III Corps - VHPA Directory Supplement Information

Transcription

III Corps
The closing history of III Corps during the Easter Offensive was a major portion of the 1999 VHPA history
which was provided to the membership in CD ROM format. Portions of that history will be included in
this 2001 history.
Each year since I, Mike Sloniker, was selected as the VHPA historian at Ft Worth in 1998, I have seen
continuous improvement in the recording of the history by the VHPA and VHCMA membership. You will
see examples of the unit histories in this living history. It is a living history because I constantly update
whatever the membership provides. For example, the 1994 Lam Son 719 history was updated last year and
pictures were included..
Additionally, the history Mike Law put in the directory will also be included here because of the excellent
order of battle Mike has provided.. This year, I will start this history off with the arty control map Joe
Potvin provided which is an excellent way to show the area of operations (AO) .
Up in the northern part of III Corps was Loc Ninh, shown below in a picture provided by Paul Jenkins who
took it in 1967.
SECTION VII - History
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In early April 1972, Loc Ninh was attacked by the NVA . Paul Murtha took this picture of the
airfield and town under attack.
2
Song Be is east of Loc Ninh and also near the Cambodian Border.
South of Bien Hoa was Phouc Vinh. Prior to Dec 67, PV housed a 1st Inf Div Bde. On 03 Dec 67, the 3d
Bde 101st moved in. In Oct 68, the 3d Bde 101st went to I Corps to join first and second Brigades 101st
Abn Div and the 1st Cavalry Division moved in.
I took this picture on 08 April 1972 of the large fixed wing strip at Song Be. Nui Ba Ra is the
mountain on the right side of the picture. The artillery fort is in the lower right. I believe the
remaining structures at LZ Buttons are in the top left of the pictures. 362 ASHC, Fly United,
Chinooks are making the Chinook IFR in the top of the picture.
3
This is Phouc Vinh in Feb 68 during Tet 68. The 162d AHC was located at PV then, and
provided lift assests to train the Infantry from the 101st who had recently arrived in VN. Prior to
deployment from Ft Campbell, the 3d Bde 101st had no aviation assets to train the infantry on
combat assault tactics. The 162d did the brunt of the training with the 128th and 173d AHC also
used during this early training period.
Phouc Vinh Nov 1971
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Phouc Vinh and the 162d AHC has always been a defining moment in my life. "On the 19th of
Dec, 1967, I was an FO with an INF Bn, 3d Bde 101st at Phouc Vinh. On this day I was with A/1506 INF, normally I was with the 3/187 INF
As background, 3d Bde arrived in country en masse on 2 Dec 67, 2d Bde arrived on 15 Dec and
was sent to Cu Chi. Since we had no slicks to train on at all in the states, we were using the
month of December to learn how to work with the 128th, 173d, 116th and the 162d. I know the
units because I took pictures of the noses of the helos.
By the 19th of Dec, I was sicked and tired of climbing in the slicks, going to an LZ, having an 8
hour walk in the woods, getting picked up at 1700, and RTB. How ignorant I was! Shortly after
noon we were taken to Phouc Vinh, got some Cs, ate them on the airstrip, and loaded up when
the 162d returned to what we thought were 8 ships. It turns out there were 7, so we were
scrambling to reassemble the aircraft loads(ACLS) so we would have unit integrity on the ground.
I was in the company command group of the CO, his two RTOs, me and my RTO. My CO was a
2d tour guy who did not want all the eggs in one basket so he did not want me with him on the
CA. So, my RTO and I would usually put with an Inf Squad that was in the platoon right behind
the command group.
When the slicks landed, the 6 of us hustled to our slick and jumped in. The guy in the left front
seat montioned me to come talk to him so I jump out and ran up to the door as we hollered under
the noise. He, either Harke or Holz, said the ship was weak and I was to ride in the one right
behind us, so I grabbed my RTO and ran for the next ship.
Off we went. I can still recall a certain amount of excitement in the heart of a 22 year old scared
as shit arty LT that went on each time the blades quit beating so loudly and the breeze started to
blow thru the cabin. I was in my usual position of sitting with my feet dangling outside when the
aircraft made a violent manuever and was suddenly landing. We were landing to a huge fire, and
we were still at Phouc Vinh.
The crewmember in the left rear of my slick grabbed a fire extinguisher and sprayed it on one of
the guys from the slick, I would have been in, who is on fire. According to Gary Roush's database
the slick lost its engine on take off, crashed and burned. All 8 souls were lost:
The crew of UH-1D 65-09987 from the 162d AHC
WO1 Larry Harke
WO1 John Holz
SP4 Anthony Campaniello
SP4 Robert D. Kline
and the heart of 2d Squad 3d Platoon Company A 1st Bn 506th Inf (Abn):
PFC Eugene Miley
PFC Steven Radu
PFC Charles Carpenter
PFC Jimmy Woolfolk
On Christmas Day, 1967, I reflected on what it felt like to spend my first Christmas, and only
Christmas, so far, away from my family. We were still in Phouc Vinh. I have kept the menu for the
meal, that has Westmoreland's signature on it. Most of all I recall walking over to the 162d's AO
at Phouc Vinh and looking at the slicks and Copperhead guns.
I recall looking at an empty revetment and wondering if that was the revetment the slick came
from. I reflected on how short the life span (in my mind) could be by being with the Infantry.
That Christmas was a turning point for me in getting control of self pity, and feeling sorry for
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myself. I was shown on the 19th that there are others who were under worse conditions. Life has
many teaching points and this was one of them.
Since moving to Northern VA, I have made it a priority to stop, on Dec 25th, by Panel 32E and
look at and touch the names, because in that empty revetment, I vowed I would never forget
those guys, ever.
WO1 Larry Harke 32E22 Washington
WO1 John Holz 32E23 Pennslyvania
SP4 Anthony Campaniello 32E20 New York
SP4 Robert D. Kline 32E24 California
PFC Eugene Miley 32E25 New Jersey
PFC Steven Radu 32E26 Ohio
PFC Charles Carpenter 32E21 California
PFC Jimmy Woolfolk 32E28 Texas
>>
There wasn’t a lot of specific terrain to use as a navigation aid. In the north by Song Be was a mountain
named Nui Ba Ra, which is shown above. The highest terrain was Nui Ba Dinh the tallest mountain in III
Corps, also known as the Black Virgin Mountain, next to Tay Ninh. In the middle of the 1st Inf Div AO
was this cutout of the 1st Inf Div patch
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The 1st Inf Div had a major base at Lai Khe that also housed the 173d AHC.
1967-70 as Thunder Road ran next to Lai Khe.
Highway 13, also known in
7
To the west was Tay Ninh.
Gary Roush, who maintains the VHPA data base was an aircraft commander in the 242d ASHC from Cu
Chi. On the right side of this picture Gary is giving the thumbs up as his Chinook is offloaded on top of
Nui Ba Dinh, the highest point in III Corps, shown in the map below, north of Tay Ninh.
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When the 229th moved into Tay Ninh, they opened a Holiday Inn.
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Mike Hodges who has maintained the 187th AHC website at www.187thahc.net keeps a site that constantly
updates the history of a unit that goes back to 1967. This is an example of the excellence on that website.
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The 187th gunships transitioned to AH-1Gs, shown above.
Imagine the sound of these 187th Crusader slicks returning to Tay Ninh. Tay Ninh was a major base camp
for the 25th Infantry Infantry Division. A member of the 25th Avn Bn, Ron Leonard continues to do
tremendous work in compiling the history of his unit and the 25th Inf Div. A major load of his effort will be
included in this history. Joe Finch, a member of the Little Bears has also produced a history of his uniit
that will also be included.
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Nui Ba Den, above, on 8 April 1972 was overrun by the NVA with at least one American Captain taken
prisoner. He was released in Mar 1973.. This area was always active. In March 1970, B/25th Avn Bn
participated in an action there:
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Co. B (GS), 25th Aviation Battalion
APO SF 96225
AVDCAN-GS
13 March 1970
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview
TO: S-1, 25th Aviation Battalion
IAW Div Reg 870-3 the following combat after action interview is submitted:
1. Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion. Support Helicopter Company
2. 3 March 1970
3. Location
a. South Side Nui Ba Den, vicinity of the pagoda.
b. Map reference 6231
4. Control or Command Headquarters-Army Aviation Element, 25th Infantry
Division.
5. Persons Interviewed.
a. Horrell, Tim K., WO1, Aircraft commander, Age 20,
Company A., 25th Aviation Battalion.
b. Little, Elbert T., 1LT, Pilot, Age 26,
6. Pearson, Robert E., CPT, Operations Officer, Age 26,
7. Task Organization- Company A., 25th Aviation Battalion.
8. Supporting Forces-Company B., 25th Aviation Battalion.
9. Background Information - Elements of Company E, 75th Rangers
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Battalion had been conducting a reconnaissance mission on the south slope of Nui Ba Den and
had made contact with an undetermined size enemy force and needed to be extracted .
10. Intelligence
a. Enemy of undetermined strength, and unknown unit.
b. Terrain-Rocky slopes of Nui Ba Den Mountain.
11. Mission - To extract the Ranger Team from the side of Nui Ba Den by using
the sides of a UH-1H.
ropes hanging from
12. Concept of the operation and execution - Once the need to extract the Ranger Team was determined,
a "Little Bear" aircraft was equipped with eight ropes attached to floor rings (four on each side) to lift the
team out by means of slinging the team on the ropes. A "Diamondhead" light fire team was called
for cover due to the presence of enemy forces. With the cover of the "Diamondhead" fire team, the "Littler
Bear" made his approach to the PZ, lowered the ropes and began to pick up the team. While hovering, the
aircraft began to take fire and took two hits, one in the fuselage and the other through a hydraulic line.
Despite the loss of his hydraulics, the "Little Bear" remained on station long enough to pick up the Ranger
Team and then flew to a rice paddy area wherehe lowered the team to the ground and continued to Tay
Ninh and made a running landing with no further damage to the aircraft.
13. Results - The Ranger Team from Company E, 75th Ranger Battalion was safely extracted with no
casualties. Little Bear losses were one ship lightly damaged by ground fire.
14. Analysis - The flexibility of the 25th Aviation Battalion was shown by the safe
extraction of a Ranger Team despite a damaged aircraft .Once again the aircraft ad crews have proved
their value to the men they support and sustain on the ground.
Robert E. Pearson
CPT, ADA
Operations Officer
14. Maximum utilization and coordination between arty, armor, TAC air and armed helicopter fire
power continues to be most effective in indigenous operations.
Steven D. Hickman
1LT INF.
Operations Officer
Eye Witness Report To Above LRRP Extraction
As I remember, there were about 6-8 LRRPs who needed to be extracted from the pagoda on the south side
of Nui Ba Den Mountain. Nui Ba Den is about 3000 feet high and the pagoda is about halfway up the side
of the mountain.
I think we pretty much made a straight-in approach. You don't want to be too fast or too slow. Get in, get
out, and stay alive. The closer you get to the mountain, the more magnificence it becomes. There wasn't
much left of the pagoda; it looked like it had been pummeled over the years. I tried to find a place to hover
over, where the Rangers could climb in. We got real close but, because of obstacles (either rocks or trees
or both), I decided to pull up, and the one Ranger on board threw out the ropes. This guy was a Telly
Savalas look-alike, and as we were in this high hover facing the mountain, waiting
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for the rangers to secure themselves to the ropes, this guy was squatting on his knees unloading his M-16
out of each side of the aircraft. That picture was surreal, movie-like. I cannot remember at which point the
hydraulics went out, but at about this time, I saw an orange dot of light dancing around in my chin bubble
and wondered 'what the hell is that.'
As we pulled away from the mountain, the hydraulics were out and that was not good. On top of that, we
were not going to get to pick up the rest of the Rangers. Don't you hate it when that happens? Well,
anyway, now I don't have a plan but I know we're going to Tay Ninh for a running landing and that I'll
figure out what to do with the Rangers on the rope by the time we get there. So we all head for Tay Ninh at
about 40 knots. I felt bad for these guys. They couldn't have had any idea what was going on, and I didn't
know how well they were secured and how long they could last. My original plan was to drop them at the
bottom of the mountain, pick up the remaining Rangers, then go back to pick up the first group. About 5
miles from Tay Ninh the Ranger on board said they were starting to have problems, something like choking
on the ropes. So we made a slow approach to a rice paddy. When we came to a high hover I asked Lt. Little
to assist me on the controls. I knew this could be counterproductive, that we could end up fighting each
other, but we were in a high hover and had room to maneuver.
The crew talked us down and it worked out ok. We left the guys in the rice paddy and went ahead and made
a running landing at Tay Ninh.
I think it was one of the Diamondheads who later told me that another ship had picked up the remaining
Rangers without any ropes. Oh, well.
And that orange dot of light dancing around in the chin bubble turned out to be a tracer casing. I picked it
up in the bottom of the chin bubble after we landed. I never knew who was shooting at whom.
Tim Horrell
19 Oct 01
118th Assault Helicopter Company
http://www.gorilla.net/~118ahc/ is the website for the Thunderbirds. This is an exceptionally well done
website that reflects a strong accounting of early Army Aviation actions that molded the reputation, and
high standards of these units. Whenever I visit the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial and look at panel
The Battle of Dong Xoai was a series of battles and air mobile operations carried out by the 118th Aviation
Company(AML) and other elements of the 145th CAB for about 10 days. The series of operations were
the defining actions of combat that established the character and traditions of the 118th thrusting the unit
into the spotlight of history. These attributes made the 118th a unit that all other helicopter units in Vietnam
looked to for inspiration. The many days of action for the pilots and crews of the 118th and their heavily
challenged maintenance crews were extremely intense and hazardous....yet they got the job
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done! The 118th Thunderbird motto, "It Shall Be Done", was proven time after time. The Battle of Dong
Xoai virtually insured the 118th would be emblazoned open the pages of US Army Aviation history in
Vietnam. For years afterwards the battle cry within the 118th was, "remember Dong Xoai."
Combat operations began on 10 June 1965 and lasted until 20 June 1965. The town of Dong Xoai is
situated at the most important read junction in the heart of northern "War Zone D". The Special Forces had
established a fortified compound and numerous strong points at strategic locations, taking the entire area
under their command.
Many parts of the fortifications were still under construction when the first mortar shells awoke the
defenders. In fact, the Navy Sea Bees were on site and the valor shown by one of their men, Construction
Mechanic 3rd Class Marvin G. Shields was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor
Likewise, 2nd LT. Charles Q. Williams, one of the Special Forces Team members, was awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroic leadership in preventing the total annihilation of US forces at
Dong Xoai.
Seabee Links and Memorial Web Sites
In honor of SWF2(Steelworker-Fabricator, 2nd Class) William Clifton Hoover, one of the SeaBees killed at
Dong Xoai, a web page has been created by his nephew, Mike Hoover.(Follow the link to the web site)
Also, in honor of her father, CMA3(Construction Mechanic 3rd Class)Marvin G. Shields, who was killed at
Dong Xoai and received the Congressional Medal of Honor, Marvin Shields' daughter has created a
memorial web site.(Follow link to the website)
For interesting and detailed accounts of the Battle of Dong Xoai as recorded by the Navy Seabees and from
the perspective ofthe Seabees, go to the Official Seabee Historical Site
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(Picture below of the 118th is from the 118th website.)
CHRONOLOGY
10 June 1965
01:00 -- Bandit stand-by fire team ordered to Dong Xoai from Bien Hoa by III Corps TOC. This was a
continuing mission
for the 118th for many years and could require flying to anywhere in III Corps.
Two UH-1B gunships took off within minutes of being alerted
and received their detailed briefings in the air. They were told the
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Dong Xoai SF Camp had been under extremely heavy mortar and
small arms fire since midnight.
Eyewitnesses Remember
CWO Ralph Orlando a Bandit pilot, wrote in his diary : "The Viet
Cong force was estimated at 1500-2000 and had hit Dong Xoai just
40 miles N. of Bien Hoa. 14 Special Forces were killed and 13
wounded. The town and compound were in a shambles. At least
seven .50 cal machine gun positions were located throughout the
area. The VC even had flame throwers and used human waves of
troops to attack the SF compound."
Garrett Sargent, door gunner on TDY to the 118th and a member
of the "Shot Gun" Platoon from the 25th Div. remembers: "I
remember we were on stand-by that night and I was on the first
two Bandit gunships that were called out at 1:00AM to go to Dong
Xoai. We kept dumping our ammo and rockets 'till dawn and the
the US Air Force came in. This went on day after day. I had a
jacket made in Bien Hoa that said, ' I know I'm bound for heaven
cause I spent my time in Hell, Shot gunner in the 118th Avn Co.
Bien Hoa-Vietnam 1965' ."
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Between 1982-1986, I worked at HQ TRADOC, Ft Monroe VA. The picture, above, is a copy of one
that was in my office. Over the years I often wondered what unit this was and what year? I found
the picture below on the 118th Website and have often wondered if there is a relationship on where
the large white numbers are on the vertical fin.. MES.
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01:30 -- Bandits directed to engage VC upon arrival at Dong Xoai.
The fire team started making firing passes once they were in
position over the town. They were engaged by the VC as soon as
they began firing. The two Bandits kept up a steady stream of fire
to silence the guns surrounding the SF Compound where all the
US and Vietnamese forces had taken refuge. The fire team leader's
helicopter was hit by ground fire and the pilot was wounded. Once
the Bandits were expended, they left the area returning with the
wounded pilot to Bien Hoa.
0430 -- As the Bandit team closed on Bien Hoa, the entire 118th had been rallied to the "Bird Cage"
and flight crews of
the 118th were on the flight line preparing for the combat assault at day light.
0600 -- All flyable 118th aircraft departed Bien Hoa for Phouc Vinh, the nearest fortified town to Dong
Xoai, which was
the staging area.
Elements of the 1st Bn, 7th ARVN Regiment were going to make
the first assault with the 118th. Although the tactical situation
was extremely confused at Dong Xoai with only scattered
intelligence as to the enemy's strength and positions, the LZ for
the first assault was an open field two miles north of Dong Xoai
and next to the road leading to the Than Loi rubber plantation.
Two more LZs were identified as suitable also within the vicinity
of Dong Xoai.
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118th AHC Psyops bird from 118th Web Site
0800 -- First combat assault into the LZ in Than Loi rubber plantation begins.
As the formation began its final approach from the east of Dong
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Xoai, fire was received, but the flight was ordered to hold
suppressive fire as it was thought, at the time, that friendly troops
or civilians might be in the LZ. However, they apparently were VC
and as soon as the ships landed the waving people dove into their
bunkers and began engaging the helicopters. After discharging
the ARVN troops the flight, being low on fuel quickly departed
and returned to Phouc Vinh for fuel and replacements. It was
later learned that within twenty minutes after the elements of the
1st/7th ARVN Regiment exited the aircraft, they were cut down
and the unit quickly ceased to be a fighting unit It was a cruel VC
trap.
Eyewitness Remembrance
CWO Ralph Orlando, a Bandit pilot wrote in his diary: "The lift
contained over 125 helicopters. Two LZs were used with the first
on the road N. of Dong Xoai and the second at the rubber
plantation. Of the 500+ troops lifted in, about 250 are unaccounted
for!"
09:00 -- Second combat assault with reinforcements from Phouc Vinh made into Than Loi airstrip.
Bandits sent ahead to
support ARVN troops on the ground. Bandits intercept 118th flight and provide cover for landing to
airstrip.
As the 14 aircraft formation approached the LZ, a herd of cattle
appeared and moved up the strip to the intended landing spot,
causing the lead helicopter to make the decision to land short. As
lead landed a HUGE explosion took place. It was a signal.
Immediately, the entire flight was engulfed in automatic weapons
fire and mortar rounds. The Bandits continued to roll in and pour
rockets and machine gun fire into the tree lines and buildings
along the airstrip as the ARVN were cut down within steps of
exiting the helicopters. One of the Thunderbird slicks had a
mortar round hit just outside of the cockpit causing it to roll over
and explode....killing the entire crew and 2 US and approximately
8 Vietnamese. (see Aircraft Incident Report UH-1B #63-08557 )
When the entire formation of 13 remaining aircraft were out of
the LZ, only one aircraft reported no damage!!
Eyewitness Remembrance
CWO Ralph Orlando, a Bandit pilot wrote in his diary: "In LZ #2,
A Company of 82nd Avn. Bn, 173rd Airborne Bde(Later
redesignated 335th Aviation Company(AML), had one slick shot
down on approach(by .51 cal). Their pilots were CW2 Raymond C.
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Galbraith and WO1 Zoltan A. Kovacs and CE and Gunner were
PFC's William R. Batchelder and Walter R. Gray. As slicks
landed, land mines exploded and the area was under mortar fire.
As they pulled pitch for takeoff, a Thunderbird slick with CPT
Walter, L. Hall, WO1 Donald R. Saegaert, SSG Joseph J. Compa,
SGT Craig L. Hagen and two paxs on board lost RPM and
crashed into trucks and buildings. The ship burned to nothing. The
troops dropped off here were also wiped out
10:00 -- Further flights to reinforce are deemed too risky and are suspended for the time being.
MAJ. Harvey Stewart, CO of the 118th, ordered remaining
aircraft, some with troops aboard, to hold at Phuoc Vinh. A
Bandit fire team had remained over the battle area to act as radio
communications relay and fire support for the troops, as long as
ammo and fuel allowed. Communications had apparently been
lost with the SF Camp and their status was unknown. The 118th
Flight Surgeon(unknown at this time), apparently flying as a
gunner, had set up a medical aid station at Phuoc Vinh to treat
the ARVN wounded. He made radio calls for C-130s for medical
evacuation of over 100 ARVN wounded soldiers.
12:00 --Radio message received by relay through one of the C-130s which was evacuating
wounded.
The message was from one of the Americans in the Dong Xoai SF
compound. The message was tragic and heroic and said, "I am
using my last battery for the radio and there is no more
ammunition; we are all wounded, some of the more
serious are holding grenades with the safety pins already
pulled. The VC are attacking in human waves. The last
wave has been defeated but we are expecting the next
wave now."
12:10 -- MAJ. Harvey Stewart, CO 118th, makes decision to return to Dong Xoai to rescue the
remaining SF
personnel.(Note -- See Aviator of the Year)
MAJ. Harvey Stewart, hearing the desperate SF message, stood
and said, "I am going in!" With that he went to the parked
helicopters with five other pilots and crew members and they
climbed into the seats. In the end, it was decided that three
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aircraft would depart from Phouc Vinh for Dong Xoai to rescue
the brave soldiers who were holding out to the last grenade.
12:45 -- Three 118th "Thunderbird" aircraft close on Dong Xoai with Bandits providing escort.
Arriving over Dong Xoai, a call went out over the radio that the
SF Compound and surrounding area was considered a "free
strike" area. The Bandits contacted US Air Force fighter bombers
in the region and received their support. While the US Air Force
pounded key areas the Bandits attacked 1/4 mile south of Dong
Xoai at a water crossing. The VC had concealed two French
armored cars captured earlier. The Bandits had discovered them
during a low level recon. Rockets destroyed them and rendered
them useless.
13:00 -- The three 118th "Thunderbird" aircraft, led my MAJ. Stewart, roar in and land outside the SF
compound. All survivors are rescued!
Moving in from the south, the three slicks flew fast and low as
their door gunners fired at any trace of VC activity. The Bandits
poured suppressive fire beside the flight paths of the slicks. With
complete surprise, they landed inside the soccer field outside the
SF compound as VC stood on buildings and on the compound
walls firing at the aircraft not more than fifty feet away. One of
the door gunners leaped from one of the aircraft exposing himself
to enemy fire. Then firing his M-14, he ran into the SF compound
entrance and led the last defenders(9 wounded Americans and 8
Vietnamese)back to the waiting helicopters. He was awarded the
DFC for his act of valor. Within seconds after the three aircraft
departed the soccer field, the area where they had landed exploded
in mortar fire and was raked with large caliber machine guns
from all quadrants. The fact that the helicopter crews were able to
successfully complete their mission can be attributed to the
element of surprise and the daring courage of the 118th pilots.
They had exemplified their motto: "It Shall Be Done"! The three
crews were decorated with one Distinguished Service Cross, five
Silver Stars, one Distinguished Flying Cross and five Air Medals
for heroism..
16:00 -- "Thunderbirds"lead Battalion sized assault into Dong Xoai with ARVN 52nd Ranger
Battalion.
In the afternoon, the 52nd ARVN Ranger Battalion arrived in
Phuoc Vinh. Plans were made by Senior Advisors to air assault
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them into Dong Xoai to recapture the road junction and the SF
compound. Other 145th Combat Aviation Battalion companies
had arrived and were prepared to assist the battle damaged , yet
flyable 118th. Being given the honor to lead the assault, the 118th
followed the previous route of flight and slipped into the soccer
field receiving only scattered small arms fire as they landed. The
VC were surprised and apparently did not expect another daring
assault that day. The constant air strikes and gunship pounding
throughout the day allowed the insertion of the 52nd ARVN
Rangers successfully, but with some losses. The VC hastily
prepared a defense around the church in town, but was slowly
defeated. Finally the town and SF compound were retaken and
reoccupied. Dong Xoai was under the control of the allied forces
once again when darkness fell at the end of 10 June 1965.
Sundown -- The 118th Aviation Company returned to Bien Hoa after the lift of the 52nd ARVN
Ranger Battalion. The day of heavy fighting had caused the loss of one entire helicopter crew and aircraft,
plus almost every helicopter having received battle damage. Ten Purple hearts were award to members of
the 118th "Thunderbirds" for the day, plus the previous mentioned awards for Valor.
11 June 1965
08:00 -- The 118th returns to Phouc Vinh to carry on the battle with sister elements of the 145th
CAB.
A battalion sized combat assault with the 118th as the lead
element carrying 100 paratroopers of the ARVN 7th Airborne
Battalion was safely made into the soccer field at Dong Xoai.
Although fire was expected by the units,, the Bandits and other
armed teams flew low to draw fire from the enemy prior to the
arrival of the slicks. The assault was successfully completed by
elements of the 145th CAB.
All Day -- The "Thunderbirds" continue to support the return of Dong Xoai to allied hands.
Following the insertion of the ARVN 7th Airborne Bn, the 118th
immediately began to perform large scale medical evacuation of
ARVN casualties. Hostilities were slowly coming to a halt except
for isolated and rear guard actions as the VC disappeared into the
surrounding jungle. The wounded were brought to the soccer field
and then evacuated back to Phuoc Vinh were the 118th's own
flight surgeon had set up a medical aide station. The Doctor(name
24
not know at this time)had been working for over forty hours with
little rest, yet the seriously wounded were treated by medical
personnel who were overwhelmed with work. At one time there
were over 200 wounded awaiting treatment at Phuoc Vinh. Many
lives were saved. The day ends with no major battles being fought.
Eyewitness Rememberance
CWO Ralph Orlando, a Bandit pilot wrote in his Diary: "Today
was the worst day in Vietnam, to date! The mission we had was a
volunteer deal to get the bodies of the men killed two days prior.
Major Stewart and I were in a slick. The Major was in the right
seat. Quatsie was the crew chief and LT Scott the gunner."(LT
Scott was the Commander of the Door Gunner Platoon which was
made up of volunteers from the 25th Division in Hawaii who came
to Vietnam for 3 months TDY's to serve as Door Gunners).
"I think we put more stress and strain on that chopper today than
Bell test pilots do. We left Bien Hoa at 1300 and picked up
Dragon 36(from 197th Aviation Company, Bien Hoa)and his heavy
fire team(gun ships) at Phouc Vinh. We contoured(low level)the
terrain along with the fire team up to Dong Xoai. Upon landing
near the destroyed compound, we were told that Red Hat
7(apparently the American Advisor) was at LZ #1 with 20 ARVN
bodies and would not move until the bodies were taken away first
So here we are, one slick hauling 20 bodies in shifts."
"After the bodies were removed to Dong Xoai, the troops moved
to LZ #2. When they were a mile away the VC opened fire on
them. They were hit hard and began to retreat. We advised the
American with them to get to a safe landing spot so they could be
picked up. While all this was going on, the Air Force was bombing
the plantation at the landing strip. An Air Force F-100 was hit and
the pilot bailed out into the rubber trees, 2 Km NW of the
plantation. We went to assist him and another slick went to pick up
Red Hat 7. The F-100 pilot sent up a flare to mark his position, but
the nearest place to him to land was 200 meters away. "
"We made about 3 orbits and landed without escort or security of
any kind. Major Stewart grabbed his AR-15 and got out and the
Gunner, LT Scott followed. Before leaving, the Major told me to
wait a few minutes and if they did not return by then to leave them
since we were almost out of fuel."
"I waited with Quatsie(Crew Chief) for five of the longest minutes
of my life but then they appeared from the trees running frantically
and panting. The Major was running with a limp, he looked hit.
They dove into the chopper shouting, "Go-Go-Go". I took off
pulling every bit of pitch that the Bird could in almost a vertical
takeoff. They shouted that the pilot was dead and that they saw
the VC kill him. Dozens of VC that chased them from the woods
appeared as we lifted off. "
"I found out later, we took two hits. One in the tail boom and one
in the oil cooler blades. The fuel was looking bad, but we made it
to Phouc Vinh. The Major did not get medical attention, he said he
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would be alright."
"At this time, we heard of a lift that was on its way to Phouc Vinh.
So, we refueled and got airborne. We tagged along with me now in
the right seat. The weather was looking muchworse every minute
with rainstorms and clouds. The slicks dropped off their troops and
now the weather was really bad. Flights were getting separated,
fuel was low and it was a mess. We finally got back after going
IFR a few times."
12 June 1965
All Day -- 118th "Thunderbirds" continue to support return of Dong Xoai to allied hands.
Again staging from Phouc Vinh, the 118th air lifted elements of
the ARVN 1st Bn, 48th Regiment to Dong Xoai. Their mission
was to reinforce the garrison already located at Dong Xoai. Troop
strength on the ground was now approaching 1000. Except for
isolated snipers and VC trapped in the town itself, the main body
of the VC had vanished. Only small unit engagements to place
this day. The Bandits and their fire teams provided continuous
fire support to the ground forces and their advisors. No casualties
were experienced by the helicopter crews. Extensive recon and
searching for elements of the ARVN 1st/7th, committed to the
battle on 10 June, confirmed that there were no signs of the unit!
13 June 1965
After being in continuous operations for over 72 hours, the 118th still provided the majority of the aircraft
for the assault on this day. Despite casualties and damage to its aircraft, the 118th was fully operational
with volunteer gunners consisting of clerks, cooks and anyone who wanted to go.
The 118th went to Xuan Loc and picked up elements of the ARVN 43rd Regiment. 100 soldiers were
lifted into a LZ 1/2 mile N. of the original assault area. Scattered small arms fire was received from within
the vast Than Loi plantation, but no helicopters sustained damage nor were there any casualties. This lift
was conducted AT NIGHT under minimum lighting. After the Bandit fire teams searched for the 7th
Regiment soldiers and found nothing, the 118th accomplished the night assault in rapidly deteriorating
weather conditions. Throughout War Zone D there were thunderstorms and heavy rain reduced visibility.
Winds gusted up to 40 knots making flying extremely difficult. The reinforcements were finally inserted
and the 118th aircraft finally recovered to Bien Hoa as single ships by 23:30 hours. Many of the aircraft
had but minutes of fuel remaining.
Eyewitness Rememberance
CWO Ralph Orlando, a Bandit pilot wrote in his diary: " An A
Company, 82nd Aviation Bn ship with CW2 Billy G. Hammer and
WO1 Michael L. Wildes along with SP5 Donald L. Baker and SSG
Kenneth L. Reed were not so lucky. They went IFR and crashed
near Bear Cat. All aboard were killed. Also, an A/501st (Rattler)
ship with Jim Dixon and Bill Gault went IFR and crashed. They
were lucky with Jim only getting a broken leg."
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Final Day
20 June, 1965
The Battle of Dong Xoai had its final chapter on 20 June, 1965. On that date the largest heliborne
operation ever in the III Corps area climaxed the closing of the battle. The 118th was again chosen to lead
the assault of 77 troop carriers and 40 armed escorts. Staging from Hon Quan, the mission was to conduct
assaults to the area N. of Dong Xoai were recon and intelligence had indicated a concentration of VC forces
in a rubber plantation. 1,089 paratroopers, the entire 3rd and 8th ARVN Airborne Battalions were landed
by elements of the 145th CAB. There were no incidents of enemy resistance experienced except minor
damage sustained by a single aircraft from one enemy small arms round.
EPILOGUE
Presidential Unit Citation
10Jun to 13Jun, 1965 (DAGO 43, dtd 1966)
The 118th Aviation Company(AML) as well as other elements of the 145th CAB were recommended
for and received a Presidential Unit Citation and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with two palms. The
citation indicates that 2,700 sorties were flown and 3,500 troops were airlifted in the Battle of Dong Xoai,
from 10 through 13 June, 1965.
"MAJ. Harvey Stewart, Commanding Officer of the 118th was given the singular honor of being the first
Army Aviator chosen to receive the Wright Brothers Memorial Award as the 1965 Military Aviator of the
Year"(page 83, Army Aviation in Vietnam, 1963-1966 ,by Ralph B. Young)
Summary
from 145th CAB Report
About midnight the VC 762d and 763d Regiments began a coordinated attack on the town and Special
Forces camp at Dong Xoai with one regimental sized force while another force positioned itself to ambush
all likely routes and LZs for ARVN reinforcements. At 0100H the standby fire team from the 118th AVN
went to support. At 0230H the CIDG force crumbled and the Americans withdrew to the district HQ with
heavy losses. At 0600H the 118th went to Phuoc Vinh to pick up 1st Bn, 7th ARVN elements to insert into
Dong Xoai. The VC around the LZ appeared as friendly civilians so the lift held their fire during the initial
insert. While the helicopters escaped with relatively little damage, the ARVNs were defeated within twenty
minutes. The air strip at the Thanh Loi Plantation was selected for the second insertion. A herd of cattle on
the strip forced the 14 ship CA to land short of their original spot and this proved to be a great blessing
when a huge mine exploded in that spot. The LZ came under heavy mortar and AW fire. One Huey was
destroyed and the entire crew died. A daring rescue by three ships lead by the 118th CO got what was left
of the Americans in the SF camp out in the early afternoon. Only a Cambodian CIDG force remained in the
fight while air strikes pounded the entire area throughout the day and late in the afternoon the 118th
inserted the 52d ARVN Rangers into the soccer field. Initially things were rough for this force but by night
fall, they had retaken the SF camp, the ARVN compound, and most of the town. For the next several days,
the 118th brought more troops in and lifted hundreds that required medical attention. On the 13th, SF A311 Det arrived and began rebuilding the camp. SF 2LT Charles Q. Williams received the Medal of Honor
for his actions in this battle. Losses on the SF side were 5 US, 3 LLDB, and 40 CIDG KIA; 16 US, 4
LLDB, and 54 CIDG WIA; 124 CIDG MIA while the VC lost 134 confirmed although hundreds more
were probably carried away
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Note: All details for this page were taken from the 145th CAB after action report, available from the
VHPA web page; "First in Vietnam--A Pictorial History of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion"
published by the Battalion Information Office, Edited by CPT John W. Gordy, Jr.,1966-67, Dai Nippon
Printing Co., LTD, Tokyo, Japan, and other sources and e-mails as indicated. Any additions or changes are
welcome and should be directed to the webmaster.
LZ Gold
19 March 1967
Many would argue that the Battle of Suoi Tre should never have happened. And, looking back, there was
good evidence to support that argument. However, in war decisions made are not always based on the best
of judgment, but rather are made because they must be made.
On 19 March 1967, the 145th CAB distinguished itself by exceptionally valorous actions in what was to
become known as the Battle of Suoi Tre! Many believe it was the most significant one-day battle to that
date in the III Corps Tactical Area. The 145th CAB was in direct support of 3rd Bde, 4th Inf. Div. The
mission for the 145th CAB is to conduct a combat assault into alanding zone located approximately five
miles north of Suoi Da, RVN(see map below).
The initial operation plans were for the assault to take place on 18 Mar 1967, several miles further north of
the actual landing zone. However, obstacles prevented the 2nd Bn, 22 Inf.(Mech) and the 2nd Bn, 34th
Armor from securing the landing zone as planned.
On the evening of 18 March, the assault was rescheduled for the next day, 19 Mar, with LZ Gold changed
to a new location. The armored and mechanized elements were still unable to meet this new schedule but,
it was decided by the overall mission commander that the assault would be conducted into an unsecured LZ
with the armored and mechanized elements to reinforce the inserted infantry at a later time.
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The hazards of using unsecured LZ's were known to be many. Everyone was aware that there were
relatively few clearings in the dense jungle adequate for Airmobile operations. Past experience clearly had
shown that when this was the case, the Viet Cong either mined or established ambushes on or near the
potential LZ's.
The 68th AHC,"Top Tigers" and the 118th AHC, "Thunderbirds" eagerly awaited the end of 29 minute
artillery preparation which would mark the beginning of the first lift. En route and landing formations
would be V's of 5 aircraft with the 68th AHC the lead company. The CO of the 145th CAB would be C&C.
The 68th and 118th were supported by heavy fire teams of Mustang and Bandit gun ships and the 334th
Armed Hel. Co., a sister unit.
The first two flights of 5 from the 68th AHC landed to the smoke and both lifted off with no problem.
They encountered little resistance upon entering LZ Gold, but received automatic weapons fire upon
departure. At the moment the aircraft of the second two flights of 5 of the 118th AHC touched down, a
command detonated 155mm artillery round was exploded. Two helicopters of the 118th were completely
destroyed and five others seriously damaged from the blasts. More mines were detonated and the landing
zone became a holocaust of fire and flying steel.
MAJ. Bill Bradner, 118th XO was flying and in the left seat of
"Thunderbird lead" was MAJ.Joe Boggs, the CO. Bill tells the
following: "On my first approach, I had to land almost against a
tree line to get the whole flight in LZ Gold. Just as I touched
down, the LZ was one explosion after another and the trail
aircraft told us we had three ships disabled in the LZ and two
more flying out of control. A gunner by the name of Bobby Cutino
took one of the M-60's from a disabled ship and began to lay down
some defensive fire cradling the weapon in his arms. The infantry
troops were dazed and all hunkered down a few yards from the
aircraft. One of the ships that was out of control was flown by
CPT Bob Kelly and MAJ. Bill Benton. It had been blown into the
air and staggered out of the LZ but they said on the radio the
controls were almost locked. Somehow they made it to an open
spot a short distance from the LZ. When I got there, Bob was out
of the aircraft and on the ground . He knew he had been hit in his
upper thigh. The only question he had was something like 'is it
still there'. We cut his trouser leg and found that he had a wad of
commo wire embedded in his leg about four inches below the
groin. He was evacuated to Tay Ninh and recovered OK."
The VC were in well established bunkers and had numeric superiority. It was later learned that major
portions of two VC regiments were engaged in the battle. Heroism became the norm rather than the
exception all day long.
Realizing the necessity for reinforcing the ground units already trapped in LZ Gold, the Thunderbirds and
the Top Tigers returned to the PZ at Ap Trai Dan(see map above) for additional troops. They returned to
LZ Gold landing in open areas immediately adjacent to LZ Gold, thinking there would be no mines there.
Bill Bradner continues: "We left to return to the PZ to pick-up
more troops to reinforce the folks on the ground. We found that a
couple more ships had been badly damaged so we were left with
only three. After picking up the troops we headed back and picked
out an area about 200 yards away. We elected to come to a low
hover instead of sitting down to let the troops off. As we came to a
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hover the VC set off another mine just in front of us and blew us
back toward the ship behind us. We lost the chin bubble and part
of the windscreen. Both doors were blown loose and we had dirt
and crud all over us. We staggered out of the LZ and returned to
the PZ to pick up the rest of the troops and check the ship for
damage. I was really surprised when we looked it over because the
whip antenna on the tail was completely missing and we had quite
a few shrapnel holes in the skin but nothing too serious. Why we
didn't lose our tail rotor I'll never know. We put in two more loads
of troops and went to Tay Ninh to see how Bob Kelly was doing
and later flew back to the 'Birdcage' at Bien Hoa"
Personal Story of a "Grunt" in LZ Gold
2LT Jim Olafson was a Platoon Leader with the 4th Div. that day and was lifted into LZ Gold by elements
of the 145th CAB.He doesn't remember which Assault Company he rode in on. But, the interesting thing
about his story is that he returned to the US, went to flight school and came back to Vietnam on his second
tour assigned to the 118th Assault Helicopter Company, "Thunderbirds"!!!
"As we approached the LZ, both the door gunner and crew chief
began firing their M-60's. At the time I thought this was just a
precaution and normal procedure. In a matter of seconds it was
apparent that we were taking fire and you could hear bullets
passing through metal on the chopper. No one said anything and
the pilots concentrated on making there approach and getting us
on the ground."
"As a grunt on board a chopper taking fire, it is a very helpless
feeling. When you are on the ground and taking fire, you can find
a place to hide. That wasn't the case on the chopper. The feeling
of being totally at the mercy of fate is very prevailing and there
isn't one damn thing you can do about it."
"As each bird approached the ground, we started jumping off of
them at approximately five feet or less. During the time that we
were exiting the choppers, there was a large amount of incoming
fire both from small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. I'm
sure that there were also some RPG's being fired towards the
choppers but at the time it was not something that was really
important to me or my personnel. As quickly as possible we tried
to make our way forward in an attempt to secure as much of the
LZ as possible for the other lifts that would be coming in."
"I recall that there was one chopper that was damaged to the
point that it could not get back in the air. I'm not sure whether it
was during this first insertion lift or during the second lift. I
remember that the crew of the chopper stayed with us on the
ground until later in the day when the LZ was more secure and
they could be extracted. They may have been lucky in the fact that
they didn't have to make any more insertions that day. At least
they all survived that day and that was the important thing."
Note: click the words BRONZE STAR to read about these 118th
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crewmembers.
"My platoon lost 13 men during that operation. There were also a
large number of wounded guys who survived mainly because there
were pilots who risked everything to extract them to medical
facilities. One of those that didn't make it was my platoon medic
who refused my orders to get on a bird and leave. Because of his
efforts, many of my men survived. I had the unfortunate honor of
writing the Congressional Medal of Honor for him. That award
was presented to his wife exactly one year from the date it was
written. His name was Donald W. Evans Jr. from Ojai,
California."
Initially, suppressive fire from escort Bandit and Mustang gun ships was impossible after the first lift due
to friendly elements scattered throughout the LZ areas. But with the help of the commanders on the ground,
the fire teams showed the utmost in determination and remarkable tactical grasp of the situation by
locating the enemy emplacements. They effectively supported the troop carrying aircraft delivering
withering and accurately deadly fire on the VC. It was only much later that tactical air and artillery could
be utilized. The armed helicopters were instrumental in preventing the loss of additional lives and aircraft.
Immediately following the explosions in LZ Gold, many damaged aircraft and injured crews staggered out
of the LZ but, were unable to make it back to the PZ. Being mostly 118th AHC single ships going down,
this required the Bandit gunship fire teams to break-up into single gunships to give cover and protection
from above. This they did until help could arrive or the crews could be extracted.
1LT Tom Payne, Fireteam leader with the Bandits remembers:
"When the explosions happened it took everyone by surprise, even
though we had secretly anticipated it was possible. As the
damaged aircraft of the 118th staggered out of LZ Gold, there
were too many to cover with fire teams so we broke down into
single gun ships to follow them to the ground in open areas and
clearings. We circled and watched and provided cover from above
until help arrived. To my knowledge, not many of them received
much gunfire from the VC as they sat damaged on the ground so
we were lucky there. Our fuel ran low after a while because it was
hot and the gun ships could carry only about 900 pounds, so we
returned to the PZ where there were refueling bladders. I
remember as we sat refueling one of our 118th AHC slicks came
hovering back to the PZ with doors all ajar and warped and one
counter weight on the rotor GONE. Amazing too was the fact that
this crew had HOVERED the five or so miles from LZ Gold back
to the PZ along the only road in the area. Quite a sight."
Courageous air crews flew a total of 8 lifts into LZ Gold and the adjacent areas after the initial holocaust.
145th CAB records show that 5 individuals were awarded the Silver Star, 19 DFC's, 14 Bronze Stars for
valor and 96 Air Medals for valor.
Four enlisted crew members of the first helicopters downed in the landing zone began stripping the radios,
weapons and other valuable equipment. They realized LZ Gold was in imminent danger of being engulfed
in flames so they secured fire extinguishers and flack vests to beat back the flames from the disabled
aircraft. They ran through the inferno looking for the wounded as the fire set off hand grenades dropped
during the confusion of the initial mine explosions. These crewmen began
giving medical aide to
wounded infantry soldiers and loading them onto aircraft which returned on successive lifts. They
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voluntarily remained in LZ Gold under heavy fire throughout the morning and early afternoon. Many more
examples of valor abounded throughout the day. These are but a few examples of the many acts of bravery
which occurred during the Battle of Suoi Tre and LZ Gold.
If you have first hand knowledge of the Battle of Suoi Tre and LZ Gold please e-mail the webmaster so
your account can be considered for inclusion. Thanks goes to Bill Bradner, Jim Olafson and Tom Payne
for their accounts of the action.
(Copied primarily from "First in Vietnam--A Pictorial History of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion"
published by the Battalion Information Office, 1966-67, Dai Nippon Printing Co., LTD, Tokyo, Japan)
118th Crewmembers Awarded
Bronze Star Medal with "V" for Heroism
General Orders Number 2185, dtd 5 June 1967, awarded the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device for
Heroism to SP4 Howard R. Childress, SP4 Harvey W. Morton, SP4 Roger F. Thomas and PFC James E.
Walenga. These men were all crewmembers on 118th Assault Helicopter Company
aircraft in LZ GOLD!
CITATION
For heroism in connection with military operations against a hostile force: On 19 March 1967, a flight of
ten helicopters from the 118th Assault Helicopter Company landed in an area which had been heavily
mined by the Viet Cong. Moments after the helicopters had unloaded their troops the landing zone erupted
in a holocaust of fire and flying shrapnel. Nine aircraft were damaged, two were completely destroyed, and
three had to be abandoned in the landing zone. Serving as enlisted crew members aboard these aircraft,
these men reacted immediately to the situation and began stripping radios, weapons and other valuable
equipment from the downed helicopters. Seeing that the landing area was in imminent danger of being
engulfed in flames, they and their fellow crew members, using fire extinguishers and flack vests, valiantly
fought the blaze while fully exposed to murderous enemy fire. Throughout the morning and early
afternoon, these men remained in the minefield administering first aid to wounded and stunned Infantry
soldiers. Later, when an aircraft returned to fly the crews out of the area, they forfeited their seats to safety
and loaded the helicopter with wounded, remaining in the minefield to render further assistance to the
ground troops. Their heroic actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and
reflects great credit upon themselves, their unit, and the United States Army.
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33
Near Cu Chi was the VN Ranger base at Truong Lap shown above
Gary Roush, while in the 242d participated in a flyby over Cu Chi. The picture below provides a good
view of Cu Chi.
34
Cu Chi aerial picture and map from Ron Leonard’s 25th Avn Bn Website
35
The 116th AHC was in Vietnam from Oct 20, 1965 to Dec 26, 1971, most of that period at Cu Chi, later
Chu Lai and stood down at DaNang.
Paul Jenkins has put together an outstanding site at http://www.pauljenkins.com/hornets/
Here are some examples of the detail on his web page
36
This outstanding picture of a 269th Avn Bn smoke ship clearly shows the effects a smoke ship provided.
37
Ron Leonard from the 25th Aviation Battalion has compiled a huge amount of information at.
members.tripod.com/ronleonard/index.htm Ron piqued my interest with the following:
In a moment, the sounds of hell will shatter the solitude of A Peaceful day. Bullets will rip through soft
breezes while tense bodies advance in search of danger. The crude contrivance of an ingenious enemy will
split the formation, disrupt the activity, whet the appetite.
An Inspired soldier will answer the call to arms and boundless energies of a razor-sharp force will be
unleashed against the ruthless opponent.
The rapid response from the alert rifleman…
The sudden burst of artillery…
The devastating air strike…
Then Silence.
The sun will seep along its westward path and the darkness of night will prevail upon vigilant eyes…
Eyes which know the ugly face of death, know the end results of an aggressive tyrant, know the rewards
of a world where choice and freedom dictate the way of life.
The triumphs of each day will build the faith of an imperiled society, strengthen the cause for freedom,
instill the hope of ultimate peace..
This is the story of the 25th Infantry Division, written by the man who wears the “Tropic Lightning”
patch, skilled through the rigors of intensive field training, matured by the strains of combat…in three wars.
It’s a story if dedication, determination…and courage.
They call it “Hell’s Half Acre” because of the fierce fighting which has taken place where the 25th
Infantry Division now has it’s base camp.
Before the “Tropic Lightning” arrived, it was a sanctuary. The Viet Cong came to the Cu Chi area to rest
and relax after a hot battle in the field. It was a good base of operations for “Charlie,” only 20 miles
northwest of Saigon.
38
Other soldiers had passed through the area but none had attempted to stay. And when the 25th Division
tried to do what no other division had yet done, they found that it was not an easy assignment.
Stories of the valiant soldiers in Vietnam are repeated over and over again.
There is the story of Danny Fernandez, a rare young man admired by his contemporaries - quiet,
cheerful, competent, unselfish. While on a search and destroy mission with C company, 1st Battalion
(Mech), 5th Infantry, Fernandez and his buddies were in a battle position when a grenade came flying in.
Fernandez immediately jumped on it and covered it with his own body, shielding the others from the blast.
Acts and deeds of heroism are recorded wherever “Tropic Lightning” operates in Vietnam.
The latest chapter in the story of the 25th Infantry Division begins in a land where tanks meet ox carts at
every crossroads, a country where war has become a way of life, a nation on the threshold of progress and
prosperity. “Tropic Lightning” soldiers in Vietnam contributed to the cause for freedom, the hope of peace,
the triumph over communism and victory in the Cold War.
The Honolulu Advertiser (September 10, 1964 issue) carried a story that read in part…”Combat troops
for the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii,” are being sent to Vietnam to serve as
machine gunners aboard U.S. helicopters, Army spokesman disclosed here yesterday.
“This is the first acknowledgement by a U.S. agency that some American troops are being committed to
the Vietnam War in capacities other than advisors.”
Today, the story, as the name. Is antiquated. The nickname “shotgun riders” is taken from the Wild West
days when shotgun-carrying guards accompanied stagecoaches on cross-country runs.
The quick draw of those shot gunners was replaced by the “Tropic Lightning” draw of the 25th Infantry
Division soldier who rode “Shotgun” in Vietnam from January 1963 to January 1966.
To kill a tiger, learn the ways of the tiger.
That was the theme of the program for training “shot gunners” - or officially, Aerial Door Gunners - those
tough, skilled soldiers who, in the tradition of their counterparts on the stagecoaches of the old West,
protected their UH-1 “Sky-coaches” while flying over South Vietnam.
It was fall of 1962 when the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, asked the Department of the
Army for help in protecting the troop-carrying helicopters being used to fight the Viet Cong. By January
1963, the 25th Infantry Division had responded to the call and had sent the first group of 100 volunteer
Aerial Door gunners to Southeast Asia.
Three years and 2,200 men later, the “Tropic Lightning” Division’s highly regarded “Shotgun” program
came to a close. Its members had compiled an enviable record of combat in a modern application of the
stagecoach shot gunners of Wild West days.
In a speech before the Senate, and recorded in the Congressional Record, Senator Daniel K. Inoye of
Hawaii said, “Within the 25th Infantry Division there is the elite corps of officers and men carrying on the
finest traditions of the American fighting man. They are called shotgunner by their friends, and a far worse
name by the Viet Cong they volunteer to fight. They know who the enemy of world freedom is; they
believe in what they are doing, and as a 25th Infantry Division motto states, they are “Ready to Strike,
Anywhere! Anytime!”
It was a quiet and peaceful Sunday morning at Schofield Barracks. The usual pastoral scene. There was
no suggestion, no possible intimation to outsiders of Quad I how 22 August 1965, was being honored by
“Charlie” Company 65th Engineer Battalion.
39
It happened fast, yet free from noise and disturbance. More than 170 fully-equipped men were
assembled, roll was called, then all hustled into waiting buses.
Forty-five minutes later: Pier 40. The proud company banner was carried aboard the Military Sea
Transportation service transport, General Edwin D. Patrick. Destination - Southeast Asia.
A few hours later, the Patrick sailed out of sight. The engineers who landed 7 September 1965 at Cam
Ranh Bay, a former French resort area, found little to be reminiscent of home, other than the attitude of the
friendly, but reserved Vietnamese people.
The more than 170 men dug in on a plain like area similar to the way Hawaii’s Plains of Waianae, home
of Schofield Barracks, must have looked around the turn of the century: hot and devoid of water.
But American ingenuity and the powerful U.S. supply line into this beleaguered country served the men
well in turning a desolate field into a base of operations for construction, reconnaissance and rehabilitation
work.
Tanned from the beaches of Hawaii, where the division had been stationed since 1954, and lean from the
months and years of tough jungle training, the men looked the part of the gallant combat veterans they were
to become in the early moments ahead.
At the Pleiku Airstrip there was no time for small talk; no time for stretching legs after the long Pacific
flight. As Colonel Stoutner loaded his men on convoys for the trip to their new home, a barren patch of
land nestled in the Vietnam countryside, a crew of men unloaded the mass of equipment the men brought
with them.
The 3rd Brigade, however, was also greeted with the sounds of war, as Air Force A1E “Skyraiders”
dropped their 250 pound bombs, released napalm and fired rockets at a Viet Cong platoon skirting the
brigade’s perimeter, while the long truck convoys pulled into their new “home.”
Command and pup tents went up immediately. Barbed wire barricades surrounded the encampment. In a
few short minutes, mortars were pointing at the lurking enemy.
The Pleiku and Cu Chi based “Lightning-aires” stripped down to their green T-shirts and began digging
the soldiers second friend - his foxhole. His best friend, the rifle, was always within reach.
In both brigade areas, the problem of dust brought back to the “Tropic Lightning” soldier memories if his
training days in the lava beds of Hawaii. Those training days are gone and again the 25th Infantry Division
has been called upon to add its “Tropic Lightning” attack to the battle.
Before the dust settled in the two brigade camp areas, the famed Hawaiian-based division welcomed a
contingent of troops from Division Artillery, Support Command and Division Headquarters in March.
The final move from Hawaii for the 25th Division was in April 1966 when the1st Brigade arrived at
Vung Tau and moved to Cu Chi to take its place along side other elements of the division in combat.
WAR! Three magnanimous alphabetical characters that achieved a stark realism for the men of the
“Tropic Lightning” Division in an untamed and sniper infested island in the middle of a sea of Viet Cong
guerillas.
Before elements of the 2nd brigade could settle back and claim their new piece of real estate at Cu Chi,
Vietnam, the entirearea had to be cleaned out and the Viet Cong dragged out of the intricate tunnel
complexes which honeycombed the base camp area.
Northeast of the base camp stand the infamous Ho Bo Woods , a patch of heavy forestation that even
crack U.S. airborne troops haven’t been able to deny to the Viet Cong.
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To the north lies War Zone C, reported to be the Viet Cong command center for the whole country and
to the west of the base camp the Vam Co Dong River flows blandly, carrying infiltrated men, supplies and
equipment between the Viet Cong bases.
The unsung war chant of the 25th Infantry Division immediately struck a “We Belong here” note.
In a series of moves designed to root the unwanted guests from the 25th Division’s newly adopted
homeland, Operations “Bobcat,” “Taro Leaf I and II,” “Clean Sweep I and II,” “Paddy Bridge,” “Search
Out.” “Flush Out,” and “Kolchak I” slashed through extensive Viet Cong emplacements during the months
of January and February 1966.
The once besieged wooded and seemingly impenetrable jungle camp area was leveled and made
comparable to a golf course. Elements of the 2nd brigade cut a swath through the area in an effort to
destroy extensive Viet Cong tunnels and fortifications and expand the perimeter. Insurgents were
destroyed, enemy ammunition and supply caches were confiscated, mines and booby traps were uncovered
and neutralized.
After two months of pounding the enemy “round-the-clock” the 25th Division’s enclave at Cu Chi was
firmly established.
Also, during Jan uary and February 1966, 250 miles to the north of Cu Chi, the 3rd Brigade Task Force
at Pleiku was making history by opening the Viet Cong controlled highway 19 during Operations
“Kamehameha” and “Taylor.” Once opened, the tons of supplies vital to wage successful battles began
pouring into the 3rd Brigade base camp.
While the swinging picks were still hacking into the dusty ground at Cu Chi, putting the finishing
touches on tent kits, mess halls and working areas Operations “Del Ray,” “Circle Pines,” “Akron,” and
“Asheville” continued to eliminate moderate to heavy Viet Cong resistance. Meanwhile, the stage was set
at Pleiku for the 3rd Brigade Task Force undergoing Operations “Garfield,” “Lincoln,” “Longfellow” and
“Paul Revere.”
Operations “Fort Smith,” “Fresno” and “Sante Fe,” area pacification missions conducted by “Tropic
Lightning,” were combined with conventional military operations during June.
“Fort Smith” provided the villagers in the Ap An Binh area the opportunity to learn of their
government’s fight against communism through the thousands of leaflets dropped by American aircraft and
by word of mouth from ARVN civic action workers and their fellow countrymen.
Operation “Fresno” resulted in “Tropic Lightning” soldiers capturing nine Viet Cong through the
defection of a Viet Cong platoon leader. The platoon leader resettled with his family in one of the
government’s “new life” hamlets and began supporting, instead of defying, the government.
“Sante Fe” consisted of civic action programs, road construction, “Helping Hand” operations and the
construction of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam compound.
In what was described as one of the largest single hauls of prisoners, enemy arms and ammunition in the
III Corps area by any U.S. unit, as the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, conducted a hard-fisted search
and clear operation tabbed “Makiki.”
The 2nd Brigade mission in Hau Nghai Province netted an ammunition supply depot containing Russian
carbines, Chinese carbines, German Mausers, Chinese submachine guns and Chinese anti-tank rockets.
During mid-June 1966 the 3rd Brigade Task Force continued to sweep the area west-southwest of Pleiku
in Operation “Paul Revere.”
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Since the operation’s inception, elements of the brigade accounted for 279 North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong killed.
Most of the action occurred during an encounter earlier in the month which saw men of the task force in
heavy engagement with what was later estimated as a North Vietnamese regiment. The communists broke
contact and withdrew to the west.
Notable operations for the Cu Chi based 25th Infantry Division during the same time included “Joliet,”
“Fargo,” “Helemano,” “Nogalis,” and “Ehu.”
June 1966 closed with the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, severing a path through the HoBO Woods
on Operation “ Coco Palms.” In addition to large stores of small arms ammunition, hand grenades, antitanks mines, claymore mines and rifle grenades were taken.
The operation yielded 10 Viet Cong killed and two confirmed Viet Cong captured. The ensuing month
saw the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, on Operation “Ewa,” 23 miles southwest of the “Tropic Lightning”
Division’s Cu Chi base camp.
The “Wolfhounds” conducted the search and destroy operation for five days, killing 14 Viet Cong and
capturing six.
Other operations moved men of the 25th on “Kahana I and II,” “Mokulea,” “Koko Head,” and “Oahu.”
