Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process Author(s): Rune Ottosen
Transcription
Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process Author(s): Rune Ottosen
Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process Author(s): Rune Ottosen Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 97-112 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425470 Accessed: 18-04-2015 01:55 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Peace Research. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ? Journalof Peace Research,vol. 32, no. 1. 1995,pp. 97-112 Enemy Images and the JournalisticProcess* RUNE OTTOSEN International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) This article discusses changes in enemy image in the three Norwegian daily newspapers through a comparative analysis of the coverage of four international conflicts: the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, martial law in Poland in 1981 and martial law in Romania in 1989. Content analysis of a sample of 915 articles shows how Norway's traditional 'enemy', the Soviet Union, ceases to be an enemy during this ten-year period. The study compares newspaper coverage of the social unrest in Poland, when the threat of Soviet intervention was manifest, with coverage of the rebellion against Ceausescu in Romania. The author discusses what has happened since the Soviet Union ceased to be the 'main threat' to Norwegian security. Has a 'new' enemy linked to Islam emerged? This is discussed while comparing news coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Iran with that of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This sample found several articles revealing prejudice against Muslims in general, but enemy images were mainly linked with the Ayatollah Khomeini in the first invasion and with Saddam Hussein in the second. The dominant use of enemy images of these two leaders is in itself an interesting part of the coverage. The author concludes that enemy images are obstacles to analytical journalism, making it more difficult for journalists to see the obvious parallels between the two invasions. Enemy images are projected mainly in editorials and commentary columns and less so in straight news articles. However, the angling of articles through headlines, illustrations and cartoons may reveal the attitudes of news desks as to who the 'enemy' is, even when the text itself is written in 'neutral' prose. 1. Enemy Images Previous research on enemy images has found that the media have a tendency to modify such images as attitudes among the political elites change (McNair, 1988; Rieber, 1991; Silverstein, 1989). Major changes on the international scene cause existing enemy images to fade. When Gorbachev introduced his 'new thinking', which culminated in far-reaching reforms in the Soviet Union and the tumultuous events in Eastern Europe in 1989, Norwegian media coverage of the Soviet Union underwent fundamental change. The dominant media - the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) and the major nationally distributed newspapers - operating within an established East-West pattern meant loyalty towards Norway's NATO allies and its established security policy and suspicion against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (Hellebust, 1990). In this context, neither the fact that the scepticism and mis* I thank Tore Fougner for his important contribution as research assistant on this project. Thanks also to Nils Petter Gleditsch, Stefan Hijelid, Heikki Luostarinen and an anonymous referee for useful comments. trust against the Eastern bloc was widely shared among Norwegians, nor the fact that many of the events and actions by the Soviet Union that were castigated in the Norwegian press actually were violations of international law and human rights, is particularly pertinent. The point here is that the event, military action or policy decision per se was not the sole reason for the media coverage of international conflicts. Let us consider, for example, the rhetoric in the Western media concerning two blatant violations of international law - the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US invasion of Panama. The invasion of Panama was (for the most part) treated in a context of 'understanding', whereas the invasion of Afghanistan was treated in a strongly 'censurious' context (Ottosen, 1993b, 1994). When Gorbachev came to power, however, this pattern began to change dramatically. Gorbachev became the darling of the Western media, and Soviet politics was treated with sympathy and understanding at least up until the repressive measures taken to quell the movements for selfdetermination in the Baltic republics in 1991. This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 98 RuneOttosen Turning to Islam, then, we should note that the enemy image of Islam has roots centuries back and must be analysed in the context of Christian-Muslim rivalry (Christensen, 1988). In his book Covering Islam, Edward Said (1989) argues that the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the capture of US hostages in the Embassy in Teheran represented a watershed in the Western media's treatment of the Muslim world. This developed further with the Rushdie affair, the civil war in Lebanon, Operation Desert Storm, the turmoil in the Soviet republics in Central Asia, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the elections in Algeria (Esposito, 1992; Ottosen, 1992). The point here is not to identify the coverage of violent actions, such as attacks by militant Muslims on Rushdie's publishers, Western tourists in Egypt, Western-oriented intellectuals in Algeria, etc., as enemy images in themselves. On the contrary, enemy images of Muslims do not distinguish between the individual Muslims behind such condemnable incidents and Muslims in general. On the contrary, they tend to link all such actions with Islam and create oversimplified cause and effect models on the basis of prejudice (Esposito, 1992; Yassine, 1993). One of the purposes of my research project has been to find out whether the roots of this new 'enemy' can be identified in the Norwegian press coverage of the conflicts mentioned. Is journalism possible without enemy images? Foreign news journalism without enemy images could be analytically oriented journalism that puts events in a historical context and bases the use of sources, the angling, and the whole perspective of the article on a principal judgment linked to well-accepted criteria from international law, human rights, etc. My purpose in this research project was to test certain hypotheses that might seem fairly obvious, namely to try to find evidence for a suspicion that mainstream Norwegian journalism lacks these analytical elements, and bases its coverage of international events on a perspective of 'worthy' and 'unworthy' victims limited to intuitive positions of what serves Western 'security' in the long run (Chomsky, 1991). 2. 