Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations

Transcription

R O M A N I A N REVIEW OF POLITICA L
S C I E N C E S A N D I NTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VOL. III
No. 1
2006
CONTENT
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
PATRICIO BRICKLE, Heidegger and Zubiri: A New Foundation for Politology....
ERIC GILDER, The Unique Role of “Constructive Alternativism” in the Creation
of Philosophical Knowledge .............................................................................
ADELA DELIU, International Relations and the Present Ethics of Power ...........
ANDRÉ TOSEL, The Globalization as Philosophical Object ...............................
3
17
26
35
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, The Educated Women in the Public Eye .....
RODICA IAMANDI, The “Cult of Personality”..........................................................
51
61
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES
DANIELA IONESCU, Romania and the Common Agricultural Policy ................
ZHU GUICHANG, A Comparasion of the European Model and the Policy
ASEAN Way: Is there a third way of regionalism for the East Asian
cooperation?.......................................................................................................
LUCIAN JORA, The History and the Policy of Reconciliation ............................
ANA BAZAC, The Russian Energy and Europe. Perspectives ............................
STANISLAV SECRIERU, Russia’s Foreign Policy under Putin: “The CIS Project”
Renewed ............................................................................................................
77
107
125
138
153
ISPRI’s ACADEMIC LIFE ....................................................................................
175
BOOK REVIEWS...................................................................................................
184
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS................................................................................
189
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., III, 1, p. 1–190, Bucharest, 2006.
TOME III
R EV U E R O UMAINE D E SCIENCES
P O LI TI Q U ES ET RELATION S
I N T ERNATIONAL ES
No. 1
2006
SOMMAIRE
PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE
PATRICIO BRICKLE, Heidegger et Zubiri: une nouvelle institution pour la
politologie ..........................................................................................................
ERIC GILDER, L’“Alternativisme Constructif” dans la création de la conaissance
philosophique ....................................................................................................
ADELA DELIU, Les relations internationales et l’éthique actuelle du pouvoir....
ANDRÉ TOSEL, La mondialisation comme object philosophique? .....................
3
17
26
35
SOCIOLOGIE POLITIQUE
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, Les femmes bien élevé dans la perception
publique .............................................................................................................
RODICA IAMANDI, “Le cult de la personalité” dans la Roumanie ....................
51
61
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET ÉTUDES EUROPÉEN
DANIELA IONESCU, La Roumanie et la Politique Agricole Commune .............
ZHU GUICHANG, Une comparasion du modèle européen et du voie ASEAN ...
LUCIAN JORA, L’histoire et la politique de la reconciliation .............................
ANA BAZAC, L’energie (russe), l’Europe et les perspectives ..............................
STANISLAV SECRIERU, La politique étrangère du Russie sous Putin:
le “projet CIS” ...................................................................................................
77
107
125
138
LA VIE ACADEMIQUE DE L’ISPRI ...................................................................
175
NOTES DE LECTURE ..........................................................................................
184
EVENEMENTS ACADEMIQUES ........................................................................
189
153
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
HEIDEGGER Y ZUBIRI: REFUNDACION DE LA POLITOLOGIA1
PATRICIO BRICKLE
Las siguientes consideraciones sólo intentan plantear un problema sobre el
cual hoy día abunda una infinita literatura liviana y sobre el cual, asimismo, no
nos hemos detenido a pensar. El problema es averiguar si es posible desarrollar
una “política” a la luz de los nuevos hallazgos filosóficos, más concretamente qué
podrían aportar las filosofías de esos dos gigantes del pensamiento como los son
Heidegger2 y Zubiri. Hay una tesis que quisiera sostener desde el inicio de este
ensayo y es que no es posible hacer ciencia política si no se sabe filosofía política
y, del mismo modo, no se puede hacer filosofía política si no se sabe filosofía.
Grandes filósofos no ha habido en la historia de la filosofía más de una decena.
Parménides, Heráclito, Platón, Aristóteles, San Agustín, Santo Tomás de Aquino,
Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger,
Wittgenstein y Zubiri. Perdóneseme que sea tan cortante y si he pecado de alguna
importante omisión, pero la historia de la filosofía está constituida fundamentalmente
por estas figuras que marcaron una pauta en la reflexión filosófica. Claro está,
ha habido muchos otros grandes filósofos, pero no hay duda alguna de que en
cada uno de los nombrados se constituyó y concentró todo el saber de su
momento y, por sobre todo, produjeron un vuelco en la historia de la filosofía, le
imprimieron su propio sello e inauguraron nuevas formas de pensar3.
No quisiera entrar en más detalles sobre este punto, sino destacar que Heidegger
y Zubiri son parte de esa potente tradición filosófica. Parece que en el caso de
Heidegger habría un consenso mayor que en el de Zubiri, sobre todo porque éste
último filósofo es conocido en habla hispana, no así en el mundo alemán, francés,
inglés o italiano.
Pues bien, el filósofo Jorge Eduardo Rivera4 publicó hace un par de años un
libro titulado Heidegger y Zubiri, cuyo contenido lo constituyen no una mera
reunión de artículos, sino que todos ellos conforman una orgánica propia y una
inspiración común que es el ser en cuanto tal.
El libro está divido en dos partes. En la primera parte, Rivera se introduce en
algunos problemas fundamentales de la ontología de Heidegger. Allí, encontramos
escritos como: La verdad implícita en Ser y tiempo; Jemeinigkeit; Zunächst und
Zumeist; Bewandtnis; El espacio en Ser y tiempo; Reversión de la metafísica; El
silencio originario en el pensar de Heidegger y, finalmente, Heidegger y la escucha
del silencio originario.
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2
En la segunda parte, Rivera explora algunos tópicos de la metafísica de
Zubiri. Allí, Rivera nos ofrece textos como: La crítica de Zubiri a Heidegger; El
origen de la filosofía en Xavier Zubiri; Acerca de la Inteligencia sentiente en
Xavier Zubiri; El hombre y Dios: un curso de Xavier Zubiri; Heidegger y Zubiri.
Esbozo de un camino y, finalmente, Realidad y aprehensión de realidad en Xavier
Zubiri. Ensayo de probación.
No es mi propósito hablar del contenido de ese libro, sino destacar una idea
que Rivera dice en el prólogo de ese texto, y es que su objetivo allí no ha sido
tender un puente entre ambos pensadores y, por lo tanto, es una tarea pendiente.
Yo quisiera asumir ese desafío — en estricto rigor, no el de tender un puente,
sino de repensar, simplemente, lo propuesto por esos dos filósofos — desde una
actividad que está más presente que nunca en la historia del hombre. Me refiero
a la política.
1. Heidegger, Zubiri: la política
La importancia de los filósofos de los que se ocupa Rivera, demás está decir
su importante aporte a la historia de la filosofía, podemos encontrarla en las
áreas — entre otras áreas, por supuesto — en las cuales, algunos nos estamos
desarrollando. Específicamente, en mi caso, la política. Y para ser más exacto a
la filosofía política y a lo que se suele llamar hoy día “ciencia política”. ¿Qué tiene
que ver la ciencia política con Heidegger y Zubiri?
Aparentemente, la ciencia política tiene ya ganado un espacio en el saber. Sin
embargo, ¿es esto efectivamente así, si la miramos a la luz de la filosofía? No
quiero entrar en detalles, pero sí arrojar algunas ideas.
Heidegger escribió en 1927, Sein und Zeit. Sein und Zeit sólo es comparable
en magnitud a la Kritik der reiner Vernunft de Kant o a la Phänomenologie des
Geistes de Hegel, al decir de F.-W. Von Herrmann.
Como se sabe Heidegger tuvo como hilo conductor de su investigación die
Seinsfrage. Ese fue su norte y fin. Auf einen Stern zugehen... nos dice Heidegger
en un bello texto titulado Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Esa única estrella —
para Heidegger — fue el ser, qué quiere decir ser, qué significa el ser en general
y en todas sus formas.
De este libro de Heidegger quiero referirme, en particular, al parágrafo 4.
Luego de exponer Heidegger, en el parágrafo 1, la necesidad de reiterar la
pregunta por el sentido del ser, Heidegger nos señalará que hay una preeminencia
óntica de esta pregunta (parágrafo 2) y en el parágrafo 3 nos argumentará que
hay no sólo una preeminencia óntica de la pregunta por el ser, sino también una
preeminencia ontológica de la pregunta por el ser.
A continuación, en el parágrafo 4 — parágrafo que me interesa destacar —,
Heidegger nos dice que una ciencia adquiere el estatus de tal cuando pone en
crisis sus fundamentos. En época de Heidegger, la matemática, la biología, la
física, etc. estaban experimentando una crisis de o en sus fundamentos. Y la
filosofía también estaba viviendo su propia crisis con las investigaciones del
propio Heidegger. Dice en Ser y tiempo:
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HEIDEGGER Y ZUBIRI: REFUNDACION DE LA POLITOLOGIA
5
“El verdadero ‘movimiento’ de las ciencias se produce por la revisión más
o menos radical (aunque no transparente para sí misma) de los conceptos
fundamentales. El nivel de una ciencia se determina por su mayor o menor
capacidad de experimentar una crisis en sus conceptos fundamentales. En estas
crisis inmanentes de las ciencias se tambalea la relación de la investigación
positiva con las cosas interrogadas mismas. Las diversas disciplinas muestran hoy
por doquier la tendencia a establecer nuevos fundamentos para su investigación.”5
Pues bien, cuando una ciencia pone en crisis sus fundamentos toca la filosofía,
porque es ella la actitud humana que se ocupa de los fundamentos no sólo de esta
ciencia o de aquella otra ciencia en particular, sino del fundamento de todo lo
que hay. Es su síno6.
El análisis que realiza Heidegger es el siguiente: primero habría una ontología
fundamental que es la pregunta por el ser; segundo, habrían unas ontologías
regionales que son todas aquellas “filosofías” parceladas, esto es, filosofía política,
filosofía de las ciencias, filosofía del derecho, etc.; en otras palabras, todas las
parcelas de la realidad de que se ocupa la filosofía que no sean en rigor la ciencia
que se busca (zetoúmene epistéme); finalmente, y tercero, estarían las ciencias
particulares, las ciencias en general, las ciencias positivas, las ciencias experimentales,
etc. Añade Heidegger:
“La pregunta por el ser apunta, por consiguiente, a determinar las condiciones
a priori de la posibilidad no sólo de las ciencias que investigan el ente en cuanto
tal o cual [que serían las ciencias positivas, y, en nuestro caso, la ciencia
política], y que por ende se mueven ya siempre en una comprensión del ser, sino
que ella apunta también a determinar la condición de posibilidad de las
ontologías mismas [que sería la filosofía política, por ejemplo] que anteceden a
las ciencias ónticas y las fundan. Toda ontología, por rico y sólidamente articulado
que sea el sistema de categorías de que dispone, es en el fondo ciega y contraria
a su finalidad más propia si no ha aclarado primero suficientemente el sentido
del ser y no ha comprendido esta aclaración como su tarea fundamental... La
investigación ontológica misma, rectamente comprendida, le da a la pregunta
por el ser su primacía ontológica, más allá de la mera reanudación de una tradición
venerable y de la profundización en un problema hasta ahora opaco.”7
Heidegger durante toda su vida pensante no hace más que ontología fundamental,
su ocupación no es más ni menos que la pregunta por el sentido del ser en
general. Entonces, a mi juicio, en nuestro siglo se produjo una disociación entre
la ontología fundamental, las ontologías regionales y las ciencias particulares; se
produjo un vacío discursivo — si se me permite decirlo así — entre esos tres
tipos de conocimientos — en razón de que el gran filósofo que fue Heidegger no
se ocupó de ningunas de esas ontologías, como sí había acontecido en la
tradición filosófica, por ejemplo, con Aristóteles, Platón o Descartes — que sólo
ha sido llenado por los trabajos filosóficos de Zubiri. Me atrevería a decir, que
Zubiri es el puente entre la gran tradición metafísica de occidente y las ciencias
positivas todas, en su búsqueda de la totalidad del saber.
Zubiri es un filósofo que reflexionó a partir de los problemas inmediatamente
presentes, a partir de su época, a partir de nuestra historia actual que se ha
6
PATRICIO BRICKLE
4
caracterizado por el dominio exacerbado de las ciencias positivas y por la
parcelación de la filosofía. La labor que realizó Zubiri fue tremenda puesto que
su trabajo consistió en ir desde las ciencias positivas a la ontología fundamental
(Heidegger) y desde la ontología fundamental hacia las ontologías regionales
(como llama Heidegger, en Ser y tiempo, a la antropología filosófica, la filosofía
del derecho, la filosofía de la historia, etc.). Me explico: Zubiri asciende a la
pregunta por el ser planteada por Heidegger en Ser y tiempo con todo el saber
positivo de su momento y respondió a ella con un macizo libro titulado Sobre la
esencia (1962). Este libro de Zubiri es, a mi juicio, su respuesta a la pregunta
fundamental de Heidegger en Ser y tiempo.
Es interesante observar el camino intelectual que desarrolla Zubiri a lo largo
de su reflexión filosófica. El tema que le tuvo en vilo — en una primera etapa
— fue la antropología filosófica. Pues bien, mientras Zubiri reflexionaba sobre
temas antropológicos concluye que el hombre es una estructura sustantiva, no
sustancial, y que esta sustantividad se caracteriza por ser un estado constructo
que consiste, a su vez, en ser una unidad primaria, en donde sus notas — él no
habla de propiedades — son coherentes entre sí y no inherentes a una sustancia.
Zubiri evita hablar de sustancia, porque este concepto tiene su peso en el pensamiento
aristotélico y acuña la palabra sustantividad para describir la estructura propia de
la realidad. Entonces Zubiri pensó que esta idea metafísica necesitaba de una
mayor explicación y pensó en ponerla a modo de apéndice en su futuro libro
sobre antropología filosófica. Sin embargo, el resultado, finalmente, fue que
aquello que sólo se pensó como un apéndice para analizar “metafísicamente” el
tema antropológico, terminó convirtiéndose en su pensamiento metafísico. Su
libro Sobre la esencia fue concebido, en un principio, como explicitación de un
concepto o categoría de sus investigaciones antropológicas.
Pero Zubiri no se queda sólo en la respuesta metafísica, sino que su reflexión
la trasladará hacia otros campos del saber. Y allí Zubiri realizó una labor titánica,
puesto que comenzó a desarrollar las “ontologías regionales”. Su pensamiento al
respecto ha quedado plasmado en varios libros. Estos libros son auténticas
filosofías parceladas, partículares, por así decirlo. Zubiri escribió, por ejemplo,
un libro sobre antropología filosófica llamado Sobre el hombre8. Reflexionó
también sobre cosmología o filosofía de las ciencias, plasmando sus ideas en dos
libros titulados: Espacio, Tiempo, Materia9 y Estructura dinámica de la realidad10.
Escribió una trilogía sobre el conocimiento llamada Inteligencia sentiente11 y
una trilogía sobre el tema de Dios con el nombre El problema teologal del
hombre12. Y muchos otros temas y problemas fueron objeto de su atención
filosófica.
Por eso pienso que hay un gran trabajo por realizar en el campo de la politología.
Es necesario que las ciencias o aquellas disciplinas que quieran independizarse
de la filosofía (es el caso de las ciencias políticas, que creen poder salir adelante
sin la filosofía) miren lo que ha acontecido en la gran tradición metafísica,
tradición a la que pertenece Heidegger y Zubiri. Es lo que pide, por ejemplo,
Julien Freund en La Crisis del Estado y otros estudios13, cuando se refiere a la
crisis de los valores del mundo contemporáneo y que Freund ve la solución
5
7
“mediante la reintegración de la antigua metafísica”, es decir, Freund apela y se
ocupa de la filosofía antigua, porque cree que sólo a través de ella se puede hoy
fundamentar las ciencias políticas. Habría que responder a Freund: Heidegger y
Zubiri representan la re-fundación de la filosofía y la re-inauguración de nuevas
posibilidades del pensar. Son una especie de nuevos Heráclito y Parménides14.
De allí que Rivera haya escrito en el Prólogo de Heidegger y Zubiri, que es
necesario establecer un diálogo serio entre y con estos dos pensadores, tarea que
cada uno de nosotros puede emprender. Hasta donde yo sé, algunos científicos
están haciendo parte de esta tarea. He ahí, por ejemplo, Diego Gracia y su trabajo
en el campo de la bioética donde ha dado tantos frutos y la obra del psiquiatra
chileno, César Ojeda, entre la que podemos mencionar el ensayo de psiquiatría
fenomenológica Delirio, Realidad e Imaginación15. En ellos se observa un verdadero
co-pensar con estos filósofos y no meramente una repetición de ideas, muchas
veces más complejas que las del mismo filósofo, tan recurrente hoy día en algunos
de sus seguidores.
Mi tesis es que sólo la filosofía de Zubiri ha estado a la altura del pensar de
Heidegger, así como lo estuvo en la antigüedad el pensar de Aristóteles respecto
al de Platón. No olvidemos que Zubiri tiene una posición muy enérgica desde los
inicios de su reflexión filosófica en relación a cómo se debe “construir” una filosofía.
Así lo podemos ver en su tesis doctoral, Ensayo de una teoría fenomenológica
del juicio16. Allí podemos leer, en las primeras páginas, lo siguiente:
“Aislada de la ciencia, la Filosofía parece tener para algunos espíritus sabor
un tanto anodino; en cambio, presentarla como la necesidad postrera del espíritu
después de haber agotado todas sus otras actividades, es decir de ella todo lo más
que se puede decir: corona de la cultura”.
Y más adelante añade:
“Es curioso el espectáculo del nacimiento y del renacimiento de una filosofía.
Y este espectáculo es tan instructivo que nos sirve casi de definición y método
de la filosofía. Los problemas filosóficos nacen de la necesidad de fundamentar
la ciencia objetiva y de interpretar sus resultados.”17
Sostengo que la discíplina política va a encontrar su lugar en las “ciencias del
espíritu” o en las “ciencias positivas” cuando sea capaz de asimilar la metafísica
de Zubiri y la ontología de Heidegger. Una posible “ciencia política” construida
a partir de la filosofía de Heidegger y Zubiri es necesario proponerse a futuro.
No una ciencia política fundada en la tradición metafísica desde Platón hasta la
filosofía pre-heideggeriana, sino postheideggeriana, es decir, una a partir de los
trabajos de Heidegger y Zubiri, que no son otra cosa que un diálogo y un encuentro
con la gran tradición metafísica. Ambos filósofos refundaron, reconstruyeron y
revitalizaron el ejercicio filosófico. A partir de sus trabajos es posible generar
categorías políticas que no necesariamente serán científicas. Categorías como el
das Man o el mit-Sein propias de la ontología de Heidegger o bien categorías
como suidad, sistema, notas (constitutivas, constitucionales y adventicias);
propias de la metafísica de Zubiri, pueden ser una importante contribución para
la comprensión de los fenómenos “políticos”. Entonces, la “ciencia política” que
surja a partir de estos análisis — pienso- será una ciencia política muy particular.
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6
No un cientismo político, sino un eidénai político o una polisofía (concepto del
que hablaré más adelante), es decir, un saber de la pólis. Saber, eidénai, es
poseer intelectivamente la verdad de las cosas, nos cuenta Zubiri — hablando de
Aristóteles — en Cinco lecciones de filosofía18.
Lo que he intentado hasta aquí es detenerme a reflexionar sobre lo que parece
obvio, pues, hoy día, estamos inhundados de propaganda “política”, de referendum
“político”, de elecciones “políticas”, de conquistas “políticas”, de líderes “políticos”,
etc. ¿De qué estamos hablando, cuando agregamos la expresión “política” en
cada una de esas afirmaciones compuestas? Quien se esté iniciando en las
“ciencias políticas” recibirá una serie de dogmas, no sujetos al debate a lo largo
de su formación. Es urgentemente necesario, a mi modo de ver, pensar una y otra
vez, repensar y replantear desde nuestra situación cuál es el lugar que le corresponde
a la política en la vida del hombre, en la vida de una comunidad, en la vida social y
en el mundo actual. Es necesario poner en crisis los supuestos, los fundamentos
sobre los cuales la “ciencia” política dice sostenerse. Es necesario un
descontructivismo en la política, desde nuestro propio acontecer. En efecto,
cuando las ciencias políticas “diálogan” con la filosofía política, lo hacen, por
ejemplo, con Hobbes, Maquiavelo, Locke, etc.; a su vez, cuando la filosofía
política “dialoga” con la filosofía, lo hace con Platón, Aristóteles, Hegel, Kant,
etc. Es menester que dialogen con Heidegger y con Zubiri.
En otras palabras, quisiera manifestar que lo mejor de la posición política de
Heidegger no está en sus discursos o en su adhesión o simpatía con el movimiento
nacionalsocialista (fuente de objeción que utilizan los cientistas políticos contra
Heidegger y que les lleva a ignorarlo — el tema queda finiquitado, por tanto,
antes de que ellos hayan leído sus escritos —, pero que a mi juicio hay que
comprender en su contexto histórico, en sentido amplio), sino en libros como
Introducción a la metafísica, Nietzsche o Serenidad, entre otros; y que una
lectura acuciosa de las “ontologías regionales” configuradas por Zubiri en sus
escritos mencionados más arriba, es la mejor herramienta — me parece — para
la creación de una “ciencia” política o bien el lugar desde donde debe brotar, hoy
día, una reflexión en torno a la política, como quiera llamársela. La idea es que
el lugar desde donde una ciencia política o una política a secas necesita nacer para
ganarse un real espacio en el saber, podría no ser la filosofía preheideggeriana,
sino postheideggeriana.
Pues bien, a continuación quisiera realizar un bosquejo por donde, a mi modo
de ver, debe ser tratado el tema político en el caso de Heidegger, su vinculación
con la filosofía política y la ciencia política, y nuestro parecer sobre qué pasa,
hoy, con estas dos discíplinas. Quede claro que es una primera aproximación a
un estudio más extenso sobre el tema de alguien que ha sido formado en la
filosofía, en la ciencia política y las relaciones internaciones, y que, además,
trabaja como funcionario del Estado. A Zubiri lo dejaremos para otra ocasión.
Eso sí quiero señalar que lo que he llamado ontología regional en Zubiri, en
estricto rigor no lo es, porque su nacimiento es fruto de las investigaciones
zubirianas y no heideggerianas, esto es, desde su metafísica y no desde la ontología,
es decir, desde la realidad y no desde el ser.
7
2. Heidegger y la política
9
Existe una investigación realziada por el filósofo Sigbert Gebert — discípulo
de Von Herrmann — cuyo título es Filosofía negativa19, que consiste en pensar
o desarrollar una Filosofía Política sobre la base del pensamiento de Heidegger
en los escritos 1933/34, teniendo presente que de lo que se ocupa Heidegger en
Ser y tiempo es de elaborar una ontología fundamenal que, sin duda, podrá ofrecer
líneamientos a una ontología de lo político, pero que, ante todo, la ocupación de
Heidegger es por la ontología fundamental. Pero la obra de Gebert no cuenta con
todo aquello que ha aparecido, especialmente en los últimos tres o cuatro años,
en las nuevas fuentes que permiten el agotamiento monográfico del pensamiento
de Heidegger del período 1933–34, reunidos en el tomo 16 de sus Obras
Completas (Gesamtausgabe, GA) Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges
(1910–1976), editado por Hermann Heidegger en el año 2000, que el libro de
Gebert indudablemente no considera por el año de su investigación, 1992. No
obstante, el libro de Gebert está absolutamente vigente.
El tomo 16 contiene varios capítulos que muestran una faceta del filósofo
particularmente práctica, pero hay uno, a mi modo de ver, fundamental, y es el
capítulo “Rektor der Freiburger Universität (1933–1934)”. Están por primera
vez reunidas en ese capítulo todas las fuentes, no sólo las conocidas, como el
“Discurso del Rectorado”, sino que también otras como los discursos a los
estudiantes, en donde Heidegger los exhorta a no trabajar solamente con su
cabeza, sino también con las manos y con los pies, por decirlo de alguna manera,
esto es, el estudiante alemán se debe ocupar no sólo de la vida académica, sino
también del trabajo. Se encuentran, además, los archivos de la universidad, las
notas personales de Heidegger, etc.; en total son unos 120 textos que pueden ser
tomados como un todo, y que, naturalmente, hace pensar que no puede considerarse
agotado el tema político de Heidegger sólo con el “Discurso del rectorado”. Por
lo tanto, los discursos a los estudiantes, sus declaraciones sobre los político, en
sentido amplio, en tanto filósofo, están reunidos por completo en este tomo, y
contiene, además, textos que no pueden ser alíneados directamente con el tema
sólo porque hayan surgido precisamente en ese período de tiempo. En consecuencia,
podemos hoy día orientarnos rápidamente hacia esta fuente si queremos tratar el
tema de la políticia en Heidegger, es decir, el tomo 16.
Ahora bien, si quisieramos ver esa fuente desde un punto de vista filosófico
podríamos decir que no se observa un diálogo entre la filosofía y las ciencias
políticas, y, lo más importante, ni se plantea el tema. No hay en esos textos de
Heidegger algo que podríamos propiamente denominar un diálogo entre las
ciencia política y sus postulados políticos, salvo si se entiende la expresión
ciencia política en el sentido de hacer de la ciencia un elemento al servicio de la
causa política como se vivió en la Rusia comunista. He allí, por ejemplo, el caso
del bioquímico ruso Oparín y su explicación materialista del origen de la vida.
Pero no es el caso de Heidegger. El pensador alemán no está trabajando en esos
textos al servicio de la causa nazi, sino que expone su visión (noús) del asunto
en cuestión y arrastrado por su pensamiento fundacional. No hay tampoco algo
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así como una ocupación explícita del tema, como lo que hemos conocido en la
tradición filosófica por nombre La República o Leviatán. Por lo tanto, el tomo
16 no es la filosofía política de Heidegger.
Pues bien, nosotros sostenemos que las ciencias políticas se conforman a
partir de la filosofía. Sin embargo, el estado actual es que no hay diálogo ninguno,
prácticamente, entre los filósofos y los cientistas políticos. Las ciencias políticas
tratan de ser muy concretas: se preocupan de la gestión del Estado, etc.; en
cambio, la filosofía política se ocupa de realizar el esqueleto, de poner las formas,
estructuras o el andamiaje de la orgazanición social, que involucra no sólo el
gobierno sino también el individuo gobernado. Claro está Bobbio entiende que
la filosofía política se resume en cuatro formas como ha sido comprendida a lo
largo de su historia: la búsqueda del fundamento último del poder; como la
determinación del concepto general de política; como la búsqueda de un estado
ideal aunque no se concrete nunca; y como discurso crítico20. En otras palabras,
la connotación o el sentido en que normalmente es usado el término filosofía es
de teoría. En efecto, decimos, filosofía es teoría, especulación, abstracción.
Entonces, frente a una filosofía política que sería una idea, un modelo, un
concepto de lo que es la política, tendríamos, por otra parte, una ciencia política
que sería una práxis, una concreción de la política. Y me parece que hay unanimidad
de sentir entre los cientistas políticos en torno a que la ciencia política debe
actuar, operar, obrar. En efecto, más que teorizar y elucubrar grandes proyectos
respecto a la pólis, el cientista político debe obrar en la sociedad, específicamente
en el Estado. Una pregunta inmediata respecto a esta posición es: acaso la
teología — que no tiene ningún problema en llamarse no científica — no ha
obrado en la historia del hombre. Si de obrar y operar se trata, entonces el
problema de qué es la política y la vinculación de la filosofía política con la
ciencia política debería ser resuelto por los ingenieros civiles. Pero -pensamosno es tarea de ellos.
Por lo tanto, es necesario, entre otras cosas, desarrollar — si es que existe —
un diálogo entre las ciencias políticas y la filosofía a través de los escritos
de Heidegger, y precisar, asimismo, determinados fenómenos espirituales, que
podrían “iluminar” el tema político para generar determinadas categorías
políticas como por ejemplo, un “pueblo histórico”, esto es, lo que significa ser
histórico (geschichtlich sein) a diferencia de, simplemente, tener una historia
(geschlichte haben)21. Tal vez una categoría fundamental de lo que he llamado,
más arriba, polisofía. En efecto, en este punto, quisiera hacer una analogía con
la tarea que se propuso la Escuela de Arquitectura de la Universidad Católica de
Valparaíso, Chile, cuando fue fundada por el arquitecto Alberto Cruz y por el
poeta Godofredo Iommi, pues su reflexión no se centraba en averiguar qué tipo
de materiales son más resistentes para ésta u otra obra, ni tampoco en las formas
que configurarían una obra arquitectónica. Su problema era y ha sido otro. Su
problema es como ha lugar la arquitectura, porque no es lo mismo una obra
arquitectónica realizada con una palabra matemática o filosófica, que una con
una palabra poética, y dentro de ésta no daba lo mismo una palabra poética lírica
que una de otro orden. Es el gran proyecto poético-arquitectónico liderado por
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Cruz y Iommi llamado “Amereida”22. Allí, es justo decirlo, hay una verdadera
mirada, un nuevo lenguaje, la asistencia a la inauguración de un nuevo oficio que
sin duda tiene el esfuerzo de ser latinoamericano. Hay un verdadero modus
vivendi, donde Rimbaud tiene un lugar destacado. Había que seguir lo que el
poeta frances había anunciado en su juventud y había puesto en obra. Siempre
rondaba en él, el pensamiento que desde los griegos la palabra ya no rimaba con
la acción (poesía y arquitectura). Y esa fue una de las grandes labores del poeta
maldito y que la escuela, entiéndase la escuela de arquitectura, debía tener como
propósito. Y allí surgía, prístino como todo lo grande, la fundación de una escuela,
porque ese propósito no se podía asumir en soledad. Era una meta colectiva. El
ha lugar, el locus, es el lugar del habla colectivo.
¿Por qué quise hacer esta analogía? Porque la propuesta de esa escuela ha
sido pensar la arquitectura a partir de los importantes trabajos de Heidegger,
entre otros pensadores, en torno al espacio, el habitar, la obra de arte, el lugar de
la palabra en la vida y en el ser humano, etc. En consecuencia, el problema
político en Heidegger podría ser ni tarea de una filosofía política ya establecida
ni de una ciencia política determinada. Entonces, ¿qué es? Polisofía, esto es,
como se ha lugar la política. Porque no es lo mismo una pólis, por una parte,
construida concretamente a partir de una ciencia política que, por otra parte, una
reflexión teórica de la pólis a partir de una filosofía política determinada (por
ejemplo, para Aristóteles la pólis posibilita la consecusión de la eudaimonía
humana mediante el florecimiento de sus virtudes; para Hobbes la pólis posibilita
la sobrevivencia del individuo en la búsqueda de su contínuo movimiento vital;
etc). En efecto, un tercer estadio podría ser la polísofía (que no postula contenidos),
pues es el ha lugar (ousía) de la pólis, es decir, una formalidad que puede ser
llenada con el contenido “acontecer histórico de los pueblos”, “destino”, “pueblo
histórico”. Estas categorías podrían dar lugar a una “forma” de fenómeno social
que se relaciona con la dirección de nuestra comunidad, distinta en cada caso, en
cada nación, para cada grupo humano que haya decidido marchar en conjunto,
convivir en torno a valores “comunes”, funcionar como un todo integrado y no
individuos disgregados. A diferencia de la teoría filosófica, la polisofía no propugnaría
que tal organización sea la mejor para una esencia, sino que respetaría el devenir
histórico y muchas veces contradictorio del hombre en lo social y de lo social
en el hombre. Esta polisofía no es comparable a la filosofía política o a las
ciencias políticas. Es otra cosa, porque surjiría de la ontología fundamental y no
de la tradición filosófica clásica. Podría relacionarse con ellas de manera
paralela o bien fundamentándolas, pero es otra cosa. En Heidegger la esencia
humana — por decirlo de alguna manera — es apertura, por lo tanto, puede ser
todas las posibilidades que sólo se agotan con la muerte. Entonces, ¿qué tipo
de régimen “político” puede caberle a un grupo determinado de hombres, si
la esencia o forma propia de cada uno de ellos es pura aperturidad? Infinita
posibilidades.
Por otra parte, en el tomo 26, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im
Ausgang von Leibniz (1928), de las obras completas de Heidegger, se puede leer
que en la metontología de la existencia recae, por ejemplo, la cuestión de la
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10
ética; la ética no es de manera alguna un tema de la ontología fundamental, sino
que de la metontología de la existencia, fundamentada ontológicamente. Luego
nombra Heidegger al arte, es decir, tenemos la filosofía del arte, que también
pertenece a la metontología de la existencia y, de la misma manera, Heidegger
podría haber escrito sólo un palabra de referencia POLITICA. No obstante,
Heidegger no se ocupa de ninguna institución, ya que la ontología fundamental
no necesita ocuparse de ellas, pues la cuestión de las instituciones es una cuestión
de las ciencias políticas o de la filosofía política, que, por su parte, podrían
recibir su fundamentación, respectivamente, de la metontología de lo político
(filosofía política nacida de la ontología fundamental. O bien, lo que hemos
llamado polisofía). El lugar de las ciencias políticas, si se piensa solamente en el
pasaje de la obra Ser y tiempo, donde se dan los líneamientos de la fundamentación
de la metontología — o si se quiere de las ontologías regionales—, es ese
parágrafo 4. Lo que Heidegger ahí todavía denomina ontología regional y denomina
a continuación metontología, consiste en la designación de la ontología a partir
de una existencia concreta. Naturalmente de una existencia que se hace
comprensible sobre una base ontológica fundamental. La metontología se ocupa
de la existencia ética, cultural, de la existencia política.
En resumen, ontología regional es el título que Heidegger primeramente
utiliza en la introducción de Ser y tiempo; ahora, después de que la ontología
fundamental ha sido expuesta, puede él formular un título especial y ese es el de
la metontología, más exactamente la transformación ontológica de la ontología
fundamental en la ontología de lo siendo. Y esta diferencia es importante, pues
nos sirve de orientación para comprender la metontología de lo político, es decir,
la existencia política. Por lo tanto, es aquí donde tendría su sitio las instituciones
políticas, es aquí donde debería pensarse metontológicamente sobre las instituciones,
y se podrían refundar, a su vez, las ciencias políticas.
Todas las ciencias son ciencias de “lo siendo”, es decir ónticas, ciencias
ónticas; pero si ahora están fundamentadas en una metontología de la existencia
que, por su parte, está fundamentada en una ontología fundamental, todo adopta
una nueva conformación. En consecuencia, para el desarrollo de la concepción
de la transformación de la ontología fundamental en metontología es importante
también el tomo 26.
Ahora bien, ¿Qué significa que pueda llegar a ser una categoría política, por
ejemplo, la expresión “un pueblo histórico”. ¿Abarcaría la concepción de Heidegger
a todos los pueblos, a los de Sudamérica, por ejemplo? Esta es una cuestión
fundamental. Pienso que Heidegger parte primeramente de la situación alemana,
pero estoy convencido de que todo lo dicho por él no está pensado sólo para el
pueblo elegido alemán, sino que partiendo de la situación histórica de su pueblo,
está dirigido a todos los pueblos. ¿Es América latina hoy un pueblo histórico,
esto es, ha llegado a una madurez que le permita ver (noús) su historia no meramente
como pasado, sus mitos no meramene como leyendas, sus conquistas no
meramente como hazañas, sus heroes no meramente como figuras? Cada una de
nuestras comunidades debe buscar su propio acontecer y destino. En efecto, el
ser habla en todas partes, en todas las épocas y en todas las lenguas. Si no fuera
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sí, La República de Platón no sería más que una pieza de museo al igual que la
historia entera de la filosofía.
Pero hay más. El fenómeno político en Heidegger también puede encontrarse
en su concepción sobre la universidad (la idea de universidad de von Humboldt,
la que él asume positivamente y que es recuperada en el tomo 16. Ello es una
complementación esencial al “Discurso del Rectorado”). En efecto, la entrada al
tema de Heidegger “Filosofía y Política”, designémoslo así, es también la reflexión
filosófica sobre la esencia de la universidad y de la ciencia y su necesidad de
refundación a través de la filosofía. Se trata de que el interés de Heidegger por
la política se presenta primeramente en el rol social de la universidad. La
universidad en la filosofía tienen la tarea delíneadora de la refundación de todas
las ciencias, para lo cual se toma de una manera estratégica la idea de la
antigüedad, pero ahora sobre suelo nuevo, su propia filosofía, que consiste en
una nueva reflexión y refundación de la esencia de la filosofía. La filosofía tiene,
por tanto, su sino (destino) en la universidad; es decir, Heidegger reflexiona
sobre la esencia de la universidad — pues desde allí se puede transformar la
sociedad — y sobre la refundación filosófica de la ciencia que tiene lugar allí,
con el fin de dar un nueva orientación intelectual (espiritual) a su pueblo, que lo
considera — seamos honestos, no sólo Heidegger — el centro de Europa y la
“asignada” para dirigir el continente y detener todo lo que no es europeo,
entiéndase Rusia y América23 (nótese el debate hoy día en relación al ingreso de
Turquía a la Unión Europea).
La universidad, entonces, no es un fin en sí mismo y, por ello, no es sólo un
pretexto para llevar a cabo una reflexión filosófica en torno a lo político, sino
que su reflexión filosófica es la que le lleva a ver a Heidegger en la Universidad
la posibilidad de un “nuevo hombre” (el nuevo estudiante alemán)24 y, en
consecuencia, de un “nuevo mundo”. La posibilidad de una transformación. Esa
concepción sobre la misión de la Universidad y de la ciencia respecto al pueblo
está pensada desde Ser y tiempo, es decir, sobre una forma determinada de
comprensión del ser. Pero a partir de los Beiträge zur Philosophie sucede que
Heidegger ve que la universidad y que en el conocimiento difundido por ella, o
sea, la tecnificación de todo lo que es, no corresponde a la misión que se le ha
encomendado, de tal manera que la universidad como empresa, y con todas sus
ciencias, se ha separado del puro devenir del ser. No obstante, ello no significa
que Heidegger se haya despedido de la idea central de la universidad, sino que
él ve que el camino primeramente ha de tomarse ahora desde el punto de vista
histórico del ser. La técnica moderna podría ser la fundamentación del cuarto
Führung y, muy probablemente, el problema político, porque la técnica es el
único gran poder que está por sobre todos los regímenes políticos y formas de
gobierno. Es ingobernable, inmanejable, incontrolable.
En definitiva, a mi modo de ver, para hacerse más o menos un cuadro
completo de la actividad y aporte filosóficos de Heidegger en el ámbito político
es imprescindible la lectura del tomo 16 y no se puede soslayar el tomo 26 de
sus obras completas. Insisto, sólo con el Discurso del Rectorado no se llega muy
lejos.
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La cuestión fundamental que nos propusimos al comienzo de estas líneas fue
preguntarnos sobre la relación de la filosofía política, la ciencia política y el
pensamiento de Heidegger, así como la manera que debía ser tratado el tema de
Heidegger y la política. He intentado mostrar, de manera general, cómo, a mi
modo de ver, debe ser abordado el problema, sin entrar a analizar el tomo 16, lo
cual será tema de otro artículo.
Pero hay otros textos de Heidegger, además de los nombrados, que me
parecen muy importantes tratarlos. Me refiero, en primer, lugar al tomo 36/37
Sein und Wahrheit (2001); que contiene — las dos conferencias del período de
rectoría — : 1. Die Grundfrage der Philosophie (semestre de verano 1933) y
2. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (semestre de invierno 1933/34). Asimismo, la
conferencia que Heidegger dictó después de la rectoría, es decir, el tomo 38:
Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache (sommersemester 1934) es de
suma importancia porque aparece el tema de la historia y de la lengua. Es una
conferencia, por tanto, a la que debemos prestar especial atención. Naturalmente,
también debe tratarse el tomo 39, es decir: Hölderlins Hymnes “Germanien”
und “Der Rhein” (Wintersemester 1934/35). Del mismo modo, el tomo 65
(1989); Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936–1938), ya que Heidegger
también se manifiesta de manera crítica sobre las decisiones epocales de los años
30, es decir, la cuestión del biologismo y del racismo. F.-W. Von Herrmann
resume gran parte de estas obras en su libro Wege ins Ereignis. Zu Heideggers
“Beiträge zur Philosophie”25, donde él los repasa y procesa, y en donde todo el
capítulo primero tiene un carácter introductorio a los Beiträge. Algo así como un
comentario, si se quiere. Se puede leer como presentación a su libro lo siguiente:
“Desde que los ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie’ son accesibles en virtud de su
publicación en calidad de tomo 65 de las Obras Completas, cada uno — que
reclame para sí el tener suficiente entendimiento hermenéutico del pensamiento
de Heidegger — está llamado a compenetrarse en los estándares y estructura de
la visión y del método del pensamiento-suceso que presentan los ‘Beiträge’;
pues él gana una orientación segura para el tratamiento hermenéutico de las
obras de Heidegger desde comienzos de los años 30. En el capítulo cuarto, desde
donde se proyecta esa vía al suceso, el autor analiza temas fundamentales del
suceso, o del pensamiento histórico del ser, es decir, cuestiones sobre la técnica
moderna y el arte, sobre la lengua y sobre la vecindad entre pensamiento y
poesía, así como sobre la relación esencial entre el hombre y Dios en el suceso”.
En seguida, tambien es importante para este tema destacar Superación de la
metafísica, pues se trata de un texto donde Heidegger se ocupa de los dirigentes
y su relación con el poder, la planificación humana, la guerra y la paz, la
devastación de la tierra; entre otras materias. Hay allí, en consecuencia, un fuerte
componente político.
En definitiva, hay un buen número de obras que debemos estudiar
detenidamente si es que realmente queremos dialogar con el filósofo de nuestro
tiempo. Por eso adhiero a las palabras de W. Biemel expresadas en una
entrevista: “Es manifiesto que en 1933 Heidegger tuvo la ilusión de que venía
una verdadera revolución. Recuérdese que había sido muy crítico con la situación
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15
en el tiempo de la república de Weimar. No cabe duda de que se dejó llevar,
dando incluso conferencias que hoy nos resultan incomprensibles. El discurso
del rectorado no fue, sin embargo, nacionalsocialista en el sentido corriente porque
el núcleo del discurso lo constituye el concepto de alétheia. Teniendo todo esto
en cuenta me parece que el libro de Farías es un intento de reducir a Heidegger
al período entre abril de 1933 y febrero de 1934. O sea que no quiere conceder
que Heidegger se distanció del nazismo. Cuando yo estuve estudiando con él
hablaba de los nazis como de criminales. Pero lo peor en el libro de Farías es
que no se ocupa de la obra de Heidegger. Lo mismo vale para el libro de Ott que
se concentra en el distanciamiento de Heidegger del catolicismo y en su discurso
de rectorado, sin entrar en lo verdaderamente decisivo: la obra escrita”. (Las
cursivas son mías)26.
3. Consideraciones finales
La relación de la ontología de Heidegger y de la metafísica de Zubiri con la
política está por hacerse. Es un desafío que debemos asumir. No se puede, a mi
juicio, en el caso de Heidegger seguir discutiendo su adhesión al nacionalsocialismo
y, como consecuencia de ello, despachar inmediatamente su importante pensamiento.
Del mismo modo, no se puede seguir ignorando el pensamiento de Zubiri,
simplemente, porque haya escrito en lengua española y porque todavía algunos
detractores lo tachen de escolástico.
Es deber de cada uno de nosotros descubrir el verdadero alcance de sus
pensamientos y eso es obra no sólo de uno o dos cientistas políticos o filósofos
políticos, sino de la comunidad completa de investigadores.
NOTAS
1. Las siguientes consideraciones no comprometen
de manera alguna al Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores de Chile. Son, por tanto, de exclusiva
responsabilidad del autor.
2. Sin duda que hay muy buenos estudios en torno
a la relación de Heidegger y la política (no así de
Zubiri y la política). Todos ellos vistos desde una
perspectiva filósófica. Así, Pöggeler, Beaufret,
Fedier, Gebert, etc. Sin embargo, no puedo estar en
absoluto de acuerdo con el artículo “El caso
Heidegger” de Luc Ferry y Alain Renaut — o bien
con publicaciones como las de Victor Farías —,
aparecido en Heidegger o el final de la filosofía
de Juan Manuel Navarro Cordón y Ramón
Rodríguez (Compiladores), Editorial Complutense,
2° Edición, diciembre 1997, pp. 111–125; porque
disentir, hoy día, del estado actual de cosas
políticas, del establishment político, — se
considera — es estar, inmediatamente, en contra
de “los valores democráticos” y, en consecuencia,
se es catalogado de facista o nacista. Mi intención,
aquí, es mostrar que los cientistas políticos tenemos
una deuda con Heidegger.
3. Martin Heidegger en Nietzsche (tomo I, Ediciones
Destino, trad. Juan Luis Vermal, 2000, p. 46)
sostiene: “El gran pensador es grande porque
es capaz de oír lo que hay de grande en la obra
de los otros ‘grandes’ y de transformarlo
originiariamente”.
4. Filósofo chileno. Se formó en los años 60s con
toda la pléyade de filósofos alemanes como
Heidegger, Gadamer, Fink, Welte, Müller, etc. y,
en España, con Xavier Zubiri. Traductor al
español de Ser y tiempo de Heidegger (Madrid,
Trotta, 2003). Ha escrito entre otros libros:
Konnaturales Erkennen und vostellendes Denken
(1967); La filosofía en la Universidad (1970);
Filosofía griega. De Tales a Sócrates (1985); De
asombros y nostalgia. Ensayos filosóficos (1999);
Heidegger y Zubiri (2002).
5. Heidegger, Martin. Ser y tiempo, trad. Jorge Eduardo
Rivera, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2003, p. 32.
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6. Cf. Grundbegriffe, Sommersemester, 1941 (GA 51).
7. Heidegger, Martin, Ser y tiempo, trad. Jorge
Eduardo Rivera, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2003,
p. 32.
8. Zubiri, Xavier, Sobre el hombre, Póstumo, Alianza
Editorial, 1986.
9. Zubiri, Xavier, Espacio, Tiempo, Materia, Alianza
Editorial, Póstumo, 1996.
10. Zubiri, Xavier, Estructura dinámica de la
realidad, Póstumo, Alianza Editorial, 1989.
11. Aunque en rigor, la trilogía de la inteligencia —
formada por Inteligencia y realidad (Soc. E. y
P/Alianza, 1980); Inteligencia y lógos (Soc. E. y
P/Alianza, 1982); Inteligencia y razón (Soc. E. y
P/Alianza, 1983). Los tres libros constituyen lo
que Zubiri ha denominado Inteligencia sentiente
— no es una ontología regional, porque realidad
e intelección son estrictamente congéneres,
pertenecen a un mismo génos.
12. La trilogía del tema de Dios la constituyen: El
hombre y Dios, Alianza Editorial, 1984; El
problema de la historia de las religiones, Alianza
Editorial, 1993; El problema teologal del hombre.
Cristianismo, Alianza Editorial,1997.
13. Cf. Freund, Julien, La Crisis del Estado y otros
estudios, Universidad de Chile, Instituto de Ciencia
Política, 1982.
14. Nótese el rol que juega la expresión Lógos en la
ontología de Heidegger y el de Noología en la
metafísica de Zubiri.
15. Cf. Ojeda César, Delirio, Realidad e Imaginación,
Chile, Editorial Universidad, 1987.
16. Zubiri, Xavier, Ensayo de una teoría
fenomenológica del juicio, Madrid, Tip. de la
“Rev. de Arch., Bibli. y Museos”, Olózaga.
Núm. I. 1923. P. 7.
17. Idem, pp. 22–23.
18. Zubiri, Xavier, Cinco lecciones de filosofía, 1°
Edición, Soc. E. y P., 1963, p. 20.
19. Cf. Gebert, Sigbert. Negative Politik. Zur
Grundlegung der Politischen Philosophie aus
der Daseinsanalytik und ihrer Bewährung in den
Politischen Schriften Martin Heidegger von
1933/34, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 1992.
Este libro es una excelente monografía del
“pensamiento político” de Heidegger. Sostiene
Gebert que el punto de partida de su investigación
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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es “la desolada situación actual de la filosofía
política y de la política”.
Cf. Bobbio, N. El filósofo y la política, Fondo de
Cultura Económica, 1996.
Dice Heidegger: “Ser histórico significa: sabiendo
de lo acaecido actuar en lo venidero para liberar
a lo pasado de su fuerza comprometedora y
preservarlo en su cambiante grandeza. Pero ese
saber se plasma en la constitución del Estado de
un pueblo, ese saber es el Estado. Él es la
estructura que evoca y une, en donde el pueblo
queda expuesto a todos los grandes poderes
humanos del ser. El Estado está siendo y es en la
medida que plasma esos poderes en la existencia
del pueblo”. GA 16, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio
Klostermann GmbH, 2000, p. 200. Al respecto,
obsérvese lo que afirma el arquitecto Alberto
Cruz en su libro Don. Arquitectura, donde se lee:
“…lo que acaece es que, bien parece, que
seguimos siendo considerados naturaleza
[entiéndase América como continente], no
historia… No heredad que se constituye en
tradición… Ante lo dicho, Amereida [palabra
compuesta por Amer: América; y Eida: Eneída]:
Amer = extensión naturaleza. Eída, Eneida;
historia”. Tomo 10, 10 p., Chile, Ediciones ARQ,
Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Estudios
Urbanos, Pontificia Universidad Católica de
Chile, abril 2002.
Poema que narra la travesía, de un grupo de
pensadores, por el continente americano, donde
participaron, entre otros, el filósofo Francois
Fedier y el poeta Michel Deguy, los arquitectos
chilenos Miguel Eyquem y Fabio Cruz.
Cf. Introducción a la metafísica, trad. Angela
Ackermann, Tercera reimpresión, enero 1999,
Barcelona, Editorial Gedisa.
Cf. GA 16, Cap. 108, “El estudiante alemán en
calidad de trabajador. Discurso en la Ceremonia
de Matriculación, 25 de noviembre de 1933”.
Cf. F.–W. Von Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis. Zu
Heideggers “Beiträge zur Philosophie”, Frankfurt
am Main, V. Klostermann, 1994.
En torno a Heidegger, Entrevista a Walter Biemel,
Raúl Fornet–Betancourt y Klaus Hedwig,
Concordia N°15, 1989, en http://personales.
ciudad.com.ar/M_Heidegger/biemel.htm.
THE UNIQUE ROLE OF “CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVISM”
IN THE CREATION OF USEFUL PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE
ERIC GILDER
Constructive Alternativism as a Pragmatic way
of Creating Testable “Useful Fictions”
In an analysis of the origins, scope and assumptions of philosophical
constructivism, Michael Mahoney describes it as a meta-theory which balances
elements of “platonic and neo-Kantian idealism, representational realism,
critical rationalism and “evolutionary empiricism.”1 Thus, according to Mahoney,
constructive meta-theories generally:
1. acknowledge the power of ideas and mental/symbolic processes that mediate,
constrain, and order the particulars and patterns of experience;
2. acknowledge the existence of a “real” external world... that can be known
to us only indirectly and imperfectly;
3. acknowledge the potential power of reason and rationality in human
knowing, that power being most apparent when applied in the service of critical
(disconfirmatory) examination rather than positive (confirmatory) justification; and,
4. assert that the function of data (sense and scientific) in knowledge development
is essentially one of selecting or winnowing enacted hypotheses; in this sense,
data do not justify or form the foundation of valid knowledge, but instead
selectively eliminate less viable approximations [emphasis in original].2
I basically agree with Mahoney, but I would argue that, in the fields of art and
values, theories are not easily negated3, but, even if this were possible, a
thorough-going disconfirmatory mode of reasoning can be destructive. Mahoney
himself quotes Hans Vaihinger to say:
“A regrettable lack of scientific understanding is apt to appear in the conclusion
frequently drawn that because such constructs are devoid of reality they are to
be devoid of utility... . The history of mankind is full of examples proving the
existence not only of fruitful errors (take religions alone, for example) but also
of harmful truths [emphasis in original].”4
Vaihinger posits a law of ideational shifts, in which ideas can develop: fictional,
hypothetical and dogmatic.5 This shift is related to the increasing certainty with
which one holds about an idea: I may hold some ideas as mere operational
fictions (e.g., thinking of the behavior of electric current in wire as analogous to
water flow in pipes), others as hypotheses (e.g., a person’s worldview can be
18
ERIC GILDER
2
apprehended though the employment of thematic construct analysis), and yet
others with dogmatic certainty (e.g., the law of gravity or the fact that the earth
is roughly round). Drawing from Vaihinger, American psychologist George A.
