The Iran Nuclear Framework Proposals

The Iran Nuclear Framework
Proposals
CNME BRIEFING, 9 APRIL 2015
Introduction
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On 2 April 2015, Iran and the six world powers with which the Iranians have been negotiating
released a framework for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iran’s nuclear
programme. This framework has given cause for considerable concern and has provoked
criticism from a wide range of observers and analysts internationally.
The concerns fall into three distinct categories. First, that it does not actually appear that a full and
comprehensive framework has the endorsement of all parties, with both the Americans and the
Iranians putting out versions of the framework that diverge on many of the most critical issues.
Second, even under the terms set out by the more robust version of the framework - as outlined
by the State Department - there are key flaws that threaten to undermine the overarching
objectives of Western policy on Iran. Particularly on the matters of verification and enforcement it
is doubtful that these parameters definitively block Iran’s pathway to producing nuclear weapons.
Third, because of the inherent weaknesses in the proposed framework it is anticipated that there
will be serious consequences for the wider Middle East. Implementation of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action as currently proposed would likely open the way to other powers
in the region advancing their own nuclear programmes and contribute to growing tensions,
rivalries and instabilities in that part of the world.
1. Disparities
While there are substantial flaws in the framework as presented by the US government there are
also pressing concerns regarding whether or not this framework even has the backing of all sides.
Washington has presented the framework parameters as being mutually agreed upon. However,
there were immediate indications that the Iranians and Americans are in fact not in full agreement
on several of the most critical issues. Indeed, the joint Iranian-EU statement made on 2 April
had a number of differences to the one made by President Obama on the same day.
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In addition, a French factsheet on the framework is reported to contradict the US version of the
framework on the crucial matters of inspections, the timing of sanctions relief and the types of
centrifuges that Iran will be permitted to use and enrich with.
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Comparing the parameters released by the State Department with an equivalent factsheet and
statements put out by the Iranians , it is possible to identify seven key discrepancies:
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1. Most controversial of all the discrepancies is the question of sanctions relief. The Obama
administration has stated that there would be a phased lifting of sanctions as part of the
implementation of the framework. The Iranians, however, insist that all sanctions will be
lifted as soon as the final agreement has been signed.
So while the parameters set out by the State Department state: “US and EU nuclearrelated sanctions will be suspended after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps”, the Iranian factsheet
claims: “all of the sanctions will be immediately removed after reaching a comprehensive
agreement”.
2. The American parameters outline restrictions on enrichment for a fifteen-year period.
Yet according to the Iranian factsheet the agreement only has an implementation period
of ten years. Either way, there are serious questions about how close to breakout Iran
would be by the time that the framework would expire.
3. According to the parameters set out by the US, Iran will not be permitted to carry out
enrichment centrifuges more advanced than the basic IR-1 model. However, just days
after the framework was released, Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif informed the
Iranian parliament that once the final agreement was signed Iran would begin enrichment
with the advanced IR-8 centrifuges—representing a dramatic upgrade in Iran’s current
enrichment capabilities.
4. There has been considerable disagreement over Iran’s formerly secret underground
nuclear bunker at Fordow. Initially the West had demanded that Fordow be dismantled
and closed altogether. Under the framework released by the US, Fordow is to be
converted into a nuclear research site of some kind, where enrichment with advanced
centrifuges will not be permitted. However, the Iranian factsheet insists that enrichment
will continue at Fordow as before.
5. It is widely agreed that an effective inspections regime must allow for IAEA inspectors to
be at liberty to hold surprise inspections at Iranian nuclear sites. The US has said that
under the framework Iran has agreed to snap inspections. The Iranians, on the other
hand, are reported as saying that such inspections would only be a temporary
arrangement.
6. With regard to Iran’s uranium stockpiles, the American account of the deal claims that
these will be shipped overseas. Yet according to Iran, its stockpiles of already enriched
uranium may be converted, but they will not be leaving the country.
‘Iran Deal Parameters’, via The Wall Street Journal, available at: http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/IranDealParameters04022015.pdf
‘Translation of Iranian Fact Sheet on the Nuclear Negotiations’, via Harvard University, available at: http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/blog/translationiranian-factsheet-nuclear-negotiations
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7. The other critical area concerns the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) aspect of the
Iranian nuclear programme. The US parameters make two references to PMD. Most
explicitly the State Department parameters state: “Iran will implement an agreed set of
measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions
(PMD) of its program.” Yet the Iranian factsheet does not even mention PMD or any
obligations relating to IAEA’s questions here.
