The social and economic effects of tuna fishing in the South

SOUTH I PACIFIC
COMMISSION
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF TUNA FISHING
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
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NOUMEA
NEW CALEDONIA
South Pacific Commission
Technical Paper No. 149
THE SOCIAL A N D ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF T U N A FISHING
I N THE SOUTH PACIFIC
By
F. DOUMENGE
Report on an Investigation by F. Doumenge,
Assistant Professor at the Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines,
University of Montpellier, France.
^»e~»mw
SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION
NOUMEA, NEW CALEDONIA
MAY, 1966
American samoa
PART TWO: THE PROBLEMS OF TUNA FISHING IN THE NEW
HEBRIDES AND THE BASE AT PALLICOLO (ESPIRITU
SANTO)
17
19
This paper is issued by
Commission for general
Commission does not
bility for the statements
the South Pacific
information. The
accept responsicontained therein.
P A R T T H R E E : NEW SHORE BASES FOR JAPANESE T U N A FISHING
28
1. Investigations and negotiations with a view to the setting-up of bases ashore
28
2. Installation of the Taiyo-Gyogyo Company in New Caledonia
28
3. The new base at Levuka (Ovalau Island), Fiji
31
Conclusions and Recommendations for New Caledonia and
Fiji
33
General Conclusions and Recommendations for the South
Pacific Area
33
1. Possibilities of organizing tuna-longline fishing based in the South Pacific.
territories
34
2. Organization of fishing and allocation of fishing grounds
34
3. Economic profits and their distribution
35
4. Organization of the bases as poles of development
36
DESCRIPTION OF CHARTS
37
APPENDIX: ORIGIN OF L A B O U R FORCE WORKING A T T H E TUTUILA
CANNERIES
38
BIBLIOGRAPHY
38
INTRODUCTION:
THE
SOUTH
AND
PACIFIC
JAPANESE
TERRITORIES
THE
TUNA
OF
EXPANSION
THE
OF
FISHERIES
It was not until 1950 that the successes of the first expeditions of Japanese longliners
grouped around mother ships showed that equatorial Pacific waters might offer vast possibilities as fishing grounds for fish of the tuna family.
However, it was only after the conclusion of the peace treaty between the United States
and Japan in 1952 that tuna-fishing fleets were able to fish the waters south of the equator.
Hence it is not much more than ten years since the territories of the South Pacific were
suddenly confronted with a new form of activity which sometimes took place in full view
of their shores.
The fishing fleets (grouped around mother ships which were used as refrigeration bases
and service platforms) avoided the ports and made but fleeting appearances, staying only
three or four months on the high seas before returning to Japan.
It very quickly became apparent that seasonal movements decreased the possibilities of
economic yields and that the limitations of floating bases were often very great. This led
to the interest shown by the big Japanese industrial fishing companies in the possibilities of
installing shore bases.
At about this time local authorities were anxious to foster new activities and to diversify
sources of income and employment, bearing in mind the problems created by population
pressures in small island territories very poor in natural resources.
Thus it was that two very different bases were installed, the Pago Pago centre in American
Samoa in 1954 and the Pallicolo (Espiritu Santo) base in the New Hebrides in 1957.
Local fears or reserve wrecked some projects (in Tonga, the Cook Islands, and French
Polynesia) or postponed others, which are only now beginning to take shape (New Caledonia
and Fiji)
At the end of 1963, therefore, the base in American Samoa had been in operation for
nine years, and the New Hebridean base for six, while a new base had been in operation
for several months in New Caledonia and another was soon to start operations in Fiji.
It therefore seemed opportune to the South Pacific Commission, as part of the activities
of its Economic Development Section, and at the request of a number of territories, to
undertake a general investigation into the social and economic effects of the establishment
of Japanese tuna-fishing bases in the islands of the South Pacific.
During the author's stay in the South Pacific in 1963 on behalf of the Coral Reef Study
Mission organized by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique frangais, and cosponsored by the Singer-Polignac Foundation, he was asked to make a series of inquiries
and, more particularly, to stay in certain territories. He had already made a study of these
problems, more especially in the territories under French administration.
In 1960, at the request of the French High Commissioner in the Pacific Ocean and
on the occasion of his first stay in the South Pacific with the Singer-Polignac Mission for
the study of the coral reefs of New Caledonia, the author had already carried out a preliminary investigation in Pallicolo in the island of Espiritu Santo (New Hebrides) and studied
the problems of possible Japanese activities based on New Caledonia and Wallis. After his
return to France, he was able to visit Japan in December, 1960, and make very useful
contacts, which enabled him to obtain an accurate picture of the facts of the situation.
In 1962 he extended these preliminary investigations to the African area (Senegal, Ivory
Coast, and Ghana) and, on the occasion of a second assignment to the Singer-Polignac
Mission, he was able to pay a second visit to the New Hebrides and Wallis and return by
way of French Polynesia where a whole series of problems related to the subject of the
present survey had arisen at that time.
In 1963 the author extended his field of investigation and pursued his research still further.
When he arrived in Noumea on 26th June, he learned of recent negotiations which were to
result in the organization of a base in New Caledonia. He was able to stay in Pallicolo
(New Hebrides) from 4th-7th July for the ceremonies celebrating the anniversary of the
(v)
work of the refrigeration base and the inauguration of new plant. In French Polynesia,
where he remained from 9th July to 26th August, he was able, in Papeete, Mopelia, and
Bora Bora, to follow various aspects of the question very closely.
He was shocked and saddened to see a Japanese tuna longliner run aground and suffer
shipwreck on the reefs of the isolated atoll of Mopelia, where sedimentological and oceanographic research kept him for nearly a month.
Finally, on assignment for the South Pacific Commission, he stayed in American Samoa
from 26th August to 7th September, went on to Western Samoa from 7th-12th September,
stayed in Fiji from 12th-30th September, visited the Tongan archipelago from 19th-21st September, and again stayed in the New Hebrides from 30th September to 19th October,
and in New Caledonia from 19th October to 5th November.
During all these visits and in all his inquiries, he was always kindly received by local
authorities and private firms. Sometimes, however, he met with a lack of facilities or with
courteous but firm refusals to allow him access to certain sources of information. That
caused him no surprise, as he knew from experience the financial difficulties and the lack
of resources of certain administrations, and was aware that the disclosure of confidential
documents might have financial implications for some of them.
Hence he apologizes in advance for the incompleteness of his results. The information
he was able to obtain was often inadequate and certain data were sometimes not forthcoming at all. In addition, as this document was completed in France, the author was unable,
as he would have wished, to have a final meeting with his informants.
The author feels obliged, however, to draw certain conclusions. If some economic, financial, or social interpretations are queried by the parties concerned, this is because the author
had no replies from them and has been obliged to make his own deductions or extrapolations.
This investigation is only a first step. The problem of the proper use of the resources
of the South Pacific ocean is now a matter of interest to all the governments and all the
inhabitants of the area. We must accordingly try to discover ways and means of reconciling the interests of the various parties concerned, so far as this is possible.
The author is therefore providing material for future analysis; he trusts that in the near
future he will be able to arrive at some synthesis, this being both possible and desirable.
His survey will first of all present the activities at Pago Pago and Pallicolo. He will
conclude by endeavouring to present a comprehensive picture of the main problems confronting the territories which have, or may have, freezing or canning installation to handle
tuna caught by Japanese longliners.
*
si:
(vi)
*
PART
OWE: T H E
TUNA-CANNING
A S R E L A T E D TO T H E ECONOMIC A N D
OF
AMERICAN
American Samoa forms a political and administrative unit
of seven islands situated to the east of 171 °W from Greenwich,
and slightly to the south of 14°S (see map no. 1). This territory occupies a central position in the Polynesian world, and
the present set-up is a result of colonial divisions in the late
19th century. A treaty dated 16th February, 1900, between
Great Britain, Germany, and the United States of America,
which put an end to a long period of disturbances and rivalries, gave Germany the islands of the Samoan archipelago to
the west of 171 °W from Greenwich, and gave the U.S.A.
the islands to the east of that meridian.
The main part of the Samoan archipelago was therefore at
first governed and colonized by Germany before being occupied
by New Zealand at the beginning of the First World War.
A mandate from the League of Nations between 1920 and
1940, followed by United Nations trusteeship after 1945,
enabled New Zealand to govern the Western Samoan islands
until independence was granted on 1st January, 1962.
INDUSTRY
DEMOGRAPHIC
FUTURE
SAMOA
171°W, has been attached to the territory, which also includes
another, uninhabited, atoll (Rose Island) situated towards
the east.
I: ECONOMIC AND HUMAN PROBLEMS OF
AMERICAN SAMOA
For many years the small territory of American Samoa
remained self-sufficient and only very slightly influenced by
the outside world. Until 1950 it was the demographic phenomena peculiar to the Polynesian Group which little by little
brought the elements of the present problem into being.
1. Increase in population and demographic pressure
The growth in population marked the rebirth of the Polynesian Islands after the critical period at the end of the
19th century.
During the period between 1900 and 1940 the islands more
than doubled their population:
1900
1912
1920
1930
1940
5,679
7,251
8,056
10,055
12,908
This quite moderate growth was followed by a veritable
population explosion between 1940 and 1950; the increase
amounted to nearly 50 per cent over ten years and brought
the population figure to 18,937.
This rapid increase is mainly due to the increase in the
birth rate and the drop in infant mortality, with a contribution
from the Western Samoa group which has close family ties
with the population of Tutuila. The population structure is
characterized by a considerable increase in the younger age
groups, especially amongst men and boys.
TABLE I—POPULATION STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN SAMOA
M a p N o . 1—Residential areas a n d corresponding numbers of workers
employed by the Pago Pago canneries, October, 1 9 6 3 . (The figures indicate the numbers of workers living in each zone and in each town.)
As compared with Western Samoa, the American Samoa
group forms only a very small unit:
• 197 square kilometres (76 square miles) against 2,934
square kilometres (1,133 square miles) in Western Samoa.
• American Samoa had a population (1960) of 20,051,
compared with 114,427 (1961) in Western Samoa.
The large island of Tutuila (with the small adjacent
island of Aunu'u (longitude 170°5'W — 170°32'W, latitude
14°14'S—14°22'S) represents more than 75 per cent of the
area of the territory and now contains 86 per cent of the
population.
The other part of American Samoa is formed by the
group known as Manu'a, which is situated further to the
east (longitude 169°41'W—169°27"W, latitude 14°10'S —
14°16'S) and which comprises the small twin islands of Ofu
and Olosega and the larger island of Ta'u.
Finally, since 1925, Swains, a small atoll situated more than
3 degrees further north, although slightly to the west of
Males
Under 15 years
15-34 years
35-54 years
Over 55 years
45.8
31.7
17.8
4.7
49.1
32.2
13.9
4.8
Females
Under 15 years
15-34 vears
35-54 years
Over 55 years
45.5
32.5
16.8
5.2
47.5
33.3
14
5.2
The average age of the population, which was 18.1 years
in 1930, fell to 16.6 in 1950. The year 1950 marks the end
of this first quite simple development based on a greater certainty of survival of the youngest infants and supported by a
moderate immigration from the Western Samoa islands.
Between the years 1950 and 1960 considerable changes took
place. First, the rate of growth came to a sudden halt.
Instead of an increase of 46.7 per cent as between 1st April,
1
1940, and 1st April, 1950, there was an increase of only
5.9 per cent between 1st April, 1950, and 1st April, 1960;
the total population increased from 18,937 inhabitants in 1950
to 20,051 in 1960.
This sudden slow-down was not due to a drop in the
birth rate, which was maintained at an extremely high level—
42.7 per thousand in 1960, 40 per thousand in 1961—nor
to an increase in the death rate, as the rate became
stabilized between 5 and 6 per thousand. On the contrary.
as the average life-span increased, the number of persons over
55 years of age progressed by 24 per cent between 1950 and
1960 (i.e., from 977 to 1,212).
The low rate of growth of the population of American
Samoa between 1950 and 1960 is therefore due to factors
outside the demographic movements which, if they had
behaved as before 1950, would have given a rate of growth of
nearly 35 per thousand per year, i.e., an increase of more
than 40 per cent in the ten years approximating to those of
the period 1950-1960.
The territory of American Samoa would have had about
26,000 inhabitants instead of slightly more than 20,000. It is
therefore emigration—which affects the adult groups and
particularly the group of men of an age capable of producing
the best work—which suddenly intervened to alter both the
population structures and the demographic prospects.
In the 1960 census, the progress of the under-14 age group
shows that the high birth rate had been maintained; in the
same way the over-55 age group shows a longer life-span,
while the drop in the adult groups stresses the toll taken by
emigration, especially among the young men.
If the absolute population figures are considered, we see a
striking downward curve—
TABLE III
AGE GROUPS
Males
1960
Males
Under 15 years
15-34 years
35-54 years
Over 55 years
49.1
32.2
13.9
4.8
51
27.8
15.4
5.8
Females
Under 15 years
15-34 years
35-54 years
Over 55 years
47.5
33.3
14
5.2
48.2
31
14.7
6.1
•%$&,
1960
Difference
15-24 years
25-34 years
...
1,911
1,382
1,848
974
— 63
—408
Females
15-24 years
25-34 years
...
1,880
1,275
1,778
1,287
— 102
+ 12
TABLE IV
1950
AGE GROUPS
PERCENTAGES
1950
1950
The adult male age group suffered a very considerable loss
if the 1960 census figures are compared with the estimates
which might have been made on the basis of the 1950 census.
Taking into account the average natural disappearance of
three males and three females per year in the age groups of
5-14 years, 15-24 years and 25-34 years, the figures in Table IV
should have been obtained—
TABLE II—POPULATION STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN SAMOA
AGE GROUPS
CENSUSES
CENSUS
No. OF
PERSONS
Males
5-14 years
15-24 years
25-34 years
35-44 years
2,778
1,911
1.382
Females
5-14 years
15-24 years
25-34 years
35-44 years
2,447
1,880
1,275
1960
ESTIMATED
No. OF
PERSONS
IN 1960
CENSUS
ACTUAL
2,748
1,881
1,352
1,848
974
945
-900
-907
-407
2,417
1,850
1,245
1,778
1,287
899
-639
-563
-346
No.
LOSSES
THROUGH
EMIGRATION
Emigration therefore accounted for at least 2,214 males and
1,548 females in the 1960 adult groups. These figures are
actually quite conservative since emigrants were admitted
between 1950 and 1960 from Western Samoa and, in smaller
proportions, from Niue and even from Tonga.
There are at least 4,000 adults who fail to appear in the
1960 census and thus upset the balance of the demographic
structure. If these adults have taken children away with them
or have had their children outside the territory during these
ten years, the 6,000 individuals missing from the 1960 census
are easily found, and it must even be acknowledged that, if
there had been no emigration, the demographic progression
would perhaps have speeded up still further in comparison
with the 1940-50 decade.
^
The reality of the extent of these emigration phenomena
is found to be still more marked in 1960 and 1961 when the
travel statistics in Table V are considered—
TABLE V
ARR IVALS
Ships anchored off the Van Camp Factory, Pago Pago.
seen mounting trawls.
The crews can be
COMPARISON
ARRIVALS DEPARTURES
1960
1961
1960
1961
By boat 4,221
By air 5,311
4,908
4,562
3,952
6,490
4 , 3 4 6 + 269
5,971 —1,179
Total
2
DEPARTURES
9,532
9,470 10.442 10,317 —
1960
910
1961
+ 562
—1,409
—
847
Habitants
P o p u l a t i on
E v o l u t i o n de l a P o p u l a t i o n
Population increase
Courbe demographique n a t u r e l l e , 1940-60
N a t u r a l demographic c u r v e , 1940-60
25,000'
E v o l u t i o n p r o b a b l e s a n s e m i g r a t i o n , 1960-70
' P r o b a b l e e v o l u t i o n w i t h o u t e m i g r a t i o n , 1960-70
20,000-
Evolution probable avec emigration
X A X X A A P r o b a b l e evolution with emigration
15,000'
10,000'
5,0004,000"
3,0002,000"
1,000Annee
1900
Year
1912
~i
1920
1
1
1930
1940
r-
1960
1970
1950
Graph I—Population changes, American Samoa
The greater number of arrivals by boat reflects arrivals from
Western Samoa, and a few return trips. The greater number
of departures by air represents the majority of departures to
Hawaii or California.
consolidated collective family enterprise on the land under the
authority of the head of the family group—the Matai system.
As the transfer of land to persons foreign to the Polynesian
group is practically impossible, and changes of ownership
within the group itself are very difficult, the rural economy of
American Samoa has remained almost exclusively concerned
with providing the means of subsistence for the family groups.
The small increase in population between 1950 and 1960
in no way shows a decrease in demographic pressure but
only shows that this pressure found an outlet in large-scale
emigration.
Although the decomposed volcanic soil is much more
favourable than the soil on the atolls, and although the climate
is very damp (average annual rainfall generally more than
192 inches at Pago Pago), it is none the less true that the
steep contours and, in particular, the small size of the islands
exclude any prospect of an agricultural export economy.
The basic crops—taro, banana, and breadfruit—are grown
on the slopes of the volcanic structures after the forest cover
has been burned and in accordance with a long-term croprotation sequence. Homogeneous plantations are rare and the
mixed crops system is found almost everywhere. Such an
economy requires a considerable labour force without being
able to supply anything beyond occasional surpluses incapable
of providing an improvement in the standard of living or of
putting money into circulation. Copra, the only product
capable of supplying a restricted market, comes mainly from
the Manu'a archipelago and cannot produce commercial transactions on a large scale. A copra fund maintains and controls
prices and tries to promote production, the producers being
freed from all marketing problems.
The United States administration, rightly anxious to maintain the foundations of the traditional social structures, has
However, climatic disturbances such as cyclones, the ravages
made by parasitic insects and rats, and low prices are all
2. Under-developed economy and efforts towards
modernization
Like many other islands in the South Pacific, American
Samoa has only mediocre natural conditions to support its
economy.
3
and gradually to organize a coherent economic and administrative life.
The first objective requires time (from 12 to 18 years) to
produce results, and only by 1970 will it be possible to judge
the results obtained from the considerable efforts and investments made in the field of education since 1957.
With regard to the second objective, lack of funds was to
paralyze public services for a long time to come while, at the
same time, private enterprise was taking the first step towards
introducing industrial life to Pago Pago with the large-scale
tuna-canning operation of Van Camp Sea Food Inc.
In an archipelago where rapid agricultural progress was
barred by the social system and land shortage, and where no
mineral resources could be expected, the only possibility was
to seek development of marine resources.
It was with this in mind that, in 1949, Island Packers Inc.
started to build a cannery which was to be supplied by a
modern fishing fleet. This interesting undertaking, with an
investment of about $US2 million, soon failed because the
fishing techniques were not adapted to local conditions.
The experiments made with the Californian technique of
tuna fishing with live bait could not succeed both because of
the lack of bait and the scarcity and erratic behaviour of
large shoals of tuna or skipjacks.
The failure of the undertaking in 1950 seemed to close the
door to industrial fishing and fish canning in this sector of
the Pacific.
However, the Government of Samoa, which was well aware
that this field was the only one offering good opportunities,
persisted in trying to conserve the existing potential.
After taking over the Island Packers' plant with the intention
of operating it themselves, the Government of American Samoa
turned its attention to existing American canning companies.
At the end of 1952, the Secretary of the Interior offered
the Pago Pago cannery to the fish-canning trade.
In spring, 1953, after considering the position, the Van
Camp company obtained the assurance that fish caught by
Japanese fishermen in the vicinity of Samoa could be unloaded
without Customs formalities, and that the canned products
made with this fish could enter the American market duty-free.
Being the only company interested, Van Camp obtained the
following lease as from January, 1954—
Lease to run from: 1st January, 1954—31st December,
1960.
Renewed lease to run from: 1st January, 1961—31st
December, 1965, with a re-negotiation of terms on 31st
December, 1962.
In this way, as from 1954, a large-scale private venture was
to provide support for the economic development of American
Samoa. From 1954 onwards, the economic evolution of the
territory was to be characterized by three factors—
1. variations in crops, making the food situation rather less
tight and providing people with a little pocket-money;
2. government investments creating employment, supplying
improved public services, and creating infrastructures;
and
3. the activity of the Van Camp cannery creating employment and the economic and financial foundations for
contact with the outside world.
factors which restrict production and exports. In recent years,
sales have been subject to very considerable fluctuations, as
shown in Table VI.
TABLE VI
COPRA EXPORTS
(IN METRIC TONS)
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
686
954
743
321
757
VALUE
(IN u.s. DOLLARS)
60,998
232,037
182,500
61,190
133,586
The income thus obtained is by no means negligible and
in some years it provides a good living for isolated communities
such as those in the Manu'a islands.
For the rest, very little—a few tons of cocoa only.
There are possibilities, however, such as an improvement
and extension in small-scale animal husbandry and better
development of the plains and hills of the south-west which
are at present neglected.
However, an agricultural development policy requires not
only considerable investment of money but also time before
it can show results.
The demographic pressure after 1940 became so great that
it was necessary deliberately to turn aside from the beaten
track.
The Second World War, which ended in 1945, gave Pago
Pago an unusual animation. Like many other islands serving
the rear areas of the American armies and navies fighting the
Japanese, Tutuila did exceedingly well out of an influx of
American troops and goods, while new jobs were available in
the auxiliary services and dependencies of the Navy.
Pago Pago thus attracted not only the population of Tutuila
but also that of the other islands, together with emigrants
from Western Samoa or Niue. This period was thus going to
be remarkable for the predominance and the constantly
growing attraction of Tutuila, and it was also going to open
new horizons for the youngest and most dynamic elements
of the population who in ever greater numbers were leaving
the strict confines of the subsistence family economy to
discover the always unstable and often disappointing realities
of a competitive monetary economy.
The end of the Pacific war, followed by the closing and
gradual evacuation of the naval base, was thus going to pose
the serious problem of employment of a redundant labour
force and that of succeeding younger generations.
All this was happening side by side with a general development in outlook and the discovery of new needs and ever
greater demands.
Certainly, emigration was to function as a safety valve by
transferring the most dynamic—but also the most unstable—
elements to Hawaii or California.
However, something fairly drastic had to be done, the more
so since, once the base was evacuated completely, the American
Navy, on 30th June, 1951, transferred the administration of
the territory to the Department of the Interior of the Federal
Administration.
At the beginning of their civil administration, American
Samoa was in a bad way—
—it lacked the essential economic infrastructures;
—it had hardly any local leaders; and
—it was almost completely isolated.