By the end of July, the “Tropic Lightning” at Cu Chi had accounted for more than 1,000 dead Viet Cong
since their arrival in Vietnam.
Operation Attleboro
Operation Attleboro (14 September - 25 November 1966) was a large Search and Destroy operation that
was initiated by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, but eventually was expanded to include not only the
196th, but also elements of the 1st Infantry and the 25th Infantry Divisions who joined forces to conduct
combat sweeps and assaults over a wide area of War Zone C. A description of the 25th Divisions operation
follows:
On 7 November, following heavy contact by elements of the 1st Division northeast of Soui Da, the
decision was made to pursue the Viet Cong 9th Division. The 25th Infantry Division was given a segment
of the operation. In response to a II Field Force directive, the division ordered the 2nd Brigade to move its
headquarters and the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry to Tay Ninh. This was accomplished on 8 November. On
9 November, the Division Forward Command Post along with the Artillery Command Post displaced to
Tay Ninh. The Division Forward CP assumed control of the operation at 0930, 10 November.
The division mission was to destroy elements of the 9th Viet Cong Division in War Zone C. At this time it
was believed the Viet Cong 271st Regiment was located in the woods northeast of Bau Co. An order was
passed to the 2nd Brigade to conduct search and destroy operations in the area to destroy the 271st
Regiment.
Brigade Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry moved to
establish a fire support base at Bau Co. The 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery then displaced to Bau Co. The 1st
Battalion, 27th Infantry was still attached to the 1st Division and the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry secured
the Tay Ninh Base Camp. A decision was made to open the road from Soui Da to Bau Co to save
helicopters. General Weyland was concerned with the threat to the 25th Infantry Division rear from the Boi
Loi-Hobo complex. He therefore detached the 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry from the 3rd Brigade,
4th Infantry Division (now 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division) and moved it to Cu Chi. The battalion was
attached to the 25th Infantry Division at 0800, 11 November 1966, and arrived at Bau Co along with two
batteries of artillery.
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A series of operations was conducted from this base. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, conducted
operations from 11-13 November east of Bau Co. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, conducted a combat
assault on the 12th and established a base to search out an area hit by a B-52 strike. It was expected back on
the 13th. The 1st Battalion (Mech). 5th Infantry, conducted a
search and destroy operation north of Bau Co and established on 12 November a base which was later
called Fire support Base 1. On 13 November the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, exploited a B-52 strike.
The 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, moved to the Bau Co base on 12 November. On 12 November, all
elements of the196th Light Infantry Brigade had been released from control of the 1st Infantry Division.
The 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, moved east of Nui Ba Den on 12 November to remain until 18 November
with the mission of securing the road. On the 12th, it established three company sized bases north
of Go Dau Ha and Bao Don with the mission of conducting operations south of the Boi Loi Woods. At
early light it was given orders to secure the Route 22 bypass In the vicinity of the Cau Khoi Plantation after
the decision was made to open the road from Dau Tieng to Tay Ninh. The 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd
Infantry, made this move on the 13th. On 13 November, the division mission changed before it could
completely search out its area of responsibility.
From search and destroy operation, the division’s mission was changed to reconnaissance by force. The
2nd Brigade was then directed to conduct operations astride
Route 4 to Kontum and be prepared to move north and seize objectives near the Cambodian border or to
move southeast to seize Bo Duc. This resulted in the 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry being
attached to the 2nd Brigade on 14 November, and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, under the 196th Brigade,
took over the mission of guarding the route 22 Bypass and the plantation. Fire Support Base 2 was
established by the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry, on 15
November. Two batteries of artillery were moved into this area. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, secured
Fire Support Base 1 and was later joined by the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry on 16 November. Two
batteries of artillery were also located in this base. Local operations were conducted in the vicinity of
these bases for several days. The base at Bau Co was closed on the 17th and the 2nd Battalion, 14th
Infantry, moved back to Tay Ninh. On 18 November the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, drove north
and arrived near the border on the 19th. Company A had a firefight en route resulting in 11 Viet Cong
killed by actual body count. The 2nd Brigade was then given an order to conduct a recon north and
northwest of Katum and be prepared to recon east of Katum, conducting operations in this area through the
22nd. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, then moved from Fire Base 1 to Fire Base 2 on the 18th. A series of
combat assaults were conducted from the 20-23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, conducted one on the
20th in the area where the 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry, had the sharp firefight on the19th. . They
conducted another on the 21st to establish a temporary Fire Support Base to support the aero-rifle platoon
which was to exploit a B-52 airstrike next to the border on that date. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry had a
combat assault on the 21st and another on the 23rd. The decision was made not to move the 1st Battalion
(Mech), 5th Infantry southeast of the Bo Duc area. Instead the 2nd battalion, 27th Infantry, conducted an air
assault into this area on the 22nd. On the 23rd, the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, moved back
to Fire Support Base 1 and then secured Fire Support Base 2 with one company on the 24th. The majority
of units moved back to the base camp on the 24th and the operation ended on the 25th for all units except
the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, which conducted deep reconnaissance east of Trai Bi.
After the operation, division officials felt that the main Viet Cong Force in its area was the 70th
Regiment which is a Recon and Security unit of COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam). The forces in
both the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions areas of operations were the 70th Viet Cong Regiment and the
101st NVA Regiment.
Operation Cedar Falls
Operation Cedar Falls (8 January-26 January 1967) was a blocking, and search and destroy operation along
the Saigon River to prevent ex-filtration from the Thanh Dien Forestry Reserve and the Iron Triangle,
denying the use of the Saigon River in the sector to Viet Cong/NVA forces.
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On 6 January, the division , under the guise of normal operations, deployed the 196th Light Infantry
Brigade, which at the time was attached to the25th Infantry Division. The 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd
Infantry moved from Dau Tieng along the southern edge of the Boi Loi woods to an overnight position. At
the same time the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry with Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry attached
moved into the area north of the Trung Lap Ranger Training Center, to initially
open a route and secure artillery support bases. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry and supporting artillery,
consisting of the 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery, and A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, was lifted into
these bases. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade Command Post and elements of the 3rd Battalion, 13th
Artillery and 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery moved by convoy to Trung Lap. On 7 January, the 1st Battalion,
(Mech), 5th Infantry secured a Landing Zone for the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry. All elements less the fire
support base security forces moved to blocking positions along the Saigon River at the same time the 2nd
Brigade moved to blocking positions along the Saigon river north of the Filhol Plantation and Nha Viec.
They deployed with Task Force 2nd Battalion , 34th Armor in the north, Task Force 2nd Battalion, 27th
Infantry in the south. During the nights a maximum amount of ambushes were placed along the river.
During daylight minimum forces secured the river, allowing extensive search and destroy operations in the
Viet Cong base areas. Control of traffic on the river was the responsibility of the 25th Infantry Division,
while the 1st Infantry Division was responsible for the control at the junction of the Saigon-Thi Tinh
Rivers. The 1st Infantry Division with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th Cavalry Regiment blocked
enemy escape routes across the Thi Than River, executed an air-mobile assault north of the Iron Triangle,
and then executed search and destroy operations south through the area.
Totals for the 18-day operations were 331 Viet Cong killed by actual body count, 39 Prisoners of War
captured, 147 Hoi Chanhs rallied, and 147 detainees held for questioning, seven M-1 rifles, 10 Mausers, six
AK-47 assault rifles, 18 pistols, two shotguns, one pellet gun, three rocket launchers, two BARs, three
rounds of rocket ammunition were captured, along with numerous miscellaneous explosives, bangalor
torpedoes and grenades. The confiscated 21,385 tons of rice. Air support sorties numbered 409 and five B52 bomb strikes were made during the operation.
Operation Gadsden
Operation Gadsden (2-21 February 1967) was a multi-brigade search and destroy-blocking operation
conducted in Tay Ninh Province along the Cambodian border. The operation was designed to expose and
deny Viet Cong infiltration and ex-filtration along well established routes across the border in War one C.
The operation was kicked off on 2 February by elements of the 25th Infantry Division and II field force.
On 3 February the 2/22nd Infantry engaged an estimated Viet Cong platoon. The Viet Cong fought from
concealed positions and maintained contact for several hours. Also, on 3 February, the Reconnaissance
1/5th Platoon received small arms, automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire from 15-20 Viet Cong. The
Viet Cong wore mixed camouflaged uniforms and black pajamas, and fought with considerable
determination, exhibiting good discipline and fire control. On the evening of 4 February, the 2/1 Infantry
received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in their battalion base area, sustaining light casualties. Earlier in
the day Company A, 2/1 Infantry captured a training model of a rocket launcher. This was the first of
several indications that the area of Operation Gadsden was a primary training ground for Viet Cong main
force units. On February, A/4 31st Infantry received small arms (SA), automatic weapons (AW) and rifle
grenade fire from 8-10 Viet Cong. After a moderate exchange of fire, the Viet Cong withdrew. On 5
February A/1/5 Infantry received heavy SA, AW and rifle grenade fire from an unknown number of Viet
Cong. Fifteen Viet Cong were KIA as a result of this action. Captured on the field was one Chicom heavy
machinegun, type 57, which indicated a company size unit or larger, but no unit identification could be
made from the equipment or documents captured in the area. On 5 February, A/2/22 located a large cache
which contained numerous documents identifying elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 70th Viet Cong
Regiment. On 6 February, 2/22 Infantry received AW, SA and rifle grenade fire from an unknown number
of Viet Cong. The Viet Cong were fighting from underground fortifications and put up a determined
effort prior to breaking contact. That same day Recon 1/5th Infantry captured documents in a Viet Cong
base camp identifying another local guerilla unit that operated a dispensary in the area, This dispensary’s
presence, coupled with the discovery of numerous medical facilities and medical supply caches, indicated
the Viet Cong were using the area as a rest and recuperation center. On 7 February, Companies A and C 1/5
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Infantry received rifle grenades and heavy SA and AW fire from an estimated Viet Cong platoon. air
strikes and artillery supported this action resulting in 20 Viet Cong KIA. Fortified bunkers and 18 tons
of rice were located in the area. Also on 7 February, 2/1 Infantry located and destroyed a Viet Cong
training area consisting of an extensive obstacle course, stockade and an elaborate land navigation course.
Documents located at the site and in a supply cache nearby, identified the 680th training Regiment and
elements of the 3rd Battalion, 272nd Viet Cong regiment which was suspected of conducting training in the
area.
During the period 8-12 February, the TeT Truce, US combat elements occupied their battalion bases
astride Viet Cong supply and infiltration routes and conducted extensive patrolling within their areas of
responsibility to deter Viet Cong activity during the truce period. There were a total of six truce violations
against US ground forces; one involving fire on US ground forces from the Cambodian side of the river. On
8 February, 1/5 Infantry was engaged by an unknown number of Viet Cong. Documents captured on the
battlefield following the action made reference to a local medical facility. The 1/5 Infantry also
discovered a company-size Viet Cong base camp and a supply cache containing documents referring to
what was believed to be the 680th Viet Cong Training Regiment. On 8 February, Recon 4/23 Infantry
located a small ammo and medical cache and documents referring to a local Viet Cong Finance and
Economy Agency. On 10 February, 1/5 ;located a very sophisticated training area consisting of 44
structures and fortifications, two class rooms, two mess halls, and a 75X30 meter rifle range
complete with silhouette targets. On 11 February, 4/31 Infantry located documents revealing strength and
armament figures on a recoilless rifle company of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment.
The final phase of Operation Gadsden consisted of attacks and sweeps in the area in response to
intelligence information regarding Viet Cong activities. On 13 February, 1/5 Infantry destroyed an
ordinance facility containing numerous bombs, artillery rounds, and grenades, as well as tools and molds
for fabrication of ordinance items. This again pointed out the importance of this area to the Viet Cong as a
logistical base. On 16 February a Chieu Hoi rallied to the 2/22 Infantry. He supplied the US forces with
valuable intelligence information regarding local guerilla activities. On 18 February, 2/77 Arty and
2/22 Infantry received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, On 21 February, 3/22 Infantry engaged an unknown
number of Viet Cong. Documents captured on the battlefield contained several references to the 70th Viet
Cong Regiment. Also Identified was a medical unit.
During the 19 day operation, six AK-47s and M-79s. Two sub-machine guns, six carbines and Mausers,
one M-14, one shotgun, three rocket launchers, 7,850 rounds of small arms ammunition, seven pounds of
TNT, assorted communications equipment, 19 bicycles, and large amounts of kerosene, tar, clothing, and
maps were captured. In addition 161 Viet cong were killed and two POWs were taken. There were 347
sorties flown in air support, and numerous B-52 bomb strikes were used during the operation.
Operation Junction City
Operation Junction city (22 February-16 May 1967) was a wide-ranging search and destroy operation
employing the 2nd brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 3rd brigade, 4th Infantry division. 196th Light Infantry
Brigade (the latter two units were attached to the 25th Infantry Division at the time), 9th Infantry Division,
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the Vietnamese Marine Brigade, consisting of the 1st and 5th
Vietnamese Marine Battalions.
The operation kicked off on 22 February when the 196th Brigade, employing the2nd Battalion, 1st
Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to establish a fire support base near the Cambodian border. The
3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, and 4th battalion, 31st Infantry conducted further airmobile assaults and
established fire support bases to the northwest of the2nd battalion, 1st Infantry. These three battalions of
the 196th Brigade began conducting search and destroy missions to the support bases to the east of the
196th Brigade with the 2nd battalion (Mech),22nd Infantry, 3rd battalion, 22nd Infantry, and 2nd Battalion,
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12th Infantry. These Battalions assumed blocking positions and began search and destroy missions in their
respective zones. The 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division set up fire support bases along the southern
portion of the division area at Trai Bai, with the1st Battalion, 27th Infantry on the west, 1st Battalion, 5th
Infantry in the center, and 2nd Battalion 27th Infantry to the east. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons 11th ACR
occupied positions to the southwest, and the 4th Battalion (Mech), 23rd Infantry established a base
camp near the 1st Infantry Division boundary.
On 23 February the 2nd Brigade, and 11th ACR began attacking to the north while the 196th Brigade and
the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division maintained blocking positions and continued search and destroy
operations in that area.
The next day the 1st and 5th Vietnamese Marine Battalions were airlifted from Trai Bai to an area
already secured by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and began an attack to the east.
On 26 February the 11th ACR conducted a sweep to the north in support of the Vietnamese Marines.
There was little contact until Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an estimated Viet Cong
Company. The ensuing fire fight resulted in 11 Viet Cong KIA by body count and 19 WIA. The search and
destroy operation continued and Viet Cong contact was again made on 28 February when Company C, 4th
Battalion, 31st Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons
fire from an unknown size Viet Cong force. The Infantrymen, supported by artillery and air strikes, killed
nine Viet Cong by body count, while the 11th ACR engaged and killed five Viet Cong in a nearby battle.
Company C, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, was conduction a road-securing operation on 1 March when
they were attacked by an estimated Viet Cong battalion. Withering fire from the tank company along with
Air Force air strikes, artillery fire, and helicopter gunships, drove off the Viet Cong force. The Viet Cong
lost 13 guerillas, but there were no US soldiers killed. Blood trails and bandages found in the battle area
indicated that there were many more Viet Cong casualties.
On 5 and 6 March, the 196th Brigade, and the 2nd Brigade, 4th Division were re-positioned within their
area of operations. New base camps were set up, from which combat patrols and search and destroy
operations were launched. The same day the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry received 120 rounds of
60mm mortar fire from unknown Viet Cong forces. The battalion returned the fire and made a combat
sweep of the suspected mortar positions, Viet Cong losses were unknown. There were five US WIA.
The following day the 11th ACR and the 3rd Brigade, 4th Division took up new blocking positions along
the Cambodian border. A task force comprised of Vietnamese Marines and th4e 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th
Infantry conducted new search and destroy operations in that area. On 8 March 1967, the task force located
and destroyed a Viet Cong Base camp containing over 150 bunkers. During the combat assault on the
camp, a helicopter from Troop D, 1st Squadron 11th ACR was hit by an RPG-2 round resulting in major
damage and five US WIA. At the same location Troop A engaged an unknown size Viet Cong
force, resulting in one Viet Cong KIA and the capture of a Viet Cong Prisoner of War.
On 11 March, the Vietnamese marine Brigade terminated its participation in Operation Junction City.
The 3rd Brigade and 11th ACR continued their search and destroy operations. Troop B, 1st Squadron, 11th
ACR made contact with a Viet Cong company along the river border of Cambodia. The guerillas attempted
to flee across the river but helicopter gunships and air strikes blocked their passage. As the battle
progressed Troops A and C were heli-lifted in to assist troop B. Contact continued all through the night,
and flare ships were employed to provide continuous illumination. The fighting died down at dawn, and a
sweep of the battle area was made. There were 28 Viet cong bodies found, and blood trails indicated there
were many more enemy casualties. Twenty-eight carbines, one heavy machine gun, two anti-tank weapons,
two printing presses and one electrical generator were captured.
On 19 March, Company A, 2nd battalion, 22nd Infantry received heavy small arms (SA) and automatic
weapons fire from a large Viet Cong force. The fire was returned with SA, AW, and M-79 grenade
launchers. The short but fierce battle resulted in five US KIA and eight US WIA. Viet Cong losses were
unknown, but blood trails indicated they had taken many casualties. On the same day, 3rd Battalion, 22nd
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Infantry was heli-lifted into a Landing Zone. As the battalion set down, they received fire from five
command detonated mines. Three helicopters were destroyed and six more were damaged. The supporting
aviation units suffered 10 KIA and 16 WIA. The battalion completed the landing, and after a fierce fire
fight with an unknown size Viet Cong force, secured the LZ. During the battle, a large Viet Cong Claymore
mine was detonated against company C, 3rd Battalion, resulting in five US WIA. The 2nd Battalion, 12th
Infantry then landed in the LZ and the two battalions set up a forward base.
On 6 April 1967 the 196th Brigade moved to Trai Bai. Troop F, 17th Cavalry, while on a search and
destroy operation, received 25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. They returned the fire with SA, AW, and M-79
grenade launchers. Artillery and helicopter gunships were also called in to assist in the attack against an
estimated Viet Cong company. In the ensuing battle, eight Viet Cong were killed.
From 8 April to 16 May, Operation Junction city was gradually phased out, with no significant enemy
contact reported during the period.
During the 84 day operation 314 small arms weapons, 30 crew-served weapons, 1,193 artillery shells,
156 mortar rounds, 60 anti tank rounds, 331 mines, 559 grenades, 41,482 rounds of small arms
ammunition, 120 bicycles, and large amounts of clothing and food were captured. 1,757 air support sorties
were flown in 741 missions for the operation. 1,648 tons of bombs and 1,104 tons of napalm were dropped.
Fifteen B-52 bomb strikes were also used during the operation. A total of 947 Viet Cong were killed, 18
prisoners of war captured, 61 detainees held, and 183 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the Government of Vietnam.
Battle Of Soui Tre
(Also See 118th AHC account)
Soui Tre, also known as Fire Support Base (FSB) Gold, began at 0430 hours on 21 March. At that time a
night patrol from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry operating just outside the 2nd Battalion, 77th
Artillery’s camp reported movement in front of and around their ambush position. However, no further
movement was detected and at 0630 the patrol prepared to return to camp. One minute later FSB Gold
came under heavy enemy 60mm and 82mm mortar attack and the 3rd Platoon ambush patrol was attacked
by a large Viet cong force. Within five minutes the patrol was overrun, and all personnel were killed or
wounded. At 0635 a Reconnaissance Patrol from 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry engaged a large Viet cong
force which had approached within 35 meters of the camp’s southeast perimeter. shortly thereafter the
entire perimeter came under attack by waves of Viet cong firing recoilless rifles, RPG-2 rocket launchers,
automatic weapons, and small arms. The heaviest attacks were concentrated on the northeastern and
southeastern portions of the battalion defensive perimeter around the FSB. As the attack increased, the
three artillery batteries of the 2/77th Artillery began firing counter-mortar fire in an effort to neutralize the
heavy Viet Cong mortar concentrations which continued to pound the entire US camp. During the final
assault, Company B reported that 1st platoon positions on the southeast perimeter had been penetrated and
that a reaction force was needed to reinforce that sector. Soldiers from the 2/77th Artillery responded to the
call rushing to the perimeter to help repulse the continuing enemy attacks. At 0700 the first of the Forward
Air controllers (FAC) arrived overhead in )1-E light observation aircraft. He immediately began directing
Air Force air strikes against the attacking hordes of Viet Cong. At the same time supporting fire from two
batteries of 105mm howitzers located at forward FSB’s nearby was brought within 100 meters of the
battalion perimeter. At 0711, Company B reported that it’s 1st Platoon had been surrounded and overrun by
a human wave attack. Airstrikes were called in all along the eastern woodline to relieve the pressure on
Company B’s perimeter. The FAC directing these strikes was shot down by heavy automatic weapons fire.
At 0752, the Company b commander requested that 2/77th Artillery fire “beehive” rounds into the
southeastern and southern sections of his perimeter. At 0756, Company B reported that complete Viet Cong
penetration had been made in the 1st platoon sector and that they were desperate for ammunition re-supply.
Ammunition and a 20 man reaction force from company A were sent to Company B. At 0813, the
northeastern section was also overrun with another human wave attack. At 0815, Company A, which had
established a night ambush position just outside the perimeter, charged into the camp’s perimeter.
Somehow all the personnel had managed toelude the surrounding Viet Cong. At 0818, Company A’s
commander reported that the Viet Cong had penetrated the northern section of the perimeter. Ten minutes
47
later a quad .50 machine gun located in the northern sector of the camp was hit by RPG-2 rocket rounds
and its crew killed. As the attacking Viet Cong swarmed over the weapon and attempted to turn it on GI
positions the gun was blown apart by a well place round from the 105mm howitzer crew who had
witnessed the whole action from their position some 75 meters away. By 0840 the northeastern, eastern,
and southeastern portions of the perimeter had withdrawn to a secondary defensive position around the
guns of the artillery batteries. The northern, western , and southern sectors had managed to hold firm
despite intense pressure from from large numbers of Viet Cong who had advanced within 15-20 meters of
the defensive positions. The attacking guerillas were within hand grenade range of the battalion command
post, and were only five meters from the battalion aid station. To counter this new threat, the remaining
howitzers of the 2/77th Artillery began firing “Beehive” rounds into the attacking Viet Cong. Air strikes
were brought in within 50 meters of US positions and supporting 105mm and 155mm batteries threw up a
continuous wall of high explosives around the battalion perimeter. When the 2/77th Artillery had exhausted
its supply of “beehive” rounds, they began to fire high explosive rounds at point blank range. By 0830 the
situation had worsened. The northern, western, and southern sectors of the perimeter were still
under intense Viet Cong pressure. The northeastern. Southeastern and eastern perimeters had been pulled in
even closer, and we were still undergoing Viet Cong human wave attacks. At 0900, a relief column from
the 2.12th Infantry were able to counter attack and re-establish the original perimeter. The Viet Cong
continued their mass attacks, many of them advancing wearing bandages from earlier wounds. Some of the
enemy, so badly wounded that they couldn’t walk, were carried piggyback into the assaults by their
comrades.
At 0912, a mechanized infantry and armor column from teh2/22nd Infantry and 2/34th Armor broke
through the jungle from the southwest. With their 90mm guns firing canister rounds, and all machine guns
blazing, they swept into the advancing Viet Cong, chopping them down by the score. Shortly thereafter, the
guerillas began to withdraw and by 1045, the Battle of Soui Tre was over.
The crack 272nd main force Viet Cong Regiment had been decimated, leaving behind 647 bodies.
Documents found intimate showed that intensive planning had been made by the Viet Cong before the
attack. The elite 272nd, one of the best organized and equipped guerilla units, was finished as an effective
fighting force. It had been long known for its fighting ability and was one of the few Viet Cong units that
would engage in daylight attacks. Its troops had been scattered in a disorganized rout as artillery and air
strikes pounded at their heels.
Nine Viet Cong were captured, and an arsenal of over 150 weapons of all types were collected. Huge
piles of enemy equipment, clothing, and documents were collected and evacuated.
During the battle, 2,200 rounds of US artillery was fired and a total of 57 air strikes supported the action.
American casualties were 31 KIA and 109 wounded.
Operation Makalapa
Operation Manalapan (18 March-21 April 1967) was a multi-brigade, two phase search and destroy
operation conducted in the Duc Hoa area to destroy local Viet Cong forces, and eliminate the area’s
effectiveness as a safe guerilla haven by destroying enemy bunkers, tunnel, and huts.
During the first part of the operation, the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry along with the 1-50th ARVN
Regiment and the 25th ARVN Division (-), established blocking positions east of the Vam Co Dong River
and conducted airmobile assaults froem their established staging areas.
In the second phase of the operation, the 1st 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 25th Infantry division conducted
airmobile assaults in the Luong Hoa area, initiated search and destroy operations in the zone, and blocked
the Viet Cong exfiltration routes to the north and east. The ARVN Task Force continued to hold their
blocking positions on the east bank of the Van Co Dong River, in addition to conducting ambushes, and
combat sweeps in that area.
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On 18 march, company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry moved by motor convoy from Cu Chi to near Vinh
Loc and began setting up a battalion base camp. Prior coordination had been made with the Vietnamese
district chief, and throughout the operation the spirit of cooperation between the US forces and the local
population remained high.
The next day the Battalion headquarters moved to Company C’s location and this became the Battion
Command Post on that date. Also on 19 march, Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry moved by helilift to
establish a company base camp near the village of Ap Tay. That night Company’s A and C began heavy
saturation patrolling in the areas around their camps. Late in the evening of the 19th, an ambush patrol
from Company A engaged a squad size Viet Cong force. In a brief fire fight the killed on guerilla, wounded
three others and captured one Chicom carbine.
On 20 March, company B completed their move by helicopter to a company base camp north of vinh
Loc. This move completed the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry’s deployment to its area of operations (AO). The
battalion remained generally in the same position until the initiation of the second phase of Operation
Malalpa on 8 April. During this time they conducted numerous combat sweeps and ambush patrols near
their base camps.
On 24 March, company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry made a combat assault into the notorious
“Pineapple Patch” area along the Kinh Xang Canal. They made no enemy contact as they swept both sides
of the canal, but one member of the patrol detonated a booby trap resulting in one US WIA. The sweep
accounted for the destruction of two bunkers and the capture of two ANPRC-10 radios, one hall craft radio,
and two Chicom carbines. Assorted amounts of ammunition, documents, clothes, and food stuffs were also
captured.
A cordon and search of the village of Ap Tay began on 26 March 1967. The operation was conducted
following an intelligence lead from a Viet Cong prisoner, who told his captors that various guerilla agents
hid in the village during the day. As the cordon was being emplaced, two men, presumably Viet Cong, ran
from the village and escaped. The remaining males were interrogated and six were discovered to be Viet
Cong.
Patrolling and local security operations, supplemented by MEDCAp’s and other Civic Action programs,
continued throughout the rest of the month. Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry and Company A, 4th
battalion (Mech), 23rd Infantry conducted fast moving search and destroy operations in the area of Viet
Con. During this period an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) from the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry was
badly damaged by an anti-tank mine, but there were no US casualties. On 27 March Company B, 4th
Battalion, (th Infantry received 6-8 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire resulting in one US KIA
and 12 US WIA. The fire came from a Viet Cong force just across the Kinh Xang Canal from the
companies position. The enemy was engaged by artillery, Air Force air strikes, and helicopter gunships,
which killed 12 Viet Cong.
On 3 April another APC from Company C, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry was damaged by an AT mine.
Again, however, there were no US casualties.
On 8 April the second phase of Operation Makalapa began. Elements of 2nd Brigade established a
brigade command post at Duc Hoa. Shortly there after, units from the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and 2nd
Battalion, 27th Infantry were airlifted into position southwest of th ejunction of the Cau An Ha and Kinh
Xang canals, and began combat sweeps to the southwest along the Zinh Xang Canal until 11 April. Enemy
contact was limited to sporadic sniper fire but literally thousands of bunkers were destroyed. Demolition
teams worked day and night destroying enemy fortifications, and used so much explosive that special
supplies if it had to be helilifted in.
Beginning on 12 April, the 1st battalion, 27th Infantry fiorst engaged an estimated Viet Cong platoon,
and the n a company, just north of Rach Gau. The guerillas were engaged without automatic weapons,
small arms, and artillery. During the fierce firefight 22 Viet cong were killed and four prisoners taken.
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Later in the day, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry uncovered and extensive weapons cache. A total
of 74 weapons were captured, including one 81mm mortar, two 60mm mortars, two 75mm recoilless rifles,
two 57mm recoilless rifles and three light machine guns. The weapons were found in 55-gallon drums and
metal boxes hidden along the banks of a canal in dense brush.
On 18 April 1967, the 1st Brigade terminated its participation in Operation Makalapa, and returned to Cu
Chi Base Camp. The 2nd Brigade continued combat assaults by the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry in the area
until 21 April, at which time Operatation Makalapa was concluded.
Division totals for the 35 day long operation were: the capture of 13 Chicom carbines, three Browning
sug-machine guns, 16 Thompson machine guns, two French rifles, two light machine guns, one Russian
sub-machine gun, one Mauser rifle, one Enfield rifle, 13 M-1 rifles, one Russian carbine, eight Chicom
rifles, 15 M-3 submachine guns, three ANPRC-10 radios, one French light machine gun, two 81mm
mortars, two 57mm recoilless rifles, three 60mm mortars, two 75mm recoilless rifles, one Browning
submachine gun, four shotguns, 50 60mm mortar rounds, two M-60 machinegun tripods, seven viet Cong
gas masks, 151 pounds of documents, 104 pounds of medical supplies, 1.521 hand grenades, 10,854 rounds
of small arms ammunition, 151 claymore mines, eight pounds of Viet cong uniforms, five civilian radios,
100 gallons of gasoline, 50 gallons of diesel fuel, 15 gallons of motor oil, 50 pounds of black powder, 5.5
tons of rice, one outboard motor, and one barber kit.
Material and structures destroyed included 3,131 bunkers, 91 foxholes, three tunnels, 55 sampans, one
boat, 253 booby traps, eight M-79 rounds, two 155mm rounds, 12 75mm rounds, two 105mm rounds, 27
60mm rounds, 70 20mm rounds, 1.323 rounds of small arms ammunition, 10 Claymore mines, 144 hand
grenades, 100 blasting caps, two anti-personnel mines, two anti-tank mines, two 750 pound bombs, 175
pounds of TNT, 200 pounds of sodium nitrate, 511 Viet cong gas masks, three motors and 51 grenade
castings.
Although the total number of Viet Cong killed was only 47, Operation Makalapa was one of the most
successful operations conducted by the division. The destruction of 3,000 bunkers denied the Viet Cong
forces operating in the area all of their effective fighting positions. The advent of the monsoon season in
April made the reconstruction of these positions practically impossible, thus blocking long-established
guerilla routes into the Saigon and Tan Son Nhut area and disrupting Viet Cong plans for attacks on these
objectives. In addition, the destruction and/or capture of large amounts of enemy supplies, weapons, and
ammunition sharply reduced the guerilla’s battle effectiveness in the area.
Operation Manhattan
Operation Manhattan (23 April - 7 June 1967) was a multi- brigade search and destroy operation conducted
to destroy Viet cong forces in the Boi Loi-Ben Cui area. The secondary mission of the operation was to
destroy Viet con facilities and fortifications in the Boi Loi Woods.
Intelligence reports indicated that the area of operation contained numerous important enemy base camps
which were used for logistical and command purposes. There were indications that one complete Viet Cong
battalion and part of another were operating in the area.
The Boi Loi woods was characterized by heavy secondary forest and dense undergrowth. There were
some area of wetland rice paddies and a large area of non-producing rubber plantation.
Operation Manhattan began on 23 April when the 4th Battalion, 23rd (Mech) Infantry moved to secure
Landing Zones (LZ‘s) for the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry. After landing
and securing the areas, the units began conductiong local search and destroy operations. That same day the
1st Battalion (Mech) 5th Infantry secured an LZ for the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry while the 34th ARVN
ranger Battalion established a blocking position along the Saigon River. The 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division conducted search and destroy operations southeast of Dau Tieng.
50
The following day the1st Brigade conducted search and destroy operations in their sector. During the
afternoon Company B, 2nd battalion, 14th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from
an unknown number of Viet cong. The fire was returned with small arms, M-79 grenade launchers and
artillery. The fierce firefight resulted in one Viet Cong killed, and no US casualties. Later in the evening
Company B, 2nd Battalion 14th Infantry came under a mortar attack from an estimated enemy platoon.
They countered with small arms, automatic weapons and artillery. The fight lasted about 10 minutes; and
one US soldier was wounded. The American counterfire blasted the enemy positions, but Viet Cong losses
could not be determined. Late that evening, an ambush patrol from Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry
engaged an unknown number of guerillas. Ina short but heavy firefight, two Viet Cong were killed; there
were no US casualties.
On the afternoon of 26 April, company B, 1st Battalion, (Mech) 5th Infantry engaged and killed a Viet
Cong sniper who had had been harassing their position. Company C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry
conducted two air mobile assaults. Their first landing zone was “cold”, but the second time they sat down
they came under small arms fire from an unknown number of Viet Cong. The Infantrymen returned the fire
with small arms and automatic weapons killing two Viet cong. All during the day, USunits encountered
many booby traps and mines. Though they moved cautiously, one soldier was killed and 12 were wounded
by the booby traps.
Between 27-30 April, all brigades continued to conduct search and destroy operations in their sectors. On
27 April, company A, 2nd battalion 14th Infantry discovered a largeife weapons cache containing 105 rifles
and pistols, 12 machine guns and over 100,000 rounds of ammunition. This cache was located in a complex
with many bunkers and tunnels which was believed to be a base camp and supply point for a Viet Cong
unit that had been reported operating in that area.
On28 April 1967, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry positions received small arms, automatic
weapons and 82mm mortar fire from an unknown size Viet Cong force. Fire was returned with small arms,
automatic weapons and artillery, resulting in one Viet cong being killed. A sweep of the area following the
battle revealed a number of blood trails and bandages, indicating that there were additional enemy
casualties. There were no casualties among US forces. Early the next morning Company B, 4th battalion,
23rd (Mech) was hit by a large Viet Cong force. The enemy employed small arms, mortars, and
rifle grenades in their attack. The infantrymen returned the fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and
artillery. As the battle continued, the guerillas fire on the unit with RPG-2 rocket launchers, but only one
APC was hit. Close support air strikes were called in, after two hours of intense fighting, the Viet Cong
broke contact and withdrew, taking their killed and wounded with them. One US soldier was killed and five
were wounded. The only equipment damage was an APC, which was destroyed. Scattered enemy contact
by 1st and 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry resulted in four Viet Cong
killed and one Viet Cong captured during the period.
During the next five days, all units continued their combat sweeps, with the exception of 4th Battalion,
23rd Infantry who provided security for the engineer jungle clearing operation. On 1 May, Company A, 1st
Battalion, 27th Infantry engaged an estimated Viet Cong platoon with small arms and automatic weapons.
The short firefight resulted in two Viet Cong killed and no US casualties. The same day Company A, 2nd
battalion, 14th Infantry discovered a huge cache containing 35 tons of rice. The rice was evacuated for
distribution to Vietnamese refugees. Troops A and D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry were making
sweeps back and forth across the southern edge of the area of operations to spot and engage any Viet Cong
who might try to flee that way. They mad three contacts with the enemy during the first week of May,
resulting in two Viet Cong killed and five Viet Cong captured. Throughout the Boi Loi Woods, and
especially in the southern sector, a great many booby traps and mines were encountered, resulting in
numerous US casualties.
During the period 6-10 May, all units continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors.
The 2nd battalion, 27th Infantry conducted several combat assaults and the 1st battalion, 25th Infantry
teamed up with the ARVN River Assault along the Saigon River.
51
Starting on 11 May 1967, the main focus of attention was directed at the 65th Engineer Battalion jungle
clearing operation. Thirty “Rome Plows” hacked away at the dense undergrowth and tangle of trees in the
very heart of the Boi Loi Woods. The emphasis of Operation Manhattan now shifted to providing local
security for the engineers through local search and destroy missions and ambush patrols. In addition to the
jungle clearing, the engineers also tackled the task of improving and upgrading the roads throughout the
operational area. This project had a two fold purpose; one , it increased the mobility and cut the reaction
time of the US forces, and two, it would be of long term benefit to the local Vietnamese, who use the roads
to travel throughout the area, and for transporting their products to market.
Between 16 may and 6 June, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry elements continued to provide engineer security
and conduct local search and destroy operations. On 22 May, the battalion began a five day operation in
which they inserted and extracted Popular Forces Reconnaissance units, and in conjunction with them
conducted combined search and destroy operations and night ambush patrols. On 28 May the 4th Battalion,
23rd Infantry relocated with the engineer elements to continue security for base camp, and at 2400 hours,
Operation Manhattan was terminated.
During the 45 day operations, 36 medical civic action programs (MEDCAP’s) were conducted, treating a
total of 5,433 patients. In addition, 20 short term, high-impact civic action projects were completed.
Schools were repaired and refurbished; refugees were given clothing, cooking utensils, and food;
Vietnamese Popular forces outposts were constructed; and large quantities of food-stuffs were distributed
to Regional and Popular Forces families. At the request of ARVN authorities, 82 refugee families were
relocated to Dau Tieng and furnished clothing, shelter, cooking and eating utensils, and commodity
support. All civic action, even though initially undertaken to gain population acceptance of US presence,
supported the Revolutionary Development Program. A total of 20 miles of road was upgraded by engineers,
giving area residents full access to population centers and market outlets. Large areas of jungle were
cleared providing local inhabitants with 4,200 acres of additional farm land.
In psychological operations, 3,545,500 copies of 43 different types of leaflets were airdropped.
Loudspeaker Chieu Hoi broadcasts totaled 1,725 minutes.
There were 74 Viet cong killed, 19 captured, and three Hoi Chanhs rallied to the GVN; 201 small arms
weapons, 18 machine guns, 42 rounds of artillery ammunitions, 671 mortar rounds, 293 mines, 901
grenades and booby traps, 400,543 rounds of small arms ammunition, 168 cluster bomb units, 3,200
blasting caps, 2,300 feet of detonating cord, 1,800 pounds of TNT, and 2,278 pounds of black powder were
captured. In addition, US forces confiscated 34 sampans, 400 pounds of clothing, 443 pounds of medical
supplies, 250 tons of rice, 5.5 tons of assorted food stuffs, 398 pounds of documents, 12,760 feet of
communication wire, 30 pounds of punji stakes, 17 pounds of tools, one telephone, seven protective masks,
two plows, 108 bicycles, one oxcart, six generators and six outboard motors. There were 461 huts, 1,594
yards of tunnels, 1,163 bunkers, 421 foxholes, 5,635 yards of fighting trench, seven base camps, one radio,
one bicycle repair shop and two small hospitals destroyed.
Operation Manhattan inflicted severe logistical loses interview Cong/NVA forces in terms of food,
supplies, ammunition, and weapons captured or destroyed. The large number of base camps, bunkers, and
tunnels destroyed also constituted a major setback to enemy forces. The clearing of extensive areas of
jungle denied the Viet Cong a safe haven, and seriously reduced the enemies’ capability to conduct
offensive or harassing operations in and around the Boi Loi Woods sector.
Operation Barking Sands
When the Tropic Lightning Division’s 27th year began, anniversary celebrations had to take a back seat to
the business of war. The 25th division pressed four operations simultaneously as its birthday passed.
Each of the operations, Barking Sands, Kolekole, Diamondhead, and Atlanta, increased the pressure on
Charlie and added luster to the arms of the division.
52
Reaching furthest back into the old year was Operation Barking Sands. Begun on 18 May 1967, it proved
to be a highly successful test of airlifting batteries of light artillery to exploit intelligence targets. Operation
Barking Sands included four sub-operations one of which was Kunia, began and ended during the divisions
27th year.
Operation Kunia was the phase of Operation Barking Sands assigned to deal with long-time Communist
sanctuaries in the Ho Bo Woods and destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in the area.
Beginning the operation the4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Manchus and the 2nd battalion, 14th Infantry
Golden Dragons swept through the dense woods without making much contact. Meanwhile Rome plows
from the 27th land Clearing Team, secured by the 4th Battalion (Mech), 23rd Infantry Tomahawks, downed
more than 90 percent of the13,000 acre Viet Cong jungle sanctuary in 56 days.
Helicopters finished off the secondary growth with defoliating chemical spray. (See operation Ranch
Hand)
Extensively booby-trapped, the area was a honey-combed with trenches, bunkers and tunnels. One multilevel underground complex covered 2,000 meters and yielded cameras, film, printing presses and type in
addition to the usual caches of weapons and ammunition.
When the final score was in on Operations barking Sands to include Kunia, 480 enemy were known dead
and 463 individuals weapons and 29 crew-served weapons captured. Food caches had yielded 196 tons of
rice.
Operation KoleKole
One of the more important functions of Operation Kilokole was to help sedcure polling places during the
South Vietnamese general elections. Kolekole was the longest running, most significant operation
undertaken by a single Tropic Lightning brigade during the year.
Behind the shield provided by the 2nd Brigade soldiers conducting Operation Kolekole, civic actions
projects were pushed forward with greater energy and results than previously possible. And, in the final
accounting by war, the brigades soldiers killed 797 Viet Cong and took 150 prisoners.
Most of the operation took place during the rainy season, adding to the difficulties but not subtracting
from the effectiveness of the brigade.
Beginning in May 1967, south of the Vam Co Dong river in Long An Province, Operation Kolekole
expanded into Tay Ninh Province with fighting along the Cambodian border before it ended in December.
The pattern for firefight with the enemy was established 16 May when the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
Wolfhounds made eagle flights to assist a CIDG unit in contact with a Viet Cong company. The
Wolfhounds handled the enemy roughly killing 14.
The next day the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Wolfhounds went one up on their brother outfit when they
killed 15 members of a Viet Cong company and captured five weapons during the assault. Throughout the
operation, Charlie preferred to run rather than fight, and he was never contacted in groups larger than
company size.
In the area of civic actions no less than 10 projects were completed with the 2nd Brigade’s help during
Kolekole. Among them were: improving the appearance and sanitary conditions of the Hoc Mon maternity
ward, renovation of two buildings to the Bao Trai hospital and aiding in the construction of the Bao Trai
High School dedicated 16 December 1967.
Toward the end of the operation, the First Wolfhounds were protecting polling places by keeping Charlie
busy outside of town with a series of combat assaults. Eight miles south of Tay Ninh they had a chance to
53
show their spirit. Following an exchange of gunfire, 17 wolfhounds chased 15 Viet Cong 400 meters and
killed them all. Wolfhound casualties were only two wounded.
The First Wolfhound’s commander seized a chance to cut off a Viet Cong platoon of 20 as it tried to
reach the Cambodian border. With two Alpha Company platoons converging on the enemy, LTC David R.
Hughes and his staff debarked from the helicopter to personally direct the assault.
One captain was dispatched to make sure an incoming platoon got started in the right direction, and then
the colonel, his S-3, an artillery observer, and a PIO camera man left their chopper and set out on foot after
Charlie.
The Viet Cong tried to scatter; five escaped the main assault, but another platoon accounted for them.
During Operation Kolekole 34 Hoi Chanhs rallied and more than 50,000 rounds of small arms
ammunition were captured. Other indications of success were the capture of 202 tons of rice and the
destruction of 577 tunnels.
Operation Diamondhead
Operation Diamondhead was mounted by the 3rd Brigade as part of the Tropic Lightning’s 1967 monsoon
campaign from 14 May to 7 December. Contact during this period was minimal, but the pressure of
Diamondhead kept the enemy off balance, forced him to disperse still further and prevented him from
taking large scale offensive action.
From May through September the brigade carried out security and reinforcement missions in the Tay
Ninh area, once combining with eight companies of Vietnamese Popular and regional forces for search and
destroy missions west of the Vam co dong river.
Sniper and booby-trap incidents, which had increased during Vietnam’s elections, tapered off during the
last 38 days of the operation. Largest single incident in this period occurred when an ambush patrol from
the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regulars killed eight Viet Cong on 24 November.
As a security measure, villages in and around the Michelin rubber Plantation were cordoned off and
searched several times. Several families were moved to areas of greater security in order to cut off Viet
Cong who may have pressured them for supplies.
During Operation Diamondhead, the enemy lost 269 killed and 33 captured. Allied forces also captured
34,000 pounds of rice, 1,500 pounds of salt, 10 AK-47s, 32 pounds of documents, and a small ford tractor
that the Viet Cong had diverted from its task of nation bu8lding.
Destroyed during the operation were 30,000 pounds of rice, 1,900 bunkers and 929 meters of trench.
Operation Atlanta
From 18 November to 23 December 1967, the division mounted Operation Atlanta. Atlanta’s primary
objective was to uproot the enemy in the Iron Triangle and deny him sanctuary.
This turned into a major project for the 65th Engineer Battalion who rafted vehicles into and out of
action, and, after some experimentation, destroyed nearly two miles of enemy tunnels.
Atlanta proved as expensive for the Viet Cong as it was rewarding for Tropic Lightning. A body count of
1,467 was amassed during the operation, but no big firefights took place; 123 enemy small arms were
captured and more than 350,000 pounds of rice were taken.
54
Enemy cleverness in the construction and concealment of tunnels proved to be a step or so behind the
ability of the engineers who destroyed the subterranean refuges.
Some were demolished by cratering charges placed every 40 meters, and when this method, though
effective, proved burdensome, it was decided to try flooding the tunnels in hopes they would collapse.
First jungle had to be cleared from the water source to the mouth of the tunnel to be flooded. When a
shortage of pipe developed, the engineers simply ditched the water source closer to the tunnel. Flooding
however, did not completely destroy the tunnels and the engineers floated explosive charges into the
passage to finish it off.
The final incident of Atlanta was also an engineering feat. A tank boarding a raft was damaged by a mine
and went down like a U-boat. The engineers waited until low tide, pulled it out, and wrote finis to Atlanta.
Operation Saratoga
Underway nearly two months before the Tet Offensive, Operation Saratoga increased pressure on the
enemy and then foiled his plan to isolate and interdict Saigon. One of the widest ranging operations yet
undertaken, Saratoga saw Tropic Lightning soldiers engaged from the Cambodian border to Saigon itself.
In Tay Ninh and Binh Duang provinces stood the 1st Brigade. Their Participation lasted from 25
February to 24 March. In spite of alert and aggressive combat sweeps, the brigade made little contact.
Charlie’s battle plans had drawn him to the south where Saigon loomed like a glittering prize. By 24
March, the body count for the 1st Brigade was 58. Three enemy soldiers had been captured.
Posted in the Hoc Mon area to dispute Viet Cong passage and to keep the way open for civilians and
Free Worlds Forces, the 3rd Brigade found far more enemy to deal with than had the 1st Brigade.
Action flared up early during the afternoon of 9 February 1968, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry
Wolfhounds were attacked by and estimated battalion of Viet Cong. The firefight claimed 102 enemy lives.
At about the same time the next day a task force composed of two companies of the 1st Battalion, 27th
Infantry Wolfhounds and a company from the 3rd Squadron 4th Cavalry came under fire form a Viet Cong
force of undermined size. The force was large enough, however, to leave 105 bodies in front of the task
force’s guns. It complemented their effort of the previous morning when the task force killed 176 Viet
Cong.
After 3rd brigade dominance of the area had been proved again, action tapered off too harassing fire and
skirmishing. Nonetheless, the 3rd Brigade killed 768 before the enemy fled altogether.
Even before Tet began, the 2nd Brigade seemed to be the eye of the storm for Operation Saratoga. The
first significant contact of the operations was also the first contact against North Vietnamese soldiers in
Hau Nghai Province. The 101st NVA regiment launched a night attack on the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
Wolfhounds. In this encounter 39 North Vietnamese were killed and the remainder of their force withdrew
into the HoBo Woods.
The Second Wolfhounds next ran the NVA force aground on 21 December when one of their base camps
was discovered. In a daylong action the Wolfhounds killed 43 but found the NVA somewhat tougher
customers than their Viet Cong counterparts.
Tougher or not, the First and Second Wolfhounds found more NVA members of the 2nd Go Mon
battalion, in base camps on the western bank of the Saigon River near Trung An and killed 89.
On 10 January 1968 the 7th Cu Chi Battalion, then nearly half NVA, launched a human wave assault on
the night position of the First Wolfhounds. It cost them 108 dead.
55
In the middle of January, the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Tomahawks came upon an unknown number of
entrenched Viet Cong in the lower Ho Bo Woods. In a two day operation 49 Viet Cong were killed.
Then came Tet. In the first major action of the Tet Offensive for the 25th Division troops, 3rd Squadron,
4th Cavalry, sent its columns steaming down Highway 1 toward the heavily besieged Tan Son Nhut Air
Base. In brutal fighting the cavalrymen, aided by air strikes and artillery, pried the enemy away from the
vital base. More than 300 enemy bodies were counted.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Brigade was drawn into the cauldron of fire near Hoc Mon as the enemy approached
Saigon. There the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry White Warriors killed 22 Viet Cong in a short, sharp fight.
The same day the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry killed 30 enemies near Ap Cho. The Third Regulars also
figured in a 10-day battle to prevent Charlie from cutting Highway 1. The Regulars won and Charlie lost,
among other things, 219 of his best fighters.
Contact continued almost daily with well armed and disciplined Viet Cong and NVA soldiers. But when
the operation ended, Tropic Lightning soldiers had claimed more than 3,000 enemy soldiers.
In the course of Operation Saratoga, Tropic Lightning also captured a quarter of a million rounds of
small arms ammunition, identified huge enemy tunnel complexes and generally destroyed much of the
enemy’s combat effectiveness.
A new enemy, the NVA, had appeared on the scene, but the courage and the professional skills of the
Tropic Lightning soldiers had again won the day.
As you can tell, I am a big supporter of Ron Leonard. His thoroughness, attention to detail, and initiative
have provided a lot of historical fact to many of our worn out memories. My first tour in Vietnam, 67-68
was in the 3d Bde 101st, specifically, Charlie Battery 2/319 FA. Ron found a history of an event I
56
participated in, and retyped it so it is readable. It brings back some good memories and helps keep the war
stories accurate. Gary Roush, flying in the 242d ASHC was my batteries lifeline to ammuntion, food,
water and mail. I very distinctly recall seeing the kicking mule on the front of the Muleskinner Chinooks
for this mission. I hope by including this piece others will realize their flying in Vietnam was part of a
overall grand scheme and not the only scheme.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCDA-CO
SUBJECT:
15 August 1968
Operational Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending 31 Jul 68.
(RCS CSFOR – 65) (R1)
SEE DISTRIBUTION:
1.
Operations: Significant Activities.
Operation TOAN THANG continued from last quarter. The forces deployed to the Capital
Military District were successful in spoiling an all out May Day attack on Saigon. Approximately
two enemy battalions, unable to consummate their attack on the capital, were trapped in the
swamps to the southwest of Highway 1 near Duc Hoa. During the period 3 – 5 May over 10,000
rounds of artillery were poured into the area inflicting heavy casualties on the combined VC/NVA
forces.
During the early morning of 9 May, Fire Support Base (FSPB) Maury, vic XT6502, occupied by
elements of 7/11 and 3/13 Arty, repulsed a strong ground attack. (See Encl 1)
On 14 May, one medium battery was deployed to FSPB Patton (XT5921) and on 15 May, two
light batteries were moved to FSPB Pope (XT5430). These moves were made to provide support
for TF Daems in operations in the vicinity of the Mushroom.
The threat of a 1 June attack on Saigon began another concentration of artillery around the city.
On 22 May, Btry C, 2/40 Arty came under OPCON of 25th Div Arty at FSPB Bishop vic XT7590,
and the following day, A, 7/11 Arty was moved to the same location from Cu Chi. Two days
later, on 25 May ’68, B, 1/27, which had just become OPCON 25th Div Arty, closed into position
at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The same afternoon, the Div Arty Headquarters Forward CP moved
into Tan Son Nhut. The concentration was completed the following day when C, 6/77 moved into
FSPB Harrison and Hq and A, 6/77 became operational at Tan Son Nhut AB. All were
redeployed from the vic of the Mushroom where the 6/77 had been supporting TF Daems.
Between 25 and 28 May the decision was made to return the Div Arty Headquarters to Cu Chi
Base Camp where established communication facilities provided better control of the situation.
This was accomplished on 29 May.
While the defense of Saigon was the center of attention and the main reason for the artillery
moves, the routine missions of supporting the maneuver elements as they ferreted out the enemy
continued. The 1/8 Arty was in direct support of the Division’s 2nd Bde and 6/77 was direct
support to the 3rd Bde /TF Daems. The 2/77, 3/13 and various attached units performed
Reinforcing and General Support roles.
(p3)
Operation TOAN THANG (Complete Victory) Phase I ended 31 May and Phase II began 1 June,.
On 1 June Task Force Daems, support by B&C, 6/77 and B, 1/27 moved against the enemy west
of Saigon along the Oriental River, but the following day the operation was canceled and by 3
June, the artillery had returned to positions on the western edge of the Capital.
57
During the first half of June there were few significant moves or operations other than a
concentrated effort on the Saigon / Tan Son Nhut Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attack
(DARMA). This consisted of firing on known and suspected enemy launching positions to spoil
possible attacks by fire, and as quick reaction counter battery fire. This mission was assumed by
the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) on 5 Jul ’68.
On 14 June, 2/77 replaced 6/77 as Direct Support to the 3rd Bde. The 6/77 became General
Support Reinforcing for the Division. On 8 June the 6/77 was assigned to the 23rd Artillery Group
and attached to 25th Div Arty. In mid July, the 6/77 was relieved from its attached status and
redeployed to the Delta, IV Corps Area, under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division.
To support the 3rd Bde, 101st Air Cav Div in operations near the Sugar Mill, XT4405, B, 2/77 and
A, 2/319 moved into Fire Support Base Jackson vic XT4216 on 19 June. The following day C,
2/319 relieved B, 2/77 at Jackson and B, 2/77 returned to FSPB Stuard Vic XT4819. The 2/319
Artillery Battalion is organic to the 3rd Bde, 101st Air Cav. On 25 June, the 2/319 moved to Dau
Tieng. The next day, C, 2/319 and C, 2/77 occupied FSPB Kearny vic XT5152 to support 3/101
Air Cav reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations in the Michelin Plantation. The following day,
the 2/319 was again on the move as A and C batteries moved from Kearny to FSPB Patton vic
XT5921. The first month of Phase II Operation COMPLETE VICTORY closed on a note of
watchful waiting in expectation of a renewed enemy offensive early in July.
In the early morning hours of 4 July, the enemy launched a heavy attack by fire (rocket / mortar,
RPGs and small arms) and a moderate ground attack against the Dau Tieng Base Camp. Artillery
elements defending the western perimeter repulsed the attackers after they had reached the main
bunker line. Four artillery men were killed and eight wounded in the fighting. Follow-up
operations in the vicinity of Dau Tieng and the redeployment of the 3rd Bde, with 2/77 attached, to
OPCON Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) caused a large number of artillery
moves between 4 – 6 July.
(P4)
B, 2/77 replaced A, 7/11 at FSPB Danford vic XS7798 on 4 July and on 6 July, C. 2/77 also
moved into Danford as the 2/77 came under CMAC control 5 July. A, 7/11 was shifted from Cu
Chi to FSPB Hull vic XT2638 on 6 July. The following day, C, 6/77 displaced from Cu Chi to
Dau Tieng and on 8 July A, 7/11 moved into Tay Ninh from Hull. B, 7/11 moved from Hull to
Schofield II vic XT3942 on 6 July where is supported reconnaissance in force operations by 4-23
Ing (Mech) south and west of Dau Tieng until 13 July when the battery moved into Tay Ninh.
Also on 6 July, C, 7/11 moved from Dau Tieng to FSPB Kearny vic XT5152; the battery returned
to Dau Tieng ;on 8 July. By 13 July action around Dau Tieng had subsided and operations
centered in the Trung Lap, Trang Bang, Go Dau Ha area until late in the month when intelligence
disclosed a major threat to Tay Ninh.
On 16 July A, 7/11 moved from FSPB Thomas III vic XT4052 to Dau Tieng and C, 7/11 moved
from Dau Tieng to FSPB Wood vic XT4434. These moves were made to maintain support for the
fast moving 4-23 Inf (Mech) as the Mohawks shifted their RIF operations from the Crescent area
to the Bo Loi Woods.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Bde, 101st Air Cav supported by its 2/319 Arty Bn at FSPB Houston vic
XT4307, had conducted a three day operation in the vic of the Sugar Mill. The 2/319 returned to
Patton on the 14th.
On 15 July the 6/77 Arty began departing the 25th Div Arty Tactical Area of Interest by convoy to
the New Port Docks, Saigon, for redeployment to the Delta. The departure of 6/77 and the CMAC
OPCON of 2/77 Arty left the 25th Div Arty critically short of light batteries for direct support
missions. The 23rd Arty Group provided partial relief when A, 213 arrived in Cu Chi 11 July to
assume a General Support Reinforcing role.
There were no major artillery actions until 21 July when A, 3/13 (the Clan) moved from Stuart to
Hampton vic XT4420 and C, 7/11 shifted to Hull vic XT2638 from Wood to provide support for
58
the initial Cu Chi to Tay Ninh night convoy. The following day C, 7/11 joined the Clan’s battery
at FSPB Hampton. The next two days, 22 – 23 July, these batteries provided support for 4-23 Inf
(Mech) as it destroyed a regimental size VC base camp, killing 14 enemy, 3 kilometers north of
Go Dau Ha.
(p5)
24 July was a day of redeployment as the 2/319 rotated its B Btry from the Screaming Eagles Base
Camp at Phuoc Vinh to FSPB Patton to relieve C Btry which returned to Phuoc Vinh. The most
significant moves were the result of an enemy threat in the Tay Ninh area. A, 3/13 and C, 7/11
convoyed from Hampton to Tay Ninh.
On 26 July the 25th Division / CMAC boundary became the Hoc Mon canal from the Saigon River
to the Pineapple area vic XS6086. As a result, the 2nd Bde elements and B, 1/8 at FSPB Pulaske II
vic XT8005 were in the CMAC TAOR and were moved north to Crockett II vic XT7416 in the
reduced 2nd Bde area of operations.
(p5)
The reinforcement of Tay Ninh continued on 27 July with A, 2/13 moving there from Cu Chi. At
Tay Ninh, the maneuver elements moved out from the base camp to hit the enemy before he could
take the initiative. To support the 3-22 Inf, B 7/11 Arty moved to FSPB Buell vic XT2153 and to
support 4-23, C, 7/11 occupied FSPB Rawlins III vic XT2848.
Meanwhile, the 101st Air Cav 3rd Bde conducted combat assault operations north of the Sugar Mill
supported by the 2/319 Arty. The artillery moved into FSPB Jackson II vic XT4519 from Patton
on 30 – 31 July
The quarter closed with the spot light on Tay Ninh and the threatened enemy 3rd Phase offensive
still only a threat. During the quarter, Div Arty units made 133 moves, some by air, but most by
convoy. A total of 256,006 rounds (193,100 – 105mm; 52,575 – 155mm; 10,381 – 8”) were
fired as Div Arty carried out its mission of providing artillery support to the maneuver elements of
the Trofpic Lightning Division.
