see here - Forgotston.com

Transcription

Licciardi – POLI 6680 Spring 2015 – Course Paper
Contents
Preface ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2
Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------------------
3-5
Literature Review ---------------------------------------------------------------
5-8
Methodology and Analysis ----------------------------------------------------
8-13
Expectations ---------------------------------------------------------------------
14
Case study of Louisiana Gubernatorial Power -----------------------------
15-20
Recommendations --------------------------------------------------------------
21
Conclusions ---------------------------------------------------------------------
22
Resources ------------------------------------------------------------------------
22-23
Appendix of Tables -----------------------------------------------------------
24-27
1
Preface
This project began as a coffee shop conversation between a few friends interested in
Louisiana state politics and policies. An assumption was that there must be some unique
authority that governors in Louisiana wield that most other state governors do not. This was
assumed because governors in Louisiana exercise peculiar influence over their legislative
counterparts and actually chose who the leadership of the legislative chambers will be during the
tenure of the governor. In addition, committee chairs and even committee members serve at the
unofficial pleasure of the governor.
C.B. Forgotston is one of the coffee klatch whose experience and expertise in Louisiana
state politics was leaned on for direction in this research. Forgotston, a political commentator
and former staff attorney for the Louisiana State Legislature, was an integral actor during the
1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention. He is a subject matter expert on the Louisiana
Constitution.
At the outset of this research, I expected to find empirical data that would allow statistical
analyses pointing toward a relationship between the peculiar gubernatorial power in Louisiana
and legislative independence and behavior. The absence of such data steered this research
toward a mixed method approach employing interviews of current and previous stakeholders.
Former Louisiana Governor, Edwin W. Edwards, granted my request for an interview for
this project. We met privately for nearly two hours in Baton Rouge, LA. I had not spoken to
Governor Edwards for twenty-seven years. We last met in 1987 at the governor’s mansion when
I was a freshman at the Louisiana State University. Governor Edwards did not disappoint and
was frank in all of his responses.
The perspectives of C.B. Forgotston set the stage for this this research. The unique
experience and qualifications of four-term Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards provided what
can be the only “reasonable” conclusion of why Louisiana legislators abdicate their right and
responsibility to be an independent branch of government.
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Introduction
This research design seeks to find a relationship between the power of governors in the
United States and their respective legislatures’ ability to be independent.
“I walked up to the legislative assembly building (Rio Grande de Sul Legislature, Brazil) and
there was this enormous sign that read, Povo sem parlamento 'e povo escravo. I didn't speak any
Portuguese so I had to ask what does that mean. The translation I got was 'People without parliament are
people in chains.’” I thought to myself, 'Aha, that's why I do what I do. That's what I believe in: That
legislatures are ultimately the guardian of the people's rights and freedom."
- Karl Kurtz, Ph.D.
Director - Trust for Representative Democracy
National Conference of State Legislatures
This subject matter is of particular curiosity in Louisiana where gubernatorial power is
perceived to be extraordinary, while objective measures of gubernatorial power have rated the
office at or below median ratings for fifty-five years. Interviews with elite actors and
stakeholders, coupled with quantitative data analysis, reveal unexpected results.
Separation of Powers
In the course of protecting individual rights, separation of powers is at the basis of
American political philosophy. By granting each branch of government specific authority,
constitutions aim to restrict any one person or branch control over the other(s). Good public
policy and equitability should result as independent branches coalescing.
While the foundations of American governments (national and state) are based on three
separate branches; legislative, executive, and judicial, a preponderance of interaction and friction
is evident between the legislative and executive branches. Invoking Montesquieu, Publius warns
in Federalist #47 “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or
body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch
or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”
This design will focus on the nature of interaction and influence between the states’
legislative and executive branches. This design will analyze the formal and procedural natures
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of state governing authorities, and to a lesser degree, political and partisan variables. Such
partisan variables may result in outcomes of a particular branch’s ability to be more powerful or
more independent than the other; however, the body of literature, upon which this research
builds, considers formal power frameworks as the primary driver in power and independence.
Legislative characteristics like independence, creativeness, and competence create an
environment where democracy flourishes. Conversely, weak, unorganized, and dysfunctional
legislatures permit authoritarian forms of government (Burns p. xi 1971).
Independence in state legislatures can be achieved by 1) having the ability to decide how
long and how often it meets, 2) being able to operate as a co-equal branch of government in
relation to the executive, 3) exercising oversight of programs and expenditures within its
purview, 4) operating freely of interest group and lobbyist influence, and 5) being free of
conflicts of interest on the part of individual legislators. The nature of part-time citizen
legislatures leaves them prone to violating some of these maxims (Burns 1971).
They’re No Angels
Legislatures with limited resources, or ambitious legislators, lean on their membership as
subject matter experts. One can find criminal justice and judicial committees rife with lawyers,
insurance committees overrun by insurance agents, and banking and finance committees full of
bankers and investment agents. Legislators find themselves relying on reports of those
committees when deciding how to vote on bills. Whether by design, serendipity, or divine
intervention, attorneys, insurance agents, educators, and bankers can find themselves in positions
to influence and perpetuate their respective industries via the legislative process.
Interest groups and lobbyists are also influential players in legislative behavior.
