Full Article

J. OF PUBLIC BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 15(4), 505-524
WINTER 2003
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN
BUDGET DECISION-MAKING TO FEDERAL MANAGERS'
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT
Andrew Blair Staley, Barbara Dastoor,
Nace R. Magner, and Chandler Stolp*
ABSTRACT. This study examines the contribution of distributive, procedural,
and interactional justice in Federal budget decision-making to Federal managers'
commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization. A total
of 1,358 useable surveys were received from a sample of 9,643 managers.
Reliability coefficients were acceptable (> .70), and intercorrelations consistent
with previous studies. Hierarchical regression analysis supported only maineffect relationships between procedural justice and interactional justice and
managers' organizational commitment. No support was found for a main effect
relationship between distributive justice and organizational commitment -- or for
any interactive effects. Contrary to models of bureaucratic behavior based on
economic theory, these findings may suggest that Federal managers may be
motivated primarily by psychological outcomes of budget decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars broadly define organizational justice as fairness in the
allocation of organizational resources (Homans, 1982). This study
------------------------* Andrew Blair Staley, D.B.A., C.P.A., is Associate Professor, Department of
Accounting, Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. His primary research
interest is in budgetary decision-making. Barbara Dastoor, Ph.D., is Associate
Professor, Wayne Huizenga Graduate School of Business and Entrepreneurship,
Nova Southeastern University. Her research focuses on strategic human
resources management and organizational behavior. Nace R. Magner, D.B.A.,
C.M.A., is J.C. Holland Professor of Accountancy, Gordon Ford College of
Business, Western Kentucky University. His current research focuses on justice
and subordinate participation in organizational budgeting. Chandler Stolp,
Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Director of the Center for
Inter-American Policy Studies, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas
at Austin. His research focuses on western hemispheric economic integration,
regional economics, and public sector productivity.
Copyright © 2003 by PrAcademics Press
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STALEY, DASTOOR, MAGNER & STOLP
empirically examines the effect of organizational justice in Federal
budget decision-making on Federal managers’ commitment to the
Federal government as an employing organization. This study seeks to
add to scholarly understanding of behavioral aspects of budgeting and
organizational justice, contribute to professional understanding of budget
formulation policies and procedures that lead to increased organizational
commitment and suggest areas for future research.
This study presents an overview of organizational justice, including a
review of organizational justice literature and development of
hypotheses. It then details the methodology used -- the model, the
subjects, the measurement of variables, and data collection. Next, it
presents the results of a hierarchical regression analysis test of the
hypotheses. The study concludes with a discussion of the results,
including the aforementioned implications for scholarly understanding,
professional management and future research.
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW
Academics and policy makers have long been interested in the
effects of budget decision-making on organizational behavior. Niskanen's
(1971) model in which budgets are maximized to increase salary and
prestige is perhaps the most famous model of how employees and
organizations react to governmental budget decision-making (see
Friedman, 1984, for an excellent discussion of this model).
Beyond Niskanen, traditional accounting-based research on budget
decision-making and organizational behavior has focused on the
relationship between budgetary participation and managerial
performance (Hopwood, 1974). Most of these studies find a positive
relationship between participation in the budgetary process and
managerial performance (Brownell & McInnes, 1986; Merchant, 1981;
see also Hopwood, 1974), although, due to such factors as corporate
culture (Brownell, 1982), the size the budget (Aranya, 1990), and
performance standards (Dunk, 1989, 1990), this finding is not universal
(Brownell, 1981, 1983; Milani, 1975).
Separately, academics and policy makers have long been interested
in the effect of resource allocation in general on organizational behavior,
namely, in the effect of organizational justice – distributive justice,
procedural justice, and interpersonal justice – on organizational behavior.
