paper - The Chronicle of Higher Education

Transcription

The Organizational Trap of Ethical Fading:
Privileging Clout in Admissions at the University of Illinois
Nathan F. Harris
Ph.D. Candidate
Center for the Study of Higher and Postsecondary Education
University of Michigan
2015 AERA Annual Conference
April 16, 2015
I welcome any comments on this paper. Feel free to write me at nathan.f.harris@gmail.com.
The Organizational Trap of Ethical Fading (Harris – 2015 AERA)
Abstract
Most policy recommendations in higher education characterize ethical misconduct as a
problem of individual moral failings that can be fixed by adopting more stringent rules. This
article, however, explores an alternative thesis. It examines a secret "clout list" and "shadow"
undergraduate admissions process for high-profile applicants at the University of Illinois; the
exposure of this process in 2009 prompted the resignation of the University's president,
numerous trustees and the Urbana-Champaign chancellor. The article, which analyzes extensive
public testimony from a state investigative commission, advances our theoretical understanding
of ethical misconduct in colleges and universities by clarifying the relationship between the
ethical traps of cognitive biases and the environmental factors and organizational structures that
aggravate these psychological tendencies. It animates the concept of "ethical fading" to explain
why and how academic leaders can rationalize misconduct as serving institutional strategic
interests. It also demonstrates how organizational routines can exacerbate ethical fading, which
helps to explain why and how ethical misconduct is an organizational problem. In demonstrating
a relationship between organizational routines and ethical fading, the article also clarifies how
academic leaders shape ethical misconduct and reveals how organizational routines that serve as
"truces" inside organizations can constitute ethical "hotspots." The article concludes by
specifying opportunities for future research on ethical fading in higher education.
Keywords
ethics; admissions; cognitive biases; organizational theory; leadership; governance; politics of
higher education; qualitative research; scandal; equity
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During the 2000s, a renewed focus on ethical conduct emerged from scandals inside and
outside of higher education. The American Council on Education (ACE), for example, explained,
“New economic demands and emerging forms of financial and academic relationships … mean
that even the most scrupulous collegiate leader sometimes needs guidance to discern the most
ethical course of action” (ACE, 2008, p. 1). To address these pressures, ACE (2008)
recommended “basic precepts” for administrators, faculty, staff and trustees to consider when
developing codes of conduct. Similarly, the Association of Governing Boards (AGB) asserted
that the responsibilities of trustees extend beyond ensuring fiscal health to avoiding a broader
range of transgressions (AGB, 2006, 2009). In “The New Ethics of Trusteeship,” Leslie and
MacTaggart (2008) stressed that a board’s most important responsibility was to protect the
public’s trust and suggested numerous ethical reforms, including conducting “ethical audits.”
Although these recommendations are useful, they offer incomplete remedies for curtailing ethical
misconduct. To echo Bertram Gallant and Kalichman (2011), reforms too often characterize
misconduct as individual moral failings that could be fixed by adopting more stringent rules.
The following article advances this perspective by analyzing a secret admissions process
for high-profile applicants at the University of Illinois (UI). In May 2009, the Chicago Tribune
reported that UI senior administrators had long maintained a “clout list” of “special interest”
applicants applying to undergraduate and graduate programs. The list for undergraduate
admissions, “Category I,” included applicants with connections to prominent donors, political
officials and trustees and administrators. Most special applicants were white; in 2009, 32 of 33
overturned decisions involved white applicants (ARC, 2009i). A “significant percentage” of
Category I applicants also hailed from affluent suburbs; over one third came from three high
schools outside of Chicago (ARC, 2009i, p. 15).
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The list was created to prevent special applicants from “falling through the cracks,” but it
evolved into a “shadow” process for granting preferential treatment in admissions. Category I
applicants tended to report lower test scores and class ranks than other applicants, but they
enjoyed a higher acceptance rate than their unconnected peers (ARC, 2009i). Administrators
even overturned the denial decisions of Category I applicants, including 33 cases in 2009 (ARC,
2009i, p. 15). A state panel established to investigate this preferential treatment, the Admissions
Commission Review (ARC), concluded, "undue influence compromised the fairness and
integrity of admissions on a systemic basis" at UI (ARC, 2009i, p. 3). The culprits behind the
process were not rogue admissions officers, but UI’s senior leaders, including trustees and the
Urbana-Champaign chancellor. The Commission found, “Category I derived its lifeblood from
the active participation of, and tone set by, those at the top of the University … Officials
routinely did nothing to block or diffuse the pressure (or worse, amplified it)" (ARC, 2009i, p.
1).
This article advances our theoretical understanding of ethical misconduct in colleges and
universities by articulating the relationship between the ethical traps of cognitive biases and the
organizational structures and environmental factors that aggravate these psychological
tendencies. First, the article animates the concept of “ethical fading” to explain why and how
academic leaders can rationalize misconduct as serving institutional interests. Second, it
demonstrates how organizational routines can exacerbate ethical fading, which helps to explain
why and how ethical misconduct is an organizational problem. Third, in demonstrating this
relationship between routines and ethical fading, the article reveals the adaptability of routines
and clarifies how academic leaders shape ethical misconduct. Fourth, it defines organizational
routines that serve as “truces” as "hotspots" for ethical fading due to the implicit dimensions of
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truces. Through these contributions, this article deepens and expands earlier promising research
on ethical misconduct in higher education (Bastedo, 2009; Bertram Gallant, 2011).
The structure of this article aims to capture the narrative character of case study research.
After analyzing the concept of ethical fading from behavioral ethics and the concept of
organizational routines from organizational behavior, I describe my analytical method for
analyzing data from the Admissions Review Commission. The analysis is organized into four
subsections: the official admissions process; the Category I admissions process; the
environmental context shaping the Category I process; and rationales for why administrators and
trustees participated in the Category I process. The discussion focuses on three conclusions:
environmental cues triggered self-deception mechanisms, including self-serving euphemisms,
that stimulated ethical fading and enabled administrators and trustees to ignore the ethical
considerations of offering preferential treatment to privileged applicants; this ethical fading was
aggravated by dimensions of the Category I organizational routine, including a deliberate
constriction of authority; and the process constituted an organizational truce for managing a
competing set of institutional priorities across a complex network of relationships, which
suppressed the ethical reflection of senior administrators and trustees. The final section specifies
opportunities for future research on ethical fading in higher education.