According to a Louisiana legislator in 2015, his committee chairmanship was awarded to him
because of an interest group’s pressure on the governor to appoint him. The legislator had been a
longtime member of the group and an advocate of its legislation as a practitioner. Legislators
(and governors) beholden to interest groups lack independence, as do those who are beholden to
governors.
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The Size of the Power Pie
Let’s consider whether or not power is zero-sum. Is there a finite parameter of power
shared between the legislative and executive branches? When a governor’s power increases,
does a legislature’s ability to be independent decrease? Can a governor of a particular state have
a high power rating while its legislature rates high on independence? Do power dynamics allow
for powerful governors and highly independent legislatures, thus exceeding a zero-sum
framework?
This design will pit the measurement of gubernatorial power against the measurements of
legislative independence. The original instruments of the two measurements are the
Gubernatorial Power Index (Schlesinger 1965) and the FAIIR System Index of a ranking of US
state legislatures (Burns 1971). These indices were developed between 1960 and 1970.
This research recognizes that the legislative branch creates and constricts policy leading
to gubernatorial power; however, this paper hypothesizes that existing gubernatorial powers are
effecting legislatures’ ability to be independent and to create restrictions on governors.
Literature Review
Theoretical and Philosophical Importance of Legislative Independence
As pointed out by Publius (likely James Madison) in Federalist #47, the idea of
consolidating power within a single branch of government violates the tenets of separation of
powers, leading to tyranny. Thus, co-equal and independent institutions must balance one
another.
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Practical Importance of Legislative Independence
As practitioners, legislators, legislatures, legislative staff, and state legislature
associations are concerned with the balance of power issue and the ability of legislatures to be
effective and independent of the executive branch.
Regarding the balance power, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL State
Legislatures Magazine, 1999) posits:
-
Constitutionally, legislatures are separate, co-equal branches
-
Legislatures must balance the power of governors
-
A good legislature has to be independent of the governor
-
Legislatures must participate on the initiation of policy
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Legislatures must refuse to be a rubber stamp for executive proposals
Gubernatorial Power Literature
The seminal work of Joseph Schlesinger results in the 1965 Gubernatorial Power Index
(GPI). He collects the original data via surveys which were completed by governors or trusted
staff. The survey focuses on how a governor perceives their power, inasmuch as formal,
informal, or obstacles preventing power. The groundbreaking work establishes the corner stone
in the measurement of four gubernatorial power factors: Tenure Potential, Appointive Power,
Budget Power, and Veto Power. Schlesinger’s original 1960 survey results in thirty-nine
complete and usable responses.
Based upon academic research theorem, Thad Beyle attempts to replicate Schlesinger’s
work by requesting surveys to be completed and returned by the administrations’ professional
staff (1968). Beyle discovers that the opinions of executive staff mirror that of their respective
governor in how they perceived gubernatorial power. A subsequent questionnaire in 1979
(Bernick) validates that non-executive branch officials also recognize the same categories of a
governor’s power as the executives themselves do.
Nelson Dometrius attempts to modify the gubernatorial power index as a measurement
tool in 1979. His assertion is that an index should do two things: be easily calculated and
measure “what it purports to measure”. Dometrius posits that to have power, it must be obvious
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what the power is or over. It is implied that this power must be over the other state
governmental institutions. Dometrius’ goal is to modify the GPI instrument toward the most
accurate tool for measurement of a governor’s power and effectiveness. He attempts to update
the original four building blocks of the model upon which future academics might conduct
research.
Dometrius becomes concerned with the effects of other plural elected executives
(Attorneys general, Lt. Governor’s, Secretaries of State and etc.), their Tenure Power, and the
effects of this phenomenon on a governor’s Tenure Power, thus adjusting the weighting of the
category in the GPI model accordingly.
Mueller (1985) compares the relative position of governors in power ratings from the period
of 1960 to 1982. He seeks to find whether Schlesinger’s 1965 index reveals changing gubernatorial
powers. He employs Schlesinger’s model against his own 1982 iteration in statistical correlation tests
and regression analyses finding that there is continuity.
The FAIIR Index of Legislatures’ Independence and Professionalism
Compared to their executive counterparts, legislators are generally part-time public
servants. Individually, they lack the time, money, and expertise that an executive does. In the
1960s and 1970s, advocates for increasing levels of professionalism and accountability of state
legislatures, lobbied for increased institutional resources for legislatures, in hopes of attracting
more diverse, educated, and professional legislative candidates. The goal was to create
independent acting legislatures in relation to the governors and lobbyists (Burns 1972).
Political science literature suggests that legislatures lack the will and resources for
executive and bureaucratic oversight. Ascher (1963) observed, “Legislators make strategic
decisions concerning allocation of their resources, with oversight rarely being accorded top
priority”
Relationships between the amount of legislative influence and some measures of
legislative professionalism are found by Elling (1992) who uses questionnaire information
collected in 1982 from bureaucrats in ten states. Burns’ 1971 FAIIR System is considered in the
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analyses. The categories of Functionality, Informedness, and Independence correlate best with
the idea of professionalism (Elling 1984).
Power may not be zero-sum
Tangentially related to power and independence are effectiveness and professionalism
Dilger et al (1995) expected to find a negative relationship between state legislature
professionalism and gubernatorial effectiveness. What they did discover was actually a positive
correlation. The authors posit “…the power relationship between the governor and the state
legislature is not necessarily a zero-sum game, with one institution gaining influence at the
expense of the other.”