Parallel efforts were to be made to promote an educational
system capable of giving training to the younger generations—
In order to judge the results, the following facts may serve
as indicators—
First, electricity consumption, which increased by about 250
per cent in ten years, showed that the economy had got off
to a good start—
1st June, 1952—30th June, 1953
3,116,700 Kwh.
1st June, 1961—30th June, 1962
7,860,900 Kwh.
4
.
Annee F i s c a l e
F i s c a l Year
195
The 1960 census listed 1,349 government workers; at 30th
May, 1962, there were 2,099, of whom 2,036 (1,745 men
and 291 women) were Samoans against 63 (56 men and 7
women) not native to the territory.
At the end of August, 1963, permanent employees numbered
2,146, to whom must be added 89 clerks with contracts, or
federal officials who are, for the most part, foreigners to the
American Samoa group. To these officials employed in the
general administration of the territory must be added 146 local
government officials (from the districts and villages).
In all, at the end of August, 1963, there were 2,381 persons
in government posts or 282 more than 15 months previously,
i.e., a numerical increase of 13.6 per cent.
Among the active population, government employment has
now taken first place and it may be estimated that, at the end
of 1963, about 45 per cent of men between 18 and 57 years,
and 8 per cent of women of the same age group, were
employed by the various government departments.
Although salaries and wages paid to the majority of civil
servants are relatively low, the total amount is a large one.
About one-half of civil servants earn less than 1,000 dollars
per annum, 40 per cent earn between 1,000 and 1,500 dollars,
and only 10 per cent earn more than 1,500 dollars. However,
the population of Samoa should receive more than 2,500,000
dollars from the 1963 payments.
Like public enterprise, private enterprise has also experienced alternating periods of stagnation and growth.
From 1958-62 there was, if not recession, at least stagnation
in private enterprise. The number of paid jobs in private enterprise hardly varied and showed only a very slight increase—
i—i—i—i—i—r
j
1954
,955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962
Graph I I — P o w e r production, American Samoa
Next, the value of exports increased from less than 250,000
dollars in 1953 to nearly 8 million dollars in 1958, and more
than 10,000,000 dollars in 1962.
Finally, budgetary investments, which were practically nil
in 1953, amounted to nearly 2 million dollars in 1958-59,
exceeding 10 million dollars in 1962, and 14 million dollars
in 1963. This meant that, after a slow start in 1953-54, the
economy of American Samoa experienced a first phase of
expansion founded on the Van Camp cannery and its peripheral activities in 1 955-58.
A stable foundation having been laid by the cannery, a
further boost was given by government investments and
employment, stimulated by the South Pacific Conference held
in Pago Pago in 1962.
The year 1963 was important for the development of
private enterprise and the intensification of public investments.
ID
JOBS
1,358
1,394
1,427
1,470
1.519
3. Public and private sectors in 1963
In the present state of the economy in American Samoa
it is the public sector which is most active.
The budget indices clearly show that the investments made
by the Federal Government represent an essential contribution
to economic growth for the last two years. Although contributions from the central government were less than 2 million
dollars for the fiscal years 1958-60, they increased to 2,642,125
dollars in 1961, to 9,605,900 dollars in 1962, and to 13,049,000
dollars in 1963.
In 1961 the United States Government became aware of
the lack of development of the territory in all fields. It initiated
a first series of large-scale projects in 1962 through the South
Pacific Conference which was held in Pago Pago, and continued
with this effort in 1963.
A good international aerodrome was built on Tutuila island.
Roads are being improved and developed, the port of Pago
Pago is being equipped with quays, a beginning is being made
to provide adequate facilities for public services, while medical,
hospital, and educational facilities can fulfil almost every need.
There is still much to be done, however. But the essential
thing is to have made a start on public services at all levels
so that it is now only necessary to go ahead until completion.
In the last three years, therefore, many tens of millions of
dollars have been invested in the island of Tutuila. The main
part of these sums was intended to pay for materials and
commodities imported from the United States, but local
workers have greatly benefited from the projects as a whole.
Workers have been given on-the-job training and the more
capable of them now hold responsible jobs.
Many new posts have been created in government departments, most of them held by Samoans.
YEAR
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
The main symptom was the decrease in the average number
of employees in the largest private firm—the Van Camp
cannery—as compared with 1958—
FISCAL YEAR
AVERAGE
OF
NUMBER
EMPLOYEES
1st June, 1957—31st May, 1958
360
1st June, 1958—31st May, 1959
380
1st June, 1959—31st May, 1960
336
1st June, 1960—31st May, 1961
321
1st June, 1961—31st May, 1962
343
Another unmistakable clue was the value of exports from
the cannery, which regressed between the fiscal years 1958-59
and 1961-62.
The economy of American Samoa was, therefore, given a
fresh start by the Government.
There have been many manifestations since the end of
1 962 of the resurgence of private enterprise which is following
the general impetus given to local affairs by Government
expenditure.
The Van Camp cannery, anxious to profit to the full from
progress in the American domestic market, is taking on more
staff, putting its plant into full operation, and planning to
increase its production capacity.
The value of products exported by the cannery was estimated by the Customs authorities at 6,949,028 dollars for the
1961 calendar year. It increased to 10,498,667 dollars in
1962. It will certainly be in the vicinity of 15 million in 1963.
Besides this, the average number of employees increased
from 343 in 1961-62 to 489 in 1962-63, and factory-hands,
who numbered 540 in February, 1963, amounted to 634 at
the beginning of September, 1963.
5
More symptomatic still was the decision taken early in 1963
by another big American canning firm—the Star Kist company
—to set up business in Pago Pago.
Work on the new canning plant, which began in April,
1963, was completed at the beginning of September, 1963,
and actual fish-canning operations were begun on 10th September, 1963. This meant about 250 new jobs in private
enterprise. The growth of the canning industry has, of course,
certain multiplicative effects. The consumption of cans justifies
a local plant, and the American Can group has set up business
and is situated between the two canneries. Yards for repairing
the fishing boats and other local trades are finding new clients.
The trend at the end of 1963 is therefore favourable from
all points of view to the economy of American Samoa, which
has never known such a boom. But at present everything
depends on the Federal Government on the one hand and the
tuna-canning industry on the other.
T — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — r
Anne'e 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1956 1959 1960 1961
Year
G r a p h I I I — U n i t e d States per capita consumption of canned tuna
The policy of the United States Government is no concern
of the author here. It is, however, his task to analyze the
special problems of tuna canning.
However, in the very vast framework which provides the
context to the international tuna market, it was the presence of
certain local facilities which led to the selection of Pago Pago.
II: THE TUNA-CANNING INDUSTRY IN PAGO PAGO
1 . General factors in the industry
The establishment and development of a tuna-canning
industry in Pago Pago was the result of the convergence of
certain influences. It was, for the most part, factors outside
the territory itself which led to the installation of the Van
Camp cannery, and it was the evolution of the conditions of
a vast production and consumption market which permitted
the increase in capacity of the first cannery and the opening
of the Star Kist cannery.
The tuna-canning industry could not have been conceived
without a major dynamic driving factor, and this was the
development of the American domestic market.
Progress manifests itself in the prospect of a rise in the
standard of living leading to the consumption of more and
more expensive products, which also save time for the house-
• — , _ . _ ^ Disponibilites t o t a l e s
•
" *
Total available
^ y y y ^ P r o d u e t i o n - p e c h e nationale
Production from U.S. catch
.Product!on-thon importe
Production from imported tuna
Importations = conserves etrangeres
'imports = Foreign-canned tuna
Tonnes
Tons
200,000 —
160,000
.-J
120,000 —
A
80,000 __
:
^
^
^
^
^
*v
^
^
40,000
^..••# • •'%• • •••••••^*
..•.
pi i
—I
1
j
1
1
1
1
1
,
1
1
I
T
I
I
I
f
^ n n e e 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Year
G r a p h IV—Evolution of the U.S. canned tuna market
6
wife. Tinned tuna corresponds perfectly to this definition.
Between 1946-61 an increase of more than 320 per cent per
head in the consumption of tuna (Graph III) was recorded,
while at the same time the consumption of canned salmon
and sardines decreased by about 50 per cent.
2. Local factors governing activities in Pago Pago
Within the favourable context of the expanding market, the
choice of Pago Pago as a site for the setting up of canning
activities on a large scale was determined by the fact that
advantages outweighed disadvantages.
To judge the real evolution of the market, account must
also be taken of the rise in the American population which
increased from 140 million inhabitants in 1946 to 190 million
in 1962.
(a)
ADVANTAGES FOUND IN PAGO PAGO
FISH
The first advantage found in Pago Pago consisted of the
possibility of canning fish of excellent quality obtained at
lower prices than in California.
In this way, the American market for canned tuna increased
from less than 5 million standard cases (48 x i lb. cans) in
1946 to more than 16 million in 1962 (Graph IV), i.e., from
60,000 tons to over 190,000 tons. However, this increase could
not be maintained by the national fisheries.
The fish caught by the Japanese or South Korean tuna
longliners consists mainly of albacore (Germo alaluni>a), a
variety particularly sought by American canners whose clientele
buy mainly "whitemeat tuna."
The Californian fishing fleet was able to satisfy almost the
whole of the demand made by the canneries until 1949. The
technique of live-bait fishing made it possible to obtain very
high yields and to work fishing grounds off the Pacific coasts
of Latin America.
This fish is caught, iced, and after remaining only a few
days in the fishing boats, is processed as and when unloaded
instead of being deep frozen as is customary when storing
large consignments before sending them to distant canneries.
The economies in freezing, transport, and thawing are added
to the technical advantages contributed by the freshness and
quality of the fish. This enables the canner to offer prices
which are advantageous to the foreign fishermen while still
comparing very favourably with the cost price of the raw
material processed in California. Although purchase contracts
are discussed every month between the fishing companies and
the canneries, and though the market prices are not published,
it may be estimated that, according to circumstances, the
actual saving made by the canner as a result of his position
in Pago Pago amounts to between 15-25 per cent of the cost
price of the raw material as compared with California. In
June, 1963, whole frozen albacore fetched 330 dollars per
short ton in California and 320 dollars in Puerto Rico, while
whole iced albacore fetched only 295 dollars per short ton in
Pago Pago.
After 1950, the records show a period of stagnation and
even some years of considerable regression in Californian
live-bait fishing.
Between 1950-59 the fish caught by the United States fishing
fleet hardly produced more than about 75,000 to 90,000 tons
of canned tuna.
The technical revolution introduced by the wide-scale
replacement of live-bait fishing by purse-seining after 1959
produced a considerable advance in 1960, but, since that time,
it appears that one must discount the very optimistic forecasts
of greatly increased landings by United States ships.
In order to supply the expanding market it was therefore
necessary more and more to use fish of foreign origin.
The easy way would have led to the introduction of foreign
tinned tuna, but a number of factors considerably limited the
introduction of such products. Inasmuch as a shortage of raw
materials prevailed after the war, the United States canning
industry was practically alone in the world in having at its
disposal an unlimited quantity of low-priced tins; possible
competitors did not have sufficient supplies until 1950-51. As
soon as foreign competition made its appearance, the American
Customs system began to penalize heavily the imports of
tinned tuna in oil (45 per cent duty as from 1951), afterwards
controlling the imports of plain canned tuna by 12i per cent
duty up to a quantity equal to 20 per cent of United States
production, 25 per cent for greater quantities.
LABOUR
The second favourable factor for the tuna-canning industry
in Pago Pago is the possibility of recruiting abundant cheap
labour—labour which is looking for work and which never
runs short: labour which is cheap in spite of substantial successive wage increases.
The minimum salaries paid at the Van Camp cannery
increased as follows—
38 cents per hour on 22nd June, 1957
to 52 cents per hour on 21st June, 1958
to 75 cents per hour on 31st August, 1959
to 90 cents per hour on 14th September, 1961
to 1 dollar per hour in October, 1963.
Finally, the well-integrated United States market, with a
small number of big producing firms, only rarely allowed
foreign competitors to come and compete on the spot with
producers who were unceasingly increasing their power and
productivity.
These increases were intended to follow the progress of the
adaptation of a rural labour force totally unused to factory
work and to compensate, to a certain extent, for the extremely
low wages paid in American Samoa, as compared with the continental United States.
However, these salaries are still very much lower than
wages in California.
Labourers packing the fish in the cans were paid 90 cents
per hour from September, 1961, in Pago Pago, and in California 2.057 dollars as from 1st September, 1961, 2.107
dollars as from 2nd September, 1962, and 2.147 dollars as
from 1st September, 1963.
The recent increase to 1 dollar an hour in Pago Pago has
therefore not materially altered this lag.
Skilled work is even less well paid, comparatively, since a
worker employed in cooking the fish was paid 1 to 1.05 dollars
per hour in Pago Pago from September, 1961, to October,
1963, while this same work in California paid 2.48 dollars,
2.55 dollars, and 2.605 dollars per hour in September, 1961,
1962, and 1963 respectively.
Thus, imports of foreign tinned tuna exceeded 25,000 tons
only in 1957 and never reached 30,000 tons except in 1959
and 1961.
In fact, the United States tuna-canning industry set about
organizing itself to respond to the growth of the market by
processing fish from foreign fishing fleets. This new type of
activity began to assume importance after 1950 and developed
to a point where, in 1959, it exceeded the production of
tinned goods from American-caught fish.
It was this trend which directly benefited American Samoa.
From 1950 onwards, canning for the American market was
less and less dependent upon Californian industry, and some
establishments were set up to can raw materials from foreign
sources. This happened not only in American Samoa with the
South Pacific fishing fleet but also in Puerto Rico with the
Tropical Atlantic fishing fleet.
7
Thus, canning, which requires a large labour force, enjoys
considerable advantages in Pago Pago—advantages which are
hardly reduced by a slightly lower yield than in California
and by the higher salaries paid to the managerial and technical
staff who have to be brought to Pago Pago to supervise
operations because of a lack of capable local people.
Bearing in mind these few disadvantages, it may be estimated
that labour costs for the tuna-canning industry in Pago Pago
are reduced by about 50 per cent when compared with
California.
There is also an advantage—although a lesser one—over
the Puerto Rico canneries where the minimum hourly rate in
a cannery was 1.15 dollars between November, 1961, and
November, 1963 (against 0.90 dollars in Pago Pago), and has,
since November, 1963, been 1.25 dollars (against 1 dollar in
Pago Pago).
As productivity and managerial staff conditions are roughly
the same in Puerto Rico as in Pago Pago, there is an economy
in labour costs of about 20 per cent for the American Samoa
canneries as compared with Puerto Rico.
(b)
Land and property ownership systems in Samoa, on the
other hand, allow very little opportunity for purchases by
private individuals, especially if they are foreign to the
territory.
Almost all the land is under collective family ownership
within the framework of the Matai system, and the public
infrastructures left behind from the naval establishment have
been transferred to the territory.
The consistent policy of the American Government being
to protect as effectively as possible the original traditional
structures of Samoan society and to discourage any attempts
at intrusion from outside elements, there could be no question
of transferring land or infrastructures to a private undertaking.
The only possible solution was a long-term lease for available sites and installations to accommodate the canning factory
and its subsidiaries.
The site which was chosen was quite naturally the sector
containing the former naval warehouses and workshops situated
at Amua on the north shore of the port of Pago Pago itself.
Landing stage and wharf structures could easily be completed and former sheds and warehouses could be partially
salvaged.
And so the Government was going to concentrate in this
sector, first the Van Camp establishment in 1954, and then
the Star Kist plant in 1963, with the American Can factory
(which is an essential complement) between the two.
The first lease with Van Camp ran for seven years, from 1 st
January, 1954, to 31st December, 1960. A five-year extension
of the lease until 31st December, 1965, was provided for, the
terms to be reviewed on 31st December, 1962.
According to the terms of the second lease, Van Camp
Sea Food paid 15,000 dollars* rent per annum to the Government of American Samoa, and tax on the cannery was 72,000
dollars or 1 per cent of the total sales of the products manufactured if this percentage was more than 72,000 dollars.
At 30th April, 1963, the terms of this lease were amended
and it was agreed that, for a period running from 1st January,
1961, to 14th February, 1993, the guaranteed minimum rental
would be increased to 20,000 dollars. With regard to tax, the
company would benefit from the Industrial Incentive Act
exemption which applies to import duties on materials and
supplies relative to production and the fishing activities connected thereto for a period of approximately seven years unless
the new company, Star Kist, lost the advantage of the exemption granted by that law before that time.
In fact, the new contract for 1963 was intended to bring
the Van Camp lease and establishment conditions into line
with the conditions allowed to the new Star Kist factory.
For Star Kist, the terms of the lease comprised—
LOCAL DISADVANTAGES
Alongside these very considerable advantages resulting from
the low price of labour and fish, certain by no means negligible disadvantages must be taken into account.
Processing is more expensive in Pago Pago than in California. Oil, salt, and spices must be transported and sorted
well in advance. Until the American Can Company's new
plant starts operating, tins must be made on the spot from
blanks imported from California. Packing crates must also be
imported and stored in advance.
The tins are labelled in California.
All these operations are 20-40 per cent dearer in Pago Pago
than in Terminal Island, U.S.A.
The fact that the local cost of power and water is higher
must also be taken into account. In the same way, maintenance
and repair of the plant is very expensive because of the local
shortage of spare parts and skilled labour.
Initial expenses which have been higher for certain installations, and the final cost of transport from Samoa to Los
Angeles must also be considered in the calculation of the
final cost price.
(c)
ESTIMATED PROFIT
It may be of interest to break down the 1963 manufacturing
cost of a case of whitemeat tuna canned in Pago Pago. The
case under consideration would contain 48 cans of i lb. each.
The cost of the fish would be about 3.50 dollars per case.
the cost of labour 1 dollar, and that of packing and processing
2.50 dollars, so that the gross cost price of one case would
be 7 dollars.
This is about 3 to 4 dollars less than for a similar product
in California.
In order to estimate the net profit in Pago Pago, account
must be taken of the cost of depreciation, renewal and maintenance of plant, transport costs, and exceptional administration
costs.
However, for a product of excellent quality which should
sell at from 15 to 16 dollars per case on the United States
domestic market, there is a very considerable profit margin
in favour of the industry installed in Pago Pago.
• A tenancy from 15th February, 1963, to 14th February,
1993.
• Payment of 168,444 dollars to the American Samoan
Government (51.444 dollars for the buildings already
existing on the site leased and 117,000 dollars representing
an advance payment on the 30-year lease).
• Annual supplementary payment of 2,000 dollars.
• Employment in the company of American citizens and
nationals only, unless with written authorization from the
Governor.
3. Organization of the canneries
(a)
* This was the guaranteed minimum rental for the cannery. However,
the annual rental was calculated on the number of short tons of tuna
processed, frozen, canned, or stored for eventual shipment or sale
during any one year. The basic rate per ton was $2.50; this basic
rate is subject to adjustment by applying a formula which takes into
consideration the average price reported by brokers and cannery representatives of canned, chunk-style, light meat advertized brand tuna to
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Market new office at San Pedro,
California, and comparing this price with the average price for the
last three months of the calendar year, 1955. The $2.50 per ton is
then either increased or decreased accordingly.
FOUNDATION
The Van Camp cannery was installed in special circumstances rather unusual in the American economic world.
Industrial activity was established in American Samoa at the
request of the government, who were anxious to see private
enterprise bring resources to the territory. It was therefore
normal that the only firm which had given a favourable
answer should be granted privileges.
8
• With regard to tax, exemption from special tax for a production quota in any calendar year of 1 million cases
of cans of tuna, 2,000 short tons of fish meal, 75,000
U.S. gallons of fish oil, 1,200 short tons of fish solubles
and 200,000 cases of pet foods. In the event of this
production quota being exceeded, the Government is to
advise the company by 10th January (1963); in the event
of tax being payable on the surplus production.
A taxation question of particular importance was raised by
the introduction of income tax to American Samoa in 1963.
The Van Camp company began to pay income tax on 1st May,
1963. This is going to put the first real tax burden on the
company. Governor R. Lee has estimated that the Van Camp
undertaking would have paid 500,000 dollars on its 1962
operations in income tax. It is likely that the tax will soon be
1 million dollars, bearing in mind the recent increase in
turnover.
As a new undertaking, under the Industrial Incentive Act,
the Star Kist company is exempt from income tax for five
years as from 1963, and will enjoy partial exemption for a
further two years.
It appears that leasing and tax conditions for both the Van
Camp and Star Kist establishments have been very favourable,
assuring each of the companies a number of initial years of
tranquillity. Although the canneries have got off to a good
start, there have, nevertheless, been certain difficulties arising
in particular from the land ownership system and the practical
impossibility of long-term leasing or purchasing of sites or
buildings to accommodate technical and managerial staff and
to escape the restrictions inherent in the concession system.
(b)
TECHNICAL
Fish intended for canning is generally used at once. As
fishing boats arrive at quite regular intervals, continuous
operation of the canneries requires only a small cold-storage
warehouse.
Whole albacore and headed and gutted yellowfin tuna are
cleaned and go to the cookers for about three hours. Two
"cookings" per day keep the packing lines supplied. These
utilize a large number of operators, 50 to 80 persons per line,
almost exclusively women. The aim is to produce a high-quality
product and, in order to tin a product which is as white and
as homogeneous as possible, to remove by hand all flesh which
has been coloured black or brown by the blood of the tuna.
The tuna is sometimes tinned in oil, but is more often plain.
The tins are closed by high-speed machines (240 j lb. cans
per minute). The production mainly includes half-pound tins,
although 1 lb. and 4 lb. tins are also produced—mainly by
Van Camp.
Flesh rejected during canning is sent to a special
producing pet foods. The scraps (heads, fins, bones,
damaged fish) are used to make fish meal. Approximately
ton of meal is produced per 20 tons of fish processed.
production from scraps was considered unprofitable and
been abandoned.
line
and
one
Oil
has
The Van Camp factory, which was modernized in 1963,
now has a processing capacity of nearly 100 short tons daily,
while, when it started, the Star Kist plant had a capacity of
50 short tons daily.
Until the end of 1963 the Van Camp plant produced its
own tins from imported blanks. With the establishment of
Star Kist, the specialized American Can plant situated between
the two canneries supplies all the tins, their production capacity
being 600,000 tins per day.
ORGANIZATION
The two canneries—Van Camp and Star Kist—have no
outstanding technical characteristics and are almost identical.
In addition to the various traditional canning stages (precooking, trimming and packing, crimping, and sterilization in
the autoclave), they include large refrigeration and ice-making
plants. In fact, each cannery serves also as a base for a large
fleet of tuna longliners. The refrigeration plants serve to deep
freeze and store swordfish, marlins, and big-eyed tuna, and
sometimes also yellowfin tuna or dolphin, which are then
exported to Japan by the fishing companies themselves. Cold
storage is also used to preserve the frozen bait imported from
Japan (Saury—Cololabis saira), which the fishing boats load
before every trip.