'Us' and the 'Other' The creation of a borderline between 'us' and the 'other' is a sociopsychological mechanism that occurs in all human relations; in the neighbourhood, community and society, people will include some but exclude others on the basis of different criteria (Kelly & Michela, 1980; Ross, 1977). Eventually nations start to define other nations as the 'other'. Carl Schmitt was one of the first to introduce a 'we' vs. the 'other' in the political analyses of a modern society. He believed that the authority of the state was linked to a collective understanding of the border towards the 'other'. If the ruling class was unable to keep this division alive its authority could then be challenged (Harle, 1991, p. 2). Heikki Luostarinen (1989, p. 124) has identified enemy images both as a reflection of the actual tension and conflict between states and as a way of creating unity in a state and legitimizing its rulers. There is no reason to believe that human beings feel a natural hostility towards people from other ethnic backgrounds. Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1991, p. 276), having studied multi-ethnic societies in Mauritius and Trinidad, concludes that ethnic differences as such are no basis for hostility between human beings. Anthony D. Smith (1991, p. 72) shows how language and symbols help to form the basis of national identity. Enemy images can also be analysed in an instrumental way, however. William Eckhardt (1991, p. 94) has shown how enemy images can be used in propaganda and war preparation by both sides in a conflict. When I discuss enemy images in this article, it is within the framework of what Johan Galtung has termed 'cultural violence': By 'cultural violence' we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art ... that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence (Galtung, 1990, p. 291).' Cultural violence can internalize the use of power and violence, but we need not see this in a purely instrumental manner: Cultural violence makes direct and structural This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process 99 violence look, even feel, right - or at least not The fact that the name Saddam Hussein wrong. Just as politicalscience is about two prob- ranked number seven on the list of the mostlems - the use of powerand the legitimatingof the use of power- violencestudiesare abouttwo prob- used words or phrases in US media coverage lems:the use of violenceandthe legitimatingof that of the Gulf War, and that the name of Hitler use. The psychological mechanism would be was connected with Saddam in 25% of internalization.(Galtung,1990,pp. 291-292) cases, indicates a campaign and not isolated instances (The Media at War, 1991, p. 42). The point about 'the enemy as enemy of This, however, does not mean that I will empirically test the presence of cultural God' is especially interesting since Saddam violence, but it is fruitful to clarify that Hussein, in his attempts to rally the Arab stereotypes can legitimate violent actions world behind him, consciously used Muslim even in news reporting. rhetoric. It is also interesting when examinPhilip Knightley (1975) describes how an ing enemy images vis-a-vis Communism, important element in war-reporting is to since US presidents Ronald Reagan and 'demonize' the enemy and to portray him as George Bush used Christian rhetoric against 'an animal in human disguise'. Enemy Communist and Muslim leaders (0sterud, images can thus be linked to the journalistic 1991). The angling of 'us' and our allies is process itself. The portrayal of Saddam part of the picture as well. Do we apply the Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait offers same yardstick to our own standards as we rich material in this respect. In headlines, do to our 'enemy'. Do we question the cartoons and articles all over the world he motives of our own acts as well as those of was compared to Hitler (also by President our allies in the same way we do with our Bush in his rhetoric), psychiatrists inter- enemy? viewed on television presented a 'remote diagnosis' declaring him as paranoid and mentally ill.2 Now, in this respect, the media 3. Four International Conflicts did have an easy job. Obviously, Saddam This article discusses changes in the image Hussein was a totalitarian leader with of the 'enemy' in Norwegian newspapers regional expansionist goals. Amnesty Inter- through a comparative analysis of the news national and other human rights organiz- coverage of four international conflicts in ations have exposed his poor human rights three major Norwegian dailies: Aftenposten record over and over again, but up until the - the largest circulation daily newspaper in Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the Western world Norway; Verdens Gang (VG) - the largest chose to look the other way. Just a few circulation tabloid newspaper in Norway; weeks before the invasion the Bush Admin- and Bergens Tidende (BT) - the largest ciristration refused to conclude that Iraq had culation regional newspaper in Norway. The engaged in a pattern of human-rights viol- criterion was examination of the most inations (Gerbner, 1992, p. 249). But after the fluential 'mainstream' press, rather than a invasion, when preparing public opinion for representative sample of the entire Norwar, President Bush was quoting Amnesty wegian press. International to document human rights violations in Iraq. Table I. Aftenposten, Verdens Gang (VG) and Bergens In Faces of the Enemy, Sam Keen (1986, Tidende(BT): Coverage of Four InternationalConpp. 49-66) shows how enemy images his- flicts(no. of Articles) torically can be categorized within certain All archetypes. Western portrayals of Saddam Aftenposten VG BT newspapers Hussein before, during and after the Gulf 99 154 351 98 War fit nicely into several of these cate- Poland 126 Romania 26 41 59 gories: 'the enemy as a criminal', 'the enemy Iraq-Iran 211 49 66 96 as a torturer', 'the enemy as death', 'the Iraq-Kuwait 55 227 64 108 enemy as rapist, desecrator of women and Total 915 237 314 364 children' and 'the enemy as enemy of God'. This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 100 Rune Ottosen The four conflicts analysed are: (i) martial law in Poland in 1981; (ii) martial law in Romania in 1989; (iii) the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980; and (iv) the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 4. Research Design The four conflicts are compared in pairwise fashion. First, I compare the two conflicts involving the Soviet Union and her former allies in Eastern Europe: the state of emergency in Poland in 1981 and the revolt in Romania in December 1989. These two events are similar in several respects. Both Poland and Romania were members of the Warsaw Pact, and both countries' leaders were in the process of losing control over a defiant opposition. In both cases there was speculation into the likelihood of a Soviet intervention. But there are also important differences which led to a change in the attitude of the Norwegian media toward intervention. In the case of Poland, the Brezhnev doctrine was still in force, and Brezhnev himself was still alive. There is reason to believe that the state of emergency was necessary in order to stave off a Soviet invasion. The Norwegian media stood ready to condemn such an invasion, should it occur. In the case of Romania eight years later, the Brezhnev doctrine had been abandoned, and Gorbachev had proclaimed a policy of non-intervention vis-a-vis the rampant turmoil in Eastern Europe. This time the Norwegian media stood ready to accept a Soviet invasion, had the opposition to the Ceau?escu regime not been able to do the job themselves.3 Second, I compare