Pakistan Earthquake 2005

Transcription

The Case of Centralized Recovery Planning
and Decentralized Implementation
Country Case Study Series
Disaster Recovery Framework Guide
May 2014
Introduction to the Recovery Framework
Case Study Series
The World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is working with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the European Union (EU)
to develop a Disaster Recovery Framework (DRF) Guide that will help governments and
partners in planning for resilient post disaster recovery while contributing to longer
term sustainable development. The guide is based on global good practices gleaned
from country experiences in disaster recovery. Hence, the development of the DRF Guide
entailed the development of country-level case studies as well as thematic case studies
on disaster recovery.
These case studies have been designed to collect and analyze information on: i)
disaster recovery standards and principles adapted by countries for specific disasters;
ii) means adopted by countries for planning recovery including efforts, considerations
and provisions (if any) for making such recovery efficient, equitable and resilient; iii)
policies, institutions and capacities put in place by countries to implement and monitor
disaster recovery; and iv) ways and means adopted by countries to translate the gains of
resilient recovery into longer-term risk reduction and resilient development.
Importantly, these case studies aim to learn from, and not evaluate, country reconstruction initiatives. Practices learned from each country’s experience will inform the contents of
the DRF Guide. Additionally, the case studies examine the planning processes and not the
implementation details of recovery experiences. As such, they do not seek to offer a comprehensive account of the post-disaster recovery program as it unfolded, but rather provide
details and insight into the decision-making processes for reconstruction policies and programs.
Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 i
Unless otherwise noted, photographs presented in the document have been included courtesy of ERRA and UN-HABITAT.
Abbreviations
ADB
Asian Development Bank
AJK
Azad Jammu and Kashmir
BBB
Building Back Better
BISP
Benazir Income Support Programme
CMTs
Construction Monitoring Teams
DNA
Damage and Needs Assessment
DRC
Data Resource Centers
DRR
Disaster Risk Reduction
DRU
District Reconstruction Unit
ERRA
Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency
FRC
Federal Relief Commission
GOP
Government of Pakistan
KMC
Knowledge Management Cell
KPI
Key Performance Indicators
KPK
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
MIS
Management Information System
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
NESPAK
National Engineering Services Pakistan
NDMA
National Disaster Management Authority
NWFP
North West Frontier Province (now KPK)
PDNA
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PEC
Pakistan Engineering Council
PERRA
Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency
PICU
Project Implementation Coordination Units
RME
Reporting, Monitoring, and Evaluation
SERRA
State Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency
SUPARCO
Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
TVS
Targeted Vulnerability Survey
UN
United Nations
USD
United States Dollar
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 iii
The 2005 Earthquake in Context
Located in South Asia, Pakistan is the 6th most populous country in the world. Pakistan
is divided into four provinces, a state and federally and provincially administrated territories. The country is exposed to several types of natural disasters, prominent among
which are earthquakes, floods, droughts, cyclones and landslides.
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Recurring floods formed the bulk of the natural disasters to have struck Pakistan
since the country’s formation, with the collective toll of the floods prior to the earthquake of 2005 leaving 6,700 people dead. Windstorms, though less frequent, have also
been devastating for Pakistan. As of the earthquake of 2005, the windstorm of 1965
remained the most fatal natural disaster in the country’s history, claiming about 10,000
lives.
The devastation caused by the earthquake of 2005, however, eclipsed all previous
disasters. Leaving 73,000 dead, the earthquake’s reconstruction was spread across the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, KPK) and a federally
administered state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). A total of 8 districts across the two
administrative entities bore the brunt of the earthquake.
The mountainous region made reconstruction particularly difficult. Not only was the
terrain not easily navigable for reconstruction, the approaching harsh winter created the
need for swift reconstruction. Reacting decisively to the earthquake, the government
established a new reconstruction agency, the Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to lead, coordinate and oversee reconstruction.
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This case study, based on comprehensive literature review and interviews with key
stakeholders, presents the highlights of the post-earthquake reconstruction process. It
outlines the decision-making processes in recovery planning and extracts best practices
and key lessons learned from the experience.
Contents
A Sense of Scale: Overall Reconstruction Needs at a Glance...................................1
Overall Recovery Planning Approach and Process.................................................3
Policy Framework for Recovery............................................................................4
Institutional Framework for Recovery..................................................................9
Recovery Financing and Financial Management.....................................................14
Implementation Arrangements and Recovery Management....................................16
Monitoring and Evaluation...................................................................................20
Grievance Redressal Mechanisms.........................................................................23
Coordination and Communications.......................................................................24
Role of Leadership and Effective Crisis Management..............................................27
Recommendations for Institutionalizing the Learnings of the Post-Earthquake
Reconstruction Experience in the Government System....................................29
A Snapshot of Good Practices and Lessons Learned...............................................31
On the tranquil early morning of October
8th, 2005, while most people slept, an
earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter
scale devastated Pakistan’s northern
areas of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK)
and Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa (KPK).
73,000 people died during the disaster, 128,309
people were injured, 600,000 houses were destroyed,
rendering 3.5 million people homeless. 6,000
educational institutions and 574 health facilities were
destroyed or damaged. The earthquake caused extensive
damage to roads, water and sanitation facilities, power,
and telecommunication infrastructure and other services
while civil administration in affected areas became
largely dysfunctional with the destruction of a large
proportion of government buildings.
DISASTER KEY FACTS
Azad and Jammu Kashmir; North-West Frontier Province
(now Khyber-Phuktunkhwa)
130,000 injured and 3.5 million homeless
73,000 dead
Housing; Education; Transport
US$3.5 billion
Area Most Affected
Affected Population
Number of Fatalities
Most Affected Sectors (based on needs)
Estimated Overall Damage (US$)
Estimated Overall Impact (% GDP – based on damage) 2.91% (includes Damages & losses)
RECOVERY KEY FACTS
Institution Managing the Reconstruction Process
PDNA (Y/N)
Donor Conference (Y/N)
Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA)
Work plans designed by ERRA; contracts implemented by large and small NGOS,
contractors, and pre-qualified engineering firms.
Yes
Yes
Amount Pledged (US$)
US$6.2 billion
Institution Implementing the Reconstruction Process
RECONSTRUCTION COST BY SECTOR
(In US$ million)
30
30
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41
6
47
2
Private housing
1,522
0
Source: Pakistan 2005 Earthquake Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment
A Sense of Scale: Overall Reconstruction Needs at a Glance
1. The destruction and loss caused by the earthquake
was the worst recorded in the history of Pakistan to
date. Immediately after the earthquake, the locallevel administration and provincial governments, the
military, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Commission (SUPARCO), and UN Agencies conducted
preliminary damage surveys, which became an important tool for program planning and the organization
of relief activities. The data collected from the rapid
survey helped establish a preliminary overview of
the extent of damages which later became the basis
for the more detailed Damage and Needs Assessment
(DNA).
OVERALL COSTS OF THE EARTHQUAKE
Category
1,092
Death and Injury Compensation
205
Early Recovery
301
Restoration of Livelihoods
3,503
Short-term Reconstruction
Medium & Long-term Reconstruction
450
3,053
Total
5,198
* An additional $576 million were estimated as indirect income losses.
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3. The level of destruction warranted a huge multisectoral recovery and reconstruction program, with
private housing as the single largest sector accounting for 44% of the overall reconstruction needs. This
was followed by the education sector at 13% and the
transport sector at 12%, while the health sector and
agriculture, and livestock accounted for 9% each.
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2. The Damage and Needs Assessment carried out by
the Government of Pakistan, in partnership with the
Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank was
published five weeks after the earthquake. Relief,
early recovery, and reconstruction costs were cumulatively estimated at USD 5.2 billion. An additional
USD 576 million was estimated in indirect income
losses. This was the first such government and centrally-led, systematic and participatory damage and
needs assessment in the country, with the active
involvement of the international community. This
assessment provided the Government of Pakistan
with a comprehensive estimate of needs and coherent recovery strategies for each affected sector, to
be presented at the Donors’ conference that was
soon to follow. This assessment was instrumental in
leveraging a record amount of funding pledges from
international partners, with the result that the reconstruction program stood amply funded in the first few
months after the disaster.
Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 1
A Sense of Scale: Overall Reconstruction Needs at a Glance
4. Early and credible assessment provided a fairly reliable estimate of the overall resource requirements
and envelope to reconstruction policy and financial
decision makers in the country, allowing them to initiate strategic and holistic reconstruction planning.
Such strategic perspective subsequently helps in
developing operational plans for the commensurate
deployment of the human, financial, and information
resources for the efficient and effective implementation of such large scale reconstruction programs. It
also helps in setting up credible data-based baselines
for the subsequent monitoring and evaluation of the
recovery program, at the programmatic, sector, and
project levels.
facilitated the subsequent evolution of the reconstruction program. This included initial recovery planning
activities, such as the development of detailed sector
strategies, programs and operational plans, addressing identified needs through project development,
setting up institutional frameworks to manage the
recovery process, and establishing efficient financing
mechanisms for recovery. It also informed the process of recovery implementation through consistent
physical quality control standards at the project and
intervention level, as well as governance, accountability and supervision processes for the reconstruction program, both as an integrative whole and in its
detailing at the lowest intervention level.
5. However the most important value addition of the initial disaster damage and needs assessment perhaps
lay in setting out and developing broad consensus
among various tiers of government and across key
development partners on the underlying policies and
principles. This only ensured strategic consistency in
the development of recovery strategies and estimates
across all sectors, such as a focus on livelihood regeneration and building back better; it also guided and
Setting up a Broad and Consistent Policy Framework for Recovery Planning
through the Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment
The Damage and Needs Assessment set forth guiding principles that were mutually formulated by the Government and
international development partners to ensure strategic consistency and operational harmony in subsequent recovery
planning and implementing activities. These included:
a. Rapid rebuilding of people’s livelihoods
b. Independence and self-sufficiency
c. Subsidiarity and decentralization
d. Focus on the most vulnerable and socially-disadvantaged
groups, such as children, women, and the disabled
e. Secure development gains and progress in poverty
reduction
f. Restoring capacities to manage the recovery process
g. Transparency and accountability
h. Avoid the creation of new disaster risks
i. Encourage engagement of private sector and civil society
j. Coordinated and coherent approaches to recovery
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Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA
Overall Recovery Planning Approach and Process
6. Given the urgent need to commence reconstruction and
start delivering in the wake of mounting public expectations, the Government of Pakistan adopted a simultaneous and integrated 4-pronged approach for post
disaster recovery planning, learning from international
good practices. This process entailed implementing a
succession of phased actions in the medium to long
term. It also significantly reduced planning time,
compared to routine and sequential approaches,
and ensured the inclusion of most key stakeholders
from the inception of the planning process. The chart
below provides a brief recap of the key steps of recovery planning undertaken by the government, most of
which were conducted in either parallel, or sequential but overlapping timeframes.