(p6)
2. Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
a.
Personnel
(1) Casualty reports
(a) Observation: Timely and accurate casualty reports from forward observer parties are
difficult to obtain.
(b) Evaluation: Frequent, prolonged separation of forward observer parties from their
parent units and limited or non-existent communi8cations with the parent unit make these reports difficult
to obtain.
(c ) Recommendation: Require the supported unit to identify and report artillery casualties
through artillery channels.
(2) Pay for artillery liaison and forward; observer personnel.
(a) Observation: Due to the nature of artillery liaison and forward observer personnel
duties, they are usually far from their parent unit on pay day.
(b) Evaluation: This creates a need for additional transportation for pay officers to pay these
personnel. It also causes poor pay service to these personnel. The supported units are interested in the
welfare of these personnel and are willing to help relieve the problem.
59
(c) Recommendation: It has proven satisfactory to place liaison and forward observer
personnel on the pay roll of the supported unit. This requires additional checking to keep up with personnel
changes, but results in better pay service and reduced transportation requirements.
b. Operations:
(p7)
(1) Radio traffic on fire direction (FD) nets
(a) Observation: Personnel other than liaison officer (LNO / forward observer (FO), firing
battery fire direction center (FDC) and controlling battalion FDC are using FD nets. This is most prevalent
when a unit comes in contact.
(b) Evaluation: At times it becomes impossible for LNOs/FOs and FDCs to communicate
with each other because of other traffic on their FD net.
(c ) Recommendation Personnel other than the LNO/FOs who have traffic for the FDCs
should use their command or other frequency. Personnel or units having only one radio can switch to
another frequency. This leaves the FD net free of all traffic except fire direction for which it was set aside.
(2) Protection of medium and heavy artillery
(a) Observation: Medium and heavy artillery with their larger silhouette are very vulnerable
to enemy direct fire weapons.
(p7)
(b) Evaluation: Protection can be provided by constructing shields of earth using a
bulldozer and chain link fence. The chain link fence detonates enemy projectiles before they strike the hull
of the weapon.
(c ) Recommendation: Erect these shields on the side(s) of the weapon nearest the perimeter
or most likely avenue of approach.
(3) Secondary explosions in M109 Howitzers
(a) Observation: Secondary explosions of ammunition stored in the interior ready racks of
M109 Howitzers are more hazardous to howitzer sections than the effects of enemy fires alone.
(b) Evaluation: Direct fire shields (see (2) above) should be erected when possible. The
M109 can take a direct hit and remain operational if there are no secondary explosions. When the
possibility of a direct fire attack exists, the battery commander may decide to follow the recommendation
below.
(c) Recommendation: When the situation warrants, ammunition in the interior ready racks
may be removed to preclude secondary explosions should the howitzer receive a direct hit.
(4) Location of medium and heavy artillery in fire support bases.
(a) Observation: Occasionally medium and heavy artillery are placed on the perimeter of a
FSPB.
(b) Evaluation: Medium and heavy artillery are improperly used when placed in a position
on a FSPB perimeter since these weapons are intended for long range heavy fire. The high explosive
ammunition employed is not as effective as the Beehive ammunition used by the light artillery in perimeter
defense. The large silhouette causes medium and heavy artillery to be an almost certain loss on the
perimeter.
(c) Reccommendation: Medium and heavy artillery are best employed in a central location
in the fire support base with the crew compartment open to the interior of the position for ease of
movement during an attack.
60
(5) Construction of perimeter defense barrier:
(a) Observation: Some perimeter defensive bunkers do not have sufficient gun ports to the
flanks.
(p8)
(b) Evaluation: The lack of flank gun ports does not permit close-in interlocking fires. It
also prevents fire along the perimeter line in the event the perimeter is broken.
(c ) Recommendation: Perimeter bunkers should be constructed with gun ports on the flanks.
c. Training Battery training programs.
(p8)
(a) Observation: The continually changing tactical situation and the very frequent
detachment of batteries from their parent unit make a battalion training schedule impractical.
(b) Evaluation: The battery commander can best adjust training requirements, available time
and facilities to the situation. The battery commander is the individual responsible for the performance of
his unit and for making or recommending promotions; therefore, he is most concerned with the training
achievement of his unit. A very flexible training program is necessary in a fast changing tactical situation.
(c) Recommendation: Establish battalion training programs which give the battery
commanders wide latitude, authority, and responsibility for planning, conducting and supervising training
in their batteries.
d. Intelligence:
None
e. Logistics:
(1) Class V transportation;
(a) Observation: It is often impossible for a battery to move a minimal basic load of 1000
HE. 90 BH, 60WP, 60HC, 120 III, small arms ammo, and fuses without seriously overloading its organic
vehicles.
(b) Evaluation: In order to provide the fire support required, the battery must be adequately
stocked with Class V. The battery also has to be ready to move at a moment’s notice. With the bunker
material and PSP required to build up a position area (as must be done at most fire support bases, each time
they are occupied), it is impossible for the battery to move its basic load. In some cases, overloading of 2
½ ton trucks has resulted in dead-lining practically every 2 ½ ton truck in a battery. The replacement of
organic 2 ½ ton trucks with 5 ton trucks would allow sufficient class V to be moved to support the
maneuver elements and prevent overloading of vehicles.
(c) Recommendation: Organic 2 ½ ton trucks should be replaced by 5 ton trucks.
(2) Insect control in forward areas.
(a) Observation: It was noted that aerosol type insecticides in open areas and ventilated
bunkers are at best moderately effective for a very short period.
(b) Evaluation: A #10 can filled ¾ full with a mixture of diesel fuel and liquid insecticide,
when placed upwind of the battery area and ignited, results in smoke being carried across the battery area
ridding it of mosquitoes, flies, etc. The smoke is not hazardous to the health of the troops and it does not
interfere with their duties.
(p9)
61
(c) Recommendation: Use of this field expedient method of insect control should be
encouraged.
f. Organization:
None
g. Other: None
(p10)
GORDON SUMNER Jr.
Col, Arty.
Commanding
3. Incl:
1. A comparison of the lessons learned in
one battle and their successful application
in a second.
2. Organizational Structure of the 25th Inf Div Arty.
3. Radar Training
AVDCMH
SUBJECT:
(p10)
(15 Aug 68) 1st Ind.
Operational Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending 31 Jul 68,
RCS CSFOR – 65 (R1)
DA, HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION , APO 96225, 25 August 1968
TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96226
Forwarded with concurrence.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
W.F. FAUGHT
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
(p11)
B
BATTLE OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE MAURY I, AND FIRE SUPPORT BASE PIKE VI
(A comparison of the lessons learned in one battle and their successful application in a second).
During the period 9 – 12 May 1968, two fire support bases of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery came
under intense enemy attack. The two attacks followed classic VC tactics and accordingly were almost
identical in nature. The defense of both bases by US troops was also successful in each case, but lessons
learned from the first defense, applied to the defense of the second fire support base resulted in far less
destruction of friendly equipment and fewer friendly casualties.
The fire support base designated as Maury I was composed of two 105mm towed howitzer batteries, B
Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery and C Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery and one 155mm SP howitzer
battery, A 3/13. The battalion fire direction center of the 7/11 Arty was controlling fires in the base, and
attached to it were two 40mm “dusters” from the 5/2 Arty. Although Maury I was located in what was
probably the best available area in its immediate vicinity, the terrain was far from ideal. Hedgerows,
bamboo thickets and woodlines surrounded the clear area, and adding to the difficulty of prepar9ing the
position was the advent of the monsoon season, making digging underground bunkers difficult.
62
At 0100 hours on 9 May 1968, Captain Kendall Jowers, battery commander of C, 7/11 Arty was finally
preparing to take some much needed rest. He knew it would be short, for he had left word to be awakened
when the guard in the exec post changed at 0200 hours. Shortly prior to 0200 hours, Captain Jowers was
shaken awake by his radio operator and staggered over to the exec post bunker just in time to glance at his
watch, verify the 0200 hours switch-over, and listen to the first mortar round explode outside the doorway.
While Captain Jowers and his men were pinned down by the intense mortar and RPC barrage, the enemy
was beginning its ground assault. After launching two diversionary attacks against the northwestern and
southwestern corners of the fire support base, the main attack was directed against the western point of the
triangle where the 155mm battery nestled less than 200 meters from a treeline.
By 0330 hours 1st Lt Robert McLaughlin, the fire direction officer of C, 7/11 Arty, was frantically moving
two 105mm howitzers to the southwestern side of the perimeter, hoping to relieve some of the pressure
against the 155mm battery with the 105mm beehive round. But as this move was being executed, the RPC
fire was having a devastating effect on the 155mm howitzers. Only one M109 was still serviceable, and
out of the other five, three had been completely destroyed.
Captain Luis Ortiz, the battery commander of the medium battery, was on his second trip to the battalion
fire direction center when he noticed one of the M548 ammunition tracks burning. Oddly enough though,
the M548 which had been adjacent to the burning track was missing, and not until daylight would Captain
Ortiz learn that the missing track was spread over the entire position in minute particles.
(p15)
The flare and gunships arrived by 0330 hours, the Air Force fighter aircraft by 0500 hours. At 0530 hours
the relief elements of LTC A.S. Fullerton’s 4th Battalion, 23rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion, which had
been racing to Maury from their night position since news of the attack had been broadcast, finally battered
their way into the beleaguered base, and the din of battle sputtered to a halt. As the dazed defenders of
Maury I picked their way through the expended canisters, wounded comrades awaiting evacuation and
widespread debris, the initial accounting of men and ammunition was begun.
All beehive ammunition had been expended, but due to the speed and accuracy of the assault against the
medium battery, less than 10 rounds of 155mm had been fired prior to the destruction of the howitzers.
The Dusters had done well. From protected berm positions, the two M-42’s had expended a total of 1100
40mm rounds, resulting in at least two secondary explosions, despite the RPC wounds received by four
crewmen.
Only 18 confirmed Viet Cong killed could be determined, and friendly losses numbered 10 killed and 66
wounded, of which 4 men later died of wounds received in the battle. These four men, along with seven
others killed and thirty-nine wounded, were all artillerymen. Of the five M109’s destroyed, one serviceable
howitzer was pieced together from two damaged howitzers. Two M548s were destroyed, and one five ton
truck was severely damaged. Also, fourteen M-16 rifles were either lost or destroyed, and a few gas tanks
ruptured.
As the analysis of the battle continued, a few lessons began to emerge which it was believed, if employed
in a similar situation, might reduce a few of the quoted statistics and increase enemy casualties. Inadequate
attention to artillery ammunition storage caused any casualties. No bulldozer had been available to
construct berms around the howitzers, and ammunition was protected on the sides only. Rather than being
on the point of a triangle, the medium battery should have been more centrally located within the perimeter
and away from a treeline. And finally, although the 105mm batteries expended their entire stock of
beehive, its effect was reduced by poor fields of fire. The start of a battle is no time to move towed
howitzers. Positions should have been chosen early in the occupation of the fire support base which would
have allowed maximum use of the beehive rounds.
On 11 May 1968, with the benefit of the lessons learned above, LTC Homer W. Kiefer, Jr., battalion
commander of the 23rd Battalion, 13th Artillery moved two batteries of 105mm towed howitzers, B Battery,
6th Battalion, 77th Artillery and A Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Artillery, and one battery of 155mm SP
howitzers, C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery, into fire support base Pike VI. The batteries closed into
63
the fire support base early in the afternoon and a bulldozer began constructing berms for the 155mm
howitzers immediately. By nightfall, only the turrets of the howitzers were exposed. The 105mm batteries
had been carefully positioned for maximum use of beehive and two howitzers, one from each light battery,
had been placed at strategic spots on the perimeter some distance from the rest of the battery positions.
While the terrain was much the same as that of Maury I, the nearby woodlines had been taken into careful
account by the positioning of the two attached Dusters, and by the excellent fields of fire enjoyed by the
light batteries. The medium battery was positioned between the two light batteries, enabling it to support
equally well all around the outside of the perimeter.
(p16)
At 0130 hours, on 12 May 1968, the searchlight crew at Pike VI had just finished sweeping across the
southern end of the perimeter, having noticed no movement, and was working its way back. Its sweep was
interrupted by approximately 400 mortar rounds, all falling in the space of 30 – 60 minutes. The battle of
Pike VI had begun. Once again, the enemy launched an attack to draw attention to the south, and the
Duster positioned on the extreme southern tip of the base had already begun firing its M60 machine gun at
about 60 – 70- VC crawling through the field 100 meters to its front. The twin 40mm Duster itself
managed only 12 rounds before an RPG fired from a range of only 50 meters, hit the turret below the right
gun and disabled both guns. Leaving 16 NVA bodies around the empty machine gun, the Duster crew fell
back on the 105mm howitzer to its rear just at the same time LTC Kiefer and three men arrived at the
Duster to kill the remaining four enemy in the vicinity with small arms. As te small arms fire became
ineffective against the withdrawing enemy, LTC Kiefer and his men joined the 105mm howitzer crew in
chasing the retreat with a few well placed beehive..
Meanwhile, LTC Kiefer’s S-3, Major Ernest Young, was busily calling in the 155mm howitzer support
from two additional batteries, B Battery, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery located at Hoc Mon and C Battery, 2nd
Battalion, 35th Artillery near Saigon, both within easy range of Pike VI. As the main attack was being
launched from the west, the 105mm battery covering the entire sector fired round after round of previously
prepared beehive and time rounds all with a very short fuse into the attacking enemy. The defense was
entirely successful. The attack ended 1 ½ hours after it began, and while only 30 – 40 enemy bodies were
found in the area immediately surrounding the fire support base, by nightfall mopping-up operations had
produced 110 body count. The artillery had lost only one killed and five wounded, while the total losses at
the Pike VI base ran five killed and thirty wounded. Equipment losses were limited to one damaged
Duster, easily repaired, and minor damage to two other vehicles
Analysis in retrospect might point out that the application of the lessons learned at Maury I to Pike VI was
no more than the application of basic artillery fundamentals in a counter-insurgency environment, and this
is probably true. But until fundamentals are employed so often and so meticulously that they become
second nature, the possibility always exists that something basic will slip by the wayside. Following is a
list of those men interviewed for the account of the two battles. All were decorated on the battleground
with the Silver Star for their gallantry, and without the aggressive leadership shown ;by each, the story of
success at Maury I and Pike VI might well have been written by the enemy..
(p17)
Encl 2 to Operational Report -- 25th Inf Div Arty-------31 Jul 68. RCS CSFOR (R1)
Organizational Structure of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery
1.
Organic and assigned units
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
2.
1st Battalion 8th Artillery
2nd Battalion 77th Artillery
3rd Battalion 13th Artillery
7th Battalion 11th Artillery
6th Battalion 77th Artillery (assigned until 8 June 1968)
Attached Units
64
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
B Battery 2nd Battalion 35th Artillery (released 1 May 1968)
A Battery 1st Battalion 27th Artillery (released 9 May 1968)
B Battery 1st Battalion 27th Artillery (24 May – 22 June 1968)
6th Battalion 77th Artillery (8 June – 13 June 1968)
A & B Battery 6th Battalion 77th Artillery (8 June – 15 July 1968)
C Battery 6th Battalion 77th Artillery (8 June - 23 June 1968)
A Battery 5th Battalion 42nd Artillery (21 June – 23 June 1968)
3.
Units under operational control of Division Artillery:
2nd Battalion 40th Artillery (22 May – 3 June 1968)
4.
General Support and General Support Reinforcing Units:
a.
b.
c.
d
1st Battalion 27th Artillery (1 May – 31 July 1968)
2nd Battalion 32nd Artillery (1 May – 31 July 1968)
B Battery (Automatic Weapons) 2nd Battalion 5th Artillery (1 May – 31 July 1968)
A Battery 2nd Battalion 13th Artillery (11 July – 31 July 1968)
(p20)
Incl 3 to Operational Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for period ending 3331 July 68
RCS CSFOR – 65 (R1)
Radar Training
Due to the effectiveness of the enemy’s rocket attacks against Cu Chi Base Camp, a thorough
radar training program was conducted by the S2 section during the month of May. This program consisted
of two phases: 1. 105mm howitzers firing data which closely approximated enemy 122mm rocket
characteristics, and 2. Live firing of captured 122mm rockets. The first phase was completed 16 May
with firing from fire support base Crockett (XT7314) toward Cu Chi. Charge 6 fired at a range of 8Km
was used to obtain muzzle velocity and maximum ordinate close to those of the rockets. The captured
ordnance was fired on 18, 19, 23, 24, and 30 May. The exercise on 18 May was another first for 25th Inf
Div Arty, since this was the first 122mm rocket to be fired by US forces. The exercise on 24 May was a
demonstration for the Commanding General, II Field Forces, and the Commanding General, 25th Infantry
Division. Firecracker ammunition was also demonstrated during this exercise. The first four firings were
used to perfect location techniques. The Q-4 radar and crew were provided by 1/8 Artillery. All Q-4
personnel of the division were present for the final firing to become familiar with the location procedure
and scope presentation.
(p21)
Ron Leonard has also transcribed articles from the Army Reporter. Here is an example of that history:
Army Reporter Articles 1
28May66-Armor Plated Chopper Seat Saves Co-pilot
CU CHI, (25th INF-IO)-The co-pilot of a UH-1D "Huey"
sat tightly in his seat as he approached Trang Bang, a
65
quiet village eight miles west of here.
The Huey, one of the many just arriving from the
United States for use of the 25th Avn. Bn., featured a
new, 168-pound armor-plated steel seat.
That seat literally saved the co-pilot's seat.
Automatic weapon fire from a Viet Cong sniper sent
one bullet through the floor of the low-flying chopper.
It bounced off the bottom of the captain's seat and
ricochetted off to the rear. There were no casualties.
The armor plated seat had received its first test
under fire and the captain took it sitting down.
25Jun66-'Lightning Bug' Hits Hard
CU CHI, (25tH INF-IO) - "We can sink river traffic on
a moonless night within two minutes after spotting it
without any trouble using the "Lightning Bug,", Major
Ronald C. Vines was talking about the 1,750,00 candles
in the sky now being used to halt the flow of VC men
and materiel on the waterways of South Vietnam.
Major Vines, gunship section leader of Company B,
25th Aviation Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, is the
man primarily responsible for the "Lightning Bug"
project here.
"Lightning Bug" is the name of a combined arms" team
of three UH-1B helicopters carrying weapons, flares and
bright lights. The light ship has seven landing lights
mounted on an adjustable frame on the ship's side. One
of the two gunners in the ship doubles as the light
operator.
The team's primary mission is to stop river traffic.
As the light sweeps along the water, most of it is
reflected back; the water looks silvery. But when the
light hits a sampan or some other major obstruction, it
doesn't reflect the light back. The object appears as
a dark shape in sharp contrast against the silvery
water.
Now the need for even more light has been
established and one of the other ships fires a flare.
Then the gunship comes in [to] blast the Viet Cong.
The three ships have a devastating combination of
7.62mm machine guns, 2.75 inch aerial rockets, .50
caliber machine guns and 40 mm grenade launchers.
Major James R. Vance, Company B Commander, is
particularly proud of his men and their skill in
operating this new addition to his company's equipment.
Almost all of the men of his unit are involved in
operational training to work in coordination with the
"Lightning Bug" team.
The Viet Cong now have one less sanctuary as the men
of the "Tropic Lightning" Division air arm pursue them
into the shadows of the night with the "lightning Bug."
08Oct66-Establishing Night Landing Zones Hard Work for
25th Avn.
66
CU CHI, (25th INF-IO) A luminous artillery flare
hangs in the wet night air, its brief light
silhouetting the forms of five men riding in a
helicopter.
The men quickly checkout the rice paddy terrain
below, for once the flare has burned out they must work
in total darkness. Their mission is to establish a
landing zone, using only small landing lights, for a
night air attack to be carried out by an infantry unit
of the 25th Division.
The five men assigned this most difficult task wear
the well known black cap of the 25th Aviation
Battalion, 25th Infantry Division. With the reputation
of "First in, Last out," they are widely respected by
the fighting men of the 25th Division, for without the
Pathfinders to show the way the air attacks which have
proved so effective would be nearly impossible.
As the chopper hovers over the paddies, 1st Lt.
James A. Hill and his team jump down into the knee-deep
water. There is no need for Hill to bark out orders
because each Pathfinder knows exactly what he must do
so he silently fades into the darkness.
Suddenly one by one the small lights appear on the
narrow berms of the paddies. In a matter of moments,
the individual lights take the shape of a landing pad
visible to the incoming aircraft, yet much more subdued
to enemy detection than the spotlights normally used by
the choppers during a night landing.
With the light set out, Cpl. Talmadge Dobbs takes
his place at the front of the landing zone. "It's hard
enough," explained Hill, "To land one of those whirlybirds during the day, to say nothing about landing one
at night with a minimum of lighting."
However, with the guidance of the Pathfinders and
the experience of top-notch 25th Avn. pilots wave after
wave of choppers loaded with Tropic Lightning troops
are landed without a trace of difficulty. Once the
infantry has landed, it is the responsibility of the
Pathfinders to maintain the landing zone for getting
the troops out as they return from their mission. This
is often the most risky part of a mission for the
Pathfinders, since it is sometimes done under intensive
enemy fire. Again the Pathfinders show the way, making
sure that every man in aboard a chopper and on his way
back to base camp.
08Oct66-Photo Caption-UNLOADING AMMO- Men of the 2nd
Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division,
unload Bangalore Torpedoes from a supply helicopter
during a battalion-sized operation south of the
Division's base camp in Cu Chi. (Photo by Sp4 Wallace
Stachera, 125th SIG-IO)
11Nov66-Photo Caption - DROP AND HIT IT - UH-1D
helicopters from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion,
25th Infantry Division, lift from a landing zone after
dropping troops of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade
during a recent search and destroy operation south of
67
Tay Ninh. (Photo by Sp4 Todd C. Darch, 25th INF-IO)
17Dec66-Photo Caption - HAULING AMMUNITION - A ground
handler attaches a sling load of 2000 pounds of
artillery ammunition to the cargo hook of an 11th
Battalion, 12th Combat Aviation Group CH-47 Chinook
during action in Operation Attleboro. (Photo by 53rd
Signal Battalion)
17Dec66-4 Avn Companies Fly Record Sorties In
'Attleboro' Action
CU CHI, (25th INF-IO) - A record number of sorties
were flown in a one-day period by four aviation
helicopter companies during Operation Attleboro in the
Viet Cong infested jungles of War Zone C.
As the missions for the day flowed into the 25th
Infantry Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC),
each was quickly coordinated with the various aviation
companies. This was the job of Army aviation personnel
working in the DTOC. "It was our responsibility,"
explained Maj. Leslie A. Layne, 25th Aviation
Battalion, "to get the choppers to the right place at
the right time."
The first mission of the day was handed to the Little
Bears of the of the 25th Aviation Battalion and the
Thunderbirds of the 118th Aviation Company. The
mission was to transport the 2nd Battalion, 14th
Infantry, 25th Inf. Div. to a forward support base.
Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery, which was
supporting the 2nd Bn. was also lifted to this time by
four CH-47 Chinooks.
Every chopper that was flyable was airborne. While
the Hornets from the 116th Aviation Battalion lifted
elements of the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the
3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, both of the 196th Light
Infantry Brigade, the 175th Aviation Battalion Outlaws
were hauling supplies to the Tropic Lightning 2nd
Brigade forward command post, plus three other forward
bases.
With the missions mounting and the need for more
choppers increasing, the 127th Aviation Battalion
Mustangs were committed to the action. The four
aviation companies which had been placed under the
operational control of the 145th Aviation Battalion
then began to lift the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
Wolfhounds, who were involved in a combat assault.
Shortly after noon, with the battle plans changing
at higher headquarters, the Thunderbirds and the
Hornets started to extract the morning drops of the 2nd
Bn. and the supporting artillery. At the same time the
Wolfhounds called for extraction and were lifted back
to the forward base. The rest of the day was used for
resupplying five 25th Division Inf. Div. forward
battalions.
The statistics for the four aviation companies
totaled 350 combat sorties, 100 resupply missions and
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2400 combat troops transported. The four Chinooks from
the 178th Aviation Battalion had moved two artillery
batteries and flown 30 resupply missions which totaled
more than 75 tons of ammunition and supplies.
But shortly after 7 p.m. as the Little Bears were
enjoying their supper, a call was received from a
Special Forces headquarters requesting helicopter
support for a Civilian Irregular Defense Group, engaged
with a VC force three miles west of Tay Ninh.
Jumping back into their ships, they returned to make
a night combat assault to reinforce the CIDG unit in
contact. In the hours to follow they hauled troops and
ammunition and evacuated the wounded to the Tay Ninh
base camp.
01Apr67-Dau Tieng Attacked;Choppers Repel VC
CU CHI, (25th INF-IO) - Captain Charles A. Robinson,
helicopter pilot in the 25th Infantry Division, dug his
face into the soft dirt of the bunker and waited.
He squirmed as red ants began to crawl inside his
fatigues, biting him as they moved. Once more, from
outside, came the deadly whooshing sound, then the
explosion.
The Viet Cong were making a night attack on the Dau
Tieng airstrip the base of Troop D. 3rd Squadron, 4th
Cavalry.
The first round from the VC barrage had landed on
the edge of the trees, just beyond two tents where the
helicopter crews were sleeping. Fragments had made a
ripping sound against the canvas.
The second round had exploded less than 100 meters
away, on the far side of two parked gunships, the VC
gunners had a bracket with the tents and the
helicopters in the middle.
The next mortar round failed to split the bracket.
Pilots and crews sprang from the bunker, ran to the
two aircraft, and began to pull a pre-flight inspection
for damage, ignoring the rounds which continued to fall
close by.
Seven minutes after the first round had landed, the
two choppers were airborne, searching for their
targets.
Team leader, Capt. Francis X. Delvy, spearheaded the
attack, his weapons systems spitting rockets and solid
tracer from the pylon-mounted machineguns. Hot on his
tail was Robinson's ship, which blasted the area with
rockets and 40mm grenades.
The gunship pilots had more to worry about than
mortars. The VC were executing coordinated ground
attacks on several isolated outposts outside the
perimeter of the camp.
Heavy enemy fire ripped into an armored column on
its way to reinforce the outposts.
As the pilots swooped in low to lay fire into the
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enemy positions, the VC turned their automatic weapons
skyward. "Every now and then I'd hear a crack,"
recalled door gunner Sgt. Robert E. Price. Each door
gunner fired some 5000 rounds that night.
Four hours later, it was all over.
The armed helicopters of Troop D, based here,
provide nighttime counter-mortar standby teams for both
Cu Chi and Dau Tieng base camps on a regular schedule.
They share this duty with the 25th Aviation Battalion
and the 116th Hornets Aviation Company.
15Jul67-Snake Slithers In, Pilot 'Downs Craft
CU CHI, (25th INF-IO) An elusive snake, slithering
around the controls of a helicopter, prompted a 25th
Infantry Division aircraft commander to radio in that
as far as he was concerned his aircraft was down.
While flying a mission for the 25th Aviation
Battalion, Capt. Thomas Fickle felt a snake crawling
across his right foot. Pilot WO George Harrison took
over the controls allowing Fickle to rid himself of
the snake.
Moments later Fickle regained the controls of the
aircraft, because it was Harrison's turn to chase the
four-foot long snake from his feet.
As the aircraft neared Bien Hoa, the snake slithered
under the floor plates. After landing the crew removed
all the inspection plates from the fuselage, found the
snake, but couldn't reach it because of all the small
compartments.
Fickle resumed the flight, and while over Long Binh,
the snake reappeared by poking its head out of an
opening in the left door.
At this point Fickle radioed to battalion operations
stating, ".... as far as I'm concerned this aircraft is
down." and immediately returned to the airfield here
where he picked up another helicopter.
Ground crew personnel worked four hours with tools,
aerosol sprays, and fire extinguishers before capturing
and destroying the snake.
11Feb68-CHOPPER RIDE TO HELL By SGT. BOB CUTTS
PS&S Staff Writer
HOWIE DEANE is just another face behind a desk, as
you glimpse him through the door of his office.
Then he stands up, and you notice the limp.
And that's your first clue that Howie Deane isn't
what you think he is.
Deane, 37, is a major, a 10-year Army veteran,
commander of the U.S. Army Japan Aviation Det., a
rated helicopter and airplane pilot and instructor, a
Vietnam veteran, and a holder of the Distinguished
Flying Cross.
He also has only one foot.
70
The missing, one, the right, was smashed into
uselessness one summer day a year ago 10 feet above a
dried-up rice paddy in some forgotten corner of Vietnam
by a Chinese submachine gun bullet. They took it off
in a dingy, Army quonset-hut field hospital a few hours
later.
"There are a lot of people who never even walk again
after losing something like a foot. The rolls of
rehabilitation centers and disability discharge rosters
are full of their names, but Howie Deane's is not on
them.
Sitting in his office between flights in his unit's
four helicopters, he has to handle the delicate task of
telling some of the highest-ranking VIPs in Japan that
they just CAN't be flown in an Army helicopter today
because the weather won't permit. Deane remembers back
to the day fate couldn't like him.
It was July 19, 1966, a hot sunny typical Vietnam
day.
"We spent the morning putting two platoons of the
25th Inf. Div. into an area down by the Oriental River,
but nothing much was going on down there."
About noon, Deane's flight of 10 Delta-model "Huey"
choppers from the A Co., 25th Aviation bn. "Little
Bears" got orders on the battalion command radio to
pull the troopers out and head for new hunting grounds.
The birds, each carrying about eight combat-equipped
infantrymen, flew northward 20 miles to a heavily
wooded area near Trun Lap, about 50 miles above Saigon.
The escorting gunships picked a likely area, a driedup paddy field, and pulled the "slicks" down in to the
area. It was quiet-like a hornets' nest before you hit
it.
The area was a Viet Cong battalion headquarters, and
Deane's flight had dropped the platoon strictly by
chance, straight between two companies of hard-core VC.
They were sandwiched in, and the Yankees were the
"meat." But no one knew it yet. There was light
ground fire on the way out- "the usual stuff."
The 25th's 105mm howitzers, dug in around an old
Japanese airfield at nearby Trang Bang, were still
silent when Deane's flight came in and picked up the
second platoon. There still was no hint.
Back again in the landing zone, there still was
little activity. But this time, the ground fire
increased slightly, and one chopper took a hit in the
tail rotor that sent it scurrying back to Cu Chi with
heavy tail vibrations.
Deane's flight headed back to Trang Bang to stand
by, but a curious message came over the radio. "Stand
by in orbit over Trang Lap Ranger Camp. You'll be
extracting casualties."
"Casualties? We just dropped them in there," Deane
said to his 20-year-old copilot, Tommy Hutchins. In
back, husky Jim Easterling, crew chief, glanced at his
door gunner, a new kid who had been in the company less
than a week. They said nothing.
71
After 10 minutes, the word came, and back they went.
Deane was flying today in the number three slot,
because flight leader's radio had gone out and that
chopper had to drop back in the flight. Ground fire
was thick and fast.
"There was a lotta chatter, lotta hits, lotta things
goin' on. Both men in the back opened up with M60s
(machine guns), and kept firing after we'd landed. It
was the first time in my young life I'd seen door
gunners firing on the ground."
Tracers were flying everywhere, and the infantrymen
ran for their lives into the copter. Deane, who didn't
get the word to extract the troops, was surprised. He
pulled the chopper out and they made for Cu Chi, to
deliver wounded and dead to the hospital there. There
were a lot of them.
They gassed up hurriedly at Cu Chi, then back to the
battle. This time, coming in, they could really see
what was going on.
"We saw a pair of Navy jets slide in just overhead,
getting ready for airstrikes. I told Hutchins 'those
are mortars in the LZ', and we could really see 'em
goin' off. Then I saw the black pajamas moving up at
the other end of the paddies. It was the first time I
really saw Viet Cong."
Troops on the ground were seeing plenty of them.
Deane heard on the radio from another chopper as they
came in "They won't come! They won't come! I'm waving
'em on, but they won't come!" Fire was so intense that
every time a man raised his head, he got it shot off.
The soldiers were paralyzed with fear.
Ten feet off the deck, a spray of AK 47 bullets
ripped into Little Bear Three. Deane felt a "mighty
sting" in his right foot and looked down. Blood was
spilling out of two holes through his foot, just in
front of his ankle. "I'm hit," he said on the
intercom, "you've got it." Seconds later, Hutchins
said, "I think our hydraulics are out." The ship
started to drop, fast.
Deane flipped the hydraulics switch to off and
wrestled the controls. The chopper flared in for a
perfect landing. "Let's see if we can get this thing
out of here," Deane said, ignoring his foot. The radio
crackled: it was the chopper behind them. "Hey three,
you're on fire. Get out of there fast." Deane said.
"Let's go," and everyone moved.
Hutchins jumped out. He saw bullets kicking up
spurts of dirt all around him, and he froze.
He stood
there for seconds, watching in helpless fascination the
fight rage around him. Then he ran like hell.
Deane staggered out on one foot, waving his .45
pistol. He looked up and saw the next chopper pull up
alongside. He remembers spotting the helmeted face of
Ira Hartwell watching him from the pilot's window then he fell flat on his face.
He started crawling.
Behind him, Easterling was dismounting his machine gun
72
and shouldering its ammo. He was hidden behind the
chopper and no one knew where he was.
Two crewmen from Hartwell's bird ran out and grabbed
Deane, dragging him into the copter. Just as they were
about to take off, Easterling walked out around his
helicopter, staggering like a drunk under the weight of
the gun. He would have been left behind if Howie Deane
hadn't fallen down.
As Hartwell took off, Deane tried to forget the pain
in his foot and fired his .45 out of the door. It was
a horrible ride back to Cu Chi.
They flew him to the 93rd Medical Evacuation
Hospital at Bien Hoa, and there he found out about the
foot. "I'd been wounded before, and didn't think it
was serious. But everyone who came by kept feeling my
toes, and wouldn't tell me what was wrong. Finally,
the doctor just said "It's pretty bad - I'll do what I
can for it." When they dumped me back in my bed after
surgery. I looked down and saw the foot was gone.
That bullet had just churned up everything inside."
When they flew him to Walter Reed Hospital in
Washington for recuperation, he called his wife from
Travis AFB, Calif.
"I tried not to tell her, but she knew something was
wrong. But she didn't care-she said she was just glad
to have me back, no matter what was wrong with me."
Deane also learned that, of all the men who didn't
get off the ground that night, none survived.
Their
bodies were found lying in the paddies the next
morning.
While Deane was lying in Walter Reed he was
surprised that everyone kept asking him if he was going
to get out. "Why, do I have to?" he answered. "I just
never thought of it any other way. I wanted to go back
to flying, and that was all I kept asking, and finally
I found someone who sent me to Ft. Rucker, Ala. for
flying tests. "Deane had spent 10 months in the
hospital, but he passed his flying tests, and acquired
an instrument instructor's rating to boot. "I just
never doubted that I'd fly again at all. I want to
keep flying still I retire."
So now, here he is, in Japan, commanding his own
aviation detachment (all four of his pilots have won
the Distinguished Flying Cross in Vietnam). Sharing
the Tokyo airways with the 587th Medical Det., which
itself has flown over 25,000 Vietnam patients from
airfields to hospitals in Japan, he says he's not
afraid of Vietnam. "I'll take my turn again if I'm
called upon."
He flies everything from ambassadors to privates
now-a far cry from the days when he taxied battle weary
troops to and from bullet-strewn fields and forests,
but the man with one foot and a lot of guts has the
feeling that he'll be seeing a lot more mission before
they put him out to pasture
73
26Jul69-Copter Rescue Was a Real Cliff-Hanger
CU CHI, Vietnam (Special) -The toe of the light observation helicopter's right
skid perched precariously on a boulder. The rotor
blade chomped furiously at nearby trees. The chopper's
body hung menacingly to the cliff's edge.
At the base of the cliff nestled a Viet Cong base
camp. The six man long range patrol (LRP) realized
their fate hung on the cliff with the chopper. They
were out of food and water, and the VC knew they were
there.
The series of events bringing the courageous pilot
to this perilous mountainside began four days earlier,
when a 25th Inf. Div. patrol left the U.S. base on the
3,200-foot summit of Nui Ba Den in Tay Ninh Province.
Their mission was to gather intelligence as they
moved down the 45-degree, enemy-infested slopes. They
were to call for extraction two days later in the rice
paddies at the base of the mountain.
On the second day, the men neared the bottom only to
find their planned exit blocked by a VC base camp. "We
couldn't get through "Charlie so we tried to go back up
and around and come down again," explained Sgt. Willard
R. Ethridge, 19, of Atlanta, leader of the F Co., 50th
Inf., patrol.
They tried . . . once, twice, three times. Each
time they ran into "Charlie."
Finally, on the third day, they stopped in a rocky
gulch one third up the mountain and radioed for help.
One man's leg had been injured by a falling rock.
Another man had suffered heat exhaustion.
"We were out of food and water. When it rained we
would catch the water running off the rocks in our
canteens - a little dirty, but it was good." said Sped.
4 Joseph Hitchens, 20, of New Orleans.
Two other LRP's at the foot of the mountain started
moving toward the trapped patrol. They both ran into
enemy .50-cal. machine-gun and rocket-grenade fire and
had to be extracted.
A 25-man reaction force from F Co. got 200 meters up
the mountain before nightfall. The next day they tried
to reach their beleaguered buddies but got pinned down
in a fire fight with the VC.
Shortly before noon, two Huey Cobra gunships from D
Troop, 3rd Sq., 4th Cav., arrived and began spewing hot
lead and rockets on the enemy in an attempt to clear
the area for a helicopter extraction.
A medevac chopper arrived to get the injured man out
first. There was no clearing near the six men large
enough for the "slick's" big rotor blade, and the plan
was to drop a hoist for the man. The pilot hovered
over twice, but both times enemy fire drove him off.
Maj. Fred R. Michelson, 35 commanding officer of D
Troop from Clayton, Mo., was flying "command and
74
control" in the OH-6A Cayuse light observation
helicopter (LOH). He called for more fire power.
Two Cobras from B. Co. of the 25th Aviation Bn., two
Huey gunships form the 4th Cavalry Sq., and two Air
Force tactical jets soon joined the other Cobras in
pounding the enemy.
A second dust-off ship with a hoist arrived. As the
pilot tried to get in close enough to drop his lift,
enemy sniper fire knocked out the communications
between the pilot and the hoist operator.
To add to the problems, the clouds opened up, and a
tropical downpour forced the helicopters to return to
the 25th Div.'s base camp at Tay Ninh.
By the time the storm cleared it was nearing dusk.
"Michelson decided that the only choice was to try to
resupply the patrol and hope they could make it through
the night.
The gunships again lit up the foot of the mountain
with their rockets and mini-guns as W.O. Stephen R.
Patterson piloted the LOH in over the men.
Michelson leaned out on the skid and swung a bag of
food, water and radio batteries toward a granite ledge.
It bounced, fell over the cliff and rolled into the
Viet Cong base camp below.
Then Patterson, 22, of Riverside, Calif. spotted a
boulder in a clearing it was just wide enough to get
one skid in.
"I hovered down and put the toe of my right skid on
the rock to steady the aircraft because of the bad
updrafts. The LRP's handed out the injured man to
Michelson," said Patterson.
Having made it once, Patterson decided to take his
four-seat chopper back for the other men.
Alone this time, he again perched his bird on the
rock. Two more men leaped from the rock to the skid
and into the chopper.
"Every time they jumped on the aircraft, it would
lurch, and I'd cut down a few small trees with my
rotor," recalled the pilot.
Three men were left, and it was getting dark. They
had one more smoke grenade. Patterson radioed them to
save it in case he didn't make the third try. He began
hunting the mountainside for the spot. At one point he
flew right over the VC base camp but did not draw any
fire.
Finally, he found the ledge and hovered in again.
The men threw on their radio and packs. Two men
jumped on first. To the last man, Pfc. Merilan Henry,
20, the tiny helicopter looked full. And Patterson was
fighting to recover the ship from a lurch caused by the
weight.
"I couldn't wait. I just dove in," Henry said.
"All I could do was throw my feet on- the rest of my
body was hanging over the side. I had my right hand up
on the pilot's chair, and the team leader was holding
on to my left hand."
75
With Henry hanging out the side, the LOH lifted away
from the steep slope 1,200 feet up. What had looked
impossible had been accomplished not once but three
times. Modestly Patterson admitted: "It did get a
little hairy there for a while.
December 15, 1969 Vietnam communique November 24-30
Joint strike guts enemy ridgeline
Helicopter gunships from the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and
artillery combined with U.S. Air Force jets in a day-long battle on Nov. 29
to kill 69 NVA troops on a ridgeline 12 miles southeast of Song Be.
Returning to the rolling hills which the Skytroopers had been patrolling
for a week, a 2nd Bde. light observation helicopter and a gunship from Co.
D, 229th Assault Helicopter Co. began receiving enemy fire.
Artillery and Air Force jets were called in and after eight hours of
fighting, 2nd Bde. LOHs reported seeing 40 bodies.Ninety minutes later,
the LOHs spotted an unknown number of NVA soldiers carrying the
bodies of several of the fallen Communists from an area about 900 yards
from the ridgeline. The helicopter crews opened up with minigun and
rocket fire and reported observing the bodies of 29 enemy soldiers.
25th Inf Div
In heavy fighting on Nov. 25, infantrymen of Co. D, 3rd Bn., 22nd Inf.
25th Infantry Division, artillery from II Field Force, helicopter gunships of
Co. B, 25th Aviation Bn., and the 187th Assault Helicopter Co. and Air
Force tactical air strikes pounded enemy hideouts in a day-long battle in
the foothills of Nui Ba Den, killing 25 NVA regulars.
On Nov. 26, eight enemy were killed by men of the 3rd Bn., 22nd Inf.
patrolling the marshes four miles west of Nui Ba Den.
The same day, men of Co. C, 4th bn., killed two enemy in a brief fire fight
six miles south of the mountain.
Two days later, riflemen of Co. C, 1st Bn., 5th Inf. and gunships killed five
enemy soldiers two miles southeast of Trang Bang.
Elsewhere, soldiers of Co. A, 1st Bn., 5th Inf. found an abandoned enemy
bunker complex four miles west of Cu Chi. Hidden in the bunkers were 22
RPG grenade rounds, 20 boxes of .51-caliber ammunition, 35 Chicom
grenades, 20 Chicom anti-personnel mines and eight pounds of TNT.
Further south, soldiers of Co. B, 1st Bn., 27th Inf. found 82 Chicom
grenades, seven boxes of 82mm fuses, 20 pounds of C4 plastic explosive
and three RPG rounds.
On Nov. 29, four enemy were killed by gunships of the 116th Assault
Helicopter Co. four miles northwest of Cu Chi.
The same day, gunships working with elements of the 2nd bn., 14th Inf.
killed three more NVA soldiers defending three bunkers nine miles
northwest of Cu Chi.
Two enemy were killed on Nov. 24 by elements of the 2nd Bn., 12th Inf. in
the tall elephant grass five miles north of Trang Bang.
1st Bde, 5th Inf
Twenty-three enemy soldiers were killed on Nov. 27 by soldiers of the 1st
Bn., 61st Inf. and 1st Bn., 11th Inf., 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division and
101st Airborne Division, gunships in an all day battle three miles south of
76
the DMZ and less than 900 yards west of the area where the Red Devils
killed about 200 members of an NVA battalion in a four-day battle earlier
this month. Two Chicom light machine guns, two RPG grenade launchers
and 36 Chicom hand grenades were captured in the action.
1st Cav Div
Twenty-three NVA soldiers were killed by artillery from the 1st Cavalry
Division FB Mary and U.S. Air Forces jets on Nov. 28 in an area 30 miles
west of Quan Loi.
In a series of unrelated contacts throughout the day, hunter-killer teams
from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Air Cav., netted six NVA soldiers near FBs
Rita and Caroline, 25 miles north and east, respectively, of Tay Ninh.
Elsewhere, men of A Troop also captured 8,640 pounds of rice buried 25
miles northeast of Tay Ninh.
A day earlier, artillery at AF Ellen and U.S. Air Force jets joined gunships
of the 2nd Bde., and Co. D, 229th Assault Helicopter Bn., to kill 21 enemy
soldiers in the jungle southeast of FB Ellen.
The same day, a hunter-killer team from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Air
Cav. accounted for six NVA soldiers along a trail 22 miles northeast of Tay
Ninh.
On Nov. 26, 11 NVA troops were killed by a hunter-killer team from A
Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cav., 22 miles north of Tay Ninh. rocket-firing
Cobras arriving on the scene killed four more and artillery accounted for an
additional two enemy kills.
An aerial rifle platoon from A Troop then swept through the are, killing
two more and later the same evening hunter-killer teams again entered the
area killing an additional two enemy soldiers.
In an unrelated action the same day, gunships of the 227th Assault
Helicopter Co. killed 10 enemy and destroyed two 12.7mm machine guns
in action four miles northwest of Song Be City.
On Nov. 30, seven NVA regulars were killed by men of Co. B, 5th bn., 7th
Inf., in a battle eight miles east of Song Be.
Six NVA soldiers were killed in an ambush by men of Co. C, 1st Bn., 7th
Cav., on a trail three miles north of FB Jerri on Nov. 25.
Later in the day, three NVA regulars were killed in an enemy bunker
complex in the same area.
Elsewhere, five NVA soldiers were killed about 14 miles northeast of FB
Jerri on the Song Be by a hunter-killer team of C Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th
Cav.
A day earlier a hunter-killer team from B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Air
Cav., killed seven enemy soldiers in Tay Ninh Province.
In the afternoon, 33 enemy were reported killed in the jungles less than
two miles north of Bu Dop by hunter-killer teams, artillery and air strikes.
1st Avn Bde
On Nov. 24, helicopter gunships of the 307th Combat Aviation Bn., 1st
Aviation Brigade, reported killing 24 VC during a three-hour operation in
the Mekong Delta, 17 miles north of Soc Trang.
1st Inf Div
A gunship crew from the 1st Avn. Bn. killed four NVA soldiers on Nov. 25
while patrolling four miles west of Ben Cat.
The same day elements of the 8th Regiment, 5th Inf., Army of the
Republic of Vietnam, working with riflemen of the 3rd Bde., 1st Infantry
Division, killed three NVA regulars in the thick vegetation five miles
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southeast of Dau Tieng.
A day earlier, elements of Companies A and C, 2nd Bn., 28th Inf., found
10 enemy bodies in the jungle four miles southwest of Dau Tieng killed
earlier in the week. One thousand AK47 rounds, three RPG boosters and an
RPG launcher were also found.
On Nov. 27, men of A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cav., while
patrolling 10 miles southwest of Lai Khe with a Popular Forces platoon,
discovered 5,491 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, and 2,535 rounds of .51caliber ammunition.
3rd Bde, 9th Inf
Soldiers of the 2nd Bn., 47th Inf., 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with
the aid of artillery overran a NVA base camp and aid station after a threehour battle with an unknown-sized Communist force nine miles southeast
of Tan An on Nov. 30. Thirteen NVA soldiers were killed in the artillery
strike.
Three more enemy were killed and five suspects detained in the operation
that followed.
A day earlier, four enemy soldiers were killed by members of Co. E, 75th
Inf., in a rice paddy one mile south of Tan An.
Earlier in the day, men of the 2nd Bn., 47th Inf., patrolling nine miles
southwest of Tan An found the bodies of two NVA regulars killed in a
previous night's contact and killed two more enemy soldiers.
On Nov. 24, members of Co. E, 5th Bn., 60th Inf., patrolling a tributary of
the Vam Co Dong River, eight miles north of Tan an, engaged and killed
three enemy moving along the banks.
The same day men of the 2nd Bn., 47th Inf. killed three more Communist
soldiers in as many contacts as they swept an open rice paddy area five
miles southeast of their Tan An base camp.
199th Inf Bde
Elements of Co. C, 2nd Bn., 3rd Inf., 199th Light Infantry Brigade,
destroyed 10 bunkers in the jungle 10 miles southeast of Xuan Loc and
killed five enemy soldiers fleeing the area on Nov. 29.
The same day, riflemen of Co. C, 3rd Bn., 7th Inf. exchanged small arms
and automatic weapons fie with a squad-sized enemy force in the jungle
eight miles east of Xuan Loc, killing three enemy.
Elsewhere, men of Co. B, 3rd Bn., 7th Inf., discovered 60 abandoned
bunkers while searching the jungle 11 miles east of Xuan Loc.
On Nov 28, four enemy soldiers were killed by the men of Co. A, 2nd Bn.,
3rd Inf., in the jungles 10 miles south of Xuan Loc.
A lone Communist was killed on Nov. 27 along a trail 25 miles northwest
of Xuan Loc by men of Co. D, 75th Inf.
Americal Div - Men of D Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Armored Cav.,
Americal Division patrolling 12 miles south of Chu Lai on Nov. 30, killed
three VC and detained another two.
Other gunships from Troop D patrolling nearby located a hidden enemy
compound and accounted for seven enemy dead and detained another five
suspected VC.
Twelve Communists were killed the same day by other Troop D
gunships, helping to cover the departure of a patrol of Co. C, 3rd Bn., 1st
Inf., eight miles southwest of Tam Ky.
On Nov. 29, a patrol from Co. C, 4th Bn., 21st Inf., killed eight enemy
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soldiers and captured three SKS rifles in a battle four miles southeast of
Duc Pho.
Six enemy were killed by gunships of the 176th Avn. Co. on Nov. 27 six
miles northwest of Quang Ngai.
101st Abn Div
Patrolling in the rain-soaked hills about 13 miles southeast of Camp Eagle
on Nov. 27, infantrymen of Co. D, 2nd Bn., 327th Inf., 101st Airborne
Division (Airmobile), killed one NVA regular.
4th Inf Div
A ranger team from Co. K, 75th Rangers, 4th Infantry Division killed two
NVA regulars in a fight on Nov, 27, 13 miles northwest of Pleiku when the
enemy soldiers walked past the concealed infantrymen and sat down in a
clearing.
On Nov. 25, D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cav., uncovered an enemy rice
cache. The rice found in an area 16 miles west of Pleiku. The find consisted
of seven huts, each containing 100 pounds of rice.
173rd Abn Bde
A ground sweep on Nov. 30 by members of the 2nd Bn., 503rd Inf., 173rd
Airborne Brigade, disclosed the bodies of nine enemy soldiers one mile
west of FB English. The enemy were killed earlier in the week by minigun
fire from a reconning helicopter force and artillery.
Two AK47s, six loaded magazines, 26 Chicom grenades, one B40 rocket
and a small quantity of rice and clothing were captured in the sweep.
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In October 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division moved from I Corps to III Corps. They took up residence in
Phouc Vinh, Song Be, Quan Loi, Tay Ninh, and Dau Tieng. Randy Zahn, Cobra Pilot in C/1-9 Cav at
Phouc Vinh sent many audio tapes home to his parents.
In the late 1990’s when Randy flew offshore helicopters from Scotland, his audio tapes were compiled and
played on BBC radio Scotland. Randy provided the tapes and the following newspaper clippings to Mike
Sloniker. These tapes passionately describe the feelings, professionalism, caring, and anguish of Randy
who was, in 1969, and 19 year old Cobra aircraft commander.
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81
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Bien Hoa Army Base 1972. Barely visible in the right center is NDB mountain. This area, originally built for the 173d Airborne
Bde in 1965, housed the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) from 67-70. In mid 1971, the 1st Cavalry Div
sent the colors of 1st and 2d Bde to Ft Hood Texas, reformed the 3d Bde into 4 Bns of Inf, a large combined 105/155 btry, and
consolidated within the 229th AHB, A&B 229th(slicks), two Cav Troops F/9(formerly B/1-9 Cav) D/229(formerly and aerial wpns
company, one ARA battery F/79, formerly C/2-20 ARA, one Chinook Company , 362 ASHC, formerly C/228 ASHB, a C&C
platoon of slicks and a unit of YUH 1H helos that were signal intelligence SIGINT configured.
The B/1-9 Cav website is more eloquent:
In late 1968, the Division moved and set up operations in III Corps at the other end of South Vietnam. In February 1969, Operation
Cheyenne Sabre began in areas northeast of Bien Hoa. In November, an important discovery, that proved costly to the enemy, was
along the border between II Corps and III Corps. "B" Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry found another canopy-concealed infiltration
route and named it the "Jolley Trail" after the troop commander, Major Charles A. Jolley. By jungle standards the Jolley Trail was an
elaborate, high-speed roadway. It was paved with bamboo matting and lined every hundreds of yards with bunkers and bomb
shelters. The trail was blasted by air strikes and patrolled repeatedly by 1st Cavalry helicopters and troopers on the ground. The year
1969 ended in a high note for the 1st Cavalry Division. The enemy's domination of the northern areas of III Corps had been smashed
- thoroughly.
On May 1, 1970, the First Team was "First into Cambodia" hitting what was previously a Communist sanctuary. President Nixon has
given the go-ahead for the surprise mission. Pushing into the "Fish Hook" region of the border and occupied the towns of Mimot and
Snoul. Troopers deprived the enemy of much needed supplies and ammunition, scattering the enemy forces. The Cambodian
Operation far exceeded all expectations and proved to be one of the most successful operations of the First Team. All aspects of
ground and air combat were utilized. The campaign had severe political repercussions in the United States for the Nixon
Administration. Pressure was mounting to remove America's fighting men from the Vietnam War. Although there would be further
assault operations, the war was beginning to wind down for many troopers.
The efforts of the 1st Cavalry Division were not limited to direct enemy engagements but also, using the experiences gained during
the occupation of Japan and Korea, encompassed the essential rebuilding of the war torn country of South Vietnam. As a result of its'
gallant performance, the regiment was awarded two presidential Unit Citations and the Valorous Unit Citation.
Although March 26, 1971, officially marked the end of duties in Vietnam for the 1st Cavalry Division, President Nixon's program of
"Vietnamization" required the continued presence of a strong US fighting force. The 3rd Brigade (Reinforced), commanded by
Brigadier General Jonathan R. Burton, included a battalion from each of the four cavalry regiments; the 2nd Battalion of the 5th
Regiment; 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment; 2nd Battalion of the 8th Regiment and 1st Battalion of the 12th Regiment along with
specialized support units as "F" Troop, 9th Cavalry and Delta Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion helped establish the 3rd
Brigade headquarters at Bien Hoa. Its primary mission was to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes in War Zone D.
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1st Cav websites:
http://www.9thcav.com/ A/1-9 Cav
http://www.geocities.com/b19loretta/ B/1-9 Cav
http://members.tripod.com/cavalier44/ C/1-9 Cav
http://www.vhfcn.org/227hist.htm 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion
http://www.snowhill.com/~ketchamj/ 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion
www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/6485/ 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion
www.bluemax-ara-assoc.com/
2/20 ARA
In 1971, Chad Richmond took this double exposure of a D/229 AHB Cobra on Lassiter Army Heliport
at Bien Hoa
In 1971-72, D/229 was an air cavalry troop on the same TO&E as F/9 Cav, formerly B/1-9 Cav
229th Bn Hq sign is shown below.
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The following pages are examples of an
outstanding effort to put the history of the 162
AHC on a website. It is found at
http://www.162ahc.com/
The first section is their recollection of 1968
with emphasis on Tet 68.
Year 1968
It is followed by their history they sent to me
for inclusion in this 2001 history.
Mike Sloniker
The 162nd began the new year with a change of commanders. Major James
Thompson assumed command from Major Stokely Wilson on January 1st. Major
Ronald Andresen, CO of the 407th TC Det. succeeded Major Thompson on May
24th, followed by Major Robert Wright in November. (It is interesting to note that
both Majors Thompson and Andresen went on to illustrious army careers and became
General Officers).
Major Thompson, in particular, was considered a good leader who was highly
thought of by the men of the company. The following anecdote related by Major Paul
Wenzel, Operations Officer, is an excellent illustration of his leadership:
"One thing Major Thompson did for which he was awarded the Soldier's Medal and
something which he did because "it was his job" probably has gone unnoticed.
Thompson and I normally integrated ourselves into the flight when we performed as
part of a battalion lift, not as flight lead but as peter pilot in one of the lift ships other
than lead. I believe we were the second and third out of eight flights of five and were
positioning ourselves in water filled rice paddies for troop pick up when one of the
ships in the second flight of five lost his tail rotor when he flared too steep and stuck
it in the water. The ship immediately turned on its side and caught fire. Ammo from
the crew chief and/or door gunner was cooking off and one could see the tracers as
they cooked off as well. Anyway, Jim Thompson recognized that one of the
crewmembers was trapped inside and without regard for his personal safety, he exited
his helicopter, ran over to the burning ship and rescued either the crewchief or the
gunner, I don't remember which. He did this in full view of our crewmembers and of
course in view of all the overhead commanders at 1500 feet or above. I remember our
guys talking about this for weeks and how they respected Thompson for his
demonstrated leadership on and off the battlefield."
Major Thompson went on to command the Army's only Air Assault Division, the
Army War College and the First US Army. Major Andresen, who succeeded Major
Thompson, later became program manager for both the Blackhawk and Comanche
helicopters and played a key role in their development and introduction.
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In early 1968 a number of improvements were made to make life a little more
comfortable for the Vultures at Phouc Vinh, including:
· A new maintenance hangar was built by the 34th Engineers (and promptly
mortared).
· Air conditioning was installed in the Officers club, EM club and dispensary.
· A new "Vulture Theater" was built with a new stage, screen, projection room and
covered seating area.
· A new addition was made to the mess hall. The mess hall was also completely
enclosed to help eliminate dust.
· A hover area for maintenance was leveled off and peniprimed along with all of the
slick line. Also, lights were installed on the slick line.
Conditions were improving at Phouc Vinh and life was not that bad for the Vultures
during this period. They occasionally got a couple of days off and went to Saigon to
relax. The officers even had their own private villa in Vung Tau, for which they
chipped in each pay day. The company also had two NCO's stationed in Saigon with
a jeep and a two and a half ton truck to expedite the supply chain and buy stock for
the Officers, NCO and EM Clubs.
The first half of January was mostly occupied with training flights for the newly
arrived 101st Airborne Division, preparing them to become operational and
indoctrinating them in the techniques of airmobile operations.
On 17 January the Vultures conducted combat assaults for the 3rd Bde, 101st
Airborne Division. As the day wore on, the troops made contact with an
undetermined number of VC and additional reinforcements were inserted by the
Vultures enabling the 101st to route the enemy.
On the 18th of January the 162nd was on Ready Reaction Force duty for III Corps
and called to the aid of the 173rd AHC (Robinhoods). While supporting the 25th
ARVN Division, the 173rd had landed in the midst of a strong VC force and lost
several ships. The Vultures and the Copperheads completed the insertion in spite of
intensive ground action.
On 29 January the Vultures, landing one ship at a time in a small pick up zone,
extracted over 60 tons of captured VC rice from a field location between Phouc Vinh
and Lai Khe. There were a few anxious moments while extracting the 600 bags of
freshly packed rice when US armored personnel carriers just north of the pick up
zone made contact with the VC. However, the mission was successfully completed
and the Vultures did not take any fire in the short skirmish that took place.