Rosenthal (1993) suggests that state legislatures have improved their standing as
representative bodies, are active participants in the policy-making process, and are producing
informed debate and legislation. At the same time, however, they are losing their capacity to
resolve conflict and build consensus. This deterioration is due primarily to increased careerism
on the part of state legislators, an increasingly politicized legislative process, increasingly
fragmented legislative institutions, and state budgetary difficulties. Governors who are able to
tame such a volatile environment are rated as highly effective by their peers. Reversing the
tensions in a negative environment, effective governors have been able to create cooperation and
consensus.
Methodology
A mixed method approach is employed for this design. Quantitative analyses of data sets
compiled by The Council of State Governments can be used operationalize gubernatorial power
(GP) and legislative independence (LI). The longitudinal and robust collection of the
organization’s data allow for a retrospective analyses of GP and LI over the past fifty-five years.
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In addition to quantitative analyses, complementary qualitative methods must be
employed in this design. One-on-one interviews of subject matter experts and stake holders are
conducted for this study. Interviews are conducted with:
-Expert staff who specialize in legislative rules and processes at the National Conference of State
Legislatures (Denver, CO),
-C. B. Forgotston is an attorney, political pundit, and state government watchdog who served for seven
years as chief counsel of the Appropriations Committee of the Louisiana House of Representatives and
staff attorney for the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention,
-Louisiana State Representative Chris Broadwater.
-Four-term Louisiana Governor Edwin W. Edwards.
This research will test Gubernatorial Power (GP) against measures of legislative
independence (LI) to determine if there are relationships between a state’s governor’s power and
its legislature’s independence.
Instruments of measurement for concepts of gubernatorial power and state legislature
independence can be found in both political science and public administration academic
literature. The seminal work of Joseph Schlesinger produced a gubernatorial power index (GPI,
1965) that has been critiqued and modified over the last five decades. This index will be the
basis of gubernatorial power measurement in this design because it is an accepted standard by
which other academic measurements of gubernatorial are designed (Beyle, Dometrius, Mueller).
In addition, a comparison of state legislatures, commissioned by the Citizens Conference on
State Legislatures, ranks state legislatures on independence among four other categories, in the
book The Sometime Governments (Burns 1971). The analysis ranks the fifty state legislatures in
its FAIIR System operationalizing: Functional, Accountable, Informed, Independent, and
Representative for the index. Subsequent models of legislative effectiveness (Squire 1992)
deconstruct and re-aggregate the FAIIR variables when operationalizing a legislature’s level
professionalism.
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Variables
The units of analysis for this design are the fifty US the state legislatures. The primary
focus of this design uses Gubernatorial Power (GP) as the predictor variable and Legislative
Independence (LI) as the dependent variable.
Tools of Measurement
GPI and indices measuring legislative behavior have been tinkered with and overhauled
over the course of decades. Changes and weighting of variables in the indices have been made
by political science and public administration academics over the course of time (Schlesinger,
Beyle, Dometrius, Squire, Bowen, Woods, Dilger et al).
(See Joseph Schlesinger’s Gubernatorial Power Index rating table from Politics of the Executive, 1965 – Table 1.1
appendix)
The cornerstones of measurement, Schlesinger’s 1960 GPI rating, published in 1965 and
The Sometime Government’s FAIIR ranking index use of 1970 data and published in 1971,
provided the building blocks for subsequent academic contributions to the subject.
As subsequent academic modifications to the indices followed suit with rating indices for
GPI and ranking systems for legislative behavior (professionalism- which uses FAIIR’s
independence in its calculation), difficulties emerge in the ability to make a cross examination.
Problems with analyzing the measures are two-fold. GPI and FAIIR were developed as a rating
indices and ranking indices, respectively. The second challenge is that indices have not been
measured concurrently (measurements in the same year), thus dis-allowing a true analysis.
(See The Sometime Governments – 1971 FAIIR Index ranking of State Legislatures Table 1.2 – appendix)
This design proposes a concurrent and congruent (rating indices for both GP and LI)
model, allowing the examination of one institution’s influence over the other. Five bivariate
correlation tests will seek to find relationships between GP and the five individual categories of
the FAIIR index (Functionality (LF), Accountability (LA), Informedness (LI2), Independence
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(LI), and Representativeness (LR). A sixth correlation test comparing the aggregated FAIIR
system ratings to it its state’s GP rating should also be conducted.
While the focus of this research seeks to discover a relationship between GP and LI, it is
prudent to consider additional measurable legislative characteristics.
GP and an aggregated measure of a legislature’s professionalism (LP) are also proposed.
Sub-categories of legislative staff (LS), legislative compensation (LC), legislative operating
expense (LX), and length of legislative session (LLS).
Updated GPIs and FAIIR System indices should reveal how evolving formal legislative
procedures and or gubernatorial powers have changed over the course of five decades.