Kelly suggests that scientists can productively entertain hypotheses cast in an
“invitational” mode (Suppose we regard electricity as water) rather than in just
indicative, conditional, subjunctive or imperative modes.6 In any case, I agree
with Jack Orr, who employs Kenneth Burke’s conception of the dialectical
relationship between the symbolic and non-symbolic world to argue for a
philosophy of “critical rationalism” versus a pure intersubjectivism (reality is
socially constructed in all its forms7 or mechanistic objectivism (reality exists
and the interpretation of that reality is unproblematic). As Orr states:
“In Burke’s terms, as long as one appreciates both the symbolic construction
of reality and the “non-symbolic reality”, it is possible to relate the two dialectically,
one can question a rhetorical construction of reality in the name of reality as
such. If, however, the concept of objective reality is abandoned, wherein shall
one question those rationalizations, mystifications, and reifications which
masquerade as the ultimately real?”8
Orr concludes his discussion of critical rationalism by naming five qualities
of the philosophy:
1. objective truth cannot be consistently denied, but knowledge is uncertain...;
2. knowledge claims are contingent upon the framework of the knower...; 3. socially
constructed frames of reference may be distinguished qualitatively as rational, or
irrational...; 4. all constructions of reality and criteria for rationality must be held
open to criticism, even the concept of critical rationality...; and, 5. criticism is the
persistent aim of inquiry.9
The philosophy of critical rationalism that Orr describes provides the
philosophical foundation of the communicative theories of Jürgen Habermas,
Stephen Toulmin, Ch. Perelman, Wayne Brockriede, Wayne Booth and Kelly
himself. As Kelly sees it, constructive alternativism begins with two basic
notions: “first, that man [sic]10 might be better understood if he were viewed in
the perspectives of the centuries rather than the flicker of passing moments; and
second, that each man contemplates in his own personal way the stream of
events upon which he finds himself so swiftly borne.”11
Philosophical constructivism “emphasizes the creative capacity of the living
thing to represent the environment, not merely respond to it”.12 Constructive
alternativism is, then, the philosophical foundation of the psychological methodology
of personal construct theory, which seeks to describe how individual humans
construe and act purposely in the world. Ultimately to Kelly, theories are the
thinking product of people who seek freedom from events occurring across time,
to whom life is an adventure. “What we are proposing is neither a conventional
philosophy nor a conventional psychology. As a philosophy [constructive
alternativism] is rooted in the psychological observation of man. As a psychology
it is concerned with the philosophical outlooks of individual man”, claims
Kelly.13 On a theoretical level, constructive alternativism posits that every theory
3
THE “CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVISM” PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE
19
of science is subject to modification or replacement; they are but useful fictions.
Kelly argues that his theory builds upon Vaihinger’s philosophy of “As-if”:
“In [his theory of “As-if”] he [Vaihinger] offered a system of thought in which
God or reality might best be represented as paradigms. This was not to say that
either God or reality was any less certain than anything else in the realm of man’s
awareness, but only that all matters confronting man might best be regarded in
hypothetical ways. In some measure, I suppose, I am suggesting that Vaihinger’s
position has particular value for psychology.”14
According to the philosophy of constructive alternativism, people are as free
as their operative paradigms allow them to be. As Kelly states, “the structure we
erect is what rules us”: “Determinism and freedom are opposite sides of the same
coin — two aspects of the same relationship. This is an important point for a man
to grasp, whether he be a scholar or a neurotic — or both!”15
So, although our hypothetical constructions or “useful fictions” are expendable
instruments of orientation to the world, and not a copy of reality, theories do
reflect the personal commitment of their maker, and, although “fictive”, theories
have real effects upon real people. As philosopher Stephen Pepper argues in his
World Hypotheses, each major hypothesis is governed by a root metaphor or
conception of the world and of people themselves; such a use of metaphor,
Burke reminds us, is an innate human activity.16 A “mechanist”, for example,
will view people as mechanical sub-assemblies of a grand design; a “formist”
will view people as abstract categories of properties; a “contextualist” vision of
reality will be governed by the movement of time across place; and an “organicist”
will see the world as an integrated life-form, incorporating all individual persons
in its biosphere. Pepper is claiming that whatever theory of knowing one holds,
a root metaphor is at work molding a particular vision of knowledge and practice
on the part of the theorist.17 As Kelly would suggest, the root metaphor of a
social theory is a “super-ordinal” construct of that theoretical system which
determines its individual elements and constructions.18 J.M.M. Mair describes
the power that such metaphors of man can possess:
“In this light we can readily begin to see all claims about man as a “developed
ape” or a “fallen angel”, a “mechanical toy” or a “super-computer”, as a “mindless
epiphenomenon of a mindless universe” or an “open system in the larger
ecosystem of the planet earth”, not as bald assertions about what man is, but as
metaphors for exploring the endless mystery of what man may yet make of
himself. The danger here comes... when we mistake metaphor—or acts of
intentional mistake making in the service of understanding—for truth itself, or
when we confuse . . an invitation to inquiry with dogmatic assertion. Not one of
the metaphors of man which has yet been elaborated can provide a full account
of his nature nor need we assume that any single or any combinations of
metaphors in the future will do so either. [Metaphors have their value, but] if we
lose ourselves in metaphors of man which are too small for us we may gain a
certain kind of security for a time, but are likely to pay a high price in despair,
confusion and the denial of freedom we can ill afford to lose [emphasis in
original].”19
20
ERIC GILDER
4
I therefore posit that the multiple selves of any author as revealed in his texts
are only as free or determined as their core constructs allow them to be. The
method herein anticipated will allow an ascertainment of how an author’s “logical”
self and “emotional” self inter-relate in his conception of authorship, and how this
multi-faceted author construes his on-going relationship with his hypothesized
audience. While (through the application of Kelly’s Personal Constructs Theory
(PCT) and dimensions of transition, built as it is upon the philosophy of constructive
alternativism) I have intended to demonstrate that it is possible to construe
authors and their multiple implied selves are creative actors in the world; i.e., that
they are important constructors of rhetorical realities for “their” readers; my main
purpose is to demonstrate that such a multiple-selves construing of the rhetorical
process can be developed into a comprehensive, yet usable rhetorical methodology.20
Critical Challenges to Personal Constructs Theory
and a Rhetorical Authorial Response
According to Phillip Tichenor and Douglas McLeod in the “Logic of Social and
Behavioral Sciences”, the basic issues in communication theory and practice center
upon five concerns:
1. the question of causation vs. prediction;
2. the question of the interplay between induction and deduction;
3. the question of choosing between mechanism/reductionism and holistic
conceptions of reality(epistemology);
4. the question of choosing between macro and micro approaches; and,
5. the question of validity.
Concerning the question of causation, Kelly was more interested in studying
how every person (including himself, the theoretician) is able to represent and
predict his or her future than to assigning clear-cut causes to every action. As per
Kelly’s conception of the role of induction versus deduction, he assumes that
people inductively construct their reality according to the deductive schema
determined by their operating core constructs. This rule applies to both researchers
and subjects (or observers) of research according to Kelly.21 For example, a
psychotherapist treats his or her patient as a cooperator, a partner in discovering
the rules of construing the meaning of past experiences.22 Kelly’s theory of
personality is reflexive in nature as any comprehensive scientific theory is. (In
reflexive theories, deduction and induction are intimately related and cannot
be profitably divorced from each other.) The main fault Kelly finds with conventional
behavioristic research (dubbed by him as the process of “accumulative
fragmentalism”) is that it provides a host of answers without posing interesting
questions or reconstructions of knowledge.23 Both Kelly and his student Don
Bannister contend that theory as reflected in the “creativity cycle” of
circumspection/pre-emption/control can assist social scientists in developing
research questions that are neither trivial (too limited in scope) nor unmanageable
(too broad and “loose”). In the “Challenges to Personal Construct” cycle, ideas
for research are developed from personal knowledge24 and perceptions; are then
5
21
formed into proposed questions of importance to the researcher; and are finally
refined into testable hypotheses. Reliability in Kelly’s theory is, according to
Mair, concerned not with simple repetition of unchanging results, but with
accurately predicting change.25 Similarly, the concept of validity in Kelly’s theory
is also tied to prediction: “The construct theory notion of validity does not hinge
on separating logical from empirical validity — it implies that all validity is
logical, in that the failure to predict successfully implies some non sequitur in
the hierarchical lines of implication from which the prediction was derived.”26
In my view, Kelly’s theory of man via personal constructs is a “critical
rationalist” one; it is not reductionistic. Kelly acknowledges the ties of his theory
to positivism via Vaihinger, but it is, in Pepper’s term, an “undogmatic”
positivism.27 To Kelly, people, (including philosophers of science) are free to
construe the reality of the world in any fashion they wish, but, if their
construction of reality is not open to sharing by others, their ability to predict the
future course of events will suffer. Maddi points out that critics of Kelly, such as
Jerome Bruner, have accused Kelly of downplaying the role of passion in man.
As Bruner argues: “[Kelly’s book] fails signally, I think, in dealing convincingly
with the human passions. There was a strategy in Freud’s choice of Moses or
Michelangelo or Little Hans. If it were true that Freud was too often the victim
of the dramatic instance, it is also true that with the same coin he paid his way
to an understanding of the depths and heights of la condition humaine. By
comparison, the young men and women of professor Kelly’s clinical examples
are worried by their dates, their studies, and their conformity. If Freud’s clinical
world is a grotesque of fin de siecle Vienna, Kelly’s is a gloss of the postadolescent peer group of Columbus, Ohio”.28
As Bruner would suggest, Kelly’s “mentalism” might have been appropriate
for his college subjects, but not for everyone.29 Kelly argues, however, that these
criticisms miss the point, that through his theory he was attempting to transcend
the thinking/feeling dichotomy: “The reader may have noted that in talking about
experience I have been careful not to use either the terms, “emotional or “affective.”
I have been equally careful not to invoke the notion of “cognition.” The classic
distinction which separates these two has, in the manner of most classic distinctions
that once were useful, become a barrier to sensitive psychological inquiry. When one
so divides the experience of man, it becomes difficult to make the most of the
holistic aspirations that may infuse the science of psychology with new life.30
Bannister argues that most critics of Kelly’s personal construct theory, such
as Bruner, are not true constructive alternativists, but “naive realists” who believe
that the traditional psychological concept of emotion is a “real” thing, “not a construct
about the nature of man.”31 In short, Kelly’s theory does not exclude “emotion”
from humans, Mildred McCoy argues, it reconceptualizes the meaning assigned
to emotion to one in which it is grounded within the whole realm of proactive
human experience, a reconstruction that elevates emotion to the proper place that
traditional psychology has denied.32
Kelly’s theory of personality has most often been considered a “micro”
methodological approach, but via the concept of constructive alternativism, it
22
ERIC GILDER
6
has “macro” utilities and implications. For example, if social scientists accept only
the fundamental postulate that the “objects” of their studies are thinking beings
who conceive of the world in much of the same way as they do, the implications
are large.33 As Kelly would suggest, both professional scientists and the “man as
scientist” are set free by their respective application of theories to the “stream of
events.” The influence of this concept has not only affected the reductionist
psychological theories of early communication research, but it also affects the
macro theorizing of “critical school” scholars by suggesting that people are not
lumps of clay passively molded by class forces in a culture.34 Thus, this “man as
scientist” stance has within it the argumentative capability to question both the
too tightly drawn and trivial research generated by reductionistic science, as well
as the often too loose and untestable suppositions (dare I say constructs?) of critical
school theorists.35
Basically, according to Kelly’s theory, a person’s constructs are validated by
his or her own experience. Therefore, constructive critical work could be produced
if critics would be mindful of the interpolation of two levels of experience that
operates when they perform the ethical act of criticizing texts: 1. the experience
of the author, on how they construe or predict the future; and, 2. how critics, in
the act of criticism, are responding to the text as their personally lived experience.
In this fashion, acts of rhetorical criticism will be explicitly reflexive, and readers
of that work of “artistic” criticism will not have to guess at the critic’s philosophical
baggage load, as well as the author’s philosophical stance as revealed by the text
under scrutiny.
As communication scholar Robert R. Monaghan has stated, there are no
perfect hypotheses or theories about rhetorical situations or events, just as there
are no perfect people.36 The decisive test of validity of a rhetorical theory rests
upon its connection to the lived “felt” or “common” experience of all human beings,
as Pepper describes: “Common sense... we thus discovered to be the very secure
basis for all knowledge. There is no evidence to indicate that common sense will
ever fail mankind except as more refined knowledge supplements it... . Our
evidence... indicates that every item of common sense is a dubitandum, a matter
that ought to being doubted in the sense to being subject to rigorous critical
scrutiny, but this very same evidence indicates that the totality of common sense
itself is, so to speak, not a dubitandum. It is a well-attested fact. All evidence
points to it as the ultimate source of our cognitive refinements, and as the lowest
legitimate level to which cognition could sink should these refinements fail.37
In this view, research is “valid” if it enables researchers to better understand
this universal human experiencing. For example, Kelly states that in the doing
of psychological research, a researcher needs to “intimately collaborate” with his
or her subjects and subject “himself [or herself] to the same experimental procedures
he proposes for his subjects”, the goal being the full experiencing of what his or
her subjects experience.38 As Kelly argues, “close observation of everything that
happens, rather than confining one’s attention to those events for which the
experimental design has preconceived categories, is not only humanistically
appropriate; it is good basic scientific method.”39 Similarly, “consistency” is held
7
23
to be more important to Kelly than the traditional scientific definition of
“reliability”, in the reading of repertory test results.40 In Pepper’s terms, Kelly’s
“consistency” construct is a form of “structural corroboration.” As Pepper defines
it: “Structural corroboration consists in the convergence of qualitatively different
items of evidence in support of a single item. We see its operation in its crudest
form in the assembling of “circumstantial evidence”, and its refined form in
theories such as those of astronomical mechanics, which have proved cognitively
very impressive because of their high predictive powers and their extensive
organization of huge masses of diverse, mutually corroborative observations.
Structural corroboration requires a theory or hypothesis for the connection of the
various items of evidence, and what is said to be corroborated here by the
convergence of evidence is not so much the evidence itself as the theory which
connects it together. Actually the two assist each other. The theory is progressively
confirmed as it successively draws more evidence in, and the various different
items of evidence achieve higher and higher corroboration in proportion as more
items enter harmoniously into the structure of the theory. Structural corroboration
is thus more individual than social. It depends upon the intellectual imagination
of a man [or woman] to conceive an hypothesis which will hold together diverse
facts, and his power to demonstrate how diverse facts bear upon one another. It
is a corroboration of fact with fact41.
I agree with Pepper here, with one exception: I do not see the same demarcation
between the individual and the social that he does: pace Kelly’s remark on
determinism and freedom (that they “are opposite sides of the same coin”), I
posit that we, as individual practicing critics and writers, are, in part, the social
product of those people from whom we have learned. In my studies on literary
and rhetorical critics such as Wayne Booth, I have hoped to clearly demonstrate
that we are not our own “self”, but, rather, a unity of socially-grounded multiple
“selves”; complex, rich “selves” formed as much by the rhetorical community of
which we are a part as we form it. Such a wondrously intricate humanity that is
a person and a critic can only be rightfully and faithfully rendered by an affectively
credulous, yet logically critical qualitative methodology that is created herein
from the seminal thoughts provided me by a Kelly and a Pepper.42
NOTES
1. Michael J. Mahoney, Constructive Metatheory:
I. Basic Features and Historical Foundations,
„International Journal of Personal Construct
Psychology“, no. 1, 1988, p. 4.
2. Ibidem, pp. 4–5.
3. Ibidem, notes xlvi–xlvii.
4. Ibidem, p. 25.
5. Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As-If”: A
System of the Theoretical Practical and Religious
of Mankind, trans. C.K. Ogden, London, Kegan
Paul, 1935.
6. Brendan Maher, ed., Clinical Psychology and
Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly,
New York, Willey, 1969, p. 149.
7. Barry Brummentt, Some Implications of “Process”
or “Intersubjectivity”: Post-Modern Rhetoric,
“Philosophy and Rhetoric”, no. 9, 1976, pp. 21–50.
8. Jack C. Orr, How Shall We Say: “Reality Is
Socially Constructed through Communication?”,
“Central States Speech Journal”, no. 29, 1978,
p. 270.
9. Ibidem, pp. 272–273.
24
ERIC GILDER
10. George A. Kelly, The Psychology of Personal
Constructs: Vol. One — A Theory of Personality,
New York, Norton, 1955, p. 3.
11. The reader will, I hope, understand that further
[sic]s after “the”, “him” and “man” are to be
incorporated by reference.
12. George A. Kelly, op. cit., p. 8.
13. Ibidem, p. 16.
14. Brendan Maher, op. cit., p. 149.
15. G.A. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 20–21.
16. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1984, pp. 141–150.
17. Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses: A Study
in Evidence, Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1970, pp. 151, 186, 232, 280, 328–330.
18. G.A. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 19–22.
19. Don Bannister, ed., New Perspectives in Personal
Construct Theory, London, Academic Press, 1977,
p. 129.
20. See Eric Gilder, Man and Mission: Construing
Wayne Booth’s Theology of Literature as Rhetoric,
Sibiu, “Lucian Blaga” University Press, 2003.
21. B. Maher, op. cit., p. 136.
22. Ibidem, p. 53.
23. Ibidem, pp. 115–117, 125.
24. Cf Maher, op. cit., pp. 127–130 and Bannister,
op. cit., apud Michael Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962.
25. Don Bannister and J.M. Mair, The Evaluation of
Personal Constructs, London, Academic Press,
1968, p. 157.
26. Ibidem, p. 178.
27. See Maher, op. cit., p. 149 and Pepper, op. cit.,
p. 334.
28. Salvatore R. Maddi, Personality Theories: A
Comparative Analysis, 3rd ed., Homewood, Dorsey
Press, 1976, p. 155.
29. Maddi comments that if a perfect prediction of
events were really possible for a person to achieve,
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
8
life would be boring indeed. A fair question to
ask of Kelly would be: “Does every person act as
a calculating scientist at all times?”
Bannister, op. cit., p. 27.
Ibidem, p. 26.
Bannister, op. cit., pp. 93–124.
This has already to some extent in mass
communication theory and practice, as witnessed
by the move away from the “mass public” models
of Hovland et al, in the 1930s, thourgh the “twostep” model of communicative influence of Katz
and Lazarfeld toward the audience-driven theme
of “uses and gratifications” research today. See
M.L. DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Theories
of Mass Communication, 4th ed., New York:
Longman, 1982, pp. 143–165, 183–198.
Everett M. Rogers, The Empirical and the
critical schools of Communication Research,
“Communication Yearbook”, no. 5, Michael
Burgoon ed., New York, Transaction, 1982,
pp. 125–144. See also William H. Melody and
Robin E. Mansell, The Debate Over Critical
vs. Administrative Research, “Journal of
Communication”, Summer, 1983, pp. 103–116.
Don Bannister, Personal Construct Theory and
Research Method, “Human Inquiry: A Sourcebook
of New Paradigm Research”, eds. Peter Reason
and John Rowan, New York, Wiley, 1981,
pp. 191–199.
Robert R. Monaghan, Measurement in Speech
Education, “The Communicative Arts and Sciences
of Speech”, ed. Keith Brooks, Columbus, Merrill,
1967, p. 571.
Pepper, op. cit., p. 320.
Maher, op. cit., p. 140.
Kelly, op. cit., p. 140.
Ibidem, pp. 231–232.
Pepper, op. cit., p. 321.
See Gilder, op. cit.
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Logic of Social and Behavioral Science,
“Research Methods in Mass Communication”,
2nd edition, Guido H. Stempel III and Bruce
H. Westley, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall,
1989, pp. 10–29.
Toulmin, Stephen E., The Uses of Argument,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
Toulmin, Stephen E., Human Understanding, Volume
I: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972.
Vaihinger, Hans, The Philosophy of “As-if”: A System
of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions
of Mankind, Trans. C.K. Ogden, London, Kegan
Paul, 1935.
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La problématique vaste et complexe des rapports entre éthique et politique
est redevenue un point de référence pour les analyses et les disputes théoriques
à la fin du XXe siècle. Les réflections sur ce rapport ont fait ressortir, dans le
périmètre de la pensée éthique et politique, des perceptions, des arguments et des
attitudes contradictoires, déterminées, en bonne mesure, par les expériences vécues.
Ainsi, d’une part, à la suite de l’effondrement des régimes totalitaires, les tendances
qui visaient «le discrédit des critiques de l’aliénation politique» ont pris de
l’ampleur, mais aussi des objections liées à l’évaluation de l’action politique «avec
les unités de mesure spécifiques aux valeurs éthiques». D’autre part, la nécessité
de consolider ces connexions, comme fondement et garantie pour assurer la
liberté, l’égalité et la justice1 a été de plus en plus affirmée. En conséquence,
aujourd’hui, quand le monde est marqué par deux tendances complémentaires,
respectivement,«la scission des frontières idéologiques», par la globalisation et
l’intensification des différences entre les cultures, les mentalités et les styles de
vie, il s’impose une attitude aux nouvelles hypothèses et méthodes de recherche
de cette connexion.
Etant donné la complexité et la difficulté de ce problème théorique mais aussi
pratique, il s’impose la précision que les repères de cette démarche visent les
tendances actuelles de l’analyse des rapports entre l’éthique et la politique
internationale, implicitement l’importance et la signification des valeurs éthiques
dans ce contexte. Cette démarche est accompagnée aussi par l’interprétation de
certains évènements politiques et attitudes internationales qui mettent en discussion
les stratégies d’action, les paradigmes théoriques et leur dimension morale.
L’analyse, la réévaluation et la repensée des rapports entre éthique et politique,
plus précisément la politique internationale, ne peuvent ignorer les interrogations
des valeurs impliquées et ne peuvent exclure non plus les connexions et les
rapports avec la réalité existante, implicitement «avec leçons de l’histoire» des
expériences communes et particulières. Ce fait, puisque la démarche théorique,
adaptée avec changements du monde actuel, exclut la variante que les valeurs
politiques et morales soient associées avec ces contenus-là, déduits d’une Vérité
métaphysique, avec des valences absolues et universelles. De nos jours, lorsque
l’univers des utopies et le territoire des idéologies n’ont plus aucun pouvoir réel
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27
de conviction, celle-ci étant annihilée par le besoin des hommes de modeler et
de gouverner leur propre vie et non pas de «transformer le monde», tenir compte
de la réalité conflictuelle de la vie et de la diversité des situations particulières
représente une condition essentielle d’une analyse théorique à laquelle il peut
détacher des valeurs communes et de nouvelles règles d’action. Davantage, le
conflit entre les valeurs ou «la guerre des divinités», selon l’expression de Max
Weber, attire surtout l’attention sur le fait que les valeurs et les raisons des valeurs
ne sont pas équivalentes, mais antagoniques ou complémentaires et, aussi, que
la rationalité scientifique «est incapable, au fond, de trouver la solution de tous
les problèmes posés par l’esprit humain»2.
Souvent les valeurs accompagnent les espoirs concernant l’émancipation des
hommes mais aussi une série des troubles liés aux possibilités de résoudre les
problèmes majeurs de la société et du monde actuel. Dans cet espace diversifié,
les valeurs morales se multiplient en «morales concurrentes», alternatives ou
contradictoires, ce qui détermine l’affirmation du relativisme, dont la conséquence
positive est la stimulation de la tolérance. Il y a aussi des cas dans lesquels
s’affirment soit la dégradation ou «le crépuscule de l’éthique», soit l’inutilité de
la morale en politique. Au niveau des relations internationales, on considère que
l’association de la morale à la politique est une association bizarre ou forcée.
D’ailleurs, le composant ou la dimension éthique de la politique internationale
constitue aujourd’hui, pour beaucoup de commentateurs, une ironie ou une autre
utopie. Pour eux, l’idée de moralité internationale est, en elle-même, contradictoire
et son acceptation présuppose que les Etats partagent des valeurs et des croyances
communes, jamais disputées ou négociées3.
Les valeurs morales constituent un système important de signalisation, nécessaire
pour coordonner des attitudes et actions politiques, mais aussi pour l’avertissement
des risques et de leurs conséquences négatives. C’est pourquoi il s’impose que
l’analyse des rapports entre la politique et la moralité dépasse le stade dans
lequel on discute seulement sur la moralité des gouverneurs ou la moralité des
politiciens. Lorsque «la dissipation des responsabilités morales» est évidente, et
on y remarque aussi «une dégradation continuelle de l’univers moral, administré
par la politique», aujourd’hui, plus que jamais, est néccessaire l’analyse «de la
moralité politique», avant tout, de la dimension morale des décisions du pouvoir4.
Dans cette direction, Paul Ricoeur considérait que l’éthique et la politique ne
peuvent être analysées indépendamment l’une de l’autre. Les deux domaines
«même s’ils se croisent, ne peuvent fusionner». Il y a même un plus grand péril:
celui «d’ignorer le croisement de l’éthique et de la politique plus que de les
confondre»5. Ce péril, apprécie Ricoeur, est alimenté aussi par la multiplication des
crises reflétées autant au nivel des politiques internes qu’au nivel international.
La connexion entre l’éthique et la politique, en général, ou le problème de la
moralité dans les relations internationales, souligne les difficultés réelles dans
les démarches théoriques. Celles-ci sont en bonne partie déterminées par le
nombre et la nature des questions concernant la dimension morale des relations
internationales. Ces questions mettent l’accent sur le soulignement du statut
d’éthique ou sur le rôle dans la structuration des décisions politiques et la
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réglementation des rapports parmi les États. Aussi, sont importantes les
questions qui visent la compatibilité de la dimension normative, reflétée au
niveau de la pratique politique et dans le fonctionnement des institutions et le
composant morale, associée aux exigences concernant la défense et le respect
des droits de l’homme ou l’accord entre la légitimité formulée et soutenue
philosophiquement et moralement. Dans ce cadre, nombreux sont les commentateurs
qui, en partant de la thèse qu’il y a des différences fondamentales entre la vérité
politique et la vérité éthique, soutiennent l’incompatibilité entre la morale et la
politique internationale. En même temps, il y a aussi beaucoup de voix qui
affirment que les valeurs morales sont indissociables des valeurs politiques, même
nécessaires pour redéfinir les relations internationales, dans la restructuration
des politiques pour maintenir l’ordre mondial et, surtout, dans la mise en évidence
des directions d’action, corrélées avec l’établissement de critères de compréhension
et d’évaluation de causes et d’effets, d’objectifs ou de moyens utilisés.
La théorie du pouvoir dans les relations internationales a été et l’est encore
marquée par les impératifs concrets du présent, mais aussi par l’évolution des
intérêts et des aspirations humaines. De ce point de vue, les théoriciens de ce
domaine, de H. Morgenthau à J. Rosneau, ont soutenu l’idée que le principe
fondamental des relations internationales est le maintien de l’équilibre parmi les
puissances et ont affirmé l’indépendance structurelle de la politique internationale.
Ils ont principalement abordé les trois articulations essentielles du pouvoir: le
rapport entre les composants matériels du puissances, les éléments qui constituent
les bases des relations inter-étatiques et la capacité prédictive de la théorie
concernant l’évolution des rapports de forces6. À leur tour, les penseurs politiques
vont définir leurs positions par l’analyse et l’interprétation des événements
politiques ou ils vont lancer leurs hypothèses et constructions dans les trois
directions fondamentales où se sont déroulés les débats, liés au rôle de la moralité
dans les relations internationales. Il s’agit du réalisme politique et du scepticisme
moral, du libéralisme et l’universalisme moral et du postmodernisme qui institue
le relativisme éthique.
Les changements produits après la fin de la «guerre froide» ont généré une
nouvelle configuration politique sur le plan mondial. Ces changements ont
également imposé de nouvelles réflexions d’ordre politique, moral et géostratégique.
D’une part, ces changements sont necessaires à cause de la crise des valeurs
traditionnelles et des concepts avec une relevance discutable, comme la sécurité,
la souveraineté, la redistribution et la citoyenneté. D’autre part, ces changements
sont sollicités par le grand et fréquent nombre de disputes sur les dilemmes moraux
qui accompagnent les actions internationales les plus sonores et les plus amples.
Il s’agit d’interventions humanitaires et pour l’assurance de la sécurité nationale
et internationale, l’impôt de la justice sur le plan mondial et de l’ordre moral et
pas moins par le front ouvert contre le terrorisme, par le recours à la force, pour
l’instauration de la démocratie. Tous ces actes et pensées, évalués dans la perspective
des théories morales, mettent en évidence le fait que l’attitude et le comportement
politique se réalisent en fonction de la situation et de l’expérience concrètes et
non par le rapport aux principes abstraits7.
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Les commentaires et les analyses qui visent la multiplication, la nature et la
légitimité des interventions politiques et militaires prennent en considération les
causes, les objectifs visés mais aussi les conséquences qui produisent de nouveaux
problèmes politiques et dilemmes moraux. Dans ce contexte, G. Andreani et P.
Hassner apprécient que l’interventionnisme a généralement créé des problèmes
et dilemmes pareils. Avec la spécification que les problèmes qui surgissent sont
complètement differents des problèmes du maintien de la paix classique, les
deux auteurs de l’étude Morale et violence internationale avertissent sur les
difficultés de compréhension, d’action et de coopération. Ces difficultés visent:
le décalage entre le mandat politique et les moyens utilisés, la protection des
forces d’intervention et la neutralisation des forces rebelles et de résistance, la
reconstruction de l’État et la réhabilitation de l’économie. En plus, le recours à
la force, soit sur la base du principe de légitimité de la défense de sécurité, soit
pour des raisons strictement humanitaires de défense et de garantie des droits de
l’homme, à l’instar des interventions en Somalie, au Rwanda, en Bosnie, au Kosovo,
en Irak a généré des disputes et des réactions critiques autour de certains dilemmes
comme: l’utilisation de la force à l’appui des victimes de l’oppression totalitaire
ou la contrainte et l’annihilation des oppresseurs, l’assurance de l’équilibre entre
l’intervention des forces de sécurité et le risque d’effets collatéraux, le rapport
entre l’autonomie des actions militaires et leur subordination par rapport à la
politique qui les soutient et les légitime, implicitement, la charge de la responsabilité
de toutes interventions pendant et après les actions déroulées8.
La nouvelle dynamique des rapports entre les États et l’extension de la
démocratie en vertu des principes qui la légitiment (le principe de la liberté, le
principe de l’organisation d’élections libres et le principe de l’autodétermination)
et celle d’un desideratum à peu près généralisé, mettent en évidence aussi le
problème éthique des moyens utilisés pour imposer et défendre le droit à la
démocratie. Des questions essentielles apparaissent dans ce sens: la démocratie
peut-elle être imposée par la force et le droit à la démocratie peut-il être défendu
par des méthodes autoritaires ? La démocratie est-elle une solution pour des pays
avec un potentiel conflictuel en évidence élevé, des pays avec des différences
éthnoculturelles inconnues et contestées ? Une série d’objections ont été formulées
à ces questions visant «la confirmation du droit à la démocratie comme appartenant
au droit international». De cette manière on invoque le fait qu’il n’y a pas une
définition de la démocratie à l’unanimité acceptée et même pas de procédures
démocratiques ayant une valabilité générale. De plus, même si on considère que
«l’intervention démocratique peut être justifiée par l’évolution de la notion de
souverainité», de la perspective du droit international, ce fait ne remplit pas un
consensus large. Davantage, même si on reconnaît la distinction entre le respect
de la démocratie et la reconnaissance des droits de l’homme, on ignore le conflit
entre les deux demandes, avec des effets négatifs dans tous les plans de la vie
interne et internationale9.
Les critiques de l’intervention démocratique mettent en discussion la légitimité
de toutes les opérations subordonnées à cet objectif et attirent l’attention sur le
fait que, au-delà de l’affirmation d’égalité entre les Etats versus la responsabilité
entre les grands puissances, se trouve le droit de chaque peuple à une existence
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libre, paisible et civilisée. Explicitement, les représentants de l’école critique du
droit international considèrent que cette politique interventionniste ne crée pas
la belle et désirée démocratie, mais elle impose et justifie un autre type de domination,
essentiellement neolibérale10.
Dans le même esprit critique, il est analysé aussi «le dilemme de la sécurité»,
un syntagme et un concept utilisé dans la théorie des relations internationales,
avec des origines dans la théorie politique de Th. Hobbes. Ce «dilemme de la
sécurité», qui fait équivaler le système politique à un système anarchique, a comme
prémisse théorique l’extension de l’état naturel au niveau des relations internationales
et vise l’assurance de la sécurité par l’augmentation exagérée du pouvoir11. Le
paradoxe est qu’on arrive à un renforcement de l’état d’insécurité et à «une
spirale d’hostilités et d’armements». En conséquence, ce ne sont pas les relations
anarchiques qui sont responsables du renforcement de l’état d’agitation sociale
et internationale, mais la méfiance réciproque entre des Etats (plus précisément
dans leurs intentions de démocratisation et pacification du monde) et les échecs
répétés sur le plan de la communication.
Une perspective opposée à l’interventionnisme est celle lancée par l’auteur
«de l’éthique du discours», Jürgen Habermas, qui se propose de continuer le projet
kantien de «la paix éternelle». Ce qui particularise sa démarche est l’affirmation
de l’unité rationnelle du langage et la nécessité de la connexion de la théorie
avec «la réalité et l’ordre historique». Ainsi, par la connaissance des tendances
naturelles, qui permettent le passage de l’état naturel vers jus cosmopoliticus, on
peut arriver à une cohabitation paisible seulement à condition de créer d’urgence
un «espace politique international» et une réforme des institutions existantes.
Exprimé de manière synthétique, cet espace est celui «des interactions et des
conciliations des intérêts individuels, de la conscience morale et des traditions
conservées par la communauté»12. En même temps, il faut souligner que cet espace
de l’harmonie des relations et des intérêts humains est loin de confirmer, avec
des arguments philosophiques, «l’universalisme moral», fortement soutenu par
Kant, visé par Habermas et contesté par d’autres penseurs politiques contemporains.
En général, l’attitude critique par rapport à l’interventionnisme et les
controverses concernant les solutions formulées, attirent l’attention, également,
sur la responsabilité politique des Etats impliqués par rapport aux risques de
renforcer les vieilles tendances ou de générer de nouveaux conflits et, pas moins,
d’en multiplier et exagérer dramatiquement les coûts moraux et humains. On
parle souvent en termes durs et impérieux de la dégradation morale du monde
politique actuel comme d’un problème réel et grav, souvent difficile à quantifier.
Une telle voix critique est celle de Noam Chomsky, dont la philosophie politique,
conformément à certains commentateurs, a certains accents qui se croisent avec
la philosophie anarchique. Le point de départ dans son analyse critique, de Des
ambitions impériales est représenté par la définition du système impérial comme
système de domination et de «l’Etat imposteur», comme organisme institutionnel,
qui ignore le droit international, promeut l’aggression et ignore enfreint les droits
de l’homme. Son message exprime la confiance aux hommes et non aux institutions
du pouvoir. Le seul type de gouvernement acceptable est celui de la liberté de
conscience, est le gouvernement qui exclut toute autorité arbitraire. A l’antipode
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se trouvent tous les gouvernements dont l’autorité est exclusivement soutenue
par le pouvoir ou par la popularité médiatisée, implicitement, par le gouvernement
américain. L’indignation résulte du comportement politique des autorités, qui,
bien qu’il «soit sans cesse à couvert en bienveillance», cache l’intention des
Etats-Unis de détenir et de garder le contrôle du monde13. En ce qui cencerne la
politique américaine actuelle, explicitement à l’intervention et à l’effondrement
de la dictature en Irak, Chomsky n’hésite pas à rappeler une ancienne devise,
conformément à l’idée que le bien s’impose forcément par l’amputation du mal.
La rhétorique de la libération d’Irak est aussi critiquée et en même temps que
celle de l’instauration de la démocratie, dont la légitimité est acceptée et reconnue,
seulement avec l’accord et l’approbation des sauveurs14.
Un autre type de réaction déontologique et morale est souvent provoqué par
les efforts des puissances d’entretenir avec des moyens de plus en plus sophistiqués
le dramatisme d’un monde marqué par des conflits et des tensions, beaucoup
étant de nature ethnique et religieuse. De cette manière, parce que le pouvoir ne
peut s’imposer et maintenir exclusivement par la justification rationnelle ou par
la domination dure, les autorités politiques n’hésitent pas à faire appel à «un
dispositif destiné à produire des effets de la catégorie comparable avec les illusions
crée par le mécanisme théâtral»15.
Plus que jamais, tant dans la politique interne qu’internationale, la mesure du
pouvoir est donnée aussi par la capacité de créer et de transmettre des images
dont la valeur dépasse, comme impact, le pouvoir de l’argumentation logique.
L’accès, à «la télé-réalité» plutôt qu’à la réalité, le croisement de l’image (comme
substitut de la pensée, comme G. Sartori soutenait en Homo videns) avec le
cynisme du «télé-politicien», transforme la zone du politique dans une scène où
les dramatisations et les effets visuels sont vitaux pour l’exercice et le maintien
du pouvoir. D’ailleurs, le pouvoir, confronté à une triple menace, c’est-à-dire celle
de «la vérité qui risque de briser l’écran des apparences», du soupçon et «de
l’usure qui l’oblige à la révolutionner», est déterminé à recourir aux techniques
d’enchaînement des images dans une mise en scène où les valences narratives
des actions projetées sont essentielles et non pas la valeur de la vérité ou de la
morale en politique16.
La politique, en général, s’est trouvée et continue d’être sous l’assaut d’un
discrédit frénétique, surtout en ce qui concerne la confiance aux structures du
pouvoir (interne et international), au management politique, mais aussi à
l’évaluation des performances politiques, sous l’aspect humain et moral. Etant
connu le fait que la politique ne se rapporte pas à un monde avec un ordre
préétabli et dépourvu de contraintes et que sa vocation fondamentale est celle de
servir l’homme, le rôle de la connaissance solide du phénomène politique et le
rôle des valeurs morales n’est pas mis en doute, au moins au niveau déclaratif.
Pourtant même si on entend fréquemment les voix qui soutiennent que les valeurs
morales sont indispensables en politique et, également, dans la rédéfinition des
relations internationales, dans l’établissement des critères d’évaluation et dans le
maintien de l’ordre et de la cohésion humaine, on constate, en fait, le mimétisme
de la moralité ou une faible influence des valeurs morales. Il en résulte, d’une
part, des efforts des analystes de décodifier les intentions politiques réelles et le
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message humain et, d’autre part, l’évidence que la responsabilité est assumée
seulement verbalement et imposée au niveau des déclarations comme obligation
ou transférée aux institutions par lesquelles se créent les prémisses de l’apparition
du politicien justicière. D’ailleurs, cette responsabilité dissimulée et non-assumée
comme responsabilité authentique met en évidence une série de contradictions.
En bonne mesure, celles-ci visent la dimension théorique et pragmatique de la
politique internationale, implicitement les controverses entre les différents
courants et orientations politiques et également les contradictions soulignées par
les analystes politiques entre le composant rationnel et celui irrationnel des
relations internationales. Celles-ci se reflètent dans la démarche des plus importants
problèmes du monde contemporain, principalement dans la légitimité théorique
des décisions politiques et pas moins dans la compréhension du rôle de l’éthique
et des mécanismes moraux dans le cadre des relations internationales.
Le composant rationnel du pouvoir, reflété dans l’axiome de l’Etat rationnel,
est soutenu tant par les représentants du réalisme politique, que par ceux du
libéralisme institutionnel. Dans les deux cas on apprécie que la rationalité du
comportement politique est demandée, d’abord par la double détermination entre
l’état d’anarchie, au niveau général, et la politique des Etats (qui à leur tour
nourrissent cet état) ou est soutenue, par les adeptes du libéralisme, par les procédures
instituées de la prise de décisions, respectivement le recours au « choix rationnel», par
l’intermédiaire des institutions internationales17.
La rationalité de l’Etat et de la décision politique dans le plan des relations
internationales ont été parfois repoussés ou analyséses dans des perspectives
différentes. Un repère théorique important et une position clairement exprimée
sont ceux formulés au début du XXeme siècle par Carl Schmitt, adepte du
décisionisme («Souverain est celui qui décide sur l’exception»), qui apprecie
que le principe fondamental de la politique est le binôme «ami-ennemi»
ou «allié-adversaire». Cette distinction fait que l’espace politique contienne
inévitablement «une altérité conflictuelle» qui ne peut pas être abordée par
rapport aux principes rationnels ou normes communes, reconnues et acceptées
par tous. La politique et la souveraineté sont subordonnées à «la logique du
pouvoir», et «la conduite morale des Etats» n’est pas évaluée par rapport à une
prétendue morale abstraite, mais seulement dans et par la guerre18. Autrement
dit, la sphère de la politique internationale est prédestinée aux tensions et aux
conflits, tandis que le critère moral-imoral, appliqué aux relations internationales
ne peut être qu’arbitraire. Dans ce paradigme d’interprétation se trouve aussi
l’approche réaliste de H. Morgenthau. En utilisant la volonté du pouvoir des
Etats dans la définition des relations internationales comme critère, Morgenthau
se situe sur la même position théorique que celle développée par Carl Schmitt, à
l’exception du fait qu’il considère le critère «ami-ennemi» non-relevant dans la
définition de la politique internationale. Pour lui, «toute la politique exterieure
n’est que la volonté du pouvoir de maintenir, de grandir et d’affirmer le pouvoir»
et non le respect des principes moraux abstraits ou des normes, du présupposé
droit international, invoqué par H. Kelsen. En conséquence, les principes moraux
sont intangibles, mais on peut tout au plus s’approcher de ce but, «par un
équilibre d’intérêts et par une solution partielle des conflits»19.
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La rationalité de l’Etat et des décisions politiques dans le contexte des relations
internationales ont été reanalysés aussi de la perspective de certaines recherches
interdisciplinaires, qui introduisent des données du domaine de la psychologie
sociale et de la sociologie des groupes. Ainsi, R. McElroy apprécie que, dans la
politique exterieure, la conscience a un rôle et impact important sur les facteurs
décisionnels. Ce rôle se met en évidence en deux situations distinctes: la première
vise la relevance morale d’une action politique qui influence et soutient la
décision, respectivement le programme de politique exterieure, et la deuxième
situation met l’accent sur la conscience des facteurs de décision qui les déterminent
à choisir, d’une manière raisonnable, des actions avec une signification morale.
Par conséquent, la conscience acceptée comme instance morale, plus ou moins
objective au niveau de chaque individu, peut influencer «les facteurs de décision
à avoir ou à repousser des initiatives de politique exterieure, grâce à leurs
implications morales»20.
L’analyse des relations internationales est indissociable de l’analyse des
théories et concepts politiques et éthiques. Ceci, parce que même si on constate
à première vue la prévalence des dimensions pragmatiques et normatives, la
légitimité des actions politiques, à base des fondements éthiques-philosophiques,
ne peut être ignorée. De plus, dans les conditions d’un désaccord réel entre le
desideratum général concernant l’affirmation d’une nouvelle société libre,
paisible, équilibrée et humaine et beaucoup de divisions et disputes au niveau
des intérêts, convictions et valeurs, on s’impose, plus que jamais, la concentration
sur ces fondements théoriques. Ceux-ci sont destinés à assurer, d’une part, les
explications nécessaires pour diminuer la perspective des conflits et des guerres
et, d’autre part, d’offrir un cadre intelligible à l’expression libre et à la coopération
des Etats. Cette nécessité est de plus en plus évidente aujourd’hui, surtout après
les attentats de 11 septembre 2001 des Etats-Unis, lorsqu’une nouvelle théorie
des conflits ou «la théorie de la barbarie» se préfigure. La l’enjeu principal est
une stratégie centrée sur des intérêts économiques et politiques et soutenus par
l’ascension des ressentiments manifestés dans des actions violentes et
irrationnelles. Les actions terroristes, en réalité, «une imitation de la guerre civile»,
confirment cette tendance mais sous la forme «du rituel tragique spectaculaire»
où la fonction du sacrifice est loin de contribuer à «l’apprivoisement de la violence»21.
Les théories sur les relations internationales mettent en évidence, d’une part,
qu’elles s’inscrivent dans ce que R. Aron appelait des «relations globales», avec
des données et des principes acceptés et, d’autre part, qu’elles sont dépendantes
des décisions subsumées à un système de valeurs partiellement soutenues.
Également, la compréhension et l’évaluation correcte de la politique internationale
présupposent la connaissance de à qu’implique la coopération, dans les
conditions d’acceptation de la diversité humaine et des causes qui alimentent des
réactions violentes et produisent des conflits sociaux et politiques. Dans ce sens,
R. Aron, même s’il a plaidé pour l’autonomie du politique, il n’a pas accepté
l’isolement de «la totalité sociale» et n’a pas exclu l’interdépendance entre le
domaine du politique et la sphère de la connaissance, de la liberté et de la
moralité. Ce «spectateur engagé» a repoussé toute mystification et démarche
unilatérale et exagérée concernant la légalité ou la moralité de la politique
34
ADELA DELIU
9
interne et internationale. Dans sa vision, l’action politique refléte et concrétise
une attitude par rapport aux valeurs affirmées et également «un acte moral puisqu’il
implique toujours une communauté». Ainsi, en exclusant toute exagération du
type de celles lancées par les théories progressistes de facture scientifique, par
l’idéalisme moralisateur ou par le moralisme conservateur, Aron situe le raisonnement
historique comme le raisonnement moral «dans une sphère intermédiaire parmi
les principes universels, abstraits et les principes du réalisme brut». En raison de
cette position, il n’ignore et n’exagère le rôle de la moralité en politique, mais il
associe la moralité avec la prudence et la sagesse. L’auteur français était convaincu
que «la moralité de la sagesse» représente plus que «la moralité de la compassion».
Même si elle est loin de contribuer à résoudre des conflits de différentes zones
du monde, cette moralité constitue pourtant un support réel pour «le plus acceptable
compromis» ou pour ce qui a été nommé un «compromis raisonnable»22.
Les données du monde contemporain et les discours théoriques actuels mettent
en évidence l’impératif de repenser et d’identifier de nouvelles significations du
rapport moralité-politique internationale. Au-delà des désaccords concernant la
légitimité et les principes de fonction du système international, des controverses
concernant certains problèmes qui visent les actions politiques déroulées,
l’intérêt national ou le destin commun, l’égalité entre les Etats et la responsabilité
des grands pouvoirs, la nécessité de reconstruire la solidarité humaine, autour de
valeurs authentiques, deviennent de plus en plus évidentes. Le recours à la force,
à la pression et à l’intimidation sont également des moyens immoraux et
inhumains qui ont menacé et toujours menaceront la civilisation de l’humanité.
NOTES
1. Évelyne Pisier, Istoria ideilor politice, trad. Iolanda
Iaworski, Timiºoara; Amarcord, 2000, p. 515.
2. Sylvie Mesure, Alain Renaut, Rãzboiul zeilor, eseu
despre cearta valorilor, trad. Roxana Albu ºi
Ciprian Mihali, Târgoviºte, Pandora-M, 2002, p. 80.
3. Gilles Andreani, Pierre Hassner, Morale
et violence internationale, “Commentaire” v
111/2005, p. 651.
4. Zygmunt Bauman, Etica postmodernã, trad. Doina
Licã, Timiºoara, Amarcord, 2000, p. 300.
5. Paul Ricoeur, Eseuri de hermeneuticã, trad. Vasile
Tonoiu, Bucureºti, Humanitas, 1995, p. 300.
6. Iulia Motoc, Teoria relaþiilor internaþionale,
Sursele filosofiei morale ºi a dreptului, Bucureºti,
Paideia, 2001, p. 96.
7. Bernard Williams, La fortune morale, Paris,
P.U.F., 1994, p. 42.
8. Gilles Andreani, Pierre Hassner, ibidem, p. 650.
9. Iulia Motoc, op. cit., p. 72.
10. Iulia Motoc, op. cit., p. 73.
11. J. Hertz, Idealist Internationalism and the
Security, „Dilemma“, pp. 157–180, în: I. Motoc,
op. cit., p. 47.
12. Jürgen Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, le
bicentenaire d’une idée kantienne, Paris, Editura
Du Cerf, 1996, pp. 42–46.
13. Noam Chomsky, Ambiþii imperiale, trad. Henrieta
ªerban, Prahova, Antet XX Press, 2005, p. 43.
14. Ibidem, p. 55.
15. Georges Ballandier, Scena puterii, trad. Fãrcaº
Sanda, Oradea, Aion, 2000, p. 16.
16. Ibidem, p. 85.
17. Iulia Motoc, op. cit., p. 56–58.
18. Sylvie Mesure, Alain Renaut, op. cit., p. 103–104.
19. Hans Morgenthau, La notion du politique et la
théorie des différends internationaux, Paris,
1933, p. 3.
20. R. McElroy, Moralitatea în politica externã
americanã, rolul eticii în relaþiile internaþionale,
Bucureºti, Paideia, 1998, p. 56.
21. Georges Ballandier, op. cit., p. 109.
22. Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations,
Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1983, p. 64.
LA MONDIALISATION COMME OBJET PHILOSOPHIQUE?
ANDRÉ TOSEL
On ne saurait énoncer quelque chose sur la catégorie de mondialisation sans
situer son inscription dans une constellation sémantique et conceptuelle où
figurent les notions de monde, mondanéité, être-au-monde. Notre rapport au
monde, à notre monde «moderne», ne va pas de soi, il émerge après que se soient
épuisées deux grandes modalités, que l’on eut sommairement définir comme
appartenance au cosmos antique et comme situation dans le mundus de la tradition
juive et chrétienne.
• Le cosmos antique est la totalité sensée et hiérarchisée des étants, totalité
toujours déjà donnée dans sa forme originiare comme un odre, avec ses places,
l’homme occupant un lieu médian qui le fait appartenir au divin, à l’intelligible,
et au physique, au sensible. Cette double appartenance est médiatisée par la
nature éthico-politique spécifique de l’animal humain qui a le logos et vit dans
la polis où il peut actualiser sa vertu proprement humaine, dans la sphère de la
praxis. Cette sphère est originale en ce que l’homme libre, le citoyen, dans la
contingence, peut faire être le champ des activités poiético-pratiques. Toutefois
la vie bonne, l’eu prattein n’a pour le philosophe qu’une nécessité relative.
Importe pour la satisfaction totale la vie selon la theoria, la vue de l’ordre en son
éternité, sa considération, qui seule donne le site où le cosmos peut être compris,
ses signes déchiffrés, sa loi observée.
• Le mundus chrétien ne remet certes pas en question l’ordre, mais il en
renouvelle profondément l’économie et le sens. Le monde astral et terrestre,
les cieux et la terre, ne sont plus éternels mais créés par un Dieu personnel créateur
qui intervient dans son cours pour en faire une histoire du salut. Les hiérarchies
terrestres de la cité entre hommes libres et esclaves ne sont pas détruites, mais tous
les hommes sont des fils de Dieu auxquels le salut est annoncé, non pas donné.
Perdu par le péché, l’homme est par sa liberté un principe d’errance dans la
création, mais il peut aussi entendre l’appel salvateur de la révélation en vivant
dans le monde comme s’il n’était pas de ce monde, en usant de lui pour se préparer
à la consommation des temps, en aménageant ce monde par son labeur.
La mondanéité moderne se détermine comme destruction et effacement du
cosmos et du mundus. La nature n’est plus ce qu’il faut imiter, la surnature tombe
dans le préjugé. L’homme est au monde sur le mode de l’être-jeté, et cet «êtrejeté» se découvre comme forme de la constitution humaine d’un monde de
l’homme, d’une histoire poiético-pratique que l’homme est supposé pouvoir
faire à partir de ses capacités. Que cette mondaneïté se divise d’elle-même en
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ANDRÉ TOSEL
2
monde civil des nations, en royaume intelligible de la liberté par delà le royaume
de la nécessité, le «mondain» a cessé dans tous les cas d’être un donné cosmologique,
ou un créé tragique, il devient le processus de l’auto-production de l’homme, de
tous les hommes désormais posés comme libres. Il est un produit d’une activité
de production hantée par le modèle de la causa sui, dont tous les hommes
participent en tant que sujets autonomes.
