mexico should have any sort of Berlin Wall on our
borders."15
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In the midst of the controversy, border scholars conducted several
opinion surveys in El Paso-Ciudad Juarez and San Diego. One survey
undertaken by Professor Ellwyn R. Stoddard that focused on leaders
revealed that 70 percent of influential El Pasoans opposed the construction of the fence, and an even higher 86 percent of important
people in Ciudad Juarez objected to the project. UE1Pasoans who
opposed the fence gave reasons for their attitudes quite similarto those
expressed by Ciudad Juarez leaders who also opposed it," wrote Stoddard. "Most of them saw the barrieras unnecessary, ineffective and of
short duration for the expense involved. Many were disturbed by its
design . . . , but mostly critical of the insensitivity of federal officials
in commencing such a project unilaterally without some input from
Mexican officials."16
I decided to conduct my own surveys after reading in the El Paso
press and hearing from U.S. immigration officials and others claims
that most El Pasoans, and particularly Mexican Americans, strongly
supported the building of the Tortilla Curtain. Such support allegedly
stemmed from firm opposition to undocumented immigration and
from the desire to keep out Mexicans from Ciudad Juarez, especially
juveniles, who were said to be committing many crimes in El Paso. I
found it disturbing that the El Paso Herald Post had concluded that
overwhelming backing for the INS proposal existed in the city based
on a few interviews with residents in a predominantly middle-class
neighborhood called Sunset Heights (near the border) and especially
from responses in returned questionnaires published in the Herald
Post that had solicited reader opinions about the fence. Of the 807
persons who returned questionnaires, 86 percent supported the fence
and only 7 percent opposed it. Some supporters added comments,
including the following: "Build it 2,000 miles long." "But we'd prefer
a cheaper way, a minefield." "Also, electrify the fence with 2,000 volts
of electricity." And from opponents: "The fence will be full of holes,
just wait and see ... waste of taxpayer monies. ..." "Travel 1,000
miles and be stopped by a six-mile fence? Nuts!" "Use the money to
develop jobs in Mexico."17
In the unpublished reports that summarizedthe results of my surveys,
I pointed out that the newspaper had failed to indicate that its interviews and "polls" were not scientific, and therefore the results should
be considered at most suggestive, and certainly not conclusive. I also
wrote that persons who responded to such requests from the media
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Border Conflict > 273
tendedto be seniorcitizens,conservative,affluent,and predominantly
I addedthat it was a safebet that manywere retirees
Anglo-American.
who habituallypassedawaytheirfreetimewritingletters"to the editor"
in sundryopinionpolls.Further,fewfromthe workingor participating
classsector of the MexicanAmericancommunityin El Paso read the
HeraldPost,let alone engagedin fillingout and mailingin newspaper
questionnaires.
Assistedby MarioGaldos,then a graduatestudentat the University
of Texasat El Paso,we set out in February1979 to determinethe viewpointsof fiftyrandomlyselectedMexicanAmericanresidentsof SouthEl
Paso,a poorneighborhoodadjacentto the border,andof fiftyrandomly
of variousethnicitieswho servedthat partof
selectedbusinesspersons
the city.At the time (and now) South El Paso servedas a prominent
who
andimmediatepathwayforhundredsof undocumentedimmigrants
crossedthe internationalboundaryon a dailybasis.
The resultsof our door-to-doorsurveysshowed that the assumed
"strong support" for the Tortilla Curtain among South El Paso's
Mexican Americansand businesspeoplewas in fact not there (see
table).18Among the communityresidents,34 percent opposed the
fence, 34 percentsupportedit, and 32 percentwere neutral.Eighty
percentfelt the fencewould not stop people fromcrossingthe border,
12 percent said it would, and 8 percentwere not sure. When asked
if they had experiencedproblemswith undocumentedpersons, 70
percent answeredno, 26 percent said yes, and 4 percent were not
sure. Those who reportedproblemsmentioned break-ins,attempted
break-ins,and theft as theirmaingrievances.Whenaskedif they knew
for surethat the intruderswereundocumentedpeople, they expressed
uncertainty,revealingawarenessthat many incidents of petty crime
invariablyinvolvedindividualsindigenous to the community.At the
time (and now) South El Paso had serioussocialproblemsstemming
from poverty and widespreadunemployment,especiallyamong the
youth.