Operationalizing Design Variables
Based on The Sometime Governments FAIIR system – (1971)
Category
Description
Functional
(LF)
Accountable
(LA)
Informed
Time and utilization, General purpose of staff, Facilities, Structural
characteristics related to manageability (#of members), procedures to
expedite flow of work, Provisions for management and coordination,
Decorum
Comprehensibility in principle (selection of leaders), Adequacy of
information and public accessibility, Internal accountability (treatment of
minority)
Time in session, Number of committees, Interim activities, form and
character of bills, Professional staff resources, Fiscal review capabilities
(LI2)
Independent
(LI)
Representative
Legislative autonomy regarding procedures, Independence of executive
branch, oversight of executive operations, Lobbyist influence, Conflicts and
dilution of interest
ID of members and constiuents, qualifications, compensation, diffusion and
constrains on leadership, access to resources
(LR)
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MEASURING GUBERNATORIAL POWER
CHART 1
SCHLESINGER'S INDEX OF THE FORMAL POWERS OF THE GOVERNORS'
Governor's Tenure Potential
5 points A four-year term with no restraint on re-election
4 points A four-year term with one re-election permitted
3 points A four-year term, no consecutive re-election permitted
2 points A two-year term with no restraint on re-election
1 point A two-year term with one re-election permitted
Governors Veto Powers
5 points An item veto plus at least 3/5 of legislature to override
4 points An item veto plus a majority of the legislators elected to override
3 points An item veto plus more than a majority of legislators present to
override
2 points No item veto, but a special legislative majority required to override
1 point No item veto and a simple legislative majority required to override,
or no veto at all
Governor's Budget Powers
5 points Full responsibility for preparing the budget
4 points The governor shares this responsibility with a civil service appointee
or with a person appointed by someone else
3 points The governor shares this responsibility with the legislature
2 points The governor shares this responsibility with another popularly
elected official
1 point The governor shares this responsibility with several others with
independent sources of strength
Appointive Powers of the Governor
The score for each state is based on the governor's powers of appointment
in sixteen major functions and offices. It indicates the degree to which the
governor can be assumed to have sole power over the sixteen functions or
offices. For each function, the index is scaled according to the governor's
powers of appointment according to the following formula:
Values of P1 + P2 + P3 P16
Index =
Maximum values of P1 + P2 . * P16
Where P= 5 if governor appoints;
4 if governor appoints and one house of legislature approves;
3 if governor appoints and both houses of legislature approve;
2 if appointed by director with governor's approval or by governor
and council;
1 if appointed by departnent director, board, legislature, or civil
service;
0 if popularly elected;
and where subscript indicates the chief administrator for each of the sixteen
major functions and offices. The sixteen functions are administration and
finance, agriculture, attorney general, auditor, budget officer, conservation, controller, education, health, highways, insurance, labor, secretary of state, tax
commissioner, treasurer and welfare.
Using the formula described above, values are obtained for each state ranging
from 1.0 to 0.0. The states are then divided into quintiles, with the bottom
quintile receiving a score of 1, the second lowest quintile a 2, and so on up
to 5 for the top quintile.
Combined Index of the Formal Powers of the Governors
The score for each governor (1 to 5) an the four scales described above are
combined to create a total index of the governor's formal powers with values
ranging from 4 to 20.
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Analysis #1
Ho – There is no significant relationship between a governor’s power and a legislature’s
ability to be functional.
Ha – The higher a governor’s GP rating is, the lower a legislature’s functional rating will
be.
Analysis #2
Ho - There is no significant relationship between in a governor’s power and a
legislature’s ability to be accountable.
Ha – The higher a governor’s GP rating, the lower a legislature’s Accountable rating will
be.
Analysis #3
Ho - There is no significant relationship between a governor’s power and a legislature’s
ability to be informed.
Ha – The higher a governor’s GP rating, the lower a legislature’s informed rating will be.
Analysis #4
Ho - There is no significant relationship between a governor’s
power and a legislature’s ability to be independent.
Ha – The higher a governor’s GP rating, the lower a
legislature’s Independent rating will be.
Analysis #5
Ho - There is no significant relationship between a governor’s power and a legislature’s
ability to be representative.
Ha – The higher a governor’s GP rating, the lower a legislature’s Representative rating
will be.
Analysis #6
Ho - There is no significant relationship between a governor’s GP rating and a
legislature’s FAIIR System rating.
Ha – The higher a governor’s GP rating, the lower a legislature’s FAIIR System rating
will be.
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Expectations
This research expects to find a negative correlation between gubernatorial power and
legislative independence. While the branches of government might be able to operate separate of
each other, the expectation that power is dynamic and not zero-sum defies sensibility (Edwards
Interview). Dilger et al (1995) consider a relationship between gubernatorial effectiveness and
legislative professionalism, which are different than power and independence.
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Legislature's Independence
50
40
30
Series1
Linear (Series1)
20
10
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Governor's Power
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The Louisiana Case
Louisiana governors have a long-time reputation of being extraordinarily powerful. So
much so that Louisiana governors have enjoyed the informal but real power of choosing
legislative chamber leaders, committee chairs and committee members in both houses of the
legislature for as long as anyone can remember (C.B. Forgtston). Constitutionally, membership
in each chamber (House of Representatives and State Senate) elect their leadership positions; a
Speaker of the House and a President of the Senate.
The gubernatorial power indices cited in this research design (Schlesinger, Beyle,
Dometrius, Mueller) all point toward the Louisiana governor’s power rating as middle-of-theroad, in terms of power ratings among other state governors. Throughout the many evolutions of
the index, Louisiana gubernatorial power rating has been median at best and just below median
in most iterations of the measurement. Conversely, The Sometime Governments: A Critical
Study of the 50 American Legislatures (1971), produced by the Citizens Conference on State
Legislatures, ranked the Louisiana state legislature (relatively high) 13th among the 50 United
States’ legislatures. Since that study was published gubernatorial powers have been curtailed
with the enactment of the state’s 1974 constitution in addition to the removal of gubernatorial
judicial appointments (Forgotston).