Homans (1961, p. 74) defines distributive justice as “justice in the
CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUDGET DECISION-MAKING
507
distribution of rewards and costs between persons.” Homans (1961)
theorizes that an individual’s reaction to an organization is dependent on
the expected relationship (based on personal or reference group
experience) between the individual’s contributions to the organization
and the resources allocated by the organization to the individual. Adams
(1965) extends and expands the concept of distributive justice, labeling it
equity theory and applying it to organizational behavior. Adams (1965,
pp. 276-277) focuses on the consequences (such as quit rates) of
employees’ comparison of inputs (“education, intelligence, experience,
training, … ”) to outputs (such as pay).
In contrast, procedural justice is justice in the procedures used to
determine the allocation of organizational resources, not the amount of
the resource itself (Allen, 1982). Thibaut and Walker (1975) define the
self-interest theory of procedural justice – that an individual’s reaction to
an organization depends on the adequacy of the procedures used to
allocate the organization’s resources because of the belief that certain
procedures, such as those that give individuals more control over the
decision process, will ultimately produce more favorable outcomes.
Lind and Tyler (1988) define an alternative model of procedural justice,
the group value model, and suggest that an individual’s reaction to an
organization depends on the adequacy of the procedures because the
presence and use of certain procedures, such as those that allow for
participation in decisions, immediately leads to feelings of self-esteem
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Bies and Moag (1986) define interactional justice as the “quality of
interpersonal treatment … [persons] receive during the enactment of
organizational procedures” (p. 44). Interactional justice theory holds that
an individual’s reaction to an organization is dependent on the
individual’s interpersonal treatment during the allocative decision
process and the organizational justice literature has evolved to define
interactional justice as decision makers’ provision of adequate
explanations for the decision, and treating employees with respect when
implementing the decision (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Moorman,
1991; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).1
Subsequent to the development of the main dimensions of
organizational justice, Folger and his colleagues (Folger, 1986; Skarlicki
& Folger; 1997; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999) discuss interactions
between distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice.
First, Folger (1986) labels the interaction of distributive justice theory
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STALEY, DASTOOR, MAGNER & STOLP
and procedural justice as referent cognitions theory, and holds that an
individual's “negative reactions to a resource allocation decision occur
when two conditions are met: (a) the outcomes associated with the
decision are considerably lower than easily imagined alternative
outcomes and (b) the procedures that give rise to outcomes are unfair,
thereby rendering the outcomes unjustified” (Brockner & Wiesenfeld,
1996, p. 193). More recently, Skarlicki and Folger (1997) and Skarlicki,
Folger and Tesluk (1999) discuss a three-way interaction between
distributive justice, procedural justice and interactional justice,
postulating that either procedural justice or interactional justice may be
substituted to ameliorate negative reactions resulting from distributive
injustice.
As a theory of organizational behavior, organizational justice is
clearly applicable to governmental budget decision-making. After all,
budget decision-making fundamentally concerns the distribution of
organizational resources, and the basic question in budgeting is: "On
what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of
activity B" (Key, 1940/1992, p. 110). While Lewis (1952/1992)
theorizes that budget allocation decisions should be made based on the
marginal benefit of the next dollar added in apportioning dollars to one
activity versus another, Wildavsky (1975) suggests that budget decisions
are made in practice on the principles of proportional balance, arbitration
(that is, following procedures), and interpersonal trust (see also Jones &
McCaffery, 1994; Schick, 1994; White, 1994).
In regard to organizational justice, proportional balance is clearly
analogous to distributive justice, as both concepts are concerned with the
actual distribution of resources to the distributee in relation to
distributions to referent groups. Arbitration is clearly analogous to
procedural justice in that both concepts focus on procedures and not on
actual results. Interpersonal trust is clearly analogous to interactional
justice as both concepts focus on the interpersonal behavior between the
budget requester and budget decision maker.
Thus, organizational
justice provides a framework for evaluating the effect of the approaches
to budget decision-making on organizational behavior.
