Implementation Deficit: Why Member States Do Not Comply With

Transcription

Implementation Deficit: Why Member States Do Not Comply
With CARICOM Directives
Paul C. Clement 1
Caribbean Future Forum
UWI, 5th -7th May 2015
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is at a crossroad. The recent decision by
CARICOM leaders to “pause” the Single Economy project brought to the forefront the
longstanding frustration with deepening regional integration. Some analysts have argued
that regional integration in the Caribbean is not advancing because of external factors such
as global financial crises. Through a case study of CARICOM’s efforts to create a Caribbean
Single Market and Economy (CSME), this paper argues that CARICOM has failed to deepen
effectively its integration process due to obstacles at the national level. Using a general
inductive approach, the paper traces the progress of CARICOM states in implementing
regional directives while analyzing internal political conditions to explain observed patterns.
The paper identifies national priorities among member governments and domestic
constitutional arrangements as key obstacles to CARICOM integration. This research
finding supports the argument that whether states make commitments to deepen regional
integration and the political effects of these commitments depend on domestic factors. The
paper concludes that both for the future of Caribbean integration and the study of regional
integration in the developing world, domestic factors that influence a country’s ability to
implement regional decisions should be considered. National priorities among member
governments and domestic constitutional arrangements are two of these factors.
Introduction
Since the signing of the Grand Anse Declaration, in July 1989, the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) has failed to deepen effectively its integration process.2
CARICOM is an organization of fifteen countries with the goals of economic integration,
1
Paul C. Clement is an Associate Professor of Economics and Chair of the Department of Social Sciences at
FIT, State University of New York (SUNY), New York, NY10001.
2
Deepening integration refers to eliminating trade barriers among member states. Moving from a free trade
area to an economic union or supranational institution.
1
foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation.3 Deepening integration refers to
closer cooperation among members towards the creation of a supranational institution.
Thirteen Heads of Government signed the Grand Anse Declaration in July 1989 with the
goal of establishing a Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) by July 4, 1993.4
More than two decades after this historic signing, the CSME is still not a reality. Expressing
his views on the CSME progress, the late Prime Minister of Grenada, George Brizan stated,
“there is no doubt that CARICOM is experiencing a severe crisis.”5 Brizan’s comments are
rooted in the reality of a decline in intra-regional trade and the tendency for member states
to breach the regional treaty. As a result, it is increasingly common for politicians and
scholars to claim that CARICOM is facing a serious “implementation deficit.” 6
The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas established CARICOM. The members of the
organization are: (1) Antigua and Barbuda; (2) The Bahamas; (3) Barbados;
(4) Belize; (5) Dominica; (6) Grenada; (7) Guyana; (8) Haiti; (9) Jamaica;
(10) Montserrat; (11) St. Kitts and Nevis; (12) St. Lucia; (13) Suriname;
(14) St. Vincent and the Grenadines; and (15) Trinidad and Tobago.7 According to a
CARICOM report, most CARICOM states share the following preconditions for deepening
regional integration: similar social and political institutions, stable political leadership, and
longstanding democratic traditions.8 As a result, it is puzzling that the organization has failed
to meet targeted dates set to establish the CSME. The Grand Anse Declaration states, “we
are determined to work towards the establishment, in the shortest possible time, of a Single
Market and Economy for the Caribbean Community. To that end, we shall ensure that the
following steps are taken no later than July 4, 1993.”9 However, the late Norman Girvan
pointed out that “target dates were variously set and missed in July 1993, December 1999,
3
Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), CARICOM Report No.2
(Buenos Aires: IDB-INTAL, August 2005), 1.
4
The thirteen CARICOM Heads of Government were representing the following states: 1. Antigua &
Barbuda 2. Bahamas 3. Barbados 4. Belize 5. Dominica 6. Grenada 7. Guyana 8. Jamaica 9. St. Kitts &
Nevis 10. St. Lucia 11. Suriname 12. St. Vincent & the Grenadines 13. Trinidad &Tobago. CARICOM
Secretariat, “Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the tenth Heads of Government Conference of the
Caribbean Community, July 3-7, 1989 (Georgetown: Caribbean Community Secretariat, 1989).
5
George Brizan, interview with author, St. George’s, Grenada, April 13, 2007.
6
Implementation deficit is defined as the difference between number of directives required by CARICOM
to complete the CSME and the actual number of directives implemented at a point in time.
7
Caribbean Association of Investment Agencies (CAIPA), http://www.caipainvest.org/members-ipas/stkitts-and-nevis.html. See also http://uicifd.blogspot.com/2005_10_01_archive.html?
8
(Buenos Aires: IDB-INTAL, August 2005), 28. For a discussion on the Caribbean as a region that has
sustained a tradition of liberal democracy, see Jorge Dominguez, Robert Pastor, and De Lisle Worrell,
Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic, and Social Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993).
CARICOM Secretariat, “Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the tenth Heads of Government
Conference of the Caribbean Community, July 3-7 1989, Grand Anse, Grenada.” (Georgetown: Caribbean
Community Secretariat, 1989). See Shridath Ramphal, “Laboring in the Vineyard,” Huntington News, May
28, 2012, http://www.huntingtonnews.net/33766.
9
2
December 2000 and December 2005.” 10 CARICOM missed its target date for the full
implementation of the Single Economy in December 2008. On May 22, 2011, CARICOM
placed the Single Economy project on “pause.”11 The “pause,” as explained in a press
statement was due to the realization that “the process towards full implementation would
take longer than anticipated.”12 Why then, given the above-mentioned favorable
preconditions, is regional integration so challenging for CARICOM? This puzzle motivates
the overarching question of this paper: why are member states not complying with
CARICOM directives?
The Analytical Framework
The overall analytical framework developed to guide this study addresses the
following questions: First, what evidence exists to confirm the relative failure of CARICOM
to deepen its integration process? Second, if an implementation deficit exists why are
member states not complying with CARICOM’s directives?13
The first question on the status of the CSME compliance record is addressed by
examining the extent to which actions required for implementation were completed.14
Whereas Girvan’s study presented the CSME’s overall level of compliance for 2004, this
study extends Girvan’s analysis to include the overall level of compliance, as well as the
compliance rates for individual member states over the period 2004-2007. A key expectation
in measuring implementation rates over time is the ability to compare compliance rates by
categories and across countries. Additionally, this approach allows for the comparison of
speed of implementation and transparency of the issues that the directives involve. The
period under study was limited only by the availability of data from CARICOM.
The CSME implementation rates from 2004 to 2007 were computed from
CARICOM data reports entitled “Establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy Summary of Status of Key Elements.”15 The CARICOM Secretariat lists 12
categories in the CSME Program that corresponds to the nine directives amending the Treaty
of Chaguaramas. Following Girvan’s approach, the 12 categories were grouped into three
main areas of Legal and Institutional Infrastructure, Single Market provisions and Single
Economy provisions. This evaluation focuses on CARICOM’s directives, which specify
Norman Girvan, “CSME: Status of Implementation of Main Elements,” in Kenneth Hall, Myrtle ChuckA-Sang, CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Challenges, Benefits, Prospects (Kingston: Ian Randle
Publishers, 2007), 65.
10
11
CARICOM Secretariat, CARICOM Leaders Seek Greater Focus on Prosperity for the People. May 22,
Press Release, 2011 (Georgetown: Caribbean Community Secretariat, 2011),
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/press_releases_2011/pres192_11.jsp.
12
Ibid.
13
Directives or protocols are used interchangeably in this paper. They are amendments to the original Treaty
of Chaguaramas to be implemented by the twelve-member states.
14
Norman Girvan, “Whither Me,” Journal of Caribbean International Relations, no.1 (2005), 14.
15
CARICOM Secretariat, Matrix of Agreement, http://www.caricomlaw.org/agreements.php.
3
actions that each member state must undertake to meet CSME commitments. A directive is
completed when all twelve-member states have fulfilled their particular responsibility.
The second question is concerned with exploring why the implementation of some
regional directives succeed or fail. The study traces the progress of CARICOM states in
implementing CSME directives while analyzing internal political conditions to describe
levels of compliance. In the case of the Caribbean, national governments are the most
dominant actors in the politics of integration. According to Axline, “CARIFTA and
CARICOM were established as intergovernmental organizations where the idea of sovereign
equality prevails, and policies require the approval of all governments in order to be
adopted.”16 Therefore, CARICOM governments stand between the domestic and regional
levels and mediate the domestic-regional interaction. In this case, the Prime Minister or
his/her designee acts as the country’s representative at the CARICOM Heads of Government
Conference.