1974 was the midpoint of elected state office terms (1972-76). Officials serving a four
year term, whose particular office responsibilities and authority were affected by the
constitutional changes, served in those positions until the end of their terms in 1976. An
example of this was the office of lt. governor. The lt. governor of Louisiana served as president
of the senate until 1976. The new constitution gave the Senate the authority to elect its own
president, when in actuality, the president of the senate served at the pleasure of the governor.
The Louisiana state House of Representatives retained its longtime ability to elect its leadership
(or at the governor’s pleasure as was the case).
Considering what is common knowledge 1) that the governor of Louisiana is naming the
leaders of the legislative chambers (C.B. Forgotston), in addition to 2) that the governor of
Louisiana’s GP rating is no stronger than half of the governors in the United States (Schlesinger,
Beyle, Dometrius), and 3) that the Louisiana legislature’s independence ranking was 13th of 50
state legislatures in 1971 (Citizens Conference on State Legislatures), the question must be
asked, Why is this happening?
Data Analysis
Data sets available from the Council on State Governments are available in the
organization’s annual Book of States report. Current (2014) data were compiled in a side by side,
state to state comparison for this research. The following categories were analyzed: Enacting
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Legislation: Veto, Line Item Veto, Veto Override an Effective Date, Term Limits of Executive
and Legislators, Number of Plural Elected Statewide Executives (e g Atty. General, Lt.
Governor), Number of Legislators in a Body, Appointive Authority of Governor, and Budgetary
Authority of Legislature and Governor.
A thorough review of the data did not reveal unique or special authority, power or
advantage that would allow the state’s governors exercise the type of power they’ve enjoyed
over the Louisiana Legislature. No variable was evident that should force the legislature to
abdicate its Montesquieu-an duties and rights of independence and autonomy.
The availability of comparative data for this case study was exhausted and no conclusion
could be made as to why governors in Louisiana wield unilateral appointive power of legislative
leaders.
A qualitative strategy was employed to fill in the gaps of this research. One on one
interviews were conducted with: staff of the National Conference of State Legislatures in
Denver, CO, staff of Louisiana state legislators (NCSL), professional political consultants,
Louisiana state legislators, and a four-term governor of Louisiana.
Interview with NCSL Staff
Brenda Erickson of the National Conference of State Legislatures (Denver, CO), a
specialist in legislative rules and processes, was interviewed about possible measures of
legislative independence and her specific knowledge of states where governors enjoyed the
ability to decide who would be the legislative chamber leaders and committee members.
Erickson recommended the book The Sometime Governments (1971) for measures of legislative
independence and knew of no other state where governors were appointing legislative leadership,
much less committee membership.
Interview with the Legislator
Louisiana State Representative Chris Broadwater was interviewed on the subject of the
governor’s power and the possibility of the state house electing its own leadership without the
influence of the governor. Broadwater (R), an attorney, was first elected to the state house in
2011. Prior to his election, he served in the gubernatorial administration of Governor Jindal
(elected 2007), who is the current governor and is term limited in 2015. Broadwater believes
that it is possible for the house to be independent and possibly elect a speaker without the
influence of the governor, particularly if a candidate for speaker is/can:
1) elected in the primary (Louisiana employs a “jungle” primary where all candidates
run together in a primary race, regardless of party affiliation- if a candidate wins at
least 50%+ 1 vote, there is no runoff election)
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2) win by acclamation (the incumbent has no challengers)
3) the gubernatorial primary race results in a runoff later in the year.
The best scenario for success would be a combination of 2) and 3). The reason is that in
this scenario the speaker candidate:
1) shows strength/popularity of the legislator seeking the speakership,
2) has nearly three months to gather support (campaign for the position within the
chamber),
3) has the ability to help his potential supporters win if they are in races or runoffs,
4) has the opportunity to defeat incumbents in opposition while helping to elect potential
challengers who would support the legislator’s speaker candidacy.
When posed with the question of what makes this year/term different from any other,
when a governor would have their way on the legislative appointments, Broadwater posits that
the nature of a competitive gubernatorial race will have gubernatorial candidates’ attention and
political capital focused on their race and not as much on the legislature. Broadwater, concedes
that without an independently elected and independently acting senate president, the house’s
efforts toward legislative independence would be for naught.
Interview with the Governor
A one on one two-hour interview with Governor Edwin W. Edwards (D) on the subject of
gubernatorial power and legislative behavior was ultimately conducted to complete the research.
Edwards is the only governor to be elected four times to the position in Louisiana, one two-term
eight year stint (1972-80), and two non-consecutive four-year terms (1984-88, 1992-96).
Edwards rose to political power in Louisiana from the Crowley city council, to the state senate,
to the US House of Representatives, and was elected Governor in 1971. His first term straddled
the state’s constitutional convention held in 1973. He was reelected in 1975. Edwards understood
how it all worked in the Louisiana legislature. He had served as a state senate floor leader for his
predecessor, Governor John McKeithen (D).
