Cooperative outcome interdependence, task reflexivity, and team

Journal of Applied Psychology
2007, Vol. 92, No. 3, 628 – 638
Copyright 2007 by the American Psychological Association
0021-9010/07/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.92.3.628
Cooperative Outcome Interdependence, Task Reflexivity, and Team
Effectiveness: A Motivated Information Processing Perspective
Carsten K. W. De Dreu
University of Amsterdam
A motivated information processing perspective (C. K. W. De Dreu & P. J. D. Carnevale, 2003; see also
V. B. Hinsz, R. S. Tindale, & D. A. Vollrath, 1997) was used to predict that perceived cooperative
outcome interdependence interacts with team-level reflexivity to predict information sharing, learning,
and team effectiveness. A cross-sectional field study involving management and cross-functional teams
(N ⫽ 46) performing nonroutine, complex tasks corroborated predictions: The more team members
perceived cooperative outcome interdependence, the better they shared information, the more they
learned and the more effective they were, especially when task reflexivity was high. When task
reflexivity was low, no significant relationship was found between cooperative outcome interdependence
and team processes and performance. The author concludes that the motivated information processing
perspective is valid outside the confines of the laboratory and can be extended toward teamwork in
organizations.
Keywords: group decision making, team effectiveness, reflexivity, cooperative goals
ing. When such epistemic motivation is low, cooperative outcome
interdependence is unlikely to contribute to team effectiveness.
Teams have become a basic building block in organizations
(e.g., Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Pfeffer, 1997). A good starting point
to understand the psychological processes underlying team effectiveness is the Theory of Cooperation and Competition (Deutsch,
1949, 1973; Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold, 1998). It suggests that people in groups perceive their goals and those of others
to be cooperatively linked (“swim or sink” together) or competitively linked (one swims, the other sinks). Under perceived cooperative, rather than competitive, outcome interdependence, team
members have high trust, are more likely to experience psychological safety, handle their conflicts more constructively, and
benefit from these conflicts both as individuals and as a team
(Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999; Tjosvold, 1998; Wong, Tjosvold, & Yu, 2005).
In this article, I review the evidence for the theory and note that
it is unclear whether cooperative outcome interdependence is a
necessary and sufficient condition for teams to be effective. Expanding on a motivated information perspective on interpersonal
negotiation and group decision making (e.g., De Dreu, 2005; De
Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; see
also Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Meglino & Korsgaard,
2004), I argue and show that cooperative outcome interdependence
stimulates team effectiveness especially when team members are
motivated to engage in deep and systematic information process-
Cooperative Outcome Interdependence and Team
Effectiveness
Members of organizational teams are interdependent in a number of ways. In many cases, team members depend on each other
for individual task completion. Such task interdependence (Wageman, 1995) needs to be distinguished from outcome interdependence, that is, the extent to which team members’ outcomes
depend on their personal or team performance (e.g., Van der Vegt,
Emans, & Van de Vliert, 2000, 2001; Wageman, 1995; see also
Katz & Kahn, 1978; Schelling, 1960). The way outcomes and
rewards are structured may give rise to perceived cooperative
outcome interdependence or to perceived competitive outcome
interdependence (Deutsch, 1973; Tjosvold, 1985, 1998; Wong et
al., 2005). Under cooperative outcome interdependence, team
members assume they swim or sink together and that they benefit
from each other’s performance. Under competitive outcome interdependence, in contrast, team members assume that when they
swim, others sink, and vice versa.
The concept of cooperative outcome interdependence is closely
linked to work on prosocial versus proself motivation in interpersonal negotiation and small-group decision making (e.g, De Dreu,
Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu,
2007; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). This work proceeds on
the basis of the assumption that group members face a mixedmotive situation with incentives to invest in the team and to
contribute to collective performance as well as incentives to do
well personally and to benefit from others’ cooperative effort
(Katz & Kahn, 1978; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Schelling, 1960).
Depending on temperament, socialization, or situational influences, team members may adopt a prosocial motivation and focus
on collective goals, or alternatively, they may adopt a proself
This research was supported by grants from the Dutch National Science
Foundation (NWO Grant 410.21.010P), awarded to Carsten K. W. De
Dreu, and the Van der Gaag Stichting, awarded to Carsten K. W. De Dreu
and Aukje Nauta. I thank Bart de Vries, Hanneke Franssen, and Nieske
Winters for their help with data collection.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carsten
K. W. De Dreu, University of Amsterdam, Department of Psychology,
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail:
c.k.w.dedreu@uva.nl
628
MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING IN TEAMS
motivation and focus on individual goals and relative performance
(Batson, 1998; Van Lange, 1999).
When team members adopt a prosocial motivation and perceive cooperative outcome interdependence, they handle differences of opinion and other types of conflict better, learn more,
and perform more effectively. Children who debate their opposing insights under cooperative outcome interdependence are
better in role taking, display enhanced moral reasoning, and
cooperate more than do children working alone or in competition (e.g., Bridgeman, 1981; Doise, Mugny, & Perret-Clermont,
1975). Alper, Tjosvold, and Law (2000) concluded that “organizational teams that rely on cooperative approaches to conflict
would appear to be good candidates for making use of their
autonomy for themselves and the organization” (p. 638). And in
their meta-analytic review, Stanne et al. (1999) made the following observation:
The results of these studies indicated that cooperation promoted
higher individual achievement and greater group productivity than did
competition. . . . resulted in significantly longer time on task, more
frequent use of higher reasoning strategies, a greater number of new
ideas and creative insights generated, and greater individual transfer
of what is learned to new situations. (p. 134)
Although encouraging, the work described above leaves unclear whether and why cooperative outcome interdependence by
itself leads to positive team outcomes. There is little doubt that
cooperative outcome interdependence helps constructive dispute resolution and fosters between-member coordination. But
why would people perceiving cooperative outcome interdependence use higher reasoning strategies more frequently, and why
would it lead them to learn more and to work harder? Equally
likely, it seems, is that cooperative outcome interdependence
leads people to focus on harmony and consensus, to maintain
their pleasant and peaceful situation, and to rely on harmonysecuring and easy-to-defend heuristics such as “equal split is
fair” and “consensus implies correctness.” In fact, research in a
variety of domains has suggested that cooperative outcome
interdependence by itself contributes little to team processes
and performance. First, evidence suggests that cooperative outcome interdependence by itself does not predispose individuals
to engage in more or less deliberate and thorough, or shallow
and heuristic, information processing (De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu,
Koole, & Oldersma, 1999). Second, research has suggested that
perceived cooperative outcome interdependence affects job satisfaction and individual and team performance only when task
interdependence is high and team members need each other to
complete their tasks (e.g., Fan & Gruenfeld, 1998; Van der Vegt
et al., 2001; Wageman & Baker, 1997). Third, recent work has
indicated that individuals become more creative when they
work under competitive outcome interdependence (Munkes &
Diehl, 2003) and that groups with prosocially motivated members are better in planning and coordination, but worse in
creative ideation, than are groups with proself motivated members (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; Goncalo & Staw, 2006).
