elliott ash - Columbia University

Transcription

Zach Y. Brown
October 1, 2016
Department of Economics
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(510) 499-9932
zyb2001@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~zyb2001
Placement Chairs: Navin Kartik, nk2339@columbia.edu, Doug Almond, da2152@columbia.edu
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu
Education:
2017 (expected)
2013
2012
2007
Ph.D.
M.Phil
M.A.
B.A.
Economics
Economics
Economics
Economics (physics minor)
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
U.C. Berkeley
Honors and Awards:
2015-2016, Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014, Faculty Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2011-2013, National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship
Fields of Specialization:
Primary Field: Industrial Organization
Secondary Field: Applied Microeconomics
Job Market Paper:
“An Empirical Model of Price Transparency and Markups in Health Care”
Abstract: In the market for health care services, consumers often do not know exact
prices when choosing where to receive care. This makes it difficult to shop around for
low cost options, potentially reducing effective consumer price elasticity and leading to
higher prices. This paper introduces an empirical model that explicitly accounts for the
lack of price transparency. First, I develop a demand model that separates underlying
consumer preferences from uncertainty about prices. Identification comes from plausibly
exogenous variation in consumers' information set due to the introduction of a publiclyavailable website providing price information for a subset of medical procedures. I then
combine this with a model of bargaining between medical providers and insurers in order
to examine how price transparency affects negotiated prices in equilibrium. I estimate the
model using detailed administrative data on medical imaging claims and website usage
and show that price transparency reduces health care prices if a large fraction of
consumers are informed. Counterfactual simulations imply that if all consumers were
informed, equilibrium prices would be 19 percent lower.
Working Papers:
“Equilibrium Effects of Health Care Price Information,” (2016). Under Review.
Work in Progress:
“Welfare Implications of Omitting Exogenous Shocks from Credit Scores: Evidence from
Agricultural Lending” (with Nicolás de Roux)
Research and Work Experience:
2014-2015, Staff Economist, White House Council of Economic Advisers
2011-2012, Research Assistant to Kate Ho (Columbia University)
2007-2010, Analyst, Cornerstone Research
2006-2007, Research Assistant to Robert Edelstein (U.C. Berkeley)
Teaching Experience:
Teaching assistantships, graduate level:
2012, Microeconomics, School of International and Public Affairs,
Columbia University
Teaching assistantships, undergraduate level:
2016, Industrial Organization, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2015, Econometrics, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2013, Development Economics, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2013, Empirical Methods for Undergraduate Thesis, Department of Economics,
Columbia University
Personal:
Citizenship: U.S.A.
References:
Kate Ho (Primary)
Columbia University
(212) 854-7605
kh2214@columbia.edu
Michael Riordan
Columbia University
(646) 484-9096
mhr21@columbia.edu
Douglas Almond
Columbia University
(212) 854-7248
da2152@columbia.edu
Christopher Conlon
Stern School of Business
New York University
(646) 389-3895
cconlon@stern.nyu.edu
Nicolás de Roux
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY, 10027
Cell: (+1) 855-451-1689
nd2282@columbia.edu
http://www.columbia.edu/vnd2282
Placement Chairs: Navin Kartik (nk2339@columbia.edu), Douglas Almond (da2152@columbia.edu)
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine (aed2152@columbia.edu), (+1) 212-854-6881
EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Columbia University
M.Phil., Economics, Columbia University
M.A., Economics, Columbia University
M.A., Economics, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
B.A., Economics, Cum Laude, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
2017 (Expected)
2014
2013
2010
2008
FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION
Development Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Banking
JOB MARKET PAPER
“Credit Scoring Meets Small Agricultural Lending: Exogenous Shocks, Recovery and Access to Formal Credit”
Abstract: Credit histories and credit scoring have become a widespread tool to assess the creditworthiness
of prospective borrowers, and have been found to increase efficiency and welfare. But this paper identifies a
market failure resulting from their use in small scale agricultural lending in developing countries. Farmers’
scores – and their access to credit – decline because of exogenous short-term weather shocks that arguably
do not reduce their likelihood of future repayment. I use data on the near universe of formal agricultural
loans for coffee production in the country of Colombia to show that excessive rainfall shocks cause lower loan
repayment, lower credit scores, and more frequent denial of subsequent loan applications. Further, drawing
on the agronomic literature on coffee production and using survey data, I show that the coffee productivity
and income recover faster from these shocks than farmers’ credit histories. I present evidence of repayment
recovery in a sample of long term loans and in a sample of high ex-ante credit score borrowers, consistent
with the results on income recovery. This leads to costs for the farmers and the lender that could be avoided.
Credit scoring should incorporate individual-level weather information, which would account for the more
volatile nature of income of small scale agricultural production in developing countries.
WORK IN PROGRESS
“Using Exchange Rates to Estimate Production Functions.” With Marcela Eslava (Universidad de los
Andes), Santiago Franco (Universidad de los Andes) and Eric Verhoogen (Columbia University)
“On the Motives of Loan Repayment to State-Owned Banks: Evidence From a Field Experiment With Small
Farmers in Colombia.” With Jairo Esquivel (Banco Agrario), Margarita Gáfaro (Brown University), Moisés
Mahecha (Banco Agrario) and Guillermo Otero (Banco Agrario)
“Welfare Implications of Omitting Exogenous Shocks From Credit Scores: Evidence From Agricultural
Lending in Colombia.” With Zach Brown (Columbia University)
PUBLICATIONS
“Sacrifice Ratios and Inflation Targeting: The Role of Credibility.” With Marc Hofstetter (Universidad de
los Andes). International Finance, v.17 no.3 pp.381-401, August 2014
“Do Preferences Shape Institutions? The Case of Inflation Aversion and Inflation Targeting.” With Marc
Hofstetter (Universidad de los Andes). Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, v.51 pp. 68-78,
August 2014
“Is It My Money or Not? An Experiment on Risk Aversion and the House-Money Effect.” With Juan Camilo
Cárdenas (Universidad de los Andes), Christian Jaramillo (CREG) and Luis Roberto Martı́nez (University
of Chicago). Experimental Economics, v.17 no.1 pp. 47-60, March 2014
“Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean.” With Laurence Ball (Johns Hopkins University) and
Marc Hofstetter (Universidad de los Andes). Open Economies Review, v.24 no.3 pp. 397-424, July 2013
WORKING PAPERS
“Back to Basics: Sticky Prices in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” Documento CEDE, Universidad
de los Andes, 2011
HONORS AND AWARDS
- Student Research Grant, Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University, 2015, 2016
- Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2015-2016
- Wueller Teaching Award, Best T.A. in Principles of Economics (runner-up) Columbia University, Department of Economics, 2015
- Fellow, Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University, 2014- Wueller Teaching Award, Best T.A. in Principles of Economics, Columbia University, Department of Economics, 2013
- Faculty Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2011-2017
- Juan Luis Londoño Award (runner-up) for Best Master Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, Department of
Economics, 2010
- Augusto Cano Fellowship, Universidad de los Andes, Department of Economics, 2009
TEACHING
- Universidad de Los Andes, International Summer School :
Industrial Development, Lecturer (with E. Verhoogen), Summer 2014
- Columbia University:
Principles of Economics, T. A. for S. Gulati, Fall 2012 (Wueller Teaching Award)
Principles of Economics, T. A. for S. Gulati, Spring 2015 (Wueller Teaching Award, runner-up)
- Universidad de los Andes:
Stata Workshop, Lecturer, 2010, 2011; Seminar on the Economics of Happiness, Lecturer (with S. Melo),
2011; Economics of Decisions and Institutions, Grad. T.A. for J.C. Cárdenas, 2010; Introduction to Microeconomics, Grad. T.A. for J.C. Cárdenas, 2009, 2010; Advanced Macroeconomics, Grad. T. A. for M.
Hofstetter and R. Suescún, 2008, 2009; Game Theory, Grad. T.A. for M. Eslava, 2009
RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS
- Eric Verhoogen (Columbia University), Jan. 2013 - Dec. 2014 and Sept. 2016 - May 2017
- Marc Hofstetter (Universidad de los Andes), Jan. 2007 - Dec. 2010
REFERENCES
Eric Verhoogen (primary)
Associate Professor
Department of Economics & SIPA
Columbia University
(212) 854-4428
eric.verhoogen@columbia.edu
Pierre-André Chiappori
E. Rowan and Barbara Steinschneider
Professor of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-6369
pc2167@columbia.edu
Jonas Hjort
Assistant Professor
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
(212) 854-5957
hjort@columbia.edu
Suresh Naidu
Associate Professor
Department of Economics & SIPA
Columbia University
(212) 854-0027
sn2430@columbia.edu
Last Updated: October, 2016
Kunjal Desai
30th September, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
Phone : +1-646-373-0428
Email : kd2380@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~kd2380
Education:
2017 (expected)
2009
2007
Ph.D. Economics
M.A. Economics
B.Sc. Physics
Columbia University
Delhi School of Economics, Delhi
St Stephen’s College, Delhi
Honors and Awards:
2010-2015, Faculty Fellow, Columbia University
2007-2009, National(CAS) Scholarship
2004-2007, KVPY Fellow, Government of India
Primary Field: Development Economics
Secondary Field: Political Economy, Economics of the Household
Job Market Paper: “Affirmative Action, Caste and the Marriage Market”
Abstract: This study investigates the role of a strong social norm - caste - on the marriage market
in India and how it responds to economic changes. A jobs-based affirmative action policy, the