Norwegian newspaper coverage of the Iraqi attack on Iran in 1980 and the same papers' coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Here, too, there are obvious parallels. In both cases Hussein's troops attacked a neighbouring country in order to annex territory which, as Iraqi propaganda would have it, 'historically' belonged to Iraq. Again, there are also clear-cut differences: When he attacked Iran, Hussein to some extent had the support of anti-Islamic sentiments in the West, which hoped the war would bring down the Khomeini regime. When Iraq attacked Kuwait, Hussein tried to play on Islamic loyalties against Western condemnation of the invasion. For a while this tactic cemented Iraq in the role of 'arch-enemy' in the new Western enemy image. Through these comparative studies I hope to find support for my thesis that it is not just the events and actions themselves (possible interventions and two actual invasions) that determine media coverage, but that the 'news slant' and rhetoric applied to the stories are influenced by the prevailing enemy image, an enemy image that has changed significantly over the past decade. 5. Methods and Definition Several important works on media rhetoric as a tool of political communication have appeared in Norway in recent years. Authors such as Tore Bj0rgo & Daniel Heradstveit (1987) and Thore Roksvold (1989) have made valuable contributions to the analysis of media content. Heradstveit has also written extensively on media coverage of the Middle East and the conflicts in the Gulf (1981, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992a,b). The rhetorical perspective in this context focuses on the media's ability to persuade. Persuasion is achieved with the help of political rhetoric. In politics, rhetoric is a tool deliberately wielded in the journalistic process through words and concepts and can be used both consciously and unconsciously to get a given message across to the receiver (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). I have used content analysis, focusing on the choice of metaphors,4 metonyms,5 the relations between connotations6 and denotations,7 which persons involved in the conflict are portrayed through ethos8 (Roksvold, 1989), and the use of the pronouns 'we' and the 'others' (Fairclough, 1989, p. 10). These elements represent the qualitative part of the analyses. It may help to understand how the enemy images are created in the text and in what way they influence the journalistic process. I have also carried out a quantitative analysis to indicate how many articles from the sample reflected these enemy images. This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process For this quantitative part of the research I needed an analytical tool to enable me to differentiate between the actual presentation of a hostile act (like the Iraqi invasion of Iran and Kuwait) and a more diffuse expectation of aggressive conduct due to cultural gaps in the perception of earlier historical experiences, or mere prejudices. By introducing the situational and dispositional enemy images, I drew upon the work of Stefan Hojelid (1991, p. 112) in his analysis of the coverage of the Soviet Union in the Nordic press. Hojelid's assumption is that the enemy image is affected by so-called cognitive factors. But these factors will not suffice to explain why the enemy image looks the way it does. We may suppose for very good reasons that national, political and ideological circumstances predestine us to have different views of actors and actions. In my analyses the situationally determined enemy image represents the presentation of a concrete hostile action, while the dispositional enemy image represents expectation of such an action. By identifying the situational and the dispositional enemy images we can trace the 'danger zone' for enemy images in journalism. To avoid enemy images is a challenge for journalists covering international conflicts. To differentiate between the two levels of enemy images I have chosen this definition of dispositional images: A dispositional enemy image is a negative stereotype& of a nation, state, religion or/and their respective regimes and heads of states. The enemy image can express itself through metaphors or other effects in the language or visual and graphical effects that create expectations of aggressive, hostile or inhuman behaviour. All the articles in the three newspapers about the four conflicts the weeks before and after the events described above took place were registered in a database," using the following variables:" (i) appearance of enemy images; (ii) genre; (iii) who is defined as the enemy? 6. Hypotheses The hypotheses were the following: 1. In media coverage of the martial law in 101 Poland there will be a clear-cut dispositional enemy image of the Soviet Union. 2. In media coverage of the martial law in Romania the dispositional enemy images have disappeared. 3. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Iran there will be a clear-cut dispositional enemy image of the Soviet Union. 4. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Iran a dispositional enemy image of Islam will occur. It will be related as much to the victim of aggression (Iran) as the aggressor itself (Iraq). 5. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the dispositional enemy image of the Soviet Union will have disappeared. 6. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the dispositional enemy image of Islam will be strengthened and further developed, related mostly to Iraq. 7. Dispositional Enemy Images Of my total sample of 915 articles I found enemy images in 217. Dispositional enemy images are the sole single category in 93 articles. If we dichotomize and collapse 'dispositional' and 'both dispositional and situational' into one category, we find that 144 out of the 217 articles contain dispositional enemy images. Compared to the 70 articles with situational enemy images, this is the biggest category. We can therefore conclude that there is a dispositional trend among the enemy images in the sample. In an analytical perspective these figures do not tell us very much, however. If we break the figures down by categories, and go into the texts we get a better picture. The sample of editorials had an overrepresentation of enemy images compared to all other categories. There were enemy images in 76% of the editorials, as against only 20% of the news articles. It would appear that the regional newspaper Bergens Tidende (BT) was the one paper in my sample that most often used enemy images in the journalistic process. The tabloid paper Verdens Gang (VG), however, had the biggest share of dispositional enemy images. If we break this down by the categories 'genre' and 'types of This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 102 RuneOttosen Table II. Enemy Images in Editorials VG Type of EI D B S Aftenposten Type of EI D B S BT Type of EI D S B All newspapers B S D All enemy images Poland Romania Iraq-Iran Iraq-Kuwait 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 1 0 3 0 1 1 3 2 2 7 2 3 3 3 8 5 6 11 Total 3 4 6 2 4 3 0 6 2 5 14 11 30 EI = enemy images. S = Number of articles with situational enemy images. D = Number of articles with dispositional enemy images. B = Number of articles with both situational and dispositional enemy images. Table III. Enemy Images of Soviet Union in Articles on Martial Law in Poland and Romania Aftenposten Type of EI S D B VG Type of EI B D S BT Type of EI D B S All newspapers D S B All enemy images Poland Romania 16 O 3 O 4 O 4 O 9 O 4 O 10 O 2 O 5 0 30 0 14 0 13 0 57 0 Total 16 3 4 4 9 4 10 2 5 30 14 13 57 S, D, B, EI - see note to Table II. conflicts', we get a more mixed picture. BT emerges as the newspaper with the most dispositional enemy images in editorials. All of the editorials in BT containing enemy images belonged to the categories 'dispositional' or 'both'. Given the fact that the editorials were the sole genre with the highest level of enemy images, we must conclude that there is no clear pattern between these newspapers.'12 All the hypotheses about the enemy images of the Soviet Union (hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5) were confirmed. As we shall see, hypotheses 4 and 6 were only partly confirmed. In what way did the enemy images influence the journalistic process? I offer examples for each of the conflicts. 