Race and the Rehnquist Court - Pacific McGeorge Scholarly

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McGeorge School of Law
Pacific McGeorge Scholarly Commons
Scholarly Articles
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1992
Race and the Rehnquist Court
Brian K. Landsberg
Pacific McGeorge School of Law
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Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Recommended Citation
Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1267 (1992).
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RACE AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
BRIAN
K . LANDSBERG*
I.
INTRODUCTION ....... ... .......... .. . .... .... ... . 1267
II.
THE STATISTICS . . . .... . ... .. ... ..... . . .. .. .. ... ... 1274
III.
THE MAJOR CASES .. .. . . .. ... . . .. .... ... . .. .. . ... 1278
A.
IV.
Racial Neutrality . . . . . .. .. .. . ... . .... .. . . .....
1. Race-Conscious Preferences and the
Rehnquist Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Statistical Disparity and the Rehnquist
Court .. ..... ... . ... ... ..... . ........... . ..
Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OTHER THEMES ..... .. ... . ...... . .... ... ..........
A. Intentional Discrimination ...... ... ..... .. . . ..
B. Coverage Issues . .. ........ . .. . . ...... ...... . ..
VI.
REACTIONS TO THE REHNQUIST COURT . . . . . . . . . .
VII.
CONCLUSION . ... .. .. .. .... . ......... .... ..........
I.
1282
1288
B.
1296
MAJOR THEMES .. ... ...... . . ... . .......... .. ...... 1300
A. The Substructure of Antidiscrimination Law . . . 1300
1. Assumptions Regarding Behavior and
Race .. . . . .. .. ... ... ... . .. .... .... . . .......
2. Remedial Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Effects of Past Discrimination . . . . . . . . .
b. Prophylactic Relief .. . . . . .. . ....... . ...
B. Selective Activism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Slippage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
2. Treatment of Precedent ..... .. ............
3. Treatment of Constitutional Challenges to
Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V.
1279
1300
1306
1306
1309
1310
1310
1317
1322
1323
1324
1328
1329
1332
INTRODUCTION
Robert Bork, while he was Solicitor General, once told the
Supreme Court:
• P rofessor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Chief,
Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, 1974-1986.
Monica G allagher, Dorothy Landsberg, John Myers, Stephen J. Pollak, and Joel Selig
provided valuable suggestions on prior drafts of this Article. Mark Ankcorn, G reg
McCracken, and Kevin Selby provided outstanding research assistance.
1267
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[Vol. 66
Race has been the political issue in this nation since it was
founded. And we may regret that that is a political reality, but
it is a reality. That's what the Fifteenth Amendment is about,
what the Civil War was about. It's what the Constitution was
in part about, and it is a subject we struggle with politically
today. 1
Mr. Bork could have added that race has been among the principal issues confronting the Supreme Court since Dred Scott v.
Sandford.2 It is no surprise, therefore, that race has occupied a
central position on the docket of the Rehnquist Court during its
first five years.
The rhetoric and issues of today's cases continue a dialectic
that began in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Two
cases from that era, the Civil Rights Cases 3 and Plessy v. Ferguson ,4 cast a shadow that reaches to the present. Several commentators have expressed fear that the Rehnquist Court will
return race discrimination law to its condition during that
period. 5 It is time to develop an understanding of the race decisions of the Rehnquist Court, even though a definitive chapter
cannot yet be written. To begin, let us review the legacy that
faced the Court when Justice Rehnquist was elevated to Chief
Justice in 1986.
During the first half of the twentieth century, race discrimination law very slowly escaped the legacies of the Civil Rights
Cases, 6 Plessy v. Ferguson, 7 and the retreat of legislative and
1. Oral Argument of Solicitor General Robert Bork, United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144 (1977), in 92 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 845-46 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978).
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
3. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
4. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
5. See, e.g., Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 770
(1986); SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 207-08 (1989) (quoting
Gary Orfield's warning that confirming Justice Rehnquist as Chief Justice "'would risk
repeating . .. the Supreme Court's emasculation of the laws and constitutional amendments
of the Reconstruction which culminated in the 1896 Plessy decision'"); Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L. REV. 597, 598 ( 1991) ("[M]ore reason for
consternation than surprise, if, in the next few years, an unsympathetic Supreme Court
declares the 1964 Civil Rights Act .. . unconstitutional as applied to racial discrimination."); D. Marvin Jones, Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil Rights, and an
Elegy for Dreams, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 64 (1990) ("The Rehnquist Court .. . seeks to
achieve the contemporary equivalent of a reversal of the basic Reconstruction assumptions
about the scope of the discrimination and the equality ideal." ).
6. 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883) (finding a federal ban on private discrimination in public
accomodations unconstitutional).
1992]
RACE AND THE REHNQU/STCOURT
1269
executive enforcement of the Reconstruction amendments. Both
the holdings and the tone of these two cases endorsed a philosophy of white supremacy. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court
threw out a public accommodations law so that the black person
would cease "to be the special favorite of the law." 8 The Court
also concluded, in Plessy, that if "the enforced separation of the
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority...
it is ... solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. " 9
The Warren Court (1953-69), 10 along with the other
branches of the federal government, formulated a broad antidiscrimination principle in cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 11 Jones v. A/fred H. Mayer Co., 12 and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach. 13 These cases wiped out the restrictions and
accompanying philosophy of the nineteenth-century cases. 14 It
fell to the Burger Court (1969-86) to refine the meaning and
mechanics of the antidiscrimination principle. 15 The Burger
7. 163 U.S. at 537 (finding the separate-but-equal doctrine constitutional). As Justice
Kennedy recently noted, Plessy "distorted the law for six decades before the Court
announced its apparent demise in Brown v. Board of Education." Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3044 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 642 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Brown
"finally liberated the Equal Protection Clause from the doctrinal tethers of Plessy.").
8. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
9. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
10. Naming a period in the Court's history after the Chief Justice who presided is an
artificial but helpful device. While membership is fluid, the Warren Court had a core of
seven members for most of Earl Warren's chieftancy (Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William
Brennan, William 0. Douglas, Thomas Clark, Potter Stewart, and John Harlan); the Burger Court had a core of nine members for most of Warren Burger's chieftancy (Warren
Burger, Lewis Powell, Harry Blackrnun, William Brennan, John Paul Stevens, Thurgood
Marshall, Byron White, Potter Stewart, and William Rehnquist); the Rehnquist Court had
three changes of membership during its first five years. Justice Kennedy replaced Justice
Powell after the first year of the Rehnquist Court. Justice Brennan resigned in July 1990,
at the end of the fourth year of the Rehnquist Court. Justice Souter replaced him. Justice
Marshall resigned in July 1991, at the end of the Rehnquist Court's fifth year, and Justice
Thomas has succeeded him. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall served under all three
Chief Justices.
11. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding state enforced school segregation to be
unconstitutional).
12. 392 U.S. 409, 413-17, 437 (1968) (finding a federal ban on housing discrimination
applicable to private action and constitutional).
13. 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (finding Voting Rights Act of 1965 to be
constitutional).
14. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 51-70 (1968).
I 5. Paul Brest defines the antidiscrimination principle as "the general principle disfavoring classifications and other decisions and practices that depend on the race (or ethnic
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[Vol. 66
Court fashioned remedial rules that recognized the inadequacy
of prohibitory relief and therefore emphasized corrective and
prophylactic measures in cases such as Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 16 Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 17 City of Rome v. United States, 18 and Fullilove v. Klutznick.19 With less certainty, the Burger Court began the task of
defining the boundaries of unlawful race discrimination in cases
such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,20 Washington v. Davis, 21
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 22 City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 23 and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 24
A study of the twenty-nine race discrimination cases that
the Rehnquist Court has decided in the past five years reveals a
mixed picture. As will be shown, the Court may be approaching
a crossroad. While outlines of the Rehnquist Court's approach
to discrimination law are emerging, crucial elements remain to
be filled in. In a broad sense, the Court has solidified the place
of an antidiscrimination principle in the constitutional pantheon.
No compromise such as the one that followed the 1876 election25
seems conceivable today, and the fears that history will literally
repeat itself seem hyperbolic. While the rhetoric of the Rehnquist Court fully embraces the Warren Court's major antidiscrimination decisions, the Court is split into two well-defined
wings on race issues. 26 The power of the two wings was balanced until Justice Brennan left the Court in 1990. The Brennan
origin) of the parties affected." Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976). Professor Brest provides a general analysis of the
Burger Court's race discrimination decisions in Paul Brest, Race Discrimination, in THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 113 (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983).
16. 402 U .S. 1, 30 (1971) (bussing).
17. 422 U.S. 405,417 (1975) (backpay).
18. 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (Voting Rights Act rule against unintentional
retrogression).
19. 448 U .S. 448, 482 (1980) (10% minority set-aside for public works contracts).
20. 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971) (disparate impact test applies in employment discrimination suits under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
21. 426 U .S. 229, 246 (1976) (disparate impact alone does not prove an equal protection violation).
22. 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (medical school admissions quota is unlawful).
23. 446 U.S. 53, 78 (1980) (electing commissioners at large, with the effect of minimizing black political power, upheld).
24. 411 U.S. 792, 800-06 (1973) (rules for establishing prima facie case of disparate
treatment under Title VII).
25. See Brian Landsberg, The Desegregated School System and the Retrogression
Plan , 48 LA. L. REv. 789, 831 n.199 (1988).
26. I describe the membership and voting records of the wings infra note 41.
1992]
1271
wing, which has shrunk from four to two Justices since 1986,
would build on the foundations left by the Burger Court. The
Rehnquist wing, now ascendant, is dissatisfied with the details of
the Burger Court legacy, viewing that legacy as having weighted
the balance unduly in favor of minority rights. 27 The Rehnquist
wing argues that it is seeking to arrive at a more equitable balance. These Justices perceive imbalance in the standards set for
proof of discrimination and in the corrective and prophylactic
principle. 28 The practical result of this dissatisfaction is a search
for balance between nondiscrimination and other values, suggesting for the first time since Korematsu v. United States 29 that
state interests may occasionally outweigh the value of
nondiscrimination.
The Brennan wing, in contrast, places the rights of minority
group members above other values. While both wings espouse
the central value of nondiscrimination, each employs rhetoric
and analysis that largely ignores the arguments of the other. 30
This absence of a common ground, this failure to reason
together, causes uncertainty about the future development of the
law. The battle over doctrinal development evokes the images of
war. The Brennan wing, in a tactical sense, occupies the high
ground of reliance on a large body of precedent. The Rehnquist
wing possesses the strategic advantages of the Reagan-Bush electoral dominance and the assured attrition of its opponents. 31
The emerging Rehnquist wing would pursue its goals
27. For example, Justice Kennedy, in a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, recently protested: "In pursuing the demand of justice for racial
equality, I fear that the Court today loses sight of other basic political liberties guaranteed
by our constitutional system, liberties that can coexist with a proper exercise of judicial
remedial powers adequate to correct constitutional violations." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U.S. 33, 81 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
28. But see Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights
and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEo. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (noting that plaintiff success rates of
civil rights and employment discrimination cases that go to trial are far below reported trial
success rates for most other litigation).
29. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding exclusion of Americans of Japanese descent from
a "military area" of California).
30. This point has been noted in the context of the Justices' general agreement on the
factors relevant to consideration of race-conscious preferences: "Such abstract and openended requirements have elicited broad support only because they mean different things to
different justices .. . ." George Rutherglen & Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the
Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467, 469
(1988).
31. The power shift is well recognized. Justice Brennan is reported to have said:
"Look, I had my way for twenty-five years, now it's their tum." Nina Totenberg, A Tribute to Justice William Brennan, 104 HARV. L. REV. 33, 39 (1990).
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[Vol. 66
through several significant doctrinal shifts. One shift would elevate the proof burdens for minorities seeking relief from alleged
discrimination by recasting the burden of persuasion in disparate
impact cases, applying "atomistic" analysis of disparate treatment claims, and discounting the continuing importance of the
history of societal discrimination. A related shift would ease the
burdens on whites seeking to show that race-conscious decisions
discriminate against them by applying strict scrutiny to all such
decisions and allowing collateral challenges of judicial remedies
for discrimination against minorities. We see in recent cases the
reciprocal relation between the disparate impact test and raceconscious affirmative action. The Rehnquist wing has narrowed
the reach of the disparate impact test because of the concern that
it would lead to the use of quotas. At the same time, the Rehnquist wing has denied the relevance of disparate impact as a justification for such race-conscious measures. The hallmark of
these shifts is increased deference to facially neutral choices of
decisionmakers and decreased deference to race-conscious
choices designed to promote minority interests. These shifts rest
upon the belief that the neutral market place will deal fairly with
minority groups. 32
Measured quantitatively, most of the Rehnquist Court's
race decisions to date fall well within the formal path established
by its predecessors. That path leads to an expansive definition of
protected groups, unease with the expansive coverage of reconstruction legislation that has been construed as targeting badges
and incidents of slavery, strong protections against intentional
discrimination, continued acceptance of reparative relief, and
close scrutiny of race-conscious affirmative action. The tone of
the Rehnquist Court's opinions unfailingly embraces nondiscrimination as an ideal. On the other hand, the Court has
sharply deviated from the beaten path in its new-found hostility
to disparate impact claims under Title VII. The opinions in disparate impact and affirmative action cases display all the
hallmarks of a Court that has lost its bearings and has yet to
chart out a new course.
At this early stage in the development of the Rehnquist
32. One critical legal scholar comments that "[t]he 1989 cases can best be understood
. . . as reaffirming the myths that justify inequality as the outcome of impersonal, neutral
forces." Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1407, 1439 ( 1990); cf Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 513 (1987) (discussing the economic efficiency ofTit1e VII).
1992]
RACE AND THE REHNQU/ST COURT
1273
Court's position on race discrimination law, perhaps it is not too
late to suggest that the Court consider foundational questions.
First, what evidence exists that the Burger Court rulings struck
an improper balance? Second, to what extent does the Court
rely on assumptions regarding the relationship between race and
the behavior of both minority group members and alleged discriminators? Absent empirical evidence, what assumptions
should the Court adopt in formulating legal rules? Third, is the
Court's real concern with the way in which lower courts and
other addressees of the nondiscrimination laws have responded
or will respond to those rulings? Is that concern well placed,
and if so, has the Rehnquist Court prescribed the correct cure?
These three questions raise one final set of questions: Should the
Court or the Congress be deciding the factual and policy issues
on which these questions turn? Thus far, the Rehnquist Court
has failed to devote adequate attention to these questions.
This Article provides an overview of the twenty-nine race
discrimination cases that the Rehnquist Court has decided
between the 1986 and 1990 terms. The overview begins with a
statistical analysis of how the minority groups fared and how
individual Justices voted. Part III then turns to nine major
cases, which fall into two categories: six revolving around concepts of racial neutrality and three involving remedial issues.
The racial neutrality cases include three in which the validity of
race-conscious preferences was at issue and three concerning
facially neutral practices that caused disparate adverse effects on
members of minority groups. Next, the major themes of the
racial neutrality and remedy cases are explored. It is argued
that the Justices proceed from different assumptions regarding
behavior and race and regarding remedial principles formulated
by the Burger Court. In addition, the Article submits that the
Rehnquist Court has engaged in selective activism, both in basing decisions on policy assumptions and in its treatment of precedent. The Article then observes some other themes animating
Rehnquist Court decisions on race discrimination; it is here that
the Rehnquist wing shows the greatest likelihood of developing
schisms. After describing the scholarly reaction to the Rehnquist Court's record on race discrimination, this Article concludes that the Court is poised at a crossroad. One path leads to
a relatively wholesale dismantling of the edifice erected by the
Burger Court; the other leads to a remodeling of the edifice with
the essential elements still in place.
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THE STATISTICS
Drawing conclusions from statistics about the results of
Supreme Court cases can be risky for several reasons. Supreme
Court decisions are not fungible. A string of victories for one
side may stem from the factual details in which particular issues
are embedded, reflecting a substantial element of chance, the
nature of the cases available for review, or a genuine doctrinal
trend. In the area of race, the changing nature of the issues
presented precludes statistical comparison of the Rehnquist
Court with previous Courts. Just as one swallow does not make
a spring, a year such as the 1988 term, when minorities lost
every case, does not necessarily make a trend. It is perfectly
plausible that a group of litigants might in any given year take
"nonmeritorious" positions in all its cases pending in the
Supreme Court, while taking "meritorious" positions some other
year. Minorities won eight out of the nine race discrimination
cases the Rehnquist Court heard during its first two terms. 33
Finally, the composition of the Rehnquist Court itself has
changed over time. 34 With these caveats in mind, the statistics
regarding race discrimination cases under Chief Justice Rehnquist are nonetheless revealing.
The Author has reviewed the twenty-nine race discrimination cases that the Rehnquist Court decided during its first five
terms (1986-90). The statistical review is summarized in tables
in the Appendix to this Article. Those tables recount the ruling
in each case and analyze the voting records of the Justices to
determine the extent of their agreement with the position of
minority group parties and with one another. The statistical
tables paint a useful backdrop for the substantive portions of this
Article, confirm the existence of two, often opposed voting
groups, and reflect possible points of schism within the group
generally identified with Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The twenty-nine race discrimination cases that the Court
33. One euphoric proponent of affinnative action, Herman 0 . Schwartz, was
prompted to write an article entitled The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All
Over But the Shouting. See 86 MICH. L. REV. 524 (1987).
34. Indeed, one author marks the beginning of the Rehnquist Court with the retirement of Justice Powell and his replacement in February 1988 by Justice Kennedy. Jones,
supra note 5, at 9 n.30; see also James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of
/988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1072 (1989) ("The
Supreme Court appointment of Justice Kennedy ... suggests that the Rehnquist Court
may, as a revisionist forum, reverse many civil rights advances of the past generation."
(footnote omitted)).
1992]
1275
has decided on the merits constitute about four percent of the
Court's merits decisions. Prior to the Rehnquist Court, claims
by whites had been heard, but not in large numbers.35 However,
whites were asserting claims in thirty-four percent (ten) of the
race discrimination cases decided in the Rehnquist Court's first
five years. 36 Not all of these claims were adverse to, and some
were congruent with, minority interests. 37 Nonetheless, this is a
startling shift. In part, it reflects increasing white awareness of
the possibility of using the Constitution and the civil rights laws
as a litigative tool, 38 and in part, it may reflect minority reluctance to press close cases in light of the present composition of
the Supreme Court. No doubt it also stems from the climate of
political opposition to affirmative action and from the perception
that the current Court is friendly to challenges to affirmative
action. Indeed, it may represent a new willingness of the current
Court to grant review of such cases.
Despite this perception, the Rehnquist Court has by no
means solidly opposed minority rights. Minority group losses
accounted for forty-one percent (twelve) of the twenty-nine race
35. See, e.g. , Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (challenging an
affirmative action plan); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (same);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (same); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (applying 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e to whites);
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (standing of whites to challenge exclusion of blacks from apartment complex); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967)
(interracial married couple challenged antimiscegenation law).
36. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
prosecutor's peremptory exclusion of black jurors in prosecution of white defendant);
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2977 (1990) (dealing with preferential treatment of minorities in the award and sale of broadcast licenses); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474 (1990) (allowing Sixth Amendment challenge to prosecutor's peremptory exclusion of
black jurors in prosecution of white defendant); Jett v. Dallas lndep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701 (1989) (respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing collateral attack on affirmative action consent decree); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (challenging minority set-aside program); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (right of white
male organizations to exclude nonwhites and women); Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301
(1988) (allowing collateral attack on affirmative action consent decree); Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615
(1987) (applying 42 U .S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 to Arabs and Jews).
37. Minority interests were advanced by a white litigant in Jett, Holland, and Powers.
They were consistent with the position of a white litigant in Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila.
38. One study finds a 2166% growth in employment discrimination litigation in the
lower federal courts between fiscal year 1970 and fiscal year 1983, compared with a 125%
growth in the general federal case load. The study concludes that " reverse discrimination"
cases account for 5.6% of this growth. John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation , 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 997 n.53 (1991).
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[Vol. 66
discrimination cases, 39 five during the 1988 term of the Court,
which was the only term in which minority groups lost more
cases than they won. Minorities won several notable victories.40
An understanding of the Rehnquist Court's record on race
starts with a review of where the individual Justices stand. On
race issues there appear to have been two gangs of four. The
polar positions of Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy (whom I will call the Rehnquist wing), on the one
hand and those of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
39. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (exercise of peremptory challenges based on bilingual language ability); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1364
(1991) (extraterritorial application of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Board of Educ.
v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991) (standard for determining whether desegregated school
system may adopt a student assignment plan that causes resegregation); Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474 (1990) (holding white defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to a fair crosssection jury were not violated by the prosecutor's racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265
(1990) (contempt of court in fair housing case); Jett v. Dallas lndep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701 (1989) (respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (application of 42 U.S. C.§ 1981 to racial harassment of
employee); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (collateral attack on an affirmative action
consent decree); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (standards for
proof of disparate impact case under Title VII); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactive application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (challenging a minority set-aside program); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (discriminatory imposition of death penalty).
40. See Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2368 (1991) (holding judicial elections
covered by§ 2 of Voting Rights Act); Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct.
2376, 2380 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991) (finding race-based peremptory challenges in civil cases violate Equal Protection Clause); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991) (holding white defendants may challenge as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause the prosecutor's racially discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct.
2997, 3027-28 (1990) (holding preferential treatment of minorities in award and sale of
broadcast licenses did not violate equal protection principle); Lytle v. Household Mfg.,
Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1331, 1336-37 ( 1990) (holding collateral estoppel does not deny jury trial of
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when court has resolved issues raised by equitable claim); University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) (finding that tenure
records were not protected from subpoena in fair employment suit); Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1990) (remedy in school desegregation case); Huntington v. NAACP,
488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) (use of zoning to exclude low cost housing from predominantly
white section of town); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 978 (1988)
(application of disparate impact test to subjective employment selection devices); New
York State Club Ass'n v. City ofNew York, 487 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988) (right of white male
organization to exclude nonwhites and women); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,
182-83 (1987) (plurality) (one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 667 (1987)
(standards governing union liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); City
of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 467-69 (1987) (application of Voting
Rights Act to annexation of land projected to become a white subdivision); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (retroactive application of Batson to direct appeal).
