The Role of Migration in Caribbean Integration and Development

Transcription

The Role of Migration in Caribbean Integration and Development
Author(s): Jay R. Mandle
Source: Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 3/4, Beyond Survival: Turmoil and Turbulence
in Small Developing States (September/December 2011), pp. 3-19
Published by: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies , University of the
West Indies
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Socialand EconomicStudies60:3 & 4 (2011):3-19
1
ISSN:0037-766
The Role of Migration in Caribbean Integration and
Development
Jay R. Mandle
ABSTRACT
thattheemigration
Thispaperhypothesizes
ofhighlyeducatedCaribbean
the
slow
the
common
source
is
pace ofeconomicgrowth
people
of region's
it has achieved.Afterdetailingboth
and thelimiteddegreeofintegration
and recentdata concerning
therecentgrowthand integration
experiences,
that
it
how
discusses
,
outflowimpairseconomicdevelopment
emigration
It
and lessens the strengthof effortsto achieveregionalintegration.
concludesby notingthata reversalin theflow of human capital has
occurredelsewhereand thata similarprocesscould be achievedin the
Caribbeanby augmentingthe alreadyexistingpatternof functional
presentin theregion.In this, theUniversity
oftheWestIndies
cooperation
that
would have a keyroleto play in creatingthekindof environment
wouldattractCaribbeanémigréstoreturnhome.
Two failures by Caribbean nations require explanation: the
relativelyslow pace of economic growth experienced in recent
years;and regionalintegration'slimitedsuccess. Bothhave been the
subject of separate, extensive discussions. But the possibilitythat
they may have a common source namely, the region's huge
outflow of people has not been widely considered by regional
scholars. This paper presentsand defendsthathypothesisand then
goes on to discuss how the regioncould encourage a returnflowof
highlyskilled émigrésand in thatway promoteeconomic developmentand integration.
Caribbean Economic Growth
Over the period 1990 to 2008, the range in growth rates among
CARICOM countries was quite wide. Jamaica's and Barbados's
Gross Domestic Product(GDP) grew at less than2% per year,while
Trinidadand Tobago's grew at more thantwicethatlevel,5.0%, and
Belize even more rapidlyat 6.7% (Table 1). WiththeotherCaribbean
nations grouped roughly in the 3% to 4% range, the region's
population weighted growthratewas 3.0% per annum.
4
SOCIALANDECONOMICSTUDIES
Table1:Growth
RatesofRealGDP,CARICOM,
OtherRegions,
1990-2007
1990-2008,
Country
Growth
Rate
Antigua/Barbuda
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
St.Kitts/Nevis
St.Lucia
St.Vincent/Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad/Tobago
4.2
1.4
6.7
2.0
3.3
2.6
1.8
4.7
3.9
3.9
2.8
5.0
Mean
Weighted
Population
3.0
EastAsiaandPacific
LatinAmerica
andCaribbean
MiddleEastandNorth
Africa
SouthAsia
Africa
Sub-Saharan
8.7
3.4
4.1
6.2
3.6
Source:CARICOMCountries:
fromThe
Computed
WorldBank,WDI Online,http://ddp-ext.worldbank.
from
TheWorld
Bank,World
org:Regions:
Computed
Indicators
2009,Table4.1.
Development
A growthrateof thismagnitudeextended over a twenty-year
period is an accomplishment that should not be dismissed.
Nevertheless, as also revealed in Table 1, the region's growth
experience compares unfavourablywith the advances occurring
elsewhere among developing nations during roughly the same
period. Growth rates in Asia were much higher than those of the
Caribbean. The Middle East, Sub-SaharanAfricaand the restof the
Latin American and Caribbean group of countriesalso grew more
rapidlythan did the CARICOM nations.
