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NAME OF MSc PROGRAMME: Local Economic Development
FULL TITLE OF SUBMITTED WORK: Dissertation - Challenging
assistentialism in Brazil. “Zero Hunger”: a Local
Economic Development strategy.
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Challenging assistentialism in Brazil. “Zero Hunger”: a Local Economic
Development strategy.
Abstract
This article examines whether the programme Zero Hunger, introduced in Brazil by President
Lula, in 2003, to combat hunger and social exclusion in the country, shows any effects on local
economic development of extremely poor localities, or just provides existential assistance to the
poor, without changing real individual output – GDP per capita for the considerations of this
article. At a glimpse, to several critics, the programme appears to be merely „assistentialist‟.
However, after careful analysis, it is possible to conclude that the programme is effectively
helping lagging regions to develop, in terms of GDP growth, and of reduction of poverty and
inequality within and between regions. The programme‟s mosaic of integrated, complementary
actions is being successful in addressing hunger and its causes, because it combines a set of
emergency actions, designed to address urgent harmful effects of poverty, as innutrition, with
more structural actions, designed to address specific causes of poverty, as unemployment and
missing markets. Such an initiative relates to a new developmental agenda adopted in Brazil,
where Washington Consensus policies have declined in influence, while Keynesian demand-side
stimulation models have gained special consideration as local economic development enhancers.
1
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
p3
2. Theoretical background
p7
3. Hypothesis
p 12
4. Zero Hunger and demand-led local economic development
p 12
4.1 The Food Security issue in historical perspective in Brazil
p 12
4.2. Zero Hunger nowadays
p 18
4.2.1 Objectives and theoretical design
p 18
4.2.2 Criticism and management reformulation
p 20
4.2.3 Actual management structure
p 22
4.2.3.1 Actions
p 23
4.2.3.2 Involved Agencies
p 26
5. Evidence Analysis
p 27
5.1 Previous Research
p 28
5.2 Maranhao Case Study
p 29
5.2.1 Methodology
p 29
5.2.1.1 Selecting criteria: Where to drive attention to?
p 29
5.2.1.2 Counterfactuals
p 32
5.2.2 Principal Findings
p35
5.2.2.1 What is about the Northeast?
p35
5.2.2.1.1 What is about Maranhao?
p38
5.2.2.2 Zero Hunger’s cash transfers correlation with GDP per capita performance in Maranhao
p 39
5.2.2.2.1 Rate of poor families protected by Family Grant
p 41
5.2.2.2.2 GDP per capita performance
p 45
6. Conclusion Marks
p 47
7. Bibliography
p 47
2
1. Introduction
The programme „Fome Zero‟ – Zero Hunger is a historic mark in Brazilian public policy. It has
been introduced in 2003, when Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva – Lula, from the Labour Party –
„Partido dos Tabalhadores‟ – PT, took office as President of Brazil, after Labour‟s remarkable
victory in 2002‟s national elections, over the PSDB- PFL coalition1 – which was in control of the
Presidency since 19942. This meant, in the words of Almeida (2005: 1), “the first major change
in governing elites in the country since the end of the military regime, in 1985”; since PT had
been the country‟s main oppositional party since then, without having, however, ever succeeded
in presidential elections before. To many, Lula‟s mandate presents the first left government ever
established in Brazil (Cerri, Santos, 2002)3, and, for this reason, great anxiety and expectations
surrounded his first years in office. These feelings were almost integrally projected to Zero
Hunger programme, which was announced as Lula‟s first priority in his presidential campaign, in
2002, and reaffirmed as a principal government policy, right on the inauguration of his first term
of office. As a result, the programme has attracted massive attention of oppositionists and of the
public opinion, and became a major criticism focus of Labour‟s administration (FAO, 2006: 5).
The food security issue became extremely popular, calling attention of diverse research
Institutes, unions, society organizations, social movements, experts, and even celebrities. Such
attention had been provoked both by the status of absolute government priority the programme
has received from Lula and by the method through which Zero Hunger was conceptualized, a
bottom-up participative approach. The programme, however, was not a complete novelty of
1
„Partido Social Democrata Brasileiro‟ and „Partido da Frente Liberal‟, which formed the coalition supporting
Fernando Henrique Cardoso – FHC‟s offices.
2
That year, FHC was elected president of Brazil, in replacement of Itamar Franco, who substituted Fernando Collor
de Mello, dismissed by impeachment, over corruption charge, in 1992.
3
See http://alainet.org/active/3107&lang=es and http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/120gp.htm , for some examples of
articles calling attention to the left orientation of Lula and PT. Accessed on 22/08/2008
3
Lula‟s government; it has been originated from the Zero Hunger Project (SILVA, BELIK and
TAKAGI, 2001), a document spontaneously produced by the NGO „Instituto Cidadania‟ –
Citizenship Institute, in 2001, containing structural guidelines for the implementation of a food
security policy in Brazil. The proposal was designed after one year of collaborative work
between many ONGs‟ representatives, research institutes, unions, society organizations, social
movements and experts (SILVA, BELIK and TAKAGI, 2001). Such achievement was possible
because, since the early 90‟s, NGOs and civil society organizations had been involved with the
hunger issue, which generated knowledge accumulation.
Jose Graziano da Silva, one of the authors of the project was called to integrate Lula‟s
administration, in 2003, to coordinate the implementation of Zero Hunger, as head of the newly
created Special Ministry of Food Security and Hunger Combat – Ministerio Especial de
Seguranca Alimentar e Combate a Fome – MESA. However, his path as minister of food security
was not a smooth one. During the first year of his term, the policy had disapproval reports
published every day, by diverse media channels, regarding the management model of the
programme and its orientation (Almeida, 2005). Several critics charged the programme as merely
„assistential‟, not effective at truly transforming unprotected individuals dependence condition
and social exclusion. Criticism focused implementation and targeting methods of Zero Hunger‟s
actions, their impact on poverty and inequality, and their possible „unintended negative impacts
on labour force participation‟ (Soares, Ribas and Osorio, 2007: 3; Almeida, 2005). It had been
largely suggested that the programme‟s conditional cash transfers, fundamental components of
its strategic policy umbrella, produced a perverse side-effect on beneficiaries‟ motivation to
engage in jobs, and make their own money, as they received free-of-efforts government aid
(Ibidem, 2007).
4
It had also been argued that the programme was populist/paternalist, which offered aid without
effectively changing the adverse excluding circumstances that made people starve, or without
impacting local economies development, roots of hunger and poverty, as largely evoked by
PSDB, main oppositionist party to PT‟s administration4. The intense spreading of these ideas, in
2003, began to weaken government‟s image and provoked a ministerial crisis. Zero Hunger,
which had been assumed as a means of combating hunger, while delivering local economic
development and fighting „assistentialism‟, and as a primary government priority, was being said
to be everything it was designed not to. Because of such a crisis, Graziano stayed in the
coordination of the programme only until January 2004, when a structural ministerial reform was
carried out to integrate all social policies in one single agency, the Ministry for Social
Development and Hunger Combat, under command of Patrus Ananias.
Evidence, however, dismiss the criticism hypothesis pointed above. Soares, Ribas and Osorio
(2007: 8), studying diverse Zero Hunger‟s conditional transfers evaluations5, found that „the
labour market participation rate of treated adults was 2.6 percentage points higher than for nontreated adults‟, while „the participation rate of beneficiary women was 4.3 percentage points
higher‟. Moreover, works of (Barros, 2007) have found that Zero Hunger‟s conditional transfers
have been responsible for a relevant decrease in Brazil‟s inequality marks in the last five years.
Taking into account the conclusions of Adelman (1977); Alesina and Perotti (1996); Benabou
(1996); and Barro (1999), who found that high inequality negatively impacts economic growth in
developing countries, it is possible to conclude that, while successful in reducing inequality, Zero
Hunger is also contributing to local economic development.
4
See for example:
http://www.psdb.org.br/assessoria_tecnica/documentos%5CINFORME_06_OProjeto_Fome_Zero_(04022003).pdf.
5
In addition, this article examines the impact of Zero Hunger transfers on real GDP growth per
capita. Findings corroborate the results found by previous evaluations. A strong correlation
marks the relationship between the two variables, meaning that the localities with higher rates of
poor families assisted by the programme, in the period studied, showed, in general – deviant
cases excluded –, higher GDP per capita performance, than less assisted localities. It also means
that the variation of real GDP per capita in the localities studied was consistent, to great extent,
with the variation of rates of poor families assisted there, year by year of the series. Such a
finding allows for the inference that Zero Hunger has generated multiplier effects at local
economies, through demand-side stimulation, which has generated growth without generating
relevant inflation – since the variable studied is real GDP per capita. This which can be taken as
a indicator that Zero Hunger has generated local economic development. This is an important
mark; since other possible criticism focus of Zero Hunger could be based on Friedman‟s
monetary framework, which predicts neutralization of any government aid, in the medium and
long run, by effects of inflation.
Of course, there is not yet a way to predict if predatory inflation is going to be, or not, a result in
the long run. The available database at the moment is yet too short to allow reliable linear
regression projections for future outcomes. Zero Hunger transfers have started in 2003 and GDP
growth results of municipalities has only been treated by Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics6– IBGE until the year of 2005, so, basically, we had only three eligible years for
analysing the variables correlation. The really strong correlation found between them, however,
alleviate the potential uncertainty, relatively to the accuracy of the research results that could be
raised as a result of the short series.
6
„Instituto Brasileiro de Georgrafia e Estatistica‟
6
Together, all the mentioned findings form a strong evidence analysis base that permits careful
conclusions about the effects of Zero Hunger in the fight against hunger and poverty. Contrarily
to what the common sense seems to suggest, the programme cannot be proved as merely
„assistentialist‟. Several researches have pointed important indicators that the programme has
advanced in the effective combat of poverty and generated local economic development.
2. Theoretical background
For its demand-side appeal, Zero Hunger is situated in the field of post-Keynesian growth
theories, which has been be explicitly declared by Jose Graziano da Silva, former Minister of
Food Security and Hunger Combat:
“We want to generate a strong stimulator of food demand in the country. This is a KeynesianKaleckian policy that aims at giving impulse to local economies dynamics, taking advantage of
their specific assets, as family-business agri-industries, for example. However, big metropolis
will also feel this impact, with the multiplication of popular restaurants and with the „first
employment‟ policies. Zero Hunger is a „social umbrella‟, but, above all, it presents the seed of a
new development model that generates social inclusion, not assistentialism”7.