Perhaps the most troubling evidence comes from studies that
use the so-called hidden-profile task (Stasser, 1999). Under
hidden-profile conditions, each individual group member holds
some items of information that are shared with other group
members and some that are available to the individual only. On
629
the basis of the information at their disposal, individual group
members come to prefer a decision alternative that they would
recognize as being suboptimal were they to pool all of the
information available among them (Stasser & Titus, 1985,
1987). Many studies have documented that, in cooperative
groups, information that is held in common by group members
is discussed at the expense of members’ uniquely held information (for reviews, see Hinsz et al., 1997; Stasser, 1999;
Wittenbaum, 2000; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). And because
cooperative groups exchange and emphasize commonly held
information and ignore critical but unshared information, they
tend to reach suboptimal decisions.
Taken together, there is evidence that when there is conflict or
difference of opinion, prosocial motivation and cooperative outcome interdependence helps team effectiveness. Otherwise, it remains unclear why cooperative outcome interdependence by itself
would be beneficial to team effectiveness. Evidence suggests that
prosocial motivation quite easily leads team members to focus on
consensus and coordination instead of on new ideas and problem
solutions, drives them toward the sharing of information already
known to all members, and leads them to settle on suboptimal
50 –50 compromises. Because members of organizational teams
are likely to bring different expertise and information, the conclusion should be that perceived cooperative outcome interdependence may be a liability rather than an asset and that it may be a
necessary, but certainly not sufficient, condition for teams to
perform effectively.
Motivated Information Processing and Group Decision
Making
Attempts to uncover the reasons for the pervasive failure of
cooperative groups to uncover hidden profiles have focused
primarily on variables influencing whether shared or unshared
information is exchanged (e.g., Larson, Christensen, Abbott, &
Franz, 1996; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987). Expanding this
“groups as information processors” framework (Hinsz et al.,
1997), recent work has indicated that at least as important is
whether group members actively and systematically process the
information that is exchanged. According to dual-process models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999), people can choose between heuristic processing of information, characterized by more shallow,
less critical processing of information and a reliance on well
learned associations on the one hand and more systematic,
effortful ways of processing that lead to deeper and more
elaborate, argument-based evaluations of information on the
other hand. At the group level, Stasser and Birchmeier (2003)
distinguished between preference-driven and informationdriven group interaction (see also Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). In preference-driven groups, members take stock of
extant preferences and form a group judgment by aggregating
these preferences. Group members may rely on the “consensus
implies correctness” heuristic (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987) to
(rightly or wrongly) infer that the group has reached a correct
decision, or they may use an “equal split is fair” heuristic to
solve their conflicts of interest (Pruitt, 1981). Informationdriven groups, on the other hand, are characterized by the
communication and integration of relevant information and thus
by systematic processing.
DE DREU
630
Whether group members engage in information-driven interaction and concomitant deep processing of information depends on
individual differences such as need for cognitive closure or need
for cognition (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Petty & Cacioppo,
1986). The epistemic motivation to engage in systematic information processing may also derive from the situation. For example,
individuals under low rather than high time pressure tend to
engage in systematic information processing and are less influenced by inadequate heuristics (De Dreu, 2003; Kruglanski &
Freund, 1983). Also, when individuals are held accountable for the
decision-making process, they engage in deep information processing and develop an accurate and multifaceted understanding of
the decision problem. When such process accountability is lacking,
however, individuals are more likely to jump to conclusions on the
basis of insufficient evidence, do not engage in deep thinking, and
are heavily influenced by heuristic cues (e.g., Lerner & Tetlock,
1999; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Finally, team members may
engage in systematic information processing under high levels of
task reflexivity, that is, “the extent to which team members overtly
reflect upon the group’s objectives, strategies, and processes and
adapt them to current or anticipated endogenous or environmental
circumstances” (West, 1996, p. 559). Under high task reflexivity,
team members overtly reflect on the group’s objectives, strategies,
and processes and adapt them to current or anticipated circumstances (Carter & West, 1998).
Several studies support the idea that factors that increase systematic information processing help groups to overcome their
information sampling bias and to reach better decisions. For example, Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir (2001) showed that when a
criticality norm has been induced in the group, more even-handed
consideration of unshared information takes place and groups
make high-quality decisions more often. Kelly and Loving (2003;
see also De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999) showed
that mild rather than acute time pressure resulted in better information exchange and better decisions, and Galinsky and Kray
(2004) showed that the activation of a counterfactual mindset
increased the discussion of unshared information and helped
groups to identify the correct decision alternative. Groups under
process accountability reported higher motivation to process information systematically, repeated unshared information more often during group discussion, and more often chose the correct
decision alternative (Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De
Dreu, in press). Finally, groups under high task reflexivity report
higher team effectiveness (Schippers, Den Hartog, Koopman, &
Wienk, 2003) and are more innovative (De Dreu, 2002; Tjosvold,
Tang, & West, 2004).
The Present Study: Hypotheses and Overview
Although many researchers may be tempted to see (perceived)
cooperative outcome interdependence as critical to effective teamwork, work on negotiation and group decision making has suggested that cooperative groups may rely on inadequate decision
heuristics, fail to develop new and creative problem solutions,
often focus too much on consensus and shared information, and
shy away from dissent and unshared information. Laboratory experiments on negotiation and group decision making have further
suggested that it is high levels of systematic, rather than heuristic,
information processing that foster the quality of joint agreement
and group decisions.