7.1 Martial Law in Poland Dispositional expectations of a Soviet invasion were so strong that both BT and VG came close to announcing the invasion that was expected, but never took place. On 26 December 1981, VCGhad a news page with the title: 'Soviet aeroplanes landed last night'. There are several elements in this article to connote that 'the Russians are coming'. There is a column title: 'Poland's Hour of Destiny', with the Solidarnosc symbol. A picture of a warship from the Russian fleet illustrated the article with the following text: 'This picture is taken from the ferry between Poland and Sweden. It shows Soviet naval ships at the harbour in Swinemunde. The ship nearest the photographer is a troop transport ship.' In the leader a Soviet spokesman according to UPI said that the 'Soviet Union would assist Poland, also militarily if the Military Council in Moscow asked for help'. This is the vocabulary of the Brezhnev doctrine (the Czechs also 'asked' for help in 1968). In the last two sentences there is information that weakens the impression that a Soviet invasion is about to begin, however. There a spokesman for the US State Department says that he cannot confirm the message about Soviet aeroplanes. This contradicts the telegram referred to further up where 'Western Diplomats' and 'all the Western news agencies in Warsaw' are cited as sources that refer to the Soviet aeroplanes as part of a possible invasion force. The day before two Polish refugees were quoted as This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process 103 having seen a Soviet invasion force under way (VG, 15 December 1981). VG in this case put the mainfocus on the information and sources that predicted a Soviet invasion(diplomaticsourcesin Warsaw and Polish refugees)- informationcontrary to this was not mentioned until the very end of the article.The whole page, the title, the lead, the choice of picture, the picture text, all point in the directionof an impendingSoviet invasion. Most likely, these decisions were taken under deadline pressure, the editorial staff drawingtoo hastya conclusionon whatlater proved to be less reliable sources. Most likely, the dispositionalexpectation of an aggressiveact from Moscow was nourished by the existing enemy images of the Soviet Jaruzelski's repression, because this very repressioncould serve to prevent a Soviet invasion. How then were enemy images of Ceau?escu,and in what way did they influence the journalisticprocess? Hitlermetaphorsand metonymsoccurred in the text, headlines and cartoons. BT carried the title: 'No assistance to the Fuhrer' on 22 December 1989. Ceau?escu was also portrayedas the 'Devil' (VG, 20 December 1989). Nor did it pass unnoticed that this was the homeland of 'Dracula'. VG wrote that 'Dracula is dead' when Ceau?escu was shot (VG, 27 December 1989). Editorialslinked the events to the 'final countdown' to communism and revitalization of 'Christianvalues'. Union. Thus I suggest that enemy images BT wrote that 'the 'Anti-Christ'is dead weaken critical thinking among journalists in (27 December). The articlestarts: respect of choice of sources and in drawing conclusions too hastily. 7.2 Martial Law in Romania In this case the hypothesis was confirmed that the enemy image of the Soviet Union had disappeared. Instead, a new enemy image was introduced: the personified image of Ceau?escuclingingto power. This new enemy image was of course not unexpected. Ceausescuwas for many 'the ideal enemy': he was tyrannical in his ruling methods, unsympatheticin appearanceand used communist rhetoric to defend his policy. If we look back on the coverage of the events in Poland, there was little focus on the person of Jaruzelski,even thoughhe had the same 'qualifications'(tyrannical,unsympathetic appearance and communist rhetoric). Despite this, only 10% had personified enemy images of Jaruzelskiamong the sample of enemy images in the Polish case. In the Romaniancase, all 42 articles classified as containing enemy images focused on the person Ceau?escu.Among these, there were five with a supplementary enemy imageof 'communism'.How can this development be explained? I find it likely that the 'dangerfrom the East' duringthe Polish crisis overshadowed the personal role of Jaruzelski.In fact the Westernpress took an 'understanding'attitude towards PARIS: What a Christmas message: Anti-Christ is dead - and it happened on Christmas Day, exclaimed anchorman, Petre Popescu in the free Romanian television. It may sound foolish, but for me Ceausescu was Satan himself, the incarnation of everything evil - and I'm glad that he is dead, says the famous playwright Eugene lonesco to the newspaper, Le Figaro. Laterin the articleElena Ceau?escugets her share: 'Withassistancefrom the machiavellian witch, Elena, he made suppression and surveillance into the religion of this country.' A reporter from VG visited a family in Bucharest: 'This Christmas Ceau?escuwill no longer play the role of Jesus Christ.For the firsttime in manyyears Christians . . . can celebrate Christmas in the old-fashioned way, with Christmas trees, hymnsand mass.' Later in the article the daughter in the family expresses the wish to reintroduceold execution methods: 'Ceausescugot awaytoo easily, the younger daughter bursts out: He should not have been shot, he should have been stoned in the centreof Bucharest.'Then the journalist observes: 'The son Adriano is smiling to himself at the end of the table. On Christmas day he was on the barricadesin the street of Bucharest,today the Anti-Christis dead and Christcan be celebratedopenly.' Aftenposten had two reporters in Romania.In a reportentitled'FromNightmare This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 104 Rune Ottosen to Victory' on 27 December (dateline Timisoara), they wrote: 'Death to Ceausescu. Death to the Anti-Christ'. The verdict was hanging on walls and posters all over Romania. Written by a bitter people. Now it's fulfilled. In Timisoara where the rebellion started, people went into the streets and embraced each other. But the joy is mixed with sorrow. On the first Christmas in freedom the Christmas trees were decorated with black ribbons. Between 4,000 and 12,000 people out of the total population in this city of 275,000 have been killed since Sunday 17 December, nobody knows for sure how