love and knowledge: emotion in feminist epistemology i

LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE: EMOTION IN FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY Alison M. Jaggar
Within th~ western philosophical tradition, ('motions lIsually have be~n con­
sider~d as potLCnti:ll1y or actually subver~ive of knowledge.' From Plato until
the present, with a few Ilotable exceptions, rca son rather than ~m()ti()n has
b~en regarded as the indispl'l1sable faculty for acquiring knowledge.'
~llthough again not lIwariably, the rational has been contrasted
and this ,:olltrasted p:lIr then has often heen linked with
other dichotol1lies. Nor only has reason been contrasted with
has also heen associated with the mental, the culnlral, the
;md the male, whereas emotion has heen associated with the irrational,
the phYSical, the natural, the particular, the private, and, of course, the
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of place to reason
rather than emotion., it has not ahvays exdudnl emotion cOlTlpletely from the
reallll of reason. In the /'hLlCdrus, Plato portrayed emotions, such as anger or
curiosity, as irrational urges (horses) that must always he controlled by rea­
son (the charioteer). On this model, the ellJotlons were not seCll as needing to
be totill1y surpre~scd hut r:uher as needing direction by reason: for example,
111 a genuinely thrcatclllllg situation, It was thought not only Irrational but
not to be afraid.· The !>plit between reason and ClUotion was not
ahsolute, therefore, for the (;rel'ks. Instead, the emotions were thought of as
providmg indispensable motive power that needed to be channeled
. Withol1l horses, after all, the skill of the charioteer wOllld be worthless. The contrast between reason and emotion was sharpened in the sevCll­
teenth century by redefining reaSOll as a purely instrumental faculty. For hoth the Creeks and the medieval philosopher!>, reason had been linked with value
ohJective st rtKture or order of
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LOVE ANI) KNOWLEDGF
Al.JSON M. JAGGAR
seen as simultaneously namral and morally justified. With the rise of modern
science, however, the realms of namre and value were separated: n<lture was
stripped of value and reconceptualized as an inanimate mechanism of no in­
trinsic worth. Values were relocated in human beings, rooted in their prefer­
ences and emotional responses. The separation of supposedly namral
from human v<~llle meant that reason, if it were to provide trustvvorthy in­
sight into reality, had to be uncontaminated by or abstracted from value. In­
creasingly, therefore, though never universally,; reason was reconceptualized
as the ability to make valid inferences from premises established elsewhere,
the ability to calculate means bur not to determine ends. 111e validity of log­
ical inferences was thought independent of human attitudes and prefer­
ences; this was now the sense in which reason was taken to be objective and
universal. '
modern redefinition of rationality required a corresponding recono.c'P­
hIalization of emotion. This was achieved by portraying emotions as nonra­
tional and often irrational urges that regularly swept the body, rather as a
storm sweeps over the land. The common way of referring to the emotions as
the "passions" emphasized that emotions happened to or were imposed upon
an individual, something she suffered rather than something she did.
epistemolob'Y associated with this new ontology rehabilitated sensory
perception that, like emotion, typically had been suspected or even discounted
the western tradition as a reliable source of knowledge. British empiricism,
succeeded in the nineteenth century by positivism, took its epistemological
task to be the formulation of rules of inference that would b'11arantee the deri­
vation of certain knowledge from the "raw data" supposedly given direc.:tly to
the senses. Empirical testability became accepted as the hallmark of natural
science; this, in turn, was viewed as the paradi!!,m of genuine
Epistemolof,'Y was often equated with the philosophy of science, and the
dominant methodology of positivism prescribed that truly scientific knowl­
must be capable of intersubje<.tive verification. Because values ;1I1d emo­
tions had been defined as variable and idiosyncratic, positivism stipulated that
trustworthy knowledge could be established only by methods that neutralized
values and emotions of individual scientists.
Recent approaches to epistemology have challenged some fundamental as­
sumptions of the positivist epistemological model. Contemporary theorists of
knowledge have undermined once rigid distinLtions betweell analytic
theories and observations, and even between
facts and values. However, few challenges have thus far been raised to the
ltT>nrrp,i gap between emotion and knowledge. In this essay, I wish to be­
uaUlt.lllg this gap through the suggestion that emotions may be helpful
necessary rather than inimical to the constm<.tion of
14 6
My account is exploratory in nahlre and leaves many questions
It is not supported by irrefutable arguments or conclusive proofs; instead,
it should be viewed as a preliminary sketch for an epistemological model
that will require much further development before its workability can be
established.
EMOTION
1. What Are Emotions?
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\i 1be philosophical question: What are emotions? requires both exolicating the
ways in which people ordinarily speak about emotion and
quacy of those ways for expressing and
Several problems confront someone trying to answer this deceptively
question. One set of difficulties results from the variety,
inconsistency of the ways 1n which emotions arc viewed, in
scientific contexts. It is, in part, this variety that makes emotions into ,a
"question" at the same time that it precludes answering that question
simple appeal to ordinary usage. A second set of difficulties is the wide range
of phenomena covered by the term "emotion": these extend from apparently
instantaneous "knee-jerk" responses of fright to lifelong dedication to an
individual or a cause; from highly civilized aesthetic responses to undifferen­
feelings of hunger and thirst," from background moods such as con­
tentment or depression to intense <1m1 focused involvement in an immediate
situation. It may well be impossible to construct a manageable account of
emotion to cover such apparently diverse phenomena.
A further problepl concerns the criteria for preferring one account of emo­
tion to another. -Ille more one learns about the ways in which other cultures
concephlalize human faculties, the less plausible it becomes that emotions
constitute what philosophers call a "natural kind." Not only do some cul­
tures identify emotions unrecognized in the West, but there is reason to
believe that the concept of emotion itself is a historical invention, like the con­
cept of intelligence (Lewontin 1982) or even the concept of mind (Rorry
1
For instance, anthropologist Catherine Lutz argues that the "dichot­
omous categories of 'cognition' and 'affect' are themselves Euroamerican
cultural constructions, master symbols that participate in the fundamental or­
ganization of our ways of looking at ourselves and others (Lutz 1985, 1
both in and outside of social science" (Lutz 1987:308). If this is true, then we
even more reason to wonder about the adeau:KY of ordinary western
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LOVl_ ANll KNOWLFDC
ways of t,)lking ,1bout emotion. 'Yet \\'e have 110 access either to our emo­
tions or to those of others, independellt of or ulIl1lediated hv the discourse of
our culture.
In the bce of these diffimlt ies, I shall sketch all ,KCOUllt of emotion with
the following limitations. First, it will operate within til(' context of western
diSCUSSIons of emotion: I shall not question, for instance, whether it would be
possible or desirable to dispense entirdy WIth anything resembling our con­
cept of emotion. Second, although this accoLlnt ,mel11pts to be consistent with
,1$ much ,)$ possible of western understandings of elllotion, it is mtended to
cover only a limited domain, not every phenomenon that may he called an
emotion. On the contra ry, it exdudes as genuine emotions both automatic
responses and nonintentional sensations, such as hunger pangs.
I do not pretend to offcr ,1 complete theory of emotion; instead, I fo­
cus on a lew specific aspects of el1lotion that I take to have been ne).',lected or
misrepresented, especially in positivist and lleopositivist ,lecounts.
would defcnd my approach not only on the ground that it illuminates aspects
of our experil'llce and al."!:ivity th,lt are obs(ured by positivist and nl'Opositiv­
1st cOl1struals but also on the ground that it is less open th,lIl these to ideolog­
ical abuse. In particular, I believe that recognizillg (errain negiencd aspects of
emotion makcs possible a better and h.:ss idl'Ologically biased account of how
is, and so oll).',ht to be, constructed.