Theoretical Framework
Bounded Ethicality & Ethical Fading
Recent research in behavioral ethics reveals how otherwise ethical individuals can make
unethical decisions. This research asserts that ethical misconduct doesn’t stem from individuals
calculating the pros and cons of corruption, but rather from cognitive failings that impair
decision-making (Banaji, Bazerman & Chugh, 2003; Chugh & Bazerman, 2007; Cain,
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Loewenstein & Moore, 2005; Moore & Loewenstein, 2004; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, &
Bazerman, 2006; Moore & Gino, 2013). By extending Herbert Simon's (1983) concept of
"bounded rationality," Bazerman and Chugh (2005) defined “bounded awareness” as “an
individual’s failure to ‘see’ and use accessible and perceivable information while ‘seeing’ and
using other equally accessible and perceivable information” (p. 2). Similarly, Chugh, Bazerman
and Banaji (2005) articulated “bounded ethicality” as the “critical constraint” or “limitation in
recognizing the ethical challenge inherent in a situation or decision” (p. 75).1
This research illustrates that due to cognitive biases, individuals construe situations that
prioritize their own concerns at the expense of “objective” ethical considerations. In one
example, Moore et al (2006) specified the process of “moral seduction” or when individuals are
“unaware of the gradual accumulation of pressures on them to slant their conclusions” (p. 11).
By exploring the work of independent auditors, they found that cognitive biases such as selective
perception are more likely to explain instances of misconduct than premeditated acts of
corruption. In the higher education literature, Bastedo (2009) recast the problem of trustee
independence through this conceptual lens. Threats to independence, including political loyalties
and professional expertise, stemmed from trustees prioritizing their own interests through
motivated reasoning rather than “malicious intent.”
Whereas moral seduction describes how individuals come to understate the ethical
conflicts shaping their behavior, other research in behavioral ethics illustrates how individuals
dismiss the existence of such conflicts. Messick and Bazerman (1996) were among the first to
question whether executives even notice ethical dimensions when making decisions due to selfserving biases. Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) advanced this argument, specifically defining the
1
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) briefly mention the Category I process, describing it as an example of bounded
ethicality (pp. 40-42).
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term "ethical fading" to describe the process by which “the moral colors of an ethical decision
fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications" (p. 224). With ethical fading,
environmental cues trigger self-deception mechanisms that narrow the decision frames of
individuals; self-interest ultimately privileges interpretations of cues that ignore ethical
considerations. They argue that these self-deception mechanisms are pervasive in organizational
life: euphemistic language; psychological numbing such as induction; errors in perceptual
causation such as focusing on individuals rather than systems and committing acts of omission;
and constrained representation of “objective” truth (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). To protect
their ethical self-images, individuals eliminate “negative ethical characterizations or distort them
into positive ones” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 232).
Organizational Routines
Despite this recent research in behavioral ethics, scholars have yet to explore how
organizational structures shape the self-deception mechanisms that exacerbate bounded ethicality
such as ethical fading. More generally, we know that structures such as the division of labor and
organizational routines shape misconduct (Brief, Bertram & Dukerich, 2001; Palmer, 2008).
Vaughan (1999), for example, coined the term “structural secrecy” to describe how division of
labor, hierarchy and specialization segregate knowledge about tasks and goals in ways that
perpetuate misconduct in organizations. By formalizing misconduct in organizational routines,
employees might not notice unethical behaviors that would typically prompt concerns because
routinization "blunts" awareness that a moral issue is even at stake (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).
Upon closer examination, organizational routines might affect ethical fading for reasons
beyond fostering mindlessness. Research in organizational behavior has long stressed the role of
routines in organizing work. Cyert and March (1963) described routines as "standard operating
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procedures" and "the memory of an organization” (p. 101). Nelson and Winter (1982) later
defined routines as "regular and predictable behavior patterns of firms" (p. 14), likening them to
genes that are heritable and selectable by the environment. Feldman and Pentland (2003) refined
this definition to be “repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent action, carried out by
multiple actors” (p. 95). Early research on routines stressed their role in reducing cognitive strain
(March & Simon, 1958), but routines have been found to be more than "simple rules of thumbs
to address regular decisions" (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011, p. 416). Nelson and Winter
(1982), for example, envisioned a political dimension to routines, arguing that routines serve as a
"truce" between subunits to "avoid procedural warfare" (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p. 98).
More recently, research on routines has emphasized their adaptability. Routines not only
provide stability, but also reflect change as organizations learn how to adapt to their environment
(Cohen et al, 1996). In exploring the planning routine of a high-tech manufacturing company,
Howard-Grenville (2005) found that employees approached routines with different intentions,
demonstrating a role for individual agency with routines. Similarly, Feldman and Pentland
(2003) envisioned a duality with routines: the abstract, idealized understanding of the routine
(ostensive aspects) and the “performance” of the routine in specific places and times
(performative aspects). They conceptualize a recursive relationship between these ostensive and
performative aspects, which constitutes an ongoing enactment or “effortful accomplishment” of
the routine that generates new understandings of the routine.
An implication of this new perspective is that routines not only change in response to
exogenous pressures, but also enable endogenous change in organizations (Feldman & Pentland,
2003). Scholars have traditionally explained organizational change as the product of exogenous
events such as introducing new technologies, reflecting the belief that routines foster “structural
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inertia” that stymies change (Weick & Quinn, 1999). This new emphasis on the adaptability of
routines, however, implies that routines could be mechanisms for ethical fading as executives,
staff and stakeholders codify interpretations of environmental pressures and organizational
idiosyncrasies into structures that preserve and privilege self-serving meanings regardless of
“objective” ethical considerations.
Research Design
Data & Method
My investigation of the Category I admissions process applies the case study method.
Case studies present rich empirical descriptions of a phenomenon within a specific setting
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). By embracing this “rich, real-world context,” case studies
stimulate theory development because they investigate “research questions that address ‘how’
and ‘why’ in unexplored research areas” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, pp. 25-7). Research in
organizational behavior has long applied the case study method to analyze instances of
organizational misconduct (Vaughan, 1999).
My data derives from the Admissions Review Commission (ARC). In June 2009,
Governor Pat Quinn established the Commission to examine UI’s admissions practices,
including the policies that “provide favorable consideration to applicants” (ARC, 2009i, p. 8).
The Commission conducted its investigation over summer 2009, submitting its final report in
August 2009. A clear charge of the Commission was exploring whether Governor Rod
Blagojevich’s administration interfered with admissions. Mr. Blagojevich had been arrested in
December 2008 on corruption charges and removed from office by the Illinois General
Assembly in January 2009.