implementation of the Mandal Commission report in December 1993, differentially affects
incomes across cohorts for treated castes. This is used to separately identify the effects of caste
and income on marital partner choice and the distribution of the match surplus using a
difference-in-differences strategy. The affirmative action policy is found to have an asymmetric
effect across genders - male members of the treated group are found to attract more desirable
spouses and get a higher share of the marital match surplus while there is no similar effect for
women. A structural model of the marriage market based on Choo & Siow(2006) is used to
investigate the marital welfare effects of the policy while controlling for selection effects.
Similar results are found. These findings suggest that the marriage market and intra household
decision making plays a significant role in determining the distribution of welfare changes from
economic shocks.
Working Papers:
“Management, Firms and Labor Regulations” (with Ritam Chaurey)
“Representation and Opportunism: RD Evidence from Indian Village Councils” (with Ashna
Arora, Rakesh Banerjee and Siddharth Hari)
Work in Progress:
“The Welfare Consequences of Re-election Incentives: Evidence from India” (with Anusha
Nath)
Summer, Fall 2009, Research Associate, Indian School of Business
Teaching Assistant, Columbia University:
Fall 2016 (Development Economics, Graduate)
Summer 2016 (Open Economy Macroeconomics, Graduate)
Spring 2015 (Financial Economics, Undergraduate)
Fall 2014 (Economic Growth and Development, Undergraduate)
Summer 2014 (Microeconomics, Graduate)
Spring 2014, Spring 2013 (Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Undergraduate)
Fall 2013 (Political Economy, Undergraduate)
Summer 2013 (Intermediate Macro, Business School)
Fall 2012 (Principles of Economics, Undergraduate)
Fall 2011, Spring 2012 (Intermediate Micro, Undergraduate)
Personal:
Languages: English(Fluent), Gujarati(Native), Hindi(Fluent), Spanish(Basic)
References:
Suresh Naidu (Primary)
Columbia University
(212) 851-0027
sn2430@columbia.edu
Pierre-Andre Chaippori
Columbia University
(212) 851-6369
pc2167@columbia.edu
Bernard Salanie
Columbia University
(212) 854-1677
bs2237@columbia.edu
AMBUJ DEWAN
October 2, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(646) 842-0292
ambuj.dewan@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~ayd2105
Education:
2017 (expected)
2014
2013
2011
Ph.D.
M.Phil.
M.A.
B.A.
Economics
Economics
Economics
Economics and Mathematics
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
McGill University
Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Microeconomic Theory, Information
Economics
Job Market Paper: “Estimating Cost Functions in Perceptual and Cognitive Processes” (with
Nathaniel Neligh)
Abstract: In models of rational inattention, information costs are usually modeled using
mutual information, which measures the expected reduction in entropy between prior and
posterior beliefs, or ad hoc functional forms, but little is known about what form these
costs take in reality. We show that under mild assumptions on information cost functions,
including continuity and convexity, gross payoffs to decision makers are non-decreasing
and continuous in potential rewards. We conduct laboratory and online experiments,
consisting of simple perceptual tasks with fine-grained variation in the level of potential
rewards, that allow us to test several hypotheses about rational inattention and compare
various models of information costs via information criteria. We find that most subjects
exhibit monotonicity in performance with respect to potential rewards, and there is mixed
evidence on continuity and convexity of costs. Moreover, a significant portion of subjects
are likelier to make small mistakes than large ones, contrary to the predictions of mutual
information. This suggests that while people are generally rationally inattentive, their cost
functions may display non-convexities or discontinuities, or they may incorporate some
notion of perceptual distance, which has implications for various economic applications,
including consumer choice.
Work in Progress:
“Promises and Pronouncements” (with Charles Maurin)
“Irrational Attention? Confidence and Information Acquisition” (with Pablo Egaña del
Sol)
Honors and Awards:
2016-2017
Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014-2015
Columbia Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences Grant
2012-2016
Faculty Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2011
Allen Oliver Fellowship, McGill University (awarded to the top
graduating student in economics continuing to graduate study)
2010-2011
Adam Smith Economics Scholarship, McGill University
2008-2009
John D. Schultz Scholarship, Heart and Stroke Foundation of Ontario
2007-2011
Dean’s Honour List, McGill University
2007-2011
James McGill Scholarship, McGill University
2007-2008
Miller Thompson Foundation Scholarship, Miller Thompson Foundation
2015-2016
Lab Manager, Columbia Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences
2012
Research Assistant for Katherine Ho, Columbia University
2009-2010
Research Assistant for George Wells and Doug Coyle, University of
Ottawa Heart Institute (Biostatistics and Health Economics)
Spring 2015
Fall 2014
Spring 2014
Fall 2013
Summer 2013
Spring 2013
Fall 2013
Cognitive Mechanisms &
Economic Behavior
Intermediate Macroeconomics
Game Theory
Game Theory
Introduction to Econometrics
Principles of Economics
Principles of Economics
TA for Michael Woodford
TA for Xavier Sala-i-Martin
TA for Benjamin Ho
TA for Prajit Dutta
TA for Alexei Onatski
TA for Anna Musatti
TA for Anna Musatti
Personal:
Citizenship: Canadian
Languages: English (primary); French (fluent); Hindi (basic)
References:
Navin Kartik (co-sponsor)
Professor
Columbia University
(212) 854-3926
nk2339@columbia.edu
Michael Woodford
John Bates Clark Professor of Political Economy
Columbia University
(212) 854-1094
mw2230@columbia.edu
Mark Dean (co-sponsor)
Assistant Professor
Columbia University
(212) 854-3669
mark.dean@columbia.edu
Alessandra Casella
Professor
Columbia University
(212) 854-2459
ac186@columbia.edu
STEPHANE DUPRAZ
October 3, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(646) 320-9026
stephane.dupraz@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~sd2702/
Education:
2017 (expected)
2011
2011
Ph.D. Economics
MSc Economics
MSc Economics & Statistics
Columbia University
Paris School of Economics
ENSAE-ParisTech
Honors and Awards:
Field of Specialization: Macroeconomics
Job Market Paper: A Kinked-Demand Theory of Price Rigidity
I provide a microfounded theory for one of the oldest, but so far informal, explanations of price
rigidity: the kinked demand curve theory. Assuming that some customers observe at no cost only
the price of the store they happen to be at gives rise to a kink in firms' demand curves: a price
increase above the market price repels more customers than a price decrease attracts. The kink in
turn makes a range of prices consistent with equilibrium, but an intuitive criterion---the adaptive
rational-expectations criterion---selects a unique equilibrium where prices stay constant for long.
The kinked-demand theory is consistent with price-setters' account of price-rigidity as arising
from the customer's---not the firm's---side, contrary to prominent models of price rigidity. The
kinked-demand theory can be tested against menu-cost models in micro data: it predicts that
prices should be more likely to change if they have recently changed, and that prices should be
more flexible in markets where customers can more easily compare prices. The kinked-demand
theory has novel implications for monetary policy: its Phillips curve is strongly convex but does
not contain any (present or past) expectations of inflation; its long-run Phillips curve is
essentially similar as its short-run Phillips curve, leading to a long-run trade-off between output
and inflation; and changes to the distribution of sectoral productivity such as oil price shocks
shift the Phillips curve.
Working Papers:
Search Models and Kinked Demands
A Plucking Model of Business Cycles, with Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson
Coordination under Ambiguity
Referee
Journal of Monetary Economics
Research Assistantship:
Summer 2012, Spring 2014:
Fall 2013:
Summer 2014:
Fall 2014 to Spring 2016:
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martin Uribe
Michael Woodford
Ricardo Reis
Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson
Fall 2012:
Spring 2013:
Summer 2014 and 2015:
TA, Intermediate Macro (X. Sala-i-Martin)
TA, First-year econ PhD Macro (S. Schmitt-Grohé & J. Stiglitz)
Instructor, First-year econ Phd Math Camp
References:
Michael Woodford
John Bates Clark Professor
of Political Economy
Columbia University
(212) 854-1094
michael.woodford@columbia.edu
Ricardo Reis
A.W. Phillips Professor
of Economics
London School of Economics
+44-20-7955-7508
r.a.reis@lse.ac.uk
Emi Nakamura
Associate Professor
of Economics
Columbia Business School
(212) 854-8162
enakamura@columbia.edu
Jón Steinsson
Associate Professor
of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-3690
jsteinsson@columbia.edu
Christopher Hansman
October 2, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(617) 459-3228
c.hansman@columbia.edu
http://www.columbia.edu/~cjh2182
Education:
2017 (expected)
2013
2009
Ph.D. Economics
Columbia University
M.A. Economics
Columbia University
B.S. Mathematics and Economics University of Chicago
Public Economics, Household Finance, Health, Insurance
Job Market Paper:
“Asymmetric Information and the Link Between Leverage and Mortgage Default”
Abstract:
Borrowers with large mortgages relative to the value of their homes default at higher rates. This
paper asks whether this correlation is due to moral hazard—larger balances causing borrowers to
default—or adverse selection—ex-ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans. To separate these
information asymmetries I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in borrowers' ex-post balances
generated by (i) the unique contract structure of Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages and (ii) the
unexpected divergence of the financial indices used determine interest rate adjustments during the
2008 crisis. I find strong evidence of moral hazard: a 10 point increase in a borrower's loan-to-value
ratio causes a 16 percent increase in the one year default rate. However, adverse selection also
explains 30-40 percent of the baseline correlation between leverage and default. I construct and
simulate a simple model of mortgage choice and default to highlight the policy tradeoff informed by