2. Enzotions as InteJ1tiunal
Early positivist ;lpproa(hes to understanding emotion asslll1led that all ade­
quate ac(ount required analytically separating emotion fmm other human
faculties. Just as positivist accounts of sense perception ;mempted to distin­
the supposedly r,lW dar,) of sensatioll from their (ognitive interpreta­
tions, so positivist ac,,~ounts of emotioll tried to separate emotion (onceptually
from both rcason and sense perception. As part of their sharpening of these
distin(tions, positivist wnstruals of emotion tended to identifv emotions
the physical feelings or involuntarv bodily movelllents that tvpically accom­
pany them, such as pangs or qualms, Hushes or trcmors; elllotions were also
assimil<lled to the subduing of physiological function or movcment, as in the
case of sadness, depression, or boredom. The cOlltilluing inHul'llcl' of
scientifi,,~ conceptions of emotion can be sem in the tal"!: that" feel­
ing" is often used colloquially as a synonym for emOtion, even though the
more cmtral meaning of "feeling" is physiological sensation. On such ac­
counts, emotions were not seen as bl'ing af}()ut anything: instead, they were
(ontrasted with ;md sel'n ;)5 pote11lial disruptions of othl'r phenomena that
<Ire about some thing, phenolllena, such ;15 rational judglllents, tiJollL'hts. and
14R
observ;niolls. The positivist approach to llnderstJlldll1g ell1otion has been
called the Dumb View (Spelman 19R2).
'111e Dumb View of emotion is quite lmten;lhle. For one
the same
or phvsiological response is likely to be
,1S V,lflOllS CIllO­
on the context of its experience. This
is otten ilillstra­
rderCllce to the famolls Schxhter and Singer
were indu(ed in research subjects by thc
the subjects then <1ttribllted to thclllselves appropriate emotions l1epclll1l1lg on
their context (Schachter and Singer 1969). Another problem with the Dumh
View is that identifying emotions with tcelings would Iluke It impossible to
that a person Intght not Ix' aware ot her cmotional state beGlllSe
definition are a lTIatter of conscious awareness. Fin,llk, emotions
differ from feelings, sensations, or nhvsiolof!ical respollses in that they are dls­
we l11;lY ;lssert truthfully th,lt we
cl'rt;lin eycnts, even if at that mo­
nor tearful.
In recent vears, contemporary philosophers 11<I\T tended to
Dumh Vicw of emotion and h,1\'e substituted more intentional or
understandings. '111ese newer conceptions elTIphasize th;lt intentional judg­
ments ;15 well as phvsiological disturb;mces are llltegrJI deillents in emotion.
They define or identify Cl1lotiOll~ not by tbe L]lt:1litv or character ot the
iologic11 sen~atjoll that may he associated with thcm but r;lther by their
intl'lltional aspect, the associated judgment. '111lls, it is the contcnt of my as­
sociated thought or judgmcnt that determines
and restlessness are defined as ",lllxletv ;lbout
of tonight's performance." Cognitivist accounts of emotion have been criticized as to allq!;edlv spontalleous, automatic, or global general feclings of nct:V0llsness, colltelltl'llness, angst, ecstJsy, or terror. Cer­ tainly, these accollnts entail th,lt infants and animals experiellce emotiolls, at all, in only a primitive, rudiml'nury form. Far frolll b,'ing llll,Kceptable, however, this entailment is desirable because it suggests th,n humans develop and l1Uturc ill elllotiollS as well ,15 ill othn dlllleJ1siollS; they increase the range, variety, and subtlety of their emotiollal respollses in accortLlllcl' life experiences and their rdlcctiol1s on these.
accounts of elllotion arc not without their O\vn problems. A sc­
\vith many is that they end up replicating within the structure
of elllotion the vcry problem they arc trying to solve-namely, that of all
artificial split between elllotion and thought- beclllsc most cognitivist ac­
COunts explain emotioll as having two "components": all affective or fecl­
lllg compollent and ,1 (ognitioll that supposedly interprets or
feelings. 'I11ese accounts, therefore, unwittinglv perpetu;lte the
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ALISON M. JAG(;AR
L 0 V E ;\ N lJ K N () W L U) (; F
distinction hetween the shared, public, ohjecti\'(: world of verifiable calcula_
tions, observations, and facts and the individual, private, suhjective world of
feelings and sensations. TIlis sharp dist inl"tion breaks any COn­
ceptual links between our feelings and the "external" world:
still conceived as blind or raw or undifferentiated, thl'll we Glll
of the notio11 of feelings fitting or failing to tit our perceptml
is, being appropriate or inappropriate. \Xihen intentiomlity is viewed as
\cctual cognition and moved to the center of om picture ot
fective elements Jre push"d to the periphery and become
whose n:levance to (motion is obscure or even
quate cognitive account of emotion must overcome this
Most cognitivist accounts of elllotion thus remain problematic IIlsorar as
they fail to explain the relation between the cognitive and the affective aspects
of emotion. Moreover, insofar as they prioritize the intellectual over the feel­
ing aspects, they reinforce the traditional western prcterence for mind Over
body.' Nevertheless, they do identify a vital feature of emotion overlooked
the Dumb View, namely, its intcntionality.
as expressions of gnd, respect, contempt, or ~lllger. On an even
cultures construct divergent understandings of what emotions
are. ror instance, English metaphors and metollymies arc said to reve'll a
of anger as a hot tluid, contained in a priv~ltc space within an
and liable to dangerous public explosion (Lakoff ~lIld Kovecses
1987). By colltrast, the Ilongot, a people of the Philippines, apparently do not
understand the self in terms of a puhlic/privatc distinction ,1lld consequently
do not experience anger as an explOSIve internal force: for them, rather, it is
phenomenon for wlllch ~m individual may, for instance, bc
3. Emotions as Social Constructs
We tend to cxperience ollr emotions as IIlVOllllltary mdlvldu.11 responses to
responses that arc often (though, sigl1lticantly, not always) private
in the sense that they are 110t perceived as directlv and imlllnliately by other
people as they arc by the subject of the experience. The apparently individual
and involuntary chara ..ter of our emotional experience is oftell taken as evi­
dence that emotions arc presocial, instinctive responses, determined by our
biological constiultion. This inferellce, however, is quite mistaken. Although
it IS prohably true that the physiological disUlrballo.'s characterizing emo­
tions-facial grimaces, changes in the metabolic ratc, sweating, trembling,
tears, and so on-arc continuous with the instinctive responses of our pre­
human ancestors and also that the ontogeny of emotions to some extent re­
capitulates their phylogeny, maUm: human emotions can he seen as neither
instinctive nor hiologically determmed. Instead, they are socially constru<.-1:ed
on several levels.