Kim and Mauborgne (1993), Lindquist (1995), Libby (1999), and
Welker and Magner and their colleagues (Ehlen, Magner, & Welker,
1999; Magner & Johnson, 1995; Magner, Welker, & Campbell, 1995;
Welker & Magner, 1994) are some of the researchers who have used
organizational justice to evaluate the impact of budget decision-making
CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUDGET DECISION-MAKING
509
and related processes on organizations. In general, these studies find that
procedural justice in budgeting is related to positive organizational
outcomes and affects (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Magner & Johnson,
1995; Welker & Magner, 1994). And, in general, these studies find that
procedural justice ameliorates the effect of distributive injustice on
organizational outcomes and affects (Lindquist, 1995; Libby, 1999;
Ehlen et al., 1999; Magner et al., 1995), although the findings are not
uniform on which model of procedural justice has the ameliorating
effect, and the ameliorating effect does not apply uniformly to all
organizational outcomes and affects tested.
Organizational justice also provides a framework for evaluating the
effect of resource allocation other than budget decision-making (e.g., pay
decisions) on organizational behavior.
Early field studies of
organizational justice find main effect relationships between the various
dimensions of organizational justice and organizational outcomes, with
procedural justice and interactional justice having stronger effects than
distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990). Later studies find an interactive
effect between distributive justice and procedural justice, or between
distributive justice and interactional justice and find that either
procedural justice or interactional justice ameliorates the negative effect
of distributive injustice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). More recently,
Folger and Skarlicki and their colleagues (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997;
Skarlicki et al., 1999) examine the three-way interaction between
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on organizational
behavior, and find that either high levels of procedural justice or high
levels of interactional justice may interact with distributive justice to
ameliorate low levels of distributive justice with respect to organizational
retaliation behavior.
In sum, organizational justice postulates that an individual’s reaction
to organizational resource allocation is dependent on distributive justice
(Adams; 1965; Homans, 1961), procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980;
Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and interactional justice
(Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Tyler & Bies,
1990). Governmental budget theory (Wildavsky, 1975) holds that
decisions allocating the government’s budget are made on bases that may
be analogous to distributive, procedural, and interactional justice.
Previous research finds main effect relationships between the
organizational justice and organizational outcomes and affects in
resource allocation and in budget decision-making (Brownell &
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STALEY, DASTOOR, MAGNER & STOLP
McInnes, 1986; Magner & Johnson, 1995; Merchant, 1981; see also
Greenberg, 1990). Thus, hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c are offered:
Hypothesis 1a: Controlling for procedural justice and interactional
justice, Federal managers who receive a budget that is fair given
their unit’s inputs and level of efforts (distributive justice) will have
higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an
employing organization.
Hypothesis 1b. Controlling for distributive justice and interactional
justice, Federal managers who receive a budget that was developed
with fair formal procedures (procedural justice) will have higher
levels of commitment to the Federal government as an employing
organization.
Hypothesis 1c. Controlling for distributive justice and procedural justice,
Federal managers who receive a budget that was developed with fair
interpersonal conduct by budget decision makers (interactional
justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the Federal
government as an employing organization.
Referent cognitions theory (Folger, 1986; see also Brockner &
Wiesenfeld, 1996) holds that procedural justice or interactional justice
interacts with distributive justice to ameliorate the effect of distributive
injustice with respect to organizational outcomes. Previous research
finds referent cognitions effects in budget decision-making (Lindquist,
1995; Libby, 1999; Magner et al., 1995). Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b
are offered:
Hypothesis 2a. Federal managers who receive a budget that is fair given
their unit’s inputs and level of efforts (distributive justice) or was
developed with fair formal procedures (procedural justice) will have
higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an
employing organization.
Hypothesis 2b. Federal managers who receive a budget that is fair given
their unit’s inputs and level of efforts (distributive justice) or was
developed with fair interpersonal conduct by budget decision makers
(interactional justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the
Federal government as an employing organization.