Tet Offensive
The 30th of January marked a new era in the fighting in Vietnam-Tet 68. The
VC/NVA undertook a major offensive in most of the key cities and districts
throughout the country. Saigon, Binh Hoa, Long Binh, Phu Loi, Lai Khe and many
other key places in III Corps were hit with rockets, mortars, and ground attacks. The
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VC/NVA expected to be welcomed by a popular uprising but instead met with
massive resistance. Enemy troops were cut down in the thousands by infantry,
artillery and air crews from assault helicopter units such as the 162nd.
On the eve of Tet Major Thompson had sent all flyable aircraft to Vung Tau in an
effort to preserve valuable assets that might be in jeopardy in an isolated place like
Phouc Vinh. On the way to Phu Loi the next day the Vultures heard a call "on guard"
for "any gunships in the vicinity of Plantation Tower (Long Binh), request assistance
to repel VC climbing the control tower". One of the Vulture pilots yelled "hell, let's
take the slicks in and let the door gunners work'em over". This was the beginning of a
hectic period with incredibly long days of flying.
On the same day, January 31st, the Vultures teamed up with sister companies, the
128th and 173rd AHC's and two Chinook units, the 205th and 213th ASHC's, and
together moved over 3,400 troops and 370 tons of cargo in the short span of ten hours
while supporting the First Infantry Division. Two battalion size insertions, two
extractions, and a further one and a half battalion insertion in company size lifts were
made in the late afternoon. Over five and a half battalions of infantry and supporting
equipment were moved by the 11th CAB from Di An to Quan Loi with the Vultures
moving over 1000 troops. This was the largest movement to date of troops by UH-1
units of a combat aviation battalion in a single day operation and positioned the First
Infantry to block a major attack on the outskirts of Saigon.
Several times during the day the Vultures came under intense enemy mortar and
rocket fire at Lai Khe and surrounding areas. However, due to the efforts of flight
leads Lt Harlan Scheibe and Lt James Shannon, the coordination by Vulture 3 (Major
Wenzel) and Vulture 6 (Major Thompson) all lifts throughout the day went
exceptionally well. Majors Thompson and Wenzel put over 22 hours of flight time on
the C&C ship on this first day of Tet as they repositioned the First Infantry. On
following days the CO and Opns Officer even resorted to putting other pilots names
in the log book to keep from being grounded for excess flight hours. There were few
experienced officers in the unit and the Vultures sorely needed their experience and
leadership.
The Vultures began the month of February with a bang. In the late hours of the first
day of February incoming 82 mm mortars were reported in the south quadrant of the
compound. These few rounds were an indication of things to come. February, or
Mortar Month as it came to be known, was to be a busy month for the 162nd.
In the early morning hours of February 3rd the Copperheads were called to the aid of
a PF (Popular Forces) compound south of Phouc Vinh which was attacked by a
company size force of VC. The Copperheads stopped the attack and were credited
with 25 VC KIA during the night action. Because of the swift strikes such as this,
Col. Lawrence Mowrey, Commander of the 3rd Bde, 101st Airborne at Phouc Vinh
presented the Copperheads with a letter of commendation.
On 5 February the Copperheads were once again called on to thwart the enemy in
their attempt to overrun a Vietnamese compound near Phouc Hoa. After being
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scrambled the Copperheads established contact with the ground unit and proceeded
with their gun runs. When it was over, one of the compound advisors gave the
Copperheads credit for 8 dead and 7 wounded VC.
On the next day, the 162nd was on RRF (Ready Reaction Force) and at 1215 hours
went to the aid of the 173rd AHC who lost two ships to enemy ground fire just west
of Binh Chan. The Vultures airlifted elements of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade
into positions around the downed aircraft and completed the lift without taking a
round.
On 8 February Major Thompson and members of the gun platoon were honored
guests of the Vietnamese district chief at Phouc Vinh. The district chief arranged an
appreciation ceremony for the part the 162nd had played in repelling repeated VC
attacks on Vietnamese outposts over the previous week. The district chief presented
the members of the 162nd with floral wreaths, which were symbolically, one of the
highest awards that a person could receive from the government of Vietnam. The VC
must have resented the awards because shortly before midnight on the same day they
presented the 162nd with a few incoming mortars and rockets.
On 10 February the Vultures were moving elements of the 9th Infantry Division from
field locations to Dong Tam when they came under heavy enemy fire. Two aircraft
took hits. CWO David Pridgeon was the aircraft commander of one of the ships and
Lt Frank Loturco was pilot. CWO Pridgeon was on his last combat assault in
Vietnam and Lt Loturco was flying his first one.
After the Vultures were released and enroute back to Phouc Vinh accompanied by a
Copperheads heavy fire team, they intercepted a call by Paris Control at Binh Hoa, on
guard, for any gunships in the area to contact Paris Control. The Copperheads
responded and were requested to go to an area five miles northeast of Binh Hoa, to
cover a downed helicopter until it's crew could be picked up. After the crew was
rescued, the Copperheads were released and returned to Phouc Vinh.
On 13 February the Vultures participated in an administrative lift for the 101st
Airborne Division when the lead ship was sprayed with by an AK 47. After taking
one round through the windshield, the crewchief of the lead ship, SP4 Howard
Wetzel, cut the enemy down with a burst from his M-60-his first VC kill.
Also on the 13th WO Ronnie Adair had a rather unusual day. WO Adair was on short
final to the normally secure pad at Phouc Hoa when his peter pilot overshot the
approach and 3 Claymore mines were detonated under the ship. Both pilots grabbed
the collective and "pumped" up enough RPM to take off. They limped back to Phouc
Vinh leaking fuel and blood from the gunner's leg. The aircraft was later found to
have more than twenty holes from shrapnel and bullets in the main rotor, tail rotor,
gear box and bottom and side of the fuselage and was rapidly losing fuel. The only
person injured was SP4 Tebay, the gunner, who was hit in the leg by a piece of
shrapnel but didn't realize it until they began tracing the source of blood on the floor.
On 21 February one of the Vulture lift aircraft received heavy automatic weapons fire
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from a VC road block north of Phu Loi and was going to make a gun run until he was
discouraged by RPG rounds and called the coordinates in to be hit by airstrikes.
On 24 February Lt Harlan Scheibe and WO Thomas Phelps had an experience they
will not forget. Their ship (66-16189) had an engine failure and lost directional
control southeast of Phouc Vinh and the aircraft crashed and partially burned. No one
was injured but it was a bad experience for everyone aboard. The aircraft was written
off but later rebuilt and returned to service.
During the month of February, the 162nd compound was hit by mortars and rockets
on at least 15 occasions but little damage was done and no one was seriously
wounded.
The Vultures started the month of March 1968 by welcoming ten new pilots to the
roost for two weeks of in-country training and orientation. The ten aviators from the
7th Squadron, 1st Cav (Blackhawks) were newly arrived in country. As was tradition
at the Vultures, each new pilot was required to put ten dollars on the bar the first
night in the company, so needless to say the month of March was started out right. At
10 cents for beer and 25 cents for whiskey, ten dollars went a long way in those days.
The first two weeks of the month were spent mostly on missions with the First
Infantry Division. However the pattern was changed somewhat with trips to Ham
Tam and Xuan Loc while supporting the ARVN units.
Around 8 pm on the evening of March 5th, the Phouc Vinh compound came under
mortar and rocket attack. The gun platoon responded by scrambling a fire team to
locate and attack the enemy positions. Through a series of miscommunications the
fire team was directed to an area where one of the gunships (64-14158) was hit by
friendly artillery fire and exploded, killing all 4 crewmembers. The lost crewmembers
were CWO Vernon R. Tweedy, SP4 Brian T. Murray, SP4 George D. Novakovic,
and WO Vernon L. Leuning, a pilot from the 7/1 Cav who was training with the
Vultures. It was a sad day for the 162nd and a senseless loss of 4 good men.
On March 12th at approximately 2130 hours the VC again hit the Phouc Vinh
compound with mortars and rockets. Although there were over 200 incoming rounds
counted there was only minor damage in the Vulture area.
A few days later the 162nd joined with sister units of the 11th CAB to lift troops of
the First Infantry Division from Quan Loi to Loc Ninh and LZ's around Loc Ninh.
The Vultures were chosen to lead the 30 ship operation and as always came through
with flying colors.
A busy day was in store for the Vultures on March 22n when they supported infantry
units south of Phouc Vinh. Immediately after receiving reports that the ground troops
were in heavy contact with enemy units the Copperheads came to their aid and drove
the VC back while the slicks resupplied the units during a lull in the fighting. The VC
directed their fire on the gunships and succeeded in downing one aircraft. However,
one of the slicks, flown by WO Donald "Hog" Welch, quickly rescued the downed
crew while five other aircraft put in a security force to secure the slick until it could
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be lifted out by a Chinook.
As the Chinook was lifting the downed gunship out of the area, a med-evac aircraft in
the same area received heavy fire and went down. The Vultures and Copperheads
responded immediately to the emergency by extracting the ground troops from where
the gunship had been downed and inserting them in to secure the crippled med-evac
ship. At one point as the lift ships were departing the area, enemy troops were seen
converging on the site.
On March 25th the Vultures started the day supporting the 1st Infantry on an
operation north of Lai Khe. With the aid of a sister unit the Vultures lifted ground
troops into LZ's with hopes of finding and destroying any VC in the area. This
Battalion size lift resulted in the destruction of two large, newly fortified bunker
complexes. The Vultures then moved to Di An to air lift more infantry units north of
Thu Duc. With a break of only thirty minutes, the 162nd ships were on their way
again supporting infantry units near Binh Hoa.
The 26th of the month was begun with incoming rounds in the 162nd area at
approximately 0100 hours. After a rather restless night the 162nd was again
participating in a battalion size operation north of Lai Khe. The lift was held up
briefly while a security force was inserted around a downed aircraft in the area.
At approximately 2245 hours on the same night the Phouc Vinh compound was
mortared again. Two mortar rounds hit the beautiful, recently completed maintenance
hanger (built by C Company, 34th Engineers), and three persons were slightly injured
from the shrapnel.
On 28 March the Vultures worked with the Black Baron and his aviation elements in
an operation north of Chon Li Tan which involved LZ's within 150 meters of the
Cambodian border. Major Thompson, the CO, later said "you learn to appreciate the
professionalism in the 162nd after seeing another unit go nearly 5 miles off course
while looking for the LZ." The Vultures as always were right on target, hitting the
RP's and LZ's with accuracy and getting the usual compliment from the ground and
air missions commanders for doing an outstanding job.
The month of March 1968 was a record-breaking month. The Vultures flew 3119
total hours, more than the company had ever flown in a single month. A total of 32
PE's were also pulled during the month, another record.
One day in early 1968, WO Ron Gresham was on a 25-ship CA with the First
Division and as the ships were unloading in a wet rice paddy he spotted a VC who
stood up maybe 50-75 yards away and fired an RPG at his aircraft. It landed roughly
20 feet short, exploded and sprayed hot mud all over the crew. Needless to say, they
got out of there fast.
On April 9th , WO James Wright was on a routine mission for II Field Forces when
he heard a distress call from an aircraft near Vung Tau. He responded to the call and
took part in a search of choppy waters just off the coast. About 30 minutes later a
Dust-Off spotted some aircraft parts in the water. A little later WO Wright and his
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crewchief (SP4 Michael Grant) spotted the downed crew of 6 people on a Vietnamese
fishing boat. As the boat neared shore, the 6 men jumped into the water, ran to shore
and were picked up by the Dust-Off.
On April 30th the 162nd and a sister unit (the 173rd) were engaged in a large
operation supporting the First Infantry Division. As they extracted troops from a hot
LZ northwest of Lai Khe, they encountered heavy automatic weapons fire on final
into the pick up zone for the last lift of 5 ships. Immediately, two Copperhead light
fire teams opened up on the area. The Vultures continued their approach and RPG
rounds began impacting in the pick up zone. At that point the slicks broke off and
were put into orbit nearby while artillery and air strikes worked over the area around
the troops. Then with seven fire teams from the 162nd and 173rd laying down heavy
covering fire the slicks pulled out the remaining troops. There were no friendly
casualties and enemy loses could not be determined.
In addition to supporting the major US infantry units the Vultures were frequently
held on standby as part of the III Corp Ready Reaction Force. They also performed
many single ship missions all over III Corps, supplying ARVN compounds,
providing reconnaissance for ground commanders and Command and Control ships
for operations in progress. These single ship missions were generally referred to as
"ash and trash" missions.
In mid April the 162nd broke another record by airlifting two complete battalions of
the 101st Airborne (1,700 troops) into positions near Binh Hoa in a period of 6 hours.
On May 2nd, while on Ready Reaction status for II Field Forces, the company was
scrambled to an area west of Loc Ninh. A company of CIDG troops was picked at
their base camp near Thu Duc and flown to Thu Duc to stand by for further
deployment. While airborne, the flight was briefed on the urgency of the mission, an
insertion of a search party in an attempt to locate 6 missing CIDG troops and their
two US Special Forces advisors. A long range patrol had stumbled into a heavily
fortified NVA bunker complex, and an attempted extraction under fire (by the 240th
AHC) had resulted in two ships being shot down and eight people missing. Most of
the patrol was finally extracted but a larger force was being inserted to search for the
missing men. The Vultures arrived in late afternoon and began the insertion, one ship
at a time into the area where a ship from the 240th AHC had been downed and
destroyed by enemy fire. Air and artillery strikes had temporarily driven the enemy
back.
The first 5 ships inserted their troops without drawing fire and shortly thereafter the
search team located the missing men. All had been killed in the vicinity of the
downed aircraft. An extraction was then initiated, again one ship at a time due to the
small size of the LZ. The first two ships loaded with the KIAs and gear made it out
without incident but the next ones began taking fire which grew more intense with
each extraction. The last two ships, chalks 6 and 7, drew heavy fire on take-off and
reported seeing a company-size NVA unit rapidly closing in on the LZ. The Vultures
arrived back at the roost at Phouc Vinh at 11 pm with no casualties.
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Unfortunately, a former Vulture pilot, WO Larry McKibben, was killed in the above
incident. WO McKibben had arrived with a group of new pilots in June 67 and was
later transferred to the 240th AHC (Greyhounds) to spread out DEROS dates. He
landed his ship in the LZ on the initial pick up attempt and was mortally wounded.
His ship crashed in the LZ and the small group of US and CIDG troops desperately
held off attempts to overrun their position. For his actions during this engagement,
Special Forces SSG Roy Benavidez was later awarded the Medal of Honor.
On May 5th SP6 Ronald R. Blanchette, a Technical Inspector, received a $10,000
lump sum bonus to re-enlist. SP6 Blanchette had joined the 162nd at Ft. Benning as a
PFC, came over on the ship in February 66 and held the distinction of being the last
remaining original Vulture.
On May 8th, the Vultures made over 600 sorties inserting and extracting troops in
hostile areas around Saigon and the Thu Duc area. A total of 12,295 troops were
lifted.
While on Ready Reaction standby on May 8th, the 162nd was scrambled to insert
reinforcements into an ARVN compound at Bin Dop. The compound was under
heavy attack but the first flight of five ships managed to land the troops and depart
without damage. However, the second flight of five ships led by Lt Harlan Schiebe
was met with a heavy barrage of mortars and rockets in the landing area while on
short final. Lt Schiebe broke off and came around for another attempt and the same
thing happened. He set up for a third attempt and began his approach to the same area
but as the mortars and rockets began impacting in the LZ he veered off to the left at
the last minute and landed the troops in an adjacent field. The troops dismounted and
took cover and the aircraft departed before the VC could shift their fire.
On the morning of May 13th, the 162nd supported the First Infantry Division in the
Phu Loi-Lai Khe area on some rather routine and uneventful CAs. However, in the
afternoon they were called on to extract a unit of the First Infantry that declared a
Tactical Emergency after 7 hours of heavy contact south of Song Be. Despite
marginal weather conditions, the Vultures completed the task without incident and
the 11th CAB commander was quoted as saying "The Vultures have once again
performed in an outstanding manner in a difficult situation."
On May 19th the company supported units of the First Division in the Lai Khe area.
During the second lift the lead gunship, flown by Cpt Michael Shannon, came under
heavy automatic weapons fire and Cpt Shannon took a round through his leg. He was
later evac'd to Quan Loi and then back to the US. His copilot, WO Butch Garner, was
also hit by a spent bullet fragment in the jaw. The round penetrated his cheek but not
his jawbone. WO Garner reached into his mouth and pulled out the bullet which he
carried for months as his lucky charm.
The 162nd again supported units of the First Division on the 24th of May. The first
lift of the morning was a 15 sortie insertion from Thu Duc to an LZ two klicks north
of VC Island. The Vultures then completed a 20 sortie extraction from a night
defensive position near Phouc Hoa to Normandy I. The Vultures next began single
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ship resupply missions until late in the day when they reformed to undertake more
extractions.
On May 27th WO James Wright was making an aerial recon of a river near Bai Trai
when he spotted a small number of VC and 2 sampans in a restricted area. The CE
and gunner (SP4 Grant and SP4 Wooden) sank one of the sampans and killed one of
the VC.
While supporting II Field Forces in late June, the Copperheads were called to cover
an emergency extraction of an Australian unit near Nui Dat. The Australians had
several people wounded while in contact with the VC and the Copperheads got one
VC KIA. Later they were called on to cover a dummy extraction of a 12 man ambush
team which had been spotted by the enemy.
One day in mid '68 WO Bill Greenhalgh and Lt Jack Donahue took a new gunner out
to the old French Fort near Phouc Vinh for some gunnery practice. After a few passes
in which the gunner managed to avoid hitting the skids or blades, WO Greeenhalgh
spotted a bird in a barren tree standing out by itself. He brought the ship to a hover
and shouted for the gunner to get the bird. The gunner expended his ammo,
splintering the tree, but missing the bird. Amazingly, the bird did not move.
According to Lt Donahue, WO Greenhalgh then turned the aircraft over to him,
pulled out his .38 pistol, took one shot out the side window and down went the bird.
Lt Donahue said of the incident, "I am here to testify that he made one hell of a pistol
shot. Should have come over to the Copperheads with me!"
On July 18th aircraft 66-16188 (AC WO Sidney Austin and WO James Cox) were
chalk 2 in a 5 ship trail formation extracting a First Infantry unit west of Lai Khe.
They were to land along a road but since an infantryman had set off a mine on the
road, the aircraft were told to land in a field beside the road. The tail rotor of WO
Austin's ship hit a tree stump, the ship spun to the right, hit the ground and rolled
over. The aircraft was destroyed but the crew escaped with only minor injuries.
One day around midyear SP4 Phil Bishop, normally flying as a gunner, recalls going
to Saigon and hitching a ride back to Phouc Vinh along with SP5 John Ohmer
(returning from TDY at Lai Khe) on a Vulture ship (V-176). The engine failed as
they entered the traffic pattern and the pilots managed a scary, but successful,
autorotation and landed in a rice paddy just outside the perimeter. There was no
major damage to the ship but it was a hair-raising incident no one involved has
forgotten.
On September 13th, the 162nd with help from the 173rd AHC (Robin Hoods) led a
battalion lift for the First Infantry near Loc Ninh. Lt Dennis Morris was flight lead
and had 20 slicks to make 5 sorties each into the LZ's. It was raining, the weather was
poor and the ceiling was down to around 700 feet. Despite these conditions the First
Infantry Division Commander, MG Ware, was on the scene in his C & C ship. With
such a low ceiling his aircraft was dangerously exposed and was shot down with all
on board killed.
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On several occasions at Phouc Vinh nearby B-52 strikes (high altitude artillery)
would be so devastating that men would wake-up feeling the vibrations caused by the
strikes and the bunks would "walk" themselves across the floor. Men woke-up in a
place other than where they went to sleep. What was even more startling was that the
Vultures often inserted troops into the same area just after B-52 strikes and would
still take a great deal of enemy fire.
Many people at Phouc Vinh in mid-late '68 remember "Lizard Six." As WO Dave
Bonifield relates, "When I arrived, on the front of our barn (hooch) hung a sign,
'Home Of Lizard Six.' When I asked who was Lizard Six I thought they were trying
to see if the new guy would fall for the bull story. However, I soon found it to be true.
Lizard Six was about 18 inches long and lived in the rafters of our barn. We often
heard him scurry around up there. If you banged on the walls you could make him
mad. He would make huffing sounds as he inflated and puffed up his lower neck.
Then he would release the air with a "heeew" sound. The net result sounded like "f-k,
f-k, f-k, heeeew". Thus the lizard was known as the F--k You Lizard. Later, I went to
the Air Force jungle survival school at Clark AFB. What do you know, there was one
of these lizards in a little zoo display. Next to it's proper name was 'FY Lizard.'
Everyone else wondered what that meant, but I knew."
(I NEED MORE INFO ON WHAT HAPPENED IN LATE 68??)
In November 1968, the priority of Delta operations was raised and the 9th Infantry
Division, previously given limited resources, was assigned 3 additional assault
helicopter units and 3 Air Cav troops. The 214th CAB with the 162nd, 191st and
240th AHC's was put under the operational control of the 9th Infantry. The
headquarters of the 9th and also that of the Mobile Riverine Force (the 2nd Brigade
of the 9th) was located at Dong Tam and the 162nd moved into that sprawling square
mile base to support the Division's operations in the Delta.
The Vultures supported almost any 9th Infantry unit at times but was specifically
assigned as direct support for the 2nd Brigade, consisting of the 3rd battalion of the
47th Infantry, 4th of the 47th and 3rd of the 60th.
Getting all the vehicles and equipment from Phouc Vinh to Dong Tam proved to be a
bit of a chore since the 162nd, like most all aviation units, devoted every resource to
aircraft maintenance and virtually ignored vehicle maintenance. As a result few
vehicles were in condition to make the trip. After much effort and considerable
assistance from battalion HQ the Vultures put together a convoy to Dong Tam,
escorted by armored vehicles (Some vehicles had no brakes and had to run into the
vehicle in front of them to stop).
The Delta region in IV Corps stretched from the Cambodian border to the tip of the
Ca Mau peninsular. It was a heavily silted level plain with no elevation above 9 feet
except in the far western area. The entire area was subject to frequent flooding.
Extensive embankments were built over the centuries to channel water into the rice
fields. Mud flats and mangrove swamps encircled the delta region along its coast.
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Road networks were limited but hard surfaced major roads did exist. Most of the
canals carried heavy traffic throughout the year.
To patrol and fight in the inundated marshlands and rice paddies and along numerous
canals and waterways crossing the Delta, the Army modernized the concept of
riverine warfare employed during the Civil War by Union forces on the Mississippi
River and by the French during the Indochina War. The Mobile Riverine Force used a
joint Army-Navy task force controlled by a ground commander. In contrast to
amphibious operations where control reverts to the ground commander only after the
force is ashore, riverine warfare was an extension of land combat, with infantry units
traveling by water rather than by trucks or tracked vehicles. Aided by a Navy river
support squadron and river assault squadron, infantrymen were housed on barracks
ships and supported by gunships or fire support boats called monitors. Howitzers and
mortars, often mounted on barges, provided artillery support.
The broad, flat stretches of the Delta provided an ideal environment for unrestricted
use of army aviation. Unfortunately, the VC's line of sight was also unrestricted.
They could see you coming from miles away and had plenty of time to take careful
aim.
In the October-November period the 162nd was chosen to experiment with helmet
sights for the XM-21 Minigun system. Sperry Rand sent a technician over to work
with the Copperheads on the test. SP5 John Ohmer (armorer) and WO Dennis
O'Brien helped install and test the system. It worked well under ideal conditions but
the dust, heat and humidity played havoc with the small servos attached to the
helmet. The system wasn't quite ready for field conditions. This was the forerunner of
the helmet-mounted sight used in the current day Apache gunship.
On December 7th, the Vultures repositioned from Dong Tam to Ben Tre before
daylight in preparation for CA. Just after daylight a B-52 strike went in southeast of
Ben Tre and the crews could see and hear the strike as they cranked. The strike was
in and around their LZ. The 9th Infantry had intelligence indicating a VC battalion
HQ in the area. The idea was to make a 10 ship insertion and then bring in more
troops if the situation warranted. Lt Dennis Montgomery (67-17559 with CE SP5
Tom Juneau) was flight lead in a 10 ship formation and WO David Bonifield was
flying trail.
The LZ had concrete hay stacks around it and although it was pretty well blow to
pieces, all hell broke loose. The flight was to make a 180 turn on the ground and WO
Bonifield was to be lead coming out. On short final, they began taking heavy fire and
Lt Montgomery's master caution light flashed on. At roughly a quarter mile from
touch down, the ship began shuttering and shaking and the gunner came on the
intercom and said he'd been hit (luckily the round had passed through his ribs just to
the side of his chicken plate and he wasn't seriously wounded). The round that hit the
gunner had continued through the firewall and punctured a hydraulics line. Since Lt
Montgomery was already set up for landing he continued on and managed to plunk
the ship down in a wet rice paddy. Not knowing the extent of the damage he elected
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to shut down in the LZ.
There was a bit of confusion as the other ships waited for Lt. Montgomery. Finally,
they turned in the LZ and WO Bonifield led the flight out, leaving the former lead
ship on the ground. Lt Montgomery gave first aid to his gunner and they all took
cover in the LZ with the infantry. Meanwhile the rest of the flight had formed up and
were circling a few miles away. At that point WO Gilbreath, disobeying orders from
the C&C ship, broke formation and set up an approach into the hot LZ to pick up Lt
Montgomery and his crew. On final approach he was covered on one side by two
Cobras and on the other by 4 Copperhead gunships, all blazing away at the tree lines.
As Lt Montgomery recalled "You should have seen the massive display of firepower,
particularly from my position. It was beautiful!" After they left the LZ, the downed
ship was hit head on in the nose by an RPG, incurring massive damage.
Amazingly, there were no fatalities. After things settled down, a CH-47 was brought
in to get the ship out. Action was still pretty intense to the north of the LZ so the
Chinook crew was told to land north and depart south. Somehow they became
confused and departed north, right over all the bad guys. However, they held on to
the Huey, probably because they were too scared to remember how to punch it off.
They ended up touching the Huey down at Ben Tre and then making a running
landing themselves, shutting down engines as they rolled. One of the fuel cells was
blown open and the inside of the Chinook and the crew were soaked-a memorable
day for them too.
Some of the men didn't let the tropical weather interfere with a traditional Christmas
celebration. They even built a good-size snowman out of sand and shaving crème that
appeared very authentic.
During the year aircraft availability rates for the 162nd exceeded 80% every month,
sometimes reaching 85%, thanks to the incredible efforts of the Vulture maintenance
team. This played an especially important part in the Vulture and Copperhead
activities in the hectic early months of the year.
The Army supply system during this period (and probably every other period as well)
was extremely cumbersome. When you needed something, you took something (a
case of steaks or chicken, etc.) to the Vulture liaison man in Saigon, told him what
you needed (plywood, air conditioner, or the like) and he would work a deal. More
often than not you would have what you wanted in a matter of days rather than
months if you depended on the supply system.
Aircraft parts supply was also sometimes a problem but the Vultures were fortunate
to have WO Ron Gresham, a great tech supply officer. As WO Dave Bonifield
relates, "We had a very high aircraft mission ready rate. With all due credit to the
maintenance guys, Ron had a lot to do with that. We would fly to Phu Loi. At the
supply depot, Ron would sometimes send me and the CE in the front door with the
requisition slips while he went in the back door to get the things he knew we did not
have the priority to get. We would fly back to Phouc Vinh with every corner of the
Huey packed and rotor blades and tail booms sticking out the doors. The net result
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was a tech supply that probably had enough parts to build a Huey and a high ready
rate."
Memorable Incidents
Other memorable incidents that occurred during 1968 include:
· WO Donald Welch, Assistant Opns Officer, hopped into the passenger seat of a jeep
that was taking him out to the flight line as a rush replacement pilot. However,
someone had removed the seat pins and as the jeep made a sharp left turn, the seat
and WO Welch both tumbled out of the jeep-Some guys had a weird sense of humor!
· Major Thompson was so incensed with the living conditions of the maintenance
people at Phouc Vinh when he took over the company (they were living on a berm
infested with rats) that he immediately had their quarters bulldozed. This left almost
100 men with no shelter at all but the engineers he called in quickly set up tents while
they built permanent quarters.
· WO Jim Cox was returning from R&R as a passenger on a slick that had an engine
failure and landed in a mine field outside of Phouc Vinh. Everyone was afraid to
move and waited for a ship to hover overhead and pick them up.
· A man shot himself in the foot while lying in his bunk and "leading" a rat with his
pistol. One of the leisure activities at Phouc Vinh was to shoot rats. Men would often
lie on their bunks with a gun in their hand so as to be able to squeeze off a shot
without moving and frightening the rat.
· After new urinals were dug, Major Thompson banned indiscriminate urinating in the
company area under penalty of the violator constructing new urinals. Two WO's
promptly ran afoul of the ban and were put to work.
· Late one night the shower ran out of water and a WO back from club was all
lathered up but with no way to rinse. Being resourceful he ran over to 1st Sgt Pine's
hooch and jumped into the fire barrel by his door to rinse off.
· Many remember the "monkey raids" at Phouc Vinh. Monkeys from the local jungle
would invade the 162nd area when the flight crews were all out flying. The monkeys
would come in looking for food and devoured any unsecured care package. They
scared the hooch maids so much they would abandon ship when the monkeys showed
up
HISTORY OF THE 162ND ASSAULT
HELICOPTER COMPANY
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1965-1972
Introduction
The 162nd Aviation Company (AML), later the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company,
was one of the earlier aviation companies to arrive in Vietnam after the ground troop
build up began in 1965. The company subsequently built a sterling record as an
assault helicopter unit.
This history is dedicated to the men of the 162nd who gave their lives in the service of
their country. But for the hand of fate, anyone of us could have easily been in their
place. We still wonder after all these years why some were chosen and others not.
Only God knows the answer. As those who survived, we owe a tremendous debt to
those who did not come back. Everything we do, every breath we take, and every
memory we have, we owe in some part to those who are not here. It is up to us to
conduct our lives so as to make their sacrifice worthwhile, honor their memory and
make sure they are not forgotten.
Also not to be forgotten are the men who made everything possible—the
maintenance crews. Much has been said about the pilots who flew the aircraft but not
much about the people who kept them in the air. Theirs was often an unappreciated
task. However, they did a magnificent job. The performance of the crew chiefs and
maintenance people was summed up by one general this way:
“The super performance did not stop with the pilots. The maintainers
achieved the miraculous…crew chiefs flew all day and worked on their birds
all night. The scene round any company maintenance detachment when the
birds staggered home in the evenings was a sight to behold. The maintenance
crews rolled out, turned on the lights, worked with flashlights, worked by feel,
worked any way, in the rain, in high winds and dust storms, all night long if
necessary to patch their aircraft, pull the required inspections, correct
deficiencies and get them back on the line by next morning. Night test fights,
prohibited in peacetime, were the rule rather than the exception.”
Finally, it is important to realize that an assault helicopter unit was a team in which
everyone had a vital role to play. Everyone was important, right down to the cooks
and mail clerk—maybe especially the cooks and mail clerk!
The Beginning
The 162nd Aviation Company (Air Mobile Light) was constituted on 31 August 1965
in the regular army and activated on 1 September 1965 at Ft. Benning, Georgia. The
unit formed up, received its men after a rather difficult time rounding up a full
complement of pilots and maintenance personnel and began training in early
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December with the 10th Aviation Group using their aircraft (B model Hueys) and
equipment. Small groups of men were sent to Ft. Rucker and Ft. Bragg for additional
specialized training.
Most pilots received only 20 or so hours of training with the unit prior to shipping out
to Vietnam. However, virtually all of them had significant prior experience with an
average of 2100 hours each. Many were dual rated and had over 3,000 hours of flight
time so they didn’t need a great deal of training. After completion of training in B
models each pilot had a one hour D (or C) model transition and they were ready to
go.
Many of the enlisted men and even some of the officers were new to the army. Cpt
Ronald Crown, the flight surgeon, had only recently been drafted and on one of his
first days at Ft. Benning he “borrowed” a jeep parked near the 162nd area to go to the
PX. However, the jeep belonged to another unit and was reported stolen. The MP’s
quickly located the jeep, apprehended “Doc” Crown and brought him back to the
162nd compound for disciplinary action. Of course, “Doc” Crown, being just drafted,
knew nothing of military life and assumed all army vehicles were communal property
to be used by anyone in the army. By his reasoning, since he was in the army, he was
entitled to use an army jeep.
Organization
The 162nd had an initial authorized strength of 219 men (including 41 Warrant
Officers and 14 Officers) and 25 aircraft—later increased to 31, including eight
gunships. The company also had three attached direct support units. These were the
407th Transportation Detachment for direct support maintenance with an authorized
strength of 72 men, the 450th Signal Detachment for avionics support with an
authorized strength of 9 men, and the 758th Medical Detachment with a flight surgeon
and 5 other medical personnel. Roughly, 80% of the entire complement of enlisted
men were regular army and 20% were draftees.
At this point, the war in Vietnam was rapidly heating up and the need for pilots far
exceeded the supply. A decision had recently been made to dramatically increase the
number of pilots trained but it required approximately a year to produce new pilots
and the pipeline was nowhere near full. Consequently, the 162nd, and other units
formed in late 1965 and 1966, had a difficult time obtaining pilots. Anyone with a
set of wings, Major and below, was press-ganged into cockpit duty. Initially at Ft.
Benning the original aviator staffing was 26 Majors, mostly fixed wing aviators who
had gone through the rotary wing transition course, 13 Captains, 2 Lieutenants (Ed
Brock and Tom Turner) and not a single Warrant Officer. Some of the pilots were
not even checked out in a Huey.
However, the shortage of pilots was only part of the problem. Skilled mechanics,
crew chiefs, avionics and armament specialists were also in critical demand. Twentysix Private E-2 crew chiefs (all draftees) were bussed to the 162nd straight out of
maintenance school at Ft. Rucker on October 29, 1965. There were only 3
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maintenance personnel with any experience—two of them were civilian maintenance
technical reps and one was a gunship CE (crew chief).
The aviator staffing shortly after arrival in Vietnam consisted of 28 Majors, 18
Captains, 3 Lieutenants and a couple of Warrant Officers. There were Majors all
over the place—some weren’t even Aircraft Commanders. There were probably
enough Majors in the 162nd to fill all the Major slots in the entire First Aviation
Brigade at that time! The pilots used to joke that “the last one out of the shower had
to be the leader” and “every major gets an airplane”. Of course, they all understood
the shortage of pilots and proceeded to have a good time flying while they still had
the opportunity.
At Ft. Benning the company had chosen the call sign “Dragon” but upon arriving in
Vietnam it was learned that some administrative outfit in Saigon was using that call
sign. The men of the 162nd then chose the call sign “Vulture” for the two slick
platoons and maintenance and “Copperheads” for the gun platoon. The first company
patch was square with a flying vulture holding a helicopter. This was simplified in
December 1967 when the round Vulture and Copperhead patches were adopted.
Later, in 1970, the maintenance platoon came to be known as the “Hangar Rats” and
had their own patch. Not to be outdone, the lift platoons also had their own patch—
“Executioners” for the 1st and “Easy Riders” for the 2nd platoon. The motto for the
company, emblazoned on the later Vulture patch was “STS” for “Set the Standard”,
or perhaps as some folks thought more appropriate “Slicker Than S----.”
During its tour in Vietnam, the 162nd had a total of 14 commanding officers as shown
below:
Commanding Officer
Major Joseph E. Pfluger
Major Albert H. (Rip) Roughen
LTC Gerald W. Kirklighter
Major Neal C. Petree, Jr.
Major Stokely L. Wilson
Major James E. Thompson
Major Ronald K. Andresen
Major Robert K. Wright
Major George W. Venti
Major Kenneth D. Loveless
Major Thomas E. Beauchamp
Major Walter B. Moore
Major Ronald A. Brooks
Major Ronald L. Grooms
Dates of Command
Sept 65-Jun 66
Jun 66-Dec 66
Dec 66-Apr 67
Apr 67-Aug 67
Aug 67-Jan 68
Jan 68-May 68
May 68-Nov 68
Nov 68-May 69
May 69-Nov 69
Nov 69-Apr 70
Apr 70-Oct 70
Oct 70-Mar 71
Mar 71-Sept 71
Sept 71-Apr 72
Mission
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Upon arrival in country on February 3rd, 1966, the 162nd was sent to Phouc Vinh, just
north of Saigon, and assigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) at Phu
Loi which supported the First Infantry Division in the III Corps area. On 1
November 1968, the company was relocated to Dong Tam in the upper Delta region
and assigned to the 214th CAB which was the direct support aviation battalion for the
9th Infantry Division. Upon the withdrawal of the 9th Division from Vietnam in
August 1969, the 162nd was assigned to the 13th CAB in the Mekong Delta and
relocated to Can Tho.
The period at Can Tho saw a shift in type of missions flown from the previous
emphasis on Combat Assaults and related support to more ash & trash type missions
with fewer CAs and a variety of sometimes unusual tasks. After the pullout of the 9th
Division (parts of the division did not leave until early 1970) there were no US
infantry units left in the Delta, and the Vultures primarily supported ARVN units.
This included the 5th ,9th and 21st ARVN Infantry Divisions as well as other
Vietnamese units throughout the IV Corps area until the company stood down in
April 1972. The 162nd had the distinction of being the last assault helicopter unit in
the Delta.
During its six years of service in Vietnam, the 162nd supported a wide variety of US,
Vietnamese and free world forces throughout the III and IV Corps area. Although the
company was in direct support of two US divisions for much of the time, it was
frequently called on to support many other units. Units supported included:
First Infantry Division (The Big Red One)
4th Infantry Division
3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
173rd Airborne Brigade
196th Light Infantry Brigade
199th Light Infantry Brigade
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
5th Special Forces—“A Teams” and Mike (Mobile Strike) Force units
Navy SEALS
1st Australian Task Force
5th, 9th and 21st ARVN Divisions
Thai Expeditionary Force
US Embassy in Cambodia
CIA (Operation Phoenix)
Local Province authorities
Delta Regional Assistance Command
Various artillery, engineer and other II Field Force units
1966
Major Joseph (Gentleman Joe) Pfluger, a former marine and long-time helicopter pilot who
had flown H-19’s in the Korean War, was the first commanding officer. He joined the unit in
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September 1965 and took the company through deployment and the first few months in
Vietnam. He relinquished command to Major Albert (Rip) Roughen in June who held the
position until December when Major (later LTC) Gerald (the Red Baron) Kirklighter assumed
command. Major Kirklighter was a big man with noticeably red hair even when cut very
short.
Major Pfluger was one of 10 Majors in the company up for promotion to LTC. He later found
himself in a rather awkward position when the other 9 Majors made the LTC list and he did
not. Despite this, he was a good leader and excellent company commander.
After the Christmas holidays in ‘65 passed, the company completed last minute preparations
for departure from Fort Benning. Late one night in early January, the company departed
Benning by bus to the Muscogee County Airport in Columbus, GA to load on to Lockheed
Electra aircraft for the flight to Alameda Naval Air Station, CA. Although the aircraft were
in standard airline configuration, all of the company personnel were in full combat gear with
steel pots and weapons. After takeoff and climb to cruise altitude, more than a few on board
commented on the really shallow rate of climb after takeoff and the extensive time spent
looking out the windows at the ground below at a very low altitude. The suspicion was that
the flight crew might have underestimated the takeoff weight of the plane due to the weight
of the full combat gear worn by all on board except them. Despite this slight problem, the
flight went well and the company off-loaded from the Electras at “oh dark early” the next
morning at Alameda.
Major Pfluger flew to Vietnam with a small advance party while Major Ed Brown, the XO,
took the main body of men over on the USMTS Pope.
In typical “hurry up and wait” manner, the company proceeded to dockside at Oakland and
boarded the USMTS John Pope for what was expected to be a departure shortly thereafter
and deployment to Vietnam by ship. Then two days were spent on board while other units
and personnel were boarding, and the company personnel stood at the rail looking across the
harbor at the San Francisco skyline - so close and yet unreachable! In addition, the
anticipation of a quick departure on the voyage was related to the fact well known by all on
board that their Vietnam tour of duty began when the ship departed - not when it arrived in
RVN. (The 25 aircraft had been picked up at the factory, flown to Oakland and loaded onto
the carrier Iwo Jima along with an advance party in December).
Some were a bit disappointed with the sendoff from the Oakland pier. Rather than cheering
crowds, marching bands and speeches as in the old war movies, the pier was deserted except
for a small, lonely-looking Army band. However, the view of the Golden Gate Bridge on the
way out of the harbor was a spectacular sight, one still imprinted in the memory of the men
who were on the troopship that day.
The trip to Vietnam via Hawaii took 22 days with one stop in Hawaii to disembark
troops for the 25th Infantry Division stationed there at the time. It was incredibly
boring and there was literally nothing to do but eat, sleep, read and play cards. “Doc”
Crown, the flight surgeon, managed to get himself into more trouble on the ship.
During the stopover in Hawaii almost everyone went into Honolulu for eight hours of
shore leave with instructions to be back at the ship by midnight. Everyone, that is,
but “Doc” Crown. He had brought his pump action shotgun along and went back to
the fantail and began shooting sea gulls. The ship’s Captain asked “Doc” Crown to
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stop shooting birds while the ship was docked. Another incident occurred later while
enroute to Vietnam. “Doc” Crown, Cpt Ronald Miller and several others decided to
have a little target practice off the fantail one day. They started by shooting tin cans
thrown up in the air but then began picking off the albatrosses that flew nearby. The
ships’ officers had a fit over this and chewed the group out—something about
bringing bad luck if you kill an albatross. (Remember “The Rhyme of the Ancient
Mariner” from high school and why the sailor was cursed?)
Many remember the unscheduled stop near Guam to transfer a man with appendicitis
to a small tug boat and the show the troops put on a few days before arrival. The
USMTS Pope stopped at Cam Ranh Bay to unload some of the smaller units that had
embarked with the company and then on to Vung Tau, arriving on 6 February 1966,
where the company offloaded onto LSM’s for the trip to the beach. The unit was
then flown into Phouc Vinh on three C-130’s, a hot, dusty and desolate spot that had
been a former French, then ARVN, compound that was now the HQ of the First
Brigade, First Infantry Division. Phouc Vinh had been a Japanese airfield called
Bung Bung in World War II and then a French airfield in the early 1950’s.
The arrival of the main party of the company at Phouc Vinh was interesting to say the
least. When loaded on the C-130s at Vung Tau, all on board were sure it would be a
flight of some time before arriving at their destination. However, in approximately
15 to 20 minutes of flying time, the C-130 descended and made an assault landing.
When looking out the small windows of the plane, all that could be seen was a cloud
of red (laterite) dust swirled up by the reversed props. It gave the impression of
landing on Mars instead of Phouc Vinh. After recovering from the effects of the
landing, the company personnel picked up their combat gear and personal gear and
disembarked down the rear ramp of the C-130 at their new base camp. As the troops
deplaned, they noticed one of the company advance party officers waiting on the
ramp for them. When all had deplaned, he formed them up in a column of twos, sort
of, and led them over the ramp where the company UH-1’s would soon be sitting.
As they proceeded the short distance to the gate of a compound, all of the newly
arrived men had experienced the climate of Vietnam for the first time after waiting
for an hour or so at the Vung Tau airfield and now in the mid-day heat at Phouc Vinh,
and were really feeling the heat and humidity. The cumulative effect of lugging their
combat and personal gear off the ship, on and off the planes, and covering the length
of the ramp had not only worn them out physically but had put them in a mental
frame of mind that was not a happy one. When they arrived at the crudely
constructed front gate of their new home, they saw the CO, Major Pfluger, 350
Magnum on his hip, sitting on a jeep with a 1/4 ton trailer behind it. They were glad
to see him—until he started laughing at them—more than a few started feeling
otherwise about him and a few choice derogatory words were muttered under their
breath. Having no other choice, they walked up to him. As they approached, he
continued laughing and then, pointing to the trailer, said “The first one’s on me!”
When they got close enough to the trailer, they saw that it was filled with iced down
beer. With that first, ice cold beer still going down, they all experienced a great
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attitude adjustment and gained a greater appreciation for their CO. Some were heard
to say that that first beer in Vietnam was the best they ever had.
The aircraft had not yet arrived but the air crews were farmed out to the 116th and
128th AHC’s (the Hornets and Tomahawks) at Phu Loi for a couple of weeks of incountry training. The rest of the company was kept busy constructing facilities and
sandbagging hooches. There were a few old French buildings but most facilities had
to be built from scratch. Initially most people, including the pilots, spent some of
their time filling sand bags and pulling guard duty on the perimeter. Someone built a
sand bag loading contraption out of a 55 gallon barrel which made filling the bags a
little easier but it was still tough work. Everything got off to a good start but some
folks weren’t too happy when a Chinook dropped a conex full of footlockers being
sling-loaded in. Major Darwin Schuett brought some jet wing tanks ups from Saigon
for use as holding tanks for the showers. It was a bit tricky flying since he couldn’t
go faster than 45 knots without causing severe bouncing (due to the aerodynamics of
the wing tanks protruding from each side of the cargo area).
The senior pilots, CO, XO and company staff lived in “Majors’ Manor”, a
refurbished original French building, and some of the junior ones made their home in
“Vultures Gulch”, a converted pig barn that resembled an old west building with a
covered wooden walk in front of a dusty/muddy street. Most others lived in GP
Medium tents.
The aircraft soon arrived in Vung Tau via aircraft carrier and the crews were ferried
over to pick them up. This first complement of aircraft consisted of 17 brand new
UH-1D models and 8 UH-1C models. (It is interesting to note that the 162nd had the
distinction of being both the first and the last assault helicopter unit in Vietnam to use
C model gunships.) On the way back to Phouc Vinh, the entire company was
diverted to the Snake Pit (home of the 71st AHC Rattlers), picked up troops and
carried out a Combat Assault (CA) at An Loc. What a way to go operational!
The Copperheads had brand new C models with quad 60’s and one 40mm
“Chunker”. The C models were the envy of the company’s sister units which still
had B model gunships and no chunkers. However, there was a shortage of M-60’s
and on the first few CA’s the slick CE’s and gunners used M-14’s fired on automatic.
After a few weeks, more M-60’s were available but they were primarily used freehand, attached to a bungee cord, since the X-23 gun mounts didn’t arrive for a couple
more months.
Initially, both the aircraft commander (AC) and crew chief (CE) were assigned to
specific aircraft while the pilot (peter pilot, or PP) and door gunner usually rotated
from ship to ship. However, in later years only the CE was assigned to a ship
although the AC and gunner often tended to fly with the same CE. A peter pilot
normally flew with every AC in the company on a rotating basis. A PP flew almost
every day for 4-5 months before he was ready for AC. When he was put up for AC,
all AC’s in the company voted on whether to grant him that honor.
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The Vultures were assigned as direct support for the 1st Brigade of the First Infantry
Division. The First Brigade units operating out of Phouc Vinh were the 1st Battalion
of the 26th Infantry, 1st of the 28th , and 1st of the 1st. The 162nd worked very closely
with these units both at Phouc Vinh and in the field. In addition to the First Infantry
Division the Vultures worked with almost any unit operating in III Corps. They
worked not only in III Corps but also throughout the area known as War Zone D and
the northern Delta.
The grizzled veteran of the group was Major Robert DesJardins who had previously
served a tour at Pleiku in the very early stages of the war. He was the resident
advisor on how to survive in Vietnam and his pointers probably saved many a pilot
and crew.
When the 162nd arrived at Phouc Vinh, it provided the 1st Brigade with a significant
air mobility capability -- in more ways than one! At that time, Phouc Vinh was an
enclave in Viet Cong held territory to the extent that it was accessible by outside
friendly forces only once a month. The rest of the month, it was encircled by VC
forces. This was alleviated on a once-a-month basis by a road clearing operation,
conducted by the 1st Brigade and supporting forces to open and keep open the road
from Phu Loi to allow large (100+) truck convoys to resupply the brigade’s isolated
location. Included in the mission essential items brought in was a supply of a variety
of liquid refreshments for the troops—beer included (on a space available basis of
course). Unfortunately, the supply of beer did not always sustain the troops until the
next month’s delivery by ground. Prior to the arrival of the 162nd and their aircraft,
it got more than a little dry towards the end of the month. However, once the
Vultures were in place and flying daily combat support (ash and trash) missions to
and from down South (Phu Loi, Saigon, etc.), the term airmobile took on a whole
new meaning. Seldom, if ever, did an aircraft return from down South without a
partial, or even full, load of mission essential liquid refreshments, Budweiser being
one of primary importance! The ability of the Vultures to bring in significant
quantities all during the month not only boosted troop morale, but also made them
very popular - and made “horse trading” for things needed by the company a lot
easier.
The first shelling by VC 75 mm pack howitzers in early 1966 was an event not to be
forgotten by those who were there. This first attack took place shortly after the
arrival of all of the aircraft. Surprisingly, it was predicted by a Special Forces grunt
who passed through while catching a ride to go back up North. He told Operations
personnel they could expect Charlie to hit within ten days - the attack occurred on the
night of the ninth day. The CO’s jeep took a direct hit from a 75 mm round and
another hit the porch of his hooch but failed to explode. A round also made a direct
hit on a conex of washing machines shipped over with the equipment, completely
destroying them. Another round severely wounded a very nice paper mache Vulture
hanging in front of Vulture’s Gulch. Fortunately, it was patched up like new.
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The attack set back an early attempt at mosquito control in Majors Manor, a never
ending task. A few days before, two residents (Majors Atsushi “Archie” Miyamoto
and Sam Patellos) made a significant contribution to this effort by scrounging some
screening material that was very hard to come by. First priority was given to the
mess hall that had walls that went from the ground up about four feet and a roof
supported by poles - otherwise an open air hooch. After being able to screen in the
mess hall, they took advantage of having enough left over to put screening in the door
and the rear window openings (no window or door, just openings) of their room.
When the attack occurred, one of the other occupants of the room forgot about the
screening in the excitement of the moment, and made a flying exit out through the
rear window opening taking the precious screening with him. Despite the seriousness
of the attack, the Vultures were fortunate in that they did not lose any personnel.
Charlies’ accuracy was such that he bracketed the aircraft ramp by hitting the POL
dump at one end and the company compound at the other end - no aircraft were lost
or damaged. As a result of the first attack, the filling of sandbags took on number
one priority for all of the company. The next day saw the building of many bunkers
with what was reported to be thousands of sandbags.
Sometime around mid April, Lt Ed Brock had the dubious distinction of earning the
first of many Purple Hearts awarded to the men of 162nd. He was firing the quad-60’s
on a Copperhead gunship and was hit in the face by shell fragments. Luckily, it was
relatively minor and he was back flying within a week or so.
Many of the Majors who came over on the ship with the unit were reassigned during
the May-June ‘66 time frame. These departures were caused primarily by two
significant events. The first was the publication of the LTC promotion list in June.
At that time, there were 10 Majors in the company that were in the zone for selection.
When the list was published, nine of the 10 made the list for promotion. Shortly after
this occurrence, all of those selected were reassigned to other duties, mostly to staffs
at USARV, MACV, and other higher HQs. Their replacements in the company were
largely company grade officers and WO’s arriving from stateside. The second event
contributing to the change in the company rank structure was the infusion of
members of the 1st Cavalry Division from up North. This was done to avoid a
rotation problem when the Cav’s first year in country ended since they all came over
at the same time in ‘65. By this action, the Cav personnel sent to units like the 162nd
would rotate out before the rest of that unit. Later in the year, the company received
another large influx of Majors as assigned pilots were transferred or DEROS’d.
The first combat casualty also occurred in April. Major Darwin Schuett and WO J.
D. Tucker were lead ship on a 4 ship CA on April 9th to insert a recon (LRRP) team
from the First Infantry in the Courtney Rubber Plantation area south of Xuan Loc.
On takeoff from Xuan Loc, Major Schuett’s ship (64-13857) had an engine failure,
crashed and burned just outside the airfield perimeter. The two pilots received only
slight injuries but the CE (SP5 Paul D. Stevens) and gunner (PFC Ronnie R.
Lovett), as well as several troops on board, had very serious burns from which some
later died. PFC Lovett died from his injuries two days later. God rest his soul.
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Everyone seems to have heard the story about a couple of 162nd crew chiefs
(apparently flight school dropouts) going to Saigon, stealing a B model and bringing
it back to Phouc Vinh. They gave it a new log book and tail number, painted a red
dog on the nose and presented it to the 407th TC Detachment CO. Who the CE’s
were remains a mystery—but they should have continued on in flight school!
The Vultures were supporting a battalion of the First Infantry Division on a CA
around midyear when a bizarre event occurred. After inserting the troops and
resupplying them the slicks were ordered to land in the LZ by the ground commander
and were stationed around the battalion’s perimeter to use the aircraft’s M-60’s for
perimeter defense. They stayed there all night and part of the next day until higher
level commanders found out about it. Luckily they were not attacked during the
night. The battalion commander on the ground got into big trouble over that one!
Some folks may remember the DECCA navigation system installed on some of the
first aircraft of the 162nd. DECCA worked by triangulating off three ground
transmitters. Using DECCA, the pilot could pinpoint his position down to within a
few meters in very rough terrain and even at night. However, the DECCA map came
in a long strip and the width represented only a few thousand yards. If a ship was
flying along the map’s vertical axis there was no problem but if it turned to the
horizontal axis the aircraft quickly ran off the map and it took some time to load and
register the adjoining map into the DECCA system. Despite its limitations, DECCA
was used frequently for Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) insertions, particularly
those involving multiple fake LZ’s to confuse the enemy. It was also very handy in
helping LRRP teams pinpoint their exact position on the ground.
Major “Rip” Roughen, a “lead magnet” in the air and a hard drinking Irishman at the
O Club, was the CO during the last half of 1966. Major Michael Royse, the
Operations Officer, recalls flying with him one day to pick up some POWs and being
hit by a 50 caliber round in the fuel tank. The round ripped a hole in the bladder and
JP-4 was pouring out when they landed. That’s when they learned the fuel cell was
self-sealing only on the bottom, not the sides. Of course it wasn’t very funny to him
but the Vultures joked about it for days when Major Roughen later broke an ankle
falling off a bar stool at the O Club.
The Vultures supported the First and 25th Infantry Divisions as well as the 173rd
Airborne Brigade in Operation Attleboro in the fall of 1966, leading many of the
large initial lifts. By this time, the Vultures had established their reputation as one of
the most proficient units conducting combat assaults. Four regiments of NVA
regulars had planned to wipe out a Special Forces camp and Mobile Strike Force at
Sui Da but were foiled by the aggressive tactics and rapid airmobile deployment of
the US units involved. Over 1,100 enemy were killed in a 4-week period.
Being designated to lead large lifts to kick off Operation Attleboro was just one
example. In an earlier similar size operation, Major Ray Holleran led a flight of 90
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slicks with supporting gunships and Chinooks. In this operation the Vultures
supported the 1st Division in establishing and operating from a forward CP on the
Michelin Plantation at the Dau Tieng airfield for the duration of the operation.
Another interesting event occurred in Sept ‘66. A Copperhead fire team under Lt Ed
Brock was supporting the 5th ARVN Division near Phu Loi and managed to singlehandedly capture 2 VC. They had spotted 3 VC who were shooting at them from a
tree line next to some rice paddies. The VC then ran along some dikes and
disappeared in into a rice paddy. Lt Brock landed both ships of his fire team on a
nearby dike and he along with both CE’s(SP5 Carl Feuchter and SP4 Gene Boselle)
and both gunners (SP4 Ronald Willis and Sgt. Robert Schaber) jumped out and
formed a line to search the rice paddy for the three VC who were hiding under the
muddy, chest-deep water. They soon located 2 of the VC by actually stepping on
them. Lt Brock waved his 45 in one VC’s face hoping to scare him into revealing the
location of the 3rd VC. However, he lost his balance in the muck and fell backwards.
He thought he was “done for” at that point but, surprisingly, the VC did not even
move. They tied them up and put one VC onto each gunship then took off and
unloaded their rockets on the suspected location of the 3rd VC they could not locate.
They turned the 2 VC captives over to the 5th ARVN Division and the division
commander later presented the entire fire team with the Vietnamese Cross of
Gallantry.
On October 4th the Vultures, covered by one Copperhead gunship, on a mission near Ben Luc
flew into the hottest LZ they had been in to date. The lead ship, 64-13854, under AC Major
Atsushi “Archie” Miyamoto with Major Carl Busdiecker, CE SP4 William DuBois and
Gunner SP4 Boynton Goldston, landed in the LZ when suddenly a number of VC came out
of rice paddies firing BAR’s, Carbines and machine guns. The ship took heavy fire—one
round hitting Major Miyamoto square in the abdomen. Luckily he was wearing his chicken
plate (chest protector) and it stopped the 30 caliber round.
Another round came up through the bottom of the ship as they landed, entering the bottom
of SP4 “Goldfoot” Goldston’s foot but did not exit the top. While the lead ship was being
shot up, another Vulture ship was also in trouble. AC Lt Roy Dowdy, Pilot WO Robert
Edgertan, CE SP4 Charles Buckner, and Gunner SP4 Lester Stevens, in ship 64-13862 were hit
many times and forced down in the LZ. After dropping its troops off the ship behind them
picked up the downed crew.
The slicks cleared the LZ with a tally of 5 VC confirmed kills while the Copperheads stayed
to provide fire support for the infantry. AC Captain John McQuestion, WO Arthur Cline, CE
SP4 Gene Boselle and Gunner Corporal Rivera-Aviles reported 10 VC confirmed kills and 5
VC wounded. WO Cline made a direct hit on 2 VC with a rocket.
Many people remember the adventures of Major Miyamoto who became known as
“Kamikaze 6”. No one remembers how many times he was wounded but it was quite
a few. On the above occasion where he was hit in the chicken plate by a round that
splattered shrapnel into his throat, chin and upper legs he was medivac’d to the
MASH at Bien Hoa. However, the wounds were not as serious as they appeared and
he returned to duty after a week or so. As Major Schuett recalled “I can still see him
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with that big grin sitting up in his bed at Bien Hoa”. Major Miyamoto’s chicken
plate, with the large depression where the slug impacted, was ceremoniously hung in
the Operation’s Hooch as a reminder for everyone to wear their chest protector. His
luck also held one day when he returned from a mission and the transmission locked
up on his ship just as they shut down.
On another occasion, the Vultures and Copperheads were standing by on an airstrip
waiting to begin a large CA with the 1st Infantry Division when the strip was shelled
by the VC. Major Miyamoto was hit by shrapnel in the back just under his flak vest.
He was medivac’d by Major Joe Estores and left blood all over the inside of his ship.
He was scheduled to go on R & R the next day and was to meet his wife in Japan.
Instead, he was evacuated to Japan for an operation and got a long R & R there with
his wife. Major Miyamoto later returned to the company. He finally managed to
make it out of Vietnam alive, but it was a pretty close thing!
In late 1966, an incident occurred that illustrates how some guys were incredibly
sound sleepers. During a mortar and rocket attack, WO Jim Christiansen was startled
awake but not sure if the noise was incoming fire. A few seconds later the mess hall
just across from his hooch was blown up by a rocket, quickly confirming his
suspicions. He ran toward the bunker outside his back door but hesitated to go in
because of his fear of spiders! Just then a large fireball (from a rocket) erupted
nearby and he decided to take his chances with the spiders. Once inside it dawned on
him that his roommate, WO Bob Truckenmiller, was missing. He ran back to his
hooch to find his roommate still fast asleep and the mess hall next door burning
furiously. WO Truckenmiller kept 3 large “Big Ben” alarm clocks in a pie tin next to
his bed to keep him from oversleeping but, of course, they were no help in this case.