Emotions are most obviously socially constructed in that children arc
taught deliberately what their culture defines as appropriate responses to cer­
tain siUlations: to fear strangers, to enJoy spi<.-y food, or to like swimming in
cold water. On a less conscious level, childrcn also kam what thcir culture
detlnes as the appropriate ways to express the emotions that it recogmzes. AI­
there may be crosscultural Similarities in the expression of some ap­
universal emotions, there arc also wide divergences in vvhat are
50
Further aspects of the social construction of emotioll are revealed through
refle<.-tioll on emotion's intentl()n~ll structure. If emotions necess'lrily involve
thell obviously the\' require concepls, which may be seen as so­
cially constructed ways of organizin!', and making sense of the world. for this
reason, emotions arc slIl1Ult;l11eously made posslhle and limited by the con­
cepulal and linguistic resources of a societv. This philosophical claim is horne
oul by empincal ohservation of the cultural variability of ,'motion. Although
there is considerable overlap III the emotions identilied h:; man~' cultures
(Wierzbicka 1986), at least some emotions arc historically or
speCific, including perhaps l!l11lUi, ,mgst, the Jap;lIll:se am,}i (in which one
to another, affiliative love) and the response of "being a wild pig,'·
which occurs among the Gururumha, a horticultural people livin!', in the
New Guinea Highlands (Averell 1'JXO: \58). Even apparently universal emo­
tions, such as anger or love m~ly vary cro~scu1turally. We have just seen that
the Iiongot experience of anger apparentlv is quite different from the modern
western experience. Romantic love was invelltcd III the Middle Ages in Eu­
rope and since th;lt time has been Illodified considerablv; for instance, it is no
longer confined to the nobility, and it no longer needs to be extramarital or
unconsummated. In some culUlres, romantic love docs not exist at all."
Thus, there are complex linguistiC and other social preconditions for the
experience, th;lt is, for the existence of human elllotions. 'n1e emotions that
we cxperience rdb.1: prev.liling forms of soci;]! lik. For instance, one could
not feel or even be betrayed in the ;lhsence of social norms about fidelity: it is
inconceivable that bctr;lVal or indeed anv distinctively hunun emotion could
be experienced by a soli~ary individual il~ sOllle hvpo~heticll presocial state of
naturc. There is a sense in which any individual's guilt or anger, joy or tri­
umph, presupposes the existence of a social group capable of ieding
anger, joy, or triumph. This is not to say that group emotions historically pre­
cede or are logical1y prior to the emotions of individuals; it is to say that
individual experience is simultaneously social experience. '" In later sections, I
shall explore the epistemological and political implications of this social
rather than individual understanding of emotion.
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LOVE AND KNOWU',J)GE
ALISON M. JAG GAR
4. Ernotions as Active Engagernents
We often interpret our emotions as experiences that overwhelm us rather
than as responses we consciously choose: that emotions arc to some extent
is part of the ordinary meaning of the term "emotion.·' Even in
that emotions are not
responses to various situations to
us to think differentlv about situations. For
our response to an
either diven our attention from its more
sary for some larger good.
Some psychological theories interpret emotions as chosen on an even
deeper level-as actions for which the agent disclaims responsibility. For in­
stance, the psychologist Averell likens the experience of emotion to playing a
culturally recognized role: we ordinarily perform so smoothly and automatic­
ally that we do not realize we arc giving a performance. He provides many
examples demonstrating that even extreme and apparently totally involving
displays of emotion in fact are fulK-rional for the individual and/or the soci­
ety. II For example, students requested to record their experiences of anger or
annoyance over a two-week period came to realize that their anger was not
as uncontrollable and irrational as they had assumed previously, and they
noted the usefulness and effectiveness of anger in achieving various social
goods. Averell, notes, however, that emotions are often usehll in attaining
their goals only if they are interpreted as passions rather than as aCi:ions, and
he cites the case of one subject led to rdlect on her anger who later wrote
that it was less usehll as a defence mechanism when she became conscious of
its
The action/passion dichotomy is too simple for understanding emotion, as
it is for other aspects of our lives. Perhaps it is more helpful to think of emo­
tions as habitual responses that we may have more or less
We claim or disclaim resDonsihilitv for
on our
responses
context. We could never "",>p'·'f'r,,-,>
aCIIons, for then they would appear
but neither should emotions be seen as
which
are
sponses to the world. Rather,
seen as necessanly passIve or
arc ways in which we engage
IS
2
even constnKi: the world. 'I11ey have both mental and physical aspects, each
of which conditions the other. In some res peLts, they are chosen, but ill oth­
ers they are involuntary; they presuppose language and a social order. lllUs,
they can he attributed only to what are sometimes called "whole persons,"
engaged in the on-going activitY of social life.
s.
Emotion, Ellaluation, and Observation
Emotions and values are closely related. The rebtion is so close,
that
accounts of what it is to hold or express certain values re­
phenomena to nothing more than holding or
certain
attitudes. When the relevant conception of emotion is the Dumb
emotivism certainly is too crude an account of what it is to
on this account, the intentionality of value
become nothing more than sophisticated grunts and
groans. Nevertheless, the grain of important truth in emotivism is its r,,,-nn,,,_
tion that values presuppose emotions to the extent that emotions provide the
experiential basis for values. If we had no emotional responses to
it is inconceivable that we should ever come to value one state of affairs more
highly than another.
Just as values presuppose emotions, so emotions presuppose values. 'I11e
object of an emotion-that is, the object of fear, grief, pride, and so on-is a
complex state of affairs that is appraised or evaluated by the individual. For
instance, my pride in a friend's achievement necessarily incorporates the value
judgment that my friend has done something worthy of admiration.
Emotions and evaluations, then, are logically or conceptually connected.
Indeed, many evaluative terms derive directly from words for emotions: "de­
sirable," "admirable," "contemptible," "despicable,"
" and so
on. Cettainly it is true (pace J. S. Mill) that the evaluation
a situation as
desirable or dangerous does not entail that it is universally desired or feared
but it does entail that desire or fear is viewed
sponse to the situation. If someone is
ceived as dangerous, her lack of fear
if someone is afraid without evident
can be identified, her tear IS denounced as IrratIonal or
every emotion presupposes an evaluation of some aspect
every evaluation or almraisal of the sit­
will
a predK1:able emotional response to
of intentional
of the Dumb View
a realization that
111 emotion
1.)3
ALISON M. JAGGAR
LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE
influences and indeed partially constitutes emotion. We have seen already
that distinctively human emotions are not simple instinnive responses to situ­
ations or events; instead, they depend essentially on the ways that we perceive
those situations and events, as well on the ways that we have learned or de­
cided to respond to them. Without charaneristically human perceptions of
and engagements in the world, there would be no charaC1:eristically human
emotions.
Just as observation directs, shapes, and partially defines emotion, so too
emotion directs, shapes, and even partially defines observation. Observation
is not simply a passive process of absorbing impressions or recording stimuli;
instead, it is an aC1:ivity of selec1:ion and interpretation. What is selected and
how it is interpreted are influenced by emotional attitudes. On the level of in­
dividual observation, this influence has always been apparent to common
sense, noting that we remark on very different features of the world when we
are happy or depressed, fearful or confident. This influence of emotion on
perception is now being explored by social scientists. One example is the so­
called Honi phenomenon, named after a subject called Honi who, under
identical experimental conditions, perceived strangers' heads as changing in
size but saw her husband's head as remaining the same. 12
The most obvious significance of this sort of example is illustrating how
the individual experience of emotion focuses our attention selec1:ively, di­
recting, shaping, and even partially defining our observations, just as our ob­
servations direct, shape, and partially define our emotions. In addition, the
example has been taken further in an argument for the social construction of
what are taken in any situation to be undisputed facts, showing how these
rest on intersubjective agreements that consist partly in shared assumptions
about "normal" or appropriate emotional responses to situations (McLaugh­
lin 1985). Thus, these examples suggest that certain emotional attitudes are
involved on a deep level in all observation, in the intersubjeC1:ively verified
and so supposedly dispassionate observations of science as well as in the
common perceptions of daily life. In the next section, 1 shall elaborate this
claim.
recognize that emotion, like sensory perception, is necessary to human sur­
vival. Emotions prompt us to act appropriately, to approach some people
and situations and to avoid others, to caress or cuddle, fight or flee. Without
emotion, human life would be unthinkable. Moreover, emotions have an in­
trinsic as well as an instrumental value. Although not all emotions are enjoy­
able or even justifiable, as we shall see, life without any emotion would be life
without any meaning.
