Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House

Transcription

Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House
Author(s): Eric Schickler and Andrew Rich
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), pp. 1340-1375
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Controllingthe Floor: Parties as
ProceduralCoalitions in the House*
Eric Schickler, University of California, Berkeley
Andrew Rich, Yale University
Theory:Partisancontrol of House organizationis contested by ideological cross-party
coalitions thatvary in strengthwith the size of the majoritypartyand its homogeneity,as
well as the natureof the issues underconsideration.
Hypotheses: Key House rules are responsive to changes in the balance of power on the
floor, even in the face of majoritypartyopposition.Majoritypartydefectorson votes on
key rules are unlikely to be sanctionedunless the partyhas a strongmajorityand is relatively unified.
Methods: An analysis of rules changes since 1919 pertainingto the dischargeprocess,
Rules Committee,and committeejurisdictions,and of the conditionsunderwhich majority partymembersare sanctionedfor disloyal behavior.
Results: The development since the mid-1970s of majority party control over House
rules is a substantialdeparturefrom priorexperience,and appearsto be a precariousstate
of affairs.
Thetransformations
wroughtby the Republicantakeoverof Congressin
1995makethis a propitioustimefor theoriesemphasizingthe importanceof
politicalpartiesin shapinglegislativepolitics.Politicalscientistshavein recent yearsput fortha burgeoningliteraturereconsideringandelevatingthe
place of Congressional parties in legislative studies (Davidson 1988;
Kiewiet and McCubbins1991; Rohde 1991). Cox and McCubbins(1993,
1994)provideone of the moretheoreticallyambitioustreatmentsof political
parties. They argue (1993, 278) that the majorityparty is, among other
things,a proceduralcoalitionthatsettlesthe key structuraldecisionsfacing
the House, therebystackingthe legislativeprocessin favorof logrollsbeneficial to the party.
Cox and McCubbins(1994, 216) observethat social choice theorems
"seemto predictever-shiftingmajoritycoalitions,with each new majority
coalitionimplementinga differentpolicy."The most prominenttheoretical
responseto this "problem"of instabilityis thatinstitutionsstructurallyinduce stability(Shepsle and Weingast1981). Following Riker(1980), Cox
and McCubbins(1994) arguethis solutionis unsatisfyingbecauseinstitu*The helpful suggestions of David Mayhew, Keith Krehbiel, Stanley Bach, Richard Beth, Terri
Bimes, Jacob Hacker,David King, Daniel Palazzolo, David Rohde, and two anonymousreviewers
are gratefullyacknowledged.The data used in this paperand all documentationnecessary to replicate the analyses is available upon request from the authors.A previous version of this paper was
presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago
Hilton and Towers,August 31-September 3, 1995.
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 4, October1997, Pp. 1340-1375 C)1997 by the
Boardof Regents of the Universityof Wisconsin System.
PARTIESAS PROCEDURALCOALITIONSIN THE HOUSE
1341
tions-committee systems,chamberrules,andso on-are themselvesdeterminedon the floorby majorityrule.As such,the selectionof institutionsinheritsthe samepotentialfor cycling thatexists in the realmof policy.
Cox and McCubbins(1994, 215) addressthis problemof endogenous
institutionsby arguingthatthe majoritypartycaucus constitutesan extralegislativeorganizationthatstabilizeslegislativeinstitutions,which in turn
stabilizepolicy coalitions.Their"thesisis thatthe rules of the Democratic
Caucusin the Houseof Representativesdictatethatall membersof the caucus are bound,if they wish to retaintheirmembership,to supportcaucus
decisions in the House on a varietyof key structuralmatters-such as the
electionof the Speakerandthe designandstaffingof the committeesystem"
(1994, 218). Since membershipin the caucus is valuableto members,the
threatof expulsiondiscouragesdefectionson importantstructuralvotes.As
a result,"constitutional
changeof the Houserulescouldbe effectedonly by
a groupcomprisinga majorityof the caucus and a majorityof the House"
(1994, 223). This reduces,thoughdoes not eliminate,the potentialfor cyruleschanges.
cling in deliberationssurrounding
In the past20 years,Housemajoritypartycaucusesappearto havebeen
strongorganizationswith the capacityto determinekey Houserules and to
discipline dissident members (Rohde 1991; for a dissenting view, see
Krehbiel1991, 1993). But Cox and McCubbins'morepowerful,and more
coaliquestionable,claim is thatpartieshave operatedas structure-setting
tions even whenpartieshave appearedto be weak andineffectual.In LegislativeLeviathan(1993), they examineCongressionalpoliticsdatingbackto
1945;othershaveattemptedto applytheirmodelto earliertimeperiods,and
even to the non-majoritarian
Senate(ForgetteandSala 1995). The thrustof
Cox andMcCubbins'argumentis thatthe conventionalwisdomthatpolitical partieslost controlof Congressionalinstitutionsin the aftermathof the
overthrowof SpeakerCannonandthe demiseof the strongDemocraticcaucus of the Wilsonyearsis simplyincorrect.
We drawon historicalevidenceto evaluatetwo interdependentclaims
centralto Cox andMcCubbins'theory:(1) the majoritypartydeterminesthe
key features of House organization.For example, Cox and McCubbins
(1993, 278) writethatthe majoritypartymanagesto "usurpthe rule-making
power of the House."(2) The majoritypartycrediblythreatensto punish
partymemberswho side with the oppositionpartyon votes thatdetermine
the key featuresof Houseorganization(1994, 224).
Ouralternativeperspectivefocuses on the risk thatdefectorson procedural votes may credibly threatento move closer to the minority party
shouldthey be punished.This leads to the predictionthatdefectorson critical proceduralvotes will not be punishedif therearea sufficientnumberof
partydissidentsto constitutea permanentmajorityshouldthey ally with the
1342
Eric Schicklerand AndrewRich
minorityparty.As a result,we hypothesizethatchangesin Houserules are
likely to occurwhen the balanceof forces on the floor changes,even if the
majoritypartycaucusmedianremainsunchanged.We maintainthatthe majoritypartycan crediblythreatento punishits dissidentspreciselywhen the
partyleast needsto do so: whenit has a substantialmajorityandis relatively
unified.Otherwise,therisksto the majoritypartyof punishingdissidentsare
likely to counterbalance
anybenefitsgainedthroughcreationof a reputation
for refusingto toleratedefectors.We believe partyproceduralcontroltherefore varies considerablyover time, and is dependentupon the size of the
partymajorityandits homogeneity(Rohde1991;Binder1996).1
We also arguethatpartyproceduralcontrolvariessignificantlyin scope,
dependingupon the natureof mattersunderconsideration.Caucusdissidentsarefarmorereluctantto carrytheiroppositionto the floorwithrespect
to personnelmatters(the election of the speakerand of committees)than
withrespectto otherimportantorganizationalmatters,suchas the designof
committeejurisdictions.Voting againstpartypersonnelconstitutesmore
thana threatto Houseorganization;it is an act of opendisrespectfor public
symbolsof the partythatis difficultfor the majorityleadershipto tolerate.
Whenwe turnourattentionto the conditionsunderwhichmembersarepunished, we find thatoppositionto the party'spresidentialcandidateis the action most likely to resultin partysanctionsagainsta member.This supports
the notionthatmembers'test of partystandinghas moreto do with respect
for partysymbols thanwith upholdingpartylogrolls embeddedin House
I
structures.
Ourevaluationof thesecompetingperspectivesis basedon two sortsof
evidence:first,we examineHousedecision-makingduringthepast75 years
concerningcentralHouse rules. Second, we examine efforts to sanction
membersof the majoritypartyfor disloyalbehavior.We attemptto identify
the ramificationsof defectingon key rulesvotes duringthe period.
Parties and House Organization
Cox andMcCubbins(1994) makeit clearthatthe realmof partisanproceduralcontrolencompassesthe selection of House officers and committees, the designof the committeesystem,andthe structureof agendapower
more generally (e.g., the determinationof committeejurisdictions, and
specification of the agenda-settingpowers of the Speaker,legislative
committees,andRulesCommittee).Together,these featuresof Houseorganizationare said to entrencha set of logrollsbeneficialto the majorityparty
(1994; 220-1).
1Inour usage, partyproceduralcontrol means that the majorityparty is at a minimumable to
block changes that a majorityof its members oppose, and at best is able to force changes that its
memberssupport.
1343
To evaluatethis claim, we considerproceduralpolitics for the period
1919-94. We choose 1919 as our startingpoint becauseit allows us to test
whetherDemocraticpartytroublesduringthe 1940s-60s were a productof
a regional stalematethat constitutedan aberrationin an otherwisestrong
recordof partyproceduralcontrol,or were representativeof long imperfect
partyproceduralgovernance.2
Forevidence,we firstexaminedthe CongressionalRecordfor the opening of eachCongresssince 1919.Fortheperiodbefore1945,we also combed
the relevantscholarlyliteratureon House organization(e.g., Cooper1960;
Damon1971;GallowayandWise 1976;Hasbrouck1927),andnewsreports,
whereapplicable.Forthe periodafter1945,we reliedheavilyuponthe Congressional QuarterlyAlmanac for information on each Congress.
