22 (TRANSLATION) October 2010 Japanese Parts Suppliers:

(TRANSLATION)
22
October 2010
Japanese Parts Suppliers:
The Road to Cultivating OEM Customers in China
Hitoshi Kaise, Project Manager
Roland Berger Ltd.
The Chinese automobile market is literally churning with energy and activity. The progress being made by
China’s vehicle makers (local OEM = original equipment manufacturers), including those of Chinese origin,
are stunning to say the least. On the other hand, Japanese owned parts suppliers either already having
advanced to China or studying the potential for moving into that market continue to voice concerns about
how best to go about drumming up business with the local OEMs in that nation. In this report, we examine
the awareness of local OEMs regarding the current market issues, their views of Japanese parts makers and
other areas, while pondering the horizon for approaches by parts suppliers from Japan in forging inroads and
partnerships with the local OEMs.
Prospects for Popularization of New Energy
Vehicles in China
The Chinese passenger car market has grown to the 10million-unit level, ranking it No. 1 in the world. This is a
market that just a decade ago had yet to reach 600,000
units. Over the past 10 years, in other words, the market
has charted rapid expansion of nearly 20-fold. The brand
mix on this market has also undergone major change.
Back around 2000, the majority of passenger cars
operating on China’s roads were “Santana” cars,
indicative of the 40% plus market share held by
Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive. Today the Shanghai
VW share has fallen to 7%, accompanied by a major
advance in brand diversification.
The Chinese government has announced its goal for
“new energy vehicle” ownership of 5 million units by
2020, with efforts underway to promote the expanded
use of cars in that category. Among the key efforts in this
direction are the “10 Citadels & 1,000 New Energy
Vehicles Project” (which determines targets for the
marketing of eco-friendly vehicles backed by financial
support), the “New Energy/Energy Saving Automobile
Industry Development Plan” (calling for outlays
equivalent to 1.3 trillion yen to promote eco-car
production) and other measures.
The “10 Citadels & 1,000 New Energy Vehicles
Project” is a plan to promote introduction of hybrid
vehicles (HV) and EV (the focus on buses and taxis) in
13 of China’s largest cities. In Beijing, for example, the
schedule is for Beijing Public Transport Holdings Ltd. to
introduce around 1,000 HV buses (including 800 units
procured from Foton Motor) and 1,500 EV by the end of
2010. The most aggressive plan, however, is the one
envisioned for Shenzhen, targeting purchases of 24,000
HV and EV by 2012. That effort is slated to encompass
infusion of the equivalent of 25 billion yen in purchase
subsidies, construction of 13,000 electric vehiclecharging stations and other support (Figure 2).
In addition, market expansion is also being forecast in
the near future for electric vehicles (EV), plug-in hybrid
vehicles (PHV) and other newly emerging automobile
modes (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Changes in Passenger Car Market Shares
by Brand
Shanghai Volkswagen
Automotive
Shanghai Volkswagen
Automotive
FAW-VW Automobile
Shanghai GM Automotive
Industry Corporation
Beijing Hyundai
40.5%
Dongfeng Nissan Motor
Chana Automobile
Tianjin Xiali Automobile
FAW-VW Automobile
Chana Automobile
Dongfeng-Peugeot-Citroen
Shanghai GM Automotive Industry Corporation
First Automobile Works Group
Guangqi Honda Automobile
Beijing Jeep Corporation Limited
China National Guizhou Aviation Industry (Group)
Other
BYD
Chery Automobile
Tianjin FAW Toyota Motor
Guangqi Honda Automobile
18.5%
7.0%
6.5%
5.6%
5.5%
5.0%
5.0%
4.3%
4.3%
3.9%
3.5%
The “New Energy/Energy Saving Automobile Industry
Development Plan” is outlined in a rough draft version
issued by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information
this August. Within this strategy, the equivalent of 850
billion yen will be invested by 2015. The breakdown of
that outlay consists of 390 billion yen for EV
14.6%
Other
7.7%
7.7%
3.5%
1.8%
2.9%
49.4%
1.6%
0.3%
0.9%
1999
2009
Source: Computed by Roland Berger based on data from Fourin, Inc.
