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Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 24
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
DENNIS CHADWICK MCGEE, as Personal
Representative/Administrator of the Estate of
DILLON C. MCGEE, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 1:15-cv-01069
MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE; JOHN
MEHR, individually and in his official capacity as
Sheriff of Madison County, and THOMAS
KNOLTON, individually and in his official
capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Madison County
Sheriff’s Office,
JURY DEMANDED
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Dennis Chadwick McGee, as Personal Representative/Administrator of the Estate of
Dillon C. McGee, deceased, files this civil rights and wrongful death action against the above
named Defendants arising out of the death of Dillon Chadwick McGee on September 26, 2014,
and in support would show as follows:
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff is bringing this action against Defendants for the wrongful death of Dillon
McGee. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Madison County, Tennessee, through its practices,
policies, customs, and patterns of conduct violated Dillon McGee’s civil rights guaranteed to him
under the constitution of the United States of America by utilizing excessive force in trying to
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apprehend Dillon McGee and ultimately killing him on September 26, 2014. Deputy Thomas
Knolton of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, acting under color of state law, used
unwarranted and unnecessary force at the Maverick Convenience Store at 3 Way Lane in
Madison County, Tennessee, when he shot Dillon McGee at close range in the back without
justification and then sought to cover up his heinous act by saying that he had to shoot Dillon
McGee because McGee was trying to run him over. However, Defendant Knolton fired the fatal
shot at point blank range into the driver’s side window as Dillon McGee was turning both his
body and his vehicle away from Knolton and after any threat of being hit by McGee’s vehicle
had passed. The fatal bullet entered Dillon McGee’s back and exited his chest as his vehicle
pulled away from the deputy and Defendant Knolton was not in danger of being struck by the
McGee vehicle when he chose to fire two shots into the driver’s window at point blank range
with the full intent of killing Dillon McGee.
The Madison County Sheriff’s Office failed to train its deputies, failed to have adequate
policies and procedures in place for its deputies, and allowed its deputies to engage in a custom
and pattern of conduct without appropriate oversight and supervision that was the moving force
behind the unconstitutional killing of Dillon McGee. Moreover, Madison County’s past history
of allowing its deputies to violate the civil rights of the citizens of this county created an
environment where deputies believed they could use excessive force and get away with it.
Defendant Mehr’s personal actions in this case after the killing of Dillon McGee show that he
condoned, approved, and ratified the conduct of Deputy Knolton and helped to foster this
environment where deputies truly believe that they can violate the civil rights of others and
escape any responsibility for their actions.
Defendant Mehr accepted the story of Defendant Knolton without questioning this story
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or challenging him on details that were inconsistent with both the scientific evidence and
eyewitness statements.
Instead of taking action against Defendant Knolton or making a
statement to the citizens of this community that excessive force will not be tolerated under his
leadership, Defendant Mehr put Defendant Knolton back to work and praised him for his bravery
and he did this months before the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation completed its investigation.
Defendant Mehr took over the responsibilities of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office with full
knowledge that its deputies had engaged in a pattern of violating the constitutional rights of the
citizens of this county and even made this past conduct an issue during his campaign. However,
Defendant Mehr chose not to take any action to protect the citizens of Madison County from
abusive deputies when he was sworn in as sheriff and then chose to ratify, condone, and approve
the deadly actions of Deputy Knolton well before a thorough investigation had been done.
Law enforcement officers must be given the right to protect themselves and the innocent
citizens of this community from the unlawful acts of criminals. However, the Sheriff of Madison
County must hold his law enforcement officers to a high standard of honor and integrity and
when an officer over reacts and unlawfully takes the life of another, he or she must be held
accountable for their actions to protect all of the innocent citizens of this community from harm.
II. PARTIES
1.
Dennis
Chadwick
McGee
is
bringing
this
action
as
personal
representative/administrator of the Estate of Dillon C. McGee, deceased, for the benefit of Dillon
McGee’s wrongful death beneficiary. Dennis Chadwick McGee is also the father of Dillon C.
McGee, deceased. The family of Dillon McGee recently received the results of DNA testing that
confirmed that the decedent is the father of E.L., the minor son of Shelby Lipford. Ms. Lipford,
as the mother of E.L., is aware that this action is being filed and consents to Dennis Chadwick
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McGee bringing this action on behalf of E.L., the wrongful death beneficiary of Dillon McGee.1
2.
