The Indonesian Military Response to Reform in Democratic Transition

Transcription

The Indonesian Military Response to Reform in Democratic Transition:
A Comparative Analysis of Three Civilian Regimes 1998-2004
Inaugural - Dissertation
zur
Erlangung der Doktorwürde
der Philosophischen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg im Breisgau
im Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher Politik
vorgelegt von
Poltak Partogi Nainggolan
Aus Jakarta, Indonesien
Wintersemester 2010/2011
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rüland
Zweigutachter: Prof. Dr. Heribert Weiland
Vorsitzender des Promotionsausschusses der Gemeinsamen Kommission der
Philologischen, Philosophischen und Wirtschafts- und Verhaltenswissenschaftlichen
Fakultaet: Prof. Dr. Hans-Helmut Gander
Tag der Fachprüfung im Promotionsfach Politische Wissenschaft: 10 Februar 2011
This dissertation is dedicated to
those who struggle for a better Indonesia and become the victims of reform
Acknowledgements
Having worked in an institution such as the Indonesian parliament (DPR) -- an
important actor in the democratic transition in Indonesia -- and witnessed many important
events during this period, I am encouraged to share with the public my knowledge and
insights into what really happened. The unclear prospect of post-Soeharto reform and the
chaotic situation caused by various conflicts throughout Indonesia have also motivated
me to examine the response of the Indonesian military, which since the formation of the
country has been viewed as the loyal guardian of the state.
The idea for this dissertation came up in mid-2001, after the sudden fall of the
first democratically elected civilian regime of Abdurrahman Wahid. However, the project
could only begin in 2004 after I had received a positive response from the representative
of the Hanns Seidel-Stiftung in Jakarta, Mr. Christian Hegemer, about my PhD
scholarship for the study at Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg (University of
Freiburg). I, therefore, would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the
Hanns Seidel-Stiftung. In particular, I would like to thank Mr. Christian Hegemer, Dr.
Michael Czepalla and Mrs. Monika Gerhard for their efforts in providing the scholarship
and extending it.
Despite the difficulties to find a supervisor (Doktorvater), who is an expert on
civil-military relations and Indonesia’s democratic transition, I eventually found Prof.
Jürgen Rüland, a well-known scholar on Southeast Asia. However, the next difficulties
came: I had to persuade both Prof. Rüland and my employer, the Research Centre of the
Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), of the feasibility of my project, a process
that took several months before I eventually got Prof. Rüland’s final consent. During this
period, I received much encouragement from Dr. Andreas Ufen from the Institut für
Asienstudien at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Hamburg, Dr.
Andreas Ufen, who persuaded my to wait and carry on. Despite his tight schedule, and
busy activities at the Department of Political Science (Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher
Politik), Prof. Rüland has done much to supervise this dissertation amid many
frustrations, including the constraints of the scholarship. He assisted me in applying for
the extension of the scholarship and, more significantly, provided his advice that helped
me accomplish this dissertation six years afterward. For this reason, my sincere
appreciation goes to Prof. Jürgen Rüland, who has also dedicated his time and tireless
support to help me improve the final version of this dissertation.
For the preparation of the proposal and the evaluation of this dissertation, I am
extremely grateful to Prof. Heribert Weiland, the Director of Arnold-Bergstraesser
Institut (ABI) Freiburg. I deeply appreciate the time he devoted to me and the access he
i
provided me to ABI’s facilities, especially for office space and the institute’s excellent
library. I thus also extend my sincere gratitude to the staff and librarians of ABI for their
friendly assistance and good service.
During the processes of researching and writing my dissertation, I learnt much
from many colleagues and friends at the Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg and the
Arnold-Bergstraesser Institut. I am grateful to those who spent their time and efforts to
share with me their views and suggestions during seminars, colloquiums, and meetings of
the Southeast Asian Studies group. Others from whom I have greatly benefitted in
discussions on issues of democratic transition in Indonesia are Dr. Marcel Baumann,
Stefan Rother, Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain, Maria-Gabriela Manea and Dr. Paruedee
Nguitragool. I am very grateful for their interest in my academic work and progress, the
mentoring they provided to me (especially for meeting the formalities at the university)
and their assistance in finding new accommodation. This gratitude includes my
Indonesian friends from the University of Indonesia, particularly Panji Anugrah Permana,
who have just started their own doctoral project.
I also greatly appreciate all the secretarial assistance I received from Mrs. Böhme
and Mrs. Tranh since my arrival in Freiburg as a foreign student. I am grateful for their
helping hands in handling my communications with the university, particularly the
Department of Political Science (Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher Politik), and settling
administrative and personal problems. For further technical assistance, I would like to
thank Yulia Indahri (Iin), a colleague in my office at the DPR, for her time and tireless
efforts.
My special thanks also go to the many persons who allocated so much of their
time for references, information and interviews with me. Of course, it is not only the time
and effort they took for which I am grateful; it is above all, their willingness to share their
knowledge and views. Perhaps, the most memorable discussions were with my father
who, unfortunately, passed away three years before I finally submitted this dissertation.
For this reason, I also dedicate this book to the memory of my father, Sahat M.
Nainggolan, SH.
Last, but by no means least, my heart goes to my family in Jakarta, Indonesia,
particularly to my wife, Riris Katharina, who has for many months looked after our
lovely daughter, Reynnalda Alesha, and took care of family concerns while I was
conducting fieldwork in Indonesia and wrote my dissertation in Germany. She has given
me the support, encouragement and love, without which this PhD dissertation could not
have been accomplished.
Due to acostics neuroma illness, I nearly collapsed during the writing of this
acknowledgement in my apartement in Freiburg. Thank God, I could return home and
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meet my family before being sent to the hospital for an immediate medical check-up. I
saw another miracle in my life, after a 14 hours complicated surgery, I have survived to
finish these acknowledgements.
Needless to say, endlich, none of the persons mentioned above is to be blamed for
the shortcomings of this dissertation, for which I am alone responsible.
Jakarta, April 2011
Poltak Partogi Nainggolan
iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................
Table of Contents .........................................................................................................
List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................
List of Diagram and Tables ..........................................................................................
Chapter One
Introduction ................................................................................
I.
Background .......................................................................
II. The Essence of the Problem .............................................
III. Literature Review .............................................................
IV. The Objective and Significance of this Research .............
Chapter Two
Theory and Methodology ...........................................................
I.
Theory ...............................................................................
A. Theoretical Framework ............................................
1. Democratic Transition ......................................
2. Civil-Military Relations in Democratic
Transition and Consolidation............................
3. Civilian Regime Performance and Military
Response ...........................................................
4. Historical and Cultural Factors: Civilian
Regimes and Military Response .......................
B. Theoretical Approaches............................................
1. Actor Theories ..................................................
2. Cultural Theories ..............................................
3. Structural Theories............................................
II. Methodology .....................................................................
A. Assumptions and Hypotheses...................................
B. Description of Variables, Concepts, and Indicators .
C. Research Instruments and Analysis..........................
Chapter Three
The Habibie Regime (1998-1999)..............................................
I.
Coping with Military Reform ...........................................
A. What Had Influenced Habibie to Introduce
Reform? ....................................................................
B. Habibie and His Reform Policies .............................
C. Military’s Earlier Reactions .....................................
D. Military’s Strong Contestation of Further Reform
Demands...................................................................
E. Habibie’s Compromise with the Military.................
F. Military Success In Preserving Its Interests .............
II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases ...................
A. Habibie’s Serious Attempts to Investigate
Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases ...............................
B. Explanations for Military Resistance .......................
C. The Military and the Emergence of Terror in
Jakarta ......................................................................
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D.
Chapter Four
The Military and the Emergence of Terror in
Various Regions .......................................................
E. Threats, Intelligence Operations, and Common
Interests ....................................................................
III. Coping with Human Rights Violations.............................
A. Habibie’s Soft Approach to End Violence, and
Military Reaction......................................................
B. Military’s New Repressive Approach in Trouble
Spots.........................................................................
C. Referendum, East Timor Inferno, and the Threat of
A Coup .....................................................................
D. Military Brutality and the Role of Militias ...............
E. Habibie’s New Approach and the TNI as Veto
Player........................................................................
IV. Coping with Separatism ....................................................
A. Habibie and Wiranto’s Response to Secessionism...
B. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Aceh
C. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Irian
Jaya...........................................................................
D. Military Response to Referendum on Independence
in East Timor............................................................
V. Coping with Radical Muslims ..........................................
A. Habibie, Islam, Radical Muslims, and the Green
Generals....................................................................
B. The Green Generals and Radical Muslims ...............
C. Habibie’s Pro-Islam Politics and Its Impacts ...........
D. The Military, Radical Muslim Organisations, and
Militias .....................................................................
E. Military Leaders and Their Pragmatic Interests .......
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................
The Abdurrahman Wahid Regime (1999- 2001)........................
I.
A. What Had Influenced Wahid to Introduce Reform?.
B. Military Position to Wahid’s Election......................
C. Wahid and His Reform Policies ...............................
D. Wahid and Security Sector Reform..........................
E. Military Response to Wahid’s Reform Policies .......
F. Ethnic Conflict in Kalimantan: Military
Contestation against the Police ................................
G. Religious Conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi:
Militias and Military’s Intelligence Operations .......
H. The Progress of Security Sector Reform ..................
I.
The Military as Veto Player: End of Reform ...........
A. Wahid’s Attempts to Investigate the Soeharto
Cases ........................................................................
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B.
C.
Chapter Five
Understanding Military Perception of Soeharto .......
Military Response to Wahid Regarding Soeharto’s
Alleged KKN Cases .................................................
D. Military Resistance In Maluku .................................
III. Coping with Human Rights Violations.............................
A. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Human Rights
Violations .................................................................
B. The Military and Culture of Violence ......................
C. Military Response to Wahid’s Concern on Human
Rights .......................................................................
A. What Had Influenced Wahid’s Response to
Secessionism ............................................................
B. What Had Influenced Military Response to
Secessionism ............................................................
C. Military Views on Decentralization .........................
D. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in
East Timor................................................................
E. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist
Conflict in East Timor.............................................
F. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in
Aceh .........................................................................
G. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist
Conflict in Aceh .......................................................
H. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in
Irian Jaya ..................................................................
I.
Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist
Conflict in Irian Jaya ................................................
J.
Understanding Wahid’s Compromise with the
Military.....................................................................
V. Coping with Islam and Radical Muslims..........................
A. Wahid and Islam.......................................................
B. Wahid and Radical Muslims ....................................
C. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Green General ....
D. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Red-White and
the Green Generals ...................................................
E. Common Interests of Radical Muslims and the
Green Generals .........................................................
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................
The Megawati Government (2001-2004)...................................
I.
A. What Had Influenced Megawati to Introduce
Reform? ....................................................................
B. Military Position to the Rise of Megawati ...............
C. Megawati and Reform Policies ................................
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D.
Megawati’s Policies Regarding Security Sector
Reform......................................................................
E. The Military and Javanese Political Culture ............
F. Military Response to Megawati Regarding Security
Sector Reform ..........................................................
G. Military Response to Decentralization .....................
A. Megawati’s Views on Her Mandate.........................
B. Megawati’s Policy Regarding Soeharto’s alleged
KKN Cases...............................................................
C. Military Response to Megawati Regarding
Soeharto’s Alleged KKN cases ................................
III. Coping with Gross Human Rights Violation Cases .........
A. Megawati and the Culture of Violence.....................
B. Megawati’s Response to Gross Human Rights
Violation Cases ........................................................
C. The Military and the Culture of Violence ................
D. Military Response to Gross Human Rights
Violation Cases ........................................................
A. Megawati and the Unitary State ...............................
B. The Military and the Unitary State...........................
C. Civilian and Military Leaders’ Cooperation to End
Separatism in Aceh...................................................
D. Burying the East Timor Trauma...............................
E. Separatism, Violence, and Conflicting Interest in
Irian Jaya ..................................................................
V. Coping with Radical Muslims ..........................................
A. Megawati’s Thoughts on Islam ................................
B. Megawati and Radical Muslim Groups....................
C. Megawati and the Red-White Generals....................
D. The Military and Radical Muslim Groups ...............
E. Megawati, the Military, and Radical Muslim
Groups ......................................................................
F. The End of Religious Conflict and the Return of
Stability in Maluku..................................................
G. Religious Conflict in Poso and Pressure for
Formation of TNI’s New Regional Command .........
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................
Chapter Six
Conclusion .................................................................................
Zusammenfassung.........................................................................................................
Bibliography..................................................................................................................
Appendix.......................................................................................................................
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List of Abbreviations
AAK
Aliansi Anti-Komunis (Anti-Communist Alliance)
ABRI
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia)
Akmil
Akademi Militer (Military Academy)
AMIN
Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (The Indonesian Mujahidin
Force)
AMPI
Angkatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia (Pro-Golkar youth
organization for Indonesia’s reform)
APBN
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (National Revenue and
Expenditure Budget)
Aster
Asisten Teritorial (Territorial Assistant)
Babinsa
Bintara Pembina Desa (lowest military post at village level)
BAIS
Badan Intelijen Strategis (Military Strategic Intelligence Board)
Bakorstanas
Badan Kordinasi Pemeliharaan Stabilitas Nasional (Coordinating
Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability)
Bakin
Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence
Coordinating Board)
Banpres
Bantuan Presiden (presidential aid funds)
Banser
Barisan Serbaguna (The Versatile Guard)
BIN
Badan Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Board)
BLBI
Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (liquidity credits from the Bank
Indonesia)
BMP
Besi Merah Putih (Red-White Iron militia group)
BPPC
Badan Pengelolaan dan Pemasaran Cengkeh (Clove Marketing and
Buffer Agency)
Brig. Gen.
Brigadier General
ix
Brimob
Brigade Mobile (heavily armed special police unit)
Bulog
Badan Urusan Logistik (State Logistics Agency)
CAVR
Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste
(The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East
Timor)
COHA
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CIDES
Center for Information and Development Studies
CPM
Corps Polisi Militer (Military Police Corps)
CSIS
Centre Strategic for International Studies
CTF
Commission for Truth and Friendship
DDII
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Teaching
Council)
Dephan
Departmen Pertahanan (Department of Defence)
Dephankam
Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan (Department of Defense and
Security)
DI/TII
Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Soldier/Indonesian
Islamic Soldier)
DKM
Dewan Kehormatan Militer (Military Honorary Council)
DOM
Daerah Operasi Militer (military operations zone)
DPR
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)
D P R D-I
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I (House of Representatives at
provincial level)
DPRD-II
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II (House of Representatives at
municipality/regency level)
DPRP
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua (The Provincial House of
Representative of the Papuan People)
Falintil
Forças Armadas para a Liberação Nacional do Timor Leste (the
Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)
x
Foreri Jaya
Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for the Reconciliation
of Irian Jaya
FPDU
Fraksi Partai Daulatul Ummah (Sovereignty of the Islamic
Community Parties Faction)
FPI
Front Pembela Islam (Front for Islam Defenders)
Fretilin
Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary
Front of Independent East Timor)
FSPUI
Forum Silaturahmi dan Perjuangan Umat Islam (Muslim Forum for
Communication and Struggle)
FUI
Forum Ummat Islam (Forum for Muslims)
FURKON
Forum untuk Perjuangan Keadilan dan Konstitusi (Forum for the
Promotion of Justice and Constitution
GAM
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Movement for An Independent Aceh)
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
Gen.
General
GNP
Gross National Product
Golkar
Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
GPK
Gerakan Pemuda Kabah (Kabah Youth Movement)
GPK
Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (Security Disturbance Movement)
G-30-S/PKI
Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia (The September
30, 1965 Rebellion Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party)
HAMMAS
Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus (Inter-University
Muslim Students Association)
Hankamrata
Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (total defense based on the
people power)
HDC
Henry Dunant Center
ICG
International Crisis Group
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ICMI
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of the
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
ICW
Indonesian Corruption Watch
Inpres
Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction)
IPTN
Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional (national aircraft industry)
ITB
Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)
JI
Jamaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community
KAMMI
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim
Student Actions Association)
Kapolri
Kepala Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Chief of the National
Police)
Kasgab
Kepala Staf Gabungan (Chief of the Joint Staffs)
Kasospol
Kepala Staf Sosial Politik (Chief of Social-Politics Affairs)
Kaster
Kepala Staf Teritorial (TNI Chief of Territorial Affairs)
Kasum
Kepala Staf Umum (TNI Chief for General Affairs)
Keppres
Keputusan Presiden (Presidential Decree)
KISDI
Komite Solidaritas untuk Dunia Islam (Solidarity Committee for
Islamic World)
KKN
Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion, and
Nepotism)
KKR
Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi (Committee for Truth and
Reconciliation)
Kodam
Komando Daerah Militer (Military Regional Command)
Kodim
Komando Distrik Militer (Military District Command)
Komnas HAM
Komisi Nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia (National Commission
for Human Rights)
Kontras
Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (The
Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence)
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Kopassus
Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army’s Special Forces)
Kopkamtib
Komando Operasional untuk Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban
(The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and
Order)
Koramil
Komando Rayon Militer (Military Sub-District Command)
Kostrad
Komando Cadangan Strategis (Army’s Strategic Reserve
Command)
KPP HAM
Timtim
Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesian
Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations in East
Timor)
KPU
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Elections Commission)
KSAD
Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (Army Chief)
Laksus
Pelaksana Khusus (Special Agency)
Lemhannas
Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (National Resilience Council)
LBH
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Foundation)
LIPI
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of
Sciences)
LJ
Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors)
Lt. Gen.
Lieutenant General
Mahidi
Mati Hidup untuk Indonesia (alive or dead for the sake of Indonesia)
Malari
Malapetaka 15 Januari 1974 (The January 15, 1974 Incident)
Maj. Gen.
Major General
MBB
Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm
Mendagri
Menteri Dalam Negeri (Minister of Domestic Affairs)
Menhan
Menteri Pertahanan (Minister of Defense)
Menhankam
Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan (Minister of Defense and Security)
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Menkopolkam
Menteri Kordinator Politik dan Keamanan (Coordinating Minister
for Politics and Security)
Menpen
Menteri Penerangan (Minister of Information)
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF
Moro National Liberation Front
MPR
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly)
MRP
Majelis Rakyat Papua (The Papuan People’s Assembly)
MUI
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Islamic Clerics)
NGO
Non-Government Organization
NKRI
Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia)
NII
Negara Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian Islamic State)
NU
Nadhlatul Ulama (the resurrected Islamic cleric group)
OPM
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organization for an Independent
Papua)
Opsus
Operasi Khusus (Special Operation)
OTK
Orang Tak Dikenal (unknown perpetrators)
Pam Swakarsa
Pasukan Pengaman Swakarsa (voluntary civilian security forces)
Pangdam
Panglima Komando Daerah Militer (Military Regional
Commander)
Pangkostrad
Panglima Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army’s
Strategic Reserve Commander)
Pansus
Panitia Khusus (Special Committee)
Paspampres
Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden (military elite presidential security
guards)
PBB
Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)
xiv
PBHI
Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (The Indonesian
Association for Legal Assistances)
PDI
Indonesian Democratic Party
PDIP
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic
Party for Struggle)
PDKB
Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love the Nation Democratic
Party)
PDP
Presidium Dewan Papua (Presidium of the Papuan Assembly)
Pepera
Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (the UN Act of Free Choice)
Perda
Peraturan Daerah (Regional Government Regulation)
Permesta
Piagam Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta (Charter for People’s Struggle)
Perpu
Government Regulation in lieu of a Law
Petrus
Penembak Misterius (Mysterious Shooter)
Pilkada
Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (direct elections of governors, mayors, or
head of districts)
PK
Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)
PKB
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKI
Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
P okja
Kelompok Kerja (Working Committee)
Polres
Polisi Resort (Resort Police)
PP
Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth)
PPMI
Perhimpunan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (The Association of
Indonesian Muslim Workers)
PPI
Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (all East Timorese pro-integration
militias)
PPP
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PPRC
Pasukan Pengendali Reaksi Cepat (new rapid strike forces)
xv
PPRM
Pasukan Pencegah Rusuh Massa (operational troops for preventing
mass revolt)
PRRI
Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of Indonesia
RMS
Republik Maluku Selatan (The Republic of South Maluku)
RUU
Rancangan Undang-undang (Bill)
RUU KKN
Rancangan Undang-undang Keselamatan dan Keamanan Negara
(Bill on State Safety and Security)
Satgas P3TT
Satuan Tugas Panitia Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur (task
force for popular consultation on the East Timor referendum)
SBSI
Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (Indonesian Workers Union)
SBY
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (The Sixth Indonesian President)
Sesko
Sekolah Komando (Military Command School)
SGI
Satuan Gugus Tugas Intelijen (Military Intelligence Task Force)
SIRA
Sentra Informasi untuk Reformasi Aceh (Centre for Information on
Aceh Referendum)
SIUPP
Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Press (press enterprise permit letter)
Sishankamrata
Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (total people’s
defense and security system)
SP3
Surat Penghentian Penyelidikan dan Penuntutan (Letter for
Cancellation of the Investigation and Prosecution)
SPKP HAM
Solidaritas Persaudaraan Korban Pelanggaran HAM (Brotherhood
Solidarity for the Victims of Human Rights Violations)
TAP MPR
Ketetapan MPR (MPR decree)
TNI
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Military)
TPF
Tim Pencari Fakta (Fact Finding Team)
UI
Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)
UNHCR
United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
xvi
UU
Undang-undang (Law/Act)
UNTAET
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTEA
United Nations for Temporary Administration
Wakasad
Wakil Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (Army Deputy Chief)
xvii
List of Diagram and Tables
Diagram 1:
Model of Analysis ................................................................................
52
T a b l e 1:
Matrix of Analysis ...............................................................................
56
T a b l e 2:
Ethnical-Regional Distribution of the Central Army Elite .................. 155
T a b l e 3:
Ethnical Background of Army Officers 1990-2000............................. 156
T a b l e 4:
Ethnical Background of Army Officers Promoted to Brigadier
General 1990-2000............................................................................... 157
T a b l e 5:
List of Major Incidents of Violence During Wahid ............................. 199
T a b l e 6:
Interviewees, Their Backgrounds, and Date of Interview (Appendix)
395
xviii
Chapter One
Introduction
I.
Background
Indonesia, a geographically vast country comprised of more than 17,000 islands
and with high levels of diversity in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion, has a
strategic position in Southeast Asia. The country, which was occupied by the Netherlands
for more than 350 years and by Japan for about three years, proclaimed its independence
in 1945, and gained full sovereignty in 1949. Indonesia had its first experience with the
democratic process by holding fair, democratic, and direct legislative elections in 1955 for
1
the first time ever.
Unfortunately, just four years later, the country entered a period of authoritarian
rule under its first Javanese civilian President, Sukarno. This situation ended a phase
characterized by democratic transition, which started in 1945, and, moreover, prevented
the country from becoming an established democracy in the Third World. Following the
regime change from Sukarno to Maj. Gen. Soeharto, who is also a Javanese native,
Indonesia entered a new and prolonged period of authoritarianism under military rule.
From 1971 until May 1998, Soeharto repressively ruled the country and rejected demands
for reform, which buried any hope of democratic transition flourishing in the immediate
aftermath of the Sukarno era. 2
Apart from its important role in defending the country from the returning Dutch
colonizers, the Japanese, and the allied forces in the 1945-1949 period, the Indonesian
military had also been actively and dominantly involved in Indonesian politics.3 In 1946,
for example, Maj. Gen. Soedarsono kidnapped Prime Minister Sjahrir, and in 1948,
4
soldiers and officers engaged in a communist rebellion in Madiun. Military factions were
also involved in separatist movements in the Sumatra and Sulawesi provinces and fought
each other during the PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia -Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) and Permesta (Piagam
1
For an overview of the 1950-1957 democratic period, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional
Democracy in Indonesia, New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.
2
For an overview of Soeharto’s New Order period, see Michael R J Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under
Soeharto: Order, Development and Power for Change, London: Routledge, 1993; Adam Schwarz, A
Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994; Michael R J Vatikiotis,
Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order. London: Routledge, 1998.
3
Ibid.
4
Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance. Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1972; Abdul Haris Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia (On Indo nesia’s Independence War), Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1989.
1
Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta --Charter for People’s Struggle) campaigns in 1958. 5
Moreover, internal conflict among army generals and their units led to the 1965 power
6
struggle and the fall of Sukarno. After the power struggle, which continued after the
1966 coup d’etat, for more than three decades, the military has continuously supported
the existence of Soeharto’s repressive regime.
In 1974, army generals exacerbated anti-Japanese riots which culminated in the
Malari riot because of a conflict of interest between Gen. Sumitro and Maj. Gen. Ali
Murtopo.7 Later, in 1984, the military supported Soeharto in suppressing his opponents in
the Pokja Petisi 50, a political group that consisted of fifty former prominent military and
8
civilian leaders who often criticized Soeharto’s authoritarian policies. In a different
move, from 1991-1998 they supported the establishment of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan
Muslim Indonesia --Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), which caused friction
between Islamist and nationalist generals. 9 In summary, there was not a single major
political problem in the period from the country’s independence up until the end of the
Soeharto era, in which the military was not involved, whether as individuals, groups, or
the institution as a whole.
II.
The Essence of the Problem
The collapse of Soeharto’s military regime in May 1998 and the subsequent rise of
a civilian regime under Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie have been embraced as the beginning
of a new era of reform (era reformasi) in Indonesia. It was hoped at the time that Habibie
would reform the country’s political system and initiate military reform, subjects which
Soeharto had ignored for many decades. For this reason, radical students demanded that
the new civilian regime consistently implement the demanded reforms, which included
investigation and prosecution of Soeharto for his corruption, collusion, and nepotism, as
5
Abdul Haris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas (Fulfilling the Call of Duty), Jakarta: PT Gunung
Agung, 1995; Audrey R. Kahin (ed), Regional dynamics of the Indonesian revolution: unity from diversity,
Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1985.
6
See, for example, Col. A. Latief, Pledoi Kol. A. Latief (The Plea of Col. A. Latief), Jakarta: ISAI, 1999;
John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30 th Movement & Suharto’s Coup D’Etat in
Indonesia, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007.
7
Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974 (General Soemitro,
Army Chief for Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, and the January 15,
1974 Riot), Jakarta: PT Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998; Ken Conboy, Intel, Menguak Tabir Dunia Inteljen
Indonesia (Intelligence, Uncovering the Curtain of Indonesia’s Intelligence), Jakarta: Pustaka Primatama,
2007.
8
John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy, New York, Colombia University,
1993: 207; Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2003: 179-180.
9
Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance, London
and New York: Routledge, 1995.
2
well as the investigation and prosecution of the military on charges of human rights
violations. They also called for peaceful solutions to be sought for separatist conflicts
throughout the country.
The withdrawal of military support from Habibie during the 1999 Presidential
election and the transfer of its support to Abdurrahman Wahid through a decisive voting
in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat --People’s Consultative Assembly)
revealed, however, that the military was still an important actor influencing the country’s
political system. Furthermore, the military’s inconsistent support of Wahid resulted in his
impeachment as President through a controversial Special Session of the Assembly. Thus,
the role of the military in blocking Wahid’s efforts to defend his position by imposing a
state emergency through a Presidential Decree at that time was very influential. The
military’s stance opened the way for Megawati Sukarnoputri to replace Wahid.
The rise of Megawati as the next Indonesian President with the full support of the
military could not banish concerns that the military might at some point withdraw its
support of the civilian regime. Nonetheless, Megawati was able to stay in power until
October 2004 and finish the remainder of her presidential term. This marked the end of
the period of post-Soeharto civilian regimes before the former military general, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, rose to power in October 2004.
The fall of Soeharto, the emergence of the three civilian regimes within six years,
and the unclear prospects of democratic consolidation in Indonesia afterwards, indicated
that the military was still a vital actor to guaranteeing national stability and the survival of
post-Soeharto civilian regimes. The reality that a military regime or a government led by a
former military president was more stable compared to the civilian one begs the question
as to how the military actually cooperated with civilian regimes in the country’s new era
of democratic transition.
As a matter of fact, since the era of independence, the military has had a huge
impact on the country’s democratic development or lack thereof. From 1955 to 1965, due
to its involvement in separatist conflicts, the military influenced Sukarno’s decision to
introduce a centralistic and repressive political system under the so-called “guided
democracy.”10 This marked the failure of Indonesia’s first democratic transition following
the success of the first free election in 1955. From 1966 to 1971, the military played a role
in deliberately crushing the expectations of student movements for increased levels of
democratization, because the transition period ended with unfair elections and new
10
See, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Aspirasi Pemerintahan Konstitusional di Indonesia: Studi Sosio-Legal
atas Konstituante 1956-1959 (The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal
Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959), Jakarta: PT Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1995.
3
authoritarian practices.11 Likewise, the resignation of Soeharto in 1998 and the
subsequent rise and fall of civilian regimes could not be separated from the military’s
manoeuvrings.
All in all, Indonesia’s transition from a long-established authoritarian political
system towards democratic consolidation is still at a fragile stage. Since the end of the
Soeharto regime in 1998, the country has embarked on a tentative experiment with
democracy. Although profound changes are currently in progress, there is no guarantee
that the world’s fourth largest country, measured in terms of population, will succeed in
democratization.12
Needless to say, Indonesia’s unclear prospects for democratic consolidation will
have implications for political stability and security in the region. If the democratic
experiment in Indonesia falters or, in a worst-case scenario, fails, the country is in danger
of becoming a failed state, which would attract extremist groups or once again fall under
13
the rule of an authoritarian regime or military supremacy.
On the other hand, if Indonesia succeeds in this transition, it could consolidate
into a pluralistic democracy --the third largest in the world, and the largest in the Muslim
world. This would provide a chance for exhibiting a model of peaceful co-existence
between democracy and Islam, and serve to counter the theocratic ideologies and
intolerant and anti-Western Islamic state concepts that are apparent in other parts of the
Muslim world.
III. Literature Review
Until the end of the 1990s, literature on civil-military relations and democratic
transition and consolidation dealt mainly with cases in Latin America and Southern and
Eastern Europe. Important works include Transitions from Authoritarian Rule by
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead,14 Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and-Post
11
See, for example, Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988.
12
Angel M. Rabasa, “Stop Snubbing Indonesia’s Military,” The International Herald Tribune, August 2,
2002: 4.
13
Ibid.
14
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (eds.), Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
4
Communist Europe from Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan,15 and Fault Lines of Democracy
in Post-Transition Latin America from Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark. 16
In later years, literature dealing with military behaviour during transition,
particularly in the case of Indonesia, was focused mainly on internal conflicts, while
discussions on the role of the military in the country’s transition only made up a small
part of these studies. These include, among others, The Military and Democracy in
17
Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power by Angel Rabasa and John Haseman;
Herrschafts-figuration und Demokratisierung in Indonesien 1965-2000 (English: Power
Figuration and Democratization in Indonesia 1965-2000) by Andreas Ufen,18
19
“Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan,” by Anthony L. Smith, and Der indonesische
Demokratisierungs-prozess: Politischer Neubeginn und historischer Kontinuität
(English: The Indonesian Democratization Process: A Political New Start and Historical
Continuity) by Christoph Schuck. 20 Rather than focusing on the military response to
democratization, their works delve into complex topics such as current international
terrorism, political parties, conflict of interest among the civilian elite, and so forth.
Meanwhile, in their writings on the military and transition, including for example,
Demokratie in Asien: Ein Kontinent zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie [English:
Democracy in Asia: A Continent between Dictatorship and Democracy], and Defekte
Demokratie, Band 1: Theorie [English: Defective Democracy, Volume 1: Theory]
Wolfgang Merkel et al presented theoretical discussions and studied regime change and
democratic transition in various countries. Nevertheless, a limited amount of attention
21
was devoted to Indonesia. More significantly, they acknowledged that they have not yet
15
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Eu rope, South America, and-Post Communist Europe, Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996.
16
Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America,
University of Miami: North-South Centre Press, 1998.
17
Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and
Power, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2002.
18
Andreas Ufen, Herrschaftsfiguration and Demokratisierung in Indonesien 1965-2000 (Power Figuration
and Democratization in Indonesia 1965-2000), Hamburg: IFA, 2000: 92-93, 188-218, and 551-557.
19
Anthony L. Smith, “Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan,” in John Funston (ed.), Government and
Politics in Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2001: 92-95.
20
Christoph Schuck, Der indonesische Demokratisierungsprozess: Politischer Neubeginn und historischer
Kontinuität (The Indonesian Democratization Process: A Political New Start and Historical Continuity),
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesselschaft, 2003: 163-176.
21
See, Wolfgang Merkel, Demokratie in Asien: Ein Kontinent zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Democracy in Asia: A Continent between Dictatorship and Democracy), Bonn: Dietz, 2003; Wolfgang Merkel et
al, Defekte Demokratie, Band 1: Theorie (Defective Democracy, Volume 1: Theory), Opladen: Leske &
Budrich, 2003: 113-116.
5
arrived at a clear explanation of the future course of democratic transition in the country
following the fall of Abdurrachman Wahid’s civilian regime.22
In Indonesia itself, there have been studies on the military during democratic
transition, for example, in the writings of Sukardi Rinakit, namely The Indonesian
Military after the New Order23 and “Decentralization and the Military”. 24 There are also
writings by Arief Yulianto, namely, Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba di
Tengah Pusaran Demokrasi [English: “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia after the
New Order in the Middle of Democratization Sphere”],25 and Kusnanto Anggoro, for
instance, “Militer dan Transisi Menuju Demokrasi” [English: “The Military and
26
Transition towards Democratization”], and “Politik Militer dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi
di Indonesia” [English: “Military Politics and Democratic Consolidation in
Indonesia”].27 In these works, however, the authors did not concentrate on military
resistance and did not apply a comprehensive comparative approach to the three civilian
regimes of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati. When observing the interplay between the
Indonesian military and civilian regime, Anggoro stressed the importance of using
cultural theory by emphasizing the importance of Javanese traditional values on tahta
(reign), harta (wealth), and kuasa (power). 28
Jacques Bertrand in his sociological study on Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in
Indonesia29still doubted the military’s role in elite and communal conflicts after the fall of
Soeharto. Meanwhile, Kevin O’Rourke in Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in PostSoeharto Indonesia30 has attempted to connect the military reaction to Soeharto’s fall and
reform demand with the spread of communal conflicts in various regions as well as the
military role to retain its position in politics. Throughout his work, enriched by empirical
22
Ibid: 113.
Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military after the New Order, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005.
24
Sukardi Rinakit,”Decentralization and the Military,” in Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, and
Carole Faucher (eds.), Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, London and New York: Routledge Curzon,
2005.
25
Arief Yulianto, Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba di Tengah Pusaran Demokrasi (Civil Military Relations In Indonesia After the New Order In the Middle of Democratization Sphere), Jakarta:
Raja Grafindo Persada, 2002.
26
Kusnanto Anggoro, “Militer dan Transisi Menuju Demokrasi (“The Military and Transition towards
Democratization”) in Maruto MD and Anwari WMK (Eds.), Reformasi Politik dan Kekuatan Masyarakat: Kendala dan Peluang Menuju Demokrasi (Political Reform and Society Forces: Constraints and
Opportunities towards Democracy), Jakara: PT Pustaka LP3ES Indonesia, 2002.
27
Kusnanto Anggoro, “Politik Militer dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi di Indonesia” (“Military Politics and
Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia”) in Analisis CSIS, No. 3, Tahun XXXII/2003, Jakarta: CSIS: 333336.
28
Ibid.
29
Bertrand, Jacques. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2004.
30
Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. NSW: Allen & Unwinn, Crows Nest, 2002.
23
6
data, O’Rourke argued that the military must have been a significant actor behind
instability in the country by disclosing covert intelligence operations allegedly organized
by the military at the beginning of reform era. He has attempted to relate the emergence of
the conflicts with traditional belief of majority people (the Javanese) in Indonesia.
Nonetheless, aside from these improvements, his work has not yet profoundly discussed
and explained the cultural perspective of the behavior of the military, civilian leaders, and
the Indonesian people largely influenced by Javanese culture. He has not tried to verify
his conclusion through interviews with relevant military and civilian figures. To have
done precisely this is one of the major contributions to this study, together with the
systematic analysis of a plethora of new source material from websites, newspaper reports
and documents. O’Rourke also did not cover in his analysis the military behavior and
civil-military relations during the full period of the Megawati presidency.
More specific discussions of the Indonesian military and aspirations of reform can
be found in the works of Jun Honna, Leonard C. Sebastian, and Marcus Mietzner. Honna,
in his work entitled Military Politics and Democratization, described the military’s
response to the Indonesian people’s pursuit of democratization in the time following the
1966 and 1998 transitions. He did not, however, cover the full period of all civilian
regimes, including most notably, the Megawati regime. 31 In addition, in his book,
Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force, Sebastian presents groundbreaking research on the Indonesian military by linking the realpolitik of the Indonesian
military to its social roots. He asserts that the realpolitik has strong socio-cultural
undertones, which in turn shape the development of military doctrines. He argued that
only after the country’s policymakers gain a better understanding of the military’s
doctrines, which reinforced its significant presence in the country’s affairs and its
subsequent restructuring, will they be able to introduce meaningful reforms of the
military.32 Therefore, Sebastian used a non-structural perspective, which may have
prevented him from performing a deeper analysis of the military’s vested interests as well
conflicts of interest among actors within the institution. Mietzner takes a different
approach in The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict,
Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, and presents more up-to-date information on
how the Indonesian military has responded to reform.33 However, in order to gain a better
understanding of post-Suharto military reform and its constraints, further research is
31
Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization, Indonesia: London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force, Singapore, ISEAS,
2006.
33
Marcus Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationa lism, and Institutional Resistance, Washington, East-West Center, 2006.
32
7
needed on the first three civilian regimes during this crucial period of democratic
transition.34
This research will focus on the relations between the civilian regime’s
performance and how the Indonesian military has responded to reform. It will also deal
specifically with historical and cultural factors and the civilian regime’s achievements in
encouraging the military’s compliance with reform, or other responses the military has
had to these reforms. The research will provide details on how the military supported
civilian regimes or resisted them during the early stages of post-Suharto democratic
transition. More specifically, it will clarify whether, in response to reform, there are
differences or similarities in the achievements of the different civilian regimes and what
type of support or resistance the Indonesian military provided to these regimes.
I will use a combination of actor-oriented, cultural, and structural approaches to
help explain civilian regimes and the Indonesian military’s response to reform. First, I
will discuss theoretical approaches to civil-military relations and democratic transition
and consolidation, as well as historical and cultural factors that can influence the
military’s response. This will be followed by an in-depth discussion of the civilian
regimes of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati. I will analyse their respective responses to the
Indonesian people’s goals regarding military reform, the investigation and prosecution of
Soeharto for his corruption, collusion, and nepotism, as well as prosecution of the military
in relation to charges of human rights violations. Furthermore, a discussion will be
presented of their solutions to separatist conflicts and the emerging demand for syariah
law to be adopted. The military response to these ambitions must also be discussed for all
the different civilian regime periods.
IV. Objectives and Significance of this Research
As was the case during the administration of the first civilian president Sukarno,
the increase in conflicts and separatist movements that endangered Indonesia’s integrity in
the post-Soeharto era has been connected to military resistance against civilian leaders in
Jakarta. The unclear prospects for transition since 1998 also reveal that civil-military
relations in Indonesia are absolutely crucial, and additional research on civilian regimes
and military behaviour in the country is needed. A study should be conducted regarding
the dynamics of changing levels of military support and resistance towards the three
different civilian regimes over six years (1998-2004) of democratic transition in order to
34
For an insightful study of the transition from Soeharto to Habiie, see Marcus Mietzner, From Soeharto
to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the Transition, in Geoff Forrester
(ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia, Renewal or Chaos?, Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies and KITLV Press, 1999: 65-102.
8
accurately portray the nature of post-Soeharto civil-military relations. This research
underlines the limitations of the “third wave of democratization” in the country, which
35
until recently have delayed its democratic consolidation.
In acknowledgment that military resistance to civilian leaders is a pivotal issue in
Indonesia’s political reform process, a comparative analysis of the three civilian regimes
of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati during the years 1998-2004 needs to be conducted.
This analysis will demonstrate the degree to which reform demands have been fulfilled by
each regime and the military as a state apparatus.
Individual, cultural and structural factors have influenced the survival of the
civilian regimes and the military response to their respective policies. The focus of the
research on interactions between the military --as individuals, collective actors, and as an
institution-- and the civilian regimes reveals why, in response to reform, the Indonesian
military has had varying levels of support or resistance for these civilian regimes.
A deeper understanding can be gained regarding the origins of Indonesia’s
difficulties in democratic transition during the first three civilian regimes, by examining
historical and cultural factors that influenced each of these civilian regimes and pushed
the military to comply with, or otherwise respond to, these reform demands. At the same
time, using information from consistent observation throughout the entirety of each
civilian regime provides for a more comprehensive description of the Indonesian military
response to reform, particularly its developments from year to year. A combination of
individual, cultural, and structural theories provides a better explanation of the
background that has influenced the interplay between the military and these three civilian
regimes, as well as the military’s resistance to Indonesia’s democratic consolidation.
Analysis across the micro and macro levels provides for a more accurate portrayal of the
prospects of transition in Indonesia.
The results of this research help to clarify factors, which have caused military
insubordination to Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati. It shows why the reform process has
stalled in post-Soeharto Indonesia and why it was more difficult for Habibie and Wahid to
maintain political stability in comparison with Megawati. Furthermore, this new research
recognizes the type of civilian supremacy that each regime sought to adopt, and their
respective policies regarding the repositioning of the military. The results of this
dissertation extend beyond the boundaries of purely academic interest, and provide
35
On the “Third Wave of Democratization” see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization
in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman and London: The University of Oklahoma Pre ss, 1991. See also,
Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 2001 and Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Coercion and Governance: The
Declining Political Role of the Militsry in Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001.
9
valuable information for post-Megawati civilian regimes in their quest to continue the
reform process and achieve democratic consolidation.
10
Chapter Two
Theory and Methodology
I.
Theory
I.A. Theoretical Framework
I.A.I. Democratic Transition
O’Donnell and Schmitter define democratic transition as the transformation and
change of a political regime from a non-democratic to a democratic regime, or the interval
between one political regime and another in the period of democratization. 36 Importantly,
democratic transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the initiation of a process of
dissolution of an authoritarian regime, and, on the other, by the installation of some form
of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a
37
revolutionary alternative. Meanwhile, democratic consolidation is linked to a period
after democratic transition, during which “the military becomes firmly subordinated to
civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic constitutional order.” 38
Samuel P. Huntington and Juan Linz distinguish among three forms of democratic
transition, namely, transformation, replacement, and transplacement.39 In transformation,
the process occurs when the elites in power take the lead in bringing about democracy. In
replacement, democratic transition occurs when the opposition groups take the lead in
bringing about democracy and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown. In
transplacement, the process occurs when democratization is initiated though joint action
by the government and opposition groups. Huntington has added intervention as another
type of transition, during which the processes of political liberalization and further
40
democratization are forcefully introduced by foreign democratic countries.
In the case of replacement, it is also said that there are strong opposition groups
who can freely organize themselves vis-à-vis a dominant conservative group which
36
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and
Laurence Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 6.
37
Ibid.
38
Larry Diamond, “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation,” Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun -han
Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, 1997: xxviii. For a broad
explanation, see also Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Defining and Crafting Democratic Transition,
Constitutions, and Consolidation,” Crafting Indonesian Democracy, R. William Liddle (ed.), Bandung:
Mizan, 2001: 17-28.
39
Huntington, 1991: 113-114 in Gregorius Sahdan (trans.), Jalan Transisi Demokrasi Pasca Soeharto
(Democratic Transition Path Post-Soeharto), Bantul: Pondok Edukasi, 2004: 34-35.
40
Huntington, 1991: 113, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004: 59, ibid.
11
strongly opposes reform demands.41 In addition, unlike in a country with a one party
system or military regime, replacement is more common in countries with a personal rule
authoritarian regime. Following the breakdown or collapse of old authoritarian regimes
caused by intensive mass demonstrations or people power, which is subsequently
superseded by an absence of legitimate, democratic government, opposition groups take
over control of the government through free and fair elections. However, the replacement
of the old authoritarian regime, itself, is not necessarily comprehensive or perfect. Groups
in the new democratically-elected government can, therefore, be trapped in conflicts of
interest and may fail in delivering the type of regime they originally promised.42
Huntington argues that to successfully move towards consolidation, democratic
transition must also be supported by a high overall level of economic wealth and
relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth.43 According to Huntington, in
addition to the emergence of a conducive political culture, strong bourgeoisie, middle
class, and civil society, economic development and high economic growth are the main
44
factors necessary for driving democratic transition. This condition can stem the spread
of military adventurism into politics, which can cause political crises during transitional
periods.45 Huntington also emphasized that after democratic transition has been achieved,
consent must be reached between the new regime and the loyalists of the old authoritarian
regime (the status-quo groups) in order to eliminate undemocratic political structures and
culture. Referring to the role of the military, Huntington links democratic transition with
the “praetorian issue,” that is, the efforts to reduce the involvement of the military in
politics, and to establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations.46 Similarly,
Giuseppe Di Palma argues that the third wave of democratization has generally resulted in
economic prosperity and equality; a modern and diversified social structure centred
around an independent middle class; and national culture that, by tolerating diversity and
preferring accommodation, is already implicitly democratic.47
Luciano Martins argues that every form, type, or model of transition has its own
distinctive character, and thus, transition could happen either discontinuously or
continuously. He also points out that in the case of discontinuous transition, there are two
41
Huntington, 1991: 113-114, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 53-54.
Ibid: 53-55, 344.
43
Samuel Huntington, Tertib Politik dalam Masyarakat yang Sedang Berubah (Political Order in Changing Society), Jakarta: Rajawali, 1983: 37-38.
44
See also Sahdan (trans.), 2004, op. cit: 64-65.
45
Salvador Giner, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 74.
46
Huntington, 1983, op. cit, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 76.
47
Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transition, Berkeley, 1990: 3, in
Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 38.
42
12
possibilities of regime development, namely:48 (1) the existing regime tries to manage
crisis through various compromises, or using higher levels of coercion, in case the regime
is able to consolidate itself. However, both strategies fail in maintaining the transition
process due to various internal problems and the increased level of threat coming from
external sources; (2) the existing regime cannot consolidate itself due to its failure to
manage crisis through various forms of compromises or higher levels of coercion, in
which case the regime collapses. At this point, there would be two possible outcomes for
these attempts at compromise, namely: (i) the attempts will succeed and the existing
regime will be ready to introduce changes, (ii) the attempts will fail because either the
existing government or the opposition continues to hold to its own stance or position,
leading to anarchy and political instability causing the transition to falter. In the case of
continuous transition, however, the existing regime sometimes has a limited political
coalition.
I.A.2. Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Transition and Consolidation
Felipe Aguero emphasizes that the critical issues in civil-military relations for
49
democratic transition are those that are related to power. Consequently, civilian
supremacy, must be approached from the perspective of changes in the relative
empowerment of civilian reformers and the military. Thus, if civilian democratizing elites
want to pursue control over the military and the military resists these ambitions, civilian
supremacy only occurs as a result of overpowering military resistance. Aguero
acknowledges that civilian supremacy arises exclusively, or even necessarily, due to an
imposition. For this reason, institutional changes often lead all participating actors,
including the military, to find positive grounds to support democratic civilian control. In
democratic transition, such institutional changes come about as the result of bargaining
backed by powerful resources that affect actors’ range of options for pursuing or resisting
change.50
Aguero points out that the process of gaining the military’s loyalty may require a
considerable amount of time. In many cases, military loyalty cannot be taken for granted
directly following the establishment of democracy, and thus coup attempts could occur.
Establishing military compliance is a complex task since democratization involves not
48
Luciano Martins, “Liberalisasi Kekuasaan Otoriter di Brazil (“Liberalization of Authoritarian Power in
Brazil),” Transisi Menuju Demokrasi, Kasus Amerika Latin (II) (Transition towards Democracy, Latin
America Case –II), Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Eds.), Jakarta:
LP3ES, 1993: 107-140, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 48-49.
49
Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective,
Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 1995: 11. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and
the State, New York: Vintage Book, 1957: 84.
13
only removing the military from political arenas and eliminating military contestation, but
also the assertion of the prerogatives of civilian officials in military and defence affairs.51
The burdens and costs of political reform actions are also variable for the civilian
government and the military. Aguero mentions that the burdens and costs are higher for
those who seek to change pre-agreed rules in order to better accommodate their interests
52
and demands than for those who are satisfied with the recently established rules. The
constitutional and popular legitimacy of the new regime make it very costly for the
military to attempt to reverse recent changes in order to limit democratization. In addition,
if the civilian regime seeks civilian supremacy, the civilians, in turn, have to advance
beyond the rules accorded by the transition.
Civil-military relations in democratic transition and the relative power of both
parties will also be affected by the level of cohesion within the military or ruling civilian
coalition, and the amount of public support each party can exhibit. In this context, a
unified civilian coalition with persistent and substantial electoral backing will find it
easier to promote reform that weakens military resistance to civilian control. On the other
hand, a cohesive military facing a divided government with limited public support may
stand better chances of deterring civilian initiatives or even strengthening military
53
prerogatives altogether. Thus, the process of asserting or resisting civilian supremacy
involves efforts by the military to gain civilian allies in support of its interests as well as
attempts by civilian democratic leaders to promote and assign critical military posts to
those military leaders most welcoming of their policies.54
In assessing civil-military relations in democratic transition and consolidation,
Stepan draws a specific connection between military contestation or resistance with the
existence of their prerogative in politics. 55 He argues that the military will demonstrate no
contestation if military and civilian leaders can accept the diminution of military
prerogatives as an integral part of a comprehensive reformed government model and civilmilitary relations. However, there can be a situation in which there is a low level of
conflict, while at the same time the military enjoys a high level of prerogative. The
military can maintain this high level of prerogative if it remains unchallenged by the top
political leaders of the democratic regime. Still, Stepan mentions that civilian government
50
Aguero, 1995, op. cit.
Ibid: 12.
52
Ibid. This approach is likely in line with the new institutionalism as formulated, for instance, by Paul
Cammack in “The New Institutionalism: Predatory Rule, Institutional Persistence, and Macro-Social
Change,” in Economy and Society, Volume 21, No. 4, November 1992: 405.
53
Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 13; Alagappa, 2001, loc.cit: 35.
54
Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 23.
55
Alfred Stepan, Militer dan Demokratisasi: Pengalaman Brazil dan Beberapa Negara Lain (Military and
Democratization: Brazil and Other Countries), translated by Bambang Cipto from Alfred Stepan,
Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Jakarta: Grafiti, 1996: 131-132.
51
14
efforts to democratically reduce military prerogatives can result in a high level of
contestation or resistance from the military, resulting in a crisis benefitting the military.56
Meanwhile, military resistance to the civilian regime and its reform demands,
which according to Samuel E. Finer, result in political interventions, can follow a number
of different models, namely:57
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Formal constitutional means;
Collusion or competition with civilian authority;
Intimidation of civilian authority;
Threatening of civilian authority with violence or non-cooperation;
The use of violence against the civilian authority.
I.A.3. Civilian Regime Performance and Military Response
There are two potential outcomes of democratic transition that must be taken into
account by civilians and the military. On the one hand, the transition has made procedural
democracy viable, and on the other hand, it has also allowed the military to act with a
high degree of autonomy. Finer reminds us that the civilian government’s reform agenda
aims at diminishing this autonomy and will cause tension within the military. This
resulting conflict is costly for the civilian government or regime, but less costly than
risking an erosion of popular support or the institutionalised setting of excessive military
prerogatives.58 For this reason, Yahya A. Muhaimin argues that civilian government
policies which can harm the interests of the military, examined from the perspectives of
its institution, groups and individuals, will push it to assume a more active role in
59
politics.
In democratic transition, Aguero argues, civilians in the government will resist
both covert and overt military pressure on policies related to civilian issues and will
60
attempt to impose greater control on military domains. This situation will result in
heightened tensions in the relations with the military, and will deteriorate further if the
56
Ibid: 136.
Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, New York: Preager, 1962:
140-163. These models have been discussed in Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al, Tentara Mendamba Mitra: Hasil
Penelitian LIPI tentang Pasang Surut Keterlibatan ABRI dalam Kehidupan Kepartaian di Indone-sia
(Soldier and Its Ally: LIPI Research on ABRI Involvement in Indonesian Political Parties), Jakarta: Mizan,
1999: 37.
58
Finer, 1962, op .cit; Bhakti, op. cit: 12.
59
Yahya A. Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer dalam Politik di Indonesia 1925-1966 (Military Develop ment in Indonesian Politics 1925-1966), Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1982: 4 & 6.
60
Agüero, 1995, op.cit; Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America. University of Miami: North-South Centre Press, 1998; Muhaimin, 1982, op.cit: 24.
57
15
civilian regime cannot control social mobilisation, the spread of violence and armed
groups, or autonomous movements in civil society, which seek accountability for past
abuses by military officers, particularly in terms of human rights. The military, in
response, will take pre-emptive or reactive measures to maximize its autonomy and resist
civilian impediments. Aguero identifies:
“The most extreme reaction is the attempt to block political change
altogether, in the hope of an authoritarian re-equilibration. More often,
however, the military tries to steer the course of change towards positions
closer to its own preferences or attempts obstructive measures, such as
maintenance of a veto power or strong oversight capacity over government
policies; threats of use of force to stop specific policies, such as an
expansion of political pluralism or the transfer of human rights violators to
court; control over intelligence agencies; and rejection of governmental or
congressional “interference” with matters deemed internal.”61
The previously mentioned military manoeuvres are invariably aimed at procuring
guarantees and reassurances, while also decreasing the level of uncertainty about the
institutional features of the armed forces. Currently, these include securing its autonomy
and protecting it from external control or a civilian regime. More precisely, institutional
guarantees given by the civilian regime to the military are those that prevent outcomes in
the political process, which may be deemed as threatening to the military institution and
its view of national security. In several cases, guarantees have been granted including
military immunity from prosecution for past human rights violations and the preservation
of the military’s autonomy. In other cases, guarantees from the civilian regime have taken
the form of constitutional provisions allowing for direct representation of military
interests, the continued existence of institutions from the authoritarian past, and power
being granted to formerly authoritarian elites who manage to mobilize enough popular
support to play an important role within competitive institutions. Still, the civilian regime
can also withdraw its guarantees to the military, and these guarantees may simply
evaporate. However, this would cause a substantial level of frustration inside the military
that could lead to resistance or attempts to forcefully reinstate these guarantees. Growing
frustration within the military could cause goals to be redefined to focus more on greater
61
Agüero, 1995, op.cit; Agüero and Stark (eds.), 1998, loc.cit. Specifically, Juan J. Linz, in Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-equilibration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, and Adam Przeworski, in
”Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 discussed the issue of re-equilibration.
16
levels of contestation, and a reawakening of its temporarily dormant dominant and
commanding stance.62
Drawing lessons from Southern Europe and South America’s experiences, the
success of democratization efforts can be measured by the ability of civilian officials to
exercise the powers assigned to the offices to which they were elected, including powers
63
over the military. The unity of the civilian regime and its ability to gain popular support,
including from political parties, factions in parliament, and other organizations, to
coalesce around formal agreements regarding institutions and basic rules of governance
are factors impacting civilian strength in repositioning the military. 64 In other words, the
unity of the civilian regime on fundamental issues will limit the range of resistance
strategies available to the military. Furthermore, the ability of the civilian regime to
maintain citizen support for its policies acts as a deterrent to forceful action by the
military against reform, as it signals the increased costs of intervention and reduces the
military’s bargaining power. Popular support for successor governments in democratic
transition is particularly important when their ideological make-up clashes with military
views or when they enact reforms that are strongly disliked by the military. Therefore, the
civilian regime must have the ability to exercise its power over the military in a timely
fashion. This is especially important in setting the goals of asserting civilian supremacy
and gaining popular support for this as well as other reforms during democratic transition
for the sake of democratic consolidation.
Efforts by the civilian regime to fulfil people’s calls for the investigation and
prosecution of human rights abuses will meet with military resistance. In this regard,
O’Donnell and Schmitter state that the more brutal, inhumane, and extensive the
repressive actions have been, the more often their actual perpetrators --whether they are in
the military institutions themselves or collaborated with them-- will feel threatened and
65
attempt to form a bloc opposing any transition. If the perpetrators or the military
institutions cannot prevent the transition, they will strive to procure iron-clad guarantees
that under no circumstances will “the past be unearthed.” Failure to provide such a
guarantee will cause military institutions to remain a serious threat to the nascent
democracy. The extreme sensitivity of the military on this issue can threaten the transition
66
process as well as recently consolidated democracies. According to O’Donnell and
62
Muhaimin, 1982, op.cit: 24-26.
Ibid: 17.
64
Ibid: 32-33.
65
See Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (eds.), Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Volume 4, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986: 29.
66
See also Bilveer Singh, Dwifungsi ABRI: Asal-usul, Aktualisasi, dan Implikasinya bagi Stabilitas dan
Pembangunan (ABRI Dual Function: Its Origin, Actualization, and Implication to Stability and Develop63
17
Schmitter, a civilian regime policy of granting clemency and appeasement in dealing with
the post-authoritarian period is the most viable and least dangerous option for the
democratization process if the repression was initially less brutal and widespread, or if
this violence occurred a long time ago.
Likewise, actions taken by the civilian regime to accede to international pressure
to investigate and prosecute past human rights abuses and introduce democratic conflict
resolution for international armed conflicts during democratic transition can play a role in
triggering military resistance. Aguero explains that external factors, which triggered or
encouraged the transition and supported the processes of democratic consolidation in
Greece and Argentina, will not be valid for all states. Thus this contradicts Whitehead,
67
who speaks of “democratization through convergence.” If a civilian regime complies
with international pressure by taking peaceful and democratic approaches to handling
international armed conflicts, separatist movements, or regional conflicts following the
collapse of authoritarian regimes, this can also invite resistance from the military. Thus, if
the civilian regime’s transition is aggressively introduced along with harsh rhetoric and
stems from international pressure, particularly if it addresses the military’s past human
rights violations, negative reactions from the military elite can be expected.
The ways in which successor governments overcome economic problems in
democratic transition and the effects this has on public support may influence the
bargaining position from which the governments face the military. 68 Aguero argues that in
most cases, public support for democratic advancement has prevailed over frustration
about economic difficulties. Therefore, it can generally be expected that more favourable
conditions for democratization will exist when successor governments are economically
prepared to cope with the difficult legacies of authoritarianism and with the possible
rising demands of a resurrected civil society. 69 Economic prosperity will also provide
flexibility in the government’s dealings with the military and help to satisfy some of the
military’s economic and budgetary demands. In addition, Finer adds that the civilian
government may depend on the military in crisis situations, which will re-open the chance
ment), Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1996: 20, translated edition of Bilveer Singh, Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual
Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Singapore, Institute of International Affairs, 1995.
67
Laurence Whitehead, “Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics Perspective,” in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime
Transition in Southern Europe, New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991; Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 33-34;
Agüero and Stark (eds.), 1998, loc.cit.
68
Aguero, 1995, op.cit: 35.
69
See also Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” in Guillermo O’Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Comparative Perspectives, Volume 5, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
18
for the military to intervene in politics.70 The same situation might happen if the
popularity of the civilian government suddenly drops.
I.A.4. Historical and Cultural Factors: Civilian Regimes and Military Response
Scholars have argued that the past institutions of the country and its military will
influence the country’s civil-military relationship. Amos Perlmutter argues that the
transition for revolutionary soldiers, who were once freedom fighters, is particularly
difficult for those officers who become romantic and nostalgic remembering their
invigorating revolutionary days.71 In addition, Harold Maynard says that it is on the basis
of the revolutionary experience that the military justifies its civil function.72
Furthermore, the historical background of the country and its military will
influence the level of military participation, intervention or involvement in a country’s
politics, the scope of issues with which the military is concerned and the means it
employs in addressing them, and models or patterns of civil-military relations.73
Huntington links the condition of civilian supremacy and the models of civilian control,
whether there was subjective or objective control, in a country to both its historical and
cultural backgrounds. 74 Therefore, new democracies will differ from long-established
democracies in how they address issues such as military professionalism and levels of
autonomy, contestation, and prerogatives for the military. The acceptance of civilian
government decisions in formulating and implementing national defence policy, although
common in long-established democracies, is rather sensitive in a new democracy because
it entails a new delineation of prerogatives.
The military’s previous cooperation in establishing and maintaining the recently
ousted authoritarian regime will strongly define the military’s interest in democratic
transition.75 As a result, in some cases, they may initially seek to maintain some of the
features of the old regime or assist in shaping the new one. In most cases, the military
strives to seize internal control of its activities and attempts to protect itself from external
70
Samuel E. Finer, 1962, as quoted by Singh, 1996, op. cit: 14.
Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett (eds.), The Political Influence of the Military, London: Yale
University Press, 1980: 23.
72
See Harold Maynard, “Indonesian Military Elite Role Perceptions”, ibid: 428.
73
See Timothy J. Colton’s studies in, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authorities: The Structure
of Soviet Military Politics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979: 233 in Samuel E. Finer, 1962, op.
cit: 18.
74
See Huntington, 1957: 83-84, ibid: 17-18.
75
See Aguero, ibid: 23.
71
19
political control, fearing, and eventually resisting political change if it impinges on the
rules of control.76
The path taken by the new emerging democracy’s transition will also affect the
nature of the country’s elite, as well as determining which elite --the military or civilian-will control the transition, while also influence the extent of its control over the transition
77
process. To put it another way, the militarised or civilian nature of the outgoing
authoritarian regime is the critical factor for determining who will be in control of the
transition. Perlmutter recognizes that specific historical experiences, as well as
professional practices, international connections, and generational or “promotion” cliques,
all affect military unity during democratic transition. Of particular importance is the way
the military views its own past performance in the government roles and the performance
of the successor civilian governments.78 At this point, there are two conditions that can
strengthen the military’s unity. Firstly, military unity is enhanced if its past performance
in government is seen as generally positive. Secondly, military unity is enhanced if a
generalized perception arises that core institutional interests of the military are being
harmed by the action of successor elites.
Nico T. Budi Harjanto states that a transition process between civilian and
military forces based on either a pact or negotiation model to establish a platform for
democratic rule requires that historical and strategic considerations for the future be taken
into account.79 By referring to Wendy Hunter’s “historical institutionalism,” Harjanto
explains that established institutional patterns tend to shape political life.80 In this context,
political development is viewed as a path-dependent process, following a pattern which
links it to the next phase, and then back to the same repeating pattern, leading to
alternative systems eventually disappearing. By using existing institutional patterns, a
political force, including the military, which has already been a long time participant in
the political sphere, can maintain its existence. Harjanto continues by stating that if the
military and other conservative elites can manage their institutional prerogatives in the
transitional period from authoritarian rule, they can probably preserve their power and
determine the limits of popular sovereignty in a new democratic rule. Historical
institutionalism suggests that a number of institutional reforms are relatively immune to
76
Amos Perlmutter, “Military and Politics in Modern Times,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 9, No.
1, March 1986: 2, ibid.
77
Ibid: 29-30 and 58.
78
Ibid: 31.
79
Harjanto, “Masa Depan Peran TNI dalam Tatanan Demokrasi di Indonesia: Harapan Kalangan Militer,”
(„The Future of TNI Role in Indonesian Democracy: The Hope of the Military”) in Rizal Sukma and J.
Kristiadi (eds.), Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer
(Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Transition in Indonesia: Civil and Military Perception), Jakarta:
CSIS and the Asia Foundation, 1999: 86.
20
change demands, except in certain critical situations. Thus, this approach highlights the
difference between the process of repositioning (penataan) and change.
Still, in conjunction with historical factors, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead
argue that a higher degree of militarization of the authoritarian regime in the past will
expose the military more transparently to emerging civilian policy and increase the
81
difficulty of the transition. In other words, the degree of militarization or civilianization
of the past authoritarian regime influences the level of power the military and civilians
hold in the bargaining process during the democratic transition period. This significantly
affects the military’s ability to set the transition agenda and to impose protective
82
preconditions for itself meant to outlast the authoritarian regime. Therefore, the military
has a stronger position if the transition is from a militarized rather than from a
civilianized authoritarian regime.
There is a strong connection between the formation of a country’s national army
83
and its political history. For example, the origins of the Indonesian military lie with the
armed groups and the pro-independence militia that fought the Japanese occupation forces
and the Dutch colonial government from the end of the Second World War until 1949.84
The Indonesian military has been a key player since the very beginning of the Indonesian
85
state. It was instrumental in winning the country’s war of independence against the
Dutch colonial power and has played an important political role ever since. Because of
these origins, the army prides itself on its history as a revolutionary people’s army and as
the prime mover of Indonesia’s independence.86 For the same reason, the military has
come to view itself as the guardian of national unity and cohesion, and as a co-equal, if
not superior, to the civilian political leadership. This background served as justification
80
Harjanto, ibid, referred to Wendy Hunter’s work on “Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the
Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil,” Comparative Politics, 27, No. 4, July 1995: 426.
81
See Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Latin America, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986: 34-36,
especially on “Degree of Militarisation of the Authoritarian Regime,” as quoted in ibid: 44 et. seq.
82
See O’Donnell, “Introduction to the Latin America Cases,” loc. cit: 10 et seq, as also quoted in ibid.
83
Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment , Forum for Democratic Reform, Sweden: International
IDEA, 2000: 87.
84
Dozens of BKR/TKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat/Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or People’s De-fence
Council/People’s Defence Army), ex-members of PETA (Pembela Tanah Air --The Fatherland Defenders)
and cadets of the Indonesian first military academy of Tangerang killed in the war against Ja-panese
soldiers in Lengkong on January 25, 1946. See, Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VI: Zaman Jepang dan Zaman Republik Indonesia (Indonesia’s
National History VI: The Japanese Occupation and the Republic Era), Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1992: 175176. See also “Cerita dari Kakek dan Paman, Keluarga Margono Djojohadikusumo” (“On the Margono
Djojohadikusumo family”), March 30, 2009, MegaPrabowo 2009, http://perubahanuntukrakyat.com/
2009/03/30/cerita-dari-kakek-dan-paman/, was accessed on February 23, 2010.
85
Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, 1992, op. cit.
86
Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and
Power, RAND Corporation, 2002: 9-10.
21
for the Indonesian military’s intervention in politics based on the concept of the “middle
road,” or later renamed as the dwifungsi (dual-role or function). According to this
concept, the Indonesian military had a socio-political as well as a defence function, which
87
gave it an institutionalized role in politics.
Harold Crouch claims that the military’s self-perception of its role as a political
power comes from a blurring of its military and political functions during the national
88
liberation wars. He insists that the lack of an apolitical tradition among soldiers has
facilitated military leaders playing these roles in the revolution.89 Since its naissance, the
Indonesian military has therefore shown itself both as a military and political power, and
has played an important political role throughout most of its history. It has behaved as a
saviour or guardian of the nation, and further justified its right to play a permanent role in
politics for several years following Indonesian independence. 90
From a historical perspective, Jusuf Wanandi clearly explains the emergence of
the Indonesian military as praetorian guards:
“The role of the TNI in politics dates back to the 1945 revolution
against the Dutch. The TNI started life as the People’s Army and the
Revolutionary Army, and acted as a body of freedom fighters against the
Dutch. That has been the basis for its legitimacy to have a role in
Indonesian civil life, including politics, ever since. It has also been used in
the interpretation of the 1945 Constitution, to affirm that professional or
functional groups, including the TNI, can be represented in Indonesia’s
highest constitutional body, namely the People’s Consultative Assembly
(MPR).
However, in reality, this dual role (that is, external and internal
defence) derives more from the TNI’s historical/political role rather than
from the Constitution….
After 1978 Soeharto was in full control of the TNI, which
gradually became his praetorian guard.”91
87
Ibid.
Harold Crouch, Militer dan Politik di Indonesia (Military and Politics in Indonesia), Jakarta: PT Sinar
Harapan, 1986: 22.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid: 24.
91
Jusuf Wanandi, “Challenge of the TNI and Its Role in Indonesia’s Future,” in Hadi Soesastro, Anthony
L. Smith, and Han Mui Ling (eds.), Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presi dency, Singapore, ISEAS, 2003: 92-93.
88
22
Meanwhile, based on empirical studies, Yorgos A. Kourvetaris provides both
historical and cultural perspectives of military intervention and deeper involvement in
politics:
“The politics of intervention and praetorianism are a rationale for
military authoritarianism and intolerance toward democratic and pluralistic
politics. The military are incapable of understanding the forces of social
change. By their very nature, military institutions are very conservative and
hierarchical and cannot tolerate disorder and social unrest. They bring
stability for the short run but stifle human freedom and democracy in the
long run. In case after case, the authors show the military’s unwillingness
to relinquish power and work in a constructive and co-operative way to
solve societal problems. In almost all countries surveyed, there is a long
tradition of military praetorianism, lack of high political culture, and little
differentiation between political and military institution.” 92
Similarly, Brian Loveman points out that the military has a tradition of practicing
the politics of anti-politics --opposition to excessive freedom-- which puts emphasis on
national security and integrity, state sovereignty, and existing threats from internal and
external political subversions, such as communism, anarchism, and foreign intervention.93
These issues can be manipulated by the military to repress universities, labour
organizations, the media, and even the legislature by claiming to protect “national values”
and the country’s “permanent interests,” and “saving the nation” from the
“contamination” of foreign influence and interests.94 Regarding the politics of antipolitics, Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr. add that the military is characterized
by a rejection of “politics” since it incited conflict among personalist factions and, later,
political parties over ideology; they argue that the spoils of rule result in bloody civil
strife.95
The military sees “politics” as creating poor economic conditions, horizontal
conflicts, and instability, which then “forces” sectors of the military to intervene to restore
order and cleanse the system of political corruption. The implementation of the military’s
politics of anti-politics has some general characteristics, such as the centralisation of
authority, a “flexible” constitution, which offers little effective constraint on the exercise
of governmental authority, and official recognition of governance through a state of siege.
92
Yorgos A. Kourvetaris in “Civil-Military Relations and Military Disengagement,” in Constantine P.
Danopoulos (ed.), Military Disengagement from Politics, London: Routledge, 1988: 271, 273.
93
Brian Loveman, For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999: 254-255.
94
Loveman, 1999, ibid, see also pp. 186 & 213.
95
Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., (eds.). The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin
America, Lincoln and London: The University of Nebraska, 1978: 5.
23
These are combined with a systematic persecution of opposition elements, including the
press, the pragmatic repression of the regime’s opponents expressing overt resistance to
official policies or programs, and the non-recognition of the legitimacy of active
96
opposition or political bargaining, negotiation, or compromise. In particular, the
military’s politics of anti-politics is anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, assuming repression of
opposition, silencing or censuring the media, and subordinating the labour movement to
the regime’s objectives. Worker strikes are also not tolerated. The military further
emphasizes order and progress, and places a high priority on economic growth.
Additionally, clearer linkages between the state and coercion are evident, there is a more
insistent demand for order and respect for hierarchy, a less tolerant attitude toward
opposition, and an outright rejection of “politics,” which is perceived as being the source
97
of underdevelopment, corruption, and evil.
Naturally, civilians and the military have differences not only in terms of their
organizations, procedures for handling problems and decision-making, as well as personal
performances, but also in regards to their values, perceptions, and interests. In general, the
military views civilians as being weaker, especially in terms of discipline. They are also
seen as selfish, lacking accountability and effectiveness, corrupt, and slower than the
military in making decisions, because they must first assess various opinions and interests
98
before making decisions. Military men claim that they have better technical and
managerial skills compared to their civilian counterparts.99 Moreover, military officers
tend to perceive political parties as agents of conflict, not as instruments for producing
consensus. For Kenneth Fidel, military intervention in politics is also considered as the
result of a perceived failure of civilian politics and civilian leadership. New military
insurgents also tend to view civilian institutions and leadership as inherently incapable of
coping with issues of development and public order.100
Muhaimin summarizes these phenomena into the so-called “politico-military
symptom” and superiority complex, namely the subjective reasons or psychological
factors which drive the military to enter political arena. 101 Currently, the military has the
general perception that the civilian government and democracy are incompatible with
attempts at creating political stability and state integration in a country burdened with
poverty, pluralism, primordial conflicts, and nation building. In other words, it sees
civilian government and democracy in new emerging states as being unable to respond to
the threats of chaos and disintegration.
96
Ibid.
Ibid: 12.
98
Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 12.
99
See also Samuel P. Huntington, Tertib Politik di dalam Masyarakat yang Sedang Berubah (Political
Order in Changing Society, 2nd Book), Jakarta, Rajawali, 1983: 314.
100
Kenneth Fidel (ed.), Militarism in Developing Countries, New Jersey, Transaction Books, 1986: 4-5.
97
24
According to Aguero, the military always feels uneasy in new democratic phases
because such situations are far more pluralistic than most officers anticipate and open the
way for the development of national-regional autonomy, federalism and even
102
separatism.
In this context, the military’s traditional value system, which places
emphasis on the importance of unity, is in accordance with the views of conservative
civilians who want to defend the existence of a unified state. This explains why Rizal
Sukma says that there is military resistance to the notion of federalism in Indonesia and
103
radical demand for reform.
Sukma argues that once democratic transition is started, civilian political groups
will all share an interest in democratization. Furthermore, even if some of these groups
are less than enthusiastic about democratization, no major political groups will actively
and openly seek military intervention to advance their interests. Civilians within the
government will also resist military pressure on policies in the civilian sphere and will try
to achieve greater control in military domains. At the same time, the military will make
pre-emptive or reactive moves to maximise its autonomy and resist these so-called
“civilian ‘encroachments’” or intrusions.104
Civil and military response to democratization in Indonesia can also be seen from
the perspective of the country’s political culture. Ulf Sundhaussen sees the importance of
identifying the existence of political cultures and their influence on the country’s
acceptance of military involvement in politics for analysing the continuation of military
involvement in politics, particularly in the Third World. 105 Furthermore, he stresses that if
there is no deep-rooted rejection among the people towards military power, generals, who
were in the position of making top decisions, could enjoy widespread recognition and
support from the people. 106
Muhaimin similarly argues that the intensity of military intervention in politics
will depend on a country’s level of political culture.107 The higher a country’s political
culture or the longer its tradition of democracy, the greater the country’s power will be in
preventing or limiting the military’s intervention into politics. Conversely, the lower the
country’s political culture or shorter its tradition of democracy, the weaker the country’s
101
Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 6-7, 12.
Aguero, 1995, ibid: 12.
103
Rizal Sukma, “Conflict management in post-authoritarian Indonesia: Federalism, autonomy and the
dilemma of democratization,” Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling (eds.), Autonomy and Disintegration
in Indonesia, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003: 67.
104
Ibid: 24.
105
Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Durability of Military Regimes in Southeast Asia,” in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and
Harold Crouch (eds.), Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press,
1985: 270, 186, in Singh, 1996, op. cit: 17-18.
106
Ibid: 21.
107
102
25
position will be in preventing or limiting the military’s political role. For this reason, the
coup d’etat, as the military’s highest possible form of political participation occurs mainly
in countries with low political cultures. In this case, political culture refers to the
circumstances, which will determine the character and attitude of soldiers and the military
as an institution in a state.
In the case of Indonesia, the religious cultures of both Islam and Hinduism have
existed in the country since long before the Portuguese and Dutch Colonialists arrived.
Huntington and Merkel offered a critical assessment of their compatibility with
democracy, as they have strongly influenced the country’s political culture until
108
recently. Aside from the continuing debates on Islam and democracy, Huntington’s
empirical studies showed that most Muslim countries, stretching from Morocco to
Indonesia, have non-democratic regimes, though some of them started to introduce
political liberalization in the 1990s.109
Huntington has recognized religious cultures as one of three factors (the others
being political and economic factors) that limit democratization in these countries. At this
point, the rise of fundamentalism in Islam and its political movements has been pointed to
as a constraint on democratization because of its coherence with the emergence of
military intervention there, either in the form of its support of authoritarian regimes or
involvement in the toppling of civilian democratic regimes.110 Esposito, whose analyses
often shows empathy with Islam, also presented a negative assessment, “Across the
political; and ideological spectrum, the Muslim experience has been one of kings, military
rulers, and ex-military rulers possessing tenuous legitimacy and propped-up by military
and security forces.” 111
108
Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation: Eine Einfuehrung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung (System Transformation: An Introduction to the Theory and Empiry of Research on
Transformation), Olpaden: Leske + Budrich, 1999: 95-100. Huntington, 1991, op. cit, or Huntington,
Gelombang Demokratisasi Ketiga translated edition from the Third Wave by Asril Marjohan, Jakarta:
Grafiti, 1997: 381-399, 404.
109
Huntington, 1991, ibid: 381.
110
Ibid: 395-398. On the cases of other countries, for example, Pakistan, see Oleg V. Pleshov, Islamism
and Travails of Democracy in Pakistan, Delhi: Greenwich Millennium Press, 2004: 158-173, where he
revealed army as the initiator and instrument of Islamization. See also, John L. Esposito and John O. Voll,
Islam and Democracy, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996: 109-114. The same book
also discussed similar case of Sudan, see particularly p. 89, and different cases in other countries, such as
Iran, Algeria, and Egypt, where the military could demonstrate either their pro- or anti-Islam political
movements through their intervention in politics. In Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in
Developing Countries 1980-1994, New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 2000: 194, referring to
what occurred in the Philippines, where Muslims are merely minority, Ali Reza Abootalebi argues,
“Clashes between the army and Communist insurgents, along with the Muslim insurgency, continued to
give credence to possible future military intervention in politics.”
111
Joshua Cohen and Deborah Chasman (Eds.), Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004: 93.
26
Meanwhile, the connection between the religious culture of Hinduism and
democratization in Indonesia can be seen by analysing the impact of Javanese political
culture, which dominated by Hinduism, on the civilian regime’s performance in pushing
political reform and the military response to it. Bilveer Singh, for example, acknowledges
that this dimension of Indonesian political culture is a factor in explaining the
development of the Indonesian military’s dual function.112 He states that the cultural
perspective of the Javanese, which make up the majority of the population, predominantly
113
influences politics and the military in the country. Furthermore, G. Moedjanto reminds
us that the concept of power in Javanese political culture does not arise suddenly, but
rather as a result of the historical process of the development of the king’s power.114 The
concept is based on historical experiences and after it was adapted and perfected, it was
then reinstated and practiced in real life. The ruling king or queen employed many
different methods to establish, develop and strengthen their power. This included, for
example, exhibiting their superiority over others, not only his/her superiority in terms of
origin, techniques of governing, or military prowess, but also their superiority as the
family chosen by God to wield power.
The similarity between the Javanese kingship model and Soeharto’s increasingly
paternalistic rule reflected the Javanese cultural underpinnings of the New Order. Making
up more than 41 percent of the total population, the Javanese, the largest single ethnic
group in Indonesia, still took a disproportionately large number of the most important
positions in the government and the military.115 The officer corps was particularly
Javanized, not only as a consequence of Java’s central role in the development of modern
Indonesia, but also because the Indonesian military appeared to regard the great
predominance of Javanese in the officer ranks as a matter of policy. Therefore, the
Javanese cultural predispositions influenced the way the government appealed to the
population and interactions within the New Order elite, and the emerging elite after
Soeharto.
According to Muhaimin, since the pre-independence period, Indonesia has had a
strong, but sophisticated, patron-client relationship in terms of society, as well as material
and non-material aspects, which has been due to the dominant influence of Javanese
116
political culture. In this relationship, the patron provides for all of the material and nonmaterial needs of the clients, and the clients, in turn, offer their loyalty. Thus, the source
of the patron’s legitimacy comes from their capability to fulfil the needs of the clients,
112
Singh, 1996, op. cit: 55.
Ibid.
114
G. Moedjanto, The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture, Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press,
1993: 104-108.
115
“Political Culture,” http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/85.htm, May 4, 2005: 1 (1-4).
116
Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 9-10.
113
27
and from the resulting loyalty of the clients.117 Meanwhile, acting as one important subculture, the Indonesian military has influenced the Soeharto government’s attitude in
terms of both the ethos and direct participation of military officers at all levels. Although
increasingly professional in a technical sense, the Indonesian military never lost its
perception of itself as the embodiment of the national spirit. Also, even though factions
always exist, the Indonesian military maintains the dwifungsi (dual functions) concept,
118
which justifies a special relationship between the soldier and state.
As a political concept, the Indonesian military’s dual function is described as “the
spirit of service of the armed forces to take up together with the other social forces, the
duties and responsibilities of the struggle of the Indonesian nation both in the field of
defence and security and also in the field of development of the nation’s welfare in an
effort to achieve national goals.”119 In simple terms, the Indonesian military has roles in
both the national defence and domestic policy, with these two functions combining to
form a responsibility for managing and maintaining internal security and stability.
In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the Javanese political culture still has a strong
influence on Indonesian politics, including the military, due to the existence of
conservative military leaders who came to power during the Soeharto era. Regarding the
military’s involvement in politics and its resistance to reform, C.S. Kuppuswamy says that
the concept of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the military draws on the country’s
experiences in struggling for independence, its political culture, and the Pancasila (the
five principle of state ideology).120 Kuppuswamy further emphasizes that the work culture
of the Indonesian armed forces that arose during the struggle for independence sees them
as the guardians of the nation and that their loyalty is to the nation and not to civil
leadership.121 For this reason, he believes that the work culture inherited from the past can
be attributed to the continued dominance of the armed forces in Indonesian politics
despite recent efforts to reduce their influence.
Salim Said argues that in Indonesia the political culture of integration, which
rejects the separation of the military and civilians, has justified the existence of the dual
function concept for a long time, and resisted a transition to civilian supremacy. Thus, the
lack of a new political culture favouring democracy has caused the failure of democratic
117
Lucian W. Pye, “Participation and Authority,” in Sidney Verba and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), The Citizen
and Politics: A Comparative Perspective, Stamford: Greylook, 1978: 95-98, as quoted by Muhaimin, 1982,
op. cit: 9.
118
“Political Culture,” loc. cit: 3.
119
C.S. Kuppuswamy, “Indonesia: Armed Forces and Their Diminishing Political Role,” Paper No. 528,
October 7, 2002, http://www.saag.org/papers6/paper528.html: 2 (1-4), was accessed on May 4, 2005.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid: 4.
28
consolidation in post-Soeharto Indonesia.122 Louis Horowitz mentions that militarism in
Third Word countries is not a function of dependency or developmentalist models, but
rather a response to the inner history and military dynamics of the Western hemisphere
123
and its specific national condition.
Sukma clarifies the relevance of historical and cultural factors with the recent
military resistance to reform in Indonesia as follows:
“In a highly centralized system of the New Order, the military played an
important role in ensuring the centre’s control over the regions on the one
hand and in forcing the regions’ obedience on the other….This system still
persists until today… Given the fact that the military still plays an
important role in politics at regional level, it is likely that the centre might
be tempted to use the military channel to intervene in regional political
affairs. And there are indications that military officers, even though they
may already have resigned from the service, will continue to occupy or
seek top civilian positions such as governor or bupati (heads of
district).”124
I.B. Theoretical Approaches
I.B.1. Actor Theories
In this research, actor theories are helpful for micro level analysis and explaining
internal factors which influence both the performance and policy of the civilian regime,
the response of the military, and the interplay between the two parties. Since democratic
transition towards consolidation is marked by interplay amongst actors, the adoption of
actor theories as one of the types of transformation theory in this research reveals the
125
interplay between the military and civilian regime. In this context, similar to mass and
126
elite, the military and civilian regimes are both seen as important actors in democratic
122
“Indonesia Belum Miliki Budaya Politik Seperti Korea Selatan” (“Indonesia does not have yet Political
Culture as in South Korea”) , Media Indonesia, 9 Mei 2005: 7.
123
See David Irving and Louis Horowitz, “The Military Elite,” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari
(eds.), Elites in Latin America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, in Loveman and Davies, Jr,
(eds.), 1978, op. cit: 272-273.
124
Sukma, in Kingsbury and Aveling, 2003, loc .cit: 72.
125
See Ellen Bos, “Die Rolle von Eliten und kollektiven Akteuren in Transitionsprozessen“ („The Role of
Elites and Collective Actors in Transition Process“), in Wolfgang Merkel (ed.), Systemwechsel 1:
Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen (Regime Change I: Theories, Methods, and Concepts), Opladen:
Leske und Budrich, 1994: 81-102. See also, Wolfgang Merkel, 1999, op.cit: 102-107 and 162-169.
126
See Wolfgang Merkel and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie: Transformationen,
Erfolgsbedingungen, Entwicklungspfade (From Dictatorship to Democracy: Transformations, Success
Conditions, Development Paths), Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999: 53-57.
29
transition.127 They are analysed as individual and collective actors or groups, and as
institutions or organizations that are involved in the transition process. They have their
own goals, interests, preferences, perceptions, decisions, strategies, reactions, and
behaviours, and have demonstrated their position either as proponents or opponents of
democratization.128 They are also viewed as actors characterised by their orientations
(perceptions and preferences) and capabilities in their performances and interplay. 129
Fritz W. Scharpf argues that actors respond differently to external threats,
constraints, and opportunities not only because they may differ in their intrinsic
perceptions and preferences, but also because their perceptions and preferences are very
130
much shaped by the specific institutional setting within which they interact. As an
institution, the interplay between the military and the civilian regime is seen in the
framework of the systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors
may choose. This framework of analysis includes not only formal legal rules that are
sanctioned by the court system and the machinery of the state, but also social norms that
actors generally respect and whose violation is penalized with loss of reputation, social
disapproval, withdrawal of co-operation and the granting of rewards, or even ostracism.
In rational-choice theory, actors’ behaviour is evaluated based on the choices they made
in light of an assessment of costs and benefits.131 Through this approach, the interplay
between the military and the civilian regime is seen from sanctioned rules that effectively
change the costs and benefits that an actor can expect when following a certain course of
action, and also social norms and culturally stabilised systems of meaning and social
entities that are capable of purposive actions.132
Furthermore, rational choice focuses on actors and their preferences, and explains
their political behaviour based rationally on interest calculations. It starts from the
assumption that political life is based on strategic interactions among individuals to
133
maximize their own interests. For this reason, political institutions are the result of
such strategic interactions. In other words, political institutions are made by political
actors according to their preferences in instrumental ways. They become the instruments
to attain political interests so that once an institution is established, it will determine
parameters for other individual actors, including their interest calculations, although these
institutions can always be modified when needed. Rational choice is relevant because the
main forces for change among the military are their individual leaders, who, if they
127
On the government as collective actors see also Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor -Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997: 39.
128
See Bos, in Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 87.
129
Scharpf, 1997, op.cit: 51.
130
Ibid: 36-39.
131
See Bos, in Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 87-88.
132
Scharpf, 1997, op.cit.
133
Harjanto, in Rizal Sukma and J. Kristiadi (eds.), 1999, loc.cit: 87.
30
contend with civilian leaders, will become political actors who also have bargaining
power.134
Scharpf describes institutions as consisting of complex actors, which create and
constrain options, and shape perceptions and preferences. In addition, actors are
characterised by specific capabilities, perceptions, and preferences. Actors who are
willing to risk paying the price of possible sanctions may violate binding rules.
Importantly, since social backgrounds and socialization histories of individuals have
become increasingly diverse, the influence of institutions on perceptions and preferences,
and hence on intentions, can never be completely understood. He stresses that in cases
where institutional change threatens to be costly, institutions will be hard to reform or
135
abolish.
According to Adam Przerworski, conflicts of interests among the elite are always
influenced by the structure of interests in democratic transition. It should be noted that the
military has vested-interests in preserving their corporate autonomy; the bourgeoisie are
interested in protecting and controlling their production means; and the state apparatus -mainly, the bureaucrats, police, and technocrats-- want to maintain their safety and basic
economic interests.136 Conflicts of interests, which cause friction among the elites, can be
observed among strategic actors who hold power by differentiating hard-liners and softliners, and moderates and maximalists in opposition groups. These groups likely include
principalists or moralists, who are ready to take risks. In this regard, the hardliners,
maximalists, and moralists are categorized as an insensitive risk group, whereas
moderates and soft-liners are seen as sensitive actors who do not want to incur risk.
Przerworski continues by mentioning that an authoritarian regime begins to
fracture when several members of the regime start trying to secure the support of
137
opposition groups. If the regime remains cohesive and tightly controls the situation, a
compromise will not be reached. On the other hand, if several powerful groups attempt to
seek political support among groups who have been previously forced to leave the
political arena by the authoritarian regime, the waves of mass mobilizations will appear to
contain the regime. The most vulnerable situation during democratic transition is caused
if a group of elites within the existing authoritarian regime seek external support for their
power.
134
Ibid.
Scharpf, 1997, op.cit: 41-43.
136
Adam Przerworski, “Sejumlah Masalah dalam Studi Transisi Menuju Demokrasi” (“Problems in Study
of Transition towards Democracy”), Transisi Menuju Demokrasi (III): Kasus Amerika Latin (Transition
towards Democracy, III, Latin America Case), Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence
Whitehead (Eds.), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994: 85-86, in Sahdan (trans.), op. cit: 300.
137
Przerworski, 1994, ibid: 87 -88, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 301.
135
31
Przerworski also adds that struggles for democratic transition in many countries
generally begin within the elite class, namely, between the soft-liners who overtly
demonstrate their pro-democracy stance and the hardliners who support the status quo or
138
the authoritarian regime.
The soft-liners usually align themselves with opposition
groups to fight against the hardliners, which results in the fall of the authoritarian regime,
or transactions occurring between the conflicting parties.
In order to explain reasons for military involvement in politics by certain actors,
Harold Crouch points to internal and external factors.139 When speaking of internal
factors, Crouch refers to the internal characteristics or situation, while external factors
refer to the environment or structural factors. The first factor consists of values and
attitudes of military officers, which affect their political orientation and their conceptions
of power in society. The second factor consists of material interests of military officers, as
corps, social classes, or individual members. For Huntington, these military interests refer
to a goal of building an apolitical society and consensus based on order. In this context,
the military prevents society from reaching the community structure it aspired to, by
criticising and reducing the role of politics.140
Crouch also argues that the values and orientations of military officers are mostly
141
a product of their historical experiences. This means that their upbringing and early
roles will establish traditions and values within them, which will be a model for early
military generations and afterwards. Singh states that the material interests of the military,
such as the allocation of an adequate budget for its facilities and salaries, will play a wider
142
role in affecting its decisions regarding political intervention. The failure of civilian
political leaders to fulfil this need will create an opportunity for the military to engage and
intervene in politics. In addition, the ambition of senior military officers to gain additional
facilities encourages them to be active in the political sphere. Finer identifies six
143
motivations for the involvement of military leaders in politics.
These motivations
include national interests, regional interests, class interests, organizational or military
corps interests; real condition of soldiers in general, and individual interests inside the
military. In a similar view, Sundhaussen states that military interventions in politics are
motivated by their class interests in defending the values and aspirations of the middle
138
Ibid.
Harold Crouch, “The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold
Crouch (eds.), Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985:
288; Singh, 1996, op.cit: 7.
140
Huntington, op. cit, 1983: 383.
141
Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc.cit, in Singh, 1996, op.cit: 8.
142
Ibid: 9-13.
143
Samuel E. Finer, 1962: 32-60; Singh, 1996, op.cit: 14.
139
32
class they belong to.144 He adds further interests for such interventions, ranging from
institutional to individual interests that do not favour constitutional rules because of
145
officers’ ambitions of authority and power.
However, Huntington’s thesis which says “it is false to attempt to explain military
intervention in politics in terms of internal structure of the military organization or the
146
social background of the officers in a country” can be critically questioned.
In the
Indonesian case, attempt of coup such as in 1965 was organized by officers who occupied
strategic positions within the military organization. Political interventions were also
conducted by the military because of the prevalence of historical and traditional values or
political culture in the military. Huntington is not, however, wrong when he mentions that
“some military men in politics have been apparently motivated by high ideals of public
service, and others by private profit.”147
Referring to actors, Edwin Lieuwen pointed out that a surplus of ambitious or
opportunistic military men has made politics in nearly every country little more than an
endless process of dissension, intrigue, and revolutionary turmoil. 148 He agrees with many
authors who have detected a tendency on the part of military men to side with
conservative parties, and a tendency for civilian politicians to side with the liberals. Both
parties accepted the existing social order, in which virtually all civilian politicians and
army officers are members of the small, vague, middle class. More importantly, aside
from their political parties, their overriding interest is power.
Lieuwen describes various motives for military officers to intervene in politics. He
distinguishes among three different groups, namely devoted professionals, latent
militarists, and idealistic officers.149 The devoted professionals might intervene in the
name of their legitimate duty to retain internal order. The latent militarists might be
motivated purely by political ambitions. The idealistic officers, who considered it their
duty to provide social justice, might contend with the other two. Importantly, he argues
that the political immaturity of the new groups aspiring to power and the lack of any
strong and well-integrated group apart from the military may encourage the military to
144
Ulf Sundhaussen, Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967 Menuju Dwifungsi ABRI (Military Politics in
Indonesia 1945-1967: Towards ABRI Dual Function), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986: 440-473, quoted by Ikrar
Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999: 40.
145
Ibid.
146
See Samuel P. Huntington, Special Adaptation from Political Order in Changing Societies, Bombay,
G.U. Mehta, 1975: 109.
147
Ibid.
148
Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America , Revised Edition, Frederick A. Praeger, New York,
1965: 20 and 27.
149
Ibid: 123.
33
intervene and create additional militarism. Quoting Stanislaw Andrzejewski,150 Lieuwen
mentions that if there is no conformity on the right to command or the duty to obey, either
because of ethnic pluralism or as an outcome of an internal rupture, brute force must
remain the last resort, and the distribution of military will then be the major determinant
of the social structure.
Lieuwen also describes that in their intervention, the military can serve as political
arbiters, as they control the means of violence, the sine qua non for political change in
most countries.151 Advanced weapons technologies and improved capabilities increase the
military’s confidence in its overwhelmingly superior power over unruly civilian elements.
They are, therefore, less hesitant to put that power to use.
In specifically examining the actors within the military, Lieuwen sees that young
officers become the sponsors of fundamental change and reform.152 They might
undermine traditional institutions and be proponents of public-welfare measures, whereby
democratic political institutions are of less concern to them. Senior officers, on the other
hand, might value stability, and thus disfavour social and political experimentation. These
senior officers might be more partial to democratic institutions than their younger rivals,
but this is likely to be a narrowly-defined “democracy,” which is tolerated insofar as it
functions within the traditional order, because they are at the top of their profession. The
senior officers are influenced by the conservatism that comes with rank, age, status, and
the attainment of comfortable material circumstances. Also, struggles among them are
complicated by ideological cross-currents and fierce personal and professional
competition.
Lieuwen reminds us that due to the special position of the military as overseeing
the monopoly of physical power, the main force towards professionalism has to come
153
from within the military. He also finds that in almost every country he researched, the
military organization is strained by struggles brought on by the country’s social crises and
competition between the (military) professionalists. Among the military professionalists,
there is competition between the group of officers who consider that the military has to
confine themselves to military duties, and the militarists who opt to take an active role in
politics.
The military’s strategic position in democratic transition as an informal political
actor with a potential veto-power, whose political actions influence the success or failure
of democratic consolidation, especially at the time of economic, social, and political
150
See, Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1954: 128.
151
Lieuwen, 1965, op.cit: 124.
152
Ibid: 126-127; 130-131.
153
Ibid: 152.
34
crisis, is acknowledged by O’Donnell and Schmitter, as well as Merkel.154 Merkel
identifies the military as a state organ and a potential internal veto-player that can
demonstrate its significant power and influence as a veto player by making interventions
155
that can be dangerous to democracy. He stresses that the emergence of threats to
national security and integrity will encourage the military to be an active veto-player that
becomes an enemy to democracy.156
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, democratic transitions are typically
initiated and negotiated by political elites in both the regime and the opposition, where
civil society has played a crucial role in building pressure for democratic transition and
157
pushing it through to completion. Actors struggle not only to satisfy their immediate
interests or the interests of those whom they purport to represent, but also to define rules
and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future.
As a matter of fact, these emergent rules will largely define what resources can
legitimately be expended in the political arena and which actors will be permitted to enter
158
it. Therefore, O’Donnell and Schmitter have identified conflicts and struggles amongst
actors in democratic transition.
Regarding the interplay between the military and civilian regime, O’Donnell and
Schmitter write:
“The degree of military penetration of the polity and society varies
across authoritarian regimes, as well as across the democratic ones that
may follow them.
(…) When the armed forces neither have nor feel a responsibility
for the policies of the regime, it is easier for them to take a hands off
attitude to the transition, by declaring themselves concerned only with
154
See Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence
Whiteheads (eds.), Transition form Authoritarian Rule, Prospect for Democracy, Vol. 4, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986: 34 et seq. See also Merkel, 1999, op.cit : 162-164, where Merkel introduced the terminology of Veto-Mächte (n). Meanwhile, Jürgen Rüland used the terminology of veto-player,
and Christoph Schuck with Veto-Akteur. See, Jürgen Rüland, “Demokratisierung in Südostasien: die
Asienkrise als Motor politischen Wandels?“ („Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Asian Crisis as
Root of Political Change?“) Zeitschrift für Politik, Jahrgang 48, Heft 1, 2001, München: Zymanns: 16, and
Schuck, 2003, op. cit: 163-192.
155
Wolfgang Merkel, Demokratie in Asien: Ein Kontinent zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Democracy
in Asia: A Continent Between Dictatorship and Democracy), Bonn: Dietz, 2003: 177-179.
156
Ibid: 164.
157
“Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion About Uncertain Democracies”, 1986: 4856 in Larry Diamond, “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation,” Diamond, Plattner, Yun, and Hung
(eds.), 1997, loc.cit: xxx.
158
Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies,” in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc.cit:
6.
35
protecting their own institutional values of stability and autonomy, as well
as public order and national security. In such cases the armed forces can
remain relatively indifferent to the emerging rules of the political game, the
identity of partisan actors, and the content of policy demands. When the
transition is initiated from regimes with extensive military participation,
and especially where military officers remain as chief executives during the
transition itself, the impact is more direct and immediate: the institutional
interests of the military --not to mention the personal interests of the
officers involved-- cannot but be affected by emerging civilian authorities
who may not be sympathetic to such considerations.”159
Regarding the position of the civilian regime and military in democratic transition,
there is a theoretical discussion on pacts as an option that seems relevant in guiding this
research, of which Linz and Stepan say:
“Much of transition literature on pacts contains references to ‘hardliners’ and ‘moderates.’ Transition is frequently seen as involving a pact
between the regime moderates and the opposition moderates who are both
able to ‘use’ and ‘contain’ their respective hard-liners. This is, in essence, a
four-player game theory model. However, two conditions must be satisfied
for it to be a true four-player game. The moderate players in the regime
must have sufficient autonomy so that they can, over time, conduct
strategic as well as tactical negotiations with the players from the moderate
opposition. Conversely, the moderates in the opposition need a degree of
continued organizational presence, power, and followers in the polity to
play their parts in the negotiation pacts.”160
In a more progressive analysis, Henry Bienen no longer sees the military as a
sterile and neutral state element continuing to justify its legitimacy and interest as being
solely for the sake of the nation.161 This view is based on the empirical observation that
the military has its own interests and shows its resistance to efforts to end
authoritarianism and transfer power to civilian institutions. Meanwhile, there are several
underlying factors to the military’s resistance to transfer of power to civilian institutions,
namely:162 (1) There is the danger of a military opponent becoming ruler; (2) all decisions
159
Ibid: 34.
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and-Post Communist Europe, the Johns Hopkins University: Baltimore, 1996: 61.
161
Henry Bienen, “Civil-Military Relations in the Third Worlds,” International Political Science Review,
Vol. 2, No. 3, 1981: 368.
162
Ivan A. Hadar, “Militer dan Pemerintahan Otoriter” (“Military and Authoritaruan Govenrment”),
Wacana, Edisi 17, Tahun III, 2004, Yogyakarta, Insist Press: 17-48.
160
36
that the military regime has made will be declared invalid; (3) all privileges that the
military currently enjoys will be withdrawn; (4) there will be political chaos once the
reform is introduced; (5) the military’s self-image as an agent of modernization will be
tarnished as the transfer of power begins; (6) there will be political pressure on the
military by parties that have enjoyed the benefits of its regime; (7) the military is always
obsessed by greed for power; and (8) in many cases, the military fears that it would face
prosecution due to the gross human rights violations of the past.
I.B.2. Cultural Theories
This research utilizes cultural theories to help explain the perceptions and
preferences, which influence military and civilian actors in their decision-making and
163
interactions.
The performance or policies of civilian regimes and the military’s
response are discussed by analyzing their respective dominant political cultures as
individual or collective actors or groups and also as an institution.164 By definition,
political culture refers to the inherited set of dominant ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and
opinions people share about who should govern, to what end they should govern, and by
what means. This is based on values and beliefs since these are shared ideas about what is
good and what is true, and such beliefs often provide a foundation for values. 165 Political
culture is a patterned way of thinking and beliefs about how the government and the
country ought to operate, and influences the political behavior of the actors. Huntington
classified this as being part of historic cultural traditions, the existence of which varies
significantly in the extent to which their attitudes, values, beliefs, and related behavior
patterns are conducive to the development of democracy.166
In the context of cultural theory, discussions on transformation can be approached
for religious-cultural types of civilization. Merkel167 has pointed to Lipset’s thesis on the
relevance between cultural and historical factors and change. Lipset (1993: 137) argues
that unlike political institutions, including electoral systems and constitutional
arrangements which are more easily changed, cultural factors that stem from different
163
The application of cultural theories to explain transformation, see again, Merkel and Juergen Puehle,
1999, op. cit: 36-44. See also Merkel, op .cit, 1999: 95-101.
164
Merkel und Puhle, 1999, op.cit.: 36-44. See also Jürgen Rüland, „Theoretische, methodische und
thematische Schwerpunkte des Systemwechselforschung zu Asien“ („Theoretical, Methodological and
Thematical Focuses of Research on Regime Change in Asia“), in Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 279-284. See
also Merkel, 2003, loc. cit: 69-70.
165
“Political Culture in America,” http://www.socialstudieshelp/APGOV_Political1%20Culture.htm., May
6, 2005: 1-5. See also S.M. Rahman, “Building Political Culture a New,” http://www.friends.org.pk /rahman/building%20political.htm: 1-2.
166
Huntington, 2001, op. cit: 298.
167
Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 95-96.
37
histories are extremely difficult to manipulate. Furthermore, in explaining the religiouscultural types of civilization and transformation, Merkel has also quoted the thesis of
Kennan (Huntington, 1991: 298), which links democratization and Western culture as a
supporting basis, and sees the incompatibility between liberal democracy and nonWestern culture or society. By referring to Huntington, Merkel agrees that there are
religious cultures, which are friendly or positive to democracy, and others, which are
skeptical, or even seen as “enemies” of democracy (Huntington, 1991: 300). Specifically,
this point of view sees fundamentalist Islam as diametrically opposed to the ideals and
practices of democracy, because it would clash with values like gender parity, human
rights, rule of law, and the separation of religion and state, or secularism, which are all
requisites of a democracy. 168 The more the counter-productive values of the religious
culture to democracy are maintained, the more apparent the constraints to democracy
would become.
Huntington clarifies the existence of various religious cultures and their degrees of
169
compatibility to democracy as follows:
(1) Western culture with its liberalism and
Protestantism; (2) Latin American culture with its Catholicism; (3) Japanese culture; (4)
Orthodox-Slav; (5) Hinduism culture; (6) African culture; (7) Confucianism culture; and
(8) Islamism culture. Of the eight religious cultures, he claims that the first three religious
cultures are compatible with Western democracy, although they have gradual differences.
The next three religious cultures are unclear in their positions as to whether they support
or reject democracy; and the last two religious cultures, Confucianism and Islamism, are
often seen as incompatible with liberal democracy.170 In a more critical analysis, he
doubts the prospect of liberalization in Muslim countries and whether their social and
political movements will maintain their commitments to democracy. He questions
whether the new governments will continue to leave their doors open to Islamic social
and political movements, e.g. fundamentalist or radical groups, without provoking
interventions from the military, which in most Muslim countries is generally known to be
171
very secular.
Although Huntington admits that there are certain Islamic values, which are
generally congruent with the requirements of democracy, he also emphasizes that Islam
rejects any distinction between the religious and the political community. Using the
expression that “there is no equipoise between Caesar and God,” he says that political
participation is linked to religious affiliation. Moreover, since the political rulers should
be practising Muslims, syariah should be the basic law, and the ulama should have a
168
Ibid: 96, 99-100.
Ibid: 96-97.
170
See also Huntington, 1991, op. cit. and Huntington, Gelombang Demokratisasi Ketiga (The Third
Wave), 1997, op.cit : 387, and 398-404.
171
Ibid: 397-398.
169
38
decisive vote in articulating, or at least reviewing and ratifying all governmental policy.
These concepts are incompatible with democracy. From an Islamic viewpoint,
governmental legitimacy and policy are derived from religious doctrine and religious
172
expertise, so they differ from and contradict with the premises of democratic politics.
Even now, several years after the publication The Third Wave, he still voiced the same
questions regarding the success of democratization in countries where Muslims make up a
majority, due to the strength of their conservative values, or the anti-democratic
173
secularism and anti-Western democracy.