Such a tendency presents what Singer (1997) has called the „swinging back of the Keynesian
consensus pendulous‟. After the monetarist Keynesian critics, of potential neutrality of
government intervention in the economy, because of inflation stimulation (Friedman, Schwartz,
1963); and after the great popularity of retrenchment ideas, with the famous agendas of Thatcher
and Reagan (Pierson, 1994), and with the wide spreading of Washington Consensus influence
7
Interview with Jose Graziano on 01/12/2002 às 00:13, by Cerri, Alterthum, originally published in the transition
government wesite, now avalilable in: http://www.midiaindependente.org/pt/blue/2002/11/42761.shtml . Accessed
on 22/06/2008
7
around the world, the developing world found its way back to some fundamental Keynesian
principles (Gore, 2000). The inaccuracy of some of Washington Consensus‟ prescriptions, in
delivering economic development to many developing countries, animated the formation of an
alternative „Southern Consensus‟, which presents a compound of more realistic development
recipes, designed for addressing specific underdevelopment determinants experienced by such
countries (Gore, 2000: 796 – 798).
Such consensus, as explained by Gore, has not counted with the protocol and institutionalization
that marked Washington Consensus; it has rather emerged from the bottom, as a synthesis of
demand-side development policies taken simultaneously in diverse Latin American countries, as
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador and Colombia (Soares, Ribas and Osorio, 2007). Such policies
emerged in these countries‟ agenda as a result of their own reflection about the specificities that
constrained their economic development, instead of coming from external agents‟ development
packages. Between those specificities, high inequality, within and between regions, poverty and
„demand-side constraints to growth‟ can be pointed out as common problems (Gore, 2000:798;
Henriques, 2000; Barros et al, 2001; Veiga 2000).
In such conditions, post-Keynesian demand-side formulations recovered importance in LatinAmerican countries. Reliance on the potential ability of „exogenous changes in effective
demand‟, in altering „the growth rate and the functional distribution of income, in both the short
and the long run‟ (Barbosa Filho, 2004:16), has been inspiring policy, under the understanding
that the economy had remained „below its potential output‟; or, in other words, had been „locked
in a “slow-growth” because of demand factors‟ (Barbosa Filho, 2004:7). As argues the author:
“Independently of the importance of supply issues, the emphasis of modern growth theory on
8
potential output tends to ignore the fact that capitalist economies may stay below their maximum
output for long periods of time. Even if one accepts Say‟s law and assume that effective demand
does converge to potential output in the long run, the adjusting period may be long enough to
make a demand-led growth theory worthy for medium-run macroeconomics. If one rejects Say‟s
law and assumes instead that it is potential output that converges to effective demand in the long
run, the need for a demand-led growth theory becomes even more obvious”. (Ibidem, 2004:4)
Neto and Vernengo (2004), and Davidson (2003) also converge in this understanding. Zero
Hunger and the late social cash transfers of Fernando Henrique Cardoso‟s administration8
integrate such a development framework. It is the pendulous swinging back again towards
government intervention reliance, and away from free markets‟ sufficiency, as has occurred in
the past, in the beginning of the XX Century. After the second industrial revolution, Weberian
„modern‟ societies engaged in a renewed capitalist mode of production, which experienced the
exacerbation, followed by extreme criticism, of laissez-faire ideals (Keynes, 1926).
In the decade of 1930, the economist John Maynard Keynes would change the history of
capitalism, by proposing the macroeconomic theoretical formulations that would enable
transition from laissez-faire capitalism to twentieth century welfare state, through a deep
„paradigm shift‟ (Kuhn, 1970: 103, 150) in State‟s role in the economy (Keynes, 1936). His
demand-side approach to economic growth fit so well with post-1929 Crisis policy needs all
around the world, that, by the end of the II World War, the world came to experience what is
today known as the „Keynesian consensus‟. The economic breakdown of 1929, and the massive
unemployment that followed, claimed policy responses diverse from those usually supported by
8
See discussion on- 2.1 The Food Security issue in historical perspective in Brazil, pp 9/ 10
9
laissez-faire enthusiasts.
The economic growth paradigm disseminated on that time, grounded on Say‟s Law supply-side
reliability, could not present a solution. The real-world unemployment issue found on Keynes‟
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), and other related works, a new
„against-crisis/ pro-economic-development‟ paradigm for State actuation, based on aggregatedemand-enhancer welfare (Behring, 1998; Linhares, 2005). The Welfare State had become the
new paradigm of interaction between government and markets and the keystone of growth
prospects for national economies. Such consensus would, however, deteriorate in the 1970‟s,
after two consecutive oil shocks –1973/1979 – and a huge international economic crisis. As
noted by Johnston (2001: 15), oil prices raised approximately 400%, combined with “the spectre
of inflation which had already been raised by the wage pressures and strengthening of the trade
unions as a result of a long experience of full employment”, created a generalized recession
unsolvable by the Welfare State.
Unemployment reached record rates since the II World War (Wijnbergen, 1985), and people
began to disbelieve Keynes fiscal policy. By the 80‟s Keynesianism was unable to deal with or
explain the low rate of net profit markets made or the high rates of inflation and unemployment.
Once again, the world was hit with high unemployment rates, but this time another worldwide
macroeconomic framework would advise policy: monetarism – to be further enforced by
Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990) advocates. Such formulation, which deeply
influenced policy in the UK and the US, from the late 70‟s (Pierson, 1994), charged the installed
Welfare State, as one of the main causes of the inflationary crisis. Inflation was blamed as the
main responsible for the crisis, and the Welfare State the main responsible for inflation. As noted
by Johnston (2001: 15), “Inflation became the nemesis of the Keynesian Consensus, and
10
inflation control the icon of the Washington Consensus”; it was the collapse of Keynesian
consensus; of the Welfare State; and the rise of retrenchment. The pendulous swung back laissezfaire reliance again.
„Populist macroeconomic policies‟, meaning lax fiscal policy, were understood „as the cause of
the lost decade‟ to Consensus‟ fathers. (Bresser Pereira and Dall‟Acqua, 1991). Williamson‟s
recipes had fiscal discipline as a strongest concern, followed by deregulation, liberalization, and
privatization (Neto, Vernengo, 2004: 3). Such an emphasis related to the idea that „high fiscal
deficits were behind macroeconomic instability‟, which generated inflation and „fears of default,
leading to balance of payments problems‟ (Neto, Vernengo, 2004: 3). As pointed out by
Davidson (2003: 3) „all ten reforms of the Washington Consensus (were) founded on classical
economic theory that supports the laissez-faire doctrine as necessary to solve all our economic
problems.‟
In Brazil, such a framework animated restrictive fiscal policy, during Fernando Henrique
Cardoso – FHC‟s administrations (1995-2002), when economic development was believed to
come as a result of successful stabilization policies, through inflation control and increased
population purchasing power. This would impulse, in the medium run, diminution of poverty,
and increased private investment, because of positive signs of rising credibility and reliability of
the economy, with stabilization attainments and inflation control. Say‟s Law was restored and
economic development was, again, expected to come as a result from supply-side adjustment
(Ferrari Filho, 2003: 279 - 282). However, such strict stabilization policies, based on primary
surplus and high interest rates, have proved a failure in many Latin American countries (Neto,
Vernengo, and 2004:3). In Brazil, after huge recession and unemployment, arisen with the
stabilization programme, during FHC‟s second term in office (1998 - 2002), Washington
11
Consensus prescriptions became nationally discredited as realistic economic growth inducer
(Bailey, Heinz, 1999; Neto, Vernengo, 2004).
Thus, the pendulous has been, again, moving way from supply-side growth approaches; postKeynesian approaches, in turn, start again to gain strength and empirical application in Latin
America, and Brazil is special As this article intends to demonstrate, in Lula‟s administration, a
new concept of developmental state, which focuses essentially on demand-led local economic
development of lagging regions.
3. Hypothesis
Demand-side stimulation policies can deliver economic development to countries like Brazil,
where high levels of poverty and inequality have created „slow-growth lock- in‟ effects, because
of demand factors (ver outras referencias em Barbosa Filho) (Barbosa Filho, 2004; Barro, XXX;
Perotti,1996; Benabou, 1996; Gore, 2000;; Neto, Vernengo, 2004; Davidson, 2003; Bailey,
Heinz, 1999).
4. Zero Hunger and demand-led local economic development
4.1 The Food Security issue in historical perspective in Brazil
During Itamar Franco presidency (1992 - 1994), under the command of civil society
organizations, a set of initiatives designed to promote food security was implemented. The most
relevant were the campaign „Ação da Cidadania contra a Fome, a Miséria e pela Vida‟ –
Citizenship Action Against the Hunger, the Misery and in Favour of Life, in 1993 and 1994; the
creation, in 1993, of the National Council of Food Security – „Conselho Nacional de Segurança
12
Alimentar‟ (Consea), by Franco – to be later restored by Lula in 20039; the elaboration, in 1993,
of the Hunger Map – Mapa da Fome, and the National Plan Against Hunger – „Plano Nacional
de Combate à Fome‟, by the Institute of Applied Economic Research – Instituto de Pesquisa
Economica Aplicada – IPEA; and the realization of the I National Conference of Food Security –
Conferência Nacional de Segurança Alimentar, in 1994 (IPEA, 2004: 37).
Other initial food security initiatives were taken during the 60‟s, when popular restaurants were
installed and nutritional surveys were conducted by the Social Security Food Service – Serviço
de Alimentação da Previdência – SAP, finding that workers nutrition was dreadful. Some
complimentary actions started to be prospected, when the military dictatorial regime (1964 –
1985) interrupted the food programme. Popular restaurants were closed and hunger left the
agenda, leaving nothing more than a residual, clientelistic/paternalistic food basket distribution
policy, to be carried out by the militaries until 1985. In 1986, in Jose Sarney‟s government, with
the re-democratization, a new food security initiative took place, the Milk Stamps – Tíquete do
Leite, which raised national demand in more than 15%, with the distribution of 5 million litters
/day. The per capita consume of milk moved from 94 litters /year to 104 litters /year, but
corruption and deviations charges made the programme nothing different from the
„assistentialist‟/ clientelistic food baskets of previous years. With the „neo-liberal‟ trends of
Fernando Collor de Mello‟s administration (1990 - 1992), however, the Milk programme was
extinct in 1991 – to be restored only in Lula‟s office, in 2004, under renewed management
structure (Cerri, Santos, 2002).
9
The CONSEA was re-established by Lula through Law 10.683/2003. Available in:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2003/L10.683compilado.htm
13
In the same year of 1991, the oppositionist Labour Party (PT), which had formed a „parallel
government‟ to monitor, and to formulate alternative policies to Collor‟s government, presented
the first proposal of a National Policy of Food Security to Brazil. The work reaffirmed the role of
the State and of national planning for defeating development obstacles. Hunger was considered
an emergent manifestation of historical socio-economic distortions, thus, requiring a bunch of
interrelated policies that would move away from mere „assistentialism‟. The underlying
framework was that the invisible market hand, in absolute glory in official circles, in that time,
was unable to beat income concentration/ inequality, land conflicts and regional disparities.