The willingness of member governments to implement regional policies is only a
starting point for the study of domestic constraints on CARICOM’s integration. The Revised
Treaty rule for all members clearly states that “decisions of competent organs considered
under this treaty shall be subject to the applicable constitutional procedures of the member
states before creating legally binding rights and obligations for nationals of such states.”17 In
other words, the directives for establishing the CSME are subject to the constitutional
procedures of the twelve participating states. In the case of CARICOM states, the
Westminster constitutional arrangements with the two-thirds majority parliamentary vote
and a public referendum for amending the constitutions is required in nine of the twelve
participating states. This multi-level governance system leaves much space for constitutional
interpretations as well as for informal lobbying and bargaining at the national level. This
system sets up an adversarial political interaction between the opposition and the ruling party
that thus slows down the integration process.
The CSME Implementation Record: 2004-2007
What is the overall level of compliance for the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy? This question has plagued CARICOM since it failed to meet its ambitious goals
in 1993. CARICOM leaders have claimed, with hardly any empirical evidence of support,
that one of the main challenges facing the CSME is an “implementation deficit.” 18 The
implementation deficit is defined as the difference between the total CARICOM directives
to be implemented and the actual number of directives implemented. While the benefits of
16
Andrew Axline, Caribbean Integration: The Politics of Regionalism (London: Nichols Pub. Co., 1979),
187.
17
Critics have argued that this rule is not applied evenly across the region because no country held a
referendum asking the member states to accept the CARICOM Treaty. CARICOM Secretariat, Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas, Article 240 (1). http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_ treaty-text.pdf.
18
Ian Boxhill, Ideology and Caribbean Integration (Kingston: University of the West Indies, 1993), 1.
Rickey Singh, Confronting CARICOM’s Implementation Deficit, Jamaica Observer Online,
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Today-s-harsh-realities-in-Caricom.
4
understanding implementation rates in the integration process have been documented in other
regions, there has been a dearth of systematic reviews of this important task for the Caribbean
community. 19 This study advances the understanding of the integration process by utilizing
new empirical data (2005-2007) to assess the implementation status of the CSME project
over the period 2004-2007.20 This study utilizes CARICOM records and reports to compute
both the overall and individual levels of compliance for the CSME. An explanation of the
CSME implementation process is followed by a summary of the CSME implementation
record. The results are presented in Table 1.
Explaining the CSME implementation process
The process of implementing the CSME involves the removal of restrictions and
making arrangements for the rights envisioned in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
enforceable.21 Explaining the relative failure of CARICOM to deepen its integration process
is primarily concerned with identifying the main obstacles to the implementation of the
CSME directives. Implementation is taken to include all activities required to realize the
operation of the CSME and the legal and institutional infrastructure. Directives indicate
specific actions that each member state must undertake to meet its CSME commitments.
Since parliaments must ratify these changes into domestic law, it is at this stage that
CARICOM experiences what is sometimes referred to in the literature as an “implementation
deficit.”22
The implementation process begins with agenda proposals from all members of the
CARICOM Heads of Government Conference. Since the Heads of Government Conference
has no supranational powers, CARICOM as an organization lacks the ability to condition the
nature of the policies adopted. As a result, member states maintain a substantial and
prominent role. One way in which states exercise their influence is through their veto power
and representation in the Heads of Government Conference. Each CSME issue is voted on
and must receive unanimous approval from the Heads of Government before being delivered
to each member state for implementation. As a result, the regional agenda tends to reflect
member state concerns, rather than being the result of thinking through what CSME
initiatives could be top priorities for the region as a whole.23 Thus, the CSME activities
See Lisa Martin, “The influence of National Parliaments on European Integration,” in Barry
Eichengreen, Jeffrey Frieden and Jurgen von Hagen, eds., Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), 65.
19
20
CARICOM has not released implementation records since 2007, thus the reason for the limited 20042007 data analysis. See CARICOM Secretariat, Matrix of Agreements, and List of Agreement, Treaties,
Directives, MOUs, Declarations and Instruments of Ratification (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat,
2003). http://www.caricomlaw.org/agreements.php.
21
The John Kissoon Report, Implementing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, 51.
See Norman Girvan, “Whither CSME,” Journal of Caribbean International Relations, no. 1 (April
2005):11.
22
23
Richard Stoneman, Duke Pollard and Hugo Inniss, Turning Around CARICOM: Proposals to Restructure
the Secretariat (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 2012), 42.
5
undertaken through regional integration can be explained in terms of the national interests of
the member states.
The CARICOM Secretariat monitors the implementation of directives in member
states and lists the directives of the CSME program in reports entitled “Establishment of the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy Summary of Status of Key Elements.”24
Governments’ implementation performance is monitored through a scheduled program
negotiated and approved by the community. According to the CARICOM Secretariat, “the
member states carry out their scheduled program, notifying the CARICOM Secretariat at
regular intervals of the actions undertaken.”25 The CARICOM Secretariat then publishes
informational reports on the number of actions taken at the national level. One caveat,
however, is that due to limited resources and lack of institutional capacity, CARICOM does
not provide a general analysis of the reports.
Summary of the CSME Implementation Record
Having explained the CARICOM policy implementation process, Table 1 presents a
summary of the implementation status of the CSME for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and
2007. The Table reflects data from the following CARICOM Secretariat documents:
“Establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary of Status of Key
Elements, dated as of October 2004, February 2005, November 2006, and May 2007.”26
Table 1 includes the twelve member states that are fully participating in the CSME
and capable of carrying out its commitments. Following Girvan’s method, the overall degree
of implementation is measured by computing the total number of directives that need to be
carried out by all entities concerned, then by identifying the number carried out to date, and
finally by expressing the latter as a proportion of the former.27 Table 1 shows the overall
level of CSME compliance from 2004 to 2007. The overall level of compliance in 2004 was
39%; in 2005 38%; in 2006 37%; and in 2007 approximately 38%. In 2007, the category
with the lowest compliance level was the Facilitation of Travel. The transfer of Social
Security Benefits had the best compliance rate. These results clearly show the extent to which
member governments are experiencing great difficulty in implementing CARICOM policies
at the national level. To summarize, Table 1 column 1, lists the three main categories of the
Revised Treaty and their sub-headings: (A) The Legal and Institutional Infrastructure; (B)
The Single Market; and (C) The Single Economy. Columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 shows the total
24
CARICOM Secretariat.
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/single_market_index.jsp?menu=csme.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
See Norman Girvan, “Whither CSME,” Journal of Caribbean International Relations, no. 1 (April
2005):11.
27
6
Table 1. The CSME Implementation Summary Status, 2004-2007
CATEGORY
Total Required Directives¹
1
A. LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
1.
Treaty Revision
No. of Directives Completed
% of Directives Completed
2004
2
180
2005
3
192
2006
4
192
2007
5
168
2004
6
136
2005
7
157
2006
8
152
2007
9
129
2004
10
75.5
2005
11
81.7
2006
12
79.1
2007
13
76.7
60
60
60
36
52
57
59
36
86.7
95.0
98.3
100
2.
National Administration²
24
36
36
36
24
35
35
35
100
97.2
97.2
97.2
3.
Enforcement and Regulation
96
96
96
96
60
65
58
58
62.5
67.7
60.4
60.4
3.1.
Caribbean Court of Justice
(original)
Caribbean Court of Justice
(Appellate)
CROSQ (Standards &
Quality
36
36
36
36
31
35
25
25
86.1
97.2
97.2
97.2
12
12
12
12
0
2
2
2
0
16.6
16.6
16.6
36
36
36
36
26
26
29
29
72.2
62.5
80.6
80.6
National Compet.
Authorities.
12
12
12
12
3
2
2
2
25.0
16.7
16.7
16.7
336
60
336
24
288
24
288
24
215
44
179
14
181
17
181
17
63.9
73.3
53.2
58.3
62.8
70.8
62.8
70.8
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
B. SINGLE MARKET
4.
Free Movement of Goods
5.
Free Movement of Services
24
12
12
12
19
12
6
6
79.2
100
50.0
50.0
6.
Free Movement of Persons
156
156
156
156
93
94
99
99
59.6
60.3
63.5
63.5
6.1.
Free Movement of Skills
60
60
60
60
44
45
43
43
73.3
75.0
71.7
71.7
6.2.
Contingent Rights
n.a
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
6.3.
Facilitation of Travel
48
48
48
48
12
12
19
19
25.0
25.0
39.6
39.6
6.4.
Accreditation &Equivalency
24
24
24
24
15
15
15
15
62.5
62.5
62.5
62.5
6.5.
Transfer Soc Sec Benefits
24
24
24
24
22
22
22
22
91.7
91.7
91.7
91.7
7.