Notre être-au-monde, au monde devenu mondialité, résultat du processus de
mondialisation de la production, est d’abord la fin du monde, la fin du monde
donné antique et celle du monde dans lequel nous est signifié l’appel à vivre en ce
monde sans en être le fils. La mondanéité moderne repose sur la déconsidération
du cosmos et du mundus, sur la puissance du désir, de la subjectivité désirante, se
projetant en devenir monde de son autoproduction et réalisant ainsi son Soi absolu.
Comme le remarque Jean-Luc Nancy1, le désir qui liquide la considération des
astres divins, déconsidère le monde pour en faire l’objet de son desiderium qui se
sidère lui-même dans la production du monde de la production pour la production,
capitaliste jusqu’à nouvel ordre. La planète errante du libre désir naît du désastre
du cosmos et du mundus, et elle fait de la terre qu’elle recouvre sa propre planète.
Longtemps cette autoproduction a réussi à fairre coïncider la conquête de la terre
et la promesse mondialiste, universaliste, de faire de cette conquête sidérante le
monde que la liberté humaine produit à partir d’elle-même, le regnum hominis, le
vrai mundus intelligibilis. C’est à l’aune de cette promesse que nous voudrions
interroger la philosophie actuelle dans sa confrontation avec la mondialisation.
De l’apologie à l’apocalypse de la mondialisation
ou comment s’orienter dans la pensée
Si en ces moments les plus hauts, la philosophie occidentale moderne s’est
voulue pensée de l’universel rationnel comme fondement du mondial sous les
auspices du droit (Kant et le cosmopolitisme), si avec Hegel et Marx elle a pensé
ensemble cet universel et les contradictions du monde réel, la philosophie
actuelle, du moins en France, a renoncé à penser la mondialisation de manière
directe, en unissant élaboration des catégories de l’universel et analyse déterminée
des processus effectifs.
Les seules exceptions notables sont celles d’Eric Weil qui dans sa Philosophie
politique2 trop oubliée, s’interrogeait sur le mécanisme social en voie de
mondialisation; ou de philosophes marqués par le meilleur de Marx (Henri
Lefebvre, Étienne Balibar, Jacques Bidet, Daniel Bensaïd, Jean Robelin, Yves
Schwartz, Jean-Marie Vincent). La philosophie délègue cette analyse aux sciences
sociales qui la tentent dans un style différent pour chacune d’elles. Ainsi
l’économie politique présente un champ antagonique où s’affrontent la thèse
libérale (dominante) du marché mondial comme base d’un nouvel ordre
international et la thèse critique (minoritaire) de cet ordre au nom de la structure
divisée de l’économie-monde (école de Samir Amin, de Giorgio Arrighi, de
Immanuel Wallerstein). Ainsi la sociologie, depuis Max Weber, traite le problème
à partir d’une interrogation sur la spécificité de la sociéte moderne comme
société de la rationalisation mondiale des structures économiques, politiques,
3
LE MONDIALISATION COMME OBJET PHILOSOPHIQUE?
37
juridiques et culturelles. Une énorme littérature spécialisée a vu le jour; le moins
que l’on puisse dire est qu’elle n’a pas attiré l’attention des philosophes professionnels.
Ce partage des tâches a pour effet de conduire la philosophie à aborder la
mondialisation du capitalisme de manière indirecte, par prétérition ou par
euphémisation. On peut grossièrement regrouper en effet sous deux chefs cette
approche de la mondialisation par la philosopie, celle de l’apologie de la
mondialisation par euphémisation de ses contradictions, et celle de la
mondialisation déterminée par prétérition comme l’événement indiscriminé
d’une apocalypse sans au delà.
• L’apologie indirecte de la mondialisation capitaliste est le fait de la
philosophie politique issue du libéralisme. Elle prend acte de la mondialisation du
marché des capitaux, de l’interdépendance des économies capitalistes, de la
dominance des technologies à haute valeur ajoutée qui sont des technologies de
la communication et de l’information. Elle prend la forme de la thèse du nouvel
ordre mondial supposé avoir émergé de la disparition du communisme de type
soviétique pour soutenir que dans les contradictions et les inégalités du marché
mondial se réalise une complémentarité des économies et des politiques dont
témoigne la constitution de zones nouvelles de libre-échange tendant à
l’unification en une fédération quasi étatique (ainsi la communauté européenne).
On n’a pas assez remarqué que cette philosophie politique accepte un partage
initial des tâches avec l’économie politique, dont elle accepte de laisser
déterminer cette autonomie de l’extérieur et de recevoir comme objets à traiter
des objets séparés de leurs conditions de possibilité économiques et sociales. Elle
rabat ses propres objets politiques sur le droit et la morale. C’est ainsi que la
thématique de la justice et de ses principes éthiques permet d’assurer la
communication avec la pratique libérale au niveau socio-économique sans que
soient thématisés les processus de démantèlement du Welfare State, les
résistances qui l’acompagnent, les transformations de l’État invité à devenir
socialement modeste, tous aspects de la mondialisation. En consacrant la coupure
entre économie et politique et en assurant la subordination des fonctions
publiques de l’État à l’élément juridico-moral tel que le définit la supposée
société civile, les théories de la justice redéfinissent la liberté de l’État comme
liberté d’adaptation aux lois redevenues «naturelles» de l’économie.
Cette apologie indirecte culmine dans l’élaboration d’un nouveau droit
international public et privé avec ses institutions propres: d’une part l’O.N.U. et la
généralisation du droit d’ingérence dans la politique d’États supposés bafouer
les droits de l’homme et du citoyen; d’autre part, le Fonds Monétaire International
et la Banque Mondiale qui conditionnent leur aide à la mise en pratique
de politiques économiques fondées sur la productivité du capital. Si les juristes
tiennent le devant de la scène, une fraction non négligeable de la philosophie
accompagne ce mouvement en développant une philosopie du droit
communicationnelle et une éthique du discours universalisable, en quoi la
mondialisation accomplirait positivement les promesses de la modernité.
• D’un autre bord, dans le sillage des grandes critiques de la modernité comme
réalisation de la métaphysique, critiques issues de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, la
philosophie procède à une reconnaissance panique de la mondialisation capitaliste
38
ANDRÉ TOSEL
4
identifiée à une reconnaissance panique de la mondialisation capitaliste identifiée
à la domination de la techno-science, et de son nihilisme. La mondialité est la
manifestation destinale ou épocale d’un envoi de l’être où se consomme son
oubli dans la manipulation de l’étant par l’étant humain. Cette approche ne tient
pas compte de la constitution de la communauté internationale ni de son droit en
qui elle ne voit que l’ultime avatar de même projet métaphysique. Elle se veut
radicale et se place sur le plan ontologique. Et son ontologie est une ontologie
négative dont le pathos est celui du tragique. Elle fait apparaître le non-sens
d’une production identifiée à la technique comme telle, vouée à devenir autoréférentielle. Elle souligne le renversement de cette production en consommation,
en consomption des hommes et des choses. Elle montre dans la crise écologique
sans précédent que connaît la planète l’effet du nihilisme occidental et elle
recherche des issues dans la seule pensée poétique ou dans des idéalisations
contre-factuelles d’expériences historiques du passé. Par la mondialisation de la
métaphysique devenue technique planétaire de la manipulation des hommes et
des choses se constitue un monde qui est l’im-monde.
Nous voudrions contribuer à la critique de ces deux modalités spéculaires de
penser, ou plutôt d’impenser, la mondialisation-processus et la mondialité-résultat.
Toutes deux, en effet, manquent la spécificité historique de la mondialisation
comme devenir-monde des rapports de production capitalistes.
De son côté, l’apologie juridico-communicationnelle de la société civile
internationale fait de la mondialisation un universel abstrait séparé de ses
conditions et de ses formes contradictoires de réalisation; elle l’idéalise comme
une sorte d’ultra-impérialisme (thèse déjà développée par le théoricien de la
Seconde Internationale, Karl Kautsky): la concentration des capitaux conduirait
à la fusion «pacifique» des capitalismes nationaux en des aires pacifiées capables
de réguler leur concurrence interne dans une exploitation en commun des ressources,
sans guerre réciproque. Or il se trouve que le capital ne peut pas se coaliser en
ses formes différenciées et contradictoires contre le travail sans produire des
divisions internes au sein de la force de travail, sans opposer les diverses
fractions de la force de travail internationale les unes aux autres; il se trouve
aussi que les États ne coexistent pas dans l’indifférence mais se lient en se
hiérarchisant en centres et périphéries, partagés eux-mêmes selon la même
logique de division du centre et de la périphérie. Il se trouve enfin que dans ce
processus incessant de restructuration la dérégulation opérée en raison des
différences de productivité est le mode même de régulation, et que donc la
guerre économique et militaire est toujours possible (et réelle). Si le droit
international public et privé fait signe en direction d’une organisation universelle
du travail social, voire d’un sur-État, cet horizon est non seulement lointain mais
ambigu. Pour l’instant, le droit s’il n’est pas simple idéologie de légitimation
demeure une diction universelle de la constitution de la hiérarchie de
l’économie-monde, nulle domination ne pouvant désormais être et durer sans
pouvoir dire un universel du droit, sans pouvoir se dire comme cet universel.
Dans le meilleur des cas, le droit international est protestation contre l’inhumain
de telle diction du droit et promesse d’un droit plus humain.
D’autre part, l’apocalyptique ontologique compromet la lucidité qui lui
permet d’individualiser les risques majeurs de la mondialisation par une vision
5
39
fantasmatique des processus effectifs de l’économie-monde. Ceux-ci sont
déplacés en de grades entités démoniaques, véritables figures du mal ontologique
qui se concentrent dans le couple Savoir-Pouvoir, identifiable indifféremment à
la Métaphysique, à la Technique, à la Technoscience, au Nihilisme. La dénonciation
fondée du fantasme rationaliste de maîtrise constitue son adversaire en une
totalité sans extériorité, sans fissures ni écarts internes, par où une résistance,
une lutte déterminée pourraient faire sens. À la mondialo-philie économicojuridique, à son culte abstrait d’un nouvel ordre international coïncidant avec le
droit, à son idéalisation naturalisante du marché, s’oppose une mondialophobie
ontologico-esthétique tout aussi abstraite, avec sa complaisance esthétisante pour
le négatif, avec sa massive identification de la métaphysique et de la technique,
avec son incapacité à analyser sans prétérition philosophante arbitraire la
mondialisation comme technologie sociale d’un rapport social déterminé, le
rapport capitaliste. Une lucidité ontologique impuissante et biaisée dément les
promesses non tenues du droit international, mais manque le droit comme
moment de la nouvelle technique sociale du capitalisme mondial, et avec lui le
rapport social fondamental.
Dans les deux cas, la pensée abdique, désorientée, oscillant entre la demiassurance d’une transubstantiation juridique des risques majeurs qui définissent
la mondialisation et la séduction morbide devant les formes du négatif, les crises
de tout ordre, du sens, des valeurs qui la caractérisent tout autant. La question
est alors celle du vieux Kant: entre apologie et apocalypse comment s’orienter
dans la pensée de la mondialisation?
La mondialisation comme technique sociale
— économico-politique — de l’internationalisation
du capitalisme historique
La philosophie est ainsi confrontée à la tâche d’une prise directe, ni apologétique
ni euphémisante, de la mondialisation, au devoir théorique d’en définir le concept
avec rigueur. Nous posons ici que la mondialisation est l’internationalisation du
rapport de production capitaliste fondé sur la soumission réelle du travail par
le capital. Si Marx ne peut être crédité d’une analyse complète de cette
internationalisation, il en a donné les principes. Les théoriciens de l’économiemonde ont pu les développer en les rectifiant. Tentons de les reformuler en
montrant comment cette reformulation est susceptible de réorienter la philosophie
du droit international, d’en dépasser les limites qui sont celles-là même qui en font
une apologétique constituante du capitalisme mondialisé, et de guider l’analyse
des structures de la société moderne. Les résultats obtenus sur le terrain de la
philosophie sociale, politique, et juridique permettront alors de revenir sur la
question proprement ontologique de la mondialité.
La mondialisation est la création d’une nouvelle structure d’ensemble de la
production, porteuse d’un nouveau système de techniques sociales, toutes
finalisées par la recherche de la productivité différentielle du capital au moyen
de la réduction du temps de travail. Ces techniques sociales sont celles de la
gestion informatisée de la production, de la généralisation du travail «immatériel».
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ANDRÉ TOSEL
6
Porté par ces techniques innovantes qui ne sont jamais pures techniques, mais
toujours matérialisations sociales du rapport d’exploitation, le mouvement du
capital internationalise le marché des capitaux et de la production. La mondialisation
est radicalement économiciste et techniciste, mais elle est tout autant politiciste,
dans la mesure où elle ne peut s’accomplir que dans le mouvement d’une
perpétuelle rehiérarchisation politique des États protecteurs des firmes
dominantes (y compris des multinationales qui ont toujours une base nationale).
La mondialisation oblige tout d’abord à récuser la conception de la société
comme ensemble de secteurs ou de pratiques séparés, chacun organisé selon son
ordre de justification propre (selon la conception exposée par Luc Boltanski et
Laurent Thévenot dans leur ouvrage De la justification. Les économies de la
grandeur). Elle est tout à la fois économique, politique, technique et juridique,
et elle oblige à recourir à un modèle théorique fondé sur l’impureté et l’intrication
des pratiques. Elle ne peut être pensée comme un métaniveau qui viendrait
surdéterminer le niveau national ou local. Elle est la scène désormais première
qui investit les dimensions, ou scènes nationales, de l’intérieur, et les transforme.
Le mondial est un niveau interne du national.
Cette primauté de l’international permet de reprendre la question de l’État
par-delà les truismes répétitifs des théories de l’État de droit. Les États ne sont
pas appelés à dépérir devant et dans la société civile internationale comme voudrait
le faire croire l’utopie néolibérale. Ils sont voués à assumer une autre fonction
qui s’enracine négativement dans leur incapacité à contrôler la formation du
marché mondial du capital (d’autres opérateurs économiques peuvent en effet
anticiper toutes les mesures prises par les États en matière de limitation des
changes). Les États ont désormais la fonction d’assurer politiquement la gestion
différenciée de la force de travail en encadrant les techniques de délocalisation
d’entreprises en raison du coût différentiel de la force de travail et en promouvant
les techniques fondées sur le gain de productivité (économie du temps de travail).
Seules peuvent développer ces techniques à haute valeur ajoutée les firmes
multinationales capables de créer des réseaux d’entreprises constituées de
nombreuses unités de production. Comme à leur tour ces firmes ont une base
nationale dominante, la mondialisation est politique: elle spécialise les États en
raison de leurs liens aux firmes, aux branches de la production où se redéfinit la
productivité du travail et donc du capital. L’accroissement de la productivité se
pose en ressource politique directe en commandant la hiérarchisation des États.
La mondialisation n’est donc pas l’instauration d’un nouvel ordre international
où s’échangeraient et se formeraient des complémentarités de secteurs. Elle est
un ordre et un espace de domination hégémonique où la place dans la hiérarchie
se joue sur la capacité de chaque État à produire et exporter des biens via les
firmes «multinationales-nationales», si l’on peut dire, biens qui requièrent du
travail très qualifié et des masses croissantes de capital financier. Ces mêmes
États sont aussi ceux où le travail le moins qualifié est devenu trop cher par
rapport au prix du marché international du travail: il leur revient à la fois de
traiter le chômage structural incompressible et de créer les conditions politiques
permettant aux firmes de recourir à la délocalisation pour la production des biens
primaires devenus moins rentables. La mondialisation est la forme technico-
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sociale nouvelle de la solution classique donnée au problème structural du
capitalisme historique: comment accroître la rémunération du capital en maintenant
élevée la demande de travail du côté des travailleurs, en évitant donc le plein
emploi. Elle a toujours pour contenu — horresco referens — la lutte de classes
du capital et du travail. Elle ne peut se réduire à la seule coopération entre
secteurs dont les uns seraient internationalisés, exportateurs de produits de haute
technologie, à la rentabilité élevée, et dont les autres, producteurs de biens
primaires, seraient déconnectés du marché mondial. C’est toujours le capital
(financier en l’occurence) qui, par son mouvement d’ensemble, met en concurrence
les marchés nationaux de la force de travail et exige de s’articuler à la politique
étatique. Celle-ci se présente alors à la fois comme gestion de cette force de travail
et comme agent co-constitutif du renforcement des secteurs compétitifs qui sur
le marché mondial deviennent les définisseurs de la norme sociale de productivité.
L’État territorial-national ne disparaît pas plus que la classe ouvrière. Il se
déplace et devient l’agent d’une projection inédite de la territorialité nationale audelà du territoire historique. L’État n’est plus l’unité d’un simple marché intérieur
qui réaliserait à son échelle le fonctionnement du capital. S’il conserve la gestion
territorialisante de la force de travail, il se projette dans la constitution d’un territoire
exterritorialisé qui est celui des lieux où l’État produit, vend, et garantit cette
production et cette vente. La France n’est pas d’abord un lieu commun de vie et de
culture; elle est (dans) le réseau des firmes françaises qui vendent et qui essaiment.
Le président de la République conçoit son rôle comme celui d’un commis-voyageur
en chef. L’État intervient comme point nodal de la politique des firmes tournées
vers l’expansion, il se charge de réduire au moindre coût les activités qui ne
s’inscrivent pas dans les réseaux des firmes. La fonction de souveraineté de l’État
s’altère en ce qu’elle ne consiste plus à concentrer les rapports de pouvoir à son
échelle, mais à les transformer pour les représenter au niveau international en
configurations directement internationales. La représentation politique est aussi la
représentation commerciale de l’entreprise France en ses firmes, et elle se dédouble
en ce qu’à l’intérieur du territoire national l’État représente cette configuration des
entreprises nationales auprès des autres forces3.
On comprend que l’offensive menée contre le Welfare State s’inscrit en cette
perspective d’une mondialisation qui est bien désémancipation en matière de
droits sociaux et qui n’a pas encore rencontré de résistance adéquate. On
comprend pourquoi et comment est en cours un processus de privatisation de
l’État et de ses appareils idéologiques que sont les services publics (transports,
système de formation scolaire et universitaire, service de santé et de sécurité
sociale). L’État se privatise dans la mesure où les marchés et les entreprises publiques
se trouvent soumis à des normes de productivité directement issues du marché
mondial. Les grandes négociations internationales deviennent des événements
de la politique intérieure et de droit intérieur. La politique économique internationale
donne ou impose de plus en plus ses objets à la politique intérieure.
La mondialisation développe ainsi un nationalisme spécifique proprement
économique qui fait de la nation une entreprise — le modèle de l’entreprise
devenant le pilier de l’idéologie nécessaire pour obtenir la soumission des États
aux normes de productivité du marché. Elle constitue la concurrence comme
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concurrence nationale où interviennent des firmes qui ne sont pas apatrides, mais
bien nationales dans leur aptitude à faire du territoire national là où elles opèrent.
L’État n’a de puissance que dans la mesure où il peut articuler des réseaux
économico-financiers qui sont tout aussi bien politiques et institutionnels. Cette
puissance a pour condition une gestion différenciée de la force de travail: la
partie de cette force de travail qui ne correspond plus à la rentabilité moyenne
définie mondialement ne peut être qu’en position d’exclusion structurale permanente.
Même si la masse des exclus varie, elle prend la forme (post?)moderne d’une
individualité humaine définie de manière privative et cumulative: elle recouvre
la masse croissante des «hommes sans», sans travail d’abord, puis sans domicile
fixe, voire sans papiers dans le cas des immigrés non tolérés. La gestion de la
force de travail implique un lien spécifique entre nationalisme et racismes,
puisque la racisation de la masse des réfugiés économiques, venus des nations
dominées, mis en concurrence avec les travailleurs nationaux, permet à l’État de
diviser cette force de travail en l’opposant à elle-même, en la différenciant, en
faisant de la citoyenneté nationale un privilège, à la fois économique et politique.
La concurrence mondiale prend simultanément la forme d’un retour de ce
que la tradition marxiste nommait l’impérialisme. Mais la mondialisation modifie
cet impérialisme en lui donnant la forme tendancielle de quasi empires, que
domine aujourd’hui l’empire des États-Unis (avec sa zone d’expansion directe
sur toute l’Amérique du Nord et une partie de l’Amérique Centrale). La formation
d’espaces supranationaux à vocation impériale ou sub-impériale repose sur les
contraintes de la productivité, puisque l’emportent les espaces qui sont producteurs
et exportateurs de technologies à haute productivité. L’économisme est politicisme
une fois encore en ce que l’unification économique (jamais totale) de ces espaces
se démultiplie en son intérieur même quand elle parvient à se traduire comme
unification politique (toujours instable). La mondialisation est la montée en puissance
d’États quasi impériaux (dont demain peut-être l’Europe), d’hégémoniser les
États-Nations plus faibles en les subordonnant au moyen des contraintes
exercées par les marchés des capitaux et en jouant des processus de racisation et
d’ethnicisation. Ainsi, à tous les niveaux du système-monde opère transversalement
la même norme de la productivité, moteur de la concurrence économique,
politique, militaire, en prise sur les oppositions nationalitaires et identitaires.
C’est elle qui unifie ce que la sociologie libéral-sociale des ordres de justification
voudrait nous présenter comme autant de sphères distinctes, susceptibles chacune
de produire sa norme de justice (Walzer, Thévenot et Boltanski). C’est cette unité
qui ouvre sur une pluralité d’histoires à vitesses différentes que le cosmopolitisme
mondialophile se refuse à penser radicalement et que l’ontologie mondialophobe
ignore superbement en donnant ainsi à son radicalisme une tournure équivoque.
Du droit international dans la mondialisation
Tout discours sur le droit international et le nouvel ordre mondial supposé
suivre de la mondialisation doit donc se mesurer à cette analyse. On ne peut
souscrise à la thèse que s’opèrerait par le jeu de la mondialisation une organisation
de la communauté internationale qui pour la première fois dans l’histoire ferait
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des droits de l’homme et du citoyen sa charte et serait à même de se donner une
structure politique effective. On assiste aujourd’hui à l’émergence d’un étrange
cosmopolitisme guerrier, à un cosmopacifisme militaire, oú se dit la mondialisation.
Si Hobbes jugeait impossible de transformer l’état de nature qui règne entre États
souverains et signifie permanence de la guerre, le droit international pense que
l’heure a sonné pour donner corps au projet kantien d’une fédération d’Etats de
droit réalisant l’état civil entre États. Le fameux Tiers qui était absent dans les relations
internationales que la Société des nations, après 1918, et l’Organisation des Nations
Unies, après 1945 n’avaient pas pu réaliser, serait mis à l’ordre du jour de la
mondialisation. Un contractualisme cosmopolitique pourrait régir le système-monde.
Il aurait les traits suivants:
1. Peut être passé entre États un pacte préliminaire de non agression, ces
États se proposant de constituer les uns avec les autres une association permanente.
C’est le pactum societatis 1.
2. Un second pacte, non plus négatif, mais positif, se forme si les États
s’accordent sur une série de règles communes pour résoudre les différends les
opposant et pour organiser le recours à une force légitime commune. C’est le
pactum societatis 2.
3. Doit s’acomplir un assujettissement à un pouvoir commun qui soit capable
de faire respecter les pactes 1 et 2, ainsi souscrits, en recourant si besoin est à la
force. C’est le pactum subjectionis.
4. La reconnaissance et la protection des droits fondamentaux de liberté sont
assurés, ces droits limitant et autorisant tout à la fois le pouvoir constitué. C’est
ce schéma qui déjà structure potentiellement l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
Résultat d’un pactum societatis, l’Organisation doit désormais disposer du pactum
subjectionis, c’est-à-dire du monopole de l’exercice légitime du pouvoir de
contrainte internationale. La guerre du Golfe persique contre l’Irak aurait esquissé
en 1991 ce passage d’un pacte à l’autre, les États-Unis pouvant être considérés
comme le bras armé de l’O.N.U. pour rétablir la souveraineté d’un État indépendant
agressé injustement. Ainsi un droit cosmopolitique aurait exprimé le nouvel
ordre international en justifiant le retour de la théorie de la guerre juste, le justum
bellum des scolastiques catholiques.
Il est possible de faire une autre lecture de ce qui est sûrement la première
guerre cosmopolitique à l’époque de la mondialisation. Voici les rudiments d’une
traduction réaliste stratégique de la guerre du droit international. En cinq leçons.
• Leçon 1. Après la fin de l’Empire du Mal soviétique et de la guerre froide,
les États-Unis, en alliance avec les États européens occidentaux, ont la charge de
la marche économique, politique, morale, du monde «mondialisé». Leur fonction
doit être redéfinie dans le sens de la Global Security. Les États-Unis ont l’occasion
historique de construire un système international enfin juste, fondé sur les valeurs
morales et politiques de paix et d’équité, et aussi fondé sur l’économie capitaliste
mondialisée et la généralisation de la démocratie. Cette Manifest Destiny implique
donc la construction d’un système de sécurité globale entre pays qui appartiennent
aux aires les plus industrialisées, sous la direction politique et militaire des États-Unis.
• Leçon 2. Cette construction à son tour exige une correction radicale de l’O.N.U.
qui ne peut plus être un simple lieu d’expression des conflits, réfléchissant les
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rapports de forces internationales, paralysé par les oppositions des anciennes
deux super-puissances et de leurs blocs. Les Nations Unies doivent être le lieu
d’énonciation du système de la sécurité globale, telle que la conçoivent les ÉtatsUnis. Si l’O.N.U. ne peut se prêter à cette énonciation, et si les votes qui s’y
manifestent sont incertains, l’O.T.A.N peut être le cadre de cette stratégie, et, loin
d’être dissoute, elle doit être utilisée comme cadre et forme d’intervention pour
rétablir militairement le droit, comme l’a montré la guerre du Kosovo, menée
contre un État, la Serbie, qui n’était formellement en guerre contre aucun des États
justiciers. En rétablissant le droit, l’O.T.A.N. assure la sécurité de la communauté
mondiale telle que l’interprètent les pays hégémoniques.
• Leçon 3. En effet, avec le droit, ce sont les intérêts nationaux et impériaux
des pays qui sont préservés dans une situation de vulnérabilité produite par la
reconstruction instable des identités nationales. Certains États, en effet, ne sont
plus en mesure d’assurer la protection des nationalités qu’ils avaient fédérées et
qui cherchent avec l’indépendance le protectorat d’États du centre capitaliste
plus puissants (cas de l’ex-Yougoslavie). D’autres sont tentés de se constituer en
puissances subimpériales fondées sur le contrôle de ressources stratégiques (le
pétrole), et des espaces stratégiques en concurrence directe avec ce centre (cas
de l’Irak). Tous doivent être réprimés, redéfinis et soumis à l’ordre du droit.
• Leçon 4. Pour réaliser concrètement les objectifs de la nouvelle stratégie,
les grandes puissances industrielles doivent abandonner le vieux principe de non
ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des États souverains, principe qui appartient
à l’ancien droit européen et que la S.D.N. et l’O.N.U. avaient déjà ébranlé,
poursuivant sur une base démocratique le processus initié par la Sainte-Alliance
à la fin des guerres napoléoniennes. La nouvelle Sainte-Alliance, sous direction
impériale américaine, reformule le principe théologique du justum bellum sous
la forme du droit humanitaire d’ingérence dans tous les cas où elle jugerait
nécessaire d’intervenir pour résoudre les crises attentatoires à l’ordre mondial.
• Leçon 5. Le pacifisme guerrier du cosmopolitisme juridique affronte le risque
d’une guerre totale contre l’ennemi qui est immédiatement criminalisé comme
ennemi du droit, et donc du genre humain. L’ennemi du droit cesse d’être, en
effet, un justus hostis, il occupe la place de l’injustus, de l’impie des croisades
chères au justum bellum. Cet ennemi mérite le châtiment qui le déclasse ou le
déspécifie, le séparant de sa dignité d’être humain. La presse américaine, à la
différence de la presse européenne, n’a pas caché la violence inouïe qui a
caractérisé la guerre du Golfe: recours à de nouvelles armes de destruction
massive, terreur exercée sur les populations civiles, désastres écologiques, blocus
économique dévastateur maintenu dix ans après les combats, contrôle total des
media privés d’images, silence imposé aux victimes du mauvais côté, la guerre
étant elle-même présentée comme un immense jeu vidéo sans risques pour les
justiciers (zéro mort). La première guerre de la mondialisation, la guerre du droit
international et de son pacifisme, a été une guerre totale, elle a dénié à l’ennemi
son statut politique pour se présenter comme une opération de police
humanitaire. À la limite, ce droit a paradoxalement restauré le principe abominé
et immoral du machiavélisme vulgaire selon lequel «la fin justifie tous les
moyens». La «vertu» n’a pas hésité à se faire terreur, hommage inattendu à
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l’«affreux Robespierre». L’extermination de personnes innocentes a été jugée
conforme à la morale et au droit réunis. Les principes de cette morale et de ce
droit ont été accommodés selon une nouvelle scolastique dont les ex-nouveaux
philosophes français se sont faits les spécialistes. Aux États-Unis s’est
développée une nouvelle spécialité, l’éthique de la guerre juste, avec les travaux
importants de Charles Beitz, Stanley Hoffman, Michael Walzer (un des rares à
avoir été traduit en français, avec Guerres justes, guerres injustes, Paris, Belin,
1998). On peut prédire sans se tromper leur importation bruyante en France. Il
n’est ni étonnant ni nouveau que le moralisme se renverse en terrorisme.
La communanté internationale telle qu’elle se présente en ses institutions
reconnues (O.N.U. et tribunaux internationaux) ne peut être considérée comme le
représentant de l’humain et de ses droits. Cette communanté se compose d’États
inégaux et inégalement capables de dire le droit international. Que dit le droit?
Réponse: ce que dit celui qui dit le droit. Qui dit le droit? Les États les plus
puissants et en particulier les États quasi impériaux, qui sans d’ailleurs disposer
d’un pouvoir réellement international se donnent un bras armé. Loin de préexister
à cette diction, le droit est sa construction. Mais cette construction demeure celle
d’un différend puisqu’il est toujours possible d’exercer le droit de protester
contre le droit dit par la puissance impériale. Les contradictions demeurent qui
font du droit une production spécifique d’universel normatif, mais cet universel
n’est jamais séparé des conditions de sa réalisation et des formes de sa contestation.
Contrairement à ce que la doxa libérale affirme sur ce point, la mondialisation
en sa phase actuelle n’est pas liée à une percée de l’universalisme effectif. Celuici a connu son meilleur moment dans la période 1945–1968, lorsque la décolonisation
(la guerre du Vietnam comprise) a coïncidé avec l’extension du Welfare State.
Depuis, la contre-révolution néo-libérale a imposé, avec le démantèlement des
rudiments de l’État de droit social, une désemancipation internationale en
scindant l’humanité selon les rapports contradictoires d’une coopération-concurrence,
en organisant le retour de la guerre juste et du droit à la guerre. Plus profondément,
malgré leur prétention, les grandes institutions qui émergent en cette mondialisation
ne renvoient pas à l’humanité comme sujet. Elles ne renvoient qu’à la communauté
internationale de fait qui est une puissance morale «fictive», une puissance
morale dont les puissances impériales doivent assurer la représentation. Le droit
international public ne peut aujourd’hui dépasser ses limites et celles-ci tiennent
aux mécanismes de la représentation qui font de la communauté internationale
la représentation des États qui la fondent. Le représenté réel n’est pas l’humanité,
mais cela même qui la divise et l’inégalise, la productivité du capital en tant
qu’elle règle la puissance productive des États inséparable de leur puissance
politique. Ou plutôt: la partie n’est pas finie, le représenté «est» le conflit qui naît
des résistances à cette productivité aveugle.
Mondialisation, ontologie et nihilisme
On ne saurait cependant s’en tenir à une critique du droit international montrant
à quelles impasses conduit l’impensé de la mondialisation. La question a bien
une dimension ontologique, comme l’a perçu de manière fantastique l’apocalyptique
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mondialophobe. La pensée de l’être-au-monde développée par l’analytique
existentiale de Martin Heidegger, prolongée par la méditation sur la condition
humaine d’Hannah Arendt et par d’autres, peut être considérée comme une
approche ontologique négative de la mondialisation, à bien des égards plus
profonde et moins hypocrite que le cosmo-politisme-bellicisme libéral. Portant
à son paroxysme le désir de la libre subjectivité dans son appropriation de l’être,
la mondialisation ne se confondrait pas tant avec l’être-au-monde du sasein
qu’elle en scellerait l’aliénation. Si notre vie est marquée par le fait d’être au
monde, si le monde est l’existential de la vie, qui a pour sens d’être contenu en
son phénomène, cet in-der-Welt-Sein ne se confond pas avec la mondialisation
qui en est l’oubli. L’activité dominée par la production aliène le sujet producteur
au monde et fait de lui un errant, un étranger, une cause errante, sans astre,
un désastre. La «conception» du monde en sa mondialité productive dénoue
irréversiblement le lien de l’humanité à la terre et au ciel. La production de la
mondialité annihile la condition originaire de possibilité de notre être-au-monde
en images du monde où se réfléchit narcissiquement, sans altérité, le désir
rationnel devenu volonté de maîtrise. Prise dans la production de son monde en
expansion totalisante, la subjectivité maîtresse renonce à «habiter» le monde
pour le faire, défaire, et refaire à son image, objet de son projet de maîtrise. Nous
sommes à la fois maîtres imaginaires de ce monde de la mondialité et esclaves
de sa loi de reproduction à l’identique. Nous avons perdu le rapport-au-monde,
l’être-au-monde, nous sommes devenus sans monde, nous sommes im-monde(s).
Si cette approche ne saurait passer pour une analyse déterminée des processus
spécifiques de la mondialisation, on ne saurait lui nier une lucidité, celle de la
lumière noire qui ne se laisse pas abuser par les mensonges de la lecture libérale
et de ses avatars. Heidegger fait de l’être-au-monde autre chose qu’une catégorie
corrélative du produire; il en fait un existential. Le monde est le propre du Dasein.
Le Dasein est être-au-monde-en-commun, Mitsein.
La communauté des hommes en son rapport au monde, saisie en son historicité,
ne se confond pas avec la mondialité résultat de la mondialisation, si celle-ci est
une dépendance de l’ipséité du sujet-souverain. Heidegger retrouve la grande
polémique qui a déchiré l’idéalisme allemand. Dans la gigantomachie philosophique,
il se range du côté de Schelling, contre Hegel, il donne à la critique romantique
de la modernité sa plus grande pertinence, à la hauteur des défis du siècle.
Autant dire que nous nous trouvons confrontés à l’équation heideggerienne
entre technique et mondialisation, mondialisation et métaphysique. La mondialisation
serait la forme que prend le destin de la métaphysique comme technique
devenue planétaire, technique de la manipulation et de la consommation des
hommes et des choses, des étants. On aurait là comme une transcription de la
réversibilité entre production et nihilisme repérée par Marx dès le Manifeste du
parti communiste et formulée en des phrases de feu: «La bourgeoisie a créé le
marché mondial [...] Ce bouleversement continuel de la production, ce constant
ébranlement de tout le système social, cette agitation et cette insécurité
perpétuelles distinguent l’époque bourgeoise de toutes les précédentes. Tous les
rapports sociaux traditionnels et figés avec leur cortège de croyances et d’idées
admises et vénérées se dissolvent; celles qui les remplacent deviennent surannées
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avant de se cristalliser. Tout ce qui était solide et stable se volatilise, tout ce qui
était sacré est profané». Le capital achèverait la métaphysique en se faisant
monde mais en consumant la possibilité de l’être-au-monde. Les aspects les plus
violents et destructeurs de la mondialisation capitaliste, son húbris, obligent à
prendre au sérieux un certain Heidegger, celui qui en son langage donne le
chiffre existential des risques effectifs de notre situation ontologique et oblige à
nous défaire des assurances du rationalisme téléologique, de son affirmation
d’un Sujet-origine promis à l’actualisation heureuse de ses Fin(s). Notre monde,
celui dans lequel nous sommes «jetés», ne peut plus se raconter d’Histoire(s),
comme le dit Louis Althusser en ses derniers textes. Notre «monde» est ce
monde-ci, il est là; il est son «il y a», et il n’obéit à la logique de nul Sens-Maître,
certainement pas à celle du cosmopolitisme cher au nouveau droit international.
L’ontologie destinale a du moins la valeur d’une provocation à l’autocritique
de la modernité mondialisée. Il est vrai que la nouvelle production est production
de nouvelles destructions en hommes, savoir-sfaire, cultures, modes de vie,
capitaux et techniques devenues obsolètes sans avoir perdu leur efficacité. Elle
est l’anéantissement de tout ce qui fait obstacle à l’infini de l’accumulation
poursuivant l’idéal de la causa sui que Spinoza ne réservait qu’à la substance et
qu’il pensait en fonction de la cessation de l’esclavage. Mais on ne peut en rester
là. Soulignons ce qui n’est pas tenable en cette autre approche philosophique
dont la radicalité doit être maintenue sous réserves critiques (comme le font
certains philosophes post-heideggeriens qui ne s’orientent ni dans le sens d’une
donation religieuse, ni dans celui d’une nostalgie de l’origine: Jacques Derrida,
Gérard Granel, Jean-Luc Nancy). Deux points méritent ainsi d’être soulignés.
• La déconstruction du projet moderne comme arraisonnement technique de
l’étant peut aboutir à un constat indépassable. Rien ne peut être envisagé sinon
de laisser-être et advenir, accomplir, l’aliénation au monde mondialisé comme
destin. Les diverses formes historiques d’exploitation et de domination qui continuent
à se nouer autour du travail sont alors légitimées comme autant de figures du
destin ou du hasard. L’ontologie risque de se résoudre en attente d’une apocalypse
sans dieu. Et de se retourner en une autre apologie — négative — de ce qui est,
sauf miracle. Rien n’est plus possible, il n’est nul besoin de sujet. Le triomphe
de la «Technique» finit alors par spiritualiser le mouvement du capital en puissance
autoréflexive, sui référentielle, en esprit. De l’esprit du capitalisme au capitalisme
comme esprit (fût-il malin). Il resterait à attendre que la société mondiale de la
production-destruction aille au bout d’elle-même, à son «effondement», qu’elle
achève sa déclinaison, qu’elle fasse coïncider son excès avec son déclin. La
seule forme de responsabilité serait celle d’un quiétisme à la sérénité durement
acquise, le seul recours serait celui de la méditation de la poésie pensante et de
son ouverture.
• Ce quiétisme ne peut être justifié que pour autant que l’on accepte la conception
heideggérienne de la technique. Or force est de constater que séparée de son lien
à la métaphysique de la subjectivité, la technique demeure une abstraction
indéterminée à laquelle on attribue une constellation informe de rapports sociaux
complexes. L’effet de suggestion et de provocation du constat heideggérien se
paie d’un prix exorbitant, celui de la dénégation de la possibilité de toute autre
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analyse. Il se trouve en effet qu’une technique n’est pas d’abord une opération
d’arraisonnement de l’étant, elle est et demeure une séparation ingénieuse et
modeste du réel et du possible, elle est une expérimentation tâtonnante dans un
monde sans ordre ni sens prédéterminé. La finalisation sociale d’un ensemble de
techniques sous un rapport social est une chose, la Technique en soi en est une
autre. La mondialisation implique une technologie sociale qui a façonné l’ordre
productif autour de techniques décisives pour organiser la soumission mondiale
du travail et accroître sa productivité sous la dominance du capital qui les a
incorporées. Ce sont les techniques réflexives de techniques qui forment et organisent
les techniques. Leur analyse fine échappe aux prises de l’ontologie destinale. Or
c’est elle qui commande la détermination d’issues alternatives. La mondialisation
redéfinit l’usage social indissolublement économique et politique des techniques
dans le sens de leur traduction en temps: gain de temps dans la mobilisation du
travail, dans la circulation du capital financier et des informations, dans les
apprentissages, gains de qualité. C’est à l’échelle mondiale que sont confrontés
les divers travaux des branches de production stratégiques et autres. On ne pourra,
le pire n’étant pas toujours sûr, inverser la tendance lourde par laquelle la
mondialisation produit un monde sans mondanéïté pour des masses croissantes
d’hommes que si la critique individualise concrètement une autre finalisation de
la technologie sociale, en réinvestissant ce niveau pour redécouvrir la sagesse
des arts et techniques et la conjuguer à l’art politique d’une action qui soit aussi
production, d’une production qui soit action.
Finitude et risques majeurs. Ou de l’impossibilisation des possibles
La division de l’humanité produite par la mondialisation capitaliste comme
sa condition de possibilité paradoxale pose ainsi de manière inédite la question
ontologique, celle de la finitude comprise de manière positive, d’un rationalisme
trans-rationnel, délivré de l’obsession de la maîtrise des choses et des hommes,
de la domination de la nature et de l’histoire. L’humanité aujourd’hui, à l’époque
de l’économie-monde capitaliste, n’est pas tant définie comme ensemble de
possibilités entravées que comme ensemble d’impossibilités pratiques liées à la
contrainte d’une productivité déliée, elle, de tout souci du bien commun. La
possibilité d’une productivité infinite du capital, obtenue par l’exploitation de la
productivité du travail, devenue un impératif inconditionnel, se renverse en
production d’une masse croissante de travailleurs séparés des conditions d’exercice
de leurs libertés, d’exclus du procès d’exploitation du travail, exilés du monde
dans le monde réellement immonde des dénués de tout, des pauvres absolus, des
«sans papiers, sans travail, sans domicile». L’humain se divise dans les inégalisations
qui structurent la hiérarchie sociale. La mondialisation réalise l’humain dans
l’inhumain d’une séparation accrue entre ceux qui ne donnent pas parce qu’ils
n’ont plus rien à donner et ceux qui ne donnent pas parce qu’ils ne veulent pas
donner. Le droit se divise dans les inégalités croissantes de sa diction au moment
où les plus puissants occupent la place de l’universel.
Cet universel existe en fait de manière négative dans la somme des risques
majeurs que la mondialisation capitaliste produit. Il n’existe pas comme un
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possible qui tend vers sa fin pré-donnée. Le risque d’un seuil d’irréversibilité
dans la division de l’humanité en humanités toujours plus inégales n’est pas le
seul. Il oblige à reposer la question du bien commun comme question à nouveau
et autrement substantielle, non plus seulement procédurale, puisqu’il en va en
effet de la subsistance de masses humaines appauvries et de la substance même
de la vie en ce monde. Si la question ontologique est celle de l’être pour l’étant
qui la pose, la mondialisation modalise cette question comme celle de notre êtreen-commun. Et désormais cet être-en-commun révèle son lien à l’être comme
nature et comme vie, dans une finitude radicale. Le risque de l’inégalisation et
de la réduction à l’humanité nue est solidaire désormais du risque d’une
dégradation irréversible des conditions naturelles — physiques, chimiques,
biologiques — de la vie humaine sur la planète Terre. La question écologique est
ontologique et la mondialisation capitaliste est lourde d’une catastrophe
écologique majeure. À son tour, la question écologique est solidaire de la question
bioéthique qui concerne la possibilité donnée à l’espèce humaine de «se faire»
en intervenant sur les mécanismes de la reproduction de sa vie. Cette possibilité
nouvelle, dans les conditions de la mondialisation, ne peut pas ne pas être
surdéterminée à son tour par les conditions de productivité du capital et par la
marchandisation: une bioindustrie soumise à un biocapital est déjà une réalité
lourde de nouvelles inégalisations et de nouvelles violences. La mondialisation
repose à nouveaux frais la question ontologique comme triple question de notre
rapport à notre être-en-commun socio-historique, à notre être de vivant, et à
notre être de chose naturelle dans la nature.
La conscience planétaire qui excite beaucoup de bons esprits se définit en
réalité par le fait que ces trois impossibilités pratiques menacent de passer à la
possibilité réelle. Elles se constituent désormais en limites infranchissables à
l’action politique. Si sont inévitables et permanents les débats sur le contenu
positif de l’humain et la dispute pour désigner qui dira le droit et le droit de dire
le droit, cette dispute et ces débats ne sont formulables aujourd’hui qu’en termes
d’une ontologie sociale négative: il est urgent de procéder au repérage de l’inhumain
historique et de penser du bord de sa limite afin de déterminer les formes d’
«impossibilisation» de sa possibilité réelle. Cet inhumain se dit dans les trois
risques majeurs qui définissent la mondialité et qui sont autant de menaces sur
la vie de l’humain. Ils nous disent ce qu’il ne faut pas faire et qui une fois fait
rendrait à la fois impossible la survie de masses humaines à la limite de la
subsistance, la vie bonne de ceux qui ont produit des conditions de vie relativement
humaines, et enfin la simple vie sur cette terre. Ces trois risques majeurs
s’enracinent dans une technologie sociale finalisée par la productivité absolute
du capital, et non par le souci agissant d’une liberté pour tous de disposer
humainement des conditions de reproduction et de production. Si l’humanité
n’est pas et ne peut être un sujet, mais demeure une image divisée façonnée par
les puissances économiques qui ont le pouvoir politique et juridique de la
définir, les forces ou puissances antagoniques existent qui peuvent exercer leur
propre pouvoir de dire et de contredire l’inhumain immanent aux trois risques
ontologiques majeurs de la mondialité. L’humain n’existe que dans la controverse
pour dire l’inhumain et dans le vide laissé béant par cette controverse. Rien ne
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peut représenter l’humanité sinon la contradiction de l’inhumain dite par les
forces qui s’opposent à toute prétention à la représentation hégémonique mais
particulière de l’humain, car ici aussi le représentant se substitue au représenté.
La lutte pour dire et contredire l’inhumain en ses formes mondiales est bien lutte
pour le droit, mais lutte contre le droit et dans le droit, pour un droit qui disant
ce qu’il ne faut pas faire mais qu’il est désormais possible de faire au risque de
compromettre l’être de l’humain, est affronté à la tâche de dire en sa négation
même le positif qu’il convient enfin et maintenant de faire pour ne pas faire
l’impossible, c’est-à-dire produire la mort de toute possibilité.
La mondialisation, comme la révolution française ou bolchevique, est bien un
événement phisolophique, le seul événement de notre actualité. À ne pas
réordonner ses questions autour de cet événement qui n’est pas promesse, mais
présentation des risques d’une impossibilité réelle et d’une limitation absolue de la
politique, la philosophie démisionne devant la tâche de penser le lien qui unit le
monde et l’immonde, et elle s’enferme dans l’autophagie et dans l’idéologie. La
philosophie n’a pas à regretter la perte d’un sens qui serait Le Sens, le sens du sens,
la nostalgie de l’Être à retrouver. C’est dans le non sens radical du triple risque
ontologique de la mondialité qu’il faut séjourner pour, dans la lutte, produire du
sens, un autre sens, faire (du) sens. Le lien de tout ce qui fait sens dans le non-sens
de la mondialisation est constitué par la résistance contre l’ordre de la productivité
devenue impérialiste du capital et de sa mesure le profit. Mais il existe toujours des
choses, des biens, des services, des hommes, qui ne sont pas engloutis dans le
néant actif du capital, qui vivent et s’opposent. Le pire n’est pas toujours sûr.
Les ontologues et les déconstructeurs de la mondialophobie ne détiennent
qu’une demi-vérité en ce qu’ils se trompent sur la cause du devenir-immonde de
la mondialisation. L’immonde ne relève pas de la science, de la technique, de la
technoscience, de la technologie sociale. Celle-ci désigne plutôt une modalité de
notre être social. Pour conjurer et dépasser le nihilisme mondial, il faut plus de
science, plus de technique, une autre technologie sociale. La mondialisation de
l’économie capitaliste repose la question des rapports réciproques de la nature,
de la vie, et de l’historicité humaine: la question de notre être comme être-encommun, par-delà l’exploitation du travail, au sein d’une nature qu’il faut contrôler
sans la détruire, dans le flux d’une vie dont nous pouvons orienter les conditions
de reproduction sans les dévier vers de nouvelles monstruosités. Si la philosophie
est amour de la sagesse, la réalisation de cette dernière est confiée à la sagesse
de l’art qui est aussi poésie, à la sagesse d’un art poétique, celui qui fait l’humain
par prosaïque lutte contre l’inhumain. Sagesse d’un art poétique qui est
simultanément l’art politique, l’art de faire vertu des risques majeurs auxuels
nous expose la Fortune. Formons alors l’idée d’un Machiavel de la multitude
dans la mondialisation.
NOTES
1. Le sens du monde, Paris, Galilée, 1993.
2. Philosophie politique, Paris, Vrin, 1956.
3. Pour cette analyse, voir l’ouvrage de Jean Robelin,
La Petite fabrique du droit, Paris, Kimé, 1995.
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
THE EDUCATED WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC EYE
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN
“No, the woman is not our brother”
Simone de Beauvoir
This study is estimating the attitudes of the Romanian society towards the
educated women. The arena of this investigation is the public sphere. Given that
the notion “public sphere” is too complex to be approached without a research
strategy, I shall focus mainly on the Romanian printed press and on the job
environment, as important branches of what is called “the public sphere”. Thus,
this study aims at identifying the particulaities of the relationship education —
social recognition in the case of women (adults, living in an urban area) and at
explaining those particulaities.
What triggers the study is the following puzzle: Educated women do not seem
to enjoy consideration because of their education. Therefore, I shall examine the
relationship between education, as independent variable and public consideration
(respect) as dependent variable. For this purpose, I shall use qualitative content
analysis of the Romanian printed press in the last six years (since the “millenium
turn”) and a questionnaire (a random research conducted in 1999, see the annex).
In what concerns the qualitative content analysis of the Romanian printed
press, I shall observe how numerous, how well situated and on which pages are
the articles about educated women in the main daily newspapers (the most
important ones, according to their printing run).
The concise theoretical background:
the feminism inscribed into the social capital debate
There is a dimension of feminism within this so significant debate around the
social capital. The phrase of William A. Galston, “Won’t You Be My Neighbor”
complements the attitude of exclusion towards the others (women amongst others)
voiced by Simone de Beauvoir.
Robert D. Putnam has started this debate around social capital and he shows,
that trust is at the core of cooperation and togetherness. What is social capital?
It is formed of values, solidarity and sentiments of community. The civic attitude,
the trust and the sense of solidarity are at the core of every functioning society.
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These are the main dimensions of the social capital. Social capital is the ultimate
pre-requisite and consequence of any effective social policy.
In Making Democracy Work1, Putnam offers one of the most significant studies
investigating the importance of the civic engagement for politics in recent years.
In this book the investigations starts from the analysis of the relationship between
economic modernity and institutional performance, towards a more complex
discussion around the relationship between community and civic engagement. In
their investigation of civic traditions in modern Italy they found that the
performance of political institutions was influenced by the character of civic life
— termed “the civic community.”2 Such civic communities were characterized
by: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust and tolerance; and a strong
life of the associations.
Robert Putnam and his team of researchers were able to compare themes and
ranges of data sources for different regions in Italy. The result was that there is
a clear relationship between civic and “uncivic” regions — and that “public
affairs are more successfully ordered in the former.”3 His conclusion was that
democracies (and economies) function better when there exists an independent
and durable tradition of civic engagement and solidarity. This book effectively
represented a manual, a guide able to determine an agenda for those willing to
explore the possibility for maintaining the convivial conditions for democracy to
flourish.
Feminist studies as well investigate the importance of civic engagement for
women and, of course they raise questions concerning the very possibility of
such engagement and of identifying the method to make women present, trusted,
respected. In most cases such requirements, traditionally, are not met. Usually,
women are partially included and not really into the social fabric. Given their
grand social role (often they are the family keepers, cooking, cleaning, bringing
up children, maintaining the family united) society welcomes women, but only
in their input. Once they overstepped the “circle of trust”, outside the traditional
roles and jobs, society proves a daring lack of social capital, “punishing” either
by means of “humor” or by means of diminishing, overlooking, ignoring their
efforts of solidarity. The women’s social capital is never returned to them, never
available for them within (“the common bank of social capital”). Yet, this
phenomenon is very serious not only for some shallow feeling like women pride.