many. rights record was not much better during this period; but at this point the Western world had more important enemies to fight, and Romania was given favourable treatment for being the 'weakest link' in the Warsaw Pact. Such hypocrisy is one thing, more interesting for my discussion is whether there is a connection between the demonization of Ceau?escu and the uncritical use of inflated death tolls. Could it be that when the demonization goes far enough the critical threshold gets lower? After all, 'Satan', 'Dracula' and 'Hitler' are capable of almost anything, aren't they? Back in Oslo the editorial comment ran like this: 'Everything is worse in Romania. The Brezhnev regime in power in Czechoslovakia after 1968 was also brutal, but it was never bestial. Let us hope Europe has learnt 7.3 The Iraqi Invasion of lran its last lesson this day before Christmas what The testing of this hypothesis was twofold: a mad dictator is capable of doing with his partly to see whether an enemy image of own people.' Islam was introduced, and partly to find out Later in the article an estimate of how whether there was a shared responsibility by many deaths this 'mad dictator' had been the parties involved. The hypothesis was partly confirmed. responsible for: 'Figures came up to 60,000 according to spokesmen for the new Even though Iraq was the aggressor, Iran was blamed just as much as Iraq (see Table regime'. The same day, Aftenposten in its editorial IV). The enemy image, however, was referred to 'human slaughter in Romania', and ironically enough there is a cartoon beside the editorial with a huge pile of Table IV. Angling of Total Sample of Articles Covercorpses under the title 'The moment of ing Iraqi Invasion of Iran truth'. Ironically, the truth was far from what was reported from the reporters in the Angling field and from the staff in Oslo. The news- Iraq is attacking 45 33 media in Norway as well as in the rest of the Iran is attacking 10) Western world operated with roughly the Iraq opposes peaceful solution 9 opposes peaceful solution same death tolls. Aftenposten did not cor- Iran 6 International support for Iraq rect their figures until 18 June the next year, International support for Iran 6 when in a short article in connection with a Total 109 trial against Securitate officers, the official death figure was pared down to 1038 The total sample of articles covering the Iraqi invasion of Iran is 211. Of these, I present only the 1()9articles (Allern, 1992, p. 264). have the relevant angling for the comparative It is remarkable how quickly the image of which perspective discussed in the article. Ceau?escu in the Western world changed from 'the favourite member of the Warsaw Pact' to 'Satan', 'Dracula' and 'Hitler'. For years Romania enjoyed favourable loan and related to the person, Ayatollah Khomeini, trading conditions, cultural exchange, etc., rather than Islam. Said (1989, pp. 3-4) anawith the USA and EC as well as other West- lysed how certain persons symbolize the ern countries. The Norwegian government enemy image of Islam. In 1980 US television even awarded Ceau?escu the order of St. showed a commercial connected with a Olav for honourable service to the 'father- shortage of energy and oil. In the film a land and mankind'. Ceau?escu's human series of still pictures was shown which in This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process 105 Table V. Categories of Enemy Images in Coverage of the Iraqi Invasion of Iran BT Type of EI B S D All newspapers S D B 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 2 4 1 26 2 7 0 1 1 5 2 11 33 Aftenposten Type of EI S D B VG Type of EI D B S Islam Arabs Khomeini Saddam Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 O 4 0 0 0 0 0 Total 0 1 3 5 0 All enemy images S, D, B, EI - see note to Table II. a subtle way linked the Muslim connection and the fear of an oil shortage. There were portraits of Khomeini, Gaddafi and Yasser Arafat. The pictures were shown without any name being mentioned, but as Said shows their Muslim background is linked to the threat to oil supplies. In several of the articles in my sample there was an implicit if not open linkage between Khomeini's 'fanaticism' and Islam. For example, let us take a commentary article in Aftenposten on 27 September 1980 under the title 'Showdown in the Gulf': 'The Arab states in the region are watching Hussein's move forward with satisfaction and scepticism. Satisfaction is connected with the prospect of getting rid of Khomeini, who with his rebellious fanaticism also threatens Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states.' The Iraqi attack is toned down with the expression 'move forward'. But Khomeini was a threat through his 'rebellious fanaticism'. Aftenposten does not express explicitly that this 'fanaticism' is related to Islam, but obviously there is an implicit connection. My material includes several examples in which Iraq is blamed for the invasion; justifying circumstances are found often connected with Arabs or Muslims. Here is another example from the same article in Aftenposten: The background to this conflict is complex, and as is often the case in that part of the world it's not easy to point out who exactly started the hostilities. But if we can use an old rule of thumb that the one who started the war is the one who has greatest progress in the beginning then the finger should be pointed at Iraq. Then Aftenposten launches 'temptation' as a motive: '. .. the combination of ideological/ religious aggression and a military decline (in Iran) might have tempted Iraq to teach its neighbour a lesson.' No expansionist motives were ascribed to Saddam Hussein; his motive is simply 'to teach Khomeini a lesson'. It is Iraq the state, and not the person, Saddam Hussein, that is defined as the attacker (after being tempted). Several examples of titles, leader, angling, illustrations and cartoons follow this trend. There is also a certain element of wishful thinking in the sense that the desire to see the fall of Khomeini is so strong that it is reflected on all levels in the journalistic process. A couple of headlines can exemplify this: 'Khomeini is totting' (VG, 25 September). 'Khomeini must be removed' (VG, 26 September). VG on 24 September has a double page with the title 'Iran is Facing a Breakdown'. The leader follows up: 'Iran is in danger of falling apart. Khomeini's aggressive policy has challenged the neighbouring countries. Today one can see no gathering authority except religion.' The whole article is based on an interview with Anders C. Sjaastad, a researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs who later became a Conservative MP and Minister of Defence. In the interview, Sjaastad mentions several reasons for the likelihood that Iran would 'fall apart'. These are: ideological and economical contradictions, eth- This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 106 RuneOttosen nical tension and the war itself. He also launches a theory about a possible Soviet interventionin the conflict. The most strikingthing about this article, however, is a huge drawingwith a map of the region and portraitsof SaddamHussein and Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini has darkdeep eyes while SaddamHusseinlooks like a Western-orientedbusiness man, a striking contrast to the cartoons we saw