1992]
1277
Stevens (the Brennan wing), on the other, have been stable and
predictable. 41 Justice White, however, is much more difficult to
chart. 42 If there is such a phenomenon as a "swing Justice," Justice White has been that person in race cases. With the departure of Justices Brennan and Marshall, one "swing Justice" is no
longer enough to determine the outcome of a case. In split decisions in race discrimination cases during the 1990 term of Court,
Justice Souter combined with Justice Kennedy or Justice
O'Connor to provide the swing votes that placed the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia in dissent four times. 43
The Court has been much more likely to be closely divided
in race cases than in other cases. During its first four terms, the
Court decided 57.1% of race cases and 18.9% ofnonrace cases
41. I have named the wings for the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan both because
they are the Justices who would normally assign opinion writing for the wing and because
of the leading role each has played as a consistent voice on race discrimination issues over
the years. Upon Justice Brennan's departure, Justice Marshall became the senior Justice of
the Brennan wing, but only for one year.
Justices Brennan and Marshall voted in every case for the position which minority
groups tended to favor, and Justice Blackmun did so in twenty-eight out of twenty-nine
cases and Justice Stevens in twenty-seven of twenty-nine cases. Thus, those four Justices
almost always agreed with one another. The only significant exception is Justice Stevens's
concurrence in Croson, 488 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., concurring). In nonrace cases, Justice
Stevens is as likely to agree with one group of Justices as with another. William D. Popkin,
A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions ofJustice Stevens, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 1088, 1089 n.6. His position is much more predictable in race cases.
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy voted against the minority group
position in a majority of cases and agreed with one another in all the race cases involving
disparate impact and affirmative action. But see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 648 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding affirmative action based on
gender). In the twenty-nine cases, Justice Rehnquist voted for the minority group position
eight times, Justice Scalia nine, and Justice O'Connor nine. Justice Kennedy participated
in twenty-one cases, voting for the minority group position in six of them. Justice Souter
has not firmly aligned with either group on race discrimination issues; he has supported the
minority group position in five of the seven cases in which he has participated. One author,
who divides the Rehnquist wing into "extreme and more moderate conservative" groups,
points out that Justice Souter voted with the moderate. conservatives in race cases. Elliot
Mincberg, The Newest Justice: Stealth Unsheathed, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 1991, at S21.
It is interesting to note that the Justices of the Brennan wing were each appointed by a
different President (Justice Brennan by Eisenhower; Justice Marshall by Johnson; Justice
Blackmun by Nixon; and Justice Stevens by Ford); the Rehnquist wing Justices all owe
their current position to President Reagan. Justice White is a Kennedy appointee, and
Justices Souter and Thomas were appointed by President Bush.
42. Justice White voted for the minority group position in fifteen cases and against it
in fourteen. His position prevailed in all but two cases, Griffith v. Kentucky and United
States v. Paradise . Those cases date from the 1986 term, the first under Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
43. See Appendix, Table III·E.
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by a five to four margin. 44 This fact heightened the importance
of a swing Justice during the first four terms and will bring
increased attention to the possibility of schisms within the Rehnquist wing in the future.
One might expect to see a close relationship between the
position of the United States and the Court,s decision. The
United States or one of its agencies appeared as a party or amicus curiae in fifteen of the twenty-nine race cases that the Court
heard on the merits. 45 The United States typically wins over
seventy-five percent of the cases in which it appears as a party or
amicus curiae before the Supreme Court. 46 Four members of the
Rehnquist Court were alumni of the Department of Justice. 47 A
majority of the members of the Court owe their positions to
Presidents Reagan and Bush, whose views the Solicitor General
was advocating before the Court. Nonetheless, of the fifteen
race discrimination cases in which the United States or an
agency of the United States appeared as a party or amicus
curiae, the Court agreed with the government in a bare
majority. 48
III.
THE MAJOR CASES
Before embarking on an analysis of the Rehnquist Courfs
race discrimination decisions, it is necessary to understand the
legal setting in which the cases were decided, as well as their
holdings. From the large body of race cases, nine cases that
merit special attention have been selected because they go to the
44. See Appendix, Table V. With the departure of Justice Brennan, only one case in
the 1990 term was decided by a five to four margin, while five were decided by a six to three
or five to three margin. See Appendix, Table I. Unanimity evaded the Court in 81% of
race cases and 74.4% of nonrace cases during its first four terms. See Appendix, Table VI.
45. These twenty-nine cases constitute 52% of the race cases. In cases overall, the
government participation rate is about 60%. See Brian Landsberg, Book Review, 6
CONST. COMMENTARY 165, 167 (1989) (reviewing LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JusTICE (1987)).
46. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 251 .
47. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia served as Assistant Attorney General;
Justice Marshall served as Solicitor General; Justice White served as Deputy Attorney
General.
48. See Appendix, Table I. The Court agreed with the Government in eight (53%) of
the cases. If one adds Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), where the
Government won on one issue and lost on another, the agreement rate is 60%, still far
below the overall Government win rate. See generally Drew S. Days, The Courts' Response
to the Reagan Civil Rights Agenda, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1003 (1989) (proposing that the
Reagan Administration was unsuccessful in its effort to reintroduce traditional theories in
the civil rights area).
1992]
1279
heart of the current issues of violation and remedy. This section
describes the legacy of the Warren and Burger Courts and the
rulings of the Rehnquist Court with respect to race conscious
preferences, statistical disparity, and remedy. Sections IV and V
then provide analysis.
A. Racial Neutrality
The primary issue dividing the Rehnquist Court is racial
neutrality. Does the Constitution forbid race-conscious affirmative action? Do the civil rights laws? What are permissible uses
of race? Would a racially neutral practice lead to racially neutral results, or, conversely, does the lack of racial diversity
among employees, government contractors, or other beneficiaries of public or private action suggest racial discrimination?
The Warren Court touched on these issues only lightly and
not until its last year. Green v. County School Board introduced
the notion that racially disparate effects (disparate impact}-use
of a device that is facially neutral but has a disproportionate
adverse effect on minorities-might reflect unlawful racial discrimination.4 9 The Court held that a freedom of choice desegregation plan under which formerly de jure segregated public
schools remained predominantly of one race failed to discharge
the school board's obligation to remedy the effects of past discrimination.50 Thus, a disparate impact test was applied to
determine compliance with a remedial obligation. If the desegregation plan failed to provide racial desegregation, another
plan, calculated to succeed, must be implemented. 51 Green thus
demanded a race-conscious remedy-one calculated to provide a
certain racial configuration of the schools.
The Burger Court confronted the race neutrality issue in a
large number of contexts. First, that Court distinguished
between two types of discrimination, disparate treatment and
disparate impact. Disparate treatment-intentional discrimination based on race-violates both the constitutional ban on discriminatory state action5 2 and the civil rights statutes. 53
Practices causing a disparate impact violate section two of the
Voting Rights Act where they cause "black voters . . . to have
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
391 u.s. 430, 441-42 (1968).
/d.
!d. at 439-41.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
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less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of
their choice"; 54 such practices violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 unless justified by business necessity. ss Disparate impact may be relevant proof of intentional discrimination, but does not, standing alone, violate the Constitution. 56
Whites, as well as minorities, are protected by the disparate
treatment doctrine. 57
Second, the Burger Court adopted the tailoring principle of
relief, requiring that judicial relief be tailored to fit the violation.
A closely related doctrine, building on Green v. County School
Board, holds that discriminators must take affirmative steps to
eradicate the effects of their past discrimination. A further
corollary allows, indeed requires, courts to order race-conscious
remedies where needed to end discrimination and eradicate its
effects. 5 8
Third, the Burger Court provided mixed guidance as to
race-conscious measures not designed to remedy the actor's past
discrimination. It held that Title VII does not bar private
employers from adopting such measures, so long as they do not
unduly trammel the rights of whites. 59 The Constitution, however, forbids states from adopting racial quotas of unlimited
duration intended to compensate for general societal discrimination. 60 On the other hand, the federal government may adopt a
54. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986).
SS. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Unjustified disparate
impact does not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but does violate the regulations under Title VI. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983).
The Court has not addressed the question whether it violates the Fair Housing Act. See,
e.g., Huntington v. NAACP, 488 U.S. IS, 18 (1988) (per curiam) (failing to reach the issue
of whether the disparate impact test is the appropriate one, but agreeing that disparate
impact was shown and not adequately rebutted). However, disparate impact without purposeful discrimination does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n
v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). The reasoning of General Building Contractors
would lead to the same ruling as to 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
56. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
57. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976).
58. All three points are established by Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 (1971) (holding that district courts have broad power to assure school
integration), and Davis v. Board ofSch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (reversing lower
court's failure to "achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into
account the practicalities of the situation").
59. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
60. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (plurality opinion). No
Burger Court opinion on this issue commanded a majority of the Justices.
1992]
1281
minority set-aside program of limited duration in order to ensure
that minority contractors are not discriminatorily excluded from
federal construction contracts. 61 The Burger Court's general
approach provided nearly absolute protection to incumbents but
less protection to persons with no strong expectation of the job
or benefit. 62
Missing from the Burger Court's opinions was a clear
explanation of the theory underlying disparate impact law. 63
Was the theory bottomed on the existence of past or present discrimination against minorities? 64 Did the theory-as suggested
by the reliance on "the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the
fox" 6 s-assume that prerequisites for employment might validly
test the qualifications of persons of one race while excluding
qualified members of another race? Was the disparate impact
test designed to provide equality of results rather than equality
of opportunity?66 Was the test to erode or promote merit systems of employment?67
61. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980).
62. Compare, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84 (disapproving race-based layoff plan);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 565 (1984) (reversing a court
order that caused senior white workers to be laid off before less senior minorities) and
International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977) (refusing to
apply disparate impact test to seniority system) with Weber, 433 U.S. at 193 (allowing some
affirmative action if private and voluntary) and Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448 (upholding a
minority business set aside).
63. See, e.g. , Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758. Peller states:
[T]he demand for an impact standard can be understood to ensure more rigorously and cautiously that irrationality and bias have been eradicated. The racially
identifiable results of a purportedly neutral selection procedure are simply taken
as more reliable evidence of racial bias than the vague and subjective inquiry into
intent.
/d. at 817. See generally Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact
Theory and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. &
PoL'Y REv. 223 (1990) (discussing the tension between "equal achievement" and "equal
treatment" theories).
64. See Shelly J. Lundberg, Equality and Efficiency: Antidiscrimination Policies in the
Labor Market, 7 CoNTEMP. POL'Y IssuES 75, 93 (1989) ("It is easier to regulate directly
things one can observe (such as the outcome of employment and compensation decisions)
rather than things one cannot observe (such as the role of sex or race in such decisions).").
65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The stork is unable to
drink from the fox's shallow bowl; the fox is unable to drink from the stork's narrow jar.
66. Peller, supra note 63, at 817. Peller notes that "[t]he impact perspective ...
[could] signify not the possibility of 'bias,' but rather that qualitatively different view that
'civil rights' means a transfer of opportunities and resources on a group basis." /d.
67. For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the
Court noted that one of the purposes of Title VII is "to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." !d. at 800. Later in the same opinion the Court stated:
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Also missing was a clear consensus as to the values affected
by race-conscious actions. Is antidiscrimination law aimed at
protecting only discrete, insular minorities? Is it aimed at producing a color-blind government? A color-blind society? Is it
permissible or necessary to use race to get beyond race?68 Does
antidiscrimination law protect groups or individuals? Will racial
neutrality freeze in place institutional racism? The Burger Court
failed to agree on a standard for reviewing equal protection challenges to race-conscious measures. 69
It comes as no surprise that these questions would continue
to bedevil the Rehnquist Court, especially in three cases regarding race-conscious preferences and in three others where disparate impact was a central issue. In five of those six cases, the
Rehnquist wing voted against the minority group position; the
Brennan wing voted for it in all six cases. 70
1. Race-Conscious Preferences and the Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court upheld race-conscious preferences in
two cases and invalidated them in a third. The permissible preferences were imposed in one case by a federal court and in the
other by rule of the FCC, arguably approved by Congress. The
impermissible preference was imposed by municipal ordinance.
[Griggs] dealt with standardized testing devices which, however neutral on their
face, operated to exclude many blacks who were capable of performing effectively
in the desired positions. Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies
in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces
beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden
on such citizens for the remainder of their lives.
/d. at 806. These statements, in one opinion, arguably refer to intent ("discriminatory
practices"), racial parity ("racially stratified job environments"), past discrimination
("childhood deficiencies ... resulting from forces beyond their control"), and a search for
merit ("capable of performing effectively in the desired positions"). /d.
68. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.").
69. See Fullilove v. K.lutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 448 (1979); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. No
opinion in either case commanded a majority of the Court.
70. The one case in which the Rehnquist wing voted for the minority position was
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), which held that subjective
employee selection devices are subject to the disparate impact test. /d. at 989-91. However, dicta in Justice O'Connor's opinion tempered the win by suggesting that the
employee's initial burden of proof is high and that the employer bears only a modest burden of going forward, while the employee retains the burden of persuasion. /d. at 993-99.
The Court adopted O'Connor's dicta the following year in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
In one case, Justice Stevens voted against the Brennan wing. City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511-18 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); see Appendix, Table II.
1992]
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In its first term, the Rehnquist Court, in United States v.
Paradise, upheld a trial court order imposing "a one-black-forone-white promotion requirement to be applied as an interim
measure to state trooper promotions in the Alabama Department of Public Safety." 71 As with every prior challenge to the
constitutionality of race quotas, no opinion commanded a majority of the Court. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Powell held that, whatever the level of constitutional scrutiny,
the order was justified as a prophylactic measure to ensure that
the Alabama Department of Public Safety would remedy its past
and continuing discrimination in promotions. Justice Powell,
concurring, argued that the Constitution required "that all government-imposed, affirmative action plans must be closely scrutinized."72 He agreed with Justice Brennan that the facts
justified the quota, even under that exacting standard of review.
Justice Stevens's concurrence argued that the federal court had
broad remedial discretion once it had found that the defendants
had engaged in racial discrimination. Justice Stewart concluded
that the quota order was well within the bounds of that discretion. 73 Justice White, in dissent, would have held that the order
exceeded the trial court's equitable discretion, but he did not
spell out his reasoning. 74 Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Scalia, would have reversed the order by
applying the strict scrutiny test applicable to other race discrimination cases under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 7 s The
outcome of the case was not surprising, since a similarly divided
Burger Court had reached a parallel result the prior year in a
suit involving discrimination by a union. 76
The significance of Paradise is two-fold. First, it foreshadows the continuing debates as to the standard of review to be
applied to affirmative action plans challenged under the Equal
71. 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1987) (plurality opinion).
72. /d. at 187 n.2.
73. /d. at 190.
74. /d. at 196.
75. /d.
76. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). Most
of the discussion in Sheet Metal Workers concerns the permissibility of race-conscious relief
under the remedial provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). /d. at 444-79. However,
the Court also held that a federal court could order such relief without offending the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id at 479-81.
The dissenters did not address the equal protection issue. See also International Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528 (1986) (holding that Title VII does not
preclude entry of consent decree providing for race-based promotions of firefighters).
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Protection Clause and as to the significance of statistical disparities in employment. However, it also reflects general agreement
among all of the Justices that, in some circumstances, federal
courts may order race-conscious affirmative action where it is
necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination. As Justice O'Connor wrote, "[b]ecause the Federal Government has a
compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by the Department, the District Court unquestionably had
the authority to fashion a remedy designed to end the Department's egregious history of discrimination." 77 Justice O'Connor,
citing her dissent in Sheet Metal Workers, agreed that racially
preferential treatment of nonvictims could be ordered "'where
such remedies are truly necessary.' " 78
While Paradise revealed the continuing division on the
Court as to the standard of constitutional review of affirmative
action programs, the Justices did not discuss that general issue
at any length. The Justices engaged in no dialogue concerning
the significance of statistical disparities, but simply talked past
one another. Thus, Justice Brennan argued that the quota,
which was to stay in effect until either the Department adopted a
selection device with no adverse impact on blacks or twenty-five
percent of the corporals were black, was necessary to eliminate
the effects of past discrimination. Had the Department's promotion proposal been adopted, the corporal ranks would have been
9.2% black, while the work force was twenty-five percent black.
Justice Brennan assumed that the disparity between the ratio of
blacks in the work force and in the corporals' ranks was an effect
of past discrimination. Justice O'Connor, however, said:
In Sheet Metal Workers, I observed that "it is completely
unrealistic to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate
with mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent
unlawful discrimination." Thus, a rigid quota is impermissible
because it adopts "an unjustified conclusion about the precise
extent to which past discrimination has lingering effects, or .. .
an unjustified prediction about what would happen in the
future in the absence of continuing discrimination." 79
This theme was to animate much of the Rehnquist wing's analy77. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 196.
78. Id. at 197 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 496 (O'Connor J.,
dissenting)).
79. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Sheet Metal Workers,
478 U.S. at 494-95).
1992]
1285
sis of subsequent cases. 80 Neither opinion explained why the
assumptions of the opposing opinion were incorrect.
The Court, two terms later, revisited affirmative action in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 81 That case held unconstitutional a minority set-aside program adopted by the City of
Richmond, Virginia. 82 The Burger Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick had charted a detailed road map for governmental entities
wishing to employ such programs to remedy past discrimination
and discourage the future exclusion of minorities from public
contracts. 83 As Professor Drew Days warned in the leading article on the decision, however, entities that failed to follow that
road map invited a holding that their program offended the
Equal Protection Clause. 84 In Croson, a six to three majority
(the Rehnquist wing plus Justices White and Stevens) believed
the Richmond program had steered off the Fullilove map, primarily by failing to show that the minority set-asides were narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination. A
majority of the Court held that, whatever standard might govern
federal affirmative action programs adopted under section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, state race-conscious programs
must satisfy the compelling state interest test, strict scrutiny.
Thus, as Professor Rosenfeld has noted, "[i]n Croson, a majority
on the Court for the first time has settled on a single standardthe strict scrutiny test-to determine the constitutionality of
affirmative action based on race. " 85 A different majority would
agree that a set-aside program, which is narrowly tailored to
80. During that same term, the Court upheld a voluntarily adopted affirmative action
plan, challenged as resulting in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987). Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court applied United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and held that the
existing imbalances in the gender composition of traditionally segregated job categories
warranted the employer's adoption of its affirmative action plan. Johnson , 480 U .S. at 627,
641- 42. Justice O'Connor, concurring, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
Weber; she would have upheld the plan because the employer "had a firm basis for believing that remedial action was required." /d. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
employer here had such a basis; it could "point to a statistical disparity sufficient to support
a prima facie claim under Title VII by the employee beneficiaries of the affirmative action
plan of a pattern or practice claim of discrimination." /d. The Chief Justice and Justices
White and Scalia dissented; they would have overruled Weber. /d. at 657 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia, J ., and White, J., dissenting).
81. 488 u.s. 469 (1989).
82. /d. at 472.
83. 448 u.s. 448, 480-92 (1986).
84. DrewS. Days III, Fullilove, 96 YAL E L.J. 453, 476-78 (1987).
85. Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1731 (1989).
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remedy past discrimination by the governmental unit or by private contractors who contract with the governmental unit, is
constitutional. Thus, the Court reaffirms the compelling interest
in remedying the effects of past discrimination.
The majority opinion, as Professor Rosenfeld has shown,
adopts an "atomistic" analysis of the facts, "relying on the disconnection of facts from the context in which they are embedded, and on the recombination of such disconnected facts into
mechanistic causal chains made up of direct and linear links. " 86
One striking aspect of the Court's reasoning is the treatment of
statistics showing that in a fifty percent black city, black contractors received a very small proportion of the city's contract
business. The city relied on those statistics to show that a
minority set-aside program was needed to overcome past discrimination. The statistics were, as the opinion shows, seriously
flawed. 87 Had the Court stopped there, its analysis would have
been unexceptional. However, it continued by suggesting that
the possibility that "[b]lacks may be disproportionately attracted
to industries other than construction" might explain the low
minority business enterprise membership in local contractors
associations. 88 Later in this Article it is argued that this hypothesis lies at the core of the Rehnquist wing's emerging approach
to race discrimination cases.
In its most recent affirmative action case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 89 the Court held:
[B]enign race-conscious measures mandated by Congresseven if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being
designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the
extent that they serve important governmental objectives
within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. 90
86. Jd. at 1761.
87. They compared minority businesses receiving prime contracts (.67%) with the
black population. However, it appeared that minority businesses received a much higher
proportion of subcontract dollars (7%-8% of all city contracts and 17%-22% of Community Block Development Grant construction projects). Moreover, the city provided no statistics as to the existing pool of minority contractors. As the Court noted, it is well settled
that "where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of
demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to
undertake the particular task." Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-02.
88. ld. at 503.
89. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
90. Jd. at 3008-09 (footnote omitted).
1992]
1287
The majority accepted the pursuit of a racial integration objective (here, diversity of radio and television programming)
through race-conscious means where the Congress and an
administrative agency have concluded that the ends are desirable
and the means appropriate. Because Congress may legitimately
require diversity of programming, it may require additional
steps, even race-conscious ones, where lesser measures have
failed. The Court justified the application of mid-level scrutiny
by reference to Fullilove, rather than attempting an analysis of
the underlying reasons for choosing that level of scrutiny. The
dissenters would have applied strict scrutiny, arguing that the
grounds that justified searching for state action in Croson
applied equally to Congress' action. 91 The dissenters stated that
integration was not an objective important enough to warrant
race-conscious government action. They argued that Congress
could not legitimately assume that particular racial groups want
or need particular kinds of programming, or that minority
broadcasters are better able to provide appropriate programming
for minorities. 92
In Metro Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor argued "[t]he policies impermissibly value individuals because they presume that
persons think in a manner associated with their race." 93 In her
view, "the Constitution provides that the Government may not
allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the
assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or
think." 94 She was concerned that "[s]uch policies may embody
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race,
evaluating their thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution." 95 Yet it is important to note that
Justice O'Connor's quarrel is with the standard of review and
the proffered justification, not with all race-conscious measures.