Integrating these two lines of research suggests that perceived cooperative outcome interdependence may set the stage
for constructive and open-minded exchange of task-relevant
information but that systematic information processing is
needed to help team members to combine and integrate this
information into new problem solutions and better ways of
completing their tasks. In other words, perceived cooperative
outcome interdependence increases team effectiveness, but only
when team members engage in systematic information processing. Indeed, prosocial negotiators develop more trust and
achieve higher joint outcomes than do proself negotiators, but
only when negotiators are under process accountability and
motivated to process information systematically (De Dreu,
Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006).
In a way, the motivated information processing perspective
and its evidence implies an important extension and qualification of the theory of cooperation and competition. Cooperative
outcome interdependence not only stimulates constructive conflict handling but also improves other team processes and team
effectiveness, especially when team members are motivated to
engage in deep and deliberate processing of available and new
information. However, the evidence for the proposed interaction between cooperative outcome interdependence and systematic information processing comes from bargaining experiments
in which process accountability was manipulated. It is thus
unclear whether, first, the perspective has any validity outside
the laboratory and, second, applies to interpersonal and group
processes outside the boundaries of interpersonal negotiation.
Third, it remains to be seen whether factors other than process
accountability have the same moderating influence on effects of
prosocial motivation and cooperative outcome interdependence
and thus whether the perspective captures the influence of
many, rather than one or two, predictor variables. Fourth, it
remains to be seen whether the theory makes valid predictions
with regard to the combined influence of cooperative outcome
interdependence and information processing motivators on
group-level information sharing and individual learning from
that information. Whereas this is implied in previous work,
there has not been any empirical test thus far.
In the present study, I submitted the motivated information
processing perspective to a new test and addressed the shortcomings mentioned above. Hypothesized relationships were
examined in a field study with a variety of organizational teams.
Cooperative outcome interdependence was assessed in the same
manner as was done in previous work (for a review, see Tjosvold, 1998). To capture systematic information processing, a
measure of task reflexivity was used. In addition to team
effectiveness, the study included measures of information sharing and learning. Figure 1 presents the model tested. It shows
that cooperative outcome interdependence is expected to predict
information sharing in teams and learning, which in turn is
expected to predict team effectiveness. However, the effects of
cooperative outcome interdependence are hypothesized to be
contingent on task reflexivity, which through enhanced motivation to systematically process information, stimulates information sharing as well as learning. In other words, the effects of
cooperative outcome interdependence on information sharing,
MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING IN TEAMS
631
Task
Reflexivity
Motivation to Systematically
Process information
Cooperative
Outcome
Interdependence
Information
Sharing
Learning
Team
Effectiveness
Figure 1. Motivated information processing and team effectiveness. Only the solid variables were included in
the study.
learning, and team effectiveness are expected especially when
task reflexivity is high rather than low. Thus, I made the
following predictions:
Hypothesis 1: Team effectiveness will be higher when team
members perceive cooperative outcome interdependence, especially when task reflexivity is high rather than low.
Hypothesis 2: Teams will engage in more information sharing
when team members perceive cooperative outcome interdependence, especially when task reflexivity is high rather than
low.
Hypothesis 3: Team members will learn more from each other
when they perceive cooperative outcome interdependence,
especially when task reflexivity is high rather than low.
Hypothesis 4: Effects of cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity on team effectiveness will be
mediated by information sharing and learning.
Method
Participants and Procedure
A database of a private company involved in selection and
assessment was used to select clients who were members of, or
could get me into contact with, organizational groups that fit the
definition of teams as ongoing, semiautonomous groups whose
members have joint responsibility for accomplishing a set of tasks
(Guzzo & Shea, 1992). A research assistant and I approached 52
clients and asked them to introduce us to their team supervisor.
Forty-eight clients agreed to do so, and 46 of the 48 supervisors
responded positively. Thus, the final sample included 368 individuals in 46 teams, with team size ranging between 4 and 13 (M ⫽
8.0) individuals. The average response per team was 84%, with a
minimum of 75% and a maximum of 98%. Sixty-five percent of
the respondents were male, and respondents averaged 34.8 (SD ⫽
6.75) years of age. Team members had received some type of
higher education, that is, either a technical (63%) or a university
(37%) degree.
All teams were semiautonomous and performed nonroutine,
complex tasks that required differential expertise and skills. All but
two teams were of mixed gender. Most teams were management or
(cross-functional) project teams in different areas, including consulting, financial planning and accounting, and research and development. Because analyses involving gender composition and
type of team (consulting, accounting, research and development)
yielded no effects involving either variable (all Fs ⬍ 1.3), these
variables are not discussed further.
Invariably, team members interacted at least once a week in
plenary meetings and informally on a day-to-day basis. Team
members were told that the purpose of the study was to gain an
understanding of the manner in which organizational teams
function and work together. Teams were promised and given
feedback after the survey, individual anonymity was ensured,
and it was emphasized that feedback would be relevant to
aggregated data only. Team members were given the survey
during a collective meeting and asked to take it home to
complete on their own time, independently and without consulting their peers, and to return the questionnaire within 2
weeks in a prestamped return envelope. Supervisors (N ⫽ 46)
received their questionnaire 1 to 3 weeks later and also were
given 2 weeks to complete it (each team had only one supervisor, and the supervisors supervised and commented on only
one team). As a reminder, and to motivate team members to
return the materials, a research assistant attended the next
collective meeting (2 to 4 weeks after the first meeting).
Team Measures
All teams were located in the Netherlands, and as team
members were Dutch speaking, all materials were presented in
Dutch. All teams performed tasks that rendered moderate to
high levels of task interdependence; in fact, a set of items
assessing task interdependence yielded high and strongly
skewed scores, with little variance within or across teams.
632
DE DREU
Beyond this, task interdependence is ignored in the present
study. However, three other control variables were included in
the analyses. First, team size was included (as reported by the
supervisor). Second, team tenure was assessed by asking the
team supervisors to indicate how long (in months) the majority
of the current members had been on the team. Third, workload
was assessed with three items derived from Campion, Medsker,
and Higgs’s (1993) study, for example, “Because there is so
much work to do, we have great difficulty finishing our tasks.”
Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very
much).
