Mexican American 1980 - Christine`s History Pages

CHAPTER
r3
aining of Power: Chicano
The
litical Empowerment,
1964-1980
\r
By the late
I
he political role of Chicanos had changed dramatically, as the
the larger American society had begun to pay attention to
U.S. go
their pr
T,
noble strwggl
mension thr
school adm
County. Also
language,
becoming disi
oppression of
of
litigation on
cia gerrymandering; and improved communication about their
spirit of Chicano ethnic pride and solidarity was kindled by the
ar Chdvez and La Causa, which beqan to have a national dihe grape boycott. Meanwhile, in South Texas Chicanos took over
ions, the judicial system, and the county government of Zavala
, Josd Angel Gutidrrez formed a political party based on race,
re-La Raza Unida Party (LRUP). In Denver, Corky Gonzdlez,
d and frustrated by the failure of the U.S. government to end
nos, organized the Crusade for Justice. For many Chicanos, participation in t
vities earned them valuable experience that thev would out to
use in their
rship in the major political parties and in their election or appomtment to tbt office. How did involvement in La Raza Unida P6.rty represent
change in the hi no community? Why did Chicanos in Texas request federal inrcrventrcn rc hi' ve full political equality?
By the
It Chicanos remained optimistic that American society could
not continue igt
them-the fastest-growing minority group in the nation.
Working thro th
Southwest Voter Regisftation Education Project (SVREP),
they went int he
nities to increase and strengthen Chicano voting power.
Chicanos beli ed hat by such organizing, they could challenge Anglo political supremacy thr
t the Southwest. The SVREP would be largely responsible for
ical power amlng Chicanos through voter registration, field rethe growth of
search, coaliti
ilding , and on-sight training of volunteers; involvement in
In
:h, tivities as conducting opinion polls and surveys, trying to influ'cy,
rking at the community level, and fighting discriminatory
election struct res S\aREP would remain an important example of citizen participation. Li
expansion of the Voting Rights Act to the Southwest in the
concerns.
ence
public
4rl
jar Problems in Mexican American History
All
benefited Chicanos, opening to them new lpplrtunities for political part a'll levels. At this time both the Democratic and Republican parties bej
qan t0 e,
ssian interest in Chicanos; no longer would either party ignore them.
How did rc Nixon administration and the Republican party clurt the Chicanos
and bri thaTn into their state and national organizations?
mid-19
ticipation
',
DOC
The stri
in
1965
of table
workers
party wa
La Raza
party to
the party
won the
lists the
that
phasis
tional i
Republ
politics.
ENTS
by palifornia grape workers for higher wages began in Delano, Californiar
the strike continued, the workers calied for a nationwide consumer boycbtt
pep to help their cause. Document I is the Boycott Day Proclamation grape
I in spring 1969. The organizing ofan independent Chicano political
of the major developments in the Chicano movement in the early 197Qs.
nida Party (LRUP) in Texas was quite successful, as it was the first such
hidve electoral victories. Document 2 is an excerpt from a speech made bj,
leader. Jos6 Ansel Gutidnez. in San Antonio in Mav 1970. after the LRUP
hobl board and city council elections in Crystal City, Texas. Document 3
iorrities adopted by the delegates to the LRUP's 1972 national convention
bd expanded into the party's platform. These points reflect the LRUP's elncommunity control by Chicanos and embrace national as well as internaof concern to Chicanos. By the early 1970s both the Democratic and thle
rn garty were acknowledging the importance of the Chicano vote in natiorlal
n Document 4, Dolores Huerta, vice-president of the United Farm Worker5
I
]
ofA
and
cated
Vilma
U.S. C
asks t
catlon
r9'79,
Vel6
Chic
I.G
We,
Day w
the
day a
later
to wil
ofChicanos during the 1972 presidential campaign.
ican American Lesal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) advdthd legal rights of Mexican Americans. Selections from the testimony that
Mdrtinez, president and general counsel of MALDEF, delivered before th{
rmission on Civil Rishts in I975. are reproduced in Document 5. Martinez
ustice Department to intervene to end the discrimination faced by Mexic{n
s. A major voter registration drive by the Southwest Voter Registration E{uect resulted in nearly 300,000 new Chicano voters. In Document 6, dated
rndlist Juan V6squez describes the numerous obstacles faced by Willie
director ofthe SVREP, in his struggle to achieve electoral recognition fbr
i
pp Workers Issue the Boycott Day Proclamation, Lf;69
brnia. joi
ioin on this International Bovcott
stiiking grape workers of California,
the consumers across the continent in planning the steps that lie aheEd on
to our liberation. As we plan, we recall the footsteps that brought us td this
thp events of this day. The historic road of our pilgrimage to Sacranlento
:hed out, spreading like the unpruned vines in struck fields, until it l{d us
g exile in cities across this land. There, far from the earth we tilled for gen-
]
I
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Emplwerment,
erations, we
seed of our
We
ican, Filipin
this land and
we are plo
that we have
nificance of
we demand,
the misuse
changes the
our wake wil
them free. B
be because
bodies are
moYement,
We have
four years a
lical symbo
protestlng
comfort, no
it is violence
pression, the
stood tall
national la
crippled by i
ported scabs;
must come
We have
did not ch
and despair
would not t
We called u
men of consc
dized by our
We
tionalities,
a
stand the la
the boycott
mands to re
recognitio
sponding
as
their patrona
hold our la
Grapes
needs and
sweet and hea
our freedom.
1964-1980 413
cultivated the strange soil of public understanding, sowing the
nd our cause in the minds and hearts of men.
farm workers for hundreds ofyears and pioneers for seven. Mexricans and others, our ancestors were among those who founded
its natural wilderness. But we are still pilgrims on this land, and
ho blaze a trail out of the wildemess of hunger and deprivation
even as our ancestors did. We are conscious today of the signt quest. If this road we chart leads to the rights and reforms
eads to just wages, humane working conditions, protection from
ides, and to the fundamental right of collective bargaining, if it
I order that relegates us to the bottom reaches of society, then in
thousands of American farm workers. Our examole will make
r road does not bring us to victory and social change, it will not
ion is mistaken or our resolve too weak, but only because our
and our journey hard. For we are in the midst of a great social
will not stop struggling 'til we die, or win!
farm workers for hundreds of years and strikers for four. It was
t we threw down our plowshares and pruning hooks. These Biband tranquility to us represent too many lifetimes of union to a degrading social system that allows us no dignity, no
We mean to have our peace, and to win it without violence. for
ld overcome-the subtle spiritual and mental violence of opsubhuman toil does to the human body. So we went and
vineyards where we had stooped for years. But the tailors of
islation had left us naked. Thus exposed, our picket lines were
ions and harassed by growers; our strike was broken by imovertures to our employers were ignored. Yet we knew the day
would talk to us, 4.s equals.
farm workers for hundreds of years and boycotters for two. We
grape boycott, but we had chosen to leave our peonage, poverty
. Though our first bid for freedom, the strike, was weakened, we
k. The boycott was the only way forward the growers left to us.
r fellow men and were answered by consumers who said-as all
must-that they would no longer allow their tables to be subsiand our sorrow: They shunned the grapes, fruit of our affliction.
at the beginning, but today we count men of all creeds, napations in our number. Between us and the iustice we seek now
powerful grocers who, in continuing to buy table grapes, betray
n customers have built. These stores treat their patrons'dehe grapes the same way the growers treat our demands for union
ring them. The consumers who rally behind our cause are reto such treatment-with a boycott! They pledge to withhold
stores that handle grapes during the boycott, just as we withthe growers until our dispute is resolved
in an unenjoyed luxury for all as long as the barest human
rights are still luxuries for farm workers. The grapes grow
the vines, but they will have to wait while we reach out first for
ime is ripe for our liberation
4t4
Problems in Mexican American History
2.J
As you
Unida P
For
in
the
he's ne
May....
We
Su
part
the Ame
6
Angel Guti6rrez Calls for Political Action, l97O
w,lthere is a new political party in Southwest Texas. It's called La Ra2a
history of this party is rather interesting.
the Chicano farmworker has made up the majority of the populatiqn
th fexas counties. But he goes trucking across this country . . . and qo
thgre to vote. Yet this is precisely the time the primaries are held-ln
, Vou see, we are in fact not even able to vote.
ve firad other problems which we have known about for a long time. . . j.
se{ly in this kind of a democratic society the citizenry is encouraged fo
in]the political process-but not so in South Texas.
asked me recently whether I thought any type of system other thdn
political system could work in South Texas. I thought
-__- -_o__- about it fo{ a
ted that the question be reworded because we ought to try the
minute a
America sy$temfirst....
rizo Spr
acquse me and mexicanos in Cristal lCrystal City], in Cotulla and C{rof being unfair. One gringo lady put it very well. She was . . . intdr-
gs,l
. pight after the school board elections and before the city counpil
viewed
. .J. Newsweek asked her to explain the strange phenomena that were gcelecti
thbse counties: a tremendous voter turnout and a tremendous amount of
curring
bloc vot g.iShe said, "Well, this is just tenible! Horrible! A few days ago 1ve
urfch of bum Mexicans to the city council." And the reporter said, "Wdll,
elected
Ttiey
ercent of this county." And she replied, "That's what I mean! 'Itfey
they are 15 percent
think
orfght to run this place!"
By I tfiese little things you can begin to understand how to define the wgrd
ns
"sri
wfrich seems to be such a problem all the time. It's funny, because the
D^ ^^'D
k$ows what a gringo is. . . . Let me elaborate on it. . . .
mexica
wdrd itself describes an attitude of supremacy, of xenophobia-tftat
ru'!e afraid of strangers. . . . This attitude is also found in institutiQns,
means
such as re Democratic Party. It's in policies like the one that says you can't sppak
spanish r sphool because it's un-American. It's in the values of people. . . .
fo{mation of this party came about because of the critical need for the
people
eiperiencejustice. It'sjust like being hungry. . . .
'et'e Chicanos who were starved for any kind of meaningful participa(ion
in deci rn]making, policy making and leadership positions. For a long time we
have
bepn satisfied with the type of leadership that has been picked for us. And
this is ha( a political party does, particularly the ones we have here. I shoulpn't
use the lu{al because we only have one. . . .
ies, or party, have traditionally picked our leadership. They $ave
this leadership into a kind of broker . . . who deals in the numbqr of
trans
prgcincts he can deliver or the geographical areas he can control. . . .
VOTES
A ra$tiful example of this is Ralph Yarborough fDemocratic senator from
Texas lhd only thing he does for Chicanos is hire one every six years. He's per]
. "Mexicanos Need to Control Their Own Destinies.' in La Raza Unida Parly in
ght @ 1970 by Pathfinder Press. Reprinted by permission
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
fectly content
1964-1980 415
the bigoted sheriff and Captain Allee [Texas Rangers] and the
strikes in El Rio Grande City and . . . all these other people.
Four
, when the guy who is now running for commissioner in La
Salle County
Raza Unida Party ran in the Democratic primaries, it cost him
al income! That's how much it costs a Chicano with a median
one-third of
income of $l 74
family per year. With the third party it didn't cost him a cent
On top
ive filing fees, they have set fixed dates for political activhave to migrate to make a living. We are simply not here for
ity, knowing
the May
Did you know that in Cotulla, Erasmo Andrade [running in the
Democratic
for state senator in opposition to Wayne Connallyl lost by
over 300 vote
the misrants weren't there? . . .
So you
what's happening is not any big miracle. It's just common
is that everybody was always bothered and said, "We can't get
sense. The
'atic
Party. Why bite the hand that feeds you?" . . . Others say,
out of the De
"Well, why
switch over and join the Republican Party?" Well, let's not
even touch on
Why can'
begin to think very selfishly as a Chicano? I still haven't found
anyone as to why we should not have a Chicano party. Para good arg
are the majority. If you want to implement and see democracy
ticularly
in action
of the majority-you are not going to do it in the Democratic
Party. You
do it through a Chicano party. . . .
But you
re is another, more important, reason, and that is that mexicanos need
control of their destiny. They need to make their own decisions....We
been complacent for too long. . . .
You've
an educational level among mexicanos inZavala Countv of
2.3 grades. In
tle it's just a little worse-about 1.5 grades.
The medi
mily income in La Salle is $1,574 a year. InZavala it's about
The
of doctors, the number of newspapers, the health, housing,
$1,754.
hunger, maln
, illiteracy, poverty, lack of political representation-all
these things
her spell one word: colonialism. You've got a handful of
gringos cont
the lives of muchos mexicanos. And it's been that way for a
long time.
Do you t
hings are going to get better by putting faith in the Democratic
Party...?O
things are going to get better because you've got a few more
office now within the traditional parties? Do you think that
Chicanos elec
get better now that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has ofthings are goi
ficially clai
there is discrimination asainst mexicanos? . .
No, it's
ng to get better. We are going to have to devise some pretty ingeruous ways
minating these gringos. Yet they don't really have to be too ingenious. All
ve to do is . . . have a little common sense. . . .
In 1960 t
26 Texas counties in which Chicanos were a majority, yet
not one of t
ies was in the control of Chicanos. If you want to stand there
and take that
an. You can be perfectly content just like your father and your
grandfather
on el sombrero en el mano lwith hat in handl.
That's wh m
of our traditional organizations will sit there and pass resolutions and mou
at conventions, but they'll never take on the gringo. They'll
never stand
and say, " . . . We've had it long enough!"
guys that
4t6
Problents in Mexican Americdn Hist0ry
This
got to go
on the N
works.
.
The
strated
the non
posit
d 'll-a Raza Unida" all over the place. We don't talk about it anymore berdality. . .
Power"
it'
cause
a
Our
gan org
zihg and moving in to counterattack every time the gringo tried to
themexicano....
't let anybody kid you. We . . . are the majority. We can stop anythjlng
an imake anything in South Texas if we stick together and begin usilng
pressure
So
and we
Thi
you can
control
We
tcanos
of bei
Y
you ru
nities
response that we've had to this third party in all sections of our comftruoverwhelming. You saw the results. You can count votes just as I did.
.
T
Y
are not
and a
people
If,
vote. B
and sa
don't
but
the w
t;,;
much
f
[on't choose that route, you can stay home . . . and just come out and
otherwise stay home. Don't get in the way.
thlrd thing you can do is lend your support, your general agreement. . . .
yoq've got these three roles that you can play. Or you can get . . . defenbive
ru
:
"This is wrong, this is un-American because you're bloc voting." ]But
that the Democrats do it too. You can say that this is racism in revfrse,
going to tlpset
this ls
is gorng
maJonty. And you can say that thls
t fbrget
fdrget that we are the majority.
le bituation in the state of Texas . . . because we're segregating oursqlves
thdt this is not what we should be trying to do, that we should be tryi4g to
dtc., etc. Well, . . . come down and tell that to my sheriff. Tell him how
fike him. Or, better yet, . . . tell it to Ranger Allee himself.
'ge,t
B ld lyour constituency, build your community-that's how we will be dlecting th e dnd possibly four congressmen in the very near future. There's goifg to
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
be another
developmen
man in Bexar County
1964-1980
417
So we have some very interesting
ng up.
3.LaR
ida Convention Announces Its Priorities, 1972
LABOR:
Parity in
he right to strike and support the farmworkers' Union.
ernment,
The end to
Adequate
Guaranteed
Governmen
End of
ment opportunities and wages for Chicanos in the Federal govic service companies and agencies, unions, etc.
itation of illesal aliens.
m wage law.
m annual income and benefits.
idies shared with laborers who work for subsidized farmers.
"ri
BUSINESS:
EDUCATION
Increased
sentation
HOUSING:
HEALTH:
Stop drug t
National
Increase
INDOCHINA;
laws."
ibution of wealth and the breakup of monopolies.
ngual, bicultural education throughout entire educational system
nities for Chicanos in higher education to have greater reprehousins insured for Chicanos.
in Chicano communities.
urance to insure adequate health care to Chicanos.
t of Chicanos into medical schools.
iate withdrawal of American troops from VietNam and Indo-
China.
PENAL SY
Prison Reform.
LATIN A
L.A.
: Elimination of U.S. economic
Puerto Ri
WENFOR
Chicano
USTICE: Chi
Free legal ai
Enforcement
Complete
Support n
Support of
AND: Honor
Cease taxati
JER CHIC
for equal ri
ENERAL:
institutions
Unida Con
and
military intervention in
pendence.
:
End to Police Brutality.
ity control of law enforcement agencies.
to serve injudgeship andjuries at all levels.
re adequate legal representation for Chicanos.
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
I independence.
two major candidates for President of the United States.
Muniz for governor of Texas.
al Mexican and Spanish Land grants.
oflland.
Pledge responsible support of Latina women in their struggle
all spheres oflife.
ity control of social, economic and political and educational
self-determination.
El Grito del Norte 5, no. 8 (October 1972).
418
ajar Problems in Mexican American History
ldres Huerta Recalls Democratic and Republican
Response to the Farmworker Issue, 1972
Int
self-tau
par Ch6vez and the struggle to unionize farm labor have become virtrhyrnous. . . . But Dolores Huerta, the union's fiery vice-president, doesn't
indJ being overshadowedby Ch6vez.. . . She thinks of herself as a "corhin the union's arrny of workers and volunteers. . . .
leadership ability is undeniable- Huerta went to the Democratic Coha flelegate from California and turned this meeting of a political pa{ty
gathering of lettuce boycotters. As one of the union's chief negotiatofs,
s the opposition's highly trained and highly paid lawyers with her ortvn
nbgotiating skills. . . .
Dolores
ubrta Talks
The na
ally
sy
seem to
mon so
But
ventron
into...
she ma
hbn you learn how to do something but you have to do something el]se.
ve'kept us on the run. . . . They got the bright idea in the Nixon admiriisfrom us ln
in tne
the lederal
federal courts. . . .
try to take the boycott away trom
We ,edt to Washington and started putting heat on the Republican partyl all
cquntry. We picketed people like Bafluelos [U.S. Treasurer Romana
over
Baflue l. , . . I was in Washington talking to the Republicans and the Demociats
stqp this thing. . .
trying
ve been working more and more with the Democratic party, because]it's
mdre liberal of the two parties. We depended on the Democrats to pas$ all
been t
those b ls. 1. . . You hardly ever get Republicans to vote for you. . . .
Ir' not true that both parties are just as bad for Chicanos, because the few benewe have gotten have come through the Democratic pany. The only thing I
fits
y to people who attack the Democrats is that they should attack the Republihave
y should be going after Nixon, after Secretary of Agriculture Butz, pfter
cans
and all of these Republicans . . . who vote against us every single time. Tl;at's
y should be going after, not after the guys who are trying to help us. . . .
who
I ink that if people are dissatisfied with the Democratic party they shoulp get
and take it over. I've told Assemblyman Moretti that he can make a deciinvol
he4 for or against the poor people, and that ifhe's against us we're going to
sion
fight m. But you can't go saying this to Reagan. He won't even meet with us.
were some problems at the Democratic Convention. It was really unfortunate
se there was a little clique that was trying to put down McGovern. The rugoing around that McGovern wouldn't talk to Chicanos. Well, thi$ was
mor
ridic
because in East Los Angeles McGovern would go to every . . . plac( Chihim to go, and speak to them. But there were people who were sflread-]
canos
ing
ruYnor around. I think they were part of the Nixon sabotage squadl . . .
It',s
But the
tration
ll
.
l
1
Huerta Talks About Republicans, C6sar, Children. and Her Home Town, " in La
November-December 19'7 2.
Voz
del
l
'
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
1964-1980 4I9
I know t lt tfre farm worker issue is not the only Chicano issue. But in terms
of the visibil y Qf the Chicano issues, . . . there wasn't an agreement among the
Sofne people talked about bilingual education, other people talked
Chicanos. .
plse. . . . There just wasn't . . . consensus on what we wanted to
about somet
make public.
, I talked to Senator McGovern's staff, . . . and I told them that
Chicanos w ed]more visibility there. Naturally, they turned to me and said they
mdke a seconding speech for Eagleton. . . . And I told them that I
wanted me
didn't want be in the limelight. . .
...The hicpnos . . . had a platform with a lot of Chicano issues which they
wanted to su nit. But it was put together kind of fast, I think. . . .
n]g that Chicanos have to come from all walks of life, from differUnders
.
.
ent expene
body to think
We're ju
tion. We're g
have had fi
the whole
ahd different communities, you're not always going to get every-
ame....
reaching a level where we can get mature political participaget it as people get more interested in politics. . . . If we would
icanos in California who were really involved in politics, . .
n campaign would have been run by Chicanos. . .
.
.
It would
eq\ that with the Republicans in for another four years, . . . we'll
rstacles. Their strategy was to get Chicanos into the Republican
fube to meet with . . . Henry Ramfrez [chairman of the President's
tt{e on Opportunities for the Spanish-Speakingl. He went around
Cabinet
and said a lot I tNnible things about us . . . back east. He thought that we didn't
have any fri
s bpck there. But we do, and they . . . told us that he was saying that
the farm work rs didn't want the union, that C6sar was a Communist, and . . . a lot
. Tfris is supposed to be a responsible man.
of stupid thi
Then the is fhilip Siinchez [National director of the Office of Economic Opportunityl. I :nt to his home in Fresno once when a labor contractor shot this
farm worker. I
bor contractor
guy wouldn't
lp jme. Later when the growers got this group of labor contractors
r d company union against us, Sdnchez went and spoke to their
together to f
meeting. It
olut in the paper that he was supporting their organization. As far
as I'm conce
, fhilip Siinchez has already come out against the farm workers,
have a lot of
party. But we
5. Vilma
on ci
Def
I am Vilma S.
Legal Defense
which works
rights of over
Testimon-r-
of
ucational Fund.
trilartinez Testifies Before the U.S. Commission
I Rights About the Mexican American Legal
se and Educational Fund (MALDEF\, L975
arlinez, President and General Counsel of the Mexican American
nd Educational Fund, Inc. MALDEF is a non-profit organization
re{ress the grievances and vindicate the legal and constitutional
million United States citizens of Mexican ancesffv. Our communitv
Iulttrtinez (San Francisco, California: Mexican American Legal Defense and Ed-
l9
), dp. 1-14.
420
ajor Problems in Mexican American History
th0 second-largest minority in America today. . . . Its needs . . . arB
the barriers it faces are lesion: the discrimination it has endured and
endure is pervasive. But I should like to believe that its hope and i{s
continues
ultimate ithiin this country are abiding and deep-sprung. Today we call upon this
comm
and this Congress to vindicate that hope and faith
AI
core of that hope and faith necessarily must lie a belief that our voices
are heard ouf impact felt, and the society at large is willing to respond as bestiit
gitimate needs of our people. But too often in the American Southwest,
can to
we find
r voices subtly but effectively silenced and our efforts cancelled. . . .
ittee can help change that.
This
hout the Southwest, Mexican Americans have not been able adequately
make their weight felt at any level of government. In Texas, where Mexicans comprise lSVo of the population only 6.2Vo of the 4,770 elective
ican A
98 of them-are held by Chicanos. California is worse. There, Mexioan
offi
Ameri
comprise 18.8% of the total population. Yet, in 1970, of the 15,650 rnaahd appointed positions at all levels of government-federal, state {nd
Jor e
y 310 or 7.98Vc were held by Mexican Americans.
local
Th result is no mere coincidence. It is the result of manifold discriminatQry
which have the desisn or effect of excludins Mexican Americans frbm
part
ion in their own government and maintaining the status quo.
, Mr. Chairman, the United States Commission on Civil Rights is char$ed
with in rnr,ing the congress and the nation about such discriminatory practices'on
the part f state and local officials. I would like to review with the Committee what
the Co mission found in Uvalde Countv. Texas. What the Commission found in
r. Chairman, exists all across the State of Texas. The pattern of abuse in
Uvalde
Uvalde
unty is strikingly reminiscent of the Deep South of the early 1960's.
The Ci 1 Rights Commission study documents that duly registered Chicano voters
ing placed on the voting lists; that election judges are selectively,and
are
delibe
ly invalidating ballots cast by minority voters; that election judges are
refusi
to aid minority voters who are illiterate in English; that the Tax AssessorCol
of Uvalde County . . . refuses to name members of minority groups as
deput e$istrars; . . . "runs out" of registration application cards when minority
ilcants ask for them; . . . refuses to register voter applicants based oq the
voter
lity that the application was filed on a printed card bearing a prelious
techn
year's ate.
er abuses were uncovered . . . [:] widespread gerrymandering with thq purpose
diluting minority voting strength; systematic drawing of at-large ele(toral
distri s with this same purpose and design; maintenance of polling places ef,clusivel n areas inaccessible to minority voters; excessive filing fees required fn order
n for political office; numbered paper ballots which need to be signed byi
the
r,, thus making it possible to discover for whom an individual cast his'
constitute
enormou
bal
is. then. is the situation in at least one of the 254 Texas counties. As the
Civil ights Commission found, the processes by which this country conducts its
are riddled with subtle-and not so subtle-discriminatorv devices
elect
whic have the effect of excludins minorities. The atmosohere in which thosd elec.
conducted is heavy with the clouds of discrimination and coercivp con.r
tions
'
l
l
i
The Gaininq of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment.
trol. . .
all across the great swath of Texas where Chicanos are attemptisions affecting their county, their city, and their schools, deciial to their daily lives. It is thus crucial that the constitutional
.
ing to share
sions which
rights of the
1964-1980 421
i
zens be enforced.
, it is simply not possible to guarantee to these people a mean-
But,
with private litigation alone. It would be like attempting to
ingful right
a sand pail.
empty the
There is,
Rights Act I
ver, an alternative remedy: Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Voting
I. Under Section 5, for instance, no change in a voting practice
ver slight, could be enforced without the acquiescence of the
. . . Practices that range from the most flagrant gerrymander to
fer of a polling place . . . would all be objectionable under
presence of federal registration examiners under Section 6, and
rs under Section 8, both would . . . dampen the abuse of
and coercion directed against Mexican Americans.
are swift. They are efficient. They are effective. They are in
Ie for the extraordinary gains marked by minorities in the
past decade. They are relevant to the problems faced by Mexhe Southwest today. The Congress should apply these remedies
Southwest. . . .
this committee should clarify for the Justice Department its rethe Voting Rights Act of 1965. .. . The Congress should pass
ge which would afford Mexican Americans in Texas and elset the powerful protections of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
or procedure,
Attorney Ge
the most su
Section5....
federal electi
raw economlc
These re
sreat measure
Deep South o
lCan
and safe
Mr. Chair
sponsibilities
amendatory I
where in the
Act.
In all this,
ticipate in our
an, there lies only the fervent desire to be heard, to pargovernment and to ensure that electoral rules and procedures
opportunity for self-expression at the polls. And ulti-our
ion is passed by the Congress and enforced by the Justice Debetter local government. . . . It will mean the beginnings of a
Americans. I sincerely hope this committee will help us
ing. Thank you.
foster-not f
, ifthis
,it
share for
that new
6. Juan
South
st Texas has
ities like .
.
white people,
ized only
for Latinos
Meskin" vote
an Vdsquez
printed by perm
uez Discusses Willie VelSsquez and the
Voter Registration Project (SVREP), L979
been . . . a throwback to simpler, uglier times. In rural com, Mexicans are still "Meskins," and the rest of the folks are
authority of the federal government and its courts is recogy. West Texas is consequently a place of political powerlessace where gerrymandered districts are common and where the
goes into a ballot box that is really a trash can. Nonetheless,
for Willie Yelasqtez," Nuestro Magazine 3, no. 2 (March 1979):20-24.
the author.
All
ajoy Problems in Mexican American History
Chicanos od{y are venturing into this political terra incognita, and . . . they are bg-
glnnlng
wid elections.
rge forward is being mapped mainly by one man. . . . He is a softactivist who likes to invoke Jefferson. Franklin and Lincoln to disarln
his critic . .1. William C. "Willie" Veliisquez . . . runs . . the most significant
Latino
iti0al group in the U.S.-the Southwest Voter Registration Education
rhis work is just starting to be recognized.
Project
is the man the Anglo establishment hates to see. When he shows up,
it almost urely means trouble for the old order that all too often still gives Anglos a
ute political power oyer sizeable, sometimes majority, Chicano populations. of,sider the progress that VelSsquez and the SVREP have made since
This
spoken e
r974:
r}r]
y d third of a million Mexican American, Native American and Black
been registered in six Southwestern states in the last two years alonei
lebs reports and analyses have been made, outlining minority votilng
strength
ielectoral contributions to date. . . .
a
ns iof minority members have been elected to office in places like Cohey. Colo.. and Pecos. Tex. . . .
JOS Cou
gigest gain is, paradoxically, the least tangible. For there has been a (efTh
inite
in Chicano attitudes-the chanse that comes from the discoverv that
they
{ctually win elections. And to understand just how big a shift that fras
hlas only to recall the years and years of trying for elective office, pnd
been,
voters
failing
eriery try. . . . Then there was a related question: How could Chicanos] esif political power across broad areas if they could not win even wfiren
ifi the majority?
anbwers came with the founding of the voter registration project. . . . U$ing
I lthe successful Voter Education Proiect launched by Southern Blacl$ rn
'6Qs, the project . . . got off the ground in 197 5, with Willie Vel6squez af the
ht away, SVREP began analyzing elections from a minority standppint,
tablish
they
asa
the m
helm.
in$ voter registration surveys and seminars and, perhaps most important,
orit target areas that were ripe for political and legal action.
t we found in a lot of these places is what the staff calls 'induced rapa6squez explains. "The people kept losing and losing, and the more you
more inclined you are to think you can never win. You tend to give
l
pfocess begins with a visit to the courthouse of the target county to ask for
to voter registration and census. . . . "We're always
lite when we go in because there's no point in antagonizing anyone,'1 says
extra
VelSs
i. "They've got to give it to you because it's a matter of public record, andi
they
w it; so if they get a little hostile, you just endure it." . . .
case in point is Sutton County, [Texas,] a sheep- and goat-raising arda . . .
population. As
constitute ))"/a
of Ine
the p0puratlon.
in moSI
lexas Coqntles,l
Chicanos
tnlcanos . . . constltute
55Vo oI
AS ln
most Texas
codnties,j
the
inbs had been gerrymandered into political impotence. In spite of ye[rs of
vigo
s iefforts, no Chicanos had ever been elected to an important officei. "In-r
duc
apathy" was rife.
Confronted with proof that the Chicano vote had been diluted, the (ountj
beine sued in federal co[rt
cobrt fot
fof
deci
to redistrict rather than face the prospect of being
)
the
licr records pertaining
r
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
almost surely losing. Result: A Mexican American today
member commissioner's court. . ,
nty script has been replayed in'dozens of counties and small
gerrym
sits...on
The Su
cities. . . .
Currentl
ties or muni
pa
staff of SV
ture action is
But
prospect
if
project is filing suit against or negotiating with 21 Texas counities over voting irregularities. . . . Further, Veldsquez and the
comoiled a . . . list of 13 Texas cities and counties where fuible.
t
s
As for
tron-ls
1964-1980 423
navl
Ject ls
designed to h
not have e
take part in a
streets and
Vel6squ
of gaining strength at the local level is encouraging, the
across the Southwest as a whole-is something else. , . .
Latino voter-and the voter registration project, by implicalittle effect at the statewide level, Vel6squez says that the proinfluence local elections. It does not fund resistration drives
on . . . gubernatorial or senatorial races because (1) it does
and (2\ most of the complaints from voters who want to
drive are focused on such local problems as drainage,
s the value of thinking small, keeping election goals concrete
and specific.
six states of
the minority
Vel6sq
ated from
then attended
tered graduate
grape boycott
Vel6squez
where. . . he
ject has even conducted 200-vote campaigns throughout the
west, and it has been generally welcomed with open arms by
ity and its supporters. . . .
up in San Antonio's West Side banio of Edgewood but graduCatholic High School, just a few blocks from downtown. He
's University. . . . Armed with a degree in economics, he enbut dropped out in 1966 to become involved full time in the
he United Farm Workers' Organizing Committee. . . . Later,
work for the Bishops' Committee on the Spanish-Speaking,
red for running up huge long-distance phone bills that were un-
related to his i
...Asfor
the first Raza
The conv
watershed eve
Chicanos and
aimed at captu
...
He
Movimiento
assembled at
I
Vel6squez ei
Vel6squez
il
if the meetins was a milestone. the afterelse. No one seemed to know how to use the potential power
vention. When a separate political party called La Raza Unida
t year under the aegis of . . . Jos6 Angel Guti6rcez . . . Ll
q{it or was read out of the party, depending on whom one talks
de la Raza Unida. But
math was som
was formed
iring, he says, "What we were really doing was putting together
convention."
held in January of 1968 at a SanAntonio high school, was a
history of Chicano politics. It marked the first time so many
. . . . had come together to try to create a powerful faction
r. And Willie Vel6squez was right in the middle of it.
the first coordinator of what was then called El
IMAU
ic self
irh the Nati
gistration pr
the first executive director of the Mexican American Unity
ich . . . is an extremely successful organization, providing
programs for Chicanos. . . . After a year at MAUC and a stint
il of La Raza, Vel6squez became involved with the voter
424
ajor Problems in Merican American History
icdntly, the project is just beginning to step up its activities in Californila.
One re
boing studied by the staff of the voter registration project was prepared
for the C ifcirnia State Assembly Committee on Elections and Reapportionment n
1977. It
d at 65 cities with substantial minority populations and conclud(d:
"Of the 65 cities, minority groups were significantly underrepresented in 63.rln
60 of
63i the Mexican American populations were underrepresented by from
one to fr r Chicano City Council members per city." . . .
he surveys the Latino political scene across the country, Veldsqr]ez
fi"d;;; tantial grounds for optimism. In the first place, the median age of MeXiicdns is 19.7 years, compared with the national average of nearly i30
can A
years.
at lneans that as Mexican Americans cross the as.e 25 threshold. whbre
frequen
of voting picks up, they should turn out more and more on election d!y.
Secondl gfoups like SVREP and MALDEF are eliminating the institutional obstacles
have kept Latinos out of the voting booth in the past. And third, the era
of Chic
Supported strikes and boycotts has served to give the Chicano a sefrse
of
that was missing before. . . .
Vel souez cautions that the 1980s misht be a decade of frustration. ". . . It
could
out to be 10 long years of misery unless we get equitable voting disrkey factor, he feels, is the 1980 census, which should provide political
tricts."
p
w|th better information on Latinos than previous counts. That is vital because i s on the basis ofthe census that all subsequent political strategies andidebased.
cisions
other thing we've got going for us is the immigrants," accordin! to
"Whether anyone likes it or not, those immigrants have not had justice
Velii
are going to demand that this country live up to its laws and its constituand t
tion.
are vital to the health of American democracv. . . .
In the city of Ozona in west Texas' Crockett County, . . . the project hdd to
ISSUE
emergency appeal for money to caffy out its case against outrageous gerryman rit'rg. . . . Its treasury was depleted. . . because SVREPhad to fight. . i. deIaying ctics and recalcitrance on the part of the Anglo establishment deterrlined
re its long-held power.
not to
Ahglo election officials had been responsible for some egregious violatrons
thle electoral code-unusual even by Texas standards. Ballots were folor
coded r that election officials could know which belonged to Mexican Ameripans.
The
lot box was opened repeatedly before the election was over. The county
clerk
aside a box for "questioned ballots" when Mexican Americans camei in to
S
vote.
two
ha
pat
oft
con
offi
cou
of fi
. A-fter years of contested, postponed and special elections, there are flnally
exican Americans on the commissioner's court in Crockett County. This
after the SVREP conducted a registration drive that enlisted the pdrticiof 95Vo of the eligible Chicanos in the county. In the crucial electionl 937a',
cast ballots. Still, the election of one of the Mexican Americans is hein!
tedr by the man he beat; it may never end. But instead of being cheated out oi'
an{ being forced to sue to win his seat, Sostenes de Hoyos is sitting [n the
and forcing his Anglo opponent to go through the trouble and elpens(
suit. In west Texas, that's real progress.
]
i
l
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
1964-1980 425
ESSAY
The Chicanos
efforts by oth
culturally, and
admission to h
ticipation in th
satisfied a
by Ignacio M,
Provo, Utah, i
thor explains
as the party's
form of the LR
date. He gai
Chicanos and
choice among t
In the
se
offers a th
lican party to
tions in Calif
the Chicano
Americans to
American fede
canos in the
in the end the
Committee to
for racial justice and equality in the 1960s, along with similar
minorities. dramatically transformed the United States sociaily,
ically. Chicanos' achievements included bilingual education,
education, assistance for migrant farmworkers, and political parrties and eventually in the major parties. La Raza Unida Party
:orlChicanos to participate in politics. The subject of the first essay,
ardia, assistant professor of history at Brigham Young University in
ie 1972 campaign of Ramsey Mufliz for governor of Texas. The auw lfufliz emerged as the major LRUP candidate for governor as well
rdidg spokesperson. Despite the nationalistic and revolutionary platIP, |,Iufliz quickly proved to be a very popular and charismatic candiwi{espread support in both the rural and urban areas ofTexas among
rglds alike. According to Garcia, many Texas Anglo liberals, without a
Qemocratic candidates for governor, opted to vote for Muiiz.
d e]ssay Tony Castro, formerly a journalist with the Houston Post,
r dQscription of the efforts of the Nixon administration and the Repubn ttie Chicano vote because of its growing potential to determine elecia {nd Texas. The author argues that the Republicans began wooing
: anld shaping a so-called Chicano Strategy by appointing Mexican
I key national offices, by increasing the number of Mexican
I erlnployees, and by distributing much-needed federal funds to Chi. Althoueh such tactics were successful. Castro concludes that
lican Chicano Strategv became mired in the machinations of the
-Elbct the President.
1972 Carnpaign of Ramsey Mufliz
for Governor of Texas
IGNACIO M. GARCIA
amsey Mufliz bylhis own account, had been active in MAYO [Mexican AmeriYouth
riz{tionl since 1968 and had even served as an organizer for the
IN
in the
Once he
and ent
the
Southwest
Ior Univers
After
ay by servin
M. Garcia.
La Raza Unida P
American
n Texas. Yet he was not well known in partv circles. . . . Mufliz
's Chicano newspaper but otherwise was not prominent in the
became a [Texas] gubernatorial candidate. . . .
a candidate, Mufliz demonstrated a tenacity and a reservoir of
i{sm that astonished the party leaders. At twenty-nine, he still
al strength that had earned him . . . an honorable mention in
rence's 1965 all-star selection for his plav as a lineman for the
.ln from Baylor, Mufliz entered the law school there and paid his
AS
an assistant student coach for the varsity team. When
he
Mufliz and the 1972 Campaign," from Unitecl We Win: The Rise and Fall
: University ofArizona. 1989), pp. 77-88. Reprinted by permission of
s and Research Center.
426
aJpr Problems in Mexican American History
received
an admi
opment
w
and no
tween
w degree. he served first as a law clerk for a local attornev. then hs
tive assistant, and finally as director of the Urban Community Dev{lation of Waco. . . .
ufriz filed to run for governor, there was no state campaign commitdee
y, the platform was not complete, and no communications existed $ed the candidate for lieutenant governor, Alma Canales. . . . Despfite
being in
ing his
gree, n
married
was a re
ballot,
On
n10 a
two
porters
fice
if
'ty
least t
sary to
the 22,
swered
that R
igh
58
hat
Ps
y, Mufliz represented middle-class respectability with his law de
hing, and attractive spouse. Canales was the radical, poorly dressfd,
AYO activist, and a less articulate candidate. Her name on the ballot
f the women's strength in the party caucuses, and she remained on fhe
efforts to remove her. . . .
9 ll972l Mufriz was unveiled at a press conference in San Arltoth Canales and a list of fifty-two other RUP candidates. Immediatfly,
s arose in regard to the party's candidates and its ballot status. f.ety pointed out that Canales, at twenty-four, could not legally take]ofn because the state constitution required a lieutenant sovernor to bb at
ears old. Compean responded that the party would go to court if ne{esthe age limitation. Reporters also asked Compean if he felt that rai$ing
ignatures needed to get on the state ballot would be a problem. He] anhe saw no difficulty in getting them and warned the party's opponpnts
ready to go through the long court process again to gain b4llot
status.
came her turn, Canales declared that the party had no interest in fllaypolitical "games" as the Democrats and the Republicans. "We'r{ not
lace a system that oppresses people with a brown system thati ople," she said. . . . For many, Canales proved to be a direct, gut-l]evel
expounded the MAYO and Raza Unida philosophy. Her candipacy
ing t
golng
cand
signal
srve l
oft
time
South
U.S.
Farm
and
the
the
and
Ev
who
of th
a
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
1964-1980 427
vote in the
ballot. He al
American
both parties
so they could sign the petitions to put the party on the state
a(cused Preston Smith, the governor, of remembering the Mexican
a[ election time. At Del Mar College in Corpus Christi he blasted
rdaking false promises.
Mexican
reficans have had it with the lies. Ya basta ["Enotgh"]. Raza Unida offers
n {lternative and the days of being led to the polls to vote straight ticket for
r parties are over. . . . It is not a revolt of guns or violence, but by the
it'sJnot done this year, it will come next year or the next
the
y{here else he stopped he was greeted by chants of "Viva la Razal"
tinie Mufliz became comfortable as the lead man for the party. At
first he felt
vorfls speaking in front of an audience and relied on prepared texts,
but soon he di :oriered that his strength was in . . . drawing in his audience by asking them q
ong, leading the chants, and joking. His mingling with the crowds
es proved particularly effective. Said one ofthe party leaders about
after his s
him: "
a likable personality. . ., so down to earth. . . straightforward,
There and
e
Ina
spoke from t
a perfect choice as a candidate. . . . He was sincere and he
In a rhetoric-conscious communitv. he not onlv said manv
of the things
had been wanting to hear for a long time. but said them in
unpretentious.
Spanish and in wpy that assured people he would not recant them even under Anglo pressure.
rig Chicanos, students, and dropouts liked his direct style, his
militancy. . . . he older Mexican Americans liked him because he carried good
credentials . . anQ could be the perfect gentleman. Wherever he went, Mufliz
picked up the
good luck for the party that Mufliz was so effective, because
It was a
he signature g he{ing did not proceed as well as the leadership had hoped. There
e not enou
vdlunteers to carry the petitions, and too many of the registered
oters were co mifted Democrats. Even when they were not, many of them felt
neasy about
si$g up the primaries, in which they could vote for a Mexican
si]gn a petition for an unknown party. Despite the publicity that
AYO and the )r$stal City takeover received, many Mexican American voters
re uninfo
The idea
r tliird party seemed to catch on faster among those who had not
,ctpral politics before. As Mufliz said at a rally: "The Mexican
merican and t blhck communities . . . don't vote because in the past thev didn't
ve a real choi
than a
are divorcin
participating
. . | . Our connection with the Democratic Party has been nothing
have lied to us and betrayed [us]. . . . Now
l nfaniage. . . . They
oufselves from the Democratic Party." Although many of these
rfcan Americans were enthusiastic about the new party, it beabigc
{ualify them to sign the petition. These people had to register
vote before t
cpuld sign, and the party did not have enough qualified regisg{thering effort had been divided by region, and though the
The
and West :xap chapters had been able to pick up signatures at a fast pace,
big-city cha rs ifir Houston, Dallas, Austin, and San Antonio were not keeping
py June 15, 19'72, a month after the primaries, Mufliz told a
with their
in San An
that the party had fifteen thousand of the twenty-three thoud signatures
428
Problems in Mexican American
S
when Br
a maveri
malnst
Briscoe
ranches
blacks,
Goi
tunity to
little
ocrats.
campalg
talked
us
Histlry
gan to increase rapidly, however, after the Democratic primariep
n the nomination in a close race with Frances "Sissy" Farenthold,
I from Corpus Christi who had attracted significant support frorh
exican Americans. To many moderates and liberal Democratb,
ed earlier times. when rural conservatives rode from out of thelr
state capital, where they maintained a status quo that excluddd
an Americans and poor whites. . . .
the state [RUP] convention on June 10, Mufliz saw a golden oppoirit disenfranchised Democrats into the Raza Unida fold and movel a
ard the center, where he could attract many Mexican American Derfry after the runoffs he called on the liberal Democrats to support liis
ying "we're talking about the same things. Liberals have alwafs
relping minorities. How much more can they help than by voting {or
saying to liberals is 'how liberal are you.' " . . .
,nvention Mufliz quickly established himself as one of the leaderslof
did it with his natural charm and through the number of people he iatb convention. In half a year Muiiz had traveled more, met more pfon interviewed more than anyone else in the party except Guti6rrez {nd
o many people outside the movement, Mufliz was the party. .. . Mufliz
the state party, principally because he was its standard-bearer but {lso
bund himself a dynamic campaigner among a less-than-charismfltic
r
At
the part
tracted
ple, and
C
symbol
group
idates.
still defining the role of the party, its ideology pnd
Mufliz already had a pattern to follow-that of a politician stumping
votes. Deeply conscious of La Raza Unida's premises, he broug$t to
n a militancy not seen since the days of the populist movemen(s in
was nevertheless a traditional campaign. He simply added a Chidano
Lrty activists were
me
,
the sta
the c
Texas,
and
diat
A
other
iew
rriginal candidates had dropped out by this time. After the formalitips of
s the party delegates debated and then approved a party platform. i
nt so . . . the voice of the people will be heard
be expected from activists who concentrated so much time on dduca
res and who gained their militancy through school boycotts and prptests
platform committee made education its top priority. . . . After depryinl
lropout rates in Texas schools . . . and the unfair school financing sJ'sten
rm called for specific measures that at the time were radical. Thd part
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
1964-1980 429
all school districts develop multilingual and multicultural programs
mlpreschool to college; that state funds be distributed equally to all
school distri s; that school officials and school boards be proportionally representative of the :ordmunity; that free early-childhood education, including daycare
and presc
activities, be provided for all children; that schools without walls be
created; and
btandardized tests be eliminated as a measure of achievement until they accu
lj reflected the language usage and culture of those tested. And finally, the
called for aid to private Chicano and black schools and colleges.
Aside fi
education, there were thirteen other sections dealing with politics,
gl justice, international affairs, natural resources, transportation,
and health. In ll areas the party platform followed a leftist-liberal line. It called for
free educati
ldwering of the voting age to eighteen; giving the right to vote to
foreigners;
ihg up monopolies; fair distribution of wealth; implementation of
equal minorit representation in the judicial system; abolishment of capital punishment; passa
of lthe Equal Rights Amendment; removal of trade embargoes and
economic san tions against Cuba; and the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. The
abolishment
tho Texas Rangers was a popular resolution at the convention. The
platform also
ed for the recognition ofthe new state ofBansladesh.