Free Movement of Capital
72
72
72
72
46
46
46
46
63.9
63.9
63.9
63.9
7.1.
Removal of Restrictions
24
24
24
24
12
12
12
12
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
7.2.
Capital Market Integration
24
24
24
24
14
14
14
14
58.3
58.3
58.3
58.3
7.3.
Double Taxation Agreement
24
24
24
24
20
20
20
20
83.3
83.3
83.3
83.3
8.
Right of Establishment
24
24
24
24
13
13
13
13
54.2
54.2
54.2
54.2
420
36
420
36
444
36
444
36
18
14
17
14
28
25
28
25
4.2
38.9
4.0
38.9
6.3
69.4
6.3
69.4
C. SINGLE ECONOMY
9.
Common External Policy
10.
Harmonization of Laws
168
168
192
192
3
2
2
2
1.8
1.1
1.0
1.0
11.
Sectoral Program &
Enabling Environment
72
72
72
72
1
1
1
1
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
12.
Common Support Measures
144
144
144
144
0
0
0
0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
13.
Public Education
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
14.
TOTAL
936
948
924
900
369
361
338
338
39.0
38.0
37.0
38.0
Source: http://www.caricom.org. Author compiled from documents “Establishment of CARICOM Single Market and
Economy: Summary of Status of Key Elements.” October 2004, January 2005, April 2006, May 2007.
required directives member states must adopt. Columns 6, 7, 8, and 9, indicates the number
of directives completed by all participating states. The “Percentage of Directives Completed”
shown in columns 10, 11, 12, and 13 represents the percentage of directives completed by
7
all states. Row 14 columns 10, 11, 12 and 13 show the overall level of compliance. For
example, for the year 2005, the data shows the CSME operating at 38% level of compliance.
That is the number of directives completed for 2005, 361, divided by the total required
directives for 2005, 948, in percentage equals 38% (361/948 X100/1 = 38%). The overall
implementation deficit in this case is 62% (100% -38% =62%). The overall level of
compliance for the years 2004,2005,2006,2007 were 39.0%, 38.0%, 37.0% and 38%
respectively. An important note is that the 948 in 2005 includes those directives not
implemented in 2004.
Although very few analysts would be surprised that the CSME is experiencing an
implementation deficit, a key contribution of this study is the identification of the Single
Economy as the category with the most serious implementation deficit. The Single Economy
had an implementation deficit of 94 percent or a compliance rate of only six percent. This
revelation is critical and timely since CARICOM is at a crossroad on how to address the
Single Market and Single Economy dilemma. Norman Girvan claimed, “there has been very
little progress in implementing the CSME since the Single Market was inaugurated with
much fanfare in 2006.”28 The May 21, 2011 announcement that the Caribbean Single
Economy was on “pause” has substantiated Girvan’s claim. The following section discusses
the CSME implementation rates and seeks the answer to the following question: Why are
member states not complying with CARICOM’s directives?
Explaining CSME Policy Implementation Mismatch
The evidence presented in this paper supports the argument that CARICOM has
failed to deepen effectively its integration process. The analysis of the status of the CSME
implementation project confirmed a policy ‘implementation deficit’ asserted by politicians
and scholars. A surprising discovery however, is the CARICOM Single Economy as an
outlier with a dismal implementation deficit of 94 percent. This revelation is important to
CARICOM policymakers since the Single Economy implementation deficit is a serious
threat to the development of CARICOM policies and thus to the strengthening of the
integration process. The data in this paper shows that in 2007 the CSME was operating at
about thirty-eight percent overall level of compliance. That is an implementation deficit of
62 percent. The three main categories, Legal and Institutional Infrastructure, CARICOM
Single Market and the CARICOM Single Economy, were functioning but not at the level of
effectiveness expected by the community. Their compliance grades were as follows: Legal
and Institutional Infrastructure, seventy-six percent; CARICOM Single Economy sixty-two
percent; and the CARICOM Single Economy, six percent. These empirical results support
the claim that CARICOM has failed to reach its goal of establishing a CSME. This paper
seeks a deeper explanation of the implementation deficit by using a two-pronged approach
to analyze and explain the implementation rates of the CSME from 2004-2007. The first
Norman Girvan, “CARICOM’s Original Sin,” Address to CARICOM Regional Civil Society
Consultation, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 10-11 February 2011,
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/caricoms-original-sin.pdf.
28
8
approach analyzes the mismatch between CARICOM’s ambitious implementation agenda
and the overall levels of compliance. The second approach traces the progress of CARICOM
states in implementing regional policies while analyzing internal political conditions to
explain observed patterns.
A noticeable contradiction from the CARICOM data is the mismatch between
CARICOM’s ambitious implementation schedule of directives and the low level of
compliance. Table 2 shows that in the year 2004, 936 directives were scheduled to be
implemented and only 369 were actually implemented. In 2005, 948 directives were
scheduled to be implemented, and only 361 were implemented. In 2006, 924 directives were
scheduled to be implemented, and only 338 were implemented. In 2007, 900 directives were
scheduled to be implemented, and only 338 were implemented. An analysis of the overall
implementation rates for 2004 and 2005 (columns 10 and 11), reveal that the implementation
rates decreased from 39 percent to 38 percent in 2004 and 2005 respectively and the total
number of directives scheduled increased from 936 in 2004 to 948 in 2005.
Table
CATEGORY
2
CSME
Policy
Implementation
Mismatch,
2004-2007
Total Required Directives
2004
2005
2006
2007
2
3
4
5
180
192
192
168
2004
2005
2006
2007
6
7
8
9
136
157
152
129
2004
2005
2006
2007
10
11
12
13
75.5
81.7
79.1
76.7
B.SINGLE MARKET
336
336
288
288
215
179
181
181
63.9
53.2
62.8
62.8
C. SINGLE ECONOMY
420
420
444
444
18
17
28
28
4.2
4.0
6.3
6.3
TOTAL
936
948
924
900
369
361
338
338
39.0
38.0
37.0
38.0
1
A. LEGAL &
INSTITUTIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Source: http://www.caricom.org. Author compiled from documents “Establishment of CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary
of Status of Key Elements.” October 2004, January 2005, April 2006, May 2007.
What explains the Heads of Governments’ decision to add directives to an already
“overloaded” agenda? Why do Caribbean leaders agree to ambitious regional integration
directives without considering the chances of getting them through the bureaucracy and
parliaments back home? This observation poses a puzzle that provides insight into the
influence of domestic factors on the implementation of CARICOM policies at the national
level.
An examination of the Single Economy category provides a solution to the puzzle.
The research shows that an “Investment Code Directive” and “Accreditation Directive” was
added to the agenda. The directives were adopted by the Heads of Governments Conference
and added to the “key elements to be implemented” by member states. However, these two
directives were expected to be strongly challenged in some MDC states, with Barbados
leading the charge. The Investment Agreement and Investment Code were not expected to
be implemented at the domestic level because of Barbados’ opposition to the “test of
9
ownership and control” clause in the directive.29 According to Francoise Hendy, Barbados’
Director of International Business, the “test of ownership and control” clause made it clear
that to qualify for benefits under the CARICOM Investment Code an investor must have
more than fifty percent equity interest “owned by a person who is a citizen of the member
state in which the company or legal entity is a national.”30 Hendy, a strong opponent to the
directive, claims that this clause was counter-productive to the interests of some foreign
investors already conducting business in Barbados.31 Hendy stated, “crafting unwarranted
limitations on the source of the investment does not send the right signals to regional nor
extra-regional investors.”32
An important question then is why did this directive get the support of the Heads of
Governments Conference? Why in light of opposition in Barbados to the “Investment Code”
and “Accreditation Directives,” were these directives added to the already overloaded
implementation schedule? The research revealed that these directives were added because
the process of adding directives to the CARICOM agenda made it easy for the governments
to do so, as well as potential domestic political benefits from an upcoming general election.
What are these political benefits? National leaders must demonstrate to their constituency
that their policies in support of regional integration are contributing to national economic
wellbeing by creating jobs in the domestic market. Therefore, at the regional level, the goal
of supporting the “Investment Code” and “Accreditation Directives,” was to appease the
domestic constituency and increase the re-election chances of the incumbent government.
Brizan’s opinion on similar directives is revealing. Heads of government tend to support
directives based on either domestic political conditions or the ideological perspectives of
their political party.33 The investment code protected local investors and made it mandatory
that they share any foreign investment in the local economy. In an election year, the political
benefits from local businesses could be substantial ranging from campaign contributions to
public endorsements. Therefore, regional leaders appear to be concerned with the short run
goal of winning the upcoming election and discount the long run consequences of their
decisions.34 However, this finding reveals that in the process of adding items onto the
CARICOM agenda, national priorities override initiatives that otherwise would be top
priorities for the region as a whole.