Within the context of western culture, however, people have often been en­
couraged to control or even suppress their emotions. Consequently, it is not
unusual for people to be unaware of their emotional state or to deny it to
themselves and others. This lack of awareness, especially combined with a
neopositivist understanding of emotion that construes it just as a feeling of
which one is aware, lends plausibility to the myth of dispassionate investiga­
tion. But lack of awareness of emotions certainly does not mean that emo­
tions are not present subconsciously or unconsciously or that subterranean
emotions do not exert a continuing influence on people's articulated values
and observations, thoughts and actions. I"
Within the positivist tradition, the influence of emotion is usually seen only
as distorting or impeding observation or knowledge. Certainly it is true that
contempt, disgust, shame, revulsion, or fear may inhibit investigation of cer­
tain situations or phenomena. Furiously angry or extremely sad people often
seem quite unaware of their surroundings or even their own conditions; they
may fail to hear or may systematically misinterpret what other people say.
People in love are notoriously oblivious to many aspects of the situation
around them.
In spite of these examples, however, positivist epistemology recognizes that
the role of emotion in the construnion of knowledge is not invariably delete­
rious and that emotions may make a valuable contribution to knowledge.
But the positivist trapition will allow emotion to play only the role of suggest­
ing hypotheses for investigation. Emotions are allowed this because the so­
called logic of discovery sets no limits on the idiosyncratic methods that in­
vestigators may use for generating hypotheses.
When hypotheses are to be tested, however, positivist epistemology im­
poses the much stricter logic of justification. The core of this logic is replic­
ability, a criterion believed capable of eliminating or canceling out what are
conceptualized as emotional as well as evaluative biases on the part of indi­
vidual investigators. The conclusions of western science thus are presumed
"objenive," precisely in the sense that they are uncontaminated by the sup­
posedly "subjective" values and emotions that might bias individual investi­
gators (Nagel 1968:33-34).
But if, as has been argued, the positivist distinction between discovery and
justification is not viable, then such a distinction is incapable of filtering out
EPISTEMOLOGY
6. The Myth of Dispassionate Investigation
As we have already seen, western epistemology has tended to view emotion
with suspicion and even hostility. I I This derogatory western attitude toward
emotion, like the earlier western contempt for sensory observation, fails to
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Al,lSON M. IfI.(;Gl\l{
values In science. For example, although such a spin, when huilt into
western scientific method, is generally sllccessful in neutralizing the
cratic or unconventional values of individual investigators, it Ius been argued
that it does not, indeed cannot, eliminate generally accepted social
TIlese values are implicit in the identification of the prohlems considered wor­
of investigation, in the selelliol1 of the hypotheses considered
of testing, ami in the solutions to the problems considered worthy of accep­
ranee. The science of past centuries provides sample evidence of the inrluence
of prevailing social values, whether seventeenth-century atomistic physics
(Merchant 1980) or, competitive interpretations of natural seleltion (Young
LOVE AND KNO\VLED(;E
struct concepru;ll models that delllollstr,lte the mutually constitutive r,\ther
oppositional relation betv..een reason and emotion. Far from
the possibility of reliable knowledge, emotion as well as value must be shown
as necessary to such knowledge. Despite its classical :1ntel'Cdents and like the
ideal of disinterested enquiry, the ideal of dispassionate enquiry IS an impossi­
ble dream but a dream nonetheless or perhaps a myth that has exerted enor­
mous intluence 011 western eplstel11olob'Y. Like all myths. it is a form of
ideology that fulfils certain social and Dolitical functions.
7. The Ideological Function
1985).
Of course, only hindsight allows us to identify clearly the values that
shaped the science of the past and thus to reveal the formative inrluence on
science of pervasive emotional attitudes, attitudes that typically went unre­
marked at the time beclUse they were shared so generally. For instance, It is
flOW glaringly evident that contempt for (and perhaps tear of) people of color
is implicit in nineteenth-century anthropology's interpretation and even con­
struction of anthropological facts. Because we arc closer to
is harder for us to see how certain emotions, such as sexual possessiveness or
the need to dominate others, currently arc accepted as guiding princioles in
twentieth-century sociobiology or e\Tn defined as p;lrt of re1son within
cal theory and economics
Values and emotions enter illto the science of the past and the present, not
on the level of scientific practice but also on the merascientific level, as
answers to V,}fiOliS questions: Wh,lt is science? How should it he practiced?
and What is the status of scientific investigatioll versus nonscientific Illodes of
enquiry? for instance, it is claimed with increasing frequency that the modem
western conception of '>cience, which identifies knowledge with power and
views it as a weapon for dominating nature, reflects the imperialism, racism,
and miso!!Vnv of the socit,ties th;lt created it. Several feminist theorists have
itself may he viewed as an expression of
char;Kteristic of m;lles in certain pe­
riods, sllch ;15 separation anxiety and paranoia (Flax 1983; Bordo 1997) or
an obsession with control and fear of contamination (Scheman 1985; Schott
the Myth
So far, I have spoken very generally of people and their emotions, as though
everyone experienced similar emotions and dealt with them in similar ways.
It is an axiom of feminist theory, however, that all generalizations about
"people" are Sllspect. '\11(' divisions in our society are so deep, p,micularly the
divisions of race, class, and gender, that many feminist theorists would claim
that talk about people in gener,ll is ideologlGllly dJngerolis beclllse such talk
obscures the fact that no one is simplv a person but instead is constituted fun­
race, class, and gender. Race, class, ,1Ild gender slwpc every as­
pell of our lives, and our emotional constitution is nm excluded. Recognizing
this helps liS to sec more clearly the political functions of the myth of the dis-
Positivism views values and emotions as alien invaders that must he re­
pelled by a stril,er ~lpplicati()n of the scientific method. If the foregoing cbims
are correlt, however, the scientific method and even its positivist construals
themselves incorporate values and emotions. Moreover, such an incor­
seems a necessary feature of all knowledge and conceptions of
knowledge. Therefore, rather than repressing emotion in epistemology it is
necessary to rethink the relation between knowledge and emotion and con­
Feminist theorists have pointed out th;lt the western tradition has not seen
everyone as eqUJlly cmotional. Instead, rC,lson has been associmed with
members of dominant political, SOCIal, amI culturJI groups and emotion with
members of suhordinate groups. Prominent ,1lllong those subordin;He groups
in our society are people of color, except for 5UDl,osedlv "inscrutable orien­
tals," and women.',
Although the emot ionali!v of women IS ,1 familiar cultural stereotype, its grounding is quite shaky. WonlCl1 appear more emotional than men because with some groups of people of color, are permitted and evell re­
quin.·d to express emotion more openly. In contemporary western culture, inexpressive women are suspect as not being rcal women,
vvhereas men \',;ho express their emotions freely arc suspellcd of heing hOlllo­
sexual or in some other way deviant from the masculine [deal. Modern west­
ern men, in contrast with Shakespc<ue's heroes, for instance, arc required to
present a facade of coolness, LlCk of excitement, even boredom, to express
emotion only rarely and then for relatively trivial events, such as sporting oc­
casions, where expressed elllotions :lre acknowledged to he dramatized and
so arc not taken entirely seriously .. OlliS, women in our society form the
main group allowed or even expected to feel emotion. A WOfIl,lll may cry in
15 6
157
1988).