Folger and Skarlicki and their colleagues (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997;
Skarlicki et al., 1999) find that either procedural justice or interactional
CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUDGET DECISION-MAKING
511
justice may interact with distributive justice to ameliorate distributive
injustice. Thus, hypothesis 3 is offered.
Hypotheses 3. Federal managers who did not receive a fair budget in
relation to their unit’s inputs and level of efforts (distributive
injustice) but who received a budget that was developed either with
fair formal procedures (procedural justice) or with fair interpersonal
conduct by budget decision makers (interactional justice) will have
higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an
employer.
METHODOLOGY
Model
This cross-sectional study empirically examines the relationship
between the Federal government's allocative decision on an individual's
budget and the bureaucrat's behavior -- that is, bureaucrats' reaction to
the decision on their budgets. Following Skarlicki and Folger (1997) and
Skarlicki et al. (1999) this study conducts a three-step hierarchical
regression analysis.
This study uses organizational commitment
(Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979, 1982) as the dependent variable, and
distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice as the
independent variables. This study entered distributive justice, procedural
justice, and interactional justice in block one (main effect); distributive
justice x procedural justice, distributive justice x interactional justice,
and procedural justice x interactional justice in block two (two-way
interactions); and distributive justice x procedural justice x interactional
justice in block three (three-way interaction).
Significance was
evaluated using the change in F.
Subjects of Analysis
This study uses as subjects Federal executives (managers) who both
supervise Federal personnel and have a budget. These subjects represent
the job category that has budget responsibilities in the Federal
government and for whom organizational commitment is paramount;
commitment to the organization from these managers is necessary to
accomplish organizational missions (Dressler, 1999; Mowday et al.,
1979; Nyhan, 1999). Respondents self-reported their status as Federal
manager, the type of budget received, and the date of their budget.
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STALEY, DASTOOR, MAGNER & STOLP
Measurement of Dependent Variable
This study uses organizational commitment as the measure of
organizational outcomes. Organizational behavior theory and research
suggest that furthering organizational commitment is key to successful
management (i.e., is linked to performance). For example, Mowday et al.
(1982) find that organizational commitment reduces absenteeism and
turnover and increases organizational effectiveness. And, Dressler (1999)
suggests that organizational commitment is necessary for employees’
self-management and that organizational commitment is also positively
associated with employees’ organizational citizenship behavior and level
of efforts.
Also, organizational commitment has been used in
organizational justice research (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Folger &
Konovsky, 1989; Magner & Johnson, 1995; Magner et al., 1995; see also
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996, for a summary), and it has been linked to
a reduced propensity to create budgetary slack (Nouri, 1994).
Following Kim and Mauborgne (1993), Folger and Konovsky
(1989), Magner and Johnson (1995), and Magner, Welker, and Campbell
(1995), organizational commitment was measured using the short-form
of Mowday, Steers, and Porter's (1979) questionnaire. This questionnaire
contained nine items. The questions were in a Likert-type format,
ranging from disagree (1) to agree (7). A typical statement in this index
is "I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally
expected in order to help the Federal government be successful."
Measurement of Independent Variables
Following Moorman (1991) and McFarlin and Sweeney (1992),
distributive justice is measured using an index adapted from Price and
Mueller (1986). Although originally formulated as a five-point Likerttype format, a seven-point index ranging from disagree (1) to agree (7) is
used for consistency. A typical statement in this index is "My unit
received a fair budget considering the amount of effort my unit puts
forth." Procedural justice is measured using an index adapted from
Moorman's (1991). Moorman's index was itself adapted from Greenberg
(1986) and is consistent with Orphen (1994). Moorman's index
contained seven items, and uses a seven-point Likert-type index ranging
from disagree (1) to agree (7). A typical statement in this index is
"Budget decision makers used formal procedures designed to ensure that
decisions on my budget could be made with consistency." Consistent
with Moorman (1991) and Gavin, Green, and Fairhurst (1995),
CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUDGET DECISION-MAKING
513
interactional justice is measured using five of six items from Moorman's
index. This index also uses a seven-point Likert-type index ranging from
disagree (1) to agree (7), and a typical statement in this index is "Budget
decision makers treated me with kindness and consideration."