Douglas E. Ramage found that exclusivism and extremism practiced by Islamic
political movements during the Soeharto era have caused military resistance to these
174
movements participating in Indonesia’s politics. Exclusivism and extremism proved
incompatible with the principles of “togetherness,” “family-like” and “integralistic state,”
which became the basic values of the country’s ideology and have been protected by the
Indonesian military since independence. For this reason, Ramage has asserted that Islam
175
was never acceptable to the Indonesian military as the basis of the state. Meanwhile,
Uhlin has recognized that there is a deep-rooted antagonism between the Indonesian
military and political Islam.176 He has described armed conflicts between Muslims and the
military, which have occurred in many parts of the country, although he agreed with
Zifirdaus (1990: 448) that none of the major Muslims organizations have ever clashed
with the military.
Meanwhile, Hinduism culture and its constraints to Indonesian democratic
consolidation can be seen in the influence of Javanese political culture on civilian regime
performance in pushing for reform, and the military response to it. In this context, we
should highlight Ramage’s statements on the strong existence of the notion of an
integralistic state amongst Indonesian civilian and military leaders.177 An integralistic
state was initially conceived by one of Indonesian founding fathers, Soepomo, who
perceived the state and society as a single organic unit and stressed the importance of
social obligations rather than individual rights. In proposing his notion of an integralistic
state in the constitutional and independence preparatory debates of 1945, Soepomo argued
that Indonesian political culture, particularly Javanese village governance, was based on
family principles. Because all individuals in the state are inseparable from one another
and the state is like a family in which all components play crucial roles, Soepomo insisted
172
See Samuel P. Huntington, “After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy, October 1997, Volume 8, Number 4, Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997: 6-10.
174
Ramage, 1995, op.cit: 122-155.
175
Ibid: 140.
176
Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-Democracy
Movement in a Changing World, Curzon Press, 1997: 65.
177
Ramage, 1995, op.cit: 125.
173
39
that such principles were not suited to Western concepts of parliamentary democracy with
checks and balances and guarantees of individual human rights. Ramage argued that these
ideas have remained part of Indonesian political thinking and have been revived in
178
official discourse since the late 1980s, particularly in military thinking.
Thus, the
concept of an integralistic state has been the ideological foundation of the Indonesian
state’s Pancasila ideology and military interventions into the country’s social and
political affairs. Ramage points out that military interest in integralism has not been
discussed in previous studies on the military and politics in the country.
Peter Britton has pointed to “local traditions” and “the Javanese military legacy”
179
in describing the source of legitimacy for the Indonesian military in politics. He argued
that evidence of the Javanese military legacy could be seen in the integration of state and
military power, with which the Grand Kings of Java were usually perceived as the Grand
Commanders. In other words, the Kings, who were also military leaders, claimed that they
themselves were Knights. Considering that most officers in the Indonesian military have
Javanese cultural background and the cultural values have been preserved through
literature and traditional ceremonies, Britton’s work helps to explain why the Indonesian
military still wants to be involved or interfere in the country’s politics.
Britton has stated that the rejection of civilian supremacy by the military is rooted
in the Javanese military legacy. He viewed the response of Grand Commander Sudirman
to disobey the civilian leaders or the Sukarno-Sjahrir administration in the period of the
national liberation war against the Dutch as less affected by the practice Sudirman learned
from the Japanese colonial government, and more inspired by his growing understanding
on the Javanese traditions from the pre-colonial period, whereby the separation of civilmilitary power was not known, and military power was political power. 180 Britton has
connected the blurred distinction between civilian and military role which has been
occurring since 1957 with the consistency of the military in keeping their Javanese
military practice, which has been widely understood among officers. As a result of the
creation of the military’s new symbols, which correlated with the symbols of Javanese
power, the Indonesian military was able maintain its traditional identity and values
despite the influence of military professionalism the officers obtained from training and
education in America. Britton later argues that the influence of military training and
178
Ibid: 126.
Peter Britton, Profesionalisme dan Ideologi Militer Indonesia (Professionalism and Indonesian Military Ideology), Jakarta, LP3ES, 1996: 1, 11, quoted by Salim Said in Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu,
Kini, dan Kelak (The Indonesian Military and Politics: Past, Today, and Future) Jakarta: PT Pustaka Sinar
Harapan, 2001: 180.
180
Britton, op. cit: 54, 56, 65; Said, op. cit: 181.
179
40
education in America on Indonesian military officers’ ideology is not significant due to
the dominance of Javanese military concepts and traditions. 181
In Javanese political culture, power and control cannot be separated from one
another, and they have been established by a patrimonial bureaucratic state, in which
proximity to the ruler was the key to command and rewards.182 This power is described in
terms of a patron-client relationship, in which the patron is the Bapak (father or elder),
and the client is the anak (children or people in general). The terms of respect and
compliance to the ruler are expressed by the Javanese Gusti-kawula (lord-subject)
formulation, which expresses the relationship of mankind to God, as well as the
relationship of the subject to his ruler. Here, the reciprocal trait for compliance is
benevolence, meaning that benefits flow from the center to the obedient subjects. By
extension, the government’s developmental activities are advantages and blessings to the
faithful. Bureaucratically, Javanese political culture is filled with an attitude of
compliance, such as respect for seniors, conformity to hierarchical authority, and
avoidance of confrontation. These are all characteristics stemming from the preindependence of the priyayi class, whose roots go back to the traditional Javanese courts.
This Javanese political culture is similar to the Indonesian military values, which
emphasize obedience to command, respect for seniors, conformity to hierarchical
183
authority, uniformity of attitude, and intolerance for differences of opinion.
Benedict R.O’G. Anderson claims that the Javanese perception of power differs
radically from Western concepts of power that have evolved since the Middle Ages. This
184
difference leads to contrasting views regarding the workings of politics and history.
The first and foremost premise of Javanese political thought is that power is concrete.
Power is also homogenous, meaning that all power is of the same type and has the same
source. Thus, power in the hands of one individual or one group is identical to power in
the hands of any other individual or group. Also, the quantity of power in the universe is
finite and does not change, which means that concentration of power in one place or in
one person requires a proportional diminution elsewhere. Last but not least, since all
power derives from a single homogenous source, power rises above questions of good and
evil; it is not subject to questions of legitimacy. Anderson summarized that, from the
Javanese political culture perspective, power is something concrete, homogenous,
constant in total quantity, and has no inherent moral implications. 185 Also, all power is of
181
Britton, ibid: 119 -120; Said, ibid: 182.
“Political Culture,” http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/85.htm, May 4, 2005: 1 (1-4).
183
Ibid.
184
Benedict R.O’G. Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1990: 19-20.
185
Ibid: 22-23. See also “The Essence of Power,” in Franz Magnis-Suseno, Javanese Ethics and WorldView: The Javanese Idea of the Good Life, Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1997: 101-102, translated by Jon Scott
and Michael Saunders, from Franz Magnis-Suseno, Javanische Weisheit und Ethik: Studien zu einer
182
41
the same type and has the same source, so the Javanese are not concerned with its proper
uses.186 They have no sense of noblesse oblige, and they do not perceive anti-social
behaviour as diminishing power. Power is amoral; the centre is only obliged to itself,
187
therefore, the edicts of the Javanese rulers had no ethical content.
Anderson sees a correlation between the perception of concentration and the idea
188
of purity, while the idea of impurity is intimately related to diffusion and disintegration.
Furthermore, power has to be absorbed from various sources, then accumulated, and
finally concentrated, so the loss of concentration is synonymous with the loss of power. In
this context, the Sapta Marga (seven principles or milestones), the code of the Indonesian
military formulated in the early 1950s, is an example of power orientation, concentration,
and display, which becomes a typical aspect of modern Indonesian public political
behavior.189 Unity is, in itself, a fundamental symbol of power, in which oneness is
power, and multiplicity is diffusion and weakness. According to Anderson, the Javanese
idea of power also has impacts for perceptions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
190
foreign relations.
The adoption of Javanese political culture into Indonesian military values was
outlined by Lt. Gen (ret) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, a prominent military and national
figure from the first generation of post-independence military academy graduates. In
addition, he was the former Governor of the National Resilience Council (Lemhannas -Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional), a state institution, which trains Indonesia’s future
leaders.191 He points out that among the eleven basic values of the Indonesian military
leadership, ten have roots in Javanese political culture. These values, among others, are
Ing Ngarsa Sun Tulada (the Indonesian military leaders should serve as examples to their
soldiers), Waspada Prabu Wisesa (the Indonesian military leaders should be prepared to
act under all circumstances), and Ambag Paramarta (the Indonesian military leaders
192
should have the capability to set priorities in responding to problems).
Importantly, Javanese political culture puts emphasis on the importance of
harmony, order, stability, and continuity.193 For this reason, consensus, not voting, is
östlichen Moral (Javanese Wisdom and Ethics: Studies on Eastern Moral), Muenchen/Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981.
186
See, Ann Kumar, “The state and status of the nation: A historical viewpoint,” in Damien Kingsbury and
Harry Aveling (eds.), 2003, loc. cit: 53.
187
Ibid.
188
Anderson, 1990, op.cit: 24.
189
Ibid: 26.
190
Ibid: 36, 41.
191
See Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Sejarah dan Perjuangannya (ABRI Leadership in Its History and Struggle), Jakarta: Intermasa, 1996: 4-5.
192
Ibid.
193
“Political Culture,” 2005, loc. cit: 3 (1-4).
42
pivotal to decision-making processes, while conflict and anarchy are to be avoided. As
was the case during the Javanese kingdom and Soeharto eras, the major components of
the nation’s political culture were derived from two central goals, namely, stability and
development. This means that if authority during Soeharto’s rule was based on the
military’s coercive support, the government’s legitimacy rested on its success in achieving
socio-political stability and economic development.194
Kumar noted that traditional Indonesian culture, which is predominantly reflected
by Javanese political culture, is viewed by Western scholars of Indonesia as inimical to
democracy and modernization, and, generally, as an obstacle to desirable develop195
ments. Javanese political culture’s unfavourable fit with democracy has also been
observed by Magnis-Suseno and further discussed by Kumar, who quotes MagnisSuseno’s explanations as follows:
“The Javanese ideal of rukun essentially implies the continuous
effort of all individuals to interact peacefully with each other … (and to)
repress signs of social or personal tension … The Javanese sense of
hierarchy requires everyone, in speech and behaviour, to show proper
respect to those with whom one comes into social contact. People in higher
positions should be respected … It is easy to show how these ideas must
196
stifle democratic aspirations.”
Magnis-Suseno goes on to say that the word rukun conveys a type of behaviour, and to act
according to rukun means to endeavour, at all times, to repress signs of social or personal
tension and to preserve the impression of harmonized social relationships as much as
197
possible. It implies continuous efforts by all individuals to interact peacefully with one
another as well as to remove potentially divisive and dissonant elements. More
fundamentally, rukun demands a comprehensive principle of social order, where everyone
must work to prevent anything, which can harm the rukun condition in society -a
condition of apparent harmony.198
Referring to the eras of the Javanese kingdoms, Moedjanto stated that the power
of a king or a ruler might be illustrated by the size of his army.199 It could also be reflected
by the various troops and ceremonial equipment the king possessed. The extent of the
king’s power could be seen in the faithfulness of his regents and other officials in carrying
194
Ibid.
Kumar, in Kingsbury and Aveling (eds.), 2003, loc. cit: 52.
196
Ibid.
197
Magnis-Suseno, 1997, op .cit: 43.
198
Ibid.
199
Moedjanto, 1993, op. cit: 104.
195
43
out his orders.200 The greatness of the king’s power was also characterized by other
elements, namely:201
1. the vastness of his kingdom’s territory;
2. the number of conquered territories and the nature of the tributes offered by
conquered kings;
3. his wealth, the number of honorary titles, and fame.
According to Moedjanto, there was no mention of any division of power, meaning
that authority was not divided, but rather remained a totality. An expression of “ngendi
ana surya kembar” (only one sun in the world) in Javanese political culture refers to the
202
meaning that there was no one who competed for the king’s power. The existence of
such terminologies as kawula (servant) for the subject people and gusti (lord) for the king
is a further expression of the absolute power of a ruler. According to Magnis-Suseno, this
reflected the principle of an integral state or the so-called “manunggaling kawula Gusti”
as introduced by founding father Supomo in the formation of the 1945 State Constitution
with the goal of guaranteeing unity and harmony among elements of the state.203 People in
Java believed that if the king obeyed this concept to its full extent, the country and the
people would benefit; however, if the king only obeyed part of the concept, the country
204
would deteriorate and the people would suffer.
Moedjanto also mentioned that in a materialistic context, the king attempted to
control all aspects of life and social economic activities within the community as well as
the government of the country. Attempts were made to collect revenues from all possible
sources of wealth by, for instance, levying taxes to cover all manner of expenditure,
including the upkeep of soldiers, their provisions, military operations, and all sorts of
royal celebrations.205 In addition, wealth was also needed to elevate the prestige of the
king and the kingdom.
The king centralized all forms of power into his hands. It was also necessary for
the king or ruler to gather all available sources of power and strength. These resources
may have been of a human nature, e.g. soldiers and regents, but they could also have been
of a non-human nature, e.g. indications of God’s predestination or will through divine
200
Ki Reditanaja, Alap-alapan Drusilawati (The Wedding of Drusilawati), Batavia, 1932: 3-4, ibid.
Moedjanto, 1993, ibid: 104.
202
Ibid.
203
Franz Magnis-Suseno, Mencari Sosok Demokrasi: Sebuah Telaah Filosofis (Finding Democracy: A
Philoshopical Study), Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1995: 14, 89-91.
204
Moedjanto, 1993, op. cit: 107-108.
205
Ibid: 109.
201
44
revelation or other signs. In these terms, wealth and a strong army were the first
conditions, which needed to be fulfilled.206
Javanese political culture emphasizes the centralization and accumulation of
power, control, stability, and state integrity, and also has a fundamental impact on
Indonesia’s political system. Anderson uses it as a framework to discuss the country’s
slow progress towards democratization and civilian regimes’ reluctance to introduce
207
reform. With this background and the lack of a high political culture, which provides
chances for negotiations and bargaining, the adoption of cultural theory is helpful to
determine military resistance to reform and civilian regimes, in terms of insubordination
208
and coup attempts.
At this point, resistance and conflicts in society, as well as
unconstitutional or undemocratic regime changes often occurred due to power struggles,
which are difficult to address if the ruler, as the patron, fails to fulfil his clients’ needs.209
The dominant political culture emphasizes the values of loyalty, collectivism, and
unity, and is sensitive to the notions of criticism, freedom, resistance, disobedience,
secessionism, and radical change. Furthermore, it preserved the patron-client relationship
of traditional society, which refers to low political culture. This stands in contrast to high
political culture, which bars the military from interventions, but requires it to respect
civilian regimes or uphold civilian supremacy, and introduces negotiations and diplomacy
to overcoming problems.210 The relevance of this can also be seen in forms of sensitive
response of civilian regimes and military leaders to the notions of the federal state and the
elimination of the military’s territorial functions.
I.B.3. Structural Theories
To gain a clearer understanding of the interplay between the military and civilian
regime, particularly the military’s response to reform demands in Indonesia’s democratic
transition, this research also needs to use structural theories for its macro analysis by
examining linkages with the condition of the state in general at the time when the
interplay occurred.211 Structuralism contributes to a deeper analysis of the military
response to the civilian regime’s performance. At this point, factors external to the
military, such as the weak condition of the civilian government and civil society, political
decay, corruption, worsening economic conditions, and a high degree of social inequality
206
Ibid: 110.
See BORG Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972: 1-69.
208
See Finer, 1967, op.cit; also, Kourvetaris in Danopoulos (ed.), 1998, loc. cit: 271, 273.
209
See Anggoro, 2003, loc. cit.
210
See again Kouvertaris, in Danopoulos, 1988, loc. cit.
211
Ibid: 270-272.
207
45
can be examined to see whether the military made any use of its politics of anti-politics,
and also to explain military resistance to reform or its counterproductive behaviour in
212
democratic transition.
Structural theories expose a disruption in the political process and a vacuum of
power, which could draw in the military and become politicised if there is a civilian
213
political failure. Such political failure can be corruption, factionalism, political decay,
illegitimacy and inefficiency of civilian political leadership. All of these defects may
endanger national security and justify the military stepping in and interfering to preserve
stability, law, and order.214 As a consequence, the stability of the state is seen as one of
the most important factors inhibiting military interventions. Weak governments rather
215
than strong armies, account for the occurrence of military coups.
In regard to structural factors, Muhaimin lists reasons, which motivate the military
to enter the political arena and take on a political role sharing a strong relation with the
condition of the country’s political life and political system. He argues that instability in
the country’s political system opens wide the opportunities for the military to use force to
improve the situation and bring back stability.216 Often, such structural factors harm the
reputation of a civilian government. Thus, in a situation where the civilian political
leadership is corrupt, weak, or cannot handle the fundamental tasks of a government,
there is heightened motivation for political intervention by the military.217
From a similar perspective, Singh views military intervention in politics as an
218
implication of political, economic, and social crisis resulting from state changes.
Quoting Amos Perlmutter, Singh supports this argument by saying that military regimes
exist in changing societies, which lack political order and legitimacy.219 They grow in
unstable administrations that are not politically developed or structurally integrated. In
most cases, the administration has never functioned or has already started to malfunction.
Military regimes are established to replace weak civilian regimes, and weak executives
and governments.
212
Brian Loveman linked threat to state integrity with military’s politics of anti-politics, see Loveman,
1999: 186, 213, 254-255; and also Loveman and Davies, Jr., (eds.), 1978: 5 & 12.
213
See Kouvertaris, in Danoupoulos, 1988, loc. cit.
214
Ibid.
215
Dankwart Rostow, quoted in Lee Sigelman, “Research Note: Military Size and Political Intervention,”
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Volume 3, Spring, 1975: 95-100.
216
217
Ibid: 4.
218
219
See Amos Perlmutter, “The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and
Achievements,” World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1, October 1980: 97.
46
In Crouch’s terminology, the structural factors listed above are identified as
external factors resulting from socio-economic conditions, political situations, and
220
international influence, which can influence the military to intervene in politics. The
existence of international factors is mentioned by Crouch in extending important
conditions for a broader military intervention in politics. 221 The impact of political
situations becomes significant due to the unstable domestic situation produced by the
civilian authority’s ineffectiveness in managing its own administration. As stated by
Crouch, the failure of civilian government to preserve stability and achieve a satisfactory
level of economic growth leads to a loss of legitimacy of the military, which makes the
military resistant to radical reform. 222 Such a failure provides not only a reason but also
the perfect chance for the military to intervene. Conversely, a strong and effective civilian
government, which has successfully maintained its legitimacy, can evidently avoid the
possibility of a military coup. Therefore, the existence of a political system with a selfish
and corrupt civilian government and politicians, which has lost people’s credibility, offers
a justifiable reason for the military to become more involved in politics.223 This situation
occurred in most of the Third World countries where the military eventually overthrew
the civilian regime, which, according to Huntington, caused praetorianism, through which
the guardian takes on the position of the master they once guarded.224
Claude E. Welch recognizes eight factors, which encourage the military to
continue to intervene in politics and resist reform demands. These factors include: 225
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The decreasing prestige and role of main political parties;
Frictions among prominent politicians;
Increasing efforts to prevent foreign threats and intervention;
The negative impacts of coup d’etat in neighbouring countries;
Internal conflicts, in particular, social and ethnic conflicts;
Economic malaise;
Corruption and inefficiency of the civilian government;
Increasing consciousness among the military elite of their power and
capability to influence and replace civilian political leaders.
220
See Crouch in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288.
Ibid; Singh, 1996, op.cit: 12.
222
Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 294.
223
224
David E. Albright, “A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” World Politics,
Vol. 33, No. 4, July 1984: 553-576, quoted by Taufik Abdullah in “Civil-Military Relations in the Third
World: An Introductory Taxonomy,” Prisma, No. 20, March 1981: 4 -5; see also Singh, 1996, ibid.
225
Claude E. Welch (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention
and Political Change, Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970: 17-35, ibid.
221
47
Sundhaussen argues that the withdrawal of the military from politics depends on
structural factors, such as the emergence of civilian counter-elites, the middle class,
labour organizations, and vocal opposition. These are all positive impacts of economic
226
and political developments. Furthermore, international allies’ support of the military, or
their withdrawal of this support provokes the military to resist going back to the
barracks.227 However, Singh says that the dynamics of internal rather than external
228
politics influence the military.
It is also noted by Singh that the emergence of an
organized and moderate political party and civilian leaders, which are able to run a stable
government and ready to protect national interest and secure the interest of the military,
will cause the military to leave the political arena. 229 Political symbioses built by the new
civilian political elite and middle class determine whether military intervention in politics
230
will end or not. In other words, in the long run, the existence of new and effective
civilian authorities, which can attend to the state’s interests and will not lead it into
political chaos and instability, will determine whether the military returns to the barracks
or rises to block reform demands.
Apart from the disagreement with Huntington, who says that military
interventions in politics cannot be explained with military reasons, his theory is justifiable
and points to the causes of interventions being in the political and institutional structure
231
of society. Military interventions in developing societies are only one specific aspect in
a condition where politics tends to lack autonomy, complexity, consistency, and
adaptability.232 Therefore, when many different types of social forces and special groups,
such as universities, the clergy, labour unions, and so forth, become “politicized,” or they
become directly active in general politics and issues that influence not only their own
group, but society as a whole, the military will respond in a similar fashion. This means
that military men are concerned not only with the particular intentions of promoting
increased pay and power for the military, but also with the distribution of power and
prestige throughout the political system.
Huntington argues more clearly that the absence or weakness of effective political
institutions will cause military officers to play a political role. Such institutions normally
allow for social forces to participate in politics, or in the condition which is recognized as
233
a praetorian society. In this situation, power is fragmented, causing authority and office
226
Sundhaussen, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 272 et seqq.
Crouch says that international support for the military is effective in situations when civilian regime has
lost most its power. See Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, ibid: 299.
228
229
Ibid.
230
Ibid: 21-22.
231
Huntington, 1975, op. cit.
232
See also, Perlmutter, 1980, loc. cit: 203-204.
233
227
48
to be easily gained and lost. In search of power, politicians simply shift their loyalties
from one social group to another. The degree to which military institutions and
representatives are involved in politics correlates directly with the weakness of the
function of civilian political organizations and the incapability of civilian political figures
to cope with various crucial problems facing the country.234 A veto coup, an extreme sort
of intervention, occurs if the existing government begins to carry out multiple radical
policies, or seeks the support of various groups in eliminating the military from the
235
political arena.
Fidel describes that, in the past, military intervention in politics was most often
rooted in political issues and, in particular, questions of political legitimacy. In contrast,
modern-day interventions are likely to be motivated by more pragmatic questions, such as
the failure of civilian leadership or government to set up and implement acceptable
development programs or the inability of the civilian government to maintain domestic
order.236 At this point, the military’s concern with developmental questions is also a
function of the fact that social change or stagnation fundamentally disturb both the
personal and corporate status of the military.237 Developmental stagnation, which causes
genuine concern for people’s living conditions, becomes a strong source of motivation.
Fidel explains that in the absence of progress under the existing social and political order,
military men may begin to consider their personal and collective role in society in terms
of a historic mission. Also, military interest in development possibly has its roots in the
desire to control the nature of change so as not to radically alter the present condition of
the officer corps and the role of the military institution. In sharp contrast with these
inflexible officers, others perceive change as inevitable and they concentrate their efforts
on becoming involved in change processes and preventing others from exercising a veto
power over programs that potentially press the military from their advantageous position
in society.238
Lieuwen has pointed to both the structural condition and encouraging environment
as causes of praetorianism, or military intervention in politics.239 Drawing on cases in
Latin America, he claimed that the re-emergence of the military on the region’s political
scene was a by-product of the area’s developing economic and social crisis, which
political institutions were not strong enough to restrain. In the resulting political chaos,
the military was called on or forced to intervene again and again.240 Lieuwen also found
that whenever the military took on political power, whatever the actual reason, it claimed
234
Ibid: 349.
236
Fidel (ed.), 1986, loc. cit: 4.
237
Ibid: 7.
238
Ibid: 8.
239
Lieuwen, 1965, op. cit: 24.
235
49
it was doing so only because the civilian government has failed. According to the
military, it was supposedly solely motivated by the purest of patriotic goals and, serious
national circumstances necessitated its intervention. Lieuwen mentioned that since
independence, the military has developed the determined principle that its responsibility
is to step forward in times of internal crisis to rescue the nation from itself.241
Perlmutter adds that the collapse of executive power is a major precondition for
praetorianism, namely, “a situation where the military class of a given society exercises
independent power by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force.” 242 He argues that in
modern praetorian states, the military challenges civilian legitimacy while offering a new
type of political authority. The decline of authority, weak and ineffective political parties,
and the absence of social cohesion in the state help to explain why the military tends to
intervene.243 Disregarding both the institutional and individual interests of the military, he
emphasizes that military intervention into civilian affairs is usually not triggered by
military groups, but by civilians. He found in most cases that when civilian political
structures and institutions failed, when factionalism developed, and when constitutional
means for carrying out political actions were lacking, civilians turned to the military for
political support.244 Thus, whatever type of intervention the military undertakes --acting
as an arbitrator, ruler, or moderator-- there must be, in essence, a reciprocal situation or
problem. Relevant examples include problems with the political system and structure,
such as highly politicized civilian and military institutions, weak political institutions and
social cohesion, or divisions among civilians.245
Huntington and Finer have similar views on the connection between these
problems with the state’s political structure and institutions and the specific types of
military intervention. At this point, both argue that a state with a mature or advanced
political structure and institutions maintains political autonomy, complexity, coherence,
and adaptability, but at the same time does not have a political army, political
bureaucracy, government business, or political religious corps. Conversely, a state with
low or poor political structure and institutions retains no political autonomy, complexity,
coherence, or adaptability. However, this state will have a political army, political
246
bureaucracy, government business, and political religious corps. Finer insists that in a
state with a mature or advanced political system, the level of military intervention is low,
240
Ibid: 123.
Ibid: 124.
242
Perlmutter and Bennett (eds.), 1980, loc. cit: 8-9, 199; See also Amos Perlmutter, The Military and
Politics in Modern Times, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977: 89.
243
Ibid: 15-16, 205.
244
Amos Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army,” Comparative Politics, April 1969:
390-391, quoted by Perlmutter and Bennet (eds.), 1980, loc. cit: 205.
245
Ibid: 205-208, 254-264.
246
Sundhaussen, 1986, op. cit: 440 -447; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999, op. cit: 43.
241
50
while in a state with a low or poor political system, the level of military intervention is
high. 247
The relevance of political structure and military intervention is also mentioned by
Sundhaussen.248 The failure of the civilian regime to develop a political system, which
guarantees political order and stability, contributes to its weakness. In the meantime, the
incapability of a civilian regime to deal with the national disintegration caused by this
failure further encourages the military to interfere in politics.
Nonetheless, for Crouch there is no single factor that is sufficient to explain why
249
the military intervenes in politics or when such an intervention would occur. Likewise,
Fidel emphasizes that employing a single approach, hypothesis, or theory to explain
military intervention or resistance fails to clearly describe cases, which take place in
certain countries. He agrees with Fidel that military intervention or resistance may very
250
well occur in conjunction with a combination of various conditions.
Huntington
acknowledges that an explanation will succeed not by its austerity, but rather its
comprehensiveness.251
Therefore, by using a combination of micro and macro level analysis and
simultaneously adopting actor, cultural, and structural theories, this research aims to
comprehensively describe and explain actor constellations, their rational calculations,
compromises, alliances, co-operations, supports or resistances, as well as conflicts inside
the military and civilian regime, and between parties. In addition, the modes of interaction
of the two parties in the form of unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote,
and hierarchical direction will be more clearly portrayed.252 Therefore, actor theories are
used to examine the internal side of the military, while cultural and structural theories are
used to examine the external side of the military in relation with its response to reform
introduced by civilian regimes during democratic transition.
II. Methodology
II.A. Assumptions and Hypotheses
The basic assumptions in this research are as follows:
247
Sundhaussen, op.cit: 442; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999, op.cit : 42.
Sundhaussen, op.cit: 440 -473; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999, op,cit: 40.
249
Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 299.
250
Fidel (ed.), 1986, loc. cit: 3.
251
Huntington, 1991, op. cit: xiii.
252
Scharpf, 1997, op.cit: 44-47.
248
51
(1) Given the fact that since independence the Indonesian military has been actively
involved in politics, and that there has been no major political crisis in the country’s
history without their involvement on an individual, group, or institutional basis, the
Indonesian military has been sensitive to civilian regimes’ moves to introduce reform,
particularly radical reform;253 (2) It was not easy to implement the concept of civilian
supremacy in the early years of post-Soeharto transition as there was an absence of
common perceptions among military and civilian leaders.
The hypotheses of the research examine different relations as follows:
(1) On the one hand, the lack of compromises, incentives, or compensation offered by
civilian regimes to the Indonesian military, and on the other hand, the potential loss of
many vested interests faced by the Indonesian military, encouraged them to resist reform
and the civilian regimes that introduced it; (2) The less threatened the vested interests of
the Indonesian military were by the reform policies of the civilian regimes, the more
likely it was to offer favourable responses or support of such policies and the respective
regimes; (3) The combination of historical and cultural factors and the civilian regimes’
poor performance increased the Indonesian military’s resistance to reform.
The historical and cultural factors constitute a contextual factor that influences the
interaction between the civilian regime performances, the independent variable, and the
military response, the dependent variable in this case. Their influences are structural and
persistent, reflecting a path-dependency of the Indonesian politics. An analytical model of
this study is presented below.
Diagram 1
Model of Analysis
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
Historical and Cultural Factors
Civilian Regime’s
Performance
Military
Response
253
For an insightful study of the transition from Soeharto to Habibie, see Marcus Mietzner, “From
Soeharto to Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the Transition,” in Geoff
Forrester (ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal of Chaos?, Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies and KITLV Press, 1999: 65-102.
52
II.B. Description of Variables, Concepts, and Indicators
Civilian Regime’s Performance refers to a civilian regime’s reform policies,
particularly in regards to military and security sector reform, and how these reforms are
implemented. This will be studied by examining the capability of three post-Soeharto
civilian governments to introduce and implement security sector reforms and whether or
not they needed to make compromises and give incentives or compensation to the
military. Regime performance is measured by examining the regimes’ capability in
investigating and prosecuting Soeharto for his corruption, collusion, and nepotism as well
as the military for its human rights violations. Also examined will be the governments’
approach to the separatist conflicts mounted in the early years of democratic transition.
Correlations with the military response to their reform policies are also studied in order to
determine whether they were influenced by historical and cultural factors and resulted in
the military’s support or resistance.
Historical and Cultural Factors refer to the ideas and views espoused by civilian
regimes and military leaders regarding reforms that should be implemented, which can be
influenced by the historical background of the formation of the Indonesian state and
military, and the cultural norms and views of civilian regimes and military leaders. This
influence is investigated by examining their family, educational, ethnic and religious
backgrounds, linkages (including to conservative Muslim groups), standpoints, thoughts,
statements, and opinions of each civilian regime and key military officials on reform. The
influence of historical and cultural factors will be identified by looking at the ideas and
views of civilian regimes and military leaders on Soeharto, state integrity, the unitary
state, centralization or accumulation of power, culture of violence, devolution, federalism,
Islam, syariah law, and the formation of an Islamic state. The study evaluates whether the
civilian regimes and military leaders encouraged and supported reform, or whether they
were reluctant and resisted to it because of their strong willingness to defend the old
principles of the state ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 State Constitution. These
principles emphasized the centralization and accumulation of power and control,
harmony, stability, and state integrity. They also rejected the adoption of syariah law, due
to the dominant influence of Javanese culture and their resistance to the rising pressure of
militant Islam in the country.
More specifically, Historical and Cultural Factors refer to the conservative views
of the civilian regimes and military leaders in maintaining Pancasila and the NKRI
53
(Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia),
and in glorifying the important role of the Indonesian military since independence.
Historical and Cultural Factors support the military’s role in politics as well as their
resistance to federalism. They also help explain the military’s obsession with state
stability and integrity, and their reluctance and resistance to further democratization due
to the prevalence of a low political culture. This concept of a “low political culture” refers
to the civilian regimes’ and military leaders’ failure to employ democratic means, such as
negotiations and diplomacy, to handle problems during democratic transition, particularly
dissatisfaction and open conflicts, which led to insubordination and coup attempts. On the
other hand, “high political culture” is characterized by military subordination to the
civilian regimes and its obedience to the principles of civilian supremacy.
Military Response refers to any form of support or resistance by the armed forces
to reforms introduced by the civilian regimes in four main areas, namely, (1) military and
security sector reform; (2) investigation and prosecution of Soeharto’s alleged cases of
corruption, collusion, and nepotism; (3) investigation and prosecution of the military’s
alleged cases of human rights violations; and (4) the handling of separatist conflicts and
proponents of syariah law. Military support demonstrates the military’s acceptance of
reform demands and civilian regimes’ reform policies. Resistance, on the other hand,
refers to the military’s negative reactions and continued rejection of reform.
Military support is analyzed for cases such as the abolition of the military chief for
political and social affairs post, regional commands, and the military faction in
parliament. I will also examine the separation of military and police organizations, the
appointment of a civilian minister of defence, and the withdrawal of military officials
from state institutions. This helps to further explain the military’s institutional and
behavioural changes. At the same time, military resistance will be studied by examining
the military’s interest in maintaining territorial commands, prerogatives, off-budget or
illegal business activities, involvement in ethnic, religious, and separatist conflicts, as
well as human rights violations and resistance to the prosecution of these violations. Its
roles in making politics of anti-politics, in being a veto-player, and in showing
insubordination to the civilian presidents and minister of defence will also be examined.
In general, the military response will be explored by examining the involvement of
the military in the country’s day-to-day politics, and by analyzing whether or not its
politics of anti-politics and activities as a veto player were still being executed, for
example, during amendment processes for the 1945 State Constitution and the drafting of
new laws redefining and repositioning the post-Soeharto military. Specific cases will also
be analyzed, including the military’s reaction to the announcing of states of emergency
and the subordination of the chief commander to the minister of defence, as well as the
repositioning and reorganization of the ministry of defence. The level of resistance,
54
whether low or high, is measured according to how many cases of military resistance
were recorded in response to the reform policies of each civilian regime.
The period from 1998-2004 has been chosen for analysis because it fully
encompasses the three civilian regimes of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati, as well as the
first democratic legislative election following the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime.
Civilian regimes in this research refer to all post-Soeharto civilian presidents with no
military careers or background in their lives. It cannot, however, be ignored that during
this period of democratic transition, there were also ex-military and active generals in
their respective cabinets, including the coordinating minister for politics and security and
military chief commander. In other words, the members of the civilian administrations
were not complete newcomers and free of all influences of the previous authoritarian
regime. However, their presidencies can still be identified as civilian regimes. Lower
numbers of retired military officers and active generals, and a more dominant presence
and influence of civilians in decision-making processes in their cabinets justify the
assessment of the Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati administrations as civilian regimes.
In this dissertation, democratic transition refers to the transformation and change
of a political regime from a non-democratic to a democratic regime, or the interval
254
between one political regime and another during the democratization process. It covers
the period following the dissolution of an authoritarian regime and the installation of new
regimes in the process of democratic consolidation. 255
This study focuses on the period of struggle for democratization following the fall
of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. This period must be dissociated from “democratic
consolidation” which refer to the post-transition period in which “the military becomes
firmly subordinated to civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic
256
constitutional order.” Democratization itself refers to:
“The processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship
were either applied to political institutions previously governed by other
principles (e.g. coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, or
administrative practice) expanded to include persons not previously
enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. non-taxpayers, illiterates,
women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover
issues and institutions not previously subject to public participation (e.g.
254
O’Donnell and Schmitter in O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 6.
Ibid.
256
Diamond in Diamond, Plattner, Yun, and Hung, 1997, loc. cit: xxviii; see also Linz and Stepan in
Liddle (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 17-28.
255
55
state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest
associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.).”257
To highlight linkages between the variables and indicators, a matrix analysis is
presented below.
Table 1
Matrix of Analysis
Variables
Regime Performance
Historical/Cultural
Factors
Military Response
257
Civilian Regimes
(Habibie, Wahid, Megawati)
 Policies for military reform
 Actions targeting Soeharto’s alleged cases of corruption,
collusion, and nepotism
 Coping with human rights abuses allegedly involving the
military, and prosecuting the guilty parties
 Coping with separatist movements; coping with radical
Muslims
 Personal, family, ethnic, religious background
 Political linkages and alliances; relations with radical
Muslims
 Views on constitutional and law reform
 Views on separatist movements
 Views and commitment to the unitary state
 Views on an Islamic state or syariah law
 Support
 Compromise
 Resistance
Diamond, in Diamond, Plattner, Yun, and Hung, 1997, loc.cit.
56
II. C. Research Instruments and Analysis
To ensure that balanced information was collected, all indicators of the Civilian
Regime’s Performance and the Military Response variables were examined using recent
books, mass-media reports, survey results, official speeches, investigation reports of
government and non-government organizations, observational notes, and documentary
studies as well as structured and in-depth interviews with relevant civilians and military
figures, activists, and analysts.
Literature, biographies and autobiographies, documents, mass-media opinions and
interviews were used to analyze the Historical and Cultural Factors in order to understand
how the civilian regimes and military leaders share their beliefs in their own political
culture. Key figures with strategic positions and influence both in the civilian
administrations as well as in the military are primary sources of information. Alternative
sources are prominent figures who were for or against radical reform and those who have
been generally recognized as pro- or anti-democracy, conservatives, progressive, softliners or hard-liners in both civilian regimes and military institutions. Most of them
witnessed the transitional change in Indonesia. Former and current national and
international human rights leaders and activists were also interviewed to make this
research more comprehensive.
Overall, forty-three military and civilian figures were interviewed during 20052008. Interviews were conducted in Jakarta, Bogor, Maluku, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam,
East Nusa Tenggara, West Timor and Irian Jaya provinces, where main incidents,
rebellions and military operations have occurred. The names and the backgrounds of the
interviewees are presented in the appendix. In-depth and structured interviews were
conducted for 1-2 hours, during which tape recorder was not used to give chance to the
informants to freely express their opinions. Nonetheless, notes were made during
interviews, followed by summaries after every interview has been concluded. Also, every
informant has been asked whether their names and information may be cited or not. In
fact, most informants have no objections their names and information can be cited.
In addition to the literature reviews and interviews, the researcher’s personal notes
recorded in Indonesia from 1998-2004 were also used as source material. These notes
were compiled from various sources, including journalists, non-government
organizations, and fact-finding teams. The use of the personal notes is complemented by
an examination of official documents such as the constitution, laws, and parliamentary
minutes and records, as well as presidential decrees and instructions.
Library studies were conducted in Indonesia and Germany, and fieldwork was
carried out in different regions of Indonesia. Questionnaires were prepared as guidance
for structured and in-depth interviews. Standard questions and other filtering, controlling,
57
or verification questions were used to obtain more reliable and objective information. A
cross-check analysis using different sources of information was carried out to gain better
insights into what occurred inside the civilian regimes and the military, and their interplay
during the 1998-2004 democratic transition.
This dissertation on the Indonesian military response to reform in democratic
transition under three civilian regimes from 1998-2004 is therefore an applied qualitative
research which employs a descriptive-interpretative analytical method. A systematic
analysis is presented on a regime-by-regime, case-by-case, and year-by-year basis. In
addition, all of the research findings are presented in the form of a qualitative research
report.
58
Chapter Three
The Habibie Regime (1998-1999)
I. Coping with Military Reform
I.A. What Had Influenced Habibie to Introduce Reform?
This section opens with a discussion of President Habibie’s background.
Indonesia’s third president was born in South Sulawesi to Javanese and Sulawesi parents.
His mother and his wife are both descendants of Javanese nobles, and three of his
brothers in law are two star generals of the army. 1 The young Habibie was a serious
student, and was described as highly energetic, mercurial in his temperament, excitable
and dismissive of criticism. He pursued higher education in Java at the prestigious
Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung --ITB), and went to
Germany after obtaining his diploma. There he studied at the RWTH Aachen Institute of
Technology from 1955 until 1965. After receiving his doctorate, he pursued a career as
an aeronautical engineer by working at the Hamburger Flugzeugbau, later known as the
Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) company, until 1973.
Habibie returned to Indonesia in 1974 upon the request of President Soeharto,
through his special envoy, Lt. Gen. Ibnu Soetowo, who was director general of Pertamina,
the state oil company, to lead the country in drafting strategies to achieve its
2
technological goals. Soon afterward, he presided over several large and high cost state
owned-enterprises, for instance, the national ship (Perusahaan Perkapalan --PAL) and
aircraft industries (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional --IPTN), and then became the
state minister for research and technology in 1978.
His political career began in 1982 when he became a member of the MPR
(People’s Consultative Assembly), a representative of the ruling Golkar (Golongan
Karya --Functional Group) Party. His membership in the group reached its peak with his
1990 election as the chairperson of the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia -Association of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). His significant role in the ICMI led
him to be appointed as Soeharto’s deputy (vice-president) in March 1998 before he
eventually replaced the former strong man of the Orde Baru (New Order) two months
later.
1
A. Makmur Makka (ed.), 60 Tahun Habibie (60 Years Habibie), Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1996;
George Junus Aditjondro, Korupsi Kepresidenan, Reproduksi Oligarki Berkaki Tiga: Istana, Tangsi, dan
Partai Penguasa (Presidential Graft, Reproduction of Three Feet Oligarchy of Palace, Military and
Ruler’s Party), Yogyakarta, LKiS, 2006: 376-377.
2
James Castles et al (eds.), Who’s Who in Indonesia’s Political Arena, The Players, The Parties: A Comprehensive Guide, Jakarta: Castle, 1999.
58
Interestingly Franz Magnis-Suseno mentions that Habibie’s background does not
make him a typical Javanese, but rather more of an urbane leader with a broad
international vision. He was able to accept modernity and generally did not want to act in
the manner of a member of the Javanese political elite. 3 He didn’t beat around the bush
when talking with other people, and expressed his opinions and wishes transparently
without using too much basa-basi (introductions). He urged people to immediately
support his ideas, which is highly contradictory with behaviors commonly demonstrated
by Javanese people. The long time he spent studying and working in Germany influenced
his ways of making decisions, often ignoring the urun-rembug (deliberation) practiced in
Javanese tradition. 4 Unlike Javanese kings and leaders in general, he made decisions
based on logic and scientific considerations, avoiding mystical calculations.
Unlike Sukarno and Soeharto, whose backgrounds were totally Javanese, and both
of which never studied abroad, Habibie’s experiences were much different, and, hence, so
were his style and outlook. Perhaps it was his time spent in Europe that made him
different. He was educated in the West and spent many years of his adult life there. In
many ways, he had adopted a Western lifestyle and outlook, and was very adept in
dealing with the Western world, unlike his predecessors. In many ways, he also
approached problems from a Western perspective due to his scientific outlook and
training. Accepting or adopting Western democracy and all the attendant values that
arose from it was not difficult for him. 5
I.B. Habibie and His Reform Policies
Habibie introduced political liberalization shortly after he was installed as the new
President on May 28, 1998. He offered amnesty to political prisoners and erased the
sentences of those who had been labeled as leftist or rightist extremists in the past and
had become the military targets due to their alleged subversive activities, for instance,
Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Hussain Al-Habsyi. He opened up freedom of expression
and ordered the minister of information (Menteri Penerangan --Menpen), Lt. Gen. (ret)
Junus Josfiah, to annul the press enterprise permit letter (Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan
Press --SIUPP). By September 1999, he had enacted Law No. 40/1999 to guarantee
freedom of the press in the country. During May 1998-August 1999, about 1,600 new
press licences were issued by his government, which was more than six times as many
compared to the 32 years of Soeharto’s rule during which only 241 press licences were
3
Makka (ed.), 1996, loc. cit: 449.
Franz Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in Jakarta.
5
Bilveer Singh, Succession Politics in Indonesia: The 1998 Presidential Election and the Fall of Soeharto,
London: Macmillan Press, 2000: 266-267.
4
59
permitted. 6 The new situation made the press become more liberal, although the ministry
of information was maintained. In February 1999, he signed a new law on political
parties, under which new political parties could be freely founded and were not required
to have Pancasila as their sole ideology. In total, between June 1998 and September 1999,
sixty-seven new laws were passed by the Habibie government and the newly energized
parliament, which was to emerge beyond its rubber stamp status. 7 These achievements
were very much appreciated by observers and critics, such as, Franz Magnis-Suseno and
Marzuki Darusman.8
Not surprisingly, once Habibie’s initial efforts to embrace reforms had been
conducted, this caused negative impacts for military officers. The release of political
prisoners and the flourishing freedom of expression encouraged radical students and
reform activists to question the role of military officers in past political interventions that
had resulted in gross human rights abuses, for instance, the July 27, 1996 attacks of
Megawati’s PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia --Indonesian Democratic Party)
headquarters and the May 13-15, 1998 riots. In response, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid,
Minister of Home Affairs (Menteri Dalam Negeri --Mendagri), sued Detak tabloid and
9
Merdeka daily due to their reports on his alleged involvement in the July 27, 1996 case.
At the same time, Jakarta regional (Kodam Jayakarta) commander, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie
Sjamsoeddin, had prosecuted Tajuk magazine for its reports on his alleged involvements
in the May 13-15, 1998 riots.10
Nevertheless, Habibie supported the amendments to the 1945 state constitution
and laws that would affect --directly, or indirectly-- the military’s future role. The
amendments had changed, for example, the composition of parliament, which reduced the
number of military members at all levels. On a national level, their seats in the MPR
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat --People’s Consultative Assembly) and DPR (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat --House of Representatives) had been reduced by about 50 percent,
from 75 to 38 percent. This cutback was also encouraged for provincial and municipality
parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat I dan II --DPRD I and II). As a
6
Lukas Luwarso,”Pers Indonesia, Pergulatan untuk Kebebasan” (“Indonesian Pers, Struggle for Freedom”),
apakabar@saltmine.radix.net, http:// www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/31/0006.html: 11.
7
Dephumham, http://www.legalitas.org, was accessed on June 11, 2009.
8
Franz Magnis Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in Jakarta; Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta.
9
In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan described that he was largely discredited
by the reports.
10
Ahmad Syafei, “Pers Masih Jadi Kambing Hitam” (“Pers Is Still a Scape Goat”), Suara Merdeka, February 9, 2002, http://www.suara-merdeka.com/harianb/0202/09/analisis1.htm: 1; Luwarso, 2000, loc. cit: 12.
60
result, the number of military officers appointed as members of parliament at both the
national and regional levels was cut in half, and affected 2,800 officers.11
Habibie also urged military leaders to stop practicing fungsi kekaryaan, or
appointing active duty soldiers to non-military functions or civilian assignments, and to
withdraw active officers from bureaucratic and elective posts in the government. Thus,
the officers had to resign from their military careers if they wanted to occupy positions in
political parties and compete in elections to serve as members of parliament, governors,
or majors. During the elections, they had to distance themselves from political parties and
restrain from influencing their old ally, the Golkar Party.
Catering to the demands of radical students and activists for security sector reform,
Habibie encouraged the military to assume a new name, causing it to make a significant
adjustment from its previous name, which had amassed such notoriety, the ABRI
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia --the Indonesian armed forces, including the
national police). The new name was to be TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia --the
Indonesian military, not including the national police) starting from April 1, 1999. The
return to its name of the early post-independence period was an attempt to improve the
military’s image in the reform era, although in reality it could not dissociate itself from
the New Order. 12 The national police force was separated from the military, and thus,
primary responsibility for internal security was transferred to the police. They assumed a
security function, while the military focused solely on defense matters. Consequently, the
Department of Defense and Security (Dephankam) was renamed the Department of
Defense (Dephan) in accordance with the military’s new role.
Moreover, Habibie endorsed calls for the replacement of the Kasospol (Kepala
Staf Sosial Politik --military chief of staff for social and political affairs), whose tasks
dealt mainly with political matters in order to control political parties, parliament,
bureaucracy, and civil society. This position was replaced with the Kaster (Kepala Staf
Teritorial --military chief of staff for territorial functions), whose tasks would no longer
have any relation with political matters. This change led to the abolition of the TNI’s
socio-political council and its staff throughout various regions of the country. In addition,
Habibie endorsed the liquidation of the military’s extra-judicial agency, Bakorstanas
(Badan Kordinasi Pemeliharaan Stabilitas Nasional --coordinating agency for the
maintenance of national stability), which had been misused to control civilian political
activities.
11
Harold Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie: military-civilian relations since May 1998,” in Arief Budiman,
Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia , Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999: 140.
12
Patrick Ziegenhain,The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization, Singapore, ISEAS, 2008: 88.
61
It is also important to note that Soeharto’s successor pushed the military to
introduce these reforms despite offering incentives. For example, in 1999 he only
allocated 5.31 percent of the national revenue and expenditure budget or the Anggaran
Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (APBN), 13 or about 0.94 percent from Indonesia’s
14
GDP, to the institution. It was a major drop compared to Soeharto’s authoritarian
regime. In 1988, for example, this figure reached 2 percent.15 Even as the country fell
into the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Soeharto still continued to allocate a higher budget
to his military, namely 1.3 percent of GDP. 16 With the severe burden inherited from the
1997 crisis, Indonesia’s GDP in 1998 shrunk by 13.1 percent, a sharp drop from the 7.8
percent growth posted in 1997.17 Unemployment figures rose from 4,275,000 in 1997 to
5,063,000 in 1998, or from 4.7 percent to 5.5 percent, 18 while GNP per capita fell to Rp.
1.1 million in 1998 from 2.2 million in 1997. 19 These factors certainly produced
unfavorable conditions for President Habibie to push military reform.
Nonetheless, aside from the unfavorable economic conditions described above,
President Habibie still recommended that the military discontinue its dual function and
withdraw its involvement in day-to-day politics. The military, of course, became
inconvenienced by his political liberalization and moves to appease radical students and
reform activists, since the ban on public criticism of TNI members had been lifted. Thus,
they were also condemned for their role as the protector of the past regime, which had
caused their image to fall dramatically from a position of supremacy to the lowest level
possible.
With the support of the reform movement amid the euphoria of democratization
following the resignation of Soeharto, at the beginning of his administration, President
Habibie capitalized on the civilian supremacy over the military by introducing political
liberalization, which implicated the military and placed it under public scrutiny.20 The
wave of condemnation had forced Gen. Wiranto, the chief commander, to offer an
explicit apology for wrongdoings. This was utterly unprecedented since the formation of
TNI. 21 This situation would surely call the TNI’s historical role into question, which
13
J. Danang Widoyoko, “Dilema Anggaran Pertahanan” (“Defense Budget Dilemma”), paper, workshop on
defence forces reform organized by Imparsial, Jakarta, April 25-29: 1-15.
14
“Indonesian Military,” http://www.nationmaster.com/country/id-indonesia/mil-military: 1, was accessed
on March 21, 2009.
15
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in Widoyoko, loc.cit.
16
Ibid.
17
Laporan Tahunan Bank Indonesia 2002 (Bank Indonesia Report 2002), Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2003:
28.
18
Key Indicators 2002 of Developing Asian Pacific Countries, ADB, 2003: 172-173.
19
Laporan Tahunan Bank Indonesia 2002 (Bank Indonesia Report 2002), Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2003,
op. cit: 45.
20
See Honna, 2003, op.cit: 200.
21
Harold Crouch, ”Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia,” in Uwe Johannen and James Go mez (eds.), Democratic Transition in Asia, Singapore: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2001: 177.
62
could lead to the loss of additional vested-interests it had enjoyed since independence as
well as its roots in the nation’s political culture.
I.C. Military’s Earlier Reactions
Due to its essential role since the formation of the state, as identified, for example,
by Huntington, the military became the first group to anticipate the trend that would end
up affecting its very existence. The military’s fear of losing its long-established
prerogative, as mentioned by Aguero and Stepan, 22 motivated it to actively address the
reforms raised during transition. They were aware that the new political constellations
and configuration of elites would determine the new rules and procedures that would
govern them.
On January 28, 1999, three election laws, which would provide for open, free, and
fair polling, were completely rewritten by a group of academic experts known as the
Panitia Tujuh (Team of Seven) and passed by the parliament. All major parties and
political leaders, including those from opposition groups, appeared willing to participate
in the new legislative elections, which would be held by June 7, 1999 under these new
ground rules. The three laws covered the requirements for forming political parties, the
election system, and the composition of the national and local representative bodies.
More specifically, the new election system law provided that the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan
Umum --National Elections Commission) would be responsible for overseeing the June 7,
1999 elections. Among its tasks was the appointment of the Indonesian Election
Commission (PPI) members, the next lower level of the election bureaucracy. It was also
charged with creating procedures for use in polling, coordinating election monitors,
allocating the number of seats assigned to each province, counting votes and announcing
the final results, and determining which “social functional groups” were eligible to
nominate people to fill the sixty-five appointed seats in the MPR. Given the broad powers
of the KPU and the voting system within the commission, its membership was of critical
importance to controlling and shaping the results of the coming elections and the new
composition of legislative bodies, which would influence the future of the country’s
23
reforms.
The election system law also stipulated that the KPU would be composed of one
representative from each party competing in the elections and five members appointed by
the government. The two groups of party representatives and government members had
22
See Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 13; Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone,
translated by Bambang Cipto, Militer dan Demokratisasi: Pengalaman Brazil dan Beberapa Negara Lain,
Jakarta: PT Grafiti, 1996: 131-132.
23
Edward Masters, “Indonesia's 1999 Elections: A Second Chance for Democracy”, Asia Society, May
1999.
63
equal voting rights; that is, the forty-eight party members would have 50 percent of the
vote, and the five government appointees would have an equal percentage. Importantly,
the superior authority of the KPU members had control over the implementation of the
often unclearly worded election system law. Accordingly, the TNI has tried to influence
the KPU’s makeup, since the very beginning, by sending their men to fill five, or almost
half of the eleven who were proposed by the government, who would represent
24
government interests.
Lt. Gen Syarwan Hamid, Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri), who was also exKasospol (Kepala Sosial Politik --the Indonesian armed forces’ chief for social and
political affairs) was the facilitator of the formation and composition of the KPU
membership. TNI was therefore able to easily propose Maj. Gen (ret) Feisal Tamin and
Maj. Gen (ret) Dunija, who were senior home ministry officials and had long campaigned
alongside the Golkar Party and the military in the past, to control grassroots opinion in
remote areas as KPU members. Also, they could embrace Brig. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, an
active general, ex-chief of staff of Jakarta regional command (Kodam Jayakarta) to be
recommended as one of the five crucial nominees. It was anticipated that Silalahi would
be serving as the surrogate of the military, in particular for the new, but nevertheless
powerful, Kaster (Kepala Staf Teritorial --TNI’s chief for territorial affairs), which
played the old function of Kasospol. Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The attempts
to place military men on the KPU provided reasons to doubt Gen. Wiranto’s sincerity in
withdrawing his military from day-to-day politics and to allow new and free
parliamentary elections to take place unimpeded.25 On the other hand, there were also
probably those within the Habibie regime who still wanted to use old practices to ensure
a favorable election outcome for the interests of their own camps.
In mid-February 1999, as the home ministry’s nominees for the five government
representatives were leaked to the press, a high degree of agitation arose, causing the
ministry to miss three deadlines for announcing the nominees. It was reported that the
delay was caused by the military’s determination that one of its members be included. 26
The military was apprehensive about not having a seat on the KPU, a situation, which
had never arisen in more than seven past legislative elections due to the fact that the
military’s role was so crucial to guaranteeing the security of the country during the
campaign period and elections themselves.27
However, due to strong criticism from radical students and reform activists,
President Habibie was prevented from authorizing the proposal of candidates encouraged
by the military. Intense pressure over several days from radical students and reform
24
Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 217.
Ibid.
26
Masters, 1999, loc.cit.
27
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 218.
25
64
activists, including large demonstrations in Jakarta, pushed Minister Syarwan Hamid to
replace military candidates such as Tamin, Dunija, and Silalahi with high standing and
independent civilian figures, such as, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Andi Mallarangeng, and
Adi Widjojo. The replacement of the generals and the promotion of the liberal and prodemocracy figures and ardent reformers was likely directed by Minister Syarwan to build
support from civil society for the forthcoming legislative elections, which would improve
28
the Habibie government’s image. Therefore, it seemed that President Habibie and his
home minister buckled under popular pressure.
A compromise might have been reached, as the full KPU elected Nasution to
serve as the KPU’s chair, but Adnan Buyung Nasution declined and handed over the top
position to his runner-up, Gen. (ret) Rudini. In exchange for appointing reformers to the
KPU, the government apparently insisted that the retired general be the commission’s
chairperson. 29 Rudini was a former army chief under Soeharto, who sat on the
commission as a representative of the MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong
Royong --the Mutual Self-Help and Familial Deliberation Party), a Golkar splinter group.
In the 1960s, MKGR was one of the military’s political vehicles for initating its dual
function. Rudini was known as a critical officer, but he still agreed with the existence of
the military’s dual function (dwifungsi), which should be maintained in order to cope
30
with new social developments. Thus, despite the failure of the TNI to acquire seats
among the five government representatives, the most important position, namely that of
chairperson, ended up in the hands of an ex-army chief.
The military’s efforts to influence reforms were also apparent in the parliament.
The Team of Seven opened up the option of blocking the appointment of military
members to the DPR and, in return, providing for a small member of appointments to the
MPR. In response, the TNI organized a lobbying effort and pressured all the members of
31
the KPU, by warning them about the consequences of radical change or speedy reform.
Feeling the reality of the military’s pressure, the KPU eventually agreed to let fifty-five
active military members be appointed as DPR members, out of total 550 (10 percent).
In addition, growing pressure from radical students and reform activists to abolish
the TNI’s dual function and seat on the DPR, led military representatives in the MPR
Working Committee to propose that the forthcoming 1999 MPR special session (Sidang
Istimewa) adopt a decree recognizing the military’s role in both the DPR and MPR.
Massive opposition from radical students and reform activists, as well as new political
28
Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid also described the background and reason in interview on January 27, 2008 in
Jakarta.
29
Masters, 1999, loc.cit.
30
See Rudini, “Legitimasi Sosial Peran Sospol ABRI,” paper presented at Sesko ABRI Seminar, Bandung,
November 4-5, 1996, in Honna, 2003, op.cit: 40.
31
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit.
65
parties, outside the parliament building resulted in a moderate version of the decree
(MPR Decree No. 14 on General Elections). This version defended the military presence,
but also made reference to a gradual diminution of their representation, although TNI was
silent on whether or not the number would eventually fall to zero. A statement was issued
by the military faction’s chairperson in the MPR, Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono, who was also the
current TNI’s chief for territorial affairs (Kaster). According to the statement, the TNI’s
social and political role would be systematically reduced, indicating that the military in
due course could maintain its political interests. 32 Hence, as noted by Stepan, there could
be a situation with a low level of conflict, while at the same time the military could still
enjoy its high level of prerogative. 33 More importantly, its prerogatives could be
protected, as the top political leaders in the democratic regime would not challenge it.
I.D. Military’s Strong Contestation of Further Reform Demands
In fact, Habibie wanted to continue pushing reform in order to draw support away
from his opponents inside and outside the parliament. He could be serious with his
reform agenda given the fact that in 1996 he was the only civilian leader --as the
chairperson of ICMI-- who had asked the military, which was still using its old name at
the time, to introduce reforms. Understandably, his tough efforts to democratically reduce
the military’s prerogatives would be met with a high degree of resistance from the TNI.
34
As Stepan argues though, the military would prevail in this crisis.
Of course the military did not want to come out the loser in negotiations with the
civilian elite. After its interventions in the KPU and parliament, it increased the intensity
of competition. In connection with this, Finer had emphasized that military resistance to
civilian regime and reform demands could be attained in various ways, for example, 35
through constitutional means, collusion and competition, and intimidation. In addition to
these methods, it could invoke the threat of non-cooperation and violence.
Knowing that the military’s soft resistance had failed in achieving its principal
objective, Lt. Gen. Suyono, Secretary General of the Department of Defense, charged
that Habibie’s reform policies ran the risk of causing the military to grow increasingly
impatient with the constant challenges to its authority, which could eventually cause the
situation to explode.36 Meanwhile, the Indonesian society’s fragility during the reform era
32
Majalah Tempo, November 23, 1998: 23.
Stepan, translated by Cipto, 1996, op. cit: 131-132.
34
Ibid: 136.
35
S.E. Finer, 1962: op. cit.
36
See “ABRI Ulang Tahun di Tengah Hujatan” (“ABRI’s Anniversary amid Charges”), October 6-12,
1998, quoted by David Bourchier, “Skeletons, vigilantes and the Armed Forces’ fall from grace”, in Budi man, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 155.
33
66
left it vulnerable to manipulation by military leaders to delay or stop further reforms. In
Jakarta and other regions, military elements started to provoke incidents, and exacerbate
communal conflicts to create chaos on a national scale in order to increase their
bargaining position vis-a-vis Habibie.
Conflicts in regions where military governors and garrison commanders no longer
existed were supposedly created by the military in order to show local people and
civilians in the country that without the military’s presence, the political situation would
become uncontrollable. Rinakit was apparently quite right in saying that the stronger the
civilian government’s efforts to implement decentralization, the stronger the military’s
37
corresponding resistance. As the military’s interests were disrupted, social violence
spread to the whole country. Conflicts that broke out in districts that were led by the
military may have been contrived by the military itself so as to avoid public accusations
that the military was behind this violence. The shadow conflicts were used as evidence to
argue that it was absurd to say that they had created problems, since similar conflicts also
occurred in regions where they held the reigns of control. Reportedly, unrest and bloody
incidents were deliberately created in certain regions, and rogue military elements
disguised as civilians were charged with carrying out these dirty jobs. Provocations and
the use of militias, paramilitary, or counter-dissident vigilante groups 38 became a daily
occurrence in the military’s involvement in troubled spots.
Various threats to TNI’s institutional interests, including decentralization policies,
apparently motivated it to protect its territorial functions by creating conflicts and
instability in these regions. In fact, social violence increased drastically following the
start of the reform era, with medium and high-scale conflicts raging in regions led by
civilian governors, i.e. Maluku, Aceh, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and Irian
Jaya. On the other hand, regions still run by military governors, i.e. Bali, North Sumatera,
39
and West Java, conflicts were less common and those that occurred were less violent.
The involvement of some military elements in communal conflicts across the
country likely correlated to their objective of influencing the results of the November
1998 MPR special session. This would prevent the reform movement from using the
session to urge the military to introduce radical reforms. Around the time that the
conflicts commenced, the TNI position was at stake due to increasing demand for their
role in social and political affairs to be reduced. Throughout May 1998, the protests of
radical students had been uncontrollable. In the following months in mid-1998, all
indications suggested that if nationalist opposition groups such as, Barisan Nasional
(National Front founded by anti-Soeharto generals), NU (Nadhlatul Ulama --the
37
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 84.
Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 17, 19-20; David Kowalewski (1991),”Counterinsurgent Vigilantism and Public
Response: A Philippine Case Study,” Sociological Perspectives, 34 (2): 127-144.
39
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 80.
38
67
resurrected Islamic cleric group), and PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan -Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle), joined the radical students, and if popular
opposition figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri created a
united front, the impact of these coalitions could jeopardize the outcome of the future
MPR special session and threaten the fate of Gen. Wiranto’s career as chief commander
of TNI.40
President Habibie therefore had to address some very delicate issues, including
the communal and “mysterious” cultural conflicts, namely, the slaughter of so-called
black magic healers or practitioners, locally refered to as dukun santet or dukung
41
tenung. Interestingly, starting in early July 1998, the unexplained murders began to
occur more frequently. Affected parties included the dukun tenung, kyai (traditional
Muslim clerics), teachers of pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools), and
common citizens, who were known as the followers of Wahid’s NU and Megawati’s
PDIP. The slaughters occurred in Banyuwangi and other neighboring districts, such as
Jember, Lumajang, Pasuruan, Sumenep, and Bangkalan. It was believed that only the
military had the skills to conduct killings, which were supposedly coordinated by active
42
or retired TNI personnel for their own institutional purposes. An independent factfinding team made up of credible NU senior clerics found evidence that military elements
43
were involved in the killings. Not surprisingly, during a rare interview, the ex-instructor
of the School for Intelligence Techniques of Bais (Badan Inteljen Strategis --Military
Strategic Intelligence Board), Lt. Col. Rudolf Barimbing, indicated the role of his former
agency by stressing that “only fools would believe that these killings were purely
44
criminal acts.” Other retired military officers also claimed that the mysterious killings
of suspected black magic healers were professionally orchestrated and matched the
military profiles of previous Bais covert intelligence and psychological operations. 45
The occurrences, that Lt. Col Barimbing and other retired military officers
disclosed, have helped explain the role of his institution, Bais, as behind the military
covert operations in Banyuwangi. To control state security, Habibie had appointed his
trustee, his brother in law, Lt. Gen. Z.A. Maulani, as the new chief of Bakin (Badan
Kordinasi Inteljen Negara --National Intelligence Coordinating Board). Nonetheless, the
first civilian president disregarded Bais, an important and a solid military intelligence
institution during the Soeharto era, which was still under military control 46 As a
40
Waluyo, 2007, loc. cit.
42
Hermawan Sulistyo, “Greens in the Rainbow: Ethnoreligious Issues and the Indonesian Armed Forces”,
in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001: 303.
43
Majalah Tajuk, February 1998, cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 169.
44
Majalah Gatra and Majalah D&R, ibid: 170.
45
Anuj Ralhan, “Psychological Operations in Indonesia’s Recent History,” Washington DC, 2002: 16.
46
Waluyo, 2007, loc. cit.
41
68
consequence, the institution could not be placed completely under his coordination, and
its operations could not be wholly controlled.
Different sources of information disclosed the involvement of Kopassus
(Komando Pasukan Khusus --army’s special forces) deserters, who had been caught by
“Banyuwangi citizens” while acting as Ninjas, or fighters who dressed like Japanese
knights (Samurai) who were armed with swords or machets. 47 It was further reported that
Kopassus were operating in and around Banyuwangi at that time, which also involved
“drops outs” from the Akabri (the Armed Forces Academy --the previous name of Akmil
or today’s Military Academy) allegedly organized by certain military figures. 48 The
military therefore became more vulnerable and seemed to be back at work in conducting
psychological operations with the goal of influencing the prospects of reform by
49
introducing terror, hysteria, and fear into the public. A reasonable explanation for the
Banyuwangi killings was that they might be an attempt to provoke a national upheaval,
which could excuse the suspension or even the annulment of the November 1998 MPR
special session. 50 Deputy chief commander Adm. Widodo pointed to the impossibility of
holding the incoming MPR session due to to the weakening national stability and security.
Alternatively, the mysterious killings might have been focused on upsetting the
political opposition. A fundamental common interest of the military was that if either of
the country’s opposition leaders, namely, Wahid or Megawati, threw their support behind
the demonstrators demanding the removal of the current commander in chief, the MPR
would have no choice but to remove him/her. The radical student and reform activist
movements had already shown their huge potency in stymieing the military’s interests.
Backed by Wahid and Megawati, they would be unstoppable. It was therefore feared that
radical reform would pave the way for a sudden ouster of old system elements, thus
severely curbing the influence of the military and Gen. Wiranto’s position. Meanwhile,
with the mysterious killings and instability in the regions of East Java, the military could
create antagonism between Wahid’s NU and Megawati’s new mass-based party, PDIP, in
their traditional bases. 51
There was therefore a possibility that the military was planning to create chaos
throughout East Java, disrupting the formation of Wahid’s National Awakening Party
(PKB) and at the same time disrupting a major congress of Megawati's PDIP planned for
47
”Awas, Pasukan Ninja Menuju Jakarta,” SiaR News Service, November 4, 1998, siar@minihub.org
http://apchr.murdoch.edu.au/minihub/xp, Xpos, No. 43/I/24, Oktober 30, 1998; “Awas, Aksi Kelompok
‘Eks-Tidar’", Siar-XPOS, March 11, 1999.
48
Nicholas Herriman,”Sorcerer Killings in 1998 in East Java: An Analysis of Press and Academic Reports”,
th
paper presented to the 17 Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne
July 1-3, 2008, the Monash Asia Institute.
49
Ralhan, 2002, loc.cit.
50
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit; see also Sulistyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 302-303.
51
69
Bali, just half an hour by ferry from Banyuwangi. 52 Such motivation has also been
described by a human rights worker who has investigated the May 13-15, 1998 riots who
questioned the role of Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, the East Java regional (Kodam V
Brawijaya) commander responsible for all the troubled spots.53 For both popular leaders,
it was obviously not the first time they had been targeted by such covert military
operations. Prior to the 1997 general elections, Wahid’s NU and Megawati’s PDI had
been severely disturbed by Operasi Naga Hijau (Operation Green Dragon) and Operasi
Naga Merah (Operation Red Dragon), respectively. 54
I.E. Habibie’s Compromise with the Military
Since the Banyuwangi killings failed to achieve their intended objective of
delaying or annulling the November 1998 MPR special session, the military prepared
militias and paramilitary groups to become involved in different covert intelligence and
psychological operations to influence the results of the session. President Habibie also
felt threatened by the session, and rather than blocking Gen. Wiranto’s efforts to organize
the groups, he supported the general financially. These funds were taken from off-budget
sources, for example, the reforestation fund and Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik --State
55
Logistics Agency) emergency cash, and used to cover the operational costs of securing
the session from the pressure of radical students and reform activists. In the time leading
up to the session, it became clear that the opposition movements led by Wahid and
Megawati had also urged President Habibie to resign, and, moreover, did not want him to
run again in the upcoming presidential election. Thus, a type of symbiotic relationship
emerged based on the common interest of the military and Habibie to safeguard their
positions in the special session.
The most direct way of preventing the MPR from working against their interests
was of course to simply stop it from convening in the place where demonstrators had
56
forced Soeharto to resign, namely, in the parliament building. For this reason, Habibie
supported the TNI in sending approximately 30,000 troops and 125,000 civilian
vigilantes to barricade the parliament. Most of these people had been recruited from
radical Muslim groups and trained by TNI under the auspices of the Pam Swakarsa
52
Jason Brown, “The Banyuwangi Murders: Why Did Over a Hundred Black Magic Practitioners Die in
East Java Late in 1998?” Inside Indonesia, No. 62 April-June 2000, http://www.hamline.edu/apaka bar/basisdata/2000/08/16/0015.html.
53
Author’s interview with the human rights worker in Jakarta.
54
Majalah Forum Keadilan, February 10, 1997 in Honna, 2003, op.cit: 43.
55
Public debates between Gen. Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen in 2004 unintentionallydisclosed the use
of the off-budget sources. See also, S. Yunanto et al, Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and SouthEast Asia, Jakarta: FES and the Ridep Institute, 2003: 125, 178-179.
56
O,Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 294-295.
70
(Pasukan Pengaman Swakarsa --voluntary civilian security forces) project.57 They aimed
to put a halt to rallies of advocates of total reform and end opposition of President
58
Habibie. Their repressive methods of dealing with the demonstrators resulted in the
Jumat Kelabu (Black Friday), also known as the First Semanggi Tragedy, which occurred
on November 12-13, 1998, caused dozen students and civilians died and hundreds
injured.59
Wiwid Partiwo, a student of Trisakti University gave testimony about the Black
Friday before the Komnas HAM. Students from this university had been killed during the
May 12, 1998 Trisakti shootings, which had triggered the fall of Soeharto. Partiwo
disclosed the existence of covert and psychological military operations, in which
Paspampres (Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden --military presidential guards), consisting
of TNI members of elite units with a high degree of operational autonomy, were involved
in the tragedy. 60 As mentioned by Bourchier, President Habibie had stitched up a deal
with the military; they collaborated to put in place an amended version of the New Order
regime to protect their common interests. 61 In effect, the First Semanggi Tragedy had
been successful in protecting Habibie from being forced out of power, as well as
protecting the TNI from having to completely withdraw from political life.
Before the Banyuwangi killings and the First Semanggi Tragedy began, Indria
Samego, Habibie’s political aide, had reminded the president that due to the military’s
high level of resistance to radical reforms, it could easily provoke simultaneous incidents
throughout the country to produce nationwide instability by employing its potential for
62
conducting intelligence operations. Samego also reminded the president about the
military’s disinclination to change its fundamental principle of “kemanunggalan tentara
dengan rakyat” (unity between the military and the people). This principle had
distinguished it from militaries in advanced democracies that would impede attempts to
remove this dual function. That is why post-Soeharto military leaders continued to see
democracy as being at its best when guided by stability and order, and civil liberties and
individual rights were circumscribed by measures to secure national security. 63
Nonetheless, Habibie’s preoccupation with staying in power until the next
presidential election had forced him to follow an ambiguous reform agenda with military
leaders. This so-called “new paradigm,” which replaced the concept of “occupying” with
57
Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 156.
Sulistyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 305.
59
Muhadjir Darwin, “Freedom from Fear: Social Disruption and System of Violence in Indonesia”, in Aris
Ananta (ed.), The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, Appendix 2, No. 23. See a detailed explanation in Part III (on human rights violations) of this chapter.
60
61
62
Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006 in Jakarta.
63
See Sebastian, 2006: 47.
58
71
“influencing,” implied that there was no significant difference between the two terms,
because both express the military’s readiness to engage in political role-sharing with
other national institutions, based on the old assumption that the military had a rightful
role to play in domestic politics.64 Thus, he was able to agree with the military leaders’
statement, which insisted that the military reform process had to be gradual, and the
elimination of its social and political role would depend on the maturity of the society,
65
which continued to remain sentimentally attached to its New Order era mission.
Habibie’s compromise with the unclear TNI reform agenda could be seen in his
new decision. In it, he agreed to reduce the dual function but only on the proviso that this
process be undertaken over a span of years, which, according to the observers, was an
absurdly long period of time in the current political climate.66 Likewise, military leaders,
such as Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono, blamed radical students and reform activists for the
unstable situation produced by their quickly increasing pressure of reforms, in order to
justify the TNI’s new integralist intervention. Such an intervention was similar to moves
by military leaders in the late 1950s to counter President Sukarno and other civilian
leaders with their experiment in liberal democracy. Stressing that a Western-style multiparty democracy remained inappropriate for Indonesia, and the post-Soeharto political
situation could bring the country back to the 1950s and 1960s, Yudhoyono began to
support this parallel measure. As recognized by Lindsey, it was not hard to see that if
Indonesia experienced political turmoil, security disturbances, and instability, then the
current debate regarding the shape of the reform might be reinvented by the military and
the government as a debate about whether reform should take place at all.67
I.F. Military Success in Preserving Its Interests
The new intervention was conducted by the TNI by retaining a formidable
political presence through its territorial organizations. The insignificant change in the
territorial structure gave it a considerable capacity to intervene in local politics under the
guise of maintaining stability. Regional civilian administration, particularly in remote
areas lacking civil society control, was still vulnerable to its pressure. It was no coincidence that in May 1999, Gen. Wiranto announced that there would be a phased return
to the pre-1980s system of having seventeen military regional commands (Kodam), in
64
Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 138-139; Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 307.
Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit.
66
See, Timothy Lindsey, “Indonesia’s Negara Hukum: Walking the Tightrope to the Rule of Law”, in
Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 370.
67
Ibid: 373.
65
72
line with the “new paradigm” designed to ensure that the Kodam were closer to the
populace.68
To this end, the first such move was taken with the creation of Maluku regional
command (Kodam XVI Pattimura) in Maluku on May 15, 1999. In Central Sulawesi,
after violence began in Poso in December 1998, a new regional command (Kodam
Merdeka) was considered.69 In addition, by September 1999 there were reports that a
regency level military command, namely, Korem 161 Wirasakti in Kupang, would be
upgraded to the status of Kodam, and six additional Kodam would be established, but no
time table was set.70 As a substitute for the Korem 164/Wira Darma of Dili, East Timor,
which had been dissolved, a new Korem was created in Flores to transfer soldiers who
had lost their posts following the referendum.71 The creation of a Kodam in Kupang had
been cancelled due to the vociferous local outcry to such plans in Flores, a region in
eastern Indonesia, which had a population dominated by non-Javanese and Christians.
Thus, the rationale behind the formation of the new territorial structures was to preserve
the TNI’s political hegemony with all its interests.72
Communal conflicts and religious and ethnic violence throughout the country had
provided a crucial opportunity for the military to maintain its role in society, and more
specifically, to preserve its most important historical, cultural, and political property,
namely, its territorial structure. The connection between various conflicts and the military
could, to some extent, be seen as co-relational, as they are both directly and indirectly
involved in the conflicts as individuals, groups, and institutions. As concluded by Azca,
without necessarily blaming the military for instigating or masterminding anything,
violence had certainly served to justify the preservation and expansion of the military’s
73
territorial structure, which indicated a setback for the reform processes.
TNI officials being appointed to important positions continued. Active military
officers were still “elected” from a government-approved list of three candidates by the
parliament based on the 1997 election. This election had been heavily dominated by the
Golkar Party, and these candidates replaced retiring military officers as governors in
several provinces, particularly in major provinces like Central and East Java. The same
thing happened at lower levels, where active military officers often replaced retiring
68
The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military Relations since the Fall of Soeharto”, Indonesia, 70, October
2000, New York: Cornell University, SEAP: 132.
69
George Junus Aditjondro, Pemekaran Kodam Sulawesi (The Enlargement of Sulawesi Kodam), 2002: 1,
in Muhammad Najib Azca, “In Between Military and Militia: The Dynamics of the Security Forces in the
Communal Conflict in Ambon”, AJSS, 34, 3, Leiden: KBNV, 2006: 451.
70
The Editors, Indonesia, October 2002, loc. cit: 132-133.
71
“Mabes TNI-AD Bersikeras Mendirikan Korem di Flores”, TNI Watch!, Siarlist@minihub.org, Decem ber 15, 1999.
72
Aditjondro, 2002, in Azca, 2006, loc. cit.
73
Ibid: 432, 451.
73
military heads of regencies, or mayors. Provincial governments also continued to recruit
military officers to important positions. In Jakarta, for instance, 150 active military
74
officers, or 458 including retired officers, were employed by the Jakarta administration.
Even in the new Department of Defense, the military still controlled civilian and
bureaucratic posts. What had been proclaimed as a “new paradigm” did not necessarily
reduce the number of positions held by people with military backgrounds. It also did not
end the practice of putting pressure on civilian agencies to request the appointment of
military officers to civilian posts. 75 Thus, these internal reforms made by the TNI were
rather half hearted since they were only a response to criticism. They were also aimed at
persuading critics of the TNI to accept its reform agenda, which was conceived by TNI
itself to maintain its dwifungsi as a means of legitimizing its role as a proponent of
modernization. 76
The TNI in fact still wanted to engage in political role-sharing with civilians. It
refused to stay out of politics, remain disconnected from societal groups, or maintain an
equal distance from all political forces. Using the existing territorial structure, they still
had a chance to exert pressure both on the regional and local governments and population.
This explained why, by early 1999, the speed of military reforms had been very slow and
had not progressed very far. As Crouch stated, whatever the theoretical arguments the
TNI used in favor of reforms, the interests of many military officers were tied to the old
system. 77
O’Donnell and Schmitter had previously emphasized that during transition, actors
struggled not only to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of those whom
they claimed to represent, but also to define rules and procedures, which would determine
likely winners and losers in the future. Certainly these emerging rules would largely
define which resources could legitimately be expended in the political arena, and which
78
actors would be permitted to enter it. Not surprisingly, the TNI still wanted to defend its
position in the forefront and its parliamentary seats until 2004 by proposing the RUU
KKN (Rancangan Undang-undang Keselamatan dan Keamanan Negara --Bill on State
Safety and Security) to the DPR in September 1999 despite strong opposition from
radical students and reform activists. The new repressive state emergency bill would
74
Media Indonesia, November 20, 1998.
Media Indonesia, November 10, 1998.
76
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al, Tentara yang Gelisah: Hasil Penelitian Yipika tentang Posisi ABRI dalam Gerakan Reformasi (Anxious Soldiers: Research Report of Yipika on ABRI Position in Reform Movement),
Bandung: TAF, PPW-LIPI & Mizan, 1999: 285-287, in Muhammad Najib Azca, “Security Sector Reform,
Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: the Case of Ambon, Indonesia”, Berghof: 4-5. In interview on
May 15, 2006 in Jakarta, Bhakti gave the same opinions on the current progress of the TNI reform; see also
Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 307.
77
Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 139-140.
78
O’Donnell and Schmitter, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 6.
75
74
enable the TNI to legally conduct searches and seizures, place people under immediate
detention, impose curfews, and order media shutdowns.
From the beginning, President Habibie gave no objection to the bill being
submitted to the parliament, because he wanted Gen. Wiranto to be his deputy, or vicepresident, in the next presidential election. Consequently, the TNI’s heavy handed
response to protesters struggling for a new political atmosphere and questioning the
military’s post-Soeharto position and past wrongdoings led in the end to the Second
Semanggi Tragedy on September 23, 1999, during which four people died and scores
were wounded. 79 The next day as demonstrations continued, and due to Habibie’s interest
in running in the presidential election that would be held in less than two months, and
was then threatened by the tragedy, he immediately changed his mind. He stepped in and
declared that he would suspend signing the bill into law.
As found by Aguero, in some cases, the military initially sought to maintain some
of the features of the old regime or to assist in shaping the new one. In most cases, it also
struggled for internal control of the military and for protection from external political
control. It worried about and finally resisted political change when it imposed rules of
80
control. Likewise, as highlighted by Harjanto, the transition process took on the shape
of a pact or negotiation model between the civilian and military forces. Its search for
preferences and platforms of democratic rule was a process defined by historical and
81
strategic considerations for the future. It also showed how established institutional
patterns had tended to shape political life.82
Political development in Indonesia had taken on the characteristics of a pathdependent process. It followed a pattern, which connected to the next phase, and then
backed to the same pattern again, so that in the end it barred other choices. By also using
existing institutional patterns, a political force like the military, which had been involved
in politics for a long time, could maintain its existence. More significantly, the TNI and
conservative elites were able to exercise their institutional prerogatives stemming from
authoritarian rule during the transition period. They were able to preserve their power and
determine the limits of popular sovereignty in a new democratic rule under the civilian
regime of Habibie.
79
Amos Perlmutter, “Military and Politics in Modern Times,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 9, No.
1, March 1986: 2, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit.
81
Nico T. Budi Harjanto, “Masa Depan Peran TNI dalam Tatanan Demokrasi di Indonesia: Harapan Kalangan Militer” (“The Prospect of TNI Role in Indonsia’s Democracy: Military Hope”), in Rizal Sukma and J.
Kristiadi (eds.), Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer
(Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Transition in Indonesia), Jakarta: CSIS and the Asia Foundation,
1999: 86.
82
Harjanto, ibid, referred to Wendy Hunter’s work on “Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military
in Post-Authoritarian Brazil,” Comparative Politics, 27, No. 4, July 1995: 426.
80
75
II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases
II.A. Habibie’s Serious Attempts to Investigate Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases
On November 12, 1998, the MPR special session issued MPR Decree No.
11/1998 on the creation of clean government based on KKN practices (Korupsi, Kolusi,
dan Nepotisme --corruption, collusion and nepotism). It was only after student protests
once again led to student deaths at the hands of the military that the MPR special session
finally agreed to a resolution to investigate the New Order regime’s corruption. The
investigation actually named Soeharto, explicitly mentioning him, his family and cronies
as bad examples for the KKN. 83 Therefore, the decree gave President Habibie the
mandate to seriously investigate the Soeharto family and their cronies’ KKN in seven
charity foundations. These foundations included Supersemar, Dakab, and Amal Bakti,
which had caused state losses exceeding US$ 600 million.84 An estimate of the Soeharto
family’s total wealth, which was not free from the practices of KKN, started at US$ 15
billion and ran as high as US$ 73.4 billion. 85 Meanwhile, the UN’s Stolen Asset
Recovery Initiative released an official report that ranked Soeharto as the highest earning
political leader, who had been accused of corruption and stealing from the people during
86
the period 1967-1998, with US$ 15-35 billion wealth.
Under strong pressure from political parties, radical students, and reform activists,
Habibie then had to show that legal conditions had changed and supremacy of law now
prevailed. By late November 1998, he took the initiative to follow-up the MPR’s explicit
order to probe Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. To investigate the sources of Soeharto’s
wealth, he ordered his first attorney general, Sujono Chanafiah Atmonegero, to conduct
enquiries. 87 Furthermore, to build support from the reformist camps ahead of the new
legislative elections of June 1999, he tried to break the stalemate on Soeharto’s alleged
KKN cases. Thus, on June 1, 1998, Atmonegoro announced the launching of an
investigation into the assets of state officials, including Soeharto and his family, by
88
establishing a team of thirty-five members. Displaying the seriousness of his effort,
President Habibie asked a famous independent lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution, to help
him in the investigation. Seeing Habibie’s apparent sincerety and seriousness in pursuing
the Soeharto family’s ill-gotten wealth, Buyung Nasution responded by setting up an
independent commission.
83
Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 101.
“Soeharto’s (Un) Pardon,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2006: 11.
85
Time, Volume 153, No. 20, May 24, 1999.
86
M. Fadjroel Rachman, “Rekor Koruptor ‘Top Markotop’” (“’Top Markotop’ of Corruptor Record”), Harian Kompas, September 20, 2007: 6.
87
Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 134.
88
Nadirsyah Hosen,”Habibie, Soeharto, and Yudhoyono: A Better World for All,” May 21, 2006.
84
76
Two weeks later, on the morning of June 15, 1998, Atmonegoro met Habibie to
report his preliminary findings on the corruption cases. Reportedly, during this meeting,
he told the President that he had found evidence of illegal practices perpetrated by
Soeharto's “charitable” foundations or yayasan. In the attorney general’s legal opinion,
the proof was enough to allow the former New Order strong man to be interviewed as a
suspect. Detention was possible and there were indications of corruption having also been
committed by several of Habibie’s top ministers and some of Habibie’s relatives.
Unexpectedly, Attorney General Atmonegro also publicly claimed to have told Habibie
that he had legal evidence that even the President himself could become a suspect in the
allegations of the corruption cases.89 Because of this, Habibie then asked Atmonegoro to
visit his office again just five hours later. That same afternoon, Habibie informed the
attorney general that he had been replaced by Maj. Gen. Andi Muhammad Ghalib.
Habibie’s concern regarding Atmonegoro’s public statements and uncontrolled
moves, and Soeharto’s reaction of issuing a harsh threat caused the President to cancel
the plan to form an independent commission under Buyung Nasution, and he instead
appointed a new attorney general. 90 Habibie took some actions that seemed to be favors
to his predecessor, Soeharto. Among these was his decision to discharge Atmonegoro
after the attorney general announced that he was organizing an investigation of the
91
unexplained wealth of previous government officials, including Soeharto and himself.
Under pressure from the MPR, Habibie later issued a presidential order to
Attorney General Ghalib to initiate an investigation. Nevertheless, Ghalib limited his
investigations of the Soeharto family’s wealth to land and cash-holdings in local banks.
According to his critics, he acted like a well-rehearsed striptease dancer in uncovering the
extent of the Soeharto wealth bit-by-bit at a dreadfully slow pace. President Habibie’s
efforts had suggested that the case had been focused only on Soeharto’s foundations
which seemed to contrast with reports of Soeharto’s wealth published in the massmedia. 92
In the beginning, however, Ghalib was seemingly serious in following the
President’s order. On December 2, 1998, in response to a mass demonstration, President
Habibie instructed the attorney general to investigate Soeharto’s wealth. Ghalib then
began with an easier case by moving for a trial in regard to the Goro-Bulog scandal. This
scandal had involved Soeharto’s youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putera (Tommy),
through his Goro company which had caused state losses of about Rp. 3 trillion.93 The
89
Ibid.
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 190-191.
91
Philip Shenon,” Suharto Rebuilds His Political Base to Shield Fortune,” The New York Times, July 2,
1998.
92
Hosen, 2006, loc.cit.
93
“Gubernur BI: Rp. 546 Milyar Dikembalikan” (“BI Governor: Rp. 546 Billion Returned”), Suara Pembaruan, August 18, 1999.
90
77
evidence that Tommy had caused these losses was quite obvious,94 and therefore the state
prosecutors specified Tommy as a suspect on December 10, 1998.
II.B. Explanations for Military Resistance
The military resisted the investigation and prosecution of Soeharto’s alleged KKN
cases. Since the transfer of power from Soeharto and the inauguration of Habibie in the
Merdeka palace on May 22, 1998, Gen. Wiranto had told Habibie and other Soeharto
successors that the military would do anything to protect Soeharto and his family from
any attempts that could disturb their future life after the resignation. Wiranto’s initiative
to come forward and convey a few remarks immediately after the inauguration obviously
explained the military’s position and their top leader’s message to those who wanted to
disturb the ex-New Order ruler and his family. A question that obviously arises is: why
did Wiranto and other senior military officers agree to protect Soeharto and his family? A
clear explanation will therefore be needed in order to understand the TNI’s response to
the full investigation of Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases by the Habibie regime.
Interestingly, chief commander Gen. Wiranto and army chief Gen. Subagyo had a
background as Soeharto’s adjutants. They owed their careers entirely to Soeharto, and felt
personally indebted to him, as he had promoted them to the highest posts in the military.
They were beneficiaries of the material rewards which Soeharto customarily bestowed on
his loyal supporters for their assistance. 95 These men as well as military units involved in
joint ventures with members of the Soeharto family, received privileges from his
government. Understandably, the ex-New Order’s authoritarian ruler and his family were
encircled by trusted ex-adjutants and military bodyguards, the so-called “Cendana
graduates,” who gained fast-track promotions, held key positions, and had direct access
96
to Soeharto and privileged access to funds. They held Soeharto in high esteem and
respected his achievements for the nation. This was a general patron-client relationship in
97
Javanese society as earlier mentioned by Muhaimin.
Similar to Soeharto, Wiranto came from an ordinary family with a traditional
Javanese background. Not surprisingly, he frankly acknowledged that he had cultural
relations with Soeharto; even after Soeharto was no longer a president, he maintained
these. He continued to regularly visit him after the resignation, and continued to conduct
what in Javanese society popularly known as ngilmu and ngelmu. This means he learned
about a lot of rational and irrational things from him, although he refused to perceive this
94
Andi Ghalib informed this also in interview on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta.
O’Rourke, 2002, op .cit.
96
Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kinsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 150.
97
Muhaimin, 1982, op cit: 9-10.
95
78
as receiving orders to be carried out in response to current situations. 98 After his
resignation, Soeharto’s close ties to the military, which had remained a powerful national
institution, were in evidence in June 1998, when he accompanied several powerful army
generals to Islamic prayers held in military mosques in Jakarta. It is reported that the
former president still regularly visited Paspampres officers and their commander, Maj.
Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, in their Jakarta headquarters. They would meet for lunch, and
even practiced shooting exercises together, all of which drew criticism from President
Habibie’s military adviser, Sintong Panjaitan. 99 At a news conference, Gen. Wiranto
acknowledged that he and other senior military officers remained “close” to Soeharto. 100
It seems that this could explain why Wiranto wanted to promote Sutarto as his
operational assistant, although Panjaitan had asked Habibie to replace the Paspampres
commander.101
Furthermore, Wiranto possessed many of qualities that Soeharto sought. As a
fellow native of Central Java, he shared many of Soeharto’s notions of hierarchy, bravery,
loyalty, and fealty. The 1968 military academy graduate put a leather puppet of Bima in
his office. Bima was an important figure from among five Pandawa knights, who in the
Javanese shadow puppet and Mahabarata epic had fought for Rama in his sacred war
against Dasamuka, the leader of the evil forces with his troops (the Kurawa). Wiranto
said that he was highly impressed by Bima’s character, which was preoccupied with the
values of power, force, and more importantly, keenness in confronting the risks of
102
defending his decisions. He was known as very loyal --the most important of Javanese
values-- to the Soeharto family, and kept the family’s problems unpublicized. For
example, although Soeharto’s children fought viciously among themselves, he was
unique in his ability to negotiate the poisonous atmosphere and maintain friendly
relations with all six children at once. 103
More so than other military leaders, Wiranto was loyal and firmly followed
Soeharto’s orders. He was successful in securing the re-election of Soeharto to his
seventh five-year term as a 76 year old, amid people’s growing anxiety regarding the
deepening economic crisis as well as resistance to his presidency. The appointment of
Gen. Wiranto as chairperson of the second working committee of the March 1998 MPR
general session (Sidang Umum) was politically significant. It signalled Soeharto’s
attempt to contain Gen. Hartono’s rising powers as chairperson of the first working
98
Idi Subandy Ibrahim (ed.), Dari Catatan Wiranto: Bersaksi di Tengah Badai (From Wiranto Notes:
Testimonials Under Storm Attack), Jakarta, IDe, Indonesia, 2003, xvi,xxv, 7, 8.
99
Hendro Subroto, Sintong Panjaitan: Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit Para Komando, Jakarta: Penerbit
Buku Kompas, 2009: 435-436.
100
Shenon, 1998, loc.cit.
101
Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 436.
102
See “Wiranto: Indonesia Butuh Pemimpin Seperti Bima” (“Wiranto: Indonesia Need A Leader Like Bima”), Kompas, June 20, 2009: 1.
103
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit.
79
committee supported by Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hardijanti (Tutut). Not only did it show
that Soeharto did not fully trust Hartono, who had been catapulted to the key position as a
result of Tutut’s lobbying, but more importantly, Soeharto wanted the leadership of the
second working committee in the hands of someone who was more trustworthy and
reliable. Wiranto’s committee was to evaluate the list of candidates for the presidency
and vice-presidency. With this appointment, Soeharto likely signaled that Wiranto was
104
far more important, reliable, and trustworthy than Hartono. No less important, Wiranto
was not only personally very close to Soeharto and his family, but also well-respected
within the military. 105
II.C. The Military and the Emergence of Terror in Jakarta
In September 1998, Habibie ordered that Soeharto be questioned concerning the
acquisition of his wealth, and he charged Attorney General Ghalib with leading the
investigation. One month later, his investigating team under Ghalib reported that there
was not enough evidence to warrant any trials. The angry public, however, pushed
Habibie to once again reopen the investigation into Soeharto’s wealth in November
1998.106 Thus, in December 1998, Soeharto was questioned by the attorney general about
corruption during his 32 years in power.
It was no co-incidence, therefore, that only one day after the state prosecutors
announced Tommy as a suspect on December 10, 1998, an explosion rocked the Plaza
Atrium in Central Jakarta. Then in the dawn of January 1, 1999, a second blast rocked the
Ramayana department store, closer to Habibie’s office, which nearly damaged the
Sabang road (Jalan Sabang), a strategic business area near the Merdeka palace. Several
bombs would have decimated the location if they had not failed to explode at once. Since
the bombs were not planted in Jakarta’s most-populated areas, it was argued that they
were likely designed to create terror targeted at President Habibie, who could hear the
explosion from his palace. One of the suspects was a member of a gang whose boss was
involved with a notorious youth organization in Jakarta. He received Rp 40 million to
blow up the store two days after the blast from its leader, who remains at large and is
107
only identified as Amir. According to the main suspect, he had previouly asked two
military personnel to help him blow up the department store, but they had turned down
108
his request. Unfortunately, no further investigation was conducted of the case.
104
106
“Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, http://www.globalintegrity.com, Washington DC.
107
“Suspect in Ramayana Blast Testify in Court”, The Jakarta Post, June 16, 1999.
108
Ibid.
105
80
Within less than 72 hours, another bomb exploded as Tommy’s older brother,
Bambang Trihatmodjo, was forced to appear at the attorney general’s office to be
interrogated regarding his role as the treasurer of a charitable foundation run by his
father, Soeharto, that was being investigated for indication of misuse.109 As in Tommy’s
case, Attorney General Ghalib explained that the evidence in the Bambang case was also
quite clear.110
Following the two bomb blasts, which were likely aimed at terrorizing President
Habibie, hosts of downtown office buildings, malls, and hotels in Jakarta and its
surrounding areas received similar bomb threats. The targets of terrors had become the
Jakartans in order to spread fear, which was expected to increase insecurity and political
instability. On January 8, 1999, riots broke out in Karawang, 60 km from East Jakarta,
during which twenty-six people were wounded and two died. Interestingly, the mass
media reported that the attention of local police had been mysteriously diverted by a false
report of chaos elsewhere. However, they asserted that military personnel had been
involved in provoking the riots.111
On January 27, 1999, Ghalib officially summoned Tommy to his office and
formally indicted him with corruption in the Goro-Bulog case also known as the Bulog
land scam deal, which cost the state an additional Rp 95.4 billion. 112 Tommy, Soeharto’s
youngest son, was former commissioner of PT Goro Batara Sakti (PT GBS), a large
company which occupied land previously belonging to the country’s logistics body
(Bulog). Less than two weeks later, on February 9, 1999, there was a bomb explosion in
the Kelapa Gading mall. This was the strategic location that had motivated Ricardo
Gelael to start the Goro-Bulog project in the first place. Gelael was a good friend of
Tommy’s from automobile sports, and a former executive of PT GBS and business crony
of the former President Soeharto.
Habibie wanted to increase the scope of the investigations. On March 8, 1999, he
agreed when Ghalib reported to him that the attorney office had found that there was
enough evidence to prosecute Soeharto. However, when Gen. Wiranto came for a
meeting on the same day, Habibie changed his mind, and asked the attorney general to
delay prosecution until the results of the June 1999 general elections were known113. On
April 12, 1999, Tommy was compelled to appear in court, but did not come. Three days
later, on April 15, 1999, a bomb exploded in a public telephone office (warung
telekomunikasi or wartel) in front of the Hayam Wuruk plaza, about 300 meters from the
109
In interview on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta, Andi Ghalib has also described this.
111
112
Eriko Uchida, “Latest Graft Cases 'Not a Deterrent' to Corruption in Indonesia,” Basel Institute of Governance, March 25, 2002.
113
Hosen, 2006, loc.cit.
110
81
state palace. A series of bomb blasts had followed the interrogations of Soeharto’s
children.
On April 19, 1999, Ghalib again forced Tommy to come to his office for the
second court appearance of Soeharto’s youngest son. At the same time, in an effort to
save their client, Tommy’s lawyers asked for an exemption to halt the proceedings, but
the judge rejected the request. Following this rejection, later that afternoon, at 03:20 p.m,
a bomb exploded in the basement of the Al-Istiqlal mosque, a well-known mosque
admired by Muslims in the country, located next to the Merdeka palace compound where
Habibie worked and lived with his family. The blast destroyed at least fifteen office
rooms, some pillars were cracked, and dozens of windows smashed, causing injuries to
four people. 114 A security guard at the mosque reported that two men had been seen
fleeing on a motorcycle shortly before the explosion. In interview, Ghalib explained that
he had not made a special investigation of the connection between the recent bomb
explosions in Jakarta and his attempts to investigate the Soeharto KKN cases, but he
assumed that those who did not want the cases to be seriously prosecuted were behind the
serial explosions. Speaking frankly, he added that due to his continuing investigations, he
and his family had been receiving threats, which were supposedly being sent by parties
who felt threatened by his moves. 115
Therefore, the deeper the dissatisfaction Soeharto and his family and cronies felt,
the greater the risk confronted by the Habibie government. More interestingly, five
attempts to punish either Tommy or Bambang for their respective corruption cases were
followed shortly thereafter by bomb explosions, and the intervals between four of the
bomb explosions were three days or less. Besides, the day after the Al-Istiqlal mosque
blast, just as suspicions were finally starting to focus on the Soeharto family, Jakarta’s
police officials announced that the perpetrators were members of the Indonesian
Mujahidin force, referring to Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN). For
Indonesians, Amin was a confusing group of Muslim radicals, because their political
goals were unclear. 116 At that time, the only known information was that the group’s
training camp was near Bogor, about 80 km Southwest of Jakarta.
Certainly the authorities’ quick accusation of the AMIN was accompanied by a
growing amount of public cynicism, particularly among the country’s reform activists. It
was questioned how the authorities, who had failed to produce any explanation for the
violence and terrorism affecting the country over the past year, needed just hours to
determine the guilty parties in the case of the Al-Istiqlal mosque blast. This is why the
114
Rocks Jakarta Mosque”, BBC News, April 19, 1999.
Andi Ghalib was interviewed on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta.
116
Sapto Waluyo,”Indonesia’s Predicament to Counter -terrorism Policy in the Era of Democratic Transition”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 15, October 2007, Jakarta: Centre f or Indonesian Reform (CIR),
2007: 123.
115
” Blast
82
Legal Aid Foundation (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum --LBH) and a group of Indonesian
NGOs accused the police of engineering this announcement. Denunciations were also
issued from Islamic camps, whose leaders complained about the deceitful methods often
practiced by the military’s intelligence officers, including Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo and Gen.
Benny Murdani, during the Soeharto era. It seemed that the police’s announcement about
the existence of the AMIN was untrustworthy, because journalists who issued
investigatory reports on the organization and actually visited the training camp that the
police had claimed was in Bogor found nothing of the sort. There was also the big
question of explaining why the alleged Muslim terrorists would target the nation’s largest
and most beloved mosque. As in the explanation for the case of the Ramayana
department store bombing, the Amin case appeared to be a simple, but vulgar deception
or fabrication produced to distract public attention from the true perpetrators. 117 The
existence of AMIN was successfully explained at a later point. It was a splinter group of
Darul Islam, the Islamic troops which fought against both the Soekarno and Soeharto
governments to create an Islamic state, which was formed right after the Ambon violence
broke out. It was found that in their activities across Indonesia (in Maluku, Poso and so
forth), their members still obtained access to military facilities, such as Pindad, which
produced standard TNI equipment and weapons, through rogue elements inside the
military.118 Needless to say, in the past Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo, Soeharto’s intelligence
adviser and head of Special Operations (Operasi Khusus --Opsus), had espoused his idea
119
of working with radical Muslim leaders.
Other police sources explained that they had been ordered by their superiors to
call off their investigation into the Al-Istiqlal mosque bombing, but had described what
actually happened on the ground. 120 It was furthermore important that the new authorities
had focused their investigation on former and serving members of covert intelligence and
psychological operations units of Kopassus, the Group IV. Meanwhile, different sources
of information in Jakarta pointed out that the Soeharto family had financed the bombing
through a Rp. 200 million payment to the perpetrators. The payment had been made with
the involvement of a former minister and a little known Muslim activist employed by
121
Tommy’s holding company, the Humpuss group. The minister was supposed to be
Muhammad “Bob” Hasan, one of former President Soeharto’s close cronies, who had
been accussed of involvement in the embezzlement of US$244 million of forestry
funds, 122 while the Muslim activist was presumed to be Toto Tasmara, who had an
unusual background. As was the case in many covert military intelligence and
117
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 233-234.
“Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,”ICG Asia Report
No. 92, Singapote/Brussels, 2005: 1, 15-17, 24, 25-31.
119
Ibid, also p. 6.
120
”Bombings Leave Southeast Asia Puzzled,” Far Easter Economic Review, January 24, 2001.
121
122
Uchida, 2002, loc.cit.
118
83
psychological operations recently run in the country, riots and bombings indicated the
involvement of thugs, religious extremists, and military elements. Once imprisoned in the
1980s as a Muslim militant, Tasmara was not only later freed, but also employed as a
vice-president of Bank Duta. The bank was controlled by Bob Hasan and Soeharto,
123
whose shares, on behalf on his three foundations, reached 87 percent. Later, Tasmara
became a corporate secretary for Tommy’s Humpuss group, which included Tommy’s
failed national car project, and defaulted on its loans to Indonesian state banks after the
1997-1998 financial crisis, which caused around Rp. 4 trillion (US$ 439 million) in
damages to the state.124
Bob Hasan, Soeharto’s business partner since the 1950s, became one of
Soeharto’s closest friends. He was a leading timber tycoon who helped manage the
former president’s fortune. He was also the adopted son of Soeharto’s superior, the late
Maj. Gen. Gatot Subroto, ex-Central Java regional (Kodam Diponegoro) commander, 125
who shared the Nusamba group with Soeharto. The group had holdings in forestry, pulp,
paper, banking, automobile manufacturing, and, moreover, the scandalous Bank Umum
Nasional. This bank had received the fourth largest amount of liquidity credits from the
Bank Indonesia (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia --BLBI), from the total of over
US$13 billion. The funds were collected since the economic crisis in 1997 and were used
126
for corrupt personal financial gain. Due to his closeness with Soeharto and his family,
Hasan had been appointed as Minister of Industry and Trade in Soeharto’s seventh
cabinet, and was also a member of the prestigious legislature, MPR.
Apart from this, analysts said that it would not be the last time that Islamists
connected to the Soeharto family would be suspected of involvement in events of
unexplained violence in Indonesia. Not all the bombings were the work of Muslim
organizations though. In fact, several major bomb explosions took place immediately
before various members of the Soeharto family faced legal proceedings, and were
apparently intended by their supporters to intimidate prosecutors and judges. 127 More
importantly, the blasts took place during the first few months of 1999, and supposedly
had some similarities, namely: (1) they were connected to dates on which Tommy or
Bambang were summoned by the attorney general’s office or the court; (2) they were of
similar magnitude; (3) nobody claimed responsibility; (4) the authorities could not
present reasonable explanations; (5) the Al-Istiqlal mosque bombing case was
temporarily obscured by atrocities in the Maluku archipelago (Ambon, Ternate, Tidore,
123
“Suharto Inc.: All in the Family,” Time Asia, May 24, 1999.