Furthermore,when viewed throughthe prism of the United
Nations Human Development Index (HDI), the Caribbean experienceis similarlyless thanfavourable.Table 2 provides both the
HDI numericrankingand percentilerankingof Caribbean nations
in 1990 and 2007. The latteris provided because it eliminates the
impact of the increased number of countriesincluded in the index
between those years. Both rankings,however, tell essentially the
The Role of MigrationinCaribbean Integration
5
same story.Only three(Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kittsand Nevis
and St. Lucia) of the twelve West Indian countriessecured a higher
percentilerankingin the later year than in the earlier.In all of the
otherstherewas a decline in both measures. Indeed, the percentile
declines for Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname and Jamaica were
precipitous.Taking all of the countriesof the region into account,
the unweighted mean percentiledecline was about 6 percentage
points.
and
Table2:CARICOMCountries
HumanDevelopment
IndexNumeric
Percentile
1990,2007
Ranking,
Country
Numeric
Rank
1990
53
Antigua/Barbuda
Barbados
20
Belize
73
52
Dominica
54
Grenada
92
Guyana
63
Jamaica
68
St.Kitts/Nevis
St.Lucia
65
66
56
Suriname
30
Trinidad/Tobago
Mean
Unweighted
58
Percentile
Rank
2007 Change 1990
2007 Change
47
37
93
73
74
114
100
62
69
91
97
64
+6
-17
-20
-21
-20
-22
-37
+6
-4
-25
-41
-34
67
87
54
67
66
42
61
57
60
59
65
81
74
80
49
60
59
37
45
66
62
50
47
65
+7
-7
-5
-7
-7
-5
-16
+9
+2
-9
-18
-16
77
-19
64
58
-6
Human
Source:ComputedfromUnitedNationsDevelopment
Programme,
1992
2009,TableH.
, Table1,Human
Development
Report
Development
Report
While, therefore,by no means can it be said thatthe region's
economy stagnated- much less declined - the factremainsthatits
economicmodernizationfellshortofwhat was occurringelsewhere
among countriesin the developing world.
Caribbean Integration
Similarly,the long-termrecord with regard to regional integration
in the Caribbean has been at best mediocre,despite the factthatan
embryonicpan-regionalistsentimenthas long been presentin the
Caribbean.Accordingto Eric D. Duke (2009), "the various effortsto
create some form of a 'united West Indies/ be it federation,
confederationor closerunion,representone ofthelongestand most
6
sustained nation-buildingideas in the British Caribbean, even
precedingthe 1930s labour uprisings,conventionallythoughtto be
the source of Caribbean nationalism." As such, he writes,
"federation became a cornerstone of burgeoning West Indian
nationalistmovements"(Duke 2009, 220-1,223).
Nevertheless Caribbean nationhood has never become a
preoccupation of the West Indian people themselves.Gordon K.
Lewis captured the problem well when he wrote thatin the region
"... therehas always been a sense of common historybut little
sense of common destiny" (Lewis, G. 1968, 371). Regionalism's
fragilehold on the aspirationsof the Caribbean people is described
by Sir ShridathRamphal thus: "the natural state of . . . our Caribwithoutconstanteffort,
withoutunrelenting
bean is fragmentation;
perseverance and discipline, in suppressing instincts born of
traditionand environment,it is to our naturalstateof disunitythat
we shall return"(Ramphal 2008,4). That stateofdisunitywas all too
clearlyrevealed when theWestIndies Federationcollapsed in 1962,
only fourshortyears afterits inception.
Despite thefailureof theFederation,regionalistsentimentdid
not die; instead it became less ambitious. Nation-building was
dropped and in its place economic integrationwas promoted.The
theory supporting integrationwas firstadvanced by Havelock
Brewsterand Clive Y. Thomas in 1967, in the firstof a series of
studies published by theInstituteforSocial and Economic Research
at the Universityof the West Indies in Jamaica.In The Dynamicsof
WestIndian Integration
, Brewsterand Thomas not only called for
liberalized trade within the region; theyalso argued that "the coordination of commercial legislation and the establishmentof a
commonset of incentivelegislationis a sinequa nonof an integrated
WestIndies" (Brewsterand Thomas 1967,30).
Since the appearance of thatpioneeringwork,many scholars
have built upon it. Norman Girvan, in a detailed study that was
adopted in principle by the CARICOM heads of governmentin
2007, envisions that a Caribbean Single Market and Economy
(CSME) could act as an "entrepreneurialstate", one that would
enable the region to accelerateits rate of economic growth.Girvan
advocates that "common Community policies and support
measures" be adopted to advance region-wide "driversof economic
His anticipationis that with regiongrowthand transformation".
wide governmentsupport,these industrieswould "drive economic
7
growth in the Community as a whole", and achieve levels of
development that would be unobtainable in the absence of
integration(Girvan 2007: 13, 18).