Dillon McGee was an adult resident citizen of the State of Tennessee and was
killed by Defendant Knolton as set forth in this Complaint during the afternoon of September 26,
2014. Dennis Chadwick McGee is a resident citizen of Madison County, Tennessee, residing
therein at 136 Mason Road, Humboldt, Tennessee.
Dennis Chadwick McGee as personal
representative/administrator of the estate of Dillon C. McGee, deceased, is a proper party to
bring this action for the wrongful death of Dillon Chadwick McGee pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-5-101 et seq., including but not limited to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106.
3.
Defendant Madison County, Tennessee, (“Defendant Madison County”) is duly
incorporated under the laws of the State of Tennessee. Defendant Madison County, Tennessee
can be served by serving Steven W. Maroney, county attorney, 425 E. Baltimore Street, Jackson,
TN 38301. Defendant Madison County is responsible for the actions and inactions of its
employees, agents, and apparent agents and for the operation, training, and policies for the
Madison County Sheriff’s Office.
4.
Defendant John Mehr (“Defendant Mehr or Sheriff Mehr”) is an adult resident
citizen of Madison County, Tennessee. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant John Mehr was
the Sheriff of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office and was acting under color of state law at all
applicable times. Defendant Mehr is responsible for the day to day operations of the Madison
County Sheriff’s Office and is the final policymaker with respect to law enforcement operations
for Madison County, Tennessee. Defendant Mehr was under a duty at all times relevant to this
case to run the policing activities of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office so as to preserve not
only the peace of Madison County but also to preserve to its citizens the rights, privileges, and
1
Plaintiff is not including the full name of the infant child in this Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 5.2(a)(3) but will provide the Court with complete information concerning the child upon request.
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immunities guaranteed and secured to them by the constitutions and the laws of the United States
and/or the State of Tennessee. Defendant Mehr is being sued individually and in his official
capacity as Sheriff of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, and may be served with this
Complaint through serving Sheriff John Mehr at 546 East College St, Jackson, Tennessee
38301.
5.
Defendant Thomas Knolton (“Defendant Knolton” or “Deputy Knolton”) is an
adult resident citizen of Madison County, Tennessee. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant
Knolton was a Deputy Sheriff with the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, acting under the color
of state law and within the course and scope of his employment with the Madison County
Sheriff’s Office. Defendant Knolton is sued individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy
Sheriff of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, and may be served with this Complaint through
serving him at 546 East College St, Jackson, Tennessee 38301.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
6.
This Court has jurisdiction over this action because of the important questions of
federal law presented by this case pursuant to inter alia 28 U.S.C. '' 1331 and 1343. The Court
has pendent jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted herein
pursuant to inter alia 28 U.S.C. ' 1367.
7.
Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b)(2) because the
events giving rise to the causes of action alleged in this Complaint occurred within the Western
District of Tennessee.
8.
Plaintiff brings this cause pursuant to federal statutes including, but not limited to,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1988 in conjunction with all relevant statutes and laws including
Tennessee’s Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes (Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-101 et seq.).
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IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
9.
On September 26, 2014, Defendant Knolton shot and killed Dillon McGee. At all
times relevant to this action, Defendant Knolton was acting in the course and scope of his
employment with the Madison County Sheriff’s Department and under color of law.
10.
Upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton acted in accordance with the
flawed policies of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office and the inadequate training it provided
its deputies at all times relevant to this action. Nonetheless, Defendant Knolton intentionally
chose to shoot Dillon McGee in the back as Dillon was trying to get away from him at a time
when Dillon McGee posed no threat of harm to Knolton, his partner or anybody for that matter.
11.
At the time of this unlawful killing, Defendant Knolton was attempting to do a
“hard take down” on Dillon McGee to question and/or arrest him concerning an incident that had
happened the night before. Defendant Knolton chose to exercise this technique in an unmarked
car and in plain clothes and without activating his emergency lights. This technique was
excessive and placed both the deputies and Dillon McGee and his passenger in danger.
Moreover, upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton made the decision to use this
aggressive and excessive technique without seeking permission or approval from anyone at the
Madison County Sheriff’s Office and Defendant Madison County allowed its deputies to use this
aggressive and excessive technique to serve warrants without appropriate oversight and/or
supervision.
12.
Upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton was there to investigate an
incident that happened on September 25, 2014, during which Dillon McGee had been riding
around with friends when they got into an altercation. Upon information and belief, there was a
fight between the young men, with Cody Melton and Dillon McGee allegedly being the
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aggressors in that altercation. However, after this alleged altercation, both of the alleged victims
voluntarily got back into Dillon McGee’s car and asked him to drop them off where they had left
their vehicle.
Moreover, the allegations against Dillon McGee were never proven because he
was killed the following day.
13.
Upon information and belief, the alleged victims went home and told a parent
what happened and one of the parents called a deputy with the Madison County Sheriff’s Office
and relayed what had happened to that deputy.
14.
The Madison County Sheriff’s Office, for some reason, chose not to question
Cody Melton but instead chose to target Dillon McGee and to do a “hard take down” on him.
Upon information and belief, a Madison County deputy questioned one of the young men who
was involved in the previous night’s altercation and asked him to tell Dillon McGee to meet him
at the Maverick Convenience Store on Three Way on the afternoon of September 26, 2014, with
the full intent to serve the arrest warrant on McGee via a “hard take down” method with guns
drawn.
15.
On September 26, 2014, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Dillon McGee and a friend
stopped in a parking lot near the Maverick Convenience Store at 3 Way Lane in Madison
County, Tennessee and went in to purchase a soft drink and cigarettes. The two young men then
walked back to the car and got inside.
16.
Defendant Knolton and his partner Deputy Terry Stewart drove down Three Way
Lane behind the Nissan Versa that Dillon McGee was driving and then pulled in the lot to do a
“hard take down” on Dillon McGee. Again, Defendant Knolton was driving an unmarked car and
was not wearing a uniform. Knolton’s partner likewise was not wearing a uniform and neither
deputy activated the emergency lights on their vehicle to make sure that Dillon McGee and
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others would know they were law enforcement officers.
17.
Witnesses at the scene did not hear the deputies tell the occupants of the car that
they were law enforcement officers or that they had a warrant for the arrest of Dillon McGee.
Upon information and belief, the deputies never properly identified themselves as law
enforcement officers. Deputy Stewart was near the driver’s door and Defendant Knolton was in
front of the vehicle with his gun drawn and pointed at Dillon McGee. Defendant Knolton fired
at least two shots through the windshield of the Nissan Versa in close proximity to Dillon McGee
shortly after jumping out of his car and pointing a gun at McGee. Fortunately, neither bullet
struck McGee. Dillon McGee was then able to pull his vehicle around the deputy in an effort to
leave the parking lot to protect him and his passenger from harm.
18.
After hearing the first set of shots, witnesses on the scene looked in the direction
of Knolton and the Nissan Versa and saw Knolton side stepping to keep up with the moving
Nissan Versa when he fired multiple shots at very close range into the driver’s side window as
the Versa was making a right hand turn away from the officer. Defendant Knolton was out of
harm’s way and the vehicle was pulling away from him when he side-stepped to keep up with
the moving car and fired the shot that killed Dillon McGee.
19.
The first shot fired into the driver’s side window shattered the glass and then
grazed the shoulder of the decedent.
20.
Defendant Knolton’s second shot into the driver’s side window hit McGee in the
back and caused a fatal wound that killed Dillon McGee.
21.
Dillon McGee was able to drive away from the Maverick Convenience Store and
was attempting to get onto Highway 45 when he lost consciousness and drove off of the road.
22.
The decedent did not pose any threat to either deputy or anyone else when he was
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shot and killed by Defendant Knolton. Defendant Knolton claims that upon his approaching the
vehicle driven by Dillon McGee, the decedent tried to run them over with his vehicle instead of
complying with their requests and that they had no choice but to shoot him in self defense. The
above story, however, is flatly inconsistent with the report of the medical examiner in this case,
with ballistics proof in this case and with eyewitness accounts that show the fatal bullet coming
from the driver’s side door/window at close range as the decedent’s body was turning away from
the deputy and as the Nissan Versa was making a right turn to exit the parking lot. By all eye
witness accounts, Defendant Knolton was no longer in front of McGee’s vehicle and was out of
harm’s way when he fired the fatal shot.
23.
