Documents considered by the Committee on 21 January 2015

Transcription

House of Commons
European Scrutiny Committee
Thirtieth Report of
Session 2014–15
Documents considered by the Committee on 21 January 2015,
including the following recommendations for debate:
Subsidiarity and Proportionality and the Commission’s
Relations with national parliaments
Report, together with formal minutes
Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 21 January 2015
HC 219-xxix
Published on 30 January 2015
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£13.50
Notes
Numbering of documents
Three separate numbering systems are used in this Report for European Union documents:
Numbers in brackets are the Committee’s own reference numbers.
Numbers in the form “5467/05” are Council of Ministers reference numbers. This system is also used by
UK Government Departments, by the House of Commons Vote Office and for proceedings in the House.
Numbers preceded by the letters COM or SEC or JOIN are Commission reference numbers.
Where only a Committee number is given, this usually indicates that no official text is available and the
Government has submitted an “unnumbered Explanatory Memorandum” discussing what is likely to be included
in the document or covering an unofficial text.
Abbreviations used in the headnotes and footnotes
EC
(in “Legal base”) Treaty establishing the European Community
EM
Explanatory Memorandum (submitted by the Government to the Committee)*
EP
European Parliament
EU
(in “Legal base”) Treaty on European Union
GAERC
General Affairs and External Relations Council
JHA
Justice and Home Affairs
OJ
Official Journal of the European Communities
QMV
Qualified majority voting
RIA
Regulatory Impact Assessment
SEM
Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum
TEU
Treaty on European Union
TFEU
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Euros
Where figures in euros have been converted to pounds sterling, this is normally at the market rate for the last
working day of the previous month.
Further information
Documents recommended by the Committee for debate, together with the times of forthcoming debates (where
known), are listed in the European Union Documents list, which is published in the House of Commons Vote
Bundle each Monday, and is also available on the parliamentary website. Documents awaiting consideration by
the Committee are listed in “Remaining Business”: www.parliament.uk/escom. The website also contains the
Committee’s Reports.
*Explanatory Memoranda (EMs) can be downloaded from the Cabinet Office website:
http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/.
Letters sent by Ministers to the Committee relating to European documents are available for the public to
inspect; anyone wishing to do so should contact the staff of the Committee (“Contacts” below).
Staff
The staff of the Committee are Sarah Davies (Clerk), David Griffiths (Clerk Adviser), Terry Byrne (Clerk Adviser),
Leigh Gibson (Clerk Adviser), Peter Harborne (Clerk Adviser), Arnold Ridout (Legal Adviser) (Counsel for European
Legislation), Joanne Dee (Assistant Legal Adviser) (Assistant Counsel for European Legislation), Joanna Welham
(Second Clerk), Julie Evans (Senior Committee Assistant), Jane Bliss and Beatrice Woods (Committee Assistants),
Paula Saunderson and Ravi Abhayaratne (Office Support Assistants).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons,
Telford House, 14 Tothill Street, London SW1H 9NB. The telephone number for general enquiries is (020) 7219
3292/5465. The Committee’s email address is escom@parliament.uk
European Scrutiny Committee, Thirtieth Report, Session 2014–15
1
Contents
Report
Page
Meeting Summary
3
Documents for debate
1
FCO (36283) (36269) Subsidiarity and Proportionality and the
Commission’s Relations with national parliaments
5 Documents not cleared
2
BIS (35957) Shareholder rights
7 3
DCMS (35305) (35304) The Telecommunications Single Market
9 4
FCO (36568) Restrictive measures against Iran: nuclear issues
17 5
HMT (36540) Investment plan for Europe
20 6
MOJ (32123) EU accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights
23 Documents cleared
7
DFID (36578) EU Development Assistance: blending grants and loans
28 8
DFT (36216) Working time: inland waterway transport
34 9
DFT (36243) Road safety
36 10
DFT (36580) Rail research and innovation
39 11
FCO (36520) (36521) EU restrictive measures against Tunisia
42 12
FCO (36596) (36597) EU restrictive measures against Côte d’Ivoire
46 13
FCO (36603) (36604) Restrictive measures against Syria
51 14
FCO (36606) International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities
53 Annex
61 Documents not raising questions of sufficient legal or political importance to
warrant a substantive report to the House
15
List of documents
62 Formal minutes
64 Standing Order and membership
65 2
3
Meeting Summary
The Committee considered the following documents:
Subsidiarity and Proportionality and the Commission’s relations with national
parliaments
Last October, we recommended the Commission’s Reports on Subsidiarity and
Proportionality and on its relations with national parliaments for debate on the floor of the
House, in view of the fundamental importance of the role of national parliaments in
scrutinising EU legislation and in providing democratic legitimacy for the EU. The
Government now informs us that this debate will take place in European Committee B. We
find this extremely disappointing, and consider that it breaches the Government’s
commitment, as set out in the Minister for Europe’s Written Ministerial Statement of 20
January 2011, to “strengthening its engagement with Parliament on all European Union
Business as part of our wider work to reduce the democratic deficit in the EU”.
Restrictive measures against Syria
We also consider proposals which would re-impose travel restrictions and asset freezes
against three individuals associated with the Assad Regime in Syria, and one entity. The
original restrictions were annulled by the General Court, and this new listing is based on a
new statement of reasons. We support the principle that restrictive measures should be
both targeted and legally robust, but it is not evident that this is the case with these
proposals, particularly given the background, which includes the Council being unable to
provide sufficient supporting evidence for the original restrictions using open sources
when invited to do so in court hearings last June. The Minister for Europe only indicates
that these proposals are based on new grounds supported by information taken from open
sources, and that they comply with fundamental rights. We clear these proposals so that
they can be adopted but ask the Minister to confirm that he considers the reasons now
given for the restrictive measures, and the underlying evidence, to be sufficiently robust to
deter or withstand further legal challenge. Some similar issues are raised by the restrictive
measures against Iran which we are also reporting on this week.
Investment plan for Europe
In November 2014 the Commission published a Communication which sets out a plan for
promoting investment within the EU economy. The plan has three strands: a European
Fund for Strategic Investments, to mobilise €315 billion (£245 billion) for investment; a
pipeline of investment projects and an investment advisory “Hub”; and a wider package of
reforms to improve the investment climate. The Government is fairly positive about the
plan, and the Minister now provides an update on the December European Council
meeting, where the ideas contained in the plan were discussed. However he does not
provide us with some specific information that we requested when we last considered this
Communication in December, including on what financial consequences there might be
for the UK arising from EU budgetary involvement in the plan. We may well wish to
recommend that this document be debated, but we postpone this decision until we have
4
seen a copy of the related draft Regulation on the proposed European Funds for Strategic
Investments.
Scrutiny of the UK’s 2014 block opt-out decision
Following an evidence session, on 12 January 2015, with the Home and Justice Secretaries
on the Government’s overall handling of the 2014 block opt-out process, and the failure to
meet its Parliamentary scrutiny obligations in relation to the 35 EU police and criminal
justice measures which the UK has re-joined, we now clear from scrutiny the
Government’s Explanatory Memoranda on the measures subject to the block opt-out.
These were submitted to Parliament in July 2013 and were reproduced in Command Paper
8671, published in the same month. The Explanatory Memoranda provided the basis for
the Committee’s detailed analysis of each measure subject to the block opt-out in its
November 2013 Report, The UK’s block opt-out of pre-Lisbon criminal law and policing
measures. The Committee published a follow-up Report in November 2014 and has
reported on the three Council Decisions and a Commission Decision, adopted on, or
shortly before, 1 December 2014 which were required to authorise the UK to opt back into
35 measures. The Government overrode the Committee’s scrutiny reserve on two of these
measures. The evidence session represented the culmination of a lengthy and highly
unsatisfactory process of scrutiny, and the Home and Justice Secretaries were left in no
doubt as to the dissatisfaction of this Committee, the Home Affairs and Justice Select
Committees, and the EU Committee in the House of Lords, with the Government’s
handling of the process.
5
1 Subsidiarity and Proportionality and the Commission’s
Relations with National Parliaments
Committee’s assessment
Committee’s decision
Document details
Legal base
Department
Document numbers
(a) Legally and politically important
(b) Politically important
(a) and (b) Not cleared from scrutiny; recommended
for debate on the floor of the House (decision
reported 15 October 2014)
(a) 2013 Annual Report from the Commission on
Subsidiarity and Proportionality (b) 2013 Annual
Report from the Commission on relations between
the Commission and National Parliaments
—
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(a) (36283), 12424/14, COM(14) 506
(b) (36269), 12425/14, COM(14) 507
Summary and Committee’s conclusions
1.1 The Commission Report on subsidiarity and proportionality provides a factual
overview of how the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality have been applied in
2013 and how the practice in applying this principle has evolved. It summarises the
activities of various EU bodies and national parliaments and examines the application of
the principle of subsidiarity in respect of three controversial proposals.
1.2 The Commission Report on relations with national parliaments also provides an factual
overview of the Commission’s relations with national parliaments in 2013. By focussing on
the informal “political dialogue” between the Commission and national parliaments it
complements the report on subsidiarity and proportionality which focusses on the formal
subsidiarity reasoned opinion mechanism.
1.3 In its Report of 15 October 2014 the Committee recommended these matters for debate
on the floor of the House in view of the fundamental importance of the role of national
parliaments, not only in scrutinising EU legislation for compliance with the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality but also more generally, in providing democratic
legitimacy for the EU. In particular such a debate would provide an opportunity for the
House to debate not only the specifics of the reports but also the wider context (including
specific and concrete proposals originating from various sources aimed at addressing the
“democratic deficit”) and pertinent recommendations in the Committee’s Report on
Reforming the Scrutiny System in the House of Commons.1
1.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) now informs the Committee that he
considers debate in Committee would provide the most appropriate means of scrutinising
1
See Twenty-fourth Report HC 109-I (2013–4), (20 November 2013).
6
these documents and that he has asked his officials to work with business Managers to
arrange a debate in European Committee at the earliest opportunity.
1.5 We reject the Government’s decision, and consider this a breach of the
Government’s commitment to “strengthening its engagement with Parliament on all
European Union business as part of our wider work to reduce the democratic deficit
over EU matters”.2
1.6 We do not accept the reasons given by the Minister, that “a debate in Committee
would provide the most appropriate means of scrutinising these documents, as was the
case with the debate on the 2012 reports”. We recall that the decision to hold the
debates on the 2012 reports was taken in the face of the recommendation from this this
Committee for debate on the floor of the House. Developments since then make it even
more important to debate the current reports on the floor of the House.
Full details of the documents: (a) Commission Report: Annual Report 2013 on
Subsidiarity and Proportionality: (36283), 12424/14, COM(14) 506; (b) Commission
Report: Annual Report 2013 on relations between the European Commission and National
Parliaments: (36269), 12425/14, COM(14) 507.
The Minister’s letter of 14 January 2015
1.7 The Minister indicates that he has carefully considered the arguments for the debate on
these reports to take place on the floor of the House and continues:
“I still believe that a debate in Committee would provide the most appropriate means
of scrutinising these documents, as was the case with the debate on the 2012 reports,
allowing for a longer and more structured debate. I have asked my officials to work
with Business Managers to arrange a date for a debate in Committee at the earliest
possible opportunity.”
Previous Committee Reports
Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii, chapter 2 and chapter 3 (15 October 2014); and see, in
respect of the 2012 Report (35242), —: Twenty-ninth Report HC 83-xxvi (2013–14),
chapter 2, (8 January 2014); Twenty-eighth Report HC 83-xxv (2013–14), chapter 2, (18
December 2013); Twenty-Second Report HC 83-xx (2013–14), chapter 5, (6 November
2013).
2
Written Ministerial Statement of the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) of 20 January 2011, Hansard
col. 52 WS.
7
2 Shareholder rights
Legally important
Not cleared from scrutiny; further information
requested; drawn to the attention of the Business,
Innovation and Skills Committee
Document details
Department
Directive amending Directive 2007/36 as regards the
encouragement of long-term shareholder
engagement and Directive 2013/34 as regards certain
elements of the corporate governance statement
Articles 50 and 114 TFEU; ordinary legislative
procedure; QMV
Business, Innovation and Skills
Document numbers
(35957), 8847/14 + ADDs 1–3, COM(14) 213
Legal base
2.1 This proposal amends the existing Shareholders’ Rights Directive (2007/36) by
introducing new provisions intended to facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights, give
them a greater say over directors’ remuneration and increase transparency in respect of:
the strategies of institutional investors and asset managers; the activities of proxy advisors;
directors’ remuneration; and related party transactions. Further details are set out in our
Report of 4 June 2014.
2.2 When we previously considered this proposal last summer we noted that the
Government was broadly supportive of the proposal; shared its concerns that the proposal
regulated matters currently covered by the voluntary stewardship code and the code of
conduct for proxy advisors; and looked forward to the Government’s further consideration
in relation to charging by intermediaries, related party transactions and the Commission’s
power to adopt subordinate legislation.
2.3 The Minister for Employment Relations and Consumer Affairs and Minister for
Women and Equalities (Jo Swinson) now updates the Committee.
2.4 We are grateful for the update from the Minister which indicates that all the
concerns raised by the Government on the original draft have been addressed save for
that concerning the Commission’s power to adopt subordinate legislation. This
proposal now reflects the UK’s approach to Corporate Governance.
2.5 As the proposal is still under discussion at working group level, we should be
grateful for a further update on this last mentioned issue and any further amendments
to the text in good time before any prospective general approach.
2.6 In the meantime we hold this matter under scrutiny and draw it to the attention of
the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee.
8
Full details of the documents: Proposal for a Directive amending Directive
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement
(35957), 8847/14 + ADDs 1–3, COM(14) 213.
The Minister’s letter of 18 December 2014
2.7 The Minister updates the Committee on the matters of concern:
“The measures around transparency of institutional investors and asset managers,
which in the UK are mainly subject to the Stewardship Code, are far less prescriptive
now that a ‘comply or explain’ approach applies throughout. Requirements on proxy
advisers have also been mitigated to take into account the Code of Principles,
developed by the sector, following an analysis and report by the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA).
“Measures on the transparency of fees charged by intermediaries have been
amended, so that the UK regime, where these are not allowed, will not be impacted.
“With regards to related party transactions, the presidency has proposed a text
focused more on principles than details, to ensure agreement from member states.
The latest draft has introduced greater flexibility, therefore limited impact on the UK
Listing Rules.
“We have clarified that the final compromise text will need to address any relevant
requirements. Any remaining aspects will be left to member states’ authority and
addressed, as appropriate, during implementation.”
2.8 She assesses the progress of the negotiation:
“Overall, I am satisfied that the proposal strikes the right balance between legislative
requirements and best practice, a confirmation that the UK approach to Corporate
Governance is a model of excellence.”
Previous Reports
First Report HC 219-i (2014–15), chapter 4, (4 June 2014).
9
3 The Telecommunications Single Market
Legally and politically important
requested; drawn to the attention of the Culture,
Media and Sport Committee
Document details
(a) Commission Communication on the
Telecommunications Single Market (b) Draft
Council Regulation laying down measures
concerning the European single market for
electronic communications and to achieve a
Connected Continent
(a) —; (b) Article 114 TFEU; ordinary legislative
procedure; QMV
Culture, Media and Sport
Legal base
Department
Document numbers
(a) (35305), 13562/13, COM(13) 634
(b) (35304), 13555/13 + ADDs 1–2, COM(13) 627
3.1 The Commission Communication sets out measures that the Commission believes are
needed to change the existing regulatory framework (last revised in 2009); the subsequent
legislative package, A Connected Continent: Building a Telecoms Single Market, was
published on 11 September 2013.
3.2 Over the past 18 months, the focus has now boiled down to two issues: mobile roaming
charges and net neutrality.3
3.3 In the latest of a series of open and very helpful updates, the Minister for Culture and
the Digital Economy (Mr Edward Vaizey) says that, contrary to earlier expectation, the
Latvian Presidency has decided to prioritise this dossier and published a “road map”
proposing that work over the upcoming three-month period should have a dual focus on
roaming and net neutrality; but also making it clear that should the Council fail to agree the
content of the proposed Regulation to the extent that trilogues (the Presidency, the
Commission and the European Parliament) can begin within three months, they will cease
all work on the proposal.
3.4 The proposal on mobile roaming is the more developed of the two:
— action is proposed at both the retail and wholesale levels; the Commission would be
charged with reviewing wholesale prices and coming forward with any necessary
3
Net neutrality is the principle that Internet service providers and governments should treat all data on the Internet
equally, not discriminating or charging differentially by user, content, site, platform, application, type of attached
equipment, and modes of communication. Proponents often see net neutrality as an important component of an
open internet, where policies such as equal treatment of data and open web standards allow those on the internet
to easily communicate and conduct business without interference from a third party.
10
proposals no later than 24 months after the adoption of the proposed Regulation,
which would in turn then be adopted no later than 18 months after they are proposed,
i.e., no later than 42 months after the proposed Regulation is adopted;
— during the interim period, there would be action on retail pricing taken whereby
consumers were able to “Roam Like At Home” within an allowance — at a level as yet
underdetermined; once this allowance was exceeded, consumers would be charged for
roaming services.
3.5 With regard to the latter, where the Presidency puts forward two pricing models, the
Minister says that the second option is somewhat less complex and that consumers would
be charged at what are “currently the wholesale caps within Roaming 3 i.e. €0.05/minute