An ice-making plant completes the refrigeration plant. Many
ships merely ice the fish caught from nearby fishing grounds
on short trips.
As soon as it is unloaded on to the quay, the fish is weighed
and graded according to quality. The fishing boats are credited
in terms of the tonnage and condition of the fish which are
assessed by the cannery.
Rejects are sent free of charge to the fish-meal and byproducts plants. Saleable fish which is not canned remains the
property of the shipowners, who send it to Japan and who pay
freezing and storage costs.
After passing through the autoclave, the tins are packed
in cardboard boxes and sent to California where they are
labelled for the market.
The plants, in general, use equipment which is already old
and has in many cases been recovered from closed or
modernized plants in California and even in Peru. In view of
the abundance and cheapness of labour, few efforts have been
made to increase mechanization and automation. This in a
sense improves quality, as careful manual labour, especially in
the preparation and tinning of the fish, yields remarkable
products.
The plants work from 7.30 a.m. to 11.30 a.m., and from
12.15 p.m. to 4.15 p.m., with a 1 5-minute break morning and
afternoon. The fish is supplied by a fleet of Japanese and
South Korean longliners which work under contract and which
are remunerated on the basis of prices indexed on the Japanese
markets and revised monthly. The shipowners have at their
disposal services attached to the canneries. They have supply
offices and thriving general stores supplied with Japanese goods
which enter the territory duty-free. They also have small
administrative premises and makeshift accommodation with
sleeping quarters, showers, and toilets for the use of crews
while ashore.
TABLE VII—CATCH FROM JAPANESE FISHING BOATS BASED AT PAGO PAGO (metric tons)
SOURCE: JAPANESE FISHERIES AGENCY
Albacore
Yellowfin tuna
Big-eyed tuna
Bill-fishes
Miscellaneous
Total
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
2,927
2,625
3,428
1,958
5,534
1,523
8,168
1,966
9,370
1,523
9,299
8,758
1,107
11,952
1,363
547
967
175
544
499
1,098
1,079
65
29
432
946
26
407
709
43
203
535
20
382
377
25
7,093
8,664
11,538
12,052
10,623
14,099
7,241
9
863
303
397
19
10,881
(c)
T H E DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIVITIES
Until 1963 the Van Camp cannery was the only one in
operation and its activities were regulated both by the general
conditions of the American national market and by local
factors.
The amount of canning done was linked to the catch brought
in by the Japanese fishermen (and, to a smaller extent, that
produced by the South Korean fleet).
Table VII shows that there were two successive stages—
the first, in 1955-57, when about 6,000 tons of raw materials
(albacore and yellowfin tuna) were processed annually; the
second stage was from 1958 to 1961, when this figure was
around 10,000 tons. The year 1962 marked a new phase with
an increase in the quota of authorizations for deliveries granted
by the Japanese Fisheries Agency. An even more marked
progress occurred in 1963 with the opening of the Star Kist
cannery and the increase in the capacity of Van Camp, and it
can be expected that, in 1964, a year which will establish the
new stage, the Van Camp cannery ought to receive about
17,000 metric tons and Star Kist about 8,000.
The quotas granted by the Japanese Fisheries Agency,
which are 22,500 short tons for the 1963 fiscal year (1st
April, 1963, to 31st March, 1964) and 27,000 short tons for
the 1964 fiscal year (1st April, 1964, to 31st March, 1965),
are most likely to be filled. With the South Korean catch,
which may be estimated at 2,000 short tons in 1963 and
2,500 short tons in 1964, about 20,000 metric tons of fish
should be processed for the calendar year 1963 and about
25,000 metric tons in 1964.
In August, 1963, there were 74 fishing boats attached to the
Van Camp cannery. Of these, 67 were Japanese (30 operated
by the Nishiro Company, 27 by the Nippon Reizo Company,
and 10 by the Mitsubishi Company) and 7 South Korean.
Towards the end of August and during September, other
boats arrived to supply the Star Kist plant; the Nishiro Company together with the Mitsui Company was to supply twenty
boats, and two more South Korean ships were to join the fleet.
perhaps to be followed by still more units.
At the beginning of 1964, therefore, there are a hundred
longliners fishing regularly to supply the two canneries.
A serious problem is beginning to arise with a considerable
decrease in catches.
Lacking documentation, the author has been unable to study
this problem carefully. However, all the fishing skippers he
interviewed stated categorically that, to obtain catches comparable to those they made four or five years ago in the
vicinity of the archipelago, they now had to go much further
out—more than a thousand sea miles from Samoa—to the
Leeward and Tuamotu groups in French Polynesia.
Overworking is to be feared and the symptoms of overfishing may manifest themselves, thus obstructing in advance
any future expansion of the canning industries.
Ill: THE INFLUENCE OF THE TUNA-CANNING INDUSTRY ON
AMERICAN SAMOA
As the only industrial activity of any size in the territory,
tuna canning will have a profound influence on social and
economic life and will have repercussions in almost every field.
1. The social repercussions of employment
At 1st September, 1963, the Van Camp cannery employed
635 South Pacific islanders. This labour force comprised more
or less equal numbers of men (307) and women (328). This
proportion is rather unusual in an industry where female labour
is normally largely predominant. It must be borne in mind,
firstly, that it is a permanent feature of Samoa that men tend
to be given priority in employment because of the abundant
available labour and, secondly, that there is the temporary
circumstance of big enlargement projects which are not yet
completed and which keep at the plant a number of men
who would not normally be there. Their departure will probably coincide with the engagement of more women for the
development of production. Everything taken into account.
the normal activity of the firm in 1964 should require about
260 men and 370 women.
The Star Kist company only opened its doors in midSeptember, 1963, with a complement of 160 Samoans, 33 men
and Ml women, supervised by experts brought from California.
The proportion of men employed is low here and, when
the cannery is in normal operation, 50-60 men and 180-200
women should be employed in the initial stage.
The labour employed as at September, 1963, is, on the
whole, very young. More than half at Van Camp and more
than 42 per cent at Star Kist are less than 27 years of age.
As was to be expected, it is the female group that is the
younger because of the engagement of girls for work on the
preparation for packing lines. In the case of men, the proportion of older people is larger as there is a considerable
contingent of skilled workers and junior technicians.
At Van Camp, for 625 persons whose date of birth is
known, there are 318 individuals aged from 18 to 27, 237
from 28 to 37, and only 70 over 38 years of age. At Star Kist,
of 159 persons, 67 are from 18 to 27, 54 from 28 to 37.
and 38 are over 38 years old.
TABLE VIII—AGE GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
VAN CAMP CANNERY—SEPTEMBER, 1963
AGE IN YEARS
YEAR OF BIRTH
Men
Women
Total
Percentage of
total population
in each group:
Men
Women
..
18-27
28-37
38-47
48-57
1945-36 1935-26 1925-16 1915-06 Total
155
163
100
137
40
26
4
299
326
318
237
66
4
625
8.4
9.3
10.6
10.7
4.2
2.9
0.5
—
TABLE IX—AGE GROUPS OF THE EMPLOYEES OF
THE STAR KIST CANNERY—SEPTEMBER, 1963
A G E I N YEARS .... 18-27
28-37
38-47
48-57
YEAR OF BIRTH
1945-36 1935-26 1925-16 1915-06
Men
Women
11
56
9
45
7
26
5
—
32
127
Total
67
54
33
5
159
0.5
3.5
0.7
2.9
0.5
—
Percentage of
total population
in each group:
Men
Women
0.7
3.1
It is particularly interesting to note the impact of employment at the cannery on the present age groups. Bearing in
mind the reduction in numbers of age groups 18-27 and 28-37
by emigration, the influence of employment at the Van Camp
cannery is very considerable upon both men and women. At
the end of September, 1963, more than 10 per cent of all the
individuals aged from 28 to 47 years in the territory of
American Samoa were employed with the company, which was
thus called upon to play an important social role.
The influence of the Star Kist cannery is still relatively
small. It is beginning to affect a considerable proportion of the
female population and, although it cannot be said that this
second undertaking has transformed the male employment
statistics to any extent so far, the same is not the case for the
female group, where extra employment involving more than
3 per cent of all the women from 18 to 47 years of age has.
in a few weeks, considerably improved local conditions.
This influence must also be judged in connexion with the
whole of the population directly affected by the income resulting from work at the cannery. At Van Camp, of 576 persons
whose position is known, 230 live on a single wage—that paid
by the plant, 214 have two wage packets (but in this group
about 100 persons form 50 households living on two wage
packets from the plant), and 132 families add two wage packets
or other types of income to the payments from the cannery.
At Star Kist, the position is very different, as only 38 persons
are the sole wage-earners in their families. On the other hand,
72 persons belong to a group having two wage packets, and
24 to a group having more than two. The work at the new
Star Kist cannery thus serves more to improve the standard
of living of the families than to provide a basic income.
One very quickly comes up against difficulties when trying
to define the concept of "family" affected by the wages. It is
practically impossible to draw an exact dividing line between
persons retaining the Polynesian concept of the family in the
wide sense, and those who now think of the family as an
independent single household: whence comes the statement,
from some twenty persons, of the existence of three or four
incomes outside the work at the cannery. These refer to incomes
shared among fifteen, twenty, thirty individuals, and sometimes
even more. In the same way, among those who state that they
have a single wage, a number contribute this sole wage packet
to a very large number of close and more distant relatives.
At Van Camp, for 572 employees whose matrimonial state
was specified, only 351 state that they are married, against
221 unmarried. The large proportion of unmarried persons
arises from the fact of the employment of many young men
and girls who have recently been taken on as labourers and
fish cleaners and who are waiting until they have some savings
before getting married. However, in this field, account must
also be taken of the fact that, in Polynesia, the fact that a
person is registered as unmarried in no way prevents his having
a family.
of its size, this figure appears to be accurate for, although
there are a large number of replies envisaging the family in
the widest Polynesian sense of the word, the inference is that
the wages are likely to benefit all the members of the group.
The structure of the family distribution table (Table X)
demonstrates the very small number of families of less than
four members, and the great predominance of families of
between five and ten members (a suitable number for a
Samoan household), as compared with families in the widest
sense.
TABLE X—THE FAMILY STRUCTURE OF THE
EMPLOYEES OF THE CANNERIES
No. OF
At Van Camp, 570 employees have given the number of
persons in their families; this totals 4,863 persons. Therefore,
5,433 persons would appear to benefit from the cannery's
activities. To this number must also be added the 64 employees
who have not given the size of their families. This should
represent between 500 and 600 more persons.
At Star Kist, for 161 replies, there are 1,080 persons
benefiting from the wages, apart from the workers themselves.
Therefore, 1,141 individuals are affected.
More than 7,000 inhabitants of American Samoa, i.e.,
about one-third of the population of the territory, would
appear to benefit from the activities of the canneries. In spite
11
TOTAL N O . OF PERSONS
IN FAMILY
VAN CAMP
STAR KIST
VAN C A M P
STAR K I S T
1
2
3
4
6
12
37
41
5
7
12
20
6
24
111
164
5
14
36
80
5
6
7
8
9
10
75
61
51
65
61
44
21
22
11
14
14
16
385
366
367
520
729
440
105
132
77
112
126
160
11
12
13
14
15 and over
26
20
12
5
54
5
9
2
1
2
286
240
156
90
979
55
108
26
14
30
570
161
4,863
1,080
Total
The size of the social group affected by cannery wages may,
moreover, be confirmed merely by contemplating the number
of children of less than 18 years of age dependent upon the
wage earners.
At Van Camp, of 576 cases studied, the number of dependent children is 2,177, and for the entire staff of the company,
there must be about 2,400 children.
For Star Kist, only 39 persons declare themselves unmarried,
against 116 married. To these must be added one widow and
four divorced persons. This confirms the view that the mainly
feminine labour force is seeking extra income from the new
plant rather than a basic income.
In order to try to establish the coefficient of influence of
the incomes drawn from jobs in the cannery for the population
as a whole, an attempt has been made to estimate the number
of families who benefit from the wage paid by the factories.
No. OF WORKERS
PERSONS
IN FAMILY
TABLE XI—CHILDREN OF LESS THAN 18 YEARS OF AGE
DEPENDENT UPON CANNERY EMPLOYEES
No. OF
CHILDREN
No. OF WORKERS
TOTAL No. OF
DEPENDENT CHILDREN
VAN C A M P
STAR KIST
VAN C A M P
0
1
2
93
48
63
22
13
15
—
48
126
13
30
3
4
5
6
78
78
78
56
21
17
25
17
234
318
390
336
63
68
125
102
27
22
14
7
12
14
9
7
—
1
189
176
126
70
164
98
72
63
—
11
576
161
2,177
645
7
8
9
10
Handover
Total
STAR K I S T
At Star Kist, for 155 persons, the number of dependent
children is 645.
by Tutuila on the other little islands of the territory, and by
the bay of Pago Pago on the island of Tutuila.
The number of children of less than 18 years of age in
American Samoa must, in September, 1963, be about 12,000.
Therefore, 25 per cent of the children of the territory are
totally or partially supported by work at the cannery.
The concentration of administrative and economic departments in one single sector certainly could not fail to attract
people; this will gradually result in the creation of a true
urban centre.
One may wonder at the difference in the estimated influence
of the wages which seem to affect one-third of the entire
population but only one-quarter of the children; it must be
pointed out in this connexion that, although 140 workers state
that they form part of a family of less than five members
(therefore at the most, husband, wife, and two children),
254 workers state that they have two dependent children at the
maximum, i.e., at least 114 wage packets benefit a group
comprising elderly dependents or other relatives. Here we
have a large number of young people who contribute their
wages to a large family, within which they play an important
economic role, although occupying a minor place. There are
not only fathers, mothers, grandparents, but also brothers,
sisters, uncles, and aunts who use the money brought in by
the young men and women. The salaries thus very widely
distributed have very little effect on the social advancement
and individual improvement in living standards of the workers
themselves.
For the moment, Pago Pago bay does not offer a properly
organized structure. The framework of commercial enterprises
and public services co-exists with the ancient traditional village
structure. The land tenure system and the ownership of land
by collectivities or government will prevent the establishment
of a town for some time. However, the problem is already
acute and it would seem advisable to prepare to solve it rather
than to continue to ignore it.
The island of Tutuila plays the role of a pole of attraction
for the other small island territories of American Samoa.
TABLE XIII—GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE
POPULATION OF AMERICAN SAMOA
TUTUILA
AUNU'U
Numerous latent conflicts result from this. Certain of them
are already evident, and more and more cases will appear as
the individual conscience begins to assert itself. Far more
numerous are the young men who, in order to free themselves
from servitude to the family, resort to emigration, which is
all the easier after the worker has become accustomed to
factory work and has improved his knowledge of English.
TABLE XII—LENGTH OF SERVICE OF VAN CAMP EMPLOYEES
YEAR TAKEN ON
AT THE PLANT
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
No.
MEN
OF WORKERS
WOMEN
TOTAL
13
15
6
18
... 13
8
11
17
... 82
124
7
6
2
5
3
6
24
36
86
153
20
21
8
23
16
14
35
53
168
277
307
328
635
...
2. Influence on the movements of population
The development of the tuna-canning industry in Pago Pago
exerts an influence on the whole of American Samoa. The
availability of well-paid jobs enhances the attraction exerted
1950
1960
....
9,842
322
15,556
398
16,814
436
....
1,588
500
509
147
1,698
576
545
164
1,661
605
429
106
12,908
18,937
20,051
MANU'A GROUP
Ta'u
Ofu
Olosega
SWAIN'S ISLAND
Total
The labour force is therefore very fluid, both for technical
reasons—recruitment and laying off in terms of fluctuations
in the activity of the cannery—and for social reasons, i.e., the
marked instability of the Polynesian workers, which has been
increased through emigration. At Van Camp, more than
two-thirds of the workers were taken on at the factory within
the last two years (and more than 40 per cent in 1963 alone).
Only about one-quarter of workers employed in 1958 are still
on the payroll (88 out of 365), and only slightly more than
one-half of those employed in 1961 (180 out of 340-360).
The men who have succeeded in obtaining a skilled job
form a stable group, however, while the women leave their
employment at the plant more readily, as soon as there is no
longer an urgent need for extra resources for the family group.
1940
TABLE XIV—STRUCTURE OF THE LABOUR FORCE AT THE
CANNERIES PER GEOGRAPHICAL SECTOR
BIRTHPLACE
RESIDENCE
GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES
VAN
CAMP
STAR
KIST
VAN
CAMP
STAR
KIST
Pago Pago Bay
South-western approaches to
bay
Eastern approaches to bay
123
22
265
41
25
23
6
4
53
28
16
6
Eastern peninsula—south coast
Eastern peninsula—north coast
41
61
11
13
54
47
12
7
North coast—central sector
28
10
19
6
North-west coast
12
14
5
14
West coast and south-west plain
76
40
84
57
7
2
5
—
99
10
105
13
17
—
17
623
156
560
159
Aunu'u Island
Manu'a Group
Swain's Island
Western Samoa
Other South Pacific islands
Total
The isolated peoples of the Manu'a Group and Swain's
Island are victims of the slump in copra prices and cannot
expect to improve their resources to any extent or to enjoy
the attractions of modern life increasingly offered at Pago
Pago. Migration has accordingly increased in recent years.
The possibilities of employment in the cannery have certainly
played a part in this increased movement of the population.
12
A total of 17.5 per cent of the Van Camp and 11 per cent
of the Star Kist personnel were born in the Manu'a and
Swain's group (Table XIV and Map No. 1). However, the
island of Tutuila has always had close relations with the
neighbouring islands of Savai'i and Upolu which form the
territory of Western Samoa, and the existence at Pago Pago
of a United States naval base which was of some importance
during the war had reinforced a long-standing attraction based
on multiple family connexions. The fact that 122 employees
(105 at Van Camp and 17 at Star Kist) were born in Western
Samoa is symptomatic. It must also be noted that 13 Van
Camp employees are natives of other South Pacific islands
(Niue, Tonga, Tokelau) which contributes still further to
strengthening the position of Tutuila as a centre of attraction
beyond the boundaries of Samoa itself.
In the island of Tutuila the reaction of the population is
very different according to the geographical area. Pago Pago
receives a constant stream of immigrants, and more than half
of the labour force living there was born elsewhere—most
often in Western Samoa or in the Manu'a islands (Table X I V ) .
It is the Van Camp cannery which employs the largest proportion of workers living in the bay (nearly 50 per cent of
the employees), while Star Kist, which only began operations
in September, 1963, has only about a quarter of its employees
living in the sector. It seems that in villages like Aua, Leloaloa,
and Atuu'u, which are near the industrial zone and which
supply very large contingents to Van Camp, there is practically
no more manpower left prepared to go to work in the cannery.
Although less clearly defined, the same seems to apply for
the community of Pago Pago (south shore of the bay, Pago
Pago, Fagatoga, Utulei).
The outskirts of the bay supply the two companies with
about 15 per cent of their labour force, but here again these
are often persons who were not born locally. In the outskirts
of Pago Pago, the only available labour is to be found in
Nuu'uli, which supplied 11 employees to Van Camp, while
the other villages have only rarely sent a few workers to
Star Kist.
As soon as Pago Pago bay and its outskirts are left behind,
the phenomena change. The farther one travels from Pago
Pago, the larger the proportion of local as compared with
resident workers, which clearly shows that the remotest villages
tend to lose an often high proportion of their young people,
who go to live in the bay area where they find better conditions
of employment and environment.
Trawls are hauled in with the aid of this winch, Pago Pago
When the new Star Kist plant opened, it attracted a greater
proportion of labour from the remotest villages, as the transport
system had made real progress since 1961 and the desire for
employment was making itself increasingly felt.
The problem of daily transport of the workers has not yet
been tackled either by the local authorities or the management
of the company. It now seems to be a determining factor for
the future.
A transport system of small buses has gradually arisen and
been developed by a series of private efforts, which are often
haphazard. Certain villages have no proper link with Pago Pago
bay; the people who wish to work at the plant must travel
daily on foot across the mountains. This is particularly so
for Vatia. In other cases, a long walk is necessary to find car
transport (this is the case with villages on the north-east coast
and the far north-west). Finally, the road is often bad, such
as between Pago Pago and Fagasa. These difficulties which
obtained when the Van Camp cannery alone existed, have
become still more serious with the flow of workers for the
Star Kist plant and, if care is not taken, they will become
even more serious in the near future should the Star Kist
factory enlarge. If a more effective and more economic transport system is not organized by the local authorities, there is
a risk of a lack of balance developing between town and
country. Some of the workers, disheartened by long and difficult
journeys, will end by deserting the villages to congregate in a
haphazard manner around the bay.
There remains in the villages a large contingent of unemployed or underemployed manpower, and the desire to
extricate themselves from the confines of the traditional subsistence economy increasingly forces the young people to seek
salaried employment.
When the Star Kist plant hired personnel, a very large
number of individuals seeking employment came forward
from areas which the activities of Van Camp had not interested to such an extent.
The north-west coast, which had only five employees at the
Van Camp cannery (less than 1 per cent of the labour force),
sends 14 employees to Star Kist (7.5 per cent of the labour
force). On top of this, the west coast and the south-west
plain, whence comes 15 per cent of the Van Camp labour
force, provide 36 per cent of Star Kist employees. In this way,
as was to be expected, the older and larger Van Camp company
has absorbed a very large proportion of the manpower from
Pago Pago bay and has contributed towards the growth of a
mixed population where elements from the remote villages and
near or far-distant islands outnumber the locally born element.
The attraction constituted by the industrial development has,
however, made itself felt in the remotest villages of the island
with, of course, a gradual decrease as the distances and difficulties of daily transportation increase.
13
The villages will then lose a part of their most effective
economic potential, while Pago Pago will have considerable
difficulty in disciplining and curbing its urban growth.
Land ownership under the Matai system is certainly a
powerful brake capable for the moment of delaying the onset
of such a movement, but it is useless to expect to be able
to maintain a state of affairs so contrary to logic and good
sense and leading to a gross daily waste of strength and energy
for more than 300 men and women.
3. The economic role of the canning industry
Above and beyond the social and human influences, the
Pago Pago canneries have played a complex role as an
economic stimulus in American Samoa.
Before the large-scale introduction of public money, the
cannery was the only monetary source capable of permitting
escape from a self-sufficient family economy. Even now, in
spite of the extensive investment of funds from the United
States Treasury, the money from the canneries plays a fundamental role in the economic balance of the territory.