He said he thought it was just a thunderstorm—until it started “raining” shrapnel on
his tin roof.
Many remember Cpt Chuck DeShields, otherwise known as “Magnet Ass”, for his
uncanny ability to draw enemy fire. He seemed to be invariably shot at on every CA.
Cpt DeShields was a big man, well over 6 feet and 240 lbs. or so, who had turned
down a Pro Football draft to stay in the Army. He always seemed to be a little lower,
or slower, than the rest of the pack and thus probably attracted fire like a wounded
duck. The other pilots joked that “if he wasn’t so damn big, he wouldn’t be over
gross and could climb faster”.
Cpt DeShields was easily recognizable approaching his aircraft on the flight line by
his gear. In addition to flight equipment, he wore both a flak vest and a chicken plate
over it and carried both a .45 pistol and an M-16 that he had scrounged from some
Infantryman. Not too many others in the company were strong enough to carry all
that.
On November 15, 1966 WO James W. Bruhn, copilot in 64-13855,was killed by
small arm fire while on an ARVN CA near Tay Ninh. As WO Christiansen recalls,
he was flying lead ship with Cpt DeShields and WO Bruhn was copilot with WO
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Chuck Tanner on their left in a 5 ship staggered trail formation. As the ships flared to
land, a machine gun opened up on them from a bunker to their left front, close to WO
Bruhn’s ship. One of the rounds went behind Bruhn’s chicken plate, killing him
instantly. No one else was hit but the ship was too damaged to fly and the crew
scrambled out and took cover with the ARVNs.
Another ship in the flight picked up the three survivors. On hearing that WO Bruhn
was dead, Cpt DeShields began crying and beating on the instrument panel, blaming
himself for Bruhn’s death.
On the 2nd lift into the LZ, WO Christiansen recalls they landed in the same spot (in a
flooded rice paddy) and the ship was rocking in an unsteady manner. The gunner
then came on the intercom saying “Mr. Christiansen, you’re on a slope!”
Christiansen responded “No S---, the ship is rocking all over the place”. The gunner
then said “No, you’re on a real slope.” At that point WO Christiansen looked out his
window and noticed 2 ARVN troops squirming under the weight of the skids, right
where there were previously dropped off.
One of the well-known landmarks in the area was Nui Ba Dien (Black Virgin
Mountain) just north of Tay Ninh. It was a perfect cone shape, rising 2500 to 3000
feet. There was a Special Forces A Team with a company of Cambodian mercenaries
on the summit who operated a radio relay station but the rest of the mountain was
controlled by the VC. The A Team was more or less adopted by the Vultures and
anyone in the area always checked in with them to see if they needed supplies or
people hauled up or down the mountain (the only way on or off was by air).
Landings at the top were no problem since they were steep pinnacle approaches.
However, during takeoffs the ships dove down the side of the mountain hugging the
treetops and almost always took fire. Luckily, the VC had lousy aim and this came to
be something of a game.
One of the missions in direct support of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was the
employment of a Copperhead light fire team to a battalion forward CP during a
battalion size operation. The SOP for this mission was to locate in close proximity to
the battalion CP and be ready to scramble if the battalion came under mortar attack—
the purpose being to get airborne, spot muzzle flashes from the mortars, and fire
rockets, machine gun, or 40mm rounds into the location of the mortars. A different
starting procedure was used to expedite getting airborne ASAP. When shutting down
at the CP, all switches were left on except for the master power switch so that when it
was time to scramble the pilot flipped on one switch to start up the aircraft and all
systems at once. The Copperheads handled this mission very well. That fact, and the
location of the company north of the other units in the 11th CAB, resulted in a call
from the Battalion Operations Center (BOC) one night to scramble gunships and go
up to Loc Ninh to support the friendlies there who were under attack by the VC.
As the Copperhead Platoon Leader (Major Ray Holleran) recalls, a couple of fire
teams got airborne in a hurry and headed North. Navigation was difficult over the
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territory between Phouc Vinh and Loc Ninh and the only things visible on the ground
were what appeared to be widely scattered campfires. After flying a general heading
and computing some rough time and distance, and having some luck, the teams
arrived at Loc Ninh. The attack had ceased shortly before their arrival, but they were
ordered to land and RON at that location. Although this put the teams in a situation
where they could come under fire if a second attack occurred, the crews agreed that it
was a better alternative than trying to get back to home base over the territory just
flown over. The teams stayed on station at Loc Ninh on standby for several days in
the same role they played in support of the battalion CPs but did not get engaged.
One event that added interest to their time at Loc Ninh was a chance to see General
Westmoreland up close. Because of the attack, he flew up to check out the situation
and his chopper was parked near those of the fire teams.
A popular event during the Phouc Vinh era was the fairly frequent burning of the latrines,
more popularly known as “S---Houses”. The latrines were originally built as 3 to 6 “holers”
over a trench 6 feet or so deep. Every week a couple of gallons of diesel was supposed to be
dumped into the trench and set on fire. If only a couple of gallons of diesel was added, the
flames would not get high enough to ignite the latrine itself. However, the problem was that
the people on the burning detail tended to add far too much diesel, causing the flames to
engulf the latrine house itself. When the latrines caught fire everyone seemed to enjoy
running around yelling “Fire, the S---House is on fire”. Many then ran not to get water
buckets or hoses but to get their cameras. This was probably the most photographed event
in Vietnam. Every S---House that caught fire always burned completely to the ground.
An interesting incident happened around the end of the year. WO Christiansen was
flying ash and trash missions north of Tay Ninh and was sent to a PZ to pick up some
equipment. On landing an officer came over and asked them to take the equipment to
a certain set of coordinates. Included in the load was a 55-gallon drum of CS gas
crystals, and a gasoline powered CS pump. Seems they had found some tunnels and
had pumped CS gas into them. Now they wanted to send the equipment back to their
base camp.
WO Christiansen protested that an open 55-gallon drum of CS, with a poncho liner
held on by a bungee cord as a lid was not the most desirable cargo in a helicopter
with no rear doors. However, the officer assured him that the “lid” was tight and he
accepted the cargo.
That decision soon proved to be a mistake. Suddenly, the “secure” lid of the 55gallon drum was flapping in the breeze, and there were CS crystals filling the air. In
no time, both pilots and the crew were virtually blinded. As the pilots struggled to
open their eyes and maintain control of the ship, the crew chief and gunner struggled
to push the 55 gallon drum out. They finally got the drum out the door (at around
2000 feet) and flew in a big orbit watching it head for the jungle below while trying
to regain ability to control the aircraft. Sometimes you wonder how many stupid
occurrences like this ended up with tragic results in Vietnam, perhaps with
“unknown” reasons listed for the loss of an aircraft and crew.
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An Officers’ Club was built in the Vulture compound at Phuoc Vinh around mid year
in an interesting series of steps. The obvious first step was to acquire building
materials - but the way the Vultures did it was unique. As a lot of units did in the
early days of ‘66, a Liaison Officer was kept on duty in Saigon with primary area of
interest being the docks of Saigon. Prerequisite qualification for this assignment was
the ability to scrounge at a high level of efficiency. All incoming ships and their
cargo were his targets. Among his major accomplishments was the continuing
acquisition of pallets of the beer for Phuoc Vinh referred to earlier. But he surpassed
all previous accomplishments when he got the word that materials to build a Vulture
O’ Club were needed. Shortly thereafter, materials started arriving by air primarily
and some by ground. As the piles of material kept accumulating, some wondered
why the CO was waiting to give the word to start building. After a period of time,
the word was put out that the club construction would now start. It was then that the
company learned that the materials on hand were, in fact, a complete corrugated
metal building that had been scrounged by our man in Saigon. The second step was
to construct the club - no easy task because it was a good size building. Although
some outside help was used, the large majority of the work was done by the officers
and men of the company. Because the construction could not detract from
operational responsibilities, the labor was done when they could find some time—and
by a special group of in-house laborers known as “short timers.”
To qualify for the “short timers” group, a guy had to have less than 30 days left
before his DEROS which meant he was eased out of being fully committed every day
to operational flights, especially combat assaults. So, after a lot of hard work done
primarily by the short timers, the O’ Club came into being and plans were made for
the long awaited grand opening. As it turned out, it was all that was expected of it but with an unexpected twist. As mentioned previously, some 1st Cav pilots joined
the Vultures in June ‘66. By coincidence, they all hit the less than 30 day mark about
the time the club was under construction. Consequently, their operational
commitments decreased and their time working on the club increased. They did a
great job that was appreciated by all until the day of the opening. It was on the
morning of the big day when the first radio calls started coming in to the company
Ops about the club building, and particularly the roof and painting thereon. These
calls came from inbound aircraft from the 1st Division HQs at Phu Loi and other
locations as they approached to land to the West, which meant the crews and
passengers had a great view of the Vulture compound. What they were seeing was a
painting large enough to cover most of the roof, and presenting a very good rendition
of the yellow and black 1st Calvary Division shoulder patch - the famous “horse
blanket!” It was later learned that our hard working group of infused pilots from that
division had put in some overtime and had gone up on the roof late on the night
before and done the deed. Needless to say, one of the first, if not the first, phone call
came from the compound right next door - HQs, 1st Brigade,1st Infantry Division.
They were a little less than thrilled about the horse blanket patch painted on a
building in the center of their base camp. The appropriate action was taken to paint
over the patch, but the guilty parties were never shot at dawn - they just DEROS’d
ASAP! After that, the O’ Club was a great place and a big morale booster.
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As most people will recall there was a road that crossed the runway at
Phouc Vinh to access the First Infantry area on the other side. There was
a stop sign at the runway and vehicles were supposed to make sure there
was no aircraft nearby when crossing the runway. However, one day a ¾
ton truck with 5-6 infantry troopers crossed the runway just as a Vulture
slick was taking off. The right skid went through the vehicle’s windshield
and ripped the windshield frame off the truck. The slick veered sharply
to the right, narrowly avoiding crashing into the ground and made a
force landing right in the middle of the maintenance area.
Other memorable incidents during 1966 include:
• When the troopship stopped in Hawaii on the trip to Vietnam, the men were
allowed to go into town for a few hours. Five men, all from other units on board,
decided they didn’t want to go to Vietnam and did not report back to the ship in
time for sailing.
•
Major Schuett used his ship’s DECCA navigation system to give some Air Force
C-130’s a makeshift GCA when they were attempting to resupply the First
Infantry at the Minh Than air strip and ran into a thick haze and IFR conditions.
•
SP4 Dennis Hickman, a Copperhead gunner, recalls his fire team escorting a
convoy of mechanized 155 mm howitzers and them taking fire from a small patch
of trees near the road. The gunships set up for a gun run but the 155 crews turned
around and lowered their tubes to fire point blank at the patch of trees. When
they fired, trees and limbs were blasted up higher in the air than the gunships and
almost knocked them out of the sky. They decided the artillery could take care of
themselves.
•
A quick thinking Vietnamese POL driver put out a fire caused by static electricity
on an aircraft at a refueling point. He stuck his fire extinguisher into the fuel port
and the CE of a nearby ship, SP4 Bill Rettenmund, extinguished a fire underneath
the aircraft. After it was over SP4 Rettenmund was so shook up he walked away
and lit a smoke and was promptly chewed out for smoking on the flight line by an
officer running toward the scene. The Vietnamese driver was awarded a welldeserved Bronze Star.
•
A memorable company personality for a while was ‘ Agnes’ who was TDY (sort
of) from her home station in the jungle. Agnes was a medium sized baboon who
was bought by one of the Vultures from a Vietnamese. She was a frequent visitor
to the porch of Majors Manor which was the location of what could be loosely
called Happy Hour for those who were available to partake of a cool one while
rehashing the day’s operations. On the porch was a scrounged old fashioned soft
drink cooler that was used to hold the beer - hopefully with some ice. Over time,
Agnes’ owner started bringing her to the porch for the get together. While there,
she perched on the cooler and was often given some beer—wrong thing to do but
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it provided some great entertainment. She put on quite an act when she had a few
swigs.
•
There was also another monkey, a 3-legged one named Henry. He roamed the
compound mooching chow, c-rations and anything he could find. Henry was
also a horny little devil. He noticed there was an abundance of cats around (some
of them "baby leopards"). Henry would lay in ambush from any suitable
concealment. When a cat came by he would pounce and rape the cat (with great
vigor). The cat would scream, spit, hiss and claw to no avail. Henry was not
choosey (male or female cat) but he WAS thorough. When he finally let the cat
go you wouldn't see that one around for a long time. A short time later he would
ambush another cat, then another, then another....etc. etc.....
•
The first pilot wounded in the face received both a Purple Heart and a reprimand
for not having his helmet shield down during a CA.
1967
The year began with Major Kirklighter, “the Red Baron”, still in command. On April 10th, he
relinquished command to Major Neal Petree who was in turn replaced by Major Stokely
Wilson on August 2nd who served the remainder of the year. Many men considered Major
Kirklighter to be the best CO they ever had. He demanded that all AC’s be able to lead the
flight and routinely rotated them into flight lead. Since Major Kirklighter was the senior
company commander in the battalion the Vultures were normally tapped to lead large CA’s.
However, he wasn’t all business and no play. Major Kirklighter had his own bar stool at the
O Club with a UH-1 shoulder harness and seat belt.
The top heavy pilots roster had still not improved much by early 1967 and in some
respects was worse. At one point there were 39 majors in the company, including 9
on the LTC list. The ”ordinary” majors were pretty much relegated to “carrying the
helmets” of the ones on the LTC list, so to speak.
Runway lighting was installed at Phouc Vinh early in the year. The lights were left
on until all reported traffic had landed each night and was available on call at other
times. This made night landings much safer and, of course, made it much easier to
find Phouc Vinh at night.
During the 1966-67 period the Vultures were in very heavy demand and it was
common for pilots to log 200 hours or more per month. In fact, WO Christiansen
reports that his highest monthly total was 260 hours and his longest day was 17
hours--That’s a lot of flying! This kind of flying put an incredible strain on the crews
and the First Aviation Brigade later initiated a policy of no more than 140 hours in
any 30 day period (although it was often ignored).
In early January, a Copperhead fire team supporting the first battalion, 26th Infantry
north of Lai Khe made 15 confirmed kills as it attacked VC near an LZ it was
covering. Two days later, a Copperhead fire team led by Cpt John Barry, and
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accompanied by Major Kirklighter, made 10 more confirmed kills while supporting
ARVN units outside of Tan An.
A senseless accident occurred on February 1st. A man from the 407th, SP4 Willard A.
Philson, stepped on a land mine while crossing over the perimeter wire to the
adjoining ARVN compound and was killed. Men from the 162nd and 407th routinely
visited the ARVN compound to buy beer and other “necessities” of life. No one
knew the area between the two compounds was mined until this incident. There was
some speculation that the mines were old Japanese mines left over from WWII.
Mine-clearing teams were brought in shortly thereafter and the area was cleared.
On February 3, 1967 Major Paul R. Karas, the XO, and Major William Phillips, the
Operations Officer, were killed while on a lift south of Saigon in the area know as the
”Testicles”. They were lead ship (66-00908) on a joint US/ARVN lift. The US and
ARVN troops were to land in different LZ’s. Enroute to the first LZ the US
commander switched the LZ’s and the US troops were landed in the ARVN LZ, right
in the middle of a huge rice paddy with no trees for at least a mile on each side. The
ARVNs, on the other hand, were to land in the apex of a V-shaped area with a river
and trees on each side.
On short final of a 10-ship staggered trail formation, the ARVN commander changed
plans and shouted for Major Karas to land short. He quickly informed the flight of
the change and the ships landed along a dike line with the lead ship in roughly the
spot where the trail ship would have been. As the troops unloaded, a massive
explosion lifted the lead ship up about 10 feet and rolled it over on its left side where
it beat itself to death, ending bottom up at a 45 degree angle. The pilot, Major
Phillips, was killed instantly and Major Karas was mortally wounded while the flight
surgeon going along as gunner (Cpt Frank Anzalone) incurred shrapnel wounds in his
chest and legs. The CE was also wounded seriously. The rest of the flight was taking
heavy fire and pulled pitch. It was several hours before a rescue ship could land.
Major Karas was still alive and strapped into his seat upside down but his wounds
were severe. He died on the medivac ship.
It was later learned that there were mines all along the dike leading to the apex.
Since the ARVN commander told Major Karas to land short, it appears that he may
well have known about the planned ambush of US troops.
A few days later on February 7th, a Copperhead gunship (64-14153) lost power and
crashed into a river on take off from a refueling pad. SP4 Willard A. Godfrey, the
crewchief, and SP4 Isiah A. Dobbins, the gunner, were killed by the impact but the
pilots (Cpt J. L. Hill and Lt William Robertson) escaped without major injuries.
Also in February, the 162nd along with the rest of the 11th CAB and two other
aviation battalions supported the 173rd Airborne and First Division in Operation
Junction City, the largest operation of the war to date. The Vultures led several of the
initial lifts with 60 or more slicks involved. This action saw the 173rd make the only
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combat jump of the war. Also taking part in the operation were the 25th Division,
11th Armored Calvary, 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the 4th and 9th ARVN
Divisions. The target was the enemy bases north of Tay Ninh City (which the French
called War Zone C). Over 9,500 troops were lifted in the initial assault. The
operation continued until mid-May and enemy dead numbered over 2,700. Large
quantities of ammunition, medical supplies and rice were also captured. The first few
days of CA’s were followed by many days of resupply and ash & trash missions by
the 162nd and other supporting units.
In the Jan-Feb period the Vultures took part in several CA’s in the Tay
Ninh area. On one occasion WO Nick Riviezzo, a Copperhead fire team
leader, was shot down in an LZ. His CE (SP4 Rick Franzese) and gunner
(SP4 Freeman Bradley) immediately took up positions and began
returning the enemy fire. SP4 Franzese noticed a rifle firing from a
bunker and ran over, grabbed the barrel and tossed a smoke grenade
into bunker. While SP4 Franzese was hanging onto the rifle the VC ran
out the back of the bunker and was cut down by WO Riviezzo with the
Thompson submachine gun he often carried.
Early in the year a Copperhead fire team was on a search and destroy mission in the
delta when they received a call to go to the aid of a US ground unit under heavy fire.
They contacted the unit and were told that artillery fire was incoming on the target.
They coordinated with the ground unit to set up a gun run so as to avoid the artillery.
On the initial run, SP4 Dennis Hickman, was firing his M-60 on a target when a
Marine jet from out of nowhere suddenly flew past at a lower altitude and right
through his machine fire. The jet was so close the Copperhead crew could see the
pilot. He had an ear to ear smile on his face and was smoking a big cigar. They
could tell by his look that he knew exactly what he was doing.
A rather unusual event occurred in early ’67. The flight surgeon, Cpt Frank
Anzalone, had the habit of going along as a crewmember on many of the combat lifts.
On one occasion he flew as “copilot” with Cpt Rod Rodowick, the maintenance
officer, when the 1st Infantry was chasing VC across the Cambodian border. Cpt
Rodowick, in Vulture 777 the maintenance ship, always trailed along on major lifts
so as to have maintenance support quickly available. He usually had no copilot so he
often invited the flight surgeon to ride along.
On this particular occasion, a Vulture ship with troops on board had crashed, with no
serious injuries, just inside Cambodia. Cpt Rodowick happened to be nearby and
answered the call for assistance. He immediately picked up the downed crew and
passengers and set the crashed ship on fire as he left. The 11th CAB commander
arrived on the scene as the rescue was taking place and when they arrived back at
Phouc Vinh, he told Cpt Rodowick he did a great job and that he was putting him in
for a DFC. Cpt Rodowick told the battalion commander that he had just received a
DFC only two weeks before and suggested he give it to his copilot instead. The
battalion commander agreed and two weeks later a DFC was presented to Cpt Frank
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Anzalone. He may well have been the only flight surgeon in Vietnam to be awarded
a Distinguished Flying Cross!
In the above incident on the Cambodian border, the Copperhead fire team covering the troop
lift and crew extraction, led by WO Nick Riviezzo, were buzzed several times by strangelooking jets they quickly realized were MIGs. WO Riviezzo had visions of becoming the first
army helicopter pilot to down a MIG and repeatedly attempted to get permission to fire, all
to no avail. Finally, a Navy fighter over on the coast picked up his radio transmission and
offered to come over and take care of the MIG. However, WO Riviezzo insisted that he get
the first shot. In the end, no one was allowed to fire and the Vultures pulled back from the
border.
In April, four new troop barracks in the Vulture area were completed and occupied.
Three permanent showers and one latrine was also completed as well as 5 new
reinforced bunkers. The VC provided the initiative on the bunkers by mortoring the
area four times in three days. Many compound buildings and improvements were
completed over the previous six months under the expert guidance of SSG James
Graham and SP4 Ronald S. Clough. SP4 Clough, company carpenter, supervised the
crew of local carpenters who did much of the construction.
A nice outdoor theatre was also built about this time. Movies were shown
every night. Shortly after it opened the movie was late one night and a
mortar round landed right in the middle of the theatre area. Luckily no
one was there at the time.
The Vultures had a busy month of combat assaults in March but less than half a
dozen in April. However, on April 8th the Vultures supported the 1st Brigade, 25th
Infantry Division in the vicinity of Duc Hoa on Operation Makalapa. On the 26th of
April, they supported the 173rd Airborne by deploying 2 battalions in the jungle
north of Bien Hoa.
The Vultures received six pilots from the 187th AHC (Crusaders) for training during
April and four pilots and four enlisted men from the 188th AHC (Black Widows) a
couple of weeks later. A number of Vietnamese pilots were also trained and two of
them joined the Vultures for an extended period of training.
On April 26th, the 2nd platoon and a Copperhead fire team were given the task of
supporting Project SIGMA on Operation Blackjack, an assignment which lasted
approximately four weeks. The slick crews received training in extracting personnel
using a 125-foot rope dangling beneath the aircraft. Ships assigned to this mission
were on alert from 0530 to 1930 hours each day. The mission was highly secret and
involved a specially trained Special Forces unit (ANYONE HAVE ANY DETAILS
OF THIS?)
Just after dawn on May 2nd Vulture 992 crashed during an approach to an LZ. SP4
Robert Bowling, the gunner, incurred a minor back injury. The crew and troops were
extracted from the area and a security force inserted until the aircraft could be
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evacuated by Chinook. The efficiency of the aircraft evacuation process was
demonstrated in this incident. From the time the ship went down to the final
evacuation by a CH-47 from Phu Loi, the total elapsed time was 1 hour and 20
minutes. Close fire support was provided by the Copperheads and the Crossbows out
of Lai Khe.
On May 3rd a tactical emergency was declared by the Special Forces troops
supported by the 2nd platoon. Seventeen UH-1D ships and 3 light fire teams were
mobilized to extract the unit and close air support was also provided by the Air Force.
The evacuation was made without incident.
The new CO of the758th Medical Det., Cpt William B. Sanders, had his mettle tested
during the month when over 30 Vultures developed food poisoning. However, the
new “doc” quickly traced the poisoning to a batch of improperly refrigerated bread
pudding and administered the proper antidote.
In mid-May, a small group of nine Special Forces troops were cut off and surrounded
by a large force of VC. While only 20 meters from a clearing where they could be
picked up, enemy fire was so intense they could not move. They radioed that they
could not survive if not picked up immediately. Because of this extreme emergency,
Major Stephen P. Stout, 2nd platoon leader, immediately led three slicks into the PZ,
covered by a Copperhead fire team. During the one minute they were in the PZ, all
three ships received numerous hits and two members of the command party on Major
Stout’s ship were seriously wounded. Due to the intensity of fire the troops could not
make it to the aircraft and the ships were forced to take off without them. Major
Stout then headed to Phouc Vinh to get medical attention for the wounded men on
board.
The other two ships under WO Kenneth Bristow and WO David Capouya went back
to the PZ. WO Bristow made a low pass over the area to locate the ground troops and
received more hits from enemy fire. His ship lost lateral cyclic control and a Special
Forces crew member on board was seriously wounded. WO Bristow made a
successful forced landing two klicks from the PZ. WO Capouya landed close by and
picked up the wounded man while Major Stout, who had returned from Phouc Vinh,
picked up the rest of the crew. The two ships then returned to Phouc Vinh where it
was determined that WO Capouya’s ship was no longer flyable. Two additional
slicks, under Major Ronald White, 1st platoon leader, and WO James Christiansen
then joined Major Stout in his rescue attempt. Arriving at the PZ WO Christiansen
was told to circle the downed ship (WO Bristow’s) so the Copperhead fire team could
be released to cover the extraction. Major Stout and his copilot (WO Craig Cameron)
made a low pass through the PZ and received moderate fire but spotted the US troops
at the edge of a tree line. They circled around for an approach and began receiving
heavy small arms fire, taking a number of hits. At this point both the gunner, SP4
Mark Epting, and crew chief, SP4 Charles Chase, had expended all of their
ammunition. At touchdown the ship took a round through the tail rotor drive shaft
and 90 degree gearbox. The US troops climbed aboard but Major Stout almost
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immediately had to do a hovering autorotation as the tail rotor failed completely.
Everyone scrambled out of the ship and took cover.
At this point Major Little and WO Ronald Freer approached and landed their aircraft
beside the downed ship. Their ship began taking hits but the US troops and downed
crew scrambled on board. Major Stout was sitting in the door of the ship firing at the
enemy when he was hit in the head by a round but not seriously injured. When all
were on board Major Little and WO Freer executed a takeoff with 1250 lbs. of fuel
and 17 people, mostly Americans, on board the single ship. That’s good size
Americans, not skinny Vietnamese—proof of the exceptional capabilities of the UH1! On top of that, the engine also had a round go completely through the compressor
section just prior to the takeoff.
After delivering his passengers to Phouc Vinh where Major Stout received medical
attention, Major Little led flights carrying a Special Forces Mike Force unit into the
two LZs to secure the downed ships.
Major Stout and Major Little were awarded a Sliver Star for their actions during this
incident. There were also 4 DFC’s, 6 Air Medals with V and 12 Army
Commendation Medals with V awarded to other personnel involved in the incident.
The nights of May 12-14 saw plenty of activity in the 162nd area as the unit
experienced four mortar attacks in the three nights. During a 30-minute period
beginning at 0207 hours, May 12th, 57 mortar rounds landed within the company
area. Several personnel were wounded as they ran to their bunkers and several 2nd
platoon enlisted men were seriously injured when a round came through the roof of
their barracks.
Five rounds landed in the immediate vicinity of “Majors’ Manor” which housed all of
the senior officers in the company. One round landed directly in front of the
building, sending shrapnel through doors, windows and walls. Another came through
the roof and one hit a few feet from the room occupied by the CO and XO. Roughly
15-20 rounds landed in the maintenance area causing severe damage to 10 aircraft.
The CO’s new helicopter, with less than 100 hours on it, took a direct hit and was
completely destroyed. Both maintenance tents were also destroyed and shrapnel
riddled many drums, containers and tires. The 450th Signal Det. had all 4 of its vans
severely damaged, one of which took a direct hit and was completely destroyed.
The Copperheads scrambled a fire team but saw little action since Air Force jets and
flare ships were quickly on station to provide counter fire. Throughout the attack
there were numerous incidents of courageous efforts by many individuals to help
their wounded comrades. The commanding general of the First Aviation Brigade
later presented 4 Bronze Stars, 13 Army Commendation Medals with V and 29
Purple Hearts to men of the 162nd.
After these attacks on May 12th-14th, all flyable aircraft were evacuated to Phu Loi
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and Lai Khe each night for a week. However, even with this extreme inconvenience
to the crews and maintenance personnel, all assigned missions were completed and
every man contributed that little bit extra.
During June, the Vultures flew CA’s on 16 separate days throughout the III Corps
area. During one of the CA’s a round hit a rocket warhead on a Copperhead gunship
(64-14154) flown by Lt William Robertson. The round caused the warhead to
explode, thereby causing 3 more warheads to explode, riddling the aircraft with
shrapnel and causing loss of hydraulics. Lt Robertson and CW2 Peter Salamone,
who were not injured, managed to land the crippled gunship on a nearby road. The
gunner, SP4 Robert Alverado, was severely wounded in the explosion. The CE, SP5
Robert Goulas, was not harmed by the exploding rockets but got a little nervous on
the way down and jumped from the aircraft before it landed, injuring his back.
Only 36 days before this explosion Lt. Robertson and Cpt Thomas Quisenberry had
been flying this same C model when 2 rockets exploded just after leaving the tube.
The ship received severe damage from shrapnel and the concussion shattered nearly
all of the plexiglass. The crew chief, SP4 Donald Combs, was severely wounded in
this incident.
After leading a three company lift inserting two battalions of the First Infantry
Division on June 5th, the Vultures began resupplying the troops. Lt Joe Grier (6512775) was approaching an LZ to land in the north end while artillery was landing in
the south end. Suddenly the artillery shifted to his end and shells began impacting all
around him on short final, hitting his ship with shrapnel. Lt Grier and the pilot
(VNAF Lt Nguyen Van Mao) lost all hydraulics but managed to land the ship without
further damage.
The same day WO Donald Foster experienced mechanical problems in Vulture 146
(66-01146) northeast of Saigon. The ship became almost uncontrollable but WO
Foster managed to land in a rice paddy. After shutting down, one side of the ship
began to sink into the mud causing the still turning rotor blade to dip very low. For
some reason the crew chief walked into the turning blade and was struck in the head.
Luckily he was wearing his flight helmet and was knocked senseless but not seriously
injured. Unfortunately, during recovery, a Chinook dropped the ship from roughly
500 feet--a brand new aircraft with only 377 hours on it!
A freak accident occurred at Phouc Vinh on June 14th. A Rebel fire team from the
First Infantry Division Aviation Battalion landed for refueling and rearming. A crew
chief on
one of the ships was shot in the head by a minigun that was accidentally discharged
(by static electricity) during rearming. Despite rapid attention by “Doc” Sanders, the
CE died within a few minutes.
The Vultures did a full day’s work on July 3rd supporting the Second Brigade of the
25th Infantry Division on Eagle Flights in the Duc Hoa area west of Saigon. During
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one insertion in late afternoon a 10 ship flight landed square in the middle of a VC
stronghold. Eight ships were hit with a total of 19 rounds. WO Fretts was hit in the
right arm, WO Christiansen in the face and Major Stout in the right leg with shrapnel.
The lifts continued until 2100 hours that night, a long and exhausting day.
In early July, the Vulture compound was hit with a mortar attack. No
one was seriously injured but a couple of brand new D models that had
just arrived were riddled with shrapnel. One mortar round scored a
direct hit on Majors’ Manor but failed to explode. The round came
through the roof and landed square on the chest of a Major called “chief”
(DOES ANYONE REMEMBER HIS NAME??) who was lying in his
bunk. Although the round did not explode it did leave a bad bruise and
broke several of the Major’s ribs. Lt Paul Fellencer recalls “It was the
only time I ever heard someone being profusely and audibly thankful for
a bruised chest and broken ribs.” Curiously, two VNAF pilots assigned
to the Vultures for training mysteriously disappeared just before the
mortar attack. There was a strong suspicion that the attack was directed
from the bell tower of the church/school just outside the main gate.
While on the way home from a lift on July 16th Lt William Robertson, Copperhead
fire team leader, spotted a group of bushes floating down the river. As the fire team
made a low pass, the bushes headed for the riverbank. Lt Robertson then began
circling the camouflaged VC sampan while his gunner, SP4 Charles Smith, put 1500
rounds of machine gun fire into the boat. One VC was killed trying to escape from
the boat which was then sunk by 40mm “Chunker” fire.
The 24th of July was a day that will be long remembered by WO David Capouya and
WO Laurence Altobell. They were flying a gunship escorting slicks from a staging
area for a lift with the 25th Infantry Division and had an engine failure at 3,500 feet
on top of a solid cloud layer. They autorotated through the clouds and by sheer luck
broke out over a clearing in the trees, the only one for miles around, and landed with
no injuries. They were picked up in minutes by WO Donald Foster in the Vulture
“Scavenger” maintenance ship.
Later that same day Major Wilson, the CO, was flying a C&C ship and spotted three
VC in the open west of Nha Be. He could not contact the gunships who had gone to
Nha Be to refuel so he made a low level pass and SP4 Huckabey, the gunner,
managed to bag all three of them.
At 0035 hours on July 27th the Phouc Vinh complex was hit with mortar and rocket
fire. Of the roughly 137 rounds fired in the 37 minute attack, 16 120 mm rockets
landed within the Vulture roost. Three men were seriously wounded at the beginning
of the attack when several rounds hit the mess hall. Another received injuries that
later required amputation of both legs below the knee as he ran from one bunker to
another one so as to be with his platoon. Fourteen others received less serious
wounds. Dr. Sanders and his medical staff had an aid station operating in their
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bunker and probably saved the lives of four seriously wounded men. However,
another man , PFC Lawrence A. Dietz, died in the hospital later that day. God rest
his soul! A 104 foot long barracks also took a direct hit and two rounds missed a
bunker with 20 men in it by 2 feet.
Throughout the attack there were many courageous acts as men helped their wounded
comrades. Two DFC’s, one Bronze Star with V, six Air Medals with V, seven Army
Commendation Medals with V and two Army Commendation Medals were awarded
to men of the 162nd for actions during this incident.
On August 4th, the 162nd supported the 9th Infantry Division with Eagle Flights south
of Saigon near Rach Kien. Three ships were hit coming into one LZ and a
Copperhead gunship (WO James Ramsey) was hit in the fuel cell, spraying fuel on
the windshield and interfering with the pilots’ vision. However, he was able to fly to
a safe area for later extraction by Chinook. Major General George Seniff, the First
Aviation Brigade Commander, happened to be flying nearby in his C model gunship
and took the place of the damaged gunship. That must have scared the men in the
remaining Copperhead gunship far more any VC did! The general ended up taking a
round in his tail boom.
An unfortunate and needless accident occurred on August 8th when SP4 Charles A.
Jones, gunner on 64-13862, walked into the tail rotor while getting ready for a 25
ship CA with the First Division. He was killed instantly. God rest his soul.
Another accident around this time almost had fatal results as the Copperheads were
doing a hot refueling in the rearming revetments at Phouc Vinh. The fuel truck was
positioned outside the revetment and the hose draped over the revetment. As you
might guess, there was a "fuel pressure surge" and the nozzle popped out of the fuel
receptacle, spraying the running C Model with fuel. The resulting fire destroyed the
helicopter, the fuel truck, and the revetment. The rockets and ammo “cooked off”
and provided quite a fireworks display. Fortunately, nobody was hurt. A few days
later, the Battalion CO came to Phouc Vinh for an Officer's Call. His opening remark
was "I understand that the Vultures had a cookout and I wasn't invited." The lecture
went downhill from there.
During the later part of the year, an enlisted shower and latrine was completed and much of
the maintenance area and flight line were peneprimed to cut down on dust in the
approaching dry season. In late October, high winds toppled the Vulture Theatre but
reconstruction began immediately. Since the mess hall seemed to be a favorite target for
mortars and rockets a bunker was added for the mess hall personnel.
The 162nd spent much of October and November supporting Special Forces troops
not only in III Corps but also II Corps. In October, three slicks and two gunships
flew up to Kontum and took a Special Forces recon team into Laos just west of Dak
To. They later picked the team up, brought it back to Kontum and then returned to
Phouc Vinh (this was a couple of weeks before the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s big
battle for Hill 875 near Dak To).
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On November 4th while supporting Special Forces units, the Vultures and
Copperheads were called to extract the troops. The PZ was very tight and could take
only one ship at a time. All four ships on the pickup incurred strike damage from
rotor blades hitting the tress but all troops were extracted safely. The aircraft landed
at a field location and Vulture maintenance came out and changed all 4 sets of rotor
blades, returning the ships to service by the following afternoon.
On November 7th, the Vultures made their first extraction with a McGuire Rig (a long
rope with loops for footholds and handholds). It went off without incident but using
one of these rigs takes practice by both the extractor (crew) and extractees. Another
extraction took place at around 2300 hours in mid November. Although a bit tricky,
there were no problems other than a Copperhead pilot incurring a slight flesh wound
from shrapnel. The Vultures also used rope ladders for some extractions and a LRRP
radioman from the 75th Infantry fell off the ladder and was killed during one such
extraction.
In late November the 162nd supported the Special Forces for several weeks in an
unusual operation near Ham Tan, 20-30 miles north of Vung Tau. A flight of 5 slicks
and 2 gunships ferried 150 Cambodian mercenaries and 10 Special Forces advisors to
a field location to begin operating in the local area. The Vultures and Copperheads
took along tents and other gear and lived in the field themselves for a couple of
weeks alongside the Cambodian troops. WO Don Welch recalls this as his first
exposure to Cambodian mercenaries.
Unlike ARVN troops who sometimes had to be physically thrown off a ship landing
in an LZ, the Cambodians were very eager to fight and Vulture crews found it
difficult to keep too many from getting on ships in the PZ. They did not like
Vietnamese at all and must have been paid some sort of bonus for killing VC. Every
time a Vulture ship cranked up to go out to a field location, the crews had to
practically fight the Cambodians off—they all wanted to go kill VC.
The Special Forces often did some rather unusual things and supporting them was
never dull. During the operation near Ham Tan they killed an NVA Major and wired
his body to a mine that would explode if he was moved. They propped him up in a
chair with an RC Cola in one hand and a transistor radio playing music in the other.
However, nothing happened and the Special Forces folks came back by a few days
later and buried him.
In the last couple of months of the year the Vultures trained pilots from the 135th
AHC (Emu’s) and from helicopter units accompanying the newly arrived 101st
Airborne Division. As a change of pace the 162nd also twice conducted CA’s for the
9th Division’s Mobile Riverine Force in the Vinh Long- Dong Tam area. This gave
pilots the chance to make a few “carrier” landings to support ships anchored in the
Delta rivers.
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Throughout 1967 the 162nd also frequently supported the 25th Division on Eagle
Flights. This involved lifting a company or more of troops into a suspected VC area.
The slicks then stood by at a near by airfield. If contact was made, more troops were
lifted in. If not, they were extracted and inserted somewhere else. On one Eagle
Flight in July, WO Paul Fretts was pilot on an afternoon insertion of troops into a
pineapple field west of Duc Hoa. As his ship landed a VC jumped up in front of him
and fired an AK-47 point blank through the windshield. One round ricocheted off the
inside of his armor seat and hit WO Fretts in the back. The AC, WO Dave Pridgeon,
took off so quickly that 2 grunts could not get off and were reported as missing by
their unit until they showed up at their base a few days later. WO Fretts was
medivac’d to Hotel 3 in Saigon and later recovered back in the US.
On December 19th the Vultures were engaged in training exercises for newly arrived
troops of the 101st Airborne at Phouc Vinh. One ship (65-09987) took off from the
airfield with 6 troops on board for a practice CA. However, as they turned downwind
the engine failed at 200 feet. The AC, WO John F. Holz, attempted to extend his
glide past a stand of rubber trees but the ship came down hard, bounced upside down
and blew up, killing all 10 people on board. In addition to WO Holz, the lost
crewmembers were WO Larry A. Harke (pilot), SP4 Robert D. Kline (crewchief),
and SP4 Anthony V. Campaniello (gunner).
•
Lt Robertson, WO Tom Shirley, SP4 Larry Rippie and SP Robert Goulas were on
a recon near Phouc Vinh early in the year and spotted what later proved to be a
mobile rocket launcher. They could not find it when they came back around but
reported it to Intelligence when the returned to the roost. They identified it as a
rocket launcher from a photo book of NVA weapons but the intelligence people
dismissed it by saying the VC didn’t have rockets that far south. In a few days,
the Phouc Vinh compound was hit with its first rocket attack.
•
A major hit his head running into a bunker during a mortar attack and was
awarded a Purple Heart.
•
WO John McCamish was AC on a lift with the 25th Infantry near Cu Chi and was
in a staggered trail right formation of 10 slicks that had landed in a huge, maybe
50-acre LZ that was clear-cut except for a few trees on their right. WO
McCamish somehow got hemmed in by the other ships and hit a tree on take-off,
causing the ship to crash and burn. No one was hurt but WO McCamish got a
tongue lashing from the CO and took a lot of ribbing from other pilots for hitting
“the only tree in a huge LZ.” It wasn’t exactly one of his career high points!
•
During a party one night the CO dispatched several trucks to downtown Phouc
Vinh to bring back some female companionship for the company. The VD rate
went sky high and the men in the 758th Medical Detachment had their work cut
out for them.
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•
Pilot staffing in the gun platoon went from almost all Majors at the beginning of
the year to all WO’s at one point in the fall. The CO “traded” one experienced
gun-qualified WO to another unit for 2 gun-qualified Lt’s.
•
WO Nick Riviezzo, Copperhead fire team leader, received a “battlefield”
promotion to 2nd Lt and was transferred to another unit. During a going away
party organized by his crew, SP4 Rick Franzese and SP4 Freeman Bradley, his
CE and gunner told the CO, Major Kirklighter, that with WO Riviezzo leaving,
they were not going to fly anymore. The “Red Baron” was a bit taken aback by
their statement but quickly recovered, then smiled and told them to report to the
maintenance detachment in the morning.
•
Some recall the legendary “Doc” Weatherford, a gunner who had already served
several tours in Vietnam (and thus had to be a little different), who armed mortar
rounds and carried them under his seat to throw out on final approach as his own
form of LZ prep.
1968
The 162nd began the new year with a change of commanders. Major James
Thompson assumed command from Major Stokely Wilson on January 1st. Major
Ronald Andresen, CO of the 407th TC Det. succeeded Major Thompson on May 24th,
followed by Major Robert Wright in November. (It is interesting to note that both
Majors Thompson and Andresen went on to illustrious army careers and became
General Officers).
Major Thompson, in particular, was considered a good leader who was highly
thought of by the men of the company. The following anecdote related by Major
Paul Wenzel, Operations Officer, is an excellent illustration of his leadership:
“One thing Major Thompson did for which he was awarded the Soldier's
Medal and something which he did because "it was his job" probably has
gone unnoticed. Thompson and I normally integrated ourselves into the flight
when we performed as part of a battalion lift, not as flight lead but as peter
pilot in one of the lift ships other than lead. I believe we were the second and
third out of eight flights of five and were positioning ourselves in water filled
rice paddies for troop pick up when one of the ships in the second flight of
five lost his tail rotor when he flared too steep and stuck it in the water. The
ship immediately turned on its side and caught fire. Ammo from the crew
chief and/or door gunner was cooking off and one could see the tracers as
they cooked off as well. Anyway, Jim Thompson recognized that one of the
crewmembers was trapped inside and without regard for his personal safety,
he exited his helicopter, ran over to the burning ship and rescued either the
crewchief or the gunner, I don't remember which. He did this in full view of
our crewmembers and of course in view of all the overhead commanders at
1500 feet or above. I remember our guys talking about this for weeks and
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how they respected Thompson for his demonstrated leadership on and off the
battlefield.”
Major Thompson went on to command the Army’s only Air Assault Division, the
Army War College and the First US Army. Major Andresen, who succeeded Major
Thompson, later became program manager for both the Blackhawk and Comanche
helicopters and played a key role in their development and introduction.
In early 1968 a number of improvements were made to make life a little more
comfortable for the Vultures at Phouc Vinh, including:
•
•
•
•
•
A new maintenance hangar was built by the 34th Engineers (and promptly
mortared).
Air conditioning was installed in the Officers club, EM club and dispensary.
A new "Vulture Theater" was built with a new stage, screen, projection room and
covered seating area.
A new addition was made to the mess hall. The mess hall was also completely
enclosed to help eliminate dust.
A hover area for maintenance was leveled off and peniprimed along with all of
the slick line. Also, lights were installed on the slick line.
Conditions were improving at Phouc Vinh and life was not that bad for the Vultures
during this period. They occasionally got a couple of days off and went to Saigon to
relax. The officers even had their own private villa in Vung Tau, for which they
chipped in each pay day. The company also had two NCO’s stationed in Saigon with
a jeep and a two and a half ton truck to expedite the supply chain and buy stock for
the Officers, NCO and EM Clubs.
The first half of January was mostly occupied with training flights for the newly
arrived 101st Airborne Division, preparing them to become operational and
indoctrinating them in the techniques of airmobile operations.
On 17 January the Vultures conducted combat assaults for the 3rd Bde, 101st
Airborne Division. As the day wore on, the troops made contact with an
undetermined number of VC and additional reinforcements were inserted by the
Vultures enabling the 101st to route the enemy.
On the 18th of January the 162nd was on Ready Reaction Force duty for III Corps and
called to the aid of the 173rd AHC (Robinhoods). While supporting the 25th ARVN
Division, the 173rd had landed in the midst of a strong VC force and lost several
ships. The Vultures and the Copperheads completed the insertion in spite of
intensive ground action.
On 29 January the Vultures, landing one ship at a time in a small pick up zone,
extracted over 60 tons of captured VC rice from a field location between Phouc Vinh
and Lai Khe. There were a few anxious moments while extracting the 600 bags of
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freshly packed rice when US armored personnel carriers just north of the pick up
zone made contact with the VC. However, the mission was successfully completed
and the Vultures did not take any fire in the short skirmish that took place.
The 30th of January marked a new era in the fighting in Vietnam—Tet 68. The
VC/NVA undertook a major offensive in most of the key cities and districts
throughout the country. Saigon, Binh Hoa, Long Binh, Phu Loi, Lai Khe and many
other key places in III Corps were hit with rockets, mortars, and ground attacks. The
VC/NVA expected to be welcomed by a popular uprising but instead met with
massive resistance. Enemy troops were cut down in the thousands by infantry,
artillery and air crews from assault helicopter units such as the 162nd.
On the eve of Tet Major Thompson had sent all flyable aircraft to Vung Tau in an
effort to preserve valuable assets that might be in jeopardy in an isolated place like
Phouc Vinh. On the way to Phu Loi the next day the Vultures heard a call “on guard”
for “any gunships in the vicinity of Plantation Tower (Long Binh), request assistance
to repel VC climbing the control tower”. One of the Vulture pilots yelled “hell, let’s
take the slicks in and let the door gunners work’em over”. This was the beginning of
a hectic period with incredibly long days of flying.
On the same day, January 31st, the Vultures teamed up with sister companies, the
128th and 173rd AHC’s and two Chinook units, the 205th and 213th ASHC’s, and
together moved over 3,400 troops and 370 tons of cargo in the short span of ten hours
while supporting the First Infantry Division. Two battalion size insertions, two
extractions, and a further one and a half battalion insertion in company size lifts were
made in the late afternoon. Over five and a half battalions of infantry and supporting
equipment were moved by the 11th CAB from Di An to Quan Loi with the Vultures
moving over 1000 troops. This was the largest movement to date of troops by UH-1
units of a combat aviation battalion in a single day operation and positioned the First
Infantry to block a major attack on the outskirts of Saigon.
Several times during the day the Vultures came under intense enemy mortar and
rocket fire at Lai Khe and surrounding areas. However, due to the efforts of flight
leads Lt Harlan Scheibe and Lt James Shannon, the coordination by Vulture 3 (Major
Wenzel) and Vulture 6 (Major Thompson) all lifts throughout the day went
exceptionally well. Majors Thompson and Wenzel put over 22 hours of flight time
on the C&C ship on this first day of Tet as they repositioned the First Infantry. On
following days the CO and Opns Officer even resorted to putting other pilots names
in the log book to keep from being grounded for excess flight hours. There were few
experienced officers in the unit and the Vultures sorely needed their experience and
leadership.
The Vultures began the month of February with a bang. In the late hours of the first
day of February incoming 82 mm mortars were reported in the south quadrant of the
compound. These few rounds were an indication of things to come. February, or
Mortar Month as it came to be known, was to be a busy month for the 162nd.
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In the early morning hours of February 3rd the Copperheads were called to the aid of
a PF (Popular Forces) compound south of Phouc Vinh which was attacked by a
company size force of VC. The Copperheads stopped the attack and were credited
with 25 VC KIA during the night action. Because of the swift strikes such as this,
Col. Lawrence Mowrey, Commander of the 3rd Bde, 101st Airborne at Phouc Vinh
presented the Copperheads with a letter of commendation.
On 5 February the Copperheads were once again called on to thwart the enemy in
their attempt to overrun a Vietnamese compound near Phouc Hoa. After being
scrambled the Copperheads established contact with the ground unit and proceeded
with their gun runs. When it was over, one of the compound advisors gave the
Copperheads credit for 8 dead and 7 wounded VC.
On the next day, the 162nd was on RRF (Ready Reaction Force) and at 1215 hours
went to the aid of the 173rd AHC who lost two ships to enemy ground fire just west of
Binh Chan. The Vultures airlifted elements of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade into
positions around the downed aircraft and completed the lift without taking a round.
On 8 February Major Thompson and members of the gun platoon were honored
guests of the Vietnamese district chief at Phouc Vinh. The district chief arranged an
appreciation ceremony for the part the 162nd had played in repelling repeated VC
attacks on Vietnamese outposts over the previous week. The district chief presented
the members of the 162nd with floral wreaths, which were symbolically, one of the
highest awards that a person could receive from the government of Vietnam. The VC
must have resented the awards because shortly before midnight on the same day they
presented the 162nd with a few incoming mortars and rockets.
On 10 February the Vultures were moving elements of the 9th Infantry Division from
field locations to Dong Tam when they came under heavy enemy fire. Two aircraft
took hits. CWO David Pridgeon was the aircraft commander of one of the ships and
Lt Frank Loturco was pilot. CWO Pridgeon was on his last combat assault in
Vietnam and Lt Loturco was flying his first one.
After the Vultures were released and enroute back to Phouc Vinh accompanied by a
Copperheads heavy fire team, they intercepted a call by Paris Control at Binh Hoa, on
guard, for any gunships in the area to contact Paris Control. The Copperheads
responded and were requested to go to an area five miles northeast of Binh Hoa, to
cover a downed helicopter until it's crew could be picked up. After the crew was
rescued, the Copperheads were released and returned to Phouc Vinh.
On 13 February the Vultures participated in an administrative lift for the 101st
Airborne Division when the lead ship was sprayed with by an AK 47. After taking
one round through the windshield, the crewchief of the lead ship, SP4 Howard
Wetzel, cut the enemy down with a burst from his M-60—his first VC kill.
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Also on the 13th WO Ronnie Adair had a rather unusual day. WO Adair was on
short final to the normally secure pad at Phouc Hoa when his peter pilot overshot the
approach and 3 Claymore mines were detonated under the ship. Both pilots grabbed
the collective and “pumped” up enough RPM to take off. They limped back to Phouc
Vinh leaking fuel and blood from the gunner’s leg. The aircraft was later found to
have more than twenty holes from shrapnel and bullets in the main rotor, tail rotor,
gear box and bottom and side of the fuselage and was rapidly losing fuel. The only
person injured was SP4 Tebay, the gunner, who was hit in the leg by a piece of
shrapnel but didn’t realize it until they began tracing the source of blood on the floor.
On 21 February one of the Vulture lift aircraft received heavy automatic weapons fire
from a VC road block north of Phu Loi and was going to make a gun run until he was
discouraged by RPG rounds and called the coordinates in to be hit by airstrikes.
On 24 February Lt Harlan Scheibe and WO Thomas Phelps had an experience they
will not forget. Their ship (66-16189) had an engine failure and lost directional
control southeast of Phouc Vinh and the aircraft crashed and partially burned. No
one was injured but it was a bad experience for everyone aboard. The aircraft was
written off but later rebuilt and returned to service.
During the month of February, the 162nd compound was hit by mortars and rockets on
at least 15 occasions but little damage was done and no one was seriously wounded.
The Vultures started the month of March 1968 by welcoming ten new pilots to the
roost for two weeks of in-country training and orientation. The ten aviators from the
7th Squadron, 1st Cav (Blackhawks) were newly arrived in country. As was tradition
at the Vultures, each new pilot was required to put ten dollars on the bar the first
night in the company, so needless to say the month of March was started out right.
At 10 cents for beer and 25 cents for whiskey, ten dollars went a long way in those
days.
The first two weeks of the month were spent mostly on missions with the First
Infantry Division. However the pattern was changed somewhat with trips to Ham
Tam and Xuan Loc while supporting the ARVN units.
Around 8 pm on the evening of March 5th, the Phouc Vinh compound came under
mortar and rocket attack. The gun platoon responded by scrambling a fire team to
locate and attack the enemy positions. Through a series of miscommunications the
fire team was directed to an area where one of the gunships (64-14158) was hit by
friendly artillery fire and exploded, killing all 4 crewmembers. The lost
crewmembers were CWO Vernon R. Tweedy, SP4 Brian T. Murray, SP4 George D.
Novakovic, and WO Vernon L. Leuning, a pilot from the 7/1 Cav who was training
with the Vultures. It was a sad day for the 162nd and a senseless loss of 4 good men.
On March 12th at approximately 2130 hours the VC again hit the Phouc Vinh
compound with mortars and rockets. Although there were over 200 incoming rounds
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counted there was only minor damage in the Vulture area.
A few days later the 162nd joined with sister units of the 11th CAB to lift troops of
the First Infantry Division from Quan Loi to Loc Ninh and LZ's around Loc Ninh.
The Vultures were chosen to lead the 30 ship operation and as always came through
with flying colors.
A busy day was in store for the Vultures on March 22n when they supported infantry
units south of Phouc Vinh. Immediately after receiving reports that the ground troops
were in heavy contact with enemy units the Copperheads came to their aid and drove
the VC back while the slicks resupplied the units during a lull in the fighting. The
VC directed their fire on the gunships and succeeded in downing one aircraft.
However, one of the slicks, flown by WO Donald “Hog” Welch, quickly rescued the
downed crew while five other aircraft put in a security force to secure the slick until it
could be lifted out by a Chinook.
As the Chinook was lifting the downed gunship out of the area, a med-evac aircraft in
the same area received heavy fire and went down. The Vultures and Copperheads
responded immediately to the emergency by extracting the ground troops from where
the gunship had been downed and inserting them in to secure the crippled med-evac
ship. At one point as the lift ships were departing the area, enemy troops were seen
converging on the site.
On March 25th the Vultures started the day supporting the 1st Infantry on an
operation north of Lai Khe. With the aid of a sister unit the Vultures lifted ground
troops into LZ's with hopes of finding and destroying any VC in the area. This
Battalion size lift resulted in the destruction of two large, newly fortified bunker
complexes. The Vultures then moved to Di An to air lift more infantry units north of
Thu Duc. With a break of only thirty minutes, the 162nd ships were on their way
again supporting infantry units near Binh Hoa.
The 26th of the month was begun with incoming rounds in the 162nd area at
approximately 0100 hours. After a rather restless night the 162nd was again
participating in a battalion size operation north of Lai Khe. The lift was held up
briefly while a security force was inserted around a downed aircraft in the area.
At approximately 2245 hours on the same night the Phouc Vinh compound was
mortared again. Two mortar rounds hit the beautiful, recently completed
maintenance hanger (built by C Company, 34th Engineers), and three persons were
slightly injured from the shrapnel.
On 28 March the Vultures worked with the Black Baron and his aviation elements in
an operation north of Chon Li Tan which involved LZ's within 150 meters of the
Cambodian border. Major Thompson, the CO, later said "you learn to appreciate the
professionalism in the 162nd after seeing another unit go nearly 5 miles off course
while looking for the LZ.” The Vultures as always were right on target, hitting the
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RP's and LZ's with accuracy and getting the usual compliment from the ground and
air missions commanders for doing an outstanding job.
The month of March 1968 was a record-breaking month. The Vultures flew 3119
total hours, more than the company had ever flown in a single month. A total of 32
PE’s were also pulled during the month, another record.
One day in early 1968, WO Ron Gresham was on a 25-ship CA with the First
Division and as the ships were unloading in a wet rice paddy he spotted a VC who
stood up maybe 50-75 yards away and fired an RPG at his aircraft. It landed roughly
20 feet short, exploded and sprayed hot mud all over the crew. Needless to say, they
got out of there fast.
On April 9th , WO James Wright was on a routine mission for II Field Forces when he
heard a distress call from an aircraft near Vung Tau. He responded to the call and
took part in a search of choppy waters just off the coast. About 30 minutes later a
Dust-Off spotted some aircraft parts in the water. A little later WO Wright and his
crewchief (SP4 Michael Grant) spotted the downed crew of 6 people on a Vietnamese
fishing boat. As the boat neared shore, the 6 men jumped into the water, ran to shore
and were picked up by the Dust-Off.
On April 30th the 162nd and a sister unit (the 173rd) were engaged in a large operation
supporting the First Infantry Division. As they extracted troops from a hot LZ
northwest of Lai Khe, they encountered heavy automatic weapons fire on final into
the pick up zone for the last lift of 5 ships. Immediately, two Copperhead light fire
teams opened up on the area. The Vultures continued their approach and RPG rounds
began impacting in the pick up zone. At that point the slicks broke off and were put
into orbit nearby while artillery and air strikes worked over the area around the
troops. Then with seven fire teams from the 162nd and 173rd laying down heavy
covering fire the slicks pulled out the remaining troops. There were no friendly
casualties and enemy loses could not be determined.
In addition to supporting the major US infantry units the Vultures were frequently
held on standby as part of the III Corp Ready Reaction Force. They also performed
many single ship missions all over III Corps, supplying ARVN compounds,
providing reconnaissance for ground commanders and Command and Control ships
for operations in progress. These single ship missions were generally referred to as
“ash and trash” missions.
In mid April the 162nd broke another record by airlifting two complete battalions of
the 101st Airborne (1,700 troops) into positions near Binh Hoa in a period of 6 hours.
On May 2nd, while on Ready Reaction status for II Field Forces, the company was
scrambled to an area west of Loc Ninh. A company of CIDG troops was picked at
their base camp near Thu Duc and flown to Thu Duc to stand by for further
deployment. While airborne, the flight was briefed on the urgency of the mission, an
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insertion of a search party in an attempt to locate 6 missing CIDG troops and their
two US Special Forces advisors. A long range patrol had stumbled into a heavily
fortified NVA bunker complex, and an attempted extraction under fire (by the 240th
AHC) had resulted in two ships being shot down and eight people missing. Most of
the patrol was finally extracted but a larger force was being inserted to search for the
missing men. The Vultures arrived in late afternoon and began the insertion, one ship
at a time into the area where a ship from the 240th AHC had been downed and
destroyed by enemy fire. Air and artillery strikes had temporarily driven the enemy
back.
The first 5 ships inserted their troops without drawing fire and shortly thereafter the
search team located the missing men. All had been killed in the vicinity of the
downed aircraft. An extraction was then initiated, again one ship at a time due to the
small size of the LZ. The first two ships loaded with the KIAs and gear made it out
without incident but the next ones began taking fire which grew more intense with
each extraction. The last two ships, chalks 6 and 7, drew heavy fire on take-off and
reported seeing a company-size NVA unit rapidly closing in on the LZ. The Vultures
arrived back at the roost at Phouc Vinh at 11 pm with no casualties.
Unfortunately, a former Vulture pilot, WO Larry McKibben, was killed in the above
incident. WO McKibben had arrived with a group of new pilots in June 67 and was
later transferred to the 240th AHC (Greyhounds) to spread out DEROS dates. He
landed his ship in the LZ on the initial pick up attempt and was mortally wounded.