The merchantswere even less enthusiasticabout the INS fence.
Sixty-twopercentopposedit, 28 percentfavoredit, and 10 percentwere
neutral.Eightypercentbelievedthat the fence would not stop people
fromcrossingthe border,while 16 percentfelt it would, and4 percent
werenot sure.Despitethe storiesthathadappearedin the mediaregarding widespreadtheft and vandalismin the Southsidestores allegedly
causedby undocumentedjuveniles,only 26 percentof the merchants
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274 * Journal of the Southwest
had experiencedsuch problems,and the nationalidentityof the perpetratorswas unclear.Seventypercenthad not encounteredproblems
andthe remainderwasuncertain.The most commoncomplaintamong
thosewho reportedproblemswastheft. Coincidentally,
the percentage
of merchantsreportingproblemswas the sameas that of the residents.
Results of "Tortilla Curtain" Survey
Conductedin February1979 with fiftyresidentsof South El Pasoand
fiftymerchantswith businessesin South El Paso
Are you in agreement that thefence should be built?
Yes
No
Residents
Merchants
17 (34%)
14 (28%)
17 (34%)
31 (62%)
Neutral
16 (32%)
5 (10%)
If built, do you think thefence will stop undocumentedpersonsfrom crossing the river?
Yes
No
Not Sure
Residents
Merchants
6(12%)
8(16%)
Problemswith undocumentedpersons:
Yes
Residents
Merchants
13(26%)
13 (26%)
40(80%)
40(80%)
4(8%)
2(4%)
No
Not Sure
35(70%)
35 (70%)
2(4%)
2 (4%)
Problemsexperiencedby thosewhoansweredpreviousquestion
affirmatively (number of times):
Residents
Theft
Theft andvandalism
Vandalism
Break-in/enteredhome
Nuisance
Merchants
7
4
2
10
1
1
1
Source: Unpublisheddata in the author'sfiles. Surveysconducted by author and Mario Galdos.
the viewpointsconcerningthe TortillaCurtainin El Paso
Interestingly,
differedsignificantlyfrom those in San Diego. In that Californiacity,
two surveyssuggestedvery strongsupportfor the fence. One mailing
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Border Conflict > 275
froma congressmanfoundthat64 percentof his constituentsendorsed
it, while only 29 percentdissented.A more formalsurveyof opinion
throughoutthe city yielded similarresults:68 percentsupportedthe
fence,26 percentdid not, and 6 percentgaveno opinion.19
Two majorfactorsneedto be consideredin attemptingto understand
the contrastin the opinionsin El Pasoversusthosein SanDiego. First,El
Pasois directlyadjacentto the borderandits economywas(andremains)
highlyintegratedwith Mexico's,whileSanDiego is abouttwentymiles
from the borderand its economy was only minimallydependenton
Mexicoat the timeof the TortillaCurtainincident.Sincethe late 1970s,
the degree of cross-borderintegrationbetween San Diego and Baja
The realbordercommunityin the
Californiahasincreasedsignificantly.
SanDiego areawas(andis) SanYsidro,but the opinionsof its residents
werenot soughtout becauseits smallsizemadeit ratherinconsequential
in internationalaffairs.Second,at the time of the controversy,Mexican
Americanscomprisedabout 63 of El Paso's populationbut only 15
percentof SanDiego's population.ThusEl Pasoansweremoredirectly
linkedwith Mexico and tended to be more sensitiveto the negative
impactthat a dangerousfencecould haveon cross-borderrelations.By
contrast,mostSanDiegoansdid not feelstronglinksto Mexicoandsaw
undocumentedimmigrantslargelyas a menaceto the United States.