Cooperative outcome interdependence was measured with
three items derived from Janssen, Van de Vliert, and Veenstra’s
(2000) study, for example, “When one or more team members
excel in their work, I benefit from that.” Items were rated on a
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Task reflexivity was measured with a selection of the items
reported by Carter and West (1998; see also De Dreu 2002;
Schippers et al., 2003). Specifically, reflexivity was measured
by asking team members to what extent they agreed with the
following items: (a) “The team often reviews its objectives”; (b)
“The methods used by the team to get the job done are often
discussed”; (c) “We regularly discuss whether the team is
working effectively together”; and (e) “In this team, we modify
our objectives in light of changing circumstances.” Items were
rated on a scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally
agree). Information sharing was measured with a six-item scale
developed for this study. Items are (Item 1) “Communicating is
a problem in my team”; (Item 2) “Members of my team inform
each other about work-related issues”; (Item 3) “The quality of
information exchange in our team is good”; (Item 4) “I get new
facts, insights, and ideas from my colleagues”; (Item 5) “During
work meetings we tell each other what we knew already and do
not exchange new information”; and (Item 6) “We do not repeat
ourselves during team meetings.” Items were rated on a
scale ranging from 1 (rarely) to 5 (very often). After reverse
coding Items 1 and 5, the scale proved reliable, and ratings
were averaged into one index of information sharing. Learning
was measured with three items: “Team members learn a lot
from each other”; “My team learns from mistakes and errors”;
and “Team members ask and give each other feedback.” Items
were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (rarely) to 7 (very
frequently).1
Team Effectiveness
Team supervisors were in close contact with their teams (80% of
the respondents reported meeting informally or formally with their
team at least once a week). Team effectiveness was assessed with
a scale developed by Hackman (1987) and previously used in
Dutch translation by Van Vianen and De Dreu (2001). Supervisors
were asked to rate, on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (totally
disagree) to 7 (totally agree), their team on five statements tapping
into aspects of team effectiveness. Sample items are “This team is
good in coming up with ways to complete their tasks”; “This team
effectively deals with uncertainty and unexpected events”; and “At
times, this team fails to approach its task adequately” (reverse
coded).
Results
Treatment of the Data and Descriptive Statistics
Individual missing values were substituted with the overall
sample’s average for that particular item, provided the number of
missing values per individual did not exceed 10% of his or her
answers (which was the case for 5 individuals from three different
teams; the data from these individuals were not included in the
analyses). Alternative substitution methods did not alter the conclusions. Because some constructs were available at the team level
only (supervisor ratings of team effectiveness) and other constructs
pertained to group-level processes rather than individual-level
processes, I checked whether data from individual team members
could be aggregated within teams (for discussions on multilevel
issues, see Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). Table 1 provides, for each
measure, the ICC(1) and ICC(2), which were computed following
the formulas presented in studies by Bliese (2000) and Bliese &
Halverson (1998) (see also Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). Eta-squared
statistics were .26 for workload, .32 for cooperative outcome
interdependence, .29 for task reflexivity, .55 for learning, and .43
for information sharing: all Fs(1, 45) ⬎ 2.09, all ps ⬍ .05. These
statistics support and justify aggregation of individual data to the
team level (cf. Bliese, 2000).
Table 1 shows small to moderate correlations among the study
variables. Cooperative outcome interdependence was not significantly related to any variable, supporting the notion that important
moderator variables may be at work. Consistent with the idea that
task reflexivity fosters information processing, a significant positive correlation between task reflexivity and information sharing
emerged. Also, task reflexivity was negatively related (marginally)
to team effectiveness, suggesting that deep information processing
is not necessarily good. Finally, team effectiveness only positively
related to learning.
Team Effectiveness and Team Processes (Hypotheses 1–3)
Predictions were tested using moderated multiple regression
analysis. In the first step, the three control variables were entered:
team size, team tenure, and workload. In the second step, main
effects for cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity were entered. In the third and final step, the interaction
between cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity
was entered. In all analyses, predictor variables were centered, and
significant interactions were decomposed using simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Table 2 summarizes the results for
information sharing, learning, and team effectiveness.
Team effectiveness. The overall regression model was significant, R2 ⫽ .32, F(6, 39) ⫽ 3.53, p ⬍ .01. Although the control
variables in Step 1 did not explain a significant amount of variance
1
Principal component analysis revealed five factors with an eigenvalue
greater than 1, explaining a total of 62% of the variance. Inspection of the
factor loadings and cross-loadings revealed that items grouped well together as intended. An exception was the information sharing scale, where
items 3 and 4 had loadings of .43 and .47, respectively. Because the scale
was reliable, I decided to use all items in the analyses (dropping the items
from the scale did lead to any significant change in results). These results
support the existence of different scales and discriminant validity of the
instruments that were used.
MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING IN TEAMS
633
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for All Study Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
a
Team size
Team tenurea
Workload
Coop. Outc. Interdep.
Task reflexivity
Information sharing
Learning
Team effectivenessa
M
SD
ICC(1)
ICC(2)
1
2
3
4
8.03
3.70
3.50
4.04
3.12
3.58
3.94
4.22
3.86
0.44
0.39
0.30
0.49
0.51
0.69
0.89
—
—
.21***
.20***
.19**
.26**
.13**
—
—
—
.66***
.66***
.63***
.70***
.55***
—
—
⫺.01
⫺.11
.07
.23
⫺.11
.15
.16
—
.31*
.07
.01
.01
⫺.08
⫺.16
.67
.22
.28*
.27†
⫺.16
.07
.75
.14
.08
.26†
.15
5
.79
.48**
.29*
⫺.25†
6
7
8
.66
⫺.26†
⫺.08
.81
.43**
.69
Note. N ⫽ 46. Dashes indicate that data were not applicable. Cronbach’s alphas are on the diagonal. Coop. Outc. Interdep. ⫽ cooperative outcome
interdependence.
a
Supervisor ratings.