His ship crashed in the LZ and the small group of US and CIDG troops desperately
held off attempts to overrun their position. For his actions during this engagement,
Special Forces SSG Roy Benavidez was later awarded the Medal of Honor.
On May 5th SP6 Ronald R. Blanchette, a Technical Inspector, received a $10,000
lump sum bonus to re-enlist. SP6 Blanchette had joined the 162nd at Ft. Benning as a
PFC, came over on the ship in February 66 and held the distinction of being the last
remaining original Vulture.
On May 8th, the Vultures made over 600 sorties inserting and extracting troops in
hostile areas around Saigon and the Thu Duc area. A total of 12,295 troops were
lifted.
While on Ready Reaction standby on May 8th, the 162nd was scrambled to insert
reinforcements into an ARVN compound at Bin Dop. The compound was under
heavy attack but the first flight of five ships managed to land the troops and depart
without damage. However, the second flight of five ships led by Lt Harlan Schiebe
was met with a heavy barrage of mortars and rockets in the landing area while on
short final. Lt Schiebe broke off and came around for another attempt and the same
thing happened. He set up for a third attempt and began his approach to the same
area but as the mortars and rockets began impacting in the LZ he veered off to the left
at the last minute and landed the troops in an adjacent field. The troops dismounted
and took cover and the aircraft departed before the VC could shift their fire.
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On the morning of May 13th, the 162nd supported the First Infantry Division in the
Phu Loi-Lai Khe area on some rather routine and uneventful CAs. However, in the
afternoon they were called on to extract a unit of the First Infantry that declared a
Tactical Emergency after 7 hours of heavy contact south of Song Be. Despite
marginal weather conditions, the Vultures completed the task without incident and
the 11th CAB commander was quoted as saying “The Vultures have once again
performed in an outstanding manner in a difficult situation.”
On May 19th the company supported units of the First Division in the Lai Khe area.
During the second lift the lead gunship, flown by Cpt Michael Shannon, came under
heavy automatic weapons fire and Cpt Shannon took a round through his leg. He was
later evac’d to Quan Loi and then back to the US. His copilot, WO Butch Garner,
was also hit by a spent bullet fragment in the jaw. The round penetrated his cheek
but not his jawbone. WO Garner reached into his mouth and pulled out the bullet
which he carried for months as his lucky charm.
The 162nd again supported units of the First Division on the 24th of May. The first lift
of the morning was a 15 sortie insertion from Thu Duc to an LZ two klicks north of
VC Island. The Vultures then completed a 20 sortie extraction from a night defensive
position near Phouc Hoa to Normandy I. The Vultures next began single ship
resupply missions until late in the day when they reformed to undertake more
extractions.
On May 27th WO James Wright was making an aerial recon of a river near Bai Trai
when he spotted a small number of VC and 2 sampans in a restricted area. The CE
and gunner (SP4 Grant and SP4 Wooden) sank one of the sampans and killed one of
the VC.
While supporting II Field Forces in late June, the Copperheads were called to cover
an emergency extraction of an Australian unit near Nui Dat. The Australians had
several people wounded while in contact with the VC and the Copperheads got one
VC KIA. Later they were called on to cover a dummy extraction of a 12 man
ambush team which had been spotted by the enemy.
One day in mid ’68 WO Bill Greenhalgh and Lt Jack Donahue took a
new gunner out to the old French Fort near Phouc Vinh for some
gunnery practice. After a few passes in which the gunner managed to
avoid hitting the skids or blades, WO Greeenhalgh spotted a bird in a
barren tree standing out by itself. He brought the ship to a hover and
shouted for the gunner to get the bird. The gunner expended his ammo,
splintering the tree, but missing the bird. Amazingly, the bird did not
move. According to Lt Donahue, WO Greenhalgh then turned the
aircraft over to him, pulled out his .38 pistol, took one shot out the side
window and down went the bird. Lt Donahue said of the incident, “I am
here to testify that he made one hell of a pistol shot. Should have come
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over to the Copperheads with me!”
On July 18th aircraft 66-16188 (AC WO Sidney Austin and WO James Cox) were
chalk 2 in a 5 ship trail formation extracting a First Infantry unit west of Lai Khe.
They were to land along a road but since an infantryman had set off a mine on the
road, the aircraft were told to land in a field beside the road. The tail rotor of WO
Austin’s ship hit a tree stump, the ship spun to the right, hit the ground and rolled
over. The aircraft was destroyed but the crew escaped with only minor injuries.
One day around midyear SP4 Phil Bishop, normally flying as a gunner, recalls going
to Saigon and hitching a ride back to Phouc Vinh along with SP5 John Ohmer
(returning from TDY at Lai Khe) on a Vulture ship (V-176). The engine failed as
they entered the traffic pattern and the pilots managed a scary, but successful,
autorotation and landed in a rice paddy just outside the perimeter. There was no
major damage to the ship but it was a hair-raising incident no one involved has
forgotten.
There was another unusual incident at the Phouc Vinh airfield about this time.
SP4 David Blomquist was a gunner on WO Greenhalgh’s ship and was getting
ready for an Ash & Trash mission. Local Vietnamese workers had been
working on the runway that morning and one had somehow managed to get
over to the ship and booby-trap the door gun ammunition with white
phosphorus (WP) grenades. As SP4 Blomquist was preparing his machine gun,
the WP grenades exploded, giving him severe burns. He was medivac’d to Can
Tho and then back to the US.
On September 13th, the 162nd with help from the 173rd AHC (Robin Hoods), led a
battalion lift for the First Infantry near Loc Ninh. Lt Dennis Morris was flight lead
and had 20 slicks to make 5 sorties each into the LZ’s. It was raining, the weather
was poor and the ceiling was down to around 700 feet. Despite these conditions the
First Infantry Division Commander, MG Ware, was on the scene in his C & C ship.
With such a low ceiling his aircraft was dangerously exposed and was shot down
with all on board killed.
On several occasions at Phouc Vinh nearby B-52 strikes (high altitude
artillery) would be so devastating that men would wake-up feeling the
vibrations caused by the strikes and the bunks would “walk” themselves
across the floor. Men woke-up in a place other than where they went to
sleep. What was even more startling was that the Vultures often inserted
troops into the same area just after B-52 strikes and would still take a
great deal of enemy fire.
Many people at Phouc Vinh in mid-late ‘68 remember "Lizard Six." As
WO Dave Bonifield relates, “When I arrived, on the front of our barn
(hooch) hung a sign, ‘Home Of Lizard Six.’ When I asked who was
Lizard Six I thought they were trying to see if the new guy would fall for
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the bull story. However, I soon found it to be true. Lizard Six was about
18 inches long and lived in the rafters of our barn. We often heard him
scurry around up there. If you banged on the walls you could make him
mad. He would make huffing sounds as he inflated and puffed up his
lower neck. Then he would release the air with a “heeew” sound. The
net result sounded like “f—k, f—k, f—k, heeeew”. Thus the lizard was
known as the F--k You Lizard. Later, I went to the Air Force jungle
survival school at Clark AFB. What do you know, there was one of these
lizards in a little zoo display. Next to it's proper name was ‘FY Lizard.’
Everyone else wondered what that meant, but I knew.”
(I NEED MORE INFO ON WHAT HAPPENED IN LATE 68??)
In November 1968, the priority of Delta operations was raised and the 9th Infantry
Division, previously given limited resources, was assigned 3 additional assault
helicopter units and 3 Air Cav troops. The 214th CAB with the 162nd, 191st and 240th
AHC’s was put under the operational control of the 9th Infantry. The headquarters of
the 9th and also that of the Mobile Riverine Force (the 2nd Brigade of the 9th) was
located at Dong Tam and the 162nd moved into that sprawling square mile base to
support the Division’s operations in the Delta.
The Vultures supported almost any 9th Infantry unit at times but was specifically
assigned as direct support for the 2nd Brigade, consisting of the 3rd battalion of the
47th Infantry, 4th of the 47th and 3rd of the 60th.
Getting all the vehicles and equipment from Phouc Vinh to Dong Tam proved to be a
bit of a chore since the 162nd, like most all aviation units, devoted every resource to
aircraft maintenance and virtually ignored vehicle maintenance. As a result few
vehicles were in condition to make the trip. After much effort and considerable
assistance from battalion HQ the Vultures put together a convoy to Dong Tam,
escorted by armored vehicles (Some vehicles had no brakes and had to run into the
vehicle in front of them to stop).
The Delta region in IV Corps stretched from the Cambodian border to the tip of the
Ca Mau peninsular. It was a heavily silted level plain with no elevation above 9 feet
except in the far western area. The entire area was subject to frequent flooding.
Extensive embankments were built over the centuries to channel water into the rice
fields. Mud flats and mangrove swamps encircled the delta region along its coast.
Road networks were limited but hard surfaced major roads did exist. Most of the
canals carried heavy traffic throughout the year.
To patrol and fight in the inundated marshlands and rice paddies and along numerous
canals and waterways crossing the Delta, the Army modernized the concept of
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riverine warfare employed during the Civil War by Union forces on the Mississippi
River and by the French during the Indochina War. The Mobile Riverine Force used
a joint Army-Navy task force controlled by a ground commander. In contrast to
amphibious operations where control reverts to the ground commander only after the
force is ashore, riverine warfare was an extension of land combat, with infantry units
traveling by water rather than by trucks or tracked vehicles. Aided by a Navy river
support squadron and river assault squadron, infantrymen were housed on barracks
ships and supported by gunships or fire support boats called monitors. Howitzers and
mortars, often mounted on barges, provided artillery support.
The broad, flat stretches of the Delta provided an ideal environment for unrestricted
use of army aviation. Unfortunately, the VC’s line of sight was also unrestricted.
They could see you coming from miles away and had plenty of time to take careful
aim.
In the October-November period the 162nd was chosen to experiment with helmet
sights for the XM-21 Minigun system. Sperry Rand sent a technician over to work
with the Copperheads on the test. SP5 John Ohmer (armorer) and WO Dennis
O’Brien helped install and test the system. It worked well under ideal conditions but
the dust, heat and humidity played havoc with the small servos attached to the
helmet. The system wasn’t quite ready for field conditions. This was the forerunner
of the helmet-mounted sight used in the current day Apache gunship.
On December 7th, the Vultures repositioned from Dong Tam to Ben Tre before
daylight in preparation for CA. Just after daylight a B-52 strike went in southeast of
Ben Tre and the crews could see and hear the strike as they cranked. The strike was
in and around their LZ. The 9th Infantry had intelligence indicating a VC battalion
HQ in the area. The idea was to make a 10 ship insertion and then bring in more
troops if the situation warranted. Lt Dennis Montgomery (67-17559 with CE SP5
Tom Juneau) was flight lead in a 10 ship formation and WO David Bonifield was
flying trail.
The LZ had concrete hay stacks around it and although it was pretty well blow to pieces, all
hell broke loose. The flight was to make a 180 turn on the ground and WO Bonifield was to
be lead coming out. On short final, they began taking heavy fire and Lt Montgomery’s
master caution light flashed on. At roughly a quarter mile from touch down, the ship began
shuttering and shaking and the gunner came on the intercom and said he’d been hit (luckily
the round had passed through his ribs just to the side of his chicken plate and he wasn’t
seriously wounded). The round that hit the gunner had continued through the firewall and
punctured a hydraulics line. Since Lt Montgomery was already set up for landing he
continued on and managed to plunk the ship down in a wet rice paddy. Not knowing the
extent of the damage he elected to shut down in the LZ.
There was a bit of confusion as the other ships waited for Lt. Montgomery. Finally,
they turned in the LZ and WO Bonifield led the flight out, leaving the former lead
ship on the ground. Lt Montgomery gave first aid to his gunner and they all took
cover in the LZ with the infantry. Meanwhile the rest of the flight had formed up and
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were circling a few miles away. At that point WO Gilbreath, disobeying orders from
the C&C ship, broke formation and set up an approach into the hot LZ to pick up Lt
Montgomery and his crew. On final approach he was covered on one side by two
Cobras and on the other by 4 Copperhead gunships, all blazing away at the tree lines.
As Lt Montgomery recalled “You should have seen the massive display of firepower,
particularly from my position. It was beautiful!” After they left the LZ, the downed
ship was hit head on in the nose by an RPG, incurring massive damage.
Amazingly, there were no fatalities. After things settled down, a CH-47 was brought
in to get the ship out. Action was still pretty intense to the north of the LZ so the
Chinook crew was told to land north and depart south. Somehow they became
confused and departed north, right over all the bad guys. However, they held on to
the Huey, probably because they were too scared to remember how to punch it off.
They ended up touching the Huey down at Ben Tre and then making a running
landing themselves, shutting down engines as they rolled. One of the fuel cells was
blown open and the inside of the Chinook and the crew were soaked—a memorable
day for them too.
Some of the men didn’t let the tropical weather interfere with a traditional Christmas
celebration. They even built a good-size snowman out of sand and shaving crème
that appeared very authentic.
During the year aircraft availability rates for the 162nd exceeded 80% every month,
sometimes reaching 85%, thanks to the incredible efforts of the Vulture maintenance
team. This played an especially important part in the Vulture and Copperhead
activities in the hectic early months of the year.
The Army supply system during this period (and probably every other
period as well) was extremely cumbersome. When you needed
something, you took something (a case of steaks or chicken, etc.) to the
Vulture liaison man in Saigon, told him what you needed (plywood, air
conditioner, or the like) and he would work a deal. More often than not
you would have what you wanted in a matter of days rather than months
if you depended on the supply system.
Aircraft parts supply was also sometimes a problem but the Vultures
were fortunate to have WO Ron Gresham, a great tech supply officer. As
WO Dave Bonifield relates, “We had a very high aircraft mission ready
rate. With all due credit to the maintenance guys, Ron had a lot to do
with that. We would fly to Phu Loi. At the supply depot, Ron would
sometimes send me and the CE in the front door with the requisition slips
while he went in the back door to get the things he knew we did not have
the priority to get. We would fly back to Phouc Vinh with every corner
of the Huey packed and rotor blades and tail booms sticking out the
doors. The net result was a tech supply that probably had enough parts
to build a Huey and a high ready rate.”
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Memorable incidents that occurred during 1968 include:
• WO Donald Welch, Assistant Opns Officer, hopped into the passenger seat of a
jeep that was taking him out to the flight line as a rush replacement pilot.
However, someone had removed the seat pins and as the jeep made a sharp left
turn, the seat and WO Welch both tumbled out of the jeep—Some guys had a
weird sense of humor!
•
Major Thompson was so incensed with the living conditions of the maintenance
people at Phouc Vinh when he took over the company (they were living on a
berm infested with rats) that he immediately had their quarters bulldozed. This
left almost 100 men with no shelter at all but the engineers he called in quickly
set up tents while they built permanent quarters.
•
WO Jim Cox was returning from R&R as a passenger on a slick that had an
engine failure and landed in a mine field outside of Phouc Vinh. Everyone was
afraid to move and waited for a ship to hover overhead and pick them up.
•
A man shot himself in the foot while lying in his bunk and “leading” a rat with his
pistol. One of the leisure activities at Phouc Vinh was to shoot rats. Men would
often lie on their bunks with a gun in their hand so as to be able to squeeze off a
shot without moving and frightening the rat.
•
After new urinals were dug, Major Thompson banned indiscriminate urinating in
the company area under penalty of the violator constructing new urinals. Two
WO’s promptly ran afoul of the ban and were put to work.
•
Late one night the shower ran out of water and a WO back from club was all
lathered up but with no way to rinse. Being resourceful he ran over to 1st Sgt
Pine’s hooch and jumped into the fire barrel by his door to rinse off.
•
Many remember the “monkey raids” at Phouc Vinh. Monkeys from the local
jungle would invade the 162nd area when the flight crews were all out flying. The
monkeys would come in looking for food and devoured any unsecured care
package. They scared the hooch maids so much they would abandon ship when
the monkeys showed up.
•
On a CA near Song Be (in Montanard country) in July or August 68, one of
the Vulture slicks noticed an abnormally high fuel consumption and
returned to Song Be. Inspecting the ship they found a cross bow arrow had
penetrated the fuel cell and caused a leak. This was the only Vulture ship to
be “shot down” bt a cross bow!
1969
Major Robert Wright began the year as CO and relinquished command to Major
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George Venti in May. He was followed by Major Kenneth Loveless who assumed
command in November.
In the 1968-69 period the imbalance of commissioned officers finally
came more in line with authorized levels for the first time. However,
instead of too many majors and captains there was now a shortage. Most
of the platoon leaders in late 68 and early 69 were Lt’s rather than
captains and there was at most one other commissioned officer in each
platoon. Of course, as always the real backbone of army aviation was the
warrant officer aviator and the shortage of commissioned officers had
negligible impact.
Some of the facilities at Dong Tam left a little to be desired. The
revetments were ready, but the barracks, buildings and creature comfort
areas were not. The barracks were framed and were slowly being built
by a civilian construction company. Officers and enlisted alike
scrounged plywood, nails, fans, and whatever else to make it “home”.
WO Glenn LaPlante had some construction experience and undertook
the task of constructing an officer’s club (bunker). It was roughly a 20 X
40 foot structure with 3-foot earth filled walls and a 4-5 foot earth roof.
The key was the 14” by 14” by 40 foot timber that LaPlante was able to
“procure” for the main beam. It was engineered as a bunker but was
finished inside as an officer’s club complete with bar (made from bowling
alley lane material). The enlisted men had to make do with a GP
Medium tent for a club. It had a few picnic tables and garbage cans filled
with ice and beer. Rank had its privileges! For some time, the enlisted
men also had to shower in a 40 knot wind underneath a conex filled with
water, using globe valves for showerheads and wood pallets for a floor.
The maintenance facilities at Dong Tam were good. The Vultures had a large open
front hangar with the shops on the lower level and offices on the second floor. Very
nice but unfortunately a strong wind blew the entire roof off one day. There was also
a wood frame mess hall with all the comforts of home. The supply room and motor
pool were the only facilities housed in tents. However, the dust at Dong Tam was
terrible. It got into everything. When it rained there would be 6-10 inches of water
in the company area. Then the sun would come out, quickly dry the ground and it
was dust all over again.
For some people at least, things were different in the Delta—and a lot
hotter. According to WO Dave Bonifield, “Flying out of Phouc Vinh, I
had received fire a few times but never taken a hit (I agree, not all were
so lucky). In the Delta, receiving fire was an every day occurrence and
hits were incurred almost every day. By the time I left, I think we
counted that my ship, that I had picked up new (Old 520), had taken
nearly two hundred hits in less than six months.”
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Many of the Vultures felt the 9th Infantry was more efficient than the 1st Infantry.
Their tactics were certainly different. Many 1st ID operations involved large multiple
battalion –size insertions with 60 of more aircraft. However, most CA’s by the 9th
were much smaller and more ad hoc. Specifically, the 1st ID would plan each search
and destroy mission in excruciating detail. Which battalions (companies) would be
inserted where, which artillery batteries would support, when fire would commence
and cease, PZ, RP and LZ times. Nothing was left to chance or ad hoc coordination.
All of this information was disseminated to supporting units (aviation and artillery)
the night before for planning and execution. Vulture operations, in turn, would
prepare maps with flight paths, times, formations, coordinates, etc. and brief and
distribute before the mission. Some felt the VC had the technology to intercept this
information and ready themselves for many of these missions—whether to combat
them or to avoid them. Often times insertions were made into a cold LZ based on hot
intelligence. In spite of this, the 1st ID would stay the course and wander around the
jungle with no one else there.
The 9th ID, on the other hand, would not make complex plans and their operations
tended to be more spur of the moment and in response to the latest developments.
They based their operations for the day on new, fresh intelligence. The 9th flew CA’s
virtually every day (as opposed to the 4-5 days per week in the 1st ID) and the
Vultures often had to ration “blade time”. For CA’s, the Vultures were normally
tasked to put up 10 slicks, one Smoke ship, one C&C and 4 gunships.
Based on the battalion commander’s intelligence, he would send his Air Cav teams out early
in the morning to develop what he thought might be hot spots. If the Cav developed
something, he would have the Vultures insert troops. If not, he would move to another
location. The VC in this area were smart. They quickly realized it was much more efficient
to shoot helicopters (not necessarily the Cav) and evade the infantry. As a result, the
Vultures received fire routinely and the downing of one helicopter meant that 6 or 8
infantrymen would be out of action. Rather than being extensively preplanned as in the 1st
ID, insertion planning by the 9th ID was accomplished on the fly as it was happening. The
battalion commander would select the LZ, C&C would coordinate PZ formation, RP time LZ
coordinates and formation, suppression, artillery, brief the guns and slicks, and do the
mission; all generally within 15-20 minutes. It was quick and very effective.
If the infantry on the ground did not made any significant findings after being on the
ground for a couple of hours, they were pulled out and taken to a new location. All
of this generally in 10 ship (company size or smaller) elements. The 1st ID, on the
other hand, often did battalion and even brigade-sized insertions. Very big and
cumbersome!
While the 9th ID’s tactics were effective, there was also a downside. Relatively small
troop units (often just one or two platoons) were sent out in the field, sometimes with
little or no artillery prep in the LZ’s, to essentially locate the enemy by drawing their
fire. Once VC or NVA troops were located in this manner, the US troops were
frequently pinned down and had to hold off the enemy until reinforcements could be
brought in. For the infantry on the ground this was obviously not conducive to a long
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life. Some felt they were being used as “cannon fodder” and morale suffered.
On New Years Day, the Copperheads supported the 191st (Boomerangs) on a CA and
were returning to the roost when aircraft 64-14160 (AC WO David Harmon, WO
“T.O.” Jones, CE SP4 Daniel Wright and Gunner SP4 R. J. Gardner) had a tail rotor
failure. WO Harmon picked out a rice paddy for landing but touched down in a right
crab and the ship rolled over and beat itself to death.
In early 1969 the 407th TC Detachment and 450th Signal Detachment were absorbed
into the 162nd and the name was officially changed to the 162nd Assault Helicopter
Company. The 758th Medical Detachment was absorbed by the local compound
medical staff.
During Tet 1969, the VC hit Dong Tam at all hours of the day and night with mortars,
rockets and sometimes 75 mm artillery rounds. Dong Tam had been built by
dredging silt from the My Tho River a couple of years earlier and the soil was very
fine and soft. Mortars and rockets left craters 3-4 feet deep.
A sad event occurred on February 4, 1969. SP4 Benjamin H. Binegar was “flushing”
water through the engine of a ship that had just returned from a mission. The cowling
was open and he was kneeling on the engine deck spraying water into the engine and
suddenly stood up into the moving main rotor blade. His skull was crushed and he
died that evening. SP4 Binegar was a crew chief who had been in country for almost
18 months. He was due to go home in a couple of weeks and had been taken off
flight status (against his wishes) so he could have a relatively safe job during his
remaining time. He was helping out on the flight line when this incredibly senseless
accident occurred. God rest his soul.
On February 28th the Vultures were supporting the Second Brigade, 9th Infantry on a
CA near Ben Tre. While on the ground at Ben Tre after refueling, the gunner on 6616151 (AC WO. H. W. Schmid, WO Marion Jaroz, CE SP4 Whitney Kloman and
gunner SP4 E. L. Andras) heard a slight knocking coming from the transmissions
area. The CE took off the side panel and the noise stopped so they took off to rejoin
their flight. About five minutes later WO Schmid felt a knocking in the cyclic
control and turned to go back to Ben Tre. A minute or so later the cyclic was ripped
out of his hand, going in a jerky, circular motion. He grabbed the cyclic but could
not control it, even with hydraulics off, and the ship began a right spiraling descent
with increasing bank. The aircraft hit the ground nose low and pinned SP4 Kloman
under the wreckage. The ship was destroyed and all four crewmen were injured but
not seriously. Luckily the ship did not catch fire, and a nearby Chinook was called
over to lift it off the CE. SP4 Kloman had a crushed skull, was later given last
rites and was not expected to live but he pulled through back in the US.
Many of the missions with the 9th Infantry Division involved small single ship Eagle
flights—almost like LRRP insertions. The Vultures and Copperheads were kept busy
inserting squad-size units who searched an area and if no VC contact was made they
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were quickly extracted and reinserted elsewhere. When contact was made, the
Vultures would bring in company or battalion size units, often on standby at Binh
Tre, to surround and attack the enemy positions. There were also many small
company-size CA’s using six slicks and two gunships on multiple sorties.
Sometimes supporting the Mobile Riverine Force involved unusual activities. Two of its
battalions were housed on LST’s moored in the My Cong River and another battalion housed
in the ‘Tiger’s Lair’ south of the River. In the words of Cpt Dennis Montgomery, “Lifting
troops off of the LST’s was always an encounter. First, we had to learn to talk Navy, e.g. ‘you
have a green deck, land port.’ No one was ever sure what that meant. Also, the LST’s
tended to align with the wind; this caused us to have to constantly land and take off in a
crosswind. Got a little exciting sometimes.”
The 2nd Brigade, and the 162nd, operated primarily in Kien Hoa province, a relatively
small area southeast of Dong Tam. However, this was the historic heartland of VC
activity and almost all CA’s were hot. One pilot recalls going into 17 different LZ’s
in a single day and being shot at in all of them.
Due to the nature of the 9th’s operations the Vultures carried out multiple CA’s every
day, day in and day out, with few breaks. The pilots built up an incredible amount of
flight time and the routine became rather numbing after a while. Lt Mike “Rock”
Pacifico reported logging 1,568 hours of flight time during his tour with the Vultures.
One day in early 1969, WO Chuck Carrillo, who had recently arrived in country, was
flying on a CA with his platoon leader Lt Mike Pacifico. On a hot extraction near
Ben Tre WO Carrillo was on the controls as they cleared the trees around the pick up
zone. Just as he turned the controls over to Lt Pacifico, a round came through the
floor, travelled the length of the collective, knocked off the little light post on the
collective head, hit the instrument panel, ricocheted up through the glare hood, hit the
upper window frame near the OAT gauge and then dropped into his lap. He sat there
stunned with his mouth and eyes wide open and then looked over to see Lt Pacifico
grinning at him. Lt Pacifico said “It’s going to be a long year, Chuck”. He was right!
On March 2nd, the VC hit Dong Tam again with a particularly heavy mortar and
rocket attack and bracketed the operations/orderly room. SP4 Mike Rush, on duty as
CQ runner that night, recalls seeing a rocket explode roughly 50 feet outside his
window. Luckily there were no serious casualties among the Vultures. However, a
sister unit (the 191st) took a direct hit on their operations building, killing the CO, XO
and four others. The 191st CO, Major John Petrie, was a former Vulture who had
previously been CO of the 407th TC Detachment, the 162nd’s maintenance support
unit.
In late March, during one of the frequent nightly mortar and rocket attacks, the VC
made a lucky hit on the main Dong Tam ammo dump down near the river. There was
a spectacular fire works display for almost 2 hours. Two Navy Seawolf helicopters
were taking off near by at the time and were blown out of the air, killing everyone on
board. The next morning there was unexploded ordinance all over the south side of
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the compound.
Many people remember Than, a bar maid at the Vultures’ Dong Tam O’ Club.
She was sophisticated, beautiful and got a lot of practice saying “No”. She
was also much more fun to watch than the Lawrence Welk Show on AFVNTV.
Another incident, or rather series of incidents, occurred early in the year that should
be noted. 1Lt Jim (Stork) Niemi managed to crash 4 ships within a period of a couple
of months, destroying almost $1 million worth of aircraft. In the first incident, he
was on a CA and was to land in a water-filled rice paddy. He planned to do the
infantry a favor and hovered over to a dike so the troops wouldn’t have to jump into
the water. However, the instability from the troops unloading caused the ship to hit
the dike, roll over and beat itself to death. Luckily, there were no serious injuries
but a grunt was was pinned under the ship. Another ship in the flight was able
to lift it up enough using seat belts as a sling for the grunt to be pulled out from
under the ship.
A few days later Lt Niemi was departing a PZ with a load of troops and took a round
through the engine. He autorotated and settled into trees after stopping his forward
airspeed, again with no serious injuries. Later, Lt Niemi was on a CA and came into
a rice paddy PZ too hot. He flared, his tail rotor dipped into the water and the aircraft
crashed into the PZ.
On another occasion, while landing in a PZ, Lt Niemi’s rotor wash set off a mine
under his tail boom, severing the tail boom and causing the ship to pitch forward with
the main rotor slicing through the troops he was to pick up. Two or three troops were
killed instantly.
Early in the year, Cpt __?__ MaDill (AC), WO “T. O.” Jones (pilot), SP4 Bonds
(CE) and SP4 Donald Gembe (CE) were flying gun cover on an CA east of Dong
Tam near Ben Tre. They had discovered and partially sank with door guns a
motorized sampan in the initial assault. Cpt MaDill, on his first day as AC, wanted to
destroy the sampan’s motor and came in low to mark the position with smoke. As
was his habit, Cpt MaDill was flying flat out at 120 knots and everyone on board was
intently searching for the sampan. They were all looking out the side of the ship and
not paying much attention to what was in front of them. All of a sudden they hit
some trees, shattering the chin bubbles and shearing a rocket pod completely off the
ship. It was a miracle they didn’t crash—they were probably saved from flipping
over by their high speed. Cpt MaDill’s AC orders were pulled for a couple of months
because of this incident.
Also one day in early in ’69 aircraft 67-19520 (AC WO Dave Bonifield,
WO Lou Dinnan, CE SP4 Van Travis and SP4 Dorn) was inbound on the
first lift of a hot CA near Ben Tre when the ship began to yaw. As WO
Dave Bonifield recalls,
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“The copilot was flying and things were a bit nervous. We started some slight
yawing and the copilot told me he thought something was wrong. In between
all the distraction I just told him it was his feet and calm down. He said no
there is a problem and the yawing got worse. I took the controls just as the
engine quit. I thought we had been shot down and called that we were going
down. We made a perfect autorotation into a rice paddy full of water.
Smokey immediately came in and started putting a circle of smoke around us.
Our six infantry troops hit the ground and immediately engaged in a small fire
fight. The rest of the flight circled back to drop the rest of the troops in our
LZ and one slick stopped to pick up our crew. The CE, gunner and I grabbed
radios and ran to the slick only to find that the copilot was not with us. I ran
back to the ship. The copilot door was still closed. I opened it and the copilot
was still sitting there frozen, with eyes as big as saucers. When I opened the
door he jumped out, unhurt, and we both ran to the other slick. There was a
lot of shooting, but when 520 was hooked back in it had no hits. The engine
failure was due to a bleed line being left finger tight after an engine wash the
night before. It had been a rushed preflight and I missed it. SP4 Van Travis
sat down on the ramp and cried. The 1st Sgt was pretty upset, but I told him I
didn't think he needed to say a word.”
A rather embarrassing incident occurred in early 69 when a Vulture slick was
working with Navy SEALS. WO Dennis Klein was peter pilot and Cpt ______ was
AC. They picked up the SEALS and received a briefing on a Navy barge anchored
just offshore near Ca Mau. Two Seawolf gunships provided gun cover and also
served as C&C, guiding the Vulture slick (a D model), who was at treetop level for
the insertion. The gunships told the Vulture ship they were coming up on the LZ, to
slow down and begun flaring. Without seeing the LZ, the AC began flaring and
ended up still over the treetops with no forward airspeed and no lift! The ship settled
into the trees and crashed. The aircraft was destroyed but luckily no one on board
was seriously injured.
Many people fondly recall “Doc” Barefoot. He was the last CO of the 758th Med
Detachment and moved the unit to Dong Tam where it was folded into the 214th
Battalion medical facility. He joined the army late in life, having been drafted at age
44 and forced to close down his medical practice. Once when the CO, Major Venti,
did not permit crew members pulling guard duty the next day off, Doc Barefoot
grounded them all for the day.
On another occasion, after a “morale building” banquet for all of the officers, nearly every
pilot was struck down with a severe case of diarrhea. Only the officers were effected which
may have been a form of retribution since the enlisted guys should have been invited also.
Most likely, some swamp water found its way into the feast, and every latrine around had
someone heaving from both ends. It lasted for days and very few pilots could fly their
missions. Doc Barefoot did a great job in ministering to the group and finally pulled
everyone though.
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Unfortunately, hygiene was sometimes not that great and conditions were somewhat
primitive. When the Company first moved to Dong Tam, the new mess hall did not have
adequate dish washing facilities so some nice monogrammed plates and dishes used at
Phouc Vinh remained in storage. The mess hall used paper plates and plastic silverware
instead. When Major Venti took command he found the dishes one day and, over the
objections of the mess sergeant, put them into use. Shortly thereafter, half the company came
down with another severe case of diarrhea, and they went back to paper and plastic. In the
early days at Dong Tam toilet paper became very scarce and something of a luxury item due
to the frequent bouts of diarrhea and dysentery.
The mess hall at Dong Tam was often neglected and did not have a senior
NCO as mess sergeant much of the time. Food was often cold and there
was no food available for the crews who worked at night. Men were
often forced to scrounge around for cold C rations. At one point,
frustration boiled over. Many people recall SSG Raymond Fitch, gun
platoon sergeant, who threw his plate of cold food against the wall behind
the serving line one day. Shortly afterwards a senior NCO was brought
in as mess sergeant and food improved dramatically. The Vultures
managed to obtain steaks from the Navy on a few occasions and even had
had a few BBQ’s.
On a mission in the Ben Tre area in mid-1969 WO Lou Dinnan was supporting the 9th
Infantry and was to drop something off on a Navy Tango boat which had a small
helipad on its rear. This was his first experience with small river boats and no one
told him to keep the skids light. Instead, when he landed on the boat he put the
collective down and the weight of the aircraft pushed the gunwales of the boat below
the waterline. As the boat began sinking WO Dinnan quickly took off and went on
his way as if nothing had happened.
There was another interesting event around midyear that many will remember. There
was an island in the river a couple of hundred yards south of Dong Tam that was the
site of a Buddhist Monastery. Often the 162nd aircraft landing at Dong Tam would
fly directly over a Temple (where the so-called Coconut Monk resided) and a large
platform where orange-robed monks often gathered. The Copperheads had been
joking for some time about scattering the monks by dropping a CS grenade on them.
One day, WO “T. O.” Jones, a Copperhead AC, decide to do just that. As they
returned from a mission, WO Jones instructed his CE and gunner (SP4 Donald
Gembe and PFC Bounds), to get ready with a CS grenade. As they flew low over a
large crowd of monks, they dropped the grenades square in the middle of the group.
They all got a kick out of seeing the monks scatter like rabbits, some of them even
jumping in the river. Unfortunately, it just so happened that a US two star general
and group of war correspondents were visiting the monks at the time. No one got the
tail number but they did see the snake on the nose and figured out it was a
Copperhead ship. Major Venti, the CO, was hauled before the general and ripped up
one side and down the other for over an hour. He came back to the roost mad as a
hornet but none of the Copperhead crews flying that day would admit to being the
guilty party.
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On June 23, the Vultures were on a 10 ship lift in 2 flights of five south of
Ben Tre. They dropped off the troops and returned to Ben Tre to await a
call for pick up. WO Dennis Bankson, who had been in country five
months, was taking his AC checkride on the lift and was tail-end charlie
of the second flight. The infantry encountered no enemy and returned to
the LZ for pick up around noon. No one realized it but the VC had
followed the infantry back to the LZ, surrounded it and prepared an
ambush for the helicopters they knew would come to pick up the troops.
As the second and last flight came into the LZ they began taking heavy
fire from all sides of the football field-size LZ.
WO Bankson loaded up his troops but as the last ship in the flight he had to wait until
the other ships took off to make sure they had not left anyone in the LZ. Just as he
dumped the nose over and applied power to take off, a mortar round landed very
close to the ship and shrapnel hit WO Bankson in the head and neck area, wounding
him severely. The ship pitched backwards, with the tail hitting the ground and
probably severing the tail boom, then pitched forward and began to spin. The AC
slammed the ship to the ground and most of the crew and infantry on board took
cover behind a nearby dike (at least one of the troops was hit in the head and killed
by the rotor blade). However, WO Bankson could not release his harness and was
trapped in the ship which was taking heavy fire from a tree line 30-40 yards away.
Realizing the pilot could not get out of his seat, the crew chief (although wounded
himself) ran back to the ship, pulled the pilot seat release handles, tilted the seat back,
slid WO Bankson out of the harness and helped him take cover behind the dike.
They were picked up by a slick after 15-20 minutes and WO Bankson was medivac’d to a hospital at Long Binh and later back to the US. The crew chief, a Hangar
Rat filling in for the normal CE that day, was hit with shrapnel in the thigh and was
also medi-vac’d back to the US. The rest of the crew escaped with no injuries.
In August 1969, the 9th Infantry Division stood down and the 162nd along with a sister
unit, the 191st AHC, were reassigned to the 13th CAB and relocated to Can Tho.
There were no large US ground units remaining in the Delta and US aviation assets
were decentralized and organized around the ARVN units they supported. The 13th
CAB became Task Force Guardian and primarily supported the 21st ARVN Division
whose operational area extended south and southeast of Can Tho down to the coast.
ARVN units in the Delta tended to do fewer CA’s than US units and on a smaller
scale, or at least smaller than the 1st Infantry. The smaller number of CA’s allowed
for a greater variety of other types of missions. The majority of assaults were
battalion size operations. ARVN units also depended very heavily on gunship
support for their far-flung outposts and to a lesser extent on artillery.
(I NEED MORE INFO ON 1969 and the 9th Infantry period??)
The move from Dong Tam to Can Tho was very interesting. Rather than
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“everybody in the trucks and follow me”, most of the men and equipment
were loaded onto Navy LST’s. They cruised down the My Tho River and
up the Bassac River, taking three days to reach Can Tho. It was a
memorable trip, seeing the river and the people who lived on it, face to
face, rather than flying over them. The Vultures also got to see how the
other half (the Navy) lived. The crew of the ship had good food, showers,
nice beds and other facilities—and very few bad guys shooting at them.
The facilities at Can Tho were a few steps down from those at Dong Tam. Instead of
wood, 2-story barracks, the unit lived in GP Medium tents for over a year while
permanent facilities were built. Living in a tent was not ideal, especially in the Delta.
Dirt, dust and mud (in the rainy season) were everywhere as were the mosquitoes and
bugs. The mosquito nets quickly became clogged with dust and the fine dust was
constantly in and on everything. In fact, some folks felt they lived like gypsies and
wondered who the Vultures had ticked off to deserve such conditions.
There had been enough space at Can Tho airfield to accommodate one AHC in
permanent facilities. Supposedly, the CO’s of the 162nd and 191st met at the Officers
Club just before the move and flipped a coin to see who would get the wooden
buildings—the Vultures lost! However, as consolation the 162nd got the H models
and the 191st took all the D models, a prize much appreciated when coming out of
tight LZ’s. (Because of the low elevations all of the few remaining D models in
Vietnam were sent to the Delta).
The mess hall at Can Tho was not too bad, at least initially. Many of the
night crews remember the split pea soup that always seemed to be the
standard fare late at night. Even today, former SP5 Mike Rush says
“whenever I see or smell split pea soup I always recall the late nights at
Can Tho.” He and others also recall the bread the Vulture mess hall
began purchasing from a Can Tho bakery shortly after the move. They
soon noticed a variety of bugs and weevils baked into the white bread and
complained about it. The bakery resolved the problem by switching to
whole wheat, making it much more difficult to detect the baked-in bugs.
At Can Tho, the 162nd and 191st usually alternated between CA’s and ash & trash
missions on a weekly basis. The Vultures and Copperheads would do CA’s one week
while the Boomerangs and Bounty Hunters would do them the next. On the off
week, the Vultures would do ash & trash while the Copperheads went hunting—
recons, hunter killer or Delta Six missions. The Delta Six missions, run by the 164th
Combat Aviation Group, required the Copperheads to operate similar to an Air Cav
unit and use their C models as both loach and gunship. These were fun missions that
everyone enjoyed—although a bit scary on occasion.
On November 4th a Copperhead fire team was covering a CA near Vi Thanh and
landed at the strip there to refuel and rearm. On take off the wing ship, 66-15215
(AC WO Barrie Springer, Lt A. N. Rufca and CE SP4 F. J. Bell) used the entire
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runway and barely managed to get a few feet off the ground. Approximately 200
meters past the end of the runway the ship settled into a rice paddy traveling about 50
yards with its skid in the water. It then hit a dike, shearing the rocket pods off and
rolling on its side. The crew escaped injury but the ship was destroyed.
One day in November just after Major Loveless assumed command, WO
Fred Auger recalls being called into the CO’s office and handed a piece
of paper, pen and envelope. He hadn’t written home in two months and
his family had contacted the Red Cross to see if he was still alive. Major
Loveless not only chewed him out but also made everyone in the company
write home that same day. With the mind-numbing day in and day out
routine some people just lost track of time.
•
Several men can never forget a haunting scene when their slick picked up a
9th Infantry trooper who had both legs blown off. He was conscious and
talking to the CE. He said “I’m going to die”—and then he died.
•
Lt Dennis Montgomery and Lt Lee Paynes were extracting troops south of
the My Tho River and Lt Paynes was hit in the foot by a tracer as they came
out of the PZ. The tracer entered the bottom of his foot but did not exit the
top. The round remained in his foot as it burned out, causing intense pain.
Lt Paynes was evac’d to Japan and then back to the US.
•
While supporting the Mobile Riverine Force, Vulture ships often had to land
on little assault boats that could not support the weight of a Huey and the
boat crews routinely neglected to lower their antennas, which caused some
confrontations between the respective crew chiefs; the boat’s and aircraft’s.
•
During a gun run on a village, SP4 Don Gembe, gunship CE, stood out on the
rocket pod and grabbed a VC flag from a pole attached to a hooch they were
working over (luckily, no booby traps!).
•
Lt Dennis Morris, 2nd platoon leader, recalls standing by for a CA at the Ben
Tre airstrip one day with the rest of the Vultures. As they waited, a C-123
on a defoliation mission caught fire and made an emergency landing at the
strip. The 123 called in when 5 minutes out but the Vultures could not clear
the runway in time so it landed parallel to the runway. The 123 touched
down streaming flames, ran through a minefield into a flooded rice paddy
and partially sank in the muck. A very memorable incident!
•
Virtually everyone hated the single ham and lima beans meal packed in each
case of 12-meal C rations. However, there was one WO who enjoyed this
particular meal, at least for a while. One day after polishing off a ham and
lima beans lunch his ship took off and shortly afterwards he “barfed” out the
side window. Unfortunately, the CE (SP4 Tom Barnes) was blasted with the
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slightly used ham and lima beans.
•
A pilot was wounded 4 times by the same bullet. A round came through the
chin bubble, went through his foot, through his calf and then thigh and
finally hit him in the shoulder.
•
Many remember the occasion when, at an Officer’s Call shortly after
assuming command, Major Venti proposed changing the name of the
company from “Vulture”, a dirty bird, to something more befitting an army
aviation unit. Needless to say, he was hooted down and it was all down hill
from there.
•
Some may recall the time when WO Tom Broadbent’s brother, an Air Force
jet jock from up north, came down and flew as door gunner with his brother.
Most fun he ever had!
•
According to recent visitors, Dong Tam still has a “snake pit”. It’s the home
of a tourist trap snake farm.
1970
Major Kenneth Loveless was the commander at the beginning of the year. He
relinquished command to Major Thomas Beauchamps on 18 April who subsequently
turned command over to Major Walter Moore on 4 October. (Major Moore
subsequently went on to become a Major General and command the Fifth Army.)
By early 1970, the few remaining US ground troops were pulling out of the Delta and the war
was rapidly becoming an all Vietnamese affair, at least in the Delta. However, the three
Vietnamese divisions, various Ranger battalions and regional (RF) troops in the area were
extensively supported by US Army Aviation units. At its peak in early 1970, there were a
total of 6 assault helicopter companies, 1 aerial weapons company (all gunships), 2 assault
support helicopter companies (Chinooks), 1 air cavalry squadron, 2 separate air cavalry
troops, 2 recon airplane companies (Bird Dogs) and 1 surveillance airplane company
(Mohawks) supporting Vietnamese troops in the Delta. These were as follows:
Home Airfield
Vinh Long
Unit
114th AHC (Knights)
175th AHC (Outlaws)
147th ASHC (Hill Climbers)
199th RAC (Swamp Foxes)
7/1 Air Cav Squadron (Black Hawks)
C/3/17 Air Cav Troop (Light Horse)
Can Tho
162nd AHC (Vultures)
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191st AHC (Boomerangs)
235th AWC (Delta Devils)
271st ASHC (Innkeepers)
244th SAC (Delta Hawks)
Soc Trang
121st AHC (the famous Soc Trang Tigers)
336th AHC (Warriors)
221st RAC (Shotguns)
C/16th Air Cav Troop (Dark Horse)
This amounted to roughly 4000 men and some 500 aircraft.
Although there were only three US Army airfields in the Delta to cover a vast region,
the 164th Aviation Group (the Delta Group), which had responsibility for all army
aviation in the Delta, had previously established (unmanned) POL refueling points at
15 regional capitals and major towns. These were strategically located throughout
the region so that no aircraft would ever be more than 20 minutes or so from a
refueling point. This provided aviation units with a great deal of flexibility and
allowed them to provide excellent support to ARVN units anywhere in the Delta. At
times during the 70-71 period there were two additional assault units assigned to the
164th Group and supporting Delta operations from the Dong Tam airfield. These
were the 135th AHC (Emu’s) and 335th AHC (Cowboys).
At this point US aviation units were very active throughout the area and pretty much
“owned” the Delta. They provided very effective support to the ARVN ground troops. In
fact, it was a rare occasion when aircrews from the Delta Group did not account for more
enemy casualties in the weekly casualty reports than the ARVN troops they supported.
Although all major US army infantry and other combat units were out of
the Delta by mid-1970 there were still quite a few US troops in the area in
addition to the aviation units. These took the form of a variety of US
engineer, signal, transportation, Special Forces and MACV advisory
units.
On January 5th a Copperhead fire team was providing gun cover for a slick spraying
Agent Orange along a canal near an ARVN compound west of Vinh Long. The slick
began receiving fire and the Copperheads started a gun run. Cpt Frank H. Brinson,
the gun platoon leader, was almost immediately hit in the throat by a round that
severed a main artery. The pilot, WO Lawrence McGlamery, took over and headed
for the hospital at Vinh Long using every ounce of torque he could pull while the CE
and gunner tried to give Cpt Brinson first aid. He by-passed the helipad, flew
underneath some power lines and right up to the back door of the Emergency Room.
Unfortunately, they could not stop the bleeding and Cpt Brinson died before they
made it to the hospital. WO McGlamery had flown the C model so hard that he
overheated the engine and it had to be changed.
WO Edward B. Melody, in country only 2 months, was killed on February 23rd as
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pilot of a slick accompanying a Copperhead fire team on a Last Light Recon south of
Can Tho near Phung Hiep. The AC, Cpt Matt Fleming, was flying in a right orbit at
1500 feet and WO Melody was looking out the window at the ground. Suddenly an
RPK opened up from somewhere below and a round hit WO Melody in the right eye,
killing him instantly. It was the only round to hit the ship.
Early in the year there was an interesting incident when a Copperhead fire team was
covering Vulture slicks on a CA. WO Jim Willard was PIC of one gunship, and Cpt
Walt Stewart was fire-team leader with WO Al Olbeter on the Chunker in the other.
After they had escorted the slicks into a fairly large LZ s, as was typical in the Delta,
they broke off to provide area security to the ground troops (21st ARVN Division).
As luck would have it, they spotted a VC up in a tree (about ½ mile from the ground
troops) taking in the scene. Of course, this was a door-gunner’s dream! As WO
Willard’s gunner was working over the VC (his aircraft was about the height of the
tree, slow, and about 20 feet away), Cpt Stewart suddenly saw an M-16 come up out
of the grass directly under Willard’s ship and open up on full automatic into the
bottom of the aircraft.
Cpt Stewart shouted into the radio for Willard to get out of there – that he was taking
fire. Of course, he knew that already because the lower pilots door hinge was shot
away, with metal fragments cutting into his leg (he continued with the mission). The
gunships immediately rolled in with 40mm and door guns. A 40mm round must have
impacted under the VC that shot at WO Willard’s ship since the explosion threw him
several feet into the air. It was almost as if the scene was in slow motion. For a
moment, Cpt Stewart thought the VC was coming through the windshield. Later
when the troops made a sweep through the area, they found eight dead VC, all within
a close radius of the tree. One of the US advisors saved an SKS rifle for the
Copperheads, and it was later presented to Major Loveless when he left the company.
One night in early 1970, SP5 David Holt had a rather close call. In his words:
“It was around midnight and I was taking a shower. I had just about
finished when our firefly ship hovered over the shower. The shower
didn’t have a roof, just beams and barrels. They sit there with that
bright light on. I thought ‘you perverts’ and then gave them some hand
signals. They just sat there so I got out my mirror and began to shave—
no sense wasting light! They then cut loose with the M-60 right at me, or
so it seemed. I left there running. When I slammed the door back, I
looked in the direction of the berm and saw a small figure in black
pajamas running from just outside the shower toward the berm. He
never tripped or got caught in the wire, he just kept running with the M60 right behind him. They said later that they got him just as he entered
the tree line. If it wasn’t for that firefly ship I don’t know if I’d be here
right now.”
In the February-March time period a rather bizarre event occurred at
Can Tho one day. A Copperhead gunship was refueling at the POL area
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when a spark apparently launched one of its rockets (with a white
phosphorus warhead). The rocket went straight down the runway and
into the ammo dump across from the airfield tower. It was a perfect
shot! The dump exploded in a tremendous blast that shook the entire
airfield, killing several guards on duty, and blowing the windows out of
the tower. There was nothing but small pieces left of the guards.
In late 69-early 70, the Copperheads spent a great deal of time operating out of Moc
Hoa near the Cambodian border, including many night missions over the Plain of
Reeds. Cpt Stewart recalls that night flights over the Plain were particularly tricky
for them since they had such limited IFR experience. On dark nights there was
absolutely no horizon and it was very easy to confuse occasional lights with stars—a
great place to get vertigo! Luckily it was flat and if you were higher than 100 feet
you wouldn’t hit anything. All in all, it was a very lonely place and anyone there was
usually the enemy.
Moc Hoa and the area around the Seven Mountains (Sisters) was Copperhead turf prior to
the Cambodian Invasion in April 1970. During the invasion they worked around the Parrot’s
Beak and the Svay Reng area inside Cambodia. They ran routine missions out of Moc Hoa
patrolling the border on the southern edge of Parrot's Beak (the beak is that "beak" looking
projection of Cambodia located between IV and III Corps, with the point of the beak looking
toward Saigon).
A typical mission was for one or two gunships and a C&C/flare ship, to stage out of Moc
Hoa, and at various times during the night to link up with an OV-1 and Delta Control to
recon the northern portion of the Plain of Reeds. The Copperheads also provided on-call
support to the Special Forces outposts along the border—the B Team was based in Moc Hoa.
The OV-1 would often pick up something on its radar, relay the coordinates to Delta Control,
and they would vector the Copperheads over the site. (It was here that the Copperheads
learned an OV-1 was great at finding herds of water buffalo.) In any case, it was a dangerous
area and dangerous mission. The American and Vietnamese troops who manned the string
of outposts along the border had a lonely and dangerous job. As the time approached to go
over the border, the Copperheads began to work around the clock - patrol the border from a
line north of Moc Hoa west to Chau Doc and then back again. Once in a while as far south as
the Seven Mountains area.
On one occasion the Copperheads were sent out from Moc Hoa in the early morning to look
for a battalion of NVA that had come off the mountains. They found them, or at least they
found each other! The NVA had at least one heavy machine gun and made the mistake of
opening fire too soon. As Cpt Stewart recalls they expended their rockets (WO McGlamery
was wing) and gave some instructions to an AH-1 team that followed them in.
Unfortunately, the NVA gunners got the range on the Cobras and killed the front seat pilot in
one of the aircraft.
On another occasion when operating out of Moc Hoa, Cpt Stewart recalls that
engineers were replacing PSP matting with the new square mats. A large, unsecured
section of matting was picked up by the rotor wash of the aircraft as he was trying to
get off the ground (remember, fully loaded C models would not hover!). The tips of
the skids slid under the mat section just as they reached translational lift, the cross
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tubes gave way and the entire skid assembly was pushed up against the bottom of the
aircraft – the first, and only, retractable gear UH-1C. They flew the aircraft back to
Can Tho, dropped two fully loaded XM200 rocket pods in the river, and landed on
some mattresses that maintenance had set up. Somewhere in the Mekong, off Can
Tho, are two surprise packages, compliments of the Copperheads and the engineers at
Moc Hoa.
In early 1970, WO Geoffrey McConnell and WO Bob Good were on a defoliation
mission (or Autumn Mist as they were called) west of Can Tho. They were to spray
trees along a canal and had a gunship escort since the VC/NVA typically shot at any
low level ships rigged for spraying. Shortly after commencing their run there was a
loud explosion underneath the ship and it ballooned up from the concussion of the
blast. At first they thought the Copperhead escort had fired a rocket too close but
then realized that was not the case. The VC had apparently wired mines into the
treetops as a defense against defoliation runs by helicopters and had detonated one as
the Autumn Mist ship flew over. The ship limped back to Can Tho and maintenance
counted over 60 holes from shrapnel and bullets. WO Good said he felt like one of
those damaged B-17’s limping back to its base in England during World War II.
On April 25th, a Copperhead fire team was working an area southwest of Can Tho.
WO Gerard F. O’Connor and WO Dennis W. Stoner in 66-15214 were on a gun run
when the aircraft inexplicably crashed pulling out of a dive after firing rockets. WO
O’Connor died in the crash and the rest of the crew were severely injured. Both
pilots’ armored seats were ejected from the aircraft in the crash. WO Stoner ended
up with his legs jammed into the mud of a rice paddy (one leg was severely broken in
several places) with the pilot’s seat on top of him and pinning him to the ground. The
main body of the aircraft was several feet away and caught fire almost immediately.
The CE (SP4 B. Potteroff) had fuel splashed onto him in the crash and was badly
burned from the waist up. The gunner (SP4 R. Volles) was not badly injured initially
but incurred serious burns on his hands as he tried to extinguish the flames on the
CE’s body. Fortunately, the C &C ship landed within a few minutes, freed WO
Stoner and took the group to the Binh Thuy Hospital.
The company later received a letter from WO O’Connor’s parents asking about a tape
recorder that he used to exchange messages with his parents. It was packed up with his gear
and shipped home but lost somewhere along the line. His parents desperately wanted it
because they thought it might contain one last taped message from their son. It was heartbreaking a tragedy!
When the Copperheads were finally allowed to cross the Cambodian border in April
they were a bit disappointed. Most of their time was spent destroying watercraft and
supplies. It was almost as if the NVA knew they were coming. Cpt Stewart recalls
finding a beautiful cabin-type boat, maybe 30’ long, and probably used by VIPs. In
his words, “I shot one rocket at it and missed. By the time I came around for another
try, my wing (WO Steve Behm) had reduced it to splinters on the water. We shot-up
hundreds of small watercraft and destroyed untold amounts of supplies. There were
numerous secondary explosions from door guns – a target rich environment - but the
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enemy had obviously pulled out fast.”
Cpt Bill Tuttle had the distinction of being the one of the first US troops in
Cambodia—at least officially. He was flying a 2 ship Nigthhawk mission out of Moc
Hoa supporting the ARVN 11th Armored Calvary when that unit jumped the gun and
crossed the border on the evening of April 30th. It immediately ran into the 17th NVA
Division and had a real fight on its hands. Cpt Tuttle did a night medivac in monsoon
conditions and under heavy enemy fire in an attempt to save a US advisor who had
life threatening wounds. Cpt Tuttle’s brand new Peter Pilot on his first in-country
mission, turned the landing light on as they landed and attracted a hail of enemy fire.
This act inadvertently allowed a second ship to land and rescue the badly wounded
advisor. Luckily, they all made it out without any casualties although Cpt Tuttle did
have a few choice words with his copilot.
After US forces left Cambodia (the ARVNs stayed for a while), the Vultures and
Copperheads shifted focus to the east - toward the area around My Tho, and got back
to small unit actions. Part of this action included an occasional search for POW
camps (that might hold two OV-1 crewmen captured in the area when their aircraft
went down in late 1969). These missions would usually follow some intelligence
report and involved 3-4 slicks, an ARVN platoon, a C&C ship and a Copperhead fire
team. They managed to find two camps, one that had been recently vacated and one
where the prisoners (roughly ten ARVNs and civilians) had been executed just prior
to the search team’s arrival. This was somewhere northeast of Can Tho, the other
was close to an abandoned airfield, probably Japanese, near the coast – east of Ben
Tre. However, at the occupied camp, the Copperhead gunners did kill some of the
guards and the ground troops got a few more of them. There were no US troops
among the dead POWs. It was learned much later that one of the OV-1 crewmen
died in an escape attempt and one lived to be released.
After Major Beauchamp assumed command in April, he learned that the barracks and
other facilities being built for the 162nd were to be given to a Chinook outfit (the 271st
ASHC) instead. This not only meant the Vultures would have to live in tents 4-5
months longer than anticipated but also the company buildings would have to be
constructed by the men of the 162nd with little outside help. For months every
available man was diverted to construction work.
When the 162nd first moved to Can Tho they had dragged a number of two and a half
ton trucks and other vehicles down from Dong Tam and put them in the motor pool to
be cannibalized for parts. Like other AHC’s the priority was on aircraft maintenance
and no one paid much attention to the seldom used ground vehicles. However, the
army did! Someone in DOD came up with the idea that combat units should have
maintenance inspections. The Vultures had a CMMI (Command Maintenance
Management Inspection) in the midst of the construction of the company buildings.
The aircraft maintenance and weapons systems passed but the motor pool failed.
The CMMI failure almost cost Major Beauchamp his head. That mysterious black CH-47 that
roamed around Vietnam in the dead of night plucking unit commanders who run afoul of
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headquarters almost came after the CO. However, he was saved when the battalion
commander intervened on his behalf. After much hard, but rather useless, work and sleight
of hand by the motor pool NCO, the Vultures passed a re-inspection of the motor pool.
Priorities were sometimes a little strange!
An interesting task that the Vultures and Copperheads greatly enjoyed in 1970 was
the Phoenix missions—a CIA sponsored operation aimed at capturing or eliminating
high level VC cadre. The Phoenix missions were based on superb intelligence, and
that was how the size of the force package was determined. At times it was a CA but
mostly it was a single slick with one or two gunships. The Phoenix “snatches” were
generally focused, surprise attacks – a slick might land four or five heavily armed
men at the door of a particular hooch, and in they went. There was one case where
the Special Operations men talked a 162nd slick into hovering over a hooch so they
could jump directly through the roof. While the ship was at a hover the object of the
mission came out the front door and gave the aircraft a burst from his AK. It was all
down hill from there - but with a happy ending. Violent in execution, short in
duration, and surprisingly free of friendly and enemy casualties, the Phoenix raids
were a unique and highly effective brand of offensive operations. The Vultures and
Copperheads loved them.
On May 27th, SP4 Andrew P. Susi, a Vulture crew chief on WO Mike Coonrod’s
ship, was killed on a CA southeast of Can Tho in the “Mickey Mouse’s Ears” area.