Conclusion
The TortillaCurtainincidentof 1978-1979 put the nationalspotlight
in the United Statesonce againon undocumentedimmigration,triggeringan emotionaldebatefamiliarto historians.Similarcontroversies
had brokenout duringthe 1920s overimmigrationquotas,duringthe
depressionof the 1930s over economicand socialconcerns,and during the 1950s over cold war-triggeredanxietyrelatedto unauthorized
foreignersliving in the United States. Greaterborder controls and
and deportationsof Mexicanimmigrantsresulted
massiverepatriations
from these previousepisodes.But none of the responsesby the U.S.
governmenteffectivelycurtailedundocumentedimmigrationor reduced
drug smuggling.Thatpatternof failurecontinuedinto the late 1970s:
afterthe TortillaCurtainbarrierswent up in El Paso and San Diego,
didnot decline;instead
undocumentedimmigrationanddrugtrafficking
they increasedto unprecedentedlevels.
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276 ^ Journal
of the Southwest
At the time both the United States and Mexico understood abundantly well that economic need prompted Mexicans to cross the border
en masse, and that the U.S. economy needed and benefited from their
labor. In terms of real solutions, it was clear in the 1970s, as it is now,
that only a binational, comprehensive approachwould have any chance
of effectively managing the migration flow. But the political climate in
the United States did not allow for devising and implementing such a
holistic framework,or for havingMexicangovernment officialsparticipate
in negotiations that would lead to effective legislation. The immigration
issue was simply too "hot" in the U.S. political system, and it remainsso
today. So the focus in the U.S. Congress remained on border enforcement rather than on finding lasting solutions to the problem.
Interestingly,the TortillaCurtainepisode moved the INS along a new
path regardingbordercontrol; that is, towardfullerimplementationof the
idea of diverting undesirabletrafficawayfrom popular crossing points in
border urban areasto uninhabited ruralterrain.That strategywould be
carriedout in 1993 when the Border Patrol successfullylaunched Operation Blockade (renamed Operation Hold the Line) in El Paso, which
became the model for subsequent operations in other border locations.
The Border Patrol positioned agents on the border in close proximity
to each other around the clock, making it next to impossible for crossers
to break through the extant fences and the new human blockade. But
would-be immigrants did not give up. They went instead to unguarded
areas such as the Sonora-Arizona desert, where they could cross the
border more easily. That change in the pattern of crossing the border
has had tragic consequences for the immigrants. Since 1993 thousands
of people have died from exposure in the Arizona desert and in other
unforgiving, remote areas of the borderlands.
The uproar over the Tortilla Curtain was predictable once the media
publicized the builder'sabysmalcomment about barbedwire and razors,
and the INS had to backdown. Interestingly,opposition in both countries
to the dangerousdesign revealeda significantamount of humanitarianism
and sympathy for immigrants. By contrast, in the twenty-first century,
it appears that those compassionate feelings have eroded substantially,
as the hostility toward undocumented immigration in the United States
has hardened and become vitriolic, and many would even say hateful.
Legions of right-wing radio and television commentators, who were rare
in the 1970s, today engage in constant fearmongering, whipping up
public opinion against undocumented immigrants. The pundits, along
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Border Conflict -fr 277
with right-wing politicians, exaggerate numbers, distort the impact
of immigrants on U.S. society, and issue incessant hysterical warnings
about alleged terroristthreats on the border. Compared to the poisoned
political climate in which immigration and border fences are discussed
publicly today, and the harshness of the language used by some politicians as they debate legislative proposals, the environment that existed
during the Tortilla Curtainincident in the late 1970s seems quite sedate,
even nostalgic. *
Notes
1 . This brief overview of border history is based on my book, Troublesome
Border(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988; rev. ed., 2006).