Hunger was the resultant of the combination of such deeply grounded socio-economic issues,
and any policy effort intending to really deal with the problem, needed to extrapolate
„assistentialism‟ and pursue actions aimed at delivering sustainable local economic development.
Included in the proposal were objectives of medium and long run as well as emergency actions,
as land reform, support to familiar agriculture, to agri-industries development, and to agricultural
goods commercialization; and creation of popular restaurants and distributions of food to the
extremely unprotected (Cerri, Santos, 2002).
The parallel government‟s project also proposed the institution of a Special Secretary of Food
Security, to be attached to the Presidency, and to coordinate all government actions around
hunger strategic objectives. In addition, it previewed an institutional link with the civil society
through the installation of a Food Security Council – CONSEA, to be leaded by the president,
and composed by representatives of all government levels – national, regional (states) and
municipal –, as well as community leaders and social entities that would help coordinating
medium and long run actions. Two years later, such propositions saw a brief impact; the
CONSEA was created in 1993, by Itamar Franco, to coordinate the actions of a Plan to Combat
14
Misery and Hunger – Plano de Combate à Fome e à Miséria, announced by the government.
However, with the immediate success of the stabilization plan – „Plano Real‟, between 1994 and
1998 – Fernando Henrique Cardoso first term of office –, another trend towards invisible market
hands reliance took place. Under influence of Washington Consensus prescriptions, the
government extinguished the CONSEA, in 1995, after first animating results of inflation control.
In substitution, the Solidarity Community Council – Conselho Comunidade Solidaria was created
to concentrate the elaboration of policies aimed at addressing poverty in general (Cerri, Santos,
2002).
Washington Consensus prescriptions were sceptics to social welfare as legitimate government
intervention in developing countries, as Brazil, where high inflation and external debt operated
(Kuczynsky, 2004: 29, 30; Birdsall, Szekely, 2004: 54 - 57); and where social welfare was
traditionally associated with, clientelistic relations between authoritarian governments and
individuals, subject to corruption and patrimonialism (Almeida, 2005; Medeiros, 2001; Malloy,
1979). That style of Welfare State, based on patrimonialism and corporativism, with cooptation
of labour organizations by the government, became largely recognized by its culture of
dependence, or „assistentialism‟. The term, used to describe paternalist/clientelistic social
welfare, distributed by giant, expensive, corrupt, inefficient, ineffective and process driven,
welfare states, became a profanity in the 90‟s Washington Consensus reforms‟ glossary (Birdsall,
Szekely, 2004: 54 - 57). Directly attributable to the populist and paternalist character of the
military dictatorial regime of 1964 – 1985, and of Varga‟s Era (1930 - 1945), Brazilian installed
Welfare State was included between reforms‟ great priorities to be implemented during Cardoso‟s
administrations (1995 - 2002), which were strongly influenced by Washington Consensus ideas.
15
Cradoso‟s reforms followed international tendency towards reduction of public expenditure
growth rates; introduction of beneficiaries‟ selectivity mechanisms – focalization; and
introduction of public-private policy management instruments (Vianna, 2000:62); as well as
decentralization, participation of beneficiaries in decision-making processes, combat against
cronyism in the use of welfare resources, rationalization and more efficient spending, and greater
equity in the provision of benefits and social services (Almeida 2005:2). In this context,
„minimum income‟ policies proposals experienced a strong revival (Linhares, 2005). Such ideas
were strongly linked with the actuation of the Solidarity Community Council presided by
Cardoso‟s wife, the sociologist Ruth Cardoso10. Considerable reforms were implemented in the
social field, both in institutional and philosophical aspects (Almeida, 2005). The Solidarity
Community served as intellectual supplier of social policy frameworks that would be inaugurated
during Fernando Henrique‟s administrations. Many of them were associated with focalized
„minimum income‟ mechanisms. As noted by Almeida:
„a set of programs were created (...), which would include rural retirement system and non contributive
social assistance programs, such as: Bolsa-Escola- School Allowance, Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil
– Eradication of Child Labor, Bolsa-Alimentação - Food Allowance, Auxilio-Gás - Gas Subsidy, Agente
Jovem – Youth Program, Programa de Saúde da Família- Family Health Care Program, Programa de
Apoio à Agricultura Familiar – Family Farming Support Program, plus the Alvorada Project, supporting
the 2.361 Brazilian towns with the highest rates of inhabitants living below the poverty line. All these
programs consist of direct transference of monetary income to the beneficiaries, centrally managed by
the Federal Government. Thus, the basic food basket distribution programs (practiced during military
dictatorial times), which were often subject to cronyism, were eliminated.‟ (Almeida, 2005).
10
Under the competence of the newly created Solidarity Community Council (1995), social policy gained a publicprivate partnership orientation and an intellectual agenda.
16
In the meanwhile, NGOs, which were called to participate in the social agenda, by the Solidarity
Community, also developed their own frameworks for social policy in the country. In 2000, the
NGO Citizenship Institute – „Instituto Cidadania‟ reintroduced the hunger issue into the social
agenda, with the proposal of a national food security policy, under the label of Zero Hunger
Project , which had Jose Graziano da Silva11 as one of its coordinators (Silva, Belik and Takagi,
2001). This version absorbed many of the contributions proposed by the parallel government,
including the re-institution of the CONSEA, besides having received other expert contributions
in the course of one year.
In 2002, Graziano was invited to coordinate Lula‟s campaign proposal for agriculture and
subsequently to join Lula‟s transition team12 for economic development. On 01/01/2003, he was
nominated Lula‟s Special Minister of Food Security and Hunger Combat 13 and received the task
of coordinating the first implementation arrangements necessary to bring Zero Hunger project
out of the paper and into action. Graziano‟s greatest challenge was to aggregate Cardoso‟s direct
transfer policy innovations (Almeida, 2005) to the Zero Hunger comprehensive programme.
Because he was not very successful in such a task, in 2004, programme‟s coordination was
transferred to the Ministry for Social Development, under command of Patrus Ananias, where
such integration was made possible.
11
José Graziano da Silva, undergraduate as an agricultural engineer, is PhD in Economics, and in Applied
Economics – University of Campinas (Unicamp). He is nowadays a permanent Professor of the Economics Institute
of the University of Campinas (Unicamp), actuating specially in Agricultural Economics, and Coordinator of the
Master in Economic Development, Space and Environment of the school. Graziano has also accomplished a postdoctoral degree at the Institute of Latin American Studies at University College London. He has published five
books, between them “The new dynamics of Brazilian agriculture” , “The new Brazilian rural”, and “Familybussiness agriculture technology” . He coordinated the formulation of the Zero Hunger project in 2000/2001, at the
NGO Instituto Cidadania, and on 01/01/2003 was nominated Lula‟s Minister of Food Security and Hunger Combat.
12
The transition team refers to a group of Lula‟s candidature head leaders, associated with the Labour Party (PT),
who supported Lula‟s presidential campaign and were tasked to take care of the initial management arrangements
required for a smooth presidential succession in 2002/2003, when Lula substituted Fernando Henrique Cardoso in
the Presidency of Brazil.
13
Accessed on 09/08/2008. Available in: http://www.vermelho.org.br/governo_lula/09.asp
17
Cardoso‟s transfer policy structure formed, thus, the essential base from which Lula‟s Zero
Hunger has been derived (Almeida, 2005). In that sense, it can be argued that Zero Hunger has
been formulated within the same social policy framework that emerged in reaction to the
clientelistic - „assistantialist‟ military model, inaugurated during Cardoso‟s years. This
framework had focalization – to attain those really unprotected people – sustainability, and local
economic development – for further beneficiaries‟ independence of social welfare – as main
inspirational fundamentals, which have been assumed by Zero Hunger (Ibidem). Thus, if
Cardoso‟s transfer policies can be understood as a reaction to „assistentialism‟, disseminated in
the country by dictatorial regimes, for so many years, (Ibidem), also can Zero Hunger.
4.2. Zero Hunger nowadays
4.2.1 Objectives and theoretical design
Accordingly with MDS authorities: “Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) is a strategy of the Federal
Government to guarantee the human right of access to adequate food for those who lack it. That
strategy is situated in a context of promotion of food and nutritional security in an attempt to
achieve social inclusion and citizenship rights for the population most vulnerable to hunger.”14
Such a general statement does not offer much of an explanation of programme‟s real
specificities, which differentiate it from the „assistentialist‟ food baskets programme, operated by
military regime. However, there is an essential difference between both policies. While the latter
consists exclusively of distribution of food, the former‟s main action, „Bolsa Familia‟ – Family
Grant, consists of cash transfers for beneficiaries to buy food themselves, within their local
14
Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome – MDS. Livreto Fome Zero – English Version. Brasilia.
2004. Available in: http://www.fomezero.gov.br/publicacoes/resolveUid/27cc25ace852bb50dc9b5a0d3f73c262 ,
accessed on 20/06/2008
18
markets. As explained by Jose Graziano15, Zero Hunger primary coordinator, one of the project‟s
main pillars „is the stimulation of aggregate demand at the local level‟. The link between the
monetary transfers and the acquisition of food at local markets was affirmed as a structural
requisite of the project, as well as the connection of transfers‟ conditionality with long run
human development generators, as education and health care.
From the beginning, Zero Hunger was conceptualized through a comprehensive set of
complimentary actions aimed at addressing different, but interconnected, chunks of hunger issue.
The project has been formulated to combine assistance to completely unprotected people, living
in absolute misery and incapable of changing their life conditions without emergency aid
support, with more structural interventions driven to address specific structural causes of hunger,
which would really help them overcome their disadvantaged life conditions (Silva, Belik And
Takagi, 2001). This can be understood as the main purpose of Zero Hunger, announced through
the famous sentence repeated by President Lula in diverse occasions: “It is necessary to give the
poor a fish, but at the same time teach them how to fish” 16.
This symbolic declaration reflects concern with the complexity involved in the treatment of
hunger. The problem has been identified as a result of lack of income, unemployment, missing
food markets, lack of education and skills, territorial isolation, poor food logistics distribution,
15
On an official report of Lula‟s government transition team, published on its official website, on 01/12/2002. The
website of the transition team used to be http://transicao.lula.org.br, but as it is currently unavailable, the complete
report can be accessed in: http://www.midiaindependente.org/pt/blue/2002/11/42761.shtml . Accessed on
09/08/2008.
16
In President Lula‟s own words: “Teaching how to fish” means creation of employment in regions stricken by
hunger and poverty, investment on improvement of living conditions of such population; means to imrpove access to
quality education, decent health, wages and income; it means to promote agrarian reform, to give incentives for
family farming; to stimulate agriculture co-ops, small loans (microfinance) and alfabetization; it means to prepare
people for a profession or a job; it means to create sufficient conditions for them to be able to support themselves. In
short, teaching how to fish means once and for all to definitely free millions of Brazilians from the humiliation of
hand-out food baskets. It means (making sure evyone can) to make everyone, absolutely everyone, be able to feed
themselves, without help from the others for that matter”. Available in:
http://www.brazil.org.uk/socialissues/zerohunger.html . Accessed on 30/06/2008.