Figure 1: Simultaneous Four-Pronged Approach for Recovery Planning by the Government of Pakistan
Strategy and Standard Setting
for Recovery Planning
Setting Up the Institutional
Arrangements
Setting in Motion Consultative
Mechanisms
Development of an overall
strategic vision for
reconstruction with provisions
for phased and duly prioritized
implementation—while
stipulating a definitive
timeframe for completion
Quick assessment of strengths
and weakness of pre-disaster
delivery mechanisms
Quick mapping exercises to
ensure inclusion of all key
stakeholders
Assessment of governance,
implementation capacities,
and skills at various levels
of government to undertake
recovery planning and
implementation
Creation of intergovernmental
forums to deliberate pros,
cons, and risks associated with
various institutional options
Articulation of policy standards
and principles for recovery
Aligning planning objectives
with pre-disaster urban and
rural contexts, and long-term
planning horizons and the
respective sector development
goals
Inclusion of DRM
mainstreaming outcomes into
recovery planning
Strategic and comprehensive
area-wide planning while taking
cognizance of urban and rural
land use either individually or
collectively
Key Actors
Federal Government: Brought
stakeholders together and
articulated a strategic
reconstruction vision;
Facilitated strategic planning
involving all stakeholders
Sub-National Governments:
Carried out local-level planning
process; Enabled meaningful
local government, civil society
and community participation
Determination of institution
implementation model, based
on geographic delineation and
administrative and functional
jurisdictions (Result Achieved :
Hybrid institutional model with
central level planning and local
level implementation, and;
with an iterative strategy for
combining top down standardsetting and prioritization, with
bottom-up, demand based and
inclusive planning)
Creation and adjustment of
legal mandate for implementing
institutions such as ERRA &
later NDMA
Commissioning staff from
existing government
departments and augmentation
of skills and capacity through
market-based hiring
Key Actors
Federal Government: Mobilized
relevant agencies to undertake
and supervise planning;
provided funding, support, and
technical expertise
Creation of forums and
interfaces where stakeholder
dialogue can facilitate a
consensus-building process
for strategic priorities through
national, regional, and local
level workshops
Undertaking Preparatory
Exercises, Surveys and
Fieldwork
Central and Rapid Post Disaster
damages, loss and needs
assessment
Detailed damage assessment
and eligibility verification
surveys for sectors such as
housing and livelihood cash
grant programs
Hazard risk identification and
mapping
Social and environmental
impact assessments
Consultation with sub-national
government, civil society,
private sector, technical
institutions, academia,
community representatives, etc.
in order to foster partnerships
and avail specialized
capabilities
Engineering and Structural
studies on cost affordable
standards for seismic resistant
infrastructure
Establishing key cross-cutting
operating principles and
performance benchmarks for
multi-sectoral recovery
Key Actors
Key Actors
Federal and Sub-National
Governments: Facilitation
of inclusive physical and
strategic planning and program
development processes.
CSOs and other Partner
Organizations: Enable
meaningful community
participation
Geotechnical studies on the
land impacts of the earthquake
and landslide mapping and
inventories
Technical experts and
organizations such as NESPAK,
SUPARCO, Geological Survey,
International Development
Agencies, Academia and
International Scientific
Organizations: Carried out
technical investigations, data
collection, and analysis to
support planning; Developed
technical recommendations
and options; Assisted with the
formation of implementation
of plans.
Policy Framework for Recovery
7. Almost concurrently with the estimation of the aggregate damages and recovery needs arising from the
disaster through the DNA, the Government of Pakistan
developed and set up a strategic vision for the overall
reconstruction program. This included enunciating
the strategic objectives for overall reconstruction
and recovery, articulation of policy standards; stipulation of a possibly phased program and definitive
timeframe for its implementation, identification of
stakeholders and development of consensus over
strategic priorities for a multi-sectoral scope of work,
geographic delineation, and determination of administrative and functional jurisdictions.
8. Another early step taken by the GOP was the establishment of cross-cutting operating principles and performance benchmarks for multi-sectoral recovery. These
included: central policy making and coordination;
subsidiarity and local implementation, public sector
facilitation of private recovery, restoration of sustainable livelihoods, independent oversight and transparency, effective management of public expectations
and grievances, fostering public private partnerships
and availing community capabilities, ensuring and
promoting longer term disaster risk reduction and
climate change adaptation, environmental and social
safeguards, and gender-issues and protection of vulnerable groups.
9. Concurrent with ERRA’s establishment, key sectors for
reconstruction were identified and sectoral strategies
were developed that aimed at mainstreaming overall
reconstruction objectives across all sectors. Virtually
immediately after the disaster, drawing on the initial
assessments available and stakeholder consultation,
twelve sectoral recovery strategies were developed.
These included: rural/urban housing development,
water and sanitation, governance, transport, power,
communications infrastructure, environment, livelihoods, tourism, social protection, health and education. All sectoral strategies additionally aimed at
mainstreaming disaster risk reduction, promoting
environmental safeguards, poverty reduction and
gender sensitivity across all activities.
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10. The political government also took early ownership
and the President’s office was actively involved in setting basic recovery guidelines. Some of the key policy
imperatives articulated by the political leadership
included: (a) building back better, (b) converting
adversity into opportunity, and (c) pro-poor recovery.
11. Building Back Better: In consultation with sector experts
and international agencies, ERRA identified the incorporation of Disaster Risk Reduction as a primary criterion
for building back better. All reconstruction would be
seismically resilient so that future earthquakes would
have a less damaging effect. Through the same consultative process, a focus on needs-based reconstruction was identified as a second operational criterion
of building back better. Instead of status quo ante as
the target of reconstruction, community needs would
be taken as the primary driver. In practice, this meant
that if, for example, a school that had previously had
a capacity of 50 children, now needed to service 100
because of changes in the community, the school
would be rebuilt to service the new need.
12. Converting Adversity into Opportunity: As with building back better, the disaster was seen as an opportunity
to reconstruct not just to status quo ante, but with new
innovations and improvements. Based on consultations
with sectoral experts and international agencies, the
principle of ‘converting adversity into opportunity
was ventured upon to replace out of date infrastructure and service delivery systems with newer, more
economically profitable and efficacious ones. Thus,
for example, prior to the earthquake, first aid clinics, maternal and child care centers, and family planning centers were all located in disparate buildings.
Reconstruction was organized so that these centers
were collocated as existing or new Basic Health Units.
Similarly, prior to the earthquake, district government offices were distanced from each other. As part
of the reconstruction of government buildings, district government offices were placed in the same district government complex, not only making it possible
for someone to have all of his/her municipal needs
met at one place, but also improving communication
and coordination among the various sections of the
district government. In the livelihood sector, subsistence farming, a primary per-earthquake enterprise,
was replaced with cash crop farming. This proved
particularly successful through the cultivation of
commercial flowers.
13. Pro-Poor Recovery: The pro-poor recovery guiding principle was translated as reconstruction that was actively
aimed at contributing towards an equitable society and
ensuring adequate access to services, programs, and
resources, particularly land and capital for all. In this
regard, particular attention was given to prioritizing
reconstruction planning that addressed the needs
of vulnerable individuals and groups, including the
socio-economically disadvantaged: elderly, widows,
single mothers, and single- or no-parent families. In
line with this principle, reconstruction in the livelihood sector provided additional grants for those
designated as landless, virtual landless, poor, or otherwise vulnerable families. For reconstruction activities that provided benefits to affected populations
based on certain criteria, legal assistance for the vulnerable was also provided. For example, in the housing sector reconstruction, ERRA’s flagship initiative,
local partners and communities were encouraged
through social mobilization to support construction
of houses for widows. The housing sector also prioritized a focus on tenants instead of owners. The decision was also taken to categorize all the kutcha (mud)
houses as destroyed so that the full compensation /
cash grant could be provided to support households
in constructing earthquake resistant houses. ERRA
undertook special initiatives for disabled persons
providing prosthetic limbs, skills training, microcredit, and job opportunities in newly established
facilities like the Social Welfare Complexes (SWCs)
and Women Development Centers (WDCs).
14. Having identified the 12 sectors targeted for reconstruction, the ERRA’s next step was to develop principles for
cross-sectoral prioritization. The still-nascent ERRA
did not have the requisite capacity to undertake all
twelve sectoral interventions simultaneously, making prioritization and staggered programmatic work
necessary. To achieve the greatest impact as early as
possible, and to “affect the lives of people directly”
in the early phases of reconstruction, those sectors
with the greatest immediate impact on affected popu
lations were prioritized. With winter approaching,
and a large homeless population living in temporary
shelters, housing emerged as the primary sector to
receive reconstruction attention. Simultaneously,
with the local economy devastated, and no ready
means of income generation, the livelihood sector
was also seen as reconstruction sector of immediate
impact on affected populations.
15. Both the housing and livelihood sectors highlighted the
need to protect and focus on vulnerable communities
in reconstruction activities. As housing was a critical
need for the most vulnerable populations, they stood
at great risk of destitution without a revival of the livelihood sector. While housing and livelihood sectoral
reconstruction was underway, education, health, and
water were also recognized as priority sectors requiring immediate attention. Public infrastructure, tourism, and environmental protection received lower
priority and the early recovery measures—such as the
construction of short- and medium-term structures,
and the erection of pre-fab buildings—were deemed
sufficient for immediate needs.
16. A set of principles was established to determine criteria for sectoral prioritization. With implementation
devolved to State/Provincial Authorities, and further
to District Reconstruction Units, the identification
of priority sectors alone was insufficient to ensure
a cohesive and uniform recovery across the various
affected districts. There was also need to ensure that
intra-sectoral reconstruction work-plans for each
area aligned. The following key principles outlining
intra-sectoral prioritization were thus instrumental
in ensuring that, though devolved, implementation
across the nine districts was compliant to overall
reconstruction objectives.
a. Broadest Impact: Those buildings and programmatic interventions were prioritized, that had
the greatest impact on the lives of the affected
community. Thus, schools which could educate
the greatest number of students, hospitals that
could service the greatest number of people, and
bridges that connect the greatest number of people were prioritized.
b. Building Most-Accessible Structures First: Another
key criterion was accessibility. The earthquake
Cash grants revive livelihoods and help revitalize economy
With the livelihood sector virtually destroyed by the earthquake, a Livelihood Support Cash Grants Program was initiated
to meet affected populations’ immediate needs. The program benefitted over 290,000 households.