ALI SON M.
J AGGAR
may geStiCulate, but a white man
and a man of
the face of
merely sets his jaw.
White men's control of their emotional
may go to the extremes
of repressing their emotions, failing to develop emotionally, or even losing the
capacity to experience many emotions. Not uncommonly these men are un­
able to identify what they are feeling, and even they may be surprised, on oc­
casion, by their own apparent lack of emotional response to a simation, such
as death, where emotional reaction is perceived appropriate. In some married
couples, the wife implicitly is assigned the job of feeling emotion for both of
them. White, college-educated men increasingly enter therapy in order to
learn how to "get in touch with" their emotions, a project other men may
ridimlc as weakness. In therapeutic situations, men may learn that they are
adept at identifying their own or others'
as emotional as women but
emotions. In consequence, their emotional development may be relatively
this mav lead to moral
or insensitivity. Paradoxically,
awareness of their own emotional responses
more intluenced by emotion rather than less.
lilllOUWl there is no reason to suppose that the thoughts and a~1:ions of
women are any more influenced by emotion than the thoughts and actions of
men, the stereotypes of cool men and emotional women continue to flourish
because they are confirmed by an uncritical daily experience. In these circum­
stances, where there is a differential assignment of reason and emorian, it is
easy to see the ideological function of the myth of the dispassionate investiga­
tor. It fun~1:ions, obviously, to bolster the epistemic authority of the currently
dominant groups, composed largely of white men, and to discredit the obser­
vations and claims of the currently subordinate groups including, of course,
the observations and claims of many people of color and women. lbe more
forcefully and vehemently the latter groups express their observations and
the more emotional they appear and so the more easily they are dis­
credited. The allee:ed eoistemic authority of the dominant groups then
I
I
.,I I
I
I
I
n
KN OWLEDGE
8. Emotional Hegemony and Ernotional Subl'ersion
mature human emotions are neither instirK1:ive nor
although they may have developed out of presocial,
responses. Like everything else that is human, emotions in part are
amstructed; like all social constru~1:S,
are historical
bearing the marks of the society that constru~1:ed them. Within the very lan­
guage of emotion, in our basic definitions and explanations of what it is to
feel pride or embarrassment, resentment or contempt, cultural norms and ex­
pe~1:ations are embedded. Simply describing ourselves as angry, for instance,
presupposes that we view ourselves as having been wronged, victimized by
the violation of some social norm. "Ibus, we ahsorh the standards and values
of Ollr society in the very process of learning the language of emotion, and
those standards and values are built into the foundation of our emotional
constitution.
Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominate tend
to serve the interest of the dominant group. Within a capitalist, white su­
and male-dominant
the predominant values will tend to
we are all likely to de­
for feminism. Whatever
an emotional constitution
has called "visceral
our color, we are likely to feel
racism"; whatever our sexual (WIl'nt1tllm
to be homophobic;
whatever our class, we are likely to be at least somewhat ambitious and com­
petitive; whatever our sex, we are likely to feel contempt for women. "Ine
emotional responses may be so deeply rooted in us that they are relatively im­
pervious to intelle~1:ual argument and may recur even when we pay lip service
to changed intelle~1:Ual convictions. 'Y
By forming our emotional constimtion in particular ways, our society helps
to ensure its own perpetuation. 'Ine dominant values are implicit in responses
taken to be preculiural or acultural, our so-called gut responses. Not only do
these conservative responses hamper and disrupt our attempts to live in or
alternative social forms, but also, and insofar as we take them to be
natural reSDonses. they blinker us theoreticallv. For instance. thev limit our
to
evitable universal human motivations; in sum, they blind us to the
of alternative ways of living.
~111is picture may seem at first to support the positivist claim that the intru­
sion of emotion only disrupts the process of seeking knowledge and distorts
the results of that process. The picmre, however, is not complete; it ignores
the fa~1: that people do not always experience the conventionally acceptable
more "subjective," biased, and irrational. In our present social context, there­
fore, the ideal of the dispassionate investigator is a c1assist, racist, and espe­
cially masculinist myth. IK
15 8
LOVE AN
I
I
1
59
LOVI AND KNOWLllH;F
emotions. They may feci S;1t1sia<'lion rather than emharr;lSSl1lent when their
leaders make fools of themselves. 'I1KY may feel rcsmtlllcnt rather tban grati­
tude for welfare payments and h;lllJ-111e-dowl1s. 'Ihn lllay be attracteJ to
forbidden modes of sexual expression. Thev mav feci rcvulsion for socially
sanctioned ways of treating children or animal;,. In other words, the
ony that our society exercises over people's emotional constitution is not
total.
who experience cOllventlon;1l1y unacccptahle, or what I call "Ol1t­
law," emotions often arc subordinated individuals who pav a di~proportion
high price for maintaining the status quo. 'Il1c social situation of sllch
people makes them un;1hle to experience the conventionally prescrifx:d emo­
tions: for instancc, people of color are more Iikdy to experience anger than
amusement when a r,Kist joke is recounted, and women subjected to male
sexual banter arc less likely to be flattered than uncomfortable or eYen akl1d.
When l1lKonventional emotional responses arc experienced by isolated in­
diViduals, those concerned may be confused, unable to name their experience;
they m;lY even doubt their own sanity. Women may come to believe that
are "emotionally disturbed" and that the elllb~lrrassment or fear aroused
in them by male sexual innuendo is prudery or paranoia. When cert~lin emo­
tions are shared or validated by others, however, the basis exists for
a subculu1re defined by perceptions, norms, and values that
pose the prevailing perceptions, norms, and values. By
for such a subculture, outbw emotions may be [)()IIti~:;lI
logically subversive.
Outlaw cmotions are distll1g11ished by their incoll1p:ltibility with the domi­
nant perceptions and values, and some, though certainly not all, of these Ollt­
law emotions arc potentially or actually femlllist ('motions. Emotions become
feminist when they incorporate feminist perceptions and v;1111cs, lust as emo­
tions are sexist or racist when they incorporate sexist or racist perceptions
~lIld values. for example, anger bccomes feminist anger whl'll it involves the
perception that the persistent importuning endured by one woman lS a single
instance of a widespread pattern of sexual harassment, and pride becomes
feminist pride when it is evoked by realizing that a certain person's ;lChieve­
ment was possible only because that individual overcame speciflcally gen­
de red obstacles to Sllccess.
Outlaw emotions stand in a dialectical rebtion to critical social theory: at
least some are necessary to develop a critical perspe<.tlve on the world, but
also presuppose at least the beginnings of such a perspective. Feminists
need to be aware of how we em draw on some of our outlaw emotions in
construlting feminist theory and :1Iso of how the increasing sODhistiGuion of
feminist theory can contribute to the
rcconstrw.1ion of Ollr emotional constitution.
1(,0
9. Outlaw Emotions and Feminist Theory
'IlK' 111o"t obvious way in which fcl11ll1ist and other outbw emotions can
in dcveloping alternatives to pn:vailing conceptions of reality is lw l1lotivating
new investigatiolls. '] his is possible because, as we saw earlier, emotiolls lll~ly
he long-term as well as momentarv; it makes sense to say that someone con­
tinlles to be shocked or saddened by a situation, even if shc is at the moment
bu!!,hing heartily. As we havc seen already, theorcrical inwstigation is alw'avs
and observatioJl is alway;, selective. Feminist emotions provide a
motivation for investig;ltion and so help to determine the sdcction of
as well :1~ the method hy which they ,1re investl!!,ated. Snsan Criffin
makes the same point when she characterizes feminist theory as toll owing ";1
direction determined bv pain, and trauma, and compassion and outrage"
(Griffin 1979:3]).