19
among others (Silva, Belik And Takagi, 2001). In short, it‟s been understood that the state of
„hunger‟ involves more complex deprivations, than strictly the inability to consume food; it is
fatally linked with deeper aspects of the social exclusion in Brazil (MDS, 2004; Dedecca,
Barbieri, 2003). So, gradually, what was initially a program driven to honour president Lula‟s
main campaign promise: to make, at least, every Brazilian be able to have a decent meal every
day, turned to be a complex network of interconnected actions aimed at shifting the social
exclusion and poverty attributes, of approximately 11, 2 million nutritionally unsecured families,
or 46 million people, which led them to starve (Dedecca, Barbieri, 2003).
Illustration:
4.2.2 Criticism and management reformulation
In accordance with the diagram above, a series of interventions were proposed such as:
20
“transference of monetary income „Cartão-Alimentação‟ - Food Card, distribution of basic food
baskets, creation of food canteens for the poor and food banks, purchasing food from family
farms, nutritional education programs, drilling artesian wells, building popular housing projects,
milk distribution and basic education programs.” (Almeida, 2005: pp). However, as pointed out
by Almeida, such an ambitious purpose made Zero Hunger lack „substance and clearly defined
objectives‟, in the beginning. Also, it seemed to ignore the cash transfers „social protection
network established by the previous government‟. Moreover the programme was argued to have
been „precariously implemented in a centralized manner, as the federal government got directly
involved in the cities, skipping state governments and participatory institutions created
beforehand‟ (Almeida, 2005: pp).
In addition, several critics charged the programme as merely „assistential‟. Its targeting methods
were doubted to impact poverty and inequality roots, while its cash transfers were said to
produce a perverse side-effect on beneficiaries‟ motivation to engage in jobs (Soares, Ribas and
Osorio, 2007: 3; Almeida, 2005). It had also been argued that the programme was
populist/paternalist, which offered aid, without effectively changing the adverse excluding
circumstances that made people starve, or without impacting local economies development, as
evoked by PSDB, main oppositionist party to PT‟s administration17. The intense spreading of
these ideas, in 2003, began to weaken government‟s image and provoked a ministerial crisis.
Zero Hunger, which had been assumed as a means of combating hunger, while delivering local
economic development and fighting „assistentialism‟, and as a primary government priority, was
being said to be everything it was designed not to. Because of such a crisis, Graziano stayed in
17
See for example:
http://www.psdb.org.br/assessoria_tecnica/documentos%5CINFORME_06_OProjeto_Fome_Zero_(04022003).pdf.
21
the coordination of the programme only until January 2004, when a structural ministerial reform
was carried out to integrate all social policies in one single agency, the Ministry for Social
Development and Hunger Combat, under command of Patrus Ananias. The Special Ministry for
Food Security and Hunger Combat was extinct and Jose Graziano became Lula‟s assessor.
With the creation of the Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Combat – MDS, Zero
Hunger suffered deep management reform. Programme Bolsa Familia – Family Grant was
created to tie together diverse fragmented social transfers in place – Zero Hunger‟s Food Card
and transfer programmes of Cardoso‟s administration18 –, with the reformulation of the „Cadastro
Unico Federal‟ – „Federal Single Registry System‟, a social policy managerial tool created
during Cardoso‟s years, by Decree19 nº 3.877/ 2001 20. Family Grant, which, then, became Zero
Hunger‟s main action, also substituted all transfer programmes operated by states and
municipalities; such government instances were called to integrate the management design of
Family Grant, instead of operating the transfers by their own. Such changes aimed bringing more
rationality to Zero Hunger. Family Grant’s reasonable success in delivering such a purpose made
it Lula‟s most celebrated social policy (Almeida, 2005), to the extent that many people don‟t
even know Family Grant is a Zero Hunger‟s action. Many treat it as an independent programme.
4.2.3 Actual management structure
Today, Zero Hunger constitutes a single umbrella that includes almost all social policies
managed by MDS, a series of different complementary policies aimed at combating poverty
18
To a list of Cardoso‟s cash transfer programmes see, on page 10, the transcription of Almeida (2005).
Available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/D3877.htm , accessed on 20/07/2008.
20
Family Grant was established by Law 10.836, with the main purpose of unifying management and execution
procedures of all cash transfers operated by the Federal Government. Its main tool is the „Federal Single Registry
System‟, which counts with municipalities‟ and state‟s cooperation for accuracy (Law 10,836, Art. 1o). Available in:
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2004/lei/l10.836.htm
19
22
through a demand-led growth intervention. One single database of potential beneficiaries was
developed by full implementation of MDS‟s national poverty record, „Cadastro Unico‟ – „Single
Registry System‟, with cooperation with municipal authorities21. Potential beneficiaries are those
families living in extreme poverty (with R$ 60.00 per capita income per month or less –
approximately $ 38.6) and in poverty (with per capita income between R$ 60.00 and R$ 120,00
– approximately $ 77.2)22. Once registered, families become eligible for receiving support from
all Zero Hunger actions, depending on their specific needs. Family Grant, the principal action,
reaches today 11,043,076 poor Brazilian families out of 11,102,770 total poor families in the country, as
estimated by PNAD 2004, having transferred a total of R$ 8,965,499,608.00 in 200723, by delivering
cash aid of R$ 58.00 + extra R$ 18.00/ per children, or extra R$ 30.00/per teenagers, held in school, at a
maximum of three kids assisted per family,
to families living with R$ 60.00 per capita income/month or
less (extreme poverty); and cash aid of just R$ 18.00/ per children, or R$ 30.00/per teenagers, held in
school, to families living with
per capita income of R$ 120.00 tops (Law 10,836, Art. 2o).
4.2.3.1 Actions
21
More information on: http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/cadastro_unico/o-que-e-1/ . For latest updates on the
Cadastro Unico specifications, see Decree 6135/2007, available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL/_Ato20072010/2007/Decreto/D6135.htm , accessed on 12/08/2008.
22
Accordingly to Family Grant's Management Report 2007, the poverty and extreme poverty parameters used by
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Combat – MDS were formulated in accordance with studies conducted
by the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography – IBG) and the Institute of Applied Economic Research –
IPEA , both part of the Ministry of Planning. Such parameters are expressed on Family Grant's Law 10,836/ 2004,
and on Family Grant's Decree 5,209/2004. The three mentioned documents were accessed on 13/08/2008, and are
available respectively in:
http://www.mds.gov.br/servicos/relatorio-gestao/2007/senarc/resolveUid/96f7cc7f855d26b70ee835bd5d2f841b
;
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2004/lei/l10.836.htm ; and:
http://www.planalto.gov.br/Ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2004/Decreto/D5209.htm#
23
MDS. Bolsa Familia.‟ “Relatório Consolidado da Folha de Pagamento”, extracted from the database of the online
monitoring system of the „Bolsa Familia‟ transferred resources – SIBEC, available in:
https://www.beneficiossociais.caixa.gov.br/ , but with restricted access to local, regional and national managers of
the program, as well as members of fiscalization and inspection agencies at local and national instances agencies
accounting and control agencies. The complete original data is shown on Annex III.
23
Zero Hunger actions are organized within four main blocks: Food Access; Strengthening of
Familiar Agriculture; Income generation; and Partnership Promotion and Civil Society
Mobilization
I – Food access
a) Conditional cash transfer:
• Bolsa Família – Family Grant
b) Nutritional programmes:
• National School Food Programme
• Food for ethnic groups
• Rainwater cisterns
• Popular restaurants
• Food banks
• Urban agriculture/Community gardens
• Food and Nutrition Surveillance
• Distribution of Vitamin A (Vitamin A+)
• Distribution of Iron (Iron Health)
• Food and nutrition for indigenous people
• Food and nutrition education for consumption
• Healthy Diet/Promotion of Healthy Habits
c) Taxes incentive/Inducement:
• Workers food program
d) Tribute reduction:
• Basic food basket tax reduction
24
II – Strengthening family agriculture
• National Programme for strengthening of family agriculture
• Harvest Insurance
• Familiar Farm Agriculture Insurance
• Food Procurement Programme (PAA)
III – Income generation
• Social and professional qualification
• Solidarity economy and productive inclusion
• Food and nutrition security and local development consortium (Consad‟s)
• Poor communities‟ productive organization (Produzir)
• Development of cooperatives of recyclable material collectors
• Guided productive microcredit
IV – Partnership promotion and civil society mobilization
• Family Houses - Social Assistance Reference Centres (CRAS)
• Social mobilization and education for citizenship
• Social and public agents‟ mobilization
• Volunteer work and donations
• Partnership with private sector and NGO‟S
• Social development councils
Source: MDS. (2004) “Livreto Fome Zero”24
24
See Anex I for details about each action
25
4.2.3.2 Involved Agencies
• Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger – MDS: Responsible for
Coordination and implementation of programme.
• Ministry of Agrarian Development – MDA: Responsible for of „Strengthening family
agriculture‟ and Urban agriculture/Community gardens.
• Ministry of Health – MS: Responsible for of health care conditionality.
• Ministry of Education – MEC: Responsible for school attendance conditionality and School
Food Programme.
• Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply – MAPA: Responsible for Harvest
Insurance and Familiar Farm Agriculture Insurance.
• Ministry of Labor and Employment – MTE: Involved in implementation of Workers food
program.
• Ministry of National Integration – MI: Responsible for managing institutional linkages between
national, states‟ and municipalities authorities.
• Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management – MP: Involved in general management aspects
of Pluriannual Plan – „Plano Plurianual‟ – PPA formulation and periodic revisions; and Budget
issues.
• Ministry of Finance – MF: Responsible for allocation of resources and Basic food basket tax
reduction.
• Office of the Civil Staff of the Presidency of the Republic – PR: Responsible for institutional
coordination within the federal government.
26
• General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic/Communication Secretariat – PR:
Responsible for general communication and marketing strategies.
• Offices of the Special Advisors of the Presidency of the Republic – PR: Responsible for
presidential interlocution.
• National Food and Nutrition Security Council – Consea: Responsible for interlocution with
state‟s and municipalities‟ food security councils interlocution between the federal government
and NGOs, civil society organizations, unions, specialists involved in the national food security
policy.
Source: MDS. (2004) “Livreto Fome Zero”
Illustration:
5. Evidence Analysis
In order to verify if Zero Hunger is actually succeeding in delivering solutions for both the most
emergent effects of misery, as hunger and indigence, as well as its main substantial causes,
27
related to localized low local economic development, this paper brings to light current GDP
performance data of some of Brazilian poorest municipalities supported by Zero Hunger. In the
case study of 23 municipalities of „Maranhao‟, a Northeast state, this article tests the correlation
between Zero Hunger‟s Family Grant cash transfers and GDP per capita municipal performance
between 2003 and 2005. First, though, we expose some of the numerous Family Grant recent
evaluation findings, conducted by prestigious research institutes at the national and international
levels.
