Tactical Evolutions in Syria 2011-2014

Transcription

The “Cahiers du Retex” (Lessons Learned Casebooks) tackle major issues important
to the French Army today, providing material for doctrinal research and development.
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Cover photo:
Syria, 2013. Fighters of the Free Syrian Army.
©Reuters
2
Cahier du RETEX – Research – March 2015
TACTICAL EVOLUTIONS IN SYRIA
2011-2014
3
Tactical evolutions in Syria, 2011-2014
This casebook is online on the CDEF website under the DREX tab –
Cahier du RETEX – “Research” Collection.
This study was developed by Adrien DESBONNET, student MRIAE Paris I Sorbonne,
research officer at the Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, 2013-2014
under the supervision of Mme Julie d’Andurain,
Director of studies – Research Division/DREX/CDEF
CDEF/DREX/B. RECH – 1 place Joffre – 75 007 PARIS
Pnia : 821 753 81 53 – Tél. : 01 44 42 81 53 –
Fax : 01 44 42 42 66 – www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Email : julie.d-andurain@intradef.gouv.fr
4
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I – THE ORIGINS OF PROTEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.1 THE “TRIANGLE OF POWER”, THE BASIS OF THE SYRIAN REGIME . . . . . . . . .
I.1.1 The birth of the Syrian regime is based on the Alawites, the armed forces
and the Ba’ath Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.1.2 President Hafez al-Assad and the establishment of his regime through
strengthening the “triangle of power” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.1.3 Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
9
9
10
11
I.2 A FRAGILE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
I.3.1 The first demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.3.2 Emerging rebel groups: claims, structures, and identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
18
I.3 THE FIRST REBEL MOVEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
CHAPTER II – THE REGIME’S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY . . . . . . 21
II.1 THE SYRIAN ARAB ARMY IN 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.2 A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY INHERITED FROM HAFEZ AL-ASSAD .
II.2.1 Hafez al-Assad’s counterinsurgency, 1979 - 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.2.2 Bashar al-Assad’s counterinsurgency strategy, 2011 - 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
26
26
26
II.3 THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE SUMMER
OF 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
II.3.1 The reasons for failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.3.2 The consequences of this failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
28
CHAPITRE III – THE SYRIAN REBELS, BETWEEN ATTEMPTED
UNIFICATION AND PERMANENT DIVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 31
III.1 THE REBELLION’S UNIFICATION ATTEMPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
III.2 THE REBEL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
III.1.1 The difficulties of the first rebel coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.1.2 Developing cooperation programs on the ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.1.3 Groups with local, provincial and country-wide influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.2.1 A rebel strategy is emerging at the national level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.2.2 The tactical challenges of the rebels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.2.3 The rebels and the population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
33
34
36
37
38
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III.3 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL PLAYERS IN THE REBELLION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.3.1 Turkey, a key rear base and source of supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.3.2 The key role of the Gulf countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.3.3 The support of Western powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
38
39
39
CHAPTER IV – ASSAD’S NEW STRATEGY: ETHNIC CLEANSING
AND CIVIL WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
IV.1 THE POPULATION, A CENTRAL ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
IV.2 INCREASED RELIANCE ON MILITIAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
IV.3 THE PRIMARY ROLE OF FOREIGN PLAYERS IN THE FIGHTING . . . . . . . . . .
46
IV.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIME’S OPERATIONS AND OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
IV.1.1 Humanitarian crisis, the regime’s ultimate weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV.1.2 Propaganda, a pillar essential to the survival of the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV.2.1 The growing confusion between militias and Syrian armed forces . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV.2.2 The role of militias in the regime’s operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV.3.1
IV.3.2
IV.3.3
IV.3.4
Iranians in Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The role of the Lebanese Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shiite militias in Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russian supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV.4.1 Assessment of operations conducted by the regime since summer 2012 . . . .
IV.4.2 Assessment of the geographical evolution of the conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
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45
45
46
48
51
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54
CHAPTER V – THE “SECOND REVOLUTION”: THE SURGE OF JIHADIST
GROUPS AND THE FRACTURE OF THE REBELLION . . . . . . 57
V.1 AN EMERGING JIHADIST REBELLION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
57
V.2 THE SYRIAN INSURGENCY AGAINST JIHADIST GROUPS: COMBAT
OPERATIONS AND COALITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61
V.1.1 The increased number of jihadist groups in Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V.1.2 The jihadist groups in the Syrian civil war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V.1.3 An unprecedented influx of foreign fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V.3 OUTLOOK: WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR JIHADISTS IN SYRIA? . . . . . . . . . . . .
57
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60
62
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6
INTRODUCTION
2011
marked 40 years since Hafez
al-Assad’s 1970 coup and
the Assad family’s dictatorial
regime over Syria. Relying on
the support of his Ba’ath Party, as well as a bloated
security apparatus, the Head of State maintained
complete control over a Syrian society deprived of
freedom and generally living in a climate of fear. The
armed forces, where Hafez came from, were brought
to the heart of power. Power therefore seemed set in
stone, immune to reforms, and only dedicated to serving the interests of a clan controlled by the Assad
family.
The fall of the regimes of Ben Ali in Tunisia followed
by Mubarak in Egypt at the beginning of 2011 showed the danger facing the dictatorial powers that
had run several Arab countries for decades. The
conflict in Syria, with its own defining features, is a
component of these “Arab Springs” that were to
sweep most of the Arab world. The eruption of
violence in Syria results from the clash between
hopes for political change that were revived by this
international wave of protests and the Syrian
regime’s inability to carry out the wide-ranging
reforms that were required.
The conflict in Syria is also a new field of action for
international jihadism. The war has seen powerful
jihadist groups emerge; Syrian territory is now deeply
divided. These movements are a threat to both
Syria’s future and that of its neighboring countries,
including Iraq. They are also a matter of concern for
Western countries that fear both the jihadists’ return
to their home countries and the rise of groups even
more powerful that al-Qaeda at its peak, which, for
“the Islamic State”, is the case today.
However, the conflict in Syria is a standalone case
given the intensity and duration of violence. The
regime’s counterinsurgency campaign quickly gave
way to a civil war resulting in a divided national territory,
a geopolitical imbroglio, and a humanitarian disaster.
This Lessons Learned casebook describes how the
Syrian civil war has evolved and draws lessons from
it in terms of counterinsurgency doctrine. This study
was conducted with a view to analyzing the tactical
evolutions of the various players involved, taking into
account the backdrop of geopolitical issues. It also
sheds light on the regional turmoil this conflict has
caused. As such, it is a relevant case study as part of
a more comprehensive approach to conflicts and
rivalries in the Near and Middle East regions.
7
CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF PROTEST
I.1 THE “TRIANGLE OF
POWER”,1 THE BASIS OF
THE SYRIAN REGIME
S
ince 1970, Syria’s authoritarian and hereditary regime has been based on the Ba’ath
Party,2 powerful internal security services,
strong armed forces, as well as a cumbersome administration. These different entities are
closely linked, interdependent and the pillars of power
serving the regime.
I.1.1 The birth of the Syrian regime is
based on the Alawites, the armed
forces and the Ba’ath Party
The Alawites, a minority branch of Shiite faith, have
gradually emerged as the country’s ruling minority.
For more than ten centuries, this community was
closed in on itself, suffering persecution, contempt
and even hatred from other Muslims to an extent
that, even today, it is considered as heretical by many
Sunnis. The French mandate (1920-1945) put a
stop to seven centuries of oppression and led the Alawites out of isolation, going as far as granting them
the “Alawite State” in northwestern Syria until the
country’s reunification in 1936. Meanwhile, a military
career path was opened to the more nationalist Sunnis, who had previously overlooked it as they viewed it
as an offshoot of the French mandate authorities.
Hated and despised by the rest of the population, the
1
2
Xavier Baron, Aux origines du drame syrien. 1918-2013, Paris,
Tallandier, 2013.
The “Renaissance or Resurrection” Party, an Arab Socialist
party created in Damascus in 1947.
Alawites found the military to be a means towards
social advancement and it became a tool of their
power that was to come. From 1952, Hafez al-Assad
rose through the ranks of the military hierarchy until
he came to power in 1970. Integrating the Alawites
into politics was mainly done through the Syrian People’s Party and the Ba’ath Party, including in Latakia.3
It must be remembered, however, that the Alawites
do not amount to a single homogeneous, monolithic,
community group. In their midst, there are rivalries
between cities and the countryside, villages, families,
and tribes.
The Ba’ath Party coup on 8 March, 1963, marked
the beginning of the party breakup. A civil-military
council, headed by Amin al-Hafez, was set up. It expelled the historical founders of the Ba’ath Party and
overthrew the Syrian Arab Republic. The officer corps
rapidly went through a time of far-reaching changes.
The Alawites took advantage of the situation and bolstered their dominance by being posted to the elite
units around Damas and in strategic sectors connected to power. Meanwhile, the Sunnis were sent to the
outer periphery of the country, on the Israeli front.
This distribution of power between the Alawites and
the Sunnis was one of the critical success factors of
the neo-Ba’athist coup, the hardline wing of the Party
led by Salah Jedid, on 23 February, 1966. The traditional Pan Arab vision of the Ba’ath Party was replaced with a policy of regionalism. Hafez al-Assad
became Defense Minister and Air Force Commander. On taking over the armed forces, he appointed
loyal Alawi officers to key positions, strongly united
behind the Assad family, while the lower ranks remained mostly Sunni. The same momentum prevailed
within the Ba’ath Party, with the Alawites gradually
3
Xavier Baron, op. cit., p. 128.
9
Chapter I – The origins of protest
replacing the Sunnis. The 1966 coup also opened a
major rift within the Party, particularly between Salah
Jedid, representing the civilian wing, and Hafez alAssad, heading the military wing along with his follower from the beginning and soon-to-be Defense
Minister, Mustafa Tlass. The 1967 defeat against
Israel (the Six-Day War), whose responsibility Hafez
al-Assad attributed to the civilian wing, was also a political defeat for Damascus. The conflict between the
civilians and the military was based on internal socialist politics, relations with other Arab states, and ties
to the Soviet Union. For Assad, the fight against Israel
took precedent over socialist changes to society.
Fighting Israel required cooperation with moderate
Arab states and the rival Ba’athist regime in Baghdad, something categorically rejected by the civilian
wing.
Hafez al-Assad got rid of his rival during the coup of
13 November, 1970, in the wake of the Jordanian
crisis. He did so with the support of the armed forces
and avoided bloodshed, referring to how he wanted
to reject Syria’s intervention to end the “intellectual
terrorism” and “dictatorship” of the civilian wing. With
a view to launching a “corrective movement”, alAssad suggested holding elections. On 12 March,
1971, Hafez al-Assad was elected with 99.2% of the
vote, a figure that attested to the dictatorial nature of
the new regime following years of unstable military
dictatorship. He then prioritized shattering the
influence of the families of large landowners through
land reform, so that a class of peasants dedicated to
the Ba’ath Party could emerge.
10
Syrian troops in Damascus, 1963
I.1.2 President Hafez al-Assad and
the establishment of his regime
through strengthening the “triangle of power”
The Constitution of 12 March 1973 granted broad
powers to the President as well as a prominent role
to the Ba’ath Party. Syria officially became a “democratic, popular, socialist and sovereign State”. The
regional commander of the Ba’ath Party shall put forward a presidential candidate to the People’s
Assembly, and then this application is subject to a
referendum. Article 8 of the Constitution stipulates
that the Ba’ath Party “is the leading party in the
society and the State”. A single-party system, a standard feature of dictatorships, was then enforced. In
this context, the President is elected for seven years
on the basis of a mandate that can be renewed indefinitely. He is Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, appoints one or several vice-presidents, the
Prime Minister and Government members. He
assumes sole legislative power when the Parliament
is not in session. The role of Parliament is thus reduced to merely rubber stamping the decisions taken
by the regional command of the Ba’ath Party, led by
President Assad. The Government has a similar
subordinate role. Furthermore, it was also added to
the Constitution that “the religion of the President of
the Republic must be Islam”, a consequence of Sunni
pressures in favor of Islam, making it the religion of
the state.
President Hafez al-Assad
Hafez al-Assad’s regime quickly set up powerful security services, pillars of the regime to be found at all
levels of society. These services are multiple, independent of the armed forces and the police and
sometimes rivalling them. They are a permanent
feature in cities where they work closely with the
Ba’ath militias, which are also present in rural areas.
Also present are the Defense (Companies) brigades,
created prior to 1970 and which were headed
by Hafez al-Assad’s brother, Rifaat al-Assad, until
1984 when he fell into disgrace. Numbering some
15,000 men, they sometimes had more modern
weaponry than the Army, including tanks that would
be put to use when quelling the Hama uprising in
1982.4 Alawi General Ali Haydar’s Special Forces,
estimated at about 10,000 men, completed this
security arsenal.
Hafez al-Assad’s power was also shared with his clan.
Among his most loyal followers was Mustafa Tlass,
an early-days companion and the irremovable
Defense Minister, Colonel Ali Zaza, an Alawite and the
head of Military Intelligence, the Sunni Abdallah
al-Ahmar, who controlled the Ba’ath Party as Deputy
Secretary, i.e. the Party’s number two after the
President, Abdel Rahman Khleifaoui, a Sunni, who
was Prime Minister from 1971 to 1972 and again
in 1976, Abdel Halim Khaddam, another Sunni,
Minister for Foreign Affairs after the coup and VicePresident in 1984 before breaking with Bashar alAssad in 2005, General Mohammed al-Kholi, an
Alawite, the head of Air Force Intelligence, who came
directly under the Head of State and General Naji
Jamil who succeeded Hafez al-Assad as Air Force
Commander. It soon became clear that the clan was
using its position for private gain and not for the State
or society.
I.1.3 Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power
These elements were still prevalent, when, on the
death of his father, Bashar al-Assad took over the
country in 2000. He was barely prepared for exercising power as it was his elder brother, Bassel, who
had been earmarked to rule, before his death in a car
accident in 1994.
4
Xavier Baron, op.cit., p. 153.
At this point, Bashar al-Assad seemed an openminded and modern man 5, although he was also perceived as a weak figure, for whom it would be difficult
to confront the “old guard” of the regime and the intricate workings of the Ba’ath Party. After fifteen years
of no meetings, a testament to the extent of Hafez alAssad’s disinterest in the Party, the Ba’ath convened
on 17 June, 2000, for its 9 th Congress, where
Bashar al-Assad was unanimously proclaimed “leader of the Ba’ath Party and the people”. The meeting
was held in the interests of legitimization and concealing the perpetuation of a hereditary dictatorial system. Three days later, on 20 June, Bashar al-Assad
was elected General Secretary of the Party. A new
Central Committee was formed, notably including
Commander Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother, a
member of the Presidential Guard; Colonel Manaf
Tlass, son of the Defense Minister, an officer of the
Republican Guard; General Ali Aslan, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces; and General Ibrahim al-Safi, Commander of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. These
appointments give a clear picture of how the presidential function, the Assad family, the Ba’ath Party,
and the armed forces at the top of the State, are
intermingled. On 10 July, Bashar was elected President by referendum, obtaining 97.2% of the vote,
without any internal dispute. Once again, the result
reflected the dictatorial nature of the Syrian regime,
where opposition is non-existent.
The first months of Bashar al-Assad’s rule were referred to as “the Damascus Spring”, a period during
which al-Assad rolled out several modernization
reforms. His inaugural speech on 17 July, 2000, was
filled with promises of change, but remained shrouded in ambiguity. Of note, he put forward that democracy would be a good thing for Syria but that its
Western model was unsuitable. He expressed the
need for “indispensable administrative reform” and
for those responsible for endemic corruption to be
brought to justice. In the first year, Bashar al-Assad
5
It was Bassel, his elder brother, who had long been groomed
for power. Consequently, Bashar al-Assad had not got ready for
a military career. He studied ophthalmology in London, where
he met his wife Asma. He is deemed to be passionate about
new technologies and the Internet. He was urgently recalled to
Damascus in 1994, following the death of his brother Bassel.
He then received accelerated military training while being prepared by his father for the exercise of power. He was promoted
(to) Colonel in 1999. At the same time, he was appointed to civilian office, as President of the Syrian Computer Society, an organization founded by his brother Bassel. See Souhail Belhadj, La
Syrie de Bashar el-Asad. Anatomie d'un régime autoritaire,
Belin, Paris, 2013, p. 105-106.
11
did pass about a hundred or so laws to facilitate
private investment, the market economy and the
opening of private banks, to address unemployment
(estimated at 20% of the active population) and the
lack of housing. For Bashar al-Assad, the Ba’ath
Party’s monopoly, or, in other words, the lack of
democracy, did not hinder economic openness.
Although Bashar’s Syria differs from that of his father
in some respects, it is very much a continuum of the
regime founded in 1970. Unlike under the rule of
Hafez al-Assad, criticism can exist in Bashar’s Syria.
The climate of fear has somewhat dissipated but
democracy remains absent, without a multiparty system, freedom of the press, nor the separation of
powers. Security services also remain very powerful
and the Assad clan seems irremovable.
The Syrian intelligence agencies, pillars of
the Assad regime
Bachar al-Assad
During this period, independent parties were formed
and several conferences, trade shows and associations were held: speech and criticism became freer.
However, this openness was only really found in the
capital and in a few of the country’s cities, and it
lacked popular support.
An opposition movement was formed, with emblematic figures such as the writer Michel Kilo, Riad al-Turk,
Riad Seif, Aref Dalila, and Burhan Galioun, who were
all present as the crisis started in 2011. On 26 September, 2000, they published the “Declaration of
the 99”, calling for an end to the state of emergency
that had been in force since 1963, amnesty for all political prisoners, and the freedom of assembly, expression and the press. In January 2001, the “Declaration
of the 1,000” called for free elections, the end of the
state of emergency and the political monopoly of the
Ba’ath Party, and an independent judicial system.
Among senior government officials, many were worried about their benefits; consequently, there were
laws that had been voted that were not enforced. As
a result, criticism was quickly stifled. In 2005, the
family clan was bolstered further, as Bashar al-Assad
engineered the departure of certain members of the
“old guard”, including Abdel Halim Khaddam and
Mustafa Tlass. While the “Damascus Spring” did not
alter the structure of the regime it did serve to inject
new ideas into society and unite opposition movements, which would resurface in 2011.
12
The intelligence agencies, or Mukhabarat, gradually
took over from the Ba’ath Party as the political backbone of the regime. Their rise to power dates back to
the 1982 Hama uprising, which would reveal how the
regime needed to tighten control over the population
and to counterbalance the power of the Ba’ath Party.
The intelligence agencies’ activities were then extended to cover Syrians’ day-to-day life. Under Hafez
al-Assad’s rule, approval from the Mukhabarat was
needed in order to create a business, marry a child
or change one’s place of residence, leading to very
significant corruption in their midst. These agencies
are manned by approximately 65,000 full-time and
hundreds of thousands of part-time agents, i.e. an
average of one agent for every 257 inhabitants.6
The Syrian security complex is divided into four Intelligence Directorates: the Political Security Directorate, the General Security Directorate, the Air Force
Intelligence Directorate, and the Military Intelligence
Directorate. The Directorates are attached either to
the Ministry of the Interior or to the Defense Ministry,
although those government departments do not
really exercise any authority over the intelligence
agencies. They are, above all, subject to President
Assad’s authority. The heads of the Intelligence Directorates report to him twice a day and receive instructions in return. The Republican Guard, headed by
Maher al-Assad, seems to be the most autonomous
entity, as he has further authority over the heads of
the various agencies. Although the agencies compete
with one another, the rule is that Military Intelligence
is the most powerful of the four Directorates. The
6
Wladimir Glasman, Les ressources sécuritaires du régime en
Syrie, Institut de Recherches et d’Études sur le Monde Arabe et
Musulman (IREMAM), 19 January, 2014. http://iremam.hypotheses.org/3969, accessed on 21 July, 2014.
Republican Guard and the Special Forces are the
two Praetorian forces that reinforce the militarysecurity complex. It is designed to monitor and
control the political field, protect government
premises and the related staff, and its leader, the
President of the Republic, Bashar al-Assad.7
The Assad clan, an asabiyyah 8 at the helm
Just like Saddam Hussein’s hold on power in Iraq and
Gaddafi’s in Libya, Hafez’ and then Bashar al-Assad’s
Syria is dominated by a clan that fosters nepotism
and interpersonal networks for the running of the
country. The clampdown on the Muslim Brotherhood
uprising between 1979 and 1982 was led by Hafez
al-Assad’s brother, Rifaat. This division of roles is
reminiscent of that between Bashar and Maher alAssad; the latter was responsible for the 2011
repression.
From the outset of Hafez al-Assad’s hold on power, a
tribal solidarity and one based on the graduating
class of the Military Academy of Homs, where Hafez
el-Assad studied in 1950, prevailed. This is where he
met Mustapha Tlass, who became his Defense Minister. Hafez al-Assad also met Mustapha al-Kholi in the
Air Force. With him, Assad illegally created an intelligence service within the armed forces that became
a Ba’athist strongpoint in the forces. This is also
where he also met two key individuals, both Alawites,
Salah Jadid and Mohammed Umran, who secretly
created a Military Committee, the main structure for
future coups.