In line with the overall aims of reconstruction, the program provided a means of targeting the most vulnerable
populations. It was recognized that the neglect of vulnerable groups in the design of sectoral interventions would greatly
exacerbate their marginalization. Thus, the program targeted families of eight or more; families with an income of less
than Rs. 3000, and families with a disabled members. 27% of all families helped were women-headed.
These families were provided a monthly allowance of Rs. 3,000 for six months. After this period, the program was
extended for another 6 months for the 23,000 most vulnerable female-headed households.
Not only did these cash grants ensure that vulnerable families had a means of meeting essential life needs, it also
contributed to the revitalization of the affected region’s economy.
had struck in an area that is not easily navigable.
In the interest of rapid recovery, infrastructure
reconstruction in the most inaccessible affected
areas was de-prioritized while structures in more
accessible areas were built first.
c. Avoiding Legal Disputes: This was particularly
relevant to land disputes. Establishing land ownership after the earthquake proved a legal challenge as many land deeds had been lost in the
disaster and competing claims on lands were
commonplace. Even distinguishing between private and public land proved to be challenging.
Meanwhile, work on disputed land was scheduled once ownership had been established by the
courts. It is worthy of note that legal assistance
was provided for the protection of vulnerable
populations and gender sensitivity.
d. Maintaining a Gender Balance: For each intervention that would benefit men, an intervention was
prioritized that would benefit an equal population of women. For example, for each school servicing 500 boys, a girls’ school of equal capacity
was reconstructed.
17. Following the above-mentioned cross-sectoral prioritization, ERRA’s first task was to translate the government’s reconstruction principles into sector recovery
programs, which it did in consultation with sector
experts and international agencies. With some data
already available via the rapid assessment conducted
for relief and the PDNA conducted for the donor’s
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conference, ERRA approached reconstruction by
first transforming the guiding principles into broad
programmatic interventions. An example of a sector
strategic framework, in this case for the flagship USD
1.5 billion ‘Rural Housing Reconstruction Program,’
serves as a good illustration of how the cross-cutting
guiding principles were translated into corresponding sector recovery strategies and programs.
18. The government also set-up consultative processes
and forums for inclusive recovery planning at various tiers, such as the broad stakeholder groups on
housing sector policy and operational aspects. For
housing, three forums were successful in continuous and proactive multi-stakeholder inclusion in
the initial years of the program. Standard processes
and forums established for housing sector consultations included: (a) carrying out mapping exercises
to identify, and ensure inclusion of all key stakeholders, (b) creation of intergovernmental forums
that help develop both horizontal and vertical lines
of communications, to deliberate pros, cons, and
risks associated with various institutional options
for housing sector planning and its implementation,
and (c) creation of wider forums and interfaces where
stakeholder dialogue facilitated a consensus-building process for operational aspects in particular
through national, regional, and local level workshops
involving sub-national governments, civil society,
technical institutions and academia, private sector,
community representatives, etc. Concurrent with the
policy and strategy formulation processes described
Policy Principle
Manifested through the following corresponding strategies:
ERRA’s Housing Program Objective: Provided financial and technical assistance to affected home owners in AJK and KPK, in
reconstruction or rehabilitation of their damaged or destroyed houses.
1. Ensuring Owner-Driven Housing
Reconstruction – homeowners in charge
of rebuilding their own homes
2. Assistance and Inspection
Reconstruction & Restoration
3. Ensuring seismic safety
Providing an enabling environment to builders and homeowners, through:
■■
Prior training, information and canvassing campaigns,
■■
Rebuilding with familiar methods & easily accessible materials—ensuring
sustainability and cultural preferences in design
■■
Providing technical assistance during construction,
■■
Promoting the use of salvaged material or additional resources such as hired trained
craftsmen, etc.,
■■
Ensuring building materials supply chains,
■■
Facilitating the opening of bank accounts, etc.
■■
Mobilizing a large number of assistance and inspection (AI) teams, for house-tohouse outreach
■■
Disbursing in tranches, linked to stages of construction and adoption of seismically
acceptable standards
■■
Disbursement through Banks after progress/quality validation
■■
Resources for forming the AI teams and management structures for these resources,
to be procured through a public-private partnership arrangement
■■
Having in place a review and approval mechanism for designs, construction
guidelines and training curricula through the development of reference minimum
structural design standards that meet internationally accepted requirements for low
cost earthquake resistant housing, such as
■■
Thinner walls
−− Lighter roofing
−− Well-connected structural systems
−− Discourage katcha type (mud) construction
Construction and planning to take into account the results of seismic zoning
■■
Coordinate multiple reconstruction initiatives & standards for equity. ERRA to ensure
−−
4. Uniform assistance packages – across
all programs and funding sources
application of uniform policies across the board
Ascertain application of seismic design standards
−− Ensure full spatial coverage
−− Reduce risks of beneficiary double counting or being missed
Cash grants to target core housing – which may not be necessarily proportionate to
the replacement value of loss
−−
−−
Maximizing Outreach – through
optimized designs and implementation
mechanisms
■■
■■
Reconstructing only where necessary through damage assessment that distinguishes
against set criteria between houses needing reconstruction and those only needing
economically feasible restoration/retrofitting
■■
Replacement of a destroyed house with a new seismic resistant core unit
■■
Restoration and strengthening of damaged houses to seismically acceptable
standards
■■
Rebuilding In-situ - addressing land ownership & availability issues, minimizing
relocation costs
■■
Relocating only where necessary – i.e., where risks or hazards remain very high due
to:
−−
−−
−−
−−
Seismicity
Topography
Soil conditions
Other environmental factors
continues
Policy Principle
Manifested through the following corresponding strategies:
4. Uniform assistance packages
(Continued)
■■
Donors/philanthropists encouraged to fund rural housing and adopt entire
communities/ villages/ towns
■■
Program sustainability to be enhanced through parallel efforts on rehabilitation of
livelihoods, physical and social infrastructure linking housing to livelihoods and
infrastructure rehabilitation, etc.
■■
Addressing future needs of the affected communities (such as possible loan schemes
over and above the cash grants)
■■
Damage assessment criteria to remain consistent across all affected districts
(surveys may be done for specific trouble areas)
■■
Eligibility criteria to include land ownership criteria or in the case of tenants,
agreements/authorization from owners to rebuild the house
■■
MOUs to be signed with beneficiaries to ensure the judicious and best possible use
of the grants with penalizing clauses for those found in intentional incompliance
■■
Developing and putting in place participatory and inclusive information management
and grievance redressal systems
5. Ensuring judicious use of grants;
reducing and managing conflicts and
grievances; avoiding socio-economic
distortions, inequities and disparities
above, the Government of Pakistan also took early
and timely decisions towards setting-up the institutional arrangements for undertaking and meeting
the challenges of the reconstruction program that
lay ahead. This essentially consisted of the following
processes: (a) a quick review and clarification of the
pre-existing, multi-tiered and multi-sectoral institutional mandates; (b) developing commensurate institutional structures for managing and executing the
8
reconstruction program; (c) the creation or readjustment of legislation for the proposed modifications to
pre-disaster arrangements, and; (d) identifying and
mobilizing the requisite capacities, skills and other
resources to be commissioned to staff from multiple
levels of government, semi-government agencies,
various technical institutions, international development bodies, and the private sector.
Institutional Framework for Recovery
19. Concurrent with the policy and strategy formulation
processes described above, the Government of Pakistan
also took early decisions towards setting-up the institutional arrangements for undertaking and meeting the
challenges of the reconstruction program. This consisted of the following processes: (a) a quick review
and clarification of the pre-existing, multi-tiered and
multi-sectoral institutional mandates, (b) developing
commensurate institutional structures for managing
and executing the reconstruction program, (c) the creation or readjustment of legislation for the proposed
modifications to pre-disaster arrangements, and (d)
identifying and mobilizing the requisite capacities,
skills and other resources to be commissioned to staff
from multiple levels of government, semi-government
agencies, various technical institutions, international
development bodies, and the private sector.
ing a cross-territorial reconstruction effort, there was
high likelihood that if left to the development departments of the two governments, programs modalities
and implementation would quickly diverge in the two
areas. On 10 October, two days after the earthquake,
the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) was established
to address immediate relief needs. On 24 October,
less than three weeks after the earthquake, the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
(ERRA) was established to lead the reconstruction
phase of the post-earthquake response.
20. When the 2005 earthquake struck, Pakistan’s legislative and institutional structures were designed for
recurring medium-sized floods and focused on disaster
management and not on disaster recovery and reconstruction. The single existing law at the time, the
Calamities Act of 1958, a primarily relief-centric provision, only afforded affected populations temporary
forgiveness from land and water tax. Paralleling this,
the only organizations available to offer post-disaster
response were locally organized Emergency Relief
Cells, whose mandate was limited to the most immediate relief-needs.
22. ERRA was set up as a time-bound central authority
under the Prime Minister’s office to tackle residual
relief, early recovery, and long term reconstruction and
rehabilitation, with long term efforts forming the overwhelming bulk of its mandate. ERRA’s scope of work
included strategic planning, resource mobilization,
coordination with all stakeholders, and monitoring
reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in earthquake affected areas. ERRA was established because
of a recognized need for a central oversight body to
coordinate the activities of the broad spectrum of
actors participating in the reconstruction—ranging
from multilateral and bilateral donors, international
NGOs, civil society, and government agencies. It was
anticipated that having multiple agencies overseeing
reconstruction would likely become unmanageable.
Thus, centralizing some functions within a single,
dedicated body was seen as essential.
21. The magnitude of the earthquake galvanized the government into decisive action. It was recognized nearly
from the outset that the severity of damages and
losses required a radical response and the Earthquake
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA)
was established as an autonomous body on 24 October, 2005. The earthquake had struck two regions:
the state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now known
as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, KPK). Both territories had
their own governments, budgets and line ministries,
and consequently separate and distinct chains and
structures of command. Given the required scope of
reconstruction, and with no precedent for coordinat-
23. Impetus for the centralization also came from the scope
and pace of the reconstruction required. Without a new
agency, the option was to rely on existing line and
development departments to spearhead reconstruction. Beyond the institutional inertia that would slow
the shift from regular functioning to reconstruction,
issues of requisite scale and pace suggested the need
for a new, dedicated agency. Most line departments
had no experience at constructing at this pace or magnitude. The education ministries of AJK and KPK, for
example, were faced with responding to the destruction of 6,000 schools, a thousand-fold increase over
their existing annual construction targets. In addition to this vastly expanded scale, there was a need
for brisk reconstruction. Affected communities were
eager to have infrastructure and services restored. To
meet these community needs, the restoration of lost
services was prioritized. The relative institutional
inability of line departments and developmental
agencies to respond to such time-sensitive needs also
contributed to the need for a new agency to manage
reconstruction.