She agreed that "[t]he FCC or Congress may yet conclude after
suitable examination that narrowly tailored race-conscious
measures are required to remedy discrimination that may be
91. Jd. at 3004.
92. ld. at 3037-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenters also argue that the policies at issue were the product of the FCC rather than Congress, and that the FCC's determinations were not due the same deference that is accorded congressional findings. ld. at
3030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. Jd. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. ld. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Jd.
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identified in the allocation of broadcasting licenses. Such measures are clearly within the Government's power."96 Justice Kennedy's separate dissent would apply strict scrutiny, under which
the Constitution would not permit "the Government to discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race in order to serve
interests so trivial as 'broadcast diversity.' " 97 The case highlights, as no prior case, the difficulty in deciding whether a government interest is compelling, important, or simply legitimate.
None of the opinions provide a test for answering that question,
yet all agree that the substantiality of the government interest is
a central issue. Justice O'Connor's opinion also betrays some
tension between her willingness in prior cases to assume that
minorities are under represented in some occupations by choice,
and her argument that the FCC policies "impermissibly value
individuals because they presume that persons think in a manner
associated with their race. " 98
Supporters of affirmative action may find encouragement in
the outcomes of these three cases on race-conscious preferences,
which preserve the Burger Court's position that a government
may grant race-conscious preferences, albeit only in narrowly
circumscribed circumstances. The Rehnquist wing's consistent
position in these cases, however, forebodes an eventual rethinking of the case law. 99
2. Statistical Disparity and the Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court addressed statistical disparity
between the treatment of whites and nonwhites in three cases,
one under the Fourteenth Amendment and two under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Burger Court had established that statistical disparity alone would generally not violate
the Equal Protection Clause, 100 but could be an element of proof
96. /d. at 3033.
97. /d. at 3045 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
98. /d. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. See generally David T. Croall, Affirmative Action in the Late 1980s, 39 LAB. L.J.
519 (1988) (discussing the effect of recent affirmative action cases on labor relations);
Thomas R. Haggard, Mugwump, Mediator, Machiavellian, or Majority? The Role ofJustice
O'Connor in the Affirmative Action Cases, 24 AKRON L. REv. 47 (1990) (predicting that
Justice O'Connor will be the center of a new majority in race discrimination cases); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J .A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative
Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609 (1990) (examining Croson's effect on affirmative action
litigation).
100. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
1992]
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of such a violation, 101 and in some circumstances could shift to
the alleged discriminator the burden of going forward. 102 The
Burger Court's adoption of the disparate impact test in Title VII
cases 103 had received Congress' knowing acquiescence in the
course of passage of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. 104 The
Rehnquist Court rejected the constitutional significance of racial
disparities in the imposition of the death sentence, 105 applied the
disparate impact test to subjective employment practices, 106 and
substantially weakened the test. 107
McCleskey v. Kemp upheld Georgia's death penalty statute
against a convicted murderer's evidence that "even after taking
account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks." 108 The Court
rejected McCleskey's Equal Protection Clause challenge because
it found that the statistics alone were not sufficient to show purposeful discrimination in the adoption, maintenance, or administration of the death penalty statute. 109 The Court rejected
McCleskey's Eighth Amendment challenge because "[a]t most,
the [statistics indicate] a discrepancy that appears to correlate
with race." 110 The Court's analysis must assume that some factor other than race discrimination explains the disparity in
sentences. McCleskey produced a study whose statistical validity the Court assumed, while adding that "[o]ur assumption that
the Baldus study is statistically valid does not include the
assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually enter into any sentencing decisions in Georgia." 111 Yet the
101. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
102. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
494-96 (1977).
103. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
104. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982). When the Court rejected
application of a disparate impact test under§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973,
Congress effectively overruled the decision. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62
(1980). In 1982, Congress amended§ 2 to apply a "results" test closely akin to the disparate impact test. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986).
105. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987).
106. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
107. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989).
108. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. The raw figures show that "[w]hite-victim cases are
nearly II times more likely to yield a death sentence than are black-victim cases." Jd. at
353 (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 293.
110. Id. at 312.
Ill. Id. at 291 n.7.
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notion that chance alone would explain such a disparity is
implausible. Other than race discrimination or chance, the other
possible explanations would be that whites are more likely than
blacks to be the victims in cases where aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, 112 or that the evidence tends to be stronger in cases with white victims than in
cases with black victims. The majority is unwilling to assume
that, all things being equal, whites and blacks would be similarly
affected by the facially neutral selection device, the criminal justice system. The Court is guided in part by instrumental concerns that:
[I]f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon
be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of
race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in other
minority groups, and even to gender. 113
McCleskey rejected a claim that racial disparities in sentencing reflected intentional racial discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The next two cases involved disparate impact claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but reflected similar concern
over undue reliance on racial statistics.
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, the Court ruled
that disparate impact analysis applied to subjective selection
devices. 114 The Rehnquist wing, joined by Justice White, was
sufficiently moved by arguments of the employer and the United
States 115 to include in the opinion dicta designed to ameliorate
112. But see id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (McCleskey proved " that the racial
disparities in the system were not the result of the differences in the average aggravation
levels between white-victim and black-victim cases.").
113. /d. at 315-17 (footnote omitted). Another consequence of the contrary hypothesis (that discrimination is the most likely explanation for the statistics) would be to label
state judges, prosecutors, or juries as racially prejudiced. It has been suggested that the
Court's "very keen concern for the sensitivities of those-mainly whites-subject to being
labeled 'racist' " may influence the Court's rejection of that hypothesis. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1388, 1418 {1988).
114. 487 u.s. 977, 991 (1988).
115. The history of Watson reveals that the federal government is taking a leading
role in developing the concerns regarding the relation between disparate impact and quotas.
In 1986, the United States petitioned for certiorari, seeking review of a Seventh Circuit
decision allowing a Title VII plaintiff to state a cause of action based on an alleged disparate impact arising from a subjective decision-making process. The Government argued
1992]
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the burdens that the disparate impact test imposes on employers
in the opinion. Because Justice Kennedy, who had only recently
taken office, did not participate, these dicta did not yet command a majority.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court attempted to
explain the disparate impact test by stating that "the necessary
premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory
motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination." 116 The opinion, however, did not explain
what that functional equivalent was. 117 The Court applied the
Griggs test to subjective selection devices for two reasons. First,
the test "could largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis
were applied only to standardized selection practices." 118 Secthat, while objective selection devices "arguably can be validated" empirically, subjective
selection devices "are not susceptible to such rigorous validation and, practicaliy speaking,
may not be susceptible to validation at all." United States Petition For Certiorari at 17
(No. 86-468); see Tisch v. Shidaker, 782 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, cert.
vacated & remanded, 481 U.S. 1001 (1987). The Government concluded that employers
using subjective selection devices would be driven to use quotas to avoid disparate impact,
and that this would be contrary to the policies of Title VII. /d. The Court granted the
petition and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), which had been decided two weeks earlier. Shidaker,
481 U.S. at 1001. Apparently the remand concerned the other issue presented by the Government, concerning the proper statistical base for comparison in a disparate impact case.
Two weeks later, the Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the
views of the United States on Question 1 presented by the petition in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 481 U.S. 1012 (1987). Question 1 was: "Is the racially adverse impact of an
employer's practice of simply committing employment decisions to the unchecked discretion of a white supervisory corps subject to the test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.?" /d. at
lOll (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court heard Watson during the following term. The Government's brief on the merits refined and expanded its position in
Shidaker, arguing again that it was virtually impossible to validate subjective selection
devices and that
[r]uling that the disparate impact theory is applicable to decisions resulting from
subjective selection processes would, therefore, create an irresistible incentive for
employers to abandon subjective selection processes in favor of objective ones or,
where such replacement is too difficult or expensive, to eliminate the statistical
disparity by superimposing quotas upon them. Neither result would be consistent
with the intent of the 1964 Congress.
Amicus Curiae Brief of United States for Fort Worth Bank & Trust at 23, Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (No. 86-6139) (footnote omitted).
116. Watson , 481 U.S. at 987.
117. The classic explanation appears in Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment
Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 299 (1971). A criterion which has an adverse differential
impact on blacks is discriminatory if "the two attributes of race that make it an inappropriate basis for allocating jobs-unrelatedness to productivity and absence of individual control-also [are] attributes of the criterion in question." /d.
118. Watson , 487 U.S. at 989.
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ond, the logic of Griggs allowed no distinction between objective
and subjective selection devices. 119
Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
White and Scalia, then added two sections of ameliorative dicta.
She agreed with the bank and the Government "that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue
pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic
measures." 120 She portrayed a parade of horribles, under which
employers would be presented with a Hobson's choice. Justice
O'Connor, without citation, speculated that
[i]f quotas and preferential treatment become the only costeffective means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially
catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely adopted.
The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that its programs are discussed in euphemistic terms, but will be equally
careful to ensure that the quotas are met. Allowing the evolution of disparate impact analysis to lead to this result would be
contrary to Congress' clearly expressed intent, and it should
not be the effect of our decision today. 121
She therefore expressed the view that evidentiary standards
should safeguard against the Hobson's choice in cases involving
subjective selection devices. She adopted a rigorous view of the
plaintiff's initial burden, requiring a showing of a causal relation
between a specific selection device and the disparate impact.
More importantly, she argued that the plaintiff's prima facie
showing does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant and
that the employer's business necessity defense does not require
formal validation of subjective selection devices. 122 Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, argued that Justice O'Connor's standards would
unduly relax the employer's burden. 123 Justice Stevens, also concurring, said the Court should not reach this issue, which was
119. Jd. at 990.
120. Jd. at 992.
121. Jd. at 993.
122. Formal validation is achieved by conducting a study which shows, by professionally acceptable methods, that the selection device is " 'predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the
job.'" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,431 (1975) (quoting EEOC Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1978)). Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in Watson quotes Albemarle Paper's reliance on the EEOC Uniform Guidelines. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1009-11.
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not presented by the question on which certiorari was granted. 124
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Watson signaled a significant
shift in the Court's treatment of disparate impact cases, a shift
that materialized in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 125 In
Wards Cove, those Justices who fully subscribed to Justice
O'Connor's Watson opinion were joined by Justice Kennedy in
holding that the plaintiffs had failed to make out a proper statistical case of disparate impact. The Court pointed out that basing a disparate impact finding on gross population statistics,
divorced from qualified work force and from particular selection
devices, would have the practical effect of requiring racial balance in employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2( j). The
Court, however, did not rest with this conclusion, but added a
section of dicta regarding the proper test for determining when
the plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated disparate impact.
In its dicta, the Court substituted a weak version of the disparate impact test. Once the plaintiff shows that the employer
uses a selection device that causes an adverse disparate impact
on minority group applicants, the employer has the burden of
production (rather than the burden of persuasion) to show that
the practice "serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer" 126 (rather than business necessity).
The burden of proving the existence vel non of alternative selection devices without a similar disparate impact now rests on the
plaintiff (rather than the employer). The Court thus eviscerated
much precedent121 with no discussion except to predict that
imposing on the employer burdens attending the traditional
strong version "would result in a host of evils we have identified
above. See supra at 652." 128 The host of evils referred to in that
citation is that "[t]he only practicable option for many employers will be to adopt racial quotas, insuring that no portion of his
124. /d. at 1011.
125. 490 U .S. 642 (1989). Charles Fried, the Solicitor General who briefed both cases
for the United States, says that " Watson had been crucial in preparing the Court for what
we would ask it to do now [in Wards Cove] .... [Justice O'Connor's opinion] gave us our
signal to press for a more thorough re-examination of what the lower courts had been doing
in Griggs-type cases." CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 226 n.64 (1991).
126. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
127. See infra note 232.
128. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. As to the burden of proof, Justice White's opinion
acknowledges "that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting otherwise." /d.
at 660. However, he does not explain why "they should have been understood to mean an
employer's production-but not persuasion-burden." /d.
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work force deviates in racial composition from the other portions thereof; this is a result that Congress expressly rejected in
drafting Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j); see also Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. at 977 and n.2 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.)." 129
Wards Cove's otherwise unexplained rules regarding the
burden of rebutting a showing of disparate impact are based on
three arguments of four Justices in Watson:
(1) The greater difficulty of justifying subjective employment
practices requires an across-the-board relaxation of the
employer's burden of proof where the plaintiff has shown
disparate impact. This is the argument for uniform standards of proof.
(2) The strong version of disparate impact analysis tends (or
might tend) to push employers to adopt quotas, while Title
129. Id. at 652 The Watson citation transports us to further dicta, this time by four
Justices (Justice Kennedy joined the Court too late to participate in Watson). There, Justice O'Connor argued that§ 2000e-2(j) "requires in our view that a decision to extend the
reach of disparate impact theory be accompanied by safeguards against the result that Congress clearly said it did not intend." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
994 n.2 (1987). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) provides, in relevant part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
the race .. . of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race . . .
employed by any employer . .. in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race . . . in . . . the available work force . . . .
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
Justice O'Connor's argument rested on the premise that "the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures. It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful
discrimination is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in
accord with the laws of chance." Watson, 487 U.S. at 992 (citations omitted). In the cited
portion of Sheet Metal Workers, Justice O'Connor had stated:
Reference to benchmarks such as the percentage of minority workers in the relevant labor pool will often be entirely proper in order to estimate how an
employer's work force would be composed absent past discrimination. But it is
completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with
mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent unlawful discrimination. That, of course, is why there must be a substantial statistical disparity
between the composition of an employer's work force and the relevant labor pool,
or the general population, before an intent to discriminate may be inferred from
such a disparity.... Thus, the use of a rigid quota turns a sensible rule of thumb
into an unjustified conclusion about the precise extent to which past discrimination has lingering effects, or into an unjustified prediction about what would happen in the future in the absence of continuing discrimination.
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494-95 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is not clear that Justice
O'Connor still regards reference to such benchmarks as "a sensible rule of thumb."
1992]
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VII is not to be construed to require quotas. This is the
instrumental argument,[ 1301 or the argument flowing from
slippage.
(3) There is no basis for the courts to assume that people of
equal qualifications will gravitate to jobs in accord with the
laws of chance, without regard to race. This argument
assumes-incorrectly, in my view-that such gravitation is
a factual hypothesis of the disparate impact test, and it
challenges that hypothesis. It seems to substitute a new
hypothesis that people may well gravitate to jobs based on
race. This is the behavioral argument. 131
The first prong appears a make-weight whose logical frailty
would not alone support the Court's decision. 132 The second
and third prong are major themes of the Rehnquist wing, as discussed later in this Article.
Another author suggests that Wards Cove and Watson
show that "a majority of the Court now apparently views impact
theory through fault-colored eyeglasses. The Justices have, in
short, shifted the focus of impact cases to the covert intentions
and motives of the employer, the same focus as treatment cases,
and thus carrying the same substantial difficulties of proof." 133
130. Instrumental judges "test the formulation and application of each rule by its
purpose or policy. Where the reason for the rule stops there stops the rule. . . . The
consequences of a rule are all important. Instrumentalist judges thus tend to be resultoriented." R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES 0. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 113-14 (1984).
131. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-99 (O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia.
132. The argument for uniform standards of proof must confront two objections.
First, it is not clear that it is difficult to justify valid subjective selection devices. Of course,
if the devices are not valid, it should be impossible to justify them, but that is no criticism of
the disparate impact test. Second, if the considerations regarding subjective selection
devices differ from those regarding objective devices, it would seem to follow that different
standards of justification should govern. Difficulties regarding justification of subjective
devices do not require or warrant watering down the standard of justifying objective
devices.
133. Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C.
L. REV. I, 10-11 (1989). Professor Brodin reaches this conclusion largely on the strength of
two points in the Court's confusing opinion in Wards Cove. First, the Court said that if the
plaintiff could show that a less discriminatory selection device would satisfactorily serve the
employer's needs, the employer's failure to adopt such a device "would prove that '(petitioners were] using [their] tests merely as a "pretext" for discrimination.'" Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). The citation of Albemarle Paper Co. reftects the ambiguity of
pre- Wards Cove doctrine regarding disparate impact. Albemarle Paper Co. held that if an
employer rebutted the initial inference that a selection device was discriminatory, the plaintiff could then prove " that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
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Whether the three decisions on statistical disparities reflect
a trend toward merging the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories remains to be seen. The decisions suggest that the
Court may have embarked on a project of rethinking the rationale and content of the disparate impact test, an issue revisited
later in this Article. 134
B.
Remedy
The remedial legacy of the Burger Court consists primarily
of two rules, the tailoring principle and the restorative principle. m Remedies must be tailored to the past violation and they
must restore the parties to the position they would have occupied but for the effects of the past violation. Taken together,
these principles led to structural reform of school systems, the
work place, and electoral systems. Various corollaries of these
rules placed limits on the duration and scope of judicial remedies. The Court also translated remedial obligation into an
affirmative duty, on the part of those who had unlawfully disracial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.' Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was using its tests
merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." 422 U.S. at 425 (citations omitted). Albemarle
Paper Co. relied on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for this
proposition; that case, of course, established the standards for disparate treatment cases,
and the "pretext" language is recited in the context of disparate treatment. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Brodin relies for his conclusion, secondly, on the Court's statement in Wards Cove that "[i]f the absence of minorities holding such skilled positions is due
to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not petitioners' fault),
petitioners' selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on nonwhites." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651-52 (footnote omitted). But it is
unclear whether the Court uses the word "fault" here in the usual sense. A footnote to that
sentence explains that " [o]bviously, the analysis would be different if it were found that the
dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants was due to practices on petitioners' part whichexpressly or implicitly-<leterred minority group members from applying for noncannery
positions." ld. at 651 n.7 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1971)).
The cited portion of Teamsters does discuss intentional discrimination which deters nonwhites from applying, but the phrase "expressly or implicitly" may mean intentionally or
unwittingly.
134. See Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TuL. L.
REV. 1359, 1364 (1990) ("[T]he conservative majority of the Court is, in these cases,
attempting to redefine the Griggs concept of disparate-impact discrimination through
manipulation of evidentiary and burden-shifting rules."). See generally Michael K. Braswen et a!., Disparate Impact Theory in the Aftermath of Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio: Burdens of Proof, Statistical Evidence, and Affirmative Action, 54 ALB. L. REV. 1
(1989) (considering the impact of Wards Cove); Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U.
L. REV. 615 (1990) (discussing the burden of proof in racial discrimination cases).
135. See generally Landsberg, supra note 25.
1992]
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criminated in the past, to remedy the effects of their own past
discrimination. Failure to do so was an independent constitutional violation. The Court, however, was badly divided on the
extent to which race-conscious measures should be available as a
remedy. It also failed to provide detailed guidance as to the
duration of the remedy and of the affirmative duty of reformed
discriminators.
The Rehnquist Court has decided four major cases regarding the application of these principles. The first, United States v.
Paradise, is described above. 136 A closely divided Court upheld
a racial quota for state trooper promotions as a remedy for a
continued and recalcitrant pattern of race discrimination and a
failure to comply with less onerous court orders.
In Spallone v. United States, 137 the Court, in a five to four
decision, overturned the federal contempt of court conviction of
a city council member who had refused to vote in favor of legislation implementing a court-approved consent decree in a housing discrimination case. The majority consisted of Justice White
and the Rehnquist wing. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court acknowledged that "[w]hen a district court's order is necessary to remedy past discrimination, the court has an additional
basis for the exercise of broad equitable powers." 138 The Court,
however, noted the countervailing interest of state and local
authorities to manage their own affairs and concluded that the
district court abused its equitable discretion in failing to use less
intrusive means before considering contempt against individual
members of the city council. Justice Brennan's dissent accepted
the appropriateness of imposing the least intrusive sanctions to
achieve compliance with the order, but deferred to the district
court's judgment that lesser measures would not work. 139
The same general themes recur in the opinions in Missouri
v. Jenkins, 140 where Justice White's swing vote allowed the Brennan wing to prevail. The Court unanimously disapproved a district court order imposing on Kansas City property owners a
property tax increase to help fund a school desegregation remedy. Justice White, for the Court, concluded that "the tax
increase contravened the principles of comity that must govern
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
493 u.s. 265 (1 990).
Id. at 276.
/d. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
495 u.s. 33 (1 990).
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the exercise of the District Court's equitable discretion in this
area." 141 Without once citing Spallone, Justice White said that
the "proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions" 142 and the availability of a less intrusive
remedy precluded such direct imposition of a tax increase.
However, the district court could order the school board to levy
such taxes as were needed to fund the remedy, and state laws
imposing tax limits could not "hinder the process by preventing
a local government from implementing that remedy." 143 Justice
White declined to review the validity of the underlying remedy
because the Court had denied certiorari on that question, which
had been presented by the State's petition.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, for the Rehnquist wing, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. The concurring
opinion, however, took strong issue with the Court's conclusion
that the district court could do indirectly what it could not do
directly. Justice Kennedy argued that the prudence that Spallone had required precluded what he viewed as the taxation
order, which the majority approved. 144 He perceived such an
order as inconsistent with the judicial function, supporting this
conclusion by arguing that the underlying remedial order, even
if constitutionally permissible, was not constitutionally required;
other possible remedies might cost less and thus not necessitate
increased taxation. Where several possible remedies exist, the
district court is obliged to choose the one that is least intrusive
on local governance. Justice Kennedy believed that the denial of
certiorari on the validity of the desegregation remedy did not
foreclose the Court from considering this argument.
Finally, in 1991, the Court decided Board of Education v.
Dowel/ 14 ~ by a five to three margin. 146 The Oklahoma City
schools had desegregated pursuant to a federal court order in
1972 and had operated under the desegregation plan until 1985,
when the schools reverted to a neighborhood school system of
student assignment. The new system caused eleven integrated
schools to become virtually all black. The plaintiffs' challenge to
141. /d. at 50.