duringthe Gulf War. There are also many weaponsdrawnon the map, all of them connoting Iraniaggression.Thereis a huge tank rolling out of Iran into Iraq. The fighter planes are headingaway from Iran towards Baghdad, while the only weapons in the Iraqimap are two tinyplaneson the ground. There are two planes directedtowardsIran in the air, but it looks on the map as if they come from another country in the Middle East. The text in the drawingas well as the visual effects connote Irani aggression,but also portray Iraq as the losing side: 'The Iranianforces of Khorramhahrand Abadan are surrounded and completely isolated'. This double signal 'Iran as aggressive'and 'Iran is losing' can in many ways symbolize the whole coverageof this conflict.The contrast between this anglingand what was to come in the next example of Saddam Hussein's aggressionten years later is remarkable,as arguedby Mowlana(1992, p. 33): tray Saddam Hussein as the devil himself. The media are of course not to blame for telling the truth about the terrible things SaddamHusseinwas responsiblefor. However, what was less convincing was that these things never featuredin the headlines as long as the regime was regarded as a Western ally. There was little mention of the fact that he was armed by the Western powersnow allied againsthim, that Saddam Hussein had received help from the Soviet Union and the KGB to buildup his military machineand secret police; or that the USA had used him vigorously in their fight againstIran after Khomeinicame to power (Colhun, 1991). The demonizationof SaddamHusseinbecomes at its most strikingif we take an overall look at the enemy images after the Iraqi invasionof Kuwait(see Table VI for a full overview). Comparingthe images of Saddam Husseinin the two invasions,we see a striking difference. It was not a generally sympatheticpicturethat was drawnof Saddam duringthe Iraqiinvasionof Iraneither, but nobody questioned his mental soundness and nobodycalled him 'Hitler'. After going thoughall the editorials,news articles and commentariesin my sample, I have to conclude that there were fewer implicit enemy images of Islam than was the case with the coverageof the Iraqiinvasion of Iran. During the invasion of Iran there were several examples of implicit enemy images of Islam in the enemy images of Khomeini.This time the enemy images are more related to SaddamHussein'spersonal The Iran-IraqWarended in August1988withSaddam Hussein in disgrace,but two years later the same Iraqiarmywas publicisedby the greatpowers and the media as one of the greatestarmiesin the world, capable of annihilatingall its neighbours. character, his mental health and his lust for This allegedstrengthjustifiedthe half-million-troop power. All of the three papersin my sample multinationalpresencein the region.No reporteror media personnelin the West was willing to inter- have enemy imagesalong those lines. And if view Iraniansoldiersand generalsas to how they we can talk abut an implicitadditionaldishad been able to keep the Iraqisin check with so positionalenemy image this time, it is more small a militaryarsenal.No interviewand reporting about 'Arabs' than about Muslims (see were done with the Iranianpopulationas to how it Table VI). had resisted the two hundred Iraqi Scud missile Even the titles of the commentaryarticles attackson the populationcentresin Tehranandthe Iranianprovincesduringthe so-called city war in in the three newspapersthe day after the 1987-1988. invasionset the trendfor whatwas to come: - 'A Killer with Family Problems' (BT, 3 August) - 'Rulerwith Blood on His Hands' Since the United Nations had almostunani- (Aftenposten, 3 August) - 'The Bully of mously condemnedthe invasionof Kuwait, Baghdad' (VG, 3 August). The leader in the path was clear for the campaignto por- this articlein VG continues: 7.4 The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process 107 Table VI. Categories of Enemy Images in the Articles on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait Aftenposten Type of EI S D B VG Type of EI D B S BT Type of EI B S D All newspapers S D B All enemy images Islam Arabs Khomeini Saddam Hussein O 0 O 2 O 0 O 11 O 0 O 2 O 0 O 3 O 0 O 14 O 1 O 7 O 0 O 1 O 0 0 5 O 1 0 0 O 0 0 6 O 0 0 30 O 2 0 0 O 2 0 45 Total 2 11 2 3 14 8 1 5 1 6 30 11 47' S, D, B, EI - see note to Table II. Totally ruthless, with a greed for power and sly these are the most used adjectives connected with Saddam Hussein (53), also known as the 'Butcher of Baghdad'. Only Hitler and Stalin have in modern times represented a worse mixture of threats, false promises and military attacks towards their neighbours. It is less importanthere to discusswhether this characteristiccan be justified. The importantthingin my comparativeperspective is to see the differencebetween the Saddam Hussein we meet in this conflict and the Saddamwe met ten yearsbefore. Even if there were similar trends in the three papers, the tabloid VG went furthest in demonizingSaddamHussein and in contrasting the 'good' against the 'evil' in the confrontation between George Bush and Saddam.To a greaterextent than the other papers VG personifiesthe whole conflictas being a 'herovs. villain'melodrama.'3Study of Norway's major tabloid newspaper, Dagbladet, shows a similartendency (Berg & Steien, 1990/91).Thus we can talk about a tabloid trend that strengthenstendencies we also findin the other two newspapers. To take a closer look at the 'villain'in the drama, let us return to the article already mentioned,entitled'The Bullyof Baghdad'. The articlerelatesto the Hitler connotation introducedin the leader: could stop Hitler. The articlesummarizesa number of Saddam Hussein's previous atrocities- torture, executions, the use of gas againstthe Kurds,etc. His rationalityis also questioned: 'Many people are of the opinionthat he is consciouslyactingcrazyso that he can more easily frighten his opponents.' It is left to the reader to conclude whetherhe is crazyor just actingcrazy- but obviously that you can't make a deal with this kind of man. A negotiationor a peaceful solution doesn't seem very likely after this. The only positive thing VG can come up with is the role Saddamplayed in deterring Khomeini. On 6 August, Israelis introducedinto the melodrama by VG's correspondent in Jerusalem.The title of the article is 'Israel Demands that "Hitler" be Stopped'. The article is illustratedwith a photographof a demonstrationin whicha puppetof Saddam Hussein is held with Nazi symbols. An adviserto the IsraeliPrimeMinisterYizhak Shamir is quoted: 'A Hitler characterlike Saddam Hussein must be stopped. ... He may wish to take the rest of the Middle East.' Thus VG uses the one partyin the Middle East with most UN resolutionsagainstit for expansionismand ill-treatmentof the Palestiniansas proof for the claimthat Saddamis It's pure fright that made Saudi Arabia sign a nonHitler without mentioningthe fact that the aggression treaty with Iraq. The treaty is probably not worth more than the one Hitler signed with Israeli government is involved in the Stalin. Kuwait is sacrificed in the same way as regionalpower battle. Poland was sacrificed. But Saddam's main objective VG also portrays Saddam's regional could be Saudi Arabia, the same way the Soviet struggleas part of an Arab tradition. power Union was Hitler's main objective. The rulingBaathpartyis linkedwithoutany The