the separation of these asymmetries. Optimal regulation of mortgage leverage must balance losses
from foreclosures against under-provision of credit due to adverse selection.
Publications:
“The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization” with Ethan Frenchman and
Arpit Gupta; Journal of Legal Studies (Forthcoming)
“Personality and the Education-Health Gradient: A Note on Understanding Differences in Health
Behaviors by Education” with Gabriella Conti; Journal of Health Economics (note), 32(2): 480-485.
(2013)
“Primate Evidence on the Late Health Effects of Early Life Adversity” with Gabriella Conti, James J.
Heckman, Matthew Novak, Angela M. Ruggiero, and Stephen J. Suomi; Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 109(23): 8866-8871. (2012)
Working Papers and Work in Progress:
“Interlinked Firms and the Consequences of Piecemeal Regulation” with Jonas Hjort and Gianmarco
León; Revise and Resubmit at The Journal of The European Economic Association
“Asymmetric Information in the Adjustable Rate Mortgage Market” with Arpit Gupta
“Vertical Integration, Supplier Behavior, and Quality Upgrading Among Exporters” with Jonas
Hjort, Gianmarco León, and Matthieu Teachout
“Reference Dependence and Imperfect Smoothing: The Case of Option ARMs”
Grants and Awards:
2016-2017, National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant
2015-2016, Russell Sage Small Grant in Behavioral Economics
2015-2016, Investing in Justice Pilot Projects Grant, Center for Justice, Columbia University
Research Assistantships:
Andreas Mueller, Columbia Business School, Summer 2012
James J. Heckman, University of Chicago, 2008-2011
Teaching Assistantships:
Corporate Finance, Gailen Hite, Spring 2016
Financial Economics, Rajiv Sethi, Fall 2015
Risk and Uncertainty, Pierre-André Chiappori, Spring 2015
Game Theory, Prajit K. Dutta, Fall 2014
Perspectives in Economics (Ph.D. Level), Joseph E. Stiglitz, Spring 2014
Introduction to Econometrics, Seyhan Arkonac, Fall 2013
Intermediate Microeconomics, Anna C. Musatti/Seyhan Arkonac, Fall 2012/Spring 2013
References:
Pierre-André Chiappori
E. Rowan And Barbara Steinschneider Professor
of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-6369
pc2167@columbia.edu
Wojciech Kopczuk
Professor of Economics and International and
Public Affairs
Department of Economics and SIPA
Columbia University
(212) 854-2519
wojciech.kopczuk@columbia.edu
Jonas Hjort
Assistant Professor of Economics and Finance
(212) 854-5957
hjort@columbia.edu
Bernard Salanié
Columbia University
(212) 854-8059
bs2237@columbia.edu
ZHELI HE
September 30, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
Placement Chair:
Placement Assistant:
(314) 372-5061
zh2178@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~zh2178
Navin Kartik
Douglas Almond
Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881
Email: nk2339@columbia.edu
Email: da2152@columbia.edu
Email: aed2152@columbia.edu
Education:
2017 (Expected)
2014
2013
2011
Ph.D.
M.Phil.
M.A.
B.A.
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
Washington University in St. Louis
Fields of Specialization: International Trade (Primary), Development Economics
Job Market Paper: “Trade and Real Incomes of the Rich and Poor: Cross-Country Evidence”
(with Feiran Zhang)
Abstract: What is the impact of trade on the distribution of real income, 𝑤! /𝑝! , in a large crosssection of countries? The vast majority of the literature focuses on the effect of trade on the
distribution of nominal incomes, 𝑤! . A small number of studies consider its differential impact
on the consumer price indices, 𝑝! . Results tend to go in opposite directions. We build a model
embedding demand heterogeneity across consumers in an assignment framework with many
labor groups to quantify the distributional effects of trade for a wide range of countries taking
both channels into account. We find that as a result of a five percent reduction in all bilateral
trade costs, the bigger decline in the consumer price indices facing the poor more than
compensates for their smaller nominal income gains (or larger nominal income losses). More
specifically, in the average country, real income of the bottom 10th percentile increases by 0.8%
more than the top 10th percentile. In addition, the poor in high-income countries benefit more
from the reduction in consumer price indices, and the rich in high-income countries benefit more
from the increase in nominal incomes. We also find that there is an interaction between the two
channels. Our results highlight the importance of combining both the income and the expenditure
channels in order to measure the distributional effects of trade accurately.
Work in Progress:
“Trade Liberalization, Productivity Distribution and Inequality”, with Feiran Zhang, April 2014
“Learning by Importing”, with Mi Dai, April 2014
Work in Progress:
“The Elusive Reallocation Effects of Trade”, October 2015
“Firm Productivity Distribution and Welfare Gains from Trade”, April 2015
“What Explains Firm-Level Sales Variation Across Export Markets”, October 2014
Honors and Awards:
2016-2017
2011-2016
2011-2016
2011
Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University
Summer Fellowship, Columbia University
Faculty Fellowship, Columbia University
Honors in Economics with Distinction, Washington University in St. Louis
Research Experience:
July 2014
Summer 2012
Summer 2012
Spring 2010
Fall 2009
Short Term Consultant, World Bank
RA for David Weinstein, Columbia University
RA for Jushan Bai, Columbia University
RA for Frederic Raines, Washington University in St. Louis
RA for Juan Pantano, Washington University in St. Louis
Spring 2016
Fall 2015
Summer 2014-2015
Spring 2015
Fall 2014
Spring 2014
Fall 2013
Fall 2012, Spring 2013
Introduction to Econometrics (TA for Seyhan Erden)
Introduction to Econometrics (TA for Mikka Rokkanen)
International Trade (Instructor)
Perspectives on Economic Studies (Ph.D. level, TA for Joseph Stiglitz)
Intermediate Microeconomics (TA for Jonathan Vogel)
The Global Economy (TA for Sunil Gulati)
Globalization & Its Risks (TA for Graciela Chichilnisky)
Principles of Economics (TA for Anna Caterina Musatti)
Personal:
Citizenship: China
Language: Mandarin (Native); English (Fluent)
References:
David E. Weinstein (Sponsor)
Columbia University
(212)854-6880
dew35@columbia.edu
Donald R. Davis
Columbia University
(212)854-4037
drd28@columbia.edu
Jonathan E. Vogel
Columbia University
(212)854-9925
jev9@columbia.edu
GORAN LAZAREVSKI
October 3rd, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(347) 583-1796
gl2291@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~gl2291
Placement Chairs: Navin Kartik, nk2339@columbia.edu
Placement Chair: Doug Almond, da2152@columbia.edu
Education:
2017 (expected)
2014
2013
2010
Ph.D.
M.Phil
M.A.
A.B.
Economics
Economics
Economics
Physics, Economics
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
Harvard University
Honors and Awards:
2013, Wueller Teaching Runner-up for Principles of Economics, Columbia University
2008, Berlin Consortium for German Studies Fellowship, Columbia University
2001-2006, Macedonian National Scholarship, Macedonian Ministry of Education
International Trade, Political Economy, Development
Job Market Paper: "Lobbying for International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights"
Abstract:
Lobbying has been thoroughly analyzed in the context of trade protection, but there is a
gap in the literature when it comes to lobbying for intellectual property right (IPR). I
propose a model that analyzes the effect of firm lobbying for IPR protection in
innovatively driven economies in an international setting. In particular, I compare the
outcomes for the IPR protection level and global social welfare between a world that is
not cooperating on IPR and a world with cooperation and IPR-related trade agreements,
such as the TRIPS, TPP and TTIP. I show that lobbying necessarily leads to inefficient
international agreements resulting in too much IPR protection and under some
circumstances could be even worse than when countries don't cooperate at all. I also
show that international lobbying and high concentration of capital can further exacerbate
this outcome. The model generates predictions consistent with firm-level lobbying data.
Working Papers:
"The effect of WTO entry on Chinese patent valuation" (in progress)
"Monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms and lobbying for trade policy", 2014
"Lobbying and Innovation: Do less innovative firms lobby for more trade protection?", 2013
2013-2014
2012-2013
2010-2011
2011
2010
Research Assistant for Suresh Naidu, Columbia University
Research Assistant (consultant) for Cristian Pop-Eleches and Markus
Goldstein, Columbia University & World Bank
Research Analyst, Center for Research and Policy Making, Macedonia:
"Perspectives of women in rural areas" (2012, author) with the
support of UN Women
Research Analyst, KB First Open Mandatory Pension Fund, Macedonia
Research Assistant for Marc Melitz, Harvard University
Instructor, Columbia University
Summer 2016 Principles of Economics
Faculty, Oxbridge the New York College Experience
Summer 2015 Introduction to Economics
Teaching Assistantships, Columbia University
Fall 2016
Game Theory, Prajit Dutta
Spring 2016
Economic Development, Anna Catarina Musatti
Spring 2015
Principles of Economics, Nicola Zaniboni
Fall 2014
International Trade, Juan Carlos Hallak
Summer 2014 Introduction to Economics, Business and Finance, Roger Mesznik
Spring 2014
Principles of Economics, Brendan O'Flaherty
Fall 2013
Principles of Economics, Bernard Salanie
Summer 2013 Introduction to Economics, Business and Finance, Roger Mesznik
Personal:
Citizenship: Macedonian
Languages: English (Fluent), German (Fluent), Portuguese (Fluent), French (Advanced),
Spanish (Advanced), Serbian (Fluent), Macedonian (Native)
References:
Suresh Naidu (Primary)
Department Of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-0027
sn2430@columbia.edu
Jonathan Vogel
Columbia University
(212) 854-9925
jev9@columbia.edu
Alessandra Casella
Columbia University
(212) 854-2459
ac186@columbia.edu
AJIN LEE
October 6, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(646) 842-1986
al3045@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~al3045/
Education:
2017 (expected)
2013
2011
Ph.D. Economics
M.A. Economics
B.A. Economics, summa cum laude
Columbia University
Columbia University
Yonsei University
Health Economics, Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics
Job Market Paper:
“How Do Hospitals Respond to Managed Care? Evidence from At-Risk Newborns”
Abstract: Despite its widespread adoption, there is little evidence that Medicaid Managed Care (MMC)
reduces costs without compromising health outcomes. I exploit an arbitrary component of MMC