24. ERRA’s organization reflected its reconstruction priorities, and drew on the best practices recommended by
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which
were later also documented in the Post-Disaster Needs
Assessment published on November 12th, 2005. Keeping the principle of decentralization and subsidiarity
in mind, ERRA was organized to both ensure uniformity in reconstruction while devolving implementation. The government drew on the suggestions of the
PDNA, to structure ERRA to be operational at the federal level, with regional and local offices to oversee
implementation. With little precedence on constituting such a body, ERRA was represented either directly
or through its affiliates at the federal, provincial/
state and district level, the institutional apparatus
was erected to govern an expanse of over the 30,000
square kilometres and nine districts of AJK and KPK
affected by the earthquake.
10
25. The ERRA Council, the apex body at ERRA, provided strategic policy oversight and ensured sustained financing.
At the top was the ERRA Council, headed by the Prime
Minister, with the Deputy Chairman of ERRA as the
secretary. Council members include the Prime Minister of AJK, the Chief Minister of KPK, the Minister for
Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, the Finance Minister, and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. This council provided strategic directions in
matters of policy formulation and ensured adequate
funding.
26. Next in hierarchy was the ERRA Board which ensured
implementation of approved policy decisions and developed and implemented annual plans, programs, projects and schemes. The Board was headed by Chairman
ERRA with the Deputy Chairman ERRA as a member
and the secretary. Other members included the Chief
Secretary AJK, the Chief Secretary KPK, Additional
Finance Secretary Expenditure, a representative from
the Ministry of Defense, Additional Secretary Planning Division, Additional Secretary Economic Affairs
Division, and six representatives from civil society.
The stature and access to power of the members of
the ERRA Board and the ERRA Council contributed to
the organization’s credibility.
Key
Council/Board
Approval and
Reporting
Reporting and
Monitoring
ERRA
Steering Committee
Steering Committee
CS/ACS Chairs
CS/ACS Chairs
Represented:
Departments
LGs
ERRA
Represented:
Departments
LGs
ERRA
NWFP
Reconstruction Agency
AJK
District Advisory Committee
District Advisory Committee
Chaired: District Nazim, DCO
Chaired: DC
DISTRICT RECONSTRUCTION UNITS
27. This bifurcation of policy planning and approval (the
responsibility of the ERRA Council), and programmatic
planning and implementation (the responsibility of the
ERRA Board) was replicated at the lower levels. At the
provincial and state levels, the Provincial Steering
Committee was coupled with the Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
(PERRA), and the State Steering Committee was coupled with the State Earthquake Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation Authority (SERRA). Similarly, at the
district level, the District Reconstruction Advisory
Committees provided work-plan oversight to the District Reconstruction Units which designed programmatic interventions.
personnel, civil society, and international/national
consultants. ERRA could draw upon both international experience of expert consultants and sector
specific experience of the line ministries. Utilizing the
best talent from existing agencies, supplemented by
the periodic hiring of international experts, allowed
for the dynamic management of recovery. The mix of
personnel from diverse backgrounds also presents
opportunities for knowledge sharing and encouraging innovation. The army provided mass and speed,
bureaucrats provided guidance on the rules and procedures, and international/national consultants and
civil society monitored implementation and ensured
the quality of technical outputs.
28. ERRA staffing profile provided another form of ensuring widespread ownership of the organization’s mandate and policies. Instituted as a hybrid organization,
ERRA’s staff was comprised of civil servants from federal, state and provincial governments, armed forces
29. ERRA’s focus on central policy-making also contributed
to keeping the organization mission-focused. In a political environment with changing governments that
brought new priorities, ERRA was able to prevent
changes in its mission. It achieved this by fending off
Organization
Council/Board
ERRA
Terms of Reference
Major Policy Decisions
Annual Work Plan Approvals
Guidance to ERRA
Overall Coordination
Approval and Project Management of National Scale
Project
Policy Formation
Program Monitoring and Setting Standards
Financial Management of ERRA Funding
Donor Coordination
Reporting to ERRA Board and Council
Steering Committee
CS/ACS Chairs
Represented:
Departments
LGs
ERRA
NWFP
DISTRICT RECONSTRUCTION UNITS
Approval Annual Reconstruction Plans
Reporting to ERRA
Overviewing Reconstruction Agency
Approval of Big Projects (above certain threshold)
Autonomous Body
Reporting to Steering Committee and ERRA
Preparing Annual Work Program
Implementation of Large Contracts in coordination with Line Agencies
Preparing District Reconstruction Plans
Implementation Small Contract in coordination with
District Governments/District Line Level Agencies
Reporting to Province/State
Coordinating/Partnering with Partners Organizations
new political interests through invoking its institutional policy approval mechanism. When a new political entity would attempt to influence ERRA to shift
its focus—for example, regionally, or sectorally—the
organization would invoke its policy approval mechanism, a joint process managed by the ERRA board, as
the sole means of reconfiguring organizational mission.
30. ERRA was also careful to build on the institutional
groundwork laid during the relief and early recovery
periods. ERRA subsumed the staff of the relief and
early-recovery organizations, thereby gaining their
institutional knowledge, as well as the community
relationships and goodwill they had cultivated. Relief
efforts led by the Federal Relief Commission (FRC),
12
The Inclusion of Line Departments to Ensure
Sustainable Reconstruction
At first, given ERRA’s reconstruction model, line
department were excluded from reconstruction activities.
However, as reconstruction progressed, it became
increasingly clear that sustainable build back better
policies required line department support once ERRA’s
work was done.
Line Departments would have to be prepared to spend for
the extra resources to support for the additional costs.
ERRA agreed to provide for the additional resources for
three years, with the agreement that within that period
the provincial and state governments would advertise,
hire, and budget for these additional costs.
Early Development of Reconstruction Strategy Contributed to a Successful Donor Conference
The success of the Donor Conference was seen as a result of
an early and well-crafted strategy for implementation that
allayed frequent donor concerns of financial transparency
and an emphasis on sustainable reconstruction.
Of particular note were five aspects of the government’s
presentation at the Donor conference:
■■ Implementation
plan: Based on the PDNA, the government
identified the sectors that required reconstruction.
■■ Implementation arrangements: once again using the PDNA,
which suggested the establishment of federal and district
level organizations for implementation, the government
outlined its strategy for implementing reconstruction.
■■ Coordination
arrangements: Given the scale of
reconstruction required, care was taken to address how reconstruction would be sensitive to coordination requirements.
This was of particular import to donors, who typically face challenges in coordinating with governments during
reconstruction.
■■ Incorporation
of DRR in recovery: Disaster Risk Reduction was established early as one of the key guiding principles in
recovery, with the reconstruction planning presented at the Donor Conference organized around this principle.
■■ Fiduciary
safeguards: Clear and transparent mechanism for tracking funds were outlined at the conference.
built initial contact and lines of informal communication with the affected communities. As the sole
agency overseeing recovery, FRC benefitted from the
immediate and deep connections with the affected
populations built by the many small and large implementers executing relief work in affected locales. In
March of 2006, while FRC’s work was still continuing,
the government recognized the need for continuity
from across relief and reconstruction and subsumed
the organization within ERRA. FRC’s independent status was dissolved, and residual relief work delegated
to ERRA. This not only afforded ERRA the institutional
knowledge of FRC’s staff , allowing ERRA to best align
relief projects with reconstruction objectives, it also
ensured that the reconstruction agency retained the
connections with the community that were essential
for sustained and productive community feedback on
reconstruction activities.
31. Early Recovery, co-led by ERRA and UNDP, initiated virtually contemporaneously with relief work, and also in
close communication with affected populations, built
similar relationships. ERRA’s close work with the
UN on Early Recovery meant that the former’s staff
not only had the benefit of being familiar with Early
Recovery efforts, but as with relief, could ensure efficient and informed utilization of resources across the
two efforts. And, as with FRC, while Early Recovery
was still being implemented, ERRA subsumed its
work entirely to ensure the greatest possible institutional continuity.
Recovery Financing and Financial Management
32. As detailed earlier, the success of the donor conference was attributed to the comprehensive planning
and the funding channels set up immediately after
the earthquake, which instilled confidence in donors,
and encouraged international involvement. This efficacy in planning and institutionalization of systems
to manage recovery was due in large part to the
involvement and endorsement of the highest tier of
the political leadership from the early stages of the
post-disaster response.
33. Funds were in the form of USD 2.5 billion in grants
and USD 4 billion in loans. The largest bilateral
donors were Saudi Arabia ($593 million in grants
and soft loans), the U.S. ($510 million in grant and
in-kind assistance), China ($320 million in grants and
loans), Iran ($200 million credit line), and the United
Arab Emirates ($200 million in grants). Among multilateral lenders, the World Bank pledged $1 billion in
soft loans; the Asian Development Bank $1 billion in
grants and loans; and the Islamic Development Bank
$500 million in soft loans.
34. Anticipating the complexity of recovery financing, ERRA
was also established as a means of streamlining the
financial aspects of reconstruction. Fiduciary concerns
provided an additional impetus for a single institution
to manage recovery. Faced with the fungibility of monies in the financial systems of regional governments,
the reconstruction effort ran the risk of reconstruction
funds being diverted towards non-recovery efforts.
This risk was made particularly acute by the unavailability of any clear or reliable method of monitoring
financial flows within regional governments. A single
funding line was seen as a solution, and a single centralizing institution provided an apropos vehicle for
the solution. This line of funding was to be independent and more robust, with the stipulation that no
funds ear-marked for the reconstruction agency could
be reassigned to another agency.
35. At the program design level, a tri-tiered planning and
project approval structure was developed. Each tier
was bifurcated to ensure a balance between uniformity
in policy and devolution in program implementation. At
the lowest level, District Reconstruction Units were
14
empowered to design projects with an estimated cost
of up to Rs. 100 Million, and with a territorial scope
limited to that district. These designs were submitted for the approval of the District Reconstruction
Advisory Committees, which ensured compliance to
centrally set guidelines. For projects that exceeded
either that financial ceiling (but were less than Rs.