The very existence of community is put into question by sexist (and racist, for
that matter) attitudes, as well as by the lack of political equality, solidarity, trust
and tolerance.
Recently, two Romanian studies have investigated a century of Romanian
feminism. They are: Emanciparea femeii române. Antologie de texte/The
Emancipation of the Romanian Woman. An Anthgology of texts), Vol. I, 1815–1918,
edited by ªtefania Mihãilescu, at Editura Ecumenicã, in 2001, and Din istoria
feminismului românesc. 1838–1929/From the History of Romanian Feminism edited
by ªtefania Mihãilescu at Jassy, Editura Polirom, in 2002. These works show that the
idea of the equality between the sexes that we have taken for granted during
communism was present in the Romanian society even from the beginning of the 19th
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century. Thus, the reader may find about the joint between the literary and feminist
movements supporting modern women rights at the dawn of Romanian modernity.
Such movements had to face narrow minded mentalities and stereotypes that
have never completely disappeared. They all crossed 19th century and continued
to govern the social and political Romanian public spheres, deep into the 20th
century. Underneath an ideologically promoted appearance of equality — during
communism — the abusive old mentality has survived and flourished. The
feminist “fight” was never considered a legitimate “communist fight” to the
extent that it was never mentioned. The volumes offer this “absent” knowledge
of feminist documents and movements, yet to be recuperated from beneath the
veil of silence and forgetfulness. In general, from these documents we understand
that Romanian feminism has developed itself as part of the generous philosophy
of human rights and equality brought about by Enlightenment.
Thus we find out also how many were the “serious” feminist journals of the
period investigated: “Lumea nouã literarã ºi ºtiinþificã” (“The New Literary and
Scientific World”), “Drepturile femeii” (“Woman’s Rights”), “Femeia românã”
(“Romanian Woman”), “Unirea femeii române” (“The Union of the Romanian
Woman”), “Familia” (“The Family”), “Dochia”. The characteristics of the Romanian
Enlightenment were complemented by cosmopolitism and humanism (a deep
knowledge of foreign languages, history and of the current European models of
modern development). The tradition of “Calimachi Code” — stating the equality
between the sexes — was retrieved, too. We are reminded of Sofia Cristoscoleu
and Sofia Nãdejde as bright figures of feminists, promoting their contemporary
European models of feminism in Romania and of Cornelia Emilian, as a
promoter of the American model of feminism, around the year 1887. We notice
that even the term “feminism” was bravely used in Romania so early in the
Romanian history of feminism, along with the identification of a problematics.
The legal and financial rights of the Romanian woman are put into relation
with the ridicule of the idea of “the dependence of the woman”. This idea is still
actual in the writings of Carole Pateman.4 She also interprets as degrading the
fact that women are often forced by the economic, social, political and cultural
traditions, not to earn enough as to be independent. Only a financially independent
woman could challenge the sexual contract that she has unwillingly inherited.
Maria Flechtenmacher and Adela Xenopol are unknown predecessors (unknown
even for the public of Romanian educated women) of Carole Pateman, in this
sense. Many of their arguments go to support the actual idea that “the force is
suffocating the right”.
Sofia Nãdejde — maybe the most radical of the Romanian feminists in the
investigated period — was tackling the sexism based on “biologism” — on the
idea that women are the prisoners of their (strange) biology (an argument that
reminds us of Simone de Beauvoir). In this sense there are mentioned interesting
writings of this author occasioned by her disputes with Titu Maiorescu, exposing
her arguments based on the philosophy of culture and especially on the standpoint
of J.S. Mill. In her work “Noua societate” (The New Society), she is also writing
about the necessary reforms for an accelerated modernization of the Romanian
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4
society, context in which she considers as most important role of the educated
women societies. She speaks about the necessity of a “moral betterment” that could
be accomplished through concrete, financial, economic, juridical and political
reforms and that, in turn would most certainly lead to the “moral betterment” of
the society as a whole. Emilia Humpel, a teacher, Titu Maiorescu’s sister, spoke
of the “bleakness of the present” expressing her scepticism in relation to success
of the necessary legislative and economic in creating a society more sensitive and
more supportive in what concerns the women’s rights as independent individual,
both within her family and outside its limits.
Nelli Cornea has published, among others, the article entitled What’s Feminism?,
that depicts, through literary examples, the “fuzzy identity” of the Romanian
woman, pleading for the free development of the woman as individual, again, a
very actual topic in contemporary feminism.
Cornelia Emilian reminds of Mary Wollstonecraft — A Vindication of the
Woman’s Rights, 1792 — in her argument for the access at culture for women,
accordingly to their inner “dispozitions”.
The reaction to feminism and feminist problematics involved “Curierul de
ambe sexe” (the “Journal for both sexes”) and names like I. Heliade Rãdulescu
(who considered that the woman is the (even linguistically) keeper of the
national spirit), or C.A. Rosetti (who argued that inequality comes (“naturally”)
with civilization like a symbol of the pathetic and moralist masculinism).
Closer to the present, our contemporary, Anne Phillips, is currently involved
in researches that could be gathered under the aegis of “Sexual and Cultural
Equality. Conflicts and Tensions”. This leading figure in feminist political theory,
in her widely studied book Engendering Democracy has examined key dimensions
in contemporary democratic and feminist thinking — including liberal democracy,
participatory democracy and civic republicanism. The author demonstrated that
democracy and feminism are twin topics and argued that each of the key
dimensions examined operates with a supposedly gender-neutral understanding
of citizenship that continues to privilege the male. In her writings generally,
she is interested in what is still the mainstream understanding of political
representation in (contemporary liberal) democracies. In particular, it is the notion
that representatives are elected to represent constituents’ opinions, preferences
and ideas, and that their sexual, racial or ethnic characteristics should therefore
be regarded as irrelevant. But these aspects are far from being irrelevant, as her
studies show. In her sound investigations, she is pursuing connections between
gender, ethnicity and race, exploring the common ground between various groups
that have experienced political marginality or exclusion. By addressing issues
like political marginality and exclusion she opens an avenue to a wider “politics
of difference” to which often the analysts — men and women — prove to be blind.
If feminism is attuned with the problematic of democracy, this is not the case
with liberalism. Anne Phillips has studied the difficulties posed by this relationship
since the mid-1980s, when she started also to develop the theme of the tensions
between equality and difference, in what concerns feminism. She is also interested
in topics like deliberative democracy, civic republicanism, and critical theory,
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that open avenues for feminism to challenge the narrowness of contemporary
liberalism, but also the inequalities occasioned by it. The relationship between
public and private spheres is also a realm for feminist debates and an area that
comes close to the debate around social capital.
On such theoretical basis I argue that social capital should be also measured
by feminist indicators such as: the assessing of the struggles for (economic)
redistribution and struggles for (political or cultural) recognition and the “critique
of assimilationism” (as interpreted within both feminist and multicultural theory
fields) should not be read as a lack of interest in solidarity and community, or in
convergence, and the equality of respect (without which a substantive equality
of condition is not possible). From this perspective the printed press cannot be
“the dog-keeper of democracy”, unless it succeeds at being social capital supportive,
that is, in an inclusive, anti-sexist and anti-racist manner. This theoretical argument
is also the starting point for a further more sociological type of research. A
special attention should be paid to the weak culture of feminism in Romania, that
is, to the lack of knowledge and awareness related to the meanings and implications,
as to the benefits of feminism, for the educated women, at present.
The qualitative content analysis
This research was conducted for a period of six years in six Bucharest dailies.
Those were România liberã, Curentul, Ziua, Evenimentul zilei, Libertatea and
Naþional.
I have chosen these particular dailies because my professional experience
with newspapers taught me that the first two tend to be more informative, while
the last three are tabloids and they offer a good range of material interesting for
a comparative approach. Thus, Ziua tends to be a very unequal newspaper in terms
of the quality (or, more specific, in terms of the accuracy and the argumentation)
of the printed information presented. In this newspaper, the investigative journalism
overlaps with the sensationalism of the articles. Their drive for sensationalism
overpasses often any quality standards (even if we speak in a more strict sense
of a journalistic quality or, in an enlarged sense, of a democratic, social capital
and feminism supportive quality). Evenimentul zilei has changed dramatically
over the period of the last five years from a tabloid to a more informative and
towards a critical newspaper, much more of a watchdog against the instituted
political power more “liberal” generally and much more “feminist” in attitudes and
perspectives than it used to be.
The first two dailies show some enlightened gender standards. Women specialists
are presented (as rare as this happens in comparison with the frequency of
presenting successful or career men, it happens) almost with the same consideration
as men are. First, the articles are situated in favorable journalistic positions on
the page (first page, last page, not towards the middle part of the middle pages).
Second, when they show photos they tend to be standard professional photos. In
spite of this, for instance, on its publicity pages, România liberã displays typical
89.89.... sex hotline photos, less frequent after 2001. Third, but most important,
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the articles are not interested more of the personal and sex life of the career
woman than of her actual career, as in other newspapers. Yet, generally, the feminist
discourse of România liberã has (slightly) improved over time.
The tabloids describe women as bodies, using a degrading language, regardless
of their concrete situation they find themselves in and regardless of their career
results, or of their education. They use an intended sensational tone to (s)exploit
women and the situation presented. They present mainly erotic, violent or degrading
data about all the women, even if they are stars, models, actresses, politicians, or
ordinary women committing, for instance, the murder of their children. In
Libertatea (famous for the rubric “The girl on page 3”), women are portrayed mainly
in such “tabloid” instances, and they are valued after their “silicon value”. The
newspaper has maintained its sexist discourse for the last five years.
A good illustration of the general sexist approach is given by the article
“Nanny” Fran Was Raped from the Naþional, 7 May (2001). There is a popular
sit com soap opera having as main character “nanny” Fran, a good-looking, strong
character, sharp, amazing with children and in her sociability, fun, extravagant
dressing and not too educated woman, in her thirties. Her qualities are no news
for the journalist of the Naþional. Interesting is only the rape that happened 15
years ago in the life of this actress! Like this is not bad enough, the article goes
on and on about the fact that she does not like children in the real life, implying
that this is a serious crime for a woman. The fact that she has a good marriage
and that the rapist was caught in 3 days and was convicted to 120 years in jail
with no possibility of commuting this sanction are not considered interesting
either and are mentioned only briefly without commentaries. A comparison with
what sanction is given in Romania for rape would have been devastating. The
intention is to taint both the image of the real woman as a successful actress and
the image on the screen (that is too good to be true!).
The qualitative content analysis results were going to correlate themselves
with the results obtained using the questionnaire.
The questionnaire
This mean of research was intended to offer the possibility of correlating the
most social data with the most personal data within the shortest space possible.
This is the reason I was keen on using a one-page long questionnaire, half a page
with questions concerning knowledge of and attitudes towards newspapers’ content
and the other half about the social profile.
According to my sociological direct observation, people in Romania are not
very eager to express their opinions in street in the front of a total stranger. I was
also a busy operator and the people I approached were in a big hurry to go home
after work. This was a supplementary reason for trying to be at once clear in this
phase of my inquiry and brief and leave the sophistication for the phase
of analyzing and interpreting data. (It is eventually a matter of social capital
not to abuse of anyone’s time). The reason why I approached people at the
metro (“Polytechnics”) was that there around 15:00 there are a great diversity of
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people to pick up from. While they are waiting, bored, for their metro, some are
tempted to engage in a short conversation. Even so, some were reluctant, some
were confused, and some were giving incomplete answers. Men were more
irritated than women because of the content of the questions. When I went
inquiring without a male company, men were either rude or trying to get
personally involved with me. Even at this level, without any relation to the actual
responses I could have some conclusions about the Romanian social network. In
society even educated women tend to be submissive, decorative, socially inert,
while men “approximate” the visibility in the public sphere that is otherwise than
decorative with lack of seriousness, with desire for adventure, and as a consequence
with an invitation at verbal aggressiveness or at sexual involvement of some
sort.
The questionnaire was applied so as to obtain a simple random sample. The
basic idea is the method of selection whereby each possible sample of n units
from a population of N units has an equal chance of being selected. For the
purposes of this school project I have decided to evaluate 20 questionnaires.
From a total population of Bucharest of approximately 2.2 millions, 20 people is
not a representative sample, but it still may produce interesting and pertinent
qualitative interpretations. I have interviewed every 5th person, men and women
alternatively.
The sociological data did not differentiate in any significant manner the
persons interviewed. Ten people, seven women and three men, answered that the
printed press presents mainly catastrophes and women either as victims or as
models, or just as sexy images. A group of six thought that newspapers are interested
in presenting male important people and sexy women. Another group of four
considered that media is concerned about grown up men and about catastrophes
concerning social facts (murders, rapes, circulation accidents).
Correlating the results obtained through qualitative content analysis and the
responses at the questionnaire I obtained the following particulars describing the
relationship between women’s education and their social recognition in Romania.
Thus, they are three. Firstly, educated women are almost invisible within public
arena. In the second place when they show up, they are promoted as something
else then what they are: they are exploited as annexes of powerful men (for
instance, Nadia Constantinescu as president’s wife, not as the specialist), or they
are inquired almost exclusively about their personal life (for example, Andreea
Esca’s pregnancy). Thirdly, women’s very pretension at professionalism is devalued,
since the intellectual prestige is used by the media to cast a better light on their
physical features (see the way models are presented as students).
Correlating and construing results
From the perspective of this study, the mechanism determining the predominance
of the negative correlation between women’s education and their social recognition
in Romania is the traditionalist and sexist attitude of perceiving educated women
as not being trust-worthy, not minding their “natural” business, etc.
58
8
Given the fact that even in qualitative terms the negative correlation of the
variables was stronger, I am going to focus further in construing this problem,
precisely because I consider that it constitutes a social problem, and not the aspect
of the positive correlation. So, having said that the situation it is not a catastrophe,
that signs of civil society’s struggle with sexism exist, I shall continue interpreting
only the main particulars of this negative correlation between the chosen variables.
The particulars of the relationship investigated are sustained and reproduced
by the trivial sexist discourse embraced by the Romanian society generally and
especially by the idle journalistic shorthand that stereotypes represent.
Thus, in the collective study “Our Image in All Dailies”5, it is shown: “how
the gender dimension is shaped by the mass-media discriminative discourse.
Women are referred to just as trivial Objects for the private use of men or
as sexual accessories. But media also performs an instructive activity in the
society. Therefore, this discriminative discourse may preserve and continuously
shape only sexist opinions. No wonder than the broad extension of sexism in
contemporary Romania.”
Not that sexism goes unchallenged in the Romanian press, but it tends to
make the general rule and impose it as “normality”.
There is even a current linguistic censorship of women’s achievement of visible
career standards. As Brânduºa Palade shows in her article “Career woman”:
“This censorship works both on the level of discourse and the collective
imaginary. The discourse reflects the collective imaginary and the collective
imaginary shapes and informs the discourse. Moreover, this mutual relationship
between these elements creates a broad propensity of the attitude disapproving
women’s career interests. Thus, the continual use of patriarchal stereotypes may
succeed in discouraging a local reinvention of women’s identity.”6
Even if, in my opinion, this approach is too “catastrophic” in the image of
inescapable censorship, I agree with the fact that women are discouraged in
reinventing their identities as feminist individuals, which in fact translates as
individuals with particular rights. Even more serious, most college educated women
speak now the patriarchal discourse and internalize it as “truth”, “fact”, “objective
reality” (as M. Miroiu has noticed in more than one instance, too). Once forced
to reflect upon such “objective reality” the educated women arrive at questioning
both its truth and its objectivity. Persevering on this critical path they become
disenchanted and they understand that women experiences are not exclusively
bodily experiences and that feminists are not necessarily hysterical, visceral,
extremists, frustrated, perverse, asexual, related to frigidness, mania, indoctrination,
or to the vulgar aggression, ambition, or malice. Reading this attitude in the key
offered by Simone de Beauvoir, they become only afterwards women, in a process
of disenchantment with the world and not due to their education. After the moment
of “awakening” they might become women even to a larger extent than they were
before, only then gaining their identity and consciousness, only then able to
articulate demands addressed to the social capital, at the same time, to the power in
exercise. Only then, the full use of a self-validated identity could support and impose
viable and successful — social and political — feminist policies (and lives).
9
59
ANNEX
Please tick the case that is applicable to you:
1) You read the printed press (the dailies):
once a month
Every two weeks
weekly
Daily.
2) In your opinion the most important articles have as main characters:
children
elders
Grown-up
Men
Women
Calamities (natural, economic,
political, social, etc.).
3) You consider that most articles about women have as protagonist (please
do circle the encountered cases and number them in the order of their apparition
frequency): Women professor
Women researcher
Women lawyer
Women engineer
Women model
Women victim
Women aggressor
Sexy women.
4) Sex: F/M.
5) Age:
20/29
30/39
40/49
50/over.
6) Education: High-school... Faculty... Graduate studies...
7) Profession...
8) You have how many co-workers?
More then 1000
500/1000
Under 500
Under 50.
9) Your position within the hierarchy at your job?
You have 2–5 supervisors
You have one
You are the boss.
Thank you for your time!7
60
10
NOTES
1. R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work Civic
traditions in modern Italy, Princeton, New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 83–120 .
2. Ibidem, p. 15.
3. Ibidem, p. 113.
4. Carole Pateman is an esteemed Professor
worldwide, currently working for the Department
of Political Science at the University of California
at Los Angeles (UCLA), author and editor of
numerous books.
5. “AnaLize”, Anateme, no. 3, 1998, p. 1.
6. Ibidem, p. 15.
7. This questionnaire was actually applied in
Romania in order to gather a significant basis
and a starting point for the qualitative analysis
interpretations and conclusions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Newspapers, 2000–2005: România liberã, Libertatea,
Curentul, Ziua, Evenimentul zilei, National and
“AnALize Journal”, Anateme, no. 3, 1998.
Fukuyama, F., “Social Capital and the Global
Economy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, issue 5,
September, 1995.
Mihailescu, ªtefania (ed.), Emanciparea femeii române.
Antologie de texte, vol. I, 1815–1918, Bucharest,
Editura Ecumenicã, 2001.
Mihãilescu, ªtefania (ed.), Din istoria feminismului
românesc, vol. I, 1838–1929, Iaºi, Editura
Polirom, 2002.
Moser, C.A., Kalton, G., Survey Methods in Social
Investigation, London, Heinemann Educational
Books, 1997.
Pateman, Carole, The Disorder of Women: Democracy,
Feminism, and Political Theory, Polity Press, 1989.
Pateman, Carole, The Sexual Contract, Polity Press,
1988.
Phillips, Anne, Representing difference: why should
it matter if women get elected?, in Anna Coote
(ed) New Gender Agenda, London, IPPR, 2000.
Phillips, Anne, Does Feminism need a conception of
Civil Society?, in S Chambers, R W Kymlicka
(eds) Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.
Phillips, Anne, Feminism and the Politics of Difference:
Or Where Have All the Women Gone?, in:
S. Palmer James and S. Palmer (eds), Visible
Women, New York, Hart Publishing Co., 2002.
Putnam, Robert D., Bowling Alone: America’s
Declining Social Capital, “Journal of Democracy”,
Vol. 6, January, 1995.
Robert Putnam, Robert Putnam Responds, “The
American Prospect”, no. 25 , March–April, 1996.
Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work Civic
traditions in modern Italy, Princeton, New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1993.
William A. Galston, Won’t You Be My Neighbor, “The
American Prospect”, no. 26, May–June, 1996.
Zanden, Vander J.W., Social Psychology, New York,
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1987.
THE “CULT OF PERSONALITY” IN ROMANIA
RODICA IAMANDI*
There is an acknowledged difficulty in the attempt to define the phrase “the
cult of personality”. First, because the current and common-sense formula, “personal
adulation”, has substituted itself for the phrase “the cult of personality”, a highly
ideologically loaded expression, with a much more complex meaning. This is
probably the reason why in the specifically Romanian post-1989 literature, the cult
of personality is defined as a political practice attributing an exaggerated role to
a political personality within the evolution of society, producing a deformation
of the whole political life of the country1 or, as a systematic attitude provoked
and controlled, concerning a leader (or a personality) considered gifted with special
qualities as an intellectual, as a sensitivity, as a manager, as a visionary, etc., as
were considered examples such as Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong, Ceauºescu,
Bokassa, Idi Amin.2 An inventory of the extant pre-1990 definitions (even if they
were conceived from the perspective of Leninist-Marxist philosophy) presented
many nuances of meaning. The theoreticians of the communist period noticed
something that the author has herself encountered. It is precisely the nuance that
the name does not capture the whole complex of aspects — economical, social,
political, ethical, ideological, etc. — that the phrase in discussion refers to.3
Second, in the literature, in all the cases of exploitation and oppression of masses
analyzed, those that were corresponding to the concentration of power in the
hands of a single person, a cult of personality is identified (as with the Pharaoh
in the ancient Egypt, the Emperor in China, the absolute Monarch in feudal
Europe, the “Führer” in Nazi Germany). Even more, in these works there is a
theoretical foundation of the cult of personality that may be analytically inscribed
within the cult of the “genius”, or of the ”hero”, or of the “crucial personality”.
This is as in the works of the romantics — such as F. Schelling and Th. Carlyle
— or in those of the young Hegeliens — such as B. Bauer and N. Stirner. The
same happens in the case of the Russian peasant 19th century revolutionaries, the
Narodnics, or in the works of F. Nietzsche.4
Finally, in the literature of the cult, the idea that the “cult of personality”
generates in the life of society a chain of phenomena contrary to the general
human moral norms is underlined. Therefore, the correct attitude of the people,
i.e., in which the accomplishment of their social duty is replaced by the blind
——————
* Text edited by Eric Gilder, PhD, visiting professor (Lucian Blaga), University, Sibiu.
62
RODICA IAMANDI
2
compliance to the proletariat’s will, to a will to be manipulated by their deified
leader (or to whomever bears the supreme authority). By so doing, people were
contributing to the spread of amoral methods used in defense for the existing
order.5
Historically, the essential contribution to bringing the meaning of “the cult of
personality” into a definite semantic field was had by Nikita Sergheevici Khrushcev.
At the 20th (1956) Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.)
he had condemned the cult of comrade Iosif Vissarionovici Djougaºvili, better
known as Stalin. In the official report, presented at the Congress, Khrushcev
says that “the Central Committee (C.C.) has taken a strong attitude against the
cult of personality, a cult that is proved itself foreign to the spirit of MarxismLeninism, against transforming this or that activist into a hero working wonders,
at the same time minimizing the role of the Party and of the popular masses,
leading to diminishing their creative activity. The spread of the cult of personality
has decreased the role of collective rule within the Party and often it has brought
about serious deficiencies in our work.”6 The C.C. analyzed in June 1956 the
objective conditions that were in favor of the spreading of the cult of personality.
The subjective factors that resulted from Stalin’s personality were as well
considered, in a decision entitled (in a genuine communist style) “On doing away
with the cult of personality and with its consequences”.
Apparently, in the “Secret discourse”7, to which foreign delegates had no
access to at the time, Khrushcev was much harsher, denouncing Stalin’s deeds
as crimes. It is due to this specific association between the cult of personality and
the name of Stalin that many political analysts consider “the cult of personality”
an “ideological euphemism for the entire system of lies, corruption, mass crimes
and universal fear.”8
Raymond Aron’s perspective is extremely useful in understanding how Stalinism
was built. He identifies five phases in the history of the Russian Bolshevik Party,
of which the fourth phase is of most interest. “During the forth phase, that of the
absolute power of Stalin, all major decisions are taken by a single man. This man
is surrounded by his comrades with whom he discusses within the Politburo, but
to whom he is incapable to impose his will. Consequently, since 1934, he begins
even to terrorize everyone, and the factions are eliminated with no mercy, not
only politically, but also physically. The opponents within the Party, either real
or virtual, are considered traitors. Thus they are killed either after they were solemnly
tried and this sentence was pronounced either following their ‘confession’, or
they were eliminated in prison.”9
Within such a system, it is obvious that the power was situated at the top of
the Party hierarchy and that a single man possessed it. “A person and that person
alone was deciding the fate of all others, covering them in glory or in shame,
transforming the servants of the régime into fiddles or into traitors.”10 According
to Khrushev, the beginning of Stalin’s cult of personality was marked by the
terrorism of the years 1934–1938, oriented against Party members. At first, the
aim was to end the life of Stalin’s already defeated adversaries, but then it
changed, striking even the most devoted of the Stalinists. “Why was terrorism
3
63
directed against the very militants of the communist Party, those who did not
deviate from the line of the Party?” To this question, Khrushcev offers only one
answer, one single interpretation: the cult of personality. Or, all one can say is that
this is actually no answer, no explanation.11
It seems that Stalin was at the origin of the notion “enemy of the people” and
that this expression made possible the use of the most terrible oppression, against
anyone who would disagree, in any manner whatsoever, with Stalin. Khrushcev
has shown that “when Stalin said that this person or the other had to be arrested,
it had to be admitted on word basis, that it was about being an enemy of the
people. And then, Beria’s clique, in charge of the state Security organs, would
go above themselves to prove the guilt of the person arrested and to sustain the
documents they forged”. The same character has underlined: “What kind of proofs
did they provide? The convicts’ confessions, (were provided) and the judges were
taking these seriously. And how can crimes never committed be confessed? In
only one way, after applying physical forms of constraint, tortures generating
lack of conscience, intellectual confusion, deprivation of human dignity.”12
According to Raymond Aron’s opinion, The Secret Report of Khruschev’s
offers a singular illustration for Montesquieu’s theory on despotism, a theory
according to which the principle of despotism is merely fear — an insidious fear
— progressively taking over all individuals inside a collectivity. To the question
“Why didn’t we do anything?” Khrushcev answers “with sincerity and naïveté”:
“it was impossible for us to undertake any action. Whenever we were convened
by the supreme leader, we never knew if it was in order to consult us concerning
an important decision, or to throw us away in Lubianka prison.”13
Whichever the theory of history adopted at some point, we have to take the
individuals into consideration as well. In order to go from potential to reality,
from the intelligible functions of purgation to the lack of measure within the real,
ample process of purgation, it was needed a unique ingredient, a man, Stalin
himself. One should not minimize the role this person/personality had played due
to that absolute power that he has possessed. At the same time, the phenomena
called “the cult of personality” are not indebted only to the particularities of a
unique man, but also to the technique of organization and action of a certain Party,
which explains the appearance of the “cult of personality” within the satellite
communist countries and around the leaders of those states, as well.
According to some historians, the cult of Stalin appeared in the period
1926–1927. In many of the speeches given by the “left-wing” opposition leaders,
there was even then present the protest against Stalin’s cult of personality. Thus,
at the 14th Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by
the end of December 1925, L. Kamenev has warned about the danger of amplification
of the cult of some leaders and especially of Stalin’s: “We are against the creation
of the theory of ‘the leader’, we are against the creation of ‘the leader’. We are
against the Sercuritate, in fact reuniting the politics and whole organization,
situating itself above the political organ… Personally, I consider that our general
secretary is not a personality to gather around a polarized old Bolshevik
headquarters… Especially because I have told these views personally and
64
RODICA IAMANDI
4
repeatedly to comrade Stalin, especially because I have told about these things
repeatedly to the group of Leninist comrades, I repeat what I have said here at
the Congress: I have reached the conclusion that comrade Stalin cannot fulfil the
role of polarizing agent for the Bolshevik head-quarters.”14
This sign marked only the beginning of Stalin’s ascension. Apparently, he
manifested a heavy democratism, almost in contrast with the “aristocratic” Trotsky.
Stalin was relatively accessible, rude and simple. He walked around freely
through the C.C. building and Kremlin, almost without any guard. Sometimes,
he stopped by unannounced at the Institute of Red Professors to talk to the
students. If at the beginning of the third decade in most official institutions there
could be seen portraits of Lenin and Trotsky (after 1924, Trotsky’s portrait was
no longer to be seen), in the early days, Stalin’s portrait would not appear anywhere;
it started to be displayed everywhere only from 1930 onwards, after in 1929,
with a pomp unnatural for the times, Stalin was celebrated at his 50th birthday .
The birthday messages congratulating him would go beyond well-wishing,
attributing qualities to him such as “wonderful”, “top”, but also words like “grand”
and “genius”. The collection of articles and memories about Stalin, issued in
1929, contained many exaggerations and deformations of the facts. The idea that
“during Lenin, comrade Stalin, one of his disciples”, was at the same time his
greatest help, who, different from others, in all the important phases of the
revolution, in all the decisive moments of activity of the Party led by Vladimir
Illich “went side by side with him, without any hesitation.”15
Some of the authors of this collection attempted to prove that although Stalin
was more of a patrician within the Party, in reality, he was an important theoretician
of Marxism-Leninism. In an article entitled “Stalin and the Red Army”, K.E.
Voroºilov attributes to Stalin non-existent merits in the Civil War.
Thus, in 1931, in the preface to the six volumes edition of Lenin’s works, the
editor, V.V. Adoratski, affirmed that Lenin’s works have to be studied with a
Stalin perspective in mind. E. Iaroslavski and A. Bubnov, the authors of the
history books of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had also
included pages consecrated to Stalin’s merits. Thus, the eulogies, that had
considerably increased in number after the C.C. plenary meeting of January
1933, were perhaps not totally lacking sincerity; but they were essentially full of
the zeal of carefully stimulated flattery. The fact that the first to resort to limitless
eulogy were the members of his Political Bureau, especially Molotov and
Kaganovich, conferred those eulogies immediately the character of an official
political line to be followed as well by those who have never considered Stalin
infallible.
Salin’s chorus of flattery was supported by voices of former opposition
leaders, whose voices were at times even louder that those of the others. Piaþakov,
Zinoviev, Kamenev were publishing articles where they were admitting their
mistakes and recognizing how right is “the great leader of workers worldwide —
comrade Stalin”. In the first issue of Pravda in 1934, an article of H. Radek spoke
of Stalin only in superlatives. After a couple of days, the article became a brochure,
with 225 000 copies being printed.
5
65
Stalin’s cult was not formed out of mere vanity alone, but also from a thirst
of power, situating his singularly, above the Party and beyond any critique, a fact
made obvious at the 17th Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, where each and every speaker was evoking the “greatness”
and the “genius” of Stalin. Then, through Comintern, the cult of the Stalin was
implemented within all communist parties from abroad. At the same time, the
example of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union stimulated the
formation of cults of the local leaders within the satellite communist countries
as well.
2. Forms of the “Cult of Personality”
in Communist Romania before 1965
In Romania, the first signs of a “cult of personality” (while in very muted
forms in comparison to what was yet to come) was noticed from the period when
the Communist Party was not a unique political force within society, dedicated
especially to Ana Pauker. She came from Moscow along with the Red Army
tanks, a fact that gave her, in that specific pro-Soviet sate of mind of the time, a
peculiar aura; plus the intervention of the Party propaganda that, over-estimating
her merits and revolutionary qualities, as it will next be the case with GheorghiuDej, and, especially, with Ceauºescu — these factors made her a second “Passionaria”
(after the name of Dolores Ibaruri). Along with her adulation, a style was
inaugurated that would be continued also in the decades to come. “As she used
to say herself, all happens because she expresses the highest knowledge, made
accessible to all. Listening to them at the meetings, with the clear and
determined voice, vibrating at her high wisdom, at her great love for people,
each felt her close, as if she would speak only to them, about their lives, about
their needs, and each listens to her all ears, absorbing every word and every
thought.”16 Even in that time notions like freedom, independence and sovereignty,
as the idea of love for the country: “the ardent love for the country goes through
as a red wire, all her activity, all her fight” was manipulated.17 Thus, Ana Pauker
arrived (next to Gheorghiu-Dej and Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu) as one of the main
aspirants for the Party leadership, a dispute for power in which she counted on
her links to Stalin’s circle, as well as upon the support of certain key emigration
comrades (Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu, Iosif Chiºinevski) with who she
formed the so-called “external group”. Therefore, this acerbic fight for supremacy
within the Party had dominated the history of Romania in the first decade after
war, a fight conducted mainly between the exponents of the two groups —
Gheorghiu-Dej, from the inside and Ana Pauker, from the outside, each trying to
enter the graces of Stalin (seen as the principal referee of this dispute). The
minority ethnic origin of Ana Pauker (who has succeeded to win the trust and
appreciation, both from Stalin and from the majority of persons in her entourage)
had determined the Moscow dictator’s support in eventually giving the “winning
cup” of this contest to Gheorghiu-Dej, who had all the required qualities for a
communist leader in that historical context, and, also, he was devoted to Stalinism
66
RODICA IAMANDI
6
with all his being. Justifying this choice, Stalin addressed Molotov (who had
sustained Ana Pauker): “Dear Viaceslav Mihailovici, Ana is a good comrade,
trustworthy, but, the Romanian Party needs a leader from the working class, a
true Romanian.”18 Hence, starting actually October 1945, at the National Conference,
for almost two decades he will be — with short intermittence — the almighty
character in Romania, both in what concerns the Party and the state.
Far from offering a solution to the fight for power once and for all, the dispute
between the two leadership teams continued, gaining often-tensioned accents.
Dej’s anxiety was even bigger, since the “external group” kept close links with
Soviet institutions, especially with the N.K.V.D. of Beria; at the same time, the
competing group (Pauker, Luca, T. Georgescu) recognized the first secretary of
the Party at the plenary meeting from 1961 and they acted “as a group constituted
singularly, outside the elected organs (…), most important matters of Party
leadership and of state being resolved by the secretariat and not by the Political
Bureau, because there they had majority and the secretary general, in many
matters of great importance, was placed in a weaker position, left by himself.”19
Given all this Dej would “come out” on top of this situation, due to his less
obvious qualities — political ability, tact and diplomacy — had been waiting for
favorable conditions in the final confrontation to appear, especially since he had
Stalin’s acceptance, who, unsatisfied with the tensioned atmosphere within the
Party, said bluntly to Dej: “if they get in your way, scare them away!”20
The opportunity to do so came along with the C.C. plenary meeting in 26–27
May 1952, called to discuss the serious deviations from the Party’s line of the
former leadership of the Finance Ministry and of Romania’s Popular Bank, realizing
that Vasile Luca “has separated himself from the Party… has surrounded himself
with Party’s enemies, has stood up against the general line of the Party”; that
Teohari Georgescu “manifested conciliatory attitude related to the rightwing
deviations of Vasile Luca”. Serious accusations Dej had for Ana Pauker, as well,
saying that “the deviation from the Party line in matters of agriculture and
collections”, that “she has cultivated unprincipled relations within the Party”.
Considering all these elements, the plenary meeting reached the conclusion that
the exclusion of Vasile Luca21 from the C.C. and of Teohari Georgescu from the
Political Bureau and from the C.C. secretariat were necessary, as later was
extended to cover the functions of vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers.
Ana Pauker was sanctioned only with a warning, but the plenary did not elect
her again as member in the secretariat and of the Political Bureau of the C.C., as
a first step towards her final elimination from the leadership of the Party.22
The disparaging and removal of the “anti-Party”, “fraction” group of PaukerLuca-Georgescu from the leadership of the Romanian Worker’s Party and
afterwards, entirely from the Party served to overcome, through the implications
and consequences the sphere of a power struggle, political disputes within
the communist Party, which then became a real “monolith Party”, dominated in
an authoritarian manner by a group with a unique political orientation and, in
fact, by a single man who would obtain thus the monopoly of personal power.
Gheorghiu-Dej’s dictatorship over the Party was then exercised without mediation
7
67
over the country as well and the “cult of personality” he generated was nothing else
but a local Stalinism.
Even if the cult of personality of Dej and his power inside the Party got a
considerable boost, he couldn’t yet consider himself as entirely mastering the
situation, as long as he felt his position within the Party threatened by his eternal
rival — Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu. The solution that he chose — following the advice
and with the support of his obedient and zealous subordinate — Alexandru
Drãghici (minister of internal affairs) — was the harshest, that is the physical
elimination of his adversary. Consequently, Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu was arrested
under the false accusation of “espionage in the service of imperialism” and
“crime of high treason”. Then, he was tried, sentenced to death and executed in
a great hurry, in the night of 16th to 17th of April 1954, “shot from behind”.
Without any doubt, Gheorghiu-Dej and his minister of internal affairs, Drãghici,
bear the main responsibility for this murder, but the entire membership of the Party
at the time (including members of Political Bureau and of the C.C.) were guilty
and responsible. The latter could not exonerate themselves for initiating, encouraging
and supporting the proliferation of the cult of personality of Dej, with unfortunate
consequences for the entire Romanian society. For they had also have overlooked,
encouraging a condemnable complicity, many abuses and illegalities to which
the entire intellectual Romanian elite (many from the intellectually flourishing
period between the two World Wars, but also other prominent figures in our
science and culture) had fallen victim to, given the inhumane regime of physical
and moral extermination within the created Romanian gulag.
Even more, while in the Soviet Union Stalinist crimes were uncovered and
therefore society there was going through a profound process of conscienceraising, in Romania there were very few signs of change; the Romanian Worker’s
Party continued to patronize a “society with rigid forms, leaded by petrified dogmas,
‘Stalinizing’ everything as an automatic device would do, once started being
impossible to stop, insulating all the possible niches from the thawing wind that,
blowing throughout all Eastern Europe, could have blown inside Romania as
well.”23 The disappearance of Stalin, instead of giving Dej and his friends the
opportunity of long-awaited normalization of domestic life, considered it an
internal affair of the Soviet Union, ignoring the similar de-Stalinization process
taking place within the most of the satellite countries of central and southeastern Europe (the Hungarian revolution of 1956 being the most violent form
of manifestation of this “political thaw”). Dej felt himself as the master of the
situation both within the Party and in the country, a fact that permitted him to
overcome successfully the moment of Hungarian revolution, namely all the
turmoil generated as consequence within Romanian young generation.
Interior stability, plus the experience gained from the “Hungarian lesson”
prompted Dej to take the next step, decisive in Romanian foreign policy (a step
that would bring him great popularity) — parting with Moscow’s direct influence.
The international context, dominated by the politics of relaxation generated by
Khrushcev, was in his favor and Dej’s tactics of overstating the “RomanianSoviet friendship” and of the fidelity towards Moscow was as absurd as it was
68
RODICA IAMANDI
8
efficient. One has to notice that the ability and diplomacy that characterized the
whole political career of this now-neglected communist leader. The way Dej had
obtained what no other satellite of Moscow had succeeded in doing: i.e., the
withdrawal of the quota of participation at “sovroms” and especially the “miracle”
of June1958, that is, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops that had been stationed
in Romania since 1944, was exemplary of his diplomatic talent.
These successes consolidated internal stability, bringing about a bonus of
popularity to the communist leader, more than all the Party propaganda and
he exacerbation of the “cult of personality” had accomplished. Starting the
historic detachment from Soviet domination was a great achievement of Dej, but
unfortunately, this gain did not extend to de-Stalinization as well, a process
started by Khrushcev at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party.
For Gheorghiu-Dej — as Silviu Brucan recognized — the Soviet experience that
he had gained to date become an à la carte menu, that is, he was choosing from
it just what suited him. Thus, Romanian experienced a de-satelliltization to save
Stalinism and not to reform it, as Khrushcev tried in the Soviet Union.”24
Dumitru Popescu says in a memoir that, “Our Stalin was not dead, our Stalin
was defending himself”25, in relation to Dej’s attitude during the 1958 campaign,
when under a barrage of attacks against those contaminated by the events in
Hungary and Poland, was an attack against the critics of Stalinism, seen as a
reaction to the cult of Stalin aimed eventually at Dej. Even if only Miron
Constantinescu and Iosif Chiºinevski were found to be scapegoats, according to
Dumitru Popescu, “behind them were large categories of Party activists eager to
open a public political process of Stalinism, including a process of the way
Stalin reflected himself in our social reality and continued to reflect himself there
because the generative factors were not removed.”26
Under such circumstances, the equivocal attitude of Dej towards the
re-launching of the process of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union at the 22nd
Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party, in October 1961 seems
understandable. He could not afford to situate himself in a position of attack
towards the orientation of the Congress and Khrushev, or to sustain openly the
cult of Stalin. With characteristic ability, he found an “original” way to expose
Stalinism by taking it against his old opponents from the “exterior group” during
the plenary of the C.C., from 30th of November — 5th of December 1961.
The report presented by Dej at the plenary meeting considered fully justified
“the measures taken by the Soviet Union Communist Party to end the cult of
personality and its consequences”, for under that influence “methods and
practices contrary to Leninist norms have taken place, overstepping the democratic
rules in Party life”, but he added, “the methods generated by the cult of
personality and by its consequences did not have the extent they had in other
countries”, because the Party, his activists guarded “the fundamental principles
of the Party”, did not give way to pressures and unhesitatingly protected the life
and the dignity of the Party members27 the main attack was directed again
towards “the anti-Party group Pauker-Luca” and towards his supporters (Teohari
Georgescu, Iosif Chilinevski and Miron Constantinescu) — supposedly the main
9
69
exponents of Stalinist cult and practices, with old and new accusations, exposing
for the first time their ill-fated role in co-operativization of the agricultural
sector, the fact that in spite of the indications of Ana Pauker to Teohari Georgescu
“in the name of the struggle against kulaks, over eighty thousand peasants, most
of them working peasants, were sent to trial”, under the accusation that they did
not respected their obligations towards the state.
Transferring the responsibility for all inequalities and abuses to the “fraction
groups”, Dej considered “a fortune for our Party that their possessions did not
result in inequality, so there were no serious injustices done to be repaired and
no one was to be rehabilitated post-mortem.”28 In the same vein of falsifying the
history, many of the senior Party leadership spoke, but none excelling in demagogy
and servility his successor to power, the new leader of the Romanian Communist
Party (R.C.P.), Nicolae Ceauºescu. (How sincere he was was demonstrated seven
years later, when he launched a virulent critique aimed at the former leadership
of which he had been a part, as an opening act to the process he was going to
attribute to Dej.) In so doing, Ceauºescu was not concerned by the fate of the
Party or by the fate of Dej’s victims, but more with personal reasons, and
primarily irritated by the fact that the parting with Moscow had been initiated by
Dej with good consequences being already seen by 1964. “For a long while —
declared Ceauºescu shortly after the plenary meeting from April 1968 — we
used to think and to declare publicly with satisfaction that we have nothing to
rehabilitate, that in Romania abuses, violations of Party democracy or of socialist
legislation did not take place. Even more, it was said that it was a great happiness
for us that we have had someone to protect the Party and state activists.”29
Ceauºescu was pointing to the observation that, beyond the cynicism of the
appreciations Dej had made was the easy way he had distanced himself from the
responsibilities for many illegalities committed under his lead, saying “we have
nothing to rehabilitate”, ignoring knowingly the victims of the genocide of
1937–1938 including R.C.P. members such as the assassinations of ªtefan Foriº
and Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, ignoring knowingly the thousands of victims of the
Romanian gulag after 1948.
The reforming action triggered by Khrushcev at the 20th Congress of the
Soviet Union Communist Party and developed at the 22nd, with all the positive
effects for the new Soviet domestic politics encouraged same actions in the
satellite countries from the eastern Europe, with first manifestations being evident
in Albania and Hungary.
Paradoxically, especially now when Stalinism and the cult of personality had
been denounced, when profound changes were taking place, Dej and Romanian
Worker’s Party were dominating the Romanian political scene. Dej was favored
also by his united team of collaborators, consisting of specialists in various fields
and devoted political men. Under his leadership, there were accomplishments,
such as the diplomatic solution to the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict, from
an apparently neutral standpoint, or the parting with Moscow, or the general
amnesty for political prisoners — a surprising political decision even for the
most ardent supporters of the régime. This amnesty was the unique liberating
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RODICA IAMANDI
10
opportunity for many leading personalities of Romanian science and culture. All
these events were the apogee of his career and brought about his large political
support.
An objective evaluation of Gheorghiu-Dej’s activity as leader of state, cannot
omit the fact that in spite of the errors committed as consequence of his “cult of
personality”, that he had captured the masses due to his adroitness in politics, he
also led Romania to the general renewal path that had opened to eastern Europe
at the beginning of 1964. As a benchmark for the new historical epoch for Romania,
the Declaration from April (1964) while conceived by this Party leader as a
perspective program, it became his political testament. Two priorities were
stated therein: the stabilization of external political goals, and the internal
stabilization of the domestic politics. He succeeded to accomplish only the first,
obtaining with many risks the autonomy of the Party, its inalienable right to
manifest itself as a national political force, and especially, the relative
independence of the country and its national sovereignty. “Even partially realized
on this exterior dimension of it — noticed Victor Frunzã — this work (left
halfway) contributed to a different reception of Gheorghiu-Dej by the history,
from, let’s say, the reception if he would have disappeared in 1956, not only with
his hands tainted by the blood of thousands of victims, but with qualities that
make him an important complex personality for our contemporary epoch…
Most certainly, Dej cannot be in trial for what he wanted to, but he did not succeed
to accomplish. Posterity has to be grateful for what he has done good for the
country and for the Romanian people.”30 Beyond these attainments there are
errors that remain, though, very serious ones, like the crimes initiated and patronized
for almost two decades, while he was gathering in his hands the entire power
within the Party and state. For these actions, he has been examined by a stern
history and found guilty without any hesitation.
3. The “Cult of Personality” as Practiced
and Imposed under Nicolae Ceauºescu
The successes obtained by Gheorghiu-Dej, especially, on the level of the
relative independence of the country and of the gaining of national sovereignty,
were subordinated by his successor, Nicolae Ceauºescu, to a personal interest.
The two personalities became the motif of an absurd propaganda campaign that
would lead step-by-step towards setting up a dictatorship and a “cult of personality”
without precedent in Romanian history. Ceauºescu’s road towards personal
dictatorship was much more oppressive than that of Dej, when it was gradually
set in place by a chain of apparently inoffensive measures, but each holding
dangerous implications for democracy.
Although only three years passed since his confirmation at the 9th Congress
of the Party as secretary general of the C.C. of R.C.P., Nicolae Ceauºescu had
accumulated already power. In December, 1967 he assumed for himself the function
of president of the Council of State, so he was now Head of State, as well as
General Party Secretary. He used these powers to first uncover the abuses and
11
71
illegalities of the former leadership (excepting himself), aiming his attacks
mainly at his rival Alexandru Drãghici and at Gheorghiu-Dej. This action was
not ostentatious, all taking place in the second part of the C.C. of the R.C.P.
plenary meeting of April 1968 (called to foster the development of education at
all levels). For example, he did not even take the floor at this meeting, but rather
tackled this subject at another meeting (a meeting of the activists of Bucharest)
on 26th of April.
That plenary had represented, after Dumitru Popescu, “the climax of deStalinization in Romania at its peak.31 The centrality of “security” acquired its
infamous place in Romania due to its importance at that stage of development of
the socialist régime (being consumed with alleged abuses, illegalities and crimes).
Particularly given that Ceauºescu considered that these abuses could not by
blamed on the “cult of personality” as others did, but that they were characteristic
of “the states of economic, political, social and educational low level of the
people and due the backward mentality of those who have committed all these
crimes”, that is, as phenomena outside socialism that should be left outside.32
The plenary meeting then rehabilitated Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, ªtefan Foriº and
other victims of the “cult of personality”, as those condemned and executed in
the Soviet Union at the order of Stalin during “Great Terror” years, 1937–1938.
Also, by eliminating the main culprit in Pãtrãºcanu’s case, Alexandru Drãghici,
Ceauºescu gave a signal for the removal of all inconvenient people, namely all
of Dej’s former inner circle.
Ceauºescu’s intransigent attitude in all matters of interest to the Party and for
the country, such as those tackled at the plenary from April 1968, or his firm
position in the Czechoslovakia matter (in which, by condemning the Soviet
intervention propelled him into the posture of a national hero) the Romanian
population saw in him an ideal, more liberal leader, more democratic and more
open to renewal than his predecessor, while, at the same time, he became
internationally famous. Great leaders, such as Harold Wilson of Britain, Charles
de Gaulle of France, and Richard Nixon of the United States, came rushing to
officially visit him in Bucharest. However, this so-called “liberation” was only a
relative one, though. Within the Party, he employed the traditional “rotation of
the staff” to minimize or eliminate the influence of the “old guard”. Hence, in
the Party, it would not be possible for a real opposition to the renewed Stalinist
methods, to the ascension of a “new cult of personality” to form, with only singular
voices being heard.
An eyewitness of the time considers that Czechoslovakia’s invasion was the
decisive moment for the creation of a “cult of personality” for Ceauºescu: “in
those moments a certain attitude imposed itself towards Ceauºescu within the
Party. As the word went back then, the man who established this attitude as a
necessity within the Permanent Presidential Council was Maurer. His reasoning
was solid and clear. He supposedly said, Now Romania is personalized by
Ceauºescu. Ceauºescu, by the nature of his function has to face all dangers
confronting the country. We have to give him a bigger say, a bigger political
force, to prove he has his back covered; that he is assured that there is no niche
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RODICA IAMANDI
12
into the leadership of Romania, into the Communist Party, that someone could
ever speculate to attack the positions promoted by Ceauºescu in the name of the
Party and of the country. This action imposes an obvious solidarity with Ceauºescu,
an unconditioned support of his positions, a definition of these positions as totally
expressing the Party, the country, the people”.33
During this first period (1965–1971), Ceauºescu succeeded to assure himself
popularity. The people saw in him the “providential man”; the leader restoring
their dignity, expressing their own hopes and dreams. They could not imagine
that he would use this popularity to ease his way to a total occupation of power.
And nothing, and no one, thus impeded the application of his plan. It all started
with changes inside the mechanism of power, placed in operation at the 9th
Congress of the Party in 1965, when the Romanian Worker’s Party became the
Romanian Communist Party and Romanian Popular Republic became Romanian
Socialist Republic, when the Congresses were re-numbered and a new
constitution was adopted. By the 1969 Congress and ones following, the changes
in the mechanism of power became much obvious, and more precisely aimed.
Of great importance was the change of the name of the supreme function within
the Party, from Secretary-General of the C.C. of the R.C.P., into that of
Secretary-General of R.C.P. At the time, Ceauºescu was already President of the
Presidential Council, the supreme functionary of the state. From now on,
Ceauºescu was to be elected not by the plenary of the C.C. but directly by the
Congress of the Party. Thus, he became the only immovable person in the Party,
protected under the simulacrum of Party democracy.
This measure affected the entire Party, diminishing the importance and role
of the other leadership bodies, especially that of the Political Bureau (to which even
Dej had paid attention), because it used to be the main means of expression of the
principle of collective leadership. Otherwise, Ceauºescu himself declared the
importance of this principle at the 9th Congress, as supreme principle of Party
leadership.34 Yet, he defied elementary norms of Party democracy, being elected
by a show of hands and unceasing cheers. It should be noted here that the choice
of the delegates at a Congress was preceded by a careful staff selection, monitored
by Ceauºescu himself and, in time, by Elena Ceauºescu, his wife, head of the feared
“Cabinet number 2”. Furthermore, all the members of C.C. were drawn from the
ranks of these same delegates, therefore completing the image of a grotesque show.
Over time, Ceauºescu’s thirst for power grew larger. When he has visited China
and North Korea in 1971 he was seduced by the dimensions and by the forms of
manifestation of the “cult of personality” seen. He saw meetings of adulation of
the leader, fascinating spectacles of light and sound, and thereby decided to import
more of such a political and cultural system to Romania. Thus:
“In Romania we are in error in what concerns the matter of the cult of personality”,
Dumitru Popescu remarked, “as it is commented upon now is seems that it
consisted of festive events only”. For Ceauºescu such “festivism” was totally
unsatisfactory and lame, much less than what he wanted. “A few voices singing
“osana” were small potatoes. He was way beyond such tiny satisfactions. He would
look over the newspapers, find phrases full with eulogy and not be thrilled at all.