Electing Officers
The evidenceon the electionsof the Speakerandcommitteesposes the
fewestproblemsfor Cox andMcCubbins'model.This shouldnotbe surprising, given that skeptics of partisanstrengthhave long arguedthatparties
hold togetherfor the electionof officers and committees,and thenbecome
farless influential(Young1958, 57, 61). Ourinvestigationof the electionof
the Speakerin eachCongresssince 1919 findsthatthreatsby majorityparty
membersto defeatthe majoritycaucusnomineehave been rare.In December 1923, a groupof roughly20 progressiveRepublicansrefusedto vote for
the partynomineefor Speaker,FrederickGillett (R-MA),on the first nine
ballots. The insurgentsprovided Gillett with the votes he needed to be
electedonly afterpartyleadersagreedto allow thema reasonableopportunityto alterkey Houserules(CongressionalRecord,December5, 1923, 14).
Since thattime, therehavebeen occasionalrumorsof dissidentfactions
in the majoritypartyflirting with minorityleadersto defeat the majority
partynomineefor Speaker(Manley1973, 243-4; Moser 1979, 51-3). Nothing has come of these rumors,althoughone of the moreinterestingtests of
the seriousnessof sucha possibilitywas avertedwhenthe Democrats,rather
thansimplylosing seatsto the Republicansin 1994, also lost theirmajority
status.3Nonetheless,it is intriguingto note thatin 1989, cross-partycoalitions rebelledagainstmajoritypartycontroland elected the Speakerof the
20ur choice of dates excludes two noteworthycases of rules changes in the twentiethcentury:
the changes forced by the insurgent-Democraticcoalition in 1909-10 over the objections of the Republicanmajority,and the rules revision of 1911 put forwardby the new Democraticmajority.The
latterpassed on a party-line vote; but the rules changes were an amalgamof partisanchanges and
concessions to reformers(Hasbrouck1927, 11-3, 38-9, 145).
3TelevisioncommentatorJeff Greenfieldreportedrumorsin Capitol Hill circles of a possible
alliance between a handfulof conservative Democrats and the GOP,if the Republicanshad found
themselves 10 seats shortof a majority(see Political Hotline, November 1, 1994).
1344
Housein the statelegislaturesof ConnecticutandNorthCarolina,two states
with traditionsof stronglegislative parties.4Developmentsin these states
sent a signalthatmajoritypartyleadersin otherlegislaturesmustat least be
cognizantof the potentialfor cross-partycoalitionsto takecontrol.
The election of House committeesand selection of committeeleaders
also appearsto be underrelativelyfirmpartisancontrol.5As Rohde(1994)
pointsout, the floor has neveroverturnedpartydecisionson committeeassignments.Threatsto vote againstcaucusnomineeshave been few and far
between,and both major"partieshave shown a delicacy aboutinterfering
with each other'scommitteenominations"(Hasbrouck1927, 44). This was
illustratedin 1971 when severalliberals,angeredat theirfailureto unseat
Districtof ColumbiaChairmanJohnMcMillan(D-SC) in the Democratic
Caucus, attemptedto have the floor overturnMcMillan's nominationas
chair.Only 15 Republicansvoted to allow the amendment,andmanyparty
membersrefusedto vote on the motionfor fearof settinga precedentof minoritypartyinvolvementin the selectionof chairs(CQAlmanac1971, 18).
A furtherindicationof the broadsupportfor the belief thatsuchmatters
do not belong on the floor is thatwhen the majoritypartycaucushas been
dividedon committeenominations,the partyhas nonethelessstoodtogether
on the floor.In the case of McMillan,96 Democratsopposedhim in caucus,
yet only 17 did so on the floor.Whenthe partyvotedto stripthe seniorityof
presidentialboltersJohnBell Williams(D-MS) andAlbertWatson(D-SC)
in 1965, there were 115 members opposed in caucus (facing 157 who
backedthepunishment),yet the losing side did not appealto the floor.Similarly,no floor appealoccurredin 1975, when threechairmenwere deposed
in the purgebroughton by the aggressivefreshmanclass swept into office
by Watergate(GallowayandWise 1976, 77).6
40n the North Carolinarevolt, see the WallStreetJournal,April 17, 1989, A12. See the Hartford Courant,January8, 1989, on the Connecticutrebellion.A cross-partycoalition also elected the
Speakerof the MassachusettsHouse in 1996, over the objections of most membersof the majority
party.
5Majority party control over selection of party members on committees does not necessarily
imply that committee composition is biased toward the majorityparty median and away from the
floor median (Krehbiel 1993).
6Partycontrol over personnelmattershas been challengedonly in unusualcircumstances.For
example, in 1981, the Democratswantedto strip Pennsylvania'sEugene Atkinson of his committee
assignments when he became a Republican. To do this would have requiredfloor approval, and
Democraticleaderswere uncertainwhethersouthernconservativeswould go along with the move in
the currentpolitical atmosphere.Atkinson held onto his assignments as a Democrat for the rest of
the Congress,even thoughhe had repudiatedhis ties to the party(CQAlmanac 1981, 11). To prevent
such occurrencesin the future,the Democratsamendedthe rules in 1983 to make continuedassignment to committees contingent upon being a member of the partycaucus grantingthe assignment
(CQ Almanac 1983, 596-7).
1345
The Committee System and Agenda Power
Partycontrolover the designof the committeesystemandof rulesconcerningagendapower has been considerablymoretenuousthanhas party
controlover personnelmatters.As is the case with personnelselections,we
find severalinstancesin which the majoritypartyhas been divided in the
caucus.Unlikethe electionof the Speakerandof the committees,however,
these disagreementshave tendedto carryover to the floor,underminingthe
party'sproceduralcontrol.
As suggestedabove,Cox andMcCubbins(1994, 223) predictthatshifts
in the position of the caucus majority are necessary preconditions for
changes in importantelementsof legislative organization.Ouralternative
perspectiveholdsthatchangesin the floormedianabsentchangesin the positionof the caucusmajorityareoften sufficientto resultin ruleschanges.It
is only in recentyears,as the threatof majoritypartypunishmentfor defectors has increased,thatthe majoritypartyhas become capableof blocking
rules changeseven in the face of a potentiallyopposingfloor majority.But
this threatof punishmentis precarious;in the presence of a narrowfloor
majorityor a dividedparty,it recedessignificantly.
One naturalfocus for an investigationof controlover these elementsof
House structureis the beginningof each Congresswhen the House must
adopta set of rules.The chairmanof the Rules Committeetypicallymoves
thattheHouseadopttherulesof thepreviousCongress,at timeswithspecific
amendments.This is the only time duringthe sessionthata simplemajority
can amendthe rules, absentthe cooperationof the Rules Committee,recourseto the dischargeprocess,or the willingnessto overrideseveralvalid
points of order.Therefore,it is at the beginningof each new Congressthat
proceduralcontrolby themajoritypartyis mostcritical.Cox andMcCubbins
(1994, 221) observethat "thevote on adoptionof the House rules is taken
immediatelyafterelection of a speakerandbeforecommitteeassignments
arehandedout.At leaston initialadoptionthereseemto be ampleincentives
for majoritypartymembersto supportthe rulesproposedby theirparty,and
empiricallythe majoritypartyalmostalwaysdoes sticktogetheron the bulk
of the standingrules."
Tobeginto test thisclaim,Table1 presentsa list andbriefdescriptionof
all roll calls takenon the initial adoptionof rules from 1919 to 1993. The
tableincludesthe cohesionof each partyon the roll call, as well as the outcome. Figure 1 graphsmajoritypartycohesion on these initialrules-adoption votes.
The datasuggestfirstthat,since the mid-1970s,majoritypartysuccess
on rules-adoptionvotes has been considerable.The Democratsused these
votes to put throughrules changes that were vehementlyopposed by the
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1348
Figure 1. Majority Party Cohesion: Rules Adoption Votes
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Note: Majorityparty cohesion is the absolute difference between the percentageof majorityparty
memberswho vote "yes" and the percentageof majoritypartymembers who vote "no."Members
who do not vote or who are pairedare excluded.
Republicans. For example, the Democrats increased their opportunities to
suspend the rules during the session, curtailed the range of available dilatory
tactics, and tightened restrictions on appropriationsriders.7
7Democraticsuccess even in this period has requiredpartyleaders to be wary of pushing too
far; Democrats did not seek to limit appropriationsriders in 1981 due to the fear of antagonizing
conservatives in the party who held the balance of power in the House. Partyleaders waited until
their majoritywas enhancedin the 1982 election to push throughthe change (CQAlmanac 1981, 5,
1983, 596-7).
1349
Second, it is only in the past 25 years that the rules votes at the beginning of each Congress have become routinely controversial. The rules were
typically adopted on voice votes from the 1920s into the 1960s, with only
sporadic controversy. In 16 of 26 Congresses from 1919 to 1970, the rules
were adopted without so much as a recorded vote.8 This includes several instances in which partisan control of the Congress changed in the preceding
election; in four of six cases in which partisan control of the House shifted,
no contested rules changes were made. This is interesting in light of the numerous controversial changes made by Republicans in 1995. Several of
these recent changes were indications that the Democrats had in the 1970s
and 1980s restructuredelements of the legislative process in favor of their
priorities. The absence of such changes in 1919, 1947, 1953, and 1955 reveals, however, that new majority parties do not necessarily confront a structure stacked in favor of the former majority party's priorities.
Third, in the 10 sessions opening with contested rules changes from
1919 to 1970, the majority party was triumphantin only six of the sessions.
An examination of the specific cases involved reveals that important rules
changes affecting agenda control have on several occasions followed shifts
in the floor median in the absence of changes in the party median.