250 Million), or spanned more than one district, the
Provincial or State authorities, PERRA and SERRA,
would design work plans for the approval of their
respective Steering Committees. Projects exceeding
that amount, and up to Rs. 1,000 Million, required
approval at the highest tier, and were designed federally by ERRA and approved by the ERRA Board.
This method of bifurcating program design and policy oversight ensured that while at the programmatic
level, decisions were made as close to the ground as
possible, policy uniformity was maintained across the
many reconstruction programs being implemented.
36. The decentralization of implementation and financial decisions was also practiced as a form of ownership-building. However, feedback and advice
solicitation alone, it was recognized, could not build
the effective and widespread ownership that would
make the centralized organization’s initiatives successful. The devolution of financial responsibility was
also essential. Thus, ERRA created a tiered financial
independence system, providing individual programs
(and thereby individual implementing agencies and
affected populations communities) independence
over the choice of initiatives to implement. At the
lowest level, District Reconstruction Advisory Teams
were given authority to approve DRU-designed projects. The Provincial and State Steering Committees
were given authority to approve projects prepared by
their respective reconstruction authorities (PERRA
and SERRA). Together, control over programmatic
interventions and financial independence were instituted to build widespread ownership.
37. Centralized policy-setting and program design were
practiced alongside financial and implementation independence to balance decentralization with uniformity in
reconstruction. Although latitude in financial manage-
Recovery Financing and Financial Management
ment engendered ownership, it also introduced the
risk of project divergence: the many local implementers, and the provincial and district reconstruction
units, it was worried, would use their money to fund
interventions that provided varying benefits. This
would lead to perceptions of unequal assistance and
ill-planned reconstruction. As a means of mitigating
that risk, ERRA enforced its policy of centralized standard setting and program design. While the choice of
which programs to implement was left to decentralized bodies, the nature of the programs, the method
of prioritization, and their modalities of implementation were required to conform to centrally managed
ERRA standards.
Implementation Arrangements and Recovery Management
38. Policy and program development continued well into
the implementation process of recovery and was periodically informed by several kinds of post-PDNA surveys.
These surveys were conducted to assess the needs
of those populations prioritized under the government’s guiding principles. While the PDNA provided a
good basis for initial reconstruction needs estimates,
it needed to be complemented with more in depth
knowledge of the needs of the affected communities. Subsequently, comprehensive and consultative
assessments were conducted by ERRA for programmatic planning. Some of the guiding principles that
emerged pertained specifically to implementation
issues, as described in the adjacent table.
39. The centralization of recovery functions in ERRA however created the risk of partner disengagement. ERRA
mitigated this risk through a variety of ownership building measures that were instituted as policy in ERRA’s
organizational and implementation procedures. This
centralization of virtually all reconstruction activities
into ERRA introduced the related problem of disengagement with partners, implementers, stakeholders,
and affected communities. The collapsing of the work
and responsibilities of multiple, disparate agencies
spread across several non-governmental organizations and two governments into a single organization,
ERRA, created the acute need to disseminate ownership of ERRA’s policies.
40. At the highest levels of consultation and ownership
building, the ERRA Board included the chief ministers
of the two governments as secretaries, and all policy
decisions were made with their consultation and
approval. This multi-layered consultative process
was institutionalized to engender ownership across
the wide range of stakeholders. The requirement for
ownership-building in mind, ERRA institutionalized
several tiers of building ownership. At the local level,
village reconstruction teams encouraged ownership
among affected communities via every-day interaction between communities and on-the-ground implementers. A tier above, Technical Working Groups
organized implementers to incorporate feedback with
the aim of engendering ownership. Comparable struc16
Principles to Govern and Guide the
Recovery Program
■■ Recovery
driven
program is based on needs and demand
■■ Support
Earthquake Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation Authority’s (ERRA) mandate to
oversee and monitor the overall reconstruction
program
■■ Strengthening
ownership of AJK and KPK without
compromising implementation efficiency
■■ Complete
reconstruction in the shortest possible
time with high quality. Strive for economies of scale
which attracts firms with good management practices
■■ Simplify
and expedite approval and implementation
procedures. Establish appropriate thresholds at
District Reconstruction Unit (DRU), Reconstruction
Agency (RA), and Steering Committee (SC) levels for
approval of plans and contracts
■■ Reconstruction
will conform to appropriate seismic
safety, quality, technological, and environmental
standards
■■ Strengthen
long-term capacity building in
reconstruction and hazard risk management
tures of ownership-building existed in another higher
tier, where stakeholders engaged in policy-oriented
discussions.
41. Designing sectoral policies required input from both
experts as well as from affected communities. ERRA’s
first consulted sector experts whose propositions were
vetted against ground realities, and the final policy
approved by ERRA at the federal level. Policies were
first designed by a technical team within ERRA with
input from relevant international agencies (e.g. WHO
for health), considering international best practices.
These practices would then be contextualized to the
Pakistani experience through a review process by
the Technical Advisory Group, which existed for each
of the twelve sectors, with each group comprised
of experts from that sector. The plan would then be
vetted by the implementers and the communities for
their input. Once community and implementer feed-
back was incorporated, the policy design would be
presented to the ERRA Board, and then for the ERRA
Council. However, this was a flexible implementation
system, and feedback loops continually attenuated
the program.
Program. Over 600 teams were formed and trained on
the appropriate and consistent application of technical damage criteria. These teams conducted comprehensive door-to-door visits over a four-month period
in all affected administrative units. This was followed
by setting a mammoth implementation mechanism
for meeting the housing program objectives of reconstructing or rehabilitating close to 600,000 houses
to improved seismic resistant standards. To this
effect, ERRA prepared a detailed operational manual
that provided guidelines on all key aspects of implementation. Although beyond the immediate scope of
this case study, a snapshot of the implementation
arrangements put in place for this program is provided below, to illustrate the complexities that have
to be overcome in the design and implementation of
such large scale reconstruction programs.
42. Going from data collection to implementation in the
rural housing reconstruction program, is by far the
single largest program in ERRA’s portfolio. To begin,
a detailed damage assessment and eligibility surveys were conducted to categorize housing units by
the extent of damage, determine eligibility, and sign
MOUs with the verified beneficiaries (quasi-legal
agreement). The survey form and technical guidelines
were developed under the Rural Housing Reconstruction Program. The information collected was used to
develop beneficiary lists and to better target grant
disbursements under the Temporary Shelter Support
Provincial/
Regional
Level
Different Army Formations
Community/
Individual
Level
Sub-District/
Union Council Level
Army Regional Management
Sub-provincial/
District Level
ERRA Housing Program Management
Assistance
&
Inspection
(AI) Teams
Mobile
Training
Teams
(MTTs)
Regional Housing Coordinators (2)
9 District Housing
Coordinators
Progress
Monitoring
Teams
(PMTs)
20+ Partner Organizations
(POs)
Training
Centers
Mobile Training & Social
Mobilization Teams
Partner Organizations
PO Field Offices
Inspection
Teams
Training &
Assistance
Teams
Village Reconstruction Committees
ERRA BENEFICIARIES
11 PO-Run
Housing
Reconstruction
Centers
Pakistan Poverty
Alleviation Fund
PPAF BENEFICIARIES
43. Similarly, a comprehensive targeted vulnerability survey made identification of vulnerable communities
accessible to partners. The Targeted Vulnerability
Survey (TVS), funded by ADB and GoP, aimed to collect data on vulnerable communities in earthquake
affected areas. Between 2007 and 2008, detailed
information was collected on 432,130 vulnerable
persons, including information on educational levels,
employment status, skill development needs, disabilities, type of aid received, and income sources.
The survey findings were made accessible to all stakeholders for project planning. This data was used to
improve delivery of the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) project to protect vulnerable people in 40 villages of districts Mansehra and
Muzaffarabad. TVS data was also shared with the
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP).
44. Identifying Women-Headed Households, the Landless,
and the Virtually Landless. As the first step to instituting a livelihood cash grant scheme, while prioritizing vulnerable communities and maintaining gender
equality, a survey was carried out to identify and map
the incidence of households headed by women. The
focus on vulnerable communities also provided the
basis for a survey of the extent and identification of
the landless (those whose lands had been washed
away by the mudslides caused by the earthquake)
and the virtual landless (those whose lands were still
intact and could be cultivated but had been rendered
so unstable by the earthquake that no sustainable
construction could take place on them).
45. Surveys for Community Livelihood Rehabilitation: In
addition to assistance for the individual losses, there
were communities for cash influx to prevent community collapse. Union Councils were taken as the unit
for assessing the losses of public goods such as small
irrigation channels, micro hydroelectric generators,
and stream crossings; and each Union Council was
provided Rs.750,000 for their activities. Consultations with these Union Councils provided the basis
for translating guiding principles into programmatic
interventions. Thus, the guiding principle of poverty reduction provided ERRA the opportunity to not
just reconstruct to the pre-disaster status quo, but
to introduce economic revitalization programs as
part of its reconstruction activities. On the ground,
18
this translated into the initiation of more profitable
means of living in the affected communities, such as
the cultivation of cash crops instead of subsistence
farming.
46. Streamlining Procurements: ERRA utilized the services
of Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) to expedite procurement processes. PEC pre-approved and ranked
contractors, simplifying the tendering process, as
well as introducing transparency into the contractor
selection process. Contractors formed a large part of
the implementing bodies in the reconstruction effort.
However, given the scale of tenders and responses to
manage, a system was needed to streamline the contract-issuing process. For this purpose, ERRA utilized
the services of Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC),
a national government-organized body, which had a
list of national and international contractors that had
already been categorized by type of expertise and
competence level. This list was used to prequalify
some contractors for reconstruction. This not only
helped expedite the process of issuing contracts,
the institutionalized process of evaluating tender
responses allowed ERRA to provide well-formulated
answers to why a particular firm was chosen. Limit-
Tripartite Construction Contracts Ensured
Oversight
Since the vast majority of the destroyed or damaged
infrastructure was owned by the provincial and state
government, dedicated Engineering Wings were
created within these governments to work solely on
reconstruction activities. These wings served as the
government’s representative, de jure “employers” of all
construction contractors, with NESPAK signing as the
“Engineer” designated to oversee construction in the
tripartite contracts.
Construction contracts were thus signed by 1) the
Engineering Wings as the “employers”, 2) NESPAK as
the “engineers”, and 3) the construction company as
the contracted party.
This arrangement not only ensured ERRA oversight of
all construction, but also served to involve state and
provincial governments in reconstruction
This arrangement not only ensured ERRA oversight of
all construction, but also served to involve state and
provincial governments in reconstruction.
ing tendering this way also eliminated the problem
of dealing with inexperienced contractors that would
severely underbid their more experienced competition to win contracts, but did not have the expertise
or experience required to successfully perform the
work. It also eliminated the associated problem of
explaining to other tender competitors why they lost
a contract to a relatively inexperienced firm.