For a pa
rEpresenting the vanguard of Chicano separatism, its governing
ly mildly nationalistic. It reflected both an effort to attract liberal
document w
groups outsi
the Mexican American community and the influence of the antiwar
It pas evident in the document that party leaders recognized their
own commu
sl conservatism in economic and social matters. They purposely
socialist rhetoric fashionable at the time. . . .
avoided much
After the nrl'ention, party leaders came out swinging, mostly at the Demoived to be vulnerable, and some party activists were angry
crats. Briscoe
because Fa
had refused to support Mufliz, whose views were closer to
hers. Mufliz av iddd criticizing Farenthold, choosing instead to woo her supporters
by pointing
sofne of the similarities of his campaign with that of the defeated
to liberals that they initiate a "Democrats for Muniz" movertrein he told black leaders in Austin that any demands they would
ment. In the sa
make, he wou si$n. He also announced that in Houston and Dallas several black
activists were gailizing a "blacks for Mufliz" drive.
In seeking adk support, Mufliz received two major boosts. The first came at
the Democrati
ional Convention in Miami, where Briscoe. followins the lead
numerous
delegates, voted for George Wallace for the presidential
nomination. A
lVallace's apparent defeat Briscoe quickly shifted his vote to
M
but most Texas liberal delegates left the convention sure that
going to do anything to help the Democrats caffy the election in
riscoe was
state. Mufli quickly announced that through his action Briscoe had . . . come
ut and shown s tfue colors. . . . He added that if Wallace's supporters launched
nother presi
af campaign, as they had four years before, it would give the
y a better c
of winning, because moderates and liberals who would vote
gainst Wallace ight also vote against Briscoe. . . .
The
mqjor boost for the campaign came when the Reverend Ralph
rnathy,
rf the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. the orsanization
demanded t
at all levels
430
rjqr Problems in Mexican American History
by Martin Luther King, Jr., endorsed Mufliz for governor. It was]a
for the RUP candidate. . . .
gqst 8 the party was certified to appear on the state ballot. With the
On
party legi mdte, Mufiiz, who up to this time had been without an official campai6fn
manager,
[Jos6 Angel; see Document2) Gutilrrez to direct his electoral ef[ort. In a roulncing Guti6rrez, he criticized the Republicans and Democrats for hihrng out -stdte, big-name public relations agencies to handle their campaigqs.
Briscoe
hired a Tennessee firm and Henry Grover a New York company. Sa[d
do!'r't have to go to New York City and I'm not going to have to go lo
Mufliz:
toirun my political campaign. A11I'm going to do is go to Crystal Ci{y.
Ten
There is firm right there and it has a staff of 10,000 people . . . and Jos6 Angel]is
led at
irnle
maJor I
rfy campaign manager." Mufliz rejected the reporters' notions that qe-
going to
cause
that
of
leputation Gutidrrez would be a hindrance to the campaign. He added
organization was picking up support among conservative and older
dhe
Mexica
The
rnlericans.
ference to Grover indicated that even LaRaza Unida could see that dhe
dandidate's campaign was picking up momentum. Grover had not bqen
oif the Republican leadership, but he had won the primaries, had milreild, and excelled as a campaigner. Some political observers also be-
lions to
lieved t
t d McGovern-led Democratic Party meant a sure victory in Texas for
ixpn and a strong coat-tail effect. . . .
u$ton, a few days before naming Guti6rrez his manager, Mufliz las$ed
who had just concluded their national convention. He acat
Rdpublicans,
out
through
both sides of their mouths because they promibed
m
of
talking
cused
but
had
only
one Mexican American in the Texas delegatfon
minorities
:
parties, he said, "We've put them in the strate
about
both
lacl<s.
Talking
and no
house, e'Ve put them in the White House, but we stay in the dog house. Vy'e
nt ito stay there anymore." Mufliz predicted that RUP and not the f.edon't
publica
would be the second majority party in the state and added that he offered a alternative to the look-alike conservatism of Grover and Briscoe.lHe
also
ied that the party was trying to help elect a Republican to get back at the
Richard
In
Democ
August 28 some liberals who had remained silent, sulking after Falenthold's friat, spoke cautiously about Mufliz and the RUP. In a cover story in The
sdrtter entitled Ya basta! they introduced Mufliz to their readers in ]this
Texas
"If
you can't stomach Dolph Briscoe and Henry Grover is unthinkablel the
fashio
name
thb Raza Unida candidate is Ramsey Mufliz." They went on to give sbme
details f Mufliz's background, highlighting his assistance to Farenthold's legislaThen. in an almost melancholic reflection of their own party's failure to
tive
provi
a
better alternative, the editors wrote:
many black, chicano and liberal Democratic leaders to whom the Observe',r has
seems clear that as John Kennedy once said, "Sometimes party loyaltyj asks
m!ch." For their own political sakes, they cannot support Mufliz against Bribcoe.
, they are planning to telegraph to their supporters, in various ways, the efiuiv-
!
,'it
t df McGovern's
great line from the Democratic convention, "Vote yourj con-
folks, just vote your conscience."
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Politicat Empowerment,
1964-1980 431
aining the Mexican American Vote
in the 1972 Presidential Election
TONY CASTRO
In historic S
Anglos, they
worst defeat
Mexican-A
a
'in
It's
ha
in
write off the Ie
electoral
could have
5 percent of
When t
were oeterml
ern states.
more gove
federal
saw the poten
gruntled with
cano vote.
2 elections rolled around, President Nixon and the Republicans
to make the same mistake in Texas and four other Southwestan was simple: . . . providing high administration positions and
jobs to Mexican-Americans and . . . doling out a bigger share of
ms aimed at Mexican-Americans. Observant GOP officials
loc of voters, and the Mexican-Americans . . . had become disic party.
Strategy. . . . It was a political move that aroused mixed
hand, Mexican-Americans were making unprecedented gains
stration. Without a doubt, the GOP showed up the Democrats
for la raza. But on the other hand, there were strong, naglong the trend would last. Indeed, the strategy came from the
, and one couldn't help but wonder whether the appointments,
ral money wouldn't suddenly develop a problem. . . .
t Nixon came to office in 1969, .. . his administration inherited
y Committee on Mexican-American affairs, created during the
lwith complaints from Mexican-Americans in the Southwest.
first year in office, Congress passed legislation changing the
inet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking Peoto strengthen and broaden the scope ofthe agency. . . . The
had intended to meet with members of the President's cabinet
, and an advisory council was supposed to be established. . . .
w were not carried out.
Call it
feelings. On t
in the Nixon
in getting thin
ging doubts as
master of poli
thejobs, andt
When
...theInterJohnson days
During Mr. Ni
agency into
ple-this
was
committee ch
discuss
parts
...
of
One
intees, Marti
ittee executi
r
<
pressure
vy Democr
n which the
bny Castro, "The
from
io, the cradle of animosity between Mexican-Americans and
that the Mexican-Americans in 1968 dealt Richard Nixon the
ingo since the Battle of the Alamo. That year, the San Antonio
ns gave the Republicans 6 percent oftheir votes. . .
the Mexican-American vote cost Nixon the twenty-five Texas
968. . . . GOP strategists conceded later that they were wrong to
ican-American vote, and their own figures showed that Nixon
he state away from Hubert Humphrey if he had won only another
ident Nixon's first high-ranking Mexican-American apstillo, resigned as chairman of the committee along with comrector Henry Quevedo. Both resignations reportedly came
the White House. as a result of the Mexican-American's
in the California and Texas senatorial elections in 1970
nt and the Republican candidates were rebuffed. . . . Those
Strategy," in Chicano Power: The Emergence of Mexican America, 1974,
4. Reprinted by permission of Tony Castro.
I
432
ibr Problems in Mexican American Hktory
tests for the GOP's Chicanos, and the White House quickly made
elections
known i diqpleasure with their performance. . . .
point, . . . the President suddenly decided to awaken the Cabinet ComAt
mittee
Its sleep. On August 5, 197 1, President Nixon announced the appoi4tment of enly M. Ramirez, an educator from Mr. Nixon's hometown of Whittier,
Californ , aF the committee's new chairman. At the same time the President directed
nistration officials to step up the hiring of Spanish-speaking perslns
and to
I $overnment programs for the country's Spanish-speaking populatio4.
In
mirnths that followed, Ramirez was joined by a flood of other Mexicanappointees. Phillip V. Sanchez, an unsuccessful GOP candidate for
Americ
in Oalifornia, was named national director of the Office of Economic Qpcongre
portunit tOEOl, thus becoming the highest ranking Mexican-American officia! in
the adm istiation. Mrs. Romana A. Banuelos, a Los Angeles businesswoman, was
appoin
treasurer of the United States, the first Mexican-American woman eVer
named
subh a high post. White House Counselor Robert H. Finch . . . was !ssigned
the President's own liaison with the Cabinet Committee. and he was
ility for handling Mexican-American relations. The White House
glven
tqd a Spanish-speaking Japanese, staff assistant William H. Marumdto,
even di
to deve p d government recruitment system for Spanish-speaking Americans. ]By
imE in l9'72, there were at least fifty high-ranking Mexican-American jofelecti
ficials
iwed their jobs to the administration's Chicano Strategy.
did the Mexican-American vote require a strategy all its own? . . I In
t . i . ttre President was going to need every vote he could get, and in Jevmid-1
eral of Le ltey states, it was the Mexican-Americans who made up the balancg of
power.
qnd the 1968 election were one example of how the Chicano vote cduld
mean
difference. . . . California was another state where the Chicano tote
the difference. . . . Indeed. the stakes were bie. One studv showed that
could
ly 6 percent of the Mexican-American vote could affect the elections
a switc of
s and California but also in New Mexico and lllinois. four sthtes
not onl 1n
with 1 e
I votes out of the 270 needed to elect a oresident.
y
1912, the number of Mexican-Americans in the upper echelons of the
B
admini ralion left little doubt about the White House's intention of going aftel the
-Aimerican vote. On the surface, the strategy appeared positive and WellMexi
meani : first, there were the appointments, the jobs, and the money that would be
Te
going
there
Nfiexican-Americans and their programs. Second, and more imporfant,
$re exposure of the administration's good deeds, to be accomplishe$ by
appol
B
tics w
went
tained
later,
story. . . . There were hints of questionabld tacinto the Chicano Strategy.
mmittee to Re-Elect the President . . . included a division assisned to
ish-speaking voter. In charge of it was Alex Armendariz,... who
t
--1- Tr,,
al memo recommending strategy for the Chicano . . . vote.
