The Lockean Case for Religious Tolerance: Persecution Ryan Pevnick

Transcription

P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 0 9 VO L 5 7 , 8 4 6 – 8 6 5
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00796.x
The Lockean Case for Religious Tolerance:
The Social Contract and the Irrationality of
Persecution
post_796
846..865
Ryan Pevnick
New York University
John Locke’s non-religious arguments for tolerance are often seen as inadequate. He is criticized for: (1)
failing to give reasons in support of a strict separation between the roles of church and state; and (2)
wrongly insisting that the coercion of belief is irrational. I argue that once we understand Locke’s
arguments for tolerance within the context of his social contract framework, his non-sectarian arguments
can circumvent such criticisms. Lockean arguments for tolerance are thus stronger than typically
supposed.
There are two main ways to defend the claim that government power ought not
to be used for the purpose of furthering any particular religious conception. First,
tolerance might be advocated from within a particular conception of the good;
that is, one might argue from premises particular to a certain theological or
religious position.While this strategy is important, it is limited in that it requires
advocates of tolerance to develop distinct supporting arguments for each conception present in society. For instance, while John Locke argues that tolerance is
a Christian virtue, this particular argument will cease to be effective if control of
the state falls to atheists. Second, one might attempt to demonstrate that there are
reasons to reject government attempts to pursue a particular religious conception
which do not grow from the commitments of a particular religious view. Here the
hope is to show that there are reasons to accept limits on the government’s right
to entangle itself in religious matters that may appeal to a set of people with a
range of core commitments. Although strictly speaking such arguments are not
neutral or non-sectarian, they seek to appeal to interests individuals have qua
citizens and thus hope to put support for religious tolerance on a somewhat
broader footing than the first type of argument can.1 Because he is interested in
appealing to the widest possible audience, Locke emphatically pursues both of
these strategies.2 However, it is the second general strategy that I will here
primarily be concerned with.3
This is not because the first strategy is irrelevant or otherwise uninteresting,4 but
because the power of Locke’s pursuit of the latter strategy has not been
adequately appreciated. Indeed, the literature is rife with doubts about the
cogency of Locke’s non-religious arguments.5 There are two main reasons for
© 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Political Studies Association
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these doubts. First, critics argue that Locke asserts, rather than justifies, the stark
separation between the domain of the government and the domain of the church
on which his advocacy of tolerance hinges. Second, following Jonas Proast, many
commentators insist that Locke is wrong to argue that attempting to coerce belief
is irrational. Together these concerns are often taken to lay waste to Locke’s
non-religious arguments for tolerance.
For instance, Jeremy Waldron influentially claims that Locke fails to provide
arguments ‘which might dissuade someone here and now from actions of intolerance and persecution’ ( Waldron, 1991, p. 98). Likewise, Micah Schwartzman
suggests that none of ‘Locke’s main arguments for toleration have general or
universal appeal. His case for toleration cannot be understood or made coherent
except in relation to its religious content’ (Schwartzman, 2005, p. 682). This
position has become ‘the most influential contemporary reading’ (Bou-Habib,
2003, p. 611) of Locke’s Letter and, as a result, analysts have concluded that ‘there
is no way to reconstruct’ Locke’s argument ‘to meet the objections’ (Quinn, 2001,
p. 60). Thus, despite the Letter’s canonical standing, critics have widely dismissed
its non-religious argumentative power as a result of objections regarding the
putative (1) lack of rationale for separating church and state and (2) irrationality
of coercing belief.
In this article, I situate Locke’s non-religious arguments for tolerance within his
social contract framework in order to show that his position is not susceptible to
these now standard criticisms.6 Rather than providing a historical account of the
development of Locke’s views or his motivation for holding them, I focus on
demonstrating that situating Locke’s arguments within his social contract framework allows one to see that they are not vulnerable to the most prevalent
criticisms. Thus, the main thrust of the article is unabashedly ahistorical;7 rather
than trying to understand Locke’s writings in their historical context, I argue that
critics have wrongly insisted that Locke’s non-religious arguments fail and so
cannot be of any aid in current attempts to understand the appropriate limits on
the use of government power to further particular religious conceptions. Our
primary focus, then, is on the argumentative power of Locke’s non-religious case
for tolerance.
The argument proceeds as follows. In the first section, I demonstrate that Locke’s
contractual arguments constitute an important (though not always sufficient)
rationale for prohibiting the magistrate from pursuing religious ends. In the
second section, by situating the argument regarding the rationality of coercing
belief within this social contract framework, I demonstrate that although analysts
have successfully rebutted one of the reasons that Locke offers for the claim that
coercing belief is irrational, they have ignored a second and stronger reason for
Locke’s insistence on the irrationality of coercing belief. If successful, these
sections demonstrate that Locke’s non-religious arguments can escape the criticisms so often thought to ravage them.
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Finally, in the third section I switch gears slightly and argue that there is reason
to think that the position I explicate in the second section is not just a powerful
Lockean response to criticism, but also part of the position held by Locke himself.
Because of this looming goal, there are moments in the first and second sections
when I find it useful to make reference to the fact that Locke explicitly makes
arguments along the lines of the ones that I suggest; such comments are meant to
prime the reader for the third section as well as reinforce the Lockean ‘credentials’
of the arguments in the first two sections.
It is important to keep in mind, then, that I have two goals in what follows. Most
importantly, I seek to show (in the first two sections) that – as a philosophical
matter – the non-religious aspect of Locke’s position in A Letter Concerning
Toleration can successfully evade the criticisms that (1) it fails to provide a reason
for separating church and state, and (2) the coercion of belief is not, in fact,
irrational. My secondary goal is to suggest (in the third section) that – as a
historical matter – there is at least some reason to believe that the Lockean
position that I explicate in showing how the view can circumvent (2) was Locke’s
own view.
The Contractual Argument for Separating Political and
Religious Concerns
Although discussion concerning the division of the political and religious
spheres fills a substantial portion of Locke’s Letter,8 it is widely thought that
Locke provides no justification for this division. Proast argued that Locke ‘does
but beg the question, when he affirms that the commonwealth is constituted
only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of the civil interests of the
members of it’ (Proast, 1984, p. 18). Likewise, Andrew Murphy repeatedly
suggests that Locke simply defines ‘government as concerned solely with externals’ (Murphy, 1997, p. 383, also p. 382). The literature is awash with similar
claims:
The problem with this contractualist argument is that it does not give an independent reason to fix the bounds of church and state according to Locke’s
definition of civil interests ... The claim that the purpose of the state is only to
protect our civil interests is not an argument, but rather the desired conclusion of the
sort of argument that Locke is supposed to have presented (Schwartzman, 2005,
p. 683, emphasis in original).