enrollment in New York to examine hospital responses and newborn health outcomes. During the study
period, infants weighing less than 1,200 grams (2 pounds, 10 ounces) were excluded from MMC and
were instead served through the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) system. Using a regression discontinuity
design, I find that newborns enrolled in MMC due to the policy stayed fewer days in the hospital and
thereby had less expensive neonatal visits. The cost differences are driven by birth hospitals retaining
more newborns enrolled in FFS while transferring away those enrolled in MMC. I find that MMC had
little impact on newborn health measured by in-hospital mortality and hospital readmission. Hospitals
only engaged in these behaviors when a high-quality hospital was nearby, suggesting that hospitals did
not sacrifice quality of care for cost reductions.
Publications:
“Impacts of Classifying New York City Students as Overweight” (with Douglas Almond and Amy Ellen
Schwartz), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, March 2016
“Late-Career Job Loss and Retirement Behavior of Couples,” forthcoming, Social Insurance and
Lifecycle Events among Older Americans Special Issue, Research on Aging, edited by Kenneth A.
Couch, Mary C. Daly, and Julie M. Zissimopoulos
Working Papers:
“Retention Heterogeneity in New York City Schools” (with Douglas Almond and Amy Ellen Schwartz)
under review
Work in Progress:
“Severity-Adjusted Payments and Hospital Practice”
“Liquidity Constraints and Health Care Utilization: Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit”
Research Grants:
J-PAL North America “Can (E)mail Improve the Effectiveness of BMI Reporting?” (with Douglas
Almond and Amy Ellen Schwartz), April 2015: $50,000.
Honors and Awards:
2014, Wueller Teaching Award (runner up), Columbia University
2014, Vickrey Prize for Best 3rd Year Paper (runner up), Columbia University
Research Assistantships:
2013-2014, Research Assistant for Douglas Almond
Summer 2013, Research Assistant for Wojciech Kopczuk
Teaching Assistantships:
Spring 2016, Intermediate Microeconomics, Qingmin Liu
Spring 2015, Intro to Econometrics, Jushan Bai
Fall 2014, 2015, Public Economics, Wojciech Kopczuk
Spring 2014, Intro to Econometrics II (Ph.D. level), Christoph Rothe
2012-2013, Principles of Economics, Sunil Gulati
Conference Presentations:
2016, International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) Doctoral School, Mannheim, Germany
2014, Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management (APPAM), Albuquerque, NM;
Social Insurance and Lifecycle Events among Older Americans Conference, Washington, DC
Referee Service:
Journal of Public Economics
Personal:
Citizenship: South Korea
Language: English (fluent), Korean (native), Chinese (intermediate)
References:
Douglas Almond (Primary)
Associate Professor
Department of Economics &
School of International and Public Affairs
Columbia University
(212) 854-7248
da2152@columbia.edu
Wojciech Kopczuk
Professor of Economics and International and
Public Affairs
Department of Economics &
School of International and Public Affairs
Columbia University
(212) 854-2519
wojciech.kopczuk@columbia.edu
Kate Ho
Associate Professor
Columbia University
(212) 854-7605
kh2214@columbia.edu
Amy Ellen Schwartz
Professor of Economics and Public Administration
and International Affairs
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse University
(315) 443-9040
amyschwartz@syr.edu
Lina Lu
September 30, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
+1-(917) 239 - 8398
ll2582@columbia.edu
http://econ.columbia.edu/~ll2582/
Placement Chairs:
Navin Kartik, nk2339@columbia.edu
Doug Almond, da2152@columbia.edu
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212)854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu
Education:
2017 (expected)
2013
2010
2008
Ph.D.
M.A.
M.A.
B.S.
Economics
Economics
Mathematics of Finance
Mathematics and Applied
Mathematics, summa cum laude
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
Zhejiang University,
China
Fields of Specialization: Econometrics (Primary), Applied Macroeconomics
Job Market Paper: “Simultaneous Spatial Panel Data Models with Common Shocks”
Abstract: I consider a simultaneous spatial panel data model, jointly modeling three effects: spatial
effect, common shocks effect and simultaneous effect. The joint modeling and consideration of
cross-sectional heteroscedasticity result in a large number of incidental parameters. I propose two
estimation approaches, the quasi maximum likelihood (QML) method and an iterative generalized
principal components (IGPC) method. I develop a full inferential theory for the two estimation
approaches, and study the trade-off between model specification and their respective asymptotic
performances. I further investigate the finite sample performance of both methods using Monte
Carlo simulations, and find that both methods perform well and simulation results corroborate the
inferential theories. Some extensions of the model are considered. Finally, I apply the model to
analyze how monetary policy shocks impact firm's bond and stock prices through the production
network with the existence of simultaneous effects between the two assets.
Publications:
“Estimation and Inference of FAVAR models” (with Jushan Bai and Kunpeng Li),
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 34:4, 620-641, 2016.
Working Papers:
“Quasi Maximum Likelihood Analysis of High Dimensional Constrained Factor Models”
(with Kunpeng Li and Qi Li), revise and resubmit, Journal of Econometrics.
“Efficient Estimation of Heterogeneous Coefficients in Panel Data Models with Common Shock”
(with Kunpeng Li), revise and resubmit, Journal of Econometrics.
Work in Progress:
“Simultaneous Dynamic Spatial Panel Data Models with Common Shocks”
“Impacts of Monetary Policy on Both Stock and Bond Markets through Production Networks:
A Simultaneous Spatial Panel Data Model Approach” (with Shaowen Luo)
Honors and Awards:
2011-present
Doctoral Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2016
Department of Economics Travel Fund for Conference, Columbia University
2016
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Travel Fund for Conference, Columbia
University
2011-2016
Summer Research Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2008
Outstanding Graduates, Zhejiang University, China
2008
Outstanding Thesis, Zhejiang University, China
2006
Shiing-Shen Chern Scholarship, Zhejiang University, China
2013-2015
Research Assistant for Jushan Bai, Columbia University
2009
Summer Intern at the Bank of China International Limited, Hong Kong
2016
North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Philadelphia, U.S.
2016
Canadian Economics Association annual conference, Ottawa, Canada
2014
Micro-econometrics(graduate), TA for Bernard Salanié
2013
Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate), TA for Eduardo Morales
2012
Introduction to Econometrics I (graduate), TA for Jushan Bai
Professional Service:
Referee
Journal of Econometrics
References:
Jushan Bai (Sponsor)
Columbia University
+1-212 8548033
jb3064@columbia.edu
Bernard Salanié
Columbia University
+1-212 8541677
bs2237@columbia.edu
Serena Ng
Columbia University
+1-212 8545488
serena.ng@columbia.edu
Ildikό Magyari
September, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(646)-734-3356
ildiko.magyari@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~im2348
Placement Co-chair: Navin Kartik, (212) 854-3926, nk2339@columbia.edu
Placement Co-chair: Doug Almond, (212) 854-7248, da2152@columbia.edu
Education:
2011 - 2017 (expected)
2008 - 2010
2002 - 2008
PhD in Economics
MA in Economics (with distinction)
MSc in Finance (1st class honors)
Columbia University
Central European University, Hungary
DOFIN ASE, Bucharest, Romania
Fields of specialization: International Economics, Industrial Organization
Job market paper: “Firm Organization, Chinese Imports, and U.S. Manufacturing Employment”
Abstract What is the impact of Chinese imports on employment in US manufacturing firms? Previous papers
have found a negative effect of Chinese import competition on employment in US manufacturing
establishments, industries, and regions. However, I show theoretically and empirically that the impact of
offshoring on firms (which can be thought of as collections of establishments) can be different from that on
individual establishments because offshoring reduces costs at the firm-level. These cost reductions can result
in firms expanding their total manufacturing employment even as particular establishments are shrunk. Using
novel data from the US Census Bureau, I show that the data supports this view: US firms expanded
manufacturing employment in response to increased Chinese import competition, in both US output and input
markets, as they re-organized towards less exposed industries. More exposed firms expanded employment of
high-skilled (i) by hiring more production workers in manufacturing whom they paid higher wages, and (ii) in
services complementary with high-skilled and high-tech manufacturing such as R&D, design, engineering,
headquarter services. In other words, although Chinese imports may have reduced employment within some
establishments, these losses were more than offset by gains in employment within the same firms. Contrary to
the conventional wisdom, firms exposed to greater Chinese imports created more manufacturing and nonmanufacturing jobs than those not exposed.
Working papers:
"Does Financial Liberalization Promote Imports?" July 2016
(Winner of Harriss Prize 2013, Olga Radzyner Award 2014)
Work in progress:
“Measuring Retailers’ Productivity” with Stephen J. Redding and David E. Weinstein
“The Role of Market Structure and Firms’ Boundary in the Propagation of Industry Specific Shocks: The Case
of the China Shock in the US”
“The Geography of US Firms’ Organization”
“Financial Shocks, Capital Accumulation and Skill Biased Technical Change across Space” with Dávid
Krisztián Nagy
2/2
Honors and awards:
2015-2016
2014
2014
2013
2013
2011-2016
2010
2008-2010
2002-2008
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Fellowship, Columbia University
Weuller Prize for the Best Dissertation Proposal, Columbia University
Olga Radzyner Award, Oesterreichische Nationalbank
Harriss Prize for best 2nd year paper (runner-up), Columbia University
Program for Economic Research Data Grant, Columbia University
Faculty Fellow, Columbia University
Stanislav Vidovic Prize for Best Dissertation, Central European University
George Soros Fellowship, Central European University
Romanian National Scholarship, Romanian Ministry of Education
Research experience and employment:
2014Special Sworn Status Researcher, US Census Bureau
2014-2016
Research Fellow, Columbia University
2013-2016
Research Assistant to David E. Weinstein, Columbia University
Fall 2016
Research Assistant to Michael H. Riordan, Columbia University
2013
Summer Visiting Researcher, Hungarian Central Statistical Office
2009-2011
Research Assistant to János Kornai, Harvard University
2009
Summer Intern, National Bank of Hungary
2006-2008
Researcher, DOFIN, ASE Bucharest
Teaching:
2012-2014
Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, USA
Industrial Organization (Fall 2014) - Instructor: Steven G. Olley
Industrial Organization (2012-2013) - Instructor: Katherine E. Ho
Economics of Money and Banking (2012-2013) - Instructor: Perry G. Mehrling
Conferences:
2014: CEEI (Vienna) 2016: NBER Summer Institute
Memberships:
European Economic Association
Personal:
Citizenship: Hungarian, Romanian
Languages: Hungarian (native), Romanian (fluent), English (fluent), French (intermediate)
References:
David E. Weinstein (Primary)
Columbia University
212-854-6880
dew35@columbia.edu
Michael H. Riordan
Columbia University
212-854-6984
mhr21@columbia.edu
Katherine E. Ho
Columbia University
212-854-7605
kh2214@columbia.edu
Jonathan E. Vogel
Columbia University
212-854-9925
jvogel@columbia.edu
2/2
EVAN RIEHL
October 3, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
cell: (347) 514-4074
email: e.riehl@columbia.edu
website: www.columbia.edu/~eer2131
Education:
2017 (expected)
2008
Ph.D. Economics
Columbia University
B.A. Economics, Poli Sci Washington University in St. Louis
Honors and Awards:
2015, Best research paper, Columbia Committee on the Economics of Education prize
2015, Teaching award (runner-up), Columbia Economics Wueller prize
2014, Best third year paper, Columbia Economics Vickrey prize
2013, Teaching award (runner-up), Columbia Economics Wueller prize
Labor Economics, Economics of Education, Development Economics
Job Market Paper: “Assortative Matching and Complementarities in College Markets”
Abstract: This paper examines one type of assortative matching in college markets:
students with high socioeconomic status (SES) are more likely to attend high quality
colleges. Assortativity matters if SES and college quality are complementary educational
inputs. I develop an econometric framework that provides tests for the existence and sign
of this complementarity. I implement these tests by exploiting a 2000 reform of the
national college admission exam in Colombia, which caused a market-wide reduction in
assortative matching in some regions of the country. I find that the reform lowered
average graduation rates and post-college earnings in affected regions, consistent with a
positive complementarity between SES and college quality. I also find evidence of
mismatch: part of these negative effects came from the low SES students who were
shifted into higher quality colleges. However, both the market-wide and mismatch effects
die out several cohorts after the exam reform, which suggests that student/college
complementarities are not set in stone.
Other Papers:
“The Big Sort: College Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes”
with W. Bentley MacLeod, Juan E. Saavedra, and Miguel Urquiola
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (forthcoming)
“Time Gaps in Academic Careers”
Columbia CDEP-CGEG Working Paper No. 20
“Learning and Earning: An Approximation to College Value Added in Two Dimensions”
with Juan E. Saavedra and Miguel Urquiola
chapter in Productivity in Higher Education (forthcoming)
Caroline Hoxby and Kevin Stange, eds.
“Assortative Matching and Complementarities in College Markets”
2016, LACEA/LAMES Annual Meeting
2016, WEAI Graduate Student Dissertation Workshop
“The Big Sort: College Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes”
2015, SOLE/EALE World Conference
2012–2016 (various), Research assistant for Miguel Urquiola
2013–2014, Research assistant for Columbia University Provost John Coatsworth
2008–2011, Senior analyst, Analysis Group, Denver, CO
2015, Economic Development TA, Anna Caterina Musatti
2013, Intermediate Microeconomics TA, Susan Elmes
References:
W. Bentley MacLeod (co-sponsor)
Sami Mnaymneh Professor of Economics
Professor of International & Public Affairs
Affiliated Law School Faculty
Columbia University
(310) 571-5083
bentley.macleod@columbia.edu
Miguel Urquiola (co-sponsor)
Professor, SIPA and Economics Department
Columbia University
(212) 854-3769
msu2101@columbia.edu
Miikka Rokkanen
Assistant Professor of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-4478
mr3454@columbia.edu
YOGITA SHAMDASANI
October 3, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(607) 379-0877
yjs2112@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~yjs2112
Education:
2017 (expected)
2014
2013
2011
Ph.D.
M.Phil.
M.A.
B.A. with Distinction
Economics
Economics
Economics
Mathematics & Economics
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
Cornell University
Development Economics, Labor Economics
Honors and Awards:
2016
Wueller Teaching Prize (Runner Up) for a Core Economics Course, Columbia University
2015-2016
2015
Wueller Teaching Prize for Principles in Economics, Columbia University
2014Fellow, Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University
2011-2015
Job Market Paper:
“Rural Road Infrastructure & Agricultural Production: Evidence from India”
Abstract: This paper estimates the role of improvements in infrastructure on households' crop choice and
input use in agriculture. The Central Government of India launched a large-scale rural road-building
program in 2000, targeting villages that lacked all-weather connectivity. Strict guidelines governed
eligibility and timing of program road provision, with larger villages receiving roads before smaller
villages. I exploit the precise timing of road construction as a source of exogenous variation in
connectivity using a household-level panel in a difference-in-difference framework. I find that households
who gain access to improved road infrastructure diversify their crop mix — they increasingly cultivate
commercial, non-cereal crops. Households also significantly increase take up of productivity-enhancing
agricultural technologies such as high-yielding variety seeds, chemical fertilizers and irrigation. These
gains are concentrated among small-scale cultivators. I find evidence that these effects operate through an
increase in access to input markets, an increase in labor mobility as well as an increase in access to
product markets where farm output is sold. These findings emphasize the substantial barrier to productive
investments generated by poor infrastructure that hampers access to markets.
Working Papers:
“The Morale Effects of Pay Inequality” (with Emily Breza and Supreet Kaur). NBER Working Paper No.
22491. Revise and Resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Abstract: The idea that worker utility is affected by co-worker wages has potentially broad labor market
implications. In a month-long experiment with Indian manufacturing workers, we randomize whether coworkers within production units receive the same flat daily wage or different wages (according to baseline
productivity rank). For a given absolute wage, pay inequality reduces output and attendance by 0.24
standard deviations and 12%, respectively. These effects strengthen in later weeks. Pay disparity also
lowers co-workers’ ability to cooperate in their self-interest. However, when workers can clearly observe
productivity differences, pay inequality has no discernible effect on output, attendance, or group
cohesion.
Research in Progress:
“Testing for Labor Rationing: Revealed Preference Estimates from Demand Shocks” (with Emily Breza
and Supreet Kaur)
Abstract: In this project, we develop a revealed preference approach to test for and quantify labor
rationing in rural Indian labor markets. We exploit a field experiment in which large numbers of rural
workers are recruited for factory employment for a one-month period during the agricultural lean season.
This generates transitory aggregate labor demand shocks in a random set of villages, absorbing up to 30%
of the labor force of casual daily workers. If a large fraction of workers is removed from a village, then
the following sets of effects will be consistent with a level of labor rationing that is at least as large as the
size of the demand shock: i) no effect on the local village wage, ii) no effect on the level of aggregate
wage employment in the village; and iii) positive employment spillovers—higher individual employment
and lower reported involuntary unemployment—on the laborers who remain in the village (i.e. who are
not removed). Pilot results from 36 villages provide evidence in support of these predictions. The large
demand shocks had no discernible effect on local wages. However, they did generate substantial
employment spillovers—workers who remained in treatment villages experienced a 37% increase in
average employment relative to workers in control villages.
2013–2014
RA for Supreet Kaur, Columbia University
Fall 2015
Intermediate Microeconomics, Susan Elmes, Columbia University
Spring 2015
Intermediate Microeconomics, Anna Caterina Musatti, Columbia University
Fall 2014
Principles of Economics, Anna Caterina Musatti, Columbia University
Spring 2013
Intermediate Microeconomics, Steve Olley, Columbia University
Fall 2012
Globalization and its Risks, Graciela Chichilnisky, Columbia University
2016
PacDev (Stanford University), CEPR PEDL Annual Workshop (London)
2015
NEUDC (Brown University)
Personal:
Citizenship: Singapore
Language: English (Native); French (Fluent); Malay (Fluent); Hindi (Basic); Chinese (Basic)
References:
Eric Verhoogen (Sponsor)
Associate Professor of Economics
and International Affairs
Columbia University
(212) 854-4428
eric.verhoogen@columbia.edu
Emily Breza
Associate Professor of Finance
and Economics
(212) 851-0171
ebreza@columbia.edu
Supreet Kaur
University of California, Berkeley
(617) 474-0710
supreet@berkeley.edu
Meiping(Aggie) Sun
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
Phone:
Email:
Homepage:
(859) 353-1950
ms4196@columbia.edu
http://www.columbia.edu/˜ms4196/
Education
Ph.D. Economics, Columbia University, 2017 (expected)
M.Phil. Economics, Columbia University, 2013
M.A. Economics, Columbia University, 2012
B.A. Economics, Mathematics and Biology, Berea College, 2010 (summa cum laude)
Research Interests
Public Economics, Health Economics, Applied Microeconomics
Job Market Paper
“The Puzzle of Mistaken Millions: The MTA Surcharge and the Surge of Money onto MetroCards” under
review
Abstract: Since 1998, the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) system has used prepaid cards (MetroCards) to collect subway and bus fares. In 2013, the MTA imposed a $1 card fee (surcharge)