5.1 Previous Research
One important finding that has been registered refers to Zero Hunger‟s Bolsa Familia transfers
relation with reduction of inequality as found by (Barros, 2007; Lindert et al., 2007) As asserted
by (Lindert et al., 2007:3):
„BFP has achieved some important efficiency gains and is showing exceptional targeting results,
with 73% of transfers going to the poorest quintile and 94% going to the poorest two quintiles.
Furthermore, studies have shown that the BFP played a significant role in the recent reduction in
income inequality, which in turn has been instrumental in reducing extreme poverty. Indeed,
results of the annual household survey (PNAD 2004) show that the BFP accounted for a
significant share (20-25%) of Brazil‟s recent (and impressive) reduction of inequality and 16%
of the recent fall in extreme poverty‟
Such a finding is also strongly supported by (Barros, 2007; and Medeiros, Britto and Soares,
2008). This is important because Barro (1999), Perotti (1996) and Benabou (1996) have found that
economic development tends to fall with greater inequality – Barro (1999) went further to show
that this is specially a reality when per capita GDP is below around $2000 (1985 U.S. dollars),
28
which is the case of many Brazilian localities, as shown on section 5.2. Moreover, Medeiros,
Britto and Soares (2008), in accordance with Soares, Ribas and Osorio (2007: 8), argue that
evidence findings do not support the hypothesis of labour market participation discouragement
for Family Grant beneficiaries, besides other positive effects measured in education and health
care poor attainments.
5.2 Maranhao Case Study
5.2.1 Methodology
5.2.1.1 Selecting criteria: Where to drive attention to?
The criterion used for selection of municipalities to be investigated was Brazilian municipalities
with highest levels of people living in extreme poverty, because, in theory, these were to be in
Zero Hunger‟s priority frontline (Silva, Belik, Takagi, 2001). Quite a few works could be found
in the social policy literature regarding methodologies for identification of which conditions
characterize extremely poor people in Brazil and where are they located. We used the Hunger
Map‟s ranking of national misery organized by the Social Policy Centre of Fundacao Getulio
Vargas – FGV (2004)25, based on data from IBGE26‟s Brazilian 2000 Demographic Census. They
have organized a ranking containing the 50 most and 50 least Brazilian municipalities affected
by poverty, as shown on table 1 below. On the left side are shown the municipalities with highest
levels of poverty, on the right side the 50 localities with lowest levels of poverty, sorted by their
position in the ranking. The initials on the right side of each municipality poverty rate are the
25
Published in: Fundacao Getulio Vargas – FGV, Centro de Politicas Sociais. Mapa do Fim da fome II:Miseria
Nacional. Rio de janeiro, 2004. Available in: http://www.fgv.br/cps/Nacional/Apresentacao.htm , accessed on
01/08/2008.
26
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – Instituto Brasileiro de Gegrafia e Estatistica.
29
abbreviations of the federative state the municipality belongs to.
Table 1
50 poorest localities in Brazil - (%) of people leaving
below the indigence line - R$ 79.00*per capita/ month
STATE
% People in misery
95.32
1 Centro do Guilherme
MA
94.56
2 Jordão
AC
93.75
3 Belágua
MA
91.95
4 Pauini
AM
91.37
5 Santo Amaro do Maranhão
MA
91.16
6 Guaribas
PI
91.07
7 Novo Santo Antônio
PI
90.59
8 Matões do Norte
MA
90.41
9 Manari
PE
90.18
10 Milton Brandão
PI
89.92
11 Cantanhede
MA
89.80
12 São Miguel do Fidalgo
PI
89.50
13 Morro Cabeça no Tempo
PI
89.03
14 Maranhãozinho
MA
88.67
15 Ipixuna
AM
88.66
16 São Benedito do Rio Preto
MA
88.61
17 Tufilândia
MA
88.50
18 Presidente Juscelino
MA
88.48
19 Santa Rosa do Purus
AC
88.28
20 Santana do Maranhão
MA
88.15
21 Porto de Pedras
AL
88.13
22 Lagoa do Tocantins
TO
88.12
23 Traipu
AL
88.07
24 Cachoeira Grande
MA
88.05
25 Araguanã
MA
88.01
26 São João Batista
MA
87.98
27 Poço das Trincheiras
AL
87.65
28 Acauã
PI
87.52
29 Paulino Neves
MA
87.50
30 Cajari
MA
87.26
31 Carnaubeira da Penha
PE
87.20
32 Pedro do Rosário
MA
87.17
33 Carrasco Bonito
TO
87.16
34 Presidente Vargas
MA
86.94
35 Lagoa Grande do Maranhão
MA
86.94
36 São José da Tapera
AL
86.84
37 Betânia do Piauí
PI
86.79
38 Guajará
AM
86.65
39 Olivença
AL
86.63
40 São Roberto
MA
86.53
41 Cajapió
MA
86.52
42 Apicum-Açu
MA
86.48
43 Formosa da Serra Negra
MA
86.45
44 Campo Largo do Piauí
PI
86.42
45 Morro do Chapéu do Piauí
PI
86.30
46 Uiramutã
RR
86.27
47 Nina Rodrigues
MA
86.26
48 Tapauá
AM
86.25
49 Fonte Boa
AM
86.25
50 Senador Rui Palmeira
AL
Source: CPS/IBRE/FGV from data of 2000 Demographic Census /IBGE
50 localities with lowest levels of poverty in Brazil - (%) of people
leaving below the indigence line - R$ 79.00*per capita/ month
Harmonia
Presidente Lucena
Águas de São Pedro
% People in misery
1.16
1.52
2.55
Nova Bassano
Monte Belo do Sul
São José do Hortêncio
Morro Reuter
Paraí
Carlos Barbosa
Alto Feliz
São Caetano do Sul
2.86
2.91
2.91
2.95
3.00
3.22
3.35
3.36
Imigrante
São Vendelino
Nova Pádua
Feliz
Vila Flores
Flores da Cunha
Vale Real
Colinas
Treviso
Dois Irmãos
Brusque
Nova Petrópolis
Lindóia
3.44
3.61
3.64
3.87
3.90
3.96
3.96
4.04
4.29
4.48
4.71
4.88
4.89
Nova Veneza
Anta Gorda
Garibaldi
Saltinho
5.19
5.24
5.30
5.30
Vila Maria
Picada Café
Gramado
Jaú
5.30
5.41
5.50
5.51
Tupandi
Veranópolis
Laurentino
Fernando de Noronha
Timbó
Holambra
5.51
5.51
5.52
5.56
5.57
5.60
Luiz Alves
Vista Alegre do Alto
5.65
5.73
Jaraguá do Sul
Bento Gonçalves
Presidente Getúlio
Cerquilho
5.81
5.84
5.85
5.87
Pomerode
Ivoti
Pareci Novo
Guaporé
Teutônia
Arroio do Meio
5.97
5.98
6.07
6.15
6.16
6.19
STATE
RS
RS
SP
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
SP
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
SC
RS
SC
RS
SP
SC
RS
RS
SP
RS
RS
RS
SP
RS
RS
SC
PE
SC
SP
SC
SP
SC
RS
SC
SP
SC
RS
RS
RS
RS
RS
* The amount of R$ 79.00), which was defined based on Sao Paulo prices, presents the indigence line estimated by
Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2003).
30
The reason why FGV‟s work was selected is that it fits well with Zero Hunger‟s indigence
parameters, in use. As defined by the formulators of Bolsa Familia – Family Grant, Zero
Hunger‟s main policy, benefits would be driven to families that earned R$ 120.00 per capita/
month or less, being higher benefits to those earning R$ 60.00 per capita/ month or less; the
latter being understood by MDS as the indigence line, and the former the poverty line, (Law
10,836/2004). FGV‟s work uses Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2003)‟s indigence line of R$ 79.00 per
capita/month, for its considerations regarding levels of poverty held by different municipalities
and regions of Brazil, value well situated between the R$ 60.00 and R$ 120.00 MDS‟s latest
poverty marks. Thus, FGV‟s conclusions of places most and least affected by indigence tend to
be consistent with government measurements and potential Zero Hunger attention.
Accordingly to FGV‟s „Hunger Map‟, Northeast is the Brazilian region, and Maranhao is the
state, with highest levels of poverty, to which Zero Hunger should drive prior attention. Data
from IBGE‟s PNAD 2004 – National Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra
de Domicilios)27 also helped such a conlusion28. For this reason, the present research‟s case study
focused analysis on Northeast and Maranhao. The municipalities selected were all those of
Maranhao included in FGV (2004)‟s 50 poorest municipalities ranking, as listed on table 2:
Table 2
Position
in the
ranking
Maranhão
(%) Rate of
people living
below the
indigence line
1st
3rd
Centro do Guilherme
Belágua
95.32
93.75
5th
Santo Amaro do Maranhão
91.37
27
Available in:
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad2004/suplalimentar2004/comentario.p
df . Accessed on 30/07/2008
28
Details are shown in the Section 6.2 „Principal findings‟ – 6.2.1 “What is about the Northeast?”.
31
8th
Matões do Norte
90.59
11
th
Cantanhede
89.92
14
th
Maranhãozinho
89.03
th
São Benedito do Rio Preto
Tufilândia
Presidente Juscelino
Santana do Maranhão
Cachoeira Grande
Araguanã
São João Batista
Paulino Neves
Cajari
Pedro do Rosário
Presidente Vargas
Lagoa Grande do Maranhão
São Roberto
Cajapió
Apicum-Açu
Formosa da Serra Negra
Nina Rodrigues
88.66
88.61
88.5
88.28
88.07
88.05
88.01
87.52
87.5
87.2
87.16
86.94
86.63
86.53
86.52
86.48
86.27
16
17th
18th
20th
24th
25th
26th
29th
30th
32nd
34th
35th
40th
41st
42nd
43rd
47th
5.2.1.2 Counterfactuals
Our intention was, at first, to compare, in a time series, GDP performance of eligible
municipalities included in the program with others, as counterfactuals, that were to be included,
but had not yet. However, it was not possible, since the implementation strategy of the program
was not to elect a priority list of poor municipalities, which would have all of their indigent
families assisted, and then gradually expand support to more and more localities, year by year, as
we first figured it was. In fact, the program was implemented, incrementally, adapting previous
programmes‟ structures, which were spread out within almost all Brazilian municipalities,
reaching a small number of poor families in each locality, though. Facing these circumstances, an
alternative counterfactual methodology had to be adopted in the present research.