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The Commission collected data from three main sources (ARC, 2009i). First, staff
reviewed more than 9,000 pages of UI documents, including emails about Category I applicants.
Second, staff interviewed more than 40 individuals, including UI‘s trustees and president, former
UI presidents, the Urbana-Champaign chancellor, several UI deans, UI staff in admissions and
governmental relations, state legislators, high school counselors and experts in university
governance and admissions. Third, the Commission conducted 12 public hearings, featuring
testimony from 30 witnesses, including trustees and administrators who had been interviewed by
staff. My data consists of three artifacts from the Commission’s investigation: 1) recordings and
transcripts of public hearings; 2) its final report; and 3) documents such as emails.
In particular, the recordings and transcripts of the public hearings are essential data.
Public inquiries – and the final reports they produce – not only aim to uncover evidence in order
to allocate blame and responsibility, but also serve to defend, and potentially re-establish, the
legitimacy of organizations under scrutiny (Gephart, 1984; Gephart et. al, 1990). Brown (2000)
reminds us that final inquiry reports can constitute “a monologue, a univocal representation that
omits, marginalizes and selectivity highlights in its suppression of interpretative plurality,”
adding that the “latent intent” of these reports “is to close down rather than open competing
plotlines; to curtail not encourage skeptical questioning” (p. 67, 68). Data analysis, which will be
detailed in the next subsection, revealed that the final report did not include key aspects of the
Category I process that were explored during public hearings. With the rich data that was
collected before and during the public hearings, I am able to profile a multiplicity of voices that
shaped the Category I process.
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Data Analysis
The systematic coding of transcripts was the primary means of data analysis, reflecting
the methodological norms of qualitative inquiry (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The coding of
transcripts and reports consisted of several phases. The first phase was reading witness
testimony. The second phase, open coding, entailed analyzing testimony and coding it into units
of raw data. This analysis revealed eight broad themes: a) description of the official admissions
process; b) description of one’s involvement in the official process; c) description of the
Category I process; d) description of one’s involvement in the Category I process; e) description
of specific cases of preferential treatment in admissions; f) description of political interference in
admissions; g) description of environmental factors shaping admissions; and h)
recommendations for improving UI’s admissions processes. The third phase of analysis, axial
coding, entailed translating emergent codes into organizing concepts such as explanations for
participating in the Category I process. This analytical process ultimately revealed two selective
codes, ethical fading and organizational routines, that described behavior at higher levels of
abstraction (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Suddaby, 2006).
This analytical method proved fruitful in two respects. First, it did not impose a
predetermined conceptual framework on the data. The interpretation describing ethical fading
and organizational routines emanated from the voices of administrators and trustees during their
public testimony. Second, and as noted earlier, this approach revealed that the Commission did
not fully explore evidence detailing the official undergraduate admissions process and the
Category I process in favor of detailing egregious examples of preferential treatment in
admissions that occurred in some graduate programs (such as the law school). My analysis,
therefore, provides a fresh opportunity to explore the dynamics of the Category I process.
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Limitations
There are several limitations with this research. First, the public testimony offers rich
description from participants in the Category I process, but it could reflect a social desirability
bias in which individuals were offering post-hoc rationalizations of their behavior. Despite this
possibility, commissioners asked many questions about specific examples of preferential
treatment, including email exchanges documenting such treatment; witnesses hoping to recast
their actions in different and more positive lights were constrained by the content of these
artifacts. Moreover, the Commission interviewed numerous participants, allowing
commissioners and the general counsel to triangulate interpretations of events from extensive
documentary evidence and testimony from numerous individuals. Second, the Commission
conducted its investigation and published its findings in just over two months. This ambitious
timeframe left little time for commissioners to ask open-ended questions of witnesses to describe
their motivation for participating in the Category I process. This concern, however, is somewhat
mitigated by commissioners asking numerous clarifying questions of witnesses during public
hearings, which forced individuals to describe their participation in the process.
Research Findings
The research findings are organized into four subsections: a) analysis of the official
undergraduate admissions process; b) analysis of the Category I admissions process; c) analysis
of the environmental context shaping the Category I process; and d) analysis of the reasons
administrators and trustees offered to explain their participation in the Category I process.
Woven together, these findings reveal the extent to which special applicants received preferential
treatment, substantiate the shadow process as a formal organizational routine and specify the
environmental cues that ultimately triggered ethical fading among administrators and trustees.
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Official Admissions Process at UI
The principle of "holistic review" guided the official undergraduate admissions process.
Admissions officers from the Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) and in colleges rated
applications using numerous criteria, including academic performance and rigor, scores on
standardized tests, academic interests, extracurricular activities, personal characteristics, special
personal talents and individual circumstances. According to Stacey Kostell, Director of
Undergraduate Admissions, "we're evaluating that student based on what's available at their high
school and what they've taken advantage of" (ARC, 2009d, 5:19:23). Although OUA admitted
30 percent of applicants automatically because of high grades and test scores, it conducted
comprehensive reviews of most applicants, including those to prestigious programs such as
engineering (ARC, 2009i). Most applications were evaluated by at least two admissions officers
and ranked a "1," "2," "3," "4" or "5" – "1" was the best score and "5" was the worst score.
The official admissions process included notification deadlines in December and
February. In December, OUA assigned applicants into one of three categories: admitted, denied
or deferred (ARC, 2009i). At this stage, admissions admitted applicants rated "1" and denied
applicants rated "5” whereas most applicants rated a “2,” “3” or "4" comprised the "deferred"
category. Before the February deadline, committees of admissions officers and college staff
reviewed deferred applicants. Admissions officers then assigned all remaining applicants into
one of three categories: admitted, waitlisted or denied (ARC, 2009i). In 2009, UI received over
26,000 applications, granted admissions to roughly 17,000 applicants and enrolled about 7,000 of
these applicants (UI, n.d.).
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“Category I” Admissions Process
The Category I process, which remained a secret to most faculty, administrators and staff,
reflected an approach to admissions that one former dean described as a "well-oiled, selfdescribed ‘system’ for dealing with ‘special interest applicants’ … with connections to elected
officials, donors and trustees” (ARC, 2009i, p. 26). According to Chancellor Richard Herman,
UI had been “tracking” high-profile applicants for “decades” (ARC, 2009c, 1:26). In his opening
statement to the Commission, Trustee Larry Eppley explained, “My prior role as board chair
received admission inquiries from many sources. I followed the established admissions protocol
and the decades-old policy on special consideration for admission” (ARC, 2009e, 3:48). While
the “watchlist” totaled 100 applicants per year in the late-1990s, it had increased to more than
150 applicants per year by the mid-2000s (ARC, 2009c).