“Indonesia sues Suharto son Tommy over carmaker sale ,” Suharto, Indosnesos, May 5, 2008.
125
John T. Sidel, “Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia’s New
Order,” Indonesia, 66, October 1998, New York: Cornell University, SEAP: 166.
126
“Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, loc. cit.
127
“Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims,” ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper, 10 October 2001, Jakarta/
Belgia: ICG, 2001: 3.
124
84
and so forth128), which could not have broken out without the existence of provocateurs,
or third parties, who systematically created anarchy in different regions of Indonesia,
129
simultaneously; (6) if the Kopassus had indeed been involved, this would suggest that
the TNI’s most notorious unit was conducting a terror operation in favor of the Soeharto
130
family.
Of course, throwing or planting bombs to further political goals was not
unprecedented, but since the fall of Soeharto in May 21, 1998, bomb explosions had
became more common. Between May and the end of 1998, for example, at least six
bombings were recorded, followed by nine more in 1999. 131
Heavy pressure from political parties, radical students, and reform activists on
President Habibie to prosecute Soeharto was disrupted by the flaring up of past conflicts
in Ketapang (Jakarta), Karawang, Ciamis (West Java), Central Java, Kupang (East Nusa
132
133
Tenggara), Ambon (Maluku), Lombok, Mataram (West Nusa Tenggara), Makassar
(South Sulawesi), Poso, Palu (Central Sulawesi), Sumatera, Kalimantan,134 and Irian Jaya.
In Jakarta, destabilization was marked by the breakout of an incident in Ketapang on
November 22, 1998. The TNI was found to have facilitated and protected the rioters, 135
which indicated that the incident not purely or even primarily motivated by religious
136
concerns.
More significantly, the police arrested 187 people, mostly Ambonese
Christian gang members or thugs who had guarded an illegal gambling hall, and three of
137
them were ex-Kopassus troops. For a long time, TNI soldiers had been known for their
involvement in providing protection for gambling, prostitution, and other businesses. 138
After this incident, a series of bomb blasts and terror began in January 1, 1999,
threatening the Central Jakarta area, not far from the Presidential palace as well as many
downtown office buildings, malls, and hotels in the surrounding areas.
128
For more details, see Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 38.
Regarding the Ambon riots, in separate interviews on June 25 and 26, 2006, in the city of Ambon, local
soldiers of Kodam XVI Pattimura, i.e. Col. Iro Suparmo, Maj. Ahmad Basar, Capt. Hendrikus JR, informed
the role of the provocateurs, among others, the Laskar Jihad and the RMS separatist organization, but they
did not uncover the involvement of TNI units. Author’s interview with a resource person in Jakarta cited
the important role of Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, the East Java regional (Kodam V Brawijaya) commander, in
allowing the transshipment of the Laskar Jihad troops from different places in Java to Ambon.
130
131
The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2001, cited in ICG, 2001, loc.cit.
132
In this region, virtual “wars” has taken place between relatively evenly balanced Muslim and Christian
communities. The initial conflict that broke out in January 1999 involved Christian Ambonese and Muslims
from nearby Sulawesi who had migrated to Maluku in large numbers during the previous three decades,
ibid: 10.
133
To compare Lombok and Mataram, see Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 22.
134
In Central Kalimantan, many of the Dayaks leading the campaign to force Muslim Mad urese to flee
from the province were themselves Muslims. See, “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,” ICG Report No. 19, June 27, 2001, Jakarta/Belgia: ICG, 2001.
135
See, for example, “Lagi Massa Tersulut” (“Again, People Incited”), Panji Masyarakat, December 2,
1998: 75.
136
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 6-7.
137
138
Juwono Sudarsono was interviewed on July 17, 2009.
129
85
In the Ketapang riots, the involvement of the Soeharto family and the military was
indicated by various sources. The thugs, both Christians and Muslims, 139 who had
triggered the riots were employed by the Soeharto family’s chief henchmen and military
backed-Muslim militant organizations. One such organization, the FPI (Front Pembela
Islam --Front for Islam Defenders) and his antagonistic chairperson, Habib Rizieq Shihab,
reportedly received political and financial support from senior military officers such as
Gen. Wiranto (TNI chief commander), Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen (ex-chief of staff of
Kostrad --Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat or army’s strategic reserves
command), and Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman (current chief of staff of Kostrad). 140 The
chairperson had admitted that two days before the violence erupted, the Ambonese
Muslim thug’s leader, Ongen Sangaji, who was linked to Soeharto’s son, Bambang, had
spoken to FPI at a meeting. The meeting was organized by the Muslim cleric, Habib Ali
bin Alwi al Ba’agil, who personally taught Soeharto’s other son, Tommy, about Islam. 141
Additional findings explained a connection between those who had instigated the
Ketapang riots and the Soeharto family and military. 142 The gang war between young
Christian Ambonese thugs and Ketapang’s Muslim residents was orchestrated by these
outside forces so that it escalated into an inter-religious conflict with the burning of
twenty-seven churches and schools in the surrounding area.143 More visibly, the gangs, in
144
particular, PP (Pemuda Pancasila --Pancasila Youth) maintained connections with
different members of the Soeharto family and military leaders. The security forces
“captured” most of the gang members and put them on ships bound for Ambon, where
they played a central role in mass communal fighting in early 1999. 145 It was also found
that they had been transported with naval landing craft on the orders of Jakarta Governor,
Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso.146 Several years earlier, in 1994, the governor had worked with FPI
patron, then Brig. Gen. Djaja Suparman, on Wiranto’s efforts to organize civilian militias
and paramilitary groups, while Wiranto was commander of Kodam Jayakarta. It appears
139
The Christians were not pillars of the local church but petty criminals who happened to have been born
into the Christian community of Maluku, similar to the gangs of Muslim Ambonese also operated in Jakarta,
see ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 7.
140
Yunanto et al, 2003, op. cit: 50-51, 178-179; Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84.
141
Ibid, and p. 60. See, further, Suara Hidayatullah, edition 04/XII, August 1999.
142
See “Provokator Menjahili Negeri” (“Provocateur Disturbed the Country”), Majalah Forum Keadilan,
February 8, 1999: 25.
143
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 6-7.
144
Loren Ryter, “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Soeharto’s Order?” in Benedict R.O’G
Anderson (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, New York: Cornell University, 2001, loc.
cit: 46, 154.
145
Colombijn and Lindblad, “Introduction”, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 4.
146
John McBeth and Dini Djalal, “Tragic Island: Ambon Violence May Have Had Its Origins in Jakarta,”
Far Eastern Economic Review, March 25, 1999.
86
that when he transported these PP thugs to provoke similar strife in Maluku, Sutiyoso
was doing so at Wiranto’s command. 147
II.D. The Military and the Emergence of Terror in Various Regions
In Kupang, a riot broke out on November 29, 1998, the day that Habibie decided
to form an independent commission that would be led by Nasution to investigate
Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. It was also one day before Soeharto’s lawyers raised the
threat of blackmail. Reportedly, masses of people tore through the city of Kupang,
damaging mosques. Information from the Department of Defense linked to the TNI
headquarters stated that the raids there were supposedly a reprisal for the targeting of
148
churches in the Ketapang riot in the preceding weeks. On the other hand, reports from
the priests and provincial government officials who saw the raids revealed that the
masses were not comprised of local Kupang inhabitants, but rather uniformed youths sent
in from remote places as far away as Dili in East Timor. 149 Therefore, the Department of
Defense’s claim that the incident occurred spontaneously was further called into
150
question. Quite amazingly, in Kupang, where there was a large contingent of security
forces, and, moreover, a base for the TNI’s operations in East Timor, anti-Muslim masses
were allowed to run amok through the city for two full days. Not only did the security
forces grant the masses free reign, but in some instances, they safeguarded them from
151
local inhabitants who tried to retaliate. The city was brought under control on
December 2, 1998, the day when Habibie announced his plan to abandon the independent
commission due to Minister Muladi’s statement that there was a lack of evidence.
In Maluku, the role of militias or paramilitary groups and rogue elements in the
military linked to the Soeharto family was even more apparent, while the direct
involvement of the military as an institution was less evident. A civilian intelligence
officer interviewed in Jakarta highlighted the role of several military officers from the
Presidential Guard Foundation (Yayasan Paspampres) in organizing the return of the
native Ambonese thugs from Jakarta to Ambon. 152 In addition, the existence of thugs
linked to Bambang Soeharto was confirmed by a former leading figure of Bakin (the
147
“Berita Penerangan Peristiwa Kupang” (“Release on Kupang Incident”), http://www.dephan.go.id.
149
“Siapa Pengembus Badai SARA” (“Who Provoked Primordial Sentiments”), Majalah Forum Keadilan,
December 28, 1998: 15. The commander of Korem 161Wirasakti, Kupang, Col. Arief Rachman, in interview in Kupang, on August 15, 2007, described the provocateurs as being from outside the province, but
declined to explain who they actually were.
150
See, Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 31.
151
“Siapa Pengembus Badai SARA” (“Who Provoked Primordial Sentiments”), Majalah Forum Keadilan,
December 28, 1998, loc. cit.
152
Muhammad Najib Azca, “In Between Military and Militia: The Dynamics of the Security Forces in the
Communal Conflict in Ambon”, AJSS, 34: 3, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2006: 441.
148
87
national intelligence coordinating board).153 In the riots prior to January 19, 1999, some
individuals from the army and police, either active members, deserters, or retired
members, played roles in instigating and participating in the clashes, especially in Dobo
village. 154
In Irian Jaya, Soeharto’s loyalist, Gen. Wiranto, supposedly refused to interrupt
the activities of other Soeharto loyalists although they encouraged the Papuan rebels to
oppose the central government. This is why the Soeharto family and the military elites
who resisted Habibie’s decisions to seriously prosecute their alleged practices of
corruption, collusion, and nepotism were able to freely conduct their activities in support
of the rebels there. Among others, Theys Eluay, one of the representatives of the UN Act
of Free Choice (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat --Pepera) who had internationally legalized
the integration of Irian Jaya into Indonesia, and previously was a member of the central
executive board of the pro-Soeharto Golkar Party and DPR representing the province,
played a significant role in reviving post-Soeharto Papuan nationalism. Also, Yorris, who
until that time was involved in various military intelligence operations, for instance, in
mobilizing thugs and paramilitaries to seize Megawati’s PDI headquarters on July 27,
1996, was often cited by people who had seen him aiding separatist demonstrations in the
province.155
Bomb threats and explosions that occurred elsewhere, including in big cities,
targeting business centers, and disturbing economic activities, reportedly also involved
security forces, military elements, paramilitaries, or religious radicals and thugs. The
Kupang riot, in particular, was followed by more demonstrations against Soeharto, and,
consequently, by more riots throughout the country. As high-level officials of the Habibie
government admitted in a confidential communication, the eruptions of violence across
the country were no coincidence. Soeharto’s loyalists were purposely inciting these
156
conflicts. Several press reports cited anonymous government sources that arrived at the
same conclusions.157 The sources stated that the perpetrators of this violence intentionally
focused on communities with grave ethnic or religious fractures, which could be
exploited and agitated.
In essence, the eruption of unrest and its widespread use of as a deceitful
instruments for political ends could have served several goals: (1) to distract public
attention from demands for trials of Soeharto and his family; (2) to threaten the Habibie
government’s officials; (3) to destroy the public’s general confidence in, or even
153
Ibid.
Ibid: 442.
155
156
Azca, 2006, loc. cit: 196.
157
“Setelah Ambon Mana Lagi” (“After Ambon, What Else”), Panji Masyarakat, February 3, 1999: 75.
154
88
destabilize the Habibie government.158 Therefore, the increasing pressure in Jakarta for
trials of Soeharto and his family, and, in particular, the attacks on the Soeharto family
residence compound by student demonstrators corresponded with the escalating regional
violence. It was known that pro-reform students engaged in persistent demonstrations
throughout December 1998 and January 1999, through which they strongly demanded the
prosecution of Soeharto and his family. Moreover, they became increasingly aggressive
by repeatedly attacking troops, who maintained a heavy defensive barricade in a 100
meter radius around the Soeharto family residence compound at Jalan Cendana in
Central Jakarta. A clash on January 9, 1999, brought about 160 casualties, and reflected
how seriously the TNI and its leaders, in particular, were in protecting Soeharto and his
family.159
II.E. Threats, Intelligence Operations, and Common Interests
Habibie feared that the Soehartos’ aggressive reaction would damage his
government, because it could implicate him and many of his cabinet members who had
drafted and helped implement the presidential decrees (Keputusan Presiden --Keppres),
which had enabled the Soehartos’ alleged KKN during the New Order era.160 In addition
to the military’s growing attempts to cultivate destabilizing elements across the country,
the issuance of the MPR decree (Ketetapan MPR --TAP MPR) gave a constitutional order
to Habibie to move forward with the investigation by early December 1998. The old
strong man was holding all the trumps though in the form of his lawyers, and was ready
to launch a reprisal by disclosing the personal wealth of Habibie’s officials and other
secrets, including their extra-marital affairs.161 Like Wiranto and other senior military
officers who were beneficiaries of gifts, which Soeharto routinely bestowed on his
assistants, Habibie and his family appeared to have received benefits from Soeharto
beyond their ventures with the Soeharto family. The current instability and the growing
demands of reform activists that Soeharto be brought to trial had probably strengthened
the mutual dependence of Habibie and Gen. Wiranto. 162
The counter-attack and further threats by the Soeharto family and its loyalists
caused Habibie to fail in enforcing the MPR Decree No. 11/1998 and secure his reformist
158
“Tiada Kata Jera dalam Demo” (“No End for Demonstration”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, January 11,
1999: 23.
160
The Indonesian Transparency Society has labeled as illegal 79 of the 528 such presidential decrees
issued between 1993 and May 21, 1998. See, “Suharto Inc.: All in the Family,” Time Asia, May 24, 1999,
loc.cit.
161
“Komisi Dibentuk, Soeharto Melempar Truf” (“Commission Formed, Soeharto Plays his Last Card”),
Majalah Tempo, December 7, 1998; “Yohannes Yakob: Kami Sudah Pegang Kartu Truf” (“Yohannes Yakob: We Had the Last Card”), Majalah D&R, December 12, 1998: 20.
162
Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 134 et seq.
159
89
credentials. His minister of justice, Muladi, had directly reminded him that if they were
not careful with regard to the juridical aspects of the Soeharto case, the political impacts
could be serious. The mass media exposed that Muladi was concerned with threats of
revenge from the Soeharto family as well as the military. 163 In interview, he described
164
such threats as a major constraint to fulfilling reform demands. Under such threats, of
course, Ghalib could not conduct a serious investigation. The attorney general revealed
165
that such threats affected not only himself but also his family. Thus, the absence of
consent between the new regime and the loyalists of the old authoritarian regime to
eliminate the undemocratic political structures and culture that had been observed by
Huntington in his studies166 impeded Habibie’s reform policies.
A tape scandal that explained Habibie and Ghalib’s orchestrated scenario to
investigate Soeharto exposed the existence of covert intelligence and psychological
operations connecting the military and Gen. Wiranto. 167 Habibie’s native Sulawesi ally
and advisor on the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung --DPA),
Baramuli, stated that the scandal was obviously an intelligence game and psychological
operations planned by the military. 168 Baramuli’s counter-attack was the first case in
which a top administration official had launched a public allegation against Wiranto’s
military. More importantly, Baramuli implied that Maj. Gen. Syamsu Djalaluddin,
Attorney General Ghalib’s aide for intelligence (Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Inteljen) was
responsible for the leak of the conversations in the telephone between Habibie and Ghalib,
and that the active two-star general had been working on behalf of the military
intelligence, Bais. 169 For this reason, after the tape scandal, Habibie immediately
discharged Syamsu although he had been appointed to the position just a few months
earlier.
Syamsu’s track record seemingly indicated that he was a Soeharto loyalist and a
close ally of Wiranto. Documents showed that until September 1998, he served as the
head of the military police corps (Corps Polisi Militer --CPM), the investigative unit of
the army that had found no guilty parties within the military during a series of military
human rights violations, i.e. the July 27, 1996 PDI headquarters attack, the 1997-1998
163
“BB Buka ‘Extra Account’ untuk Tampung Pengembalian Utang” (“BB Opens ‘Extra Account’ for
Debt Return”), Suara Pembaruan , August 16, 1999.
164
Muladi was interviewed on March 28, 2008 in Jakarta.
165
Interview with Andi Ghalib on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta.
166
Huntington, 1983, op. cit, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, op. cit.: 76.
167
In interview on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta, Andi Ghalib told that his conversations by phone with Presi dent Habibie was secretly recorded by their opponents. He also described the progress of the investigations
of the Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases, which had been conducted in line with the president’s expectation
and direction. Because of this their opponents, particularly, radical students and reform activists, blamed
them for organizing false efforts.
168
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 230, 222.
169
The appointment of an active military official to occupy the civilian post also explained the extent to
which military reform had been implemented.
90
student and activist kidnappings, the Trisakti shootings, and the May 1998 anti-Chinese
riots in Jakarta. Logically, after being assigned to the attorney general’s office, it was
inconceivable that he was actually working against Wiranto on behalf of others, namely,
Ghalib and Habibie. 170 Furthermore, Syamsu was replaced with Lt. Gen. (ret) Yusuf
Kertanegara, another of Wiranto’s close allies, former Irjen Dephankam (General
Inspector of the Ministry of Defense and Security) and member of the military honorary
council (Dewan Kehormatan Militer --DKM). He had sacked Lt. Gen. Prabowo from the
position of Kostrad commander six months earlier, demonstrating Habibie’s incapability
of continuing reforms. He seemingly miscalculated that Kertanegara as well as Tyasno
Sudarto, the Bais chief, were former commanders of the Central Java regional command,
where Soeharto had served as commander in the 1950s. He likely ignored that the future
commander continued to select Soeharto loyalists, such as Subagyo, Wismoyo
Arismunandar, and so forth. Thus, Wiranto’s choice to appoint Kertanegara based on his
military background to replace Syamsu was apparently aimed at inserting him into the
Habibie camp so that Wiranto could ensure that the attorney general’s office would
protect, rather than attack, Soeharto, his family and cronies, and other related military
interests.171
Due to the various military threats and heavy criticism of the reform movement,
after the tape scandal, Ghalib was replaced by his deputy, Ismoedjoko (Wakil Jaksa
Agung). Leading up to the presidential election on September 25, 1999, the caretaker of
the attorney general’s office initiated prosecution on the Soehartos’ alleged KKN cases.
Nonetheless, the drama surrounding Habibie continued. The President ordered that the
prosecutions be halted and in a letter (Surat Penghentian Penyelidikan dan Penuntutan -SP3) he urged Ismoedjoko to cancel the investigation and prosecution by October 11,
1999. Thus, the attorney general's office, in a decision signed by the Acting Attorney
General, Ismoedjoko, formally cancelled the investigation of the Soeharto case on the
grounds that there was not enough evidence.172 It could hardly have been a coincidence
that Ismoedjoko’s SP3 accomplished something that Gen. Wiranto had vowed to do the
moment Habibie assumed his presidency, namely, protect Soeharto. Habibie’s decision to
close the case and to also nominate Gen. Wiranto as his running mate in the next
presidential election obviously indicated his pragmatic approach to winning the military’s
173
favor.
170
In interviews, Andi Ghalib (on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta), as well as Indria Samego (on May 15, 2006
in Jakarta) and Dewi Fortuna Anwar (on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta), who were Habibie’s advisers, did
not disclose Habibie’s difference with Wiranto.
171
172
Hosen, 2006, loc.cit; Andi Abdussalam, “News Focus: Soeharto's Health and Legal Case,” Antara, May
20, 2006, Selected Postings from East Timor, Prominent Indonesians Call For Soeharto's Trial.
173
“Bila Kingmaker Ingin Menjadi King” (“If the Kingmaker Wants to be a King”), Majalah Tajuk, October 21, 1999.
91
Prior to the October 1999 MPR special session (Sidang Istimewa), Habibie
explained his decisions by reminding everyone of Ismoedjoko’s claim that the Soeharto
investigation was halted due to insufficient proof. The president knew that his ministers’
missions in Europe had found no evidence of bank transfers in the Soeharto family name,
despite what had been reported by the foreign media. He avoided mentioning that his
government had never formally requested assistance from the Swiss government. As a
result, pro-reform students and radical reformists lost trust in Habibie.
As Ghalib admitted in his biography published 2 years later, chief commander
Gen. Wiranto and President Habibie had prevented him from declaring Soeharto as a
174
suspect of KKN. In interview, Ghalib also mentioned the same limitation in regards to
the insufficient evidence.175 According to Ghalib, Gen. Wiranto was genuinely worried
by the prospect of continuing investigations, which could carry serious implications for
Soeharto. Other reports supporting Ghalib’s statements explained the additional
constraints he faced in moving forward with the investigation of Soeharto’s alleged KKN
cases. The scandal exposed by Majalah Panji Masyarakat regarding the circulation of the
Ghalib-Habibie tape had clearly informed Habibie’s orchestrated scenario and false
efforts to cope with these cases, which worsened the president’s image in public and
among opposition leaders.176
Habibie’s inconsistency in dealing with Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases and his
support of Ismoedjoko’s SP3 in finally ending the prosecution were seemingly connected
with his long-relationship with Soeharto spanning a time period from 1950 until the 1997
legislative and presidential elections. Looking at his background, he had actually known
Soeharto for more than 40 years. Posted in Sulawesi as a mid-rank army officer, Soeharto
met the Habibie family while Habibie was still a young child. Then, after Habibie’s father
passed away, Soeharto had taken a personal interest in Habibie. Soeharto replaced
Sukarno through a controversial mandate during the crucial transition period from
civilian to military authoritarian system. He convinced Habibie to dedicate his skills to
the country by offering him more important positions in Indonesia, because in Germany
his highest position had been as vice-president of MBB.
After returning to Indonesia, Habibie headed several large, high-cost ventures
involving strategic state-run enterprises supported by Soeharto, including the national
aircraft industry (IPTN). President Soeharto gave his protégé his own government
department and unlimited funds, including money from reforestation projects. In effect,
he sacrificed agricultural and small and medium-scale economic sectors, to build
Southeast Asia’s first aircraft industry in Indonesia. Critics accused Habibie of building
174
Usamah Hisyam (ed.), HA Muhammad Ghalib: Menepis Badai Menegakkan Supremasi Hukum (HA
Muhammad Ghalib: Challenging Storm to Uphold Law Supremacy), Jakarta: Dharmapena, 2000: 342, 352.
175
Andi Ghalib was interviewed on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta.
176
Hisyam (ed.), 2000, ibid: 379-382.
92
aircraft nobody wanted, and of not understanding economics. The military also felt
insecure in buying his IPTN products and disliked having to receive ex-East German
ships bought by him because of their dissatisfaction with the conditions of the ships and
the issue of underlying corruption in these dealings. However, with Soeharto’s full
177
support, Habibie was untouchable.
Starting in 1978, Habibie served as State Minister of Research and Technology
until President Soeharto chose him as his deputy (vice-president) in March 1998. His
close friendship with Soeharto had been absolutely critical to his rise to power. Habibie
himself openly acknowledged Soeharto as his long-time mentor and patron, and referred
178
to him grandly as Mr. SGS or “Super-Genius Soeharto.” In his autobiography, he said
that he had learned a lot from Pak Harto (Mr. Soeharto) about the Indonesian culture of
leadership, particularly the culture and philosophy of Javanese leadership. He believed it
would be difficult to lead Indonesians if he could not understand the culture of Javanese
leadership. He admitted that the past experience and additional knowledge he received
from Pak Harto over 40 years regarding the (Javanese) culture of leadership had
influenced his way of making policy.179 This entailed paying respect to elder people or
his predecessors, and Soeharto in particular. Thus, he could not allow further
investigation, prosecution, or the trial of the former New Order ruler.
Therefore, Habibie’s long relationship with Soeharto kept him from being
consistent and serious in dealing with the Soehartos’ alleged KKN cases. His personal
interests could also be potentially harmed by the relevations in such a case. As Aguero
180
recognized in similar cases, the military’s previous partnership in the formation and
protection of the authoritarian regime, which was now initiating withdrawal, had a strong
defining effect on military interests during the democratic transition under Habibie. The
military --in this context, the TNI-- initially sought to preserve some of the features of the
old regime.
III. Coping with Human Rights Violations
III.A. Habibie’s Soft Approach to End Violence, and Military Reaction
According to Habibie, Indonesia paid a high human price for its post-Soeharto
democratization. He regretted that during his presidency, when anarchy emerged, he was
177
Jonathan Head,”Profile: President BJ Habibie”, BBC Special Report, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
events/indonesia/profiles/98092.stm: 1-2.
178
Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
179
Bacharuddin Jusif Habibie, Detik-detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi
(Decisive Seconds: A Long Road toward Democracy), Jakarta: THC Mandiri, 2006: 53 -54.
180
Perlmutter, 1986, loc. cit, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 23.
93
unable to effectively end the violence and bring back stability. 181 In the war-torn province
of Aceh, for instance, he had tried to introduce peaceful settlement by lifting its DOM
(Daerah Operasi Militer --military operations zone) status, ending the war, and opening
dialogues with GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka --Movement for An Independent Aceh)
rebels. However, his inability to uphold civilian supremacy caused him to be inconsistent
in lifting the DOM and pulling out the troops, which gave the military the opportunity to
continue its repressive measures there. In addition, his dependency on Gen. Wiranto led
to an unwillingness to conduct a formal investigation or prosecution of human rights
violations of the military in Aceh, despite mounting evidence and testimony pointing to
killing, torture, and disappearances. The evidence had been gathered by the parliament
and Komnas HAM’s fact-finding teams. 182 Hence, aside from the apology extended by
Wiranto to the Acehnese due to the grave violations of human rights perpetrated by the
military, and Habibie’s earlier support of the formation of commissions to inquire into
human rights abuses in Aceh, Habibie showed no signs of being ready to follow-up on
inquiries and engage in prosecution. No additional actions were taken on allegations that
military personnel and high-ranking officers, in particular, might have been involved. As
Marzuki Darusman stated, the President did not want to take any risk of strong resistance
183
by military leaders.
As Usman Hasan, head of presidential advisory team for Aceh, describes, Habibie
did not want prosecution of military atrocities in Aceh during the DOM years,
particularly, the First and Second Operasi Jaring Merah (red-web operations). Once legal
proceedings were taken against some soldiers, later prosecution could reach the highest
184
echelons of the military and his cabinet ministers. Thus, Gen. Wiranto, Gen. Feisal
Tandjung, and Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid,185 who were ministers or occupied ministerial
level positions in the Habibie cabinet, as well as many others, could be affected. Habibie
was reasonable and did not take the advice of his special advisers, who had concluded
that the main issue of the vertical (separatist) conflict in Aceh was military atrocities
during the DOM years. His inability to make his own decisions triggered a new war
between the GAM and the military. In Lhokseumawe, the war caused 781 civilians
deaths, while 163 others went missing, 100 were raped, and hundreds of soldiers died.
Across all of Aceh’s regions, the war caused about 3,000 fatalities. 186
181
“Transisi Demokrasi, Habibie Ingatkan Indonesia Membayar Mahal untuk Demokrasi” (”Democratic
Transition, Habibe Reminds Indonesia’s High Pay for Democracy”), Harian Kompas, June 7, 2006: 5.
182
Majalah Gatra 4, No. 38, August 8, 1998; Gatra 4, No. 41, August 29, 1998, cited in Bertrand, 2004:
175.
183
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta.
184
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 177.
185
In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid argued that at that time in the wartorn Aceh, he only conducted his duty as a member of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) just like other
Indonesian soldiers in other provinces. Therefore, he argued that the use of violence was often unavoidable.
186
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 35.
94
In Irian Jaya, Habibie had also attempted to initiate a new approach to addressing
separatist conflicts and started to relax his political control over the biggest island in the
most eastern part of Indonesia. By October 5, 1998, following Gen. Wiranto’s
announcement, 187 the new President lifted the province’s DOM status after it had
experienced the repressive policies of Soeharto for almost 30 years. He signaled a
possible reduction in the TNI’s participation in the conflict. He pursued dialogues with
Foreri (Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya --Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian
Jaya People), a coalition of local churches, universities, tribes, women, and student
groups, which had denounced the province’s integration into Indonesia and had
demanded a referendum for Papuans to choose their own future. Ignoring his advisers,
and considering that it was his duty to listen directly to the concerns of his people, in
February 1999, he opened a dialogue with 100 noted Papuans,188 or the so-called “Team
of 100,” representing a wide social, religious, and geographic spectrum of Papuan
189
society, in the state palace. Unfortunately, during the unprecedented meeting, Foreri
affirmed their standpoints and formally demanded independence, effectively shocking
190
Habibie and Gen. Wiranto.
Thus, the meeting halted any plans for the national
dialogue that had previously been highly anticipated by the new president.
Habibie’s decision to lift DOM in Aceh and Irian Jaya, which had often been seen
191
192
by the military as a soft policy, which could cause disintegration of the state, voiced
their negative reactions and anger. Habibie’s reluctance to prosecute the perpetrators of
human rights violation in the provinces with vertical conflicts encouraged the military to
preserve their culture of violence there. In fact, the withdrawal of combat troops did not
mean that TNI had completely ended its presence in Aceh, since its regular units assigned
for aims of national defense remained there. But nothing resulted from this constructive
development following the renewed use of violent measures against the Acehnese. Still,
TNI troops were unable to control their emotions and overreacted in their response to the
new situation. A number of new incidents that heralded a return to violence started as the
celebrations by local populations enthusiastic to observe the troops’ departure turned into
large-scale violent events. The departure of the Kopassus from Lhokseumawe in early
September 1998 was witnessed by thousands of people, and resulted in a riot that quickly
spread to other towns in the area, causing extensive destruction to government and
193
foreign investors’ properties, such as banks and office buildings.
According to
187
Amiruddin al Rahab, Heboh Papua: Perang Rahasia, Trauma, dan Separatisme (Papua Question: Secret Operations, Trauma and Separatism), Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2010: 45, 75.
188
Al Rahab, 2010, op.cit: 29.
189
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman,“Papua: the Last Frontier for democratization, demilitarization and decentralization in Indonesia,” in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed.), Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, Indonesia, Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 42, University of Oxford, September 2007: 8.
190
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 175-177.
191
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta.
192
Dewi Fortuna Anwar was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta.
193
95
Acehnese intellectuals and NGOs, the riots were engineered by the military to create a
pretext for returning to Aceh to continue their presence there. 194 In fact, Gen. Wiranto
had sent new combat troops from Medan, the neighboring city, to secure the town. He
also provided vital revenue to the central government in Lhokseumawe, including the oil,
gas, and fertilizer plants.
III.B. Military’s New Repressive Approach in Trouble Spots
Under Habibie, there was no significant change in the perception of the TNI’s
generals and their jobs and responsibilities. Fundamentally, whether they were retired or
not, the generals saw their job as a sacred mission bestowed upon those ready to sacrifice
themselves for the sake of the nation. Such a view, a key legacy of a politicized military
nurtured during the New Order, which had still been very prevalent up until that time,
was likely being used to protect them from any charges of abuse by claiming that their
mission was to maintain the integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia
(Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --NKRI). 195
In other words, the TNI soldiers could not be blamed, because in conducting their
jobs, they were carrying out the state’s mission of defending the integrity of the NKRI.
This pretext had often been used as an axiom for justifying or excusing violent incidents
involving civilians. This meant that such missions needed to be carried out at all costs.
More specifically, as the nature of the mission became sacrosanct, it also became
politically acceptable and practically convenient for TNI soldiers to stop taking into
account the basic rights of local people and other civilians caught in conflict situations.196
In trouble spots such as Aceh and East Timor, clashes resulting in TNI casualties
were usually followed by heavy-handed retaliation as collective punishment of villages
allegedly supporting rebels. Day by day, this became a common tactic of TNI soldiers in
conducting their anti-guerilla warfare. Furthermore, they also were able to arbitrarily
attack communities of militants or poorly armed believers in any region of the country. 197
Examples of this continuing reality were the sweeping operations hunting for
GAM rebels and their sympathizers, during which TNI units raided villages, harming
non-combatants. Ali Zamzami from Solidaritas Persaudaraan Korban Pelanggaran
HAM (SPKP HAM --Brotherhood Solidarity for the Victims of Human Rights Violations)
194
Philip J. Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, London and New York, Routledge,
2002, op. cit: 142.
195
Aboeprijadi Santoso,”Generals and the ‘Invention of Tradition’”, The Jakarta Post, May 6, 2008: 7.
196
Ibid.
197
Ibid.
96
reprimanded TNI soldiers for operations, which had been improperly conducted. 198
Around eleven people were killed in early January 1999 when troops opened fire on a
crowd that was protesting the persistant military presence in Aceh. A few days later,
about 1,000 TNI soldiers attacked Kandang in the hunt for a GAM leader, an action
199
which marked the start of a new escalation of violence. The more the Acehnese
demonstrated against military presence and in favor independence, the more frequently
the TNI soldiers opened fire on crowds. In the May 1999 incident in Krueng Geukeueh,
while searching for GAM members participating in a large meeting or rally, the soldiers
opened fire on a crowd of mostly women and children, causing fourty fatalities. 200 The
incident was pointed to by Zulfikar Muhammad from Koalisi NGO HAM (NGOs
coalition for human rights), and Zamzami, as another brutal new case of alleged violence
by TNI soldiers.201
The TNI began to launch sweeping operations more commonly in different
locations, and raided villages believed to be hiding rebels. They increased their troop
levels to close to 6,000 as part of the newly installed operational troops for preventing
mass revolt (Pasukan Pencegah Rusuh Massa --PPRM). Since they played the same
function as troops assigned during the DOM years, with this policy the military leaders in
Jakarta had actually annulled their previous decision to remove non-organic troops from
202
Aceh. More significantly, with the return of combat forces and the start of a new and
bloody anti-insurgency campaign, Aceh’s status as a military operations zone was, in
effect, restored. Habibie’s soft approach of making visits, asking forgiveness, and
promoting reconciliation with the Acehnese in late March 1999 had been met with large
demonstrations demanding a referendum on independence. This gave the military reason
to udertake even more repressive measures. 203 Thus, as pointed to by both Marzuki
Darusman, a Komnas HAM’s investigator, and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie’s adviser
and spokeswoman, the new repressive measures reflected the military’s disappointment
in the president’s weakness in seeking a peaceful approach to coping with separatist
204
conflict in Aceh.
The Linud 100 (airborne) unit of TNI soldiers was reported to be involved205 in an
unfinished operation from July 1999 that led to the killing of a well-known Islamic cleric,
198
Ali Zamzami was interviewed on August 25, 2007, in Banda Aceh.
200
Ibid: 177.
201
Zulfikar Muhammad and Zamzami were interviewed on August 25, 2007 in Banda Aceh.
202
Majalah Forum Keadilan 8, No. 16, July 25, 1999.
203
David Bourchier, “Habibie’s Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism, and the Struggle for Power”, in Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi
and Crisis, Singapore: ISEAS, 2000, loc. cit: 25.
204
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta; Dewi Fortuna Anwar was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta.
205
John Roosa, “Brawling, Bombing, and Backing: The Security Forces As a Source of Insecurity”, Inside
Indonesia, January-March, 2003.
199
97
Teungku Bantaqiah, and more than fifty of his followers. 206 In other words, in
Bantaqiyah’s village, the soldiers had massacred fifty-one unarmed civilians. 207 Those
unfamiliar with the nature of the TNI’s covert intelligence and psychological operations
would simply say that the killings were conducted by OTK (Orang Tak Dikenal -unknown perpetrators), official terminology commonly used by the local authority to
support the operations of the security forces through their plausible deniability, and
208
contain the GAM rebels. Nonetheless, the Acehnese voiced their rejection of the
PPRM’s existence. Following the withdrawal of PPRM troops due to mass strikes and
pressure by local NGOs on August 3 and 4, 1999, however, more troops were substituted
in their place. Chief Commander Gen. Wiranto and Coordinating Minister for Political
and Security Affairs, Gen. Feisal Tandjung were in charge of the First and Second RedWeb operations during the DOM years. These operations had resulted in atrocities and
met with sustained resistance amid the Acehnese’s rising demand for the prosecution of
the perpetrators. Not including the GAM’s armed rebels, nearly 2,000 Acehnese civilians
had become the victims of the TNI’s new military operations.209
Meanwhile, in Irian Jaya, as President Habibie offered political liberalization to
the Papuans, the military worked to repress activities it deemed to be separatist. As a
result, one student --another version said three students210-- was killed in Abepura during
a demonstration after the military opened fire on Cendrawasih University to prevent
students from aggressively raising the Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) flag frequently
used by the separatist Papuans, or those labeled by the military as Gerakan Pengacau
Keamanan (GPK --Security Disturbance Movement). The security forces and military
units in particular, had fired rubber bullets at demonstrators who refused to lower the flag
after it was raised on July 2, 1998.211 Gen. Wiranto justified such repressive measures by
saying that whenever a flag other than the Bendera Merah-Putih (the Red and White flag)
of Indonesia was displayed during a demonstration, then this was a separatist act that
shattered national unity and integrity.212 This situation suggests that post-Soeharto TNI
leaders were still preoccupied with the notion of unitary state, which had become
sacrosanct. Therefore they denied any further right to national self-determination.213
It was reported that the military used the “fence of calves” tactic in fighting the
Papuan rebels, in which ordinary villagers were put in a line and forced to walk in front
206
208
Interviews with Burhanuddin Umar, an Acehnese and a pro-Masyumi or modernist Muslim activist, and
with Muchlis, an employee who lived in Banda Aceh , on August 23, 2007, in Banda Aceh.
209
John McBeth, “Worse to Come,” Far Eastern Economic Review,” July 29, 1999: 16-18.
210
Daeng Baranggau, local resident of Abepura, was interviewed on June 4, 2008 in Abepura.
211
Harian Kompas, July 7, 1998; Majalah Forum Keadilan 7, No. 8, July 27, 1998, cited in Bertrand, 2004,
op. cit: 154.
212
Media Indonesia, July 8, 1998, ibid.
213
207
98
of troops to flush the rebels out of hiding, causing the bloody Biak incident of July 6,
1998.214 It was also said that unidentified military units opened fire on a demonstration in
215
Biak and threw the dead into the sea. Later, as some bodies washed up on the shore,
the military claimed that they were not victims of the massacre, but of the devastating
tsunami that hit the coast of Papua New Guinea on July 17, 1998, several days afterward.
In Maluku, the new political situation was marked by the euphoria of reform
under Habibie and produced big riots. By the second week of November 1998, for
example, students at a rally were demanding an apology from Maluku regional (Kodam
XVI Pattimura) commander, Maj. Gen. Hikayat, who had claimed himself to be a
representative of the province’s people. This claim came after he attended the MPR
special session on 10-13 November 1998 in Jakarta, and triggered a major clash with the
military. The students who protested that Hikayat did not represent the people’s voice
clashed with military officers. Reportedly, ninety-four people died and 100 were badly
wounded, while 2,000 houses, 300 stores, and other public buildings were burned
down.216
III.C. Referendum, East Timor Inferno and the Threat of A Coup
In June 1998, Habibie offered a special economic package to East Timor, which
was faced with a severe economic crisis and international pressure for democratic
transition in Indonesia as well as growing demonstrations demanding independence for
the province. Furthermore, in his address to the nation on the occasion of Indonesia’s
national celebration on August 15, 1998, he asked forgiveness for the human rights
abuses conducted by the military in the past in the province. This initiative apparently
annoyed the TNI as a state institution. 217
Unfortunately, the East Timorese leadership showed little enthusiasm for wideranging autonomy, and the president failed to stop demonstrations demanding a
referendum on independence in the province. The initiative remained ineffective as
violence and covert intelligence and psychological operations conducted by
paramilitaries linked to the TNI continued. Knowing that his proposal was inadequate for
dispelling the uncertainty there, by January 27, 1999 he stated that he would give East
Timor independence if the offer of wide-ranging autonomy were denied.
Habibie’s approval of a referendum reflected his support of a peaceful solution to
the ongoing conflict in East Timor, which had been raging since Soeharto integrated it as
214
Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 7.
The Editors, Indonesia, October 2000, loc. cit: 131.
216
217
215
99
Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province in 1976. To show that he was serious about this new
option, he also ordered the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights Affairs to release
Xanana Gusmao, the resistance leader. Using this solution, the new president wanted to
portray Indonesia as a country, which had left its authoritarian system and was becoming
a new democracy.
The referendum in East Timor was freely held on August 30, 1999 under UN
supervision, but Habibie’s negligence in anticipating the TNI’s reaction was not in line
with the progressive solution. In fact, his order to the TNI to control the activities of its
paramilitaries led to anarchy after the clear result that 78.5 percent refused the wideranging autonomy. He did not anticipate that violence would break out and escalate
within hours of the results being announced because of the mounting dissatisfaction and
anger among pro-Indonesia paramilitaries.
Frustrations over the result of the referendum caused the TNI linked-proIndonesia paramilitaries to engage in vast destruction, burning, and looting, and
displacing of the local population. Hundreds of people were killed, mostly civilians who
favored independence, and around 200,000 fled to the mountains or the nearest province
of West Timor due to the systematic destruction of cities and hundreds of villages in East
Timor.218 Given the fact that the Indonesian security forces did not react by stopping the
anarchy, the UN decided to send a peacekeeping force.
President Habibie proved unable to control the TNI and its militia forces during
their systematic scorched-earth campaign,219 which had damaged about 70 to 80 percent
220
of East Timor's infrastructure as they withdrew from the territory. This resulted in an
abrupt confrontation between him and his chief commander, Gen. Wiranto. The president
had embarked on his East Timor policy to improve Indonesia’s international image, but
the military had, in effect, sabotaged that policy. 221 Due to their interest in giving
Indonesia a better image, Habibie and his cabinet had rejected Wiranto’s statement of
martial law in East Timor the previous day on September 6, 1999. This reaction
infuriated Wiranto and led the TNI to put more pressure on Habibie. It was reported that
within several hours of the cabinet decision, Wiranto with a group of generals in tow
visited the president.222 Amazingly, reports indicate that Habibie acted upon the things
Wiranto said in the meeting, bowing to the pressure. In other words, the president was
218
Associated Press, September 3, 1999, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 143-144.
Philip J. Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, London and New York, Routledge,
2002: 138-139.
220
“East Timor: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000”, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, US Department of State, February 23, 2001 .
221
222
Derwin Pereira, “Wiranto is the Man to Watch,” and “Inside Story: The ‘Silent Coup,’” The Straits
Times, September 12, 1999.
219
100
pushed into going along with his chief commander’s plan.223 The result of the TNI’s
pressure became clear early the following day, as Habibie reversed his cabinet decision
and announced martial law in East Timor.
By September 10, 1999, responding to heavy international pressure, 224 and trying
to improve the image of Indonesia due to its urgent interest in regaining foreign aid,
Habibie was ready to accept the long-awaited invitation of international peacekeepers.
This meant accepting the presence of foreign troops on “Indonesian soil,” without
Wiranto’s consent. According to Habibie’s aides, just before he made the announcement,
on September 8, 1999, Wiranto confronted him on the issue and threatened to step
225
down. The President also received a written ultimatum from the chief commander, who
warned him that if he admitted foreign troops into East Timor, the military would hand
power to a ministerial triumvirate consisting of Gen. (ret) Feisal Tandjung, Lt. Gen (ret)
Syarwan Hamid226 and Gen. Wiranto himself. 227 As Habibie refused to resign, Wiranto
reportedly agreed to allow him to keep his position on the condition that from then on,
the chief commander, not the president, would make all strategic decisions regarding the
former Indonesian province. 228
Rather than a calculated threat, the general’s move was likely soft resistance
responding to an external factor, using Crouch’s terminology. 229 This resulted in
deception aimed at forcing President Habibie to delay his decision, in order to give the
TNI and its militias the chance to finish their scorched-earth campaign in East Timor
before they entirely removed all of their forces from the former territory. Domestic and
international media widely referred to these alleged events, in particular, Wiranto’s
ultimatum, as a “silent-coup,” which achieved its goal of bluffing the new civilian
president. In Aguero’s study, it was found that threats of force to stop specific policies
would be the military’s most extreme reaction during the early stages of democratic
230
transition.
In effect, Wiranto’s ultimatum had prevented Habibie from summoning
international or UN peacekeepers, but his aides spread word that a coup d’etat had been
attempted. This triggered a counter-move from the Bais, through which Maj. Gen.
Tyasno Sudarto, the new chief, replacing Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim, 231 and his
223
Bowling, 1999, in Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 29.
Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc. cit: 182.
225
Harian Kompas, September 9, 1999: 1, 11; Harian Kompas, September 13, 1999: 1, 11.
226
In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid gave no comment about this.
227
Pereira, The Straits Times, September 12, 1999, loc.cit
228
229
See Crouch in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288.
230
Aguero, 1995, op. cit.: 23.
231
The Editors, “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite January 1, 1998-January 31, 1999,” Indonesia, 67, April 1999, New York: Cornell University, SEA: 140.
224
101
intelligence officers spread word that the president was on the brink of resigning. It was
reportedly no coincidence that late that night Habibie’s residence suffered a rare power
232
outage, which according to some of his aides, was meant to intimidate the president.
This calls to mind one of Finer’s models of military resistance, namely, the use of
233
intimidation.
Wiranto’s final announcement that Indonesia would accept the UN
sponsored-military forces was not instantaneous. Thus, on the evening of September 12,
1999, the TNI endorsed the presence of an international peacekeeping force within days
of the “silent coup.” Of course its main forces had been withdrawn and the scorchedearth campaign was complete, so the damage had been already done by the time the UN
arrived.
III.D. Military Brutality and the Role of Militias
Eventually, Habibie announced his policy on TV by saying that he had made a
decision to approve an international peacekeeping force working together with the TNI to
reestablish stability in East Timor after the referendum. While delivering his speech on
Indonesian television and arguing that the government could not wait any longer, because
too many people had lost their lives, Wiranto stood at his side, symbolizing his support of
the decision. This was even though Wiranto had made sure that the international
peacekeeping force would effectively begin their tasks no sooner than 15 days later, the
minimum length of time needed by the Indonesian military to complete its scorched-earth
campaign in East Timor 234 and withdraw the pro-integration militias from the territory.235
Reports from the Komnas HAM, for example, indicated that armed pro-integration
militias were being supplied with weapons by their supporters in the TNI. This was
evidently being accomplished through covert intelligence and psychological operations
with, the involvement --as usual-- of the black-clad Ninjas, mysterious warriors who
wore masks during their operations in an imitation of the practices in Japanese histories,
236
which had never occurred in East Java or Banyuwangi in particular. Reports about the
connection between the militias and the TNI, as well as the TNI’s involvement in the
violence, were issued by the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor and the
Indonesian Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations in East Timor
(KPP HAM Timtim). 237 As Liem said, thugs acting on the orders of their Kopassus
masters were responsible for the killings and devastation that grew in intensity during
232
Pereira, The Straits Times, September 12, 1999, loc. cit; O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 274.
S.E. Finer, 1962: op. cit: 140-163.
234
Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138-139.
235
236
Douglas Kam men, ‘The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final
Solution in East Timor,” in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 172.
237
233
102
1999 and came to a terrifying climax in September 1999.238 It was also significant that
the Komnas HAM had specified the possible involvement of high level TNI officers in the
post-referendum violence.
In addition, there was abundant evidence that gangsters and street hoodlums who
had joined militia groups had razed much of East Timor and followed orders from the
army leadership. 239 On April 4, 1999, the Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron)
paramilitary group, for example, opened fire with automatic weapons on unarmed
240
civilians seeking safe haven in Liquica. They slaughtered those, who tried to escape.
On April 17, 1999, while fighting back East Timorese activists demanding independence
241
and causing disturbances, the TNI killed twelve people and wounded ten more. TNI
headquarters officials immediately denied that security forces had been involved in the
Liquica killing. A report issued by a journalist who interviewed witnesses and survivors,
however, noted that the TNI was not justified in claiming that there was no blood on their
hands. Witnesses and survivors of the incident said that they recognized the local military
troops who were not wearing uniforms, but carried semi-automatic weapons and actively
participated in the shooting. 242 There were further contradictions with the TNI’s
explanation of the event. They said that there had only been five deaths in the Liquica
killing, but local people saw army troops removing several truckloads of bodies, which
243
were later found dumped in a nearby pond. Other sources said that the death toll was
estimated at fourty-five. 244
Yayasan HAK, East Timors most prominent and respected human rights group,
pointed to the role played by Indonesia’s most capable and also most feared army unit,
the Kopassus. José Oliveira, a spokeperson from the Yayasan HAK, said that in April
1999, he had witnessed Kopassus soldiers directing pro-Jakarta militias in a massacre in
the Liquica’s Catholic church, which left fifty-two unarmed civilians dead and dozens
245
more injured. Aside from this case, Kopassus soldiers had been involved directly or
indirectly in activities across the whole of East Timor; they gathered intelligence,
supervised beatings and torture, and supported the militia with training. In Liquica,
238
Liem Soei Liong,”It’s the Military, Stupid!” in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 203.
Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, ibid: 21.
240
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 261. Another source said that it occurred on April 6, 1999, see Eldridge, 2002,
op. cit: 156.
241
242
243
Ibid.
244
Robert Lowry, “East Timor: An Overview of Political Development,” in Manning and van Diermen
(eds.), 2000, loc .cit: 94.
245
Mark Dodd, “Kopassus in E Timor --Licensed to Kill,” The Australian, December 19, 2005,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,17604498%5E28737,00.html.
239
103
humanitarian aid workers saw Kopassus soldiers directing the Besi Merah Putih
militias.246
On the same day, Deputy Chief Commander Eurico Guterres, a protégé and longtime associate of the Indonesian military, who had then become a central leader 247 of the
pro-integration East Timorese movement, made a speech during a meeting in the Dili
parliament building on August 9, 1999. The meeting was attended by TNI soldiers and it
dealt with directing the militias to conduct a systematic cleansing of the ranks for traitors
248
to the cause of integration. A confession by Aitarak member Eusebio Soarez, who was
captured in Dili, revealed that the meeting, which was also attended by Basilio Araujo,
the political leader of the Pro-Integration Movement, instructed all pro-integration
defenders to kill pro-independence people after the August 30th referendum.249 In fact,
TNI soldiers who were responsible for guaranteeing security there before and after the
referendum did not take the appropriate actions. Leaked Indonesian army documents
showed that Aitarak, which was led by Guterres, was a regular part of the Indonesian
armed forces. 250 Moreover, Guterres has boasted to journalists that he took his orders
directly from Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, then the Kodam IX Udayana regional commander,
251
and told others that he communicated with Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim,
the TNI
representative for the task force on the East Timor consultation for referendum (P3TT).
The TNI also did nothing, although the foreign press reported the killing of
refugees, who were taking shelter in the house of a pro-independence figure, Manuel
Carrascalao. The killings were carried out by militias, and resulted in between fourteen
252
and twenty-five deaths. When appearing before a fact-finding team of the Indonesian
parliament (DPR) visiting East Timor to see Indonesia’s readiness for the referendum,
Guterres confessed that he had directly led the attacks on the refugees. Unaware that his
actions could be prosecuted in the future as gross violations of human rights, he
specifically told the team about how he had brutally killed Carrascalao’s son. Guterres
reported that he and his militia groups had to consume pills distributed by Indonesian
soldiers before they began their actions.253 Importantly, he disclosed that he had just been
246
Ibid.
Calvin Sims, “Jakarta Won't Pardon Suharto Son; Orders Militia Chief's Arrest,” New York Times.com,
October 5, 2000.
248
249
Conor O’Clery, “Killer Held in Mountains Tells of Murder Plans,” Irish Times, September 22, 1999.
250
“East Timor under the Indonesian Jackboot: An Analysis of Indonesian Army Documents”, Tapol, 15
November 1998.
251
Joanna Jolly, “Militias Vow to Rise from the Ashes,” South China Morning Post, 19 November 1999.
252
253
Humphrey Wangke, the secretary of DPR fact finding team, was interviewed on August 15, 2007, in
Kupang, West Timor.
247
104
following the orders of TNI officers when he and the pro-integration militias took action
together with TNI soldiers. 254
Furthermore, the Bobonaro-Maliana military district (Kodim 1636) commander,
Lt. Col. Burhanuddin Siagian, reportedly was caught carrying out executions on
September 4, 1999. 255 This resulted in his indictment for a particularly vicious atrocity in
the Maliana region. 256 Previously, he had made public speeches threatening to kill
supporters of independence for Timor-Leste, and was responsible for the death of seven
people in April 1999. The Kodim 1636 commander was charged with individual
responsibility and command responsibility for the following crimes against humanity:
torture, murder, persecution, and deportation or forcible transfer of a civilian population.
He was held responsible for the creation of the Bobonaro militia system, which had
257
become one of the most repressive in the whole of East Timor. The Kodim 1636
commander was also alleged to have participated in looting and arson during an attack on
a church complex in Suai. It was also accused for causing the destruction of some 80
percent of the buildings in the town and was estimated to have killed over fifty people.
They were alleged to have removed twenty-six bodies and secretly buried them in a
258
region nearby.
The killings in Suai began on September 6, 1999, as the Laksaur Merah Putih and
Mahidi militias and members of the TNI and POLRI attacked refugees staying in the Suai
Church complex. The attack was reportedly led directly by the Regent of Covalima, Col.
Herman Sediono and the Suai sub-district military (Koramil) commander, First
Lieutenant Sugito. At the time of the attack, the police, the Loro Sae Mobile Brigade
Contingent, and members of the TNI were outside the fence shooting refugees who tried
to flee the church complex. At least fifty people were murdered in this incident, and the
burying of the corpses was directed by the Koramil commander along with three
259
members of the TNI and a contingent of the Laksaur militia.
One day earlier, on September 5, 1999, Detachment 81 (D-81), a unit from Group
V of Kopassus, was reported to have silently slipped into the territory, giving evidence of
254
Eurico Guterres was interviewed on October 10, 2007, in Jakarta.
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 269; Eldridge, 2002, loc. cit: 156-157.
256
Reported by James Dunn, who served as UN expert on crimes against humanity in East Timor, in 20012002, see “West Papua: Indonesian Military Colonel Siagian, Indicted for Crimes Against Humanity,
Rallies Mmilitias in West Papua,” The Institute for Papuan Advocacy & Human Rights (IPAHR), 2007,
http://jsmp.minihub.org/indictmentspdf/Cailacoindnannexeng07feb03;http://jsmp;minihub.org/indictments
pdf/MalianaBurhanuddin22_7_03.pdf.
257
The Cailaco Indictments issued on February 3, 2003 and The Maliana Indictments issued on July 10,
2003 by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of Dili District Court.
258
Eldridge, 2002, ibid.
259
“Background on September 6, 1999 Suai Massacre,” Executive Summary Report on the Investigation of
Human Rights Violations in East Timor, KPP HAM Timtim, and Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General, January 31, 2000.
255
105
the formal deployment of the covert warfare group after the result of the referendum. 260
There was no evidence of any human rights abuses being committed by the group in East
Timor, but it was believed that the group was deployed to Dili (Baucau) on September 5,
1999. On this same day, there was an attack on the Catholic diocese office, where several
hundred Timorese had sought protection. Reportedly, at least, twelve people died in the
diocese incident. 261 In the night of the following day, the attackers razed Bishop Carlos
262
Belo’s house, and hundreds of refugees were forced into trucks and taken away.
Reports from Dili’s notoriously violent Becora neighborhood said that uniformed
soldiers had searched houses using machine guns, firing their weapons, and throwing
263
grenades. Houses in the suburban area of the capital of East Timor were burned down
and pro-independence residents who did not escape and hid in the hills were immediately
forced by the militias onto trucks bound for Atambua on Indonesia’s border with West
Timor. The atrocites were reportedly organized by TNI soldiers in cooperation with proJakarta militias in Becora and had caused around fifty fatalities among the local
people. 264 On September 8, 1999 in a separate case in Maliana, thirty-three noncombatants were reportedly murdered by a joint force of TNI soldiers and militias. 265
An independent international human rights group called the Commission for
Seeking of Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) had been recommended by a UN affiliatedhuman rights commission to conduct investigations since 2002. In a report, it pointed to
the activities of pro-integration militias and the TNI having been responsible for the
deaths of 1,400 pro-independence East Timorese.266 Many perished in September 1999
from vicious attacks, which put into perspective the significance of the crimes allegedly
committed there by the TNI.267 In terms of numbers of lives lost, the terrors allegedly
perpetrated by the TNI were extremely widespread and deep-seated so as to be a very
significant crime. The violence was further described as being more than just the sum of a
series of massacres and murders on a remote half-island involving perhaps 2,000
victims. 268 By September 1999, it had resulted in the forced expulsion and exodus of
260
John McBeth, Dan Murphy, Rodney Tasker, and Michael Vatikiotis,”Indonesia: No Way Out,” Far
Eastern Economic Review, September 23, 1999.
261
Dodd, 2005, loc.cit.
262
O’Rourke, 200 2, op. cit: 272.
263
“Update from Becora,” East Timor International Support Centre, September 5, 1999.
264
O’Clery, 1999, loc. cit.
265
Laporan Singkat KPP HAM Timtim (Executive Summary Report of KPP HAM on the Investigation of
Human Rights Violations in East Timor), Jakarta: Komnas HAM, January 31, 2000.
266
Chega!, CAVR, 2006; also interview with Pat Walsh, vice-chairperson of CAVR, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, March 11, 2009; and “Xanana Akan Bawa Laporan Soal Kekejaman Indonesia ke PBB,” Media Indonesia Online, January 18, 2006, http://www.mediaindo.co.id: 1.
267
Joseph Nevins, A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor, New York: Cornell University
Press, 2006: 5, 18.
268
Richard Tanter, Desmond Ball, and Gerry van Klinken (eds.), Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s Military
and Violence in East Timor, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006: 118; Jim Della-Giacoma, “The
106
three-quarters of East Timor’s 800,000 people, and the organized destruction of the
territory’s infrastructure and housing. It also involved an attack on the territory’s
religious institutions and a frontal attack on the fundamentals of democracy and freedom.
Unfortunately, it was difficult for Habibie to force the TNI to assume official
responsibility for what happened in post-referendum East Timor. The TNI had shown
resistance to Habibie’s efforts to address the conflict peacefully. Although he was able to
continue with the referendum process, and survived both the “intimidation” and a “silent
coup,” he was unable to stop the TNI from implementing what people had suspected as a
planned and systematic scorched-earth campaign. Piecing together field observations,
certain patterns emerged, which clearly show that the violence was not spontaneous, but
was to some degree actually organized by and carried out with the compliance of the
269
TNI. Interestingly, while they denied any involvement and proclaimed their innocence,
the TNI was ableo to plan a well-orchestrated campaign of violence and create hellish
conditions in East Timor. 270 As argued before by Aguero, the civilian regime’s
compliance with international pressure to peacefully and democratically handle armed
conflicts after the fall of authoritarian regime had invited resistance from the military. In
this case, Habibie’s further moves towards democratization, which were introduced with
strong rhetoric and an aggressive approach, also stemmed from international pressure,
271
and met with negative reactions from military elites.
Caetanno de Soussa Guterres, an ex-member of Falintil’s resistance, the TNI’s
brutality was stirred up by their deep frustration and humiliation in losing a territory that
272
had been occupied for more than two decades. Likewise, Eurico Guterres, a prominent
militia leader, said that the systemic violence was conducted by the TNI to defend East
Timor as an Indonesian province and part of the unitary state (NKRI). He explained that
as a leader of pro-integration militias, he had to support the TNI’s decisions before and
after the referendum. He also stated that what he had done there was merely carrying out
the TNI’s order to defend East Timor at all costs. Therefore, all the actions of the prointegration militias he had led, which had resulted in grave human rights violation, were
consequences of a national policy of the Indonesian security forces, in particular, the
TNI. 273
The latest report by the Indonesia-Timor Leste Joint Commission for Truth and
Friendship (CTF) also found that gross rights violations had occurred in East Timor in
1999 in the form of crimes against humanity such as murder, rape and other forms of
Violent Archipelago: Rethinking Its Place in History,” Indonesia, 82, October 2006, New York: Cornell
University, SEAP, 2006.
269
Robinson, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 254-255.
270
Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, ibid: 21.
271
Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 33-34.
272
Caetanno de Soussa Guterres was interviewed on August 15, 2007, in Kupang, West Timor.
273
Eurico Guterres was interviewed on October 10, 2007, in Jakarta.
107
sexual violence, torture, and illegal detention and forcible transfer and deportation carried
out against civilian populations. It was concluded that the pro-autonomy militias were the
“primary direct perpetrators” of the gross human rights abuses, while TNI’s personnel,
police, and civilian authorities had consistently and systematically cooperated with and
supported the militias in a number of significant ways, thus contributing to the
perpetration of the crimes.274 It was further stated that when viewed as a whole, the gross
human rights violations committed against pro-independence supporters in East Timor in
1999 constituted an organized campaign of violence. A recent report by CAVR was
presented by its vice-chairperson, Pat Walsh, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on March 11,
2009. It demanded the prosecution of TNI commanders deemed responsible for the
atrocities, and highlighted the existence of this organized campaign of violence.275
Looking back, there was nothing new about the behavior of the Indonesian
military at that time. It was known that the country’s long history was filled with actions
of violence and chaos organized by this state institution, which had been given the
privilege of holding weapons and using armed violence to perform its duties. TNI’s
leaders and soldiers, including Gen. Wiranto’s 1968 class and the following generations,
had been indoctrinated with the culture of violence, which designated them as hulubalang
raja, or the loyal guardians of the ruler --rather than the state-- making them similar to
Tentara Mataram or Wisanggeni (the Mataram or Wisanggeni army). That is why
Kusnanto Anggoro, an expert on military and Javanese history and political culture from
CSIS Jakarta, still referred to the post-1998 Indonesian military as Tentara Jawa (the
Javanese army), which continued to firmly uphold the principles of seeking senjata
276
(weapons), tahta (reign), kuasa (power), dan harta (wealth) as part of their daily lives.
In addition to this, T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of Propatria, an NGO focused
on Indonesia’s security sector reform, explained that the TNI’s culture of violence, which
had resulted in many cases of gross human rights violations in the country, was not
always guided by business interests.277 The background of the current chief commander,
Gen. Wiranto, supports this view, as be was born in Yogyakarta and grew up in Solo,
where the Javanese culture originated. Like his senior and patron, Soeharto, Wiranto had
rarely had occasion to leave Indonesia, particularly, for pursuing education and
274
Yemris Fointuna and Abdul Khalik,”Former Timor Militias Reject CTF Report,” The Jakarta Post, July
15, 2008: 2. Significantly, Indonesia accepted the truth commission’s report, findings, and conclusions, and
recognized the truth that gross violations of human rights happened prior to and shortly after the popular
consultation, that blamed the country’s government, military, and the police for gross human rights
violations in East Timor in 1999. Furthermore, the government extended deep regrets for what had
happened in the past that had claimed many lives. That acceptance ended years of denial. See, Tony
Hotland, “RI, T. Leste Both Involved in ‘Gross Rights Violations:’” CTF, The Jakarta Post, July 12, 2008:
3; “RI Accepts Blame in E. Timor Mayhem,” The Jakarta Post, July 16, 2008: 1.
275
After the presentation in the IPU Seminar on Peace and Security, Pat Walsh, was interviewed on the
same day, March, 11 2009, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
276
Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 31, 2007, in Jakarta.
277
T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on October 31, 2007, in Jakarta.
108
participating in exchange program abroad. This could supposedly affect the development
of the military leaders’ views regarding democracy, the military’s role, and human rights
in the future.
III.E. Habibie’s New Approach and the TNI as Veto Player
The new president, Habibie, had attempted to overcome various engineered
278
communal conflicts with a new approach. In Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya, for
example, he initially did not adopt the Javanese approach, which is absolutely intolerant
of disloyalty. Unlike Soeharto, he introduced peaceful conflict resolution by lifting the
status of the respective provinces as military operation zones. He ended the wars and
opened dialogue with different rebel groups, and, moreover, offered an alternative option
of a referendum for independence in East Timor. His failure to preserve East Timor and
his dependency on Gen. Wiranto, however, provided the TNI with greater opportunities
to continue their culture of violence across Indonesia. As a result, it became more
difficult for Habibie to end the repressive measures of the Indonesian military, and,
279
unfortunately, he was later accused of endangering the existence of the NKRI.
Similarly, President Habibie failed to bar the TNI’s role as a veto player in the
MPR, which had been used to prevent the investigation and prosecution of its alleged
past human rights abuses. Using its representatives in the MPR, the military organized
lobbies with civilian members of parliament to protect their vested interests by
demanding support for the creation of Article 28I (1) in the 1945 amendment to the state
constitution, which forbids the prosecution of past human rights abuses under
retrospective law. Constitutionally, the TNI was successful in protecting its personnel
from possible accusations of having committed gross human rights abuses. This success
280
would certainly constrain the operations of future human rights tribunals, but evidently
showed the strategic position of the military during the transition, and which had been
281
acknowledged by O’Donnell and Schmitter as a potential veto-player.
On September 23, 1999, civil society opposition to the drafting of a new
repressive law for a state of emergency proposed by the TNI resulted in the Second
Semanggi Tragedy. During the incident, students and fanatical supporters of Megawati
were killed, while others were severely injured. The TNI also arrested student
demonstrators and NGO leaders. During these incidents, the TNI presented a stern
response to protesters struggling for new spheres of activity by questioning the military’s
278
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie’s political adviser and spokeswoman, was interviewed on December 18,
2006 in Jakarta.
279
Ibid.
280
Edridge, 2002, op. cit: 145.
281
O’Donnell and Schmitter, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 34 et seq.
109
position post-Soeharto and its past wrongdoings. Regrettably, President Habibie was
unable to restrain TNI soldiers from opening fire on demonstrators with live bullets,
which resulted in the deaths of four people --three of them teenagers-- and scores of
wounded. 282 In the previous year, on November 12-13, 1998, the First Semanggi Tragedy
had erupted after the students, in a forceful attempt to come to the parliament building to
stop the MPR special session, clashed with the military in the Semanggi area. This
resulted in the deaths of fourteen students and civilians, 195 people being seriously
wounded, and 239 more slightly injured. 283 An alternate source counted seventeen dead
and over 400 wounded.284 Some had been found shot dead with live bullets, while others
were killed, or suffered serious wounds from rubber bullets fired at close range. 285
Instead of answering students’ demand of justice for the perpetrators of these gross
human rights abuses, the military introduced a new wave of violence. Even worse, the
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Gen. (ret) Feisal Tandjung,
commented that the occurrence was a consequence of the democracy student
demonstrators fought for.286
Ironically, the perpetrators --163 soldiers including twelve field officers-- ended
up serving imprisonment periods of just 14-21 days for indisciplinary conduct, meaning
that only low ranking officers had been punished in the absence of investigations of
287
possible gross human rights violations.
The only case in which the Habibie
government prosecuted high-ranking officers was the case of the 1997-1998 kidnapping
of students and reform activists which implicated Gen. Wiranto’s rivals, namely, Lt. Gen.
Prabowo Subianto and his elite group. With the full support of Gen. Wiranto, due to the
chief commander’s interest in rooting out Prabowo’s influence, and to punish the
insubstantial accusation of indisciplinary conduct, Habibie had no difficulty in bringing
them before the military court. Prabowo was shown to be an ambitious military leader
who had been a captain in the Kopassus until he became a three star general in the
Kostrad and had been charged with his role in a counter-coup d’etat and coup d’etat.288
His group’s maneuvers to challenge Wiranto and Habibie following the transfer of power
from Soeharto were suspected of being an “unfinished coup attempt”.289
282
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 295; Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit, Appendix 2, No. 23 and 24.
Ibid, Appendix 2, No. 23.
284
285
Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, ibid: 137.
286
O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 183.
287
Ibid: 184.
288
Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 450-463 and 22-25.
289
In a recent public statement, Lt. Gen. Prabowo regretted his half-hearted maneuvers, which had been
suspected as a coup attempt. See, “Prabowo Menyesal Tidak Kudeta” (“Prabowo’s Regret for Cancelling
the Coup”), Kompas-online, March 31, 2009 http://nasional.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/03/21360125/prabowo.menyesal.tak.kudeta, was accessed on March 31, 2009: 1.
283
110
In due course, the TNI’s honorary council (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira --DKP)
discharged Lt. Gen. Prabowo from his strategic position as Kostrad commander, Maj.
Gen. Muchdi from the Kopassus, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin from the Kodam
Jayakarta, and Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim from the Bais. It did not, however, extend any
sentence for their alleged activities in masterminding the kidnapping or for their role in
cases of alleged gross human rights violations during the May 12, 1998 Trisakti shootings
290
and the subsequent May 13-15, 1998 riots. Although it is believed that he worked with
Prabowo during the last days of Soeharto, Zacky was not immediately replaced. 291 For
the kidnapping as well, low and middle ranking officers received just one to two year
sentences. 292 The same held true for the Trisakti shootings, where several lieutenants and
police officers were sanctioned with light punishments ranging from two to ten months
sentences. 293
The prosecution of the military elites for their involvement would logically
become a dilemma for the president in certain cases. In the First Semanggi Tragedy, for
example, he had supported the TNI’s use of paramilitary groups, whose members were
mostly his sympathizers, to tackle radical student demonstrators and the reform
movement. Likewise, for the Banyuwangi killings, he let grave human rights violations
remain unanswered for. The chief of the Bakin, Lt. Gen. Maulani, presumably was aware
of the covert military intelligence and psychological operations purportedly organized by
the Bais. He was also, however, Habibie’s brother in law, which of course gave him an
advantage since the case took place in both PKB’s and PDIP’s traditional bases. The case
also implicated his rivals, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri, in their
preparations for the forthcoming legislative and presidential elections. Therefore,
President Habibie did not endorse any inquiries into accusations that military elites might
have provoked both communal and separatist conflicts in various parts of Indonesia. 294
Such accusations could have been harmful to his political interests and the stability of his
administration due to the possible involvement of some of the generals in his cabinet.
Habibie’s interest in remaining in power had further damaged his image.
Therefore, his government’s rhetoric of reform was soon weakened by this exercising of
violence reminiscent of previous years. As had happened under Soeharto, the opposition
was accused of being an enemy of the state and the president. Emulating the New Order’s
tradition, President Habibie claimed that student demonstrators and reform activists were
290
Laporan Pelapor Khusus Komnas Perempuan tentang Kerusuhan Seksual Mei 1998 dan Dampaknya
(Report of Special Rapporteur of Women National Commission on Sexual Assaults on May 1998 and its
Impacts), “Data Korban Kekerasan Seksual 1998 Diserahkan” (“Data of the 1998 Sexual Assaults Victims”), Harian Kompas, May 24, 2008: 24.
291
Honna, 203, op.cit: 163.
292
Fadli Zon, Politik Huru-Hara Mei 1998 (The Politics of May 1998 Riots), Jakarta: IPS, 2004: 30 -31, 146.
293
“Kerusuhan Mei 1998: Kejahatan Negara Tanpa Pertanggungjawaban” (”The May 2008 Riots: State
Crime Without Accountability”), Harian Kompas, May 16, 2006: 4.
294
Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc. cit: 182.
111
manipulated by anarchists. Security forces harassed public figures and prominent critics,
such as Ali Sadikin and Sri Bintang Pamungkas. The military in particular, threatened
them with arrest, and the regime’s Chief of National Intelligence Coordinator, Lt. Gen.
Maulani, was said to play a significant role in this respect.295 Maulani was also apparently
behind the sidelining of leftists, such as the PRD and ex-PKI members, from political
activities and kept them from joining new political parties in the new era of reform.
Furthermore, President Habibie had asked the military to respond harshly to student
demonstrations, which tended to become more radical on a day-by-day basis.296
IV. Coping with Separatism
IV.A. Habibie and Wiranto’s Response to Secessionism
Is there any relation between the TNI’s continued culture of violence and the
emergence of separatist activities in the region? In this context, Habibie’s political aide
Samego said that military’s long distrust of civilian leaders’ loyalty to the state due to the
persistent danger of disintegration or separatism had justified them in maintaining their
297
dual function to protect the existence of the unitary state (NKRI). Military leaders,
including Chief Commander Gen. Wiranto, often used the rhetoric of satu untuk semua,
semua untuk satu (one for all, all for one). On numerous occasions, they promoted the
important principles of unity and loyalty, which are deeply emphasised in Javanese
culture. 298 From this cultural perspective, repressive measures were fundamental for
guaranteeing loyalty and obedience from all parts of the nations. Thus, separatist
movements could not be tolerated and had to be eradicated. 299 At the same time,
compromising with separatist elements would weaken the sovereignty of the state,
meaning that loyalty to the state was of vital importance to maintaining national
integration. Provinces such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor, where separatist
movements exist, were seemingly perceived as Indonesia’s outer islands, which should
show their compliance to Java, the centre of the NKRI’s power and authority.
In reality, for the moment at least, the Javanese were the natives of Indonesia’s
main island of Java. With approximately 85 million people, or more than 40 percent of
300
the country’s total population, the Javanese made up the largest ethnic group. They
were traditionally concentrated in the provinces of East Java, Central Java, and
295
Timothy Lindsey, “Indonesia’s Negara Hukum: Walking the Tightrope to the Rule of Law,” in Budiman,
Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 371.
296
Max Lane, “Bebaskan Semua Tapol” (”Free All Political Prisoners”), http://www.xs4all.nl/-prdeuro/LIBERATE/Nomor8/mimbar-i.htm: 4, 12.
297
Indria Samego was interviewed on May 15, 2006, in Jakarta.
298
See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 47.
299
Ibid.
300
“Javanese,” http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery;jsessionid=agrmk82835k6s?tname=javanese&s..: 1.
112
Yogyakarta. Due to the migration policy implemented in Indonesia over several decades
of Soeharto’s New Order era --part of the national transmigration program-- large
populations of Javanese became established in almost all of Indonesia’s provinces.
Javanese could be found in all professions, and in particular, in the government and the
301
military. Compared to their related ethnic groups, namely the Sundanese (30.9 million),
Madurese (6.8 million), and Balinese (3.0 million), their numbers were much higher than
302
any other ethnic group in Indonesia. In addition, since most important events in the
country’s history happened or were decided by the central government in Java, the
Javanese culture had a great influence on the country’s future.
More importantly, the traditional over-representation of the Javanese in the
central army elite continued until 1999. At least 55 percent of military leaders, or thirtythree out of every sixty officers, at the central level were from this ethnic group. The
Javanese were trailed by the Sundanese in second place with 6.5 percent, or four out of
sixty officers. The Batak, Balinese, and Madurese, who were also categorized as Javanese,
as well as the Minangkabau, came next.303
The background of the state formation and composition of the population had an
effect on Indonesia’s political culture. The strategic position of Java in the country’s
history, as well as its majority population, had exercised a fundamental influence on the
country’s political culture as well as the TNI. Considering that their doctrines had long
since been internalized, especially in educational and training centers, and cemented over
several generations, it was not easy to change the military’s behavior to make it more
adaptable with reform demands.
The new chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, like his Javanese predecessors, 304
continued to put emphasis on the importance of defending the unitary state, which could
be endangered by uncontrolled reform in the post-Soeharto era. 305 Due to the recent
emergence of regional disobedience, which endangered the unitary state, the general did
not support civilian leaders’ proposals, including those from MPR speaker Amien Rais,
to adopt federalism in the country. 306 Likewise, he often reminded the nation of the
dangerous threat of foreign intervention, as in East Timor, which could damage national
integration. Wiranto was concerned that the spirit of unity and nationhood had been
weakened since the outbreak of reform demands in 1998. He said that civilians, political
elites in particular, should be blamed for the situation. His reasoning was that instead of
301
Ibid.
Ibid.
303
The Editors, Indonesia, April 1999, loc. cit.
304
Soeharto and other military leaders had feared that civil society would some day have the potential to
challenge existing power structures and norms in their own society. See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 49.
305
“Situasi Kebangsaan: Bangsa Terpuruk, Kaum Nasionalis Kumpul” (“The Nation Worsened, Nationa lists Gathered”), Harian Kompas, March 20, 2006: 2; see also Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 47-48.
306
Harold Crouch was interviewe d on April 22, 2006, in Jakarta.
302
113
paying greater attention to the agenda of common concerns, they had become more
deeply involved in their own individual or group interests.307
Not surprisingly, the military officers’ mindset was centralistic. It fell in line with
Javanese political culture, which considered anything contrary to its precepts as a threat.
Quoting Britton (1996), Rinakit noted that the Javanese values influenced the inner
workings of the military. By quoting Anderson (1990), he also emphasized the idea of
Javanese political culture as symbolized by a lamp. The more centralistic the power, the
brighter the lamp. In other words, decentralization stood in contradiction to the ideas of
power in the Javanese political culture, because it dimmed the lamp.308
Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 had extended autonomy to provinces to
rule their own regions. Although these laws were an attempt by the central government to
appease regional governments, Habibie’s decentralization policies could become a danger
to national integration, since the authority of the regional governments would become too
extensive. The military worried that the process of national integration, which had taken
place post-1958 after Gen. Nasution introduced the Jalan Tengah (Middle Way) concept,
would be threatened by the rising demands of decentralization. The Middle Way
established the basic principle of the military’s dual function rooted, particularly, in
territorial structures.309
In the meantime, the parallelism of the military’s organizational structure with the
civilian bureaucracy guaranteed national integration, because it was capable of
identifying early activities that would be dangerous to the political stability of the country.
The military maintained its perceptions that there was no other group in society as
committed to the unity or integrity of the nation as itself. In addition, it stood alone in its
capability to eradicate rebellions and separatist movements, such as the 1948 PKI Madiun,
PRRI/Permesta, DI/TII, and the 1965 G-30-S/PKI putsch. 310 Decentralization was
therefore simply a process that threatened national integration, and thus, contradicted
with the military’s role as an institution concerned with national building and integration
(Maynard, 1976). The military was generally of the opinion that decentralization would
not bring a better life for Indonesians, since it pushed them to be inward-looking and
encouraged them to adopt a narrow spirit of localism.311
Due to its unchanged historical and cultural views during the Habibie era, the
military, had also never supported civilian leaders’ attempts to establish a federal state in
Indonesia. As Habibie’s political aide Samego describes it, the military worried that such
307
“Wiranto Risau Terpuruk Solidaritas Kebangsaan” (“Wiranto Worried the Deteriorating Solidarity of
the Nation”), Rakyat Merdeka, June 1, 2006: 9.
308
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 75-76.
309
Ibid: 75-76.
310
See also, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 30-42.
311
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 76-77.
114
an attempt would endanger the existence of the unitary state, which at that time was being
threatened by a rising pride in regards to religion, ethnicity, and civilian leaders’ group
312
identifications. The military saw civilian leaders as more interested in maintaining their
parochial, rather than national, interests. Consequently, these leaders could not be
entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the unitary state in the future. Besides,
military leaders still were not sure about the prospects of Habibie’s presidency, and they
considered his performance as poor in the current transition.
Even worse, it was thought that federalism and separatism would diminish the
power and authority of Java as the centre of power. Therefore, federalism could not be
tolerated, and separatism had to be immediately eliminated, because it was synonymous
with rebellion directed at weakening the power of Java. For this reason, any separatist
movements in the country would meet with a repressive response from the military.
Crouch underlined that the values of Javanese political culture, which stress the
accumulation of power and lay emphasis on unity and loyalty, influenced the TNI’s
response to reform, formation of a federal state, and separatism. Therefore, the TNI’s
culture of violence, which was refelected in its coercive and repressive measures,
fervently grew as the country confronted increasing threats of separatism in its post-1998
democratic transition. 313 More so than in the past, repressive methods were transparently
applied by the military to address separatist movements throughout the country.
Of equal importance is Crouch’s view that the Javanese political culture, which
accentuates a centralistic government structure, is actually in accordance with the
military’s efforts to protect its political and economic interests. However, civilians were
not the sole perpetrators of disloyalty to the country. In certain cases, the military was
also guilty of this, as some of its leaders were involved in provoking separatist
movements due to the existence of their political and economic interests. Importantly,
Rinakit revealed that more repressive measures had been imposed on Aceh and Irian Jaya,
provinces rich in natural resources. 314 This is why security sector reform and the
elimination of the TNI’s territorial function, for example, as proposed by civilian leaders,
was difficult to realize.
Unlike the military, President Habibie was able to tolerate proposals for the
establishment of a federal state, and even a referendum on independence. 315 He was
familiar with the concept of a federal state from his experience in Germany. He
understood that, similar to a unitary state, it was only an instrument for establishing a just
312
Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006, in Jakarta.
Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006, in Jakarta; Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 47-48.
314
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), loc. cit, 2005: 84.
315
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie’s adviser and spokesperson, was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in
Jakarta.
313
115
and prosperous society. Therefore, such notions could be openly discussed in society. 316
Quoting Magnis-Suseno, a typical urban leader with a broad international vision, Habibie
was able to transparently articulate his new proposals and opinions, and asked other
people to back his ideas. 317 Likewise, A. Makmur Makka, Habibie’s secretary for almost
two decades, reminds us that Habibie’s experiences studying and working in Germany
had contributed to his way of thinking and making decisions, which was very uncommon
318
for Javanese people and Indonesia’s political elites. He was known as a person who
made his decisions based on logic.
President Habibie’s style and outlook resulted in a concern among TNI leaders
about losing vulnerable regions, for example, Aceh and Irian Jaya, after the secession of
East Timor through the August 30, 1999 referendum. This motivated the military to again
declare military operations zones (DOM) in these two regions. This was after they had
been briefly lifted by the president after he took power, and almost 30 years after they
had been implemented via the repressive policies of the Soeharto regime.319 With the
exception of Aceh, Indonesia’s westernmost province, which had contributed
significantly to the country’s independence war, Gen. Wiranto did not publicly apologize
320
for his past military actions in Irian Jaya and East Timor. Reportedly, it was just local
commanders who had issued open apologies for atrocities carried out by individual
soldiers, and which had never been conducted by whole units or institutions.
IV.B. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Aceh
Meanwhile, in Aceh, criticism of the TNI’s handling of the new separatist
conflicts was voiced by intellectuals and NGOs such as Musliadi from Koalisi Aksi
Gerakan Mahasiswa Aceh Barat (West Aceh student movement action coalition), Dja’far
Siddik from IFA, as well as Suprin Sulaiman, Kurdinar, and Zulfikar Muhammad from
Koalisi NGO HAM, and Ali Zamzami from SPKP HAM. 321 Their support for a stronger
322
role of the police in the province, rather than returning it to the military, was ignored.
The TNI feared that the GAM might be continuing their struggle and guerilla activities,
due to President Habibie’s soft approach. 323 Further incidents occurred in November and
December 1998 mainly in North and East Aceh, as well as Pidie, where hundreds of
youths, many armed with weapons, searched for military members. They kidnapped and
316
Indria Samego, Habibie’s political aide, was interviewed on June 14, 2006, in Jakarta.
Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007, in Jakarta.
318
Makka (ed.), 1996, loc. cit: 449.
319
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: 125.
320
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 174; Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 142.
321
The first three activists were kidnapped in 2002; the rest were successfully interviewed on August 25,
2007 in Banda Aceh.
322
Interview with Ali Zamzami on August 25, 2007, in Banda Aceh.
323
See again, interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta.
317
116
killed seven soldiers.324 As a consequence, the troop presence was increased after major
clashes. On the other hand, the Acehnese organized large demonstrations demanding a
325
referendum on independence within days of the East Timor offer. In addition, support
for a referendum demanding independence had spread dramatically like wildfire across
the province.
Habibie’s promise of establishing a free port in Sabang, enlarging the Banda Aceh
airport, providing funding to build eighty-five madrasah (Muslim schools), and train
transportation were meaningless, since the Acehnese had lost hope and trust in the
government. 326 A new political development later emerged in Aceh as students and
intellectuals from all over the province formed a large congress on February 4-6, 1999 to
establish the Centre for Information on Aceh Referendum (Sentra Informasi untuk
Reformasi Aceh --SIRA). The centre was to start a new phase of struggle for demanding a
referendum on independence. The formation of SIRA and the cry for referendum it
produced therefore became new difficulties for Habibie.
President Habibie continued to respond sluggishly. He received Governor
Mahmud’s proposal for special statute for Aceh and passed it into law on September 23,
1999, just a few days before his transitional presidency ended. Still, there was nothing
new about Aceh’s special status in the new law, because it had been acquired several
decades earlier, but remained an empty title lacking follow-up. The new law protected the
Acehenese in practicing syariah (Islamic law) for religious, educational, and economic
affairs, as well as in the local culture. The law, however, was seen as insufficient by
many had been demanding justice and freedom for a long time. Habibie’s reluctance to
settle core issues, namely the prosecution of military perpetrators of atrocities, led to his
failure in appeasing the Acehnese. The new law was unable to eliminate Acehnese
aspirations for a referendum, as security forces resumed their repressive measures.
The experience dealing with East Timor had hardened military resistance to
327
separatist demands. In sweeping operations following the secession of East Timor, TNI
units raided villages, hunting for GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka --Movement for An
Independent Aceh) rebels under a new campaign called Operasi Wibawa 99 (Operation
Authority 99). The operations resulted in human rights violations, in particular when
around 1,000 TNI soldiers assaulted the Kandang region in search of GAM leaders.328
Sporadic clashes between TNI soldiers and the GAM resulted in additional negative
effects over the subsequent months.
324
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit.
Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 25.
326
Majalah Tempo 27, No. 15, January 12-18, 1999; Majalah Gatra 5, No. 20, April 3, 1999, cited in
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit.
327
Eldridge, 2002, op. cit.
328
325
117
IV.C. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Irian Jaya
In Irian Jaya, as President Habibie began to relax political control, a group of
Papuans mobilized in favor of independence. Nonetheless, in June 1998 he was still
pursuing dialogues with the Foreri (forum for the reconciliation of Irian Jaya people).
This move was a progressive breakthrough, because Foreri denounced Irian Jaya’s
integration into Indonesia, and demanded a referendum for Papuans to choose their future.
The dialogue with Foreri culminated on February 26, 1999 in an unprecedented meeting
of 100 delegates from Irian Jaya with Habibie, during which they were guaranteed
freedom of speech without fear of prosecution, including the issue of independence.
At this point, it should be stated that Habibie was the only president who directly
and bravely received a delegation of 100 people, who claimed themselves as representing
all Papuan aspirations and interests, in the Merdeka palace. Ignoring his advisers, and
considering it his duty to listen directly to his people, he conducted this dialogue with
them in the state palace. As anticipated, during the dialogue the delegation voiced its goal
of forming an independent state and asked Jakarta to recognize the Papuan declaration of
independence, which had been declared on December 1, 1961. In front of President
Habibie, Tom Beanal, the chief of the Amugme tribe, read a political declaration and
stated that the Papuans were not making a new declaration of independence, but just
demanded the government to recognize the previous one. Mr. Beanal insisted that they
329
were ready for the consequences of this goal being realized.
The strong declaration in favor of independence certainly surprised Habibie.
Though shocked by the declaration, the President tried to listen carefully to the demands.
Afterwards though, he re-emphasised that independence was impossible. He said that the
Papuan demand was a matter of principle for Indonesia, and not a simple wish to be
fulfilled. He pointed to similar demands of secession from other provinces, such as, East
Timor and Aceh. Trying to defend his arguments, he said that he was not a robot able to
instantly cope with every request, but was subject to the same constraints as any other
human being. 330 In a failed effort to convince the delegation otherwise, Habibie was
unable to persuade the delegation to reconsider its objective of independence.
Unfortunately, the delegates maintained their standpoints and read a declaration
denouncing the history of their region’s integration into Indonesia, and formally
demanding independence. Thus, the meeting in the presidential palace put an end to a
plan for a national dialogue that Habibie had once expected.331
329
J. Osdar, “Sentuhan Para Presiden kepada Papua” (“Presidents’ Policies to Papua”), December 1, 2005,
Kompas-online, http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/01/Politikhuku/2254535.htm: 1-3.
330
Ibid.
331
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 153-154.
118
After the deadlock in the dialogue between the president and the Foreri, which
had denounced Irian Jaya’s integration into Indonesia and demanded a referendum for
Papuans to choose their future, President Habibie unilaterally decided to divide Irian Jaya
into three provinces. He did not heed the TNI’s advice and made his decision without
deliberating on the security consequences for the new provinces following the lifting of
their military operations zone status. Law No. 45/1999 on the formation of the West,
Central, and East Irian Jaya provinces produced conflicts among different tribes, and
exacerbated the ongoing conflict between the regional and central governments.
Communal conflicts were also caused by Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 327/M/1999
on the appointment of Bram Oktovianus Aturury as the caretaker of the governor of West
Irian Jaya. Consequently, the Papuans organized protests and accused Habibie of
attempting to divide them in order to avert further separatist tendencies. 332
On February 27, 1999, Gen. Wiranto was also astonished to learn that
independence was the single most important issue that had been voiced by the 100
Papuan representatives who President Habibie had encouraged to freely speak their
minds. 333 The threat of separation, therefore, resulted in more severe military measures in
Irian Jaya. It is likely that Wiranto anticipated the impact of a stronger cry for
independence, which could generate similar movements in other parts of Indonesia. As a
result, the military stopped following compromise approaches.
IV.D. Military Response to Referendum on Independence in East Timor
Anticipating that his proposal on wide ranging-autonomy could be rejected,
President Habibie offered another option of a referendum on independence to East Timor,
an offer that was not offered to Aceh or Irian Jaya.334 He felt that his pragmatic approach
to handling the province was still in Indonesia’s interests, and was mandated by the
political realities of the post-Soeharto era. 335 He merely wanted to be realistic in assessing
Indonesia’s interest in a province, which represented less than 1 percent of the country’s
total population and territories, but which had been using a disproportionately large
amount of the national budget since Indonesia’s invasion in 1974 and East Timor’s
integration into the country in 1976.
Based on these considerations as well as the reality that the majority of the people
of the tiny territory are Catholics, in his worst-case scenario, Habibie seemingly
calculated that Indonesia had little to lose in practical terms. To persuade skeptics that
332
“Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (“Central Government Demanded to Respect Papua’s Special
Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ ut- 01.htm: 1-2.
333
Philpott, 1999: 66, in Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 25.
334
335
119
East Timor was not worth keeping, he drew attention to the tiny size of the territory and
the small proportion of the total population that its people contributed to the country. In
February 1999, he also pointed out that aside from rocks, the East Timorese had given the
country nothing. They had no natural or human resources, in addition to having no
336
appreciable gold deposits or technology. He concluded that the benefits of maintaining
the province were neglibible for Indonesia with its majority Muslim population.
Nevertheless, his new and radical initiative displeased the military, and in particular, its
conservative leaders.
In fact, President Habibie’s lack of preparation for winning the referendum has
been blamed for the loss of a large amount of support from the East Timorese for the
proposal of integration with Indonesia under the new structure of wide-ranging autonomy.
Furthermore, he did not anticipate that violence would erupt and escalate in East Timor
within hours of the results being announced, because of the mounting dissatisfaction and
anger from pro-integration militias and their main sponsor: the military. They thought
that he wanted to use the referendum on independence to distance himself from Soeharto,
to appear reform-minded, and to increase his reputation internationally. The referendum
proposal surprised the TNI, which had expressed little public opposition, but later
accused him of failing to consult them.337 This contradicted with the past reality that
since the formation of Indonesia, the military had been a powerful and effective means
for the regimes to encourage political integration in the country and protect national
338
unity. In other words, it played a vital role in coping with separatist movements across
the country.
Habibie’s civilian advisers in the ICMI, for instance, Dewi Fortuna Anwar,
339
influenced the decision on the reasonable proposal of independence. The involvement
of the TNI headquarters was ignored, causing a negative reaction from Gen. Wiranto and
other members of the military elite to Habibie’s presidency. Several weeks before the
president announced his new proposal, TNI commanders were already alarmed to
discover that he was even examining such a plan. The new proposal had been perceived
by the TNI as a critical decision that would cause a great setback to the military’s
determined effort to keep the territory within Indonesia.
Taking into account President Habibie’s lack of preparation for winning back East
Timorese support for the option of wide-ranging autonomy, TNI leaders were reported to
have launched Operasi Sapu Jagad (Operation Global Clean Sweep) to undertake covert
336
Ibid.
Ibid: 257.
338
Manuel Schmitz, Ethnische Konflikte in Indonesien und die Integrationspolitik Suhartos (Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia and the Politics of Integration of Soeharto), Mitteilungen des Instituts fuer Asienkunde
Hamburg, Nummer 362, Hamburg, IFA, 2003: 88-103.
339
337
120
intelligence and psychological campaigns threatening pro-independence East Timorese
and preparing reprisals if they chose independence in the August 30, 1999 referendum. 340
Prior to this operation, the press reported that Dili, the capital of East Timor, was seized
by rumors of the activities of the black-clad Ninjas.341 The TNI’s move to reduce troop
levels in East Timor in August 1998, following Habibie’s offer of special autonomy, had
also been replaced with a new policy of using and arming militias from Jakarta as part of
alleged covert operations. By September 1998, just one month after the highly publicized
withdrawal, the TNI secretly sent around 3,500 fresh troops there.342
Habibie’s controversial decision upset the TNI and reunited factions in the
institution, most notably the East Timor veterans, due to their interest in saving the
territory from secession. Immediately, Gen. Wiranto asked his formal rival Prabowo’s
associates to prepare a contingency plan. These associates included Maj. Gen. Sjafrie
Sjamsoeddin, who was then an expert in TNI headquarters, especially for counterinsurgencies, and Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim, Bais chief. Zacky was reported to have told
East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana, that as a military man, intelligence officer, and
veteran, he could not accept losing East Timor. 343 Therefore, just a few days after the
reshuffling of military elites on January 4, 1999, Wiranto gave Zacky the more crucial
task of representing the military and its interests in the taskforce on the East Timor
consultation (P3TT). Wiranto’s appointments of Sjafrie and Zacky, who formerly
belonged to the Prabowo clan, suggested that Wiranto now had confidence in them. As
before, during the crucial times before Soeharto’s fall, Wiranto, Sjafrie, and Zacky,
minus Prabowo, had now become important TNI leaders controlling the development of
military operations occurring close to referendum. The chief commander was both aware
and in full control of all the TNI actions in East Timor. 344
Although the taskforce’s name sounded unobjectionable, it would actually have
vital control over all of the TNI’s operations in the threatened territory. More importantly,
Zacky was a senior Kopassus intelligence operative with many years of experience in
East Timor, as well as Aceh and Irian Jaya in running counter-insurgency campaigns
against the anti-NKRI (separatist) rebels. Together with Mahidin Simbolon, Zacky had
gained a reputation as a foremost expert in covert warfare, and along with Sjafrie, the two
were among those most intimately involved in East Timor. In addition, Sjafrie was the
former chief of the clandestine “Elang” (“Eagle”) military unit that carried out
kidnappings and murders in Aceh following his replacement as Jakarta military (Kodam
Jayakarta) in 1998. Now Zacky, aided by Sjafrie, was apparently given the responsibility
of conducting a crash program in raising, training, and arming pro-integration militias in
340
Tapol Bulletin, June 7, 1999, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 143.
Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit.
342
Ibid: 175.
343
Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 29.
344
Honna, 2003, op.cit: 175.
341
121
East Timor. 345 Both men were also seemingly responsible for training the militias to
initiate intimidation and violence targeted at pro-independence groups to secure victory
346
in the coming referendum. Using these militias, TNI leaders could expect to protect
their institution in their covert operations from future accusations of human rights abuses.
Parallel to the TNI, the militias were also present in the districts, sub-districts, and
most villages. They established battalions in each of East Timor’s thirteen districts,
companies, and platoons at the sub-district and village levels. At each level, their
347
members cooperated with, and doubled as, resident military personnel. Their ranks
were evidently filled with East Timorese civilians, who fanatically backed integration
with the Indonesian government. These included high numbers of TNI troops in civilian
uniforms, as well as some West-Timorese hoodlums.348
At that time, the regional commander of Bali and West and East Nusa Tenggara
(Kodam IX Udayana) who was responsible for East Timor’s security was Maj. Gen.
Adam Damiri. He had previously served as an aide to Maj. Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin in
Jakarta regional command (Kodam Jayakarta), prior to Brig. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, the chief
of staff, who was promoted to East Java regional (Kodam V Brawijaya) commander.
Silalahi’s responsibility bordered on Damiri’s regional command, and he had previously
been connected with the Banyuwangi killings.349 In addition, Damiri’s assistant in Kodam
IX Udayana was Brig. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon, well known as Zacky’s alternative in
covert operations. He was also an ex-Korem 164 commander based in Dili, the capital of
East Timor. Importantly, during a meeting in Bali in February 1999, Damiri and
Simbolon were reported to have ordered the militias to eliminate all East Timorese
leaders and sympathizers.350
According to Liem, creating militia forces in East Timor was a logical
consequence of the Kopassus operation of conducting a counter-insurgency to get East
Timorese to fight against other East Timorese.351 It was shown that many of the 11,000
militias were trained in West and East Timor by the Kopassus Groups IV and V. NonTimorese from across Indonesia, often thugs from Indonesia’s Eastern regions, and even
criminals released from prisons, were also recruited as members of the militias. However,
Gen. Wiranto has denied any TNI involvement with the militias whatsoever. He went on
to clarify that the armed thugs had emerged and developed their ranks spontaneously. In
345
Kammen, in Anderson (ed.) 2001, loc. cit: 184.
347
Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000: 71; O’Rourke,
2002, op. cit: 259.
348
Liem Soei Liong, in Colombijn and Lindbad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 203.
349
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 169-171. Author’s interview with a noted human rights observer in Jakarta also
cited this.
350
Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 183-184.
351
Liem Soei Liong, in Colombijn and Lindbad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 203.
346
122
the meantime, a number of militia members and pro-integration leaders voluntarily
confessed to having received arms and funding from the TNI. Likewise, a local officer
352
admitted that he had distributed rifles to newly recruited militia members. Similar
confessions were made by representatives of pro-integration groups who testified that
353
they were trained by TNI members.
It was therefore, clear that the chief commander’s explanation and clarification
contradicted with the testimony of Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, the TNI’s East Timor postreferendum martial law chief. Appearing before a public hearing held by the Joint
Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) on October 24, 2007
in Jakarta, he argued that the existence of the militias was legally justified. They had been
formed as civilian defense groups or Wanra, part of the Indonesian defense system,
which existed everywhere in Indonesia, including East Timor, at that time. They were
trained in discipline and were bound to certain rules. These rules, of course, had been
made or dictated by the Indonesian military. Moreover, they were, supplied with weapons
to “safeguard their neighborhoods.” 354
Linkage and patronage activities of the TNI with militias became more
transparent just days after President Habibie made his formal offer of a ballot on January
27, 1999, as militia violence erupted in several western districts of East Timor. In midFebruary 1999, a Kopassus intelligence officer reportedly addressed militia leaders from
twelve districts in regards to a plan to launch an all-out attack on suspicious sympathizers
of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and the Falintil, Xanana’s
military organization. The officer’s address was similar to the instructions given earlier
by top generals of the Kodam IX Udayana regional command during the Bali meeting. 355
In fact, the TNI itself was directly involved in many cases of violence throughout East
Timor. On April 17, 1999, for example, while fighting back East Timorese activists
demanding independence and organizing resistance, the TNI caused the deaths of twelve
people and wounded ten more. 356 Meanwhile, the Liquica killing, which resulted in
approximately fourty-five deaths, 357 was another clear indication of the TNI’s
unwillingness to secure a peaceful solution for East Timor. 358
Documents of the Operation Global Clean Sweep proved the TNI’s central plan of
disrupting the referendum by using militia violence and intimidation. As noted by
352
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 258-259.
The testimony made before a public hearing held by the Joint Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission for
Truth and Friendship (CTF) on October 24, 2007, in Jakarta. See, Desy Nurhayati, “TNI ‘Armed’ East
Timor Civilians,” The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2007: 1.
354
Syahnakri’s testimony, ibid.
355
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit; Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit.
356
357
Lowry, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 94.
358
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 261; Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 156.
353
123
Robinson, militia groups were seeking broader coordination with the TNI. The rhetoric of
terror reflected in the document, a hallmark of the TNI’s repressive methods, had become
a standard feature of the militia’s style. Thus, Operation Global Clean Sweep could begin
flexibly and its impact depended on developments on the ground. 359
The Garnadi document dated July 3, 1999, was signed by Maj. Gen. Garnadi, the
special assistant to the powerful Coordinating Minister Gen. (ret) Feisal, who was serving
as the vice-chair of Zacky’s P3TT taskforce. This document outlined the TNI’s postreferendum contingency plan to evacuate pro-integration militia members and TNI units,
and recommended securing their withdrawal routes and destroying vital facilities and
360
objects. The recommendation clearly showed that high-ranking TNI officials expected,
and were possibly also planning, apocalyptic consequences to the referendum. The
document had been widely distributed among civil servants in Dili, following a visit by
Jakarta’s officials. The document seems authentic, and Garnadi, himself, admitted that
the signature on it was his own. 361
The Tavares document preceded the Garnadi document and revealed that the preand post-referendum violence was planned at high levels. It’s instructions dated July 7,
1999 were purportedly signed by Joao da Silva Tavares, supreme commander of all prointegration East Timorese militias (Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi --PPI)362 and ordered a
continuation continue of the campaign of terror and intimidation against those who were
influencing the East Timorese to reject special autonomy. The document was copied to
various officers, including TNI chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, and Kodam IX Udayana
regional commander, Maj. Gen. Damiri, although these officials were not actually named.
The instructions promised in detail that the TNI would provide militias with substantial
363
material support, in particular, weapons. It was clearly mentioned that if the proautonomy forces were defeated, then Operasi Pembersihan (Operation Clean-Up) would
be simultaneously launched to its fullest extent against the pro-independence forces.
The operation’s name was a bit different from the Operation of Global Clean Sweep, but
it followed similar aims.
Among the documents found amid the escalation of the conflict leading up to the
referendum, the Garnadi document was most likely authentic and may be considered the
“smoking gun,” proving that there was both a close official relationship between the TNI
and the militia, and that the post-referendum violence was planned at the highest levels in
359
Geoffrey Robinson,”The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun: Tracing the Origins of Violence in East
Timor”, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 247.
360
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 265; Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 185.
361
Harian Kompas, May 4, 2000, cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit.
362
See,”Mantan Panglima PPI Dimakamkan di TMP Seroja” (“Ex-PPI Supreme Commander Buried in
Seroja National Cemetery”), Republika-online, June 11, 2009, was accessed on June 11, 2009.
363
Robinson, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 248.
124
Jakarta.364 A key passage in the document states that “evacuation routes must be planned
and secured, possibly by destroying facilities and other key assets,” and lends credence to
claims that the document spelled out a systematic “scorched-earth” plan due to the fact
that East Timor was almost entirely destroyed following the referendum.365 Additionally,
two other documents found before the ballot, the Telegram Brigade Penyelamat Integrasi
Timor-Timur (The East Timor integration savior brigade telegram) and the Operasi
Cabut (The Operation Pull-Out), outlined the TNI and militias’ readiness and plans for a
repressive response and evacuation after the ballot. These documents emphasize the roles
played by Jakarta’s military elites, for example, Lt. Gen. Johnny Lumintang, army deputy
chief, and regional commanders down to the lowest levels, regional government officials,
and intelligence officers. 366
TNI leaders were uneased by the result of the registration for the referendum,
which accounted for 98 percent of East Timor’s eligible voters.367 For this reason, during
a cabinet meeting on July 28, 1999, Wiranto strongly recommended to President Habibie
that the referendum be cancelled.368 Habibie’s civilian ministers, however, rejected the
idea, and argued that international repercussions would be harmful. The opposition of the
TNI leaders to the civilian opinion was so heated that the the cabinet meeting lasted all
day. In the end, the civilians prevailed and the referendum process continued.
In response to international criticism on the TNI’s involvement, on August 13,
1999, Gen. Wiranto made the pointless change of removing Korem 164 commander, Col.
Tono Suratman, but retaining Maj. Gen. Zacky, the key officer in charge of all TNI
operations in East Timor through his P3TT taskforce. Surprisingly, instead of being
dishonored, shortly therafter Suratman gained both a promotion in rank and a different
post as deputy TNI spokesman. Soon afterward, it became known that his substitute was
a fellow Kopassus officer, Col. Noer Muis, who continued to give the militias free rein.
Phone calls from international leaders, including UN Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, demanded that the TNI restore law and order. A few days before the referendum,
Wiranto was pressured into withdrawing Zacky to Jakarta, and provisionally substituting
369
him with Maj. Gen. Tyasno, who was also an ex-Bais chief. Again, Wiranto had taken
an artificial measure that was merely aimed at easing international pressure. It should be
borne in mind that Tyasno was Wiranto’s ally and Zacky’s successor in the Bais, and
they had worked together closely for years. Attention was drawn to the fact that Wiranto
had substituted TNI commanders in East Timor with those who had a similar background,
364
Ibid: 249.
