Mark Spoerer Forced Labor in the third Reich

Transcription

ww w.wollheim - m em or ial.de
Mark Spoerer
Fo r ce d La b o r i n t h e Th i r d Re i ch
I nt roduct ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
The I deological and Milit ary- Econom ic Background for t he Use of Foreigners . .
3
The Recruit m ent of Workers in t he ―
Great er European Econom ic Area‖ . . . . . .
5
The Working and Living Condit ions of Foreign Workers wit hin t he Reich . . . . . 11
The Labor Deploym ent of Concent rat ion Cam p Pr isoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
Responsibilit y for t he Deploym ent of Forced Laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Nor b er t W o llh eim Mem or ial
J.W. Goet he- Universit ät / Frit z Bauer I nst it ut
Frankfurt am Main, 2010
ww w.wollheim - m em orial.de
Mark Spoerer: For ced Labor in t he Thir d Reich, p. 1
I n t r o d u ct i o n
Toward t he end of t he t im efram e in which Norbert Wollheim w as working as a
forced laborer at t he Buna I V plant of I .G. Farbenindust r ie in Monowit z, alm ost 9
m illion people in t he Germ an Reich were sharing t he sam e fat e. Approx im at ely
700,000 m en and wom en were, like Wollheim , used for forced labor in concen t rat ion cam ps. Anot her 2.2 m illion forced laborers had t he legal st at us of
prisoners of war, and alm ost 6 m illion wer e classified as foreign civilian laborers.
Not all forced laborers were subj ect t o such inhum ane working and living condit ions as t hose im posed on Norbert Wollheim , but t hey all had one t hing in com m on: t hey were forced t o work against t heir w ill and far from t heir hom e for t he
benefit of Germ any‘s wart im e econom y. 1
Aft er t he first half of t he ninet eent h cent ury, forced labor was no longer cust om ary in Germ any, except in penal inst it ut ions. Com pulsory enlist m ent of hum an
beings in labor did not resum e unt il t he 1880s, w it h t he econom ic ut ilizat ion of
t he newly acquired Germ an colonies. Whet her and t o what ext ent colonial pract ices had an influence on labor policy in World War I is a t opic t hat has not yet
been researched. I n any event , Germ any put around 2.5 m illion prisoners of war
t o work, along wit h j ust under half a m illion foreign civilian forced laborers,
m ost ly from Poland and Belgium . 2
I n World War I I , t he ext ent of t he forced labor at t ained far great er dim ensions.
I n general, t hree m ain groups of forced labor ers are dist inguishable: foreign civi-
1
2
On t he definit ion of t he t erm ―
forced labor,‖ see Mark Spoerer: Zwangsarbeit unt er dem
Hakenkreuz. Ausländische Zivilarbeit er, Kriegsgefangene und Häft linge im Drit t en Reich und
im beset zt en Europa 1939–1945 ( St ut t gart : DVA, 2001) , p. 15f. Beyond t he bor ders of t he
Third Reich, m any m ore m illions of people had t o do forced labor for t he Ger m an occupying
power, see ibid., pp. 35–88; also, Spoerer: ―
Der Fakt or Arbeit in den beset zt en Ost gebiet en
im Widerst reit ök onom ischer und ideologischer I nt eressen.‖ I n: Mit t eilungen der Gem einsam en Kom m ission für die Erforschung der j üngeren Geschicht e der deut sch - russischen Beziehungen 2 ( 2006) , pp. 68–93, here, in part icular, p. 88f.
See Jürgen Zim m erer : ―
Der Wahn der Planbarkeit . Unfreie Arbeit , Ver t reibung und Völkerm ord
als Elem ent e der Bevölker ungsökonom ie in Deut sch - Südwest afrika.‖ I n: Com parat iv 13
( 2003) , no. 4, pp. 96–113; also, Zim m erer : ―
Die Geburt des ‗Ost landes‘ aus dem Geist e des
Kolonialism us. Die nat ionalsozialist ische Eroberungs- und Beherrschungspolit ik in ( post - ) kolonialer Perspekt ive.‖ I n: Sozial.Geschicht e 19 ( 2004) , no. 1, pp. 10–43; Sebast ian Conrad:
―
‚Eingeborenenpolit ik ‗ in Kolonie und Met ropole. ‚Erziehung zur Arbeit ‗ in Ost afrika und Ost west falen.‖ I n: Sebast ian Conrad / Jür gen Ost erham m el, eds.: Das Kaiserr eich t ransnat ional.
Deut schland in der Welt 1871 –1914 ( Göt t ingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , 2004) , pp. 107–
148; Mark Spoerer : ―
Zwangsarbeit sregim es im Vergleich. Deut schland und Japan im Erst en
und Zweit en Welt kr ieg.‖ I n: Klaus Tenfelde / Hans- Jürgen Seidel, eds.: Zwangsarbeit im
Eur opa des 20. Jahrhundert s. Vergleichende Aspekt e und gesellschaft liche Auseinanderset zung ( Essen: Klar t ext , 2007) , pp. 187–226.
lians, bot h m en and wom en, insofar as t hey were prohibit ed fr om ret urning t o
t heir hom eland; pr isoners of war; and cam p pr isoners, m ost of whom were inm at es of concent rat ion cam ps. I n t he case of t he first group, it m ust be observed
t hat som e of t he foreign civilians working in t he Germ an Reich in World War I I
had originally com e t here ―
volunt arily.‖ Upon closer exam inat ion, however, t he
not ion of ―
volunt ar iness‖ proves t o be problem at ic, because t he Germ an occupat ion aut hor it ies exert ed pressure on t he populat ion of t he occupied areas of Europe. I n t he following m at erial, ―
foreign workers‖ is used as an um brella t erm for
t he t hree cat egories: ( 1) foreign civilians, bot h m en and wom en ( volunt ary and
involunt ary) , ( 2) prisoners of war ( POWs) , ( 3) cam p prisoners ( also including
Germ ans, however) . The t erm ―
forced laborers,‖ on t he ot her hand, includes,
besides t he POWs and t he cam p prisoners, only t hose foreign civilian laborers
who were forced int o work; t hat is, it excludes workers from neut ral count r ies or
count ries t hat were friendly w it h t he Germ an Reich, as t hese people had t he opport unit y t o ret urn t o t heir hom elands.
By now, t he fat e of t he people on whom unfree labor was forced in Germ any
during World War I I has been well researched. St art ing w it h t he pioneering and
st ill relevant work done by Ulr ich Herbert , first published in 1985, 3 hundreds of
regional and local hist orical st udies have appeared on t his t opic. While Herbert
st ill was t urned away by alm ost all t he firm s he approached, m any have com e t o
realize in t he m eant im e t hat t hey can no longer keep silent about t his part of
t heir com pany‘s hist ory. Around 2000, it was quit e t he ―
in t hing‖ for num erous
large concerns t o com m ission independent hist or ians t o com e t o t erm s wit h t he
period of t he Third Reich and in part icular wit h t he use of forced labor. 4
Only t he m ost significant result s of t he research can be sum m arized here. First ,
light is shed on t he ideological and m ilit ar y - econom ic background of t he use of
foreigners. Next , t he recruit m ent of t he for ced laborers is descr ibed. Then, in t he
3
4
Ulrich Herbert : Frem darbeit er. Polit ik und Praxis des „ Ausl nder- Einsat zes“ in der Kriegswirt schaft des Drit t en Reiches ( Bonn: Diet z, 1999) ( first edit ion, 1985) ; Herbert , ed.: Europa und
der „ Reichseinsat z“ . Ausl ndische Zivilarbeit er, Kriegsgefangene und KZ- Häft linge in
Deut schland 1938–1945 ( Essen: Klart ext , 1991) .
Chief am ong t he pioneers wer e Daim ler - Benz and Volkswagen; see Barbara Hopm ann et al.:
Zwangsarbeit bei Daim ler - Benz ( St ut t gart : St einer , 1994) ; Hans Mom m sen / Manfred Grieger:
Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeit er im Drit t en Reich ( Düsseldorf: Econ, 1996) ; also,
Klaus- Jörg Siegfried: Rüst ungsprodukt ion und Zwangsarbeit im Volkswagenwerk 1939–1945.
Eine Dokum ent at ion ( Frankfurt am Main: Cam pus, 1986) .
m ost ext ensive sect ion, t he specific working and living condit ions are t he focus of
t he port rayal. The deploym ent of concent rat ion cam p prisoners is t reat ed in a
separat e sect ion. Finally, som e br ief observat ions are m ade concerning responsibilit y for t he use of forced labor.
Th e
I d e o l o g i ca l
an d
M i l i t a r y - Eco n o m i c
Ba ck g r o u n d
for
the
Use
of
Fo r e i g n er s
The Nat ional Socialist racial hierarchy recognized var ious cat egories: t he ―
Nordic
peoples,‖ t hat is, t he Scandinavians, Dut ch, and Flem ish; t he ―
Rom anic peoples,‖
t he Walloons, French, and I t alians; t he ―
Slavic Unt erm enschen,‖ in part icular t he
Poles and et hnic groups of t he Soviet Union; and at t he very bot t om of t he scale,
t he Jews and t he ―
Gypsies.‖ Despit e occasional difficult ies in assigning people t o
a group, as in t he case of t he I t alians, w ho init ially were allies, and cit izens of
vassal st at es in t he Balkans, t his hierarchy was t he basis for t he legal and act ual
t reat m ent of foreigners t hroughout t he ent ire war. 5
At first , conflict s bet ween t he goals of racial ideology and econom ic obj ect ives
were rare. The Nat ional Socialist s cam e int o power when unem ploym ent was at
it s peak, and em ploym ent of foreigners also was at a low point . By 1934, how ever, skilled workers in t he m et alworking indust r y were once again in short
supply, and full em ploym ent was at t ained in 1936/ 37. The im port ing of foreign
workers increased, but cont inued t o be curbed by t he Reich‘s chronic short age of
foreign currency. 6
For t his reason, t he Reich governm ent saw it as an obvious solut ion t o sat isfy at
least part of t he need for workers, which was growing apace in t he course of t he
m ilit ary build- up, by drawing on a dom est ic populat ion group t hat had been deprived of alm ost all r ight s since 1933: t he Jews. I ncreasingly r obbed of all opport unit ies t o earn t heir livelihood t hrough work and t hus dependent on welfare,
Germ an and Aust rian Jews, as of fall 1938, were called upon by t he st at e au-
5
6
See Herber t : Frem darbeit er , esp. pp. 116–122; Spoer er: Zwangsarbeit , pp. 24–26.
On t he growt h in t he num bers of foreigners em ployed in t he Germ an Reich before World War
I I , see Lot har Elsner / Joachim Lehm ann: Ausländische Arbeit er unt er dem deut schen I m perialism us 1900 bis 1985 ( Berlin: Diet z, 1988) , pp. 387, 396f.
t horit ies for ―
work deploym ent in segregat ed groups‖ ( geschlossener Arbeit seinsat z) . 7
I n wart im e, t he allocat ion of workers, like t hat of raw m at erials and in part even
of financial resources, was increasingly dist anced from t he m arket ‘s m echanism s
of self- regulat ion and subj ect ed t o cent ral planning. Com pet it ion, t herefore, was
far from being abolished; inst ead, it shift ed from t he anonym ous m arket place t o
t he corridors of t he pr ocurem ent depart m ent s of t he Wehrm acht and t he bureaucracy. The long- t erm perspect ive of t he privat ely run firm s was focused on t he
post war period; t he war econom y was const rued by t hem as an int erm ediat e
phase wit h very specific ent repreneur ial opport unit ies and r isks. Arm s cont ract s
were lucrat ive indeed, but t he high profit s could be dist ribut ed only in part and
t herefore were reinvest ed. 8 By well- t arget ed accept ance of arm am ent s cont ract s,
accum ulat ions of skilled workers, facilit ies, and st ocks of goods could be ret ained
or even built upon, and t hese would represent valuable st art - up capit al in peacet im e. 9
The year 1942 was a t urning point in t he Germ an wart im e econom y. The aut hor it ies increasingly st r ipped away t he workforces of firm s t hat w ere unable or unwilling t o m anufact ur e product s of significance t o t he arm s indust ry. The sm aller
of t hese fir m s in part icular now ran t he r isk of being shut down. Arm s product ion
had largely been m ade t he responsibilit y of t he Reich Minist er for Arm am ent s
7
8
9
Sem inal work on t his was done by Wolf Gruner: Der Geschlossene Arbeit seinsat z deut scher
Juden. Zur Zwangsar beit als Elem ent der Verfolgung 1938 –1943 ( Berlin: Met ropol, 1997) ;
Gr uner: Jewish Forced Labor Under t he Nazis: Econom ic Needs and Racial Aim s, 1938 –1944
( Cam bridge: Cam bridge UP, 2006) , pp. 3–137.