Locke’s systematic elaboration of the consequences flowing from the basic difference between religion and government, and from the primacy of personal and
subjective conscientious conviction in everything relating to the former, was the
pillar sustaining his justification of toleration (Zagorin, 2003, pp. 261–2).
[Locke’s] point in the Letter was to underline the incommensurability between the
domains by elaborating a corresponding view of human action and experience
itself as similarly separate and bounded ... Toleration was shown to be natural or
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self-evident given the radically dichotomous nature of these two types of human
actions, experiences, and ideas ... The reader could not avoid acknowledging that
indeed his experience within these two spheres was often sharply conflictual
(Creppell, 1996, pp. 203–4).
Thus, rather than providing a justification for the separation of spheres, Locke is
typically interpreted as having asserted that such a separation is ‘basic’,‘natural’ or
‘self-evident’.9
Fortunately, commentators are mistaken in thinking that Locke provides no
reason for the separation of spheres. Instead, such reason is provided by Locke’s
contractualist arguments, but this has been overlooked by scholars commenting
on the Letter.10 Rather than being asserted as natural or self-evident, the social
contract argument of the Second Treatise can provide reason to separate the two
spheres.11
On Locke’s account, one only transfers rights to government because of the
insecurity of property in the state of nature.12 As he says:
the great and chief end therefore, of Men uniting into Commonwealths, and putting
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property. To which in the
state of Nature there are many things wanting (Second Treatise, §124, emphases in
original).13
In particular, Locke highlights three enforcement problems in the state of nature
(Second Treatise, §124–6):
(1) there is no settled, established and publicly known law;
(2) there is no established and impartial judge; and
(3) there is no reliable way to execute sentences.
The purpose of government, on this account, is to protect property in those
situations in which individuals cannot do so themselves because of the above
problems:
by establish’d standing Laws, promulgated and known to the People, and not by
Extemporary Decrees; by indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by those Laws;And to imploy the force of the Community at home, only
in the Execution of such Laws ... And all this to be directed to no other end, but
the Peace, Safety, and publick good of the People (Second Treatise, §131, emphases in
original).
Because government is instituted in order to address the insecurity of property in
the state of nature, it is justified in taking measures to address these enforcement
problems.14
Many commentators suggest that even if this amounts to an explanation of why
certain powers would be transferred to the magistrate, it is not clear why
additional ones would not be transferred. For instance, Schwartzman suggests that
‘missing from the contractualist argument is an explanation for why individuals in
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the state of nature would not give up control over the religious aspects of their
lives’ (Schwartzman, 2005, p. 684). At issue, then, is whether the contractual
argument can provide good reasons to disallow government’s pursuit of religious
ends (such as the salvation of its citizenry).15
The most obvious reason not to include pursuing the salvation of the citizenry
within the powers of the magistrate is, in Locke’s words, that ‘no-body can in
reason suppose, that any one entered into civil society, for the procuring, securing,
or advancing the salvation of his soul; when he, for that end, needed not the force
of civil society’ (Locke, 1690, p. 22). This, though, is not a good reason to those
who (1) share the faith of the magistrate and (2) value the salvation of others. It
may well be that government power is required to bring fellow citizens to one’s
own way of thinking.
So while commentators suggest that the contractualist argument fails to give
reasons to limit the authority of government to non-religious matters, I will argue
that Locke’s account provides two important reasons why self-interested individuals (even those sharing the religious beliefs of the magistrate and wanting to
convert others) should not give government jurisdiction over religious matters.
Nevertheless, in emphasizing that the contractualist account provides reasons even
for a self-interested majority to adopt a policy of tolerance, I do not want to
suggest that Locke’s argument for tolerance is simply a prudential one. There are,
of course, other elements to Locke’s argument, not least of which is a strong
moral and religious conviction that the magistrate ought not to interfere in the
relationship between an individual and God. It is important, however, to see that
the contractualist account can provide reasons even to those who do not share this
conviction: those – for example – who are undecided about the merits of
religious tolerance but recognize their interest in having a sovereign who can help
overcome enforcement problems.
If Locke’s case is to be argument rather than assertion, it needs to provide a set of
reasons to adopt a policy of tolerance even to those who may disagree about the
moral importance of the individuality of one’s relationship with God or the shape
of individual rights. Thus, though it is certainly not the whole of Locke’s case, it
is worth carefully assessing the extent to which the contractual argument can
provide non-religious reasons to adopt a policy of tolerance. Accordingly, in what
follows, I argue that (1) the structure of the decision situation presented in the
state of nature undermines attempts to expand the purpose of government and (2)
transferring surplus power to the sovereign will render it dangerous (even for the
majority).
First, the structure of the decision situation presented in the state of nature gives
reason to prefer limiting government to non-religious ends. If the majority insists
on giving the sovereign power over religious matters, it is in the minority’s
interest to resist agreement entirely. Those who do not share a religion with the
magistrate will clearly have reason to reject a contract that legitimates government
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ends beyond solving the collective action problems presented by the state of
nature. After all, such an agreement would allow the state to advocate forcibly a
particular religious conception over and against the pleas of minorities. However,
people would not give up their right to choose a religion because:
If there I take a wrong Course, if in that respect I am once undone, it is not in the
Magistrates Power to repair my Loss, to ease my Suffering, nor to restore me in any
measure, much less entirely, to a good Estate. What Security can be given for the
Kingdom of Heaven? ... Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound,
and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be not thoroughly
perswaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it.
No way whatsoever that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my Conscience, will
ever bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed (Locke, 1991, p. 30; see also Locke,
2006, pp. 273–4).
The sovereign cannot offer individuals anything rivaling the importance of
salvation and, thus, individuals have no reason to forfeit control over religious
aspects of their lives (no matter what earthly benefits the sovereign can provide in
return). Hence those in the minority will not transfer rights over religious
conscience because there is nothing to gain from such transfer.
Further, in the Letter, Locke argues that a substantial range of religious beliefs are
consistent with the protection of property, saying:
It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of
toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted),
that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world
upon account of religion (Locke, 1991, p. 52).
