ga1.disec – muntr 2014

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Honourable participants,
It is a tremendous pleasure to welcome you all to the tenth annual session of Model United
Nations Turkey (MUNTR) 2014 Conference. I am Hüseyin Kağan İmamoğlu and I have the
distinct honour of serving as the Secretary-General of MUNTR, a conference that has, for the
past decade, successfully presented its participants a unique simulation experience that strives
to achieve academic discussions of the highest quality.
Bearing in mind the perfect example that has been set for MUNTR by its previous sessions,
the Secretariat has been working relentlessly in order to create an academic setting deserving
of the successful tradition we are now leading as well as satisfying its participants with
regards to all academic-wise matters. A substantial amount of effort has been put into this
very guide, and I would like to assure all of you that this document contains all the necessary
knowledge required in order to participate in the discussions.
Before addressing the academic content of this document, I have to thank all members of the
Secretariat, and Ms. Arzum Koca in particular. Without her dedication and efforts, the setting
we have been pursuing so as to attain academic excellence would be incomplete. As the
Under-Secretary-General responsible for the General Assembly First Committee:
Disarmament and International Security, her devotion and contribution to the Conference has
been indispensable.
The General Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and International Security, will be
focusing on two highly important issues, that currently occupy the international agenda:
Promoting Effective Verification and Compliance Measures for Arms Control and
Disarmament and Strengthening Proactive Cyber Defense and Enhancing International
Information Security. Within this context, the delegates of DISEC, are highly encouraged to
thoroughly read this very study guide prepared for them. Considering that DISEC, a General
Assembly Committee, will be a rather large committee in which its participants can
experience the art of lobbying, utilization and combination of this guide with the policies of
Member States present in the sessions will be of key importance with regards to achieving a
Conference that incorporates a simulation experience which will gratify academic
expectations.
In case you require any further information or instruction as to the academic-wise content of
the Conference and DISEC in especial, you may always contact your Committee Directors;
responsible Under-Secretary-General, Ms. Arzum Koca; or me via imamoglu@muntr.org.
Reiterating my sincere belief and confidence that MUNTR 2014 will be a Conference in
which not only the academic trend we have generated over the past decade, but also you will
excel; I welcome you once more.
Kind regards,
Hüseyin Kağan İmamoğlu
Secretary-General
LETTER FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL
Dear participants,
My name is Arzum Koca and I am a junior at Ankara University School of Law. In this
conference I serve as the Under-Secretary-General responsible for the Disarmament and
International Security Committee and the Scheidemann Cabinet and it is my pleasure to
welcome you.
Along with our Secretary General we chose the topics related to verification and compliance
for our first agenda item, and cyber crime related topics for our second agenda item. When
you try to disarm the world there are many discussions about how to regulate that
disarmament but regardless of the measures it always comes to the necessity of ensuring the
verification of those measures. Before moving to further implementations regarding
disarmament the world needs to ensure the compliance first. This is the reason behind our
first choice. While the first agenda item is the substructure of further solutions the second one
addresses the needs of digital era. Knowing the impotence of both topics I wish you fruitful
debates.
Although they are very essential I am well aware that MUN activities do not only consist of
academics. Therefore it is my sincere wish for you to get to know other participants, make
long lasting friendships, enjoy all the social events and make many good memories.
Should you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me via koca@muntr.org or
your committee directors.
Regards,
Arzum KOCA
Under-Secretary-General
General Assembly First Committee and 1919 Germany: Cabinet Scheidemann
GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST
DISEC works in close cooperation with
COMMITTEE: DISARMAMENT
two
AND INTERNATIONAL
Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the
bodies,
namely
Geneva
based
UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
SECURITY (DISEC)
which was established by the UN Special
Assembly
Session on Disarmament in 1978.vi While
deliberative,
the Commission deals with a smaller
policymaking and representative organ of
number of items than the First Committee
the United Nations (UN) which was
and in greater detail; CD focuses on
established in 1945.i The GA comprises of
negotiation of treaties.vii Although CD sets
all 193 Members of the UN with equal
its own agenda, it is funded by the UN and
United
Nations
(UNGA)
is
General
the
chief
meaning each
reports to the General Assembly. viii Also
Member State in the Assembly has one
reporting to the General Assembly, it is
vote.iii
decided by GA’s decision that as of 2000,
representation principle,
ii
the UNDC would normally comprise two
Being the First Committee of the GA,
substantive items per year from the whole
Disarmament and International Security
range of disarmament issues, including one
Committee
on nuclear disarmament.ix
(DISEC)
deals
with
disarmament, threats to peace and tries to
find solutions to the challenges in the
The Concept of International Security
international security regime.iv
and Disarmament
The
First
Committee
considers
all
According to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the
disarmament and international security
UN
Charter,
matters within the scope of the UN Charter
international
such
“the
peace
maintenance
and
of
security and
principles
of
disarmament”, is an important objective of
maintenance
of
the UN for strengthening international
international peace and security, principles
security. x From the term "disarmament"
governing disarmament and the regulation
various measures related to the regulation,
of armaments; promotion of cooperative
limitation, reduction and elimination of
arrangements and measures aimed at
armaments, armed forces and military
strengthening stability through lower levels
expenditures; limitations or prohibitions on
of armaments.v
the
as
cooperation
the
in
general
the
development,
testing,
production,
emplacement, deployment, proliferation
and transfer or use of arms can be
understood.
xi
One crucial point about
of the peaceful settlement of disputes with
disarmament measures is that, it should be
implementation of progressively more
balanced: No state should gain a military
effective measures for peace-keeping.xvi
advantage as a result, or have its security
diminished.xii
AGENDA ITEM A:
The term “international security” can be
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE
defined as “a state of international
VERIFICATION AND
relations
COMPLIANCE MEASURES FOR
in
which
implementation
respect
for
of
there
sovereign
the
rights
is
full
equality,
inherent
in
sovereignty, non-use of force or the threat
of force, the inviolability of frontiers, the
ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
territorial integrity of States, the peaceful
settlement of disputes, non-interference in
internal affairs, respect for human rights
and
fundamental
freedoms,
including
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
belief, equality of rights and the right of
peoples to determine their own destiny; cooperation among States and fulfilment in
good
faith
of
obligations
under
Bearing in mind the utmost importance of
disarmament
the
maintenance
of
international peace and security, it is vital
to know that the States are acting in
accordance with the related regulations. In
other words it should be ensured that
disarmament
agreements
are
being
complied with and the method for that is
verification.
international law.”xiii
in
xvii
Although
specific
techniques of verification will change
Disarmament and effective international
based on the nature of each particular
security
disarmament measure, the disarmament
process.
preservation
xiv
is
a
complex
It incorporates the halting of the
will still require efficient verification.xviii
arms race, reduction and elimination of
arms while having effective verification
measures. On the other hand, it would be
better to create an atmosphere of trust and
confidence,
for
the
maintenance
of
undiminished security for all States and
enhancing
security
throughout
the
process.xv Also it includes the involvement
"Disarmament
and
arms
limitation
agreements should provide for adequate
measures of verification satisfactory to all
parties concerned in order to create the
necessary confidence and ensure that they
are being observed by all parties. The form
and modalities of the verification to be
provided for in any specific agreement
depend upon and should be determined by
the purposes, scope and nature of the
agreement. Agreements should provide for
the participation of parties directly or
through the United Nations system in the
verification process. Where appropriate, a
combination
of
several
methods
of
verification as well as other compliance
procedures should be employed."
(General
Assembly
resolution
Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) can
be defined as “weapon[s] with the
capacity to inflict death and destruction on
such
a
massive
scale
and
so
indiscriminately that its very presence in
the hands of a hostile power can be
considered a grievous threat.” xxii WMDs
have the potential to kill thousands of
people in a single attack. xxiii Moreover
S-10/2,
their effects may persist in the environment
and human bodies. xxiv They are nuclear,
paragraph 31)
At the following parts of this Agenda Item,
specific verification measures for different
types of disarmament mechanisms, general
obstacles of effective verification systems
and compliance methods will be inspected
in details. The root cause of the diversity in
disarmament measures comes from the
difference of the armaments which are the
subjects of disarmament.
a. Weapons of Mass Destruction
xix
Each armament
has its own appropriate method.
xx
I. Classification of Arms
Arms can be classified by many factors
such as user, target or function. UN Office
for Disarmament Affairs divides the arms
in two main categories as, weapons of
mass destruction and conventional arms,
each with its sub-distinctions.xxi
biological,
or
chemical
weapons;
xxv
moreover, there are certain differences in
their use, effects, legal status and strategic
importance.xxvi
1. Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons work by releasing a huge
amount of energy through fusion or
fission.xxvii Although nuclear weapons have
been used in war only twicexxviii – by the
United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945 – the threat of their usage, whether
intentional or accidental, by States or by
terrorists, remains as long as such weapons
continue to exist.xxix The United States, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom,
France, People’s Republic of China, India,
Pakistan,
the
Democratic
People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Israel are
the nine States that are believed to be the
only States in possession of nuclear
nuclear weapon States in a multilateral
weapons.xxx
treaty
Apart from the safeguarded nuclear stocks,
which
has
the
goal
of
disarmament.xxxvi
there are also concerns that other related
Another important treaty concerning the
nuclear
nuclear
materials
are
not
secured
non-proliferation
is
the
sufficiently and are vulnerable to theft.xxxi
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Related to the protection of these nuclear
(CTBT) which bans the nuclear weapon
and radioactive materials, the International
tests. xxxvii Verification of whether or not
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains
the parties are fulfilling their obligations is
an Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) on
ensured by the Preparatory Commission
incidents of illicit trafficking and other
for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
unauthorized
occurred
Organization (CTBTO) which maintains a
intentionally or unintentionally, with or
monitoring network of 337 facilities
without crossing international borders, as
globally.xxxviii
activities
that
well as unsuccessful or thwarted acts.xxxii
CD has also started working on the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
negotiations of a verifiable treaty banning
Weapons (NPT) which aims to achieve
the production of fissile materials for
cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear
nuclear weapons, but there are still
energy, to prevent further spread of nuclear
significant hurdles to overcome, including
weapons
nuclear
whether and how it can be verified that
disarmament can be considered a landmark
States are meeting their obligations under
international treaty. xxxiii A total of 190
such a treaty.xxxix
and
to
pursue
parties have joined the Treaty, including
the five nuclear-weapon States (China,
France, Russia, the UK and the US), then
DPRK announced its withdrawal and that
left the Treaty with 189 parties.xxxiv While
more States have acceded to NPT than to
other disarmament agreements, in 1995,
the duration of the NPT was extended
indefinitely.
xxxv
Also another important
characteristic of the NPT is that it is the
only binding commitment made by the
There are also regional efforts towards
global
nuclear non-proliferation.
Four
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are in force:
in Latin America and the Caribbean,
Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and
Central Asia. xl A Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone can be specified as “a region in
which countries commit themselves not to
manufacture, acquire, test or possess
nuclear
weapons.”
xli
Each
Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone establishing treaty has
Nazi concentration camps and in Asia).xlviii
a protocol for the five nuclear-weapon
Development, manufacture and stockpiling
States to sign and ratify. xlii According to
of chemical weapons intensified in the
these
Cold War period.xlix
legally
binding
protocols,
the
nuclear-weapon States respect the status of
the zones and not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against treaty States
Parties.xliii
The danger of the chemical weapons led
governments to adopt Chemical Weapons
Convention
(CWC)
which
bans
the
development, production, stockpiling and
use of chemical weapons and requires
2. Chemical Weapons
Modern use of chemical weapons began
with World War I, when both sides to the
conflict used poisonous gas to inflict
agonizing suffering and eventually caused
almost 1.3 million casualties.xliv
States Parties to destroy all stocks of
chemical weapons within 10 years with a
possible extension of up to five years
(which was 2012). l Inspections system of
CWC and the guarantee of the safe
destruction of these weapons are carried
As a result of public outrage, the Geneva
out by the Organization for the Prohibition
Protocol which prohibits the use of
of
chemical weapons in warfare was signed in
indicated in the CWC.li
Chemical
Weapons
(OPCW)
as
1925.xlv Although it was a beneficial step,
the
Protocol
did
not
prohibit
the
3. Biological Weapons
development, production or stockpiling of
Rapid advancements in the life sciences
chemical weapons. xlvi Another problem of
and the globalization of biotechnology
the Protocol was the fact that many States
make the deliberate use of biological
that ratified the Protocol reserved the right
agents as weapons to cause disease
to use prohibited weapons against States
outbreaks, a growing concern.lii Apart from
that were not party to the Protocol or in
the above mentioned Geneva Protocol
cases where chemical weapons were used
which contained the same weaknesses for
against them.xlvii
both chemical and biological weapons, liii
In the inter-war period, two signatories of
the
Geneva
Protocol
used
chemical
weapons (by Italy in northern Africa and
by Japan in China) and unfortunately the
violations continued in World War II (in
the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC
or BWC as mentioned in some documents)
which bans the development, production,
kilograms of conventional weapons to
stockpiling and acquisition of biological
megaton nuclear warheads.lx
and toxin weapons and requires the
destruction of such weapons or delivery
means was signed in 1972. liv With total
170 States-Parties and 13 signatories, there
are still 19 States which have neither
signed nor ratified the Convention.
lv
Although some steps have been taken, the
BTWC has no formal monitoring and
verification mechanism and lacks any
measures for investigating States suspected
of non-compliance.lvi
Although proliferation of missiles is a
universal subject, reaching to a consensus
on how to regulate missiles has proven to
be an extremely complicated case.
lxi
Discussions in the UN did not result in
concrete
policy
recommendations;
furthermore, there are no multilateral
treaties that deal with missiles and their
proliferation.
difficulty in
lxii
the
One
reason
of
the
non-proliferation
of
missiles is that they can be seen as a
The Sixth Review Conference of the
legitimate component of a State’s self-
BTWC
defence.lxiii
(held
in
Geneva
in
2006)
established the Implementation Support
Unit (ISU) which does not have the
mandate to monitor compliance or carry
out inspections, but to assist States-Parties
with the implementation of the Convention
and
to
serve
clearinghouse.
as
an
information
lvii
Rockets and missiles are a very diverse
class of weapons that can be defined as
“self propelled vehicles without a guidance
system”
which means once they are fired
they cannot be redirected.
missiles
are
the
Control
Regime
Missile
(MTCR)
Technology
and
the
International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (also called
the Hague Code of Conduct or HCOC).lxiv
While the former seeks to coordinate
4. Missiles and Other Delivery Systems
lviii
The two basic instruments regulating the
lix
Generally
being categorized by launch platform and
sub-categorized by range and by target;
their potential payloads range from a few
export controls of missiles and missile
technology,
HCOC,
aims
to
build
confidence among its parties through prelaunch notifications and other transparency
measures.lxv
b. Conventional Arms
“While nuclear weapons threaten us with
mass destruction, on a cumulative basis
conventional weapons wreak tremendous
death and destruction every day in
conflicts across the globe. It is, therefore,
and relatively easy to produce. lxx Also
vital to encourage responsible conduct in
small arms are highly portable thus can be
conventional weapons transfers. We must
smuggled
also explore ways to lessen the pressure on
borders.
States to engage in conventional weaponry
usages, remain widely available and are
build-ups,
little regulated.lxxii
while
safeguarding
the
legitimate right to self-defense of all
Member States.”