While Edwards was the first governor to enjoy the informal authority of choosing the first
Louisiana senate president (the new state constitution let the senate elect the president), he and
his predecessors enjoyed appointing floor leaders in the state senate. The main floor-leader
picked by the governor effectively ran the senate’s business, even though the lt. governor served
as the official senate president, prior to 1976.
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In Edwards’ first term (1972-1976), he appointed loyal floor leaders and committee
chairmen in the senate. The speaker of the house during Edwards’ first and second term was
Edgerton “Bubba” Henry (D). Henry was elected by the membership of the house using a
similar strategy described by State Rep. Broadwater. Henry won his primary election and made
grand bargains along the way to gain commitments for the top job in the house. Edwards’
election was not decided until he won the runoff. Edwards had campaigned as a reform
candidate and says he saw no reason to oppose Henry’s election to the top post in the house,
although he and Henry both knew that if Edwards would have wanted someone else to be
speaker, it would have been someone else.
1976 saw the election of Michael O’keefe, Jr.(D) as senate president. O’Keefe was
reported to be the most powerful man in the legislature and only deferred that power to Edwards.
O’Keefe remained in place as senate president, even under the tenure of Republican Governor
Dave Treen. O’Keefe was able to keep his position because Treen was indifferent to the power
of a Louisiana Governor to informally appoint such positions. As non-deferential as Treen might
have been, he backed into having to appoint the speaker of the house for his one term in office
(1980-83). When neither of two competing candidates for the post of speakership could muster a
majority of house votes to be elected, they asked Treen to decide, Treen picked a third candidate,
uptown New Orleans State Rep. John Hainkle (D).
Edwards defeated Treen in 1983 to return to the office in 1984. Edwards appointed John
Alario (D) as the new speaker of the house and retained Sammy Nunez (D) as senate president
(O’Keefe resigned from his office in 1983 under Federal investigation). Edwards’ was defeated
in a re-election bid in 1987 by Governor Buddy Roemer (D) who switched to Republican
affiliation after his election. Roemer appointed Allen Bares (D) as senate president and Jimmy
Dimos (D) as speaker of the house. In a flash of independence in 1990, the senate revolted
against Roemer and Bares, ousting Bares from his senate presidency and re-electing Sammy
Nunez independently of the governor’s influence, according to Edwards. Edwards was elected
as governor for a fourth term in office in 1991, defeating Roemer (R) in the primary and David
Duke (R) in a runoff election. Edwards retained Sammy Nunez as the senate president and
elevated his loyal supporter John Alario back to speaker of the house.
Edwards was presented with statistical information about the lukewarm GP rating of
Louisiana governors and the lack of evidence pointing toward a governor’s ability to punish
recalcitrant legislators. Edwards acknowledged that the empirical findings were accurate, there
is nothing extraordinary about the governor’s ability to punish a legislator, unless the legislature
itself abdicates its authority and independence from the beginning that is, allowing the governor
to make those leadership and committee membership appointments. The authority to appoint,
deny, or remove chairmen and committee membership is used as a cudgel to keep legislators in
line.
18
When making committee appointments, governors reward those loyal to him/her and
loyal to his/her policies. If the governor changes their position on a policy, so do those
legislators. This peculiar legislative behavior has given governors in Louisiana complete unitary
control over the legislative agenda, including the budget. Recalcitrant legislators see line item
expenditures vetoed as punishment. Line-item veto is not a unique or special power given to
Louisiana governors, forty-three other states give their governors the same authority. Legislators
also point toward the governor’s influence at the Bond Commission as a way to punish. The
governor of Louisiana has significant appointive power of this board that decides which capital
projects will be funded via borrowing schemes. Legislators who find themselves on less than
favorable terms with the governor can expect to find projects in their respective districts denied
by lack of funding (borrowing). This predicament can be avoided in one of two ways; first by
not budgeting projects that exceed the current year’s revenue (CB Forgotston) and second by
changing the method by which the Bond Commission is appointed. The second method can be
accomplished by a majority vote of each legislative body. This year (2015) is a gubernatorial
election year in Louisiana. The exiting, term-limited governor (Jindal), would not be affected by
such a policy change. Because of the known rivalry between Jindal (R) and current
gubernatorial candidate front runner US Senator David Vitter (R), there could be an opportunity
where the governor would not veto such a bill.
Edwards reports that Louisiana is the only state where this phenomenon (gubernatorial
appointment of legislative leadership) is occurring. His experience and attendance at dozens of
National Gubernatorial Association conferences and meetings affirms his conclusion. He said
that half of his gubernatorial peers wanted to know how he was able to have such influence and
the other half wanted to know why he would want to have such a relationship or influence in the
states legislature.
Edwards was once asked by a New Hampshire governor:
NH governor: “You really talk to those people (legislators)?”
Edwards: “Yes, of course. You don’t?”
NH governor: “Absolutely not. I go to my office, they go to theirs. I send bills to be passed and
they either pass them or they don’t. I veto the bills and they override them or they don’t.”
Edwards: “Well my legislators are always at my house, I want to - and have to talk to them.”
The Reveal
Why is it that this separate branch of government is abdicating its duty and right to be
independent by allowing the governor to lord over them? Is it laziness, sloth, not wanting the
19
responsibility of leadership, the desire to scapegoat the executive? Edwards says “all of the
above.”