Thus, on the Lockean view a limited diversity of opinions is consistent with social
peace (so long as the magistrate responds to them properly). Given this, the
minority’s unwillingness to cooperate is important even to a strictly instrumental
majority. This is because the three relevant inconveniences (no agreed-upon law,
arbitrator or way to execute the decisions of an arbitrator) are collective action
problems. As a result, overcoming them requires cooperation from a large majority of the population. It will not be enough for a small majority group to impose
solutions on the rest of society; instead, solving the problems requires that the vast
majority of the population see the solutions as consistent with their interests. And
again, getting such cooperation requires presenting the minorities with a contract
they can accept, that is, one that refrains from intolerance.
Connectedly, Locke insists that policies that discriminate on the basis of religious
belief are themselves a major source of civil disorder.16 He argues that policy
aimed at producing a religiously homogeneous society endangers the state’s
ability to fulfill its primary role.
Let those Dissenters enjoy but the same Privileges in Civils as his other Subjects,
and he will quickly find that those Religious Meetings will be no longer dangerous. For if men enter into Seditious Conspiracies, ’tis not Religion that inspires
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them to it in their Meetings; but their Sufferings and Oppressions that make them
willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate Governments are every where
quiet, every where safe. But Oppression raises Ferments, and makes men struggle
to cast off an uneasie and tyrannical Yoke (Locke, 1991, p. 52).
Policies partial to particular religious groups undermine the ability of the state to
provide order. Individuals thus have reason to refuse government leeway over
such matters.
Again, because overcoming collective action problems requires widespread
support, those in the majority have reason to offer the social contract on terms
that are as widely agreeable as possible. Thus, if the majority recognize their
strong interest in solving the collective action problems faced in the state of
nature, they will have to offer terms that minority groups (at least those of
substantial size) find acceptable. However, as Locke argues, there is nothing that
can be done to render soul saving a legitimate end of government in the eyes of
those who differ on religious matters from the magistrate. As a result, even the
majority have reason to limit the ends of government to the protection of
property (the solution of the three collective action problems). Pushing for a more
expansive social contract jeopardizes the ability of the magistrate to solve the
collective action problems presented by the state of nature. Thus, the first reason
provided by the contractual argument to limit the scope of government power is
that including religious issues in government jurisdiction threatens the government’s efficiency in addressing enforcement problems and promises to provoke
disorder.
Second, Locke suggests that individuals in both groups have an interest in limiting
the power transferred to the magistrate. After all (as Locke recognized from
first-hand experience), transferring rights to the magistrate can be a source of
both security and insecurity.17 Thus he argues that individuals have an interest in
limiting the power transferred to the government. In the Second Treatise he
repeatedly suggests that a government that exceeds the rights required to solve the
relevant collective action problems is illegitimate and, indeed, more dangerous
than the state of nature. To think that men would transfer powers to the
magistrate beyond those needed to address such issues is, he argues, to think that
‘Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them
by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions’
(Second Treatise, §93, emphases in original). Individuals, in Locke’s view, will resist
transferring rights over religious belief to the sovereign because such a transfer
will increase the likelihood and ability of the sovereign to become a predator (see
Locke, 1690, pp. 26–7). Of course, the extent to which this one extra power will
render the sovereign dangerous (and whether that is worth it) depends on the
specifics of the situation.
Thus the contractual argument provides two important reasons for the separation
of spheres from which Locke’s argument for tolerance moves. First, providing the
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magistrate with power over religious matters jeopardizes the government’s ability
to provide public goods and encourages disorder.18 Second, granting the magistrate additional power is risky for all citizens. These arguments show that Locke
provides non-religious reasons even to a self-interested majority to tolerate large
classes of dissenters. Thus, even if an individual rejects all of Locke’s religious
arguments, the case for tolerance is not entirely lost. Instead, the contractual
framework helps produce an argument that even this interlocutor should be able
to recognize.19
Although Locke thus provides important non-religious reasons for tolerance, they
do not necessarily constitute a sufficient rationale for tolerance. Instead, the
strength of these arguments depends on the preferences of citizens (how much
does the majority value saving others?) and the size and strength of the groups.
That is, if the costs of disorder, the threat of powerful government and less
efficient solving of collective action problems exceed the benefits the majority
judge themselves to receive from using the government to pursue religious ends,
then they will have sufficient reason to adopt a tolerant policy. Thus Locke’s
non-religious arguments will be sufficient to justify tolerance in some cases and
not in others.20
One might object that the reasons I have stressed are insufficient because they
would be incapable of persuading religious interlocutors who place a qualitatively
greater value on conversion than civil peace. Such a character is neither difficult
to imagine nor confined to philosophical thought experiments. Indeed, in the
beginning of his response to Locke, Proast himself insists that he sees ‘no reason,
from any Experiment that has been made, to expect that True Religion would be
any way a gainer by’ toleration (Proast, 1984, p. 2). If the standard for a successful
argument is that it must demonstrate that ‘true religion’ will benefit, clearly the
above considerations are not successful. Notice, though, how immoderate is
Proast’s position here: he entirely discounts any earthly considerations. I concede
that the non-religious Lockean contract argument is without the resources to
convince such individuals to accept a policy of tolerance. No non-religious
argument can appeal to an individual who affords non-religious concerns no
importance; indeed, this is an inherent limitation of non-religious arguments for
religious toleration. As we will see, it is in response to this kind of challenge that
Locke shifts his focus to the advancement of a religious argument for tolerance;
with such an interlocutor, these premises are the only ones from which to work.21
However, the fact that there are inherent limits to non-religious approaches must
not be used as a way of ignoring the presence and power of such arguments. The
same, after all, is true of religious arguments. Given the diversity of people’s
commitments, it is unreasonable to expect a single argument to be capable of
convincing all individuals.
Recall that we began the section by noting that commentators typically insist that
Locke simply asserts or ‘defines’ the separation between spheres as ‘basic’,‘natural’
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or ‘self-evident’. As a result, it is suggested that Locke’s non-religious argument
for religious tolerance begs the question. This section’s argumentation demonstrates, however, that Locke’s social contract arguments provide a set of reasons for
the limitations on the legitimate functions of the state for which he argues. Thus
while there are, of course, many objections to Lockean social contract doctrine,
it cannot be an objection that the bounds of government are simply announced;
instead, the contract itself shapes the sovereign’s scope of authority. Commentators are only able to dismiss this argument by illegitimately separating Locke’s
Letter from his social contract argument.