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Figure 2: 10 Citadels & 1,000 New Energy Vehicles
Project Approach
• Changan government procurement
of 1,000 HV from FAW by 2012
• Introduction of 30 new energy
buses
• Wuhan government
procurement of 500 EV from
Nissan by 2011
• Dalian Passenger Transport
Group procurement of 150 HV
buses from FAW
Changan
Dalian
Beijing
• October 2008: Chongquin
government procurement of 10
HV from Chongquin Automobile
• October 2009: Changsha
government procurement of 252
HV buses from Hunan CSR Times
Electric Vehicle
• Xiamen Golden Dragon testdriving of HV buses
Jinan
Chongqing
Shanghai
Hefei
Hangzhou
Nanchang
Changsha Wuhan
Kunmin
• Shenzhen government
procurement of 20 PHV “F3DM”
from BYD
Shenzhen
• December 2008: Beijing Public
Transport Holdings procurement
of 800 HV buses from Foton
• Jinan government procurement
of 80 diesel-powered HV buses
from Zhongtong
• 2009: Shanghai Jiushi Co.
concludes HV bus supply
contract with SAIC
• 2009: Hangzhou government
procurement o f50 HV buses
from Xiamen Golden Dragon
• Test-driving of An Yuan Bus
diesel PHV buses
of Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, First
Automotive Works Group, Dongfeng Motor
Corporation, Chana Automobile Co. Ltd. and
Beijing Automobile Works. While these companies
are subservient to government policies, their
generous capital backing ensures that they have
extensive plant and equipment facilities along with
outstanding human resources (including many
holding doctoral degrees). The corporate groups of
these OEMs also contain joint venture parts
suppliers formed with foreign-owned parts makers
(from which they procure the lion’s share of their
components).
The government-controlled joint ventures are
companies launched by government-controlled and
owned OEM and overseas OEM. They include Shanghai
GM Automotive Industry Corporation, FAW-VW
Automobile Co., Ltd., Dongfeng Nissan and others.
Though referred to here as “joint ventures,” their
decision-making toes the line of government policy, and
on that point there is no difference from the governmentcontrolled and owned OEMs. With regard to the sourcing
of technology, however, the companies can be supplied
by both the foreign-owned OEM as the joint venture
partners and the parent company (the governmentcontrolled and owned OEM). In terms of development
capacity, they fall short of the generous funding enjoyed
by their government-controlled and owned counterparts.
The Chinese-owned majors are OEMs that receive no
capital investment from the government and advance inhouse development and brand sales on the strength of
their own resources. This category includes Chery
Automobile Co., Ltd., Geely Automobile Holdings, BYD
Co., Ltd. and others. The financial strength of these
companies comes up far short of the governmentcontrolled OEMs, while their locations in provincial
areas render it difficult to attract outstanding personnel.
Despite their “major” status, meanwhile, these
companies remain in the midst of emerging from reliance
on reverse engineering based copies, and currently find
themselves even further below the governmentcontrolled joint venture OEMs in terms of technical
prowess as well. Because of this, the motivation of these
makers to raise development capacity on their own
strength runs high.
The Chinese-owned small and medium firms comprise
the remainder of the OEMs – operations that have sprung
up haphazardly around the nation. The estimates of their
numbers vary widely, with some claiming 100 and other
figures going as high as 150. Basically speaking, they are
enterprises that got their starts as family-run town
factories and are simply unable to gear up for massproduction at levels of several ten thousand units.
This leads us to the questions of what type of local
OEMs offer the greatest opportunities for inroads by
Japanese-owned parts suppliers, and whether there are
Source: Individual company press releases
development by OEMs and subsidized purchases of EV
by general consumers; 130 billion yen for development
of motors and batteries by key component
manufacturers; 70 billion yen for construction of
charging stations; and 260 billion yen earmarked for
OEM development of HV and consumer HV purchase
subsidies. Moreover, 16 vehicle manufacturers, parts
makers and major energy-related state-run enterprises
have formed the Electric Automobile Industry Union in
an effort to organize approaches aimed at promoting
industry. On a separate front, 10 OEM companies have
launched a consortium to study technology exchange,
standardization of major parts and other initiatives,
setting their sights on 500,000 EV unit sales by 2015.
Hand in hand with market expansion, the momentum of
development, production and sales by local OEMs can be
expected to pick up further steam from here on as well.
Local parts makers, meanwhile, are not the only ones
with their eyes riveted on the business opportunities. This
market also offers big chances for Japanese-owned parts
suppliers, with the number of companies declaring their
desire to gear up in that direction on the rise daily. At
present, however, very few such Japanese parts makers
have actually succeeded in landing orders from local
OEMs. If the truth were known, it seems clear that these
suppliers lack clear ideas about how to cultivate the
market comprised of the local OEMs. To take that
plunge, the first step must be to gain an understanding of
the structure and distinguishing characteristics of these
local vehicle assemblers.