The multiplicative effects are felt on numerous levels. The
amount of traffic through the port of Pago Pago—with a fleet
of 50, then 70, and finally 100 longliners—necessitated a small
repair yard capable of careening and maintaining the boats as
well as carrying out engine repairs. The slipway and repair
yard is situated in the immediate proximity of the canning
plants; it forms an integral part of the industrial quarter which
has replaced the naval station. It is a State concern. In
September, 1963, 46 permanent employees and 32 assistants,
under contract, ran the undertaking which, in the 1962-63
fiscal year, worked for 95 boats and had a turnover of
154,000 dollars. The increase in the fleet based at Pago Pago
is such as to permit immediate plans to enlarge the concern,
which makes an essential contribution to the training of local
skilled workers. It trains mechanics, carpenters, and metal and
wood workers, who constitute one of the surest assets for the
territory in its conversion into an active economic structure.
the three streams of money engendered by the Van Camp
cannery.
The Van Camp cannery has bought about 11,000 short tons
of tuna from Japan and, to a lesser extent, from South Korea;
it has paid between 220 and 240 dollars per short ton for the
yellowfin tuna (20 per cent) and 250 to 270 dollars per short
ton for albacore (80 per cent), i.e., outgoings of about
2,800,000 dollars. From these expenses it is necessary to
deduct about 150,000 dollars paid to the government shipyard
for repairs; 500,000 dollars for fuel, paid to the Standard Oil
Company of California; 150,000 dollars paid back to the
cannery for its services (ice, freezing and storage of fish for
export to Japan, storage of bait, various services, etc.); and
200,000 dollars spent with the local trades people (purchase
of foodstuffs for the fishing boats, money spent by the crews,
etc.).
There appears, therefore, to be a sum of 1,800,000 dollars
which will revert to Japan and South Korea, to which it would
be necessary to add the value of the exports of frozen swordfish and miscellaneous other frozen fish, i.e., about 200,000
dollars.
Japan and South Korea would therefore draw a gross profit
of about 2 million dollars from their operations off Pago Pago.
If we now look at the domestic economy of American
Samoa, the income consists of 520,000 dollars in wages paid
at the cannery, to which must be added about 80,000 dollars
in wages in the boat repair yard and at the fuel station, i.e.,
600,000 dollars.
Moreover, 100,000 dollars are paid into the local treasury,
while 200,000 dollars approximately go to the public services
(electricity and water); purchases of local products from, and
services provided on the spot by companies or private individuals may be estimated at 100,000 dollars.
About one million dollars would therefore remain in the
islands and would represent the actual share of the American
Samoan economy in the activities of the Van Camp cannery
for the fiscal year 1961-62, to which must also be added about
50,000 dollars in profits taken on the 200,000 dollars' worth
of miscellaneous business done by the Japanese.
In the same way, the fuel requirements of the fishing boats
justify the operation of a large oil bulk store distributing more
than 10,000 tons of oil products per annum, and employing
some ten persons. The purchases of fresh food are small. They
mainly consist of bananas and a few vegetables, making it
possible to maintain a flow of purchases which, however,
benefits the importers of agricultural produce from Western
Samoa more than the Tutuila growers.
The production of canned goods means a new activity for
the commercial port of Pago Pago, which will in future provide
a greater attraction to regular shipping lines or tramp steamers
as a result of incoming freight (packings, spare parts, and new
equipment) and outgoing freight comprising all the tinned
goods. It must also be taken into consideration that the wages
paid by the canneries mean an increase in the purchases of
imported foodstuffs (tinned goods, sugar, rice, and soft drinks),
fabrics, and household articles, which also provide a not insignificant extra volume of freight for ships calling at the port.
The profit-earning capacity of the public services (water
and electricity in particular, but also telecommunications) is
largely assured by purchases by and payments from the canneries and their accessory installations.
There now remains the profit for the United States economy.
It is represented by the value of the products from the cannery
on the United States markets (on the assumption that the
entire journey between Pago Pago and California is made in
United States bottoms. If not, it would be necessary to subtract
the cost of freight charged by foreign shipowners and to credit
the economies of their countries with this profit).
In the fiscal year 1961-62, about 755,000 cases of tinned
tuna were exported. We estimate that 500,000 cases contained
first-grade whitemeat tuna at 16 dollars per case, 100,000
contained second-grade whitemeat tuna at 13 dollars per case.
100,000 cases contained first-grade light meat tuna at 13
dollars per case, 40,000 cases contained second-grade light
meat tuna at 11 dollars per case, and 15,000 cases contained
grated tuna at 8 dollars per case.
Though incomplete, these few paragraphs nevertheless give
an idea of the complex economic and financial chain reactions
set off around the canneries. However, information and evaluation present almost insurmountable difficulties immediately
one tries to give statistics on the various elements and attempts
to draw up a balance-sheet of money left in the territory and
money leaving it for the United States and Japan.
The value of canned goods landed in California would
therefore be 12,160,000 dollars, to which it is necessary to
add the value of pet foods (220,000 dollars) and fish meal
(50,000 dollars)—in all, 12,430,000 dollars, from which must
be deducted 2,800,000 dollars for the purchase of Japanese
fish, and 1,000,000 dollars left to the local economy, but to
which must be added 150,000 dollars for the services supplied
to the Japanese and 500,000 dollars for fuel sold to the
fishing boats.
If we take the last "normal" year before the recent development, i.e., the fiscal year 1962 (1st July, 1961—30th June,
1962), we can attempt to draw up a balance-sheet in terms of
In this way, directly or indirectly, the United States economy
would appear to derive a gross income of about 9,200,000
dollars from various fishing, canning, and transport operations.
14
This gross income includes depreciation and the payment of
interest on the capital invested and the supply of raw materials
(crates and tins, fuel, spare parts, etc.).
These figures, which seem to us rational and valid after our
inquiries, in themselves justify the increases in wages and the
collection of income tax introduced in 1963.
It is therefore impressive to see the biggest effort towards
the economic advancement of American Samoa work out at
an increase in revenue of I million dollars for the territory.
2 million dollars for Japan and South Korea, and no less than
9,200,000 dollars for the United States. For the future, we
can assume that, apart from increases in the price of fish,
the Japanese share will evolve only in terms of the quantities
supplied. On the other hand, the share of American Samoa
will increase at the expense of the United States share in
terms of wage rises and the income from duties and taxes.
The new wages at 1 dollar an hour and the levy of income tax
would have decreased the United States share by about
700,000 dollars to the profit of the Samoan revenue.
One might ask, what is the basis of such a margin of profit?
It is the combination of lower wages and fish purchases at
more economical rates than in the United States, low taxes,
and a social system with a very low cost of living, added to
the high prices of a vast, protected, and expanding domestic
market where high-quality products such as those obtained at
Pago Pago are at a premium.
What is the situation now at the beginning of 1964?
The investments made by Van Camp Sea Food amount to
about 1,800,000 dollars. Those of Star Kist amount to
1,000,000 dollars. Production for the 1964 calendar year will
probably be 1,200,000 cases for Van Camp and 660,000 cases
for Star Kist. Bearing in mind a certain decline in sales and a
setback in the United States market we would have a declared
value ex-Samoa, by-products included, of about 13,000,000
dollars for Van Camp and 6,500,000 dollars for Star Kist.
It is none the less true that Samoa can supply neither fish,
tins, crates, power of local origin, transport, nor capital, and
can hardly expect to take more than a relatively small share
of the income derived from the canneries.
Payment for the fish, which we estimate at 280 dollars per
short ton for whole albacore and 250 dollars per short ton
for yellowfin tuna, gutted and headed, should represent
6,850,000 dollars, of which the Japanese and South Koreans
ought to take home 4,600,000 dollars.
Again, it is necessary that the increase in wages and taxes
should be compatible with the financial returns of the industry.
We are now treading on very delicate ground.
Taking the 1961-62 fiscal year as an example, we see that
the territorial Customs Department and the Van Camp company estimated the value of the products from the cannery
at the time of export at approximately 7,880,000 dollars only.
Our estimate of the value of these products when placed on
the United States market was 12,430,000 dollars; there is,
that is to say, a huge difference of 4,750,000 dollars. This
difference is supposed to represent the freight and handling
charges from Pago Pago to California, labelling and general
administration costs, and especially the cost of marketing and
unacknowledged extra profit on the operation as a whole.
The territory should reap in wages 1,300,000 dollars at
Van Camp, and 550,000 dollars at Star Kist, plus 150,000
dollars in additional wages at the repair yard, American Can,
and fuel depot.
Van Camp, subject to income tax, would have to allow about
1 million dollars in all for taxes and duty, while Star Kist,
exempt from income tax and not producing more than their
tax-free quota, need allow practically nothing for the territory
in duty and taxes, once their initial establishment duty is paid
in 1963.
From one point of view, these 4,750,000 dollars might be
subtracted from the 9,200,000 dollars increase in revenue we
have shown in our calculations. With the sum of 4,450,000
dollars, therefore, there would be less disproportion between
the United States and Samoan shares. However, it seems to us
that the actual United States profits are those corresponding
to the higher figure.
The public services should receive 500,000 dollars, and
other expenditure for services and local purchases could reach
200,000 dollars. In 1964, Samoa's economy thus ought to
receive an income of about 3,700,000 dollars.
It is possible to divide the activities of the Van Camp Sea
Food company into two categories—the first, an industrial
category corresponding to the manufacture of 7,680,000
dollars' worth of products, and the second, a commercial
category corresponding to the import, final grading and
distribution of these products, giving an extra turnover of
4,750,000 dollars. Let us also admit that only the first category
is of concern to the Samoan territory; the second affects only
the continental United States and cannot therefore be submitted to our analysis.
For their industrial operations in Pago Pago, Van Camp
should have about 2.5 million dollars available for depreciation
and profit, and Star Kist about 1.5 million dollars. Van Camp's
profits are reduced by heavy tax deductions, while Star Kist,
which has proportionately higher profits, must make provision
for faster amortization.
The actual value of the total production in the United States
ought to be about 28 to 30 million dollars for an initial value
of 19.5 million dollars.
It must be recorded that, after an exceptional year of very
high profits like 1961-62, a more even distribution and a
certain standardization are to be expected in 1964, with slightly
higher prices for fish, increased wages, heavier taxation, and a
slight slump on the American domestic market.
From the industrial turnover of 7,680,000 dollars 2,800,000
dollars have to be deducted for fish; 520,000 dollars for wages;
2,000,000 dollars for crates, tins, and condiments; 100,000
dollars for tax; and 200,000 dollars paid to the public services;
but it is necessary to add 150,000 dollars received as a result
of services to the fishing boats. If we deduct a further 210,000
dollars for miscellaneous expenses, there remains 2,000,000
dollars for the amortization of the capital invested and for
profit.
Tuna canning, nevertheless, remains an excellent business
proposition, ensuring very rapid amortization and particularly
high profits for its promoters. In addition, it should also be
pointed out that the canneries perform a commercial function
by importing and distributing within the territory inexpensive
products from the United States. The Samoans—like all Polynesians—are very fond of tinned fish. Tinned spiced mackerel
in tomato sauce is a cheap product and now forms an integral
part of the normal diet of the salaried Samoans. The author
has not had the time or the means to pursue his investigations
in this field, but he would be surprised if a large part of the
wages distributed to the workers did not finally revert to the
cannery by the indirect route of purchases of tinned goods
from the same firm in California.
If it is considered that, in 1962, before the large 1963 investment, there had been since about 1954 1,400,000 dollars'
worth of investments made, it may be estimated that an annual
sum for depreciation of 200,000 dollars was reasonable. A
sum of 1,800,000 dollars accordingly remains by way of net
profit on the industrial operations themselves which, in itself,
might justify proceeding with a programme for the modernization and enlargement of the company.
15
intricate work. The more than satisfactory results in Pago Pago
are therefore following a general pattern, the outcome of
which will be an increasing trend for the over-populated islands
of Polynesia to welcome transformation industries.
4. Adaptation of the social and demographic structures to
the new activities
It remains to be seen to what extent the Samoan population
has had its outlook changed by the development of the canneries and its contacts with Japanese fishing activities.
Apart from the alterations in material standards of living
as increasing quantities of foodstuffs, clothes, and household
articles are being brought into the islands, Samoan society is
changing very quickly both morally and mentally. The authority
of the older persons is being questioned, and the desire to
escape from the family group is manifest; in point of fact, the
young people of Tutuila are striving for independence and the
opportunity to live their own lives.
In spite of the size of their fishing fleet, the Japanese do not
stay long in Pago Pago and have very little contact with the
Samoans. There are rarely more than some ten boats in port
unloading their catch or laying in stores. There is, therefore,
a maximum of 250-300 Asiatic fishermen staying in the port
at a time, with only very restricted contact with the local
population. The very strict regulations which, in particular,
compel all crews to be back on board by 10 p.m., prevent
clashes and antagonisms which might at the outset have
worried the authorities.
This means that, far from being a stabilizing factor, the
industrial work provided by the canneries is increasing the
already marked post-war instability of the young adult groups.
Work at the cannery may have put the brakes on emigration
to a slight extent for a period of four or five years (1958-63).
but has not stopped movements in depth, and has even increased potential mobility by permitting an ever-greater number
of young men and women to acquire standard English and
basic technical training. It is accordingly necessary to envisage
the near future clear-sightedly.
The Samoans just tolerate the Japanese and Koreans and
give them absent-minded or irritated treatment. The fact that
the Japanese and Koreans—many of them "rough diamonds"—
are anxious to return home with as much money as possible
and are reluctant to spend locally, does not facilitate relations,
even on the commercial level. The situation is totally different
here from the problems raised by the presence of other Asiatic
groups in Polynesia or Melanesia. The Japanese and Koreans
are only passing strangers; not one of them would dream of
settling in a country which cannot feed its own population.
At the beginning of 1964 it seems that
almost full complement, and that in the
openings are only likely to be found at
Even there, a bare hundred extra jobs are
It might have been thought that the example offered by the
huge catches obtained with modern boats might have produced
a psychological effect upon the Polynesians who, though
familiar with the sea, are without resources, but consume large
quantities of fish. It would also have been greatly desirable to
see a Samoan fishing industry organized so as gradually to
replace the foreign fisheries. The income from the sale of the
fish would then have remained in Samoa and would have considerably exceeded the profits derived from wages.
Van Camp have an
near future further
the Star Kist plant.
likely to materialize.
In the space of three years, progress has been very great.
In January, 1961, there were only 342 jobs at the Van Camp
cannery; in February, 1963, there were 540. In January. 1964,
the two canneries and the can factory together employ about
900 workers. But the saturation point is now almost reached
and if there are one thousand jobs at the end of 1964/beginning
of 1965, we will have to be satisfied, if only to have time
for a pause and because any further extension would pose
problems of space and premises which are very difficult to
solve.
This explains why the Van Camp company with the assistance of the territory has tried to train Samoan crews. For this
purpose, they purchased and brought from Japan a standard
tuna longliner, of 154 tons, 30 m. long, 6 m. wide, with a
340-H.P. engine. This boat, which was named Atu'e, cost
84,000 dollars. It was manned by eight Japanese-trained crew
and an attempt was made to recruit Samoan trainee fishermen.
In two years, the boat made ten fishing trips, 106 Samoans
had been taken on board, but 65 went to sea only once, 20
twice, and 10 three times; 10 candidates went to sea from
four to six times, and only one seaman (a native of the
Tokelau Islands) went out nine times and may be considered
a true fisherman. These operations showed a deficit of 64,000
dollars. It was indeed a large sum of money to train but a
single fisherman, and matters were allowed to rest there; the
boat will remain laid up until it can go back to sea in the
normal way with a new and entirely Japanese crew.
More than 500 new posts created from the end of 1962
to the beginning of 1964 have been easily filled at the local
level.
Certainly, the demographic movement is slightly declining;
births have fallen from 864 in 1959 to 858 in 1960, 844 in
1961, 812 in 1962, and the demographic surplus, which was
756 in 1959, fell to 750 in 1960, to 738 in 1961, and to 681
in 1962.
However, there must be no wishful thinking here. Women of
child-bearing age are exceedingly numerous; 2,967 girls of from
5 to 14 years of age in 1960 will be between 15 to 24 years old
in 1970, while 1,778 women 15 to 24 years old in 1960 will
also be of child-bearing age in 1970.
Even with a considerable decrease in the birth rate, between
1,000 and 1,100 births at least must be expected annually
by 1970.
It is obvious that, although the Samoan likes sea fishing,
he is not willing to remain three weeks absent from home and.
here again, we have no alternative but to record that the
introduction of new techniques has been practically without
effect at the local level.
As the lengthening of the average life span is making itself
felt, American Samoa must be prepared, in 1970, to support
both more children and more old people.
It is therefore necessary for the active elements of the
population to increase in large proportions. While in 1960
there were 4,300 men and 4,510 women aged between 15 and
54, there ought (disregarding the departures to Hawaii and
the United States and the migratory surpluses from Western
Samoa and other South Pacific islands) to be 6,909 men and
6,810 women in this active group. Between 1960 and 1970,
assuming that all the men and only 35 to 45 per cent of
the women are looking for a paid job, it will have been
necessary to create 2,629 new jobs for men and 800 to 1,000
jobs for women. Between 1960 and 1964, the administration
has produced about 1,100 new posts, of which 900 are for
men and 200 for women. The canneries and associated activities
In short, it is only the paid work at the factory that has
brought both new habits and changes which are gradually
gaining in depth. In this field the tuna canneries at Pago Pago
offer a conclusive example of the capacity of the Polynesian
to adapt himself rapidly to industrial requirements which were
hitherto totally foreign to him.
In French Polynesia, the use made of the Makatea phosphate deposits has proved that the Polynesian can be an
excellent worker and is capable of acquiring some skill in
technical posts. In the Cook Islands, the success of the clothing
factories and fruit canneries has shown that the Polynesian
woman can be equally adaptable and able to do careful,
16
For their part, the rare Japanese he was able to interview
pleaded professional secrecy and were unwilling to give any
information on special fishing problems; the author accordingly
prefers not to discuss these problems here.
* US 1,000,000
Finally, the total lack of transport, especially outside Pago
Pago, restricted the author to a few excursions on foot, which
took him through beautiful scenery, but were inadequate if
he is to present an exhaustive picture of the situation in the
island of Tutuila as a whole.
His efforts are merely a first approach to the problem which
will need to be dealt with on many points that are, for the
moment, obscure.
The author feels obliged to draw the attention of the
Government of American Samoa to the following points—
1958
1959
Graph V—Contribution of the U.S. Government to the budget of American
Samoa.
for their part have contributed about 600 new jobs, 200 for
men and 400 for women. In this way, 1,100 jobs for men and
600 jobs for women are already taken. However, between now
and 1 970, to avoid recourse to emigration, it would be necessary to create more than 1,500 new jobs for men and 200 to
400 jobs for women.
There will probably be a few more openings with Star Kist
in 1964 or 1965, so that there may not be too high a percentage
of female labour looking for work between 1965 and 1970.
We think that a serious problem will arise for the male
workers particularly as, since 1960, the big public works
programme converging with industrial expansion and increased
administrative employment has obscured this fundamental
question.
It seems to us impossible that many more government
officials will be taken on, and the industries bound up with the
cannery hardly seem likely to create new openings, and unless
public works on an exceptional scale are undertaken, it is
probable that at least one thousand young men will be looking
tor new jobs between 1965 and 1970, and will not find them.
Emigration, slowed up for a time, will therefore have to be
resumed as once again population growth will prevail over
economic development.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN SAMOA
The author's inquiries pursued in Pago Pago at the end of
August and beginning of September, 1963, have allowed him
to consider the main problems only, and even then not always
adequately.
Although certain official documents were made available to
him through the kindness of Mr Owen S. Aspinall, acting
Governor in the absence of Governor Lee, and although he
was able to make a fairly thorough technical and social
investigation thanks to the kindness of the managements of
Star Kist and Van Camp, the author was not, on the other
hand, able to gain access to statistical sources more recent than
those for the 1961-62 fiscal year and was unable to consult
the original census or customs records or the original agreements between the territory and the industries.
As far as the manufacturers were concerned, a courteous
but very firm refusal to provide any figures on balance-sheets
or financial results obliged the author to make his own rough
estimates, based on many cross checks of local and international data, which may be in error in certain respects. Until
his views are refuted with definite facts and figures he must
perforce consider them correct.
1. The present development of Pago Pago is paralyzed by a
land tenure and administrative system which does not in
any way respond to the requirements of an administrative
and industrial centre. It seems a matter of urgency to draw
up a town-planning scheme and to give Pago Pago town
status if the population is to benefit from the social and
economic advantages which may be obtained in exchange
for paid work.
2. The question which seems to have been forgotten and
neglected to date is that of transport into Pago Pago from
the interior and outer ends of the island. In a territory
where everything is more or less run by the administration
it is surprising that no co-ordinated public transport service,
capable of meeting the daily requirements of nearly 400
workers in industry, not to mention government employees,
has been organized.
3. The positive contribution of industrial wages to the Samoan
way of life can only really be assessed by a thorough
investigation at the level of the households themselves and
extending to the most remote villages. However, numerous
signs tend to show that the ever-wider distribution of money
symbols entails an irreversible deterioration of the familygroup economy system. It would be advisable to provide
for the necessary changes and adaptations in the civil law
relating to persons and property.
4. The presence of a very large industrial fishing fleet and
Asiatic crews has not given rise to any serious problems,
but neither has it contributed to the orientation of the native
Large dog-fish are often netted.
17
The crews keep and dry the fins.
Pago.
Pago
population towards new ways of exploiting the resources
of the sea—in this field, it appears that the reactions of
the Samoans have been less positive than those of the
Tongans or Tahitians. The only effort at fisheries development is directed towards improving the techniques of a
small nucleus of subsistence fishermen.
ought to be adjusted to permit the territory to derive the
greatest possible advantage from the proceeds of the value
added, but the necessity must nevertheless be borne in mind
of allowing the companies an adequate profit, thus enabling
them to support any possible increase in the purchase price
of fish or a decrease in the price of tinned goods on the
United States domestic market.
5. For the next five years, immigration from other islands—
in particular from Western Samoa—should be discouraged.
An emigration plan should be put in hand in order to avoid
over-large unemployment figures.
8. The decrease in catches, the policy of other neighbouring
territories, and the policy of the Japanese Fishing Agency
indicate that the levels attained in 1964 will certainly remain
stationary for a number of years. It is therefore necessary
to plan now for other industrial establishments to relieve
the tuna canneries, which are no longer able to repeat for
the territory's benefit the investments and the increase in
employment which characterized the years 1962-63.
6. To check the tendency towards concentration of the population and the exodus from the country districts there is
urgent need for planning in the other islands of the archipelago and in the remote districts of Tutuila.
7. The administration should carefully study the balance of
payments and prepare trade statistics for the territory.