The Category I protocol evolved into a more formal process for several reasons. First,
senior administrators came to realize that monitoring special applicants did not provide sufficient
control to manage relationships with high-profile sponsors in 2002 after an embarrassing
situation in which the grandson of a former governor was denied admissions through the official
process (ARC, 2009b). Second, the implementation of a new enrollment management system
“streamlined” the shadow process. The "Category I" name actually came from a field for special
applicants in the Banner Enrollment Management Suite, which UI implemented for
undergraduate admissions in the mid-2000s. Its functionality allowed admissions officers to
“tag” special applicants with a "red strike" or "red stripe” (ARC, 2009d) and any UI staff with
access to the system to generate sophisticated reports about applicants.
Third, Chancellor Herman steadily secured authority over the Category I process. The
Commission characterized Herman as "the ultimate decision-maker with respect to Category I
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applicants" (ARC, 2009i, p. 15). While serving as provost of the Urbana-Champaign campus, he
assumed responsibility for fielding admissions queries from trustees because admissions reported
through the provost’s office; and when Herman became chancellor, he continued this work
despite OUA not reporting through the chancellor’s office (ARC, 2009d). Trustee David Dorris,
for example, testified that upon joining the board, Herman recommended channeling admissions
inquiries through the chancellor’s office (ARC, 2009f). To manage the process, Herman
convened secret meetings prior to notification deadlines that included Rick Schoell (Executive
Director, Governmental Relations) and Keith Marshall (Associate Provost for Enrollment
Management). All Category I applicants were discussed in these meetings; at times, this smaller
group considered admitting applicants who had been denied or waitlisted through the official
process. In addition to these meetings, there were “rolling” discussions among Herman, Marshall
and staff in governmental relations to address specific Category I applicants.
In its final incarnation, the Category I process provided senior administrators increasing
flexibility to manage relationships with key stakeholders. First, in deference to sponsors,
admissions officers could not deny Category I applicants without consulting the referring
individual (ARC, 2009i). Second, Category I applicants were often placed in a "holding pattern"
in which they were either deferred after the December notification or waitlisted after the
February notification (ARC, 2009i). To deflect criticism from counselors at feeder high schools,
overturned applicants were admitted late in the admissions cycle – even into June (ARC, 2009i).
Third, Category I applicants disproportionately benefited from appeals: the rate of appeal for
special applicants was 50 percent, but it was only 10 percent for other applicants (ARC, 2009i).
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Deteriorating Environment Creates “Extreme Stress”
During public meetings, administrators and trustees allayed most concerns that Governor
Blagojevich had interfered with undergraduate admissions. They, however, acknowledged an
increasing number of special applicants. Trustee Dr. Ken Schmidt, for example, characterized
special inquiries as an “epidemic”; he was receiving inquiries “all the time” (ARC, 2009e,
3:11:11). The most prevalent factor identified for the increase was economic anxiety. Trustee
Schmidt explained, “The more the economy had turned, the more inquiries we were getting”
(ARC, 2009e, 3:12:30). Chancellor Herman believed that UI provided in-state students “great
value” amidst tough economic times, which exacerbated UI’s increasing selectivity and
stimulated an increase in the number of special applicants (ARC, 2009c, 27:03).
Moreover, administrators and trustees voiced anxiety over UI’s fiscal future. Trustee
Eppley, who had served as board chair for longer than his predecessors, was “concerned about
protecting the University” after years of rescissions and decreased funding (ARC, 2009e, 15:31).
In FY1980, UI received $1.32 billion in state appropriations, but by FY2009, it was receiving
$718.5 million from the state (UI, 2008, p. 11). Its fiscal situation worsened during the 2000s –
before and during Governor Blagojevich’s tenure. During the early 2000s, UI received
consecutive mid-year rescissions totaling over $75 million; and these cuts were compounded by
a decline in appropriations of more than 16 percent, representing a loss of $130 million, between
FY2002 and FY2005 (UI, 2008, p. 6). As asserted in UI’s FY2010 budget proposal, “reductions
placed extreme stress on the University” and “State budget difficulties during the last dozen
years has significantly eroded the resource base of the University of Illinois” (UI, 2008, p. 6).
This anxiety over resources concerned commissioners – wasn’t there a “natural
incentive” to favor applicants sponsored by officials who controlled UI’s appropriations? The
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Chicago Tribune echoed this tension, describing “an awkward situation in which university
officials are taking requests from legislators who hold the school’s purse strings and trustees who
are, in essence, their bosses” (Cohen, St. Clair & Malone, 2009, p. 1). Chancellor Herman
acknowledged, “we can't be naive as to the world we live in” (ARC, 2009c, 20:12), and
described his actions as helping to “secure the broader interests of the institution” (ARC, 2009c,
23:31). Dr. James Stukel, a former UI president, further warned commissioners of the ethical
hazards accompanying UI’s dynamic economic and political environment. “So here you sit,
thinking about how can I do favors to do – to get something in return” (ARC, 2009h, 1:14:30). In
a letter to Governor Pat Quinn, UI’s Faculty Senate recognized that decisions had “been made
with an eye toward what these leaders thought would be best for the institution – maintaining
good relations with state officials, donors, and others” (UI, 2009, para 24).
Rationalizing the Category I Process
During the Commission’s public hearings, senior administrators and trustees articulated
four primary reasons for participating in the Category I admissions process, as described below.
Being "Responsive" and "Courteous"
Administrators and trustees emphasized being “courteous” and “responsive” to
stakeholders who referred applicants. Staff in governmental relations considered admissions
inquiries a form of constituent relations. Mr. Terrence McLennand, Assistant Director of State
Relations, believed the Category I process strengthened relationships with legislators.
To the extent that members contact us with a constituent request, which from the
legislator perspective is no different when they get a call saying somebody – I can't
get my tax refund, can you help get that dug out of the pile. I mean that – to the
extent that we can answer, help them, assist, it helps our relations with the General
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Assembly ... Just as far as an inquiry, if they bring us an inquiry and we have an
outcome that helps our relationship with the General Assembly (ARC, 2009b, 2:43:36).
Richard Schoell, Executive Director for Governmental Relations, explained, “I believe it's my
role to be responsive to members' requests as they come in because the interests they have in the
University of Illinois” (ARC, 2009b, 1:12:08).