Local OEM Structure and Advised Targets for
Japanese Parts Makers
Local OEMs in China may be broadly divided into four
categories: (1) Government-controlled and owned, (2)
government-controlled joint ventures, (3) Chinese-owned
majors and (4) Chinese-owned small- and medium-sized
enterprises.
The government-controlled and owned category
companies are state-run OEMs bankrolled by the Beijing
central government or local governments. They consist
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Vol. 22
any promising Chinese-owned OEMs to choose from. As
mentioned, the technical capacity of Chinese-owned
majors tends to be weak, with their volition to make
improvements high. Because of that, they have high
hopes for finding partners willing to extend the support
needed for development. During a recent interview with
the vice president of a Chinese-owned major OEM, that
executive stressed the following points: “Please tell
Japanese parts makers that we are fully open to joint
development and new transactions, and definitely favor
long-term relationships. For us as well, there is no merit
in simply absorbing know-how and then switching to
other partners after a short period of time.” It does
without saying, furthermore, that landing orders from
Chinese-owned majors, OEMs currently in the process of
expanding their market shares, offers attractive business
potential for Japanese parts suppliers as well.
Figure 3: Approaches to Local OEMs
Direct Approaches
(Direct access to
local OEMs)
Independent approaches
(own company)
With other Japanese companies
Premise of ability to combine in-house products
into package units
With parts makers with local OEMs
as their customer base
Indirect Approaches
(Teaming up with
local parts makers to
access local OEMs)
With parts makers offering
the same products
Premise of ability to product at low prices
With parts makers offering
different products
Premise of ability of combine in-house products into
package units
Source: Roland Berger
When attempting to directly access local OEMs, two
different patterns are plausible – independent approaches
by the interested company, or joining forces with other
Japanese companies in plotting such advances. In our
opinion, the former pattern promises to more effective.
As noted above, local OEMs generally have a
constructive outlook on doing business with Japaneseowned parts makers. In fact, there are cases in which
even the materials for batteries produced in-house by
Chinese-owned majors are supplied via joint
development with Japanese materials producers. In the
latter case, an example of the pattern adopted is for
motor manufacturers to team up with producers of
batteries, inverters and converters, followed by attempts
to market these components as electrically operated
power train packages. It should be pointed out, though,
that a tricky aspect of this approach is how to most fairly
allocate the rights and responsibilities involved. For
example, who will accept responsibility in the event of
quality problems? How will the profits be divvied up?
Stories of how such issues tend to slow the progress of
corporate alliances are common fare in today’s arena of
big company tie-ups. But in a market like China, where
speed is of the ultimate essence in making inroads, such
hassles could doom a venture to failure.
Compared to this, the priority weighting of governmentcontrolled and owned OEMs is low. This is not to say
that opportunities to collaborate with such companies
should be avoided. However, they have already
established joint ventures with their partners and have
been procuring components on an exclusive basis from
those suppliers for over 10 years. Those partners,
furthermore, are Bosch, Continental AG and other megasuppliers from Europe and North America that are
certainly not inferior to Japanese-owned parts makers in
terms of technical strength either. These companies have
also forged strong ties with local OEM. Taking all of
these factors into consideration, it is obvious that
penetrating such strongholds would require considerable
power.
It is also difficult to view the government-controlled
joint ventures as prime targets for market advance
offensives. This is linked to their strong sense of the
ability to receive technology at no cost from joint venture
partners, and the resulting low motivation to carry out
development on their own expense while paying the
price for the know-how as they proceed. Besides this,
they often share the same suppliers with the governmentcontrolled and owned OEMs that are their parent firms,
making it more than likely that they will encounter the
same barriers. The Chinese-owned small and medium
OEMs operate in the domain where cheap is king, with
their needs for the type of advanced technologies
supplied by Japanese parts low from the outset. As a
result, it is also difficult to regard these companies as
viable targets for business approaches either. All in all,
therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the priority for
local OEM partnerships should be placed on the Chineseowned majors.