†
p ⬍ .10. * p ⬍ .05. ** p ⬍ .025. *** p ⬍ .01.
in team effectiveness, F(3, 39) ⬍ 1, the main effects did so in Step
2, F(2, 39) ⫽ 4.41, p ⬍ .025. Higher task reflexivity was associated with higher team effectiveness. As predicted, however, adding
the interaction between cooperative outcome interdependence and
task reflexivity in Step 3 significantly increased the amount of
variance explained, F(1, 39) ⫽ 7.44, p ⬍ .01. Figure 2 (top panel)
shows that cooperative outcome interdependence related to higher
effectiveness when task reflexivity was high, B ⫽ 2.55, t ⫽ 4.06,
p ⬍ .001. When task reflexivity was low, cooperative outcome
interdependence was not significantly related to team effectiveness, B ⫽ ⫺.14, t ⬍ 1, ns. The results support Hypothesis 1.
Information sharing. The overall regression model was significant, R2 ⫽ .36, F(6, 39) ⫽ 4.78, p ⬍ .01. Whereas the control
variables in Step 1 did not explain a significant amount of variance, F(3, 39) ⬍ 1, adding the main effects in Step 2 explained a
significant increase, F(2, 39) ⫽ 6.15, p ⬍ .005. Table 2 shows that
higher task reflexivity predicted more information sharing. This
effect was qualified by the significant interaction between cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity, entered in
Step 3, F(1, 39) ⫽ 9.69, p ⬍ .01. Simple slope analyses showed
that cooperative outcome interdependence related to more information sharing when task reflexivity was high, B ⫽ 1.62, t ⫽ 4.77,
p ⬍ .001. When task reflexivity was low, perceived cooperative
outcome interdependence was not significantly related to information sharing, B ⫽ ⫺.12, t ⬍ 1, ns (see also Figure 2 [middle
panel]). The results support Hypothesis 2.
Learning. The overall regression model was significant, R2 ⫽
.42, F(6, 39) ⫽ 5.31, p ⬍ .001. The control variables in Step 1 did
not explain a significant amount of variance in learning, F(3,
39) ⬍ 1.70, ns, but the main effects did so in Step 2, F(2, 39) ⫽
5.18, p ⬍ .01. Task reflexivity was positively associated with
learning, as expected. Adding the interaction between cooperative
outcome interdependence and task reflexivity in Step 3 led to a
further increase in explained variance, F(1, 39) ⫽ 14.48, p ⬍ .001.
Simple slope analyses showed that cooperative outcome interdependence related to more learning when task reflexivity was high,
B ⫽ 2.09, t ⫽ 4.70, p ⬍ .001. When task reflexivity was low,
cooperative outcome interdependence was not significantly related
to learning, B ⫽ ⫺.71, t ⫽ ⫺1.12, p ⬍ .26, ns. The results support
Hypothesis 3 (see also Figure 2 [bottom panel]).
Mediation Tests (Hypothesis 4)
In my original model, I argued that information sharing and
learning would mediate the interaction between cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity on the one hand and
Table 2
Regressions of Team Effectiveness, Information Sharing, and Learning on Cooperative Outcome Interdependence (CI), Task
Reflexivity (TR), and Their Interaction
Dependent variable
Team effectiveness
Predictor variable
Step 1 (control)
Team size
Team tenure
Workload
Step 2 (main effects)
CI
TR
Step 3 (interaction effect)
CI ⫻ TR
*
p ⬍ .05.
**
p ⬍ .025.
B
SE
Information sharing
⌬R2
B
SE
.043
0.02
0.23
0.46
0.01
0.17
0.39
0.40
0.82**
0.39
0.29
2.35**
0.86
Learning
⌬R2
.036
0.06
⫺0.07
0.06
0.01
0.09
0.21
.147**
.182**
0.09
0.53**
0.22
0.15
1.44**
0.46
.124**
B
⫺0.02
0.10
⫺0.10
SE
⌬R2
.072
0.01
0.12
0.27
.146**
0.58*
0.52**
0.28
0.20
2.32**
0.61
.143**
.204**
DE DREU
634
team effectiveness on the other. To test for mediation, I repeated
the moderated multiple regression analyses used to test the hypothesis about team effectiveness while controlling for information sharing (Model 1) and team learning (Model 2). Table 3
summarizes the results. In Model 1, the previously significant
interaction between reflexivity and cooperative outcome interdependence was significant, B ⫽ 3.36, t ⫽ 3.71, p ⬍ .001. In
addition, regressing information sharing on team effectiveness
produced a nonsignificant model, R2 ⫽ .06, F(4, 41) ⬍ 1, ns. Thus,
there is no support for the idea that information sharing mediates
the effect of cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity on team effectiveness (cf. Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998).
In Model 2, the previously significant interaction between reflexivity and cooperative outcome interdependence was no longer
significant, B ⫽ 1.85, t ⫽ 1.83, p ⬍ .10. In addition, regressing
learning on team effectiveness produced a significant model, R2 ⫽
.24, F(4, 41) ⫽ 3.36, p ⬍ .01, with learning being a significant
predictor, B ⫽ 0.58, t ⫽ 3.22, p ⬍ .01. Finally, a Sobel test
confirmed that the reduction in explained variance between simple
and multiple regression was significant, z ⫽ 2.43, p ⬍ .015.
Together, these results suggest partial support for Hypothesis
4 —learning (but not information sharing) significantly mediates
the effect of cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity on team effectiveness.
Conclusions and Discussion
In this study, several predictions, derived from a motivated
information processing perspective on negotiation and group decision making, were tested in the context of team processes and
team effectiveness. Consistent with this perspective and with laboratory experiments, the present study shows that cooperative
outcome interdependence related to more information sharing, to
learning, and to higher levels of team effectiveness when task
reflexivity was high. When task reflexivity was low, cooperative
outcome interdependence had no significant relationships with
information sharing, learning, or team effectiveness. In addition,
the present study indicates that learning, and not information
sharing, mediated the interaction between cooperative outcome
interdependence and task reflexivity on team effectiveness.
This study provides new support for the motivated information
processing perspective (De Dreu, 2005; De Dreu & Carnevale,
2003; Scholten et al., in press). Evidence shows that laboratory
groups make better decisions and negotiate their conflicts more
constructively (a) when members perceive cooperative outcome
interdependence and have a prosocial motivation and (b) when
members (are motivated to) engage in systematic, deliberate, and
thorough processing of information.