Bashar al-Assad has fostered the same approach at
the top of the State ever since he came to power in
2000. Of note, his brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, ran
the presidential Palace’s security services. Bashar alAssad’s wife, Asma, a modern and attractive woman,
also plays a role. She is a vital cog in the system, lending moral support to the Sunni side of the regime,
as well as representing its cultural, intellectual and
human side. Bashar al-Assad’s mother, Anissa, closely tied to the Head of State’s elder sister, Bushra,
and his maternal uncle, Mohammed Makhlouf, also
play a role in the conduct of policy and repression.
7
8
Souhail Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar el-Asad. Anatomie d’un
régime autoritaire, Belin, Paris, 2013, pp. 320-321.
“Esprit de corps”.
They thereby refuse any political concessions to
the opposition, as, in their view, doing so would spell
the end of the regime. Important ties also exist with
Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, a wealthy
businessman, who is head of the al-Dunya TV station,
the regime's propaganda weapon.
The above reflects a trend that began under Hafez alAssad and that was also seen in Iraq under Saddam
Hussein: the more a regime is weakened, the more
power is concentrated among the personal relatives
of the Head of State and the personalization of power
and the cult of personality further reinforced. As
Syria’s economy was liberalized, a new, mostly nonAlawite, economic elite also emerged. Political and
military elites in power, along with new entrepreneurial elites, forged links through marriage, building a
network of alliances that could be described as a
“military-merchant complex”. The Syrian regime has
thus been politically savvy, by creating inter-community alliances with the old Sunni and Christian bourgeoisies.
• Anissa Makhlouf: Hafez al-Assad’s wife, Anissa
Makhlouf remains highly influential within the
family council. Along with the Makhlouf family,
her daughter Bushra and her son Maher, she
forms a very influential block opposed to any political reform.
• Mohamed Makhlouf: Ahmed Makhlouf’s brother and Rami Makhlouf’s father, he made a
substantial fortune from managing State and
private companies, enabling his son, Rami, to
gain Hafez al-Assad’s confidence. He attends
family gatherings.
• Rami Makhlouf: A powerful businessman, he is
said to control 60% of the national economy. He
embodies corruption in the eyes of opponents.
His empire mainly consists of powerful companies in the construction business and the oil
industry; Syriatel, the main mobile telephone
operator in the country; and the al-Dunya TV
channel. He is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin.
• Hafez Makhlouf: Rami Makhlouf’s younger
brother, he was quickly promoted once Assef
Shawkat was dismissed as Director of General
Security in September 2011. He heads the
intelligence agencies.
13
Jamil
al-Assad
Hafez
al-Assad
Anissa
Makhlouf
Mohamed
Makhlouf
Rami
Makhlouf
Hafez
Makhlouf
Bashar
al-Assad
Maher
al-Assad
Bushra
al-Assad
Bassel
al-Assad
Majid
al-Assad
Rifaat
el-Assad
Asma
Akhras
Assef
Shawkat
Bouthaina
Shaabane
The Assad clan, a family at the head of Syria
• Jamil al-Assad: Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother, he was the head of the al-Mutarda militia
armed by his brother Rifaat’s Defense Companies, linked to the Shabiha mafia-style militias.
His son Fawwaz manages real estate and
commercial companies and is one of the main
leaders of the Shabiha militias. He died in
2004.
• Rifaat al-Assad: Hafez al-Assad’s brother, he
had a considerable influence on him. He spent
a long time as Commander of the Defense Companies (pro-regime militias), but was removed
from office in 1984 for plotting a coup against
his brother.
• Asma Akhras: Born in Britain in 1975 to a
wealthy Sunni family from Homs, she is the
modern, attractive and media-conscious figure
of the regime. She actively participates in building up a modern and moderate image of
President Assad.
• Maher al-Assad: Brother of President Assad,
he is the most influential of the Head of State’s
entourage. He led the siege of Daraa in 2011
and is reportedly violent and unstable. He is
Commander of the Presidential Guard, the
Republican Guard and the Army’s 4 th Armored
14
Division, allegedly the most powerful. He represents the hard wing of the regime, as well as
heading up very profitable business activities.
• Bushra al-Assad: Bashar al-Assad’s older sister
is the head of the national pharmaceutical industry. With her mother, Anissa, and her brother,
Maher, she is influential within the family council
and opposes any concessions from the regime.
• Assef Shawkat: He was married to Bushra alAssad and spent a long time as Commander of
the regime’s security agencies. In September
2011, Bashar al-Assad feared that Shawkat’s
positive relations with the West would weaken
his loyalty and so he was dismissed. He became
Deputy Defense Minister and Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces. Unpopular with
Maher al-Assad, he was dismissed from office in
2008. The 2011 repression made him essential to the regime once again. He was killed in a
bomb attack in Damascus on 18 July, 2012.
• Bassel al-Assad: Hafez al-Assad’s eldest son,
he had been groomed to succeed his father. He
died in a car accident in 1994. He was head of
the Presidential Guard and chairman and founder of the Syrian Computer Society. He was also
very influential in implementing Syria’s policy in
Lebanon.
• Majid al-Assad: The youngest brother of Bashar al-Assad, he died in 2009. As he suffered
from ill health, he never had any political role.
• Bouthaina Shaabane: The official interpreter
for Hafez, and then Bashar al-Assad, she later
became Minister of Expatriates from 2002 to
2008. She is now a political and media adviser
to Bashar al-Assad. She is known abroad as
the voice of the regime’s propaganda, keen to
present it as a victim of terrorism and disinformation.
I.2 A FRAGILE
ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The conflict in Syria is the product of deep-rooted
dynamics that have shaped Syria’s history for
decades or even centuries. A well-worn subject in
Syria’s history, 2011 marked the awakening of the
fears of the minorities.
In Syria, the Sunnis account for 74% of the population, the Alawites, Ismaili and other Shiites for 13%,
the Christians for 10%, the Druze for 3% and there
are also Jewish communities in Damascus and
Aleppo.9 The regime relies on the geographical
layout of community divisions to stir up the fear of
Islamism and gain the support or neutrality of minorities (Alawite, Druze, Christian, etc.). The recent
history has taken this direction, for example with the
strengthening of the Christians’ identity as Eastern
Christians. Similarly, attacks against the Alawites
during the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood reinforced the “fortress mentality” of the Shiite minority,
essential for understanding the current conflict.
Regionalism and social divisions also affect the geography of the conflict. Bashar al-Assad, for example,
has played on how Damascus and Aleppo compete
with one another, favoring the latter to counter the
Damascus’ success, following the age-old policy of
9
CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html, accessed on 15 July,
2014.
“divide and rule”. Assad opened the city to international competition, causing numerous textile businesses to go bankrupt.10 The modernizing reforms
of the early 2000s accentuated social inequalities,
eroding the social basis for the regime. Peasants
were especially concerned and would count for a
significant number of the 2011 insurgents. Having
also suffered droughts since 2005, the regions
most affected were among the first to rise up. According to the economist Samir Aita,11 300,000 out of
one million12 farming jobs were destroyed between
2003 and 2007. No longer the priority of the
regime, momentum has been gaining ground ever
since. In 2013, a total of 17.8% of Syrians were
unemployed; 12% of the population was living below
the poverty line in 2006.13 Although these numbers
alone do not explain the 2011 uprising, they offer a
better understanding of the frustrations experienced
by the Syrians who took to the streets at that time.
Northern Syria is now largely controlled by rebel
groups; it has suffered heavily from desertification
and scarce resources. Historically absent, the State
has only recently become present in the region. This
partly explains the difficulty the regime has experienced keeping hold of this now largely lawless territory
ruled by warlords. On the economic front, Ba’athist
voluntarism did not manage to balance out Syria’s
territory more effectively for the benefit of its outskirts, instead the Aleppo-Damascus axis remains the
backbone of the country.14 Even the coastal region,
the stronghold of the Alawite community, has loosened its ties with the Assad clan, which has long since
moved to Damascus. Syria is deeply divided ; the
nation-building project has failed and the risk of partition is still acute.
The population distribution across Syria also
explains the evolving conflict. Regime strongholds
are provided by Druze in the south, Alawites in the
coastal area as well as Sunnis tied to the regime
10
11
12
13
14
Fabrice Balanche, “Comment les inégalités sociales et spatiales alimentent la révolte anti-Assad”, L’Orient Le Jour,
25 November, 2011.
Quoted in Fabrice Balanche, “Comment les inégalités sociales
et spatiales alimentent la révolte anti-Assad”, art. cit.
Syria’s active population numbers roughly six million people.
2014.
Baudouin Dupret, Zouhair Ghazzal, Youssef Courbage, Mohammed al-Dbiyat, La Syrie au présent. Reflets d’une société, Arles,
Actes Sud, “Sindbad”, 2007, p. 87.
15
by clan and tribal
connections scattered
all over Syria. Similarly,
informal Druze, Alawi
and Christian settlements in most urban
centers slow the
advance of the rebels
and allow the regime to
retain strong pockets
of resistance.
DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIA’S POPULATION
Finally, the gradual
State withdrawal linked
with the economic opening, combined with
an agricultural farming
crisis, has negatively
impacted the network
of small and mediumsized cities. The private
sector has failed to
develop its potential due
to an excess of red tape
and, despite State tax
incentives, the closures
of local businesses,
including in northeastern Syria. A system
combining a regulated
economy and bureaucracy with economic liberalism
and globalization is a contradictory juxtaposition that
does not work. The regime has been unable to break
with the past, as it is keen on keeping up its supportive
patronage networks.15 Along with the demands for
political freedoms, the Syrian crisis is ultimately
the result of the regime’s failures in economic policy
and nation-building. The momentum of the Arab
Springs resonated with the country’s young population (54% of Syrians are under 25 years 16). However,
this was only the trigger to an untenable situation.
Source: Atlas du Proche Orient arabe, PUPS, 2011.
I.3 THE FIRST REBEL
MOVEMENTS
The disproportionate response from the regime to
the first peaceful protests of March 2011 and its
inadequate reforms set off a rapid escalation of violence throughout the country. The first rebel groups
formed quickly, particularly with defectors from the
Syrian armed forces, and the insurgency took shape,
marking the beginning of the Syrian civil war.
I.3.1 The first demonstrations
15
16
Fabrice Balanche, “Comment les inégalités sociales et spatiales alimentent la révolte anti-Assad”, art. cit.
2014.
16
In the face of events in Tunisia and Egypt in January
and February 2011, at first, the Syrian regime seemed calm and even anxious to meet people’s expectations.
Little by little, the fear of the uprising spreading fuelled
anxiety at the highest levels of the State and measures were taken, such as the 17% rise in salaries
for two million government employees. Based in particular on the “Damascus Spring”, demands were
made for the end to the state of emergency and for
a new constitution.
On 15 March, 2011, a first demonstration was held
in Damascus to call for an end to the state of emergency and the special courts. Demonstrations
then spread gradually to the other cities in Syria and
the number of arrests increased. The first clash
occurred in Daraa, in southern Syria; a rural province
neglected by the regime and that had sunk into
poverty. A group of ten to fifteen teenagers was
arrested for writing graffiti on the walls stating, “The
people want the fall of the regime”. The regime gave
an unreasonable response: the children were imprisoned and abused. People reacted strongly, and the
protests, which remained peaceful, grew in number
in the following days, making particular demand for
the dismissal of the Daraa Governor as well as the
Security Commander. The police shot at demonstrators and the regime deployed reinforcements. Tanks
from Maher al-Assad’s Republican Guard intervened
on 23 March. On 31 March, the armed forces withdrew and the prisoners and teenagers were released, the Governor and the Security Commander
dismissed. The authorities claimed that the armed
forces had been deployed due to armed terrorist
groups operating in Daraa, thereby ignoring the real
causes of the uprising. This would be a claim to be
repeated time after time. The escalation of violence
then began, with repression becoming the norm
despite the initially peaceful protests.
By the end of March, a phase of urban guerrilla warfare was underway, mainly in Homs, Hama, and Latakia. However, it was, to a lesser extent, also present
in Bashar al-Assad’s favored beacons of the country,
Damascus and Aleppo. In these cities, predominantly
Sunni business circles had linked their interests
to the regime and feared for instability.17 During a
speech on 30 March, Bashar al-Assad slammed the
“foreign conspiracy” facing Syria, which had to be
fought relentlessly. In an effort to secure their neutrality, 300,000 Syrian Kurds, were granted Syrian
citizenship18 as an appeasement measure. Bashar
al-Assad made this effort to try and prevent the
Turkish border from becoming a transit area for
rebel weapons and so that Iraqi Kurdistan could not
Demonstration in Homs (2011)
17
18
Xavier Baron, op. cit.
Further to the controversial 1962 census, 20 % of the Kurds
had been deprived of their Syrian citizenship.
17
be turned into a secure home base. On 21 April, the
state of emergency was lifted, the Supreme State
Security Court was dissolved and conditional authorization was issued for certain peaceful demonstrations. However, this had come too late and now
demands were dealing exclusively with the fall of the
regime. Despite the commitment of the Shabiha,
mostly Alawite mafia-style militias, on the side of the
regime, the insurgency spread to Deir ez-Zour, Idlib
and Banias, in Syria’s hinterland.
Opposition demonstration in Homs (2011)
I.3.2 Emerging rebel groups: claims,
structures, and identities
In a country where political opposition is not tolerated
and in a context of fierce repression, initially there
was no structure to the insurgency. Within a few
weeks, a network of local coordination committees
developed in the neighborhoods of various cities,
mostly composed of young people with no political
motivation. By the end of April, these had become the
main opposition structure, helping the families of victims and prisoners, caring for the wounded in often
illegal hospitals, communicating with foreign media,
and preparing demonstrations during the Friday
prayer.
Little by little, the number of defectors from the Syrian
armed forces grew. They were predominantly Sunni
and were first and foremost those enlisted in the
lower ranks and young conscripts. They formed the
Free Syrian Army (FSA) on 29 July, 2011, headed
by Colonel Riad al-Assad, who had sought refuge in
Turkey. The FSA then claimed several thousand members. From the outset, the FSA had problems getting
organized, although it grew increasingly active despite its limited weaponry. Its main problem was that
it lacked an undisputed personality as leader to unite
18
the rebel movements, plus, in the event of victory, it
did not have a clear program for the country. The
main opponents to the regime had been forced into
exile several years back, or were imprisoned; they
were scattered, lived far away and were sometimes
representatives of competing currents. Some of
them were indeed Islamists, secular, nationalists,
Marxists or liberals. A Syrian National Council (SNC)
was finally established on 23 August, 2011 in Istanbul, with 140 members. Half of them did not live in
Syria, undermining the legitimacy of the SNC. The
SNC tried to coordinate fighting. It was first led by
Burhan Ghalioun, a longstanding figure of the opposition living in Paris. However, he was heavily criticized
for living far from Syria and his links to the Muslim
Brotherhood and Turkey. He was quickly ousted.
The level of violence rose in early 2012, as did the
number of armed clashes between the Syrian Arab
Army and the FSA. The regime now faced an armed
opposition movement that was more and more
capable of coordinating its attacks. Several bomb
attacks took place in Damascus, particularly against
security service buildings. In February, car bombs
also exploded in Aleppo, in front of facilities (harboring) housing military intelligence and security forces.
Such attacks were first favored by the rebels as they
still lacked the unity and sufficient means to launch
full-scale offensives.
The bomb attack in Damascus on 18 July, 2012,
was the most major tactical choice from the rebels.
That day, a bomb exploded during a meeting of the
main security authorities at the headquarters of the
National Security Council in central Damascus, which
had nonetheless been placed on high alert. Three top
government officials were killed: the deputy Defense
Minister and President Assad’s brother-in-law, Assef
Shawkat; the Defense Minister, Dawoud Rajiha and
General Hassan Turkmani, a military adviser to Bashar al-Assad and his crisis cell.
At that time, the armed opposition claimed to have
about 40,000 men. Salafist fighter groups also began
to appear: Muslim fundamentalists mostly from Syria,
although others were from Afghanistan, Libya or Iraq,
with the objective of creating an Islamic Republic in
Syria. At the beginning of 2012, these groups were
still few in number although, along with the regime,
they fuelled the transformation of peaceful protests
into an armed conflict. The risk was that this conflict
would take on a religious aspect. Al-Qaeda-affiliated
groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra claimed responsibility for bomb attacks in Damascus. These Islamist
groups receive considerable external support, mainly
from Saudi Arabia, Qatar or even al-Qaeda.
At the beginning, the first armed rebel groups were
mainly under the protection of the Free Syrian Army.
In 2011, this was the only real opposition force on the
ground. Most opponents were in fact men who had
the intention of defending their family, their village,
and their community. However, some structured
rebel groups had existed since as early as 2011,
such as the Farouq battalions. Formed in Homs, this
organization little by little expanded in size and prominence throughout the country, operating in Homs,
Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus. It was a member of
the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, an organization
allied with the FSA, created in September 2012. The
Farouq battalions are well-trained and well-funded
and know how to use social networks and media to
maintain their reputation.19
19
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The Free Syrian Army”, Middle East Security
Report, 9, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013, p. 41.
19
CHAPTER II
THE REGIME’S
COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGY
T
he regime’s disproportionate response in
2011 was followed by a strategy of counterinsurgency inherited from Hafez al-Assad.
Bashar al-Assad faithfully followed the same
methods used by his father thirty years ago when
dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion.
II.1 THE SYRIAN ARAB
ARMY IN 2011
Prior to the conflict, Bashar al-Assad’s armed forces
were considered some of the most powerful in the
Arab world. They comprised some 220,000 fulltime soldiers plus 300,000 conscripts (24-month
conscription). With 60% of Syria’s financial
resources 20 at their disposal, they are suitably equipped with technological capabilities.21 The forces guarantee their officers and non-commissioned officers
good social standing, in addition to a pension and,
most of the time, other fringe benefits. Some specific
cases of corruption or smuggling have also been
known, which have increased the resentment of the
population against them.
ratio. Each division possesses additional combat
support elements and one artillery battalion from
300 to 500 men, bringing it to a full strength of
15,000 soldiers. One mechanized brigade of 2,500
to 3,500 men is equipped with 105 infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs) and 41 tanks split into three mechanized battalions, one armored battalion and one artillery/ADA/engineer battalion. Each armored brigade
contains 105 tanks and 31 IFVs and includes three
armored battalions, one mechanized battalion and
one artillery/ADA/engineer battalion. The Syrian
Army is composed of about 40 of these brigades.22
There are also five specialized divisions: the 4 th Armored Division, the Republican Guard and two Special
Forces divisions. The 17 th Army Reserve Division
also falls into this category. These divisions include
three battalions of 300 to 500 soldiers, i.e. about
1,500 men each.
Eight of Syria’s thirteen Army divisions are conventional armored or mechanized divisions containing
four maneuver brigades each. The different brigade
types are mixed in a three to one ratio in each division, so that an armored division includes three
armored brigades and one mechanized brigade,
while a mechanized brigade contains the opposite
20
21
Barah Mikaïl, La Syrie en 50 mots clés, Paris, L’Harmattan,
collection Comprendre le Moyen-Orient, 2009.
Barah Mikaïl, La Syrie en 50 mots clés, Paris, L’Harmattan,
collection Comprendre le Moyen-Orient, 2009.
The Syrian Arab Army
22
Joseph Holliday, The Syrian Army Doctrinal Order of Battle,
Washington D.-C., Institute for the Study of War, 15 February,
2013, p. 5.
21
Chapter II – The regime’s counterinsurgency strategy
Conventional units
Historically, the 1st Corps has formed the first line of
defense against the Israeli threat. The independent
61st and 90 th Infantry Brigades occupied fighting
positions along the Golan Heights. The second line of
defense is manned by the 5 th Mechanized Division
tasked with preventing an attack from the south and
securing the Jordanian border. The eastern flank side
was secured by the 15 th Special Forces Division. The
7 th Mechanized Division had to secure the most
direct approach from the northern Golan to Damascus. The 2 nd Corps was responsible for managing the
Syrian occupation of Lebanon (until 2005), securing
the Lebanese border and providing a second line of
defense against a potential Israeli invasion ; a real
obsession for the Syrian armed forces. The 3 rd Corps
is responsible for interior defense and reinforcing the
front in case of a war against Israel. The 11th Armored Division is stationed near Homs, in central Syria.
The 3 rd Armored Division secured the northern
approach to Damascus (it played a key role in the
defense of the regime during the 1984 attempted
coup). Finally, the 17 th and 18 th Divisions are independent of Corps structures, and are responsible for
northern and eastern Syria.
The armor-centric formations and highly personal
chain of command were designed for conventional
conflict, mainly against Israel, and not to deal with an
internal insurgency. This explains in part both the disproportionate response of the regime in 2011 and its
inability to decisively fight alone against rebel groups.
The “Praetorian units”
The “Defense Companies” had long been commanded by Hafez al-Assad’s brother, Rifaat. They included
twelve elite brigades of armor, Special Forces, and
artillery/ADA. Alawites made up 90 % of their
strength and maintained close tribal links to Hafez alAssad.
After Rifaat’s abortive 1984 coup, Hafez reduced
them to one division, now known as the 4 th Armored
Division, which has been very active since the
beginning of the conflict. The 4 th Armored Division
(15,000 soldiers) is reportedly the best unit of the
Syrian Army. It includes three armored brigades, one
mechanized brigade and a Special Forces regiment.
All the troops are career military personnel, former
officers of conventional units. Eighty percent of the
22
Division’s ranks are Alawites. It is headquartered in
the Mazzeh military complex, in southern Damascus.