Essent ial on t his t opic: Willi A. Boelcke: Die Kost en von Hit lers Krieg. Kriegsfinanzier ung und
finanzielles Kr iegserbe in Deut schland 1933 –1948 ( Pader born: Schöningh, 1985) ; Christ oph
Buchheim / Jonas Scherner: ―
The Role of Pr ivat e Propert y in t he Nazi Econom y: The Case of
I ndust r y.‖ I n: Journal of Econom ic Hist ory 66 ( 2006) , no. 2, pp. 390–416. On profit s, see
Mar k Spoerer: Von Scheingewinnen zum Rüst ungsboom . Die Eigenkapit alrent abilit ät der deu t schen I ndust rieakt iengesellschaft en 1925–1941 ( St ut t gar t : St einer, 1996) .
See Paul Erker: I ndust rieelit en in der NS- Zeit . Anpassungsbereit schaft und Eigenint er esse von
Unt ernehm er n in der Rüst ungs- und Kriegswirt schaft 1936–1945 ( Passau: Rot he, 1994) ,
especially pp. 67–75; Paul Erker / Toni Pierenkem per , eds.: Deut sche Unt er nehm er zwischen
Kriegswirt schaft und Wiederaufbau. St udien zur Erfahrungsbildung von I ndust rie- Elit en
( Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999) . On t he part icularly well researched firm Daim ler- Benz, see
Hopm ann et al.: Zwangsarbeit , pp. 77–80, 489–492; Neil Gregor: St ern und Hakenkreuz.
Daim ler - Benz im Drit t en Reich ( Berlin: Propyläen, 1997) , especially pp. 148–161, 368–377;
and on Flick, Kim C. Priem el: Flick. Eine Konzerngeschicht e vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik ( Göt t ingen: Wallst ein, 2007) , pp. 502–507, 517–522.
and Munit ions, 10 who pushed t hrough a severe rat ionalizat ion pr ogram t hat also
included leading indust rialist s ( ―
t he aut onom ous responsibilit y of indust r y‖) and
m anaged t o bring about an im pressive increase in t he figures for finished product ion of arm am ent s—albeit while neglect ing t he product ion of consum er
goods. 11 I n addit ion, in March 1942, Hit ler nam ed t he Thuringian Gauleit er Fr it z
Sauckel t o serve as General Plenipot ent iary for Labor Deploym ent . Sauckel was
t asked wit h solving one of t he m ost pressing problem s of t he arm s indust ry —t he
short age of labor—while largely sparing Germ an wom en from such labor for
ideological and sociopolit ical reasons. 12
The large- scale deploym ent of foreign workers, which culm inat ed aft er 1942 in
t he forcible recruit m ent of m illions of people from alm ost every corner of Europe
as a consequence of Sauckle‘s init ially ver y successful effort s, t ook place am idst
t he conflict ing prior it ies of t he Nat ional Socialist s‘ racial doct r ine and t he pragm at ism of t he m ilit ar y econom y. I n t he deploym ent - relat ed decisions, pragm at ic
considerat ions are seen t o have been dom inant at first , but t he concret e, oft en
count erproduct ive cir cum st ances of t he deploym ent were a concession t o t he
ideologues. 13 That will be exam ined in great er det ail below.
Th e Recr u i t m e n t o f W o r k e r s i n t h e “ Gr e a t e r Eu r o p e a n Eco n o m i c A r e a ”
Four basic m et hods of recruit ing foreign civilian workers are dist inguishable: ( 1)
pure recruit m ent , ( 2) recruit m ent wit h significant influence on living condit ions,
( 3) conscript ion, t hat is, roundup of ent ire age groups, wit h recourse t o t he local
adm inist rat ion, and ( 4) deport at ion involving t he indiscr im inat e use of force by
Germ an or Germ an- allied occupat ion aut horit ies. These four ideal t ypes, which
10
11
12
13
Fr it z Todt , from February 1942 Albert Speer, from Novem ber 1943 wit h t he t it le of Reich
Minist er for Ar m am ent s and War Product ion.
See Jonas Scherner / Jochen St reb: ―
Das Ende eines Myt hos? Albert Speer und das so genannt e Rüst ungswunder.‖ I n: Viert elj ahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirt schaft sgeschicht e 93
( 2006) , no. 2, pp. 172–196.
An overview of t he wart im e econom oy is present ed by Frit z Blaich: Wirt schaft und Rüst ung im
„ Drit t en Reich“ ( Düsseldor f: Drost e, 1987) ; Avraham Barkai: Das Wir t schaft ssyst em des Nat ionalsozialism us. I deologie, Theorie, Polit ik 1933 –1945, 2nd edit ion ( Frankfurt am Main:
Fischer TB, 1988) ; Adam J. Tooze: Ökonom ie der Zerst örung. Die Wirt schaft im Nat ionalsozialism us ( Berlin: Siedler, 2007) . I n addit ion, see St effen Rassloff: Frit z Sauckel: Hit ler s „ Must er Gauleit er“ und „ Sklavenhalt er“ ( Erfurt : Landeszent rale für Polit ische Bildung, 2007) .
A fundam ent al work on t he r elat ionship bet ween Nat ional Socialist ideology and t he int erest s
of t he arm am ent s indust ry is Ulrich Her ber t : ―
Arbeit und Vernicht ung. Ökonom isches I nt e-
nat urally int ert w ined in pract ice or exist ed side by side for som e t im e, can be
found in m ost part s of t he ―
great er European econom ic area,‖ depending on t he
harshness of t he occupat ion regim e. 14
I n t he allied, officially sovereign count ries of Sout hern and Sout heast ern Europe,
t he Germ an recruit ers could not apply dir ect pressure t o t he populat ion. These
count ries were—in or der of t he recruit m ent figures act ually recorded—I t aly ( unt il
it s capit ulat ion in 1943) , Croat ia, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rom ania. I n
order t o engage in recruit m ent in t hese count ries, t he Germ an Reich had t o conclude bilat eral agreem ent s involving prim arily t he regulat ion of legal issues relat ed t o foreign exchange and social insurance.
The recruit ing of indust rial workers in cit ies was handled by having applicant s
present t hem selves at a Germ an recruit ing office and undergo m edical and skillspecific exam inat ions t here. I f bot h part ies were in accord, t he applicant s signed
a st andard agreem ent , received t he requisit e exit papers from t heir governm ent ,
and t raveled at a st at ed t im e by special t rain t o Germ any, along w it h hundreds
of ot her volunt eers. Recruit m ent of agr icult ural workers proved t o be far m ore
t roublesom e for t he recruit ers. As t he hom es of t he pot ent ial candidat es w ere
scat t ered all over t he count ryside and t hey cam e t oget her in larger groups only
t o at t end church services, recruit m ent in t he villages frequent ly t ook place on
Sundays. As in m edieval t im es, t he recruit ers deployed drum m ers for t his pur pose. Those who allowed t hem selves t o be convinced by t he ( oft en exorbit ant )
prom ises of t he recruit ers signed t he st andard agreem ent and t hen had t o appear at an appoint ed t im e at a collect ing point , usually a t rain st at ion or a port
on t he Danube. 15
The Germ an aut horit ies proceeded in a very sim ilar fashion at first in t he occupied regions of West ern and East ern Eur ope, except t hat in t he case of direct
Germ an cont rol, t he st ringent need for int ergovernm ent al agreem ent s was ab-
14
15
resse und Prim at der ‚Welt anschauung‗ im Nat ionalsozialism us.‖ I n: Herbert , ed.: Europa, pp.
384–426.
See, for an overview, wit h several art icles on m anpower recruit m ent in each, Herbert , ed.:
Eur opa; Richard J. Overy / Gerhar d Ot t o / Johannes Houwink t en Cat e, eds.: Die „ Neuordnung―Europas. NS- Wirt schaft spolit ik in den beset zt en Gebiet en ( Berlin: Met ropol, 1997) .
See Runderlasse für die Arbeit seinsat z, Reichst reuhänder - und Gewerbeaufsicht sverwalt ung
1941, p. 391; Tim m / Heim bürge: Der Einsat z ausländischer Arbeit skräft e in Deut schland
( Berlin: no publisher given, 1942) , pp. 57 –76; John H.E. Fried: The Exploit at ion of Foreign
Labor by Ger m any ( Mont r eal: I nt ernat ional Labour Office, 1945) , pp. 256–263.
sent . Because t he foreign workers, w it h t he except ion of t he East Europeans,
were assured of t he sam e wage and working condit ions as t heir Germ an colleagues, and t he unem ploym ent rat e was st eadily r ising in m ost of t he occupied
count ries aft er t he conquest , t he Germ an labor deploym ent aut horit ies believed
t hey would have an easy j ob of it . I n no region, however, did t he Germ an recruit ers succeed in m eet ing Ber lin‘s am bit ious expect at ions. Only a sm all per cent age of t he West ern European indust r ial workforce could be induced t o go t o
Germ any by high w ages and t he act ual or alleged accom plishm ent s of Nat ional
Socialist social policy ( healt h care, occupat ional safet y, supposed overcom ing of
t he ant it hesis bet ween capit al and labor) .
I n t he occupied t errit ories, t herefore, t he Germ an labor deploy m ent aut horit ies
changed t heir t act ics and began t o use pr essure and force. As t he Germ an occupiers had t he right t o issue direct ives t o t he aut horit ies, t hey had m any ways
of applying pressure t o t he working populat ion. I n Poland, as was also t he case
lat er in t he occupied t errit or ies of West ern Europe and t he Soviet Union, t he occupat ion aut hor it ies‘ r efusal t o allocat e essent ial prelim inary product s or issuance
of direct orders t o close down cont ribut ed t o t he crippling of businesses and t he
rise in t he unem ploy m ent rat e. I f som eone failed t o regist er w it h t he Labor Office
( and t hus risked being sent t o Germ any for com pulsory service) , t he food st am ps
or social benefit s for his fam ily could be reduced or even denied alt oget her. This
com binat ion of reduct ion of local j obs, com prehensive adm inist rat ive regist rat ion,
and financial pressure on fam ilies prom pt ed m any younger, usually single, m em bers of households t o sign up for labor deploym ent , if need be, even for work in
Germ any. This dem onst rat es once again how problem at ic t he not ion of volunt ariness is.
As t hese m easures, t oo, failed t o have t he desired effect , t he Germ an occupiers
finally proceeded t o use overt forcible recruit m ent ( conscript ion or deport at ion)
in all t he occupied t errit or ies, w it h t he except ion of Denm ark. Assum ing t he
Germ ans decided t o leave t he local aut hor it ies in office and only place t hem under t heir com m and or under t hat of a puppet governm ent , on t he one hand, t his
had an advant age: t here was less resist ance t o be reckoned wit h. On t he ot her
hand, cert ain considerat ions had t o be grant ed in order t o induce t he local aut horit ies or t heir governm ent t o collaborat e.
The classic exam ple is t he Service du t ravail obligat oire ( STO) , which was est ablished in France in February 1943. Sauckel, who want ed t o gain m ore and m ore
French workers, especially skilled worker s, for t he Germ an w art im e econom y,
had increased t he pressure on t he Vichy r egim e t o such a degree t hat it saw it self com pelled t o int r oduce a service obligat ion in Sept em ber 1942, and t his subsequent ly was inst it ut ionalized in t he form of t he STO. Even so, t he blow of t he
Germ ans‘
dem ands
could
be
cushioned
by
t he
STO—depending
on
t he
circum st ances—in a socially accept able way: ent ire age groups were called up,
but exem pt ions ( as of 1943, lim it ed once again) were grant ed, for exam ple, t o
m arr ied couples and fam ily m en or farm er s and policem en. I n t ot al, m ore t han
600,000 French workers went t o Germ any t hrough t he STO. 16
Wit hout t rying t o give even t he appearance of quasi- legal adm inist rat ive act s,
t he Germ an labor deploym ent aut hor it ies in Poland and t he occupied t errit ories
of t he Soviet Union proceeded t o engage in deport at ions, alm ost from t he very
out set . As early as Sept em ber 1939, isolat ed raids and deport at ions t ook place.