Defendant Knolton walked right up to Dillon McGee’s car and shot him at point
blank range in the back as he was trying to turn away from the approaching gun. Knolton was
not wearing a uniform and arrived on the scene in an unmarked car without ever putting on his
emergency lights. Upon information and belief, Dillon McGee did not know with any degree of
certainty that Defendant Knolton was a law enforcement officer.
24.
At the time he was shot, McGee posed no threat of harm to Defendant Knolton or
anyone else as he was simply trying to drive away.
25.
Defendant Knolton had no prior interactions with McGee which would suggest in
any way that McGee posed an immediate or imminent threat to others as he drove away.
26.
Defendant Knolton had no reason to believe that McGee posed an immediate or
imminent threat of serious physical harm to himself or others.
27.
Defendant Knolton violated the civil rights of Dillon McGee in a number of ways
on September 26, 2014, from the way he misrepresented facts in an affidavit he signed to get an
arrest warrant to the way he further decided to apprehend McGee via a “hard take down” and to
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the way he walked right up to his car and shot him in the back at point blank range. Defendant
Knolton utilized excessive force in attempting to execute McGee by using an unmarked car with
two plain clothes officers with the plan being to approach him with guns down in the parking lot
of a convenience store when they knew where he lived and where his parents lived.
28.
The actions of Defendant Knolton were objectively unreasonable.
29.
Defendant Knolton knew or should have known that McGee’s family lived a short
distance away and yet chose to come at him with guns drawn in an aggressive tactical maneuver
instead of trying to secure his arrest in a less aggressive and safer manner.
30.
Upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton and other Madison County
deputies told others of the plan to apprehend McGee with the use of deadly force in an attempt to
teach him a lesson and a number of McGee’s acquaintances were actually there to witness the
events of September 26, 2014.
31.
Defendants Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official capacity)
failed to have appropriate and constitutional policies in place at the time of this incident, failed to
properly train the deputies, failed to enforce the policies that they had in place and allowed their
deputies to engage in a pattern of misconduct in violation of the Constitution of the Unites
States. Defendants Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official capacity) allowed
Defendant Knolton and others to use “hard take downs” to serve warrants with appropriate
oversight and approval and this pattern and custom allowed Defendant Knolton in this case to
violate the civil rights of Dillon McGee. By way of alternative pleading, Defendant Madison
County had constitutional policies but Defendant Knolton chose not to follow them and instead
chose to utilize excessive deadly force in violation of such policies.
32.
Defendant Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official capacity)
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ratified, condoned and approved the conduct of Defendant Knolton in this case.
33.
Deputies with the Madison County Sheriff’s Office have used excessive force in
the past and yet Defendants Madison County and Mehr have done little to nothing to deter
continued violations. Defendant Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official
capacity) did a woefully inadequate job investigating this incident and merely accepted the selfserving statements of the deputies involved without conducting the type of investigation that an
incident like this requires, thereby sending the wrong message to both the deputies on this force
and the citizens of this County. This is further evidence of Sheriff Mehr and Madison County’s
ratification and approval of Defendant Knolton’s conduct.
34.
Defendants have engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional conduct that created an
environment that allowed this shooting to happen.
35.
Defendants violated McGee’s constitutional rights namely those rights protected
by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as set forth herein.
Those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation. A reasonable deputy or officer
confronted with the same or similar situation would have known that using deadly force would
violate those rights.
36.
It was clearly established law at the time Dillon McGee was shot that deputies and
officers had no right to use deadly force when there was no threat to themselves or anyone else
or after any perceived threat had passed.
37.
At the time Dillon McGee was shot, it was clearly established law that deadly
force could not be used simply to prevent the escape of a felony suspect.
38.
Defendant Knolton had no probable cause that Dillon McGee posed an imminent
or immediate threat of serious physical harm either to himself or to others.
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Defendant Knolton had no reason to believe that Dillon McGee presented an
imminent danger to himself, to his partner, or to any members of the public in the area after he
pulled away from the deputies.
40.
Dillon McGee had a constitutional right to be free from the use of deadly force or
excessive force because, at the time he was shot, all officers and all other persons were in a
position of safety.
41.
Defendant Madison County has failed to adequately and constitutionally train its
police officers in the use of deadly force when attempting to arrest an individual they believe to
be a fleeing felon.
42.
Defendant Knolton=s acts, inactions and omissions were conducted with deliberate
indifference to Dillon McGee=s constitutional rights.
43.