Edwards explained that it is the personal and particularistic, self-aggrandizing nature of
legislators to have trivial access to the governor and his things. Louisiana legislators desire the
ability to have their daughters’ weddings at the Governor’s Mansion, influence over patronage
state jobs e.g. a legislator would want influence over a low-level LADOTD gravel yard job to
reward a supporter by having a supporter’s family member get the job. A proclamation from the
governor for a constituent’s 100th birthday or a 5th, 10th, 25th, or 50th anniversary proclamation of
accomplishment from the governor - for a constituent- is a significant “win” for many legislators.
Louisiana legislators have given up their Montesquieu-an duties and rights, by not risking such
trivial self-aggrandizement.
Edwards says that these types of rewards are particularly valued by rural legislators who
want to be perceived as influential and important in their districts. Legislators want their pictures
at the governor’s ball to be included with press releases sent to their local newspapers for
outward proof of their importance. This peculiar behavior is not as pervasive among
metropolitan legislators, but enough of them are effected by the desire for such selfaggrandizement that a majority coalition is formed to abdicate their collective independence
every four years. The coalescence of this coalition transcends political party, race, and religion.
To be close friends of the governor, or at least that perception, is why this phenomenon occurs.
Are Louisiana Governors More or Less Powerful Today Than Before Edwards?
Edwards says that Louisiana governors should be less powerful today than they were
before his first term in office. He attributes this to formal powers taken from the governor in the
new constitution (1974). Before 1974, Louisiana governors enjoyed the privilege of appointing
hundreds of elected officials across the state, when seat vacancies arose. Governors were
appointing local judges, mayors, councilmen, police jurors, sheriffs and many other positions.
This practiced ended with the 1974 constitution. If a governor was having difficulty negotiating
with a legislator, all he had to do was call the local officials in the legislator’s district, who the
governor had appointed, to “convince” the legislator that they should “get right” with the
governor. Since 1974, such vacancies are filled through the local selection of a replacement by
the local governing body or agency effected. If the local authority does not fill the vacancy in
thirty days, the governor gets to fill the position with his/her appointee.
Louisiana's earlier constitutions are to be found in philosophy, style, organization, language and
definitions. The 1973 draft constitution, in my opinion, has taken a balanced approach to the powers of the
executive branch. On the one hand, the number of elected officials has been reduced, not so much for political
rea-sons as for administrative efficiency, thus more positions have be-come subject to gubernatorial
appointment. On the other hand, the 1973 convention created a better balance of power between the three
branches of government by stripping away the governor's appointive power to fill vacancies in the judiciary and
20
in local governmental subdivisions. It is this latter provision which is most strikingly different from previous state
constitutions. For the first time in the constitutional history of Louisiana, the extensive appointive authority of
the governor-originally delegated by the Constitution of 1812-has been severely curtailed. An analysis of
Louisiana's governorship suggests that Louisiana's chief executive shave had no extraordinary constitutional
powers. Constitutional grants of authority to the executive branch of government have not expanded since the
Constitution of 1812: the expansion of executive powers has more often than not resulted from actual practices
rather than from constitutional provision. I tend to agree with recent interpretations that emphasize the
paradox of the gradual truncation of the governor's constitutional authority since 1812 and, simultaneously, the
lodging of enormous political power in that office. (Edwards 1974)
Recommendations
Gubernatorial Power v Legislative Independence
Concurrent and congruent models of gubernatorial power as well as legislative
independence should be developed by employing elements of previous academic models and
indices. Future indices should be measures on a rating scale, then reported in relative terms e.g.
If a case rating is 19 on a scale of 5-20, the relative rating will be 1.267 because there is only a
15 point difference between 5 and 20, thus the division of the sum (19) should be by 15 and not
20 the equation should be 19/15 = 1.267.
Ranking variables 1-50 presents a problem with differences of magnitude, as
demonstrated in the FAIIR index ranking state legislatures’ characteristics.
Other variables that should be considered when researching and analyzing gubernatorial
power and legislative influence are campaign contributions to legislators and legislative
candidates from a gubernatorial campaign funds or PACs
Power of Louisiana Governor
Additional qualitative analysis should continue in the development of why this peculiar
legislative behavior persists in Louisiana. Current office holding actors should be interviewed,
however, more reliable sources may be retired legislators and governors.
Quantitative analyses of the nominal rewards that legislators receive should be quantified.
The number of visits to the Governor’s Mansion, number of gubernatorial events attended by a
legislator, number of press releases and news stories naming a legislator and governor, and
number of gubernatorial proclamations requested and received by a legislator for constituents
can be coded rural (R) or metropolitan (M) by the nature of a legislators district type
operationalized by square miles which a district encompasses. This type of data could be tested
in chi square, ANOVA, or logistic regression models to determine significant differences
21
between rural and metropolitan legislator rewards as well as determining the odds that a
legislator will seek the types of rewards being tested.
Conclusions
Until concurrent and congruent indices of gubernatorial power and legislative
independence are, developed, the effect of gubernatorial power on legislative independence will
be difficult to measure.
While research and rating indices of gubernatorial power have consistently ranked
Louisiana governors at or below median ratings of the fifty state governors for five decades, the
governor of Louisiana holds the unitary influence and autonomy of a monarch, vulnerable only
to an electorate who will challenge their authority. The governor of Louisiana does not exercise
such influence derived from constitutional or statutory rights, this power is willfully abdicated by
a legislative body unwilling to act independently or responsibly. Montesquieu must be rolling
over in his grave.