As well as motivanng critical research, outlaw emotions may also enable us
to perceive the world differently from its portr.wal ill conventional descrip­
tions. They llJay provide the first indiCltions that sOlllethin!!, is wron!!, with
the way alleged h<.1S have heen constructed, with accepted understandlll!!s of
how
rctlcLL on our initiallv pU7lJin!!, irritahilitv, revulsion, :mger, or fear mav we
bring to consciousness our "gut-kvd" awareness that we arc in :1 situation of
coercion, cruelty, inJustice, or dan!!,cr. 'nms, conventionally inexplicable emo­
tions, particularly, though not
lead us to make subversiw obsl'r.ations that challenge domimnr
of the status qllO. Thev l11av help us to rC:llize that \vhat arc taken
to be bl1s h~lVe becll constructed in ;1 wa\' that obscures the realitv of suhor­
dinated people, l'spl'ciallv WOlllen's rl';llitv.
But why should we trust the emotional responses of WOIl1l'll and other
subordinated groups? How em \eVl' determine which olltbw emotiolls are to
he endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? III what sense can we say
that SOllle emotional responses are more appropri:1tl' than others- \'\/hat rea­
son is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the
perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, arc to be preferred to perceptions
inform(·d hv mnventioll:ll emotiolls? Here I call indicate only the gmeral di­
rection of an answer, whosc full elaboration must ~lwait another occasion."
I suggest that emotiolls arc appropriate if they are characteristic of a soci­
ety in which all hlll1UIl:> (and perhaps sOllle nonhuman life, too) thnve, or if
the\" are conducive to establishing such a society. For instance, it is appropn­
ate to feel JOY when we are developing or l'xercizing our creative powers, and
it is appropri;1te to fed ;l11gcr :1I1d perhaps dis!!llst in those situations where
,
1 (, I
,
LUVr" AND KNOWLEDCE
hUrTuns are denied their full creativity or fn:edom. Similarly, it is appropriate
feci fear if those capacities arc threatened in us.
lbis suggestion obviously is extremely vague, vergmg on the
How can we apply it in situations where there is disagreement over
is or is not disgusting or exhilarating or unjust? Here I
for which I have argued elsewhere: the perspective on reality available from
the standpoint of the oppressed, which in part at least is the standpoint of
women, is a perspective that offers a less partial and distorted and therefore
more reliable view (Jaggar 19H3:chap. 1 J). Oppressed people have a kind of
epistemological privilege insofar as thev have easier access to this sr,lndpoim
and therefore a better cbanec of asccrtaining tbe possible bcginnings of a
societv in wbich all could thnvc. For this reason, I would claim that the emo·
tiona( responses of oppressed peopk' in general, and often of women in par·
ticular, are more likely to be appropriate th~ln the emotional responses of the
dominant class. 111~lt is, they are more likely to incorporate reliabk
of situations.
Even in contemporary science, where the ideology of (lJspassl()n~1te enquiry
is almost overwhelming, it is possible to discover J few examples that seL'm to
support the chim that certain emotions are more appropriate thall othL'rs in
both a moral and epistemological Sl'I1se. For instance, Hilary Rose claims that
women's practice of caring, even though warped by its containment in the
alienated context of a coercive sexlwl division of labor, nevertheless has gen·
crated more accurate and less oppressive undt'rstandings of women's
functions, such as menstruation (Rose 191:\3). Certain emotions may be both
morally appropriate and epistemologically advantageous in approaching the
and even tbe inanimate world. Jam' Goodall's scientific contribu­
tion to our understanding of chimp~1nzee behavior seems to have been made
possible only by her amazing empathy with or even love for these JllImals
(Goodall 191:\7). In her study of Barbara McClintock, Evelyn Fox Keller de­
scribes McClintock's rdation to the objects of her research-gr~lins of maize
and their gcnetic properties-~ls a relation of affe<.tion, empathv, and "the
hIghest form of love: love that allows for intimacy without the annihibtion of
difference." She notes that McClintock's "vocahulary is consistl'l1tiy a vocah·
of affec"tion, of kinship, of empathy" (Keller 19H4: 1(4). Examples like
these prompt Hilary Rosl' to assert that a feminist science of nature needs to
draw on heart as well as hand and brain.
to
162.
1(J. Some Implicatio11S 0(' Recognizing the
Ernotion
t~pistemic
Potential
Accepting that e1ppropnate emotions arc indispensable to reliable
does not mean, of course, that uncritical feeimg may be suhstituted for sup­
posedly dispassionate investigation. Nor does it mean that the emotional re­
sponses of women and other members of the underclass arc to he trllsted
without question. Although our el11otions are epistemologically
they are not epistcmologically indisputable. Like all our faculties,
misleading, and their data, like all dat~l, arc always suhject to reinterpretation
and revision. Because emotions are not prcsocial, physiological responses to
unequivocal situations, they are open to challenge 011 variolls grounds. 'llll'y
may be dishonest or sdf-deceptive, they may incorporate m;1ccurate or
perCl'ptions, or they may he constituted by oppressive values.
indispensability of appropriate emotions to knowledge 111eans no more
no less) th~1I1 that dlscord;1I1t emotions should he attended to seriously and rc·
speLtfully rather than condel11ned, ignored, dlscollnted, or suppressed.
as appropriate emotions may contribute to the developmcnt of knowl·
edge, so the growth of knowledge may contribute to the dcvclopml'l1t of ap'
propriate emotions. For instance, the powerful insights of fel11ini~t theory
often stimulate new emotional responses to past and present sitlwtions. Inevi·
tably, our emotions are affected by the knowledge that the \\7omen on our
are paid systematically less tban the men, that one gIrl in four is sub­
jected to sexual abuse lrom heterosexual men in her own family, and that
few women rCeleb orga,m in heterosexual intercourse. We arc likely to fed
emotions toward older WOl11el1 or people of color as we reevaluate
our standards of sexual attractivencss or acknowledge that black is heautiful.
The new emotIons evoked by feminist insights are likely in turn to stimulate
feminist observations ;md insights, and these may generate new direc­
tions in both theory and politic11 pr:1\.1Ice. The feedback loop hetween our
emotional constitution and our theorizing is continuous; each
modifies the other, in principle insep:.1rable from it.