Dillon McGee suffered a deprivation of his 4th Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
44.
Defendant Madison County failed to adequately train its deputies, including
Knolton, on proper use of deadly force in circumstances such as those presented here.
45.
Dillon McGee suffered a deprivation of his 14th Amendment right to procedural
and substantive due process, including but not limited to his right to personal privacy, bodily
integrity and life.
46.
Rather than admit his wrongful conduct, Defendant Knolton knew that he could
simply tell his supervisors and investigators that he was in fear for his safety and/or his partner’s
safety and he would be exonerated from killing an eighteen (18) year old boy and that is exactly
what happened in this case.
47.
Defendant Madison County failed to adequately train its officers in violation of
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the Constitution of the United States of America.
48.
Plaintiff asserts that Dillon McGee suffered great pain and suffering and lost his
life as a direct and proximate result of the actions and inactions of Defendants and his family has
suffered greatly because of this loss.
49.
It was foreseeable that Dillon McGee would lose his life and Plaintiff would
sustain such damages on behalf of his heirs as a result of Defendants’ actions and inactions.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS – THOMAS KNOLTON
50.
Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every Paragraph contained
in this Complaint and by reference makes said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth
verbatim.
51.
Plaintiff avers that firing multiple gunshots at an individual who is not an
immediate threat amounts to the use of excessive and/or unreasonable deadly force against the
decedent in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, especially when the shots are fired in the back while the individual is pulling away.
52.
Defendant Knolton committed the actions and/or omissions described herein
under the color of state law and by virtue of his authority as a law enforcement officer of the
Madison County Sheriff’s Office and substantially deprived Dillon McGee of his clearly
established rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to him by the Fourth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and
1988.
53.
The unreasonable and excessive use of force against Dillon McGee in the form of
multiple gunshots fired at him as his car was rolling away from the deputy deprived him of his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable, excessive and deadly
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force and unreasonable seizure. Plaintiff avers that Defendant Knolton knew to a moral certainty
that the shots fired at Dillon McGee as means intentionally applied to seize him were likely to
cause severe injury or death.
54.
Defendant Knolton was not justified in his use of deadly force and did not and/or
could not reasonably believe in good faith that deadly force was warranted in this case. His
behavior as described in this Complaint was objectively unreasonable.
55.
Defendant Knolton’s actions in deciding to do a “hard take down” of Dillon
McGee under the facts and circumstances of this case deprived Mr. McGee of his rights
protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
56.
Defendant Knolton’s actions were done with deliberate indifference to Dillon
McGee’s health, safety, welfare, liberty and life.
57.
Defendant Knolton’s actions were egregious and shock the conscience.
58.
A reasonable officer confronted with the same or similar situation would have
known that using deadly force would violate Dillon McGee’s rights protected by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
59.
In support of the Plaintiff’s claim that the conduct of Defendant Knolton violated
the Fourth and Fourteen Amendment rights of Dillon McGee, Plaintiff relies upon the factual
allegations set forth in this Complaint.
60.
Plaintiff avers that he and his wife and the decedent’s minor son had a
constitutional right of familial association with Dillon. Further, Plaintiff avers that he and his
wife and decedent’s minor son had a constitutional right to the society and companionship of
Dillon. As a direct result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, Plaintiff and his wife lost their son
and suffered great losses of a personal and pecuniary nature, including but not limited to the loss
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of companionship, society and support of the Decedent as well as grief, sorrow and mental
suffering and so did decedent’s minor son. Plaintiff avers that the Defendants violated these
rights and that their actions constituted an unconstitutional termination of his familial association
and society and companionship of their son under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unites
States Constitution.
61.
Defendant violated Dillon McGee’s constitutional rights in many ways, including
but not limited to:
a. Misrepresenting the facts that were communicated to him in the affidavit that
he executed to obtain a felony arrest warrant against Dillon McGee;
b. Intentionally deciding to use a “hard take down” to serve the arrest warrant
that was just executed against Dillon McGee where such an aggressive
approach was not warranted;
c. Aggressively attempting to apprehend Dillon McGee with his gun drawn in an
unmarked car without activating any emergency lights or sirens and without
making sure that he had back up on the scene in marked cars with uniformed
deputies;
d. Unnecessarily escalating a situation that could have been handled without the
need for such an aggressive use of force;
e. Failure to use or even attempt to use less aggressive or less intrusive measures
in executing an arrest warrant;
f. Not properly identifying himself as a Madison County Sheriff’s Deputy so
that Dillon McGee would know who was pointing a gun at him and
attempting to stop his movement;
g. Using deadly force when there was no danger to himself or anyone else in the
area;
h. Using deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect after any potential threat of
harm had passed placing the suspect and his passenger at risk of serious
bodily injury or death; and
i. Using excessive force and otherwise violating the civil rights of Dillon
McGee.