32
GDP per capita data, from IBGE‟s 1999- 2005 series29, was collected for all municipalities listed
above and results were compared between two groups; group A, on table 4, containing Maranhao
sample‟s municipalities with most expressive incidence of Family Grant‟s transfers – highest
ratios of localities‟ poor families included in the programme; and, group B, on table 5, containing
Maranhao sample‟s municipalities with lowest incidence of Family Grant‟s transfers – lowest
ratios of localities‟ poor families included in the programme –, as counterfactual elements. To
divide Maranhao‟s sample between samples A and B, average rates of protected families of all
municipalities were calculated for each year, from the original data provided by
SENARC/MDS30, which contained number of poor families existent in each municipality of the
sample31; number of families supported by Bolsa Familia in each of them, from 2003 to 2007;
and the respective amount of money transferred by the central government to the families
assisted. From this data, we obtained the ratios of families covered in each municipality in each
year for series 2003-2007, and annual average rates of protected families of the sample.
The outliers, with approximately 20% less of secured families than the average amount, in at
least one year of the sample, were included in group B, taken as counterfactuals to those that had
families supported rate close or above the sample‟s average annual rate. These last ones were
included in group A. Tables 4 and 5 show Maranhao municipalities included in groups A and B,
with respective ratio of poor families assisted by Family Grant, by year of the sample. Data
29
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. Accessed on
14/06/2008.
Available
in:
http://www.ibge.gov.br/lojavirtual/default.php?codigoproduto=8948
;
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/pibmunicipios/2003/default.shtm
30
“Relatório Consolidado da Folha de Pagamento”, extracted from the database of the online monitoring system of
the „Bolsa Familia‟ transferred resources – SIBEC, available in: https://www.beneficiossociais.caixa.gov.br/ , but
with restricted access to local, regional and national managers of the program, as well as members of fiscalization
and inspection agencies at local and national instances agencies accounting and control agencies. The complete
original data for Maranhao‟s municipalities studied is shown on Annex III.
31
Estimated by PNAD 2004
33
provided by SENARC/MDS also included years 2006 and 2007, but because municipal GDP
data provided by IBGE was available only until 2005, Family Grant‟s data will be considered
only until 2005 as well, since the utility of the independent variable is given by the availability of
dependent variable marks.
Also in group B, were included the municipalities of Rio Grande do Sul‟s sample, on tables 3
and 6, which were considered Brazilian localities with lowest numbers of poor families (FGV,
2004), where the impact of Bolsa Familia tends to be insignificant – in a locality as Harmonia,
for example, where only 1.16% of the population live below the indigence line, even if Family
Grant transfers reach all the poor individuals, its impact on GDP tends to be irrelevant, since the
total amount of transfers‟ eligible beneficiaries (poor) is so small. It is almost like Rio Grande do
Sul selected municipalities experience no incidence of Bolsa Familia transfers at all, thus, useful
as counterfactuals to municipalities included in group A.
Table 3
Position in the ranking
1st
2nd
4th
Rio Grande do Sul
Harmonia
Presidente Lucena
(%) Rate of people living
below the indigence line
1.16
1.52
Nova Bassano
2.86
5th
Monte Belo do Sul
2.91
6th
São José do Hortêncio
2.91
Morro Reuter
Paraí
Carlos Barbosa
Alto Feliz
Imigrante
São Vendelino
Nova Pádua
Feliz
Vila Flores
Flores da Cunha
Vale Real
Colinas
Dois Irmãos
2.95
3
3.22
3.35
3.44
3.61
3.64
3.87
3.9
3.96
3.96
4.04
4.48
7th
8th
9th
10th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th
19th
21st
34
23rd
26th
27th
29th
30th
Source: see page 22
Nova Petrópolis
Anta Gorda
Garibaldi
Vila Maria
Picada Café
4.88
5.24
5.3
5.3
5.41
5.2.2 Principal Findings
5.2.2.1 What is about the Northeast?
It is noteworthy, on table 1, the fact that Rio Grande do Sul (RS), a state located in the South
region of Brazil, concentrates 32 out of the 50 Brazilian municipalities least affected by
indigence (64% of the sample), including the least of all of them, Harmonia, followed by Santa
Catarina (SC), also from the South, and Sao Paulo (SP), from the Southeast. These two states
hold, respectively, 9 and 8 localities of the list, presenting, respectively, 18% and 16% of the
sample. Together, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina reunite 41out of the 50 Brazilian
municipalities with lowest levels of people living with life standards below Ferreira, Lanjouw
and Neri‟s (2003) indigence line (82% of the sample), meaning that the South region of Brazil
concentrates the country‟s municipalities with lowest concentrations of poverty, although, in
terms of number of indigent people per state, the results are not the same, as showed on table 1.
The numbers on table 1 lead us to conclude that, while in Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina, poverty
is more equally distributed between diverse municipalities, in Rio Grande do Sul, it is more
concentrated in some places, since the latter contains several municipalities with the lowest
levels of poverty in Brazil, but on aggregate it does not present the same result. This implies that
there is no linearity between both measures, meaning that it is not that there is no indigent people
living in Rio Grande do Sul; it is just that in this state some localities actually managed to
maintain poverty away.
35
Oppositely, it is also notable that, 23 out of the 50 localities with highest levels of people living
with life standards below Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri‟s indigence line – 46% of the sample – are
from the state of Maranhao (MA), located in the Northeast region of Brazil – including the
poorest of all of them, Centro do Guilherme. This presents almost three times more than the
percentage held by Piaui (PI) – another state of the Northeast –, position number 2 in the poverty
ranking, which contains 8 of the 50 poorest Brazilian municipalities (16%). Alagoas (AL), also a
Northeast state, comes in third, with 6 municipalities included in the list, or 12% of the sample.
Together, these three states sum 74% of the sample (37 localities), meaning that northeast is the
region of Brazil where the poorest municipalities of the country are located.
Moreover, in terms of number of indigent people per state, northeast also concentrates the
highest results, as pointed out by FGV (2004), showed on table 1. Again, Maranhao leads the
ranking – 68.42% of the population under indigence line –, followed by Alagoas (63.75%), Piaui
(63.30%), Ceara (58.65%) and Bahia (57.89%), both from the Northeast as well, which confirms
the northeast as the poorest Brazilian region, and Maranhao, Piaui and Alagoas as the poorest
states of Brazil – both in terms of number of municipalities with highest levels of poverty and of
percentage of the population living in indigent conditions.
36
Table 1
5 more
5 less
Brazilian States' Misery Ranking: 5 Brazilian States more and less affected by misery
% of people leaving with per capita income lower than R$ 79.00* per state of the Federation
UFs
1 - São Paulo
2 - Santa Catarina
3 - Distrito Federal
4 - Rio Grande do Sul
5 - Rio de Janeiro
% of People in Misery
14.25
15.36
17.06
18.36
19.45
1 - Maranhão
2 - Alagoas
3 - Piauí
4 - Ceará
5 - Bahia
68.42
63.75
63.30
58.65
57.89
Source: CPS/IBRE/FGV from data of 2000 Demographic Census /IBGE
Table copied from FGV (2004), available in Portuguese in: http://www.fgv.br/cps/Nacional/Apresentacao.htm
In addition, Northeast has been pointed out as the region with higher levels of nutritionally
unprotected individuals, challenged by starvation, for IBGE‟s 2004 National Household Sample
Survey („Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios‟ – PNAD)32. According to the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics – IBGE, the high levels of nutritionally challenged
individuals found in the Northeast and North of Brazil, as shown in chart 1, reflect the well
known regional disparities, in terms of life standards and of access to general consumption of
goods and services, which historically operate in the country. The chart shows that, in the South,
more than 75% of the households had granted access to food consumption in quantity and quality
compatible with the minimal standards defined by OMS as mandatory for a healthy living
maintenance, in the occasion of the survey, while, in the North, only 53.6% of the population did
experience the same situation, and, in the Northeast, not even half of the resident people, 46.4%,
did. Moreover, the survey also shows that, out of the 14 million people found in gravely
nutritionally unprotected households, 52%, i.e. around 7 million people, were resident in the
32
Available in:
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad2004/suplalimentar2004/comentario.p
df . Accessed on 30/07/2008
37
Northeast, region that counted for just 28% of the Brazilian total population, in the occasion of
the survey (PNAD, 2004).
Chart 1
Source: PNAD 2004.
5.2.2.1.1 What is about Maranhao?
In addition to FGV findings, IBGE‟s PNAD 2004 shows that, besides being the state with the
highest number of municipalities included in the top 50 poorest localities in Brazil, including the
first of the ranking; and despite being the state with highest rate of people, over total population,
living under conditions of indigence; Maranhao also presents the highest levels of nutritionally
unprotected people – 69,1% of the population, including slightly, considerably and gravely
unprotected people. 18% of such are considered gravely unprotected, facing serious risk of
starvation, and 27. 9% are considered considerably unprotected, facing risk of starvation. Both
marks were the highest rates between all Brazilian states in each respective category, registered
in the occasion of the survey, as shown in chart 2. That is precisely why Maranhao has been
selected for this research‟s case study.
38
Chart 2
5.2.2.2 Zero Hunger’s cash transfers correlation with GDP per capita performance in
Maranhao
5.2.2.2.1 Rate of poor families protected by Family Grant
a) Group A:
Table 4 – Sample‟s municipalities with ratio of assisted families close to the sample‟s annual
39
average rate, in approximately 20%, or higher, in all years of the series 2003 – 2005.
Municipalities
CENTRO DO GUILHERME
BELAGUA
SANTO AMARO DO MARANHAO
MATOES DO NORTE
CANTANHEDE
MARANHAOZINHO
PRESIDENTE JUSCELINO
SAO JOAO BATISTA
PAULINO NEVES
CAJARI
PRESIDENTE VARGAS
LAGOA GRANDE DO MARANHAO
SAO ROBERTO
CAJAPIO
FORMOSA DA SERRA NEGRA
AVERAGE Rate
Estimated number of
poor families
(PNAD 2004)
973
771
1306
1257
2980
1279
1774
3058
1551
2150
1770
1405
726
1424
1831
Protection rate (%)
2 003
55
59
31
47
53
49
30
54
60
52
43
77
38
56
53
51
2 004
55
69
55
55
59
78
64
63
79
54
71
82
52
72
54
64
2 005
89
82
68
81
67
92
74
88
88
73
78
84
87
74
81
81
b) Group B – counterfactuals:
I – Maranhao’s municipalities with ratio of assisted families, approximately, 20% lower than
localities‟ annual average rates, in at least one year of the series 2003 – 2005.