on new MetroCard purchases. After the card fee was imposed, riders started to put more money on new
MetroCard purchases. The response to the card fee was greater in low-income neighborhoods and among
riders who used cash or debit cards rather than credit cards. As a result, riders carried much larger unused
balances on their cards, and over $20 million a year more money escheated to the MTA when these cards
expired. These results may have implications for fare designs of public services.
Publications
“Dissecting China’s Property Market Data” (2016) World Economics 17(1): 41-62
Working Papers
“The Causal Effect of Institutional Discrimination on Health among Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China”
(revise and resubmit)
Abstract: Research on segregated and discriminated migrants has been done mostly in western context where
social segregation towards minority migrant population has already established. It is difficult to isolate the
influence of institutional discrimination and social stigma against migrant population. The unique household
registration (Hukou) system in China offer an opportunity to examine the effects of initial social segregation on
mental and physical health of migrants. Using change in hukou system in 1964, the regression-discontinuity
(RD) design estimates in this paper suggest that urban hukou citizens have much better chances of being in
good health. The deleterious effect of rural hukou on health possibly work through mechanisms of income
disparity, variations in educational attainment, and availability of health insurance.
“The Impact of Local Liquor Sales Restriction on Birth Outcomes and Alcohol-related Crimes in Texas”
“Will Consumers Voluntarily Undertake More Proenvironmental Actions When It is Easier? Evidence from
New York City” (under review)
Conference and Seminar Presentations
2015 EconCon 2015; Chinese Economic Association (CEA) Annual Conference
2016 NBER Summer Institute (Urban Economics); Eastern Economic Association Annual Conference; Boulder Summer Conference on Consumer Financial Decision Making; Canadian Economics Association Annual
Meiping(Aggie) Sun
2
Conference; Western Economic Association International Annual Conference; European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE) 22nd Annual Conference; Chinese Economic Association (Europe/UK) Annual Conference; Southern Economic Association Annual Conference
Honors and Fellowships
Fellowship in Academic Administration, Columbia University (2016)
Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University (2015-2016)
Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, Columbia University (2011-2015)
Faculty Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University (2010-2011)
Hilda Welch Wood Achievement Award, Berea College (2010) - Given to one female student at the top of the
graduating class
Olive Ruth Russell Fellowship, Berea College (2010)
Gilman Wei Full Scholarship Award, Berea College (2006-2010)
Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society
Research Experience
Economics Research Internship, J.P. Morgan, New York, NY (Summer 2014)
Research Assistant for Dr. Shama Perveen, Columbia Water Center, Columbia University, New York,
NY (June 2011 - November 2011)
Research Assistant for Dr. James Heckman, Department of Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago,
IL (June 2009 - January 2010, Summer 2010)
Teaching Experience
Instructor:
Intro Course in Econ/Finance (Summer 2012 and summer 2013)
Health Economics, Simmons College (Spring 2017)
Teaching assistantships:
Principles of Economics, TA for Sunil Gulati (Fall 2011, Spring 2012, Fall 2013, and Spring 2014)
Principles of Economics, TA for Anna Caterina Musatti (Fall 2012 and Spring 2013)
Gender & Applied Economics, TA for Lena Edlund (Fall 2014)
Intermediate Macroeconomics, TA for Jon Steinsson (Spring 2015)
Microeconometrics, TA for Noha Emara (Fall 2016)
Personal
Language: English (Fluent); Chinese (Native); Korean (Beginner)
Computer Skills: Proficient in C++, Latex, Microsoft Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Matlab, R, Stata
References
Brendan O’Flaherty (Sponsor)
Columbia University
(212)854-2449
bo2@columbia.edu
Douglas Almond
Columbia University
(212)854-7248
almond@columbia.edu
Pietro Ortoleva
Columbia University
(212)854-4459
pietro.ortoleva@columbia.edu
Suresh Naidu
Columbia University
(212)854-0027
sn2430@columbia.edu
Sunil Gulati
Senior Lecturer
Columbia University
212-854-4067
skg21@columbia.edu
Last updated: October 3, 2016
http://www.columbia.edu/ ms4196/MEIPING.pdf
Maria Micaela Sviatschi
September 27, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(917) 628-5267
mms2241@columbia.edu
www.micaelasviatschi.com
Education:
2017 (expected)
2013
2012
2009
2007
Ph.D.
M.Phil
M.A.
M.A.
B.S.
Economics
Economics
Economics
Economics
Economics
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
Universidad de San Andres
Universidad de San Andres
Fields of Specialization: Development Economics, Labor Economics, Crime
Job Market Paper:
“Making a Narco: Childhood Exposure to Illegal Labor Markets and
Criminal Life Paths” Columbia Economics Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award (runner-up), Reubens Fellowship Award
Abstract: I study how exposure to illegal labor markets in childhood affects criminality in adulthood. To do so, I
exploit the timing of a large anti-drug policy in Colombia that shifted cocaine production to Peruvian districts wellsuited to growing coca. In these districts, children participate in tasks such as harvesting coca leaves and transporting
processed cocaine. Using variation across districts, years, and cohorts, I show that at times of high coca prices,
children in locations suitable for coca production are more likely to work, and have lower test scores and higher
dropout rates. As adults, these individuals are 30% more likely to be incarcerated for violent and drug-related crimes,
and are less likely to trust government institutions. This is true even for individuals who move to non-coca suitable
districts, implying that they developed criminal skills during childhood. Informed by a model of parental incentives, I
show that a conditional-cash-transfer program that encourages schooling and was rolled out gradually, mitigated the
effects by reducing drug production, child labor, and crime. Finally, I show how the program can be targeted taking
into account the geographic distribution of coca suitability and spatial spillovers in cocaine production within suitable
areas. Overall, this paper provides evidence on the early underpinnings of criminal careers by showing how crimespecific human capital can develop at the expense of other forms of human capital in “bad locations.”
Ongoing projects:
“Long-term Effects of Temporary Labor Demand: Free Trade Zones, Female Education and Marriage Market
Outcomes in the Dominican Republic”, working paper. Columbia Economics Harris Prize (runner-up). Best Graduate
Paper Award on Topics of Labor and Gender in Latin America, Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies.
“Exporting Criminal Capital: The Effect of US Deportations on Gang Formation and Human Capital in Central
America” with Josefa Aguirre, working paper
“The Effects of Indoor Prostitution on Sex Crime: Evidence from New York City” with Riccardo Ciacci, working
paper
“What Makes a Good Public Servant? Criminal Exposure and Performance in Office” with Jorge Mangonnet
“Access to Women Emergency Centers, Domestic Violence and Education” with Iva Trako and Guadalupe Gutierrez
“Bright Minds, Big Rent: Gentrification and the Rising Returns to Skill” with Lena Edlund and Cecilia Machado.
NBER Working Paper w21729, November 16, 2015
Publications:
“Auspicious Birth Dates Among Chinese in California” (with Douglas Almond, Christine Pal Chee and Nan Zhong).
Economics and Human Biology, July 2015.
2014: Research Assistant to Ernesto Dal Bo (University of California, Berkeley), Research Assistant to Douglas
Almond (Columbia University)
2012: Research Assistant to Jeffrey Fagan (Columbia University)
2011: Research Assistant to Rafael Di Tella (Harvard Business School)
2008-2011: Research Fellow, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.
2008: Research Assistant to Martin Rossi (Universidad de San Andres, Buenos Aires), Research Assistant to Rafael Di
Tella (Harvard Business School)
2016: Urban Economics, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014: Topics in Development Department of Economics, Methods for Undergraduate Thesis, Department of
Economics, Columbia University
2013: Development Economics, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2012: Gender and Economics, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2008-2011: Applied Microeconomics (Grad.TA), Principle of Economics, Economics History, Economics of
Regulation, Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres
Honors and Awards:
2015: Reubens Fellowship in support of research in the Fields of Development, International and Labor Economics for
“Making a Narco…”, Columbia University
2015: Best Graduate Paper Award on Topics of Labor and Gender in Latin America for “Long-term Effects of
Temporary Labor...”, Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies in Latin America and the Caribbean
2014: Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award (runner-up) for “Making a Narco…”, Columbia University
2014: Student Research Grant, Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University
2014: Fellow, Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University
2013: Harris Prize Second Year Paper Award (runner-up) for “Long-term Effects…”, Columbia University
2011-2016: Faculty Fellowship, Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2010: Best Paper for Young Scholars (runner-up), Development Economics Conference in La Paz, Bolivia
2008: Best Undergraduate Thesis, Universidad de San Andres, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Best Paper for
Undergraduate Thesis (runner-up), Argentinean Association of Political Economy in Buenos Aires, Argentina
Referee services:
Journal of Human Resources
Seminars and conferences:
November 2016: Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) and Latin American Econometric
Society (LAMES) Annual Meeting. June 2016: Annual Meeting of America Latina Crime and Policy Network,
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2014-2015: World Bank Conference on Productivity and Development, Mexico DF. World
Bank Conference on Gender and Agency, Washington DC; University of Leicester, Econ. PhD Conference, Leicester,