Under the heading of "Imports" the statistics should include
the value of the fish caught by the Japanese and South
Koreans, since the heading "Exports" comprises the value
of the cannery products. The value of services provided
ought to be calculated as accurately as possible. The territory owes it to itself to study, with the canneries, the
problems of investment and depreciation. Wages and tax
9. The small share of the profits going to the local economy
and the very high percentage reaching the continental
United States is mainly due to the fact that neither public
nor private capital in the territory has any share in the
cannery concerns. It would be advisable to work out a plan
permitting local investors to have an interest in the firms—
this being the only possible way to add the profits from
invested capital to the tiny profit in wages.
18
P A R T TWO: THE PROBLEMS
THE N E W
HEBRIDES
PALLICOLO
OF TUNA FISHING
AND
(ESPIRITII
The excellent results recorded off Pago Pago from 1955
onwards were to increase the interest of Japanese tuna fishermen and shipowners in the South Pacific. They were eager to
find a base in the western sector where recent expeditions,
undertaken by fleets accompanied by parent ships, had shown
excellent prospects.
As early as November, 1955, contacts were established
between Japanese business groups involved in industrial fishing
and international trade and English and French businessmen
in Fiji and New Caledonia.
However, after negotiations in British- and French-governed
territories had proved disappointing, and a first plan for setting
up a base in New Caledonia had been abandoned, attention
turned to the New Hebrides, where the Franco-British Condominium Administration seemed readier to make certain Customs, tax, financial, and legal concessions. The favourable
reception from the two Resident Commissioners and the progressive outlook of local businessmen decided the Japanese
partners to engage in operations using a land base for the
freezing and cold storage of the catch from the longliners
operating in the waters of the archipelago. These products were
then to be exported to canneries or consumer markets in
Europe, Japan and, in particular, North America.
I: ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE AT PALLICOLO
(ESPIRITU SANTO)
At the outset of the negotiations it was agreed to install a
fishing base in the north of the New Hebrides, on the island
of Espiritu Santo, in the sector which had served during the
Second World War as a logistic base for the American troops
throughout the Solomon Islands campaign, and had the merits
of being well known and of having retained certain basic
facilities.
To launch the new venture, the South Pacific Fishing Co.
(S.P.F.C.) was formed in 1957 with a capital of £Stg.l20,000
shared between the Japanese, British, and American interests.
£30,000 was subscribed by the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, an
affiliated company of the Mitsui financial and industrial group.
£30,000 by the Taiheiyo Suisan Kaisha Company, an industrial
group specializing in deep-sea fishing, £45,000 was subscribed
by the Donald Gubbay Company, a New Hebridean commercial and industrial firm, and £15,000 by the Washington
Packing Co., a Californian canning firm.
In the organization of the company, the roles were naturally
divided between the partners, the Gubbay company supplying
its principal contribution in kind (land and wharf at Pallicolo,
buildings, etc.). The Mitsui company became responsible for
supplying Japanese goods and for financing the work, the
Taiheiyo company supplied the company with fishing boats
authorized by the Japanese governmental fishing agency to
fish in the South Pacific, and the Washington Packing Co., at
the outset at least, absorbed in its American plant a large part
of the fish caught.
After building freezing and cold-storage plants in Pallicolo,
and establishing a base capable of serving as a home port to
fishing boats of a certain tonnage, operations began at the end
of 1957. The first two boats arrived on 5th and 6th November,
1957. By mid-January, 1958, eight boats had arrived (one of
which was wrecked on the reefs).
THE BASE
IX
AT
SANTO)
o Is. T o r r e s
I.Vcu
Lava
o I.Gaua
/L£S
0
-15s
G/LB£J?T
S
ror>e
I. Perrreco+e.
,
J-Annbr>nm
I.Mallicolol
Al.Vo+e
170"
175"
M a p N o . 2—Places of origin of the Melanesians working at the Pallicolo
base.
Since 1958 a large complex has been built which constitutes
(with the Forari manganese mine on the Island of Efate)
one of the major elements of the industrial potential of the
archipelago. The Pallicolo site is well sheltered, the fishing and
freezing base being situated on the leeward side of a long
sandy spit which protects Pallicolo bay from the heavy swells
raised by the south-eastern trade wind. The anchorage is clear
and deep and is situated on the steeply sloping edge of the
sand formation. The approaches are free from reefs and not
only the small fishing boats but also cargo ships of considerable
tonnage can manoeuvre without hindrance.
Pallicolo is rather remote from the urban and commercial
centre of Luganville-Santo situated on the Segond Channel.
The distance, about seven miles, is covered by an excellent road
system built by the United States army; this has been maintained in a satisfactory condition since 1942.
Since it is situated away from any town, the Pallicolo base
has had to organize itself to be self-sufficient and so, apart
from the port installations (T-shaped wharf with conveyor belt
for the transport of fish and refrigeration and freezing chambers), a small industrial complex has been built comprising a
power plant, repair shops, oil tanks, hauling and careening slip
for the construction and repair of small boats, and a piped
fresh water supply. In contrast to Pago Pago, where public
services are supplied by government agencies, the Pallicolo
base makes practically no call upon any external source of any
size. It is not even connected to the Luganville telephone
system. In this way it cannot give any support to the development of the public infrastructures, and lives apart from the rest
of Santo.
The S.P.F.C. establishment is essentially a base for the
transit and grading of catches.
19
In fact, the company merely purchases, at prices fixed in
advance by contract, the fish landed by the various boats
supplied through the Taiheiyo Suisan Kaisha. Each fishing boat
is therefore independent as regards both its working conditions
and its internal organization. When a boat calls upon the
services of the S.P.F.C. for fuel, ice, provisions, fishing gear,
or for repairs, it pays for all of these services.
The S.P.F.C. merely acts as a contractual purchaser and a
supplier of services against payment.
The fishing vessel must therefore be well organized in order
to retain some profit in its operations.
The company takes delivery of the fish and simply preserves
them by freezing, and after grading them, distributes the fish
on the world markets.
The albacore is deep frozen and sold whole. Yellowfin tuna
when small (under 60 kg) is gutted and headed. Only the
fillets are taken from large yellowfin tunas.
The same procedure is adopted for big-eyed tuna. Bill-fishes
are sold only as fillets.
At the present time, the S.P.F.C. only markets frozen
products. Until 1960, certain fish, skipjack in particular, were
smoked. Since the smoking sheds were then destroyed by fire,
it does not appear that the company is at present anxious to
resume manufacture of products which can only be marketed
in Japan and at comparatively low prices.
The fish handled by the company are sent mainly to the
United States (California and Hawaii) where they are canned.
During the first years of operation the United States market
absorbed about 90 per cent of production.
The fish is carried by a small ship chartered by the S.P.F.C.
the Santo Maru, which sails about every seven weeks; a
small quota of low-quality products is sold at low prices on
the Japanese market, in particular marlins and big-eyed tuna.
During 1960, a new market appeared in metropolitan
France, a duty-free quota of 500 tons having been granted to
the Compagnie Frangaise des Pecheries du Pacifique Sud,
which happens to be an affiliated company of the S.P.F.C.
In fact, the French metropolitan market offers a definite
interest for the S.P.F.C, firstly, because it buys secondary
products such as big-eyed tuna, at very remunerative rates,
secondly, because it pays slightly higher prices for the yellowfin tuna than does the United States market, and finally,
because it seems that the albacore catch may sell in large
quantities following the relatively mediocre landings in recent
years in the Bay of Biscay.
As a commercial firm, the South Pacific Fishing Company
cannot, however, ignore problems concerning the fishing
grounds exploited by the ships which supply it with their
catches.
Since 1960, the author has been able to follow very regularly
the evolution of the fleet's fishing operations, thanks to the
kindness of the management of the company who have received
him on four occasions for a number of days; he has also been
able to examine the fishing logs of the boats at length. It
might be well, he feels, to publish the present results of these
investigations, as it is possible to base certain general rules
valid for all the regions of the South Pacific on this particular
case.
II: FISHING PROBLEMS
The activity of the Pallicolo base is essentially founded on
longlining practised according to the customary Japanese
technique.
1. Organization of fishing
Boats coming to fish in the vicinity of the New Hebrides
and landing their catches at Pallicolo are now either ships of
25-27 metres of the 100-ton class, or ships of more than 30
metres of the 160-180 ton class (see Table X V ) .
The first group forms part of a very important series which
was launched in Japan between 1955 and 1960 with Government support (subsidies and loans), which has to a certain
extent made it possible to re-employ crews previously engaged
in salmon fishing in the North Pacific. As Russian pressure
resulted in annual agreements restricting Japanese activities in
the Okhotsk and Bering Seas, and fixing constantly decreasing
quotas to enable the land-based fisheries on the coasts of
Siberia and Alaska to maintain a satisfactory level of activity,
the Japanese Government had to try to divert part of the
crews of the Sub-Arctic fishing fleets to tropical fishing. These
boats may bring in catches of 60 to 65 tons (whole or headed
fish) and are able to stay at sea about a month.
The second group comprises either boats which are often
old and already written-off and whose capacity and range are
not much greater than the 100-ton boats, or else new boats
capable of storing more than 1 00 tons of fish and able to stay
at sea for more than six weeks.
In general, all the craft have powerful engines and very
modern navigational equipment (radar, Loran equipment,
100-watt radio, echo-sounding apparatus, etc.). It should be
noted that a few boats fish with live bait in Japanese waters
and then utilize their slack season by longlining in New
Hebridean waters.
TABLE XV—SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SANTO LONGLINERS (1962-63)
DIMENSIONS
METRES
N A M E O F VESSEL
L
No.
3
No. 1
No. 5
No. 5
No. 5
No. 11
No. 3
No. 32
No. 58
No. 2
No. 8
No. 1
Chitose Maru
Chitose Maru
Shinmei Maru
Shinmei Maru
Ryoei Maru
Unyu Maru
Zuihoo Maru
Taisen Maru
Nichibei Maru
Taisei Maru
Katsu Maru
Miyoshi
Koohei Maru
lyowa Maru
Nanshin Maru
Nankai Maru
B
D
23.23 x 4.59 x 2.52
24.04
4.53
2.49
24.88
5.50
2.83
26.90
5.70
2.70
24.18
5.43
2.78
22.66
5.10
2.62
33.00
6.55
3.20
26.80
5.70
2.70
27.33
5.60
2.84
24.98
5.05
2.61
26.50
5.80
2.70
24.80
5.33
2.75
27.07
5.70
2.70
26.63
5.51
2.70
30.67
6.00
3.10
29.94
6.00
3.10
GROSS
TONNAGE
ENGINE
HP
H O M E PORT
CAPACITY OF
FISH HOLDS
(TONS)
DATE
LAUNCHED
69.55
75.41
99.86
99.40
97.95
69.97
179.69
99.70
99.89
84.93
99.07
99.65
99.84
99.92
159.67
156.90
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
Diesel
180
210
310
430
270
250
450
400
340
270
310
250
350
320
400
320
Kushimoto
Kushimoto
Kushimoto
Kushimoto
Koza
Nachi Katsuva
Kisenuma
Nakaminato
Tokyo
Gowamachi
Choshi-shi
Miura-shi
Nakaminato
Nakaminato
Nawa
Nawa
48
48
65
65
65
40
110
60
58
52
60
60
65
65
75
75
July, 1958
June, 1959
July, 1957
June, 1961
August, 1957
November, 1959
November, 1959
July, 1960
June, 1961
August, 1955
May, 1962
November, 1955
July, 1960
March, 1955
January, 1948
April, 1946
20
The fishing boats which come to Pallicolo stay from six to
eight months in the South Pacific. The owners undertake by
contract to deliver the fish to the S.P.F.C. at an agreed price.
As the S.P.F.C. has no fleet of its own at present, the
number of boats delivering fish to Pallicolo varies considerably
from one month to the next (see Table XVI). On the whole,
the annual average remains almost stable with a total of
slightly over 100 boat/months. The boats are consistently more
numerous at the end of the year (from August to December)
than at the beginning (from January to July), as certain boats
leave the Northern hemisphere after the spring and early
summer fishing season off the coasts of Japan to come to the
Southern hemisphere and join the boats which are used for
year-round fishing in distant waters.
The gradual arrival during the last five years of more modern
boats of heavier tonnage to replace the first vessels, which
were often already obsolete, has made it possible to increase
fishing efficiency by considerably extending the average length
of time spent at sea on each fishing trip.
In this way, from year to year, the number of days of
effective fishing of the boats delivering their catch to Pallicolo
has regularly increased (see Table XVII), while there is the
same seasonal lack of symmetry in the amount of traffic. There
is greater activity at the end of the year. During the last
quarter—October to December—there is an average of 828
fishing days per month against only 538 days for the first
half-year—January to June—with an intermediate phase during
the third quarter (664 days of fishing per month from July
to September).
Production is not consistent with the increase in fishing
effort. While the number of fishing days has regularly grown
from year to year, the tonnage of fish unloaded was less in
1959-60 and 1961 than that for the year 1958. and although
the production figures in 1962 are slightly higher than in
1958, it was with a fishing effort increased by more than 65
per cent (see Table XVIII).
In spite of certain adjustments in relation to the number of
fishing operations, landings are still much larger during the
July/December half-year than during the January/June halfyear. This raises problems of catch per unit of effort in the
sectors fished by the fleet attached to the New Hebridean base.
2. Yields from the fishing grounds
The fishing grounds frequented by the ships supplying
Pallicolo are generally restricted to the area between the
Solomon Islands to the north and New Caledonia to the south.
i.e., to the west of the Santa Cruz and Banks Islands in the
northern group of the New Hebrides proper (see Charts 1 to
24 at the end of this paper). It is certain that the great
majority, if not all, of fishing operations will be found in this
sector (between 158-164°E). In the southern summer (November to February), the major part of the vessels occupy a more
southerly position and approach the north of New Caledonia.
while in the cold months (May to September) a tendency is
noted to go towards the north in the waters of the Solomon
Islands. This is only generally valid and in no way constitutes
an absolute rule, and the most frequented sector straddles the
parallel of 15°S. There is a tendency towards 12-14°S from
February to June, and towards 16-17'S from October to
January.
TABLE XVI—NUMBER OF SHIPS UNLOADING FISH
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
Total
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Total
9
9
9
7
8
7
13
8
10
8
8
8
4
6
10
11
10
9
12
5
9
7
12
12
9
12
8
9
7
10
6
6
10
11
12
14
9
8
7
7
7
6
6
10
10
13
12
11
7
6
5
5
8
11
9
10
12
13
10
12
38
41
39
39
40
43
46
39
51
52
54
57
104
107
114
106
108
539
It must be noted that although the craft willingly go quite
far west, they are reluctant to leave the immediate vicinity of
the archipelago in the east. It is only rarely that fishing operations are observed in the eastern sector, and these are but
infrequent and episodic attempts which take place not far
from the coast.
With the considerable decrease of catches skippers have been
obliged to try to extend their field of activity and to disperse
in search of the most favourable areas.
At first, craft of more than 100 tons, which are more or
less autonomous, ventured in August and September to the
TABLE XVII—NUMBER OF FISHING DAYS FOR THE WHOLE
FLEET
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
Total
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Total
114
124
130
94
92
71
143
82
123
82
91
100
47
81
112
116
137
126
154
71
129
112
185
157
98
166
110
133
99
131
94
99
134
140
176
168
117
118
114
102
91
70
84
126
167
220
185
138
132
95
104
79
163
161
172
178
236
269
198
204
508
584
570
524
582
559
647
556
789
823
835
767
1,246
1,427
1,548
1,532
1,991
7,744
The crew wind in trawls on the quayside, Pallicolo—Espiritu Santo
21
TABLE XX—WEIGHT OF CERTAIN SPECIES LANDED
(metric tons to the nearest ton)
TABLE XVIII—TOTAL WEIGHT OF LANDINGS
(metric tons to the nearest ton)
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
Total
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Total
382
403
402
246
282
291
556
312
431
314
353
372
160
225
299
324
395
324
427
199
319
290
484
481
214
412
264
369
260
310
216
266
378
377
442
432
297
297
200
280
314
267
271
371
476
477
474
330
324
205
201
148
396
454
465
413
533
471
320
484
1,377
1,542
1,366
1,367
1,647
1,646
1,935
1,561
2,137
1,929
2,073
2,099
A,2,AA
3,927
3,940
4,054
4,414
20,679
Whole albacore
1958
JANUARY
206
FEBRUARY
200
MARCH
229
APRIL
131
167
MAY
JUNE
130
JULY
305
AUGUST
210
327
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
223
238
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
235
Total
south-west of New Caledonia where some fine catches of
albacore could be made.
The second reaction was mainly noticed in 1962. While, in
1961, the ships generally remained in a group and exploited
limited areas successfully, the following year they dispersed
in their search for fish, and a single vessel changed position
three or four times over a distance of some hundreds of miles
during one voyage of 25 to 30 days; this involves considerable
loss of time and greatly increases the overheads of the shipowners without producing a satisfactory solution or reducing
the fall in catches. In this respect it is interesting to see the
evolution of the monthly landings compared with the area of
sea fished. The fishing sectors (see Charts 1 to 24) have been
charted in square degrees by reading the daily position of the
fishing vessels from the radio communication log books kept
in Pallicolo. The number of daily fishing operations in each
square degree has been read monthly over the two years 1961
and 1962. (See pages 39-42.)
By comparing these data with the tonnages of fish unloaded
in Pallicolo (see Table XIX), the average monthly production
from the fishing grounds per square degree may be estimated
—and a drop in average monthly production per square degree
from about 10,000 kg. to 7,850 kg. is thus observed. The
greatest drop is recorded during the second half-year, just
when fishing operations are most active.
2,601
1959
107
125
180
180
236
203
299
150
248
180
325
385
1960
150
226
169
160
148
180
145
189
203
200
254
279
1961
195
160
103
159
146
98
152
233
288
316
340
235
1962
194
105
113
85
228
244
297
283
366
311
183
271
Total
852
816
794
715
925
855
1,198
1,065
1,432
1,230
1,340
1,405
2,618
2,303
2,425
2,680
12,627
1959
1960
1961
1962
Total
57
100
72
89
141
140
94
94
112
86
56
45
86
72
56
37
111
167
135
78
90
82
70
103
301
437
338
416
550
581
520
296
404
351
317
318
1,086
,087
4,829
Yellowfin tuna
1958
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
Total
92
106
85
80
89
133
194
70
55
38
48
44
31
66
63
89
99
49
57
19
24
22
41
35
1,034
595
35
93
62
121
110
92
40
35
123
123
102
91
1,027
As with all longline operations in tropical waters, catches
consist essentially of albacore (Germo alalunga) and yellowfin
tuna {Neothunnus tnacropterus) (see Tables XX and X X I ) .
Generally speaking, albacore on its own represents about 60
per cent by weight of landings, and yellowfin tuna (except for
1960, which was an exceptionally bad year) represents about
25 per cent.
Tonnage of other species—big-eyed tuna {Parathunnus sibi),
swordfish (Xiphias gladius), marlins (Makaira spp.), and
TABLE XIX—PRODUCTION AND YIELDS FROM SECTORS FISHED BY THE TUNA TRAWLERS OF PALLICOLO
1961
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMER
Total
MONTHLY t AVERAGE
1962
SQUARE
DEGREES
FISHED
PRODUCTION
IN M E T R I C
TONS
25
52
32
40
16
21
24
39
48
50
26
33
297
297
200
280
314
267
271
371
476
477
474
330
406
4,054
34
338
YIELD IN
KG. PER
SQ. DEGR.
11,880
5,710
6,250
7,000
19,620
12.710
11,280
9,510
9,920
9,540
18.230
1 0,000
1 0,000
1 kg.
=
2.2 lb. avoirdupois.
22
SQUARE
DEGREES
FISHED
PRODUCTION
IN METRIC
TONS
YIELD IN
KG. PER
SQ. DEGR.
31
45
20
31
38
48
36
56
73
61
61
62
324
205
201
148
396
458
465
413
533
471
320
484
10,450
4,550
10,050
4,770
10,420
9,460
12,910
7,370
7,300
7,720
5,240
7,800
562
4,418
47
368
7,850
skipjack (Katsuwonus pelainis)—always remains very low and
constitutes only a very secondary product.
The fishing year in New Hebridean waters is divided into
two very characteristic seasons (see Table X X I a ) : August to
December (overlapping into July and January) is the albacore
season, while February to June (overlapping into January and
July) is the yellowfin tuna season.
A few fluctuations which may affect this normal scheme of
things cause exceptions to this rule (September-October, 1960.
March, 1960).