The Division Commander is technically Major General
Mohammed Ali Durgham, but Bashar’s brother,
Maher al-Assad, is widely suspected of acting as the
de facto Division Commander. At 44, he seemed to
be the main organizer in suppressing the 2011 protests in Daraa, Homs and Banias. As a close adviser
to Bashar, in April-May 2011, he was publicly accused by the United States and the European Union of
having been the principal overseer of violence and a
facilitator of human rights violations. He is very
influential with the Head of State, having appointed
two of his cousins, Fawwaz and Mudhir al-Assad, at
the head of the Shabiha militias.23
Hafez al-Assad established the Republican Guards in
1976 under the command of Adnan Makhlouf, his
wife’s first cousin. In 2011, they included three
mechanized brigades and two “security regiments”.
Their main role was then to protect the country
against internal threats. The Division was quartered
around the Presidential Palace and in the Qasioun
military complex overlooking Damascus’ northern
suburbs. It was outfitted with better equipment and
maintained at full strength. Most of its officers are Alawites, although there are Sunnis, such as Manaf Tlass,
the son of Mustapha Tlass, Hafez al-Assad’s longserving Defense Minister, who defected in July 2012.
The Special Forces Regiments have served as a
regime protection force and are a critical component
of Syria’s national defense. They more closely resemble conventional light infantry units, but they have
received specialized training in airborne operations.
They were of crucial importance for keeping Hafez alAssad in power during the 1984 attempted coup.
Their commander at the time, however, Major General Ali Haydar, was put under arrest in the 1990s
because of his opposition to Bashar.
The armament of the SAA
For the most part, the Syrian Arab Army operates old
Russian-made armaments, particularly a large number of tanks. However, most of them are obsolete:
the T-54s, T-55s, T-62s and T-72s date back to the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s respectively.
23
“Maher el-Assad, le bras armé du régime syrien”, Le Figaro,
1 March, 2012.
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2012/03/01/01003
-20120301ARTFIG00768-maher-el-assad-le-bras-arme-duregime-syrien.php, accessed on 30 June, 2014.
Syrian T-72 tank (Maskana)
Syria’s land forces military equipment in 2011
Tank and heavy armor
Light armored vehicles
Armored and wheeled vehicles
T-72
T-72 M
T-62M/K
T-54/T-55
T-55 ARV
BMP-1
BMP-2
BTR-50
BTR-60
BTR-70
BTR-152
BTR-40
BRDM-2
122
1,478
1,000
2,200
?
Vehicles and missile systems
?
?
560
?
95
Artillery
Rocket launcher systems
BM-21 MRLS 122 mm
Type-63 MRLS 107 mm
Raad 240 mm (Iranian Fajdr-3)
WS-1 Khaibar 302 mm
2,450
100
?
Towed howitzers
280
200
?
?
M-1931/ M-1937 122 mm
M-1938 122 mm
D-30 Howitzer 122 mm
M-46 130 mm
D-20 152 mm
M-1937 152 mm
S-23 180 mm
100
150
600
600
20
50
50
23
Vehicles and missile systems (suite)
Ground-to-Ground missiles
FROG-7
SS-21
SS-1 Scud B
SS-1 Scud C
SS-1 Scud D
Fateh-110 M600
SS-C-1B Sepal
SS-C-3 Styx
Ground-to-Air missiles
SA-2 Guideline
Pechora-2M
SA-3 Goa
SA-5 Gammon
SA-6 Gainful
SA-9 Gaskin
SA-8 Gecko
SA-11 Buk M1
SA-17 Buk M2
SA-13 Gopher
SA-22 Pantsir-S1
TOR-M1
Portable Ground-to-Air missiles
SA-24 Strelets (Igla-S)
SA-7 Grail
SA-14 Gremlin
SA-16 Igla-1
SA-18 Igla
18
18
18
8
?
?
4
6
Artillery (suite)
Self-propelled howitzers
D-30 mounted on T-34 chassis
2S3 152 mm
2S1 122 mm
50
50
400
ZSU-23-4
Tungunska-M1
400
6
Self-propelled guns
Light and Heavy Weapons
Mortars
100
?
?
32
50
20
56
?
?
35
12
?
32
?
?
?
?
Mortar 82 mm
M-1943 120 mm Mortar
M-160 160 mm Mortar
M-240 240 mm Mortar
Anti-tank rockets/missiles
AT-3 Sagger
At-4 Spigot
AT-5 Spandrel
At-7 Saxhorn
AT-10
AT-14 Kornet
Milan Anti-tank
RPG-7
RPG-29
Anti-aircraft guns
ZU-23-2
M-1939 37 mm
S-60 57 mm
KS-19 100 mm
KS-12 85 mm
200
400
100
10
3 000
150
40
?
800
?
200
?
?
650
300
675
25
25
Source: www.armyrecognition.com and Joseph Hokayem,“Radioscopie de la crise syrienne. (¾) Les forces en présence”,
Revue de Défense Nationale, Tribune n°257.
The infantry operates a variety of light armaments,
mostly from Soviet arsenals (AK-47/AKM assault
rifles, Dragunov SVD sniper rifles, RPK machine guns
and RPG antitank rocket launchers).24
24
http://www.armyrecognition.com/syria/syrie_armee_
syrienne_forces_defense_terrestres_equipements_militaires_vehicule_blindes_informations.html, accessed on
27 February, 2014.
24
The regime also maintains sophisticated air defense
systems (SA-17 and SA-22). These Russian groundto-air systems are relatively modern. Although respectively medium- and short-range (with a range of
up to 42 kilometers and an altitude up to 25 km for
the SA-17s), they are equipped with modern technologies, particularly as regards radar systems, and
remain highly mobile and difficult to detect. These sys-
tems partly explain the Western powers’ reluctance
to get involved in Syria. Moreover, should they intervene, Russia might feel justified in transferring to
Syria the long range surface-to-air S-300PMU-1/2
system (SA-20 ), which was already purchased by
Damascus but whose delivery was blocked as a result
of international pressure.25
Prior to the civil war, the Syrian Air Force had an
inventory of more than 350 aircraft, including a majority of obsolete ones. Syrian fixed-wing aircraft include
Mig-29s, Mig-25s, Mig-23s, Mig-21s, Su-22s, and
Su-24s fighters. It has often been defeated by the
Israeli Air Force and has not led any attack outside of
Syria since 1982. Unlike its Turkish and Israeli neighbors, the Syrian Air Force did not enter into the race
for modernizing its air defense systems; any intervention in either of these countries would be considered
suicide. It has also had its fair share of desertions,
reducing the number of pilots and the number of
technicians able to maintain aircraft (both fixed and
rotary-wing), prepare them for missions, and ensure
that airbases and air traffic control are satisfactorily
run. Moreover, few of these aircraft have the capability to attack ground targets, pilots have not been properly trained and interoperability with ground troops
is minimal. Very few direct support missions have
been conducted since 2012. The L-39 Albatros training and attack aircraft, the remaining fighter-bombers, MiG-21s and MiG-23s, the Mi-25 attack
helicopters and Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport and air
assault helicopters, i.e. 150 airplanes and about
50 helicopters altogether,26 have greatly contributed
to containing and repelling the opposition while terrorizing the population. Helicopters and transport
planes (Il-76s in particular) have also enabled the
resupply of the forces deployed in “fortress cities” ;
enclaves of the regime in northern Syria. The Air
Force is therefore a cornerstone of Damascus’
power, but it is threatened by the pressure on its
airbases, which are surrounded and sometimes
overrun by the rebellion, the development of rebel
air defense assets (e.g. a MiG-21 fighter was shot
down by a Chinese-made FN-6 missile) and a lack of
25
26
Corentin Brustlein, Étienne de Durand, Guillaume Garnier,
Marc Hecker, Élie Tenenbaum, Syrie : l’option militaire restet-elle ouverte ?, Note de l’Ifri, September 2013.
“Interventions en Syrie : que valent les défenses militaires de
Bachar el-Assad ?”, Jeune Afrique Blog Défense, 30 August,
2013.
spare parts or aviation fuel. Attack helicopters played
a crucial role in quelling the rebellion. In 2011, the
regime thus had 219 rotary-wing aircraft.27
Syrian MIG fighter
The Syrian regime’s stand-off strike assets appear to
be significant. With the help of North Korea, Syria has
been operating Scud missiles (B, C and D variants)
since the late 1980s, some of which have a 700-km
range. Otherwise, Syria has also been producing M600 missiles for several years, a local variant of the
Iranian Fateh-110, as well as acquiring Russian-made
SS-21A Scarabs. Although both missiles have smaller ranges than the Scuds (250 and 120 kilometers
respectively), they are more accurate and require
drastically less preparation time (solid propulsion). To
this day, ground-to-ground missiles forces might still
include dozens of launchers and hundreds of
missiles.28 However, out of the 300 BM-21 multiple
rocket launchers fielded in 2011, less than a hundred
are still reportedly operational, mainly due to a lack of
skilled technicians to operate them.29
The Syrian Navy has a limited operational capacity.
Largely obsolete, with ships often dating back to the
1970s, and poorly trained, it has never been the
regime’s priority. It is by all means a coastal defense
Navy, with low projectability. The armed ships are
Petya III light frigates, purchased in 1975 (only one in
two is said to be operational). Sixteen Osa -class missile
27
28
29
More precisely, 20 MI-14s, 5 Ka-28s, 20 Mi-2s, 138 Mi-8s/
17s and 36 Mi-25s.
http://www.armyrecognition.com/syria/syrie_armee_syrien
ne_forces_defense_terrestres_equipements_militaires_vehicule_blindes_informations.html, accessed on 27 February,
2014.
Brustlein, Durand, Garnier, Hecker, Tenenbaum, Note de l’Ifri,
op. cit.
“Interventions en Syrie”, Jeune Afrique Blog Défense, op. cit.
25
patrol boats equipped with SS-N-2 Styx missiles are
now obsolete. Only the Tir -class missile patrol boats
(IPS 18 ) present a serious threat. Three were purchased from North Korea in 2002, three others from Iran
in 2006. The boats are equipped with the Iranian Noor
anti-ship missile, a local version of the Chinese-made
C-802 .30
II.2 A COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGY INHERITED
FROM HAFEZ AL-ASSAD
During the first year of the conflict, the Syrian regime
applied a counterinsurgency strategy identical to that
employed by Hafez al-Assad against the Muslim
Brotherhood between 1979 and 1982. Counterinsurgency has both a military component and a civilian component. The military component is based on
three points: measures for creating a safe and secure
environment, consolidating the safe and secure environment, and eliminating the threat. Combat tasks
include seizing a position, destroying, securing, defending, holding, containing, fixing, pursuing, directing fire
support, providing fire support, conducting combat
patrol operations, and encircling.31
II.2.1 Hafez al-Assad’s counterinsurgency, 1979 -1982
Faced with the Islamist uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood (1979-1982), Hafez al-Assad developed
a counterinsurgency campaign combining three
strategies: carefully selecting and deploying the
most trusted military units (selective deployment );
raising pro-regime militias and using those forces to
clear insurgents out of major urban areas, and then
hold them with a heavy garrison of troops (clear and
hold ).32
30
31
32
Brustlein, Durand, Garnier, Hecker, Tenenbaum, Note de l’Ifri,
op.cit.
Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency, German Army Office, Division I - Army Development, Cologne, June 2010, p. 21.
Joseph Holliday, “The Assad Regime. From Counterinsurgency
To Civil War”, Middle East Security Report, No.8, Institute for
the Study of War, March 2013, p. 7.
26
Selective deployment relies on pairing elite all-Alawite forces with line troops to compel allegiance. As
such, Assad family members played a key role in the
campaign. Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez’s brother, notably
commanded the elite troops of the Defense Companies and Major General Shafiq al-Fayadh, commanding the 3 rd Armored Division and Hafez’s cousin,
was sent to Aleppo. At that time, three quarters of
the officers and one third of the troops deployed
were Alawites. The regime took the additional precaution of expelling all the men who came from
Hama, the heart of the rebellion. The Ba’ath Party
and its sympathizers, members of Ba‘ath-affiliated
Popular Organizations, were also given weapons.
The real innovation on the part of the regime, even
at the time, was to rely on the support of paramilitary forces and militias.
The clear and hold strategy involves deploying armored troops in urban centers, using indirect fire if
necessary, and then maintaining a strong military
presence in the cities to prevent insurgents from
returning. In March 1980, the 3 rd Armored Division
cleared Aleppo “ house by house ”, the rest of the
insurgency being fought district by district, city by
city.33 In Hama, in 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood
was strong enough to inflict heavy losses on regime
troops. In response, Assad massed artillery ahead of
the ground offensive and laid siege to the city with
heavy artillery, namely heavy bombing, to prepare the
entry of commandos into the city, supported by tanks.
The city was then held with several troop garrisons.
II.2.2 Bashar al-Assad’s counterinsurgency strategy, 2011-2012
In replicating the strategy used by his father thirty
years earlier, Bashar al-Assad gave a disproportionate response to the first demonstrations in 2011.
Like his father, Bashar paired elite units, often comprising Alawites, with carefully selected conventional
forces in order to prevent any large-scale defections.
The regime relied on the support of Special Forces
regiments for the most brutal forms of repression
while limiting conventional troops’ exposure to the
population, as in Daraa in 2011. This strategy was
33
To Civil War”, art. cit., p. 12.
based on a new task-organization of the Army: trustworthy subunits were reinforced to form effective
conventional brigades.
Syrian infantry fighting vehicle in Homs
(December 2011)
Between the summer of 2011 and the end of 2012,
the 1st Armored Division’s 91st, 153 rd and 58 th Brigades were the most active, mainly around the divisional base of Al-Kiswah, south of Damascus. The
76 th Brigade, quickly nicknamed the “Death Brigade”,
was very active in Idlib from February 2012. The elite
teams of the 4 th Armored Division were deployed,
with elements of the 3 rd, 7 th and 10 th Divisions, to the
Damascus suburb of Zabadani. All conventional units
were employed but only small hand-picked groups
were sent into the field. These groups were companysize units. In Zabadani, barely 40 armored vehicles,
i.e. a battalion-size unit, were deployed. This strategy
has effectively prevented unit-level defections but has
severely undercut the regime’s available combat
power.
The operation in Homs is the best example of the
clear and hold strategy. After amassing a wide array
of elite forces in the city and shelling opposition-held
neighborhoods, Assad’s forces were able to clear
the area. The regime held the city with a heavy troop
presence after clearing it by indirect fire, without
incurring a high loss of ground forces. During the
siege of the city, 3,000 artillery guns were used, i.e.
only 80% of the regional assets.
Artillery shelling is characteristic of Assad’s strategy,
as seen from the beginning of 2012 in Zabadani,
near Damascus. This operation resulted in the with-
drawal of the insurgents from Homs in early March
2012. Once the city was cleared by the governmental
forces, elite units were redeployed to other fronts, as
was the case for elements of the 4 th Armored Division and Special Forces regiments, to Idlib, Daraa or
Damascus, while the city was held by conventional
units. The regime’s tactics worked well in Homs
(finally conquered on 7 May, 2014, after a ceasefire
was agreed with the rebels), but Assad ultimately
lacked the forces necessary to repeat this approach
in Syria’s northern provinces.
Reliance on the support of militias and paramilitary
forces is Hafez al-Assad’s other legacy. Pro-Assad
militias were quick to emerge during the conflict. As
of 2011, the regime was able to rely on the support
of nearly 100,000 Jaysh al-Sha’bi paramilitaries, or
“People’s Army”. There are two types of pro-regime
militia. Firstly, the mafia-like Shabiha militias made up
of Alawi criminals that are sometimes closely linked
to the Assad family. The second type, sometimes also
called Shabiha, but mostly referred to as “Popular
Committees”, are made up of minority populations
with the aim of protecting their communities. The
regime does not have complete control over these
groups. The Shabiha ’s ranks significantly grew in the
(themed) mid- 1980s when Hafez al-Assad dismantled his brother Rifaat’s Defense Companies. Two of
Hafez al-Assad’s nephews, Fawwaz and Mudhir alAssad, then became feared Shabiha leaders. These
groups sometimes come from disadvantaged Sunni
classes and earn a living from crime (looting, kidnapping, and trafficking), notably in Deir ez-Zor and
Daraa. The “Popular Committees” are apparently
made up of Syria’s minority communities, such as
Christians. They set up checkpoints and secure the
supply lines of the regime, but often act in the interests of self-protection rather than in support of
Assad.
During this counterinsurgency campaign, Assad only
relied on one third of his Army. The 4 th Armored Division and the Republican Guard were the only units to
have been kept at full strength, i.e. 26,000 soldiers
altogether. The twelve highly-active Special Forces
probably never operated at full strength, with 50% of
Sunnis in their midst. They count some 12,000 fighters. Generally speaking, the regime has never been
able to deploy more than the equivalent of one brigade from each combat division (which consists of
four brigades on average). The more conventional brigades (27,000 soldiers) have remained close to their
27
base (about 15 km), mainly to keep control of them.
Thus, out of the 220,000 soldiers that made up the
Syrian Army in 2011, only 65,000 were considered
trustworthy. Many were regarded with suspicion,
confined to their barracks and sometimes locked in
detention centers (1,500 Sunni officers were imprisoned in 2012). Defectors amounted to 20 to 30%
of the Syrian Armed Forces.
Restrictions on the use of all regime forces led to
some units being overused and exhausted in early
summer 2012. The other effect of this strategy was
the militias being put to essential use in the fighting
after the summer of 2012. This also spelled heavy
losses for the regime during that time: 2,300 killed in
action by June 2012 and nearly 10,000 men put out
of action.
II.3.1 The reasons for failure
Bashar al-Assad’s regime lacked the resources to
apply the same strategy he had employed in major
urban centers to Syria’s provincial capitals and countryside. This strategy had resulted from the reasonable acknowledgement that controlling Syria’s urban
population centers was critical for the survival of the
regime. Nonetheless, it also guaranteed that his
counterinsurgency campaign would fail, by granting
the insurgency freedom of movement outside of
cities, where it could be enhanced.
Three dynamics led to this failure:
• in cities, the attempt to separate the insurgents
from the population only accelerated population
displacement along religious and sectarian
lines, which in turn increased the partition of the
country and entrenched broader civil conflict in
Syria;
II.3 THE FAILURE OF THE
COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGY IN THE
SUMMER OF 2012
In summer 2012, after one year of conflict, insurgents still held strongholds in major cities as well as
large areas, mainly in northern and southern Syria.
The strategy inherited from Hafez al-Assad, requiring
sizeable forces had worked in Homs, but did not for
the rest of Syria. Bashar al-Assad could only acknowledge that his counterinsurgency strategy had failed
and find a way to boost his forces once again.
• the Syrian Army, which could not generate
enough troops, was often confused with the
militias;
• the uneven distribution of regime forces between the south and the center of the country
where they are clearly present, and the north,
largely left to the insurgents.34
The cleansing strategy of urban centers consisted of
forcing civilians out of insurgent-held areas, rather
than clearing insurgents out of population centers.
Forced population displacement emerged as an unintended outcome of the early 2012 Homs siege. It
transformed the clear-and-hold counterinsurgency
strategy into a form of ethnic cleansing. The consequence was the arrival of poor Sunni families in
Damascus suburbs, reinvigorating the protest
movement in the capital. An emblematic example is
that of Rastan, which was liberated in July 2012
but became a ghost town emptied of its inhabitants.
II.3.2 The consequences of this failure
The first consequence of this failure was a stalemate situation in the conflict. By failing to secure
victory in the first year, the regime had allowed
A soldier of the Free Syrian Army (Aleppo, 2012)
28
34
To Civil War”, art. cit., p. 19.
powerful rebel groups to form. These could coordinate with each other and after losing control over
one area, they could take control of another. Both
sides in turn were able to believe victory would be
quick, ensuring the escalation of violence and the
continuation of the conflict. The absence of a clearcut superiority of the regime combined with the
insurgents’ lack of means and unity perpetuated
the illusion of a speedy victory for each side, leading
to a stalemate, the partition of the country and a
large-scale humanitarian crisis.
The other consequence, for both sides, has meant
having to call increasingly on external actors to the
conflict. The regime persists in shutting the door on
any political compromise by betting on a divided international community and increased aid coming from
Hezbollah, Iran, Russia and Iraqi Shiite militias. The
regime has also been able to reorganize its armed
forces; decentralizing command and control and reallocating forces between units. The insurgents attribute their future to a possible Western intervention
and aid granted by their different sponsors, such as
Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
29
CHAPTER III
THE SYRIAN REBELS, BETWEEN
ATTEMPTED UNIFICATION AND
PERMANENT DIVISIONS
III.1 THE REBELLION’S
UNIFICATION ATTEMPTS
S
ince July 2011, The Free Syrian Army (FSA)
has tried to impose its authority over the
rebel groups on the ground, although the distance between it and them, internal and
external rivalries and the diversity of the insurgents
all formed obstacles to its leadership. Other actors
then asserted their rights and competed with its
influence.