See also, Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138-139.
366
Robinson, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 251-254.
367
368
369
Their similar background was more deeply discussed in the Editors, Indonesia, April 1999, loc. cit: 140.
365
125
effectively replacing like with like. With such a mechanism, Zacky could supposedly
retain control of TNI operations from afar.370
The result of the referendum, which caused East Timor’s secession, obviously
seemed like an insult to the TNI as a sign that it was unable to defend the territory within
Indonesia. President Habibie’s decision to release Xanana and return him triumphantly to
East Timor caused a rise in domestic criticism of TNI leaders and soldiers for actively
arming the militias, which deeply harmed the TNI. 371 Intense international pressure to
accelerate the transition of post-referendum East Timor to independence added to the
TNI’s dissatisfaction with Habibie. Habibie’s aides in the state palace reported that the
president had received a written ultimatum from Wiranto, threatening him with the “silent
coup” of a ministerial triumvirate.372 Therefore, it is important to refer back to Loveman’s
earlier study, which pointed out that the military’s intense resistance to the referendum on
independence and the threat of a coup were actually the sorts of politics conducted to
preserve national integrity and state sovereignty from foreign intervention.373
After the Maliana case, in which thirty-three non-combatants were killed by a
joint force of militia and TNI soldiers on September 8, 1999,374 Wiranto arrived in Dili
airport with a delegation of Habibie’s ministers and immediately declared martial law. He
said that anyone on the streets after midnight would be shot on sight. This decision
actually reflected the military’s victory over civilian leaders in Jakarta. Not suprisingly,
several perpetrators of the various violent post-referendum incidents as well as prominent
militia leaders were present at the Dili airport meeting where Wiranto declared martial
375
law.
Envoys of the UN Security Council who visited East Timor after the referendum
also noted that the TNI was able to “switch the violence on and off” at will. Nonetheless,
there was nothing new about such findings, because journalists had been reporting on the
situation for 7 months. Thus, within half an hour of the UN envoys’ departure, shootings
376
began again on Dili’s streets.
At the same time, in the countryside the TNI and its militia forces continued its
planned and systematic scorched earth campaign before withdraw all their forces. The US
President’s warning of severe economic sanctions if the violence did not end in East
Timor eventually compelled the TNI to begin an organized withdrawal by September 15,
1999. This amounted to precisely 10 days, the minimal length of time needed to complete
370
372
Derwin Pereira, “Wiranto is the Man to Watch,” and “Inside Story: The ‘Silent Coup,’” The Straits
Times, September 12, 1999, loc.cit; O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 273, 457.
373
Loveman, 1999, op. cit: 186, 213, 254 et seq.
374
Laporan Singkat KPP HAM Timtim (Executive Summary of KPP HAM on the Investigation of Human
Rights Violations in East Timor) Jakarta: Komnas HAM, January 31, 2000, loc. cit.
375
376
The Financial Times, September 13, 1999, cited in O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 275.
371
126
the missions described in the Garnadi document following the start of the scorched earth
campaign. 377 Following the referendum on independence, East Timor was literally
demolished by the TNI in September 1999, and, in particular, by the mobilized
militias,378 who had been armed and trained by members of the TNI.379 It should be noted
380
that the TNI’s response was aimed at preventing a new nation or state from emerging.
For all intents and purposes, Gen. Wiranto and other TNI leaders may have been
trying to send a message to secessionist movements elsewhere in Indonesia. Repressive
measures in responding to secessionist movements had been adopted by Javanese kings
or rulers, and even civilians, since the Sukarno era. Furthermore, none of the military’s
senior officers ever expressed public reservations about the TNI’s actions in East Timor,
not even Yudhoyono, Kaster, who was celebrated as an intellectual reformer. 381 Rather
than voicing differences of opinion, other prominent members of the military’s high
command remained conspicuously silent. The exception here was Maj. Gen. Agus
Wirahadikusumah, one of the few reformist generals. In an unexpected move, he sharply
criticized his colleague, Maj. Gen Djaja Suparman, Kostrad commander, for his statement, which seemingly supported the TNI generals accused of responsibility for the East
382
Timor atrocities following the referendum.
V. Coping with Radical Muslims
V.A. Habibie, Islam, Radical Muslims, and the Green Generals
The following section discusses relations among radical Muslims, President
Habibie and the military. Tracing Habibie’s background, it is notable that he was born in
South Sulawesi, where people generally have conservative views regarding religion. His
father was a Muslim cleric, while his grandfather was a Muslim leader and member of the
Islamic Court of Law. He was raised in an orthodox family, and from a young age was
377
See again, Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138-139.
Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 49.
379
Kiki Syahnakri’s testimony conveyed before the public hearing of the CTF on October 24, 2007 in Ja karta. However, due to his background as TNI general, until recently he denied the accusations which mentioned TNI’s involvement in the so-called gross crimes against humanity in East Timor. See again, Nurhayati, 2007, loc. cit: 1.
380
Tanter, Ball, and van Klinken (eds.), 2006, loc. cit: 11.
381
382
Victoria S, “Mayjen TNI Raden Agus Wirahadikusumah, MPA: Jenderal Kritis di Kursi Pangkostrad”
(“Maj. Gen. Raden Agus Wirahadikusumah, MPA: Critical General in Charge of Kostrad”), Indonesia
Media Online, Berta 04-2000.htm, April 2000, http://www.indonesiamedia.com/rubrik/berta/berta00april agus.htm
378
127
known as both a serious and strongly religious student. 383 His brother, Junus Effendy, exnaval officer, was sentenced to prison at the beginning of the Soeharto era for his alleged
involvement with radical Muslim activists. In addition, his younger sister was the wife of
Lt. Gen. Z.A Maulani, a pro-Islamist group general.
Habibie’s political career culminated with his 1990 election as chairperson of the
ICMI, the most important Muslim intellectual organization. With the backing of the ICMI,
as well as Soeharto, he was untouchable, despite closing down three vocal magazines,
Tempo, Detik, and Editor, which had criticised him for the controversial buying of exGerman ships. The ICMI successfully backed him in his bid for the vice-presidency in
the March 1998 presidential election without any challenge from the military, unlike in
1993 when it openly opposed Soeharto’s nomination of Sudharmono as his vicepresidential candidate. The military had proposed ex-armed forces (ABRI) commander,
Gen. (ret) Try Sutrisno as an alternative. More significantly, the ICMI showed its
influence in placing its members in the Soeharto-Habibie cabinet and parliament.
Upon his appointment as vice-president, Habibie drew on many of his close aides
from within the ICMI and its think-tank, CIDES (Center for Information and
Development Studies). He backed the ICMI in founding a sectarian newspaper,
Republika, and PPMI (Perhimpunan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia --The Association of
Indonesian Muslim Workers), and in further developing the organization’s pro-Muslim
agenda including the syariah banking system. Together with the ICMI, he sponsored the
formation of Badan Kordinasi Umat Islam (Coordinating Board for Muslims) on May
1998 to coordinate the activities of all major Muslim mass-organizations. These
organizations could be used for political purposes in a show of force in the near future if
384
needed.
Because of its controversial anti-Chinese and sectarian campaigns, the ICMI
allegedly contributed to the flaring up of the May 13-14, 1998 riots, 385 which caused 288
deaths and 101 more people to be wounded. In addition, ninety-two women became the
victims of sexual harrasment, all of which gave clear evidence of gross human rights
386
violations and paving the way for Habibie’s rise to power. The ICMI's strong influence
continued after Lt. Gen. Prabowo fell from his position as Kostrad commander. Lt. Gen.
Maulani, the new chief of Bakin, and President Habibie urged Chief Commander Gen.
383
“Habibie B.J,” http://www.bookrags.com/history/worldhistory/habibie-b-jema-02/: 1-2; James Castle et
al (eds.), Who’s Who in Indonesia’s Political Arena: The Players, the Parties: A Comprehensive G uide, Jakarta: Castle, 1999.
384
Singh, 2000, op. cit: 122.
385
Ibid.
386
Laporan Pelapor Khusus Komnas Perempuan tentang Kerusuhan Seksual Mei 1998 dan Dampaknya
(Report of Special Rapporteur of Women National Commission on Sexual Assaults on May 1998 and its
Impacts), “Data Korban Kekerasan Seksual 1998 Diserahkan” (“Data of the 1998 Sexual Assaults
Victims”), Harian Kompas, May 24, 2008: 24.
128
Wiranto to replace Prabowo's successor, Maj. Gen. Lumintang, with Maj. Gen. Djamari
Chaniago, regional commander of Kodam III Siliwangi. The replacement of Lumintang,
who had been installed just 6-7 hours earlier, was linked to his Christian background, and
ignored the fact that he was one of most distinguished graduates from the 1970 Military
387
Academy and also an excellent professional. In a similar case, the ICMI played an
important role in preventing Maj. Gen. Luhut Pandjaitan from becoming the Kopassus
commander. He would have replaced Maj. Gen. Muchdi, who, like his protégé Prabowo,
had been discharged due to his alleged involvement in student kidnappings and the May
13-14, 1998 anti-Chinese riots. Pandjaitan had a special forces career and other
qualifications, including past posts as ex-commander of the Pussenif (Pusat Senjata
Infantri --Infantry Weapons Center) and the special anti-terror unit of the Kopassus.
Muhdi was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Sjahrir, who was not a special forces career officer.
Soon after the downfall of Soeharto, the ICMI launched a process of de-Soehartoization in the cabinet and parliament. It replaced old members with its own, especially
radical Muslims, a process which had been impossible because of Soeharto’s veto.
President Habibie awarded key cabinet positions to ICMI-affiliated figures, e.g. Adi
Sasono, Soleh Solahuddin, and A.M. Saefuddin. Since the early 1990s, many people
affiliated with the ICMI had been more involved in the Golkar Party so that as Habibie
became president, many of them, for example, Fadel Muhammad and Marwah Daud
Ibrahim, were appointed to the executive board of the party.388 Therefore, Habibie had
made the ICMI his most important political vehicle during the Soeharto era during his
long struggle to become vice-president, and also in the following era in an effort to
389
preserve his presidency.
Since Habibie’s main basis of support came from Islamic groups, the impression
quickly emerged that under his presidency, Indonesia would undergo a process of
390
Islamization. Moreover, Bilveer Singh, a Singaporean scholar of Indonesia, saw the
political paradigm shifting in favor of “political Islam,” and referred to an almost
permanent struggle for the formation of an Islamic state, or the implementation of the
syariah law. In other words, Indonesia would become more Islamized, partly due to the
fact that 87 percent of its population follows the Islamic faith, but more essentially, due
to the rise of a political elite that believed in “Islamizing” the country’s politics, economy,
and social order.391 President Habibie had declared on June 25, 1998 that he would never
adopt a single official religion because he regarded all religions as equal, and that
Indonesia would not declare itself as an “Islamic state.” 392 Even so, the political,
387
Singh, 2000, op. cit.
Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 84.
389
390
Sukma, 2003, op. cit.
391
Singh, 2000, op. cit: 227.
392
“Country Will Not Become Islamic State,” The Straits Times, October 9, 1998.
388
129
economic and social trends at that time tended to indicate that “political Islam” was on
the rise, particularly due to the emerging phenomenon of “ICMI-ization” of the country
across all its structural levels.
The commitment of Habibie’s supporters in the ICMI to their agenda of
“Islamization” is reflected in the statement of one of the ICMI’s founding members,
Imaduddin Abdulrahim. He argued that only Islam could serve as an integrative basis for
Indonesia. According to him, nationalism could not be the unifying basis for Indonesia,
but rather Islam, the set of beliefs followed by 90 percent of the people, was fit to serve
as the moral basis for the state. 393 On the other hand, due to his lack of legitimacy,
President Habibie expected Islam to serve as an important source for support. Therefore,
he needed to inject a sense of Islam into his policies.394 For this reason, too, he developed
a close relationship with radical Muslim groups so that he could gain strong support in
dealing with moderate Muslim and national-secular groups, who threw their support
behind Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati, his main rivals in the forthcoming
elections. 395
President Habibie’s relationship with radical Muslim groups could be seen in his
support for the formation of Partai Keadilan (Justice party) and Partai Bulan Bintang
(Crescent and Star Party), and the re-establishment of Masyumi, which was banned
during the eras of Sukarno and Soeharto. At the same time, his government continued to
watch over the political activities of the leftists, in particular seeing to it that ex-PKI
members did not join new political parties.396 His close connections with radical Muslims
had saved him from being removed from power along with Soeharto. As pointed out by
Sukma, Habibie ruled the country by presenting a more reconciliatory approach towards
Islam in domestic politics. This was due to his dependence on the support of some
segments of Islamic movements and the need to cultivate an image as an Islamic leader
397
as the basis of his legitimacy.
Habibie’s strongest support turned out to be none other than the ICMI he headed
as general chairperson from its inauguration in December 1990 to March 1998, right
before he was installed as vice-president. He himself had alluded to his reliance on the
ICMI, by appealing to the ICMI not to leave him alone in his golden cage after becoming
vice-president.398 For its part, the ICMI made no bones about its support for Habibie.
The political situation surrounding Soeharto’s collapse had prompted many other
Islamic groups to throw their support behind Habibie. Aside from the ICMI, one such
393
Ramage, 1995, op. cit: 53, 168.
Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 84-85.
395
396
Lane, “Bebaskan Semua Tapol” (“Free All Political Prisoners”), loc. cit: 4.
397
Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 79, 81-83.
398
Singh, 2000, op. cit: 224, 226.
394
130
group was the KISDI (Komite Solidaritas untuk Dunia Islam --Solidarity Committee for
Islamic World), an organization affiliated with the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah
Indonesia --Indonesian Islamic Teaching Council). The KISDI, which had previously
backed Habibie to become vice-president, also promoted him as Soeharto’s successor. Its
support was clearly demonstrated on May 22, 1998 when KISDI members staged a rally
at the parliament building, carrying a banner reading: “Opposition to Habibie =
399
Opposition to Islam”. As acknowledged by its chairperson, Ahmad Soemargono, the
KISDI had openly defended Habibie several times in face to face talks with groups that
were trying to undermine the legal government.400
V.B. The Green Generals and Radical Muslims
Importantly, the KISDI was founded with the support of Soemargono’s close
friend, Prabowo Subianto, when he was a Lieutnant Colonel, as well as other sectarian
military leaders. This was part of an endeavour to mobilize support from modernist Islam
for Soeharto’s New Order regime in the 1990s 401 to counter Soeharto’s opponents in
402
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Following Prabowo’s fall from his position as
Kostrad commander a few days after Soeharto’s resignation, the radical Muslim organization continued to maintain relations with sectarian generals inside the military. The
organizations members were not only involved in organizing demonstrations against
Habibie’s opponents, but also in serving as militias in various covert military intelligence
and psychological operations. Five thousand KISDI members assisted Pam Swakarsa in
protecting Habibie from the threat of impeachment proposed by radical reformists during
the MPR special session in November 1998. 403 To this end, KISDI leaders cooperated
with military elements to mobilize tens of thousands of rural youths armed with bamboo
spears to confront anti-Habibie and anti-military demonstrators at the MPR session in
November 1998. 404
Another radical Muslim group, which supported President Habibie like the KISDI,
was the FPI. It was established in August 17, 1998 and had branches in at least sixteen
provinces with ten million members. 405 Until recently, it was chaired by Habib
Muhammad Rizky Shihab, a religious teacher educated in Saudi Arabia. Because of its
militant campaigns defending Islam and Habibie, the FPI, which established with the
399
Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 84.
Ahmad Soemargono, Saya Seorang Fundamentalis (I am a Fundamentalist ), Jakarta: Global Cita Press,
1999: 111.
401
Adam Schwarz, 1999, in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 180; ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 12.
402
Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 78-79, 83.
403
404
ICG, 2001, loc.cit.
405
Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84.
400
131
support of Kodam Jayakarta regional commander Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman, was later
said to be the city’s most hostile militia group. It has been reported that other army
generals such as Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen, Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim, Lt. Gen. Suaidi
Marasabessy, Gen. Fachrul Razy, and Gen. Wiranto had regular contact with the FPI.
Conversely, FPI leaders maintained regular contact with Indonesia’s military elite
through its Habib community based at its centre in Central Jakarta’s Kwitang area.
According to Habib Shihab, since the days that Wiranto had only one star, he had always
attended the FPI’s important events, e.g. the commemoration of the Prophet
Mohammad’s birth.406 It should be emphasized that no suggestion is being made here that
Wiranto or the other military officers who attended the commemoration share the goals
of the FPI, but only that they had found it useful to maintain contacts with Islamic
organizations that had the capacity to mobilize supporters in the streets.
In addition to this, another important FPI figure, Habib Ali bin Awi al Ba’agil,
claimed to be a close friend of Gen. Wiranto and his ally, Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman. 407
Ba’agil was known as the religious teacher of Soeharto’s children, in particular Tommy
and Bambang. His name had previously been mentioned in connection with Soeharto and
his family’s corruption cases as well as the bombing incidents and the FPI meeting with
the Ambonese Muslim leader, Ongen Sangaji, close to the flaring up of sectarian
408
conflicts in Maluku. Lt. Gen. Prabowo was also reported to have actively supported
this militia organization.409 During the MPR special session on November 10-13, 1998,
the FPI joined forces with state-sponsored civilian militias (the Pam Swarkarsa). It
worked with the KISDI to prevent pro-democracy student activists from marching on
parliament to demand the resignation of President Habibie and the military’s total
removal from politics.410
Another important group was the Laskar Jihad (holy warriors). This was a
paramilitary division of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah
(Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the
Prophet), which was formed when religious conflicts escalated in Maluku, and was
chaired by Ja’far Umar Thalib, an Afghani veteran. The members of this organization
received military training under the supervision of Brig. Gen. (ret) Rustam Kastor. It was
reported that plans had been made to send 10,000 jihad troops to Ambon, Maluku, to do
what they said was a “compulsory duty without exception for all Muslims.”411
406
“Kita Tetap Tegas, Tolak Presiden Perempuan,” Koran Tempo, June 23, 2001.
Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000: 26, cited in ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 12-13.
408
See, “Tommy and Habib Ali Baaqil,” Indonesian Observer, September 18, 2000, loc.cit; “Baagil di Balik Bom?” (“Baagil Behind the Bombing?”), Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000: 26.
409
“Sipil Berwajah Militer” (“Civilian with Military Face”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, No. 07, June 11,
2006: 18-19.
410
Yunanto et al, 2003, loc. cit: 51-52; Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84.
411
407
132
Aside from the KISDI, FPI, and Laskar Jihad, there were other Islamist groups,
which explicitly backed Habibie. Few of these, for example, the PPMI and GPK (Kabah
Youth Movement) were actually mass-based organizations created by the ICMI, PPP
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan --United Development Party), or Golkar. In addition,
Habibie’s supporters soon founded the FURKON (Forum for the Promotion of Justice
and Constitution) to challenge radical students and reformists who demanded his
resignation through an MPR extraordinary or special session (Sidang Istimewa). Together,
the KISDI, FPI, and FURKON morphed into militias, which worked with the military to
secure Habibie’s and Wiranto’s positions from the threat of a transitional presidium
prepared by the Ciganjur Group. This presidium would have consisted of Wahid,
Megawati, Rais, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, and was promoted by radical
students and reformists. To maximize support for the Habibie presidency, the activities of
these radical Muslim organizations were coordinated by Adi Sasono and his ICMI
brothers in arms under an umbrella organization called the Forum Ummat Islam (FUI -Forum for Muslims).412 Hence, President Habibie was backed by important segments of
the Muslim community, particularly its radical elements.
Habibie’s political survival up until the next presidential election would depend
on the support of Islamic political parties. One of these political parties was the PPP,
which had strongly backed him to replace Soeharto amid the mounting political and
economic crisis facing Indonesia in the second quarter of 1998. The PPP shared similar
views with Habibie on Muslim interests, particularly the supporting of national
legislations prompted by syariah law. To ensure another term of presidency for Habibie,
PPP chairperson, Hamzah Haz, reportedly received “tactical funds” from him. The PBB
chairperson, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, and Gen. Wiranto, TNI chief commander also
reportedly gathered a similarly large amount and used it to secure the East Timor
413
referendum.
Like the PPP, the PBB’s support of Habibie correlated with its interest in adopting
syariah law in the country. The PBB's founders, Hartono Marjono, Yusril Ihza Mahendra,
and Achmad Sumargono, acknowledged that they had continued to strive for the same
objectives of Mohammad Natsir and Syarifuddin Prawiranegara, who had fought since
the independence era for the formation of an Islamic state with their Masyumi party For
the time being, Marjono maintained his political attitude as a radical Muslim opposition
figure promoting the interests of the old Masyumi, although he remained under tight
supervision by the Soeharto regime under the policy of cekal (cegah dan tangkal --
412
Singh, 2000, op.cit.
Habibie’s “generosity” was criticised as a practice of money politics. In the PPP, this caused a schism
between Hamzah and his rivals from the Muslim Indonesia faction; in PBB between Yusril and Hartono
Marjono/Fadli Zon; and in the military between Gen. Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen.
413
133
blocking and refusing) and was not permitted to go abroad by Soeharto. 414 It is also
important to note that Prawiranegara’s son, Farid, was a close friend of Lt. Gen. Prabowo,
who had protected the ICMI against the Soeharto and Wiranto factions.
Long before the PBB was founded, Yusril was one of many prospective leaders of
the HMI (Association of Muslim Students) and the ICMI. He was called a “young Natsir”
and had been groomed by the senior Masyumi leaders to replace Natsir with the mission
of continuing to promote the Masyumi’s interests in the future. For this reason, Yusril had
also been sent to Malaysia to study and develop the Masyumi’s and Natsir’s goal of
forming an Islamic state in a plural society, as in Malaysia and Indonesia. Marjono and
Yusril became two Muslim intellectuals who continually represented an oppositional
stance to the country’s secular national ideology, Pancasila. Led by Yusril and some
militant Islamic leaders, the PBB received strong support from the DDII, which claimed
to have about 8 million members. Later, the PBB explicitly adopted Islam as its
ideological foundation. Expecting to draw support from former members of the Masyumi,
the PBB attracted followers and sympathizers from several regions of Java and South and
West Sumatera.
V.C. Habibie’s Pro-Islam Politics and its Impacts
Habibie also had close ties with Fuad Bawazier, a crafty power broker who
maintained ties with the ICMI and other radical Muslim groups. Bawazier was Habibie’s
supporter in Poros Tengah (the Central Axis), a coalition formed by radical Muslim
parties to prevent Megawati from winning the forthcoming presidency. Bawazier
reputedly helped Gen. Wiranto recruit and finance Muslim militias, for instance, the
Laskar Jihad.415 Its 10,000 young militant members protected the November 1998 MPR
special session and became the most active organization in sending thousands of
volunteers to troubled spots in the Maluku islands to back Muslims against Christians. 416
Aside from this, Habibie’s support came from small factions in the MPR, e.g. Daulatul
Ummah faction (FPDU). This faction was comprised of five radical Muslim parties,
which backed Gen. Wiranto’s candidacy for vice-president in the October 1999 elections.
President Habibie’s sectarian politics were reflected in his Aceh policy. Rather
than attempting to answer the Acehnese’s cry for freedom and justice or prosecute past
grave human rights abuses, 417 he endorsed the law outlining Aceh’s special status. The
414
Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (19661993), Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer & K.O.K.G, 1997: 243.
415
Yunanto et al, 2003, op. cit: 125, 178-179.
416
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 292; ICG, 2001: 13.
417
See again, interview with Marzuki Darusman, a member of Komnas HAM’s investigation team, on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta, on Habibie’s unwillingness to follow up on his team’s inquiries.
134
law allowed the Acehnese to apply syariah law to religious, educational, and economic
affairs, as well as local culture. His dealings with the ICMI to strengthen his position in
national politics had been, furthermore, pointed to as responsible for triggering religious
conflict in Maluku. More than elsewhere, in Maluku, President Habibie and the ICMI’s
open public policies promoting Islam at the expense of other religions caused a
heightening of tensions in the dividing society. 418 His sectarian policies to obtain more
support for the coming elections by sponsoring militant Muslim organizations and their
paramilitary groups provoked the religious conflict in Maluku.
President Habibie’s pro-ICMI policies were also implicated in the situation in
Poso, Central Sulawesi, where the Christian and Muslim populations were in balance. His
move to pass a new law on the enlargement of the Central Sulawesi province and
decentralize Poso in December 1998 caused fierce competition among candidates for
Bupati (district head). The Christians, who wanted the position, but failed to secure it,
organized demonstrations. They accused the Muslims of corruption and manipulating the
selection process, which led to clashes. This also started a new cycle of reprisals in
Maluku. The decentralization policy placed more power and resources in Poso and
resulted in acute conflicts as societal groups mobilized along religious lines. This was due
in part to existing social structures, in which religion had been a strong identifier for
group differences. The increase in sectarian politics in Jakarta influenced Poso, where the
sectarian conflict in the district of Central Sulawesi turned into vicious fighting,419 and
national and local elites’ interests and their capacities to mobilize client groups played a
significant role. The level of tension was maintained by political and military elites from
420
the past Soeharto regime, who had conflicts of interest with President Habibie.
In Jakarta, President Habibie allowed the FURKON, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi
Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia --Indonesian Muslim Student Actions Association), FPI,
KISDI, and the youth wing of the PBB to organize a large rally to call for volunteers to
defend Islam in Maluku and prepare for jihad (holy war).421 Immediately, registration for
jihad was opened in conservative Muslim neighborhoods in Jakarta, Yogyakarta,
Surakarta, Semarang, and Makassar. The formation of jihad forces and the tendency
towards civil militarism422 also occurred in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and other regions
facing religious conflicts. As a result, the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors) was formed and
418
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 10.
420
Majalah Tempo 28, No. 8, April 24-30, 2000; Majalah Tempo 29, No. 15, June 12-18, 2000, cited in
Bertrand, 2004, op.cit: 132.
421
Harian Republika, March, 6, 1999; Harian Kompas, March 4, 6, 1999, Majalah Forum Keadilan, No.
25, March 1999, ibid.
422
419
135
would develop into another radical Islamic group that had gained prominence since the
fall of Soeharto. 423
In fact, Habibie’s policy of creating a new province in North Maluku in August
1999 ignited a new religious conflict in the Maluku archipelago. The conflict was
centered around the fierce competition over control of political and economic resources
between Muslims and Christians affected by the growing sectarian politics he endorsed in
Jakarta following the formation of the ICMI.424 He was led to take the wrong decision
based on his ignorance of the historical background inherited from the Dutch colonial
rule, during which the region had been divided into North and South Halmahera.
Accordingly, the impacts of the subsequent religious conflict were much more severe,
and reached across Maluku and elsewhere. In the meantime, President Habibie had made
biased decision in dealing with East Timor. He linked it with a large amount of
development compensation, which had been provided by the majority Muslim population
in Indonesia since the integration of the territory as the twenty-seventh province of
Indonesia in 1976, and offered a new proposal of a referendum on independence.
Unlike Habibie, military leaders at that time were of the opinion that the ICMI's
ideology and long-term objectives endangered national interest Its exclusiveness was said
to be the main challenge to the nation’s secular ideology of Pancasila, which emphasised
the principle of negara integralistik (an integralistic state or integralism) and
kebersamaan (togetherness or family-like-ness). They suspected that the ICMI had a
hidden agenda to eliminate the military’s dual function, which had long standing
historical and cultural roots with the formation of the Indonesian state. Accordingly, most
generals were not at ease with the rise of the ICMI.425
V.D. The Military, Radical Muslim Organizations, and Militias
President Habibie’s concessions to the ICMI’s sectarian objectives alarmed the
military and caused it to be more vigilant of further calls for democratisation. The choice
of a democratization strategy had long been a cause for much anxiety and tension
between the military and the ICMI. 426 In other words, the use of the ICMI in the struggle
for democratization had aroused all the ideological issues that most easily provoked and
challenged the military’s political thinking and ideology. The nationalist wing inside the
TNI feared that President Habibie would be used by the ICMI as a godfather for its
sectarian policies in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Therefore, Habibie’s sectarian policies
423
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 13.
Research reported by Thamrin Amal Tomagola, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 129-130.
425
See Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 298.
426
Ramage, 1995, op. cit: 112.
424
136
would not only be harmful to an integralistic state, but also to secular Muslim officers’
interests.
At this point, it is important to note that the military’s commitment to the
preservation of Indonesia as a unified state was intimately linked to Pancasila and their
own dwifungsi. 427 Also, the perception persisted that there was an ideological threat
from Islam. Based on this, the military might once again seek to raise the specter of an
“Islamic threat” in order to continue to justify a military role as the defender of Pancasila
and the state from the threat of the extreme right. As previously predicted, actions by the
TNI leaders to approach radical Muslim groups in the post-Soeharto period were unable
to eliminate such suspicions.
This situation was recognized by President Habibie’s political aide, Samego, who
pointed out that in general the Indonesian military would not go along with the formation
428
of a religious state, or the adoption of religion as a state ideology. Its reluctance to help
the government address communal conflicts throughout the country was caused by a high
level of uncertainty produced by President Habibie in response to reform demands.
Therefore what was commonly observed was the use of religious issues and radical
Muslim groups by the military for its leaders and institutional interests. Gen. Wiranto’s
fear of accusations that the TNI was violating human rights justified his interest in using
radical Muslim groups and their paramilitary organizations as militias, for example, in
handling pro-reform students, radical reformists, and anti-Habibie demonstrators during
the MPR special session in November 1998.429
Thus, the general had reason to use the militias by recruiting Habibie’s radical
Muslim supporters in the FURKON as private volunteers to assist the TNI in providing
security during the special session. The mobilization of the militias in Pam Swakarsa,
consisted of 40,000 civilians.430 This resulted in new violence and awakened a sense of
tension surrounding divisions between Muslims and secular nationalists, which carried
431
consequences for relations with non-Muslims. Thus, TNI leaders had used policies
aimed at shifting the nature of the confrontation from a vertical (students versus the
Habibie government and the military) to horizontal one (students versus radical
Muslims). 432
One of the elements of the Pam Swakarsa, the FPI, had already been organizing
activities that seemed to be typically designed to support the military in opposing reform
demands rather than protesting relevant issues that had offended large parts of the
427
Ibid: 155.
Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006, in Jakarta.
429
Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 305.
430
431
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 103-104.
432
Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit.
428
137
Muslim community, such as abuses of Acehnese women and the religion ministry’s
extortion of hajj pilgrims.433 Ironically, immediately after the FPI was founded in mid1998, the leadership instructed its followers in their own peculiar version of Islamic
doctrine. They were also trained in martial arts and had a structure similar to a military
unit. They were accorded ranks and given command responsibility for specific
neighborhoods, particularly, in North Jakarta, where many militant Muslims live.
The involvement of military elements in the formation of radical Muslim groups
could also be seen in the case of the Laskar Jihad, for which Brig. Gen. (ret) Kastor
played a role in supervising military training and preparing for their involvement in the
Maluku conflict. Furthermore, Lt. Gen. Maulani, the Bakin chief, followed the agenda of
the ICMI in pushing de-Christianization by replacing the newly appointed Kostrad
commander, Lt. Gen. Lumintang with Lt. Gen. Chaniago. The military also followed the
agenda of the ICMI by preventing Maj. Gen. Luhut from becoming Kopassus commander
and replacing Maj. Gen Muchdi. Previously, military leaders, such as Gen. Feisal and
Gen. Hartono, had been transparent in their endorsement of the establishment of the
ICMI, as was the case with Lt. Gen. Prabowo, Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen, and Maj. Gen.
434
Muchdi, with their Islamist backgrounds.
In a more blatant manner, the military had used members of the FPI, Laskar Jihad,
and KISDI to engineer horizontal conflicts throughout Indonesia in an attempt to increase
their bargaining position across from President Habibie and the reform movement. The
FPI was involved in the orchestrated Ketapang incidents, which triggered similar
435
incidents in other parts of the country. Meanwhile, the Laskar Jihad waged war against
Christians in Maluku. The two radical Muslim groups, along with the KISDI, and
followers of the PPP, PBB, and so forth, were elements of Pam Swakarsa. They had been
recruited from radical Muslim bases in Banten, Bekasi, Karawang, Bogor, Cianjur,
Bandung, Lampung, Makassar, and marginal areas of Jakarta, and organized by Gen.
Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Kivlan for safeguarding the November 1998 MPR special session,
just two weeks later.436
Gen. Feisal, the coordinating minister for security and political affairs, was said to
have also played a role in persuading President Habibie to instruct Wiranto to use Muslim
volunteers along with military militia groups. 437 Kivlan, together with several Muslim
officers, admitted to having been involved in organizing the Muslim volunteers under
433
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 187; Togi Simandjuntak (Ed.), Premanisme Politik. Jakarta: ISAI, 2000: 113115, 117.
434
435
See „Lagi, Massa Tersulut“ („Again, People Incited“), Majalah Panji Masyarakat, December 2, 1998,
loc.cit; Yunanto et al, 2003, op. cit; Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84.
436
Kivlan Zen, Konflik dan Integasi TNI-AD (Conflict and Integration in Army), Jakarta: IPS, 2004: 92-95.
437
Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 133; Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley,
and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, ibid: 159.
138
orders from Wiranto.438 Aside from Wiranto and Kivlan, Gen. Hartono was apparently
the most important advocate of the Pam Swakarsa. In addition, Habibie’s presidential
439
guards were said to have been active in recruiting vigilantes from several parts of Java.
Meanwhile, key Muslim figures, such as leaders of the FURKON, Komaruddin Rachmat,
Faisal Biki, and Heri Ashari, as well as the chairperson of Council of Islamic Clerics
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia --MUI), K.H. Ali Yafie, and editors of pro-Habibie sectarian
440
newspaper, Republika, were publicly sympathetic with the Pam Swakarsa.
The existence of the FUI, established by Habibie’s allies to gain wider support
across Indonesia, was very helpful in mobilizing the volunteers. The FUI was an alliance
of some twenty Islamist groups explicitly backed by President Habibie. Few of these
were real mass-based organizations created by the ICMI, PPP, Golkar, or the military
itself. Importantly, the leaders of at least three militia groups linked to the FUI
acknowledged that their members had received training from military personnel before
the beginning of the November 1998 MPR special session.441
To strengthen the Pam Swakarsa, the military recruited 300,000 members of the
Islamic Youth Movement; 120,000 members of the Hizbullah Brigade; 120,000 members
of the FURKON; 1,000 members of the Bandung Moslem League; 700 members of the
Bandung Islamic Students, and 450 members of the Al-Furqon youth.442 The militarybacked Islamic militias were armed with bamboo spears and were deployed in clashes
with student demonstrators. Through Pam Swakarsa, the military not only used the
militias or paramilitary groups to secure Habibie’s presidency, put a halt to the proreform student rallies, and end opposition to Habibie. They were also used to protect the
military’s position and interests, especially during the special session, from the violent
pressures of the reform movement, which demanded that the president immediately
resign and the military retreat completely to the barracks. 443
Under Soeharto, the use of militias and paramilitaries, consisting of thugs and
radical Muslims, had become common practice in covert military intelligence and
psychological operations. The Malari (Malapetaka 15 Januari 1974 --the January 15,
1974 incidents), for instance, had revealed the machinations of Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo and
his Opsus (Operasi Khusus --Special Operation) in organizing the radical Muslims, as
outlined in the Rachmadi document, to counter student demonstrators criticizing the
country’s growing corruption and dependence on Japanese investment in early 1974.
Such operations would always require a major role to be played by military intelligence
438
Kivlan, 2004, op. cit.
“Mahasiswa Mengaku Informan Minta Perlindungan Komnas HAM” (“Students Claimed Informant
Asked Protection from National Commission for Human Rights”), Media Minggu, November 22, 1998.
440
Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, ibid: 159.
441
442
Rinakit, 2005, op.cit: 122.
443
439
139
(Bais), the agency most adept at training and employing civilian militias, and the special
forces (Kopassus) units in organizing them.
Apart from being paid, the “volunteers” were enjoined to move against the proreform students or the anti-Habibie and anti-military demonstrators in defense of
“Islam”. 444 Under the guidance of Gen. Wiranto, the military mobilized the Pam
Swakarsa, by which they hoped to avoid blame for using coercive measures against the
pro-reform movement. Therefore, Colombijn and Lindblad referred to the use of the Pam
Swakarsa as “little more than old wine in new bottles.” It was the same as the use of
bands of thugs, street hoodlums, or gangsters when civilian politicians needed them and
445
the military wanted to fish in troubled waters.
The two analysts had, moreover,
discerned that most of these were militant Muslim groups, and the best known was
probably the FPI, which put pressure on the opponents of President Habibie and the
military.
V.E. Military Leaders and Their Pragmatic Interests
After successfully safeguarding the special session and controlling the radical
Muslims, on January 5, 1999, Gen. Wiranto began a reshuffling process and announced
significant changes in the military line-up. The changes affected 100 officers from across
the entirety of the TNI institutions, causing analysts to conclude that what Wiranto did
was to weed out the ICMI elements from the military. 446 Specifically, there was a clear
demotion and loss of power for Gen. Fachrul Razy as TNI Chief for General Affairs
(Kepala Staf Umum --Kasum), and Maj. Gen. Zacky as Bais chief. Lt. Gen. Sugiyono, exSoeharto ADC, replaced Fachrul, who had been previously promoted to a higher ranking
by the ICMI, while Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto replaced Zacky. 447 Both Sugiyono and
Tyasno were closer to Soeharto in terms of loyalty than the people whom they succeeded.
At the same time, a Christian, Lt. Gen. Lumintang, ex-commandant of the Military Staff
and Command College --a marginal post-- was appointed Army Deputy Chief (Wakil
Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat --Wakasad). This represented a de-ICMI-ization and degreening process in the military, clearly confirming that political and military
appointments had become heavily politicized, and were increasingly viewed through
ethnic and religious lenses. 448
444
Ibid: 305-306.
Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 21.
446
The Straits Times, January 6, 1999, cited in Singh, 2000, op. cit: 228.
447
The Editors, Indonesia, April 1999, loc .cit: 140.
448
See Reports and editorial of pro-Islam newspaper, Harian Republika, January 5-6, 1999, in Singh, 2000,
op. cit: 228-229.
445
140
The military’s support of radical Muslim groups was actually temporary in nature.
This led Crouch to doubt whether military leaders such as Feisal, Prabowo, Djaja, and
Wiranto were devoted Muslims in the same way as the radical Muslims they backed.
Likewise, the Australian expert of Indonesian affairs doubted that these military leaders
wholly encouraged the formation of an Islamic state and the implementation of syariah
law to replace the 1945 state constitution and Pancasila ideology. 449
Agreeing with Crouch, Ikrar commented that military leaders’ support of radical
Muslims and their interests were so pragmatic due to the rising pressures of the reform
movement on military institutions at that time. Ikrar argues that it was actually impossible
for the TNI to justify the establishment of an Islamic state as long as the Sapta Marga
(seven pledges) doctrine was maintained, because it demanded loyalty to the 1945 state
constitution and Pancasila ideology. He draws attention to the fact that in the past
military support for radical Muslim groups was part of its covert intelligence operations,
i.e. the Malari, Woyla, and Tanjung Priok cases. It was aimed at producing people’s
dependency on the military to preserve state stability. The existence of the groups was
needed by the military in order to justify its repressive approach in the country. 450
Radical Muslim groups also played a role in helping Gen. Wiranto meet the
MPR’s minimum requirements of support for securing a formal nomination of an MPR
faction to run in the November 1999 presidential election. He might refrain from using
his TNI faction from fear that his candidacy would produce early resistance from
reformist blocs in the MPR. He failed to win the Golkar Party nomination, which had the
second largest members after the PDIP. Its leaders had decided to nominate other
candidates and the chief commander had also previously refused to be nominated as the
451
running mate of either Habibie or Akbar Tandjung. Therefore, Wiranto sought the
support of his military allies, the radical Muslim factions. He successfully gained the
solid support of the FPDU (Fraksi Partai Daulatul Ummah --Sovereignty of the Islamic
Community Parties Faction). Not surprisingly, since Soeharto’s final years in office,
military leaders have been cultivating good relations with key figures in the FPDU such
as Hartono Marjono, Ahmad Sumargono, and Jusuf Hasyim. Their common interest in
defying the increasing pressure of democratic forces resulted in a honeymoon between
the military and radical Muslim factions at that time. Unlike the situation under Murdani,
because of this shared interest the military had been tolerating political activities of
radical Muslims in following their interest in establishing Islamic law.
Although the FPDU was in the MPR, it was the second smallest faction with a
mere ten seats. It had garnered attention for being passionately committed to the
449
Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006, in Jakarta.
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006, in Jakarta.
451
See also “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post-Election Assessment Report,” No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999: 7.
450
141
promotion of Islamic law. Unlike the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which had resorted to
violent means to achieve its objectives, the five tiny parties within the FPDU, for instance,
the PBB (the Crescent and Star Party), were far from being revolutionaries. They
legitimized general elections and used the parliament to struggle to realize their
objectives. They maintained long-standing ties to the military during the final years of the
Soeharto regime. In addition, they had all been strong supporters of Habibie due to his
profound sympathy towards Islamic groups. In the meantime, the military backed radical
Muslim groups in their defence of President Habibie from the pressure of radical students
and reform activists. Gen. Wiranto, moreover, played a determined role in mobilizing
Muslim militias to secure the November 1998 MPR special session. It was not difficult
for him to gain the support of radical Muslims in the MPR for the formal nomination that
his vice-presidential campaign required. As a result, in a formal request organized by a
member of the military faction, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, 452 seventy-four MPR members
453
sponsored Wiranto’s nomination paving his way to the vice-presidential elections.
VI. Conclusion
Obviously, after more than there decades of enjoying its priviledges protected by
its historical and cultural legitimacy, the military was sensitive from the very beginning
to reform demands. Thus, due to his positive response to reform demands, Baharuddin
Jusuf Habibie, Indonesia’s first civilian president in the post-Soeharto democratic
transition, was confronted with fierce resistance from the military, which felt threatened
by the reform. He attempted to uphold civilian supremacy over the military with his
decision to offer a referendum on independence in East Timor without prior consultation
with its leaders. He also initiated political liberalization, which challenged the military
and placed it under greater scrutiny and criticism. 454
At the beginning of his presidency, Habibie attempted to follow demands for
reform. Unfortunately, his long involvement during Soeharto’s New Order regime
constrained his movement in introducing reform to the military, which had been fulfilling
a dual role for more than three decades under an authoritarian political system. The
increase in military pressure, as well as Habibie’s interest in retaining power during his
transitional term and also to run again for the next term, caused him to change his
position from encouraging the military to fulfil reform demands to tolerating their
inconsistent response. Therefore, it can be stated at this point that he was unable to retain
452
In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, revealed how enthusiastic the
Muslim conservative groups, including ICMI, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, and other Habibie’s supporters, had
been in extending their support.
453
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 320; “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post-Election Assessment Report,” No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999: 7, loc.cit.
454
See Honna, 2003, op. cit: 200.
142
his liberal views and new approaches to push further reform, which would largely
implicate the military and the country’s basic principles, including those dealing with
secessionism.
Just a few days after Habibie took power, competition between military leaders,
namely Gen. Prabowo and Gen. Wiranto, reached its zenith with the replacement of Gen.
Prabowo. Meanwhile, friction between the green and the red-white generals continued,
particularly between those who had long been suspected of being ICMI and Murdani
sympathizers. More importantly, the military was not eager to adopt reforms because of
its existing historical and cultural legitimacy, which had protected its individuals, groups,
and institutional interests for a long time. The dominant influence of the Javanese
political culture, due to former Soeharto generals and the New Order’s military officers,
proved counter-productive to democratization. This was due to a continuation of
subjective campaigns to integrate civilian and military tasks, as well as prioritize unity
and harmony, and the use of repressive measures. The increase in acitivities of radical
Muslims demanding syariah law also produced unfavorable situations for pushing the
military to continue reform.
Calls for serious reform and an investigation of gross human rights violations had
been specifically blocked by the military. This had been achieved through a sophisticated
engineering of new conflicts and the instigation of new violence in society to increase the
military’s bargaining position vis-a-vis the Habibie regime and the reform movement.
The military often manipulated the importance of defending the unitary state (NKRI) and
Pancasila ideology to justify its policies of repression, a culture of violence and vested
interests. The military actually frequently disturbed national security, for instance, in
ending the investigation and prosecution of Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases, through
various suspected covert intelligence and psychological operations by employing militias
and radical Muslims. In addition, the military sometimes employed constitutional means,
by becoming a veto player in the parliament (both the DPR and MPR) to protect their
interests. Their push to nominate chief commander Gen. Wiranto for vice-president in the
1999 elections is another specfic example.
With its atrocius actions in East Timor, the TNI was surprisingly effective in
deflecting popular frustration and reminding Indonesia's leaders that they could not afford
to alienate their army. The TNI’s mounting disappointments following the referendum in
East Timor led to its growing resistance to President Habibie. This situation not only
resulted in the spread of conflicts throughout the country, but also in the failure of
Habibie to gain support for his new term, since his accountability speech was rejected,
455
particularly by the TNI faction in the parliament (MPR).
455
See Ziegenhain, 2008, op .cit: 94-95.
143
Accordingly, there was no significant change in the military’s behavior resulting
from the security sector reforms under Indonesia’s first post-Soeharto civilian regime.
The military was successful in influencing and changing the path of reform through
constitutional and unconstitutional means in its attempts to resist the new president and to
push him to defend the military’s interests. Taking into account Martins’ models of
democratic transition,456 the Habibie regime was unable to consolidate itself because of
its failure to manage crisis through the use of various forms of compromise or higher
levels of coercion by cooperating with the military.
456
Martins, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (Eds.), 1993, loc. cit: 107-140; also, in Sahdan (trans.),
2004, op. cit: 48-49.
144
Chapter Four
The Abdurrahman Wahid Regime (1999-2001)
I.A. What Had Influenced Wahid to Introduce Reform?
Abdurrahman Wahid was born in Jombang, East Java, the main base of the largest
Islamic traditional organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU --the resurrected Islamic cleric
group). He was the son of Wahid Hasyim, a respected national figure during the
independence war, and the grandson of Hasyim Ashari, the only “great leader” (Rais
Akbar) of NU. His parents were both Javanese and devoted Muslim scholars, and he laid
claim to ancient Chinese ancestry, a Chinese Muslim named Tan Kim Han. 1
After finishing his education in a Javanese Islamic traditional boarding school
(pesantren), Abdurrahman Wahid continued with higher education at the University of
Al-Azhar Cairo (Egypt), University of Baghdad (Iraq), Europe, and Canada, but he
obtained no formal degrees. He spent most of his time reading about Western philosophy,
spy fiction novels, and biographies of many prominent figures at the library of the
American University in Cairo. He also got involved in discussions around campuses and
watched foreign movies. 2
In 1984, he became chairman of NU and his progressive thinking helped convert
NU into a more politically independent mass-organization. He merged Islamic boarding
school tradition with Islamic liberalism and secularism, Western liberalism, and Javanese
syncretism.3 It has been said that Wahid was a culturalistic Muslim with the instincts of a
Javanese king. 4
During the authoritarian Soeharto years, Wahid maintained a wide sphere of
compliance and criticism. He endorsed Soeharto’s policy in forcing all political parties
and social organizations to adopt the secular state ideology, Pancasila, in the mid-1980s.
On the other hand, Wahid opposed the efforts of Soeharto to control Islam for his
regime’s advantage. This was evident in his resignation from the government-backed
Islamic scholars’ association, ICMI, and his move to alternatively establish the Forum
1
Mark Tran, “Abdurrahman Wahid,” Guardian Unlimited Special Reports, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,2763,200655,00.html: 1-3.
2
Greg Barton, Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid , Equinox Publishing (Asia)
Pte. Ltd., 2005, http://www.antarakita.net/reviews/r24.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.
3
Harry Bhaskara, Questioning Gus Dur, Jakarta: the Jakarta Post, 2000: 43-44.
4
Barton, op. cit.
145
Demokrasi (Forum for Democracy) with prominent nationalists in March 1992 as a
response to the rising primordial tendencies in Indonesian politics at that time.
In 1998, after Soeharto’s resignation, Wahid founded the Partai Kebangkitan
Bangsa (PKB --National Awakening Party) with an inclusive platform despite its Islamic
credentials. Known as a moderate Muslim eager to collaborate with other religious
groups, he had become one of Indonesia’s most powerful voices for ethnic and religious
tolerance. He called on Islamic leaders to understand that minorities had their own
thoughts about the law and state, so his colleagues should be wise and ready to
compromise. Instead of a religious state, he endorsed the practice of secularism without
specifically saying that it was secularism.
While campaigning in the 1999 presidential elections, Wahid supported the
separation of state and religion as well as rights for women and minorities.5 In an
interview, he said, for example,”if the new parties want Islam to be a moral or educational
force in politics that is okay. But, if they want to perform it with the laws of this country,
then we must resist that.”6 He maintained his belief in secular government, which made
him a champion against the (radical or conservative) Islamist camp and garnered him the
support of many Indonesians. 7
Wahid’s behavior, wise to some, disrespectful to others, and his mercurial style of
leadership constantly confounded critics and sometimes caused him to be misunderstood.8
He was a very frank speaker, and well-known for his sharp and sometimes cynical
commentary on the country’s politics. He was also noted for his unpredictability and
indecisiveness. Nevertheless, the central aspect of his personality was the fact that he is a
populist leader who has always expressed strong and relentless concerns regarding issues
of nationalism, democracy, and the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia.9
Despite his official position as a leader of NU, an organization with about 40
million members, Wahid was seen as a leading proponent of secular democracy in the
country. His views were often more nationalist than they were explicitly Islamic.10 He
strongly envisioned the establishment of a civil democratic society in Indonesia where all
citizens could enjoy equal rights regardless of their religious views, race, or other
5
“Abdurrahman Wahid: Southeast Asia History, Biographies,” http://reference.allrefer.com/encyclopedia/
W/WahidA.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.
6
“Profile Abdurrahman Wahid,” ibid.
7
“Indonesian Election Triggers Violence,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4
80232. stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.
8
Barton, op. cit.
9
Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 118.
10
Ramage, 1995, op.cit: 49, ibid.
146
origins.11 Directly after his election as president, he guaranteed that the nature of
Indonesia as a Pancasila state, as the basis for the development of democratic pluralism
and religious tolerance, would remain unchanged. In his idealism, he was trying to look
for a political future of greater democratization with less military influence and no Islamic
fundamentalism.
With one foot in the traditional world of Javanese mysticism and the other in the modern
world of globalization, Wahid governed the country. A dukun (a Javanese soothsayer) who
habitually accompanied Wahid was able to see the ”big man,” the spirit of Soeharto,
standing in the doorway at the top of the steps. This dukun conducted a prayer ritual
before Indonesia’s fourth President entered the palace where he would now work and
live. He and his family waited for the soothsayer to finish his prayer ritual to banish the
black power of Soeharto, who was trying to hurt them, before they began their time in this
important and historical place.12
I.B. Military Position to Wahid’s Election
While Wahid had medical problems which left him with physical handicaps, he
was still an extremely popular figure when he was elected in the 1999 MPR special
session by opponents of Megawati. He was initially hailed as an alternative reformer, who
could heal deep national wounds from decades of Soeharto’s oppression and corruption.
It is of no lesser importance that his victory resulted from the transfer of Gen. Wiranto’s
support from Habibie to himself during the presidential election, causing the TNI/Police
faction, the new name for the military or the armed forces (ABRI) faction, in MPR to vote
for him.13
Just a few minutes before the election, it is likely that the military sent an
important message to supporters of Megawati not to push for the election of Megawati. At
that moment, thousands of pro-Megawati demonstrators had converged on Jakarta’s main
traffic junction, in front of Hotel Indonesia. This was also outside the 1999 MPR
assembly, where members were waiting to vote for their presidential candidates. The
message became clear soon after voting commenced --an explosion tore through the
crowd injuring several PDIP supporters.14 For the Wahid camp, the bomb explosion
would also be understandable as a crucial message not to stop thinking about the
military’s role in this election. This also meant that the new president had to take into
11
Abdurrahman Wahid, Islam, Negara, dan Demokrasi (Islam, State, and Democracy), Jakarta: Erlang-ga,
1999: 101; Sukma, 2003, op.cit.
12
Terry McCarthy, “Democrat...or Boss?” Time, Search Time.com, July 09, 2000.
13
14
Mietzner, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc.cit: 53.
147
account that the military was the main guarantor of the country’s stability and the future
of his administration.15
Therefore, it seems that Wiranto’s entire TNI/Police faction backed Wahid in the
presidential elections. Being aware of the military’s deep involvement in the long history
of Indonesia, Wahid was of the opinion that a proposal for military reforms would be
16
unpopular. More importantly, it would be difficult to implement such reforms because
the country had to break free from its centuries-old legacy of civil-military relations
infuenced by the political culture of the dominant ethnic group, namely the Javanese, who
preserved the ruler’s law and culture of violence.17
I.C. Wahid and His Reform Policies
Over a period of 1 year and 9 months (from October 1999 until June 2001), the
Wahid government produced fifty-one laws together with the DPR, making it more
productive than the previous regime of Habibie.18 Most of the laws were about the
formation of new provinces, municipalities, or cities, connected with the regime’s interest
in responding to the public’s push for greater autonomy. Of fifty-one laws, there were
three important laws concerning political reform and human rights protection, namely the
amending Law No. 7/1999 on elections, the Law on Labour Unions, and the Law on the
Human Rights Court. Anticipating that the 1999 Human Rights Act (Law No. 39/1999)
would frustrate the international community’s demand for the trials of those responsible
for East Timor violations, the Wahid government passed a new bill on human rights
courts. This became Law No. 26/2000 and it specified a wider range of offences and
provided for retroactive prosecutions. The law, adopted in November 2000, extended the
coverage of internationally recognised human rights abuses.
Wahid’s commitment to reform (or reformasi) could also be seen in his support
for MPR decrees (Ketetapan MPR --TAP MPR) and laws (Undang-undang --UU). The
first important step, initiated already before Wahid came to power, was the drafting of
MPR Decree No. 11/1998 on the creation of clean governance free from the practices of
KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme --corruption, collusion and nepotism). This decree
clearly mandated the investigation of accusations of KKN cases involving Soeharto, his
family, and cronies in seven state charity foundations (Supersemar, Dharmais, Dakab,
Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila, Dana Mandiri, Dana Gotong Royong Kemanusiaan, and
15
Joe Havely, “Analysis: New hope for Indonesia?”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/481548.stm: 1-4, was accessed on 29 October 2005.
16
Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006, in Jakarta.
17
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 403.
18
148
Trikora). These crimes caused state losses of Rp. 1.4 trillion. The second step was MPR
Decree No. 6/2000 on the separation of TNI and the police, and MPR Decree No. 7/2000,
which stipulated the role of TNI and the police. This was part of the reposition policy of
the military institution, because after more than three decades it had become so powerful
and enjoyed many priveledges given by the state. Likewise, Wahid wanted the withdrawal
of the Special MPR Decree No. 25/1966, which banned the spread of communism, but his
effort was blocked by conservative factions including the military and Islamist parties in
MPR.
Furthermore, Wahid followed up on MPR Decree No 11/1998 by supporting the
making of Law No. 28/1999 on clean governance free from the practices of the KKN. He
also initiated the creation of Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy for the Irian Jaya
province, which was to help settle the gap between the regional and central governments.
The law gave Irian Jaya special status in regards to its law, economy, and politics under
the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI) to prevent it from further separatist acts.19 Last but
not least, he encouraged the creation of Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden or
Inpres) No. 9/2000 on mainstreaming gender for the acceleration of equality and justice
for women. During his first days, he made important decisions such as to empty
Indonesia’s jails of political prisoners, namely the leftist radicals such as PRD (Partai
Rakyat Demokratik --People's Democratic Party) activists and PKI sympathisants who
still detained under Habibie, and to promise more decentralization of governmental
authority.
I.D. Wahid and Security Sector Reform
During the 1999-2000 period, 1 year after Wahid took office, Indonesia achieved a
modest economic recovery during which economic growth reportedly took hold. GDP
expanded by 4.9 percent in 2000 from 0.8 percent in 1999, which improved expenditure
and industrial origin or sectors and surpassed the government’s projection of 3-4 percent
GDP for 2000. Unlike in 1999, when exports weakened and imports collapsed, in 2000,
there was strong growth in either exports or imports. In addition, the open unemployment
rate decreased slightly from 6.4 to 6.1 percent and GNP per capita during 1999-2000 rose
20
from 1.3 to 1.5 percent. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic recovery was still very
much under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank.
19
“Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (”Central Government Was Demanded to Respect Papua’s
Special Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ut01. htm: 1-2.
20
Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2002 (Report on Indonesia’s Economy 2002), Bank Indonesia, 2003:
28, 37.
149
Shortly after his election, President Wahid introduced a series of measures to
establish civilian control over the military, and to curb the military. He made clear that he
supported TNI reform, which resulted in important repercussions within the officer corps.
His moves certainly posed a direct threat to the institutional interests of the TNI and the
personal interests of senior officers, as he simultaneously allocated only 2.96 percent of
the state budget (APBN) to the defence sector in 2000, or around 1.1 percent of
Indonesia’s GDP. This was a sharp decrease compared to 1999, when it reached 5.31
percent and to the budget he gave to the educational sector, which equalled 4.26 percent.
Likewise, in 2001, he provided 3.79 percent of the state budget for the defence sector, a
slight increase compared to 2000, and still much lower than the budget he allocated for
the educational sector - 4.69 percent. 21
Importantly, for the first time since the 1950s, a civilian, Juwono Sudarsono, was
appointed as Minister of Defence. Also, in the past military officers never spoke about
civilian supremacy, but now it had become part of the vocabulary of senior officers.22 Not
surprisingly, Wahid first forced Gen. Wiranto to resign from military command, and later
from the TNI, after being named in connection with gross human rights abuses in East
Timor. Following this, a major reshuffling of top military appointments occured,
favouring officers considered loyal to the president and supportive of democratic
reform.23 Wahid, for instance, promoted Agus Wirahadikusumah, a progressive figure,
who became Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat --Army's Strategic
Reserves Command) commander to replace Djaja Suparman, an anti-reform general.
Later, Wahid supported devolution of power by implementing Law No. 22/1999
on regional government and Law No. 25/1999 on the balanced financial regulation of the
central-regional governments passed under Habibie which markedly increased regional
autonomy and challenged the military’s territorial function. Accordingly, the local
parliament received the power to terminate business agreements that only benefited the
companies supported by the military, which mostly operated in important sectors such as
the fishery, forestry, and mining sectors. The decentralization scheme obviously caused a
significant loss of power for the TNI, which would have been even higher, had active
officers holding civilian positions in the regional governments been forced to resign from
the military prior to expiry of their term. In the past, TNI officers were usually governors
of the richest provinces with budgets exceeding Rp. 250 billions (US$ 25 million)
annually.24 In line with this, Wahid demanded that the TNI diminish its territorial function
by pushing it to dissolve regional commands in Aceh and Maluku in order to decrease
tensions, violence, and incidents, which often led to human rights abuses.
21
Zulfahmi, 2006, loc.cit: 15; Widoyoko, 2005, loc. cit.
Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc.cit: 178.
23
Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138.
24
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc.cit: 79.
22
150
In a surprise move on March 8, 2000, he signed two new Presidential decrees. One
eliminated Bakorstanas (Badan Kordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional -Coordinating Board for National Stability Strengthening Assistance, an extraconstitutional body to control state stability), and another stopping Litsus (Penelitian
Khusus --special background check). The removal of Bakorstanas caused a loss of jobs
for 271 colonels and three generals. The annulment of Litsus would no longer allow the
TNI to reject the appointment of civilians deemed to have “unclean” backgrounds, and,
25
hence, to justify the continued appointments of military personnel in the civil service.
In another surprise move in March 2000, Wahid reportedly mentioned that the
notorious Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus --Army’s Special Forces) would be
26
sharply reduced. Honna said that this was part of radical reform initiatives and that the
numbers would go from about 6,000 troops to a little over 5,000. This was a decrease
from the preliminary proposal to radically reduce the troops by 700 hundred personnel
within 1 year in order to avoid resistance from inside the unit.27 Nonetheless, Kopassus
commander Maj. Gen. Sjahrir clarified that he has not yet received orders to carry out the
reduction, and there has been no further reporting on the issue, and the result was still
unclear.28
Simultaneously, Wahid announced plans to implement the enlargement of combat
forces in all three-service branches, namely, the navy, air force, and the army, and
especially Kostrad. This was, in part, an attempt to relieve TNI over the changing status
of civil-military relations, as well as an issue of providing jobs for surplus officers.
Previously, in December 1999, Wahid had announced and promised a 62 percent rise in
the military budget from Rp. 11.6 trillion to Rp. 18.9 trillion per year, with Rp. 9.12
trillion reserved for equipment and Rp. 5.45 trillion for soldier salaries. 29 However,
overall, the vast majority of the above announced changes in the TNI organization and
strength had not been implemented.
By May 2000, Wahid’s civilian minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono,
announced plans to eliminate the position of chief commander (Panglima TNI) and
changed it with a chief of the joint staffs (Kepala Staf Gabungan --Kasgab TNI).
According to the proposal, the new position would no longer carry ministerial rank, but be
placed under the minister of defense. It had been also proposed that the position of
25
See “Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan” (“Cilangkap Group Still Dominant”), Media Indonesia, June 11,
2000.
26
See Honna, 2003, op.cit: 180-182.
27
“Personel Kopassus Akan Dirampingkan (“Kopassus Personnel Will be Trimmed”), Suara Merdeka,
March 21, 2000.
28
The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, op.cit: 134.
29
“Anggaran Militer Naik 62%” (“Military Budget Increases 62%”), TNI Watch!, December 15, 1999,
ibid: 135.
151
Kasgab TNI be revolved among the three service branches at regular 3-year periods, but
the plans showed no progress. On the other hand, on July 1, 2000, the national police was
separated from the TNI and placed directly under the president’s control, which meant a
loss of budget for the military.
Since the reform movement began, the quantity of officers who held the
gubernatorial and mayoral positions had been gradually reducing. Based on the data from
2001, out of thirty-one provinces and 337 municipalities, the number of military
governors and majors is seventeen (54.83 percent) and 123 (36.49 percent), respectively.
These were slightly lower proportionately compared to the data of 1999 when out of
twenty-six provinces and 316 municipalities, fifteen (57.69 percent) and 116 (36.70
30
percent) of the similar positions were occupied by military officers.
Compared to Habibie, Wahid more progressively pushed the reposition of the TNI
in order to rapidly increase military professionalism and establish civilian supremacy. As
argued by T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of Propatria, an NGO focused on security
sector reforms, Wahid tried to establish civilian supremacy and encourage the military to
obey civilian leaders. 31 His commitment to military reform was also acknowledged by
Effendy Choirie, a close aide of his in PKB. Specifically explained during an interview,
President Wahid wanted the military only as a defense force because his NU had always
been a victim of TNI’s dual function.32 His moves to promote pro-reform officers to
strategic positions, i.e. Wirahadikusumah as Pangkostrad (Panglima Kostrad --Kostrad
Commander), Saurip Kadi as Aster (Asisten Teritorial --Territorial Assistant), and
Simbolon as Kasdam Jaya (Kepala Staf Kodam Jaya --Chief of Staff of Jakarta Regional
Commander), were applauded by the reform movement. 33 Simbolon had even been
promoted as Kopassus commander, though not successfully, due to the resistance of
Wahid’s opponents inside the army.
Likewise, his new civilian minister of defense, Mahfud MD, who replaced
Juwono due to his illness, noted that Wahid had broken the long tradition established
since the military was founded in 1945 by accepting for the first time a navy officer (an
admiral) to become chief commander. This is the person who, on April 20, 2000 in a TNI
leaders meeting (Rapat Pimpinan or Rapim), had promised to bring the military out of
their old social-political functions, focused only on their defense duties.34 Mahfud himself
explained that he had replaced military officers with civilians, comprising seven of eleven
first echelon positions, in his ministry. He also appointed a civilian to chair Lemhannas
30
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc.cit: 79.
T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on July 13, 2006 in Jakarta.
32
Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta.
33
See also, Honna, 2006, op.cit: 180.
34
Rusdi Marpaung (eds.), Dinamika Reformasi Sektor Keamanan (The Dynamics of Security Sector Reform), Jakarta: Imparsial, 2005: 149.
31
152
(Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional --National Resilience Institute), an important institute
preparing future leaders of the country, which, until the Habibie era, was still controlled
by the military and directed at least by a three-star general.
In the meantime, Wahid promoted progressive officers who opposed Gen. Wiranto
and his group with their ambiguous reform. The progressive officers, represented by Maj.
Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah --the then newly appointed Kodam VII Wirabuana regional
commander in Sulawesi-- Brig. Gen. Saurip Kadi, Brig. Gen. AA Simbolon, and Col. RR
Simbolon, wanted to create a professional military focused only on external defense so
that TNI would no longer be engaged in day-to-day politics whatsoever. Referring to
35
Lieuwen, in this regard, Wirahadikusumah and his friends could be classified as young
officers who were the underminers of traditional institutions, and who were against senior
officers whose ideal was stability, and who, as its defenders, disfavoured political
experimentation.
On December 13, 1999, Wirahadikusumah presented his reform agenda in a paper
entitled “Redefining, Repositioning, and Reactualising the Military in the Life of the
Nation” before the DPR Committee 1 (Komisi 1), Sub-Committee on Defense, without
previously consulting his seniors in TNI headquarters. In his surprising proposal, he
suggested a reduction of Kodam numbers throughout the country, which was against the
proposal of the main leaders of the army who wanted to add garrison commands at the
provincial levels in the near future. For this reason, TNI spokesperson, Maj. Gen.
Sudrajat, commented on Wirahadikusumah’s agenda as a violation of the code of ethics of
36
officers.
His view on the territorial structure was the most important of all changes he
suggested because this would implicate many aspects. Since 1945, through the territorial
command, TNI conducted their political role on a daily basis, similar to the Dutch
colonial military structure. Here, military posts or personnel were placed at every rank of
civilian bureaucracy, from the provincial capital (Kodam or Komando Daerah Militer -military regional command) down to the village (Babinsa or Bintara Pembina Desa -lowest post at village level in order to control civilian political activities at the grassroots)
level. For a long-time, both officers and ordinary soldiers considered territorial command
posts as the most enviable job in the military, largely since it offered abundant chances to
generate individual affluence. In contrast, Wirahadikusumah was of the view that the
territorial command was exactly what was impeding democratization due to their
35
36
Lieuwen, 1965, op. cit: 126-127.
“Ekspresi Kemarahan Angkatan 1973”, TNI Watch! apakabar@Radix.Net, December 21, 1999.
153
existence as a means of domination, control, and political manipulation; thus, it should be
curbed if the country chose to campaign for a new and more democratic future.37
Since his appointment as Pangkostrad, Wirahadikusumah suggested that the two
lowest layers of the territorial command at the village and sub-district level be removed.
Through his associate, Saurip, then assistant for territorial affairs at army headquarters, he
ran a project aimed at the withdrawal of 33,000 military personnel from the lowest
(village or community) level, namely, Babinsa. They were planned to be concentrated at
the district levels or Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer --Military District Command)
where they would have received training as members of regional defense units.38
Therefore, by April 2000, there was an experimental removal of military
personnel posted at the village level (Bintara Pembina Desa or Babinsa) and subdistrict
level (Koramil or Komando Rayon Militer --Military Subdistrict Command) in the Kodam
Jayakarta and Kodam V Brawijaya regional commands. However, there had not been any
reporting on their actual liquidation. Instead, it appeared that the Babinsa and Koramil
had simply been repositioned as part of the local Kodim.
At this point, he was ready to eliminate numerous businesses run by TNI’s various
“charitable foundations” and by individual units and officers, which had been used as a
financial conduit of the territorial commands, but the benefits of which have been flowing
more to the individual officers running the businesses rather than the military as an
institution. He could not also excuse the practice of backing or racketeering in the
discotheques, brothels, and narcotics businesses. As pointed out by Choirie, Wahid’s
main political adviser, what Wirahadikusumah actually wanted to do was to root out the
practice of dual function to help the military focus on defense matters, changing them into
professional soldiers.39 Through the promotion of Wirahadikusumah and his allies,
40
conservative generals anticipated that Wahid would immediately launch comprehensive
and progressive military reforms41 which would have severely affected the TNI and their
careers.
Therefore, conflict of interests emerged between hardliners and softliners, or
maximalists and moderates, or between those who were ready to take risks and those who
did not want to confront risks. Different social backgrounds and socialization histories of
the pro-reform officers --Wirahadikusumah, for instance, pursued higher education in the
US after completing his military academy, and was concerned about the civil-military
relationship-- led to their different perceptions and preferences on the military’s role in
37
”I’m Just Anticipating Change Earlier than the Others”, Van Zorge Report, January 7, 2000.
Mietzner, 2006, op. cit: 73.
39
40
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta.
41
Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, was interviewed on July 17, 2009 in Jakarta.
38
154
Indonesia. They were aware of the consequences of violating TNI’s old values and were
willing to pay the price of sanctions being applied in the institution.
I.E. Military Response to Wahid’s Reform Policies
In the history of pre-modern Indonesia (the Javanese kingdom era), soldiers played
important roles that could not be separated from the activities of kings, their families, and
palaces (keraton). Likewise, in traditional Javanese society, soldiers had a good image
and became a class that was deserving prestigious positions. At the beginning of
Soeharto’s New Order in the mid-1960s, the proportion of Javanese in the military was 66
percent. Within 10 years (1977), it increased to 74 percent, and eventually reached 80
percent in the next 5 years (1982).42 This means that, with a proportion of only 41 percent
43
of the entire Indonesian population, the Javanese contributed two-thirds to the troop’s
manpower in the late 1990s.
The following figures reveal more specifically the ethnic composition of the TNI.
The data cover officers who were posted in the central army elite, or were considered to
possess key posts in the army, naval, or air force:
Table 2
Ethnical-Regional Distribution of
the Central Army Elite
Ethnic Groups
Number of Officers
Javanese
33
Sundanese
4
Toba Batak
3
Minangkabau
2
Balinese
2
Madurese
2
Ambonese
1
Menadonese
1
West Timorese
1
42
David Brown,”The State of Ethnicity and the Ethnicity of the State: Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia,”
in Ethnic and Racial Studies, No. 1, 1989: 69.
43
BPS, http://www.bps.go.id, November 21, 2000.
155
Banjarese
1
Karo Batak
1
Bugis-Makasarese
1
Morotai
1
Unknown
7
TOTAL
60
Source: The Editors, Indonesia, April 1999: 134
Therefore, the above figures disclosed that Javanese held 50 percent of positions in the
central army elite.
Within the army, the composition of army officers based on their ethnical
background during the last one-decade was as follows:
Table 3
Ethnical Background of
Army Officers 1990-2000
Ethnic Groups
Number of Officers
Javanese
6,311
Sundanese
1,505
Batak
802
Bali
286
Padang
243
Palembang
170
Aceh
140
Bugis
124
Minahasa
115
Makassar
110
Ambon
70
Betawi
53
Melayu
45
156
Madurese
29
Irian
26
Timor
26
Banjar
23
Dayak
11
Source: Zen, 2004: 131-132 (modified)
The above data illustrate that in the 1990-2000 period about 63 percent of the
high- ranking army officers were Javanese by ethnic background. Since the army was the
main branch which mostly exercised the military’s dual function role, it can be said here
that dwifungsi was basically a Javanese phenomenon.
In more detail, the figure below presents the ethnic background of the army
officers that had been endorsed to become brigadier generals in the decade between 1990
and 2000:
Table 4
Ethnic Background of Army Officers
Promoted to Brig. Gen. 1990-2000
Ethnic Groups
Number of Officers
Javanese
378
Sundanese
93
Batak
48*
Minang
42
Minahasa
21**
Aceh
16
Palembang
16
Bugis
15
Bali
14
Banjar
9
Madurese
8
Melayu
8
157
Ambon
6
Makassar
6
Toraja
4
Timor
3
Notes:
*
+ 2 from Tapanuli and 1 from North Sumatera.
Sangir
+ 3 from
Talaud and 1 from North Sulawesi.
Source: Zen, 2004: 133-134 (modified)
**
Again, the data above showed that around 55 percent Javanese of total ethnic
background had been promoted from senior middle rank-officers to much higher positons,
namely, brigadier generals. Since the position of generals was much more important than
other lower ranks, it can be concluded here that the Javanese generals dominated the
policy or decision-making process in the army, especially, on matters of the military’s
dual function. This means that, until Wahid assumed the presidency, the majority of
generals in the army were Javanese. In other words, the Javanese generals held more
important positions, particularly in the decision-making process than any other ethnic
group in the army, as well as the military as a whole, for the reason that the army soldiers
were always the overwhelming majority in the Indonesian military.
The proportions of the contribution that indicated the Javanese domination in the
composition and main structure of TNI institutions were certainly an interesting fact for
those who probably never saw similar facts in other countries. It was, therefore,
reasonable for Wessel to comment that “No serious observer of Indonesia can overlook
the fact that Javanese domination of government offices and army leadership exceeds its
proportional share in relation to the population of Indonesia.” 44
Importantly, Javanese dominance in the armed forces had been reinforced by the
domination of the Javanese ethnic group in government and politics in general. As stated
by Brown, the above data indicated that the promotion process in the military was
ethnically selective. This means that Javanese leaders, either for security reasons or
“primordial affiliation” had tended to favour their fellow Javanese in recruitment and
45
promotion. Likewise, decisions for implementing military reform would be strongly
influenced by those military leaders who held key positions.
44
Ingrid Wessel, “State Nationalism in Present Indonesia,” in Wessel (eds.), Nationalism and Ethnicity in
Southeast Asia, Berliner-Asien-Afrika-Studien, 4/2, Muenster/Hamburg, 1994, 40-41.
45
Brown, 1989, loc.cit.
158
That is why Kusnanto Anggoro, a security and political analyst from Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and a lecturer of the Indonesian military
command school (Sekolah Komando --Sesko), said that constraints for military reform
laid in the norms and values which TNI soldiers inherited from generation to generation
which essentially have not yet changed until recently. 46 Effendy Choirie, Wahid’s main
political adviser who was also a member of the Subcommittee of Defense of Committe I
(Komisi I) of the parliament, stated that conservative officers were reluctant to reform,
and always justified their claims on the important role of the military in the country’s
history.47
In fact, military leaders under Wahid, such as chief commander Gen. Wiranto and
army chief Gen. Tyasno, expressed their worries on the amendments of the 1945 State
Constitution which implicated the position of the military in the newly emerging
democracy. They were of the opinion that the amendments would give a chance for the
emergence of old conflicts as happened in the 1950s during the liberal democracy era.
That time period had damaged national unity and the military’s dual function, which had
existed since 1945, and which led the country to disintegration.48 Therefore, military
leaders still took the view that the 1945 State Constitution is sacrosanct and is not
necessary to be amended for the sake of preserving NKRI.49
Similarly, Lt. Gen. Ryamizard, the new Kostrad commander, a hardliner or antireform figure who replaced Wirahadikusumah, stated that to understand TNI, one needed
to learn the country’s history because it was born in a particular period of history that
50
made it unique and highly relevant in national politics. Moreover, TNI’s conservative
leaders still cited that the TNI army was originated from the people, and that it was
established to undertake a national liberation struggle. They always justified this by
stating that this was what has placed it apart from many other armies elsewhere.
Moreover, they said that TNI was not even founded by the political leadership but selfestablished by the nationalist youths to defend the dignity of the nation. In view of these
origins, TNI perceived itself as being equal to civilians. 51 Thus, referring to Perlmutter’s
analysis,52 the founding of the country and the formation of the military in the past still
influenced the new civil-military relationship that was being built by Wahid, a civilian
president. Thus, for nostalgic soldiers still celebrating the revolutionary days the
46
Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 11, 2006 in Jakarta.
Effendy Chorie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta.
48
“Amandemen Jangan Digagas Politisi” (“Amendments May Not be Proposed by Politician”), Harian
Kompas, Maret 22, 2007: 1;”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (“Tyasno: The Amendments of the
1945 Constitution Not Legitimate”), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006: 2.
49
See also, Sebastan, 2006, op.cit: 47.
50
Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta.
51
Bilveer Singh, Ryamizard --in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005: 43.
52
See Perlmutter and Bennet (eds.), 1980.
47
159
transition became difficult. In other words, TNI still wanted to justify its civil function on
the basis of the revolutionary experience, a point also stressed by Maynard.53
In reality, Wahid’s announcement of military reorganization and the sidelining
of several allies of Wiranto had implications for his support in parliament and in the
party. Matori Abdul Djalil, PKB chairperson and MPR deputy speaker, had become a
target of an assassination attempt on March 5, 2000, after being stabbed by two assailants
54
suspected of acting under orders of military elements. The attack happened days after
the announcement of a military reshuffle. The putative reason behind the attack was that
Matori had advised Wahid on whom to promote, and enthusiastically suggested a total
55
change of military leadership in order to promote true reformers. The PKB chairperson
was a key go-between with army generals to secure their support before the President's
successful purge of former TNI chief commander General Wiranto and his followers. He
had secretly met Lt. Gen.Tyasno Sudarto and Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah at the
Borobudur Hotel the year before and the two agreed to support the President.
Immediately afterwards, in early December 1999, Tyasno, previously a Wiranto
supporter, was promoted to the army's top post of chief-of-staff from his position as
deputy chief. Meanwhile, Wirahadikusumah, who had a well-established reputation as an
army reformer, then began an unprecedented public sniping campaign against Gen.
Wiranto and criticized the army's role in politics and its endemic corruption. He was
rewarded with a promotion to the army’s top combat command, the chief of the Kostrad.
Matori was also influential in choosing Adm. Widodo Adisucipto to take command of
TNI. President Wahid accepted his advice to choose Widodo over Wiranto’s preferred
56
candidate, who became the deputy.
Police, describing the Matori attack as a random act of violence and not likely an
assassination or intimidation attempt, failed again to convince the public. Mass media had
reported that there were two men on a motorcycle who attacked him in front of his home,
in an exclusive house compound equipped with internal security in South Jakarta, as
Matori was returning from jogging.57 A further police statement claimed that the attacker
was a member of Angkatan Mujahiddin Islam Nusantara group (AMIN), the obscure
radical Muslim organization that had been previously declared by the police as the
53
See Maynard, in Perlmutter and Bennet (eds.), 1980, ibid.
55
”Siapa Bohir Proyek Pembunuhan Matori,” (”Who Was Behind the Killing Attempt of Matori”), Koran
Kontan, March 13, 2000.
56
Effendy Chorie, Wahid’s close associate in the parliament, interviewed by Jakarta's Forum news magazine, see Tim Dodd, “Stabbing Triggers Alarm for Wahid's Rule,” Australian Financial Review, March 7,
2000.
57
“Leader of Gus Dur's Party Stabbed.” The Straits Times, http://straitstimes.asial.com.sg/asia/sea1_0306.html, March 6, 2000.
54
160
perpetrator of the 1999 Al-Istiqlal mosque bombing.58 Although the statement said that
several members of AMIN attacked Matori with a machete,59 few believed that AMIN
existed. Moreover, the attacker’s identity was later found as a thug of a small market in
East Jakarta, and without evidence of a religious fundamentalism. More importantly,
although the police authorities had sufficient evidence, they never arrested the alleged
perpetrators. 60 An independent and critical information source, Siar, cited the connection
of the military with the attack, and, in particular, suspected the role of the ex-Kostrad
commander who was supposedly humiliated by his sudden replacement with
Wirahadikusumah.61
Other events that could be obviously linked to the military’s reaction to Wahid’s
plans for military reorganization and further security sector reforms were the emergence
of serial bombings and new unrest simultaneously throughout the country, namely,
Jakarta, Central and East Java, Aceh, West and Central Kalimantan, Poso, Lombok, West
Timor, Maluku, and Irian Jaya. Military elements were further suspected in inciting
political elites in provinces such as Bengkulu and Makassar to resist the Wahid
government. For this reason, Wahid later warned that military elements were organizing
parallel campaigns on a larger scale. Commenting on the new riots in Lombok, the
president further said that there was great frustration of TNI officers, whose power was
62
vehemently being questioned. It was clear at the time that his relationship with TNI
rapidly worsened due to his tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of the institution.63
Wahid’s indisposition to protect military domestic interests led to TNI’s defiance of his
presidency, which harmed his efforts to build civilian supremacy.
Military resistance to Wahid further crystallized in their maneuvers against the
promotion of reform-minded generals. Prior to this, Wiranto had made a comprehensive
reshuffle of personnel and recommended a conservative civilian minister of defense,
Juwono Sudarsono. Wiranto had, moreover, successfully used his TNI/Police faction in
MPR to exert his influence on the amendments of the 1945 Constitution, especially
Chapter XII, Article 30 (2), the Second Amendment to the 1945 State Constitution. These
interventions preserved TNI’s strong position in the country’s traditional concept of
sistem pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta (total defense and security system). At
the same time, the military could maintain its strategic position which subordinated it to
the president and not the minister of defense. Due to this arrangement, Mahfud M.D,
58
See again, Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit: 123.
“Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,” ICG Asia Report No. 92, Singapote/Brussels, 2005: 26.
60
Ibid.
61
”Penganiayaan Matori: Kelompok Radikal dan Djaja Terlibat,” (“Matori Assault: Radical Group and
Djaja Suspected Involved”), SiaR-Xpos, SiaR News Service, siar@minihub.org, March 11, 2000.
62
Richard Lloyd Parry,”Dark Forces Strikes Lombok,” The Independent, January 23, 2000.
63
Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 124.
59
161
Juwono’s successor and Wahid’s pro-reform aide, failed in his plans to place the new
chief commander, Adm. Widodo, under his authority. The amending clause of the
constitution had supposedly been manipulated by Widodo to derail Mahfud’s agenda of
64
implementing civilian supremacy.
Saurip,65 a reformist general and Wirahadikusumah’s associate, admitted that
President Wahid could not push for further military reforms because TNI was still under
Wiranto’s and his allies’ control. As a result, Wahid and the reformist generals failed in
developing stable civilian supremacy and sending the military back to the barracks. As far
as the reformist generals were concerned, the campaign for a comprehensive security
66
sector reform cost them their current posts in TNI. Saurip, for instance, was transferred
to a less important post as a staff in the TNI headquarters until he retired. Moreover,
President Wahid could no longer retain Wirahadikusumah as Kostrad commander because
the reformist general’s policy of auditing the Kostrad budget had brought him at
loggerheads with powerful TNI figures, particularly Wiranto and Sutarto, and all
67
territorial commanders.
Wirahadikusumah had discharged two of his staff in Kostrad due to their
involvement in financial misconduct, invited public accountants to investigate the case
and disclosed the internal corruption to the mass-media. The accusation of abusing about
USD 20 million from Kostrad enterprises during the time of Djaja, his predecessor, had
drawn angry reactions from Wiranto, Widodo, and Djaja.68 To reduce tension, and in an
attempt to initiate compromise with the current military leadership, President Wahid
abandoned his agenda of reforming TNI’s territorial command structure, and his more
conciliatory stance towards separatist activities, and subsequently allowed security
crackdowns both in Aceh and Papua. 69
The military demonstrated even stronger resistance in May 2001, when its leaders,
primarily army chief, Gen. Sutarto, declined to support Wahid’s plan to issue a
presidential decree on state emergency, which was needed to retain control over the
deteriorating political and security situation. Because of this insubordination,70 Wahid
tried to substitute Gen. Sutarto with Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, and promote a Christian
64
Mahfud MD was interviewed on January 9, 2007 in Jakarta.
Maj Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta.
66
Ibid; see also, Honna, 2003, op.cit: 183.
67
Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta.
68
Koran Jawa Pos, July 15, 2000, cited in Honna, 2003, op.cit: 183.
69
Marcus Mietzner, “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance,” Washington DC, East-West Center, 2006: 34.
70
In a talkshow (“Kick Andy”) with Andi Noya in Metro TV on March 7, 2008, again, Wahid mentioned
Gen. Sutarto’s behavior at that time as insubordination.
65
162
general, Lt. Gen. Lumintang, to become TNI deputy commander. 71 He also wanted to
promote Gen. Sudarto to replace Adm. Widodo as chief commander. However, he failed
to carry out these plans, even to promote Lumintang, due to the resistance of military
72
elites.
One of these was Gen. Agum Gumelar, the new coordinating minister for
political and security affairs, who was just appointed to replace Gen. Yudhoyono after the
latter’s earlier insubordination to Wahid’s plan to declare a state emergency.
Wahid’s maneuvers to replace the conservative with reformist generals that
affected many officers 73 produced abundant resistance from his opponents inside the
military. For this reason, in the middle of May 1999, TNI’s main commanders organized a
meeting in Bandung, and issued a statement to reject the president’s plans to promote
reformist generals, read by Kodam IX Udayana regional commander, Maj. Gen. Willem
da Costa, a Wiranto partisan. They, the eleven regional commanders, declared that TNI
would not obey to what they called Wahid’s “political generals,” referring to the reformist
camp in the military, which at that time was still in power. Essentially, the statement
meant that if Wahid appointed reformist generals such as Wirahadikusumah and Saurip
Kadi to key posts, the entire military command would openly rebel.74 Lt. Gen. Sutarto had
stated that if President Wahid persisted in promoting Wirahadikusumah, there would be a
very strong resistance from the ranks. He even threatened that he would leave TNI should
75
Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah became his new boss.
Apparently, conservative generals feared that with the presidential decree
(Maklumat) on state emergency, Wahid would introduce radical reforms and execute a
comprehensive reshuffle of TNI institution that would affect them. For this reason,
Sutarto called a gathering of 200 high-ranking officers to back his statement of refusal to
Wahid’s Maklumat and endorse support from all Kodam regional commanders for his
army leadership.76 He was successful in obtaining support from 124 retired generals from
the army, including senior generals, such as, Wiranto, Try, Hartono, and Wismoyo.
Later, under the order of the new Kostrad commander, Lt. Gen Ryamizard, the
military held apel kesiagaan (an alert gathering) at the Monas square, in front of Wahid’s
office, the Merdeka palace on July 22, 2001. This was open blackmail as the gathering
involved two thousand soldiers, including special troops from Kopassus, the Marines and
71
Usamah Hisyam et al (eds), SBY: Sang Demokrat (SBY: The Democrat ), Jakarta, Dharmapena, 2004:
529-531.
72
Yenny Zanuba, Wahid’s daughter, personal secretary and spokesperson, was interviewed on October 14,
2006 in Jakarta.
73
Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006, in Jakarta.
74
75
Majalah Tempo, October 15, 2000, in Honna, 2003, op, cit: 186.
76
Honna, 2003, ibid: 190.
163
Air Forces,77 and several military tanks with their cannons all directed at the presidential
palace. With the gathering, the military wanted to convey that it was ready to take any
78
measure to block President Wahid’s decision to declare a state of emergency. This was a
parallel to the October 17, 1952 show of force which occurred at the same location and
also with the guns directed on the palace.79
The October 1952 incident was followed by the discharge of Gen. Abdul Haris
Nasution from his position as chief of staff of the armed forces (Kepala Staf Angkatan
Bersenjata --Kasab), and it encouraged Soekarno to leave the post vacant afterwards.
However, Wahid did not react in the same way, even though the show of force was
continued by a military parade on several strategic roads in the capital city. With the work
culture inherited from the days of the freedom struggle, the TNI apparently wanted to
style themselves as the guardians of the nation and show that their loyalty was to the
country and not to civilian leadership. 80
Maj. Gen. Ryamizard’s statement, that the show of force was aimed at
safeguarding Wahid, could hardly be more away from reality.81 It was much more likely
that the move was an attempt to help the politicians in the parliament to unseat Wahid
more quickly. As noted by Singh, through the show of force, Ryamizard actually would
have liked to prevent Wahid’s supporters from coming from the East Java region to
Jakarta to put pressure on the president’s opponents in the military and parliament. In
fact, the military’s maneuvering sent strong emphatic warnings to Wahid that reform
measures should proceed no further. Of course, as argued by Effendy Choirie, the roll call
82
could not have been performed without the consent from Widodo, the chief commander.
Some even predicted that TNI sought to trigger a nationwide unrest to justify a military
takeover.83
Aside from this, TNI had reshuffled its top leadership four times. This, on the one
hand, had helped the armed forces to defend themselves against Wahid’s progressive
reforms. On the other hand, it had constrained him from consolidating his power and
meeting his objectives in developing civilian supremacy.84 Predictably, thus, military
headquarters did not back his decision to declare martial law as well as to remove the
police chief, Gen. Surojo Bimantoro in June 2001. Such behavior by the military, argued
77
“Cerita di Balik Apel TNI di Monas”, (“Stories behind TNI Gathering in Monas”), Detik.com, July 23,
2001.
78
Zen, 2004, op.cit: 100.
79
See also, Honna, 2003, op.cit: 192.
80
Kuppuswamy, 2005, loc. cit.
81
Singh, 2005: 63.
82
83
Singh, 2005, op.cit: 63.
84
Rinakit, 2005, op.cit: 197.
164
T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of Propatria, a NGO campaigning for Indonesia’s security
sector reform, was an act of insubordination to civilian leaders, particularly, the
85
president. More interestingly, the military backlash that led to Wahid’s impeachment
was often seen in connection with Ryamizard’s subtle support for Wahid’s pro-military
deputy, Megawati Soekarnoputeri, in her new struggle for the presidency.86 Therefore, it
was noticeable that in its intervention and controlling the means of violence, TNI could
87
perform what Lieuwen calls the arbiters of politics.
I.F. Ethnic Conflict in Kalimantan: Military Contestation against the Police
In 1997 and 1998, extremely violent ethnic clashes occureed in West-Kalimantan
between indigenous Dayaks and migrants, from Madura, East Java. In 1999, the war
between Dayaks and Madurese in the towns of Sambas and Sampit in Central Kalimantan
killed hundreds of people, mostly Madurese, while thousands fled to Java when the
Dayak people took revenge on the migrant group.88 Again, in early 2001, when Wahid
paid a state visit to Nigeria and Sudan, such clashes suddenly erupted in the neighbouring
89
towns of Central Kalimantan.
A brawl, which began with a quarrel between Dayaks and Madurese in a karaoke
bar near Kereng Pangi in December 15, 2000, fuelled the tensions. Within 2 months, it
escalated into a violence that spread to Sampit and the capital city of Central Kalimantan,
Palangka Raya, 90 220 km away from the site of the original incident. In this incident,
thousands of Dayaks took part in a raid against Madurese. The violence killed 469 people,
91
among whom 456 were Madurese, according to the early March 2001 statistics, and
92
destroyed thousands of homes. Additionally, about 108,000 Madurese fled Central
Kalimantan, followed a few weeks afterwards by the entire Madurese community in the
province due to fast rising violence and killings across parts of the province.93
85
Singh, 2005: 63.
87
Lieuwen, 1965, op. cit: 124.
88
Abdul Khalik, “Ethnic-Based Conflict Continues to Haunt West Kalimantan,” The Jakarta
Post, February 28, 2008.
89
See also Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 304-305.
90
“Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,” ICG Asia Report No. 18, June 27, 2001:
3-6, 19.
91
Majalah Tempo, March 11, 2001: 21, ibid.
92
Ester Indahyani Jusuf, “Item 15: Indigenous Issues,” Asian Legal Resource Centre, UNHCR, April 12,
2001.
93
Majalah Tempo 30, No. 2, March 12-18, 2001; Majalah Tempo 30, No. 7, April 16-22, 2001; “The
Sampit Violence”, http://www.thejakartapost.com/editorial.asp, The Jakarta Post, February 23, 2001; Lewa Pardomuan, “Indonesian Islanders Take Borneo Riots Lightly,” March 28, 1999, Reuters.
86
165
Nevertheless, Wahid, who had an NU base in Madura, offered no emotional
reaction in response to the new wave of violence in Kalimantan. He had asked Madurese
to restrain and behave more wisely as migrants in order to avoid new incidents and more
strife. His great influence among NU’s followers in Java and Kalimantan was very helpful
in easing and preventing the Madurese from taking revenge. Also, he suggested that
reporters should not exaggerate the level of violence in Central Kalimantan, even though
the clashes had drawn worldwide attention as international mass-media captured horrible
images of mutilated corpses and decapitated bodies. Similar to Habibie, Wahid had a
heavy task to settle horizontal conflicts in Kalimantan.
In fact, Wahid’s neutral stance and peaceful approach to the conflict in
Kalimantan significantly reduced the tensions, which contributed to the improvement of
security conditions there. The involvement of third parties, e.g. radical Muslims and the
security forces had been contained due to the tireless efforts of the new Kodam VII
Wirabuana reformist regional commander, Maj. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, in controlling
the region. The absence of interventions from military elements at that time had not only
prevented the recurrence of the riots, but also contributed to further stability in most parts
of Kalimantan.
However, the fall of Wirahadikusumah and Wahid’s weaker position in the
following months changed the situation. On July 5, 2000, military’s covert and
psychological operations started again, and this time, Central Kalimantan became the
target of the new riot. Some people dressed like Ninja, or Japanese warriors with masks
and dark costumes, suddenly attacked some Muslim zones, as happened in East Java in
mid-1998 and East Timor in the 1990s.94 The police could not prevent and control the
clash that consequently broke out. This led to a riot and caused at least four deaths,
twenty slightly wounded, and two houses burnt.95
Horizontal conflicts between the Christian Dayaks and the Muslim Madurese
continued, which led refugees to flee from a large number of hot spots. Those who chose
to embark on evacuation ships were compelled to pay bribes to the security forces. The
rivalry between the soldiers and the police started competing to control the lucrative sale
of passenger accommodation. This new chaotic situation deteriorated because of the
fights between two components of the security forces in Kalimantan: the military and the
police.
Not long after the separation of the police from the Indonesian military as a
consequence of the reform agenda supported by Wahid and reformist generals, on
February 27, 2001, a brawl caused by a quarrel over control of an evacuation ship
94
95
See again, for example, Ralhan, 2002, loc.cit.
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 51.
166
escalated into a fatal battle between TNI soldiers and the police.96 In this incident, a group
of soldiers made intense attacks and injured two middle-ranking police officers. In an
attempt of revenge, a heavily armed special police unit (Brimob --Brigade Mobile)
commenced a fierce gun battle,which raged through the streets of Sampit, involving more
than eighty soldiers and police troops.97 The battle killed a passer-by and a soldier,
injured three more soldiers, three police personnel, and two other persons. 98 The clash
also destroyed dozens of buildings and vehicles in the area, including the evacuation ship
provided for the displaced Madurese.
Defense minister, Mahfud M.D. was of the opinion that the military should take
over control of the situation in the field from the police. However, the organizational
separation of the two branches mandated by the 2000 MPR annual session (Sidang
Tahunan) unexpectedly produced trouble.99 Threatened by a lessening of authority as a
result of Wahid’s security sector reform, the military responded slowly to civilian moves
of reinstating security in Kalimantan.
Army chief, Gen. Sutarto, complained about the separation of the police from the
military after a long, secretive, and unusual meeting with all fifty-five active generals on
March 1, 2001. 100 Critics, nevertheless, said that the military’s concern stemmed not from
the security needs of the Kalimantan inhabitants, but rather from the institutional interests
of the military. Reportedly, the military had gained profits from its role in providing
security services, protecting the logging, mining and plantatation companies 101 since the
New Order era.102 Through various foundations, it also got involved in other businesses
103
throughout the country, particularly in resource rich regions like Kalimantan. Since its
separation from the police, however, it no longer held a clear monopoly on coercive force,
while the police, even though weaker, was beginning to perform as an adversary.
96
“Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report
No. 18, June 27, 2001, loc.cit: 10.
97
“Salah Paham, Aparat Bentrok” (“Misunderstanding, Security Apparatus Clashed”), Banjarmasin Post,
February 28, 2001.
98
”Di Tengah Evakuasi Pengungsi Sampit, TNI dan Brimob Baku Tembak” (“Sampit Refugees Evacuated: TNI and Brimob Cross Fire”), Harian Kompas, February 28, 2001.
99
”TNI Shoud be Given More Authority to Maintain Security,” The Jakarta Post, March 2, 2001.
100
Ibid.
101
No. 18, June 27, 2001, loc.cit: 19.
102
Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta; Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta; .Maj. Gen. Sidarto Danusubroto was interviewed on November
28, 2006 in Jakarta.
103
See, for example, Moch. Nurhasim (ed.), Praktek-praktek Bisnis Militer: Pengalaman Indonesia, Burma, Filipina, dan Korut (Military Business in Practices: Lessons from Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines,
and North Korea), Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, 2003; Lex Rieffei et al, Menggusur Bisnis Militer: Pem biayaan TNI Melalui APBN (Eradicating Military Business: Financing TNI with APBN), Bandung: Mizan,
2007.
167
In reality, the deployment of troops to the new trouble spots in Central Kalimantan
frightened the looting Dayaks, who were equipped only with hatchets and sickles.
Because of the new wave of riots, chief commander Adm. Widodo recommended to Gen.
Sutarto to strengthen the military by inceasing the number of local soldiers and sustain the
army’s presence. He also suggested that military seize strategic towns such as Sampit and
Palangka Raya to safeguard Madurese refugees. Meanwhile, Gen. Sutarto mentioned that
if the army took action, the only available choice of action would be to shoot on sight.
Nevertheless, he argued, this was unworkable because the military lacked legal authority.
Therefore, he used the new strife in Central Kalimantan as a pretext to endorse “a legal
umbrella,” namely, expanded military powers, so that the military could become proactive in preserving security.104
Military passivity to stop the new horizontal conflicts drew sharp criticism. NGO
activists such as Hendardi from PBHI (Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia --The
Indonesian Association for Legal Assistances) and Mufti from Kontras (Komisi untuk
Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan --The Commission for Disappearances and
Victims of Violence) wondered how the mobs could run amok in full view of the
military.105 It seemed that the prologue of the new riots in Central Kalimantan was
paralleled by what had previously happened in East Timor and Maluku. Not surprisingly,
in one incident, the absence of the military following the withdrawal of the police led to
the slaughter of 118 Madurese and tens of thousands were forced to flee by rampaging
Dayaks mobs. 106 The statement of army and police officers whic said that they were
The new fighting between the indigenous Dayaks and settlers from the island of
Madura broke out on March 22, 2001, near the town of Kuala Kapuas in Central
Kalimantan. At least ten people were killed. Nevertheless, for almost three weeks,
throughout the riots, soldiers showed their unwillingness to lend a hand. Their leaders
were allegedly exploiting the ethnic and religious clashes to engage in their own
objective, augmenting their political bargaining power. The role of the third parties in
horizontal conflicts in Kalimantan could not be disregarded.107 Ihsan Fadlil, an ulama
(religious scholar) from the largest Muslim boarding school in Bangkalan, Madura, said
that he and Madurese in Bangkalan heard reports that the military was taking sides by
108
only confiscating the weapons from the Madurese.
In the meantime, one of the
common Dayak grievances was that the police, for whatever reason, favoured Madurese
and that they had not acted vigorously enough to arrest the Madurese responsible for the
104
Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in Jakarta; Mufti was interviewed on July 24, 2006 in
Jakarta.
106
”Descend Into Darkest Borneo,” The Economist, March 1, 2001; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit.
107
Sulistiyo in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 303; Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003: Appendix 2 No. 43.
108
Pardomuan, 1999, loc.cit.
105
168
death of a Dayak at Kereng Pangi in December 15, 2000 which had incited all the
conflicts in Central Kalimantan. As reported by International Crisis Group, this view of
police partiality seemed confirmed when Dayaks were murdered during the 2 days of
109
Madurese control of Sampit on February 19-20, 2001.
I.G. Religious Conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi:
Militias and Military Intelligence Operations
Riots caused by the deteriorating state of inter-religious relations reoccurred in
Poso during April and May, 2000.110 The first in a series of violent incidents occurred
between April 16-19, 2000. Again and quite simply, as happened during the Habibie era
and in other primordial conflicts in Indonesia, a fight between drunken teenagers turned
into a large-scale riot. Six people died and churches, schools, and hundreds of houses
were burnt down.
After a few weeks of a lull, the conflict reignited and continued for several more
weeks. The second incident broke out on May 23, 2000, spread fears and paralyzed the
111
whole city. Like in previous riots, the violence was triggered by a brawl between two
drunken young men of different religions. Also, similar to other places in Indonesia, such
as Ketapang, Kupang, and Maluku, the growing inequality and tensions between Muslims
and Christians in Poso had been exploited by third parties to create a new incident that
worsened the situation. Unfortunately, it was still not clear who began the brawl that had
turned it into a several-day riot. 112
In addition, there was an attack by an unknown group on the Christian people who
were guarding and patrolling their villages, where three persons were killed.
Approximately 2,000 people fled to Poso military district (Kodim Poso), and around 500
people to Poso police resort (Polisi Resort or Polres Poso).113 Also, four people were
wounded, and 267 houses and a number of public buildings and cars were burned
114
down. The riots continued in Sayo from May 24-26, 2000, and rapidly spread to Tojo
district (Kecamatan Tojo), where two people were killed, and at least eleven people
seriously injured.
109
No. 18, June 27, 2001, loc.cit: 23.
110
“Rekomendasi ‘Mandul’ Pansus Poso” (“’Vain’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Poso”),
Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005.
111
Ibid.
112
113
“Rekomendasi ‘Mandul’ Pansus Poso” (“’Vain’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Poso”),
Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005, loc.cit.
114
169
After a number of small conflicts during which several churches went up in
flames, Christian retaliation targeted the Muslims in Poso. It was reported that people
115
dressing like ninjas suddenly attacked several Muslim territories. The so-called Barisan
Kelelawar (Batmen) led by a West Timorese, Fabianus Tibo, purportedly supported by
the military, was alleged of killing hundreds of people, while 30,000 refugees took refuge
in neighbouring areas.116 The appearance of ninjas, comprising of paramilitary groups
from other regions who had previously participated in the East Timor conflict and the
Banyuwangi killings, in instigating conflict in Poso seemed to suggest that the military
intended to demonstrate its resistance to the Wahid government through covert
operations. According to Panji Masyarakat and The Jakarta Post, at least sixteen people,
including former military officers, were allegedly involved in instigating the conflict.117
Tibo’s friend, Dominggus da Silva, and former Jamur Jaya village chief, Yulius Sebi,
disclosed that they had been abducted by three military officers who wore civilian dress
while investigating the previous incidents, and admitted that they were from the Pasukan
Cinta Damai (Love Peace Troops). One of them was Capt. (Inf.) Agus Firman Yusmono,
who promised to send back Tibo and his friends to their own home after a three-day
interrogation, but they did not come home although the investigation had taken place.
During the abduction, the military officers forced Tibo and his friends to take part in the
Christians retaliation attacks.118
Likewise, Kodam VII Wirabuana regional commander, Maj. Gen. Slamet
Kirbianto, revealed that Paulus Tungkanan, another friend of Tibo and the successor of
Advent Lateka, the leader of the Pasukan Merah (Red Troop --the Christian warriors),
was an ex-army soldier with first lieutenant rank. Tibo himself was only a naïve follower
of the troop due to his lack of education. Unexpectedly, in October 2000, a document
entitled “Military Response towards Social Conflict in Poso,” published by Yayasan Bina
Warga of Central Sulawesi, accused Tibo as the mastermind of the May 2000 incidents in
119
Poso. After igniting communal and separatist conflicts in other regions in Indonesia,
and due to conflicts of interest with the Wahid government and the reform movement, the
military apparently needed to create a plausible pretext for producing insecurity and
instability in Poso. It used militias and paramilitary groups to counter pressure from the
reform movement, which became more and more critical of the TNI’s involvement in
120
conflicts.
115
Ibid, Appendix 2 No. 48.
Panji Masyarakat, July 5, 2000, The Jakarta Post, July 31, 2000 and September 11, 2000.
117
Ibid; Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), loc. cit: 50.
118
Maria Hasugian et al, “Mencari Keadilan dari Prahara Poso” (“Finding Justice from Poso Turmoil”),
Majalah Tempo, April 16, 2006: 76-78.
119
Ibid: 78.
120
The political motive of the military involvement in Poso was explained in interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta.
116
170
Civil society organizations accused the military of orchestrating the incident in
Poso and criticized the unfair trial of Tibo who received the death sentence in the absence
of any investigation. Similar to the Habibie era, under Wahid, the Poso conflict was
sustained due to the role of security forces in producing new incidents. Since mid-April
until early June 2000, at least 120 people were killed, 189 wounded,121 and about 1,000
houses damaged.122 Both Christians and Muslims therefore came to the conclusion that
the military, the militias, and the jihad troops who later came mainly from Java, as well as
123
local and Jakarta elites, were the trouble-makers. They wondered why there was an
overwhelming presence of TNI troops, especially Kopassus, and military standard
weapons in Poso. 124 The Jakarta and Poso governments had never decided to send combat
battalions to Poso, nonetheless, troops and army special force units were operating there.
Many military standard weapons had been distributed to civilians, while the jihad troops,
from the Laskar Jihad and Mujahiddin, could freely enter and leave Poso and create new
incidents.