47. In addition to the need for rapid procurement, the
mega-scale infrastructure reconstruction required an
expert group that could rapidly and reliably provide
oversight and advice in reconstruction. Following soon
after ERRA’s establishment, the National Engineering
Services Pakistan (NESPAK), a publically organized,
independent group of engineers, were installed
as General Consultants to the Authority to oversee construction & implementation. Their role was
instrumental in the conduct of timely assessments
of structural damages and geological hazards, and
seismic mapping. NESPAK also oversaw and advised
in the development of seismic resistance standards,
the reconstruction plans for government, health and
education buildings, as well as in the urban planning
essential to town and village recovery.
48. In addition to its role as the general consultant setting construction standards, and being instrumental in
policy design, NESPAK’s engineering expertise gave it
the requisite skills to be the primary party responsible
for project costing. NESPAK’s costing was combined
with ERRA leadership reconstruction goals to develop
yearly budget estimates. ERRA projected a standardized reconstruction rate for all its projects: each
sector was to be built back at 33% in its first year
of reconstruction, 33% in the next year, and 34% in
Government Construction Projects
Competed
Typical of earthquakes, a majority of the reconstruction
required in Pakistan’s disaster centered on
infrastructure. ERRA recognized the need for—but
was unable to effectively accomplish—standardization
of construction rates. While the government offered
Rs. 2,000 per square foot of reconstruction to its
contractors, other implementers, offered up to twice
that amount, skewing the market towards projects
being implemented by the higher paying agencies.
the final year. Based on these targets, and adjusted
to reflect the previous year’s accomplishments, ERRA
would submit a budget to the government prior to
the passage of the federal government’s budget. The
strong support for the reconstruction effort among
the political leadership meant that ERRA’s budgetary
needs were met entirely for the first three years of its
work.
49. After recovery progressed and began to address issues
of development, implementation fatigue began to
appear in some aspects of reconstruction. Team spirit
and motivation were high in the initial phases of
reconstruction, resulting in quick delivery of high
quality outputs. However, as invariably occurs,
during subsequent years pace of implementation
decreased. Once the reconstruction of key damaged
and destroyed infrastructure had been completed,
and reconstruction began to address issues of development policy, particularly urban development, the
pace of recovery slowed and observable difference in
delivery of outputs was observed.
Monitoring and Evaluation
50. ERRA’s Monitoring and Evaluation Wing was also established at the Authority’s inception. This ensured early
oversight mechanism and also contributed to a successful donor’s conference by increasing confidence in the
reconstruction effort. In joint consultation with stakeholders, ERRA’s M&E wing developed an evaluation
framework. Its core principals included a focus on
results and beneficiaries, lessons learning, transparency, and communication. The overall M&E system was
established to enable ERRA and its partners to measure
performance on all reconstruction projects undertaken
by implementing organizations and agencies. The system supported project-level monitoring and provided
independent analysis on overall progress strengthening accountability. It also ensured compliance with
ERRA’s directives and sectoral strategies, and improved
responsiveness to identified problem areas.
51. ERRA adopted parallel systems of monitoring and
evaluation, one internal and one external. The internal system consisted of detailed project level supervisions and the monitoring of recovery programs
and projects by PERRA, SERRA, DRUs, line departments, partner organizations, and NESPAK. External monitoring was carried out by donor missions,
institutional reviews, and annual evaluations. The
accessibility of information provided under the M&E
system improved project transparency, increasing
stakeholder confidence in the recovery program.
52. Internal monitoring of financial data included joint oversight by ERRA’s M&E Wing and the program manager.
The availability of implementation and financial data
was made possible by the joint oversight of all projects
by the ERRA’s M&E Wing’s audit department and the program manager. This structure helped ensure financial
transparency, adherence to standards, as well as facilitated the involvement of the project management team
in the oversight process. Additional monitoring teams
oversaw the technical aspects of reconstruction as well
as the social impact of the reconstruction activity. The
M&E Wing deployed two teams at the project level to
oversee reconstruction. The Construction Monitoring
Teams (CMTs) monitored technical aspects of both the
inputs and outputs of reconstruction, ensuring com20
Implementation Oversight by NESPAK
At the project planning stage, NESPAK was responsible
for vetting the designs for infrastructure reconstruction
to ensure compliance with seismic resistance and urban
planning objectives. During project implementation, it
was also responsible for supervision of several of these
construction activities.
pliance with centrally set standards for reconstruction. The Social Survey Teams (SSTs) assessed the
social impact of reconstruction activities, providing
feedback from the impacted communities to continually guide interventions. The teams began monitoring
adherence to ERRA standards from the commencement
of the project, where it ensured tenders were publicized in accordance with federal guidelines, and that
procedural requirements were adhered to in tender
evaluations. Monitoring continued through the lifecycle of projects, with teams overseeing progress along
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that had been predefined with input from NESPAK. M&E teams would
also make frequent site visits to ensure adherence to
construction standards. M&E teams would verify and
document findings by taking pictures of project sites.
This information, once logged in the M&E system, was
sent back to donors to ensure that there were constant corrections being made during reconstruction.
In addition to alerting the donors of any missteps or
lack of adherence to standards by the implementers,
ERRA also asked implementers to correct their procedures on the spot.
53. The inclusion of individuals with expertise in procurement processes and M&E also ensured that all planned
activities were continually being vetted for compliance
to government regulations, and anticipated bottlenecks could be resolved in a timely fashion. Maintaining flexibility in its implementation, ERRA instituted
new mechanisms for program monitoring that maintained close links with affected communities as well
as project implementers. As project implementation
progressed, a capacity deficit for monitoring projects
at the district level began to appear. This was particularly exacerbated by a parallel deficit in the abil-
ity to communicate project issues to other recovery
actors. Given the scope of the recovery effort, and the
breadth of stakeholders involved, Project Implementation Coordination Units (PICUs) were organized
in September 2008 to bridge these capacity gaps.
In this role, PICUs served a dual function of maintaining links with the affected communities, as well
as ensuring that reconstruction progress remained
on schedule. The units submitted regular progress
reports to the relevant wings of ERRA, and suggested
remedial measures where implementation was facing
challenges. In this sense PICUs were an essential part
of the program management machinery, maintaining
informal links with the community, and having formal
chains of command available to raise these issues
with ERRA leadership.
54. Establishment of a Dedicated Reporting, Monitoring,
and Evaluation (RME) System for Rural Housing based
in the Program Manager’s office. The system collected,
collated, analyzed, and reported on disaggregated
data on physical and financial progress and seismic compliance being received from Army regional
offices, and national citizens’ database (NADRA) and
ERRA Management Information System (MIS) respectively. The system also obtained data streams from
the Training MIS and ERRA M&E unit’s building mate
rial supply and price monitoring mechanism. The RME
had in-built query and monthly reporting options, and
cross-tabulation capacity across the above variables
and data streams. This enabled a much more effective and efficient monitoring of reconstruction trends,
identification of problematic areas, and consequently
more informed decision making and development of
mitigation measures. These Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms contributed to high project completion rates. Within 3 years of the earthquake, ERRA’s
flagship initiative, the Rural Housing Reconstruction
program had been nearly completed. Of the houses
constructed, a dramatic 96% were constructed to the
new seismically resistant standards ERRA introduced.
55. Similarly, at the 5-year mark, the Water and Sanitation
sector saw the completion of 84% of all planned projects, with the remaining 16% under construction. This
sector’s reconstruction, in line with the principle of
build back better, introduced water quality improvement processes. Sectors such as Education and Health
registered the slowest performance. A lack of contractors, as well as a lack of contractor expertise contributed to this slow rate of reconstruction. The education
sector also suffered from sustainability issues as provincial and state governments, faced with a financial
crunch, struggled to maintain the schools.
Schematic Illustration of Business Process for ERRA Housing RME
Reporting, Monitoring, Evaluation
Functions of Central RME:
Central RME System
Location: ERRA Program
Manager (Housing)’ Office
7d
7d
Dedicated NADRA Team for Housing HME
■■ Cleaning and preparing data for use
■■ Incorporation of data in designated software for
HME System
■■ Generating regular and custom query reports■■ Coordinating and liasing with ERRA RME Staff
■■ Data transmittal to ERRA RME System
REPORTING
Generates district and UC level disaggregated monthly reports on:
■■ Physical Progress (number of houses under construction out
of those visited by AI teams; stages of construction reached by
beneficiaries in percentage terms, rate of physical progress on a
timescale)
■■ Financial Progress (number and percent of beneficiaries having
received the various grant installments; total amount disbursed
by ERRA to beneficiaries in respect of various grant installments;
rates of disbursement of various installments on a timescale)
MONITORING
■■ Monthly monitoring of rates of seismic compliance at a district
and UC level disaggregated basis;
■■ Correlating rates of seismic compliance with (a) coverage and
outputs of training program, (b) reasons for non- compliance, and
(c) any other available quantitative and qualitative parameters,
such as availability of materials,adequacy of designs, consistency
of AI, etc.
■■ Helps identify problem areas/UCs and devise appropriate
interventions, thus providing a more enabling environment
for informed management decision-making (for which further
community level data may also be generated)
EVALUATION
■■ Furnishing readily available disaggregated data for third party
evaluations, especially for facilitating sample size determination
and targeting
Grant
MOUs Signed &
Disbusrements
■■ 3rd Grant Certifications
Processed and
Disbursements
■■ 4th Grant Certifications
Processed and
Disbursements
■■ No
of houses
inspected (the sample
size)
■■ No. of houses
commenced
■■ No. and classification
of compliant and noncompliant houses
(24-day loop - Only Horizontal Flow of
Data)
OPTION A
10d
New Stream of Data for RME System
3d
NADRA’s Regular Database on Financial
Progress for ERRA Housing Program
Other
intermediaries
OPTION B
(31-day loop - Both Vertical & Horizontal Flow of Data)
22
Option A: RME Physical data
directly sent by army units to
NADRA/ERRA
Army Regional
Management AJK
(Div HQ)
Army Regional
Management NWFP
(Div HQ)
7d
-AI Hubs
■■ 2nd
Data Streams from Army
routed through NADRA
or ERRA MIS:
Army District Units
USUAL Data Streams
from NADRA Database:
Option B: RME Physical data first
compiled at Army Div level and then
sent to NADRA/ERRA
Grievance Redressal Mechanisms
56. ERRA’s flagship program of rural housing reconstruction
also instituted a dedicated, low-cost, low- maintenance
software-based grievance redress program. Designed
by ERRA, the Pakistan Army and AJK’s SERRA, this
detailed MIS system enabled ERRA to effectively track
the disbursement of grant tranches. It also enabled
ERRA to appropriately handle grievance cases related
to various stages of construction through: the ability
to search hundreds of thousands of individual records
and their statuses; the rapid generation of correction
lists; and the tracking of bank transactions and reconciliations. This brought down grievance correction
and redressal times from 3 months to 10 days (by a
factor of 8-10), and elimination of a backlog of around
37,000 grievance cases in AJK alone.