62.
As a direct and proximate result of the actions and omissions of this Defendant,
Dillon McGee was killed and his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution were violated.
63.
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sustain such damages as a result of Defendant Knolton’s actions and inactions.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS – JOHN MEHR,
IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
64.
in this Complaint and by reference make said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth
verbatim.
65.
At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant John Mehr was acting under the color of
state law by virtue of his authority as the Sheriff of Madison County, Tennessee, and committed
the actions and/or omissions described herein in violation of Dillon McGee’s rights, privileges
and immunities guaranteed to him by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1988.
66.
Defendant Mehr took over the responsibilities of the Madison County Sheriff’s
Office with full knowledge that its deputies had engaged in a pattern and practice of violating the
constitutional rights of the citizens of this county, and even made this past conduct an issue
during his campaign for election.
67.
Defendant Mehr chose not to take any action to protect the citizens of Madison
County when he was sworn in as Sheriff from abusive deputies; and then chose to ratify,
condone, and approve the deadly actions of deputy Knolton well before a thorough investigation
had been done.
68.
Defendant Mehr failed to review deadly force and other relevant policies,
practices and procedures which were in place when he became Sheriff. Thus, he failed to put
into place constitutional policies for the Madison County Sheriff’s Department regarding fleeing
suspects or the use of deadly force.
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69.
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Despite being on notice that there was a need for specific training regarding the
use of deadly force when his deputies were faced with a situation similar to that presented here,
Defendant Mehr did not institute appropriate training for such incidents. Specifically, sheriff’s
deputies, including but not limited to Defendant Knolton, were not provided adequate training
regarding the apprehension or arrest of an individual suspected of committing a crime and did
not institute appropriate training measures as to when the use of deadly force was appropriate.
70.
Defendant Mehr authorized the use of “hard take downs” in situations where such
tactics were absolutely unnecessary, such as the situation described herein.
71.
Defendant Mehr did not require, train, or advise his deputies to use less
aggressive and/or less intrusive measures to effectuate the service of an arrest warrant.
72.
Defendant Mehr permitted, condoned, and ratified all of the actions and inactions
of Defendant Knolton as described herein.
73.
Defendant Mehr violated Dillon McGee’s clearly established rights protected by
the United States Constitution.
74.
Plaintiff asserts that Dillon McGee suffered great pain and suffering and lost his
life as a direct and proximate result of the actions and inactions of this Defendant.
75.
The aforementioned actions of Defendant Mehr were a proximate cause of the
harms and damages alleged herein, including but not limited to the death of Dillon McGee.
76.
sustain such damages as a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS BY MADISON COUNTY AND JOHN
MEHR, IN HIS OFFICAL CAPACITY
77.
Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every paragraph contained
in this Complaint, and by reference makes said paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth
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verbatim.
78.
Defendant Knolton acted in accordance with unconstitutional policies that
allowed deputies to use deadly force to apprehend an individual wanted for aggravated assault
even when that individual did not pose an immediate or imminent threat to the deputy or public.
79.
Defendants Madison County and Sheriff John Mehr did not properly investigate
deputy seizures and use of excessive force on citizens or properly discipline deputies for those
acts and condoned an environment in the Madison County Sheriff’s Office where deputies
thought that it was okay to violate the civil rights of the citizens of Madison County.
80.
Defendant Madison County and its relevant policymakers have failed to act to
remedy patterns of excessive force in the Madison County Sheriff’s Office despite actual
knowledge of the same, thereby tacitly approving and ratifying the type of misconduct alleged
here.
81.
Defendant Madison County policymakers failed to have in place sufficient
policies and training to prevent excessive force and it was this lack of policies and training which
was the moving force behind the unconstitutional killing of Dillon McGee. Upon information
and belief, the policy concerning the use of deadly force that was in place in September of 2014
was on its face violative of the law and was unconstitutional.