Data Collection
This study collected data with a five-page self-administered
questionnaire sent to the 9,643 "Executive Command" mailing list of
Federal executives maintained by Government Executive Magazine.
Eliminating respondents who identified themselves as not being Federal
managers as well as those with missing data in the dependent or
independent variable data resulted in 1,358 usable surveys, a response
rate of 14%. Eighty percent (1,086) of the respondents are male; there
are 154 (11.3%) females, with 118 (8.7%) no responses to the
demographic question on gender. The mean age of the respondents is
49.94 years, with a standard deviation of 6.56 years, a minimum age of
27, and a maximum age of 80. A majority (931 or 68.6%) is in a civilian
job series, including 125 (9.2%) in the Senior Executive Service. Some
188 (13.8%) are part of a military job series, and there are 239 (17.6%)
no responses to the question on job series.
Career GS-15s are the superior of a plurality of the respondents -407 or 30%. Career Senior Executive Service members are the superior
of 267 (19.7%) respondents, with political appointees the superior of 207
(15.2%) of the respondents, other career incumbents the superiors for
362 (26.6%) of the respondents, and 115 (8.5%) no responses to the
demographic question on superior.
RESULTS
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, correlations, and
reliabilities for the variables. The intercorrelations for the organizational
justice variables are consistent with Skarlicki and Folger (1997). The
alpha reliability coefficients are all acceptable, exceeding the common
threshold of .70 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). A rotated
factor matrix (not shown) loaded distributive, procedural, and
interactional justice on three separate factors (all loadings above .5; most
loadings above .8).
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STALEY, DASTOOR, MAGNER & STOLP
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities
Variable
1.
OC
M
4.85
SD
1.12
1
(.87)
2
3
2.
PJ
3.85
1.53
0.33
(.94)
3.
DJ
4.12
1.80
0.21
0.53
(.97)
4.
IJ
4.15
1.58
0.34
0.76
0.61
4
(.92)
Notes: N = 1,358; M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation; OC =
Organizational commitment; PJ = Procedural justice; DJ =
Distributive justice; IJ = Interactional justice. Alpha reliability
coefficients are on the diagonal.
Regression Analysis
Table 2 summarizes the hierarchical regression analysis for
procedural justice, distributive justice, and interactional justice in budget
decision-making on Federal managers' organizational commitment. (A
four-step hierarchical regression, not shown, was also conducted, with
gender, age, and tenure entered at step one. The control variables are not
significant and did not change the results of the three-step analysis).
As shown in Table 2, the main effect of the organizational justice
variables is significant (∆ F = 67.208, sig. ∆ F < .001). The specific
main effect coefficient for procedural justice is positive and significant (t
= 4.621, p. < .001). The specific main effect coefficient for interactional
justice is also positive and significant (t = 4.978, p. < .001.). As shown
in Table 2, the interactive effects of the organizational justice variables
are not significant for the two-way interactions (F = .793, sig. ∆ F =
.498) or the three-way interaction (F = .789, sig. ∆ F = .375). Thus,
contrary to expectations and to previous organizational justice research
in general and organizational justice research in budgeting specifically,
there is no interactive effect between procedural justice or interactional
justice and distributive justice. Further, distributive justice in budget
decision-making is not significant with respect to organizational
commitment. Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 2b, and 3 are not supported.
CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUDGET DECISION-MAKING
515
TABLE 2
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Organizational
Justice Variables on Organizational Commitment
Variable
t
B
Step 1: Main effects
DJ
- 0.01
- 0.24
PJ
0.18
4.62
IJ
0.21
4.98
Step 2: Two-way interactions
PJ x DJ
0.05
0.28
IJ x DJ
0.16
0.91
PJ x IJ
- 0.21
-1.33
Step 3: Three-way interactions
PJ x DJ x IJ
- 0.39
- 0.89
2
Total ∆ R
Sig. t
∆ R2
.130****
.811
<.001
<.001
.001
.779
.361
.184
.001
.375
.132****
Notes: N = 1,358; M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation; OC =
Organizational commitment;
PJ = Procedural justice; DJ =
Distributive justice; IJ = Interactional justice; B = Standardized
regression coefficients. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01; ****p <.001.
Change in R2 (∆ R2) evaluated using F statistic. At step 1, ∆ F =
67.208, sig. ∆ F = <.001; at step 2, ∆ F = .793, sig. ∆ F = .498; at
step 3, ∆ F = .789, sig. ∆ F = .375; total F = 29.238, sig. = <.001.
DISCUSSION
Implications for Scholarly Understanding
Economic theory suggests that bureaucrats are motivated by the
amount of budgetary resources received as a result of budget decisionmaking (Niskanen, 1971; see Friedman, 1984, for a summary).
However, consistent with other recent organizational justice research on
budget decision-making in governmental settings (Magner & Johnson,
1995), the main effect-only results of this study suggests that Federal
managers focus unconditionally on the fairness of procedures used in
budget decision-making and interpersonal behavior during budget
decision-making, and not on the fairness of the actual dollar level of
budget resources. Contrary to the predictions of the models based on
economic theory, the amount of budgetary resources allocated by the
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STALEY, DASTOOR, MAGNER & STOLP
Federal government to the Federal manager does not appear to be
important in determining the level of managers' commitment to the
Federal government as an employing organization. Indeed, the lack of
an interaction between distributive justice and procedural justice may
suggest that Federal managers are concerned with the psychological
outcomes of budget decision-making such as achieving self-identity and
self-esteem rather than with economic outcomes, and thus that Federal
managers’ behavior follows the group-value model of procedural justice
(Ehlen et al., 1999). As explained by Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996),
under the group-value model, procedural justice is linked to individuals'
reaction to organizational decisions because:
.... when procedures are fair, individuals' needs for self-esteem
and self-identity are likely to be fulfilled. Furthermore, because
procedures are viewed as relatively stable, people should feel
reassured that they will continue to have their identity and
esteem needs met in the future. Consequently, they are relatively
unaffected by the concrete outcomes associated with a current
decision. (p. 200)
The lack of an interaction between interactional justice and
distributive justice may be similarly based: Federal managers may focus
on interpersonal interactions because the presence of certain
interpersonal interactions meets social norms and, thus, leads to positive
psychological outcomes like self-esteem and self-identity through
validating their membership with the Federal government (Ehlen et al.,
1999). The lack of an interactive effect between distributive justice and
interpersonal justice indicates that interactional justice is not linked to
Federal managers' commitment to the Federal government as an
employer because certain interpersonal interactions excuse unfavorable
economic outcomes for the Federal manager and their specific suborganization.
Also, it is possible that budgets in the Federal government are
relatively stable. The chances that budgets differ from expectations may
be rare, and, following Adams (1965), it is possible that managers have
adjusted their inputs or their referent groups so that there is equity
between inputs and outcomes such that distributive justice in budget
decision-making no longer impacts organizational behavior. Finally,
although not strictly analogous to this study, Kim and Mauborgne (1993)
note that procedural justice does not interact uniformly with commitment
and other measures of organizational behavior in determining
CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUDGET DECISION-MAKING
517
organizational outcomes. Kim and Mauborgne (1993) suggest that
procedural justice is a countervailing force where the interests are most
divergent. It could be that, through self-selection and sorting in both
internal and external labor markets, Federal managers are the subjects
most interested in the objectives of the Federal organization and seek
validation of that interest through the group-value model of procedural
justice and with the existence of procedures or interpersonal
communication viewed as fair, rather than on distributive outcomes
(Ehlen et al., 1999).