The “test of ownership and control” clause mandates that corporations have 51 percent local ownership.
However, Barbados, had pre-established agreements without restrictions.
29
30
Francoise Hendy, Investment Harmonization: The State of Play and its Potential Impacts (Barbados,
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development, April 13, 2006), 9.
31
Ibid., 18.
32
Ibid.
33
George Brizan, interview with author, St. George’s, Grenada, April 13, 2007.
See Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, “American Political
Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000), 263. According to Pierson, the principal reason is “the logic of electoral
politics. Since the decisions of voters are taken in the short run, elected officials generally employ a high
discount rate.”
34
10
National Priorities and the Regional Agenda
The CARICOM directives adopted at the regional level can be explained in terms of
the national priorities among member governments. The principal policies adopted by the
CARICOM Heads of Government define the issues presented to the member states for
implementation. These issues arise from the interests of one or more member states, which,
according to a recent CARICOM report, “there is no mechanism for filtering, evaluating and
prioritizing member state demands at the Heads of Governments Conference.35 Therefore,
there is no enforced system to have directives placed on the agenda. According to the report,
“there had been a mistaken reluctance on the part of the Secretariat to challenge specific
instances when too much was asked.”36 This administrative loophole explains how national
priorities get to dominate the Heads of Government Conference agenda instead of initiatives
that are top priorities for the region as a whole. An important finding therefore, is that the
absence of a prioritization and enforcement process in CARICOM’s agenda setting
procedure, results in state leaders loading the agenda with national priorities instead of top
priorities for the CARICOM region as a whole.
Although preliminary, the following cursory results show a positive correlation
between the signing of significant integration treaties and general electoral cycles in the
Caribbean. One caveat is that the following results are not conclusive, and the patterns
suggest a promising area for further research in investigating the correlation between national
electoral cycles and regional integration in the Caribbean. A landmark treaty was the signing
of the Grand Anse Declaration in July 1989 in Grenada. According to Brizan, the Grand
Anse Declaration was a significant political event for politicians all over the Caribbean and
even more so for the host Prime Minister Herbert Blaize and his ruling political party.37 The
intended implementation date of July 4, 1993 was extremely ambitious given the hundreds
of directives that were to be implemented by the twelve-member states. Why was
communicating the full implementation of the Grand Anse Declaration so urgent? A cursory
examination of the relationship between key CSME agreements and Caribbean election
cycles provides a possible answer. Table 3 indicates a positive correlation between key
CARICOM decisions and member states general election cycles. Nine out of the twelve
CSME member states held general parliamentary elections in 1989, the same year of the
signing of the Grand Anse Declaration. The member states were Antigua and Barbuda,
Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Suriname, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines.38 In June, 1989 the Heads of Government of Dominica, St Lucia and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines met together in order to discuss with the Prime Minister of
Grenada, Herbert Blaize, the early holding of elections. St. Lucia’s Prime Minister, John
35
Ibid., 44.
36
Richard Stoneman, Duke Pollard and Hugo Inniss, Turning Around CARICOM: Proposals to Restructure
the Secretariat (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 2012), 30.
37
George Brizan, interview with author, St. George’s Grenada, April 13, 2007.
38
Christoph Mullerleile, CARICOM Integration: Progress and Hurdles: A European View (Kingston:
Kingston Publishers, 1996), 167.
11
Compton, said that general elections in Grenada and other OECS member states were no
longer only a national question.39 The context of this statement was the post United States
invasion of Grenada and the return of the former dictator Eric Gairy. Compton and others
feared Gairy’s Grenada United Labor Party (GULP) and the Maurice Bishop Patriotic
Movement (MBPM) could outperform the moderate parties based on their new popularity
and financial resources.40
An analysis of the timing of the signing of the other landmark decision, the 2001
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, shows that five of the 12 members (Table 3 column 2) of
CSME members held general elections in 2000, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines held a
Table 3. Elections Schedule in CSME Member States, Selected Years.
Country
Antigua & Barbuda
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago
St. Kitts &Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & Grenadines
General
Election Year
(1)
1989
1991
1989
1989
1990
1989
1989
1989
1991
1989
1989
1989
Signing of the
Grand Anse
Declaration
(1a)
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
General
Election Year
(2)
1999
1999
1998
2000*
1999
1999
1998
2000*
2000*
2000*
2000*
2001
Signing of the
Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas
(2a)
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
Source: http://www.caricom.org (Columns 1a and 2a). http://www.caribbeanelections.com (columns 1 and 2).
general election in 2001.The expansion of the CARICOM conference agenda allows the
leaders to handpick certain directives that demonstrate to their national constituency that they
are looking out for their national well-being. To elaborate, it appears from this analysis that
just prior to general elections Caribbean leaders propose directives in order to improve their
election chances. Adopting directives at the regional level have politically popular results in
the short run, regardless of the chances of being incorporated into national law. These
patterns suggest a promising area for further research.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
12
Explaining CSME Implementation Rates, 2004 – 2007
A serious problem facing CARICOM is the fundamental contradiction between the
goals of CARICOM and the complex policy implementation process to achieve those goals.
Implementation matters are considered particularly important because they reflect the
problems caused by the multi-level structure of CARICOM policy making. The directives
for deepening regional integration within CARICOM states are subject to the constitutional
procedures of the twelve member states. This multi-level system thus complicates the control
of CARICOM policy making. When the CARICOM Heads of Governments commit
themselves to a particular agreement, they must also concern themselves with the domestic
arrangements in their respective home country. Therefore, in implementation, domestic
economic and political conditions play a major role. An analysis of implementation rates in
Figure 1 shows that in the case of the CSME, among the four MDCs, Trinidad and Tobago,
Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana, not one of them had achieved an implementation rate over
60
50
40
30
2004
20
2005
Trinidad
Suriname
St. Vincent
St. Lucia
St.Kitts
Jamaica
Guyana
Grenada
2007
Dominica
0
Belize
2006
Barbados
10
Antigua
% directives implemented
Figure 1 Implementation Rates of Member States, 2004-2007.
Member State
Figure 8 Member State Implementation Rates Through Time, 2004-2007. Source: Author compiled from
documents “Establishment of CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary of Status of Key Elements.”
October 2004, January 2005, April 2006, May 2007. Sourced from CARICOM website, www.caricom.org
55 percent. What explains this puzzling case? Puzzling because despite the sound theoretical
basis for expecting the MDCs of the region to have higher implementation rates than LDC’s,
Figure 1 shows that there is little difference in the implementation rates between both groups.
Theoretically the MDCs such as Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica are expected to be the
strongest supporters of the CSME since they are the most developed countries in the region
and thus potentially the greatest beneficiaries of free trade. This finding is therefore
inconsistent with theoretical expectation. If one were to suggest the intuitive notion that
13
states’ performance in living up to their commitments was a straightforward function of their
benefits from integration, the MDCs would have significantly higher implementation rates.
This observation poses a puzzle that provides insight into the role of domestic political and
economic arrangements in the region.
The following assessment of CSME implementation rates begin with the member
states’ progress in implementing the CSME’s Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
directives, followed by an analysis of the progress of member states in implementing the
Single Market and Single Economy directives. The extent of policy implementation varies
widely within each category and the level of completion varies widely between the three
main categories.
The Revised Treaty: The Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
According to the data in Table 4, as of 2007, compliance is most impressive in the
Legal and Institutional Infrastructure category where more than three-fourths of the
directives needed to establish the Legal and Institutional Infrastructure were completed.
However, the degree of completion varies widely between the Legal and Institutional
infrastructure subcategories. The notable exception is the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)
Appellate Jurisdiction operating with only 16.6 percent compliance level and the National
Competition Authorities operating at a level of only 16.7 percent.
Treaty Revision
The Revised Treaty of nine directives were produced by an intergovernmental Task
Force (IGTF) and signed by the More Developed Countries (MDCs), Barbados, Guyana,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago on July 5, 2001. According to Ralph Gonsalves, Prime
Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, because they were not guaranteed compensation
in 2001, the Less Developed Countries, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St Lucia withheld support for the Revised Treaty.41 It is
possible that the smaller countries delayed signing because of the potential losses of customs
revenue and increased competition for their domestic industries. The following statement by
the manager of an agro-industrial plant in Grenada sums up the concern of most of the
business owners in the LDCs, “opening up competition in the region, with larger companies
in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, there is no way my business will survive.”42 The less
developed countries eventually bargained for a number of specific concessions and
derogations under the Revised Treaty.