82.
Defendant Madison County policymakers were aware of, condoned and facilitated
by their inaction, a “code of silence” in the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, by which deputies
fail to report misconduct committed by other deputies, such as the misconduct in this case.
83.
The injuries and death of Dillon McGee could have been avoided had Defendants
Madison County and Sheriff John Mehr provided constitutional policies and appropriate training
as to the proper use of deadly force. This lack of adequate policies and training amounts to an
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unconstitutional policy.
84.
Defendant Madison County was on notice of each and every constitutional
violation alleged herein taking place by Madison County Sheriff’s Office deputies, its Sheriff
and Defendant Knolton. These Defendants violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of Dillon McGee in that they were deliberately indifferent to the rights of Mr. McGee and
others through their hiring, firing, and retention of officers, as well as their in adequate training
with regard to the use of deadly force.
85.
These Defendants were on notice that Defendant Knolton and other Sheriff’s
deputies would be called upon to make decisions regarding individuals they perceive as fleeing
or escaping from the service of an arrest warrant. Despite this notice, these Defendants failed to
adequately train said officers, including Defendant Knolton, with regard to when to use or refrain
from using deadly force. Defendants also failed to have in place adequate written policies and
adequate procedures for the use of deadly force.
86.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Madison County and Defendant John Mehr are
liable for the actions of Defendant Deputy Knolton and all other law enforcement officials
involved in the decision and execution of the “hard take down” and deadly force applied upon
Dillon McGee as set forth above. Defendants Madison County and John Mehr permitted,
encouraged, tolerated, and ratified an official pattern, custom, and practice by its law
enforcement deputies violating the federal constitutional rights of the public at large during the
course of their law enforcement applications. The actions of Defendant Deputy Knolton as
alleged above were done pursuant to one or more policies, practices and/or customs of Defendant
Madison County.
87.
After the incident, Defendants Madison County and John Mehr determined that
19
PageID 20
Defendant Knolton had acted appropriately and in compliance with the policies, practices and
customs of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office but did so well before any meaningful
investigation was done.
Notwithstanding the sheriff’s vote of confidence, the actions of
Defendant Knolton during this incident were in direct violation of the laws of the United States
and the State of Tennessee regarding the use of deadly and/or excessive force. Despite violating
the federal and state law, Defendant Knolton was not reprimanded or terminated but instead
praised.
Accordingly, the Defendants Madison County and John Mehr ratified, condoned,
acquiesced in, and/or approved of Defendant Knolton’s conduct in this action in all respects. As
the Defendants Madison County and John Mehr determined that the Defendant Knolton’s
conduct as set forth herein was in compliance with the policies, practices and customs of
Madison County and the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, the Defendants Madison County and
John Mehr are directly liable for the actions and constitutional violations of the Defendant
Deputy Knolton. Moreover, this conduct is consistent with past actions of these Defendants,
which created an atmosphere of no accountability on the part of the officers.
88.
As a matter of both policy and practice, the Madison County Sheriff’s Office
directly encourages, and is thereby the moving force behind the very type of misconduct at issue
in this case.
89.
As a matter of both policy and procedure, the Madison County Sheriff’s Office
facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue here by failing to adequately investigate, punish
and discipline prior instances of similar misconduct, thereby leading Madison County Sheriff’s
Deputies to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging
future abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff.
90.
Generally, as a matter of widespread practice so prevalent as to comprise county
20
PageID 21
policy, deputies of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office conduct unlawful seizures and use
excessive force on citizens, yet the Madison County Sheriff’s Office makes findings of
wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number of cases.
91.
Defendant Madison County does not properly investigate police/deputy seizures
of civilians and uses of excessive force or properly discipline deputies for those acts.
92.
Defendant Madison County and Sheriff Mehr had an unconstitutional policy in
effect at the time Dillon McGee was shot, permitting the use of deadly force even when no one
was in harm’s way or in imminent danger.
93.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Madison County and Sheriff Mehr are liable for
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and all other applicable statutes and laws because their
custom, policy or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional violations addressed
herein.
94.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant Madison County and Defendant
Mehr are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and all other applicable statutes and laws because
their failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to such rights. Defendants’ failure to train
was the moving force behind Dillon McGee’s constitutional deprivations.
95.