I n t he annexed Polish regions, t he norm was conscript ion: t he local adm inist rat ion sum m oned specific individuals for labor deploym ent , while t he Germ an labor
deploym ent aut horit ies in t he Generalgouvernem ent banked at first on recruit m ent of volunt eers and t hen, aft er t he failure of t his approach, sw it ched t o a
rut hless policy of deport at ion. 17 These m et hods were em ployed in t he occupied
t errit ories of t he Soviet Union as well. The lower - key variant consist ed of im posing cert ain quot as for ―
volunt eers‖ on regional or local adm inist rat ive bodies. I f
t he quot a was not m et , Germ an securit y forces sim ply seized t he required num ber of people in t he villages in quest ion or on farm s. The even m ore rut hless variant consist ed of raids in places such as villages, resident ial neighborhoods of
t owns, cafés, or m ovie t heat ers. Anyone unable t o present papers proving t hat
he or she was em ployed was sim ply picked up and t aken t o t he nearest collect ing
point . Before t he individual‘s depart ure in a t ransport , fam ily m em bers, if any,
16
17
See Yves Durand: ―
Vichy und der ‚Reichseinsat z‗.‖ I n: Herber t , ed.: Europa, pp. 184–199;
Helga Bories- Sawala: Franzosen im „ Reichseinsat z“ . Deport at ion, Zwangsar beit , Allt ag. Erfahrungen und Erinner ungen von Kr iegsgefangenen und Zivilarbeit ern ( Frank furt am Main: Lang,
1996) , vol. I , p. 248; Bernd Zielinski: ―
Die deut sche Ar beit seinsat zpolit ik in Frankreich 1940 –
1944.‖ I n: Overy / Ot t o / t en Cat e, eds.: „ Neuordnung“ Europas, pp. 109–131, here p. 123.
Czes aw uczak: ―
Polnische Arbeit er im nat ionalsozialist ischen Deut schland während des Zweit en Welt kriegs. Ent wicklung und Aufgaben der polnischen Forschung.‖ I n: Herbert , ed.:
Europa, pp. 90–105, here pp. 94–99.
st ill had an opport unit y t o br ing t heir children or siblings som e food for t he j our ney, clot hing, and personal- hygiene art icles. 18
Transport of Polish and Soviet forced laborers norm ally t ook place in closed
freight cars, w it h a bucket in t he corner w here t hey could reliev e t hem selves. I n
cert ain t ransit cam ps, especially Cracow, Lublin, Cz st ochowa, and Warsaw, t he
deport ees were deloused and m edically exam ined t o det erm ine t heir degree of
fit ness. Upon arr ival in Germ an t ransit cam ps, t here generally w as anot her round
of delousing, followed by depart ure on foot or furt her t ransport t o t he respect ive
Germ an cont ract ors ( Einsat zt räger) : privat e ent it ies ranging from an individual
farm er t o a m aj or corporat ion, public ent erprises, m unicipalit ies, church facilit ies,
et c.
The t ransfer of capt ured enem y soldiers was handled in a sim ilar way. Aft er
capt ure, t hey were brought behind t he front lines t o t ransit cam ps, where t hey
were deloused, and t hen t ransport ed t o POW cam ps for noncom m issioned per sonnel ( St alag, St am m lager) or for officers ( Oflag, Offizierslager) , locat ed in t he
Reich. I f t hey were deem ed fit for work, t he prisoners of t he St alags were hired
out in t he form of labor bat t alions t o t he various cont ract ors, w it h arrangem ent s
handled by t he Labor Offices.
A different fat e was dest ined for t he Soviet POWs at first . The Wehrm acht , which
had experienced no problem s in t he West ern t heat er in 1940 w hen t ransport ing
m ore t han 2 m illion French and Belgian POWs ( t he Dut ch prisoners were direct ly
released) int o t he Reich, allowed 2 m illion of t he 3.35 m illion Soviet POWs t o
st arve t o deat h in t he first few m ont hs of t he East ern Cam paign. Not unt il lat e
Oct ober 1941, when t he Germ an advance had bogged down, did Hit ler decide t o
deploy Sov iet POWs for labor w it hin t he Reich. Hit ler was not t he only one t o
whom t his decision m ust have present ed som e difficult y: t he Germ an securit y
agencies, t oo, were not happy t hat , in addit ion t o t he Poles, ot her Slavic Unt erm enschen, possibly ―
infect ed wit h Bolshevism ,‖ now were t o find t heir way int o
18
On Poland, see uczak: ―
Polnische Arbeit er,‖ pp. 94–99; on t he Soviet Union, Rolf- Diet er
Müller: ―
Die Rekrut ierung sowj et ischer Zwangsarbeit er für die deut sche Kriegswir t schaft .‖ I n:
Herbert , ed.: Europa, pp. 234–250; on Belorussia especially, Chr ist ian Ger lach: Kalkuliert e
Morde. Die deut sche Wir t schaft s- und Vernicht ungspolit ik in Weißrußland 1941–1944
( Ham burg: Ham bur ger Edit ion, 1999) , pp. 466–476.
t he Reich. 19 These ideological and racial m isgivings were accom m odat ed by
ensuring correspondingly inhum ane condit ions of deploym ent . The m ort alit y rat e
of t he Soviet POWs far exceeded t hat of all ot her groups of for ced laborers, wit h
t he except ion of t he concent rat ion cam p pr isoners. 20
The fat e of t he cam p det ainees who were deployed as laborers was in m ost cases
inconceivably t err ible. Anyone who was placed in a Germ an concent rat ion cam p
was subj ect ed at t he very least t o m ont hs of harassm ent and t orm ent . St art ing
in 1941, Jews, who unt il t hen had been crowded t oget her in ghet t os or int erned
in forced labor cam ps sim ilar t o concent rat ion cam ps, were t ransport ed t o specially built ext erm inat ion cam ps, all of w hich, w it h t he except ion of Che m no,
were sit uat ed w it hin t he Generalgouvernem ent . Anyone who cam e t o Che m no,
Lublin- Maj danek, Sobibór, or Treblinka was, as a rule, m ur dered im m ediat ely.
Auschwit z occupied a special posit ion in t he Germ an concent rat ion cam p syst em .
While t he ot her cam ps list ed above were pure ext erm inat ion cam ps, Auschwit z
used t he infam ous m et hod of select ions. Anyone whom t he Germ ans deem ed
unfit for work went t o t he gas cham ber. The ot hers were eit her hired out t hrough
one of t he Auschwit z cam p‘s ext ernal det achm ent s t o em ployers in Upper Silesia
or Moravia, or sent fart her int o t he Reich, where t hey were assigned t o one of
t he concent rat ion cam ps t here and t hen hired out . Thus t here now were not only
Slavs, but Jews again inside t he Reich: for t he Nat ional Socialist ideologues,
anot her painful concession t o t he pragm at ist s in t he arm am ent s sect or of t he
econom y.
The allocat ion of t he foreign workers, w it h t he except ion of t he cam p pr isoners,
t o users of t heir labor in t he Reich was handled by t he Labor Office. I n light of
t he increasing reduct ion in t he Germ an wor kforce due t o t he draft ing of m en int o
t he Wehrm acht , t hese cont ract ors asked t he Labor Office for replacem ent s, and
when so doing t hey could assert cert ain pr ior it ies, in coordinat ion w it h t he local
19
20
On t he Nat ional Socialist racial hierar chy and ant i- Slavism in part icular, see Herbert : Frem darbeit er , pp. 59–61, 116–122; and on it s popularit y am ong t he Germ an populat ion, Mark
Spoerer: ―
Die soziale Differenzierung der ausländischen Zivilarbeit er, Kriegsgefangenen und
Häft linge im Deut schen Reich.‖ I n: Milit ärhist orisches Forschungsam t , ed. : Das Deut sche
Reich und der Zweit e Welt krieg. Vol. 9/ 2: Die deut sche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 –1945: Ausbeut ung, Deut ungen, Ausgrenzung ( Munich: DVA, 2005) , pp. 485–576, her e pp. 569–576.
Fundam ent al on t his t opic is Christ ian St reit : Keine Kam eraden. Die Wehrm acht und die
sowj et ischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945 ( Bonn: Diet z, 1997) ( fir st edit ion, 1978) ; on t he
m ort alit y rat e, see Spoerer: ―
Zwangsarbeit sregim es,‖ p. 215.
com m and in charge of war- relat ed product ion ( Rüst ungskom m ando) . The Labor
Office t hen assigned t he cont ract ors foreign civilian workers or, in coordinat ion
wit h t he responsible St alag, POWs. Concent rat ion cam p pr isoners could be request ed only in case of especially st rat egic needs and only from t he Econom ic
and Adm inist rat ive Main Office ( Wirt schaft s- und Verwalt ungshaupt am t , WVHA)
of t he SS.
The t ot al num ber of foreign civilian worker s, POWs, and cam p prisoners brought
t o Germ any during World War I I is around 13.5 m illion, of whom only 10 t o no
m ore t han 20 percent are t o regarded as volunt eers. 21
Th e W o r k i n g a n d Li v i n g Co n d i t i o n s o f Fo r e i g n W o r k e r s w i t h i n t h e Re i ch
I n t he Germ an wart im e econom y, t he fulfillm ent of t he essent ial basic needs of
t he populat ion—housing, food, and clot hing—was increasingly r egulat ed, especially where foreigners were concerned. This set of regulat ions, t oo, was an ex pression of t he Nat ional Socialist racial hierarchy. That is reflect ed especially
clear ly in t he special right s—rat her, lack of right s—for cert ain gr oups of foreigners. To im plem ent t hem in everyday life, under t he ―
Polish Decrees‖ of March
1940 t he Poles—in addit ion t o num erous prohibit ions and draconian penalt ies—
were also visually st igm at ized in part icular by t he int roduct ion of a ―
P‖ badge t o
be worn on t he chest ; t his was eight een m ont hs before t he int roduct ion of t he
yellow St ar of David in t he Alt reich ( Germ any w it h it s pre- 1937 boundaries) . The
Ost arbeit er ( ―
East ern workers‖) , t oo—civilian workers from t he Germ an- occupied
t errit ories of t he Soviet Union—had t o put up wit h wearing an ―
OST‖ ( ―
EAST‖)
badge. The well- enforced requirem ent for t he wearing of badges had a clear
funct ion: Poles and Ost arbeit er were m eant t o be not only m arked in general as
allegedly inferior hum an beings, but also im m ediat ely recognized and, should t he
occasion arise, t urned away in shops, rest aurant s, and public m eans of t ransport at ion. Even for open- m inded Germ ans, t his m ade it m ore difficult t o associat e w it h m em bers of t hese t wo groups.
21
Mar k Spoer er / Jochen Fleischhacker: ―
Forced Laborers in Nazi Germ any. Cat egories, Num bers, and Sur vivors.‖ I n: Journal of I nt erdisciplinary Hist ory 33 ( 2002) , no. 2, pp. 169–204;
Spoerer / Fleischhacker : ―
The Com pensat ion of Nazi Germ any‘s Forced Labourers. Dem ographic Findings and Polit ical I m plicat ions.‖ I n: Populat ion St udies 56 ( 2002) , no. 1, pp. 5–21.
Only a sm all percent age of t he foreign civilian workers had t he opt ion of looking
for a place t o live out side t he barracks cam ps; as a rule, t hese were t he Dut ch,
Flem ish, Danes, or cit izens of allied count r ies. The norm was housing in cam ps,
usually in barracks, som et im es also in gym s or large rest aurant room s. The fur nishings of t hese cam ps were sparse, part icular ly in t he cam ps for Soviet POWs,
where a m uch higher occupancy rat e was planned for t he barracks. Not only was
t here no privacy of any kind in t he cam ps, but t he inm at es also had t o expect
t heft and deal m ost not ably wit h verm in and epidem ics.