Table 5
Municipalities
CACHOEIRA GRANDE
ARAGUANA
SAO BENEDITO DO RIO PRETO
APICUM-ACU
NINA RODRIGUES
TUFILANDIA
PEDRO DO ROSARIO
SANTANA DO MARANHAO
AVERAGE Rate
Estimated number of
poor families
(PNAD 2004)
1004
1449
2540
1532
1210
985
2598
1967
40
Protection rate (%)
2 003
2 004
0
52
5
6
7
17
15
27
21
21
22
28
25
35
35
47
16
29
2 005
89
18
54
90
33
51
54
50
55
II – Rio Grande do Sul’s municipalities with lowest rates of poor families incidence (FGV,
2004), where the impact of Bolsa Familia tends to be insignificant:
Table 6
Municipalities
HARMONIA
PRESIDENTE LUCENA
NOVA BASSANO
MONTE BELO DO SUL
SAO JOSE DO HORTENCIO
MORRO REUTER
PARAI
CARLOS BARBOSA
ALTO FELIZ
IMIGRANTE
SAO VENDELINO
NOVA PADUA
FELIZ
VILA FLORES
FLORES DA CUNHA
VALE REAL
COLINAS
DOIS IRMAOS
NOVA PETROPOLIS
ANTA GORDA
GARIBALDI
VILA MARIA
PICADA CAFE
AVERAGE Rate
Estimated number
of poor families
(PNAD 2004)
58
46
103
28
57
78
77
227
62
69
45
24
196
40
241
67
63
265
308
133
334
95
52
Protection rate (%)
2003
2004
2005
19
9
56
21
25
46
81
29
15
26
2
29
22
35
44
40
29
100
13
62
57
28
38
45
13
80
50
37
73
106
77
35
57
29
54
42
53
78
70
65
109
72
69
75
49
73
83
13
110
71
37
73
110
82
11
57
33
83
62
110
113
73
78
114
92
107
119
84
113
36
61
79
5.2.2.2.2 GDP per capita performance33
a) Group A
Table 7
33
Data is available until 2007, however, because GDP data is available only until 2005, here we display numbers
until 2005 only. Complete data can be found on Annex III.
41
Municipalities
Centro do Guilherme
BELAGUA
Santo Amaro do Maranhão
Matões do Norte
Cantanhede
Maranhãozinho
Presidente Juscelino
São João Batista
Paulino Neves
Cajari
Presidente Vargas
Lagoa Grande do Maranhão
São Roberto
Cajapió
Formosa da Serra Negra
GDP per capita
1999
2000
792
1 145
470
783
586
697
681
671
780
1 211
706
909
790
741
915
959
1 551
648
1 124
771
933
568
856
745
1 109
765
1 101
1 001
714
1 070
Chart 3
b) Group B – counterfactuals:
I – Maranhao
Table 8
42
2001
1 158
1 292
713
1 176
933
955
628
957
828
1 194
737
1 520
967
830
1 082
2002
1 233
996
799
1 133
1 008
1 160
824
868
843
1 233
889
1 870
1 129
869
1 464
2003
2 487
2 115
1 306
1 677
1 501
1 777
1 380
1 776
1 601
1 952
1 717
1 795
1 637
1 342
1 799
2004
2 765
3 052
1 470
2 064
1 841
2 192
1 519
2 071
1 803
2 505
1 975
2 555
1 758
1 599
1 924
2005
3 092
3 080
1 645
2 321
2 258
2 718
1 664
1 958
2 026
2 755
2 231
2 263
1 986
1 590
2 297
Municipalities
Cachoeira Grande
Araguanã
São Benedito do Rio Preto
Apicum-Açu
Nina Rodrigues
Tufilândia
Pedro do Rosário
Santana do Maranhão
1999
592
1 403
645
404
683
675
636
836
GDP per capita (R$)
2002
2003
835
1 386
2 005
2 542
759
1 465
714
1 247
1 078
1 574
987
1 918
898
1 124
934
1 497
2000
749
1 455
713
587
925
742
769
617
2001
799
1 908
878
705
831
888
852
664
Chart 4
II – Rio Grande do Sul
Table 9
43
2004
1 439
2 688
1 842
1 401
1 812
2 234
1 286
1 640
2005
1 587
2 607
1 869
1 466
2 148
2 580
1 526
1 656
Alto Feliz
Anta Gorda
Carlos Barbosa
Colinas
Dois Irmãos
Feliz
Flores da Cunha
Garibaldi
Harmonia
Imigrante
Monte Belo do Sul
Morro Reuter
Nova Bassano
Nova Pádua
Nova Petrópolis
Paraí
Picada Café
Presidente Lucena
São José do Hortêncio
São Vendelino
Vale Real
Vila Flores
Vila Maria
1999
6 603
5 982
13 283
5 689
13 372
7 789
12 361
17 974
9 750
9 010
9 158
8 715
15 890
16 839
10 072
7 624
13 747
7 577
9 122
5 758
4 914
8 048
10 335
2000
7 245
7 298
14 982
6 494
15 413
6 913
13 680
18 371
10 488
10 428
10 985
9 425
21 945
17 405
10 367
8 942
17 602
8 291
11 114
6 350
5 448
9 653
10 200
Chart 5
GDP per capita
2001
2002
8 028
8 273
9 790
11 641
16 270
18 420
7 117
8 043
17 020
17 466
6 963
7 258
14 691
16 572
20 051
22 180
10 066
10 751
11 832
14 717
11 320
15 286
9 886
10 916
23 406
29 267
22 001
27 115
10 792
10 527
10 196
13 859
15 595
16 733
9 444
10 370
11 358
12 958
7 213
8 110
5 995
6 723
10 805
11 800
11 455
13 641
2003
6 570
11 429
18 737
7 753
16 215
8 891
13 537
18 855
9 083
13 818
9 058
10 422
23 786
15 867
10 262
12 830
12 110
11 292
11 150
7 065
6 819
10 493
12 381
GDP per Capita (Reais)
Municipalities
2004
7 029
11 050
21 758
7 672
17 639
9 515
14 497
21 665
10 147
16 497
9 587
11 248
28 561
17 366
11 570
14 381
15 788
10 819
11 491
8 525
7 517
11 867
12 234
2005
7 405
8 748
24 217
8 359
16 664
10 573
15 334
23 502
12 118
17 124
10 020
11 229
30 609
17 969
12 526
15 989
18 052
11 6603500
11 671
9 8693000
7 667
13 6592500
12 442
2000
1500
1000
500
GDP per capita
0
44
5.2.2.2.3 Correlating both variables
a) Group A
Table 10
2003
Municipalities
CENTRO DO GUILHERME
BELAGUA
SANTO AMARO DO MARANHAO
MATOES DO NORTE
CANTANHEDE
MARANHAOZINHO
PRESIDENTE JUSCELINO
SAO JOAO BATISTA
PAULINO NEVES
CAJARI
PRESIDENTE VARGAS
LAGOA GRANDE DO MARANHAO
SAO ROBERTO
CAJAPIO
FORMOSA DA SERRA NEGRA
GDP per
capita
2 487
2 115
1 306
1 677
1 501
1 777
1 380
1 776
1 601
1 952
1 717
1 795
1 637
1 342
1 799
2004
Family Grant's
poor families
protection rate
(%)
55
59
31
47
53
49
30
54
60
52
43
77
38
56
53
Chart 6
45
GDP per
capita
2 765
3 052
1 470
2 064
1 841
2 192
1 519
2 071
1 803
2 505
1 975
2 555
1 758
1 599
1 924
2005
Family Grant's
poor families
protection rate
(%)
55
69
55
55
59
78
64
63
79
54
71
82
52
72
54
GDP per
capita
3 092
3 080
1 645
2 321
2 258
2 718
1 664
1 958
2 026
2 755
2 231
2 263
1 986
1 590
2 297
2003-2005
Family Grant's Correlation
poor families
between
protection rate variables
(%)
2003-2005
89
82
68
81
67
92
74
88
88
73
78
84
87
74
81
0.891053
0.850366
0.982924
0.91393
0.99558
0.966103
0.946456
0.371199
0.970603
0.794476
0.950815
0.72857
0.998207
0.989753
0.975506
b) Group B
I – Maranhao
Table 11
2003
Municipalities
Cachoeira Grande
Araguanã
São Benedito do Rio Preto
Apicum-Açu
Nina Rodrigues
Tufilândia
Pedro do Rosário
Santana do Maranhão
GDP per
capita
1 386
2 542
1 465
1 247
1 574
1 918
1 124
1 497
2004
Family Grant's
poor families
protection rate
(%)
GDP per
capita
0
5
7
15
21
22
25
35
1 439
2 688
1 842
1 401
1 812
2 234
1 286
1 640
Chart 7
46
2003-2005
2005
Family Grant's
poor families
protection rate
(%)
52
6
17
27
21
28
35
47
GDP per
capita
1 587
2 607
1 869
1 466
2 148
2 580
1 526
1 656
Family Grant's Correlation
poor families
between
protection rate variables
(%)
2003-2005
89
18
54
90
33
51
54
50
0.935882
7.19E-05
0.707185
0.82494
0.918308
0.951931
0.99771
0.995828
Example of Dimension of Bolsa Familia’s transfers in GDP results.
6. Conclusion Marks
The findings of the Case Study Maranhao bring about really strong correlation between GDP per
capita attainments and Zero Hunger‟s Bolsa Familia cash transfers, which means the pace of
GDP growth has been largely influenced by number of poor families assisted by Family Grant, in
extremely poor municipalities of Maranhao. This finding agrees with demand-led growth
theories discussed on section 2, and with the hypothesis supported in this research, dismissing
the common sense hypothesis of programme‟s creation of dependence and assistentialism. Local
economies are growing and this is a first step for long run sustainable local development and
poverty diminution.
Together with all other findings listed on section 5.1, this article brings evidence that allows for a
conclusion that post-Keynesian demand-side interventions are succeeding in delivering
economic development to places with high levels of poverty and inequality.
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54
Annex I
• Bolsa Família (Conditional Cash Transfer)
Bolsa Família is considered Fome Zero‟s main action. A cash transfer programme bound for
families in poverty situation, with a general income up to R$100 (U$ 43) monthly. It associates
the transfer of financial benefits to the access to social basic rights: health, food, education and
social assistance.
• National School Food Programme (PNAE)
It is a programme which offers, at least, one meal a day, seeking to fulfill nutrition needs of
students during their stay at school, contributing to growth, development, learning and scholar
goals, as well as to the constitution of healthy nourishment habits.
• Food for ethnic groups
It extends access to basic food for indigenous people, communities of slave descendants
(quilombolas), groups of peasants in camps, rubbish pickers and others who face a food and
nutrition insecurity situation as a result of food allocation.
• Rainwater cisterns
It is an action developed for the population of peasants from the Brazilian semi-arid region,
seeking the improvement of life conditions and access to water as well as the encouragement of
keeping up the intercourse in the semi-arid.
• Popular restaurants
They are common-wealth spaces administered by the public power that is characterized by
commerce of ready and healthy meals, and by an accessible cost to people who have to eat out
daily.