41
Ralph Gonsalves, The CARICOM Single Market and Economy and Its Implications for Credit Unions in the
Region. Keynote Address delivered at the Conference of the GSB Credit Union in Jamaica (St. Vincent and
the Grenadines: Office of the Prime Minister, April 24, 2004).
42
ADM Agro-industries Manager, interview with author, St. George’s, Grenada, April 11, 2007.
14
Table 4 Implementation Rates: Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
CATEGORY
1
A. LEGAL &
INSTITUTIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
2004
2005
2006
2007
2
3
4
5
180
192
192
168
2004
2005
2006
2007
6
7
8
9
136
157
152
129
2004
2005
2006
2007
10
11
12
13
75.5
81.7
79.1
76.7
1.
Treaty Revision
60
60
60
36
52
57
59
36
86.7
95.0
98.3
100
2.
National
Administration²
Enforcement and
Regulation
Caribbean Court
of Justice
(original)
Caribbean Court
of Justice
(Appellate)
CROSQ
(Standards &
Quality
National
Competition
Authorities.
24
36
36
36
24
35
35
35
100
97.2
97.2
97.2
96
96
96
96
60
65
58
58
62.5
67.7
60.4
60.4
36
36
36
36
31
35
25
25
86.1
97.2
97.2
97.2
12
12
12
12
0
2
2
2
0
16.6
16.6
16.6
36
36
36
36
26
26
29
29
72.2
62.5
80.6
80.6
12
12
12
12
3
2
2
2
25.0
16.7
16.7
16.7
3.
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
Source: http://www.caricom.org. Author compiled from documents “Establishment of CARICOM Single Market and
Economy: Summary of Status of Key Elements.” October 2004, January 2005, April 2006, May 2007 .
Chapter VII Article 142 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas allows compensation as well
as derogations from community obligations for all LDCs countries. According to the
CARICOM records, Grenada was the last member to enact the Revised Treaty into law
because of the devastation of the island in 2004 by Hurricane Ivan. The directive on the
Treaty Revision was deleted from the key elements in 2007 because all participating
members had signed onto the Revised Treaty.43
Enforcement and Regulation
In the category of Enforcement and Regulation, the notable exceptions are the
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) Appellate Jurisdiction, operating with only 16.6 percent
compliance level and the National Competition Authorities, operating at a level of only 16.7
percent compliance. In February 2001, CARICOM member states entered into a binding
treaty to create the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).44 According to the Revised Treaty, “the
CCJ is charged with employing the rules of international law to interpret and apply the
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community, including the
43
This evidence shows the number of directives in a particular year could fluctuate.
CARICOM Secretariat, “Signing of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Twelfth
Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community,”
February 14-15, 2001, Bridgetown, Barbados, (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 2001).
44
15
CSME.”45 Establishing the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ, a key pillar in the CARICOM
structure, has proven to be the most challenging directive to enact into domestic law. The
CCJ is intended to have two jurisdictions: an appellate jurisdiction to replace the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council and original jurisdiction to create the legal framework for
the CSME. Duke Pollard, legal consultant to CARICOM, contends that the CSME would be
weaker and much less attractive to investors without the foundation of a judicial body that
guarantees stability.46
According to Table 4, the compliance level for the CCJ original jurisdiction improved
from 86.1 percent in 2004 to 97.2 percent in the following three years, while the appellate
jurisdiction improved from zero percent to 16.6 percent. What explains the implementation
gap between these two levels of jurisdictions? First, the original jurisdiction of the CCJ is
concerned with the disputes under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. [In particular,
disputes about the interpretation of some aspect of the main treaty governing the CSME].
According to Stephen Vasciannie, cases under the original jurisdiction do not pass through
local courts and originate in the CCJ.47 The main reason is to show fairness and to respect
the sovereignty of both countries. In addition, cases between countries are not heard in local
courts in order to avoid problem of enforcement. Although the challenge of enforcement still
exists if a member opts not to enforce judgements of the CCJ, the state would be in breach
of the treaty establishing the CCJ and Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Other members could
put political pressure on that country to obey the judgements of the CCJ.48
Second, according to Vascianne, “the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ is concerned
with appeals from local courts, through the local court of appeal to the CCJ as the final court
of appeal.”49 What explains the implementation gap between these two levels of
jurisdictions? The answer lies in factors impeding the implementation of the appellate
jurisdiction at the national level. First, a number of states, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica
in particular, have been reluctant to switch their right to final appeal from the Privy Council
in Great Britain to the CCJ. One main concern for some MDCs is the possibility of not having
a citizen on the CCJ to protect the interest of that country. 50 Therefore, the member states
enact the original jurisdiction because their local courts and national sovereignty are not
significantly affected. Another reason is that the CCJ requires member states to allocate
their limited resources to a plan that would only help the country in the long run. While
implementation costs for the CCJ are likely to be significant in the short-term, expected
benefits to the community as a whole occur in the long-term. However, as mentioned earlier
45
Ibid.
46
Duke Pollard, The Caricom System: Basic Instruments (Kingston: Caribbean Law Pub. Co., 2003), 12.
47
Stephen Vasciannie states that in addition, to avoiding problems of enforcement, this is consistent with
international law to show fairness and respect the sovereignty of both countries. Stephen Vasciannie, “CCJ:
Original Jurisdiction,” Jamaica Gleaner, February 7, 2007, http://jamaicagleaner.com/gleaner/20070207/cleisure/cleisure2.html.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Trinidad and Tobago Parliamentary Debates. Hansard Transcripts. February 2, 2005, 109.
16
politicians are most interested in the short-term results of their actions. As a result, without
compensation national priorities take precedence over implementing the appellate
jurisdiction of the CCJ.
Furthermore, attempts to implement the CCJ in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica
illustrates how constitutional crisis brought to the forefront two significant challenges to
deepening CARICOM integration. First, the absence of a supranational institution lend
regional decisions hostage to domestic constitutional arrangements. Second, because of the
unanimous vote needed at the CARICOM Heads of Government meeting a constitutional
crisis in one state can hinder the entire progress of regional integration in the Caribbean. 51
The crisis surrounding the implementation of the CCJ directives in Jamaica
demonstrates how constitutional arrangements affects the CARICOM integration process.
The crisis brought to the fore the inadequacies of the inherited political – constitutional
arrangements and the need for constitutional reform.52 The link between the CSME and the
CCJ was manifested when the launch of the CCJ scheduled for February 16, 2005, was forced
to be postponed after the Privy Council in London, Jamaica’s highest court, ruled that the
procedure followed by Jamaica to enact legislation to establish the CCJ as the final court of
appeal was “unconstitutional.”53 The CCJ was eventually inaugurated on April 16, 2005 in
Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. However, three CARICOM states, Barbados, Belize and
Guyana, have signed on to both the original and appellate jurisdictions of the CCJ. What
explains the success of these three states in acceding to the CCJ? An analysis of the
constitutional arrangements in all three countries shows two main factors common in all three
cases: first, none of their constitutions required a public referendum at the time of joining the
CCJ; second, all ruling political parties in the government commanded more than a twothirds majority in the parliament. Therefore, the constitutional arrangements in these three
cases actually supported implementation of the CCJ jurisdictions. Barbados, Guyana and
Belize acceded to the CCJ as their final court of appeals after approval by their respective
parliaments and not by popular support in a national referendum. All three-member states
also had more than two-thirds majority in their parliaments at the time of the CCJ adoption
vote. The constitutional arrangements in most member states sets up a contest between the
opposition and the ruling parties that has hindered the regional integration process.
One recommendation on how to overcome constitutional obstacles, given that some
constitutions are so challenging to amend, is to encourage member states to revive and get
more involved in the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP).
Strengthening the ACCP is critical, since evidence in other regional integration organizations
have shown that involving the entire legislature in the negotiation process improves
David Hinds, Trinidad’s Crisis: A Consequence of the Caribbean’s Authoritarian Culture. October 8
2001, http:Guyanacaribbeanpolitics.com.
51
David Hinds, “Trinidad’s Crisis: A Consequence of the Caribbean’s Authoritarian Culture,” October 8,
2001, http://www.Guyanacaribbeanpolitics.com.
52
53
Privy Council Appeal No.41 of 2004 Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Limited
and others v. Hon. Syringa Marshall-Burnett and Attorney general of Jamaica.
17
implementation performance.54 Because parliamentarians on both sides are able to discuss
the effects and possible remedies of directives beforehand, the directives going forward for
parliamentary adoption stand a better chance. The main reason is that uncertainty is reduced
and increases the chances of parliamentary adoption.