III.1.1 The difficulties of the first rebel
coalitions
Created on 29 July, 2011, the FSA is both a label and
a structure. As the first nationwide rebel organization
with international visibility, it brought together the first
groups set up in 2011, including the Free Officers
Movement founded on 23 September, 2011, as well
as those created later sharing similar features. Fulltime member groups belonging to the structure,
most often run by military deserters, acknowledged
the Syrian national framework. Those not part of the
FSA’s structure were instead overseen by civilians
and primarily identified themselves with the Islamic
faith. There was, however, no clear-cut division between these two categories. The FSA Command and
Headquarters, established in November 2012 with
Brigadier General Salim Idriss as Chief of Staff, included representatives of Salafist groups (Damascus’s
al-Islam Brigade or Idlib’s Suqour al-Sham 35). Personal infighting, as well as the rivalry between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, meant that the FSA was quickly
prevented from extending its authority over all the
rebel groups. In addition, maintaining ties between
central command and the provincial military councils
proved difficult. From the outset, the FSA’s legitimacy
and authority have been undermined by the distance
and the strong influence the Muslim Brotherhood
and Turkey have over it. The FSA had therefore hoped
for an intervention from Western powers to overthrow Bashar al-Assad; their decision in September
2013 not to intervene came as a significant blow.
Ever since, Salafist and jihadist groups have increasingly taken over the FSA.
Rebel groups are granted access to Saudi funds by
pledging allegiance to Brigadier General Idriss. Saudi
Arabia has the most influence in the FSA Command
and Headquarters; a coalition based primarily on
mutual contingency interests and rarely on a specific
and shared political plan. Groups deemed by Saudi
Arabia to be too Islamist and/or too close to Qatar
do not have access to its funding, as was the case
for members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Syria (al-Islam in Damascus, the al-Tawhid and alFath Brigades in Aleppo, Suqour al-Sham in Idlib, the
Farouq battalions across the country, etc.36). Brigadier General Idriss thus has no authority over these
35
36
Interview with Thomas Pierret, “Conflit syrien : quelle morphologie des forces insurgées ?”, DSI, n°94, July-August 2013.
Interview with Thomas Pierret, “Conflit syrien : quelle morphologie des forces insurgées ?”, DSI, n°94, July-August 2013.
31
Chapter III – The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions
groups since he does not bring them any material aid,
meaning that mere cooperation is all that links them.
For groups that are completely apart from FSA, such
as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian
Islamic Front and various other units formed by villagers or tribes, there is only timely local and operational coordination.
Meanwhile, the Syrian National Council (SNC) was
founded on 15 September, 2011, dominated by Sunnis and Liberals but also Kurds. It had fraught ties
with the FSA, as the latter accused it along with the
Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), of not serving the
revolution, indulging in opportunistic behavior and
being nothing more than pawns of Western powers
in Syria. On 11 November, 2012, the SNC joined the
National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (NCSYOF), created in Doha a few days
earlier. However, the two organizations clashed over
the issue of whether to participate in the Geneva II
conference in January 2014. The SNC refused to
participate and severed all ties to the Coalition,
although it joined again in February 2014. In October
2012, the SNC claimed to have a $40 million budget
coming mainly from Libya, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates and France, stating that 90% of the budget
was allocated to humanitarian aid.
The Supreme Military Command (SMC) was created
in Antalya on 7 December, 2012, when 260 rebel
commanders expressed renewed interest in unification, with (security) officials from the US, France,
Britain, Jordan, and the Gulf in attendance. The SMC
incorporates a representative of the Kurdish National
Council (KNC) and local coordination committees. It
was created with the goal of serving as a Defense
Ministry for the Syrian Opposition Coalition. Its objectives were to unify forces on the ground to prevent
anarchy ; to sideline external rebel elements and
reduce their influence over the fate of the people; and
to prevent the extremist elements from taking over
centers of power.37 The SMC sought to adhere to
democratic principles and emphasized the importance of elections. The command was divided into five
geographic fronts with six elected members each:
the eastern front, the western/middle front, the
northern front, the southern front, and the Homs
front. It consolidated the 14 provincial Military Councils into five operational headquarters. Five military
deputies and five civilian (assistant) deputies were
37
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The Free Syrian Army”, art. cit. p. 16.
32
appointed by SMC members to head each front. Each
front was divided into five departments: Operations,
Espionage, Logistics, Financial and Administrative
Affairs, and Transitional Justice. There were also two
centralized departments, an arms committee and a
financial committee. The SMC was a compromise
between the Saudi and Qatari visions for it, a condition necessary for the success of the organization. It
showed that the rebels had learned from the failures
of the High Revolutionary Council of February 2012,
the Unified Command of September 2012, led by
exiled deserters, as well as the Five Front command,
held by the Qataris, and created on 5 November,
2012. Lessons had been learned from the division,
or even armed clashes, between independent brigades and military councils, the Saudi Arabia/Qatar
rivalry or even personality contests.
On 28 February, US Secretary of State, John Kerry,
pledged “non-lethal” American aid, through the SMC
and the FSA, highlighting the success of the two organizations. They appeared as moderate authorities
capable of creating better opportunities for integration and communication and acting as a brake on
the radicalization of the opposition. However, there
remained many obstacles: the integration of existing
command networks, the jihadist groups in the field,
the management of the different sources of funding,
and the issue of resources flow. In 2014, the Coalition was largely rejected by the FSA and Islamist
groups that criticized it for having been imposed by
the West.
The opposition is therefore fragmented. The division
reflects Syria’s complexity and the decentralized
origin of the revolt and the groups themselves. In the
medium term, this is their weakness as well as their
strength.
Members of the Free Syrian Army during a meeting
with UN representatives (2012)
III.1.2 Developing cooperation programs
on the ground
In summer 2012, rebel commanders began to
tactically coordinate in order to plan operations and
combine resources. This coordination facilitated
many important offensives, particularly in eastern
Syria, leading to the capture of the rebels’ first
provincial capital, al-Raqqah, in March 2013. The
gradual buildup of HQs, such as the Supreme Military Command (SMC), fulfilled their wish to prioritize
campaign goals, deploy support units for priority
missions or supply these units with adequate equipment. The SMC enabled a greater integration of
groups and better communication. It was based on
the rebel leaders’ bottom-up power and influence.
It acted as a communication platform its authority
relies on it being able to organize transactions
with donors and allocate resources to rebel-held
communities.
A chain of command was established. Military
Council heads were meant to report directly to the
General Command. In practice, however, the General Command did not exercise operational control.
The FSA coordinates more that it controls and its
influence is perceived differently depending on the
front. Brigadier General Salim Idriss is recognized
more as a political leader than a field commander,
restricting his authority in favor of group leaders,
resulting in a decentralized structure whose
decisions are taken collectively in a bottom-up
approach.
In 2012- 2013, the rebellion’s progress in terms of
cooperation allowed them to focus on the regime’s
air infrastructures in northern Syria. One example
of this was the capture of the Taftanaz military airport, near Idlib, on 11 January, 2013, through the
combined efforts of multiple rebel units. Another is
the operations against Minakh, Nayrab and Kweris
military airports in Aleppo province, the capture of
the al-Jarra airbase and Base 80 and coordinated
attacks against the Wadi al-Deif military base in
the Idlib province, stemming from the cooperation
between Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian Islamic Front
and SMC subunits.38
38
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The Free Syrian Army”, art. cit., p. 25-26.
We will follow her for the entire paragraph.
In the east, the capture of al-Raqqah city in March
2013 as well as the al-Thawra dam, Syria’s largest
hydroelectric dam, and oil and gas fields by Jabhat
al-Nusra and other units in December 2012, was
testament to the opposition’s progress. The battle for
Homs is another example of cooperation between
rebel groups, although it was won by the regime.
Rebel gains in eastern Damascus, for their part, were
the result of offensives carried out jointly by Jabhat
al-Nusra and the FSA. From 2012, the rebel groups
of the Jabal al-Zawiya area, i.e. the hills between
Hama and Idlib, have been an example of successful
and effective rebel cooperation: groups in the area
have built command and control structures and
offensive and planning capabilities. The main groups
are the Suqour al-Sham Brigade and the Shuhada
Jebel al-Zawiya Battalion (or “Harmoush Battalion”).
A provincial military command was provided by the
Military Council of Idlib. Combined attacks, such as
that of 28 May, 2012, on a checkpoint near the
village of Mughara and simultaneously on the checkpoint in Mariyan, attest to these cooperation and
planning capabilities.
The SMC and the FSA are trying to convert networks
to military hierarchies, although groups primarily
identify with their leader : command structures are
in fact based on networks rather than hierarchies.
Although this suggests that the rebellion cannot
suddenly be deprived of its leaders, the population
has come to view rebel commanders as independent
warlords. Furthermore, the issue of a strict military
hierarchy is one of establishing a code of military
justice for the rebellion, i.e. codes of conduct and
sanctions for those who violate them.
The other challenge facing large-scale cooperation
is how to overcome Syria’s North-South divide. The
opening of the Turkish border summer 2012 was a
decisive factor in enabling the rebels to take over
most of northern Syria. Better access to resources
and fallback areas has put them in a much more favorable position than groups in the south. Northern
commanders therefore have greater influence, which
has led to a certain North-South divide in the rebellion.
The issue also lies in the incorporation of independent
units. The SMC, in particular, managed to integrate
members of the Syrian Liberation Front and the
Syrian Islamic Front and cooperate with the Salafijihadist group Ahrar al-Sham. Similarly, the FSA was
able to conduct combined operations with Jabhat
al-Nusra.
33
Finally, the issue of financing and access to resources
is the biggest obstacle to the unification of the
rebellion and cooperation between groups. Some are
sometimes well-used to receiving funds from various
donors – mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar – who currently tend to favor the most radical groups which
explains, in part, why jihadist groups have dominated
the rebellion since 2013. Antitank and antiaircraft
weapons, as well as secure communications equipment, are a prerequisite for rebel success in the cities.
The legitimacy of the SMC depends on its ability to procure and distribute them. It has so far been a failure.
III.1.3 Groups with local, provincial and
country-wide influence
Two types of organizational model have emerged
from within the rebellion: localized battalions and larger “franchise” brigade-level organizations whose
influence sometimes extends across Syria.
Localized battalions tend associate themselves with
the FSA. They have limited geographical scope and
their raison d’être is most often the defense of their
own village. They are usually financed by the international sponsors of the SMC and the FSA. There are
several hundreds of localized rebel groups in Syria.
The “franchise” brigade-level organizations are often
led by civilians or deserters who were formerly
NCOs. The ideological aspect of their fight is more
pronounced than that of local groups and their private patrons. These brigades may have country-wide
influence, such as the Farouq Battalions or the
Suqour al-Sham Brigade. The Khalid bin Walid Brigade (in March 2012, the largest rebel force in Syria
with over 3,000 fighters, nowadays largely dispersed) in the Homs province; the Farouq al-Shamal Battalion, (the northern branch of the Farouq Battalions
in the Aleppo province); the al-Haqq Brigade (a member of the Syrian Islamic Front) in the Homs province;
the al-Tawhid Brigade (the most important group in
the Aleppo province, a member of the Syrian Liberation Front); or even Ahrar al-Sham (a member of the
Syrian Islamic Front) in the Aleppo and Idlib provinces
have, for their part, influence over the provinces.
They are independent from, but often cooperate with
the FSA or with one another.39
So-called “franchise” brigade-level rebel organizations with provincial
or even country-wide influence
Khalid bin Walid Brigade (Homs province)
(disbanded)
Harakat Fajr al-Islamiyya- (“The Islamic Dawn Movement”) (Aleppo city and province)
Farouq al-Shamal Battalion (Aleppo)
Umma Brigade (Maarat al-Numaan, Idlib province)
Farouq Battalions (country-wide)
Al-Haqq Brigade (Homs)
Shuhada Suriya Brigade (“Syrian Martyrs Brigade”)
(Jabal al-Zawiya, Idlib province)
Fajr al-Islam Battalion (Maarat al-Numan, Idlib
province)
Suqour al-Sham (Idlib province, Jabal al-Zawiya)
Dara al-Thawra Brigade (“The Revolution Shield
Brigade”) (Idlib province)
Al-Tawhid Brigade (Aleppo province)
One level below organizations such as the FSA, the
SNC or the SMC, the coalitions of the Syrian Liberation Front and the Syrian Islamic Front nevertheless
have country-wide scope. The Syrian Liberation Front
was created in September 2012 from a coalition of
20 Islamist groups. It is not directly incorporated into
34
Ahrar al-Sham (Aleppo and Idlib provinces)
Liwa al-Islam (“Islam Brigade”) (Damascus)
Ansar al-Islam (Damascus)
Al-Furqan Brigades (Damascus)
Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade (Damascus)
Deir ez-Zor Revolutionary Council
Jabhat al-Nusra (“Victory Front”) (country-wide)
the FSA because it has contempt for its presence
abroad. It is, however, a member of the Supreme
Military Council. Its key units are Suqour al-Sham,
the Tawheed Brigade and the Farouq Battalions.
39
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The Free Syrian Army”, art. cit.
Islamist groups members of the Syrian Liberation Front
Suqour al-Sham (Idlib and Hama provinces)
Shaheed Ahmed Ouda Battalion (Homs)
Farouq Battalions (Homs)
Mohammed ibn Abdullah Battalion (Homs)
Deir ez-Zor Revolutionary Council
Tawheed Brigade (Aleppo))
Liwa al-Islam (Islam Brigade))
Ansar al-Sham (Damascus)
Suqour al-Kurd Brigade (Qamishli)
Suqour Homs Battalion (Homs)
The Syrian Islamic Front was created on 21 December, 2012. It is made up of Salafist-backed Islamist
groups that are seeking to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Syria. However, they are also Syrian nationalists. It is not linked to the SMC as closely as the Syrian
Shuhada Baba Amr Battalion (Homs)
Jund Allah battalion (Homs)
Homs Brigade (Homs)
Fursan al-Haq Battalion (Homs)
Amr bin al-A’as Brigade (Deir ez-Zor)
Al-Iman Brigade (Hama)
Qal‘at Homs Battalion (Homs)
Liberation Front but the commander of the al-Haqq
Brigade is a member of the SMC Council. Many subunits of the Islamic Front are linked to SMC-affiliated
brigades and battalions. Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour
al-Islam are its main units.
Islamist groups members of the Syrian Islamic Front
Ahrar al-Sham (country-wide)
Suqour al-Islam (Damascus province)
Liwa al-Haq Brigades (Homs province)
Mus‘ab bin Ameer Brigade (Aleppo province)
Harakat al-Fajar al-Islamiyya (Aleppo province)
Al-Iman Combat Brigades (Damascus province)
Al-Hamza bin Abdul-Mutallab Brigade (Damascus
province)
Jeish al-Tawheed (Deir ez-Zor province)
The specific case of the Kurds in Syria
The Kurds have found themselves in a difficult balancing act since the beginning of the conflict. As of
2011, the main local force, the PYD (the Democratic
Union Party, the Syrian branch of the Turkish PKK)
has sought to retain control of its territory in
northeastern Syria. In November 2013, the PYD
announced the creation of an autonomous government for Kurdish areas, divided into three zones.
Engaged in heavy fighting against ISIL from the end
of 2013, the PYD, just like the PKK, is suspected of
maintaining close ties to the Damascus regime. The
Syrian armed forces did indeed maintain troops in
al-Qamishli and al-Hasakah and the end of 2013
saw the smooth transfer of authority from Syrian to
Saraya al-Maham al-Khassa (Damascus province)
Jama‘at al-Tali‘a al-Islamiyya (Idlib province)
Ansar al-Sham Brigades (Latakia province)
Kurdish authorities. It is very much likely that Bashar
al-Assad granted autonomy to the Kurds in order to
withdraw his troops from northeastern Syria in
order to redeploy them on other fronts, or to ensure
the neutrality or even the support of the PYD. In
response, Turkey, opposed to the PKK, and hence to
the PYD, would have turned a blind eye to the numerous Islamists crossing its shared border with Syria
with a view to weakening the PYD. Turkey also relied
on the Kurdish National Council (KNC) in Syria (close
to the Syrian National Council) and Barzani’s Iraqi
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) for this purpose.
However, this strategy did not prevent the strengthening of the PYD and forced Turkey to negotiate
with the PYD and the PKK (peace process) from the
summer of 2013. Choosing to negotiate could also
35
have been motivated by wanting to maintain the
ever-present divide between the PYD and the KNC,
as keeping Kurds divided is pursuant to the Turkish
strategy.40
in the Capital of the Omayyads” in the Jawbar district
of Damascus which involved six brigades, including
Jabhat al-Nusra. The regime struck back during the
summer of 2013, trying to cut the rebel supply lines
around Damascus, surrounding the Ghouta areas and launching offensives at Daraya and
Moadamiya. The rebel counterattack was Operation “Al-Furqan”. The increased number of
named operations shows that
these larger-scale operations
were better planned. Twentythree brigades took part, including FSA-affiliated battalions
and Islamist brigades such as
Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat alNusra. Success in Bahariya,
Otaybeh and eastern Ghouta
opened up the road to the capital.41 However, the coalition
Kurdish territories in northern Syria (March 2014)
quickly collapsed.
III.2 THE REBEL STRATEGY
Despite persistent divisions and a lack of equipment,
the Syrian rebellion still rules large territories and
retains control over certain urban areas. The rebels
were often able to implement useful combat strategies, even if these were often makeshift. Joint operations or even genuine campaigns were planned from
rural to urban areas.
III.2.1 A rebel strategy is emerging at
the national level
The creation of the Supreme Military Command in
December 2012 was a major milestone in the unification of the rebellion and led to the emergence of a
broader strategy. Priority was given to phasing out
the regime’s facilities, such as artillery and air power.
Emphasis was then placed on the regime’s military
and air bases. For the SMC, neutralizing these infrastructures was an absolute prerequisite for victory,
Damascus being the ultimate goal. Larger-scale operations followed in 2013, such as Operation “Epic
40
C.R., “Le “cavalier seul” des Kurdes en Syrie”, Orient XXI,
27 March, 2014. http://orientxxi.info/magazine/le-cavalierseul-des-kurdes-de,0553, accessed on 15 July, 2014.
36
Airbases were also attacked: Abu ad-Duhur, south
of Aleppo; Minnakh, north of Aleppo (40 Mi-8 helicopters); and al-Qusayr, near Homs. Rebels seized
40 MANPADS launchers in the fall of 2012 and shot
down two helicopters and one fighter aircraft near
Aleppo in December 2012. In northern Syria, Taftanaz airbase was overrun in January 2013. Al-Jarrah
military airport and Base 80, in the province of Aleppo,
also fell into rebel hands. They also threatened
Damascus international airport with their success
in eastern Ghouta. The rebels also concentrated
forces against isolated regime outposts: in May 2012,
seventeen of them had been seized in northern Syria.
In January 2013, the regime had only seven combat
outposts left north of the provincial capitals.42
Rebels conducting patrols in Aleppo (2012)
41
42
Stéphane Mantoux, “L’armée syrienne. (2/2) Dans la guerre
civile (2011-2013)”, Lettre du RETEX-Recherche, n°1, 20 September, 2013.
Stéphane Mantoux, “L’armée syrienne. (2/2)”, art. cit.
However, the buildup of the jihadist groups (see
chapter V), together with the gradual decline of the
SMC and the FSA due to Western non-intervention
and the relative deficiency of their groups’ external
support, failed to achieve the objectives of a national
strategy. For the time being, the rebels have not
been able to take control over the regime’s air and
artillery infrastructures and continue to suffer from
the asymmetry of the conflict. As the regime is
strengthened by its external allies, the rebels do not
in fact have the assets necessary to gain ground
without losing any.
III.2.2 The tactical challenges of the
rebels
The lack of (materiel) equipment, heavy weaponry
and communications (equipment) assets led the
Syrian rebellion to employ unconventional tactics. As
a result, since June 2012, the rebels have systematically used (fairly) really effective improvised explosive devices 43 (IEDs) throughout Syria, as well as
hollow charges against armored vehicles. This is
the most characteristic weapon of guerrilla tactics,
widely used, for example, in Afghanistan, or more
recently in Mali.
The rebellion is also developing antiaircraft capabilities, one of the keys to the conflict. During summer
2012, it already counted 15 to 25 ZSU-23 self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon systems, 2 to 5 57-mm
towed guns and 15 to 30 SA-7 MANPADS and probably SA-16 and SA-24 systems as well. In October
2012, five helicopters and six fighter aircraft had
already been shot down. Although the regime has lost
relatively few fighter-bombers (about 20), it has lost
more than half of its combat helicopters (Mi-8/17) 44
43
44
IED: “Igniters, standard and electrical detonators, explosives,
detonating devices (detonating cord, time fuse, etc.), miscellaneous equipment (steel wire, nails, spring leaf, dry battery, etc.)
whose countless combinations are available to the sapper.
The key is to surprise the enemy in the accomplishment of
one of his instinctive actions (...) or to rely on his curiosity, his
negligence, his hostile feelings, his peacefulness (mine with
time-delay) or his human nature (booby-trapped corpse) ”.
“Enseignements des opérations des dernières campagnes”,
3 e bureau de l’état-major de l’Armée, Ministère de la Guerre,
Paris, October 1965, p. 62.
Stéphane Mantoux, “La guerre civile syrienne : interview de Tom
Cooper”, 10 December, 2013. Retrieved from http://lautrecotedelacolline.blogspot.fr/2013/12/la-guerre-civile-syrienneinterview-de.html, accessed on 13 December, 2013.
and by 2013 its air power was nearly exhausted.
However, the lack of heavy weaponry suitable for
taking on Syrian Army tanks has prevented the rebels
from militarily gaining the upper hand.
Weapon supply depends entirely on border control.