13
73
For him, mass hysteria was essential, millions’ “osana”, over-enthusiastic
collectives’ adhesion, the rumble of the meetings in the public square, the huge
crows of workers with their arms stretched up to reach him, the living queues
along his car rides lasting for kilometers, arms scanning from hundreds of
chests. He has built as a lucid and calculated architect the complicated frame of
mass delirium (...) He has organized periodically gigantic congresses and
conferences. He has institutionalized the grand country tours, the pompous work
visits in the counties, plants, towns, villages and the so-called dialogue with the
people were hundreds of thousands participated.”35
Thus, in a second phase (1971–1980), Romania obtained a “mini-cultural
revolution” leading to an oversized “cult of personality”. After assuming the function
of supreme commander of the armed forces, he transformed the low-prestige
Political Bureau into the Political Executive Committee, politically controlling
the entire activity of the government. I. Gh. Maurer, then-head of the government,
faced Ceauºescu’s acts with ever-greater difficulty, for his successors will now
have a solely decorative role. After 1974, Elena Ceauºescu launched herself into
politics, gaining one leadership function after another, up to “prime vice-prime
minister”. At this time, Ceauºescu’s control over all acts of internal and external
politics is complete. Differences in the ruling circle start to show, both in matters
of form and content (especially from Maurer’s part) but his honorable attitude is
not followed as an example by many others. Therefore, many politicians opposing
imposture and megalomania of Ceauºescu’s political, social and economic life
left their functions “willingly” or were set aside.
The “shadow directors” of such a “personality cult” staged congresses, public
gatherings and homage shows, training impressively large masses, in Chinese
and North Korean style. Masses almost never gather willingly. The “shadow
directors” thus invent and institutionalize all types of National Councils mimicking
democracy, only to elect as their head, with exaggerated pomp, Nicolae Ceauºescu.
Finally, the plenary meeting of March 1974 proposed to the Great National
Assembly the institution of the function of President of Romania and for that
function unanimously elected Nicolae Ceauºescu.
Through this new function, Ceauºescu reached the climax of political power;
with 1974, the dictatorial régime was stepping into a new historical phase. In only
nine years, he had become the most powerful man in Romania, “an absolute
monarch”36, according to Silviu Brucan, and the following rise to power of his wife,
Elena Ceauºescu, made Romania a “communist two-headed monarchy.”37 They
then succeeded to build an almost perfect model of a personal-dictatorship political
system, permitting them not only to control Romania, in every political way, but the
personal life of the 23 million Romanians, as well, for almost a quarter of a century.
Perplexed, the “public opinion” had assisted such a metamorphosis of the leaders
in which they had placed so many hopes. Ceauºescu was the one who promised
at the tribune of the 9th Congress not to admit “any forms of overstepping the
principle of work and collective leadership”, and he had proposed as well the
introduction of procedures to which “no Party member can have more that one
function of leadership, either within the Party or within the state.”38
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RODICA IAMANDI
14
During the period that entered history as the “Golden Epoch” or as “Nicolae
Ceauºescu Epoch”, came into form after 1971, the “cult of personality” acquired
the most absurd forms of expression, by which his totalitarian power was finally
consecrated. Any act of internal or external policy was now “under the thumb”
of the General Secretary, any action took place only under his “direct supervision
and guidance”, given his “pretentious indications” — expressions obsessively
usual with Party propaganda of the epoch. At the same time, a “cult of personality”
of Elena Ceauºescu was carefully installed, motivated by her allegedly exceptional
merits during the revolutionary times in Romania. This as done although Ceauºescu
himself had asked at the tribune of the 9th Congress that any personality from
history be objectively presented, considering that “the exaggeration of the merits
of some militants” was damaging. “No leader, no matter how prominent,” said
Ceauºescu then, “can be presented as the only agent of the historical events, without
deifying that person, to denying the role of the masses, of the people… Would
be wrong to exaggerate past merits of some leaders only to put the history ‘in
accord’ with the present.”39
With characteristic demagogy, after the plenary meeting of 1968, Ceauºescu
stated that the activity of any Party member was to start from “an objective and
lucid analysis of the facts and not from the myths. We do not need idols. We do
not need to transform people into flags.”40 However, by bending the historical
truth, Party propaganda has put into circulation facts and appreciations well over
the limit of credibility in creating a heroic aura for Ceauºescu, so to increase his
domestic and foreign prestige. In reality such propaganda harmed no one, being
too extreme to be believed by anyone: the presence of Nicolae Ceauºescu, aged 12
in the revolutionary movement, at 15 into the Party, or his important contribution
to the activity of the National Anti-Fascist Committee in 1933 and the arrangement
of the 1st of May 1939 demonstration with the future Elena Ceauºescu, or even the
episode of his presence in the prison camp at Târgu Jiu… In direct relation to the
development of the communist totalitarianism is the proliferation of the “cult of
personality” of Nicolae Ceauºescu in the 1960s and ’70s and, in the ’80s the “cult
of personality” of Elena Ceauºescu, to grotesque extremes. Thanks to a perfectly
functioning propaganda mechanism and to a rhetoric overstating the merits of the
Secretary General, forcing the superlatives of the Romanian language over decent
limits, the cult flourished. No less useful were the actions of (re-named) artists,
writers, plastic artists, who, from either conviction or opportunism, made it
possible to set him high on a pedestal of power. Thanks to them, Ceauºescu came
to believe himself that he was the “Genius of the Carpathians”, that the history of
the Romanian people began (and would end) with him. The newspapers, Vlad
Georgescu (one of the opponents of the régime from abroad) remarked, saw him
as “the icon of a prince”, referring to him as “Man”, written with capital letter (as
once “God” was written). “His people” was used in reference to Ceauºescu as with
the kings of old, but no prince or king in Romania (not even those with the biggest
egos) would approve of these unnatural forms of expressions, or of them being
practiced to such an extent as to transform into a familial cult. Only Stalin has been
genius, prophet, and father of many nations.“41
15
75
Such appropriations and manipulations of national and patriotic feelings,
obstinately invoking the historical past under the pretext that it restores to a
people their true national dignity were diversions in the service of the “cult of
personality”. The festive meetings and the pompous festive shows held to allegedly
honor the patriotic actions of forefathers were just pretexts to inoculate into the
public opinion the idea that the R.C.P. was in fact the person continuing the
traditions of fight for social justice, independence and national sovereignty of
the Romanian people. By relationship as relatives, the Secretary General, came
to personify the aspirations of all Romanians. This cult grew to a point that the
name and figure of Nicolae Ceauºescu were situated next to legendary symbols
of Romanian history — from Burebista to Decebal, Bãlcescu and Cuza. From
here to associating the Party and Ceauºescu with the name of the country in a
popular slogan of “the golden epoch”, “the Party, Ceauºescu, Romania”, was just
a step. Within such a context it is easy to understand that any criticism of
dictatorship, of the “cult of personality”, or directed to the absurd economic and
social policies generated thereby was immediately qualified as “anti-Romanian”
and sanctioned as such by the oppressive régime.
Without any doubt, the “cult of personality” so carefully cultivated was supported
by a wise foreign policy, of national independence and sovereignty. Such foreign
policies were approved by all Western powers, as well, since the principles of
these policies were mostly part of the Helsinki Treaty. (Indeed, many were the
same policies as those formulated by Dej in his “Declaration of April 1964”.)
Thus, the President of Romania, by accurately speculating upon the designs
of Western leaders, “naturally” came to consider himself (with the aid of a large
chorus) as one of the great personalities of the contemporary world. A clear
retrospective view on the last quarter of century of communism should seriously
put the question of how such a possibility of the absurd “cult of personality” of
Ceauºescu and his despotic régime came to be, especially after the sad experience
of Dej with an earlier variant. It is the author’s contention that such a state of
events that brought Romania to the “brink of disaster” was born at the confluence
of three factors: the Stalinist model, the will of the leader and the active or
passive acceptance of the population to be so led.42 The active support was offered
by the higher communist activists (“the nomenclature”), the admirers and councils
which always surrounded Ceauºescu, and local activists. The passive support
was offered by the resigned, humble or indifferent masses, acquiescing in dictatorial
decisions even when these were not in their best interests, affecting their hopes
and their human dignity and freedom. For too long, stand-up reactions were almost
non-existent, nut this should not be explained by mere cowardice, but rather by
a temporarily “rational” compromise, given that the “cult of personality” and the
dictatorship were both considered “temporary” aberrations by their fragility,
artificiality, demagogy and lack of truth. Ceauºescu possessed a syncretic, cultic
nature, combining elements of the cults of Mussolini, Hitler, Mao and Kim de
Sung (weaving within the same fabric the traditional Asian cultic elements with
the modern Soviet elements of Stalin’s “cult of personality.”43)
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RODICA IAMANDI
16
NOTES
1. Sergiu Tãmaº, Dicþionar politic. Instituþiile
democraþiei ºi cultura civicã/Political Dictionary.
The Institutions of Democracy and the Civic
Culture, Bucharest, Editura Academiei Române,
1993.
2. ***Dicþionar enciclopedic, vol. I, A.C., Bucharest,
Editura Enciclopedicã, 1993.
3. Ovidiu Trãsnea, Nicolae Kallos (coord.), Micã
enciclopedie de politologiei, Bucharest, Editura
ªtiinþificã ºi Enciclopedicã, 1977, pp. 111–112.
4. O.G. Drobniþki, I.S. Kon (coord.), Mic dicþionar
de eticã, Moscova, Editura pentru literaturã
politicã, 1965, pp. 25–26 (C).
5. Ibidem.
6. N.S. Khrushchev, Raportul de activitate al
Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist al
Uniunii Sovietice la Congresul al XX-lea al
Partidului/Activity Report..., Bucharest, Editura
de Stat pentru Literaturã Politicã, 1956, p. 134.
7. “Discursul secret”/“The Secret Discourse” of
Hrushcev at the 20th Congress of CPSU,
immediately taken over in the Western press, and
in Tariq Ali, The Stalinist Legacy, Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984, pp. 256–270,
apud Vladimir Tismãneanu, Reinventarea
politicului. Europa rãsãriteanã de la Stalin la
Havel/Reinventing the political… trans. in
Romanian by Alexandru Vlad, Polirom, 1997
and A. Rossi, Autopsie du stalinisme, Paris,
1957, apud Raymond Aron, Democraþie ºi
totalitarism, trans. in Romanian by Simona
Ceauºu, Bucharest, Editura ALL Educaþional,
2001, pp. 204–220.
8. Vladimir Tismãneanu, op.cit., p. 74.
9. Raymond Aron, Democraþie ºi totalitarism/
Democracy and Totalitarism, trans. Simona
Ceauºu, Bucharest, Editura ALL Educaþional,
2001, p. 194.
10. Ibidem, p. 212.
11. Ibidem, p. 219.
12. A. Rossi, Autopsie du stalinism, Paris, 1957,
p. 10, apud Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 209. .
13. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 211.
14. Apud Roy Medvedev, Despre Stalin ºi Stalinism,
Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 1991, p. 56.
15. Ibidem, p. 133.
16. Victor Frunzã, Istoria stalinismului în România/
The History of Stalinism in Romania, Bucharest,
Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 491.
17. Ibidem.
18. Silviu Brucan, Generaþia irositã/ The Wasted
Generation, Bucharest, Editura Univers&
Calistrat Hogaº, 1992, p. 59.
19. Gheorghiu-Dej, Darea de seamã a delegaþiei
P.M.R. la cel de-al XX-lea Congres al P.C.U.S./
Report of the P.M.R. Delegation at the XXth
Congress of P.C.U.S., in “Scânteia” newspaper,
anul XXXI, nr. 5371, 7 decembrie, 1961, p. 1.
20. Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincerã a poporului
român/A Sincere History of the Romanian People,
Bucureºti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1997,
p. 471.
21. Not after long, Vasile Luca was arrested, trailed
and at 10th October 1954, sentenced to his death,
sentence changed after the appeal, to a sentence
for life.
22. “Scânteia” newspaper, anul XXI, nr. 2360, 29 mai,
1952, p. 1.
23. Victor Frunzã, op. cit., p. 423.
24. Silviu Brucan, op. cit., p. 95.
25. Dumitru Popescu, Am fost ºi cioplitor de himere/
I was an unrealty carver, too, Bucharest, Editura
Expres, 1994, p. 50.
26. Ibidem, op. cit., p. 153.
27. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, op. cit., p. 1.
28. Ibidem.
29. Nicolae Ceauºescu, Cuvântare la adunarea
activului de partid al municipiului Bucureºti/
Speech at the Bucharest Party Summons, 26 IV
1968.
30. Victor Frunzã, op. cit., pp. 459–461.
31. Dumitru Popescu, op. cit., p. 133.
32. Nicolae Ceauºescu, România pe drumul
desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste/Romania on
the Road of Perfecting Socialist Construction,
vol. III, Bucharest, Editura Politicã, 1969, p. 194.
desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste, vol. I,
Bucharest, Editura Politicã, 1968, p. 74.
36. Silviu Brucan, op. cit., p. 145.
37. Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 515.
38. Nicolae Ceauºescu, op. cit., p. 74.
39. Ibidem, p. 515.
desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste, vol. III,
Bucharest, Editura Politicã, 1969, p. 194.
41. Vlad Georgescu, Politicã ºi istorie. Cazul
comuniºtilor români 1944–1977/The Case of the
Romanian Communist, München, Ion Dumitru
Verlag, 1983, p. 91.
42. Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 516.
43. See also Lavinia Betea, Psihologie politicã.
Individ, lider, mulþime în regimul comunist/
Political Psychology. Individual, Leader, Crowd
during the Communist Régime, Iaºi, Polirom,
2001, pp. 176–177, 188–190, for a development of
this argument, as for a competent identification
and analysis of the propaganda directions that have
built the cult of personality of Nicolae Ceauºescu:
the fasifying of biography, the identification of the
leader with the Party, the people and the country,
the appropriation of the mission of the “saviour” of
the nation, the appropriation of the role of a
visionary and un rested guide for the destiny of the
masses, the appropriation of the status of an
international politician.
I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S
AND EUROPEAN STUDIES
ROMANIA AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
(PART I)
DANIELA IONESCU
Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the short and far-term
economic impact of Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.) over: Romanian farmers’
income; national budget; consumer prices; trade with European Union (E.U.);
rural development. The above-mentioned impacts will be studied in details for
the next three years after enlargement because this is the period generally
considered to be the most economically painful. It is a period of adaptation,
during which Romania has to implement the expensive E.U.’s criteria.
The medium-far term impact will be considered for a time span that goes
beyond the first three years of membership (2010 or 2011) up to 2016, when
Romania will enjoy the full benefits of C.A.P. It will be analyzed the future
effects of the C.A.P. reform from June 2003 upon the Romanian agriculture. As
a new member, most of the terms of this reform will not be applied to Romania
in the first 3 years after accession but only afterwards.
Who will be the victims and who will be the beneficiaries of the C.A.P. on short
and long term? Is the reformist trend inside E.U. beneficiary for the Romanian
agriculture? What structural advantages and disadvantages has the Romanian
agriculture in regard with C.A.P.? Which is the bill that the national government has
to pay for the implementation of C.A.P.? These are few of the most important
questions that the paper will try to answer concerning mainly the economic aspects.
I. Explanation of the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.)
— market measures
C.A.P. is the best-integrated sector in E.U. 90% of the agricultural production
of the member states is subjected to E.U.’s reglementations. It has the two
pillars: Pillar 1 regards the market reglementations as well as the subsidies and
quotas. The second one involves the measures for the rural development.
Each year the Council of Ministers negotiates three kinds of prices. E.U.
imposes certain prices for the internal market, such as the indicative price. (Ind.
P). These have always been higher than those on the international market; therefore
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DANIELA IONESCU
2
the E.U. consumers are paying more for food than the non-E.U.. The reason of
this price is to assure a reasonable level of income for farmers. The intervention
price (Intervt. P) is the minimum price guaranteed. When the offer is higher than
the demand for some products, the Community buys them in order not to
decrease the market price under the intervention price. The intervention price is
lower than the indicative price but higher than the international price (W.P.)
Ind.P>Intervt.P>W.P. The threshold price refers to the protectionist policy of the
Community, by which it does not allow the import of agricultural products at
lower prices than the threshold price. After the expenditure for the transport and
trading, the price becomes higher than the internal prices.
A very important component is the subventions: direct payments, the financing
of export and others.
The direct payments — The subventions for production are given to those
products that may have a high price on the market, for example, due to a high
custom duty, thus discouraging their consumption. It is granted either on each
product, on area or on each animal. They are granted for: olive oil, oil bearing,
sheep meat, and tobacco. There are also bonuses for the high quality of some
products or animals as well as for processing the food. The 2003 reform hinted
to a decoupling of the subsidies from the amount of production. Nevertheless, in
order to safeguard particular production sectors and avoid abandoning them
some specific aid payments would be provided for such products as durum
wheat, rice, nuts, energy crops and starch potatoes.
The Compensatory payments — Were introduced in 1992 (McSharry C.A.P.
reform) in order to compensate the losses suffered by farmers as a result of the
decrease in the intervention prices close to the international ones. These payments
have no connection with the amount of production and they are granted as a steady
yearly amount of money either per hectare or per animal. The farmers have to respect
some standards of food and animal quality and the welfare of the environment.
Export subsidies — The agricultural products have higher prices than the
average world prices from outside E.U. Therefore the communitarian producers
are not enticed to export their products. Consequently, the E.U. encourages them
to export at a price considerably lower than those from E.U. and the E.U. supports
the price difference. Thus, the E.U. farmers can find easier markets avoiding
overburdening the E.U. market and they loose no money.
The custom tariff protection — Those who export on the E.U. market have to
respect the health and quality criteria, which are quite expensive. They are also
subjected to a single custom tariff for all the products.1
The rural development sector will be presented in details in a following
chapter dedicated to this subject.
II. Romanian agriculture’s major characteristics,
problems and challenges
Romania has a remarkable agricultural potential, but is not effectively exploited.
It is on the second place after Poland among the Central East-European candidates
3
79
concerning the available agricultural land. After accession might be the 7th
country after France, Spain, Poland, Germany, Italy and UK, having an 8% from
the total European Union’s agricultural land.
Romania has the largest number of population involved in agriculture (42%
in 2004) to which it corresponds a contribution to Gross Domestic Product
(G.D.P.) of approx. 10%. Therefore the Agricultural sector is one of the most
important in Romanian economy. In E.U. 1,7% from its population is involved
in agriculture, while its contribution to G.D.P. is 4.2%.
Romania has the most fragmented agricultural land in all E.U. and from all
the candidates — the average is 2 ha. Most of them are subsistence or semisubsistence farms that produce for self-consumption rather than for the market.
This is also responsible for the low productivity, while E.U. has big farmers
associations able to resist to European competition and also able to influence the
E.U. policy. The Romanian National Institute for Statistics estimated that more
than 60% of the production is for the self-consumption and not for the market.
This represented a big problem when the quotas of production were negotiated.
The quota is a maximum quantity of production allowed by the E.U. and is not
supposed to be exceeded. This is negotiated taking as a reference point the products
that reached the market and not the real production. Since only 40% of what has
been produced in Romania was destined to the market, was very difficult to
obtain good quotas mainly when it came of milk and wine. If the fragmentation
and the subsistence character is maintained the same problem will occur for the
next round of negotiations. This may impinge over agro-food production.
Another negative consequence of the excessive fragmentation is the poverty.
In 2001 the average monthly income for a Romanian farm was 165 euro. This is
only 12% more than the income of a family of unemployed. Moreover, this sum
includes the value of the products that are for self-consumption and they represent
around 57%. Therefore, the cash account for much less, around 75 euro. Needles
to say that this has upon consequences upon the productivity of this farm and
upon its means of modernization. There is a limited access to inputs and services
due to the poverty. For example there are still farmers who cannot afford to have
not even one tractor.
The trade balance is persistently negative and the share of agriculture in the
Romanian exports decreased constantly. Its main partner (exporter and importer)
is E.U. Until 2004 the second importer partner were the C.E.F.T.A. countries, but
since 2004 this is not available anymore since its members became E.U. members.
The Romanian products have a lower quality and are more expensive than the
strongly subsidized E.U. agricultural products (for more details see the Trade chapter).
The High rate of unemployment affects marnly the rural population: in 2002
only half of it was employed. The Social infrastructure represents another big
challenge since 60% of farmers are old (over 50) and very poorly educated. This
makes difficult the modernization of the sector and is oe of the reasons for its
lack of efficiency. The infrastructure in the rural area is totally insufficient. In
2001 only 10% of the rural roads were modernized. This has a negative impact
over the transport infrastructure. The transport of the agricultural products in
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DANIELA IONESCU
4
Romania it is one of the most expansive one in Eastern Europe. It is time consuming
and fuel consuming. The communication infrastructure is also very poor. One
phone central was available for an area of 100 km, serving more than two villages.
The Agricultural Banks’ activity is also very poor. They are of almost no use for
farmers since they cannot fulfill the criteria imposed by these banks for getting
credits.
The state financial resources are small due to the macroeconomic problems
that undermine the Romanian economy. One of the consequences is that the state
subsidies are much under the E.U.’s ones: less than 5% for the crop production
from the Agricultural national budget in comparison with 41.5 % from the E.U.’s
budget. The state help was granted only to big farms with over 100ha and to the
public sector rather than the private one. This means that more than 90% of the
farms were excluded from any state aid. Another result of the governmental lack
of money is that the agricultural investments are very poor. Also the domestic
legislation is not clear and sometimes is contradictory. There is no investment
bank for the local authorities, which should support their small projects. The
international programs were hampered because of diverse constraints: in the
case of World Bank and its Rural Development Program — there is a too long
period for preparation; lack of flexibility of WB’s representatives in allowing the
starting in some parts of this project. This program is in stand-by in the last
three years. S.A.P.A.R.D. program co-financed by E.U. has particular structural
and administrative difficulties, which decreased considerably the fund
absorption and the number of beneficiaries.
The financial consultancy system in the agricultural sector is in a cradle stage.
They are too expansive and the application procedure is too complicated to be
easily accessed by the Romanian farmers. Consequently, this system is of no use
at this moment.
The degradation of the agricultural soil due to human activity and natural
causes is one of the biggest concerns of the Romanian authorities. It affects the
quality of 12 million of agricultural land, from which 7.5 million ha are cropland.
Due to the bad management in collecting and storing the garbage, the subterranean
waters are mostly affected and through them, the quality of the plants. One of
the main problems that affect the quality of the soil is the abandon of the
agricultural land. Because of the extreme fragmentation of the agricultural land
as well as due to the lack of financial means, many farmers cold not afford to
take care of their land. It is estimated that the abandoned land accounts for
5–10% yearly. The fragmentation makes also difficult the implementation of some
national measures that should stop or prevent the further deterioration the soil.2
Advantages of the agricultural sector and its potential
The agricultural sector has one of the biggest agricultural lands from Eastern
Europe. The soil is favorable for an intensive agriculture and is of a good
quality. Romania has a strong tradition in agriculture and this sector is diversified
since it produces a wide range of agro-products from vegetables to animal farms.
5
81
During the Communist period was developed the high-level education in agriculture,
being set up a network of faculties and research institutions in this area. Consequently,
Romania is not lacking in highly trained specialists: such are the agricultural
engineers. The agricultural sector has a very good productivity for durum wheat,
which is above the average production in E.U. The milk production increased in
the last years exponentially. The Romanian trade is completely integrated in to
the European system since 60% of it is done with E.U.
Another important characteristic of the agricultural sector is that it has a strong
potential for agro-tourism and eco-tourism, but it has not been properly used. A
study of Commission evaluated that Romania is the fourth preferred country for
this kind of tourism by the E.U. tourists. The mot important attractions were the
authenticity of traditions and the daily life (the traditional agriculture, the sheep
breeding). The eco-tourist activities that could be developed are: bird watching
in the Danube Delta, horse riding, walking with the bicycle or with the cart.
The great potential for organic agriculture is to be emphasized, too. It has
already acknowledged that the area for organic agriculture should triple in the
first three years after accession and for the next ten years is supposed to grow
six times. Organic agriculture is strongly encouraged by the E.U. through a lot
of bonuses, primes and payments; it has attractive prices and an increasing
demand on the market. If Romania will reach its prospects in this area will have
be the 6th country with the largest organic agricultural land from E.U., after UK,
Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark and Italy.
III. E.U. policy towards Romania. The Association Agreement
and the results of the C.A.P. negotiations
The Association Treaty
Until Romania concluded its Accession Treaty in 2005, the relationship with
E.U. was regulated by the Association Agreement (or the European Agreement),
which was signed in 1993 and entered into force three years later. Although the
main idea of the Treaty was to envisage free trade between the E.U. and Romania,
the agricultural sector one of the most sensitive issues in EU was not subjected
to the same terms like all the other sectors. In the article 3 of the Protocol 3,
paragraph 2 from the Treaty of Association, the Romanian processed agricultural
products (stipulated in Annex A) were not subjected to any tax exemption. For
the other agricultural products the Community admitted an increase of the
import quotas with 10% yearly for the next 5 years while the custom tariffs for
these products will be reduced with 20% for 3 years and then frozen in the last
2. Both the quotas and the custom tariff reductions were not enough to encourage
the E.U. imports of agricultural products from this country. Moreover, the terms
of the Treaty rather encouraged the export of raw agricultural products, with all
its negative consequences for Romania. From all the other candidate countries
who concluded these Association Treaties with E.U., including Bulgaria,
Romania had the worst terms concerning the Agricultural trade: the lowest
quotas of export to E.U. and the smallest number of products that were subjected
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DANIELA IONESCU
6
to the custom tariffs reductions. However, the E.U. became the most important
market for the Romanian agricultural products but the balance of trade remained
constantly negative.3
The results of C.A.P. negotiations4
The negotiations for Chapter 7, Agriculture, started on 1 of October 2002,
after the negotiations with the countries from the first wave of enlargement
(Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Baltic countries) came
almost to an end. The result of this situation was that Romania’s requirements
could not exceed what has been already negotiated and granted with the first
candidates. The negotiations for this difficult chapter were concluded on 1st of
April 2004.
The C.A.P. budget for Romania
Romania has obtained an overall amount of 4.7 billion euro that will be
granted for the 2007–2009 (the first three years after accession). The direct
payments will be granted gradually. In the first year will receive 25% from the
level of direct payments at that moment, it will increase with 5% till 2010, and
then will increase with 10% till 2016 when it had to reach 100%. The estimated
value of these direct payments is of 881 billions euro. The market measures (the
indicative prices, the intervention prices) represent 732 billions euro. The rural
development accounts for 2.3 billions euro + 800 millions for projects funded
from structural funds. Romania has the right to use 20% of the rural funds as
direct payments until the amount will reach 100%.
Until 2006 Romania has to organize the Agency for Interventions and Payments
and the Integrated System for Administration and Control, without which the
money for the market measures could not be possibly granted.
From six periods of transition required by Romania to implement the acquis
communautaire, it received 4 in the following areas: 3 years, till 2009, for the
modernization of the units, which are processing and collecting the milk, to apply
the acquis for the diary farms, for modernization of the units for processing the
meat and 8 years for the elimination of the hybrid vineyards and their replacement
with other types allowed by the E.U. standards.
A very important result was that 7 million ha of agrarian land was accepted
eligible for direct payments, which, places Romania on the second place after Poland
among the other candidates and on the 6th place in Europe. This represents 102%
from what Romania has initially required. It also obtained a series of bonuses
and primes per animal head and these subventions represent 80% and 100%
from what Romania required. For example in the sugar sector, the negotiations,
though tough, were successfully concluded with a quota of production for Romania
that covers the internal consumption. For the diary sector was also negotiated a
good quota of production, keeping in mind that only 40% of the milk produced
in Romania fulfills the E.U. standards.
Romania will not be subjected for the next years after accession to the same
criteria and requirements that are subjected the old members of the E.U. as a
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83
result of the 2003 C.A.P. reform. This reform introduced new eligibility criteria
and a new system of financial discipline Romania will be exempted from these
requirements until will fully enjoy the same benefits like the old members and
until will completely implement the criteria stipulated in the Accession Treaty.
IV. Short and Long-term impact of the E.U. over
the Agricultural sector in Romania
IV.1. The introduction of the C.A.P. prices, the Single Payment Scheme on Area (S.P.S.A.)
and their effects over the prices in Romania and over the farmer’s income-short term
Concerning the E.U. funds-only the direct payments granted to the farmers
will be introduced step by step. Payments for supporting the market and for the
rural development would be granted 100% immediately after the integration.5
Romania, as well as all the other 10 candidates + Bulgaria will receive the
direct payments gradually during a period of 10 years starting from the date of
the accession. In the Romanian case the direct payments will start from 2007
(possibly) and will be only 25% from those granted to the old member states. Till
2010 they will increase with 5% and then will increase yearly with 10%, reaching
the same level of direct payments with those received by the old 15 member
states in 2016.6
Table 1
The gradual introduction of the direct payments in Romania
and the other 10 candidates (the percentages)
Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CEE 10 25% 30% 35% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Romania &
—
—
— 25% 30% 35% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Bulgaria
Based on Treaty of Accession
The C.A.P. reform from 2003 introduced a scheme for single payment
starting with 2005. It is based on the direct payments that the farmers received
between 2000–2002. Romania (and the other candidate countries) as a new comer
who did not receive payments and who has to make a big administrative effort
to implement C.A.P. was offered the option of Single Payment Scheme
(S.P.S.A.) on area. Yet this will be applied for a short period after the integration
(3 years) with the possibility to prolong it with maximum 2 years. In order to
receive the direct payments Romania must have the administrative capacity to
implement them till 2011, if not than it can continue with the S.P.S.A. but the
subsidies will be frozen at 50%. S.P.S.A. is a uniform payment per hectare paid
once per year. The amount of money is calculated based on the total amount of
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DANIELA IONESCU
8
the direct payments divided to the eligible agricultural area. In order to be eligible
a farm has to have a certain size. Romania chose a minimum of 1ha for a farm
in order to be eligible to receive the payments... According to the agreement
between Romania and the E.U. in 2007 (the presumably date of accession) the
direct payment will be 34.90 euro per hectare, representing 25% of the direct
payment granted to the old member states.
After Romania’s accession to E.U. only the direct payments are subjected to
a gradual increasing while all the other components of C.A.P. will fully enter to
force starting from the first year of membership. Also any state intervention on
the market will have to be changed according to the E.U. regulations.
Figure 1
Impact of C.A.P. on farmer’s income for the most important activities 2007
Added value
in Billion lei7
Barley
wheat
sun fl.
corn
Milk
potatoes
pork
beef
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
0
-5.000
Present policies
C.A.P. + S.P.S.A.
C.A.P. prices without direct payments (S.P.S.A.)
Source: World Bank Report June 20058
egg
chicken
9
85
In the cereal sector the prices after 2002 at some important agricultural products
in Romania (such as wheat, corn, barely potatoes) raised above the E.U. prices
(see Table 2) as a result of the increasing of input prices (for seeds and fertilizers
mainly) and the macro-economic situation. Also the quality of the Romanian
cereals is (for many of them) under the E.U.’s standards. Consequently after the
accession the cereal producers will be the most affected ones. They will have to
adjust their prices to the E.U.’s level, which is lower and they will also have to
produce better quality, which implies higher input prices. Therefore the World
Bank calculated that in the first three years after accession the losses of the
cereal producers will be considerable (30% for wheat, 44% for barely, 43% for
corn from the actual income calculated for 2004)). The evaluation was made
excluding the direct payments that will be granted. Even with the direct payments
(granted gradually) the losses for cereal producers will be reduced to a half but
they will remain consistent.
Table 2
2003–2004 cereal prices euro/kg Romania – E.U.
Cereals
Wheat/durum wheat/barely
Corn
Romania
E.U.
minimum – maximum price Intervention price
Euro/kg
Euro/kg
0.10-0.16
0.12-0.16
0.8
0.8
Sources: European Commission Directorate General of Agriculture, The Romanian Association
of Meat producers, the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Environment and Waters
The meat sector
This sector may have some advantages comparative with the cereal one. The
decrease of cereal prices will bring a decrease of input costs for animal farms.
This will be quite welcoming since the prices at pork are with 20–30% above the
E.U.’s indicative price level. Comparatively the prices gap between E.U. and
Romania is smaller than in the cereal sector. Yet, this approach should be taken
carefully since the quality of some of Romanian products is inferior to those of
E.U. So, the price gap may be bigger and consequently after accession the animal
producers will have to decrease at the level required by E.U. The poultry sector
is one of the most inefficient one and the World Bank calculated that would be
the most affected, with losses that will mount to 31%. The same source estimated
that, generally, the income for the meat producers might rather increase in the
first 3 years after accession (except the poultry sector) even without the Direct
Payment Scheme (D.P.S.) (e.g., +21% for beef).
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DANIELA IONESCU
10
Table 3
2003–2004 meat prices euro/kg Romania – E.U.
Meat
pork
beef
poultry
Romania
E.U.
Minimum – Maximum Price Intervention price
Euro/kg
Euro/kg
2–2.20
1.6–1.7
1.2–1.5
1.6–1.7
1.6–1.7
1.4
Sources: European Commission Directorate General of Agriculture, The Romanian
Association of Meat producers, the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Environment and Waters
Diary sector
The milk production generates an important part of the Romanian farmers
income, accounting for 22%. 98% of it is produced in private, small-medium sized
farms. Milk price although has increased in the last 2 years (2003–2004) is close
to E.U.’s indicative price level or even a little under it. Again should be taken
into consideration the quality which may also extend the gap prices between
Romania and E.U.: e.g., in 2001 only 40% of the milk produced in Romania to
be exported on communitarian market met the E.U.’s quality criteria. Overall
was estimated by the World Bank and the European Commission9 that the
income of milk producers will increase as a result of C.A.P. (+32% — World
Bank estimation).
Only the egg producers will record large losses due to the acute inefficiency
of this sector (up to 60% of their actual income–calculated for 2004) and without
direct payments. It was calculated that the rough impact of the C.A.P. prices
would decrease the farmers’ income mainly in the first years with approximately
19% if the Single Payment Scheme on Area does not accompany it as it was
described above. Although this Scheme will be applied, the losses will mount to
9% from the actual income mainly in the first year of accession, 2007, when the
combination between the C.A.P. requirements and the low level of the direct
payment (25% from the E.U.) will inflict a heavy burden upon the farmers.
Romania will also have to give up to some national direct payments such is the
one set up in 2003 by which the government decided to pay around 70 euro per
hectare (ha) for those farms that had more than 5 ha (which cover only
approx.18% of the whole number of farmers due to the fact that more than 80%
are small farms with less than 5 ha.). In comparison the Direct Payment granted
for 2007 will be only half of it — 34.90 euro per ha. The advantage would be
that smaller farms (with a minimum of 1 ha) will also benefit because until now
the governmental policy was to favour only the big farms (over 100 ha) and the
public sector.
Both World Bank and the European Commission agreed in their evaluations
that in order to soften the decrease of farmers’ income immediately after the
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87
accession there is a need to supply the E.U.’s direct payments with national
financial support that should reach 20–30 % from the E.U. actual level of direct
payments. Was calculated that in order to maintain the income at the pre-accession
level (2005) would be necessary a 20% financial aid, while if it is intended to
increase them, 30% would be the right figure. If this financial help is not granted
than the agricultural incomes will reach the 2005 level only in 2010 when the
level of direct payments will be 40% from the E.U. average level. In other words
the impact over Romanian farmers will be disastrous mainly in the cereal sector.
After 1997 the ability of a farmer to spend on inputs has decreased constantly
and dramatically until it reached in 2004 a half from what it used to be in 1994.
If this trend will continue after 2007 will be very difficult for many farmers to
increase their productivity. Therefore a national supplement added to the direct
payment in the first years seems necessary. World Bank also calculated that the
smallest farms and the largest farms will be the main beneficiaries of the direct
payments, mainly if they are coupled with the financial aid from the national
budget, while the medium farms (between 10–100 ha) may benefit less.
IV.2. The eligibility issue for direct payments
Romania decided that only those farms with a minimum of 1 ha will be
eligible for the Direct Payments. This represents the highest accepted ceiling for
eligibility in E.U..10 The minimum eligible area in E.U. is 0,3 ha while the
maximum is 1 ha. Romania as well as all the other eastern candidates chose the
maximum level because the cost of implementation of the direct payments for
farms smaller than 1 ha would have been extremely burdening for their budget
since the majority of farms in these countries has less than 1 ha. For Romania
the phenomenon of division of land in small farms is even more acute since
49.5% from 4.5 millions of farms have less than 1 ha.
These are the so-called subsistence farms that produce for self consumption
while only the rest of the products is sold on the market. This is also one of the
reasons for the high inefficiency of the Romanian agriculture. Consequently these
farms will be excluded from direct payments.11 The positive aspect is that only
5% of the agricultural land will be excluded (as it can be noticed from Figure 2),
the negative one is that almost 50% of the farms will not receive anything. It was
calculated that the impact of this situation over farms with less than 1ha will be
negligible since 34.90 euro/ha per year cannot be a significant improvement.
Even for the World Bank or the European Commission was difficult to calculate
the exact impact of C.A.P. over prices for consumers and they resorted to
simulations for the next 3–6 years. Romania is a special case due to the high lack
of efficiency of its agro-food sector.
As we could notice from Table 2, the cereal prices set up by producers for
wheat and corn are above the E.U. intervention prices, moreover their quality is
under the communitarian standards. After the accession the producers will have
to reduce the price to the E.U.’s level and therefore is expected a certain small
decrease in prices on the consumer market for basic cereal products, such as
bread, after accession.
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DANIELA IONESCU
12
Figure 2
The distribution of farms in relation with their number and seize
Number
of farms
Source: World Bank Report, June 2005
IV.3. Impact over consumers’ incomes
Agricultural
surface
The vegetable sector is very important for the Romanian consumer because
the prices for meat are high and many people replaced the meat consumption
with vegetables. As it can be noticed from the table nr. 4 the prices are under the
E.U. level. Although the domestic wholesale chain (open markets) remains very
important, it recorded a certain decrease in the last years in the favor of
supermarkets. Here most of the vegetables are coming from import, Romania
13
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being dependent on imports since 1993. The main source is Turkey (40%),
followed by the C.E.F.T.A. countries (which now are E.U. members) with 18%
and E.U. with 13%.12 The quality of these products is higher than the Romanian
ones but also their price is higher. If the trend continues and if the situation from
the other candidates who joined E.U. in 2004 can be a hint, then the Romanian
consumer may expect a moderate increase of prices for vegetable after accession.
Table 4
Prices on consumer market for vegetables in Romania and E.U.
with a minimum and a maximum price (were chosen the most relevant
vegetables on the Romanian consumption market) 2004
Euro/kg
Vegetables
Potatoes
Pepper
Bean
Tomatoes
Romania
0.25-0.27
0.70-0.90
0.70-1.00
0.55-0.70
Sources: Romanian Institute for Statistics and EUROSTAT 2002
UE
0.40-0.80
0.50-1.00
1.30-1.80
0.80-1.50
In the meat sector the 2004 prices in Romania are equal and even above the
E.U.’s consumer prices. Pork and poultry are more expansive than in E.U., which,
logically, follows the producer prices (see table 5). Beef is under E.U. consumer
price.13 Therefore might be expected a small decrease in prices at these products.
Should be also taken into consideration that Romania domestic demand is
dependent on pork (35%) and poultry (50%) imports and the main exporters on
the Romanian market are Hungary, US and E.U. countries. After accession the
commerce between Romania and Hungary will be completely free of taxes meaning
that the nowadays taxes imposed to Hungarian agro-products (20%) will be
removed and therefore their products should be less expansive on the Romanian
market. On the other hand it can be noticed that there is a quite big gap between
producer’s prices and consumer’s prices (see table nr. 3 and table nr. 5). Meat
pork bought directly from the producer is three times less expansive than the one
available on the market.14 This accounts for another negative point of Romania’s
agro-food chain. The transport prices are high and there is no system of checking
the dealers who intermediate the trade and who can set very high prices.15
Considering all said above, we can assume that after Romanian’s accession, the
prices for pork and poultry will decrease slightly while the beef price may
increase. The chain market (producer–dealer) will be better regulated, fact that
will help narrowing the gap between producer’s and consumer’s prices.
World Bank estimated that, overall, the consumer prices will increase moderately
after Romania’s accession. In this context it has been calculated (World Bank)
that in the next three years following the accession the expenses for food will
increase with around +3% and on the medium term (next 6 years after accession)
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DANIELA IONESCU
14
Table 5
Prices on consumer market for meat in Romania and E.U.
with a minimum and a maximum price (were chosen the most relevant
type of meat for the Romanian consumer) 2004
Euro/kg
Meat
Pork
Beef
Poultry
Romania
3.80-6
3.30-5
2.20-3.20
European Union
2.30-4
4.50-6
1.40-2.40
Sources: Romanian Institute for Statistics and EUROSTAT 2005
this value will decrease to 1.6%. The highest increase will be at eggs +16% and
diary products +6.8%. Yet the importance of these products in the domestic
expenditure is considered reduced. It has been noticed that although prices at
agricultural products increased in all the other 10 candidates yet the impact was
softened by the emergence of supermarkets and of the international providers
who strengthened the competition, something that is expected to happen in
Romania too. The most affected would be the poorest farms and those households
that do not produce food for their own consumption, these being those from the
urban area.
IV.4. The impact of quotas
In order to prevent the overproduction the E.U. set up some maximum
quantities that should not be exceeded for products such as: milk, fruits, vegetables,
sugar, potatoes, etc. Quotas are set up yearly at the communitarian level and then
are negotiated and distributed for each country. If these quotas are surpassed,
fines will be paid. Romania obtained some good quotas for sugar and milk
mainly. The problem is that these quotas may turn against it. For these products
Romania experienced in the last 10 years a sharp decline in production and the
trend continue to be negative, although at a slower pace after 2002. Moreover,
for milk, only 40% of the quantity produced in the reference period (1996–1999)
complied with the E.U. quality and sanitary standards. For sugar and milk the
quotas obtained covers the internal consumption. If the farmers don’t manage to
fulfill the quality criteria as well as to prevent the decreasing of production, then
these quotas will be lost and replaced with smaller ones thus preventing the
development of these sectors.16
IV.5. Costs of the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy
Romania will be a net beneficiary of the C.A.P. budget, although this would
not be very obvious in the first years of accession when it will have to spend
important funds with the implementation of C.A.P., its institutions and its
standards of quality and safety. Starting with 2007 the Romanian contribution to
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91
the E.U. budget will be of around 800 million euro while Romania it will receive
during the period of 2007–2009 approximately 4.7 billion euro. This amount of
money is calculated for the next 3 years. From this amount, 800 millions will be
direct payments. It does not involve national co-finance but the sate has to pay
the implementation (e.g. the setting up of a National Payment Agency). 732
millions will be and for market measures. It involves the intervention prices and the
re-financing of export prices. 2,424 million euro for rural development granted
during 2007–2009. Romania has to co-finance it 25%. While 800 millions for
infrastructure projects.
Although at a first glance Romania seems to receive a lot of money (after
Poland it received the highest amount of funds for agriculture) the positive balance
may not be as big as it may seem.
1. The direct payments issue
As both World Bank and the European Union had concluded it, in order to
soften the decrease of farmers’ income in the first years of accession, the
Romanian government should supply the direct payment received in the first
years with 20–30 % from the C.A.P. direct payments. In doing so the state has
two options: to take money directly from the budget but this will increase the
already big public deficit or it is allowed to take 20% from the funds granted for
rural development but this would mean to undermine and slow down the programs
meant to develop and increase the efficiency of the agriculture.
2. The institutional building and structural instruments
In general terms the implementation of C.A.P. policy involves the setting up
of common market organizations, quality certifications, sanitary and phyto-sanitary
control, etc. Romania has been lagging quite a lot at this chapter. The existing
sanitary and veterinary control is far from E.U. standards while the common market
organizations are in the cradle stage yet.17 The larger the gap is the more money
requires filling it in. Romania has the right to receive funds from E.U. budget,
after accession. These funds should cover integrally the costs of these adjustments.
Unfortunately, in practice, E.U. declared herself unable to sustain these costs till
2013, when the new members contribution to C.A.P. budget will increase enough
to cover these kinds of expenses.18 Such a conclusion implies that Romania has
to pay the costs of the C.A.P. implementation till 2013 at least, integrally. Although
it has not been calculated the exact cost of this expenditure it is inferred that the
budget for Agriculture will have to be increased with a minimum of 50% (at the
2004 level) in order to be able to cover the implementation of C.A.P.19
In order to make functional the C.A.P. policies it is necessary to create the
institutional and administrative framework. This includes the setting up of
management systems such as a paying agency and the Integrated Administration
and Control System, the Romanian Agency for Food Safety, etc.20 Very important
was also the setting up of S.A.P.A.R.D. Agency in which the Romanian part was
left to manage the E.U. funds by itself. E.U. financed all these structural adjustments
but a co-finance from the national budget was also necessary.
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3. The quality and sanitary standards
16
This is perhaps the most sensitive aspect of the acquis-communautaire
implementation due to its particularly high costs. As it had been mentioned
above (the implementation of C.A.P. policy sub-chapter) the state has to organize
the administrative framework for checking the agricultural products quality and
for setting up the standards in tune with EC requirements. But those who have
to implement them are the farmers. These requirements are very specific and
they include 90% of the agricultural products. They cannot be negotiated and
they are compulsory, otherwise the producer cannot sell his products on the
market. The costs of implementation of the sanitary and quality standards are
supported by farmers, Since 91% from the cereal products are produced in private
small farms.21 Although it has not been made a clear estimation for how much a
cereal producer needs in order to respect the E.U. criteria so that he can sell on
the market, yet a rough estimation raises the price to around 500 euro for a farm
that has less than 1ha.22 Since these kinds of farms are excluded from any direct
payments or rural development funds and since the smallest farms are also the
poorest (with an average of 70 euro/month)23 it is likely that their owners will
not be able to pay for the changes to meet the E.U. criteria. Therefore they will
not be allowed to sell their products. This means that in short time their farm will
disappear. From the efficiency point of view this will help Romania’s agriculture
to create bigger farms and to give up, step by step, to the subsistence farming
which impinges over its productivity. More capable managers will take over more
land. From the social point of view this might end up with a disaster for many
people. 42 % of population is involved in agriculture and from this 50% has farms
less than 1ha.
Even for medium farms that might be eligible for direct payments and other
funds, the introduction of the new requirements might prove too costly and
they may constitute a heavy burden. As World Bank estimated their losses might
go to up 9% comparing with the pre-accession years, even if they receive direct
payments.
The animal-diary sector will be the most affected one by the C.A.P. standards.
The milk and pork production decreased year by year. The input prices at these
products increased while the pork and poultry quality was lower than the E.U.’s
products. Also the Romanian consumers had to pay higher prices than the E.U.’s
citizens were paying for the same products and they were getting lower quality.24
That is why pork, poultry and diary products faced a strong and almost crushing
competition coming from the cheaper and better E.U.’s products. Small farms
own 84.5% pigs (between 1–5 pigs) while big farms with over 500 animals are
only 52 (small farms are 1.170.000).25 These figures are relevant since small
farms produce rather for subsistence and their ability to sell products is reduced
due to the reasons mentioned above (low quality, high prices, crushing
competition with the E.U. products). The small farmers have to comply with a
whole set of veterinary standards, they have to buy new machines (e.g., for
17
93
milking), to build up new stables that should correspond to E.U. criteria, to use
a certain type of food, etc. For a small-medium size farm this may lead to
expanses that are above 1000 euro. If a big farm can afford to do this, for a small
one with only 2–3 pigs and cows these would inflict a heavy financial burden
and it is likely that they will not manage to comply. 95,8% from the diary farms
has 1–2 cows and only 284 have more than 50 cows.26 In a medium diary farm,
milk represents half of the income resulted from the selling of their products.27
Therefore the inability to sell this product may bring bankruptcy for these farms
and keeping in mind their number, these may have serious social consequences.
The milk sector is perhaps one of the most difficult to be harmonized due to
numerous and expensive criteria. There is no wonder that exactly the livestock
and dairy sector is the least harmonized from all (see table 6). Romania negotiated
diverse primes and bonuses for cattle breeders but in order to get them they have
to comply with E.U. expensive standards. Adding to this that livestock sector
does not receive direct payments and that they will have to sell at the E.U.
indicative price which for poultry, pork and eggs will be lower than the preaccession price, the impact might be quite tough at the level of small and
medium farms mainly. The negative impact of the E.U. criteria over the livestock
and diary sector is extended also over the units for purchasing and processing
these products. One of the reasons for the lack of efficiency of this sector was
the small number of these units and their quite high prices. After the accession
they will be even fewer and their prices might be even higher because they still
do not fulfill the E.U. standards and their adoption will bring new expenses for
those who can afford them or just closing off for those who cannot.
It is true that Romania negotiated and obtained a series of 3 years transitional
periods for the introduction of the acquis-communautaire in the livestock and
diary sector. It is doubtful that this is enough time for small farms to modernize, since
it is expected that in the first three years after accession their incomes may decrease.
Table 6
The situation of harmonization of the agriculture-food sector
with the E.U. standards in 2005
Harmonized
in a high degree
Seeds production
Wine culture
Wine
Fito-sanitary control
Veterinary-Sanitary control
Partially harmonized
Fruits and vegetables
Cereals
Milling
Pesticide
Source: The Ministry of European Integration
Not harmonized
Sugar
Milk and diary products
Pork, beef
Eggs, poultry
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DANIELA IONESCU
18
IV.6. The commercial trade sector
IV.6.1. Impact of accession over Romania’s external trade and commitments
Perhaps the most important result of Romania’s accession, concerning trade
is that the Trade Agreements concluded by Romania until now will have to be
canceled or changed. As a member of E.U. Romania will have to accept the
Common Custom Tariff by which all member states must apply the same tariffs
when it comes of trade done with non-EU states.
The main consequences upon Romania’s agreements and partners will be as
it follows:
World Trade Organization-Romania received the status of semi-developed
country, which is unique among the other central-east candidates. This status
allowed it to negotiate very high and therefore very favorable tariffs, thus being
able to protect its domestic producers. After accession Romania will have to give
up to the status of semi developed country and therefore to the advantageous
tariff regime negotiated. It will have to align their custom tariff to that of E.U.’s,
which is lower than the one practices by Romania at this moment. The status
changing will transform Romania from a beneficiary of the Generalized System
of Trade Performances (GSTP) to a donor.
Central — European Free trade Association (C.E.F.T.A.) — In 1997 became
member of C.E.F.T.A. and it adopted the preferential system. Yet, the lack of
efficiency of Romania’s agriculture determined high negative trade balance with
C.E.F.T.A.’s members (see Table 8) and therefore, temporarily Romania took
protectionist measures for its domestic products (mainly against Hungary and
Poland). Since almost all C.E.F.T.A. countries are already members of E.U., then
accordingly, Romania has to give up to any protectionist measures and join the
E.U. free trade area.28
Table 7
Romania’s agro-food trade balance million (USD) with its main partners
E.U.
C.E.F.T.A.
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
-181
-118
-160
-227
-190
-276
-212
-77
-134
-155
-221
-217
Source: The Romanian Ministry of Agriculture 2004
As a E.U. member Romania will have to participate in the preferential
agreements concluded with countries from Africa, Caraibe and Pacific.
It appears that at least for the first years after accession Romania will rather
loose than gain as a result of giving up to its old commitments. The members of
C.E.F.T.A. were among the most important trade partners in trade agriculture
and the trade balance with them was largely in their favor. After accession it is
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95
likely that this negative trade balance will increase since Romania does not have
any means left to protect its producers. Also as a result of changing its status
from semi developed to developed country Romania will have to replace the
advantageous custom tariffs negotiated with the less favorable ones of E.U. The
advantages will be more obvious on the long run. E.U. is one of the world most
powerful economic powers and the mightiest one in Europe. Therefore, as a
member of E.U., Romania will be able to promote its interests more successfully
in the international trade since will be backed by the strong E.U.’s capacity of
negotiations.
IV. 6. 2. Trade with E.U.
The most important aspect of Romania’s agricultural trade is that while
before 1989 was a traditional agro-exporter with a strong positive trade balance,
after 1990, the situation changed radically and the balance became negative, a
fact that remained as such till today. Moreover, if till 1997 Romania used to
export processed agricultural products, after this year the structure of its exports
changed in the favor of unprocessed, raw materials and export of live animals
(pigs and cows mainly). Also the share of agro-food imports/exports (see figure
3) decreased steadily from year to year until now. E.U. represents the most important
partner for Romania after 1993 mainly, but unfortunately for the Romanian part
the trade balance remained strongly in favor of E.U. (see the table). Apart from
the domestic faults of this sector the terms of trade imposed by E.U. to Romania
in the last 10 years did nothing to soften this situation on the contrary it hampered
it. It is interesting to notice that after Romania suffered the tough impact of
transition from communism in 1990–1993, it started a period of relative progress
in most of areas, including agriculture. Between 1994–1997 the balance of
agricultural trade recorded a certain positive trend, which was followed after
1997 and mainly after 1999 by a sharp downturn.29 In 1993 Romania signed the
Association Agreement with E.U. by which, starting with 1996, the trade
between them was liberalized, the only exception being for the agricultural products
It was stipulated that the Romanian processed agricultural products were not
subjected to any favorable free tax regime; they were to be treated like all the other
products coming from countries which E.U. had no Association Agreement with.