Regional integrationhas advanced. Its initialimpetus was the
Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) agreed to in 1965 by
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and (then) BritishGuiana. Even
more important was the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973 that
established the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM) and the 2000 Revised Treatyof the same name whose
stated objectivewas to bring into existencethe CSME. At the subregional level, the impetus towards cohesion resulted in the 1981
establishmentof the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) in which member states share a common currency,and
monetary policy is set by an Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.
Recentlythe OECS has set out to deepen its integrativefunction.In
December 2009 its members initialed the draft of a new treaty
which, as described by the organization, will establish an
"Economic Union ... as a single financial and economic space"
(Organisationof EasternCaribbean States 2009: 5).
But over and against these accomplishments,the integration
exercise has been frustrating.Writingin 2003, Brewsterreported
that though the CSME agreementwas then fourteenyears old, to
date "very little had advanced to the stage of implementation"
(Brewster 2003: 2). Several years later not much had changed.
Girvan calculated thatby 2007, of the 798 "total required actions"
needed to implementthe CSME only 55% had been implemented.
An even more tellingpatternemerged when Girvan separated the
actions required to achieve a "single market" from the more
demanding actions associated with constructing a "single
economy". Almost two-thirds(64.7%) of the formerhad been
accomplished. For the single economy, the percentage was 15.4.
However, next to nothing had been done to harmonize laws, to
create an enabling environment,or to introducecommon support
measures (Girvan2003: 35). Indeed in 2009,economistsat theWorld
Bank and the Organization of American States declared that
"economic integrationhas stalled in theregion" and thatmore than
thirtyyears afterthe 1973 Treatyof Chaguaramas "called for the
establishmentof a common market..., that goal is still ratherfar
frombeing met...CARICOM has still yet to be a single market
economy" (Tsikataet al 2009: 31).
8
That the CARICOM process has been incompletemeans that
integrationitselfhas had little positive impact on the economic
growth trajectoryof the region. When Trinidad and Tobago's
petroleumexports are excluded, intra-regionaltrade as a share of
CARICOM's totalinternationaltradedid not increaseat all between
1979 and 2003, standing at about 6% of total trade throughoutthe
period. Similarlythe sectorsthatexperienced the most substantial
growthin these years - tourismand natural gas and petroleumwere largely unaffectedby the intra-regionaltariffreductions
implemented in these years. As Moreira and Mendoza put it,
despite theliberalizingof tradewithinCARICOM "more thanthree
decades of regional integrationhave not done much to change a
regional division of labour that dates back from colonial times"
(Moreira and Mendoza 2007: 18, 22, 25).
Mechanisms of Integration
The Caribbean is not alone of course in confronting
both centripetal
and centrifugalforces.Successfulnation-buildingrequires thatthe
formerbe strongenough to overcome the latter.In a recentpaper,
identifiescriticaldifferencesin thisregard
Vaughan Lewis fruitfully
between the region's failed Federation (1958-1962) and the
accomplishmentsin nation-buildingthat occurred contemporaneously in India and Indonesia. Lewis writes that in the latter
countries, there "was the development of non-state political
institutionsdevoted well beforeindependence to the articulationof
unified political party arrangementsor national liberationfronts,
across the geographicterritories
ready to assume officeas majority
national governments,irrespectiveof considerationsof linguistic,
religious or cultural differences and other potential splittest
tendencies"(Lewis, V. 2008: 7). At the non-governmentallevel, that
is, diverse citizensjoined togetherpoliticallyto influencethe shape
of thenationunder construction.
Such integrativepolitical activitywas all but totallyabsent in
theyearsprecedingtheestablishmentoftheWestIndies Federation.
Vaughan Lewis reportsthattherewas "no solidaristpolitical glue
binding the national parties to each otherin a federalstructure.So
therewas littlebasis forthe progressivearticulationof inter-island
politicalsolidarity. . ." (Lewis, V. 2008: 7). As principalhistorianof
the FederationJohnMordecai writes,both the West Indies Federal
9
Labour Party and the Democratic Labour Partyof the Federation
were "contrivedin expediency - both lacking distinctfoundations
in doctrine,traditionalthemesand standardsaround which leaders
of the territorialparties . . . could rally."Regionalism could hardly
have takenrootin a settingin which as Modecai notes in thoseyears
"the Eastern Caribbean and Jamaica had no direct steamship
communication,did not read each other's newspapers, and at the
level of the man on the streetwere hardly aware of each other's
existence,except on the cricketfield" (Mordecai 1968: 30, 85-6).