2. Flawed Parameters
Putting the major disparities aside, even if the framework was to be implemented precisely as
outlined by the US government without any further revisions, the plan as proposed would still
leave serious cause for concern. Since the release of the parameters by the State Department
there has been considerable debate regarding the efficacy of these proposals and whether they are
sufficient to meet the stated aim of preventing Iranian nuclear breakout. The version of the
framework put forward by Washington appears particularly inadequate with regards to
inspections, verification and enforcement. Additionally, the US framework puts only temporary
restraints on Iran while ultimately accepting and legitimising an Iranian nuclear programme that is
currently recognised as being illegal under international law.
2.1 Accepting Iran as a Threshold Nuclear State
President Obama has pledged that once the framework has been implemented, and for the
decade that it is fully operational, Iran will at any given time be at least a year away from
weaponisation breakout. Even if this is true, and there is reason to suspect that Iran may already
be less than a year away from breakout, it is not clear that a year would necessarily be long enough
to take the required action for stopping Iran from weaponising.
There is no guarantee that detection of an Iranian breach of the agreement would be immediate.
Even if detection were to happen a year away from nuclear breakout, it is questionable whether
this would give sufficient warning to act effectively. President Obama has said that if need be
sanctions could be put back in place, but as seen in the past, building an international consensus
for tough sanctions can prove a slow and unpredictable process. The time it would take for any
such sanctions to come into effect would be longer still. And whereas in the past sanctions have
been used to pressure Iran into coming to the negotiating table, by this point far from incentivising
Iranian cooperation, the Iranians may in fact decide to make a dash for breakout instead.
2.2 Inspections
One of the most problematic areas of this agreement relates to the matter of verification. Iran is
well experienced in both concealing aspects of its nuclear programme and in breaching
international resolutions and agreements. Additionally, there still appear to be considerable
disagreements about the exact nature of the inspections agreed upon under the fame work. Even
with the most extensive level of inspections currently being proposed there is reason for concern.
An Iranian move toward breakout almost certainly would not be a clear-cut or singular
event. Rather it is anticipated that the Iranians would seek to reach breakout through a gradual
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accumulation of minor and ambiguous breaches of the agreement, each of which might not
individually be considered substantial enough to warrant a strong response from the international
community.
Then there is the question of how intrusive the inspections will be. The US government has stated
that Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of
which Iran is a signatory, which allows for relatively intrusive inspections. The Iranians, however,
claim only to have agreed to such inspections on a voluntary and temporary basis. Furthermore,
Iran has agreed to the implementation of the Additional Protocol previously and then
subsequently broken the agreement, as was the case between 2003 and 2006.
Dr Olli Heinonen, Former Deputy Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
has also expressed serious reservations about seeing a North Korean scenario repeated in the
Iranian case . This would involve the Iranians carrying out activities that breached the agreement
but at uninspected sites. Similarly, there is the concern that Iran might simply outsource some of
its nuclear activities to beyond its borders, such as to North Korea.
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Even excluding these possibilities, with not a single Iranian nuclear site being fully closed or
dismantled, and with Iran itself being such a vast country, questions have been raised about
whether the IAEA currently has the manpower or resources to adequately carry out such a large
and technically complex task.
2.3 Enrichment and Centrifuges
While Western powers had initially opposed all uranium enrichment by Iran, the framework now
accepts Iranian enrichment as a core element of an agreement. In the period that the international
community has been negotiating with Tehran the number of operational centrifuges has increased
dramatically from around a hundred to over twenty thousand. At the same time the number of
centrifuges that Western negotiators have been prepared to countenance has also increased
during negotiations. From early demands that the number of centrifuges be limited to the
hundreds, it was subsequently reported that negotiators had upped that number to around two
thousand. Under the current framework Iran will be permitted to keep over 6,000 centrifuges.
Around 5,000 carrying out low level enrichment at Natanz, and controversially another 1,000
would be kept in place at the underground and formerly secret facility at Fordow which the West
had previously been demanding Iran dismantle altogether.
This number of centrifuges is dramatically in excess of what Iran could conceivably need for
civilian and non-military purposes. As outlined in the 2014 Henry Jackson Society report The
Iranian Nuclear Programme: Practical Parameters for a Credible Long-Term Agreement4, Iran
should be limited to between 2,000 and 4,000 IR-1 centrifuges with even 2,000 centrifuges
providing Iran with ample uranium for all foreseeable research and civilian needs.