NUMBER OF FISH CAUGHT PER 100 HOOKS
Percentage
TABLE XXI—PERCENTAGE OF CATCHES IN TOTAL WEIGHT
A Ibacore
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Monthly
Average
53.6
49.7
56.9
53.1
59.3
44.4
54.8
67.2
75.7
71
67.5
63
67
55.5
60.3
55.4
59.9
62.4
70
75.5
77.9
62.1
67.3
80
70.2
54.9
63.9
43.5
56.9
58.1
67.2
71
53.9
53
63.1
64.6
60.1
51.4
56.5
57.6
57.7
53.8
63.8
68.5
68.7
79.1
72.2
72.6
63.34
53.04
57.82
53.30
56.02
51.08
62.36
68.62
67.34
66.28
68.38
70.30
Yearly A verage 59.9
66.6
58.4
65.8
53.7
51.5
56.9
46.3
36.7
56
62.9
60.5
66.2
71.8
71.3
59.8
1959
1960
1961
1962
19.1
29.6
20.9
27.5
25.2
15.1
13.4
9.4
7.4
7.7
8.5
7.4
15.2
16.2
22.5
23.5
32.7
42.1
29.6
18.3
13.1
32.6
32.6
23.1
21.1
26.1
19.4
33.7
35.7
31.8
44.9
52.5
34.6
25.3
23.6
18
11.7
13.5
26.8
26.7
34.7
27.8
25.2
28
36.8
29.1
18.9
16.9
11.8
17.6
16.7
24.6
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
24.4
28.1
22.2
31.5
31.6
44.4
35
22.1
12.8
11.9
13.5
11.8
Yearly A verage 23.8
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
Monthly
Average
21.16
31.72
26.02
29.74
34.36
35.68
26.08
17.76
18.66
16.40
14.88
14.10
1960
1961
1962
Monthly
Average
19.1
19.7
21.3
18.3
17.9
17.5
17.6
18.1
20.8
21.3
20.9
20.1
18.8
17.9
18.5
16.7
17.8
17.4
18.4
20.1
20.7
19.5
19.4
19.4
19.2
18.4
18.6
17.4
16.1
18.8
19.4
17.2
18.8
18.3
18.9
19.8
19.2
17.9
17.8
16.4
17.4
18.8
18.7
19.7
18.2
20.7
21.1
20
17.4
18.3
17.4
16.5
17
17.9
18.8
21.7
19.9
19.2
19.4
19.6
18.74
18.44
18.72
17.06
17.24
18.08
18.58
19.36
19.68
19.82
19.94
19.98
Yearly A verage 19.4
18.7
18.4
18.8
18.6
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1962
Average
5.81
5.14
5.11
4.73
5.51
6.13
6.43
6.29
6.22
5.76
6.45
6.17
Yearly A verage 5.81
5.92
4.32
4.39
4.43
4.54
4.05
5.66
5.45
5.12
5.18
5.16
6.71
3.80
4.24
4.45
3.71
4.90
3.91
4.13
5.77
4.21
4.06
3.97
4.37
4.53
3.94
2.64
4.94
4.78
3.89
5.04
5.26
5.00
4.00
4.78
4.57
4.52
3.96
3.78
3.63
4.62
4.95
5.31
4.39
4.46
3.52
2.80
3.02
4.91
4.32
4.07
4.28
4.87
4.58
5.31
5.43
5.00
4.50
4.63
4.97
5.08
4.30
4.45
4.08
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Average
39.3
40.1
35.7
34.5
29.6
34.9
30.8
29
38.5
41.3
40.6
40.4
40.4
35.5
31.6
26.2
28.6
34.1
36.5
39.3
41.3
38.3
32.5
35.8
31.9
25
22.7
23.3
23
25.8
33.1
35
28.9
28.9
29.1
31
31.5
33
41.4
32.4
35
36.4
37.3
33.9
33.5
36
44.2
38.5
40
40.4
32.8
30.2
31.7
30.9
28.5
32.7
33.7
34.1
30.1
31.4
36.62
34.60
32.84
29.32
29.58
32.42
33.24
33.98
35.18
35.72
35.30
35.42
35
28.1
36.1
33
Yearly A verage 36.3
NUMBER OF FISH CAUGHT PER 100 HOOKS
Percentage
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Average
1.20
1.34
1.11
1.53
1.75
3.11
2.34
1.32
0.56
0.52
0.66
0.57
Yearly A verage 1.33
0.78
1.15
0.89
1.46
1.22
0.56
0.54
1.34
0.24
0.33
0.39
0.33
0.77
0.53
1.28
1.34
2.09
2.54
1.45
0.66
0.52
1.65
1.58
1.04
0.91
1.34
0.81
1.34
0.79
1.40
2.31
2.86
1.64
1.23
1.06
0.62
0.37
0.45
1.24
0.88
1.21
0.98
0.87
1.20
1.97
1.60
0.8
0.65
0.53
0.68
0.71
1.00
0.84
1.26
1.02
1.47
1.80
1.99
1.35
1.04
0.83
0.71
0.63
0.59
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
(kg.)
1959
1961
Monthly
60.7
1958
1960
Average weight (kg.)
TABLE XXII—ALBACORE
Average weight
1959
TABLE XXIII—YELLOWFIN TUNA
Yellowfin tuna
1958
1958
The albacore (Germo alalunga) are generally larger in the
fishing season (about 20 kg. from August to December) than
in the off-season (about 17 to 18 kg. from January to July).
It is characteristic that the big specimens of more than 22 kg.
are hardly found except between August and December, while
the small fish of from 15 to 16 kg. are seen only between
February and June (see Tables XXI, XXIa, and XXII). As a
general rule the percentage of fish caught compared with the
fishing effort is higher with fish of the 19-22 kg. category than
with the 15-1 8 kg. category.
23
For yellowfin tuna (Neothunnus macropterus), the phenomenon is generally the reverse (see Tables XXIa, XXIIa,
XXIII, and XXIIIa); the period when the fish is most abundant
(March to June) is when the large specimens are scarce.
Good yields are obtained with the 20 to 30 kg. fish. On the
other hand, yields drop sharply when specimens of from 40 to
60 kg. are more frequent (August to January).
TABLE XXIIa-—MONTHS WHEN THE WEIGHT OF THE FISH IS
GREATER THAN THE AVERAGE
Albacore
1958
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
These few observations seem to show that at least two
stocks of albacore are encountered and these show hardly any
tendency to mix; the younger only reaches the fringes of the
Coral Sea.
In the case of the yellowfin tuna, the best yields obtained
during the cool season with young adult fish confirm all the
observations made throughout the central Atlantic and the
other regions of the tropical Pacific, and in the Indian Ocean.
There remains the problem of the considerable decrease in
catches observed at the end of 1962 and throughout 1963.
Yellowfin
3. Future Problems
The absence of sustained investigations and knowledge concerning marine fauna in the area exploited by the longliners
delivering their catch to Pallicolo makes it very difficult to
estimate the proper level to be assigned to fishing.
The research of the Institut Francois d'Oceanie of Noumea
dealt with longline fishing in more southerly waters, to the
south-east of New Caledonia where the boats attached to the
New Hebrides base fish only in August and September. We are
therefore reduced to drawing a few conclusions based on the
fishing statistics alone.
TABLE XXIa—MONTHS WHEN THE PERCENTAGE OF
CATCHES IS GREATER THAN THE ANNUAL AVERAGE
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
1962
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
+
t
t
1959
1960
1961
1962
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tJ.
i
t
t
f
t
t
t
t
t
t
\
t
t
Albacore
1959
1960
1961
t
t
t
1962
t
t
t
t
t
t
Yellowfin tuila
1958
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
1959
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
1960
1961
1962
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1958
1959
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
Yellowfin tuna
1958
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
24
1960
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
1961
1962
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
-h
1958
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1961
TABLE XXIIIa—MONTHS WHEN THE PERCENTAGE OF FISH
CAUGHT IS GREATER THAN THE AVERAGE
Albacore
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1960
tJ.
tuna
1958
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1959
t
t
t
t
t
t
1959
1960
1961
1962
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
The first disquieting sign is the consistent decrease in catch
per fishing effort (100 hooks). So far as albacore is concerned,
this amounted to an average of 30 per cent between 1958 and
1962 (see Table XXII). This does not constitute an isolated
case but is a general phenomenon in the tropical Pacific,
central Atlantic, and Indian Ocean. It does not seem that the
fundamental stock has been affected, thus endangering the
balance of the species, since the average weights of the fish
have remained more or less stable and have varied only
slightly to the extent that the catches of fish of the 15-18 kg.
category have been generally more abundant than those of
the 19-23 kg. category.
With regard to the yellowfin tuna, the considerable variations
recorded from year to year are mainly due to the fluctuation
in the numbers of young fish, which increase the catch per
fishing effort but considerably diminish the average weight of
the catch without in any way implying an impairment of the
fish population.
Moreover, the yellowfin tuna, which are also found on the
surface, escape an exclusive attack from drifter fishing while
this is not the case for the albacore which, since October,
1962, witnessed a veritable collapse of the catch per fishing
effort, in particular in the sector comprised between the
parallels 13° and 17° S. and the meridians 155° and 165° E. In
1963, the longliners working in this sector have had to go
further and further south in the vicinity of New Caledonia.
Longliner at the quayside, Pallicolo—Espiritu Santo. Equipment for loading
ice on to fishing boats is shown at the right.
set-up. At the administrative level, the Condominium finances
first of all collect the various licensing fees and taxes on
industrial and commercial activities in the territory.
The considerable drop in the overall productivity of this
zone was already very apparent in 1962 when compared with
1961 (see Table XIX). It was even more noticeable in 1963.
This is a disturbing sign, although it is impossible to assess
the respective importance of the general factors affecting the
dynamics of the species and of the impact of the fishing effort.
In the immediate future the most elementary caution demands
that the critical zone should not be overloaded by the arrival
of further ships but, on the other hand, that an effort should
be made to fish elsewhere until it can be seen if any progress
is made by a return to environmental conditions more favourable to the development of the albacore population.
If a return to more satisfactory yields cannot be obtained
in the next few years, it must be concluded that fishing has
reached the danger point after which it is desirable and
necessary to restrict fishing activities.
However, the base of Pallicolo should, without further ado,
face up to another danger—that of one day finding itself
without ships interested in distant fishing grounds whose yields
are dwindling to such an extent that there is no longer sufficient
incentive to go on with arduous and sometimes even dangerous
campaigns. To meet this danger the S.P.F.C. is arranging to
have its own boats.
In a letter dated 16th May, 1958, the French and British
Resident Commissioners restrict to 2 per cent the tax collected
by the Condominium on all fish exports for 1962, the sum
thus deducted being about £Stgl 0,000 or 2,400,000 CFP frs
(£A12,000). With other taxes (on fuel and machinery used
for the requirements of the company), the Condominium
budget benefits by about 6 million CFP frs (or £A30,000).
The French Administration benefits by the tax on the issue
of certificates of origin for products intended for the French
market, i.e., about 500,000 CFP frs for 1963. This income
will be increased notably in future, as a recent regulation
raised the tariff from 500 to 1,000 CFP frs per ton as from
1st February, 1964.
Quite apart from these tax aspects, which are limited, the
influence of the Pallicolo base is seen in the employment field
and in multiple indirect effects on the local economy. With
regard to labour, the problems to be solved have often been
difficult. The New Hebrides in general, and the island of
Espiritu Santo in particular, are unable to offer specialized
workers who must also be capable of working alongside the
Japanese fishermen.
All the specialized services of the base are maintained by
36 Japanese, who are required to stay for an average of two
years in the New Hebrides. The wage scale varies considerably.
The manager receives 36,000 CFP frs per month (£A180),
while the ordinary office clerk or unskilled machinery or
refrigeration worker draws 7,600 CFP frs (£A38) monthly.
At the beginning of 1964, ten new boats were under construction—eight in Korea and two in Okinawa (Ryukyu)—
for fishing off the New Hebridean base. At least five of these
boats will be directly commissioned by the S.P.F.C, who plan
to try an experiment with mixed Japanese-Gilbertese-New
Hebridean crews.
It will be interesting to see to what extent this project is
successful, as it would seem to be a most promising means of
promoting the technical and economic development of the
Melanesian peoples.
A sum of about 4,800,000 CFP frs (£A24,000) is paid as
wages to the Japanese workers. These consist both of skilled
workers, often elderly, managing the principal services, and
young auxiliary workers. In all there are—4 over 48 years of
age, 10 from 38 to 47, 8 from 28 to 37, and 14 from 18 to 27.
Accommodation, food, and the main services are supplied
by the company itself. This leaves very little for the profit of
the local trade. The sums which the Japanese workers spend in
the various establishments at Santo may, at the most, be
estimated at 200,000 CFP frs (£A1,000). This sum consists
mainly of money spent in bars and night clubs in the port.
Ill: THE PLACE OF THE ACTIVITIES AT PALLICOLO IN
NEW HEBRIDEAN ECONOMY AND LIFE
The activities of the storage and freezing plant in Pallicolo
(Espiritu Santo) remain to a certain extent on the fringe of
the New Hebridean economy proper. The main share of the
profits go to Japan in the form of payment for fish or are
distributed outside the territory in various forms.
However, as the company reached a normal level of operation, some interesting effects have been recorded in the local
It must be noted also that the Japanese employed at the
base or on the fishing boats very frequently call upon the
services of the French hospital at Santo, where all those injured
at work are hospitalized.
25
Alongside this foreign labour force, which hardly benefits
the territory at all, the management has tried, both for
economy's sake and with the wish to ensure a better link with
the local population, to arrange for the training of a group
of New Hebridean workers, some of whom at least would be
capable of holding positions of responsibility. Thus, in October,
1963, there were 55 natives of the archipelago employed in
Pallicolo. As their wages ranged between 2,400 and 4,600
CFP frs per month (£A 12-23), the annual sum drawn by
this local labour force amounts to approximately 2 million
CFP frs (£A10,000).
on the base (4,800,000 CFP frs) and the Japanese share in
the profits and depreciation, which we estimate at 10 million
CFP frs. In all, the income obtained by the Japanese economy
from the operation at Pallicolo and in the fishing associated
with it is slightly more than 64 million CFP frs or £A320,0O0.
This amounts to a little over 700,000 United States dollars.
For the New Hebrides, the gains come from the wages paid
to the New Hebrideans—2 million CFP frs; the various sums
spent by the crews and foreign personnel of the base; and a
few purchases of local products (certain provisions and
water/ice); services requested from public services (posts and
telecommunications, hospital treatment and medical services);
or from private individuals by shipowners—in all about 2
million CFP frs; taxes, duties and various fees—6,600,000
CFP frs; and finally, the New Hebridean share in profits and
depreciation, which we evaluate at 7,500,000 CFP frs.
This is a direct gain for the New Hebrides—a gain
which does not remain confined to Espiritu Santo but is
widely distributed throughout the archipelago. In fact, the population of Espiritu Santo is very small and not even sufficient
to fulfil the labour requirements for the plantations. For a
long time, therefore, it has been customary to apply to more
densely populated islands for workers and even to call upon
Asiatics (Vietnamese before 1939) or Polynesians (Wallis and
Futuna Islanders since 1955).
The share of extra income obtained by the New Hebridean
economy from the Pallicolo activities would therefore be more
than 18 million CFP frs for 1962 (£A90,000, or 200,000
United States dollars).
Although the Pallicolo base employs only one Asiatic (born
in Canton but resident in Santo) it has, on the other hand,
only one New Hebridean native of Santo against 54 from other
islands. The islands usually supplying the most workers are
again similarly represented. Ambrim supplies 17 workers; Aoba,
14; Malekula, 12; Epi, 9; and Paama, 2. These workers' wages
are thus distributed throughout the group and support about
500 persons.
Other foreign economies are also concerned, although to a
much lesser extent—
• The Gilbert Islands through the wages of their workers
(who spend some of their money in Pallicolo)—only about
7,000 dollars.
In spite of its efforts at local recruitment, the company has
been unable to fulfil all its requirements and has also had to
bring in workers from outside the New Hebrides. The overpopulated Gilbert Islands, where the British Administration
encourages emigration, have made the necessary contribution.
In October, 1963, there were 26 Gilbert Islanders employed
in Pallicolo and earning 2,400-2,600 CFP frs a month
(£A12-13), receiving in all about 780,000 CFP frs per annum
(£A3,900). The Gilbertese are generally young (14 between
1 8-27 years of age, against five from 28 to 37 and seven from
38 to 4 7 ) . They have come to the New Hebrides mainly to
provide for the needs of large families without resources. In
fact, 20 of them state that their families have no money
coming in other than their wages, five say that their families
have one other source of income apart from their own, and
only one person stated that his family had two other sources
of income.
• The United States have the sales of fuel, certain machinery,
and spare parts, and also the profits and depreciation reverting to United States shareholders: approximately 2,500,000
CFP frs (27,500 dollars).
It is thus seen that the money which remains in the territory
represents, in the case of Pallicolo, a much higher percentage
of the turnover than in Pago Pago.
This is due to several reasons—first of all, taxes collected
in 1962 corresponded to roughly 5 per cent of the turnover—
i.e., almost the proportion collected in income tax from the
Van Camp company in Pago Pago in 1964. In addition,
although the wage share is smaller, the local economy can
supply more food products such as meat, fruit, and vegetables.
Finally, as local capital plays a large part in the business
it is able to draw a not inconsiderable share of the profits.
This is the essential difference from the situation of the canning
industries in American Samoa.
This is a particularly clear example and is worthy of consideration by all the Governments concerned in the economic
promotion of South Pacific territories. There, as elsewhere,
it is not in the utilization of the labour force but in the
formation and investment of local capital that, in the end, is
found the true source of the industrial and commercial profits
affecting the territory.
Although six of them state that their families are less than
five persons, 13 have between 5 and 10 in their family, and 7
more than 10 persons. This would amount to 217 persons
remaining in the Gilbert Islands who profit from the Pallicolo
wages. However, in the Gilbert archipelago, it is mainly the
islands in the south which are concerned. Arorae supplies 10
workers with 64 persons dependent upon them. Tamana has
8 workers who have 84 dependent persons, and Nikunau has
2 workers supporting 15 persons.
Does this mean that the specific situation of the New Hebridean economy is such as to solve all the problems? Certainly
not. In fact, the economy of the territory is represented by two
sectors of very unequal importance: on the one hand, the native
economy, which is exclusive and paralyzed by poor utilization
of natural resources and manpower (which are in short supply)
and, on the other, the dynamic "settlement" economy, which
is favoured by considerable available space and the prospects
of development of new and often virgin sectors. In the internal
distribution of the profits drawn from the Pallicolo revenue,
the native economy will receive hardly more than 15 per cent
(wages and a small part of the public takings), whereas the
"settlement" economy will obtain 85 per cent, as it is this
economy which has supplied the capital, absorbs the larger part
of the public expenditure by administrative agencies, and
covers the requirements for public services.
One other island, Kuria, in the centre of the archipelago,
provides 6 workers with 49 dependants.
It is also interesting to see how the incomes drawn from
fishing and fish grading are distributed.
The f.o.b. value of fish exported from Pallicolo in 1962
was declared at nearly £Stg468,000, i.e., 110 million CFP frs
(£A550,000).
Payments to the lapanese fishing boats amounted to nearly
300 million yen, i.e., 80 million CFP frs or £A400,000. The
money spent by the shipowners in goods other than Japanese
(mainly fuel) or in services must have amounted to about
30 million CFP frs. The gain for the Japanese economy was
therefore about 50 million CFP frs or £A250,000. To this
must be added the wages of the Japanese personnel employed
It is therefore to the extent to which the "settlers" finally
become rooted in the New Hebrides, at the same time in26
creasing their activities and consolidating their foundations so
as to identify themselves with the country, that it will be
possible to achieve integration of the income derived from
industrialization.
It appears that, in the final outcome, the position of the
New Hebrides is almost identical with that of American
Samoa where the main profits go to non-resident interests.
In the last resort, the problem is to determine whether, by
free decision of those concerned, a greater proportion of the
profits is likely to be ploughed back into the New Hebrides,
bearing in mind that there is no chance of all or some of the
members of the Boards of Directors of the Van Camp and
Star Kist companies settling in Pago Pago unless by direct
or indirect intervention of the territorial administration.
In this field, the position of the New Hebrides is very
special. Alongside islands with a well-established native population with economic frameworks and structures peculiar to
underdeveloped regions of high density and rapidly increasing
population (Tanna, Tonga, Aoba, etc.) there are other islands
like Espiritu Santo which are almost uninhabited and which
offer an excellent field for dynamic business enterprise and
settlement.
Filiefs and sections of sword-fish are being unloaded,
Santo.
The Pallicolo plant should thus be understood as the link
in a chain which also includes the agricultural coastal area
and the urban centre of Santo. In this society, where the
original inhabitants of the island are almost non-existent, and
where whites of various origins rub shoulders with Polynesians
(Tahitians, Wallis Islanders, Samoans), Asiatics (Chinese and
Vietnamese who have refused repatriation), and Melanesians
from the entire archipelago (Banks, Aoba, Malekula, Pentecost.
Ambrim, etc.), the Pallicolo plant, attracting as it does an
unstable labour force of Japanese, Gilbertese, and New Hebrideans from various islands, is in no way exceptional.
The direction taken by further activities at Pallicolo must
therefore be decided in terms of whatever is decided by the
territorial authorities to ensure settlement and development of
the island.
The Pallicolo venture might play a decisive role if it could
be used as a crucible for melting into a single economic entity
Asiatics (Japanese and Korean), Micronesians (Gilbert Islanders), Melanesians (from the entire archipelago), Polynesians
(Wallis Islanders), and Europeans (English-speaking and
French).
Pallicolo—Espiritu
force. Investments would approach 60 million CFP
frs (660,000 United States dollars).
Production would amount to 400,000 cases per
annum, turnover 4 to 5 million dollars ex New
Hebrides.
3. The operation of a cannery calls for an immigration plar
to bring in labour—
• either by allowing a number of Japanese or South
Korean families to settle, at least temporarily, one
or more of whose members would work on fishing
boats owned by the S.P.F.C. and the others working at the cannery,
• or by calling upon Micronesian (Gilbertese) and
Polynesian manpower (Wallis and Futuna Islanders),
• or by recruiting workers from the more densely
inhabited islands of the archipelago.
A combination of all three suggestions might also be
envisaged.
The New Hebridean context and the under-population
of Espiritu Santo, emphasized by the recent departure
of almost all the Vietnamese colony, render possible
a more liberal immigration and settlement which
would be inconceivable in most of the other territories of the South Pacific and, in particular, in
Polynesia.
4. I he nations who hold the New Hebrides trust under the
Condominium system should offer new markets,
especially for tinned products. Although the French
market has begun to accept New Hebridean products.
the territories of the sterling area, of which the
New Hebrides form part, should be able to absorb
considerable quantities of tinned tuna. A combined
action in this sense by the administrations and the
promoters of the Pallicolo venture should produce
positive results.
5. A new use for the cold-storage base might be found if a
considerable part of the fish were used on the spot
to give tinned produce. Cattle raising, which has very
good prospects in Espiritu Santo, is for the moment
paralyzed by the lack of markets. The cold-storage
base might be used for the refrigeration and storage
of carcases intended for export to Japan. Cattle
raising might benefit by the production of foods
including fish meal, which can also be used to aid
the expansion of pig and poultry breeding.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
CONDOMINIUM OF THE NEW HEBRIDES
The activities of the Pallicolo base have, up to the present.
remained comparatively limited. Their scope can in no way
be compared with that of bases in American Samoa. In the
world context of tuna-freezing bases in the South Pacific, as
well as in Africa and in the Caribbean, they are of minor
importance only. If the future is to be safeguarded, considerable
progress must be made to enable the venture to take a definite
place on the world market and to consolidate its existence
within the economic framework of the South Pacific.
1. It seems necessary to reserve an adequate fishing zone for
boats supplying Pallicolo to avoid suffocation through
lack of production and also to prevent anarchic
competition with the new Fiji and New Caledonia
bases. The use of long-range boats capable of fishing
much further south should be encouraged.
2. Something should be done to boost the value of the catch
by local processing. In this connexion, it is advisable
to plan for the installation of a cannery. This should
be on a smaller scale than that of the Star Kist
factory in Pago Pago, i.e., 30 to 35 metric tons of
fish handled daily. There should be about 120 to 150
persons employed in addition to the present labour
27
PART
THREE: NEW
SHORE
TUNA
RASES FOR
JAPANESE
FISHING
The success of the Pago Pago canneries and the consolidation
of the Pallicolo cold-storage base very quickly led the main
Japanese groups interested in the tuna-fishing industry in the
South Pacific to look for new bases to operate, so as to
circumvent the inconveniences of having to use parent-ships
to accompany trawlers.