Brewstermakes a similarpoint about the politicaleconomy of
integrationin his comparison of the Caribbean's experience with
thatof Europe. What he points to as the criticaldifferencebetween
the two effortsis thatin Europe, unlike in the West Indies, a strong
political/economicconstituencywitha vested interestin integration
promoted the process. He argues that on the Continent
"transnational[economic] interests. . . had much to gain fromthe
deepening of integrationand much to lose from its failure to
advance." In contrast,he goes on, "in CARICOM thisis not thecase.
A transnationalconstituency,
and thus a source of pressure forthe
CSME, whether of business or civil interests,is almost wholly
absent" (Brewster2003: 2). Fundamentalin thisregardwas thevery
limited intra-regionaltrade that occurred among West Indian
nations,an absence thatstands in contrastto the robustcommerce
present among European countries. Commercial interestsin the
West Indies are largely indifferentto regional markets; while in
Europe the private sector, by virtue of its continentalscope, is
keenlyconcernedthataccess and opportunitiesthroughoutEurope
be made available to it.
In light of the differences between the European and
Caribbean commercial concerns with integration,it is fruitfulto
reverse the causality present in Brewster'sanalysis. He addresses
the problem as one in which an insularbusiness communityin the
West Indies did not press for integration.But an even more
importantissue might be why the liberalizing of trade that did
occur within CARICOM failed to result in the business community'sbreakingout of its insularity.If it had, the region'sprivate
sector could well have acted as an agent that promoted deeper
integration.
What thiscounter-factual
exerciseraises is the possibilitythat
firmsin the Caribbean lacked the capacity to respond positivelyto
10
the opportunitiespresentedto themby the limitedintegrationthat
theregiondid experience.Seeing theproblemin thatway raises the
question of whether there was a common source for both the
stuntingof economic growthand the limitingof integration.That
common source may have been emigration. Nothing more
differentiatesthe countries of the West Indies from nations
elsewhere- not even smallness of size - than its verylarge outflow
of people. The vast scale of Caribbean emigrationindeed influences
virtuallyall elementsof social change in the region.
Caribbean Migration
Accordingto estimatesprepared by Docquier and Marfouk(2005),
the emigrationrates forCARICOM countriesare the highestin the
world. The data in the firstcolumn of Table 3 indicatethat37.7% of
people born in a CARICOM nation live outside of the region.What
this means is that the out-migrationfromthe region is more than
threetimesthelevel ofthatfromCentralAmerica,a regiontypically
associated withhigh migrationrates.
Table3:Emigration
RatesforCARICOMCountries,
1965-2000
Rateof
RateofSkilled
Emigration Emigration
Antigua/Barbuda
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
St.Kitts/Nevis
St.Lucia
Suriname
Trinidad/Tobago
Mean
Unweighted
37.6
32.3
29.0
40.8
53.7
42.1
35.3
49.4
23.1
36.5
47.4
25.2
37.7
66.8
63.5
65.5
64.2
85.1
89.0
85.1
78.5
71.1
84.5
47.9
79.3
73.3
RateofSkilled
(16
Emigration
yearsormore)
79
76
73
67
62
59
53
48
45
43
NA
17
65
RateofEmigration
andRateofSkilledEmigration,
2005,
DocquierandMarfouk
TableA.1-2;RateofSkilledEmigration
Table4, Mishra2006,
(16yearsormore),
Annex
Table1
The Role of MigrationinCaribbean Integration 11
But even more dramaticis the outflowof skilled labour from
the Caribbean. The second column of Table 3 reports on the
percentageofCaribbean people withcollege degrees who live in the
developed world. The data in this column is remarkable.Virtually
all college-educatedGuyanese (89%) live abroad and thepercentage
is not much lower forGrenada, St. Kittsand Nevis, and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines.This suggests that,taken as a whole, in excess
of 70 percentof highlyeducated West Indian people reside outside
of the region.