Lack of enthusiasm of TNI in preventing the actions of the militias gave rise to
public suspicion that the military was organizing covert intelligence and psychological
operations in order to strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis the civilian
government.125 As noted by Umar Abduh from the Poso Centre for Democracy and Social
Studies, the involvement of the military in maintaining the sectarian conflict in Poso was
evidenced by an escalation of its intelligence activity in the area. Furthermore, the
presence of paramilitary troops and radical Muslims was an indicator of the military’s
intelligence work in an attempt to instigate religious strife.126 This may explain why
bombs exploded, people were mysteriously shot dead, and many others living in remote
areas intimidated.
Also Aditjondro states that elements of both the military and religious radicals
often become involved in the outbreak of vertical and horizontal conflicts in post-Soeharto Indonesia. The military’s special interests in Poso could, however, change from
time to time, either in the political or in the economic domains. They were connected with
121
“Warga Maumere Berdoa Tolak Eksekusi Tibo Cs” (“Maumere Prayed against the Executions of Tibo
cs”), Suara Pembaruan, April 3, 2006: 3.
122
Majalah Tempo 28, No. 8, April 24-30, 2000; Majalah Tempo 29, No. 15, June 12-18, 2000; “Terpidana Kasus Poso Diperiksa” (“Poso Convicts Prosecuted”), Media Indonesia, April 4, 2006: 6.
123
“Tokoh Agama Poso Protes Polisi (“Poso Religious Leaders Protested Police”), http://www.Kompas.
com/utama/news/ 0511/25/682541-htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 25, 2005; See also, ICG, 2001,
loc.cit: 10.
124
Ridwan M. Sijabat, “Political elites ‘prolonging’ Poso sectarian conflict,” The Jakarta Post, April 29,
2006: 4.
125
“Komnas HAM: Segera Adili Pelanggar HAM” (“Komnas HAM: Brings to Justice Human Rights Vio lators”), Harian Kompas, April 27, 2006: 2; Interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights
activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta.
126
Ibid.
171
the elections of mayors or district heads (bupati), and the provision of humanitarian
aid.127 Yet, as underlined by Sydney Jones from the International Crisis Group, military
128
interests in selling weapons and providing security services were merely derivative
businesses of their wider interests. These were to control religious conflict in the wealthy
region of Central Sulawesi in order to create a better bargaining position in their power
struggle with political elites in Jakarta over security sector reform. The latter was at
variance with the military’s idea to establish a new regional command in Central
Sulawesi.
Incidents in Poso exacerbated the sectarian violence into lasting until December
2001. Wahid belatedly responded to the conflict in Poso. Only in 2001, his government
began the Sintuwu Maroso Operation to bring back security and order to the region. The
result was, however, ambiguous as violence and conflict easily recurred in Poso when
conflicts of interest among elites in Jakarta, especially between civilian and military
leaders, intensified.130 A combination of political, economic, and religious grievances
exploited by the security forces, namely the military and the police, caused appalling
atrocities in Poso.
129
I.H. The Progress of Security Sector Reform
By the time Wahid came to office in 1999, the TNI still maintained their
predominantly Javanese-influenced doctrines, such as Hankamrata (Pertahanan
Keamanan Rakyat Semesta --total defense based on the people power), Tri Ubaya Cakti
(three sacred tasks which are reflected in the Doctrine of Kekaryaan or civic action, the
Doctrine of Development, the Doctrine of National Security), and Cadek (Tjatur Dharma
Eka Karma --four services led by one desire). As in the past, the existence of the
Hankamrata TNI combines civilian and military tasks, which contributes to blurred civilmilitary relations. This also applies to Tri Ubaya Cakti since it still defended the
Kekaryaan Doctrine and the Doctrine of Development. Together these doctrines provided
the armed forces the justification for continuously involving themselves in civilian affairs
and occupying non-military posts. In accordance with this, the existence of the Cadek
doctrine still reflected TNI’s unwillingness to dissociate defense and security functions,
127
Sydney Jones was interviewed on April 19, 2006, in Jakarta.
See also, Arianto Sangaji,”Kekerasan Poso dan Ekspansi Modal” (“Poso Violance and Capital Expansion”), Harian Kompas, September 12, 2006: 6.
129
“Warga Maumere Berdoa Tolak Eksekusi Tibo Cs” (“Maumere Prayed Against the Executions of Tibo
cs”), Suara Pembaruan, April 3, 2006, loc.cit.
130
“Konflik Poso: Pemerintah Seharusnya Evaluasi Operasi Sintuwu Maroso” (“Poso Conflict: The Go vernment Should Evaluate Sintuwu Maroso Operation”), Harian Kompas, March 13, 2006: 4; “Tokoh
Agama Poso Protes Polisi” (“Poso Religious Leaders Protested Police”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/
news/0511/25/ 682541-.htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 25, 2005.
128
172
the latter of which should actually be carried out by the police.131 No less important, both
Cadek and Tri Ubaya Cakti were directly adopted from the old Javanese language which,
as argued by Sebastian, “invokes in the mind of its Javanese beholder traditional notions
132
of power.”
Rinakit correctly noted that, compared to other internal (organizational) reforms of
the military, the revision of military doctrines was still left behind. Arguably, TNI did not
revise its doctrines because once it did, its role in socio-political affairs (dwifungsi) would
inevitably come to an end. Due to its fear that it would no longer have any legal basis to
legitimize its socio-political role, TNI retained these old doctrines. 133 Referring to the
important Javanese notion of satria (knight), which gave the satria roles in guarding both
the palace and society, TNI officers wanted to retain their traditional roles as military
commanders and political leaders. In other words, the military still wished to identify
itself not only as the instrument of the state but also its protector.
Obviously, it was not easy for the military institution to change such a selfperception deeply rooted in their traditional worldview. During the era of Javanese
kingdoms, besides being commanders, military officers also held such political positions
as temenggung (head of the county) and adipati (mayor).134 The TNI thus strongly
resisted plans to dismantle the regional commands (Kodam), regarding them as crucial for
regaining their political control over society. It justified the retention of the territorial
commands by persistently raising the threat of disintegration and by reminding others of
their responsibility to prevent it. By issuing TNI Commander Decree No. 151/P/V/1998
on May 18, 1998, Gen. Wiranto authorized the re-establishment of seven regional
commands which had been liquidated by Gen. Murdani in 1984, namely, in Aceh,
Maluku, East and West Kalimantan, West Sumatera, North Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara.
More importantly, as explained by Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, during the long period
of Soeharto’s rule (1966-1998) soldiers had been intensively indoctrinated by feudal
values that strongly influenced Indonesian society. This was hadly surprising given
Soeharto’s preoccupation with the Javanese style of leadership in ruling the country. This
constrained TNI in redefining and repositioning itself after 1998. Therefore, Widjojo
argued that TNI could not be modernized and soldiers could not be professionalized as
long as the armed forces’ system of recruitment, promotion, and education was not
changed. This situation, which differed markedly from the military in Western countries,
131
133
Rinakit, 2005: 164-165.
134
Ibid: 145-146.
132
173
hampered the TNI to respect civilian supremacy and, particularly obey objective civilian
control over the military.135
With this cultural disposition, the TNI recalcitrantly resisted President Wahid’s
attempts to replace conservative military leaders with reformers. This becomes evident on
a closer scrutiny of Gen. Wiranto’s promotion policy, the deals he was able to strike with
the President when the latter sacked him and the deliberate discreditation of the reform
faction in the TNI. Although Gen. Wiranto eventually obeyed when replaced by Wahid as
coordinating minister of politics and security in February 2000, he did so only on the
condition that Adm. Widodo, his supporter from the navy, be promoted as his successor.
He also agreed to resign as coordinating minister for political and security affairs, but the
concession the President had to make was the appointment of Wiranto’s loyal ally, Lt.
Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as the new minister. Several months before, he had
successfully recommended a civilian with conservative views on civil-military
relationships, Juwono Sudarsono, to become the minister of defense.
In November 1999 Wiranto reshuffled over 100 senior military officers136 in an
apparent attempt to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the reformist forces within and
outside the armed forces. Later, in February 2000, a second military reshuffle repositioned
seventy-four senior officers, this time promoting reform-minded officers and replacing
many Wiranto’s supporters. With Wahid’s position increasingly becoming tenuous in a
deepening conflict with the legislature, he began to backpedal in his promotion of military
reformers. The two other major reshuffles under his aegis --in June 2000, affecting 122
officers, and in August 2000-- increasingly shifted the balance back to the conservatives
in the TNI.
Wiranto’s forced resignation and the rise of Agus Wirahadikusumah in the TNI
ranks stirred increasing restiveness in the armed forces. After the Agus-Djaja dispute,
rumors spread again about a planned military coup d’etat, which led to a domestic
confusion.137 The rumour was an obvious warning that military elites were discontented
with the presidential intervention in the military’s promotion process, an act they viewed
as interference in their internal affairs, Whereas Wahid, ignoring surging military
hostility, continuously made public statements about the existence of a coterie of
unfaithful officers, especially among the regional (Kodam) commanders.138. The military
135
Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta.
The Editors, Indonesia, 2002, loc.cit: 126.
137
Ibid: 136.
138
He claimed that there were a couple of Pangdam who were gathering power to challenge his government. Later, he revealed that those military generals had, in fact, organized a meeting in a hotel to discuss
plans to destabilize his government. According to various sources these statements were directed at Maj.
Gen. Sudi Silalahi (Kodam V Brawijaya or East Java regional commander), Maj. Gen. Slamet Supriyadi
(Kodam III Siliwangi or West Java regional commander), and Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo (Kodam IV Dipo136
174
conservatives hit back. In the so-called Bulakrantai document, reform-minded generals
were accused of a conspirative meeting at the residence of the Kostrad commander on
April 16, 2000 for devising a strategy to hasten the rise of Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah to
the position of army chief and replacing the current Gen. Tyasno Sudarto. The four page
counterfeit document, allegedly made and spread by forces loyal to Wiranto and exKostrad commander Djaja, had served its goal.139
Samego, a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Science (Lembaga Ilmu
Pengetahuan Indonesia or LIPI), stated that there were indications of covert intelligence
operations organized by conservative military elite who were behind the distribution of
the false document to stop the manoeuvres of the pro-reform generals who were behind
140
the distribution of the false document.
He pointed out that the the military
conservativehad successfully politicized a common social event at the residence of
Wirahadikusumah into a political gathering in order to bring down reformist generals who
held important posts at the time, and particularly, to discredit their leader. In an interview,
Maj. Gen. Saurip insisted that the gathering was no more than a traditional thanksgiving
ceremony many Indonesians usually hold, which was attended by members of their
families. There were no discus-sions of political issues or on planning political
manoeuvres to remove TNI leaders.141
Commenting on the Bulakrantai document, Saurip further stated that there was a
power struggle between conservative generals, represented by Wiranto, Sutarto, Djaja,
and all eleven regional commanders, and his own group behind the spread of the false
document aimed at discrediting their reform notions. Saurip stressed that the Bulakrantai
document142 was actually the sort of intelligence operation repeatedly conducted in the
past by TNI conservative generals as revealed by the Rachmadi and Gilchist documents143
The spread of the document, he explained, occurred soon after meetings of senior
generals in Wiranto’s residence, when eleven regional commanders in Bandung agreed on
the objective of preventing further military reform, in particular with a view to civilian
negoro or Central Java regional commander). See “Sejumlah Pangdam Ingin Goyang Saya” (“Several
Regional Commanders Want to Challenge Me”), Banjarmasin Post, March 15, 2000; “Pangdam Jelek, Out
Saja” (“Bad Regional Commanders Should Go”), Banjarmasin Post, March 18, 2000; The Editors,
Indonesia, 2002, loc.cit.
139
The Editors, Indonesia, 2002, ibid: 137.
140
141
Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta.
142
Bulakrantai is the name of the street where the gathering took place.
143
The Rachmadi document was used by the military for its intelligence operation under Lt. Gen. Ali
Moer-topo for the 1974 Malari affair to blame a radical Muslim group and their leader, Rachmadi. The
Gilchrist document was used by the military for its intelligence operation under Lt. Gen. Soeharto for the
1965 G-30-September PKI affair to crush PKI. The document was claimed found in the residence of
British Ambas-sador to Indonesia, Gilchrist, in Jakarta.
175
supremacy and the removal of TNI territorial commands throughout the country.144
Samego supported Saurip’s opinion on the conservatives’ moves to overthrow the reform
145
faction by spreading the so-called Bulakrantai document.
The politically engineered Bulakrantai document eventually caused the fall of
Agus Wirahadikusumah and his allies, as Wahid could not defend himself and his camp
due to the fast growing pressure of his opponents in TNI against him. Agus was relieved
146
of his Kostrad command and also other reformers, like Saurip, lost their command.
Worse, Wahid had to support Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was promoted to
become the new Kostrad commander, and Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, who was
promoted as the new army chief replacing Gen. Tyasno Sudarto. The rise of military
conservatives in top position of the TNI had a strong obstructive effect on the president’s
options in pushing further military reform. In fact, President Wahid’s efforts to
democratically reduce the military’s prerogative in the field of promotion produced strong
opposition from conservative military leaders. This corresponds with Finer’s analysis who
refers to several means of the military to stall reform such as formal constitutional means,
intimidation, and non-cooperation threats. 147 The latter two had been already been
experienced earlier by Habibie. If Habibie was intimidated in his palace and residence,
Wahid faced the same in front of his palace, in the form of TNI’s show of force led by
Kostrad commander (Pangkostrad) Gen. Ryamizard. More significantly with regards to
the military resistance, Stepan believed that the military would succeed in that crisis.148
I.I. The Military as Veto Player: End of Reform
Wahid’s effort to produce an internationally recognized law on human rights
tribunals and, in particular, his interest to enact retroactive trials, was opposed by the
TNI/Police faction which received support from radical Muslims and other conservative
representatives from the past regime in the parliament. After a long debate, a compromise
was reached which provided for special ad hoc human rights tribunals to try severe
human rights abuses occurring before the new law came into force. Nevertheless, under
this solution, the tribunals had to be set up in each case by the president with the approval
of the DPR. This however opened the procedure to politicization. In its annual session of
August 1-18, 2000, the MPR weakened the authority of human rights courts even more. In
the session military and conservative factions succeeded inserting a clause in the new
Article 28 (I) of the amended 1945 State Constitution, which prohibits trying citizens
144
146
The Editor, Indonesia, 2000, loc.cit: 126.
147
Finer, 1962, op.cit : 140-164; Ikrar et al, 1999, loc.cit: 37.
148
Stepan, 1996, op. cit: 136.
145
176
under retroactive laws.149 The constitutional clause challenged Wahid’s ability of
prosecuting severe human rights abuses and protected military officers from the
punishment for gross human rights violations that occurred before 1999. It effectively
ruled out that Wahid could instrumentalize human rights issues to harass his opponents in
the military. This also weakened Wahid in his defence against ongoing military-supported
moves in the MPR to impeach him.
In the following months, the military extracted still more concessions from Wahid.
Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono obtained the important portfolio of coordinating minister for
political and security affairs, as well as his promotion to a four-star general, on October
26, 2000. Conversely, Wahid’s supporter for reform, Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, was
ousted from his key post as Kostrad commander and replaced by the conservative Lt.
Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu. The military also succeeded to remain represented in the DPR
until 2004 and in the MPR until 2009, thereby consecutively strengthening its veto player
role in the process of democratization and military reform.
The military’s veto player role became also evident towards the end of the year
2000, when Wahid had to contend with a series of bombings in Jakarta, Bekasi, Medan,
Pematang Siantar, Pekan Baru, Batam, Sukabumi and Mataram on December 24, 2000,
and new unrests throughout the country. According to Wahid, the perpetrators were
political actors who were seeking to undermine his administration and expel him from
power, a thinly veiled hint that he suspected the military to be behind these incidents.150
Since the violence did not abate, by late January 2001, Wahid had lost patience and tried
to discharge army chief Gen. Sutarto, but failed due to the TNI’s veto player role in DPR.
The army chief refused to resign, and Wahid received support for the measure neither
from the military nor from the leaders of the political parties in the DPR. Working against
Wahid was MPR decree (Ketetapan MPR --TAP MPR) No. 7/2000 of August 18, 2000,
which provided that the appointment and dismissal of the police chief commander
(Kepala Polisi --Kapolri) needed legislative endorsement. A particular obstacle for
further reforms were was the TNI/Police faction in the DPR and the MPR which in
collusion with conservative and opportunistic civilian politicians could slow down, dilute
151
and prevent the progress of military and security sector reform in large.
It was thus hardly surprising that the TNI/Police faction in the DPR did not
support the President when he was facing charges of embezzling money from the
Yanatera Bulog foundation and a grant from the Sultan of Brunei. In August 28, 2000, the
DPR formed with the consent of the TNI/Police faction a Special Commitee (Pansus) on
149
Eldridge, 2002, op.cit : 148.
151
As argued by AS Hikam, a legislator and member of Commission I overseeing defence, foreign affaits
and information. He was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
150
177
Buloggate and Bruneigate with the ultimate objective of impeaching the president. Also
in the two memorandums which according to then existing impeachment rules had to be
passed by the legislature before the MPR could vote on the dismissal of the president, the
DPR TNI/Police faction did not support the president. In the vote on the first
memorandum, the TNI/Police faction voted against the president, meaning the armed
forces censured their supreme commander.152 In the second voting, the TNI/Police faction
abstained, knowing that the vote would be won by the anti-Wahid camp. Wahid’s refusal
to respond to the Buloggate and Bruneigate charges, his decision at the height of the crisis
to replace the police chief and Wiranto ally, Gen. Bimantoro, without seeking the DPR’s
approval and to declare a state emergency, finally resulted in his impeachment in a special
MPR session on July 23, 2001.153 No less important is the fact that with the election of
Megawati Soekarnoputri, the country’s fifth president is a politician close to conservative
circles in the armed forces and hence the TNI’s most favored candidate.
With a view to the events, one can thus hardly disagree with DPR Vice
Chairperson Muhaimin Iskandar, a member of Wahid’s PKB, that the TNI/Police faction
was an important force in the parliament. If it had not supported the ouster of Wahid, the
other factions would have not dared to do so. 154 In this connection it is also important to
note that only days before the impeachment vote, the military headquarters reshuffled the
membership of its DPR faction Officers who had hesitated overthrowing Wahid, such as
Maj. Gen. Ferry Tinggogoy, were replaced by conservatives, such as Maj. Gen. Max
Tamaela, the former commander of Maluku’s Kodam XVI Pattimura regional command.
Also, in their official comment on the second memorandum, all TNI/Police faction
members had made obvious that they would agree with the convening of a special MPR
155
session. In interview, Wahid stated that it was clear from the outset that TNI did not
support his presidential decree on state emergency (the Maklumat), which was eventually
issued on July 23, 2001.156 Together with the national police, the military explicitly
declined to support President Wahid’s order to dissolve the DPR and to prevent the
opening of the MPR special session which pursued only one agenda: the impeachment of
the president.157 The Wahid area thus shows that the military was still politically highly
influential. Supporting the inthronization and the impeachment of Wahid it acted as
kingmaker and by derailing Wahid’s military reform as a veto player in Indonesia’s
democratization.
152
Patrick Ziegenhain, The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization. Singapore, ISEAS, 2008: 130.
Ibid: 143.
154
Ibid: 131.
155
156
157
153
178
II.A. Wahid’s Attempts to Investigate the Soeharto Cases
To implement MPR Decree No. 11/1998 which mandated the creation of clean
governance, and laid down the legal foundation for prosecuting corrupt practices of
former President Soeharto, his family and cronies, Wahid ordered the investigation of
Hendra Rahardja, the owner of the now defunct Bank Harapan Sentosa (BHS),158 and
Bob Hasan, former minister of forestry under Soeharto, one of his most famous business
cronies of Chinese descent. 159 President Wahid appeared serious in prosecuting Hasan,
who was accused of embezzling US$244 million of forestry funds. Hasan was the former
director of PT Mapindo Parama, the sole contractor in a large-scale forestry mapping
project. The Central Jakarta District Court had sentenced Hasan to 2 years in jail for a
previous corruption case amounting to US$ 75 billion in 2001. The High Court
160
disregarded his appeal and increased the term to 6 years. For misappropriating of Rp.
1.95 trillion (US$ 216.7 million) of BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia -Liquidity Support of Bank of Indonesia) funds disbursed to the BHS bank during the
1997-1998 economic crisis, Rahardja obtained a life sentence, and his two accomplices,
namely Eko Edi Putranto -- the former bank commissioner--161 and Shemy Konjongian -162
the former director of the bank-- were each sentenced to 20 years in jail. Such moves,
which pleased reform activists, heightened pressure on Soeharto and his family as well as
his cronies and loyalists.
In an attempt to distinguish his policy from Soeharto, Wahid was quoted by the
(British) Guardian as saying that Soeharto just tried to please his cronies or friends, but
that he, Wahid, would build an economy for the majority of the people. 163 He charged that
Soeharto robbed the country by allowing the conglomerates and his cronies to control the
economy, while the majority of Indonesians lived at the subsistence level. For this reason,
he vowed to give subsidies to the people, not to the conglomerates as Soeharto did. To
stop new cronies and KKN practices, he sought to uphold of the rule of law principle.164
158
See,”Jejak Intel Swadaya,” (“Track Record of Private Intelligence”) Tempo Interaktif, April 19, 2010,
http://www.tem-pointeraktif.com/khusus/selusur/markus2/page04.php, was accessed on May 1, 2010.
159
Uchida, 2002, loc. cit
160
Ibid.
161
Abdul Khalik, “RI poised to recover US$ 800 million in stolen assets,” the Jakarta Post, http:// www.
the jakartapost.com/news/2007/09/05/ri-poised-recover-800m, was accessed on May 1, 2010.
162
“Koruptor yang Lolos dari Pengawasan Imigrasi,” (“Corruptors Disregarded Immigration List”), Media Indonesia, May 3, 2020: 19.
163
Mark Tran, “Abdurrahman Wahid,” Guardian Unlimited Special Reports, http:///www.guardian.co.uk/
indonesia/Story/0,2763,200655,00.html, loc.cit.
164
Ibid.
179
In a report published by Tranparency International, Soeharto was listed on the first
place of the ten most corrupt political leaders in the world. By contrast, when Soeharto
was still in power, Forbes had named Soeharto in July 1997 as the fourth richest man in
the world. Moreover, Time had revealed that Soeharto’s children and grandchildren
owned between 312 and 350 companies in Indonesia and abroad.165 On December 6,
1999, due to growing public pressure to prosecute alleged KKN in Soeharto’s former
inner circle, Wahid ordered Attorney General Marzuki Darusman to reopen the
investigation files of Soeharto. This overturned the controversial SP3 (Surat Perintah
Pemberhentian Penyidikan --a letter which ordered the prosecutors to close the cases),
which had just been issued by the Darusman’s predecessor, the Acting Attorney General
Ismoedjoko, 2 months earlier, on the eve of the October 1999 MPR special session.
Therefore, on February 10, 2000, Darusman sent out a letter to summon Soeharto
to the Attorney General’s office. Expectely, Soeharto ignored the summons three times on
the ground of his deteriorating health. Thereafter, Wahid sent envoys, consisting of
military and civilian figures, namely, Lt. Gen.Yudhoyono and Saefullah Yusuf, and also
his personal secretary (who happened to be his daughter), Yenny Zanuba, to approach
Soeharto at his residence. They tried to persuade him to be cooperative so that he would
be pardoned from sentencing as long as he agreed to return his wealth to the state. As
Soeharto continued to resist, on March 31, 2000, he was named a suspect for collecting
and misusing more than US$600 million through seven charitable foundations controlled
by his family.166
Although the investigation continued, and on April 5, 2000 Soeharto was
summoned once more, the investigation was eventually terminated due to his
deteriorating health. The government’s prosecutors imposed the status of city arrest on
him and, a week later, prohibited him leaving the country. In the following months, the
Attorney General’s office tightened its control over him. Soeharto was placed under
house arrest, and in August 2000, he was formally charged with corruption.
On August 31, 2000, the trial of Soeharto for allegedly siphoning off Rp. 5.1
trillion (US$ 570 million) from various charities that he and his family had operated,167
began in the South Jakarta District Court, the first level court. Yet, Soeharto did not
attend the trial, with his doctors citing health reasons such as mental disorder and
permanent brain damage. For the reason that there was no use to continue the trial, on
September 28, 2000, a five-judge panel of the South Jakarta District Court dismissed
165
M. Fadjroel Rachman,“Jejak Langkah (daripada) Partai Golkar“ (”The Footstep of the Golkar Party”),
Kompas-online, December 5, 2005, http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/05/opini/2265007.htm:
1-2.
166
Majalah Tempo, May 21, 2006: 30.
167
“Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, loc.cit.
180
corruption charges against Soeharto, and closed the case. This automatically ended the
status of his city arrest. Surprisingly, however, although Soeharto was eventually declared
permanently unfit to stand trial by his doctors, he was still able to criticize all charges
directed against him and demand that political leaders revoke MPR Decree No. 11/1998
as the legal basis enabling the trials.168 The court’s decision was therefore criticized by
NGOs such as YLBHI (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia --Indonesian Legal
Aid Foundation) and ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch) because Soeharto could actually
169
be prosecuted, including with in absentia trial.
As the first level court did not see fit to prosecute Soeharto, the case was returned
to the Office of the Attorney General who made an appeal to the Jakarta High Court. The
court accepted the appeal, and on November 8, 2000 overruled the controversial previous
decision by ordering the lower court to re-open the case. However, on February 2, 2001,
the Supreme Court accepted Soeharto’s appeal, released him from city arrest, and stated
that the trial could be continued if he recovered from his illness. 170
Importantly, in December 2001, the new Attorney General, MA Rachman,
submitted two reports to the DPR on Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. In the first report,
Soeharto was charged to have violated Article 1 Section 1, and Article 28 and 34 of Law
No.3/1971 on anti-corruption and abuse of power by issuing Keppres (Keputusan
Presiden --Presidential Decree) No. 20/1992 and Inpres (Instruksi Presiden -Presidential Instruction) No. 1/1992 which benefited his family and cronies.171 Both
Keppres and Inpres allowed his son, Tommy, to monopolize cloves business across the
country through BPPC (Badan Pengelolaan dan Pemasaran Cengkeh --Clove Marketing
and Buffer Agency), which had caused Rp. 1.7 trillion (US$ 187 million) in losses to the
state.172 In the second report, Soeharto had allegedly misused a large amount of funds
from the seven state foundations.
II.B. Understanding Military Perception of Soeharto
In Javanese tradition, keselarasan (harmony) and keheningan (tranquility) served
to legitimize an emperor’s rule. Upheaval, amok, and chaos would therefore do the
opposite.173 It seemed clear that the Trisakti shootings were designed to serve as a
triggering mechanism, while the deliberately instigated riots of May 14, 1998 were meant
to delegitimize Soeharto. Similarly, post-Soeharto unrest was provoked to produce huru168
Ibid.
“NGOs Suggest Soeharto be Tried in Absentia,” Antara News, 05/10/2006, http://www.antara.co.id/en/
print/?i=1147268057, was accessed on May 1, 2010.
170
171
“LSM: Soeharto Harus Diproses Hukum, (NGO: Soeharto Must Be Prosecuted”), Suara Pembaruan,
May 9, 2006.
169
181
hara (upheaval), which in the Javanese concept of power meant a message to the civilian
leaders that they should pay more attention to their satria (knights, soldiers) and kawula
174
(people). From this point of view, if Wahid faced riots and unrest, it signified that there
was something wrong with his policies, especially with his military reform.
In the Javanese concept of power, a state is similar to keluarga besar (a big
family). Thus, if the father does not adequately care for his children, the children will
demonstrate their annoyance by demonstrating mutung, or temporarily stop obeying him,
and ngamuk (run amok). Likewise, in case the king did not care any longer for his satria’s
and kawula’s needs, both would perform their mutung and ngamuk attitudes as resistance
175
until the king knew his ignorance. In reverse, if the king or father felt he had properly
taken care of his satria and kawula or the children, he would demand kesatyaan penuh
(whole loyalty) from them. Otherwise, he would use all his power and at all cost,
particularly, exercising kekerasan (violence), to defend his wahyu (mandate), taking into
account his position as a representative of God, to punish the disloyal people. 176
Similar to the old political elites, military officers still paid their respect to
Soeharto although the old man had resigned. In line with the Javanese principle of mikul
duwur mendem jero in the Javanese political culture, the former leader should always be
respected. He should not be harassed, rather he should be released from any charge of the
past wrongdoings, and be forgiven. The failure to observe this principle was identical
with disregarding the principle of lengser ke prabon (the peaceful retirement) of the
former leader.177 This insult would be compensated by vengeance of the old leader’s
followers and loyalists, particularly his guards or the military that still respected that
patron.
II.C. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases
As often occurred during the Habibie period when the Soeharto’s alleged KKN
cases were being investigated, two bombs exploded simultaneously in Jakarta at the same
time when the annual MPR meeting was being held. The first bomb incident took place at
172
”AGO Reopens Graft Case Against Tommy”, The Jakarta Post, July 20, 2007.
174
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit.
175
176
Interview with Vonny Kusumastuti, an expert of Javanese political culture, on October 11, 2006 in Jakarta.
177
G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H, Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya (Soeharto: My
Thoughts, Words, and Deeds), PT Citra Lamtoro. Gung Persada, 1989.
173
182
the first floor of the Attorney General’s Office (Kejaksaan Agung) building on July 4,
2000. This came right after Tommy Soeharto had left the building just one hour before.
Soeharto’s youngest son had been queried for his aeroplane chartering business which
was accused of misusing eight helicopters belonging to the forestry ministry. No one was
injured in the blast, but it caused serious damage to the building. One day later, a second,
more powerful device, was found at the building and defused by the police. That much
larger bomb was planned to explode on the third floor and would have demolished at least
half of the building, mainly the records library and its files on the Soeharto family’s
current corruption investigations, but the shake from the previous explosion stopped the
timing device of the larger bomb.178 Although, there were no fatalities, the explosion was
considered as sending a message to Wahid not to follow-up the investigation of the
Soeharto cases.
Police investigators identified the unexploded device as military material issued to
an arsenal in the East Java regional command (Kodam V Brawijaya) in the years before.
They also discovered that all nine guards escorting Soeharto’s son were ex-military
personnel. Six of them arrived at the building together, using a white Toyota Land
Cruiser. At least four eyewitnesses saw that several of them brought a kit bag from the
building to their car.179 The investigators had discovered the car in West Java, and found
out that it belonged to Boli Diaz, a former sergeant-major in Paspampres (Pasukan
Pengaman Presiden --the military’s elite presidential security guards), who was the
younger brother of Agus Diaz, the head of Tommy’s personal guards. Later, it was
reported by the police that the drawing made from the porter’s explanation and those who
had seen someone planting the unexploded device in the third floor of the Attorney
180
General’s office, corresponded with the face of Boli.
The police had actually possessed adequate evidences, namely, the suspects who
were under arrest, positive identifications from eyewitnesses, and fingerprints from the
bomb. Unfortunately, on July 18, 2000, as the investigations were finally on the brink of
uncovering an important case of political violence, and police officials stated that they
were merely waiting for the conclusions of the fingerprints test from the forensic
laboratory, the case suddenly died because the conclusions themselves had never been
181
announced. More astonishingly, the police investigators gave no more statements on
the case, and the Kodam V Brawijaya regional commander, Maj. Gen. Sudi, also
disregarded his assurance to investigate how the bomb went missing from the arsenal in
178
”Pelaku ‘Bom Kejaksaan’ Eks Paspampres, Sebuah ‘Hard Top’ Putih Diamankan” (“Attorney General
Office Bomber Is Ex-Presidential Guard, White ‘Hard Top’ Car Seized”), Media Indonesia., July 13, 2000.
180
”Bom di Kejagung: Dua Pria dalam Hardtop Diperiksa” (“Attorney General Office Bomb Case: Two
Men in Hardtop Investigated”), Suara Pembaruan, July 14, 2000: 1, 4.
181
179
183
his region. Previously, the investigators said that the serial number of the explosives was
traced back to the East Java army command.182 TNI leaders never revealed how the
explosives went missing or who was responsible. That is why rumours circulated the
bomb was planted by parties working for Tommy, who was being questioned by the
Attorney General Darusman around that time.183
Furthermore, Boli Diaz and Tommy’s other bodyguards were released from
custody, while the local police official who had been handling the case, Edward
Aritonang, was replaced weeks later. This situation forced Attorney General Darusman to
temporarily abandon his investigation of the helicopter scandal of Tommy.184 Since
earlier, Darusman had predicted powerful forces would prevent further legal moves
against the Soeharto family. He was of the opinion that there were forces of resistance
within the bureaucracy, such as, the armed forces, who thought things should not go any
further. 185 The reason became clear after Wahid later confirmed that the case had to be
closed because certain elements inside the military, especially the army, opposed the
186
investigations. This paralleled an earlier KKN investigation against Soeharto. In April
1999, the police had been ordered to shut down their investigation into the Al-Istiqlal
mosque bombing perpetrated hours after Tommy’s appearance in court in the Goro-Bulog
corruption case,187 also known as the Bulog land scam deal, which cost the state an
additional Rp 95.4 billion.
On August 1, 2000, another explosion occurred in front of the Philippine embassy,
causing two deaths and seriously injuring the Ambassador and twenty others. The
bombing has been linked to Attorney General Darusman’s decision of sending Soeharto
and his family to court on allegations of corruption. 188 Testimonies in the Jakarta court
disclosed that the bomb was planted by members of the Abu Sayyaf,189 a Philippine
terrorist group aligned with the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah ands operating in the Sulu
archipelago, which was believed to retaliate against a government military offensive
against Muslim insurgents in the Philippine south. Some of the alleged perpetrators such
182
Roosa, 2003, loc.cit.
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit; Media Indonesia., July 13, 2000, loc.cit; Suara Pembaruan, July 14, 2000,
loc.cit.
184
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007.
185
Chris Brummitt,“Indonesia Marks Eighth Anniversary of Downfall of Ex-Dictator Suharto”, Associated
Press, May 21, 2006.
186
“Tommy and Habib Ali Baaqil,” Indonesian Observer, September 18, 2000, loc.cit; Majalah Tempo,
October 1, 2000: 26, cited in ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 12-13; Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October
187
”Bombings Leave Southeast Asia Puzzled,” Far Easter Economic Review, January 24, 2001.
188
Darwin, in Aris Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 106-107.
189
Since its establishment in the early 1990s in the southern Philippines, the militant group had con -ducted
violences in what they describe as their fight for an independent Islamic province. For further information,
see “Abu Sayyaf,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Sayyaf, was accessed on May 4, 2010.
183
184
as Amrozi, Fatur Rachman Al-Ghozi, Dulmatin and Hambali were also Pondok Pesantren
(Islamic boarding school) Ngruki graduates or senior figures in the Jemaah Islamiyah.190
Amrozi told the judge panel of the Jakarta court that the bombing was carried out by
Faturrahman Al Ghozi who previously ordered him to prepare explosive materials. He
admitted that he had bought the materials from Tidar Kimia chemical shop in
Surabaya.and provided vehicle to transport the explosives to Jakarta.191
But how could the group get access to the explosives and easily prepare and
conduct its operations without being detected by Indonesia’s national intelligence
institutions? Again, there was speculation that the blast was related to military resistance
to the Wahid presidency. Such a kind of blast was almost impossible during the prereform era. While it is possible that the terrorist group could rely on allies among Islamist
extremists in Indonesia, the attack could also be facilitated by the unwillingness of
Indonesian intelligence to prevent it.192
A more dreadful incident, with adverse repercussions on the exchange rate of the
Rupiah, was the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange building on September 13, 2000.
At that time, Tommy Soeharto was being questioned by the Attorney General’s Office for
his alleged corruption cases, and the following day the above-mentioned trial of former
193
President Soeharto on more serious alleged corruption cases was also scheduled. The
C-4 explosion killed fifteen persons and wounded dozens others. It raised serious
questions about the end of the bombing incidents and had an adverse effect on foreign
investors’ confidence to do business in Indonesia.194 Quite obviously the bombing was a
caluculated move by Soeharto loyalists inside the military to undermine the country’s
slow and painful recovery from the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 and to blackmail
Wahid into abandoning the prosecution of Soeharto’s KKN ccases.195
As during the Habibie government, terror attacks during the Wahid government
were apparently carried out in response to the political measures the President took at that
time. Every time a member of the Soeharto family got into trouble with the authorities,
trouble breaks out in some regions in Indonesia. In a rare public statement Wahid’s
Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono made clear the alleged involvement of high
190
“Bali Suspects Linked to 2000 Blast.” BBC NEWS/ASIA-PACIFIC, March 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/2839501.stm, was accessed on May 4, 2010.
191
“Bali Bombing Suspect Admits Role in Philippine Embassy Bombing,” Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet, 2003-06-19, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/19/content_927980.htm, was accessed on
May 4, 2010.
192
ICG, 2001, loc.cit; ICG, 2002, loc.cit; ICG, 2004, loc.cit.
193
Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit: 124-125.
194
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.) , 2003, loc.cit: 107.
195
Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit.
185
ranking (military) officials in transition violence and their objectives, as well as about the
reason why he failed to prevent and address the conflicts:
”Whenever there is a court case involving Soeharto, his family, or
a high official from the past regime, a riot always follows… Those who are
behind the riots are individuals defending Soeharto. I profoundly believe
that these are ex-officials from his last government, who were appointed
again in Habibie’s government, namely, my ex-cabinet colleagues… By
defending Soeharto, these persons are actually attempting to defend
themselves…They included ex-high officials, either military or civilians,
those who are aware of Habibie’s and Wahid’s intricacies in addressing the
four or five cases of ongoing unrests in areas, i.e. Aceh and Maluku.
Therefore, I can make sure that there is an intentional and organized
attempt to overwork the security forces, in order to create the sense that
Wahid is vain and powerless to control the situation…The military and the
intelligence agencies are still evenly split between the old and new force.
The problem is that those financing the unrests have more money....”196
Thus, surprisingly, a minister, considered as a conservative inherited from the
ancient regime, for the first time pointed out that Soeharto’s cronies may have been
behind the bloody riots in order to derail investigations in past mismanagement and
corruption.197 More importantly, he supposedly knew who was funding the operations of
both the blasts and regional conflicts. Nevertheless, he refrained from mentioning the
names for ethical reasons, respecting his relation with his colleague ministers in the
cabinet, although mass media had identified the two most likely architects as Gen. Feisal
and Gen.Wiranto. 198 Juwono, however, said military officers’ alleged involvement was
“uncontrollable factors” in the country’s violence and that he was powerless to force their
199
sacking.
Asked about Tommy by the mass media, Juwono further mentioned that he was
convinced that Tommy’s personal guards had perpetrated the bombing of the attorney
200
general office. Juwono’s allegations were supported by Maj. Gen Saurip Kadi, who
also believed that New Order elements might have had a hand in orchestrating riots across
the country due to their interests in creating a strong bargaining position against Wahid
196
”Juwono Sudarsono: Kroni Soeharto Mendanai Kerusuhan” (“Juwono Sudarsono: Soeharto’s Cronies
Finance the Riots”), Majalah Tempo, July 19, 2000; Van Zorge Report, January 22 and February 2, 2001;
197
McCarthy, 2000, loc.cit.
198
199
Richard Galpin, “Army Accused over Moluccas Conflict”, BBC News, July 17, 2000.
200
Majalah Tempo, July 19, 2000, loc.cit; McCarthy, 2000, loc.cit.
186
and his reform agenda.201 A similar opinion came from Lt. Gen (ret) Agus Widjoyo, who
stated that bomb explosions in August and September 2000 apparently followed attempts
202
to bring members of the Soeharto family to court and also Attorney General Marzuki
Darusman told the mass media that the bombings showed the characteristics of the works
of rogue or anti-reform military elements and Soeharto loyalists.203 Later investigations
revealed that two of the suspects in the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing were active
204
military personnel from Kostrad and Kopassus,
while a different source mentioned
205
both were Kopassus members.
Due to the potential involvement of the Soeharto loyalists, Juwono’s successor as
defence minister, Mahfud M.D., recommended that the government simply drop the case
against the former president. Otherwise, the country would be threatened by more terror,
and the government would be further undermined.206 Unfazed, President Wahid rejected
his aides’ proposition and went on with his efforts to hold the Soeharto family
accountable for the mismanagement and embezzlement of state resources during the New
Order period.
Despite the ongoing maneuvers to destabilize his government, President Wahid
rejected pardoning the convicted son of Soeharto. Tommy Soeharto, sentenced by a court
to 18 months in prison for his role in a multi-million dollar land scam, was arrested on
Wahid’s order. With this move, Wahid tried to send the message that violence and
corruption will no longer be tolerated in the country. Tommy Soeharto pleaded guilty on
October 3, 2000 and at the same time asked for a presidential pardon to avoid jail which
207
Wahid refused. This decision resulted in further unrest.
201
203
”Drop Soeharto Trial to Avoid More Violence--Minister,” Reuters, September 15, 2000.
204
”Political Brief,” Van Zorge Report , February 2, 2001; “Sipil Aceh: Teroris Atau Kambing Hitam,”
(“Civilian Acehnese: Terrorist or Scapegoat”), Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000; “Siapa Dalang Bom:
GAM, Militer, Atau...” (“Who Behind the Bomb: GAM, the Military, or ...”), Majalah Tajuk, No. 16,
September 28 October 11, 2000; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit.
205
Fawthrop, 2002, loc.cit.
206
Mahfud MD was interviewed on January 9, 2007 in Jakarta.
207
Calvin Sims, “Jakarta Won't Pardon Suharto Son; Orders Militia Chief's Arrest”, New York Times.com,
October 5, 2000.
202
187
II.D. Military Resistance in Maluku
Wahid faced a chaotic situation in Maluku, where from Central and Southeast
Maluku, the religious conflict reached North Maluku. Within a short period, the
escalation produced new and worse violence of unprecedented levels. For this reason, in a
gathering with Maluku people in Jakarta on January 15, 2000, he stated that the conflicts
were created by “dirty hands” or “intellectual actors.” These were, namely, the status quo
group or Soeharto’s loyalists, particularly, inside the military, which were opposing the
reform movement and the Wahid regime. The anti-reform movement in Jakarta obviously
attempted to switch the existing vertical conflicts between the Pattimura University’s
students, who demanded the termination of the military’s dual function practices in
208
Maluku, and the TNI, into horizontal conflicts by instrumentalizing religious issues.
Thamrin Amal Tomagola, a researcher from the University of Indonesia who was
a native of Maluku, supported Wahid’s suspicions by helping to disclose that the “dirty
hands” were Soeharto loyalists inside and outside the military, who supposedly pursued
two hidden agendas. These were to prevent the prosecution of Soeharto and his generals
(for alleged human rights violations and other abuses), as well as to create a new regional
command in the region, namely, Kodam XVI Pattimura, thus making it to seventeen
throughout Indonesia as earlier planned by the military. Munir, a noted human rights
activist who was later murdered by an intelligence operative, expressed a similar opinion
as Wahid on the alleged involvement of military officers in provoking conflicts in
Maluku. The new TNI commander, Adm. Widodo, also admitted this involvement,
209
though he could not tell when exactly this began.
Obviously, the investigations of the Soeharto family spurred military behavior,
which soon led to a markedly deteriorating security situation in Maluku. One example
was the extraordinary troop build-up in the province. The TNI deployed at least fifteen
different external battalions consisting of 8,000 army troops and 400 from the mobile
brigade, which reportedly often not only provoked but also escalated the conflict.210 There
are many reports which suggest that the military had failed to remain neutral in handling
local incidents. The troops which were sent there to back up the police were slow in
stopping the fighting between two Muslims and Christians. As mentioned by some
witnesses, including senior military officers who were questioned about the situation in
the field, soldiers involved in this fight not only took sides in conflict, but also shot at
211
rioting crowds. The local population, whose families took part in the fighting, shared
208
Tri Ratnawati, Maluku dalam Catatan Seorang Peneliti (Maluku in Notes of A Researcher), Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006: 57, 87.
209
Ibid: 57-58, 61.
210
211
188
similar information.212 Military interference thus markedly increased the number of
casualties in the conflict.
Towards the public, the new TNI chief commander, Adm. Widodo, excused his
soldiers’ involvement for the reason that they had to intervene in order to protect their
families. This justification drew questions of why TNI leaders sent troops who had a
conflict of interest and could not act firmly to reduce conflict? In fact, the
overwhelmingly Muslim Kostrad troops were siding with the Maluku Muslims, while the
Brimob security forces, who were 75 percent Christians, were siding with the
Christians.213
The conflict in Maluku was further exacerbated through the arrival of more than
4,000 Laskar Jihad fighters in Ambon and other islands in the province.214 As already
briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, 215 the Laskar Jihad is a paramilitary division of the
Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah (Communication Forum of the Followers
of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet), which was chaired by Ja’far Umar
Thalib, a veteran of the Afganistan war in the 1980s. It was formed to assist Muslims
when religious conflicts escalated in Maluku. Its members had received military training
under the supervision of Brig. Gen. (ret) Rustam Kastor. By using passenger ships such as
Pelni and Rinjani since April 2000, their fighters had been arriving in the war-torn
archipelago from Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) and Tanjung Perak (Surabaya) harbors.
Contemporary media reports and academic studies of the conflict were quite
unanimous in their judgment that the massive influx of jihad fighters in the province
could not have occurred without substantial logistical support. In view of the close
relations some military leaders entertained with radical Muslim organizations such as the
PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang --Crescent and Star Party), DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah
Indonesia --Indonesian Islamic Teaching Council), Kisdi (Komite Solidaritas untuk
Dunia Islam --Solidarity Committee for Islamic World)), FPI (Front Pembela Islam -Front for Islam Defenders), Furkon (Forum Penegak Keadilan dan Konstitusi --Forum for
the Promotion of Justice and Constitution), and Laskar Jihad, suspicions not
coincidentically concentrated on the armed forces. This belief was corroborated by
information that retired military officers and soldiers led by retired Brig. Gen. Kastor -former Chief of Staff of the eighth army command, Trikora, in Jayapura West Papua who
212
Family John Gomez and their neighbours were interviewed in Ambon, on June 25, 2006.
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit.: 131.
214
Majalah Tempo 29, No. 12, May 22-28, 2000; Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militancy and the Quest
for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia, Utrecht: Unversiteit Utrecht, 2005, https://open-access-leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/13369/1/Dissertation+Noorhaidi.pdf, was accessed on May 5, 2010.
215
See Chapter 3: 90-91.
213
189
had also been stationed at the TNI headquarters in Jakarta-- organized military training for
the Laskar Jihad at a camp near Bogor, not far from Jakarta.216
With this background, the Laskar Jihad fighters were apparently allowed to enter
Maluku by the security forces. The TNI could actually have prevented the jihad troops’
departure if it wanted to seriously halt them because they knew much about the troop
leaders, sponsors, plans, the jihadis appearances (such as specific uniforms and outfits)
and the departure points. Also, the access of the Laskar Jihad to weapons and explosives
they used in training and in the war zone in Maluku could have been blocked if there was
no tacit or open support of the TNI for the Laskar Jihad fighters. Giving more credence to
such reports, a member of the Laskar Jihad described, how upon arrival at the harbor of
Ambon, their troops were passionately welcomed by some military men, who greeted
them with “welcome to the jihad battlefield!” Moreover, shortly after arrival they were
provided with standard military weapons, including AK-47s and SS-14s 217 and on several
occasions were backed in combat by military personnel and units.218
In order to avoid a further influx of jihadis to Maluku, and to de-escalate the
conflict, President Wahid belatedly ordered the training camp near Bogor closed 219 and
Adm. Widodo to ensure that all visitors entering Maluku would be examined. The
security forces, however, failed to implement the president’s order. Although he was no
longer TNI chief commander, Gen. Wiranto’s explained this fact by saying that the TNI
could not prevent the jihad fighters getting on board of ships in Java because just like
other passengers they paid for the tickets and had no weapons. This explanation, of
course, drew indignant criticism in light of the TNI’s persistent claim to bear the main
responsibility for the country’s security. 220 Mufti Makarim, for instance, a human rights
activist of Kontras, wondered why the security apparatus allowed the Laskar Jihad to
come to Ambon, and assist them assaulting their Christian enemies.221 Again, it seems that
the military’s role in the Maluku conflict must be linked to its displeasure with the
216
George Junus Aditjondro, “Notes on the Jihad forces in Maluku,” July 2000, http://www.angelfire.com/
rock/hotburrito/laskar/aditjondro500.html, was accessed on May 5, 2010; Noorhaidi, 2005, op.cit: 201,
216; Istiqomatul Hayati “Polisi Akan Periksa Brigjen (Purn.) Rustam Kastor,” Tempo Interaktif, May 8,
2001, http://www.tempointeraktif. com/ hg/nasional/2001/05/08/brk,20010508-14,id.html.
217
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 13; “Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku”, ICG Asia Report, No.
10, December 19, 2000.
218
Manning and van Diermen (eds.), ISEAS, 2000, loc.cit; Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), loc. cit.
Further evidence for a collusion between TNI elements and Laskar Jihad troops was provided by the mass
media. In early July 2000, for example, a BBC cameraman covered an intense gun battle in the streets of
Ambon, the capital city, where Christian fighters were trading fire with Muslim militias who were fighting
together with regular army troops.
219
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 13.
220
Philips Jusario Vermonte, “The Relationship between the Army and Islamic Groups in Indonesia:
Com-paring the Period of the Transition to Authoritarian Rule in the 1950s and the Transition to
Democracy in the 1990s”, working paper, Jakarta: Interseksi Foundation, 2007.
221
Mufti Makarim was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta.
190
ongoing investigations of military personnel’s involvement in the human rights violations
after the East Timor referendum in August 1999.
The arrival of the well-armed Laskar Jihad and the fast increasing presence of
jihad volunteers222 in Ambon resulted in renewed fighting and were responsible for the
deterioration of the Maluku conflict with a sharp increase in casualties, particularly
among Christians. For instance, in Awaai village, sub-district of Salahatu, Ambon, the
Muslims (kelompok putih or the white group) assailed the Christians (kelompok merah or
the red group). 223 Between December 26, 1999 and January 7, 2000, 907 people were
killed, but a less conservative account estimated more than 2,000 people died.224 A week
before the incident in Awaai village, the Christian territory in Leihitu had been totally
ravaged, with seven people killed.225 Due to the intensifying conflict in the province,
Wahid finally imposed darurat sipil, or a state of civil emergency beginning June 27,
2000. Nevertheless, the measure did not show any significant results, and the archipelago
was still on fire.
Influenced by professional provocateurs, the religious conflict in Maluku entered a
second phase in May 2000, as the new waves of jihad forces arrived. In the process, as
confirmed by military and police officers interviewed, Laskar Jihad forces, supported by
military units from Java and Makassar (who were in their majority Muslims) launched
attacks on predominantly Christian police forces, including Brimob, and their
headquarters.226 Colombijn and Lindblad claim that the violence was stimulated and
maintained by the military that had ulterior political and economic interests.227 After all,
TNI could extend their functions beyond mere defence into national security matters, and
thereby revitalize their dual-function or socio-political role, by restoring their territorial
command system.
Also Kodam XVI Pattimura regional commander, Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela,
confirmed emotionalized troops took sides in the conflict.228 Unfortunately, the regional
commander did not mention that at least five of the nineteen military battalions sent to
Maluku were from East Java (Kodam V Brawijaya) and commanded by Maj. Gen. Sudi,
an officer associated with Gen. Wiranto and Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, both of whom
were linked to either to the human rights violations in East Timor and during the
222
Majalah Tempo 29, No. 12, May 22-28, 2000.
224
Majalah Gatra 5, No. 53, November 20, 1999; Majalah Gatra 6, No. 10, January 22, 2000; Majalah
Gatra 10, No. 12, February 5, 2000.
225
Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 52.
226
Author’s interview with Major Toga Panjaitan on June 20, 2001 in Jakarta; Author’s interview with Mj.
Ahmad Basar on June 25, 2006 in Ambon..
227
Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002, loc. cit: 4.
228
O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit.
223
191
handover of power from Soeharto to Habibie. It took the TNI leadership until June 14,
2000 to eventually replace biased troops.229 Brig. Gen. Tamaela, a Wiranto’s ally and
sympathizer of the Muslim’s cause, was replaced by Brig. Gen. I Putu Yasa, as the new
commander. I Putu Yasa was a Hindu from Bali and could therefore be expected to stay
neutral,230
A report of Komnas HAM, based on an 11-month study of the Maluku conflict,
further supported evidence for the involvement of TNI troops. Komnas HAM’s
investigators concluded that human rights abuses were perpetrated by “both individuals
and state apparatus, and both the military and the police.”231 As reasons for the conflict
the report named social resentment, agitation and provocations by third parties and
outside agents, the non-neutral stance of the security forces, religious animosities,
reprisals, and the political rivalry of elites. The November 1998 Ketapang riot232 was also
cited as a factor that had stimulated the conflict. The gang war between Christian
Ambonese thugs and Ketapang’s Muslim residents in Central Jakarta orchestrated by
233
outside forces had escalated into an inter-religious conflict. Reportedly, the security
forces had “captured” most of the gang members --who connected with the Soeharto
family and military leaders-- and put them on ships bound for Ambon, where they played
a central role at the beginning of sectarian conflicts here in early 1999.234 Therefore, it
became obvious that the increasing violence was not only caused by mounting local
frustration and anger, but also provocation from outside by third parties.235 It was indeed
inexplicable, why, despite having 11,000 personnel deployed throughout the Maluku
region, the military was constantly powerless to control the conflict.
In reality, military behavior in Maluku showed a number of similarities with their
behavior in East Timor. In addition to the existence of militias, Wiranto, while still on his
post as TNI chief, established in Maluku a task force called Satgas Pemulihan
Perdamaian (Task Force on Restoration of Peace), for which Maj. Gen. Suadi
Marasabessy had responsibility. This was similar to the innocuous-sounding post of head
of security advisor to the Indonesian government’s Satgas P3TT (Satuan Tugas Panitia
Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur --Task Force for Popular Consultation on the East
Timor Referendum) occupied by Maj. Gen. Zacky, whose responsibility was to monitor
security preparations in advance of the ballot. While Zacky was supposedly preparing a
smooth referendum in East Timor, Marasabessy was presumably attempting to bring back
peace in Maluku. O’Rourke however mentions that both seemed to possess major
229
Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit.
231
”Human Rights Commission Releases Report on Maluku Conflict,” Detikworld, February 6, 2001.
232
See Chapter 3: 34-36, 97.
233
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 6-7.
234
Colombijn and Lindblad, “Introduction”, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 4.
230
192
authority over military operations in their respective regions, and to pursue different
objectives as indicated by the title of their tasks forces. Like in East Timor, Wiranto also
claimed that TNI were doing their utmost to return order in Maluku, even though the
violence constantly worsened.236 Marasabessy’s promotion to the higher post of chief of
general staff (Kepala Staf umum or Kasum) in March 1, 2001 gave him strategic authority
over troop deployment and military operations across Indonesia. This could explain why
TNI activities in Maluku expanded significantly afterward.
Investigations by human rights organizations and independent researchers such as
University of Indonesia researcher Tomagola provided an even more complex picture of
TNI involvement in Maluku. Kontras activist Mufti, for instance, found out that apart
from the involvement of the military’s special intelligence task force (SGI) in supporting
the Laskar Jihad on the ground, Kopassus soldiers protected Christian militia leaders
such as Berty “Coker” Loupatty and Alex Manuputty.237 Berty was known as a gang
leader who turned out to be an informer for Kopassus. Other members of the Coker gang
admitted they had been trained and funded by Kopassus.238 Tomagola, for his part, cited
Wiranto and three active generals, e.g. Djaja, Suadi, and Sudi, as the main agents of
provocation who were responsible for triggering and prolonging the religious strife.239
Wiranto filed a defamation suit against Tomagola, but court proceedings were cancelled
as Tomagola threatened to use the trial as a platform for presenting the complete details of
the TNI leaders’ involvement in all episodes of the Ambon religious conflict. 240
III. Coping with Human Rights Violations
III.A. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Human Rights Violations
Different from Habibie, Wahid took more serious measures to prosecute human
rights abuses perpetrated by military personnel. He supported the investigation of Gen.
Wiranto due to his alleged involvement in East Timor’s post-referendum gross human
rights abuses. That is why the general was abruptly discharged from the highest position
in the military as chief commander after being implicated by the KPP HAM Timtim
(National Human Rights Commission on East Timor) in connection with gross human
rights abuses in East Timor. However, Wahid not only targeted Wiranto, but also other
alleged perpetrators of abuses.
235
Ibid: 348.
237
Mufti Makarim was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta.
238
Tom Fawthrop, “Indonesian Military's Links to Terror,” Asia Times, November 7, 2002.
239
”Wiranto Sues UI Sociologist,” The Jakarta Post, May 1, 2001.
240
”Peristiwa” (“News and Events”), Majalah Tempo, May 13, 2001: 38; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 400.
236
193
He had supported the investigation and prosecution of the May 12 Trisakti
shootings as well as the November 12, 1998 First Semanggi Tragedy and the September
1999 Second Semanggi Tragedy, for which the military was believed to be responsible.
Also, he encouraged enquiries into allegations that military personnel had provoked
ethnic and religious unrest in various parts of the country, i.e. in Ambon, Poso, and
Papua. Further, he had encouraged the national police to investigate the July 27, 1996
incident at the PDI headquarters, including the involvement of pro-Soeharto PDI leader,
Soerjadi. The investigation had actually revealed the involvement of the Jakarta regional
(Kodam Jayakarta) commander, Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso, and his paramilitary troops. 241
Lastly, Wahid instructed the Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia -National Human Rights Commission), particularly its KPP HAM Timtim, to investigate
military involvement in East Timor atrocities both prior to and after the August 30, 1999
referendum.242
Aside from this, President Wahid was praised by NGOs for his struggle
demanding the withdrawal of MPR Decree No. 25/1966, which banned the spread of
communism. Moreover, he apologized on behalf of his traditional supporters, the NU, to
former PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia --Indonesian Communist Party) members and
their families for the violence and atrocities committed by NU and its affiliated
organizations after the 1965 Coup, which had forced President Soekarno to step down.
In the first day of his presidency, Wahid had made an important gesture to empty
Indonesia’s jails of political prisoners. 243 In January 2000, he revoked Presidential
Instruction (Inpres) No. 41/1967 that had been endorsed by the Soeharto regime in its
anti-Chinese and communist campaign due to the alleged involvement of the People’s
Republic of China in the October 1965 putsch. The decree had restricted for a long-time
the public celebration of Chinese religious practises and traditions. Soon thereafter, by
March 8, 2000, he dissolved the Bakorstanas (Badan Kordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan
Stabilitas Nasional --Agency for Coordination of the Assistance for the Consolidation of
National Security), an extra-constitutional military intelligence body, which had replaced
similar organizations such as Kopkamtib (Komando Operasional untuk Pemulihan
Keamanan dan Ketertiban --the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security
and Order) and Laksus (Pelaksana Khusus --Special Agency) These were created to
politically repress anyone who threatened the regime’s stability during the Soeharto era.
Having dissolved Bakorstanas was obviously an outstanding attainment of Wahid in
protecting civil liberty.
241
Otobiografi Politik RO Tambunan: Membela Demokrasi (Political Biography of RO Tambunan:
Defending Democracy), Jakarta: TPDI, 2008: 374.
242
243
”Seluruh Tapol dan Napol Dibebaskan” (“All Political Prisoners Will be Released”), Harian Republika,
Desember 24, 1999.
194
On November 23, 2000, Wahid in cooperation with the DPR endorsed Law No.
26/2000 on human rights tribunals. To support the implementation of this law, he issued
Presidential Decision (Keppres) No. 31/2001 to establish human rights tribunals in
regional courts in Jakarta Pusat, Surabaya, Medan, and Makassar on March 12, 2001. In
addition, on April 6, 2001, he issued Keppres No. 48/2001 to set up the office of
Sekretariat Jenderal Komnas HAM (The Secretariat General of the National Commission
of Human Rights).
When he took office, Wahid had to deal with the powerful TNI, which was
humiliated by its withdrawing in disgrace from East Timor to pave the way for the
intervention of the UN peacekeeping troop Interfet led by Australia. Such humiliation
caused TNI to resist international, specifically United Nations, calls for an independent
investigation of crimes against humanity in East Timor, where commanders, as reported
by the (British) Guardian, turned a blind eye to or even orchestrated the campaign of
terror targeted at civilians by anti-independence militias.244 Wahid faced a dilemma:
Should he side with the TNI or comply with the international community, which would
apply pressure through the international lending institutions, e.g. the IMF and World
Bank? Worse, what had been identified by Crouch as the external factor,245 eventually
reunited different factions in TNI to challenge the Wahid presidency.
The rising reform demands, especially from the families of the victims of the
Trisakti shootings and the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots, helped President Wahid support
the establishment of a human rights investigation team (KPP HAM) on the cases. Further,
he ordered Attorney General Marzuki Darusman to follow-up KPP HAM’s findings. The
latter had revealed that the cases were gross human rights violations. He was convinced
that, if pursued further, senior level military officers, former commanders and even some
of the top military leaders could be held accountable.
III.B. The Military and Culture of Violence
As observed by analysts, cultivating new values in the Indonesia military was not
an easy task because from generation to generation, soldiers grew up and were educated
in an institution predominantly influenced by Javanese political culture. Kusnanto
Anggoro, an expert on military affairs and himself a native of Java, explained that most
TNI soldiers, particularly their leaders, were like Kumbakarna, a Ramayana knight figure,
who preferred to seek power rather than show loyalty to the truth. He acknowledged that
there were few soldiers who performed like the character Wibisana in Ramayana, which
244
245
Tran, loc.cit.
Ahmad and Crouch (Eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288, 298, in Singh, 1996, op. cit: 12.
195
together with Mahabharata was a Sanskrit epic of Hindu mythology, which had a strong
impact on Javanese thinking since 5 AD. Wibisana was a wise knight and model figure
who loved truth and did not put force as his first choice to counter critics and his
opponents.246
In the Ramayana, Kumbakarna was caught in the dilemma between defending his
homeland and siding with the truth. Although Kumbakarna knew that the ruler in the
palace, Alengka or Ngalengkadiraja, was breaking the law, he was a patriot who fought to
defend his ruler to his last drop of blood. In Mahabharata, the Pandawa knights struggled
for defending their rights for the throne of the Hastinapura kingdom against the Kurawa,
who wanted to take control of the the kingdom. As elaborated by Slamet Susanto and
Tarko Sudiarno, the story above had been taught for a long time in society, particularly in
the military, and taken as an example how Indonesians should love and uphold the
country’s honor.
The persona of the wayang (Javanese shadow puppet) characters in the Ramayana
and Mahabharata epics were enriched with the story of Babad Mataram, which
recounted conflicts, hunger for power, and coup d’etats that occurred among the rulers,
princes, knights, and soldiers from generation to generation in the old Mataram
kingdom.247 More specifically, the Babad Mataram treated the changes of power holders
such as that of Ken Arok, who was the founder the Rajasa dynasty around 1227 and the
first ruler of the Singhasari-Majapahit, an ancient Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in Java. He
became the king after killing Tunggul Ametung, a powerful regional leader or ruler of the
Tumapel area. . According to the Babad Mataram, the bloody coup d’etat is an important
element of Javanese political culture, reflecting the idea of brutal power struggle in the
past that countinues to the present.
It seemed that military resistance to civilian rulers, such as Wahid, brought to
mind the soldier’s position as a hero. Here, the military might be symbolized as
Kumbakarna who did his utmost to defend Buriswara, his elder brother, who had
kidnapped Sinta, Rama’s wife, and taken her hostage. Kumbakarna might be compared
with his other brother, Wibisana, who sided with Rama for the sake of truth. In a simple
sentence, Kumbakarna’s philosophy was ”right or wrong is my country,” while, Wibisana
emphasised “right or wrong is right or wrong.”248 In this context, the character of the
wayang portrayed human attributes that incorporated some valuable insights, rarely found
in the textbooks, about love for the fatherland and concern for fellow human beings. To
246
Slamet Susanto and Tarko Sudiarno,”Schools Bring ‘Wayang Kulit’ to Classroom”, The Jakarta Post,
http://www,the jakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20050319.P01, March 19, 2005: 1-2.
248
Veven Sp Wardhana,”Mass Media ‘a Hero’ in the Coverage of East Timor”, The Jakarta Post, http://
www.sidsnet.org/mir/pacific/usp/journ/nius/docs/nov99/2458.html, November 19, 1999: 3.
247
196
find the model character of a soldier or military leader similar to Wibisana was apparently
difficult. During the Wahid era, military figures such as Agus Wirahadkusumah and his
close allies might have the character Wibisana, while Wiranto and the supporters of his
policy on East Timor might reflect the character Kumbakarna.
Likewise, Vonny Kusumastuti, a Javanese native and expert on ancient Indonesian
political systems, explained the repressive character of the Indonesian military by linking
it to the culture of violence that grew in different Mataram dynasties. During these times,
struggles for power and succession were followed with conflicts, chaos, coup d’état, civil
war, and bloodshed. According to Vonny, various mayhems and human rights abuses
orchestrated by the military during the Wahid presidency, and the political disorder that
led to his impeachment were comparable to similar episodes that happened in the Babad
Mataram. In this context, a culture of violence such as amok, scorched-earth policy, and
targeting large number of kawula (ordinary people) took place both in old and modern
Indonesian political systems. 249
In an interview with the author, Wahid added that there was a similarity between
the current behavior of military officers and the past keraton (the palace of the Javanese
king) guards, particularly regarding their policy of prioritizing security approaches. He
therefore criticized military leaders who still threatened to stage a coup against civilian
leaders whose policies were against their wishes. 250 Maj. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, one of
the few officers following the character of Wibisana criticized that human rights abuses
such as in East Timor are just part of a larger culture of impunity within the Indonesian
military. This was actually a clear but rare acknowledgment by a TNI officer who for a
long time had known that military brutality had occurred and was perceived as normal
practice.251 As from the point of view of Wirahadikusumah and other intellectual officers
human rights abuses such as in East Timor were very embarrassing, they wanted to end
that sort of culture, and so vehemently pushed internal reform. Nonetheless, the proestablishment group in the TNI leadership saw the critics as a serious challenge to the
chain of command and a threat to their authority. This caused Kostrad commander, Lt.
Gen. Djaja Suparman, to angrily respond to the criticism by declaring that attacks on the
252
officer corps would anger the military as a whole, including the troops.
Commenting on the Kostrad commander’s reaction, Wirahadikusumah’s ally,
Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, replied that efforts to transform TNI into warlord troops, not
professional soldiers, continued. According to Saurip it was precisely such efforts that
had led TNI to become deeply involved in numerous violent incidents across the country.
249
Vonny Kusumastuti was interviewed on October 11, 2006 in Jakarta.
251
Harian Kompas, February 2, 2000: 1 cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 357.
252
250
197
They were also involved in the unconstitutional attempts of challenging the authorities of
legitimate civilian regimes, such as Sukarno and Habibie. This bad old culture of TNI
must be eradicated, if the country wanted to see the military functioning only as an
253
instrument of the state and no longer one of ambitious individual figures.
Human rights violations occurred persistently due to the strong existence of a
culture of violence that the soldiers inherited from the past. In this context, TNI soldiers
254
sticked to their old principle of countering violence with violence. TNI, therefore,
should start to reform their educational, recruitment, and training systems. As also
reminded by Wahid’s cabinet member, A.S. Hikam, the corporate culture of the military
255
did not change because the curricula were still the same as during the Soeharto era.
Mufti Makarim, the human rights activist from human rights advocacy group
Kontras, deplored the long standing culture of violence that had been internalized in the
TNI institution. Even though many officers or soldiers have been investigated as gross
human right violators and some of them had been jailed, violence orchestrated by the
military during the Wahid period continued unabated.256 Kusnanto thus stated that
without a comprehensive change of the TNI’s old doctrines and values, he was pessimistic that the armed forces would behave as expected and become professional soldiers who
adapt to reform demands. Even with such comprehensive change, he added, the country
would still need 20-30 years, or one generation, to definitely see its military be able to
uphold civilian supremacy. This means that current TNI soldiers were still imbued with
their old culture that always encouraged them to seek tahta (reign), kuasa (power), and
harta (wealth) by exercising their social, economic, and political functions, outside their
core function of defense.257
III.C. Military Response to Wahid’s Concern on Human Rights
Wahid’s support of KPP HAM Timtim to investigate the alleged East Timor gross
human rights abuses resulted in the most comprehensive inquiry that the military had ever
faced, with potentially wide-ranging consequences not only for the TNI leadership but
also for the TNI institution in general. The TNI believed that if chief commander, Gen.
Wiranto could be punished, other officers linked to abuses, including those in the
Soeharto era, could be held accountable as well. The war crimes tribunal in the
253
Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, were interviewed on April 9,
2008 in Jakarta.
255
AS Hikam was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
256
Mufti Makaraim was interviewed on July 24, 2006 in Jakarta.
257
254
198
International Court in Den Haag, which was trying Serbian leaders for gross human rights
abuses at that time, caused serious concern for Wiranto and his subordinated generals.258
Charged with crimes against humanity they would have a lot to loose: their rank, prestige,
wealth and even freedom. Hence, their stiff resistance against human rights investigations.
Responding to speculation that Wahid intended to dismiss leading military figures,
including.TNI chief and coordinating minister for defense and national security, Gen.
Wiranto, army chief Gen. Sutarto and Kostrad commander Lt. Gen. Djaja, the proWiranto spokesman, Maj. Gen. Sudrajat, abruptly disputed the president’s authority over
the TNI. Interpreting the constitution, he argued that the clause vesting the president with
the highest authority over the army, navy, and air force did not mean that he was the
259
supreme commander, a title that was used only in the United StatesS. Wahid sought to
immediately discharge Sudrajat, but was hindered of doing so by the military leadership.
Confronted with a dominance of conservative generals, it took him 1 month to finally get
the military spokesman replaced.
As a result, when KPP HAM Timtim started its investigation in mid-December
1999, it corresponded with another upsurge in religious violence in Indonesia. It is true
that the country had to grapple with endemic unrest since the beginning of Habibie’s
civilian rule, but it must be underlined here that never before had so many conflicts
exploded simultaneously. This was even more surprising as the country’s economy was
gradually recovering from the disastrous effects of the Asian financial crisis of
1997/1998. Within a month, no less than half a dozen incidents broke out, inter alia, the
Wisma Doulos attack, the escalation of the Maluku conflict, separatist rebellions in Aceh
and Irian Jaya, the religious uprising in Lombok, and new waves of mysterious killings of
the alleged dukun santet or dukun tenung (black magic healers or practitioners, or
witches) in Java.
Table 5
List of Major Incidents of Violence During Wahid
Time
Incidents of Violence
December 1999
New wave of of sectarian conflicts in Maluku
December 1999
New wave of conflict in Aceh
December 15, 1999
Attacks on Christian humanitarian foundation (Wisma
Doulos) in East Jakarta.
258
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 341-342.
”Kapuspen: Presiden Bukan Pangti TNI” (“TNI Spokesperson: President Not Chief in Chief”), Harian
Republika, December 28, 1999: 2.
259
199
December 1999 - January 2001
Mysterious killing of dukung tenung (witches)
March 5, 2000
Assassination attempt on Matori Abdul Djalil, PKB
chairperson and MPR deputy speaker
April - June 2000
New waves of sectarian conflicts in Poso, Central
Sulawesi
May 28, 2000
Bomb explosion in GKPI church in Medan
July 2000
Ninja Action in Central Kalimantan
July 22, 2000
Bomb explosion in Santa Anna and HKBP churches in
Medan and Jakarta
July 2000
The beginning of new sporadic conflicts in Irian Jaya
August 1, 2000
Bomb explosion in front of the Philippine Embassy
August 20, 2000
Bomb explosions in GKRI and GKII churches in
Medan
August 27, 2000
Bomb explosion in the house of a Protestant Priest
September 13, 2000
Bomb explosion in the Jakarta Stock Exchange building
October 14, 2000
Bomb explosion in, Newmonth, a multi national
company in Sumbawa.
November 12, 2000
Bomb explosion in ISTP, an educational institution
founded by a noted Protestant figure, TD Pardede, in
Medan
September-December 2000
Escalation of conflict in Aceh
December 15, 2000
Youth brawl which later instigated new wave of ethnic
clashes in East Kalimantan
December 24, 2000
Bomb explosions in churches and other Christian
targets in Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Medan, Pematang
Siantar Pekan Baru, Batam, Mataram
March 2001
Escalation of ethnic clashes in Central Kalimantan
Source: Harian Kompas, Majalah Tempo, and Majalah Panji Masyarakat December 1999-March 2001
In the regions of East and Central Java, where most of President Wahid’s NU
supporters lived, the killings of the alleged dukun santet rapidly began to spread again. In
fact, in Java, these incidents occurred repeatedly, following the escalation of political
tensions and elite conflicts in Jakarta. According to a NU investigation team, 143 people,
including eighty-three NU members, have died since the Banyuwangi killings started in
200
1998, along with another 105 murders in neighbouring regions such as Jember, Lumajang,
Pasuruan, and Sumenep. 260 At this time only about eighteen victims were reported by the
mass media, but the total number was believed to be higher and the method of the
murders was essentially the same as in early July 1998. Additionally, in a press
conference the East Java police chief stated that Jakarta thugs had been hired to carry out
the killings through covert intelligence and psychological operations. According to this
261
source, they were paid around Rp. 3 million for one killing.
It was not, therefore, by chance, that the cases emerged barely 3 months after an
evidently planned scorched-earth campaign in East Timor had been accomplished. They
coincided with the KPP HAM Timtim’s hearings, which were held between midDecember 1999 and late January 2001, when the violence across the country peaked.
Certainly, not all incidents might have been orchestrated by the military, but rather have
been triggered by the prolonged economic crisis and social injustice. Yet, there was
abundant reason to believe that the new wave of violence was intentionally incited to
divert government attention from KPP HAM Timtim and impel the president to stop
enquiries into human rights abuses of the military in East Timor.262
The findings of the KPP HAM Timtim enquiry, which held TNI responsible for at
least fourteen cases of human rights violations in the form of killings, rapes, tortures,
forced disappearances and so forth,263 further increased the tensions. After President
Wahid had forced Gen. Wiranto to step down from his position as coordinating minister
for politics and security as a result of the KPP HAM investigation, coup rumors swept
through Jakarta and persisted for several months during the escalating conflict between
the president and Wiranto.
Regarding the military reactions to human rights investigations, O’Donnell and
Schmitter noted that the more brutal, inhumane, and extensive the military’s human rights
violations had been, the more the perpetrators feel threatened. Failing to provide an
amnesty or resorting to some sort of amnesia in this case would cause the military to
remain a serious threat to the emerging democracy. 264 It was thus no coincidence that the
coup rumours subsided after Wahid obtained a guarantee from UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan that Wiranto would not be tried by the International Court in The Hague. In the
light of military pressure it was also quite obvious why Attorney General Darusman’s
260
“East Java Cleric's Killing 'Politically Motivated'”, Laksamana.net, November 30, 2003; “Ninja Killers'
Resurface in East Java”, Laksamana.net, November 30, 2003.
261
”Pelaku Pembunuhan ‘Dukun Santet’ di Malang Dibayar Rp. 3 Juta” (“The Perpetrator of ‘Whitch’
Killing in Malang Paid Rp. 3 Million”), Harian Republika, December 27, 2000: 1.
262
263
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
264
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 29; Elster and Slagstad (eds.), 1988, loc.
cit: 24-26.
201
final list of suspects excluded Gen. Wiranto, Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim and Maj.
Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and only included Maj. Gen. AdamDamiri --who was Kodam
IX Udayana regional commander from June 16, 1998 until November 1, 1999, whose
responsibility consisted of the former East Timor province-- in addition to four colonels
and six lieutenant colonels.265
For Darusman it was evident that the major impediment to the prosecution of the
266
alleged human rights abuses in East Timor was intractable elements inside the military.
Similarly, Wahid had stated that the provocateurs of the religious conflicts and the
perpetrators of the serial bombings were supporters of the previous authoritarian Soeharto
regime and anti-reform figures, including those inside the military, who were attempting
267
to undermine his government and oust him. His moves between April 2000 until May
2001 to dismiss Gen. Endriartono, the army chief, was a manifestation of his frustration
with the army and the latter’s growing resistance to his presidency. Predictably, Wahid
failed to dismiss Endriartono who not only had the backing of the TNI headquarters but
also of all TNI regional commands.
The bombings and the violence incited by military elements thus went largely
unresolved and unpunished. Quite to the contrary, rising military pressure and his
intensifying conflict with the legislature eventually forced Wahid to relent in his stance on
human rights courts. In mid-April 2001, he signed a presidential decree that established a
legal basis for ad-hoc human rights courts, but it was restricted to only trying the
violations that occurred after the August 30, 1999 East Timor referendum. His decision
was a concession to the military, effectively excluding the pre-referendum human rights
violations that had been investigated by the KPP HAM Timtim268 and which according to
the KPP HAM Timtim indicated TNI elements’ involvement and lack of responsibility in
preventing systematic violence and crimes against humanity. 269 Darusman’s account thus
contradicted the one of Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, an Indonesian commander who was in
charge of East Timor post-referendum security operations. Asked by the Joint IndonesiaTimor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) in a public hearing on October
24, 2007, in Jakarta, Kiki contended that there were no planned violations of human
270
rights.
265
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
267
268
Marzuki Darusman, in the interview on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta, also told that
constraint.
269
Author’s interview with Marzuki Darusman on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta; “Laporan Lengkap KPP
HAM Timtim oleh Komnas HAM,” http://www.elsam.or.id/pdf/monham/timtim/Laporan%20Lengkap%20KPP% 20HAM%20Timtim%20oleh%20Komnas%20HAM.pdf, was accessed on July 3, 2010.
270
Desy Nurhayati, “TNI ‘Armed’ East Timor Civilians,” The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2007, loc.cit.
266
202
Neither was President Wahid able to proceed with the prosecution of the Trisakti
shootings and the May 1998 tragedy. Under heavy pressure of the TNI/Police faction in
the DPR and supported by the Islamist parties, a Special Commission of the Parliament
(Pansus) investigating the cases, had designated them as ordinary crimes, reducing their
status from gross human rights violations as recommended earlier by Komnas HAM.271. In
other words, the cases would not be processed in an ad-hoc, but rather a military tribunal,
272
disregarding the conclusions of the previous enquiries. Consequently, Attorney General
Darusman could not prosecute active or retired generals in the TNI for their alleged
involvement.273 Wahid’s move to disclose the alleged involvement of the military in past
military atrocities reconciled Lt. Gen. Prabowo, who was earlier accused of
masterminding the May 1998 riots, with his main rival, Gen. Wiranto. Both of them thus
shared an interest in challenging and eventually ousting President Wahid.
While it was obvious that the riots were not about race or ethnicity but rather an
orgy of organized violence stemming from an intra-elite conflict, especially inside the
274
military, Wahid’s hands to shed further light into these incidents were bound. What his
government could finally do was only to uncover the case of the kidnapping and forced
disappearance of political and student activists during 1996-1998. These cases became the
prologue of the May 13-15, 1998 anti-Chinese riots and the Trisakti shootings which were
275
connected with them in terms of cause and effect. But again, in the cases of the
kidnappings, forced disappearances and the Trisakti shootings only middle-ranking
officers up to the rank of colonel were considered responsible and could be sent to court,
while the generals could not even be summoned.276 Moreover, due to the DPR legislation
mentioned above, these middle-ranking soldiers could not be brought to an ad-hoc human
rights court as required in Law (UU) No. 39/1999 on human rights. Instead, they were
tried by a military court. This meant that the cases of kidnapping and forced
disappearance were not tried as gross human rights abuses, but only as ordinary violations
of military discipline and rules.
Much to the dismay of the victims of the gross human rights violations as well as
their families the military courts freed all defendants accused in connection with the
271
Quite disturbingly, rather than being examined as a suspected perpetrator, Lt. Gen. Prabowo was treated like a hero while giving testimony in parliament, according to the reports of the Joint-Fact Finding
Team and other independent investigation teams. The writer was present at the testimony held by DPR
Pansus (Special Committee) at that time (2000).
272
Harold Crouch, “Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia,” in Uwe Johannen and James
Gomez (eds.), Democratic Transitions in Asia, Singapore: Select Publishing, 2001: 182.
273
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakar ta.
274
John McBeth, “Shadow Play”, Australia Review, July 23, 1998.
275
Ibid.
276
“Penantian Panjang Korban Pelanggaran HAM,” (“Deep Expectation of Human Rights Victims”), Wacana Ham, 2nd Edition, VI,July 1-31, 2008, http://www.komnasham.go.id/portal/files/wacana%20edisi%
20 JULI%202008.pdf, was accessed on May 11, 2010: 5-6.
203
Trisakti and May riots. Because of the pressure and intervention of the military, President
Wahid was unable to show his consistent respect to human rights as he had done in the
past as a societal leader. Understandably, the reform movement massively criticized this
setback to implementing transitional justice which they attributed to the TNI’s interest in
protecting their soldiers from prosecution for alleged gross human rights violations,277
and President Wahid’s political weakness. Wahid’s behavior in fact corroborated
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s argument that a policy of amnesty or amnesia on the part of
the civilian regime in the post-authoritarian period would be less dangerous for the new
democracy than proceeding with the prosecution of human rights violations. 278
IV.A. What Had Influenced Wahid’s Response to Secessionism?
Because Indonesia was an archipelagic state, for Wahid, a unitary state was more
suitable for keeping the more than 17,000 islands together rather than a federal state. His
inclination to the unitary principle became apparent when he chaired NU (Nahdlatul
Ulama), the mass-organization professinga syncretic Islam that incorporated elements of
Javanese mysticism, as well as ancient Hindu and Buddhist traditions, from 1984 until
1999. In reverse, he declined to support the adoption of a federal state as proposed by
Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah, the other large Islamic socio-religious
organization which in contrast to NU stood for a modernist version of Islam. He
supported decentralization and special autonomy, provided that they remained within the
framework of the unitary state of Indonesia.279
In order to avert moves for initiating federal states, such as what had been
promoted by Marwah Daud Ibrahim and other politicians from Sulawesi frustrated with
Habibie’s defeat and Javanese domination of politics, Wahid took early steps by putting
national integration near the top of his government agenda. This included appointing
280
ministers from a wide variety of regions to his cabinet. Moreover, at his presidential
swearing-in ceremony, he vowed to defend the integrity of the territory of Indonesia
against “other countries that sometimes underestimate our feelings and dignity.”281 His
emphasis on the need to protect the country’s territorial integrity could be associated with
277
Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists of Imparsial, were interviewed on April 9, 2008 in
Jakarta.
278
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 29.
279
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 16, 431.
280
David Bourchier,“Habibie’s Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism and the Struggle for Power,“ in Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, Singapore, ISEAS, 2000.
281
“Indonesian President Pledges to Uphold Democracy,” loc. cit.
204
his disappointment in the result of the referendum in East Timor which had led to the
secession of the province and the formation of an independent state.
Later, responding to the manifold internal threats Indonesia was facing and the
various pressures produced by globalization, Wahid often restated the importance of
Indonesia’s territorial integrity. According to him, good international relations should be
based on the principles of mutual respect, and Indonesia would not allow other countries
to pass judgment on Indonesia or interfere in its interal affairs. He knew that this was an
uphill task given Indonesia’s great diversity, and the continuing communal and separatist
unrest threatening to tear the country apart and raising the spectre of Indonesia becoming
a “failing state.” However, by quoting what the founding father of the nation, Sukarno,
said, Wahid stated that Indonesia had a reason to be one nation with a notion of the
unitary state, which should be consistently upheld.282
In view of the threat of disintegration, Wahid was aware that the country needed a
strong leader who could effectively respond to a greater trend of fundamentalism,
factionalism, and separatism which endangered the NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik
Indonesia --Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), a key element of Pancasila,
Indonesia’s state ideology. Persistently he reminded others that religion and, more
specifically, Islam had merely been used by political elites as a political vehicle to meet
their ambition for power. For this reason, he asked political elites and their supporters to
uphold Pancasila. For him the nation’s commitment to the unitary state was not
negotiable.283
In his response to the jihad campaign of radical Muslims, President Wahid
demanded that they abstain from combatting Christians, but rather defend NKRI from
disintegration. For Wahid, defending the NKRI and the Pancasila ideology was a
284
religious duty. That is why he supported the initiative of various youth groups and
religious leaders in organizing a national youth oath ceremony day to reinforce the
nation’s commitment to keep on protecting the NKRI.
However, critics accused President Wahid of excessively pursuing romantic
Javanese ideals of social harmony.285 His offer of governmental posts to all elements of
the political spectrum, including the ancient régime, had associated him with the notion
of inclusiveness or “integralism” that characterized Javanese politics. No less important,
he was another Indonesian leader who was fond of Javanese culture as exemplified by the
wayang shadow plays. It was therefore argued that President Wahid was a culturalistic
282
Ibid.
Windoro Adi, “Apel Pancasila: Kamu-kamu, Kita-kita” (“Pancasila Day Celebration: Between You and
Us”), Harian Kompas, June 8, 2006: 5.
284
“Pertahankan Pancasila” (“Uphold Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006, loc.cit: 2.
285
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 195, 344.
283
205
Muslim with the instincts of a Javanese king. Asked about whether he would prefer to
maintain the principle of the unitary state over democracy amid the threat of
disintegration, one of these king-like sentiments became manifest as he affirmed that he
286
preferred to preserve NKRI, although this would make him somewhat despotic. That is
why Sebastian pointed out that despite their vastly different perceptions of concepts such
as “revolution,” “development,” or “reform,” Sukarno, Soeharto, and Wahid shared an
287
adherence to a conservative ideology derived from Javanese tradition.
IV.B. What Had Influenced Military Response to Secessionism?
In the past, in order to facilitate the process of nation building, President Soeharto
introduced a policy of social integration through transmigration. At first glance, his
original idea to integrate different ethnic groups across the country through the melting
pot policy of transmigration with the ultimate goal of creating “a new Indonesian society”
and to build national identity and awareness appeared quite plausible. This policy, which
was backed by the military however became counter-productive in the long-run. What
Soeharto and his military implemented was not a process of true integration of migrants
and local inhabitants, but rather a process of Javanization. Thus, the regime sent large
numbers of Javanese to be settled in regions outside Java, where they often failed to
recognize local traditional customs and come into conflict with the indigenous
population.288
As pointed out by Fearnside, the Soeharto regime made no secret of its objective
of quickening the demise of tribal cultures and languages, and replacing them with the
dominant Javanese culture.289 The feeling of alienation and even hatred among the local
population towards the domination by Javanese migrants in both the governmental as well
as the private sector was therefore not surprising as even casual observers noticed.290
Schmitz described the process of Indonesianization of the archipelago as no more than the
Javanization of the Indonesian Republic, while Klein observed that, in the construction of
291
Indonesia’s national culture, Javanese culture played a principal role.
286
“Pertahankan Pancasila” (“Uphold Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006: 2.
288
Patrick Guiness, “Local Society and Culture,” Hal Hill (eds.), Indonesia’s New Order: the Dynamics of
Socio-Economic Transformation, Honolulu, 1994: 278.
289
Philip M. Fearnside,“Transmigration i n Indonesia: Lessons from its Environmental and Social
Impacts,” Environmental Management, No. 4, 1997: 563.
290
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo,“Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict: A Preliminary Observation,” Sojourn, No. 2, 1997: 315.
291
Martin Klein, Javanismus und Herrschaft in Indonesien: Zum Zusammenhang von Kulturinterpretation
und Ideologie, Suedostasien Working Papers der Humboldt Universitaet zu Berlin, No. 6, Berlin, 1997,
Schmitz, 2003, op.cit: 75.
287
206
Javanization permeated in the civilian bureaucracy from the highest to the lowest
levels, and the public as well as the private sector. Further, the Javanese cultural
hegemony was strengthened by a similar Javanization of the military institution, whose
structure or hierarchical structure paralleled the civilian bureaucracy. Thus, with its
repressive approach, for more than three decades, the military played a key role as the
government’s tool in safeguarding Soeharto’s politics of homogeneity and a nation
292
building process dominated by Javanese political culture.
Additionally, the strong existence of feudal values in Indonesian politics and
military life was reflected by the persistent use of Javanese terminologies of power. Some
of these were: satria piningit (model leader in Javanese society), kesatyaan (loyalty), and,
mostly, manunggaling kawula-gusti (the unity of people and the king, who represents
God in the microcosms or on earth), which was later developed into kemanunggalan
rakyat dengan tentara or the unity between people and soldier (and no separation
between political and military functions), and which had been adopted to support the dual
293
function of the military. In this relation, military leaders during the Wahid period, such
as Wiranto and Ryamizard, often referred in analogy to pre-colonial Javanese Kingdoms
and their rulers in order to explain Indonesia’s current situation.294 Wiranto, for instance,
often mentioned kesatyaan to show his loyalty and respect to previous leaders such as
Soeharto, and emphasized keselarasan (harmony) to oppose aspirations of federalism and
pressure for reform.295 In fact, Wiranto’s loyalty to Soeharto was never in doubt.
Immediately after the short resignation ceremony of Soeharto, he took the microphone
and announced to the nation that he would personally protect the safety and the dignity of
296
the former president and his family. Usually, someone deeply socialized in Javanese
culture would publicly use the word “harmony” in order to send a strong message to those
who were challenging his power that he would ultimately use force (gebuk) against his
challengers. It was, therefore, as earlier stated by Magnis-Suseno that rukun (harmonious
community) was a keyword to venture at all times that contained signs of social or
personal tensions, and to preserve the impression of harmonized social relationships as
much as possible. 297
292
Schmitz, 2003, op.cit: 94.
Interview with Permadi, an expert on Javanese political culture, member of Committee I, dealing with
military and defense issues, in DPR, on November 25, 2006 in Bogor.
294
Interview with Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta; See also, Bilveer Singh,
Ryamizard -- in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005.
295
See, for example, Shenon, 1998, loc.cit; also Idi Subandy Ibrahim (ed.), Dari Catatan Wiranto: Bersaksi di Tengah Badai (From Wiranto Notes: Testimonials in Mid of Storm Attack), Jakarta, IDe,
Indonesia, 2003.
296
Endy M. Bayuni, “How Soeharto Schemed and Habibie Botched it”, The Jakarta Post, October 9, 2006:
2.
297
Magnis-Suseno, 1997, op. cit: 43.
293
207
Gen. Ryamizard habitually cited Gajah Mada, the greatest general of pre-modern
Indonesia. Gajah Mada was also the prime minister and an important ruler of the old
Javanese Majapahit kingdom, who was credited with the territorial expansion and
maintenance of the kingdom, particularly during the years 1331 to 1364, which is
considered by the military as the origin of the Indonesian state and nation. 298 In replying
to his opponents, he frequently reminded them to pay respect the country’s principle of
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity), which also originated from old Javanese
language, and also Pancasila, the five principles derived from the Majapahit and Gajah
Mada era. Furthermore, he often mentioned national unity, national territory, the life and
culture of the armed forces, their role in national politics, and their pursuit for unity. All
these references can be traced to the Gajah Mada period and the practices and experiences
299
of this era.
However, the strong reliance on values of Javanese political culture made military
leaders target for critics. Officers like Ryamizard who was never trained abroad reacted
defensively to such critique. Ryamizard, for example, responded to reform pressure by
stating that the country is under cultural attack. Despite its great historical past and rich
cultural heritage, external forces had been attempting to transplant alien ideas into the
country in the name of development and modernization. In Ryamizard’s view, ideas such
as democracy, human rights, and accountability should be adapted to Indonesia’s
conditions and needs even though they were progressive and became part of the recent
global discourse. The semantics of Javanese politics thus signified that the military was
not prepared to follow their civilian president and his refomist policies.
As explained by Choirie, the existing influence of Javanese political culture on the
military was reflected in its leaders’ views on the concept of the unitary state,
accumulation of power, culture of violence, and the use of repressive measures which
were in accordance with its defensive response to the mounting pressure for federalism,
separatism, security sector reform, and civilian supremacy, demands that had been raised
by the reform movement.300 As already discussed earlier, the Javanese conceived power
as a concrete matter, not as something abstract. More fundamentally, it was sacred: it was
transferred by God to the king. In order to show that the king was in possession of wahyu
(mandate), power had to be concentrated in him completely. It could not be reduced or
divided to another person. A division of power would mean that the king no longer held
full wahyu from God, leading to the loss of his legitimacy as king.301 For the Javanese,
there existed only one sun, meaning that in society or a state, and even an organization,
298
Singh, 2005, op. cit: 18-19.
Ryamizard was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta; See also, Singh, 2005, op. cit: 18-19.
300
301
Anderson, in Claire Holt (ed.), 1972, loc.cit; Anderson, 1990, op.cit : 19-20; 22-24, 36, 41; Sebastian,
2006, op. cit: 9-10.
299
208
they admitted only one single authority. There were no twin leaders that had the same or
equal authority or power (ora ana srengenge kembar).302 Thus, the more of power the
king held, the stronger was the legitimation of God and the people he obtained.
More specifically, every Javanese king would preserve the traditional values of
keselarasan (harmony) and keheningan (tranquility) in his government as long as
possible. Otherwise, people would question whether he still deserved the whole wahyu or
not, raising doubts that he was still the right king to govern. Therefore, the king would
seek to maintan keselarasan and keheningan, even if this included the adoption of
repressive means through his hulubalang (guards).303 Thus, the adherence of Indonesian
leaders since Sukarno, as well as their military, to the principle of the unitary state of
Indonesia (NKRI) had its historical and cultural roots in the Javanese concept of power.
This immersion had been further laid down in the modern 1945 State Constitution and in
state ideology, Pancasila. For this reason, the idea of devolution, or even federalism, was
difficult to accept.304
Not surprisingly, military leaders such as Wiranto, Tyasno and Ryamizard were
not at ease with proposals for amendments to the 1945 State Constitution raised by the
reform movement. Wiranto, for instance, argued that the amendments would change the
essential philosophies of keselarasan, manunggaling kawula-gusti, and so forth that in
due course would damage keheningan. This, for him, would threaten state integration
because the amendments would be against the nation’s basic principle of kebersamaan
(togetherness) and negara kekeluargaan (familiness).305
Former army chief Tyasno stated that the amendments would eradicate
keseragaman (uniformity), which had become the identity of the nation, kesetiaan
(loyality), and other political values inherited from the past, thus jeopardizing the unitary
306
state (NKRI). He suspected foreign countries behind the mounting pressure on the
amendments of the 1945 State Constitution.307 Especially, liberalization would challenge
the existence of Indonesia as an integral state, based on the national principle of
togetherness and the organic family principle.308
302
Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 456.
Maj. Gen. Saurif Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta.
304
Ibid.
305
“Amandemen Jangan Digagas Politisi” (“Amendments May Not be Proposed by Politicians“), Harian
Kompas, March 22, 2007: 1.
306
“Gerakan Revolusi Nurani Anggap Perubahan UUD 1945 Tidak Sah” (“The Moral Revolution Movement Views the Amendments of the 1945 Constitution Not Legitimate“), Harian Kompas, January 4,
2007: 3.
307
”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (“Tyasno: The Amendments of the 1945 Constitution Not
Legitimate“), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006: 2.
308
“Indonesia Harus Kembali ke UUD 1945 Asli dan Pancasila”, Harian Kompas, July 6, 2006: 4.
303
209
Similar to Tyasno, in a more direct way, Ryamizard accused foreign countries of
assisting certain groups in society encouraging fundamental changes in Indonesia. His
accusation was actually targeting the reform movement which he suspected of having
turned into conspirators selling their country in exchange for personal benefits. While
charging that reformist aspirations had started to damage the country, he claimed that the
military had responsibility for preventing the country from disintegration caused by the
fundamental changes of the NKRI principle, the 1945 State Constitution, and the
309
Pancasila. Therefore, as Nordholt pointed out, the military always perceived itself as
the only force that could keep the Indonesian state intact. 310
IV.C. Military Views on Decentralization
The Indonesian military officers’ mindset was centralistic in nature. Since its
formation, the leaders of the armed forces stressed the important existence of the unitary
state and their interests to maintain it. Military leaders thus complained that the
decentralization policies initiated through Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 under
Habibie and implemented by Wahid, would severely damage national integration mainly
because the authority of local governments would become too extensive. Moreover, as
Law No. 22/1999 stipulated that provincial and district heads would be directly elected,
the appointment of military personnel to local government positions as practiced under
the dual function doctrine would no longer be possible, Henceforth, military officers
would have to retire before running in the election. The military thus feared that
decentralization would diminish the military’s opportunities to interfere in civilian affairs
and continue its socio-political role. 311
Decentralization was also seen by the military as a threat in conjunction with the
rise of political Islam312 It feared that it would markedly widen the latter’s scope for
political mobilization, even to the point of demanding the implementation of the syariah
law.313 The military itself still kept its threat doctrine that was developed in the mid1980s, which declared that any ideology directed against Pancasila should be crushed. In
view of this, conservative Islam was actually perceived as part of the so-called “right
extremes” (Honna, 1999).
309
“Kostrad Tetap Loyal kepada NKRI” (”Kostrad Still Loyal to NKRI”), Mei 21, 2000, http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2001/ 05/20/0040.html: 1-3.
310
Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc.cit: 52.
311
312
Suryadinata, 1992, 1998; Rinakit, 2005.
313
Rinakit, 2005, ibid: 77.
210
Military leaders also feared that the transfer of autonomy to the regions would
threaten the future of their territorial commands. Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999,
which led to an unprecendented increase of regional autonomy, and Government
Regulation No. VI/2000, which conveyed the authority to the police to handle domestic
security affairs, had affected military organization at district levels. Under the new legal
provisions, local government would utilize the police, not the military to combat
disturbances of public order. The military’s presence at those levels would thus no longer
be relevant, and it would lose its direct access to controlling society. Reasonably, many
TNI officers anticipated that their interests would be jeopardized by the continuation of
decentralization under Wahid.314
Military resistance against decentralization was indicated by the involvement of
soldiers in provoking and exacerbating unrest throughout the country, which hampered
the implementation of decentralization. In unstable regions where police could not longer
maintain public order, the military now had reason to maintain, and even to re-establish,
its territorial commands. In Aceh and Maluku, for instance, the armed forces could reestablish Kodam Iskandar Muda and Kodam XVI Pattimura military regional commands
after social violence broke out there again. Thus, an established presence and de facto
parallel administrative status provided the military continued strength at the regional and
local levels.
As a result, it was not easy to dismantle the military’s territorial structure during
the Wahid era. In the absence of adequate police strength, many military officers and even
parts of the public regarded the territorial commands as still vital in preserving order in
conflict regions. With only 200,000 personnel, the police was totally understaffed and
hardly in a position to take over all of the military’s law-and-order functions. Also, in
respect to the military’s business interests in various parts of the country, territorial
appointments were coveted among many officers who regarded them as avenues to
wealth. At the same time, the dismantling of the territorial structure would strongly limit
opportunities of soldiers for promotion and access for patronage.315
Therefore, as also observed by Eldridge, although much of its formal authorities
had been reduced, the military continued to retain its influence at the regional and local
levels by maintaining the territorial system. In regions such as Aceh and Papua, where
secessionist threats were serious, the presence of TNI soldiers was the heaviest.
Unfortunately, however, they did not demonstrate a willingness to provide security for
citizens against outbreaks of disorders. In many cases, they even worsened the situation in
order to create local dependency on their presence and increase their bargaining position
vis-à-vis the central government. Such a strategy was seemingly meant to undermine
314
Ibid: 79-80.
211
democratic reforms initiated by Wahid. Not surprisingly, accusations emerged that
Soeharto loyalists in the military were provoking violence elsewhere to destabilize
Indonesia’s fledgling democratic system through the use of their territorial command
316
structure.
IV.D. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in East Timor
During his presidential campaign, Wahid sharply criticized Habibie for his rash
proposal of a referendum on East Timor’s independence. Nonetheless, as a newly elected
president, he complied with the result of the referendum that granted East Timor
independence status, and, remarkably, he offered Indonesia’s cooperation and friendship.
He sought to address separatist conflict there in a civilized manner and put an end to the
repressive approach that had been adopted by the military since the territory’s 1975
invasion by Indonesian forces.
However, before, while campaigning for presidency, however, Wahid also
resorted to a “military-nationalist” language in his attempt to draw military support for his
presidential bid. He justified this stance, on the one hand, by arguing that Indonesia had to
follow its own rather than others’ understanding of East Timor. On the other hand,
however, he accused NGOs of colluding with foreign associates in using East Timor to
corner Indonesia. For Wahid, criticism of military errors at that time was exaggerated
since such errors derived more from individual than institutional causes, and, more
importantly, the military was still in the process of correction.317 He viewed the foreign
comdemnation of Indonesia’s East Timor referendum process on the whole as
unacceptable.
Surprisingly, faced with the uncontrollable situation in East Timor, Wahid
changed his mind and sent a letter to the UN Security Council on September 7, 2000 to
strongly condemn the post-referendum killings in West Timor, the nearest Indonesia’s
province, which became the new base for TNI after its withdrawal. With US$ 5 billion in
World Bank assistance at risk, he demonstrated resolve by shipping two fresh battalions
there and inviting international observers to verify progress in seizing the weapons of
former pro-integration militias. Later, he supported Komnas HAM and its independent
committee for the inquiry on human rights violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM Timtim).
It had accomplished its investigation in East Timor and indicted the militias’ main leader,
315
Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc.cit: 180.
Eldridge, 2002, op.cit : 138-139.
317
Ibid.
316
212
Eurico Guterres, as a key organizer of riots, and sentenced him to 6 months jail for a
weapons offence.318
Due to the rising international pressure and urgent need for foreign aid, Wahid
supported KPP-HAM Timtim’s further reports that recommended the prosecution of the
military officers.319 He encouraged the start of an official inquiry, for which the Attorney
General’s office had named nineteen suspects, including thirteen military officers and
320
three militia leaders. Thus, while he was on a series of visits to European countries in
early February 2000, KPP-HAM Timtim concluded that the former TNI chief
commander, Gen Wiranto, was responsible for what happened in East Timor after the
referendum. Wahid immediately reacted by demanding that the general resigns from his
321
current post as coordinating minister for political and security affairs.
After a
dangerous two week stand off and coup rumors circulating in Jakarta, he finally
persuaded Wiranto to resign to give a chance for the prosecution.
Wahid’s position vis-à-vis Wiranto became stronger as several leaders of the
countries he was visiting conveyed their support to Wahid and expressed great concerns
over a military coup. This episode demonstrates how Wahid smartly instrumentalized
foreign policy to mobilize international support for his government, thus bolstering his
political position in the domestic power struggle. Because of his manoeuvres, the coup
d’état threats faded away.322
Under Wahid’s support, the KPP-HAM Timtim had been mandated to investigate
reports of systematic killings that led to crimes against humanity, extrajudicial executions,
and arbitrary shootings in East Timor during 1999.323 In its findings, the independent
commission cited evidences of violent rapes, massive killings, and a planned and
systematic scorched-earth policy, which left an estimated 70-80 percent of East Timor’s
infrastructure severely damaged by the time the Indonesian military and militia forces
withdrew from the territory.324 The KPP-HAM Timtim became the focus of attention
because it subpoenaed testimonies from more than thirty prominent officials, militia
leaders, or TNI personnel in early December 1999. 325 The list included Sjafrie
318
Ibid: 154.
Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, loc.cit: 182.
320
321
Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 109.
322
Ibid.
323
324
Marzuki Darusman, who chaired the KPP-HAM during the inevestigations, described also this in interview on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta; see also, “East Timor: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000”, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, February 23, 2001,
loc. cit.
325
Recently, the vice-chairperson of KPP HAM Timtim, Todung Mulya Lubis, mentioned again the alleged
direct or indirect involvements of TNI leaders based on the assumption of commanders responsibility. See,
319
213
Syamsoeddin and Zacky Makarim, the two alleged planners of the campaign to defend
East Timor, and Wiranto. This marked the second time that the three generals had been
questioned by an official fact-finding team, following earlier investigations of the May
13-15, 1998 riots in Jakarta during August-September 1998.
Moreover, Wahid also announced a special human rights court on East Timor
326
which however would only try offences after the referendum on August 30, 1999. This
decision followed a clause in the new Article 28 (I) of the amended 1945 State
Constitution, which prohibits trying citizens under retroactive laws, which had been
successfully inserted by the military/police faction in the MPR annual session during
August 1-18, 2000. Further, he allowed the opening of the National Council of Timorese
Resistance (CNRT) representative office in Jakarta by December 1999, and held direct
discussions with East Timorese resistance leaders, overruling military objections. His
apology for Indonesia’s past wrongdoings, most of which involved the military, earlier
made during an official visit to Dili in February 2000, had generated goodwill and respect
among East Timorese, but produced minor protests, especially, from military-nationalist
elements in Indonesia.327 Ignoring this reality, on September 1, 2000, Wahid backed
Attorney General Darusman in initiating legal proceedings for human rights abuses in
East Timor, which came about 6 months after the KPP-HAM recommended trials for the
328
thirty military, militia and civilian figures mentioned above.