To structure our analysis, we have divided the rules changes into three
substantive domains: the discharge process, the powers of the Rules Committee, and committee jurisdictions more generally. These three areas encompass the bulk of the efforts to change rules that appear to fit Cox and
McCubbins' category of "key structural matters" pertaining to agenda
control.9
Discharge Process
The discharge process was a center of controversy between party leaders
and cross-party coalitions for much of the first 40 years of this century. Following Republican losses in the 1922 elections, the Democrats held a sufficient number of seats to constitute a majority should they unite with progressive Republican members. At the opening of the new Congress in January
1924, progressive Republicansjoined the Democrats to force througha series
of rules changes, including a reduction in the numberof members requiredto
support the discharge of a committee from 218 to 150. This change challenged agenda control by the majority party and the standing committees
(Beth 1994), and was opposed by 78% of the Republicans voting. At the next
8In most of these 16 cases, the CongressionalRecordreveals no evidence of controversyduring floor debateon the rules.
90ur discussion also includes those rules changes affecting the areas in question that were
adoptedat times otherthan the opening of a new Congress.
1350
election, the 1924 Coolidge landslide gave the regular Republicans a sufficient floor.majority to control the next Congress without the help of the progressive Republicans' votes. As a result, the regulars in 1925 reversed the
1924 rules changes and renderedthe discharge process ineffective. Dissident
Republicans cast 22 votes against the rules changes, but this left them several
votes short of the number needed to preserve the rule.
The Democrats continued to call for a liberalization of the discharge
process while in the minority. When the party gained a slim majority in
1931, they had their opportunity to implement such a change, reducing the
number of members required to support bill discharges from committees
from 218 to 145. This rules change passed on a near-perfect partisan vote,
yet it is unclear that liberalizing the discharge process was done in order to
facilitate majority party priorities. After all, as the majority party,the Democrats would presumably be the ones threatenedby discharge petitions (given
that they controlled the committee system, as is assumed in the Cox and
McCubbins formulation). It is better to view the 1931 change as part of an
effort to maintain consistency in positions: the Democrats, having advocated
a rules change to benefit the minority party while in the minority, were unable to switch sides on the issue quickly once they were in the majority.
By 1933, Democratic leaders came to believe that the party needed to
return to the requirement for 218 signatures on discharge petitions. The
Democrats now had a large, unruly majority, and leaders were concerned
that members would use the discharge process to force ill-advised bills to
the floor that benefited special interests while undermining the general
Democratic recovery program (WashingtonPost, April 13, 1933). Despite a
clear majority of the caucus favoring the rule change, a large number of
Democrats promised to fight the move on the floor. Facing the prospect of
an embarrassingfloor defeat, party leaders deferred action until 1935, when
the once-more increased Democratic majority led to a renewed effort to restrict the discharge process. Before the opening of the new Congress, the
Democratic caucus voted 225-60 to make the rule change a binding party
position (WashingtonPost, January3, 1935). The change then passed on the
floor by a 245 to 170 vote. Seventy-two Democrats defected on the critical
procedural vote shutting out amendments to the rules package, and 70 defected on the vote on final passage of the rule change. Thus, although the
party leaders were successful, the force of the so-called "binding" vote is
difficult to judge.
As the "conservative coalition" of Republicans and southern Democrats
gained control of several critical committees in the late-1930s, some mainstream Democrats sought a liberalized discharge rule as a mechanism to pry
party programs loose from recalcitrant committees (see for example, Congressional Record, January 3, 1939, 13-4). Party leaders successfully re-
1351
sisted such efforts, believing that a liberalized discharge rule held the danger
of disrupting the House agenda too seriously to be a well-tailored tool to
challenge the growing conservative ascendancy. Still, the calls by liberal
Democrats to ease the discharge rule underscore the extent to which a strong
faction within the Democratic party believed that the party lacked effective
control over the proposal behavior of House committees.
Beyond these occasional liberal demands, one finds no serious effort to
alter the discharge rule until 1993.10 The 1993 change makes public the
names of representatives who sign discharge petitions, thus undermining
party leaders' ability to discourage members from signing petitions for politically popular proposals opposed by the majority Democrats. Republican
James Inhofe's (R-OK) success in amending the rule was rooted in his ability to use the media to raise the visibility of the issue. Democratic leaders,
sensing an impending defeat, dropped their pleas for members to fight
Inhofe's proposal, and reluctantly accepted this minority party-forced
change (CQ Almanac 1993, 10).
To sum up, rules surroundingthe discharge process were changed twice
following changes in the balance of power on the floor absent changes in the
majority party (1924, 1925), once following a change in the majority party
that arguably coincided with a change in the balance of power on the floor
(1931), and once when a minority party member successfully manipulated
the visibility of House decision-making to his advantage (1993).
The Rules Committee
While the discharge process was the major agenda control issue plaguing the House in the 1920s and 1930s, efforts to limit the power of the Rules
Committee were central to House rules battles in the 1940s through the
1960s. In the 1948 election, the Democrats regained majority party status,
with their largest majority since the 77th Congress of 1941-42. As Cox and
McCubbins (1993, 259) observe, at the opening of the new Congress in
1949, the Democratic caucus voted 176-48 to bind its members to vote for a
21-day rule to curtail the power of the then-conservative Rules Committee
and thus to assist in the enactment of liberal programs. The rule allowed legislative committees to bring bills to the floor on specified days if the Rules
Committee had held up the bills in question for more than three weeks. The
Democrats succeeded in passing the change on the floor. This is where Cox
and McCubbins' (1993) discussion of the 21-day rule ends. Thirty-one
101nDecember 1982, the Democratscontemplatedseeking a rules change increasingthe number of signaturesrequiredfor a dischargepetitionon constitutionalamendmentsto two-thirdsof the
membership.The move was intendedto hinderRepublicanefforts to bringpolitically embarrassing
constitutionalamendmentsto the floor, but the effort was droppeddue to fierce oppositionby some
Democrats(CQAlmanac 1983, 596-7).
1352
Democrats, however, defected on the floor vote, disregarding the binding
caucus decision. These defections were insufficient to affect the outcome,
given the substantial Democratic majority. But Rules Committee member
Eugene Cox (D-GA) attempted to overturn the 21-day rule a year later, and
attracted the votes of 85 Democrats. Cox's bid fell short only because 64
Republicans voted to retain the rule.
Republican gains in the 1950 election provided a floor majority for the
conservative coalition, however. This is precisely the sort of situation in
which the stability-inducing quality of a party caucus is presumed to shut
out rules changes. A majority of Democrats, including the majority leader
and whip, opposed Cox's 1951 proposal to delete the 21-day rule. But 39%
of voting Democrats united with 81% of voting Republicans to make way
for the Cox substitute to pass at the opening of the new Congress.
Further evidence of the importance of floor majorities, as opposed to
caucus majorities, is suggested by the 21-day rule's reenactment in 1965
when Democrats had a greatly increased floor majority and could again afford numerous southern defections. The caucus approved the package of
rules changes 189 to 71.11The changes passed on the floor despite the opposition of 78 Democrats. Sixteen Republican votes provided the Democrats
with their margin of victory. The caucus voted to retain the rule in 1967, but
it was once again repealed by the full House since Republican gains had
shifted the floor majority in favor of the conservatives (CQ Almanac 1967,
180). This time, 18.5% of the Democrats voting cast ballots with the Republicans to open the rules to amendment, and 32% voted for the amendment to
delete the 21-day rule. This defeat for a substantial majority of the Democrats again illustrates the party's inability to control key structuralmatters
during this period.12
There is a single instance of a major rules change affecting the Rules
Committee that was not done through amending the rules at the start of a
new Congress. This was the 1961 decision to enlarge the Committee, which
enabled the Democrats to put two additional liberals on Rules. Cox and
McCubbins (1993, 257) correctly observe that this is perhaps the premier
instance of the majority party manipulating committee sizes for partisanpurposes. Nevertheless, its passage also illustrates some of the limitations on
partisan control. Although more than two-thirds of the Democrats favored
enlarging the Committee, Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) did not ask for a
"The 1965 rules also preventedthe Rules Committeefrom blocking bills from being sent to
conference.
12The Democratsmade a final attemptto pass what had become a 31-day rule in 1971. By this
time, the rule was of limited importancebecause the Rules Committeewas no longer a conservative
power base. Still, 40% of the Democratsunited with the Republicansto delete the proposed31-day
rule.
1353
bindingtwo-thirdscaucusvote on the issue for fearof furtherantagonizing
conservative Democrats (MacKaye 1963). The floor vote on the rules
change was postponedfor five days due to the belief that the leadership
lackedthe votes to prevail.The leadersfinally succeededin an extremely
tight 217-212 vote.13While this was an importanttriumphfor the majority
party,64 Democratsdefectedfrom the party'sposition,and as a resultthe
Democratscould not have prevailedwithoutthe supportof 22 Republicans
who defected from their fellow partisans.FormerRepublicanleader Joe
Martin(R-MA)providedhis friendRayburnwith crucialassistancein gainpressurefromthe WhiteHousewas
ing the Republicanvotes. Furthermore,
appliedin the closing days before the vote, includingoffers of side-payments to waveringmembers(Peters 1990). Had the White House been in
Republicanhands,such side-paymentswould likely have been used to foil
the majorityparty.