Trustees stressed responsiveness not only to maintain relationships with public officials,
but also to serve as sympathetic public stewards. Trustee Larry Eppley, who referred applicants
with ties to Governor Blagojevich, expressed a perspective offered by many trustees: the citizens
of Illinois deserved answers to their questions, including those concerning admissions.
I wasn't hoping – I wasn’t demanding that ‘oh, this kid’s got to get in.’ None of
that. These were anxious parents or anxious relatives. They have a question about
admissions. The respectful thing to do, the courteous thing to do, the non-judgmental
thing to do is if there can be a question answered or some sort of follow-up, whatever
the issue is (ARC, 2009e, 1:35:53).
Trustee David Dorris conveyed a similar sentiment, saying, “These people, when they contact
me, what I want is information so I can go back and give them an answer. Not be rude, not be a
cold bureaucratic organization, but give them information and it’s the end of the subject” (ARC,
2009f, 3:19:52).
Senior administrators, including Chancellor Richard Herman and President Joseph White,
also espoused this ethic of responsiveness. President White justified the special list “in order to
respond courteously” to individuals (ARC, 2009i: 22). During his testimony, White supported
the elimination of Category I, but argued that it humanized UI for prominent alumni and donors.
I want to be completely realistic about this. This Commission is hearing a lot about
17
special treatment, favoritism. But understand we get complaints all the
time about the University being a big, faceless bureaucracy. Unresponsive. And so,
when we – if the answer to a prominent alum, which is probably what this is, is
‘thank you for calling, have Katie call the admissions office personally,’ the next
thing I am going to hear from that person is 'you should see the way Princeton treats
me. You should hear the way the University of Michigan treats me.' And that's just
the fact (ARC, 2009i, 4:16:36).
Similarly, Chancellor Herman stressed a need to maintain a special process as “a matter of
courtesy." Although he regretted aspects of the Category I process, Herman underscored its
benefits, particularly that "we are looked upon as being responsive" to trustees, donors,
legislators and the governor's office (ARC, 2009c, 1:35:46). In contrast, Dr. Sidney Micek,
President of the University of Illinois Foundation, recommended not eliminating the Category I
process. He argued that it enabled “good stewardship” with donors (ARC, 2009g, 2:15:19). “I
think it's important that admissions does its job … but ultimately … will not in any way
disadvantage the University either, in the sense of, as a courtesy, allowing people who have
invested in the University and who we want to keep investing in the University” (ARC, 2009g,
3:38:43).
Creating Educational Opportunities
Senior administrators and trustees asserted that the Category I process created
educational opportunities for applicants. Despite evidence to the contrary, some administrators
and trustees believed the process benefited under-represented students. Dr. James Stukel, a
former UI president, emphasized creating opportunities for students across the entire state.
During my presidency, I traveled 100,000 miles in my car to 48 communities
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in Illinois. And the idea was to put a face on the University all over the state
because we are the state's university ... In many of those meetings that I had with
alums, with editorial boards, with people that come to the event, there were many
stories that were big to them … There is a whole bunch of these quirky things
where they don't quite fit in the [admissions] model … valedictorians who are in
a small downstate community. They, their ACT may not be as high as others,
but they didn't get in. They need a vehicle (ARC, 2009h, 37:53).
Similarly, Trustee Dorris differentiated between forwarding applicants who were relatives or
business associates and those who were from rural communities. "I don't apologize for me
advocating for the downstate or small rural schools. They don't score as well as on the ACT.
They just don't have the educational background" (ARC, 2009f, 3:39:08). In addition to
geographical diversity, Trustee Frances Carroll justified her involvement as a means of
advocating for racial diversity. She forwarded the names of applicants through the Category I
process in hopes of increasing enrollment among students of color (ARC, 2009d). Trustee
Niranjan Shah, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, similarly framed his advocacy of Indian
students as increasing the representation of international students on campus (ARC, 2009f).
A more common rationale for creating educational opportunities, however, was
protecting applicants who deserved “a second look." Along with current and former
administrators, trustees described examples in which their intervention secured admission for
wronged applicants. Trustee Dr. Ken Schmidt described advocacy as a remedy for "the special
circumstance when you know something is awry" (ARC, 2009e, 3:43:03). "What do you do
then? Do you go back to the student and discuss it … where do you take that concern? If you
19
can't advocate for anybody nobody has an advocate" (ARC, 2009e, 3:43:07). In fact, Trustee
Schmidt considered advocacy part of his duty as a trustee.
I believe in my heart of hearts that if you are a trustee in the University, you, you
were appointed by the governor and approved by the senate, then all of a sudden
you have an obligation to the University and anything that has to do with it. And if
you have a chance to advocate for a good cause or a student, then maybe you should
think about doing that (ARC, 2009e, 3:05:37).
Although Trustee Shah regretted “inquiring” about some applicants, he described many efforts as
requesting that admissions “take a second look” at applicants who did not have “direct access” to
“power” (ARC, 2009f, 1:47:58).
On a similar note, former President Stukel lamented the lack of a “relief valve” for
qualified students who were denied admissions (ARC, 2009h, 37:00). “For example, ‘why is it
that my son had an ACT of 34 and did not get into the University of Illinois?’ If I’m a parent, I
sure as heck want to know why that's the case. So where do they go?” (ARC, 2009h, 38:23).
Staff in governmental relations shared this concern. Mr. McLennand believed it was his
responsibility to “bring forward” admissions cases that legislators thought “deserved a second
look” (ARC, 2009b, 2:28:30). Similarly, Mr. Schoell wanted to encourage admissions inquiries
from citizens, including those channeled through legislators. "Sometimes those people don't
know where to go. The University of Illinois is some big massive place. I want to make sure that
those individuals do have an opportunity to tell their story" (ARC, 2009b, 1:53:06).
Admitting “Qualified” Applicants
Senior administrators and trustees believed that applicants admitted through the Category
I process were qualified to attend the University of Illinois. First, they stressed that only a small
20
number of applicants received preferential treatment. Chancellor Herman explained that the
Category I list only included 150 to 200 applicants every year; and approximately 90 of these
applicants were admitted on their merits "without any discussion" and another 30 were
eliminated from consideration by "normal procedure" (ARC, 2009c, 35:32). He overturned
decisions, but characterized the frequency of these interventions as “very small” and only
involving “a small number of individuals” (ARC, 2009c, 40:32). "That's not an excuse. It's just a
statement of scale" (ARC, 2009c, 35:42). UI’s outside counsel emphasized this point in a letter
to the Commission, claiming, “the isolated incidents of poor admissions decisions identified
through the Commission's fact-finding process are an extremely small percentage of the overall
admissions at our great university" (Latham & Watkins, 2009, p. 2).