UK; University of Warwick, Econ. PhD Conference, Coventry, UK; Northeast Universities Development Consortium.
Boston. 2008-2010: John Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore; Association for Social
Economics. Montreal, Canada; Population Association of America, Dallas; LACEA
References:
Jonas Hjort
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
(212)-854-5957
hjort@columbia.edu
Miguel Urquiola
Columbia University
(212)-854-3769
msu2101@columbia.edu
Bentley Macleod
Columbia University
(310)-571-5083
Teck Yong Tan
Contact Information
Address: Department of Economics, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street New York, NY 10027.
Website: http://www.columbia.edu/∼tt2430/.
Email:
teck.tan@columbia.edu.
Tel:
(+1) 347-481-0655.
Placement Chairs:
Navin Kartik, nkartik@columbia.edu; Douglas Almond, da2152@columbia.edu.
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu.
Education
Ph.D. Economics, Columbia University, May 2017 (expected).
Principal Advisors: Navin Kartik and W. Bentley MacLeod.
M.Res. Economics, University College London, 2011.
M.S. Mathematical Economics & Econometrics (High Distinction), Toulouse School of Economics 2010.
B.A. Economics (First-Class Honors), National University of Singapore, 2009.
B.Sc. Applied Mathematics, National University of Singapore, 2009.
Research Fields
Contracts and Organization; Microeconomic Theory.
Working Papers
(Job market paper)
Firm Culture and Innovation: The Extrinsic Motivation of Freedom at Work.
Why do workers perform better with more freedom at work? This paper provides an extrinsic motivation
of this phenomenon and introduces a novel view of firm culture as the information flow to the managers.
In a principal-agent setting in which innovations are not contractible ex-ante, the agent faces a ratchet
effect of innovating when monitored: if he uncovers a more efficient technology, the principal will raise his
performance requirement in the future; anticipating this, the agent never tries to innovate. By adopting
a “freedom-at-work” culture, the principal allows the agent to privately learn the outcome of his experimentation. The resulting information asymmetry compels the principal to share the innovation surplus
with the agent in the form of an information rent, thus giving the agent incentives to innovate. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the principal can benefit from generating asymmetric information against herself.
Managing Training and Production Activities in Organizations.
Sending workers for training improves their future productivity but comes at a cost of forgoing current
production. This paper studies dynamic contracting under this trade-off in the presence of moral hazard
on the worker’s production effort and adverse selection on his learning ability. I illustrate the effects of
the principal’s ability to observe the worker’s initial activity choice – training or production – on the
type of constraints in the contracting problem, the resulting form of the optimal contracts, and the type
of distortions in the second best.
Teck Yong Tan CV
2
Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and
Guile, NBER Working Paper 22156 (with W. Bentley MacLeod).
We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized
by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure.
Two generic contract forms are studied. An authority contract has the Principal reveal his information
before the Agent responds with her information. Under such a contract, the Agent’s compensation varies
only with the Principal’s information, while her information is used to punish untruthful behavior by
the Principal. Conversely, a sales contract has the Agent reveal her information first. In this case, the
Agent’s performance incentives are affected by the information revealed by both parties. Because the
Agent’s information affects her compensation, the information revelation constraints are more complex
under a sales contract, and provide a way to integrate Williamson’s (1975) notion of guile into agency
theory. We find that designing sales contracts for expert agents, such as physicians and financial advisors,
are significantly more complex than designing optimal authority contracts.
Work in Progress
Persuasion under Costly Lying.
I study the design of information acquisition structure when a Receiver relies on a Sender to report the
new information. Sender can misrepresent the new information at a lying cost. Under minimal assumptions on the lying cost, lying never occurs in the Sender-optimal equilibrium; instead, Sender designs
a vague information acquisition structure to gain credibility that he will not misrepresent any new information. This hampers the effectiveness of Sender’s persuasion. When Sender has state-independent
preference and constant lying cost, the optimal information structure can be derived using geometry
arguments. A comparison is drawn with the optimal information acquisition structure when Receiver
observes the new information directly.
Feedback and Belief Manipulation via Discretionary Rewards.
I study the role of information provision in discretionary rewards. In a principal-agent setting with
unknown state (eg. match quality) and subjectively evaluated outcomes (outcomes are privately observed
by the principal), discretionary bonus payments act as credible feedback to the agent. The incentive to
manipulate the agent’s belief about the state affects the relational contract and payment decision. Under
the principal-optimal equilibrium, the principal promises an excessively high bonus and pays it if and
only if she observes a good outcome (i.e. no lying about evaluation). I discuss the analogy with signaling
games and show that the principal-optimal equilibrium is the only equilibrium that survives the Cho and
Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion equilibrium refinement.
Fellowships & Awards
Wueller Teaching Award for best TA, Columbia University, 2016 (winner); 2015, 2013 (runner-up).
Best TA for 1st year PhD course, Columbia University Association of Grad Students in Economics, 2016.
Wueller Prize for best pre-dissertation proposal (runner-up), Columbia University, 2014.
Vickrey Prize for best 3rd year paper (runner-up), Columbia University, 2014.
Harriss Prize for best 2nd year paper, Columbia University, 2013.
GSAS Faculty Fellowship, Columbia University, 2011–2017.
Overseas Research Scholarship, University College London, 2010–2011.
WM Gorman Scholarship, Deparment of Economics, University College London, 2010–2011.
Eiffel Scholarship (by French government for graduate studies in France), 2009–2010.
Teck Yong Tan CV
3
Conference and Seminar Presentations
2016: Econometric Society North America Summer Meeting; National University of Singapore.
Teaching
Lecturer for Game Theory, Summer 2014 & Summer 2015.
Teaching Assistant for Intermediate Microeconomics, Fall 2015 & Spring 2016.
Teaching Assistant for Microeconomic Analysis II (1st year Ph.D), Spring 2015.
Teaching Assistant for Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Spring 2013.
Research Assistantship
Research Assistant to W. Bentley MacLeod, Summer 2012 – Fall 2012.
Research Assistant to Navin Kartik, Fall 2013 – Summer 2014.
Professional Activities
Referee for: Games and Economic Behavior.
Miscellaneous
Languages: English (Fluent), Chinese (Fluent), French (Basic).
Citizenship: Singaporean.
References
Navin Kartik (co-sponsor)
Columbia University
(212) 854-3926
nkartik@columbia.edu
Yeon-Koo Che
Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory
Columbia University
(212) 854-8276
yc2271@columbia.edu
Last updated: October 2016
W. Bentley MacLeod (co-sponsor)
Sami Mnaymneh Professor of Economics and
Professor of International and Public Affairs
Department of Economics and SIPA
Columbia University
(310) 571-5083
KEREM TUZCUOGLU
October 7, 2016
Columbia University
1103 International Affairs Building
420 W 118th St, New York, NY 10027
Phone: +1 (917) 399-9596
kerem.tuzcuoglu@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~kt2426
Placement Chairs:
Navin Kartik, nk2339@columbia.edu
Doug Almond, da2152@columbia.edu
Placement Assistant:
Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881,
aed2152@columbia.edu
EDUCATION
2011—2017 (expected)
2010—2011 (Ph.D. track)
2008—2010
2003—2008
Ph.D.
M.A.
M.A.
B.S.
Economics
Economics
Economics
Mathematics
Columbia University
Ohio State University
Koc University
Bogazici University
Fields of Specialization: Econometrics
Research Interests:
Time Series, Macroeconomics, Financial Econometrics
JOB MARKET PAPER
“COMPOSITE LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF AR-PROBIT MODEL: APPLICATION TO CREDIT RATINGS”
Abstract: In this paper, persistent discrete data are modeled by Autoregressive Probit
model and estimated by Composite Likelihood (CL) estimation. Autocorrelation in the
latent variable results in an intractable likelihood function containing high dimensional
integrals. CL approach offers a fast and reliable estimation compared to computationally
demanding simulation methods. I provide consistency and asymptotic normality results
of the CL estimator and use it to study the credit ratings. The ratings are modeled as
imperfect measures of the latent and autocorrelated creditworthiness of firms explained
by the balance sheet ratios and business cycle variables. The empirical results show
evidence for rating assignment according to Through-the-cycle methodology, that is, the
ratings do not respond to the short-term fluctuations in the financial situation of the firms.
Moreover, I show that the ratings become more volatile over time, in particular after the
crisis, as a reaction to the regulations and critics on credit rating agencies.
WORKING PAPERS
“HOW IMPORTANT ARE GLOBAL FOOD SHOCKS”, with Bilge Erten, September 2016,
submitted to Journal International Economics
“INTERPRETING THE LATENT DYNAMIC FACTORS BY THRESHOLD FAVAR MODEL”, with
Sinem Hacioglu, 2016, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 622, Bank of England
HONORS AND AWARDS
2015—2016
2011—2016
2014
2011
2008—2010
Wueller Teaching Award, Best TA in Ph.D. Courses, Columbia University
Graduate School Fellowship, Department of Economics, Ohio State University
Tubitak’s Fellowship for national graduate education
RESEARCH AND WORK EXPERIENCE
2015 Analyst at The Bank of England, London, UK
2014 Consultant for Medivo Inc., New York, USA (Big data analysis and forecasting)
PRESENTATIONS
2016 The 11th Greater New York Metropolitan Area Econometrics Colloquium
2016 Eastern Economic Association 42nd Annual Conference
2015 Bank of England
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
2011—2016 Columbia University, Teaching Assistant