In cases of banding together with local parts makers as
well, there are again several conceivable patterns for
choosing partners. They include: (1) Parts makers with
local OEMs as their customer base; (2) parts makers with
the technology to build the same products at low prices;
and (3) parts makers with products that can be combined
with the in-house wares of the Japanese supplier for
packaging. In China, there are currently no locally
owned operations along the lines of Denso, Bosch or
other integrated parts producers. Behind this is the fact
that most local Chinese parts makers contain equity
investment from local OEMs – making them part of socalled keiretsu enterprise groups with linked capital. This
places limits on the ability to engage in extensive
supplying of parts extending across several different
local OEMs, with the result that the individual parts
makers fail to grow large in scale. For example, even in
the case of Chinese-owned major OEM Chery, the
company’s group contains a total of 17 wholly owned
subsidiary parts suppliers alone – four each for chassis
and power train components respectively, and three each
Approaches to Local OEMs
Having said this, what types of approaches should be
made to what specific categories of local OEMs in
seeking to break into the Chinese market? We feel that
such efforts can be grouped into two major categories
(methods): (1) Direct access to local OEMs; and (2)
teaming up with local parts producers in establishing
access to local OEMs (Figure 3).
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for body, interior and electrical parts, respectively.
Beside these, Chery also maintains equity stakes in 14
other parts makers. In view of this, joining forces with a
parts supplier boasting such a customer base is pretty
much tantamount to entering into a partnership with the
local OEM itself.
with this emerging as the core technology in the industry.
Reverse engineering is not a reliable way to achieve
precision reproduction of the input and output in
controllers and other electronic components. This leads
us to conclude that a low likelihood exists for the
occurrence of such feared technology drains.
Naturally, not all suppliers belong to corporate groups
(keiretsu). This points to the approach of taking aim at
domains where independent local parts makers have
made inroads, with the local and Japanese parts makers
teaming up to enhance their aggregate value. In cases of
the same product, Japanese parts suppliers appear to have
attained higher overall adaptability to respond to
demands for more advanced technology. On the other
hand the Japanese firms rank inferior in their ability
(marketing strength) to identify the needed specs and
quality, cost competitiveness and information. It is in
such areas, therefore, that the local Chinese parts makers
can manifest their fortes. Working through such mutual
complementation provides one means of raising the level
of added value in marketing to local OEMs.
The second factor detracting from the potential for
technology to be lifted is that even if the engineering of
individual parts is mapped out, it will be tough to
develop a grasp of how to link those components
together. Though China has been renowned for its copied
cars, in recent years the types of completely forged
vehicles so common not so long ago are rarely seen out
on the roads. What this means, in other words, is that
local OEMs need to combine copied parts for packaging
as new models. The technology of “linking” together
multiple numbers of parts demands a level of expertise
far superior to that needed to reproduce separate
individual parts. This is due to the necessity for knowhow to create linkage based on consideration for the
mechanical and electronic interfaces between individual
parts, with a massive degree of knowledge and
technology required for that work. With EV, there is talk
about reaching the “plug-and-play” capability seen in
personal computers, thereby eliminating the need for
such interfacing. Realizing such capacity, however, will
require much more time and work. Though touted for
their ability to run on electricity, these vehicles will
obviously continue to be equipped with chassis, bodies
and other machine parts as well. For that matter, simply
linking up the motor, battery, controller and other
components is hardly sufficient to get an EV up and
running. Once the motor is changed, failure to adjust the
controller that exercises integrated control over the
operation will render it impossible to even send and
receive signals. To also secure performance on a par with
existing engine vehicles, meanwhile, it will be critical to
add subtle tooling to achieve high safety, energy savings
and other desired performance factors. The underlying
strength accumulated by Japanese parts makers, the
product of decades of efforts that also include work on
EV, should be a decisive factor in this area. Therefore,
even if local OEMs pilfer technology for individual
parts, that know-how alone will amount to little more
than worthless relics. It is precisely for this reason,
therefore, that Japanese parts makers should be able to
excel as important partners during the period, at the very
least, required for the local OEMs to achieve interfacing
capabilities similar to those of the Japanese.
Moreover, even with local suppliers that enjoy expertise
in other parts, there is room for entering into alliances if
efforts can be made to combine the components for
marketing as packaged units. This resembles the
previously explained pattern of Japanese parts makers
teaming with each other. Likely, to be encountered,
however, are the same issues such as quality assurance
and profit distribution. Taking these factors to heart, we
believe that initially adopting the head-on tactic of
mounting direct and independent approaches to local
OEM offers the most promising method at the current
point in time.