142. /d. at 5 I.
143. /d. at 57-58 (citing North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45
(1971)).
144. /d. at 71 (Kennedy, J. , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Kennedy did not discuss Swann.
145. 111 S. Ct. 630, 630 (1991).
146. Justice Souter took no part in the case.
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the new plan ultimately led to a court of appeals decision that
the board had failed to justify abandoning the prior court
order. 147 The court of appeals applied the standard of an old
antitrust case, United States v. Swift & Co. , which said an antitrust decree should not be dissolved unless it results in "grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." 148 The
Supreme Court unanimously disapproved the court of appeals'
standard for dissolution of a school desegregation decree,
because prior school desegregation cases had held that desegregation decrees were temporary measures. Again, the Court considered judicial respect for local governance of school systems an
important value. The majority, echoing the amicus brief of the
United States, failed to give clear guidance as to the standard to
be applied on remand. The Court took the unusual step of
reversing the decision of the court of appeals, but remanding the
case directly to the district court. That court is to "address itself
to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable."149 If so, the injunction should be dissolved and the new
student assignment plan should be judged by "appropriate equal
protection principles." 150 The Court did hint that, to the extent
that present residential segregation is a vestige of former school
segregation, continuation of the desegregation plan might be
required.151 The Court did not address the issue of whether
location and capacity of schools might be considered an effect of
past discrimination, nor did it address the dissent's argument
that the stigma which attaches to one-race schools is a cognizable effect of past discrimination. 152 The dissent would have
affirmed because racially identifiable schools are vestiges of past
discrimination that perpetuate "the message of racial inferiority
inherent in the policy of state-sponsored segregation." 153
147. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 634.
148. 286 u.s. 106, 119 (1932).
149. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 638; cj. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States for the
Board of Education at 14, Board of Educ. v. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630 (1991) (No. 89-1080).
The court should ask "(I) whether the district has continuously complied with the desegregation decree in good faith; (2) whether the school district has abandoned any and all acts
of intentional discrimination; and (3) whether the school district has eliminated, as far as
practicable, the 'vestiges' of prior discriminatory conduct." Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 638.
150. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 638.
151. /d. at 638 n.2.
152. /d. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153. /d. at 648.
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As with the cases regarding race-conscious preferences, the
remedy cases preserve the legacy of the Burger Court. As is
shown in Part IV, however, here too the Rehnquist wing's opinions foreshadow a rethinking of the tailoring and restorative
principles.
IV.
A.
MAJOR THEMES
The Substructure of Antidiscrimination Law
The Rehnquist wing, while showing no outward sign of
abandoning the foundation of antidiscrimination law, shows
growing unease with its substructure. Antidiscrimination law
has come to rest on assumptions regarding behavior and race,
and on remedial principles regarding effects of past discrimination and insurance against future discrimination. If these
assumptions and principles erode, the structure of antidiscrimination law will lose its supports. Thus, while eschewing
any design to alter radically antidiscrimination law, the Rehnquist wing may be embarking on a path that will lead to just that
effect.
1.
Assumptions Regarding Behavior and Race
Where whites, as a group, receive proportionately more
rewards (e.g., jobs, contracts, political power, housing) than
minorities, 1s4 several hypotheses might explain the disparity.
The disparity might stem from deliberate discrimination by the
bestower of rewards. Iss Or the bestower of rewards might have
created a structure for their bestowal that unintentionally results
m disparity, 1 s6 stemming either from "cultural" differences
154. The depressed economic condition of black Americans is well documented. See,
e.g., Francine Blau & John W. Graham, Black- White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composition, 105 Q.J. EcoN. 321 (1990); Jeremiah Cotton, The Declining Economic Status of
Black Families, REv. BLACK PoL. EcoN., Summer 1989, at 84; Melvin L. Oliver &
Thomas M. Shapiro, Race and Wealth, REv. BLACK PoL. EcoN., Spring 1989, at 5; Finis
Welch, The Employment of Black Men, J . LAB. EcoN., Jan. 1990, at S26.
155. CLINT BoLICK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 115 (1990). A related cause might be "the empirical reality
of unconscious racism." Sheri L. Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 1016, 1017 (1988). As Professor Johnson points out, the Court has not
recognized that possibility. !d. Such an "empirical reality" would seem to be a matter of
proof, to be tendered by the party alleging racial discrimination.
156. Ronald Dworkin summarizes this "structural discrimination" as "the intractable social and economic patterns of American society, created by generations of injustice,
through which poorer education, lower expectations, and instinctive and unacknowledged
prejudice insure that race continues to be a dominant, pervasive factor affecting the lifetime
1992]
RACE AND THE REHNQUISTCOURT
1301
between whites and minorities or from differences in "merit., 157
Either past discrimination 158 or inherent group differences could
cause the differences in merit. Finally, the disparity could result
from chance. All but the last of these possible causes are group
based. The Court has not read the Constitution as embracing
any view of the causes of disparate impact. Therefore, the Court
can find no basis in the Constitution for adopting any particular
view, absent some definitive empirical evidence. Normally the
Court would treat the question as a legislative one and defer to
Congress or to the states. Difficulty arises only if the legislature's resolution of the question leads to the adoption of raceconscious measures, for such measures have traditionally triggered close judicial scrutiny.
The Rehnquist wing has firmly rejected any supposition
that, all things being equal, minority representation in various
jobs would likely mirror the qualified pool. These Justices
believe that it is equally plausible that occupational choices are
heavily determined by race. 159 In none of the cases does the
prospects of individual citizens." Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the
Supreme Court, N.Y. REV., July 18, 1991, at 23, 25 (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER
AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991)).
Professor Fiss points out that where the discriminatory impact flows from a nonmerit criterion, it is particularly unfair to judge minorities on the basis of that criterion. Fiss, supra
note 117, at 296. Former Solicitor General Fried, who filed the Government's brief in
Wards Cove, agrees. See Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, on S. 2104, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1989) (statement of
Charles Fried) ("[l]f you have an employment requirement ... which operates as a barrier
to minority opportunity, and there is no real reason to maintain that barrier, you should
remove it and open the way to opportunity.") [hereinafter Civil Rights Act Hearings].
157. I enclose merit in quotation marks to point out that the definition of merit itself
may contribute to disproportionality of rewards. Normally it is the bestower of benefits
who defines merit.
158. The Civil Rights Commission says that Justice Clarence Thomas, when he was
Chairman of the EEOC, noted that "[s]tatistical disparities in employment may indicate
'inadequate job preparation' rather than discrimination." UNITED STATES COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS 24
n.119 (Clearinghouse Publication No. 93, 1987).
159. Cj City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 472-80 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor.
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, had upheld a district court finding that the
annexation of largely vacant land was part of a pattern of activity purposefully designed to
increase white voting strength and minimize black voting strength in a virtually all-white
city, in violation of§ S of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988). The
district court had found, and the majority affirmed, that the annexed area was "likely to be
developed for use by white persons only." City of Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 466. Justice
Powell pointed out that the Fair Housing Act forbids discrimination in housing and argued
that the district court's finding was therefore "sheer speculation." /d. at 478. He suggested
that "an equally logical, if not more compelling, assumption is that the annexation of the
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Court discuss evidence bearing on such racial characteristics.
There is a slim body of literature in the social sciences which
speculates that race and ethnicity influence occupational
choice, 160 but the Court does not point to those writings or claim
that there is consensus as to their validity. The Justices who
adhere to the old view, that one would not expect race to influence occupational choice, point to no empirical evidence either.
Instead, they appear to believe that the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII embrace the American melting pot ideal, that
racial imbalances are aberrational and racial integration is the
norm.
The Court will need to come to grips more directly than it
has with these two competing pictures. Probably neither is completely accurate. Indeed, each contains internal inconsistencies.
The Brennan wing assumes that, all else being equal, persons of
one race will be just as qualified as persons of another race; yet,
the same Justices assume that race brings unique qualifications
to the electronic media. The Rehnquist wing assumes that formal equal opportunity has led (or can lead) to a society in which
the race of others does not affect our treatment of them, but may
well affect their own conduct. 161 The Chief Justice and Justice
Scalia have also argued "that all groups tend to have particular
sympathies and hostilities-most notably, sympathies towards
their own group members." 162 Elsewhere, they seem to assume
that the needs of individuals are fungible, without regard to race.
Several consequences flow from the Rehnquist wing's
assumptions about race. First, these assumptions have a direct
bearing on evidentiary burdens. A city wishing to adopt a
minority set-aside program faces the heavy burden of showing
that present racial disparities in contracting are the result of past
intentional discrimination. An employee challenging an
employment practice with a disparate impact may not rest with
Western Addition will increase the black voting strength in the city." /d. at 478 n.3. The
thrust of this assumption is that, absent discrimination, blacks would likely settle in previously all-white neighborhoods.
160. See, e.g., Sowell, "Affirmative Action": A Worldwide Disaster, COMMENTARY,
Dec. 1989, at 21. Professor Loury presents a variant on this approach. He argues that
"(g]ross statistical disparities are inadequate to identify the presence of discrimination
because individuals ditrer in many ways likely to atrect their earnings capacities which are
usually not measured and controlled for when group outcomes are compared." Civil Rights
Act Hearings, supra note 156, at 77 (statement of Glenn C. Loury).
161. But see Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2128-32 (1989).
162. Powers v. Ohio, Ill S. Ct. 1364, 1378 (1991) (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
1992]
1303
showing that impact, but must also show that the employment
practice is not job-related. A defendant sentenced to death for
killing a white person may not escape that penalty by showing a
pattern of higher penalties for killing whites than for killing
blacks; the defendant must show that the prosecutor, judge, or
jury imposed that sentence because of race, or that the state
adopted its death penalty standards or procedures with the
intent to discriminate based on race.
A closely related consequence is the shift away from recognizing structural discrimination claims. McCleskey's equal protection claim arguably ran afoul of the Burger Court's rulings in
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 163 and City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 164 which required that the plaintiff prove intentional discrimination by a particular actor. His Eighth Amendment
claim, however, was arguably in the mainstream of the Court's
rulings that, as Justice Brennan's dissent points out, have "been
concerned with the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the proven fact of one." 16s The Court was
unwilling to import a racial claim into that structural framework. The Rehnquist wing would ordinarily disallow governmental programs designed to rectify structural exclusions of
minorities from jobs, contracts, or broadcast licenses; it would
require a showing of intentional discrimination to justify raceconscious measures. Some members of the Rehnquist wing
would also extend this limit on affirmative action to include private employers, by either overruling or recasting the Weber
holding. 166 The Rehnquist wing's revision of the traditional
understanding of congressional intent regarding proof of structural discrimination in employment in Wards Cove, noted
163. 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979) (holding that proof that veteran's preference for
state employment had disparate impact on women is insufficient to show violation of Equal
Protection Clause).
164. 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980) (showing that black voting strength is minimized by
at-large election of commissioners does not make out a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause).
165. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 322 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. The restrictions on government affirmative action are based on the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth (explicit) and Fifth (implicit) Amendments to the Constitution. The restrictions on employer affirmative action would be based on Title VII.
Professor Fried argues that the two sets of entities should be treated differently: "The
government, unlike private actors, is a monopolist whose regime we cannot escape, and
therefore it makes sense to discipline the government far more tightly-particularly in an
area like racial preferences, which can so easily degenerate into stifling political entrepreneurship and rent-seeking." FRIED, supra note 125, at 130.
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above, 167 can be viewed as an attack on the very notion of structural discrimination.
A third consequence of the Rehnquist wing's assumptions
regarding race is the variable use of generality and specificity in
its treatment of race issues. On the one hand, the Justices treat
race discrimination on a very general level, so that affirmative
action is treated the same as discrimination against blacks. On
the other hand, they require that proof of discrimination and
proof of justifications for affirmative action proceed on a very
specific level, thus placing a heavier burden on black plaintiffs
and on defendants seeking to support affirmative action.
Perhaps of most consequence is that the logic of the Rehnquist wing's position in these cases could take the Court beyond
challenging prior interpretations of statutory intent and beyond
challenging the proposition that the Constitution bars structural
discrimination. One could infer from the Rehnquist wing's
opinions that Congress may not constitutionally enact laws barring structural discrimination. If the disparate impact test promotes race-conscious actions, and if the Constitution forbids
race-conscious actions, may Congress forbid practices with a
racially disparate impact?168 If a municipality may not base its
race-conscious contracting program on structural discrimination, may the federal government? The issue of the constitutionality of the disparate impact test has not been raised in the
Supreme Court, but no one may doubt that the Justices are
aware of it. Indeed, in a completely gratuitous opinion joining
Justice Scalia's dissent in a case under section two of the Voting
Rights Act, Justice Kennedy wrote "to add only that the issue
before the Court is one of statutory construction, not constitutional validity." 169 To make his meaning unmistakable, he continued: "Nothing in today's decision addresses the question
whether § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as interpreted in
Thornburg v. Gingles [applying the results test] . .., is consistent
with the requirements of the United States Constitution." 170
167. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
168. The Department of Justice has argued that under the disparate impact test,
"[f]ar from making race and other proscribed criteria irrelevant in public and private decision-making, such proscribed criteria necessarily assume paramount importance in the
determination of the treatment of individuals." OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 14 (1987).
169. Chisom v. Roemer, Ill S. Ct. 2354, 2376 (1991) (Kennedy, J ., dissenting).
170. /d. (citation omitted). One possible constitutional challenge goes to Congress'
1992]
1305
It is also revealing to note the relationship between these
assumptions and the ideology of race discrimination law. Typically, the Justices 171 and scholars 172 draw two competing ideological pictures-an individual-based versus a group-based
model. Those who follow the individual-based model tend to
oppose, and those who embrace the group-based model tend to
support, race-conscious affirmative action and the disparate
impact test. Yet, the proponents of the individual-based model
often explain statistical disparities by pointing to differences in
group behavior, while the proponents of the group-based model
tend to stress the impact of past discrimination on individuals.
The putative dichotomy between individual and group-based
models fails to take account of the nature of discrimination.
Discrimination is group based, yet it falls on individuals. 173
Antidiscrimination measures must address both the group and
the individual.
The approach of the majority in these cases, and of the four
Reagan appointees in the Metro Broadcasting case, is that statistical imbalances in a workforce, or among government contractors or broadcasters, provide an insufficient basis for corrective
steps; only a strong showing of past discrimination warrants
race-conscious preferences (and even that showing might not
suffice for Justice Scalia). Although giving lip service to Griggs
and the disparate impact test under Title VII, these opinions
undermine Griggs and, if carried to their logical conclusion,
would lead to its eventual overruling, the gist of the opinions
being that statistics are meaningful only as part of a case of
intentional discrimination. The Court in Wards Cove provides
no explanation of the reasons Congress adopted both an intent
power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to forbid the states to adopt voting
practices which, while they have a discriminatory effect, are not motivated by invidious
intent. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970), upheld such laws. The other (however remotely) conceivable argument rests on the
Fifth Amendment's equal protection limitation on Congress' power. If the Court found
that the disparate impact test was facially discriminatory or was motivated by a desire to
favor minorities and disfavor nonminorities, the test would deny equal protection of the
laws.
171. See, e.g. , Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010-11 (1990).
172. See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination, and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 99, 105 (1983); Haggard, supra note 99 at 82; Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., Permissive
Affirmative Action for the Benefit of Blacks, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 398.
173. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job
Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1195-96, 1240-43 (1991).
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standard and a disparate impact standard in Title VII, as well as
in the Voting Rights Act. The approach of the Reagan appointees rejects the traditional assumption "that minorities were no
less interested than whites in higher-paying, more challenging
work." 174 The Rehnquist wing provides no explanation why
blacks might be less interested in certain occupations than
others. m If the assumption is true, the skewed interest most
likely stems from social position, which was determined by history. The history is one of slavery and discrimination. Unlike
sex discrimination cases, employers have rarely, if ever, sought
to show that particular jobs are more appealing to whites than to
blacks. 176
2.
a.
Remedial Principles
Effects of Past Discrimination
Race neutrality has been an overarching concern of the
Rehnquist wing. These Justices have agreed, however, that at
174. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argu·
ment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1798 (1990). Professor Schultz explains that lower courts
have often rejected such an assumption about women because they have accepted the argument that women were less interested than men in traditionally male jobs. Judges have
often "accepted the dominant societal view of women as marginal workers. This view is
linked to the cultural image of women as beings formed in and for the private domestic
sphere, rather than actors shaped like their male counterparts by and for the public world
of wage work." !d. at 1771. While that image contradicts the assumptions of Title VII, at
least it provides an explanation, however suspect, for the disparities between women in the
labor force and women in particular jobs.
175. A study of employers in Chicago "found that employers consistently relate race
to inferior education, lack of job skills, and unreliable job performance." Kirschenman &
Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them But . .. ·~· The Meaning of Race for Employers, The
Urban Underc/ass, noted in MARGERY TuRNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 2 (C. Jencks & P. Peterson eds. ,
1991). Most employers "associated negative images with inner-city workers, and particularly with black men." !d. These employer attitudes mirror the attitudes of a majority of
whites, who "still believe that both blacks and Hispanics are not only more inclined than
whites to prefer welfare, but are also lazier, more prone to violence, less intelligent and less
patriotic." /d. (citing a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, in January 1991). Another survey reflects that while whites recognize
that discrimination is one cause of the unfavorable status of blacks, 60% of whites "hold
that blacks lack the motivation or will power to overcome it." R. Farley, Neighborhood
Preferences and Aspirations Among Blacks and Whites 10-11 (May 1991) (unpublished
paper presented at the Urban Institute Urban Opportunity Program, Conference on Housing Markets and Residential Mobility, May 20 and 21 , 1991, Airlie House, Virginia).
Whites give blacks a more negative ranking than all other groups as to violence, self-sufficiency, and diligent working. !d. at 16.
176. Cf Schultz, supra note 174, at 1778-79 (showing that employers often argue that
women lack interest in particular jobs).
1992]
1307
times race neutrality may paradoxically require a discriminator
to take race into account in order to overcome the effects of past
discrimination. While espousing the reparative and tailoring
doctrines, the Rehnquist wing has in practice subordinated them
to other values in each of the remedy cases decided by the Rehnquist Court. The Brennan wing, on the other hand, has placed
those principles on the same level as the antidiscrimination principle itself.
All four remedial decisions involve state or local government defendants who engaged in a lengthy pattern of intentional
racial discrimination. In Paradise 177 and Spallone 178 the defendants had continued that pattern, in the form of a refusal to take
reparative steps, even after the district court entered its remedial
order. In Paradise, the Alabama Highway Patrol continued its
use of racially exclusionary selection devices for more than ten
years after being ordered not to discriminate, in spite of repeated
subsequent enforcement proceedings. In Spallone, city council
members openly refused to comply with a consent decree. In
both cases the district courts, concluding that less intrusive
measures had failed to work, adopted strong prophylactic measures to bring about compliance. The Rehnquist wing agreed
that in extreme cases such measures might be warranted, but
disagreed with the trial courts' assessments of need. In Paradise,
the Rehnquist wing unsuccessfully maintained that the preference for race neutral remedies should prevail; 179 in Spallone, deference to local governance prevailed. 180
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Rehnquist wing again placed
deference to values of local governance above the trial court's
judgment that an extraordinary remedy was required in order to
overcome the effects of past discrimination. 181 Justice Kennedy's opinion acknowledged the Equal Protection Clause's
"mandate to eliminate the cause and effects of racial discrimination in the schools." 182 He believed, however, that the majority
had lost "sight of other basic political liberties guaranteed by our
constitutional system, liberties that can coexist with a proper
exercise of judicial remedial powers adequate to correct constitu177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 170-71 (1987).
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1990).
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 196-201.
Spallone, 493 U.S. at 273-80.
495 u.s. 33, 50-58 (1990).
!d. at 81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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tiona! violations." 183
Finally, in Board of Education v. Dowell, the full Court
agreed that the Swift & Co. rule, which makes terminating a federal injunction very difficult, should not apply to desegregation
cases because it is inconsistent with our tradition of local control
of education. 184 The Rehnquist wing, which commanded the
majority vote in the case, avoided the hard question in the case
regarding the appropriate standard to apply in deciding whether
to terminate the injunction and whether the school authorities
should bear any continuing duty to avoid reinstating the effects
of past discrimination. Justice Marshall, for the Brennanless
Brennan wing, argued that the issue should be whether the new
one-race schools imparted a racial stigma. tss This was a new
tack, reflecting a recognition that, after over a decade of desegregation, it becomes difficult to identify concrete effects of past discrimination. Justice Marshall maintained that the Court should
assume that racial stigma attached to one-race schools is a continuing effect of the prior segregated system. 186 The Court may
address these issues in the October 1991 term in Freeman v.
Pitts 187 (standards for deciding unitariness of school system) and
United States v. Mabus 188 (duty of formerly dual system of
higher education).
At issue in Dowell on remand and in Freeman and Mabus is
the continued vitality of the Burger Court's tailoring and restorative principles. If a formerly segregated school system that has
desegregated for a period of years may adopt a retrogression
plan without scrutiny of possible reinstitution of effects of past
discrimination, then Swann itself will have lost its underpinnings.189 On the other hand, Justice Marshall's stigma approach
would lead to a virtually permanent ban on one-race schools. It
should be possible to preserve the tailoring and reparative doctrines without unduly impairing the ability of local school systems to structure student assignments, or imposing some
permanent racial balance formula. The Court could achieve this
result by allowing school systems that have been declared unitary to freely adopt new assignment systems subject to challenge
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
/d.
111 S. Ct. 630, 636-38 (1991).
/d. at 639.
Id. at 639-40.
111 S. Ct. 949 (1991), granting cert. to 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989).
111 S. Ct. 1579 (1991), granting cert. to 914 F .2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990).
Landsberg, supra note 25, at 832, 838.
1992]
1309
that the system either acted with discriminatory intent or reinstated effects of past discrimination. 190
b.