Only t he cam ps for POWs and pr isoners were guarded; cam ps for civilian workers
generally were not guarded. I n early 1942, however, t he first Ost arbeit er cam e
upon barbed- wire- enclosed cam ps t hat w ere guarded, which t hey could leave
only under wat ch. Aft er a few m ont hs, however, t he Germ an aut horit ies recognized t hat t here was no need for direct guarding. I ndeed, where could foreign
workers have escaped t o? Their hom eland was eit her st ill under Germ an occupat ion or on t he ot her side of t he front . Therefore, m any of t he escape at t em pt s
t hat nonet heless occurred had as t heir goal m erely a change t o a j ob wit hin t he
Reich t hat offered m ore t olerable condit ions.
The m ain problem for m ost foreign worker s was obt aining food. The basic m eals
were provided by t he firm s and eat en in cam p or at t he plant . Som e of t he foreign workers, par t icular ly t hose from allied count ries, also received food rat ion
cards in addit ion, depending on where t hey were housed, and t hey could in any
case use t heir wages t o buy ext ra foodst uffs in shops and on t he burgeoning
black m arket . Poles and Ost arbeit er, in cont rast , received m arkedly less food and
food of inferior qualit y, no rat ion cards, and lower wages besides. While m ost
Poles worked in t he count ryside, and m ore food t hus cam e t heir way on t he
farm s, hunger was t he const ant com panion of t he Ost arbeit er, who were
deployed pr im ar ily in indust r y. The sam e w as t rue for t he Soviet POWs, t he I t alian m ilit ary int ernees, and t he concent rat ion cam p prisoners. There are m any
eyewit ness account s st at ing t hat m em bers of t hese four groups used t o fight
over food scraps or break out of t he cam p at night , risking t heir lives t o st eal
pot at oes, cabbage, or t urnips in t he surrounding fields. Theft and bet rayal were
endem ic in t he cam ps because t he gnawing hunger was st ronger t han t he sense
of solidar it y; fem ale Ost arbeit er prost it ut ed t hem selves t o t he bet t er - provisioned
West ern workers in ret urn for a loaf of bread. For t he clearly bet t er - fed Germ an
populat ion, t hese behaviors, which sprang from a povert y t hat t hreat ened t he
workers‘ very exist ence, m erely served as confirm at ion of racist prej udices.
Foreigners received, as a basic principle, no rat ion coupons for t he purchase of
clot hing. The clot hing t hey had brought from hom e was subj ect ed t o wear and
t ear, m ainly at work, and in m any cases it could not be replaced. By wint er, if
not sooner, t his short age was keenly felt , especially by forced laborers who had
been seized on t he spot and deport ed in sum m er. The absence of replacem ent
clot hing, part icular ly of underwear, led t o unpleasant body odor, especially when
open wounds fest ered. Here t oo, t he degree of m edical care provided, which varied in accordance wit h t he racial hierarchy, t urned out t o be a self- fulfilling
prophecy. While t he West ern workers and West ern POWs frequent ly m anaged t o
avoid verm in infest at ion and keep t heir clot hing clean, t his was generally im possible for groups t hat were far less well prov ided for: Ost arbeit er, Soviet
POWs, I t alian m ilit ary int ernees, and concent rat ion cam p pr isoners.
Cont act wit h POWs, prisoners, Poles, and Ost arbeit er was off lim it s for t he Ger m ans in t he workplace, apart from t he giving of act ual inst ruct ions. For m ale
m em bers of t hose groups, except for non- Soviet POWs, t he exposure of sexual
cont act s wit h Germ an wom en norm ally result ed in t he deat h penalt y. The m inim um punishm ent faced by Germ an wom en was st igm at izat ion ( shorn head, being paraded around t he village) , while Ger m an m en ran t he risk of being sent t o
a concent rat ion cam p. 22
Because of t he m any changes over t he passage of t im e alone, an ent ire book
could be writ t en about t he com plex of m at erial rewards offered in ret urn for t he
work perform ed, including m oney wages, paym ent in kind, and social insurance
right s. 23 I n general, it can be said t hat in pr inciple, civilian workers, w it h t he
except ion of t he Poles and Ost arbeit er, received t he full Germ an wages for t he
sam e work. The em ployer had leeway, how ever, in assigning t he foreign workers
t o wage bracket s and dist r ibut ing special bonuses. Conversely, because of sepa-
22
23
See Diem ut Maj er: „ Frem dvölkische“ im Drit t en Reich ( Boppard: Boldt , 1981) , p. 307f., 674;
Bernhild Vögel: „ Ent bindungsheim für Ost arbeit erinnen“ . Braunschweig, Br oit zem er St rasse
200 ( Ham burg: I nt er - Abo- Bet reuungs- Gm bH, 1989) , p. 134; St efan Maiwald / Gerd Mischler :
Sexualit ät unt er dem Hakenkreuz. Manipulat ion und Vernicht ung der I nt im sphäre im NS- St aat
( Ham burg: Europa, 1999) , p. 130.
The m ost com prehensive port rayal cont inues t o be t hat given by Fried: Exploit at ion, pp. 107–
136; for a few correct ions in t his regar d, see Spoerer: Zwangsarbeit , pp. 151–166.
rat ion allowances, it was even possible for West ern European foreigners t o be
paid a higher am ount t han t heir Germ an colleagues.
Poles and Ost arbeit er received t he sam e st andard gross wage as Germ ans;
Ost arbeit er, however, were t axed in accordance wit h Tax Bracket I ( single wit h
no children) , regardless of t heir act ual fam ily st at us. I n addit ion t o t he t ax on
wages, t he Poles also had t o pay a discr im inat ory special t ax, t he 15 - percent
―
Social Equalizat ion Tax‖ ( Sozialausgleichsabgabe) , and t he Ost arbeit er were required t o pay t he ev en higher ―
East ern Workers‘ Tax‖ ( Ost arbeit erabgabe) . Because t he em ployers furt her were allowed t o deduct 1.50 RM for room and board
from t he pay of bot h t hese groups, t he Poles and Ost arbeit er received only a few
RM or even j ust a few groschen at t he end of t he week, while a Germ an or West
European skilled worker was paid around 40 t o 50 RM per week.
But m ost ot her foreign workers, t oo, were deprived of a not inconsiderable part
of t heir wages when t hey t ransferred t heir savings t o t heir hom e count ries. As a
result of t he occupat ion policies of t he Ger m ans, high inflat ion prev ailed in m ost
of t he occupied t errit ories. Act ually, t hat should have led t o an upward revaluat ion of t he Reichsm ark vis- à- vis t hese currencies, but t he Reichsbank kept t he
exchange rat e of t he Reichsm ark art ificially low. Thus t he foreign workers paid
RM am ount s int o a Germ an bank, and t he bank not ified t he foreign bank t hrough
t he appropriat e bilat eral clearing house, so t hat t he foreign bank —on t he basis of
t he unfavorable rat e of exchange—could pay out a corresponding am ount in t he
local currency t o t he fam ily m em bers. Because of t he inflat ion prevailing t here,
however, t he purchasing power was less t han in t he Reich, which m eant , in real
t erm s, a severe devaluat ion of t he sum rem it t ed. The difference in buying power
st ayed wit h t he Germ an Reich. 24
Alt hough t he foreign civilian workers had t o pay social insurance cont ribut ions
( including unem ploy m ent insurance! ) , t hey were discr im inat ed against in t erm s
of benefit s, especially in t he case of t he Poles and Ost arbeit er. I n hospit als, t hey
officially ranked as second- or t hird- class pat ient s, behind t he Germ ans. I n case
of im pairm ent s t o healt h t hat led t o t he expect at ion of a lengt hy absence from
24
See Fried: Exploit at ion, pp. 159–182; Karl Heinz Rot h: ―
Dreifache Ausbeut ung der
Fr em darbeit er. Eine Dokum ent at ion über Ökonom ie und Polit ik des Lohnersparnist ransfers in
der ‚europäischen Gro r aum wirt schaft ‗ 1940–1944.‖ I n: Mit t eilungen der Dokum ent at ionsst elle zur NS- Sozialpolit ik 7/ 8 ( 1985) , pp. 69–100.
work, t hey were sim ply sent hom e, where m edical care was dist inct ly poorer,
also as a result of t he Germ an occupat ion. The sam e policy was applied t o pregnant wom en at first .
The handling of pregnant wom en from Poland and t he East and t heir newborn
infant s is an especially ugly chapt er in t he t reat m ent of fem ale forced laborers.
The living and working condit ions of m any girls and wom en were so harsh t hat
m any deliberat ely got pregnant in order t o be sent hom e. I n lat e 1942, aft er t his
had com e t o t he at t ent ion of t he Germ an aut horit ies, t hey disallowed deport at ion
t o t he wom en‘s hom e count ries. The Polish wom en and fem ale Ost arbeit er were
urged or even forced t o have abort ions, t hough for Germ an wom en, abort ion
carried severe penalt ies, even including t he deat h penalt y. I f t hey w ished and
were able t o give birt h t o t he child nonet heless, t hen t hey had t o cont inue work ing unt il j ust before t he due dat e. The children of m any such wom en were t aken
away from t hem short ly aft er birt h. I f t he child was ―
suit able for Germ anizat ion‖
according t o racial cr it eria, but t he m ot her was not , t hen t he child was put up for
adopt ion by a Germ an couple w it hout inform ing t he m ot her. Ot herwise, t he
children were placed in a ―
boarding hom e for foreigners‘ children,‖ where t he fem ale forced laborers could visit t hem in t heir t im e off from work, if dist ance per m it t ed. Because t hese hom es generally did not even have enough m ilk available,
t he m ort alit y rat e for children of wom en from East ern Europe was m any t im es
t hat for Germ an children: 25 t o 50 % was supposedly t he norm . How m any
t housands of t hese children were forcibly adopt ed or st arved t o deat h or per ished
in som e ot her m anner is a subj ect t hat has not been syst em at ically researched
t o dat e. 25
The offense of which forced laborers m ost oft en were accused was ―
labor cont ract violat ion.‖ This was used as a blanket t erm t o cover any and all labor- lawrelat ed violat ions of t he harsh condit ions of t he deploym ent of foreigners. The
penalt ies ranged from warning and deduct ions from wages all t he way t o as-
25
See Raim ond Reit er: Töt ungsst ät t en für ausländische Kinder im Zweit en Welt kr ieg. Zum
Spannungsverhält nis von kr iegswirt schaft lichem Arbeit seinsat z und n at ionalsozialist ischer
Rassenpolit ik in Niedersachsen ( Hannover: Hahn, 1993) ; Gisela Schwarze: Kinder, die nicht
zählt en. Ost arbeit erinnen und ihr e Kinder im Zweit en Welt krieg ( Essen: Klart ext , 1997) ;
Gabriella Hauch: ―
Zwangsarbeit erinnen und ihre Kinder: Zum Geschlecht der Zwangsarbeit .‖
I n: Oliver Rat hkolb, ed.: NS- Zwangsarbeit : Der St andort Linz der „ Reichswer ke Herm ann
G ring AG Berlin“ 1938–1945. 2 vols. ( Vienna: Böhlau, 2001) , pp. 355–448.
signm ent t o concent rat ion cam ps or work educat ion cam ps ( Arbeit serziehungslager, AEL) . The AELs had ar isen since 1939 and were subor dinat ed t o t he
Gest apo. The condit ions of det ent ion corresponded roughly t o t hose in t he Ger m an concent rat ion cam ps, but generally t he period of confinem ent was lim it ed t o
t hree t o eight weeks at m ost . Aft er confinem ent t here, t he AEL prisoners usually
ret urned t o t heir old place of em ploym ent . From t he st andpoint of t he firm s,
which obviously were act ively involved in developing t he rapidly expanding net work of AELs, 26 t hat was t he great advant age over adm ission t o a concent rat ion
cam p. Once t he SS got hold of workers w it h whom it could expand it s econom ic
em pire, it generally did not part w it h t hem again. I n addit ion, t he firm s expect ed
t he sight of t he gravely m alt reat ed ret urnees t o have a disciplinary effect on t he
ot her workers, doubt less wit h som e success.