2.4 After Expiration
Ten years after implementation, the proposed framework is due to be scaled back and eventually
terminated. This leaves troubling questions about what will happen after that. Currently there are
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‘Ex-IAEA Deputy: Deal puts Iran on nuke threshold for 10 years, then gets worse’, The Times of Israel, 7 April 2015, available at:
http://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-iaea-deputy-deal-puts-iran-on-nuke-threshold-for-10-years-then-gets-worse/
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Heinonen, O., ‘The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Practical Parameters for a Credible Long-Term Agreement, The Henry Jackson Society (2014),
available at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The-Iranian-Nuclear-Programme-online.pdf
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six separate United Nations Security Council resolutions prohibiting all Iranian enrichment. But
the framework not only proposes to remove these, it also allows Iran to keep all existing nuclear
sites and to make certain advancements in its research technology and capabilities. The concern is
that by the end of the ten year period Iran’s nuclear programme will have been legitimised and
Iran will be closer to being able to achieve breakout than before. All nuclear related sanctions will
have been permanently removed but Iran’s primary obligations under the framework will have
expired.
In an NPR interview days after the release of the framework, President Obama appeared to
concede that under the deal thirteen years from now Iran would be left with a “near-zero”
breakout time. The State Department subsequently denied that the President had acknowledged
this.
Nevertheless, one of the most problematic elements of the proposed framework is that viewed in
the long term it appears to leave Iran poised for breakout, at best offering just a short delay in
Iran’s weaponisation progress in return for far-reaching, long lasting and possibly irreversible
Western concessions.
3. The Dangers of Regional Proliferation
In the event that the current framework is ratified it will have dramatic consequences for the
region as a whole. By leaving Iran with the capabilities of a nuclear threshold state the
international community will find it all but impossible to deny the right to equal capabilities to
other powers in the region, particularly those commonly regarded as allies such Saudi Arabia,
Jordan and Turkey. If these levels of nuclear capabilities were to become the norm across the
Middle East it would almost certainly become impossible to prevent the eventual breakout to
weaponisation in most of these cases. We have already seen just how difficult the business of
sanctions, inspections and negotiations has been just in the Iranian case. It would not be viable to
replicate this same model in numerous other countries simultaneously. The inevitable nuclear
arms race across the region that already threatens to erupt would have dire and destabilising
consequences for the world at large. The outcome of a nuclear standoff in such a volatile part of
the world carries incalculable and global risk.
Even if a regional nuclear arms race could be avoided, the prospects of a nuclear or nuclear
threshold Iran are still bleak. Iran’s hegemonic ambitions across the Middle East have been plain
to see and continue to cause dangerous levels of tension among Iran’s Sunni neighbours. Iranian
proxies are currently involved in a number of conflict zones across the Middle East and Iranian
breakout would both embolden these forces and compel Iran’s regional rivals to push back
against such proxies all the more fiercely. Additionally, we are already seeing a situation unfolding
in Yemen in which it is possible to envisage conventional warfare erupting between Iranian forces
and those of Saudi and even Pakistan. This kind of scenario would have the potential for
catastrophic consequences.
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About the Author
Tom Wilson is Resident Associate Fellow at the Centre for the New Middle East at
The Henry Jackson Society. Prior to joining The Henry Jackson Society, he worked as a
Tikvah Fellow at Commentary Magazine, where he wrote about political extremism and
terrorism in the Middle East. Tom attended Royal Holloway University and UCL, where
he obtained a BA and an MA in Modern History. His writing has been published in The
Wall Street Journal, Commentary Magazine, Standpoint, Real Clear Politics, The
Jerusalem Post and other outlets.
About the Centre for the New Middle East
The Henry Jackson Society Centre for the New Middle East is a one-stop shop designed to
provide opinion-leaders and policy-makers with the fresh thinking, analytical research and policy
solutions required to make geopolitical progress in one of the world’s most complicated and fluid
regions. Established following the fall out from the “Arab Spring,” the Centre is dedicated to
monitoring political, ideological, and military and security developments across the Middle East
and providing informed assessments of their long and wide-ranging implications to key decision
makers.
About The Henry Jackson Society
The Henry Jackson Society is a think tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles
and alliances which keep societies free - working across borders and party lines to combat
extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly
uncertain world.
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