Prophylactic Relief
The reparative doctrine is not the only possible basis for
voluntary or court ordered, race-conscious affirmative action, or
other remedial steps. The other basis that the Burger Court recognized was the prophylactic doctrine-that it may be appropriate to fashion remedial rules of sufficient clarity and specificity to
ensure compliance with the antidiscrimination principle. 191
Such rules require the actor to engage in activity that is not
required by the substantive law. 192 An employer, concerned that
the personnel department may be insufficiently sensitive to the
need for nondiscrimination, may put in place prophylactic
mechanisms to ensure against discrimination. Even if its personnel department is committed to nondiscrimination, the employer
may be concerned about possible "aversive" discrimination, buried prejudices that some scholars believe are endemic among
white Americans. 193 A judge, concerned that prior decrees forbidding racial discrimination have been ineffective, may deem it
necessary to constrict further the defendant's freedom of action.
A municipality, concerned that nondiscrimination rules have not
opened to minorities a fair opportunity to participate in public
contracts, may decide to adopt a race-conscious system for
ensuring such an opportunity.
The Rehnquist wing, as we will see, bases some of its race
discrimination doctrine on a perceived need for prophylactic
modification of Burger Court jurisprudence, to avoid anticipated
straying by defendants and lower courts. Indeed, it has been
argued that strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures is itself a
190. See id. at 800-07.
191. See id. at 804.
192. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
190, 203-04 (1988).
193. See, e.g., Mark A. Fossett & K. Jill Kieco1t, The Relative Size of Minority Populations and White Racial Attitudes, 10 Soc. Sci. Q. 820 (1989); Samuel L. Gaertner & John
F . Dovidio, The Subtlety of White Racism, Arousal, and Helping Behavior, 35 J . PERSONALITY & Soc. PsvcHOL. 691 (1977); Gregory D . Squires & William Velez, Insurance Redlining and the Process of Discrimination, REv. BLACK POL. EcoN., Winter 1988, at 63.
Farley shows that while whites favor fair housing legislation, one quarter of surveyed
whites would feel uncomfortable in a neighborhood in which one of fifteen homes was
occupied by black residents; indeed a 1991 survey reflected that 40% of whites preferred
neighborhoods which were 100% white and 25% preferred 90% white neighborhoods.
Farley, supra note 175, at 6-7.
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prophylactic rule. 194 Nonetheless, the Rehnquist wing is hostile
to prophylactic relief. For example, in Paradise, the majority
approved a race-conscious remedy because the defendants had
thwarted race-neutral remedies that might otherwise have been
effective. The Rehnquist wing dissented. In Spallone, the Rehnquist wing disapproved a remedy the district court thought necessary to compensate for the proven recalcitrance of individual
defendants. The Court will have to resolve this seeming incongruity under which unproven hypotheses become the basis for
doctrine, while proven need is held insufficient to justify a tailored remedy.
B. Selective Activism
If the Court, or at least the Rehnquist wing, is questioning
the substructure of antidiscrimination law and possibly dismantling it, one would expect the Justices to proceed carefully and
with great restraint. To the contrary, however, several opinions
reach out, addressing issues not presented, applying nondeferential standards to legislative action, slighting precedent, and relying on instrumental concerns 195 in revising doctrine.
1.
Slippage
The Supreme Court sits near the apex of the judicial hierarchy, answering only to the Constitution (metaphorically) on
issues of constitutional law and to the Congress as to issues of
statutory law. It bases its decisions on facts filtered through several lower court layers. In turn, its decisions pass through filters
on their path toward implementation. As Karl Llewellyn so vividly painted the picture:
What warrant have we for assuming that even the judicial
system alone . .. works with any unity? We look at our highest
courts and find their words a long way from their doing. In
their own work we find that we can trust their rules part way,
but part way only. In their own work the drive-belt slips
between rules and results. Must we not then assume a further
slipping as the distance grows, and as we move down the line?
At each stage less exalted judges, at each stage more of them:
are we not to guess that the average of ability is lower, too?
Are we not to guess that other factors join in giving the wheels
their drive, as the factor of high court rules slips more and
194. Strauss, supra note 192, at 205.
195. See supra note 130.
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more into ineffectiveness; that the interplay of belt and gearing
turns the machine in strange, unsuspected ways? Ignorance,
prejudice, accidents of experience, favor, indolence, even corruption: how much, how often, when, and where? How far,
too, does the set-up of the procedural system stand between the
rules and the result? Yet by their fruits shall ye know them.
Law is, to the community, what law does} 96
In the law of race discrimination, where the Court's
accepted ultimate objective is racial neutrality, the Court faces a
daunting task if it wishes to calibrate the law to defeat slippage.
A simple nondiscrimination rule may lead to widespread evasion, as occurred during the period between Brown v. Board of
Education and Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education . 197 A rule requiring affirmative action could lead to a racial
spoils system. Moreover, it is unlikely that a case that reaches
the Supreme Court will provide a factual record permitting the
Court to reach factual conclusions as to the general adherence to
rules in other cases. Alexander came only at the end of a long
history of lower court decisions that revealed the extent of official foot-dragging to avoid compliance with Brown.
The Supreme Court is undoubtedly aware of the possibility
of slippage. In many instances it corrects lower court slippage
by reversing erroneous interpretations of its precedents. 198 The
Court might also seek to avoid slippage by writing clear opinions
that state the law unambiguously. 199 Where there is a history of
lower court error or intransigence, the Court may resort to
detailed instructions to minimize future slippage. The Rehn196. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 90-91 (1951).
197. 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam). Compare id. with Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Alexander ended the era of all deliberate speed and commanded that
desegregation proceed "at once." /d. at 20. As Justice Black noted, in an opinion in chambers," ' [a]ll deliberate speed' has turned out to be only a soft euphemism for delay." Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. ofEduc., 396 U.S. 1218, 1219 (1969) (considering motion to
vacate suspension of order of court of appeals).
198. For example, Fullilove could be read on two levels. It could be read, as many
governmental entities preferred, as validating minority set-aside programs. Or it could,
more accurately, be read as mapping the boundaries between permissible and impermissible
programs. Croson, and the reaction to it, reflect that government entities tended to stretch,
in harmony with their preferred reading, rather than to tailor as the proper reading of
Fullilove commanded. See infra notes 199-201.
199. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Croson noted the benefits of a bright-line test. He
argued that the rule Justice Scalia suggested
would strike down all preferences which are not necessary remedies to victims of
unlawful discrimination, would serve important structural goals, as it would eliminate the necessity for courts to pass upon each racial preference that is enacted.
Structural protections may be necessities if moral imperatives are to be obeyed.
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quist wing, however, seems to be acting on the basis of anticipatory or hypothetical slippage in race discrimination law. It does
so based not on evidence but on predictions, primarily from the
executive branch, that the disparate impact test and relaxed
scrutiny of affirmative action programs will lead to invidious discrimination against whites. Moreover, the Rehnquist wing's
remedy for this anticipated slippage is not simply corrective, but
prophylactic. Rather than strike down invidious discrimination
when it occurs, the thrust of the Wards Cove decision is to alter
Title VII interpretations in an effort to remove the perceived
danger that employers (and, perhaps, lower courts) will respond
to them by resorting to discrimination. 200 In short, the Rehnquist wing is concerned that the disparate impact test may lead
to unintended consequences, even to possible violations of the
law. Thus, to prevent employers from overcompensating in one
direction, it appears that the Court may be adjusting its doctrine
toward the opposite direction. 201
This instrumental argument in Wards Cove, that the strong
version of disparate impact doctrine leads to quotas, must overcome four logical flaws. First, even if the premises of the argument are correct, it does not follow that a weak version of the
disparate impact test should be substituted for the strong version. That is an argument more properly addressed to Congress
than to the Court, because it calls for a change in the law based
on policy concerns. Second, the Wards Cove opinion, and prior
opinions on which it relies, fails to establish the correctness of
either premise of the argument. The notion that disparate
impact analysis tends to push employers to adopt quotas has no
His opinion would make it crystal clear to the political branches, at least those of
the States, that legislation must be based on criteria other than race.
. . . [But] I am not convinced we need adopt it at this point.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518-19 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
200. A variation on this theme appears in Justice Scalia's opinion urging the Court to
overrule United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). He argued that Griggs created an incentive for employers to engage in reverse discrimination and therefore the combination of the Griggs rule with the Weber rule (allowing employers to engage in raceconscious affirmative action) converted Title VII "into a powerful engine of racism and
sexism, not merely permitting intentional race- and sex-based discrimination, but often
making it, through operation of the legal system, practically compelled." Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. This is at odds with the normal role of courts. "Courts usually judge statutes by
the way in which they are actually enforced, not by imagining horrible events that have
never happened, never will happen, and could be stopped by courts if they ever seemed
about to happen." ROBERT H . BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 97 (1990).
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empirical support. The evidence, instead, reflects that discrimination is still much more likely to be directed at blacks than at
whites. 202 The sentiment that Title VII frowns on all voluntary
quotas was rejected by the Court in United Steelworkers v.
Weber. 203 Third, the premise simplistically ignores other possible influences on employer conduct and also ignores the possible
effects of alternate rules. For example, it has been noted that
Title VII litigation, which was once dominated by hiring discrimination cases, has shifted to a regime in which discriminatory firing suits predominate. Therefore,
[w]ith the enormous increase in discharge cases, the probability
that a worker will bring a discriminatory firing suit is now substantially higher than the probability that a worker will bring a
failure to hire suit. Consequently, antidiscrimination laws may
actually provide employers a (small) net disincentive to hire
women and minorities. 204
The Court is ill-equipped, and has in any event failed to try, to
resolve the legislative facts bearing on these premises. The
Court does not know that Griggs has encouraged improper discrimination against white males; nor does it know what discrimination against minorities and women the new Wards Cove rule
will encourage. Finally, it is equally plausible that the ban on
intentional discrimination might encourage employers to adopt
quotas in order to escape liability. 20s This could hardly be a
202. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 175, at 32. The Urban Institute conducted an
"audit" of hiring opportunities, by sending similarly qualified black and white persons to
apply for jobs. The resulting report concluded that "if equally qualified black and white
candidates are in competition for a job, when differential treatment occurs, it is three times
more likely to favor the white applicant than to favor the black." ld. While "unfavorable
treatment of young black men is widespread and pervasive across firms offering entry level
jobs in the Washington, D.C. and Chicago metropolitan areas .. . reverse discrimination
... is far less common." ld.
203. 443 U.S. 193, 204-08 (1979). The Court upheld a race-conscious affirmative
action plan contained in the collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser Aluminum
Co. and the United Steelworkers of America. ld. at 209. The plan established a training
program for skilled trades jobs, to be filled from the ranks of unskilled employees. For
every white employee placed in the program, a black employee was placed. Jd. at 198-99.
The Court held that the plan did not unduly trammel the rights of white employees and
therefore did not violate Title VII. /d. at 208.
204. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 38, at 1024.
205. See Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Toa Tough? Not
Enough/, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 402, 406-07 (1987). Justice Thomas, when he was
Chairman of the EEOC, argued that affirmative action provides a discriminatory employer
a way to transfer the costs of its discrimination to past victims and "to the qualified persons
who wilJ be deprived of an employment opportunity because someone else was given a
preference under the remedial plan." /d.
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ground for failing to forbid intentional discrimination.
Within Wards Cove's instrumental argument lay the seeds
of a future rejection of the Weber case, which approved raceconscious voluntary affirmative action plans of private employers so long as they do not unduly trammel the rights of others.
Indeed, in Johnson, the Rehnquist wing and Justice White foreshadowed such a rethinking of Weber. 206 On the other hand,
Johnson, though not a race discrimination case, is a Rehnquist
Court decision that does reaffirm the vitality of Weber . If one
could rely on stare decisis, one might think Weber's position was
secure. 207
Congress has explicitly stated that nothing in Title VII
requires quotas. What the Rehnquist wing complains of is simply that some employers, to avoid violating the disparate impact
test of Title VII, might be tempted to turn to an affirmative
action plan consciously designed to guard against disparate
impact; a quota would be the easiest of such plans to administer.208 A quota, however, would not necessarily cure disparate
206. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment upholding the affirmative action plan, would recast Weber to allow
such plans only where there is "[e]vidence sufficient for a prima facie Title VII pattern or
practice claim against the employer itself." /d. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
White, dissenting, would overrule Weber, as construed by the majority; he apparently
would accept Weber only if it were interpreted to approve only affirmative action plans
"designed to remedy the intentional and systematic exclusion of blacks by the employer
and the unions from certain job categories." ld. at 657 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia's dissent, joined by the Chief Justice on this point, engaged in a spirited attack on the
Weber decision, and would overrule it. ld. at 657-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. As discussed, infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text, the Rehnquist wing
has weakened the hold of stare decisis.
208. Justice O'Connor relied in part on Justice Blackmun's early concurring opinion
in the Albemarle Paper case, where he voiced concern that rigid adherence to the EEOC's
guidelines for validating employment selection devices "will leave the employer little
choice, save an impossibly expensive and complex validation study, but to engage in a
subjective quota system of employment selection. This, of course, is far from the intent of
Title VII." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, however, adhered to the main components of the disparate
impact test. Indeed, in his concurring opinion in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 209-16 (1979), he argued that employers should be able to adopt race-conscious affirmative action programs based on past "arguable violations" of Title VII. ld. at 212. He
believed that an arguable violation could be established based on "a mere disparity between
the racial composition of the employer's work force and the composition of the qualified
local labor force." Id. at 214. So his view of the intent of Title VII changed during the
four years between Albemarle Paper and Weber. Moreover, he joined in the Court's opinion in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), which goes far to cut off the use of quotas
as a cure for disparate impact.
The Court did have before it some anecdotal evidence from prior cases suggesting that
employers adopt affirmative action plans to ward off discrimination suits. S ee, e.g. , Furnco
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impact, since the Court has held that disparate impact is measured by the effect of each practice on minority selection and not
by the bottom line. 209 Ironically, then-Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Powell's dissent in Teal,
which argued that the "likely consequences of [the Court's] decision" are to "force employers either to eliminate tests or rely on
expensive, job-related, testing procedures, the validity of which
may or may not be sustained if challenged.m1° Finally, this
instrumental concern with the consequences of the disparate
impact test seems inconsistent with the Court's ruling in Furnco
regarding proof in disparate treatment cases. 211 There the Court
held that, to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case, the employer
should be entitled to present evidence "that his work force was
racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high
percentage of minority employees."212 Therefore, "the District
Court was entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force
when trying to make the determination as to motivation." 213
Thus, the incentive remains for an employer to adopt what ProConstr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 572 (1978). In Furnco, the Court noted that Furnco
had instructed its job superintendent "to employ, as far as possible, at least 16% black
bricklayers, a policy due to Furnco's self-imposed affirmative-action plan to insure that
black bricklayers were employed by Fumco in Cook County in numbers substantially in
excess of their percentage in the local union." Id. Notably, however, the 16% figure was
not achieved; blacks worked 13.3% of the person-days. ld. at 570.
209. Teal, 457 U.S. at 445-51.
210. /d. at 463 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell did add, in an early foreshadowing of the Rehnquist group's current approach, that "[f]or state and local governmental
employers with limited funds, the practical effect of today's decision may well be the adoption of simple quota hiring." ld. This suggestion seems far-fetched, since it assumes that
state and local governments might return to the standardless selection system which the
merit system replaced. Indeed, Justice Powell's opinion concluded by quoting favorably
then-District Judge Newman's argument in another case that the bottom line defense was
consistent with the cases allowing private employers to adopt affirmative action plans. /d.
at 464 (quoting Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (D. Conn.
1979)). Although Connecticut "denied that specific affirmative action had been taken," it
seems clear that in Teal the employer attained a racially balanced bottom line by use of
race-conscious preferences among those who passed the discriminatory test. Alfred W.
Blumrosen, The "Bottom Line" After Connecticut v. Teal, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 572, 575
(1983). "In choosing persons from [the] list, . . . [p]etitioners .. . applied what the Court of
Appeals characterized as an affirmative action program in order to ensure a significant
number of minority supervisors." Teal, 457 U.S. at 444. Thus, Teal renders less likely, not
more likely, the use of quotas to compensate for disparate impact. Professor Blumrosen
argues that "Teal was wrongly decided because it did not support affirmative action to
compensate for the effect of tests that screen out a higher proportion of minorities than
whites." Blumrosen, supra, at 583.
211. 438 U.S. at 575-80.
212. /d. at 580.
213. ld.
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fessor Fiss calls "insurance [that] would minimize the risk of
having to defend against a claim of discrimination and facilitate
the defense against any such claim." 214 As he notes, "[o]ne form
of insurance consists of racial hiring." 215
More importantly, the instrumental concerns depend on
essentially political arguments. These arguments were developed by the Justice Department under the Reagan administration.216 They have served as the basis of the government's
litigating positions217 and the administration's legislative arguments. It may have been perfectly proper for the executive
branch to take litigative and legislative positions based on political preference, but there is general agreement that the political
preference of the Justices, without regard to congressional
intent, does not provide a proper basis for Supreme Court decision-making, especially in statutory cases. 218 Of course, Congress may always correct the Court's errors; that is one reason
for the normally strict adherence to stare decisis in statutory
cases. The Reagan and Bush Administrations opposed the disparate impact test, but must have known that it would be futile
to seek legislative revision of the test. Rather than seek legislative change, they asked the Supreme Court to revise the test.
The Court's validation of unsubstantiated fears that led it to
water down the Griggs test has taken new life in the political
arena, confirming President Bush's opposition to legislatively
restoring the test. The President vetoed the 1990 Civil Rights
Act because, "[p]rimarily through provisions governing cases in
which employment practices are alleged to have unintentionally
caused the disproportionate exclusion of members of certain
214. Fiss, supra note 117, at 256.
215. /d.
216. While Watson was pending, the Department of Justice published its 158-page
study of the disparate impact test. The Department of Justice argued that the test validated
group rights and undermined individual rights, that it would lead to "politicalization of
private activity" and "social balkanization," and that it would return us "back to the
future." OFFICE OF LEGAL PoLICY, supra note 168, at 18-19. The Department of Justice
argued that employers would inevitably be led to adopt quotas to avoid liability under the
disparate impact test; it cited no empirical evidence that this had happened. I d. ; see also
NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 33-59 (1988).
217. Charles Fried, the Solicitor General at the time, referred to Wards Cove as
"[o]ur opportunity to tame Griggs." FRIED, supra note 125, at 121.
218. As Professor William Eskridge has noted: "Like previous Courts, the Rehnquist
Court has substituted its policy preferences for those of the enacting Congress. But it has
also 'reneged' on the historical tradition by which the Court has long attended to the preferences of Congress." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/
Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 684 (1991).
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groups, § 2104 creates powerful incentives for employers to
adopt hiring and promotion quotas." 219 The Court's opinions
constitute the main body of empirical support for the President's
position, even though the opinions themselves lack empirical
support. 220 Thus, a bootstrap operation, from Solicitor General
brief, to Supreme Court opinion, to Presidential veto message,
has embroiled the Court in politics in a way we have not seen for
many years. 221
2.
Treatment of Precedent
Judicial activism and judicial restraint are defined in part by
the Court's respect for stare decisis, the binding authority of precedent.222 Traditionally, that doctrine applies with its fullest
force to statutory interpretation, especially to long standing constructions. Because it is easier for Congress to change the law
than for the nation to amend the Constitution, the Court may
honor the values of stare decisis in statutory cases without worrying that error cannot be otherwise corrected. 223 While it
might be argued that the Court has the right or even the duty to
reach out to correct constitutional error, 224 no such argument
219. President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights
Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1632, 1633 (Oct. 22, 1990).
220. Compare the findings of a recent Los Angeles Times survey of America's ten
largest industrial corporations, that the legislation then being proposed to overturn Wards
Cove "is not likely to require them to replace existing employment policies with rigid
numerical formulas for hiring and promoting women and racial minorities." Sam
Fulwood, Despite Bush Rhetoric, Firms Find No Quotas in JCights Bill, SACRAMENTO BEE,
June 30, 1991, at A6. A modified version of this legislation has become law. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-2000h-b, amended by 102 Pub. L. 166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
221. Professor Eskridge has written a thorough analysis showing how the activism of
the Rehnquist Court on legislative issues differs from the activism of the Warren and Burger Courts. He argues that the Warren and Burger Courts may have slighted the original
intent of legislators, but tried to render decisions consistent with current legislative
thought; by contrast, the Rehnquist Court follows neither the original nor the current
intent of Congress. Eskridge, supra note 218, at 680. Thus, the Court "clog[s] the legislative agenda with issues settled yesterday, ... [and] distract[s] Congress from understanding
and addressing the tough civil rights issues of today and tomorrow." /d.
222. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 G Eo.
L.J. 1361 (1988) (stating that stare decisis, although significant, is not dispositive of an
issue).
223. But see BoRK, supra note 201, at 102 (stating that Congress is often not free to
correct a judicial misinterpretation of a statute).
224. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (urging that the Court should reach out
beyond the narrow issues of the case and overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
Justice Scalia analogized to City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989),
where "despite the fact that we had already held a racially based set-aside unconstitutional
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has been advanced as to long-standing statutory rulings that
might have been wrong when decided. The ordinary deference
to prior statutory rulings has been enhanced where Congress has
subsequently taken action that indicates ratification of the ruling.225 This is not to say, however, that the Court will never
overturn a statutory ruling. For example, in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Corp. ,226 the Warren Court overruled statutory decisions
founded on the discredited constitutional rulings in the Civil
Rights Cases. 227
The Rehnquist Court has been faced with pre-existing statutory decisions at odds with its views on race discrimination
law. It first determined to confront a Burger Court statutory
race discrimination ruling in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union. 228 In Patterson, the Court, without prompting from the
parties or amici, ordered reargument on "[w]hether or not the
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary should be reconsidered?"229 Runyon, which
because unsupported by evidence of identified discrimination, which was all that was
needed to decide the case, we went on to outline the criteria for properly tailoring racebased remedies in cases where such evidence is present." Webster, 492 U.S. at 533 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice Scalia took up the argument again in his plurality opinion in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), stressing that "the doctrine of stare decisis is
less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents." /d. at 2686. Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter, who concurred in the five to four decision, took pains to avoid
overruling precedent, however. But see Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (a six to
three majority overruled Eighth Amendment decisions from 1987 and 1989). Justices Souter and Kennedy agreed that the decisions should be overruled, because "when this Court
has confronted a wrongly decided, unworkable precedent calling for some further action by
the Court, we have chosen not to compound the original error, but to overrule the precedent." /d. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring). One perceives nuanced differences of approach
to stare decisis among the Rehnquist-wing Justices.