This was a very prominent series of bends in the river that looked just like Mickey
Mouse ears from the air. A lift of ARVN troops were inserted into one of the “ears”
into what turned out to be an ambush. The Copperheads covering the lift ships had
recommended the LZ be moved but the Vietnamese province chief in the C&C ship
insisted the LZ be right in the “ear”. As soon as the slicks touched down the entire
LZ lit up with automatic weapons fire. The ARVNs were cut to pieces but all the
Vulture ships managed to make it out of the LZ. On the way out, SP4 Suzi was hit in
the head by a single round. He made it back to the hospital in Can Tho but died the
next day. The copilot, Lt William Healy, was also wounded but not seriously. There
was suspicion of collusion between the ARVN province chief and the VC but no one
ever knew the whole story.
One day in midyear WO Willard and Cpt Stewart were cruising along in their
gunships at tree-top level heading to Ca Mau when they suddenly broke over 20 to 30
NVA troops bathing in a stream. As can be imagined, it was bare asses running all
over the place and the CE/gunners asking if they should shoot (maybe that American
sense of fair-play!). WO Willard and an NVA soldier (who had made it to his AK)
dueled it out. He would shoot at Willard with the AK, Willard would shoot a rocket
at him, and so on. WO Willard won the contest on the third or fourth rocket.
Another interesting incident happened around midyear. The CO went on R&R and
left the most senior Captain, a platoon leader, as acting commander. The Platoon
Leader had been in country a couple of months and figured he was about ready for
AC, so he cut orders appointing himself as an Aircraft Commander. On his first day
flying as AC he was supposed to land at the Binh Thuy Navy field. He was talking to
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the Binh Thuy Navy tower but shot his approach to the Binh Thuy Air Force Base.
Unfortunately, he cut off an F-4 flown by a full colonel on final approach and that
was the end of his AC days for a while!
In the 70-71 period the company had a slick painted flat black (to cut down on shine
and glare in the moonlight). It was equipped with a zeon light panel on the right side
of the cargo compartment with 7 large zeon bulbs. The ship would fly at night into
suspected areas of enemy activity looking for lights or fires. It would then light up
the area and call in gunships to see if they could draw fire. If so, they would unload
on the target. The zeon ship was almost always flown by CW2---- Smith?, an
experienced pilot who had been in country over 2 years.
June 1970 was a sad month for the 162nd. On June 20th a Copperhead fire team on a
recon mission took fire from a hooch in a small clearing surrounded by tall trees.
They returned fire and set up for a rocket run but the trees obstructed their angle of
attack. WO Alex Spence, the aircraft commander, then began a rocket run at a steep
angle so as to be able to get a clean shot at the hooch. However, for some unknown
reason he did not pull out of the dive and the ship (65-09454) hit the trees, rolled over
and exploded. WO Spence, the pilot (WO Robert F. Colatruglio) and CE (SP4
Joseph P. Lutz) were killed on contact but the gunner, PFC Gary Catlett, survived
with serious injuries. He escaped from the crash and a nearby slick dropped a rope
and carried him to a clearing where they put him on board and took him to the
hospital. He was medivac’d back to the US. The cause of the crash, whether it be
enemy fire, target fixation, or something else, could not be determined.
Three days later on June 23rd, a slick (67-17594) with a Vietnamese woman and 7
Navy passengers on board departed Ca Mau at around 1800 hours for Can Tho.
Roughly 5 minutes later at an altitude of 1,500 feet the mast apparently snapped off
just below the rotor head assembly. Subsequent investigation revealed that “mast
bumping” had occurred. A heart-breaking 12 souls were lost in this unthinkable
accident, with 3 members of the crew being 20 years old or younger. The
crewmembers were WO Daniel J. Hallows (AC), WO Lawrence M. Moore (pilot),
SP5 Denis J. Dillon (CE) and PFC James W. Lenz (gunner). May God bless them
all. From the nature of the weapons recovered it appears the passengers may have
been SEALS or part of the CIA Phoenix program.
One day around mid-year, the 162nd planned a company party and the flight platoons
had been able to return from a CA a little early in anticipation of the party. One of
those engine shipping containers was filled with ice and beer. Everyone had had a
few beers and were standing around waiting for the steaks to cook when the
Operations Officer came running over to the group. He said a loach had been shot
down and they needed to insert some troops asap. Then he turned to the first platoon
leader, Cpt Bill Howell, and asked how many of his crews were ready. Cpt Howell
immediately answered “all of them”. At that point the entire first platoon headed
toward the flight line, running, staggering and falling all over each other like a scene
from the Keystone Cops. However, once they made it to the aircraft, they quickly
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sobered up and it was all business. They picked up and inserted the troops but were
not able to rescue the loach crew. The VC had beat them to it.
One day in mid-1970, WO Robert Good was AC of a slick that had an engine failure
south of Can Tho. The ship was empty and he made an autorotation into a flooded
rice paddy, setting the aircraft down with no damage. WO Good had put out a May
Day call that was picked up by a medivac ship not far away. There was no dry
ground where they landed so WO Good put a smoke grenade on the synchronized
elevator of the ship to signal the pick up ship. When the aircraft was sling-loaded
back to Can Tho, WO Good was there when the CO came by to take a look a it.
Although there was no damage and he had made a great autorotation, Major Moore
saw where the smoke grenade had scorched the sync elevator and had a fit. He
chewed WO Good out—for damaging the ship. It was hard to please a perfectionist!
Sometime in August of ’70 the SEALS and MACV were searching for a VC/NVA
POW camp in the U Minh Forest area. They had carried out several Sniffer missions
and confirmed a great deal of human activity in the area. One day the Vultures took
part in an ARVN six-ship, no-prep raid in the U Minh about half way between Ca
Mau City and Rach Gia in an effort to surprise and overrun a suspected POW camp.
They landed and stayed in place instead of pulling pitch and getting out. According
to Cpt Bill Tuttle, “The local bad guys must have bugged out while we were enroute,
because you could still smell the faint odor of wood smoke. The ARVN grunts found
the compound underground—three stories, complete with a generator room, pumps, a
decent-sized hospital, and a clothing and equipment manufacturing area with 50
Singer sewing machines, but no live POWs—just dog tags stuck in the walls. The
VC had kept the guys in 3’x3’x5’ cages dug into the sides of the tunnels, and when
they died, they just collapsed each cage roof to bury them. They tamped the dirt
down, then tucked their dog tag chains into the wall. Kind of reinforced your desire
to go out fighting if you went down while flying single ship.”
According to the briefing before the raid, there were supposed to be three confirmed US and
10-15 ARVN’s being held in the POW camp. One of the US advisors who went down into
the tunnels said they found five sets of US dog tags and "a lot" of ARVN ID’s on the second
level and he had heard that there were more down on the third.
On August 26th the Vultures were on a CA supporting ARVN troops and were
departing a hot LZ when the lead ship (69-15429, a brand new aircraft) was hit by an
RPG at an altitude of about 200 feet. The aircraft exploded and all aboard were
killed. The crewmembers were WO William H. Laurence (AC), Cpt Stephen D. Carr
(pilot and first platoon leader), SP5 Benny R. Halstead (CE), and SP5 Larry B.
Jacobson (gunner). It was WO Laurence’s first flight after making AC and many
remember how proud he was of that achievement. The CA was only 10-15 minutes
from Can Tho and the Operations staff were listening to the radio traffic when the
ship was hit. They were stunned by the news--to be so close yet so helpless. It was a
sad loss!
In the August-September period the 162nd lost nine ships with engine failures. The
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third stage compressor blades were apparently faulty and that group of engines failed
at around 1200 hours. WO “Tuna” Williams was lucky enough to be in on 3 of the
engine failures.
In the fall of 1970 the 121st AHC and 336th AHC at Soc Trang began training
Vietnamese air force (VNAF) personnel en masse to take over their function and
subsequently turned their aircraft, equipment and facilities over to two newly formed
VNAF squadrons. In the South Vietnamese armed forces all aircraft, including
helicopters, were part of the air force and these two units had US air force rather than
army advisors. Unfortunately, the advisors were mostly jet jockeys who had been
through a 25-hour helicopter transition course and had no clue as to how to run air
mobile operations and support ground troops. Soc Trang airfield was turned over to
the Vietnamese air force and the remaining US troops either stood down or were
transferred to Can Tho. The Vultures and Boomerangs at Can Tho ended up taking
up some of the slack with the Tigers and Warriors gone.
One evening in the fall there was a USO show at the Officers Club. The 162nd crews
were out on missions and arrived late for the show but quickly made up for lost time.
Some of the men took to the stage and proceeded to help out the performers with
singing and dancing. Major Beauchamps, the CO, got up to herd everyone back to
their seats but ran into the Airfield Commander just entering the Club.
Unfortunately, the Airfield Commander didn’t appreciate the humor of the situation
and reacted very negatively. He booted the Vultures out of the Club, telling them not
to come back. It took a while for the CO to get back on speaking terms with the
Airfield Commander.
Late in the year, SP4 Dan Pannunzio was CE of V369 on maintenance run to Long
Binh. Although it was a little awkward they put a crated tail boom and transmission
in the cargo area of the Huey and flew it back to Can Tho. Because of poor
aerodynamics and wind resistance they had to stop to refuel at My Tho and Vinh
Long. When the ship landed at the POL pad they jumped out, grabbed the fuel hose
and then realized they couldn’t access the tank because the open cargo door blocked
it. They couldn’t close the door because of the tail boom cargo and finally ended up
getting a skinny-armed Vietnamese to reach between the fuselage and door to unlock
the emergency window release. So much for using their head!
Shortly after assuming command of the 162nd in October, Major Moore ended a
longstanding initiation rite for new pilots, much to the chagrin of some and the relief
of others. The initiation usually took place late at night after most people were
asleep. The “old-timers” would get together and go drag the unsuspecting “newbie”
out of his hooch and hold him down on the ground while one of them dropped his
underwear and sat on the face of the new guy. This procedure was known as the
“Crack 6” and initiated all new pilots into the unit.
The wood, two-story barracks and other permanent facilities were finally completed
in November and the company moved out of the tent city that had been home for the
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first 15 months at Can Tho. It was beginning to look a lot like a nice company area
but when the monsoon rains came it was still a muddy mess in some areas.
Unfortunately, the bunkers were built partially underground and no one considered
what would happen in the rainy season. At that time of year the bunkers usually had
about 2 feet of water in them. Some people simply got on top of the bunkers during
mortar attacks with their cameras and tape recorders and tried to direct the VC fire to
the ragged ships they hoped would be hit.
In early December, the Vultures and Copperheads were on a CA east of Can Tho.
The LZ was full of water and the ships hovered over small raised islands so the
ARVN’s could jump off. Lt Ken Barnard was AC in one of the ships and they began
taking heavy fire as they came into the LZ. The ARVN’s would not get off so the CE
was throwing them off. As the lead ship lifted out of the LZ, Lt Barnard saw a VC
step out from behind some grass roughly 10-15 yards in front of his ship and aim his
AK-47 directly at his copilot. Three rounds went through the right windshield and
the VC then aimed at Lt Barnard. Six rounds went through the left windshield. Since
the ship was hovering, it was above the VC and he had aimed too high. No one was
hit. Lt Barnard then pulled full power and tilted the rotor forward at a sharp angle in
an attempt to hit the VC with the rotor blade as he took off. However, the VC went
completely underwater and was not touched. As they lifted out of the LZ they could
see an ARVN with an M-60 dangling from the skid of the ship in front of them. He
hung on until around 200 feet AGL and then fell into a rice paddy. Lt Barnard
displayed the windshield in his hooch for weeks afterwards.
There was a sad event in the company on Christmas Eve. A gunner from one of the
flight platoons, PFC Samuel E. Dick (20 years old) received a letter from his
girlfriend informing him she had been on several “acid trips” with his friends back
home and she didn’t want to see him again. PFC Dick went to the arms room and
told the armorer he wanted to clean his M-16. He took it back to his barracks, loaded
it, put the barrel in his mouth and pulled the trigger. God rest his soul! He was just
as much a casualty of the war as those killed by enemy bullets.
On December 27, the 162nd was on a CA in the Ca Mau area. A slick went down in
the LZ and a Copperhead fire team covered it until the crew could be picked up. One
of the gunships (66-15008, CE SP5 Curt Krouse) came under heavy fire and took
roughly 10 hits. The gunner, Sgt Ames, was hit in the face with shrapnel and the AC
, WO Bruce Bonner, had rounds go between his legs, into his seat and over his head
but was not hit. They flew back to a staging area and shut down to check damage.
After looking the ship over closely they reloaded and continued their mission, flying
roughly 8 more hours that day. On arrival back at Can Tho, a maintenance inspection
discovered some serious damage, including a swash plate push/pull tube that had
been hit and half the diameter was missing –scary!! The ship stayed in maintenance
for several weeks, had an engine failure on its first flight out and was destroyed.
(There may have been several Silver Stars or DFC’s awarded for the December 27th
incident. Can anyone provide more detail?)
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Other memorable incidents during 1970 include:
• Cpt Lonnie Ames, maintenance officer, was relieved for taking a shot at a hooch
maid who stole his watch.
•
SP5 Greg Price, a maintenance team chief, decided he’d like to fly and transferred
to a flight platoon. His ship was shot down on his first flight out of Can Tho.
SP5 Price figured that was enough flying for him and came back to maintenance.
•
Lt Imanuel Sieving and his gunship crew were shot down near Moc Hoa one
night around midyear. They landed on the bank of a canal and held off the VC
until morning when they were rescued.
•
The XO and 2nd platoon leader flying C&C were awarded a Silver Star for
picking up the crew of a downed Copperhead gunship (WO Mike Perrin, WO
Peter Lautzenheiser, SP4 Greg Boska and SP4 Leroy).
•
WO “Tuna” Williams was flying a defoliation mission on Christmas Eve and
forgot to switch radios when he tried to inform his accompanying gunships that
he was taking fire. A slick 25 miles away responded “I don’t give a damn, I’m
not there.”
•
Lt. Guy Smith, son-in-law of then Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was wounded on
a CA and Major Loveless had to call the State Department in Washington to
explain the circumstances.
•
Some of the Vultures took part in a SEAL raid where they grabbed a VC
paymaster for the local VC battalion, complete with payroll. They all took some
VC NLF “Liberation Money” as souvenirs.
•
The 271st Innkeeper Chinook that picked up AC # 555 (a fully loaded gunship)
downed upwind of a village on Go Cong Island dropped the gunship on takeoff.
There was a TV crew from a major US network in the village at the time
gathering “local color” footage and they scattered as a cloud of red smoke and CS
gas drifted through the village. The Vultures heard about this for weeks.
•
WO Dennis O’Brien had to write home to ask his parents for money to pay off his
gambling debts so he could DEROS. He owed so much they wouldn’t let him
Vietnam without paying his debts (whoever he owed apparently could pull a few
strings!).
1971
Major Walter Moore was the CO as the year began and was replaced by Major
Ronald Brooks in March, followed by Major Ronald Grooms in September.
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In January 1971 US ground troops saw their last action in the Delta when D Troop,
7/1 Air Cav, supporting the ARVN 9th Infantry Division, was inserted to relieve a US
Special Forces camp under attack on Ta Bec mountain (one of an air cav squadron’s
4 troops is an infantry troop of some 200 men).
Around 2 am on New Years Day, someone at 13th CAB decided a convoy due in
from Saigon was late (at 2 am, it sure was!!) and asked the 162nd to send a slick up to
look for the convoy. The pilots, and everyone else, had been celebrating the holiday
with a few rounds of drinks as was their (daily) habit and had just went to bed.
Fortunately for the crew, the ship never made it out of the revetment. The tail boom
ended up on top of the revetment with the aircraft resting at an odd angle.
However, another ship was then launched. Cpt Phil Dolberg, being the “least drunk”
of the bunch was sent out to search for the convoy. He recalls that “if I hadn’t had a
few glasses of liquid courage, I would have never gone out at night and flew at tree
top level down the road with my landing light on searching for the convoy.” He
didn’t find it.
On the afternoon of January 2nd one of the Cav units got into trouble and had a couple
of ships shot down in an LZ. The Vultures were called on to insert troops into the LZ
and rescue the downed crews. A flight of 4 Vulture ships made 3-4 insertions at
night under very heavy fire. The lead ship kept his navigation lights on steady bright
(while the others in the flight went to black-out) and shot his approach to a strobe
light on the ground in a tight LZ. It was a dark night with no moon and a harrowing
experience for those involved. All of the AC’s were awarded DFC’s.
Beginning in early 1971, the 162nd picked up the mission of supporting the US
Embassy in Cambodia. Several times a week, and sometimes daily, two slicks were
sent to Phnom Penh for the day to fly the embassy staff to various locations within a
couple of hours of the capital. These were fun, but exhausting, missions and
sometimes a little scary. For some reason the embassy insisted that the army
markings on the helicopters be covered with tape, which made a rather silly looking
sight.
Crews on the Cambodian missions were forbidden to spend the night in Cambodia,
except in case of emergency. The ships had to be available by 6-7 am. This required
that the crews wake up around 3 am so as to take off by 4:30 am and fly in the dark to
Phnom Penh to arrive by 6 am. Often they flew all day and didn’t get back to the
roost in Can Tho until 9-10 pm. A long day—especially if you had the same mission
the next day!
Early one morning in the first few months of 1971 CW2 Bill DeGoey and WO Ray
Buchter left Can Tho only to have an engine failure shortly after take off. For some
reason they couldn't maintain rotor RPM in autorotation and fell through when their
rotor RPM became too low to sustain even an autorotative descent. They were flying
a Charlie model “borrowed” from the 191st and the crewchief and gunner were both
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from the 191st. They hit the ground like the proverbial ton of stuff and the aircraft
was demolished. They hit so hard that WO Buchter’s seat was broken - the tubular
metal that the canvas webbing was stretched over was broken into two pieces. WO
DeGoey was evacuated with a spinal compression injury from which he later
recovered. The crew chief and gunner were both injured but not seriously. This was
a mini-gun ship and they received leg injuries when the ammo cans beneath the rear
seat (with all 6000 rounds of 7.62mm rounds in it!) broke loose and went flying
forward when they hit the ground. Later that day, WO Buchter was released from the
hospital. WO Peter Lautzenheiser remembers him staggering around the second
story balcony near the Copperhead lounge shouting something along the lines of
“Boy! We really f----d up that aircraft!” He was drunker that a skunk and feeling no
pain. The reality was that he'd had a fairly close brush and was mighty glad to have
escaped without serious injury.
The 162nd had a great recovery team during the 1971 period. Led by SP6 Tim
Lawrence, the Hangar Rat Recovery Team had the procedure down pat. They could
land in a PZ and rig a ship for sling-loading out by Chinook in less than 2 minutes.
Unfortunately, the Chinooks often had a nasty habit of dropping the ships. The 162nd
lost several this way.
Cpt Steve Garber, Operations Officer, recalls an incident early in the year when he
was on a GCA (ground controlled radar approach) into Can Tho airfield. The smoke
and haze from rice farmers burning their fields was so thick it was impossible to see
the ground. He was vectored in by the radar operator but on final approach the
operator suddenly said something to the effect, “Sorry, but I’ve lost you. Please take
over and land visually.” That’s a hell of a thing to hear on an IFR approach! Luckily
as he got closer he was able to make out the runway.
WO Allan Cease remembers one of his first flights in country in early 71. The
mission was to go to an ARVN outpost on an island in a river north of Can Tho and
transport a load of marijuana to an LST anchored not far away. It seems the
Vietnamese had been growing it right next to their outpost. It was spotted one day by
the Delta Regional Advisory Command (DRAC) staff as they flew over it.
A few nights later, WO Cease and WO John Young, the AC, were scrambled for a
C&C mission to the same outpost where they directed Cobras in beating off a VC
attack. (Perhaps the VC were mad about losing their share of the marijuana crop!)
When the Cobras left to rearm and refuel, WO Young dropped down to 200 feet and
his gunner got a couple of kills as some VC tried to leave the island by sampan. This
was pretty frightening stuff for someone like WO Cease who had just arrived in
country.
During the 70-71 period, the Vultures and Copperheads spent a great deal of time
supporting the 9th ARVN Division. The 191st (Boomerangs), the only other AHC and
sister unit at Can Tho also supported this unit as well as other units but often could
not field enough ships for scheduled combat assaults. As a result, the 162nd ended up
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flying most of the CA’s. Obviously, this did not foster a friendly spirit of cooperation
between the two units.
On March 1st the 162nd received word that 2 aircraft commanders with more than 90
days left in country should immediately be sent up to the 101st Airborne Division in I
Corps to take part in Lam Son 719. Apparently the 101st was running out of AC’s
and needed replacements fast. An AC draft went out to a number of units and each
was directed to contribute 2 AC’s. That night the CO, Major Moore, called all the
pilots together in the room used as a bar in the lower level of the pilots quarters
building. He put the name of every one eligible in a hat and drew 2 names out. WO
Charles Thomas and WO “Tuna” Williams were the lucky winners. They left the
next day and were assigned to C Company, 101st Aviation Battalion where they took
part in the push into Laos. They had a “hot” time in Laos!
No one who was there can forget the tragic mid-air collision on March 17th just off
the end of the runway not far from the 162nd area. An Air America Porter was
landing and was hit by a Cobra from C/16th Cav that had been doing autorotations.
Everyone on both ships were killed.
On March 22nd the 162nd was called on to help out in a bad situation. C Troop, 16th
Cav had a Cobra shot down in an area near the U Minh Forest where they drew heavy
enemy fire. The Cobra was hit by 51 caliber fire and autorotated safely but the two
pilots were killed before they could exit the ship. The Vultures were called on to
bring in troops. Cpt Durwood Gooden and CW2 Paul Anderson led a 5 ship flight
into the LZ over known enemy positions (at the insistence of the 13th CAB
Commander). They took a round in the fuel cell, the ship caught fire and blew the
tail boom off at 200 feet AGL on short final. The aircraft then spun out of control
into a flooded rice paddy. Three of the crewmembers survived but the gunner, SP4
Dennis M. Hotaling, and some of the troops on board did not. The pilot and CE were
seriously injured but Cpt Gooden less so, and he returned to the 162nd after
recovering.
A second ship in the CA with Cpt Gooden was also shot up on short final, caught fire and
crashed into the LZ. The AC, Lt Kenneth Barnard, and his crew survived the crash and
managed to escape the burning ship but several troops on board were killed in the crash.
The crews of both downed ships were picked up WO John Young who took a tremendous
amount of fire while hovering around the LZ to retrieve the crews. WO Young was awarded
the Silver Star for his actions in this incident. (Some think the Battalion Commander, not WO
Young, was the one who picked up the 2 crews and received the Silver Star. Can anyone
confirm???).
Many remember either the Battalion Commander, LTC Ruby Whitehead, or the 164th
Group Commander (Delta 6) joined them for the second and third lifts into the LZ
with his VIP ship that had fancy yellow leather (or plastic) seats and steps.
In April, the 162nd and 191st carried out a number of large CA’s with 3-4 regiments of
ARVN troops in and around the U-Minh Forest area in the far south of the Delta to
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counter NVA forces infiltrating from Cambodia. This all Vietnamese action (other
than US aviation support) involved very heavy fighting, lasted several months and
virtually destroyed the 359th NVA Regiment. The ARVN units inflicted hundreds, if
not thousands, of casualties and successfully blocked the NVA units from
establishing major base camps in the U-Minh.
Several people recall a slick door gunner who came over from the infantry after
already spending a couple of tours in country. Shortly after he arrived his ship
spotted some VC in a free fire area. The gunner opened fire and killed two of the VC
and then demanded that the pilot land so he could cut off their ears. Everyone
thought the guy was a nut case and he didn’t last long in the company. It was
rumored he was given a “Section 8” discharge. Unfortunately, anyone who spent a
couple of years in the infantry probably wasn’t very “normal” after that experience.
According to Cpt Bill Howell there was a man in the company in late 70-early 71
with an uncanny ability. “We had a guy who could give us warning for incoming fire
as soon as it left the tube no matter how much noise was around him. One night we
were in one of the tents (before we had barracks) listening to Sly & The Family Stone
and he was lying on one of the bunks. All of a sudden he sat up, yelling ‘incoming’.
Approximately 10 seconds later the rocket hit the airfield. I don’t know what kind of
sixth sense he had but he knew every time before the round hit the ground.”
Toward mid-year the 162nd was host to two experimental gunships with the acronym
of INFANTS for “Infrared Night Fighter ANd Tracker System”. Each of the two M
model gunships had a normal “slaughter ship” configuration—miniguns and 14
rockets. However, infrared searchlights were mounted on the minguns and a camera
was in a ball turret on the nose. A TV screen was mounted on the console between
the pilots. The INFANTS had originally been formed in late 1970 as part of the
Bounty Hunter gun platoon of the 191st AHC (and the Copperheads had occasionally
worked with them) but as the 191st was slated for stand down in September they were
attached to the 162nd.
The Vultures supported the INFANTS and provided a C&C ship to navigate for and direct
the INFANT team on nightly patrols of the canals south and east of Can Tho down to the UMinh Forest. The INFANTS flew low along the canals and engaged targets without
displaying any visible light, even on the darkest night (there were 3 small blue lights on top
of each INFANT ship to enable the C&C ship to see them and navigate for them). For the six
months or so it was attached to the 162nd the INFANT fire team was very effective and
destroyed hundreds of sampans, and probably got a similar number of KIAs. The
psychological impact of two gunships accurately identifying and engaging targets in
complete darkness must have been terrifying to the VC/NVA. However, the INFANT ships
required a great deal of maintenance support and were withdrawn in late 1971.
In 1971-72 the Vultures routinely had 2 or 3 slicks on night missions. In addition to
the INFANT C&C, another aircraft (the Firefly ship) with an infrared/white light
search light (actually an M-48 tank search light) and a 50 cal door gun flew perimeter
security around Can Tho and patrolled canals to the south and east. A third ship, the
166
Nighthawk, equipped with a 50 cal door gun on one side and a hand controlled
minigun on the other, often worked with the Firefly ship in patrolling canals. At
times, the Nighthawk ship also mounted a hand controlled belt-fed 40 mm grenade
launcher and had 4 gunners on board—sort of a mini version of Puff the Magic
Dragon. When large targets were located, either by the INFANTs or the infrared
search light of the Firefly, Navy or Marine fighter bombers were called in. The
Marines also ran a night mission over the Delta with an aircraft that could detect
people on the ground, even inside bunkers, through heat differential. The Marine and
Navy aircraft coordinated closely with the Vultures on these night missions.
Once a significant target was found, the infrared search light of the Firefly was trained on it
and the fighter bombers called in. When the strike aircraft were in position the search light
was switched to white (visible) light with a narrow, focused beam to guide the bombers to
the target. With the INFANTs, Firefly, and the Marine aircraft with the heat differential
equipment all working together, there was no escape for the VC/NVA—they had no way to
hide!
Many pilots and crews enjoyed the night missions, especially patrolling the canals for
VC traffic, and tended to specialize in them. As Cpt Stan Gause recalls, his first 400
hours of flight time with the Vultures was almost entirely at night. Also in the Navy,
Air Force and Marine crews, the same people tended to fly the night missions and the
Vultures were pretty much on a first name basis with them. At times the night
missions involved only one or two ships and it was a lonely feeling to be over the
vast expanse of the Delta all by yourself with no one to help if you went down.
However, at other times the night skies over the Delta seemed downright crowded as
Navy, Marine, and Air Force fighters as well as Army Cobras and C models stacked
up overhead awaiting their turn to unload on a target. Sometimes it was a real party
when you came upon a good target—that’s what made it a fun job! The Vultures
were instrumental in taking the cover of darkness away from the VC and denying
them unhindered access to the canals of the lower Delta during this period.
The Firefly mission was often something of a fun job and the crew
sometimes got a kick out of scaring the devil out of anyone spotted on the
ground—enemy or friendly. The CE would locate someone with his
searchlight in infrared mode, narrow the beam to a very intense beam of
roughly 3 feet diameter, and then switch over to white light. Of course,
this blinding flash of intense light would terrify the unsuspecting target
and often produced an interesting reaction.
One day in the summer, Cpt Garber and Cpt James Elliot, gun platoon leader, were
running a CA near Rach Gia with 5 slick and 4 guns. They were suddenly pulled off
the mission and diverted to Chi Lang on the Cambodian border just south of the
Mekong (near the Seven Sisters area). The Special Forces had established a camp
there to train Cambodian army troops.
The Vultures and Copperheads supported the Special Forces camp on a “training”
167
mission that ran into an NVA regiment. Over a 2 day period there were 50
Cambodian, 20 ARVN and nine US Special Forces troops killed in the engagement.
Cpt Garber recalls being awake for more than 48 hours and then sleeping for 24 hours
straight on returning to Can Tho. At one point he was on a night mission when he
turned the ship over to his copilot, just as tired and dazed as himself, who did not take
over the controls. Both pilots sat there thinking the other one was flying when in fact
no one was. The ship began a slow descending turn as the cyclic tipped over. They
both then realized that no one was flying the aircraft and grabbed the cyclic.
Also around mid-71, the Vultures and Copperheads were on a 12 ship ARVN CA
several miles south east of Dong Hung when the NVA opened up on them as they
landed. The lead ship landed on top of a concrete bunker and the others landed in a V
formation behind it. SP4 Jack Tibbets, gunner in the lead ship, killed two NVA that
came out of the bunker and dragged a wounded ARVN back on board before his ship
took off. No one on board was wounded but the AC’s helmet mike cord was severed
by bullet. The flight went back to the staging area and SP4 Tibbets counted 38 holes
in his ship. They prepared to lift more ARVNs into the LZ but the first group had
encountered heavy fire and withdrew to more defensible positions.
Around this same time a rather bizarre incident occurred. WO Andy Gagnon and gunner
SP4 Jack Tibbets were preparing to take off on a firefly mission one night when a Major who
had some staff job at Can Tho showed up on the flight line and took the copilot’s place—
probably to get his hours in for flight pay that month. They were later called out to an
ARVN outpost to provide illumination and assist in repelling VC coming through the
perimeter wire. This was during the monsoon season and there were low clouds and poor
visibility. At one point the Major took over the controls and almost immediately began a
slow roll to the right. When he reached a 45 degree bank, WO Gagnon realized something
was wrong and tried to take back control of the ship but the Major would not turn lose of the
cyclic. As WO Gagnon struggled for control, SP4 Tibbets hit the Major over the head with an
M-60 buffer rod in an attempt to make him turn the controls loose. In fact, he hit him so hard
that his helmet cracked in half and he was knocked out.
WO Gagnon then regained control of the ship and flew back to Can Tho, radioing for
an ambulance (since the Major was unconscious). They picked up a copilot and
continued on with the mission until daylight. On their return to Can Tho the next
morning the crew was called in and interviewed individually by Major Brooks, the
CO. When SP4 Tibbets went in to tell his side of the story to the CO, Major Brooks
already had a good understanding of the situation and told him “it would have been
much simpler and a lot less paperwork if you had just killed the SOB.”
When the US ground troops left the Delta in 1970 most of the medivac (Dustoff)
aircraft were also withdrawn. This, coupled with the fact that ARVN units didn’t
seem to have any air medical evacuation support, meant the 162nd and other assault
helicopter units often performed medivac missions for both US and ARVN troops.
Medivac missions were unique in that they gave the crews an incredibly strong sense
of pride, satisfaction, sadness and futility, all at the same time. Cpt Gause recalls:
“It’s hard to describe the feeling of achievement and pride in knowing that we
168
actually saved another human’s life for once instead of trying to kill him. Yet
seeing men barely alive with their limbs and bodies blown to shreds was
incredibly saddening, leaving you depressed and with a sense of helplessness.
Some of the ARVN troops we picked up had 2, 3 or even all 4 limbs missing
or badly mangled but they still clung to life with an Asian stoicism and
resignation. I never saw a Vietnamese trooper cry, or even show any strong
emotion, only that haunting look of sadness in their eyes.”
During 1971 the Vulture mess hall went from one extreme to the other—from extremely poor
to exceptional, all within a few months. Early in the year, the mess sergeant was courtmartialed for skimming off the company rations. Its seems he had been in-country a long
time, 4 or 5 years, and had a restaurant downtown, complete with a Vietnamese wife, or
whatever. One day, one of the unit police at the main gate stopped the deuce and a half that
picked up and returned the civilian KPs employed in the mess hall. He stopped the truck
because he thought something was leaking from it. However, subsequent investigation
revealed a false bottom in the bed of the truck and a compartment full of Vulture rations.
The mess sgt was very fortunate the MPs whisked him away—he wouldn’t have lasted long
if he’d been sent back to the roost!
After this episode a new mess sergeant (SFC___?___) and mess officer (Cpt Ronald
Cabral) were brought in and they did a magnificent job. Everyone in the 162nd at the
time fondly remembers the Vulture mess hall and the food served in the later half of
1971. The mess hall went through several contests and inspections and was actually
awarded a plaque by USARV as the “Best Mess Hall in Vietnam”. Those steaks and
lobsters served every Friday evening locked up the award.
Since most men in the company went to the Can Tho Officers, NCO or EM clubs
they normally didn’t use their liquor ration. Cpt Cabral collected ration cards each
week and bought alcohol which he took down to the Navy base at Rach Gia to trade
for local lobsters. Then he went to a nearby SeaBee base and traded more whisky for
steaks. Not only was the food incredible but the mess hall staff really got into the
swing of things and took great pride in their work—just like in a fancy restaurant.
Tables were set with linen table cloths, silverware and flowers. Colorful curtains,
“mood” lighting and wall decorations were added and music played during mealtime.
It was the only 5 Star mess hall in Vietnam, maybe even the entire US Army. High
ranking officers came down from Saigon just to eat in the Vulture mess hall.
Later in the year the Vultures were on a CA south of Vinh Long. When the slicks
landed one of the gunners, SP5__?___ Barnhart, jumped out to assist a wounded
ARVN. Somehow his ship took off without him and he was reported missing. SP5
Barnhart was found a couple of days later in a cat house in downtown Can Tho.
Although it is not clear what he did when he was left in the LZ, it must have been
something big since he was later awarded a Silver Star for his actions that day.
(DOES ANYONE HAVE MORE INFORMATION ON THIS INCIDENT??)
In December, the Vultures and Copperheads were on a CA that had a novel twist—
literally. Lt. Edwin Clapp was leading a CA down south into what was expected to
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be a hot LZ. On long final he spotted a tornado a couple of miles away coming
directly toward the LZ. He broke radio silence and diverted the flight while the
tornado passed over the LZ. When it passed, the slicks then turned on final and
landed in an LZ with plenty of VC all around but none in condition to put up a fight.
Not just luck or execution—maybe it was STS!
Some of the other memorable events that took place in 1971 include:
• Two pilots who had a little too much to drink in downtown Can Tho one night
stole a jeep to make it back to the airfield before curfew.
•
WO “Duke” Christian had not yet made AC but grew a handlebar moustache
which, according to the unwritten code among the pilots, was an adornment
strictly reserved for AC’s. His room was “fragged” with purple smoke one night
to teach him a lesson.
•
Some joker strung explosive engineer “det” cord for a clothes line for the
mamasans and set it off with a full load of clothes.
•
The CO was awarded a DFC for crossing the Cambodian border at 6,000 feet.
•
The Vultures and “Darkhorse” pilots from C/16th Cav from across the runway
were trashing each other at the O Club one night and came very close to a freefor-all.
•
Sammy Davis, Jr. visited Can Tho as part of a USO tour and asked which unit
was the most remote on the airfield. When told the Vultures were at the far end
of the runway he said he’d like to put on a show there. He walked all the way to
the 162nd mess hall and put on an impromptu show. The Vultures loved it.
•
Cpt Garber started his engine with the main rotor tied down, brought it up to 6600
rpm and looked up to see the rotor blade was not moving (most people didn’t
think this was possible but apparently it is if the rotor blade is not allowed any
initial movement).
•
Some pilots didn’t like the long walk home from the O Club at night and
routinely appropriated whatever jeep was parked near the club. They would drive
it to the roost, even if the steering wheel was chained, and abandon it. Whenever
anyone at Can Tho lost a jeep the Vulture roost was the first place they looked.
•
The Nighthawk ship was called out to an outpost one night and directed to a VC
target. The ship had twin 60’s on one side and a minigun and searchlight on the
other. They dropped a number of flares but some were defective and their
parachutes did not deploy. They worked over the area with the minigun and
killed a few VC and learned the next day that they had managed to bag a KIA
with one of the defective flares.
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•
In early 1971, the VC published wanted posters with pictures of individuals in the
Copperhead gun platoon. The rewards weren’t much but the Copperheads got a
big laugh out of it—and they stayed a little more alert whenever they went into
Can Tho!
•
Some recall the incident where a Vulture slick picked up an ARVN Major, a few
other ARVNs and two VC prisoners from a field location in the U Minh and
ferried them to Bac Lieu for interrogation. Enroute the Major grabbed one the
prisoners and threw him out of the aircraft at an altitude of some 2000 feet,
apparently because he refused to talk. Yes, it was horrifying and against the rules
of war—but the VC did things just as bad, or worse, and on a far larger scale!
The remaining prisoner quickly decided he would talk and was singing like a bird
by the time they reached Bac Lieu.
(I WOULD LIKE MORE INFO ON 1971 ACTIVITIES??)
1972
On January 11th the company lost a Copperhead gunship. A fire team was covering a
Chinook resupplying an ARVN base near Ca Mau when the lead gunship (65-09543)
suddenly exploded in mid-air, possibly hit by an RPG or large caliber weapon. The
lost crewmembers were Cpt Robert W. Vehling (platoon leader), WO John David
Eddy, SP4 G. Wayne Tawney and Sgt. Leonard H. Mantooth. All losses were sad
but this one especially so. Cpt. Vehling had an identical twin brother who was a pilot
at another unit at Can Tho. He was almost inseparable from his brother during their
off-duty time. Seeing him at the memorial service the next day was a heartwrenching sight still vivid in the memory of those who were there that day.
Another Copperhead gunship was shot down in January and may well have set a record for
number of hits. While attacking a target in the U-Minh forest area, the ship came under fire
from a minigun the VC/NVA had recovered from a downed loach and rigged up as a
ground-fired weapon. The Copperhead ship took a total of 212 hits from the minigun and
crashed. Amazingly the only casualty was the gunner who was hit in the foot by a minigun
round. The crew managed to set the aircraft down and were picked up almost immediately
by a nearby slick.
On a lighter note, many will remember the spider monkey named Pete, owned by one
of the men in the commo shack. It was kept chained to a pole outside the commo
shack but got loose one day and one of the junkies in the company (unfortunately
there were a few of them at that time) shot him up with heroin. The monkey then
went crazy and ran around the barracks excreting in his hand and throwing it at
anyone he considered deserving. This, in turn, ticked off quite a few people who
pulled out their M-16’s and hand guns and started shooting at the monkey. No one
hit him but they did manage to put a lot of holes in the sheet metal roofs, creating
more gripping and complaints when it rained. The poor monkey finally died after a
couple of days running around on the roofs and being shot at by half the company.
171
In early 1972, the combat missions were gradually winding down and more and more
were ash & trash. Cpt Gause recalls going on many of the Cambodian Embassy
missions and noticing how poorly equipped the Cambodian Army was. The
Cambodians had few machine guns and many of them were using World War II era
Japanese bolt action rifles. The Vultures had accumulated a large amount of excess
weapons over the preceding few months so Cpt Gause and others on the Cambodia
run began taking over excess M-60’s, initially to trade for SKS rifles and 9 mm
pistols as souvenirs for the Vultures. Beginning with one or two per flight, this trade
quickly grew into a significant “gun-running” operation.
Since the Cambodian Army didn’t generally have access to M-60 ammunition, the
Vultures began supplying that as well. It got to the point where each slick making the
trip to Phnom Penh was loaded up with weapons and ammunition. Initially it was
traded but later simply given to the Cambodians. The Cambodians always treated the
Vulture crews like royalty and took them on a tour of the local sights wherever they
landed. The 162nd crews liked the Cambodians (who were refreshingly open and
friendly to Americans) and decided to help their war effort by giving them excess
weapons and ammunition. No attempt was made to hide this activity. The US
military attaches at the Embassy knew full well what the Vultures were doing and
tacitly agreed to look the other way.
The 162nd Assault Helicopter Company flew its last operational mission in late-March
1972 and stood down on April 3rd, 1972 after more than six years of war. Aircraft
and equipment were taken to Saigon and turned in over the next couple of weeks.
Getting rid of the equipment turned out to be a major problem. Only the amount of
equipment listed on the unit property book could technically be turned in but the
162nd had far more equipment than it was authorized.
Since it was one of the last US units in the Delta to stand down (and THE last AHC),
many of the previous units to stand down had given their excess equipment to the
Vultures. As a result, the Vultures had numerous extra vehicles, weapons and even
extra aircraft. For example, the company was signed for a total of 61 M-60 machine
guns but in fact had several hundred of them. There were M-60’s stuffed in almost
every nook and cranny. A similar situation existed with almost all weapons and it
took a great deal of negotiation, threats and shouting to turn in the large amounts of
excess equipment. In some cases, much of it simply ended up at the bottom of the
Mekong River, buried around the airfield or in the South China Sea. More than one
truck loaded onto the ferry at Can Tho for the trip across the river didn’t quite make it
to the other side!
There was also a strong rumor that one of the extra and badly damaged aircraft was
buried beside the runway one night. This may not have been true but there were
some suspicious looking marks left by a bulldozer one night. The maintenance folks
also had a C model Hangar Queen they used for spares that hadn’t flown in months.
It took a lot of work to put it back together so they could fly it up to Vung Tau one
last time to turn it in. By mid-April all equipment was disposed of, the last man
172
signed out of the unit and the colors shipped to Ft. Hood, Texas. The 162nd AHC
passed into history.
The old tradition of new pilots drinking the “Green Mother” as an initiation rite into
the company survived to the end. Just before departing, many pilots gathered at the
Can Tho O club for one last time and downed a Green Mother to the memory of those
who went before them.
The 162nd Assault Helicopter Company served in Vietnam for just over 6 years and 2
months. During this time it built an unsurpassed record as an assault unit. It was one
of the best, a proud unit that led the way and helped establish the traditions of Army
Aviation. The 162nd logged more than 175,000 hours of “blade time” in 192 aircraft
assigned to the company during its service in Vietnam. A total of 60 aircraft (31% of
the total) crashed and incurred major damage, including 33 that were completely
destroyed.
There were many fine aviation units in this helicopter war. Some may have
accomplished more and certainly some incurred more casualties. However, the 162nd
had no equal in terms of individual motivation, dedication, esprit de corps and service
to our country. May God bless the men of the 162nd.
In a sense, the stand down of the 162nd also marked the end of an era in Army
Aviation and close fire support for ground troops. The company was the last assault
helicopter unit in Vietnam to use that extraordinary aircraft—the UH-1C model
gunship. Despite the fact that it was notoriously difficult to takeoff fully loaded and
often would not even hover like a normal helicopter, the aircraft flew beautifully once
in the air. The 540 rotor system gave it amazing maneuverability.
It was an incredible feeling to slide, bump and bounce down a runway on takeoff,
nursing every ounce of torque, and then reach translational lift. You could feel the
power, an invisible hand lifting the aircraft into the sky. Every pilot who ever flew a
C model gunship loved it. Ground troops in a firefight also loved the C model. It
could not stay on station as long as, or carry the ordinance of, a Cobra but it flew low
and slow enough to see all the action and spot things other aircraft missed. The
uncanny ability of an experienced crew chief and gunner to find targets that others
missed was unbelievable. They had eyes like eagles. The C model could provide
accurate and effective fire literally within a few feet of ground troops, far closer than
any other type of aircraft. The closeness to the ground and the ability of the ground
troops to actually see the gunship crews provided an immense psychological lift to
the infantry.
During its 6 years of service in Vietnam, the 162nd lost 39 of its members killed in
action. The Roll of Honor is shown below:
Name
Date KIA
Age
Hometown
173
PFC Ronnie R. Lovett
WO James W. Bruhn
SP4 Willard A. Philson
Major Paul R. Karas
Major William R. Phillips
SP4 Isaiah A. Dobbins
SP4 Willard A. Godfrey
PFC Lawrence A. Dietz
SP4 Charles A. Jones
WO Larry A. Harke
WO John F. Holz
SP4 Anthony V. Campaniello
SP4 Robert D. Kline
CW2 Vernon R. Tweedy
WO Vernon L. Leuning
SP4 Brian T. Murray
SP4 George D. Novakovic
SP4 Benjamin H. Binegar
Cpt Frank H. Brinson
WO Edward B. Melody
WO Gerard F. O’Conner
SP4 Andrew P. Susi
WO Alex C. Spence
WO Robert F. Colatruglio
SP4 Joseph P. Lutz
WO Daniel J. Hallows
WO Lawrence M. Moore
SP5 Denis J. Dillon
PFC James W. Lenz
WO William H. Laurence
Cpt Stephen D. Carr
SP5 Benny R. Halstead
SP5 Larry B. Jacobson
PFC Samuel E. Dick
SP4 Dennis M. Hotaling
Cpt Robert W. Vehling
WO John David Eddy
SP4 Gary Wayne Tawney
Sgt. Leonard H. Mantooth
4/11/66
11/15/66
2/1/67
2/3/67
2/3/67
2/7/67
2/7/67
7/27/67
8/8/67
12/19/67
12/19/67
12/19/67
12/19/67
3/5/68
3/5/68
3/5/68
3/5/68
2/4/69
1/5/70
2/23/70
4/25/70
5/27/70
6/20/70
6/20/70
6/20/70
6/23/70
6/23/70
6/23/70
6/23/70
8/26/70
8/26/70
8/26/70
8/26/70
12/24/70
3/22/71
1/11/72
1/11/72
1/11/72
1/11/72
18
29
23
32
37
23
29
19
18
26
26
21
19
27
21
21
19
25
28
21
22
20
23
22
19
19
20
21
18
24
26
20
21
20
21
24
21
22
21
Phoenix, OR
Alma, NE
Gering, NE
Alexandria, VA
Enterprise, AL
Magnolia, NJ
Milton Junction, WI
Palos Verdes, CA
Charleston Heights, SC
Seattle, WA
Harrisburg, PA
Corona, NY
Long Beach, CA
New Orleans, LA
Yakima, WA
Lorain, OH
Kenosha, WI
East Peoria, IL
Statesboro, GA
Fayetteville, AR
Herington, KS
St. Johnsville, NY
Tonawanda, NY
Warren, MI
Deerfield Beach, FL
Holland, NY
East Point, GA
San Marcos, CA
Milwaukee, WI
San Antonio, TX
Barre, VT
Glen Morgan, WV
Norma, ND
Honolulu, HI
Middletown, NY
Greenwood, IN
Ann Arbor, MI
Charleston, WV
Louisville, KY
(DOES ANYONE KNOW IF I’M MISSING ANY NAMES?
In such a close knit unit each man was precious and a friend to many. They made the
supreme sacrifice in service to their country. Anyone of us could easily have been in
their place. They were our compatriots, our friends, and will always be in our hearts,
every day, as long as we breath. Although we age with the passing years, they do not
174
grow old but remain forever young in our minds eye. Forever 19, 20 years old, their
life cut short at the very beginning of its journey, never to experience the love,
friendships and pleasures we experienced as we grew older.
In the words of the British poet Lawrence Binyon,
“They shall not grow old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.”
It is up to us to make sure their memory remains alive. By our conduct we honor
them and make their sacrifice not in vain. May God take their soul in his hands and
may we meet again someday.
Epilogue
The 162nd Assault Helicopter Company was reformed at Ft. Hood, Texas in mid-1972
and sometime later transferred to Germany. Cpt Paul Fellencer, Vulture pilot from
the 67-68 era, relates:
“Years later while on a business trip to Germany, I think it was 1982, I was at
the Officers Club one evening at Rhein Mein AFB near Frankfort and there
was a large noisy group of people having a party. They were having a
farewell dinner for the final stand down of….the 162nd AHC!! I didn’t want
to intrude so I listened to a few toasts and left the club saddened and
somewhat depressed. The coincidence of my being there that night and
listening to those really “young” people talk about closing down something so
important to me had a profound effect on me.”
(Does anyone know if any current army unit claims lineage from the 162nd?)
Contributions to this history have been made by the following former members of the
162nd Assault Helicopter Company:
Stan Gause (71-72)
Bill Greenhalgh (68-69)
Richard Freesland (67)
John Davenport (67-68)
Tom DeMars (68-70)
Joe Estores (65-66)
Paul Fretts (67)
Ron Gresham (68-69)
Art Cline (67-68)
Mike McPherson (66-67)
Lou Dinnan (68-69)
Mike Rush (69-70)
Walt Stewart (69-70)
Harlan Scheibe (6-68)
Kerry Watson (71-72)
Dar Schuett (65-66)
Richard Rhoads (71-72)
Ronald Case (67-68)
Dan Pannunzio (70-71)
Bill Howell (70-71)
Jim Christiansen (66-67)
Bob Truckenmiller (66-67)
175
Ed Brock (65-67)
Chuck Carrillo (68-69)
Edwin Dean (67-68)
Thomas Beauchamps (70)
Ron Miller (65-66)
Edwin Clapp (71-72)
Walter Ellis (70-71)
Jackie Tibbets (71-72)
David Saunders (68-69)
Mike Royse (66)
“Duke” Christian (71-72)
Don Nickolson (70-71)
Paul Wentzel (68)
Don Welch (67-68)
Brian Busch (70-71)
Jim Cox (68-69)
Walter Sharpes (71-72)
Mike Hall (67)
Peter Lautzenheiser (70-71)
Bill Rettenmund (65-67)
Dennis Hickman (66-67)
Bill Tuttle (69-70)
Jack Donahue (68-69)
Nick Riviezzo (66-67)
Dennis Bankson (69)
Len Matlick (71-72)
Tim Lawrence (70-71)
Paul Fellencer (67-68)
Tom Broadbent (68-69)
Richard Moran (69-70)
Mike Kolanik (68-69)
Dave Bonifield (68-69)
James Ramsey (66-67)
Phil Bishop (68)
Mike Rigney (70-71)
Robert Bostwick (70-71)
Allan Cease (71)
James Wright (68)
Kenneth Barnard (70-71)
Dill Fouts (68)
Rick Lloyd (69-70)
Jim Peppler (67-68)
Ed Brown (65-66)
Steve Garber (71)
Bob Goulas (67-68)
David Holt (69-70)
Bob Good (70)
Rick “Tuna” Williams (70-71)
Tom Turner (65-66)
John McCamish (67-68)
Mark Coletta (71-72)
Ray Holleran (65-66)
Joe Harbison (69-70)
Ray Swindell (65-66)
Dennis Montgomery (68-69)
Rod Rodowick (66-67)
Dennis Morris (68-69)
Tom Barnes (68-69)
Dennis Stoner (70)
Howard Clampitt (65-66)
Neil Townsley (71)
Dave Bonifield (68-69)
Fred Auger (69-70)
Tom Broadbent (68-69)
Paul Stevens (65-66)
162nd AHC Honors and Awards
Valorous Unit Award, 4 November - 20 November 1966
Meritorious Unit Commendation, 1 January – 31 December 1967
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, 1 March 1966 - 26 March 1967
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, 27 March 1967 - 17 May 1968
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, 1 January 1969 – 1 June 1969
176
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, 15 December 1969 –10 October
1970
Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Medal, First Class, 19 December 1966 - 28 June
1969
Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Medal, First Class, 1 May 1969 – 15 May 1970
Campaign Participation Credits
Vietnam Counteroffensive
Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase II
Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase V
Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69 Counteroffensive
Vietnam Summer-Fall 1969
Vietnam Winter-Spring 1970
DA Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Vietnam Cease-Fire
25 Dec 1965-30 Jun 1966
1 Jul 1966-31 May 1967
1 Jun 1967-29 Jan 1968
30 Jan 1968-1 Apr 1968
2 Apr 1968-30 Jun 1968
1 Jul 1968-1 Nov 1968
2 Nov 1968-22 Feb 1969
23 Feb 1969-8 Jun 1969
9 Jun 1969-31 Oct 1969
1 Nov 1969-30 Apr 1970
1 May 1970-30 Jun 1970
1 Jul 1970-30 Jun 1971
1 Jul 1971-30 Nov 1971
1 Dec 1971-29 Mar 1972
30 Mar 1972-28 Jan 1973
177
`
Since putting the 1999 directory together concerning the 1972 Easter Offensive, I have found an Aviation
Digest article concerning SA 7 missile strikes, titled “Missile, Missile, Missile, published in April 1975.
Bob Monette and Mike Brown are VHPA members. CW3 Rinehart died at Illeshiem Germany in late
1977.
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
Mike Brown in 1972 receiving the Broken Wing for his flight in half a cobra from MG James F Hamlet
who was commander of 3d Bde 1st Cav at the time of the incident documented in the Army Digest article.
On the next page is a memorial to those lost in the crash of a CH 47A from the 362d ASHC in
1972
185
The next memorial of the fallen of the 118th shows some of the earliest KIAs in the Army Aviation units.
186
187
Memorial to the fallen of the 128th AHC designed by Jay Reiseden
Delta Troop ¾ Cav has scanned in pages of unit yearbooks on their website. This is an excellent method of
compiling history. On the following page is an example of their effort.
188
189
190
191
192
193
Off Vung Tau, the USNS Corpus Christi provided aircraft maintenance support.
Below is Gary Roush’s 242 ASHC Chinook parked in the aft landing area.
194
At Hotel 3 in Saigon, oil samples were analyzed and new aircraft were accepted .
195
196
The mountain near Xuan Loc , near Gia Ray, was a very visible
navigation point in the Eastern part of III Corps.
Gia Ray, like Nui
Ba Den to the west
housed a signal unit.
The picture below
was taken directly
over FSB Mace
which was on the
Eastern side of Gia
Ray.
Flight crew is using
sucker hole method
of getting to
destination.
197
The following is in the 2001 VHPA Directory and is included here for reference. Mike Sloniker
SECTION VII - The Helicopter History of III Corps
with special emphasis on unit locations
ing with the traditions set by the last few Directories, the Directory Committee presents a few pages of
history material to support the theme of this edition. This year’s theme is the history of helicopter units that
were based in III Corps, with special emphasis on those that lived and worked north and west of Saigon.
By mid-October, on the VHPA’s website www whpa org, the Historical Committee, chaired by Mike
Sloniker, and the Database/Records Committee, chaired by Gary Roush, will provide expanded coverage of
the history of these units with photographs, narratives, website links, etc.
The fact that III Corps had the highest concentration of the helicopter assets in all of Southeast Asia during
the Vietnam Era is well know. The next few pages attempt to outline III Corps helicopter unit locations in
a year by year roster. Naturally, the roster is published with the hope that readers will make comments as
well as provide updates and corrections. Unit historical narratives, copies of orders, award citations,
interesting stories, photographs, etc. should be sent to the VHPA HQ, ATTN: Historical Committee or via
email to sloniker@vhpa.org. Updates or corrections for this roster should be sent to Mike Law, 6969 W.
Yale, Unit 72, Denver, CO 80227, 303-988-7797, or law@vhpa.org.
The task of learning unit locations is made even more difficult when we recall that most units had an
official basecamp, usually at one of the large military bases such as Long Binh or Bien Hoa, but lived and
worked out of another base much nearer their Area of Operation (AO). The 195th AHC is a good example
of this. Their official basecamp was at the Plantation, near Bien Hoa but any of the line pilots will tell you
that during their entire tour of duty they only stayed at their basecamp for a few days - most of the time
they were at exciting places like Song Be and Quan Loi. In fact if you ask one, “Where were you based?”
He answers Song Be in late 67 or Quan Loi in early 68. Then, just maybe, he’ll mention that their official
basecamp was at the Plantation.
Basically, the VHPA wants to know WHERE WERE YOU and WHEN!! Updates or corrections for this
roster should be sent to Mike Law, 6969 W. Yale, Unit 72, Denver, CO 80227, 303-988-7797, or
law@vhpa.org.