Since some of these well-educatedémigrésmay have received
their advanced degrees only afterhaving moved from the West
Indies, thisdata may overstatethe Caribbean's loss. The regiondid
not investas much in thepeople who were educated elsewhere as it
did in the people who received theirtertiarydegree in the West
Indies. To take this into account, Prachi Mishra notes that
individuals who migratein theirlate teens or laterare less likelyto
obtain their schooling in the United States than in their home
country. Restrictingthe migration rate to those who left the
Caribbean at age 16 or higher thereforerefinesthe measure and
adjusts it to bettercapture the loss of educated people fromthe
region who received theirtertiaryschooling in the region (Mishra
2006, 17). When this is done, as Column 3 of the table shows, the
estimateof regionalloss is reduced. But thefactremainsthatskilled
emigrationfromthe region was very high, with the unweighted
mean suggesting than more than half of Caribbean people who
received tertiaryeducation in the regionnow live in the developed
world.
The hypothesis that emerges from this discussion is that
emigrationis the common source of the region's sluggish growth
and incomplete integration.In this perspective the outflow of
human capital deprives the Caribbean of precisely the kind of
human capital thata moderneconomy requires.But thatsame flow
resultsin thefactthata large segmentoftheWestIndian population
becomes adults anticipatingthattheywill secure theirprofessional
careers elsewhere. As such they do not see themselves as the
architectsof a West Indian nation.
12
Emigrationand Economic Growth
Prachi Mishra has computed the "welfare impact of skilled
emigration"by estimatingthedirecteconomic costs associated with
emigrationand comparing that figure with the positive flow of
remittancesthat the exodus generates (Mishra 2006: 6). In her
calculations,thecost side involves theincome and earningsthatdid
not occur because of emigration,the externalitiesthat were lost
because of that exodus, as well as the losses associated with the
investmentthat was made in émigrés' education. Her estimate is
that in ten of the twelve CARICOM countriesbetween 1980 and
2002, the losses associated with emigration exceeded the dollar
value of remittances. In the cases of Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Jamaicaand Trinidad and Tobago the losses were quite
high,in excess of 10% of GDP. Only in Grenada and St. Lucia were
losses and remittancesapproximatelyequal.
withHighSkillEmigration
as
Table4: LossesandRemittances
Associated
Percent
GDP,1980-2002
Country
Loss
13.2
Antigua/Barbuda
18.5
Barbados
Belize
6.8
11.5
Dominica
11.0
Grenada
9.5
Guyana
20.4
Jamaica
9.7
St.Kitts/Nevis
3.8
St.Lucia
St.Vincent/Grenadines 10.7
Suriname
7.8
16.8
Trinidad/Tobago
Mean
Unweighted
11.6
Remittances Remittances-Loss
3.0
2.3
4.7
8.4
11.0
1.9
7.4
6.9
4.0
7.2
0.5
0.3
-10.2
-16.2
-2.1
-3.1
0.0
-7.6
-13.0
-2.8
+0.2
-3.5
-7.3
-16.5
4.8
-6.8
Source:
Mishra
2006,Table6
But development should be conceived as a broader process
thancan be estimatedwith these calculations,valuable as theymay
be. What is fundamentalto modern growthis the competenceof a
population to work in a complementaryrelationshipwith modern
technology.As the World Bank puts it in its 2005 report on the
region,"cross countryvariationfs]in competitiveness,productivity
and income are profoundlylinked with differencesin skills and
technology". What this means is that "learning" is central to
economic modernization. According to the Bank, "'learning'
workers,'learning' firmsand 'learning' regions are winners in the
planet-wide, technology-driven, hyper-competitive economy"
(World Bank 2005: 144).
The logical inference to be drawn is that the region is
positioned poorly with regard to such "learning" to the extentthat
it loses highlyeducated and skilled personnel.As Andres Solimano
writes, "an outflow of entrepreneursand technical talent may
depress business creation,innovationand growth"(Solimano 2008:
13). With this the case, there is at least a presumptivecase to be
made that the high levels of emigrationfromthe Caribbean have
deprived itsbusiness communityof the capabilitiesnecessaryforit
to respond aggressively to the market opportunitiescreated by
CARICOM. No doubt other factorswere at work in this failureas
well. But managerial and technical limitationsare likely to have
been importantin the continuinginsularityof the region'sprivate
sector, evidenced by the very low level of intra-regionaltrade
existingamong memberstates.