Order and the Irrationality of Indirect Persecution
An important element of Locke’s argument for religious tolerance is that it is
irrational to attempt to coerce belief. One – but, I will suggest, not the only –
argument that he provides for this position is that deeply held beliefs are not
chosen and so cannot, even through coercion, be un-chosen:
[S]uch is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief
of any thing by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments,
nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the
inward judgment that they have framed of things (Locke, 1991, p. 18).
Here Locke insists that the state’s tools are not capable of altering religious belief.
Many take this argument to be the whole of Locke’s view (Fiala, 2002, p. 103;
Mendus, 1991, p. 160),‘the single Argument by which the Author endeavours ...
to establish his Position’ (Proast, 1984, p. 4), ‘the most promising’ (Schwartzman,
2005, p. 680) or the ‘most powerful argument in the Letter Concerning Toleration’
( Waldron, 2002, p. 231).
It has, however, been successfully challenged by a number of critics. Waldron,
following Proast and St Augustine, concedes that religious belief cannot be directly
coerced. He allows, for example, that a Jew who finds herself at the wrong end of
a radical missionary’s gun cannot, on command, change her faith. Nevertheless he
argues that there are indirect and subtle manners through which even deeply held
beliefs may be coerced:
Although the law cannot compel men coercively to believe this or that because it
cannot compel the process of understanding, it can at least lead them to water and
compel them to turn their attention in the direction of this material. A man may
be compelled to learn a catechism on pain of death or to read the gospels every day
to avoid discrimination. The effect of such threats and such discrimination may be
to increase the number of people who eventually end up believing the orthodox
faith. Since coercion may therefore be applied to religious ends by this indirect
means, it can no longer be condemned as in all circumstances irrational ... Even if
belief is not under the control of one’s will, the surrounding apparatus may be; and
that will be the obvious point for a rational persecutor to apply his pressure
( Waldron, 1991, pp. 116–7; see also Proast, 1984, p. 5).
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Waldron argues that this indirect persecution is potentially efficacious and, so,
rational. As a result of this line of attack, Locke’s argument is typically seen as
‘open to a number of fairly strong objections’ (Schwartzman, 2005, p. 680) or even
‘beyond rescue’ (Bou-Habib, 2003, p. 618).
Although I believe that Waldron is correct that such an indirect strategy may be
efficacious, there is an important difference between demonstrating that a ‘rational
persecutor’ ought to ‘apply his pressure’ to the ‘surrounding apparatus’ of belief
and showing that such persecution is the appropriate step for the magistrate to
take up. Locke has a second reason for resisting persecution, one that does not
hinge on its putative inefficacy.
Indeed, while Waldron correctly identifies the surrounding apparatus as the
rational place for a persecutor to apply pressure, this assessment misses much of
the point of Locke’s argument. Notice that while Waldron asks what the persecutor
ought to do, Locke is interested in what the magistrate ought to do. This change
in perspectives marks an important sleight of hand, for it is not the magistrate’s
business, as Waldron implicitly assumes, to search far and wide for efficacious
methods of persecution. Showing that some method of coercing belief is possible
(as Waldron’s argument does) is quite different from demonstrating that such a
tack is advisable for the magistrate (as Waldron’s argument does not do). In
addition to knowing about the efficiency of persecution, the magistrate (unlike
the persecutor) must also understand how it relates to his primary goals (addressing the collective action problems noted in the previous section).
Citizens are unlikely to respond well to a leader who compels his citizens ‘to learn
a catechism on pain of death or to read the gospels every day to avoid discrimination’ ( Waldron, 1991, p. 116); instead we can expect that people will resist a
magistrate who – implementing this indirect persecution – forces citizens to read
certain religious texts while banning others. That the persecution is indirect
should not lead one to think of it as unobjectionable; indeed, most of us would
bitterly oppose a government that forced us to read certain texts, banned others
and even compelled us ‘to learn a catechism on pain of death’.
Indeed, Locke himself emphatically makes the point that differential treatment of
religions is bound to upset civil peace towards the Letter’s conclusion:
Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone, and that there were some other
Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features, so that those who have black Hair (for example) or
gray Eyes, should not enjoy the same Privileges as other Citizens; that they should
not be permitted either to buy or sell, or live by their Callings ... can it be doubted
but these Persons, thus distinguished from others by the Colour of their Hair and
Eyes and united together by one common Persecution, would be as dangerous to
the Magistrate ... there is only one thing which gathers People into Seditious
Commotions, and that is Oppression (Locke, 1991, p. 52).
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In this passage, Locke insists that the threat to order lies not in ‘the diversity of
Opinions, (which cannot be avoided) but the refusal of Toleration to those that
are of different Opinions’ (Locke, 1991, p. 52). It is this intolerance that, on his
view, ‘has produced all the Bustles and Wars’ typically attributed to religious
diversity simpliciter (Locke, 1991, p. 52). Thus, on the Lockean view, the magistrate
has reason to resist indirect persecution: even if potentially efficacious, it threatens
to undermine the civil peace that the magistrate is charged with upholding. As a
result, it is illegitimate (in the sense that it is beyond the scope of the powers
transferred to the magistrate).22
While Locke is therefore concerned with the possibility that persecution may
undermine the provision of order, the only effect of the indirect persecution noted
by Waldron is an increase in ‘the number of people who eventually end up believing the orthodox faith’ ( Waldron, 1991, p. 116).Waldron fails to acknowledge that
even indirect persecution is likely to lead to unrest,resistance and ultimately disorder.
Alternatively,Locke insists that persecution makes the persecuted‘very much more
[the magistrate’s] enemy’ (Locke, 1993, p. 193) and ‘will certainly make [the
persecuted] hate the person of their persecutor’(Locke,1993,p.206).On this view,
even if we accept that indirect persecution eventually promises to be effective in
creating a homogeneous society, we must also recognize that – in the meantime –
it is likely to cause civil discord as citizens respond to having treasured books
censored, being forced ‘to learn a catechism on pain of death’ or being disallowed
from meeting with their religious brethren.Indirect persecution cannot be instantly
effective (indeed it is a process likely to work only over generations) and its
inadvisability stems, on the Lockean account, from its tendency to undermine the
objectives of the political community in the meantime.
Recall that ‘The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their
Property’ (Second Treatise, §124). Or, early in the Letter:
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to
secure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his subjects in particular,
the just possession of those things belonging to this life (Locke, 1991, p. 17).
Thus, on Locke’s account (and for the reasons outlined in the first section) the
magistrate is centrally charged with upholding order and the stability of property.