As t he m ilit ary prospect s worsened, t he regim e at t em pt ed t o play off not only
t he West ern Europeans but also t he East ern Europeans against t he advancing
Red Arm y, especially as it had been recognized in t he m eant im e t hat disproport ionat e increases in labor product ivit y could be achieved wit h bet t er nut rit ion and
higher wages. 27 I n lat e March 1944, t he wage condit ions of t he Ost arbeit er were
largely brought in line wit h t hose of t he Polish civilian workers, and in August
1944 t he daily rat ions of t he Ost arbeit er were aligned w it h t hose of t he ot her
POWs. I n addit ion, t he ―
OST‖ badge was replaced w it h lit t le t riangles t hat indicat ed t he et hnic affiliat ion ( Russian, Belor ussian, Ukrainian) of t he wearers. Unt il
t he end of t he war, t he rat ions were incr easingly brought int o conform it y w it h
t hose of t he West European workers—at least on paper. 28 Finally, in March 1945,
even t he social equalizat ion t ax was dropped. Whet her t here was a definit e im provem ent in t he living and working condit ions, however, is unclear. 29 I n eyewit ness account s, at any rat e, it plays alm ost no role. Quit e probably, anot her fact or
here is t he fact t hat Poles and Soviet cit izens had neit her any knowledge of t he
new regulat ions nor any ent it y t o which t hey could com plain, so t hat business-
26
27
28
29
See Gabi Lot fi: KZ der Gest apo. Arbeit serziehungslager im Drit t en Reich ( St ut t gart : DVA,
2000) , p. 316f.
See Diet rich Eichholt z: ―
Die ‚Kraut akt ion‗. Ruhrindust rie, Ernähr ungswirt schaft und Zwangsarbeit 1944.‖ I n: Herbert , ed.: Europa, pp. 270–294; Spoerer: Zwangsarbeit , pp. 127–135.
Herbert : Frem dar beit er , pp. 306–313.
See Annet t e Schäfer: Zwangsarbeit er und NS- Rassenpolit ik. Russische und polnische Arbeit skräft e in Würt t em berg 1939–1945 ( St ut t gart : Kohlham m er , 2000) .
m en, as well as t he frequent ly corrupt cam p and kit chen personnel, did not feel
obligat ed t o abide by t he new, m ilder regulat ions. Here t here is clear evidence
t hat t he racial hierarchy of t he Germ an populat ion was in no way forced upon t he
count ry by t he Nat ional Socialist s, but was shared by t he m aj orit y.
I n m any int erviews w it h cont em porary w it nesses, it has been confirm ed t hat t he
form at ive im pressions of t he forced laborers in Germ any were m arked by hunger, cold, racial discrim inat ion, and fear of air raids. Depending on nat ionalit y
and st at us, t hese four fact ors played roles of varying im port ance. 30 Toward t he
end of t he war, when scarcely any place in Germ any was safe from low - flying
Allied aircraft , hardly any of t he alm ost 9 m illion foreign workers are likely t o
have been in Germ any of t heir own free w ill.
Th e La b o r D e p l o y m e n t o f Co n cen t r a t i o n Ca m p Pr i so n e r s
When t he first concent rat ion cam ps cam e int o exist ence in 1933, t he Germ an
penal syst em int roduced condit ions of im prisonm ent such as neit her t he Weim ar
Republic nor t he Germ an Em pire had known. They m ust be underst ood only
against t he backdrop of an ideology t hat assigned no value t o t he individual as
such. Anyone who violat ed cert ain, allegedly fundam ent al, nor m s of t he social
exist ence of his people had placed him self out side t he Volksgem einschaft , t he
―
et hnic com m unit y.‖ Therefore he had t o be reeducat ed—or ext erm inat ed.
Therefore, from t he legal st andpoint , a concent rat ion cam p pr isoner was in pr inciple an out law , considered fair gam e. As of 1934, assignm ent t o a cam p was
m ade at t he request of t he Secret St at e Police Office ( Gest apa) or, lat er on, t he
Reich Securit y Main Office ( Reichssicherheit shaupt am t , RSHA) , w hich was est ablished four weeks aft er t he war began, as a way of unit ing t he Crim inal Police
( Kripo) , Securit y Police ( Sipo) , and Secret St at e Police ( Gest apo) under a single
roof. The concent rat ion cam ps were subordinat ed t o t he I nspect or of Concent rat ion Cam ps, who in t urn report ed im m ediat ely t o Him m ler unt il 1942, and from
t hen on t o t he Econom ic and Adm inist rat iv e Main Office ( WVHA) of t he SS.
The WVHA was est ablished in February 1942 by SS- Gruppenführer Oswald Pohl
at Him m ler‘s request , t o coordinat e t he econom ic act ivit ies of t he SS. When
30
See Hopm ann et al.: Zwangsarbeit , pp. 483–489.
Him m ler , one m ont h lat er, also placed t he concent rat ion cam ps under t he cont rol
of t he WVHA, Pohl set up a new depart m ent al group, Am t sgruppe D, in Oranienburg near t he Sachsenhausen concent rat ion cam p. The group was headed by SSBrigadeführer Richard Glücks, unt il t hen t he I nspect or of Concent rat ion Cam ps.
Responsibilit y for t he hir ing out of concent rat ion cam p pr isoners fell t o Am t D I I ,
led by SS- Oberst urm bannführer Gerhard Maurer, one of t he few t rained businessm en in t he WHVA, which em ployed as m any as 1,500 people. 31
For Him m ler, t hroughout t he ent ire durat ion of t he Nat ional Socialist regim e t he
concent rat ion cam p prisoners represent ed a disposable body t hat he could br ing
int o play for his frequent ly changing polit ical plans. Once a prisoner was in t he
concent rat ion cam p syst em , bribery or good cont act s could help him gain release
in except ional cases, but norm ally he was at t he m ercy of t he cam p SS, for bet t er or worse. Of t he approxim at ely 1.65 m illion people who were put int o t he
concent rat ion cam ps bet ween 1933 and 1945, only about 100,000 w ere released
t hrough norm al procedures before t he war ended. 32
From t he out set , t he forced labor of prisoners played a role in t he concent rat ion
cam ps. I n t he first phase, from 1933 t o 1936, however, work was prim ar ily a
m eans of discipline and hum iliat ion, frequent ly a form of pure harassm ent . 33 The
beginning of t he second phase in 1937 coincides, not by chance, wit h t he
achievem ent of full em ploy m ent and t he st art of t he m anpower short age. The
obj ect ives of ―
educat ion,‖ punishm ent , and ext erm inat ion cont inued t o be t he
focus of forced labor in concent rat ion cam ps, of course, but now t he SS availed
it self of t he pr isoners‘ m anpower t o creat e an econom ic m ainst ay. Most of t he
SS- owned ent erprises founded since 1938 were ―
eart h- and st one- works com panies,‖ which on t he one hand were int ended t o be suppliers for Hit ler‘s gigant ic
building proj ect s, and on t he ot her were well suit ed for abandoning undesirable
prisoners t o ―
ext erm inat ion t hrough work.‖ I n June 1938, Reinhard Heydrich,
31
32
33
See Jan- Erik Schult e: ―
Das SS- Wirt schaft s- Verwalt ungshaupt am t : Zent rale der Zwangsar beit
von KZ- Häft lingen.‖ I n: Ulr ike Winkler , ed.: St ift en gehen. NS- Zwangsarbeit und Ent schädigungsdebat t e ( Cologne: PapyRossa, 2000) , pp. 85–107, here pp. 91–93.
See Joseph Billig: Les cam ps de concent rat ion dans l'économ ie du Reich Hit lérien ( Paris:
Presses Universit aires de France, 1973) , p. 94; Karin Ort h: Das Syst em der nat ionalsozialist ischen Konzent rat ionslager. Eine polit ische Organisat ionsgeschicht e ( Munich: Pendo, 2002) ,
pp. 340–343.
See Falk Pingel: Häft linge unt er SS- Herrschaft . Widerst and, Selbst behaupt ung und Ver nicht ung im Konzent rat ionslager ( Ham burg: Hoffm ann & Cam pe, 1978) , pp. 35–39.
head of t he Sipo and t he Gest apo, for t he first t im e described t he deploym ent of
forced labor as t he essent ial pur pose of t he concent rat ion cam ps. 34 I n t he following years, t he ent erprises of t he SS expanded vigorously. However , it was not
possible t o build up an effect ive econom ic concern wit h t he SS guard forces,
which in m ost cases were very sim ple in st ruct ure. They were out of t heir dept h
as m anagem ent personnel, so t hat t he well- pract iced r it uals of violence persist ed
even long aft er it w as obvious t hat t hey were econom ically dysfunct ional. Of
course, aft er t he subordinat ion of t he I nspect or of Concent rat ion Cam ps t o t he
WHVA in March 1942, t here was an ext ensive replacem ent of t he cam p com m andant s, but t he plan t o get r id of corrupt and ineffect ive despot s and have a
new, elit e group of SS officers capable of t hinking in econom ic t erm s lead t he
cam ps in a m ore t ight ly organized way proved t o be illusory. Corrupt ion, m alt reat m ent , and m urder cont inued t o charact erize t he concent rat ion cam p syst em . 35
The syst em at ic use of concent rat ion cam p prisoners in t he arm s indust ry began
lat e in t he sum m er of 1942. Since March 1941, however, t wo pilot proj ect s had
been under way at t he const ruct ion sit es of I .G. Farben in Auschwit z- Monowit z
and of St eyr- Daim ler- Puch in St eyr. I n fall 1941, t he aircraft m anufact urer
Heinkel also began deploying prisoners. 36
I .G. Farbenindust r ie AG, a giant chem ical corporat ion creat ed by a m erger in
1925, is t he very sym bol of t he ent anglem ent of privat e indust rial firm s w it h t he
Nat ional Socialist regim e. Even before t he war, owing t o it s significance for t he
synt hesis of fuel and rubber ( Buna) , I .G. Farben had been t ight ly woven int o t he
34
35
36
Mar t in Br oszat : ―
Nat ionalsozialist ische Konzent rat ionslager 1933 –1945.‖ I n: Hans Buchheim /
Hans A. Jacobsen / Helm ut Kr ausnick: Anat om ie des SS- St aat es, 2nd edit ion ( Munich: dt v,
1979) , vol. 2, pp. 11–133, here p. 91 ( wit h list of sources) .
See Karin Ort h: ―
Die Kom m andant en der nat ionalsozialist ischen Konzent rat ionslager.‖ I n:
Ulrich Her bert / Karin Ort h / Christ oph Dieckm ann, eds.: Die nat ionalsozialist ischen
Konzent r at ionslager. Ent wicklung und St rukt ur ( Göt t ingen: Wallst ein, 1998) , vol. 2, pp. 755–
786, here p. 758f.
On I .G. Farben, see Pet er Hayes: ―
Die I G Farben und die Zwangsarbeit von KZ- Häft lingen im
Werk Auschwit z.‖ I n: Her m ann Kaienburg, ed.: Konzent rat ionslager und deut sche Wirt schaft
( Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1996) , pp. 129–148, and also Karl Heinz Rot h: ―
I .G. Farbenindust rie AG in Wor ld War I I .‖ Frit z Bauer I nst it ut / Goet he Univ ersit ät Frankfurt am Main: Norbert
Wollheim
Mem orial,
2011,
ht t p: / / www.wollheim m em orial.de/ files/ 1062/ original/ pdf_Karl_Heinz_Rot h_I G_Farbenindust rie_AG_in_World_War_
I I .pdf; on St eyr- Daim ler - Puch, see Bert rand Perz: ―
Der Arbeit seinsat z im KZ Maut hausen. ‖ I n:
Herbert / Ort h / Dieckm ann, eds.: Nat ionalsozialist ische Konzent r at ionslager , vol. 2, pp. 533–
557; on t he Heinkelwerke, see Ort h: Syst em , pp. 175–179.
count ry‘s rearm am ent effort s, especially since t he ( second) Four Year Plan of
1936.