The memb
.
Fdederick Malek, deputy director of the committee. . . . The memo conulgestions and recommendations that certainly were employed, thqn or
,po la raza
wbo
raza.
r
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
1964-1980 433
ows that Armendariz planned to use negative tactics in either atlizing
the Mexican-American vote. For example, he suggested
tractlng or
pr
vide secret assistance to the fledgling La Raza Unida party in
that the GO
Texas as an
o to pull votes from the Democrats. . . . This is how Armendariz
The
S
lr
outlined the
rat gv:
pf this area [Texas] would be incomplete without special mention of La
If is unique in that it is . . . an effective political party. The party is working on its rri political organization, caucuses, slates, and the signatures necessary to
present I owfr ballot. The rationale it presents is that if enough votes are siphoned
away
th( Democrats, there will be more of a power balance and La Raza could
Any
ana
Raza Uni
s
.
sivp votes, or at least achieve bargaining power. Republicans are in a good
help to attract to La Raza as voters the 62.3 percent who already approve of
La Raza's strategy usually is denouncement of old party politics. . . . McGovern
ld 1be exposed as an old-style party politician
since his recenl
"rp""iully
visit to I
a Governor Georgel Wallace, who is vastly unpopular among Mexican-Ame an{. Humphrey is easily attacked in this manner. Kennedy would present
an eno
s froblem as his whole family is loved by Mexican-Americans. Republicans wolt haye to lay off him entirely and expend all negative efforts in the Spanishnil1.^ helping La Raza.
speaking
On
r hand, the 19.4 percent who disapprove of La Raza may be the most
the group, making them a natural Republican target. . . . Furthermore,
consefvat
it \\till be
to try to crystallize the remaining 33 percent of the Spanish-speaking
heard of La Raza, or who have no opinion of it, toward La Raza, the
who have
Republic
or sta))ing at home. . .
lnust come up with a slick advertising package showing the President
doing, or
n]g done, something about jobs and housing. . . . If he could be directly
, fldentified with a push for bilingual education. we wou]d have a strong
and
positive i
Utalics by T. Castrol
cast conc
position
that
.
lt is not rtidularly surprising, then, that George McGovern, during the last
month of the anipaign, accused the Republican party of bribing . . . La Raza
Unida in Texa . . . to hold down the vote among Mexican-Americans. Through his
Illinois coord :of, Gene Pokorny, Senator McGovern accused Jos6 Angel Guti6rrez of espou
n$utrality in the presidential election in exchange for a $1 million
health clinic f hi$ hometown of Crystal City, Texas. Pokorny got his information
)riQto, a Chicano doctor who said he was offered a job at the new
from Dr. J
health clinic
Gqti6rrez's wife. "She indicated that such funding had been made
beca
available
Qf an arrangement between La Raza Unida and Republican party
yisaid.
officials,"
At its nati
I bonvention in El Paso, LaRaza Unida refused to endorse either
:rnJ
nj or President Nixon, and party leaders instead urged their folSenator
lowers to fore r riational politics and concentrate on races involving La Raza
Unida cand
s, Nuch as Ramsey Mufriz, the party's gubernatorial nominee in
xas. This
e Qame as a surprise and a disappointment to McGovern backers
other libe ;, r,irho counted on the support of Chicano activists. At the conven, Mufliz dec refl that the only way he would favor endorsing McGovern would
by securing refum endorsement of his own candidacy from the Democratic
lnee
ilr
Problems in Mexican American History
's accusation asainst LaRaza Unida evoked a rash of ansrv denia.ls
and denu iations. Mufliz charged that McGovern was "playing politics with the
health n
s bf Chicanos." And Mario Compean, La Raza Unida's state chairman
1n
replied: "We still maintain our position that there is no difference bbtween G rrgd McGovern and Richard Nixon. It really doesn't make any differenpe
tousw geqs elected."
whtile, the federal health grant to Crystal City ran into some red tape, ahd
a group
C{ystal City citizens wound up lobbying for the grant in Washington. At
a press
rf$rence, Crystal City Mayor Francisco Benavides called McGovern a
liar for
ing that "this grant was only a political arrangement between our clty
licans in return for the Chicano vote." And in a letter to Dr. Prieto,
and the
Guti6rre s ryife, Luz, wrote: " . . . since 1970, this community has been and cdntinues
demanding, threatening, and fighting to get not one million dollars for
one clin in] Crystal, but $25 billion for clinics in Chicano communities throughout the
utfrwest. . . . Nothing is going to deter us from continuing our struggle
for heal cdre . . . so little political schemes designed to promote the presidential
of a gringo will certainly not get in our way." . . .
asplratl
But Rppublican-RazaUnida "arrangement" was only one of the charges Deagainst the GOP's Mexican-American ranks after the election. In the
mocrats
year I
in$ up to the election, the Cabinet Committee and its chairman Henry
wqre extremely active in playing up the administration's pro-SpanishRami
pobture, and Democrats were quick to charge that both the Cabinet Cci,mspeaki
mittee rd Ramirez had overstepped their boundaries by getting involved in the
campa n. The Democrats also charged that the White House used some of the
Mexica -Atnerican appointees, whom the Hatch Act prohibited from becording
active i pofitics, as spokesmen for the President's campaign.
In )7$, while Watergate and Senator Sam Ervin's investigating committee
captu
thle national spotlight, Representatives Henry B. Gonzalez and Eligio
(Kika)
ld Garza, both from Texas, worked quietly to force changes in the Cabiiltee or else curtail its funding by Congress. At the same time, the Oabnet C
inet C rdittee came under additional Dressures at hearinss conducted bv the
rit Operations and the Judiciary Committees of the House of RepresenGove
tatlves
U1 mdtely, the House Judiciary Committee got the necessary weapons tor use
alnirez and the Cabinet Committee. For example, the Judiciary Comrnitagalns
that Ramirez had attended the GOP National Convention in Miami
tee
Beach
Cabinet Committee funds. . . . Using records belonging to the Caqinet
and to the Spanish-speaking division within the Committee to Re-elect
Com
t, the Judiciary Committee staff uncovered more than 500 pages of rtemthe
*hich told a good deal about the roles of Nixon's Mexican-Americahs in
ora
the
ign.
the documents in question-which later fell into the hands of Sedator
A
Ervin' Whtergate committee-was an intriguing hand-written letter from [rtrew
Mexi 's flReies Lopez; see Chapter 12, Document 3] Tijerina to Ramirez: Tijerina
was
nowledging he'd been offered an executive pardon for a federal . . .
"olvicti in feturn for his support of President Nixon. Certainly, Tijerina had dlastically
down his rhetoric since being released on parole from a federal
The Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment,
penitentiary.
leader, althou
panos,...w
1964-1980 435
jthe activists no longer looked up to him as a top movement
Tijerina remained influential in New Mexico among the . . . HisI liopes he had once lifted with the possibility of some day regain-
ing the ancest
Spanish land grants.
to lRamirez, dated August 14, 1972, Tijerina wrote: "I'm very glad
In his lel
that I got to
fou. I also want to make it very clear that I am very thankful of
what you ment
)d to me in your office concerning . . . the possibility of a full exAsl I said before while I was in your office, I want to repeat it in
ecutive
wrltlng, most thq Spanish-speaking people in the United States would feel grateful if an execut
would be granted."
{ardon
Ramirez f
afded Tijerina's letter to Armendariz along with a memorandum:
a iirdicated that he would work for us in return for due considera-
thi[ controversy there were references to Henry Ramirez, Brown
iddle Americfl s ahswer to the likes of Tijerina, Jos6 Angel Guti6rrez, and Corky
nzales. In l9l{2, fi.amirez . . . established himself as the Nixon administration's
Mexic{fr-American spokesman, Ramirez claimed the administration
him up t$ thp Cabinet Committee chairmanship because he had credibility
the Mexican-lAmbrican community. . . . The son of Mexican immigrants who
gan as migranft wQrkers in California, Ramirez studied for the priesthood but inwound uplla l{nguage teacher in a high school in Whittier, the President's
.own. Latefl he lworked for the Republican party on the precinct level in Calia. . . . Desplfe his political activities, Ramirez considered himself an educator,
he became dllrector of the U.S. Civil Riehts Commission's Mexican-American
udies Divisionlfwh{re he headed up the commission's exhaustive study of Mexin-American edLcation in the Southwest.