Even, then, if we grant that certain types of persecution are likely to be efficacious, their
tendency towards disorder renders them inadvisable from the perspective of the magistrate.
Indeed, Locke explicitly argues that religious homogeneity ought not to be the
magistrate’s goal, for it is not religious diversity but ill-treatment of certain groups
that leads to instability:
Take away the partiality that is used towards them in matters of common right;
change the laws, take away the penalties unto which they are subjected, and all
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things will immediately become safe and peaceable: nay, those that are averse to the
religion of the magistrate, will think themselves so much the more bound to
maintain the peace of the commonwealth (Locke, 1991, p. 30).
The Stirs that are made, proceed not from any peculiar Temper of this or that
Church or Religious Society; but from the common Disposition of all Mankind,
who when they groan under any heavy Burthen, endeavour naturally to shake off
the Yoke that galls their Necks ... There is one only thing which gathers People
into Seditious Commotions, and that is Oppression (Locke, 1991, p. 49).23
The primary goal of government is to protect property, and indirect persecution
threatens to undermine this goal. It is, therefore, irrational for the magistrate to
adopt a policy of indirect persecution – even if it is likely (in the long run) to be
effective in changing the beliefs of the coerced. Even if indirect attempts to coerce
belief are empirically possible, they remain irrational from the perspective of the
magistrate because they risk undermining the government’s primary objective.
Thus the non-religious Lockean case for tolerance is not as easily undermined as
commentators would have us think.
Furthermore, this Lockean non-religious line of argument, according to which
tolerance is often justified through its contribution to civil peace, is of continuing
relevance in arguments about the government’s proper role on issues of religious
import. Indeed, nearly every US Supreme Court ruling on issues related to the
separation of church and state comments on the potential divisiveness and
instability of a government intent on entangling itself in religious ends. For
instance, in considering a case on the constitutionality of non-denominational
prayer in public school, the Court argued:
The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this
country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular
form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred,
disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs (Engel v. Vitale,
370 US 421, 1962).24
Like Locke, the Court has consistently worried that government pursuit of
religious ends invites disorder and that this result provides good reason, even to
the majority, to resist the government’s pursuit of such ends.25 Thus theorists have
been too quick to conclude that Locke’s non-religious arguments for tolerance
are bereft of persuasive power. Indeed, if the Lockean case for tolerance is widely
viewed as passé, it is at least partly because perennially relevant aspects are rarely
recognized as Lockean.
Locke and the Irrationality of Coercing Belief
In the preceding section I tried to show that the view articulated by Locke in A
Letter Concerning Toleration is not devastated by the recognition that it may be
empirically possible to coerce belief in an indirect manner, because there is an
additional and more robust reason for thinking it – from the magistrate’s per© 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Political Studies Association
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spective – irrational to attempt to coerce belief. Although I believe that this line
of argument is the strongest Lockean response to the criticism regarding the
irrationality of coercing belief (and that it is worth explicating for that reason
alone), I want to resist the claim that it is only an interesting way to save Locke’s
own arguments from failure. Instead, there is evidence to suggest that Locke
himself adopted and advanced this line of argument.26
Below, I provide two reasons for accepting that Locke himself thought intolerance
was irrational because such coercion threatens to undermine the very purpose for
which the sovereign was instituted. The first reason has to do with the shape of
Locke’s original response to Proast and the second concerns Locke’s treatment of
atheists.Without claiming that such reasons are dispositive, I believe that (together
with the argument’s consistency with the Second Treatise) they at least provide
reason to consider the possibility that the view advocated here is more than just
a Lockean reconstruction.
First, Locke strongly objected to Proast’s characterization of his argument against
the coercion of belief. Indeed, one of the first points that he makes in response to
Proast is that:
you [Proast] tell us, ‘the whole strength of what that letter urged for the purpose
of it lies in this argument [the argument regarding the irrationality of coercing
belief]’, which I think you have no more reason to say, than if you should tell us,
that only one beam of a house had any strength in it, when there are several others
that would support the building, were that gone (Locke, 1690, p. 4).
Here Locke adamantly resists Proast’s suggestion that the whole of the case for
tolerance rests on the argument regarding the impossibility of coercing belief;
instead he insists that this is but one of the reasons provided to support tolerance.
Moreover, Locke vehemently objects to Proast’s characterization of the argument
regarding the impossibility of coercing belief. Against Proast’s interpretation,
Locke insists:
In neither of those passages, nor any-where else, that I remember, does the author
[Locke himself] say that it is impossible that force should any way, at any time, upon
any person, by any accident, be useful towards the promoting of true religion, and
the salvation of souls; for that is it which you mean by ‘utterly of no use’ ... But that
which he [again, Locke himself] denies, and you grant, is, that force has any proper
efficacy to enlighten the understanding, or produce belief. And from thence he
infers, that therefore the magistrate cannot lawfully compel men in matters of
religion. This is what the author says, and what I imagine will always hold true,
whatever you or any one can say or think to the contrary (Locke, 1690, p. 4).
This passage is significant because in it Locke does not deny that indirect coercion
may be of some use in altering belief but instead insists that it is beyond the scope
of the legitimate authority of the magistrate. Again it is beyond the legitimate
authority of the magistrate because it threatens to undermine his main goals.
859
Likewise, there is evidence in the Letter that Locke’s concern is with the rightful
domain of the magistrate. For example, in discussing the right of resistance he
insists that ‘the question is not here concerning the doubtfulness of the event, but
the rule of right’ (Locke, 1991, p. 45). His focus is primarily on the normative
justifiability of acts rather than their empirical probability. Thus Locke resisted
Proast’s characterization of his position and defended himself in terms similar to
the ones I advance.
Although Locke did object strongly to Proast’s characterization of his position
and offered an explanation along the lines of the one outlined here, one might
nevertheless object that this line of argument does not fill the bulk of Locke’s later
work on toleration.While this is true, it is also readily explained. As we have seen,
Proast challenges Locke to explain how a policy of tolerance will benefit ‘true
religion’:
How much soever it [a policy of tolerance] may tend to the Advancement of Trade
and Commerce (which some seem to place above all other Considerations); I see
no reason, from any Experiment that has been made, to expect that True Religion
would be any way a gainer by it; that it would be either the better preserved, or the
more widely propagated (Proast, 1984, p. 2).
In this way, Proast alters the desiderata by which arguments are assessed. He
changes the conversation from one about the proper role of the magistrate to one
about the consequences for the true religion.