Implications for the Management of the Federal Government
For the management of the Federal government, the main effects
only finding of this study indicates that budget decision makers should
use fair formal procedures and fair interpersonal behavior to help ensure
subordinate managers' commitment to the Federal government as an
employer. Accordingly, the Federal government may wish to take steps
to ensure that budget decision makers use fair formal procedures,
namely, “procedures designed to: a) collect accurate information
necessary for making budgetary decisions, b) provide opportunities to
appeal or challenge budgetary decisions, c) allow representation to all
sides affected by the budget decision, d) make budgetary decisions with
consistency, e) provide feedback on budgetary decisions, and f) allow
request for clarification or additional information on budgetary
decisions” (Moorman, 1991, p. 850; see also Greenberg, 1986;
Leventhal, 1980). And, accordingly, the Federal government may wish
to take steps to ensure that elements of interactional justice are
incorporated into the performance plans of superior Federal managers
who make budget decisions to ensure that these managers: “a) consider
the viewpoints of subordinate managers when making budget decisions,
b) provide timely information about the implications of budget decisions
to their subordinate managers, c) treat their subordinate managers with
kindness and consideration when making budget decisions, d) show
concerns for their subordinate managers' rights when making budget
decisions, and e) take steps to deal with subordinate managers in a
truthful manner on budget decisions” (Moorman, 1991, p. 850; see also,
Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Tyler & Bies,
1990).
Also, since this study has shown that Federal managers are not
primarily concerned with the economic outcomes of budget decision-
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STALEY, DASTOOR, MAGNER & STOLP
making, those who are concerned with the absolute or relative
distribution of actual budget resources – the Congress, the Office of
Management and Budget, and advocacy groups – may not wish to rely
on the Federal managers to advance their interests.
Limitations of the Study
The results, the findings and the conclusions of this study need to be
interpreted in light of several limitations. First, this study uses crosssectional data, which prevents direct determination of the causal order of
the relationships between organizational justice and organizational
outcomes (Babbie, 1995; Davis, 1985). Second, this study investigates
the contribution of organizational justice in the Federal government's
budget decisions to Federal manager's organizational commitment, and
its results may not be generalizable to other organizations. Third, there
could be variables antecedent to organizational justice and organizational
commitment, as well as intervening variables, as indicated by the low
total R2 of .132 for organizational commitment. Fourth, this study uses
questionnaires that do not have any reverse-scored items, and the
possibility for response bias exists. Fifth, this study uses a commercial
third-party mailing list which may contain errors to survey officials at
their offices -- officials for whom receiving mail may be difficult and for
whom responding is not an official duty -- and the response rate was
14%, which is lower than the response rate that might be found for
surveys with more certain populations, more certain and accessible
addresses, and with respondents for whom there are built-in stimuli to
respond (Babbie, 1995). Finally, Van den Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke
(1997) suggest that the order in which organizational justice information
is received may impact fairness judgments, and no provisions are made
for determining the order in which respondents received organizational
justice information. Nonetheless, as detailed above, this study may have
made a significant contribution to the management of the Federal
government, scholarly understanding, and theoretical understanding.
Recommendations for Future Research
The results of this study have a number of implications for future
research. Future researchers could confirm whether the lack of a
normally robust interaction between distributive justice and procedural
and interactional justice exists in other government or non-profit
organizations. Future researchers could also examine the effect of
CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUDGET DECISION-MAKING
519
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on other measures of
organizational behavior, such as intent to turnover, trust in superior or
observed budgetary slack.
NOTES
1. Consistent with recent organizational justice literature (Leung, Chiu,
& Au, 1993; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Skarlicki et al., 1999),
interactional justice is treated as a separate component of
organizational justice, rather than as a subcomponent of procedural
justice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Libby, 1999; Moorman,
1991); for the purposes of this study, there is no practical effect of
labeling these two independent dimensions procedural justice and
interactional justice rather than formal procedural justice and
interactional procedural justice.
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