225. For example, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the
Court relied in part on "the absence of congressional efforts to amend the statute to nullify
Weber," in declining to overrule Weber. /d. at 629 n.7. But see Webster, 492 U.S. at 532
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 forbids racial discrimination in private real estate transactions).
227. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
228. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). During the Rehnquist Court's first term, however, the
Court considered a sex discrimination case in which a minority of the Court (Justice Scalia,
joined by the Chief Justice, and, in a separate opinion, Justice White) would have overruled
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616 (1987), even though, as Justice O'Connor pointed out, the question had not
been "raised, briefed, or argued in this Court or in the courts below." Johnson, 480 U.S. at
648 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued, inter alia, that "this Court has
applied the doctrine of stare decisis to civil rights statutes less rigorously than to other
laws." /d. at 672-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 617 (1987) (citation omitted).
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extended the ruling of Jones to forbid race discrimination in all
contractual matters, was an open-ended decision and led to
much greater protection against race discrimination than the
modem Civil Rights Acts provided. The question evoked a
storm of protest. 230 The following term the Court decided that
the values of stare decisis outweighed any possible interpretive
error in Runyon and reaffirmed that case (while at the same time
severely limiting its scope). Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court recognized three possible reasons for overruling a statutory precedent. First, changes in judicial doctrine or congressional action may remove, weaken, or even contradict the
conceptual underpinnings of the precedent. Second, a precedent
may prove in practice to be unworkable. Finally, "it has sometimes been said that a precedent becomes more vulnerable as it
becomes outdated and after being 'tested by experience, has been
found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the
social welfare.' " 231 The Court said statutory precedent should
be overruled only upon a showing of special justification, and it
found no such justification for overruling Runyon.
Despite the reasoning of Patterson, that same term saw the
Court decide Wards Cove, in which the Court gratuitously
reached out and, without reasoned discussion, rejected prior
decisions applying the disparate impact standard. 232 Even when
the Court overrules constitutional rulings it ordinarily reviews in
detail its reasons for doing so. Indeed, the institutional strength
of the Court depends in large measure on its tradition of explaining the grounds for its decisions. The Wards Cove opinion has
been much criticized both for reaching out and for failing to
230. See FRIED, supra note 125, at 125.
231. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921))).
232. One of the principal architects of the Department of Justice's campaign against
the disparate impact test, former Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper, approvingly
noted that "[i)n Wards Cove . .. the Supreme Court abandoned the 'business necessity' test
as it has been applied since Griggs and redefined the employee's burden in proving disparate
impact." Charles J. Cooper, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: A Step Toward Eliminating Quotas in the American Workplace, 14 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 84, 90 (1991); see also
William B. Gould, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1485, 1488-99 (1990) (arguing
that Wards Cove reverses Griggs sub silentio). But see Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead?
Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 2, 16,
34 (1989) (arguing that Wards Cove is inconsistent with lower court interpretations of
Griggs but does not overrule any Supreme Court applications of Griggs).
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explain why the Court was repudiating prior rulings.233
The Rehnquist wing has also been less than careful in its
reliance on precedent. For example. the Wards Cove dicta rest
on a misuse of the Teamsters case. To understand fully the
Wards Cove Court•s treatment of the burden of proof issue. one
must begin by turning to Justice o•connor•s opinion in Sheet
Metal Workers because. as shown above. 234 Wards Cove relies on
Watson. which relies on Sheet Metal Workers. Sheet Metal
Workers involved a court-ordered goal or quota. In the course
of arguing that a court-ordered quota would violate two sections
of Title VII. 235 Justice o•connor reasoned that
it is completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of each
race will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each
employer or union absent unlawful discrimination. That, of
course, is why there must be a substantial statistical disparity
between the composition of an employer's work force and the
relevant labor pool, or the general population, before an intent
to discriminate may be inferred from such a disparity. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 339-40 & n.20 (1971).236
The Court's reasoning in Wards Cove thus incredibly traces back
to Teamsters . That case's holding that statistical disparities may
establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination
becomes authority for doubting the significance of those disparities in disparate impact cases. Moreover. the Teamsters note
that Justice o·connor cites proceeds on a premise diametrically
opposed to hers:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a
case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it
is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representa233. See, e.g. , Belton, supra note 134, at 1403. Professor Spann traces the Court's
"effortless vacillation between intent and effects principles" to the lack of any principled
basis in the text of the Constitution or Title VII for deciding whether to apply a disparate
impact test or a disparate treatment test. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L.
R E V . 1971, 1987-88 (1990). He characterizes Wards Cove as defying "all notions of consistency and constraint." /d. at 1988.
234. See supra note 70. A pre-Rehnquist Court study of Justice O'Connor concluded
that close examination of her opinions on stare decisis "raises questions about how consistently" she adheres to "traditional limitations on judicial conduct." Richard A. Cordray &
James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 389, 393 (1985).
235. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2( j), 2000e-S(g) (1988).
236. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 ( 1986).
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tive of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in
the community from which employees are hired.237
Justices White and Rehnquist, who had registered no dissent
from Justice Stewart's opinion in Teamsters, have reversed their
view.238
The Rehnquist wing's carelessness with precedent is also
illustrated by Teague v. Lane, 239 which rejected a criminal
defendant's collateral attack on his state court conviction. The
defendant claimed that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory
challenges to prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory
manner. The Court declined to give retroactive effect to Batson
v. Kentucky, 24Q found Teague's claim, under Swain v. Alabama, 241 procedurally barred, and declined to rule on a Sixth
Amendment claim because it held that a ruling on the claim
would not retroactively apply to Teague. The Court, thus, did
not directly address race discrimination issues. However, the
plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor (joined by Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Kennedy) sounds a familiar theme, arguing that if
Teague were to prevail, the Court would effectively be requiring
proportional representation of blacks on petit juries.242 Teague
had argued that the standards of Duren v. Missouri 243 should
govern his fair-cross-section claim. The plurality pointed to the
showing necessary to meet Duren's second prong: "demonstrating that the group is underrepresented in proportion to its position in the community as documented by census figures." 244
Demonstration of that prong, however, would not make out
defendant's case, as he would still have to show "that the underrepresentation of the group 'is due to systematic exclusion of the
group in the jury selection process.' " 245 Notably, Justice White,
the author of Duren, joined in the Teague judgment but not in
237. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
Justice O'Connor does not reject that view of Teamsters. Her concurring opinion in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), agrees that properly computed statistical disparities, if sufficiently stark, make out a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination. /d. at 651 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. They joined Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson , which called Teamsters' assumption "dubious." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 659.
239. 489 u.s. 288 (1989).
240. 476 u.s. 79 (1986).
241. 380 u.s. 202 (1965).
242. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 n.l.
243. 439 u.s. 357 (1979).
244. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 n.l.
245. /d. (quoting Duren , 439 U.S. at 364).
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part IV of Justice O'Connor's opinion, where this discussion of
Duren occurs.
In sum, the Rehnquist Court has substantially loosened the
restraints of stare decisis by ignoring, mischaracterizing, and
giving short shrift to inconvenient precedents. 246
3.
Treatment of Constitutional Challenges to Legislation
Legislation challenged under the Equal Protection Clause is
normally upheld if the legislature had any rational basis for
enacting it. The Court, however, has applied strict scrutiny to
classifications disfavoring minority group members and has held
such legislation invalid unless necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. The Burger Court was unable to decide on the
level of scrutiny that should apply to race-conscious affirmative
action plans under which white persons were disfavored. The
Rehnquist wing supports the application of strict scrutiny to
such legislation and has succeeded in mustering a majority for
that position as to state legislation. 247 It has failed, however, to
prevail as to federal legislation and regulations. 248 As noted
above, 249 a question of relative competence arises if the Court
rests its decision on factual assumptions. On the other hand,
judicial acceptance of legislative judgments can be a two-edged
sword.250
246. More carelessness occurs in the opening sentence of Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Metro Broadcasting, where she says: "At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not 'as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.' " Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028 (1990) (quoting Arizona Governing
Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)). Norris was not a constitutional case, but a
statutory one. The quoted material did not begin with "the simple command that the Government must treat citizens 'as individuals.' " Norris, 463 U.S. at 1083. Rather, it said
"Title VII requires employers to treat their employees as individuals." Id. One may argue
that the statutory and constitutional commands concerning this point should be the same,
even though in other respects they differ. But such an argument is a far cry from pretending that a statutory ruling was really a constitutional one.
247. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989). The Brennan wing agrees that rational basis scrutiny is inappropriate; it would apply so-called
midlevel scrutiny, under which "race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial
goals 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives' in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 535
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359
(1978)).
248. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 2997.
249. See supra notes 204-21 and accompanying text.
250. "[l]t seems less than clear that the Court's conclusion that racial distinctions are
sometimes permissible will work in the long run to the benefit of those it was intended to
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The decision to apply strict scrutiny stems from both factual assumptions and a view of the policies of the Equal Protection Clause. The Rehnquist wing assumes that race-conscious
affirmative action stigmatizes the minority persons whom it is
designed to help. The stigma is both internal (imbuing the purported beneficiary with a feeling of inferiority) and external
(inculcating in whites who feel displaced by both a corresponding feeling that the beneficiary is inferior and resentment toward
minorities). Recognizing that the purpose for adopting the
Equal Protection Clause was to protect the newly freed slaves,
these Justices believe that the most protective construction
would allow few, if any, exceptions to a rule of color blindness.
They point out that the Brennan wing formulation requires the
Court to decide which classifications are benign in order to apply
the correct standard of review. Finally, the Rehnquist wing
points to Plessy as illustrative of the Court's inability to rise
above or recognize the prejudices of the moment. This clash
transcends the issue of standard of review because even the most
stringent standard of review allows the legislative branch to
exercise its competence to determine whether particular means
are suited to pursuing the compelling state end. If that is so, the
Court will have to decide whether it may substitute its own judgment for the legislative judgment with regard to the stigmatic
and other effects of an affirmative action plan. Perhaps the
answer will depend on the record underlying the legislative
judgment.
V.
OTHER THEMES
The nine cases described above have drawn much attention;
those who discuss the Rehnquist Court's race discrimination
decisions normally confine themselves to these cases. m Because
help . . . . It may be that politically powerless minorities are most secure if racial classifications are forbidden entirely." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 487-88 (1991).
251. The other cases that have drawn considerable attention are Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989), and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Martin held
that white firefighters who had not been parties to a Title VII consent decree against the
Birmingham fire department were not bound by the affirmative action provisions of the
decree. 490 U.S. at 761-69. The Rehnquist wing and Justice White constituted the majority, and the Brennan wing dissented. While some have pointed to the case as placing unusual barriers in the way of settling Title VII cases, Professor Selig has convincingly
demonstrated that the Court's application of well-settled due process concepts does nothing
of the sort. Joel L. Selig, Affirmative Action in Employment after Croson and Martin: The
Legacy Remains Intact, 63 TEMPLE L. REv. I , 20-29 (1990). Patterson held that a claim of
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these cases constitute less than a third of the Court's total decisions on the subject, however, a complete picture requires at
least brief attention to the other, relatively less controversial,
decisions. Those cases include several unanimous decisions. In
many, the Rehnquist wing supported the position of minority
group plaintiffs. In others, schisms within the Rehnquist wing
resulted in victory for the minority group position.
A.
Intentional Discrimination
The Rehnquist Court has fairly consistently provided
stronger protection against intentional discrimination than
against practices with an adverse disparate impact. University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC unanimously rejected a university's plea
for a privilege against disclosure of peer review materials that
are relevant to charges of race discrimination in tenure decisions. 252 While acknowledging "the costs that ensue from disclosure," the Court observed:
[T)he costs associated with racial and sexual discrimination in
institutions of higher learning are very substantial. Few would
deny that ferreting out this kind of invidious discrimination is a
great if not compelling governmental interest. Often ... disclosure of peer review materials will be necessary in order for the
Commission to determine whether illegal discrimination has
taken place. Indeed, if there is a "smoking gun" to be found
that demonstrates discrimination in tenure decisions, it is likely
to be tucked away in peer review files. 253
In Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., the Court unanimously rejected an employer's invocation of collateral estoppel
to avoid a jury trial in a race discrimination and retaliation claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, where the trial court had found against
the plaintiff on parallel Title VII claims.254 The Court disagreed
with the court of appeals' view "that the judicial interest in econracial harassment on the job was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Patterson, 491
U.S. at 175-85. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court painted the Court's role modestly:
"our role is limited to interpreting what Congress may do and has done." !d. at 188.
Nonetheless, he cited reluctance "to federalize" what should be a matter of state law as one
reason for the Court's decision. !d. at 183. He also noted that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 forbade racial harassment on the job; therefore, the primary consequence of
Patterson is to limit the remedy for such discrimination, not to bar such suits altogether.
!d. at 172. However, the limit on the remedy is substantial, since back pay is often not a
significant remedy for harassment, while § 1981 remedies include money damages.
252. 493 u.s. 182, 188-95 (1990).
253. !d. at 192-94.
254. 110 s. Ct. 1331, 1335-37 (1990).
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omy of resources overrode Lytle's interest in relitigating the
issues before a jury." 255 The Court was also unwilling to assume
that the trial court's dismissal of the discrimination claim under
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrated
that the trial court would have directed a verdict against the
plaintiff on his similar § 1981 claim. While the decision is
unremarkable, it does reinforce the Court's emphasis, in cases
such as Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 256 and Curtis v. Loether, 251
on the importance of allowing colorable discrimination claims at
law to go to the jury.
A group of cases contesting peremptory challenges of
jurors, allegedly based on race, reveals varied approaches by different members of the Rehnquist wing. The first of the group,
Holland v. Illinois, unanimously held that a white defendant had
standing to assert a Sixth Amendment challenge to the prosecution's race-conscious use of peremptory challenges to disqualify
potential blackjurors.258 Four Justices dissented, however, from
the further holding that the Sixth Amendment provides no protection against such challenges.259 Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court is consistent with the Rehnquist wing's general
approach to quotas. As we saw in Teague v. Lane, the Rehnquist wing believes that extending the fair cross-section requirement to selection of petit juries would suggest a right to a
racially balanced jury.260 However, a crack in the Rehnquist
wing was manifested by Justice Kennedy's concurrence, stating
that "if the claim here were based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, it would have merit. " 261
Justice Kennedy's view prevailed in Powers v. Ohio, 262 with
only the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia dissenting. The Court
had previously held, in Batson v. Kentucky, that a defendant
could raise an equal protection challenge to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors of the
255. /d. at 1335.
256. 398 u.s. 144, 153-61 (1970).
257. 415 u.s. 189, 191-93 ( 1974).
258. 493 u.s. 474 (1990).
259. ld. at 475-77.
260. 489 u.s. 288, 314-16 (1989).
261. Holland, 493 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 490-9 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 504-05 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
262. Il l S. Ct. 1364, 1364 ( 1991).
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defendant's race. 263 Powers applied Batson to a white defendant's objection to race-conscious exclusions of black persons
from the petit jury. The Court held that individuals had an
equal protection right not to be excluded from the petit jury
based solely on race and that a defendant had standing to challenge such an exclusion, regardless of the defendant's race. 264
The dissenters would have held that the exercise of race-conscious peremptory challenges does not violate the equal protection rights of the prospective jurors and that, in any event, a
defendant's standing to challenge a juror's race-conscious exclusion depends on the defendant sharing the same race as the prospective juror. 26s
The Court further extended Batson in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , holding that the ban on race-based peremptory challenges applies to civil cases as well and that a party in a
civil case has standing to object to the practice. 266 Again, Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court, with the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor and Scalia dissenting. The primary issue was whether
the discrimination should be imputed to the federal court so that
it would be covered by the equal protection guarantees of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 267 Justice Kennedy concluded that "[t]o permit racial exclusion in this official
forum compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen
by the color of his or her skin. " 268
While agreeing that "[a]rbitrary discrimination based on
263. 476 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1986). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented
from that decision. /d. at 112-17.
264. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1367-70.
265. /d. at 1374-82.
266. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087-89 (1991).
267. The Court mentioned 18 U.S.C. § 243, which makes it a crime for any person
charged with any duty in the selection of jurors to disqualify any citizen from service on
account of race. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988). It also mentioned 28 U.S.C. § 1862, which pro·
vides that "(n]o citizen shall be excluded from service as a . .. petit juror in the district
courts of the United States ... on account of race." 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988). However, the
Court did not discuss whether either statute might provide a nonconstitutional ground of
decision. Curiously, the Court also did not cite or seem to consider whether race-based
peremptory challenges might violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides, in part: " All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right .. . to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). Section 1981 applies to private
action and thus might have provided a vehicle for avoiding the state action issue. See
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989). But see Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 590-95 (1872).
268. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
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race is particularly abhorrent when manifest in a courtroom, " 269
Justice O'Connor's dissent insisted that since the discriminatory
peremptory challenge comes from the private attorney rather
than from the judge, no state discrimination has occurred. 270
Justice Scalia's separate dissent argued that the majority decision would result in further litigation of side issues at the
expense of the merits of civil cases. 271
Another split of the Rehnquist wing occurred in Hernandez
v. New York. 272 The Court, by a six to three margin, upheld a
state court ruling that the prosecutor had presented a racially
neutral basis for his peremptory challenges of Spanish-speaking
jurors and that the challenges had not been based on race. 273
There was no majority opinion for the Court. Justice Kennedy,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Souter,
agreed that the prosecutor's justification for the challenges-fear
that the challenged persons would be unable to rely solely on an
interpreter's version of Spanish language testimony-resulted in
a disparate impact on Latinos and that the disparate impact was
evidence of possible racial discrimination. 274 The defendant lost
because the trial judge's finding that the prosecutor's motives
were race neutral was not clearly erroneous.27s Justice Kennedy,
however, noted, "[w]e would face a quite different case if the
prosecutor had justified his peremptory challenges with the
explanation that he did not want Spanish-speaking jurors."2 76
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, generally agreed with
Justice Kennedy, but seemed to disagree with this last point.
She would rule that "[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike
may be, the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection
Clause unless it is based on race." 277 Justice Stevens dissented, 278 arguing that the prosecutor's explanation was insufficient. It was a proxy for discriminatory exclusion of Latinos;
the prosecutor's concerns could have been accommodated by
269. /d. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
270. /d.
271. /d. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1860 (1991).
273. /d. at 1866-68.
274. /d.
275. /d. at 1868-72.
276. /d. at 1872.
277. /d. at 1874 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
278. Justice Marshall joined the dissent; Justice Blackmun dissented for essentially
the same reasons. ld.
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less drastic means; and if individual jurors could not accept the
interpreter's version of testimony, they could be challenged for
cause. 279 The gap between the Kennedy opinion and the Stevens
opinion is narrower than that between Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor. Justices Kennedy and Stevens seem to agree that
some traits are so closely related to race that state action based
on those traits looks suspiciously like race discrimination. The
seeds of future shifting alignments may have been sown by these
optmons.
The jury cases show that the Rehnquist wing is not monolithic, at least when intentional race discrimination is concerned.
Justices Kennedy and Souter elevate the elimination of race discrimination over the tradition of peremptory challenges and the
generally restricted nature of third-party standing. They take an
expansive view of state action where race discrimination in the
courtroom is the issue. The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
would narrowly confine the Burger Court's Batson decision,
believing that race may have a permissible role to play in the
exercise of peremptory challenges. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
would not require that the prosecutor's "justification be unrelated to race," only that it "not be the juror's race." 280 Justices
Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Souter leave that issue to another day.
B.
Coverage Issues
The Court has confronted several statutory cases, in addition to those already discussed, in which the two wings have
displayed differing approaches. The Rehnquist wing, for the
most part, has narrowly construed the coverage of civil rights
statutes; the Brennan wing has found coverage in every case
where that issue has been presented. During the first term of the
Rehnquist Court, the Justices all agreed that persons of Arab or
Jewish ancestry could invoke the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
against persons who discriminated against them based on their
ancestry. 281 But on every coverage issue decided since that time,
the Court has split. Some Justices in the Rehnquist wing would
have denied coverage in three Voting Rights Act cases in which
the Court found coverage. 282 Conversely, the Brennan wing dis279. Id. at 1877.
280. Id. at 1875 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
281. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987); Saint Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-13 (1987).
282. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., Ill S. Ct. 2376, 2382 (1991) (hold-
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sented from the Court's denial of coverage in two cases under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and one case under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 283 As with the issue of peremptory challenges, the
Rehnquist wing was not united on the Voting Rights Act coverage issue. It is difficult, however, to forecast any long-term
schism based on these cases.
VI.
REACTIONS TO THE REHNQUIST COURT
Reaction in the law journals predictably falls into three categories: extremely critical, balanced, and extremely supportive.
Strangely, however, the extremely critical and extremely supportive reactions share the view that the Court has initiated a
general reversal of the Burger Court approach to race discrimination. These two sets of reactions differ primarily on the desirability and consequences of the reversal.