In 1963, the ruleswere amendedto makepermanentthe increasein the
size of the RulesCommitteeinitiallyapprovedin 1961. On the initialproceduralvote to shut off furtheramendments,the Democratsprevailedeasily
with only seven defectors.On the vote on adoptionof the new rules, the
Democratsagainprevailed,althoughthis time with 48 defectors.The vote
on the firstmotion,with its mereseven dissidents,is one of the firstindications in the datawe haveexploredof numerousmajoritypartymembersapparentlyvotingagainsttheirpolicy preferencesin orderto follow the majority of theirfellow partisans.14
The Democratsgained a much greaterdegree of controlof the Rules
Committeeduringthe 1970s. Particularlyimportantwas the Democratic
caucusrule adoptedin 1975 grantingthe Speakerthe powerto appointmajority partymembersto the Committee.Thereis little doubtthatmajority
partymemberson the Rules Committeenow have strongincentivesto be
responsiveto partyleaders.It shouldalso be noted thatsince shortlyafter
the 1910 enlargementof Rules,the majoritypartyhas maintainedan advanThecrucialpoint,however,is thatin
tageouspartyratioon the Committee.15
spite of a favorablemajoritypartyratio,Republicansand dissidentDemocratsenjoyeda workingmajorityon the Committeethroughoutthe 1937-61
period (Rohde 1991, 98), and the Democraticleadershipdid not gain unequivocalcontrolof Rulesuntilthe 1970s.
13Observers estimated that Rayburnhad between two and five pocket votes ready should he
have needed them (MacKaye 1963). Still, even with the pocket votes, the outcome was extremely
close.
'4One reason for the low numberof defectors on the previous question motion was that the
vote shut out a package of "fair-play"proposalsthat the Republicanswere planningto offer, which
included such provisions as increasedminoritystaffing.
15Thisratiowas increasedfrom 2-1 to 11-5 in 1975.
1354
The evidenceon ruleschangespertainingto the RulesCommitteetherefore offersonly limitedsupportfor the hypothesisof majoritypartycontrol.
Importantchangeswere madein 1951 and 1967 despiteclearmajorityparty
oppositionto change.It also appearsthatmostRepublicansopposedchanges
adoptedin January1924restrictingthepowersof theRulesCommitteechairman (Hasbrouck1927). The majoritypartysucceededin alteringthe Committeein 1949, 1961, and 1965, butthe lattertwo triumphswere dependent
on minoritypartysupport,andthe 1949and 1965changeswerereversedtwo
yearslaterby cross-partycoalitions.Not until caucuschangesin the 1970s
did the majoritypartyfinallygainfirmcontrolof the Committee.
CommitteeJurisdictions
Turningto changes in committeejurisdictions,one finds surprisingly
few cases of eitherpartyusingthe adoptionof rulesat the startof the session
to put forwardchanges.Nevertheless,importantchangeshave been considered and, on occasion, approvedin the past 75 years. Jurisdictionchanges
areof threetypes:formalrulechanges,changesbasedon bill-referralprecedents,and alterationsbased on more-or-lessformalunderstandingsamong
committeeleaders (Evans and Oleszek 1995). King (1992, 1994) argues
convincinglythatbill-referralprecedentshave been a majorinstrumentof
jurisdictionchange,andthatthis processhas been largelynonpartisansince
of the parliamentarian's
office in the yearsfollowing
the institutionalization
the overthrowof SpeakerCannon.
changes,we attempt
To supplementKing'sanalysisof precedent-based
to identifyevery case in which the jurisdictionof a committeewas altered
througha rule changefrom 1919 to 1993. We rely primarilyon the House
RulesManual,whichis publishedwith each new Congress.We use the versions of the Manualfor the 65thCongress(1917-19), 68thCongress(192325), 75th Congress (1937-38), 79th Congress (1945-46), 80th Congress
(1947-48), 84th Congress(1955-56), and 103rdCongress(1993-94). We
comparethe jurisdictionlisted in the Manualfor each committeeat each
pointduringthe period.To reducethe likelihoodof missingany changes,we
use the detailednotes aboutjurisdictionchanges includedin the Manual,
and the discussions of committeejurisdictionsin Joint Committeeon the
Organizationof Congress(1993) andHouse Select Committeeon Committees (1974).
Table 2 presents a brief description of each rule-basedjurisdiction
changethatour searchuncovered.16Of the 26 items, the only instancesof
16Ourtable omits one case: between 1920 and 1921, Ways and Means'jurisdictionwas tightened to include matters"purportingto raise revenue."We were unable to find any informationon
this change.
1355
party-line voting on committee changes are two cited by Cox and
McCubbins (1993, 254)-the 1975 abolition of the House Internal Security
Committee and the 1977 decision to dissolve the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy (JCAE)-along with the decision to strip the Standardsand Conduct
Committee of its legislative jurisdiction (which was folded into the same
rules changes as the Internal Security and Atomic Energy changes). 17These
examples are rightly taken as indications of majority party strength. Particularly impressive, in sharp contrast to rules votes in the 1940s-60s, is that although 97 members voted against dissolving the JCAE in caucus, only two
Democrats voted to save the committee on the floor.
We also find two instances in which the majority party provided the
bulk of the support for the proposition, but could not have prevailed without
the help of numerous minority party members. These cases are the recentralization of the appropriationsprocess in 1920 and the Hansen committee
reforms of 1974.18 But there are also important cases in which controversy
crosscut partisan lines, such as the changes to energy jurisdiction adopted in
1980 (King 1992; Uslaner 1980), and the creation of the Budget Committees
in 1974 (Schick 1980; Wander 1984). Furthermore,there are many cases of
jurisdiction change that appear to have been non-controversial. These include the 1927 decision to merge the 11 Committees on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments (Galloway and Wise 1976), the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Cooper 1960), and the creation of the Science and AstronauticsCommittee in 1958 (CQAlmanac 1958, 164). Floor debates about
many of the changes in our table indicate that the absence of controversy
stemmed from members' belief that the changes would increase the efficiency of the committee system (cf. King 1992). This suggests that informational models of committee organization can be helpful in illuminating jurisdictional changes (Krehbiel 1991).
Perhaps most importantly,cross-party coalitions have on occasion overwhelmed the proceduralcontrol of the majority party: the classic case of this
is the creation of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in
1945. When the 79th Congress convened in 1945, conservative Democrat
John Rankin (D-MS) sponsored a surprise floor amendment to the rules,
17Onepossible additionalexample is the 1977 vote to make the IntelligenceCommitteea Permanent Select Committee, which pitted most Republicans against most Democrats. Nonetheless,
therewere 43 Democraticdefectorson the vote. Republicanoppositionto the resolutionwas due to
displeasureover the partyratio on the committee and concern about guidelines for handlingclassified information(CQ Almanac 1977, 376-7).
'8Althoughmost Democrats opposed the special rule to consider the 1920 changes, several
Democraticleaders supportedthe rule and the most recent DemocraticPartynationalplatformendorsed the change (Congressional Record, June 1, 1920, 8113). See Sheppard(1985) and King
(1992) for discussions of the Hansenreforms.
Table 2. Rule-basedChanges in CommitteeJurisdictions, 1919-1993
Year
Case
1920
Recentralize Appropriations
1924
Create World War Veterans, along
with minor changes to Civil Service
and Irrigation and Reclamation
Merge 11 Expenditures Committees,
and abolish five minor committees
Create Memorials Committee
Merchant Marine jurisdiction over radio
given to Commerce, and Commerce
jurisdiction over water transportation
transferredto Merchant Marine
Jurisdiction of Pensions, Invalid
Pensions, and Veterans Affairs
adjusted
Expand World WarVeterans'
jurisdiction
1927
1929
1935
1939
1944
1945
1946
1946
1953
1954
1958
1967
1967
1969
1971
1971
1974
1974
1975
Creation of HUAC
Legislative Reorganization Act
(Davidson 1990; King 1992)
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
creation
Minor changes to Armed Services
jurisdiction to account for creation
of Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Committee granted
authorization power
Science and Astronautics creation
Standards and Conduct creation
Veterans Committee given jurisdiction
over veterans' cemeteries from
Interior
Clarify HUAC jurisdiction and change
its name to Internal Security (HISC)
Banking and Finance given jurisdiction
over impact on the economy of tax
exempt foundations and charitable
trusts
Small Business made Permanent
Select committee
Creation of Budget Committee and
related budget jurisdiction changes
Hansen committee reforms
(King 1992; Sheppard 1985)
Abolish HISC and strip Standards
and Conduct of its jurisdiction
over campaign contributions
Partisan context
Majority party provided most
support, but minority votes
essential to passage
Cross-party coalition victory or
noncontroversial (see footnote 19
of text)
Noncontroversiala
Noncontroversial
Noncontroversialb
Noncontroversial (see Congressional Record, January 13, 1939,
13-15)
Cross-party coalition victory or
bipartisan controversy (see
footnote 20 of text)
Cross-party coalition victory
Noncontroversial
Noncontroversialc
Noncontroversial
Noncontroversial, but with partisan
elementd
Noncontroversial (CQ Almanac
1958, 164)
Noncontroversiale
Noncontroversial (Congressional
Record, October 20, 1967,
29560-29566)
Minor cross-party coalition victoryf
Noncontroversialg
Noncontroversialh
Bipartisan controversy1
Majority party provided most
support, but minority votes
essential to passage
Majority party forced change
(see text)
Table 2. Rule-based Changes in CommitteeJurisdictions(continued)
Year
Case
1977
Abolish Joint Atomic Energy and
strip Standards and Conduct
of its jurisdiction over lobbying
Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee created
1977
1980
1983
1993
Energy changes (King 1992;
Uslaner 1989)
Tightened Ways & Means jurisdiction
over tax matters
Dissolve select committees, including
Permanent Select Committee
on Aging
Partisan context
Majority party forced change
Noncontroversial, but with
partisan element (see
footnote 17 of text)
Bipartisan controversy
NoncontroversialJ
Cross-party coalition victory
aThejurisdictionof the resultingExpendituresCommitteewas modified slightly in 1928. The Rules
Committeeunanimouslyreportedthe change, which passed withoutdissent (CongressionalRecord,
March 17, 1928, 4930).
bTheRules Committee'sDemocraticchairmanand RankingRepublicanmembereach endorsedthe
change, which was agreed to on a voice vote (Congressional Record, February26, 1935, 26272631).
cSenatorArthurVandenberg(R-MI), a memberof the minorityparty,originatedthe proposalto create a JointCommittee,which was made partof the Atomic EnergyAct of 1946 (CQ Almanac 1945,
674, Hewlett and Anderson 1962, 435, 507). We found no indicationof a dispute over the creation
of the Joint Committee or its jurisdiction in Hewlett's lengthy description of the Act's travails
(Hewlett andAnderson 1962, 482-530).
dSee discussion in footnote 21 of the text. The Committee'sauthorizationpower was expanded in
June 1957. This change was also noncontroversial(Greenand Rosenthal 1963, 179-80).
eThe committee was createdon April 13, 1967 on a 400-0 vote. The House made the committee a
permanentstandingcommittee and expanded its jurisdiction on April 3, 1968. The 1968 proposal
was praisedby members of both parties and passed 406-1 (Congressional Record,April 3, 1968,
8776-8812). Lobby reform was added to the committee'sjurisdiction on July 8, 1970 by a 382-0
vote (CQ Almanac 1970, 1020).
fDemocratson the JudiciaryCommitteecomplainedthat the changes infringedon Judiciary'sjurisdiction (CQ WeeklyReport,February21, 1969, 274, 277). The previous question on the resolution
passed with the Democratsevenly split, and the Republicansunited in favor of the motion.
gSee CongressionalRecord,April 27, 1971, 12080-1. The proposalwas cosponsoredby the chairmen and rankingminoritymemberson the two affected committees.
hThe change was incorporatedinto the package of new rules passed by the Democrats. The rules
were controversialbut thereis no indicationin the CongressionalRecordor in CongressionalQuarterly thatthis particularchange was opposed by anyone. Small Business was made a standingcommittee with legislative jurisdiction in a floor amendmentto the Hansen reform proposal passed in
1974. The amendmentpassed on a standingvote.
iSee Wander(1984). The 1974 Budget Act also made modifications to the responsibilities of the
AppropriationsCommittee.A provision in the 1985 Budget Act modified the Budget Committee's
jurisdiction to provide for responses to presidential sequestration orders (House Rules Manual,
103rdCongress,pp. 376-7, 423). Budget law changes over the years also necessitatedminormodifications in the jurisdiction of Ways and Means, GovernmentOperationsand Rules (House Rules
Manual, 103rdCongress, 387-8, 404, 412-3).
JAlthoughincluded in the Democraticpackage of rules changes, the Republicanskept this proposal
in their substituteversion of the rules (Congressional Record, January3, 1983, 39). There was no
discussion of this change duringthe floor debate on the rules changes (see also CQ Almanac 1983,
597).
1358
revivingthe Dies SpecialCommitteeon Un-AmericanActivities,andmaking it a standingcommittee.Democraticleaders,includingMajorityLeader
JohnMcCormack(D-MA), condemnedthe Rankinamendment,and more
thantwo-thirdsof Democratsvoted againstthe Rankinmotion (CQAlmanac 1945, 79-82). However,70 Democratsjoined the bulk of the Republicans to create the standingcommittee.Althoughthe Democratsdid tame
HUACsomewhatwithcaucuschangesadoptedin 1949,the committeecontinuedto use its substantialbudgetto plague the Democraticleft for some
time to come (Goodman1968).
In additionto the case of HUAC, the 1924 creationof the WorldWar
VeteransCommittee,19andthe 1944 decisionto expandthe VeteransComeach appearto be cross-partyvictoriesover majority
mittee'sjurisdiction,20
partyleaderseagerto preventexcessive largesseto a powerfulpoliticalconstituency.A morerecentcase of a cross-partycoalitiontriumphoccurredin
1993 whenRepublicansattractedenoughDemocraticvotes to doom several
select committeesthathad long servedas politicalplatformsfor Democrats
(CQ Almanac 1993, 13).
This diversityof experiencesupportsthe view thatmajoritypartycontrol of committeejurisdictionshas been variableat best. Nonetheless,Cox
andMcCubbins(1993, 255) arguethat"themajoritypartyhas reshuffledjurisdictionalresponsibilitiesseveraltimes since the LegislativeReorganization Act of 1946."For evidence,they cite Dodd and Oppenheimer(1977),
who discuss the 1974 Hansenreformsand the 1974 creationof the Budget
Committee,but no otherfull committeejurisdictionchanges.Beyond this,
the only cases offeredin defenseof this claim arethe Democrats'depriving
theirWaysandMeanscommitteemembersof theirrole as the party'sCommitteeon Committees,andthe Republicans'1954 expansionof thejurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.Whetherthe Ways and
Meanscase is properlyregardedas a changein committeejurisdictionis unclear, and while the atomic energy change was to some extent a partisan
Similarly,the creationof
move, it passedwithoutsubstantialcontroversy.21
19SeeHasbrouck(1927). Democratshad pushedfor creationof a WorldWarVeteransCommittee since 1919, but Republicans buried these measures in the Rules Committee (Congressional
Record, December 3, 1919, 100). The Rules Committeeincludedthe change in its package of rules
changes in January1924.
20TheRules Committee refused to reportDemocrat John Rankin's resolution to expand the
Committee'sjurisdiction,but Rankinobtainedthe 218 signaturesrequiredto dischargeRules. Republicansprovided 131 signaturesfor the petition, as opposed to 84 from Democratsand threefrom
membersof thirdparties.Several Republicanleaders, and few Democraticleaders, signed the petition. The resolutionpassed on a division vote-doubtless few memberswantedto oppose the veterans publicly.Despite a draftingerror,the change was treatedas a valid precedentfor subsequentreferrals(House Rules Manual, 79th Congress, 326).
21Section261 of the Atomic EnergyAct of 1954 grantedthe JCAE the power to reportauthorizationbills for certainAtomic EnergyCommissionprojects.Democraticleaderson the Committee
1359
the Budget Committee was hardly dominated by partisan forces (Wander
1984). Even in the case of Hansen, Democrats were so deeply split that reform advocates made several concessions to Republicans to attract needed
votes (Sheppard 1985).
The reason that partisancoalitions have put through few major revisions
in committee jurisdictions may be that membership on committees creates
crosscutting cleavages that are viewed as a legitimate basis for opposing
party leaders. Unlike assignments of members to committees, the determination of committee jurisdictions appears to be a matterthat is with rare exceptions left to the membership as a whole ratherthan restricted to the majority
party caucus.
Even the Republican-designed changes to committee jurisdictions
adopted in 1995 were limited by fear of trouble on the floor. David Dreier
(R-CA) devised an ambitious plan to reshape jurisdictions to correspond to
Republican priorities. But the Republican leadership dramatically scaled
back the proposal due to fear that the Dreier plan would "endanger unanimous Republican support for the opening day reforms, and potentially complicate timely passage of the Contract with America" (Evans and Oleszek
1995, 17). The Republicans did eliminate three minor committees with primarily Democratic constituencies; however, few other changes to jurisdictions were adopted. Evans and Oleszek argue that the fierce divisions in the
Republican caucus surrounding the committee changes paralleled the
Democrats' earlier experiences with jurisdiction reform, and seriously limited leaders' ability to reshape the committee system in a partisan direction.
They conclude that "in the House Republican experience with jurisdictional
change, constituency interests and the personal power stakes of key legislators dominated partisan motivations" (Evans and Oleszek 1995, 21).
Our evidence on jurisdictions challenges the view that the committee
system is designed to protect majority party logrolls. Clearly, committee jurisdictions have been shaped through more party-centered processes in recent years than in the past. It is hard to imagine in 1995 that a major revision
in committee jurisdictions could be adopted that was essentially proposed by
a member of the minority party,as was the case with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Evans and Oleszek 1995). But it is not at all clear that
had sought a similarchange startingin 1949, but had been dissuadedfrom pursuingit by AEC objections (Green and Rosenthal 1963, 169-71). The 1954 change had a partisanelement: it was tailored to the Republicangoal of limiting the AEC's ability to initiatelarge-scalepublic nuclearpower
projects.But Section 261 was not a particulartargetof Democraticobjections. Indeed, the AECchaired by an Eisenhower appointee-was the primaryopponent of the authorizationprovision.
Green and Rosenthal(1963, 172) write that despite the Eisenhower"administration'sopposition to
inclusion of [thejurisdictionchange], therewas little public discussion of the matter.In lengthy debate on the 1954 act, the legislators raised no objection to the authorizingprovision"(see Hewlett
and Holl 1989, 142-43 for a similarassessment).
1360
the majorityDemocratsbuilta set of committeejurisdictionssystematically
biasedto favorDemocraticpartylogrolls.Cox andMcCubbins(1994, 220)
arguethat"thekey logrolls of a U.S. majoritypartyare often protectedby
the judicious allocationof committeepower (e.g. the dominanceof organized laboron the EducationandLaborCommittee;the requiredsupportof
the oil-depletion allowance for a Democratic assignment to Ways and
Means; the dominanceof the InteriorCommitteeby westerners;and the
dominationof theAgricultureCommitteeby membersfromagriculturedistricts)."In ourview, threeof the fourcases citedby Cox andMcCubbinsare
characteristicof cross-partydistributivecoalitions, as opposed to Democraticpartylogrolls.
The oil-depletionallowancewas createdin 1926 by a RepublicanCongress. It was attackedvigorouslyby threeDemocraticpresidents,and for
severaldecadesit was defendedagainstliberalDemocrats'attacksby CongressionalRepublicansin alliance with conservativeDemocrats(Oppenheimer 1974). Why Democraticpresidentswould repeatedlyattackwhat
scholarstaketo be a key elementof Democraticlogrollsin Congressis unclear.While SpeakerRayburnprotectedthe provision,Oppenheimer(1974,
72-3) reportsthatafterRayburn'sdeathin 1961,committeeappointments
to
Ways and Meansno longerwere based on supportfor the allowance.Furthermore,liberalDemocratswere finally successfulin scalingback the allowance in 1975 (CQ Almanac 1975, 98-110).
The dominanceof memberswith a strongconstituencyintereston AgricultureandInteriorhas long held truefor bothDemocratsandRepublicans
(Fenno 1973; Jones 1961). The new RepublicanCongressof 1995 did not
challengethejurisdictionof eithercommittee.RepublicanDreierproposed
removingnutritionjurisdictionfromAgriculture.But incomingAgriculture
ChairPat Roberts(R-KS) and other farm state Republicanssuccessfully
blocked the change,indicatingthatthe famouslinkagebetweenfood programsand farmbenefitsis valuedby some prominentRepublicansas well
as Democrats(EvansandOleszek 1995, 14).
Of the four cases cited, only Educationand Laboris an element of a
party-specificlogrollof sorts.22Althoughthe committeewas underconservativecontrolfor the firstdecadeafterits creationin 1946,Democraticleaders soughtto appointonly liberalsto the committee,andby 1959, the committeehada liberalmajority.But this did not stopthe floorfromsubstituting
bill for the committee'smore liberal 1959
the antilaborLandrum-Griffin
proposal (Reeves 1993). Indeed, notwithstandingsuccesses in 1964-66,
22Still,creationof Educationand Laborwas includedin RepublicanJamesWadsworth'scommittee realignmentplan, which served as the basis for the jurisdictionchanges adoptedin the Legislation ReorganizationAct of 1946.
1361
EducationandLaborhas long been notoriousfor havingits productstaken
aparton the floor(Fenno1973;Mayhew1974).Althoughlaborinfluenceon
the committeeprobablypreventedsome antilaborlegislationoverthe years,
it also mustbe acknowledgedthatlaborhas neverachievedits goals of reversingrestrictionsin Taft-Hartley(1947) andLandrum-Griffin
(1959).
We concludefrom our examinationof House rules thatdecisions surroundingthe dischargeprocessandRules Committeehave been only incidentallyparty-based.Theyhavebeenfundamentallyideological,andcan be
representedon a single underlyingdimensionfor muchof the periodunder
consideration.ConservativeRepublicansopposedDemocratsandprogressive Republicansin the 1920s, while liberalDemocratsopposedconservative Democratsand theirRepublicanallies for much of the 1940s-60s. As
the balanceamongthese coalitionsshifted,so (in general)did the relevant
rules.IncreasedDemocratichomogeneityin the 1970s and 1980s,however,
allowed the majoritypartyto gain controlover the Rules Committeeto a
degreethatappearsto be less susceptibleto changesin the coalitionalbalance on the floor.A secondtype of ruleschangehas been moreconsistently
partisan:Democratshave been quiteunitedwhenit comes to deprivingRepublicansof committeestaffandopportunitiesto offerdilatorymotions(see
Table1). A thirdtype of rulechange,involvingcommitteejurisdictions,has
tendedto be less partisanthaneitherof the firsttwo categories.The distribution of committeeturfinvolvesmultiple,crosscuttingevaluativedimensions
for members.Only rarelyhas the majoritypartybeen sufficientlystrongto
dominatethe cross-partycleavagesin this realm.
Punishing Defectors
Ourinvestigationof changesin Houseorganizationrevealsthatthe majoritypartyhas enjoyedconsistentcontrolof the electionof the Speakerand
committee assignments,but that partisancontrol of key House rules has
been farmoretenuous,particularlypriorto the mid-1970s.The weaknessof
partisancontrolover rulesin the 1919-70 periodmightrelateto limitations
in the majorityparty'sabilityto punishdefectorson rulesvotes duringthis
period.
Cox andMcCubbins(1994) arguethatmajoritypartycontroloverrules
is safeguardedby a party'sabilityto sanctiondefectorson key procedural
votes. They writethat"theDemocraticcaucushas madea very publiccommitmentto expel (or discipline)memberswho fail to supportthe featuresof
House structurethatundergirdthe party'slogrollingabilities"(1994, 224).
The centralquestionis whetherthe majoritypartyis willingto punish"pivotal"defectors-that is, dissidentswho constitutea majorityif they unite
with the minorityparty(1994, 223). Cox andMcCubbinsobservethatpunishing pivotaldefectorscarriesthe risk thatthe partywill lose its majority
1362
statuspermanently,but they arguethatthe partywill neverthelesscredibly
threatenpunishmentto dissidentsbecausea reputationfor toughnessis essentialto the party'sorganizationalviability.The way to build a reputation
fortoughnessis to use a rangeof punishments:"ifnonpivotalgroupsarepunished,possiblywith sanctionsless severethanexpulsion,thenmembersof a
prospectivedissidentgroupwill be concernedwith the group'sunityof purpose andpivotalness"(1994, 224). This suggeststhatdefectorson important
rulesvotes will not necessarilybe expelled,butthatdefectionon suchvotes
shouldhave adverseconsequencesfor some members.These consequences
shouldbe visible to othermembers-otherwise,the partywill not createthe
reputationfor toughnessthatis requiredfor an effectivedeterrent.
Testingthe claim thatpartyleadersare able to use a rangeof sanctions
to makethe threatof punishmentcredibleeven to potentiallypivotalgroups
is difficult;thereis no ideal methodto determinethe numberof members
deterredfrom defectingby the threatof punishment.We focus on one particulartype of punishmenthere:seniorityviolations.We do so becauseseniorityviolationsarethe mostvisibleformof punishment,shortof expelling
membersfromthe party(whichhas not been done since the 1924 case discussed below). For Cox and McCubbins'hypothesisto be testable,there
mustbe observablepunishmentsthatarepredictedto be used underspecifiableconditions.Cox andMcCubbins'(1994) essay suggeststhatsome form
of punishmentis predictedto be metedout to at least some of the defectors
on a given rulevote on a key structuralmatterundergirdingthe party'slogrollingabilities.Thispredictionis challengedif it turnsoutthatthe mostvisible formof punishment-seniorityviolations-was not used to punishdisloyaltyon importantrulesvotes for severaldecades.
We assess the likelihoodof visible punishmentin the event of various
forms of disloyal behaviorby majoritypartymembers:oppositionto the
party'spresidentialcandidate,oppositionto the partyon the electionof the
Speaker,anddefectionon the vote to adoptthe Houserulesat the openingof
each new Congress.23In Table3, we list the numberof membersengaging
in each of these activitiesfor eachCongressfrom 1919 to 1993 in whichdefectionsoccurred,alongwith whetherthese activitieswere followedby any
loss of committeeassignmentsor committeeseniority.This does not fully
respondto the problemof membersbeingdeterredfromdefectingdueto the
anticipationof punishment.The tableindicates,however,the conditionsun23Forthe periodup through1944, we relied on Berdahl(1949) for our list of presidentialelection defectors. For the 1948 election, we relied upon Garson (1974), Key (1962), and Bolling
(1968). For informationon subsequentpresidentialelections, we relied primarilyupon CQAlmanac
and CQ WeeklyReport. We believe our list covers a substantialmajorityof cases of defections in
presidentialelections by majoritypartymembers.
1363
der which membersare likely to be punished,which in turnshouldinform
memberexpectationsof punishment.If memberssee thatdefectorsin presidentialelectionshave often been punished,while manymembershave defectedon rulesvotes withoutapparentsanctions,this will presumablyshape
members'beliefs aboutwhatthe partyexpectsof them.
Sanctions
The aftermathsof the 1922 and 1924 elections providean interesting
test for the conditionsunderwhich the majoritypartycrediblythreatensto
punishdissidents.As notedabove,progressiveRepublicansheldthe balance
of powerfollowing the 1922 elections,andrefusedto back the Republican
candidatefor Speakeron the firstseveralballotsin December1923.The insurgentsalso allied with the Democratsto force throughseveralimportant
ruleschangesin January1924.Yetwe find no evidencethattheseinsurgents
were punishedfor theirbehaviorduringthe Congressin question.Indeed,
insurgentleaderJohnNelson (R-WI)was placed on the Rules Committee.