This meant that the Romanian processed agro-products were subjected to
protectionist import custom tariffs. E.U. negotiated some quotas for Romanian
products (the quantity of products that E.U. would import from Romania with
reduced custom tariffs). But both the quotas and the reduction of E.U.’s custom
tariffs were quite small, while the production prices in Romania increased above
the international average ones. Moreover, the Romanian producers could not
make a full use of these quotas, because many of their products did not meet
E.U.’s criteria of quality and safety. Also in 1997–1998 the government reduced
or almost eliminated any subventions for agricultural products as a result of the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund pressure. While the Romanian
producers did not benefit almost at all from the semi-liberalized regime of agro
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DANIELA IONESCU
20
trade, the E.U.’s exporters enjoyed fully the whole benefits of it. The unsubsidized,
poor and backward Romanian agro-producers had to face the crushing competition
of (in comparison) heavily subsidized communitarian products that were invading
the Romanian market at lower prices and having a better quality. The result was
that from an exporter of processed food, Romania became a net exporter of raw
Figure nr. 3
Source: The European Commission, DG VI 2003
agro-material with all the negative consequences, while the negative trade balance
with E.U. grew up. Is this situation going to change after accession? Certainly
not for the next years. One of the most important partners used to be C.E.F.T.A.
(Central European Free Trade Association) countries that already joined the E.U.
club in 2004. The trade balance has been already negative, but this is expected
to increase since as members of E.U. both Romania and the former C.E.F.T.A.
members will have to give up to any protectionist tariffs among them and therefore
Romania will be exposed to a free competition coming from the new members
such as Hungary and Poland, competition which has been partially deterred
through some protectionist custom tariffs (20–25%) that the domestic authorities
imposed them in order to protect somehow the Romanian pork and poultry producers,
the most affected ones. After accession all these will disappear. Therefore for the
short-medium future it is expected that the negative trade balance with E.U. will
be maintained and even expanded.
21
IV.7. The rural development sector after 2003 reform
97
A new policy for rural development was introduced as the second pillar of the
E.U. Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.) in the framework of Agenda 2000 in
March 1999. Agenda 2000 reformed the C.A.P. in view of the expected enlargement
to largely rural countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria or Romania. A brief description
of the main targets of the Rural development as well as its ways of funding is in
the Cassette 1.
One of the problems with rural policy is that has to be co-financed from the
national budget with 25% which represents around 606 million (Romania receives
2.3 billion for rural development from E.U. for the next 3 years 2007–2009) and
this will constitute another burden for the already strained national budget. But the
biggest challenge is represented by the absorption of the rural development funds.
As a result of the 2003 reform, starting with 2005, together with the modulation is
introduced also the cross-compliance criteria: in order to be eligible for the new
system of payments the farmers have to fulfil new environmental standards, food
safety, animals and plants’ health and also to maintain the agricultural ground in
good conditions even if it is not worked. Before the 2003 reform only the
environmental requirements existed but they were optional. Now the failure to
observe all these rules will result in the loss of rights to full subsidy payments Yet,
the member states can decide and implement this cross-conditionality according to
the specificity of each area fact, which can give them some flexibility in
implementing this policy. The Romanian farmers will be also subjected to the same
cross-compliance but not immediately after the accession. The important point is
that a considerably amount of money from the rural development fund is targeting
exactly the implementation of these new requirements: 27% of EAGGF
expenditure (see the table). In order to receive money for introducing the new
standards for food quality, animal health, friendly environment agriculture, the
Romanian farmer has first, to fulfill the old criteria for which he is not going to
receive any support. The expenses of a small-medium (1–10 ha) Romanian farm for
accomplishing old standards have been very roughly calculated at an average of
500–1000 euro (the figure may vary in connection with the type of activity–animal
farm or crop farming, with the environmental conditions, etc).
The average income of a small–medium farm (1–10 ha) in Romania has been
calculated in 2001 as being between 70–100 euro/month cash. Therefore the
prices for implementing the old E.U. criteria seem prohibitive for more than 70%
of the farms. Consequently the access of the majority of farmers to rural development
funds that regards implementation of cross-compliance criteria (that is standards
above the existing ones) is practically blocked.
Another set of important measures are those regarding the restructuring of the
semi subsistence farms that represent the crushing majority in Romania (and
also in all the other eastern candidates). These farmers may receive 1000 euro/
farm.30 The condition to receive the money is to present a plan which explains
how the farm might be transformed in a commercially efficient one. Around
18% of the Romanian farmers are old people (over 60 years old) and they have
very basic notions of arithmetic and writing. The level of education is generally
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DANIELA IONESCU
22
Funding the Second Pillar — rural development
EAGGF Guarantee Section or Guidance Section — Guarantee
For the whole E.U.
I. Added measures
• early retirement,
• less-favored areas,
• agro-environment measures,
• afforestation of farmland,
• renovation and development of villages,
• protection and conservation of rural heritage,
• diversification of farm activities,
• improvement of infrastructure.
II. Reforming C.A.P.
— fulfilling the new standards for environment, public safety, animal safety, etc.
(temporary support and gradually decreasing for 5 years with a maximum of 10.000 euro/
year/houselhold). They are not compulsory yet.
— Consultancy support — in order to increase the efficiency of their farms and to
comply to the new standards the farmers are encouraged to use the consultancy companies
support. Their expenditure will be 80% covered the maximum being 1.500 euro.
— food quality — payments for those farmers who participates national and
communitarian schemes for improving the food quality following the cross-compliance
standards maxim 300 euro/year/household for 5 years.
III. Support for semi-subsistence farms
IV. Payments that complement the direct payments
V. Measures S.A.P.A.R.D. type
— stimulating the setting up of farmers organizations
— technical assistance
EAGGF Guarantee section
— investments in agro-companies
— support for young farmers-maximum 30.000 euro
— career support
— forests
— development of rural areas
Source: The European Commission: DG VI 2004
23
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Table 9
Rural development expenditure starting with the most expansive chapters
Rural development chapters
Agro-environment
Share in EAGGF expenditure 2006 (%)
27.5
Development and restructuring of farms 25.8
Less-favored areas
12.5
Farm investments
9.5
Afforestation of farmland
Marketing
Young farmers support
Early retirement
Career support
9.8
7.7
3.7
2.9
0.7
Source: Rural Development in the E.U., Fact Sheets 2003, European Commission, Agricultural and
Rural Development, Luxembourg 2003
very low in the rural area where only 8% of the population between 20–24 years
attends different forms of education. The consultancy system is very poorly
developed and most of the farmers do not even know of their existence or if they
know they are too expansive to afford them. Therefore, the making up of a
successful plan for restructuring his farm might be a task much over the possibilities’
of a Romanian farmer and consequently, he will not receive any help even if he
might be willing to do some improvements.
The aging of rural population is a problem existent in the E.U. also but in a
smaller proportion than in Romania. The E.U. came with the solution of the early
retirement of farmers (starting with 55 years old). The rural pensions in Romania
have been always embarrassingly low (around 5 euro/month)31 and totally
unsatisfactory even for a minimum level of subsistence. This is one of the main
reasons for which long after they become pensioners the farmers continue their
working. The only way to convince the old farmers to give up to their land in
favor of younger and more capable ones is to provide them with much higher
level of pensions than the existent ones. Yet, the government alone does not have
the financial means to realize this. The Ministry of Agriculture is planning to
introduce a new pension scheme which, at least at this stage seems to make no
difference with the old scheme: for each hectare of land sold, an old farmer will
receive 100 euro/year.32 8 euro/month is an amount of money for which no farmer
will give up to his land. Consequently the early retirement plan of E.U. will have
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100
no success if the pension system will not be substantially improved, a task that
the domestic government cannot financially afford in the next years. The E.U.
program that encourages young people to start up a farm might be a better
solution since 30.000 euro may be a tempting amount of money for many.33
The S.A.P.A.R.D.34 program
The best way to verify the ability of Romania to absorb E.U.’s funds for the next
years is to view the results of the S.A.P.A.R.D. program. Since 1998 when it
started, until 2004 the S.A.P.A.R.D. program recorded a much reduced ability of
absorbing the structural funds. The result after 6 years is not at all encouraging.
Because of the administrative problems in the beginning the starting of the program
was delayed with 18 months. Romania was granted 151 millions euro/year for
2000–2006. Yet, three years after its beginning, in 2003 it absorbed only 16.3
millions. Only in 2004 Romania received the whole amount of money. Very
important is that the private beneficiaries, the small farmers did beneficiate only in
a very small existent of these funds. The main beneficiaries remained the public
sector with 1,336 projects while the private one has only 733, half from the public
ones.35 A small–medium farm is practically excluded from the benefices of
S.A.P.A.R.D.. One of the reasons regards the co-financing. A small or even medium
farm can hardly afford to pay 50% of a project of a minimum 5000 euro, since their
whole income may not go beyond 2000 euro/ year in the best case.36 Also, the
application forms together with the set of requirements are too complicated to be
correctly understood by the farmers who, most of them are old, poor and poorly
educated. Mostly important is that the target of the program meets only partially the
specific needs of the Romanian agriculture and is rather directed to the E.U. needs.
The program is more focused on environmental improvements than on social
aspects: e.g it does not include the modernization of the agricultural technology that
is lagging far behind E.U. mainly in the smallest and poorest farms. To the
structural faults of the program are added the administrative ones. S.A.P.A.R.D. is
the program that enjoyed the largest autonomy, meaning that Romania has the
flexibility to manage it with very little E.U. intervention. Unfortunately the
Romanian authorities proved almost unable to make the program work well. One
of the major faults was the restricted access to information concerning the exact
procedure of application.37 The farmers who were expressing an interest in this
program were given diskettes (floppy) with the application forms and were told to
download them. Most of these people have not even seen a computer all their life,
even more to know the meaning of the word “download”. This is just only one
(extreme and funny) example of how the Romanian authorities understood their
informational task. The process of application was so difficult and so entangled
bureaucratically (the applicants needed a mountain of papers stamped by 5–6
institutions) that many of the applicants were simply bored and they gave up. In
2004, the year of concluding the negotiations for the Agricultural chapter the
S.A.P.A.R.D. program, in spite of considerably improvements continued to work
unsatisfactorily with a reduce capacity of absorbing funds.38
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The analysis of the S.A.P.A.R.D. program is important because is a test for
the administrative ability of a country to implement the C.A.P. requirements
which, after accession are more complex. Characteristic for the E.U. (and the
Pillar 2 of C.A.P. makes no difference), is that most of the funds are conditioned
by the forwarding of successful projects. Romania rather failed this test, which
poses a question of its future ability to make full use of money destined to rural
development. It also seems that only big farms and public sector will enjoy a
certain benefit while for most of the farms smaller than 10 ha that represents
98% of the total, the access to its benefits will be rather closed.
IV. 7. Long-term impact of 2003 C.A.P. reform
The decoupling of direct payments from the amount of production in order to
counter-act the overproduction that has been marring the E.U. agro-market for
many years is the main element of the 2003 reform. For the first 5 years
Romania will not be subjected to the same requirements but it will adopt a
simplified form of granting the direct payments under the S.P.S.A. (Single Direct
Payment Scheme on Are), which has been already discussed. Yet, for the medium–
longer term Romania will have to apply the new system. The decoupling is only
partial and some agricultural products will be partially exempted from it (such
are the cereals and livestock sector) or totally exempted (the fruits and vegetables).39
This means that the stimuli for overproduction are still there. The fact that the
decoupling is not complete but partial is rather an advantage for Romania
because it stimulates production in sectors that are heavily suffering of
underproduction such is the vegetable and livestock sector: in 2000–2002 the
vegetable production in Romania was 60–70% less than in E.U. and for
example, in the same period the milk production in Romania was 50% less than
in E.U.40 On the contrary, the idea of decoupling, though beneficial for the future
development of agriculture in E.U. generally, may rather hamper, in the
Romanian case an agricultural sector that is producing much under its
possibilities.
The partial decoupling of direct payments will complicate the administrative
procedure, which is already very complicated, because it will combine the old
types of payments with the new ones plus the national financial aid, if necessary.
This will be a future important problem for Romania who has been encountering
problems with the setting up of the administrative framework for the much
simpler Scheme of Direct Payments.
The cross-compliance and its impact over Romania’s agriculture have
been already discussed in the previous sections of this paper. Although the
perspectives do not seems very rosy from this point of view, Romania may
have a chance with the development of organic agriculture for which it has a
considerably potential. Unfortunately, until now this potential has not been
exploited. Although the number of organic farms is increasing it still remains
much under possibilities (approx. 55.000 ha). Organic farms will easier fulfill
the cross-compliance requirements.
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DANIELA IONESCU
26
The modulation system is another important element of the 2003 C.A.P.
reform. Its main idea is that some money will be taken from the Pillar 1 (direct
payments and diverse subventions) and given to pillar 2 — rural development.
Under this proposal, 20% of direct payments would be taken away from farmers
and will be transferred to rural development pillar in order to promote food
quality, meet higher standards and foster animal welfare. The direct payments
will be reduced progressively 3% in 2005, 4% in 2006, 5% in 2007. What is
important for Romania is that these modulations will be applied only to big
farms that receive more than 5000 euro/year direct payments. Since more than
80% of the Romanian farms are small or medium (0.5–10 ha) it is likely that
modulation will affect a very small number of farms.
The reform of the market policy regards certain measures taken concerning
the intervention prices, the indicative prices and the primes and bonuses granted
as it is presented in the table:
Table nr. 7
Cereals (crops) — The reduction with 50% of the monthly increase of the Intervention Price
Barely — complete giving up to the Intervention Price
Durum Wheat — decrease of the supplementary aid with up to 285 euro/ha
Rice — The Intervention Price reduced with 50% (150 euro/tone); the freezing of the
quantity eligible to intervention measures; increasing of the direct payment from
52 euro/tone –177 euro/tone
Energetic crops — direct payment set up to 45 euro/ha
Bonuses for drying the cereals, oily seeds, cotton seeds and cotton — increase from
19 euro/ha to 24 euro/ha
Nuts — the present system will be replaced by a single direct payment of 120.75
euro/ha
Milk and diary products — for butter the Intervention Price reduced with 25% for
2004–2007; the intervention for butter will be limited to 30.000 tones (for all E.U.
members); for milk there will be no Indicative Price anymore.
Source: European Commission DG VI 2003
In the table above I have presented those changes that are more or less
relevant for Romania. It can be noticed that there is a strong trend inside E.U.
for reducing the Intervention Prices following the 2003 reform. Although these
measures regard a time span that is before Romania’s accession or immediately
after, it gives an idea of what it will have to face as a member of C.A.P. in the
coming years. The cereals, including barely and durum wheat represent the most
27
103
important part of the agricultural production and Romania is a net exporter at
this sector. Therefore the reduction of the Intervention Prices, which seems to be
the long-term trend will decrease the income of the Romanian cereal producers
(for the short term the impact has been already discussed in the chapter for direct
payments impact). Milk, which is another important product in the Romanian
farms, will have no indicative price starting with 2005. This means that the
prices at this product will decrease. This is not a very good piece of news for the
milk producers who, although are estimated to benefit from the reduction of
inputs (cereal prices will decrease) as a result of E.U. membership, will enjoy
these benefits to a smaller extent.
Conclusion to the analysis of the Economic impact of the C.A.P.
The paper demonstrates that the main trend inside the E.U. is shaping a
future in which the new comers, including Romania will enjoy to a much less
extent the benefits that created the welfare of the E.U. farmers.
The result of the negotiations between Romania and E.U. is rather mixed. On
the short-medium term the agricultural sector will suffer some shocks both
social and economic: Small farms and the subsistence farms will be the most
affected even bankrupted, while the access to the E.U. funds might be quite
difficult due to the numerous and costly criteria; the consumer prices will increase
although not too much; the negative trade balance with the E.U. may even increase.
Many of the negative consequences that Romania will have to face as a result
of the C.A.P. policy are due to the particular backwardness of its agricultural
sector. Yet, this study came to the conclusion that the E.U.’s approach during the
negotiations did not always match to the realities from this country. This is
particularly true when it comes about the S.A.P.A.R.D. program and its semifailure. Many of its structural targets were created to answer to the E.U.’s own
problems (such is the environmental criteria) rather than to the Romanian’s more
pressing social needs. The E.U.’s rigid and exclusive way of negotiations and a
not very realistic agenda for this case, made the Romania’s situation even more
difficult than it was anyhow. The major result of all these misfits was that it
delayed the implementation of the E.U. acquis communautaire. The Romanian
reduced administrative capacity to manage the very demanding task of the
implementation of the C.A.P. institution played, of course, the major role in these
delays.
The European Community proved also to be a very tough political negotiator
with a generous discourse of integration but with a much stingier approach in
technical details. The accession offer for the agriculture is the result of a negotiations
process among the old member states and the Commission in which most of the
candidate countries, except Poland, played a very limited role. Romania’s ability
to influence this process was even more reduced.
One of the major results is that Romania will have to restructure its agricultural
sector with a financial support from the E.U. that is not as large as it may seem.
To resume, for the short-medium term (2006–2013) from the approximately
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DANIELA IONESCU
28
1,5 millions euro that will receive under market measures for the next three years
will be deduced the 800 millions Romania’s contribution to the C.A.P. plus the
cost of the institutional implementation of this policy which will reduce the
financial support to something less than 500 million euro the net money.
As a member of E.U. Romania will loose the advantages gained in the World
Trade Organization and the complete opening of its trade borders to the former
members of C.E.F.T.A. who now are E.U. members will do nothing than to
increase its negative agricultural trade balance with them (mainly with Hungary
and Poland). Overall the trade balance with E.U. has been for many years
negative and this situation will not change but it may even get worse in the first
years after accession.
The results of the negotiations are definitely in the favor of the old Member
States who insured for themselves the biggest part of the E.U. budget, while the
new members, although many and poorer than the poorest E.U. old members
have to be content with a tiny part. Theoretically this result might be reversed
once they become insiders but the E.U.–15 took some safeguard clauses in the
shape of 2003 C.A.P. reform and German-French agreement to freeze the C.A.P.
budget for the next E.U. budget.
The conclusions stated above may seem rather bleak and someone may ask
if indeed it is worthy for Romania to join C.A.P. after all? Romania has no choice.
C.A.P. is a part of E.U. and it has to accept it or to give up to the E.U. membership.
The integration in E.U. is not done in pieces. Romania’s gains in other fields
such as: security, international political position, foreign direct investments, etc
may overrun the losses mentioned above. Even more important these negative
impacts are calculated only for the first years after enlargement and therefore
they are temporary. In 2016 Romania will enjoy the full direct payments. As for
the access to the rural funds it is difficult to evaluate how long may take for
Romania to learn how to absorb these funds efficiently.
The main benefits will be more obvious on the long-term trend. One of them
will be that on the international trade arena where Romania’s position will be
considerably enhanced since will be back by the strong negotiations power of
E.U. The participation to C.A.P. as well as the new trend inside it, which tries to
stress more on quality than on quantity, seemingly very harsh in the beginning,
may force the Romanian agriculture into a more rapid restructuring than if it had
stayed out of it. The high fragmentation of land should decrease allowing only
to the most competitive farms to survive. Romanian agriculture is working much
under its potential. Therefore it is expected that the C.A.P. will prompt a better
use of it. Romania has very good natural conditions for agriculture; it has a good
agricultural tradition as well as crop diversity; it has trained and educated people
in the area (agricultural engineers); it has a good potential for organic agriculture
which attracts good E.U. funds, has a large offer on the communitarian market
and attractive prices. The accession to E.U. may also offer diversification of
activities such as agro-tourism, and a better commercialization of some traditional
products; also the common market organizations will receive a necessary boost,
straightening the influence of Romanian farmers on the E.U. market.
29
105
NOTES
1. European Commission (2002c), “Agriculture in
the E.U. Statistical and Economic Information
2001”, January, available on www.europa.eu.int/
comm/agriculture/agrista/2001.
2. For data on Romania see European Institute from
Romania, Impact Study, nr. 11, Bucharest 2004;
for E.U. data see European Commission,
Directorate General for Agriculture (DG VI),
Agriculture in the Economic Union — Statistical
and Economical Information 2002, Brussels,
February 2003.
3. The European Agreement with Romania. The
text can be found, on www. europa.eu.int/
enlargem/Romania.
4. Accession Treaty concluded between Romania
and E.U., on www.mie.ro/tratat_aderare/
English/doc.htm.
5. European Commission, DG VI, “The Common
Agricultural Policy explained”, October 2004,
www.euroap.eu.int/comm/agriculture/cap.pdf.
6. Treaty of Accession with Romania.
7. The national currency is LEI and at the moment
when the World Bank’s Reports were written 1
Euro = 36.000 Lei. This paper will use the same
exchange rate although starting with June 2005
the value of LEI was adjusted in order to cut off
the inflation, meaning that now 1 Euro =36 Lei.
8. World Bank Report, “Sectorul Agrar din
Romania într-o perspectivã europeanã”, Chapter
III, June 2005 available on www.siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTROMANIAINROMANIAN/
resources/capitolulV, pdf.
9. The European Commission, Directorate General
for Agriculture, “Agriculture Situation in the
Candidate Countries”, July 2002, on www.europa.
eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/
countryrep/romania.pdf.
10. See The Romanian Ministry of Euro-Atlantic
Integration: www.mie/ro/archives/news/2004.
11. The European Institute from Romania, “Studii
de Impact (PAISII). Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor de
dezvoltare agricolã ºi ruralã în România. Influenþele
noii reforme a Politicii Agricole Comunitare”,
Bucharest, 2004.
12. Ministry of Romanian Agriculture, “Date despre
comerþul Românesc între 2000–2003”, fact sheets.
13. The Romanian National Institute of Statistics, the
data are available on this site: www.insse.ro/
inidcatori/Eluna
14. The Romanian National Institute of Statistic and
EUROSTAT 2002–2003.
15. The European Institute from Romania, “Politica
Agricolã”, Working Paper for the PHARE project
RO0006.18.02.
16. Treaty of Accession with Romania Annex B,
paragraph 4 and The European Institute from
Romania, “Politica Agricolã Comunã. Consecinþe
asupra României”, October 2002 available on
the site of the Institute: www.ier.ro.
17. The European Institute from Romania,
“Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor...”, 2004.
18. The European Commission (2003), “Proposal
for a Council Regulation establishing common
rules for direct support schemes..., COM (2003),
p. 23.
19. World Bank Report, 2005.
20. The European Commission (2002d), Directorat
General Enlargement, “Enlargement of the E.U.
Guide to the Negotiations Chapter by Chapter”,
updated December 2002, on www.europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargem/guide.pdf.
21. European Commission (2002d), Directorat
General Enlargement, Idem.
22. The European Institute from Romania,
“Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor...”, 2004.
23. Idem.
24. The European Commission, Directorate General
of Agriculture, Analysis of the Impact on
Agricultural Markets and incomes of E.U.
Enlargement to the CEECs, March 2002, on
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge/Agriculture/2
002/doc.pdf.
25. The Romanian National Institute of Statistic and
EUROSTAT 2002–2003.
26. “Romania’s Position Paper Chapter 7, Agriculture”,
paper presented at the Conference on Accession
to the European Union — Romania, Brussels, 10
January 2002, CONF_RO 1/02.
27. The European Institute from Romania, “Politica
Agricolã Comunã – Consecinþe...”.
28. The European Commission, “Analysis of the
Impact on Agricultural…”, March 2002.
29. Economic Intelligence Unit, “Country ReportRomania”, for April 1997; June 1999.
30. The European Commission (2002b), “Mid-Term
Review of the Common Agricultural Policy…”.
31. The European Institute form Romania,
“Ierarhizare…”, 2004.
32. World Bank, June 2005.
33. European Commission (2002b), “Mid-Term
Review..”, 2002.
34. The S.A.P.A.R.D. program was designed by EU
to grant pre-accession funds in order to help the
candidate countries to comply with the EU
requirements and also to help them to modernize
this sector.
35. The Romanian Ministry of Integration www.mie.
ro /doc.pdf.
36. Estimation made on the data provided by the
National Institute of Statistics from Romania.
37. “Adevãrul“, “Programul S.A.P.A.R.D. este dat
pe dischetã þãranilor români”, April 2003.
38. The European Commission, “Country ReportRomania”, November 2003.
39. The
European
Commission
(2002b),
“Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament. Mid-Term
Review of the Common Agricultural Policy”,
COM (2002) p. 394.
40. The European Institute form Romania,
Ierarhizare…, 2004.
106
DANIELA IONESCU
30
BIBLIOGRAPHY
European Commission (2002c), “Agriculture in the
E.U.. Statistical and Economic Information
2001”, January, available on www.europa.eu.int/
comm/agriculture/agrista/2001.
European Commission, Directorate General for
Agriculture (DG VI), “Agriculture in the Economic
Union-Statistical and Economical Information
2002”, Brussels, February 2003.
European Commission, DG VI, “The Common
Agricultural Policy explained”, October 2004,
www.euroap.eu.int/comm/agriculture/cap.pdf.
The European Commission, Directorate General for
Agriculture, “Agriculture Situation in the
Candidate Countries”, July 2002 on www.europa.
eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/
countryrep/romania.pdf.
The European Commission (2003), “Proposal for a
Council Regulation establishing common rules
for direct support schemes...”, COM (2003), p. 23.
The European Commission (2002d), Directorat
General Enlargement, “Enlargement of the E.U..
Guide to the Negotiations Chapter by Chapter”,
updated December 2002 on www.europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargem/guide.pdf.
The European Commission, Directorate General of
Agriculture, “Analysis of the Impact on Agricultural
Markets and incomes of E.U. Enlargement to the
CEECs”, March 2002 on www.europa.eu.int/
comm/enlarge/Agriculture/2002/doc.pdf.
The European Commission (2002b), “Communication
from the Commission to the Council and the
Euroepa Parliament. Mid-Term Review of the
Common Agricultural Policy”, COM (2002),
p. 394.
European Commission, “Rural Development in the
E.U. Agricultural and Rural Development”, Fact
Sheets, Luxembourg 2003.
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November 2003.
European Commission DG VI (Agriculture), “Prospects
for Agricultural Markets”, Brussels 2001 on
www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/2001_engl.
doc.pdf; “European Commission DG VI (2002)”,
“Questions and Answers. Commission’s
Enlargement proposals”, 30 January, 2002.
European Commission DG VI (2002), “Questions
and Answers. Commission’s Enlargement
proposals”, 30 January, 2002.
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Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13
December 2002”, SN 400.02.
The European Institute from Romania, “Studii de
Impact (PAISII). Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor de
dezvolatre agricolã ºi ruralã în România.
Influenþele noii reforme a Politicii Agricole
Comunitare”, Bucharest, 2004.
European Institute from Romania, “Politica Agricola”,
Working Paper for the PHARE project
RO0006.18.02.
European Institute from Romania, “Politica Agricolã
Comunã — Consecinþe asupra României”,
October 2002 available on the site of the
Institute: www.ier.ro.
World Bank Report, “Sectorul Agrar din România
într-o perspectivã europeanã”, Chapter III, June
2005 available on www.siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTROMANIAINROMANIAN/ resources
/capitolulV.pdf.
Economic Intelligence Unit, “Country ReportRomania”, for April 1997, June 1999.
Economic Intelligence Unit, “Country Report for
Poland and for Hungary”, April–June 2005.
Accession Treaty concluded between Romania and
E.U., on www.mie.ro/tratat_aderare/English/
doc.htm.
Romania’s Position Paper Chapter 7 — Agriculture,
paper presented at the Conference on Accession
to the European Union — Romania Brussels, 10
January 2002, CONF_RO 1/02.
EUROSTAT 2002–2003, on www.europa.eu.int/
EUROSTAT.
European Agreement with Romania — its full text
can be found, on www. europa.eu.int/enlargem/
Romania.
Ministry of Romanian Agriculture, Date despre
comerþul Românesc între 2000–2003, Fact
sheets.
ARTICLES AND BOOKS
Daugbjerg C., Policy feedback and paradigm shift in
E.U. agricultural policy: the effects of the
MacSharry reform on future reform, “Journal of
European Public Policy”, 2003, vol. 10:3 June,
pp. 421–437.
Daugbjerg C. and Swinbank A., The C.A.P. and E.U.
Enlargement: Propsects for an Alternative Strategy
to Avoid Lock-In of the C.A.P. Support, “Journal
of Common Market”, vol. 42, nr.1, pp. 99–199.
Frohberg K. and Hartmann, M. (2002), Financing
Enlargement: The Case of Agriculture and Rural
Development, “Review of European Economic
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Phinnemore D., Preparing for Enlargement, in:
Gower J., “The European Union Handbook”, 2nd
edition, London, 2002.
COMPARING THE EUROPEAN MODEL AND THE ASEAN WAY:
IS THERE A THIRD WAY OF REGIONALISM
FOR THE EAST ASIAN COOPERATION?
ZHU GUICHANG*
Introduction
Regionalism has gained new momentum in world economics and politics in
the post-Cold War era. Its role in facilitating economic and trade cooperation
among regional states, promoting regional peace and stability, and shaping
regional, even world order, has been recognized and analyzed by many analysts.
Despite their disagreement about the causes and dynamics of regional integration,
they share the common view about the importance of the regional integration
and the necessity of paying attention to the development of this phenomenon.
Regional integration in Europe and East Asia has attracted much more attention
than other regions for different reasons. The European integration and the EU
have made great progress in breaking through the traditional transnational
cooperation and has become a model of regional integration. Therefore, it is
understandable of its attractiveness. Regional integration in East Asia is a recent
practice with fewer achievements. However, its distinctive way of promoting
regional integration, the so-called ASEAN way has received much criticism. As
a result, it is significant to make a comparative study of regionalism in Europe
and East Asia, to find the advantages and disadvantages of both models of
regional integration, and to explore the possibility of a third way to promoting
regional integration in East Asia.
In this paper, it is assumed that regional institutional arrangements created for
promoting regional integration are not only the indicators of representing the
degree of regional integration but also the important factors in shaping the
process of integration and determining the success and failure of the process.
The degree of regional integration can be ordered according to the levels of
institutionalization of regional cooperation. The European model of integration
can be considered as representing the high-level institutionalized integration,
while the ASEAN way representing the low-level one. Though regional integration
with low-level institutionalization is widely present in the world, it will be
——————
* Centre for European Studies, Shandong University, Jinan-China.
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ZHU GUICHANG
2
fragile and easy to be interrupted and even destroyed by both internal and
external forces. Regional integration with high-level institutionalization represented
by the EU is more stable and dynamic, but the EU is very unique and can not be
simply emulated by other regions. However, its uniqueness doesn’t mean its
experiences of institutional integration are irrelevant to other regions. It seems
that there should be a third way of regionalism between ASEAN way and European
model, that is between the low degree of institutional integration limited to
intergovernmental cooperation and the high level one expanded to supranational
governance. East Asia can be the region for experimenting this kind of regionalism.
Based on the hypothesis, the paper will analyze the institutional characteristics
of the European model and explain why the Member States of the EU transfer
their sovereignty to the Community and create the unique supranational governance
systems. The functions and the role of the supranational governance system in
promoting integration will be explored. The doubts about the supranational features
of the European model will be analyzed.
Turning to the East Asia, the paper will focus on the ASEAN way and explain
its basic principle of non-interference, its informal way of cooperation, its weak
institutionalization and non-legalistic decision-making procedures.
Moving to the next part, the paper will explain what are the main reasons
behind the differences of the European model and the ASEAN way. The paper
argued that the homogeneous characteristics of western Europe and the
heterogeneous features of Southeast Asia provide sound explanations for differences
between the two models. While stressing the different features of the two regions
and their different approaches to regional integration, the paper also pointed out
the similarities of the European Model and ASEAN way by using level-analysis.
Despite there is much criticism to ASEAN way, It seemed that it most East Asian
states embraced it. It was widely accepted and applied by the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, South Korea), the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and other regional organizations. However, the weaknesses of
the ASEAN way in promoting regional integration can not be neglected. This
weakness can be redressed in some degree by learning the European experience.
ASEAN+3 as a tentative process of East Asian integration can benefit a lot from
the experiences of European Union and the ASEAN. If it can successfully combine
the models together, then a new way of regionalism in East Asia will arise.
2. The European model of regional integration
European integration and the EU have long been widely regarded as the
model of formal regional integration. What is the European model? Different
scholars with different disciplines have different views about the European
model. Scholars of international relations tend to view the EU as the future
model of the world order system based on multilateralism and international law.
Scholars of economics see the EU as the model of economic integration with
common market and common currency. Scholars of sociology tend to view the
EU as the capitalist model with emphasis of social market economy. That is to
3
A COMPARASION OF THE EUROPEAN MODEL AND THE ASEAN WAY
109
say, it is difficult to find a consensus on the exact meaning of the European
model. In fact, there even exist different opinions about the European model
among the same scholarship.
This paper does not want to discuss the different views about the European
model, but focuses on the European political and institutional integration. The
concept of political and institutional integration is defined “not as the emergence
of completely novel Community institutions but as the growing competence of
the European Community to make binding rules in any given policy domain.”1
Based on this definition, the European model can be referred to the pooling and
sharing sovereignty of the Member States of the EU at the Community level and
the supranational governance system. In fact, European Community/EU has
long been considered as “an exercise in the pooling and sharing of sovereignty.”2
What is the pooling of sovereignty? According to Keohane, “sovereignty is
pooled, in the sense that, in many areas, states’ legal authority over internal and
external affairs is transferred to the Community as a whole, authoring action
through procedures not involving state vetoes.” Without transference of
sovereignty (the authority, power, competence) from the member states level to
the community level, there will be no integration process. In this sense, integration
process can be regarded as a process of continuous transference of state sovereignty.
Once the member states stop transferring their sacred sovereignty, the integration
process will be jeopardized. The “Empty Chair Crisis” of the European integration
in 1966 was a case in point. However, the transference of sovereignty to community
level does not mean eroding or even losing of state sovereignty. It just means the
pooling and sharing of sovereignty. In order to exercise the transferred sovereignty
at the community level, a set of supranational institutions will be created and a
number of principles, rules and norms will also be set out.
From the beginning of the European integration, a set of supranational
institutions such as European Commission, the European Parliament (called
Assembly initially) and the European Court of Justice was created together with
some intergovernmental institutions such as Council of Ministers. With the
development of the integration, these supranational institutions have played more
important role in governing regional affairs. The European integration has so far
achieved great success in terms of enlargement and deepening. Membership of
the EU expanded from original six member states to 25 in 2004. It will be further
expanded to include Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia in 2007. Despite strong opposition
and long-term delays, the European leaders decided to kick off the accession
negotiation process with Turkey this year. The process of the European integration
has developed steadily from establishing a free trade area, customs union, common
agricultural and fisheries policy, to building a common market, economic and
monetary union and single currency, from economic integration to political,
security and military integration.
Many factors have contributed to its successes, however, transferring sovereignty
to the Community level and the supranational institutions are crucial to its
continued development, especially the role of supranational institutions such as
Commission, European Court of Justice in preventing the rollback of the
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4
integration. Even though there are many disagreements among academics about
the real transferring of sovereignty, the autonomy of European supranational
institutions, one can not deny the fact that more and more decisions and legislations
regulating traditional national affairs are made not by national governments and
parliaments, but by European institutions, not by unanimous consent, but by
qualified majority-voting and even simple majority voting, that the EU law has
supremacy over Member States’ law and has direct effect at the Member States
without transferring into domestic law. In fact, with the development of the
European integration, a unique supranational entity has been emerging, which
goes beyond merely inter-state arrangements typical of institutional activity at
the international level.
The supranational character or the supranationality of the EC/EU has already
been pointed out and analyzed by neo-functionalism.3 For Haas, supranationality
did not mean that Community institutions exercise authority over national
governments, but rather refer to a process or style of decision-making, “a cumulative
pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionally
vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of
compromises upgrading common interests.”4 Whether we view supranationalism
as a process of supranational decision-making or as a structure of supranational
institutions or as a combination of the two, we can see that supranationalism is
the essence of the European political and institutional integration.
Yet, the supranationality of European integration has been questioned by
realism and liberal intergovernmentalism.5 First, the intergovernmentalism insisted
that the process of the European Union supranational decision-making took
place within the context of intergovernmental agreements. National governments
are the masters of the constitutional treaties establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community, European Economic Community, the Single European Act,
and the European Union. It is they that launch the negotiation process to draft a
new treaty or revise the existing treaties. These treaties or revised treaties must
be ratified by the European Council and then by individual member states.
Otherwise they will not come into effect. The current French and Dutch no vote
on the European Constitution was a case in point. It is the member states that
decide whether, when, in what areas the supranational decision-making process
will be applied. This kind of decision is called the “history-making decisions”,
or the “celebrated intergovernmental bargains.”6 According to Peterson,
“history-making decisions” are taken at a “super-systemic” level, or one that
transcends the EU’s day to day policy process. History-making decisions alter
the Union’s legislative procedures, rebalance the relative powers of EU
institutions, or change the EU’s remit.”7 The dominant actors in the supersystemic level are European Council and the national governments in
intergovernmental conferences. “Most history-making decisions are made
unanimously and intergovernmentally.”8
Secondly, the intergovernmentalism questioned the autonomy of the
supranational institutions and therefore their active role in regional integration.
Although member states delegated authority to supranational institutions, they
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still can instruct, police, monitor, and rein in supranational actors at any time.
That is to say, the supranational institutions are just the instructed agents of the
member states without independence and autonomy. Consequently, they just
function mostly as passive devices to reduce the transaction costs and enhance
the efficiency of intergovernmental negotiations and agreements.9 Taken the
European Commission as an example, although according to Treaties, it has exclusive
right of initiative, and is made up of individuals who must act independently and
make allegiance to the EU, it normally consults national representatives at every
stage of formulating its policy proposals, because it knows very well that the fate
of its proposals will be in the hands of Council of Ministers.
In fact, there are innumerable committees of national experts and bureaucrats
preparing the Commission’s proposals. The execution of the Council’s directives by
the Commission is closely supervised by the committees of national bureaucrats,
some of which can be overruled the Commission’s moves.10 In other words, what the
Commission did was just the member states wanted. Even the alleged independent
Commissioners themselves are not really independent because their nomination is
made by their own government. In short, “the Commission is not a supranational
entity in the sense of being an authoritative decision-making above the nation-state,
nor has loyalty been transferred from nation-state to the Commission.”11
Whether the criticism made by intergovernmentalism on the supranationality
of the EU is true or not, it did point out another feature of the European integration.
That is nation-states and national governments have still played a dominant role
in the European integration process. It seems to be interesting and surprising that
the two contrasting features exist in the same process of the European integration.
However, if we adopt the method of level analysis (see Peterson 1995), then we
can have a better understanding of the two features of the European integration.
At the super-systemic level, the history-making decisions which address the
question of how EU governance changes are always based on the consensus and
intergovernmental agreements among the Member States reflecting the member
states’ interests and preferences, and “reflect the distinctly political rationality:
the desire of national governments to remain in power.”12 At the systemic and
sub-systemic levels, the policy-setting and policy-shaping decisions which address
the questions of what to do and how to do it mainly rely on the European
institutions such as the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, the
Committee of Permanent Representatives, and follow the Community method of
decision-making. The two or three-level analysis tells us that the supranational
and national features of the European integration are not mutually exclusive but
symbiotic. They coexist in the European integration process and become the
distinctive features of the European model of regional integration.
3. ASEAN way of regional integration
Unlike the model of European integration, the East Asia has experienced
quite different pattern of regional integration. The most distinctive form of
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regional integration in East Asia was the so-called “ASEAN way” which was
gradually developed since the foundation of the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) on 8 August 1967 by signing the Bangkok Declaration. This
founding document, however, unlike the Treaty of Rome establishing the
European Economic Community, was not a legally binding document and required
no ratification of the member states. It just expressed the common determination
of the member states (the five founding member states are Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) to ensure their stability and security from
external interference and to preserve their national identities. It also set out the
ASEAN’s three central objectives such as to accelerate economic growth, social
progress and cultural development in the region, to promote regional peace and
stability, and to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters
of common interest (see the Bangkok Declaration, Thailand, 8 August 1967,
www.aseansec.org.) In fact, ASEAN was not created as a mechanism for resolving
disputes among the member states but as a forum to managing their differences
in that it operated on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
the member states from its formation. It did not have its secretariat until 1976.
The Secretariat was given no supranational authority.
According to Jeannie Henderson, there are three reasons why the noninterference principle became a guiding tenet of the ASEAN.13 The first reason
was that its member states feared external support for their domestic communist
insurgencies. During the height of the cold war, this fear had its grounds.
However, this fear did not exist any longer since the late 1970s. The second
reason was that ASEAN’s ethnic, religious, political and economic diversity
risked irreconcilable differences between its members unless these aspects of
national life were excluded from discussions. This reason still holds true today,
even with nearly forty years development. The ASEAN’s diversity is not narrowing
but widening with the enlargement of the ASEAN, especially with the admission
of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The third reason was that the
member states’ governments of the ASEAN were unwilling to cede their newfound sovereignty, either to a supranational body or by allowing members to
comment each other’s internal affairs. The member states’ sensitivity towards
their sovereignty was due to the fact that all member states of ASEAN except
Thailand had been colonized and just won their independence after the end of
the Second World War. This sensitivity towards sovereignty made the ASEAN
operate on quite distinctive ASEAN way from the beginning.
What is ASEAN way? Its main contents can be identified in the written
fundamental agreements or documents of ASEAN. ASEAN did not conclude a
legally binding treaty until the first ever ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976 — the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which contains
fundamental principles for inter-state relations. These principles include: (a)
“mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity
and national identity of all nations”; (b) “the right of every state to lead its
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national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion”; (c)
“non-interference in the internal affairs of one another”; (d) “settlement of
differences or disputes by peaceful means”; (e) “renunciation of the threat of use
of force”; and (f) “effective cooperation among themselves.”14 The TAC’s
fundamental principles are in fact not different from those of the UN Charter and
other international norms and principles. However, it represented a formal and
regional commitment to these principles. Since then, TAC has become the most
important legal foundation for regulating the relations among the member states
of the ASEAN. All non-founding members of ASEAN acceded to the TAC at the
time of their entry into the association. Major East Asia states like China, Japan,
the Republic of Korea also acceded to the TAC. The criteria for attending East
Asia Summit set out by ASEAN were the accession to the TAC. Australia, New
Zealand, and India acceded to the TAC for attending the first East Asia Summit.
That is to say, the above-mentioned principles of TAC have been accepted and
abided by both within the ASEAN and beyond it.
Amitav Acharya argued that ASEAN way could be regarded as the prominent
symbol of ASEAN. According to him, ASEAN way has two main aspects: “The
first is avoidance of formal mechanisms and procedures of conflict resolution”;
and the second is “the principle of consensus”. Acharya and among other
scholars take the ASEAN way as the particular approach to conflict-reduction or
conflict management or bargaining style in the South East Asia. In this paper
ASEAN way, however, will be defined in a broad sense as an approach to regional
integration in South East Asia. It has the following characteristics.15
First, ASEAN has proceeded without formal institutional designing and building.
It has no regional parliament or council of ministers with law-making powers,
no power of enforcement, and no judicial system. Although as mentioned above,
ASEAN Secretariat was established in 1976 after nine years of its founding.
However, its basic mandate is to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination
of ASEAN organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects
and activities. That is to say it plays a coordinating and facilitating role. In 1992,
the ASEAN Summit agreed that formal summit would be held every three years
rather than on ad hoc basis, with the provision for informal ones in intervening
years. It also agreed to re-designate the Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat
into the Secretary-General of ASEAN with an enlarged mandate to initiate,
advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities. The Secretary-General has
been accorded ministerial status and serves as the spokesman and representative
of ASEAN. Despite these improvements, ASEAN Secretariat is not a supranational
institution and ASEAN is a regional entity with weak institutionalization.
Second, related to the first point, ASEAN member states have tried to avoid
the formal mechanisms and procedures of negotiation. They prefer the informal
and non-legalistic decision-making procedures in dealing with their relations
and their common problems. Since its formation, the way to arrive at agreements
in ASEAN has been through careful consultation and consensus rather than
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across-the-table negotiations involving bargaining and give-and-take. And ASEAN
has been cooperating through informal understandings that impose no legally
binding obligations. For the reached agreements, member states have just moral
obligations to apply to them.
Third, ASEAN has moved crementally and at a pace comfortable to all
member states, which can be attributed to its consensus decision-making. As
mentioned above, all decisions are made within ASEAN on the basis of
consensus. There is no voting and of course no veto in the ASEAN decisionmaking process. If a consensus cannot be reached on an important issue, the
ASEAN states agree to disagree and go their separate ways, and ASEAN
assumes no common position on the issue. ASEAN also has conditioned its
members to work around conflict. While intra-ASEAN issues may not be
resolved, they can be put aside so that they do not interfere with cooperation on
other matters.16
After the end of the cold war, ASEAN has accelerated its integration process
and strengthened their cooperation both within themselves and with outside
world. The 1992 Singapore summit agreed to deepen their economic cooperation
by initiating an economic programme to establish the Common Effective Preferential
Tariff for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Under this agreement, the AFTA
member states are legally committed to reducing tariffs on their trade with one
another. The tariff reductions are to be carried out through national legal
enactments by each party to the agreement in accordance with an agreed schedule.
AFTA could be seen as the first substantial step toward integrating the ASEAN
market, and the real launching economic integration of ASEAN. Before 1992,
ASEAN had initiated and developed many economic programmes to strengthen
their cooperation, but most of them failed. One of the reasons for this failure is
the absence of binding instruments and monitoring system. The successful
launching of the AFTA and relatively smooth development can be contributed to
the legally binging nature of AFTA commitments.
Since the launching of the AFTA, ASEAN economic cooperation and integration
has expanded to other sectors such as investment, service, finance and monetary.
Meanwhile, in 1996, ASEAN agreed on a mechanism and rules for settling
disputes arising from any of the economic agreements binding the association.
In 1997, ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020. In 2003, ASEAN
leaders made the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) and
committed themselves to realizing the ASEAN Community. All these
developments indicate that the way of ASEAN regional integration is changing
and adapting to the new reality. As Jeannie Henderson observed “the legally
binging nature of AFTA commitments and the role of the ASEAN Secretariat
in monitoring observance of the scheme contrasted with the essentially
consultative nature of much of ASEAN’s functional cooperation”. Despite
the adaptation of the ASEAN way in recent years, its characteristics of weak
institutionalization, informal understanding and non-legalistic decision-making
based on consensus are still prevailing in the South East Asia regional
integration.17
9
4. Comparing the European model and the ASEAN way
115
The patterns of regional integration in Europe and Southeast Asia, as above
shown, are quite different. The European model of integration can be considered
as representing the high-level institutionalized integration, while the ASEAN
way representing the low-level one. The differentiation may be over-simplified
but it does reflect the different approaches to regional integration in the two
regions. What then are the main reasons for the differences between the
European model and the ASEAN way?
Helen Wallace attributed the European model of regional integration to the
specificity of western Europe. According to her, four characteristics can be identified
in western Europe. Fist, the collective memory of the devastation of the second world
war made western Europe countries preoccupied with collective security. Strong
commitment has been made to devise regimes specifically to promote collective
security, and the security of individual states since the end of the war. This
preoccupation with security and the security arrangements have had “profound
impacts on how cross-border regimes have been shaped to promote political and
economic exchanges as a means of embedding cooperative behaviour”).18 In other
words, European integration was the product of “a common disaster and predicament:
the war and its aftermath, American hegemony and the Soviet threat.”19
Second, “western Europe is an overcrowded region in terms of both population
and the number of distinct states. The connections between populations in
adjacent states have deep roots in history, then overlaid by the newer impacts
of globalization.” “Neighbouring states have developed local frameworks for
cooperation, both to regulate their borders with each other, and to develop
particular forms of particular cooperation.”20
Third, western European countries have more or less the same political
system, that is, the liberal democratic systems. Without taking this dimension
into account, it will be impossible to understand the institutional characteristics
of the EU. “The EC and later the EU were in part devised to contribute to
democratic stabilization as the club of European liberal democracies, characterized
also by their functioning market economies”.
Fourth, western European countries have more or less similar social welfare
system. The social impact of the economic integration has to be taken into
account in devising European institutions.
Besides the above-mentioned four characteristics, we can add some points to
the specificity. For example, most of western European countries are developed
states sharing the same culture and religion. All these factors have combined to
shape the development of European integration, and its approach to promoting
and managing regional integration.
In comparison with western Europe, Southeast Asia is a much more
heterogeneous region. First, Southeast Asian countries have quite different
political systems. As Jeannie Henderson observed that “the Association’s
political spectrum broadened with the inclusion of the communist governments
of Vietnam and Las, and of Myanmar’s authoritarian military regime, just as
liberal democracy was becoming more entrenched in the Philippines and
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Thailand”. There are no democratic criteria for admission new member state into
the ASEAN, while the EC/EU has set out strict political conditions. Unlike the
EC/EU as a club of liberal democracies, ASEAN is a highly heterogeneous
organization politically. The diversity of political systems of ASEAN member
states has made the informal way of cooperation more acceptable and viable
than the formal one.21
Second, Southeast Asia is also a region with various economic systems and
great economic disparity. Member states like Singapore, Brunei and Thailand
have established functioning market economic systems, while other member
states like Myanmar and Laos still maintain their planned economy. The economic
disparity within ASEAN ranged from industrialized states like Singapore to
agricultural countries like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar in terms of degree of
industrialization, and in terms of per capita income/GNP “from Singapore’s
$32,940 to Cambodia’s $300, and Vietnam’s $320.”22 Given the different stages
of economic development within ASEAN, their economies should be
complementary. On the contrary, “the emergence and consolidation of ASEAN
took place in a climate of fairly low level of intra-regional transactions and
interdependence.” “Even today, ASEAN’s trade with non-ASEAN members is
significantly higher than intra-ASEAN trade.”23 This low-level transactions and
interdependence within ASEAN makes the regional economic integration
difficult and less urgent. However, the high dependence of ASEAN economies
on extra-regional trade partners makes ASEAN regionalism “stronger in its
external relations than in intra-ASEAN cooperation.”24
Third, Southeast Asian countries have different cultures and religions. The
regional diversity of culture and religion ranged from Singapore and Vietnam’s
Confucianism to Indonesia’s Islam and Myanmar’s Buddhism. They also have
different strategic views.
In short, the diversity among Southeast Asian countries in terms of political
systems, economic development, culture and religion makes the formal
institutionalized cooperation difficult, if not impossible. The heterogeneous
characteristics of the Southeast Asia have shaped the development of its
integration, and its approach to promoting and managing regional integration. In
order to achieve and maintain unity in this great diversity, ASEAN member
states have to follow the ASEAN way to promoting regional cooperation. This
way may be not desirable but workable.
Although the homogeneous characteristics of western Europe and the
heterogeneous features of Southeast Asia provide sound explanations for
differences between the European model and the ASEAN way, they do not
exhaust the explanation. For example, the external power, especially the Untied
States has pursued quite different policies to the two regions. In Europe, it has
enthusiastically promoted multilateral cooperation by establishing the NATO
and the OECE (today’s OECD), and by supporting the ECSC, EEC. In Southeast
Asia or broadly in East Asia, the United States chose to deal with East Asian
countries individually and bilaterally, which constitutes a major barrier to the
regional cooperation. Given the significant presence and importance of the US
power in the two regions, the impact of its approach on the regional integration
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can not be neglected.25 (The different features of the two regions and their
different approaches to regional integration can not, however, be exaggerated.
The similarities of the European Model and ASEAN way can easily be identified.