Graduate Level
Introduction to Econometrics (Ph.D. course, Best TA Award)
Econometrics II (M.A. course)

Undergraduate Level
Advanced Econometrics, Time Series Econometrics, Introduction to
Econometrics, Financial Economics, Intermediate Macroeconomics
REFERENCES
Serena Ng
Columbia University
+1 (212) 854-5488
serena.ng@columbia.edu
Jushan Bai
Columbia University
+1 (212) 854-8033
jb3064@columbia.edu
Martín Uribe
Columbia University
+1 (212) 851-4008
mu2166@columbia.edu
ENRICO ZANARDO
September 21, 2016
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
(347) 681-4746
ez2197@columbia.edu
Personal Website
Placement Chairs: Navin Kartik, nkartik@columbia.edu Doug Almond, da2152@columbia.edu
Field of Specialization: Microeconomic Theory (Primary), Matching (Secondary)
Research Interests: Economic Theory, Information Economics, Matching
Education:
2017 (expected)
2014
2013
2011
2010
2009
Ph.D. Economics
M.Phil Economics
M.A Economics
M. Sci. Applied Mathematics
Exchange Abroad Program (EAP)
B.A Pure Mathematics
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
University of Padua (Italy)
UCLA
University of Padua (Italy)
Honors and Awards:
2016-2017, Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University
2011-2016, Faculty Doctoral Fellowship, Columbia University
2012 Diploma Summa Cum Laude, Galilean School of Higher Education
2011 Laurea Summa cum Laude, University of Padua
2009 Laurea Summa cum Laude, University of Padua
Job Market Paper: “How to Measure Disagreement?”
This paper defines a quantitative measure of disagreement. I introduce six axioms that a
measure of disagreement should satisfy and then characterize all the functions that
represent it. I then consider two applications. First, I find necessary and sufficient
conditions for more public information to decrease disagreement between rational agents.
Second, I show that in an economy with heterogeneous beliefs, trade of contingent assets
is increasing in my measures of disagreement, and the asset prices are the beliefs that
minimize aggregate disagreement.
Working Papers:
“When does information reduce disagreement?” (with Navin Kartik)
“Matching in the smallest Large Market” (2016), under revision
2015-2016, Research Assistant for A. Prat and M. Halac (Columbia Business School)
2013-2016, Research Assistant for N. Kartik (Columbia University)
Fall 2014, Research Assistant for M. Di Maggio (Harvard Business School)
2013, Research Assistant for A. Casella (Columbia University)
Summer 2012, Research Assistant for R. Sethi (Barnard College)
Summer 2016, Mathematics for Economists (Master) (TA for E. Gerratana)
Summer 2015, Introduction to Microeconomics (Master) (TA for E. Gerratana)
Spring 2014, Advanced Microeconomics (Ph.D) (TA for N. Kartik and P. Bolton)
Fall 2012, Game Theory (Undergraduate) (TA for Q. Liu)
Seminar Presentations:
March 2014, Economics PhD Conference (Warwick University, UK)
Referee Experiences:
2014, Mathematical Social Sciences
Personal
Citizenship: Italy
Language: Italian (Native); English (Fluent); Spanish (Intermediate); French (Beginner)
References:
Navin Kartik (Primary)
Professor
Columbia University
(212) 854-3926
nkartik@gmail.com
Yeon-Koo Che
Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor
of Economic Theory
Columbia University
(212) 854-8276
yc2271@columbia.edu
Pietro Ortoleva
Columbia University
pietro.ortoleva@columbia.edu
Paolo Siconolfi
Professor
(212) 854-3474
ps17@columbia.edu

elliott ash - Columbia University

Transcription

Similar documents

our faculty hiring brochure

THE COMMUNICATOR July 1, 2014 - Columbia United Church of

OAK HALL LANE - Merritt Properties

October 13-19, 2014 The Mayor`s Walk Against Domestic Violence

BP Columbia ParCar Enlargement.indd

The Resource Economics Major at the University of Connecticut

It`s that time of year again! - Cayce West Columbia Life Magazine

scott phillips - scott michael phillips

Fifth Annual Moving Forward Together Secondary Transition Fair

The Impact of the Lausanne Peace Treaty