I n 1940, when I .G. Farben was planning a sit e for a new plant t o produce Buna
and synt het ic fuel, it decided on Auschwit z. A crucial fact or in t his decision was
t he concent rat ion cam p t hen under const ruct ion, which from t hen on m ade
prisoners available as const ruct ion workers. At t he beginning, t he firm st ill
lodged prot est s against t he poor healt h sit uat ion of t he pr isoner s, but a process
of inurem ent quickly cam e int o play. I n m id- 1942, t he Auschwit z m ain cam p
even set up a subcam p of it s own in Auschwit z- Monowit z, r ight next t o t he plant
grounds. Of t he t ot al of around 35,000 pr isoners m ade t o work for I .G. Farben in
Auschwit z- Monowit z,
bet ween
23,000
and
30,000
died. 37
In
t he
nearby
subsidiar ies of t he plant , Farben deployed 6,000 addit ional concent rat ion cam p
prisoners, m ost of whom perished. Anot her 11,000 concent rat ion cam p prisoners
worked at t he Leuna, Wolfen, and Munich plant s. Overall, at it s num erous plant s,
Farben used at least 60,000 foreign civilian workers, 10,000 POWs, and 52,000
concent rat ion cam p prisoners. 38
The SS was int erest ed in far m ore t han t he m ere hiring out of prisoners, how ever: it also want ed t o solicit arm am ent s orders it self and have t hem filled in t he
concent rat ion cam ps. I t at t em pt ed t his in t he Buchenwald and Neuengam m e
cam ps, where it had arm s m anufact urers produce sm all arm s, definit ely wit h an
eye t o supplying it self as well. But aft er only a few m ont hs, in Sept em ber 1942,
37
38
According t o t he st at em ent of t he form er clerk in t he Labor Deploym ent Depart m ent at t he
Buna/ Monowit z concent rat ion cam p, Ervin Schulhof, bet ween Oct ober 1942 and January 1945
around 35,000 prisoner s passed t hrough t he Buna/ Monowit z concent rat ion cam p, see Ervin
Schulhof, affidavit , June 21, 1947, NI - 7967. Archiv des Frit z Bauer I nst it ut s, Nürnberger
Nachfolgepr ozess Fall VI , PDB 74 ( g) , pp. 128–133, here p. 130. For t he various est im at es of
t he num ber of prisoner s m urdered, see Pet er Hayes: I ndust ry and I deology. I G Farben in t he
Nazi Er a ( Cam bridge: Cam br idge UP, 1987) , p. 359; Raul Hilber g: Die Vernicht ung der europäischen Juden ( fir st edit ion, 1961) ( Frankfurt am Main: Fischer , 1990) , p. 994; Karl Heinz
Rot h: ―
I .G. Auschwit z. Norm alit ät oder Anom alie eines kapit alist ischen Ent wicklungssprungs?‖
I n: Ham burger St ift ung zur Förderung von Wissenschaft und Kult ur , ed.: „ Deut sche Wir t schaft “ . Zwangsar beit von KZ- Häft lingen für I ndust rie und Behörden ( Ham burg: VSA, 1991) ,
pp. 79–95, here p. 87; Bernd C. Wagner: I .G. Auschwit z. Zw angsar beit und Vernicht ung von
Häft lingen des Lagers Monowit z 1941–1945 ( Munich: Saur , 2000) , p. 281f; see also Florian
Schm alt z: ―
The Buna/ Monowit z Concent rat ion Cam p.‖ Frit z Bauer I nst it ut / Goet he Universit ät
Fr ankfurt
am
Main:
Norbert
Wollheim
Mem or ial,
2010,
ht t p: / / www .wollheim m em orial.de/ files/ 1057/ original/ pdf_Florian_Schm alt z_The_BunaMonowit z_Concent rat ion_Ca
m p.pdf.
See Hayes: ―
I G Farben,‖ p. 129, and especially Wagner: I G Auschwit z, p. 336. On t he hist ory
of I .G. Farben in general, Hayes: I ndust ry and I deology ; Got t fried Plum pe: Die I .G. Farbenindust r ie AG. Wirt schaft , Technik und Polit ik 1904 –1945 ( Berlin: Duncker & Hum blot , 1990) .
t he bold plans of t he SS for set t ing up an econom ic em pire of it s own, founded
on t he labor of prisoners, ran aground. On t he one hand, even sim ple orders required t he acquisit ion of m achines and t ools, w hich proved difficult in light of t he
chronic bot t lenecks in t his sect or. On t he ot her hand, neit her t he Minist ry of Ar m am ent s nor pr ivat e indust ry could get anyt hing out of t hese plans. Gnashing
t heir t eet h, Him m ler and Pohl were forced t o set t le for t he relat ively m odest role
of t he WHVA as lender of a workforce. 39
The t hird phase of t he deploym ent of concent rat ion cam p prisoners as laborers
began in Sept em ber 1942, when t he WVHA swit ched t o hiring out great er num bers of prisoners t han ever before t o t he arm s indust r y and ot her cont ract ors. I n
cont rast t o t he civilian workers and POWs, who were provided t hrough t he local
Labor Office, concent rat ion cam p pr isoners could be obt ained only from a cent ralized source, t hrough t he WVHA‘s Am t sgruppe D in Oranienburg. I nt erest ed par t ies conveyed t heir needs t o t he appropriat e Rüst ungskom m ando, which ver ified
t he degree of urgency. I f t he Rüst ungskom m ando was in agreem ent , t hen t he
com m andant of t he concent rat ion cam p concerned and it s supervisor of labor
deploym ent checked on t he deploym ent condit ions at t he locat ion, including t he
t ype of work done and t he facilit ies for feeding and shelt er ing t he prisoners. Then
Pohl, as head of t he WVHA, decided whet her t o approve t he deploym ent . I f he
gave his assent , represent at ives of t he cont ract ors, usually em ployees at t he j unior- or m iddle- m anagem ent levels, went t o t he appropriat e concent rat ion cam p
and picked out t he desired num ber of pr isoners t here, using t raining and st at e of
healt h as t he decisive crit eria. The process frequent ly was rem iniscent of ancient
or m edieval slave m arket s: The prisoners, m en and wom en alike, st ood naked in
front of t he represent at ives of indust ry, w ho insist ed on having a look at each
person‘s set of t eet h. 40
As in t he case of t he POWs, an ext ernal work det achm ent ( Aussenkom m ando)
t hen was form ed, set up on t he plant grounds t hem selves or in t he vicinit y. The
cont ract or provided t he housing; t he SS was responsible for t he t ransport at ion,
39
40
See Miroslav Kárný: ―
Das SS- Wirt schaft sverw alt ungshaupt am t . Verwalt er der KZHäft lingsarbeit skr äft e und Zent rale des SS- Wirt schaft skonzerns.‖ I n: Ham burger St ift ung, ed.:
„ Deut sche Wirt schaft ―
, pp. 153–169.
This r ecruit ing pract ice has been described m any t im es, see, for exam ple, Hopm ann et al.:
Zwangsar beit , p. 93.
guarding, feeding, clot hing, and m edical care of t he prisoners, wit h varying
regulat ions w it h regard t o part iculars, especially in t he last year of t he war. The
account ing m et hod, t oo, was sim ilar t o t hat used for t he deploym ent of POWs.
The cont ract ing part ies were t he Reich and t he cont ract or, who paid a fee for t he
use of t he prisoners. The fee varied over t im e, and aft er Oct ober 1942 it was set
at 4 RM per day for unskilled workers and wom en and 6 RM for skilled workers.
This equat ed t o bet w een 45 and 65 percent of t he pay of a Ger m an worker. 41 Of
t hese per diem rat es, t he SS at first passed on not hing at all t o t he prisoners;
lat er, as an incent ive t o boost perform ance, it gave t hem a t iny am ount in t he
form of cam p m oney. The rem ainder, aft er deduct ion of expenses, had t o be paid
int o t he public purse of t he Reich. I t was t hus not t he SS, but t he Reich Minist ry
of Finance, which was com plet ely uninvolved in t he ent ire operat ion, t hat received t he lion‘s share of t he fees paid for hir ing concent rat ion cam p prisoners. 42
The benefit for t he SS lay in t he gain in power, as t he organizat ion had at it s disposal absolut ely t he last labor reserves.
Unt il fall 1944, Osw ald Pohl m ade t he final decision on t he deploym ent of
prisoners, t hough m any an indust r ialist assured him self of t he support of even
higher aut hor it ies when he want ed t o lend special weight t o his r equest s. For ex am ple, Ferdinand Por sche int ervened wit h Him m ler personally on behalf of t he
Volkswagen plant . I n Sept em ber 1944, however, Speer decreed t hat from Oct ober on, his Reich Minist ry for Arm am ent s and War Product ion reserved t he right
t o m ake t he final decision on t he allocat ion of concent rat ion cam p prisoners. This
am ount ed t o a de fact o disem powerm ent of t he WVHA in t he area of labor
deploym ent , and it underscored t he increasingly significant r ole of t he arm am ent s bureaucracy under Speer. 43
For Jewish concent rat ion cam p pr isoners, deploym ent at forced labor init ially
m eant only a post ponem ent of t he deat h sent ence. But t he ot her concent rat ion
cam p pr isoners, t oo, were under const ant t hreat of deat h. I f t hey were assigned
41
42
43
See Mark Spoerer: ―
Profit iert en Unt ernehm en von KZ- Arbeit ? Eine krit ische Analyse der
Lit erat ur.‖ I n: Hist orische Zeit schrift 268 ( 1999) , no. 1, pp. 61–95, here p. 68.
Herm ann
Kaienburg:
„ Vernicht ung
durch
Arbeit “ .
Der
Fall
Neuengam m e.
Die
Wirt schaft sbest rebungen der SS und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Exist enzbedingungen der KZ Gefangenen ( Bonn: Diet z, 1990) , p. 287, in par t icular, fn. 26.
See Kárný: ―
SS- Wirt schaft sverwalt ungshaupt am t ,‖ p. 162; Mom m sen and Grieger:
Volkswagenwerk, p. 43; Schult e: ―
SS- Wirt schaft sverwalt ungshaupt am t ,‖ S. 99.
t o const ruct ion det achm ent s, t hey were not hing m ore t han ―
hum an m at erial.‖
Wit h scant prot ect ion from t he t hin prisoner‘s work coat , t hey were forced t o do
heavy labor in all weat hers. I f a pr isoner fell ill or was inj ured, and t herefore was
unfit for work, he was t ransport ed back t o t he m ain cam p or ev en t o one of t he
infam ous ―
sick cam ps,‖ which oft en were act ually deat h cam ps. The m ort alit y
rat e of t he so- called Bauhäft linge ( ―
const ruct ion pr isoners‖) was im m ensely high;
t he average life expect ancy was only a few m ont hs. Part icular ly in t he case of
const ruct ion pr isoners, business calculat ion even cont ribut ed t o t he worsening of
t heir survival chances. For t he Buna/ Monowit z concent rat ion cam p, I .G. Farben
won out over t he SS and got it s way: t he sickness absence rat e was not allowed
t o exceed 5 percent , and Farben did not have t o pay per diem rat es for sick
prisoners for m ore t han 21 days. As a result , pr isoners who were ill were sent
back t o Auschwit z and exchanged for ―
fresh‖ ones. 44
I f concent rat ion cam p pr isoners were assigned t o product ion work in a plant
building, however, t hey did have a chance, and not only because t hey were prot ect ed from t he elem ent s. Even for sim ple act ivit ies, t hey had t o be broken in,
and such t raining could t ake several weeks. Thus, in t he eyes of t he cont ract ors,
t he prisoners represent ed hum an capit al. Therefore t hey were not readily replaceable, and t hat gave t hem a chance t o survive. Courageous businessm en like
Bert hold Beit z and Oskar Schindler m anaged t o use t his argum ent successfully
against t he SS, even in t he case of Jewish pr isoners in t he Generalgouvernem ent . 45 I n fact , even wit h all t he differences in det ail, t he m ort alit y rat es in
product ion det achm ent s were m arkedly lower. Fem ale concent rat ion cam p
prisoners were usually deployed at product ion work, and t herefore t hey had a
relat ively high chance of survival, especially as t he harassm ent of wom en by t he
guards and Germ an forem en also was less pronounced. As a rule of t hum b, one
can say t hat t he m ore skill required by t he j ob t o be done, t he great er t he
chance of survival; t hat is, survival was m ore likely if t he cont r act or had a vest ed
int erest in t he individual worker .
44
45
Wagner: I G Auschwit z, p. 175.