To use Peterson’s three-level analysis, the European model and ASEAN way are
quite similar in the super-systemic level. In this level, both of them adhere to the
evolutionary approach, relying largely on painstaking consensus-building to
reach agreements. Although EU has formal institutions and decision-making
procedure with majority-voting system, “the participants in the EU policy
process tend to base cooperation on consensus, and eschew cooperation when
there is more than short-term dissensus.”26 In fact, consensus-building is the
most frequent way of developing agreements in the EU. In this level, both of
them depend on the strong commitments and political leadership of the member
states. The European model and ASEAN way are also similar in the subsystemic level in terms of formal and informal policy networks.
Although the European Model and ASEAN way are quite different in the
systemic level, the distance between them is not as large as it was in the past
because the current process of globalization, mutual interdependence, and
multilateralism affects the regional integration in the same way. In fact, since the
end of the Cold War, the differences between the European model and ASEAN
way have been narrowed. They are converging on building and strengthening
formal institutions and reaching legally-binding agreements. However, this
convergence doesn’t mean the ASEAN integration will follow and emulate the
European model, which will be proved futile just as the African Union shows.
Neither is the European model better than the ASEAN way. It just means ASEAN
can learn some successful experiences of European integration to enrich and
improve its unique way of promoting regional integration.
What, then, can ASEAN learn from EU? ASEAN may learn from EU in many
aspects such as democratic political systems, rule of law, democratic governance, and
regional institutional buildings. However, the most important point that ASEAN
should learn from EU would be the European new attitudes towards sovereignty
and its relevant practices. ASEAN member states may change or adapt their
approaches towards sovereignty in the context of globalization and mutual
interdependence, just as the EU Member States did after the end of the second
world war. As we said in the first part, European integration can be regarded as
an exercise of pooling and sharing sovereignty. EU member states have
embraced a notion of pooled and limited sovereignty since the launching of
European integration process, which was quite different from the classical
conception of external sovereignty that “a state must have control of its external
policies and be free of external authority structures.”27 The embrace of new
conception of sovereignty of European states made their integration process
more sustainable and successful. European experience in terms of changing their
attitudes to traditional absolute sovereignty can provide some clues for
Southeast Asian states to change and adapt their current view towards
sovereignty. Nowadays, Southeast Asian states still cling to a more traditional
notion of sovereignty, and strongly oppose external interference in their domestic
affairs, and are reluctant to pool and limit their sacred sovereignty.
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The recent debate on ASEAN’s principle of non-interference among ASEAN
member states can illustrate their reluctance.28 Since 1997, ASEAN faced server
challenges posed by the enlargement especially the political situation in
Cambodia and Myanmar, economic and financial crisis, upheavals and terrorism
in Indonesia, transnational problems like toxic smog, tsunami disaster, and
recent avian bird flu. How to meet these challenges quickly and effectively?
ASEAN member states have different opinions. Malaysia and Thailand proposed
some proposals like “constructive intervention” and “flexible engagement”.
These proposals may have different contents but all insisted that if one member
state’s actions had a cross-border impact and affected other member states or
affected ASEAN’s diplomatic credibility, ASEAN affected member states or
ASEAN would be able to offer constructive criticism, concerns and advice to the
country, which is not, and should not be, considered as “interference” in its
domestic affairs.
These proposals were clearly inconsistent with and in fact a fundamental
move away from the principle of non-interference, which elicited debate among
the ASEAN member states. Indonesia and the new member states opposed these
proposals and insisted on the principle of non-interference. The result of the
debate was a compromise between two sides. The proposals were rejected but
they promised to practice “enhanced interaction” henceforth, which means ASEAN
could have more open exchanges on issues with clearly defined cross-border
effects while respecting the principle of non-interference.
The debate shows that given the short history of national independence and
their vulnerability as developing or transitional states, ASEAN member states
are still sensitive about their sovereignty and maintain the classical conception
of sovereignty on the one hand, however, on the other hand, under the conditions
of their increasingly mutual interdependence and the rising of cross-border
problems, they came to realize that they had to adapt their attitudes towards
traditional absolute sovereignty if they wanted to tackle effectively their common
problems, to benefit from their cooperation, and to make ASEAN as a credible
and powerful international actor. The practice of “enhanced interaction” did not
indicate that ASEAN would follow the European model but indicate that
ASEAN would change its operating principles in a gradual and cautious way.
5. ASEAN way beyond Southeast Asia
In comparison with European model, ASEAN way has been under more
criticism and suspicion. ASEAN was criticized by its failure to quickly and
effectively response to the financial crisis in the region in 1997. It was also
criticized by its reluctance to press some member states’ governments like
Myanmar to respect human rights and rule of law, and to reform its military
regime. Its ability and role of managing and solving regional problems has been
questioned. Some external critics even went further to conclude that the ASEAN
way had failed.29 However, despite these criticisms and contrary to the rash
conclusion, the ASEAN way has been and will continue to be the only effective
way to bring these diverse states together and to achieve unity in this great
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diversity. Moreover, its relevance to the wider region of East Asia or the AsiaPacific has been acknowledged. In fact, ASEAN way was widely accepted and
applied by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, South
Korea), Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and other regional organizations. This raised the
expectation that ASEAN way could serve as a model for East Asia and even
Asia-Pacific.
East Asia has witnessed the flourishing of regional institutions since the end
of the Cold War. The ARF, APEC, and ASEAN+3 are the most important
institutions in East Asia and Asia-Pacific region up to now. ARF is the only
multilateral security framework in the region and brings all the major powers
both within and outside the Asia-Pacific region together. The ARF was formally
proposed by ASEAN and endorsed by its dialogue partners at the PostMinisterial Conference (PMC) in 1993 and began its operation in 1994. Its
objectives, which were outlined in the first ARF Chairman’s Statement in 1994,
are to (a) foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security
issues of common interest and concern, and to (b) make significant contribution
to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the AsiaPacific region. The ARF seeks to build mutual confidence and trust among its
members through regular consultations at the ministerial, senior officials and
experts level, and joint activities. It also seeks to develop a capacity to prevent
conflict through diplomacy.
The ARF is proceeding at a pace comfortable to all participants, which have
diverse strategic views, security concerns, interests, capabilities, and expectations
thus making it very difficult to move forward at a fast pace. Its process is
characterized by informality: it has no collective bureaucratic apparatus, and even
no own secretariat. Its decision-making procedures are based on consensus and
its agreements have no legally binding force on its member states. It has no
resource and ability to resolve a conflict when it emerges.30 These characteristics
of the ARF are similar to the ASEAN way. In fact, ASEAN as the initiator of the
ARF has assumed a leading role in the ARF from the beginning and its leading
role will be continued in the foreseeable future.
ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF makes the Forum operating according to
the ASEAN way and following the ASEAN model. However, this may cause
some problems. The ARF is limited to security issues. If there is no consensus
on the related security issues among the members, there will be a risk of
stagnation and even rolling-back of the Forum because of its lacking issuelinkages. The fact that it has been unable to make its planned progression from
confidence-building to preventive diplomacy illustrates this problem. ASEAN
way of avoiding problems, focusing only on common agreed issues, and shelving
the divisive issues may be difficult for western members of the ARF to accept.
While it is necessary for the ARF to follow the ASEAN way, it seems inadequate
for ARF to make further progress beyond the area of confidence-building.
Unlike the ARF, the APEC has not been dominated or driven by the ASEAN.
But its procedures and operating principles have been shaped by the ASEAN
way. At the first ministerial gathering in Canberra in November 1994, ASEAN’s
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proposals that different levels of economic and political development within the
APEC states should be taken into account, that APEC should be a forum for
constructive discussion, not a mechanism to enforce action by its members, were
accepted. It was agreed at the meeting that “diversity in levels of economic
development would be taken into account, that decisions would be reached by
consensus, and that emphasis would be placed on an informal, frank exchange
of views.”31 Thus, APEC’s procedures resembled ASEAN way. Like ARF, it lacks
formal and binding decision-making, and enforcement mechanism.
The APEC has made great progress in its admission of new members, in
regional economic and technical cooperation, in business facilitation, and in
regional trade liberalization. Moreover, its political significance has considerably
increased as it offers a useful opportunity for major powers (the United States,
Russia, China, and Japan) in the region to meet each other and to address the
political and urgent issues. Despite its dynamism and progress, the APEC still
faces some obstacles in the future development.32 One of the obstacles will be
APEC’s operating principles with emphasis on consensus and non-binding
agreements. Trade liberalization has become the main objective of the APEC
since the meeting in Seattle in November 1993. However, trade liberalization
was not pursued by negotiating a binding agreement like the EC and GATT/WTO
did, but by submitting “Individual Action Plans.”33 Even though IAPs were
designed to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific
region by the year 2010 for developed economies and 2020 for developing
economies, they were made by members themselves and had no legally binding
effect, and there were no supervision system to monitoring the implementation
of these plans. For this reason, it seems that the target will be not realized
according to the schedule. The fact that with only five years left, the developed
economies have made no substantial efforts to liberalize their trade and investment
illustrates the limitations of the APEC’s approach to regional economic integration.
Unlike the ARF and APEC which were designed to deal with security and
economic issues respectively, the ASEAN+3 is a comprehensive mechanism
addressing political, economic and security issues in East Asia. It was established
in 1997 against the backdrop of financial crisis and economic downturn in East
Asia with the aim of expanding and deepening cooperation between the two subregions, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. Since its inception, the ASEAN+3
process has taken up various measures to strengthen regional cooperation and
integration.
Like the ARF, ASEAN has been the driving force of the process of ASEAN+3,
and in fact the ASEAN+3 process was the combination of the existing dialogue
mechanisms of ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-RoK. In this sense,
it was an incomplete multilateral mechanism. From the beginning, the ASEAN+3
mechanism put more emphasis on strengthening bilateral cooperation between
ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN-RoK. No surprisingly, ASEAN Leaders
and their counterparts from China, Japan and RoK at the inaugural meeting of
ASEAN+3 summit issued three Joint Statements (ASEAN-China, ASEANJapan, and ASEAN-RoK Joint Statements) rather than one. They managed to
produce a joint statement on East Asia cooperation at the third ASEAN+3
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Summit in Manila in 1999, in which the leaders expressed their hope to promote
dialogue and to deepen and consolidate collective efforts with a view to advancing
mutual understanding, trust, good neighborliness and friendly relations, peace,
stability and prosperity in East Asia and the world.
As the newest regional cooperation mechanism in East Asia, the ASEAN+3
process raised great expectations on East Asian integration. It is expected in the final
report of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) which was set up to bring together
experts from Track-2 to discuss the future of cooperation in East Asia that the
ASEAN+3 process will eventually lead to the formation of an East Asian Community.
Whether this high expectation is realistic or just rhetoric, it did raise a serious question
of how to promote East Asian integration based on the ASEAN+3 process.
There is and will be no easy answer to this complex question, but the abovementioned European model and ASEAN way can provide some experiences and
lessons to the East Asian integration. First, regional integration needs strong
political commitments of the states, especially regional big powers’ strong political
commitments to regional cooperation. The Franco-German axis has provided
strong dynamics to the European Community/European Union and has served as
the “engine” of the European integration since 1950s. As the largest country in the
Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s strong political commitments to regional cooperation
were crucial for the establishment and the development of the ASEAN. In East
Asia, cooperation between China and Japan and their strong political commitments
to regional cooperation are pivotal to the development of East Asian integration.
Second, a set of regional institutions should be established and empowered to
governing the regional affairs along with the integration process. From the
beginning of the European integration, a set of well-structured European institutions
was created and endowed with true power of decision and action. The powerful
European institutions have played significant role in promoting European
integration and in safeguarding community interests. Regional integration requires
member states to respect and promote community interests while pursuing their
national interest. However, without strong regional institutions with true power, it
will be difficult to guarantee that member states will act like this. While the
European model of regional integration with supranational institutions may not suit
the East Asia, its institution-based integration did have profound implications to
East Asian integration. While the ASEAN way with weak institutions may be
suitable for the reality of East Asia, the weakness of ASEAN may suggests that
East Asian integration will face the same problem in the future.
For this reason, the measures proposed by EAVG and selected by the official
East Asia Study Group (EASG) like the formation of an East Asia Forum, an
East Asia Business Council and a network of East Asian eminent intellectuals,
and the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit to an East Asian Summit, and other
institutional buildings should be given careful consideration. The first East Asia
Summit was held on schedule in December 2005. But according to the Declaration
of the first East Asia Summit, the Summit was established not as a formal
institution to facilitate regional cooperation but as a forum for dialogue on broad
strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the
aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. These
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institutional building measures may promote the institutionalization of the East
Asia cooperation process and will lay a solid institutional basis for future
development of East Asian integration.
Third, while regional integration may need informal ways of cooperation,
formal instruments and legally binding commitments are indispensable to the
development of regional integration. European integration has had firm legal
foundations from the beginning. The fundamental treaties like Rome Treaty,
Merger Treaty, Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdan Treay, Nice
Treaty, and the Constitutional Treaty, together with enormous European law
(regulations and directives) have constituted the so-called acquis communautaire.
The candidate states must accept the acquis communautaire before they join the
EU. The European integration is characterized by the rule of law. By contrast,
ASEAN still prefers to cooperation based on informal ways. However, the
limitations of this way has become clear with the deepening of the integration
process. The successful experience of European integration and the painful lessons
of ASEAN in this aspect should remind East Asian countries to promote regional
integration through law, rather than just by diplomacy.
6. Conclusion
European integration has not only brought peace, stability, prosperity to the
region, which had been the major battle fields of the two world wars, but also
created a supranational political and legal system, which transcended the traditional
transnational cooperation and has become a model of regional integration.
Inspired by the progress of the European integration, Southeast Asian states
established ASEAN in 1967 to promote regional integration. Unlike the European
Community, ASEAN has developed a quite different way, the so-called ASEAN
way, to strengthening regional cooperation. Rather than creating a regional
supranational governance system, the ASEAN regionalism has been limited to
informal consultation and cooperation, and has been characterized by its weak
institutionalization. These characteristics of the ASEAN way has invoked much
criticism, however, it seems that ASEAN has achieved the similar progress like
the EC/EU in bringing peace, stability and to a less degree prosperity to the
region. Furthermore, it has become the engine and the model of regional integration
in the wider region beyond Southeast Asia. Europe and Asia have developed
quite different forms of regionalism.
From a normative point of view, European Union serves as the model of
regional integration in terms of transcending divergent national interests and
governing regional affairs effectively. Other regions in the world including East
Asia and Asia-Pacific should emulate the European model rather than following
its own way. However, the contextual factors and the specificity of western
Europe which have shaped the European integration process should not be
overlooked. East Asia is not a region like western Europe with homogenous
political and economic system, and common culture and identity, but rather a
region with substantial cultural, political and economic differences, its integration
process can not simply follow the European model without considering the
17
123
regional reality. While the ASEAN way has been widely applied in East Asian
and Asia-Pacific regional institutions like APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3, its weakness
and limitations as the ASEAN has shown should not be neglected.
How, then, should the East Asian integration be promoted? Is there any third
way of regionalism between the European model and the ASEAN way? The
answer may be no, but ASEAN+3 as a tentative process of East Asian integration
can benefit a lot from the experiences of European Union and the ASEAN. It can
benefit from the ASEAN’s experiences in bringing the diverse regional states
together and in achieving unity in this great diversity. It can also benefit from
ASEAN’s experiences in engaging with external powers like the United States,
China, Japan and in gaining their support for regional integration. This will be
extremely important for East Asian integration because the United States as the
extra-regional power have profound strategic, security, political and economic
interest in the region and most of East Asia countries treat their bilateral relations
with the U.S.A. with a higher priority than relations among themselves. Given
the United States’ strategic importance, huge influence and military presence in
the region, the East Asian integration can not achieve any substantial progress
without gaining American full support.
The European experiences in building an effective regional governance
system based on formal institutions and law can be helpful and useful for the
East Asia countries to design and build their regional institutions. The practices
of the European states in transferring, pooling and sharing their national sovereignty,
and the new attitudes towards sovereignty, can remind the East Asian states that
there exists an alternative way to preserve their sovereignty, and therefore will
encourage them to embrace and practice the new ideas of sovereignty.
The comparative study of the European model and the ASEAN way highlights
the different characteristics of the two models, but it also points out the trend of
the convergence of the two models as the ASEAN has moved towards more
institutionalized cooperation since the late 1990s. The two models look like so
different, but that doesn’t mean they are mutual exclusive. On the contrary, they
may be mutual complementary. If that is the case, East Asia can be the region to
combine the merits of the two models and to experiment a third way of regionalism.
NOTES
1. Caporaso, James A., and Keeler, John T.S. “The
European Union and regional integration
theory”, in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey (eds.),
The State of the European Union: Building a
European Polity? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner&
Company, 1995 pp. 29–62.
2. Keohane, Robert O. and Hoffmann, Stanley,
“Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s”,
in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann
(eds.), The New European Community: DecisionMaking and Institutional Change, Boulder,
Westview Press, 1991.
3. Haas, Ernst B, “Technology, Pluralism and the
New Europe”, in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.),
A New Europe? Boston 1964: Houghton Mifflin.
4. Haas, Ernst B, Beyond the Nation State:
Functionalism and International Organization,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.
5. Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The
Fate of the Nation-State in Europe”, Daedalus;
Milward, Alan S, The European Rescue of the
Nation-State, London 1992: Routledge; Moravcsik,
Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose
and State Power from Messina to Maastricht,
124
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
ZHU GUICHANG
Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press,
1992, 95(3): pp. 862–915.
Moravcsik, Andrew, “Preferences and Power
in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 1993, 31(4): pp. 473–524.
Peterson, John, “Decision-Making in the European
Union: towards a framework for analysis”,
Journal of European Public Policy,1995, 2(1),
pp. 69–93.
Idem, p. 84.
Caporaso, James A. (1998) “Regional integration
theory: Understanding our past and anticipating
our future”, Journal of European Public Policy,
1998 5(1): pp. 1–16.
Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The
Fate of the Nation-State in Europe”, Daedalus;
Milward, Alan S, The European Rescue of the
Nation-State, London: Routledge, 1992, 95(3):
pp. 862–915.
Keohane, Robert O. and Hoffmann, Stanley,
“Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s”, in
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.),
The New European Community: Decision-Making
and Institutional Change, Boulder, Westview
Press, 1991, p. 16.
Peterson, John, “Decision-Making in the European
Union: towards a framework for analysis”,
Journal of European Public Policy,1995, 2(1):
p. 72.
Henderson, Jeannie, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi
Paper 328, Oxford: Oxford University Press for
the IISS, 1999, pp. 16–17.
Acharya, Mmitav, “Collective identity and conflict
management in Southeast Asia”, in Emanuel
Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security
Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998, p. 209.
Idem, pp. 210–212.
Dahl, Arnfinn-Jorgenson, Regional Organisation
and Order in Southeast Asia, London: Macmillan
1982; Antolik, Michael, ASEAN and the Diplomacy
of Accommodation, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.,
1990.
Henderson, Jeannie, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi
the IISS, 1999, p. 23.
Idem, p. 34.
Wallace, William, “Regionalism in Europe:
Model or Exception?” in Andrew Gamble and
Anthory Payne, (eds.), Regionalism and World
Order, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 201.
18
20. Wallance, Helen, “The Policy Process: A
Moving Pendulum”, in Helen Wallace and
William Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000, pp. 51–52.
21. Idem, pp. 51–52.
22. Henderson, Jeannie, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi
the IISS, 1999, p. 34.
23. Acharya, Mmitav, “Collective identity and
conflict management in Southeast Asia”, in
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.),
Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998, p. 205.
24. Akrasanee, Narongchai, “Issues in ASEAN
Economic Regionalism”, in Karl D. Jackson and
M. Hadi Soesastro (eds.), ASEAN Security and
Economic Development, Berkeley: University of
California, 1984, p. 72.
25. Pemple, T. J, “East Asia: Emerging Webs of
Regional Connectedness”, in Yan Xuetong and
Zhou Fangyin (eds.), Security Cooperation in
East Asia, Beijing: Beijing University Press,
2004, pp. 228–229.
26. Wallance, Helen, “The Policy Process: A
Moving Pendulum”, in Helen Wallace and
William Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000, p. 63.
27. Keohane, Robert O. (2002) “Ironies of Sovereignty:
The European Union and the United States”.
Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (4), 2002,
p. 308.
28. Henderson, Jeannie, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi
the IISS, 1999, pp. 48–55.
29. Idem, p. 48.
30. Attina, Fulvio and Zhu Guichang, “Security
Culture and the Construction of Security
Partnerships: the European Union and China
Compared”, Mediterranean Journal of Human
Rights Vol. 5: 2001, pp. 101–102.
31. Bessho, Kero (1999), Identities and Security in
East Asia, Adelphi Paper 325, Oxford: Oxford
University Press for the IISS, 1999, p. 65.
32. Foot, Rosemary, “Pacific Asia: The Development
of Regional Dialogue”, in Andrew Gamble and
Anthory Payne, (eds.), Regionalism and World
Order, London: Macmillan, 1996 p. 347.
33. Bessho, Kero (1999), Identities and Security in
East Asia, Adelphi Paper 325, Oxford: Oxford
University Press for the IISS, 1999, p. 66.
HISTORY AND THE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION
LUCIAN JORA
Is it possible to produce new historical narratives, which meet the highest
standards of historical scholarship, while opening new space for discussion
among former protagonists in a conflict? What is the potential for developing a
shared history? What methodology should be used? In examining the various
myths that have developed over time, which case studies could have the greatest
potential for success? What role does history play in political reconciliation, and
what role can historians play in public debates about the past? What can they
contribute to the search for state and institutional accountability for historical
injustices? What might these narratives look like, how could they be publicized,
and how large a spectrum of viewpoints could these narratives span, while excluding
versions generally judged to be denial or the incitement of xenophobia?1
A major methodological challenge is the integration of two kinds of history,
one based on traditional ways of reconstructing events and one based on
memory and narratives. It was agreed that the key to a successful project would
require the bridging of serious historical research with contemporary public
dialogue. In order for a project to succeed, several underlying principles need to
be recognized. 1) Empirical evidence is important to the legitimacy of the project;
2) The recognition of facts by both parties is vital; 3) It is important to carve out
an original niche for the project and not to replicate current or past efforts by the
historical community; 4) A joint narrative that does not deny the legitimacy of
the other is important in the process.2 However as far as the second point is
concerned we may agree that is important not to replicate previous work but
what about several situation in which this work in whether unknown whether
unused? Furthermore, historians have little choice in the focusing on victimhood and the burden of the past, because this is what is provided by contemporary
public discourse. This is connected to the general caution concerned the possibility
that a project might create a narrative of mutual productive interaction that
would overshadow the conflict in history. While falsely harmonious narratives
can be dangerous, the possibility of reconciliation is built on acknowledgement
of both conflict and coexistence.3
Traditional history is now felt to be insufficient as a mean to understand the
events of a certain period; memory and trauma have a special relationship. The
key moments are events in which time is compressed: they draw the prehistory
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of the key events, particularly the nineteenth century and the interwar period,
into their narrative, and, as all foundational events do, it projects into the future
as well. If we take an example of an extreme sensitive subject from the contemporary
Polish-Jewish history, a key historical misunderstanding lies in the fact that the
Jews focus exclusively on the Holocaust and see it as separate from World War
II, while for the Poles, conversely, the key event is World War II, with the Holocaust,
at least until very recently, being largely unknown among the general populace
and largely ignored by scholars.4
Another recent Central European example coming in our mind came from the
context of Czech-German, or Romanian-Hungarian relations, places where history
is clearly not a stale science. History is a living entity, which, far from remaining
behind the ivied walls of academia, pervades all aspects of Central European
culture and politics. This does not discount the importance of historical research
of many historians in the region, but merely points out once more the fact that
the choice of research topics and the emphasis of conclusions do not escape the
context of the age in which they are written. Each era, each group, each historian
is moved to present history in a certain way. At times, a climate of fear moved
historians to present their findings in totalitarian regime-approved manner.
Furthermore like anywhere else, what happened in the past is not as important
for today as what people believe has happened. The question then becomes
“Who does the reminding?” Quite clearly that role is filled by intellectuals and
the ruling elites.5
Recent Representative Projects
The Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs and Elazar Barkan,
of Claremont Graduate University, initiated the IHI (International History Initiative)
in 2001. The first meeting with the support of an advisors group of distinguished
historians took place on February 15–16, 2002, at the Pocantico Conference
Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The goal of the project was to address
historical issues of a disputed past in order to transform historical disputes from
a cause of further or renewed conflict into a tool in long-term reconciliation and
peace-building.6
IHI brings together historians and other scholars from opposing sides of
historical conflicts to jointly research and discuss difficult parts of their common
histories. In attempting to bring long-term historical perspectives to bear in
redressing contemporary conflicts, we expect to encounter thematic and practical
challenges. We recognize that the complex nature of history means that each
conflict is unique in many respects. Yet, we expect that comparative work would
enable IHI to articulate several key areas of inquiry regarding those aspects of
conflicts and post-conflict transition that are shared. These could include: the
role of mediators and outsiders in bridging historical narratives; types of conflicts
most likely to benefit from this tool, and at which stage(s); an investigation of
the related roles of historians and truth commissions, as well as their differences;
and the challenge of how best to disseminate the resulting collaboratively produced
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historical narratives to the public, in order to promote deliberation for further
political and social reconciliation.7 IHI proposes to bring together groups for
each case study that would determine as a fundamental part of their mandate an
agenda of critical issues for each case, as well as the methodology with which to
address it. The flexibility to reframe a debate will provide new opportunities to
address old conflicts from a fresh perspective. External initiatives are necessary
to commence the process for the many conflicts where political actors lack the
will or the interest to facilitate such a historical inquiry, and to rigorously assess
its potential.8
A note on terminology
As a project with global agenda and aspirations, the intercultural difficulties
of presenting these concepts, not all of which can be translated in a neutral,
value-free form, create added difficulties. Finding the right terminology for each
case study is one challenge the project is addressing. Elzam Brakan thinks that
three terms are especially problematical: reconciliation a concept seen by many
to be primarily informed by Christian principles, is a case in point.9 Commission
is another that carries negative connotations in some cultures. Finally “negotiated”
history does not mean bartering truth for evidence, nor treating all claims as valid.
Rather, “negotiated” means taking account of the other’s narrative and attempting
to incorporate it into one’s own; joint research and discussions delegitimize
patently false claims, and narrow the gap between the interlocutors.10 The outcome
of successful negotiated history is both the respect shown to the defendable
narratives of both sides of a conflict, and, as importantly, the process itself,
which underscores the willingness of the current generation to overcome the
burden of historical conflict. The convening of historical commissions as an
attempt to clarify contentious historical issues that undermine the development
of peaceful, cooperative relations between groups or states is not new. IHI
contribution lies in several areas:
First of all, historical commissions as tools for transition and reconciliation
have received relatively little attention compared to such projects as truth
commissions, trials, lustration and the opening of secret police files. IHI as a
vehicle for convening historical commissions is an attempt to contribute to our
collective knowledge of how such commissions work and when they work
best.11 Unlike earlier commissions, which were convened by governments as
official, bilateral bodies, the commissions as envisioned by IHI are unique in
being convened by civil society actors and in being multilateral. The commissions
will bring transnational approaches to history to bear on questions of contested
histories. Civil society involvement can lower the political stakes and enable
greater openness of historical investigations, including in cases where governments
are not willing or able to do so.12
Drawing on the observation that historians, together with lawyers, are increasingly
being drawn into debates about the past and questions of justice and reconciliation
without having the tradition of involvement in policy debates that lawyers do,
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IHI search for the most effective way to involve historians in this public arena
without compromising their scholar integrity.13 We have to admit this is a very
challenging task, often opposed by the historians themselves, a few are motivated
by academic criteria but for most we suppose the simple commodity. This may
enlarge the circle of actors whose expertise can be utilized in the search for new
tools to promote long-term peace and civic engagement. Finally, the record of
publicizing the findings of historical commissions to date is mixed. Many
historical commissions remain virtually unknown to the greater public, while the
results of some, such as the Czech-German, or the Romanian-Hungarian Historical
Commissions have been publicized through creative work with history educators.
One of IHI like organizations top priorities is to ensure that the findings of
successful historical commissions are disseminated beyond the narrow range of
elite actors initially involved in political normalization efforts to engage a
broader array of citizens, including the university, secondary school teachers and
students, and the media.14
Anticipated Outcomes/Products
Throughout the Central and Eastern Europe and many other parts of the
world, history has often been (and still is) an instrument of political purposes being
shaped according to perceived national needs. This is reflected through history
books, which are used in schools in those countries at all levels. It goes without
saying that this kind of teaching material often strengthens the national prejudices
about neighbouring countries and the concept of our enemies.
The first outcome of the projects would be the successful convening of all the
planned historians meetings for a given case study and the issuing of a joint
report. This will indicate the furtherance of conversations or deliberations which
have not taken place before and which were at the very least fraught with difficulty
at the outset. This construction of a public space, which did not exist before,
could facilitate and instigate further work by others who are not directly a part
of the project.
A second challenge is the public dissemination of the results of the commission
according with the initial plans. Material based on the initial scholarly report have
to be published both in print format and on a website which would be broadly
advertised to scholars, policy makers, the media, educators and others. It was
crucial to involve select media, non-governmental organizations and educators in
the promotion of discussions and deliberation about the results of the commissions.
These can help to create activities that ensure the findings reach those outside the
narrow range the political elite usually involved in political reconciliation, thereby
creating a broader process, not limited to diplomats, government leaders and the
academy. Religious institutions, leaders and educators would be essential to this
effort, as religious institutions have grass-roots, locally based constituencies that
can be mobilized. NGOs that could be partners in these efforts would be educational
ones like Germany’s George Eckert Institute, which focuses on the revision of
history and social science textbooks and collaboration with international textbook
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commissions, and the U.S.-based Facing History and Ourselves and Teaching for
Tolerance, both of which use challenging material about traumatic pasts to promote
moral deliberation among secondary school students.15
A third outcome would be the development of training programs: many
conflicts which could benefit from the creation of a historical commission take
place in countries where historians do not have adequate access to written
archives or data-basing capability. Indeed, many conflicts are so recent that the
skills needed would be in the taking of oral histories more than archival
research; and in some places there are very few formally trained historians. The
development of training methods and resources would be a valuable contribution
to the capacity of societies in which there is a widely recognized need for greater
transparency and knowledge about past human rights abuses, but currently
insufficient skills and resources to undertake such historical inquiries.16
Another recent project has been developed by the Centre for Democracy and
Reconciliation in South-Eastern Europe (CDRSEE). This project on the last
years tried to offer a solution to the highly debated problem concerning History
teaching among former enemies in an attempt to set up an agenda for grass roots
reconciliation from one side and a closer to the historical truth version of History,
from the other side.17 In cooperation with teachers and educational experts from all
South-Eastern European countries, the Thessalonica based center produced four
History Teaching Books, which train the critical view on one’s own history and
teaches what the other side considers as the truth.18
During teacher training workshops organized by the Center for Democracy
and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, December 2000 to February 2002, some
history teachers from several different Southeast European countries asked for
materials that they could use in their lessons apart from the standard textbook.
According to the organizers this project is a response to their demand and a
remedy to the lack of good textbooks in some countries. However we are meant
to ask how representative are those history teachers for this professional branch
in their own countries. The debate as we have noticed had involved not necessary
history teachers but university academics and the kind of approach as proposed by
the participants according with our own experience has not been very popular
among old school history teachers. Yet the most difficult aspect to render in print
and capture in a book is the experience of communication. Getting to know the
other was as important as the scientific discourse recorded in this book. It was
demonstrated again that in this field the dynamic of human contact is more
powerful than scientific findings, and changes in the teaching of history will
come from motivated individuals rather than impersonal institutions.
The Workbooks project consists of developing alternative teaching materials
for history teachers at the primary and secondary school level in Southeast
European countries. The four workbooks have the following four themes: The
Ottoman Empire (assessed at a workshop in Istanbul, July 2003); Nations and
States in Southeast Europe (assessed in Bucharest, November 2003); The Balkan
Wars (assessed in Cyprus, February 2003); The Second World War (assessed in
Zagreb, September 2003).
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A team of coordinators has been working on this project, planning and
implementing, since the beginning of 2002. The coordinators are also the editors
of the workbooks.19 One or two contributors from each of the eleven countries
collected the materials – pictures, diplomatic texts, treaties, memoirs, literature,
testimonies, newspapers — for the each topic. The sources are documents on
different aspects of each historical topic presented from different national
perspectives, thus providing by definition multi-perspectivity via a comparative
approach.20 The workbooks are meant to be used by secondary and primary
school teachers. 15 000 history teachers are meant to receive the workbooks in
their own language. 3000 copies of the English version are suppose to be distributed
to the above listed target groups. The workbooks would also be useful for
university courses such as sociology, education, history, Balkan studies, European
studies, Political science, policy studies, etc.21
In the last decade, the concept of a new approach towards history emerged as
acounterweight to new aggressive and defensive nationalisms. The con-sequent
idea to promote a common history of the region was also launched in political
and intellectual environments. However, this new history should not be a new
construction, which would replace the national histories. It would rather be a
new interpretation of the national pasts based on a common cultural and institutional
heritage. And it implies the introduction in history teaching of supra-national
elements as a counterweight to ethnocentric or even nationalistic historical
narratives.22 In Communist countries before 1989 the prevailing combination
was one of a Marxian analysis of the overall historical development with the
emphasis on political and military history, and national themes.23 The collapse
of communism in the region took with it the Marxist historiography, which had
determined for decades the accounts and interpretations of the past. Yet this
official historiography produced by state institutions (universities and research
institutes) and taught in the schools as the dominant scientific discourse was not
always in line with social memory and the perception of the past as they were
communicated through the family. Written and oral history would often encounter
and contradict each other. The existence of parallel narratives meant that the
change of the dominant narrative did not take place in vacuum or without strong
resistance. So the old official history gave way (in some places) to a new history.
The divisive historical discourse propounded by antagonistic nationalisms,
usually in pairs, certainly does not promote a supranational history. Memory also
plays a divisive role in a region of wars and uprooting. Peter Burke claims that
history is forgotten by the victors but not by the vanquished, citing the example
of the English structural amnesia and the Irish hypertrophied memory. He also
observes that uprooted peoples, such as the Polish, seem obsessed wirth their
past (we would add here the Armenians).24
The Central and Southeastern Europe is inhabited by vanquished and uprooted
people. This is reflected in the national historiography of all states on the region
and confirmed by the weighty shadow of History on the public life of those
societies. Yet the duty of remembering, in the way it is defined, is not entirely honest.
Memory selective, by definition is accompanied by the parallel process of
oblivion, which often assumes the form of an official censorship of embarrassing
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memories. It is what Paul Connerton calls organized oblivion.25 Censorship is a
feature of both individual and collective memory (in the way individuals compose
their autobiography, or in cases of deliberate, unofficial suppression, such as
Germany after WWII and France after Vichy). In such cases social memory does
not repudiate the official history; on the contrary, their silences complement each
other and society learns to remember its past in a particular way. The fact that
the Turk is the favorite enemy of Balkan peoples is neither new nor unexpected.
The Balkan nationalisms which led to the formation of national states in the
region were developed against the crumbling Ottoman empire and in opposition
to everything the Turks stood for in the Western mind. The Ottoman Empire,
associated with the Orient and all its negative connotations, constituted a negative
example and was held to be the main cause for the backwardness of the other
Balkan peoples.26 Although the Turks remained in the Balkans for half a
millennium, they were always considered as outsiders and their presence was
seen as temporary.27 This view, although the dominant one has its opposite. A
historiographical trend of Turkish origin claims that the Ottoman Empire was a
golden age for the Balkans a heaven of religious tolerance and harmonious
coexistence of the peoples. According to this view, the emergence of Balkan
nationalisms was a sign of ingratitude towards the Ottomans, which destroyed
the conditions of order and peace in the region and triggered a period of disorder
and war. In fact, this reversionary historiography of the Ottoman period has fed
in part the new trends for a shared Balkan history, which would attempt to
promote the uniting elements of Balkan peoples as the heritage of a common
past. In such a history the Ottoman Empire would have to have if not a leading
at least an important role and of course this would not be accepted only by those
who idealise the Balkan experience of the Ottomans. Indeed, although not
considered a Balkan people the Turks are the main sine qua non of the Balkanness.28 The Balkan peoples may have rejected their Ottoman heritage in the
context of their Western orientation, but they carry this heritage in their everyday
life. In fact, in many aspects such as cuisine this heritage has been assimilated
so fully as to be perceived and projected as a special national feature. Shared
experiences are thus felt to be exclusive, and the multiple is perceived as unique.
This we does not include others and does not share anything.29
So how could one go about writing a common regional history? Is there an
imagined Balkan community to which this history would relate? If not, is there
one being formed now? If yes to which extend? Can it be instrumentalised and
to what end? Who will determine the content of this new common history? And
how can it be incorporated in an educational strategy which would help decode
and understand the south east European world of today? Skepticism about the
feasibility of û and the need for a supranational history has been expressed
already in the case of a common European history, based on the efforts made so
far.30 Doubts are summarized by Koulouri summarized in the following questions:
Can we really speak of continuity in European history? Would the writing of this
history be based on the model of national histories? Might it be that we are
witnessing a process of constructing Europe in the same way national states
were formed? Similarly, in the case of the Balkans, the writing of one history
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LUCIAN JORA
8
would require that each ethno-cultural community in the region acknowledge a
minimum proportion of Balkanness as element of its identity, and also that there
is both temporal and spatial continuity. Given that identity normally involves some
territoriality, a definition of the Balkan territory is as important as the compilation
of a Balkan history. The new holistic perception of Balkan history cannot but
correspond to a new holistic perception of Balkan territory: to the acceptance of
the relative and fluid character of frontiers and a description of the territorial
structure in new terms. Yet in a region of constantly changing borderlines such
an aspiration would seem at least utopian at this time.31
If we were to use the concept of cultural borders in writing the history, we
should accept a priori that cultural borders are never closed or impermeable.
This means that the geographical area where a culture is established may be
fixed, but it is not sealed. In this way we can under-stand the endless interaction
and mutual penetration among the different national/cultural entities which lead
to new patterns. A shared history presupposes spatial continuity a cultural
continuum û but also, more importantly, temporal continuity. Of course, these
historical experiences were neither exclusively nor evenly distributed throughout
a particular region. Even the communist period, for all its denigration by the
post-communist Balkan societies, is still a shared historical experience whose
vestiges are visible to an external observer. The Ottoman dominance, The Ortodoxy,
the Communism. But then we may ask. What kind of Ottoman dominance or
what kind of Communism the one experienced by Albania, the one experienced
by Yugoslavia, or the Romanian one? These common historical pasts should be
perceived as fields of cultural exchange and interaction rather than one-way
influence of the dominant national/cultural group in each case. The highest
barrier for a shared history is to accept as equal the various cultural contributions
and relativise the uniqueness of the nation.32 Within Central and Eastern Europe
each nation sees itself as unique, incomparable and superior, and employs history
to prove it. Yet supremacy has no history, it is a-historical for its entire disguise
as historical. Qualifying uniqueness means making cross-cultural comparisons
to highlight the common, unifying elements. In this respect, too, the trend is
different: neighbouring nations vie for the exclusive use of national symbols and
figures which are seen as essential to their own identity.33
Despite widespread skepticism as to the feasibility of a shared regional
history for the Central and Eastern European nations, there is an increasing number
of those who believe in the expediency of a unifying teaching to promote a
common historical consciousness, mutual understanding and tolerance. The
solution is thus seen in the context of a new educational approach rather than a
novel method of historiography.
The role of education
The basic idea is that a change in the teaching methods of history may have
a long-term effect on the way neighbouring peoples see one another. Specifically,
E. Kofos suggests that: An improvement of school textbooks may function as a
long duration Confidence Building Measure a tool for reconciliation.34 An
9
133
assertion easy to make however difficult to apply outside the Academia. Cristina
Koulouri considers: It is true that totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have
attempted to control the education of the young, hence also schoolbooks; but it
is also true that much more than effective means of propaganda and conscience
manipulation, schoolbooks are a mirror of the society that produces them. They
rarely contain stereotypes and values unacceptable to society. Therefore their
content may be a good guide as to a societs values; history books, in particular,
may reflect the image a human society has of its past and, indirectly, the way it
imagines its future. This reasoning has been the basis for the recent spate of
research projects and publications. The underlying assumption behind this
activity is that there is some connection more or less direct between the content
of textbooks and the escalation of nationalism, whose extreme manifestation is
armed conflict.35 Of course, already in the 1920s and 1930s schoolbooks had
been judged and largely found guilty of the wars in the 20 th century.36 It was
deemed necessary to revise them to eradicate negative stereotypes and prejudice
against other peoples, and many efforts were made to this end in Europe (e.g.,
between France and Germany, Germany and Poland, etc.). The results are visible
in Western European books, although ethnocentrism often seems hard to overcome.
Nevertheless, schoolbooks cannot be treated as a uniform set. As in all similar
cases, we can discern both common traits and deviations. Thus, although
ethnocentrism appears prominent in the historical narrative it does not always
assume the form of nationalism. Historical methods also differ as each country
has its own tradition of history and historiography. Essentially, however, schoolbooks
merely reflect the prevalent ideology not necessarily the official one as it is
diffused through the media, the family and other social institutions. If a cold war
is currently going on among text is because there are strong feelings in society
that also nurture another cold war among the media, which reflect and shape
mentalities as much as the school.37 Therefore the responsibility of historians is
a political one. Historical discourse cannot be used to justify past or present
regimes; it must develop critical spirits and free citizens.38
Critical thinking acquired through learning history is, after all, the future citizens
only protection against distortions, simplification and manipulation. This critical
historical discourse is by definition ironic, since irony is inherently self-critical,
inherently dialectic, and promotes self-knowledge by liberating us from our
illusions.39
So if history is rewritten, it cannot feign ignorance or innocence. Besides, the
political developments in the Balkans and the revision of the past coincide with
international developments in historiography: the re-evaluation of historical canons
and grand-narratives, the questioning of objective historical knowledge, the
emphasis on the subjective, the particular and the personal, the examination
of the margins and the discovery of history obscure protagonists. The new
educational approach to history is summarized in the application of a
comparative, multiperspective method, the focus on economic, social and
cultural history and the development of students analytical and interpretative
skills to enable them to evaluate the information they receive.40
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LUCIAN JORA
10
Comparative history aims to acquaint students with both differences and
similarities and abolish the dogmatic teaching of the objective history of the one
and only truth. The move away from political and military history towards
economic, social and cultural history is meant to teach historical experiences
which are more familiar and interesting to children and de emphasize war as an
element of historical evolution, especially in terms of the relations with neighbouring
states. It also aims at teaching conflicts from a new perspective, in terms of both
content and method. Finally, the development of critical thinking is the main
purpose of historical teaching, so that future citizens will be immune to attempts
to manipulate them.41 The ultimate goal of this concept of writing and teaching
history is to promote mutual tolerance and understanding. Yet which kind of
history would promote tolerance? A history that emphasizes similarities in the
abstract, or one which does not conceal the differences? We usually think that
tolerance towards the Other, the different, must come from the acknowledgement
of our similarities.42 Sylviane Agacinski, however, puts forward a different
view: The first chapter, Common Past, Shared History, refers to these common
pasts which can form the basis of a shared history.43 It includes papers delivered
in three workshops, namely workshop I on Hungarian legacy in Southeastern
Europe; workshop V titled The Balkan empires: common heritage, different
Heirs, part of which was workshop V Greeks and Turks: the Janus of a common
history; and workshop VI titled Yugoslavia: A Look in the Broken Mirror. Who
is the other? Yasemin Soysal and Lilian Antoniou demonstrate this dipole as
regards the definition of national evolution by Greeks and Turks, respectively.
They examine the textbooks of lower secondary schools in Britain, Greece and
Turkey to show that Turkish identity is a state identity with the main focus on
national territory, while Greek identity is a cultural identity with the main focus
on national time. The two national histories relation to Europe is equally
different: Greece inside but outside, Turkey outside but inside.44 The irresolute
European character of the Byzantium and the Ottoman Empires clear identification
with the Orient is also reflected in British school-books which represent the
viewpoint of an external observer Western Europe as to the history of the eastern
part of the continent.
Similar circumstances are found in Romania. In her study of Romanian
schoolbooks Codruþa Matei finds that the Byzantine heritage, being identified
with Orthodoxy, is seen as very important to Romanian history while the Ottoman
empire is presented as an extraneous element, although it is a major factor in
national history.45 The textbooks place particular emphasis on the Romanian
principalities relations with the Ottoman Empire, especially on the special
administrative status of the principalities and Romanian resistance against the
Ottomans.46 Matei also reports the classroom experience of her pupils as to their
picture of the Ottoman Empire, and discovers stereotypes which are not found
either in the books or in the teaching. In the area of Byzantine and Ottoman
studies each country follows its own tradition of historiography, which is not
dictated by purely scientific criteria but is usually connected with political
conditions.47 In the case of Romania, Bogdan Murgescu explains that the growth
11
135
of Byzantine and Ottoman studies in the 1960s and 1970s after the tradition
created by N. Iorga and later by Mihai Maxim functioned as an escape from that
times heavily politicised history. However, he points out that today there is
considerably less interest as young people are not particularly attracted by an
academic career, especially in fields which in their eyes do not seem to produce
socially significant knowledge.48 The Hungarian heritage appears to be less
important for Balkan schoolbooks. As Mirela-Luminiþa Murgescu explains, the
world history taught in SE European countries is clearly Western-oriented and
the history of SE Europe is presented through bipartite relations with neighbouring
countries rather than a unified whole.49 As one would expect, because of these
very bilateral historical relations the Hungarians figure much more in Romanian,
Serbian, Croatian or even Slovenian textbooks than other peoples of SE
Europe.50 Of course, Hungary appears under the prism of each national history,
and Hungarians figure in schoolbooks only in as much as they come into contact
with the authors own nation.51
The ideas presented above are very generous. Remain to be seen to which
extent those ideas and initiatives will find the way from the ivory tower of
Academia and enjoyable round tables to the reality on the field. The seminars
most visible result was four alterative History school books. Although available
on line for free (http://www.see-jhp.org/hw_alternative.html”; http://www.seejhp.org/hw_alternative.html) according with our knowledge at least in Romania
they are almost unknown. The school books were preceded by a number of
informal meetings and two series of (http://www.see-jhp.org/project_phase2.
html) seven workshops for teacher trainers to examine alternative methods of
teaching history, particularly controversial historical events, completed in
February 2002.52 So far we were unable to find information regarding the degree
National Ministries of Education from various target countries succeeded to
transform the initiatives into state policies, or whether or not the four schoolbooks
are officially accepted as legitimate alternative teaching materials in the schools.
The next step would be to find how many teachers effectively use those
materials and with what kind of results.
NOTES
1. www.salzburgdialogues.net
2. Idem.
3. Dr. Elazar Barkan http://www.salzburgseminar.
org/ihjr/index.cfm?Status=Projects&FullAbstrac
t=1&IDEvent=807
4. Dr. Elazar Barkan www.salzburgseminar.org/
mediafiles/MEDIA11750.PDF
5. Andrew Stroehlein, Czechs and the CzechGerman Declaration: History to Approach a
New of Failure The Thesis submitted in partial
requirement for the degree of Master of
Philosophy at the Institute of Russian and East
European Studies, University of Glasgow,
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
September 1997, http://www.blisty.cz/files/isarc/
9709/19970917c.html.
Barkan & Cole www.cceia.org/media/IHI
description.pdf.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
This will be supplemented by an initial scholarly
study of past historical commissions and their
achievements conducted by IHI co-director Elazar
Barkan with funding from the United States
Institute of Peace.
136
LUCIAN JORA
12. Barkan & Cole, International History Initiative
IHI The Historical Commissions Project Of the
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International
Affairs, http://www.cceia.org/media/IHI
description. pdf, p. 2.
13. Ibid.
14. IHI is currently exploring the feasibility of various
case studies, with the intent of focusing on the
most promising ones. These include: An East
Central Europe case, beginning with PolishJewish history; a Pacific Asian case focusing on
considerations of Japan colonial history as an
essential backdrop to the events of World War II;
the first study within this case is be Korea-Japan;
Zimbabwe: the legacy of violence within the
liberation movement as a source of contemporary
conflict; Cyprus, potentially in conjunction with
the evolving political discussions, which might
yield results in a relatively short time; a TurkishArmenian investigation; an Indonesian-East
Timor case.
15. www.cceia.org/media/IHIdescription.pdf
16. The Project Directors are: Elazar Barkan, who is
Professor of History and Cultural Studies at
Claremont Graduate University and the author of
The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating
Historical Injustices (Norton, 2000) and the
editor of a multi-authored volume on the role of
apology in political reconciliation (forthcoming).
Lili Cole is Senior Program Officer at the Carnegie
Council on Ethics and International Affairs, a
New York-based 501C-3 public research and
education institution, where she directs the
History and the Politics of Reconciliation Program.
She is the co-editor, with Peter Danchin, of
Protecting the Human Rights of Religious
Minorities in Eastern Europe (Columbia, 2002).
17. In our view Historical Truth is understood as a
version of History attempting to present it as a
complexity from as many points of view as
possible, closer to the concept of Total History as
theorized by the French Ecolle des Annaless.
18. This project is generously supported by http://
www.usaid.gov/The United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the:
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/
index_html and the German Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
19. Dr. Christina Koulouri is the General Coordinator
of this project, is the General Editor of all four of
the workbooks, and is the Chair of the CDRSEE’s
History Education Committee. She has coordinated
the History Education Committee’s work since it
was founded in 1998, including 7 textbook
workshops, 7 teacher training workshops, 4
assessment workshops of the Workbooks, and is
the Editor of the two publications produced by
the HEC so far. Dr. Halil Berktay of Sabanci
University in Istanbul, and Dr. Bogdan Murgescu
of the University of Bucharest are co-editors of
12
the teaching pack on the Ottoman Empire. Dr.
Mirela Luminita Murgescu of the University of
Bucharest is the editor of the pack on the
Creation of Nations and States; According with
the organizers, in Bucharest, Mirela and Bogdan
Murgescu have a team of graduate students in
the department of history who are ready to begin
the Romanian Communication Committee. They
are in touch with a network of history teachers
across the country.
20. The contributors were in constant communication
with the coordinators regarding the materials that
they were gathering and sending; they also met
with each other on two occasions. The first
meeting was early in the project, in November
2002 in Belgrade, for the coordinators to discuss
with the contributors their role and responsibilities,
and the aim of the project. The second meeting
was towards the end of the creation phase of the
workbooks. Any omissions in first drafts were
identified, and the contributors were able to see
the complete result of their work. After that
workshop, the contributors submitted the final
materials that were needed for all four
workbooks.
21. http://www.cdsee.org/teaching_modern_
sehistory.html.
22. Dr. Christina Koulouri, New Challenges for the
Study of Modern Greek History, www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposium
Papersonline/LSE-published%20paper.pdf, p. 2.
23. Dr. Christina Koulouri, New Challenges for the
Study of Modern Greek History, www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposium
Papersonline/LSE-published%20paper.pdf, p. 2.
24. www.cdse.org/teaching_modern_sehistory.html.
25. P. Burke, Varieties of Cutural History, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1997, pp. 53–54, quoted by Koulouri
in Clio in the Balkans, p. 10, available on line:
http://www.cdse.org/teaching.
27. P. Connerton, How societies remember, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989, quoted by
Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 10, http://
www.cdse.org/teaching.
28. www.cdse.org/teaching§_modern_sehistory.
html.
29. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 13, http://
www.cdse.org/teaching
html.
31. Cf. Elli Skopetea, Turks and the Balkans, quoted
by, Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 13,
http://www.cdse.org/teaching.
33. Ibid.
34. Evangelos Kofos, Long Duration CBMs in the
Balkans: Re-assessment of the Role of History
and Geography School Textbooks, in Culture
and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe
13
(International Conference, Thessaloniki, Greece,
June 26–29, 1997), Association for Democracy
in the Balkans, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, pp. 85–97.
35. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 20, available
on line:http://www.cdse.org/teaching.
36. Hayden White, Interview. The Ironic Poetics of
late Modernity, Historien 2 (2000), pp. 191–193.
37. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 14, http://
html.
39. F. Braudel, Grammaire des civilisations, quoted
by Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 16, http://
40. www.cdse.org/teaching§_modern_sehistory.html.