Fearof losing theirmajoritystatusforcedRepublicanleadersto makeconcessions to the insurgentswithin theirranks,ratherthansanctioningthese
members.This inabilityto punishdissidentsin a closely dividedHouse is
evidence thatthe credibilityof the threatto punishis seriouslyreducedin
the case of potentiallypivotaldefectors.
In 1925, the greatlyincreasedRepublicanmajorityallowedpartyleaders greaterleverage.Partyleadersmadeit clearthatearliermisbehaviorin
December1923, and January1924, was not now at issue.24Leadersstated
that the tests to be applied to memberswere supportfor Coolidge in the
1924 presidentialelectionand supportfor the Republicaneffortto organize
the House in December1925 (Berdahl1949). Elevenof the 12 presidential
election defectorsrefusedto vote for RepublicanNicholas Longworthof
Ohiofor Speakeron the floor.Eachlost committeeseniority,andthoseservto minorasing on majorcommittees,with one exception,were transferred
signments(Berdahl1949). A twelfth presidentialelection defector,Oscar
Kellerof Minnesota,voted for Longworthfor Speakerbut defectedon the
rules adoptionvote at the openingof the Congress.Keller apparentlywas
24TheRepublicanspassed a caucus rule in 1925 preventingcommittee chairs from serving on
the Rules Committee(Hasbrouck1927). This change led two membersof Rules to leave the Committee. One of the two-Royal Johnson(R-SD)-had defected on one of the four floor votes on the
rules in January1924. We were unable to document whether the caucus rule change was done to
oust Johnson. The change was one of a handful of restrictions passed by the Republicans in the
1920s to preventmembersfrom serving in more than one "leadership"position (Hasbrouck1927),
and it was enforcedin subsequentsessions, forcing reliablepartysupporters,such as WallaceWhite
(R-ME), off of Rules. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that the caucus change was a party
leadermove to enhancetheir control of the Committee.
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1366
not punished.25The other 14 Republicans who defected on one or both of
the 1925 rules votes, but who had backed Longworth for Speaker and
Coolidge for president, also were not punished.26
The message sent by these actions would seem to be that while a divided party with a slim majority did not punish its dissidents, a more secure
majority looked to supportfor the party's presidential candidate and Speaker
nominee as the criteria for good standing. Disloyalty on rules votes, while
perhaps affecting future advancement, did not portend severe punishment.
When asked in 1937 what makes a "bona-fide Republican," Congressman
Hamilton Fish (R-NY) responded that since 1910 the clear criterion had
been that "it is one who supports his party's candidate for the presidency"
(as quoted in Berdahl 1949, 504). Senate Republicans in 1936 also concluded that the "generally accepted definition of what makes a party man is
that he shall have supported the Presidential candidate of the party in which
he claims membership" (Berdahl 1949, 505). The absence of defectors on
votes to elect the Speaker after 1925 suggests that this too was a criterion for
good party standing, following Longworth's disciplining of the 1925 bolters.
These loose standardswere not a mere aberrationused by Republicans due
to their regional divisions: before the Democrats' deep regional split
emerged, the Democrats did not punish any of the 72 party members who in
1935 disobeyed a binding caucus vote to reinstitute the requirementfor 218
signatures on discharge petitions. Although the Democrats did succeed in
increasing the discharge requirement,party leaders had been unable to do so
two years earlier because many of the same members had made it clear they
would defect on the floor. During the era of deepest Democratic regional divisions (1937-65), the party punished only a handful of its presidential election bolters and none of the members who defected on rules votes. Based on
this record of party discipline since 1919, Ripley noted in 1967 that caucuses violated seniority only in isolated instances where members "supported the presidential nominee of another party" (1967, 53).
By 1975, this conclusion no longer held. Although the three chairmen
who lost their positions in 1975 were not punished for disloyalty on rules
votes, these were the first clear instances of seniority violations in the majority party for reasons having to do with conduct within the House of Repre25Kellerretainedhis chairmanshipof the Railways and Canals Committee, remained as the
rankingmember on Claims when the chair of that committee became vacant, and moved up from
fourthto second place on the District of ColumbiaCommittee.He did not become chair of Claims,
presumablydue to the practicethat no memberchair more than one committee.
26Nonetheless,the fall in the numberof defectors on the dischargevote-from 44 in 1924 to
22 in 1925-might indicate that the increasedRepublicanmajorityallowed partyleaders to intimidate several potential dissidents. Hasbrouck(1927) surmises that this threatsuccessfully deterred
freshmenfrom defecting.
1367
sentatives-as opposedto presidentialelection defections,frail health,or
personalscandals-in several decades.The operationof recentlyadopted
caucusrules facilitatingattackson sittingchairmen,the restlessnessof the
largefreshmanclass, andDemocrats'substantialmajorityin 1975likelyeach
contributedto the successof the 1975effortto deposethe threechairmen.
It appearsfromTables 1 and 3 thatmemberbeliefs aboutthe level of
loyalty expectedfromthem on rules votes changeddramaticallyfollowing
the 1975 seniorityviolations.Therecontinuedto be substantialnumbersof
defectorson the vote on initialadoptionof Houserulesup through1975.Yet
immediatelyafter 1975, defectionsfell to minusculelevels until 1993. The
most interestingfeatureof this developmentis thatDemocraticloyalty on
substantivemattersdid not rise significantlyuntil 1983 (Rohde 1991, 53).
This suggeststhatthe emergenceof a crediblethreatto sanctiondefectors
(afterits absencefor many decades)-though rootedin rising Democratic
homogeneityandin the largemajoritiesof the mid-1970s-had an independentimpacton partisanproceduralcontrol.Majoritypartymembersapparently were relativelyfree to disobey the partyon even the most important
proceduralmattersup throughthe mid-1970s,until the partyfinally made
memberssubjectto seniorityviolationsfor theirconductin the House.This
changeresultedin a dramaticincreasein partyproceduralcontrol,andlikely
createdincentivesfor memberloyaltyon other,substantiveissues as well.
Ourevidenceon the credibilityof partythreatsto sanctiondefectorsis
indirectandthus shouldbe interpretedwith caution.It is possiblethateven
beforethe 1970s, the majoritypartyhad access to sanctionswhichperhaps
wereless visiblethanseniorityviolations,yet weresufficientto detera large
is suspectbecausethe
proportionof would-bedefectors.This interpretation
majoritypartydid lose severalimportantrulesvotes duringthisperiod.Still,
our evidence is sufficient only to call into question, not refute, Cox and
McCubbins'view of sanctions.
Rewards
The senioritysystemdid not leave partyleaderswithoutany tools to induce loyalty priorto 1975. For example,scholarshave long observedthat
partyloyalistsare advantagedwhen it comes to initialassignmentsto committees(Cox andMcCubbins1993;Ripley 1967;SmithandRay 1983).But
it is anopenquestionhow muchimpactthepotentialloss of futurerewardsas opposedto the threatof an immediateloss in existingassignments-had
on memberloyaltyon rulesvotes.
To begin to answerthis question,we examinethe likelihoodof receiving a favorablecommitteeassignmentfor Democratsin the 79th Congress
(1945-46) in the aftermathof Rankin'ssuccessful amendmentto create
HUAC.We selectedthis case becausethe vote to createHUACwas one of
1368
the clearesttests of partyloyalty on a committeejurisdictionmatterin the
twentiethcentury.The previouslyexisting Dies Select Committeeon UnAmericanActivitieshad a recordfor successfullyunderminingthe reputationandelectoralsuccessof liberalDemocrats(Goodman1968).As a result,
voting to createHUAC was an actionlikely to lead to directelectoralharm
to fellow Democrats.
Table4 presentsourresults.Basedon Galloway(1946, 54, 90), we classify 10 committeesas majorHousecommittees.We thenexaminethe likelihood of receivingan assignmentto one of these 10 committees,given a yes
or no vote on the Rankinamendment.The first notableresultis thatmembers alreadyon the 10 committees(none of whom were removedfromthe
committeesin the aftermathof the vote), voted 65 to 37 againstthe Rankin
amendment.27
The rate of defections of these members(36%) is slightly
higherthanthe 28%defectionratefor partymembersnot on the 10 major
committees,althoughthe differenceis not statisticallysignificant(p = .26).
If one restrictsthe analysis to the Rules, Appropriations,and Ways and
Meanscommittees,the disparityis a bit stronger:membersalreadyon these
committeesvoted 20 to 15 againstthe Rankinamendment,a lower proportion thanthatfor the restof the party,whichvoted 129 to 55 againstRankin
southern
(p =.19). Theseresultsmostlikely aretraceableto disproportionate
representationon leading House committees, but they also indicate that
membersserving on key committeeswere hardlyparagonsof loyalty on
rulesvotes.
One hundredseventeenDemocratsvoting on the Rankinamendment
werenot on any of the 10 majorcommitteesat the openingof the 79th Congress.Thesemembersvoted84 to 33 againsttheRankinamendment.Wefind
that34.5%of the membersvotingagainstRankinreceivedan assignmenton
one of the top 10 committees,while 27.3%of the membersvotingin favorof
Althoughthis differenceis smalland
Rankinreceivedsuchan assignment.28
is farfromstatisticalsignificance(p = .59), thereis someevidenceto suggest
27Twomembers who voted against the Rankin amendment, Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and
Donald O'Toole (D-NY), moved from slots on one of the 10 committeesto places on several minor
committees. One memberwho voted in favor of Rankin,E.C. Gathings(D-AR) was transferredin
1945 from MilitaryAffairs to Agriculture.Both committees are on our list of 10 majorcommittees.