This new support is important for a number of reasons. First, the
support for the motivated information processing perspective was
based exclusively on laboratory experiments with psychology undergraduates performing relatively simple tasks in short-lived encounters. Through triangulation (Campbell & Stanley, 1963), the
present replication and extension lends further confidence in the
validity of the motivated information processing perspective. Further, it indicates that the perspective also makes valid predictions
in high-stakes situations, where team members share a past and a
future and perform relatively complex, nonroutine tasks.
Second, the present study adds to previous work on motivated
information processing in teams by showing that cooperative outcome interdependence and task reflexivity affect not only team
members’ information sharing but also their learning. And although researchers studying motivated information processing
have thus far ignored learning, it proved to be important in that it
mediated the interaction of cooperative outcome interdependence
and task reflexivity on team effectiveness. Thus, future research
with regard to motivated information processing in group decision
making and work teams will benefit from closer attention to
individual and group-level learning.
That learning did, and information sharing did not, significantly
mediate the effects of cooperative outcome interdependence and
task reflexivity on team effectiveness is consistent with other work
showing that social and epistemic motivation do not have their
effects because they increase the amount of information that is
exchanged but rather because they increase the processing of this
Table 3
Regressions of Team Effectiveness on Cooperative Outcome Interdependence (CI), Task Reflexivity (TR), and Their Interaction After
Controlling for Information Sharing (Model 1) and Learning (Model 2)
Model 1
Predictor variable
Step 1 (control)
Team size
Team tenure
Workload
Step 2 (mediator)
Information sharing (Model 1)
Learning (Model 2)
Step 3 (main effects)
CI
TR
Step 4 (interaction effect)
CI ⫻ TR
B
SE
⫺0.01
0.28†
0.42
0.01
0.16
0.36
⌬R2
.054
B
⫺0.02
0.21
0.48
SE
0.28
—
0.33
1.19**
0.37
0.31
3.36**
0.91
⌬R2
.043
0.12
0.17
0.38
.035†
.091
0.69**
—
—
0.22†
—
0.12
0.27
0.70**
0.42
0.31
1.85†
1.01
.23**
.087†
.20**
Note. Dashes indicate that data were not applicable.
p ⬍ .10. * p ⬍ .05. ** p ⬍ .025.
†
Model 2
.036†
MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING IN TEAMS
6
Team Effectiveness
5,5
5
Task Refl
(-1sd)
4,5
4
3,5
Task Refl
(+1sd)
3
2,5
2
low (-1sd)
high (+1sd)
Cooperative Outcome Interdependence
6
Information Sharing
5,5
5
4,5
4
Task Refl
(-1sd)
3,5
3
2,5
Task Refl
(+1sd)
2
low (-1sd)
high (+1sd)
Cooperative Outcome Interdependence
6
5,5
5
Learning
4,5
Task Refl
(+1sd)
4
3,5
3
Task Refl
(-1sd)
635
information. For example, De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel (2000)
found that negotiators under process accountability did not exchange more information than did negotiators who were not held
accountable, but they did pay more attention to newly available
information. This increased information processing and the resulting improved understanding of the negotiation task accounted for
the effects of process accountability on the quality of negotiated
agreement. In a similar vein, Scholten et al. (in press) found that
effects of process accountability on group decision-making quality
were not mediated by the sheer amount of information that group
members exchanged but rather by the repetition of unshared information items. These prior studies, together with the present
study, thus indicate that motivated information processing effects
reside at the level of processing and integration of information
more than at the level of information exchange per se.
Third, the present study is the first to show that task reflexivity
moderates the effects of perceived cooperative outcome interdependence. Previous studies on motivated information processing
only examined the moderating influence of process accountability,
despite the claim that any factor that motivates to systematically
process information would act as a moderator of the effects of
perceived cooperativeness and concomitant prosocial motivation
(cf. De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). The findings for task reflexivity
are conducive to this claim and thus extend previous work in an
important way. However, as no direct measures of systematic
information processing were included, future research is needed to
show that the present effects of task reflexivity were indeed due to
higher motivation to process information systematically.
The present study speaks to a number of issues beyond the
motivated information processing perspective. For instance, a
large number of studies have shown that cooperative outcome
interdependence leads to more constructive conflict management
and better learning from clashing opinions than does competitive
outcome interdependence (Stanne et al., 1999; Tjosvold, 1998).
This work left unclear, however, whether and why cooperative
outcome interdependence would be beneficial by itself or only
when differences and opposition emerge. Because the present
study shows that cooperative outcome interdependence related to
team process variables and team effectiveness especially when
task reflexivity was high, I conclude that perceived cooperative
outcome interdependence is not a sufficient condition for team
effectiveness.
One may wonder whether task reflexivity, with its presumed
high levels of systematic information processing, should always be
recommended and always help teams to perform more effectively.
Decision making often involves a tradeoff between effort and
accuracy: The strategies that more often lead to the correct choice
most of the time also require more effort and time. One benefit of
using simplifying strategies and “quick and dirty” heuristics evidently is that these are quick methods to arrive at a choice. In other
words, it is not always better to engage in deep processing. Rather,
when decisions are unimportant and time is limited, this may not
be a wise thing to do. Further, deep processing may also lead to
stalemates or to decision delay. For relatively complex decisions,
2,5
2
low (-1sd)
high (+1sd)
Cooperative Outcome Interdependence
Figure 2. Moderating effect of task reflexivity (Refl) on the relationship
between cooperative outcome interdependence and team effectiveness (top
panel), information sharing (middle panel), and learning (bottom panel).
636
DE DREU
for example, it probably is always possible to search for more
information. However, eventually, the time must come to make a
choice. When self-imposed or external deadlines are given, this
may not be a real problem, and systematic information processing
may benefit more than it hurts. But when no such deadlines exist,
factors stimulating systematic information processing may help
when the tasks are moderately complex but hurt when the tasks are
simple and straightforward or when tasks are overly complex.
Future research could be developed to test this curvilinear relationship among systematic information processing, task complexity, and team effectiveness.
In the introduction, I cited several studies showing that cooperative outcome interdependence has a number of positive effects,
especially when team members have high rather than low task
interdependence (e.g., Fan & Gruenfeld, 1998; Van der Vegt et al.,
2001; Wageman & Baker, 1997). Although relevant data are
lacking, the present study suggests that high task interdependence
may have its moderating effects because it stimulates systematic
information processing. Testing this hypothesis is important because support would allow researchers to treat, within this context,
task interdependence as just one of the many predictors of systematic information processing. Ultimately, this would lead to a
rather integrative, yet parsimonious, theory of negotiation, group
decision making, and team effectiveness.