IV.E. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in East Timor
The report of the KPP-HAM Timtim of January 31, 2000, presented by Djoko
Sugianto, declared that elements of the military, police, and civil government funded,
trained, and encouraged militias, both directly and indirectly, that caused human right
abuses in East Timor. Similar to Darusman, 329 Sugianto, cited evidence of serious human
rights abuses conducted in a coordinated, systematic, and a large-scale method. The report
specifically acknowledged the form of massacres, searches and seizures, theft, brutality
towards women and children, including rape and sexual molestation, forced evacuation,
arson, looting, and vandalism. Sugianto said that all these acts represented crimes against
humanity. Therefore, the subcommission recommended that the attorney general pursue
the investigation of thirty persons, including the entire top echelon of military and
“Restropeksi Pelanggaran HAM di Timtim” (“Retrospection of Human Rights Violations in East Timor”),
Harian Kompas, December 22, 2008: 36.
326
Eldridge, 2002, ibid: 157.
327
Ibid: 158.
328
Marzuki Darusman in interview on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta cited the KPP
HAM Timtim’s results and recommendations of their investigation.
329
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
214
government figures mentioned as responsible in the post-referendum incidents.
Remarkably, Soegianto emphasized that paramount responsibility rested with Wiranto on
the round that all crimes against humanity in East Timor took place due to the failure of
the TNI chief commander to guarantee public security surrounding the balloting process.
330
Several factors, ranging from extensive economic interests of the Soeharto family
and military to collusion networks surrounding an ex-provincial governor, led to the
creation of the military-nationalist lobby in East Timor. Such interests comprised over
half a million hectares of land held for coffee, sugarcane, sandalwood, timber, marble
extraction, and a venture in three oil wells and several construction projects. Moreover,
Indonesia was interested to exploit oil reserves concentrated in the western region of the
territory.331 The loss of all of the military’s vested-interests in East Timor and Wahid’s
changing perception towards the military’s role in East Timor after the referendum
strongly shaped the military’s behavior to his administration.
Therefore, the Indonesian military continued to push East Timorese refugees to
West Timor and preclude their return.332 Reportedly, up to 300,000 people were moved
out to the West Timor region, with an estimated 167,000 people arriving in mid-2000.
Many who came later had been rounded up by TNI soldiers and paramilitaries, loaded
into trucks and boats, and brought to West Timor. Reportedly, the second–in-command
officer in the referendum task force, who was also the Bali and West and East Nusa
Tenggara (Kodam VI Udayana) regional commander, Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, played a
role in encouraging pro-Indonesia paramilitaries to launch a series of raids across the
border into East Timor.333
The paramilitaries also recorded identities of dislocated people at several
checkpoints, took control of refugee camps, and aggressively sought out suspected proindependence sympathizers, many of whom remain unaccounted for. Thus, not only had
the presence of the paramilitaries obstructed access of humanitarian aid agencies and the
work of UNHCR, but they had also caused the displaced people to be unable to freely
334
decide whether to return home or to stay in Indonesia.
Their continuing presence
through periodic cross-boundary attacks, disinformation campaigns and deterring refugees
from returning home, threatened the security of the newly independent state. Later, former
330
Harian Kompas, February 1, 2000: 11, cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 355.
332
Ibid: 156.
333
Lowry,“East Timor: An Overview of Political Developments,” in Manning and van Diermen (Eds.),
Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi in Crisis, 2000, loc.cit: 104.
334
331
215
minister of defense, Juwono, acknowledged the role of Soeharto loyalists and others
attempting to weaken Wahid by supporting the paramilitaries’ activities there. 335
A more specific incident, largely connected to the role of the Indonesian military,
took place on September 6, 2000, in Atambua, a town located at the border of East and
West Timor. Thousands of armed militia assailed the UNHCR office, took the lives of
336
four humanitarian aid workers including an American. Obviously, this was hardly a
random act of violence. Police officials found Eurico Guterres, the central leader of the
pro-Indonesia militia groups, who instructed his followers not to surrender their guns
during a recent Wahid government campaign to disarm them, which incited the attack and
337
killings.
Moreover, the incident occurred just at the time Wahid was at the UN
headquarters in New York to deliver a speech before at least 154 other world leaders who
assembled for an important world event, the Millennium Summit.338 The official
statements of the US Ambassador to the UN at that time, which said that the world had to
face the fact that elements within the Indonesian military were directly or indirectly
339
responsible for the abuses, exposed the violent behavior of TNI. It does not need much
imagination to understand that the incident was aimed at disgracing Wahid. The violence
had been used to challenge him, domestically and internationally, in order to prove that
the civilian president could not control the current situation and he had lost his
340
credibility. One may thus conclude that the human rights investigations on East Timor
that began in December 17, 1999 and the subsequent dismissal of Gen. Wiranto from his
position as coordinating minister for political and security affairs (Menkopolkam),
strongly stiffened TNI resistance against his presidency and led to continued obstruction
of the East Timor peace process.
IV.F. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in Aceh
Once he was installed, President Wahid ensured quick solutions to regional
violence in Aceh and took personal responsibility for it. However, his earlier promise of a
referendum for Aceh, which was raised during his presidential campaign, became a major
335
Ibid: 159.
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 107.
337
Sims, 2000, loc.cit. With enough evidence, Eurico Guterres was arrested to become a suspect in the
destruction and burning of the UNHCR office in Atambua, while two militia members were arrested and
another four were pursued in connection with those killings.
338
John McBeth and Michael Vatikiotis, “Timor: Jakarta’s Shame,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 21, 2000, http://www.feer.com/_0009_21/p16region.html,
339
Warren Caragata,”Batlle of Wills: It’s Still Wahid versus Rogue Military Elements. Can Anyone Win?”
Asiaweek, Vol..26, No. 39, October 6, 2000; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 378.
340
Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit: 125.
336
216
obstacle for his peace initiatives.341 Wahid thus began his presidency under big pressure
from the Acehnese, of whom a large number of ulama (Islamic clerics), local NGO
activists, students, and intellectuals joined the SIRA (Sentra Informasi untuk Referendum
Aceh --Information Center for Aceh Referendum), and demanded an independence
referendum. While Wahid responded evasively to these demands,342 organized
demonstrations attended by about one million Acehnese stepped up pressure on the
343
government generating alarm among national elites.
The increasing Acehnese clamor for a referendum produced a big dilemma for
Wahid, because he could not hold a referendum without consulting the parliament.
However, such consent could hardly be expected in the light of the earlier disastrous East
Timor referendum and the strong position of nationalist parties such as PDIP, Golkar and
the military/police faction in the DPR. But also initiatives short of a referendum such as
an open-ended dialogue, for which Wahid tolerated a peaceful celebration of the so-called
“twenty-third anniversary of the Aceh declaration of independence” of December 4, 1999
and the displays of GAM flags, or his proposal of a complete withdrawal of all central
government troops from the province, were no longer acceptable to the Acehnese.
As a result, he had to deny that there would be an independence option. Instead,
he offered a new referendum proposal over the introduction of the syariah law and other
concessions such as the appointment of Hasballa Sa’ad, a native Acehnese, as human
rights minister. While these overtures irritated the military, Acehnese regarded them as
worthless.344 Moreover, the promise of a troops withdrawal was not easy to implement
given the military’s aversion to such a measure.
Wahid’s policy to preserve the unity of Indonesia and, simultaneously, tolerate
more civil liberties and democratization had produced on-going tensions between the
military, on the one hand, and SIRA and GAM, on the other. The tensions often caused
low-intensity conflicts between TNI soldiers and GAM rebels, triggered by sweeping
operations or counter-attacks of each party. Growing international pressure on the military
for the atrocities committed in East Timor, increased the military’s frustration of the way
the civilian leader was addressing separatist conflicts. Also, the replacement of Gen.
Wiranto by Adm. Widodo could not reduce tensions and incidents in Aceh since GAM
became stronger and more provocative. According to a report of human rights NGO
Kontras (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan --Commission for Missing
Persons and Victims of Violence), at least 105 people were killed in Aceh in December
341
“Pemerintah Dinilai Lamban Selesaikan Konflik Makassar” (“The Government Was Seen Slow in Addressing Conflict in Makassar”), Harian Kompas, December 31, 1999, apakabar@Radix.Net.
343
344
“Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?” ICG Asia Report, No. 18, June 27, 2001.
342
217
1999.345 The report was a great embarrassment for the president who subsequently
supported the formation of various commissions to inquire into human rights abuses in
346
Aceh, which drew negative reactions from the military.
But even though the conflict in Aceh worsened, the president did not give up his
search for a peaceful settlement. Despite opposition from the parliament and TNI
generals, he negotiated a cease-fire with GAM under the mediation of the Henry Dunant
Centre, a Geneva-based NGO. On May 12, 2000, the Indonesian government signed with
GAM an agreement on a humanitarian pause to stop the armed conflict in the province.
Unfortunately, however, the agreement soon collapsed due to different
interpretations of the two due to different interpretations of the two conflicting parties on
the implementation modalities. GAM’s proposal for ending attacks and removing all TNI
troops, not only for the non-organic (local or special troops), could not be implemented
because President Wahid was of the opinion that he still needed the organic troops to
maintain formal police operations.
But also in Jakarta, political conditions worsened. The replacement of Gen.
Wiranto, and Wahid’s promotions of reformist generals increased TNI resistance against
the president. As TNI’s and parliament’s pressure on him mounted, Wahid
opportunistically changed his position towards GAM and began to adopt an increasingly
tough stance against the separatists. In his accountability speech at the August 2000 MPR
annual session, he announced a less compromising approach towards GAM. He vowed
that he would no longer allow any separatist movement, and that he would take firm
action against separatists. Yet, he was still committed to the policy of special autonomy
for Aceh that had been earlier agreed by Habibie and the parliament and some parts of
which had to be implemented before the end of 2001. Under this framework, Aceh was
entitled to a 70 percent share of oil and gas revenues, and autonomy in religious and
educational matters, including the adoption of the syariah law.347
Despite the humanitarian pause, violence in Aceh continued almost unabatedly.
The incidents between security forces and GAM worsened during the first and second
phase of a humanitarian pause that took place before and after September 2, 2000. They
climaxed with the bloodshed of November 10-11, 2000 in Banda Aceh which was caused
by a clash between security forces and demonstrators participating in a massive rally
organized by SIRA in support of a referendum on independence. The violence, in which
thirty-nine people died after the security forces, particularly the police, opened fire into
345
The Jakarta Post, January 29, 2000.
347
“Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace,” ICG Asia Report, No. 17, June 12, 2001.
346
218
the crowds, had not only damaged his peace options and impeded subsequent
negotiations, but also tarnished the image of his government in Aceh.348
In the meantime, GAM became more aggressive in searching for new targets.
After consecutive attacks on cabinet members and American energy giant Exxon Mobil,
which disrupted the activities of other major industries in Aceh, President Wahid had no
choice but to support TNI in sending 2,000 additional troops to protect the firms so that
349
they were able to continue their operations. Also a limited agreement for the cessation
of hostilities (COHA) within restricted zones in North Aceh and Bireun for only 2 weeks
from March 22 to April 3, 2001 failed.
Thus, in February 2001, Wahid’s defence minister, Mahfud M.D. stated that the
government had shown patience for a long time to negotiate a peace accord with GAM.
Unfortunately, rather than attempting to show good will, GAM separatists tended to step
up their armed attacks in an attempt to hasten the secession of Aceh from Indonesia.
Since GAM did not change their response, and as his government was losing patience,
Mahfud M.D. warned that President Wahid would no longer tolerate GAM separatist
actions.350
On the government side, the military always opposed a soft approach to
separatism including political dialogue and negotiations. Lack of consistent support from
political parties and growing criticism in the legislative bodies (DPR and MPR) and the
charge that Wahid jeopardized the unity of the state due to his persistent negotiations with
GAM had undermined his position. Therefore, after all his peace initiatives had failed,
beginning in mid-March 2001, he introduced a new policy of “limited military operation”
to back the on-going police operations in Aceh.351 His break with a conciliatory approach
was also marked by his government’s decision to classify GAM as a “separatist”
organization. The issuance of the Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 4 on April 11, 2001
gave both political and legal protections for the TNI’s new operation. Wahid apparently
tried to force the Acehnese, especially the GAM rebels, to accept the special autonomy
status with more repressive measures. As mentioned by Bourchier, the rising resistance
and pressure from the military and other opposition groups to his government offered the
352
president no more scope for compromise with the Acehnese (rebels).
348
Majalah Tempo 29, No. 37, November 13-19, 2000, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 180, 246.
Majalah Tempo 30, No. 3, March 19-25, 2001, ibid.
350
“Usaha Tangkal Aksi Penyerangan Bersenjata di Aceh, TNI Akan Gelar Operasi Militer Terbatas”
(“Deterring Armed Assaults, TNI Will Deploy Limited Military Operations”), http://www.hamline.edu/
apaka-bar/basisdata/2001/02/27/0047.html, February 28, 2001: 1-2; Also, interview with Mahfud M.D. on
January 9, 2007.
351
349
219
IV.G. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in Aceh
In January 1999, TNI, although formally under the auspices of the national
police, launched Operasi Wibawa (Operation Authority), which was infamous for its
massacres of civilians. 353 Entering the second half of 1999 until the beginning of the
Wahid presidency, violence in Aceh escalated, killing at least 260 people.354 Acehnese
had earlier called for the complete withdrawal of TNI troops, but this had been repeatedly
refused by Wiranto. New human rights abuses committed by the troops prompted the
Acehnese demand for a referendum on independence.
Military behavior in the troubling province was also influenced by the policies of
the civilian government. Fast growing pressure by civic movements demanding a
referendum on independence and President Wahid’s tolerance of separatist activities,
motivated the TNI to increase repression. Wiranto’s army chief, Gen. Subagyo, even
355
suggested that martial law be declared in parts of Aceh.
In a press conference in Tokyo, during his state visit to Japan in mid-November
1999, Wahid, who often made inconsistent decisions, again promised a referendum in
356
Aceh, which would be conducted within 7 months. This caused a stern reaction from
TNI spokesman, Maj. Gen Sudrajat, who commented that Wahid had been expressing a
personal opinion, not speaking in his capacity as president. In blatant insubordination,
Sudrajat further suggested that if Wahid rejected the military a free hand in crushing the
Acehnese separatists, they might attempt to manoeuvre him out of power.357 Hardly less
subtle was the warning of defense minister Juwono that Indonesia might face a Pakistanstyle military takeover, if civilians failed to build a “healthy and strong” political
atmosphere. There were clear indications that the current military leadership considered
civilian rule as a temporary and possibly dangerous experiment.358 That is why Wahid
suddenly changed his mind. In a state visit to Jordan, on November 24,1999 he told
reporters that independence for Aceh was out of context.359
352
Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc.cit: 34.
“A Reign of Terror: Human Rights Violations in Aceh 1998 -2000”, Tapol, March 2000, in Damien
Kingsbury, “The Blessing of September 11: The 'War on Terror', Reform and the TNI,” Joyo Indonesia
News, Kabar Irian, June 29, 2004 (Part 2).
354
“Indonesian President Says Acehnese Have Right to referendum,” Agence France-Presse, November 4,
1999, http://meltingpot.fortunecity.com/albania/726/president.htm..
355
Agence France Press, November 21, 1999; Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc.
cit: 34.
356
“Indonesia Wahid: Wants to Hold Referendum on Aceh in 7 Months,” Dow Jones , November 16, 1999,
cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 334.
357
“Wahid’s Statement on Aceh Vote Only Personal Opinion: Army Spokesman,” Agence France-Presse,
November 17, 1999, ibid.
358
The Jakarta Post, 23 November 1999; Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc.cit: 34.
359
353
220
In the meantime, failing to prevent people attending the celebration of the twentythird anniversary of the declaration of independence of Aceh organized by GAM on
December 4, 1999, the TNI launched attacks with full strength on GAM targets while
making their sweeping operations in various regions of Aceh. On the other side, GAM
stepped up its counter-attacks on military and police targets. On account of the rising
number of innocent victims in Aceh, and based on the initiative of Acehnese
representatives, the DPR made a testimonial hearing by inviting leading generals. The
hearing was attended by three ex-chief commanders, e.g. Gen. Benny Murdani, Gen. Try
Sutrisno, and Gen. Feisal Tanjung, and ex-operational and territorial officers, e.g. Maj.
Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim, who knew much about the “Operasi Jaring Merah I and II”
(“Red-Web I and II” operations) which had been conducted in Aceh, and Lt. Gen.
Syarwan Hamid, ex-Liliwangsa resort (Korem) commander. Passionate accusations by
DPR members, especially Teungku Nasruddin Daud, a respected PPP’s ulama, of TNI’s
past human right abuses, demanding their leaders’ accountability, had embarrassed all the
generals attending the hearing.360 It was not known whether there was connection
between the testimony and the death of Daud in Medan, near Aceh, when he made a
working visit soon afterward. It was reported further that at least thirty people were killed
in one week alone in mid-January 2000, which was an abnormally high toll.361
In fact, Wahid’s support for the prosecution of human rights abuses allegedly
involving middle-level officers, which had just begun on April 21, 2000, was met by TNI
resistance. The lieutenant-colonel in command of the troops who were accused of killing
over fifty villagers in Desa Betong Ateuh (West Aceh regency) on July 23, 1999 had
mysteriously disappeared, leaving a captain as the most senior officer among those
362
charged. Meanwhile, high-level officers or generals who might be accountable in
preparing brutal campaigns in Aceh were not prosecuted.
Wahid’s move to further negotiate with the Acehnese armed rebels (GAM) to
reach a humanitarian pause under the mediation of the Henry Dunant Centre of
Switzerland was countered with even greater resistance by the military. Fighting between
TNI and GAM continued when Wahid won the international community’s respect for his
attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully such as by negotiating an agreement of
cessation of hostilities in Geneva. Apparently, the 1999 East Timor referendum, which
resulted in the province’s secession made the military more distrustful of any sort of
international involvement in the country’s conflict resolution.
The resumption of TNI and GAM clashes caused new violence in various areas of
Aceh despite the renewal of the humanitarian pause agreement until December 2000. As
360
The hearing was attended by the writer.
“I Could Have Taken Power,” The Age, January 23, 2000.
362
361
221
revealed by Kontras in July 2000, there were at least eight incidents of armed conflict,
seven attacks on civilians, eight attacks on security personnel, and three sweeping
operations, in which sixty people died and eighteen were injured, including security
363
forces officials. In a press release, new TNI spokesman, Rear Marshall Graito Usodo,
disclosed that up to the end of the first humanitarian pause on September 2, 2000, TNI
had noted forty civilian dead and 122 injured. In addition, twenty security forces officials
364
(military and police) had been killed. Altogether more than 960 people died in clashes
365
in 2000, twice as much as in 1999. Among them was the clash on November 10-11,
2000 between pro-referendum demonstrators and the security forces in Banda Aceh. The
latter confrontation virtually ended the political dialogue between the Wahid government
and GAM.366
As GAM bargaining position improved, the military increased activities in Aceh.
Responding to the guerilla tactics of GAM, TNI soldiers often demonstrated little
restraint. GAM’s attacks on two visiting cabinet ministers and on Exxon were answered
with the preparation of new military operations and troop reinforcements. As mentioned
by Eldridge, TNI in Aceh faced a stark choice between withdrawal, with full legal
acknowledgement of past human rights abuses, or re-imposing a martial law.367
The end of President Wahid’s soft approach, due to the rising pressure of military
leadership and the parliament to his policy, had created a situation that favoured the TNI’s
approach of eliminating GAM. His failure in maintaining reformist generals on the one
hand, and TNI conservative leaders’ success in impeding security sector reforms on the
other, had resulted in a more repressive approach by TNI toward Aceh. In due course,
TNI had been able to convince the president that GAM could no longer be tolerated and
should be crushed.368
TNI campaigns launched after the issuance of Presidential Decree (Keppres) No.
4/2001 drastically increased violence in Aceh. Within one to 2 months, in May, and June
2001 alone, 367 people were reportedly killed.369 With President Wahid on their side,
TNI, as part of security forces, had a reason for showing less tolerance for any kind of
peaceful demonstrations, let alone demanding a referendum on independence in Aceh.
After that, it was reported that the death toll mounted by around fifty up to a hundred
363
Harian Kompas, July 18, 2000 in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 179.
The Jakarta Post, September 22, 2000, ibid.
365
Majalah Tempo 29, No. 37, November 13-19, 2000; AFP, November 11-14, 2000; AFP, January 6,
2001.
366
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 180, 246.
367
368
The Jakarta Post, August 7, 2000; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 181.
369
Majalah Tempo 30, No. 18, July 2-8, 2001.
364
222
people per month.370 Attacks into 2001 indicated that dozens of local people continued to
be killed by security forces each week, despite another cease-fire being signed in May
371
2001.
IV.H. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in Irian Jaya
To stop the widespread protests caused by the policy of Habibie, President Wahid
withdrew the planned division of Irian Jaya by revoking the law that had been passed by
the DPR and endorsed by the Keppres (Presidential Decree) of September 25, 1998. He
tried then to introduce a more tolerant towards Papuans. Unlike Habibie, Wahid tolerated
the display of Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) flags in Timika beginning on November 10,
1999 without any intervention from security forces. He permitted the flag raising
ceremonies as long as Indonesian Merah Putih (Red and White) flags were also on
display. Thus, on December 1, 1999, Morning Star flags were raised in eleven towns, and
massive gatherings held everywhere to celebrate “West Papuan independence”. According
to Elsham, a human rights NGO, up to 800,000 people took part in these events, which
372
would have been impossible during the past authoritarian period of Soeharto.
To calm the Papuans, Wahid visited the region by December 31, 1999 and had
talks with community representatives and nationalist leaders. In a symbolic act of
reconciliation, he renamed the Irian Jaya province Papua. This name, which
acknowledged Papuans’ cultural claims, had not been used since the Soeharto regime took
over the province from the Dutch through the Pepera (referendum).373 Nevertheless, he
restated that for his government, independence was not an option.374 In fact, the name
change was never officially used under the Wahid presidency because it was attacked by
parliamentarians, especially the TNI/police faction members in the DPR, charging that it
jeopardizes national unity.
On January 1, 2000, at the regional command (Kodam XVII Trikora) headquarters, Wahid announced the using of the original name of Irian Jaya, Papua, which was
greatly appreciated by the Papuans, but strongly rejected by the military since it sounded
less nationalistic. He later assigned his deputy, Megawati, to give more attention to the
most-eastern province of Indonesia, and she was accompanied by nine ministers on the
visit to Papua from May 18-22, 2000. The delegation visited eleven municipalities and
370
Ibid.
372
“Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Papua, 1999-2000”, Human Righst Watch:
New York, 2000: 27-30.
373
374
Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 156, 242.
371
223
two districts, which never happened in the past. Rather than trying to discuss political
issues that were long awaited by the Papuans, during her visits, Vice-President Megawati
unfortunately talked a lot about cultural issues. Also, because she used an official car and
was tightly guarded by security guards, it was almost impossible for the Papuans to
communicate with her. Even a daughter of the main tribal chief who was widely respected
in Papua had not been almost allowed to meet her. This caused more criticism and
375
damaged the Wahid government’s image. Wahid’s investigation of Soeharto’s alleged
KKN cases had resulted in growing opposition and pressure, not only in Jakarta, but also
in Papua. Theys Eluay and Yorrys Raweyai, two Papuan informal leaders, became more
active in provoking and mobilizing Papuans to struggle for independence. Ryter, a
researcher who studied the Indonesian paramilitary organizations, pointed to the
connection between Yorrys’ separatist activities in Irian Jaya with the Soeharto family’s
struggle for survival in Jakarta. 376 According to Ryter, within weeks after the
investigations against Soeharto started, Yorrys was able to mobilize independence
protests in Jayapura. O’Rourke, in addition, claimed that Yorris, who was also the leader
of PP (Pemuda Pancasila --Pancasila Youth) a pro-Soeharto paramilitary organization,
had provoked separatism and ethnic conflict to worsen the sense of crisis in Jakarta.377
After the fall of Soeharto, Yorrys was observed continuing to position himself as a
leading Irianese or Papuan figure. Although a native Papuan and widely known, he was
not a credible freedom campaigner in Papua since his interests noticeably rested in
Jakarta. He had, however, a background of long and dedicated service to the Soeharto
family and the military, involving his PP members. This occurred while PP chief legal
counsel, Ruhut Sitompul, was working as Wiranto’s personal lawyer in the KPP HAM
Timtim’s investigation of the general’s alleged involvement in East Timor’s gross human
rights violations.
Meanwhile, Theys’ rise to prominence in 1998-1999 was connected with Yorrys
378
and Soeharto’s backing. Many believed that both might be trying to manipulate the
Papuan separatist aspiration to the advantage of Jakarta elites and the Soeharto family. In
a failed attempt to reduce pressure created by the Soeharto family and their loyalists,
President Wahid took an initiative seeking reconciliation with them. Yorrys represented
them in Soeharto’s Cendana residence, and it was broadcasted by many national
375
J. Osdar,“Sentuhan Para Presiden kepada Papua” (“Presidents’ Policies to Papua”), December 1, 2005,
http://www. Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/01/Politikhukum/2254535.htm: 2.
376
Ryter, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 46, 66.
377
378
224
television channels. Thus, Wahid had visited Yorrys in Cendana, where Soeharto, his
family, and cronies attended the meeting.379
After the failure of the reconciliation meeting, Theys and Yorrys intensified their
separatist activities. These were connected with political tensions following Wahid’s
dismissal of Golkar cadres from the cabinet, namely, Jusuf Kalla, Bomer Pasaribu, and
Mahadi Sinambela. As Theys and Yorrys were Golkar members, with Yorrys being the
leader of the party’s youth wing, AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia --Young
Generation for Indonesia’s Reform), the turbulences in Jakarta had repercussions in
Papua.380 Papuan nationalists formalized their movement by organizing two big
congresses on February 23-26, 2000 and May 29-June 4, 2000, which resulted in the
establishment of Presidium Dewan Papua (PDP), or Presidium of the Papuan Assembly.
Wahid responded to this challenge of his government by a soft approach. He tolerated the
raising of the Morning Star flags which he regarded as cultural expressions, and not
necessarily separatist acts. He had, moreover, donated 1 billion Rupiah to finance the
second congress. Also, he had arranged a meeting on July 4, 2000 with Theys, the newly
emerging leader of the separatist movement, whose influence among Papuans increased
rapidly.381 However he failed in renaming Irian Jaya province to Papua as his opponents
in the MPR became stronger after Megawati’s PDIP and the Golkar factions aligned
themselves with the TNI/police faction in the DPR.
Implementing MPR Decree No. 4 /2000, the Wahid government and DPR passed
special autonomy laws for Papua (Law No. 21/2001) and Aceh (Law No.18/2001). The
one on Papua, agreed to in April 2001, comprising clauses preserving and enforcing
Papuan values and culture, transferred a substantial amount of power to the province, and
recommended that 80 percent of revenue be retained by the provincial government. At the
same time, however, the MPR decree prevented Wahid from introducing a more
progressive solution to Papuans by offering federalism.
379
Again, on occasion of the 2005 National Conference of Golkar, Yorrys was assigned by the party to ex tend a special appreciation and award, namely Anugerah Bhakti Pratama, or the Most Distinguished
Award to the ex-party’s Advisory Council Leader, to Soeharto for his highest devotion. See, Indra Subagja,
“Soeharto Bantah Ajukan Syarat Terima Penghargaan Golkar” (Soeharto Not Give Conditio-nality for the
Golkar’s Award”), http://jkt1.detiknews.com/indexphp/ detik. read/tahun/2005/bulan/11/tgl/ 24/time/213043adnews/485918/id-kanal/10: 1-2.
380
See, also, “Ikrar: Yudoyono Tidak Memiliki ‘Leadership,’” (“Ikrar: Yudoyono Has No ‘Leadership’”),
Suara Pembaruan, http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/19/Nasional/nas07.htm: 1-2.
381
225
IV.I. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in Irian Jaya
The military’s support of Wahid’s victory in the presidential election influenced
his decision to retain Gen. Wiranto as TNI chief commander. However, his good relations
with the military turned into conflict as he began to investigate the alleged reports of the
Soeharto’s KKN and Wiranto’s involvement in the East Timor mayhem. The conflict
worsened after Wahid continued to use a democratic approach through cooperative
responses to settle separatist conflict in the eastern-most of Indonesia’s provinces, Irian
Jaya. In contrast to him, who tolerated Papuan demonstrations and congresses, and even
the display of the Morning Star flag, the military adopted a repressive approach.
Moreover, after Foreri (Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya --Forum for the
Reconciliation of Irian Jaya People) raised the issue of independence, TNI tightened their
control over Papuans, and prohibited them from displaying the Morning Star flag and
from using their original provincial name Papua.382 Army chief Gen. Sutarto also warned
that TNI would not tolerate any secessionism, including the one in Papua that undermined
383
the existence of Indonesia.
As a result of the hardline stance of the military, several Papuan were killed or
wounded in Nabire (July 2000), Sorong (August 2000) and Merauke (February 2002),
following clashes provoked by flag-raising incidents. The prohibition of flag raisings and
TNI’s repressive measures also caused serious clashes in Wamena, where thirty-seven
people were killed, eighty-nine injured, dozens arrested, and more than 13,000 people
reportedly left the area on October 6, 2000.384 Also, the commemoration of the Papuan
independence, which was held across the province on December 1, 2000, produced
several incidents, and caused a number of Papuans in Merauke, Fak-fak, and Tiom killed
when security forces pressurized people to take down the flags after the permitted time.
As reported by Komnas HAM, killings, torture, and forced disappearances also occurred
385
in Wasior on June 13, 2001. Meanwhile, Papuan separatist leader Theys Eluay and
several members of the PDP were arrested and imprisoned for 2 months due to their
separatist activities in the flag raising ceremonies and organizing the two big congresses
mentioned above.
Alleged backing and financial support from the Soeharto family stifled initiatives
of local authorities to prohibit Theys and Yorrys from more activities in provoking
Papuan people to demand independence. 386 With the suspected role of third parties,
382
“TNI Tidak Tolerir Pemisahan Irian Jaya” (“TNI Not Tolerate Separation of Irian Jaya”), http://www.
hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/11/13/ 0048.html, November 14, 2000: 1-3.
384
385
“Pemerintah Dinilai Lebih Cinta SDA daripada SDM” (“Government Preferred Natural to Human Resources”), Harian Kompas, June 5, 2006: 8.
386
See again Ryter, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 46, 66.
383
226
especially military territorial units, it was unproblematic to mobilize the Papuans who
mostly lived in remote highlands and coastal areas to come to the two big congresses held
within a short time interval. Irian Jaya, although being rich with natural resources, was the
least developed region of the Eastern Indonesian provinces, everything was costly there,
and most Papuans still lived in great poverty and had poor educational backgrounds. In
the absence of facilities, particularly transportation means, the holding of the two big
congresses would be impossible without the logistic assistance of TNI’s territorial units.
For their part, Theys and Yorrys were new leaders known only by Papuans who lived in
the main cities.
Therefore, it is likely that pro-Soeharto local authorities and military territorial
units facilitated the access of Theys and Yorrys to remote areas. After the 1961 Mandala
military operation to free Irian Jaya from the Dutch colonial rule, and also the 1968
Pepera referendum, Soeharto became popular among the Papuans. Ryter’s description of
the triangle relations between Soeharto, TNI, and the Pemuda Pancasila paramilitary
group explain the military’s double game in response to the separatist movement in Irian
Jaya.387 At the beginning, the territorial units helped the separatists in organizing their
activities with the effect of identifying their identity and exposing their sanctuaries. With
this knowledge, the military was later able to crush them by using intelligence operations
of Kopassus units. The same two-pronged strategy had been previously used by the
military in eliminating separatist movements in East Timor (Falintil), Aceh (GAM), and
Maluku (RMS).
In fact, Theys’ arrest was not followed by the arrest of Yorrys. Unlike Theys and
other Papuan political leaders, NGO activists, and foreigners who were tightly watched,
Yorrys could freely come to and leave Irian Jaya. As expected, shortly after the two big
congresses, the Papuan separatist movement was paralyzed by repressive measures of the
military. Similar to what happened in East Timor, Aceh, and Maluku, in Irian Jaya, TNI
repression was evidence of the military’s determination to prevent at all costs a
referendum with an independence option.388 The mobilization of militias such as Pemuda
Pancasila against the separatists was a strategy to forego future accusations of human
rights abuses, albeit one bound to fail.
Moreover, in the mounting tensions between Wahid and TNI leaders, the military
intensified their security approach in Papua. Consequently, killings, torture, and
kidnappings occurred as TNI troops began to eradicate the separatist movement in Papua.
The deep suspicions of TNI troops of indigenous people pushed them to treat every
Papuan as if he or she were member of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka -Organization for An Independent Papua) separatist group. Not coincidentically, TNI
387
Ibid: 45 et seqq.
227
presence in Papua remained high. This meant that Kopassus personnel were positioned at
district-level (Kodim) headquarters where they were particularly visible.389 Simon Patrice
Morin, a native Papuan, told of the aggressive behaviour of the TNI soldiers posted in
Papua. This is why he was of the opinion that the Papuans feel more secure if there were
only a few TNI soldiers. In other words, due to the unchanging approach, the more TNI
soldiers that were posted there, the more the Papuans felt insecure. 390
IV.J. Understanding Wahid’s Compromise with the Military
Interestingly, Wahid had always argued that political culture greatly influenced
Indonesian leaders and their style of government.391 Similar to Soeharto, Wahid was seen
as symbolizing Semar, who, in the Javanese wayang or shadow puppet, performed as the
servant of the good heroes, who was well respected due to his seniority and authority, and
392
reputed to be blessed with magical powers from God. More than this, Semar perceived
himself as the representative of God in the King’s palace. 393
Meanwhile, authority and power are seen as a concrete matter by Javanese whose
life is marked by symbols. As widespread unrest occurred in various regions, many
people believed that President Wahid had lost the support of the majority of Indonesians.
This meant that he had lost the wahyu or the sacred mandate from God to govern the
country. President Wahid was aware that he would face a critical situation when he could
not prevent or end the unrest that, as he later knew, had been instigated by military
elements.394
Likewise, the spread of political rallies throughout the country and the “seizure”
of various symbolically important buildings and monuments by anti-Wahid demonstrators
and the military were seen as being politically significant by the majority of the
population due to their traditional perception of the heavenly wahyu. For most Indonesian
leaders, especially those who had Javanese native backgrounds, such culturally inspired
rejection was so important that it greatly influenced their political actions. Not
surprisingly, when Wahid was cornered by the rallies, which had been backed-up by the
military, he immediately sent his traditional supporters to handle the unrest and calm the
388
Eldridge, 2002, op.cit : 138-139.
The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, op.cit.
390
Simon Patrice Morin was interviewed on April 2, 2008 in Jakarta.
391
392
At the office of Muhaimin Iskandar, chairperson of PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa -- Nation Awakening Party), the picture of Wahid with Semar costume and character was hung on the wall, see,
“’Korban Gus Dur Bertambah” (“Another Gus Dur’ Victims “), Media Indonesia, Maret 28, 2008: 1.
393
Singh, 2000, op. cit: 137, 154.
394
389
228
demonstrators. He also sent NU members from the grass root level to counter rumors that
had been spread regarding his allegedly corrupt attitudes. The news was considered as
bringing humiliation on Wahid and to undermine his position. This is why those who
spread the rumors became the target of intimidation by his militant supporters, in
particular, Banser (Barisan Serbaguna --the Versatile Guard), a paramilitary organization
of Ansor, the youth wing organization of NU.395
Arguing that he was not Soeharto who had misused the sacred mandate, Wahid
said that he could actually maintain his mandate by resorting to more violence. This was a
common habit of Javanese rulers in the past when facing rebellion or coup attempts.
However, different from Javanese leaders from central Java or wilayah pedalaman --the
mainland, where the Mataram kingdom was located-- who never interact with Western
rationality and still are strongly influenced by their rural culture, Wahid who was born in
East Java and studied abroad, avoided to make reprisals. He was aware that reprisals
could produce civil war, as often happened in the country’s history. In other words, if he
396
defended his mandate by using force, there would be bloodshed. Therefore, Wahid lost
his presidency after being forced to resign; or as the Javanese put it: lengser ke prabon,
not through a normal political succession. He regarded his impeachment as an
“unconstitutional” transfer of power, similar to a coup d’état. He believed it had been
397
organized by his opponents who were backed by the military. Nevertheless, for the
majority of Indonesian people, mystical, supernatural, or cultural rejection was in some
ways more significant than the truth, that is, the unconstitutional succession.
Regarding the Indonesian political culture, which was still to a considerable extent
feudalistic due to the considerable influence of Javanese culture, Wahid recognized that
there were aspects of Javanese political culture that were not democratic. Referring to the
concept of government as ruling like a king, he maintained it is widely internalized by
political elites and their military supporters. This cultural explanation of events under
Wahid was even shared by Arief Budiman, an Indonesian sociologist, who normally
pursues a structuralist approach.398
Furthermore, President Wahid’s unwillingness to punish big violators of human
rights that had allegedly created the violence afflicting Indonesia for some time created
his reputation of not decisively suppressing violence. Mochtar Pabotinggi, a political
analyst from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), argued that if President Wahid
were against violence, he would have created a very strong deterrent by strictly and
395
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 126.
Abdurrahman Wahd was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta.
397
For the military’s veto player role during Wahid’s impeachment, see Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 130-131.
398
Bhaskara, 2000, op.cit: 117-118.
396
229
rigidly punishing violators of human rights.399 In reality, Wahid’s lack of courage to take
firm action and enforce the law had resulted in the spread of violence throughout the
country. Responsible military leaders were thus able to escape adequate punishment
during his presidency. Worse even, under pressure by the military he finally acquiesced to
address separatism in Aceh and Papua through repressive means and by supporting
intensified military operations there.400
Other political analysts, such as Harry Tjan Silalahi from the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, linked Wahid’s Javanese cultural background
to the compromises he made with the military. In this point Harry, who was also an expert
of Javanology, came to similar conclusions like a structuralist such as Arief Budiman.
Harry argued that in order to understand Wahid’s presidency, one had to understand
different types of Javanese political culture. Harry, like Arief, saw a relationship between
President Wahid’s behavior and the slowness, inconsistency and indecisiveness of the
Javanese people from wilayah pesisir, coastal areas, where the Majapahit kingdom was
located and its people have interacted with foreigners since a long time. For example, in
the case of Gen. Wiranto, the former chief commander, President Wahid was unable to
take firm action. He had suspended his decision to dismiss Gen. Wiranto several times. In
the end, he was too late to release Wiranto from his post as coordinating minister for
political and security affairs to get an opportunity to summon him to the court that was
dealing with his alleged involvement in gross human rights violations in East Timor
before and after the referendum. For Wahid, Gen. Wiranto has also attempted to maintain
East Timor inside the NKRI, protecting it from foreign intervention. Therefore, he did not
support an international tribunal for trying Gen. Wiranto, and even showed no reaction
when the Indonesian ad hoc human rights tribunal released him later from any
responsibility.
Additionally, President Wahid did not really like to be criticized. Although he
easily communicated with other people and one could tell him everything, it had to be
done in a Javanese or kyai (a respected traditional Javanese Islamic leader) way. He was
said not to be the scholarly type of decision maker, who sat down with experts and
debated with them. Instead, conforming to Javanese culture, he slowly arrived at a
conclusion. Also, he would give full attention to what input others might have for him,
but he made his decision on his own. More clearly, in the eye of the German-born
Indonesianist, Magnis-Suseno, President Wahid was some sort of a combination of a
Javanese king and a wali, the respected traditional Javanese propagator of Islam. 401
399
Ibid: 91 et seqq.
Ibid.
401
Ibid: 142-143; Also, interview with Franz Magnis-Suseno on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta.
400
230
President Wahid’s views on the on-going conflicts across the country that broke
out since the fall of Soeharto made clear his cultural disposition. From his perspective, the
conflicts were kinds of amuk massa or riots, allegedly produced by Soeharto’s loyalists
who could not accept his fall. They run amok because their leader was forced to resign
which they considered as an insult for him. Responding to their anger, President Wahid
took the initiative to visit Soeharto and former chief commanders, such as Murdani and
Try Sutrisno, to prevent further incidents provoked by the past regime’s followers. By
approaching the former New Order’s ruler and supporters in a conciliatory move,
President Wahid attempted to rebuild the disturbed keselarasan (harmony) and
keheningan (tranquility).
Due to the Javanese culture’s call for deference towards elders, for this reason,
too, he was reluctant to impose stringent punishments on Soeharto.402 He understood that
in the Javanese political culture, the new leader had to keep the principle of mikul dhuwur
mendem jero, meaning that past leaders should be respected and released from any charge
of wrongdoings they did in the past. Otherwise, their followers would demand vengeance
for their discontents. The same culture logic also prevailed when Wahid’s followers
themselves rioted in various regions in Java. In their view, Wahid was insulted by the
DPR with its memorandum threatening him with a proposal to the MPR to impeach him,
even though the attorney general’s office had made clear that he was not involved in the
scandal over the embezzlement of Bulog funds.
V. Coping with Islam and Radical Muslims
V.A. Wahid and Islam
Wahid was enormously critical of all that smacked of Islamic fundamentalism,
sectarianism and religious extremism. He could not hide his dislike of fanatics who
claimed to be more religious than others. By contrast, Wahid’s Muslimhood was open, far
from exclusive. It did not, as in the case of other Muslim leaders, disengage him from
people of other religions and beliefs. He was identified with Islamic liberalism and
Islamic secularism since he had frequently praised Muhammad Sahid Al Asmawi, one of
the promoters of secularist Islam. 403
Importantly, Wahid had been on a lifelong campaign to promote religious
tolerance. For him, “political Islam” stood in stark contrast to his Javanese-based cultural
and traditional Islam. In fact, it was the more fanatic elements of political Islam who had
mounted armed insurrections in West Java during the 1950s and in Aceh until to the
402
403
Bhaskara, 2000, op.cit: 93, 118.
Ibid: 43-44, 144.
231
present. In Wahid’s view, radical and Middle Eastern variants of Islam struggling for the
introduction of syariah law to Indonesia, would keep apart Indonesia’s religious
minorities. Although they formed no more than 12 percent of the national population, in
reality, some of these minorities were the majority groups in certain distant regions of the
Indonesian archipelago, especially, in the eastern parts, such as Maluku, Papua, and Nusa
Tenggara Timur. Thus, the advance of “political Islam,” Wahid argued, would exacerbate
secessionist tendencies in the regions where minorities were dominant, and put national
unity at risk.
It was thus only consequent that Wahid upheld the state ideology Pancasila,
which embodied the Javanese idea of harmony and unity. For Wahid, without it,
Indonesia would cease to be a state. In fact, he urged Indonesians to abolish all
regulations, provisions, and laws that violated Pancasila.404
Wahid recognized the equality of all religions and had the ability to interact with
other religions. He never felt more Islamic than others, and never judged the “Muslimness” of other Muslims.405 As a “neo-modernist,” adopting Barton’s terminology, Wahid
was committed to pluralism and the core values of democracy. His pluralistic views had
been woven into the very fabric of his version of Islamic faith as the principal values of
406
Islam itself.
As Indonesia’s national unity was based on a living political ideology, namely,
Pancasila. Therefore, Wahid argued that Muslims should conform to live in a state that
would never be based on the formal recognition of Islam as objectively “better” or more
deserving of government support than other religions. Otherwise, he reminded, such a
development would jeopardize national unity.407 Together with NU’s scholars, Wahid
declared that there was no need to establish an Islamic state, and that Pancasila was
compatible with the principles of Islam. Clearly, in many ways, Pancasila had become his
preferred ideological vehicle for the expression of his political messages. Yet, he feared
that democratization would provide Indonesians with the opportunity to “choose Islam,”
which in turn may play into the hands of radical Muslims, or the military, which would
408
eventually reject and fight both democracy and political Islam.
As an advocate of secularism, Wahid shared parallels with Sukarno, Indonesia’s
first civilian president, He also recommended Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a Turkish leader
who eliminated Islamic formalism in politics, as a model to be used in Indonesia. Wahid
404
“Pidato Gus Dur” (“Gus Dur Speech”), Suara Pembaruan, June 8, 2006: 2.
Mochtar Buchori, “NU: A Bullwark of Indonesian Democracy?“ The Jakarta Post, December 7, 1994.
406
Barton in David Bourchier and John Legge, (Eds.) Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, Victoria: Monash University, 1994: 144-147.
407
Ramage, op.cit: 62.
408
Ibid: 72.
405
232
insisted that democracy in this country, despite the reality that around 90 percent of its
population is Muslim, could only thrive in a setting of religious harmony. Within this
context, Wahid strongly believed that the character of Indonesia as a Pancasila state, and
its stress on religious harmony, was a basic requisite for the maturity of a real democracy
in the country. In other words, Islam was mentioned not as an exclusive option to other
systems of social order, but as a complementary element among a broad range of other
409
aspects in the nation’s life.
In Wahid’s view, the problem was that Islam was not fully comprehended by the
majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Different from his view on Islam, which assured
democracy and equal treatment, the Islam that was practiced in Islamic countries, e.g. the
Middle East, and became the orientation of radical Muslims in Indonesia, was a legal
formality. President Wahid was aware that during his rule religious fundamentalists
would keep fighting for Islamic laws for Indonesia. In his view, Islamic laws, if adopted,
would breach Pancasila ideology and the 1945 State Constitution that guaranteed the
principle of the unitary state (NKRI).
V.B. Wahid and Radical Muslims
Wahid’s secularist view on the separation of religion and state and his refusal to
grant a more pronounced role to Islam in the government and legal system exposed him to
criticism from radical Muslims. Despite their rejection of Wahid’s secularist views after
the withdrawal of Habibie from the 1999 presidential contest, radical Muslims had no
alternative, but supported and voted for him to stop the woman candidate from the
winning party of the legislative elections, Megawati Soekarnoputri, to be chosen as the
country’s next president. Wahid’s open criticism of Megawati, in which he opportunistically questioned Megawati’s readiness as a female leader of a predominantly Muslim
country, had contributed to broad support for his election from the radical Muslims and
410
conservative groups in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Thus, one of the
key factors behind Wahid’s election victory was support from the powerful alliance of
Islamic parties, particularly, conservative groups under the leadership of Amien Rais
(PAN), Hamzah Haz and Aisyah Amini (PPP), Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Hartono Marjono
and Ahmad Sumargono (PBB), Nur Hidayat Wahid (PK), and Marwah Daud Ibrahim
411
(ICMI). They all expected something in return for their support, namely, access to
409
Abdurrahman Wahid, “Indonesia’s Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a Choice?“ in Richard
Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds., The Politics of Middle Class in Indonesia, Victoria: Monash University, 1990, 24, Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 119.
410
Tran, loc.cit: 1-3.
411
See again, Havely, 2005, loc.cit; also “Indonesian election tr iggers violence,” BBC News, 2005, loc.cit.
233
political power and concessions from the Wahid government, to be able to realize their
conservative notions on an Islamic state and society.
Nonetheless, the support Wahid obtained in the presidential election would not
stop him from opposing the political Islamists and their radical activities. For example, he
denounced leaders and followers of FPI (Front Pembela Islam --Front for Islam
Defenders) for their attacks on Christian religious sites in Wisma Doulos and Lombok and
on places, such as discotheques, nightclubs, bars, and so forth in the name of Islam.
According to Wahid, such brutal behavior could not be tolerated and had to be stopped
because it did not respect rule of law and led to anarchy.
As a Muslim leader, Wahid also publicly denounced the alleged involvements of
radical Muslims of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in
serial bombings and terrorist attacks across Indonesia. These attacks increased when he
faced rising resistance and pressure from the Soeharto family and its cronies as well as the
military due to his reform policies. It was Wahid, too, who reprimanded and instructed the
security forces to prevent the Laskar Jihad from going to Maluku to aggravate sectarian
conflict there. He refused to give in to the demands of radical Islamic leaders such as Abu
Bakar Ba’syir (the Founder of the MMI and JI) and Ja’far Umar Thalib (the Laskar Jihad
leader) who had proposed to wage a holy war in Maluku and the formation of the Laskar
Jihad. Wahid’s clear opposition against violence in Maluku drew aversion from radical
Muslim leaders and their followers at the grass roots level. Therefore, his opponents
blamed him for being excessively tolerant towards other religions while criticizing his
own and being indifferent to Islam.
Wahid’s opposition to the aspiration of radical Muslims for syariah, which was
revitalized during his presidency, was laid open when he mentioned that there were
certain groups in society who wanted an alternative ideology beyond Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution. For Wahid, the growing pressure for adopting the syariah law could
damage the current transition process. To avoid this, he urged ulama (Islamic clerics) and
national leaders to learn from history, in particular on the common interest of the military
and radical Muslims who would sacrifice national interests and democratic consolidation
412
for their own narrow agenda.
Besides the issue of syariah, Wahid’s initiative to open trade and broad diplomatic
relations with Israel also irritated radical Muslim groups. Wahid hoped that with this
move he could improve Indonesia’s international image, an important precondition for
accelerating the recovery of the country’s economy. This pragmatic approach caused
growing dissatisfaction by Islamist parties after their representatives had been ousted from
his coalition cabinet on November 26, 1999. The relationship of the president with
412
234
leaders of Islamist parties worsened because they were more interested in nurturing their
sectarian politics and therefore did not hesitate to order Islamic militias to join the jihad
against Christians in Maluku and Poso. The move obviously aided military leaders in their
conflict of interest with Wahid and therefore wanted national security to deteriorate.
V.C. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Green Generals
In January 2000, radical Muslims organizations, including KISDI, FPI, and DDII,
organized large-scale demonstrations in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Makassar. On January 7,
in a big rally in Jakarta, twenty-two militant Islamic organizations gathered in Monas
square, near the Merdeka palace. Present in this demonstration were also Amien Rais and
Ahmad Sumargono, prominent Islamic leaders associated with PAN and PBB. In their
political sermons, they encouraged the demonstrators to practice jihad in Maluku and
Poso, because in their view the government was unable protect the Muslim minorities in
these regions. The two political leaders were known as being close to ICMI and the green
generals and believed of having been under the protection of Lt. Gen. Prabowo during the
increase in political tension between ICMI, Soeharto and Gen. Wiranto in the months
preceding Soeharto’s resignation. Even more disquieting however, was the presence of
many speakers and organizations that had track records of co-operating with the military,
both institutionally and individually. They hailed the decision to send Maj. Gen.
Marasabessy, a conservative officer, to Maluku in order to resolve the conflict. This
officer, a native of Maluku, was the preferred leader of the TNI’s peace-making mission
because he was widely known as a determined Islamist general.413
Still, in January 2000, radical Muslims openly aligned themselves with TNI chief
commander Gen. Wiranto, and thus increased their influence on the military. Two years
earlier, they had played a significant role in assisting him to provide security for the
November 1998 MPR special session. Before that, their representatives in MPR, FPDU
(Fraksi Partai Daulatul Ummah --Sovereignty of the Islamic Community Parties Faction)
414
had backed the formal nomination of the general to run for vice-president. Now, some
of their representatives joined the military defense team to help Wiranto respond to the
KPP HAM Timtim’s accusation that he was responsible for gross human rights violations
in East Timor. On behalf of PBB, an Islamic party controlling thirteen seats in the DPR
and that since its formation in 1998 had built an alliance with military figures, legislator
Hartono Mardjono contributed his expertise as a lawyer to the military defense team
headed by Adnan Buyung Nasution. Prominent party leaders such as Ahmad Sumargono
413
See also, “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post- Election Assessment Report”, No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999: 7, loc.cit.
414
235
defended Wiranto in the DPR, while PBB chairperson, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, attacked
Darusman’s dual role as Attorney General and chairperson of the National Human Rights
Commission (Komnas HAM). The two PBB leaders were instrumental in organizing
415
pressure to force Darusman’s resignation from Komnas HAM.
Supported by Golkar, PBB, PPP and the military quietly joined forces to block a
new human rights law to be passed by the DPR. Without this law, Darusman would have
difficulty in trying someone accused of gross human rights violations. Radical Muslims
shared with the military the belief that the accusations of the TNI leaders’ involvement in
East Timorese atrocities were orchestrated by foreign countries and targeted at the
Indonesian Muslims. No coincidentically, in January 2000, FPI held a peaceful
demonstration in front of the office of the Secretariat General of the Komnas HAM,
harshly criticizing the latter’s obsession with East Timor, even though Indonesian
Muslims were also suffering in the territory.416 Some speakers there called for a jihad
against the intervention of the international peace keeping force. They criticized that
Wahid’s decision to establish human rights tribunals was against Muslims’ interests in the
country.417
FPI demanded the dissolution of the Komnas HAM for paying less attention to,
and failing to deal with, the violence in Maluku, which caused great suffering to Muslims
as the sectarian conflict emerged there. Several months afterwards, in June 2000, a radical
group of Muslim students, HAMMAS (Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus -Inter-University Muslim Students Association), demonstrated in front of the Komnas
HAM office, smashing some of its windows. A few days later FPI, mobilizing three
truckloads of protestors armed with sticks and stones, launched another attack on the
office of the human rights commission, citing the same reasons.418 In view of these
incidents, AS Hikam, a member of Wahid’s cabinet, concluded that the failure to
comprehensively prosecute gross human rights violations allegedly committed by TNI
before and after the Wahid presidency must also be attributed to the strong pressure of the
Islamists.419
Meanwhile, the campaigns and preparations of Islamists for jihad in Maluku
continued. At the beginning of April 2000, the Laskar Jihad held a tabligh akbar (big
gathering) in Jakarta. It was attended by around 100,000 participants and it condemned
the disaster that had been afflicting the Maluku Muslims, who were perceived as facing a
415
O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 345. In interview on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta, Darusman described the
pressure he received from the conservative or rightist factions in parlia-ment which had hampered his
moves to fulfill reform demands which wanted to be endorsed by the Wahid government.
416
ICG, 2001, loc. cit: 8.
417
418
Kompas, June 24, 2000, The Jakarta Post, June 24, 2000, ibid.
419
AS Hikam was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
236
genocidal threat.420 Seeking to counteract the threat, the leader of the group, Ja’far Umar
Thalib, announced the necessity for armed holy battle. He openly confirmed the
determination of the group’s members to go to the battlefield in the Maluku islands and
stand with the Muslims fighting against their Christian opponents. After the rally, he
established a paramilitary training camp in Bogor, about 60 km from Jakarta. Here,
thousands of young men were trained, volunteers to engage in combat in the trouble spots
across Indonesia.
The Laskar Jihad recruited, trained, and equipped Javanese youths to fight
Christians in Maluku based on their belief that “jihad is not a crime, rather a holy
421
obligation of the believers to defend Islam from other religion’s threats”. On April 6,
2000 they marched to the Merdeka palace, and sent six of their representatives, among
others, Ja’far Umar Thalib and Brig. Gen. (ret) Rustam Kastor, to meet President Wahid.
At the meeting, the delegation blamed Wahid of favouring Christians and of having led
his country into the trap set by either a West-Zionist conspiracy or, alternatively, a
422
communist plot, as indicated by the escalation of the conflict occurring in the islands.
As a result, the meeting came to an abrupt end after Wahid asked them to leave his
office.423
In Yogyakarta and Makassar, FPI branches and Forkap-Malut (Forum Komunikasi
untuk Propinsi Maluku Utara --Communications Forum for the Province of North
Maluku) offices were established to recruit volunteers for jihad in Maluku. In the
meantime, a jihad force in Ternate had already been sent to North Halmahera to back
Muslims without any intervention from the regional military command (Kodam XVI
Pattimura), which had just been founded by the Habibie government.424 In Jakarta, in
April and May 2000, jihad volunteers commenced to leave for Maluku, after organizing
the above-mentioned show of force in front of the Merdeka palace and the DPR building
with their white uniform, swords, and some military equipment. Within weeks Laskar
Jihad had sent several thousand fighters through different shipments to the troubled
420
Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia”, Indonesia, 73, April 2002: 147.
421
Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 122; “Gertakan Jihad Lewat Posko” (“Threat of Ji had from
Command Post”), Majalah Tempo, January 17, 2000.
422
Radical Muslims continued to be concerned about a revival of communism in Indonesia, in particular,
after President Wahid proposed the lifting of the ban on communism early in 2000. See, ICG, 2002,
loc.cit: 9.
423
Harian Kompas, April 7, 2000, cited in Hasan, 2002, loc.cit: 148.
424
Majalah Gatra 6, No. 10, January 22, 2000, Majalah Gatra 6, No.11, January 29, 2000, cited in Ber trand, 2004, op.cit: 131.
237
province.425 Their arrival made a turning point in the sectarian conflict as the level of
violence became considerably higher than before.
The radical Muslim alliance was not restricted to political manoeuvres and public
showing-off, but it seemed that a more forceful approach was also applied. This came in
mid-December 2000 when Attorney General Darusman decided to set a trial date for
Aitarak militia’s notorious militia leader, Eurico Guterres, who was known as one of the
military’s most reliable allies in the 1999 East Timor chaos. Because they are not guarded
by the state apparatus, churches became easy targets of several bombing attacks. On May
28, 2000, an explosion at a Protestant church injured at least forty-seven people, while
bombs found in two other churches had failed to explode. Three months afterwards, in
426
August 2000, another church was damaged in a bomb explosion in Medan. A week
before the East Timor trials, on Christmas Eve, bombs exploded at Christian targets in ten
cities throughout Indonesia. The bombings killed a total of nineteen people and seriously
injured 120 others. 427 The East Timor trials were indefinitely postponed, but the
perpetrators of the bombings were never put on trial, although several suspected were
arrested and a host of clues were obtained.
Suspicion of military involvement increased since most events were conducted in
428
a professional way. As reported by O’Rourke, in Batam, Riau, two perpetrators of three
bomb explosions which had wounded twenty-nine people were caught by the military
police. The perpetrators included a soldier of a Kopassus unit and another from the
Kodam II Sriwijaya regional command.429 In Jakarta, an intelligence agent reportedly
implicated in the bombing of the Catholic Katedral church, around 500 meter from the
Merdeka palace, who had caught by the police was quickly freed.430 Moreover, of the
,three men who were caught with bomb-making equipment, two were double-agents
suspected of working for both the GAM (A Movement for an Independent Aceh) and Bais
(military strategic intelligence board) and one was an ethnic-Chinese financier, whom
military officials in Medan acknowledged as one of their business partners. Citing the
local police report, Tempo magazine reported that they were suspected of organizing
bomb explosions in Medan, North Sumatra. Also apprehended was a lieutenant-colonel of
Kopassus, who was an intelligence chief for the Kodam 1 Bukit Barisan regional
425
Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 122; “Gertakan Jihad Lewat Posko” (“Threat of Jihad Through
Command Camp”), Majalah Tempo, January 17, 2000.
426
“47 Injured in Medan Church Blast”, The Jakarta Post, May 29, 2000; “Medan Church Bombs Linked
to Provocateurs”, The Indonesian Observer, August 21, 2000; ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 4.
427
“Sekelumit Fakta Seputar Bom Natal” (“A Fact about Christmas Bomb”). Majalah Tempo, February 25,
2001: 62-63; O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 385-6.
428
See, Honna, 2003, op.cit: 277.
429
“Cerita dari Mosaik Bom Natal” (“The Story About the Christmas Bomb”), Majalah Tempo, February
25, 2001: 61.
238
command.431 The plot thus showed that intelligence officers were connected through their
sponsors and GAM double-agents with the suspected bombers. Moreover, as also
reported, the suspected bombers themselves had longstanding ties to the Kopassus. The
best indication was in Bandung, where a bomb exploded when it was being assembled in
a workshop, killing three, and injuring two people. One of the dead was carrying an
address book, in which he had written the phone number of the Jakarta residence of an
432
active two-star general. Importantly, investigators found clear signs of a plan in the
various cases.
An alternative investigation conducted by Forum untuk Indonesia Damai (Forum
for Peaceful Indonesia), an independent team consisting of notable figures of moderate
Muslims, including Nurcholish Madjid, Emil Salim, and Mar’ie Muhammad, also
suspected an involvement of active or retired military personnel in the serial bombings.433
Several years thereafter, the trials of JI activists involved in subsequent bombing incidents
in Bali and Jakarta corroborated the radical Muslims’ connection to Ba’syir, their cleric,
and other leaders who in January 2000 had attended the rally declaring jihad. More
significantly, the easy access of JI activists to explosives and military standard weapons,
including from army manufacturer Pindad, came under scrutiny as did the obvious
disinclination of the military to prevent the bombings.
Attorney General Darusman Marzuki therefore connected the recent instability
with the government’s initiative to prosecute past East Timor gross human rights abuses
as well as Soeharto and his family’s alleged corruption cases. 434 The bombing incidents
occurred amid the rising tension between President Wahid and the military and the rising
rivalry between military and police institutions. They also coincided with the civilian
president’s failure to control military intelligence units, and the breakup of his fragile
coalition with Islamic parties and conservative leaders whom earlier supported him.435
V.D. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Red-White and the Green Generals
430
“Tamu Misterius di Biara Fransiskan” (“Mysterious Guest in the Fransiscan Closter”), Majalah Tempo,
February 25, 2001: 76.
431
“Bom di Jalur Kontak GAM-TNI” (“Bomb in the Hot Spot of GAM-TNI“), Majalah Tempo, February
25, 2001: 69.
432
“Cerita dari Mosaik Bom Natal” (“The Story About the Christmas Bomb”), Majalah Tempo, February
25, 2001: 60.
433
“Political Briefs,” Van Zorge Report, January 22, 2001: 38; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit : 386-7.
434
Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
435
Waluyo, 2007, loc. cit: 125.
239
Wahid’s moderate Islamic vision and nationalist spirit linked him to the red-white
generals, such as Benny Murdani and Try Sutrisno. His respect for minority groups
produced his good relationship with, and confidence in, Christian generals, such as Luhut
Panjaitan and Johnny Lumintang. Not surprisingly, he had sympathizers in the military
faction in the DPR such as Maj. Gen. Ferry Tinggogoy who did not agree with their
commander’s opposition to Wahid.
Before becoming president, Wahid entertained relatively good relations with the
younger generation of military leaders, including Gen. Wiranto. His cooperative attitude
towards these military leaders had helped him gain support from the military faction in
the parliament in his bid for the presidency in October 1999. Otherwise, he would have
failed in obtaining Golkar’s support to challenge his main rival, Megawati, the leader of
the largest parliamentary faction in the presidential election in the MPR.436
After the election, Gen. Wiranto became part of Wahid’s kabinet pelangi (rainbow
cabinet), in which he occupied a high position as coordinating minister for political and
security affairs. Within a few months, however, the relationship suddenly soured due to
the impact of the human rights violations in East Timor after the referendum. The
relations worsened when the new president forced his minister to resign due to the rising
pressure from donor countries to prosecute the human rights violations before and after
the independence referendum in East Timor.
Relations between Wahid and most military leaders turned from tension into
conflict after Wahid promoted Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah to Kostrad commander,
replacing Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman. Wahid’s move to promote more reformist generals to
occupy important positions and encourage his radical reform agenda produced growing
frustration among conservative military commanders. An example was the promotion of
Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi as army chief assistant for territorial affairs. Circulation of the
fabricated Bulakrantai document, accusing the reformist generals of influencing Wahid to
reshuffle TNI officers, 437 increased pressure on Wahid. The green generals, too, exterted
pressure on Wahid by using their Muslim militias, which for the last few years they had
438
protected.
Through their representatives in the DPR, radical Muslims responded to Wahid
and the reformist generals. For instance, PBB legislator Abdul Qaedir Djaelani charged
that the masterminds of the Christmas bombings were Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah and
Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, TNI’s two leading reformers. 439 However, this accusation was
hardly plausible as the two reformist generals persistently criticized atrocities committed
436
“Profile Abdurrahman Wahid,” 2005, loc.cit.
For details on the Bulakrantai document, see page 35-36.
438
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakar ta.
437
240
by the TNI in its operations. Saurip rejected this claim in an interview with the author, but
admitted he was sidelined after the conservative officers organized their resistance to
440
against the reformers proposals for more progressive military reform. In the light of
multiple links between the military leadership and radical Muslim organizations,
Djaelani’s verbal attack against reformist generals suggests that conservative officers may
have coordinated their attacks against military reformers with Islamist forces.
Compared with previous cases confronting Wahid, there were similarities between
the violent actions conducted by the radical Muslims and those that were organized by
their patrons, the green generals. The FPI, for example, on December 15, 1999 reportedly
played a role in attacking and torching the buildings of a school and hospital (drug
rehabilitation center) run by a Christian humanitarian foundation (Wisma Doulos) in East
Jakarta. These institutions had been accused of influencing Muslims to leave Islam. Also,
the eruption of religious violence in Maluku, which involved radical Muslim militias,
occurred just days after KPP HAM began its investigations with the Wisma Doulos
441
incident. The attack by some 300 people allegedly from FPI with sharp weapons and
Molotov cocktails against Wisma Doulos, which caused three dead, thirty wounded, and
some buildings burnt down, had been seemingly planned before.442 The foundation was
located about 500 meters from TNI headquarters and the military personnel deployed at a
443
nearby territorial post were reportedly unwilling to intervene. Thus, the rioters could
freely wreck the facilities of the foundation, which had faced threats by militants already
months before.444 No military personnel was sent to fight the raging fire, which lasted
until the early morning.
The Wisma Doulos incident was the worst case of religious violence in the capital
city since the Ketapang riots in November 1998. There was sufficient reason to believe
that the same paramilitary group that participated in the Ketapang riots, namely, the FPI,
had perpetrated the attack. A least two of nine suspects being held by the city police were
445
FPI members. FPI was a volunteer group formed to combat what they called the
“enemies of Islam.” Evidence disclosed that it functioned in the style of a military-backed
gang. No less important, it was generally believed that FPI’s military patron was
439
Majalah Gatra, January 27, 2001: 27.
441
442
Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit.
443
“Wisma Doulos, Serangan Malam” (“Wisma Doulos, Night Attack”), Majalah Tempo, December 26,
1999.
444
Doug Bandow, “Jakarta's Seething Volcano”, Chronicles Magazine, March 2001.
445
“Noegroho says 'brochures provoked Doulos burning'”, The Jakarta Post, January 03, 2000.
440
241
Wiranto’s protégé and loyalist, Kostrad commander Lt. Gen. Djaja, who was against
Wahid. 446
More obviously, FPI was established immediately after Djaja had been promoted
as Jakarta regional (Kodam Jayakarta) commander in mid-1998. FPI was among the
paramilitary groups that he used to protect the 1998 MPR special session.447 Following its
suspected involvement in the Ketapang riots, rather than attacking prostitution
compounds, nightclubs, gambling centres, and drugs and narcotics networks, all of which
were widely trusted to be backed by military elements, FPI customarily targeted obscure
nightspots on a regular basis without prevention from the security forces and Jakarta’s
authorities under Governor Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso. This vigilante group has often taken the
448
law into their own hands. In effect, it functioned as the army’s racketeering group,
which was used to put pressure on businesses that challenged the army in the
entertainment sector, or on the owner of businesses or their bosses that stopped giving
contributions to their patrons inside the army institutions.449 Like the New Order’s
Pemuda Pancasila (PP), the FPI was manipulated by the military for political ends.
Not surprisingly, rather than concentrating on issues that directly affected
Muslims, such as violence in Aceh and corruption in state-run pilgrimages to Mekkah,
FPI’s interests corresponded with those of the army. Besides defending both MPR special
and annual sessions, it also protested against KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum --the
General Elections Commission). This was done on behalf of conservative Islamic
political parties organized in the Partai Daulatul Ummah faction (FPDU), which had
450
nominated Wiranto for vice-president. In December 1999, its leaders also chose to take
on a matter that was actually to have no relevance to them, namely, KPP HAM’s
investigation on East Timor. 451 Many rallies were organized to defend Gen. Wiranto from
accusations of gross human rights abuses in East Timor. Like other militant Muslim
452
organizations, FPI’s demonstrations took place in front of the Komnas HAM office,
453
which was damaged in the process. This situation gave a clear indication that the rise of
446
See, for instance, George Junus Aditjondro,“Financing Human Rights Abuses,” November 20, 2000,
http://www.koteka.net/part1.htm.
447
See O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit.
448
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 2.
449
“Perjalanan FPI Membasmi Tempat Maksiat” (“FPI Long Way to Sinful Places”), Bali Post, December
19, 2000; ICG, 2001, loc.cit.
450
See also, “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post- Election Assessment Report,” No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999, loc.cit: 7.
451
“FPI Pertanyakan Profesionalisme KPP HAM dan Marzuki Darusman” (“FPI Questioned Professionalism of KPP HAM and Marzuki Darusman”), December 27, 1999, http://www.Berpolitik.com/articles/99/
12/27/1948200.shtml, Berpolitik.com.
452
See again page 112-113 of this dissertation.
453
See again, “FPI Rusak Kantor Komnas HAM dan Kafe Jimbani”, Harian Kompas, June 24, 2000, “FPI
members attack rights commission headquarters”, The Jakarta Post, June 24, 2000.
242
fundamentalist Islam and its political movement hamstrung democratisation in tandem
with military restiveness, as had been argued by Huntington.454
Apart from FPI, there were about thirty other militia and paramilitary groups with
approximately 700,000 members, the majority of which were radical Muslims. Combined
with an absence of rule of law and together with several groups in the military, which
used to stand above the law, these forces became a serious threat to the fragile process of
455
democratization under Wahid. For example, in March 2000, the FPI held a rally in the
centre of Jakarta, in which banners were displayed with slogans like “We are ready to slay
communists” and “We are ready to behead communists.” 456 Elsewhere, some fifty radical
Muslim groups established what they called the AAK (Aliansi Anti-Komunis --AntiCommunist Alliance) together with the Front Merah-Putih (Red-White Front) headed by
the East Timorese militia leader, Eurico Guterres,457 who maintained close relations with
military leaders. Also major groups in AAK, for example, the FPI, Front Hizbullah and,
Ikhwutan Sunnah Waljamaah (ISW), were known to have established close ties with the
military. ISW was chaired by Habib Al-Habsyi, a militant Muslim cleric imprisoned in
1980 for bombing the world’s largests Buddhist sacred site, the Borobudur temple, who
was surprisingly freed before the end of his sentence in 1999 on the orders of Gen.
Wiranto.458
In the name of AAK and as part of their anti-communist campaign, the radical
Muslims embarked on a “sweeping” operation in May 2001. They took certain books that
had been declared pro-communist publications from bookstores and publicly burnt them.
In their operations they also destroyed books regarded anti-Soeharto and anti-military.
Therefore, the whole operation was hardly a pure religious affair, but rather a planned
military (intelligence) operation. After launching the rowdy campaign of destroying
“communist” books, the Alliance leaders threatened to begin “sweeping” people.459
Another Muslim group allegedly working on the military’s behalf was PPMI
(Persatuan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia). Chaired by a certain Eggi Sudjana, PPMI was a
Muslim labour union founded to challenge the pro-reform SBSI (Serikat Buruh Seluruh
Indonesia). The latter was an independent Indonesian labor association founded and led
by Muchtar Pakpahan, a Christian who was an anti-Soeharto activist. Sudjana allegedly
supplied Muslim paramilitaries to Kostrad commander Djaja Suparman. Moreover, he
454
Huntington, 1991, op. cit.
Siar News Services, May 18, 2000; Togi Simandjuntak (ed.), Premanisme Politik (Political Thugs), Jakarta: ISAI, 2000: 59-60; Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc.cit: 51.
456
“FPI Activists Rally against Communism”, The Jakarta Post, March 19, 2000.
457
ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 9.
458
459
“’Sweeping’ Buku Berbau Kiri Tetap Akan Berlanjut”, Harian Kompas, May 8, 2001; ICG, 2001, loc.
cit.
455
243
was believed to enjoy strong connections to Wiranto, and to have worked with legislators
from PBB who had aligned themselves with the general.460 Supposedly acting as a
frontman of the military, on January 17, 1999, he organized a demonstration in Lombok,
Mataram, the capital city of West Nusa Tenggara province, to express solidarity with
Muslims in riot-torn Maluku. The event attracted a crowd of around 5,000 people.461
After the rally, about half of them run amok around the small island, killing five
people, devastating dozens of churches, public buildings, and a large number of Christian
businesses and homes in an amazingly short range of time. The mass-media speculated
that the attack was pre-arranged, and the perpetrators were not unruly masses, but well462
organized paramilitaries, bringing target lists and using walkie-talkies. They had split
up and attacked widely scattered districts at the same time. Two big command posts of
Kopassus troops located in the surrounding area did nothing to intervene when the riots
occurred. Lombok was also hosting of a large number of military personnel that had just
been removed from East Timor. Meanwhile, as several units of marines and police began
to contain the riots, their field-radio communications were said to have been
electronically jammed.463
These and other militant activities of radical Muslim groups -- like the training of
jihadis to be sent to Maluku in a camp near Bogor under the tutelage of a retired military
general464-- raised concerns on the return of a military-backed authoritarianism, but under
the disguise of Islamic politics. In many of these incidents, the radical Muslims had
apparently been employed by the military to defend the remnants of the ancient régime
and simultaneously confront newly emerging democratic forces. Of course, the rise of
religious extremism endangered the prospects of reforms, since the TNI response to
religious extremism was poorer than to separatist movements in various areas of the
country.465 As it was reasonable to prevent other acts of terror across the country, Wahid
gave instruction for the capture of Habib Ali bin Alwi al Ba’aqil, a famous figure in the
FPI. His alleged role with Tommy Soeharto has been cited in the case of the JSX
bombing. Habib Ali had claimed to be a close friend of Gen. Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Djaja
Suparman.466 The collusion between militant Muslims and the military was undoubtedly a
concerted effort by the military of resisting civilian supremacy under Wahid.
460
See also, “Indonesia Muslims, Christians Move to Avoid Conflict”, UCA News, February 14, 2000.
462
John M. MacDougall Jr,“Lombok Unrest: Description and Analysis,” January 22, 1999, http://www.
groups.yahoo.com/group/berita-bhinneka/message/14813.
463
“Reports Highlight Army’s Role in Lombok’s Riots,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 27, 2000.
464
For details, see again page 55, 56 and 114 of this dissertation.
465
466
“Baagil di Balik Bom?” (“Baagil Behind the Bombing?”), Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000: 26; ICG,
2001, loc.cit: 12-13.
461
244
V.E. Common Interests of Radical Muslims and the Green Generals
In the history of Indonesia, military alliances with radical Muslim groups were
artificial and opportunistic in nature. The alliance was usually the result of coinciding
short-term interests (symbioses mutualisma).
As stated by Choirie, military leaders such as Wiranto, Prabowo, and Djaja were
allegedly behind the activities of the radical Muslim groups, conservative Islamic parties,
and political Islamists in pursuit of their own pragmatic interests in struggling for
power.467 Their existence was seen as very fruitful in the eyes of military leaders. The
groups could challenge student demonstrators and pro-democracy and human rights
activists who demanded military leaders to be summoned for their alleged involvements
in the past gross human rights abuses. In return, the radical Muslims needed military
support in their struggle to force President Wahid to adopt the syariah law. Thus, the
military recruited radical Muslims to be trained as volunteers as well as militias to
respond to their common enemies such as student demonstrators, human rights activists
and radical reformists. Militant Muslims and conservative military leaders shared a
common interest in rejecting of what they despised as Western ideas such as
democratization, human rights, and gender parity.
In the past, the military usually ended its toleration of the activities of radical
Muslims after accomplishing its objectives. It would then initiate military operations
against those who still demanded to adopt the syariah law or raised other demands
directed against Pancasila. During Sukarno’s leadership, the military hunted radical
Muslim leaders, for example, Kartosuwiryo and Kahar Muzakkar, and rooted out their
followers, namely, DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia --Islamic soldiers/
Indonesian Islamic soldiers) devotees in West Java and South Sulawesi. Likewise, under
Soeharto, various military operations were conducted, including covert intelligence and
psychological operations, to crush Imron, Amir Biki, Sungkar, and Ba’syir, and their
respective fanatic disciples in the 1980s. These Muslim militants still sought to form NII
(Negara Islam Indonesia -- the Indonesian Islamic State) through underground organizations such as Komando Jihad, Majelis Mujahiddin, and Jemaah Islamiyah. Other military
operations against what were considered as Islamist sectarians included the Woyla,
Lampung (1988), and Priok, Jakarta (1984), incidents, causing hundreds of deaths.
In 1999 and 2000, under the protection of their military patrons, radical Muslims
could freely pursue their political agendas and exert strong pressure on Wahid. L’histoire
se repete, as in 1945 and 1959. Attempts to call for the insertion of the Jakarta charter in
467
Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July, 11, 2006, in Jakarta.
245
the Constitution and the implementation of the syariah law were made by PPP and PBB
through the aggressive pressure of their supporters who frightened their critics and
opponents. Their actions during the year 2000 also contributed to undermining the Wahid
presidency since the security forces, consisting mainly of military elements, took no
measure to stop the actions on the streets, parliament building compound, and public
places. Military reluctance to take appropriate measures to stop the disruptive actions of
the radical Muslims was associated with its interest to muster support from Indonesian
Muslims to defy investigations of their gross human rights violations in East Timor as
demanded by the international community.
Although radical Muslims were a minority in post-Soeharto Indonesian politics,
their existence could not be ignored due to the military’s role behind their activities. As
argued by Ikrar, the military’s role was also motivated by the necessity of gaining militant
Muslim’s support against President Wahid’s agenda of military reforms, particularly after
he promoted Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah and other reformist generals who were
468
strongly acclaimed by pro-democracy activists. Because of this reciprocal support, the
bargaining position of both the military and radical Muslims in national politics became
much stronger. Their representatives in the parliament had successfully built a grand
coalition with Soeharto’s old party, Golkar, and PDIP, the victorious party of the 1999
parliamentary elections, to oppose Wahid and his declining number of supporters from
PKB and PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa --Love the Nation Democratic Party).
In fact, the alliance between the military and the radical Muslims extended into 2001 as
the military had not yet achieved its final objective, namely, to exert greater control over
the presidency.
As mentioned by reformist generals such as Saurip Kadi, the re-emergence of the
radical Muslim groups after 1998 and their increasing pressure for the syariah law
became a serious obstacle for the country’s democratic transition. Although the groups
did not represent a majority of Muslim citizens in the country, their uncompromising
attitude damaged the prospect of democratic consolidation. However, Saurip predicted
that military alliances with the radical Muslim groups would lessen once Megawati, a pro469
military and an ultra-nationalist figure, came to power.
VI. Conclusion
Abdurrahman Wahid, who was democratically elected by the MPR as Indonesia’s
fourth president, faced a formidable agenda to continue reform, namely, eliminating the
military’s role in politics and society while preserving at the same time the unitary state.
A legacy of Soeharto’s decades’ long dictatorship and the military’s strong role had
468
469
246
hamstrung his presidency and his efforts to fulfill reform demands. In this constraining
context, the mercurial president attempted to promote political and military reform in the
country.
As most military officers had inherited Javanese cultural values that had been
preserved for a long time in the educational system, curricula, literatures, and traditional
ceremonies, the military still believed that it had a right to interfere in politics. Fear of
loosing the power, privileges, and prestige that it had enjoyed for more than three
decades, as well as facing prosecution for alleged gross human rights violations involving
the military as an institution, as groups, and as individuals, on the one hand, and President
Wahid’s unwillingness to protect its interests, on the other, caused it to oppose his reform
agenda, particularly after the president promoted pro-reform generals to influential posts.
This resistance disrupted the stability of his government due to the escalation of
political tensions and conflicts throughout the country. Likewise, the hostile political
atmosphere consumed much of his energy, and was to blame for leaving him little time to
improve government policies. His efforts to prosecute Soeharto’s suspected KKN cases
and ambiguous response to separatist movements had further increased military pressure
on his leadership. As in the Habibie era, the military resorted to various forms of covert
military intelligence and psychological operations to block Wahid’s reform agenda,
especially in the military and security sectors.
Most elements in the military were critical of Wahid in the way he governed the
country. Frustrated by his military reshuffles and reform agenda, the military supported
his opponents, especially the radical Muslims and in the legislature, to impeach the
president. As under Habibie, the existence of the radical Muslims impeded the country’s
efforts to reduce violence, while the president had difficulties abandoning the
predominant Javanese political culture, which was preoccupied with the accumulation of
power and a culture of violence.
Unlike under Soeharto, military officers including the territorial and Kostrad
commanders, the military spokesman, and the army chief, openly resisted the president.
Short of a coup, they displayed their displeasure with the president by demonstrative
gatherings and show of force, a posture climaxing with the rejection of implementing
Wahid’s decree of a state of emergency. During this time, tensions between different
factions in the TNI also emerged, especially between reformist officers and conservative
generals, in the course of which Lt. Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah and his adherents lost
their strategic posts.
Wahid’s efforts at asserting control over the military were only partially
successful. The absence of common perceptions on reform, and the lack of compensation
he given to military leaders resulted in his failure to uphold civilian supremacy.
247
Preventing Gen. Wiranto from an international tribunal for his alleged involvement in
gross human rights violations in East Timor was not sufficient to regain his military’s
trust. In fact, a human rights ad hoc tribunal in Indonesia profoundly disgraced military
leaders and stirred their open resistance to Wahid civilian regime and its supporters.
The Wahid era thus confirms the thesis formulated at the outset of the study that
the more reformist a civilian government, the more restive the military and the stronger
the latter’s efforts to interfere in the political process. Yet, as will be shown in the next
chapter, collusion between civilian politicians, especially legislators and political parties
with the military in impeaching Wahid, markedly strengthened the position of the military
in Indonesian politics which experienced a resurge under the presidency of Megawati
Soekarnoputri.
248
Chapter Five
The Megawati Government (2001-2004)
I.A. What Had Influenced Megawati to Introduce Reform?
Megawati Soekarnoputri, born on January 23, 1947 in Yogyakarta, is the second
child of the Indonesian first president, Sukarno. She grew up in luxury in the Merdeka
palace, attended universities, but never earned a degree. She went to Padjadjaran
University in Bandung to study agriculture, but dropped out in 1967, after her father’s fall
from power. Her family was ignored by the new regime of Soeharto provided they stayed
out of politics.1 She went to the University of Indonesia in 1970 to study psychology but
dropped out after 2 years. She had little knowledge of the world outside Indonesia, and
her warmest admirers would not claim that she was an intellectual.2
Megawati got married with a Javanese military officer, Surindro Suprijarso, who
died in a plane crash in Irian Jaya in 1970, the year Sukarno died. With her current
husband, Taufiq Kiemas, she had three children who grew up and pursued education in
Indonesia. She is a Muslim but also followed traditional Javanese beliefs and had great
faith in astrology.3 She rarely wore headscarf and Muslim traditional clothes like most
Muslim women in Indonesia and often dressed in military uniforms in various occasions
of state and military ceremonies. Though born in Java and being a Muslim, she lived in
Bali, where she built up a large base of political support among the Hindu and Christian
communities who mostly inhabited the outer islands of Indonesia, the larger part of that
big country.4
Although her father’s followers continued to see her as his political heir, she
avoided politics for nearly 20 years, describing herself as a simple housewife. She began
her political career in 1987 as she and her husband joined PDI (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia --the Indonesian Democratic Party), a government-sanctioned party which
provided a façade of democratic choice in the Soeharto’s New Order government. She
was elected to the rubber-stamp parliament as a reward for her apparent acceptance of the
1
“Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://megawati-sukarnoputri.biography.ms/: 1-4, was accessed on
October 29, 2005.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
“Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://www.bookrags.com/biography-megawati-sukarnoputri-ema04/: 1-2, was accessed on October 29, 2005; Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for
Stability, second edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
249
government, helped by her father’s charisma. In DPR, from 1987-1992, she did not
perform as an active and a vocal member.
Despite her lack of experience in politics, she immediately became hugely popular
in 1995, after she won control of the PDI. More importantly, after her decision to become
an opposition to the Soeharto regime in 1994-1995, accusing it of rampant nepotism and
corruption, she emerged as the symbol of people’s resistance to Soeharto and the New
Order government. Due to Soeharto’s anger at her political move, in 1996, the New Order
government started to intervene in her party. By using its supporters in the PDI, the
government ousted her from the party’s leadership through an extraordinary party
congress. A military operation to crush PDI by attacking the party headquarters triggered
rioting in Jakarta. Although she herself was never in danger, she became a symbol of
resistance.5 In fact, the exclusion of her from contesting the May 1997 legislative election
only increased her popularity.
In 1998 she established a new party, PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perjuangan -- the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle). She displayed great courage
in opposing the government and became a symbol of hope for democratic reform.
Although she was a focus for opposition against the Soeharto regime, she was barely
involved in the mass-movement which overthrew Soeharto. Therefore, many doubted her
judgement and leadership qualities.6 Her strongest support came from the uneducated and
poor people who had been badly hit by the country’s worst economic crisis in a
generation. Her party emerged as the largest party in the June 1999 free legislative
elections, the first time since 1955, but did not win an absolute majority of votes or a
majority of seats in the parliament.
Her populist appeal as someone who stood for the poor and disenfranchised as
well as nationalist interests was not sufficient in the face of her politically smart rival
Abdurrahman Wahid.7 Due to the Muslims opposition to a woman president, and her lack
of experience, other parties united to block her. Her erstwhile friend and ally, as well as
political mentor and advisor, Wahid, a moderate Muslim cleric, who previously gave
support for her presidential nomination, was chosen instead. To appease her supporters
who were angry because of the “betrayal” and unexpected defeat of their leader in the
October 1999 MPR special session, Megawati was elected as vice-president. Following
the controversial impeachment of Wahid in the June 2001 MPR special session,
5
“Megawati Emerges from Sukarno’s Shadow,” http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/
07/23/indo.mega/: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.
6
Anton Alifandi, “Analysis: Megawati’s Struggle for Power,” BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/481341.stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.
7
Ibid.
250
Megawati was installed as the fifth President of Indonesia. This made her the first woman
in the country to occupy the most important position.
Apart from her election, Megawati had few visible talents as a politician. She
avoided media interviews, and refused to take part in head to head debates. She had been
criticized by many politicians for being aloof and complacent.8 She seldom spoke in
public and rarely discussed anything approximating policy. Many observers saw her
presidency as a product of backroom intrigue and power-brokering of anti-Wahid groups,
including the military, which had been adversely affected by Wahid’s maneuvers and
policies. The very same coalition of forces that united to keep her out of the top job after
9
the 1999 election had then united to elevate her to the presidency. It was true that she
was adored by millions of loyal followers, but little was known about her political skills.
Many still wondered if her rise to power had been a result of her own skills, or the will of
others who wanted to govern through her, especially, the still powerful military.
As the eldest daughter of Indonesia’s founder and first President Sukarno, who
ruled the country from 1945 to 1966, Megawati inherited his thoughts on politics and
statecraft. Her ideology focused on preserving her father’s legacy, the 1945 State
Constitution, which allowed for a strong central power and the unitary state named the
Republic of Indonesia which her father helped found in 1945 and included the provinces
which were incorporated or annexed later, such as Irian Jaya (1969) and East Timor
(1975).10 Her supporters called her the “Mother of the Nation.” Though urban
intellectuals backed her, her mass base among the “little people” rested on the symbolism
of being Sukarno’s daughter, a throwback to the current mythologized days of national
unity and pride.
Comparable to her father, she often mentioned the need for the Indonesian people
to have strong commitment to UUD 1945 (the 1945 State Constitution), Pancasila (state
ideology), and the existence of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --the unitary
state of the Republic of Indonesia). In her view these three institutions were sacred and
had to be preserved due to their historical importance. In her official statements and
presidental speeches, she frequently reminded the nation that the three institutions were
part of the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17,
1945, and, thus, they must be maintained in the future. She also pointed out that these
three important pillars of the state had been constructed by the founding fathers of the
republic, particularly Sukarno.
8
Ibid.
Tony Karon, “Megawati: The Princess Who Settled for the Presidency,” Time, http://www.time.com/
time pow/printout/0,8816,169130,00.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.
9
10
Vaudine England,“Megawati and Her Generals”, South China Morning Post , December 26, 2000.
251
In the past, Sukarno held power as president and head of state which resembled
practices in old Java under the Hinduistic Majapahit and Mataram Kingdoms. That is
why, with the NKRI concept, he sought to concentrate absolute power and to rule with a
centralized or “Javacentrist” system of government. Such concept was aimed to protect
the central government’s power in order to build Indonesia as a strong state and a great
power.11 Due to her commitment to follow her father’s view on NKRI, she was blamed of
not appreciating the culture of other ethnic groups. She was also of the view that the
12
Indonesian military was a national asset to protect the NKRI.
I.B. Military Position to the Rise of Megawati
Megawati’s path to power was widely open as the military and radical Muslim
groups in the government and parliament came to the conclusion that Wahid was
incapable to continue his presidency because of his “erratic” style of government and
alleged involvement in the Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik --State Logistic Agency)
corruption scandal although the court could not prove it. She could take over the
presidency from Wahid after he had been finally impeached by the MPR (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat --the People’s Consultative Assembly).
This was a different situation compared to almost 2 years before, when the
military was solidly behind Wahid’s election, disregarding Megawati and frightening her
supporters with repressive measures including bomb explosions on the street near the
parliament building. Clearly, the bomb explosion at that time which killed and wounded
several people sent a message to Megawati and her supporters to bury their aspirations
and let Wahid to be elected.13
In the aftermath, however, with Wahid’s indifference to the military’s corporate
interests and the emerging resistance of the armed forces to his presidency, the military
faction withdrew their support, encouraged the parliament to issue Memorandum (motion
of non-confidence) two times, to clear the way for Megawati to succeed him. Contrary to
Sukma’s argument,14 this political situation suggested that she could not take over the
presidency from Wahid if she was only supported by the Islamic parties, such as PPP
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan --United Development Party) and PBB (Partai Bulan
Bintang -- Crescent and Star Party). These parties, known as Poros Tengah or the Central
11
Mochtar Naim,”Mohammad Natsir dengan Konsep Integral dan Toleransinya” (“Mohammad Natsir with
His Concepts on Integration and Tolerance”), Harian Republika, July 24, 2008: 4.
12
13
Havely, 2005, loc.cit.
14
252
Axis, had initially supported Wahid’s election as president, but became increasingly
alienated by Wahid’s erratic style of government.
As acknowledged by Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, who was TNI Kaster (Kepala Staf
Teritorial --chief of territorial affairs) during the Megawati government, the military
could trust Megawati to protect its institutional and its leaders’ vested-interests. This
meant that, compared to the two previous civilian presidents, she could be more expected
by military officers to protect the TNI’s reserved domains because she would not push the
military to continue its internal reforms. In other words, she would not confront the
military with reform demands, so that it could maintain its old functions and organization,
particularly, the territorial commands. No less important, before her election, she
15
promised to increase the annual budget of TNI.
I.C. Megawati and Reform Policies
In cooperation with DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat --the House of
Representatives), and aided by a favourable political context, the Megawati government
16
had passed 122 laws between July 2001 and September 2004. However, most of them
were laws concerned with the enlargement of municipalities and cities and good
governance, such as the law on foundations, the law on money laundering, the law on the
anti-corruption commission and the amending of Law No. 31/1999 on the eradication of
corruption,. These laws were made under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). However, although she was much longer in office than her predecessor, Megawati
only passed two laws concerned with military and security sector reform, namely, the Law
on State Defense (Mo. 3/2002) and the Law on the TNI (No. 34/2004) which had been
initiated by Wahid.
Later, the government of Megawati initiated a new political party law and a law on
broadcasting, which reduced civil liberties. The President also passed laws on the
elections of the President and heads of regional governments which would allow TNI to
send its officers to run and give them a better chance to win than civilian candidates due
to the continuing presence of TNI’s territorial structure throughout the country. In
addition to this, the Megawati government had been responsible for initating a bill on the
formation of a commission on truth and reconciliation which, tabled in May 2003, was
passed by the DPR as Law No. 27/2004 on September 7, 2004. This law granted impunity
for military officers who were involved in the past human rights abuses, while
simultaneously disregarding the rights of the victims and their families of obtaining fair
15
16
253
trials and compensations. One of its clauses (Article 44) mentioned that the existence of
human rights tribunals is not recognized in Indonesia. Different from what South Africa
had conducted in addressing past conflicts and creating national reconciliation, this law
prevents the formation of such tribunals. Therefore, soon after it was passed, at least six
NGOs and a number of human rights activists and victims of human rights abuses filed a
judicial review to the Mahkamah Konstitusi (the Constitutional Court), questioning the
law’s stipulations, including Article 27 (1), which granted impunity for the gross
17
violators. But rather than reviewing the substance of the law and show sympathy to the
victims, Megawati preferred to support the enactment of the law. It seemed that the law
was tabled to protect members of the armed forces from punishment for past human rights
abuses in exchange for military support in the 2004 presidential elections. 18
Further, Megawati released Inpres (Instruksi Presiden --Presidential Instruction)
No. 1/2003 on the enlargement of fourteen regencies to support the formation of West
Irian Jaya province. Actually, this Inpres was not in accordance with Undang-undang
(UU) or Law No. 21/2001 on the special autonomy status of Irian Jaya previously
initiated by Wahid to ease separatism there without creating a new province and
regencies. Megawati continued to enact the Inpres due to her party’s interest to gain more
legislative seats for their supporters in the region in future elections.19 She turned a blind
eye to the fact that the enlargement would damage the existing borders which would
affect the lifes and traditions of the tribes living in the area, create local conflicts and
exacerbate separatist activities.20
During Megawati’s term of office, reforms which had been started under Habibie
and Wahid continued, but slowed down and became erratic due to her support of the
military in the drafting process of the Military Bill which would eventually become Law
No. 34/2004 on TNI.21 With several counter-productive laws on politics, including the
new laws on political party and broadcasting, she ended her presidency with an
incomplete democratic transition. Contrary to Crouch’s view that President Megawati had
promoted political reform by urging further amendments to the 1945 State Constitution
17
“UU KKR, Banyak Pasal Dinilai Rugikan Korban” (“Law on Commission on Truth and Reconciliation,
Many Clausuls Harms the Victims”), Media Indonesia, April 13, 2006: 5.
18
“UU KKR Abaikan Hak Korban” (”Law on Commission on Truth and Reconciliation Ignores the Rights
of the Victims”), Suara Pembaruan, June 22, 2006: 3.
19
Lihat “Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (“Central Government Was Demanded to Respect Papua’s
Special Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ ut01.htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005. Juga, Robert Isisdorus, “Pilkada atau Pemekaran Papua” (”Regional Elections or Enlargement of Papua”), http://www.suarapembaruan. com/News/2005/11/26/ Utama/ut05. htm,:
1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005.
20
”Gubernur Papua Minta Segera Cabut Inpres No. 1/2003” (“Papua Governor Wants Cancellation of
Presidential Instructions No. 1/2003”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2007/ 04/21/Nusantara/
nus-14.htm, was accessed on April 21, 2007: 1-2.
21
See, Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 132.133.
254
and producing more new laws, in reality, she tried to limit civil liberties by tightening
legal provisions for those who wanted to form new political parties and found electronic
22
media enterprises. More significantly, she would not revoke Article 19 in the bill on
TNI, which allowed the military to impose martial law and transfer power without making
prior consultation with the incumbent president, had there not been pressure from the
reform movement right before the September 2004 presidential elections.
Furthermore, unlike Habibie and Wahid, Megawati never supported the formation
of a federal state in Indonesia in response demands of the regions which resented the
profound disparities between Java and the outer islands. Strongly resenting the separatist
movements in Aceh, (South) Maluku, and Irian Jaya, the independence of these
provincies was absolute anathema for her. Alternatively, she offered a special autonomy
status to Aceh by submitting and eventually enacting a particular law. However, a similar
law which granted a special autonomy status to Irian Jaya had been undermined by her
presidential instruction (Inpres) to enlarge Mimika, Paniai, Sorong, and other regencies in
the province.
Civil liberties were threatened by her government as she imposed a strict
regulation on public rallies, the first since the fall of Soeharto. This affected those who
wanted to criticize the president in public because they could be punished by a defamation
clause of KUHP (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana --the Criminal Code) inherited
from the Dutch colonial government. Her reservation towards free expression in public
also threatened the freedom of the press, especially if it commented on the situation in
Aceh and her government’s (repressive) approach in handling separatist conflict there. In
an official forum, for example, she complained about the press for its interviews with
GAM rebels which were publicized abroad. According to President Megawati, such
interviews showed that the press did not possess nationalism or patriotism, leaving the
23
country’s interest behind.
I.D. Megawati’s Policies Regarding Security Sector Reform
TNI’s role as revolutionary (tentara pejuang) and people’s army (tentara rakyat)
was endorsed by different presidents. Most salient in this respect was Megawati, who,
similar to Sukarno, her father, in her official remarks frequently praised the important role
of the military institution in safeguarding the country and its people from any kind of
22
23
Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006 in Jakarta.
Harian Kompas, March 15, 2007: 4.
255
threats since independence.24 To pay respect and show pride of her national military, she
always wore TNI uniform when she attended and led military ceremonies. Not
surprisingly, her track record showed good relations with the red-white faction of the
military that were close to Gen. Murdani and Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono, as well as other
pro-Soeharto generals from the new generation, such as Gen. Wiranto, Adm. Widodo, and
Gen. Sutarto, who consecutively led TNI afterwards. In most of her official speeches
during legislative and presidential campaigns, she took pains to praise Wiranto and his
military for their support of her presidency. Attempting to continuously show tribute to
TNI leaders, she mentioned that the military was changing from a tool of Soeharto’s
authoritarian rule to a professional defence force. Nonetheless, the reform movement
became increasingly sceptical to such pronouncements.
It was very clear that since her rise to power, President Megawati did not want to
urge TNI to change the old doctrines of Tri Ubaya Cakti (the three sacred principles) and
Catur Darma Eka Karma (four tasks one response), which defined TNI’s dual function
and gave the military reason to resume its involvement in non-military affairs after the fall
of Soeharto.25 The controversial role inherited from the past was also protected by Law
No. 34/2004 which was passed in the last few months of her presidency. Thus, under
Megawati, there was a stagnation, and, eventually, a setback of military reform efforts.26
As noted by Mietzner, Wiranto’s role in facilitating the rise of the next generation of
military officers close to him prevented the complete destruction of the Soeharto regime
and allowed many of its key elements, in particular, the military, to make a relatively
smooth transfer into the new polity. Megawati supported the military in this process by
allowing it to define and implement its own internal reform.This had resulted in the
omission of important items from the reform agenda, especially, the territorial command
structure, which was left untouched.27
President Megawati’s lacklustre reformism and her mediocre leadership was
another factor that caused the stagnation of security sector reform. Meanwhile, the rising
threat of international terrorism since 2002 after the series of attacks of Jamaah Islamiyah
(JI) in Jakarta and Bali provided TNI an additional pretext to cancel its command
structure reform. With the renaissance of nationalist-unitarian notions of state security,
24
See, for example, Megawati Soekarnoputri, ”Sikap dan Kebijakan Politik PDI Perjuangan” (”The Position and Politics of the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle”), paper, the XXVIIIth Regular Course
of Lemhannas, Jakarta, DPP PDIP, July 28, 2005.
25
Rusdi Marpaung (eds.), Dinamiika Reformasi Sektor Keamanan (Dynamics of Security Sector Reform),
Jakarta: Imparsial, 2005: 176-177; Also, interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta.
26
See, Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 132.
27
Mietzner, 2006, loc .cit : 6.
256
Megawati became even more apathetic to protect civilian supremacy and civil liberties
that would positively influence the prospect of TNI reform.28
Reversely, Megawati expanded her concessions to the military by offering greater
institutional autonomy and new opportunities to interfere on security affairs. She returned
the post of TNI chief commander to the army by promoting Gen. Sutarto, the army chief,
in a wide-ranging reshuffling of the top military leadership in 2002. She further
encouraged the promotion of Lt. Gen Ryamizard, then Kostrad (Komando Cadangan
Strategis Angkatan Darat --Army’s Strategic Reserves Command) commander, who held
strong nationalist-unitarian views and opposed progressive reform, that had made him
politically controversial but popular with the army mainstream, to the position of army
chief. As argued by Effendy Choirie, member of the defense subcommittee of DPR’s
Committee 1, by endorsing those hardliners or what he identified as anti-reform officers,
President Megawati tried to invite the military back to the political arena, and ignored the
post-Soeharto consensus which would have enabled the air force chief to replace Adm.
29
Widodo AS as TNI chief commander.
No less important, she appointed Matori Abdul Djalil defence minister. Matori
was a former aide of Wahid who defected from Wahid’s PKB (Partai Kebangkitan
Bangsa --National Awakening Party) and transferred support to Megawati’s camp. Matori
badly lacked knowledge of military affairs, but sought to compensate this by pursuing a
course of accommodation toward the military elite as new minister of defence. Although
he had made a constructive effort to define the country’s threat perception in the Defence
White Paper (Buku Putih Pertahanan) of 2003, he was also quite comfortable with being
the mouthpiece of the most heavily militarized government ministry. 30 After he suffered a
stroke, Megawati did not fill the vacancy position until the expiration of her term by
October 2004. Consequently, her disengagement from details of military management,
combined with the absence of a minister of defence, left the military largely in control of
31
their corporate affairs.
Also, in comparison to Habibie and Wahid, Megawati was more dependent on
military support to preserve her position and promote her political interests. Due to this
motivation, in 2002 she drastically increased the budget for defence from 3.79 percent of
APBN (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara --state revenue and expenditure) or
national budget at the end of the Wahid presidency (2001)32 to 7.07 percent. This was
slightly less than the allocation for education, which reached 7.76 percent. In 2004, the
28
Ibid: 33.
30
Carmel Budiardjo, “Indonesia’s Territorial Integrity and the TNI’s Role in Crushing Separatism”, http:
//tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/r030603tni.htm, was accessed on June 3, 2003: 1-5.
31
Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit: 34.
32
Zulfahmi, 2006, loc.cit: 15; Widoyoko, 2005, loc. cit: 1-15.
29
257
last year of her presidency, the defence budget increased further to 8.40 percent,
surpassing the budget she allocated for the educational sector which attained only 7.75
percent. President Megawati supported most of the financial requests made by the military
33
without demanding detailed explanations for particular budget items.
The condition of Indonesia’s economy in 2003 also improved and became more
stable, as suggested by slight improvements of the main economic indicators. Economic
34
growth rose to 4.1 percent from 3.7 percent in 2002, and the number of people living
below the poverty line decreased by 1 percent from 38.4 million to 37.4 million people, or
from 18.4 percent in 2002 to 17.4 percent in 2003.35 Megawati’s success in significantly
reducing the inflation rate from 10.03 percent in 2002 to 5.06 percent in 2003 had
36
improved the welfare especially of those at the lowest level of the income distribution.
A recovering economy and improving monetary conditions resulted in a better condition
of the real economy, resulting in economic growth (GDP), which further rose to 5.1
percent in 2004, the highest level after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.37 Likewise, GNP
per capita in 2003 steadily increased to Rp. 2.0 million (US$ 200) from Rp. 1.7 million
(US$ 170) in 2002 and Rp. 1.4 (US$ 140) million in 2001.38 Summing up, one may argue
that in 2004, Indonesia’s economy had partly recovered from the 1997 financial crisis.
This economic achievement had also helped President Megawati prevent military
opposition. It also indicated the positive relationship between civilian regimes’ success in
reaching economic progress and military support for them as earlier argued by
Lovemann,39 Crouch, 40 and Welch. 41
President Megawati supported most of the financial requests made by the military
without demanding detailed explanations for particular budget items.42 Because of this, in
April 2002, for example, the DPR threatened to create a special committee of
investigation (Panitia Khusus or Pansus) to examine from which sources she provided a
43
Rp. 30 billion (about US$ 3 million) grant to the military and the police. DPR wanted to
know whether the money had been really used to help renovate houses and dilapidated
military barracks (asrama) of lower ranking TNI soldiers and the police across Indonesia.
33
Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2003 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2003), Jakarta, Bank Indonesia, 2004: 3, 27.
35
“Ironi Kemiskinan di Negeri Kaya” (”Irony of Poverty in Rich Country”), Kompas , April 9, 2005: 37.
36
Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2003 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2003), 2004, op.cit: 58.
37
Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2004 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2004), Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2005: xix.
38
Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2003 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2003), 2004, op.cit: 45.
39
Loveman, 1999, op.cit: 186, 213, 254-255; Loveman and Davies, Jr., (eds.), 1978, loc.cit: 5 & 12.
40
Crouch in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288.
41
Welch (ed.), 1970, loc. cit: 17-35.
42
Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 39.
43
34
258
It was later known that the money the President used had been taken from Bantuan
Presiden (Banpres), or the presidential aid funds, something that must be approved by the
DPR because they are part of APBN which must be passed as law. In the end, Megawati
did not need to come to the parliament for defending the allocation because in the absence
of support by the military faction, the proposed establishment of an investigative
committee or Pansus Asramagate for questioning the asrama scandal was afterwards
withdrawn.