We lack informationon whetherGathingssought the transfer.Finally, CliffordDavis (D-TN), who
voted in favor of Rankin,moved from MilitaryAffairs to Public Worksin 1947 when MilitaryAffairs and Naval Affairs were consolidatedinto the Armed Services Committee.Two lower ranking
membersof MilitaryAffairs in 1945, both of whom also voted in favor of Rankin,were appointed
to Armed Services in 1947.
28Wealso used a logit model to predictwhethermembersnot on the 10 committees in 194344 received assignmentsto the committees in 1945, controllingfor region and whetherthe member
was a freshmanin 1945. The coefficient for the vote on the Rankinamendmentwas tiny and insignificant (.025; p = .83).
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1370
thatthe desireto receivefavorablecommitteeassignmentsplayedsomerole
in the vote. FreshmenDemocrats,who presumablyhad the most to gain or
lose by theirconduct,voted 51 to 5 againstthe Rankinamendment.Region
andideologyundoubtedlywerein partresponsiblefor this strongleadership
support:only 16%of freshmenDemocratswho voted were fromthe South.
But even controllingfor region,freshmenvoted againstthe RankinamendIt seems fairto conclude
mentin greaternumbersthandid non-freshmen.29
thatthe desirefor rewardsfromthe leadershipwas at least a mild incentive
forpartyloyaltyon thisvote. Nonetheless,the extentof thisincentiveis open
to question:afterall, threeof the five freshmenwho voted for Rankinreceived assignmentsto a majorcommittee(as opposedto 19 of the 51 who
wereopposed).
Ouranalysisof the 1945 case is subjectto the problemthatthe decision
to defectmightdependon whethera memberis seekingto transferto a new
committee.Still, ourdataprovidesome supportfor the view thatthereis an
asymmetrybetweenpartyleaders'abilityto rewardloyal behaviorandleaders' abilityto punishdisloyalbehavior(Sinclair1983).A likely explanation
for this is thatpartyleadersneed to balancethe goal of enforcingunitywith
"keepingpeace in the family"(Sinclair 1983). Withholding,rewards
from
dissidentsposes muchless of a threatto "peacein the family"thandoes directpunishment.
But the threat of withholding possible rewards apparentlywas not
nearly as stronga deterrentto defection on critical votes as has been the
post-1975additionalthreatof specificsanctions.Our1945 dataindicatethat
the effecton futureadvancementof defectingon thisparticularkey rulevote
was farfromoverwhelming.The successesof cross-partycoalitionsin 1924,
1945, 1951, and 1967 speakto the limitedeffectivenessof the merethreatof
reducedprospectsfor futureadvancement.
Weconcludethatthe partythreatto punishdissidentshas variedsignificantly in scope and severity.The 1923 and 1925 evidence indicates that
memberswho defecton the electionof officerssuchas the Speakeraresubject to punishment,but thatleadershave been reluctantto jeopardizepartisan controlof the House in orderto enforce strictdisciplineon these matters. Memberswho defect on rules votes have only rarelybeen subjectto
directpunishment.The threatof sanctionsfor variousforms of disloyalty,
however,appearsto have increasedsignificantlysince 1975, contributing
morethanlikely to the dramaticrise in partyloyaltyon rules-adoption
votes.
By contrast,memberswho defectedto supportthe opposingparty'spresidentialcandidatehave long been subjectto visible punishment.This set of
29Weused a logit model to predict the vote on the Rankin amendment(yes = 0, no = 1; n =
219). The dummy variablefor freshmenhad a coefficient of 1.54 with a standarderrorof .52.
1371
findings suggests that the primary test of party status for roughly 50 years
starting in 1919, had far more to do with deterring open disrespect for public symbols of the party, than with safeguarding the majority party's procedural control of the House.
Discussion and Conclusions
Onepossibleresponseto ouranalysisis thatwe areexamininga period
in which the majoritypartyhas often been unusuallydivided,andthatthis
the degreeof majoritypartyproceduralcontrol.It
leadsus to underestimate
is certainly true that the Democrats were extremely divided during the
1937-75 period,andthatthe Republicansfaced importantdivisionsduring
the 1919-31 period when they were in the majority. The question is
whether the relatively unified parties of recent Congressional experience or
the divided parties of these earlier periods are more characteristic of Congressional politics. In fact, with the exception of the 1983-92 period and a
short-lived era of Democratic strength in 1911-17, which suffered a severe
setbackwith the outbreakof WorldWarI (GallowayandWise 1976), the
Democraticpartyhas faced serious divisions at all times since the Civil
Warwhen it has held majoritystatusin Congress.For example,the Democratswere the majoritypartyin the House for all but four yearsfrom 1875
to 1895. The partywas forced to grapplewith a strong,regionally-based,
protectionistwing for much of this period, and was torn aparteven more
severelyby the silverissue in the early 1890s. Its recordof proceduralcontrol duringthis periodcould be characterizedas mixed, at best (Alexander
1916; Wolf 1981). As for the Republicans,after facing serious divisions
throughoutthe 1870s and 1880s (CooperandBrady1981;Wolf 1981),they
did enjoy perhaps the longest period of strong party governance in Congressional history, lasting roughly from 1895 to 1909. Yet as early as 1905,
the party began to face serious fissures rooted in regionally-based divisions
over President Theodore Roosevelt's ambitious program (Hatch 1967). Al-
thoughRepublicanleaderswere able to delay the progressive-conservative
split which eruptedin 1909-10, this breach was not fully repairedfor
nearlythreedecades(Berdahl1949). Clearly,it has not been at all unusual
to have a sizable bloc of opposition-pronedissidentswithin the majority
party.
Evidence from the 103rd Congress (1993-94) indicates that the fairly
long recentperiod of Democraticunity and proceduraleffectiveness was
beginning to unravel before the Republican takeover of the House, revealing once again the frailty of strong party government in Congress. The
numberof Democratsdefectingon the initial adoptionof the House rules
increasedsubstantiallyin 1993. Granted,the Democraticleadershipwas
pushinga numberof controversialchanges,andthe leadershipdid triumph
1372
over Republicanobjections.Nonetheless,the willingnessof 14 Democrats
to vote for the Republicanrecommittalmotion on the rules, and of 27
Democratsto vote againstfinal adoption,is suggestiveof a rebelliousspirit
withinthe party.This rebelliousspirithad concreteeffects laterin January
1993, when one-thirdof the Democratssurprisedthe leadershipby joining
with the Republicansto deny fundingfor the Select Committeeon Narcotics. By March,Democraticleadersconcededthey lackedthe votes to preserve fundingnot only for the Narcoticscommitteebut also for the Select
Committeeson Hunger,Aging, and Children,Youthand Families(CQAlmanac 1993, 13). Restiveness among conservativeDemocratsalso led to
floor defeatsfor six specialrules to considerlegislationin the 103rdCongress, a dramaticcontrastto the Democrats' record of success on these
votes in previoussessions.
A furthersign of decliningDemocraticproceduralcontrolwas Inhofe's
victoryon the dischargepetitionsecrecyfight in September1993. The dischargechangeno doubtcontributedto leadershipdifficultiesin fightingyet
anothermanifestationof frayingproceduralcontrol:the so-called"A to Z"
spendingreductionsplan(Krehbiel1995).Themeasure,proposedby Robert
Andrews(D-NJ)andBill Zeliff (R-NH)aimedto set asidea 56 hourbloc of
time for considerationof any floor amendmentto reducefederalspending.
Andrews and Zeliff filed a discharge petition to bypass the Rules
Committee'seffortto block the measure.AlthoughAndrewsandZeliff fell
14 signaturesshortof the 218 required,it is likely thathad the Democrats
retaineda reducedmajorityin the ensuing104thCongress,the Republicans
wouldhavefounda sufficientnumberof Democraticalliesto bring"Ato Z"
to the floor.30This opportunityfor open floor considerationof untoldnumbersof amendmentsto reducespendingwouldhave doubtlessthreatenedall
sortsof Democraticand cross-partylogrolls.It might well have been 1910
all over again,with the partylabelsreversed.
TheDemocrats'troublesin the 103rdCongress,alongwiththe evidence
on rules changesand committeejurisdictionspresentedabove,revealsthat
the Housemajoritypartyhas not consistentlybeen able to entrencha set of
partisanlogrollsin Houserules.Instead,partisancontrolof Houseorganization is ordinarilycontestedby ideologicalcross-partycoalitionsthatvaryin
strengthwith the size of the majoritypartyandits homogeneity,andby bipartisandistributivecoalitionsthatappearto be somethingof a constantin
Congressionalpolitics. This complexitygoes againstthe view thatthereis
any coherentprincipleof Congressionalorganizationthat "solves"the cycling problem.It also points the way for models of legislative politics in
30SeeNational Journal Congress-Daily, "Andrews,Zeliff to Renew Spending Cut Effort in
1995," October7, 1994.
1373
which innovative representatives battle to manipulate the design of institutions to suit partisan, ideological, distributive, and other goals.
Manuscript submitted 18 October 1995.
Final manuscript received 18 June 1996.
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Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House

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