Before closing, some limitations need to be addressed. Whereas
the design of the study prevented—in some, but not all, cases—the
occurrence of common-method variance by using different sources
for predictor variables (team members) and outcome measures
(supervisors), the design of the study was cross-sectional, which
prohibits conclusions about causality. Granted, many experimental
studies were conducted to support the causal links in the motivated
information processing perspective (e.g., De Dreu, 2003; De Dreu
et al., 1999; De Dreu et al., 2006; De Dreu, Koole, et al., 2000; De
Dreu, Weingart, et al., 2000; Scholten et al., in press; Van Kleef,
De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Nevertheless, it is important that
researchers are careful about causality and develop longitudinal
designs to address this issue. Further, the present findings are
based on self-reports with regard to the occurrence of task reflexivity. Although these self-reports converged considerably at the
team level, thus suggesting at least intersubjectivity, more objective measures of task reflexivity would be desirable. Also, work is
needed to better understand where task reflexivity comes from. Is
it a particular leadership style, an external threat, the result of
particular personality variables present in the team, or any combination of these and other factors? It may be useful to know this
because it may clarify whether teams with high task reflexivity are
different on a number of dimensions than are those low in task
reflexivity. Finally, as mentioned earlier, this study included indirect measures of systematic information processing—information
sharing and learning—and future research is needed to show that
the present results can indeed be explained in terms of heightened
motivation to process information systematically.
Taken together, the present study supports a motivated information processing perspective developed to account for the effects
of perceived cooperative outcome interdependence and information processing tendencies on bargaining and group decision making. This study extends previous work in a number of ways and
shows that teams are more effective when their members perceive
cooperative outcome interdependence and have high levels of task
reflexivity.
References
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression. London: Sage.
Alper, S., Tjosvold, D., & Law, K. S. (2000). Conflict management,
efficacy, and performance in organizational teams. Personnel Psychology, 53, 625– 642.
Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. T. Gilbert,
S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology
(4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 282–316). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2005). Conflict’s consequences:
Effects of social motives on postnegotiation creative and convergent
group functioning and performance. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 89, 358 –374.
Bliese, P. D. (2000). Within-group agreement, non-independence, and
reliability: Implications for data aggregation and analysis. In K. J. Klein
& S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), Multilevel theory, research, and methods
in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions (pp. 349 –
381). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Bliese, P. D., & Halverson, R. R. (1998). Group size and measures of
group-level properties: An examination of eta-squared and ICC values.
Journal of Management, 24, 157–172.
Bridgeman, D. L. (1981). Enhanced role-taking through cooperative interdependence: A field study. Child Development, 52, 1231–1238.
Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. C. (1963). Experimental and quasiexperimental designs for research. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Campion, M. A., Medsker, G. J., & Higgs, A. C. (1993). Relations between
work group characteristics and effectiveness: Implications for designing
effective work groups. Personnel Psychology, 46, 823– 850.
Carter, S., & West, M. A. (1998). Reflexivity, effectiveness, and mental
health in BBC-TV production teams. Small Group Research, 29, 583–
601.
Chaiken, S., & Stangor, C. (1987). Attitudes and attitude change. Annual
Review of Psychology, 38, 575– 630.
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York: Guilford Press.
Cohen, S. G., & Bailey, D. E. (1997). What makes teams work: Group
effectiveness research from the shop floor to the executive suite. Journal
of Management, 23, 239 –290.
De Dreu, C. K. W. (2002). Team innovation and effectiveness: The
importance of minority dissent and reflexivity. European Journal of
Work and Organizational Psychology, 11, 285–298.
De Dreu, C. K. W. (2003). Time pressure and closing of the mind in
negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
91, 280 –295.
De Dreu, C. K. W. (2005). A PACT against conflict escalation in negotiation and dispute resolution. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 149 –152.
De Dreu, C. K. W. (2006). Rational self-interest and other-orientation in
organizational behavior: A critical appraisal and extension of Meglino
and Korsgaard (2004). Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 1245–1252.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Stroebe, K., & Euwema, M. C. (2006).
Motivated information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of
negotiated agreement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90,
927–943.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Carnevale, P. J. D. (2003). Motivational bases for
information processing and strategic choice in conflict and negotiation.
In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol.
35, pp. 235–291). New York: Academic Press.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Giebels, E., & Van de Vliert, E. (1998). Social motives
and trust in integrative negotiation: Disruptive effects of punitive capability. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 408 – 422.
MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING IN TEAMS
De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S., & Oldersma, F. L. (1999). On the seizing
and freezing of negotiator inferences: Need for cognitive closure moderates the use of heuristics in negotiation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 348 –362.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S., & Steinel, W. (2000). Unfixing the fixed-pie:
A motivated information-processing account of integrative negotiation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,79, 975–987.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social
motives on integrative negotiation: A meta-analytical review and test of
two theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 889 –
905.
De Grada, E., Kruglanski, A. W., Mannetti, L., & Pierro, A. (1999).
Motivated cognition and group interaction: Need for closure affects the
contents and processes of collective negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 346 –365.
Deutsch, M. (1949). A theory of cooperation and competition. Human
Relations, 2, 199 –231.
Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Doise, W., Mugny, G., & Perret-Clermont, A. N. (1975). Social interaction
and the development of cognitive operations. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 5, 367–383.
Fan, E. T., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (1998). When needs outweigh desires: The
effects of resource interdependence and reward interdependence on
group problem solving. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20, 45–
56.
Galinsky, A. D., & Kray, L. J. (2004). From thinking about what might
have been to sharing what we know: The effects of counterfactual
mind-sets on information sharing in groups. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 40, 606 – 618.
Goncalo, J. A., & Staw, B. M. (2006). Individualism– collectivism and
group creativity. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100, 96 –109.