naturalanswerto this is of course a logicalreasonto a communistenemy image: war - war was after all the only thing that 'Saddam claims to have family links to This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 108 RuneOttosen Nebuchadnezzar as well as the Prophet Mohammed. Only 22 years old he tried to claw his way to the top as terrorist for the communist Baath Party.' The other Arab countries are portrayed as weak, scared and cowards who would not close ranks behind Kuwait: 'Beyond dispute the strongest military power in the region - a million men equipped with weapons and eight years of experience - Saddam has frightened the other Arab countries from helping Kuwait. ... It's pure fright that made Saudi Arabia sign a non-aggression treaty with Iraq.' The contrast is enormous between the 'aggressive villain' Saddam, 'the chicken' Arabs and the other main person in the melodrama: 'the hero' George Bush. Bush is introduced to the drama on 4 August under the headline 'Bush is Promising Revenge'. At this point Saddam has claimed that foreigners in Baghdad are not allowed to leave. A subtitle: 'Americans Taken as Hostages in the Kuwaiti War' establishes the dramaturgical context. The hostages symbolize the cruelty of Saddam Hussein and their release will eventually be a measure of Bush's bravery. A huge picture of George Bush on the front page with a firm expression and a fisted hand. In contrast there is a small picture of Saddam just beside the fist, with the following text beneath: '"The Butcher from Baghdad": The feared but impoverished president Saddam Hussein has probably robbed Kuwait's huge gold stock.' Here, another motive is introduced: greed. In a Hollywood context the melodrama could be a Western movie. The impoverished and feared villain has stolen the gold. But the sheriff George Bush is about to enter the scene. In the leader the message is clear and outspoken: Bush is ready for action: 'The president of the United States - the world's most powerful man - came through with a clear message to "the butcher from Baghdad", Saddam Hussein - If you as much as touch a hair on the head of the hostages you must take responsibility for the consequences.' On 8 August VG has a new front page with the headline: US Forces to Saudi Arabia. The headline is inserted in a full page picture with US soldiers in combat uniform. The picture connotes 'firm courage' and could be taken out of 'Green Berets' or a similar Hollywood movie. Inset is the following text: 'US troops are landing in Saudi Arabia to defend the country against an attack from Iraq. The situation in the Gulf is growing more and more explosive.' The day after, VG has another full-page spread with a picture of President Bush seated at his desk. The headline sounds like Bush's own rhetoric: 'Stop the Dictator'. In the text beneath we are confronted with another Hitler connotation: 'President Bush compares Saddam Hussein's behaviour with Hitler's tactics in the 1930s and says that he must be stopped.' The military potential of both sides in the conflict is analysed in several articles: Iraq is presented on 8 August under the headline: 'Desperate Potential'. The leader starts like this: Against a unanimous world boycott'4 the world's most dangerous man - Saddam Hussein - has to make a choice: He can give in or attack with all the weapons he has. Nobody doubts that he is mad enough to use them. Tanks, bombers, rockets and gas. In addition, 1.3 million'5 well-equipped and well-trained soldiers. The articleis illustratedwith a mapof all the Scud-rocket bases in Iraq. In striking contrast to this connotation of aggression, gas and death, the day after (9 August) the US military force is presented with pictures of various weapons under the heading: 'Here are the US muscles - warship and battle planes will tame Iraq'. The article concludes that the US motives are solely defensive: 'The US will have supremacy in the air, but President George Bush said clearly yesterday that the US will not attack, just defend the territory of Saudi Arabia.' With Iraqi 'desperation' against the 'muscles' of the USA the countdown could start for what was to become deadline 'Operation Desert Storm' on 15 January 1991. This melodrama fits into an international pattern. Similar 'countdowns' between the 'hero' George Bush and the 'villain' Saddam have been identified in the media coverage in the USA (Kellner, 1992, pp. 64-65), in Denmark (Skovgaard-Petersen, This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1991) and Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process in Sweden (Johannesson, 1992). Lakoff (1991) has analysed how George Bush played the leading role in a rescue scenario in the official US version of the conflict: Iraq is the villain, Kuwait the victim; US the hero and the crime is kidnapping and rape. This simplified version of realities and the purpose of showing that war was necessary and unavoidable. Kurt Johannesson (1992, pp. 55-57) has shown how the use of historical parallels covered up other perspectives of this conflict, including US great power ambitions in the area. Noam Chomsky (1992, p. 55) shows how the media made invisible 'disturbing elements' in this blackand-white picture. One example of such a disturbing element was the position of the democratic opposition in Iraq, which was strongly opposed to Saddam Hussein (and had been so during the period when the West used Saddam Hussein as a buffer against Iran), but it also opposed the strategy of going to war. They feared the consequences the war would have for the civilian population in Iraq. In their attacks on Saddam Hussein, the Western media often ignored the fact that the Muslim world was deeply divided on the whole issue of the Gulf War. Instead there was a tendency to provide a stereotyped picture of Muslims with racist undertones. When the media campaign against Iraq and Saddam Hussein started, it was easy to build on the prejudice which had always existed against Muslims in Christian societies and which was made stronger during the Khomeini Revolution. Why then this sudden change in the image of Saddam Hussein? Torben Retb0ll (1991) shows how the image of the enemy has changed according to historical developments, and how the image of the friend can change accordingly. Basically, you are not judged by your acts, but according to your place in the friend/enemy picture. Acts that the media accept or ignore when 'friends' are concerned are condemned when the 'enemy' is involved. Retb0ll gives the following examples: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was condemned, but conveniently forgotten when invasions involving the Western powers, including the US-backed 109 annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, and the US invasions of Panama and Grenada. Saddam Hussein was rightly condemned for keeping civilians as hostages in Iraq, but nobody informed the public that the USA refused to help one of its own citizens, when Jennifer Casolo (a missionary) was illegally detained by the government of El Salvador in 1989. Saddam Hussein was condemned for invading the French Embassy in Kuwait and thus violating international law. Hardly any news media 'remembered' that the US invasion forces in Panama in 1989 had entered the private home of the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Panama and afterwards