As these expeditions become more important, provisioning
or transfers of catches would have to be carried out either at
sea or in foreign ports where the harbour facilities might at
any time be denied. It therefore seemed urgent to stabilize the
operational fleets by providing adequate shore bases.
The search for possible new land bases became more and
more active from 1960 onwards as the hopes placed in
Atlantic fishing were not fulfilled and more consideration than
ever was given to the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
The preliminaries to any decision are often long and tortuous,
and subject to a host of complicated factors which make them
very similar to diplomatic negotiations.
Nothing at all, or very little, is done in the open. The
official files themselves contain scant information and it takes
some time to unravel the complicated tangle of each particular
case.
Although the author is by now more or less acquainted
with the full details of the major files over the past six years,
it would be unnecessarily indiscreet to proceed with public
analyses of the various cases.
He will merely set forth the results as they appear at the
end of 1963.
An approach of some kind has been made to almost all the
South Pacific territories since 1956.
In certain cases—as in the Kingdom of Tonga—the local
government, wishing to exclude foreign influences as much as
possible, has found it undesirable to consider the installation
of a freezing and cold-storage base which might have the effect
of introducing Asiatic technicians or workers and of bringing
some hundreds of fishermen to the island.
Elsewhere, port facilities, the economic context, or the
nearness of other bases have not seemed to be sufficiently
favourable (Cook Islands, Wallis, Solomon Islands).
Sometimes, as in French Polynesia, arrangements just about
to materialize have had to be re-examined or cancelled because
of new priorities.
Finally, after much hesitation, two new bases were launched
in 1963, one in New Caledonia and the other in the Fiji group.
1. Investigations and negotiations with a view to the
setting-up of new bases ashore
The negotiations leading to the establishment of a shore base
are always lengthy and delicate. They present many technical
and financial problems as well as political and strategic aspects.
The partners are, first of all, shipping interests and the big
Japanese industrial and commercial trusts. Each of these
groups endeavours to protect its own interests, but the main
object is to get ahead of other competitors; thus, very keen
rivalries are engendered by the distribution of the quotas allocated by the Japanese Fishing Agency.
The preliminary phase therefore takes place in Tokyo,
where each group concerned tries to present its claims in the
best possible way by argument or "lobbying," and various
types of pressure play a large part.
The Japanese Fishing Agency aims at bringing some stability
and order into the major economic and geographic sectors
among which the production quotas are distributed in advance.
Once equipped with their authorizations to sell on the international and domestic markets, the Japanese companies try
to produce as quickly as possible the tonnages to which they
are entitled. This often explains a certain haste on the part of
the Japanese producers, who wish to fulfil their quota in the
quite short period of time—not exceeding 18 months or two
years—allotted to them.
Next to the Japanese producers we find the main United
States importers, who may want their own permanent installations so as to be more certain of obtaining their raw materials
at a lower price.
Then there are the various territories, with their local and
central governments, and local businessmen.
2. Installation of the Taiyo Gyogyo Company in New
Caledonia
Since 1954, certain Japanese groups had been interested in
the facilities available on the west coast of New Caledonia,
where the lagoon and safe anchorages could easily accommodate the longliners which would frequent the fishing grounds
off Australia and New Zealand and might even go as far north
as the Solomon Islands.
Certain contacts were established, then attention was transferred to the New Hebrides as doubts on local political balance
and the possibility of reaching long-term agreements caused
postponement of plans to organize a base in the vicinity of
Noumea.
These first contacts had, however, called attention to the
problems of the development of the deep-sea fishing industry
in New Caledonian waters. The exports of New Caledonian
nickel ore to Japan, which had reached sizable proportions
TABLE XXIV—PRODUCTION FROM JAPANESE LONGLINERS BASED OUTSIDE THE ARCHIPELAGO
(in thousands of metric tons)
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
11.2
14.1
14.4
20.7
24
33
64
Land-based fleets
7.1
8.8
15.8
16.6
16.4
17
25
Atlantic fleet
—
15.9
31
50.8
73
82
60
18.3
38.8
61.2
88.1
113.4
132
149
Pacific and Indian Oceans:
Fleets accompanied by floating bases
Total
28
since 1958, led some concerns to think that other profitable
business might be promoted in conjunction with Japanese firms.
It was not until early 1963 that the earlier projects were
resumed and carried to a conclusion.
Changed conditions made it possible to pass in a few
months from the planning stage to the first installation.
On the Japanese side, the Taiyo Gyogyo Company, who
thought that they would be able to set up installations in
the port of Papeete, where they were already carrying out
transhipments and needed servicing for their boats, had to
reconsider these projects at the end of 1962 in the light of the
organization of a weapon-testing range for the French forces.
They then turned towards New Caledonia where they hoped
to find a base permitting them to fulfil a large quota of
frozen fish which had just been allocated to them by the
Japanese Fishing Agency.
In Noumea, certain private interests wished to associate
themselves with such a venture, and the local administrative
and political authorities, anxious to increase their revenue—
which had been considerably affected by the mining and industrial recession of 1961-62—were all prepared to offer considerable facilities to a business venture capable of introducing
new income.
After several months of discussion, a local firm, the Societe
I'Ocean, was created to act as a go-between in getting the
projects of the Taiyo Gyogyo Company approved.
As the latter wanted to go ahead as quickly as possible they
had a plan approved, enabling them to make use of the
services of a freezer ship until such time as a permanent land
base could be built.
The New Caledonian Territorial Assembly, which held an
extraordinary meeting on 6th August, 1963, approved an
agreement which was signed on 9th August, 1963.
This agreement provides as follows—
"A cold-storage warehouse with a capacity of 1,200 tons shall be
constructed within two years with extension to 2,000 tons and completion of the installations within a maximum period of five years.
This warehouse, which is to be able to handle 15,000 tons per annum,
shall be constructed in the industrial zone reserved by the territory at
Numbo Bay-Ducos peninsula, on the outskirts of Noumea.
"Until the initial cold-storage plant begins operating, the Societe
I'Ocean is authorized to use the services of a refrigeration ship, the
Eiyo Main, with a gross tonnage of 2,617 tons and a storage capacity
of 1,200 tons.
"The land provided by the territory is under a renewable 18-year
lease: 2 hectares 35 ares are immediately available at 100,000 CFP frs
per hectare as from 9th August, 1965, with possibilities of extension
over 4 to 5 hectares.
"Investments shall be about 100 million CFP frs, i.e., about 1,100,000
dollars.
"Fishing shall be carried on outside the lagoon, territorial waters, and
reefs of New Caledonia. The fish shall not be sold on the local market
nor may the ice produced by the refrigeration plant. Fuel and electricity
shall be supplied through local firms and companies, both for the base
and for the fishing boats.'
"Food supplies, both for the fishing boats and the land-based personnel, shall be obtained locally; in particular, contracts for fruit and
vegetables shall be signed with the local co-operative producers who
will, moreover, be able to make use of 200 to 300 m3 of cold-storage
space for their products.
"Unskilled labour shall be recruited on the spot through the Labour
Office. Contracts shall be awarded to local firms for work which the
company will not be able io carry out themselves. In the same way,
local services and resources must be given priority for the requirements
of fishing boats and plant.
"Waste products shall be supplied free of charge to the territory or
destroyed.
"The company shall bear the Customs costs, and the cost of superintendence and management of the warehouse accounts. It shall assume
responsibility for the annual salary of a Customs officer.
"As regards the operation of the venture, the products handled and
warehoused shall retain Japanese nationality and be re-exported duty-free.
"The Taiyo Gyogyo fishing fleet and factory ship shall be required
under common law to pay the existing duties and tax relevant to the
movements, operations, and transhipments which they carry out.
"The Societe I'Ocean shall be subject to all current duties and taxes
on companies and commercial ventures.
Trawls are stowed aft in cases, Noumea
(Ducos)
"The Societe I'Ocean shall pay a 'warehouse tax' per metric ton or
fraction of a ton of fish frozen aboard the refrigeration ship Eiyo Main
or at the land-refrigeration warehouse, levied on frozen foods on leaving
the warehouse for export, as follows—
"During the first three years of operation—
• 260 CFP frs per metric ton or fraction of a ton for fish shipped
to Japan.
• 400 CFP frs per metric ton or fraction of a ton for fish shipped
to other countries.
"From the fourth year and for five years thereafter—
• 425 CFP frs per metric ton or fraction of a ton for fish shipped
to Japan.
• 650 CFP frs per metric ton or fraction of a ton for fish shipped
to other countries.
"Should world tuna prices vary by 10 per cent or more, this tax
may be increased or decreased in the same proportion by a vote of the
Territorial Assembly.
"If the establishment of associated industries contemplated by the
Societe I'Ocean eventually brings lasting resources of reasonable importance to the territory, apart from revenue from direct taxation, this
warehouse tax may be reconsidered and reduced accordingly, bearing in
mind the added value of the corresponding resources contributed to the
territory. The same may be done in the event of the tonnage handled
by the Societe I'Ocean greatly exceeding the figure of 15,000 tons
initially provided for."
29
It cannot therefore be said that the Taiyo Gyogyo freezing
and cold-storage base was economically essential to Noumea.
On the other hand, during this same period, the north of
the island and the east coast were neglected and underequipped. It would have been infinitely better, from the planning point of view, if the Taiyo Gyogyo base had been
installed elsewhere than at Noumea, and preferably on the
north-west coast.
To this end, it would have been preferable to offer fiscal
inducements rather than to encourage further concentration
of activities in Noumea.
It would be senseless to consider creating a large new port,
a new heavy industry, or a "second capital" elsewhere, bearing
in mind the size of the territory and its present and future
population. But it would be an excellent thing to encourage
the establishment of marine and food industries in other small
centres which might thus be given a new lease of life.
Fish hauled a b o a r d the EIYO M A R U , Noumea
(Ducos)
The New Caledonian administration—particularly the metropolitan element—has therefore taken special care to lay down
as definite a policy as possible for a venture the capital for
which was almost entirely foreign—a venture controlled technically and economically from outside.
These are wise precautions which make it possible to protect
local interests and may mean a little additional profit; they do
not, however, compensate for the lack of investment by New
Caledonian businessmen in the company.
The example of Pallicolo ought to be followed in a territory
which lacks neither finance nor initiative and has long been
familiar, by virtue of its mining and heavy metallurgical
industry, with international markets.
Only experience will tell whether this carefully thought-out
contract will in the end produce more than a little revenue
from taxation and a few wage-packets for unskilled workers.
It would have been greatly desirable to consider from the
first the installation of a freezing and cold-storage base as the
nucleus of a new pole of development and economic growth
in the territory. New Caledonia is increasingly concentrating
its population, its assets, and its capital in the city of Noumea.
The town is growing; full employment is all the more assured
since the nickel industry was on the upswing in 1963, while
repatriations to North Vietnam caused the departure of more
than 3,000 persons.
In this connexion, it is most regrettable that, in the haste
of the negotiations and decisions of July and August, 1963,
nobody seriously thought of using the new activities created
by the grading and processing of fish as a means of boosting
agriculture and stock-raising in the Ouaco region. The new
jobs created would have been particularly valuable to a rural
and mining area, and, in particular, the fish meal and animal
food by-products could have helped intensive stock-raising,
while the frozen fish available would have made it possible to
reopen the cannery which had to close down due to changes
in the meat and cattle markets.
The Societe VOcean and the Taiyo Gyogyo Company moved
very rapidly. Only a few weeks after the agreement was signed,
the Eiyo Maru began work in mid-September.
On the occasion of the author's last trip to Noumea at the
end of October and beginning of November, 1963, landings
had already exceeded 2,000 tons and shipments to the United
States had begun.
After six months of operation with the temporary coldstorage installation on board the Eiyo Maru, we can see what
effect these new activities have had on the local labour market
and economy—
• Fish received and processed by 1st April, 1964: over
6,000 metric tons.
• Fish exported: 4,500 metric tons (one-third to the United
States, two-thirds to Japan).
• Labour employed: 55 Japanese and about 58 locally
recruited labourers.
• Tax collected by the territory, including pension contributions: 2 million CFP frs.
• Company expenditure in the territory (including ships'
provisions): 12 million CFP frs, or 130,000 United States
dollars.
Locally recruited personnel include a few Japanese (5)
who stayed in New Caledonia or were allowed to return after
almost all of their countrymen were expelled in 1942. There
are also a few Europeans (four born in Noumea and one in
France). However, most of the local personnel is made up
of Melanesian labourers and unskilled workers.
In March, 1964, the Societe I'Ocean employed 48 Melanesians residing in Noumea and in the immediate vicinity.
However, none of them originally belonged to this area. Like
almost all the Melanesians living in the capital, they came to
Noumea in search of higher wages and to enjoy—if only for
a few months or years—the pleasures of town life.
A longliner returns from a fishing expedition, Noumea
A point worthy of note is that the biggest contingent in this
labour force is made up of persons from the Loyalties, and
from Houailou (on the west coast of New Caledonia), where
rural overpopulation is becoming increasingly felt. The rest
(Ducos)
30
come from the north, where both agriculture and mining suffer
from chronic depression (see Map 3 ) . This is additional proof,
if proof were needed, that it would have been vastly better to
deploy this extra labour elsewhere, rather than to lay up
trouble for the future by exaggerated concentration on the
capital.
The Melanesians employed by the Societe VOcean are young
(12 are under 20 years of age, 12 between 21 and 30, 7
between 31 and 40, and 8 are over 40).
Most of them are single ( 3 7 ) . Only ten are married, and
one is a widower. Twenty-six have stated that they support
themselves and their families only with the salary paid by the
company. In 13 cases another salary is received in the family
and nine have more than one income to add to that drawn from
the Societe VOcean.
In the aggregate, 129 persons (including 55 children under
18 years of age) other than the company employees benefit
from these 48 salaries.
The opening operations are quite promising in spite of
certain disputes relating to administration and regulations.
From the human and social point of view, New Caledonia
has the immense advantage of enjoying almost full employment
and of having no violent racial problems. This makes for
favourable reception of foreigners, who may consider long-term
residence without coming up against fundamental hostility of
an economic, sociological, or political nature.
Well-developed (although costly) basic services are available
for fishing vessels and the temporary floating base.
It remains to be seen what will revert to local enterprise
when the final stage of construction and equipment is reached
—and to what extent the benefits derived by the local economy
will prove lasting.
Taxation remains, on the whole, a secondary consideration.
An estimated table of payments to the territory for the first
years shows only modest levels (Table XXV).
The frozen product export estimates remain problematical,
and we are allowing for an increase in rents in 1969, either
because of an extension of surfaces leased, or because of an
increase in rental.
What counts above everything else is the indirect effect
arising from all the transactions in the territory. We expect
that these will quite quickly reach an annual volume of 30 to
40 million CFP frs for ordinary purchases and services,
without mentioning duty-free operations. To these must be
added wages, which may soon represent 5 to 7 million CFP frs
for normal operation, without taking into account workers
recruited for construction of the buildings.
However, the achievement of these objectives is entirely
dependent on acceptable catches in the waters between the
Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia.
M a p N o . 3—Places of origin of the Melanesians employed early in 1 9 6 4
on board the EIYO M A R U — t h e temporary freezing base of the Societe
I'Ocean, Noumea (Ducos).
Increased catches in New Caledonian waters will only accentuate the alarming phenomena we have recorded in a thorough
study of the activities of the New Hebridean fleet.
It must be hoped that the remoter regions—particularly the
more southerly ones—will give more satisfactory yields. The
evolution of the catches of longliners delivering to Noumea
in the next few years should be followed closely, so that the
operations planned may not some day be sharply disrupted.
Finally, on present form, the general economic contribution
to New Caledonia from its new fishing base seems to us barely
greater than that from a nickel mine producing 150,000 to
180,000 tons of 3 per cent ore per annum.
3. The new base at Levuka (Ovalau Island), Fiji
At the same time as the decisions were taken in New
Caledonia and put into provisional application, a decisive step
was also taken in Fiji with the installation of a freezing and
storage base for the catches of Japanese longliners.
Here, as in New Caledonia—and perhaps even more so—
the Japanese fishing companies had long thought of setting up
a land base intended to replace the parent-ships cruising in the
open seas of the archipelago for four to six months, and even
longer, every year.
Many plans had been on the point of fruition, and on
several occasions certain trade journals, though generally well
informed, thought they were in a position to announce that
final decisions had been reached. However, on each occasion,
TABLE XXV—ESTIMATED TAX TABLE IN RESPECT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NOUMEA (DUCOS) BASE
YEAR
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
EXPORT ESTIMATES
JAPAN
U N I T E D STATES
METRIC TONS
8,000
10,000
12,000
12,000
15,000
15,000
16,000
16,000
2,000
2,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
4,000
4,000
WAREHOUSE
U N I T E D STATES
3,200,000
4,000,000
4,800,000
7,800,000
9,750,000
9,750.000
10,400,000
10,400,000
R E C E I P T S IN C F P
TAX
JAPAN
520,000
520,000
780,000
1,275,000
1,275,000
1,275,000
1,700,000
1,700,000
FRANCS
LEASE OF
GROUND
235,000
235,000
235,000
400,000
400 000
400.000
TOTAL
3,720,000
4,520,000
5,815,000
9,310,000
11,260,000
11,425,000
12,500,000
12,500,000
an insurmountable obstacle arose at the last moment, due to0
political or economic difficulties and disturbances in the terriitory, lack of financial backing, lack of a suitable site, etc.
natives at Levuka, and eleven or twelve Japanese or Europeans
and nine natives at Suva.
The need for a permanent base in the Fiji group was in-icreasingly felt by the Japanese companies who had to transhipp
at Suva ever-greater quantities of fish. From 4th July to 27thh
October, 1962, 6,279 short tons had been transhipped inn
nine operations.
About sixty new posts will therefore be added to the
economy of Fiji. As wages to local workers are to be about
£F20 per month, about £F15,000 will be put into circulation.
If an attempt is made to estimate revenue gains directly
accruing to the territory, the result is £F40,000 in respect of
tax paid during construction and establishment.
At the same time, the Government of Fiji, alarmed by the
rapid growth of population, was increasingly anxious to finds3
some new branches of activity capable both of bringing in
resources and creating employment. An agreement was finallyy
reached to form the Pacific Fishing Company Ltd., registeredi
under the laws of Fiji on 19th February, 1963.
This company was formed with 300,000 £F1 shares. Thee
capital was to be subscribed as follows: 100,000 shares by the;
Itoh Company of Osaka; 75,000 shares by Nihon Ryokoku
Kaisha of Tokyo; 75,000 shares by the Banno Company off
Osaka; and the remaining 50,000 shares being subscribedi
locally. Prominent among these subscribers were Mr H. M.
Scott, lawyer and businessman, who is a director, and Mrr
V. J. Costello. By agreement with the Government of Fiji,
the company was authorized to set up a freezing and cold-'_
storage base at Levuka on the island of Ovalau.
In April, 1963, the new company set about organizing ai
freezing base at —35°C with a daily output of 50 metric tons5
and a storage capacity of 1,500 metric tons at —25°C. A1
20-tons-per-day ice-making plant will be attached to the mainI
plant and will include storage for 200 tons of ice.
This installation will represent, with its outbuildings, an
investment of £F580,000 (£F300,000 in capital and £F280,000)
in credit).
The building operations should come to £F480,000, of
which £F350,000 represents imported materials and £F130,000'
local expenses.
This base is intended to handle and market 16,500 metric
•
tons of frozen fish from the first year. At the outset, supplies|
are to be provided by 30 tuna longliners belonging to the
•
Tuna-Fisheries Shipowners Co-operative of Tokyo, and the
fleet is to grow quite quickly as provision is being made toi
have at least one hundred fishing boats supplying the base.
New jobs will be created at the plant for eight Japanese or
European executives and 40 local workers. In addition, the
offices will employ three Japanese or Europeans and nine
When the base is operating, duties and taxes on operations
and products will be about £F7,000 annually.
By far the biggest problem is to decide whether or not to
apply export duty (annual turnover of about £F2,000,000 per
16,000 tons of frozen products), and to collect income tax
from the company and staff, and after what period of time—
(the personnel could pay £F5,000 immediately in income tax
and the company £F 19,000 at the end of five years).
The decisions arrived at in respect of the applicable tax
system will determine the direct share which will remain in
the territory, as neither wages nor profits from local investments
are likely to bring in considerable income.
The indirect share, which may also be quite appreciable,
is more difficult to estimate. The requirements of the fishing
fleet in fuel, fresh foods, and repairs will bring in a little
additional profit. As the contracts do not lay down as strictly
as in New Caledonia the relationships which are to exist
between the base and the local producers and tradesmen, we
must wait and see to what extent the local economy will
benefit from a new economic flow arising from the transit and
grading of Japanese fish.
After inspecting the site at the end of September, 1963,
and after considering certain economic and social aspects, the
author's own view is that the choice as a base of Levuka, on
the island of Ovalau, was a very happy one from the viewpoint of Fiji.
The temptation was very great to authorize the creation of
the freezing and cold-storage base in the rather successful
framework of the Suva industrial zone. The promoters made
considerable efforts to obtain a decision to this end.
However, there is already too great a tendency to concentrate activities in Viti Levu, and Suva, like Noumea, although
on other grounds, tends to become an unbalanced pole of
expansion, over-congested with labour and economic activities.
Hence the choice of Levuka, in an island suffering from a
serious recession, is to be applauded.
The island of Ovalau is interesting in that it was the scene
of the first contacts between 19th-century colonial economy
and Fiji. Levuka was the first capital before Suva was chosen
in 1881. From its role at the end of the 19th century it has
retained a more composite population than elsewhere, and an
"old colonial" aspect which gives it a special charm. After a
period of intense commercial activity, the town's influence and
importance have declined in step with the growth of Suva and
the decline of the old copra plantations superseded by the
sugar industry.
The settlement therefore no longer served any useful purpose
and its port could not depend upon so small and underpopulated an island. The new fishing venture, which will
operate from May, 1964, will bring this sleepy old centre back
to life and will also find a setting more propitious than would
have been the case had another island been chosen.
The EIYO MARU is being used as a freezing factory and provisional
storehouse at Noumea (Ducos). Two longliners are unloading alongside.
32
Levuka is a small town which is distinguished by its large
European element and by the presence of many intermediate
groups between the Fijians and the Indians, which form the
two main opposing ethnic and economic groups in the two large
neighbouring islands (Viti Levu and Vanua Levu).
According to the 1956 census, the town of Levuka had
1,535 inhabitants. In order of importance, these were 493
Fijians, 358 part-Europeans, 333 Indians, 134 Chinese and
part-Chinese, 96 Europeans, 56 Rotumans, and 65 other Pacific
islanders. The arrival of Japanese people in this cosmopolitan
population will not cause any particular upheaval if adequate
measures can be taken to organize the fishermen's periods of
shore liberty.