As the citations throughout this Article reflect, most scholarly reaction to the Rehnquist Court has been hostile, and some
has been apocalyptic. As to race discrimination, Professor
Chemerinsky's description of the 1988-89 term is typical: "For
conservatives, this is a year of rejoicing. The Reagan legacy of a
conservative Court seems secure for many years to come. For
liberals, it is a time of despair. The 1988-1989 Term was devastating for civil rights and civil liberties."284
A similar evaluation is implicit in the title of Professor
Brodin's article: Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term:
The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction. 285 Professor Brodin carries
his hyperbole into his analysis. For example, he complains that
ing that § 2 of Voting Rights Act covers election of judges) (the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Scalia dissented; Justices O'Connor and Souter voted with the majority);
Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2368 (1991) (holding that state judicial elections are
covered in the Voting Rights Act); City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462,
472 (1987) (coverage of city's annexation of unpopulated land) (the Chief Justice, Justice
Powell, and Justice O'Connor dissented). This is one of two cases, both in his first tenn on
the Court, where Justice Scalia supported the position of minority groups and the rest of
the Rehnquist wing opposed it. See Appendix, Table II.
283. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230-36 (1991) (finding no
coverage of employment discrimination that an American employer commits against an
American employee outside the United States); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 731-36 (1989) (finding no respondeat superior liability under § 1981); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 189 (1989) (holding race-based retaliation against
employee not actionable under§ 1981).
284. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 45 (1989) (footnote omitted).
285. See Brodin, supra note 133, at I.
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Martin v. Wilks "appears to be ... a call for what in an earlier
era of the civil rights struggle would be termed 'massive resistance' to the civil rights decrees of federal courts. ''286
Chemerinsky's description of the Rehnquist Court's "jurisprudential theme" does not fit the Court's race discrimination
decisions. He says the theme "is the Court's search for judicial
neutrality,"287 and that "[t]he Court is animated not by an
affirmative view of the Court's role or of constitutional values to
be upheld, but rather by a vision of the bounds of judicial behavior."288 Yet the Rehnquist wing expresses a strong view of the
Court's role and vividly describes the constitutional values to be
upheld. As far as race is concerned, these are activist Justices.
Chemerinsky acknowledges as much:
Ironically, the lack of a consistent theory of constitutional
interpretation creates the appearance of arbitrarily imposed
judicial values. For example, how can the Court's invalidation
of Richmond's affirmative action program be reconciled with
its insistence that the Court rule against the government only
when guided by clear constitutional principles that exist external to the views of the Justices? By what theory is the requirement that the government be "color-blind" such a principle
.. .?"289
This last question deserves further development, but too often
286. /d. at 23. Brodin does not explain who is to engage in this massive resistance.
The white employee who objects to a decree is powerless to resist massively; the objector
may challenge the decree in a federal court action-a far cry from interposition, standing in
the school-house door or calling out the national guard. The employer is in no position to
massively resist, since violation of the court order will lead to a contempt citation, even if
the court order is vulnerable to attack by the white employees. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 319 (1967). Martin may have set back the cause of affirmative action
but it is no invitation to anything remotely resembling massive resistance. But see Selig,
supra note 251, at 29 ("Martin, which probably could be altered by legislation carefully
drafted to avoid due process problems, is a limited holding consistent with existing substantive and procedural law and also represents no retreat on the subject of affirmative
action.").
287. Chemerinsky, supra note 284, at 48.
288. /d. at 49.
289. /d. at 59 (footnote omitted); see also Ronald Salley, Note, Croson- The Cornerstone of Backlash Jurisprudence, 7 HARV. BLACKLE'ITER J. 167, 171 (1990) (" Croson and
its even more powerful progeny can indeed be seen as the culmination of twelve years of
'backlash' jurisprudence on the part of the Supreme Court, and one which has handed the
opponents of affirmative action the necessary ammunition to strike down such legislation
whenever proposed, in tum making a virtual mockery of the civil rights struggle of the past
three decades."). A sampling of the many other critiques of this genre includes Freeman,
supra note 32; Gould, supra note 232 (proposing that the Rehnquist Court's opinions are
like those of the previous century); Jones, supra note 5; Kushner, supra note 34; Constance
B. Motley, The Supreme Courr, CiYil Rights Litigation, and Deja Vu, 76 CoRNELL L. REV.
1992]
1331
the rhetoric of these articles fails to provide serious consideration of the Rehnquist wing's concerns.
The supporters of the Rehnquist Court are drawn largely
from the ranks of the Reagan Justice Department. Having
sought strict scrutiny of race-conscious preferences, they
applaud Croson and side with the dissent in Metro Broadcasting. 290 Having sought to restrict the disparate impact test, they
applaud Wards Cove. 291 Having espoused restraints on structural injunctions, they support Spallone and decry Missouri v.
Jenkins .292
There is much in the Rehnquist Court's opinions to fuel
these fires on the extremes, but the third group of writings,
which I would characterize as balanced, finds that the Court has
not abandoned the Warren and Burger Court rulings. Professor
Selig is closer to the mark:
In sum, the Brennan-Powell majority's legacy on affirmative action in employment remains fully intact. To conclude
otherwise would be a form of "crying wolf" that squanders
credibility and that, by attributing to the Courfs decisions a
scope far broader than what a fair reading would indicate, itself
threatens to impair the very legacy it is so important to
preserve. 293
Professor Rosenfeld takes a different tack: All nine Justices in
Croson "believe that the equal protection clause is designed to
uphold the equal worth, dignity, and respect of every individual
regardless of race.... [and] share the notion that the ultimate
fulfillment of constitutional equality lies in the establishment of a
truly color-blind society."294 Professor Miller carries this analysis one step further, arguing that
643 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court has gotten tired of race discrimination
litigation).
290. See, e.g., BoucK, supra note 155, at 109-10; Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1990) (comparing the
collectivist view with the individualist view). Professor Fried was Solicitor General during
the latter part of the Reagan Administration; Mr. Bolick worked in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice during that period.
291. See, e.g., BoucK, supra note 155, at 120-21; Cooper, supra note 232, at 92;
Player, supra note 232, at 46-47. Mr. Cooper was an Assistant Attorney General in the
Justice Department during Reagan's term, and Professor Player was a Scholar-in-Residence there in 1986-87.
292. William B. Reynolds, Judicial Remedies: Braking the Power to Fix It , 14 HARV.
J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 120, 122, 123 n.l4 (1991). Mr. Reynolds was Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights throughout the Reagan Administration.
293. Selig, supra note 251, at 29.
294. Rosenfeld, supra note 85, at 1749 (footnote omitted); see also Days, supra note
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changes [from Warren Court and Burger Court decisions] have
been surprisingly marginal. . . . The Rehnquist Court's commitment to this core agenda [of Brown v. Board of Education
and United States v. Caro/ene Products] is not dramatically different than that of its predecessors, at least not when the broad
sweep of constitutional law is taken into account. 295
If the Court has not yet turned its back on the Burger
Court's legacy, the question is whether that legacy can long survive the logic of the Rehnquist Court's decisions. What does the
future hold? This question is addressed in Part VII below.
VII.
CONCLUSION
The Rehnquist wing has been shaped by the appointments
of the Reagan-Bush years, years of political controversy over
race discrimination law. More than at any time since the late
1930s, the President has used the appointment power to further
his political agenda, nominating judges only after intensive ideological screening. 296 Both President Roosevelt and President
Reagan sought to change the direction of judicial decisions.
President Roosevelt, however, sought to further judicial
restraint in review of constitutional challenges to legislation. 297
By contrast, President Reagan's program was one neither of
restraint nor of activism, but was based on a substantive agenda,
focusing on the one hand on a relaxed review of anti-abortion
laws while, on the other hand, seeking strict scrutiny of affirmative action laws and programs. Study of the emerging Rehnquist
Court reveals that President Reagan has apparently succeeded in
creating a remarkably cohesive wing with respect to race discrimination matters, at least in the short run.
One should nonetheless exercise caution in evaluating the
Rehnquist Court on the strength of only five terms; indeed, Justice Kennedy's appointment, reinforcing the Rehnquist wing of
the Court, occurred too late to affect two of those terms. 298 Justice Souter has not yet firmly revealed his views in race discrimination cases. All members of the Rehnquist Court embrace the
48; Leland Ware, A Remedy for the "Extreme Case ": The Status of Affirmative Action After
Croson, 55 Mo. L. REv. 631 (1990) (discussing recent affirmative action cases).
295. Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 Soc. PHIL.
& POL'Y 196, 196 (1991).
296. See BORK, supra note 201 , at 271-93.
297. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (12th ed. 1991).
298. See Chemerinsky, supra note 284, at 44 n.4.
1992]
1333
nondiscrimination requirement/99 and none espouses racial balance as an end-state requirement of the Constitution or antidiscrimination laws. The Justices are divided along instrumental
lines, seemingly determined by behavioral assumptions.
The Warren Court, once it had imposed the nondiscrimination requirement, spent the rest of its days in a holding pattern.
Post-Brown decisions extended and defended the application of
the antidiscrimination principle but did little to define the principle or shape remedial rules. The Burger Court displayed an
optimism that well-defined rules of liability and remedy would
lead to compliance and end the need for frequent judicial intervention. 300 The Rehnquist Court implicitly distrusts government intervention and believes that the Burger Court's
definitional project failed in two ways. First, the definitions
struck the wrong balance between the rights of minorities and
others (employers and nonminorities). Second, the definitions
299. Both wings frequently use the rhetorical device of raising the specter of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), when embracing the nondiscrimination ideal. The Rehnquist wing finds race-conscious affirmative action to be a throwback to Plessy. See Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, I to S. Ct. 2997, 3044 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
majority exhumes Plessy's deferential approach to racial classifications .... "); id. at 3047
(Majority interprets "the Constitution to do no more than move us from 'separate but
equal' to 'unequal but benign.' "); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). It also relies on the ghost of Plessy in other cases. See
Powers v. Ohio, ttl S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 174 (1989). The Brennan wing stresses Plessy as a fount of historical discrimination,
whose etfects unceasingly flow, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), and as a manifestation of failure to recognize the stigmatic etfect of state
enforced segregation. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630, 642 ( 1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
300. It is worth noting that both the Warren and Burger Courts decided many cases
against blacks. While now generally viewed as favoring the rights of minorities, those
Courts drew heavy criticism for such decisions. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 661-62 (2d ed. 1976); DERRICK A. BELL,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 5.15.2 (2d ed. 1980); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-20 (2d ed. 1988); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95,
99-102; Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237,
243 (1968); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976) (holding that the
disparate impact test does not extend to claims of unconstitutional race discrimination);
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (finding that a federal court may not impose
an interdistrict school desegregation remedy absent an interdistrict violation of the Constitution); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (closing municipal swimming
pools to avoid desegregation does not violate Equal Protection Clause); Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks upheld, in
absence of showing of long-term systematic exclusion); Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891, 891
(1955) (failure of Supreme Court to exercise mandatory jurisdiction over appeal from
annulment based on antimiscegenation statute); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955) (writing that desegregation is to proceed with " all deliberate speed").
1334
TULANE LAW REVIEW
(Vol. 66
are subject to manipulation and misunderstanding, further skewing the balance. The Rehnquist wing has undertaken to correct
the perceived imbalance and to strip away definitional rules that
it believes skew the balance.
The changing direction of the Rehnquist wing has
prompted severe criticism from the traditional civil rights coalition. 301 Concern that the Court is departing from the Burger
Court legacy is fueled by the cheering squad for recent decisions.302 To accuse the Rehnquist wing of "callous racial insensitivity"303 or "moral blindness," 304 however, ignores the
concerns that, rightly or wrongly, prompt revision. Yet the
Rehnquist wing has fueled that hyperbole by failing to justify its
revisionism and by adopting wooden formulas (e.g., the Wards
Cove rule and a virtually per se rule of invaliditating race-conscious affirmative action) that inadequately protect the legitimate interests of nonwhites.
The result of these shifts has not yet fully crystallized. The
momentum seems to undermine the pillars of the Burger Court
jurisprudence:
( 1) the requirement of overcoming effects of past discrimination;
(2) the tailoring principle-which may be both empowering and
limiting;
(3) the disparate impact test under Title VII and the Voting
Rights Act;
(4) the rejection of any per se invalidity of race-conscious affirmative action.
The Rehnquist Court has not explicitly rejected these foundational rules. At times its rhetoric has even embraced them. The
internal logic of some opinions and the explicit statements of
individual Justices, however, portend further erosion and possible overturning of the Burger Court's race jurisprudence.
No doctrinal revolution has been completed. The Court is
at a crossroad. One road leads to abandonment of most of the
antidiscrimination law structure the Burger Court had erected.
The other leads to careful narrowing of Burger Court prece301. See, e.g. , Ralph G. Neas, The Civil Rights Legacy of the Reagan Years, USA
TODAY MAG., Mar. 1990, at 16, 18 ("[T)he new five-person majority on the Supreme Court
poses the gravest threat to civil rights and civil liberties in America today."). Mr. Neas is
executive director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.
302. See, e.g. , Cooper, supra note 232; Reynolds, supra note 292.
303. Freeman, supra note 32, at 1433.
304. Jones, supra note 5, at 47.
1992]
1335
dents. If one believes that the Burger Court structure is essential
to preserving Brown's antidiscrimination principle, the former
road would lead to yet another crossroad, and the future of
Brown would be at stake. Abandonment of the Burger Court
structure would require the creation of a new structure for
enforcing the antidiscrimination principle. The narrowing of
Burger Court precedents would be uncomfortable, but would
leave Brown unchallenged. We still await the answer to the
question whether "the counterrevolution that had been staved
off during the Burger years might finally come to pass." 30s
Americans rally around the Constitution, while disputing
its meaning; so too with the antidiscrimination principle.
Although the public, the Congress, the President, and the Court
have embraced nondiscrimination as an abstract principle,
Plessy showed it was possible to pay lip service to nondiscrimination while sanctioning oppression of people because of their race.
The stated fear of the Rehnquist wing is that race-conscious,
group-based measures will revive Plessy. The stated fear of the
Brennan wing is that the failure to follow such measures will
revive the effects of Plessy. The search for a common definition
of the antidiscrimination principle must address both these fears.
The danger is that the ascendant wing will impose doctrine that
recognizes only half the threat.
Some may say that the key to the future lies in the judicial
nomination and confirmation process. It seems clear, however,
that a Rehnquist wing will dominate the Court for many years
to come. The key may lie elsewhere. One possibility is legislation providing more specific standards for the courts to apply,
thus limiting the Court's ability to shape antidiscrimination law.
Despite nearly unanimous supportive rhetoric from its members,
however, Congress' effort to overturn Wards Cove's definition of
business necessity ended in confusion-essentially returning the
issue to the courts. 306 Moreover, legislative solutions that the
305. CURRIE, supra note 250, at 601.
306. Congress overturned several Burger Court civil rights rulings. See Eskridge,
supra note 218. However, its 1990 effort to overrule Wards Cove, Patterson , and several
other cases was vetoed by President Bush. President's Message to the Senate Returning
Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1632 (Oct.
22, 1990). A similar bill (H.R. l) passed the House in 1991. A revised bill was enacted in
November 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), amended by 102 Pub. L. 166, 105 Stat. 1071.
That statute contains no definition of "business necessity," but provides that the only
authoritative legislative history as to the meaning of the term is an interpretive memorandum which simply refers the Court to its pre-Wards Cove decisions. See Sec. 105(b), refer-
1336
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[Vol. 66
Court believes lead to quotas may face constitutional challenge.
The Rehnquist wing seems determined to assert the Court's preeminent competence and apply strict scrutiny to legislative solutions if they are race conscious. 307 So while future legislation
may influence the path of antidiscrimination law, litigation will
continue to play a major shaping role. Litigants would do well
to concentrate on building factual records that address the
behavioral assumptions of the two wings of the Court. The disparate impact test has provided a seductive incentive for plaintiffs to avoid the expense and delay attendant to developing an
exhaustive factual record. Thus, while the test has provided a
powerful litigation tool to minority group plaintiffs, an unanticipated side effect may have been a reduced judicial understanding
of the structure of racial discrimination. Finally, the supporters
of minority groups seeking to preserve the gains of prior decades
will need to search for arguments and actions responsive to the
concerns of the Rehnquist wing. They will need to recognize
and address the individuality of the Justices who comprise that
wing and to appeal to swing Justices such as Justice White and
possibly Justice Souter. They will need to develop the theoretical underpinnings of the disparate impact test. They will need to
exercise care in the formulation of affirmative action plans.
When both sides of the debate wrap themselves in the mantle of nondiscrimination, the rhetoric of nondiscrimination fails
to resolve doctrinal debates. The future of antidiscrimination
law may depend on the ability of advocates to rise above rhetoric
and on the willingness of the Rehnquist wing to listen.
ring to 137 Cong. Rec. 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991), as the sole source of legislative
history. However, President Bush, still concerned that the disparate impact rule could lead
to quotas, has instructed federal officials to rely on an analysis submitted by Senator Dole
and others. President Bush's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1701, 1702 (Nov. 21, 1991).
307. In this respect, the race cases depart from the nonnal Rehnquist wing position.
"The Rehnquist Court ... seems bent on minimizing rather than expanding its role. The
Court recognizes that it is the third branch of government, rather than the first or secondand the only one that is not politically accountable in any direct way." Donald Ayer, The
Rehnquist Court Unbound, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 1991, at S20.
1992]
1337
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY
How the Tables in the Appendix were Compiled
TABLE
I
Summary of Cases and Opinions
TABLE
II
Votes of the Justices For and Against the Position of
Nonwhite Parties and Amici Curiae
TABLE
III A- E
Yearly Summary of Justice Agreement in Race Cases
TABLE
III-F
Summary of 1986-90 Terms Justice Agreement in
Race Cases
TABLE
IV
Summary of 1986-90 Terms Justice Agreement in All
Cases
TABLE
V
5-4 Decisions
TABLE
VI
Unanimity in Full Opinions
TABLE
VII
Amicus Filings in Race Cases
1338
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(Vol. 66
METHODOLOGY
SELECTING THE DATABASE
This database contains the twenty-nine race discrimination
cases decided on their merits during the 1986 through 1990
terms of the Supreme Court, where the existence of or remedy
for racial discrimination was an issue presented.
Per curiam cases, namely Town of Huntington v. NAACP 1
and Alvarado v. United States 2 were excluded from the database
because they do not provide an analysis of the issues. The
remaining cases were reviewed to determine whether the racial
issues controlled the decision or whether a nonracial issue was
being addressed in a racial discrimination case. Cases in which
the Court was reviewing only procedural error, such as Owens v.
Okure, 3 dealing with the statute of limitations, or where the
Court decided matters regarding the awarding of attorney's fees,
Blanchard v. Bergeron;' are not included in this study.
The body of cases was developed initially by searches in
online databases and in appropriate digests for key words, statutes, and acts (e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, The Fair Housing Act and
key word searches including "rae!" and "discrimination"). To
assure the complete representation of the race cases decided by
the Rehnquist Court, all cases reported in the Supreme Court
Reporter were scanned from the October 1986 term to the
present.
READING THE STATISTICS
Table I presents a summary of the twenty-nine cases,
including the author of the majority opinion and the vote. The
fourth column of the table shows whether the position taken by
the U.S. government in each case, either as an amicus curiae or
as a party to the controversy, prevailed. This was determined by
comparing the briefs filed with the published opinion of the
Court for similarities in reasoning, citations, and argumentative
structure. Column five sets out the same results for the nonwhite or minority position.
The minority group position in each case was determined
by ascertaining from the U.S. Reports and briefs filed in the cases
1. 488 u.s. 15 (1990).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990).
3. 488 u.s. 235 (1989).
4. 489 u.s. 87 (1989).
1992]
1339
what position the mainstream, well-established minority group
organizations had taken in the case, either as amici curiae or as
attorneys for litigants. These organizations include, but are not
limited to, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
the NAACP, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
the Law, and the Congressional Black Caucus.
Table II provides the voting behavior of each Justice in relation to whether the nonwhite position prevailed in the case. The
chart identifies whether the Justice voted "for" (F) or "against"
(A) the nonwhite position in each racial discrimination case
reviewed in each term. An asterisk (*) marks which Justice
wrote the majority opinion. After the list of cases and the Justices voting, the total decisions "for" or "against" the black/
nonwhite position are given, for each term as well as the totals
for all terms at the end. The chart was compiled by searching
each case to determine how and with whom the Justice voted
and whether the nonwhite position aligned with the Justice's
views. This sometimes required a subjective decision as to
whether the case represented a win or loss for the nonwhite position, especially given the debate over what a particular case
decided. The standard for determining the prevailing party was
to determine which party substantially prevailed in the case,
using the criteria set out above for Table I.
Table III records the voting alignment of the Justices on
race discrimination cases by tabulating the number of times one
Justice voted with another. Tables III-A through III-E represent the voting alignment of the Justices for each Supreme Court
Term. Table III-F is a summary of the voting alignment of the
Rehnquist Court for race discrimination cases, through the
October 1990 term. Table III follows the model of the statistical
analysis found in each November's Harvard Law Review, which
analyzes the Supreme Court's workload for the preceding term.
We have also used the same abbreviations and definitions: "0"
represents the number of times two Justices agreed in opinions
or judgments of the Court; "S" represents the number of times
two Justices agreed in a separate opinion, concurrence or dissent; "D" represents the number of decisions in which the two
Justices agreed either in the majority, dissenting, or concurring
opinion; and "N" stands for the number of decisions in which
the Justices participated and thereby had the opportunity of
agreeing in the case. "P" is the percentage of agreement of the
Justices, computed by dividing "D" by "N."
1340
TULANE LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 66
Table IV summarizes the overall voting alignment of the
Rehnquist Court, 1986-1990. The figures for the individual
terms were retrieved from the Harvard Law Review charts.
Table V compares the ratio of five to four split decisions to
total decisions in all cases from the 1986-90 terms, as reported in
the Harvard Law Review, with the five to four split decision ratio
in racial discrimination cases. Both figures are broken down by
term.
Table VI provides a numerical and percentile breakdown of
Supreme Court unanimity with respect to racial discrimination
cases, compared with unanimity in all cases. The decision of the
Court is unanimous if all the Justices agree with the Court's
opinion and judgment. The "With Concurrence" column lists
cases where one or more Justices concurred in the judgment but
did not concur with the Court's opinion, and where there were
no dissents. Any case with a dissent was placed in the "With
Dissent" column.