-
BAN
lxxi
relatively
easily
across
Moreover, they have wider
1. Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALWs)
KI-MOON,
United
Nations
Secretary-General, the United Nations
Disarmament Yearbook, 2007
A universally accepted definition of a
'small arm' or of a 'light weapon' does not
exist, but it can be said that, on the
Conventional weapons include various
proposal of the UN Panel of Governmental
weapons; that are more easily defined by
Expert in 1997,lxxiii the main characteristics
what they are not (nuclear, chemical and
of them is being portable.lxxiv Examples to
biological weapons, which are called
such weapons can be given as follows: for
“unconventional”) than what they are. lxvi
small arms; revolvers and self-loading
Conventional weapons are the devices
pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles,
capable
or
sub-machine guns and light machine guns;
injuring mainly (though not exclusively)
for light weapons; heavy machine guns,
through explosives, kinetic energy or
hand-held
of
incendiaries.
killing,
lxvii
incapacitating
Some
examples
of
conventional weapons can be listed as,
armoured combat vehicles, helicopters and
aircraft, warships, small arms and light
weapons, landmines, cluster munitions,
ammunition and artillery.
lxviii
Although
they receive less attention than weapons of
mass destruction due to having less
dramatic results and being limited in scope,
they are the most common type of
armament
globally;
lxix
in
addition,
historically they are used more commonly
in conflicts as they are widely available
under-barrel
and
mounted
grenade launchers.lxxv
According to the Small Arms Survey (an
independent research project which serves
as the principal international source of
public information on all aspects of small
arms and armed violence and as a resource
for
governments,
policy-makers,
researchers, and activists), lxxvi more than
1,200 companies in at least 90 countries
are involved in some aspect of small arms
and light weapons production.
lxxvii
In
addition, illicit trade of such weapons has a
With the effects of Landmine Convention
great value.lxxviii
in 1997 and the awareness raised by civil
Having one of the least transparent trades
of all weapon systems,lxxix small arms and
light
weapons
regulated;
lxxx
are
not
efficiently
moreover, due to this lack, it
is comparatively easy for small arms to
slip from the legal market to the illicit
market.lxxxi The Small Arms Survey noted
in 2001, that “more is known about the
number of nuclear warheads, stocks of
chemical weapons and transfers of major
conventional weapons than about small
society groups which were integral to the
Convention’s development and entry into
force in the following years, there has been
progress in more than 75 countries. lxxxv
However, in every region there are still
countries
affected
by
landmines
or
unexploded ordnance to some degree such
as Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chechnya,
Colombia, Iraq, Nepal and Sri Lanka.lxxxvi
3. Cluster Munitions
lxxxii
arms”.
A cluster munition (or cluster bomb) is “a
container that holds a number of sub-
2. Landmines
Although
the
original
purpose
of
landmines was to protect antitank mines
(to stop them from being removed by
enemy soldiers), borders, camps and other
strategic locations and to restrict the
movement of enemy troops; now they are
mainly deployed as offensive weapons,
often in internal conflicts and against
civilians.lxxxiii
munitions, ranging from a few to several
hundred.” lxxxvii Handicap International (an
independent international aid organization
working in situations of poverty and
exclusion, conflict and disaster) lxxxviii has
recorded that there are more than 11,000
cluster munitions casualties worldwide;
moreover
98
percent
of
them
are
civilian. lxxxix It is known that there are
thirty-four countries producing cluster sub-
Since the development of systems related
munitions and at least 73 countries are
to the delivery of mines (such as from air),
known to stockpile them.xc
they have been used in greater numbers;
marking and mapping became nearly
II. Overview of the Agenda Item
impossible which resulted with unmarked
The importance of arms control and
fields and thousands of mine-related deaths
disarmament
and injuries.lxxxiv
maintenance of international peace and
agreements
security is indescribable.
for
xci
the
While an
efficient and comprehensive treaty covers
explanations and normative approaches.xcvi
the needs of that area, that treaty will not
These
mean anything if it is not complied with.xcii
exclusive; moreover, several points have
Therefore in an era in which means of
common characteristics. xcvii Nonetheless,
destruction
the
these four broad approaches differ from
technological developments, agreements’
each other in important respects and offer a
quality share equal importance with their
useful way to organize the studies on
impacts on life. xciii For that reason it is
compliance
crucial to be sure that the agreements are
agreements.xcviii
improves
parallel
to
complied with, and to be sure of the
compliance; it is crucial to promote
effective verification systems.
perspectives
are
not
with
a. Enhancing
mutually
international
Compliance
with
Agreements
Seeing that compliance with agreements
B. UNDERSTANDING
should be promoted and strengthened, the
VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
fundamental mechanisms to achieve that
Before examining the reasons of non-
goal can be listed as objective verification,
compliance of disarmament treaties or the
incentives and penalties, as well as
verification measures of such treaties
domestic
verification and compliance should be
(especially penal legislation). xcix Looking
inspected deeply.
through areas of international law, it can be
implementation
provisions
said that “[t]here are many possible types
I. Compliance
of treaty provisions to consider, including:
“Compliance” means the fulfilment by the
individual accountability; measures to
contracting parties of their obligations
accommodate
under an agreement and any amendments
actors;
to the agreement.xciv Until recently, far less
mechanisms
attention
to
agreements); methods of arbitration and
understanding why governments actually
adjudication; means to protect ‘whistle-
comply with such agreements, given that
blowers’; retaliation rights (such as
they can be costly in the short term and are
retaliation in kind); methods of imposing
has
been
devoted
not likely to be centrally enforced.
xcv
There
financial
and
binding
obligate
dispute
(especially
penalties;
non-state
settlement
in
liability
trade
for
are four wide approaches to that matter,
compensation; confiscation of materials
namely:
rational
(as in the laws of contraband); court
domestic regime based
challenges initiated by civil society actors
realist
functionalism,
theory,
(to apply pressure and provide exposure);
and
strengthened
links
to
domestic
enforcement mechanisms. As mentioned
above, one of the most powerful means of
promoting treaty compliance is to harness
the target state’s own law enforcement
mechanisms.”c
Before
setting
up
the
compliance
mechanisms, the competent body of an
agreement could, where authorized to do
so, regularly review the implementation of
obligations under the agreement and
examine specific difficulties of compliance
b. Negotiations
for
Compliance
thus consider measures aimed at improving
it.ciii While regular reviews assist States in
Mechanisms
Negotiation process of agreements is vital
for States to determine whether they would
be able to comply with its provisions and
for assessing their domestic capabilities for
implementing
c. Compliance Mechanisms
the
agreement
under
negotiation.
preventing possible non-compliance, they
are best placed to choose the approaches
that
are
useful
and
appropriate
for
enhancing compliance with them.civ While
the amount of incentive measure usage
(referred to as “carrots” at Table 1) may
change the characteristic of compliance
In order not to have compliance problems,
mechanisms, root causes of different
States should not only participate in the
approaches lies in the reasons of treaty
process of the determination of provisions
violations.cv
but also contribute to the process of
deciding the compliance mechanisms such
as funding of verification methods or noncompliance penalties.ci
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to
agree upon a mechanism for amendment
and for treaty review conferences where
complaints can be voiced and constructive
measures adopted so that parties may deal
with possible dissatisfactions, which might
lead to non-compliance.cii
misbehaviour of Parties. cvii Leading to a
Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of
cooperative
atmosphere,
facilitative
measures must assist States by creating the
Compliance Approachescvi
capacity to comply with their international
1. Facilitative Approach
commitments
This approach is based on the idea that
confidence in the treaty regime as a
most treaty violations result from a lack of
whole.cviii The management doctrine is an
awareness,
application of the general principle of
capacity,
resources
and
and
strengthening
concerns raised within a given Party
peaceful
settlement
regarding the implementation of provisions
principle
of
of the treaty and
emphasizes preventive measures to protect
not
from
wilful
of
caution
disputes,
as
it
the
clearly
rather than attempting to compensate or
both the management and the enforcement
punish for harm after it has occurred. cix
approaches, not as alternatives but rather
Moreover,
greater
as a list of possible responses to different
participation in and implementation of the
types of non-compliance.cxv The following
treaty regime.cx
table
it
may
encourage
outlines
the
advantages
and
disadvantages of the above approaches.
2. Enforcement Approach
Positive measures may not always be
enough to bring a State that may lack the
political will to cooperate into compliance;
due to that reason, enforcement measures
cxvi
Once the States have chosen the approach,
they
should
start
developing
the
compliance mechanism in accordance with
the following points:
can be applied as a second plan once the
 Clarity: To assist in the evaluation and
management mechanisms have failed.cxi It
ascertainment of compliance and prevent
is clear that, once again, States are willing
possible differences in interpretations, the
to protect their sovereignty rather than
obligations
exposing themselves to counter measures
agreements should be stated clearly;cxvii
taken by the international community;
moreover they are often reluctant, for
political reasons, to take legal action
against each other or even to authorize
other Parties to do so. cxii Enforcement
measures have been criticized for being
bilateral,
confrontational
and
strongly
backward-looking, addressing problems
only after they arise.
cxiii
However, despite
the criticisms, it is true that the threat of
stricter
enforcement
mechanisms
and
sanctions has played a proven preventive
cxiv
role.
of
parties
to
multilateral
 Reporting, monitoring and verification:
Most common compliance mechanisms of
multilateral
agreements
can
include
provisions for reporting, monitoring and
verification of the information obtained on
compliance which can also help promotion
of compliance by, inter alia, potentially
increasing public awareness.
collection
and
reporting
cxviii
Data
requirements
should not be too onerous and should be in
accordance with those of other related
agreements.
cxix
They can include the
following requirements:
Bearing in mind that the two approaches to
non-compliance with international treaties
are not mutually exclusive; an ideal noncompliance system combines elements of
o Reporting: Parties may be required to
make reports on compliance or on noncompliance
regularly
by
using
appropriate formats that are simple and
brief to ensure consistency, efficiency
compliance at an early stage, determine the
and convenience;cxx
causes of non-compliance, and to prepare
o Monitoring: Monitoring involves the
collection of data and, parallel to the
provisions of an agreement they can be
used to assess compliance with an
agreement,
to
identify
compliance
problems and to indicate solutions;cxxi
suitable responses including, addressing
and/or
correcting
compliance
the
without
state
delay.
of
cxxv
nonThese
responses may include both facilitative and
stronger measures thus can be adjusted to
meet changeable necessities of cases of
non-compliance.cxxvi
o Verification: Ascertaining whether a
party is in compliance and, in the event of
d. Problem of Interpretation
non-compliance, the degree, type and
Sometimes it turns out that there are
frequency
of
non-compliance
by
differing interpretations of the treaty
verification
of
data
technical
language especially when an agreement is
information is very important. cxxii While
officially written in more than one
implementing verification measures, the
language.cxxvii Many, but by no means all,
principal source might be national reports
compliance issues have been due to
and, technical verification can involve
differing
interpretations
independent sources for corroborating
changes
in
national data and information.cxxiii
developments. cxxviii Even at the stage of
and
Just as compliance mechanisms, States can
also consider the inclusion of noncompliance provisions with a view to
assisting
parties
having
compliance
problems by addressing individual cases of
non-compliance and taking into account
the importance of tailoring compliance
of
technology,
language,
or
new
information gathering in accordance with
the
purposes
of
monitoring
and
compliance, the problem of what it means,
arises. There are many levels of difficulties
beyond
data;
interpretation
furthermore
involves
their
judgments
regarding intentions.cxxix
provisions to the agreement’s specific
Since compliance is essentially a legal
obligations. cxxiv While determining on a
issue, there is a need for precision in how
non-compliance mechanism, it should be
information and its interpretation are
kept in view that those mechanisms could
presented, “in particular, loose use of
be used by the parties to provide a way to
undefined terms such as “program” and
identify
especially “capability” is not helpful.cxxx If
possible
situations
of
non-
a country is said to have the “capability”
Capacity-based
to do something, the inference is frequently
(intentional non-compliance) results from a
that it is in violation of some obligation,
State’s wilful decision to violate the law
which may be quite misleading. cxxxi For
which is based on the State’s calculation of
example, to say that a country has the
its interests, costs and benefits, particular
capability
biological
to, among other things, the primary rules,
weapons sounds quite dire until one
participants, and facts involved at any one
recognizes that this would be true of any
moment.cxxxvi
to
manufacture
country with a developed pharmaceutical
cxxxii
industry.”
terminology
To
and
overcome
the
interpretation-related
problems, in recent years, the relevant
international organizations, such as the UN
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission
(UNMOVIC),
the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and the Organisation for the
Prohibition
of
Chemical
Weapons
(OPCW) have been quite careful in their
language.cxxxiii
non-compliance
However, often non-compliance is rooted
in numerous second order conditions and
inadequacies in how the international
community
creates,
internalizes,
and
manages the rules such as substantive and
procedural flaws in the creation of legal
norms that impinge on the rules’ fairness
and legitimacy. cxxxvii There could also be
deficiencies in norm internationalization,
in the transnational legal process as
mentioned in the section above.
A third form of non-compliance can also
e. Causes of Non Compliance
be based on the international system’s
On the surface, non-compliance is simply a
structural inability to maintain and enforce
function of the wrongdoer’s ability and
international
law
will, which can be summarized as, the
international
institutions.
wrongdoing State’s incapacity to comply
operational gaps can provide opportunities
with the law and its desire to comply.cxxxiv
for non-compliance in ways as by reducing
Incapacity can be based on several factors
the risk that non-compliant acts will be
such as ambiguity in the rules themselves;
punished and by altering a State’s cost-
limitations on the State’s ability to take
benefit calculus.cxxxix
actions necessary to obey the rule, for
example
financial
or
technological
deficiencies; or, more simply, a mistake or
a lack of intention to disobey.cxxxv
and
to
cxxxviii
control
Such
f. Determining the Existence of Non-
information for compliance which is from
Compliance
all sources, not just what may be seen in
Since the first principle of international
relations is that, agreements have to be
complied with (pacta sunt servanda); cxl
violations should be identified promptly,
and appropriate responses should be
taken.
cxli
The questions of who actually
carries out these tasks, who should decide
whether non-compliance has occurred and,
if so, how serious it is has proven to be
more difficult than many would have
expected.cxlii
the field at a particular place and time. cl
Moreover, it helps to make the work of the
inspection
team
confrontational.
in
the
field
less
cli
g. Consequences of Non-Compliance
“Once non-compliance is suspected, there
is
usually
a
process
of
graduated
exposure: consultation with the suspected
party; formal recommendations from an
expert group or governing body; possible
demands for inspections; demands for
In principle, each State-Party has an
remedial action with a stipulated deadline;
obligation to make compliance decisions
increased public exposure; referral to the
for itself; however, in practice, the ability
UN Security Council; condemnation in
of States-Parties to evaluate relevant
national and international fora; and
information varies widely.cxliii
collective measures or other arrangements
The major multilateral agreements are not
entirely consistent in their compliance
approach
and
are
more
difficult
to
understand: cxliv Some have a governing
body, cxlv some have verification regimes
and organizations to carry them out, cxlvi
some have only review conferences, cxlvii
and some lack even that mechanism.cxlviii
to address non-compliance.”clii In most of
the treaties signed since 1967, the above
mentioned measures are implemented in
outline only. Among the collective actions
suggested
by
the
respective
treaty
administering organisations are sanctions
which can only be in the form of
recommendations to States-Parties unlike
the decisions of the Security Council, and
Moreover, when agreements are inspected
cannot involve the use of military force,
the inspection teams do not have the
but could still be quite powerful if
responsibility to make actual compliance
undertaken voluntarily and collectively.cliii
judgments:
they
may
identify
an
“ambiguity” but not a “violation”.cxlix This
fact is in accordance with the necessary
damages the terms of verifiability, the
II. Verification
As defined in the introduction section of
this document the main goal of treaty
verification is to determine and, hence, to
credibility of the verification mechanisms
that are established and the possibility of
international controversy.clix
promote the compliance of parties. The
One other difficulty is the high temptation
issue of verification is more than a
to avoid details in favour of getting an
technical issue and quite separate not only
early agreement, leaving those aspects to
from the legal question of whether an
the
bodies
with
the
clx
mission
of
observed activity constitutes a treaty
implementing the treaty.
violation but also from the political
too much detail can also be efficient since
question of what to do about a violation
implementation process almost always
once it has been detected.cliv Another result
throws up unexpected problems that can be
of efficient verification mechanism is that
difficult
to
precluded.
clxi
when there are no immediate suspicions of
treaty violations neutral verification can
help to raise confidence.clv
be in attempting to establish legal and
organizational barriers to the imposition of
politics, verification does not operate in a
void agreement. clvi Approximately all the
time there is a tension between achieving
consensus on a treaty and achieving an
agreement on the optimal verification and
that
the
options
difficulties
in
are
the
be said that there is one aspiration that
No matter how efficient negotiators might
system
from
if
negotiation process of verification, it can
a. Negotiating Verification
compliance
Apart
resolve
Not getting into
should
be
adopted.clvii It is often seen that a powerful
conception of verification is traded off for
some other, unrelated aspect of the
envisaged treaty.clviii While States tend not
to like intrusive verification measures that
cause them effort and expense, this
negotiators should have, that is building
flexibility efficiently into their verification
system so that it can adapt itself to future
needs and challenges.clxii Flexibility should
be built very carefully and creatively since
States will oppose too much flexibility
because they want to be sure about what
they are signing up to.clxiii
b. Organization of Verification
Much
has
been
learned
about
the
requirements of organizational structures
for effective verification and compliance,
especially when a comprehensive system is
envisaged. clxiv Moreover, there is now a
standard model for a conference of States-
Parties, a governing body and a technical
blinded instrumentation which can only
secretariat, including where necessary a
inspect a limited area.clxxii
standing
clxv
inspectorate.