Emigrationand Integration
But it is not only likelythat Caribbean emigrationhas been costly
with regard to development.It also seems probable thatit has had
a negative impact on integration.Because of emigration,West
Indian childrenare broughtup to believe thattheirfutureprospects
will be best advanced outside of their country of birth. With
aspirationsattachedto emigration,theproportionof people willing
to dedicate themselves to the institution-building
that Caribbean
to
not
mention
integration
regional nation-buildingrequires is
driven down to a lower level than would prevail in the absence of
such attitudes.
Insight into this problem is provided by Rosina Wiltshire's
discussion of the factthatforthe people of the West Indies, "longtermemigrationhas resulted in pivotal socializing institutionslike
the family transcending national boundaries". In such families
Wiltshirewrites,"Childrengrowingup in the donor societyreceive
early messages about the host society as representingthe land of
opportunity."As a result,she continues,"it is no wonder thatat the
14
firstpinch of economic crisisin the donor territoriesall roads lead
to the alternativehome in the North American paradise with
massive legal and illegal outflows." As she puts it, identification
with a geographically circumscribed place to which positive
characteristicsare attributed"has not necessarily been part of a
Caribbean reality"(Wiltshire1992: 177).
Migration,in short,shapes childhood socialization in a way
that lessens the likelihood that the people of the West Indies will
share an unambiguous identificationwith the region. If, as Liah
Greenfeld argues, nationalism is central to success in the
developmentprocess,the flood of people leaving theWest Indies is
the antithesisof what modernizationrequires (Greenfeld2001: 234).
The propensityto migrateis of course a response to market
opportunities.But thatresponse has also been deeply internalized
and accepted as the norm by the West Indian people. That is the
likely reason for the governmentsof the region having adopted
what a leading Caribbean migrationscholar has described as a
"laissez-faireapproach to migration".And it is forthe same reason
that government officials frequentlyare quoted in support of
emigration,as in thecase ofJamaica'sMinisterof Education in 2001,
who said thathe "was not opposed to the recruitment
of hundreds
of local teachersforposts in New York schools", at least partially
because many of them were going to teach "our own childrenof
Caribbean origin" (Thomas-Hope 2002: 24, 21).
Reversing Migration
It would be desirable to reverseor at least reduce the emigration
rate in order to promote Caribbean development and integration.
But public supportwould not countenancerestricting
thatoutflow.
Few office-seekersin the region would be willing to put their
political careers at risk by opposing the freedomto move abroad
without domestic constraints.Even more important,as ThomasHope emphasizes, "there is no need in small countriesto regard
non-migrationas being necessarily beneficial to the country.In
small countriesas thoseoftheCaribbean,thereis much to be gained
by both individual and communityas a whole fromthe mobility,
especially students or persons early in their professional lives."
What developmentpolicy needs to do, she writes,is "focus upon
15
the propensityof migrantsto return"and place emphasis on "the
creation of the opportunitiesand the environmentconducive to
retainingthemaftertheyreturn"(Thomas-Hope 2002: 26).
This veryissue - how to gain access to and utilize the skillsof
émigrés to promote development in theircountriesof origin has
been the subjectof recentdiscussion among developmentanalysts.
Solimano writes that in contrastto past thinkingthat considered
migrationas a one-way flow of people frompoor to richcountries,
in recentyears "we thinkmore in termsof brain circulation,a twoway (or multipledirectional)movementof talentedindividuals . . .
What is now highlightedis the way that therecan be a 'beneficial
brain drain'" (Solimano 2008: 2). This literaturehas only recently
startedto appear and as yetthereis not enough empiricalevidence
to support strong policy recommendationsconcerning the promotion of a reverseflow of human capital. Obviously it is difficult
to overcome the attractionof advanced living conditionsas well as
the entrepreneurialand research opportunities present in the
developed world. Nevertheless,theidea thatmigrationis no longer
viewed as necessarily a one-way flow represents a change in
perspective that potentially could be of great value to the
Caribbean.