The Real Risk of Doing Business with Local
OEMs
Regardless of the approach, a major concern for
Japanese parts suppliers is how to lower the level of risk
involved. In this regard, just what is the inherent risk of
dealing with local OEMs? The area most often
mentioned is that of so-called “technology drains.” This
refers to the fear that technology and know-how will be
absorbed through the products of Japanese parts makers,
with the affiliation then cancelled in favor of a shift to inhouse production. With that, the technology will continue
to be used without payment of any additional costs or
fees. The question arises, however, if whether such a
chain of events is really likely to occur. From three
different viewpoints, we feel that the possibility of such
an outcome is low.
The third argument against technology drains concerns
the difficulties in changing design ideas, specs and
processes once they have taken root. By furnishing
technology and becoming integrally involved in the
development efforts of local OEMs, Japanese parts
makers will be able add their own corporate color to the
thinking and the methods applied to the OEM designs.
Once such conditions have been established, even if the
local OEMs improve their technical strength the most
sensible mode of operation will be to continue doing
The first reason for this conclusion concerns the natural
limits on the degree to which parts technology can be
elucidated. It is true that local OEMs are well equipped
to engage in copying through the reverse engineering of
existing products. Reverse engineering, however, is
effective primarily on machine parts. Recent years have
seen major advances in the use of automotive electronics,
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business with the Japanese parts makers (with which they
share common design ideas and processes). In that sense,
taking precautions to ensure difficulties with the use of
technology other than that developed in-house is the
most natural and strongest form of risk control. Why do
keiretsu groups effectively exist in Japan? It is because,
amid differences between the individual OEM design
ideas and processes, it is easiest to work with parts
suppliers with which relations have been maintained over
the years (even when removing all emotional attachment
from the picture). Under the present circumstances, we
feel there is still time for Japanese parts makers to take
the initiative in cultivating these types of relationships
with local OEMs focused on Chinese ownership.
marketing functions. Bosch subscribed to the thinking
that simply because product technology developed for
industrialized countries may be state-of-the-art does not
meant that it can be adopted as-is for the upscale car
market in China. This represents a direct application of
the old adage, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.” It
also flew in the face of the belief held back then that
China amounted largely to a production base, with few
efforts made to approach that country as a viable car
market. This approach can be seen as the primary factor
behind the sustaining of Bosch’s partnership with
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation for over 25
years.
Strong commitment, meanwhile, is an expression of the
resolution to provide total support for the partner on the
capital, geographical location and human resource fronts
alike. For example, the Western parts producers Johnson
Controls Inc., Delphi Corporation, Lear Corporation and
Borg Warner Inc. have all established ties with Beijing
Automobile Works (BAW). In terms of capital, each of
these manufacturers has launched joint ventures with
BAW, pledging to carry on deep relationships over the
long term. Location-wise, they have opened their own
plants in the “supplier park” adjacent to the BAW plant,
setting up systems that allow them to immediately get
together with BAW to address and mutually work out
resolutions to any problems that crop up. For human
resources, a large number of local staffers, including
those in management posts, have been hired, laying the
groundwork for smooth give-and-take attuned to the
Chinese language, business practices and other local
customs. In addition, Bosch has invested the equivalent
of 2.1 billion yen to build a winter season testing center,
which it uses to conduct joint tests open to local OEMs
that do not have such facilities. Continental, meanwhile,
has opened a new 10,000m2 development base, while
relocating its Asia headquarters to Shanghai. In all, its
outlays amount to some 7 billion yen while a workforce
of around 900 persons is currently in place (Figure 4).
Based on the three reasons mentioned above, we
believe that the risk of so-called technology drain is not
nearly as acute as feared by many Japanese parts makers.
Far more worrisome than that, in the event of hesitation
on the part of Japanese suppliers to disclose their
technology, is the scenario of local OEMs entering into a
steady stream of tie-ups with other parts makers. Before
they realize it, Japanese dalliers may find that all the
potential partners for forging inroads on the Chinese
market have been taken. Nissan Motor President Carlos
Ghosn, in fact, has expressed his company’s intention to
supply Chinese joint ventures with technology on an
unconditional basis. This stance may also be read as an
expression of the keen sense of importance attached to
averting the risk of getting off to a late start in China.
Strategies for Raising the Chances of Success
When all is said and done, however, the key premise for
building up relations with local OEMs is what we would
describe as “mutual affection.” In the midst of an
onslaught by parts makers from around the world to
succeed in China, the specific approaches used to
persuade local OEMs to choose a certain company as a
partner are also an important factor. What strategies did
Bosch, Continental and other suppliers that have already
established strong relationships with local OEMs use to
make such inroads? The two key points on this front
consist of keeping a “low profile” in order to learn from
one’s own partner, and making a “strong commitment”
to that partner.