2. On the evolution of U.S. immigration policy and its impact on Mexican
immigrants, see the following works: Francisco E. Balderramaand Raymond
Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal:MexicanRepatriation in the 1930s (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1995); Arthur F. Corwin, ed., Immigrants
and Immigrants: Perspectiveson Mexican Labor Migration to the United States
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); Ernesto Galarza,Merchantsof Labor:
The Mexican Bracero Story (San Jose, CA: Rosicrucian Press, 1964); Juan R.
Garcia, Operation Wetback:The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented
Workersin 1954 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Michael C. LeMay,
From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy since
1820 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987); Mae M. Ngai, ImpossibleSubjects:Illegal
Aliens and theMaking of ModernAmerica (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,
2004); Joseph Nevins, OperationGatekeeper:TheRise of the "IllegalAlien" and
the Making of the US -Mexico Boundary (New York: Routledge, 2002); and
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,TemporaryWorkerPrograms:
Backgroundand Issues,96th Congress, 2nd Session (February 1980).
3. From New TorkTimes,April 3, 1924, p. 34; LosAngeles Times,January26,
1925, p. 1; WashingtonPost,February24, 1925, p. 1; El PasoHerald Port,January
2, 1936; El Paso Times,April 15, 1937; ChicagoDaily Tribune,March 15, 1948,
p. 1, and May 27, 1955, p. 1; LosAngeles Times,July 13, 1955, p. 27.
4. As a teenagerliving in CiudadJuarezin the late 1950s I crossedinto El Paso
illegally many times, successfully hiding from the observers in the watchtowers
and eluding the roving Border Patrol agents. On a couple of occasions, however,
my brother and I were caught and sent back to Ciudad Juarez.
5. Patch of land belonging to Mexico left isolated by the shifting Rio Grande
and consequently widely used by border crossers and smugglers.
6. Oscar J. Martinez, "La fronteravista por Rene MascarefiasMiranda:Entrevistade historia oral", [1976], unpublished manuscripton file at the Institute
of Oral History at the University of Texas at El Paso, pp. 287-88.
7. Ibid. pp. 287, 289.
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278 ^ Journal
of the Southwest
8. See Garcia, Operation Wetback.
9. WashingtonPost. December 24, 1978, p. A3.
10. See, for example, WashingtonPost, October 24, 1978, p. A6; El Paso
Herald Post, October 25, 1978, p. Al; New YorkTimes,November 7, 1978, p.
22.; WashingtonPost, December 24, 1978, p. A3.
11. Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Oscar J. Martinez, and Miguel Angel Martinez
Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations and the ccTortillaCurtain": A Study of
LocalAdaptation to FederalBorderPolicies(El Paso: El Paso Council on the Arts
& Humanities, 1979), pp. 20-21. This sixty-seven-page report (in typescript)
unfortunately received limited distribution beyond El Paso.
12. El Paso Herald Post, October 25, 1978, p. Al; Stoddard, Martinez, and
Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations, pp. 20-22.
13. Stoddard, Martinez, and Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations, pp.
20-22.
14. WashingtonPost, December 24, 1978, p. A3.
15. New YorkTimes,November 7, 1978, p. 22. Interestingly,the Washington
Post began another story on the controversy with a reference to famous border
barriersin world history that had been judged failures:"History has given us a
Great Wall of China, a Maginot Line in France, a McNamara Line in Vietnam
and a lesson about man-made barriers:Most of them don't work, as long as there
are human beings intent on going from one side to the other." WashingtonPost,
December 24, 1978, p. A3
16. Stoddard, Martinez, and Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations, pp.
27-28.
17. El Paso Herald Post, December 6, 1978, pp. A1-A2.
18. Complete results of the surveys are in the author's files. A brief summary
drawn directly from my original report and similarto what I have included here
appears in Stoddard, Martinez, and Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations,
pp. 28-29.
19. Ibid., 30, 67.
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