Resources
Bernick, Emil Lee. The role of the governor in the legislative process. Diss. The University of
Oklahoma., 1976.
Beyle, Thad L. "The governor's formal powers: A view from the governor's chair." Public
Administration Review (1968): 540-545.
Bowen, Daniel C., and Zachary Greene. "Should We Measure Professionalism with an Index? A
Note on Theory and Practice in State Legislative Professionalism Research." State Politics &
Policy Quarterly (2014): 1532440014536407.
Burns, John W. The Sometime Governments,A Bantam Book. Published 1971
Dilger, Robert Jay, George A. Krause, and Randolph R. Moffett. "State legislative
professionalism and gubernatorial effectiveness, 1978-1991." Legislative Studies Quarterly
(1995): 553-571.
Dometrius, Nelson C. "Changing gubernatorial power: The measure vs. reality." The Western
Political Quarterly (1987): 319-328.
Edwards, Edwin W. "The Role of the Governor in Louisiana Politics: An Historical Analysis."
Louisiana History (1974): 101-116.
22
Elling, Richard C. 1984. "State Legislative Influence in the Administrative Process:
Consequences and Constraints. "Public Administration Quarterly7: 457-81.
Elling, Richard C. 1992. Public Management in the States: A Comparative Study of
Administrative Performance and Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Mueller, Keith J. "Explaining variation and change in gubernatorial powers, 1960-1982." The
Western Political Quarterly (1985): 424-431.
Reisinger, Tyler Lang. Beyond Beyle: Assessing the measurement of institutional and informal
gubernatorial powers. Diss. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2008.
Rosenthal, Alan. "The legislative institution: In transition and at risk." The state of the states 2
(1993): 29-52.
Scher,Seymour. 1963. "Conditions for Legislative Control." Journal of Politics 25: 526-51.
Schlesinger, Joseph A., H. Jacob, and K. N. Vines. "Politics in the American states." Boston:
Little, Brown (1965): 207-238.
Squire, Peverill. "Measuring state legislative professionalism: The squire index revisited." State
Politics & Policy Quarterly 7.2 (2007): 211-227.
Woods, Neal D., and Michael Baranowski. "Legislative professionalism and influence on state
agencies: The effects of resources and careerism." Legislative Studies Quarterly 31.4 (2006):
585-609.
Websites
Council on State Governments -Book of States 2014-
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/bos-
2014
National Conference of State Legislators - http://www.ncsl.org/
Interviews
Broadwater, Chris, Louisiana State Representative
Edwards, Edwin W. – Four-term governor of Louisiana
Erickson, Brenda- National Conference of State Legislatures, specializing in legislative rules and
processes
Forgotston, C.B., Political commentator, former staff attorney for the Louisiana State Legislature
Giannobile, Patti, Political Consultant, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Chris Broadwater
23
APPENDIX
Table 1.1 Schlesinger’s 1965 Gubernatorial Power Index
24
Table 1.2 – 1971 FAAIR Distribution Scale of state Legislature Rankings
25
Ranking systems presents a problem
when considering magnitudinal
differences. There appears to be
more of a difference between CA #1
and NY #2 than between OH #16 and
SD #17.
Squires Legislative professionalism rating/ranking Index
26
27
Criteria Used to Construct the Index of Legislative Professionalism
I.
Legislative Staff
5 points: Year round personal and district staff for both chambers.
4 points: Year round personal staff for both chambers.
3 points: Year round personal staff for only one chamber; session only personal staff for at least one chamber; or shared
year round personal staff for both chambers.
2 points: A staff pool available for members.
1 point: No staff. Source:
The Council of State Governments. The Book of the States. Various Editions. Lexington, KY: The Council of State
Governments.
II.
Annual Compensation
for Regular Session The rank-and-file member's annuals salary, adjusted for inflation. Source: The Council of State
Governments. The Book of the States. Various Editions. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments.
III.
Operating Expenses Per Legislator
The state legislature's annual operating expenses, per member, adjusted for inflation. Sources: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. State Government Finances in (various years). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office; and The Council of State Governments. The Book of the States. Various Editions. Lexing-ton, KY: The Council of State
Governments.
IV.
Length of the Legislative Session
Actual length of the legislative session. Source: The Council of State Governments. The Book of the States. Various
Editions. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments.
State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness, 1978-1991 Author(s): Robert Jay Dilger, George A. Krause and
Randolph R. Moffett Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly,Vol. 20, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 553-571.
28
Anthony Licciardi, Jr. MPAi
The University of New Orleans – Department of Political Science, Milneberg Hall – New Orleans, LA 70401
POLI 6680 Legislative Behavior
Spring 2015
Abstract
This research design considers the ratings of gubernatorial power indices and the measurement
of the fifty US state legislatures’ independence, among other legislative characteristics. The
design predicts a negative correlation between gubernatorial power and legislative
independence based upon a case study of the relationship between Louisiana’s governor and
its legislature. Recommendations for the construction of concurrent and congruent indices are
included in this design.
Key words: gubernatorial, power, legislature, independence, Louisiana, Schlesinger, Beyle, index
______________________________________________________________________________
i
Political Science- PhD student - research focus in election administration and US voter behavior
29
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see here - Forgotston.com

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