Document 6518077

The Argument of Leo Strauss in
“What is Political Philosophy?’
LAURENCE
READINGLeo Strauss is a d%cult exercise
and much of the difficulty is the result of
planning. The planning follows naturally
from a distinction that Strauss takes seriously between opinion and knowledge, a
distinction that determines in advance that
only readers of a certain quality and temper have the need to know what Strauss’
books and essays really contain. The
planned difficulty of Strauss’ work is present in spite of-even partly because of-a
superficial lucidity and apparent directness
of expression. To discover this planned obscurity is at once maddening and pleasurable. It is maddening because it seems such
a discourtesy to the reader and such an affront to what he can reasonably expect
from an author. Surely all Strauss’ readers
have labored over other kinds of obscurity
in other works and the hint of an intentional lack of directness and clarity cannot
be received kindly. Yet the discovery is not
lacking in pleasures of a sort that Strauss
himself points 0ut.l These pleasures are the
ones appropriate to a particular nature and
those possessed of it Strauss flatters and
lures. In any case, it is a discovery that
comes only slowly and against much disbelief-at least for those of us who have not
LAMPERT
been his students or students of his students.
Yet one ought to have expected that
Strauss would come to practice the art of
writing that he himself rediscovered in such
writers as Plato, Maimonides, Machiavelli
and Spinoza. His practice of that art could
also be expected to be somewhat different
from theirs because the persecution that
first made their methods expedient is not
a feature of our society. Nevertheless, the
convictions that made their practice possible and desirable can still be shared, convictions concerning the public views and
philosophy, or to put it in terms to be discussed later, convictions concerning love
of one’s own and love of the good.
One may investigate the difficulties in
Strauss’ work in order to discover the positions he holds, but Strauss continuaIIy turns
the reader away from his own opinions to
the subject matter itself. The result is that
the diiKculties in Strauss’ work are the
merest beginning for anyone who becomes
interested in his work. For all its difficulty
that work is an invitation to further reading of other difficult writers to whom
Strauss’ work points; it is an invitation to
a way of life very much as Plato’s Republic
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is an invitation from Socrates to Glaucon
and Adeimantus to a new way of lifewith the difference that Strauss’ invitation
is to the reading of old books.
The heart of Strauss’ work is the continuing battle between the ancients and the
modems. What follows is an account of one
skirmish in that battle. It is an especially
interesting skirmish because it shows clearly Strauss’ strategic complexity. To keep
to the martial metaphor, in his essay
Strauss is willing to be bested in one field
in order to win a possible long-term victory elsewher-he
is bested in front of all
the spectators but aims to persuade a very
few curious and fastidious questioners who
linger behind after the apparent defeat.
“What is Political Philosophy?” is the
important title essay of Strauss’ book V h
is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies2
and it has been recently reprinted as the
lead essay in Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo
The essay describes
the ancient and modern solutions to the
problem of political philosophy. Obviously,
from Leo Strauss one expects a defense of
classical political philosophy. But from Leo
Strauss one expects a better defense than
is given in the central section of “What is
Political Philosophy?” Strauss here defends classical political philosophy against
two common objections but his answers to
the objections are at best fragmentary and
question-begging. But the clear weakness
of the answers is not inadvertent and the
defense of classical political philosophywhile nowhere else directly undertaken in
the essay-does not hang on the answers
to the objections despite all appearances to
the contrary. Unlike the political science
characterized in the first section of his essay, Strauss’ essay does not itself take “the
form of teachings which can be transmitted
in classrooms.” (p. 15) In the first section
that follows I will show the inadequacy of
Strauss’ answers to the two objections; in
the second section I will show that this inadequacy is the veiled anticipation of a
much more elaborate and categorically different answer.
I
IN THE
MIDDLE or second section of the essay Strauss presents “The Classical sohtion,” cites two common objections to it and
then attempts to answer these objections.
These are the two objections:
(1) classical political philosophy is antidemocratic and hence bad; (2) classical
political philosophy is based on classical
natural philosophy or on classical
cosmology, and this basis has been
proven to be untrue by the success of
modern natural science. (p. 36)
Most readers of the essay would be inclined
to agree with these objections, yet Strauss’
answers do not seem to take the objections
very seriously.
Strauss’ answer to the first objection
grants the anti-democratic stance of the
classics and defends this stance on the
grounds that democracy is not a workable
means for achieving the goal that the classics aim at, namely, virtue. Strauss’ answer, which amounts to a statement of what
he takes to be the classics’ argument against
democracy, ends with this assurance: ‘Yet
granted that there are no valid moral and
political objections to classical political
philosophy. .” (p. 38) But Strauss’ argument does not justify this sweeping claim
as its conclusion; it does not demonstrate
the invalidity of all moral and political
objections to classical political philosophy.
As Strauss presents it, the argument
against democracy depends upon two
strings of inferences. The first string runs
as follows: virtue requires education which
requires leisure which requires wealth and
wealth will always be the preserve of a relative few. Democracy or the rule of the majority will be (to reverse the string): the
rule of the poor, of the non-leisured, of the
uneducated (Strauss delicately stops here
but there is an additional step:) of the nonvirtuous. As Strauss recognizes, “this classical argument would not be stringent if men
did not need education in order to acquire
a firm adhesion to virtue.” (p. 37) Strauss
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cites Rousseau as the teacher of the view
that men do not need education for this
end, of the view, that is, that nature equips
men with the goodness required. This challenge to the classical reasoning is dismissed
very briefly with two considerations: (1)
“the same Rousseau was compelled to develop a scheme of education which very few
people could financially afford” (p. 37)
and (2) few of us hold Rousseau’s view
hence it is not the basis of the common objection to classical political philosophy and
can be set aside.
But what about universal education?for universal education is a natural way out
of the problem posed by the first string of
inferences, and is, moreover, the way taken
in the modern world to make democracy
viable. Here Strauss employs the second
string of inferences : universal education
requires an economy of plenty which requires the emancipation of technology from
moral and political control. Strauss alleges
without demonstration that the classics
contain the “implicit prophecy that the
emancipation of technology, of the arts,
from moral and political control would lead
to disaster or to the dehumanization of
man.” (p. 37) Strauss claims that this
prophecy has not been refuted.
The unargued premise of Strauss’ conclusion that there are no valid moral and
political objections to classical political
philosophy is the claim that the source of
the standard moral and political objections
is a system of thought that necessarily
abandons the moral and political control
of technology. Presumably the point is that
from a system that abandons the moral and
political no valid moral and political objections can arise.
But this answer entirely misses the spirit
of the objection for the objector would
hardly grant that the technology required
for universal education is necessarily
emancipated from moral and political control. And no reason is given why he should.
Strauss’ argument does not attempt to persuade the objector to assent to this proposition; it is simply a counter-charge. It is not
obvious that a technology that makes possible universal education must abandon
moral and political control. Also, there
would seem to be moral and political objections (to slavery, e.g.) that might arise
from contexts other than a dependence on
technology thus making Strauss’ conclusion
invalid because it includes all moral and
political objections. At best Strauss’ argument against moral and political objections
to classical political philosophy begs the
question. It assumes that such objections
can arise only from the standpoint of a particular technology, and it assumes that they
arise there only self-contradictorily on the
grounds that that technology is emancipated from moral and political control.
Strauss’ answer to the second objection
is even briefer and more puzzling than his
answer to the first. The objection is that
classical political philosophy is fatally tied
to an outmoded cosmoIogy. The gist of
Strauss’ answer is that Socrates, the founder of classical political philosophy, was
committed to no cosmology whatever;
Strauss asserts, rather than argues, that
knowledge of political things is possible
apart from any cosmological commitment.
The second paragraph of the answer consists of a series of Socratic claims about
philosophy as a searoh for knowledge of the
whole. Philosophy is said to be a search
that aims at a complete combination of
political knowledge and cosmological h o w l edge. “And this combination is not at our
disposal.” (p. 39)
But these counter assertions completely
miss the point and spirit of the objection
-namely, that classical political philosophy
cannot be reconciled with modern natural
science whose success has proven classical
cosmology untrue. Even if we grant
Strauss’ claim that classical political philosophy is logically separable from ancient
cosmology he still has not shown that it is
compatible with modem cosmology. An
additional claim is made in this regard:
“Whatever the significance of modern natural science may be, it cannot affect our understanding of what is human in man. To
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understand man in the light of the whole
means for modem natural science to understand man in the light of the sub-human.
But in that light man as man is wholly unintelligible.” (p. 38) This claim too simply
restates a Socratic position and does nothing to demonstrate the truth of that position. It is not self-evident (modem natural
science clearly has affected our understanding of the human in man even if-as
Strauss seems to imply-only by losing
sight of it) and would hardly be regarded
as true by one who raised this objection.
This part of the answer consists of the
counter-charge that the objection itself is
based on a cosmology, one that leaves the
human unintelligible.
Like the first answer, the second one consists simply of counter-claims with little
persuasive force. They are hardly sufficient
to induce the objector to reconsider his objections because they simply assume the
truth of what is in question, classical political philosophy. They fail to take the objections seriously. And yet the objections are
ones that most readers would be inclined
to make because they reflect what we know
to be good (democracy) and what we know
to be true (modem science).
I1
WHY DOES Strauss answer so unpersuasively two objections which seem so necessary
and so telling? One is forced to go back
over the arguments many times to discover
their rationale and significance. Only
gradually does Strauss’ strategy come to
light. Before stating the objections themselves Strauss characterizes them in a direct
and disparaging way. To raise these objections “requires neither originality nor intelligence, nor even erudition.” (p. 36)
One gathers that these are not the most serious objections that can be raised even
though they are the only ones raised by
Strauss and the only ones answered (or
not answered). There would seem to be objections that do require originality, intelligence and erudition. What are they? w h y
are they not mentioned? Can they be more
important than the ones that are mentioned? Why are they not answered?
The context of the objections indirectly
supplies answers to these questions. Immediately preceding the two objections is
Strauss’ account of “The Classical Solution.” Presumably this part presents the
view to which the objections object. But
this presumption is mistaken. There is nothing in the classical solution as Strauss presents it that would raise the objections
cited. Furthermore, immediately following
the objections is Strauss’ account of “The
Modem Solutions,” which indirectly shows
that there are objections which are original,
intelligent and erudite, and which do object
to the classical solution as presented by
Strauss. Yet Strauss never characterizes
these solutions as objections and never directly answers them. We have then the following puzzling situation: the cited objections do not object to what is presented as
the classical solution; these objections are
answered in a clearly unsatisfactory manner; the original, intelligent and erudite
objections do object to what is presented
as the classical solution but they are not
characterized as objections to it nor are
they answered. In face of these puzzles one
turns back to “The Classical Solution” itself-what
is it and just how is it defended?
The title of the middle section, “The
Classical Solution,” seems to promise a
statement of what that solution is. For the
most part this section is a discussion of the
Laws. It is said that “the character of
classical political philosophy appears with
the greatest clarity from Plato’s Laws,” (p.
29) and that seems to promise a statement
of what that character is. But the material
discussed is surprising in the light of these
expectations for at first there appears to be
no direct statement of either the solution
or the character of classical political philosophy. The matters emphasized seem at first
to be peripheral, even trivial. But the seemingly peripheral gradually comes to light
as the most central matter.
Plato, Socrates and Aristotle are all dis-
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cussed in the middle section. Aristotle is
dealt with last and most briefly but also
most directly and this discussion casts a retroactive light that clarifies the meaning of
Strauss’ account of Plato and Socrates. The
single point of the single paragraph on
Aristotle concerns Aristotle’s carefully
drawn and carefully guarded (because potentially impolitic) distinction between love
of one’s own and love of the good. Classical political philosophy never forgets the
importance of one’s own but it never ranks
this higher than the good. Because of the
universal inclination towards love of one’s
own this distinction is politically dangerous; but it is philosophically necessary and
its disclosure must be accompanied by the
greatest caution and tact.
Seen retrospectively, the earlier discussions of Plato and Socrates are instances
of this distinction and they indicate the
political character of all approaches to
philosophy. These discussions show how the
philosopher deals with the politics of
philosophy.’ The discussion of Plato is concerned with one main quession: how can
an Athenian stranger discuss the best laws
with a Cretan and a Spartan when these
laws are closer to Athenian laws than they
are to Cretan or Spartan laws? That is, how
can a stranger from Athens recommend the
good laws of Athens to men who know
Athens as alien and who love Crete and
Sparta as their own? The much briefer
discussion of Socrates is also concerned
with the politics of philosophy. It shows
how Socrates reconciles love of one’s own
and love of the good in his decision to face
and accept the sentence of the Athenian
court. This decision is a political decision
for the philosopher because it concerns the
relationship of one’s own and the good. The
character of political decisions and of classical political philosophy is clarified by the
nature of this particular decision: “It did
not consist in the simple subsumption of his
case under a simple, universal, and unalterable rule.” (p. 33)
In his accounts of Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle, Strauss is consistent in paying the
most careful attention to the circumstances
and occasions for the disclosure of the issues involved as if the circumstances and
occasions were as important as the issues
themselves. Thus it becomes clear that when
the issue is the distinction between love of
one’s own and love of the good the circumstances and occasions are that important.
While at first there seems to be no substantive account of what the csSsical solution is, it becomes apparent that what is
substantive is the distinction between love
of one’s own and love of the good, and the
recognition that this distinction must be approached with the greatest caution and with
the most careful attention paid to the circumstances of disclosure.6 What of the two
objections then? They clearly do not object
to what is set forth as the classical solution.
Rather, the discussion of the classical solution explains them in advance-albeit indirectly. The nature of the objections is
shown by the distinction between love of
one’s own and love of the good. The objections are displayed as failures to make that
distinction. That is, they identify one’s own
(in this case, our own, the modern) as the
good without further ado and they reject
the classics as other than one’s own and
hence false and worse. Strauss’ account of
the classical solution silently informs the
reader about the nature of the objections.
We are all inclined to make the objections
because they reflect what is our own.
What then of the answers to the objections? They too fail to draw the distinction
between one’s own and the good. The answers occupy the same argumentative
ground as the objections. In the terms of
a distinction elaborated in the first section
of Strauss’ essay the objections and answers
both are examples of “political thought”
and not of political philosophy, both are
“primarily interested in, or attached to, a
specific order or policy” (p. 12) and both
“dogmatically assume principles which m
well be questioned.” (p. 13) The answers,
by being simply counter-charges based on
principles which can be questioned, reveal
(by their nature as well as their content)
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-~
the character of the standard objections as
themselves committed to principles which
can be questioned (regarding technology
and cosmology). The answers indicate that
there is a clear separation in principle between the classical and modem, and they
take their stand within classical political
philosophy. The objections give Strauss
the opportunity to defend classical political
philosophy in a way that has been clearly
anticipated earlier in the essay. It is said
in the discussion of the Laws that the Spartan’s attack on an Athenian institution
gives the Athenian stranger a perfect excuse to defend that institution. (pp. 30 f.)
Like the Athenian stranger who defends
that institution by acting the part of a
patriot and not a philosopher, Strauss defends classical political philosophy here
simply as a partisan of it. The answers
demonstrate the nature of the objections
from the perspective of classical political
philosophy; they demonstrate that nature
by mimicking it. But these answers are not
Strauss’ last word on the objections nor are
they the only way in which his essay exemplifies the central distinction of classical
political philosophy.
While these two objections require
neither originality, nor intelligence, nor
erudition (it might be said that the answers
do not either) there are objections that do,
and these objections are not ignored in
Strauss’ essay although they do not appear
directly as objections. They appear rather
as “The Modern Solutions.” These solutions
object to the classical solution because it is
not a solution and Strauss’ account of the
classical solution clearly recognizes that
fact about it. That is, for classical political
phiIosophy the establishment of the best
political order rests on chance, or, more
directly, the best political order lacks actuality. It is no solution if a solution is the establishment of that order. The serious objections criticize classical political philosophy in the same way that Plat0 says the
public criticizes the philosopher: the
philosopher is either useless or harmful,
useless to one’s own or harmful to it be-
cause not a partisan of it? That is, the serious objections do recognize the distinction
between the love of one’s own and love of
the good but they reject it as unrealistic.
These objections, unlike the earlier ones,
do object to what is set forth as the classical
solution. The modem solutions attempt a
true solution by taking their bearings not
from the good but from one’s own (p. 41)
and by seeking to actualize a new social
order. They obliterate the distinction between love of one’s own and love of the
good. (p. 42) The appeal is precisely to
those who choose their own over the good.
(pp. 45 f.) The solution is a revolution in
the human estate effected by man and his
determination to master chance.*
Strauss’ account of this most serious objection silently expIains and grounds the
first two abjections. It shows in an indirect
way that there is a necessary connection between the first two disparaged objections
and the one serious objection.
The cosmological issue (the second objection) is the more evident. Cosmology appears directly as an unresolved problem in
Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s program is based
on a cosmology that assumes “the untenable
character of teleological natural science”
(p. 47) but that assumption itself remained baseless until it was grounded by
modem science. The anti-teleological principle is retained by Hobbes and Locke and
(< the turn from man’s end to man’s beginning” is completed by Rousseau who understands the state of nature “as not pointing
beyond itself.” (p. 52) The final step in
anti-teleological cosmology is taken By
Nietzsche for whom “Nature has ceased to
appear as lawful and merciful. The fundamental experience of existence is therefore
the experience, not of bliss, but of suffering, of emptiness, of an abyss.” (p. 54;
see p. 53) In all these cases a specific antiteleological cosmology is shown to be basic
to the political philosophy that is developed.
We must read this account in the light of
the second objection and its answer because
it is there that the matter of cosmology is
first raised and left questionable. The ac-
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count shows-as
the answer intimatedthat the objection itself is based on a particular cosmology that rules out natural ends
and thereby rules out classical political
philosophy. Classical political philosophy
on the other hand is said to have been inaugurated “in the light of the mysterious
oharacter of the whole” (p. 39) and to have
viewed political things as knowable in
themselves apart from a cosmology. (pp.
39 f.; see pp. 27 f.) Thus, while it may be
said that classical political philosophy is impossible for a cosmological view that rules
out natural ends, it is only modem political
philosophy that depends directly on a particular cosmology.
In the answer to the first objection, the
issue of democracy led directly if questionably to the problem of technology. In the
third section of the essay the word “technology” is never used, but technology itself
appears regularly as the modern effort to
conquer chance. Conquering chance is
there seen as an essential part of the program of modern pnlifird philosophy, 8s
inseparable from its determination to actualize the desired new social order. (pp. 41,
46f., 51, 53f., 55) Conquering chance leads
not only to the mastery of nature But also
to the manipulation and training of men,
now taken as almost infinitely malleable.
(p. 42) To use the terms of the answer
to the first objection: Modem teohnology is
displayed as emancipated from moral and
political control because it is an essential
offspring of a political philosophy that takes
its bearings from the lower rather than the
higher-and not only its bearings but its
means as well for Strauss emphasizes the
fact that modem political philosophy depends upon the freeing of “blind selfish
passion” (p. 54) for the actualization of the
desired new order. It depends upon the
‘‘discovery or invention of the need for an
immoral or amoral substitute for morality.”
(p. 49; see pp. 43, 48, 49, 54) We must
read this account of the conquering of
chance in the light of the answer to the first
objeotion because it is there that the matter of the emancipation of technology from
moral and political control is first raised
and left questionable. The answer to the
first objection intimated what is elaborated
in the account of the modern solutions,
namely, that the modern solutions necessarily include a technology that aims to
conquer chance and that is emancipated
from moral and political control whether
that emancipation is in the name of glory
(pp. 42 f.) or power (pp. 48 f.) or acquisitiveness (p. 49) or feeling (p. 53) or creativity. (p. 54) Classical political philosophy
on the other hand is said to be “free from
all fanaticism because it knows that evil
cannot be eradicated and therefore that
one’s expectations from politics must be
moderate” (p. 28) and to have maintained
that emancipation of technology from
moral and political control “would lead to
disaster or to the dehumanization of man.”
(P. 37)
The importance of the standard objections is maintained by their veiled reintroduction in the third section of the essay.
They s.re dispzrzge:! ::.hex first aT,7=.~n~d
because of the superficial form they take,
a form which is indicated by the situation
they occupy in the essay and by the nature
of the answers to them. They are treated
more elaborately if more covertly when
they are raised again by the original, intelligent and erudite objection to classical
political philosophy, by the objection, that
is, that truly mcognizes the solution and
character of classical political philosophy
as the commonly stated objections do not.
The answers to the original objections are
counter-charges which are incomplete and
question begging. The answers indicate by
assertion what lies behind the objections.
But the answers are preparations for the
disclosure of the actual grounds of the objections in the discussion of the modern solutions. The common objections rest on a
misunderstanding of the classical and on
ignorance of their own foundations.
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swered? Strauss’ essay ends without seeming to conclude; it ends with an account
of radical historicism (Heidegger) which
Strauss clearly deplores but it ends without
argument against it. Why does Strauss give
no direct answer to the objection that is
original, intelligent and erudite? To answer
this question two points must be considered: (1) the nature of Strauss’ essay; (2)
the consequent strictures on any possible
defense of classical political philosophy.
(1) If we recognize from the middle
section of the essay that it is the character
of classical political philosophy to distinguish in a cautious and tactful way between love of one’s own and love of the
good, and if we recognize from our assent
to the two objections that the modem is our
own, then the whole essay discloses itself
as an exercise in the spirit of classical
political philosophy. The middle section
shows the nature of classical political philosophy but it shows as well the nature of
Strauss’ essay. It too is a subtle and reticent
attempt to call attention to the distinction
between love of one’s own and love of the
good. It recognizes the value and depth of
the attachment to one’s own but it also
recognizes that that attachment can impair
love of the good for one’s own does not
embody the good. The essay recognizes, to
put the issue in the standard Socratic way,
that there are truths that need to be learned
that cannot be taught in the usual way. The
essay takes classical political philosophy
most seriously by abiding by its most
important and dangerous distinction. The
evidence of this commitment to classical
political philosophy is clearly seen in the
following point.
(2) The reticence imposed by taking
classical political philosophy seriously is
not silence, and, within the strictures of
what classical political philosophy permits,
there can he found in Strauss’ essay a
defense of the classical solution and an
answer to the modern solution. Naturally
this defense must be mainly a challenge
and an invitation to inquiry. In the third
section of the essay, radical historicism is
presented as the consistent unfolding of the
modem view initiated by Machiavelli’s
original, intelligent and erudite objection
to classical political philosophy. Modem
philosophy culminating with Heidegger is
taken as a self-consistent development and
as the objection to classical political
philosophy. In his account of this development Strauss is careful to point out its
consistent and necessary abandonment of
the highest (the good) ; its dependence
upon the “lower” elements in man for suecess; its abandonment of moral and political control of technology; its dependence
upon an exclusive cosmology; and the
lamentable character of its final and
necessary fruits in Nietzsche and Heidegger. In these specific ways Strauss argues
against the complex and often exotic positions held by many modern philosophers.
The rigor and intellectual austerity of his
account seem to remove it from our immediate and intimate concerns. It seems distant from “our own,” more distant certainly
than the democratic and scientific commonplaces of the first two objections. The
criticism of a few philosophers is not
immediately recognizable as a frontal
attack on our own. And yet, of course, it
is an attack on our own, an attack that
consistently refrains from pointing out the
necessary connections between these philosophers and our commonplace verities.
Nevertheless, the reader can supply the
essential point: the two objections to the
classics that are cited first and that we
clearly assent to as our own are necessarily
grounded in modern philosophy. These
objections (“our” objections) derive necessarily from the original, intelligent and
erudite objection. These two objections
which appear so forceful and which appeal
to both our moral and scientific superiority
are thus with great reserve and caution
shown to have a most questionable base.
What we clearly recognize as our own is
shown to be tied to what is not nearly
so recognizably our own and what is, consequently, capable of being attacked and
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opened to doubt within the strictures of
classical political philosophy.
The unresolved conflict between the objections which seemed so forceful and the
answers which seemed 50 inadequate is an
anticipation of the conflict of the third section, a conflict that at first appears merely
academic but that is actually completely
fundamental. In this latter conflict and in
the counter-charges contained in the answers to the first objections, Strauss indicates the lines along which further inquiry
’See e.g. Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art
of Friting (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 19521,
pp. 24-25, 36, 55-60, 162-163, 184; Leo Strauss,
The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally,
19641, pp. 50.54. ’(Glencue, Illinois: Free Press,
fied sons, from the political life to the philosophic lifE” Strauss, What is Political Philosophy?,
pp. 93-94. ‘Republic, 493e-494a. ‘Clearly the meaning of “solution” has changed in the movement
from classical to modem although Strauss makes
no direct note of it. What does the classical solution solve? It solves the problem “What is political philosophy?” and it solves it by reoognizing the politics of philosophy. What do the
modem solutions solve? They solve the problem
“What is political philosophy?” and they solve it
by solving-or setting out to solve-the problem
of the human condition. Modem political philose
phers aim to become the legislators and prophets
of a new social order. They seek to abolish
chance and to actualize “the right or desirable
social order.” (pp. 46 f.) Because classical political philosophers are not the legislators and
propheb of a regime what they soive mu= be
different. Because they aim at the good and at
the best political order, the actualization of the
order depends upon chance. (p. 34) Strauss’
account of the modem solutions shows that they
represent a consistent unfolding of what is actually a single objective to classical political pbilosophy, albeit an original, intelligent and erudite
objection.
19591, pp. 9-55. Subsequent page references are
to this edition and are included in the text. ‘Hilail Gildin, editor, (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill,
19751, pp. 3-57. ‘This is not to suggest that these
are the only matters or the only important matters in these discussions. Rather, these mattem
are particularly suggestive concerning the problem of the inadequate answers to the objections
This same limitation applies to the subsequent
use of the first and third sections of Strauss’ essay. ‘In terms of a distinction Strauss draws elsewhere this account of classical political philose
phy is one sided, although the side it discusses
is 11---~
--- L 1
w= i u v t G uupv’wii~ uuc:
au’jwiive
‘political’ in the expression ‘political philosophy’
designates not so much a subject matter as a
manner of treatment; from this point of view, I
say, ‘political philosophy’ means primarily not
the philosophic treatment of politics, but the political, or popular, treatment of philosophy, or the
political introduction to philosophy-the attempt
to lead the qualified citizens, or rather their quali-
...
must be carried out in order to pursue the
possibility of a stand-point other than our
own. This is the defense of classical political philosophy. It is the reestablishment of
its central distinction in the only way appropriate to it.
Winter 1978
46
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