Networks for trafficking weapons and combatants
are the same as those used during the wars in Lebanon and Iraq. The same clans and families have been
running these networks for decades or centuries,
mainly motivated by money rather than ideology. The
CIA and other Western intelligence agencies are
trying to control such trafficking so that certain categories of weapons do not fall into the hands of alQaeda-affiliated jihadist groups, although this has
never been easy.45
On the whole, the rebels have been receiving better
weapons since February 2013 and the opening of
the Jordanian border: RPG-22 and M-79 Osa rocket
launchers, Milkor MGL/RBG-6 grenade launchers
and M60 recoilless rifles, mainly from former Yugoslavia. In Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Idlib, the rebels were
able to concentrate adequate forces, coordinate
their actions, bring in heavy weapons to bear, and
sustain operations while under regime air attack.46
These examples highlight how rebels were able to
directly confront regime troops in major cities and
that guerrilla warfare in rural areas was not their sole
course of action. The rebels went so far as to attack
the regime in its stronghold of the coastal region. On
21 March, 2014, the “Muarakat al-Anfal” offensive
began (which refers to a Sura of the Quran), in the
north of the Latakia province. The Kassab border
post was seized by the rebels who broke through to
the Mediterranean for the first time since the conflict
began.
In Damascus, rebel tactics are somewhat different.
They consist of taking positions and then withdrawing
from them before their forces are too weakened, to
finally strike other positions. So far, this has worked
well and the rebels are still firmly rooted in the capital.
However, the low number of available forces has
often resulted in opposition strongholds being cut off:
they had to pay a high price for lack of strategic depth.
45
46
Joseph Hoyakem, “Radioscopie de la crise syrienne (¾).
Les Forces en presence”, Tribune n° 257, Revue de Défense
Nationale, p. 1.
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The Free Syrian Army”, art. cit, p. 23.
37
This was the case in Rastan, in Talbissa south of
Hama, in the old district of Khaldiya in Homs, in Tall
Kalakh on the Lebanese border, in al-Qusayr and even
in several Damascus suburbs, like Qudsaya and
Darayya. Maintaining functioning supply lines is a key
challenge for the various players in the conflict. The
lack of forces on both sides goes a fair way to explain
the stalemate in the conflict, with each side struggling
to keep its supply lines running.
III.2.3 The rebels and the population
In March 2011, the population showed strong support for the peaceful movement and then the FSA. If
the population is, in the words of Mao Zedong, “the
water in which the insurgent swims”, this grassroots
rebel force could have been expected to achieve quick
success against the regime. However, with the opposition unable to establish a unified military hierarchy,
increasingly, the population came to view rebel leaders as independent warlords, barely capable of presenting their demands. As the SMC failed to draw up
a code of conduct, there was a continuation and even
an increase in summary executions, looting and
abductions, progressively undermining the better
part of the insurgency’s grassroots base. Finally, Bashar al-Assad wielded control over propaganda,
denouncing an insurrection run from outside Syria
and primarily manned by jihadists. With an increase
in jihadist groups in 2013, there was truth to the
regime’s propaganda w, thereby leading to the population to feel alienated from the rebels. The regime
used hunger as a weapon, as well as massively shelling rebel cities, including public service infrastructure, bakeries and hospitals, leading many Syrians to
cease support for the insurgents, out of coercion and
fear.
With the population at stake, the battle of perceptions is crucial during an insurgency. It is apparently
the regime who has won it for the time being. The
advantage, however, is fragile because it is based
more on fear than on adherence to the regime. The
center of gravity, i.e. the population, is also at stake in
the infighting within the rebellion where secularists,
Islamists and jihadists battle it out.
III.3 TURKEY, A KEY REAR
BASE AND SOURCE OF
SUPPLY
The Syrian conflict has quickly become a war by
proxy for regional powers. Rivalry between Saudi
Arabia and Iran is, as such, telling. For both sides,
their progress and even their survival largely depend
on external support. Although the competition for
financing and access to resources has sometimes
caused divisions among rebel groups, external support remains central to the Syrian insurgency.
III.3.1 Turkey, a key rear base and
source of supply
Turkey is directly concerned by the Syrian conflict,
especially since it shares borders with Syria. It was
one of the first countries to support the Syrian rebellion and rapidly became one of the main host countries for Syrian refugees, affording considerable
freedom to international ONGs within its territory.
In 2013, however, the situation grew tense as the
Turkish population in the areas surrounding refugee
camps could no longer tolerate being in competition
with refugees, with them accepting lower wages and
thereby disrupting the local economy.47
Turkey’s stance on the situation is due to trying to
score points against both the European Union and
regional powers. Its government, representing Sunni
political Islam, is also involved in the regional rivalry
between the Sunnis and Shiites underlying the Syrian
conflict. Its support to the rebellion is thus a way to
counter Iranian ambitions in Syria.
The opening of its border with Syria in the summer of
2012 was crucial for the Syrian rebels and proved
instrumental in the rebel takeover of northern Syria.
This opening allowed the passage of weapons and
combatants in both directions, while providing the
rebels with vital fallback areas. In 2013, its strategy
47
38
Romain Mielcarek, “Armes, médicaments, argent : qui livre
quoi à Damas ou aux rebelles ?”, RFI, 29 September, 2013.
http://www.rfi.fr/zoom/20130921-armes-medicamentsargent-livre-damas-rebelles-soutiens-r%C3%A9gime-fournisseurs/, accessed on 15 July, 2014.
evolved into a more political posture as it became
less directly involved in the conflict. Although Turkey
has certainly turned a blind eye to arms trafficking for
the rebellion and undoubtedly authorized jihadist fighters crossing its territory to reach Syria, it is unlikely
that it was responsible for delivering weapons directly
to the rebels.48
Regular incidents or even direct clashes between
Turkey and the Syrian regime also occurred: a Turkish aircraft was shot down in June 2012, and then
the Turkish village of Akcakale, next to the Syrian border, was hit by the Syrian regime in October 2012,
killing five people. A Syrian aircraft that had entered
Turkish airspace was then shot down on 22 March,
2013. In March 2014, the two countries exchanged
fire during the rebel operation “Muarakat al-Anfal” in
the north of Latakia province, the Syrian regime
having accused Turkey of supporting rebels in this
offensive action.
Finally, Assad’s policy of openness towards the Syrian
Kurds is not only intended to divide the opposition and
guarantee the neutrality of large swathes of the territory, but it also aims to deal a blow to Turkey while
stoking the claims of Turkish Kurds.
III.3.2 The key role of the Gulf countries
The Gulf countries, at the forefront of which are Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, have rapidly emerged as the main
patrons of the Syrian rebels.
Qatari humanitarian aid is mainly channeled through
Muslim charities to Syrian refugees in Syria’s border
countries. These organizations are also suspected of
covertly being in contact with rebel groups and financing them.49 Arms shipments are underhanded and
have not been officially acknowledged by Doha. In
spring 2013, the Financial Times estimated that
Qatari aid had reached a staggering amount of more
than EUR 2.25 billion. The weaponry provided to the
rebels by Qatar are said to benefit only Islamist
groups, excluding al-Qaeda-affiliated groups.
48
49
Ibid.
Romain Mielcarek, “Armes, médicaments, argent : qui livre
quoi à Damas ou aux rebelles ?”, RFI, 29 September, 2013.
http://www.rfi.fr/zoom/20130921-armes-medicamentsargent-livre-damas-rebelles-soutiens-r%C3%A9gime-fournisseurs/, accessed on 15 July, 2014.
Saudi Arabia is unofficially considered as one of the
main arms suppliers to the Syrian insurrection. It has
allegedly supplied the heaviest weapons available to
insurgents (antitank rocket launchers, air defense
missiles as well as ammunition and shells).50 It has
also reportedly financed jihadist groups. In early
2013, Saudi Arabia pledged EUR 240 million in
humanitarian aid, although these funds have proved
difficult to trace as they have been transferred
through dummy NGOs. A similar financial effort was
promised by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates at
the time. Saudi Arabia has the support of most members of the Arab League and seeks to oppose Iranian
influence in Syria and the region. This support is also
part of the Saudi Arabia/Qatar rivalry, which materialized in the form of them establishing competing
rebel coalitions.
III.3.3 The support of Western powers
The United States has officially acknowledged having
delivered arms to the Syrian rebels (automatic weapons, ammunition, and other equipment including
vehicles). Supplying heavy weaponry, such as surface-to-air missile launchers, remains an option but
thus far has always been rejected, lest they should
fall into the hands of the jihadist movements. American military support remains at a rather low level:
EUR 60 million have been pledged, the equivalent of
one week of their direct aid to Israel, or 60 days of
military aid to Egypt. Washington has also delivered
significant quantities of food and medicine. About
EUR 400 million of humanitarian aid has been provided so far. In addition, the United States gave a total
of EUR 187 million of material and medical assistance directly to the rebels.51
Although France plays a very active diplomatic role,
it maintains that it has not provided any significant
military aid, instead preferring a humanitarian
approach. Officially, there is only Operation “Tamour”
in Jordan, consisting of the deployment of a field
hospital and medical teams for refugees. Since the
beginning of the Syrian crisis, France’s small team
of Special Forces in Jordan, usually tasked with
exchanges and exercises with regional partners, has
been reinforced with a view to possible projection
50
51
Ibid.
Ibid.
39
should the situation there develop. France has reportedly provided the rebels with non-lethal military
equipment only; mainly telecommunications and ballistic protection equipment and night vision goggles.
It also provided humanitarian aid to the tune of EUR
12 million in 2012, including two million directly allocated to the opposition, thereby providing the Syrian
National Council with means of subsistence which
must not be used to buy weapons. Finally, Paris granted Jordan EUR 100 million in 2012 that would be
supplemented by EUR 50 million to support the care
and welfare of refugees.52
At the St Petersburg G20 summit in September
2013, Great Britain announced it would send an
additional EUR 60 million to Syria for humanitarian
purposes (equipment, medical training). In total,
EUR 477 million have been allocated to Syrian
refugees. Although it has long been the EU’s lead
52
Ibid.
40
advocate of plans to supply arms to the rebels,
Great Britain has still not officially recognized such
operations.
Moreover, with a total of EUR 1.3 billion, the EU is
the largest contributor to humanitarian assistance
in Syria. France, Denmark, Italy, Hungary, Sweden,
Norway, Austria, Luxembourg and Slovakia contribute to this effort.
As Syria’s neighbor, Jordan welcomes a lot of refugees and plays on its position as a weakened country
to attract international aid. The United States, France
and Great Britain allegedly train rebels in Jordan.
Finally, Iraq has until recently taken a very low-key
approach to the Syrian issue, although many Iraqi
Shiite militias went to fight alongside the Bashar
al-Assad regime. On 27 April, 2014, Iraq conducted
an air raid in Syria against a jihadist convoy that was
trying to reach its border, killing at least 8 people.
CHAPTER IV
ASSAD’S NEW STRATEGY:
ETHNIC CLEANSING
AND CIVIL WAR
I
n light of the failure of the campaigns conducted
during the first year of the conflict, in summer
2012, Bashar al-Assad decided to implement a
new strategy, based on laying sustained sieges
to cities, worsening the humanitarian crisis, and
systematic destruction. Although different means
are employed, the regime remains in a posture of
counterinsurgency.
IV.1 THE POPULATION,
A CENTRAL ISSUE
IV.1.1 Humanitarian crisis, the
regime’s ultimate weapon
Ethnic cleansing, another approach to the
“divide and rule” policy
By clearing insurgent-held cities, from the summer
of 2012, Bashar el-Assad organized a large-scale
forced displacement of mainly Sunni populations. As
early as May 2011, militias murdered 108 inhabitants of the Sunni village of Taldou, in the Houleh area
of Homs province. Two weeks later, 100 Sunni villagers were killed in Qubeir in the Orontes river valley
where Alawites, Christians and Sunnis live side by
side. In August 2012, the Sunni suburb of Darayya
was heavily bombed and hundreds of people executed. Ever since, these practices have become systematic.
Air power has become the most significant instrument in the regime’s efforts to displace populations.
The regime first employed its helicopters for bombing. Then, during the battle for Aleppo in August
2012, 20 Syrian Air Force jets were committed to
compensate for the lack of artillery. The only regime
aircraft that can provide accurate direct support is
the MI-25 Hind, but Hassad never possessed more
than 40 of these valuable attack helicopters.53 The
lack of available aircraft is a clear setback to the
regime.
However, the helicopter is an essential counterinsurgency weapon. It greatly contributes to the airland
maneuver’s mobility and security in theatres with limited infrastructure, against a land-based enemy adept
at using ambushes. As second lieutenants Rolland
and Tisseron note in one of their tactical studies,
attack helicopters have a deterrent effect on enemy
combatants 54 and reassure ground troops, meaning
they are not only maneuver and combat assets. They
can also be used for intelligence collecting or as command platforms, depending on the requirements of
ground troops and the constraints of the mission.
However, given that they are less protected than
tanks and more exposed than fixed-wing aircraft helicopters remain vulnerable targets. For combatants
53
54
For the last two paragraphs, see Joseph Holliday, op. cit,
pp. 21-23.
For the entire paragraph, see Second Lieutenants Guillaume
Rolland and Antonin Tisseron, L’Emploi des hélicoptères en
contre-insurrection. Quels enjeux pour quelles menaces ?,
Cahier de la Recherche Doctrinale, Centre de Doctrine
d’Emploi des Forces, March 2012 (online on the CDEF website,
“anciennes publications”).
41
Chapter IV – Assad’s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war
with few ground-to-air weapons facing enemy air
superiority, destroying aircraft on the ground was the
preferred course of action during clashes at the end
of the Cold War. The distribution of night vision systems [provided to the rebels by France in particular]
and the increased protection of airbases hamper this
course of action.
As a sign of ammunition shortages, improvised
bombs made of oil drums have been dropped on
cities since August 2012. This also demonstrates
that the regime’s ammunition is designed for conventional war with Israel over the Golan Heights and not
for counterinsurgency purposes. The “barrel-bombs”
may be an attempt from the regime to devise new
methods for better destroying buildings. The regime
has also tried to depopulate (d) rebel-held areas
through air power, by targeting bakeries and hospitals, as was observed in Halfiyah near Hama. Ballistic
missiles (Scuds, M-600s, SS-21 Scarabs) are also
part of the inventory used for forced displacement.
Four hundred ballistic missiles are allegedly available.
Forty are said to have been launched between midDecember 2012 and February 2013.55
The regime has also developed a robust chemical
weapons program. On 21 August, 2013, Damascus
was hit by a chemical strike that killed 281 people56
in Eastern (districts of Ayn Tarma, Duma, Irbin, Jawbar, Kafr Batna, Qas Alaa, and Zamalka) and Western Ghouta (district of Mu’addamiyah ash-Sham).
Other independent assessments conducted, for
example, by Doctors Without Borders, reported at
least 355 people dead. Several technical counts,
according to different sources, assess the number
of dead to be approximately 1,500. The strike was
the starting point of Phase I of Operation “Capital
Shield”, a large-scale offensive by the regime to
regain control of rebel-held districts of the capital.57
This large-scale and coordinated attack could only
55
56
57
“Hospitals are a high-value target”, The World Today, October
& November 2013, p. 37. See also Joseph Holliday, op. cit,
p. 24.
“Programme chimique syrien. Cas d’emploi passés d’agents
chimiques par le régime. Attaque chimique conduite par le
régime le 21 août 2013”, Synthèse nationale de renseignement déclassifié, 02/09/2013, p. 2. http://www.defense.
gouv.fr/actualites/articles/programme-chimique-syrien-etattaque-du-21-aout-2013, accessed on 14 December, 2013.
Valérie Szybala, “Assad Strikes Damascus. The Battle for
Syria’s Capital”, Middle East Security Report, 16, Institute for
the Study of War, January 2014, p. 24.
42
have been conducted by the regime.58 The combined
attack on 21 August displayed a classic tactical
concept of operation (artillery preparation, then
ground offensive). The use of chemical agents was
part of a tactical maneuver that was coherent, in military terms, with the Syrian armed forces’ doctrine of
employment. Credible intelligence from various
partners refers to specific preparations in the days
leading up to 21 August. The UN also assumes that
chemical weapons were used on five sites: in Khan
al-Assal on 19 March, 2013, where the regime
and the rebels both accused each other ; in the
Jawbar district of Damascus on 24 August, 2013;
in Saraqib on the same day; in Ashrafieh Sahnaya on
25 August; in Bahhariye on 22 August; and in Sheikh
Maqsood on 13 April.59
The Syrian regime has one of the largest operational
stockpiles of chemical weapons worldwide, i.e. more
than one thousand tons of chemical warfare agents
and precursors. This arsenal includes several hundred tons of yperite [mustard gas] (stored in final
form), several dozens of tons of VX nerve agent
(the most toxic chemical warfare agent) and several
hundred tons of sarin (the bulk of the stockpiles).
Both sarin and VX are organophosphate neurotoxic
agents. They are stored in precursor form, i.e. two
chemicals that are mixed just before employment,
a technique that shows the Syrian regime having
mastered chemical weapons technology. Its scientists have also worked on nitrogen yperite, a first
generation vesicant agent, as well as an organophosphate neurotoxic with a higher toxicity than
sarin.60
The regime also has a wide range of vectors to deliver
its chemical weapons. SCUD-C, SCUD-B, M-600,
SS-21 missiles, aerial bombs, and 302 and 320-mm
rockets can deliver chemical agents.
Bashar al-Assad and some of the most influential
members of his clan are the only ones cleared to
issue the order to use chemical weapons. The order
is then transmitted to the officials of the relevant
58
59
60
“Programme chimique syrien”, art. cit.
Alexandra Geneste, “Syrie, L’ONU confirme l’utilisation d’armes
chimiques dans cinq sites”, Lemonde.fr, 13 December, 2013.
http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/
2013/12/13/syrie-l-onu-confirme-l-utilisation-d-armes-chimiques-dans-cinq-sites_4333695_3218.html, accessed on
13 December, 2013.
Synthèse nationale de renseignement déclassifié, op. cit, p. 3.
Delivery and range of chemical weapons
SCUD-B
VX
Sarin
×
×
SCUD-C
M-600
SS-21
Bombs
Rockets
Other tactical
ammunition
×
×
×
×
departments of the Scientific Studies and Research
Center (SSRC) (better known as CERS, Centre
d’Études et de Recherches Scientifiques ). Meanwhile, the Army Headquarters receives the order and
selects the targets, weapons and toxic agents to use.
On 14 September, 2013, the United States and Russia concluded an agreement to eliminate chemical
weapons in Syria, based on commitments made by
Bashar al-Assad’s regime. On the same day, the
Syrian regime acceded to the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Dismantling the Syrian chemical weapon
program is the responsibility of the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) based
in The Hague. It is governed by Resolution 2118,
unanimously adopted on 27 September by the
UN Security Council. According to this framework
agreement, the entire Syrian arsenal must be destroyed by 30 June, 2014. Syria stated it operates
23 sites.
In total, the country has nearly 3.5 million internally
displaced persons (IDPs), a figure that could jump
to 6.5 million by the end of 2014, according to the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
In addition, 2.5 million Syrians took refuge abroad,
including one million in Lebanon.61
The “starvation until submission” campaign,
the weapon of hunger
By laying sieges to several cities, the Bashar al-Assad
regime is implementing a “starvation until submission” campaign. The United Nations estimates that
Yperite
×
×
×
×
Out of a total population of 22 million.
500 km
×
250-300 km
×
×
300 km
70 km
50 km
Less than 50 km
over 250,000 people were trapped in besieged
areas early in February 2014.62 The most critical
areas where civilians were at the greatest risk of
starvation were in and around Homs and Damascus.
The regime’s siege on the southern Damascus
suburb of Hajar al-Aswad gave some insight into how
the tactics of besieging neighborhoods had been
implemented all over the Damascus countryside.
After a regime offensive in September 2012 causing
many civilians to flee the suburb, regime forces withdrew and positioned themselves around the edges
of Hajar al-Aswad. In December 2012, the road to
Damascus was shut down. In April 2013, civilians
bringing supplies into the city were arrested. The
strict military cordon was followed by several days of
artillery shelling. Around Damascus, Hajar al-Aswad,
Babila, Yelda, Hujeira, Asali, Tadamon, Buweida, Yarmouk, and Husseiniya were placed under a similar
blockade.63 At the end of 2012, the regime embarked on a campaign of bulldozing neighborhoods in
Damascus, including Qadoun, Tadamoun, and Mezzeh. The regime’s strategy aims to wear out the population, preventing it from joining the insurgency by
capitalizing on fear and tying their survival to fighting
coming to an end. It also has a deterrent effect on the
rebel groups, in that they cannot enter a city without
the risk of heavy shelling on the population. They must
take this into account before entering an urban
area.64
62
63
61
×
×
×
Range
64
Isabel Nassief and Valérie Szybala, “ The Starvation until
Submission Campaign”, Syria Updates, Institute for the Study
of War, 7 February, 2014.
Valérie Szybala, “Assad Strikes Damascus. The Battle for
Syria’s Capital”, art. cit., p. 18.
Joseph Holliday, op. cit., p. 23.
43
A district in Homs (November 2012)
IV.1.2 Propaganda, a pillar essential to
the survival of the State
La population est le centre de gravité de The population is the center of gravity of both the insurgency
and the counterinsurgency. For the loyalist forces,
the population serves primarily as a means of maintaining the existing system; a tool for achieving
victory and control. For the insurgents, it is more
than that : it is a tool for achieving victory but it is
also, and above all, both the cause and the purpose
of their action. Insurgents have a closer relationship
with the population as usually they were formerly
part of it. Nonetheless, the population’s support is
not necessarily needed for winning, but it should
clearly not have overriding support for the adverse
side.