for voice calls, €0.02 per SMS and €0.05/MB for data”. Whilst this would, the Minister
says, ensure that consumers have clarity with regard to expected charges once they have
exceeded their allowance, he is still considering whether this proposal overall fully meets
the Government’s negotiating objectives, as well as what changes would be necessary to it
in order to do so; is giving consideration as to whether this model “fully addresses the
identified risk of arbitrage, along with whether it negates the identified risks of not
addressing wholesale prices for, at least, in 3 years”; and says that “progress on developing
such a view is somewhat stymied without sight of the level of allowance and the specific
text itself”.
3.6 On net neutrality, the Minister says that the Presidency road-map is “even more
succinct i.e. there is a commitment to continue with a principles-based approach without
detailing what these principles would be” — an approach that he could possibly support
but upon which he is unable to comment further as to whether it would fully meet his
overall negotiating objectives without sight of the detail.
3.7 In summary, the Presidency road-map offers “potential to drive an overall agreement
within the next 3 months but it lacks the specific detail in order for me to have a fullyformed opinion on the chances of success, as well whether it fully addresses UK’s specific
concerns and identified risks in each of these areas”. The Minister envisages the necessary
detail becoming known once the Presidency publishes the specific legal text — “expected
within the next two or three weeks” — and proposes to provide an analysis once they have
done so.
3.8 We are, as ever, grateful to the Minister for his timely update, and look forward to
receiving his next one, as outlined immediately above.
3.9 Bearing in mind how this dossier has moved forward, then marked time, then
moved forward in a more limited way over the past 18 months, when he does so, we
should be grateful if he would summarise what his negotiating brief now is (c.f.
paragraph below).
3.10 We would also like him to explain: what the concept of arbitrage is in this context,
and what “the identified risk” thereof is; what “the identified risks of not addressing
wholesale prices for, at least, in 3 years” are; and what the inter-relationship is between
retail and wholesale prices.
11
3.11 We would also like to know what is proposed regarding the issue of spectrum
management.
3.12 We also draw his attention to recent media comment on this dossier.4 In essence,
it notes that:
— in April 2014, the European Parliament voted to eliminate roaming fees by midDecember 2015, but Member States have not yet set a date for doing this;
— fees from telecom providers have fallen significantly in recent years (since 2007,
final prices for calling and texting in other EU countries decreased 80% for
consumers, while data roaming prices fell 91%) but 28% of Europeans still turn off
their mobile phones when they enter another EU country to avoid roaming fees;
— some high-tech associations and experts argue that, without roaming fees, prices for
domestic phone calls and mobile internet use would have to increase and that those
who do not travel much and currently profit most from low fees for domestic calls
ones who will suffer;
— the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC), on the other hand, considers
operators’ concerns to be unfounded, and sees potential economic advantages in an
elimination of roaming fees;
— while the European Parliament favours the principle of net neutrality, the German
Chancellor has advocated a more nuanced position.
3.13 We also remind the Minister that any proposal to enter into trilogue discussions
will need clearing with the Committee beforehand; likewise “any overall agreement”.
In this regard, we would also like his thoughts on how best to handle scrutiny of the
other uncertainties he mentions concerning the possibility that, though having been
presently dropped, “other [unspecified] elements of the proposal… may become the
subject of future discussion and consideration under the trilogue process”.
3.14 In the meantime, we shall retain the documents under scrutiny.
3.15 We are also again drawing this chapter of our Report to the attention of the
Culture, Media and Sport Committee.
Full details of the documents: (a) Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on the Telecommunications Single Market: (35305), 13562/13,
COM(13) 634; (b) Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying
down measures concerning the European single market for electronic communications
and to achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC
and 2002/22/EC and Regulations (EC) No. 1211/2009 and (EU) No. 531/2012: (35304),
13555/13 + ADDs 1–2, COM(13) 627.
4
See European
Voice: 20 January 2015.
12
Background
3.16 The Commission argues that, as the world moves rapidly towards an Internet-based
economy, Europe lacks a genuine single market for electronic communications, and is
consequently losing out on a major source of potential growth. It also states that decisive
further action is needed to prevent any further decline in Europe’s global position in this
sector; considers what remaining barriers exist; and sets out measures that the Commission
believes are needed to change the existing regulatory framework (last revised in 2009) in
order to remedy the situation.
3.17 Recalling the conclusions of the 2013 Spring European Council, calling for measures
to create a Single Telecoms Market as early as possible, the Commission published on 11
September 2013 a legislative package for a Connected Continent: Building a Telecoms
Single Market, which it says is aimed at building a connected, competitive continent and
enabling sustainable digital jobs and industries; with proposed legislative changes to several
regulations that (the Commission says) would “make a reality of two key EU Treaty
Principles: the freedom to provide and to consume (digital) services wherever one is in the
EU”.
3.18 The full background to the Commission Communication and this draft Regulation is
set out in the first of our previous Reports; likewise the very detailed and helpful analysis of
both documents by the Minister (in his Explanatory Memorandum of 10 October 2013.5
3.19 Our subsequent Reports embody a number of series of full and very helpful updates
ever since this package was first deposited.6 They include, in September, the Opinion of
the Culture, Media and Sport Committee (CMS), along with Ofcom’s submission to that
Committee. The CMS Committee deemed it clear from Ofcom’s submission that at least
some of the proposals lack sufficient grounding in terms of evidence, analysis and
consultation, and that much work remained to be done to achieve outcomes that were
proportionate and struck an appropriate balance between national and wider European
interests.7
3.20 Since then, this dossier has moved forward intermittently, prior to and since the 27
November 2014 Telecoms Council. At that point, on the key outstanding issues, the
Minister that:
— there was “a general political commitment towards abolishing mobile roaming charges
within the EU, although questions remained over the mechanism to achieve this and
the timing for its introduction”; the Minister remained “committed to achieving a
‘Roam Like At Home’ outcome, effective as soon as was possible”, and continued “to
strive to achieve that outcome”;
5
See Eighteenth Report HC 83-xvii (2013–14), chapter 2 (16 October 2013).
6
See Twenty-seventh Report HC 219-xxvi (2014–15), chapter 3 (17 December 2014), Twentieth Report HC 219-xix
(2014–15), chapter 1 (19 November 2014), Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014–15), chapter 11 (15 October 2014),
Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014–15), chapter 9 (3 September 2014), Eighth Report HC 219-viii (2014–15), chapter 5 (16
July 2014), First Report HC 219-i (2014–15), chapter 5 (4 June 2014), Thirty-fourth Report HC 83-xxxi (2013–14),
chapter 2 (5 February 2014), Twenty-eighth Report HC 83-xxv (2013–14), chapter 4 (18 December 2013).
7
See “Background” in Twenty-seventh Report HC 219-xxvi (2014–15), chapter 3 (17 December 2014) for summary and
Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014–15), chapter 9 (3 September 2014) for full information.
13
— there was “also a general consensus on the introduction of a regulation on net
neutrality although, like roaming, there was currently a lack of consensus on
approach”; and
— there remained “some areas of disagreement between Council and the Commission on
how to approach future spectrum management”: no detailed discussion had yet taken
place on how to resolve this lack of agreement; the Minister’s position remained one
where he did not wish “to see an oversight role for the Commission in such matters”
but instead “to evolve the role of the existing Radio Spectrum Policy Group”,8 which he
said remained the approach favoured by the Council.
3.21 He summarised the overall position thus:
“some progress has been made and the general direction of travel is one that favours
a simplified approach as long-championed by the UK and has the potential to realise
a demand-side and consumer-centric solution that would help drive the digital single
market and be of real benefit to UK businesses and consumers.”
3.22 In order to ensure that the UK was able to take part in the discussion of, and agree to
any General Approach, the Minister requested a scrutiny reserve waiver, thus “allowing
UK to support a General Approach that fits our existing negotiating position”; and based
on the understanding that “should the proposed General Approach fall outside the UK’s
current negotiating mandate, I will not be willing to agree same”.
3.23 We agreed on the basis of the understanding set out above and also provided that:
— he continued to supply regular updates on the trilogue negotiations, in the same detail
as hitherto; and
— he deposited the final text of the draft Regulation that emerges from the trilogue
process, without caveat and with a fresh Explanatory Memorandum, in good time for a
debate prior to formal adoption by the Council, should the Committee then so decide.9
3.24 Most recently, the Minister explained that:
— shortly before Council, the agenda item was changed to a “State of Play”; whilst “not a
recognised category of document”, it could be “conceptually considered to lie between
a Progress Report and a General Approach”, and reflected the Presidency’s ambition of
achieving the same outcome, i.e. that informal trialogue with the European Parliament
began at the earliest opportunity;
— whilst the UK and a number of Member States supported this approach in order to
achieve a simplified agreement including action on mobile roaming charges, a
sufficiently large number cited concerns about the lack of a common position it was
clear that there was not sufficient agreement on roaming and net neutrality to move
forward as proposed;
8
The high-level advisory group assisting the Commission in developing radio spectrum policy for the EU, which has
hitherto played a pivotal role in driving harmonisation of the technical aspects of spectrum management in EU.
9
See Twentieth Report HC 219-xix (2014–15), chapter 1 (19 November 2014).
14
— there was also serious concern among some Ministers that the Presidency was
mismanaging the process by attempting to circumvent the will of Council in order to
enter trialogue discussions with the Parliament at a stage when no common Council
position had been adopted;
— the Council decided to refer the proposal back to Working Group level for further
development, with the two remaining Working Groups under the Italians focussing on
net neutrality and mobile roaming;
— early indications from the incoming Latvian Presidency were that they did not regard it
as a priority, though the Minister anticipated pressure from the Commission towards
reaching an early agreement on the package;
— it “very much” remained the Minister’s ambition that an agreement around a simplified
Regulation on mobile roaming was reached as soon as possible, and his officials were
looking to work with both Presidencies to ascertain if a compromise around these
issues, and more widely, was achievable;
— given the current status of the proposal and lack of clarity regarding plans for progress
in the short term, he proposed to write again early in 2015, once the incoming
Presidency had made clear its plans and intentions.
3.25 We again expressed our appreciation to the Minister for these insights, and looked
forward to hearing from him, as suggested, early in the New Year.
3.26 In the meantime, we noted that the scrutiny waiver applied only to the 27 November
2014 Telecoms Council and that, should the Minister again find himself in that position, he
would need to seek a fresh prior agreement from the Committee.
3.27 We also:
— again draw this chapter of our Report to the attention of the Culture, Media and Sport
Committee; and
— continue to retain both documents under scrutiny.10
The Minister's letter of 15 January 2015
3.28 The Minister says that the Latvian Presidency have changed their position, indicated
that this dossier will now be “the joint-first priority in the telecoms policy space” and
published a “road-map” proposing that work over the upcoming three-month period
should have a dual focus on roaming and net neutrality; but also making it clear that should
the Council fail to agree the content of the proposed Regulation to the extent that trilogues
can begin within three months, they will cease all work on the proposal.
3.29 The Minister continues thus:
10
Twentieth Report HC 219-xix (2014–15), chapter 1 (19 November 2014).
15
“Whilst I cover the specific detail of content of the ‘road-map’ below, it is worth
noting at this juncture that this should not be taken as an indication that the other
elements of the proposal are to be dropped and there remains scope that they may
become the subject of future discussion and consideration under the trilogue
process. As such, I am particularly keen that the any overall agreement retains the
consumer protection element (which you may recall is largely at a stage that it could
be easily adopted), along with a commitment to review the current market of
wholesale access broadband products for enterprises. Therefore, UK will continue to
push for inclusion of same in an overall agreement and this is in-line with the
position that my Cabinet colleagues cleared at the end of last year.”
3.30 The Minister then turns to each of the “road map” elements as follows:
Mobile Roaming
“The Presidency have noted the previous proposals on dealing with this issue and
that there was no overall agreement within Council on any one position. As such,
they have put forward a proposal that takes action at both the retail and wholesale
levels.
“On the wholesale level, the Commission would be charged with instigating a review
of wholesale prices and coming forward with any necessary proposals for action no
later than 24 months after the adoption of the proposed Regulation. Any such
actions would then be adopted no later than 18 months after they are proposed (in
effect, no later than 42 months after the proposed Regulation is adopted).
“During the interim period, there would be action on retail pricing taken whereby
consumers were able to ‘roam like at home’ within an allowance — at a level as yet
underdetermined. Once this allowance was exceeded, consumers would be charged
for roaming services.
“With regard to the level of charges, the Presidency paper sets out two options. The
first is a varying level of charge that reflects and takes into account the relative
wholesale and retail prices of the ‘home’ Member States and the Member State in
which the consumer is roaming. In effect, a UK-based consumer would face a
differing level of charge for roaming in Spain when compared to Greece, for
example. Further, a German consumer may be charged differing levels when
roaming in the same Member States used in this example. The second option is
somewhat less complex and consumer would be charged at what are currently the
wholesale caps within Roaming 3 i.e., €0.05/minute for voice calls, €0.02 per SMS
and €0.05/MB for data.
“Whilst it is clear that the second option is less complex and would ensure that
consumers have clarity with regard to expected charges once they have exceeded
their allowance, I am still considering whether this proposal overall fully meets our
negotiating objectives, as well as what changes would be necessary in order to it to do
so. My initial concern is a clear indication from the Presidency that any allowance
would not replicate domestic consumption patterns but would be sufficient to
‘…provide basic mobile phone usage (essential when travelling)…’.
16
“I am also giving consideration as to whether this model fully addresses the identified
risk of arbitrage,11 along with whether it negates the identified risks of not addressing
wholesale prices for, at least, in 3 years. However, progress on developing such a view
is somewhat stymied without sight of the level of allowance and the specific text
itself.
Net neutrality
“With regard to this element, the Presidency road-map is even more succinct i.e.,
there is a commitment to continue with a principles-based approach without
detailing what these principles would be. This approach is one that UK could
possibly support but without sight of the detail, I am unable to comment further on
whether it would fully meet our overall negotiating objectives. That said, I can
confirm that my officials continue to liaise with key Member State partners in
drawing up a principles-based text and we have had an indication from the
Presidency that any such text could form the basis of a text moving forward. As such,
I am hopeful our objectives would be met overall.
“In summary, the Presidency road-map does offer potential to drive an overall
agreement within the next 3 months but it lacks the specific detail in order for me to
have a fully-formed opinion on the chances of success, as well whether it fully
addresses UK’s specific concerns and identified risks in each of these areas. The
necessary detail will no doubt become known once the Presidency publishes the
specific legal text associated with each — expected within the next two or three weeks
— and I propose that I write again with an analysis of same once they have done so.
You are, of course, more than welcome to raise any immediate questions or concerns
in the interim.”
Twenty-seventh Report HC 219-xxvi (2014–15), chapter 3 (17 December 2014), Twentieth
Report HC 219-xix (2014–15), chapter 1 (19 November 2014), Thirteenth Report HC 219xiii (2014–15), chapter 11 (15 October 2014), Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014–15), chapter 9
(3 September 2014), Eighth Report HC 219-viii (2014–15), chapter 5 (16 July 2014), First
Report HC 219-i (2014–15), chapter 5 (4 June 2014), Thirty-fourth Report HC 83-xxxi
(2013–14), chapter 2 (5 February 2014), Twenty-eighth Report HC 83-xxv (2013–14),
chapter 4 (18 December 2013) and Eighteenth Report HC 83-xvii (2013–14), chapter 2 (16
October 2013).
11
Arbitrage is normally regarded as the practice of taking a positive expected return from overvalued or undervalued
securities in an inefficient market without any incremental risk and zero additional investments. It consists of
trading in two assets — with at least one being mispriced, i.e., if its current price diverges from the price predicted
by a mathematical model that, essentially, looks at discounted future cash flows. The theory was first proposed by
the economist Stephen Ross in 1976.
17
4 Restrictive measures against Iran: nuclear issues
requested
Document details
Council Decision concerning restrictive measures
against Iran
Article 29 TEU; unanimity
(36568), —
Legal base
Department
Document number
4.1 As well as implementing the measures contained in UNSCR 1929 of 9 June 2010,
Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP imposed additional EU sanctions in the energy sector,
the financial sector, trade, the Iranian transport sector in particular the Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Line (IRISL) and its subsidiaries and air cargo; and new visa bans and asset
freezes, especially on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
4.2 Council Decision 2014/829/CFSP of 25 November 2014, amending Decision
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, extended the suspension of
restrictive measures specified in the Joint Plan of Action, agreed between the E3+3 and
Iran, from 24 November 2014 until 30 June 2015. The full background is set out in our
Report of 10 December.12
4.3 This Council Decision extends the expiry date of an existing exemption to the
freezing of funds and economic resources from 31 December 2014 until 30 June 2015 and
relists one individual, Gholam Hossein Golparvar (Golparvar) and one entity, the
National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC). Their original lisitings had been annulled by
the General Court.13
4.4 When we considered this proposal at our meeting of 7 January 2015 we held the
matter under scrutiny and asked for further information about the timing of the
relistings. That same day we received a copy of a lengthy letter from solicitors acting for
NITC to Lord Tugendhat, the Chairman of Sub-Committee C of the House of Lords
European Select Committee setting out objections to the relisting of that company. In
summary they are:

The Council had given insufficient time to consider the information provided in
advance of the proposed relisting;

The proposal to relist was based on “the same facts and the same or very similar
consequential allegations” as had been rejected in the earlier litigation by the
General Court. In particular, NITC asserted that transport of crude oil was a
12
See (36529), —: Twenty-fifth Report HC 219-xxiv (2014–15), chapter 15 (10 December 2014).
13
Cases T-58/12, judgment of the 12 December 2013 and T-565/12, judgment of 3 July 2014.
18
legitimate activity under the Joint Action Plan without explanation as to why NTIC
has been “singled out”; and the evidence that NTIC provided financial support for
the Iranian regime had already been rejected by the Court;

The Explanatory Memorandum from the Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) incorrectly asserted that no fundamental rights issues apply and
indicating that it is not possible to disclose the evidential basis for the relisting that
was provided to NITC, who in turn have provided it to the Committee; and

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has refused to engage with NITC’s efforts
to seek more detailed justification for the re-imposition of restrictive measures, or
consultation with it on the proposals.
4.5 After the meeting the Committee also received a letter from solicitors acting for
Golparvar asserting that there are no new factual allegations and no new evidence to
support his relisting, and specifically denying that he acts for, or has links with, other
entities as alleged by the Council in its statement of reasons forming part of the proposal
to relist him. These are IRISL and associated companies. The enclosures point to his
having fully retired from any positions he may have had and disposing of any relevant
shareholdings.
4.6 The Minister now explains that the Council did not prioritise these relistings as it had
to prioritise the Ukraine crisis during July and after that the summer break intervened;
and that “on balance it was judged that it was more important to ensure that these
relistings were done in accordance with EU priorities and an assessment of the wider Iran
negotiations context”. He does not say whether the consequent break in continuity of
restrictive measures has, in fact, led to the dissipation of assets because “It is not possible
for the EU implementing authorities to divulge information about what, if any, assets an
individual/entity holds within the EU”.
4.7 He further explains that any information provided by the Council in advance to an
individual or entity likely to become the subject of restrictive measures is “not for public
consumption”.
4.8 The approach of the Council to re-imposing restrictive measures against both
Golparvar and the NITC lacks urgency. The original measures against NTIC expired
in September 2014 and those against Golparvar in February 2014. The Minister does
not disclose whether the clear risk of asset flight materialised.
4.9 There is a discrepancy between NITC’s perception that information provided to it
in advance of the imposition of restrictive measures was non-confidential, and the
Minister’s assertion that “it is not for public consumption”. However it appears to us
that the Council seeks to limit information it uses as a basis of restrictive measures to
that which is “open source”; an example is the restrictive measures concerning Syria
considered at Chapter 13 of this Report. We therefore ask the Minister why he could
not provide to this Committee open source information which has also been provided
to the individual or entity concerned.
4.10 This Committee is not in a position to judge whether or not the reasons and
detailed evidence to support them are sufficient to justify the relisting of Golparvar
19
and NTIC. That, ultimately, is for adjudication by a court. We are however concerned
that the Government should ensure that restrictive measures should be legally robust.
This is particularly important in this case, not least because of the adverse Court
judgments on the first attempts — notwithstanding that in neither case did the
judgment of the General Court preclude the possibility of relisting. We ask the
Minister to confirm that he considers the reasons for the restrictive measures, and the
underlying evidence to be sufficiently robust to deter or withstand further legal
challenge.
4.11 We retain the Decision under scrutiny.
Full details of the documents: Council Decision amending Council Decision
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran: (36568), —.
4.12 In response to the Committee’s inquiry concerning the timing of the proposal and
the risk of asset flight, the Minister indicates:
“The Committee is correct that the period after the General Court judgment (2
months and 10 days) had expired before the relistings were agreed. Given events in
Ukraine, and the multiple rounds of restrictive measures that the EU Council
imposed in response to the Ukraine crisis, the relisting of Gholam Golparvar was not
considered by the EU Council in the early months of 2014. When the EU Council
did have the capacity to consider this relisting, we had already reached the EU
summer break and so the relisting was not considered further until September 2014.
“In the case of NITC, the listing was annulled on 03 July 2014, which was almost
immediately before the EU summer break. Again, the EU Council necessarily needed
to prioritise work on Ukraine restrictive measures during July (you will recall we
adopted a package of restrictive measures on 31 July 2014), prior to the EU summer
recess.
“In September, after the EU summer break, a decision was taken not to pursue the
relistings until after the end of E3+3 negotiations with Iran, in November 2014
(when the Joint Plan of Action (JPoA) was extended until 30 June 2015). This has
meant that the relistings were fully considered in mid-December 2014.
“Whilst there may have been a risk of asset flight for both Golparvar and NITC
during the period that they are not subject to restrictive measures, on balance it was
judged that it was more important to ensure that these re-listings were done in
accordance with EU priorities and an assessment of the wider Iran negotiations
context. It is not possible for EU implementing authorities to divulge information
about what, if any, assets an individual/entity holds within the EU.”
4.13 And with regard to the information provided in advance to those whose relisting is
likely:
“In addition to the question posed in the report, I wanted to take the opportunity to
explain to the Committee that when an individual/entity is relisted, they are notified
20
in advance by the EU Council and are given an opportunity to seek further detail on
why they are being relisted. The EU Council can then share information it holds on
its file which has informed its decision-making process. Whilst the EU Council is
permitted to share this information with the individual/entity concerned, this
information is not for public consumption. This is why the underlying evidence for
these relistings cannot be shared with either the ESC or the House of Lords Select
Committee.”
Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014–15), chapter 6 (7 January 2015); but see
Twenty-fifth Report HC 219-xxiv (2014–15), chapter 15 (10 December 2014); Ninth
Report HC 219-ix (2014–15), chapter 41 (3 September 2014); also see (35964) — and
(35965) —: Forty-seventh Report HC 86-xlii (2012–13), chapter 11 (30 April 2014) and
(35712) 18163/13: Thirty-first Report HC 83-xxviii (2013–14), chapter 15 (22 January
2014), and the earlier Reports referred to therein.
5 Investment plan for Europe
Politically important
Not cleared from scrutiny; further developments
awaited
Document details
Commission Communication about promoting
investment in the EU
—
HM Treasury
(36540), 16115/14, COM(14) 903
Legal base
Department
Document numbers
5.1 In November 2014 the Commission published this Communication suggesting a plan
to promote investment in the EU economy. When in December 2014 we considered this
document we had before us the Government’s relatively positive, albeit nuanced, initial
comments about the plan. However, we postponed further consideration of the document
pending an account from the Government of the outcome of the forthcoming European
Council discussion of the Commission’s ideas and the Government’s assessment of a
number points.
5.2 We are grateful for the information, such as it is, we are now given. Although we
recognise that some points cannot be fully clarified until the Commission brings
forward its implementing proposals, we are disappointed that the Government rather
carelessly fails to address, even cursorily, some of the points we raised previously.
21
5.3 As for the debate recommendation we have foreshadowed previously we are
postponing consideration of that until we have the draft Regulation on the proposed
European Fund for Strategic Investments for scrutiny. But in that connection we
should like an answer soon to our question as to the Government’s assessment of what
the Commission’s suggestion of fast-tracking that draft Regulation might mean for
national parliamentary scrutiny.
5.4 Meanwhile the document remains under scrutiny.
Full details of the documents: Commission Communication: An investment plan
for Europe: (36540), 16115/14, COM(14) 903.
Background
5.5 In November 2014 the Commission published this Communication suggesting a plan
to promote investment in the EU economy. The plan would have three strands:

a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), to mobilise €315 billion (£245
billion) for investment;

a pipeline of investment projects and investment advisory “Hub”; and

a wider package of reforms to improve the investment climate, including action to
remove barriers in the single market and improve regulation.
5.6 When in December 2014 we considered this document we had before us the
Government’s relatively positive, albeit nuanced, initial comments about the plan. We
noted that we might well want to recommend that Members be given an opportunity to
debate this proposed plan. However, we said that we would not decide on that until we had
an account from the Government of the outcome of the forthcoming European Council
discussion of the Commission’s ideas. In addition to that account, we asked to have also the
Government’s assessment as to:

the likelihood of a leverage ratio of 1:15 from use of the EFSI;

whether drawdowns from the EU Budget for the Fund would be a reasonable use
of the programmes concerned;

whether the European Investment Bank (EIB)’s involvement in the plan poses any
risk to its credit standing;

what additional risk the plan might pose for the EU’s Guarantee Fund;

what the suggested fast-tracking of the draft Regulation on the EFSI might mean
for national parliamentary scrutiny; and

what financial consequences there might be for the UK.
5.7 Meanwhile the document remained under scrutiny.
22
5.8 The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr David Gauke) first comments that:

as the Prime Minister made clear at the December 2014 European Council, at a
time of low growth in the EU, the Government supports a focus on ways to
encourage investment;

it is important that the approach is comprehensive;

while use of EIB lending backed by a guarantee will feature as part of that, more
important is structural reform to improve the environment for investment and
deliver the necessary focus on drawing in private investment;

the Government is clear that this will not be delivered if greater investment is not
supported by, among other factors, urgent structural reform; and

many details of the investment plan remain unclear and the Government expects
more clarification when the Commission publishes an implementing proposal
shortly.
5.9 The Minister then addresses a number, but not all, of the questions we asked and one
we did not ask. First, in relation to the likelihood of a leverage ratio of 1:15 from use of the
EFSI, he says that:

the Government cannot at this stage speculate on the likelihood on delivering this
suggested ratio;

it can be noted, however that the EIB’s 2012 capital increase targeted €180 billion
(£140 billion) total investment, leveraging 1:18 capital to total investment; and

the EIB expects to reach this target during the course of 2015.
5.10 Turning to the use of drawdowns from the EU Budget for the EFSI the Minister says
that the Commission has yet to set out the proposed composition and profile of the EU
Budget contributions to be made, so it is not possible to provide further detail at this stage.
As for any risk for the EIB’s credit standing the Minister says that:

the Government is clear that it is important that the EIB maintains its AAA rating
and it will expect any new lending opportunities to be constantly reviewed so as to
optimise the EIB’s volume-risk trade-off and value-added to the markets, whilst
remaining attentive to the maintenance of the AAA rating; and

the financial robustness of the EIB is a high priority for the UK, as it is at the very
core of the EIB’s business model and is the fundamental basis of its ability to lend
at favourable conditions.
5.11 The Minister says “You ask about the pipeline of investment projects to make use of
the Fund. Delivery of the proposed overall investment target of €315bn will be highly
dependent on the ready availability of robust, investment-worthy projects which can make
use of the Fund-backed EIB lending and attract other sources of investment”.
Notwithstanding that we did not ask about this we note that the Minister tells us that:
23

the Government has submitted a strong list of pipeline projects, linked to the
National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) it publishes annually, which sets out plans for
delivery of UK infrastructure, with a clear pipeline of planned investment;

the UK’s NIP enabled the Government to be on the front foot in proposing over
£60 billion of investment that could be eligible for support from the proposed EFSI;
and

the EIB and Commission Task Force Report highlights the UK’s NIP and approach
of producing a clear, rigorous pipeline across all infrastructure sectors as an
exemplar.
5.12 The Minister does not address our questions about what additional risk the
investment plan might pose for the EU’s Guarantee Fund, what financial consequences
there might be for the UK from EU budgetary involvement in the plan and, immediately
and importantly, what the suggested fast-tracking of the draft Regulation on the EFSI
might mean for national parliamentary scrutiny.
Twenty-seventh Report HC 219-xxvi (2014–15), chapter 7 (17 December 2014).
6 EU accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights
requested
Document details
Council Decision authorising the Commission to
negotiate the Accession Agreement of the EU to the
ECHR
Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol (No 8); Article 218(8)
TFEU, unanimity; consent
Ministry of Justice
(32123), 10817/10, —
Legal base
Department
Document numbers
6.1 Following the provisional agreement by the Council of Europe “47+1” group of a draft
accession agreement in early April 2013, the Commission referred the agreement to the
Court of Justice (CJEU) in July of that year for an opinion on whether it was compatible
with the EU Treaties pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU. That Article further provides:
“Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into
force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised”.
24
6.2 The Government lodged its written observations with the Court on 15 October 2013
and, together with other Member States, presented its oral submissions at the hearing of 5–
6 May 2014. Advocate General Kokott’s opinion was delivered on 13 June 2014 and this
found the agreement to be compatible with the EU Treaties subject to a number of
significant provisos.
6.3 The Court delivered its opinion on 18 December 2014, in which it found aspects of the
agreement to be incompatible with the EU Treaties. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of
State for Justice (Chris Grayling) now writes to update us on the reasoning that supported
the ruling (see paragraph 6.15 below) and its implications for the accession process.
6.4 We thank the Justice Secretary for his letter and the evidence he gave to us on
Monday 12 January.
6.5 We recognise that the Government is still considering its position in the wake of the
CJEU’s opinion and waiting for indications on 18 February of the Commission’s
position on a renegotiation of the accession agreement. We look forward to hearing
again from the Minister once there are further developments to report.
6.6 In the meantime, we retain the document under scrutiny.
Full details of the document: Council Decision authorising the Commission to
negotiate the Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR): (32123),
10817/10, —.
Background and previous scrutiny
6.7 An outline of the legal and procedural steps involved in the process of EU accession to
the ECHR, as well as an account of developments to date in that process and the
Government’s view, are set out in our previous Reports.
6.8 Since the date of our last Report (8 January 2014), the Minister has written twice to
update us on developments relating to the Article 218(11) TFEU proceedings and the
anticipated publication of EU internal rules. Those rules would be needed to regulate, in
detail, from an EU perspective how the EU and Member States would participate in the
Council of Europe and the Strasbourg Court, covering matters such as the proposed corespondent and prior involvement mechanisms14.
6.9 In his letter of 1 May 2014, the Minister told us that:

14
there would be a hearing before the CJEU on 5–6 May in the proceedings
requesting the CJEU’s opinion on the compatibility of the provisional accession
agreement with the EU treaties (pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU);
The “co-respondent mechanism” as set out in Article 3 of the proposed accession agreement gives the EU the right
to join proceedings against an EU member state before the ECtHR in a case where the compatibility of EU law is
called into question. It also allows Member States to be joined to proceedings against the EU in certain
circumstances. It is aimed at preventing the ECtHR from examining issues related to the division of competences
between the EU and the Member States. The “prior involvement” mechanism, set out in Article 3(6) of the same
agreement, affords the CJEU the opportunity to assess the compatibility of the relevant provision of EU law where
an application to the ECtHR alleges that a provision of EU law is incompatible with the ECHR.
25

at this hearing, Member States intervening in the proceedings would be making
their oral submissions;

there would be no official written record of the public proceedings and, in any
event, he would not be able to provide any detail of the UK’s submission or other
aspects of the litigation since this would breach CJEU confidentiality; and

publication of the internal rules was not expected until after the delivery of the
CJEU’s opinion and their legal basis would only then be clarified.
6.10 In our letter of response of 7 May 2014, we asked to hear from the Minister, after the
5–6 May hearing, what arguments were submitted to the CJEU by various Member States,
given that the hearing was public.
6.11 The Minister replied by a letter of 17 June 2014. He said that at the 5–6 May hearing:

submissions were heard by the full court from all three EU institutions and 21
Member States;

all oral submissions supported the compatibility of the draft accession agreement
with the EU Treaties;

the UK asked the CJEU to “robustly test the Accession Agreement and its
implications whilst steering clear of making any findings that may prejudge the
content of the EU internal rules”; and

the judges were very engaged, suggesting that they would “give careful
consideration to the post-accession constitutional relationship between the legal
order of the EU and the Council of Europe”.
6.12 In our letter of 25 June 2014, we told the Minister that we were “disappointed that the
information provided on the submissions made to the Court during a public hearing” was
so limited.
The Minister’s oral evidence taken on 12 January 2015
6.13 The Justice Secretary gave evidence to us on a number of matters on 12 January,
including the following question:
“What is the Government’s understanding of the ruling of the Court of Justice on 18
December that the draft agreement for EU accession to the ECHR is incompatible
with the EU treaties, and what are the implications of the Court’s opinion for the
accession process?”15
6.14 The Minister responded as follows, referring in the first instance to the CJEU’s
reaction to the impact of the proposed agreement on its position relative to the Strasbourg
Court (ECtHR):
15
Oral evidence taken on 12 January 2015, HC 919 (2014–15), Q 45 [Geraint Davies].
26
“If you cut through all of the judgment, you come down to a simple proposition,
which is that the ECJ is unimpressed by the idea that it will become a junior court.
The truth is that that is precisely what the accession to the ECHR does. Ironically,
from a very different route, the ECJ have reached the same conclusion that I have
about the ECHR. Now, the ECJ have reached it on the basis that they want all the
power themselves; I do not agree with that bit but, at the end of the day, the current
situation means that in many respects the European Court of Human Rights has
become our supreme constitutional court.
“Because it has an unlimited jurisprudence, and because it can interpret different
aspects of our daily life as being affected by human rights laws, it has a legal blank
cheque to decide different things in different areas in the way that it chooses. That
Court has been very clear—indeed, its President said so recently—that it sees itself as
the ultimate arbiter. It believes that Parliaments and other courts should follow its
rulings, and fundamentally what has happened is that the ECJ has said they do not
like that very much, because of a very clear situation where two member states end
up in a case in the European Court of Human Rights, on a legal matter related to
European law, and it is there that the decision is taken, rather than the ECJ.
“The whole process of the European Union acceding to the ECHR convention has
been put into some degree of chaos by this judgment. We are waiting to see how the
Commission responds. It is worth putting on record one thing, though: I am clear
that any arrangement—either a modification of the current proposals, or a revised
version of the current proposals, for the EU to accede to the ECHR—cannot, and
should not, affect our relationship with the Council of Europe and with the Court,
and particularly should not preclude this Parliament from taking decisions about its
relationship with the European Court of Human Rights. That is immensely
important, and that is something that we would regard as being absolutely sacrosanct
in giving our consent to it. The Lisbon Treaty accepts that the European institutions
should be subject to the rules of the ECHR, but if it changes our national
relationship, that is a very different question. It would be unacceptable for me to see
our relationship with that Court fundamentally changed as a result. But at the
moment, the process of the European Union acceding to the ECHR has been set
back some considerable way.”16
6.15 The Minister, enclosing the CJEU’s opinion (and accompanying Press Release),
provides us with a summary of the reasons why the court found the accession agreement to
be incompatible with the EU Treaties. He says that:
“1. the draft Agreement does not take into account the specific characteristics and the
autonomy of EU law (for example, it does not prevent Protocol 16 to the ECHR
being used to circumvent the preliminary reference procedure);
16
Q 45 [Chris Grayling].
27
2. it does not prevent the possibility of disputes between EU Member States, or
between Member States and the EU, concerning the application of the ECHR to
matters within the scope of EU law being brought before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR);
3. the co-respondent mechanism and prior involvement procedure have not been
drafted in a way which preserves the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law;
and
4. it does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the ECtHR matters relating to the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which cannot be reviewed by the
CJEU.”
6.16 The Minister then addresses consideration of the implications of the opinion, both by
the Government and by the Commission. Whilst the Government is “currently analysing”
the opinion and its implications, he says that discussions in Brussels will resume on 18
February. At that point, the Minister says the Government will obtain some indication of
the approach the Commission “will seek to take in further negotiations”. He adds:
“It is clear that further amendment of the draft Accession Agreement will now be
necessary, but we will need further time to analyse the precise terms of the changes
required and what will be negotiable.”
6.17 He commits to keeping the Committee up-to-date with further developments.
Twenty-ninth Report HC 83-xxvi (2013–14), chapter 13 (8 January 2014); Twenty-third
Report HC 83-xxi (2013–14), chapter 13 (20 November 2013); Fourteenth Report HC 83xiv (2013–14), chapter 16 (11 September 2013); Twenty-ninth Report HC 86-xxix (2012–
13), chapter 4 (23 January 2013); Sixteenth Report HC 428-xiv (2010–12), chapter 6 (26
January 2011).
28
7 EU Development Assistance: blending grants and
loans
Cleared from scrutiny; further information
requested; relevant to the debate already
recommended on European Court of Auditors’
Special Report No. 18/2014; drawn to the attention
of the International Development Committee
Document details
Legal base
Department
Commission Report: The activities of the EU
Platform for Blending in External Cooperation
since its establishment until end July 2014
—
International Development
Document numbers
(36578), 17001/14, COM(14) 733
7.1 “Blending” — an innovative form of development financing increasingly used by the
Commission — uses grant money to leverage additional loan financing in order to achieve
development outcomes. Blending is targeted to investment opportunities, usually major
infrastructure projects with potential development impact, that are viable but do not attract
sufficient funding from market sources.
7.2 In 2012, a new EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation (EUBEC) was
established as a Commission Group of Experts. The Platform is composed of a Policy
Group (the Commission, Member States, and the European External Action Service
(EEAS)); the European Parliament as an observer and a number of Technical Groups
(Commission, Member States, EEAS and non-EU Financial Institutions). This report
covers the work of EUBEC since its establishment until end of July 2014 and provides an
overview of the Platform’s work.
7.3 Its initial work was to review the existing EU blending facilities. The Commission’s
report concludes that, to date, existing EU blending facilities have shown positive signs
regarding performance in support of EU external policies, and that EUBEC has clearly
demonstrated its value in bringing together a wide range of stakeholders to exchange
expertise on aspects of blending in external cooperation. The report also highlights a
number of areas for future improvement (see the “Background” paragraphs below for
details).
7.4 The Minister (Baroness Northover) considers the EUBEC platform a welcome
development, and endorses the Commission’s bringing together of a wide range of
stakeholders to exchange expertise on all aspects of blending in order to improve its
effectiveness. She also supports the recommendations that the Platform continues its work
on mobilising private sector resources; the future governance of EU Blending Facilities;
and the involvement of non-European Financial Institutions. Noting that the UK has been
29
closely engaging in all aspects of the EUBEC platform, and has a keen interest in how the
areas for further improvement are resolved, she and her officials will continue to scrutinise
how these will be structured and governed to ensure the ongoing value-for-money of EU
resources, clear timelines, and that the UK’s bilateral contribution to the Infrastructure
Trust Fund17 is not negatively affected. The Minister would like to see more competition
for funds as a good way of ensuring only the best projects receive funding, and welcomes
the conclusion that where non-European Financial Institutions are already acting as lead in
specific blending facilities (e.g., the African Development Bank), their role should be
preserved.
7.5 However, though supporting the Commission in continuing to explore using
innovative finance, such as blending, to achieve development objectives, the Minister says
that, in the medium term, the UK will need to see a clear demonstration of “additionality”
from blending, i.e., evidence that blending is leveraging additional money towards
development objectives. The planned results framework should, she says, provide a basis
with which to assess the projects financed by the Commission’s blending facilities, and,
during implementation, it will be vital to define clearly success criteria in order to
understand whether this is the best use of the Commission’s resources. As part of this, the
Minister would like to reach “a common understanding” with the Commission about the
circumstances in which finance can correctly be considered to have been leveraged; and
also ensure that Commission continues to focus on diversifying the sources of financing
unlocked by blended grants — leveraging not only public sector finance, but also unlocking
the significant private sector finance that she regards as critical to realising the potential for
economic development.
7.6 Two months ago, we reported on the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report
No. 16/2014: The effectiveness of blending regional investment facility grants with
financial institution loans to support EU external policies. It described blending as “the
next big thing in EU development policy funding”, and observed that, with the
incoming Commission inevitably being “under huge pressure to stretch the leveraging
of EU funds with loans to its limits”, it would be “paramount that blending is only used
when the Commission can clearly demonstrate its added value”.
7.7 That ECA Special Report also looked at the Commission’s ROM (Results
Orientated Monitoring) process and methodology and its results framework —
something that the Commission has yet to set up but which its counterparts, both
international and bilateral (e.g. DfID), have long-established — to provide an
accountability tool to communicate results to stakeholders and a management tool to
provide performance data to inform management decisions, thus ensuring that
resources are allocated efficiently. In commenting on this ECA Special Report, the
Minister said that she was aware of the need for the Commission to do more “to
establish additionality”. And she also noted that she would monitor the Commission’s
progress in adapting its ROM process and methodology and its yet-to-be-established
“results framework” to the specific characteristics of blending.
17
ITF: EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund AIF: Asian Investment Facility CIF: Caribbean Investment Facility IFCA:
Investment Facility for Central Asia LAIF: Latin America Investment Facility NIF: Neighbourhood Investment Facility
IFP: Investment Facility for the Pacific WBIF: Western Balkans Investment Framework.
30
7.8 The Committee recalled the Ministers predecessor’s views18 and suggested that she
herself might need to do more than simply monitor the Commission’s progress, if the
clearly defined success criteria that she rightly regarded as vital to understanding the
effectiveness with which the Commission uses the EU taxpayers’ resources in its
development activities around the globe, were ever to be established.19
7.9 Once again, the Minister’s reply strikes the right tone. However, as we observed at
our most recent meeting regarding a further, and relevant, European Court of Auditors
Special Report,20 in our view the Council needs to grasp this matter, and drive the
Commission forward in a sustained fashion, so that a proper, effective evaluation
mechanism is introduced across all its development activities. That is why we have
recommended that Special Report be debated in European Committee. We consider
that this Commission report should be listed as one of the relevant documents to that
debate.
7.10 We would also like the Minister to report progress in this area in two years’ time, if
she or her successor have not had cause to do so sooner.
7.11 In the meantime, we now clear this Commission report, which we are also drawing
to the attention of the International Development Committee.
Full details of the documents: Commission Report: The activities of the EU
Platform for Blending in External Cooperation since its establishment until end July 2014:
(36578), 17001/14, COM(14) 733.
Background
7.12 In accordance with the EU guarantee for European Investment Bank (EIB) external
lending21, the European Parliament requested that the Commission study, and
subsequently report upon, the development of an “EU Platform for External Cooperation
and Development” in order to optimise the performance of blending in external
cooperation. In the subsequent report, the Commission set up the new EU Platform for
Blending in External Cooperation (EUBEC) as a Commission Group of Experts, which was
formally launched in December 2012.
7.13 The Platform is composed of a Policy Group and a number of Technical Groups:
— Policy Group: EU Member States, European External Action Service (EEAS) and the
Commission, with the European Parliament and other participants invited as
18
In April 2014, the then Minister (Lynne Featherstone) declared that better, timelier results data was “vital if we are
to secure good value for money in our development programmes and demonstrate this to UK taxpayers”, and was
“something the UK has been consistently calling for since DfID’s Multilateral Aid Review…was first published in
2011”; pointed out that the proposal was not something new and that, on the contrary, it would do no more than
bring the EU into line with other multilateral and bilateral development actors, including her own Department; and
also pointed out that the costs of implementing a results framework would be “more than offset in the long run by
increased value for money from Commission aid programmes”. See (35735), 17709/13: Forty-seventh Report HC 83xlii (2013–14), chapter 1 (30 April 2014), Paving the way for an EU Development and Cooperation Results
Framework.
19
See (36451) —: Twentieth Report HC 219-xix (2014–15), chapter 14 (19 November 2014).
20
European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) Special Report No. 18/2014 —: EuropeAid’s evaluation and results-oriented
monitoring systems: (36569), —: See Twenty-ninth Report HC 219-xxviii (2014–15), chapter 2 (14 January 2015).
21
Decision No 1080/2011/EU.
31
observers; has met five times and discussed the work of the Technical Groups and
additional selected topics, such as Future Governance of EU blending facilities and role
of non-EU Financial Institutions (FI) in EU Blending Facilities.
— Technical Groups (TGs): the Commission, EEAS, FIs and a number of Member States’
representatives; five TGs22 have been established; complemented by a number of
workshops.23
7.14 This report provides an overview the work of EUBEC since its establishment until end
of July 2014. The Commission report concludes that blending facilities:
— had shown positive signs regarding performance in support of EU external policies;
— had achieved their goal of mobilising significant public resources;
— needed further improvements in monitoring and reporting systems;
— benefited from a flexibility that contributed to the relevance and quality of the project
portfolio;
— incorporate sound processes and standards project design and preparation, but the
added value of the grant should be further specified and analysed in the grant
application form to allow measurability;
— enhanced coordination, exchange of information and cooperation between European
aid actors, but less so with non-European aid actors;
— involve partner countries/regions, but coordination at the local level between EU
Delegations and FIs should be improved.
7.15 The report notes that the Technical Groups had addressed a number of the challenges
identified above: an improved and harmonised Grant Application Form, which explicitly
introduces the issue of debt sustainability; a new results measurement framework that will
provide information on expected results ex-ante, measure the outcome ex-post and allow
further enhancement of reporting on the achievements of the facilities; work to ensure
harmonization and early provision of contractual information intended to reduce timeline
towards project implementation.
7.16 However, the report also concludes that, in order to improve further the quality and
efficiency of EU development and external cooperation blending mechanisms, a number of
areas need to be further explored. The expanded use of specific financial instruments is
needed to employ the limited budget funds as efficiently as possible, and in areas where
grants are not always the best instrument to develop types of economic activity. While the
Commission endorses the platform’s efforts to promote further use of financial
instruments, it says that it is essential that these provide clearly defined additionality, and
22
TG1 “Review of existing blending mechanisms” – TG2 “Enhancement of blending activities” – Results Measurement
Framework (RFM) – TG3 “Improvement of Processes” – TG4 “Promotion of Financial Instruments” – TG55
“Contracting, monitoring and reporting”.
23
Workshops have been on the issues of: Climate Change mainstreaming; Debt Sustainability; Blending and ODA;
Roundtable with Export Credit Agencies.
32
there is a successful conclusion to the TG’s work on mobilisation of private sector
resources. In terms of the future governance of EU blending facilities, organising the
blending frameworks according to the financing instrument is welcomed in so far as it will
help streamline, simplify and improve efficiency; however, implementation of
recommendations must first be agreed in close coordination with EEAS and EU Member
States. Finally, the involvement of non-European Financial Institutions needs to be
clarified, as this offers an additional opportunity to add further expertise to the Platform
and improve decision making.
7.17 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 12 January 2015, the Parliamentary UnderSecretary of State at the Department for International Development (Baroness Northover)
notes the report’s overall finding: that the EU blending facilities have performed positively
in support of EU external engagement, and EUBEC has demonstrated its value in terms of
bringing together stakeholders to exchange expertise on aspects of blending in external
cooperation.
7.18 She also recalls a recent European Court of Auditors report looked into the
effectiveness of blending24, and says:
“The Commission accepted virtually all of the recommendations of the Court, and
has already implemented a significant number of these, for example including a
results framework in its project application, and introducing an improved and
harmonised Grant Application. The existing changes, and implementation of the rest
of the recommendations, should continue to make blending a more effective
development tool.”
7.19 Since 2007, the Commission have set up eight regional investment facilities —
essentially a pool of grant money available specifically to leverage additional loans — in
eight different regions.25 These cover the entire sphere of external action outside of the EU.
In the period 2007–13, over €2.1 billion was allocated to these facilities. The Minister notes
that:
“The UK is a bilateral contributor to the Infrastructure Trust Fund, which will be
governed under the EDF financing instrument.26 Going forward, the UK is clear that
UK bilateral funds must continue to be used only for regional infrastructure (as
originally intended) and the UK’s voting rights should continue to reflect this
bilateral contribution.”
The Government’s view
7.20 The Minister comments as follows:
24
Special Report No. 16/2014: The effectiveness of blending regional investment facility grants with financial
institution loans to support EU external policies. See our Report at (36451), —: Twentieth Report HC 219-xix (201415), chapter 14 (19 November 2014) for the Committee’s consideration thereof.
25
ITF: EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund AIF: Asian Investment Facility CIF: Caribbean Investment Facility IFCA:
Investment Facility for Central Asia LAIF: Latin America Investment Facility NIF: Neighbourhood Investment Facility
IFP: Investment Facility for the Pacific WBIF: Western Balkans Investment Framework.
26
So far the Department for International Development (DfID) has contributed £67million.
33
“The UK considers that the EUBEC platform has been a welcome development. It is
positive that the Commission is bringing together a wide range of stakeholders to
exchange expertise on all aspects of blending in order to improve its effectiveness.
The UK also supports the recommendations of the report that the Platform
continues its work on issues of mobilising private sector resources; the future
governance of EU Blending Facilities; and the involvement of non-European
Financial Institutions.
“The UK has been closely engaging in all aspects of the EUBEC platform, and has a
keen interest in how the areas for further improvement are resolved. On the
governance of blending facilities, the UK will continue to scrutinise how these will be
structured and governed to ensure the ongoing value-for-money of EU resources,
clear timelines, and that the UK’s bilateral contribution to the ITF is not negatively
affected. On the inclusion of non-EU Finance Institutions in the facilities, the UK see
more competition for funds as a good way of ensuring only the best projects receive
funding. The UK welcomes the conclusion that where non-European Financial
Institutions are already acting as lead in specific blending facilities, that their role
should be preserved, for example the African Development Bank.
“Overall, the UK supports the Commission in continuing to explore using innovative
finance, such as blending, to achieve development objectives. However, in the
medium term, the UK will need to see a clear demonstration of additionality from
blending — evidence that blending is leveraging additional money towards
development objectives. The results framework should provide a basis with which to
assess the projects financed by the Commission’s blending facilities, and, during
implementation, it will be vital to define clearly success criteria in order to
understand whether this is the best use of the Commission’s resources. As part of
this, the UK would like to come to a common understanding with the Commission
about the circumstances in which finance can correctly be considered to have been
leveraged.
“The UK would also like to ensure that Commission continues to focus on
diversifying the sources of financing unlocked by blended grants. To be successful, it
must leverage not only public sector finance, but also contribute to unlocking the
significant private sector finance which is critical to realising the potential for
economic development.”
None, but see (36451), —: Twentieth Report HC 219-xix (2014–15), chapter 14 (19
November 2014) and (34964 ), 10272/13: Thirty-first Report HC 83-xxviii (2013–14),
chapter 12 (22 January 2014).
34
8 Working time: inland waterway transport
Cleared from scrutiny
Document details
Legal base
Department
Draft Council Directive about a social partners
agreement on working time in inland waterway
transport
Article 155(2) TFEU; —; QMV
Transport
Document numbers
(36216), 11688/14 + ADDs 1–3, COM(14) 452
8.1 The Commission has proposed this draft Directive, in the context of the Working Time
Directive, to implement a European Social Partners’ Agreement between the European
Barge Union, the European Skippers Organisation and the European Transport Workers
Federation on specific working time rules for mobile workers in inland waterway
transport.
8.2 Although we have recognised the need for adequate working time rules for mobile
workers in inland waterway transport, we have shared the Government’s view of the
inappropriateness of this proposal for the UK. However, we heard in December 2014 that
the proposal was likely to be adopted that month in a form still unsuited to the UK’s
circumstances.
8.3 We commented that it was very disappointing that the UK’s reasonable needs were not
likely to be met and endorsed the Government’s expected vote against the proposal. We
kept the document under scrutiny, pending a report on the final outcome.
8.4 The Government tells us now that, as expected and despite the dissatisfaction of a
number of other Member States, the proposal was adopted, with only the UK and Hungary
voting against.
8.5 Given these disappointing circumstances, our further consideration of the proposal
is redundant and we clear now the document from scrutiny.
Full details of the documents: Draft Council Directive implementing the European
Agreement concluded by the European Barge Union (EBU), the European Skippers
Organisation (ESO) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) concerning
certain aspects of the organisation of working time in inland waterway transport: (36216),
11688/14 + ADDs 1–3, COM(14) 452.
Background
8.6 The Working Time Directive lays down common minimum standards, but allows for
more specific rules to be made for particular sectors. The Commission has proposed this
draft Directive to implement a European Social Partners’ Agreement between the
35
European Barge Union, the European Skippers Organisation and the European Transport
Workers’ Federation on specific working time rules for mobile workers in inland waterway
transport.
8.7 We have considered this proposal three times previously. We have recognised the need
for adequate working time rules for mobile workers in inland waterway transport. But we
have shared the Government’s view of the inappropriateness of this proposal for the UK
and have been concerned about a seemingly precipitate push to agree the proposal. When
we last considered the matter the Government told us that it was likely that the Presidency
would achieve a political agreement on the proposal at a Council on 11 December 2014,
that the UK’s concerns had not been met and that the Government expected to vote against
the draft Directive.
8.8 We said that it was very disappointing that the UK’s reasonable needs were not likely to
be met. So we endorsed the Government’s expected vote against the proposal. We kept the
document under scrutiny, pending a report on the outcome of the Council meeting.
8.9 The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Mr John Hayes) writes now to report
the final outcome on this proposal, following the meeting of the Employment, Social
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council on 11 December. He says that:

as expected, the Council adopted a political agreement on the draft Directive;

the UK, however, together with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland and Malta, tabled a joint statement highlighting the inadequacy
of the Commission’s impact assessment and the lack of adherence to better
regulation principles;

the UK, together with Hungary and Malta, also tabled a second statement, which
raised concerns about the lack of representation during the Social Partner
negotiations on the proposal; and

the Directive was adopted on 19 December 2014 through written procedure by
QMV — only the UK and Hungary opposed, although five other Member States
abstained.
8.10 Noting that the Directive must be transposed by 31 December 2016, the Minister also
tells us that the Government intends to continue to work closely with the UK industry
affected to ensure that implementation achieves the objective, which is supported by the
main trade associations, of tightening regulations of working time on commercial inland
waterway vessels in the interests of safety, but minimising administrative burdens and any
unintended impacts.
Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014–15), chapter 11 (3 September 2014), Fifteenth Report HC
219-xv (2014–15), chapter 5 (22 October 2014) and Twenty-fifth Report HC 219-xxiv
(2014–15), chapter 4 (10 December 2014).
36
9 Road safety
Document details
Legal base
Department
Draft Directive facilitating cross-border exchange of
information on road safety related traffic offences
Article 91 TFEU; co-decision; QMV
Transport
Document numbers
(36243), 12107/14 + ADD 1, COM(14) 476
9.1 In May 2014 the Court of Justice annulled Directive 2011/82/EU, which was intended
to facilitate cross border enforcement in the field of road safety. The objection to the
Directive was that it had a JHA legal base, which incidentally allowed the UK and Ireland
to choose not to participate and meant that it could not apply to Denmark. However, the
Court maintained the Directive’s effects until the entry into force within a reasonable
period of time of a new Directive based on a transport legal base.
9.2 The Commission therefore issued this new proposal for a Directive to replace the one
annulled. The content is the same as Directive 2011/82/EU, with the exception of the
change of legal base, deletion of text about the non-application of the Directive to those
Member States (including the UK) that had not been party to the original measure and
associated amendments in the recitals.
9.3 We recognised, given that many Member States will have already gone far in
transposing the annulled Directive, that there would be little appetite for changing the
substance of the new proposal. Nevertheless, we noted the concerns the Government had
expressed to us and urged it to press for amelioration of those concerns. We noted
particularly that a two-year deadline, say from April 2015, for transposition by the UK (and
Denmark and Ireland) would allow time for amendments to the Directive helpful to the
UK, following the Commission’s review of the Directive, due by November 2016. We kept
the proposal under scrutiny pending a report from the Government on any success it had
in achieving amendments to the draft Directive.
9.4 In October 2014 the Government told us that a two-year period for transposition, that
is, until May 2017, and the protection of personal data it was seeking had been secured. We
recognised the very limited timetable set for adoption of this legislation by the Court of
Justice and the value, in the circumstances, of the amendments achieved for the UK (and
Ireland and Denmark). However we said that we would keep the document under scrutiny
until we had confirmation that the amendments had been secured in discussion with the
European Parliament.
9.5 The Government tells us now that discussion with the European Parliament has left the
transposition and data protection positions unchanged, that no further changes of
substance will be made and that the final text will probably be adopted at the General
Affairs Council on 20 April.
37
9.6 We are grateful for this confirmation that the amendments previously reported to
us have been secured and now clear the document from scrutiny.
Full details of the documents: Draft Directive facilitating cross-border exchange of
information on road safety related traffic offences: (36243) 12107/14 + ADD 1, COM(14)
476.
Background
9.7 In May 2014 the Court of Justice annulled Directive 2011/82/EU, which was intended
to facilitate cross border enforcement in the field of road safety, by supporting Member
States in the investigation of eight offences committed by drivers in other Member States.
The objection to the Directive was that it had a JHA legal base — Article 87(2) TFEU,
which incidentally allowed the UK and Ireland to choose not to participate and meant that
it could not apply to Denmark. However, the Court maintained the Directive’s effects until
the entry into force within a reasonable period of time of a new Directive based on Article
91(1)(c) TFEU, a transport legal base.
9.8 The Commission therefore issued this new proposal for a Directive to replace the one
annulled. The content is the same as Directive 2011/82/EU, with the exception of the
change of legal base, deletion of text about the non-application of the Directive to those
Member States (including the UK) that had not been party to the original measure and
associated amendments in the recitals.
9.9 We recognised, given that many Member States will have already gone far in
transposing the annulled Directive, that there would be little appetite for changing the
substance of the new proposal. Nevertheless, we noted the concerns the Government had
expressed to us and urged it to press for amelioration of those concerns, even though this
might necessitate the Presidency slowing the push for Council agreement. We noted also
that a two-year deadline, say from April 2015, for transposition by the UK (and Denmark
and Ireland) would allow time for amendments to the Directive helpful to the UK,
following the Commission’s review of the Directive, due by November 2016. We kept the
proposal under scrutiny pending a report from the Government on any success it had on
slowing the Council consideration of the draft Directive and in achieving amendments to
it.
9.10 In October 2014 the Government told us that it had been unable to achieve
postponement of the Council decision on a general approach but that a two-year period for
transposition, that is, until May 2017, and the protection of personal data it was seeking
had been secured. We recognised the very limited timetable set for adoption of this
legislation by the Court of Justice and the value, in the circumstances, of the amendments
achieved for the UK (and Ireland and Denmark). However we said that we would keep the
document under scrutiny until we had confirmation that the amendments had been
secured in discussion with the European Parliament.
9.11 The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport (Mr Robert
Goodwill), reminding us that we had been told previously that the Government planned to
38
engage proactively with MEPs during their consideration of this proposal, and in particular
that it was important to ensure that the two year transposition period was retained, says
that:

the two year transposition period came under question during MEP discussions
and an amendment was put forward which would have reduced the period to one
year;

this would have been very unwelcome and it is unlikely that the Government could
meet such a transposition deadline;

it engaged closely, however with the Rapporteur and other key MEPs, to explain
the reasons for the two year period, and MEPs were sympathetic to the UK
position; and

one trilogue meeting has taken place and this has confirmed that the UK, Denmark
and Ireland should have the additional two year transposition period that was
proposed by the Council.
9.12 The Minister continues that:

this is a good result for the UK and the Government is very pleased that the final
text allows the UK the same amount of transposition time as was granted to other
Member States;

a subsequent Council Working Group meeting was held in December 2014, which
discussed and confirmed this position and looked at other, relatively minor,
amendments;

no further changes of substance will be made and the text will now be sent to the
Jurist-Linguist meeting early in 2015; and

he understands that the new Latvian Presidency will seek to adopt the final text at
the General Affairs Council on 20 April.
Twelfth Report HC 219-xii (2014–15), chapter 7 (10 September 2014); Fifteenth Report
HC 219-xv (2014–15), chapter 6 (22 October 2014).
39
10 Rail research and innovation
Document details
Draft Council Decision to endorse a plan for
managing public-private rail research and
innovation
Articles 187 and 188 TFEU; —; QMV
Transport
(36580), 17013/14, COM(14) 739
Legal base
Department
Document numbers
10.1 Shift2Rail is a new Joint Undertaking between the rail industry in the EU and the EU.
It is a broad-scale research and innovation initiative. The aim is to create a step change in
rail technology that will help promote the competitiveness of the EU rail industry and meet
changing EU transportation needs. The purpose is to carry out research and innovation
that will identify how certain targets can be met and carry out projects to demonstrate
feasibility of innovations.
10.2 The Shift2Rail Regulation requires the Joint Undertaking to establish and develop a
strategic Master Plan. The Commission presents this draft Council Decision to endorse
the proposed Shift2Rail Master Plan, which is based to a significant extent on the UK Rail
Technical Strategy.
10.3 The Government welcomes the plan, telling us that it presents innovative UK rail
supply companies, research organisations and universities with enhanced business
opportunities and that it is expected to lead (in the long term) to improvements in the
affordability, capacity and reliability of rail transport in the UK.
10.4 Whilst clearing this proposal from scrutiny, we draw it to the attention of the
House for the information it gives about possible business and rail transport benefits
for the UK.
Full details of the documents: Draft Council Decision endorsing the Shift2Rail
Master Plan: (36580), 17013/14, COM(14) 739.
Background
10.5 Shift2Rail is a new Joint Undertaking (JU — public private partnership) between the
rail industry in the EU and the EU (represented by the Commission) established by
Council Regulation (EU) No. 642/2014, which came into force in July 2014. The JU is a
broad-scale research and innovation initiative. The aim is to create a step change in rail
technology that will help promote the competitiveness of the EU rail industry and meet
changing EU transportation needs. The purpose is to carry out research and innovation
that will identify how the following targets could be met, and also to carry out projects to
demonstrate feasibility of the innovations:
40

an overall reduction in costs of 50%, through a reduction of the costs of
developing, maintaining, operating and renewing infrastructure and rolling stock,
as well as through increased energy efficiency;

an increase in capacity of 100%; and

an increase in reliability of 50%.
10.6 Shift2Rail will conduct research and demonstration projects in the following five
technical thematic areas or “Innovation Programmes”:

cost-efficient and reliable trains, including high capacity trains and high speed
trains;

advanced traffic management and control systems;

cost efficient and reliable high capacity infrastructure;