However,
international verification organizations still,
rarely adopt best management practicesclxvi
and tend to use allegedly tried and true
mechanisms, often simply because they are
readily available while assuming that
running a verification organization is a
unique organizational challenge that has no
similar elsewhere.clxvii
c. Technology
and
technology can be specialized deeply that
it must be researched and developed by
verification bodies themselves. clxxiii That
eventually will be a heavy burden on
verification
organizations,
Techniques
of
techniques and technologies can be used in
verification
systems,
the
with universities, less commercially-driven
the
mutually
beneficial
exchange of technology, methodologies
between
Although the latest and most appropriate
despite
possible existence of creative partnerships
organizations,
Verification
multilateral
Another difficulty is that verification
international
verification
organizations and national research and
monitoring agencies.clxxiv
the
The fact that many developing countries
question of to which extent is often
face obstacles when reporting on their own
controversial. clxviii To begin with, there is
compliance with international treaties and
always a trade-off between effectiveness
adopting
and cost since States-Parties will naturally
measures constitutes a proof that national
want to keep the costs of verification as
technical and technological incapacity for
low as possible, while still giving the
self-monitoring
verification system a requisite degree of
treaty commitments is also a major
credibility.clxix
issue.clxxv Although bodies of professional
Sometimes it is seen that the States are
worried for the technology to be too
capable and want to restrict it, clxx other
times the type of verification technology
being applied needs to be restricted in
order to prevent proliferation-relevant
information being disseminated to the
verifiers; clxxi hence, the use of so called
on-site
national
and
implementation
for
inspectors,
implementing
comprehensive
protocols, procedures and technologies for
on-site inspections and useful amount of
experience
and
monitoring
to
the
use
of
supplement
remote
on-site
inspections exist, difficulties continue in
contributing
technical
personnel
to
international verification efforts and the
education process of them.clxxvi
d.
Funding
of
the
Verification
cultivating
Mechanisms
Although no one expects verification
systems to have endless currency, it also
cannot be expected to be done on the cheap
lest it discredit the whole verification
enterprise. clxxvii Today, almost all of the
multilateral verification organizations are
experiencing
funding
challenges,
clxxviii
especially when compared to spending on
defence, spending on verification seems
like a burden and a necessary security
bargain.
other
clxxix
bodies can take caution against these by
Verification regimes need
funding
possibilities,
such
as
foundations and commercial spin-offs.clxxx
stakeholders
elsewhere,
together with civil society and among nongovernmental organizations. clxxxiii Support
for multilateral verification organizations
can be raised by participating in States
Parties’ annual and review meetings,
organizing
‘side
events’,
undertaking
research into the challenges faced by
verification regimes.clxxxiv
f. Related International Organizations
1. Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre
Established in 1986, the Verification
Research, Training and Information Centre
e. Building
the
International
Verification Community
(VERTIC) is an independent, non-profit,
charitable organization which supports the
Multilateral organizations need to do better
development,
at promoting a positive reception of the
verification of international agreements as
contribution they make to international
well as initiatives in related areas.clxxxv The
peace and security or whatever their
aforementioned
objective may be so that they can sustain
through various ways such as research,
the
analysis,
necessary
political
support
and
implementation
support
assistance,
is
and
provided
training
and
information.
clxxxvi
relevance. clxxxi An example can be given
dissemination
of
from the disarmament area: when pressed
Development
and
to sign Additional Protocols to their
monitoring, reviews, reporting, verification
nuclear
some
and compliance measures on national
governments, have actually requested a
implementation mechanisms are the main
quid
focuses of VERTIC’s work.clxxxvii
safeguards
pro
quo
agreements,
like
technical
and/or
economic benefits when the primary
benefit derives from the improvement of
their national security.
clxxxii
Verification
application
of
Asking
for
international
the
elimination,
supervision,
of
under
Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles with a specific range it also called
for measures to ensure that the acquisition
Figure 1: Logo of VERTICclxxxviii
and production of prohibited items were
VERTIC holds an observer status at the
IAEA
General
Conference
and
not resumed.cxci
has
consultative (roster) status with the UN’s
“The Commission's mandate [was] the
Economic and Social Council. Moreover
following: to carry out immediate on-site
itself or its staff are members of the
inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical
Academic Council on the United Nations
and missile capabilities; to take possession
System
(ACUNS), BioWeapons
for destruction, removal or rendering
Prevention Project (BWPP), Chemical
harmless of all chemical and biological
Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC),
weapons and all stocks of agents and all
European
and
related sub-systems and components and
Development Association (ESARDA), EU
all research, development, support and
Non-Proliferation
Consortium,
manufacturing facilities; to supervise the
International Action Network on Small
destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic
Arms (IANSA), International Institute for
missiles with a range greater than 150 km
Strategic
International
and related major parts, and repair and
Relations and Security Network (ISN) ,
production facilities; and to monitor and
Landmine Action and several others.clxxxix
verify
Safeguards
Studies
Research
(IISS),
Iraq's
compliance
with
its
undertaking not to use, develop, construct
2. United Nations Special Commission
Existing from 1990-1999 the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
was a UN inspection team created to
inspect Iraq’s production of weapons of
or acquire any of the items specified
above.”cxcii
3. UN Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission
mass destruction and remove or destroy
The
weapons and to implement the non-nuclear
Verification and Inspection Commission
provisions of the resolution 687 and to
(UNMOVIC) was created through the
assist the International Atomic Energy
adoption of Security Council resolution
cxc
1284 in December 1999. cxciii UNMOVIC
Agency (IAEA) in nuclear areas .
United
Nations
Monitoring,
replaced
the
former
UN
Special
Commission (UNSCOM) with the mandate
to verify Iraq's compliance with its
obligation regarding the weapons of mass
destruction and to operate a system of
ongoing monitoring and verification to
ascertain that Iraq did not reacquire the
same weapons prohibited by the Security
Council.cxciv Unlike its predecessor the UN
employees were working as the staff. cxcv
“UN inspectors that tasked with verifying
and monitoring Iraq’s disarmament had
not been able to visit Iraq since a U.S. led
coalition invaded the country in 2003. The
international organizations are accordingly
various:
 States-parties need to ensure the integrity
and technical competence of international
implementation,
compliance
verification,
organizations.
cc
and
Although
some of these organizations have been
underfunded and are unable to provide the
high-level training and equipment that is
necessary for their success, they must be
capable
of
excluding
unwarranted
intelligence infiltration and of protecting
restricted and proprietary information.cci
United States and United Kingdom assured
 While States-Parties should accept their
the
responsibility
council
disarmed.”
cxcvi
that
Iraq
had
been
“Although its inspectors
to
contribute
to
the
verification process and to make their own
were withdrawn from Iraq, UNMOVIC
national
continued to operate with respect to those
organizations
parts of its mandate it could implement
States-Parties to have greater access to
outside of Iraq and maintained a degree of
relevant compliance information and help
preparedness
them in analyzing and understanding such
Iraq.”
cxcvii
to
resume
work
in
On 29 June 2007, the Security
Council adopted resolution 1762 and interalia, decided to terminate immediately the
mandate of UNMOVIC under the relevant
should
international
assist
interested
information.ccii
 When
necessary,
international
organizations should move expeditiously
to
resolution.cxcviii
decisions,
reach
compliance
decisions,
to
ameliorate instances of non-compliance,
4.
Strengthening
International
Organizations
appropriate
Since it is very difficult to generalize the
compliance
recommendations
and to refer intractable cases to the
problems,
to
cxcix
strengthening
higher
authorities,
which
themselves must then deal with the
issue.cciii
The
international
organizations
of
implementation and compliance have a key
role in keeping agreements, especially the
respect their treaty commitments because
cciv
they want to be respectable members of the
arms control agreements, effective.
However, the ability of these organizations
international community.
to identify and fix compliance problems
accelerating
needs to be improved.ccv
integration
C.
COMPLIANCE
CONTROL
AND
OF
ARMS
DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS
pace
makes
ccix
of
Since the
international
all
States
more
dependent upon one another, the cost for a
State to be seen as an unreliable treaty
partner could be very high. ccx Another
reason is that while devotion to and
Arms control and disarmament treaty
compliance
obligations are respected for reasons. First,
specific rewards, such as a facilitated
the rules they lay down are accepted by,
transfer
for example in the cases of BWTC, CWC
assistance,
and NPT, a vast number of States-Parties
with a treaty is likely to be discouraged by
that share the view that such weapons are
the risk of economic or other pressures,
destructive;
possibly
outlawed.
ccvi
they
want
them
to
be
By sticking to agreements,
States help progressively build up a world
order that will give them the assurance of
other States to be bound by restrains while
demanding
the
same
restrains
for
themselves. ccvii Second reason of treaty
compliance of global arms control and
disarmament treaties is that during their
negotiation process, many specific national
concerns are taken into account; moreover
concessions are made equally. ccviii Third
reason comes from the respect to the law,
since just as citizens, for the most part,
States comply with the law not out of fear
of penalty or other consequences for
violations but because they accept the
requirement of law and want to be seen as
law-abiding.
Governments
habitually
of
with
treaties
technology
conversely,
sanctions,
may
and
bring
technical
non-compliance
brought
by
the
international community or individual
States.ccxi
Nevertheless, non-compliance with treaty
obligations under arms control agreements,
might meet only oral condemnation,
especially if the wrongdoing party is a
State that has influence on the international
relations area or is invulnerable for some
other reason.ccxii “Yet, just as national laws
are rarely discarded because of violations,
treaties are also rarely abandoned because
of a few violations.”ccxiii
I. Determining non-Compliance with
investigate and eliminate Iraq’s weapons
Arms
of mass destruction.ccxviii
Control
and
Disarmament
Treaties
To
Changing from agreement to agreement,
discuss
the
implementation
and
between individual States and the Security
compliance issues of the major agreements
Council
that were negotiated bilaterally such as
implementing
SALT, START, the Anti-Ballistic Missile
conferences. ccxix This way, the judgments
Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the
of individual States are made into a
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, the
collective judgment at the level of the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
conference of States-Parties, executive
commissions which carry on their work in
council, board of governors, or other
secret
bodies
and
can
discuss
classified
information have been established.
ccxiv
stand
that
agreement.
ccxx
executive
bodies
are
councils,
and
specified
review
by
the
Above mentioned bodies
Basically, in these fora, other parties to the
can take actions themselves or, in some
agreements make the judgments about the
cases, refer the matter to the United
compliance.ccxv As seen in the example of
Nations.ccxxi
the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission, which implements START,
results of these commissions' work to
improve the viability and effectiveness of
the agreements are sometimes made
public.ccxvi
 In
the case of the CWC, the Executive
Council
has
the
power to
consider
“concerns regarding compliance, and
cases
of
non-compliance.”
ccxxii
“Conference [of States Parties] shall, in
cases of particular gravity, bring the issue,
UN Security Council is at the top of the
including
pyramid with the authority to take actions
conclusions, to the attention of the [UN]
against threats to international peace and
General Assembly and the [UN] Security
security, especially when non-compliance
Council.”ccxxiii
of multilateral agreements is the case.ccxvii
Since charters of the organizations created
by the UN tend to be focused, and their
lines of authority clear, they have a special
character
such
as,
the
UN
Special
Commission and UNMOVIC which were
created by the Security Council
to
 In
relevant
information
and
the CTBT, the Conference of States
Parties and Executive Council are given
alike powers and responsibilities, with the
reference to the UN and not making a
difference between the General Assembly
and the Security Council.ccxxiv
 Resorting
to the UN is not mentioned in
were created by the States-Parties and
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
possess special expertise on the subject
Treaty.ccxxv
matter involved.ccxxix
 In
International
the case of NPT and IAEA, the NPT is
organizations
should
be
more subtle in that the IAEA does not have
careful about proving a State is in non-
jurisdiction over all provisions of the treaty
compliance. They may not have all the
but does have jurisdiction over safeguards,
relevant
which has been a key point of the
though they may know enough to say that
disagreements with regards to Iran and
a State is in non-compliance, they still
moreover,
even
For example, even
should be careful about certifying it. ccxxx
though the bodies did not take action in the
“This is [a well-known] arms control
end, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2003
dilemma about not being able to prove a
reported North Korean “non-compliance
negative because it may be that the
and the Agency’s inability to verify non-
relevant sites were not inspected or not
diversion of nuclear material subject to
inspected at the right time or the right
safeguards” to the Security Council and
people were not interviewed and so on—a
the General Assembly.ccxxvii
valid principle that, if taken to extremes,
North Korea.
ccxxvi
information,
Decisions of these organizations differ
from the decisions of the Security Council
since they are not binding on the StatesParties.
ccxxviii
However,
they
are
exclusively capable of making compliance
judgments, both based on the terms of the
agreements themselves and because they
will assure that compliance issues will
never be resolved.”ccxxxi
II. Compliance Provisions
Table 2: Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament
Treaties: Major Prohibitions and Compliance
Provisionsccxxxii
D.
VERIFICATION
OF
ARMS
the
arms
control
lexicon,
while
“monitoring” is the gathering of data
relevant to an obligation in a treaty,
“verification” includes a judgment, made
at the political level, as to whether a party
is complying with this obligation. ccxxxiii In
popular usage, however, “verification”
covers both functions.
ccxxxiv
A monitoring
and verification regime’s purpose is both
to
prevent
violations
from
being
committed and to detect violations that do
occur. ccxxxv Measures for consultation and
clarification
viability
and
and
for
improving
effectiveness
of
the
the
agreement should be included in such a
regime, as well as measures for the
resolution of disputes. ccxxxvi Incentives for
compliance
and
sanctions
for
monitoring
mechanism
non-
compliance can be provided by above
mentioned enforcement mechanisms. Since
non-compliance
can
be
made,
provisions in arms control have many
functions. They promote compliance by
rendering the risks and costs of evasion
unacceptably
high,
thereby
international
confidence
building
ccxxxvii
by
reassuring participating States that their
interests
are
being
protected.
ccxli
Furthermore, a verification mechanism
makes it easier for a party that is unjustly
accused of violating a treaty to prove its
ccxlii
innocence.
Member
States
By
certificating
that
fulfilling
their
are
obligations, and by confirming that the
prohibited activities have not taken place,
verification generates trust in arms control
and disarmament initiatives.ccxliii
VERIFICATION REGIMES
these organizations and better use should
deterring
possible violators; ccxl they play a role in
have implementation, verification, and
a reliable and stable view of the role of
a
proliferation agreement. ccxxxix Verification
E. PROBLEMS WITH
compliance organizations, there should be
is
prerequisite for any arms control or non-
most of the major arms control agreements
be made of their capabilities.
that
provides data on which the judgment of
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
In
reliable
Confidence in verifying a numerical limit
on a weapon system depends on the
number
of
weapons
permitted;
ccxliv
moreover, it is generally difficult to have
It is a requirement of verification that each
confidence in agreements that involve
State to have a consistent and objective
small numbers of weapons.
mean of monitoring the military activities
example a complete ban of a missile
of the other. ccxxxviii Because of this, an
system would be easier to verify than an
effective verification regime including a
agreement that allows 100 such missiles on
ccxlv
For
each side since it would be difficult to
for non-compliance, and to incorporate
detect whether they had 100 or 130. ccxlvi
many other compliance initiatives from the
Because
primitive provision of the 1925 Geneva
of
agreements
that
reason
that
arms-control
completely forbid
a
Protocol to the complex mechanisms of the
cclii
CWC.
are much easier to monitor and verify for
international community will have many
compliance than the agreements which are
opportunities to make treaties more robust
allowing small numbers of weapons.ccxlvii
with the inclusion of evolving compliance
Regarding the verification of arms control
and disarmament agreements, problem of
the cruise missiles (small pilotless drones
several meters long) is a special case.ccxlviii
The main complicating factor of them is
that the same type of cruise missile can
carry either a nuclear warhead or a
conventional one.
ccxlix
Hence separating
cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads
from those carrying conventional warheads
In
the
21st
weapon system, a practice or an activity
century,
the
mechanisms and international law will be
more strictly monitored, enforced and
obeyed.ccliii If nations are to carry out deep
reductions in their weaponry and move
towards their stated goal of ‘general and
complete disarmament under strict and
effective control’ and towards the eventual
international peace and security, then even
more progressive instruments will be
needed to be devised.ccliv
is an extremely difficult task. ccl Due to
While devising those instruments it should
above mentioned reasons it is likely that
be
any verifiable treaty dealing with cruise
verification and monitoring of small arms
missiles must cover the total number of
control are bound to differ substantially
cruise
from the ones used in other arms control
missiles
allowed,
distinguishing
between
conventional
warheads
solutions should be sought.
without
nuclear
and
kept
in
mind
that
methods
of
and
and disarmament fields. cclv Even a new
further
innovative and creative approach may be
ccli
F. CONCLUSION
needed or a variety of different approaches
may have to be combined in order to
monitor
and
verify
various
different
Compliance mechanisms in disarmament
aspects of the implementation of small
accords become more sophisticated in the
arms
th
control
initiatives.
cclvi
“These
20 century. Great strides have been made
approaches
will
lean
to increase verification capabilities, to list
monitoring
than
verification,
the rewards for compliance and penalties
intrusive nature of verification regimes are
more
towards
as
the
likely to be resisted by States that are keen
 Ways to determine the non-compliance
to preserve their national sovereignty, keep
with
issues related to national security under
agreements;
wraps,
and
protect
the
commercial
interests of their arms industries.”cclvii
arms
control
and
disarmament
 Methods of increasing the funding of
verification mechanisms;
The efforts on attaining such an order are
mostly through establishing transparency,
confidence-building among the actors,
establishing an evolving attitude towards
 Ways
to
build
an
international
verification community by strengthening
the related international organizations;
the utility of weapons and growing
 Measures for overcoming verification of
experience with verifiable interim steps
arms control and disarmament agreements
towards
that limit the cruise missiles;
the
disarmament.
long
lasting
goal
of
cclviii
 Methods to ensure the verification of
G. POINTS THAT A RESOLUTION
arms control and disarmament agreements
SHOULD COVER
regarding WMDs with paying importance
In light of the issues explained in the
previous sections, the General Assembly
to different types of weapons and the
treaties that regulate them;
First Committee is expected to pass a
 Methods to ensure the verification of
comprehensive
arms control and disarmament agreements
resolution
that
should
cover these points:
regarding SALWs;
 Measures of determining best approaches
 Measures to guarantee that the States are
for arms control and disarmament treaties
complying with the arms control and
compliance mechanisms;
disarmament treaties regarding WMDs;
 Methods to overcome terminology and
 Measures to guarantee that the States are
interpretation related problems regarding
complying with the arms control and
the compliance of treaties;
disarmament agreements regarding SALW.
 Ways to determine who will decide the
existence of a non-compliance with arms
control and disarmament agreements;
AGENDA ITEM B:
telecommunications
context
of
technology
international
in
the
security
STRENGTHENING PROACTIVE
“nowadays usually called cyber-security”
CYBER DEFENCE AND
which has been introduced by the Russian
ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL
Federation
INFORMATION SECURITY
September 14, 2011, Russian and Chinese
since
governments,
A. INTRODUCTION
fiction, the debate among policy-makers
internationally on what norms shall guide
swing.
cclix
with
cclxiii
Tajikistan
On
and
Uzbekistan, proposed an International
Since cyber-warfare is no longer science
behaviour in
1998.”
cyber-space
is
in
full
Code of Conduct for Information Security,
a week later, Russia published a concept
for
a
Convention
on
International
Information Security.
The emerging perception of
In the early 2010, a group of governmental
what constitutes national interest will
experts (GGE) and diplomats from the
inform and be informed by the discussions
U.S., Russia, and China, mutually stated
on how to use the new technological
that potential threats in the sphere of
possibilities for warfare.
cclx
information security are among the most
Related discussions take place in the
United Nations in the form of two different
streams:
the
politico-military
focusing
on
cyber-warfare
stream
and
an
economic stream focusing on cybercrime. cclxi Examining both streams, it is
evident that norms governing cyberspace
are slowly emerging with the involvement
serious challenges of the twenty-first
century in their report for the UN. First
group of experts and diplomats in 2004,
had failed before to even find the smallest
common denominator which forced the
Secretary-General to conclude that due to
the complexity of the issues no consensus
was reached.cclxiv
of many UN bodies related to the issue.cclxii
Since these technologies have numerous
“While cyber-security was making front
economic and social benefits, Information
page headlines in 2010 with Stuxnet and
Wiki Leaks, at the United Nations: the U.S.
reversed its long-time policy position and
for the first time co-sponsored a draft
resolution
on
information
and
and Communication Technologies (ICTs)
have reinvented the international security
environment.
cclxv
However, it is not
arguable that ICTs can also be used
contradictory to international peace and
security; they produce an evident increase
in disruptive activities since they are used
cyber-conflicts also results in difficulties in
for crimes. Moreover, the destructive use
formulating
of ICTs by parties who have broad
problems of the counter strategies include
impunity systems is easily concealed, thus
the speed required to cope with such
finding a specific perpetrator can prove to
attacks, an inadequate terminology or
be difficult if not impossible.
cclxvi
Those
counter
strategies.
Other
lexicon, an outdated Internet structural
facts construct an environment that aids the
design,
use of ICTs for increasingly complex
collateral
abuses. Because
the
agreements, recognition of technologies
international community is crucial to
involved, and the need for equilibrium
reduce risk and enhance security, Member
between Internet privacy and control.cclxviii
cooperation
of
States have repeatedly stated the need for
cooperative action against threats resulting
from the malicious use of ICTs.
"Further progress in cooperation at the
international level will require actions to
promote a peaceful, secure, open and
cooperative ICT environment. Cooperative
measures that could enhance stability and
security
include
norms,
rules
and
principles of responsible behaviour by
States, voluntary measures to increase
transparency, confidence and trust among
States and capacity-building measures.
States must lead in these efforts, but
effective Cooperation would benefit from
the appropriate participation of the private
sector and civil society."cclxvii
problematic
assessment
of
damage,
verification
of
I. Cyber Definitions and Other Relevant
Terms
Computer and electronic based technology
refers to the term cyber as a prefix. cclxix
Cyber-space is a prepared domain framed
by the use of electronics to exploit
information via consistent systems and
their related infrastructure. cclxx Therefore
cyber-space is a unique hybrid regime of
physical and virtual properties, hardware
and software, which are all computer
networks including the Internet as well as
other networks both separate from and not
linked to the Internet.cclxxi
a. Internet
The Internet is the biggest network in
The challenges of addressing cyber-
cyber-space,cclxxii and it was planned to be
warfare and cyber-security arise from the
open, modest, and neutral.cclxxiii Alternative
fact that both are relatively new issues,
opinions can be found in some states such
therefore, many countries are unprepared.
as China or Saudi-Arabia.
The virtual and anonymous nature of
Internet's structural design is dependent on
cclxxiv
The
choice, not natural law.cclxxv Moreover, the
safeguards, guidelines, risk management
national
laws,
technological
developments
area
that
in
the
approaches,
enables
the
practices, assurance and technologies that
sense preferences of different cultures are
environment and organization and user's
the reasons of the bordered Internet that
assets.”cclxxxii While cyber-security can be
emerged through national changes of the
divided
Internet‘s architecture.cclxxvi
espionage, crime, cyber war, and cyber
Although it can be said that the national
legislation does create borders legally and
sometimes
through
specific
technical
features,cclxxvii the Internet’s original intent
ignores those national borders, and it
remains
borderless
unless
specific
interventions are taken by the governments
to alter this state of nature.cclxxviii
affecting another country from one place,
without that user ever having left his/her
own country.cclxxix Such action that exploits
in
international
both
national
jurisdictions
benevolent or malevolent.
can
cclxxx
and
be
While
handling cyber-security, when the latter is
the case, need for international cooperation
is obvious.cclxxxi
cclxxxiii
major
cyber
categories:
the possibility for the
subsistence of a threat can go back to three
sources,
(1)
Flaws
in
the
design
of
the
Internet;cclxxxiv
(2)
Flaws
in
the
hardware
and
software;cclxxxv
systems online.cclxxxvi
c. Cyber Power
Cyber-power is
“the
ability to
use
cyberspace to create advantages and
influence events.” cclxxxvii It can be used to
produce
preferred
outcomes
within
cyberspace. Another usage of cyberspace
is that it can use cyber instruments to
produce preferred outcomes in other
d. International Communication
Cyber-security has been defined by the
International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) to indicate the “collection of tools,
security
four
the
domains outside cyberspace.cclxxxviii
b. Cyber Security
policies,
protect
(3) The move to put more and more critical
Actions can be taken in one country while
loopholes
into
to
best
can
terrorism,
used
training,
implementation of certain policies, and in a
Yet, the Internet remains borderless.
be
actions,
concepts,
security
Technology
International Communication Technology
refers to “technologies that provide access
to
information
through telecommunications.” cclxxxix Focus
points
of
ICTs
communication
are
primarily
technologies
the
including
rapidly than conventional communication
technology or the Internet.ccxciii
e. International Cooperation
the Internet, wireless networks, cell phones,
Because of the Internet's transnational
and other communication mediums.ccxc
nature, governments have recognized the
Digital ICT is the creation of the meeting
of modern telecommunication technology
and digital data processing technology.ccxci
The telecommunication technology used
by convergent technologies can be listed as
the internet; the devices themselves that
are computers which evolve rapidly such
need for international cooperation.
ccxciv
International cooperation is defined in the
form of regimes as “sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations.”ccxcv
as, PC, notebook, mobile phone, smart
It is common for the UN bodies to be used
phone, pad, and the like. The speed at
as a mediator through Member-States’
which
negotiations.ccxcvi
digital
technology has
highly
developed in the past is without a
guide.ccxcii Moreover, it can be said that the
convergent ICT is spreading much more
Table 3: Global ICT developments, 20012013ccxcvii
This is another reason behind the division
of
UN's
security.
activities
ccxcviii
regarding
cyber-
Although the division is
incomplete,
the
Telecommunication
International
Union
(ITU)
categorizes the UN organization's work on
cyber-security as follows:
2. Negotiations on economic issues.cccv
The politico-military branch of the UN is
mainly
concerned
about
how
the
information technologies can potentially be
used
for
contradicts
destructive
purposes
with
objectives
the
that
of
maintaining international stability and
(1) Combating cyber-crime: ITU and
security and even has a negative effect on
the United Nations Office on Drugs and
the security of States.cccvi On the other side,
Crime (UNODC);ccxcix
the economic branch is about the illicit
(2) Building capacity: ITU, The United
Nations
Institute
Research (UNIDIR),
misuse of information technologies.cccvii
for
Disarmament
Cyber-warfare and cyber-crime are other
and
The
alternative terms for these two branches,
United
cccviii
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice
respectively.
Research Institute (UNICRI);ccc
described as "the unauthorized penetration
(3) Child Online Protection: International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), United
Nations
International
Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UNICRI,
UNODC.ccci
Cyber-warfare
is
by, on behalf of, or in support of, a
government into another nation's computer
or network, or any other activity affecting
a computer system, in which the purpose is
to add, alter, or falsify data, or cause the
disruption of or damage to a computer, or
Generally, the ITU and UNODC are
network device, or the objects a computer
considered the leading UN bodies in cyber-
system controls."cccix
security and cyber-crime.cccii
II. Relevant Bodies
f. Cyber-Security
and
the
United
Nations
Union
The norm emergence process of the UN,
on the cyber-security can be divided into
two main branches of negotiations:ccciii
1. Negotiations
a. International Telecommunication
focusing
military issues,ccciv
on
politico-
International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) is the leading and specialized agency
of the United Nations which handles the
ICTs. cccx "As the global focal point for
governments and the private sector, ITU's
role in helping the world communicate
organizational platform used by Member
spans
States; but also an autonomous norm
[three]
core
communication,
sectors:
radio-
standardization
and
development." cccxi ITU is established with
the purposes of allocating global radio
spectrum and satellite orbits, developing
entrepreneur.cccxvi
b. The United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research
United
Nations
networks and technologies, and striving to
Disarmament
Research
improve
voluntarily
the
technical
standards
access
to
that
ICTs
ensure
for
the
underserved communities worldwide.cccxii
Being the only treaty organization under
the umbrella of the UN which works on
cyber issues, ITU is the principle United
Nations
organization
that
has
the
responsibility for practical aspects of
The
founded
and
Institute
(UNIDIR),
for
a
autonomous
institute within the framework of the UN,
conducts research on disarmament and
security
to
assist
the
international
community. cccxvii As an impartial actor,
UNIDIR creates ideas and promotes action
on disarmament and security.cccxviii
cyber-security. cccxiii ITU joined the UN
Statute of the UNIDIR, explains its
system as a Specialized Agency under
functions in Article 2 as follows:
Article 57 of the Charter which established
"The work of the Institute shall aim at:
that "the various specialized agencies,
intergovernmental
(a) Providing the international community
agreements and having wide international
with more diversified and complete data on
responsibilities, as defined in their basic
problems relating to international security,
instruments, in economic, social, cultural,
the armaments race and disarmament in
educational, health, and related fields,
all fields, particularly in the nuclear field,
shall be brought into relationship with the
so as to facilitate progress, through
United Nations."cccxiv
negotiations, towards greater security for
established
by
all States and towards the economic and
ITU occupies a significant role in setting
social development of all peoples;
technical standards with special focus
areas like “smart grid infrastructure.”cccxv
(b) Promoting informed participation by
Looking from an international relations
all
theory point of view, ITU’s role in the UN
(c) Assisting ongoing negotiations on
activities related to the cyber security is
disarmament and continuing efforts to
very important because it is not only an
ensure greater international security at a
States
in
disarmament
efforts;
progressively lower level of armaments,
UNICRI
particularly nuclear armaments, by means
intergovernmental, governmental and non-
of objective and factual studies and
governmental organizations on creating
analyses;
and implementing enhanced policies on
(d) Carrying out more in-depth, forward-
crime prevention and criminal justice.cccxxiii
looking
UNICRI declares their goals as:
and
long-term
research
on
disarmament, so as to provide a general
insight into the problems involved, and
stimulating
new
initiatives
for
new
negotiations."cccxix
bureaucracies to become involved in
cccxx
Moreover, UNIDIR
dedicated the third issue of its publication
Disarmament Forum to the issue of
"Information
mandated
to
aid
 advancing the understanding of crimerelated problems;
 fostering impartial and competent
UNIDIR was one of the first UN
cyber-security.
is
&
Communication
Technologies and International Security."
and many more.cccxxi
criminal justice systems;
 supporting the respect of international
instruments and other standards established
by the international community;
 facilitating international law enforcement
cooperation and judicial assistance.cccxxiv
Since UNICRI mostly aims to endorse
c. United Nations Interregional Crime
every
nation's
self-reliance
and
the
development of institutional capabilities, it
and Justice Research Institute
provides a one-stop capacity offering highUnited Nations Interregional Crime and
level knowledge in crime prevention and
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) is a
criminal justice problems.
UN entity that was established in 1967 by
the
Economic
and
Social
Council
(ECOSOC) following Resolution 1086 in
order to support countries in their efforts of
preventing crime and assisting criminal
justice while supporting governments and
the international community to tackle with
the criminal threats to peace, development
and stability.cccxxii
UNICRI Statute states in Article 2 that "
[i]n the pursuit of its objectives, the
Institute shall carry out its activities in
close collaboration and co-ordination with
institutes and other bodies within and
outside
especially
the
United
with
the
Nations
system,
United
Nations
regional institutes on the prevention of
crime." cccxxv Consequently, UNICRI sets
its activities and priorities in accordance
with the United Nations Commission on
General to conclude that due to the
Crime
Criminal
complexity of the issues involved, no
also it maintains close
consensus was reached on the preparation
Justice;
Prevention
cccxxvi
and
working relations with various UN bodies
and agencies, especially with the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC).cccxxvii
of a final report.cccxxx
The Group consisted of governmental
experts from 15 States: Belarus, Brazil,
China, France, Germany, India, Jordan,
Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, the Republic of
d. Group of Governmental Experts
There have been a total of six groups of
governmental experts on cyber related
issues so far. “The first GGE in 2004
created by the General Assembly's First
Korea, the Russian Federation, South
Africa, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
United States of America.cccxxxi
Committee with the second one publishing
The main obstacle on the way of consensus
its report in 2010 [and the third one
was the question of whether or not
publishing its report in 2013]. In 2004,
international law sufficiently regulated the
ECOSOC set up an intergovernmental
security aspects of international relations
expert group on identity-related crime
in cases of hostile use of ICTs for politico-
which has evolved into the core group of
military purposes. However, the work of
experts. The ITU set up a high level expert
the GGE was not completely useless. On
group that developed the cyber-security
the contrary, it successfully increased the
agenda in 2007 and the United Nations
amount of the relevant efforts on the
Congress
international agenda.cccxxxii
on
Crime
Prevention
and
Criminal Justice established an openended intergovernmental expert group on
cybercrime in 2010.”cccxxviii
2. Second
Group
of
Governmental
Experts (2010)
This time, the GGE did come to a
1. First Group of Governmental Experts
(2004)
consensus
stating
that
existing
and
potential threats in the area of information
The first Group of Governmental Experts
security are important challenges of the
(GGE) was launched in 2004, in order to
twenty-first century.
present a report in 2005; however, at the
perpetrators
end, they were not able to reach a common
terrorists;
position. cccxxix This forced the Secretary-
national infrastructures, and governments
cccxxxiv
are
cccxxxiii
While their
identified
as
individuals, businesses,
are
identified
victims.
cccxxxv
as
their
potential
B. THE POLITICO-MILITARY
As States are found to
STREAM: CYBER-WARFARE
expand cyber warfare capabilities, the
threat is considered to be large enough to
pose a risk to national and international
peace
and
security.
cccxxxvi
“They
acknowledge the attribution problem and
the dual-use character of the cyber-space,
which corresponds with the idea that the
Internet is neutral and the way it is put to
use is dependent on the intent of its users
(unanticipated
consequences
aside).” cccxxxvii Existing means to combat
the criminal use of information technology
and to create a global culture of cybersecurity is mentioned.
3. Third
Group
cccxxxviii
Cyber-warfare
is
at
the
centre
of
discussions in the General Assembly’s
First Committee on developments in the
field
of
information
and
telecommunications in the context of
security.
cccxli
These
discussions
have
specific moments such as the presentation
of
the
first
draft
resolution
on
developments in the field of information
and telecommunications in the context of
security in the First Committee in 1998,
and each year since then, by the Russian
government. cccxlii Expansion is wanted for
the international law regimes that aim at
of
Governmental
the prevention of the use of information
technologies for purposes incompatible
Experts (2013)
The need for better focusing on the
discussions on international peace and
with missions of ensuring international
stability and security.cccxliii
security got even more noticeable with the
In accordance with the political blocs,
lessons learned from the first and second
discussions have two sides; some are
GGE.
cccxxxix
outcomes
Results of the reports and
of
the
whereas others wish the same laws that
discussions in the First Committee greater
apply to the use of kinetic weapons to
weight
the
apply to state behaviour in cyberspace
international community and allow them to
while trying to step up international
add a substantive layer to the work done in
cooperation
and
other forums.
their
actions
legitimacy
cccxl
give
calling for a cyber arms control treaty,
among
Third GGE will be
examined in the following chapters of this
Agenda Item.
agencies.
among
law
enforcement
cccxliv
I. Phase 1: 1998-2004
First steps towards cyber norms are made
in this phase. The 1998 draft resolution
was adopted and it built on the prior work
The first resolution on this item, 53/70,
on the “role of science and technology in
was adopted by the General Assembly; yet,
the context of security, disarmament and
the push for an international treaty was met
other related fields” (A/53/576, 18 Nov
with suspicion by some states which
cccxlv
“The key elements of the
believed that such a treaty could be used to
resolution for an international computer
limit the freedom of information under the
security treaty are: mentions the military
guise
potential
telecommunications security.cccl
1998).
of
information
and
communication technology for the first
time as well as an expression of concern
about
the
use
of
such
technology
of
increasing
information
and
II. Phase 2: 2005-2008
In 2005, an important alteration occurred
inconsistent with the objectives of maintain
in
international
resolution introduced by Russia was
stability
and
security
the
First
Committee.
The
draft
to
adopted and went to a recorded vote for the
prevent cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism
first time in its history. cccli The U.S. was
(US position) invites Member States to
the only state that voted against the
inform the Secretary-General notably on
resolution on October 28. ccclii During this
their views regarding definitions and the
period, cyber-warfare made attained public
development of international principles
attention for the first time in 2007 because
(operative paragraphs
of the Distributed Denial of Server (DDoS)
(Russian
position)
mentions
need
regarding next
steps).”cccxlvi
(which will be explained in the following
Comparing to the 2010 version of the draft
resolution, it can be seen that here are two
main changes:
cccxlvii
parts of this Agenda Item) attack against
Estonia and during the Georgian- Russian
war in 2008.
cccliii
However, even the
description of these events is controversial
(1) Oversight of the reference and attempt
and dependent on the still ongoing norm
to come up with definitions which would
emergence and classification of such
have debatably been a first step towards a
incidents.
cyber arms control agreement;
cccxlviii
(2) Substitution of the reference to
international principles with references to
international
measures.cccxlix
concepts
and
possible
cccliv
It is still controversial
whether DDoS was a cyber-attack or
merely a form of protest that should be
protected
under
the
freedom
of
expression. ccclv On the other hand, the
effects of Stuxnet were perceived more
like sabotage than a traditional attack.ccclvi
The
difference
in
this
classification
suggests that outcome of the event is
another decisive factor.ccclvii To sum up, the
debates are as much about norms as on
how to classify the events in the first
place.ccclviii
strategies and technologies, policies and
best practices;
4. Identification of measures to support
capacity-building
less
developed
countries; and
5.
III. Phase 3: 2009-To-Date
in
Finding
possibilities
to
elaborate
common terms and definitions relevant to
In October 2009, draft resolutions in the
United
First Committee once again started to be
resolution 64/25/78"ccclxi
adopted without an opposition, just as the
pre-2005 period. ccclix Later in Geneva, the
UN agreed to discuss cyber-warfare and
cyber-security with representatives of the
UN in the First Committee.ccclx
Nations
General
Assembly
Estonia and Israel joined the new group
established in 2009.ccclxii Since Estonia was
the first country to go through a massive
DDoS attack, and Israel was considered to
be of the potential states designing Stuxnet,
Later in the same year, the second GGE
this
presented its report. The group made the
importance.ccclxiii
following five recommendations to the
states:
change
had
a
significant
Also during this same period when the
major WikiLeaks release and Stuxnet took
"1. Further dialogue among States to
place, the U.S., decided to co-sponsor the
discuss norms pertaining to State use of
Russian draft resolution in the DISEC.ccclxiv
ICTs, to reduce collective risk and protect
Resolution 65/41 included a paragraph
critical
requesting
national
and
international
infrastructures;
measures
to
address
the
implications of State use of ICTs, including
exchanges of national views on the use of
ICTs in conflict;
national
to
report at the 68th session in 2013. This
GGE and its report will be explained
deeply in the following sections of this
Agenda Item.ccclxv
C.
3. Information exchanges on national
legislation,
Secretary-General
establish a new GGE in 2012 to submit a
2. Confidence-building, stability, and risk
reduction
the
ICT
security
THE
ECONOMIC
STREAM:
CYBER-CRIME
There are many bodies of the UN that deal
with the economic stream of the issue.
United Nations structure of governance on
of a global culture of cyber-security. ccclxx
crime is even more complex than the
The second resolution on a global culture
typical UN system since the General
of cyber-security negotiated in 2004 and
Assembly, has been dealing with the issue
adopted by the GA is extended to contain
as well as The United Nations Economic
the protection of critical information
and Social Council (ECOSOC) with its
infrastructures which take their roots from
smaller membership of only 54 out of the
the 2003 meeting of the G8 Ministers of
193 UN Member States.ccclxvi In addition to
Justice and Interior. ccclxxi The resolution
ECOSOC, two functional commissions
now contains the link between countries’
meeting annually also focus on crime,
critical
namely: the Commission on Narcotic
critical information infrastructures.ccclxxii
Drugs and the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice.
ccclxvii
Lastly, an independent UN Congress on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
takes place every five years as well as the
aforementioned
bodies
to
make
recommendations to the Commission on
Crime
Justice.
Prevention
and
Criminal
ccclxviii
infrastructures
and
countries’
After the shift in the U.S. policy in 2010,
the third resolution, Resolution 64/211,
was adopted. ccclxxiii An important part of
the document is the second part of its title:
Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and taking stock of national
efforts to protect critical information
infrastructures.
ccclxxiv
The
document
includes an annex that outlines a voluntary
D. THE SECOND COMMITTEE OF
self-assessment instrument for national
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY - "A
efforts to protect critical information
GLOBAL
infrastructures with a detailed road map for
CULTURE
OF
CYBER-
Member-States. ccclxxv Being sponsored by
SECURTIY"
The three resolutions of the General
Assembly's Second Committee on “a
global culture of cyber-security" link the
the U.S. along with 39 other countries, the
key challenges added to the original draft
are:
and
“ (i) First, references to civil society and
economic referencing the resolutions of
business were taken out of the original
both the First and Third Committee.ccclxix
draft of the resolution text itself. The
two
streams:
politico-military
After introducing a draft resolution in 2002,
the Second Committee entitled the creation
section mentioning freedom of expression
and the free flow of information, ideas and
knowledge was also deleted as well as the
suggestion to submit relevant information
in Tunis, Tunisia in 2005. ccclxxviii Today,
by a set deadline, by the sixty-fifth session.
annual WSIS Forums are an essential part
(ii) Second, the final text emphasizes the
importance of the mandate of the Internet
Governance Forum and reiterating that all
Governments should have an equal role
and
responsibility
for
international
Internet governance relating to the larger
Internet
governance
debate.
It
of the follow-up on the World Summit on
the Information Society.ccclxxix They have a
set
of targets,
recommendations
and
commitments to build a comprehensive,
people-centric and development-oriented
Information Society.ccclxxx
also
The review process which was initiated in
highlights that each country will determine
2013 with the purpose of assessing the
its own critical information.
progress and lessons learned by all
(iii) Third, the resolution highlights the
importance of international informationsharing and collaboration, so as to
effectively
confront
the
increasingly
transnational nature of such threats‖ and
encourages Member States to share best
practices for dissemination.”ccclxxvi
E.
WORLD
SUMMIT
ON
stakeholders
private
-including
sector,
community,
civil
Internet
and
society,
technical
Governments-
in
advancing targets set by the WSIS in areas
such as Internet infrastructure, ICT and
education, or building confidence and
security in the use of ICTs had two main
outcomes that are being prepared:ccclxxxi
THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1) A
statement
on
the
WSIS
implementation,ccclxxxii
The UN General Assembly Resolution
56/183 endorsed the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS) in two phases.
(2) A Vision statement on forwardlooking challenges.ccclxxxiii
WSIS aimed to achieve "a common vision,
The format and aims of the meeting may
desire and commitment to build a people-
be further developed by the discussions of
centric,
the UNGA at end of March 2014 on the
inclusive
and
developmentwhere
future of the WSIS. ccclxxxiv Furthermore,
everyone can create, access, utilize and
2015 is 10th anniversary of the World
share information."ccclxxvii
Summit
oriented
Information
Society
The first phase of the WSIS took place in
Geneva in 2003 and the second phase was
on
(WSIS).ccclxxxv
the
Information
Society
F. GLOBAL
CYBER
SECURITY
AGENDA(GCA)
sought to develop advice on how criminal
The Secretary-General of the ITU, Dr.
Hamadoun I. Touré, launched the Global
Cyber-Security Agenda (GCA) on 17 May
2007.
It was a framework to establish
international
 “Work Area one, 'Legal measures',
internationally compatible manner.
 Work
Area
two,
'Technical
and
procedural measures', focused on key
endorse the efforts for cyber-security and
measures for addressing vulnerabilities in
increase confidence and security in the
software products, including accreditation
information society. The GCA aimed to
schemes, protocols and standards.
collaboration
that
dealt with through legislation in an
would
encourage
cooperation
activities committed over ICTs could be
amongst
all
relevant parties in confidence building in
the use of ICTs.ccclxxxvi
 Work
Area
structures”,
three,
“Organizational
considered
generic
frameworks and response strategies for the
The High-Level Experts Group (HLEG),
prevention, detection, response to and
assisted the GCA with advices on the
crisis
complex
cyber-
including the protection of countries’
The HLEG is “a group of
critical information infrastructure systems.
security.
issues
ccclxxxvii
surrounding
specialists in cyber-security, comprising
more than one hundred experts from a
broad range of backgrounds in policymaking, government, academia and the
private sector.”
ccclxxxviii
HLEG will be
examined in the following pages of this
document.
I. Five pillars of the ITU Global Cyber
Security Agenda
management
of
cyber-attacks,
 Work Area four, “Capacity building”,
sought to elaborate strategies for capacitybuilding mechanisms to raise awareness,
transfer
know-how
and
boost
cyber
security on the national policy agenda.
 Work
Area
five,
“International
cooperation” sought to develop a strategy
for international cooperation, dialogue
and coordination in dealing with cyber-
The ITU Global Cyber Security Agenda
threats.”cccxc
seeks to build on existing national and
regional initiatives to avoid repetition of
work and encourage collaboration amongst
G. HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP
(HLEG) ON CYBER SECURITY
all relevant partners. ccclxxxix The GCA is
Consisting of successful specialists in the
built upon five key Work Areas (pillars):
subject, an expert panel was appointed to
advise the ITU Secretary-General on the
-to provide guidance on possible long-term
complex issues surrounding cyber-security.
strategies and emerging trends in cyber-
ITU
security.”cccxciii
Secretary-General
appoints
the
members of the High-Level Experts Group
(HLEG), with “due consideration to both
geographical
expertise,
diversity
to
ensure
representation.”
cccxci
and
range
of
multi-stakeholder
Having more than
one hundred world-renowned specialists in
cyber security, representing expertise from
across a broad range of backgrounds
including the administrations of ITU
Member States, industry, regional and
international organizations, research and
academic institutions, the key purpose of
the HLEG was to advise the ITU
Secretary-General on the complex issues
surrounding
formulate
cyber
security
proposals
on
and
to
long-term
For their advices to be efficient, HLEG
Members acted in their personal capacity
and at their own expense, therefore their
advice can be considered as objective and
impartial.
cccxciv
organization
Members
are
elected
Member-States
from
the
main
five
world
security and other information technology
firms) and other regional and international
organizations,
academic
and
research
institutions to ensure a representative
balance in the membership.cccxcv
CONDUCT
The
being
service providers, software developers,
five
Areas.
by
regions; industry (manufacturers, operators,
H. INTERNATIONAL
Work
this
nominated as a broad cross-selection from
strategies to promote cyber security in the
key
of
FOR
CODE
OF
INFORMATION
responsibilities of the HLEG were:cccxcii
SECURITY
“-to further develop GCA by proposing
“On September 12, 2011, the permanent
refinements to its main goals;
representatives
-to analyze current developments in cybersecurity, including both threats and stateof-the-art solutions, anticipate emerging
and future challenges, identify strategic
options, and formulate proposals to the
ITU Secretary-General;
-to meet the goals of GCA;
of
China,
Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United
Nations submitted a letter jointly to the
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, asking him to
International
Code
of
distribute the
Conduct
for
Information Security drafted by their
countries as a formal document of the 66th
session the General Assembly and called
upon countries to further discuss the
document within the framework of the
In recent years, information and network
United Nations so as to reach consensus
security started to draw attention from the
on the international norms and rules
international community thus it is required
standardizing the behaviour of countries
to
concerning information and cyberspace at
standardize information and cyberspace
an early date.”
cccxcvi
Code
Information
Security
of
Conduct
for
for
maintaining
information and network security which
cover the political, military, economic,
social,
aspects.
cultural,
cccxcvii
international
rules
technical
and
other
It is understood from the
submitted by China, Russia, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan
is
the
first
relatively
comprehensive and systematic document
in the world proposing the international
rules on information and network security
and more certainly it will not be the only
one.cdi
principles that countries shall not use such
I. POTENTIAL THREATS FROM
information
CYBER-SPACE
and
to
behaviour. cd It can be said that the draft
Various basic principles raised by the
International
formulate
telecommunication
technologies as the network to conduct
hostile behaviours and acts of aggression
or to threaten international peace and
security and stress that countries have the
rights and obligations to protect their
information and cyberspace as well as key
information and network infrastructure
from threats, interference and sabotage
In modern society, communication through
internet is the primary method for private
and professional endeavours.cdii Therefore,
cyber-threat
is
omnipresent
in
the
communication systems, the computerbased critical infrastructure and also in the
military technologies.cdiii
attacks.cccxcviii “They advocate establishing
Considering the political and military
a multilateral, transparent and democratic
spheres, the oft-cited computer worm
international
‘Stuxnet’ of June 2010 is "the most
Internet
governance
mechanism, fully respecting the rights and
outstanding
freedom of information and cyberspace
modern cyber-attack with a political
with the premise of observing laws,
background.
helping developing countries develop the
demonstrates the role of cyber-space as a
information and network technologies and
central sphere for political, diplomatic and
cooperating
military disputes and confrontations of the
crimes.”cccxcix
on
fighting
cyber
individual
The
incident
'Stuxnet'
of
a
episode
21st century." cdiv Because of the difficulty
of finding the responsible behind a cyber-
 “Extortion. The attackers seek to cause
attack, national governments can easily
key online business services to become
conceal
unavailable at critical times and expect
entities.
their
attacks
behind
private
cdv
payment for an attack to cease.
 Espionage. The attackers seek to cause
I. Distributed Denial-of-Service
Distributed
denial-of-service
(DDoS)
attacks pose an immense threat to the
Internet, and many defence mechanisms
have been proposed to overcome the
problem.cdvi Since it is a dynamic process
and attackers constantly modify their tools
key
business
services
to
become
unavailable or unresponsive while reaping
an award on another front. The DDoS
attack itself is used as a method of
disguising the real purpose of the attack or
distracting the victim’s attention.
to bypass these security systems in return
 Protesting. The attackers seek attention
researchers modify their approaches to
to the particular cause or public issue they
handle new attacks.
cdvii
The DDoS field is
are pursuing and work to force a
rapidly becoming more and more complex.
particular change in policy or behaviour.
While this hinders an understanding of the
Attack participants are provided with
DDoS incident the variety of known
target and coordination details from a
attacks creates the impression that the
central “authority”.
problem is enormous, and hard to explore
and address, existing defence systems
deploy various strategies to tackle the
problem.
cdviii
Understanding
their
similarities and differences, and assessing
their effectiveness and cost, it is difficult to
compare them to each other.cdix
 Nuisance. The attackers launch attacks
against a broad spectrum of targets
“because they can”. The objectives vary
greatly between targets but the DDoS
attacks are typically short- lived, often
reactionary to a perceived slight, or
designed
Although for many organizations situated
to
gain
some
temporary
advantage over named individuals.”cdxi
at the receiving end of a coordinated DDoS
attack, the objectives of the attackers may
II. WikiLeaks
not necessarily be self-evident,cdx from an
Since the leak of the Pentagon Papers forty
instigator’s perspective, some of the most
years ago WikiLeaks’ 2010–2011 release
common DDoS objectives are:
of multiple large caches of classified
documents
stolen
from
the
U.S.
government constitutes the most radical
disclosure of classified information.cdxvii It
form of unauthorized disclosure.cdxii
is assumed that the state knows or at least
“Publishing improves transparency, and
this transparency creates a better society
for all people. Better scrutiny leads to
reduced
corruption
and
stronger
can confidently predict disclosure’s ill
effects when the laws and regulations that
govern classification are the subject.cdxviii
Constitutional
executive-privilege
and
democracies in all society’s institutions,
state-secret doctrines rest on the parallel
including government, corporations and
presumption that the threat of disclosure
other organizations. A healthy, vibrant and
will affect the executive’s ability to protect
inquisitive journalistic media plays a vital
the nation and perform his delegated duties.
role in achieving these goals.” cdxiii
For that reason, the sequential narrative, in
which information disclosure impairs the
III. Declaration of WikiLeaks
state’s operations and endangers the nation,
“Asserting that it is “part of that media”
forms a core tenet of the transparency
that
ideal’s
spreads
transparency,
WikiLeaks
contends that its publication of authentic
limitations.
cdxix
Therefore
information transforms must be controlled.
documents leaked from governments and
powerful private entities will expose
IV. Stuxnet Computer Worm
“otherwise unaccountable and secretive
Since the invention of the first computer-
institutions” that engage in unethical acts,
assisted industrial control system (ICS)
“good
device, technical and national security
government and a healthy society,” “alter
communities expressed concerns about
the course of history in the present, and . . .
software and hardware vulnerabilities and
lead us to a better future.”” cdxiv It is
potential security risks associated with
believed
these
and
thereby
that
help
since
establish
the
information
devices.
cdxx
Penetration
of
a
cdxv
computer system for purposes of degrading
Therefore when information disclosure
its capabilities, manipulating data, or using
leads to a more engaged public, more
the device to launch cyber attacks on other
democratic politics, and a more efficient
systems is generally included in such
state, it forms a core tenet of the ideal
concerns.cdxxi
transforms, it must be disclosed.
transparency.cdxvi
In September 2010, media stated that a
A similar description plays the same role
new form of cyber attack appeared to
about concerns regarding the unauthorized
target Iran, although the actual target, if
any, is unknown.cdxxii What was known is
J. REPORT OF THE THIRD GROUP
that through the use of thumb drives in
OF
computers that were not connected to the
(2013)
Internet, a malicious software program
known as Stuxnet infected computer
systems that were used to control the
functioning of a nuclear power plant
moreover once inside the system, Stuxnet
had the ability to degrade or destroy the
software on which it operated.
cdxxiii
GOVERNMENTAL
EXPERTS
Agreement of UN group of governmental
experts on cyber-security on a substantial
consensus report represents a significant
success
for
the
maintenance
of
international peace and stability in this
crucial area.cdxxviii
Moreover the Stuxnet worm appears to be
“By acknowledging the full applicability of
the first malicious software (malware)
international law to state behavior in
designed specifically to attack a particular
cyberspace,
type of ICS: one that controls nuclear
transparency
plants, whether for power or uranium
measures,
enrichment.
cdxxiv
Although early reports
by
extending
and
traditional
confidence-building
and
by
recommending
international cooperation and capacity
focused on the impact on facilities in Iran,
building
it was later discovered that the program
communications
had spread throughout multiple countries
infrastructure more secure around the
worldwide.cdxxv
world, the report lays a solid foundation
To date, numerous countries including Iran,
Indonesia,
India,
Pakistan,
Germany,
China, and the United States are identified
to
make
information
technology
and
(ICT)
for states to address the mutual risks that
arise from rapidly increasing cyberthreats.”cdxxix
to be affected by the Stuxnet worm to
It is disturbing that each day, more-
varying degrees of disturbance in their
sophisticated cyber tools allow states to
cdxxvi
“A lack of
attack the control systems of critical
publicly available information on the
infrastructure.cdxxx Furthermore these tools,
damage caused by Stuxnet in these
coupled with a widespread uncertainty
countries makes it difficult to determine the
about the rules that would govern state
malware’s potency.”cdxxvii
behaviour in cyberspace, have raised the
technology systems.
risk of cyber-conflict between states. cdxxxi
It was, therefore, of crucial importance that
the UN find common grounds to address
these
challenges
by
affirming
and
clarifying the application of international
law to state behaviour in cyberspace and
by
recommending
confidence-building
measures.cdxxxii
a substantial report, namely “On the
Developments in the Field of Information
and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security” to carry out a
mandate from the UN General Assembly
to examine possible cooperative measures
in addressing the existing and potential
threats regarding the use of ICTs. cdxxxiii
This mandate was more specific than other
expert
emphasized
“According to a recent study by the UN
Institute for Disarmament Research, more
than 40 states have now developed some
military cyber-capabilities, 12 of them for
On June 7th, the group of experts agreed on
recent
I. Difficulties
groups,
the
need
as
to
it
clearly
elaborate
confidence-building measures and norms,
offensive cyber-warfare.”cdxxxvii
According to the report there are several
factors
that
make
the
situation
in
cyberspace particularly difficult to control.
For example many of the tools in
cyberspace can be used for both legitimate
and malicious purposes.cdxxxviii Attributions
to specific perpetrators continue to be
difficult, increasing the risk of “false flag”
attacks which can be defined as attacks by
a state, group, or individual under an
assumed identity.cdxxxix
rules or principles of responsible behaviour
Another difficulty which is emphasized in
of States.cdxxxiv
the experts’ group report is the issue of
Four categories are covered within the
group’s report for enhancing international
cyber-security: cooperation, international
law, confidence-building measures, and
improvements in states’ capacities for
building robust ICT infrastructures. cdxxxv
When examined together, the report
presents specific measures to promote the
peaceful use of cyberspace in the interest
of preventing international conflicts.cdxxxvi
collateral
damage.
For
example
by
spreading malware into computer networks
or digital control systems that were not the
primary target of the original attack; global
connectivity, vulnerable technologies, and
anonymity
facilitate
the
spread
of
disruptive cyber-activities that may cause
considerable collateral damage. cdxl These
damages can be particularly through socalled ICT enabled industrial control
systems such as those used in nuclear
power
plants
infrastructure.cdxli
and
other
critical
cdxlviii
“To address these new risks, the report
the arms control implications.
calls on Member States to agree on an
particular, the group called upon states to
array of international actions in the four
promote a peaceful ICT environment,
categories to promote a peaceful, secure,
which was a referral to the Outer Space
open
ICT
Treaty. cdxlix In its approach to cyberspace
also
issues, the experts group applied a similar
recognizes the importance of participation
concept to one they used in the information
of and cooperation with the private sector
weapons:
and civil society in these efforts.cdxliii
specific prohibitions but positing the
and
environment.”
cooperative
cdxlii
The
group
refraining
from
In
imposing
general objective of peaceful state use of
II. Building Transparency and Trust
cyberspace.cdl
The issue of dealing with the possibility of
states
acquiring
cyber
weapons
and
pursuing their development is a highly
"The report recommends the following
confidence-building measures:
controversial issue, yet the group managed
 Exchanging views and information on
to take a realistic approach on the
national policies, best practices, decision-
matter.
cdxliv
In their draft code of conduct
making
processes,
and
national
on the usage of ICTs by states, China and
organizations and structures with regard
Russia suggested explicit prohibitions of
to cyber[-]security. As an example, the
“information
the
United States in 2012 and Germany in
cdxlv
2013 exchanged so-called white papers on
weapons”
and
proliferation of their technologies.
However,
in
deliberations,
the
experts'
Chinese
and
group
Russian
representatives accepted that the dual
nature of these technologies is decided
upon a more pragmatic approach.cdxlvi Thus,
the group decided on starting out with a
traditional approach, which was taking
confidence-building
measures
before
attempting to agree on prohibitions that are
cyber [-] defense with Russia.
 Creating
bilateral
or
multilateral
consultative frameworks for confidencebuilding measures, for example, within the
Arab League, the African Union, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)
Organization
Regional
for
Forum,
Security
and
the
Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), and the
basically unverifiable.cdxlvii
Organization of American States. These
The
Group’s
2013
report
repeatedly
referred to terms used in other treaties on
frameworks could include workshops and
exercises on how to prevent and manage
private sector will cooperate to elaborate
disruptive cyber [-] security incidents.
the objectives, conditions, requirements
 Enhancing the sharing of information
and crisis communication among states on
cyber[-]security incidents at three levels:
between national [Computer Emergency
Readiness Teams] CERTs bilaterally and
within already existing multilateral CERT
communities
to
exchange
technical
information about malware or other
and frameworks on a global scale.cdliii As a
result, some global ICT corporations are
already engaged in this issue. Nevertheless,
the exact roles of states and private
companies and the method on cooperation
among them in the issue of cyber-security
needs to be clearly defined and developed
by
governments
stakeholders.
and
private
sector
cdliv
malicious indicators; through previously
existing or newly created channels for
Furthermore, in their report, the experts
crisis management and early warning to
highlighted the necessity for international
receive, collect, analyze, and share such
capacity building in order to assist states in
information to help mitigate vulnerabilities
their efforts to tackle the digital divide and
and risks; and through channels for
to improve the security of vital ICT
dialogue at political and policy levels.
infrastructure.cdlv The report also called on
 Increasing
states, "working with the private sector and
cooperation
to
address
incidents that affect critical infrastructure
systems, particularly those that rely on
UN
specialized agencies, to
provide
technical or other assistance in building
capacities in ICT security."cdlvi
ICT-enabled industrial control systems.
To conclude, Member States must take the
 Enhancing
mechanisms
enforcement
cooperation
for
to
law
reduce
incidents that could be misunderstood as
hostile state actions and that affect
international security."cdli
necessary measures to reach the objectives
of this framework with state practices in
accordance with the general principles to
create a cyberspace that is “peaceful,
secure, open and cooperative” which is the
The group expressed the necessity of
primary goal articulated in the experts
governments to take the lead in developing
group report.cdlvii
and implementing those measures and it is
K. CONCLUSION
also highlighted that the private sector and
civil society have an important role to
The emergence of Stuxnet becomes the
play.cdlii In the future, governments and the
starting point of a new era for cyber-
attacks.cdlviii Although the damage it caused
regional legal frameworks;
was appeared to be limited to the Iranian
secure
nuclear program, the vulnerabilities it
applications;
revealed were enormous.cdlix “By the time
national
it was discovered, Stuxnet had wormed its
structures to deal with cyber incidents;cdlxv
way into computer networks around the
lack of information security professionals
world, including, by some estimates, nearly
and skills within governments;cdlxvi lack of
half of those running electric utilities.”cdlx
basic awareness among users; lack of
Apart from the potential damage, even the
international cooperation between industry
sole existence of Stuxnet is troublesome
experts, law enforcements, regulators,
enough since it is an example of the
academia and international organizations
capacities of future cyber attacks.
to address a global challenge.cdlxvii
Cyber-attacks on vital infrastructure are
L. Points that a Resolution Should
becoming widespread; moreover, cyber-
Cover
security professionals report that the
computer infrastructure has become more
vulnerable even in just the past year. cdlxi
And yet, while the threat of cyber-attacks
has rapidly grown, the response has not
kept the pace. While it is evident that this
software
cdlxiv
and
cdlxiii
and
lack
ICT-based
of
global
lack of
appropriate
organizational
In the light of the issues explained in the
previous sections, the General Assembly
First Committee is expected to pass a
comprehensive
resolution
that
should
cover these points:
global threat may only be effectively met
 Mechanisms to increase international
by a global solution by the international
capacity building in order to assist states
community working together to design a
new law for cyber-attacks, international
community has thus far largely failed to
 Ways
to
overcome
the
challenges
outlined in the 2013 GGE report such as:
update the legal framework for responding
o lack of adequate and interoperable
to cyber-attacks. cdlxii Although efforts of
national or regional legal frameworks
States and organizations especially the
work of the UN and the recent GGE report
shows that the international community
o lack of secure software and ICT-based
applications
gives utmost importance to the agenda,
o lack of appropriate national and global
there are many challenges such as a lack of
organizational structures to deal with
adequate and interoperable national or
cyber incidents
o lack
of
professionals
information
and
skills
security
within
governments
o lack of basic awareness among users
 Ways to be protected from Stuxnet and
similar cyber threats
 Measures to strengthen the international
organizations regarding cyber-security
 Measures to be taken in order to promote
 Measures
transparency and trust
transforms while respecting freedom
 Ways to prevent occurrence of collateral
damages
to
control
information
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Ibid.
iii
Ibid.
iv
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Ibid.
vi
James Lee.1919. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. [online] Available at:
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Ibid.
viii
Ibid.
ix
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x
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Ibid.
xii
Ibid.
xiii
Ibid.
xiv
Ibid.
xv
Ibid.
xvi
Ibid.
xvii
Ibid.
xviii
Ibid.
xix
United Nations. 2013. FIRST COMMITTEE APPROVES SERIES OF DRAFTS ON WHICH DIVERSE
POSITIONS CONVERGE BEFORE TACKLING RAFT OF MORE CONTENTIOUS TEXTS NEXT WEEK.
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xx
James Lee. 2013. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. [online] Available at:
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xxi
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xxii
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xxiv
Ibid.
xxv
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xxvi
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xxvii
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xxviii
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 2014. The effects of nuclear weapons. [online] Available at:
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xxix
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
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January 2014)
xxx
Kym Ganczak. 2014. Non-proliferation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. [online] Available
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xxxi
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3
January 2014)
xxxii
Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January
2014)
xxxiii
Ibid.
xxxiv
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3
January 2014)
xxxv
Ibid.
xxxvi
Ibid.
xxxvii
Ibid.
xxxviii
Ibid.
xxxix
Ibid.
xl
Daryl G. Kimball. 2012. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz (Accessed 4 January 2014)
xli
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3
January 2014)
xlii
Ibid.
xliii
Ibid.
xliv
Ibid.
xlv
Ibid.
xlvi
Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January
2014)
xlvii
Ibid.
xlviii
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3
January 2014)
xlix
Ibid.
l
Ibid.
li
Ibid.
lii
Ibid.
liii
Ibid.
liv
Ibid.
lv
Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC). [online] Available at:
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/convention-prohibition-development-production-and-stockpilingbacteriological-biological-and-toxin-weapons-btwc/ (accessed 4 January 2014)
lvi
Ibid.
lvii
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3
January 2014)
lviii
Ibid.
lix
Jürgen SCHEFFRAN. 2007. Missiles in conflict: the issue of missiles in all its complexity. [online] Available
at: http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/EINIRAS/47131/ichaptersection_singledocument/9a9d3bab-f4da44f9-9d23-8955babc5d75/en/3_Missiles+in+conflict.pdf (accessed 4 January 2014)
lx
Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January
2014)
lxi
Aaron Karp. June 2005. Going Ballistic? Reversing Missile Proliferation. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Karp (accessed 4 January 2014)
lxii
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES. 2001. Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and
Prospects. [online] Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op7/op7.pdf (accessed 4 January 2014)
lxiii
James Clay Moltz. 2000. The Impact of National Missile Defense on Nonproliferation Regimes. [online]
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lxiv
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES. 2013. Ballistic Missiles & Outer
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lxv
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3
January 2014)
lxvi
Control Arms. 2009. SCOPE: types of equipment to be covered by an Arm Trade Treaty. [online] Available
at: http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Scope-Types-of-Weapons.English.pdf
(accessed 5 January 2014)
lxvii
Ibid.
lxviii
Ibid.
lxix
Wade Boese. 2007. The Accomplishments of Conventional Arms Control. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2497 (accessed 5 January 20014)
lxx
Ibid.
lxxi
Kate Joseph and Taina Susiluoto. 2002. A role for verification and monitoring in small arms control? [online]
Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2002/VY02_Joseph-Susiluoto.pdf
(accessed 5 January 2014)
lxxii
Control Arms. 2009. SCOPE: types of equipment to be covered by an Arm Trade Treaty. [online] Available
at: http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Scope-Types-of-Weapons.English.pdf
(accessed 5 January 2014)
lxxiii
Small Arms Survey. Definitions of Small Arms and Light Weapons. [online] Available at:
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html (accessed 5 January)
lxxiv
Small Arms Survey. About the Small Arms Survey. [online] Available at:
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/mission.html (accessed 5 January)
lxxv
Small Arms Survey. Definitions of Small Arms and Light Weapons. [online] Available at:
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html (accessed 5 January)
lxxvi
Small Arms Survey. About the Small Arms Survey. [online] Available at:
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/mission.html (accessed 5 January)
lxxvii
SMALL ARMS WORKING GROUP. 2006. Consequences of the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms
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f (accessed 6 January)
lxxviii
SMALL ARMS WORKING GROUP. 2006. Consequences of the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms
and Light Weapons. [online] Available at:
http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/sawg/2006factsheets/SAWG_Small_Arms_Fact_Sheets_2006.pd
f (accessed 6 January)
lxxix
Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January
2014)
lxxx
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lxxxi
Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
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lxxxii
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lxxxiii
Melissa Gillis. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf (accessed 3
January 2014)
lxxxiv
Ibid.
lxxxv
Ibid.
lxxxvi
Ibid.
lxxxvii
Melissa Gillis. 2012. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/ru/publications/pdfs/disarmament%20a%20basic%20guide%202012.pdf (accessed 3 January
2014)
lxxxviii
Handicap International. 2014. About Handicap International. [online] Available at: http://www.handicapinternational.org.uk/about_us (accessed 6 January 2014)
lxxxix
: Dr. Brian Rappert and Richard Moyes. 2006. A case for the prohibition of cluster munitions. [online]
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xc
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xci
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xcii
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xciii
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xciv
United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND
ENFORCEMENT
OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at:
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January)
xcv
Beth A. Simmons. 1998. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/bsimmons/files/Simmons1998.pdf (accessed 8 January)
xcvi
Ibid.
xcvii
Ibid.
xcviii
Ibid.
xcix
David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse. 2003. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict. [online]
Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Reconciliation-After-Violent-Conflict-A-HandbookFull-English-PDF.pdf (accessed 8 January)
c
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT
TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January)
ci
Ibid.
cii
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2001. Verification Yearbook. [online] Available at: http://candispeace.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Compliance_VERTIC-YrBk2000_Dorn&Scott.pdf (accessed 8
January 2014)
ciii
UNEP Division of Environmental Law and Conventions. 2010. Auditing the Implementation of Multilateral
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civ
Liles Parker. 2014. Regulatory Compliance / Compliance Plan Development and Implementation. [online]
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cv
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2001. Verification Yearbook. [online] Available at: http://candispeace.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Compliance_VERTIC-YrBk2000_Dorn&Scott.pdf (accessed 8
January 2014)
cvi
Ibid.
cvii
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Division of
Environmental Law and Conventions. 2009. Issues of compliance: Considerations for the international regime an
access and benefit sharing. [online] Available at:
http://www.unep.org/delc/portals/119/COMPLIANCEandABS.pdf (accessed 8 January)
cviii
Ibid.
cix
Ibid.
cx
United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND
ENFORCEMENT
OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at:
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January)
cxi
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Division of
Environmental Law and Conventions. 2009. Issues of compliance: Considerations for the international regime an
access and benefit sharing. [online] Available at:
http://www.unep.org/delc/portals/119/COMPLIANCEandABS.pdf (accessed 8 January)
cxii
Ibid.
cxiii
Ibid.
cxiv
Ibid.
cxv
Ibid.
cxvi
Ibid.
cxvii
United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND
ENFORCEMENT
OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at:
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January)
cxviii
Ibid.
cxix
Ibid.
cxx
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Division of
Environmental Law and Conventions. 2009. Issues of compliance: Considerations for the international regime an
access and benefit sharing. [online] Available at:
http://www.unep.org/delc/portals/119/COMPLIANCEandABS.pdf (accessed 8 January)
cxxi
United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. GUIDELINES ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND
ENFORCEMENT
OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online] Available at:
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf (accessed 8 January)
cxxii
Ibid.
cxxiii
Ibid.
cxxiv
BRUCH, CARL and MREMA, ELIZABETH. UNEP GUIDELINES AND MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE
WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS. [online]
Available at: http://www.inece.org/conference/7/vol1/MremaBruch.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxxv
Maas Goote & René Lefeber. 2004. COMPLIANCE BUILDING UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL
TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE. [online] Available at:
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/014/j2323e.pdf (accessed 9 January)
cxxvi
COMMISSION ON GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE. 2002. PROCEDURES
TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND GRICULTURE. [online] Available at:
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/014/y7168e.pdf (accessed 9 January)
cxxvii
Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxxviii
Ibid.
cxxix
Ibid.
cxxx
Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Ifft (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxxxi
Ibid.
cxxxii
Ibid.
cxxxiii
Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxxxiv
Jacob Katz Cogan. Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law. [online] Available at:
http://www.yale-university.org/yjil/PDF/Cogan.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxxxv
Ibid.
cxxxvi
Ibid.
cxxxvii
Ibid.
cxxxviii
Ibid.
cxxxix
Ibid.
cxl
Barker, J. 2014. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. [online] Available at:
http://www.eolss.net/eolsssamplechapters/c14/e1-44-01/e1-44-01-txt-02.aspx [Accessed: 13 Feb 2014].
cxli
Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Ifft (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxlii
Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxliii
Edward Ifft. 2005. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control Verification.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Ifft (accessed 9 January 2014)
cxliv
Ibid.
cxlv
Un.org. 2014. UNODA - Disarmament Related Treaties. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/treaty/treaties.shtml [Accessed: 11 January 2014].
cxlvi
Ibid.
cxlvii
Ibid.
cxlviii
Global-challenges.org. 2014. Global Issues of the Twenty-First Century: United Nations Challenges.
[online] Available at: http://www.global-challenges.org/37biological-weapons.html [Accessed: 11 January
2014].
cxlix
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 11 January 2014].
cl
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 11 January 2014].
cli
Ibid.
clii
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2001. Verification Yearbook. [online] Available at: http://candispeace.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Compliance_VERTIC-YrBk2000_Dorn&Scott.pdf (accessed 8
January 2014)
cliii
Ibid.
cliv
Ibid.
clv
Ibid.
clvi
Ibid.
clvii
Ibid.
clviii
Vertic.org. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/Findlay_Geneva%20speech.doc
[Accessed: 11 January 2014].
clix
Ibid.
clx
Opcw.org. 2014. History of the Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at:
http://www.opcw.org/news-publications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ [Accessed:
11 January 2014].
clxi
Ibid.
clxii
Ibid.
clxiii
Vertic.org. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/Findlay_Geneva%20speech.doc
[Accessed: 11 January 2014].
clxiv
Ibid.
clxv
Opcw.org. 2014. History of the Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at:
http://www.opcw.org/news-publications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ [Accessed:
11 January 2014].
clxvi
Mofa.go.jp. 2014. Roles of the United Nations and Other International Organizations, and Japan's
Cooperation. [online] Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1990/1990-2-4.htm [Accessed:
11 January 2014].
clxvii
Opcw.org. 2014. History of the Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at:
http://www.opcw.org/news-publications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ [Accessed:
11 January 2014].
clxviii
Vertic. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/No19.pdf [Accessed: 11 January
2014].
clxix
Ibid.
clxx
Vertic. 2014. Yearbook [online] Available at:
http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2003/VY03_Introduction.pdf [Accessed: 11
January2014].
clxxi
Ibid.
clxxii
Ibid.
clxxiii
Research.microsoft.com. 2014. [online] Available at: http://research.microsoft.com/enus/um/people/leonardo/vstte.ps [Accessed: 14 January 2014].
clxxiv
Ibid.
clxxv
Ibid.
clxxvi
Ibid.
clxxvii
Vertic. 2014. Yearbook [online] Available at:
http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2003/VY03_Introduction.pdf [Accessed: 11
January 2014].
clxxviii
European Commission. 2014. [online] Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/finance/international/transparency/docs/mrv_cc_finance_master_en.pdf
[Accessed: 11 January 2014].
clxxix
Vertic. 2014. Yearbook [online] Available at:
http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2003/VY03_Introduction.pdf [Accessed:11
January 2014].
clxxx
Ibid.
clxxxi
Ibid.
clxxxii
Ibid.
clxxxiii
Nuclearfiles.org. 2014. Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: Issues: Arms Control and Disarmament:
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/armscontrol-disarmament/verification/index.htm [Accessed: 14 January 2014].
clxxxiv
Ibid.
clxxxv
Vertic.org. 2014. VERTIC: Building trust through verification - About VERTIC. [online] Available at:
http://www.vertic.org/pages/homepage/about/about-vertic.php [Accessed: 11 January 2014].
clxxxvi
Ibid.
clxxxvii
Ibid.
clxxxviii
Ibid.
clxxxix
Ibid.
cxc
Council on Foreign Relations. 2014. UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM): Mandate. [online]
Available at: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/un-special-commission-iraq-unscom-mandate/p19033 [Accessed: 18
January 2014].
cxci
Un.org. 2014. basicfacts.html. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/General/basicfacts.html [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cxcii
Un.org. 2014. UNSCOM MANDATE. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscom.htm#MANDATE [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cxciii
Ibid.
cxciv
Unmovic.org. 2014. UNMOVIC - United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.
[online] Available at: http://www.unmovic.org/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cxcv
Ibid.
cxcvi
Ibid.
cxcvii
Ibid.
cxcviii
Ibid.
cxcix
Beyondintractability.org. 2014. Monitoring of Agreements | Beyond Intractability. [online] Available at:
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/monitoring-agreements [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cc
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cci
Ibid.
ccii
Ibid.
cciii
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT
TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January)
cciv
Ibid.
ccv
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccvi
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT
TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January)
ccvii
Ibid.
ccviii
Ibid.
ccix
Ibid.
ccx
Ibid.
ccxi
Ibid.
ccxii
Ibid.
ccxiii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxiv
Ibid.
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxvi
Armscontrol.org. 2014. State Department Arms Control Compliance Report Underscores Value of New
START | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/newstartcompliancereport [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxvii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxviii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. State Department Arms Control Compliance Report Underscores Value of New
START | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/newstartcompliancereport [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxix
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification | Arms Control Association. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxx
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxi
Ibid.
ccxxii
Opcw.org. 2014. Chemical Weapons Convention. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/chemicalweapons-convention/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxiii
Opcw.org. 2014. About the Convention. [online] Available at: http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/about-the-convention/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxiv
Ctbto.org. 2014. The Treaty: CTBTO Preparatory Commission. [online] Available at:
http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/ [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxv
Ibid.
ccxxvi
Un.org. 2014. NPT Treaty. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html
[Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxvii
Iaea.org. 2014. News Center : IAEA and DPRK. [online] Available at:
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxviii
Ibid.
ccxxix
Ibid.
ccxxx
Ibid.
ccxxxi
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxxii
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT
TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January)
ccxxxiii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxxiv
Ibid.
ccxxxv
Ibid.
ccxxxvi
Ibid.
ccxxxvii
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT
TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January)
ccxxxviii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxxxix
Ibid.
ccxl
Ibid.
ccxli
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT
TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January)
ccxlii
Ibid.
ccxliii
Ibid.
ccxliv
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxlv
Ibid.
ccxlvi
Ibid.
ccxv
ccxlvii
Ibid.
Un.org. 2014. NPT Treaty. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html
[Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxlix
Armscontrol.org. 2014. Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification. [online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1926 [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccl
Fas.org. 2014. Cruise Missiles. [online] Available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/cm/ [Accessed: 18
January 2014].
ccli
Ibid.
cclii
A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott. 2009. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS FOR DISARMAMENT
TREATIES. [online] Available at: http://candis-peace.org/dorn/compliance-mechanisms-for-disarmamenttreaties/ (accessed 8 January)
ccliii
Ibid.
ccliv
Ibid.
cclv
Vertic. 2014. Yearbook. [online] Available at:
http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2002/VY02_Joseph-Susiluoto.pdf [Accessed: 18
January 2014].
cclvi
Ibid.
cclvii
Ibid.
cclviii
Ibid.
cclix
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cclx
Ibid.
cclxi
Ibid.
cclxii
Ibid.
cclxiii
UN General Assembly A/RES/53/70
cclxiv
United Nations. 2014. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS_33.pdf
[Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cclxv
Ibid.
cclxvi
Ibid.
cclxvii
Ibid.
cclxviii
Oapen.org. 2014. [online] Available at: http://www.oapen.org/download?type=document&docid=391032
[Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cclxix
References-definitions.blurtit.com. 2014. What Does Cyber Mean? - Blurtit. [online] Available at:
http://references-definitions.blurtit.com/34981/what-does-cyber-mean- [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cclxx
Ibid.
cclxxi
Ibid.
cclxxii
Ibid.
cclxxiii
Schreier. On Cyber Warfare. [online] Available at:
https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCgQFjAA&url=
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dcaf.ch%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F67316%2F1025687%2Ffile%2FOnCyberwarfare
-Schreier.pdf&ei=rMXqUs6GEoKThgew3YHoAQ&usg=AFQjCNHSti4VD11zqhHbyC36ASV0RLJ8g&bvm=bv.60444564,d.ZG4 [Accessed: 10 February 2014]
cclxxiv
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cclxxv
Ibid.
cclxxvi
Oecd.org. 2014. Internet economy - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. [online]
Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonald
ata.htm [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cclxxvii
Ibid.
cclxxviii
Wipo.int. 2014. Understanding Copyright and Related Rights. [online] Available at:
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.html [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
cclxxix
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cclxxx
Ibid.
cclxxxi
Ibid.
cclxxxii
Ibid.
cclxxxiii
Ibid.
ccxlviii
cclxxxiv
Ibid.
Ibid.
cclxxxvi
Ibid.
cclxxxvii
Ibid.
cclxxxviii
Ibid.
cclxxxix
Techterms.com. 2014. ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) Definition. [online] Available
at: http://www.techterms.com/definition/ict [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxc
Ibid.
ccxci
Ibid.
ccxcii
Fleming Euan. 2014. [online] Available at:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/114353/2/Fleming_Euan_553.pdf [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxciii
Ibid.
ccxciv
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
ccxcv
Ibid.
ccxcvi
Wto.org. 2014. WTO | Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study. [online] Available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case27_e.htm [Accessed: 18 January 2014].
ccxcvii
Ibid.
ccxcviii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
ccxcix
Ibid.
ccc
Ibid.
ccci
Ibid.
cccii
Epublications.bond.edu.au. 2014. [online] Available at:
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=eassc_publications [Accessed: 18
January 2014].
ccciii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
ccciv
Ibid.
cccv
Ibid.
cccvi
Mark Sedra. THE FUTURE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM. [online] Available at:
http://www.coffey.com/Uploads/Documents/The%20Future%20of%20SSR_20110504145753.pdf [Accessed 11
February 2014]
cccvii
Ibid.
cccviii
Epublications.bond.edu.au. 2014. [online] Available at:
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=eassc_publications [Accessed: 18
January 2014].
cccix
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccx
Ibid.
cccxi
Un.cv. 2014. Agencies of the UN: ITU. [online] Available at: http://www.un.cv/agency-itu.php [Accessed:
18 January 2014].
cccxii
Ibid.
cccxiii
Ibid.
cccxiv
Un.org. 2014. Charter of the United Nations. [online] Available at:
https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxv
Un.cv. 2014. Agencies of the UN: ITU. [online] Available at: http://www.un.cv/agency-itu.php [Accessed:
18 January 2014].
cccxvi
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxvii
Editors, I. 2014. UNIDIR Books and Reports. [online] Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=47329 [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxviii
Ibid.
cccxix
Unidir.org. 2014. UNIDIR : Statute. [online] Available at: http://www.unidir.org/en/about/theinstitute/statute [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxx
Unidir.org. 2014. UNIDIR : The Institute. [online] Available at: http://www.unidir.org/about/the-institute
[Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxxi
Ibid.
cccxxii
Ibid.
cclxxxv
cccxxiii
Unicri.it. 2014. Mission and Statute. [online] Available at:
http://www.unicri.it/institute/about_unicri/mission_statute/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxxiv
Ibid.
cccxxv
Unidir.org. 2014. UNIDIR : Statute. [online] Available at: http://www.unidir.org/en/about/theinstitute/statute [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxxvi
Unicri.it. 2014. Mission and Statute. [online] Available at:
http://www.unicri.it/institute/about_unicri/mission_statute/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxxvii
Ibid.
cccxxviii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxxix
Ibid.
cccxxx
Unicri.it. 2014. Mission and Statute. [online] Available at:
http://www.unicri.it/institute/about_unicri/mission_statute/ [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cccxxxi
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxxxii
Ibid.
cccxxxiii
United Nations. 2012. Developments in the Field of information and telecommunication in the context of
international security. [online] Available at: http://www.ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/EnekenGGE-2012-Brief.pdf [Accessed: 10 February 2014]
cccxxxiv
Ibid.
cccxxxv
Ibid.
cccxxxvi
Ibid.
cccxxxvii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxxxviii
Ibid.
cccxxxix
Ibid.
cccxl
Ibid.
cccxli
Ibid.
cccxlii
United Nations. 2012. Developments in the Field of information and telecommunication in the context of
international security. [online] Available at: http://www.ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/EnekenGGE-2012-Brief.pdf [Accessed: 10 February 2014
cccxliii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxliv
Ibid.
cccxlv
United Nations. 2012. Developments in the Field of information and telecommunication in the context of
international security. [online] Available at: http://www.ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/EnekenGGE-2012-Brief.pdf [Accessed: 10 February 2014]
cccxlvi
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxlvii
Law Reform Commission. 2010. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MEDIATION AND
CONCILIATION. [online] Available at: http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/r98ADR.pdf [Accessed:
11 February]
cccxlviii
Ibid.
cccxlix
Ibid.
cccl
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccli
Ibid.
ccclii
Un.org. 2014. General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine Non-Member Observer State
Status in United Nations. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm
[Accessed: 10 February 2014].
cccliii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccliv
Ibid.
ccclv
Ibid.
ccclvi
Ibid.
ccclvii
Law Reform Commission. 2010. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MEDIATION AND
CONCILIATION. [online] Available at: http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/r98ADR.pdf [Accessed:
11 February]
ccclviii
Un.org. 2014. General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine Non-Member Observer State
Status in United Nations. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm
[Accessed: 10 February 2014].
ccclix
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
ccclx
Ibid.
ccclxi
Ibid.
ccclxii
Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. Estonia and Israel. [online] Available at:
http://www.vm.ee/?q=node/64 [Accessed: 10 February 2014].
ccclxiii
Ibid.
ccclxiv
Ibid.
ccclxv
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
ccclxvi
Archive.unu.edu. 2014. United Nations in Twenty-First Century. [online] Available at:
http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/un21-report.html [Accessed: 10 February 2014].
ccclxvii
Ibid.
ccclxviii
Ibid.
ccclxix
UN General Assembly A/RES/57/239; A/RES/58/199; A/RES/64/211
ccclxx
Wikileaks.org. 2014. Cable: 09USUNNEWYORK1161_a. [online] Available at:
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USUNNEWYORK1161_a.html [Accessed: 10 February 2014].
ccclxxi
Ibid.
ccclxxii
Ibid.
ccclxxiii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
ccclxxiv
U.S. Homeland Security. 2007. National Preparedness Guidelines. [online] Available at:
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf [Accessed: 20 January 2014]
ccclxxv
Ibid.
ccclxxvi
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
ccclxxvii
Internetsociety.org. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) | Internet Society. [online]
Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/wsis [Accessed: 20 January 2014].
ccclxxviii
Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at:
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014].
ccclxxix
Internetsociety.org. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) | Internet Society. [online]
Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/wsis [Accessed: 20 January 2014].
ccclxxx
Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at:
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014].
ccclxxxi
Ibid.
ccclxxxii
Ibid.
ccclxxxiii
Ibid.
ccclxxxiv
Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at:
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014].
ccclxxxv
Internetsociety.org. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) | Internet Society. [online]
Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/wsis [Accessed: 20 January 2014].
ccclxxxvi
Itu.int. 2014. World Summit on the Information Society. [online] Available at:
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html [Accessed: 21 January 2014].
ccclxxxvii
Ibid.
ccclxxxviii
Ibid.
ccclxxxix
Ibid.
cccxc
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxci
Ibid.
cccxcii
Itu.int. 2014. ITU - Global Cybersecurity Agenda. [online] Available at:
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/hleg/ [Accessed: 19 January 2014].
cccxciii
Ibid.
cccxciv
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxcv
Itu.int. 2014. ITU - Global Cybersecurity Agenda. [online] Available at:
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/hleg/ [Accessed: 19 January 2014].
cccxcvi
Fmprc.gov.cn. 2014. China, Russia and Other Countries Submit the Document of International Code of
Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t858978.htm [Accessed: 19 January 2014].
cccxcvii
Ibid.
cccxcviii
Tim Maurer. Cyber norm emergence at the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]
cccxcix
Fmprc.gov.cn. 2014. China, Russia and Other Countries Submit the Document of International Code of
Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations. [online] Available at:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t858978.htm [Accessed: 19 January 2014].
cd
Ibid.
cdi
Armscontrol.org. 2014. China and Russia Submit Cyber Proposal | Arms Control Association. [online]
Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/China_and_Russia_Submit_Cyber_Proposal [Accessed:
22 January 2014].
cdii
Issuu. 2014. Atlantic Voices Vol.2 no.5. [online] Available at:
http://issuu.com/atlantic_treaty_association/docs/vol._2__no._5__may_2012_ [Accessed: 23 january 2014].
cdiii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. China and Russia Submit Cyber Proposal | Arms Control Association. [online]
Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/China_and_Russia_Submit_Cyber_Proposal [Accessed:
22 January 2014].
cdiv
Issuu. 2014. Atlantic Voices Vol.2 no.5. [online] Available at:
http://issuu.com/atlantic_treaty_association/docs/vol._2__no._5__may_2012_ [Accessed: 23 january 2014].
cdv
Ibid.
cdvi
Ibid.
cdvii
Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at:
https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed:
24 January 2014]
cdviii
Ibid.
cdix
Wikileaks.org. 2014. About. [online] Available at: http://wikileaks.org/About.html [Accessed: 24 January
2014].
cdx
Ibid.
cdxi
Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at:
https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed:
24 January 2014]
cdxii
Wikileaks.org. 2014. About. [online] Available at: http://wikileaks.org/About.html [Accessed: 24 January
2014].
cdxiii
Ibid.
cdxiv
Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at:
https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed:
24 January 2014]
cdxv
Law.cornell.edu. 2014. Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery | Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure | LII / Legal Information Institute. [online] Available at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26 [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cdxvi
Gunter Ollman. 2014. Understanding the Modern DDoS Threat. [online] Available at:
https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Understanding_the_Modern_DDoS_attack.pdf [Accessed:
24 January 2014]
cdxvii
Law.cornell.edu. 2014. Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery | Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure | LII / Legal Information Institute. [online] Available at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26 [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cdxviii
Ibid.
cdxix
Ibid.
cdxx
Ibid.
cdxxi
Ibid.
cdxxii
Ibid.
cdxxiii
Ibid.
cdxxiv
Ibid.
cdxxv
NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2014. United Nations First Committee | NTI. [online] Available at:
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/un-first-committee/ [Accessed: 27 January 2014].
cdxxvi
Ibid.
cdxxvii
Law.cornell.edu. 2014. Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery | Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure | LII / Legal Information Institute. [online] Available at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26 [Accessed: 25 January 2014].
cdxxviii
NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2014. United Nations First Committee | NTI. [online] Available at:
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/un-first-committee/ [Accessed: 27 January 2014].
cdxxix
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014].
cdxxx
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014].
cdxxxi
Ibid.
cdxxxii
Ibid.
cdxxxiii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014].
cdxxxiv
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014].
cdxxxv
Ibid.
cdxxxvi
Ibid.
cdxxxvii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014].
cdxxxviii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014].
cdxxxix
Ibid.
cdxl
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014].
cdxli
Ibid.
cdxlii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014].
cdxliii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014].
cdxliv
Ibid.
cdxlv
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity | Arms Control Association.
[online] Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-onCybersecurity [Accessed: 30 January 2014].
cdxlvi
Un.org. 2014. First Committee Wraps Up Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space,Opens
Discussion on Conventional Weapons, Hearing Introduction of Six DraftTexts. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gadis3394.doc.htm [Accessed: 1 February 2014].
cdxlvii
Ibid.
cdxlviii
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014].
cdxlix
Un.org. 2014. First Committee Wraps Up Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space,Opens
Discussion on Conventional Weapons, Hearing Introduction of Six DraftTexts. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gadis3394.doc.htm [Accessed: 1 February 2014].
cdl
Armscontrol.org. 2014. The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. [online] Available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5927 [Accessed: 29 January 2014].
cdli
Ibid.
cdlii
Sustainabledevelopment.un.org. 2014. Future We Want - Outcome document .:. Sustainable Development
Knowledge Platform. [online] Available at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html [Accessed:
2 February 2014].
cdliii
Ibid.
cdliv
Ibid.
cdlv
Un.org. 2014. First Committee Wraps Up Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space,Opens Discussion
on Conventional Weapons, Hearing Introduction of Six DraftTexts. [online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gadis3394.doc.htm [Accessed: 1 February 2014].
cdlvi
Ibid.
cdlvii
Ibid.
cdlviii
Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, Available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703340904575284964215965730.html. [Accessed 4 February
2014]
cdlix
Ibid.
cdlx
Ibid.
cdlxi
Mark Clayton, Security Lags Cyberattack Threats in Critical Industries, Report Finds, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (April 20, 2011) (citing a global survey of 200 computer security professionals working
in critical infrastructure industries, “In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks”).
cdlxii
Mark Clayton, Security Lags Cyberattack Threats in Critical Industries, Report Finds, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (April 20, 2011) (citing a global survey of 200 computer security professionals working
in critical infrastructure industries, “In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks”).
cdlxiii
Datuk Mohd Noor Amin. 2013. Security of Telecommunications Networks. [online] Available at:
http://www.tk.gov.tr/etkinlikler/uluslararasi_etkinlikler/dosyalar/securityoftelecommunicationsnetworks.pdf
[Accessed: 31 January 2014]
cdlxiv
Ibid.
cdlxv
Ibid.
cdlxvi
Ibid.
cdlxvii
Ibid.