Locke, wanting to defeat Proast on Proast’s own grounds, goes on to develop a
number of arguments purporting to demonstrate that a policy of tolerance will be
best for the true and saving religion.27 This, however, marks a move away from the
topic addressed in the Letter and helps explain why Locke does not further
explicate the contractual argument in the remainder of the later writings.
Because, for the sake of argument, he accepts the way in which Proast reframes
the debate, the contractual argument is no longer of central importance. Again,
this is not because such an argument was not important for the Letter, but that
what is at stake in the debate changes as the argument proceeds. Thus the fact that
Locke’s later writings focus on other arguments does not provide reason to doubt
the importance of contractualist considerations.
Second, this manner of understanding Locke’s arguments regarding the irrationality of attempting to coerce belief has the further advantage of helping us make
sense of otherwise troubling aspects of his position. For instance, if Locke’s
defense of tolerance hinges only on the empirical claim that coercion is incapable
of altering beliefs then it would seem to provide strong reason to tolerate all
groups ( Waldron, 2002, p. 232). There would be no more reason to refuse
tolerance to atheists than non-traditional Christians. However, this – as we know
– is not what Locke recommends; instead he refuses to support the extension of
tolerance to atheists and is ambivalent about extending tolerance to Catholics.28
He insists, for example, that atheists are not to be tolerated because – since God
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puts strength in promises, covenants and oaths – they cannot be trusted to uphold
agreements crucial to peaceful civil society. The view I have advocated allows us
to overcome this puzzlement by explaining why it may be rational to attempt to
coerce the will of atheists but not most other dissenters.
In general, force is disallowed because it threatens to provoke disorder and, as
such, is antithetical to the ends of the sovereign (provision of public goods and
protection of property). However, on Locke’s view, atheists already present a threat
to civil society and thus their toleration cannot advance civil peace. If the
irrationality of coercing belief referred only to its empirical impossibility, then
Locke would seemingly be forced to accept the tolerance of all groups, but if he
is instead primarily concerned with the consequences persecution may have on
the maintenance of a stable society, then it may – as he suggests – be rational to
tolerate some groups (those who pose no independent threat) and persecute
others (those whose mere presence threatens the magistrate’s ability to pursue his
ends successfully).29 Thus an advantage of the interpretation that I propose is that
it can make sense of Locke’s exclusion of atheists.
Conclusion
Despite the Letter’s status as a canonical defense of tolerance, its non-religious
arguments are widely seen as vulnerable to decisive objections. I have argued that
Locke’s position – once properly understood in the context of his social contract
arguments – can circumvent such criticisms.
First, I showed that Locke’s contractual argument provides important reasons
(related to order and efficiency) for even a purely self-interested majority to resist
using the government to pursue religious ends. Even if one desires a more robust
argument for tolerance, a virtue of this part of Locke’s account is that it may
appeal to a set of people who will likely be at odds on appropriate premises for
any more robust argument for tolerance. Second, I argued that understanding the
role of civil stability in Locke’s defense of tolerance allows us to understand the
sense in which persecution is irrational. In particular, even indirect persecution is
generally irrational because it threatens to undermine the protection of property
for which government is instituted. Third, I suggested that in addition to a
powerful Lockean rejoinder there is reason to suspect that Locke himself supported this view regarding the irrationality of persecution. Three advantages of
this interpretation are that it: (1) makes sense of Locke’s specific arguments in a
way that allows them to circumvent relatively obvious criticisms; (2) is consistent
with Locke’s rejoinder to Proast; and (3) brings coherence to the position by
explaining why he supports tolerance in some cases while opposing it in others.
Rescuing Locke’s Letter from the shadow cast upon it by facile objections, these
arguments allow us to see the document’s argumentative power in a new light and
resist the common concern that the case for ‘religious toleration ... rests on shaky
861
philosophical foundations’ (Quinn, 2008, p. 168). Moreover, recasting the document allows us to appreciate how Locke’s arguments for tolerance are integrated
within his larger theory of legitimate government as an integral feature of a
prosperous civil society.
(Accepted: 24 September 2008)
About the Author
Ryan Pevnick, Department of Politics, NewYork University, 19 West 4th St office #326, NewYork, NY
10012, USA; email: ryan.pevnick@nyu.edu
Notes
I am grateful to Colin Bird, Julian Franklin, A. John Simmons and several anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
Additionally, four others are owed special thanks. First, the essay was originally written for a seminar that I took with
George Klosko and he, at numerous points, encouraged me to continue work on it. Second, Micah Schwartzman twice
provided detailed feedback on drafts which has led to enormous improvements in the article. Our conversations have
deepened my understanding and appreciation of Locke’s arguments. For this, I am most grateful. Third, Ingrid Creppell
provided comments and, more importantly, inspired my interest in Locke’s writings on religious tolerance. Finally, I was
blessed to have many opportunities to discuss Locke’s views with the late Perez Zagorin. The loving memory of his
magnanimity and intellectual passion provide lasting inspiration in life and scholarship.
1 This is not, as we shall see, to say that such an argument will appeal to all possible interlocutors. Some people can
only be reached via the first type of argument.
2 The distinction between these two types of strategy hinges on the kinds of reasons offered in support of the
arguments. For example, one might support religious tolerance because of a belief in the importance of individual
religious freedom. Such an argument can be defended via either strategy, depending on the type of reason
underlying the commitment. If it is argued that a person can only be a true believer if they make the decision for
themselves rather than being pressed into faith by government, then we have a religious argument for tolerance.
This argument will only appeal to those who subscribe to a religion holding that one must commit in a suitable
individual way for the commitment to be authentic. Alternatively, one might argue that religious freedom is
valuable because it helps prevent the government from becoming too strong or overbearing. This reason can be
understood by people with a wide range of conceptions of the good.
3 Note that the justification can be coherent in its pluralism. Jeremy Waldron argues that ‘different lines of argument
do not converge on a single destination: each argument yields a distinct conception which in turn generates distinct
and practically quite different principles of political morality’ ( Waldron, 1991, p. 114). Although it is true that
pluralistic justification may lead to practical incoherence, it does not follow that all arguments based on pluralistic
justification unravel into this sort of incoherence.
4 Instead, a central task of any argument for tolerance is to persuade believers. The argumentation offered (and
omitted) in A Letter Concerning Toleration is carefully selected.While there is much in the Christian tradition capable
of justifying or even motivating violence, Locke emphasizes its pacific elements.While this is an obvious tactic, it
is not without significance. Careful and selective emphasis is part of what shapes what we think and who we are.