See Thom as Sandkühler: „ Endlösung“ in Galizien. Der Judenm ord in Ost polen und die
Ret t ungsakt ionen von Bert hold Beit z 1941–1944 ( Bonn: Diet z, 1996) ; ―
I ch m usst e es einfach
t un.‖
I nt erview
wit h
Bert hold
Beit z.
SZOnline,
Februar y
1,
2008.
ht t p: / / www.sueddeut sche.de/ wirt schaft / art ikel/ 97/ 155689/ ( accessed on April 2, 2008) .
Under such circum st ances, t here was hardly any t hought of resist ance, part icular ly sabot age. The frequency of act s of sabot age and ot her form s of collect ive
polit ical resist ance seem s t o have been far lower t han t he Germ an securit y agencies had feared. Short ly aft er t he w ar, t he form er head of t he foreigners‘ division
at t he Reich Secur it y Main Office ( RSHA) est im at ed t he num ber of act s of sabot age com m it t ed by foreigners at an average of 6,800 per annum . Even t he
usually paranoid RSHA at t ribut ed t hem alm ost w it hout except ion t o personal
m ot ives. 46
Nat urally, lit t le is known about t he ext ent of t he successful act s of sabot age.
Special significance w as assigned t o sabot age at t he Mit t elwerk ( Cent ral Wor ks) ,
where, since August 1943, t ens of t housands of concent rat ion cam p prisoners
and ot her forced laborers had been at work, first building t he facilit ies for product ion of t he V- 1 flying bom b and t he V- 2 rocket ( A- 4) and t hen m anufact ur ing
t he unit s t hem selves. The WHVA set up a special concent rat ion cam p for t he
prisoners: Mit t elbau- Dora, which was a branch of t he Sachsenhausen concent rat ion cam p at first , but t hen was cont inued as an independent concent rat ion
cam p. The prisoners worked in 12- hour shift s for m ont hs on end, wit hout com ing
out side int o t he fresh air . Thousands died of hunger, epidem ic disease, and m ur der. Even t he prisoners were swept away by t he m yt h t hat Nazi propaganda built
up surrounding t hese ―
ret aliat ory weapons.‖ Believing t hat t hey were helping t o
build a m iracle weapon t hat could decide t he out com e of t he war —a weapon t hat
im paired t heir own chance of release and also t hreat ened t heir fam ilies and
fr iends back at hom e—t hey founded an int ernat ional resist ance organizat ion and
sabot aged product ion. I n fact , m any V- 1 bom bs and V- 2 rocket s failed t o reach
t heir t arget s. 47
46
47
See Ulrich Herber t : ―
Von der ‚Arbeit sbum m elei‗ zum ‚Bandenkam pf‗. Opposit ion und Widerst and der ausländischen Zwangsarbeit er in Deut schland 1939 –1945.‖ I n: Klaus- Jürgen Müller
/ David N. Dilks, eds.: Grossbrit annien und der deut sche Widerst and 1933 –1944 ( Pader born:
Schöningh, 1994) , pp. 245–260, here pp. 254–257.
See Walt er Bart el: ―
Neue For schungsergebnisse über den gem einsam en Kam pf deut scher und
ausländischer Ant ifaschist en in Deut schland gegen den faschist ischen Raubkrieg. ‖ I n: Bullet in
des Arbeit skreises „ Zweit er Welt krieg“ , 1965, no. 4, pp. 1–19, here p. 14f.; Manfred Bornem ann: Geheim proj ekt Mit t elbau. Vom zent r alen Öllager des Deut schen Reiches zur größt en
Raket enfabrik im Zweit en Welt krieg, 2nd edit ion ( Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 1994) , p. 102;
Rainer Fröbe: ―
Hans Kam m ler – Technokrat der Vernicht ung. ‖ I n: Ronald W. Sm elser / Enrico
Syring, eds.: Die SS. Elit e unt er dem Tot enkopf. 30 Lebensläufe ( Paderborn: Schöningh,
2000) , pp. 305–319, here p. 312.
For m ost of t he concent rat ion cam p pr isoners, however, t he daily st ruggle for
survival was all t hat count ed. One of t he chief problem s from t heir point of view
was t he discrepancy bet ween t he m eager food rat ions on t he one hand and t he
great ly increased caloric requirem ent s result ing precisely from hard, heavy labor.
To spare t heir dwindling reserves of st rengt h, t he prisoners did as lit t le work as
possible. To forcibly goad all of t hem t o work harder would have required a far
great er num ber of guards. Therefore, in 1942, t he m anagem ent of I .G. Farben‘s
Buna plant at Auschwit z- Monowit z suggest ed increasing t he concent rat ion cam p
prisoners‘ will t o wor k by int roducing an incent ive plan, cynically t erm ed Frauen,
Fressen, Freiheit ( ―
wom en, chow, freedom ‖) . I ndeed, in May 1943, Oswald Pohl
issued a corresponding decree prom ising cert ain benefit s t o prisoners wit h
above- average perform ance,
including
ext ra food
and
brot hel
visit s,
but
excluding t he prospect of release. Subsequent ly I .G. Far ben int r oduced an incent ive plan for t he concent rat ion cam p prisoners at it s const ruct ion sit e in
Auschwit z- Monowit z. The cam p m oney could be used by t he prisoners t o buy
st at ionery, t oot hpowder, cigaret t e papers, and t he like in t he cam p cant een.
They also could use it t o visit t he brot hel, set up as part of t his sam e schem e—
which m any pr isoners declined t o do, however. But t hey could not buy what t hey
needed m ost of all: foodst uffs. Therefore t he syst em of rewards did not result in
t he increase in labor product ivit y sought by t he firm . Ot her chem ical com panies
in t he region had t he sam e experience. Not unt il lat e in 1944 did represent at ives
of t he Upper Silesian chem ical concerns openly st at e t hat it was food, rat her t han
m oney, t hat had an obvious correlat ion w it h work perform ance. Thereupon t hey
decided t o int roduce a policy of Leist ungsernährung, or perform ance- relat ed nut rit ion. This inevit ably would have result ed in t he survival of t he fit t er prisoners
at t he expense of t he weaker ones. Short ly t hereaft er, however, t he Red Arm y
liberat ed t he Auschw it z concent rat ion cam p and it s subcam ps. 48
Wit h t he advance of t he front line, t he sit uat ion of t he pr isoners det eriorat ed
drast ically. The SS dest royed not only m any docum ent s t hat would have re-
48
See Pingel: Häft linge, pp. 132, 283f.; St reit : Keine Kam er aden, p. 214; Piot r Set kiewicz:
―
Häft lingsarbeit im KZ Auschwit z I I I - Monowit z. Die Frage nach der Wir t schaft lichkeit der Ar beit .‖ I n: Her bert et al.: Konzent rat ionslager , vol. 2, pp. 584–605, here pp. 597, 600. On t he
developm ent of forced prost it ut ion in t he Germ an concent rat ion cam ps, see Baris Alakus /
Kat harina Kniefacz / Robert Vorberg: Sex- Zwangsarbeit in nat ionalsozialist ischen Konzent rat ionslagern ( Vienna: Mandelbaum , 2006) .
vealed t heir cr im es, but also, in m any cases, t he wit nesses t hem selves. Anyone
who lagged behind on t he evacuat ion m arches, known wit h good reason as deat h
m arches, was m urdered by t he guards. Therefore t he m ort alit y rat e am ong t he
concent rat ion cam p prisoners soared t o new height s once again in t he final
m ont hs and weeks. Though t he concent rat ion cam ps had st ill cont ained 511,537
m en and 202,674 wom en in m id- January 1945, no m ore t han 475,000 of t hem
survived t he war. Many t housands died in t he weeks and m ont hs follow ing liberat ion, vict im s of t he direct consequences of forced labor and t he deat h
m arches. 49
Re sp o n si b i l i t y f o r t h e D e p l o y m e n t o f Fo r ce d La b o r er s
The gigant ic program of forced labor t hat t he Germ ans developed, especially
from 1942 on, is w it hout precedent in t he hist ory of t he t went iet h cent ury. I n
t erm s of scope, t here m ay have been program s of sim ilar size in t he Soviet
Union and China, but t heir vict im s were predom inant ly nat ionals of t hose count ries, rat her t han for eigners. The illegal nat ure of t his program was apparent t o
cont em poraries in t he Reich, as is indicat ed by t he dest ruct ion of huge num bers
of docum ent s regarding labor deploym ent in governm ent offices and pr ivat e
firm s im m ediat ely before t he approach of Allied t roops. The m ass deport at ions of
civilians from occupied count ries and t he circum st ances of forced labor deploy m ent were am ong t he m ain char ges in t he Nurem berg Trials. Represent at ives of
t he Germ an st at e and of Germ an indust ry ( Flick, I .G. Farben, and Krupp) were
convict ed of part icipat ion in t he forced labor program . 50
49
50
On t he num bers, see Billig: Cam ps, p. 95; Henry Friedlander: ―
Darkness and Dawn in 1945:
The Nazis, t he Allies, and t he Survivors.‖ I n: 1945. The Year of Liber at ion ( Washingt on, D.C.:
USHMM, 1995) , pp. 11–35, here pp. 13, 23f.; Johannes Tuchel: Die I nspekt ion der Konzent r at ionslager 1938–1945. Das Syst em des Terrors ( Berlin: Ed. Hent rich, 1994) , p. 213;
Spoerer / Fleischhacker: ―
Forced laborers‖; Spoerer / Fleischhacker: ―
Com pensat ion.‖
Benj am in B. Ferencz: Less t han slaves: Jewish Forced Labor and t he Quest for
Com pensat ion ( first edit ion, 1979) ( Bloom ingt on: I ndiana UP, 2002) ; Const ant in Goschler:
―
St reit um Alm osen. Die Ent schädigung der KZ- Zw angsarbeit er durch die deut sche Nachkriegsindust rie.‖ I n: Sklav enarbeit im KZ. Dachauer Heft e 2 ( 1986) , pp. 175–194. On t he
Nurem ber g Trial involving I .G. Farben, see also Karl Heinz Rot h: ―
Case VI . The I .G. Farben
Trial at Nurem ber g.‖ Frit z Bauer I nst it ut / Goet he Universit ät Frankfurt am Main: Norbert
Wollheim
Mem orial,
2010,
ht t p: / / www.wollheim m em orial.de/ files/ 1060/ original/ pdf_Karl_Heinz_Rot h_Case_VI _The_I G_Farben_Trial_at _Nure
m berg.pdf.
I f one at t em pt s, at a rem ove of m ore t han six decades, t o m ake a norm at ive and
m oral assessm ent of t he deploym ent of forced labor, t wo elem ent s m ust be
dist inguished: first , t he deploym ent per se, and second, t he circum st ances of t he
deploym ent , t hat is, t he living and working condit ions.
I t is not subj ect t o doubt t hat t he chief responsibilit y for t he deploym ent of
forced laborers and it s at t endant circum st ances was borne by t he Germ an st at e.
The governm ent planners of w ar product ion ident ified t he m anpow er short age as
a crucial bot t leneck and t ook corresponding st eps t o rem edy t he sit uat ion. The
init ially hesit ant firm s cam e t o t erm s w it h t he use of foreigners, quickly realized
t he new opport unit ies being offered t o t hem , and soon becam e t he schem e‘s
m ost zealous cham pions. This is in line w it h t he m ore recent im age, gained from
research, of t he relat ionship bet ween t he st at e and t he econom y in t he Th ird
Reich, according t o which t he st at e specified t he param et ers. Wit hin t his fram ework, however, t he represent at ives of large concerns in part icular could gain
considerable influence. The big businesses were, t o adapt a form ulat ion of
Avraham Barkai‘s, j unior par t ners. 51
How did t his shared responsibilit y look in concret e t erm s? For t he second
quest ion—t he responsibilit y for t he circum st ances of forced labor deploym ent —
t his is less difficult t o answer t han for t he first quest ion, as an im pressive num ber of regional and local case st udies have becom e available in t he m eant im e.