Bashar al-Assad has fully understood the key role of
the population for his regime’s survival. As such, fear
acts as an efficient instrument, enforced by heavy
shelling, sustained sieges, and executions. The Syrian
regime uses the “propaganda of threats” to intimi-
44
date its enemies and the population.65 Resorting to
ethnic cleansing, forced displacement and media
manipulation to portray the insurgents as Islamists
coming solely from outside Syria constitutes “wearing
propaganda”. The regime also applies “dividing propaganda” 66 in order to deepen divisions not only
within the population but also within the opposition.
Bashar al-Assad managed to accentuate the rebel
divide by favoring emerging jihadist groups (including
by freeing terrorist group leaders). In addition, one
must note the internal propaganda aimed at galvanizing the troops. The regime’s propaganda media are
primarily Syria TV (satellite channel), Syrian New
Channel, Syrian Drama TV, and Addounia TV, controlled by Rami Makhlouf, a businessman and cousin of
the Assad family. Bashar al-Assad also capitalizes on
new social networks such as Instagram, Twitter and
Facebook to feed speeches and images to Syria’s
population, but also to influence foreign public opinion.
65
66
Hugues Esquerre, Dans la tête des insurgés, Paris, Éditions du
Rocher, 2013, p. 193.
IbIbid.
Facebook is also used to identify and arrest opponents. A full-fledged cyberwar is being waged between hacker teams from the various factions to hack
rival Internet websites.
The maintenance of public services is also used for
the regime’s propaganda, as it seeks to be deemed
as essential for the survival of the population. In the
areas where he has control, Bashar al-Assad has
endeavored to maintain the State and related services, with the civil service thereby playing a major
role. On the whole, civil servants care about maintaining the State, which is often confused with Bashar
al-Assad. He also tries to prevent the insurgents
from doing the same by cutting their supply lines, targeting public buildings in insurgent areas and inflicting siege campaigns. In February 2014, armistices
were signed in most districts around Damascus to
restore public services and supply food to a population weakened by hunger. Here, Assad’s strategy
had proved somewhat successful; the population
had been subjugated by hunger and the regime had
become essential to their survival. In March 2014,
40% of the Syrian public hospitals were no longer
functional and one in five schools had been damaged
or occupied by people driven from their homes by
fighting.67
IV.2 INCREASED RELIANCE
ON MILITIAS
IV.2.1 The growing confusion between
militias and Syrian armed forces
To compensate for a lack of troops, Bashar al-Assad
has to rely on paramilitary and militia groups to
support his operations and secure his supply lines.68
In September 2012, thousands of reservists were
called up as reinforcements, mainly from the Alawi
regions in northwestern Syria. Only half reported
for duty. They were sent to the 416 th Special Forces
battalion.69
67
68
69
Francetvinfo.fr, 8 March, 2014.
Here, we will only deal with Syrian militias; foreign militias will
be addressed in another part of this study.
To Civil War”, art. cit., pp. 29-30.
Militia groups therefore had to reinforce troops.
The decentralization of Syrian Army command and
control in 2012-2013 replaced the long centralized
tradition inherited from Soviet doctrine. As well as
improving the regime’s operational flexibility, decentralization has added to the convergence between
the Syrian Army and the militias, as they have been
acting in an increasingly manner from the summer
of 2012. As an example, 10,000 militia members
joined the Homs offensive in early 2013. The Iranian
Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah played a major
role in the training of this popular force (Jaysh alSha’bi ), estimated at 50,000 fighters.70
In early 2013, Assad took steps to formalize the process by grouping the militias in the National Defense
Forces. Equipment, uniforms (in both cases, wearing
civilian clothing, ill-fitting and slovenly outfits, civilian
kits, etc.) and operational capabilities have become
almost identical. This confusion creates a problem
in identifying the parties to the conflict; it is difficult
to know if it is Syrian forces or militia who have
operated in such or such an area or to point out
those responsible for any abuses. In addition, some
200,000 members of the regime’s security apparatus have been heavily committed alongside militia
groups since the beginning of the conflict.
IV.2.2 The role of militias in the regime’s
operations
When incorporated into the regime’s operations, militias most often play the role of Syrian Army auxiliaries.
As an example, in the fall of 2012, bulldozers were
used by the Syrian military to raze buildings to the
ground in Damascus suburbs, with the militias ensuring population displacement by expelling or even
slaughtering the last remaining inhabitants.71 Due
to the decentralization of command and the lack of
professional troops, militias most often act autonomously or even independently. Armed groups receive
instructions, before it being up to them to operate on
the ground in complete autonomy. The key is to drive
70
71
Ibid.
Stéphane Mantoux, This is Syria. L’armée syrienne, Alliance
Géostratégique, 12 September, 2013. http://alliancegeostrategique.org/2013/09/12/this-is-syria-larmee-syrienne/,
accessed on 13 November, 2014.
45
the populations out of cities and suburbs by using
terror, and go “insurgent-bashing” (or assimilated
insurgent), without going into detail.72
Deemed to be poorly disciplined, militias do have
two advantages. First of all, they do not require great
leaders or general officers for them to act. They can
therefore continue to operate under the authority
of local commanders, even when a senior official is
killed. As such, destroying Syrian Army command
centers will not fundamentally destabilize these
groups. On the other hand, Syrian powers cannot be
accused of crimes committed by gangs that mainly
operate outside a centralized chain of command.
The National Defense Forces militias, set up from
the former Popular Committee militias, were mainly
formed by Christian, Druze and Alawite minorities
fearing persecution from insurgent Sunnis, who have
been systematically presented as jihadi terrorists
by the regime propaganda. The Ba’ath Party militia
is also armed and takes part in fighting. These are
the “Battalions of the Ba’ath Party”, established
in Aleppo in 2012 and controlled by the Party. The
Ba’ath party saw the conflict as the opportunity
to reassert its position. These battalions number
between 5,000 and 7,000 men, although they have
seen little combat.
The much older, criminal Shabiha militias are almost
exclusively made up of Alawites and are closely associated with the Assad clan. The movement appeared
when trafficking was organized with Lebanon during
the war that engulfed the neighboring state in the
1980s. The Shabiha subsequently prospered
through racketeering, drug trafficking and smuggling
between the two countries. As it was led by members
of the Assad clan, the Mafia-type organization had
the protection of Hafez al-Assad, who already used
it for doing dirty work. Frédéric Encel, a lecturer at
the political science school Science-Po in Paris,
explains that, “the regime does not want to use its
well-trained soldiers to go after civilians. Either the
Shabiha are sent alone to a rebel-held city where
there is no armed resistance or, should the rebels be
72
Laurent Touchard, “Interventions en Syrie : que valent les
défenses militaires de Bachar el-Assad ?”, Blog Défense Jeune
Afrique, 30/08/2013.
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB2013083
0114007/, accessed on 15 July, 2014.
46
heavily armed, tanks and military helicopters pound
the city before leaving the militias to finish off the
job with their handguns, their batons and their edge
weapons”.73
This fear also serves as a dissuasive force within the
Syrian armed forces to prevent any attempts at desertion. The Shabiha, for example, were responsible
for watching over the regiments, including those
made up of non-Alawites. These militias are committed to upholding the regime, as its members would
be hunted down should it fall. The regime also provides them with a substantial income, in addition to
which must be counted the wealth resulting from looting. Their average salary is around 2,000 Syrian
pounds (30 euros) per day, in a country where the
average monthly income might be 150 euros. This is
why it also attracts many non-Alawite people.74
Pro-Assad militias thus include a variety of actors who
actively contribute to upholding the regime. Their buildup, improved tactical effectiveness, equipment and
collaboration with regime forces have enabled them
to fulfil their role as Syrian Army auxiliaries. It should
be noted, however, that fighting between pro-Assad
militias is known to have taken place.
IV.3 THE PRIMARY ROLE
OF FOREIGN PLAYERS
IN THE FIGHTING
The Assad regime’s survival is largely sustained by
foreign players. Having appeared during the stalemate in the conflict, their increasing presence is a
sign of the conflict’s sectarization.
IV.3.1 Iranians in Syria
Syria has longstanding relations with Iran, as the two
countries have been in strategic partnership since
the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy in February
73
74
Quoted in Christophe Rauzy, “Les Chabbiha, miliciens de la
“sale guerre” en Syrie”, Francetvinfo.fr, 27 July, 2012.
Hala Kodmani, “Syrie : les chabbiha, ces hors-la-loi qui font la
loi ”, Libération.fr, 27 September, 2011.
1979. This privileged relationship is based on a shared commitment to continue fighting against Israel,
a common will to resist American influence in the
Middle East and a joint interest in curbing Iraq’s and
Turkey’s influence. It is also based on a Shiite alliance,
with Assad seeking recognition of the Alawi community as a full-fledged branch of Shiism.75
During the Iran-Iraq War, Syria supplied weapons and
war materiel to Iran, including ground-to-air missiles
and antitank rockets. Iranian pilots were also authorized to land on Syrian airbases in case of emergency.
Groups of Iraqi Kurdish dissidents were also trained
by the Syrian Army.76 In return, Iran supplied oil to
Syria at a very low price. Although this relationship
turned sour during the war in Lebanon in 1982, and
then the rapprochement of Syria and the United
States during the first Gulf War, at the end of the
1990s, Syria’s relationship with Iran picked up again.
Iran in particular provided significant support to
Syria’s chemical weapon programs.
Iran has provided assistance to the Assad regime
since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. The Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or “Quds Force”
(QF) was sent to act as a fighting force on the ground,
espionage services or even law enforcement forces.
The first part of the support provided by Iranian
forces is an advisory mission.77 QF Commander,
Major General Qassem Suleimani plays a prominent
role. Iran’s involvement in Syria became clearer in
February 2013, when Iranian Brigadier General
Hassan Shateri was assassinated in the Damascus
countryside. The Quds Force is based in the Syrian
Special Forces training complex in al-Dreij, between
Damascus and Zabadani. Its best prepared troops
for counterinsurgency were sent to Syria. These men
provided military training, mainly to the 416 th Special
Forces Battalion. Assistance was also given to the
Shabiha militias. They played a role in a string of major
offensives mounted in the first quarter of 2012 between Damascus and Zabadani. Some of the Syrian
counterinsurgency practices may also reflect Iranian
advice, such as building a wall around the former
75
76
77
Baudouin Dupret, Zouhair Ghazzal, Youssef Courbage, Mohammed Al-Dbiyat, La Syrie au présent, Paris, Sindbad, Actes Sud,
2007, p. 823.
Ibid, p. 824.
Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy
in Syria”, AEI’s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study
of War, May 2013, p. 10. We will follow them for the entire
paragraph.
rebel stronghold in Homs. The Assad regime has not
always been a perfect partner, however. The Iranians
also issued strong criticism after the Houla massacre on May 25, 2012 and have been often frustrated
with Assad’s disproportionate responses.
Intelligence support is the second part of Iranian aid.
Syria’s General Security Directorate is supported by
Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the Iranian Ministry
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and the major
defense contractor Iran Electronics Industries (IEI).
These designations shed some light on the relations
between Syrian and Iranian state security agencies.
Military (resupply) support makes up the third part
of Iranian aid. Aerial resupply has been most critical
for the regime forces, which were threatened by
the rebels blocking roads. 117 cargo and passenger
planes operated by Yas Air, Iran Air, and Mahan Air
were listed in September 2012. Iranian Air Force
Ilyushin-76s were also employed. Iraq, it should be
noted, has no capability to protect its airspace. The
road between Baghdad and Damascus remains the
main ground corridor for Iranian aid. The primary
crossing points on the Syria-Iraq border have
included Rabia-Yaarabiya in the north, Sinjar, the
Euphrates River between Al Qaim-and Abu Kamal.
Since the end of 2012, only the Al Walid-At Tanf
border crossing near Jordan has seemed to be the
only border crossing point to have remained viable.
Iran has also deployed naval vessels through the
Suez Canal to Syrian ports, demonstrating the so far
limited plausibility of a sea supply line.
Finally, the Iranians participate in the training of
the 50,000 militia members called Jaysh al-Sha’bi,
or “the People’s Army”, modeled on the Iranian Basij
militia. Iran can have them capitalize on its previous
years’ experience in the training of Iraqi and Afghan
groups. This is part of Iran’s longer-term strategy in
Syria; should the Assad regime fall, these militias and
the remnants of the security institutions will have no
other choice but to turn to Iran so that they could
ultimately lead an uprising against the new regime
and bring to power the Islamic Republic.78
78
Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in
Syria”, art. cit., p. 21.
47
IV.3.2 The role of the Lebanese
Hezbollah
Hezbollah has been in Syria in significant numbers
since the end of 2012. Their 5,000 elite commandos
are equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and
have trained the Syrian Army in urban warfare. They
reportedly protect Bashar al-Assad.79 The conflict in
Syria has put Hezbollah on the defensive to protect
its supply routes from Syria into Lebanon.80 Hezbollah
also aims to protect an air and ground corridor
through which the weapons and ammunition necessary for fighting against Israel are shipped. It is essential for the Syrian regime to prevail, at least in the
Alawi coastal strip, so that Hezbollah can potentially
route MANPADS procured in Europe or the United
States and land them in Tartus, then to be used
against Israeli aircraft.81
Hezbollah is not committed in its entirety ; instead
members from Shiite villages in Lebanon come of
their own volition. They are reservists, although first
and foremost they are members of elite units trained
by the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
These men have been hardened in the fight against
Israel, with leaders who allegedly trained 50,000 militia members. In early 2012, Hezbollah snipers were
deployed in the Battle of Zabadani, a key city on the
supply route from Damascus to Lebanon. Hezbollah
escalated its combat role in February 2013 when it
launched an offensive against villages near al-Qusayr.
Hezbollah troops are said to have been involved in
80 clashes in Syria, from the Aleppo province to
Homs province through Damascus and the Ghouta
area.82 They arrived at the end of 2012, “although
today Hezbollah fights almost exclusively with elite
units of the 4 th Division, the Special Forces or the
Republican Guard ”, recalls a source close to the
party quoted by G. Malbrunot. Hezbollah has trained
Army leaders in counterinsurgency warfare in collaboration with the Iranian Quds forces. Iran and
Hezbollah are closely linked; Iran played an important
79
80
81
82
Georges Malbrunot, “Le Hezbollah en sauveur d’Assad”,
Le Figaro, Tuesday, 21 January, 2014.
Syria”, art. cit., p. 21.
Stéphane Mantoux, “La bataille d’Al-Qusayr (15 May - 5 June
2013)”. Historicoblog.com, accessed on 21 November, 2013.
Georges Malbrunot, “Le Hezbollah en sauveur d’Assad”, art.
cit.
48
role in establishing the party in 1982. Hezbollah
drafted the party constitution still in effect, including
elements of the Iranian Constitution.83 Hezbollah
regularly receives aid from the Islamic Republic, with
Syria as the crossing point.
Sometimes, Hezbollah also fight in Syrian Army
uniform, becoming indistinguishable from them,
and operating under Syrian command.84 Infighting
sometimes occurs as Hezbollah men sometimes
take issue being alongside the less pious Alawites.
Hezbollah demanded that the Mafia-type criminal
elements be put aside. Tensions also arose over
the use of chemical weapons or when a close associate to Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, had to go
to Damascus to convince Bashar al-Assad not to
respond to Israeli strikes in May 2013.
Four hundred men have allegedly been killed and a
thousand others wounded. Among those killed in a
rebel offensive in the Ghouta areas in late November
2013 were leaders such as Wissam Sharafeddine,
along with 26 others. After several days, thousands
of insurgents who had come from Jordan and broken
through the regime’s defensive lines and Hezbollah
then had to bring in reinforcements from Lebanon
to recapture the lost positions, with Syrian Army
support. Hezbollah troops are usually organized in
six-man assault teams and issued with American
machine guns fitted with a biometric scanner, a
Russian piece of equipment for detecting shadows
through a building or identifying human forms behind
foliage up to 200 meters away.85 These teams have
stand-off support from Syrian tanks and, unlike the
Iranians, fight alongside Syrian soldiers. Finally, Hezbollah allegedly gather intelligence: a list of 80 Syrian
soldiers who had provided rebels with information
was reportedly submitted to Bashar al-Assad.86
Hezbollah have allegedly been protecting Assad since
the end of August 2013.
There have always been internal power struggles
within Hezbollah. The resistance of the “Party of God”
is based on the fight against Israel and not on lending
83
84
85
86
Interview with Amal Saad Ghorayeb, “Le Hezbollah : résistance,
idéologie, politique”, Confluences Méditerranée, 2007/2 N°61,
pp. 41-47.
cit. This has been questioned by other sources.
cit.
Ibid.
support to a repressive dictatorial regime. Moreover,
it cannot afford to commit all of its forces in Syria. The
party base, located in Lebanon, has long expressed
doubts about a massive intervention in Syria but now
describes the commitment as an “existential struggle” 87 in order to confront Sunni radicals beyond their
borders, to prevent them from waging war within
Lebanon. The Syrian regime would like to create a
Syrian Shiite Hezbollah to avoid long-term dependency
on the Lebanese Hezbollah, but will probably take time.
The battle of al-Qusayr (15 May – 5 June,
2013)
The battle of al-Qusayr marked the beginning of a
major campaign from the regime to retake Syria’s
strategic areas. It also reflected the ever-increasing
overlapping between Syrian Army soldiers, militias
and foreign fighters, with Hezbollah playing a special
role at al-Qusayr. Al-Qusayr had a population of
30,000 predominately Sunni inhabitants, located
10 km from Lebanon and 25 km from Homs. The
Syrian regime tried to regain control over the entire
province following its offensive on Homs in February
2012.
Most rebels in al-Qusayr were local people, mainly in
the Farouq Battalions, the most powerful unit in the
city. This formation belongs to the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Fifteen units are thought to have taken
part in the defense of al-Qusayr, involving a few thousand fighters (perhaps 2,000). The al-Qusayr Military
Council was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Mohieddin
al-Zain, AKA Abu Arab, but the chain of command
remained unclear. The presence of Jabhat al-Nusra
had evidently been exaggerated by the media, the
regime seeking to present all defenders as jihadists.
The rebels were reasonably well equipped with arms
and ammunition, salvaged in particular from the
Dabaa Military Airport: AK-47s, RPG-7 rocket launchers, PK machine guns, 23-mm twin-barreled guns,
mortars, and 107-mm and 122-mm rockets. The fighters divided the city into sectors to better organize
defense preparations. Tunnels were dug and underground bunkers built. Barricades blocked streets,
buildings were booby-trapped and roads mined.88
87
88
Ibid.
Stéphane Mantoux, “La bataille d’Al-Qusayr (15 mai - 5 juin
2013)”, Historicoblog, 21 November, 2013.
http://historicoblog3.blogspot.fr/2013/11/la-bataille-dalqusayr-19-mai-5-juin.html, accessed on 22 November, 2013.
Syrian soldiers a few kilometers from al-Qusayr
(May 2013)
Remote-controlled hand-made explosive devices
positioned in belts under the roads were ready to destroy vehicles. Meanwhile, Hezbollah divided the city in
16 areas of operations, assigning code numbers to
key points and objectives, a procedure well known to
the party for protecting radio communications. With
1,200 to 1,700 men, Hezbollah exercised tactical
control of the battle, giving orders to Syrian officers.
The movement had apparently divided its forces into
17 groups of 100 men. However, during fighting, the
basic pawn was the 3-to-5 man squad. The fighters
were relieved weekly, and then every 20 days. Detailed reconnaissance was conducted, and then Hezbollah engineers began to demine buildings. Supported
by Syrian artillery and aviation, Hezbollah fighters
used RPG-7s, 107-mm modified rockets (IRAM,
Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions), and Dragunov sniper rifles.89
On 3 June, 2013, 14 rebel commanders out of
17 voted to withdraw from al-Qusayr. Some managed
to get to Arsal, in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, which had
been a logistics node of the rebellion until Yabroud was
captured by the regime. The fight for al-Qusayr was
longer and fiercer than expected: 70 to 120 Hezbollah
fighters were killed. The rebels, meanwhile, published
the names of 431 of their soldiers killed in action,
although the overall number is undoubtedly higher.90
The rebels were isolated and faced forces far stronger than them who were able to capitalize on how
near they were to Lebanon. Hezbollah showed it was
capable of fighting in urban areas and sent a strong
message to Israel. It then moved to the Daraa, Idlib
and Aleppo provinces and the Damascus suburbs.
89
90
Ibid.
Ibid.
49
Al-Qusayr Campaign: March 2013
Jessica Lewis and David Y. Stephenson
Ar-Rastan
FSA
Talbisa
x
104
xx
Homs
11
Shinshar
xx
Shamsin
FSA
RG
45
SF
47
SF
x
UNK
Bekaa Valley
L
105
53
x
Lebanon
RG
18
Dabaa
Al-Qusayr
x
SF
4*
LH
Hermel
L
LH**
* Unknown elements within the 4th Armored Division were among the stay-behind force in Homs city after the Bebruary 2012 assault.
** Lebanese Hezbollah forces are depicted here as two regiments because the total number of forces estimated in Syria presently total to 2,000.
• Regime force disposition in Homs City in Marc 2013 is based upon ISW report, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, by Joseph Holliday.
• Opposition units are represented as task forces comprised of multiple rebel groups and represented for their estimated total strength.
• Estimated pro-regime unit available strength is represented as a proportion of the whole in red.