The identity of Locke’s audience makes the argument from religion a critical one; if people’s strongest commitment
is religious, the construction of a principle of toleration consistent with that religion is necessary. Thus internal
arguments for toleration are integral. For the best accounts of the potential importance of Locke’s religious
arguments in the literature, see Schwartzman (2005) and Waldron (2002).
5 Throughout the article I discuss the possibility of non-religious reasons for tolerance. One objection to this line of
argument might be that nothing in Locke’s work can provide non-religious reasons because its most basic starting
point (the equal moral status of individuals) is an overtly religious one ( Waldron, 2002). For the purposes of this
essay, I simply set that point aside and assume, perhaps without justification, that many people will accept the equal
moral status of individuals without accepting Locke’s rationale for that position. It does seem that many who reject
Locke’s religious premises accept this basic moral claim for a host of reasons (and non-reasons). Thus I proceed
under the assumption that the basic equality of individuals may be established by some overlapping consensus rather
than only via Locke’s religious rationale.
6 My focus is squarely on Locke’s Letter and not the later writings on religious tolerance. I avoid discussing his other
work except where it is of critical importance for understanding this document.
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7 Some will suggest that the project is therefore anachronistic.While the particular shape of the dilemma facing Locke
(in terms of managing a political society in the face of religious pluralism) was certainly different than ours (such
that he would likely have a different understanding of words and concepts that we both make use of ), it does not
follow that there can be no Lockean approach to our issues of religious pluralism. I take for granted that there is
an appreciable difference between explicating a Lockean framework for negotiating the state’s role in a religiously
plural society and (say) proclaiming that Locke sits on one side or another of religiously infused contemporary issues
such as stem cell research, gay marriage or abortion.Whether or not the project is anachronistic, I see no reason to
think that it is objectionably so. Indeed, those whom I criticize have also focused primarily on this ahistorical
question; that is, on the issue of whether or not Locke’s arguments might provide us with resources to construct
an argument for tolerance that may be applicable ‘here and now’.Waldron, for example, explains that his article ‘is
not intended ... as an historical analysis of his position’ and that, instead, he will ‘consider the Lockean case as a
political argument – that is, as a practical intellectual resource that can be abstracted from the antiquity of its context
and deployed in the modern debate about liberal theories of justice and political morality’ ( Waldron, 1991, p. 98,
emphasis in original; similarly see Schwartzman, 2005, pp. 700–1).
8 For excellent discussions of the Letter from this perspective, see Chen (1998) and Creppell (2003, ch. 5).
9 Some suggest that even though the contractualist argument fails to provide reason to limit the scope of government,
Locke provides subsidiary arguments based on the characteristic tools of the state. For instance,Waldron holds that
Locke ‘defines the state in terms of the characteristic means at its disposal’ ( Waldron, 1991, p. 101). In particular, the
magistrate is specially equipped with coercive force. Thus Waldron claims that ‘the fact that governments and their
officials work by coercive force while other organizations do not is the fundamental premise of Locke’s argument
and the basis of his distinction between church and state’ ( Waldron, 1991, p. 102). The difficulty with avoiding the
contractualist argument by instead assessing the state based on its characteristic tools is that the tools available to
government are those transferred by individuals under the terms of the contract. Thus if the contractualist argument
begs the question, we do no better by looking for an argument based on the characteristic tools of the state.
10 Because of the anonymity of Locke’s texts, Proast was not in a position to understand the relationship between the
two arguments. However, we can use our improved perspective to understand better the argumentative strength of
the Lockean position.
11 For somewhat comparable views on this point, see Stanton (2006, pp. 89–92); Wootton (1993, pp. 99–104).
12 Locke (1970, pp. 124–126). Hereafter, references to the Second Treatise will take the form (Second Treatise, §xxx).
13 Note the wide sense of property being used by Locke; he refers to lives, liberties and estates under the general term
‘property’ (Second Treatise, §123). It should also be recognized that the mere fact that the state is justified as a way
of protecting property says little – in itself – about the implications the Lockean position has for distributive justice.
That is, a justification based on the protection of property might underlie a nightwatchman state or an egalitarian
one depending on what one accepts as rightful claims to property in the first place. For the Lockean, much will
depend on how one understands the duty to charity and the Lockean proviso. The weight of these restrictions is
much contested and I raise the issue only to make clear that a justification of the state that depends on the protection
of property does not, by itself, have clear implications regarding distributive justice.
14 Locke makes this point in his Essay Concerning Toleration, explaining that ‘if men could live peaceably & quietly
together without uniteing under certain laws & growing into a common-wealth, there would be noe need at all of
magistrates or polities, which are only made to preserve men in this world from the fraud & violence of one an
other, soe that what was the end of erecting of government, ought alone to be the measure of its proceeding’ (Locke, 2006,
pp. 269–70, emphasis added).
15 Here it might be worth noting that Hobbes (as well as Locke himself in the Two Tracts) provides an argument which
holds, roughly, that solving the enforcement problems noted above provides reason to grant the sovereign all power
over religious issues and (if the sovereign thinks it necessary) to reject a policy of tolerance. Thus social contract
arguments can lend strength to religious tolerance or intolerance, depending on the particular arguments used to
flesh out the contract. In the substantive space between Hobbes and the later Locke, much rides – as we shall see
– on arguments and judgements about the relationship between diversity, government policy and disorder. This is
important because it shows that those willing to accept the premises of a social contract argument cannot be
presumed already to support religious tolerance. The social contract is just a mode of reasoning which may support
a range of different conclusions depending on the arguments used to flesh it out.We should avoid, then, thinking
that there is a social contract answer to questions such as the appropriateness of religious tolerance.
16 While commentators have certainly noticed Locke’s interest in order (see, for example, Creppell, 1996, pp. 218–9;
Josephson, 2002, pp. 254–7; Tully, 1993, p. 53), its importance to the argument has not been fully explicated. For
example, James Tully mentions Locke’s comments regarding the connection between tolerance and order, and
insists that ‘the magistrate’s role continues to be to uphold the public good’ (Tully, 1993, p. 53). However, he does
not show why Locke takes the public good to exclude religious ends. What we need to know is what kinds of
non-religious reasons are given to exclude religious ends from the tasks of government. Although Selina Chen
argues that Locke’s epistemological position provides important reasons to restrict government authority to
non-religious matters (Chen, 1998), I am not aware of any systematic attempt to explain how Lockean contract
doctrine can provide such reasons.