Keeping a low profile refers to the awareness
that even companies ranking as global leaders as
parts makers are novices when it comes to the
Chinese market, combined with sincere and
devoted efforts to identify the local demand and
develop products capable of addressing those
needs. Bosch launched its full-fledged advance to
China in 1994, at a time when the majority of
passenger cars on the road were still Santana
models. In the quest to grasp the state of needs
distinctive to China, it established Shanghai ZF
Steering as a joint venture parts manufacturer
with Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation,
and instilled that company with development and
In both of these cases, there is a clear sense of the
strong commitments on the part of the suppliers to either
sink or swim on the Chinese market in partnerships with
the local OEM. In summation, on one side we have parts
Figure 4: China Bases of Western Parts Makers
Bosch: Winter Season Testing Center
Continental: Asia Headquarters and Development Center
• Local development of brakes, ABS and
ESP, joint testing with local OEMs
• Asia Headquarters
– Construction of
new 16-story
building
– Floor space of
15,000m2
• Investment capital: 2.1 billion yen
• Personnel: 40 persons
• Development Center
– Chassis, power train and safety
technology R&D
– Site area: 10,000m2
• Total investment: 7 billion yen
• Total personnel: 900 persons
Source: Individual company websites.
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Vol. 22
makers fully committed to the rising to all challenges on
the China market, while on the other are suppliers
continuing to play a wait-and-see game of feeling out
possible partners out of fear of possible technology
drains. When we consider how the actions of these two
sides are reflected in the eyes of the local OEMs, the
answer should be perfectly clear.
competitive circumstances, it seems quite natural that the
first step should be to utilize direct discourse with local
OEMs to locate envisioned partners. Once finding such
candidates, furthermore, suppliers need to engage in
passionate talks based on explanations of their
willingness to furnish technology and then work together
in achieving long-term mutual progress and growth.
Conclusion
The majority of Japanese parts manufacturers are sizing
up the dramatic expansion of the Chinese auto market
and the fierce mo mentum o f the lo cal OEMs
spearheading that advance, while pondering the threat
presented by the waning state of the domestic Japanese
market. Impacted by both developments, they have keen
interest in making business inroads with local OEMs in
China. For their part as well, the local OEMs, primarily
those that are Chinese owned, are also voicing the desire
to enter into relationships with Japanese parts makers
that are armed with solid technological strength. Yet, in
spite of the desire on both sides, the vacillation
demonstrated by so many Japanese parts suppliers
appears to be rooted in fears of having their technology
drained off. However, if companies can adopt the
approach of embedding themselves in the development
operations of local OEMs, it will be possible to establish
relationships capable of generating mutual merits for
both sides over the years to come. As noted, these parts
makers need to realize that the true risk lies in being left
at the starting gate. To seize the initiative in this market,
it will be important to make firm commitments to
specific automakers on the various fronts of capital,
location and human resources. Even Western parts
makers that have put down roots and been operating in
China for several decades have largely failed to achieve
conditions under which they can effectively sell their
wares to a large number of local OEMs with which they
maintain only limited ties. Latecomers to the market
attempting that approach, therefore, would appear to
have little chance of lasting success. In searching for
potential partners, therefore, the best approach naturally
lies in being totally honest with companies that appear
attractive and about which the desire exists to learn the
insides and outs, and then engage in heart-to-heart
discussions. The current situation finds large numbers of
parts makers from around the world advancing to China
to court the local OEMs there. Under these highly
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Profile
Project Manager
Histoshi Kaise
hitoshi_kaise@jp.rolandberger.com
Completed graduate studies at Yokohama National
University, then went to work for a major automotive
manufacturer before joining Roland Berger. Left for
employment at a business firm and then a venture
incubator, before returning to Roland Berger.
Kaise is involved in a large number of projects at Roland Berger –
management, business and marketing strategies, brand management, M&A
support and other areas with the key focus on the auto industry. His strong
points include promoting the style of setting up at client operations and
using daily discussions to analyze and improve the status quo.
Vol. 22 October 2010
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Tokyo Office Automotive Strategy Team
Satoshi Nagashima Partner Team Representative
Ken Mori
Partner
Keisuke Yamabe
Partner
Hiroshi Nishijima
Project Manager
Hitoshi Kaise
Project Manager
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