Source: Institute for the Study of War,
http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/mapBlankMay.png
Al-Qusayr Campaign: June 2013
Ar-Rastan
Jessica Lewis and David Y. Stephenson
FSA
FSA
x
Talbisa
Homs
11
18
x
FSA
Shinshar
UNK
Dabaa
Al-Qusayr
Shamsin
UNK
NDF*
Lebanon
Bekaa Valley
Hermel
UNK
L
xx
104
xx
105
RG
45
SF
47
SF
x
x
x
3
53
4
UNK
RG
x
x
RG
SF
4
LH
L
LH**
NDF
• Lebanese Hezbollah and National Defense Forces are represented with reduced available strength based upon estimates of high casualties in Al-Qusayr.
• Opposition forces have been displaced from Al-Qusayr and are isolated at Dabaa military base, which is regime-controlled.
Source: Institute for the Study of War,
http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/mapBlankJune.png
The northwestern city of Talkalakh, which had been
besieged for two years, fell as a result of that operation. The regime then turned against Homs and captured the central Khaldiya district on 29 July, as the
rebellion had chosen to sacrifice this area to better
50
preserve the northern Aleppo province and positions
in Damascus. The rebels also gathered in the Qalamoun Mountains, between Damascus and Homs,
north of the capital, in particular around the town of
Yabroud. It was indeed in Danha, in the Qalamoun
Mountains, that rebels seized three Syrian Army arms
depots with numerous antitank missiles on 2 August.
Nevertheless, with the Qalamoun Mountains lying
close to the Lebanese border, they were a prime
target for a regime and Hezbollah offensive; this got
underway on 15 November, 2013.91
The battle for the Qalamoun Mountains
Hezbollah also played a crucial role in the battle for
the mountainous area of Qalamoun, located northwest of Damascus and crossed by the M5 highway,
linking Damascus and Homs. Hezbollah also focused
on cutting off supply lines between Arsal, Lebanon,
and rebel-held areas in Qalamoun. The fall of alQusayr in June 2013 was part of the large-scale
campaign completed in March 2014 when the
regime took Yabroud. During the campaign, the key
objective was the contested section of the M5 highway between Qara and Yabroud. The offensive
against Qara began on 15 November, with heaving
shelling and regime helicopter bombardments.92
Pro-regime forces encircled the town, modelled on
the strategy that had been implemented since
the summer of 2012. Four days later, the town fell,
causing large-scale displacement as 2,200 families
fled across the border into Lebanon.
The regime then increased operations in the towns
of an-Nabek and Jarajir which lie on the M5. The
rebels seized control of Deir Attiyah while the regime
continued heavy shelling throughout Qalamoun, particularly on the towns of Deir Attiyah, an-Nabek, and
Yabroud. Both rebel and pro-regime fighters (both
sides) demonstrated an understanding that mountainous terrain would require a shift in fighting tactics.
The regime focused on disjoining rebel-held towns in
the area and besieging towns with heavy rebel
concentrations. Meanwhile, rebels relied on heavy
reinforcements and rearmament from other regions,
as well as irregular tactics such as car bombs which
became a specialty of al-Qaeda affiliated groups such
as the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS).
91
92
2013)”, art. cit.
Isabel Nassief, “Hezbollah and the Fight for Control in Qalamoun”,
Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, 26 November,
2013, p. 1.
Having demonstrated its commitment alongside the
Syrian Army during the battle of al-Qusayr, Hezbollah
then conducted reconnaissance operations in the
Qalamoun area. Hoping for a decisive victory, the
regime concentrated its forces in Aleppo, Damascus
and the Northern provinces. For the regime, Qalamoun was not the priority, but it was for Hezbollah,
given its location along the Lebanese border. Hezbollah employed guerrilla tactics, operating in small
squads, damaging the logistical connections between
Arsal and the rebel towns around Qalamoun, rather
than clearing and holding territory as they did in alQusayr.93 In addition, according to rebel groups,
Hezbollah was said to hold eight villages near the northern Lebanon border, in an effort to disrupt the rebel
supply line to Homs.
The capture of Yabroud by the regime in March
2014 marked the success of this campaign. The
regime can now benefit from substantial supplies
from Lebanon and connect Damascus and Homs
without much danger. This victory could prove decisive in the continuation of the conflict.
IV.3.3 Shiite militias in Syria
Shiite militiamen, including 2 to 3,000 Iraqis, are not
as disciplined as Hezbollah fighters. They have maintained ties to Iran since the counterinsurgency in
Iraq and are partly helped by them. In Syria, they are
duplicating the strategy employed in Iraq and are
likely to protect Iranian interests in Syria even if
Assad falls. Iranians reportedly used Hezbollah fighters to train them.94
Fighters were first sent by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). They have been clearly identifiable since the end of 2012, as this was when they
formed the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB),
made up of Syrian and foreign Shiite fighters who are
members of Hezbollah and Shiite Iraqi militias. It
includes some 500 fighters. In April 2013, both
Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq confirmed
their involvement in Syria by publishing pictures acknowledging that four of their fighters had been killed
93
94
Ibid, p. 3.
Syria”, AEI’s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study
of War, May 2013, p. 23.
51
while “defending Shi‘ite shrines in the Damascus
suburb of Sayyeda Zeinab”.95 The Abu al-Fadl al-Haq
Brigade stated that its primary task was to protect
the shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab in southeast Damascus
(where the remains of the daughter of the first Shiite
Imam are entombed). This is also key terrain for both
Assad and Iran in the defense of Damascus because
it leads to Damascus International Airport.
The various paramilitary forces fighting in Syria benefit from Iranian support as they are pursuing their
mutual objectives in Syria. They share a common interest in protecting themselves against the threat of alQaeda affiliates, as well as a potentially hostile Sunni
majority potential government in Syria. These movements will keep up the fight to keep Assad in power
as long as possible. Out of all of them, the shabiha
have the most to lose and are prepared to fight to the
end.
IV.3.4 Russian supply
Russia has provided Bashar al-Assad’s regime
with unwavering support since the beginning of
the conflict. Russian aid even increased in 2013,
with deliveries of armored vehicles, surveillance
equipment, radars, electronic warfare systems, and
guided bombs for planes, shipped to Latakia and
Tartus.96 Russia’s attitude in Syria is mainly defensive, primarily with a view to maintaining a line of
defense to prevent Islamist groups from moving
northward, towards the Caucasus and Chechnya.
Historically, Russia also plays the role of protector of
the Eastern Christians; an increasingly viable option
as there is a union between Church and State currently asserted in Russia, between the executive
power and the Orthodox Church. Finally, on a symbolic level, Russia is seeking to assert its presence
within its only Arab ally state after the concessions
made in 2011 concerning the Western intervention
in Libya.
Russian Federation in Syria since the agreement
reached in 1971, which was part of a wider policy of
military aid to Arab countries, such as Egypt, Algeria,
and Libya. This is the only Russian military port outside of the former Soviet republics and Russia’s only
direct access to the Mediterranean. Tartus is classified as a deep-water commercial port which can
process giant tankers up to 120,000 tons, but also
military vessels. In 2008, the Port of Tartus processed 2,776 merchant vessels carrying 12.9 million
tons of cargo.97
Officially designated as a “Navy Sustainment Center”,
the port facility can support all the ships of the Russian fleet except the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. 98 It includes ammunition depots; basic repair
capabilities are also provided through the (regular)
limited presence of the Russian repair ship PM-138.
However, there is no command and control facility
nor military hospital facilities or barracks. Despite
Russian pledges to improve Tartus, the naval base is
in no better condition than it was thirty years ago and
only offers basic support functions. Nonetheless, Tartus is described as essential in Russian official
speeches. Interest in Tartus is primarily geopolitical
since it highlights Russian influence in the Mediterranean and the Arab world against NATO.
The Russian fleet has been in decline since the end of
the Cold War but is gradually improving, as shown in
2008 when the destroyer Admiral Chabanenko transited the Panama Canal, marking the first time a Russian ship had gone through it since WWII. Finally,
Russia seems more committed to maintaining
cooperation with a client state rather than with a
regime or with Assad.99 Its support to the regime
could become jeopardized should the rebels make
significant progress, even though this support has
been robust since the beginning of the conflict. However aid continued in 2014 and is crucial to the
regime.
The naval base of Tartus is located in the coastal
area of northwestern Syria. A stronghold of the
regime, it has been one of the major interests of the
95
96
Quoted in Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, p. 24.
Isabel Nassief, “The campaign for Homs and Aleppo”, Middle
East Security Report, 17, ISW, January 2014, p. 40.
52
97
98
99
Christopher Harmer, “Russian Naval Base Tartus”, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, 31 July, 2012, p. 1.
Ibid, p. 5.
Ibid.
IV.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE
REGIME’S OPERATIONS
AND OF THE
GEOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION
OF THE CONFLICT
IV.4.1 Assessment of operations
conducted by the regime since
summer 2012
Deemed to be ossified and as fielding obsolete armed
forces at the beginning of the conflict in 2011, the
Syrian regime has nonetheless held on to power and
has even gradually gained the upper hand over the
rebellion. To the surprise of many observers, it has
shown a degree of adaptability that recalls the wide
range of means available to a dictatorial regime fiercely attached to power. The progressive decentralization of the Army’s chain of command has allowed
for greater flexibility and responsiveness. The integration of external elements, militiamen and foreign
fighters has also been well conducted. The Syrian
Army knows how to incorporate them and has sometimes accepted foreign officers taking charge of the
conduct of operations. Gradually what has emerged
is a government hybrid force, made up of a regular
Army that can appropriate unconventional methods
to fight an irregular enemy. These factors maintain
the hope of a final victory for the regime, as they
enable it to fight simultaneously on several fronts.
This has been the case since May-June 2013, a first
since the beginning of the conflict.
The regime has shown adaptability, particularly in its
employment of armor in urban areas. Armor is not
considered well suited to cities as it is allegedly vulnerable to antitank teams taking advantage of building
fronts and the infinite avenues of approach offered
by urban architecture. These weak points, however,
were turned into strengths. The tank remains the
only vehicle capable of moving over ground it has
made unusable for other vehicles, making it the only
vehicle able to control terrain. Syrian tanks operate
by “masking” mobility corridors, i.e. firing heavily and
brutally against building fronts and attached rooms.
The internal blast is particularly devastating and
expels the occupants as it is channeled through the
maze of rooms, corridors and staircases. The exterior blast releases a cloud of debris that may diso-
rient people escaping along the building front. This
effect is heightened by the narrow streets of Syrian
cities that for the most part are very old. This principle
is also being implemented by the BMP-2 IFVs with
their 30-mm guns during movement phases. Tanks
roll in a very tight disposition, “armor against armor”,
to ensure individual and collective self-protection
(the tortoise principle) of the column of armor and
dismounted infantry. It also allows an optimized response by cross-checking the areas covered by active
and passive systems used for positioning and assessing the threat. The area of action is methodically
identified to deny firing corridors (redoubts, recesses).
Each tank then fires in the priority areas of the firing
corridor it has been assigned, then moves on to
another corridor at the same time as other tanks.
The “Achilles heel” of Soviet and then Russian-designed tanks is the circular ammunition feeding system located in the turret well. Contingency armor
was therefore added to tanks (Kontakt tiles, bags of
sand, garden bricks, steel rebars). In Syria, all hit or
damaged tanks are towed away for immediate repair
or to ensure they do not fall into rebel hands. Rehabilitation is facilitated by the ruggedness of equipment.
Syrian tanks also faced IEDs, although these do not
represent the main threat in urban areas. Field Artillery Simulation Systems (FASS) can deal with this
rebel course of action. Counter-IED is a skill mainly
entrusted to dismounted infantry and engineers who
focus on drainage networks under avenues, streets
and alleys.100 These methods have allowed the Syrian
Army to regain control over urban areas from the
rebellion. The latter has therefore had to be capable
of tactical discipline and innovation in order to prevail.
From summer 2012 until the end of 2013, the
Syrian regime went from defending a few strategic
locations, to avoid dispersing limited forces, to largerscale offensives to cut off rebel centers from their
surroundings and their logistical supply routes. This
was the major campaign of besieging insurgent cities,
enabled by the growing role of elements external to
the Syrian Army in the fighting. The success of this
campaign was based on Bashar al-Assad taking risks.
He gambled on combining his main assets, i.e. elite
units from Damascus, and even from the province of
Daraa, aircraft and the elite infantry of Hezbollah, to
pull off major coups. This course of action allowed him
100
“Chars et antichars en Syrie. 5e partie : Les blindés”, Focus
hebdomadaire, EM9, BIMa/BRRI.
53
to achieve success in, among others, Homs, alQusayr and the Qalamoun Mountains. Success led
his Iranian allies and Hezbollah to provide increased
support. On the other hand, insurgents were more
divided than ever and blamed each other for their
failures.101 Assad, however, did not seem to have
enough assets to achieve final victory. To fill the gap,
he used illegal means such as chemical attacks,
barrel-bombs, and organized famine. Urban centers
were not always entirely under his control; Kurdish
areas, a large part of the eastern desert, the southern region between Damascus and Daraa as well
as cities such as al-Raqqah and the northern border
area were abandoned for the time being. The regime
was then busy maintaining its presence in Aleppo
and regaining or maintaining control primarily over
Damascus, then Homs and Idlib.
Death toll of victims of the conflict
From the beginning of the conflict in March 2011 until
June 2014, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
(SOHR) recorded 160,000 people killed. Among them,
40,000 were rebels. On the Syrian regime’s side and
the militia fighters supporting it, the SOHR recorded
58,000 deaths. There were 364 killed among Hezbollah’s Lebanese fighters and 605 among other foreign
Shiite fighters. 18,000 people also went missing after
being arrested by the security forces. 8,000 others
were in the hands of the rebel forces or had been
kidnapped.102 The remaining 50,000 victims were
civilians.
On the military side, the Syrian Arab Army is no longer
a single entity. From all the former units, there remain
only two or three task forces resembling mechanized
brigades according to their composition, mobility and
firepower.103 The core is made up of former elite
units. Syrian forces therefore mix with the militiamen
of the National Defense Force and Iranian, Iraqi and
Hezbollah fighters, forming a hybrid force. The Syrian
Air Force, meanwhile, has not lost a lot of fighter bombers (15 MiG-21, Su-22, MiG-23BN and Su-24 as of
101
102
103
2013)”, art. cit.
“Syrie : 150 000 morts en près de trois ans”, Lefigaro.fr with
Reuters, 1 April, 2014.
Stéphane Mantoux, “La guerre civile syrienne : interview de
Tom Cooper”, 10 December, 2013. Quoted in http://lautrecotedelacolline.blogspot.fr/2013/12/la-guerre-civilesyrienne-interview-de.html
54
December 2013), although on the other hand it
has lost more than half of its Mi-8/17 helicopters.
The Air Force Academy had to be closed down. The
regime also lost much of its armored or mechanized
units (equipment wear and defection) and suffers
from fuel shortages.104 Syria’s military is therefore
nearly exhausted and its survival is due to its allies.
IV.4.2 Assessment of the geographical
evolution of the conflict
In March 2011, the conflict began in Daraa, in
southern Syria, a province relatively neglected by the
regime. It then spread rapidly to other urban centers,
and later to Syria’s two major cities, Aleppo and
Damascus. Due to the stalemate situation in the
current conflict, the dynamics in Syria’s various
provinces have differed. Syria is not entirely a war
zone, although most regions have been subjected
to violence.
Each front has its own characteristics and, as time
goes on, has gone through changes. Northern Syria
was quickly held by insurgents. The regime preferred
to concentrate its forces on the Damascus-HomsAleppo axis, and then in the south. Besides ISIL, the
opposition is dominated by multiple armed groups
from the conservative lower classes, who fight
amongst themselves to obtain often sporadic Turkish, Saudi and Qatari support. Islamist groups have
gradually prevailed in northern Syria, predominantly
financed by Gulf donors and private Islamist networks, or even al-Qaeda. As an example, jihadis led
the operation to take al-Raqqah. Fighting then took
place between secular, Islamist and jihadist groups.
Northern Syria is mainly held by insurgents, but the
area remains fragile and is not secure. The rebels
also continued to push toward Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia. Northeastern Syria is held by the Kurds, who do
not trust Islamists or Arab nationalists and clashes
between them have reportedly taken place. Turkey
plays a major role in northern Syria, allowing rear
bases to be set up by the insurgents and weapons
and fighters to get through. Overall, the northern
front is a lawless area occupied by competing armed
groups, with criminal and radical tendencies. Rebel
military victories are therefore far and few between.
104
Ibid.
In eastern Syria, the regime lacks social support and
a military bedrock, as it does in the north. It is also an
area influenced by Iraq, with deep-set tribal structures
and places of jihadi culture. This isolated area offers
freedom of movement to the Iraqi groups that are
establishing increasing continuity with western Iraq.
This desert area is still largely not taken into account.
The dynamics in southern Syria are different yet
again. The birthplace of the insurgency, it is a rural,
but densely populated area that is home to one of the
toughest fronts in the country. Given its proximity to
Israel, many of the regime’s military bases are located in this area, with strong ties to Damascus. The
opposition has shown great resilience, conducting
sophisticated and coordinated operations. Jabhat
al-Nusra is quite influential in this area and has
demonstrated a genuine ability to work with civilian
governance structures. Saudi Arabia is very influential in countering the Turkish presence in northern
Syria. The regime is gradually gaining the upper hand
in the region, especially following the capture of Khirbet Ghazaleh in May 2013. Strikes so far have been
primarily conducted to limit the advance towards
Damascus, while the end of 2013 saw an increase in
the amount of shelling and air raids on cities which
likely set up rebel supply lines.
Damascus, the capital, crystallizes an existential
struggle for both sides. The city has seen continuous
shelling and fighting since the beginning of the conflict.
After rebel advances in supposedly impenetrable
areas in July 2012, the regime stepped up its efforts.
In early 2013, the regime set conditions for future
operations in the city by seizing key terrain to open its
own supply lines and isolate rebel support zones
(sieges, blockades). The rebels repelled many offensive operations during summer 2013 and conducted
counteroffensives for re-establishing supply lines in
eastern Ghouta: the al-Furqan counteroffensive led
by a coalition of rebel brigades and the Jabhat Fatah
al-Asima coalition at Jawbar. On 20 August, 2013,
the regime launched its biggest offensive in Damascus with Operation Capital Shield. The chemical attack
on 21 August was part of the preparation for the operation. Artillery bombardments took place before
ground troops moved in. The operation continued
into September and October, with a campaign using
improvised barrel-bombs that had replaced chemical
weapons. The rebels were able to reorganize (“the
Front to Conquer the Capital” around the FSA) and
retain most of their areas.
In central Syria, the opposition was able to take of the
porous Lebanese border for some time (with the support of the Sunnis from northern Lebanon), until
there was heavy commitment of the Lebanese Hezbollah, allowing the regime to retake the Qalamoun
area and al-Qusayr. The regime also occupies Mt
Qasioun where a large complex of military bases is
located (Mazzeh 86, Masakin, Haras, Hay al-Wurud
and Ish al-Warwar) at the center of an Alawi neighborhood. Although there remain some pockets of resistance in Homs, the regime has gradually regained
control over central Syria.
Even before the fall of al-Qusayr, the regime, with the
support of Hezbollah and grassroots and Iraqi militia
fighters, sent troops to Aleppo as part of Operation
“Northern Storm” which began on 9 June, 2013. This
marked the transition from defense to offense, mainly
in the western part of the city, with the storming
of rebel areas. Military logic would have called for a
sustained effort in central Syria, towards Homs. By
attacking Aleppo in June 2013, the regime apparently
wanted to capitalize on the momentum of al-Qusayr
and exploit rebel weaknesses following their defeat.
Another alternative assumption is that the rebel progress on Menagh airbase, close to Aleppo, as well as
their progress in the city and in Idlib, called for swift
action on Assad’s part.105 This operation was a failure
and the rebels remained entrenched not only in eastern and southeastern Aleppo, but also in the western
part of the city. At the same time, the regime stepped
up its efforts in the Khaldiyeh district in Homs, which
had been disputed since March 2013. Troops who
had pulled out of Aleppo and northern Syria arrived
as reinforcements at the end of June. The rebels
were mainly entrenched in the city center (the Old City,
Khaldiyeh, al-Qusour, Hamadiyeh, etc.) and were
shelled continuously. The largest part of the city was
held by the regime, with the areas held corresponding mainly to Alawite-populated neighborhoods.106
At the end of 2013, the regime took the city of
as-Safira, located southeast of Aleppo, which was
essential for securing the Hama-Aleppo supply route.
The regime used 25 T-72 tanks, armored attack
vehicles, and support helicopters. Rebel coordination,
on the other hand, was weak. The regime then continued its offensives towards Aleppo, Base 80 and the
105
106
Isabel Nassief, “The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo”, Middle
East Security Report, 17, ISW, January 2014, p. 21.
Ibid, p. 25.
55
road between as-Safira and Nayrab military base. The
offensive was primarily designed to isolate rebel-held
areas, secure supply lines and air and military bases.
A barrel-bombing campaign (explosives and shrapnel
mostly delivered by Mi-8 and Mi-7 helicopters) targeting Aleppo began in mid-December 2013, in order to
clear the civilian population from the city. Soon afterwards, the regime took complete control over the
Naqqarin, Zarsour, Taaneh and Subeihieh areas.107
Now capable of simultaneously fighting on several
fronts, at the beginning of 2014, the regime continued its efforts in the area of the Qalamoun Moun-
107
Ibid, p. 35.