National Competition Authorities
National Competition Authorities was the second most difficult directive to be
implemented after the Caribbean Court of Justice appellate directive. The CARICOM Treaty
provides for “the establishment and operation of a regional competition commission to
facilitate implementation of a Community Competition Policy.”55 The objectives are “to
maintain competition and improve economic efficiency in production and trade; prohibit
anti-competitive business conducts that prevent, restricts or distorts competition; promote
consumer welfare and protect consumer interests.”56 Only three member states, Barbados,
Jamaica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, currently have competition laws in place, and
only Barbados and Jamaica have institutional arrangements to enforce those laws. The
implementation rate in 2005 was 16.7 percent (Table 4). The implementation rate remained
at the 16.7 percent level for 2006 and 2007 (Table 4). The failure in this area is explained
by the various countries being more concerned with their own problems than with what is
happening in the region. National Competition Authorities require resources to maintain an
office and qualified staff to implement competition policy rules applicable throughout
CARICOM.57
The Revised Treaty: The Single Market
According to Table 5, the Single Market is operating at a level of 62.8 percent
compliance. Table 5 shows that the Single Market subcategories are not functioning at the
level of effectiveness anticipated by CARICOM. The Free Movement of Goods, Free
Movement of Skills, transfer of Social Security benefits and double taxation agreement were
at 70.8 percent, 71.7 percent, 91.7 percent and 83.3 percent respectively. The following
section analyzes these outliers.
See Lisa Martin, “The influence of National Parliaments on European Integration,” in Barry Eichengreen,
Jeffrey Frieden and Jurgen von Hagen, eds., Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe (New York:
Springer-Verlag, 1995), 65.
54
CARICOM Secretariat, “Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Establishing the Caribbean Community,
Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy” (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 2001).
55
56
Ibid.
57
Stephen Vasciannie, CCJ: Original Jurisdiction. Jamaica Gleaner. February 7, 2007. http://jamaicagleaner.com/gleaner/20070207/cleisure/cleisure2.html.
18
Free Movement of Goods
The freeing of trade in the Caribbean creates regional benefits as far as there is
regional production to take advantage of the labor market. However, the benefits of free trade
are unequally distributed towards MDCs such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, which
are more advanced industrially and have already established some productive capacity.
Table 5. Implementation Rates: The Single Market, 2004-2007
CATEGORY
2004
2005
2006
2007
2
3
4
5
336
336
288
288
2004
2005
2006
2007
6
7
8
9
215
179
181
181
2004
2005
2006
2007
10
11
12
13
63.9
53.2
62.8
62.8
Free Movement of
Goods
2. Free Movement of
Services
3. Free Movement of
Persons
3.1. Free Movement of
Skills
3.2. Contingent Rights
60
24
24
24
44
14
17
17
73.3
58.3
70.8
70.8
24
12
12
12
19
12
6
6
79.2
100
50.0
50.0
156
156
156
156
93
94
99
99
59.6
60.3
63.5
63.5
60
60
60
60
44
45
43
43
73.3
75.0
71.7
71.7
n.a
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
3.3. Facilitation of Travel
48
48
48
48
12
12
19
19
25.0
25.0
39.6
39.6
1
SINGLE MARKET
1.
3.4. Accreditation
24
24
24
24
15
15
15
15
62.5
62.5
62.5
62.5
&Equivalency
3.5. Transfer Soc Sec
24
24
24
24
22
22
22
22
91.7
91.7
91.7
91.7
Benefits
4. Free Movement of
72
72
72
72
46
46
46
46
63.9
63.9
63.9
63.9
Capital
4.1. Removal of
24
24
24
24
12
12
12
12
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
Restrictions
4.2. Capital Market
24
24
24
24
14
14
14
14
58.3
58.3
58.3
58.3
Integration
4.3. Double Taxation
24
24
24
24
20
20
20
20
83.3
83.3
83.3
83.3
Agreement
5. Right of
24
24
24
24
13
13
13
13
54.2
54.2
54.2
54.2
Establishment
Source: http://www.caricom.org. Author compiled from documents “Establishment of CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary
of Status of Key Elements.” October 2004, January 2005, April 2006, May 2007.
The record shows that LDC members states oppose the freeing of trade because of
losses in customs revenue and increased competition for their domestic industries. In
Grenada, for example, the top concern of small businesses is inter-island competition and the
fear of losing business to the more developed Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica.58 The Free
Movement of Goods category plummeted from 73.3 percent in 2004 to 58.3 percent in 2005
(see Table 5).59 An investigation into the Single Market records exposes the reason behind
this decline. In 2004, a number of member states exercised their right of exemption in the
58
ADM Agro-industries manager, interview with author, St. George’s, Grenada, April 11, 2007.
59
http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAR/MatxMarch2005.asp.
19
Revised Treaty. For example, Belize applied a revenue replacement duty on a list of goods
of CARICOM Community Origin; St. Kitts and Nevis applied an unauthorized import duty
on beer, pasta and aerated beverages from St. Lucia’s; St. Vincent and the Grenadines applied
an import (equalization) tax on rum of Community Origin;60 and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines maintained prohibitions on certain agricultural products from Grenada, Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago.61
This evidence is revealing for two reasons. First, since St. Vincent and the Grenadines
and Grenada are members of the OECS economic union, it is clear that these prohibitions
are also posing challenges to the organization. Second, the provisions in the Revised Treaty
that allow member states to opt in or opt out of regionalist actions depending on their interests
and circumstances is counterproductive to deepening integration. It is clear that, in the
absence of compensation, the LDC members choose national priorities ahead of regional
commitments. The lack of an institutional leader and regional paymaster to ease
distributional tensions through side payments may explain, in part, why CARICOM states
have not shown an overriding commitment to regional integration and instead have placed
national priorities ahead of regional commitments.
Transfer of Social Security Benefits
The subcategory with the highest level of compliance is the Transfer of Social
Security benefits with a 91.7 percent implementation rate. The Transfer of Social Security
Benefits is important in facilitating the free movement of labor within the CSME and applies
to all persons who are moving to work or have worked in two or more countries that have
implemented the agreement. The directive allows CARICOM countries much flexibility in
coordinating their social security programs, and this may account for the high level of
compliance. For example, under this directive, insured persons are entitled to benefits from
one or more of the Social Security Organizations in various CARICOM member states for
which they qualify. 62 An insured person who lives in a member state i.e., St. Lucia, and is
employed in two or more CARICOM member states, including St. Lucia, that person will
remain insured in St. Lucia.63 In addition, a person living in one member state i.e., Jamaica,
and is entitled to a benefit from another member state i.e., Grenada, that person will be paid
in the currency of the country in which they reside i.e., Jamaican dollars, but at the same rate
as if he/she lived in the Grenada.64 The directive is in effect in all CSME member states
except Suriname. Because the social security institutions are similar in terms of operations,
60
CARICOM Report, Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL),
CARICOM Report No.2 (Buenos Aires: IDB-INTAL, August 2005):
18.http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAR/MatxMarch2005.asp.
61
http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAR/MatxMarch2005.asp.
62
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/social_security.jsp?menu=csme.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
20
flexible in terms of access and adaptable in terms of currency, and do not require giving up
any control over national development its directives are almost fully implemented.
The Facilitation of Travel
Table 4 shows the Facilitation of Travel category with the lowest compliance rate of
39.6 percent. The free movement of factors of production is considered an essential element
of a common market. However, the free movement of labor in CARICOM faces many
challenges because the MDCs with relatively high per capita income and relatively higher
quality social services fear uncontrolled immigration from the more populous but poorer
LDC countries. The increasing volume of cases before the CCJ and local media reports
supports this position. Barbados, for example, fear an influx of immigrants from some of the
poorer countries of the Eastern Caribbean.65
In the Grand Anse Declaration, the Heads of Governments pledged that, from
December 1990, all CARICOM nationals should be free to travel within the Community
without the need for passports.66 Facilitation of travel refers to “the freedom of CARICOM
nationals to travel into and within the jurisdiction of any member state without harassment
or the imposition of impediments."67 The implementation of measures for the facilitation of
travel throughout CARICOM is far from complete – 25 percent in 2004 and 2005, 39.6
percent in 2006 and 2007 Table 4). St. Vincent and the Grenadines was the only country by
that date to have issued a CARICOM passport, and other facilitating measures such as the
creation of dedication lines for CARICOM nationals at ports of entry.68 In addition, over
1000 citizens of CARICOM member states had been denied entry at the major airports in
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad.69 The CARICOM Secretariat admits that some restrictions
are cumbersome administrative processes, and “domestic politics often makes it unattractive
for people, especially those with families to move.”70
Right of Establishment
The right of establishment allows Community nationals to establish a business
presence anywhere in the CSME. According to the Revised Treaty, “any citizen of
CARICOM can engage in any wage earning activity of a commercial, industrial, professional
See Stabroek News, “Fifty-three Guyanese Deported from Barbados,” Stabroek News,
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/archives/06/30/fifty-three-guyanese-deported-from-barbados.