The implicitmodel is based on the experiences of high-tech
employees born in countriessuch as Taiwan (China), Chile, China,
India or Israel,many of whom worked in theUnited Statesor other
OECD [OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationand Development]
countries,but at some point returnedto their countriesof birth.
There theyestablishednew firmsand/orprovided technicaladvice
forlocal corporations.In these ways, as Danny M. Leipziger writes,
members of the diaspora "can act as bridges between foreign
technologyand marketsand local entrepreneurs,and complement
and strengthenlocal market-basedinstitutions".But success in this
regard involves more than just the private sector. It requires
supportive governmentpolicies and institutionsin the recipient
nation. As Leipziger summarizes the situation, "strong local
institutionsare crucial forutilizingdiaspora resources effectively"
(Leipziger 2008: 3, 5). Success in encouraging a return flow of
Caribbean migrantswill not only stimulateeconomicgrowth;itwill
also advance the cause of integration.
Attractingoverseas Caribbean professionalsto returnhome is
almostcertainlybeyond the capacityof any one WestIndian nation.
16
Doing so will require "functionalcooperation" among the nations
of the region.It is in this dimension of integration- the sharingof
servicesand the undertakingof joint activitiesby the governments
of the region - that substantial achievementshave already been
recorded,holding out the promise of more such advances in the
have secured gains withregardto healthcare,
future.Shared efforts
disaster
education, security,
management,research and development, and sports and youth development. And though Clive
Thomas argues that the institutionalframeworkconcerningsuch
activities "still remains far from satisfactory",he nonetheless
observes thatthatframeworkis "more developed than otherareas
of regional integration"(Thomas 2008: 261). AttractingCaribbean
people resident in the diaspora to return to the region would
involve building on these experiencesand expanding the realm of
functionalcooperation.
The pioneer in functionalcooperation- the Universityof the
West Indies (UWI) - could be the locus of such an effort.
Researchers on the subject of return migration have learned,
according to Mario Cervantes and Dominique Guellec, that
"developing centersofexcellenceforscientificresearchand framing
the conditionsforinnovationand high tech entrepreneurshipcan
make a countryattractiveto highlyskilled workers."The authors
add that"the task is not easy and it takes time. . . ." But theygo on
to reportthat China has been particularlysuccessfulin this effort
and has done so in part by having "launched a projectto develop
100 universitiesinto world-class institutionsthatnot only provide
higher education training,but also academic employment and
researchopportunities"(Cervantesand Guellec 2002).
The scale involved in the Chinese experience of course is
vastly differentthan what would have to occur in the Caribbean.
But the principleremainsthe same. IfUWI were self-consciouslyto
become a hub of technologically sophisticated research and
development, it likely could provide a sufficientlydesirable
environmentto attracthighlytrainedCaribbean people to returnto
the region in roles that might combine entrepreneurshipand
academic employment.
To a limited extentthis already is being undertaken at the
University.However, such an innovativestrategywould require a
substantialincrease in the resourcesthatare made available to the
school. It could onlybe accomplishedifattractingreturneesbecame
an explicit goal, and fund-raising efforts were targeted to
accomplish that aim. This would involve not only the kind of
privatesectorfund-raisingthatis increasinglybeing undertakenby
UWI. Collectively the region's governmentswould have to be
supportiveof heightenedeffortsby,forexample,joiningtogetherin
diplomatic effortsto secure additional resources from donor
agencies and governments.There is no certaintythatsuch funding
would be adequately made available. But the promiseof success in
such an endeavor would be greaterthan the region'sprotractedbut
treatment
ultimatelyfutileeffortsto protectspecial and differential
forits sugar and bananas.
Otheraspects of functionalintegrationcould complementthis
effort.Cooperation to tackle the veryhigh level of crimethatexists
in the region, to improve the quality of primaryand secondary
education, and to expand available health services all should be
understood as components of a strategythat,by improving the
quality of life available to returningmigrantsand their families,
could act to reduce the region'sheavy loss of skilled and educated
labour.
In thisway regional integrationcould be deepened and at the
same time the prospects for Caribbean economic modernization
enhanced. The region's long-standingculture of migrationmight
therebybe turnedto its advantage.
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The Role of Migration in Caribbean Integration and Development

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