In another case, the President had been heavily criticized by DPR members for
failing to consult them before signing the deal of the purchase of the Sukhoi jet fighters
44
and helicopters made during her visit to Moscow in April 2003. There was indication
that the purchase breached both defense and budgetery laws since the expenditure for the
military aircraft was neither included in the 2003 defense budget, nor was it inserted in
the military planned budget. Although a special committee of inquiry (Pansus Sukhoi)
was formed and carried out its task, only Widjanarko Puspoyo, the Chairperson of Bulog,
45
had been sent to court for the misappropriation of the state logistics agency’s budget.
More importantly, without the support of the military faction, DPR had stopped the
activities of its Sukhoi enquiry committee. Therefore, the DPR’s enquiry into the
Sukhoigate scandal, as it became popularly known, had no further impacts on the political
position of President Megawati.
More interestingly, close to the 2004 general elections, the incumbent president
instructed the branches of her party --the PDIP-- to support military candidates for the
positions of governor, major, and regent. One significant example which had upset her
supporters was her order to support a military figure as speaker of the elected city council
in Jakarta.46 This clearly reflected her increased dependency on the military for her
political survival. Not surprisingly, in return, she encouraged the military to intensify its
47
campaign in Aceh against the GAM rebels. Before she concluded her presidency, she
even allowed the military to submit the draft bill on the Indonesian military (TNI), later
passed as Law No. 34/2004, which contradicted with Law No. 3/2002 on National
Defence and Law No. 2/2002 on the National Police These two laws were passed under
the Wahid administration which had the objective to reform the TNI, end its sociopolitical
48
functions, and separate it from the police. As stated above, the TNI bill submitted to the
44
Ibid: 148.
Leanika Tanjung and Eduardus Karel Dewanto, “Badan Urusan (Logistik) Pesawat,” (“State Logisctis/
Aircraft Agency”), 29 Juni 2003 , Tempo Online, http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2003/06/29/
LU/mbm.20030629.LU88768.id.html, was accessed on May 26, 2010.
46
Sander Thoenes, “Indonesian Military Power Undimmed by Humiliations”, Financial Times, September
21, 1999.
47
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher, 2005, loc. cit: 85.
48
See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit.
45
259
legislature by the Megawati government again granted authority to the military to take
over power in case of a state emergency, thereby restoring its previous position.
Considering that the military faction was still in parliament until October 2004,
and ignoring criticism from reform activists, Megawati endorsed the submission of the
law. She conferred ample opportunity to the TNI to improve its position and protect its
vested interests. In return, she expected military support for her campaign in the
presidential elections scheduled for July and September 2004. If passed into law, the draft
bill would seriously threaten the on-going security sector reform. Article 19 of the draft
bill, for instance, would allow the TNI to restore its dual function by vesting it tasks other
49
than war. The article granted unlimited powers to the TNI chief commander to define
when and under what circumstances the sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the
security of the state are under threat.50 This is why Article 19 had been often cited as
“pasal kudeta” or “the coup chapter.” The draft article obscured security and defense
matters, and fused the functions of the military and the police that had been separated
before.
Although the DPR could revise some of the bill’s worst reversals of military
reform, including the “pasal kudeta“ (Article 19), with Law No. 34/2004 eventually
passed, TNI could retain its political influence and maintain its territorial function which
in the past had been misused for protecting illegal business practices. 51 In addition,
Article 45 opened new access for TNI officers to occupy civilian posts in the cabinet and
the bureaucracy, both in the central and regional government offices, without retiring
from their military carreers.
Of course, the concessions Megawati made in Law No. 34/2004 increased the risk
for the return of the military’s dual function and supremacy over the civilian control. This
is why Rinakit commented that it was evident that military power had become a critical
factor in the calculations of ambitious politicians such as Megawati.52 Earlier, Alagappa
had noted that in the initial stages of democratic transition, civilian authorities for a
number of reasons, including lack of expertise or a desire to consolidate their hold on the
political realm, might willingly acquiesce to demands of the armed forces which were
preserving and possibly even strengthening their prerogatives in institutional and security
matters. Such a situation could also be found in Indonesia’s democratic transition under
President Megawati Soekarnoputri.53
49
Anggoro, expert on the Indonesian military, in Marpaung (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 174.
Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit.
51
Marpaung (Eds.), 2005, ibid; Also, interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al -Araf, human rights activists
from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta.
52
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher, 2005, loc. cit.
53
Alagappa, 2001, op.cit: 35.
50
260
Therefore, PKB legislator Choirie maintained54 that from mid-2001 until 2004
Indonesia’s security sector reform slowed down, although, according to Pramono, 55
Megawati’s political adviser, political stability was much greater, compared to the period
from mid-1998 to early 2001, when the country was governed by Habibie (1998-1999)
and Wahid (1999-2001). In an interview with the author, Choirie explained how
adamantly TNI leaders opposed the provisions on civilian supremacy and human rights in
the military draft bill. In accordance with this, T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of
Propatria, an NGO focusing on Indonesia’s security sector reform, argued that by
supporting TNI’s aspiration on the military’s tasks “other than war” which were not
rigidly defined in the draft bill, President Megawati wanted also to maintain the military’s
territorial function.56 In other words, she did not support the reform movement which
57
demanded the elimination of the tasks that had been largely misused in the past.
According to Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, a military analyst from LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu
Pengetahuan Indonesia -- Indonesian Institute of Sciences), President Megawati actually
58
wanted to create a subjective civilian control --as defined by Huntington -- over the
military with the new law. 59 This could be seen, for instance, in her decision to promote
Gen. Ryamizard, the army chief, to the post of chief commander. Megawati was beholden
to Ryamizard who had played a key role in the impeachment of President Wahid and the
installation of Megawati as new president. More specifically, she wanted to perform her
role as TNI supreme commander, for which she passionately wore military uniform on
many occasions at state ceremonies. Such reality reminded the analyst to Sukarno’s
behaviour before the end the first Indonesia’s democratic transition in the 1950s.
President Megawati had also gone out of her way to cheer up TNI soldiers. She
had visited two important corps of the army, Kopassus and Kostrad. She participated in
parades, rode on heavy equipment, and delivered homilies on the need for self-respect and
the duty to protect the nation. At the closing ceremonies of a Kostrad training camp in
Cipatat, Bandung, she said, “It will be more important for you to develop a sense of
belonging to your corps and your nation in such a way that will help you with your duties
in securing our respected and beloved country.”60
As pointed out by Australian military expert, Harold Crouch, President Megawati
never encouraged TNI to change its old doctrine of Catur Dharma Eka Karma, the pillars
54
Pramono Anung was interviewed on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta.
56
“Warga Sipil Keberatan Upaya Pertahankan Koter” (“Civilians Resisted Territorial Command Existence”), Harian Kompas, March 1, 2007: 2.
57
58
Huntington, 1957, op.cit.
59
Ikrar Nusa Bakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta.
60
England, 2000, loc.cit.
55
261
of the military’s dual function. For this reason, there was no significant change in the
structure and composition of the defence ministry, the national intelligence board (Badan
Intelijen Nasional --BIN), and other institutions which should actually be controlled by
61
civilians. Due to Megawati’s unwillingness to press for reform, the country got stuck in
what Crouch and Salim criticized as “half-hearted reform.”
I.E. The Military and Javanese Political Culture
As stated by Ong Hok Ham, a senior Indonesian historian and expert of Javanese
culture, TNI perceived their role comparable with the Satria (knights) in traditional
Javanese kingdoms, where they played the dominant role. The fact that Javanese values
influenced the inner world of the military62 explains why TNI was reluctant to leave its
dual-function. In accordance with integrationalist state theory, the Javanese political
culture made no separation between military and political functions. The concept
inherited by the nation from the Mataram kingdom put the guardians of the kingdom, the
knights, or the soldiers, in special position, and conferred privileges on them. As a
consequence, even including in the period of the so-called parlamentary democracy in the
63
mid-1950s, the military had always played a dominant role in Indonesian politics. At
that time, military leaders under Gen. Nasution through his Jalan Tengah (Middle Way)
concept laid the ideational foundation to the political role of the military. The MiddleWay
was renamed in 1965 to dwifungsi (dual function), and over the years, it became the main
doctrine of the military, which imposed its dominant role on every main area of the
nation’s life.64 Any attempt to bring the armed forces under civilian control had been met
with stiff resistance.
To have a better understanding on the Indonesian military and their political
culture, the views of Kusnanto Anggoro, a scholar of military and Javanese political
culture from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, need to be
noted. According to him, most soldiers still see themselves as members of a caste rather
than a profession. Consequently, current TNI do not differ from Tentara Jawa (Javanese
traditional soldiers), Tentara Mataram (Mataram soldiers), or Tentara Wisanggeni in the
past who wanted to have control over weapons, reign, and wealth simultaneously.65
61
Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher, 2005, loc. cit: 75-76.
63
See also, Crouch, 1978, and ICG, 2000, in Liem Soei Liong, in Colimbijn and Lindblad, 2000, loc. cit:
198.
64
Notosutanto, 1984, in Liem Soei Liong, ibid.
65
Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 31, 2007, after discussions and book launch entitled
Metamorfosis Bisnis Militer: Sebaran Bisnis Militer Pasca Diterbitkannya UU TNI (The Metamorphose of
62
262
In line with this, Burhan Magenda, a military expert from the University of
Indonesia, argued that the behavior of the Indonesian armed forces was deeply influenced
66
by the dominant Javanese political culture existing before the colonial era. Using
Rueland’s cultural approach, it can be further argued here that Hinduistic and Brahmanic
culture dominating the Southeast Asian region in the past had strongly affected Javanese
kingdoms which controlled most regions that would form together the modern state of
67
Indonesia. This Javanese cultural dominance is associated with a hegemonic Indonesian
state. According to Rueland, transmigration policy, which was intensified in the 1970s
and 1980s and attempted to ease the population explosion on Java, was also intended to
consolidate the military regime’s, particularly, Soeharto’s rule, which strongly relied on
Javanese symbols and values by settling Javanese in the outer islands of Indonesia.
Besides, Burhan said that Javanese people gave high respect to the role of their
traditional soldiers. They could tolerate that soldiers are profoundly involved in the daily
life of society in order to guarantee security, in addition to their role in the palace to
protect the king and his family from any kind of internal and external threats of
disturbance. Due to their high respect to soldiers’ role as warriors and protectors of the
kingdom and society, the Javanese easily forgave them for the wrongdoings such as
human rights violations.
Javanese culture also maintains that state and society are inseparable. As argued
by Permadi, the independence of Indonesia was founded in 1945 within this integralistic
perspective as enshrined in its basic constitution and state ideology.68 Therefore, the
practice of the military’s dual function had been tolerated by the Indonesian people for a
long time, and became difficult to be removed. Permadi added that such difficulty was
influenced by the old value of the manunggaling Kawula-Gusti which perceived the
military as an integral part of society that could not be separated from it. More
specifically, the old Javanese value interpreted as kemanunggalan tentara dan rakyat had
constrained TNI to introduce new cultural values which could lead them to transform
themselves to become a modern and professional military that could wholly abandon its
social and political roles. On the other hand, the established values that are still taught in
TNI training courses continuously motivated soldiers to get involved in civic affairs, and,
reversely, to be sensitive to criticism and demands for reform.
Military Business: Military Business after the Issuance of Law on TNI), Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, FES,
2007.
66
Burhan Magenda was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta after seminar on “TNI and the Inte-rest
to Maintain theTerritorial Command System” held by the Centre for Researches of DPR.
67
Juergen Rueland,”Ethnic Conflict, Separatism and Terrorism,” in Stephan Hoadley and Juergen Rueland (eds.), Asian Security Reassessed, Singapore: ISEAS, 2006: 211-212.
68
Permadi was interviewed on November 25, 2006 in Bogor.
263
Burhan also believes that that political culture could change, but this would take
time, and depend on the extent of external influences to which the military is exposed.69
During the Megawati era the Javanese were still the dominant ethnic group, therefore this
situation precluded the change of the political culture. Based on the 2000 census report,
with 41 percent of the total population, the Javanese continued to be the largest ethnic
group.70 Combined with the Sundanese, Cirebonese, Madurese, Bantenese, Balinese, who
were also indigenous ethnic groups of Java and are still close to them, they made up
around 64.9 percent of the Indonesian population. The Javanese had a high concentration
in almost all provinces of the country; they included at least 15 percent of the local
population in thirteen of the thirty provinces. Even outside Java, the Javanese make up the
largest single ethnic group in the provinces of Bengkulu, Lampung, and East Kalimantan,
while in many other provinces, they were second or third to the local indigenous
population in terms of size.71 For instance, they were the second biggest ethnic group in
North Sumatra, comprising 32 percent of the provincial population, in Riau with 25
percent, Jambi with 27 percent, Central and South Kalimantan with 18 and 13 percent
72
respectively. With this positive cultural predisposition to the military, not surprisingly,
there was evidence that the public in general was not opposed to the military role in
internal security. A survey conducted at the Gadjah Mada University at the request of the
military, disclosed that 78 percent of the respondents were in favor of a military
provincial command and a smaller percentage, but still a majority, approved military
73
commands at lower local levels. More importantly, although the military had announced
the turnover of territorial affairs to local authorities, critics were still doubtful that it
would really do this. The civilian minister of defence under Habibie and Wahid, Juwono
Sudarsono, acknowledged that the Indonesian people still tolerate the military to practice
74
its territorial function.
In this relation, two main critics of Javanese culture, Suwardi Endraswara and
Mohamad Sobary, reminded that in response to change, the culture shows ambiguous
reactions. It generally resists outside pressure for change due to its emphasis on the values
of persatuan (unity), 75 stabilitas (stability), and ketertiban (orderliness). They are the
dominant symbols of the Javanese culture which had been internalized by civilian leaders
69
Burhan Magenda was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta.
The 2000 Population Census, Central Bureau Statistics, Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 2001.
71
Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, “Who are the Indonesians?” The Jakarta Post, August, 16, 2005.
72
Ibid; see also, Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
73
Dwith Y. King in “Sizing-up Indonesia's New Leadership”, conference report, Washington DC: Asia
Society, 2001.
74
Juwono Sudarsono was interviewed on July 17, 2009 in Jakarta.
75
“Rukardi, ‘Budaya Jawa Digugat Habis’” (“Rukardi, ‘Javanese Culture Totally Questioned’”), Suara
Merdeka, November 19, 2006: 1-2.
70
264
like Megawati as well as TNI.76 For this reason, Maj. Gen. Sidarto Danusubroto, a former
Sukarno aide and President Megawati’s political adviser, argued that the Indonesian
military would still be sensitive to reform if the political culture of the nation did not
77
change.
A similar view came from the TNI institution. Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, the last
Kaster, (Kepala Staf Teritorial --TNI chief for territorial affairs) and a proponent of an
abolition of the military’s territorial function, admitted that TNI’s institutional culture,
which hindered it to accept civilian supremacy, was not easy to be removed. This means
that TNI would not give up its dual function, as long as the role of the military in the
country’s polity was negotiated by civilian and military leaders who were socialized in the
78
traditional culture. A clear example for this, according to Widjojo, is Law No. 34/2004,
which again granted the military authority to perform non-military tasks. It had been
iniated by TNI leaders and passed by President Megawati and the parliament (DPR).
Previously, chief commander Gen. Sutarto often stated that although the role of TNI had
been redefined in the amended 1945 State Constitution, TNI would still be involved in the
state and government affairs and the nation’s decision making process. 79
In fact, during the Megawati presidency, the armed forces still tightly upheld their
doctrines of Tri Ubaya Cakti, Catur Dharma Eka Karma, and Sishankamrata (total
defence),80 which justified and prolonged their participation in civic affairs, even at
village level, supported by the existence of their territorial commands and their rejection
to civilian tribunals. 81 Military training schools, and, more significantly, the military
academy (the Akademi Militer --Akmil), which was responsible for recruiting and
preparing army officers, also maintained its old symbols and values which found
expression in old Javanese language, for example, adhitakarya mahatvavirya nagara
bhakti (creating soldiers or officers with highest devotion to the state), 82 trisakti wiratama
83
(creating soldiers or officers who are brave, committed, and devoted), and so forth,
76
Maj. Gen. Sidarto Danusubroto was interviewed on November 28, 2006 in Jakarta.
78
79
”Militer Menatap Masa Depan” (“Military Anticipates the Future”), http://www.tokohindonesia. com/
ensiklopedi/e/endriartono-sutarto/index.shtml, September 27, 2006: 1-4.
80
See Andi Widjajanto, “Pemberdayaan Wilayah Pertahanan” (“Empowerment of Defense Territory”),
paper, presented in Centre for Research and Information Services of DPR, June 6, 2006, Jakarta: 1-4.
81
An evaluation from Muladi, Governor of Lemhannas, National Resilience Council, an important state
institution which prepares the promotions of military and civilian officers to strategic posts. See, “DPR
Nilai Pemerintah Tak Serius: Kultur TNI Harus Diubah” (“DPR Sees Government Not Serious: TNI’s
Culture Must be Changed”), Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006: 4; also interview with Muladi on
March 28, 2008 in Jakarta.
82
“Sekilas Akmil: Lintasan Sejarah Akademi Militer” (“A Glance on Military Academy: The History of
Military Academy”), http://www.akmil.ac.id/sekilas/php: 1-2; “Lambang Akademi Militer” (“Symbol of
Military Academy”), http://www.akmil.ac.id/lambang.php#top: 1.
83
“Visi dan Misi” (“Vision and Mission”), http://www.akmil.ac.id/visi_misi.php: 1.
77
265
which reflected on the cadets life and decisions. Moreover, soldiers still claimed that they
were inseparable parts of the people and upheld Sapta Marga, the seven milestones of the
TNI soldiers, in which the third milestone declared that they were knights of Indonesia.
They still also preserved Sumpah Prajurit --the Soldier’s Oath-- which stated in its first
principle that every soldier must be loyal to NKRI (the unitary state of the Republic of
Indonesia) which is based on Pancasila (state ideology) and UUD 1945 (the 1945 State
84
Constitution). Similar to this, their leaders continued to keep leadership principles
which were mostly written in old Javanese language, such as satya (loyal), ing ngarsa
sung tuladha (to give the right example and lead from the front), ing madya mangun
karsa (to be a driving force from the middle), tut wuri handayani (to guide from behind),
and waspada purba wisesa (to supervise subordinates and have the courage to correct
85
them). All the same doctrines and values would justify their right to perform sociopolitical functions in the new post-Soeharto era. 86
Reform demands which brought about domestic instability had confirmed and
legitimized TNI’s new emphasis on the concept of integralism as its main ideological
guideline which was mostly influenced by the Javanese political culture. TNI had reason
to defend their ideology by referring to the disintegration in Eastern Europe after the fall
of communism and arguing that only its territorial presence in the regions was able to
87
prevent Indonesia from going down similar path.
Not surprisingly, military leaders, for example, army chief, Gen. Ryamizard, like
his seniors in the past, publicly stated that “In Indonesia, we, the Army, are part of the
people,” to keep justifying the involvement of the military in political life. This meant as
an “Army of the people,” the military had a particular role in guarding against separatism
and security disturbances, so that it deserved a bigger role in national security affairs.
However, Gen. Ryamizard later denied that the statement suggested a return to politics:
“The idea of more involvement in handling domestic security should not be seen as the
military’s return to day-to-day politics. We, as the Army, are just sharing our ideas on
how to prevent the country from disintegration.” 88 Analysts saw the statements well
connected with BIN’s (National Intelligence Board, previously known as Bakin) proposal
on giving back TNI its role for arrest and investigation explained in the Megawati
government’s recent initiative of issuing anti-terrorism regulations after the October 12,
2002 Bali bombings. They would provide again the military space to operate as a quasipolice force, thereby overruling MPR Decree No. 6/2000, which had laid down the
separation between the police and the military.
84
Ibid: 213.
86
Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 325-326.
87
88
“BIN wants its power back from police”, February 24, 2003, Laksamana.net.
85
266
I.F. Military Response to Megawati Regarding Security Sector Reform
One of the characteristics of Megawati’s leadership that was seen as favourable
for the military was that during her presidency she never introduced policies which went
against the military. Her pride of the military, on the one side, and poor knowledge on
security matters, on the other, led her to give a blanco check to the military. This is why
under her presidency domestic security rapidly recovered and national stability increased.
In the absence of military opposition, her goverment was stable and free from
military pressure, fabricated opposition, intimidation, and coup threats.89 She could stay
longer in power due to her policies which were conducive for the interests of the military.
This supported Singh’s argument who had linked stability, regime survival, and the
90
protection of both national and military interest. Meanwhile, terorrist attacks such as the
bombings in Jakarta, Bali, and Poso actually targeted foreign countries, such as the U.S.,
Britain, and Australia, not to her government. The “failure” of TNI to prevent radical
Muslims from perpetrating the attacks was a reflection of its ambivalent response to
reform. Army chief Gen. Ryacudu, for instance, was quoted as saying that his military
strategic intelligence unit (Bais), which had relied on a strong intelligence network, had
detected terrorist cells in Indonesia a long time earlier. However, it did not act for the
reason that it was no longer within its jurisdiction to do so. 91 The head of the national
intelligence board (BIN), who was also former Kopassus (army’s special forces) officer,
Lt. Gen. AM Hendropriyono, and TNI chief commander, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, also
believed that more authority was required to uncover the terrorist network on a larger
scale than so far achieved by the police. With this argument, the military intended to
regain the Indonesian people’s support for the reinforcement of its territorial command
structure and its security functions instead of the national police which was portrayed as
being incapable of coping with the international terrorist attacks.92
With the blanco check for reforming itself, the military saw no reason to change
93
its institutional culture. In fact, the armed forces clung to their interventionist tendencies
in politics. For example, in late 2003, army chief Gen. Ryamizard organized a show of
force by deploying his army in Senayan national sports compound, near the parliament
building. On that occasion, he warned politicians, especially party leaders, not to exploit
the forthcoming September 2004 presidential election for their own narrow interests to
89
Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006 in Jakarta; Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July
90
See Singh, 1996, op.cit: 20-22.
91
Sunday Times, October 27, 2002, cited in Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 105.
92
The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2002, ibid
93
267
prevent the country from bloody clashes and security disturbances that would endanger
national stability.94 Later, chief commander Gen. Sutarto made a statement before the
working meeting of the defence commitee of the DPR, announcing that there were parties
95
who wanted to sabotage the upcoming September 2004 presidential election. Earlier,
Maj. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo, military spokesman and former assistant of Kasospol
(Kepala Staf Sosial Politik --military chief for social and political affairs), said that if TNI
only functioned as defence force, it would make them a tool of the government, not of the
state, like fire extinguishers which were subordinated to a certain government agency
without authority to perform other funtions. Referring to the period of the struggle for
independence, Suwarno argued, TNI should be actually allowed to perform again as
prajurit pejuang bersenjata or soldiers and, simultaneously, freedom fighters, who had
96
capability to mobilize masses in addition to control military affairs.
Therefore, TNI leaders and soldiers were reluctant to implement internal reform
and ignored the existing laws which required TNI to withdraw from politics, stop
business activities, and focus on improving their professionalism. For the time being, they
still demanded voting rights for their personnel in the parliament and rejected civilian or
public court trials. TNI also continued to deploy huge numbers of their members in rural
and urban areas, especially in trouble spots, such as, Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Poso through
their territorial structure. The armed forces had effectively defended their autonomy from
institutional control, so that previous pressure of reform still had not yet brought major
changes to them. In other words, there was actually little progress in transforming the
TNI.97
TNI leaders held onto their political culture, even under Adm. Widodo, a chief
commander with navy background. His “New Paradigm” proposed on October 5, 2001
was largely similar to his predecessor Wiranto’s agenda. It still emphasised TNI as “part
of the national system” which played the same important role like any other civilian
98
institution. Such paradigm would obviously provide the military with wide access to
exercise its social-political functions. It would be protected by the Military Law No.
34/2004 which the military faction in the DPR sought to pass at the end of Megawati
presidency.
94
Asril Sutan Marajo,”Mencermati Kinerja KPU” (“Evaluating KPU’s Performance”), Suara Merdeka, 3
Desember 2003, http://www.suara merdeka.com/ harian/0312/03/kha1.htm: 1-4.
95
Ibid.
96
Suwarno Adijoyo, Kemanunggalan TNI-Rakyat yang Hakiki: Jangan Sekali-sekali Menyakiti Hati Rakyat (The Essence of TNI-People Integrity: Never Harm People’s Heart), Jakarta: Swadana Bangun Dinamika Dunia, 2002: 9, 11, 16, 27.
97
Mietzner, 2006: 59.
98
Marpaung (eds), 2005, loc.cit: 149; Also, interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights
activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta.
268
As pointed out by Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, with the blanco check from President
Megawati, TNI had cancelled its territorial command reform.99 A reform proposal
introduced by Widjojo in September 2001 was rejected by the military leadership and the
majority of officers who wanted to defend the old system. Widjojo’s move could
effectively be blocked after TNI headquarters had disbanded his Kaster office in
November 2001 and he was removed to the less significant post of deputy chairperson
(Wakil Ketua) of MPR. This removal signified the end of internal military discourses on
overhauling the territorial command system, and left the TNI without new proponents of
reform.100
Under the new favorable situation, the military consolidated its position and
struggled for executive positions in the regions. In 2002 and 2003, the armed forces were
successful in winning the elections for governor throughout Indonesia and thus
strengthened their political power quite markedly. The success of TNI officers in winning
local government elections in many regions was in part helped by Megawati’s instruction
101
to her PDIP to recruit the military candidates. Meanwhile, the intense conflict among
political parties over key governor positions, for example, in Jakarta as well as Central
and East Java, had caused many legislatures to support the incumbents with military
background, or, alternatively, they nominated other military officers to replace them. In
effect, many retired generals maintained their governorships in regions outside Java.
These successes encouraged retired generals such as Wiranto, Prabowo Subianto, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, and Agum Gumelar to run in the first direct presidential elections
in 2004. Their competition became known in the country as the “star wars” of Soeharto’s
New Order military figures. Therefore, not only had the military succesfully defended its
territorial (political) power base and autonomy from civilian control, it also used the
fragmentation of civilian politics to carve out political concessions. As explained by
Mietzner, this situation demonstrated how the military as an institution as well as
individual protagonists were able to use the new democratic conditions to their own
102
advantage. This situation, in addition to the TNI-friendly Military Law No. 34/2004,
supported Alagappa’s argument that in exchange for reducing their direct political role in
the initial stage of democratic transition, the military might seek to preserve and even
strenghten its prerogatives in both institutional and security matters. 103
Thus, with Megawati’s concessions, military personnel again began to perceive
themselves as more important than civilians. Likewise, her appreciation of the military’s
important role as the savior of the state retained its claim that it is an institution which
99
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid: 43, 59.
103
Alagappa, 2001, op.cit: 35.
100
269
must remain in national politics. 104 That is why by the end of the Megawati era more than
75 percent of the soldiers resisted reform 105 and upheld their belief that soldiers should
have supremacy over the civilians. This figure highlighted the conservative views
predominant in the military by which soldiers had been socialized since they were cadets
in the military academy.
Rear Marshall Koesnadi Kardi, head of educational and training of defence
ministry, acknowledged this assessment. As a result, the old composition, structure,
doctrines, and mindset, the behavior of TNI soldiers during the early reform era until the
Megawati presidency were still the same.106 For this reason, both Samego and Koesnadi
were of the opinion that military reform could only be comprehensively realized if these
problems had been tackled much earlier. In the absence of strong reform pressure, TNI
introduced only a limited organizational reform, an addition to its weapon system reform
which was supposedly easier to be conducted.
TNI’s determined effort to end military reform, and to retain its position in politics
surfaced in the last period of the Megawati government. Its chief commander Gen.
Sutarto, assisted by the TNI faction in the parliament, proposed the new bill on TNI,
which, especially in its Article 19, conceded unlimited powers to the TNI chief
commander to make his own definition when and under what circumstances “the
sovereignty of the state, the country’s territorial integrity and the security of the nation are
under threat.”107 Interestingly, the draft bill also allowed TNI to perform non-military
tasks, enhancing its ability to interfere in civilian affairs. The military thereby justifies
these powers with the argument that it had to retain its personnel in civilian institutions
such as the defence ministry (Departemen Pertahanan or Dephan) and the national
intelligence board (BIN). By calling for a strict security approach and increasing its
authority, the armed forces capitalized on low-intensity conflicts in Aceh, Papua, and
Poso, as well as terrorist bombings in order to restore its claim to a domestic security
108
role. A unique model of post-Wahid military resistance to civilian regime and reform
demands thus occurred in form of collusion between TNI and President Megawati. It
resembles the sort of collusion between the military and civilian leaders during transition
109
earlier identified by Finer.
104
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviwed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta.
Indria Samego in “Reformasi Masih Hadapi 75 Persen TNI yang Konservatif” (“Reform Movement
Still Faces 75 Procent Conservative TNI”), Harian Kompas, December 21, 2006: 5; Also, interview with
Indria Samego in Jakarta on June 14, 2006.
106
“Yang Berubah dari TNI Baru Senjata” (“What has changed only the weapons”), Harian Republika,
December 20, 2006: 3.
107
Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit:1-5.
108
Mietzner, 2006, op.cit: 37.
109
See, again, Finer, 1962, op. cit: 140-163; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al, 1999, op. cit: 37.
105
270
I.G. Military Response to Decentralization
TNI commanders in the Cilangkap Headquarters (Jakarta) had been aware that
legal reforms made by the previous regimes would impact on their vested interests. Strong
autonomy granted by Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 to regional governments,
especially at the level of municipalities or regencies, had not only jeopardized the
principles of centralization and accumulation of power as well as integralism and the
unitary state but also curbed political and economic interests of TNI leaders in Jakarta 110
After the issuance of the laws, the TNI chief (Panglima TNI) had to deal with various
decision-makers throughout the country to preserve the military’s business interests. The
new situation became more complicated because the mayor (walikota) and regent (bupati)
positions became much stronger than those of the governors. Active officers were
furthermore banned from running in direct elections of governors, mayors, or head of
districts (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah --Pilkada). In case they contested, they must have
earlier retired from their current posts and compete with civilian candidates.
In another new trend after the separation of the armed forces and the police as one
of ther measures of military reform, there were intensifying turf battles over business
opportunities between the two institutions. Welcome moves to give the police greater
responsibility for internal security had produced the unintended side effect of giving the
police opportunities to take over businesses in which TNI had been previously dominant,
not only for security and protection services, but also to many other areas. Thus, where
the police had begun to displace the TNI, struggles over territory repeatedly had broken
out into violence.111
Before 1998, much of the money generated by military businesses in various
regions was allocated to senior officers, including to those who worked in TNI higher
commands in Jakarta.112 Different from the local commanders who could tap into growing
local and regional budgets to cover military expenditures and to wholly control the extra
income, higher commanders in their Jakarta bases did not have similar opportunities due
to the policy of decentralization. Together with local governments, local commanders
could often deeply be involved in illegal logging and other illegal activities of exploiting
natural resources because of the uncontrolled autonomy. Meanwhile, higher commanders
in Jakarta could not longer be able to use the profits from these operations as previously.
With the emergence of new competitors, namely political parties which were struggling to
establish a presence at the grass-roots and legislatures and bureaucracies in smaller
110
Rueland, in Hoadley and Rueland (eds.), 2006, loc. cit: 220.
Edward Schneier,”Evolving Patterns of Legislative Oversight in Indonesia,” in Rick Stapenhurst et al
(eds.), Legislative Oversight and Budgeting, Washington DC: IBRD, WB, 2008.
111
271
regions which were attempting to cope with their new roles, after 1998 military
commanders in Jakarta faced difficulties in taking advantage from the TNI’s territorial
function in order to free themselves and the military institution from their dependency on
regular government appropriations (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara -APBN).113
Decentralization was one of the reasons why the military was reluctant to provide
security and get involved in different conflicts in the regions. The formation of new
municipalities and regencies which in many cases was accompanied by riots and
instability had provided opportunities for TNI to create new regional commands. In
Maluku, TNI had successfully re-established Kodam XVI Pattimura regional command
after the formation of new province Maluku Utara (Malut). In Aceh, after the province
obtained its special autonomy status, TNI had re-established Kodam Iskandar Muda
regional command which had been dissolved under Habibie. In Poso, TNI failed to realize
its proposal to create a Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer --military regional command)
as its main base in Sulawesi due to strong opposition from NGOs.
The new dominant role of the military in handling communal conflicts and
fighting separatist movements, and also in the war on terror produced political capital for
its officers, which was contributing to their resistance against the reform movement. Gen.
Ryamizard strongly argued that TNI still needed its territorial role.114 Therefore, the
Megawati government and the military faction in the parliament initiated the revisions of
the above laws on regional autonomy which had drastically reduced the power and
authority of the central government and TNI’s potential control, as well. The reform
opponents inside the TNI which were represented by the army mainstream also moved to
marginalize Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi and his allies115 and even moderate reformers such as
Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo from the center of decision making.
The growing threat of international terrorism caused by radical Muslim groups in
Indonesia gave the military more arguments to reject demands for further reform. The
three consecutive bomb attacks in Bali and Jakarta between October 2002 and September
2004, and the military’s “inability” to prevent or stop them, actually sent a clear message
to the public that the unitary state (NKRI) would be in danger if the military’s territorial
function was abolished or reduced. By showing reluctance to take firm action against
radical Muslim groups, the military wanted to disclose that the existence of militant
Islamist groups could be dangerous and threatening the Indonesian state. Therefore, the
112
Mietzner, 2006, op.cit.
“Too High a Price” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/ja/node/11300/section/3.
114
Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta.
115
113
272
government also had to reconsider moves to eliminate TNI’s role in non-military affairs,
such as security and business.
TNI’s “inability” to support the police in unveiling and crushing the terrorist
network drew strong criticism as its extended intellegence operations had hardly changed
since Soeharto resigned. With its inactivity, the military was seen in the public to have
encouraged the radical Muslim groups to conduct their terrorist activities in different
116
places across Indonesia.
The groups, whose network during the New Order was
suppressed by security officers could now freely choose their targets and conduct
bombings in main cities within a short period. TNI’s standard weapons (M16 and SS-1)
and the ammunitions and explosives (TNT) used by the groups which had been found
during the police investigations indicated that the military was at least informed about the
groups and their activities. 117
TNI soldier’s alleged individual involvement in the activities of international
terrorist groups, including in prayers and regular meetings, that had been succesfully
uncovered by police investigators,118 depicted the military as a state institution that was
allegedly also responsible for the success of the militants. As Indria Samego pointed out,
TNI probably had no direct connection with the terrorist groups, but the heavy bombings
could only be perpetrated by actors that had access to high-powered weapons such as
those in possession of TNI. 119 Under relentless pressure of reform, the military appeared
as an institution that would gamble with the country’s security for the sake of its own
gain.120
In the 2003 Defence White Paper prepared by the defence ministry, which, except
for the minister himself, was controlled by military staff, TNI had clearly mentioned that
the country was facing numerous non-traditional threats such as communal conflicts,
separatism, and terrorism. It was also described there that it was the explicit task of the
TNI to safeguard the nation from the threats which demanded it to be involved not only in
“war military operations” but also “non-military operations.” As a consequence, in the
Defence White Paper, TNI stated its disagreement with the dismantling of the territorial
116
See, “Military ‘knows’ the bombers, police don’t”, The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2002; ICG, 2005,
loc.cit; ICG, 2001, loc.cit.
117
ICG, 2005, loc.cit.
118
See, for instance,“Aksi Balas Dendam Terungkap: TNI Pecat Yuli Karsono karena JI,” (“Act of Vengeance Corroborated: TNI Discharged Yuli Karsono for Involvement in JI”), Harian Kompas, June 25,
2010: 3. Karsono was army soldier from Cimahi, West Java, found involved in the activity of JI’s followers.
119
120
Ariel Heryanto,”Udang di Balik Terror,” http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0511/07/opini/215044-5. htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 9, 2005.
273
command system as demanded by its critics. Therefore, it appeared that instead of
dismantling the system, TNI preferred to retain or revitalize it.121
In fact, both the civilian defence minister as well as the president, Matori Abdul
Djalil and Megawati Soekarnoputri, encouraged the military to strengthen their territorial
command system to cope with the rising threat of international terrorism. They also
agreed with the re-establishment of TNI regional commands (Kodam) that had been
removed under Habibie. Therefore, the terrorist bombings had corroborated the view of
the military that national security would be threatened if the wide ranging decentralization
scheme initiated in 1999 would be pushed further. It was argued that decentralization
might facilitate the spread of the dangerous activities of the radical Muslims throughout
the country which, as a result, would be difficult to be controlled by the military.
The revitalization of a militaristic approach to conflict resolution, the change of
international security environment after the September 11, 2001 terorrist attacks in the
US, and President Megawati’s soft approach to military reform and dependency on TNI
gave opportunity to the military to dissociate itself from reform demands. Gen. Ryamizard
Ryacudu, the army chief, suggested to the government to revive and expand the
intelligence gathering capability of the territorial command to help TNI cope with the
terrorist threat. In February 2003, he publically stated that the military’s security role
should be reinstated due to the threats of separatism and other security disturbances in the
country.122 With the positive response from President Megawati, particularly, after the
bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, military personnel
became the most important actors in the counterterrorism units previously staffed
exclusively with police officers. The previously limited role of the TNI in
counterterrorism which had produced their officers’ displeasure led them to argue for a
more extensive engagement of the military.123
II.A. Megawati’s Views on Her Mandate
121
Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit: 1-5.
The Jakarta Post, March 3, 2003, cited in Sebastian, 2006, op. cit: 341.
123
Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 40-41.
122
274
As argued in Anderson’s seminal studies, power is the essence of everything in
Javanese history and practice. 124 The Javanese believe that power is a force that can be
possessed by individuals and that it comes from God. Therefore, the question of
legitimizing the possessor of the Sinar (light), Cahaya (radiance), and Wahyu (divine
mandate and legitimation) is very crucial in a country where the Javanese live as majority.
The process of legitimation can take time, and when it is transferred from one person to
another, it usually tends to be traumatic.
Also, since power is unitary, it emanates only from a single source. It becomes all
the more important to identify who has it, because only a good leader can posses it. This
is all the more important as power is not answerable to the people, but to God alone. The
Javanese concept of power thus markedly differs from the perception in the West where
power is an abstract notion. Identifying such leader or person with power can, thus,
become arduous. Therefore, it would be far easier to continue the system rather than
attempt to change it as this may bring about unknown consequences.125 Within this
framework or mindset, a leader predominantly influenced by the Javanese political culture
tends to preserve the system and would not be eager to take any risk for change.
Similar to Soeharto, Megawati originated from a Javanese background and was
thus socialized in Javanese political culture and values. Comparable to Soeharto, and also
Soekarno, her father, President Megawati behaved in typical Javanese way in running her
government. She strove for equilibrium, order, and harmony, or stability more than
anything else. In her view, the country was more like a kingdom, therefore, she ruled
more like a Javanese queen rather than a president of a modern country who had been
elected by the people. Similar to Soeharto who perceived himself as a king and
simultaneously a patriot and, thus, could not be badly treated as other Indonesian and
Javanese rulers in the past, President Megawati considered herself comparable to a great
king or queen from a great kingdom. In this context, she often sent her daughter, Puan
Maharani, to represent her in many important occasions and to be treated with the
privileges accorded to princesses or princes from the Solo kingdom.126 Meanwhile,
cronyism and nepotism were perceived absoloutly legitimate as the traditional leaders saw
it as a right to reward their loyal courtiers. Needless to say, her government was also
confronted with rampant practices of corruption allegedly involving Megawati’s husband
and members of her party.127
124
Benedict ROG Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Language and Power: Exploring Political Culture in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992: 17-77.
125
Singh, 2000, op.cit: 20.
126
“Soeharto, Patriot atau ‘Crook’” (“Soeharto, A Patriot or ‘Crook’”), Kompas-online, April 11, 2007,
http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0704/11utama/3438004.htm, was accessed on April 11, 2007: 3.
127
Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 25-28.
275
Likewise, Megawati came out to see her role for the most part as a symbol of
national unity, because of which she rarely actively intervened in government business.
Her apparent passivity in governing was explained by some Indonesian scholars with
128
reference to Javanese mythology. According to these scholars, President Megawati saw
her father, Soekarno, the first President of the country, as a “Good King” of Javanese
legend, while, Soeharto was seen as the “Bad Prince” who had stolen the ”Good King’s”
throne. Meanwhile, Megawati perceived herself as the “Avenging Daughter” who
unseated the “Bad Prince” and salvaged the “Good King’s” throne. Once this had been
accomplished, she was satisfied to reign as the “Good Queen,” and left the business of
government to others. Permadi, a close aid of President Megawati in the parliament
(DPR), stated that Megawati was perceived as a Satria Piningit or a new leader in the
Javanese legend that had recieved the long-awaited divine mandate to bring the country
out of a chaotic situation.129
Similar viewpoints had been raised by Franz Magnis-Suseno, a renowned scholar
studying Javanese traditional values for a long time. According to Magnis-Suseno,
Megawati behaved like a princess from old Javanese kingdoms as often described in the
Javanese shadow puppet theatre that tended to wait rather than making pro-active
decisions, and who wanted other people to accomplish her duties. Harmony was the
highest priority of her administration, which had implications on her lenient policy
towards former President Soeharto, who was still supported by many of his followers
during her administration.130 Therefore, due to their adherence to conservative values
derived from Javanese traditions, the leadership style of civilian leaders like Megawati
131
resembled the one of former authoritarian rulers like Soekarno and Soeharto.
Two-facedness, hypocrisy, and ascetism, stereotypes of the Javanese people were
repeatedly applied by Megawati during her presidency.132 For example, she defended that
women needed to turn out to vote and should take a greater role in politics. Yet, as the
chairperson of the country’s biggest party, PDIP, she did not recommend many women to
run for parliament. It was thus not surprising that she chose only few women in her
cabinet although according to the constitution she had the prerogative to appoint
ministers. Moreover, she emphasized in many of her speeches the need to implement the
rule of law and previously blamed Soeharto and the negative impacts of his rule, but
refrained from holding him and his cronies accountable for their abuses and misdeeds.
128
“Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://megawati-sukarnoputri.biography.ms/: 1-4, was accessed
on October 29, 2005.
129
130
131
Sebastian, 2006, op. cit: 48.
132
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit
276
Although President Megawati persistently stressed that “all Indonesians should
think of themseves as Indonesians first, and Javanese or Sumatran second,”133 her style of
leadership suggested that she was more inspired with her father’s Javanese political
culture and values. Her style of unilateral communication and reluctance to discuss
government policies publicly made her presidency, the power to govern, and the political
mandate she received from the parliament a sacred matter.
II.B. Megawati’s Policy Regarding Soeharto’s alleged KKN Cases
Part of President Megawati’s ambivalence toward Soeharto’s alleged corruption,
collusion, and nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme --KKN) cases is her policy
toward Tommy Soeharto. Tommy, on hiding for more than a year, had been sentenced by
the Supreme Court to 18 months in prison for real estate fraud in September 2000. He
was recaptured in November 2001 being suspected of masterminding the assassination of
Supreme Court judge M. Syafiuddin Kartasasmita. The latter was a member of a panel of
judges that had sentenced Tommy for graft in a land exchange deal involving the State
Logistics Agency (Badan Urusan Logistik --Bulog) and Tommy’s corporation, PT Goro
Batara Sakti. A champion of anti-corruption and an assertive judge in the country’s
generally corrupt justice system, Syafiuddin was assassinated in July 2001 by two
motorcycle-riding gunmen believed of carrying out orders from Tommy.134 Found guilty,
Soeharto’s youngest son was then sentenced to 15 years in prison in July 2002 after the
public slammed Megawati and security officers for their “inability” to arrest Tommy.
While, the government under public pressure became more assertive in
prosecuting alleged KKN cases of Soeharto’s children, it remained passive in dealing with
cases incriminating the former Indonesian strongman himself. Megawati had ordered to
send a team of doctors whose independency was doubted to examine and make certain the
current condition of Soeharto’s health. She shared however the opinion of pro-Soeharto
Supreme Court chief, Bagir Manan, who on December 11, 2001 stated that the trial of the
former autocratic ruler could not be resumed due to the latter’s ill health. This assessment
was backed by the team of doctors who on December 12, 2002 had checked with
Soeharto’s personal doctors who had determined that the former president was
133
134
Ibid: 216.
277
“permanently” unfit to stand trial. 135 For humanitarian reasons, President Megawati
demanded the cases which directly involved Soeharto to close.136
It is general knowledge that since corruption charges were filed against Soeharto
in the Habibie period, the former president never appeared in court. But contrary to the
judgment of the doctors, in November 2003, he managed to travel to LP Nusakambangan,
an isolated prison in a small and inaccessible island in the South Java Sea, to visit his
137
imprisoned son Tommy. Concluding Soeharto was in a better health condition than the
doctors admitted, the Attorney General’s Office tried to reopen his cases.138 On December
8, 2003, the parliament (DPR) proposed to the Megawati government to discuss again the
Soeharto cases and to resume the trial. In March 2004, Transparency International (TI)
placed former president Soeharto on top of its list of the most corrupt world leaders. The
TI report estimated that he embezzled between Rp. 137 trillion and Rp. 319 trillion
(US$15 billion and US$35 billion) during his 32-year rule. 139
MPR Decree No. 11/1998 had named Soeharto and his family and cronies as
examples for the KKN, 140 and mandated to investigate seven charity foundations, for
instance, Supersemar, Dharmais, and Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila in which the former
president, family members and close associates were involved. 141 On March 8, 1999,
Attorney General Andi Ghalib reported to President Habibie that his office had found that
there was enough evidence to prosecute Soeharto. On March 31, 2000, the former
autocrat was named a suspect for collecting more than US$ 600 million misused through
the seven charitable foundations controlled by his family.142 On April 12, 2000, the
Wahid government’s prosecutors imposed the status of city arrest on Soeharto and
forbade him to go abroad. In the subsequent months, he was placed under house arrest, so
that in August 2000, he could be formally charged with corruption.
In December 2001, in his report to DPR, Attorney General MA Rachman stated
that Soeharto was indicted to have violated Article 1 Section 1, and Article 28 and 34 of
Law No.3/1971 regarding the abuse of power. Soeharto had issued Keppres (Keputusan
135
“Perjalanan Perkara Soeharto” (“The Journey of Soeharto’s Legal Case”), Majalah Tempo, May 21,
2006: 30.
136
Heru Margianto, “Megawati: Jangan Paksakan Proses Hukum terhadap Soeharto,” (“Megawati: Don’t
Force Legal Process Toward Soeharto,”) Kompas Cyber Media, April 25, 2006, http://www.infoanda.
com/linksfollow.php?lh=BlNUUVBQBgRV;kepustakaan-presi-den.pnri.go.id/uploaded_files/.../KCM_
20060425.pdf, was accessed on January 30, 2010.
137
138
“Perjalanan Soeharto di Ranah Hukum” (“The Journey of Soeharto in Legal Case”), Majalah Forum
Keadilan, No.4, May 21, 2006: 25.
139
“Timeline, Global Integrity's 2006 Country Reports Website”, http://www.GlobalIntegrity.org, Washington DC, 2006, was accessed on May 29, 2009.
140
141
“Soeharto’s (Un) Pardon”, Asian Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2006, loc.cit.
142
Majalah Tempo, May 21, 2006, loc.cit.
278
Presiden --Presidential Decree) No. 20/1992 and Inpres (Instruksi Presiden -Presidential Instruction) No. 1/1992 which benefited his families and cronies, 143 which
144
caused Rp. 1.7 trillion (US$ 187 million) in losses to the state. Once more, he was also
accused of misusing a large amount of money from the seven state foundations.
Nonetheless, President Megawati did not change her policy. In her presidential
election campaign, she adopted a magnanimous attitude, telling the public that she wanted
to treat Soeharto better than he had treated her father. This referred to the fact that
Soeharto locked up her father in house arrest despite his serious illnesses in the late
1960s, and widespread belief that the internment had hastened Soekarno’s death. 145
Since the beginning of her presidency, President Megawati had already sent a clear
message to the Indonesian people, in particular the military, the state institution to which
Soeharto spent most of his dedication, that she would not bring Soeharto to trial. Like
most Javanese and the majority people in the country who respect religion, she has a high
regard for elder people, especially former leaders who have been in the past
acknowledged for their dedication to the nation. In front of the media, she revealed that
she could not treat the former president as a crook as this would harm his dignity and
honor. She reminded that, due to Soeharto’s illness and age, Indonesians might not urge
146
her to send him to court.
Although there was an opportunity to reopen Soeharto’s trial, President Megawati
did not want to endorse it.147 In the absence of a court decision toward Soeharto’s KKN
cases, it was also reported that she had proposed an idea to use her prerogative right -laid down in the 1945 State Constitution and Emergency Law (Undang-undang Darurat)
143
“LSM: Soeharto Harus Diproses Hukum” (”NGO: Soeharto Should be Prosecuted”), Suara Pembaruan, May 9, 2006: 3.
144
”AGO Reopens Graft Case against Tommy”, The Jakarta Post, July 20, 2007.
145
In this case, Soeharto did not respect Javanese culture which honors elder people or former leaders Gati
Gayatri (Depok: University of Indonesia, 2003) in “Konstruksi Realitas Kepemimpinan Presiden Soeharto
dalam Berita Surat Kabar: Analisis Kritis terhadap Makna Pesan Politik yang Disampaikan dengan
Menggunakan Konsep Ajaran Kepemimpinan Jawa” (Construction of Reality of President Soeharto’s
Leadership in Newspaper: A Critical Analysis on the Meaning of Political Message Using Javanese
Leadership Concept), revealed Soeharto’s inconsistency with Javanese values on leadership..
146
Margianto, 2006, loc.cit.
147
Arfi Bambani Amri, “Buku Manuver Taufiq Kiemas: Mengapa Megawati Lembek pada Soeharto Faktor
Pertama, Soeharto Tak Pernah Berniat Membunuh Bung Karno dan Keluarganya,” (“A Book on Taufiq
Kiemas’ Maneuvers: Megawati Introduced Soft Policy to Soeharto, Soeharto Did Not Want to Kill
Sukarno and His Family”) January 12, 2010, Viva News, http://politik.vivanews.com/news/read/120386mengapa_ megawati_lembek_pada_soeharto was accessed on January 30, 2010; Derek Manangka, Jurus
dan Manuver Taufiq Kiemas: Memang Lidah Tak Bertulang (Strategy and Maneuvers of Taufiq Kiemas:
Lips Service Only), Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2010: 39.
279
No. 11/1954-- to extend amnesty to Soeharto. 148 Criticism from law experts and human
rights activists, for instance, Adnan Buyung Nasution and Hendardi, prevented her from
149
issuing the amnesty.
Under President Megawati, there was a setback in response to reform demands to
prosecute Soeharto and his cronies. Although she was not part of the New Order regime,
in fact, she did not want to send to trial the former leader of the regime. Her husband’s
alleged involvement in new KKN practices with conglomerates or Soeharto’s cronies who
had connections with military generals and businesses, 150 forced her not to follow-up
Soeharto’s cases beyond the case of the murder of the judge organized by Tommy.
Research conducted by George Junus Aditjondro, an Indonesian sociologist studying
corruption, revealed personal and business relations of Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso (former Kodam
Jayakarta regional commander), Lt. Gen. Makmun Murod (former KSAD --Kepala Staf
Angkatan Darat-- or chief of the army) and Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono (former chief of BIN
--Badan Intelijen Negara-- or National Intellegence Board) with the president’s husband,
Taufiq Kiemas. It was reported that, for example, Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso, who was at the time
Jakarta Governor, had allegedly given the Jakarta Outer Ring Road (JORR) project worth
US$ 2.3 billion to Kiemas. As part of the project, Rp. 17 billion (US$ 1.7 million) had
been allegedly sent earlier by Sutiyoso to him, and Rp. 10 billion (US$ 1 million) to Roy
B. Janis, Megawati’s PDIP Jakarta branch chairman. There is also information that a
business permit to open a floating casino in Teluk Jakarta (the North Jakarta gulf) had
been allegedly offered to Kiemas in order to stop the investigation of the general’s alleged
involvement in the July 27, 1996 attack. 151 Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. (ret) Makmun Murod and
Taufiq Kiemas’ were closely connected in their businesses with Syamsul Nursalim, one of
152
Soeharto’s cronies.
Aditjondro specifically revealed Kiemas’ businesses with Artha Graha group and
close relations with Tommy Winata, the leader of the group, in which the army through its
foundation, the Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi, controlled 20 percent shares of the bank of
the group, namely Bank Artha Graha.153 Tommy Winata was cited maintaining good
relations with Pemuda Pancasila, one of the pro-Soeharto counter-dissident vigilante
148
“Maju Mundur Penanganan Kasus Soeharto,” (“Inconsistency in Handling Soeharto Case”) Reformasi
Hukum, October 5, 2006, http://reformasihukum.org/konten.php?nama=MekanismeLegislasi&op=de-tail_
politik_ mekanisme_legislasi&id=81.
149
“Sebuah Abolisi yang Menguji Megawati,” (“Abolition Which Tested Mgawati”), Liputan6, http://berita.liputan6.com/progsus/200112/25943/class=%27vidico%27, December 25, 2001.
150
Aditjondro, 2006: op.cit : 25-28, 395-398; “Memberantas KKN Tak Cukup Hanya Pidato,” (“Combating Corruption Could Not Only Talk,”) Kompas-Online, August 5, 2003, http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0308/ 05/utama/472505.htm: 3.
151
Majalah Panji Masyarakat, August 30, 2000: 27 in Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 395-396.
152
Aditjondro, 2006, ibid: 26-27; 397.
153
Ibid: 28, 396.
280
groups.154 Meanwhile, by issuing Inpres (Instruksi Presiden --Presidential Instruction)
No.8/2002, Megawati protected businesses interests of Soeharto’s cronies, including his
daughter, Tutut, by discharging them from obligations of paying back their debts to the
state under the BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia --liquidity credits of the Bank
Indonesia) scheme.155
II.C. Military Response to Megawati Regarding Soeharto’s Alleged KKN cases
The goodwill policy of the Megawati government toward Soeharto resulted in the
military support to her presidency. Her positive response to military aspirations, that the
former New Order ruler should be treated respectful and not be harassed once he had
resigned from his positions in state leadership, indeed led to political stability in
Indonesia. In the 40 months of her rule, the longest among the three civilian regimes
studied here, neither communal and separatist conflicts nor covert intelligence and
psychological operations suspected engineered by the military to pressure the government
into abandoning the prosecution of Soeharto, had taken place. This situation differed
markedly from the transitional periods under Habibie and Wahid. Taking lessons from
past experience, Megawati anticipated security problems if she continued to bring
Soeharto and his family to trial.
Although there were new violent incidents in Poso, Jakarta and Bali, they were not
related with the Soeharto cases because the Megawati government, contrary to calls by the
courts and the DPR, kept his files closed. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the series
of bombings in Poso, Jakarta and Bali resulted from the activities of radical Muslims and
international terrorists linked to JI and Al-Qaeda attempting to make Indonesia a new
front in their fight against the West, and military elements, who wanted to use the volatile
situation to strengthen their territorial command structure and function. With the
incidents, and their unwillingness to prevent them, TNI eventually obtained the pretext
that their intellegence units be upgraded though the strengthening of the territorial
command structure across the country.
Different from Habibie and Wahid, Megawati was aware that Wiranto and his
successors in the military were determined to protect Soeharto.156 Military interest to
154
Ibid.
The Presidential Instruction was cited as “the Released and Discharged letter.” For further information, see Kwik Kian Gie, “Tiga Debitor ke Istana, Soal Kecil!” (“Three Debtors’ Visit to Palace Not A Big
Issue!”), Harian Kompas, February 18, 2006: 56.
156
O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 228-229.
155
281
protect its erstwhile patron reserved domains and Megawati’s interest to stabilize her
administration thus coincided.157
III. Coping with Gross Human Rights Violation Cases
III.A. Megawati and the Culture of Violence
President Megawati had similar views as the military leaders on how to cope with
the various issues the country faced. Both believed in a culture of repression as a means to
cope with threats to the unitary state. Hendardi, a noted human rights activist from PBHI
(Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia --The Indonesian Association for Legal
Assistances), complained that her feudal style of governing was favored by military
leaders who sought to protect themselves from charges of involvement in gross human
rights abuses in the past and currently. 158
As pointed out earlier, Megawati’s vision of a leader was more corresponding to
that of a Javanese ruler, who was heavily influenced by the philosophy of the Javanese
wayang and the traditional stories in the shadow puppet. This influenced her cenralistic,
top-down approach to govern and her undemocratic style of leadership. She was inclined
to believe that she knew best for the Indonesian people and that she should be the sole
interpreter of all matters, including the 1945 State Constitution and state ideology,
Pancasila. As a result, she responded with repressive measures against her political
opponents, for example, student demonstrators, radical reformists and the pro-democracy
movement.
Like her father, Megawati was a leader who relied on the power of the masses to
support her rule. Her followers mostly comprised of wong cilik (common people) of the
urban and rural areas of Indonesia, where a large number of people remembered her
father’s significant role in the country’s history, especially during the formation of the
republic. Thus, Sukarno’s popularity helped her in building PDIP as a mass-based party
that could be used to support her political career in the future.
The use of popular support to safeguard Megawati’s political interests could be
seen in 1995 and 1996 when her followers succesfully protected her from the Soeharto
regime’s attempts to remove her from PDIP leadership by interfering in the PDIP
Congress in Medan and attacking PDIP headquarters in Jakarta. These incidents caused
brawls between her supporters and security forces, followed by killings and arson that
claimed hundreds peoples lives, disappearances, and seriously wounded. Megawati did
157
158
“Suharto Inc.: All in the Family”, Time Asia, May 24, 1999.
Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in Jakarta.
282
not take any action to prevent and stop her supporters from running amok and becoming
easy targets for the security forces.
Another example of Megawati’s effective use of the political masses was in the
October 1999 presidential election as she used PDIP followers to challenge security
forces in Jakarta, particularly in front of the parliament building, to increase her
bargaining position vis-à-vis her rivals. The pressure of PDIP sympathizers contributed to
her election as vice-president, defeating Hamzah Haz, after the military, Golkar, and
PKB, and other factions in MPR eventually changed sides to support her candidacy.
Again, the mobilization of masses by Megawati resulted in the deaths of some of her
supporters as a result of bomb explosions close to the parliament building where the
election took place.
Later, power struggles between Megawati and Wahid caused tensions between their
supporters in political parties and mass-organizations which triggered clashes with a large
number of victims. As part of a show of force, Megawati allowed her supporters to cut
their fingers and made blood stamps in order to prove that they were ready to die in
defending her from threats of Wahid.
As president, Megawati never tolerated independence aspirations for autonomy in the
regions and supported the security forces in crushing separatist movements. Support the
military emergency imposed on Aceh in May 2003, she stated “it would not do any
damage to Indonesia to lose several people rather than jeopardizing 220 million other
159
people.”
She agreed with TNI’s efforts to strengthen the Kodam Iskandar Muda
regional command and to increase the number of both organic and non-organic troops in
the TNI’s campaign to eliminate the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) rebels. Her approval
of the military’s repressive approach and the declaration of a military emergency status
had led to a marked upsurge of human rights violations, increasing the risk for noncombatants or innocent people living there. At the end, the government had stationed
approximately 40,000 police and soldiers in Aceh, fighting an estimated 5,000 GAM
rebels.160 The military emergency was initially declared for a 6-month period, but on
September 4, 2003, TNI chief Endriartono suggested that military operations could last
161
until the GAM no longer posed a security threat.
159
"Jakarta Bombs Rebels," Reuters, May 29, 2003, in Document-Indonesia: New Military Operations,
Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD) , Amnesty
International Report 2009, London.
160
“ Indonesian Military Offensive in Aceh Could Last until April”, Agence France Presse, September 4,
20-03.
161
Ibid; "Jakarta Bombs Rebels," Reuters, May 29, 2003, loc.cit; Document-Indonesia, Amnesty International Report 2009, loc.cit.
283
In Irian Jaya, Megawati’s dispensation to TNI to use its repressive approach to
OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka --Organization for An Independent Papua) rebels and
restate the province as military operations zone contributed to TNI’s difficulty to stop its
soldiers’ involvement in human rights violations. New covert intelligence and
psychological operations were apparently connected with the kidnapping and (extra
judicial) killing of Papuan prominent separatist leader, Theys Eluay,162 and the
163
dissapearance of his driver, Aristoteles Masoka. Later, TNI was accused of being
involved in organizing the killings of three civilian employees of Freeport, an American
transnational corporation based in Timika. 164 Under Megawati also the regional command
in Irian Jaya had been reinforced.
Predominantly influenced by Javanese political culture, President Megawati
believed that challenges to the central government reflected disloyalty of the kawula
(regions) to her sacred rule and the unitary state. That is why she encouraged TNI to send
troops to trouble provinces, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya, perceiving this policy as sort of
165
punishment of rebels who were underming her rule. She ignored the human costs of the
policy and did not support the prosecution of old and new cases of human rights
violations which happened before and after July 2001, the time she took over power from
Wahid. Not surprisingly, she endorsed Law No. 27/2004 on the formation of the
Committee on Truth and Reconciliation, which did not end impunity of the perpetrators
of gross human rights violations. Mufti and Hendardi, two noted human rights activists,
thus strongly criticized her ways of handling human rights violations. NGO activists even
classified her as a pro-violence president, worse than Habibie and Wahid.166
Megawati’s bad image regarding human rights had been linked to her
government’s poor handling of the July 27, 1996 case. She was not serious in enforcing
truth and justice because she did not support the prosecution of former military leaders
167
charged with the case. She allegedly offered a large amount of money to the so-called
“Kelompok 124 (Group 124),” the victims of the brutal attacks, and further tried to stop
162
See Matthew Moore and Karuni Rompies,”Kopassus Guilty of Eluay Murder,” April 22, 2003, The
Age, http://www.theage.com.au/artice/2003/04/21/1050777211770.htl: 1-2.
163
“Pernyataan Sikap Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Papua: Mendesak Komnas HAM Menuntaskan Ber bagai Kasus Pelanggaran Berat HAM di Papua (“Statement of Civil SocietyCoalition for Papua: Urging
Komnas HAM to Seriously Prosecute Gross Human Rights Violations”),” July 28, 2004, http://www.kontras.org/index.php? hal= sia-ran_pers&id=229.
164
Ibid.
165
Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit: 7, 13, 16.
166
Mufti was interviewed on July 24, 2006 in Jakarta; Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in
Jakarta.
167
Otobiografi Politik RO Tambunan: Membela Demokrasi (Political Biography of RO Tambunan: Defending Democracy), Jakarta: TPDI, 2008; ”Megawati Disebutkan Tahu Rencana Penyerbuan Itu …”
(“Megawati Reportedly Already Known the Attack Plan …”), Harian Kompas, July 29, 2008: 5.
284
them demanding the alleged perpetrators, former TNI generals, to face prosecution. 168 Her
party’s support of a second term of Jakarta Governor Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso suggests that
President Megawati obviously did not want the July 27, 1996 case to be comprehensively
addressed. Sutiyoso was Kodam Jayakarta regional commander at that time, who together
with his military aides, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Sudi Silalahi, was allegedly
involved in the incident. 169
III.B. Megawati’s Response to Gross Human Rights Violation Cases
Immediately, just a few weeks after she rose to power, in an attempt to mobilize
support from the reform movement, on August 1, 2001 Megawati issued Keppres
(Keputusan Presiden --Presidential Decree) No. 53/2001 supporting the Central Jakarta
regional court to form an ad hoc human rights tribunal. Nevertheless, the prosecution of
the Trisakti shootings and the first and second Semanggi Tragedies could not be smoothly
conducted, although since August 27, 2001 Komnas HAM (National Human Rights
Committee) had formed its ad hoc team to follow-up the cases and by October 5, 2001
had concluded that they were gross human rights violations. A few months later, on
January 29, 2002, KPP HAM (Investigation Committee of Human Rights Violations
founded by the Komnas HAM) chairperson had sent summons to twenty TNI high and
middle-ranking officers. In the absence of Megawati’s determination to enforce the law
and to uphold civilian supremacy, the summons could not be enforced. In fact, Megawati,
as president and TNI supreme commander, had never instructed TNI chief commander
Gen. Sutarto and his subordinated generals to comply with the KPP HAM’s summons.
Therefore, on April 22, 2002, KPP HAM handed over the cases to the Attorney
General’s office. However, on March 4, 2004, the Attorney General office declined to
summon high and middle-ranking officers, arguing that the cases did not constitute gross
human rights abuses so that the accused officers could be tried by ordinary military
tribunals.170 This was a surprising change of mind of the Attorney General’s Office,
because during the Wahid presidency, when the office was led by Marzuki Darusman, it
had reached the same conclusion as KPP HAM. Further, by July 31, 2004, the cases were
sent back to the KPP HAM and the Central Jakarta regional court even rejected KPP
HAM’s proposal to summon all officers as witnesses.
168
Otobiografi Politik RO Tambunan: Membela Demokrasi (Political Biography of RO Tambunan: Defending Democracy), Jakarta: TPDI, 2008, op.cit: 172.
169
Ibid: 374.
170
Vincentia Hanni S, “Kejahatan Negara Tanpa Pertanggungjawaban” (“State Crime Without Accountability”), Harian Kompas, May 16, 2006: 4.
285
In the absence of President Megawati’s support, Law No. 39/1999 on human rights
tribunals made under the Wahid presidency could not be implemented to prosecute these
gross human rights abuses cases. Likewise, the alternative to adopt the Criminal Code to
prosecute the cases was no longer pursued by the Central Jakarta regional court. This
meant that Megawati wanted the cases to be stopped, because summonning military
figures such as Wiranto, Prabowo Subianto, Zacky Anwar Makarim, and Sjafrie
Sjamsoeddin could damage the president’s good relations with the military and would
have repercussions on the stability of her government.
Apart from the ordinary military tribunals, which on January 30, 2002 had
discharged nine policemen and punished them only with 3-6 years imprisonment for the
Trisakti case, Megawati had no interest to prosecute other cases. This was a great setback
bearing in mind that on August 1, 2001 she had issued Keppres No. 53/2001 encouraging
the Central Jakarta regional court to set up an ad hoc human rights tribunal. With the
Keppres, she obviously only sought to temporarily appease the victims of abuses and their
families rather than demonstrating commitment to reform in seriously prosecuting gross
human rights perpetrators. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that President
Megawati later withdrew the decree and replaced it with softer policies such as PP
(Peraturan Pemerintah --Government Regulation) No.2/2002, which protects the victims
and the witnesses, and PP No.3/2002, issued on March 13, 2002, which provides
compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation to the victims. The two government
regulations are counterproductive to Keppres No 53/2001 because there is no provision
regarding the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of the gross human rights
171
abuses. She therefore stayed away from handling the main issue.
Megawati also largely ignored other cases of gross abuses such as the
Banyuwangi killings and the July 27, 1996 tragedy which targeted her party and killed
many of her supporters, although in January 2002 the police had sent the dossiers of the
case to the Jakarta high court. Meanwhile, the Pengadilan Koneksitas (connecting court)
of the July 27, 1996 tragedy had been formed as a prerequisite for setting up an ad hoc
tribunal. The connecting court had been furthermore held by June 23, 2003, more than 1
year before she ended her presidency. Nonetheless, it only summoned unimportant
officers, namely, Col. Budi Permana and Lt. Suharto, and several civilians, and
disregraded high ranking officers who were allegedly responsible in planning the brutal
171
“Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 2/2002” (“Government Regulation No.2/2002”), http://
perlindungansaksi.files.wordpress.com/ 2008/07/pp-2-tahun-2002.pdf; “Peraturan Pemerintah Republik
Indonesia No. 3/2002” (“Government Regulation No. 3/2002)”, http://www.icel.or.id/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=157, ICEL.
286
attack. Worse, all officers, who had been declared suspects, were later freed from any
charges by the court on January 6, 2004.172
The final year (2004) of the Megawati presidency was a dark time for law
enforcement and human rights protection. Because of her lack of concern for gross human
rights violations, activists mentioned 2004 as “the year of humanity crisis.” 173 Civil
society’s efforts to disclose past abuses met the deaf ear of the government. President
Megawati failed to urge Attorney General AR Rachman to follow-up NGO findings of
gross violations committed by the state apparatus, cases which mostly involved the
military. This is why the prosecution of the May 1998 riots, the Trisakti shootings, and
the first and second Semanggi Tragedies did not progress.
Unlike Wahid, Megawati ended her presidency with a setback for the human
rights campaign in Indonesia. The third post-Soeharto president, who had more
opportunities to advance human rights than Wahid and Habibie, was unwilling to address
grave past abuses and to bring to trial high-ranking military officers allegedly involved in
the cases. President Megawati’s indifference sent to state institutions such as the Attorney
General’s office, the national police, and the courts the message that there is no need to
seriously prosecute the past abuses. The institutions which have obligation to protect
human rights in the country failed to fulfil the victims’ desire for justice. The mostly lowranking officers found guilty received only internal sanctions, being removed from their
positions temporarily before being promoted to better positions. At the worst, they were
dismissed without facing further prosecution and punishment. Courts, the last hope for
justice, with their light sentences thus became part of the problem.
In fact, there was no human rights case which had been comprehensively settled
under Megawati. While past cases remained unsettled, new ones occurred in Makassar,
Bojong (Bogor), Manggarai, and Gorontolo, where students, peasants, and other civilians
became the victims of repressive acts of the state apparatus. The state continued to use
force against critics rather than offering dialogues to improve its policies concerning
education, waste management, and land disputes. Reconciliation was sought not to find
the truth, but rather to free the perpetrators of abuses from charges of crimes against
humanity. By its critics, particularly NGOs, the Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi
(KKR --Committee for Truth and Reconciliation), for instance, had been considered as
merely a committee for protecting the perpetrators. 174
172
Ibid.
See the comments of Coordinator of Comission for Disappeared People and the Victims of State Repressions (Kontras), Usman Hamid, in Kontras’s Annual Evaluation 2004, ”Tahun Gelap Penegakan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia,” (The Dark Year of Law and Human Rights Enforcement”), Harian Kompas, January 4, 2005.
174
Ibid.
173
287
Nonetheless, to heal the trauma of the victims of gross human rights violations of
the May 1998 riots, especially the Chinese minority, and to show consistency in
promoting nationalism, Megawati continued Wahid’s policy in eliminating the
discrimination of the Chinese in Indonesia. Under her presidency, for example, the
Chinese New Year (Imlek) was declared a national holiday. More fundamentally, through
her PDIP faction in parliament, she endorsed amendments to the 1945 State Constitution
in the 2001 MPR annual session, deleted the stipulation that the president shall be
indigenous and replaced it with the requirement of citizenship. This amendment was a
progressive achievement of her government because these constitutional provisions had
long been an annoyance for the Chinese community in the country.175
Through the above measures, President Megawati sought to persuade the Chinese
capital which had fled the country after the May 1998 riots to return to Indonesia. Yet,
there was no prospect in the investigations of the riots and even less in the prosecution of
those responsible for them, which would have helped the Indonesian Chinese to heal their
trauma. Again, the president did not want to jeopardize the support of the military even
though she knew that the military was involved in the riots. She was aware that any
attempt of an inquiry into the May 1998 riots would have consequences for important
military figures such as former Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat -army’s strategic reserves command) and Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus --army’s
special forces) commander Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto and TNI’s noted intelligence
officer, Lt. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim. The prosecution of Prabowo and Zacky could
reveal similar practices of military covert operations organized by TNI generals in the
past, especially the July 27, 1996 incident, because of the long involvement of both
officers in such kind of operations.
In fact, under Megawati, Zacky, who supposedly played a major role behind the
176
scene in organizing a military intelligence operation during the July 27, 1996 incident,
took command of Bais. Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso, former Kodam Jayakarta regional comman-der
at the time the incident occurred, had obtained for his second term one of the
government’s most coveted posts, the governorship of Jakarta. Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono,
Sutiyoso’s former deputy in the Kodam Jayakarta regional command, was appointed as a
member of Megawati’s cabinet, namely, coordinating minister for political and security
affairs --an important position controlling TNI and the police. The alleged main perpetrators from the military were thus rewarded with promotions, while, at the same time,
Megawati could secure her presidency under their protection. Therefore, any attempt to
175
The Jakarta Post, October 15, 1998; The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2000; Majalah Tempo, 30, No. 52,
February 25, March 3, 2002; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 70, 232.
176
See, O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit.
288
put on trial the alleged perpetrators of gross human rights violations could harm
Megawati’s good relations with the military.
III.C. The Military and the Culture of Violence
The Indonesian military was particularly known for its repressive behavior which
can be traced to the long period of authoritarianism and the culture of violence in
Indonesian society since pre-colonial times. Accounts of the past Javanese kingdoms were
full with acts of violence, such as fightings, vengeance, brutal attacks, killings, and wars
between individuals, groups, and dynasties, which continued in the colonial period,
during the struggle for independence, and in the post-independence period with
rebellions, revolts, and coup attempts. The frequency of violent incidents in Indonesian
history thus leads to the thesis that violence had roots in the culture of the country’s
dominant ethnic group.
Due to the elevated role of soldiers in pre-modern and contemporary Indonesia,
not surprisingly, the military, as well as the police, which until 2000 was still under the
same institution, namely ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia --the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), as individuals and an institution, became the main
perpetrators of violence. It is widely accepted that through covert intelligence and
psychological operations the military had been involved in most violent incidents of the
more recent past such as the 1965 coup attempt, the 1974 Malari and 1998 May riots, and
other cases such as the Tanjung Priok and Lampung tragedies. Even, after the end of
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the military was still accused of being responsible for
new incidents in East Java, Maluku, Kalimantan, Poso, Nusa Tenggara, East Timor,
Aceh, and Irian Jaya.177
Analysts of cultural and social change and security issues such as Permadi,
Kusnanto Anggoro and Burhan Magenda, point out that the culture of violence is nothing
new to Indonesian society. As explained by Permadi, the pre-colonial history of Java is
full with huru-hara (riot) and amuk-massa (violence) instigated by struggles among
178
members of the dynasties. Kusnanto also alleged that recent violence involving the
military stemmed from conflicts among officers and civilian leaders who were being
obsessed with tahta (reign), kekuasaan (power), and harta (wealth). As argued by
Kusnanto, especially for the Javanese, the dominant ethnic group, these three matters are
177
178
See, for example, O’Rourke, 2002, ibid.
289
essential to guarantee harmony and loyalty in society.179 The importance to guarantee
harmony and loyalty is still socialized in society until recently through formal education,
part of education since they are in elementary school, and training programs organized by
government and state institutions. Informally, Indonesians learn the importance of the
dominant cultural values from various cultural programmes such as wayang (shadow
puppet) performance in cultural centers and on televisions and radios. They also learn it
from books, magazines, newspapers, and comics as well as stories conveyed by their
180
families.
Burhan Magenda confirmed these views, emphasizing that violence had been
inherent in the political culture of the Indonesian military and civilians for centuries. He
maintained that military leaders from Solo and Yogyakarta, two power centres of
Javanese kingdoms, were known in the past as more feudal and repressive compared to
military leaders from other provinces. He gave an example by comparing Javenese
generals such as Soeharto, Ali Murtopo, and Benny Murdani with non-Javanese military
leaders such as AH Nasution, TB Simatupang and Sumitro. The reason for his argument
was that in Javanese society, in which ambiguity, hyprocrisy, and betrayal existed,
violence was seen as an effective means for leaders to create and preserve loyalty and
harmony.181
More specifically, in the patron-client relation of the Javanese’s kawula-gusti (the
people-the king who represents God) concept, soldiers were part of kawula whose life had
to be supported by the king. In reverse, in compensation, soldiers had the task to protect
the king, his family, and the palace. In case the king did not care for his soldiers’ needs,
the soldiers might complain. Apparently, the rioting that broke out and was instigated by
military members can be linked to the protest of the palace guards against the poor
response of the king to their complaints. Thus, if the king failed to fulfil the needs of the
soldiers, this meant that he also failed to grow loyalty from his kawula and create
harmony in his kingdom. Obviously, if such a situation continued in the long run, it
would undermine the position of the king because he would no longer be perceived
legitimate to hold the wahyu or the divine mandate.
179
Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on June 6, 2006 and November 18, 2006 in Jakarta. Similarly,
Franz Magnis-Suseno said that in a society such as Indonesia where the influence of Javanese political
culture was dominant and the role of reign, power, weapon, and wealth were equally imperative, the
position of the military was vital, and their existence in politics was not easy to be totally eliminated.
Nonetheless, education, personal interests and the capacity of civilian and military leaders could also
influence them in intro-ducing reform. Franz Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in
Jakarta.
180
See again previous pages, pp. 19-22.
181
Burhan Magenda was interviewed on January 30, 2006 in Jakarta.
290
Rioting provoked by the soldiers instigated power struggles and was usually
followed by regime change. The endemic separatist, terrorist, and criminal violence
throughout Indonesia at the beginning of reform era which in many cases were instigated
by the military could be equated to the pre-colonial restiveness of soldiers. It served to
test in how far the President was capable of fulfilling (mengayomi) his/her kawula needs.
For the Javanese, a (good) leader should possess qualities of pengasuh (guardian) to lead,
182
guide, and to stimulate subordinates (asuhan). Therefore, TNI’s lack of enthusiasm to
safeguard the country from serial bombings of terrorist groups that occurred under
Megawati could be interpreted as the typical way traditional soldiers demonstrated
dissatisfaction with their ruler (Gusti).
The Indonesian military’s intimacy with violence was also connected with its
obsession to control territorial integrity of the country. An indication for this is the
popular use of old Javanese term mandala (war theatre; land, water and air territories) and
keutuhan wilayah (territorial integrity) in society and military institutions. In this relation,
every space of mandala and keutuhan wilayah must be defended until the last drop of
blood because they deal with dignity (sedumuk bathuk senyari bumi).183 Not surprisingly,
Gen. Yudhoyono, Megawati’s coordinating minister for political and security affairs,
stated that TNI would not tolerate any separatist movement in Aceh, Irian Jaya or
184
anywhere in Indonesia, and would respond to them with military force. He argued that
such response was needed to protect the the integrity of the state that in the eyes of TNI
cannot be compromised. For this reason, too, concepts such as integrasi nasional
(national integration), persatuan nasional (national unity) and kedaulatan bangsa
(national sovereignty) are commonly found in his and other military leaders’ rhetoric at
185
that time.
The military’s obsession with a culture of violence also transpired when chief
commander Gen. Sutarto insisted that soldiers are prepared and trained only to achieve
one goal, that is, to win the war. This implies that they would win the war, if they could
kill and destroy their enemy with maximum force. 186 In an attempt to block negotiation
with GAM, he reminded Jusuf Kalla, Megawati’s minister for social welfare, who was
initiating peace talks on Aceh that the government should not compromise with the rebels
187
or tolerate their separatist goals because it would endanger state integrity. At a briefing
of military officers in Jakarta in May 2003, Gen. Sutarto ordered TNI soldiers to hunt
182
See, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 10.
I. Basis Susilo, “Ambalat dan Konsep Kuasa-Wilayah” (“Ambalat and the Territorial Rule Concept”),
Kompas-online, June 12, 2009, was accessed on June 12, 2009.
184
See, Gen. Yudhoyono’s Biography in Hisyam et al (eds.), 2004, loc.cit: 800.
185
Hisyam et al (eds), 2004, ibid: 805-806.
186
Dewabrata, 2006, loc.cit.
187
“Purnawirawan TNI Khawatir Aceh Lepas” (“TNI Retired Generals Worry Aceh Secession”), Harian
Kompas, September 18, 2005: 2.
183
291
them down and “root out” (membasmi) GAM rebels.188 Likewise, Coordinating Minister
Gen. (ret) Yudhoyono mentioned that the only way to address the conflict in Aceh was a
military solution because he saw in GAM a traitor organization that attempted to separate
189
Aceh from Indonesia.
Gen. Sutarto and Gen. (ret) Yudhoyono were supported in their views by highranking military officers such as army chief Gen. Ryamizard, who stated that different
from politicians, military leaders wanted an effective way to address conflicts throughout
the country by exercising force. Since the separatist groups continued their armed
struggle, there was always justification for TNI to respond by repressive means. By
quoting Javanese words such as pithes (crush) and gebuk (pound) that were used in the
past by Soeharto to punish his political enemies, Ryamizard warned that his soldiers were
ready to end separatist conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya with maximum military force,
which could be launched whenever the president ordered it.190 This also included
justifying acts such as the extra-judicial killing of Theys Eluay, leader of the Papuan
separatist organization (OPM).
In contrast to NGO activists who view the TNI soldiers carrying out the mission to
kill Theys as human rights violators, Gen. Ryamizard bluntly stated that the soldiers
191
should be regarded as national heroes since they had accomplished their mission well.
Moreover, after his visit to the troops stationed in Aceh, he stated that with or without an
emergency status, TNI would take any risk to fight GAM in order to stop their separatist
activities. Re-emphasizing his preference for a military solution, he was adamant that the
military did not participate in the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Aceh
conflict held in Geneva in October 2002. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, the
military would not adopt responsibility for it.192
Ryamizard’s statement was supported by retired military officers in the parliament
such as Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala who said that since their formation, the Indonesian
armed forces had applied force to suppress separatist movements, rebels, and other groups
considered as a threat to the country. State sovereignty was TNI’s main objective which
188
“Indonesia Troops Told to ‘Exterminate’ Aceh Rebels, Spare Civilians,” Agence France-Presse, 20
May 2003, in Document-Indonesia: New Military Operations, Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in
Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD), Amnesty International Report 2009, London.
189
“Perang Melawan GAM, Satu-satunya Jalan Selesaikan Aceh” (“Fighting GAM, the Only Solution for
Aceh”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/02-08/30/040529.htm, was accessed on September 26,
2006: 1-5.
190
”Prajurit Profesional Sejati” (”Real Professional Soldier”), http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi
/r/ryamizard-ryacudu/index. shtml, was accessed on September 27, 2006: 1-6.
191
192
”KSAD: Ganggu Keutuhan NKRI, Otomatis TNI Bertugas” (”Army Chief: NKRI Threatened, TNI Will
Act”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/0209/ 18/034818.htm, was accessed on September 18, 2002:
1-2.
292
had motivated it to choose such a response.193 As the TNI were not so much engaged in
comprehensively transforming themselves, or had not fundamentally changed their
concept on security threats and approach of addressing conflict, violence was still a major
194
characteristic of soldiers’ general behaviors.
The “soft approach” preferred by the
civilian regimes of Habibie and Wahid was deemed by them a great blunder. By contrast,
Megawati’s zero tolerance against separatists to protect Indonesia’s territorial integrity
was conducive to TNI. However, military repression caused an escalation of conflicts in
troubled provinces, with mounting victims, while it simultaneously restored TNI’s claim
to a domestic security role and returned it to the center of policymaking in areas affected
by sectarian clashes and separatist movements.195
Similar to Ryamizard, lower-ranking military officers such as (Korem)
Lilawangsa military resort commander Lt. Col. AY Nasution stated that he would not
tolerate the Acehnese in his territory to join the anniversary celebrations of GAM’s
declaration of independence. He ordered his soldiers to shoot on sight, no matter who
196
they were, for supporting the separatist activities. Such statements set the tone for the
behaviour of TNI soldiers during the military operations and left little doubt as to the
message from their superiors that they should shoot first and ask questions later. This is
why there had been frequent accusations of unlawful killings of both of civilians and
GAM members.
According to a TNI document issued by in September 2004, 2,849 GAM members
had been killed during military operations since May 2003. Of this figure, 2,409 were
mentioned to have been killed during the military emergency and 440 since the
implementation of the civilian emergency.197 A military spokesperson in Jakarta put the
number of GAM deaths at 400 in the first 6 weeks of the civil emergency.198 The military
had acknowledged that there had been civilian casualties. In mid-August 2004, based on
media reports, it was revealed that 147 civilians had been killed during the past 10
199
months. Nevertheless, based on figures from the military information centre published
in September 2004, the number of civilian fatalities was much higher. According to these
193
Maj. Gen. Sembiring Meliala was interviewed in Jakarta on October 17, 2006.
Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif said that culture o f violence had internalized in TNI since a long time, thus,
it was not easy to eliminate it, similar to the problem of dual function to totally withdraw TNI from state’s
politics and non-military affairs. He was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in Jakarta.
195
196
"Indonesia troops told to ‘exterminate’ Aceh rebels, spare civilians," Agence France -Presse, May 20,
2003, in Document-Indonesia: New military operations, old patterns of human rights abuses in Aceh
(Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD), Amnesty International Report 2009, London.
197
"TNI Klaim Telah Tewaskan 2.800 Anggota GAM" (TNI reported had killed 2,800 GAM members),
Acehkita, September 17, 2004, ibid.
198
“Indonesia Army Kills 400 Alleged Aceh Rebels since May 19", Associated Press, July 16, 2004, ibid.
199
"Nearly 1,160 Aceh Rebels Killed in 10 Months", Laksamana Net, August 18, 2004.
194
293
figures, 662 civilians had been killed, consisting of 579 during the military emergency
period and 83 since the beginning of the civil emergency.200
As argued by Mietzner, the relaunching of military operations in provinces
threatened by separatist movements had proven the vital role of TNI in upholding law and
order, irrespective of the growing pressure for reform. 201 Its alleged hand in inflaming
new riots and exacerbating the situation in trouble spots was effective in granting TNI a
wider domestic security role. Terrorists’ attacks had strengthened TNI’s territorial
command and intelligence roles as well as its culture of violence after the issuance of two
new government regulations in lieu of a law on anti-terrorism, namely, Perpu No. 1 and
202
Perpu No. 2 of 2003, which was viewed by DPR deputy speaker Andi M. Fatwa as a
203
great setback to reform. T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of the Propatria, commented
that the increase of human rights violations perpetrated by TNI soldiers tallied also with
their political interests.204
III.D. Military Response to Gross Human Rights Violation Cases
205
Due to her close relations, in politics and business,
with Lt. Gen.
Hendropriyono, President Megawati had promoted him as chief of BIN, the new state
intelligence board replacing Bakin, although he had been accused of primary
responsibility for the Talangsari incident. The human rights abuse occurred on February 7,
1989, caused at least 246 people dead in Lampung province when Hendropriyono, as a
Colonel, was commander of a military resort, namely, Korem 043 Garuda Hitam.206 In
June 2001, the National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) had set up an ad
hoc team for investigating the abuse which included violent killing, arrest and forced
detention. Nonetheless, the Megawati government did not endorse the effort to open this
case. She would not also open gross cases of human rights abuse which occurred in East
200
"Versi TNI: 662 Warga Sipil Tewas Sejak Darurat Militer" (TNI Source: 662 Civilians Died Since
Military Emergency), Acehkita, September 17, 2004, ibid.
201
Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit.
202
See, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 152-156.
203
See http://www.gatra.com/2003-08-14/artikel.php?id=30641, August, 14, 2003 in AM Fatwa, Menghadirkan Moderatisme Melawan Terorisme (Introducing Moderatism to Combat Terrorism ), Jakarta: Hikmah, 2006: 111; see also, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit.
204
T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on October 31, 2007 after discussions and book launch entitles Metamorfosis Bisnis Militer: Sebaran Bisnis Militer Pasca Diterbitkannya UU TNI (The Metamorphose of
Military Business: Military Business after the Issuance of Law on TNI), Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, FES,
2007.
205
For further information, see Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 27.
206
“Kasus Talangsari Lampung Dibuka Lagi,” (“Talangsari Lampung Case Is Opened Again”) Tempo Interaktif, http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/0401/brk, 200504..., April 1, 2005, was
accessed on March 12, 2010.
294
Timor before and after referendum because such effort could implicate more close allies
such as Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei, who was said to have developed business ties with the
207
president’s family, for instance, in North Sulawesi province.
President Megawati’s ambivalent and lenient approach in handling gross human
rights violation cases involving the military had resulted in the latter’s favorable response
to her presidency. In fact, throughout her rule, military leaders threw their support to her
government. Significantly, political stability could be maintained and she could
accomplish her full term of office in September 2004 without pressures to resign or coup
threats by which the military would blackmail her into abandoning the prosecution of its
alleged gross human rights violation cases.
Meanwhile, an effort by Elsham, a NGO concerned with human rights and legal
aid, to investigate a case of human rights violations in Timika, Irian Jaya, in late
December 2002 and early January 2003 had been obstructed by TNI. In a shooting
208
incident the NGO’s director was wounded. l
A testimony from Deki Murid, an ex-informant of Kopassus disclosed that troops
th
of the 515 Battalion of Kostrad created a shooting incident at the border of Irian Jaya
and Papua New Guinea (PNG) to intimidate other parties in order to stop the investigation
of the case of shooting the Elsham director. 209 The explanation of TNI chief commander
Gen. Sutarto that all the shooting incidents were organized by elements of the separatist
movement in Irian Jaya to draw international attention was thus questioned by NGO
activists. The activists criticized the general’s accusation which had linked their prohuman rights activities to foreign interventions.
With its deeply entrenched culture of violence, the military failed to understand
Papuan aspirations for the prosecution of human rights violations which increasingly
occurred in the so-called “era of reform.” TNI ignored that native Papuans needed
protection on the one hand, and wanted a fair solution toward various cases of human
rights violations they experienced in the past, on the other. Even the special autonomy
status granted to the Irian Jaya province was not followed-up with the central
government’s willingness to handle the cases. This resulted in the growing mistrust of the
native Papuans toward Megawati and the military. Markus Yenu, the leader of the
transitional government of West Papua National Authority (WPNA), argued that the
207
Aditjondro, op.cit: 27-28.
“Kasus Penembakan di Papua: Upaya Pisahkan Papua dari NKRI” (”Shooting Incident in Papua To Secess Papua from NKRI”), http://www.westpapua.net/news/03/01/030103-kasus_penembakan_di_papua_
upaya_pi..., January 3, 2003: 1-3.
209
Ibid.
208
295
increasing deployment of soldiers and the police in Papua was part of TNI’s effort to
intimidate the Papuans in order to stop their aspirations.210
With the new and much more favorable political context under a pro-military
president, TNI was involved in more cases of human rights abuses in the country. Just a
few days before Megawati ended her presidency, Munir Said Thalib was found dead on
September 7, 2004 in Garuda, a state-owned airline, on a flight from Jakarta to the
211
Netherlands. Munir was a prominent human rights activist who had keenly disclosed
many cases of gross abuses, for example in Aceh, during military operations under
Soeharto, and Jakarta, the Tanjung Priok shooting and the 1997-1998 student activists
kidnapping cases, involving TNI and its main generals. An autopsy conducted afterwards
212
in the Netherlands revelead that he had been poisoned with arsenic.
A joint
investigation team (TPF --Tim Pencari Fakta or Fact Finding Team) consisting of
investigators from the national police and NGOs indicated the involvement of military
officers and generals working for the state intelligence board (BIN).213
IV.A. Megawati and the Unitary State
According to Robison the ideological foundation of Indonesian authoritarianism is
the notion of the organic, or integralist state, as contained in the 1945 State
Constitution.214 Influenced by a conservative Javanese legal scholar, Raden Soepomo,
who played a major role in the making of the 1945 State Constitution, the integralist state
became Soekarno’s preferred model of political order, which was upheld by his daughter,
Megawati. This model is a selection of ideas which emphasized the supremacy of the
state. It entailed a concoction of Javanese notions of authority and traditional law adopted
since Dutch colonial times in order to emphasize the values of hierarchy and harmony and
of collective identity under an authoritative leadership.215 This explains why state
authority, integrity, sovereignty and stability became central themes in Megawati’s
presidency. She was fervent to campaign on themes of national pride and simultaneously
relentlessly reminded Indonesians to work for the unity of the state.
210
Ichwan Susanto and Edna C. Pattisina, “Otonomi Daerah Papua Barat (4): Jakarta (Masih) Utang,”
(West Papua Regional Autonomy (4): Jakarta Is Still Indebted”), Harian Kompas, February 27, 2010: 5.
211
Nur Mursidi,”Munir, A Fighter Never To Be Forgotten,” The Jakarta Post, April 17, 2005.
212
Harian Kompas, December 27, 2004.
213
Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 428, 432-433.
214
Richard Robison, “Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime,” in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and
Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Sydney:
Allen und Unwinn, 1993: 41-47.
215
Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence”, in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002, loc.cit: 43.
296
Like many other Javanese politicians, President Megawati was obviously a
political conservative. This explains why she was preoccupied with the territorial integrity
216
of the state, but neglected individual freedom and broader human rights demands. She
perceived loyalty as an important element in politics, which was similar to the traditional
patron-client relationship between the king and the people in the feudalistic Javanese
kingdoms. Due to her aversion to criticism and opposition, it can be understood why she
217
was uneasy with freedom of expression and press.
Also, as noted by Rueland, Megawati shared with the military strong nationalist
sentiments and an equally strong sense of unity. Specifically, she shared with the TNI a
Javanese version of nationalism which had laid the foundation for the unitary state she
218
inherited from Soekarno, the founding father of the nation.
In addition to this,
O’Rourke pointed out that she shared the secular-nationalist ideology that prevailed
among TNI generals which would make it for her far easier to rule.219
220
With her aloof style of leadership,
she was even more Javanese than
221
Soekarno. Avoiding dialogues with people in troubled provinces, she chose to stay in
her palace. If she conducted a field trip, she preferred to ride in her presidential car with
closed windows.222 If she had to meet the people, it had to be arranged under the close
watch of the presidential security guards (Paspampres --Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden).
Taking into account her bad rapport with the people in troubled provinces, it is
comprehensible why she had problems to understand the aspirations and demands of
minorities and separatists.
As previously stated, Megawati inherited from her father the preference for the
integrationalism that became the concept for Indonesian statehood in the 1945 State
Constitution and Pancasila.223 Federalist tendencies thus met her stiff resistance.
Indonesian nationalists’ perception of federalism was strongly influenced by historical
experience. They closely associate federalism with the Dutch colonialists’ devide-etimpera policies of the late 1940s. At that time, the division of Indonesia into several
smaller states such as Negara Indonesia Tengah, and Negara Indonesia Timur, which
preferred to transfer their loyalties to the Dutch colonial government rather than to the
224
Indonesian government in Java, hastened separatism and disintegration. The fear that
216
Mietzner, 2006: 35.
“Indonesia Tak Punya Sejarah Kebebasan Pers” (“Indonesia Has No Past Pers Freedom“), Harian
Kompas, March 15, 2007: 4.
218
Rueland in Hoadley and Rueland (eds.), 2006, loc.cit: 215.
219
220
Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala was interviewed on October 17, 2006 in Jakarta.
221
Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in Jakarta.
222
Osdar, 2005, loc. cit.
223
Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence”, in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002, loc.cit: 43.
224
Ikrar Nusa Bakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in Jakarta.
217
297
unlimited autonomy of the regions would invite foreign intervention further spurred her
aversion to federalism.225
Like most Javanese leaders she believed that negara adalah pusat dan pusat
adalah negara (the state is the central government, and reversely, that the central
government is the state). Peripheral rulers must go along with the central ruler.226
Megawati did not want provinces and smaller regions to challenge the authority of Java as
a center of power and government because this would undermine the whole country due
to the regions’ increasing autonomy.227 Her strong opposition to Law No. 22/1999 on
regional autonomy and Law No. 25/1999 which increased regional governments’ fiscal
autonomy must be attributed to these worries. This explains why shortly after taking
office she supported moves to amend the two laws.
In the view of Crouch, fear of a reduction of central government authority was a
strong reason why Megawati avoided responding to discourses on federalism which
228
became a hot subject at the beginning of reform era. From the perspective of Javanese
political culture, federalism would undermine the greatness of power of the ruler. As
argued by Moedjanto, in the Javanese conception power was not divided but was rather a
totality.229 Therefore, for a Javanese ruler such as Megawati, there must be only one sun
in the world, “ngendi ana surya kembar,” meaning that there was no one who competed
for the ruler’s power.
From the point of view of Megawati, separatism would jeopardize the country’s
Javanese-based concept of Wawasan Nusantara, or the unity of Indonesian archipelago
under the control of the central government in Java, a state doctrine pursued since the
Majapahit kingdom.230 In other words, separatism would damage the organic totality of
the state.231 As cited in the Indonesia’s history, the concept of NKRI, bendera merahputih (the red-white flag), and the principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity)
originated from the Majapahit kingdom, which became the foundation for the formation
of Nusantara (Indonesia) and its regions under one national state and government
(Wawasan Nusantara).232 Kings and even Indonesian leaders born after Soekarno often
225
Susilo, loc. cit, 2009.
227
Pramono Anung was interviewed on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta.
228
229
Moedjanto, 1993, op. cit: 104.
230
Interview with Pramono Anung on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta; Interview with Ryamizard Ryacudu
on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta; See also, Bilveer Singh, Ryamizard --in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada,
Sydney: Book House, 2005, op. cit: 18-19.
231
See Michael Van Langenberg, “The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony”, in State and
Civil Society in Indonesia, edited by Arief Budiman, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 22, Clayton:
Monash University, 1990: 124; Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 15.
232
See MC Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200, Stanford University Press, 2001.
226
298
mentioned the Majapahit kingdom, reminded of the good traditional values maintained at
that time, and glorified its accomplishments under chief commander Gajah Mada, who
had conquered other kingdoms outside Java and made the Majapahit kingdom much more
233
respected by its neighbours.
Gajah Mada was well known for his oath, “Amukti
Palapa,” which declared that if other islands ouside Java had been conquered, he would
be able to take a rest (lamun huwus kalah nusantara, isun amukti palapa).234 Not
surprisingly, as a strong defender of the unitary state principle Megawati believed that the
unitary state proclaimed in the 1945 State Constitution had always been regarded as a
central article of faith that she would be prepared to defend. 235
Megawati could tolerate aspirations on autonomy in provinces as long as it would
not produce new rulers that undermine her government. She rejected an independent
administration in Indonesia’s provinces under the umbrella of federalism since this would
undermine the power of the central government. 236 She sought to avoid a comprehensive
power sharing that could damage the unitary state.
Due to her devotion to the unitary state, she could not tolerate aspirations of
separatism so that she pursued a repressive approach in Aceh, Maluku, and Irian Jaya.237
She criticized Habibie for the referendum on independence in East Timor. In reverse, she
assisted pro-integration refugees who wanted to be resettled to West Timor after the
disappointing result of the ballot. She often attacked Habibie over East Timor but kept
quiet on the Indonesian military’s role there.238
Moreover, she advocated a tough line against the Aceh separatist movement
(GAM). The unitary state was a final solution to the country. 239 A peaceful settlement of
separatism could only be on the central government’s terms and in way that might not
harm the principle of the unitary state. Megawati also did not support a peaceful
settlement of separatist conflict under the brokerage of a foreign country. In her official
addresses, she often stressed that Indonesian problems must be solved by Indonesians.240
Such a rigid approach contributed to the breakdown of the Framework Agreement of the
COHA (Cessation of Hostilities), which was concluded between the central government
233
Dahono Fitrianto and Ingki Rinaldi, “Bayang-bayang Sebuah Kejayaan” (“Shadow of A Glory”), Harian Kompas, January 4, 2009: 18.
234
Achmad Sunjayadi, “Membaca ‘Dongeng’ Nusantara” (“Reading the ‘Tale’ of Nusantara”), Harian
Kompas, October 27, 2008: 39.
235
Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit: 3.
236
Ibid.
237
Karon, loc cit.
238
Sander Thoenes, “Indonesian Military Power Undimmed by Humiliations”, Financial Times,
September 21, 1999, loc.cit.
239
240
Ibid.
299
and Aceh’s GAM rebels in Tokyo on May 17-18, 2003 with the help of the Geneva-based
Henry Dunant Centre.
GAM failed to firmly declare its acceptance of the proposal of a special autonomy
law for Aceh and refused to abandon its armed struggle and its separatist activities. It
persistently breached the cease fire agreement by continuously declaring its aspirations for
independence and the separation from the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI). GAM also
failed to lay down its weapons as required by COHA, it established a rival local
governmental structure, continuously recruited fighters for the “Aceh National Army,”
extorted Acehnese people and imposed levies called as “Nangroe tax.” These GAM
activities were viewed not only as violating Indonesian national law but also the spirit and
241
letter of the COHA.
Due to the weakening trust resulting from reports on new
provocations by both parties and, after the failure of a peaceful conflict settlement,
President Megawati imposed military emergency status on Aceh and backed TNI to
launch a military campaign by May 19, 2003.
President Megawati acted similarly in addressing the separatist conflict in Irian
Jaya where she also opted for a military solution. In the Javanese concept of power, there
is a view which says that the more remote an object is, the less light it gets from the lamp,
meaning that the more remote a territory the more difficult it is for the central government
to control it. 242 Irian Jaya as the easternmost province of Indonesia was therefore seen by
President Megawati as the most vulnerable to separatism.
Even the granting of special autonomy to the province by Law No. 21/2001 could
not wipe out her doubts about the province’s loyalty to the central government. With this
special autonomy status, Papua has got authority over all government functions except on
foreign policy, defense, religion, and finance. It is also entitled to receive special
allocation fund (dana alokasi khusus), additional allocation fund (dana alokasi
tambahan) and sharing revenue (dana perimbangan) from tax and natural resources
which can reach 90 percent in addition to national allocation fund (dana alokasi umum
nasional). Because of her doubts about Papuan loyalty, and also motivated by her party’s
objective to gain more seats in the national parliament (DPR), she issued Presidential
Instruction (Inpres) No. 1/2003 which markedly curtailed the provincy’s special
autonomy. Crouch commented that Megawati’s Javanese background must be attributed
to her fear of coping with the fast increasing power of governor and mayors in the
243
province.
241
“Press Release Joint Council in Tokyo Failed to Reach An Agreement,” Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia Tokyo, http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/press/press030519e.htm.
242
Rinakit, 2005, loc.cit: 76-77.
243
300
President Megawati’s priority to preserve the unitary state was also in line with
her choice to implement “subjective control” over the military.244 With such a kind of
control, she treated the military as a guardian of her regime survival as often occurred
during the pre- and post-colonial times. She wanted the military to be more dedicated in
its loyalty to her personal rather than to the state interest. 245
IV.B. The Military and the Unitary State
Since their formation in 1945, the Indonesian armed forces legitimized their
political role with the argument that they were the soldiers of the people and had to
remain close to the people. Therefore, it was often said that any attempt to distance the
military from the people was an abuse of the very essence, which in Javanese terminology
is known as the jati diri and kodrat, or identity and providence, of TNI. 246 For TNI,
“being part of the people” could only be attained by the retention of their territorial
command function throughout the country, or, to use a very popular expression, by
247
“embedding” the soldiers in the Indonesian people. Maj. Gen. Priyanto, territorial
asssistant of army chief, admitted that only with the territorial command function the
military could secure the nation’s integrity and the unitary state (NKRI) because that
function would make the military the most organized and the most powerful institution in
248
the country. In reverse, TNI feared that reform demands could damage its capability to
cope with threats to NKRI.
TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and army chief Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
frequently insisted that the unitary state project could only be secured by offering TNI a
greater role in fighting separatism. In response to the rising threat of separatism, Gen.
Endriartono reminded that he was witnessing many regions demanding to secede from the
Indonesian state in their effort to deal with the country’s multi-dimensional crisis. For this
reason, he urged the Indonesian people to share a united vision on national integrity and
to eliminate their vested interests. He stated:
“All Indonesian people have to possess and demonstrate a high
spirit of nationalism and have healthy souls that will never support national
disintegration ... As long as the Government works for the sake of the
interests of the entire nation and people, we must be loyal. The most
244
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006.
246
Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit.
247
Ibid.
248
Maj. Gen. Priyanto’s explanations in seminar on TNI’s territorial function after Soeharto held on June
6, 2006 by Center for Research and Information Services, DPR, Jakarta.
245
301
important thing is that what’s best for this nation will be best for TNI [the
armed forces].”249
In March 2003, Gen. Ryamizard convened a meeting of hundreds of active and
retired top-ranking military officers to express TNI concern for the existence of the
unitary state. In the meeting, the army chief urged the government to restore TNI’s
security role due to the rising dangers of separatism and other security disturbances across
Indonesia. Gen. Ryamizard argued that building military professionalism might be good
for the armed forces of a country like America, but, for Indonesia, whose process of
nation-building had not yet been accomplished, this was not enough. For Gen. Ryamizard
250
and TNI there was no way to compromise over the unitary state. TNI preoccupation
with the unitary state thus relegated the reform process to a backseat.
Inside TNI, Gen. Ryacudu was broadly known as an army general who had close
connections to the red-white faction and the most vocal representative of the anti-reform
wing. He frequently stated that the Indonesian military was unique, and, therefore, did not
need to seek international advice on its reform agenda.251 Like the country’s civilian
leaders, he often glorified and referred to the Majapahit Kingdom and its chief
252
commander Gajah Mada. However, his inward looking attitude had isolated him from
international affairs. He often spoke out against deficiencies in governance and the risk of
national disintegration that made him a visible symbol for the military’s reluctance to
progressive reform. Due to his closeness to President Megawati, attributed to the fact that
his father was a loyalist of Soekarno and that he himself originates from Palembang, the
same South Sumatran town as Megawati’s husband Taufiq Kiemas, Ryamizard exerted
great influence on government policies.253
Gen. Ryamizard and Gen. Sutarto followed their predecessors, Gen. Wiranto and
Adm. Widodo, in attributing great importance to preserve NKRI and Wawasan
Nusantara. These ideas provide the TNI with space to become involved in state and
society affairs. As stated by Ryamizard, the military’s stance toward the NKRI and
254
Wawasan Nusantara has never changed since independence. As a result, TNI could not
agree with the aspirations on federalism which emerged in late 1940s and in early years of
reform era. The armed forces strongly believed that this would encourage other regions to
separate from the republic. Ryamizard thus refused to negotiate with representatives of
249
England, 2000, loc.cit.