Defendant Madison County and Defendant Mehr had a policy, custom and
practice of inadequate training and supervision.
96.
Defendant Madison County and Defendant Mehr had one or more
unconstitutional written policies which were the moving force behind the constitutional
violations suffered by Dillon McGee.
97.
The aforementioned actions and omissions of the individual defendants were
proximately caused by the policies, practices, customs, and inadequate training of Defendants
21
PageID 22
Madison County and John Mehr and were the underlying cause of the death of Dillon McGee.
98.
It was foreseeable that Dillon McGee would be deprived of his constitutional
rights and ultimately lose his life as a result of Defendants’ actions and inactions as described
herein.
VIII. WILLFUL AND INTENTIONAL TORTS OF DEFENDANT THOMAS KNOLTON
99.
in this Complaint and by reference make said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth herein
verbatim.
100.
In addition to the above and/or in the alternative, the acts of Defendant Knolton
alleged herein constitute the common law intentional torts of assault, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and outrageous conduct under the laws of the State of Tennessee.
101.
Defendant Knolton committed an unpermitted and offensive touching of Dillon
McGee through an object he set in motion, by firing a gun at point blank range into the back of
Dillon McGee.
102.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the acts and omissions of Defendant Knolton
alleged herein were intentional, malicious, reckless, willful and wanton and in bad faith, entitling
the Plaintiff to judgment against Defendant Knolton for all damages associated with the
wrongful death of Dillon McGee, including but not limited to punitive damages.
103.
The aforementioned actions of Defendant Knolton proximately caused all of the
harms and damages alleged herein, including but not limited to severe emotional harm of Dillon
McGee and the death of Dillon McGee. Plaintiff alleges that such injuries and ultimately Dillon
McGee’s death was a foreseeable consequence of the acts and omissions of Defendant Knolton
as alleged herein.
22
PageID 23
IX. LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
104.
verbatim.
105.
Plaintiff alleges that as a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of the conduct
of Defendants as described herein, Dillon McGee suffered loss of life.
106.
Plaintiff and his wife (Christina McGee) and E.L., decedent’s minor son, also
suffered in their individual capacities as a result of the conduct of Defendants. They suffered
and continue to suffer the loss of services and companionship of Dillon and their damages are
part of the overall pecuniary value of the life of the decedent to be disbursed to the wrongful
death beneficiary.
X. DAMAGES
107.
As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the acts and/or omissions of the
Defendants, Dillon McGee was killed on September 26, 2014. The injuries for which Plaintiff
seeks compensation, include, but are not limited to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Physical injuries, including the death of Dillon McGee, and this family’s
resulting loss of familial association with him;
Conscious physical and emotional pain and suffering of Dillon McGee from
the time of injury until his death, and his loss of the pleasures of life;
Funeral expenses incurred for Dillon McGee;
The pecuniary value of the life of Dillon McGee, including but not limited to
the loss of his companionship and consortium;
Loss of future earnings and future earning capacity;
Prejudgment interest and/or post judgment interest and statutory and
discretionary costs to the extent permitted by law;
Attorney fees and expenses pursuant to applicable law, including but not
limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
Injunctive and/or declaratory relief that the acts and conduct set forth above
were unconstitutional, and precluding them from engaging in such activities
in the future; and
All such further relief, both general and specific, to which he may be entitled
23
PageID 24
under the premises.
XI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
108.
verbatim.
109.
The actions of the Defendants sued in their individual capacity were performed
intentionally, recklessly, fraudulently and/or maliciously, thus entitling Plaintiff to a substantial
award of punitive damages under applicable law to be determined by the jury in this cause.
XII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff sues Defendants jointly and
severally for the injuries described and pray for judgment and an award of injunctive and/or
declaratory relief and compensatory damages and punitive damages (where appropriate).
Plaintiff seeks Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) as compensatory damages, plus an amount
of punitive damages as may appear fair and reasonable to a jury. Plaintiff seeks such other relief,
both general and specific, to which he may be entitled in this case.
A JURY IS RESPECTFULLY DEMANDED.
Respectfully submitted,
s/Jeffrey S. Rosenblum
Jeffrey S. Rosenblum, (#13626)
Matthew T. May, (#25547)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6070 Poplar Avenue, Suite 550
Memphis, TN 38119
(901) 527-9600
jeffr@randrfirm.com
matt@randrfirm.com
24

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