had to veto a resolution in the UN Security Council condemning the act. 8. Conclusion The Soviet Union ceased to be an enemy in the ten-year period I have analysed, and in this sense my hypothesis was confirmed. When this enemy image was alive (during martial law in Poland) it seems to have weakened the source-critical attitude which eventually led to too hasty conclusions (about a possible Soviet invasion). Personified enemy images have replaced the role of the Soviet Union in the conflicts analysed in my material. The enemy images of Arabs and Muslims took on a more subtle and indirect role than I had expected. In fact enemy images of Muslims became more evident after the period analysed here, especially after 15 January 1991, when the possibilities of terror actions by Iraqi agents became an issue (Bj0rgo, 1992; Ottosen, 1991, p. 33; Yassine 1993). In what way does the personified enemy image influence the journalistic process? In the cases of Ceau?escu, Khomeini and Saddam Hussein we can speak of a 'scapegoat effect'. The blame for violation of international law, human rights, etc., is partly explained through the personal characteristics of the leaders involved. The hypocrisy of these enemy images is evident in the cases of Ceau?escu and Saddam Hussein since both were used by the Western world in a period when they were useful allies in a bigger strategic game, even when their lack of This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 110 RuneOttosen respectfor humanrightswas evident at that they used, etc. I have analysed only the time as well. Even more serious is the fact articlesthemselves.It should also be underthat these enemy images seem to have lined that the internationalconflictsstudied weakenedthe analyticalperspectiveand the here are of the type much more likely to source-criticalattitude. In the Romanian generate enemy images than other topics. case the consequence was that the news- To gain a deeper understandingof enemy papers had exaggeratedthe death figures. images in everydayjournalism,one has to The fact that Iran and Khomeini were analyse a sample of newspapers over a blamed for the war just as much as Saddam longer time-span, including periods when Hussein and Iraq indicates that the enemy the situation is more 'normal'than during images overshadowedanalyticalapproaches overt conflicts.The extent to whichlinkages to coverage, such as the historicalconflict- can be found in commercialpressure and lines in the region and Saddam Hussein's politicalframesof referenceshould also be regional ambitionsthat were proved again examined. when he attackedKuwait.Since this analytical perspective was missing in the first NOTES round, it could not be picked up again ten 1. Galtung (1969) differentiates between direct years later. Instead we were witness to an violence, which expresses itself in wars and armed enormousdemonizationof SaddamHussein conflicts, and structural violence, which occurs in that again overshadowedthe international the global contradictions in the North-South conflict. aspects of the conflict including the US 15 January 1991. motive to salvage its own superpoweram- 2. Klassekampen, 3. Aftenposten, 29 December 1989. bitions and to defend the oil supplies, as 4. I define a metaphor as a quality or a characteristic declared in the Carter doctrine of the late attributed to a person by using a name, image, adjective, etc. 1970s (Ottosen, 1986). About 80% of the news articles in my 5. I define a metonym as a part of the reality that is described as representing the whole complex situsample did not include any enemy images, ation. which indicates that there is no need to 6. I define a connotation as something that is sugdramatize the effect of enemy images in gested by a word in addition to its simple meaning. ordinary day-to-day reporting. When it 7. I define a denotation as the basic meaning of a word. comes to news items, my materialindicates Ethos is analysed here in connection with characthat in general enemy images influencethe 8. terization of a person we have or have no confiangling more than the text itself. The tabdence in. loid VG presents a more black-and-white 9. Walter Lippman defines stereotypes as a way of organizing a presentation on a regular basis picture of the conflict in the Gulf than through simplified expressions in a convenient and the other two newspapers. The overtime-saving manner (Yassine, 1993). representationof enemy images in the edi- 10. The theoretical and methodological problems are torials and commentary articles indicates discussed in more detail in my report (Ottosen, 1993a, pp. 43-50), in which I also describe a rethat enemy images have an impact on the liability test based on Scott's pi with a methodologilanguage in the process of articulating cally acceptable result. meanings.Thus this is a moraland political 11. There were other variables in the survey as well, issue as well as a professionalweakness. such as size of the article, use of sources and angling, but the whole study will not be presented Care has to be taken in launching a in this article. 'replacementtheory' (that a Muslimenemy In the following cases, ranked in descending order, image has replacedthe enemy image of the 12. dispositional enemy images were the biggest catSoviet Union). We haven't actuallyproved egory of enemy images: (1) VG's coverage of marthat there has to be an enemy image at all tial law in Poland, (2) VG's coverage of martial law in Romania, (3) VG's coverage of the Iraqi times, but my findingsshow that the picture invasion of Kuwait, (4) Aftenposten's coverage of is complex and that each crisis has its own martial law in Romania, (5) Aftenposten's coverage the whole I not character. have analysed of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, (6) BT's coverage journalistic process including how the of martial law in Romania. Situational enemy images were the biggest category of enemy images journalists were influenced, what sources This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process in: (1) VG'scoverageof the Iraqinvasionof Iran, (2) Aftenposten's coverage of martial law in Poland,(3) BT'scoverageof martiallawin Poland, (4) BT's coverageof the Iraqiinvasionof Iran. In Aftenposten'scoverageof the Iraqiinvasionof Iran 'both dispositionaland situational'was the biggest category of enemy images. In the case of BT's coverageof the Iraqiinvasionof Kuwaittherewere equally as many 'situational' as 'dispositional' enemy images. 13. B0 (1985) has analysedNorwegiantabloidswithin the perspectiveof Sergej Balukhaty'sanalysesof the Russiandramasfromthe last century.I use the expression 'melodrama'in the context of B0's model. 14. 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RUNE OTTOSEN, b. 1950, Cand.Polit in Political Science (University of Oslo, 1984), BA in Journalism (Norwegian College of Journalism, 1973); Journalist in various media (1977-84); Lecturer. and Research Fellow at the Norwegian College of Journalism (1984-8); Information Director and Research Fellow at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (1989-91, 1991-2),1 Norwegian Federation of Journalists (1993-5). Currently writing the history of the Norwegian profession of journalism. This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Sat, 18 Apr 2015 01:55:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions