Battle of Jutland.

Battle of Jutland
The Battle of Jutland was a naval battle fought by the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet
(which also included ships and individual personnel from the Royal Australian Navy
and Royal Canadian Navy) against the Imperial German Navy's High Seas Fleet
during the First World War. The battle was fought on 31 May and 1 June 1916 in the
North Sea near Jutland, Denmark. It was the largest naval battle and the only fullscale clash of battleships in the war. It was only the third-ever fleet action between
steel battleships, following the smaller but more decisive battles of the Yellow Sea
(1904) and Tsushima (1905) during the Russo-Japanese War.
The Grand Fleet was commanded by British Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, and the High
Seas Fleet by German Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer. The High Seas Fleet's
intention was to lure out, trap and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the
German naval force was insufficient to successfully engage the entire British fleet.
This formed part of a larger strategy to break the British blockade of Germany and to
allow German mercantile shipping to operate. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy pursued a
strategy to engage and destroy the High Seas Fleet, or keep the German force
contained and away from Britain's own shipping lanes.
The German plan was to use Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper's fast scouting group of five
modern battlecruisers to lure Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty's battlecruiser squadrons
into the path of the main German fleet. Submarines were stationed in advance
across the likely routes of the British ships. However, the British learned from signal
intercepts that a major fleet operation was likely, so on 30 May Jellicoe sailed with
the Grand Fleet to rendezvous with Beatty, passing over the locations of the German
submarine picket lines while they were unprepared. The German plan had been
delayed, causing further problems for their submarines which had reached the limit
of their endurance at sea.
On the afternoon of 31 May, Beatty encountered Hipper's battlecruiser force long
before the Germans had expected. In a running battle, Hipper successfully drew the
British vanguard into the path of the High Seas Fleet. By the time Beatty sighted the
larger force and turned back towards the British main fleet, he had lost two
battlecruisers from a force of six battlecruisers and four battleships, against the five
ships commanded by Hipper. The battleships, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir
Hugh Evan-Thomas, were the last to turn and formed a rearguard as Beatty
withdrew, now drawing the German fleet in pursuit towards the main British
positions. Between 18:30, when the sun was lowering on the western horizon,
backlighting the German forces, and nightfall at about 20:30, the two fleets – totalling
250 ships between them – directly engaged twice.
Fourteen British and eleven German ships were sunk, with great loss of life. After
sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe manoeuvred to cut the Germans off from
their base, hoping to continue the battle the next morning, but under the cover of
darkness Scheer broke through the British light forces forming the rearguard of the
Grand Fleet and returned to port.
Both sides claimed victory. The British lost more ships and twice as many sailors,
and the British press criticised the Grand Fleet's failure to force a decisive outcome,
but Scheer's plan of destroying a substantial portion of the British fleet also failed.
The Germans' 'fleet in being' continued to pose a threat, requiring the British to keep
their battleships concentrated in the North Sea, but the battle confirmed the German
policy of avoiding all fleet-to-fleet contact. At the end of the year, after further
unsuccessful attempts to reduce the Royal Navy's numerical advantage, the German
Navy turned its efforts and resources to unrestricted submarine warfare and the
destruction of Allied and neutral shipping which by April 1917 triggered America's
declaration of war on Germany.
Subsequent reviews commissioned by the Royal Navy generated strong
disagreement between supporters of Jellicoe and Beatty concerning the two
admirals' performance in the battle. Debate over their performance and the
significance of the battle continues today.
Background and Planning
German planning
With 16 dreadnought-class battleships, compared with the Royal Navy's 28, the
German High Seas Fleet stood little chance of winning a head-to-head clash. The
Germans therefore adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy. They would stage raids
into the North Sea and bombard the English coast, with the aim of luring out small
British squadrons and pickets, which could then be destroyed by superior forces or
submarines.
In January 1916, Admiral von Pohl, commander
of the German fleet, fell ill. He was replaced by
Reinhard Scheer (left), who believed that the
fleet had been used too defensively, had better
ships and men than the British, and ought to take
the war to them.
According to Scheer, the German naval strategy
should be to damage the British fleet by offensive
raids against the naval forces engaged in
watching and blockading the German Bight, as
well as by mine-laying on the British coast and
submarine attack, whenever possible. After an
equality of strength had been realised as a result
of these operations, and all our forces had been
made ready and concentrated, an attempt was to
be made with our fleet to seek battle under
circumstances unfavourable to the enemy.
On 25 April 1916 a decision was made by the German admiralty to halt
indiscriminate attacks by submarine on merchant shipping. This followed protests
from neutral countries, notably the United States, that their nationals had been the
victims of attacks. Germany agreed that future attacks would only take place in
accord with internationally agreed prize rules, which required an attacker to give a
warning and allow the crews of vessels time to escape, and not to attack neutral
vessels at all. Scheer believed that it would not be possible to continue attacks on
these terms, which took away the advantage of secret approach by submarines and
left them vulnerable to even relatively small guns on the target ships. Instead, he set
about deploying the submarine fleet against military vessels.
It was hoped that, following a successful German submarine attack, fast British
escorts, such as destroyers, would be tied down by anti-submarine operations. If the
Germans could catch the British in the expected locations, there were thought to be
good prospects of at least partially redressing the balance of forces between the
fleets. If the British sortied in response to the raiding attack force, the Royal Navy's
centuries-old instincts for aggressive action could be exploited to draw its weakened
units towards the main German fleet under Scheer. The hope was that Scheer would
thus be able to ambush a section of the British fleet and destroy it.
Submarine deployments
A plan was devised to station submarines offshore from British naval bases, and
then stage some action that would draw out the British ships to the waiting
submarines. The battlecruiser SMS Seydlitz had been damaged in a previous
engagement, but was due to be repaired by mid May, so an operation was
scheduled for 17 May 1916. At the start of May, difficulties with condensers were
discovered on ships of the third battleship squadron, so the operation was put back
to 23 May. Ten submarines – U-24, U-32, U-43, U-44, UC-47, U-51, U-52, U-63, U-
66, and U-70 – were given orders first to patrol in the central North Sea between 17
and 22 May, and then to take up waiting positions. U-43 and U-44 were stationed in
the Pentland Firth, which the Grand Fleet was likely to cross leaving Scapa Flow,
while the remainder proceeded to the Firth of Forth, awaiting departing
battlecruisers. Each boat had an allocated area, within which it could move around
as necessary to avoid detection, but was instructed to keep within it. During the initial
North Sea patrol the boats were instructed to sail only north-south so that any enemy
who chanced to encounter one would believe it was departing or returning from
operations on the west coast (which required them to pass around the north of
Scotland). Once at their final positions, the boats were under strict orders to avoid
premature detection that might give away the operation. It was arranged that a
coded signal would be transmitted to alert the submarines exactly when the
operation commenced: 'Take into account the enemy's forces may be putting to sea'.
Additionally, UB-27 was sent out on 20 May with instructions to work its way into the
Firth of Forth past May Island. U-46 was ordered to patrol the coast of Sunderland,
which had been chosen for the diversionary attack, but because of engine problems
it was unable to leave port and U-47 was diverted to this task. On 13 May, U-72 was
sent to lay mines in the Firth of Forth; on the 23rd, U-74 departed to lay mines in the
Moray Firth; and on the 24th, U-75 was dispatched similarly west of the Orkney
Islands. UB-21 and UB-22 were sent to patrol the Humber, where (incorrect) reports
had suggested the presence of British warships. U-22, U-46 and U-67 were
positioned north of Terschelling to protect against intervention by British light forces
stationed at Harwich.
On 22 May 1916 it was discovered that Seydlitz was still not watertight after repairs
and would not now be ready until the 29th. The ambush submarines were now on
station and experiencing difficulties of their own: visibility near the coast was
frequently poor due to fog, and sea conditions were either so calm the slightest
ripple, as from the periscope, could give away their position, or so rough as to make
it very hard to keep the vessel at a steady depth. The British had become aware of
unusual submarine activity, and had begun counter patrols that forced the
submarines out of position. UB-27 passed Bell Rock on the night of 23 May on its
way into the Firth of Forth as planned, but was halted by engine trouble. After repairs
it continued to approach, following behind merchant vessels, and reached Largo Bay
on 25 May. There the boat became entangled in nets that fouled one of the
propellers, forcing it to abandon the operation and return home. U-74 was detected
by four armed trawlers on 27 May and sunk 25 mi (22 nmi; 40 km) southeast of
Peterhead. U-75 laid its mines off the Orkney Islands, which, although they played
no part in the battle, were responsible later for sinking the cruiser Hampshire
carrying Lord Kitchener (head of the army) on a mission to Russia on 5 June. U-72
was forced to abandon its mission without laying any mines when an oil leak meant it
was laying a visible surface trail astern.
Zeppelins
The Germans maintained a fleet of Zeppelins that they used for aerial
reconnaissance and occasional bombing raids. The planned raid on Sunderland
intended to use Zeppelins to watch out for the British fleet approaching from the
north, which might otherwise surprise the raiders.
By 28 May, strong northeasterly winds meant that it would not be possible to send
out the Zeppelins, so the raid again had to be postponed. The submarines could only
stay on station until 1 June before their supplies would be exhausted and they had to
return, so a decision had to be made quickly about the raid.
It was decided to use an alternative plan,
abandoning the attack on Sunderland but
instead sending a patrol of battlecruisers
to the Skagerrak, which is the strategic
gateway to the Baltic and North Atlantic
waters off Jutland and Norway
They thought would encounter merchant
ships carrying British cargo and British
cruiser patrols. It was felt this could be
done without air support, because the
action would now be much closer to
Germany, relying instead on cruiser and
torpedo boat patrols for reconnaissance.
Orders for the alternative plan were
issued on 28 May, though still hoping that
last-minute improvements in the weather
would allow the original plan to go ahead.
The German fleet assembled in the Jade River and at Wilhelmshaven and was
instructed to raise steam and be ready for action from midnight on 28 May.
By 14:00 on 30 May, the wind was still too strong and the final decision was made to
use the alternative plan. The coded signal '31 May G.G.2490' was transmitted to the
ships of the fleet to inform them the Skagerrak attack would start on 31 May. The
pre-arranged signal to the waiting submarines was transmitted throughout the day
from the E-Dienst radio station at Brugge, and the U-boat tender Arcona anchored at
Emden. Only two of the waiting submarines, U-66 and U-32, received the order.
British response
Unfortunately for the German plan, the British had obtained a copy of the main
German codebook from the light cruiser SMS Magdeburg, which had been boarded
by the Russian Navy after the ship ran aground in Russian territorial waters in 1914.
German naval radio communications could therefore often be quickly deciphered,
and the British Admiralty usually knew about German activities.
The British Admiralty's Room 40 maintained direction finding and interception of
German naval signals. It had intercepted and decrypted a German signal on 28 May
ordering all ships to be ready for sea on the 30th. Further signals were intercepted,
and although they were not decrypted it was clear that a major operation was likely.
At 11:00 on 30 May, Jellicoe was warned that the German fleet seemed prepared to
sail the following morning. By 17:00, the Admiralty had intercepted the signal from
Scheer, '31 May G.G.2490', making it clear something significant was imminent.
Not knowing the Germans' objective, Admiral
John Jellicoe (left) and his staff decided to
position the fleet to head off any attempt by
the Germans to enter the North Atlantic, or
the Baltic through the Skagerrak, by taking up
a position off Norway where they could
possibly cut off any German raid into the
shipping lanes of the Atlantic, or prevent the
Germans from heading into the Baltic. A
position further west was unnecessary, as
that area of the North Sea could be patrolled
by air using blimps and scouting aircraft.
Consequently, Admiral Jellicoe led the 16
dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 4th
Battle Squadrons of the Grand Fleet and
three battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser
Squadron eastwards out of Scapa Flow at
22:30 on 30 May. He was to meet the 2nd
Battle Squadron of eight more dreadnought
battleships commanded by Vice-Admiral
Martyn Jerram coming from Cromarty.
Hipper's raiding force did not leave the Outer Jade Roads until 01:00 on 31 May,
heading west of Heligoland Island following a cleared channel through the
minefields, heading north at 16kn (18mph; 30km/h). The main German fleet of 16
dreadnought battleships of 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons left the Jade at 02:30,
being joined off Heligoland at 04:00 by the six pre-dreadnoughts of the 2nd Battle
Squadron coming from the Elbe River. Beatty's faster force of six ships of the 1st and
2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons plus the 5th Battle Squadron of four fast battleships left
the Firth of Forth on the next day; Jellicoe's intention was to rendezvous with him
90 mi (78 nmi; 140 km) west of the mouth of the Skagerrak off the coast of Jutland
and wait for the Germans or for their intentions to become clear. The planned
position gave him the widest range of responses to likely German intentions.
Order of Battle
Dreadnought Battleships
Pre-Dreadnoughts
Battlecruisers
Armoured Cruisers
Light Cruisers
Destroyers
Seaplane Carrier
British
28
0
9
8
26
79
1
German
16
6
5
0
11
61
0
Jellicoe's Grand Fleet was split into two sections. The dreadnought Battle Fleet with
which he sailed formed the main force and was composed of 24 battleships and
three battlecruisers. The battleships were formed into three squadrons of eight ships,
further subdivided into divisions of four, each led by a flag officer. Accompanying
them were eight armoured cruisers (classified by the Royal Navy since 1913 as
"cruisers"), eight light cruisers, four scout cruisers, 51 destroyers, and one destroyerminelayer.
The Grand Fleet sailed without three of its
battleships: Emperor of India in refit at
Invergordon, Queen Elizabeth drydocked at
Rosyth and Dreadnought in refit at
Devonport. The brand new Royal Sovereign
was left behind, with only three weeks in
service, her untrained crew judged unready
for battle.
British reconnaissance was provided by the
Battlecruiser Fleet under David Beatty (left):
six battlecruisers, four fast Queen Elizabethclass battleships, 14 light cruisers and 27
destroyers.
Air scouting was provided for by the
attachment
of
the
seaplane
tender
HMS Engadine, one of the first aircraft
carriers in history to participate in a naval
engagement.
The German High Seas Fleet under Scheer was also split into a main force and a
separate reconnaissance force. Scheer's main battle fleet was composed of 16
battleships and six pre-dreadnought battleships arranged in an identical manner to
the British. With them were six light cruisers and 31 torpedo-boats, (the latter being
roughly equivalent to a British destroyer).
The German scouting force, commanded by Franz Hipper, consisted of five
battlecruisers, five light cruisers and 30 torpedo-boats. The Germans had no
equivalent to Engadine, and no heavier-than-air aircraft to operate with the fleet, but
had the Imperial German Naval Airship Service's force of rigid airships available to
patrol the North Sea.
The British capital ships carried a larger number of guns and a correspondingly
larger weight of broadside than their German counterparts: 332,360 lb (150,760 kg)
as compared to 134,216 lb (60,879 kg). All of the battleships and battlecruisers on
both sides also carried torpedoes of various sizes, as did the lighter craft. The British
battleships carried three or four underwater torpedo tubes. The battlecruisers carried
from two to five. All were either 18-inch or 21-inch diameter. The German battleships
carried five or six underwater torpedo tubes in three sizes from 18 to 21 inch and the
battlecruisers carried four or five tubes.
The German battle fleet was hampered by the slow speed and relatively poor
armament of the six pre-dreadnoughts of II Squadron, which limited maximum fleet
speed to 18kn (21mph; 33km/h), compared to maximum British fleet speed of 21kn
(24mph; 39km/h). On the British side, the eight armoured cruisers were deficient in
both speed and armour protection. Both of these obsolete squadrons were notably
vulnerable to attacks by more modern enemy ships.
Battlecruiser action
The route of the British battlecruiser fleet took it through the patrol sector allocated to
U-32. After receiving the order to commence the operation, the U-boat moved to a
position 80mi (70nmi; 130km) east of May Island at dawn on 31 May. At 03:40, it
sighted the cruisers HMS Galatea and Phaeton leaving the Forth at 18kn (21mph;
33km/h). It launched one torpedo at the leading cruiser at a range of 1,000yds
(910m), but its periscope jammed 'up', giving away the position of the submarine as
it manoeuvred to fire a second. The lead cruiser turned away to dodge the torpedo,
while the second turned towards the submarine, attempting to ram. U-32 crash
dived, and on raising its periscope at 04:10 saw two battlecruisers (the 2nd
Battlecruiser Squadron) heading southeast. They were too far away to attack, but
Kapitänleutnant von Spiegel reported the sighting of two battleships and two cruisers
to Germany.
U-66 was also supposed to be patrolling off the Firth of Forth, but had been forced
north to a position 60mi (52nmi; 97km) off Peterhead by patrolling British vessels.
This now brought it into contact with the 2nd Battle Squadron, coming from the
Moray Firth. At 05:00, it had to crash dive when the cruiser Duke of Edinburgh
appeared from the mist heading toward it. It was followed by another cruiser,
Boadicea, and eight battleships. U-66 got within 350yds (320m) of the battleships
preparing to fire, but was forced to dive by an approaching destroyer and missed the
opportunity. At 06:35, it reported eight battleships and cruisers heading north.
The courses reported by both submarines were incorrect, because they reflected
one leg of a zig-zag being used by British ships to avoid submarines. Taken with a
wireless intercept of more ships leaving Scapa Flow earlier in the night, they created
the impression in the German High Command that the British fleet, whatever it was
doing, was split into separate sections moving apart, which was precisely as the
Germans wished to meet it.
Jellicoe's ships proceeded to their rendezvous undamaged and undiscovered.
However, he was now misled by an Admiralty intelligence report advising that the
German main battle fleet was still in port. The Director of Operations Division, Rear
Admiral Thomas Jackson, had asked the intelligence division, Room 40, for the
current location of German call sign DK, used by Admiral Scheer. They had replied
that it was currently transmitting from Wilhelmshaven. It was known to the
intelligence staff that Scheer deliberately used a different call sign when at sea, but
no one asked for this information or explained the reason behind the query – to
locate the German fleet.
The German battlecruisers cleared the minefields surrounding the Amrum swept
channel by 09:00. They then proceeded northwest, passing 35mi (30nmi; 56km)
west of the Horn's Reef lightship heading for the Little Fisher Bank at the mouth of
the Skagerrak. The High Seas Fleet followed some 50 mi (43 nmi; 80 km) behind.
The battlecruisers were in line ahead, with the four cruisers of the II scouting group
plus supporting torpedo boats ranged in an arc 8mi (7.0nmi; 13km) ahead and to
either side. The IX torpedo boat flotilla formed close support immediately
surrounding the battlecruisers. The High Seas Fleet similarly adopted a line-ahead
formation, with close screening by torpedo boats to either side and a further screen
of five cruisers surrounding the column 5–8mi (4.3–7.0nmi; 8.0–12.9km) away. The
wind had finally moderated so that Zeppelins could be used, and by 11:30 five had
been sent out: L14 to the Skagerrak, L23 240mi (210nmi; 390km) east of Noss Head
in the Pentland Firth, L21 120mi (100nmi; 190km) off Peterhead, L9 100mi (87nmi;
160km) off Sunderland, and L16 80mi (70nmi; 130km) east of Flamborough Head.
Visibility, however, was still bad, with clouds down to 1,000 ft (300 m).
Contact
HMS Warspite and Malaya, seen from HMS Valiant at around 14:00 hrs
By around 14:00, Beatty's ships were proceeding eastward at roughly the same
latitude as Hipper's squadron, which was heading north. Had the courses remained
unchanged, Beatty would have passed between the two German fleets, 40mi
(35nmi; 64km) south of the battlecruisers and 20mi (17nmi; 32km) north of the High
Seas Fleet at around 16:30, possibly trapping his ships just as the German plan
envisioned. However, his orders were to stop his scouting patrol when he reached a
point 260mi (230nmi; 420km) east of Britain and then turn north to meet Jellicoe,
which he did at this time. Beatty's ships were divided into three columns, with the two
battlecruiser squadrons leading in parallel lines 3mi (2.6nmi; 4.8km) apart. The 5th
Battle Squadron was stationed 5mi (4.3nmi; 8.0km) to the northwest, on the side
furthest away from any expected enemy contact, while a screen of cruisers and
destroyers was spread southeast of the battlecruisers. After the turn, the 5th Battle
Squadron was now leading the British ships in the westmost column, and Beatty's
squadron was centre and rearmost, with the 2nd BCS to the west.
At 14:20 on 31 May, despite heavy haze and scuds of fog giving poor visibility,
scouts from Beatty's force reported enemy ships to the southeast; the British light
units, investigating a neutral Danish steamer (N J Fjord), which was stopped
between the two fleets, had found two German destroyers engaged on the same
mission (B109 and B110).
(1) 15:22 hrs, Hipper sights
Beatty.
(2) 15:48 hrs, First shots fired
by
Hipper's
squadron.
(3)
16:00
hrs-16:05
hrs,
Indefatigable explodes, leaving
two
survivors.
(4) 16:25 hrs, Queen Mary
explodes,
nine
survive.
(5)
16:45
hrs,
Beatty's
battlecruisers move out of
range
of
Hipper.
(6) 16:54 hrs, Evan-Thomas's
battleships turn north behind
Beatty.
The first shots of the battle were
fired
at
14:28
when
HMS Galatea and Phaeton of
the British 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron opened on the
German torpedo boats, which
withdrew toward their own
approaching light cruisers.
At 14:36, the Germans scored the first hit of the battle when SMS Elbing, of RearAdmiral Friedrich Bödicker's Scouting Group II, hit her British counterpart Galatea at
extreme range.
Meanwhile Beatty began to move his battlecruisers and supporting forces
southeastwards and then east to cut the German ships off from their base, and
ordered Engadine to launch a seaplane to try to get more information about the size
and location of the German forces. This was the first time in history that a carrierbased aeroplane was used for reconnaissance in naval combat. Engadine's plane
did locate and report some German light cruisers just before 15:30, and came under
anti-aircraft gunfire, but attempts to relay the plane's reports failed.
Unfortunately for Beatty, his initial course changes at 14:32 were not received by Sir
Hugh Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron (the distance being too great to read his
flags), because the battlecruiser HMS Tiger – the last ship in his column – was no
longer in a position where she could relay signals by searchlight to Evan-Thomas, as
she had previously been ordered to do. Whereas before the north turn, Tiger had
been the closest ship to Evan-Thomas, she was now further away than Beatty in
Lion. Matters were aggravated because Evan-Thomas had not been briefed
regarding standing orders within Beatty's squadron, as his squadron normally
operated with the Grand Fleet. Fleet ships were expected to obey movement orders
precisely and not deviate from them. Beatty's standing instructions expected his
officers to use their initiative and keep station with the flagship. As a result, the four
Queen Elizabeth-class battleships – which were the fastest and most heavily armed
in the world at that time – remained on the previous course for several minutes,
ending up 10mi (8.7nmi; 16km) behind rather than five. Beatty also had the
opportunity during the previous hours to concentrate his forces, and no reason not to
do so, whereas he steamed ahead at full speed, faster than the battleships could
manage. Dividing the force had serious consequences for the British, costing them
what would have been an overwhelming advantage in ships and firepower during the
first half-hour of the coming battle.
With visibility favouring the Germans, Hipper's battlecruisers at 15:22, steaming
approximately northwest, sighted Beatty's squadron at a range of about 15 mi
(13 nmi; 24 km), while Beatty's forces did not identify Hipper's battlecruisers until
15:30. (position 1 om map). At 15:45, Hipper turned southeast to lead Beatty toward
Scheer, who was 46 mi (40 nmi; 74 km) southeast with the main force of the High
Seas Fleet.[35]
The Run to the South
Beatty's conduct during the next 15 minutes has received a great deal of criticism, as
his ships out-ranged and outnumbered the German squadron, yet he held his fire for
over 10 minutes with the German ships in range. He also failed to use the time
available to rearrange his battlecruisers into a fighting formation, with the result that
they were still manoeuvring when the battle started.
At 15:48, with the opposing forces roughly parallel at 15,000yds (14,000m), with the
British to the southwest of the Germans (i.e., on the right side), Hipper opened fire,
followed by the British ships as their guns came to bear upon targets (position 2).
Thus began the opening phase of the battlecruiser action, known as the "Run to the
South", in which the British chased the Germans, and Hipper intentionally led Beatty
toward Scheer. During the first minutes of the ensuing battle, all the British ships
except Princess Royal fired far over their German opponents, due to adverse
visibility conditions, before finally getting the range. Only Lion and Princess Royal
had settled into formation, so the other four ships were hampered in aiming by their
own turning. Beatty was to windward of Hipper, and therefore funnel and gun smoke
from his own ships tended to obscure his targets, while Hipper's smoke blew clear.
Also, the eastern sky was overcast and the grey German ships were indistinct and
difficult to range.
Beatty had ordered his ships to engage in a line, one British ship engaging with one
German and his flagship HMS Lion doubling on the German flagship SMS Lützow.
However, due to another mistake with signalling by flag, and possibly because the
Queen Mary and Tiger were unable to see the German lead ship because of smoke,
the second German ship, Derfflinger, was left unengaged and free to fire without
disruption. SMS Moltke drew fire from two of Beatty's battlecruisers, but still fired with
deadly accuracy during this time, putting nine shells into Tiger in the first 12 minutes.
The Germans drew first blood. Aided by superior visibility, Hipper's five battlecruisers
quickly registered hits on three of the six British battlecruisers. Seven minutes
passed before the British managed to score their first hit.
Beatty's flagship Lion burning after being hit by a salvo from Lützow
HMS Indefatigable sinking, struck by shells from SMS Von der Tann
The first near-kill of the Run to the South occurred at 16:00, when a 12in (300mm)
salvo from Lützow wrecked the "Q" turret amidships on Beatty's flagship Lion.
Dozens of crewmen were instantly killed, but far larger destruction was averted when
the mortally wounded turret commander – Major Francis Harvey of the Royal
Marines – promptly ordered the magazine doors shut and the magazine flooded.
This prevented a magazine explosion at 16:28, when a flash fire ignited ready cordite
charges beneath the turret and killed everyone in the chambers outside "Q"
magazine. Lion was saved. HMS Indefatigable was not so lucky; at 16:02, just 14
minutes into the slugging match, she was smashed aft by three 11 in (280 mm)
shells from SMS Von der Tann, causing damage sufficient to knock her out of line
and detonating "X" magazine aft. Soon after, despite the near-maximum range, Von
der Tann put another 11 in (280 mm) salvo on Indefatigable's "A" turret forward. The
plunging shells probably pierced the thin upper armour, and seconds later
Indefatigable was ripped apart by another magazine explosion, sinking immediately
with her crew of 1,019 officers and men, leaving only two survivors. (position 3).
Hipper's position deteriorated somewhat by 16:15 as the 5th Battle Squadron finally
came into range, so that he had to contend with gunfire from the four battleships
astern as well as Beatty's five remaining battlecruisers to starboard. But he knew his
baiting mission was close to completion, as his force was rapidly closing with
Scheer's main body. At 16:08, the lead battleship of the 5th Battle Squadron,
HMS Barham, caught up with Hipper and opened fire at extreme range, scoring a
15in (380mm) hit on Von der Tann within 60 seconds. Still, it was 16:15 before all the
battleships of the 5th were able to fully engage at long range.
HMS Queen Mary blowing up
At 16:25, the battlecruiser action intensified again when HMS Queen Mary was hit by
what may have been a combined salvo from Derfflinger and Seydlitz; she
disintegrated when both forward magazines exploded, sinking with all but nine of her
1,275 man crew lost. (position 4). Commander von Hase, the first gunnery officer
aboard Derfflingler, noted:
The enemy was shooting superbly. Twice the Derfflinger came under their
infernal hail and each time she was hit. But the Queen Mary was having a bad
time; engaged by the Seydlitz as well as the Derfflinger, she met her doom at
1626. A vivid red flame shot up from her forepart; then came an explosion
forward, followed by a much heavier explosion amidships. Immediately
afterwards, she blew up with a terrific explosion, the masts collapsing inwards
and the smoke hiding everything.
During the Run to the South, from 15:48 to 16:54, the German battlecruisers made
an estimated total of forty-two 11 and 12in (280 and 300mm) hits on the British
battlecruisers (nine on Lion, six on Princess Royal, seven on Queen Mary, 14 on
Tiger, one on New Zealand, five on Indefatigable), and two more on the battleship
Barham, compared with only eleven 13.5in (340mm) hits by the British battlecruisers
(four on Lützow, four on Seydlitz, two on Moltke, one on von der Tann), and six 15 in
(380 mm) hits by the battleships (one on Seydlitz, four on Moltke, one on von der
Tann).
"Something wrong with our bloody ships"
Shortly after 16:26, a salvo struck on or around HMS Princess Royal, which was
obscured by spray and smoke from shell bursts. A signalman promptly leapt on to
the bridge of Lion and announced "Princess Royal's blown up, Sir." Beatty famously
turned to his flag captain, saying "Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with
our bloody ships today." (In popular legend, Beatty also immediately ordered his
ships to "turn two points to port", i.e., two points nearer the enemy, but there is no
official record of any such command or course change.) Princess Royal, as it turned
out, was still afloat after the spray cleared.
At 16:30, Scheer's leading battleships sighted the distant battlecruiser action; soon
after, HMS Southampton of Beatty's 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron led by Commodore
William Goodenough sighted the main body of Scheer's High Seas Fleet, dodging
numerous heavy-calibre salvos to report in detail the German strength: 16
dreadnoughts with six older battleships. This was the first news that Beatty and
Jellicoe had that Scheer and his battle fleet were even at sea. Simultaneously, an allout destroyer action raged in the space between the opposing battlecruiser forces,
as British and German destroyers fought with each other and attempted to torpedo
the larger enemy ships. Each side fired many torpedoes, but both battlecruiser
forces turned away from the attacks and all escaped harm except Seydlitz, which
was hit forward at 16:57 by a torpedo fired by the British destroyer HMS Petard.
Though taking on water, Seydlitz maintained speed. The destroyer HMS Nestor,
under the command of Captain Barry Bingham, led the British attacks. The British
disabled the German torpedo boat V27, which the Germans soon abandoned and
sank, and Petard then torpedoed and sank V29, her second score of the day. S35
and V26 rescued the crews of their sunken sister ships. But Nestor and another
British destroyer – HMS Nomad – were immobilised by shell hits, and were later
sunk by Scheer's passing dreadnoughts. Bingham was rescued, and won the
Victoria Cross for his leadership in the destroyer action.
The Run to the North
As soon as he himself sighted the vanguard of Scheer's distant battleship line 12mi
(10nmi; 19km) away, at 16:40, Beatty turned his battlecruiser force 180°, heading
north to draw the Germans toward Jellicoe. (position 5). Beatty's withdrawal toward
Jellicoe is called the "Run to the North", in which the tables turned and the Germans
chased the British. Because Beatty once again failed to signal his intentions
adequately, the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron – which were too far behind to
read his flags – found themselves passing the battlecruisers on an opposing course
and heading directly toward the approaching main body of the High Seas Fleet. At
16:48, at extreme range, Scheer's leading battleships opened fire.
Meanwhile, at 16:47, having received Goodenough's signal and knowing that Beatty
was now leading the German battlefleet north to him, Jellicoe signalled to his own
forces that the fleet action they had waited so long for was finally imminent; at 16:51,
by radio, he informed the Admiralty so in London.
The difficulties of the 5th Battle Squadron were compounded when Beatty gave the
order to Evan-Thomas to "turn in succession" (rather than "turn together") at 16:48
as the battleships passed him. Evan-Thomas acknowledged the signal, but
Lieutenant-Commander Ralph Seymour, Beatty's flag lieutenant, aggravated the
situation when he did not haul down the flags (to execute the signal) for some
minutes. At 16:55, when the 5BS had moved within range of the enemy battleships,
Evan-Thomas issued his own flag command warning his squadron to expect sudden
manoeuvres and to follow his lead, before starting to turn on his own initiative. The
order to turn in succession would have resulted in all four ships turning in the same
patch of sea as they reached it one by one, giving the High Seas Fleet repeated
opportunity with ample time to find the proper range. However, the captain of the
trailing ship (HMS Malaya) turned early, mitigating the adverse results.
For the next hour, the 5th Battle Squadron acted as Beatty's rearguard, drawing fire
from all the German ships within range, while by 17:10 Beatty had deliberately eased
his own squadron out of range of Hipper's now-superior battlecruiser force to give his
damaged ships a respite from the accurate and deadly fire of his foes. Since visibility
and firepower now favoured the Germans, there was no incentive for Beatty to risk
further battlecruiser losses when his own gunnery could not be effective. Illustrating
the imbalance, Beatty's battlecruisers did not score any hits on the Germans in this
phase until 17:45, but they had rapidly received five more before he opened the
range (four on Lion, of which three were by Lützow, and one on Tiger by Seydlitz).
Now the only targets the Germans could reach, the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron,
received simultaneous fire from Hipper's battlecruisers to the east (which HMS
Barham and Valiant engaged) and Scheer's leading battleships to the southeast
(which HMS Warspite and Malaya engaged). Three took hits: Barham (four by
Derfflinger), Warspite (two by Seydlitz), and Malaya (seven by the German
battleships). Only Valiant was unscathed.
The four battleships were far better suited to take this sort of pounding than the
battlecruisers, and none were lost, though Malaya suffered heavy damage, an
ammunition fire, and heavy crew casualties. At the same time, the 15in (380mm) fire
of the four British ships was accurate and effective. As the two British squadrons
headed north at top speed, eagerly chased by the entire German fleet, the 5th Battle
Squadron scored 13 hits on the enemy battlecruisers (four on Lützow, three on
Derfflinger, six on Seydlitz) and five on battleships (although only one, on
SMS Markgraf, did any serious damage). (position 6).
The Fleets Converge
Jellicoe was now aware that full fleet engagement was nearing, but had insufficient
information on the position and course of the Germans. To assist Beatty, early in the
battle at about 16:05, Jellicoe had ordered Rear-Admiral Horace Hood's 3rd
Battlecruiser Squadron to speed ahead to find and support Beatty's force, and Hood
was now racing SSE well in advance of Jellicoe's northern force. Rear-Admiral
Arbuthnot's 1st Cruiser Squadron patrolled the van of Jellicoe's main battleship force
as it advanced steadily to the southeast.
At 17:33, the armoured cruiser HMS Black Prince of Arbuthnot's squadron, on the far
southwest flank of Jellicoe's force, came within view of HMS Falmouth, which was
about 5mi (4.3nmi; 8.0km) ahead of Beatty with the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron,
establishing the first visual link between the converging bodies of the Grand Fleet. At
17:38, the scout cruiser HMS Chester, screening Hood's oncoming battlecruisers,
was intercepted by the van of the German scouting forces under Rear-Admiral
Bödicker.
Heavily outnumbered by Bödicker's four light cruisers, Chester was pounded before
being relieved by Hood's heavy units, which swung westward for that purpose.
Hood's flagship HMS Invincible disabled the light cruiser SMS Wiesbaden shortly
after 17:56. Wiesbaden became a sitting target for most of the British fleet during the
next hour, but remained afloat and fired some torpedoes at the passing enemy
battleships from long range. Meanwhile, Bödicker's other ships fled toward Hipper
and Scheer in the mistaken belief that Hood was leading a larger force of British
capital ships from the north and east. A chaotic destroyer action in mist and smoke
ensued as German torpedo boats attempted to blunt the arrival of this new
formation, but Hood's battlecruisers dodged all the torpedoes fired at them. In this
action, after leading a torpedo counterattack, the British destroyer HMS Shark was
disabled, but continued to return fire at numerous passing enemy ships for the next
hour.
The Fleet Action - Deployment
In the meantime, Beatty and Evan-Thomas had resumed their engagement with
Hipper's battlecruisers, this time with the visual conditions to their advantage. With
several of his ships damaged, Hipper turned back toward Scheer at around 18:00,
just as Beatty's flagship Lion was finally sighted from Jellicoe's flagship Iron Duke.
Jellicoe twice demanded the latest position of the German battlefleet from Beatty,
who could not see the German battleships and failed to respond to the question until
18:14. Meanwhile, Jellicoe received confused sighting reports of varying accuracy
and limited usefulness from light cruisers and battleships on the starboard (southern)
flank of his force.
(1) 18:00 Scouting forces rejoin their
respective fleets.
(2) 18:15 British fleet deploys into battle
line
(3) 18:30 German fleet under fire turns
away
(4) 19:00 German fleet turns back
(5) 19:15 German fleet turns away for
second time
(6) 20:00
(7) 21:00 Nightfall: Jellicoe assumes
night cruising formation
Jellicoe was in a worrying position. He
needed to know the location of the
German fleet to judge when and how to
deploy his battleships from their cruising
formation (six columns of four ships
each) into a single battle line. The
deployment could be on either the
westernmost or the easternmost
column, and had to be carried out
before the Germans arrived.
However, early deployment could mean losing any chance of a decisive encounter.
Deploying to the west would bring his fleet closer to Scheer, gaining valuable time as
dusk approached, but the Germans might arrive before the manoeuvre was
complete. Deploying to the east would take the force away from Scheer, but
Jellicoe's ships might be able to cross the "T", and visibility would strongly favour
British gunnery – Scheer's forces would be silhouetted against the setting sun to the
west, while the Grand Fleet would be indistinct against the dark skies to the north
and east, and would be hidden by reflection of the low sunlight off intervening haze
and smoke. Deployment would take twenty irreplaceable minutes, and the fleets
were closing at full speed. In one of the most critical and difficult tactical command
decisions of the entire war, Jellicoe ordered deployment to the east at 18:15.
Windy Corner
Meanwhile, Hipper had rejoined Scheer, and the combined High Seas Fleet was
heading north, directly toward Jellicoe. Scheer had no indication that Jellicoe was at
sea, let alone that he was bearing down from the northwest, and was distracted by
the intervention of Hood's ships to his north and east. Beatty's four surviving
battlecruisers were now crossing the van of the British dreadnoughts to join Hood's
three battlecruisers; at this time, Arbuthnot's flagship, the armoured cruiser
HMS Defence, and her squadron-mate HMS Warrior both charged across Beatty's
bows, and Lion narrowly avoided a collision with Warrior. Nearby, numerous British
light cruisers and destroyers on the southwestern flank of the deploying battleships
were also crossing each other's courses in attempts to reach their proper stations,
often barely escaping collisions, and under fire from some of the approaching
German ships. This period of peril and heavy traffic attending the merger and
deployment of the British forces later became known as "Windy Corner".
Arbuthnot was attracted by the drifting hull of the crippled Wiesbaden. With Warrior,
Defence closed in for the kill, only to blunder right into the gun sights of Hipper's and
Scheer's oncoming capital ships. Defence was deluged by heavy-calibre gunfire from
many German battleships, which detonated her magazines in a spectacular
explosion viewed by most of the deploying Grand Fleet; she sank with all hands (903
officers and men). Warrior was also hit badly, but she was spared destruction by a
mishap to the nearby battleship Warspite. Warspite had her steering gear overheat
and jam under heavy load at high speed as the 5th Battle Squadron made a turn to
the north at 18:19. Steaming at top speed in wide circles, Warspite appeared as a
juicy target to the German dreadnoughts and took 13 hits, inadvertently drawing fire
from the hapless Warrior. Warspite was brought back under control and survived the
onslaught, but was badly damaged, had to reduce speed, and withdrew northward;
later (at 21:07), she was ordered back to port by Evan-Thomas. Warspite went on to
a long and illustrious career, serving also in World War II. Warrior, on the other hand,
was abandoned and sank the next day after her crew was taken off at 08:25 on 1
June by Engadine, which towed the sinking armoured cruiser 100mi (87nmi; 160km)
during the night.
Invincible blowing up after being struck by shells from Lutzow and Derfflinger
As Defence sank and Warspite circled, at about 18:19, Hipper moved within range of
Hood's 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron, but was still also within range of Beatty's ships.
At first, visibility favoured the British: HMS Indomitable hit Derfflinger three times and
Seydlitz once, while Lützow quickly took 10 hits from Lion, Inflexible and Invincible,
including two below-waterline hits forward by Invincible that would ultimately doom
Hipper's flagship. But at 18:30, Invincible abruptly appeared as a clear target before
Lützow and Derfflinger. The two German ships then fired three salvoes each at
Invincible, and sank her in 90 seconds. A 12 in (300 mm) shell from the third salvo
struck Invincible's Q-turret amidships, detonating the magazines below and causing
her to blow up and sink. All but six of her crew of 1,032 officers and men, including
Rear-Admiral Hood, were killed. Of the remaining British battlecruisers, only Princess
Royal received heavy-calibre hits at this time (two 12 in (300 mm) by the battleship
Markgraf). Lützow, flooding forward and unable to communicate by radio, was now
out of action and began to attempt to withdraw; therefore Hipper left his flagship and
transferred to the torpedo boat SMS G39, hoping to board one of the other
battlecruisers later.
Crossing the T
By 18:30, the main battlefleet action was joined for the first time, with Jellicoe
effectively "crossing Scheer's T". The officers on the lead German battleships, and
Scheer himself, were taken completely by surprise when they emerged from drifting
clouds of smoky mist to suddenly find themselves facing the massed firepower of the
entire Grand Fleet main battle line, which they did not know was even at sea.
Jellicoe's flagship Iron Duke quickly scored seven hits on the lead German
dreadnought, SMS König, but in this brief exchange, which lasted only minutes, as
few as 10 of the Grand Fleet's 24 dreadnoughts actually opened fire. The Germans
were hampered by poor visibility, in addition to being in an unfavourable tactical
position, just as Jellicoe had intended. Realizing he was heading into a death trap,
Scheer ordered his fleet to turn and flee at 18:33. Under a pall of smoke and mist,
Scheer's forces succeeded in disengaging by an expertly executed 180° turn in
unison ("battle about turn to starboard"), which was a well-practiced emergency
manoeuvre of the High Seas Fleet.
Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer later wrote:
It was now obvious that we were confronted by a large portion of the British
fleet. The entire arc stretching from north to east was a sea of fire. The flash
from the muzzles of the guns was seen distinctly through the mist and smoke
on the horizon, although the ships themselves were not distinguishable.
Conscious of the risks to his capital ships posed by torpedoes, Jellicoe did not chase
directly but headed south, determined to keep the High Seas Fleet west of him.
Starting at 18:40, battleships at the rear of Jellicoe's line were in fact sighting and
avoiding torpedoes, and at 18:54 HMS Marlborough was hit by a torpedo (probably
from the disabled Wiesbaden), which reduced her speed to 16kn (18mph; 30km/h).
Meanwhile, Scheer, knowing that it was not yet dark enough to escape and that his
fleet would suffer terribly in a stern chase, doubled back to the east at 18:55. In his
memoirs he wrote, "the manoeuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset
his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the
breaking loose at night." But the turn to the east took his ships, again, directly
towards Jellicoe's fully deployed battle line.
Simultaneously, the disabled British destroyer HMS Shark fought desperately
against a group of four German torpedo boats and disabled V48 with gunfire, but
was eventually torpedoed and sunk at 19:02 by the German destroyer S54. Shark's
Captain Loftus Jones won the Victoria Cross for his heroism in continuing to fight
against all odds.
Gefechtskehrtwendung
Commodore Goodenough's 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron dodged the fire of German
battleships for a second time to re-establish contact with the High Seas Fleet shortly
after 19:00. By 19:15, Jellicoe had crossed Scheer's "T" again. This time his arc of
fire was tighter and deadlier, causing severe damage to the German battleships,
particularly Rear-Admiral Behncke's leading 3rd Squadron (SMS Konig, Grosser
Kurfürst, Markgraf, and Kaiser all being hit, along with SMS Helgoland of the 1st
Squadron), while on the British side, only the battleship HMS Colossus was hit
(twice, by SMS Seydlitz, but with little damage done).
At 19:17, for the second time in less than an hour, Scheer turned his outnumbered
and outgunned fleet to the west using the "battle about turn" (German:
Gefechtskehrtwendung), but this time it was executed only with difficulty, as the High
Seas Fleet's lead squadrons began to lose formation under concentrated gunfire. To
deter a British chase, Scheer ordered a major torpedo attack by his destroyers and a
potentially sacrificial charge by Scouting Group I's four remaining battlecruisers.
Hipper was still aboard the torpedo boat G39 and was unable to command his
squadron for this attack. Therefore, SMS Derfflinger, under Captain Hartog, led the
already badly damaged German battlecruisers directly into "the greatest
concentration of naval gunfire any fleet commander had ever faced", at ranges down
to 4mi (3.5nmi; 6.4km). In what became known as the "death ride", all the
battlecruisers except SMS Moltke were hit and further damaged, as 18 of the British
battleships fired at them simultaneously. Derfflinger had two main gun turrets
destroyed. The crews of Scouting Group I suffered heavy casualties, but survived
the pounding and veered away with the other battlecruisers once Scheer was out of
trouble and the German destroyers were moving in to attack. In this brief but intense
portion of the engagement, from about 19:05 to about 19:30, the Germans sustained
a total of 37 heavy hits while inflicting only two; Derfflinger alone received 14.
While his battlecruisers drew the fire of the British fleet, Scheer slipped away, laying
smoke screens. Meanwhile, from about 19:16 to about 19:40, the British battleships
were also engaging Scheer's torpedo boats, which executed several waves of
torpedo attacks to cover his withdrawal. Jellicoe's ships turned away from the attacks
and successfully evaded all 31 of the torpedoes launched at them – though, in
several cases, only just barely – and sank the German destroyer S35. British light
forces also sank V48, which had previously been disabled by HMS Shark. This
action, and the turn away, cost the British critical time and range in the last hour of
daylight – as Scheer intended, allowing him to get his heavy ships out of immediate
danger.
The last major exchanges between capital ships in this battle took place just after
sunset, from about 20:19 to about 20:35, as the surviving British battlecruisers
caught up with their German counterparts, which were briefly relieved by RearAdmiral Mauve's obsolete pre-dreadnoughts (the German 2nd Squadron). The
British received one heavy hit on Princess Royal but scored five more on Seydlitz
and three on other German ships. As twilight faded to night and HMS King George V
exchanged a few final shots with SMS Westfalen, neither side could have imagined
that the only encounter between British and German dreadnoughts in the entire war
was already concluded .
Night Action and German Withdrawal
At 21:00, Jellicoe, conscious of the Grand Fleet's deficiencies in night fighting,
decided to try to avoid a major engagement until early dawn. He placed a screen of
cruisers and destroyers 5mi (4.3nmi; 8.0km) behind his battle fleet to patrol the rear
as he headed south to guard Scheer's expected escape route. In reality, Scheer
opted to cross Jellicoe's wake and escape via Horns Reef. Luckily for Scheer, most
of the light forces in Jellicoe's rearguard failed to report the seven separate
encounters with the German fleet during the night; the very few radio reports that
were sent to the British flagship were never received, possibly because the Germans
were jamming British frequencies. Many of the destroyers failed to make the most of
their opportunities to attack discovered ships, despite Jellicoe's expectations that the
destroyer forces would, if necessary, be able to block the path of the German fleet.
Jellicoe and his commanders did not understand that the furious gunfire and
explosions to the north (seen and heard for hours by all the British battleships)
indicated that the German heavy ships were breaking through the screen astern of
the British fleet. Instead, it was believed that the fighting was the result of night
attacks by German destroyers. The most powerful British ships of all (the 15-inchgunned 5th Battle Squadron) directly observed German battleships crossing astern
of them in action with British light forces, at ranges of 3mi (2.6nmi; 4.8km) or less,
and gunners on HMS Malaya made ready to fire, but her captain declined, deferring
to the authority of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas – and neither commander reported
the sightings to Jellicoe, assuming that he could see for himself and that revealing
the fleet's position by radio signals or gunfire was unwise.
While the nature of Scheer's escape, and Jellicoe's inaction, indicate the overall
German superiority in night fighting, the results of the night action were no more
clear-cut than were those of the battle as a whole. In the first of many surprise
encounters by darkened ships at point-blank range, Southampton, Commodore
Goodenough's flagship, which had scouted so proficiently, was heavily damaged in
action with a German Scouting Group composed of light cruisers, but managed to
torpedo SMS Frauenlob, which went down at 22:23 with all hands (320 officers and
men).
From 23:20 to approximately 02:15, several British destroyer flotillas launched
torpedo attacks on the German battle fleet in a series of violent and chaotic
engagements at extremely short range (often under 0.5mi (0.80km)). At the cost of
five destroyers sunk and some others damaged, they managed to torpedo the light
cruiser SMS Rostock, which sank several hours later, and the pre-dreadnought
SMS Pommern, which blew up and sank with all hands (839 officers and men) at
03:10 during the last wave of attacks before dawn. Three of the British destroyers
collided in the chaos, and the German battleship SMS Nassau rammed the British
destroyer HMS Spitfire, blowing away most of the British ship's superstructure
merely with the muzzle blast of its big guns, which could not be aimed low enough to
hit the ship. Nassau was left with a 11ft (3.4m) hole in her side, reducing her
maximum speed to 15kn (17mph; 28km/h), while the removed plating was left lying
on Spitfire's deck. Spitfire survived and made it back to port. Another German
cruiser, SMS Elbing, was accidentally rammed by the dreadnought Posen and
abandoned, sinking early the next day. Of the British destroyers, HMS Tipperary,
Ardent, Fortune, Sparrowhawk and Turbulent were lost during the night fighting.
Just after midnight on 1 June, SMS Thüringen and other German battleships sank
HMS Black Prince of the ill-fated 1st Cruiser Squadron, which had blundered into the
German battle line. Deployed as part of a screening force several miles ahead of the
main force of the Grand Fleet, the Black Prince had lost contact in the darkness and
took a position near what she thought was the British line. The Germans soon
identified the new addition to its line and opened fire. Overwhelmed by point-blank
gunfire, the Black Prince blew up, (857 officers and men - all hands - were lost), as
her squadron leader Defence had done hours earlier. Lost in the darkness, the
battlecruisers SMS Moltke and Seydlitz had similar point-blank encounters with the
British battle line and were recognized, but were spared the fate of Black Prince
when the captains of the British ships, again, declined to open fire, reluctant to reveal
their fleet's position. At 01:45, the sinking battlecruiser Lützow – fatally damaged by
Invincible during the main action – was torpedoed by the destroyer G38 on orders of
Lützow's Captain Viktor von Harder after the surviving crew of 1,150 transferred to
destroyers that came alongside. At 02:15, the German torpedo boat V4 suddenly
had its bow blown off; V2 and V6 came alongside and took off the remaining crew,
and the V2 then sank the hulk. Since there was no enemy nearby, it was assumed
that she had hit a mine or had been torpedoed by a submarine.
At 02:15, five British ships of the 13th Destroyer Flotilla under Captain James
Uchtred Farie regrouped and headed south. At 02:25, they sighted the rear of the
German line. HMS Marksman inquired of the leader Champion as to whether he
thought they were British or German ships. Answering that he thought they were
German, Farie then veered off to the east and away from the German line. All but
Moresby in the rear followed, as through the gloom she sighted what she thought
were four pre-dreadnought battleships 2mi (1.7nmi; 3.2km) away. She hoisted a flag
signal indicating that the enemy was to the west and then closed to firing range,
letting off a torpedo set for high running at 02:37, then veering off to rejoin her flotilla.
The four pre-dreadnought battleships were in fact two pre-dreadnoughts, SchleswigHolstein and Schlesien, and the battlecruisers Von der Tann and Derfflinger. Von der
Tann sighted the torpedo and was forced to steer sharply to starboard to avoid it as it
passed close to her bows. Moresby rejoined Champion convinced she had scored a
hit.
Finally, at 05:20, as Scheer's fleet was safely on its way home, the battleship
SMS Ostfriesland struck a British mine on her starboard side, killing one man and
wounding ten, but was able to make port. Seydlitz, critically damaged and very
nearly sinking, barely survived the return voyage: after grounding and taking on even
more water on the evening of 1 June, she had to be assisted stern first into port,
where she dropped anchor at 07:30 on the morning of 2 June.
The Germans were helped in their escape by the failure of the British Admiralty in
London to pass on seven critical radio intercepts obtained by naval intelligence
indicating the true position, course and intentions of the High Seas Fleet during the
night. One message was transmitted to Jellicoe at 23:15 that accurately reported the
German fleet's course and speed as of 21:14. However, the erroneous signal from
earlier in the day that reported the German fleet still in port, and an intelligence
signal received at 22:45 giving another unlikely position for the German fleet, had
reduced his confidence in intelligence reports. Had the other messages been
forwarded, which confirmed the information received at 23:15, or had British ships
reported accurately sightings and engagements with German destroyers, cruisers
and battleships, then Jellicoe could have altered course to intercept Scheer at the
Horns Reef. The unsent intercepted messages had been duly filed by the junior
officer left on duty that night, who failed to appreciate their significance. By the time
Jellicoe finally learned of Scheer's whereabouts at 04:15, the German was too far
away to catch and it was clear that the battle could no longer be resumed.
The Outcome - Reporting
At midday on 2 June German authorities released a press statement claiming a
victory, including the destruction of a battleship, two battlecruisers, two armoured
cruisers, a light cruiser, a submarine and several destroyers, for the loss of
Pommern and Wiesbaden. News that Lutzow, Elbing and Rostock had been scuttled
was withheld, on the grounds this information would not be known to the enemy. The
victory of the Skagerrak was celebrated in the press, children were given a holiday
and the nation celebrated. The Kaiser announced a new chapter in world history.
Post-war, the official German history hailed the battle as a victory and it continued to
be celebrated until after World War II.
In Britain the first official news came from German wireless broadcasts. Ships began
to arrive in port, their crews sending messages to friends and relatives both of their
survival and the loss of some 6,000 others. Authorities considered suppressing the
news, but it had already spread widely. Some crews coming ashore found rumours
had already reported them dead to relatives, while others were jeered for the defeat
they had suffered. At 7pm on 2 June the Admiralty released a statement based on
information from Jellicoe containing the bare news of losses on each side. The
following day British newspapers reported a German victory. The Daily Mirror
described the German Director of the Naval Department telling the Reichstag: "The
result of the fighting is a significant success for our forces against a much stronger
adversary". The British population was shocked that the long anticipated battle had
been a victory for Germany. On 3 June the Admiralty issued a further statement
expanding on German losses, and another the following day with exaggerated
claims. However, on 7 June the German admission of the losses of Lutzow and
Rostock started to redress the sense of the battle as a loss. International perception
of the battle began to change towards a qualified British victory, the German attempt
to change the balance of power in the North Sea having been repulsed. In July, bad
news from the Somme campaign swept concern over Jutland from the British
consciousness.
At the end of the battle, the British had maintained their numerical superiority and
had 23 dreadnoughts ready and four battlecruisers still able to fight, while the
Germans had only 10 dreadnoughts. One month after the battle, the Grand Fleet
was stronger than it had been before sailing to Jutland. Warspite was drydocked at
Rosyth, returning to the fleet on 22 July, while Malaya was repaired in the floating
dock at Invergordon, returning to duty on 11 July. Barham was docked for a month at
Devenport before undergoing speed trials and returning to Scapa on 8 July. Princess
Royal stayed initially at Rosyth but transferred to drydock at Portsmouth before
returning to duty at Rosyth 21 July. Tiger was drydocked at Rosyth and ready for
service 2 July. Queen Elizabeth, Emperor of India and HMAS Australia, which had
been undergoing maintenance at the time of the battle, returned to the fleet
immediately, followed shortly after by Resolution and Ramillies. Lion initially
remained ready for sea duty despite the damaged turret, then underwent a month's
repairs in July when Q turret was removed temporarily and replaced in September.
A third view, presented in a number of recent evaluations, is that Jutland, the last
major fleet action between battleships, illustrated the irrelevance of battleship fleets
following the development of the submarine, mine and torpedo. In this view, the most
important consequence of Jutland was the decision of the Germans to engage in
unrestricted submarine warfare. Although large numbers of battleships were
constructed in the decades between the wars, it has been argued that this outcome
reflected the social dominance among naval decision-makers of battleship advocates
who constrained technological choices to fit traditional paradigms of fleet action.
Battleships played a relatively minor role in World War II, in which the aircraft carrier
emerged as the dominant offensive weapon of naval warfare.
British self-critique
The official British Admiralty examination of the Grand Fleet's performance
recognised two main problems:

British armour-piercing shells exploded outside the German armour rather than
penetrating and exploding within. As a result, some German ships with only 8in
(20cm)-thick armour survived hits from 15-inch (380mm) projectiles. Had these
shells penetrated the armour and then exploded, German losses would probably
have been far greater.

Communication between ships and the British commander-in-chief were
comparatively poor. For most of the battle, Jellicoe had no idea where the
German ships were, even though British ships were in contact. They failed to
report enemy positions, contrary to the Grand Fleet's Battle Plan. Some of the
most important signaling was carried out solely by flag instead of wireless or
using redundant methods to ensure communications - a questionable procedure,
given the mixture of haze and smoke that obscured the battlefield, and a
foreshadowing of similar failures by habit-bound and conservatively minded
professional officers of rank to take advantage of new technology in World War II.
Shell performance
German armour-piercing shells were far more effective than the British ones, which
often failed to penetrate heavy armour. The issue particularly concerned shells
striking at oblique angles, which became increasingly the case at long range.
Germany had adopted trinitrotoluene (TNT) as the explosive filler for artillery shells in
1902, while the United Kingdom was still using a picric acid mixture (Lyddite). The
shock of impact of a shell against armour often prematurely detonated Lyddite in
advance of fuse function while TNT detonation could be delayed until after the shell
had penetrated and the fuse had functioned in the vulnerable area behind the
armour plate.
The issue of poorly performing shells had been known to Jellicoe, who as third sea
lord from 1908–1910 had ordered new shells to be designed. However, the matter
had not been followed through after his posting to sea and new shells had never
been thoroughly tested. Beatty discovered the problem at a party aboard Lion a short
time after the battle, when a Swedish Naval officer was present. He had recently
visited Berlin, where the German navy had scoffed at how British shells had broken
up on their ships' armour. The question of shell effectiveness had also been raised
after the Battle of Dogger Bank, but no action had been taken. Hipper later
commented, "It was nothing but the poor quality of their bursting charges which
saved us from disaster".
Admiral Dreyer, writing later about the battle, during which he had been captain of
the British flagship Iron Duke, estimated that effective shells as later introduced
would have led to the sinking of six more German capital ships, based upon the
actual number of hits achieved in the battle. The system of testing shells, which
remained in use up to 1944, meant that, statistically, a batch of shells of which 70%
were faulty stood an even chance of being accepted. Indeed, even shells that failed
this relatively mild test had still been issued to ships. Analysis of the test results
afterwards by the Ordnance Board suggested the likelihood that 30 - 70% of shells
would not have passed the standard penetration test specified by the Admiralty.
Efforts to replace the shells were initially resisted by the Admiralty, and action was
not taken until Jellicoe became First Sea Lord in December 1916. As an initial
response, the worst of the existing shells were withdrawn from ships in early 1917
and replaced from reserve supplies. New shells were designed, but did not arrive
until April 1918, and were never used in action.
Battlecruiser losses
The British battlecruisers were designed to chase and destroy enemy cruisers from a
range at which these ships could not reply. They were not designed to be ships of
the line and exchange broadsides with the enemy. Although one German and three
British battlecruisers were sunk, none of them were destroyed by enemy shells
penetrating the belt armour and detonating the magazines; each of the British
battlecruisers was penetrated through a turret roof and her magazines ignited by
flash fires passing through the turret and shell-handling rooms. Lützow sustained 24
hits and her flooding could not be contained. She was eventually sunk by her
escorts' torpedoes after her crew had been safely removed. Derfflinger and Seydlitz
sustained 22 hits each but reached port (although in Seydlitz's case only just).
Sir John Jellicoe's official despatch:
The disturbing feature of the battlecruiser action is the fact that five German
battlecruisers engaging six British vessels of this class, supported after the first
twenty minutes, although at great range, by the fire of four battleships of the
"Queen Elizabeth" class, were yet able to sink Queen Mary and Indefatigable.
The facts which contributed to the British losses, first, were the indifferent
armour protection of our battlecruisers, particularly as regards turret armour,
and, second, deck plating and the disadvantage under which our vessels
laboured in regard to the light.