IT solutions for attractive railway services; and

technologies for sustainable and attractive European freight.
10.7 The Shift2Rail Regulation requires the JU to establish and develop a strategic Master
Plan.
The document
10.8 The Commission presents this draft Council Decision to endorse the Shift2Rail
Master Plan. The document contains the Commission’s explanatory memorandum, the
results of consultations, a summary of the legal elements of the document and the text of
the proposed Council Decision.
10.9 An initial version of the Shift2Rail Master Plan27 has been developed by the JU in a
process led by the Commission and in consultation with the European Railway Agency and
the European Rail Research Advisory Council Technology Platform. This proposed Master
Plan defines the priority research and innovation activities to drive innovation in the rail
sector across the EU in the long term. In accordance with Annex I to the Shift2Rail
Regulation, the Master Plan is structured around the five Innovation Programmes and
provides details of the proposed work.
10.10 The Master Plan is based, to a significant extent, on the UK Rail Technical Strategy.
Network Rail was closely involved with the development of the Master Plan as a founder
member of Shift2Rail. The Commission led a consultation on the draft plan, which
included a public consultation meeting held in June 2014 attended by close to 200
stakeholders. On 24 September 2014 the Shift2Rail Governing Board (which includes
Network Rail) approved a version of the Master Plan including major contributions from
relevant stakeholders.
27
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/doc/2014-09-24-draft-shift2rail-master-plan.pdf.
41
10.11 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 14 January the Minister of State, Department
for Transport (Baroness Kramer) says that the Government welcomes the Master Plan,
which, in conjunction with the JU, is expected to lead (in the long term) to improvements
in the affordability, capacity and reliability of rail transport in the UK, which will benefit
UK citizens and UK rail freight customers, with the UK rail sector (particularly Network
Rail) also standing to gain from the investment in rail research and innovation.
10.12 The Minister tells us that:

there are no specific policy implications arising directly from the plan, as it is
largely based on the UK Rail Technical Strategy;

UK companies may wish, however, to respond to future open calls which will be
based on the Master Plan; and

they can approach FutureRailway (a cross-industry body supported by
Government that both funds research and innovation and provides independent
advice on rail research and innovation) for assistance in preparing proposals that
seek to deliver aspects of the Master Plan.
10.13 The Minister comments further that:

Shift2Rail will provide innovative UK rail supply companies, research
organisations and universities with enhanced business opportunities to develop
and exploit new technologies and solutions;

it will do this by co-funding collaborative research and innovation activities at a
size and scale that cannot be provided through national programmes; and

it will also help UK players gain access to EU partners with skills or resources they
cannot readily find in the UK.
10.14 Finally, the Minister tells us that the draft Council Decision to endorse the Master
Plan has no direct financial implications. But she reminds us that:

the size of the JU programme itself is expected to be between €800 million and €1
billion (£623 million and £779 million), with the Commission contributing up to
€450 million (£350 million) between 2014 and 2020 and the rail industry
contributing the remainder;

a quarter of the research funds would be designated for SMEs, research
organisations and universities through open calls; and