"11K' case and speed \\'ith which we un rceducate our emotions nnfortll­
is not great. Emotions arc only partially within our control as mdividu­
als. Although affected by new information, thesc habitual responses are l10t
. unlearned. Even when \.\'e COIll{' to believe conSCIously that our fear
or sl1;l111e or revulsion is u11\\'arranted, we may still continue to experience
emotions inconsistcnt with our consciolls politics. We may still continue to be
anxIous for male <lpproval, competitive with ollr comrades and sisters, and
with our lovers. "J1wsl' unwelcomc, because apparently inappropri-
I (q
ALISON M. JAGGAR
LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE
ate emotions, should not be suppressed or denied; instead, they should be
acknowledged and subjected to critical scrutiny. The persistence of SLlch recal­
citrant emotions probably demonstrates how fundamentally we have been
constituted by the dominant world view, but it may also indicate superficial­
ity or other inadequacy in our emerging theory and politics." We can only
start from where we
who have been created in a cruelly racist,
capitalist, and male-dominated society that has shaped our bodies and our
our
our values and our emotions. our language and our
systl:ms of
111e alternative eDistemolOl.~ical models that I would suggest disDlav the
in part because of their social re­
slich emotions, in themselves and
sponsibility for caretaking,
emotional nurturance. It is tme
women, like all subordinated peoples, .
proximity with their master~, often engage in emotional
and even
self-deception as the price of their survival. Even so, women may be less
other subordinated groups to engage in denial or sUDDression of outlaw
emotions. Women's work of emotional nUrrllrance has
in recognizing hidden emotions and in
of those emotions. -I11is emotional acumen can now be re(:og.fll,~ed
as a skill in political analysis and validated as giving women a
advan­
tage in both understanding the mechanisms of domination and envisioning
freer ways to live.
arc as
our emotional responses to the world
and how our changing emotional re­
would demonstrate the need
on the outer world but also
.
on ourselves and our relation to that world, to examine critically our social
our al1:ion5, our values, our perceptions, and our emotions. 'Ihe
models also show how feminist and other critical social theories are indis­
pensable psychotherapeutic tools because they provide some insights neces­
sary to a full understanding of oLlr emotional consti111tion. 111Lls, the models
would explain how the reconstruction of knowledge is inseparable from the
reconstmction of ourselves.
A corollary of the reflexivity of feminist and other critical theory is that it
requires a much broader constmal than positivism accepts of the process of
theoretic<ll investigation. In particular, it requires acknowledging that a neces­
sary pan of theoretical process is critical self-examination. Time spel1l in ana­
lyzing emotions and uncovering their sources should be viewed, therefore,
neither as irrelevant to theoretical investigation nor even as a prerequisite for
of the emotional decks, "dealing with" our
it; it is not a kind of
emotions so that they not inHuence Ollr thinking. Instead, we must recognize
that our efforts to reinteroret and refine our emotions arc necessary to our
as our efforts to reeducate our emotions are nec­
Critical reHection on emotion is not a self­
and Dolitical action. It is itself a kind
social
tage. We can now sec that women's subversive insights owe much to wom­
en's outlaw emotions, themselves appropriate responses to the situations of
women's subordination. In addition to their propensity 10 experience outlaw
emotions, at least on some level, women are relatively adept at identifying
r64
11. CONCLUSION
The claim that emotion is vital to systematic knowledge is only the most ob­
vious contrast between the conception of theoretical investigation that I have
sketched here and the conception provided by positivism. For instance, the al­
ternative approach emphasizes that what we identify as emotion is a concep­
tual abstraction from a complex process of human ,lctiviry that also involves
acting, sensing, <lIld evaluating. "I11is proposed account of theoretical con­
struction demonstrates the simultaneolls necessity for and interdependence of
faculties that our culture has abstracted and separated from each other: emo­
tion and reason, evaluation and perception, observation and action. The
model of knowing suggested here is nonhierarchical and
instead, it is appropriately symbolized
upward spiral. Emotions are neither more basic than
.
.
nor are
refleLls an aspect of human
to borrow a famous phrase from a iViarxian context,
of these faculties is a necessary condition for the
the ""'r."."t"'1i~P
within the west­
I
I
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1.
16 5
ALISON M. JACCAl<
LOVE AND KNOWl.ED(;1'
NOTES
6. ror instance, Juitus ;\loravcsik has char'H.:rerized as emotions what 1 would caLi
hunger and thirst, appetite, that are not desires for any particular food or
drink (Mor'l\'csik 19H2:207-224). I mysdf think tbat such states, which Moravcslk
also calls instincts or appentes, are understood better as sensations than emonons. In
other words, I would view so~called instinctive, t1onll1temional fedings as the biologt­
cal raw mJtenal frolll wbich full-fledged buman emotions
7. Even adherents of the Dumb View recognize, of course, that emotions are not
entirely random or unrelated to an individual's Judgments and beliefs; in other words,
note th'lt people ,1re angry or eXl:ited ut;out sometillllg, ;lfraid or proud ol some­
thing. On the Dumb View, however, the illdgtnents or beliefs associated with an emo­
tion an: sel'll as its causes and thus '15 related to it
X. Cheshire Calhoun poimed this out to nK' in private correspondence.
9. Rewgnition of the many levels on whICh emotions <Ire soci'lily constructed
raises tbe question whether It makes sense even to speak of the posslbilitv of universal
emotions, Although :1 full answer to this question is
one might ,pecubte that nwny of what we westerners Identify as emotiolls bave hlllc~
tional analogues in other (ultllfes. In other words, it may be tbat people in everY ntl~
ture might behave 111 ways that fulfil <11 least some sooal fUllctions of our angrY or
fearful behavior.
10. The relationsbip hetwel'll the emotional expenence of an individual and the
emotional experience of the group to which the individual lx'iongs may perhaps be
clarified by analoj.,'Y with the relation between a word and the Iangnage of which it is
;1 part. That the word has mealllng presupposes it's ,1 part of ,1 linguistic svstel11 with~
out which It has no meaning; vet the langu'1ge Itself has 110
the Illeaning of the words of which It is composed together with their grammatical or­
\Xlords ;lnd language pre,uppose and Illutually constiulte each other.
both individual and group emotion presuppose ,md mutually nmsUhlte each other.
11. Averell cites dissoci;nive reactions hy mtlitary 1""NlIm/,l
Force gnse and shows how
Sihl:1tLonS while
or blame
(Averell 19H(): 157).
12. These and similar
are descrihed 111 Kilpatrick 1961 :ch. 10, cited by
19H5:296.
13. '111c positivist :lltitude toward emotion, wbich requires that lde;ll Illvesng;llllrS
be both dlslI1terested and dispassionate, may be a modern vanant of older tradItions
in western philosophv tbelt recommended people ,eek to minimize their t'111otiOlWI
responses to the world and develop instead theIr powers of rationality and purl'
I wish to thank the
on l\lrlter drafts
Nicholson, Bob
man, Karsten Stmhl, lO'H! Tronto, Daisy Quarm, Naomi Quinn, ,md Alison
am also eratefnl to Illy wileaples in the fall I ';)85 Women's Smdies Ch'lir Semill<1r ,It
Rutgers UniversIty, and to audiences at Duke
University Centre, Holxnt and William Smith University of North CHolin'l at Chapel spollses to earlier versions of this chapter. In addition, I received Illany ments frolll memhers of the Canadian
shldents in Lisa Heldke's delsses 111 feminist epistemology 'It Carleton College emd
Northwestern lJrll\wsitv. ·Ilunks, too, to Delia (
able environllll'llt in which I wrote the first draft.
A similar version of this l'ssay appeared
l/une 198';)). Reprintcd hv
I. PhIlosophers who do not conform to this gcnerellization and cOlNiwte pelrt ot
what SW,'ln Bordo c111s a "recessiw,' tre1(.iItion in westem phllosophv indude HIITT1l:
,md Niet'(sche, Dewev and James (Bordo 1987: 114- II Hl,
2. '111e western tradition 'IS a whole has heen Its historv may he vil'wed :lS a continuous r",lrc1U!J110 ror a surn'v of this
frolll a fcminlst I ';)rl"1.