More frequently, administrators, trustees and even admissions officers maintained that
applicants admitted through the Category I process were just as qualified as other applicants.
Although Abel Montoya, a former Associate Director of Admissions, refused to overturn the
denial decisions of some applicants – “I thought we were setting them up for failure, where I
thought that their grades indicated they were going to flunk out” – he believed most reversals
involved qualified students (ARC, 2009b, 37:02). “The ones that we know are going to be
successful … There’s only so much I can do, if they got in … at least they’re going to be
successful (ARC, 2009b, 36:43). Mr. McLennand dismissed the notion that Category I applicants
stole spots from more qualified applicants; instead he argued that they were victims of UI
becoming “hyper selective” (ARC, 2009b, 2:23:46). He believed that Category I applicants with
“very competitive” test scores were being denied even though they would have received
“automatic admission to any other state school” (ARC, 2009b, 2:24:26). Denied applicants
would have been admitted “with their same scores” had they graduated from different high
21
schools, but they were “being compared to other qualified students” from “competitive” high
schools (ARC, 2009b, 2:28:12).
Chancellor Herman echoed similar points. He believed that Category I applicants, even
those rated a “5,” “had as a minimum quality their ability to succeed at the institution” (ARC,
2009c, 34:51). He noted that half of applicants with overturned decisions reported ACT scores
above the median for the Division of General Studies (ARC, 2009c, 1:28:40). In other cases,
Herman justified reversing decisions because he believed students could succeed. In one
example, he directed admissions to admit a denied applicant (who had connections to one of the
governor’s prominent donors) after reviewing the applicant’s file. He told commissioners, “Well,
honestly, in this particular instance, I looked at the information I had about the applicant and
decided he could succeed” (ARC, 2009c, 1:44:50).
Buffering the Official Admissions Process
Senior administrators contended that the Category I process protected the undergraduate
admissions process from external interference. Chancellor Herman served as “the buffer” for
external stakeholders, trustees, the president and deans while Associate Provost Keith Marshall
acted as the intermediary for admissions staff. In his opening statement to the Commission,
Herman stated, “As chancellor, my intent was to insulate the colleges as much as possible from
external requests, and respond promptly and appropriately to inquiries that we received” (ARC,
2009c, 1:41). He feared that public officials and trustees would begin “reaching into the
colleges” and contacting deans unless he coordinated inquiries (ARC, 2009c, 15:35). Trustee
Dorris, echoed this characterization, describing Herman as "very protective of the people
underneath him.” “And he doesn't let things slide down that are going to be difficult to handle.
He kept them to himself" (ARC, 2009f, 3:16:17).
22
While Chancellor Herman was trying to buffer those at the top, Keith Marshall was
hoping to protect admissions officers. Stacey Kostell, Director of Undergraduate Admissions,
explained that OUA had not "felt any external pressure" because “Keith shields us from that”
(ARC, 2009d, 6:11:23). "To be honest, I think that Keith was being a good supervisor and letting
us do our job in making sure that, that went through him and not through us" (ARC, 2009d,
5:07:43). During his testimony, Marshall stressed his efforts to insulate undergraduate
admissions, saying, "I have done my level best from keeping the Category I process from the
regular admissions process" (ARC, 2009a, 21:49) and “I have worked very hard in my role to
separate out those two processes" (ARC, 2009a, 46:38). As a result, Kostell explained that
admissions officers knew little about “how often those decisions were overturned, or really what
that looked like – how many were on the list, what the decisions were and if a decision changed,
how often that happened” (ARC, 2009d, 5:16:04).
One consequence of this buffering was that few administrators and trustees knew the
term “Category I” until the Chicago Tribune broke the scandal. Moreover, few administrators
and trustees had realized that the tracking list actually constituted a formal process. President
White, despite referring applicants, voiced surprised over Category I’s institutionalized nature,
particularly the existence of meetings to overturn decisions. This surprise extended to trustees –
even though most of them had intervened on behalf of applicants. In addition to Trustees Eppley,
Schmidt and Carroll, Trustee Dorris was shocked to learn of the Category I process. “I, like all
the other trustees, no matter how unbelievable it sounds, I had never heard that term or knew
about this internal tracking system with preferential treatment until I read it in the Chicago
Tribune” (ARC, 2009f, 3:15:33).2
2
In August 2009, seven of nine UI trustees resigned due to their participation in the Category I process. The
resignations of President White and Chancellor Herman followed over the next two months.
23
Discussion
Ethical Fading among Senior Administrators
The phenomenon of ethical fading impeded the ethical reflection of senior administrators
and trustees at the University of Illinois. Environmental cues, including increasing numbers of
undergraduate applications and insecurity over state funding, triggered self-deception
mechanisms that constricted the decision frames of administrators and trustees. First, they used
numerous euphemisms to mask advocacy of applicants or directives to overturn decisions. The
Category I process was described as a “watchlist” or “tracking system,” disguising the extent of
interference. Chancellor Herman, among others, rejected the opinion of admissions officers to
admit applicants who “could do perfectly well” and were “going to be successful”; and
admissions officers tolerated reversed decisions because they believed applicants had an “ability
to succeed.” Moreover, administrators and trustees sanitized their involvement by employing
positive language such as needing to be “responsive” and “courteous,” providing “relief valves”
and “second looks” for “deserving” applicants and trying to “buffer,” insulate” and “shield”
colleges and admissions. Through these euphemisms, individuals described their participation in
terms that not only avoided negative judgments, but also portrayed their behavior in favorable
language that enhanced self-perceptions of morality. Instead of offering privileged applicants
preferential treatment, they were creating and protecting educational opportunities for applicants.
Second, administrators and trustees succumbed to the psychological numbing of
induction, which diminished their capacity to acknowledge the ethical consequences of providing
preferential treatment. In a letter to Governor Pat Quinn, the Faculty Senate of the UrbanaChampaign campus acknowledged, “This President and Chancellor did not invent ‘clout’ as a
factor influencing campus admissions; it has been a longstanding problem at this University as at
24
nearly every university, public or private” (UI, 2009, para. 5). The impulse to respond out of
“courtesy” had become a taken-for-granted norm at the University of Illinois. Iterations of the
Category I process continued to resemble historical practices just enough to not trigger ethical
reflection. If tracking special interest applicants was ethical, so was contacting high-profile
sponsors about pending decisions; if these practices had been ethical, so was meeting to discuss
applicants; if meeting was ethical, so was reconsidering decisions to deny “qualified” applicants.
