an updated version of the article

Defending the Iran Nuclear Deal -Debate in Los Angeles Mirrors the National Debate.
by Jeff Warner*, April 16, 2015; Updated April 20, 2015
http://www.citywatchla.com/lead-stories-hidden/8854-defending-the-iran-nuclear-dealdebate-in-los-angeles-mirrors-the-national-debate
The famous adage of thinking globally, but acting locally applies to the current debate over
US foreign policy toward Iran. This issue is hardly remote from Los Angeles, and the local
press, including the Jewish Journal of Los Angeles, have opened up a serious debate on the
proposed nuclear deal between Iran on one side, and the P5+1 countries on the other: the
United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. A “framework” for
a final agreement was announced on April 2. The LA Times immediately supported the deal
and called for giving it a chance. The LA Daily News noted the deal extracted critical
concessions from Iran, but worried that it would project U.S. weakness.
Meanwhile the Los Angeles Jewish Journal strongly panned the deal in a column by its
publisher, David Suissa, who called the framework “a dangerous lemon.” But Suissa’s
distorts most aspects of the framework agreement. To promote a serious local discussion
over the US government’s rapprochement with Iran, I offer a counterpoint to his
arguments.
Suissa starts by quoting Henry Kissinger and George Schultz that “What began as
negotiations to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with
an agreement that concedes this very capability.” But Suissa drops the end of Kissinger and
Schultz’s sentence that says “albeit short of its full capacity in the first 10 years.” But that is
critical caveat. Under twelve years of negotiations, Iran went from 100 to 19,000
centrifuges, but the framework agreement Iran is limited to just 5,000. Clearly the
framework is cutting Iran’s enrichment capacity to the bone for the next decade, and even
then an Iranian nuclear bomb will still be outlawed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Suissa says that Iran was only “two or three months” from nuclear breakout (“breakout”
meaning a country has already amassed enough 90% enriched uranium or plutonium to
build one bomb). But despite his Chicken Little warnings, Iran was never a few months
from breakout. Iran had a quantity of 20% enriched uranium before the 2013 “interim”
agreement which kick-started negotiations that eventually led to the April 2 framework
agreement. But under the interim agreement, Iran agreed to neutralize its 20% enriched
uranium and promised not to enrich above the 5% used in power reactors. To say the
least, a significant effort is required to further enrich 20% uranium to the 90% level
required to create a bomb.
As for the plutonium path, Iran agreed to reconfigure its Arak heavy water reactor cutting
plutonium production to less than 1 kg a year – far less than the amount required for
breakout.
Suissa acknowledges that the framework extends Iran’s breakout time to over a year, but
belittles that difference, claiming that no matter what inspection protocol is in place, Iran
will still cheat. Not only is there no evidence that Iran will cheat on inspections, but
according to Israel’s newspaper of record, Ha’Aretz, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said
his real fear is that Iran will abide by the agreement. In fact, Suissa reaches the belief that
Iran with cheat because that is what Israel did when it misled the United States and even
France about its nuclear reactor in Dimona. Since Israel cheated to develop its nuclear
bombs, Suissa assumes that Iran has its same low standards and will, therefore, also cheat.
Then Suissa discounts the ten-year inspection schedule, quoting Marc Theissen to suggest
that at the end of that interval Iran will turn its nuclear program inside out in a matter of
days. He says that Iran will not have to dismantle any of its nuclear facilities, but Suissa
does not acknowledge that under the negotiated framework, Iran must convert its facility
at Fordow so it can no longer be used to enrich uranium. Furthermore, enrichment at
Iran’s Natanz site will be limited to 3.67%, using outdated centrifuges. Finally, no new
enrichment facilities can be built under the deal.
Suissa copies former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to say that bombing Iran’s nuclear
facilities will be more like the assassination of Osama bin Laden than the U.S. invasion and
occupation of Iraq. Not likely according to all military experts, including Israel’s. Even
limited airstrikes would require a massive military operation that would start with
American warplanes destroying Iran’s air defense capabilities using “long-range bombers,
drones, electronic warfare, land-based fighter bombers, carrier aircraft, and submarinelaunched cruise missiles.” Follow-on airstrikes would then destroy known nuclear
facilities, a military action far beyond Israel’s capabilities. Finally, the introduction of the
Russian S-300 air defense system in Iran further complicates any aerial attack on Iran’s
nuclear facilities
Suissa follows David Horovitz to argue that under the deal “thousands of centrifuges are to
be allowed to keep on spinning.” That is true in one sense. The deal allows Iran to use
5,000 older models to enrich uranium and another 1,000 for research only. What Suissa
does not realize is that today Iran has about 19,000 centrifuges, many with up-to-date
technology, so the deal reduces Iran’s enrichment capability to a small fraction of what it
has today because of earlier international failures to reach a negotiated settlement with
Iran.
Suissa insinuates that Obama is going for this “bad deal” because he is desperate to achieve
a foreign policy success. We hope that is the case. The deal that Obama is negotiating stops
Iran from building a nuclear bomb, if that was even Iran’s intention, a conclusion
challenged by both US and Israel intelligence agencies.
Finally, Suissa worries that Iran will eventually attempt to develop a nuclear bomb. I share
that worry. The ultimate driver for Iran to build a nuclear bomb is Israel’s arsenal of 100
or more nuclear bombs, as well as its endless threats to attack Iran. What is needed is a
Middle East nuclear-free zone. But we doubt Suissa would support that because it would
mean that Israel would be required to give up its arsenal of nuclear bombs.
In this violent part of the world, diplomacy is the only way to stop a technologically
sophisticated country like Iran from developing nuclear bombs to match Israel’s nuclear
arsenal. Obama is well aware that, at most, bombing will only delay Iran for a 2-4 year
period, while giving Iran an unchallengeable right to develop nuclear weapons.
While this debate might seem remote in Los Angeles, I think it is important enough for us to
not only closely follow the issues, but do all we can to avert another Middle Eastern
conflagration.
*
Jeff Warner is the Action Coordinator of LA Jews for Peace. He welcomes questions
and comments at info@lajewsforpeace.org.