3. TIlLIS, fear or other emotions were seen as rational in somc cin:ul11stal1o:s. To
illustrate tillS pom!, Vlck\ Spelman quotes ArIStotle as "lying (in the Nic/io/lluduUII
bInes, Bk. IV, cl1. 5): "IAnvonel who does not get angrv when there IS reason to be
angry, or wbo does not gl't angry in the right way at tbe right time and with the nght
is ,I dolt" (Soc/man 19H2: I
4. Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant are among the
who did
not endorse a whallv stripped~dowll, instrumentalist
5. Thc reloGltion ot values in hum:1I1 ;1ttitlldes and
grounds for
beG111Se
could lwve heen conceIved as
in a common or universal human ne1tnre.
fact, however, the
rather than the cOllll11onahtv, of human
and responses was
values gr'lduallv came to he viewed as
particular, :llld eH'n
rather than as Ullivcrs,ll and ohll'ltive.n1e
to the
of human
desires was the supposedly univers'll urge to
and the motive to m:lximize onc's
own utility, whatever that consisted in. T11c
'lild
was seen as perhaps the
becaw,c it W:1S a nrecondition for
ot her desi res.
166
14, It is 110W widely accepted that the suppression Hul! reprl'ssion of emotion has
damagmg if not explosive consequences, There is general acknowledgment that no
one em aVOId at some tilllc experiencing emotions she or he finds 11I1pleas:1I1t, and
there is e1iso increasing recognition that the deni,ll of such emotions IS hkcly to result
dIsorders of thought ,1L1d bch:wIor, in proJeLtlllg one's own emotions on
them to in'1ppropriate situations, or in psychosolmltLc ailments,
which purports to helD individuals reco!!llizl' and "deal with" their
16
ALISON M. JACGAR
[OVE AND KNOWIFDCI
ror
emotions, has become an enormoLis indmtrv, espl'ci'lllv in the l Jnitcd State>;, In mllch
however, cmotions still are conccivt'd as feelings or pas­
disturbances th.u .1ft1ict individuals or interfere with their capacity
.md 'Ktiol1. Different therapies, therefore, Iwve developed a wide
variety of techniques for cncournging pcople to "discharge" or "vent" their
liN ,1S thev would dmin an ,1bscl'ss. Oncl' emotions have hem dischargl'd or vented,
are supposed to be expl'ricnced Il'ss
or l'ven to v;mish entlrdv, and con,
exert less int1l1l'11ce on individu'1ls' thoughts and actions, TIllS approach
dearly demonstrates its klT1ship with the "tolk"
and It equally dearly retains the tnlditional westenl
thM el11otloll is inillllcal to ratlon'll thought .1Ild action. 111l1s, stich '1pproaches tall to
challenge and il1~k~cd provide covert support for thl' view that
knowers are
not onlv dislllterested hilt .llso di,passHmmc,
ditfen:nCf':s.
instaIKL', girls r.Hher tlun
.m: (;lII~llt tcar ;md lhsgu,t ;lIld sl"lkes, .lffcetion for Huflv ;1Ilil11;1Is,
,h;lIl1(, for th'ir naked bodlcs. 1llCI! r'ltiJer than womcil whose sl'xlial rl'­
\'Isllal ,md sOllltrlllle'i \lolelll porllogr'lphv. Girl" for othL'rs: hovs and men arc taue.ht 10 tor lower-cbss and some nOllwhitl' mell
becallse the e,-pres,ion of ell1otion is
Men ot the upper d;IS,I'S k'ln! to mltiy.lte ,III :1ttitude of
dctachl'll amusemellt. As WI' shall see shortlv, diftcrenccs III the emotional constitutioll
of v<lrious p;roups may he l'pisten101oglGlIh siPli1iGlnt in so far as they both presup­
pose and faciliwte differclIt W'lys of perceiving thl' world.
20. i\ lleCl'SS;11""\ condition for l'xperil'l1clIlg tel11lllist l'lllotions IS th,lt Ol1e aln';ldv bc
a felllini,t 111 ,OIllC ,l'IlSl', evell If Olll' docs l10t cOl!sciollsh Wl';1[ that bbci. gut mall:
women ,md soml' l1Ien, cvell those who would dcny th;lt thev ~lre femllli'it, stilll'xpni­
ence emotion, cOlllp;lIihle \\ 1Ih tCIIlllllst \"lIIlCS. For illStann:, thn m,1\ he
In
the pcrceptioll that sOl1leone IS bcmg mlstrcatcd Ilist !wcatN: she is ~l WOIll,1I1, or
m,IV wke speci'1l
111 the ;lChlL'\Ul1l'lIt o! <1 WOIll'll1. It those who expericnce such
emotiolls ,1[l' ullwilling to rl'lOp;lllZL' thell1 ;1, fellllllist, their emotion, .1rl· proh;lhk de­
scribed better <1S potentiallv tcminist or prdc1l1illlst l'motiol1\.
21. I OWL' this ,U,l:;gCStlOIl to :\ tIl'CI'l Lllld.
22. \XI!lhll1 ,1 temillist context, Ben'lllel' !-'Ishn SllK~ests th'lt W(' foclls partlClIl'lr ,It­
ten non on our emotions o! guilt and ,hame ,IS part ot .1 cntiul rcev,lluatiol1 of our
polinc11 ideals ,HId our political pr;ILTice (Fi,her 19S4l.
IS. E, V. Spelman (1982) Illustrates thIS point with a l]uot,ltion from thl: well­
known (ontel11pOr'II)' philosopher, R. S. Peters, who wrote "we spe'lk 0/ emotional
outhursts, reactiolls, upheavals and women"
the Aristotl'ildll
New Senes, vol. 62.).
16. It seeills likelv th,l[ the conspicuous ab,ellcL' of elTIOllon showil bv Mrs,
Thatcher is a dchherMe stratq..' V she finds neCl'SS;1rV to counter the puhlic perception of
women as too el11otional for political leadership. '111l' strategy results III her hemg per­
r:1thl'r th.ll1 a r<:,ll woman. lronicallv,
ceived a, ,1 forl!lIlbhlc le'lder, hut an Iron I
Nl'iI Killilock, IcadlT of the British Llbour P;1!tv and 'Ihatchcr\ m;1l11 opponent III the
1987 C;cner'll Elccllon, was 'lhle to lllUster LOnsidlT<1ble
,uppon through telni­
siou collllllcrcials portr.mng him in the stercotvpicailv feminiue roll' of C<lring ahout
the llllfortul1<lte VIctims of TI1'lIciwr ecollomics. UltimalL'iy, however, tillS ,upport \hlS
[lot suffiCient to desln)\' public conndence in \lr,. ThatchlT\ "n1.1"culine" cOlllpett'llce
and gam Killl!oek the ciectlon.
17. On till' rare occt...ion, when a white 1ll~1I1 crics, he i, t'll1h'lrras.,ed and ted, con
strall1cd to apologi/.c. Thl' one exception to the rule that 111m shollid he emotionless is
that the\' .1re allowed ;md otten even l'xpl'Cted to expcricllc(' ,1IIger. Spelman (1982)
out th.lI men's culwral plTmlssioll to be ;lIlgrv holster;. their cLulll to
8. Somcone might argue th'lt the viciousiless of this myth W;IS not ,I logic11 IICCt'S
sit\'. In the eg.tlitarun SOClct\" where the ulilcepr.. or re~lson ,mel emotiol! were not
111 the w;w they stili .m: rod,1\', it mIght he arglll'd th'lt the ideal of the
coliid hl' episteillologlcalir henef1ci'll. Is it possihle that, 111
circnl11sL1I1lTS, the
of the
•111 ideal 1Il'\'l'r to he rc;lliZl'd
hut nevertheless hdninL' to minimize "subll'ctiv!lv" and hia,? "Iv own \Iew is that
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