The following abbreviations are used in this roster:
AR = Arrival Date
DP = Departure Date
RE = Date assets were reorganized
RL = Date unit relocated within III Corps
1961
198
8th TC Co
8th TC Co
57th TC Co
11 Dec AR
Dec DP
11 Dec AR
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut To Qui Nhon
Tan Son Nhut
33rd TC Co
45th TC Bn
57th TC Co
UTT Avn
17 Sep AR
1 Jul AR
all year
16 Oct AR
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
33rd TC Co
45th TC Bn
57th Med Det
57th TC Co
117th Avn Co
118th Avn Co
25 Jun RE
23 Sep RE
16 JAN AR
25 Jun RE
25 Jun AR
26 Jun AR
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
1962
1963
Apr AR
Jun AR
To 118th Avn Co
To 145th Avn Bn
From Nha Trang
To 120th Avn Co
From II Corps
From 33rd TC
Co
Tan Son Nhut From 57th TC
Co
Bn
Bn
Vung Tau
Vung Tau
all year
Tan Son Nhut
3rd Avn Co
3rd Avn Co
2 Dec AR
14 Dec RE
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
56th TC Co
57th Med Det
68th Avn Co
117th Avn Co
118th Avn Co
120th Avn Co
145th Avn Bn
145th Airlift
Plt
330th TC Co
765th TC Bn
16 Oct AR
all year
15 Aug AR
all year
all year
all year
all year
unknown
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut From UTT
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
Tan son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut To Phan Thiet
all year
12 Oct AR
Vung Tau
Vung Tau
120th Avn Co 26 Jun AR
145th Avn Bn 24 Sep AR
145th Airlift
Plt
330th TC Co
A/19th TC
Co
UTT Avn
23 Sep AR
1964
To A/501st Avn
Bn
Air America
Avn Spt Bn
Avn Spt Bn
UTT Avn
unknown
Apr AR
12 Oct DP
15 Aug DP
From Avn Spt
Bn
Bien Hoa
From 3rd Avn
Co
Tan Son Nhut Helicopter opns
Vung Tau
Vung Tau
To 765th TC Bn
Tan Son Nhut To 68th Avn Co
1st Inf Div
1st Inf 1st
Avn
A/1st Avn
Oct AR
16 Oct AR
Bien Hoa
Phu Loi
25 Nov AR
Phu Loi
A/501st Avn 14 Dec AR
1965
1st Inf 1st Bde 6 Oct AR
Includes B/1st
Avn
From 155th Avn
Co
Phuoc Vinh
199
1st Inf 2nd
Bde
1st Inf 3rd
Bde
1st Inf
DivArty
D/1/4th Cav
E/701 Mnt
2nd Sig Grp
11th CAB
12th CAG
18th Eng Bde
56th TC Co
57th Med Det
68th Avn Co
68th Avn Co
101st Abn 1st
Bde
101st Abn 1st
Bde
116th Avn Co
117th Avn Co
118th Avn Co
120th Avn Co
125th ATC
Co
128th Avn Co
145th Avn Bn
147th ASHC
155th Avn Co
155th Avn Co
159th Eng
Grp
161st Flt
173rd Abn
Bde
197th Avn Co
11 Jul AR
Bien Hoa
2 Oct AR
Lai Khe
17 Oct AR
Phu Loi
Oct AR
Oct AR
3 Jun AR
3 Nov AR
28 Aug AR
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Tan Son Nhut
Phu Loi
Tan Son Nhut From Prov Avn
Grp
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut To 197th Avn Co
Bien Hoa
Second tour
Bien Hoa & Vung Tau
20 Sep AR
all year
all year
1 Mar RE
28 Nov AR
Jul AR
Sep DL
Bien Hoa
To Cam Ranh
Bay
20 Oct AR
Aug DP
all year
all year
5 Nov AR
Cu Chu
Bien Hoa
From Pleiku
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
Bien Hoa
20 Oct AR
all year
28 Nov AR
8 Oct AR
26 Nov DP
30 Oct AR
Phu Loi
Tan son Nhut
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Bien Hoa
1 Sep AR
7 May AR
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
To A/1st Avn Bn
Australian Army
Tan Son Nhut From 68th Avn
Co
197th Avn Co unknown RL Tan Son Nhut To Bien Hoa
283rd Med
15 Sep AR Tan Son Nhut
Det
1 Nov AR
Long Binh
254th Med
Det
330th TC Co all year
Vung Tau
765th TC Bn all year
Vung Tau
A/82nd Avn 1 May AR
Vung Tau
A/501st Avn all year
Bien Hoa
A GS Grp
18 Dec AR Saigon
Air America all year
Tan Son Nhut
1 Mar AR
1966
1st Inf Div
1st Inf 1st
all year
Avn
1st Inf 1st Bde all year
Phu Loi
Phuoc Vinh
200
1st Inf 2nd
Bde
1st Inf 2nd
Bde
1st Inf 3rd
Bde
1st Inf
DivArty
D/1/4th Cav
E/701st Mnt
1st Sig Bde
1st TC Bn
2nd Sig Grp
9 Sqdn
11th CAB
12th CAG
Mar RL
Bear Cat
From Bien Hoa
Sep RL
Di An
From Bear Cat
Lai Khe
all year
all year
1 Apr AR
1 Apr AR
all year
3 May AR
all year
29 Jun DP
18th Eng Bde 1 Dec DP
25th Inf Div
25th Avn Bn
25th Inf 1st
Bde
25th Inf 2nd
Bde
4th Inf 3rd
Bde
25th Inf
DivArty
D/3/4th Cav
E/725th Mnt
34th GS Grp
56th TC Co
57th Med Det
58th TC Bn
68th Avn Co
68th Med Grp
71st AHC
79th Eng Grp
116th Avn Co
118th Avn Co
120th Avn Co
125th ATC
Co
128th Avn Co
145th Avn Bn
147th ASHC
159th Eng
Grp
161st Flt
173rd Abn
Bde
173rd Avn
Co
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Saigon
Vung Tau
USNS CC Bay
Tan Son Nhut
Vung Tau
Australian AF
Phu Loi
Long Binh
From Tan
SonNhut
Tan Son Nhut To Dong Ba
Thin
Mar AR
29 Apr AR
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
20 Jan AR
Cu Chi
9 Oct AR
Cu Chi
4 Apr AR
Cu Chi
24 Mar AR
1 Apr AR
24 Jan AR
all year
all year
7 Aug AR
all year
7 Feb AR
1 Sep AR
Oct AR
all year
all year
all year
all year
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Tan Son Nhut From A GS Grp
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Saigon
AMMC
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
From A/501st
Avn
Long Binh
From Phan Rang
Cu Chu
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
all year
Jun DP
Phu Loi
Long Binh
all year
Jul DP
Vung Tau
Long Binh
all year
all year
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
10 Mar AR
Lai Khe
From Tan
SonNhut
From Bien Hoa
201
197th Avn Co
199th LIB
222nd Avn
Bn
283rd Med
Det
254th Med
Det
330th TC Co
334th Avn Co
1 Sep DP
10 Dec AR
25 May AR
Bien Hoa
Song Be
Vung Tau
all year
Tan Son Nhut
all year
Long Binh
all year
1 Sep AR
Vung Tau
Bien Hoa
605th TC Co 8 Mar
A/82nd Avn 1 Sep DP
A/501st Avn 1 Sep RE
A GS Grp
24 Jan DP
Capital Avn 1 Jul AR
Bn
HC-1 Det 29 29 Jun AR
PHILCAG 14 Sep AR
USARV R/W
unknown
Flt
To 334th Avn Co
From FW Avn
From 197th Avn
Co
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Vung Tau
To 335th Avn Co
Bien Hoa
To 71st AHC
Saigon
To 34th GS Grp
Tan Son Nhut
Saigon
Vung Tau
Tay Ninh
Tan Son Nhut Into 120th Avn
Co
1967
1st Inf Div
1st Inf 1st
all year
Avn
1st Inf 1st Bde 7 Mar RL
1st Inf 2nd
Bde
1st Inf 3rd
Bde
1st Inf
DivArty
D/1/4th Cav
E/701 Mnt
1st Sig Bde
1st TC Bn
2nd Sig Grp
3/17th Cav
3/17th Cav
ATr
3/17th Cav
BTr
3/17th Cav
CTr
9 Sqdn
11th CAB
12th CAG
17th Avn Co
20th Eng Bde
20th TC Co
25th Inf Div
25th Avn Bn
Phu Loi
Quan Loi
From Phuoc
Vinh
all year
Di An
all year
all year
16 Oct
all year
25 Jan DP
Oct AR
Oct AR
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Long Binh
From Saigon
Vung Tau
USNS CC Bay
Tan Son Nhut To Long Binh
Di An
Di An
Oct AR
Di An
Oct AR
Di An
all year
all year
all year
25 Sep AR
3 Aug AR
3 May AR
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Cu Chi
all year
Cu Chi
Bear Cat?
202
25th Inf 1st
all year
Bde
25th Inf 2nd all year
Bde
4th Inf 3rd
Aug RL
Bde
25th Inf 3rd
Aug AR
Bde
25th Inf
all year
DivArty
D/3/4th Cav all year
E/725th Mnt all year
25th CAC
25 Oct AR
34th Eng Grp 21 Mar AR
34th GS Grp all year
45th Med Co 19 Jun AR
56th TC Co all year
57th Med Det all year
58th TC Bn all year
68th Avn Co all year
all year
71st AHC
79th Eng Grp all year
101st Abn Div
101st Avn Bn
10 Dec
AR
101stAbn 2 Bde 10 Dec
AR
101stAbn 3 Bde 10 Dec
AR
101st Abn Div 10 Dec
Arty
AR
101st Abn 5 TC 10 Dec
Bn
AR
125th ATC
all year
Co
135th Avn Co 3 Oct AR
145th Avn Bn all year
147th ASHC all year
159th Eng
all year
Grp
Oct AR
159th Med
Det
161st Flt
all year
173rd Abn
Nov DP
Bde
all year
173rd Avn
Co
187th Avn Co 15 Mar AR
188th Avn Co 4 May AR
190th Avn Co 12 Aug AR
195th AHC 2 Nov AR
199th LIB
Mar RL
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Name changed
Cu Chi
Units in III
Corps
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Saigon
AMMC
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Cu Chu
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
Cu Chi
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
To An Khe
Lai Khe
Tay Ninh
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Plantation
Long Binh
TDY to I Corps
From Song Be
203
199th LIB
199th LIB
200th ASHC
205th ASHC
210th Avn Bn
Apr RL
Jul RL
15 Mar AR
30 May AR
2 Apr AR
all year
Bien Hoa
From Long Binh
Long Binh
From Bien Hoa
Bear Cat
Phu Loi
Tan Son Nhut From Capital
Avn
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
From Buffalo
Avn
Vung Tau
25 May AR
12 Aug AR
28 Jan AR
Jul DP
Bear Cat
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Tan Son Nhut To Pleiku
Jul DP
Long Binh
22 Dec AR
20 Dec AR
all year
all year
9 Mar AR
24 Mar AR
3 May AR
all year
all year
all year
2 Apr DP
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Vung Tau
Bien Hoa
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Tan Son Nhut
Saigon
To 210th Avn Bn
1 May DP
1 May AR
all year
Vung Tau
Vung Tau
Tay Ninh
213th ASHC 13 Jan AR
214th Avn Bn 19 Apr AR
222nd Avn
Bn
240th Avn Co
242nd ASHC
269th Avn Bn
283rd Med
Det
254th Med
Det
273rd HHC
308th Avn Bn
330th TC Co
334th Avn Co
388th TC Co
520th TC Bn
539th TC Co
605th TC Co
765th TC Bn
Air America
Capital Avn
Bn
HC-1 Det 29
HA(L)-3
PHILCAG
To Nha Trang
To HA(L)-3
1968
1st Inf Div
1st Inf 1st
Avn
1st Inf 1st Bde
1st Inf 2nd
Bde
1st Inf 3rd
Bde
1st Inf
DivArty
D/1/4th Cav
E/701 Mnt
1st Sig Bde
1st TC Bn
2nd Sig Grp
3/17th Cav
3/17th Cav
ATr
3/17th Cav
BTr
3/17th Cav
all year
Phu Loi
12 Nov RL
Lai Khe
From Quan Loi
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
Di An
Di An
USNS CC Bay
all year
Di An
all year
Di An
204
CTr
9 Sqdn
all year
11th CAB
all year
all year
12th CAG
17th Avn Co 16 Mar DP
20th Eng Bde all year
20th TC Co all year
25th Inf Div
all year
25th Inf 1st
Bde
25th Inf 2nd all year
Bde
25th Inf 3rd
all year
Bde
25th Inf
all year
DivArty
D/3/4th Cav all year
E/725th Mnt all year
25th CAC
all year
34th GS Grp all year
56th TC Co all year
57th Med Det all year
58th Avn Bn 1 Mar AR
58th TC Bn Fed DP
79th Eng Grp all year
101st Abn Div
101st Avn Bn
Mar DP
101stAbn 2 Bde Mar DP
101stAbn 3 Bde Mar DP
101st Abn Div Mar DP
Arty
101st Abn 5 TC Mar DP
Bn
117th Avn Co Jan AR
125th ATC
all year
Co
147th ASHC all year
159th Eng
all year
Grp
161st Flt
all year
173rd Avn
all year
Co
188th Avn Co 1 Jul DP
195th AHC all year
199th LIB
Mar RL
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Bear Cat
Bien Hoa
Cu Chi
To Phu Bai
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Long Binh
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
Saigon
To Da Nang
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
For I Corps
For I Corps
For I Corps
For I Corps
Bien Hoa
For I Corps
Cu Chu
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
From Pleiku
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Lai Khe
Tay Ninh
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Plantation
Gao Ho Nai
Departed RVN
From Long Binh
205
199th LIB
Jun RL
Long Binh
200th ASHC 1 Jul DP
205th ASHC all year
210th Avn Bn 15 Jan DP
Bear Cat
Phu Loi
Long Thanh
213th ASHC
214th Avn Bn
222nd Avn
Bn
240th Avn Co
all year
15 Nov DP
Dec DP
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
Bear Cat
all year
Bear Cat
From Gao Ho
Nai
Departed RVN
Geronimos
From
TanSonNhut
Black Cats
To Dong Tam
From Vung Tau
nd
242 ASHC all year
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
273rd HHC all year
Long Binh
303rd TC Co 23 Sep AR Long Thanh
To Phu Bai
308th Avn Bn 16 Mar DP Bien Hoa
Vung Tau
Bien Hoa
357th TC Co 15 Oct AR Bien Hoa
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Tan Son Nhut
HA(L)-3
all year
Vung Tau
PHILCAG all year
Tay Ninh
Starting in October 1968 and continuing for several weeks, the 1st Air Cavalry Division relocated from I
Corps to III Corps. The 1st Cav had so many helicopter units and there were so many other unit relocations
that the Directory Editor decided to allocate an entire section to just the 1st Cav Division. Indeed the
relocations of other units and dispersion of the 1st Cav’s helicopter unit to so many III Corps locations is
one of the motivations for preparing these rosters.
1st Cavalry Division in III Corps
1st Bde
2nd Bde
3rd Bde
1/9th Cav HHT
1/9th Cav A
Trp
1/9th Cav B Trp
1/9th Cav C Trp
2/20th ARA
HHB
2/20th ARA A
Bty
2/20th ARA B
Bty
2/20th ARA C
Bty
11th Group
11th GS Avn
Co
15th Med Bn
15th TC Bn
Oct AR
Oct AR
Oct AR
Tay Ninh
Quan Loi
Quan Loi
Tay Ninh
Tay Ninh
Dau Tieng
Tay Ninh
Dau Tieng
Oct AR
Oct AR
Phuoc Vinh
Phuoc Vinh
206
15th TC A Co
15th TC B Co
15th TC C Co
227th AHB
Oct AR
227th AHB A
Co
227th AHB B
Co
227th AHB C
Co
227th AHB D
Co
228th ASHB
228th ASHB A
Co
228th ASHB B
Co
228th ASHB C
Co
229th AHB
229th AHB A
Co
229th AHB B
Co
229th AHB C
Co
229th AHB D
Co
E/82nd Arty
Phu Loi
Cu Chi
Tay Ninh
Tay Ninh
Dau Tieng
Dau Tieng
Roster of helicopter units in III Corps (Continues)
1969
1st Inf Div
1st Inf 1st
Avn
1st Inf 1st Bde
1st Inf 1st Bde
1st Inf 2nd
Bde
1st Inf 3rd
Bde
1st Inf
DivArty
D/1/4th Cav
E/701 Mnt
1st Sig Bde
1st TC Bn
2nd Sig Grp
3/17th Cav
3/17th Cav
ATr
3/17th Cav
BTr
3/17th Cav
CTr
all year
Phu Loi
12 Mar RL
18 Jun RL
Quan Loi
Dau Tieng
Di An
From Lai Khe
From Quan Loi
Lai Khe
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
Di An
Di An
all year
Di An
all year
Di An
USNS CC Bay
207
9 Sqdn
11th CAB
12th CAG
20th Eng Bde
20th TC Co
25th Inf Div
25th Avn Bn
25th Inf 1st
Bde
25th Inf 2nd
Bde
25th Inf 3rd
Bde
25th Inf
DivArty
D/3/4th Cav
E/725th Mnt
25th CAC
34th Eng Grp
34th GS Grp
56th TC Co
57th Med Det
58th Avn Bn
68th Avn Co
79th Eng Grp
116th Avn Co
117th Avn Co
118th Avn Co
120th Avn Co
125th ATC
Co
128th Avn Co
135th Avn Co
145th Avn Bn
147th ASHC
159th Eng
Grp
161st Flt
165th TC Co
165th CAG
173rd Avn
Co
187th Avn Co
190th Avn Co
195th AHC
199th LIB
205th ASHC
210th Avn Bn
213th ASHC
222nd Avn
Bn
240th Avn Co
242nd ASHC
269th Avn Bn
273rd HHC
303rd TC Co
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Cu Chi
all year
all year
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
all year
Cu Chi
all year
Cu Chi
all year
Cu Chi
all year
all year
all year
Feb DP
all year
all year
all year
17 Feb DP
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Long Binh
Vung Tau
To Bin Thuy
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
To 165th CAG
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Cu Chu
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
all year
25 Sep
17 Feb AR
all year
Bien Hoa
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Lai Khe
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Tay Ninh
Bien Hoa
Plantation
Long Binh
Phu Loi
Long Thanh
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Bear Cat
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Long Binh
Long Thanh
208
330th TC Co
334th Avn Co
357th TC Co
388th TC Co
520th TC Bn
539th TC Co
605th TC Co
765th TC Bn
Air America
HA(L)-3
PHILCAG
Thai Avn Co
all year
all year
29 Sep DP
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
13 Dec DP
25 Feb AR
Vung Tau
Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Departed RVN
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Tan Son Nhut
Vung Tau
Tay Ninh
Departed RVN
Bear Cat
1st Inf Div
1st Inf 1st
Avn
1st Inf 1st Bde
1st Inf 2nd
Bde
1st Inf 3rd
Bde
1st Inf
DivArty
D/1/4th Cav
E/701 Mnt
1st Sig Bde
1st TC Bn
3/17th Cav
3/17th Cav
ATr
3/17th Cav
ATr
3/17th Cav
BTr
3/17th Cav
CTr
2nd Sig Grp
9 Sqdn
11th CAB
12th CAG
20th Eng Bde
20th TC Co
25th Inf Div
25th Avn Bn
25th Inf 1st
Bde
25th Inf 2nd
Bde
25th Inf 3rd
Bde
25th Inf
DivArty
D/3/4th Cav
E/725th Mnt
25th CAC
15 Apr DP
15 Apr DP
Di An
Phu Loi
1970
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
15 Apr DP
15 Apr DP
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
15 Apr DP
Departed RVN
15 Apr DP
Departed RVN
20 Mar DP
6 Apr DP
all year
all year
all year
4 Jan DP
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Di An
Di An
To C/16th Cav
Departed RVN
Unknown
Di An
From Soc Tang
all year
Di An
Dec DP
Di An
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Cu Chi
7 Dec DP
8 Dec DP
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
all year
Cu Chi
8 Dec DP
Cu Chi
Departed RVN
8 Dec DP
Cu Chi
Departed RVN
all year
14 Oct DP
all year
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Long Binh
Departed RVN
USNS CC Bay
To Soc Trang
To Vinh Long
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
209
34th GS Grp
56th TC Co
57th Med Det
68th Avn Co
79th Eng Grp
116th Avn Co
117th Avn Co
118th Avn Co
120th Avn Co
125th ATC
Co
128th Avn Co
135th Avn Co
145th Avn Bn
147th ASHC
159th Eng
Grp
159th Med
Det
161st Flt
all year
all year
all year
all year
15 Dec DP
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Departed RVN
Cu Chu
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
6 Nov AR
Long Binh
From Cu Chi
Bien Hoa
Departed RVN
Unknown
DP
165th CAG all year
173rd Avn
all year
Co
190th Avn Co 10 Dec DP
195th AHC 14 Dec DP
199th LIB
11 Oct DP
205th ASHC all year
213th ASHC all year
222nd Avn
all year
Bn
242nd ASHC all year
273rd HHC all year
303rd TC Co 4 Feb DP
HA(L)-3
all year
Thai Avn Co all year
Bear Cat
Cu Chi
Cu Chi
Long Binh
Long Thanh
Departed RVN
Vung Tau
Bien Hoa
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Tan Son Nhut
Vung Tau
Bear Cat
1st Sig Bde
1st TC Bn
Long Binh
Vung Tau
all year
unknown
DP
2nd Sig Grp 23 Oct DP
3rd Bde 1st Cav 30 Apr AR
Long Binh
Phu Loi
Lai Khe
Tay Ninh
Bien Hoa
Plantation
Long Binh
Phu Loi
Long Thanh
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
1971
Long Binh
Binh Hoa
To Cam Ranh
Bay
Departed RVN
Separate status
210
229th AHB
229th AHB A
Co
229th AHB B
Co
229th AHB C
Co
229th AHB D
Co
362nd ASHC
F/9th Cav
F/77th AFA
3/17th Cav
3/17th Cav
ATr
3/17th Cav
BTr
9 Sqdn
11th Avn Co
11th CAB
12th CAG
20th Eng Bde
20th TC Co
25th Inf 2nd
Bde
25th CAC
34th GS Grp
45th Med Co
56th TC Co
57th Med Det
68th Avn Co
116th Avn Co
117th Avn Co
118th Avn Co
120th Avn Co
125th ATC
Co
128th Avn Co
135th Avn Co
145th Avn Bn
147th ASHC
159th Eng
Grp
165th CAG
165th TC Co
173rd Avn
Co
187th Avn Co
205th ASHC
210th Avn Bn
213th ASHC
222nd Avn
Bn
227th Avn Bn
30 Jun AR Bien Hoa
From B/229th
Avn
30 Apr AR
30 Apr AR
all year
Di An
all year
Di An
all year
Di An
5 Dec DP
19 Apr DP
all year
all year
20 Sep DP
15 Mar DP
30 Apr DP
Vung Tau
Phuoc Vinh
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Cu Chi
Long Binh
all year
all year
30 Apr DP
all year
all year
1 Apr DP
Jan DP
all year
31 Aug DP
all year
20 Sep DP
Long Binh
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Bien Hoa
Cu Chu
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Bien Hoa
all year
all year
all year
all year
all year
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
all year
all year
all year
Long Binh
Phu Loi
Lai Khe
all year
15 Apr DP
31 Aug DP
all year
15 Dec DP
Tay Ninh
Phu Loi
Long Thanh
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
25 Jul DP
Phuoc Vinh
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
For I Corps
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Black Cats
Departed RVN
To 10th & 52nd
Avn
211
228th Avn Bn
240th Avn Co
242nd ASHC
244th Avn Co
244th Avn Co
269th Avn Bn
273rd HHC
283rd Med
Det
330th TC Co
334th Avn Co
334th TC Co
388th TC Co
520th TC Bn
539th TC Co
605th TC Co
765th TC Bn
Air America
D/3/4th Cav
F/4th Cav
10 Apr DP
26 Dec DP
1 Oct DP
31 Aug AR
26 Dec DP
15 Apr DP
all year
Feb AR
all year
all year
31 Aug AR
all year
all year
30 Jun DP
all year
all year
all year
10 Feb DP
10 Feb AR
Thai Avn Co 31 Aug DP
1st Sig Bde
3/17th Cav
3/17th Cav
ATr
3/17th Cav
BTr
11th CAB
12th CAG
25th CAC
34th GS Grp
56th TC Co
57th Med Det
59th CAC
117th Avn Co
120th Avn Co
128th Avn Co
135th Avn Co
145th Avn Bn
147th ASHC
159th Eng
Grp
165th CAG
165th TC Co
173rd Avn
Co
187th Avn Co
213th ASHC
273rd HHC
330th TC Co
334th Avn Co
334th TC Co
362nd ASHC
Bear Cat
Cu Chi
Bear Cat
Bear Cat
Cu Chi
Long Binh
Long Binh
To Da Nang
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
From Tuy Hoa
Vung Tau
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Phu Loi
Departed RVN
Phu Loi
Vung Tau
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
To F/4th Cav
Long Binh
From D/3/4th
Cav
Bear Cat
Departed RVN
1972
7 Nov DP
Apr DP
Apr DP
Long Binh
Phu Loi
Di An
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Apr DP
Phu Loi
Departed RVN
1 Mar DP
all year
26 Mar DP
30 Nov DP
30 Apr DP
all year
30 Sep AR
26 Mar DP
Oct DP
30 Jan DP
14 Feb DP
2 Apr DP
17 Mar DP
30 Apr DP
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Long Binh
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
Long Binh
Phu Loi
Bear Cat
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Long Binh
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
30 Jan DP
30 Apr DP
31 Mar DP
Long Binh
Phu Loi
Lai Khe
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
14 Feb DP
31 Mar DP
29 Feb DP
30 Apr DP
1 Mar DP
30 Apr DP
20 Aug DP
Tay Ninh
Phu Loi
Long Binh
Vung Tau
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
Bien Hoa
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
Departed RVN
212
388th TC Co
520th TC Bn
605th TC Co
765th TC Bn
Air America
F/4th Cav
all year
29 Apr DP
1 May DP
29 Apr DP
all year
all year
Vung Tau
Phu Loi
Departed RVN
Phu Loi
Departed RVN
Vung Tau
Departed RVN
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
1973
12th CAG
16 Mar DP
57th Med Det 29 Mart DP
59th CAC
13 Mar DP
259th Sqdn
activation
Det ?
date
unknown
388th TC Co 13 Mar DP
F/4th Cav
26 Feb DP
Long Binh
Departed RVN
Tan Son Nhut Departed RVN
Tan Son Nhut Departed RVN
Bien Hoa
VNAF medevac
detachment for
MR III
Vung Tau
Departed RVN
Tan Son Nhut
Long Binh
Departed RVN
259th Sqdn Det ? all year
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
259th Sqdn Det ? Apr
Air America Apr
Bien Hoa
Tan Son Nhut
1974
1975
History items collected from the 195th AHC
The following paragraph was harvested from the website homepages.waymark.net/~spike/
The 195th Assault Helicopter Company served in the Republic of Vietnam from the 2nd of November 1967
through the 14th of December 1970. The unit was comprised of three flight platoons, the 609th
Transportation Detachment (maintenance platoon), and the 366th Signal Detachment (avionics platoon).
The 195th’s primary mission was to support the special operations of MACVSOG CCS (Military Assistance
Command Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, Command and Control South) whose missions were
over the border operations into the Parrot’s Beak and Fish Hook areas of Cambodia. The 1st Airlift Platoon
was assigned to SOG operations. Part of the 2nd Airlift Platoon was also assigned to SOG operations, while
part of the platoon provided support to several other operations in the III CTZ area such as Company F, 51st
Infantry (Airborne) LRP (Long Range Patrol). The Gunship Platoon was committed to SOG and LRP
operations only. The 195th had the distinction of being the only officially authorized camouflaged painted
Hueys in the U.S. Army because of constant "over the fence" operations.
History of the 195th AHC by Tyler Furbish
On the 27th of September 1966, the 195th Aviation Company was allotted to the Regular Army and was
activated at Ft. Carson, Colorado on 25 November 1966. We arrived in Vietnam on 2 November 1967. The
last of the original 31 aircraft arrived on the 27th of November 1967. With the arrival of the men and
aircraft, the unit was redesignated as the 195th Assault Helicopter Company. Most of the company
personnel traveled to Vietnam on a troop ship - the General Walker - and the aircraft traveled via another
ship - the Sea Train Washington. Several of the company were Advance Party and made the trip from Ft.
Carson to Vietnam by air. Still others were "infused" into the company from other units already in country.
This was a practice used by the Army to preclude the whole company "DEROSing" at the same time.
While some personnel were brought into the 195th, others were transferred out to other units. In the early
days, as it was throughout unit history, the company was comprised of 3 flight platoons: the 1st Airlift
Platoon, the 2nd Airlift Platoon, and the Gun Platoon. The 1st Lift was originally nicknamed Snoopys (or
something like that). Their patch was Snoopy on his dog house, scarf trailing in the breeze. The 2nd Lift
was nicknamed the Ghostriders, and the Gun platoon was nicknamed the Thunder Chickens. Somewhere
along the line, probably in 1969, the 1st Lift had a nickname change to become known as Fly United. Still
later, probably in early 1970, they again changed their nickname to the Sky Pilots. The 2nd Lift and the
Gun platoon kept their original nicknames for the duration.
213
Each airlift platoon was originally comprised of 11 troop carriers called Slicks - these were Bell UH-1H
helicopters fitted with Lycoming T53-L13B engines. Originally these ships were designated UH-1D
models. The Army decided to change the designation to UH-1H because of the L13B engine that set it apart
from the D model with its' L13 engine. The difference was that the L13B had more shaft horsepower.
Slicks were armed with one M-60 machine gun on either side of the aircraft. The M-60s were fired by the
Crew Chief and the Gunner. The gun platoon was comprised of 8 Gunships - these were UH-1C model Bell
helicopters. The C model was much like the A or B model in appearance except for the 540 rotor head that
was characterized by its' wide chord main rotor blades. There were 6 ships with a combination of mini guns
and rockets (one mini and 7 rockets on each side), and 2 Hogs - ships that carried rockets and a 40mm
cannon or Blooper (19 rockets on each side and the Blooper on the nose). Each Gunship also carried two
M-60 machine guns. Like on the Slicks, these M-60s were fired by the Crew Chief and the Gunner.
Gunships were fitted with Lycoming T53-L11 engines. There was also one maintenance Slick assigned to
the 609th Transportation Detachment (the guys who did the maintenance and kept us flying).
The original missions, which began 1 December 1967, were in support of MACV-SOG. By the middle of
the month we had also picked up missions for the 51st Infantry LRP (Long Range Patrol). At that time the
missions were split with the 1st Airlift Platoon supporting SOG and the 2nd Airlift Platoon supporting the
LRPs. The Gun Platoon supported both missions throughout the duration.
The next great event in history was 31 Jan 68 - TET. What an experience. Volumes have already been
written on that subject.
On 29 February 1968 we mourned our first KIA.
The 16th of April 1968 found the whole company being pulled off Special Operations to perform full
company assaults (all 30 ships) with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and then the 9th Infantry Division.
These operations took us to places like Dong Tam, Binh Chan, Ben Luc, Tan An, Nha Be, and area
southwest of Saigon. On the 8th of May, Saigon was hit hard and we put in several 15 flight-hour days.
These full company assaults lasted only about 30 days. On the 15th of May the 1st Lift returned to Special
Operations (SOG) while the 2nd Lift returned to the 51st LRP missions.
By some quirk of fate, we found ourselves flying combat assaults for the 9th Inf Div for a period in early
June 1968. On 3 June 68 we had one man WIA, and 9 out of 10 of our ships took multiple hits during a
combat assault. Records show that most of our ships logged 16 to 18 flight-hours that day. Around mid
June we ceased these operations and re-rigged the aircraft to resume SOG missions.
Then, on 18 June 1968, the 1st and 2nd Airlift platoons swapped missions with the 1st Lift taking up the
51st LRP missions and the 2nd Lift taking over the SOG missions. This didn't last long either because by
27 June both airlift platoons were on SOG missions. From there SOG missions became our bread and
butter until the unit was deactivated.
At some point in 1968, we began to take our aircraft, one or two at a time, over to Bien Hoa to have the Air
Force paint them in a camouflage paint scheme. It is believed that this camouflage paint scheme was
similar (or maybe identical) to that of the USAF 20th SOS who flew support for SOG CCS out of Ban Me
Thout. We operated out of the CCS South launch site, Quan Loi. We continued to work B-56 Project
Sigma, out of Dau Tieng mostly, and transitioned to Quan Loi to work B-50 Project Omega and CCS.
There were no markings at all on the ships once they were camouflaged - no U.S. Army, no serial numbers,
no nothing. It is believed that we were the only U.S. Army unit to fly camouflaged Hueys. After we got the
paint jobs, Lear Siegler installed scrambler radio equipment in the ships too.
Sometime in the July/August 1968 time frame, one of the recon teams found the largest cache of enemy
weapons ever found up to that time. It took 14 Chinook sorties (loads) to haul it all off.
The month of September 1968 found us working B-52 Project Delta, Operation Alamo, out of Quan Loi.
Three ships from the 2nd Lift began a joint 6-day operation with the 240th AHC on 1 October 1968. This
operation was in the Plain of Reeds with the 9th Infantry Division. On the 5th of October, we suffered 9
casualties and lost 2 aircraft on this mission.
Three of our ships supported the Royal Thai Army, out of Bear Cat, beginning in October 1968 and
carrying though the end of 1969 at least. In 1970 Thai pilots began flying with some of our pilots on
missions in support of the Royal Thai Army.
One of our Recon Teams suffered "several" KIA and WIA, and we lost one gun ship and had 3 others
heavily damaged on 2 March 1969. And on the 4th of April, we lost another slick. On April 6th, one RT
member was KIA and 5 were WIA. Four air crew were WIA. And we lost another slick.
214
In late August 1969, 195th air crews rescued an O-1 Bird Dog pilot who had gone done in Cambodia at
night. After about 3 hours of searching and hovering over jungle at night, he was located and taken to
safety by means of a McGuire Rig.
On the 8th of October 1969, four aircrew and 3 RT members were KIA. One aircraft was lost.
The 23rd of November 1969 began a 30 day period of encountering the enemy on 80% of the CC insertions
and extractions.
The 195th lost another man (KIA) on 4 December 1969. We lost another ship that day also.
There is a large hole in the history for the year of 1970 - mostly because no Historical Notes for that year
have been found yet. What is painfully clear is that we had 5 men KIA between early March and Early June
1970. The 195th Assault Helicopter Company was deactivated on 14 December 1970
A Brief History of the 195th AHC’s Camo painted Hueys
The 195th Assault Helicopter Company was deployed to the Plantation airfield in Long Binh, Vietnam from
Ft. Carson, CO in October 1967. The unit went operational on 1 December, 1967 with its first mission
being in support of MACV-SOG. Although the unit was utilized in various missions, its primary
commitment was to support Special Operations conducted by the Special Forces C5 and MACV-SOG. In
the spring of 1968, while supporting Project Sigma, Project Delta, based in Nha Trang, had deployed to the
northern section of three corps, based at Quan Loi, and the 195th was assigned to support their Cambodian
over-the-fence missions. As a result of the clandestine operations that were to be conducted over the
boarders in support of the missions, the commander of the 195th, MAJ Richard Hummel along with the
Project Sigma commander, Major May, sought and was granted approval of repainting the aircraft. This
resulted in the 195th being the only “authorized” camouflage Army aviation unit.
The U.S. Air Force located in Binh Hoa agreed to paint the eight UH-1Cs and twenty-three UH-1Hs using
their paint colors and schemes in the May to July time-frame of 1968. Although the Air Force had
similarly painted Hueys, there was evidently no template for the pattern and consequently the camouflage
scheme was painted freehand by the technicians. This camouflage consisted of a blue-white bottom to the
aircraft and four tints of greens and browns on the upper surfaces. All markings indicating the aircraft
ownership were eradicated: There were no tail numbers or “United States Army” visible on the airframes.
The identification plates were also removed. The flight crews also wore a non-descript uniform of “tiger
fatigues”, customarily worm by the South Vietnamese Army Special Forces, without name tags, dog tags,
ID cards or rank. This was all done to give the appearance of not being associated with the United States in
the event of an aircraft being downed in the cross-boarder missions.
It seems that the enemy had recognized the fact that the camouflaged helicopters were the ones feeding
vital intelligence to the US military and causing the difficulties with their logistical resupply coming from
the north through Cambodia. These camouflaged aircraft were easily identified and soon the 195th found
themselves a more frequent target than other aircraft during takeoffs and landings at the Quan Loi airfield.
Consequently, the aircraft were repainted back to the original OD paint scheme in mid 1970. The unit
continued with the Special Operations missions until it was deactivated and its colors returned to the United
States in 1970.
History items collected from Flying Circus, 1st Brigade - 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
The following material was harvested from the section titled A PLACE TO HANG OUR HAT on the
website www.flying-circus.org. It was compiled by Frank Vanatta, who was (surprise, surprise!) a Scout
pilot!
The "Flying Circus" was best known for its SCOUT section; but the Circus also flew Command & Control,
Ash and Trash, Medivac and anything else the 1st Brigade needed at any given time. This web site is
dedicated to the people of widely varying backgrounds who came together under the turbulent and
uncertain times of war and together produced the unit which became known as the "Flying Circus".
In late 1968, the Division packed up and moved to the other end of the country, setting up camp in III
Corps in the Southwest corner of Vietnam. From the Division Headquarters at Phouc Vinh, the Cav began
to operate in the four main provinces of Phouc Long, Binh Long, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong. The
beginning of 1969 saw Operation "Toan Thhang II" result in the capture of one of the largest stockpiles of
ammunition found in the war. Operation "Cheyenne Sabre" began in February with the aim of disrupting
the supply routes northeast of Bien Hoa - an area known as the "Serges Jungle Highway." By August, the
enemy was getting tired of this "interference" by the Cav and they mounted attacks against Quan Lai, LZ
215
Becky, LZ Jon, LZ Kelly, and LZ Caldwell. Not only were these attacks thrown back, but by the end of the
year the Cav had totally destroyed the enemy’s hold on that part of the country.
On 1 May, 1970, President Nixon gave the order for the Cav to move into Cambodia to smash enemy
supply areas in what was known as the "Fish Hook", near the towns of Mimot and Snoul. This mission was
completed at the end of June, and was to become one of the most successful operations of its type for the
Cav. Countless amounts of weapons and ammunition were captured or destroyed, the items uncovered
ranging from small arms to a Porsche sports car. By this time, popular sentiment in the US was growing
against further involvement in the war. Though there was more fighting to be done, the beginning of the
withdrawal was commencing. By late March, 1971, the official duties of the 1st Cavalry Division ended.
Though the majority of the Cav began to leave Vietnam, parts of the three Brigades were reformed to make
up a new 3rd Brigade which was then headquartered at Bien Hoa. This group became occupied with the
program of "Vietnamization", which was designed to help the Vietnamese people take control of their own
future defense. On 5 May, 1971, the colors of the 1st Cavalry Division, minus those of the 3rd Brigade,
were officially moved to Fort Hood, Texas. Thus ends this brief collection of the exploits of the 1st
Brigade. Though the 1st Cav was reorganized and went on to perform other assignments and test new
military concepts, and the 3rd Brigade continued to perform admirably in Vietnam until 21 June, 1972, that
is another story.
History items collected from the 362nd ASHC
The following material was harvested from the website www.geocities.com/cobalt_oneniner and is titled
362nd AVIATION COMPANY, THE LAST "HOOKERS", AUGUST 1971 - AUGUST 1972, The 362nd
Aviation Company was the last American, CH-47 combat unit to serve in Vietnam. On 30 June 1971, at
Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat), B Company, 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile) was reorganized and designated the 362nd Aviation Company (ASH). It was assigned to the
229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Later, after
the 3rd Brigade furled its colors, another organized force, Task Force Garry Owen, remained to fight. The
362nd stayed with them. In August 1972, the 362nd ceased to exist as it too cased colors. Another page
became history in the annals of Army aviation.
By today's standards, the 362nd did a battalion's work. It contained 24 CH-47A helicopters and over 500
Skytroopers. Organized with its own depot maintenance, it essentially was self sustaining. No other
maintenance capability existed in country for this "Workhorse of Army Aviation."
Planners knew, if this unit didn't fly, the First Cav didn't fight. It was the 362nd that keep fuel flowing for
other ships to fly. From Bearcat, to Phu Loi, to Long Thanh North, the 362nd hunkered down and slugged
it out with the rest of the Cav. Early 1972 saw the most fierce combat of the Vietnam conflict. There were
no US ground force combat units in Vietnam. There were American advisors and aviation. Ground combat
was the realm of the ARVN. The "United Team" was at its best and in its finest hour. Each one of them is
deserving of the utmost respect.
History Item Collected by the 25th Aviation Battalion Association
Editors Note: Over the years of collecting and publishing history material for the VHPA, the various VHPA
committees have gotten to know some of the truly hard workers. Les Hines from the 123rd Aviation
Battalion Association is one of the best and so is Ron Leonard, Diamondhead 085, of Ranson WV,
Webmaster for the 25th Aviation Battalion at /members.tripod.com/ronleonard/. These men and their
organizations have been patiently typing Vietnam Era documents into word processors for years and have
always been quick to share a copy with the VHPA History Committee. The follow are examples of the
history that is collected and preserved because of these fine, fine men who were hard working crew chiefs
in Vietnam.
EYEWITNESS STATEMENT - On 22 December 1968 at approximately 0025 hrs, the Diamondhead 10 light fire
team from B Co, 25th Avn Bn was scrambled to XT2430 to support a night location containing three (3)
elements of the 4th Bn, 9th Inf. A briefing from the ground commander revealed that their situation was
desperate and that they were surrounded and in danger of being over-run by a large enemy force. Upon
arriving over the area of contact, the lead ship of the fire team came under heavy anti-aircraft fire. WO1
Larry D King, aircraft commander of the wing ship, immediately began to place suppressive fire into the
enemy weapons positions with complete disregard for his own safety. Maneuvering his aircraft around
friendly artillery WO1 King began making immediate suppressive firing passes into the main body of the
216
enemy force, ignoring the large volume of enemy anti-aircraft fire directed at his ship. Realizing that
constant suppressive fire was needed in more than one location, and coordinating with the fire team leader,
WO1 Robert H Moore, the decision was made to split the fire team into two separate fighting units. WO1
King then began making independent firing passes at the enemy, exposing himself to intense enemy fire, to
give the friendly units maximum support from his armed helicopter. Noting that a large enemy unit was
attempting to withdraw form the area of contact, WO1 King contacted the forward air controller, Issue 15.
Having expanded all ordnance WO1 King maneuvered his aircraft into such a position to cover the forward
air controller, who then placed an airstike on the enemy location. Leaving the area of contact only long
enough to refuel and rearm, WO1 King made continuous firing passes for a period of over six (6) hours,
thereby contributing greatly to the repulsion of the enemy attack and reducing the number of friendly
casualties. Remaining on station after the enemy contact had been broken to provide security for medical
evacuation and resupply operations. Signed by Robert H Moore, WO1 Avn
Editor’s Note: The good news is that the VHPA knows these two pilots were not killed in Vietnam. The
bad news is that the only other information the VHPA has about these two men is that they were flight
school classmates is 67-23. Any reader with more information about these men is encouraged to contact the
VHPA.
Images Remain For "Little Bear 714" Gunner by- Tony Lazzarini
The following true story is a tribute to the men of A Company, 25th Aviation Battalion, also known as
"Little Bear," who served in the Republic of Vietnam. Reprinted by permission of the author from his book,
"Never Trust a man in Curlers."
In late October 1967, an armored personnel carrier with numerous troops on board rolled on top of a
powerful anti-tank mine. The ensuing explosion killed four men and severely injured several others.
Vulnerable and alone their distress call for a dust-off was responded to by the closest helicopter in the area.
The Huey Little Bear 714 was returning to base from it's lone previous mission. Two round trips were
needed to deliver the wounded to a base hospital. It would take a perilous third trip in darkness to retrieve
the bodies of the dead. Hastily we loaded the last of the dead into a helicopter. Above me the rotor blades
were spinning frantically grasping for enough air to remove us from the engulfing jungle. A voice in my
flight helmet cried out, "We're taking hits." The crewchief's machine gun responded with a burst of
yellowish orange tracers that disappeared into the night shrouded jungle. "I'm In," I shouted and squeezed
into the small space behind my own machine gun. We started to lift off when flashes of white appeared
from the shrinking earth. I could hear the splats as the bullets searched the ship for another host. I yanked
back on the trigger if my weapon and fired, and fired. The burning APC remained as a marker to soon fade
and be forgotten, like it's unfortunate crew. In the real world, grieving parents would be left with only tears
and memories.
"Where are you hit?" "What?" I replied. "Where are you hit?" again questioned the medic. We were back
on the landing pad of the base hospital. The last body was being carried away on an olive green stretcher.
The medic pointed to my blood-drenched arm. "It's not mine," I informed him coldly and turned back to reenter my ship. Light from the well lit pad revealed a palette of blood left by our passengers. The rotor
blades fan effect had spray painted the inside of the Huey with a red sticky coating. Three bullet holes
ventilated the area around my perch. Jerry, the crewchief was staring down at a puddle of red dish-black
fluid growing under the tail boom. The pilot was shutting down the engine to examine a strange whistling
sound coming from one of the rotor blades. It would soon reveal a .30-caliber incision. Once again, in my
seat behind the machine gun. I leaned back against the bulkhead and closed my eyes. "I'll be back in the
states in 10 more days, and all this will be forgotten," I said to myself. I was wrong, I have never forgotten.
Tony Lazzarini-Iron Triangle Oct 27, 1967.
217
The Chinooks of III Corps were the 205th, the 213th,
and 242d ASHC of the 1st Avn Bde and the 228th
ASHB from the 1st Cav
218
The following is from the
242d ASHC website found
at:
http://www.angelfire.com/mo
/242sdASHC/
On 21 November 1968, the 242 ASHC was resupplying fire support base Keene south of Cu Chi near the
Plain of Reeds in support of the 2nd Battalion 14th Infantry 25th Infantry Division. I was the aircraft
commander of Chinook CH-47A serial number 66-19019 and Captain Roger P. Olney was the pilot. SP5
Alfred T. Calderon was the crew chief in the flight engineer's position for this flight, SP5
Robert W. JeWell was the flight engineer in the right door gunner position, and SP4 Bruce A. Knieff was
the left door gunner. CPT. Olney was new in country. At that time, which was about 6 months into my tour
in Vietnam, I had accumulated over 700 flight hours in Chinooks with over 400 as an aircraft commander.
Being one of the few commissioned officers in the company, I was generally assigned to fly with the new
higher ranking officers for in country orientation.
We had an internal load of 16 grunts and several bags of mail plus an external load from Cu Chi. CPT.
Olney was flying at the time and I was working the radios. We first set down the external load then hovered
over to the resupply pad to set down to unload the internal men and supplies. To hold down dust during the
dry season, this Fire Support Base had placed a heavy Neoprene pad on the landing area and held it in place
with sand bags. I noticed as we approached that the pad had split down the middle exposing the dirt
underneath. CPT. Olney hovered to the pad and set the back wheels on the ground. I lifted my feet to
engage the brakes (the Pilot not flying worked the brakes since the Chinook would roll forward as the front
wheels were lowered). Just as the front wheels were touching the ground, I noticed out of the corner of my
left eye that the left half of the pad was flying up toward the aft rotor. The Chinook's 110 knot rotor wash
was always kicking up poncho liners, empty sandbags, and small tents, so we routinely looked for loose
objects. This pad, however, was so big that it never occurred to me that it would blow up in the blades. I
grabbed for the collective to pull pitch but it was too late. The pad hit the aft rotor on the left side. There
was an instant severe vibration so I knew we had a serious blade strike which automatically meant a shut
down. At the same time the caution panel lit up so an emergency shut down was in order so I immediately
pulled both flight levers to stop.
CPT. Olney being new was turning the switches the wrong way so I hit him to keep his hands away from
the controls. I was most concerned about the fuel valves, fuel pumps, and generator switches which are on
the overhead panel.
219
The vibration quickly stopped and the front rotor was coasting down normally so I assumed there was no
major problem. CPT. Olney, however, immediately got out of his seat and quickly left without saying a
word, his "chicken plate" (ceramic armor chest protector) crashing to the floor. This was very unusual since
both pilots normally stayed in their seats until the rotors stopped. The pilot who flew in the right seat had a
rear view mirror so he could see back through the companion way into the cargo compartment. After I
completed the shut-down procedure, I looked to see why he left in such a hurry and was shocked to see the
Chinook was on fire and it was up to the companion way. I was trapped!
As I experienced several times in Vietnam, during periods of pure terror, training takes over and everything
fortunately happens in slow motion. I remembered being told in flight school about the emergency escape
door each pilot had which was operated by a black and yellow striped handle located just above my head on
the left. I knew exactly where it was because that is where I always hung my Kodak instant camera. I
grabbed for the handle and jerked down. To my horror and surprise the handle broke off in my hand and the
door did not pop out like my training said it would. "Now," I said to myself, "it is time to panic!" "No wait," the voice in my head started again. "If the emergency handle fails then the door can be kicked out."
Leave it up to the Army to think of everything. No sweat, just kick out the door. Well I kicked and kicked
but nothing happened. This was not surprising, now that I think about it, because there was not much room
to kick. "Well this is it, I am trapped," I thought, "I am going to die. My training has run out. Not
only have I crashed but now I am going to be burned alive!" This gave me a new meaning to the phrase
"crash and burn." "Well, I will take one last look at my fate" - Surprise! the fire had backed off just enough
for me to get through the companion way and over the right door gun. "Let's go!" the little voice said, "Let's
get the hell out of here!" That is what I did. At the time it seemed like this all took about an hour but in
reality it probably lasted about 20 seconds.
Now to take inventory. Everyone got out. Thank God! One grunt had scratched his face and the flight
engineer had sprained his wrist. He also was soaked in hydraulic fluid and was very lucky not to have
caught on fire since he was standing under the aft pylon when it separated and caught on fire. In fact, it all
happened so fast that his intercom cord was burned in two before he could say anything on
the intercom. What a relief and what a fire! The aft rotor and aft pylon had separated from the fuselage with
the result of exposing gallons of oil and jet fuel to the hot turbine engine exhaust causing the instant fire.
One aft rotor blade was thrown 110 yards. Fortunately, the pad flew into the left side of the aft rotor which
pulled the hub and transmission away from the front rotor and fuselage instead of into them, which a blade
strike on the right would have caused. Also, fortunately, because I got the fuel valves off
so quickly the fire did not get into the fuel tanks which still had about 2000 pounds of JP-4 in them and
could have caused an explosion or much bigger fire.
As I was trying to figure out what to do next, from out of nowhere a young Lieutenant General appeared
with a photographer in tow. Apparently he was flying in the area in his Huey and heard about the accident
on the radio. He asked who was in charge of the Chinook and was directed to me. By this time I was in a
nearby bunker because ammunition carried on the Chinook was cooking off and I was afraid the fuel tanks
would explode. After I convinced the General that I was in charge even though I was a Lieutenant and
the pilot was a Captain, he said, "Let's go put that fire out, Lieutenant." I said, "Sir, this thing might explode
any minute and, besides, those are M-79 and M-60 rounds cooking off in the fire that you hear." He said to
me, as we backed toward a bunker, "don't you have fire extinguishers on that thing?" I said, "Yes sir, but
they are little tiny things that last about two seconds and that's a big fire!" All this time the General's
photographer was getting some great pictures of the General with this burning Chinook in the background.
I guess I finally convinced him that the Chinook was a lost cause because he began directing his energy
toward the fire support base commander. He started asking questions about why he did not get resupplied
by road instead of by air and other embarrassing questions. This gave me an opportunity to slip away.
I went looking for a radio to call Cu Chi and inform my Company Commander of my predicament and see
if we could get something to put out the fire. Shortly a Huey and a Chinook showed up from Cu Chi. The
Chinook brought a large airport-type fire extinguisher from the Muleskinner ramp which was successfully
used to put out the fire just as it reached the fuel tanks.
220
CPT. Olney and I climbed into the Huey for the embarrassing ride back to Cu Chi. To my surprise I had the
emergency handle and my camera with me which confirmed to me that in an emergency you took with you
only what was in your hands or attached to your body. My chicken plate was missing but I had my pistol.
As a result, I continued to wear a .45 caliber pistol instead of switching to an M-16 rifle like some of the
other pilots did. As the Huey climbed out of the LZ, I tried to take a picture of the wreckage but my
camera would not work. It did not matter, however, since the battalion safety officer confiscated all the film
from all of the cameras at the fire support base which yielded a full sequence of the action except for the
exact instant of the blade strike. I was surprised at the number of pictures. A battalion clerk later gave me 8
x 10 size blow-ups of several of the pictures to add to my emergency handle souvenir.
As I recall, the accident investigation found me partially at fault for not exercising proper care in a
hazardous situation and found the ground commander partially at fault for improper maintenance of a
landing pad. My guess is that the ground commander got more grief than I did because of that General
showing up. I was flying the next day and never heard anymore about the accident except for a review with
the accident investigation officer and a routine check by the flight surgeon. The damage came to
$1,290,504.40. I was glad the Army did not make me pay for it.
The good thing was that all 16 passengers and the crew of 5 did not get seriously hurt. The bad thing was
that 5 or 6 bags of mail from home were lost in the fire. What was left of the Chinook was hauled to the
539th General support Maintenance company located at Phu Loi and cannibalized for parts.
Eight days before this accident I was so close to an air strike in an LZ that my Chinook got hit with the
debris from the bomb blast. Three days before this accident I called a Mayday because of a complete
electrical failure. Two days after this accident I nearly drowned in a swimming pool after my crew threw
me in because we got shot up that day. Seven days later I got shot at by an American GI because my
Chinook blew dirt in his first hot meal in weeks (turkey dinner for Thanksgiving). Eight days later my
Chinook was completely surrounded by enemy tracers at tree top level at a Vietnamese village on the
Cambodian border nicknamed Diamond City without taking a single hit. After these events I decided that I
was not going to get killed in Vietnam. After living through all of this, I could live through anything!
Flying has been described as hours and hours of boredom interrupted by moments of terror. In Vietnam
flying helicopters in combat was hours and hours of excitement interrupted by intense periods of extreme
terror.
Please send additions to Gary Roush roush@servtech.com
205th ASHC Geronimos Websites:
http://members.tripod.com/frenchys_205/
homepages.together.net/~chbart/newpage.html
221
213th ASHC ”Black Cat” Web Site is at http://www.sunsetcruises.com/213th/
213th Assault Support Helicopter Company
The Blackcats of Phu Loi
CHAPTER 1
LINEAGE AND HONORS
The 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company was
organized on 21 February 1941 as Company E, 34th
Quartermaster Regiment, and was activated as a Regular
Army unit on 6 March 1941 at Langley Field, Virginia.
Company E was redesignated on 10 January 1942, as the
841st Quartermaster Company, and later redesignated on 19
September 1942, as the 2013th Quartermaster Truck
Company, Aviation.
During WW II, the 2013th participated in the New
Guinea, Leyte, and Southern Philippines
Campaigns. The 2013th was deactivated on 17
June 1946 in Loyo, Philippine Islands. On 1
August 1946, the 2013th was designated as the
2013th Transportation Corps Truck Company. The
2013th was again converted and designated as
the 213th Aviation Company (ASH) on 23 March
1966 at Ft. Benning, Georgia. The 213th was
activated on 1 June 1966. After extensive training
in maintenance and operations of the CH-47
"Chinook" helicopter, the 213th was deployed to
Vietnam.
In late November 1966 the 213th lifted off with
the first of sixteen aircraft from Ft. Benning,
Georgia. In a southern route, they headed for
Stockton Army Depot, Stockton, California. The
helicopters were deployed in a group of four each
day until all sixteen Chinook were in route to
California. After arriving in Stockton Army Depot
the aircraft were given a thorough inspection in
preparation for their flight to Alameda Naval Air
Station at Oakland, California. At Alameda the
222
aircraft were prepped and blades removed and
bagged for overseas shipment on the USNS Kula
Gulf destination, Vietnam.
On 2 January 1967, Major Charles W. Miller
departed Savannah, Georgia aboard the USS
Defender with general cargo of the 213th A.S.H.C.
as the first contingent. On 7 January 1967 the
USNC Kula Gulf, with Major James EZ. Starkey.
Commanding Officer, of the 329th TC
Detachment, as Troop Commander and 3 Officers,
1 Warrant Officer, 25 Enlisted men, and 18
helicopters aboard, departed Alameda Naval Air
Station, California.
On 11 January 1967 the advanced party,
consisting of five (5) officers, including LTC Henry
G. Moseley Commanding Officer, 213th ASHC, and
six (6) enlisted men, left Ft. Benning, Georgia by
air en route to the Republic of Vietnam. They
arrived at Phu-Loi, South Vietnam on 14 January
1967 and laison with the 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Battalion designate of the 213th ASHC.
The company was assigned a 9-1/2 acre area, on
which there were seven (7) permanent structures.
They immediately began planning the layout of the
area.
The first two (2) cargo aircraft, an Air Force C-141
and a C-130, departed Lawson Airfield Ft.
Benning, Georgia on 22 January 1967. On board
were 63,000 pounds of unit's "Red Tat" cargo, one
(1) Chief Warrant Officer and nine (9) enlisted
men.
On 23 January the last cargo aircraft, a C-130
carrying 25,000 pounds of "Red Tat" cargo and
two (2) enlisted men left Lawson Army Airfield.
Also leaving that day was the first troop aircraft,
carrying eight (8) officers, two (2) Chief Warrant
Officers and 88 enlisted men, lifted off Lawson
223
Army Airfield. The last troop aircraft, carrying nine
(9) officers, three (3) Chief Warrant Officers and
85 enlisted men, left Lawson Army Airfield on 24
January 1967. Major George W. Adamson, Acting
Commander of the 213th ASHC since the
departure of the LTC Moseley, left on the last
troop aircraft.
On 25 January the first cargo aircraft arrived in
Vietnam, followed on the 26th by the second cargo
aircraft and the first troop aircraft. The last lift of
the main body, the second troop aircraft, arrived
in the Republic of Vietnam on 27 January 1967.
The USNS Kula Gulf arrived at Vung Tau Vietnam,
with the unit's 18 aircraft on 29 January 1967.
The general cargo arrived Phu Loi by truck convoy
and was followed by the CH-47's, the last one
arriving 4 February 1967. The rear detachment,
consisting on one (1) officer and two (2) enlisted
men, arrived in Phu Loi on 9 February 1967. As of
9 February 1967, the 213th Assault Support
Helicopter Company completed its move to the
Republic of Vietnam.
Training and Operations
On the 30th and 31st of January 1967, the officers
and men of the 213th ASHC received several
through briefings from the staff officers of the
11th Combat Aviation Battalion. The 178th ASHC,
also members of the 11th Battalion, began
training the pilots and crews of the 213th ASHC.
On the 31st the pilots were given in-country check
rides and area orientation, while the crews were
instructed on in-flight procedures of the theater of
operations.
As of 29 January 1967, the 213th ASHC and the
329th TC Detachment were assigned to the 11th
Combat Aviation Battalion by General Order #4
224
paragraph 1, Headquarters, 12 Combat Aviation
Group, dated 8 February 1967, and given the call
sign "Stagecoach". On 7 February the 213th ASHC
begun committing three aircraft per day for
missions and on 13 February, they declared
themselves operationally ready. The pilots and
crews were given their final orientation ride of the
III & IV Corp areas. The primary mission of the
213th was to support the 1st Infantry Division,
"The Big Red One". On 15 February they carried
Nancy Sinatra and a five-(5) piece band, their first
mission since becoming operational.
The 213th ASHC, jumped into their first big
operation on 22 February 1967. Operation
(JUNCTION CITY). At the end of (JUNCTION CITY)
the radio call sign of the 213th was changed from
"Stagecoach" and officially became "BLACK CATS".
The crest of the 213th was derived from the 413th
Fighter-Bomber Squadron, a WW II Army Air Corps
Unit. The original crest presented a Black Cat on a
bomb. On the present crest, a Black Cat, back
arched in anger, rides a CH-47 "Chinook"
helicopter into battle.
Since the arrival in Vietnam, the BLACK CATS have
flown all types of missions, ie., combat assaults,
medical evacuations, gas drops, defoliation
missions, flame bath drops, aircraft recoveries,
and normal re-supply missions, earning the unit
the Meritorious Unit Citation and two awards of
the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm.
During the five years the 213th was in Vietnam the
following was dutifully logged 678,271 passengers
were carried, 207,283 sorties were flown, 374,915
tons of cargo were carried 62,742 hours were
flown and 926 aircraft recoveries were made.
These statistics speak for themselves.
On 15 February 1972, the stand down was official
225
and the unit was given orders to deactivate. As the
213th went home, it carried with it a glorious
history of the many men who proudly displayed
fortitude and courage while serving their country.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
All dates, orders, and events indicated in this text
were authorized. All statements including facts,
figures, and percentages made in this text were
verified either from conversation with responsible
individuals or extracts from authenticated records.
The author has reviewed all comments with
prudence and feels there is no doubt to their
validity and accuracy.
A BLACK CAT FROM PHU-LOI
Michael Allen Brown
213th A.S.H.C. 1966-67
226
In Country Cobra Transitions were taught by the 5th Avn Det at Vung Tau.
Unit’s symbol is on the doghouse.
227
Blue Max Snake refueling at POL pad FSB Mace near Xuan Loc
Nov 1971. Gia Ray is in distance.
228
F Troop 9th Cav Cobra Maintenance at Lassiter
AHP, Spring 1972
3/17 Air Cav Squadron Website. www.geocities.com/aircavalry317acr/Homepage317acr.html
Air Troop 11th ACR http://11thcavnam.com/
The 11th ACR aircraft were featured in the annual VHPA calendars. Pictures are below.
229
230
III Corps Huey Nose Paint Jobs. These were painted using the “forgiveness “ theory. Paint the nose and
ask for forgiveness vice permission. Unit id’s are withheld to protect the guilty.
231
232
233
…and lastly, if we forget these guys in our hearts, they are truly gone
234
235
236
WO1 David Kink, KIA RVN, his mother, and his
little sister Julie Kink on the day he flew to
Vietnam
237
238

III Corps - VHPA Directory Supplement Information

Transcription

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