The incremental evolution of the Category I process blurred discrete decisions points that might
have prompted administrators and trustees to recognize the ethical implications of their actions.
Third, administrators and trustees characterized the Category I process as a response to
immutable exogenous factors, which privileged self-serving explanations of preferential
treatment. Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) warn, “self-interest may mean that I see other factors
as more variable than they really are, and hence erroneously deﬂect blame from myself that
should rightfully be assigned to me” (p. 230). The process of coordinating and responding to
inquiries assumed the character of VIP customer service: important individuals need information
or even a favor – what can we offer them? But the understandable desire to serve the needs of
high-profile stakeholders too often supplanted ethical considerations of equity and fairness in
admissions. Through biased attribution, administrators and trustees deemed their participation in
the Category I process as a necessary imperative, which disguised the extent to which their
behavior undermined the integrity of undergraduate admissions.
Organizational Routines Aggravate Ethical Fading
The ethical fading of administrators and trustees was aggravated by the organizational
routine of the Category I process. First, conscious attempts to buffer the admissions office
concealed the process and constricted its authority and task structure. Chancellor Herman and
25
Associate Provost Marshall understood the reach of Category I, and senior staff in governmental
relations and admissions knew that denial decisions were overturned at times, but very few
individuals realized its machinations. For trustees, the process seemed straightforward: email or
call Herman about an applicant and await his response. Trustees believed that admissions
officers were evaluating referred applicants, but didn’t seem to grasp the extent to which Herman
intervened behind the scenes. Admissions officers knew the powers that be were instructing
Marshall to overturn decisions, but it wasn’t always clear who was pulling strings for applicants.
The shadow process engaged a complex network of stakeholders, but because inquiries were
routed through the chancellor’s office, it meant that an already clandestine process was unlikely
to be understood because most people possessed a bounded view of the process.
Second, administrators and trustees deliberately excluded admissions officers throughout
the Category I process. Admissions used holistic review to rate applications, but trustees and
administrators regularly judged the qualifications of applicants from a single data point. The
convenient availability of data through UI’s enrollment management system enabled
administrators outside of admissions to recast their overturning of admissions decisions as
providing informed second opinions. Officials in government relations, for example, could
access an applicant’s record and deem her test score as “high” or “competitive.” Dr. Stanley
Ikenberry, UI’s former president, underscored this negative effect of enrollment management
systems, saying, “There is a fundamental danger when you begin to routinize and systematize
what is on its face a potential intrusion into the process “ (ARC, 2009h, 2:38:23). ”I think
desystemitizing this – the administration may have been a little bit overly efficient here, and it
unintentionally aggravated its own problem” (ARC, 2009h, 2:39:48). During secret meetings,
Associate Provost Marshall tried to act as “devil’s advocate,” using aggregate statistics to
26
persuade the group against overturning some decisions, but these efforts focused mostly on
egregious outliers. The suppression of admissions expertise ultimately eliminated opportunities
to contextualize the meaning of admissions data.
Third, minimal discussion of admissions policies among trustees enabled them to infer a
hear no evil, see no evil perspective on admissions inquiries. Numerous trustees testified that the
board rarely discussed admissions; trustees assumed little role in articulating and overseeing
admissions policy beyond discussing tuition rates and out-of-state enrollment. Curiously, trustees
were unaware that admissions didn’t even accept letters of recommendation from undergraduate
applicants. This overall lack of knowledge about admissions practices not only raises concerns
over the board’s commitment to policy oversight, but also illustrates how trustees could operate
within a zone of ignorance concerning the Category I process, failing to ask questions about how
their inquiries and referrals fit within the broader admissions process.
This relationship between organizational routines and ethical fading begins to
demonstrate how leaders actually shape ethical misconduct. First, routines embody a duality of
structure and agency. “While organizational routines are commonly perceived as reenacting the
past, the performance of routines can also involve adapting to contexts that require either
idiosyncratic or ongoing changes and reflecting on the meaning of future realities” (Feldman &
Pentland, 2003, p. 95). The Category I example provides empirical support for Feldman and
Pentland’s assertion. The process was not set in stone: its essential purpose endured over time,
even as its particulars evolved to accommodate changing circumstances. The ostensive aspect of
the routine changed little as presidents, chancellors, trustees and governors came and went, while
the performative aspect of the routine adjusted to new pressures. The continual enactment of the
routine demonstrated a reflective character that looked to the future as much as the past – the
27
Category I process was both the blueprint for and footprint of how UI leveraged admissions to
manage relationships with important stakeholders.
Second, the Category I case demonstrates that both exogenous and endogenous events
can stimulate adaptations in organizational routines. Exogenous events altered the Category I
process, particularly increases in applications, and corresponding increases in selectivity, and
continued anxiety over state funding. Yet endogenous events – Richard Herman’s decision to
retain power over the process when transitioning from provost to chancellor, a new enrollment
management system allowing staff outside of admissions to access data on applicants and the
extended tenure of Trustee Eppley as board chair – also altered the process, eliminating
opportunities for new perspectives to question the ethical assumptions underpinning the process.
These examples illustrate that routines change not only from environmental pressures, but also
from idiosyncratic changes within the organization itself.
The lesson for leaders is not only to espouse ethical values, but also to work behind the
scenes to ensure that values are codified and embedded into routines. The Category I process
didn’t entail one-off email exchanges or hush-hush discussions among administrators and
trustees. Instead leaders condoned and perpetuated the process, formalizing activities into a
routine – forwarding names of applicants, labeling applicants as Category I, reconsidering the
qualifications of denied applicants, admitting applicants into alternative majors, overturning
admissions decisions. This continual enactment of the routine evolved into shared
understandings about “the way things are done around here” (Levitt & March, 1988, p. 327). Not
surprisingly, the Commission concluded that “failures in leadership” fostered a culture that “too
easily tolerated undue influence and an overall admissions approach that merged, rather than
28
separated, an otherwise unremarkable institutional desire to cultivate relationships and curry
favor with the rich and powerful” [emphasis in original] (ARC, 2009i, p. 2).
Organizational Truces as “Hotspots” for Ethical Fading
The Category I example also demonstrates that routines can constitute organizational
truces. The process codified a compromise for how to manage a competing set of institutional
priorities across a complex network of relationships. Instead of tolerating direct intervention in
admissions from prominent donors or political officials or providing no differentiation in
responsiveness to trustees or high-profile sponsors, senior administrators created and maintained
procedures that protected the core admissions operation and satisfied UI’s strategic interests.