The Jakarta Post, March 21, 2003; Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit; Interview with Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta.
251
Mietzner, 2006: 69.
252
Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. See also, Bilveer Singh,
Ryamizard --in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005, op. cit: 18-19.
253
Mietzner, 2006, op. cit: 49-50.
254
250
302
separatist movements who did not want to withdraw to give up their secessionist
ambitions. It was in line with this view that TNI should not support the framework
agreement with GAM on the COHA in Aceh and peaceful conflict resolution with RMS
in Maluku and OPM in Irian Jaya since TNI could not tolerate such disloyalty toward
NKRI.255
Likewise, Adm. Widodo, who was TNI chief until June 2002 warned the Papuans
that Irian Jaya was an inseparable part of NKRI so that the military would not allow it to
become independent. 256 Not surpisingly, TNI soldiers were strongly involved in the lowintensity conflict with the Papuan rebels that resulted in the extension of the status of
Irian Jaya as a military operations zone (Daerah Operasi Militer --DOM). Widodo’s
successor, Gen. Sutarto, defended his predecessor’s decision to punish provinces defying
central government control by preparing more military campaigns on a higher scale.257 On
the Aceh rebellion, he declared the press, “GAM adalah pengkhianat bangsa karena
hendak memisahkan diri dari NKRI!” (“GAM was the real traitor of the nation since it
258
mobilized the Acehnese to separate from NKRI!”).
Meanwhile, Gen. Tyasno, Gen. Sutarto’s erstwhile contender for the post of TNI
chief, linked the threat to NKRI to the amendment process of the 1945 State Constitution
which could create instability if it reduced the power of the central government. He
suspected that the constitutional amendments could endanger the principle of integralism
and the TNI’s role in protecting the NKRI. He thus urged the whole nation, particularly
civilian leaders and politicians, to restore and strengthen their commitment to the
259
country’s historical and cultural legacy of integralism. Resolving the conflict in Aceh
by inviting foreign mediators would likewise undermine Pancasila ideology, the 1945
255
Ibid.
“Widodo AS: Papua Bagian Integral RI yang Sah” (“Widodo AS: Papua An Integral and Legitimate
Part of Republik of Indonesia”), http://www.metronews.com/berita.asp?id=14320., was accessed on April
7, 2006: 1.
257
“Kasus Penembakan di Papua: Upaya Pisahkan Papua dari NKRI” (”Shooting Incident in Papua To
Secces Papua from NKRI”), http://www.westpapua.net/news/03/ 01/030103-kasus_penembakan_di_papua_upaya_pi..., January 3, 2003, loc. cit: 1-3; ”Panglima TNI: Reformasi TNI Jalan Terus” (“TNI Chief
Commander: TNI Reform Continues”), http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0206/08/utama/pang01.
htm, June 8, 2002: 1-3.
258
“Panglima TNI, Itu Tergantung GAM, Penyelesaian Kasus Aceh Lebih Baik Via Diplomasi” (”TNI
Chief Commander, It Depends on GAM, Aceh Solution Better Via Diplomacy”), http://www.Pikiranrakyat.com/cetak/0403/15/0502.htm, April 15, 2003: 1-2;”Perang Melawan GAM, Satu-satunya Jalan
Selesaikan Aceh” (”War on GAM, The Only Solution for Aceh”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/
0208/30/040529.htm, was accessed on September 26, 2006: 1-5.
259
“Indonesia Harus Kembali ke UUD 1945 Asli dan Pancasila” (”Indonesia Should Return to the Original 1945 and Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, July 6, 2006: 4; “Mantan KSAD: TNI Jangan Dipaksa Gunakan
Hak Pilih” (”Ex-Army Chief: TNI Should Not be Forced to Vote”), Suara Karya, November 17, 2006: 4;
”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (”Tyasno: The Amendments of the 1945 Constitu-tion Not
Legitimate”), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006, loc. cit: 2.
256
303
State Constitution, and national sovereignty.260 Gen. Tyasno’s recommendation to return
to the original 1945 State Constitution was, as we have seen in Chapter IV, highly
261
controversial.
He was backed by then TNI spokesman, Maj. Gen. Suwarno
262
Adiwijoyo,
and territorial assistant in the TNI headquarters, Maj. Gen. Syamsul
263
Ma’arif, that it became the main duty of the TNI to safeguard and defend the 1945
State Constitution and the Pancasila ideology. Any attempts, therefore, to change the
pillars of the unitary state by proposing an alternative constitution and ideology, and to
install a federal political system, would be crushed by TNI.
The promotion of conservative generals and hardliners such as Gen. Endriartono
Sutarto, Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu and Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo to top positions in
TNI, consecutively as chief commander, army chief, and Kostrad commander, constituted
the military’s increasing concern on the unitary state caused by the reform and the
separatist movements. Kusnanto argued that Megawati’s view, which was preoccupied
with the NKRI, encouraged the TNI to become more resistant to reform compared to
264
previous periods.
Similar perceptions on the prospect of the unitary state between
President Megawati and military leaders contributed to their similar response to reform
and separatism during 2001-2004.
As a result, the unitary state principle was maintained, while Megawati and the
conservative generals could preserve her presidency and their top posts in TNI. In effect,
the uneasiness of the military about the increasing danger of separatism during democratic
transition had created a coincidence between TNI leaders and the top representatives of
265
the new civilian regime in protecting the state by sacrificing the progress of reform. A
deep sense of humiliation caused by the “loss” of East Timor and a determination not to
lose any more territory pushed military and civilian leaders to align themselves.266 For
Megawati and the TNI, the loss of more territory had to be prevented by all means.
IV.C. Civilian and Military Leaders’ Cooperation to End Separatism in Aceh
260
“Kembalikan Pancasila ke Aceh” (“Return Pancasila to Aceh”), Suara Pembaruan, January 6, 2009: 2.
See again, “Indonesia Harus Kembali ke UUD 1945 Asli dan Pancasila” (”Indonesia Should Return to
the Original 1945 and Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, July 6, 2006, loc.cit; “Mantan KSAD: TNI Jangan
Dipaksa Gunakan Hak Pilih” (”Ex-Army Chief: TNI Should Not be Forced to Vote”), Suara Karya,
November 17, 2006, loc.cit; ”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (”Tyasno: The Amendments of
the 1945 Constitution Not Legitimate”), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006, loc. cit.
262
Adijoyo, 2002, op.cit: 11, 18.
263
Maj. Gen Syamsul Ma’arif was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in Jakarta.
264
Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on June 6, 2006 in Jakarta; see also, Yulianto, 2002, op.cit: 451452.
265
In his studies, Aguero anticipated military uneasiness during democratic transition, see Aguero, 1995,
op. cit: 12.
266
Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit.
261
304
Megawati began her presidency with a different approach than Wahid in coping
with the separatist conflict in Aceh. Previously, as Wahid’s deputy, she had no
opportunity to impose a military approach in the troubled province. However, as president
she could introduce a policy to the western-most province of Indonesia based on her
nationalist ideals.
On September 8, 2001, she visited Aceh, apologized to the Acehnese for the
central government’s neglect, and promised a more responsive government attitude for
the future.267 Yet, she avoided entering a dialogue with the Acehnese, depriving her of a
better understanding of the Acehnese grievances and demands. After her failure to win the
hearts and minds of the Acehnese, GAM rebels gained in increasing support to resume
their separatist activities. At this point, Megawati returned to a policy similarly repressive
than in the New Order period, by allowing TNI to resume military operations with the
objective of eradicating GAM and ending its aspiration for independence. She further
issued Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 7/2001 to facilitate deploying troops in Aceh.
Before the annual MPR session on November 1, 2001 she announced sending more TNI
troops to the province and endorsed the re-establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda
regional command earlier dismantled by Wahid.268 While stepping up military operations,
President Megawati enacted the law on a special autonomy status of Aceh passed in 2001
(Law No. 18/2001) which had never been implemented by Wahid. It was also an attempt
to appease the Acehnese with concessions, including the option to implement shariyah
law and allowing the province to retain 70 percent of the revenues from oil and gas
exploration. Finally, she renamed the province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which meant
269
a peaceful, prosperous, and free region, to meet the aspirations of the Acehnese.
Megawati’s long established relationship with the red-white military faction was
favourable for TNI to reaffirm its position as security and defence forces, particularly in
the regions confronted with separatism. Her leadership style which was hostile toward
separatist movements granted comfortable space for TNI to freely conduct military
operations in Aceh. The issuance of Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 7/2001 and her
statements in the MPR annual session of November 1, 2001 signaled to the TNI that
Megawati would not object to a military solution of the conflict. With the president taking
its side, TNI could not only reinforce its forces with fresh troops from outside Aceh, but
also upgrade its logistical capability and re-establish a regional command. Further, TNI
introduced restrictions on political life in a region where hundreds of thousands had
rallied for independence in August 2000.
267
Tjahyo Kumolo et al, Megawati Soekarnoputri: Presiden Pilihan Rakyat (Megawati Soekarnoputri:
The Peoples’ President), Jakarta: Global Publika, 2004: 89.
268
The Jakarta Post, January 11, 2002; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 182.
269
Majalah Tempo 29, No. 5, April 3-9, 2000; The Jakarta Post, November 27, 2000, May 18, 2001, and
January 2, 2002: 182, 246.
305
In the light of the new more accommodating attitude of GAM in 2002, Megawati
introduced softer policies on Aceh. She sent coordinating minister for political and
security affairs Gen. Yudhoyono to attend talks with GAM leaders in Geneva mediated by
the Henry Dunant Centre. She further sent coordinating minister for social welfare Jusuf
Kalla to talk on a more comprehensive peace plan. However, in contradiction to these
initiatives, she tolerated TNI to resume military operations. Under the increasing pressure
270
of the Megawati government, intimidated by TNI’s massive campaigns and under the
impact of new government overtures, GAM hesitantly agreed to a new Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement (COHA) which was signed by December 9, 2002.
Within this framework, the rebels pledged to cease their attacks and disarm, while
the government agreed to use police units to conduct normal policing activities. This
agreement paved the way for a new dialogue, including the military, with the Acehnese
people on the basis of the special autonomy law on Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which
also provided for democratic elections in Aceh.271 A limited form of autonomy was
introduced in Aceh on January, 1, 2003 before it would be transformed into a special
autonomy. The province was also promised a greater share of oil and gas revenues and
free and direct elections for its governor.272
Nevertheless, such progress did not sufficiently address the root of the separatist
conflict because it takes time for regaining the trust of the Acehnese in the central
government. Also, by the time of the dialogues the Megawati government had not yet
introduced a bureaucratic reform which was needed to replace the Javanese-dominated
273
provincial government which existed since her father’s and Soeharto’s rule. COHA had
not yet made much headway since the separatist Acehnese wanted more, particularly after
another formerly troubled Indonesian province, East Timor, won its independence.274
GAM openly expressed its position by announcing that while it accepted autonomy as a
basis for negotiations during the peace talks in Geneva, it had not dropped its demand for
275
full independence.
Despite the fact that President Megawati had signed the Framework Agreement of
the COHA, TNI did not withdraw all of its forces from Aceh. TNI justified this with the
argument that GAM rebels resisted total disarmament and instead of accepting special
270
Ibid: 219.
Majalah Tempo 31, No. 41, December 8-15, 2002; “Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Acheh Movement,” http://www.hdcentre.org/Programmes/aceh/aceh%20COH.htm, January 15, 2003; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 182, 246.
272
“Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
and the Free Acheh Movement,” http://www.hdcen-tre.org/Programmes/aceh/aceh%20COH.htm, January
15, 2003; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 182, 246.
273
Rueland, in Hoadley and Rueland (eds.), 2006, loc. cit: 230-231.
274
Rachel Clarke,”Aceh’s Bloody War”, BBC News Online, July 17, 2002.
275
“Activists Urge Jakarta Not to Declare Emergency in Aceh”, Agence French Press, July 12, 2002.
271
306
autonomy continued to strive for independence. This was the pretext for TNI’s hardliners
to resume counter-insurgency operations, which also served to protect their alleged
interests in marijuana plantations, illegal logging, smuggling, and other racketeering
276
businesses, including security protection services for Ameircan firm ExxonMobile’s oil
and natural gas projects in the province.277
President Megawati’s declining trust in GAM in the next few months was in line
with TNI’s effort to secure its position in Aceh. With the president’s support, the military
could take a tough response against GAM’s putative misinterpretations of the new peace
agreement (COHA). Meanwhile, overreacting by soldiers that provoked new violence
could not be prevented due to the president’s dependency on TNI. New cases of human
rights abuses emerged although the level of intensity dropped in comparison to the
previous period. The improved performance of the police forces in conducting normal
policing activities contributed to the decrease.
Meanwhile, TNI was broadly suspected of sabotaging the peace deal by
engineering attacks on monitors of the cease-fire and provoking GAM rebels to engage in
battle again.278 Without support for a peaceful conflict settlement and still haunted by the
secession of the East Timor province, Megawati declared martial law and endorsed one of
279
the largest military campaigns in the country’s history. The COHA collapsed entirely
when President Megawati on May 19, 2003 gave greenlight for TNI in starting its
offensive to stamp out 26 years rebellion in Aceh.280
TNI launched massive operations in an all out war against GAM by deploying its
PPRC (Pasukan Pengendali Reaksi Cepat --new rapid strike forces).281 In those
operations, hardliners such as Gen. Sutarto, Gen. Ryamizard, and Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo
played significant roles. Ryamizard justified these operations by explaining that GAM
could not be trusted because the rebels still wanted independence. Therefore, TNI could
not support the COHA.282 It was rather TNI’s duty to crush the rebels.
In accordance with this, Maj. Gen. Djali Yusuf accused monitors from the Henry
Dunant Centre (HDC) that they had often met people associated with the separatist
group.283 He questioned for what reason the HDC had summoned activists of various
276
ICG Report No. 17, loc.cit: 14.
Erhard Haubold, “Jakarta im Wettlauf mit der Zeit,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November, 15,
1999, Schmitz, 2003, loc.cit: 113.
278
“The Aceh Stalemate,”Laksamana.net, January 31, 2005, http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db
900sid/VBOL-696KKJ?OpenDocument , was accessed on June 1, 2010.
279
280
281
Ibid.
282
283
“Activists Urge Jakarta Not to Declare Emergency in Aceh”, Agence French Press, July 12 2002.
277
307
non-governmental organisations to their secretariat in Aceh, which according to him
could not be justified. In his view many foreigners were involved in Aceh to advance their
own interests. The general also said he had obtained the identities of those who waged an
international campaign for an independent Aceh and local activists who were selling
Indonesia. He likened these activities to similar subversion in East Timor.284 This is why
TNI’s security forces sought to identify their identities and keep them under surveillance.
It is true that Megawati had signed a peace agreement with GAM. Yet, the new
peace agreement could not be effectively implemented since GAM became much stronger
due to TNI’s failure in regaining Acehnese trust. Also, because of her lack of experience
and capability, Megawati could not immediately impose civilian supremacy on the
military in order to prevent the reoccurrence of incidents between TNI and GAM. In the
end, as a result of the deteriorating security in Aceh, she imposed darurat militer (the
status of military emergency) on the province.
Megawati’s Menkopolkam Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono complied with
requests from Kodam Iskandar Muda regional commander Maj. Gen. Djali Yusuf for
more troops. During an inspection trip to Aceh, Yudhoyono called GAM “terrorists” and
insisted that the government would not tolerate armed separatism. Irrespective of the
opposition of human rights activists in the province, he too favoured declaring a state of
emergency.285 Although there were already at least 28,000 troops in Aceh, Maj. Gen.
Djali suggested 8,000 more to be sent.286
In early 2003 Ryamizard belonged to the fiercest opponents of the Aceh peace
process, and many believed that he played a major role in its failure. 287 In early June
2003, military operations in Aceh entered their third week.288 In line with the campaign,
TNI established an emergency administration in the local governments to replace the
ineffective civilian bureaucracy. Many of the civilian posts remaining vacant for fear of
the TNI’s or the rebels’ revenge were filled with army officers imported from TNI’s vast
territorial network, giving the military the chance to justify the continued importance of
the territorial command system.
During the new offensive, TNI largely restricted press activities in the troubled
province, especially in the hot spots, and discouraged journalists from interviewing GAM
leaders. For this reason, it was impossible to verify military data related to the offensive,
including the number and classification of victims. Nonetheless, a source disclosed that
the massive campaign had resulted in hundreds of deaths, causing the total death toll to
284
Ibid.
Ibid.
286
Clarke, loc.cit.
287
288
285
308
over 12,000 since 1976. 289 TNI themselves claimed that 213 of their soldiers died and
hundreds were wounded.290
Within 1 year, GAM’s guerrilla operations could be contained so that on May 19,
2004 President Megawati was able to downgrade the status of the military emergency to a
civil emergency. TNI complied with her decision because its troops had regained
momentum and strengthened their strategic position on the ground. Importantly, however,
despite the improved situation, violence against civilians, especially women did not
subside. A report of investigation of an anti-violence NGO, Kontras, found out that for
the time of the emergency from May 2003 to August 2005, sixty-five out of 103 cases of
291
violence against civilians occurred. Less, namely fourteen cases happened from mid292
2001 to May 2003. International and local human rights organizations had consistently
raised concerns about abuses being allegedly committed by TNI and GAM rebels.
Explicitly, President Megawati supported military campaigns in troubled
provinces, especially Aceh, by saying that soldiers fighting against separatists were
patriots who did their duty to save the nation and the NKRI. For this mission, they had the
authority to carry out both military and non-military operations. They were protected by
political decisions which meant that TNI soldiers had national responsibility to root out
293
the rebels and to put an end to secessionism.
President Megawati consistently backed TNI in deploying more troops and
launching massive operations, especially in remote areas controlled by GAM rebels. She
defended TNI operations by arguing that they were necessary to protect Indonesia’s
sovereignty and integrity.294 She rejected international assistance to resolve separatist
conflicts because it would compromise national sovereignty. It was Megawati’s firm
belief that the conflict in Aceh should be settled by the Indonesian government within the
framework of the 1945 State Constitution and the unitary state. GAM should not be
treated as a foreign entity but rather as part of the nation which rebelled against the central
government. Separatism in Aceh was in other words a purely domestic affair which had to
be solved by Indonesians.295
TNI chief commander, Gen. Sutarto, stated that the military operations conducted
for 2 years since May 2003 was a great success. He argued that evidence for this success
is the substitution of the military emergency by a civilian emergency status for the
289
Far Eastern Economic Review, June 5, 2003: 16; December 25, 2003: 21.
Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit.
291
“Mayoritas Kekerasan Terjadi Saat Darurat Militer” (”Most Violence Occurred during Military Emergency”), Harian Kompas, January 23, 2007: 4.
292
Ibid.
293
Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit: 12.
294
Ibid: 12.
290
309
province, that the total number of separatist rebels could be reduced to 9,593 from
approximately 10,000, and 2,330 various standard weapons such as AK-49, M-16 and SS1 could be seized. TNI could moreover regain control over most areas in the province
296
although about 10 percent or 600 villages were still under GAM influence. The figures
presented by Gen. Sutarto drew criticism. The media questioned TNI’s success since it
could not demonstrate its performance by significantly reducing the number of the
297
separatist rebels.
In an interview, Ryamizard, however, acknowledged the progress
achieved by TNI. He was convinced that the separatist movement in Aceh could be ended
by the massive military campaigns.298
IV.D. Burying the East Timor Trauma
Megawati had a firm view on East Timor, opposing the proposal of the Habibie
administration to conduct a referendum on independence in the province. Her counterproposal was to grant a special autonomy status to the twenty-seventh province of
Indonesia as a final and everlasting solution. Within this framework, East Timor would be
under the control of the Indonesian government and there would be no foreign
interference into the territory’s domestic problems. Secession, on the other hand, would
not be tolerated and would be met with repressive measures of the central government.
Megawati had criticized Habibie for his lack of nationalistic awareness in offering
to surrender East Timor to the pro-independence group and international opinion. The
pro-independence vote was for her a result which represented a rejection of Soeharto’s
New Order regime rather than of Indonesia itself.299 For her, the “loss” of East Timor was
a humiliation that could jeopardize the country’s integrity. She was therefore determined
300
not to give up any more territory and rejected any proposal for a referendum in other
troubled provinces, such as in Aceh and Irian Jaya. According to Megawati, Habibie’s
policy in East Timor breached Indonesia’s democratic procedure, by-passed parliament
(DPR) and thus violated the 1945 State Constitution.
She shared the view of the TNI on East Timor’s secession. TNI opposition to East
Timor secession reflected its concern that a referendum would create a dangerous
precedent for other provinces with separatist tendencies. According to TNI, the ballot
process in East Timor and its outcome were purportedly unfair, manipulated by unfriendly
295
Ibid: 8-9.
Ibid.
297
Far Eastern Economic Review, June 5, 2003, loc.cit; December 25, 2003, loc.cit.
298
299
300
296
310
outsiders.301 Moreover, Megawati and TNI perceived the pro-integration militias as
brothers who deserved support and understanding. By contrast, they considered Western
countries, especially the United Stated and Australia, as being driven by racial, religious,
and geo-political motives, and which used East Timor to dismember Indonesia. They
suspected that external forces and Indonesia’s economic dependence and political
incompetence had forced the civilian Habibie government into a humiliating surrender of
302
national territory. For this reason, President Megawati had never asked for forgiveness
to the government of the new independent state of Timor Leste and the East Timorese for
what had been done by Indonesia for more than two decades, including the postreferendum riots allegedly orchestrated by the TNI. 303
To spare the country from humiliation, she did not support the prosecution of the
security forces accused of human rights violations before and after the referendum. On
September 7, 2003 she initiated a bill, which later became Law No. 27/2004, to addresss
the accusations through a committee on truth and reconciliation which would not
304
seriously hold the human rights violators accountable.
Likewise, she sided with
military leaders who suggested that the human rights violations in East Timor were
ordinary crimes which could be tried by military tribunals.
Not unexpectedly, the military tribunals turned out to be sham trials. Some
officers, including Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, ex-Kodam IX Udayana regional commander,
and Col. Muis, ex-Korem Wiradarma military resort commander, who had received
moderate sentences by the tribunals were later freed from charges by higher tribunals.
They even gained promotions in their own corps, while, in contrast with this, ex-civilian
local leaders and leaders of paramilitary groups were sent into prison before they were
also released after a short time. As a consequence, critics mentioned that the tribunals
were no less than a political show, an engineered solution, created by President Megawati
to appease the victims and their families, and, at the same time, protect and please
military officers involved in the abuses, and TNI, in general.
By endorsing the military tribunals, President Megawati ignored the demands of
the East Timorese who wished a fair and comprehensive solution of the problems
resulting from the conflict. East Timorese leaders, such as Xanana Gusmao and Ramos
301
Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc. cit; Eldridge, 2002, op.cit.
Eldridge, 2002, ibid.
303
Similar response had also showed by her Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Gen.
(ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was also former military leader (Kasospol and Kaster), when he
became the next president after Megawati. For further information see “Ramos Horta: Indonesia Harus
Minta Maaf” (“Ramos Horta: Indonesia Must Ask for Forgiveness”), Koran Tempo, March 18, 2010: B7.
304
In 2006, the Law No. 27/2004 was annulled by the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi). For further information, see Rosya, Vini Mariyane. “Pelanggar HAM Masa Lalu Bebas dari Hukuman,” (“Past Human Rights Violators Released from Sentence”) Media Indonesia, March 19, 2010.
302
311
Horta, who earlier keenly demanded transparent human rights tribunals, soon changed
their minds, and, similar to Megawati, took an accommodating stance toward TNI. They
were concerned with the security of the newly independent state, particularly its border
with Indonesia. They were aware of the fact that new incidents occurred after the
referendum which had caused security disturbances.
The new TNI leadership under Gen. Sutarto and with the full support of President
Megawati resisted international and the reform movement’s pressure for human rights
tribunals. By adopting the clauses of the old criminal code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum
Pidana --KUHP) inherited from the Dutch colonial government, the military, together
with the police could arrest hostile demonstrators who were raising the issues of East
Timor abuses and the generals’ accountability.
IV.E. Separatism, Violence, and Conflicting Interests in Irian Jaya
Worried by the domino effect of the separation of East Timor from Indonesia
which had repercussions on Aceh, President Megawati initiated a no-compromise
approach toward the separatist movement in Irian Jaya. On many occasions, she reiterated
her opposition to a new referendum on independence in addition to the one, the Pepera,
which had been held in 1968 under the supervision of the United Nations for Temporary
Administration (UNTEA). Like in Aceh, she asked for forgiveness for the New Order
government’s wrongdoings in the eastern-most province of Indonesia in her independence
day address to the nation on August 16, 2001.305 She also committed herself to remedy
the injustice and discriminations encountered by the Papuans. At the same time, however,
she registered her strong opposition to the secession of Papua. The most she was willing
to conede to Papuans was a special autonomy status under Law No. 21/2001, but she did
not open a dialogue with the Papuans.
Due to her strong opposition to secessionism, she encouraged the military to crush
306
separatist groups that still could not accept special autonomy. Her firm response to the
separatist movement in Irian Jaya was strongly influenced by her father’s struggle to expel
the Dutch colonizers from the territory and bring it under the fold of the unitary state of
the Republic of Indonesia. It was Soekarno, who in 1961 ordered to send troops to New
Guinea and it was Gen. Soeharto who commanded the military operation code named
Mandala to free Irian Jaya from the Dutch.307
305
Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit; Eldridge, 2002, op.cit.
Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit.
307
Eva-Lotta E Hedman, “Papua: the Last Frontier for Democratization, Demilitarization and Decentralization in Indonesia,” in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed.), Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, In306
312
In addition to this, Soekarno changed the name “Papua” to “Irian Jaya,” meaning
victory, after the success of the military campaign that also influenced the result of the
UN Act of Free Choice or Pepera. After annexation of the territory, Soekarno’s
successful policy of “national character building,” which integrated native Papuans into
Indonesia through political education, had been neglected by President Soeharto who was
mainly interested in exploiting the natural resources of the region. With the East Timor
lesson in mind, Megawati was committeed to keep the province within Indonesia. She did
not support attempts to change Irian Jaya’s status, and even, its name given to it by
Soekarno. For this reason, PDIP, her party with the biggest faction in MPR, supported
Golkar and other nationalistic factions to reject Wahid’s proposal to rename Irian Jaya
into its original name Papua.
In fact, Megawati’s interest to win more legislative seats in Irian Jaya in the April
legislative 2004 elections and thereby support her plan to run again in the July 2004
presidential election resulted in her failure to end separatism in the province. In an
attempt to enlarge fourteen regencies, she issued Presidential Instruction or Inpres
No.1/2003 on January 27, 2003, 14 months since the enactment of UU No. 21/2001 on
November 21, 2001. The redefinition of local government boundaries served the objective
to form a new province in Irian Jaya to be named West Irian Jaya (Irian Jaya Barat or
Irjabar). This effort is not in favour of Chapter 76 of the UU No. 21/2001 which
stipulates that any effort to enlarge the Papua province needs the consent of the MRP
(Majelis Rakyat Papua --the Papuan People’s Assembly) and DPRP (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat Papua --the provincial House of Representative of the Papuan People).
Furthermore, 2 weeks after the Inpres No.1/2003 was enacted, a retired Brigadier
General of the marine corps, Abraham Octovianus Atururi, was installed as the governor
of Irian Jaya Barat. Brig. Gen. Atururi was also a former official in the military strategic
308
intelligence agency (Bais).
President Megawati’s decision which was viewed as a
309
betrayal of the Papuan people’s aspirations
produced communal conflicts among
various ethnic groups that enhanced opposition to Jakarta.310 Nonetheless, with TNI on
her side, she could master this problem by deploying more troops in the most volatile
areas and endorsing the TNI plan to maintain Irian Jaya as a military operation zone
donesia, Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 42, University of Oxford, September
2007;.Amiruddin Al Rahab, Heboh Papua: Perang Rahasia, Trauma, dan Separatisme, Depok:
Komunitas Bambu, 2010.
308
Susanto and Pattisina, Harian Kompas, February 27, 2010, loc.cit.
309
Ibid.
310
“Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (“Central Government Was Demanded to Respect Papua’s Special Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ ut01.htm, loc.cit: 1-2, was
accessed on November 27, 2005. Juga, Robert Isisdorus, “Pilkada atau Pemekaran Papua” (”Regional
Elec-tion or Enlargement of Papua”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ut05.
htm, loc. cit: 1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005.
313
(DOM). She declined the separatist leaders’ proposal for an open dialogue involving
Papuans living in exile, human rights activists, civil society, and the leaders of the Papuan
Council (Presidium Dewan Papua --PDP). She was seemingly more interested in
addressing the separatist conflict in the province in her own way rather than searching a
new solution.311
TNI responded to the separatist conflict in Irian Jaya in a similar way than in other
provinces. In fact, Megawati’s rise confirmed TNI to sustain their military operations and
to crack down on the secessionists, mainly the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka -Organization for an Independent Papua). The Papuans’ loss of trust in the proposal of
special autonomy not only fuelled the recommencement of separatist activities but also
military operations to stop them. The failure of the implementation of the special
autonomy proposal benefited the military, which was disinclined to it due to its belief that
it would threaten its control over the province. This deteriorating situation led to new
armed clashes between TNI soldiers with the OPM.
Based on their Sishankamrata (Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta -total people’s defense and security system) doctrine,312 TNI leaders justify their use of
militias in the war against the OPM rebels, not only because their failure to crush the
rebels, but also to avoid accusations of gross human righst violations. There were indeed
reports on the activities of TNI, in particular, its elite unit, Kopassus, in the formation and
training of anti-independence militias in Irian Jaya.313 A number of reports of early June
2002 indicated that the TNI was preparing to intensify the crackdown on independence
supporters.
Pro-independence and human rights groups claimed that additional special force
troops and Muslim militia groups were being moved into the province.314 Large groups of
Laskar Jihad members, nearly all young men, not transmigration families, were entering
Irian Jaya every week among the thousands of transmigrants from other areas of
Indonesia. Their presence was not only ignored, but seemingly organized by TNI. The
militant militias which were trained with arms had earlier been involved in communal
fighting in both the Maluku archipelago and Sulawesi.
Toward the end of 2001, the Laskar Jihad leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib, reportedly
made a visit to Sorong. Since then, the influx of the radical Muslim militias steadily
311
J. Osdar,”Sentuhan Para Presiden kepada Papua” (“Presidents’ Policies to Papua”), 1 December 2005,
http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/01/Politikhukum/2254535.htm, loc. cit: 3, 1-3, was
accessed on December 1, 2005.
312
See about this, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 15-16.
313
M. Davies. Indonesian Security Responses to Resurgent Papuan Separatism: An O pen Source Case
Study, Canberra: Australian National University, CDSS, 2001; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit.
314
John Roberts, “Indonesian Military Steps Up Repression in West Papua”, WSWS, June 8, 2002.
314
increased.315 Also, military training had been taking place, initially in isolated bush areas,
but more recently on the premises of a local mosque. In March 2002, twenty church
leaders in Sorong issued a statement together with eight clan and youth leaders,
complaining about the presence of Laskar Jihad and drawing attention to the
dissemination of inflammatory publications and videos alleging that Christians are
responsible for “separatist” movements and constitute a threat to Indonesia's territorial
integrity. According to Elsham, a leading Indonesian human rights organization, there
were around 3,000 members of the Laskar Jihad in Irian Jaya and they had set up a
number of branches of its umbrella organization called Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah
Wal Jamaah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah) in several cities,
including Sorong, Fak-Fak, Jayapura, Timika, Nabire and Manokwari.316
Based on reports from the town of Fak-Fak, small boats had been seen arriving
since April 2002, each bringing about ten Laskar Jihad members, apparently from
Maluku. They had also set up commands in Arso, near Jayapura, the capital city of the
province, which had been the location of large transmigration resettlement areas for
newcomers from Java. In addition to the spread of the Laskar Jihad, TNI soldiers had
been actively promoting the establishment of pro-Jakarta militias known as Satgas Merah
Putih (Red-and-White Task Force),317 whose members were recruited from newcomer
Indonesian communities, for example, the native Papuans and pro-integration East
Timorese.
The Sydney Morning Herald reported that an additional 150 Kopassus troops had
318
been just moved from Sumatra to back up the army presence in the Irian Jaya province.
To counter opponents of continued Indonesian rule over the province, TNI, with the
backing of President Megawati, had resorted to increasingly repressive methods in the
period from January 2001 to June 2002. A de facto curfew was imposed, and arbitrary
arrest and detention were common. Reportedly, TNI soldiers were directly involved in
319
several murders.
In their efforts to fight separatists, TNI also conducted intelligence operations to
weaken PDP (Presidium Dewan Papua --Papuan Council Joint Leadership), an
opposition group established by prominent native Papuans. Its leader, Theys Eluay,
became the victim of kidnapping after having been formally invited by local military
officers for attending a national ceremony on the Indonesian Heroes Day on November
320
10, 2001. He was found dead several days afterwards in West Koya, around 60 km
315
Ibid.
“Laskar Jihad Poses a New Threat”, Tapol, tapol@gn.apc.org, September 16, 2002.
317
Ibid.
318
Roberts, 2002, loc.cit.
319
Ibid.
320
Moore and Rompies, 2003, loc.cit.
316
315
from Matoa Hotel in the city centre Jayapura, where he was watched by military
intelligence in his last days.321 The investigation of Theys’ death revealed that Kopassus
troops were involved in the kidnapping of Theys and his driver, Masoka, which ended
322
with the death of Theys and the disappearance of Masoka. Reportedly, Megawati did
not authorize this intelligence operation and regretted the kidnapping and the death.323
As a matter of fact, tension was often built up by the military to serve their
parochial interests. For instance, TNI was also accused of being responsible for an
“engineered ambush” on a company road under its security control in Timika on August
31, 2002, which killed three teachers, including two Americans, employed by the
American-owned Freeport mining company. Company employees suspected military
involvement in the ambush, which may have been part of a turf war beween the armed
forces and the police, as the company was threatening to cut its support for TNI. Antonius
Wamang and his friends, allegedly OPM followers, were later presented as the only
suspects of the ambush, and sent to Jakarta for trial. Although he denied the allegation,
Wamang obtained a life sentence without having a chance to defend himself properly and
explain where the standard weapons of TNI, such as M-16 and SS-1, and their pertinent
ammunitions they used came from.324 OPM leaders had denied that they ordered Wamang
and his friends to launch an attack on the employees of Freeport.
Other reports also stated that Kopassus was involved in the ambush.325 The army’s
counter-insurgency elite had been accused of staging a “freedom-fighter ambush” that
could be readily blamed on local tribespeople, known to be strong critics of the American
company. U.S. officials, according to a report of the Washington Post, had confirmed that
they have evidence that senior Indonesian military officials discussed an operation against
the U.S. mining company before the August 31, 2002 ambush.326 Together with Theys’
death and the recent spread of Laskar Jihad and pro-integration militias to Irian Jaya, this
ambush followed the assignment of Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon to take charge of the
restive province as the Kodam XVII Cendrawasih regional commander. Simbolon was
one of key military figures who were accused of orchestrating the violence in East Timor
in 1999.327 Similar in East Timor and Aceh, Kopassus officers deployed in rebellious
321
Author’s interview on June 2-4, 2008 in Jayapura, Irian Jaya; Author’s interview on June 8, 2008 in
Jayapura, Irian Jaya.
322
“Penegakan Hukum Tak Membaik” (“Law Enforcement Not Improved”), Harian Kompas, January 28,
2005: 8; Moore and Rompies, 2003, loc. cit.
323
324
Wamang informed that the standard weapons of TNI and their ammunitions had been sent by military
leaders he knew in Jakarta, see, “Penegak Hukum Harus Adil dalam Kasus Antonius Wamang” (“Law Enforcer Should be Fair in Antonius Wamang Case”), Suara Pembaruan, http://www.suara-pembaruan.
com/News/2007/04/21/Nasio-nal/nas02.htm, was accessed on April 21, 2007: 1-2.
325
Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit.
326
327
Ibid.
316
Irian Jaya apparently conducted covert operations in a desperate bid to prevent the
province from breaking away from Jakarta.
Another incident which involved the local government apparatus occurred in
Wamena on April 4, 2003.328 Here, too, were reports of killings, torture, and forced
disappearances as a result of TNI operations against OPM followers who were accused of
being responsible for the surprise attack on an ammunitions depot and the loss of several
329
weapons of Kodim (military district command) 1702 Wamena. By early June 2003, the
military, supported by its main forces from Kopassus and Kostrad, under the coordination
of Korem (military resort command) 171 Jayapura, intensified its operations in the
Central-Highlands of Irian Jaya, not only in Wamena but also in Kwiyawage, where many
330
had been reportedly tortured and murdered. Under Megawati and two Kodam XVII
Cendrawasih regional commanders, namely Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon and Maj. Gen.
Nurdin Zainal, military operations to stop OPM’s flag (Bintang Kejora) raising and to
hunt its followers had been conducted.331
Ryamizard, the new army chief, suspected that the activities of separatists there
would become the next major threat to the country after a similar development in Aceh.
He, therefore, encouraged to set up billboards and displayed banners reading “NKRI
adalah harga mati” (The unitary state of Indonesia is the final solution) and “TNI
Benteng NKRI” (TNI is the fortress or defender of the unitary state) in front of the
headquarters of Kodam (provincial level regional command), Korem (regency or
municipality level regional command), and other TNI territorial commands at the lower
levels as well as strategic places in Irian Jaya. The objective of this propaganda was to
warn Irianese that TNI would not tolerate federalist sentiments and secessionism
challenging the unitary state.332 The independence of Irian Jaya would mean that the
country and the military would lose the most resource-rich region with huge security
payment, or upeti, in Javanese terminology, which between 1998 and 2004 had lined up
the pockets of the military and police generals, colonels, majors, and captains and their
units nearly US$ 20 million, while, at least an additional US$ 10 million was also paid to
them during those years.333
328
“Penegakan Hukum Tak Membaik” (“Law Enforcement Not Improved”), Harian Kompas, January 28,
2005, loc.cit.
329
“Pemerintah Dinilai Lebih Cinta SDA daripada SDM” (“Government Preferred Natural than Human
Resources”), Harian Kompas, June 5, 2006: 8.
330
Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit; Al Rahab, 2010, op.cit: 60-61.
331
Al Rahab, 2010, ibid: 64-65.
332
The billboards and banners were still there when the writer came to Irian Jaya for conducting fieldwork
in June and December 2008.
333
Jane Perlez,”Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste,” New York Times, http://www.ny-times.
com/2005/12/27/international/asia/27gold.html?pagewanted=1&n: Part I: 1, was accessed on December
28, 2005.
317
For many years Freeport received security protection from TNI against threats
emanating from the separatist movement and the low-level insurgency which can be
traced back to the early 1960s. With growing pressure on the activities of the American
transnational corporation (TNC), the needs for military presence in Irian Jaya grew. They
also grew due to the increasing number of riots directed against foreign firms which were
sometimes engineered by military elements. 334 This also happened to a Korean TNC
Korindo located in Boven Digul which, as revealed by Usman Hamid and Nurvita
Indarini from human rights NGO Kontras, also needed additional security protection from
TNI units.335
V. Coping with Radical Muslims
V.A. Megawati’s Thoughts on Islam
Megawati’s toughts on Islam were reflected in speeches she delivered on the
occasion of state ceremonies and also in media comments. On many occasions, she
quoted her father’s views and arguments of how to respond to the aspirations of radical
Muslims for an Islamic state. She stressed that becoming a good Muslim does not mean
that Indonesians had to adopt the life style of the Arabs.336
Evidently, President Megawati was against syariah law and attempts to adopt it
into national laws (undang-undang) and regional government’s regulations (Perda). She
believed that the relations between human beings and God was an individual affair and
should not be brought into public domain.Corresponding to this background, she did not
agree with the idea to form a national law on anti-pornography. She opposed this move
because it would use syariah as a parameter that would also affect Indonesians with
another religious background, such as Christian, Hinduist, and Buddhist minorities. 337
She also shared with her father the belief that the idea of an Islamic state was
nothing else than a concept formulated in recent times by Muslim scholars and
intellectuals without strong basis in Islamic teachings. 338 This means that there is no
334
Part IV, ibid: 4.
“Presiden Diminta Terbitkan Inpres Penghapusan Bisnis Militer” (”President Demanded to Issue Presidential Instruction to Diminish Military Business”), http://www.detiknews.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2005/bulan/12//tgl/30/time/060: 1-3, was accessed on December 30, 2005.
336
Megawati Soekarniputri,”Menyegarkan Kembali Semangat, Rasa, dan Paham Kebangsaan Kita Memperingati Hari Lahirnya Pancasila 1 Juni 2006” (”Refreshing the Spirit and Ideology of Our Nationalism In
Order to Commemorate Pancasila Anniversary on June 1, 2006”), Jakarta, DPP PDIP, 2006: 2-3, 8-9.
337
“Megawati Minta Pansus Cermati RUU APP” (“Megawati Asks Special Commitee to Critically
Discuss Bill on Pornography”), Media Indonesia, March 8, 2006: 4.
338
S ukarno, Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the Banner of Revolution), Vol. 1, Jakarta, 1964: 452.
335
318
obligation for Muslims to create an Islamic state.339 An Islamic state would jeopardize the
unity of the state due to its contradiction to the country’s multiethnic reality. For this
340
reason, she was of the opinion that in Indonesia, Islam should not become a state affair.
To counter radical Muslim aspirations for syariah law, she stated that Islam as a
religion respected social diversity. She believed that Islam respected the existence of
other religious groups even if they had fewer believers and followers. She stated that
Indonesia was not a state based on religious exceptionalism, but rather on Pancasila
secular ideology, which included citizens from different religious backgrounds.341
President Megawati argued that those who wanted the formalization of syariah did
not understand Islam and ignored the religion’s appreciation on differences which
regarded.it as God’s blessing. She added that preserving priority on unity and nationhood
in state life would not prevent a citizen from becoming a devoted Muslim. This implies
342
that one can be a nationalist and a good Muslim at the same time. The amendments of
the 1945 State Constitution, the adoption of syariah law and the establishment of an
Islamic state would be a setback for the country.
V.B. Megawati and Radical Muslim Groups
Before the October 1999 presidential election, Megawati did not have good
relations with radical Muslim groups in the country. Her strong opposition to Piagam
Jakarta (the Jakarta Charter), which orthodox Muslims regard as the basis for
implementing syariah law in Indonesia, did not make her popular among these groups.
Also, she was unable to enter a political alliance with groups of a different ideology, not
even for the sake of winning the presidential election. The only political alliance she had
set up with an Islamic organization and political party was with former President Wahid’s
NU (Nadhlatul Ulama --The Resurrection of Ulama) and his party, PKB (Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa --National Awakening Party) due to the latter’s moderate views on
Islam that respected religious pluralism.
Since early 1999 Islamist parties such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan -United Development Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang --Crescent and Star Party), and
PK (Partai Keadilan --Justice Party) had launched smear campaigns on women
candidates for high political office. PPP, the party coming in fourth in the parliamentary
339
Muhammad Ridwan Lubis, Pemikiran Sukarno Tentang Islam (Soekarno’s Thoughts on Islam), Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1992: 264.
340
Sukarno, op.cit: 407; Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 18.
341
“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Harus Dipertahankan” (”Unity in Diversity Should be Preserved”), Harian Republika, June 5, 2006: 3.
342
Soekarnoputri, 2006, loc.cit.
319
elections of June 1999 behind PDIP, Golkar and PKB, had joined calls to reject a woman
candidate as next president after Habibie. Its chairperson, Hamzah Haz, stated that his
party would enter coalitions with individual Muslim legislators who shared the same
platform, mission, and vision, so that they could unite in finding the candidate for the
presidency.343 He had prepared measures to press Muslim legislators elected in the June
1999 legislative elections to form an alliance against Megawati, the secular-nationalist
presidential candidate. He had confirmed that his party, in accordance with Fatwa Ulama
(Muslim scholars’ religious ruling), wanted the best Muslim son, not a daughter, or what
he explained as a he, not a she.344
Lacking support from radical Muslim groups, Megawati failed to win the 1999
presidential election. This failure forced her to build a big political coalition with PPP,
PBB, PK and others after these parties felt increasingly betrayed by Wahid’s erratic style
of government. She decided to throw her party’s (PDIP or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perjuangan --Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle) support behind Hamzah Haz as
vice-president, although he earlier opposed a female president. This marriage of
convenience between secular-nationalist and radical Islamic groups was made possible
only by their common interest to remove Wahid from power.345 Although she followed
Soeharto’s strategy of entering alignments with political Islam, the political coalition did
not mean that she supported their efforts to pass national and regional regulations
adopting syariah law or to create an Islamic state either through contitutional or
inconstitutional means.
The common interest to oust Wahid had changed political constellations in the
country. While the radical Muslim groups altered their perceptions toward a woman
president, Megawati realized the important role of these groups in national politics. The
creation of the common front with Islamic groups and parties would guarantee the
stability of her presidency until October 2004.
Nevertheless, as noted by O’Rourke, she would soon find her new alliance
confronted by the groups which kept on struggling for their original ideas. 346 Hamzah’s
election as vice-president and her “gotong royong” cabinet signifying her effort to strike
a balance between the secular-nationalist and conservative Islamic forces could not
guarantee that the marriage of convenience between the two different parties would
survive without major problems. The inclusion of two major Muslim parties, namely, PPP
343
“Muslim Leader Moves to Block Megawati,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/
37-3658.stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.
344
Hamzah Haz was interviewed by Antara, in “Muslim Leader Moves to Block Megawati,” BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/37-3658.stm: 1-3, which was accessed on October 29, 2005.
345
346
320
and PBB, did not eliminate, but only reduce the challenges of Islamic groups to her
government.347
Many doubted that Megawati and Muslim groups could keep intact the grand
coalition government given the fact that the PPP and PBB were actively involved in the
campaign against a woman as president. More significantly, the question of state identity
had long been a major point of controversy between PDIP and the two Islamic parties. As
the PDIP preferred to maintain the non-religious character of the state, the PPP and PBB
had never concealed their determination to incorporate the Piagam Jakarta, which
obliged all Muslim citizens to adhere to the syariah law into the 1945 State Constitution.
The adoption of the Piagam Jakarta was practically the same as to change the country’s
secular identity into an Islamic one. From the PDIP’s point of view, thus, the election of
Hamzah Haz as Megawati’s deputy was also combined with the expectation that it would
reduce the call for the implementation of the syariah law from militant quarters in the
Islamic community. 348
But challenges to her government from the radical Muslim groups on the issue of
state identity came soon after assuming the presidency. The first was launched just a few
weeks after her inauguration when thousands of FPI (Front Pembela Islam --Front for
Islamic Defenders) members organized a big demonstration in front of the parliament
building. They demanded the insertion of the Piagam Jakarta in the 1945 State
Constitution and widely called for the implementation of the syariah law. The pressure of
the groups became more significant as PPP and PBB officially proposed to MPR that the
Piagam Jakarta should be adopted in the 1945 State Constitution during the annual
session of the assembly which was to be held in November 2001.349 Again, in March
2002, a noted radical Muslim figure who was the highest leader of Majelis Mujahiddin
Indonesia Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, proposed to MPR the inclusion of the Piagam Jakarta,
350
which granted the implementation of the syariah law.
However, as moderate Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, and
the military did not support these initiatives, the efforts of the radical Muslim groups
failed to attract much support, even after their second demonstration during the MPR’s
annual session. Not surprisingly, Megawati’s PDIP faction with the support of the Golkar
Party and the TNI faction in MPR could end discussions on Piagam Jakarta and the
syariah law in the parliament. Thereafter Megawati came under attack from the same
347
Riswanda Imawan,”Make-up of Megawati’s Team: To Please and Appease”; Hadi Soesastro,”Market
Will Give the Cabinet the Benefit of the Doubt,” The Jakarta Post, August 10, 2001.
348
Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 126. This was confirmed by the secretary general of PDIP, Pramono Anung, in
interview at the party’s headquarters on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta.
349
Sukma, 2003, op. cit.
350
Subur Tjahyono,”Memasyarakatkan Pilar Bernegara hingga ke Ngruki” (“Promoting State Ideology to
Ngruki”), Kompas, April 30, 2010: 2.
321
groups, namely PPP and PBB, which publicly criticized her lack of leadership in the mid
of an ongoing economic crisis. 351 But, without the military behind them, they could not
force another secular president to resign as in the case of Wahid. Even the series of
352
terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta between 2002 and 2004 did not lead to her
downfall so that she could accomplish her term which ended in October 2004.
V.C. Megawati and the Red-White Generals
Megawati’s positive views on TNI had reciprocally resulted in the military
leaders’ strong support for her presidency. TNI Chief commander Gen. Sutarto, for
instance, had stated that he would not tolerate any attempts to remove Megawati from her
legitimated presidency. In a statement that had drawn criticism from Wahid’s camp -Wahid’s supporters were still of the view that Megawat replaced Wahid in
unconstitutional way-- he further guaranteed that there would be no unconstitional moves
to replace her. 353 Pro-military legislators from PDIP such as Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala
backed TNI’s standpoint by arguing that with Megawati TNI could be at ease for a long
time due to her visions and style of leadership that is acceptable to TNI. He stated,
354
“President Megawati understands TNI, and TNI can follow her.”
Army chief Gen. Ryamizard admitted that Megawati was the only Indonesian
post-Soeharto civilian president who was broadly welcomed by TNI. Ryamizard praised
355
her respect of TNI and her unwillingness to interfere in military affairs. Like himself
who never studied abroad and was not much influenced by foreign ideas, Megawati had a
very different personal character and style of management than Habibie and Wahid. Also,
she had never introduced policies that had negatively affected the military. Such mutual
respect led to good relations between Megawati and TNI leaders until the end of her term.
Pro-Megawati military generals, either from the old or the new generation, such as
Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala,356 ex-Kodam XVII Cendrawasih regional commander
357
under Soeharto, and army chief Gen. Ryamizard, claimed that TNI did not need to
follow all Western concepts on professional soldiers and civilian supremacy. According
351
“Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://www.bookrags.com/biography-megawati-sukarnoputri-ema
--04/: 1-2, was accessed on October 29, 2005; Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search
for Stability, Second Edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
352
Far Eastern Economic Review, September 12, 2002, loc.cit: 15-22.
353
”Panglima TNI: Reformasi TNI Jalan Terus” (”TNI Chief Commander: TNI Reform Continues”), http:
//www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0206/08/utama/ pang01.htm, June 8, 2002: 1-3.
354
Maj. Gen. Sembiring Meliala was interviewed on October 17, 2006 in Jakarta.
355
356
Maj. Gen. Sembiring Meliala was interviewed on October 17, 2006 in Jakarta.
357
Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on Novermber 24, 2006 in Jakarta.
322
to the two generals, there was no necessity for TNI to leave their age-honored ways which
had been valued as precious national cultural heritage. Strongly defended by Ryamizard,
this cultural legacy distinguished TNI from military institutions in Western countries. The
dual function and the armed forces’ mission to preserve the unitary state are parts of this
cultural legacy which can be traced back to the Majapahit kingdom and Gajah Mada and
his soldiers.358
In addition to Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala and Gen. Ryamizard, many nationalist
officers from the army, navy, air force, and the police approached or joined Megawati’s
party (PDIP). Prominent figures such as Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar and Lt. Gen. Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono were appointed as minister of transportation and telecommunication, and coordinating minister for social and political affairs, respectively. This showed
that Megawati was supported by nationalist generals both from Murdani as well as nonMurdani cadres. Gen. Murdani, himself, former chief commander and an opponent of
ICMI, the influential Muslims’ Intellectuals Association, had played a role in preventing
Megawati from becoming the target of Soeharto loyalists’ attack in the July 27, 1996
violence against her party’s headquarters in Jakarta’s Diponegoro road. He informed her
about the plans of Soeharto’s generals to occupy her party headquarters and to replace her
with a pro-Soeharto new leader. Hendropriyono, a nationalist general with links to
Murdani, who allegedly played a role in repressing militant Muslims in Lampung which
resulted in the Lampung incident when he was military resort (Korem) commander, was
promoted as chief of BIN (Badan Intelejen Nasional --National Intellegence Board).
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a general who did not belong to the Murdani faction,
was promoted to a cabinet post, namely coordinating minister for social and political
affairs, overseeing the TNI chief commander, the chief of the national police, the minister
of defense, the chief of BIN, and the minister of home affairs. Although he had been sent
to the U.S. for military training and higher education, like many other Indonesian generals
and civilian leaders, he also glorified the Majapahit era. He conferred the name of
Tunggadewi, who in the Javanese history is known as a respectful queen of the Majapahit
kingdom, to his first granddaughter.359
V.D. The Military and Radical Muslim Groups
358
Similar explanations came from Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’rif, Aster Kasum TNI (Asisten Territorial Kepala Staf Umum TNI --territorial assistant for TNI General Staff), who was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in
Jakarta.
359
“Cucu SBY Diberi Nama Almira Tunggadewi Yudhoyono” (“SBY Granddaughter Was Named Almira
Tunggadewi Yudhoyono”), Kompas-online, http://www.Kompas.com/read/xml/2008/08/18/14385984/…,
was accessed on March 19, 2009: 1.
323
Under the Megawati presidency, TNI leaders did not hesitate to exploit for their
personal and corporate interests the bombings organized by terrorist groups such as
Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda which were connected to radical Muslim groups in
the country such as MMI (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia --Indonesian Mujahiddin
Assembly), Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors), and Laskar Jundullah (Jundullah Warriors).
In his reports Aditjondro claimed that there was collusion in a series of bomb attacks
between radical Muslim groups and the national intelligence network (BIN) which at the
360
time was controlled by Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono. The first of these bombings occurred
in Bali on October 12, 2002, targeted Paddy’s café and killed 202 people. Many of them
were foreign tourists, twenty-two of them Australians. Dr. Azhahari and Noordin M. Top
from JI, the alleged masterminds of the blast, had targeted Australians due to their role in
the US invasion in Afghanistan and Irak, and, notably, Indonesia’s former East Timor
province.
The East Timor policy of the Howard government had hastened the province’s
independence and this contributed to the deterioration of the living conditions of Muslims
in the predominantly Catholic territory.361 Another major blast occurred in Jakarta on
August 15, 2003, hitting JW Marriott hotel. Like in the Bali blast, the motivation behind
the attack was to kill Americans and the Westerners. The last bombing attack targeted the
Australian embassy on September 9, 2004, less than 1 month before Megawati ended her
presidency.
Police investigations later revealed that the Malaysian leaders of JI, Dr. Azahari
and Noordin M. Top, were assisted by Indonesian Islamic extremists, namely, Imam
Samudera, Amrozi, Umar Patek, and Dulmatin. They were supported by MMI, which
provided them with legal assistance and organized propaganda to counter the accusations
from the authorities and the police. Interestingly, before Imam Samudera and Amrozi, the
main suspects, were captured, Republika, an Indonesian newspaper that acts as a mouth
piece of radical Muslims in the country, persistenly denied that they were behind the
above terrorist activities.
The trials of JI bombers later disclosed the connection of the extremist Muslims to
Abu Bakar Ba’syir, a cleric running an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in Solo, and
other leaders who were in favour of jihad. They also raised the question how JI activists
would have easy access to Indonesian military standard weapons and explosives and why
the security forces, especially military intelligence, were not able to prevent the attacks.
There were credible reports that Laskar Jihad militias had been in part trained and armed
360
Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 425-425.
“Azhahari Diduga Tewas: Kelompok Teroris Masih Berikan Perlawanan” (“Azhahari Probably Died:
Terrorist Group Still Fight”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/0511/09/200258-.htm: 1-2, was accessed on October 9, 2005.
361
324
by members of the TNI, including Kopassus, and by veterans returned from fighting
against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 362 Laskar Jihad and others, including the smaller but
well-trained Laskar Mujahiddin, the Sulawesi-based Laskar Jundullah and, the almost
completely unknown Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) organization were represented on the
Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia or the War Fighters’ Council under the leadership of Abu
Bakar Ba’syir, who was later claimed to be the spiritual leader of the JI..363
Kopassus’ links to intelligence agencies such as BIN and Bais raised the issue of
both parties’ relationships to several of the extremist organizations, especially Laskar
Jihad and Jama’ah Islamiyah.364 It has been common knowledge that BIN and its
predecessor, Bakin, had infiltrated radical Muslim organizations such as Jama’ah
Islamiyah and its predecessors, including Komando Jihad, Darul Islam (DI), and Negara
Islam Indonesia (NII), in order to learn about their activities and for manipulating them
for other political purposes, such as “sting” operations. “Sting” operations were conducted in the second half of the 1970s when Soeharto’s covert or special operations unit
(Opsus) encouraged radical Muslims to establish links to the DI and NII movements to
agitate for an Islamic state.365 The intention by Opsus at that time was to legitimize the
authoritarian New Order by discrediting radical Muslims, who were portrayed as a
potential threat to state order and security.
For the military, the existence of the radical Muslim groups had a dual benefit. On
the one hand, TNI leaders could use them to neutralize and thus soften societal pressure
on TNI on the human rights front and help deflect from their dreadful enemies, namely,
366
the student opposition.
This means also if military leaders grew dissatisfied with
Megawati, they could employ the groups to disturb destabilize her government. On the
other hand, once they did not need the groups any longer, they would reveal that they are
a threat to the future of the unitary state because of their ideals of an Islamic state. Against
this background, it can be argued that as long as the military was under reform pressure, it
was not fully committed to prevent the bombing activities of the groups in Bali, Jakarta,
and other places of the country. This at least could be concluded from a statement by Maj.
Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif, Aster Kasum TNI (Asisten Territorial Kepala Staf Umum TNI -territorial assistant for TNI General Staff), who argued that it would be difficult for the
military to stop the activities of the radical Muslim groups due to TNI’s lack of authority
to do it. The military general had even directly blamed the reform movement as the source
362
ICG, 2004, loc.cit; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit.
ICG, 2002, loc.cit; ICG, 2003, loc.cit; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit.
364
“Gufron Arrest May Lead to Suharto's Dark Forces”, Laksamana.Net, December 10, 2002; Ken Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces Equinox, Jakarta, 2003; Ken Conboy, Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service Equinox,Jakarta,2003; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit.
365
“Kopassus Behind Militia Attacks: Report”, Laksamana.Net, 22 January 2002; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.
cit.
366
363
325
of the TNI’s predicament and TNI’s reluctance to crush the terrorist groups and their
activities that had produced fear in society. 367 If civilians wanted the military to provide
368
security, they should not dissociate the TNI from political and security affairs.
As argued by Australian scholar Greg Barton, the author of former President
Wahid’s biography, since Soeharto’s resignation in 1998, key military generals with
Islamist sympathies sought to mobilize Islamist militias for their own purposes. At this
time Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and other Jama’ah Islamiyah leaders returned to Java from selfimposed exile in Malaysia. Barton pointed out that in early 2000, when President Wahid
sacked Gen. Wiranto over the East Timor post-ballot massacres and began to encourage
profound reforms within the military, generals known to be religious hardliners used
369
radical Islamist militia to destabilize the Wahid government.
Under the Megawati
government, the generals still took advantage of the militias’ continuing activities for
revitalizing TNI’s territorial and intelligence functions.
V.E. Megawati, the Military, and Radical Muslim Groups
As explained earlier, Megawati’s rise to power was only possible in line with her
accomodating approach to the military and political Islam. The military and the Islamic
groups could continue exploiting the divisive issue of religion to keep their opponents at
bay. A conservative general such as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto was in power and proficient
at extracting support, particularly in parliament, from radical Muslim groups, for instance,
PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang --Crescent and Star Party).370 Gen. Endriartono played a key
367
Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in Jakarta.
In fact, after the radical Muslims’ bombing happened again in Jakarta, namely on July 24, 2009, targeted at the same place, Hotel JW Marriott, where many foreigners gathered or stayed, 6 years after the
first attack, which had killed nine and wounded dozen people, the idea to revitalize the deployment of TNI
soldiers at the lowest level of every province of the country, namely sub-district or village (Koramil -military sub-district command), to control civilian activities in order to assist the police in conducting their
security task obtained wide support from civilians at the end of the first term of the presidency of Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono.This meant that the rising threat coming from terrorism organized by the radical
Muslims had successfully improved the image of Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa --petty, training, or noncommissioned officers at the village level) and invigorated its territorial intelligence function. Therefore,
chief commander Gen. Djoko Santoso, further suggested to return the authority of TNI to be allowed to arrest and interrogated civilians who were suspectedly behind bombing and other terrorist activities. See, for
example, “Antiteror TNI Kerahkan Pasukan ke Kecamatan” (“TNI’s Anti-Terrororist Desk Sends Troops
to Village”), Koran Tempo, August 12, 2009: A2; “25 Gembong Teroris Mengancam” (“25 Terrorist Main
Activists Threaten“), Suara Pembaruan, August 13, 2009: 1-8; “TNI Akui Mampu Hadapi Terorisme:
Tiga Kemampuan Angkatan Darat Menganggur” (“TNI Is Capable to Handle Terrorism: Three Army’s
Potentials Were Idle“), Harian Kompas, August 19, 2009: 4; Adhitya Cahya Utama, “Militer Usul
Intelijen Bisa Menang-kap” (“The Military Proposed Intelligence Allowed to Arrest”), Jurnal Nasional,
September 8, 2009: 9.
369
370
See O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 402-404.
368
326
role in the 2001 ouster of reformist President Wahid and his replacement by his deputy
Megawati Soekarnoputri. 371 At the time of the Soeharto regime’s collapse, Endriartono
commanded the Jakarta-based presidential security force regiment (Pasukan Pengaman
Presiden --Paspampres) and maintained close contact with former President Soeharto
afterwards.372
Endriartono, the close ally of Soeharto, on June 17, 2002 took command of TNI
and helped the institution restore its powerful position. He took over the position of chief
commander from Navy Adm. Widodo Adisutjipto after the admiral had been promoted by
Wahid as the first non-army officer to head the Indonesian military in its 57-year history.
By appointing Gen. Endriartono, Megawati bypassed an air force commander who was
next in line for the job. Endriartono’s appointment was criticized as a reversal of Wahid’s
policy of ending the army’s domination of the military by promoting top officers from the
navy and air force services considered untainted by human rights abuses.373
With Megawati at its side, it was clear that the only opponents of the military were
student demonstators and radical reformers. However, the support of her party (PDIP)
was successful in blocking the pressure of the demonstrators and reformers on military’s
interests in the parliament. In fact, the military’s tactical proximity to radical Muslim
groups had encouraged President Megawati to depend on the military, so that she did not
find herself confronted by an alliance between the military and radical Muslims.374
Nevertheless, in general, the Indonesian military still preferred secular-nationalist
ideals. Although there were military leaders involved in or backing the activities of
radical Muslims groups, namely, those who became known as the “green generals,” their
involvement or support was tactical or temporary in nature. Moreover, the generals who
sympathized with sectarian religious groups were only a minority in the institution, which
since its formation in 1945 had not changed its doctrine and educational system
predominantly influenced by secular-nationalist ideals, the Pancasila ideology and the
1945 State Constitution. Consequently, the number and the influence of the red-white,
that is, the-pro secular-nationalist generals were much greater than the one of the green
generals.
Both military and civilian analysts who were interviewed for the study confirmed the
scenario depicted above. In addition, Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, TNI territorial chief (Kepala
Staf Teritorial --Kaster) during the Megawati era, noted that the emergence of the two
military factions was stirred by the personal interest of these leaders and not TNI as a
371
Slobodan Lekic, “Suharto Loyalist Takes Over Military”, Associated Press, June 18, 2002.
Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 435-436.
373
Lekic, 2002, loc.cit.
374
Ibid.
372
327
state institution.375 It was this factionalism that facilitated the military’s deep involvement
in civilian affairs, especially, in sticking to its territorial function. Promotion or political
ambitions were the main motivations for the opportunistic behaviour of individual
military leaders and for betraying their secular-nationalist ideals. Thus, like their Islamist
civilian counterparts, pro-Islamic generals appeared willing to exploit religion as a
political vehicle.376 Army generals such as Wiranto, Djaja Suparman, Sjafrie
Sjamsoeddin, Prabowo Subianto, and Zacky Anwar Makarim, and others, who
temporarily backed the formation and the activities of radical Muslim groups such as FPI,
KISDI, LJ, and PBB, were by no means fanatical Muslims.377
V.F. The End of Religious Conflict and the Return of Stability in Maluku
Megawati took over the presidency from Wahid who was impeached by the MPR
with a solid support from retired red-white generals in her PDIP. She gave a key position
to Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei in PDIP as member of its central board, and appointed Lt. Gen.
Hari Sabarno as minister of domestic affairs, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar as minister of
transportation, and Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono as chief of the national intelligence board
(BIN). Since the fall of Soekarno, Megawati and her family cultivated good relations with
the navy corps that influenced her decision to retain Adm. Widodo as armed forces
commander. She removed Gen. Tyasno Sudarto and Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman from their
respective positions as army chief and Kostrad commander and replaced them with Gen.
Sutarto, a close ally of Gen. Wiranto, and Lt. Gen. Ryamizard, a son in law of Gen. Try
Sutrisno, a red-white general and associate of Gen. Moerdani, and former vice-president
under Soeharto.
The transfer of military support from Wahid to Megawati improved Megawati’s
capability in addressing religious conflict in Maluku. In May 2002, she ordered the
transfer of authority for security operations in Maluku from the police to the military
thereby ending the dispute between the two institutions over who should lead the effort to
378
return stability to the strife-torn region. Her tough anti-separatist policy was echoed by
the military which exerted pressure on the Laskar Jihad and other warrying parties in the
region to withdraw their militias. TNI also controlled its troops more effectively so that
their involvement in communal and separatist conflicts in the various areas of Maluku
drastically decreased, and the number of incidents and casualties dropped.
375
377
378
376
328
In accordance with the re-establishment of the Kodam XVI Pattimura regional
command and the election of a former regional commander as the new governor of the
conflict-ridden province which had been endorsed by President Megawati, TNI performed
a high-profile engagement in returning peace in the province since May 2002. With the
recovery of TNI’s territorial function, the Kodam XVI Pattimura regional commander,
Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso, was no longer reluctant to control security in the province. By
coincidence, TNI was also able to help the central government to effectively prevent the
Christians from reviving the proposal to establish RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan --the
Republic of South Maluku). In the conflict with Wahid, military elements from Kopassus
had protected RMS symphatizers and leaders such as Berti Coker and Alex Manuputty.
With the full support of the military, the Laskar Jihad and other paramilitary
groups could be disbanded by the government and forced to leave Maluku. This situation
had significantly reduced the scale of conflict and tensions in the entire region. The
influential Laskar Jihad leaders, especially Ja’far Umar Thalib, together with many of his
followers, were deported to Jakarta with government transportation facilities. The great
influence of Megawati’s PDIP among native Christians in Maluku was also considered
very helpful in downscaling conflict.
In accordance with the disappearance of tensions between civilan and military
leaders in Jakarta, North Maluku returned to a peaceful condition, and also in the other
parts of Maluku province, the situation improved markedly. Under such favorable
circumstances, the Megawati government could initiate peace talks in Malino. The active
role of Yusuf Kalla, minister of people’s welfare, who was in charge of the negotiations,
greatly contributed to the successful conclusion of a peace pact in February 2002.
Although the so-called “Malino Peace Agreement I” was interrupted several times by
violence and fighting which still sporadically broke out in some locations, the new
incidents could be contained due to Megawati’s capability in developing a stable political
system and the resultant positive response from the military in assisting the
implementation of the peace pact on the ground.379 The Malino Peace Agreement II
complemented the first peace accord. It was concluded to fasten a comprehensive peace
settlement in Maluku. TNI’s compliance to President Megawati led to the successful
implementation of the last Malino peace pact, which contributed to the recovery of
Maluku stability in 2003.380 A comprehensive and permanent conflict resolution could be
realized in the entire archipelago before the Megawati presidency ended.
379
380
Ibid: 133, 238.
329
V.G. Religious Conflict in Poso and Pressure for Formation of TNI’s New Regional
Command
Several months after Megawati assumed her presidency, a new wave of violence
erupted in Poso. From November 26 to December 2, 2001, a group of armed people
organized a series of attacks in Sepper and Silanca, and other regions in Poso. In the
attacks four TNI soldiers and three civilians were killed, while eighty-eight houses, four
religious sites, and the offices of Kelurahan (the lowest level of the regional government)
and Puskesmas (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat --center for public health services at
Kelurahan level) were damaged.381
On December 20, 2001, Minister Kalla visited Poso to initiate peace talks between
Muslim and Christian groups who were at war with each other in the central region of
Central Sulawesi province. After several rounds of dialogues with the warring parties,
Kalla’s tireless efforts resulted in a peace declaration which was signed in Malino.
Nonetheless, in the absence of law enforcement and due to the work of to the agents of
provocateurs,382 the Malino declaration could not effectively eradicate violence. Worse
even, new incidents caused more brutal killings with a larger number of victims,
including teenagers and women.383
While security in Aceh and Maluku steadily improved, in Poso, religious conflict
escalated because the TNI still allowed radical Muslim groups such as the Laskar Jihad,
Laskar Mujahiddin, and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which had connections to Abu Sayyaf of
384
385
the South Philippines,
and moreover, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), to
infiltrate the region. The arrival of various extremist groups from outside the region
381
“Rekomendasi ’Mandul’ Pansus Poso?” (“’Vain’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Poso”),
382
For further information, see, for example, Yosef Tor Tulis, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, Mari nus Riwu: Kisah Tiga Martir dari Poso (Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, Marinus Riwu: A Story
about Three Martirs from Poso, Jetpress, Juli 2007.
383
“Inpres No. 14/2005 tentang Poso, Menguji Kesungguhan Pemerintah” (“President Instruction No. 14/
2005 on Poso, Testing Government’s Consistency”), http://www.suarapembaruan. com/News/2005/12/ 01/
Sorotan/sor01.htm,: 1-3, was accessed on December 1, 2005.
384
Identified as a Philippine terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf, which split from the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), is one of the two major Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines operating
in the Sulu archipelago. Abu Sayyaf recently attempted to retaliate against the Philippine government
which had started an offensive against Muslim insurgents. Indonesian activists such as Amrozi, Fatur
Rachman Al-Ghozi, Dulmatin and Hambali, who were also graduates of the Ngruki Islamic boarding
school of Solo, Central Java, were senior figures in the JI. Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the
Abu Sayyaf group had conducted violent acts in what they describe as their fight for an independent
Islamic province. See, for instance, “Abu Sayyaf,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Sayyaf, was accessed
on May 4, 2010; see also, “Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines, Islamist separatists),” Council on Foreign
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/9235/abu_sayyaf_group_philippines_islamist_sepa-ratists.html.
385
“Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” Asia Report, No. 80, July 13,
2004, ICG, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/080-southern-philippines-backgrounder-terrorism-and-the-peace-process.aspx?alt_lang=id.
330
initiated a new phase of conflict marked by armed clashes and explosions. For example,
on March 23, 2002, the building of the branch office of the social welfare ministry was
386
blasted. Also, on October 12, 2003, a group of armed people assaulted several villages
387
in the coastal area of Poso, killing eight and injuring dozens.
In response to the worsening situation, Megawati ordered more security forces to
Poso. To follow up this, military leaders sent battalions from neighbouring regions and
388
Java. Ironically, the presence of more security forces could neither reduce the violence
nor prevent new strife from occuring. Local informal leaders and NGOs activists, like
Irianto Kongkoli and Prof. Mamar, criticized the presence of TNI’s special forces units,
such as Kostrad and Kopassus, because Poso, until that time, was never declared as a
389
military operation zone (DOM) such as East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya.
NGOs demanded an investigation to identify the reasons for the deteriorating
communal conflict. They were stopped by increasing harassment. Adnan Arsal, a local
Muslim leader and chairperson of FSPUI (Forum Silaturahmi dan Perjuangan Umat
Islam --Muslim Forum for Communication and Struggle) charged that the violence in
Poso was no longer the work of the inhabitants but the security forces.390
Despite the deteriorating security in Poso, Megawati did not review military
presence and did not heed to the informal leaders’ suggestions to investigate mysterious
shootings (Penembak Misterius) and killings since 2001, the method of violence which
had been widely used during the New Order era. She also did not oblige the military to
work hard to return stability to the region by arresting the trouble makers, including
former Moro Jihad fighters and recalcitrant elements of the TNI. According to a report of
Kontras (The Commission for the Disappeared and Victim of Violence), there were
nineteen cases of violence in all regions of Central Sulawesi during 2002, ten cases during
2003, and seven cases during 2004. Aside from shootings, there were four cases of
killings in 2002 and three cases in 2003. In addition to this, bombing incidents occurred
fourteen times in 2002, eight times in 2003, and four times in 2004.391
386
“Rekomendasi ‘Mandul’ Pansus Poso” (“’Ineffective’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Poso”), Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005, loc.cit.
387
Ibid.
388
Ibid.
389
Ibid.
390
“Semua Berharap Penderitaan Itu Segera Berakhir” (“Everyone Hope the Misery Immediately Ends”),
http://www.suara-pembaruan.com/News/2005/12/ 01/Sorotan/sor02.htm,: 1-2, was accessed on December
1, 2005.
391
“Siaran Pers Bersama tentang Menyikapi Eskalasi Kekerasan di Sulawesi Tengah” (“Joint Pers Release
on Response to Escalation of Violence in Central Sulawesi”), October 31, 2005, http://www.Kontras.org/
index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=203, was accessed on April 10, 2010.
331
With the escalation of conflict, TNI had a rationale to expand their role in Central
Sulawesi. It initiated the Sintuwu Maroso operation to bring back law and order,
involving thousands of troops and police members. According to a research report
authored by Kelompok Perjuangan Kesetaraan Perempuan Sulteng (group for gender
parity struggle in Central Sulawesi), the operation affected civilians: around 400 women
became the victims of sexual harassment of warring parties and security forces. 392 Rather
than improving security in Poso, the presence of TNI soldiers worsened the communal
conflict. As noted by Sydney Jones, head of the Jakarta branch of the International Crisis
Group (ICG), TNI spurred the escalation of the conflict in order to bargain for a higher
military budget.393 There was also a report which said that around Rp.168 billion of the
budget distributed to recover stability in the region had been misused. Importantly, Rp.
605 million allocated for refugees had been sent to the office of national intelligence
board (Badan Inteljen Nasional --BIN) in Central Sulawesi, and the state apparatus in the
province and lower levels.394
Therefore, in the absence of their territorial function in the region, TNI was
reluctant to prevent and stop the escalating communal conflict. In pursuing its interest for
acquiring a greater budget, TNI wanted to preserve the unstable situation in Central
Sulawesi. In the Tentena bomb explosions, two Kopassus soldiers were captured by the
police, but they were shortly released after the police was told that they had no authority
to interogate them. Local leaders and NGOs activists openly criticized the involvement of
TNI in the new cases of violence.395 They argued that the religious conflict was
apparently kept alive by TNI in order to reach the formation of a new regional command
396
in the province.
Human rights NGOs like Kontras and Imparsial claimed that the new cases of
violence were systematically planned with similar methods by operatives who were
experienced in preparing and conducting attacks, and with access to sophisticated
weapons, ammunitions, and explosives. They were trained in timing the attacks so that
they would provoke new incidents.397 The appearance of Ninja, mysterious kidnappings,
392
Suara Pembaruan, June 16, 2006: 4.
Sydney Jones was interviewed on April 19, 2006, in Jakarta.
394
“Melemahkan Jaringan Kelompok Mujahidin di Indonesia: Pelajaran dari Maluku dan Poso” (“Weakening Mujahidin’s Group Network in Indonesia: Lessons from Maluku and Poso”), Asia Report, No. 103,
October 13, 2005, ICG: Jakarta, Brussells: 15-16.
395
“Tokoh Agama Poso Protes Polisi” (“Poso Religious Leaders Protested Police”), http://www.Kompas.
com/utama/news/0511/25/682541-.htm.: 1-2, was accessed on November 25, 2005.
396
“Semua Berharap Penderitaan Itu Segera Berakhir” (“All Expect the Misery Immediately Ends”), http:
//www.suara-pembaruan.com/News/2005/12/ 01/Sorotan/sor02.htm, loc.cit: 1-2, was accessed on December 1, 2005.
397
“Siaran Pers Kontras No. 26/SP-Kontras/XI/2004: Keberadaan Efektifitas Pasukan Keamanan di Poso
Harus Dievaluasi (“Pers Release of Kontras No 26/SP-Kontas/XI/2004: The Presence and Effectiveness of
393
332
shootings and killings, and bomb explosions were patterns of the violence found in many
incidents across Indonesia in which the TNI were allegedly involved through covert
intelligence and psychological operations. In these incidents, soldiers organized terror in
small units with operatives who were well-trained killed targets effectively and escaped
after accomplishing their operations. Some of the terror activities were conducted not far
from the barracks of TNI or the office of the police. A group identified as Tim Bunga
(Flower Team) organized terror which was similar to what happened in Banyuwangi,
Ciamis, and East Timor during 1998-1999, and, moreover, reminded NGOs to Tim
Mawar (Rose Team) of Kopassus which had organized kidnappings and forced
disappearances of students in 1997 and 1998. 398
Corroborating these assumptions was Maj. Gen. Arief Budi Sampurno, the Kodam
VII Wirabuana regional commander (Pangdam --Panglima Daerah Militer), whose
responsibility included Sulawesi, who argued that TNI should establish new territorial
commands in Central Sulawesi down to the local level because his command
headquarters in Kalimantan could no longer effectively control security in Central
Sulawesi. Previously, TNI had suggested the formation of a new battailon, namely
Batalyon 714, to improve security in Poso regency. Since October 2003, then
Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had
399
launched an intelligence operation and increased the number of security forces, of
which TNI contributed half, from 2,024 in 2001 to 3,238 in 2002, and to 4,764 in 2003,
not counting the intelligence forces.400 Arief’s argument is surprising because when Maj.
Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah was Kodam VII Wirabuana regional commander, he could
immediately address the horizontal conflict in Poso. The arrival and involvement of the
Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahiddin, and JI could have been prevented if Maj. Gen. Arief
was seriously interested in returning stability to the province. The military’s behavior in
that province was thus a response to the reform movement, which at that time continued
Security Forces in Poso Must be Evaluated“),” November 9, 2004, http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=
siaran_pers&id=238.
398
Such activities were disclosed by Haris Azhar and Edwin Partogi, who respectively were head of data
and research division and head of operational division of Kontras in Jakarta on November 21, 2005. See,
“Penanganan Poso Perlu Dukungan Politik Presiden” (“Poso Conflict Resolution Needs President’s Political Support”), http://www.Suara-pembaruan.com/News/2005/11/ 22/Nasional/nas14.htm: 1, was accessed
on November 22, 2005; “Presiden Harus Beri Dukungan Politik ke Polri” (“President Should Give
Political Support to the National Police”), http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0511/22/politikhukum/22337-08. htm, loc.cit: 1, was accessed on November 22, 2005.
399
“Siaran Pers Bersama Kontras, ICW, KAMUST, PBHI, Kelompok Kerja untuk Perdamaian Poso, Wal hi, dan LPSHAM Sulteng mengenai Perluasan Konflik dan Kekerasan di Palu, Sulawesi Tengah” (“Joint
Pers Releases of Kontras, ICW, KAMUST, PBHI, Kelompok Kerja untuk Perdamaian Poso, Walhi, and
LPSHAM”),” December 15, 2004, http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=234.
400
“Siaran Pers Kontras No. 26/SP-Kontras/XI/2004: Keberadaan Efektifitas Pasukan Keamanan di Poso
Harus Dievaluasi (“Pers Release of Kontras No 26/SP-Kontas/XI/2004: The Presence and Effectiveness of
Security Forces in Poso Must be Evaluated“),” November 9, 2004, loc.cit.
333
to demand the eradication of TNI’s territorial function throughout the country.401 Until
2004, the final year of Megawati’s presidency, more atrocities happened such as the
shootings of a Christian judge, Ferry Silalahi, in May and a priest of the Palu Christian
church (GKS), Susianti Tinulele, in July, and a lecturer of the University of Tadulako, as
well as attacks on public targets, such as markets, religious sites and schools, which often
occurred on the eve of religious holidays. 402
VI. Conclusion
Contrasting with her party’s vision and mission to uphold pluralism of Indonesian
society, Megawati Sukarnoputeri became an authoritarian leader. Her views and
background contributed to her performance which resembled more a traditional Javanese
king rather than a democratically elected president. Her introverted personality and lack
of political experience, on the one hand, and her aversion to political manoeuvring, which
had led to the destruction of her party under Soeharto and her loss in the 1999 presidential
election, on the other, influenced her to avoid dialogues with her opponents in handling
issues of separatism.
Although there was considerable disappointment of the reform movement with
Megawati’s mediocre performance in office, with the military at her side, she was able to
survive her term. Her lack of decisive leadership and her indifference toward further
reform and democratization was conducive to TNI interests.
Her unwillingness to bring Soeharto and his family as well as military leaders to
trial due to their alleged involvement in various cases of corruption, collusion and
nepotism and gross human rights violations also contributed to the military’s support to
her presidency. Her inactivity in these issues stabilized her government and reduced
threats coming from her opponents.
Her authoritarian leadership and her ideational proximity to TNI made her an ideal
ally for the military. In fact, as a president, she never introduced new policies which
would harm TNI’s vested interests. Quite to the contrary, her regime produced new or
amended laws which were at variance with reform demands and slowed down security
sector reform. At the same time, the culture of violence of the civilian regime and TNI
employed to protect the unitary state (NKRI) continued.
401
See “Sulawesi Perlu Koter: Tak Ada Anggota TNI yang Terlibat Kasus Poso” (“Sulawesi Needs Territorial Command: No TNI Members Got Involved in Poso Conflict”), http://www.Kompas.com/kom-pascetak/05-11/13/daerah/2208379.htm : 1-2, was accessed on November 13, 2005.
402
“Gorries Mere Pimpin Tim Tangani Terorisme di Sulteng” (“Gorries Mere Led Team to Address Terrorism in Central Sulawesi”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/News/ 0511/21/160617/.htm: 1, was accessed on November 22, 2005.
334
Her lack of enthusiasm for reform produced the military’s positive response to her
regime. Military support was essential for her to create political stability for concluding
her presidential term, without intimidation and coup threats. Moreover, friction among
leaders inside the military decreased during her term of office. Under Megawati,
Indonesia’s internal stability increased, and communal and separatist conflicts could be
handled more effectively.
Providing higher state budget allocation for defence and security sectors, and
concessions to the military in the new bill on TNI passed as Law No. 34/2004 contributed
to the military’s compliance with her government. Moreover, her decisions to promote
and maintain conservative generals such as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and Gen. Ryamizard
Ryacudu weakened the opposition, including separatist movements. Her preoccupation
with Indonesia’s territorial integrity and firm policy to respond separatism had favoured
TNI position. At this point, Megawati’s nationalist-unitarian view was conducive with
TNI actions in trouble spots.
In fact, Megawati had a solid regime which could not be jeopardized by pressures
of radical Muslim groups due to her good relationship with the military. Reversely, in the
absence of military’s support for them, radical Muslim groups were forced to reduce their
political activities and pressure to her government. Megawati’s cooperative approach to
the military which had been disgraced at the time of Soeharto’s fall and threatened under
new civilian regimes of Habibie and Wahid helped the TNI to regain much of their
influence.
335
Chapter Six
Conclusion
It was the objective of this study, to explore the relationship between the reform
performance of Indonesia’s civilian regimes in the security sector and the military’s
response to these reforms. The period of investigation spanned the entire process of
democratic transition from the resignation of President Soeharto and the collapse of his
authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998 to the end of the presidency of Megawati
Soekarnoputri in October 2004. With the subsequent presidency of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono Indonesia entered a period of political consolidation. By that time, a lengthy
process of constitutional change had come to an end and ushered in a new presidential
political system which has been rated by Freedom House1 and other democracy indices as
the most democratic in Southeast Asia. Yet, the preceding analysis has shown that
democratic consolidation is incomplete. By the end of the transition process the military
as the former authoritarian regime’s major pillar had regrouped and rescued many of its
erstwhile privileges and reserved domains into the Era Reformasi.
This thesis has examined the reasons why military reform in Indonesia was only
partial and why military influence resurged in the post-Soeharto years. It departed from
the theoretical transition literature, combining actor-oriented, structural and cultural
perspectives. Empirically the study rests on extensive interviews, newspaper analysis,
internet research and analysis of websites, publicly accessible documents, statistics and
scientific literature. The study explored for each of the three transitional civilian
presidencies between 1998 and 2004 (Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati
Soekarnoputri) military responses to civilian reform overtures in areas such as
prosecution of human rights violations by the military, the investigation of corruption
cases (KKN --Kolusi, Korupsi, Nepotisme) involving the former President Soeharto and
his cronies, separatism and Islamic radicalism. At the end it turned out that the
hypotheses formulated at the outset of the investigation could be largely confirmed. The
study showed that even though the armed forces were in retreat after the end of the New
Order regime and discredited in large parts of the public due to flagrant human rights
violations and severe military repression in the Soeharto era, the TNI managed to remain
a major power factor in the Indonesian political system. The armed forces benefited in
their recovery from the weakness of civilian regimes, the power struggles within the
civilian political elite which sought alignments with the military (thus establishing the
1
Freedom in the World 2006, Freedom House//Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, ISBN 0-7425-5802-9;
“Freedom in the World,“ http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15, was accessed on July 1,
2010.
337
type of subjective military supervision of which Huntington had warned)2 and the
relenting external pressure on the military following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New
York and Washington as well as the Bali bombing in October 2002.
When President Habibie came to power after the resignation of President Soeharto
he was widely regarded as an exponent of the ancient regime. A former close associate of
Soeharto, Habibie was vice president at the time of Soeharto’s resignation. He ruled with
a cabinet in which he retained most of Soeharto’s ministers and in which the military was
represented with six posts. Heavily criticized and distrusted by the reformasi movement,
and in dire need to build up his own power base, Habibie embarked on a democratization
course which freed the formation of political parties from former restrictions, guaranteed
freedom of assembly and of the press, freed political prisoners, promised parliamentary
elections and launched a bold decentralization program. For the military most threatening
were Habibie’s announcements --concessions to the reform movement-- of investigating
former human rights violations of the armed forces, most notably the kidnappings of
democracy activists and the riots in Jakarta prior to the departure of Soeharto during
which more than 1,200 people died. The Habibie administration was also at loggerheads
with the military over its decision to investigate the alleged widespread corruption under
the Soeharto regime. Although the incumbent military leadership had played a major role
in forcing Soeharto to step down, it had also vowed to protect the former strongman
against harassment by subsequent governments. Another issue of civil-military dissent
became Habibie’s surprising decision to hold a referendum on the future of East Timor
which eventually led to the secession and independence of the province which was
annexed by Indonesia in 1975.
Conservative elements in the military responded to Habibie’s reform policies by
instigating violence across many parts of the country. This included series of bombings in
Jakarta and atrocities committed by black ninjas in East Java which coincided with the
prosecution of President Soeharto’s son Tommy for his involvement in the murder of a
judge and the investigation of the former President himself on charges of corruption. The
military also built up pro-Indonesian militias in East Timor which went on rampage after
80 percent of the East Timorese had voted for independence from Indonesia on August
30, 1999. In Jakarta the military leadership mobilized para-military forces and militias,
supposedly to protect the MPR session scheduled for November 1998 against street
protest of the reform movement, but more likely to intimidate reformers who sought to
curtail military influence in politics. It was hardly surprising that under these
circumstances, the October 1998 MPR session were overshadowed by massive violence,
henceforth known as the First Semanggi Incident, in which security forces killed four
persons and wounded dozens. Rogue elements in the military and factions loyal to former
2
338
President Soeharto also increasingly used contacts to radical Muslim groups to incite
unrest in many parts of the country.
As Habibie failed to win over parts of the reform movement and in his bid to gain
control over the Golkar Party in the run-up to the MPR session in October 1999 in which
a new president was to be elected, the president made compromises with the military. His
policy shift became visible in slowing down or even halting the prosecution of human
rights crimes committed by the military at the end of the New Order period, the KKN
cases involving Soeharto and his clan and the investigation of the transition violence in
which military elements and radical Muslim groups were involved. This alliance of
convenience brought back the military as a political player in the decisive MPR session in
November 1999 which once more was accompanied by street violence. The Second
Semanggi Incident caused even more victims than the First Semanggi and once more it
were the security forces which were blamed for the escalation of violence. In the MPR
session, the military was instrumental in Habibie’s resignation as president and even
more in the wheeling and dealing which brought to power Abdurrahman Wahid as his
successor.
Although the new president’s party, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
controlled only about 10 percent of the seats in the legislature, the Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat (DPR), and his support in the presidential election by the military
notwithstanding, Wahid soon initiated major reforms in the security sector. The military
leadership felt increasingly threatened by these moves, as they jeopardized the military’s
autonomy in deciding how far reforms should go. Under Habibie, the military had made
tactical concessions which found their expression in the New Paradigm, but which,
despite a retreat from civilian political positions still left intact many of the military’s
corporate interests. Wahid increased pressure on TNI by dismissing Gen. Wiranto as
coordinating minister for political and security affairs, and by several command
reshuffles which markedly increased the profile of a reformist faction in the TNI led by
Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah. Although this group of military reformers was clearly
a minority in the officer corps, it was vocal and highly present in the media. It attracted
the ire of the conservative majority of military officers by calls for gradually dismantling
the army’s territorial command structure, the main pillar of the latter’s political influence,
and the complete abrogation of the dwifungsi, which had been the ideological
underpinning for the military’s elevated political and social role in the Soeharto era. Agus
also initiated investigations into alleged military corruption which implicated senior
officials. Wahid, for his part, increased military anger about his rule even more by
resuming investigations into the Soeharto clan’s KKN cases, past military human rights
violations, and by a less violent approach to solve separatist rebellions in Aceh and Irian
Jaya as well as ethno-religious strife in the Moluccas (Maluku), Kalimantan and Central
339
Sulawesi. Wahid thus initiated the most far-reaching security sector reforms of all three
presidents of the transition period between 1998 and 2004.
The military responses to Wahid’s reform policies resembled very much the one
under Habibie, even though --given the more serious challenge-- they produced more
violence than before. By either tolerating separatist insurgencies and ethno-religious
clashes or even instigating them, the military sent out the message that without a strong
TNI the country would sink into chaos. The military regarded only itself in the position to
guarantee the integrity of the Indonesian unitary state (Negara Kesatuan Republik
Indonesia --NKRI), one of the sacred legacies championed by the military since the
revolutionary struggle for independence. The military or rogue military elements had
their hand in the fighting in the Moluccas between Christians and Muslims, the training
and arming of radical Muslim militias such as Laskar Jihad, provocations and abuses in
Aceh which drove Acehnese in scores into the arms of the separatist Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka (Movement for an Independent Aceh), while in Irian Jaya, Kopassus special
forces conducted covert operations with the objective of encouraging separatist activism
of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organization for an Independent Papua --OPM). The
military also intervened late in violent ethnic and religious clashes in Kalimantan and
Central Sulawesi (Poso), thus tacitly tolerating an escalation of violence in these
provinces. Unrest was here often also linked by the military to demands for a
revitalization of the territorial command system.
While these moves destabilized the Wahid government and seriously eroded not
only its own legitimacy, but also the one of the new democratic political system as a
whole, Wahid contributed to the failure of his reformist polices by his own severe
blunders, misjudgments and a highly erratic style of government. Although his party
commanded only few seats in the DPR, Wahid soon antagonized virtually all parties
represented in his grand coalition or “rainbow cabinet” by high-handed cabinet
reshuffles. Fearing for their influence on the government and the loss of patronage, these
parties soon orchestrated powerful opposition against Wahid. Already less than a year
after his rise to the presidency Wahid was locked in a fierce battle with the legislature
which launched corruption charges against him and --as the president continued to treat
the legislature with contempt-- eventually initiated an impeachment process against
Wahid. In the process, also constitutional changes seeking to end military representation
in the country’s legislatures, including the MPR, DPR and local parliaments (DPRDs),
became an object of the president’s conflict with the DPR. Due to their need for TNI
support, and in order to improve their position for a future presidential contest, party
leaders made concessions regarding the exit of the military representatives from the
parliament.
The infightings among civilian politicians paved the way back for the military into
the political game. In their conflict, Wahid as well as the legislature, sought the support
340
of the military. Wahid made concessions to the military leadership by sidelining the
reformist officers in new command reshuffles. Soon thereafter he had again to turn for
support to the reformist faction when his conflict with the legislature climaxed and the
military openly defied his plans to call a state of emergency and to dissolve the
legislature. In the end the legislature impeached Wahid with the support of the DPR’s
military faction in a questionable, coup-like procedure in which the military cornered the
embattled president through open insubordination.
The special MPR session that impeached Wahid also elected Megawati
Soekarnoputri as the new president. Megawati had nurtured close ties to conservative
military officers who continuously rose through the ranks during her presidency. At the
same time, she approved the complete sidelining of the remnants of the reformist faction
in the TNI. Proposals to abolish or at least downsize the territorial command system
became from then on anathema. At the same time, the president tolerated the repressive
approach of the TNI to end the separatist insurgencies in Aceh and Irian Jaya. The TNI
offensive launched in Aceh against GAM in May 2003 was one of the largest military
operations ever in the country. In return for their free hand, the military ended covert
operations and stop destabilizing the political authority. By allying with the TNI,
Megawati could thus rely upon much greater political stability than her predecessors. As
a quid pro quo, Megawati painstakingly avoided anything which could be perceived by
the TNI as reform initiatives. Under Megawati, pressures for reform came mainly from
civil society, the academe, parts of the media and the legislature. Her government
launched a military draft bill which, if passed by the legislature, would have given the
military far-reaching powers in cases of emergencies. However, opposition against the
draft bill coming from some sectors in the Defense Ministry, public pressure and a critical
stance of the DPR ensured that the most problematic provisions encoding discretionary
powers for the TNI could be watered down. .Military Law No. 34/2004 eventually
stressed the political neutrality of the military and obliged TNI to recognize norms such
as democracy, civilian supremacy, human rights, national and international law. It also
provided for the transfer of the military’s businesses to the state, although leaving open
the modalities. Yet, the law also remained unspecific on other key issues of the military
reform postponed for subsequent resolution. Some notorious examples of such omissions
with future consequences for the democratic consolidation and the military reform are: it
did not touch the issue of the territorial command structure, it retained elements of
dwifungsi and it did not regulate the crucial issue of military justice. In negotiations
surrounding the constitutional amendments the military agreed to completely withdraw
from the country’s legislatures by 2004, 5 years earlier than demanded by reformasi
movement in the first months of regime change ,but it did so only in exchange for
concessions in the legal procedures concerning the prosecution of human rights
violations. Staunch resistance to the reform of the military justice system and the attack
on the Law No 26/2000 on human rights at the Constitutional Court with regard to the
341
principle of retroactive prosecution made it difficult to hold TNI members individually
accountable for alleged past human rights abuses. Moreover, TNI’s repeated efforts to
undermine the investigation into past human rights abuses by Komnas HAM and within
the ad hoc human rights courts (found as compromise with respect to the question of
retroactivity) together with the unsatisfactory ruling of these courts created a strong
impression among the public and political analysts that TNI has decisively opposed any
civilian intervention on judicial grounds.
The Megawati presidency thus confirmed the second hypothesis formulated at the
outset of the study: The less threatened the vested interests of the Indonesian military
were by the reform policies of the civilian regimes, the more likely it was that the military
behaved cooperatively with the respective regimes and favored their toothless military
policies. However, while this brought back political stability to the country, it also shut
doors to further military reform. By the end of her presidency the military had regrouped
and regained a position which, although less powerful than in the Soeharto era, it was far
too influential for an admissible standing of the armed forces in a full-fledged democracy.
Yet, it should not be overlooked that the resurgence of the military as a power
factor in Indonesian politics was closely linked to external influences. The terrorist
attacks in New York, Washington, London and Madrid and, in particular, in Indonesia
itself, including the Bali bomb blasts, as well as the bombings of the Marriott Hotel in
Jakarta and the Australian Embassy directed attention to counter-terrorist measures. The
United States, which had imposed an arms embargo on Indonesia since the Dili (Santa
Cruz) massacre in East Timor in 1991 (which was reinforced with military training ban
after the post-referendum riots in the former Portuguese colony in 1999), initiated a
process of rapprochement to the TNI. The war against terror reduced reform pressures on
the TNI which again became a partner for foreign powers which hitherto had ostracized
the Indonesian military.
Finally, the study also confirmed the last of the three hypotheses outlined in
Chapter 2. Here, the argument was made that the combination of historical and cultural
factors and the civilian regimes’ poor performance was conducive to the Indonesian
military’s resistance to reform. In the previous chapters, it was amply demonstrated that
the ideological underpinnings of the TNI still resonated strongly with the integralistic and
organicist conception of statehood which became the main characteristic of the 1945
State Constitution. Indonesian organicism was closely linked to seemingly traditional
Javanese notions of power and kingship which also attributed an elevated role to the
ksatria, the warriors. These notions of statehood which combined conservative Western
influences with Javanese tradition were inculcated into the collective memory of the
armed forces through the soldier’s oath, military doctrines such as the Sapta Marga and
at all levels of officers training. They fell on fertile ground as until today a majority of the
TNI officer corps is of Javanese descent. More importantly, however, many of the
342
organicist and integralistic notions of statehood are shared not only by the military, but
also by wide sections of the public. Especially Megawati Soekarnoputri shared these
ideas which she adopted from her father, Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno, but they
are also highly popular in her party, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)
and many other nationalist forces in the country. With these cognitive predispositions in
wide sections of the Indonesian political class, the military and the public, it may be
explained why the military influence on Indonesian politics is so resilient. It also does not
bode well for military reform which after the stalemate reached under the Megawati
presidency will proceed only very slowly in the future.
343
Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich im Rahmen der
politikwissenschaftlichen Transitionsforschung mit der Problematik der zivilmilitärischen Beziehungen und deren Einfluss auf den Demokratisierungsprozess in
Indonesien. Der Untersuchungszeitraum umfasst die politischen und gesellschaftlichen
Prozesse seit dem Zusammenbruch des autoritären Regimes im Jahre 1998 bis hin zum
Ende der Präsidentschaft von Megawati Sukarnoputri im Oktober 2004.
Ausgangspunkt der politischen Transition in Indonesien waren der Rücktritt
Suhartos und der damit verbundene Zusammenbruch der autoritären “Neuen Ordnung”
im Jahre 1998. Im Zuge des sich daran anschließenden Demokratisierungsprozesses
wurden von den Zivilregierungen der Folgejahre mehrfach Versuche einer Reformierung
des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors vorgenommen. Das Widererstarken des Militärs in
den letzten Jahren lässt jedoch erkennen, dass speziell im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors
bislang nur partiell Reformen durchgesetzt werden konnten. Am Ende des
Transitionsprozesses hat es das Militär, welches die wichtigste Stütze des autoritären
Vorgänger-Regimes war, geschafft, sich zu reorganisieren und eine Vielzahl seiner alten
Privilegien in die Era Reformasi zu überführen. Obwohl Indonesien mit der
Präsidentschaft von Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono im Jahre 2004 in die Phase der
demokratischen Konsolidierung eingetreten ist und das neue demokratische System von
verschiedenen Demokratie-Indizes durchaus positiv bewertet wurde, muss in Anbetracht
der gegenwärtigen Einflussmöglichkeiten des Militärs auf zivil-politische Prozesse davon
ausgegangen werden, dass der Konsolidierungsprozess in Indonesien noch nicht
abgeschlossen ist.
Ausgehend von der Frage, warum der Einfluss der Streitkräfte in der postSuharto-Ära wieder zugenommen hat, wird untersucht, was die Gründe für die lediglich
partielle Reformierung des Militärs in Indonesien waren. Diesbezüglich werden die
Reformvorhaben im Bereich des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors und die Reaktionen
des Militärs auf diese in den drei Präsidentschaftsperioden der indonesischen
Transitionszeit zwischen 1998 und 2004 in welcher Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid und
Megawati Soekarnoputri regierten, analysiert.
In allen drei untersuchten Regierungsphasen wurden Reformvorhaben im Bereich
des Sicherheitssektors angestoßen. Diese bezogen sich unter anderem auf die
Strafverfolgung
von
Menschenrechtsverletzungen,
die
Untersuchung
von
Korruptionsfällen im Umfeld des ehemaligen Präsidenten Suharto und den Umgang mit
separatistischen und militanten islamischen Gruppierungen.
344
Die theoretische Fundierung der Dissertation bilden politikwissenschaftliche
Transitionstheorien, anhand welcher durch die Kombination von akteurszentrierten,
strukturalistischen und kulturalistischen Ansätzen eine multiperspektivische
Herangehensweise intendiert wird. Empirisch beruht die Studie auf umfangreichen
Interviews, Internetrecherchen und der Analyse von Zeitungsartikeln, Internetseiten,
öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, Statistiken und fachwissenschaftlicher Literatur.
Die Ausgangsthese der vorliegenden Arbeit lautet, dass das Militär in Indonesien
nach wie vor einen bedeutenden Machtfaktor innerhalb des politischen Systems darstellt.
Trotz des Rückzuges der Streitkräfte infolge des Endes der „Neuen Ordnung” und ihrer
Diskreditierung
in
weiten
Teilen
der
Öffentlichkeit
aufgrund
von
Menschenrechtsverletzungen und militärischen Repressionen während der Suharto-Ära,
hat es das Militär geschafft, einige zentrale Einflusssphären in die Phase der
demokratischen Konsolidierung zu überführen und sich als fester Bestandteil des neuen
politischen Systems zu etablieren.
Die unzureichende Entmachtung der Streitkräfte kann sowohl auf interne als auch
auf externe Einflussfaktoren zurückgeführt werden. So wurde das Wiedererstarken des
Militärs durch die Schwäche der zivilen Regierungen und die Machtkämpfe innerhalb der
politischen Elite, welche diese zur Kooperation mit militärischen Kräften veranlasste,
begünstigt. Darüber hinaus hat aber auch der nachlassende externe Druck, der auf einen
Bedeutungszuwachs des Militärs im Rahmen der internationalen und nationalen
Terrorismusbekämpfung zurückzuführen ist, zu einem Wiedererstarken der Streitkräfte
beigetragen. Die Terroranschläge in den USA und Europa und insbesondere jene in
Indonesien selbst, lenkten die Aufmerksamkeit zunehmend auf Strategien der
Terrorismusbekämpfung. Demzufolge wurde das Militär, welches als wesentlicher
Akteur des „Krieges gegen den Terrorismus” innerhalb Indonesiens betrachtet wurde,
auch von internationalen Mächten wie den USA rehabilitiert, was zu einem Nachlassen
des Reformdrucks im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors führte.
Zudem können für jede der drei untersuchten Regierungsphasen spezifische
Problemkonstellationen herausgestellt werden, die das Verhalten von Zivilregierung und
Militär hinsichtlich der Reformierung des Sicherheitssektors beeinflusst haben.
Nach dem Rücktritt Suhartos im Jahre 1998 übernahm zunächst Habibie die Rolle
eines Übergangspräsidenten, der das Land durch die erste Phase der politischen
Transition führte. Aufgrund seiner Position als ehemaliger Vize-Präsident und enger
Vertrauter Suhartos galt er als Vertreter des Ancien Régime. Das damit verbundene
Misstrauen, welches ihm von der indonesischen Reformbewegung entgegengebracht
wurde, veranlasste Habibie zu demokratischen Reformen, die u.a. die Durchsetzung der
Versammlungs- und Pressefreiheit, die Freilassung politischer Gefangener, die
Aufhebung von Beschränkungen im Bereich von Parteiengründungen, die Einleitung
345
eines umfassenden Dezentralisierungsprogrammes und die Durchführung von
Parlamentswahlen vorsahen. Von Vertretern des indonesischen Militärs (Tentara
Nasional Indonesia, TNI) wurde insbesondere sein Vorhaben, Untersuchungen zu den
von Militärs begangenen Menschenrechtsverletzungen einzuleiten und eine Überprüfung
der Korruptionsvorwürfe gegenüber dem Suharto-Regime vorzunehmen, als Provokation
wahrgenommen.
Ein
weiterer
Gesichtspunkt
der
zivil-militärischen
Meinungsverschiedenheiten war die Ost-Timor-Frage, zu welcher Habibie
überraschenderweise ein Referendum ausrufen ließ, welches letztendlich zur
Unabhängigkeit der 1975 von Indonesien besetzten Provinz führte. Konservative Kräfte
innerhalb des Militärs nahmen diese Bestrebungen Habibies zum Anlass, paramilitärische
Milizen aufzubauen und in vielen Regionen des Landes gewalttätige Ausschr

The Indonesian Military Response to Reform in Democratic Transition

Transcription

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