57. ERRA also established twelve Data Resource Centers
(DRCs) across the affected areas to handle grievances
and act as information centers. DRC managers were
focal points for grievance-related issues and had the
authority to update records after due verification.
ERRA maintained real-time logs of all updates in
order to guard against future inconsistencies. Additional Grievance Redress Committees (GRCs) were
established at seven locations to enable wider cover.
Coordination and Communications
58. Communication management was an integral part of
ERRA’s organizational structure serving to strengthen
the organization’s credibility. ERRA established a
Knowledge Management Cell (KMC) and a media wing to
document experiences and lessons learning, facilitate
knowledge sharing, and to aid in communications. The
KMC strengthened ERRA’s communication networks,
developed an institutional library, stored information
on district profiling. The media wing also undertook
and published annual reviews, corporate brochures,
and case studies aiding in the identification of problem areas and supporting course corrections. Press
reporting was also regularly analyzed to gauge public opinion on the recovery program. ERRA’s effective
communications strategy successfully served to raise
its visibility and profile.
An Information Clearing House Could Have
Attracted More Donors
As reconstruction activities began, the need for an
information clearing house started to become apparent.
The data collected by the multiple surveys was seen
to be of great use in recovery planning, particularly
in answering the data questions of donors and
implementers. Consequently, the program manager
of Social Protection was tasked with combining the
datasets on vulnerable populations that had been
collected (reference Guiding Principles). Had this
information been available earlier in the reconstruction
effort, it could also have been used to mobilize smaller
donors who were otherwise put off by lack of ready
transparency.
59. Ownership among the largest donors was cultivated
by assigning each major donor a sector in which they
took the lead in reconstruction. A ‘G7-plus’ group was
established that included the 7 largest donors. This
group met every month, and each one of these donors
picked a sector in which they took the lead. The World
Bank, for example, took the lead in housing, and the
European Union spearheaded education sector reconstruction. This close involvement gave the donors
a sense of ownership, as well as confidence in the
reconstruction effort.
24
UNDP’s TAMEER Project
The UNDP was actively involved in post-earthquake
response from the first days of emergency rescue,
making it intimately familiar with the disaster.
Recognizing that ERRA would need support in
designing and implementing its mandate, UNDP
established the Technical Assistance for Management
of Earthquake Early Recovery (TAMEER) project in
December 2005.
Set up initially with a 13-month horizon, TAMEER
was extended to run for three years, providing
capacity-building support to ERRA in defining
the new institution’s mandate; drawing up plans
for reconstruction and rehabilitation; monitoring
implementation, and ensuring effective communication
among stakeholders.
60. Allowing each of the largest donors to take the lead in a
sector’s reconstruction also proved beneficial for ERRA.
The system provided an ongoing check on programmatic activities, since donors could draw upon their
sectoral involvement to suggest policy adjustments.
This further served to boost donor confidence in the
reconstruction process, and leading to smooth financial flows for ERRA.
61. Although large donors were contributing amply, the
need was recognized for the facilitation of smaller
donors. A dedicated Donor and Sponsor Wing was
created within ERRA to facilitate contributions from
smaller donors. While contributions from such donors
are far smaller than institutional contributions, large
volume compensated for their smaller size. Smaller
donors were seen to be particularly less likely to
contribute if they encountered multiple steps in the
donation or sponsorship process. Thus, arising from
this requirement, though not limited to dealing exclusively with smaller donors, the Donor and Sponsor
Wing was created within ERRA which offered a single
window for the facilitation of all of a potential donor’s
needs.
62. High-level coordination across sectors and programs
was greatly facilitated by daily coordination conferences. Since programs were so closely tied to each
other, ERRA instituted a Morning Coordination Conference. Each morning the program managers, the
individuals primarily responsible for programmatic
planning and oversight of individual reconstruction
initiatives would discuss mutually relevant updates.
The conferences were often subject specific, with a
program manager from a particular sector presenting on her work, leading to a lively discussion on the
intersection of her work and those of other program
managers. This mechanism was a key method of vetting program mechanics with the ERRA team, and
often served to facilitate mid-course corrections.
63. Training of Partner Organizations, Construction Artisans & Communities/Homeowners in Seismic Resistant
Construction. A very important element of ERRA’s
reconstruction program was its emphasis on building
awareness and capacities for seismic resistant reconstruction. For example, a comprehensive 3-pronged
training strategy and curriculum for seismic resistant
reconstruction of houses was developed by ERRA,
under which a cascade of training facilities were
made available to all partner organizations, interested construction artisans in the affected districts,
and the affected communities as well as homeowners.
All recipients of such training were duly certified by
the respective trainers, prior to the commencement of
reconstruction activities. Grassroots partner organizations were made responsible for training functions
Ensuring Communication for Successful
Implementation of Guiding Principles
Communication was key to successful intra-sectoral
prioritization, and it was observed that after
the earthquake that a multitude of stakeholders
commenced recovery efforts and programs with little
coordination.
This led to an over-emphasis on the principle of
accessibility.
With all implementers prioritizing reconstruction in
accessible locations, less navigable areas were being
entirely neglected. Reconstruction efforts in accessible
areas were being duplicated at the cost of recovery in
inaccessible areas.
A coordination mechanism was therefore put into place
to avoid program duplication and ensure equitable
resources were invested in all provinces, inclusive of
rural and urban areas.
This mechanism ensured that all recovery effort needed
approval of ERRA before being carried out, which could
be cumbersome, but ensured comprehensive coverage
of the entire affected area.
such as providing guidance to affected communities
in implementing the owner driven housing reconstruction program and in ensuring compliance with
social and environmental risk safeguards.
ANNEX -1: THREE-PRONGED APPROACH FOR INFORMATION SHARING AND TRAINING
PUBLIC INFORMATION &
BEHAVIORAL CHANGE CAMPAIGN
HRC Training Program (by ENSET etc.)
Army Master Trainers
Donors/Private
Housing Sponsors
Prov/Distt. Govts,
PERA/SERA/DRUs
HRC Master Trainers
Training of AI
Teams by Army
MTs
Training of PO MTs
Structural Design & Construction Methods
■■ Damage
Assessment
■■ Structural
Design &
Construction
Methods
POs’ Training Program
Training of Master
Skilled Labor-MSL
Training of Master
Self Builders-MSB
Training of Village
Reconstruction
Committees-VRCs
Direct Assistance to
Beneficiaries by AI
Teams
■■ Provision of
Outreach & Community
Mobilization Teams
Mobile Demonstration
Teams
Structural
Design Options,
Construction
Guidelines
■■ Assistance &
Compliance
Certification
Grant Beneficiaries
26
Role of Leadership and Effective Crisis Management
64. Strong leadership within ERRA was a key reason for the
success of post-earthquake reconstruction. While Pakistan has incurred many high intensity natural disasters
before and after the 2005 earthquake, none of the recovery responses by the public sector have come close to
matching the uniquely successful 2005 reconstruction
program. A main reason for this success was robust
leadership within ERRA, as well as strong political
support for the organization from the highest tiers of
political leadership.
65. Close cooperation between the civilian and military
branches of government were also a factor in the success of the reconstruction operation. The appointment
of military personnel at the head of ERRA assisted
in ensuring close civil-military coordination. In particular, the appointment of a high-ranking member
of the country’s armed forces as the Deputy Chief of
ERRA, the de facto chief executive of the organization, greatly facilitated civilian-military coordination.
66. ERRA also benefitted from strong support from highlevel political leadership. Indeed, the single most
important factor identified by many studies of the success of the reconstruction experience was that project
and programme leadership cultivated at the highest
levels of government. From the moment of its institutional inauguration, ERRA as an institution benefitted
from strong political support, with the President’s
office providing particularly strident support. This
high-level backing gave the institution powerful
political clout. This political backing was also instrumental in overcoming the institutional resistance
ERRA faced from the well-established line ministries
and departments as well as the absence of subsidiary
rules and procedures which led to problems in staff
recruitment and procurements. It also helped alleviate institutional resistance to ERRA, particularly that
which centered around its special financing mechanisms.
Strong Leadership was Critical in Providing Livelihoods Assistance to Vulnerable Families
Based on a review of international good practices,
ERRA opted to launch a livelihoods cash assistance
programs which provided unconditional monthly
cash transfers to deserving affected families. US
$85 million was disbursed to 268,000 deserving
families.
Despite initial setbacks and criticism that such a
program was a dole-out and created dependency
on public support. However international literature
also suggested that while it was important to ‘take
out the relief crutches’, economic restoration
was not immediately possible and hence families
who were below the poverty line, or had lost their
breadwinners or suffered life crippling injuries, or
were female-headed households, were eligible to
be provided income support in the first six months.
In the long run, post program evaluations showed how this program was extremely beneficial in averting another manmade disaster after the first natural disaster, in sustaining poor families in that rough period, and allowed them to
gradually find a more sustainable means of livelihood.
Role of Leadership and Effective Crisis Management
67. The change in political leadership created a change
in political priorities, impacting the pace of reconstruction. During the initial years of reconstruction,
with strong political ownership and commitment at
the national level, and full backing of the national
leadership, ERRA was able to requisition quality staff,
obtain requisite financial resources and exercise the
authority to take quick decisions without having to go
through the usual bureaucratic bottlenecks. However,
the change in government in 2008 brought in new
priorities. This caused a decrease in support for the
reconstruction effort, impacting ERRA’s ability to expediently resolve potential delays.
BBB in Housing Reconstruction was a Result of Strong Leadership by ERRA
Housing Reconstruction and Building Back Better. ERRA faced a formidable challenge in convincing the public to forego
speedy reconstruction of homes and traditional ways of construction in favor of more resilient reconstruction which could
withstand future earthquakes.
Despite demands for a lump-sum payment of the housing subsidy in one go, ERRA leadership implemented the principle
of building back better, by devising the public subsidy program around conditional and incremental cash transfers.