the proposed Commission contribution falls within existing budgets.
None.
42
11 EU restrictive measures against Tunisia
Document details
Department
Council Decision and Council Implementing
Regulation concerning restrictive measures
directed against certain persons and entities in view
of the situation in Tunisia
(a) Article 29 TEU; unanimity
(b) Article 215 TFEU; QMV
Document numbers
(a) (36520), — (b) (36521), —
Legal base
11.1 On 4 February 2011 the EU imposed an asset freeze against 48 members of the former
regime in Tunisia who are held responsible by the new Tunisian authorities for the
misappropriation of Tunisian State funds.28
11.2 These measures consist of a freezing of funds and economic resources of those
persons listed in the annex to the CFSP Decision, and were imposed following the 2011
resignation of former President Ben Ali. There are no travel restrictions imposed through
these measures.
11.3 The draft Decision and Implementing Regulation seek to amend Council Decision
2011/72/CFSP by extending the current sanctions for another year, until 31 January 2016.
They accordingly provide for the extension of restrictive measures against “persons
responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds, and who are thus depriving the
Tunisian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their economy and
society and undermining the development of democracy in the country”. They also make a
small change to the identifiers of three individuals, who are deceased, but against whom
judicial proceedings are continuing in Tunisia, and who would accordingly remain on the
list of persons subject to the EU measures.
11.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) notes that Tunisia successfully
completed its transition to democracy in 2014 by holding its first full-term legislative
elections in October 2014 and first ever democratic Presidential election in November and
December 2014. He recalls that addressing the corruption of the previous regime has been
a priority, though progress has been slow in respect of international asset recovery. He also
notes that the asset freeze itself does not enable Member States to seize assets deemed to
have been corruptly obtained, or return them to the Tunisian State, and that “further
action through the criminal justice system in the requesting state is required”; and declares
28
The full background to the measures in question is set out in our previous Report — (35736),—; (35737),—: Thirtythird Report HC 83-xxx (2013–14), chapter 19 (29 January 2014) — and the earlier Reports referred to therein.
43
that: “Supporting the aspiration to extend the current restrictive measures will allow
investigations into the alleged corruption of listed individuals to be completed”.
11.5 In its Conclusions of 19 January 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council:
— congratulated Tunisia in the wake of the legislative and presidential elections, which
“marked an historic step in the country's democratic transition”;
— welcomed the democratic commitment and the sense of responsibility of the Tunisian
people and of all the political leaders and civil society;
— congratulated Mr Béji Caïd Essebsi on his election as President of Tunisia, as well as the
newly-elected representatives of the Tunisian people;
— professed its steadfast commitment to cooperating with the new President of Tunisia,
the next government, and the whole of Tunisian society, in order to “deepen the
Privileged Partnership between the EU and Tunisia”; and
— reiterated its willingness to continue to back the efforts of the new authorities with
political and financial support commensurate with both the progress already achieved
and the challenges faced.
11.6 As was the case a year ago (see “Background” below), although no questions arise
from the proposals themselves, we are nonetheless reporting the renewal of these
measures because of the widespread interest in developments in Tunisia — where the
“Arab Spring” began, and which in many ways continues to carry a torch that has been
dimmed in those other Arab countries that followed in its wake.
11.7 We now clear the Council Decision and Council Implementing Regulation.
Full details of the documents: (a) Council Decision amending Council Decision
2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities
in view of the situation in Tunisia: (36520), —; (b) Council Implementing Regulation
implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 101/2011 concerning restrictive measures
directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Tunisia:
(36521), —.
Background
11.8 The Council Decision and Council Implementing Regulation that the Committee
cleared from scrutiny a year ago enable a further 12 months “roll-over”, to 31 January 2015.
The Decision and Implementing Regulation thus provided for the extension of restrictive
measures against persons adjudged by the post-revolutionary authorities to have been
“persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds, and who are thus
depriving the Tunisian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their
economy and society and undermining the development of democracy in the country”.
They also made amendments to the grounds for listing of 45 of the 48 listed individuals.
The measures consist of a freezing of funds and economic resources of those persons listed
in the annex to the Decision.
44
11.9 As the Minister for Europe noted, the 48 individuals listed are former President Ben
Ali, his wife Leila Trabelsi and other members and close associates of their families. With
regard to the amendments to the grounds for listing 45 of the 48, the Minister recalled that
three of the listed individuals (Fahed Al Matri, Mohamed Trabelsi, and Slim Chiboub)
successfully challenged their listing in the General Court in May 2013. The General Court
ruled that their statement of reason for listing (which referred to money laundering) did
not meet the criterion for designation (responsibility for misappropriation of State funds)
in the relevant Decision and Regulation. The Foreign Affairs Council then adopted a new
Decision and Implementing Regulation on 31 July 2013, which amended these statements
so that they referred back to the designation criteria, and ensured that Matri, Trabelsi and
Chiboub remain listed (the Committee cleared these at its meeting on 4 September 2013).
The 2014 Decision and Implementing Regulation accordingly made the same amendments
to the remaining 45 listings, and reduced the risk of any further legal challenges being
made. As of now, the Minister said, legal proceedings against all the listed individuals were
continuing in Tunisia. Although some individuals had challenged their listings, either on
hardship grounds or by providing more detailed legal evidence, EU partners were satisfied
that the existence of national legal proceedings provided sufficient justification to maintain
all the listings.
11.10 More generally, the Minister said that Tunisia had made impressive progress in its
transition to democracy. Addressing the corruption of the previous regime continued to be
a priority for the government, though progress had been slow in a post revolution
environment. The asset freeze did not itself enable Member States to seize any assets
deemed to have been corruptly obtained, or return them to the Tunisian State; further
action through the criminal justice system was required before such measures could be
taken. He therefore supported the aspiration to extend the current restrictive measures to
allow investigations into the alleged corruption of listed individuals to be completed and
ensure that the structures and processes in Tunisia were in place to return misappropriated
assets to their rightful owners.
11.11 Although no questions arise, the Committee concluded that a Report to the House
was warranted because of the level of interest in developments in “the new Tunisia”, and
because it illustrated how the EU continued to endeavour to help a new regime that was
itself endeavouring, in what were no doubt difficult circumstances, to develop a law-based
approach that, if it could be developed in this sensitive area, could have much wider
positive repercussions.29
The draft Council Decision and Council Implementing Regulation
11.12 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 14 January 2015, the Minister for Europe says
that:
— the Tunisian government has confirmed that national legal proceedings against all 48
listed individuals are continuing in Tunisia;
29
See (35736), — and (35737), —: Thirty-third Report HC 83-xxx (2013–14), chapter 19 (29 January 2014).
45
— since the last review in 2014, the Tunisian government have provided further
information on three of the listed individuals who have been deceased since 2011:
Mr. Moncef Ben Mohamed Ben Rhouma TRABELSI
Mr. Mohamed Adel Ben Mohamed Ben Rehouma TRABELSI
Mr. Faouzi Ben Haj Hamda Ben Haj Hassen BEN ALI
— judicial proceedings against the deceased are continuing in Tunisia, so they should
remain on the list of persons subject to the EU measures; and
— the revised measures will amend the identifying information for the deceased persons.
“Tunisia successfully completed its transition to democracy in 2014 by holding its
first full-term legislative elections in October 2014 and first ever democratic
Presidential election in November and December 2014. Addressing the corruption of
the previous regime has been a priority but progress has been slow in respect of
international asset recovery. The asset freeze itself does not enable Member States to
seize assets deemed to have been corruptly obtained, or return them to the Tunisian
State. Further action through the criminal justice system in the requesting state is
required. Supporting the aspiration to extend the current restrictive measures will
allow investigations into the alleged corruption of listed individuals to be
completed.”
11.14 On 19 January 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the following Conclusions
on Tunisia:
“1. The European Union congratulates Tunisia in the wake of the legislative and
presidential elections which mark an historic step in the country's democratic
transition.
“2. It welcomes the democratic commitment and the sense of responsibility of
the Tunisian people and of all the political leaders and civil society who have
managed to preserve a spirit of dialogue conducive to ensuring the success of
this process. The EU pays tribute to the Independent High Authority for the
Elections (ISIE) which has excellently organised several free, transparent and
democratic elections within a short period of time. Tunisia's democratic
transition is a source of hope and inspiration for other peoples of the region.
“3. The EU congratulates Mr Béji Caïd Essebsi on his election as President of
Tunisia, as well as the newly-elected representatives of the Tunisian people. It
wishes the new authorities every success with the inclusive preparation and the
implementation of the reforms which are key to consolidating the rule of law
and the democratic achievements of the new Constitution, guaranteeing the
46
security of all Tunisians and meeting the economic and social aspirations that
were behind the 2011 revolution.
“4. The EU remains steadfastly committed to cooperating with the new President
of Tunisia, the next government, and the whole of Tunisian society, in order to
deepen the Privileged Partnership between the EU and Tunisia. With this in
mind, the EU will continue to back the efforts of the new authorities with
political and financial support commensurate with both the progress already
achieved and the challenges faced.”30
None, but see (35736), — and (35737), —: Thirty-third Report HC 83-xxx (2013–14),
chapter 19 (29 January 2014) and the earlier Reports referred to therein.
12 EU restrictive measures against Côte d’Ivoire
Document details
Council Decision and Council Regulation
amending restrictive measures against, and
restrictions on the supply of assistance related to
military activities to, Côte d'Ivoire
Legal base
(a) Article 29 TEU; unanimity;
(b) Article 215 TFEU; QMV
(36596), — and (36597), —
Department
Document numbers
12.1 Côte d’Ivoire (CDI) has been a troubled country over recent years.31 UN sanctions
were first imposed in 2004. The EU imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban and asset
freeze on three people and a ban on direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds.
12.2 Following the disputed election results in November 2010, further EU measures
targeted individuals and entities supporting the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, and
obstructing the process of peace and national reconciliation, and in particular jeopardising
the proper outcome of the electoral process. After prolonged resistance and a violent
dénouement, former President Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 and President Ouattara
30
Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/01/fac-150119-council-conclusions-ontunisia/.
31
See (34023), — and (33898), 10281/12: Sixth Report HC 86-vi (2012–13), chapter 9 (27 June 2012) and all the Reports
referred to therein for the full background to the EU’s dealings with Côte d’Ivoire in recent years.
47
was able to take office. UN, and thus EU, restrictive measures have been gradually eased
thereafter in order to acknowledge and encourage continued progress towards stable,
democratic, law-based governance.
12.3 The attached Council Decision and Council Regulation seek to add a derogation to
the prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain items, solely for use in
civilian mining and infrastructure.
12.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) explains that:
— in late 2013, the Federation for European Explosives Manufacturers (FEEM)
approached the European Commission with concerns over the inclusion of certain civil
explosives and related equipment (e.g. detonators) in the EU “internal repression” list
that is annexed to EU sanctions;
— FEEM’s concerns were that these items are essential in mining construction and other
civil infrastructure projects and could not be used easily and conventionally as weapons
of internal repression;
— the matter was referred to the Conventional Arms Exports Group (COARM) which in
turn set up a virtual “experts group” to discuss the issue; and
— the COARM report is a classified document, but in essence “proposed a solution to
allow Member States to authorise on a case-by-case basis the supply of certain
explosives and related equipment where they are satisfied that they are for use in the
type of projects described above”.
12.5 The Minister says that:
— CDI continues to show encouraging progress, particularly over the past 12 months,
with the presiding government continuing to take steps to ease political tensions and to
improve the security and stability of the country;
— following the lifting last year of the embargo on diamonds, the CDI authorities have
continued to strengthen the governance framework required to meet the minimum
requirements as set out by the Kimberly Process;
— the proposal now being put forward shows that the international community views the
positive developments in CDI favourably; and
— the Government shares this optimism and believes that that the derogation will further
support measures to bring peace, stability and prosperity to the country.
12.6 We shall no doubt hear more about progress towards the creation of an
environment conducive to proper elections, and especially a credible, apolitical, and
comprehensive voters list prior to the Presidential elections; in the implementation of
its SSR strategy; and, more generally, on the “clear post embargo strategy” set out
before the UN on 12 December 2014 (see paragraphs 12.14–12.15 and 12.21 below)
when the overall EU package of restrictive measures is submitted for scrutiny in the
Spring.
48
12.7 In the meantime, we now clear this Council Decision and Council Regulation.
Full details of the documents: (a) Council Decision amending Decision
2010/656/CFSP renewing the restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire: (36596),—;(b)
Joint Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 174/2005
imposing restrictions on the supply of assistance related to military activities to Côte
d'Ivoire: (36597),—.
Background
12.8 As earlier Committee Reports have noted, Côte d’Ivoire (CDI) has beden a troubled
country over recent years.32 UN sanctions were first imposed in 2004. These are
implemented in by the EU by a “policy-setting” Council Decision and implementing
Regulations. EU restrictive measures prior to the 2010 election were thus an arms embargo,
a travel ban and asset freeze on three people and a ban on direct or indirect import of all
rough diamonds.
12.9 Following the disputed election results in November 2010, further EU measures
targeted individuals and entities identified as supporters of the incumbent, Laurent
Gbagbo, and who were obstructing the process of peace and national reconciliation, and in
particular jeopardising the proper outcome of the electoral process. After prolonged
resistance and a violent dénouement, former President Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011
and President Ouattara was able to take office. The EU immediately responded by delisting
certain entities and individuals that no longer met the listing criteria set by the measures
(which the Committee reported to the House).
12.10 Then a further 78 individuals were judged no longer to constitute a threat to the
process of peace and national reconciliation, and were de-listed in line with a policy of
supporting that process and the other main priorities of the new Ivorian administration —
re-starting the economy and security sector reform (having produced several Reports to
the House in 2010 and 2011, the Committee concluded these measures were not, in and of
themselves, ones that warranted a further substantive Report).
12.11 On 23 April, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 2045 (2012). The EU
accordingly modified arms sanctions set to expire in May 2012 until 30 April 2013, to
include exemptions, including for arms and related equipment intended to enable the
Ivorian security forces to use appropriate and proportionate force while maintaining public
order, and arms and other equipment for support of the security sector reform process.
12.12 At that time, the Minister explained that, via the adoption of UNSCR 2045 (2012),
the UNSC welcomed the steady progress and achievements Côte d’Ivoire had made since
the disputed Presidential elections in returning to stabilisation, notably by holding
parliamentary elections, addressing immediate security challenges, advancing economic
recovery and strengthening international and regional cooperation; acknowledged the
efforts by all Ivoirians to promote national reconciliation and consolidation of peace
through dialogue and consultation; encouraged the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation
32
See (34023), — and (33898), 10281/12: Sixth Report HC 86-vi (2012–13), chapter 9 (27 June 2012) and all the Reports
referred to therein for the full background to the EU’s dealings with Côte d’Ivoire in recent years.
49
Commission to make further progress in this direction; and welcomed the assistance of the
African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in this regard. This
notwithstanding, the UNSC remained concerned about the unresolved challenge of
security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), as
well as the circulation of weapons, which continued to be significant risks to stability.
However, the Minister said, in taking note of the difficulties faced, the UNSC also
acknowledged the urgent need for the Ivoirian Government to equip and train its security
forces, especially the police and gendarmerie, with standard policing weapons and
ammunition, and the importance of the Ivoirian Government being able to respond
proportionately to threats to the security of all its citizens. So necessary amendments were
needed to the arms embargo that would allow the international community to respond
more quickly to the needs of the Ivoirian Government while still retaining the necessary
controls on the export of arms and related material.
12.13 Although no questions arose, on that occasion we concluded that these
developments, in a part of the world of continuing political importance to UK and EU
interests, warranted a substantive Report to the House.33
12.14 Most recently, in June 2014, the Minister reported that the CDI continued to make
encouraging progress. There were, though, still pockets of insecurity; the government had
accordingly prioritised implementation of its SSR national strategy; but challenges
remained with regard to accelerating the pace of reform, restoring public confidence in the
national security forces and strengthening capacity, particularly concerning the police and
gendarmerie, and disarming all former combatants by the mid-2015 target.
12.15 Politically, the 2015 Presidential elections would be a key milestone; the immediate
challenge was to create an environment conducive to proper elections, and especially a
credible, apolitical, voters list that would enfranchise the estimated five million voters (i.e.,
c. 50%) not on the electoral register.
12.16 With regards to the renewal of the UN restrictive measures, the Minister said that
some Member States had argued that the fact that progress had been made by the Ivorian
authorities on SSR and DDR reform justified a fairly substantive lifting of the arms
embargo; other Member States felt that this was premature, and that more evidence was
needed of the military being under the control of a democratically elected civilian
government over a more substantial amount of time; and the UK Government agreed that,
while the upcoming elections were a key point against which to measure progress, some
easing to the embargo was warranted to allow the Ivorians to better equip their army,
police and gendarmerie, so as to marginalise the Zone Commanders and mark the progress
in SSR reform thus far. Hence the compromise of the lifting of “non-lethal” items from the
embargo and replacing the requirement for the Ivorian authorities to obtain advanced
approval from the UN CDI Sanctions Committee for exports of “small arms” with a
requirement to notify the committee when they received such exports. UNSCR 2153
(2014) also allowed for the transfer of lethal arms to the Ivorian security forces, providing
the UN CDI Sanctions Committee was notified in advance and that they were subsequently
satisfied that any such exports were likely to contribute positively to SSR objectives;
33
See (34023), — and (33898), 10281/12: Sixth Report HC 86-vi (2012–13), chapter 9 (27 June 2012).
50
supplies of lethal arms under this exemption are to be logged and recorded by the Ivorian
authorities, with weapons requiring physical markings to help monitor and account for
their circulation in CDI.
12.17 Regarding the diamonds industry, the Minister said that had also been significant
progress: CDI now met the minimum Kimberly Process requirements. The Ivorian
authorities had a strategy in place to ensure that the diamonds industry continued to
transition in a structured and accountable fashion; the Ivorian authorities had provided the
UN with information on their plans to facilitate appropriate Government rough-diamond
valuation, anti-fraud measures and the establishment of ‘buying houses’, to regulate the
valuation and sale of diamonds; various bodies, such as the UN Group of Experts, the
Kimberly Process Working Group on Monitoring, INTERPOL and “Friends of Côte
d’Ivoire”, had also been invited to remain involved and consulted on progress. Thus it was
agreed at the UN that the diamonds embargo could be lifted.
12.18 The Minister also noted that, whilst the EU was permitted to adopt further measures
to that of the UN, there was consensus that the situation in CDI was progressing in such a
way, and would continue so to do, that there was no need for any additional autonomous
EU measures to be included in the Council Decision or the supporting Council
Regulation.34
The draft Council Decision and Council Regulation
12.19 The attached Council Decision and Council Regulation seek to add a derogation to
the prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain items solely for use in
civilian mining and infrastructure, in relation to Council Decision (2010/656/CFSP) and
Council Regulation (174/2005) concerning restrictive measures against Cote d’Ivoire.
12.20 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 15 January 2014, the Minister for Europe
explains the origin and nature of the proposal, as outlined above.
“CDI continues to show encouraging progress in its recovery from the civil crisis that
followed the 2010 Presidential elections. The underlying security situation has
continued to improve, particularly over the past 12 months, with the presiding
government continuing to take steps to ease political tensions and to improve the
security and stability of the country. The next Presidential vote will take place in
October 2015 which will provide the CDI authorities with the chance to demonstrate
its support for the democratic process through the holding of free and fair elections.
“In April 2014 the UN Security Council eased the arms embargo on CDI in
recognition of its progress and development, facilitating greater access to the CDI
authorities for arms and equipment needed to further its Security Sector Reform
(SSR) objectives. The embargo on diamonds has also been lifted through the country
34
For full background, see (36144), —: Fourth Report HC 219-iv (2014–15), chapter 10 (25 June 2014).
51
meeting the minimum requirements as set out by the Kimberly Process. These
requirements include measures to ensure diamonds from CDI are mined and sold
via legal means, reducing the possibility of illicit diamonds trading funding rebel
groups in the country. On 12 December 2014 CDI set out a clear post embargo
strategy before the UN which included steps to strengthen the governance
framework of the Kimberly Process and valuation capacities, developing and
implementing anti-fraud measures and establishing legally constituted buying
houses. The lifting of these sanctions measures shows the international community
views the positive developments in CDI favourably. The UK shares this optimism
and believes that that the derogation as set out in the Council Decision and
Regulation will further support measures to bring peace, stability and prosperity to
the country.”
None, but see (36144), —: Fourth Report HC 219-iv (2014–15), chapter 10 (25 June 2014)
and (34023), — and (33898), 10281/12: Sixth Report HC 86-vi (2012–13), chapter 9 (27
June 2012).
13 Restrictive measures against Syria
requested
Document details
(a) Council Implementing Decision implementing
Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive
measures against Syria
(b) Council Implementing Regulation implementing
Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 concerning restrictive
measures in view of the situation in Syria
(a) Article 29 TEU; unanimity
(b) Article 215 TFEU; qmv
(a) (36603),— (b) (36604),—
Legal base
Department
Document numbers
13.1 These proposals will re-impose travel restrictions and asset freezes against three
individuals associated with the Assad regime in Syria, Ayman Jabir, Khalid Qaddur and
Mohamed Hamcho, and one entity, Hamcho International. The original restrictions were
annulled by the General Court. The re-listing is based on new statements of reason.
52
13.2 We support the principle that restrictive measures should be both targeted and
legally robust. However it is not evident that this is the case with these proposals,
particularly given the background, which includes the Council being unable to provide
sufficient backing evidence using open sources when invited to do so in court hearings
on 11 June 2014. The Minister (Mr David Lidington) only indicates that these proposals
are based on new grounds supported by information taken from open sources which
can be shared with the Court; and also that they comply with fundamental rights. The
reasons given in respect of Qaddur appear especially vague in that they state that he “is
associated with a person benefitting and supporting the regime” without identifying
that person.
13.3 We clear these proposals so that they can be adopted before the existing restrictive
measures end. However, in doing so we ask the Minister to confirm that he considers
the reasons given for the restrictive measures, and the underlying evidence, to be
sufficiently robust to either deter or withstand further legal challenge. We also ask him
to provide this evidence given that it is open source.
Full details of the documents: (a) Council Implementing Decision implementing
Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria: (36603), —; (b)
Council Implementing Regulation implementing Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 concerning
restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria: (36604), —.
Background
13.4 On 13 November 2014, the General Court of the European Union annulled the
designations of Khalid Qaddur, Ayman Jabir, Mohamed Hamcho and Hamcho
International under the EU Syria sanctions regime in Cases T-653/11 Ayman Jabir v
Council, T-654/11 Khalid Qaddur vs. Council and T-43/12 Mohamed Hamcho and
Hamcho International vs Council. The Court’s main reason for annulment in each case
was that the EU Council was unable to provide the Court with sufficient evidence to back
up the assertions made in the statement of reasons. The Court suspended the effects of the
annulment until 28 January 2015.
The Explanatory Memorandum of 15 January 2015
13.5 The Minister sets out the Government’s general policy:
“Targeted, legally robust sanctions are one of the tools the EU can use to pressure the
regime into reassessing its position and reengaging constructively with peace talks
with the moderate opposition. It is necessary to designate those providing practical
and financial support to the Syrian regime and its war effort in order to put pressure
on the Syrian regime to enter into a political settlement to the conflict, and also to