• Food banks
They act on receiving food donations considered improper to commerce, but appropriate for
consumption. Food is given to non-profitable institutions from civil society which produce and
distribute free meals to people in situation of food vulnerability.
• Urban agriculture/Community gardens
They are developed at places appreciated by the community, where there is a concentration of
families and people with low income and lack of food, willing to encourage and uphold the
introduction of small unities for healthy food production.
• Food and Nutrition Surveillance (Sisvan)
It is an action of basic attention to health which has the objective of organizing the nutritional
conditions, describing tendencies of health and nutrition and situations of nutrition insecurity,
either on individual or collective levels, collecting information for the estimate of public policies
to the Health Single System, seeking the improvement of people‟s health conditions.
Distribution of Vitamin A (Vitamin A +)
55
It is set to prevent and/or to control the shortcoming of vitamin A, in order to aid the reduction of
infections seriousness and, consequently, the reduction of motherly-childish mortality. It is
directed to children aged between 6 to 59 months and women on immediate after-birth,
belonging to endemic areas, like the Northeast Region, Vale do Jequitinhonha, and Mucuri, in
Minas Gerais.
• Iron Distribution (Iron Health)
It is a strategy directed to prevent and/or to control anemic diseases by iron deficiency on the
most vulnerable groups (children from 6 to 18 months, pregnant women and women on the afterbirth), whose researches point to a prevalence of 50% on children and 40%on pregnant women,
which brings serious consequences to the full physical, mental and social development from
childhood to adult/grown-up phase.
• Food and nutrition for indigenous people
It is an action which produces a record of indigenous populations, guaranteeing their inclusion
on governmental instruments in accordance with their cultural values, willing also to introduce
intersectional actions for food and nutritional security, environmental management and
sustainable development of these indigenous populations.
• Food and nutrition education for consumption
It develops actions to promote healthy diet, which seek to stimulate the society, through
educational activities and communication actions, to fight hunger and to adopt health
nourishment habits.
Healthy Diet/Promotion of Healthy Habits
It instigates healthy nourishment during life time, preventing and controlling nutritional
disturbances, as well as illnesses related to nourishment and nutrition on the Health Single
System, besides subsidization actions of food and nutritional education along with the
population, through publishing instructive material.
• Worker’s food programme (PAT)
It has the objective of improving worker‟s nutritional conditions, with positive repercussions into
life quality, reducing accidents at work and increasing production.
• Basic food basket tax reduction
Exemption and minimization on the ICMS duty concerning first need food which compose the
basic food basket, considered indispensable to dignified survival.
Strengthening of family agriculture
• National Programme For Strenethening of Family Agriculture (Pronaf)
It values and promotes family agriculture as an essential economic activity for the
socioeconomic sustainable development in rural areas.
• Harvest Insurance
56
It is one of the actions of Pronaf which seeks stability and security for the practice of agricultural
activity on the semi-arid region of Brazil, making possible that farmers receive a benefit in the
period of dry weather and a family living during six months.
• Familiar Farm Agriculture Insurance
It guarantees 100% covering of a loan, plus 65% of the liquid revenue expected by the project
provided by family farmes. This innovation will guarantee significant percentage of the expected
incoming by family farmers at the moment of engaging his agricultural costing operations at
Pronaf.
• Food Procurement Programme (PAA)
It encourages the production of food by family agriculture, allowing purchase, constitution of
stocks, and distribution of food for people in situation of food insecurity. The products are also
allocated to school lunch, hospitals, and beneficent enterprises.
Income generation
• Social and professional qualification
It promotes worker‟s social, occupational and professional qualification linked to the other
actions of integration promotion to job market and to school attendance.
• Solidarity economy and productive inclusion
It makes available opportunities of social (reflections on citizenship, strengthening and the
working world), professional (technical-scientific basis of occupation) and occupational (specific
activities about occupation, technical-management proportions, co-operator and associative) for
paid workers and/or victims of actions from the Employment Public System and from actions of
social solidary economy, linked with credit actions, job generation and income as well as social
economy.
• Food and Nutrition Security and Local Development Consortion (Consad)
It is an initiative of territorial development promotion, at peripheral areas in the country, whith
emphasis on food and nutrition security as well as work and income generation, as the main
strategy for socioeconomic emancipation of families wich are under the poverty line in these
regions.
• Poor communities’ productive organization (Produzir)
It promotes social inclusion for unemployed people and poor communities, rural or urban and
employees of enterprises on a process of productive weakening, organizing them on productive
auto-manageable projects, achievable and upheld economically.
• Development of cooperatives of recycable material collectors
Supports the cooperatives development, especially collectors (rubbish pickers), for triage and
benefit from garbage, alongside the new model of integrated treatment and eradication of
landfills.
• Guided productive microcredit
57
Gives credit for the attending of financial necessities of workers of small size productive
activities of using a method based on direct relationship with local workers where the activity is
executed.
Partnership Promotion and Civil Society Mobilization
• Families’ Houses - Social Assistance Reference Centers (CRAS)
It is a continued service of basic social protection, developed at the Reference Center of Social
Assistance. These centers spaces are located strategically in areas with social and personal risk
and vulnerability. They give social assistance, articulate services available in each location,
increasing, coordinating and organizing a web of basic social protection alongside professional
qualification policies, productive inclusion and other public and social policies in search of
better conditions for families.
• Social mobilization and education for citizenship
It provides the qualification, logistics, elaboration and reprodution of informative material,
among other actions. It proposes to: prepare citizens in Brazilian cities, starting by areas with
Fome Zero priority and, in the future, reaching families in situation of insecurity, reaching and
organizing mobilization initiatives of the Society for the Food and Nutrition and giving priority
in organizing forums on Food and Nutrition Security.
• Social and public agents mobilization
It promotes workshops, courses and events, capacitating public and social agents for monitoring
and evaluating social development and figth against hunger policies, besides improving these
policies based on results obtained, and increasing transparency of government actions.
Volunteer work and donations
It is a great national movement of solidarity towards those that suffer each day with the lack of
food and cannot wait for the results of profound changes in the economic and social structures. It
is important to remember that there are many ways to help someone in need. However, the act of
donating goes way beyond the offer of food or money. It is also important for the society to get
involved in the actions of the programmes that seek to overcome the structural causes of hunger
and poverty. There are many ways to donate, being that in money, food, or partnerships. More
information is available at the website www.fomezero.gov.br
• Partnership with the private sector and neo’s
These are projects executed by Fome Zero‟s partners that serve as support for the Federal
Governments social policies. Institutions that want to be partners of Fome Zero must act with
priority in their structural actions, in which are included support in generating work and income,
complementary actions of Bolsa Família programme, social protection actions, nourishment and
nutritional security.
• Social development councils
It is the society‟s participation and verification over Fome Zero actions. Social control bodies of
programmes that integrate Fome Zero respect the reality of local instances (existent Social
Counsels, Committees).
58
CENTRO DO GUILHERME
BELAGUA
SANTO AMARO DO MARANHAO
MATOES DO NORTE
CANTANHEDE
MARANHAOZINHO
SAO BENEDITO DO RIO PRETO
TUFILANDIA
PRESIDENTE JUSCELINO
SANTANA DO MARANHAO
CACHOEIRA GRANDE
ARAGUANA
SAO JOAO BATISTA
PAULINO NEVES
CAJARI
PEDRO DO ROSARIO
PRESIDENTE VARGAS
LAGOA GRANDE DO MARANHAO
SAO ROBERTO
CAJAPIO
APICUM-ACU
FORMOSA DA SERRA NEGRA
NINA RODRIGUES
Municipalities
Estimated
Family Grant transfers
number of
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
poor
Covered Total Amount Covered Total Amount Covered Total Amount Covered Total Amount Covered Total Amount
families Families trasfered (R$) Families trasfered (R$) Families trasfered (R$) Families trasfered (R$) Families trasfered (R$)
973
536
102,495.00
538
488,330.00
866
572,262.00
1,129
941,254.00
1,147
1,115,665.00
771
452
117,285.00
535
493,815.00
636
565,119.00
795
674,751.00
772
803,873.00
1306
402
101,270.00
717
454,774.00
890
779,410.00
1,323 1,074,197.00
1,293
1,276,819.00
1257
590
109,430.00
689
552,688.00
1,020
708,953.00
1,124
955,928.00
1,249
1,149,274.00
2980 1,590
261,375.00 1,744 1,411,210.00
2,010 1,564,572.00 2,272 1,869,247.00
2,309
2,119,609.00
1279
631
86,660.00
994
597,421.00
1,174
868,532.00
1,278
997,681.00
1,240
1,114,935.00
2540
171
36,450.00
425
177,288.00
1,369
540,413.00
2,579 2,054,700.00
2,524
2,477,122.00
985
217
53,000.00
273
216,889.00
503
354,721.00
862
600,952.00
997
915,804.00
1774
527
108,020.00 1,137
606,288.00
1,306 1,022,781.00 1,608 1,241,471.00
1,801
1,606,724.00
1967
697
164,800.00
934
716,073.00
992
869,402.00
1,005
885,619.00
1,337
1,136,709.00
1004
2
350.00
522
67,544.00
895
575,934.00
1,151
967,689.00
1,228
1,051,710.00
1449
78
11,445.00
91
73,690.00
264
132,475.00
1,372
757,045.00
1,431
1,292,295.00
3058 1,663
219,205.00 1,924 1,593,920.00
2,702 1,970,358.00 3,300 2,748,228.00
3,291
3,103,440.00
1551
935
214,120.00 1,227
977,759.00
1,358 1,176,028.00 1,962 1,582,549.00
2,039
1,952,426.00
2150 1,116
131,470.00 1,159
944,565.00
1,573 1,070,125.00 2,119 1,635,356.00
2,138
2,034,212.00
2598
645
102,620.00
904
639,018.00
1,398
970,489.00
2,567 1,963,725.00
2,607
2,477,260.00
1770
764
88,275.00 1,250
773,545.00
1,385 1,199,202.00 1,631 1,431,800.00
1,714
1,655,053.00
1405 1,077
234,335.00 1,146
985,137.00
1,185 1,020,447.00 1,546 1,315,600.00
1,600
1,574,454.00
726
276
56,005.00
380
280,937.00
631
430,771.00
772
647,252.00
761
720,107.00
1424
802
112,780.00 1,026
721,445.00
1,057
840,481.00
1,304 1,041,025.00
1,425
1,299,888.00
1532
227
32,475.00
415
230,140.00
1,384
932,755.00
1,779 1,524,649.00
1,822
1,773,117.00
1831
972
114,360.00
985
903,529.00
1,489 1,024,726.00 1,883 1,562,684.00
1,872
1,791,983.00
1210
249
31,990.00
252
235,469.00
396
254,421.00
1,059
801,377.00
1,217
1,237,136.00
ANNEX III
59