Guzzo, R. A., & Shea, G. P. (1992). Group performance and intergroup
relations in organizations. In M. D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough (Eds.),
Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (2nd ed., Vol. 3,
pp. 269 –313). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Hackman, J. R. (1987). The design of workteams. In J. W. Lorsch (Ed.),
Handbook of organizational behavior (pp. 315–342). Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hastie, R., Penrod, S. D., & Pennington, N. (1983). Inside the jury.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R. S., & Vollrath, D. A. (1997). The emerging
conceptualization of groups as information processors. Psychological
Bulletin, 121, 43– 64.
Janssen, O., Van de Vliert, E., & Veenstra, C. (2000). How task and person
conflict shape the role of positive interdependence in management
groups. Journal of Management, 25, 117–141.
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1989). Cooperation and competition:
Theory and research. Edina, MN: Interaction Book.
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. (1978). The social psychology of organizations. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations. New York:
Wiley.
Kelly, J. R., & Loving, T. J. (2003). Time pressure and group performance:
Exploring underlying processes in the attentional focus model. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 185–198.
Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Bolger, N. (1998). Data analysis in social
psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T., Fiske, & A. Lindzey (Eds.), The
handbook of social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 233–265). Boston: McGrawHill.
Klein, K. J., & Kozlowski, S. W. J. (Eds.). (2000). Multilevel theory,
research, and methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and
new directions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
637
Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of lay
inferences: Effects of impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping, and
numerical anchoring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19,
448 – 468.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the
mind: “Seizing” and “freezing.” Psychological Review, 103, 263–283.
Larson, J. R., Jr., Christensen, C., Abbott, A. S., & Franz, T. M. (1996).
Diagnosing groups: Charting the flow of information in medical
decision-making teams. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
71, 315–330.
Lerner, J. S., &. Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of
accountability. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 255–275.
Meglino, B., & Korsgaard, M. (2004). Considering the rational self-interest
as a disposition: Organizational implications of other orientation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 946 –959.
Munkes, J., & Diehl, M. (2003). Matching or competition? Performance
comparison processes in an idea generation task. Group Processes and
Intergroup Relations, 6, 305–320.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of
persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). New York: Academic Press.
Pfeffer, J. (1997). New directions for organizational theory: Problems and
prospects. New York: Oxford University Press.
Postmes, T., Spears, R., & Cihangir, S. (2001). Quality of decision making
and group norms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80,
918 –930.
Pruitt, D. G. (1981). Negotiation. New York: Academic Press.
Schelling, T. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Boston: Cambridge University Press.
Schippers, M. C., Den Hartog, D., Koopman, P. L., & Wienk, J. A. (2003).
Diversity and team outcomes: The moderating effects of outcome interdependence and group longevity and the mediating effect of reflexivity.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24, 779 – 802.
Scholten, L., Van Knippenberg, D., Nijstad, B. A., & De Dreu, C. K. W.
(in press). Motivated information processing and group decisionmaking: Effects of process accountability on information sharing and
decision quality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Shrout, P. E., & Fleiss, J. L. (1979). Intraclass correlations: Uses in
assessing rater reliability. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 420 – 428.
Simonson, I., & Staw, B. M. (1992). Deescalation strategies: A comparison
of techniques for reducing commitment to losing courses of action.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 419 – 426.
Stanne, M. B., Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1999). Does competition
enhance or inhibit motor performance: A meta-analysis. Psychological
Bulletin, 125, 133–154.
Stasser, G. (1999). The uncertain role of unshared information in collective
choice. In L. Thompson, J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Shared
cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge (pp. 49 – 69).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stasser, G., & Birchmeier, Z. (2003). Group creativity and collective
choice. In P. B. Paulus & B. A. Nijstad (Eds.), Group creativity:
Innovation through collaboration (pp. 85–109). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group
decision making: Biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1467–1478.
Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1987). Effects of information load and percentage
of shared information on the dissemination of unshared information
during group discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
53, 81–93.
Ten Velden, F., Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2007). Majority and
minority influence in group negotiation: The moderating effects of social
motivation and decision rules. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 259 –
268.
638
DE DREU
Tjosvold, D. (1985). Implications of controversy research for management.
Journal of Management, 11, 21–37.
Tjosvold, D. (1998). Cooperative and competitive goal approach to conflict: Accomplishments and challenges. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 47, 285–342.
Tjosvold, D., Tang, M., & West, M. A. (2004). Reflexivity for team
innovation in China: The contribution of goal interdependence. Group
and Organization Management, 29, 540 –559.
Van der Vegt, G., Emans, B. J. M., & Van de Vliert, E. (2000). Team
members’ affective responses to patterns of intragroup interdependence
and job complexity. Journal of Management, 26, 633– 655.
Van der Vegt, G., Emans, B. J. M., & Van de Vliert, E. (2001). Patterns of
interdependence in work teams: A two-level investigation of the relations with job and team satisfaction. Personnel Psychology, 54, 51– 69.
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). The
interpersonal effects of emotion in negotiation: A motivated information
processing approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,
510 –528.
Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in
outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 337–349.
Van Vianen, A. E. M., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2001). Personality in teams:
Its relationship to social cohesion, task cohesion, and team performance.
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 10, 97–120.
Wageman, R. (1995). Interdependence and group effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 145–180.
Wageman, R., & Baker, G. (1997). Incentives and cooperation: The joint
effects of task and reward interdependence on group performance.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 18, 139 –158.
Weingart, L. R., Bennett, R. J., & Brett, J. M. (1993). The impact of
consideration of issues and motivational orientation on group negotiation process and outcome. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78,
504 –517.
West, M. A. (1996). Reflexivity and work group effectiveness: A conceptual integration. In M. A. West (Ed.), Handbook of work group psychology (pp. 555–579). Chichester, England: Wiley.
Wittenbaum, G. M. (2000). The bias toward discussing shared information:
Why are high status members immune? Communication Research, 27,
379 – 401.
Wittenbaum, G. M., & Stasser, G. (1996). Management of information in
small groups. In J. L. Nye & A. M. Brower (Eds.), What’s social about
social cognition? Research on socially shared cognition in small groups
(pp. 3–28). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Wong, A., Tjosvold, D., & Yu, Z.-Y. (2005). Organizational partnership in
China: Self-interest, goal interdependence, and opportunism. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 90, 782–791.
Received December 27, 2005
Revision received June 27, 2006
Accepted July 3, 2006 䡲