I ndeed, t he Nat ional Socialist st at e at t em pt ed t o regulat e t he deploym ent of foreigners t o t he m axim um ext ent , right up t o and including t heir privat e life; wit h
regard t o Poles and Ost arbeit er, t his can be described, wit hout any exaggerat ion,
as apart heid. I n t he end, however, t he cont ract ors ret ained quit e a lot of room
for m aneuver in dealing w it h t he forced laborers, part icular ly on t he im port ant
issue of t heir diet . 52 All ext rem es can be discerned, ranging from brut al exploit a-
51
52
Bar kai: Wirt schaft ssyst em , p. 23, uses t he expression ―
sleeping part ner.‖ See also Buchheim /
Scher ner : ―
Role,‖ pp. 410–412.
This is pr im arily t he result of com parat ive regional st udies, such as t hat by Roland Pet er :
Rüst ungspolit ik in Baden. Kriegswirt schaft und Ar beit seinsat z in einer Grenzregion im Zweit en
Welt krieg ( Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995) ; Andreas Heusler: Ausländereinsat z. Zwangsarbeit für
die Münchner Kriegswirt schaft 1939–1945 ( Munich: Hugendubel, 1996) .
t ion t o collegial t reat m ent , fr iendly dealings, and, in t he count ryside, even
accept ance int o t he fam ily. 53
I n general, it can be st at ed t hat t he chance of being t reat ed decent ly decreased
as t he size of t he com pany increased. I t m ade a difference whet her a farm er or
pat riarchal m edium - sized ent repreneur had direct cont act w it h ―
his‖ foreign
workers, or whet her several inst it ut ionalized levels of hierarchy, which inevit ably
produced anonym it y, lay bet ween t he com pany m anagem ent and t he foreigners.
Then t he em ployees were far m ore likely t o have t o deal wit h a convinced racist
or sim ply unscrupulous opport unist s in t he com pany hierarchy above t hem or
around t hem , which t hey could bypass t o m ake im provem ent s for t heir foreign
workers only at t he risk of pot ent ially dangerous conflict s. I n m any large firm s,
t herefore, t he at t it ude of t he com pany m anagem ent , as well as m id- level and
j unior m anagem ent , t oward t he foreigners was plainly charact erized by indifference. Then t he foreign workers were exposed t o t he caprices of t he cam p and
cant een personnel or, in t he workplace, t o t hose of t he forem an or m ast er
craft sm an.
I t is far m ore difficult t o answer t he quest ion of t he ext ent t o which t he cont ract ors m ust bear a share of t he responsibilit y for t he deploym ent of forced labor ers. Most com panies saw t hem selves faced wit h t wo t rends over t he course of
t he war: First , t he focus of product ion increasingly shift ed aw ay from consum er
goods t o arm am ent s. This process as such w as probably inevit able, because product ion of consum er goods not viewed as essent ial by t he aut horit ies was increasingly rest rict ed or prohibit ed alt oget her. The com panies had, at m ost , lat it ude
for deciding t o what ext ent and on what t erm s t hey would dedicat e t hem selves
t o arm am ent s product ion. 54
53
54
See Ela Hornung / Er nst Langt haler / Sabine Schweit zer: ―
Zwangsarbeit in der Landwirt schaft .‖ I n: Das Deut sche Reich und der Zweit e Welt krieg , vol. 9/ 2 ( Munich: DVA, 2005) , pp.
577–666; Oliver Rat hkolb: ―
Zwangsarbeit in der I ndust rie.‖ I n: ibid., pp. 667–727.
See Mark Spoerer: ―
Zur Verant wort lichkeit privat wirt schaft licher I ndust rieunt ernehm en für
den Einsat z von NS- Zwangsarbeit erI nnen. Das Beispiel Daim ler - Benz.‖ I n: Gabriella Hauch,
ed.: I ndust rie und Zwangsarbeit im Nat ionalsozialism us ( I nnsbruck: St udienVerlag, 2003) , pp.
37–47; Jonas Scherner: ―
‚Ohne Rück sicht auf Kost en?‗ Eine Analyse von I nvest it ionsvert rägen
zwischen St aat und Unt er nehm en im ‚Drit t en Reich‗ am Beispiel des Förderpräm ienverfahrens
und des Zuschussvert rags.‖ I n: Jahr buch für Wirt schaft sgeschicht e, 2004, no. 2, pp. 167–188.
As an inform at ive case st udy, see Lut z Budrass / Manfred Grieger: ―
Die Moral der Effizienz.
Die Beschäft igung von KZ- Häft lingen am Beispiel des Volkswagenwerks und der Henschel
Flugzeug- Werke.‖ I n: Jahr buch für Wirt schaft sgeschicht e, 1993, no. 2, pp. 89–136.
Second, t he sit uat ion m ost likely was sim ilar for t he deploym ent of foreign civilians and POWs. The st at e of research on t his point rem ains unsat isfact ory, of
course, probably in part because of t he lack of sources. St ill, cert ain dilem m as
can be deduced from t he fact t hat t oward t he end of t he war t here m ost likely
was not a single relat ively large firm in t he m anufact ur ing sect or t hat did not use
foreign workers. 55 As t he lengt h of t he war increased, t he Wehrm acht draft ed
m ore and m ore Germ an workers. Then t he com panies request ed replacem ent s
from t he Labor Office and were init ially given foreign civilian workers who had
com e t o Germ any of t heir ow n free w ill, or POWs, w hose labor deploym ent —w it h
som e rest rict ions—was fully backed by int ernat ional law. I n 1942 or 1943 at t he
lat est , t he firm s received foreign civilian workers, bot h m en and wom en, who
definit ely were not in t he Reich volunt ar ily, as it quickly becam e clear.
As far as is known, t his caused no et hical problem s for m ost cont ract ors. From a
form al legal st andpoint , t here was not hing wrong wit h t he deploym ent of foreigners, and t he par t icipat ion of t he firm , in fact , was highly desirable from t he
st at e‘s point of view. And apart from t hat , it soon w as evident t hat working w it h
forced laborers was bet t er in quit e a few respect s, because t hey were easier t o
discipline, t he indust r ial safet y regulat ions were looser, and t hey had lit t le if any
abilit y t o defend t hem selves against t he breach of legal regulat ions, due t o t heir
lack of knowledge or legal represent at ion. Therefore, aft er init ial hesit at ion, m ost
cont ract ors com pet ed vigorously for allocat ion of forced laborers.
But if a businessm an felt bound t o an et hos t hat t he Nat ional Socialist s despised
as old- fashioned or ―
liberalist ,‖ he faced a difficult decision. Ar m am ent s orders
were lucrat ive, but as t he war wore on t hey could be filled only by using forced
laborers. Thus anyone who want ed t o keep his int egrit y had t o allow t he less
scrupulous com pet it ors t o pass him by. Aft er t he war ended—t he post war
perspect ive was always significant for privat ely run com panies—t hese com pet it ors would have a bet t er st art ing posit ion. Because of t he cont inuing drain on t he
Germ an workforce, such a firm was t hreat ened wit h even great er danger, however. I dled m achiner y and vacant operat ional sit es undoubt edly would have
brought t he local ar m am ent s com m and and t hen t he Gest apo as well int o t he
arena. They would have had lit t le underst anding for t he businessm an‘s scruples,
55
Also according t o Herbert : Frem dar beit er , p. 430.
and would have appr opriat ed t he m achines or fact ory sit es, if any, and leased
t hem t o t he com pet it ors for t he durat ion of t he war or even sold t hem . Arguably,
t he fact t hat businessm en, faced wit h t he alt ernat ive of on- sit e cont ract ion or
deploym ent of forced labor , opt ed for t he lat t er and t hen t ried t o t reat t he allocat ed forced laborers decent ly can seem reprehensible only if one applies very
rigorous et hical post ulat es.
I n fact , however, it w as t he big firm s in part icular t hat obviously had no reservat ions of t hat kind. Rat her, t hey vied act ively for t he allocat ion of addit ional m an power, even aft er t he forced nat ure of t he labor deploym ent had long been
obvious. The dreadful point of culm inat ion was t he deploym ent of concent rat ion
cam p pr isoners, which, int erest ingly, by no m eans every large com pany considered unavoidable. Adam Opel AG, for exam ple, ot herwise not squeam ish about
deploying forced laborers, used no concent rat ion cam p prisoners, in cont rast t o
alm ost all it s com pet it ors ( including Ford) . 56 The m any allied com panies of t he
chem ical and nonferr ous m et al- producing and - processing indust ry, t oo, under
t he Met allgesellschaft um brella, forewent , as far as is known, t he use of concent rat ion cam p pr isoners. Despit e t he st rat egic im port ance of t heir product s, t hese
com panies obviously did not feel com pelled t o ent er int o such an ext ensive ent anglem ent w it h t he crim es of t he Nat ional Socialist regim e, what ever t he reasons m ay have been. Ot her com panies are known concret ely t o have successfully
refused a deploym ent of concent rat ion cam p pr isoners, despit e pressure from
t he aut horit ies and wit h no discernible consequences. Conversely, only a very
few cases are known in which firm s—possibly because t he body of source m at erial is not conclusive—felt com pelled t o r equest concent rat ion cam p pr isoners. 57
But t hese were except ions. I n t he vast m aj orit y of cases, in fact , t hese were
com panies t hat had backed t he Nat ional Socialist arm am ent s boom from t he out set and now, in light of t he foreseeable out com e of t he war, saw a chance of
56
57
See Reinhold Billst ein et al.: Working for t he Enem y: Ford, General Mot ors, and Forced Labor
in Germ any during t he Second Wor ld War ( Oxfor d: Ber ghahn, 2000) , p. 12; Henry A. Tur ner
Jr.: General Mot ors and t he Nazis. The St ruggle for Cont rol of Opel, Europe’s Biggest Car m aker ( New Haven: Yale UP, 2005) , p. 145f.
Mar k Spoer er: ―
Profit iert en Unt ernehm en.‖ An alleged acr oss- t he- board com pulsory fram ework for t he deploym ent of foreigner s is em phasized by Werner Abelshauser in part icular :
―
R st ungsschm iede der Nat ion? Der Kruppkonzern im Drit t en Reich und in der Nachkriegszeit
1933 bis 1951.‖ I n: Lot har Gall, ed.: Krupp im 20. Jahrhundert . Die Geschicht e des Unt er -
saving t heir valuable m achinery from t he Allied airst r ikes, w it h t he help of concent rat ion cam p pr isoners. 58 St art ing in m id- 1943, ent ire plant s w ere m oved underground in hazardous relocat ion proj ect s. For t he t errible living condit ions t o
which t he ―
const ruct ion prisoners‖ were subj ect ed during t he building of t he gigant ic t unnel facilit ies, t he relocat ing fir m s and in part icular t he const ruct ion
com panies m ost cert ainly share t he responsibilit y in large part .
Regardless of t he quest ion of t he at t it ude of individual fir m s t oward t he deploy m ent of forced laborers, sixt y years aft er t he fact it is indeed im possible t o const rue a legal obligat ion, t hough a m oral obligat ion clear ly can be const rued.
Arm am ent s orders were profit able, but could be filled only by deploying forced
laborers. As t he r ising profit s could not be fully dist ribut ed and it was advisable
anyway, because of t he hidden inflat ion, t o reinvest t hem in capit al expendit ures,
m ost indust r ial firm s, especially t he large ones, em erged from t he years of war,
rent cont rol, and curr ency reform as relat ive winners. I n 1948, t he capit al asset s
of West Germ an indust ry were 20 percent great er and dist inct ly younger t han
before t he war, despit e t he air war and dism ant ling. 59 Today‘s shareholders and
em ployees of indust rial firm s receive dividends and salaries from capit al asset s
whose foundat ions could be laid and developed in t he last years of t he war only
wit h t he help of forced laborers.
( Translat ed from Germ an by Kat hleen Luft )
58
59
nehm ens vom Erst en Welt krieg bis zur Gr ündung der St ift ung ( Ber lin: Siedler , 2002) , pp.
267–472, here p. 430f.
Spoerer : ―
Verant wort lichkeit .‖
See Wer ner Abelshauser: ―
Kriegswirt schaft und Wirt schaft sw under. Deut schlands wirt schaft liche Mobilisierung für den Zweit en Welt krieg und die Folgen für die Nachkriegszeit . ‖ I n:
Viert elj ahrsheft e für Zeit geschicht e 47 ( 1999) , no. 4, pp. 503–538, here pp. 524, 535f.

Mark Spoerer Forced Labor in the third Reich

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