65
66
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/travel.jsp?menu=csme.
67
Ibid.
68
CARICOM Report No.2 (Buenos Aires: IDB-INTAL, August 2005), 28.
69
Stabroek News, “CSME Implementation Deadline Still Top Priority,” December 15, 2008.
70
CARICOM Report No.2 (Buenos Aires: IDB-INTAL, August 2005):28.
21
or artisanal nature, or create and manage economic enterprises, including any organization
for the production of trade in goods and the provision of services owned or controlled by
them, in any member state participating in the CSME.”71 The provisions on right of
establishment also accord free movement to self-employed service providers, entrepreneurs,
technical, managerial and supervisory staff, as well as their spouses and immediate
dependent family members.72 Only a few states have so far passed legislation to provide this
extension of free movement. 73
The dismal record of the Right of Establishment directive is explained by national
priorities. Barbados in particular has requirements for non-nationals to register, which is
discriminatory and often slows the registration process. Restriction on access to property is
another problem affecting the Right of Establishment.74 The case of Barbados is a microcosm
of the nationalist challenges to implement the Right of Establishment in CARICOM states.
For example, in an effort to appeal to national sentiments for partisan gains, politicians in the
Democratic Labor Party (DLP) campaigned from 2005 to the 2008 election on an antiimmigration, “anti-right of establishment” platform.75 David Thompson’s Democratic Labor
Party promised to introduce policies to control immigration “in the interest of the local labor
force and the “foreign worker” who may otherwise be subject to exploitation.76 These
remarks were made for domestic political purposes, but with the help of social media, they
instantly triggered a chain reaction in the other islands. Such reactions further strengthen
nationalist identities by refreshing old memories of the conflicts surrounding the West Indian
Federation. In the process, the younger generation, who did not experience the divisiveness
in the West Indian Federation, are introduced to new anti-Caribbean integration sentiments,
making possible their inter-generational transmission.
Entitled ‘Pathways to Progress’ the manifesto of Thompson’s Democratic Labor
Party promised Barbadians a transformation that would meet the “real needs of the people.”77
According to the manifesto, “these workers may initially accept lower wages and less
agreeable working conditions than their Barbadian counterparts, thereby affording some
employers the opportunity to bypass the Barbadian worker.”78 Caribbean journalist Rickey
71
72
Ibid.
73
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Progress Made in the
Implementation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy,
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/1/14381/G0770.pdf.
Havelock Brewster, CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Assessment of the Region’s Needs
(Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 2003), 2.
74
Rickey Singh, “Threatening Division’s Governance Conflicts,” Trinidad Express, January 14, 2000,
http://www.trinidadexpresssicom.
75
76
77
http://bajanreporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2008_dlp_manifesto.pdf.
78
Ibid.
22
Singh states, “since the inauguration of CARICOM no other partner state has ever resorted
to the controversial practices against such large numbers of CARICOM nationals. Singh list
the nationals as Guyanese, Vincentians, and Jamaicans.”79 Barbadian workers were
considered to be facing competition from “foreign workers,” who for the most part, came
from within CARICOM, attracted by employment opportunities and the improved standard
of living that Barbados offers.80 Jacqueline Jack, President of the Caribbean Congress of
Labor (CCL) said that although progress had been made on the CSME she was “...far from
pleased about the state of affairs of CARICOM in respect of free movement of labor.”81
George Brizan explains that the CSME poor record in the Right of Establishment category
highlights the continuing presence of national insularity in member states.82 In the post 2007
period, strong anti-immigration sentiments in Barbados resulted in several high profile cases
going to the CCJ. The most public trial being the case of Shanique Myrie, a citizen of Jamaica
vs. the Government of Barbados.83 The CCJ awarded the Jamaican citizen J$3.6m because
the Barbados Government breached Myrie’s right to enter the country under Article 5 of the
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. 84 This landmark judgement revived the notion that there
might be some hope in the future of CARICOM. If the CCJ could enforce this judgement.
The lack of an institutional leader and regional paymaster to ease distributional
tensions through side payments may explain, in part, why CARICOM states have not shown
an overriding commitment to regional integration and instead have placed national priorities
ahead of regional commitments. One recommendation for overcoming this national level
obstacle is to have Trinidad and Tobago be the institutional leader and regional paymaster.
It is not that Trinidad and Tobago would be an ATM for the region. Their role would be
similar to that of Germany in the European Union. The economic growth from the regional
investment would return to Trinidad and Tobago.
The Revised Treaty: The Single Economy
According to Table 6, the CARICOM Single Economy has been a dismal failure.
Articles 44 and 70 of the Revised Treaty call on member states to “coordinate their monetary
and fiscal policies and promote a sound macroeconomic environment in the region, and
79
80
Ibid.
81
CARICOM Secretariat, Remarks by Ms. Jacqueline Jack, President of the Caribbean Congress of Labor,
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/convocation_csme_jack.jsp.
82
George Brizan, interview with author, St. George’s Grenada, April 13, 2007.
The Gleaner, “CCJ Ruling: Shanique Myrie to be Awarded J$3.6m,” The Gleaner, October 4, 2013.
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/latest/article.php?id=48410
83
84
Ibid.
23
instruct the relevant Community Councils to determine appropriate measures to that
effect.”85
Table 6. Implementation Rates: The Single Economy, 2004-2007
CATEGORY
1
C. SINGLE ECONOMY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Common
External Policy
Harmonization of
Laws
Sectorial
Program &
Enabling
Environment
Common
Support
Measures
Public Education
Total Required Directives
2004
2005
2006
2007
2
3
4
5
420
420
444
444
2004
2005
2006
2007
6
7
8
9
18
17
28
28
2004
2005
2006
2007
10
11
12
13
4.2
4.0
6.3
6.3
36
36
36
36
14
14
25
25
38.9
38.9
69.4
69.4
168
168
192
192
3
2
2
2
1.8
1.1
1.0
1.0
72
72
72
72
1
1
1
1
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
144
144
144
144
0
0
0
0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
Source: http://www.caricom.org. Author compiled from records “Establishment of CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary of
Status of Key Elements.” October 2004, January 2005, April 2006, May 2007.
Table 6 shows that the only area of progress was the Common External Policy subcategory
with the majority of the other required directives still outstanding. In 1992, the Heads of
Government established monetary union as an explicit goal to be achieved through a staged
process of monetary convergence.86 According to a CARICOM Report, the term Single
Economy was understood to include the establishment of full monetary union and a common
currency.87
Common External Policy
CARICOM leaders established a four-phase implementation program for the CET in
1992. Although the speed of implementation has varied among member states, because of
the CET, the implementation of the region’s import tariffs have been significantly reduced,
from an average of 20 percent in the early 1990s to 10 percent.88 However, in the absence
of compensation from CARICOM or from a regional paymaster the OECS members have
85
86
(Buenos Aires: IDB-INTAL, August 2005), 31.
87
Ibid.
CARICOM Secretariat, “Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Establishing the Caribbean Community, 5 (80)
(Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 2001), 5.
88
24
had to make adjustments since they rely heavily on taxes to support their economy. Since the
CARICOM Treaty does not prohibit the negotiation of agreements with third countries, the
OECS states are looking to outside organizations (such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of the Americas ALBA) and are thus at odds with the principle of regional
integration.89
Harmonization of laws
One of the most visible contradictions of the CSME experience with integration is
the implementation gap between the Single Market and the Single Economy (See Figure 2).
% directives implemented
Figure 2. CSME Overall Implementation Rates, 2004-2007
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
Legal/Institutional
Single Market
Single Economy
Category
Source: Author compiled from records “Establishment of CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary
of Key Elements.” October 2004, January 2005, April 2006, May 2007. Http://www. caricom.org.
of Status
What explains the relative failure to harmonize monetary and fiscal policies? The main
obstacle is the national priorities of member governments. It is clear that the compliance rate
in the Single Market outweighed the Single Economy in every year under this study. In 2007,
the compliance rate was 62.8 percent while the Single Economy was 6.3 percent. Figure 2
shows graphically, the number of directives that had been incorporated into national law in
all states from 2004 – 2007 The Single Economy directives were implemented at a much
lower rate, 6.3 percent. What explains this wide implementation gap? Harmonizing fiscal
and monetary policies entails relinquishing some degree of control over national
development. The process of moving from the Single Market to the Single Economy is a
89
Belize benefits from a special provision by which it retains the right to enter into bilateral agreements
with neighboring countries in Central America. This is based on its proximity to Central American
countries.