863
17 This view is notably different from the one adopted by Locke in his early career (Locke, 1967).
18 For a magisterial account of the development of Locke’s political thought that is exceptional in the stress that it does
place on the underlying prudential considerations, see Kraynak (1980). Despite the myriad strengths of Kraynak’s
explanation, he greatly exaggerates the importance of skepticism in Locke’s argument for religious tolerance. In
particular, Kraynak claims that ‘Locke is saying that subjective belief makes a doctrine objectively true or false. As
a result, sincere belief becomes the sufficient test of a doctrine’s truth and sincerity in one’s own beliefs is sufficient
for salvation’ (Kraynak, 1980, p. 65). Locke, however, is making the weaker (and more plausible) claim that sincere
belief is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for salvation. For instance, in support of his view Kraynak quotes
Locke’s claim that ‘every church is orthodox unto itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any church
believes, it believes to be true’ (Kraynak, 1980, p. 66; Locke, 1991, p. 24). Notice that Locke says that ‘whatsoever any
church believes, it believes to be true’ and not (as Kraynak’s argument requires) ‘whatsoever any church believes is
true’. This misinterpretation underlies Kraynak’s portrayal of Locke as a radical atheist. For example, it allows him
to claim that a Lockean will hold that ‘no one can say what is right for another because all truths are equal’ (Kraynak,
1980, p. 66, see also pp. 54–5).
19 Locke himself deliberately makes his case in a way meant to appeal to such interlocutors (see, for example, Second
Treatise, §131).
20 Notice that the same kind of insufficiency arguably haunts Rawls’ efforts to exclude comprehensive doctrines from
certain kinds of public debate (Rawls, 1999). For instance, Michael Sandel argues that even if the achievement of
a mutually respectful and tolerant public culture is an important goal, it is not clear that it is more important than
commitments internal to a comprehensive doctrine (Sandel, 1998, p. 196). That the former has this importance,
though, would need to be shown if – for example – doctrinaire Catholics were to be given reason to refrain from
using sectarian reason to promote their position on abortion. This similarity between the limits of the two
arguments is suggestive of the general limitations on non-religious arguments for tolerance.
21 The only other alternative seems to be, with Rawls, to dismiss such figures as ‘unreasonable’ (Rawls, 1993), especially
his discussions of reasonableness and the criterion of reciprocity; see also Dreben (2003). Given, however, the
prevalence of such interlocutors, it is – it seems to me – to Locke’s great credit that he goes on to develop a set of
religious arguments meant to appeal to them.
22 This line of argument will not be sufficient to convince a sitting magistrate who cares more about religious
conversion than civil order because – as we have seen in the first section – that individual will not be convinced
by the argument for separation of spheres. Again, such an individual needs to be addressed via religious arguments.
The arguments can nevertheless be important in such a situation because they offer a standard of legitimacy by
which citizens can judge their government. A magistrate who pursues religious objectives without the approval of
their subjects faces the threat of removal.
23 Much of Locke’s non-religious argument for religious tolerance rests on this empirical claim that it is not a normal
range of diversity, but the magistrate’s response to it that ushers forth disorder. As we will see in the third section,
where this empirical claim is in doubt, the case for religious tolerance falls asunder.
24 Indeed, the order-based argument even played an important role in the institution of the First Amendment. For
instance, James Madison argued against public sponsorship of religious instruction, suggesting that it would be ‘a
dangerous abuse of power’. The document notes (among other Lockean points) that ‘Every relaxation of narrow
and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to assauge the disease’ (Madison, 1785).
25 Despite the prominence of concerns about the threat of disorder created by government adoption of religious ends,
the Court has ‘never held that the potential for divisiveness alone is sufficient to invalidate a challenged governmental practice; we have, nevertheless, repeatedly emphasized that “too close a proximity” between religious and
civil authorities, may represent a “warning signal” that the values embodied in the Establishment Clause are at risk’
(Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668, 1984 [Brennan J., dissenting]).
26 Again, I do not mean to deny that Locke sometimes also argued that intolerance is irrational because coercion
cannot act on the will. Instead, my claim is that he made both of these arguments and that even if – as Proast and
others have shown – one fails, the other retains merit.
27 For a helpful exploration and defense of the arguments Locke goes on to develop, see Tuckness (2008). Like the
social contract argument, the ‘universalization argument’ developed by Locke in the later letters (and highlighted by
Tuckness) does not depend on narrow religious premises and is accessible to a broad audience. I resist, however,
entering into a dispute about what should count as Locke’s ‘main’ argument. That the universalization argument
is – for example – more prevalent and foundational in the later letters is largely a consequence of Locke’s goals in
those letters (that is, once again, answering Proast’s challenge to show that true religion benefits from a policy of
tolerance). Had Proast instead built his challenge around the claim that tolerance was inconsistent with the teachings
of Christ or the provision of order in civil society, we can trust that the shape of Locke’s responses would have been
quite different.
28 In the literature there is some controversy regarding the status of Catholics in Locke’s view ( Waldron, 2002, pp.
217–23). In order to understand Locke’s hesitations, it is important to distinguish between the religious beliefs of
Catholics and their political commitments. Locke wishes to deny tolerance only to those Catholics who promise
obedience to the Pope and not necessarily to Catholics as a class. Indeed Locke allows that ‘Papists and all other men
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have a right to toleration of their religious worship & speculative opinions’ (Locke, 2006, p. 306). He goes on,
however, to insist that ‘having adopted into their religion as fundamentall truths, severall opinions, that are opposite
and destructive to any government but the popes’, Catholics ‘have noe title to toleration ... since their very principles
make them irreconcilable to the state’ (Locke, 2006, pp. 306–7). Locke clearly worries that being a Catholic generally
entails such obedience and thus denies tolerance to Catholics as a class (see Marshall, 2006, pp. 686–94). Thus, as
Marshall notes, Locke ‘was struggling over how to discriminate between the series of associated political principles
which for him made Catholics intolerable, and the religious worship and other religious beliefs of Catholics which
deserved toleration’ (Marshall, 2006, p. 692).
29 These comments highlight, once again, the limited nature of Locke’s arguments for tolerance, but this recognition
of the limits (and potential danger) of tolerance is a benefit of the Lockean framework (even if we would want to
argue with Locke about where the lines are best drawn).
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The Lockean Case for Religious Tolerance: Persecution Ryan Pevnick

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