The payment of grant installments was subject to the houses, constructed through a homeowner driven model, to people
meeting the seismic compliance requirements set by the government. There was huge hue and cry from various quarters
on this arrangement, and many issues arose with maintaining reasonable rates of compliance, but ERRA leadership most
commendably withstood this period in a calm and calculating manner.
Various facilitation measures of gigantic proportions were put in place to provide an enabling environment for people
to comply with the building back better standards put in place by the government. Teams were provided constant
encouragement and motivation to repeatedly extend reach out to the 600,000 families scattered over this largely
inaccessible areas, while communities often perched on mountain cliffs well beyond the snowline or buried in deep and
dark mountain gorges and ravines. The results proved the program a resounding success: an over 90% rate of seismic
compliance was achieved and more than that, the seeds for a culture of seismic compliant reconstruction were sown in
the entire affected area.
28
Recommendations for Institutionalizing the Learnings of the PostEarthquake Reconstruction Experience in the Government System
68. The recommendations included in this section provide
a guide for steps that can be taken to institutionalize
the learnings of the 2005 earthquake experience into
NDMA policy and the wider government system. The
success of the 2005 program can be used to develop
not only ex-post best practices, but can also inform
ex-ante preparatory work to contribute to disaster
risk reduction. This final step of the institutionalization of recovery best practices, learned from the 2005
experience, can help guide future recovery efforts
under NDMA.
69. Ex-Ante Institutionalization of Recovery can help Ensure
Integration of DRR: Among the central learnings from
the earthquake of 2005 was the need to be ready for
disasters. Being prepared for a disaster helps deliver
good recovery. Knowing risks and vulnerabilities,
Pakistan can put in place policies, standards, and
institutional arrangement for managing recovery
before a disaster strikes. The establishment of NDMA
has been a key step in this regard. By giving NDMA
the lead in disaster management in all stages following the disaster, the lessons learned about the need
to maintain continuity from relief to reconstruction
can be introduced across the spectrum of post-disaster activities. This will require formalized and predictable strategic and resource commitments towards
recovery planning, implementation and performance
management. Successful recovery will further require
sustained national ownership and development cooperation for maintaining traction and momentum on
recovery.
70. Development of national policy standards for informing
and guiding disaster recovery strategies: The emergence of a more conducive national policy environment for recovery strategy-formulation, planning and
implementation holds the key to building recovery-led
resilience. Pakistan has made strides in developing
national policy standards as a result of the 2005
Recommendations
earthquake recovery experience. It can build on this
by developing common standards for all future recovery endeavors by consolidating past country experiences, existing legal provisions and contemporary
international practices. Developing these standards
and guidelines ex-ante can greatly contribute towards
the development of successful recovery strategies in
the chaotic ex-post environment.
71. Maintaining a strategic and institutional continuum
between preparedness, recovery and prevention is
essential for the efficiency of future recovery efforts.
Future disaster recovery can be made more efficient
and effective in contributing towards longer term
risk reduction by: (a) overcoming the inherent shortcomings of institutions and governance structures in
treating recovery as a ‘developmental urgency’, and;
(b) improving coordination and strategic harmony
across various national and subnational tiers of government and across recovery and regular development institutions. The establishment of NDMA with
a strong institutional mandate for all three of these
functions sets the stage for operationalizing and
streamlining the links between preparedness, recovery and prevention.
72. Ex-Post Development of National Recovery Frameworks
can help ensure DRR in recovery. As we see emerging
clearly from the post-earthquake experience, recovery offers a unique window of opportunity to reduce
future risk. People are more aware of risk, politicians are more motivated, and the funds are often
available. Developing recovery frameworks at that
time will help bring multiple stakeholders and their
competing or diverging priorities to one common
and inclusive platform for recovery strategy develop-
30
ment, planning and project development. These can
also: (a) help make recovery inclusive and resilient,
and (b) increase the likelihood of the gains from the
recovery process becoming sustainable and translatable into resilient development. In this regard, NDMA
and its lower-tier offices could play a major positive
role by developing national, subnational or local
recovery frameworks, as necessitated by a particular
disaster, as a means of ensuring the systematic integration of DRR in recovery planning and implementation processes.
73. Importantly, is should be recognized that such a Recovery Framework would not replace a PDNA or other
post-disaster assessment. The Recovery Framework is
developed in a manner that it would follow PDNA, and
would elaborate the findings of PDNA.
74. Recovery Management and Monitoring. There is a
need for: (a) establishing quality control and enforcement mechanisms for the implementation of recovery,
(b) building capacities of national, subnational and
local governments in the design and implementation
of BBB-based resilient recovery interventions, and (c)
developing recovery program monitoring and evaluation systems, including tangible indicators of the
integration of DRR in recovery. The latter includes the
development and institutionalization of actionable
and measurable indicators to monitor progress of
implementation and achievement of recovery goals.
Finally, governance and accountability systems
should be put in place that permit greater accountability between government, the affected population,
and the general public on recovery issues.
A Snapshot of Good Practices and Lessons Learned
■■ With a large scale, multi-jurisdictional disaster such
as Pakistan’s 2005 earthquake, a “business as usual”
approach must be adapted for the extraordinary circumstances. Dedicated institutions, with legal mandate and political backing are necessary to implement
successful recovery.
■■ In such large scale disasters, the most viable insti-
tutional option may be to consolidate reconstruction
into one agency that provides oversight, a single
point of coordination for national and international
stakeholders, and adds additional capacity to implement and expedite reconstruction projects. However in such a model, multi-agency and multi-tier
inclusion of public and private stakeholders is to be
ensured and implementation responsibilities have to
be delegated to sub-national, or district and municipal levels.
■■ As noted above, decentralization in implementation
should be followed. However, this should be balanced
with processes to ensure centralization in order to
ensure uniformity in reconstruction priorities and
policies across jurisdictions and programs.
■■ Such agencies must also be accompanied by a clear
exit and transitional strategy and sunset clause that
is triggered: (a) upon either the substantial achievement of major reconstruction targets, or (b) even earlier, if such an institution is only meant to provide
an initial impetus for the reconstruction program to
firmly take root and once the reconstruction program
is on the path of effective and efficient delivery, in
accordance with jointly agreed vision for reconstruction that a post disaster country formulates.
■■ A clear legislative mandate is essential for any insti-
tution tasked with overseeing reconstruction after
a natural disaster. Whether existing legislation is
amended, new legislation is introduced or a mandate
is created through ordinances and government orders,
it should clearly codify the functions and authorities
A Snapshot of Good Practices and Lessons Learned
of the implementing institution. This mandate can
also enable the establishment of a dissolution date or
sunset clause for the institution so responsibility for
national development can return to established institutions as they were pre-disaster.
■■ Recovery work can be assisted by the formation of
■■ In keeping with the principle of decentralization,
ety organizations is essential for success. Appropriate
coordination mechanisms should be institutionalized
rather than leaving them to ad-hoc arrangements.
provincial/local level reconstruction agencies should
take the lead in the post-disaster reconstruction following localized, provincial level disaster events.
Keeping in view the scale of disaster, necessary support should be provided by the national level reconstruction body.
■■ Post-disaster reconstruction should be utilized as an
opportunity to overcome pre-disaster gaps and shortcomings, and to introduce disaster risk reduction.
■■ Similarly, by linking post-disaster reconstruction to
broader sectoral programs and priorities, recovery
should be used as a means of furthering development
goals.
■■ A focus on livelihood generation, particularly for vul-
nerable groups, is a key means of sustaining local
economy. Cash grants, by providing cash injections
into the economy, are a good means of assisting in
livelihood support.
■■ Detailed assessments conducted after the PDNA help
inform policies and constitute a vulnerability mapping exercise that can assist future reconstruction
projects, and longer term developmental planning.
■■ A focus on improved access to services as well as ser-
vice delivery should go hand-in-hand with infrastructure reconstruction. Sectors such as education, health
and water and sanitation should be given equal attention alongside transport and housing reconstruction.
■■ Multi-hazard risk factors should be considered in
design and implementation, including seismic, landslide and flooding risks.
32
village-level reconstruction committees, and through
the expansion of the network of community based
organizations.
■■ Coordination between the public sector and civil soci-
■■ The early development of a holistic prioritization
strategy can help in the planning of a recovery strategy that ensures that overall reconstruction priorities
are reflected across the many reconstruction programs.
■■ The inclusion of international experts in the develop-
ment of priorities can be beneficial. They can provide
both sector-specific expertise as well as draw on other
recovery experiences to recommend best practices.
■■ Early recovery planning can greatly impact the suc-
cess of the donor conference. Presenting donors with
a recovery plan that includes institutional arrangements and monitoring and evaluation procedures
increases donor confidence, having a positive impact
on contributions.
■■ Mechanisms for speedy procurement, as well as
streamlined and transparent tendering and contract
award processes are essential in reconstruction.
■■ Joint oversight mechanisms are useful for ensuring
financial transparency, and contribute to donor confidence.
■■ Robust internal monitoring and evaluation systems
can function as ‘eyes and ears’ for reconstruction
managers, and external technical audits serve to
increase donor and public confidence.
■■ Local feedback and inclusiveness assists in service
delivery, standard setting, and in M&E evaluations.
The DRF Guide will complement the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) by using its outputs to help governments
develop comprehensive, integrated, multi-sectoral recovery plans and management strategies. The DRF Guide
addresses key elements such as: (a) Institutional framework for recovery; (b) Policy making and planning for recovery
programs; (c) Costing and financing recovery programs, and; (d) Managing recovery and monitoring the delivery of
results. Over time, the DRF is intended help improve government readiness for disaster recovery. By following the
Guide, disaster recovery will be seen not as a short-term, remedial response, but an opportunity to build resilience and
contribute to long-term development.
The Guide is being developed as a completely practice-based tool with input from: (a) an International Advisory Group
(IAG), composed of senior international experts with first-hand recovery management experience; (b) a Technical
Working Group (TWG), including professionals from the World Bank, UNDP, EU, and other stakeholder partners with
practical expertise in various aspects of recovery, and; (c) a series of national-level and thematic case studies that will
synthesize various global recovery experiences. The stakeholder engagement process encourages government officials,
civil society organizations, and private sector entities familiar with large-scale recovery efforts, to collaborate in the
development and dissemination of the DRF Guide. The DRF Guide is scheduled to be launched at the Second World
Reconstruction Conference.

Pakistan Earthquake 2005

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Reconstruction After Hemipelvectomy With the Ice

Reconstruction Vocabulary List

Conoscopic holography: toward three-dimensional

A Robust Approach for 3D Cars Reconstruction