25
highly politically charged activity in the sense that CARICOM member governments must
give up some degree of autonomy over domestic matters to move to a Single Economy. The
Single Economy directives involve a greater degree of restriction of national freedom of
action than implied by the Single Market. In the case of CARICOM, the issue is more
complex since some of the member states have overlapping membership in the Eastern
Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) and already relinquished control over monetary policy.90
Transparency of Directives
Tracing the progress of implementation of both the Single Market and Single
Economy directives shows that the directives implemented by national governments were
also more transparent in terms of the issues the directives described. It is evident that physical
barriers are easily observable, involving explicit controls on the movement of goods or
restrictions on importing personal effects. For example, implementation rates in the Free
Movements of Goods, 70% in 2006 and 2007, are much greater than the Harmonization of
Laws, 1% in 2006 and 1% in 2007. What explains this implementation gap? The answer lies
in the transparency of the directive and the national priorities among member governments.
The visibility of the directives may explain why they are removed rather quickly once
negotiated by the Heads of Government Conference and required by states to be dismantled.
According to one Grenadian parliamentarian in the ruling party, eliminating tariffs on
manufactured canned juices and other goods coming from Trinidad and Tobago is felt almost
immediately by the consumer in terms of lower prices. 91 Therefore, from this politician’s
viewpoint, some national policymakers make decisions on transparent directives in order to
show their constituencies that they are working on their behalf. On the other hand, the
harmonizing of monetary and fiscal policies not only involves giving up some control over
national development but the impact on the economy is lagged. Given the logic of electoral
politics, the more transparent directives will be given priority.
The case of the OECS overlapping membership within CARICOM is even more
complex. Member states have given up monetary policy control to the Eastern Caribbean
Currency Authority. To relinquish fiscal policy control to CARICOM without “guarantees”
would leave politicians with no lever of control over monetary and fiscal policy and as a
result, the potential to plan in response to electoral promises. It is clear that, in the absence
of compensation, the LDC members would choose national priorities ahead of regional
commitments. Again, the lack of an institutional leader and regional paymaster to ease
distributional tensions through side payments may explain, in part, why CARICOM states
have not shown an overriding commitment to regional integration and instead have placed
national priorities ahead of regional commitments. As institutional leader Trinidad and
90
Grenada is part of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA), a monetary union using a
common currency called the Eastern Caribbean dollar. Monetary policy is conducted by the Eastern
Caribbean Currency Authority located in St. Kitts and Nevis.
91
Grenadian Parliamentarian, interview with author, St. George’s, Grenada, April 11, 2007.
26
Tobago would be like what Germany was to the European Union – a benefactor from the
economic growth of the region as a whole.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, the empirical evidence confirmed that from 2004 to 2007, CARICOM
failed to reach its stated goals for establishing a CSME. The first major finding of this paper
is the identification of the CARICOM Single Economy as the category with the lowest
compliance level. In 2004, the Single Economy compliance level was only 4.2 percent
compared to the Single Market’s compliance record of 63.9 percent. In 2005, the Single
Economy compliance level decreased to 4.0 percent. However, the next year the compliance
level increased to 6.3 percent and remained at that level for 2007. In 2007, the compliance
level for the Single Market was 62.8 percent. The results revealed that the CSME was
operating at about 39 percent overall level of compliance in 2004, 38 percent overall level of
compliance in 2005, 37 percent overall level of compliance in 2006, and 38 percent overall
level of compliance in 2007.
Second, the paper examined the internal challenges to establishing the CSME.
National priorities among member governments and domestic constitutional arrangements
were identified as key obstacles to the CSME integration process. The implementation data
revealed a mismatch between the proposed directives on the CARICOM agenda and the
actual level of compliance. The reason for this mismatch was national incentives such as the
domestic political benefits politicians expect to derive from supporting certain directives.
Incumbent leaders are interested in being re-elected and since the decisions of voters are
taken in the short run, they announce decisions over new directives as if full implementation
were imminent and oversell the benefits of implementation. While increasing the proposals
at the regional level has politically popular consequences in the short run, this practice has
resulted in a loss of confidence by the Caribbean public in the regional integration process.
Third, the research revealed that the most successful directives implemented by
national governments were also more transparent in terms of the issues the directives
described. This paper explained that physical barriers are easily observable, involving
explicit controls on the movement of goods and individuals such as custom charges or
restrictions on importing personal effects. For example, implementation rates in the Single
Market, Free Movements of Goods (70% in 2006 and 2007) are much greater than the
Harmonization of Laws (1% in 2006 and 1% in 2007) because the flow of goods are more
transparent than understanding the possible consequences of a CARICOM monetary union.
In addition, the harmonizing of monetary and fiscal policy involves giving up some control
over national development and the potential to plan in response to electoral promises. The
visibility of the transparent directives explain why they are removed rather quickly once
negotiated by the Heads of Government Conference.
Fourth, the paper argued that domestic constitutional arrangements impede the
deepening of regional integration in the Caribbean. The constitutional delays in Trinidad and
Tobago and Jamaica support this thesis. The study explained that the Westminster
constitutional arrangements set up an adversarial political culture between the opposition and
ruling party. Given the constitutionally required two-thirds majority vote plus a national
27
referendum in some member states, regional integration policies are usually held hostage at
the national level.
The following recommendations are based on the main findings. The first
recommendation is that CARICOM adopt a partial integration approach to deepening
regional integration. It is clear from the findings that establishing the CARICOM Single
Economy is more challenging than establishing the CARICOM Single Market. The reasons
range from the political and economic sacrifice required to harmonize both monetary and
fiscal policies to the transparency of the directives and political will of the respective
governments. This paper proposes a partial integration approach to deepening CARICOM
integration by first focusing exclusively on completing the Single Market then concentrating
on completing the Single Economy.
The paper revealed that CARICOM’s incremental approach on all fronts has not
worked as anticipated. As a result, this paper recommends that the CARICOM leadership
seek out those arrangements, which have the best chance of succeeding and complete
implementation on those fronts. This strategy would focus on delivering tangible benefits in
a timely manner and take into account the actual implementation capacity of member states.
For example, using all its available resources concentrate on completing the CSM directives
with the highest implementation rates. Specifically, seek out those directives that have the
best chance of succeeding and perfect implementation of those directives in every member.
The empirical investigation conducted in this paper identified the following CARICOM
Single Market directives: the free movement of goods, the free movement of skills and the
transfer of social security. The CSM proved to be relatively successful because the directives
were easier to implement. They were easier because they did not require surrendering control
over national development or because governments found them more politically expedient
to implement. Demonstrated success in a few areas could serve as leverage to take on the
more challenging Single Economy directives.
The second recommendation is that Trinidad and Tobago assume the position of
institutional leader and regional paymaster in order to ease distributional tensions through
generous side payments. The lack of resources and the absence of an institutional leader and
regional paymaster to ease distributional tensions explain why CARICOM leaders put
national priorities before regional commitments. Given the end of EU preferential treatment
and reduction in financial resources from the international community, it is critical that
Trinidad and Tobago assume the position of regional leader. In addition, the variation in the
levels of development between the MDCs and LDCs creates the specter of the MDCs
appearing to dominate the region’s economic development prospects forcing the LDCs states
to forge their own deals independent of the regional strategy. Self-help measures alone are
insufficient to prevent CARICOM members from reneging on regional commitments.
The third recommendation is that CARICOM strengthen the ACCP and encourage
all parties, including the opposition, to engage in the negotiation process in order to assure
more efficient implementation. Consultation has the potential of reducing uncertainty, a key
obstacle in the adoption of regional policies at the national level. Since the Heads of
Government Conference do not have supranational powers over legislation, strengthening
the ACCP is the second-best approach to overcoming ideological and constitutional obstacles
encountered at the national level. Since Caribbean parliaments retain significant authority at
the implementation stage, failure to involve them in the negotiation process can pose severe
28
obstacles to policy implementation. Reviving and strengthening the ACCP is necessary in
order to address the democratic deficiencies within the integration process. It should have
legitimacy and take into account the opinions of opposition parliamentarians. Early
involvement in the negotiation process by those parties who will have to implement
agreements assures more efficient implementation.
In summary, CARICOM cannot achieve its goal of establishing a CSME unless it
addresses the implementation deficit and the internal obstacles to regional integration. The
leaders must make deliberate decisions based on the priority of regional directives and
available resources. Finally, both for the future of Caribbean integration and the study of
regional integration in the developing world, internal factors that influence a country’s ability
to implement regional decisions should be considered. National priorities among member
governments and domestic constitutional arrangements are two of these factors.
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