curtail the Syrian regime's ability to wage a brutal war against its own people. The
UK remains firm in its belief that a negotiated political settlement is the only solution
to conflict and Syria's worsening humanitarian crisis.”
13.6 In respect of these specific individuals and entity he indicates:
53
“The Syria policy imperative for re-listing Ayman Jabir, Khalid Qaddur, Mohamed
Hamcho and Hamcho International has remained strong following the court
judgements annulling these listings. The Syrian regime relies on the support of
individuals and entities such as these to continue its brutal war on the Syrian people.
There was a high risk that their funds, once unfrozen, would be at the disposal of the
regime for use in their repression of the civilian population. Therefore new grounds
for re-listing were prepared, supported by evidence from open sources that the
Council will be able to share with the Court.”
13.7 He indicates that new grounds for re-listing the four cases have been prepared during
the period of the suspension of the annulment of the original restrictive measures. They
are supported by information taken from open sources that the Council will be able to
share with the Court. He also confirms that these proposals are in accordance with
fundamental rights.
None.
14 International Code of Conduct on Outer Space
Activities
requested
Document details
Legal base
Department
Council Decision on an International Code of
Conduct for outer-space activities
Article 28 TEU; unanimity
Document number
(36606), —
14.1 In 2007, the EU launched its proposal for a voluntary, non-legally-binding
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (“Code of Conduct”). The aim is
to establish a normative framework and agreed best practices for all uses of outer space,
promote the transparent and responsible use of outer space and complement existing legal
instruments. Given the slow progress and difficulties in developing a treaty-based
approach, and the rapidly increasing dependence on space-derived services, the EU
proposed the Code of Conduct initiative as a more flexible framework that would be easier
to agree by the international community.
54
14.2 Working closely with the UK and other EU Member States, the EU produced a
preliminary draft Code of Conduct in 2008.35 On the basis of a revised draft in September
2010, the Council invited the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy to pursue consultations with third countries with the aim of establishing a text that
was acceptable to the greatest number of countries, and of subsequently adopting the Code
at an ad hoc diplomatic conference.
14.3 Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP, which was extended in January 2014 by
2014/42/CFSP, authorised the EEAS to conduct a series of activities to build further
support (four multilateral experts meetings were held, and experts from a total of 95
countries consulted, on the proposed substance).
14.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) now explains that, following the
successful conclusion of the consultative process in Luxembourg in May 2014, many States
are calling for formal multilateral negotiations on the Code of Conduct.
The draft Council Decision
14.5 The Minister then explains that this Council Decision would:
— authorise the EEAS to continue their facilitating role, moving the initiative to a
multilateral negotiating process;
— provide for continued outreach with third parties to build a broad base of support for
the Code of Conduct, as an example of a Transparency and Confidence Building
Measure (TCBM) identified in the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts’ (UN
GGE) report on TCBMs in Outer Space, of which the UK was a member;
— also provide for outreach activities to raise wider awareness of other TCBMs, in line
with the Council Decision of 29 May 2012.
14.6 The Minister goes on to say that, in order to maximise the skills and exposure to
different states and stakeholders, the EEAS propose to engage both the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) — given their previous experience of holding similar
multilateral events, particular expertise in space security and their past collaboration with
the UN GGE; given that engaging both UN agencies also demonstrates the cross-cutting
nature of the Code of Conduct, as it seeks to bridge both military and civilian uses of Outer
Space; and given that both agencies have a broader mandate to promote and support
TCBMs and to collaborate with other UN institutions to enhance space security following
the acceptance of the UN GGE report.
14.7 With regard to the future timeline, the Minister says that the EU’s present aim is for
the negotiation process to start in mid-2015, with a view to opening the Code of Conduct
for signature once the negotiations have concluded.
14.8 He also reiterates the Government’s position on the competence question:
35
See the relevant Council Conclusions.
55
“The Government has previously made clear that the EU does not have the
competence to negotiate the Code of Conduct on EU Member States’ behalf. The EU
has the authority currently: to speak or make decisions about the Code of Conduct
on the basis of unanimity among all EU Member States; to consult with third parties;
and, following the adoption of the 2012 and 2014 Council Decisions, to convene
multilateral experts meetings. This Council Decision would authorise the EEAS to
facilitate a multilateral negotiation process. The EEAS understands that any further
activity would require further explicit authorisation from the Council and that EU
Member States would still participate in this process in their own right.”
14.9 No questions arise. However, given the subject matter and the way the process is
being handled — the EU and Member States driving it forward in a way that properly
respects their respective competences, and building support from third countries, but
towards a UN-based outcome — a further Report to the House is appropriate.
14.10 The draft Council Decision notes that assistance for the implementation of the
Code of Conduct and “its point of contact” could be provided through a future Council
Decision. That would appear to be some time away. Before then, in a year’s time, we
should be grateful for an update from the Minister on what has happened by virtue of
the present proposal, and how the way ahead then looks.
14.11 In the meantime, we now clear the Council Decision.
Full details of the document: Council Decision in support of the Union proposal
for an International Code of Conduct for outer-space activities as a contribution to
transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space-activities: (36606), —.
Background
14.12 17 December 2008 Council Conclusions supported the first draft of an international
Code of Conduct for outer space activities, in which States would participate on a
voluntary basis, and which would include transparency and confidence-building measures,
as a basis for consultations with key third countries that have activities in outer space or
interests in outer space activities, with the aim of reaching a text that is acceptable to the
greatest number of countries.36 In the light of consultations with major “space-faring”
nations, the High Representative (HR)/European External Action Service (EEAS), working
with Member States, produced a revised version, on the basis of which the Council
mandated the HR, on 27 September 2010, to carry out further and wider consultations.37
14.13 The Council Decisions that the Committee cleared in 2012 and 2014 provided
funding for and authorized the EEAS, with administrative support from the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), to hold a series of meetings
involving all 71 members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, with
a view to developing a voluntary Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
36
See the relevant Council Conclusions.
37
(33884), —: Third Report HC 86-iii (2012-13), chapter 14 (23 May 2012). Also see Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities for full background.
56
14.14 In the most recent update, the Minister for Europe emphasised the UK’s dependency
on space-based technologies for a wide range of services that affect our daily lives. Despite
the ongoing delay, the Minister continued to believe that the EU-led Code of Conduct,
although not legally binding, would play a key role in delivering international co-operation
for a safe, secure and sustainable space environment — a political commitment to agreed
norms of responsible behaviour in outer space that would serve as a basis for future space
management initiatives; a series of transparency and confidence building measures; and —
with a space sector currently worth over £9bn annually to the British economy and
ambitions to raise this further to £40bn by 2030 — the well-managed level playing field in
outer space that is increasingly important to UK industry.
14.15 But there was still work to be done: the Minister reported that the latest round of
multilateral consultations on the draft Code, hosted by the EU in Luxembourg, continued
the trend of increasingly constructive discussions, leaving noticeably fewer unresolved
substantive issues. Whilst not the preferred route for all, a large number of states were
calling for formal multilateral negotiations on the draft Code, which the Minister believed
would most likely attract wider support for the initiative and where, given the role it had
played in developing the Code, the EU was the best candidate to host the negotiations.
However, mindful that some states wished to see the UN playing a key role, the EU was
currently considering a number of UN institutions as possible partners for delivery of the
negotiating conference, with a view to their then hosting the Secretariat for the Code when
it was opened for subscription. The Government was currently considering the detail of
this proposal, but believed that an EU-hosted negotiating conference with UN involvement
should allow the EU and its Member States to retain sufficient control to ensure that the
Code was finalised in a timely manner whilst generating support from those states
uncomfortable with a process taking place outside of the UN framework.
14.16 With regard to the way forward, the Minister noted that the EU had the authority
under CFSP to speak or make decisions about the Code on the basis of consensus amongst
its Member States; to consult with third parties; and to convene multilateral consultative
events. But he also noted that, although the EEAS was facilitating the process and
providing a forum for discussion, the text itself was being developed by EU Member States,
under the principle of unanimity, and EU Member States were participating in all
consultation meetings in their own right:
“the EEAS is not presenting a position on behalf of either the EU or its Member
States at these meetings. The EU does not have the authority to negotiate a final text
on Member States’ behalf. As things stand, EEAS’ mandate will have been fulfilled
once the next revised draft of the Code has been published.”
14.17 The Minister confirmed that another Council Decision would be needed in order to
take the Code to the next phase of negotiation; he did not envisage the EU seeking to
increase its role beyond facilitation, but his officials were alert to any move to do so.
14.18 The Minister saw value in the EU having a role in the Code, once it was open for
subscription (as its main architect, and given its own space interests), and given that the
57
current provisions within the text of the Code were in line with the General
Arrangements:38
“It would not preclude the UK from subscribing independently, nor from taking an
active role in the management of the Code if we wished to do so. I do not believe that
there are currently any issues concerning EU competence or external
representation.”
Our assessment
14.19 Our major concern since this proposal first emerged — by then, over two years ago
—had been to ensure that, in this process whereby Member States were essentially subcontracting the process to the EEAS, the latter did not over-reach themselves and that,
instead, Member States remained in control; in that regard, all seemed to continue to be in
good order thus far.
14.20 We looked forward to the next Council Decision, when we asked that the Minister
explain clearly and fully the roles of the EU and the UN in negotiating the Code; what role
the UN would have in administering the Code; and what the EU’s and the Member States’
position would be once the Code was open for subscription.
The draft Council Decision
14.21 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 16 January 2015, the Minister for Europe
explains that this Council Decision would:
— authorise the EEAS to continue their facilitating role, moving the initiative to a
multilateral negotiating process;
— provide for continued outreach with third parties to build a broad base of support for
the Code of Conduct, as an example of a Transparency and Confidence Building
Measure (TCBM) identified in the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts’ (UN
GGE) report on TCBMs in Outer Space, of which the UK was a member;
— provide for outreach activities to raise wider awareness of other TCBMs, in line with
the Council Decision of 29 May 2012; and
— authorise the EEAS to enter into an agreement with external implementing agencies to
provide administrative support, in the same way as previous Council Decisions on this
subject.
14.22 The Minister recalls that Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP of 29 May 2012, which
was extended in January 2014 by Council Decision 2014/42/CFSP, authorised the EEAS to
conduct a series of engagement activities to consult on, and build further support for, the
Code of Conduct. He continues thus:
38
General Arrangements for EU Statements in multilateral organisations. For the Committee’s consideration of the
General Arrangements, see Fifty-fourth Report HC 428-xlix (2010-12), chapter 18 (1 February 2012).
58
“These activities included four multilateral experts meetings, which promoted the
initiative and consulted experts from a total of 95 countries on the proposed
substance of the Code of Conduct. These meetings have been valuable in building
awareness and support for the draft Code and in seeking to establish a text that meets
the expectations of all interested states.
“Following the successful conclusion of the consultative process in Luxembourg in
May 2014, many states are calling for formal multilateral negotiations on the Code of
Conduct. This Council Decision would authorise the EEAS to continue their
facilitating role, moving the initiative to a multilateral negotiating process. The
Decision would also provide for continued outreach with third parties to build a
broad base of support for the Code of Conduct, as an example of a Transparency and
Confidence Building Measure (TCBM) identified in the 2013 UN Group of
Governmental Experts’ (UN GGE) report on TCBMs in Outer Space, of which the
UK was a member. The Council Decision also provides for outreach activities to
raise wider awareness of other TCBMs, in line with the Council Decision of 29 May
2012.
“The Council Decision would authorise the EEAS to enter into an agreement with
external implementing agencies to provide administrative support, in the same way
as previous Council Decisions on this subject. In order to maximise the skills and
exposure to different states and stakeholders, the EEAS propose to engage both the
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) given their previous experience
of holding similar multilateral events, particular expertise in space security and their
past collaboration with the UN GGE. Engaging both UN agencies also demonstrates
the cross-cutting nature of the Code of Conduct, as it seeks to bridge both military
and civilian uses of Outer Space. Both agencies have a broader mandate to promote
and support TCBMs and to collaborate with other UN institutions to enhance space
security following the acceptance of the UN GGE report.
“The EU’s present aim is for the negotiation process on the Code of Conduct to start
in mid-2015, with a view to opening the Code of Conduct for signature once the
negotiations have concluded. The EEAS are considering different ways in which to
achieve this, in consultation with EU Member States and other supporters of the
initiative. Potential approaches include the EEAS’ original proposal to hold an ad hoc
diplomatic conference, and reference to the UN General Assembly.”
14.23 On the matter of EU and Member States competence, the Minister says:
“The Government has previously made clear that the EU does not have the
competence to negotiate the Code of Conduct on EU Member States’ behalf. The EU
has the authority currently: to speak or make decisions about the Code of Conduct
on the basis of unanimity among all EU Member States; to consult with third parties;
and, following the adoption of the 2012 and 2014 Council Decisions, to convene
multilateral experts meetings. This Council Decision would authorise the EEAS to
facilitate a multilateral negotiation process. The EEAS understands that any further
activity would require further explicit authorisation from the Council and that EU
Member States would still participate in this process in their own right.”
59
14.24 The Minister also says:
“Since its inception, the Code of Conduct has been an EU-led initiative. Given the
expertise and international contacts the EEAS has developed to date, we believe it is
appropriate for them to continue to take forward the initiative and we judge that this
does not pose any subsidiarity issues, not least as the UK will continue to participate
in the process in its own right.”
14.25 The Minister continues his comments as follows:
“The UK has been a consistent supporter of the proposed International Code of
Conduct of Outer Space Activities. The Government is supportive of the EEAS’
continued leadership of this phase of the process, and therefore supports the
proposed Council Decision.
“An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities is one of the
deliverables set out in the UK’s first National Space Security Policy, published in
April 2014.39 The Government regards the Code of Conduct as a valuable means of
building trust, transparency and predictability in the uses of outer space, and
enhancing safety, sustainability and security in an increasingly congested and
competitive environment. It will provide a mechanism for coordinating responses to
space debris, including risk mitigation and avoidance. With little chance of progress
on a legally-binding agreement in the short-medium term, and with the UK and
other states’ increasing dependence on space-derived services for communications,
observation data and navigation, the UK considers the Code of Conduct as currently
the only viable international instrument to regulate outer space activities, and a
necessary first-step towards a longer-term goal of verifiable and equitable arms
control in space.
“It is important that the Code gains broad support from around the world from
States at different stages of their space-faring development. It is the Government’s
opinion that moving to a phase of negotiations would most likely attract that broad
basis of support for the initiative, as well as maintain the support the Code of
Conduct has already attracted to date. The UK, along with other EU Member States
and the UN Secretary General, feels that this process would allow for the greatest
number of states to engage with the initiative and the Government judges that,
despite being negotiated outside of the UN framework, the process would be
consistent with the conclusions and recommendations of the UN GGE.
“The UK has worked hard to support the EEAS in building momentum behind the
initiative and bringing third parties on board. The United States, in particular,
continues to value the UK Government’s role as a key interlocutor to drive forward
39
According to the Government, the National Space Security Policy “sets out a coherent approach to the UK’s space
security interests and outlines measures to make the United Kingdom more resilient to the risk of disruption to
space services and capabilities, enhance our national security interests through space, promote a safe and more
secure space environment and enable industry and academia to exploit science and grasp commercial
opportunities”.
60
progress among EU Member States and build support from third countries. A
number of other like-minded states including Japan and Australia have publicly
announced their support and have engaged actively in the last two years to
complement the EU and UK’s efforts to maximise support.”
14.26 With regard to the Financial Implications, the Minister says:
“The budget approved in the May 2012 Council Decision was €1,490,000. The
breakdown of spend is attached at Annex A. Due to savings made during the course
of the activities undertaken, it was possible to conduct a further multilateral
consultation meeting within the existing budget as provided for by Council Decision
2012/281/CFSP.”
14.27 The breakdown of the forecast spend for the projects to be carried out under this
Council Decision are, the Minister says, as follows:
— Regional or sub-regional seminars: Promotion of political commitments to encourage
responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, Outer Space: €296,151;
— Small outreach events: Promotion of political commitments to encourage responsible
actions in and the peaceful use of, Outer Space: €51,688;
— Organisation of open-ended multilateral negotiation meetings: €568,910;
— Project management and staff costs: €252,424;
— Contingencies and Indirect Costs: €105,226
Total: €1,274,399
14.28 The budget has been calculated “using a combination of UN budgeting tools (for
estimating administrative costs, daily subsistence allowance, hospitality costs), previous
experience of hosting multilateral meetings, and estimates taken from EU Commission
Guidelines for flights and per diems. The locations for events will be chosen to capture the
widest possible audience to ensure extensive international reach; some external experts
provide their services free of charge, and the budget covers only travel and subsistence for
them where this is required”.
14.29 The Minister also notes that there is no additional financial burden on the UK as a
result of this decision, which will be taken from the 2014 CFSP budget.
14.30 Finally, with regard to the Timetable, the Minister says that, in order for the EEAS to
sign contracts with the implementing agents within the current budget and begin outreach
leading up to negotiations, the Council Decision would need to be adopted by early
February 2015.
None, but see (33884), — and (35714), —: Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014–15), chapter 37
(3 September 2014), Thirty-first Report HC 83-xxviii (2013–14), chapter 14 (22 January
2014) and (33884), —: Third Report HC 86-iii (2012–13), chapter 14 (23 May 2012).
61
Annex
Provisional spend figures for Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2014/42/CFSP.
The final spend figures are currently undergoing UN auditing procedures.
TOTAL BUDGET
Heading
Project
Amount (€)
1
Outreach activities including three regional seminars
265,000
2
Background Support to the High Representative
3
Organisation of Multilateral ‘Kick-off’ Meeting (May 2012) and
three Multilateral Experts Meetings (May and November 2013 and
May 2014)
440,000
4
Co-ordination of non-governmental experts and visibility actions
120,000
5
Programme management, administration and staff costs
505,000
8,000
Total expenditure
1,338,000
Total budget provided for by 2012 Council Decision
1,490,000
62
15 Documents not raising questions of sufficient legal
or political importance to warrant a substantive report
to the House
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
(36594)
17119/14
COM(14) 744
Draft Council Decision on the position to be taken within the
Committee on Trade in Goods set up by the Free Trade Agreement
between the European Union and its Member States, and the
Republic of Korea, as regards the adoption of the rules on TRQ
administration.
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(36581)
17022/14
+ ADD 1
COM(14) 738
Commission Seventh Annual Report on the Implementation of the
European Fisheries Fund.
(36586)
17088/14
COM(14) 746
Draft Council Decision establishing the position to be adopted with
regard to proposals for amendments of Annex III to the Rotterdam
Convention.
Department for International Development
(36575)
16855/14
+ ADD 1
COM(14) 712
Commission First Biennial Report — Implementing EU food and
nutrition security policy commitments.
Department for Transport
(36576)
—
—
European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No. 21/2014 — EU-funded
airport infrastructures: Poor value for money (pursuant to Article
287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU).
(35160)
—
—
Article 10(4) of Protocol 36 to the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) —
The ‘2014 Decision’ Measures that are the responsibility of HM
Treasury, HMRC, Department for Transport and Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.
63
HM Revenue and Customs
(36588)
17111/14
COM(14) 745
Commission Report — Final evaluation of the Fiscalis 2013
programme.
Home Office
(35156)
—
—
Explanatory Memorandum (EM) on Article 10(4) of Protocol 36 to the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU) — The ‘2014 Decision’ Schengen
Measures.
(35157)
—
—
The ‘2014 Decision’ EU agencies, mutual legal assistance, drugs and
proceeds of crime.
(35158)
—
—
The ‘2014 Decision’ Extradition, crime (including cyber and organised
crime), fraud and counterfeiting, databases and automated
information exchange, and all others.
Ministry of Justice
(35159)
—
—
The ‘2014 Decision’ Ministry of Justice measures.
64
Formal minutes
Wednesday 21 January 2015
Members present:
Sir William Cash, in the Chair
Andrew Bingham
Mr James Clappison
Michael Connarty
Geraint Davies
Kelvin Hopkins
Jacob Rees-Mogg
Henry Smith
Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg declared a pecuniary interest in relation to the documents covered in
chapter 2 in this Report, in accordance with the Resolution of the House of 13 July 1992.
Draft Report, proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1.1 to 1.4 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 1.5 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 1.6 to 15 read and agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Thirtieth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
****
[Adjourned till Wednesday 28 January at 2.00pm.
65
Standing Order and membership
The European Scrutiny Committee is appointed under Standing Order No.143 to examine European Union
documents and—
a)
to report its opinion on the legal and political importance of each such document and, where it considers
appropriate, to report also on the reasons for its opinion and on any matters of principle, policy or law which
may be affected;
b)
to make recommendations for the further consideration of any such document pursuant to Standing Order
No. 119 (European Committees); and
c)
to consider any issue arising upon any such document or group of documents, or related matters.
The expression “European Union document” covers —
i)
any proposal under the Community Treaties for legislation by the Council or the Council acting jointly with
the European Parliament;
ii)
any document which is published for submission to the European Council, the Council or the European
Central Bank;
iii) any proposal for a common strategy, a joint action or a common position under Title V of the Treaty on
European Union which is prepared for submission to the Council or to the European Council;
iv)
v)
any proposal for a common position, framework decision, decision or a convention under Title VI of the
Treaty on European Union which is prepared for submission to the Council;
any document (not falling within (ii), (iii) or (iv) above) which is published by one Union institution for or
with a view to submission to another Union institution and which does not relate exclusively to consideration
of any proposal for legislation;
vi)
any other document relating to European Union matters deposited in the House by a Minister of the Crown.
The Committee’s powers are set out in Standing Order No. 143.
The scrutiny reserve resolution, passed by the House, provides that Ministers should not give agreement to EU
proposals which have not been cleared by the European Scrutiny Committee, or on which, when they have been
recommended by the Committee for debate, the House has not yet agreed a resolution. The scrutiny reserve
resolution is printed with the House’s Standing Orders, which are available at www.parliament.uk.
Current membership
Sir William Cash MP (Conservative, Stone) (Chair)
Andrew Bingham MP (Conservative, High Peak)
Mr James Clappison MP (Conservative, Hertsmere)
Michael Connarty MP (Labour, Linlithgow and East Falkirk)
Geraint Davies MP (Labour/Cooperative, Swansea West)
Julie Elliott MP (Labour, Sunderland Central)
Stephen Gilbert MP (Liberal Democrat, St Austell and Newquay)
Nia Griffith MP (Labour, Llanelli)
Chris Heaton-Harris MP (Conservative, Daventry)
Kelvin Hopkins MP (Labour, Luton North)
Chris Kelly MP (Conservative, Dudley South)
Stephen Phillips MP (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)
Jacob Rees-Mogg MP (Conservative, North East Somerset)
Mrs Linda Riordan MP (Labour/Cooperative, Halifax)
Henry Smith MP (Conservative, Crawley)
Mr Michael Thornton MP (Liberal Democrat, Eastleigh)
The following members were also members of the committee during the parliament:
Mr Joe Benton MP (Labour, Bootle)
Jim Dobbin MP (Labour/Co-op, Heywood and Middleton)
Tim Farron MP (Liberal Democrat, Westmorland and Lonsdale)
66
Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North)
Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock)
Ian Swales MP (Liberal Democrat, Redcar)

Documents considered by the Committee on 21 January 2015

Transcription

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