56
tains, south of Homs. Capturing Yabroud marked
the success of this campaign, thanks to the heavy
commitment of the Lebanese Hezbollah. The battle
for Homs was finally won by Assad in May 2014.
The regime’s progress, however, has some limitations: it remains dependent on Hezbollah in many
areas, raising the issue of which objectives to pursue,
as Hezbollah is in a position to impose its views on
the regime based on its own interests. Moreover,
the regime has proved unable to retake Aleppo and
northern Syria largely remains in rebel hands.
CHAPTER V
THE “SECOND REVOLUTION”:
THE SURGE OF JIHADIST GROUPS
AND THE FRACTURE
OF THE REBELLION
A
lready plagued by multiple divisions, the
Syrian rebellion has gradually had to face the
rise of jihadist groups. They are, for the most
part, better armed and better trained,
having spotted the opportunity during the Syrian
conflict to make a lasting mark in the Middle East.
From 2013, the FSA, which had no more than
15,000 troops in 2014, was supplanted by Islamist
groups, now the largest and most active part of
the rebellion. They include, at the forefront, Ahrar alSham (20,000 fighters), the al-Tawhid Brigade
(12,000 fighters), and Jaysh al-Islam (15,000 fighters). They face competition from fast-expanding jihadist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The future of the
rebel groups in Syria, however, is far from certain
because they enjoy very little popular support.
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “On the Front Lines of Syria’s Civil
War”, The Wall Street Journal, 30 August, 2013.
V.1 AN EMERGING JIHADIST
REBELLION
V.1.1 The increased number of jihadist
groups in Syria
Ahrar al-Sham near Damascus in 2013
The first jihadist groups appeared on the TurkishSyrian border right at the beginning of the uprising in
March 2011. Their number then increased rapidly.
Indeed, several factors combine to these groups’
57
Chapter V – The “second revolution”: the surge of jihadist groups and the fracture of the rebellion
benefit. Historically, the regime has lent support to
terrorism (Syria has been on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1979), primarily providing
them with strong logistical networks, operational
experience, and a detailed inside knowledge of Syria’s
security and intelligence agencies. The Assad regime
has mainly supported Palestinian movements such
as al-Saiqa (1966), the Islamic Jihad Organization
(IJO), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Hamas,
mainly to put pressure on Israel. Ties were also maintained with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to put
pressure on Turkey and Iraq.
More recently, the Syrian regime provided support to
foreign fighters in Iraq during the 2003 Iraqi insurgency. In the same vein, in February 2012, the
regime released Abu Musab al-Suri, an important
jihadist ideologue and a top al-Qaeda operative. As the
alleged mastermind of the 2005 London Bombings,
he had been in Syrian custody. Dozens of other known
militants were also released.108 These groups then
had a large stock of weapons received from the
Syrian Army in the previous decades. In February
2012, al-Zawahiri, the current al-Qaeda leader, called
upon “every Muslim and every honorable and free
person in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to go to
Syria”.
Assad’s strategy then became clearer : fostering
the emergence of jihadist groups within the rebellion
to divide it while also deterring the Western powers
from intervening in Syria. Doing so has also galvanized
Assad’s support base. The Christian and Alawi
communities massively rallied to the regime against
the jihadist threat. Finally, this was also intended to
discourage the Sunni middle and upper classes from
joining the rebellion.
Most rebels are practicing Sunni Muslims, who tend
to be more conservative to the north of the country.
Many are fighting for the Syrian nation as revolutionaries and could be classified as “religious-nationalists”.109 Although they are inspired by Islam, they are
also fighting for Syria. They make up the bulk of the
FSA battalions. They are different from the Salafists
and jihadists. Islamism covers a wide spectrum, deno108
109
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria”, Middle East Security Report,
6, Institute for the Study of War, September 2012, p. 15.
Ibid, p. 19.
58
ting the political manifestation of Islam, as this should
drive politics and serve as the foundation of society.
Islamists generally believe that modern democratic
institutions are compatible with Islam. As an example,
the FSA promotes a secular and democratic agenda,
but many of its battalions are Islamist, such as
Suqour al-Sham in Jebel al-Zawiyah, in northern Syria,
or the Umma Brigade.
Salafism is a Sunni school of jurisprudence which
refers to the Salaf, the earliest Muslim community in
history. Shiites and Alawites are considered enemy
sects which must be fought. According to Salafism,
the Sunnah, which includes the Quran and the
Hadiths (the collected teachings and practices of the
Prophet) provides sufficient guidance for establishing
governance and a social framework. The Salafists
reject democracy and the concept of statehood and
seek to establish an Islamic caliphate that would
encompass the entire Umma, or Muslim community.
The “Arab Springs” led some Salafists to consider
taking part in free elections in Tunisia and Egypt,
creating an internal division between the SalafiIslahi (reformists) and Salafi-Jihadi, who refuse voter
participation and are now a minority. They are the
ones using violent means in Syria and elsewhere.
V.1.2 The jihadist groups in the Syrian
civil war
Until April 2013, the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolution and Opposition Forces, along with the
FSA, were trying to form alliances with the jihadists
in the fight shared against Assad. At that point,
violent fighting between jihadists and Kurds broke
out, including in Ras al-Ayn, near the Turkish border,
and around the oil fields in the Hasakah province. The
fact that the FSA then relied on a number of units
with conservative Islamic tendencies did not aid in
the conduct of a clear and unified strategy towards
jihadist groups; in fact it counted as another factor
favoring their growing influence.
In summer 2013, the number of jihadist fighters in
Syria was estimated at 6,000. By May 2014, there
could have been as many as 10,000. Most were
trained in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Jihadist
groups quickly managed to form alliances and coalitions to increase their influence. Led by Hassan
Aboud, Ahrar al-Sham (“The Free Men of the Levant”)
was established by prisoners who had been released
by the regime. Ahrar al-Sham allegedly counted
between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters in 2014.
This movement has proved highly effective in the
provinces of Idlib, Hama, al-Raqqah and Aleppo and
forms the main component of the Syrian Islamic
Front (SIF). Created in December 2012, the SIF is
made up of around ten Salafist brigades, demonstrating how jihadist and Islamist groups are willing and
able to get organized. The case of Ahrar ash-Sham
demonstrated that it is possible to be a member of
the SIF and cooperate with the FSA.110
More violent and more conservative, the al-Qaedaaffiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (“the Front of Victory”) is
the most powerful jihadist group in eastern and
northwestern Syria. Counting between 5,000 and
8,000 fighters, it receives weaponry from the Gulf
countries. Jabhat al-Nusra first appeared in January
2012. It stands out from other jihadist groups in that
it efficiently runs the areas it controls. Boasting a
humanitarian branch, Qasim al-Ighata, it strives to
provide aid to the population. As such, it is one of the
few jihadist groups to enjoy some popularity, although
this has been undermined by its coercive enforcement of Sharia law.
Abu Mohammed al-Golani’s movement achieved a
significant milestone on 9 May, 2012 when it launched a bomb attack against military intelligence
buildings in Damascus, killing 55 people. Jabhat
al-Nusra does not resort to suicide bombings but
instead uses car bombs in urban centers. Some
aspects of its combat tactics are directly inherited
from the regime’s Mukhabarat, a legacy of its past
allegiances.111 Al-Qaeda, whose direct involvement
in Syria has often been exaggerated, also relies on
a network of smaller units including elements of
al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah
al-Islam and the Jordanian groups, providing them
with operational support, trainers and bomb makers.
ISIL in the area of Azaz
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) first
appeared in January 2013. Following an attempt to
merge with Jabhat al-Nusra, an offer which was
refused in April 2013, ISIL asserted its rights, seizing
control of the capital of al-Raqqah province, where it
began to establish a state within a state. Abundant
funds allow it to provide transportation, public and
social services, as well as the production and distribution of bread.112 ISIL then garnered support from
tribes that had not been known for religious extremism, such as the Afadila tribe, who had been longstanding supporters of the regime.113
ISIL was able to count on support from the Muhajirin
wa-Ansar forces, mainly made up of Chechens and
North-Caucasians, from May 2013. This support
played a part in ISIL taking control of Minnagh military
airport in August 2013 and defeating the 66 th Brigade in Hama Province in September 2013. In June
2014, ISIL controlled large areas in northeastern
Syria and remains known for its violence. It lacks the
population’s support, especially given that it demands
payment of a protection tax in the areas under its
control. ISIL counts 10,000 mostly foreign fighters,
who are often seasoned veterans of Iraq and Syria
and seem to enjoy a certain protection from Bashar
al-Assad. This is especially the case in al-Raqqah,
enabling Bashar al-Assad to heighten tensions within
the rebellion and fuel the jihadist threat, as this fits
his agenda.114 Besides, the increased number of
Western hostages taken by ISIL has led to indepen112
110
111
Barah Mikaïl, “Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie : une réalité
aux déterminants multiples”, Moyen-Orient, Numéro spécial
Djihad. Du Coran à la guerre en Syrie, October-December
2013, n°20, p. 36.
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria”, art. cit., p. 33.
113
114
Stéphane Mantoux, “Bas les masques. Ce qui se joue derrière
le combat contre l’EIIL en Syrie”, Histricoblog.fr, accessed
7 January, 2014.
Ibid.
Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Baghdadi, l’émir djihadiste dont la tête
est mise à prix”, Rue89.fr, “Les Blogs”, accessed on 23 April,
2014.
59
dent observers deserting combat zones, thereby
leaving Assad in sole charge of information. As such,
ISIL benefits from many factors favoring its rise and
that have quickly resulted in clashes with other rebel
groups.
ISIL’s breakthrough came in June 2014, as it became
“the Islamic State” in Iraq, showing the fighting
power of the movement. Early in July 2014, its leader,
al-Baghdadi, proclaimed himself Caliph, or leader of all
Muslims, controlling vast territories in northeastern
Syria and northern Iraq, including Mosul.
The other main jihadist groups are Liwa al-Haqq,
engaged in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Homs
and a member of the SIF, and Liwa al-Islam, engaged
in the Damascus area, which has ties to Jabhat alNusra and is also a member of the SIF.
Finally, groups that are members of the Syrian Islamic
Front (SIF) are distinct from the groups that are
members of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front
(SILF): supporters of a more moderate Islam who
maintain stronger ties to the FSA and the Muslim
Brotherhood. These groups include the al-Farouq
Brigades (15,000 fighters), which operated in Baba
Amr and Homs in 2012; the al-Tawhid Brigade
(12,000 fighters), which set itself apart during
the battles of Aleppo in August 2012 and al-Qusayr
in June 2013; Suqour al-Sham (6,000 fighters),
committed in the regions of Aleppo and Idlib; Liwa
al-Umma (6,000 fighters), controlled by the FSA
and mostly made up of Libyans; and the al-Fatah
Brigade.115
V.1.3 An unprecedented influx of foreign
fighters
The importance of the part played by foreign fighters
in the Syrian conflict is unprecedented. Different
categories should be listed. Many are young revolutionaries from the region looking to extend the “Arab
Estimated number of rebel foreign fighters (end of 2013)
France
700
Saudi Arabia
600 to 1,000 Morocco
United
Kingdom
200 to 300
Lebanon
65 to 890
Belgium
100 to 300
Libya
Denmark
65
Egypt
Germany
200
Spain
51
Tunisia
Turkey
77 to 91
Kosovo
4 to 150
Afghanistan
12 to 23
Albania
9 to 140
336 to 556
Qatar
15
Finland
4 to 20
120 to 360
Oman
1
Canada
9 to 100
800 to 1,000 Kuwait
63 to 500
Bosnia
60
Pakistan
7 to 330
Austria
57
Algeria
70 to 120
Netherlands
50 to 100
Italy
45 to 50
Sweden
30 to 40
Norway
Jordan
30 to 40
2,000
Bahrain
United Arab
Emirates
54 to 71
12
Ireland
Australia
11 to 26
23 to 205
14
United States 17 to 60
Israel
15 to 20
Russia
40 to 600
74 to 114
Iran
3
Macedonia
3 to 20
Yemen
15 to 110
Mauritania
2
Kazakhstan
14 to 150
Iraq
60 to 250
Luxembourg
1
China
6 to 100
Palestinian
Territories
Somalia
Sudan
6 to 68
2 to 100
Bulgaria
Switzerland
1
1 to 8
Kyrgyzstan
Serbia
9 to 30
3
Source: Stéphane Mantoux, “ Et combattez-les jusqu’à ce qu’il ne subsiste plus d’association,
et que la religion soit entièrement à Allah ’. Un portrait des combattants étrangers de l’insurrection en Syrie”,
Historicoblog.fr, 19 December, 2013
60
115
Barah Mikaïl, “Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie”, art. cit., p. 36.
Spring” to their Syrian neighbors; others are fighting
for Islam, considering it their religious duty to protect
their Muslim brothers in Syria, but not seeking to
destroy Syrian society. This is the case of the Umma
Brigade, led by the Libyan-Irish fighter Mahdi alHarati, a supporter of the democratic process.116
Finally, many foreigners are Salafi-jihadists, grouped
under ISIL (composed of 70 % of foreigners), the
Abdullah Azzam Brigades and other Jordanian
groups. While most fighters are from Libya, Tunisia,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 17 % of the jihadists in
Syria in the summer of 2013 came from outside the
Arab world. It is rare to see groups where Syrians
fight alongside foreigners, since Syrians are generally reluctant to see foreigners interfere in their
revolution and often consider them to be spies.
When they are associated, it means that there was
no other choice.
Apart from the veterans of Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Chechnya, Yemen and Libya, most foreign fighters
have little combat experience and first go through
training camps. They hold relatively junior positions.
Of note, Ansar al-Sharia has set up training camps in
Libya. These fighters have helped strengthen the
most radical factions of the insurgency, but have also
revitalized the radical communities in their country
of origin. The fact that they are likely to return home
is of major concern to several governments. Access
to Syria is facilitated by certain states lending their
support to the Syrian rebellion; they are thus reluctant to regulate the flow of fighters. On the other
hand, the rebels control most of the Turkish-Syrian
border and can easily help foreign volunteers pass
through, with Turkey’s complicity. This goes some
way to explain the fact that the number of European
volunteers tripled between June 2013 and January
2014.117
116
117
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria”, art. cit., p. 24.
Stéphane Mantoux, “Et combattez-les jusqu’à ce qu’il ne subsiste plus d’association, et que la religion soit entièrement à
Allah’. Un portrait des combattants étrangers de l’insurrection en Syrie”, Historicoblog.fr, accessed 19 December, 2013.
V.2 THE SYRIAN
INSURGENCY AGAINST
JIHADIST GROUPS:
COMBAT OPERATIONS
AND COALITIONS
Although certain alliances exist between the rebels
fighting for a democratic transition, the Islamists and
the jihadists, tensions run very high between the different movements and a lot of fighting has already
taken place. As early as summer 2013, after breaking with Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL encroached upon
other movements’ territories in northeastern Syria.
In September 2013, it took control of the border post
of Azaz and the number of skirmishes rose. The
Syrian Islamic Front, which includes seven of the
major armed groups such as Ahrar al-Sham, the alTawhid Brigade (very involved in Aleppo) and Jaysh alIslam (very engaged in Damascus and openly
opposed to ISIL), rapidly clashed head-on with ISIL.
Clashes also took place between ISIL and Jabhat alNusra. Fighting with Ahrar al-Sham was especially
deadly in the town of Maksana, east of Aleppo.118
Since January 2014, the fight against ISIL has mainly
been led by the Syria Revolutionaries Front (SRF)
and the Army of Mujahedeen. The SRF was created
on 9 December, 2013, by merging 14 mostly local
groups and former powerful entities such as the
Farouq Battalions. It claims to have 10 to 15,000
fighters, partly issued from the Military Council of
Idlib. The Army of Mujahedeen, created early in
January 2014, includes eight armed groups, i.e. 6 to
8,000 fighters. This movement was explicitly formed
to prevent ISIL from taking over northern Syria. It
declared war on ISIL from its inception, rapidly
gaining support from the Syrian Islamic Front. On
13 January, 2013, after ten days of fighting, ISIL
had lost many strongholds in the provinces of Aleppo
and Idlib but still held onto the province of al-Raqqah.
ISIL retook the villages of Haritan and Basraton,
among others. The death toll was said to stand at
700 people, mainly due to suicide and ISIL-conducted
attacks.119
118
119
Stéphane Mantoux, “Bas les masques”, art. cit.
Ibid.
61
For its part, Jabhat al-Nusra condemned ISIL choices
prior to the fighting. Nonetheless, its attitude towards
ISIL can vary depending on its local components and
between becoming involved in the fighting (al-Raqqah)
and providing tacit support to ISIL (Aleppo). The situation has not quite reached a “second revolution” in
which rebels are consistently united against ISIL. ISIL
still controls many strongholds and is far from defeated. However, the movement was weakened by the
departure of the predominantly Chechen Shishani
group, following combat operations. Finally, it should
be noted that the renewed fighting between late
2013 and early 2014 was linked to the Geneva II
Conference on Syria, held on 21 January, 2014. In
fact, the Syrian opposition wanted to prevent the
regime from using the jihadist threat in the country
as an argument.
The various alliances and oppositions are therefore
not clearly defined. The FSA command in Turkey is
trying to distance itself from Salafi groups, but
alliances are being formed on the ground, particularly
in northern Syria. Indeed, FSA-affiliated groups are
looking to benefit from these groups which are often
better equipped and better trained, as well as being
effective and keeping a low profile. For instance,
FSA groups became allies with Ahrar al-Sham and
sometimes Jabhat al-Nusra, which attempts to
appear as moderate. The FSA refuses, however,
to join the Mujahedeen in Syria, a group of Salafijihadists. Alliances between Salafist groups are also
forged. For example, the Muhajirin wa-Ansar group
led a combined operation with ISIL, al-Nusra and
Ahrar al-Sham against the YPG Kurdish militias.
First and foremost, this division in the Syrian rebellion
serves Assad’s strategy, as the jihadist threat fuels
his propaganda and weakens the opposition. Nonetheless, these jihadist groups have become powerful
and remain well established in Syria. As such, they
are a major enemy for the regime unless, as some
analysts claim, Assad has reached a lasting agreement with these groups over the partition of Syria.
V.3 OUTLOOK: WHAT IS THE
FUTURE FOR JIHADISTS
IN SYRIA?
Syria does not have a jihadist tradition. Memories
of the violent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood
in 1982 are still raw, and the population appears
unwilling to support an Islamicization of society. Even
if they secure victory against the Assad regime,
Islamist and Salafist groups will struggle to build up
solid grassroots support. The establishment of an
Islamic Caliphate must simply be ruled out. Should
the regime hold onto power, which now looks likely,
the future of these groups will be difficult: they are
likely to experience violent repression.
However, with the jihadists scattered throughout
the so-called “liberated” zones, they will prove very
difficult to eradicate. During these years of war,
these groups have brought Salafist and jihadist
radicalism into stark relief in Syria. Whatever the outcome, society will bear the scars. This is an issue
raised, for example, by areas destroyed by fighting,
especially the city of Homs. With resettlement could
come religious radicalization, building on the anger
and frustration of the population.120
Syria’s “talibanization” seems unlikely, but an increased communitarization, with informal social and
sectarian lines, is a realistic assumption for the
future of the country.121 In any case, Syria will have
to address an economy in tatters that is already
marked by an industry left weakened by war, poverty
affecting half of the population, as well as an unprecedented structural unemployment.
120
62
121
Barah Mikaïl, “Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie : une réalité
aux déterminants multiples”, Revue Moyen-Orient, Djihad.
Du Coran à la guerre en Syrie, October-December 2013,
Number 20, p. 39.
Mikaïl Barah, “Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie”, art. cit., p. 39.
CONCLUSION
S
ince its beginning in 2011, the Syrian civil war
has killed 150,000 people in three years. It is
primarily a humanitarian disaster, although it
also shows how complex it is, for a government, to carry out a strategy of counterinsurgency
on its own territory. The Syrian conflict is also an
opportunity to once again observe the frail geopolitical
balance in the Near and Middle East regions
In 2011, the Syrian regime was close to defeat.
Since then, it has been able to remain in power by
using all available means and demonstrating how
it can adapt to an extreme situation for which it
was unprepared. After his victory in Homs, Bashar
al-Assad even seemed ready to take over most of
Syria again. His willingness to hold presidential elections in June 2014 pointed to a return to normality,
as did the general amnesty on 9 June 2014, which,
as it applied to those prosecuted for terrorism,
was the broadest since the conflict began. However,
neither this false leniency nor his worthless landslide
victory at the polls should mean that the huge challenges still facing the Syrian dictatorship can be
overlooked.
Indeed, at the time of writing in summer 2014,
Aleppo, Syria’s business capital, is still resisting and
northeastern Syria is in the hands of powerful rebel
groups. The most dominant of these are the Islamist
and jihadist groups, such as “the Islamic State” led
by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which also controls part of
northern Iraq. Sunni jihadism is taking hold in Syria,
recalling how al-Qaeda was established in Iraq in
the wake of the 2003 American intervention. War
unleashes fanaticism; it exploits the misery and
injustice experienced by victims of conflicts. This is
where the essence and the rationale of doctrine lie:
preventing and responding to conflicts as effectively
as possible. By doing so, we defend and advocate
an approach to people and peace.
63
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67
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Tactical Evolutions in Syria 2011-2014

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