Importantly, the specifications of Category I process – or put another way, the terms of the truce
– were never explicitly acknowledged by different stakeholders. Nelson and Winters (1982)
explained, “the terms of the truce can never be fully explicit … The terms become increasingly
defined by a shared tradition arising out the specific contingencies confronted and the responses
of those parties to those contingencies” (p. 111).
The Category I process necessarily assumed a clandestine character, which illustrates
how organizational routines that serve as truces can represent "hotspots" for ethical fading. An
acknowledgment of the truce would have animated internal and external conflicts, which might
have exposed the ethical implications of the process. The preservation of the Category I process
required administrators and trustees to suppress and ignore ethical considerations because
acknowledging such concerns might have signaled waning support to external stakeholders and
revealed the scope of professional marginalization to admissions officers. As a truce, the
Category I process buried considerations that might have prompted administrators and trustees to
contemplate the ethical consequences of offering preferential treatment to privileged applicants.
29
Directions for Future Research
This article reveals numerous opportunities for future research on ethical misconduct in
higher education. One opportunity is to explore the relationship between ethical fading and
“academic capitalism.” In response to declining revenues from traditional sources, institutions
are establishing new revenue streams by pursuing market-focused, “entrepreneurial” strategies
and reconsidering how to deploy “institutional resources” (Mars & Metcalfe, 2009; Slaughter &
Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Along with pursuing entrepreneurial activities, senior
administrators might be broadening conceptualizations of institutional “resources” to generate
new revenues from traditional sources such as alumni, donors and government. The taken-forgranted admissions practices of “legacy admits” and “development admits,” for example, aim to
deepen the relationship between admissions and development in order to maximize gift revenues
(Golden, 2007). Moreover, my analysis of the Commission’s data revealed examples of
preferential treatment for numerous student services. In an environment of constricting
resources, administrators might offer a broader set of “assets” – assignments to desirable
residence halls, invitations to exclusive living learning communities and co-curricular programs
or priority enrollment in popular courses – to strengthen, maintain or repair relationships with
prominent external stakeholders.
Future research could explore whether colleges and universities provide preferential
treatment for external stakeholders across a range of services and the extent to which
administrators, faculty, staff and trustees perceive these actions as ethical. The use of qualitative
methods might prove difficult with this research due to social desirability bias (Arnold &
Feldman, 1981) and the hidden nature of the behavior (Treviño & Weaver, 2003), but the use of
surveys might offer sufficient anonymity for respondents (Wouters et al, 2014). The sensitivity
30
of this research highlights several trade-offs with survey design. First, balance observer-reports
and self-reports (Zuber & Kaptein, 2013). Although some researchers argue that self-reports
provide accurate assessments of ethicality under conditions of anonymity (Bennett & Robinson,
2000), others prefer observer-reports because this approach minimizes social desirability bias
(Kaptein, 2008; Treviño & Weaver, 2003). Second, survey individuals at different levels of the
institution. What a housing manager, for example, might consider a transgression, a development
officer might consider an essential courtesy. Third, ask close-ended and open-ended questions.
One set of close-ended questions could determine the frequency of preferential treatment, while
others could gauge the reasons why certain applicants (or students) receive such treatment and
ask respondents to rate the ethicality of these actions. Moreover, the inclusion of open-ended
questions would allow respondents to describe reasons for providing preferential treatment in
their own words irrespective of whether they conceptualize the behavior as ethical.
Another research opportunity is to examine the relationship between ethical fading and
the affective and cognitive processes of senior administrators. Individuals use self-control to
resist negative behaviors, but because of ego depletion, one’s capacity for self-control diminishes
over time (Treviño, den Nieuwenboer & Kish-Gephart, 2014). Gino and colleagues (2011) found
that the likelihood of unethical behavior increases after individuals had to demonstrate selfcontrol. The work of presidents, chancellors and provosts claims a cognitive and emotional toll
(Cohen & March, 1974; Kerr & Gade, 1986), which might make self-regulation more
challenging over time and ethical fading even more difficult to acknowledge and mitigate.
Despite the sensitivity of this issue, scholars could use qualitative and quantitative
methods to explore how ego-depletion shapes ethicality among senior administrators. Semistructured interviews with presidents, chancellors and provosts could determine the stressors that
31
affect their work and ascertain the extent to which administrators believe these stressors tax their
cognitive and emotional ability to address difficult problems, including navigating decisions with
ethical consequences. Another approach could be convening focus groups of senior
administrators to discuss the factors that complicate decision-making, which could be part of a
conference hosted by an association or a school of education. These interviews and focus groups
could then inform the development of surveys that investigate similar questions, particularly
those exploring the relationship between job stressors and the cognitive and emotional capacity
of senior administrators to recognize and raise ethical concerns.
Conclusion
This article serves to remind scholars, policymakers and leaders in higher education that
the potential for misconduct pervades colleges and universities more than we assume – and even
more than we feel comfortable acknowledging. The pull of ethical fading is powerful. At the
University of Illinois, it was strong enough that senior administrators and trustees compromised
the institution’s land-grant heritage. Dr. James Stukel, UI’s former president, described
providing preferential treatment in admissions as betraying the institution’s “gene pool” (ARC,
2009h, 57:33).
Sadly, the potential for transgressions that undermine the public’s trust in higher
education is only to increase as colleges and universities continue adapting to deteriorating fiscal
environments and dynamic political environments. Within the context of ethical fading, these
pressures will make it even more difficult for administrators and trustees to recognize ethical
imperatives while engaging important stakeholders and securing the interests of their institutions.
At public institutions, threats to the integrity of admissions processes might not be novel. A
recent report, which scrutinizes interference in admissions from the president’s office at the
32
University of Texas, suggests that public universities continue to formalize preferential treatment
in admissions by establishing and adapting sophisticated organizational routines that circumvent
formal admissions processes and contradict the letter and spirit of formal admissions policies
(Office of the Chancellor, 2015; Stripling, 2015).
Importantly, this article should not be interpreted as an excuse to exempt individuals from
personal responsibility for unethical behavior. When trustees, administrators, faculty, staff and
students violate ethical standards, they should pay the consequences. But if our scholarly
community is serious about informing the design of more ethical institutions, we need to
acknowledge that misconduct is an organizational problem that demands organizational solutions
that embrace the realities of individual behavior. By understanding these environmental,
organizational and psychological factors, we can help senior administrators and trustees begin to
mitigate the conception and proliferation of ethical misconduct.
33
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