Jellicoe and Beatty, as well as other senior officers, gave an impression that the loss
of the battlecruisers was caused by weak armour, despite reports by two committees
and earlier statements by Jellicoe and other senior officers that Cordite and its
management were to blame. This led to calls for armour to be increased, and an
additional 1 in (2.5 cm) was placed over the relatively thin decks above magazines.
To compensate for the increase in weight, ships had to carry correspondingly less
fuel, water and other supplies. Whether or not thin deck armour was a potential
weakness of British ships, the battle provided no evidence that it was the case. At
least amongst the surviving ships, no enemy shell was found to have penetrated
deck armour anywhere. The design of a new battlecruiser HMS Hood (which had
started building at the time of the battle) was altered to give her 5,000 tons of
additional armour.
Signaling
Throughout the battle, British ships experienced difficulties with communications,
whereas the Germans did not suffer such problems. The British preferred signaling
using ship-to-ship flag and lamp signals, avoiding wireless, whereas the Germans
used wireless successfully. One conclusion drawn was that flag signals were not a
satisfactory way to control the fleet. Experience using lamps, particularly at night
when issuing challenges to other ships, demonstrated this was an excellent way to
advertise your precise location to an enemy, inviting a reply by gunfire. Recognition
signals by lamp, once seen, could also easily be copied in future engagements.
British ships both failed to report engagements with the enemy but also, in the case
of cruisers and destroyers, failed to actively seek out the enemy. A culture had
arisen within the fleet of not acting without orders, which could prove fatal when any
circumstances prevented orders being sent or received. Commanders failed to
engage the enemy because they believed other, more senior officers must also be
aware of the enemy nearby, and would have given orders to act if this was expected.
Wireless, the most direct way to pass messages across the fleet (although it was
being jammed by German ships), was avoided either for perceived reasons of not
giving away the presence of ships or for fear of cluttering up the airwaves with
unnecessary reports.
Fleet Standing Orders
Naval operations were governed by standing orders issued to all the ships. These
attempted to set out what ships should do in all circumstances, particularly in
situations where ships would have to react without referring to higher authority, or
when communications failed. A number of changes were introduced as a result of
experience gained in the battle.
A new signal was introduced instructing squadron commanders to act independently
as they thought best while still supporting the main fleet, particularly for use when
circumstances would make it difficult to send detailed orders. The description
stressed that this was not intended to be the only time commanders might take
independent action, but was intended to make plain times when they definitely
should. Similarly, instructions on what to do if the fleet was instructed to take evasive
action against torpedoes were amended. Commanders were given discretion that if
their part of the fleet was not under immediate attack, they should continue engaging
the enemy rather than turning away with the rest of the fleet. In this battle, when the
fleet turned away from Scheer's destroyer attack covering his retreat, not all the
British ships had been affected, and could have continued to engage the enemy.
A number of opportunities to attack enemy ships by torpedo had presented
themselves but had been missed. All ships, not just the destroyers armed principally
with torpedoes but also battleships, were reminded that they carried torpedoes
intended to be used whenever an opportunity arose. Destroyers were instructed to
close the enemy fleet to fire torpedoes as soon as engagements between the main
ships on either side would keep enemy guns busy directed at larger targets.
Destroyers should also be ready to immediately engage enemy destroyers if they
should launch an attack, endeavouring to disrupt their chances of launching
torpedoes and keep them away from the main fleet.
To add some flexibility when deploying for attack, a new signal was provided for
deploying the fleet to the centre, rather than as previously only either to left or right of
the standard closed-up formation for travelling. The fast and powerful 5th Battle
Squadron was moved to the front of the cruising formation so it would have the
option of deploying left or right depending upon the enemy position. In the event of
engagements at night, although the fleet still preferred to avoid night fighting, a
destroyer and cruiser squadron would be specifically detailed to seek out the enemy
and launch destroyer attacks.
Controversy
At the time, Jellicoe was criticised for his caution and for allowing Scheer to escape.
Beatty, in particular, was convinced that Jellicoe had missed a tremendous
opportunity to annihilate the High Seas Fleet and win what would amount to another
Trafalgar. Jellicoe was promoted away from active command to become First Sea
Lord, the professional head of the Royal Navy, while Beatty replaced him as
commander of the Grand Fleet.
The controversy raged within the navy and in public for about a decade after the war.
Criticism focused on Jellicoe's decision at 19:15. Scheer had ordered his cruisers
and destroyers forward in a torpedo attack to cover the turning away of his
battleships. Jellicoe chose to turn to the southeast, and so keep out of range of the
torpedoes. If, instead, he had turned to the west, could his ships have dodged the
torpedoes and destroyed the German fleet? Supporters of Jellicoe pointed to the
folly of risking defeat in battle when you already have command of the sea.
Jellicoe himself, in a letter to the Admiralty months before the battle, had stated that
he intended to turn his fleet away from any mass torpedo attack (that being the
universally accepted proper tactical response to such attacks, practiced by all the
major navies of the world), and that in the event of a fleet engagement in which the
enemy turned away he would assume that the intention was to draw him over mines
or submarines and that he would decline to be so drawn. The Admiralty approved
this plan and expressed full confidence in Jellicoe at the time (October 1914).
The stakes were high, the pressure on Jellicoe immense, and his caution certainly
understandable. His judgment might have been that even 90% odds in favour were
not good enough to bet the British Empire. The former First Lord of the Admiralty
Winston Churchill said of the battle that Jellicoe "was the only man on either side
who could have lost the war in an afternoon." Jellicoe was aware of the ammunition
problem, as he had tried to improve it at an earlier time. He was probably also aware
of the ammunition vulnerability and other qualitative differences.
The criticism of Jellicoe also fails to sufficiently credit Scheer, who was determined to
preserve his fleet by avoiding the full British battle line, and who showed great skill in
effecting his escape.
Beatty's actions
On the other hand, some of Jellicoe's supporters condemned the actions of Beatty
for the British failure to achieve a complete victory. Although Beatty was undeniably
brave, his mismanagement of the initial encounter with Hipper's squadron and the
High Seas Fleet cost considerable advantage in the first hours of the battle. His most
glaring failure was in not providing Jellicoe with periodic information on the position,
course, and speed of the High Seas Fleet. Beatty, aboard the battlecruiser Lion, left
behind the four fast battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron – the most powerful
warships in the world at the time – engaging with six ships when better control would
have given him 10 against Hipper's five. Though Beatty's larger 13.5in (340mm)
guns outranged Hipper's 11 and 12in (280 and 300mm) guns by thousands of yards,
Beatty held his fire for 10 minutes and closed the enemy squadron until within range
of the Germans' superior gunnery, under lighting conditions that favoured the
Germans. Most of the British losses in tonnage occurred in Beatty's force.
Losses
British losses were 6,784 men, German losses 3,039, a total of 9,823 men.

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British
Battlecruisers Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible
Armoured cruisers Black Prince, Warrior, Defence
Flotilla leaders Tipperary
Destroyers Shark, Sparrowhawk, Turbulent, Ardent, Fortune, Nomad, Nestor
German
Battlecruiser Lützow
Pre-Dreadnought Pommern
Light cruisers Frauenlob, Elbing, Rostock, Wiesbaden
Destroyers (Heavy torpedo-boats) V48, S35, V27, V4, V29
Selected honours
The Victoria Cross is the highest military decoration awarded for valour "in the face
of the enemy" to members of the British Empire armed forces. The Ordre pour le
Mérite was the Kingdom of Prussia and consequently the German Empire's highest
military order until the end of the First World War.
Pour le Mérite


Franz Hipper (SMS Lützow)
Reinhard Scheer (SMS Friedrich der Grosse)
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Victoria Cross
The Hon. Edward Barry Stewart Bingham (HMS Nestor)
John Travers Cornwell (HMS Chester)
Francis John William Harvey (HMS Lion)
Loftus William Jones (HMS Shark)
A 1916 German propaganda postcard,
comparing the adversaries' losses.
Henry Allingham
The last surviving veteran of the battle, Henry Allingham, a British RAF (originally
RNAS) airman, died on 18 July 2009, aged 113, by which time he was the oldest
documented man in the world and one of the last surviving veterans of the whole
war. Also among the combatants was the then 20-year-old Prince Albert, second in
the line to the British throne, who would serve as King George VI of the United
Kingdom from 1936 until his death in 1952. He served as a junior officer in the Royal
Navy.
Remembrance
The Battle of Jutland was annually celebrated as a great victory by the right wing in
Weimar Germany. This "victory" was used to repress the memory of the German
navy's initiation of the German Revolution of 1918–1919, as well as the memory of
the defeat in World War I in general. (The celebrations of the Battle of Tannenberg
played a similar role in the Weimar Republic.) This was especially true for the city of
Wilhelmshaven, where wreath-laying ceremonies and torch-lit parades were
performed until the end of the 1960s.