The rest of the population as recorded in the 1956 census
of the island of Ovalau comprised 3,049 persons including
2,332 Fijians. 482 Chinese, Europeans, Polynesians, Micronesians, or persons of mixed descent, and only 235 Indians.
There is, therefore, besides the Fijians, a large group of very
diverse social status which has its origin in the history of the
port of Levuka.
While there will not be the same difficulties of co-existence
with the Japanese which might have been feared elsewhere,
the effect of the creation of a few dozen jobs will perhaps
help to check an increasingly marked tendency of the adult
population to seek employment in Viti Levu and especially
in Suva.
The opportunity for providing fruit and vegetables to the
boats may assist in the development of a better agricultural
system on a co-operative basis. Communications between
Levuka and Suva will certainly be more numerous and quicker,
and everybody will gain thereby.
Sword-fish are being cut up on the GIYO M A R U r Noumea
(Ducos)
It is therefore important to define the role that (a) the new
possibilities of refrigeration and, (b) the new connexions with
the Japanese and United States economies can play in the
territorial and regional economic framework.
For Fiji, the establishment of a freezing and cold-storage
base for Japanese fishery products is important chiefly in
connexion with regional planning and with the solution of a
special economic and social problem—the reactivation of
economic life at Levuka and on Ovalau Island itself.
In supplying a staging-post service, it is usually a good thing
to take bold action to assist the transit of men, goods, and
capital.
Certain problems are only partly solved. Ovalau Island, which
is eminently suitable to the establishment of a base restricted
to freezing, lacks both the facilities and the labour needed if
it were desired at a later date to promote a canning industry.
The creation of free zones or free ports might be the logical
outcome of these new formulae.
The Levuka base, which is well designed, built on sound
economic foundations, and has been granted favourable administrative and financial conditions, should be successful. Its
establishment in Levuka should make a decisive contribution
to the economic revival of Ovalau Island.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
After examining, in each of the territories concerned, the
main problems presented by the freezing, cold-storage, and
canning of tuna caught by Japanese longliners, the author
wishes, in conclusion, to raise a number of points which affect
the joint interests of the South Pacific territories.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEW
CALEDONIA AND FIJI
The two new establishments at Noumea and Levuka present
the same problems for the general economy of New Caledonia
and Fiji. In both cases, local investors are putting only very
small capital into these new undertakings, and this only in
accessory forms so as to serve more or less as cover or agents
for Japanese business interests in their dealings with the territorial or metropolitan administrations.
The only profit remaining for the territories, therefore, is
fiscal revenue, the payment of modest wages, and also the
indirect profits from the swelling turnovers and increased
profitability of certain public or private services (banks, fuel
depots, posts and telecommunications, ports, customs, possibly
electricity, water supplies, etc.).
To be able to benefit to a greater extent from the activities
of a commercial venture which uses the territory merely as a
staging post, it is necessary to have public or private capital
invested in it.
Furthermore, to prevent the activities of the freezing and
cold-storage bases handling the catches of Japanese tuna longliners from developing as enclaves outside the country, serious
consideration should be given to the possibility either of
canning part of the fish on the spot, or of integrating with
other local agricultural and stock-breeding activities.
Shark fins drying in front of the site where buildings are being erected
for the Societe I'Ocean company, Noumea (Ducos). In the background,
the store ship EIYO M A R U , derricks, and refrigerating equipment.
33
further away from Noumea, in the western lagoon and its
passes. These local fishing activities of European origin are
perfectly integrated into the country. For its part, the lnstitut
Franqais d'Oceanie, with Orsom 111, has undertaken very useful
longlining experiments in which we were privileged to take
part in June, 1960.
In French Polynesia, the Tahitian fishing fleet customarily
ventures even further afield. Very instructive private experiments have shown that the longline technique of tuna fishing
organized on a reduced scale, with small boats manned by
only a few men, might be carried out with success and some
profit.
From another angle, the people of Tonga have a particularly
well-developed feeling for the sea and will not hesitate to fish
in distant waters if given the opportunity.
In the same way, the efforts of the Cook Islands Fisheries
service show that the subsistence fisherman is capable of providing solid foundations for a reorganized fishing industry.
All this stock-taking and planning may therefore succeed in
providing new resources for the economies of the many territories which, at the moment, are neglecting the opportunities
offered by the ocean.
For this purpose, a change of outlook is necessary. It would
be undesirable simply to transpose Japanese, United States, or
European techniques, methods, and types of organization. On
the contrary, an attempt should be made to accept the living
realities of Polynesian, Micronesian, and Melanesian societies
and to help them progress in the direction of greater efficiency.
Small-scale Polynesian fishing.
It should also be remembered that, in the South Pacific,
the only fishing industries really integrated with local life are
based at Noumea and Papeete, where considerable capital has
been invested in European-inspired forms of activity which
are perfectly adapted to the natural environment as well as to
the local economic and human context. A fair degree of
productivity has been achieved with semi-artisanal methods.
From all this, it appears that, while there is little chance
of promoting forms of industrial fishing identical with those
of the Japanese in the present economies and civilizations of
the South Pacific, the use of small boats to fish inshore waters
might well prove rewarding.
These boats, of 15 to 1 8 metres and fitted with 80 to 120
HP engines, would be provided with refrigerated holds and
would stay at sea for not longer than a week. With a crew
of 8 to 10 men, they might provide part of the supplies for
the freezing bases or, better still, for existing or future canneries. The necessary capital, in this case, would be within the
possibilities of local investors or local public funds.
Freezing bases and canneries would no longer be merely
staging posts providing a service, but a means of increasing
the value of a local product.
The Japanese fishing industry would not be excluded from
the South Pacific, since it would be left with most of the vast
ocean spaces too remote to be fished profitably by boats whose
economic range would not exceed 200 miles.
Fishermen return, N u k u ' a l o f a — T o n g a
1 . Possibilities of organizing tuna-longline fishing based in
the South Pacific territories
Up to the present, contacts between Japanese fisheries and
indigenous societies have remained very limited, or non-existent.
The only sustained attempt with considerable backing—that
of the Atu'e at Pago Pago—to try to organize longline tuna
fishing with locally recruited crews ended in failure. It is
certain that the obstacles of language, custom, concepts of
social relationships, and organization of work are very difficult,
if not impossible to overcome, at least over a very short
period of time.
To wish to model the Polynesians or Melanesians on a
fishing civilization totally foreign to them is most certainly a
mistake.
Although the South Pacific islanders are primarily agricultural people and their traditional fisheries are restricted to
food-gathering on the reefs and to fishing the lagoons and
channels with traps or locally manufactured gear, there are
considerable possibilities of adaptation to more complicated
ways of life based on the sea. In olden times, at least, the
Polynesians proved fairly intrepid seafarers, and Polynesian—
even Melanesian—sailors are perfectly adequate for inter-island
navigation.
2. Organization of fishing and allocation of fishing grounds
On the premises just outlined, it is the author's view that
the territories should try to define, and implement at the earliest
possible moment, a common policy for the control of fishing
and the organized exploitation of resources which are not
inexhaustible and are subject to delicate laws of biological
balance.
Without taking into account expeditions from floating bases,
parent ships, and associated fleets, by mid-1964 there will be
about 180 Japanese longliners fishing permanently in the South
Pacific (100 to 105 from American Samoa, 30 to 32 from the
Fiji Islands, 30 to 32 from New Caledonia, and 15 to 18 from
the New Hebrides). Such a fleet represents a fishing effort
which should produce landings of about 60,000 tons.
It is not, therefore, absolutely impossible that there may one
day be local fleets participating in an industrial-type fishing
activity. However, before going ahead with further costly and
hazardous attempts, we should sum up previous experiments
accurately and define the basic sociological factors present.
Some indications are already available. There is in New
Caledonia a local fleet which is gradually fishing further and
34
Nobody can at present say with certainty if the threshold
of overfishing is near or not. However, general declines in
yields in recent years do seem to show that this point is near.
All concerned will suffer if it is reached.
The time has passed when a few boats had vast areas of
sea to themselves and unlimited facilities in virgin fishing
grounds. A problem of nearness of, and competition between.
the various fleets will arise. In fact, the shipowners—whether
financial groups or private individuals—are far from being
united. Rivalries will arise between some of them, originating
in the conflict of interests in Japan or elsewhere, and few of
the protagonists will have any scruples in trying to get some
good hauls in waters hitherto frequented by others. Levuka.
Pallicolo, and Noumea are not so far apart that friction will
not constantly develop and become rapidly inflamed, while the
Pago Pago fleet will increasingly be led to venture further
from Samoa.
Under these circumstances it is to be feared that considerable
difficulties will arise either between territories defending the
interests of the companies associated with them, or between
territories and fishing companies not associated with them.
local fleets, or will try to organize such fleets in accordance
with the above recommendations, should be able to reserve
for themselves the exclusive use of certain zones. If such
exclusion is to be effective, it must be accepted and recognized
not only by the fleets based on the territory, but also by all
the public or private parties engaged in tuna longlining throughout the South Pacific.
Rather than wait for unilateral reactions which might be
clumsy and violent, it would be better to determine in advance
the zones to be protected and reserved, without forgetting to
include those where there are no active bases at the time
(Solomon Islands, Wallis and Futuna. Tonga, the Cook
Islands, French Polynesia, etc.).
To go even further, it seems to the author that it would
be advisable for the interested territories to intervene in order
to avoid competition arising between the various fleets, which
could only cause serious difficulties and harm all concerned.
The definition of zones which would be reserved as a matter
of priority to the boats of such and such a base seems to us
strongly indicated in the New Caledonia-New Hebrides-Fiji
area. The administrations of the territories concerned would.
after reaching agreement between themselves, authorize calls
at their base only by those boats whose owners accept the
delimitation of fishing grounds according to geographical
sectors—which might of necessity be for seasonal reasons.
For the moment, policing and supervision of the vast ocean
spaces throughout which the islands are scattered is almost
non-existent and, indeed, impossible.
The result of this is the very understandable tendency
among Japanese fishing skippers to believe themselves masters
of the sea and independent of the jurisdiction of the island
territories. When catches are meagre in the open sea there is
a great temptation to fish inshore in notoriously unprotected
territorial waters. The offending vessel may pay the penalty
for this by coming to grief on a shoal. Be that as it may.
foreign boats fishing for lengthy periods in full view of the
shore constitute a spectacle by no means rare, and their
catches may seriously affect those of small local craft. Offences
of this kind seem to be especially frequent in French Polynesia.
the Cook Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, and Wallis and
Futuna.
It seems in any case likely that continuance of the present
attitude of non-interference will lead to difficulties of a very
grave kind. It would be to the advantage of all if action were
taken in advance.
The author sincerely hopes for a meeting, possibly under
the auspices of the South Pacific Commission, where a legal
and practical form would be given to these new relationships
between the territories, and which would make it possible to
define the first elements of a joint policy to meet the expansion
of Japanese tuna fishing.
3. Economic profits and their distribution
The author feels that he has adequately shown that most
of the profits made by the freezing and cold-storage bases and
by the canneries go to the investors. This is only one example
of a phenomenon of general significance peculiar to all underdeveloped or developing countries.
If this fact is considered realistically, there are only three
solutions—
This problem, which had not previously seriously troubled
the Governments and Administrations, is likely to become
worse as rivalry, inevitably, grows more acute. A fleet which
may respect the territorial waters of the territory to which its
base is attached will not hesitate to plunder neighbouring
groups from which it can expect no retaliatory action.
It is at present technically and financially impossible to
organize even limited supervision by police boats. Accordingly.
the author feels that all the Governments concerned, whether
they come under the aegis of the South Pacific Commission
or not, should try to reach agreement.
We would recommend—
• An agreement among as many territories as possible,
according to which any properly corroborated fishing
offence in territorial waters in any one of the sectors
covered by the agreement would involve, on the part of
the territory where the boat concerned is based, the same
retaliatory procedure and the same penalties as if its own
territorial waters had been violated.
• Provision of means whereby offenders might be readily
descried and identified from the coast. This might be done
by starting a register of shipping common to all these
foreign fishing bases, with a registration number, to be
clearly painted on both sides of the bows in characters
at least three or four feet high, being allotted to each ship.
It might also be agreed to have the superstructures of the
boats from each base painted a uniform colour which would
differ from one base to the next, so as to be able to identify
the home base of the offending boat at a glance.
This seems all the more necessary as more delicate questions
must now be broached. The territories which already have
Using the reef.
35
Sale of giant clams, N u k u ' a l o f a — T o n g a
1. To allow partial financing from public sources—an option
for which provision has been made in the contract between
Taiyo Gyogyo and New Caledonia.
2. To make arrangements such that the capital invested from
outside stays within the territory.
3. By various means to encourage the investment of local
capital.
Economic, administrative, and political considerations will
determine which of these three courses is the most suitable,
and will show whether some compromise might be possible
whereby the advantages offered by these various possibilities
might be combined.
Fiscal benefits remain marginal only. Remuneration of the
labour force is small—even for the canneries. Between visible
imports (fish, machinery, packings, etc.) and invisible ones
(interest on capital) and exports, very little remains for local
economies.
4. Organization of the bases as poles of development
In all the instances with which we have been dealing, one
problem has always arisen: that of deciding what part an
isolated venture such as this might play in promoting balanced
development.
In connexion with rational planning of space, it may be
a good or a bad thing to favour establishment of a base in one
place rather than in another.
A freezing and cold-storage base and, to an even greater
extent, a cannery, is capable of stimulating the economy of a
whole region. It is by the creation of a many-faceted interrelationship, rather than by the volume of profits and number
of jobs, that a sound economy will be obtained.
The establishment or development of public services (port,
Customs, communications, banks, water supplies, power production) will benefit all local economic activities.
The new relationships established with distant but powerful
promoters—Japan and the United States—may well give a
boost to agriculture or stock-breeding.
Lower export freight rates may be obtained for local
products making use of the shuttle services or return trips of
cargo-boats, ensuring connexions with the outside world. For
those who know how much freight rates may burden the
marketing of produce from plantations or from native agriculture, this is a most important factor. If, for example, copra,
cocoa, bananas, and cattle could be exported more cheaply,
in particular to Japan, the profits obtained indirectly by the local
economy would far exceed those derived directly from taxation,
purchases of goods or services, or payment of wages.
Hence, it would be well if such bases were to be set up in
places suffering from isolation and under-development. It is,
the author feels, short-sighted to succumb to the lure of quick
returns from their establishment in centres already flourishing.
Noumea, Suva, Papeete, and Apia need no assistance of
this kind. On the other hand, the New Caledonian countryside,
the non-sugar-producing areas of the Fiji islands, and isolated
islands would greatly profit from the organization of activities
which will help put them in touch with the rest of the world.
The establishment of any base should therefore be accompanied by a due regard for regional planning with all it entails:
urbanization studies, sociological investigations, etc.
If the role of economic stimulus is considered as essential,
peripheric activities must be emphasized (canneries, fish meal,
animal foods, packaging plant, ship repairs, small mechanical
industries, power and refrigeration industries).
Such industries cannot be left to the free working of the
profit motive. Once established, they are going to set men,
goods, and capital in motion; hence, governments cannot stand
aside. The decisions taken will have to make allowance for
labour problems, the need for furthering a higher standard of
living among native peoples, and the necessity, sooner or later,
of new political and social structures. Immigration may or may
not be necessary to promote the desirable—and unavoidable—
settlement of empty areas.
Hasty, sometimes ill-advised, choices have already been
made. But many others have still to be made, and they ought
to be preceded by careful reflection. Changes are necessary
and possible in certain cases, and the Governments and
Administrations responsible should not hesitate to make them.
The author is only too well aware of the gaps and imperfections of this paper. For these he craves the reader's indulgence,
pleading once more that all he has tried to do is to draw
the attention of governments and interested parties to certain
problems.
All he has really done is to collate such data as he has been
able to assemble and put forward a few ideas. But the detailed
investigation which these questions merit has still to be undertaken, and could doubtless be more appropriately entrusted
to a team (making use of the methods of operation research)
than to an individual.
Beyond the anonymous phenomena of political economy,
the author's sympathy goes first to the men, to those who
labour and work, on boats, in yards, in factories, to those
who have to face being uprooted and to those who cannot
find a livelihood near their homes.
In so small, so enclosed, so unstable a world as the islands
of the South Pacific, the arrival or departure of a few dozen
or a few hundred individuals has effects which have no parallel
elsewhere.
These considerations, and the proximity of grossly overpopulated areas in South-East Asia, have to be kept very much
in mind.
The sudden increase in the activities of Japanese longliners
has raised, and will raise, more and more problems for all the
South Pacific territories, whether or not foreign bases have
been set up there.
If the author has succeeded in making people aware of
some of the problems discussed, his object will have been
achieved.
Small-scale Polynesian fishing. A fishing boat returns from the reef.
Giant clams a n d other shell-fish are being sold, N u k u a l o f a — T o n g a .
The author owes it to himself to say how greatly his own
knowledge and experience have been enriched by the close
contacts made in the course of this rapid, ten-week survey
undertaken on behalf of the South Pacific Commission. Without
lengthy preparations, begun as long ago as 1960, he would
never have been able in the time allotted to bring his investigations to a successful conclusion.
Despite pertinacious investigation, it may be that even now
certain problems remain inadequately elucidated.
However, what most struck the author almost everywhere
was a surprising ignorance about developments in other parts
of the Pacific. What is secret in one place is common
knowledge in another. What is known to one territory may
be unknown to its neighbour, even though both of them may
be administered by the same metropolitan Power.
This ignorance engenders mistrust and fear.
A policy of secrecy is surely out of date. The problems
considered above are ripe for public debate and solution, the
one over-riding consideration being the need to promote the
economic and social advancement of small and isolated communities.
There is just not enough land available for the island
territories to be able to meet all the needs of their peoples,
in view of the prodigious increases in population now taking
place in Polynesia, Micronesia, and even in Melanesia,
especially since so many Asians and Europeans have now been
fully absorbed into the island economies.
Reliance on mineral resources and the provision of incidental
services cannot provide more than makeshift, piecemeal
solutions.
The South Pacific islands, occupying as they do the world's
largest ocean, must endeavour to put to good account the
wealth of the seas which surround them.
Small-scale
Polynesian
fishing. Fish are sold
Nuku'alofa—Tonga.
when
DESCRIPTION OF CHARTS
The fishing sectors of the charts on pages 39-42 have been marked in
square degrees after reading the daily position of each fishing vessel from
the radio communication log books kept in Pallicolo (Espiritu Santo). The
number of daily fishing operations for each square degree has been read
monthly over the two years, 1961 and 1962.
The heavily outlined squares indicate daily fishing operations in which
ten or more vessels were engaged in one month.
By comparing these data with the tonnages of fish unloaded in Pallicolo
(see Table XIX on page 22), the average monthly production from the
fishing grounds per square degree may be estimated—and a fall in average
monthly production per square degree from about 10,000 kg. to 7,850 kg.
can be seen.
37
the
boats
return,
APPENDIX:
ORIGIN
OF
LABOUR
FORCE
WORKING
AT
THE
TUTUILA CANNERIES
BIRTHPLACE
AREAS AND VILLAGES
VAN
CAMP
STAR
KIST
PLACE OF
RESIDENCE
VAN
CAMP
BIRTHPLACE
AREAS AND VILLAGES
STAR
KIST
Eastern
Pago Pago bay
Aua
Le Pua
Le Loa Loa
Atuu'u
Anua
Satala
k J u l u l a ....
....
Pago Pago
Fagatogo
Utulei
37
5
—
—
13
1
—
—
37
16
14
1
1
3
7
3
92
41
31
118
22
265
42
—
North coast, central sector
Fagasa
North-west coast
Aasu
Auloau
Fagamalo
Fagali'i
Poloa
South-west shore of the bay
Fagaalu
Fatumafuti
Matuu
Faganeanea
Nuu'uli
5
2
3
1
—
15
3
12
3
5
4
29
25
6
53
2
2
—
3
11
West coast and south-west plain
Amanave
Agugulu
Utumea
Setetaga
Nya
Asili
Amaluia
Leone
Vailoatai
Taputimu
Malaeloa
Futiga
Iliili
Pavaiai
Faleniu
Mapusaga
Vaitogi
Tafuna
16
Eastern shore of the bay
Lauli'i
Aunu'u Island
Eastern peninsula—south
Amaua
Fagaitua
Alof au
Amouli
Utumea
Alao
Tula
23
4
28
6
7
2
5
—
coast
2
10
3
3
2
11
10
41
4
3
1
3
11
3
14
5
3
2
17
10
54
3
6
1
2
STAR
KIST
VAN
CAMP
STAR
KIST
peninsula—north coast
Onenoa
Sailele
Masausi
Masefau
Afuno
Vatia
6
1
3
2
4
11
6
9
—
2
52
1
22
26
VAN
CAMP
PLACE OF
RESIDENCE
12
2
6
5
7
10
31
4
3
3
4
4
8
25
61
13
47
7
28
10
19
6
3
2
—
—
—
2
8
2
4
3
5
5
1
3
—
3
4
12
14
5
14
3
1
2
5
—
2
1
23
5
2
1
1
2
1
6
5
6
1
—
—
15
1
76
1
—
3
5
—
5
3
1
1
5
3
2
—
5
2
5
1
2
4
1
1
2
22
8
3
1
6
3
8
7
3
1
14
1
40
84
—
1
—
4
1
—
1
5
4
2
10
4
4
2
6
3
7
3
—
3
2
58
RIRLIOGRAPHY
DOUMENGE F.—Oil en est le Japon dans le domaine de la
peche et du commerce international des thonides?—
American Samoa—ANNUAL REPORT, 1961.
American Samoa—ECONOMIC REPORT—U.S. Department of
Labor—Branch of Industry Committees—May, 1963.
PECHES MARITIMES N O . 1012—July, 1962, pp. 504-511.
Fish and Wildlife Service—Preliminary report of Japan's landings of fish and aquatic products—1961-62—Market
News Leaflet No. 83—July, 1963.
DOUMENGE F . — L E JAPON ET L'EXPLOITATION DE LA M E R —
Bulletin Societe Languedocienne de
Geographie—Montpellier—France—Volume 32—January-June, 1961.
DOUMENGE F.—Le developpemeni de la grande peche industrielle japonaise—PECHES MARITIMES N O . 1008—March,
1962—pp. 147-155.
Fish and Wildlife Service—Advance report on the fisheries of
the United States, 1962, by E. A. Power—Fishery Leaflet
532—May, 1963.
38
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