Table VII is a breakdown of the race cases by interest group
amicus filings. The five interest groups tracked are the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the Mexican-American Legal Fund, and
the Lawyer's Commission for Civil Rights Under the Law. The
table indicates which position the respective amicus was advocating, respondent or petitioner. If no brief was filed by that
group for the case, the column is left blank. If the group joined
with another interest group in filing a brief, this is treated as a
distinct filing. For example, if the ACLU and the NAACP
joined in co-signing the same brief for a particular case, this is
counted under both the NAACP and ACLU columns.
.....
TABLE I
\0
\0
SUMMARY OF CASES AND OPINIONS
Case and Citation
Author
N
.__.
Vote
US Win
Nonwhites Win
1986 Term
~
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (retroactive application of Batson to direct appeal).
Blackmun
6-3
-
Yes
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (application of Voting Rights
Act to annexation of land projected to become a white subdivision).
White
6-3
Yes
Yes
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (constitutionality of district court's imposition
of one black for one white hiring and promotion in Georgia Dept. of Public Safety).
Brennan
5-4
No
Yes
McOesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 249 (discriminatory imposition of the death penalty).
Powell
5-4
-
No
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (application of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982 to Arabs).
White
9-0
-
Yes
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (application of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982 to Jews).
White
9-0
-
Yes
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (standards governing union liability
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
White
::t..
&3
::t..
~
~trj
~
~
~
s
Vi
5-4
No
Yes
~
8
§3
1987 Term
~
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. I (right of white male
organizations to exclude nonwhites and women).
White
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &: Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (application of disparate impact
test to subjective employment selection devices).
O'Connor
9-0
8-1 (IV)
7-2
-
Yes
No
Yes
.....
w
.....
~
Case and Citation
Author
Vote
US Win
Nonwhites Win
w
N
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (challenge to minority set-aside
program).
O'Connor
6-3
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (retroactive application of Batson v. Kentucky, which
allows collateral attack of prosecutor's racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges).
O'Connor
7-2 (II)
S-4 (I, III)
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (standards for proof of disparate
impact case under Title VII).
White
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (collateral attack on affirmative action consent decree).
Yes
No
-
No
5-4
Yes
No
Rehnquist
5-4
Yes
No
Patterson v. McLean Federal Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (application of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 to racial harassment of employee).
Kennedy
5-4
Partial
No
Jett v. Dallas lndep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (respondeat superior liability under 42
u.s.c. § 1981).
O'Connor
5-4
(1, IV)
-
No
"'-3
~
~
~
~
~
1989 Term
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (availability of tenure records in
Fair Employment suit).
Blackmun
9-0
Yes
Yes
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (contempt of court in Fair Housing case).
Rehnquist
5-4
No
No
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (Sixth Amendment challenge to prosecutor's
peremptory exclusion of black jurors in prosecution of white defendant).
Scalia
5-4
-
No
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (use of collateral estoppel to deny jury
trial of discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
Marshall
9-0
-
Yes
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (remedy in school desegregation case).
White
9-0 (II)
5-4 (1, III, IV)
-
Yes
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (preferential treatment of minorities in
award and sale of broadcast licenses).
The F.C.C. regulation was upheld, but the Justice Department position lost.
Brennan
•
~
1988 Term
5-4
~
~
~
~
~
........
No•
Yes
<
0
~
a..
a..
Case and Citation
1990 Term
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, ttl S. Ct. 630 (standard for determining whether
desegregated school system may adopt a student assignment plan which causes
resegregation).
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., ttl S. Ct. 1227 (extraterritorial application of
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (white defendants may challenge as a violation of the
equal protection clause the prosecutor's racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from a jury).
Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859 (exercise of peremptory challenges based on
bilingual ability).
Oark v. Roemer, Ill S. Ct. 2096 (enjoining election pending pre-clearance of voting
change under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (race-based peremptory
challenges in civil cases violate equal protection clause).
Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (state judicial elections are covered by Section
Two of Voting Rights Act).
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General, ttl S. Ct. 2376 (state judicial elections
are covered by Section Two of Voting Rights Act).
Author
Vote
US Win
Nonwhites Win
-
\ &)
\&)
N
Rehnquist
5-3
Yes
No
Rehnquist
6-3
No
No
Kennedy
7-2
Yes
~
~
~
::t...
Kennedy
6-3
Kennedy
9-0
Kenendy
5-4
Stevens
6-3
Stevens
6-3
Yes
Yes
No
~
Yes
~
~
Yes
~
Yes
Yes
~
~
s
Vi
...,
8
...,~
w
~
w
-t
TABLE II
w
HOW THE JUSTICES VOTE CONCERNING THE NONWHITE POSITION
1986 Term
Griffith v. Kentucky
City of Pleasant Grove v. United
States
United States v. Paradise
McClesky v. Kemp
St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.
Total For
Total Against
1987 Term
Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust
New York State Club Ass'n v. City
of New York
Total For
Total Against
1988 Term
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson &
Co.
Teague v. Lane
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
Martin v. Wilks
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.
Total For
Total Against
6
I
2
0
0
6
Kennedy Marshall
O'Connor PoweU Rehnquist Scalia Souter
Stevens White
Blackmun
Brennan
•F
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
F
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
A
•F
F
F
F
F
F
•F
F
F
F
F
A
A
F
F
A
F
•A
F
F
A
4
3
A
A
F
F
F
3
4
A
A
F
F
A
4
3
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
•F
•F
7
4
3
~
F
F
F
~
F
F
F
F
7
7
F
F
F
F
F
7
0
0
0
5
F
F
F
F
F
•F
F
NS
F
F
2
0
•F
•F
2
2
I
2
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
F
F
A
F
•A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
6
•A
A
A
A
•A
A
A
•A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
A
A
A
•A
A
0
6
0
6
0
6
A
•A
A
A
A
0
6
5
I
F
F
6
0
0
6
0
F
F
F
F
4
2
-.,
~
~
~
~
tlj
;:s
t.t1
~
,........,
-<
0
0\
0\
Blackmun
1989 Term
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
Spallone v. United States
Ho11and v. Illinois
Lytle v. Household Mfg.
Missouri v. Jenkins
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC
Total For
Total Against
1990 Term
Board of Educ. v. Dowen
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
Powers v. Ohio
Hernandez v. New York
Clark v. Roemer
Edmonson v. Leesvi11e Concrete Co.
Chisom v. Roemer
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attny.
General
Total For
Total Against
4
2
5
3
Total for 1986 • 1990 Terms
Total For
Total Against
Majority Opinions Written 1986 •
1990 Terms
Total For
Total Against
17
12
•F
F
F
F
F
F
6
0
Brennan Kennedy Marshall
F
F
F
F
F
•F
6
0
O'Connor Powell Rehnquist
Scalia Souter Stevens
F
A
A
F
A
A
2
4
F
F
F
•F
F
F
6
0
F
A
A
F
A
A
2
4
F
•A
A
F
A
A
2
4
F
A
•A
F
A
A
2
4
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
•F
•A
•F
•F
A
A
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
F
A
F
A
F
F
•A
•A
A
A
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
A
A
A
8
0
3
8
0
4
4
I
7
I
7
5
White
F
F
F
F
F
F
6
0
F
A
A
F
•F
F
4
2
NS
A
F
A
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
•F
•F
A
A
F
A
F
F
F
F
5
2
8
0
5
3
28
I
21
0
15
29
0
10
19
4
3
8
21
9
20
5
2
27
2
15
14
2
0
2
0
3
2
1
0
I
3
0
I
0
4
0
I
0
0
2
0
6
6
.....
\C
\C
N
........
~
~
~
~
~
tl':i
~
~
~
s
Vi
lo.o3
8
~
lo.o3
I
.....
~...)
~
VI
TULANE LAW REVIEW
1346
[Vol. 66
TABLE III A
JUSTICE AGREEMENT IN RACE CASES-1986 TERM
Marshall
5
7
71.4%
3
7
42.9%
4
7
57.1%
5
5
I
I
5
7
71.4%
4
p
0
4
s
•
4
I
D
N
p
57.1%
6
7
85.7%
0
4
5
s
O'Connor 0
s
7
•
D
N
p
0
s
2
7
28.6%
7
3
2
7
28.6%
3
2
5
7
71.4%
6
7
85.7%
3
2
5
7
71.4%
4
4
4
•
4
7
57.1%
•
4
7
57.1%
4
5
7
71.4%
7
42.9%
5
5
7
71.4%
0
4
D
N
p
4
7
57.1%
I
5
7
71.4%
5
7
71.4%
I
3
•
p
I
4
I
5
7
71.4%
3
5
7
71.4%
2
•
2
•
•
•
3
D
N
s
4
7
57.1%
4
7
57.1%
I
•
2
4
•
O'Connor Marshall
2
6
2
2
7
7
7
28.6%
100.0%
4
3
7
42.9%
4
s
3
7
42.9%
•
4
7
57.1%
0
Rehnquist 0
•
6
7
85.7%
4
7
57.1%
s
I
•
4
7
57.1%
D
N
p
D
N
p
Stevens
6
7
85.7%
4
7
57.1%
p
Scalia
Powell
4
D
N
D
N
Powell
Rehnquist
3
Stevens
5
s
Brennan
Scalia
5
White
4
Blackmun 0
2
28.6%
6
2
7
7
100.0%
Brennan
6
2
7
7
100.0%
1992]
1347
TABLE III B
White
2
Stevens
•
•
I
p
2
2
HJO.O%
0
2
D
N
p
2
2
100.0%
Blackmun 0
s
D
N
Brennan
s
I
2
50.0%
•
Scalia
2
•
•
Marshall
D
N
p
I
I
100.0%
0
2
D
N
p
2
2
100.0%
s
O'Connor 0
s
D
N
p
Rehnquist 0
s
Scalia
Stevens
•
2
2
2
2
2
2
100.0%
2
2
100.0%
2
2
100.0%
I
2
2
100.0%
I
I
100.0%
I
I
I
I
100.0%
I
I
100.0%
2
2
100.0%
2
D
N
p
2
2
100.0%
2
50.0%
I
2
50.0%
•
•
2
2
100.0%
2
2
2
2
100.0%
2
•
•
I
2
50.0%
I
2
50.0%
2
•
2
2
100.0%
2
•
0
s
I
2
0
D
N
p
I
2
50.0%
•
2
2
100.0%
I
I
100.0%
2
2
•
D
N
p
s
I
I
100.0%
I
2
2
100.0%
Kennedy 0
s
•
2
2
100.0%
•
I
2
50.0%
Rehnquist O'Connor Marshall
2
2
2
2
2
100.0%
•
2
100.0%
2
2
100.0%
•
2
•
2
2
100.0%
2
2
100.0%
Kennedy
I
•
I
I
100.0%
I
I
100.0%
Brennan
2
I
2
2
100.0%
TULANE LAW REVIEW
1348
[Vol. 66
TABLE III C
Blackmun 0
s
D
N
p
Brennan
Kennedy
Marshall
6
16.7%
Scalia
I
I
5
6
6
100.0%
s
4
4
6
66.7%
D
N
p
6
0
6
D
N
p
6
6
100.0%
2
6
33.3%
6
4
4
6
66.7%
6
2
6
6
100.0%
2
6
33.3%
s
•
I
6
16.7%
I
I
•
•
5
I
I
5
6
6
6
16.7%
16.7%
83.3%
•
2
•
6
6
5
6
5
6
83.3%
6
6
100.0%
6
6
100.0%
6
6
6
•
6
s
s
D
N
p
Rehnquist 0
s
D
N
p
0
s
D
N
p
0
s
D
N
p
•
6
•
6
6
100.0%
•
5
6
83.3%
2
•
2
6
33.3%
5
6
83.3%
2
•
2
6
33.3%
5
•
5
•
I
6
16.7%
5
6
83.3%
6
•
6
6
100.0%
6
6
6
100.0%
6
•
0
O'Connor 0
Stevens
I
Stevens
Kennedy
6
Brennan
I
•
I
6
16.7%
0
D
N
p
Scalia
White
I
I
6
5
5
6
83.3%
1992]
1349
TABLE III D
Blackrnun 0
White
4
Stevens
4
D
N
p
4
6
66.7%
s
s
Brennan
0
s
D
N
p
Kennedy 0
s
D
N
p
Marshall 0
s
D
N
p
O'Connor 0
s
D
N
p
Rehnquist 0
s
D
N
p
Scalia
0
s
D
N
p
Stevens
0
s
D
N
p
•
4
•
4
6
66.7%
s
s
•
I
6
83.3%
4
I
s
6
83.3%
2
•
6
83.3%
2
6
33.3%
4
4
•
4
6
66.7%
s
s
I
s
6
83.3%
Scalia
2
•
2
6
33.3%
2
•
2
6
33.3%
s
2
6
6
100.0%
2
•
2
6
33.3%
2
s
6
83.3%
2
6
33.3%
3
6
6
100.0%
s
•
s
•
•
•
2
6
83.3%
2
6
33.3%
s
•
s
•
6
83.3%
4
•
4
6
66.7%
2
2
6
33.3%
s
2
6
6
100.0%
2
4
2
2
•
•
2
2
6
6
6
6
33.3%
HXl.O%
33.3%
2
2
4
2
2
6
33.3%
2
6
33.3%
6
•
s
•
s
2
6
6
100.0%
2
6
6
100.0%
2
2
2
6
33.3%
2
6
33.3%
•
s
2
6
6
100.0%
•
6
100.0%
2
•
2
6
33.3%
Kennedy
2
•
2
6
33.3%
2
•
2
6
33.3%
Brennan
4
2
6
6
100.0%
TULANE LAW REVIEW
1350
[Vol. 66
TABLE III E
Blackmun 0
White
5
D
N
p
5
8
62.5%
0
6
D
N
p
6
8
75.0%
3
8
37.5%
5
5
8
62.5%
5
3
8
8
100.0%
6
4
6
8
75.0%
4
8
50.0%
s
Kennedy
s
Marshall 0
s
D
N
p
O'Connor 0
s
D
N
p
Rehnquist 0
s
D
N
p
Scalia
0
s
D
N
p
Souter
0
s
D
N
p
Stevens
•
s
Souter
5
Scalia
5
7
71.4%
I
8
12.5%
5
7
71.4%
2
2
4
8
50.0%
•
•
•
•
•
4
•
4
8
50.0%
I
5
7
71.4%
5
•
5
7
71.4%
•
3
7
42.9%
2
2
8
25.0%
7
•
7
7
100.0%
5
8
62.5%
I
8
12.5%
5
•
5
7
71.4%
•
4
2
6
8
75.0%
4
•
4
8
50.0%
5
3
8
12.5%
I
4
5
•
2
4
7
I
8
8
8
12.5%
50.0%
87.5%
•
•
0
D
N
p
Stevens
5
2
7
8
87.5%
I
7
14.3%
I
I
8
12.5%
8
12.5%
2
2
4
8
50.0%
3
I
4
8
50.0%
2
4
6
8
75.0%
5
8
62.5%
3
•
3
8
37.5%
Kennedy
3
•
3
8
37.5%
1992]
1351
TABLE III F
JUSTICE AGREEMENT IN RACE CASES-1986-1990 TERMS
White Stevens Souter Scalia Rehnquist Powell O'Connor Marshall Kennedy Brennan
7
15
15
5
9
8
4
10
17
12
s
9
•
12
10
D 15
24
5
9
8
4
10
27
7
20
N 29
29
7
29
29
7
29
29
21
21
p 51.7% 82.8% 71.4% 31.0% 27.6% 57.1% 34.5%
93.1% 33.3% 95.2%
Blackmun 0
Brennan
Kennedy
Marshall
•
•
•
•
7
4
8
21
38.1%
7
21
33.3%
4
7
57.1%
13
4
D 17
8
16
N 21
21
7
21
p 81.0% 38.1% 71.4% 76.2%
16
3
19
21
90.5%
0
10
10
6
D 10
16
N 21
21
p 47.6% 76.2%
s
0
s
0
17
8
5
•
15
9
9
•
D 15
23
5
9
N 29
29
7
29
p 51.7% 79.3% 71.4% 31.0%
s
O'Connor 0
21
11
17
I
7
D 21
11
22
N 29
29
7
29
p 72.4% 37.9% 71.4% 75.9%
•
s
Powell
0
s
4
5
4
I
5
7
71.4%
4
4
D
N
7
7
p 57.1% 57.1%
Rehnquist 0
20
9
3
18
I
•
6
D 21
9
24
N 29
29
7
29
p 72.4% 31.0% 42.9% 82.8%
•
s
Scalia
0
s
18
•
10
•
D 18
10
I
N 29
29
7
p 62.1% 34.5% 14.3%
Souter
0
s
7
•
5
•
D
7
5
N
7
7
p 100.0% 71.4%
Stevens
0
s
16
•
D 16
N 29
p 55.2%
5
21
23.8%
16
3
17
21
81.0%
4
II
8
29
27.6%
4
7
57.1%
II
29
37.9%
19
6
24
29
82.8%
3
2
5
7
71.4%
15
•
•
4
I
5
7
71.4%
•
•
12
10
21
21
100.0%
5
5
21
23.8%
3
3
13
23.1%
TULANE LAW REVIEW
1352
[Vol. 66
TABLE IV
JUSTICE AGREEMENT IN ALL CASES 1986-1990 TERMS
Brennan
0
293
9
301
567
53.1%
309
95
397
568
69.9%
348
12
358
460
77.8%
253
4
257
459
56.0%
83
7
88
105
83.8%
379
459
82.6%
358
39
393
460
85.4%
348
17
364
692
52.6%
366
132
593
690
85.9%
58
I
59
108
54.6%
294
14
308
685
45.0%
318
2
320
691
46.3%
80
3
83
151
55.0%
491
31
416
685
60.7%
371
22
388
684
56.7%
90
6
96
108
88.9%
459
66
512
678
75.5%
513
68
580
684
84.8%
109
16
125
ISO
83.3%
113
3
116
ISO
77.3%
84
I
85
ISO
56.7%
103
5
108
147
73.5%
117
13
130
151
86.1%
528
51
579
691
83.8%
375
II
386
689
56.0%
85
4
88
108
81.5%
471
31
498
685
72.7%
360
12
372
688
54.1%
71
5
76
107
71.0%
81
3
84
108
77.8%
59
I
60
108
55.6%
D
N
p
Kennedy 0
s
D
N
p
Manball 0
s
D
N
p
O'Connor 0
s
D
N
p
Powell
0
s
D
N
p
Rebnquist 0
s
D
N
p
Scalia
0
s
D
N
p
Souter
0
s
D
N
p
Stevens
0
s
D
N
p
401
23
423
690
61.3%
Scalia
355
10
364
683
S3.3%
Powell
99
3
102
148
68.9%
Stevens
388
97
483
688
70.2%
s
Souter
63
I
64
108
59.3%
Rehnquist
386
8
392
689
56.9%
White
413
s 20
D 432
N 690
p 62.6%
Blackmun 0
259
9
268
565
47.4%
33
so
488
75
557
685
81.3%
270
270
569
47.5%
81
4
85
151
56.3%
O'Connor Marshall Kennedy
260
386
384
20
156
4
531
264
401
686
690
460
58.5%
77.0%
57.4%
267
II
278
563
49.4%
339
227
519
567
91.5%
349
37
387
452
85.6%
223
5
228
430
53.0%
316
13
328
687
47.7%
174
3
177
342
51.8%
Brennan
328
122
440
568
77.5%
1992]
l"~CE
AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
1353
TABLE V
5-4 DECISIONS
1986
1987
1988
1989
Non-Race Cases
42 (145)
30.0%
12 (140)
8.6%
27 (137)
19.7%
36 (133)
28.1%
Race Cases
3 (7)
42.9%
6 (6)
100.0%
3 (6)
50.0%
0 (2)
0.0%
1990
Total
21 (112) 105 (555)
17.5%
18.9%
0 (8)
0.0%
12 (21)
57.1%
1354
[Vol. 66
TULANE LAW REVIEW
TABLE VI
UNANIMITY IN FULL 0PINIONS 1
1968-1990 Terms
Unanimous
Race Cases
Non-Race Cases
5 (19.0%)2
176 (26.4%)
With Concurrence
Witb
Dissent
Total
2 (9.5%)3
22 (75.9%)
29
424 (63.6%)
667
55 (9.9%)
1
"A decision is considered unanimous only when all Justices hearing the case voted to
concur in the Court's opinion as well as its judgment. When one or more Justices concurred in the result but not in the opinion, the case is not considered unanimous. A decision is [considered "with concurrence"] if one or more Justices concurred in the result but
not in the Court's opinion, and there were no dissents." Leading Cases 105 HARV. L. REV.
117, 421 (1991).
2 The unanimous decisions are Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987);
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987); University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990); and Lytle v. Household Mfg., 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990).
3
The two cases in this column are Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. I (1988)
and Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
1992)
TABLE
1355
VII
AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN SUPPORT OF THE
NONWHITE POSITION
NAACP
Griffith v. Kentucky
City of Pleasant Grove v. United
States
United States v. Paradise
McCiesky v. Kemp
St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.
Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of
New York
City of Richmond v. J .A. Croson &
Co.
Teague v. Lane
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
Martin v. Wilks
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
Spallone v. United States
Holland v. Illinois
Lytle v. Household Mfg.
Missouri v. Jenkins
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC
Board of Educ. v. Dowell
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
Powers v. Ohio
Hernandez v. New York
Clark v. Roemer
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
Chisom v. Roemer
Houston Lawyers' Ass' r. v. Attorney
General
NAACP
L.D.ol
EeL Fund
ACLU
Mex·Am Lawyer's
Legal
Comm. for
Fund
C.R.
p
R
R
R
R
R
p
p
p
p
p
R
R
p
p
p
p
p
?
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
R
p
p
p
R
R
p
R
R
R
R
R
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p

Race and the Rehnquist Court - Pacific McGeorge Scholarly

Transcription

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