Then in Aug$st 4f l9'7I, the President elevated Ramirez to the chairmanship of
Cabinet Comr$ittqe. By the end of the 7972 election campaign, the Cabinet Comboasted thdt Rhmirez had traveled more than 135.000 air miles in telline the
of the admiflistration's good works. One of Ramirez's first trips was a two-day
ing into Texas flnd fhe Lower Rio Grande Valley along with a host of other Mexir-American apflpin0ees. . . . Ramirez's rhetoric on that trip set the pace for the spiels
'$ Spanish surrogates during the next few months. "No other adthe admini
nistration has flaced such a heavy emphasis on solutions to the problems of the
ish-speaking,ff R{mirez told a press conference in Houston. "Next to the AmeriIndian, Spani
ng rank lower than any other single group in such areas as
ional attainr$en{, housing conditions, employment, etc. Under the present adnistration, we h{lve fuitnessed a new awareness of the problem and a willingness to
steps to allevi{ite tfrese conditions within the Spanish-speaking community."
But by far thelino$t revealing thing Ramirez said came at a press conference in
las during the {fst flays of the campaign. Pressed by a reporrer, Ramirez lashed
k with a thinlyllvei[ed
threat: If the GOP's
ticket failed ro win ar
J|
- presidential
E---- -20 percent oflthq Chicano vote, President Nixon would cut off all "conces" to the Spaniph-fpeaking, meaning the end of federal appointments and the
S]
fl
of federal fuifds into Mexican-American projects. But if the Chicanos did
p
uce the requir{p vOte quota, "it will place us in a good negotiating position for
fi her appointmerifs and funds from the administration."
Problems in Mexican American History
tas
A
Strategy
Be
most visi
tration's
tivists'
and
eted an
carried
young
Mexican
brainchi
and in 1
pointee
played
with
oEo.
over h
year.
there was a cruel irony in the President's rejection of hiring quof
he other hand demanding a specific vote quota from Mexicani
sibly the incident reflected some late doubts about the Chicanp
also the impact of the administration's Chicanos. . . .
mirez, Sanchez and Mrs. Banuelos were the other two Hispanqs
the campaign. Mrs. Banuelos, no doubt, strengthened the admini$among Mexican-Americans who were offended by the Chicano aciions against her. In San Antonio, for instance, Chicano activisfs
of the farm labor movement, including Bishop Patricio Flores, picknce by Mrs. Banuelos. The next day, the San Antonio Express Ne4ts
ry and a front-page picture of Mrs. Banuelos . . . confronted byl a
;trator pushing at her with a sign saying, "Go Back to Nixon." . . . i
le, Sanchez, as national director of OEO, represented the pinnacle pf
success within the executive branch. OEO, Lyndon Johnsori's
administering the War on Poverty, is ranked just under cabinet levpl,
nchez was the highest-ranking Mexican-American presidential {pnation's history. Although overshadowed by Ramirez, Sanchez
istration's . . . game well. But within three months of the electipn,
ty world came tumbling down.
1973, the Nixon White House, which was never fully sympathstic
son dream of a war on poverty, announced its intention to dismaritle
, which caught Sanchez by surprise, no doubt cast a dark shadow
saw his role and influence within the administration in the previbus
.
, Banuelos, Ramirez, and the other high-ranking Hispano appoinfees
only a fraction of the Mexican-Americans who became governqtent
under the Nixon administration. In Novembet of 1970, the White
House
sisting
eral
j
prog
icanPoint
to cal
feder
L
Ame
rnlSS]
The
succ
goal
pari
pil
De
I
nced what came to be known as the "Sixteen-Point Prosram" fof asish-speaking Americans in getting more lower- and middle-level ifedut the president failed to set out any specific goals or timetables i4 the
reby creating a point of conflict between the administration and Mexln groups seeking a massivejob-assistance effort.
i
I-1972, a year and a half after the President had launched the Sixfeenram, five major Mexican-American organizations still saw it necebsary j
an "affirmative moral commitment" from the White House to tt{p up i
ployment of the Spanish-speaking. . . . The organizations, inchhdingl
eague of Latin American Citizensl, the G.I. Forum, and the Me4ican-i
Political Association, asked the Equal Employment Opportunity pom-l
set specific goals and timetables for employing the Spanish-spedking.i
rs of the organizations said that for almost two years they had soug[t un]
ly on ten separate occasions to meet with the President to discus$ such
timetables. They claimed that Mr. Nixon's failure to ensure popqlatiori
nt employment to Spanish-speaking Americans cost Me|<icanl
:airs 101 federal jobs and $950 million in 1911. According to statisticq comf
y
representative, the Mexican-Americanl Legan
/the organizations and their
land Education Fund, Spanish-speaking Americans represented 7 pierceqt
Gaining of Power: Chicano Political Empowerment.
the nation's
1964-1980 437
ion but only 2.9 percent of the federal government's civilian
ll-time emplo
One aspect f tfre Nixon Chicano Strategy that did stand out, though, was the
the administration poured into Spanish-speaking projects. In the
mount of mon
r preceding e (lection, an estimated $47 million was channeled into programs
:[king, many of them funded on a one-year-only basis. . . . An
br the Spanish pe[king,
llion to $26 million was set aside through the Department of
ional $24
g and
rfr Development for low-cost housing for Spanish-speaking
'r"'
oufrt spent in the Spanish-speaking communities was a figure the
The total
hebitated to discuss. But there were indications that the $47 milixon Hi
ion figure was ctlally far below the total expenditure for the Chicano vote. Docbirlet Committee showed that at least $20 million was invested in
ments in the
anish-speaki 3 pfojects in the Texas region and another $ l7 million in the Caliornla reglon, rd these funds were in addition to what Mexican-Americans reived through :grilar lederal programs.
By the
of the campaign, the GOP's Chicano Strategy, despite its shortmings, had t : Dbmocrats on the run. From the beginning, Democrats had taken
'$ wooing of the Chicanos lightly, and they appeared to disregard
administrat
Mexican-Americans even within their own ranks. Meandiscontent
lidan effort went beyond rhetoric, and it was hard for Democrats
while, the Re
to argue with t e lflispano appointments, the Spanish-speaking employment program. and the
I dollars flooding Mexican-American projects. . . .
By all indi tiqns, the strategy worked. Although the Republican ticket wound
up wlnnlng wl plpnty of room to breathe, the President's Chicano Strategy succeeded in win in! so many Mexican-American votes as to raise the question
vote would ever return to the Democratic fold in the onewhether the
sided proporti s ffpast years. In Texas, where President Nixon had received only
10 percent of re ivote in 1968, the Nixon-Agnew ticket made sweeping gains
among Mexic -Alnerican voters, with predominantly Mexican-American counties in South T m jand the Lower Rio Grande Valley giving the President as much
ttr]e vote. . . . President Nixon carried 49 percent of the Spanishas 65 percent
speaking vote T{xas and Florida and I 1 percent of the Spanish-speaking vote in
California. . . .
The Com ttde to Re-Elect the President made its own check of MexicanAmerican voti 1 t{ends, and in San Antonio it took a sampling of three predomi-
nantly Mexic
income and
low-income
high-income
-A]merican precincts, which showed the relationship between
ies. President Nixon received 20 percent ofthe vote in a
49 percent in a middle-income precinct, and 68 percent in a
ifrct. Similar precinct samplings in Los Angeles showed that the
:11, beating the Democrats in some places, and suggested a much
vole among Mexican-Americans in the state. . . .
ni[ht, Nixon's Hispanos celebrated along with everyone . . . , but
On electi
the landslide ;tofy and the success of the Chicano Strategy were both in for an
ymoon. Just weeks after the inauguration, President Nixon and
abruptly short
his administ
ound themselves entangled in the Watergate matter. And it was
GOP ticket
stronger Nixo
438
Problems in Mexican American Historv
s[me time that the Nixon Hispanos and others who had been wooed to
:ar[p awakened to political reality.
House decision to dismantle OEO and the subsequent humiliatidn
were representative of what some Mexican-American leadefs
at about
s
the Ni
The
of Philli
felt was
ir betrayal by the administration. After the election, the number bf
officials leveled off and actually dwindled. . | .
high-ra
ng j Spanish-speaking
Talk
I apout stepped-up government hiring of the Spanish-speaking, and the
nsfead announced budget cutbacks in housing, manpower training, arlrd
e
Presiden
ed,ucatlon. . . .
rly rising brown star still in the administration in 1973 was Alex Armeh, riras named director of the Office of Minority Business Enterpribe
Cpmmerce Department. Suddenly there was a change in the rhetoiic
within
qf the mouths of the Nixon Hispanos. "This country is based upon the
coming
private enterprise . . . and we will not be in the mainstream of Amefiprinciple
il] we, the Spanish-speaking, get into business on the same footing as
can life
everyo elsp," Ramirez . . . told the National Spanish-Speaking Business Devdlopment onference in Chicago. . . .
health
The
danz,
But he fihetoric overlooked the major problem-the extremely high faihlre
rate of s all businesses. And, as much as the campaign strategy, the message ulas
aimed at rdwn Middle America rather than the masses in the barrios who were in
need of federal assistance. "Spanish-speaking voters gave the Prdsimuch
(f confidence," observed Tony Gallegos, national chairman of the G.I.
dent a
f
Forum,
followi
positio
Ifr
[he cou
electorate for other reasons. The Chicano Strategy . . . became a political
the Chi anQ Strategy produced a remarkable transformation in the politics of
-A{rericans from a predictable, homogeneous bloc into a fluid, tic{etMexi
splitti elebtorate that-much like the rest of America-has become disillusiohed
with po ticians and the parties, weary of political promises and slogans, and eqger
to find
\a'/ FU
Tony
Alfredo
tl
Alma
&
F. Chris
belter way to solve its problems.
THER
READING
tro) Chicano Power (19'/ 4)
reflar, "Perspectives on Politics, Part
t_
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