41. R. Stradling, Teaching 20th-century European
history, Council of Europe, 2001, p. 88.
on line:http://www.cdse.org/teaching.
137
43. Ibid.
on line www.cdse.org/teaching_modern_
sehistory.html.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Idem, p. 22.
52. The findings from the analysis of Balkan
textbooks in the workshops organized by the
History Education Committee of the CDRSEE
were first summarized in Teaching the History
of Southeastern Europe, Thessaloniki 2001;
pp. 22–23.
L’ÉNERGIE (RUSSE), L’EUROPE ET LES PERSPECTIVES
ANA BAZAC
Le mois de janvier 2006 a mis l’Europe devant le choque de l’énergie et de
la dépendance:
1. Tout d’abord la croissance du prix du gaz. L’Europe a négocié avec la Russie
l’année dernière dans le contexte international du haussement des prix et spécialement
du prix des hydrocarbures. Mais la Russie a demandé à l’Ukraine aussi que
cette-ci se soumette aux règles du marché. L’Ukraine a refusé et le premier
janvier la Russie a coupé le gaz.
L’augmentation du prix du gaz russe pour l’Ukraine n’a pas seulement des
causes politiques (liées à la volonté de la classe politique ukrainienne au pouvoir
de refuser l’alliance avec la Russie et de devenir le supporter des Etats-Unis)
mais, et premièrement, des causes économiques. Le haussement des prix s’est
inscrit et est inscrit dans la logique de l’époque. Les détenteurs de richesses
naturelles et surtout d’énergie doivent profiter au maximum de l’intervalle dans
lequel le développement se déroule dans le vieux cadre. Ce cadre se structure par
des relations de production, capitalistes, mais aussi par la technique dominante
aujourd’hui. Pas seulement la Russie suive de profiter au maximum de l’intervalle
quand la croissance économique se base encore sur la technique liée aux sources
conventionnelles d’énergie. Et en maintenant une position économique déterminante
on peut presser avec plus de succès pour une position politique confortable.
Mais, pour continuer à lier l’économique au politique, ce n’est pas l’OMC
(Organisation Mondiale du Commerce) qui a recommandé l’abolition des prix
favorisants? De ce point de vue, l’OMC pourrait presser la Russie d’augmenter
le prix pour le Belarus aussi; et la seule réponse serait alors l’intégration RussieBelarus dans une structure étatique unique (fédérative).
Mais même si l’OMC a recommandé l’augmentation graduelle des prix au
celui du marché, l’alignement de tous les prix au celui du marché ne serait-il une
mesure perverse? C’est-à-dire si le Turkménistan et l’Uzbekistan hausseront
aussi le prix de leur gaz — on sait que la compagnie RosUcrEnergo, formée de
Gazprom et la filiale suisse de Reifeissen Bank et intermédiaire dans l’affaire, a
réussi aplaner le conflit seulement en achetant du gaz bien plus bon marché de
ces deux pays et de Kazahstan — ne serait cette mesure un précédent pour tous
les détenteurs de matières premières du monde et en même temps la cause de la
destruction du présent ordre économique mondial? L’accord à peine signé le
2
L’ENERGIE (RUSSE), L’EUROPE ET LES PERSPECTIVES
139
4 janvier 2006 entre la Russie et l’Ukraine durera-t-il les cinq années préconisées?
Et cette mesure n’augmenterait-elle le prix payé par les pays européens pour le
transit du gaz en Ukraine?
2. Le mi-janvier un atroce froid de loup1 a déterminé la baisse dans
l’approvisionnement au gaz des pays européens. De son coté l’Ukraine, qui a
profité en utilisant sa propriété sur les gazolines (sur le transit) pour voler du gaz,
a voulu ameuter l’Europe contre la Russie tout en réclamant l’augmentation du
prix du transit (payé bien sur par tous les bénéficiaires).
3. Même si la Georgie et l’Arménie ne sont pas dans l’Europe, on doit remémorer
aussi la demande de la Russie envers ces deux pays de payer pour le gaz un prix
plus proche au prix du marché.
Avant d’aller plus loin on doit mentionner que l’augmentation des prix de
l’énergie dans tous ces pays entraînera des pressions sociales, des émeutes canalisées,
comme auparavant dans la guerre civile algérienne de 19872 jusqu’à la fin des
années 90, vers des tendances non démocratiques.
4. En juin 2006, le Turkménistan a annoncé Gazprom qu’il va hausser le prix
de transit, et ainsi Gazprom a averti à son tour les pays de la Communauté des
États Indépendants qu’ils auront payé le gaz russe «au prix européen». En ce
contexte, l’éventuelle décision de l’Ukraine de dénoncer l’accord avec Gazprom
générerait une nouvelle crise du gaz3.
Ainsi deux problèmes, intersectés et pas neufs évidemment mais qui ont
montré un nouveau niveau qualitatif, ont frappé les politiciens de l’Europe:
l’approvisionnement avec l’énergie et la relation avec la Russie.
Ce n’est pas du tout pour la première fois dans les dernières décennies que la
logique du système nous secoue. Qu’on ne se rappelle pas seulement le choc du
1973 mais aussi la haussée des intérêts à la fin des années ’70, liée du deuxième
choc pétrolier d’après la révolution islamique iranienne. Mais on sait que la
relation de subjugation des pays faibles mais riches en matières premières par les
pays développés a toujours été, parce qu’elle l’est, structurelle pour le capitalisme:
on doit acheter le plus bon marché possible et on doit vendre au plus haut niveau
possible de point de vue quantitatif et qualitatif.
Pourquoi alors les événements du mois de janvier et spécialement ceux entre
la Russie et l’Ukraine sont si importants?
Est-ce parce que les précédents réalisés pendant les années ’70 ont-ils été oubliés
ces dernières 16 années à cause du triomphe du capital transnational? Parce que la
Russie n’est pas un pays d’Afrique qu’on peut dominer facilement? Parce que
toute la question est toute proche de l’Europe? Ou bien parce que le prix actuel
de l’énergie est plus contraignant sur l’économie qu’il y a plus de trente années?
La réponse affirmative est valable pour toutes ces interrogations. Et encore.
L’état actuel du système capitaliste global est plus vulnérable qu’auparavant.
Même s’il se trouve dans la phase ascendante de la révolution industrielle présente,
du capitalisme présent (transnational) et du cycle long (Kondratieff) présent, quand
la haussée plus ou moins légère mais contrôlée des prix4 a déterminé la généralisation
rapide des innovations techniques et en même temps a pu contrebalancer jusqu’à
présent les conséquences sociales de cette généralisation (c’est à dire l’accroissement
140
ANA BAZAC
3
du chômage, donc la baisse des salaires). Mais la concurrence mondiale s’est
accru et s’accroît chaque jour. Et les pays émergents ne concurrent seulement
avec leurs produits plus bons marchés mais aussi pour l’énergie.
L’augmentation générale des prix qui s’accélère5 certainement après la démarche
russo-ukrainienne menace la consommation et les profits6, pour ne parler ici du
fardeau pesé sur les familles et les gens qui n’appartiennent pas aux grands
détenteurs de capital. Les plus forts survivront et deviendront plus forts qu’avant,
mais qui sont aujourd’hui ces plus forts?
Les grandes sociétés soutenues par des états forts. Comme avant la première
guerre mondiale, la plus acharnée lutte se passe entre les plus forts. Mais aujourd’hui
le paysage de ceux-ci est plus dense: les grandes puissances sont peu à peu
disloquées de leur place traditionnelle, ce sont la Chine7 et l’Inde qui sont les plus
affamés compétiteurs pour l’énergie et les matières premières et en même temps
pour les marchés, les relations entre les pays développés et «le reste» ne sont plus si
confortables comme jadis, «le reste» a des armes et surtout ce sont les valeurs
démocratiques promus par «la vieille Europe» qui montrent — comme d’ailleurs ils
l’ont montré dès le commencement — la direction. Parce qu’il y a une contradiction
essentielle entre ces valeurs et les relations capitalistes comme telles, c’est-à-dire
comme relations mondiales. Et si on veut que la démocratie et les droits de l’homme
règnent partout, donc à l’échelle des relations internationales aussi, on doit faire des
efforts pour dessiner les alternatives au présent management de l’ordre mondial.
Que peut faire l’Europe? Diversifier les sources d’énergie8: l’Afrique de Nord
est à coté, la région Caspique est plus loin, mais tous ces espaces sont incertains
de point de vue politique, ne parlant pas de la compétition pour eux. Réduire le
nombre des partenaires de qui on dépend: par exemple l’Allemagne a démarré
le projet de la pipeline de la Russie par la mer Balte. Développer le stockage,
utiliser l’énergie avec parcimonie9 — et éduquer la population en ce sens —,
accentuer la recherche pour des alternatives. Et on fait tout ça, comme après
1973 et 1979, mais évidemment avec plus de détermination: si les dépenses pour
la recherche, développement et démonstration (RD&D) en énergie ont diminué
depuis les premières années ’80 — aussi parce que le prix du pétrole a
significativement diminué depuis 198510 jusqu’à la fin des ’90 — la conscience
des multiples provocations de notre temps génère plus ou moins rapidement un
autre approche du problème.
Il y a quand même des difficultés. Les rapports de World Energy Council11 (WEC)
ont montré que les frais des gouvernements en matière de RD&D en énergie ont
décliné, aussi parce que les compagnies publiques d’énergie ont été privatisées.
Si la planification stratégique à long terme a décliné aussi, justement à cause du
manque des compagnies publiques d’énergie qui auparavant ont soutenu cette
activité, on ne peut quand même avoir une image cohérente sur la situation
entière parce que les compagnies privées n’offrent pas leurs dates au WEC d’une
manière transparente et permanente.
Concrètement, les dépenses pour la RD&D en énergie augmenteront légèrement
en ce qui concerne la réduction des prix de revient de l’exploration et production
(la croissance de l’efficacité) en fonction des nouvelles ressources qui seront de
plus en plus difficiles à exploiter. De ce point de vue la première concurrence est
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celle pour les ressources exploitables avec les technologies existantes. Les
dépenses augmenteront dans une grande proportion pour le stockage et le transport
de l’énergie. Les grands acteurs/joueurs dans l’énergie seront justement ceux qui
contrôleront le transport: ou bien la propriété des sources sans la propriété des
pipelines, gazolines, câbles et installations ne sera pas assez puissante.
On développera les frais pour les combustibles non conventionnels12 mais la
proportion est et sera beaucoup plus petite qu’on s’imagine: jusqu’à l’horizon
2050, l’utilisation du pétrole, du gaz et du charbon prévaudra sur celle du nucléaire,
du soleil, de la biomasse, du vent et des marées13. Les dépenses pour la réduction
des poudres provenant de l’exploitation et de l’utilisation de pétrole, du gaz et
du charbon ne pourront atteindre que moins que le double de la concentration du
dioxyde de charbon dans l’atmosphère aux niveaux préindustriels seulement
vers 2100: et seulement si l’amélioration de l’efficacité de l’utilisation de l’énergie,
et si le développement des sources non conventionnelles et du nucléaire (on ne
dit pas ici la provenance fission/fusion) seront les principaux objectifs de la
stratégie énergétique14.
C’est une question d’évolution graduelle évidemment mais la disproportion
aigue entre les dépenses pour l’armement15 et celles pour la RD&D en énergie
n’est pas avant tout la conséquence des difficultés techniques.
Parce que les compagnies d’énergie sont privées, même si elles tendent à
diversifier leurs sources de profit et à construire leur position à long terme elles
n’ont pas l’argent nécessaire pour une RD&D d’envergure — en ce sens leur
collaboration avec les grands bancs est limité par le profit tiré toujours à la suite
de l’exploitation profitable hic et nunc, c’est-à-dire aux plus petits frais du
moment — et ne sont pas parties d’une stratégie unique et cohérente à l’échelle
mondiale. Le modèle est ainsi celui de permanent atermoiement, du transfère des
problèmes et des tâches vers l’horizon suivant où ceux-ci seront plus coûteux.
Par exemple, en avril 2006, le président Bush a annoncé, «à cause de
l’augmentation des prix de l’énergie», que les Etats-Unis vont suspendre les
règles écologiques dans les raffineries, stopper les achats du gouvernement pour
ses réserves et donner plus de temps pour que les compagnies payent leurs
emprunts de ces réserves. En quête des profits, il s’agit de la consolidation du
contrôle sur l’offre et les prix dans les mains des monopoles énergétiques:
l’intérêt de développer l’énergie alternative et écologique est plus bas que celui
d’exacerber la crise présente, même avec les dépenses militaires de plus en plus
accrues.
L’optimisme et l’attitude conciliatrice des rapports ont en vue plutôt la
capacité générale d’apprendre forcée par les contraintes de l’environnement.
Mais même si historiques, ces contraintes ne sont pas «naturelles», elles sont les
conséquences de l’exploitation et du traitement privé de la nature et de la société.
La conscience de ces conséquences et la gravité de celles-ci impliquerait
aujourd’hui un changement radical dans la stratégie énergétique, économique et
sociale: parce que le passage rapide vers une stratégie mondiale unitaire et
cohérente, intégrée et sociale est le seul démarche qui préviendrait la détérioration
de l’environnement naturel et sociale et sauverait le long terme de l’humanité.
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Que doit donc faire l’Europe? Elle a évidemment un handicape: les EtatsUnis et le Japon dépensent environ 65% des sommes utilisées par les gouvernements
membres de l’Agence Internationale de l’Énergie16. L’Europe ne peut pas dépasser
cette proportion mais elle peut unir ses efforts avec ceux des pays en cours de
développement, surtout les pays qui offrent l’énergie.
D’ailleurs en 2004 l’Union Européenne et 11 pays du sud-est du continent ont
constitué la Communauté d’Énergie pour unifier les règles concernant l’énergie et
en même temps pour réduire la sur-dépendance en renforçant la coopération et les
investissements17. Mais la coopération avec la Russie, plus ancienne, s’est manifestée
par les investissements croisés des compagnies. Ainsi les compagnies européennes
de transport de gaz (voir les allemandes Wirom18, Wintershall, Wingas Gas, la
britannique Gas transportation, les italiennes Volta et Promgas, la française FRA
Gaz, l’autrichienne Trading company (et OMV, qui appartienne 30% au Gazprom19),
la grecque Prometheus Gas, les polonaises Gas Trading et Europol Gas, la bulgare
Topenergy, la hongroise Panrusgas, la serbe Progress et le turque Turusgaz20) ont
des actionnaires russes comme elles sont aussi des partenaires avec Gazprom, la
plus grande compagnie en matière de gaz21. Les intérêts du capital se nattent en ce
qui concerne le prix et le développement. (De ce point de vue la Russie, et pas
l’Ukraine, est pour l’Europe le partenaire et l’acteur plus important: c’est Gazprom
qui fournit 25% du gaz utilisé en Europe en pressant sur les réserves stratégiques
des compagnies et des états; le froid de loup de la Sibérie et pas d’Ukraine a généré
le haussements du prix du gaz dans les contrats pour février déjà. La dépendance
d’Ukraine peut être minimisée plus facilement22).
Comme tout le monde, l’Union Européenne doit résoudre le problème de
l’énergie23 en faisant face en même temps aux provocations complexes de
l’environnement24, de la concurrence et du développement. L’intégration et la
formation du marché unique en matière d’énergie a été et est le processus le plus
important de point de vue de la concentration et la consolidation du capital mais
aussi de point de vue des standards d’utilisation de l’énergie.
La notion de développement durable (Bruntland, 198725) qui suggère la
nécessité de réviser les relations sociales, contient certainement «l’utilisation plus
intelligente26 des moins des combustibles fossiles et le développement des
alternatives»27. Ainsi la politique énergétique de l’Union consiste dans «la
combinaison de l’économie d’énergie — par une utilisation plus efficace —
environ 1% de la consommation annuelle28 — avec des sources alternatives, surtout
renouvelables et une coopération internationale plus résolue»29. La coopération est
vitale parce que l’Union importe 50% de son pétrole et de son gaz (utilisant 80%
des combustibles fossiles) et cette dépendance pourra augmenter en 2030 à 70%30.
On savait bien que la conversion vers une économie basée sur l’énergie produite
par le vent, la biomasse, le hydro et le soleil — jusqu’à la conversion vers une
économie basée sur le hydrogène — est absolument nécessaire31. Cependant le
développement de cette économie a été avant tout subordonné aux exigences
«du marché»32. Et un moyen de respecter l’accord de Kyoto est l’achat des
«degrés» de pollution avec le dioxyde de carbone des pays qui ont réduit leur
activité industrielle (comme de la Roumanie). L’Union a promu comme objectif
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essentiel la prévention de la hausse de la température moyenne globale de plus
de 2 degrés Celsius. Mais cet objectif ne pourra pas arrêter la fonte de la banquise
de Groenland avec toutes les conséquences: ça veut dire que la concentration
de bioxyde de carbone sera de 450 /1 million, plus haut qu’à nos jours (environ
380 /1 million) et qu’avant la révolution industrielle (275/ million. La question
est ainsi moins liée aux obstacles technologiques qu’aux obstacles politiques: le
rythme d’implémentation des nouvelles technologies, l’allocation des fonds33, la
conscience de la gravité de la situation sont le résultat des intérêts restrictifs du
capital, qui est évidemment «sans frontières».
La chance de l’Europe ne peut pas du tout provenir du soutien politique des
pays qui s’opposent à la Russie du point de vue des Etats-Unis par exemple. Si
l’intégration économique européenne est quand même la chance intermédiaire
de l’Europe, la solution à court terme de l’Europe en matière d’énergie ne
consiste pas dans la position partisane auprès la Georgie — qui a accusé la
Russie d’avoir saboté la gazoline vers Tbilissi34, qui s’est retiré du Conseil des
ministres de la Communauté des États Indépendants sous le motive qu’elle
désire entrer dans l’OTAN et qui a invité les russes de quitter leurs bases militaires
d’Osétie de Sud et d’Abhasie. Les réserves de pétrole et du gaz de la Caspienne
ne peuvent substituer à court terme l’énergie russe: le pipeline Bakou-TbilissiCeyhan et le gazoline Bakou-Tbilissi-Erzurum ne sont pas encore construits et
en tout cas le plus proche pouvoir est celui de la Russie. Le mouvement géorgien
d’acheter 2 millions mètres cubes par jours d’Iran — approximativement la
moitié des besoins de Georgie — n’est pas une «victoire» contre la Russie à
cause du prix du gaz qu’elle n’a pas dévoilée et surtout à cause des relations
russo-iraniennes. D’ailleurs en avril 2006 la Moldavie a cédé au Gazprom le
réseau électrique qui la traverse vers les Balkans et l’Europe centrale. Maintenant
on sait que le prix payé par la Georgie pour le gaz russe est moins haut que celui
payé par la Roumanie: «la Georgie est plus proche de la Russie que la Roumanie»,
mais la condition que l’état roumain ne veut pas vendre sa compagnie Romgaz
est un obstacle pour la tendance de concentration russe35.
La Russie veut profiter au maximum de la situation présente sur le marché du
gaz. Les bonnes relations politiques n’ont pas empêché la Russie de demander à
Arménie de doubler d’avril 2006 le prix payé jusqu’à maintenant de 56$ / 1000
mètres cubes. L’Arménie dépend encore 100% du gaz russe et plus de 70% de
son infrastructure appartient à la Russie. Mais ce n’est pas une question de
«perfidie»: simplement la Russie a vu une opportunité d’acheter une partie du
gazoline futur Iran-Arménie au prix d’un prix «amical» pour l’Arménie et aussi
de payer un loyer «amical» pour la base militaire de Gyumri. Et l’achat a été
réalisé en échange avec le prix fixe du gaz russe jusqu’en 2009.
La démarche de la Russie sera suivie par mêmes démarches d’autres possesseurs
de hydrocarbures. Avec toutes les pressions politiques, des augmentations des
prix de toutes les matières premières auront lieu.
Il y a, évidemment, plusieurs aspects du problème iranien. En tout cas les
événements liés à l’Iran déterminent que le rôle de la Russie augmente36, sur le
plan économique et politique aussi. Comme après la révolution islamique de
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1789, un nouveau choque pétrolier se profile à cause d’une escalade du conflit
iranien37. Les réserves de la Mer du Nord ne dureront pas à l’infini (en
2020–2030 seulement la Norvège ayant des ressources d’énergie), on a besoin
de temps pour construire des pipe-lines alternatifs, il y a plusieurs courtisans
pour les gouvernements amis des pays desquels on a tant besoin.
Le futur immédiat est ainsi très palpitant: espérons qu’on ira désamorcer les
conflits, et ça serait possible justement à cause de la sagesse politique des classes
gouvernantes de tous les pays: elle savent très bien que la guerre peut être le
terrain de leur chute. Mais en même temps, rappelons que la guerre est un moyen
de destruction des forces productives et ainsi elle permet que la domination de
classe gagne encore un peu de temps. Et puis si «les conditions subjectives» ne
sont pas — et elles ne le sont pas — mûres pour le changement politique radical
anti-capitaliste et mondial, une crise provoquée d’une guerre ne ferait que
«montrer» que ce changement serait «simplement utopique».
Ainsi la question énergétique se lie serrement avec celle du pouvoir militaire
et politique. Le comportement de la Russie n’est pas du tout différent de celui
des autres puissances. Et pas parce que la morale serait celle qui règne les
relations internationales, l’Europe doit voir la Russie comme une collaboratrice
de premier rang et tendre à une intégration économique plus profonde. L’Europe
fait déjà tout ça et sa persévérance est tout à fait pragmatique.
Mais les démarches européennes, comme d’ailleurs celles de la Russie (et
comme d’autres pays) ont lieu dans le cadre de la concurrence: chaque pays/
chaque capital voit le terrain/le capital des autres comme le prix pour la puissance
manifestée dans la lutte et ils s’approchent du but de l’intégration par des
relations simples et au fond timides. Tout le monde sait déjà qu’est-ce que c’est
que la géopolitique, mais les liaisons entre l’Union Européenne et la Russie sont
d’une façon quelconque séparées de relations avec la Chine, par exemple. Le
problème est ainsi le sens donné à l’intégration régionale (européenne): celui de
moyen d’affermissement régional ou celui d’étape d’intégration mondiale. Le
sens est évidemment capitaliste et pour cette raison ce problème est lié à un
autre: libéraliser le marché (d’énergie) et en même temps promouvoir la planification
intégrée. Comme on le voit bien, les pays veulent libéraliser l’espace extérieur
et protéger le leur: le principe de réciprocité est ainsi attaqué par la configuration
structurelle des relations entre les pays puissants dans un domaine ou en général
et les pays dépendants, dans un domaine ou en général.
Le Gazprom — qui s’est fait sa propre compagnie média, en incluant Vedomosti,
Izvestia, Komsomolskaïa Pravda et la station NTV — a voulu évidemment
profiter de la situation en investissant dans l’énergie de l’Europe: ces
investissements sont le résultat de la libéralisation mais conduisent au monopole
de Gazprom. Cette pression de la Russie par l’intermède de ses ressources
énergétiques — nommée par certains une nouvelle «guerre froide»38 — est au
fond le réciproque des investissements européens (et mondiaux) dans la Russie.
Tout simplement la Russie veut dépasser son statut de fournisseur des ressources
énergétiques pour l’Europe39 en achetant des réseaux de distribution comme des
centrales électriques européennes.
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En Europe, comme partout d’ailleurs, on a vu et voit encore une «guerre»
entre les «libéraux» et les protectionnistes, dans chaque pays et entre les pays.
À cause de sa dépendance de l’énergie russe (un tiers de son nécessaire) que
du fait que la Russie est son premier partenaire commercial, l’Allemagne40 a
signé, fin d’avril 2006, l’accord de collaboration entre E.ON Ruhrgas (la grande
compagnie européenne de distribution), le producteur de produits chimiques
BASF et Gazprom pour la construction du gazoline Russie Allemagne sous la
mer Baltique et, en même temps, l’accord de recevoir une partie des actives de
la compagnie de distribution Wingas (qui opère en Allemagne, France, Belgique,
Autriche et la République Chèque). Mais en contrepartie, Wingas participera
avec 35% à l’exploitation de gaz Iujno-Ruskoie. En ce qui concerne E.ON, elle
permettra à la Russie accès à son réseau de sous distribution de l’Europe de l’est
en échange avec sa participation à la production de l’énergie. L’Italie aussi se mêle
dans cette affaire de construction du plus grand consortium qui contrôlera la
livraison du gaz en Europe.
Mais la Grande Bretagne s’oppose à l’expansion de Gazprom, endurcissant
ses lois pour arrêter la Russie de prendre Centrica41, la principale compagnie de
distribution britannique. Et l’Agence Internationale pour l’Énergie Atomique (AIEA)
a aussi averti que l’Europe est trop dépendante de l’énergie russe.
Certaines voix de l’Europe Centrale et de l’Est s’alignent à cette position
«indépendantiste». La Russie a averti42 que l’opposition de l’Europe conduira
Gazprom se diriger vers l’Amérique du Nord43 et vers l’Asie.
La France a pressé que l’Union Européenne permette l’accès de Gazprom en
Europe si la Russie permet aussi l’achat de ses réseaux de distribution par les
investisseurs européens, condition refusé par la Russie. (Pour sa position, la
France a été exclue du plan du consortium.)
Au bout du conte c’est la création du marché unique dans ce domaine. En
reste c’est la lutte économique et l’amitié idéologique avec les Etats-Unis qui
circonscrivent les relations économiques de l’Union avec ses voisins de la terra
ferma.
En tout cas, les projets russes de réorientation de ses exports d’énergie
dépendent des revenus obtenus en Europe. Et tout ça est basé sur la tendance
d’amplification des prix de l’énergie.
Ainsi le contrôle des moyens d’énergie et de production par les compagnies
européennes ne va pas si facilement, même si ce contrôle vient de plus en plus
de la part des compagnies européennes intégrées. Ni la diversification de la
dépendance énergétique n’est pas sans périls. La recherche pour un moyen
d’énergie révolutionnaire parait plutôt être la solution.
Mais la recherche n’est pas seulement une question d’invention scientifique:
la direction de la canalisation de l’argent et la volonté politique pour implémenter
la science dans la vie quotidienne constituent des obstacles qu’on ne peut pas
ignorer. Le fait que le rythme de la recherche concernant la fusion nucléaire a été
lié aux fonds insuffisants, dans le contexte de la baisse des fonds pour la
recherche et le développement de l’énergie, n’a pas été le résultat de la pénurie
du capital, à cause de la récession prolongée (c’était la phase descendante du
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cycle long): le surplus du capital inutilisé dans la production a été converti dans
la spéculation financière et dans l’armement et beaucoup moins dans la recherche.
Et même la recherche militaire n’a pas été trop appliquée en ce qui concerne
l’énergie alternative.
Pourquoi donc? Était-ce parce que même avec l’augmentation des prix du
pétrole et du gaz, on pensait qu’on en avait encore assez? Certainement, mais pas
les ressources facilement disponibles alors et encore abondantes ont freiné la
focalisation des fonds pour la recherche et le développement de l’énergie
alternative. Ou bien cette cause s’est tressé avec le motif économique mis en
évidence par et dans la logique du système: jusqu’à ce que le prix existant était/est
plus bas que les sommes nécessaires pour la RD&D de l’énergie alternative, la
plus grande partie des fonds préconisés à l’énergie a été/est canalisé pour
continuer l’exploitation des hydrocarbures. Dans ce cadre on ne peut non plus
négliger le motif politique: guerre froide et de nos jours le prolongement de celuici, l’escalade des armements, la compétition et dans une mesure plus réduite la
collaboration des états en ce qui concerne la recherche révolutionnaire.
C’est pour cette raison que même en 2005 les dessins et les espérances
concernant l’énergie en 203044 ont en vue que 80% de l’offre de l’énergie seront
des combustibles fossiles, même si les besoins s’accroîtront de 50% face à
200545, et que seulement 2% de l’offre de l’énergie viendra des sources
renouvelables autres que le hydro46. La demande de gaz s’accroîtra plus rapidement,
substituant le charbon comme la seconde source d’énergie avant 2015. On
dépensera beaucoup d’argent pour réduire la pollution et utiliser économiquement
l’énergie mais les résultats ne pourront pas arrêter la tendance actuelle de
changement climatique mondial et de désordre écologique. D’autant plus que
plus de la moitié de la demande de l’énergie proviendra des pays en cours de
développement: même si l’intégration régionale sera un clé pour le succès des
démarches47, le financement de l’énergie (et de la recherche) dans les pays extérieurs
à l’OCDE sera une grande provocation.
Ainsi parce que les ressources de combustibles fossiles et d’uranium et les
avancements technologiques pour l’exploitation de ceux-ci sont «géants»48, les
futures décennies ne seront pas les témoins des changements révolutionnaires en
ce qui concerne l’énergie. Mais ça veut dire aussi qu’on ne verra pas des changements
révolutionnaires dans les relations économiques et politiques mondiales.
C’est la logique du capital qui pousse les propriétaires (de l’énergie) et les
dirigeants de l’économie d’exploiter avec les plus bas prix les ressources et
d’investir seulement dans l’espoir d’un futur profit et d’une situation exclusive.
La direction politique suive certainement cette logique. Les conséquences sur la
nature et la société sont absolument secondaires.
Dominer les sources d’énergie existantes et profiter de la propriété de ces
sources: c’est le cours principal de la politique internationale actuelle malgré
les avertissements de la nature, l’essor de la connaissance scientifique et l’état
des sociétés.
De point de vue scientifique ce cours n’est pas du tout implacable. L’exemple
le plus important est ici la recherche sur la fusion nucléaire49. L’histoire de la
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coopération internationale pour la RD&D de la fusion nucléaire a relevé que la
logique de la recherche scientifique réclame la déclassification de l’information
scientifique et que si la guerre froide a pu freiner la circulation libre de
l’information scientifique elle n’a pas pu l’empêcher50. La coopération internationale
a reçu un impulse du fait que la recherche sur la fusion était, et l’est, très chère.
Pour cette raison le JET a pu être la base pour le projet transnational ITER51, de
démonstration de la possibilité technologique et économique de produire énergie
par la fusion. En 1992 s’est formé le group European Safety and Environmental
Assesment for Fusion Power, qui a construit en 1995 la théorie de l’énergie par la
fusion nucléaire comme l’énergie propice au développement durable52. Mais la
fusion a des avantages aussi dans la non-prolifération: si les usines nucléaires par
la fission ont une application duale, de pouvoir produire électricité mais aussi bien
des armes nucléaires53, la production de l’énergie par fusion n’entrain pas des
matériels qui demanderaient les contrôles de l’Agence International d’Énergie
Atomique. Et pourtant les sommes utilisées pour la RD&D en fusion sont beaucoup
plus réduites que celles pour l’armement. (Justement pour cette applicabilité duale
les sommes pour la fusion ont été plus petites que celles pour la fission54 même si
de nos jours la proportion s’est inversée.
La coopération internationale s’inscrit ainsi dans la logique des choses de
l’heure actuelle. On ne peut plus se développer en manière isolée, de plus que la
position pionnière dans la RD&D ne dure pas. Dans le plus coûteux projet
commun après celui de la Station Spatiale Internationale, le Réacteur
International Thermonucléaire Expérimental55, l’Union Européenne participe
avec environ 50% et les États-Unis, le Japon, la Chine, la Russie, la Corée de
Sud — chacun avec moins de 10%. À cause de ses dettes et de ses frais pour
faire la guerre, l’Amérique n’a pas pu obtenir la place que sa position de Superpuissance militaire l’aurait supposée. Et comme on le sait, la France, au nom de
l’Union Européenne a gagné devant le Japon: on construira le Réacteur à
Cadarache, ce qui est très avantageux pour l’emploi et le développement de la
région. En même temps, parce qu’on est au commencement on tend à profiter de
toute position/opportunité on a.56
Le développement de l’énergie propre issue de la fusion n’annulera pas la
dépendance de l’Europe de la Russie, des pays de la mer Caspienne comme des
pays de l’Afrique du Nord: mais il aura accentuer toute espèce de dépendance,
aussi celle de ces pays face à l’Europe. Ainsi ces environ 40 années jusqu’à la
transformation de la fusion dans une méthode banale de fabrication de l’énergie
sont pleines des antagonismes aigus pour la puissance dans le vieux cadre des
forces productives et relations de productions existantes.
Chacun des pays et des structures développés a, et tous ensemble ont, comme
tous les pays d’ailleurs, des problèmes créés par la logique du système: chacun
dépense l’argent pour l’armement et pour la défense, ce qui inclût un système
bureaucratique si élargi et profond qu’on frissonne, dans tous les pays la somme
pour l’armement est plus grosse que celle pour l’aide pour le développement.
Mais on doit voir les sommes utilisées pour la prévention des maladies comme
la tuberculose et les autres maladies de la pauvreté. L’intérêt à court terme —
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celui du profit privé hic et nunc — qui subordonne les états justement à cause
des liens si étroits entre la bureaucratie politique et ce profit privé entre de plus
en plus en collision avec l’intérêt social et celui à long terme en même temps.
Nous vivons dans une époque de transition.
Est-ce que le futur est-il dessiné par les nouvelles technologies qu’on devra
projeter sur la base de la nouvelle énergie issue de la fusion nucléaire?
Certainement, et ainsi une nouvelle «phase d’or» dans le développement de
l’humanité pourra avoir lieu. Pas du chômage, parce que le fait que le prix des
biens sera de plus en plus bon marché permettra déduire la valeur du travail de
la qualité de celui-ci, donc de la vie des travailleurs. L’écologie, la culture,
l’éducation permanente, les relations sociales, l’aide et le développement de
toutes les couches sociales et de toutes les régions du monde, la recherche et
l’industrie basée sur la recherche sont les domaines qui ont une vraie faim de la
force de travail et qui seront les moyens d’élever la qualité de la vie des gens.
D’autre part, toute cette «philosophie» parait aujourd’hui invraisemblable.
Les prix, et surtout ceux de l’énergie, montent, la lutte pour ressources est
sauvage, millions des êtres humains souffrent parce qu’il y a des ressources
vitales, comme l’eau, qui manquent. À cause de la pénurie, de la pauvreté, de la
souffrance, les relations interhumaines s’endurcissent, l’aliénation est plus
profonde que jamais et l’autoritarisme et l’irrationalisme de la direction politique
donnent l’impression d’une chute dans un nouveau Moyen Age. Est-ce que le
futur est-il le maître du présent? Oui, répondent la science et la technique, mais
tout dépend de la responsabilité des gens.
Les perspectives de l’énergie montrent les perspectives sociales et politiques
du monde et de l’Europe. Le critère essentiel pour le développement des nouvelles
forces productives est la différence entre le prix de cette démarche et le profit
obtenu des vieilles forces productives. Et si ce profit peut être obtenu par des
moyens extra économiques — par la guerre et la menace à la guerre, mais aussi
par des pressions économiques et par des actions politiques tout à fait loin d’être
«orthodoxes», démocratiques — on l’obtient.
La focalisation de ces pages sur l’énergie n’exclut pas certainement des
autres facteurs et leur influence de permanente bifurcation de l’histoire. La
conclusion ne mène pas du tout au pessimisme, mais à l’interrogation des sens
de la société présente.
Le «délai» que nous vivons n’est pas un cul de sac de l’histoire. L’analyse
lucide des facteurs, rapports et conditions de cet intervalle de quelques décennies
dessiné par l’énergie permet que la critique sociale gagne aussi du temps.
NOTES
1. Qui a entraîné même minus 65 degrés en Sibérie,
là où sont les champs pétrolifères et plus de
minus 30 degrés à Moscou et à Sankt Petersbourg.
2. Liée certainement de la décision du
gouvernement français de 1986 de payer à
l’Algérie le gaz au tarif mondial et non plus au
tarif des contrats longs.
3. Voir Gândul, le 24 juin 2006.
4. Voir http://www.oecd.orgtopicstatsportal/0,2647,
en_2825_495691_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
12
Conformément aux Indices des Prix de
Consommation (IPC), la mesure générale de
l’inflation sauf alimentation et sauf énergie, dans
les pays de l’OCDE les prix ont augmenté avec
2,7% l’année terminée en décembre 2005
comparativement à l’année terminée en novembre
2005 de 2,6%. Mais (voir OCDE, Principaux
Indicateurs Économiques, février 2006,
18628078.pdf) on doit savoir que si l’inflation au
prix à la consommation de l’alimentation a été
d’environ 1% (la rate des 12 mois), lé prix à la
consommation de l’énergie s’est accrû d’environ
12,2%.
Voir aussi Jean-Philippe Cotis, économiste chef
de l’OCDE, What is the economic outlook for
OECD countries?, septembre 2005 http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/50/27/35310111.pdf. où l’auteur
a souligné que la montée des prix des combustibles
influence les pays en fonction du moment de leur
cycle économique et que l’inflation est dangereuse
pour le capital dans ses deux hypostases.
5. Le développement accéléré, c’est-à-dire la
demande accélérée (mais on ne doit pas oublier
les massifs achats par les fonds d’investissements,
les nouveaux intermédiaires sur le marché), ont
déjà généré le haussement des prix des matières
premières. Qu’on voit seulement le prix de
l’aluminium et du zinc: en 2005 l’aluminium a
haussé avec 14% face à l’augmentation estimé
de 10%, tandis que le zinc — avec 52%, et pas
avec 26% qu’on a prévu. Jusqu’à mi-janvier
2006 le prix du zinc a atteint le record absolu de
2071,5 $/la tonne, tandis que le prix de
l’aluminium s’est placé sur le plus haut niveau
des derniers 17 ans. Le 3 février 2006, l’aluminium
était 2592,50 $ /la tonne, le zinc — 2357,50 $ /la
tonne Voir le rapport sur 2005 du London Metal
Exchange, The World Centre for Non-ferrous
Metal Trading, à http://www.lme.co.uk, les dates
de 3 février et l’article de Sandra Buchanan, Profits
double for second year running dans “Metal
Yearbook 2005’’, voir ibidem.
6. Voir AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DE
L’ENERGIE, The impact of higher oil prices on
the global economy, with a focus on developing
economies, 2004, http://www.iea.org/textbase/
work/2004/cambodia/bj_session1.3jacobs%20presentation.pdf où une simulation de
croissance des prix avec 10$/le baril a montré
que l’influence est globalement négative, sans
même tenir compte des effets secondaires sur la
confidence des consommateurs/du marché et sur
le prix du gaz, d’électricité et des autres
combustibles: le Produit Net Brut (PNB) des
pays diminue avec 0,5% la première année avec
les prix élevés (mais un facteur important est
l’utilisation des revenues supplémentaires par les
exportateurs de combustible), le PNB du monde
aurait été plus grand depuis 2001 si le prix du
pétrole n’aurait pas crû et la situation des pays en
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
149
cours de développement et importateurs du
pétrole se détériore.
Voir Brian Smith, China’s growing trade with
Africa indicative of Sino-Western energy
conflicts, 24 January 2006, http://www.wsws.org
C’était la première réponse après les événements
de janvier-mars 2006, voir aussi Fergus
Michaels, Europe’s energy crisis sharpens
antagonisms with Russia, 6 April 2006,
http://www.wsws.org
Voir qu’on parle du «charbon propre», c”est à
dire des techniques d’utilisation efficace et plus
écologique qu’aujourd’hui du charbon comme
solution contre la dépendance du pétrole. Mais
c’est une question politique ici: l’éparpillement
quasi uniforme des réserves du charbon — sauf
le Moyen Orient — fait que les États-Unis
détiennent 26% des réserves, la Russie et les
membres de la Communauté des États
Indépendants – 23%, la Chine – 12%, l’Australie
– 8%, l’Allemagne – 7%, l’Afrique du Sud – 5%.
En tout cas, conformément au l’Institut Mondial
du Charbon, ces réserves dureront 164 années,
tandis ce que celles du gaz – 67 années et celles
du pétrole – 41. (Gândul, le 29 novembre 2005).
WEC, Energy Technologies for the Twenty-First
Century (2001), http://www.worldenergy.org/
wec-geis/publications/reports/et21/
introduction/introduction.asp
Les conclusion desquels sont plutôt optimistes:
«la taille et la composition des récentes dépenses
pour la RD&D peuvent être considérées comme
plus ou moins appropriées aux futures provocations
et opportunités qu’on anticipe», ibidem.
Voir aussi l’intention de la Corporation Spatiale
russe Energhia de commencer un projet de
construction d’une base permanente sur la Lune
pour livrer jusqu’en 2020 à l’échelle industrielle
l’isotope Hélium-3, qui n’existe pas sur la Terre
mais est abondant sur notre satellite naturel,
conformément au România liberã, le 28 janvier
2006.
Energy Data Centre, Global Energy Scenarios to
2050 and Beyond (2001), http://www.world
energy.org/wec-geis/edc/scenario.asp
Ibidem.
Mais le nucléaire présent, par fission, n’est pas si
«propre» comme on le croit: la gestions des déchets
radioactifs n’est pas encore résolue à plus forte
raison que qu’il s’agit d’une durée de la nocivité
de ces déchets de plusieurs milliers d’années.
Ainsi la solution nucléaire de la présente crise
énergétique s’oppose à la demande du
développement durable: elle est simplement une
solution économique dans la logique de type
Louis XIV du capitalisme.
Voir le budget militaire américain de 440
milliards $ pour l’année fiscale 2007, une
croissance de 7% et qui entraîne des réductions
des programmes sociales comme Medicare et
150
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
ANA BAZAC
Medicaid, plus de la demi des dépenses
militaires mondiales d’environ 1000 de milliards
$. Voir le Quadrennial Defense Review, janvier
2006. Mais aussi pour l’Europe, Burkard Schmitt,
European Union Defence Expenditures, 2005,
http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf (même
si les dépenses militaires de l’Union sont
d’environ 2% du Produit Interne Brut, en 2004,
la France a dépensé 32,4 milliards euro,
l’Allemagne –24,2 milliards euro, Grande
Bretagne –26,8 milliards euro; les six les plus
forts pays ont dépensé 80% du budget européen
pour la défense et 98% des sommes utilisées
pour la recherche militaire; en 2004, les EtatsUnis ont dépensé plus de deux fois plus que
l’Union; mais EDA chief: Defense budget race
with US is irrelevant, http://www.euractiv.com/
Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-134450-168type=News
WEC, ibidem.
Mais cette coopération a supposé par exemple
que l’Union Européenne a exigé que la Roumanie
paye le gaz produit dans le pays avec le même
prix que le gaz importé — sans demander à
l’Autriche de payer sa énergie hydro avec le
même prix que celui obtenu de sources fossiles
— et avant privatiser la production interne de
gaz. Donc les profits iront dans les poches des
compagnies qui vont acheter les ressources
roumaines de gaz. Voir l’observation de
l’économiste Ilie ªerbãnescu, Preþul gazelor: o
murdãrie fãrã margini a UE, dans «Jurnalul
Naþional», le 21 mars 2006.
Qui opère en Roumanie et qui a comme
partenaires Romgaz –50 % et Wieh –50%.
Gândul, le 11 mai 2006.
Le partenariat dans ces compagnies est le
suivant: en Allemagne, Wingas Gas: Gazprom
– 35,9%, Wintershall –65%; Wintershall Erdhas:
Gazprom –50,9%, Wintershall –50%; Zarubezhgas
Erdgashandel: Gazprom –100%; en Grande
Bretagne, Gas transportation: Gazprom –10%,
British Gas –40, Elf –10%, BP –10%, Conoco
–10%, Tuhrgas –5%, Distrigaz –5%; en Italie,
Volta: Gazprom –49%, Edison –51%; Promgas:
Gazprom-50%, SNAM –50%; en France, FRA
Gaz: Gazprom –50%, Gas de France –50%; en
Autriche, Trading comany: Gazprom –50%, OMV
–50%; en Grèce, Prometheus Gas: Gazprom
–50%, Copeluzos Group –50%; en Pologne, Gas
Trading: Gazprom –35%; Europol Gas: Gazprom
–48%; en Bulgarie, Topenergy: Gazprom –100%;
en Hongrie, Panrusgas: Gazprom –50%, MOL
–50%; en Serbie, Progress: Gazprom –50%,
Progres 15%; en Turquie, Turusgaz: Gazprom
–40%.
Mais la quatrième compagnie énergétique, après
l’américaine ExxonMobil, le BP (British
Petroleum), la Royal Dutch Shell, et avant la
française Total, de point de vue de la valeur de
marché.
13
22. Même la Roumanie a contracté directement avec
Gazprom (par l’intermède de Transgaz) pour
éviter le doublage des contrats avec l’Ukraine,
voir Adevãrul, le 20 janvier 2006, p. B1. Mais
voir Livre Vert „Vers une stratégie européenne
de sécurité d’approvisionnement énergétique“,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transpor
t/fr/lpi_lv_fr1.html
23. Voir la Politique Énergétique de la Commission
Européenne: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
energy/index_en.html, EU Energy Grants and
Loans: http://www.eurpa.eu.int/grants/topics/
energy/energy_en.htm, EU Legislation in Force:
Energy Policy: http://www.europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/en/repert/index-12.htm
24. Voir le rapport Avoiding Dangerous Climate
Change, janvier 2006, http://www.defra.gov.uk/
environment/climatechange/internat/dangerouscc.htm
25. Voir le Rapport Bruntland, 1987, http://www.
srds.ndirect.co.uk/sustaina.htm#TheBruntlandre
port
26. Voir le programme “Énergie intelligente pour
l’Europe” (2003–2006) qui a dépensé /est en
cours de dépenser 200 millions euro dans la
recherche pour économiser l’énergie, pour son
utilisation efficace et pour les ressources
renouvelables.
27. Euguides, “Energy Policy in the European Union,
2005”, http://www.eubusiness.com/guides/ energy
28. Par exemple par la «co-génération», c’est-à-dire
par les usines qui produisent en même temps
électricité et chaleur en utilisant le gaz, et pas les
dérivées du pétrole ou le charbon; ou par les
standards de construction et des installations de
chauffage et d’air conditionné qui réduiront la
demande d’énergie d’environ 25% d’ici en 2020
(en calculant le doublage des installations d’air
conditionné); ou par la meilleure utilisation du
transport public et privé: le management du
trafique et la planification urbaine s’ajoutera
ainsi au bio combustibles qui fourniront en 2010
5,75% de la consommation totale de l’énergie et
qui pourront remplacer 20% du pétrole utilisé
comme combustible en 2020. Voir le Sixième
Programme Cadre de l’UE pour la Recherche et
le Développement Technologique.
29. Euguides, ibidem.
30. Ibidem.
31. The European Renewable Energy Centres Agency
a été fondé en 1991 comme un European
Economic Interest Grouping en incorporant 48
groupes de recherche proéminantes de toute
l’Europe; Voir http://www.eurec.be Mais voir
European Environment Agency http://www.eea.
eu.int. Aussi le rapport Energy and environment
in the European Union, préparé par AEA
Technology Environment, partenaire de
European Topic Centre on Air nd Climate
Change, http://www.eea.eu.int/environmental_
14
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
issue-report_2002_31/en Mais aussi la
Commission européene diréction generale de
l’énergie et des transports, http://www.
managenergy.net et le rapport Restructuring of
the European Commission Energy & Transport
DG - Mai 2004, http://www.managenergy.net/
conference/2004.html
Voir le rapport Market-based instruments for
environmental policy in Europe http://reports.
eea.eu.int/technical_report_2005_8 C’est significatif
que le premier rapport basé sur des indicateurs,
Energy and Environment in the European Union,
2002, de European Environment Agency (voir
energy_low_sum_en.pdf) a montré que sans des
mesures additionnelles, le décroissement des
émissions de dioxine de carbone ne continuera
jusqu’à 2010, que la décroissance de la
consommation de l’énergie n’aura pas lieu après
2010, au contraire, que le prix de l’énergie a
baissé à cause aussi de la libéralisation des
marchés, de la décroissance des prix des
combustibles fossiles (!) et des subventions, que
le cible du Protocole de Kyoto de réduire jusqu’à
2010 avec 8% de niveau de 1990 les émissions
de gaz au effet de serre ne serra pas atteint en
2010 mais que la pollution avec dioxine de
soufre, oxyde de nitrogène, des composants
organiques et des particules décroîtra avec les
taxes sur le carbone et en générale avec
l’internalisation des coûts de l’environnement et
la suppression des subventions. Dans ce rapport
la proportion des sources renouvelables
s’ensuivait croître à 12% en 2010.
Voir aussi le problème de système de bourse
CO2, le prix, les quantités, les conséquences,
chez Yann Moulier-Boutang, L’irruption de
l’écologie ou le grand chiasme de l’économie
politique, 2006, http://multitudes.samizdat.net/...
Voir la Pétition Européenne pour la Recherche et
l’Innovation, janvier 2006, qui demande au
Conseil d’Europe et à la présidence autrichienne
d’accepter sans coupes le budget pour
2007–2013 et surtout d’accepter les propositions
initiales de la Commission européenne pour le
Septième Programme Cadre 2007–2013 pour la
Recherche, le Développement Technologique et
la Démonstration (FP7) et pour le Programme de
la Compétitivité et de l’Innovation (PCI,
2007–2013) en http://www.eurec.be/about
EUREC/new.htm Le FP7 a démarré le ‘FP7
Research Priorities for the Renewable Energy
Sector’, le premier mars 2005.
Après cette accusation, le gouvernement géorgien
a coupé le gaz pour l’ambassade russe à Tbilissi,
les russes répondant par la même mesure à
Moscou, et a exclu quelques jours les avions
russes de l’espace aérien georgien.
Voir Gândul, le 13 mai 2006.
Entre 1985 et 1995 le rôle de l’OPEP
(Organisation des Pays Exportateurs de Pétrole)
151
diminua à cause de l’arrivée des nouveaux
producteurs comme la Grande Bretagne, parfois
exportateurs comme la Norvège et à cause du
rôle croissant de l’URSS. L’attitude des pays
arabes envers la Russie, et pas seulement, doit
être liée à cette concurence.
37. Déjà l’Iran, le quatrième producteur mondial de
pétrole, a menacé qu’en cas de conflit armé, il
cessera les exports du pétrole brut (qui sont vers
l’Europe et l’Asie), ainsi qu’il bloquera la gorge
Ormuz parmi laquelle passent les transports de
pétrole des autres pays du Golfe.
À cause de l’augmentation de la demande
mondiale de pétrole — surtout dans les pays
asiatiques, ou seulement dans le premier
trimestre de 2006 la demande de la Chine est
accrût de 25% — le conflit iranien entraîne une
cherté générale des marchandises et la pression
de l’inflation. L’incertitude concernant l’inflation
a déjà généré l’orientation des investisseurs vers
l’or, qui est devenu plus cher, et vers les
spéculations financières. La petite turbulence du
marché international du mois du juin 2006 en est
la conséquence.
38. C’était un euro-parlementaire de la part de la
démocratie chrétienne allemande qui a dit pour la
Die Welt que le comportement de Gazprom est
une guerre froide aux méthodes nouvelles, voir
Peter Schwarz, Gazprom threat increases tensions
in Europe, 26 Aprilie 2006, http://www. wsws.org
39. 90% des exports de pétrole et gaz de la Russie
sont pour l’Europe.
40. À cause des relations entre l’ancien chancellier
Schröder et Gazprom, en Allemagne a eu lieu un
débat sur les liaisons entre les relations
extérieures et les politiciens, voir Stefan
Steinberg, Gerhard Schröder, Gazprom and
German foreign policy, 11 Aprilie 2006, http://
www.wsws.org
En tout cas, Schröder a devenu le conseiller pas
seulement de Gazprom mais aussi du groupe
média Ringier.
41. Gazprom veut contrôler 20% du marché
britannique d’ici en 2015.
42. Voir Financial Times de 20 avril 2006.
43. Très intéressé par le gaz liquéfié que la Russie lui
livrera en 2010, après la construction d’un
gazoline dans l’Extrême Orient.
44. Fatih Birol (International Energy Agency),
World Energy Prospects for 2030, dans „The
World Energy Book”, Autumn 2005, http://www.
worldenergybook.com mais aussi le rapport
2005 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy_
transport/en/lpi_lv_en.htm
45. Pour un tau moyen de croissance économique de
1,6% per annum.
46. Energy Data Centre, ibidem.
47. Voir André Caillé (president de World Energy
Council), Regional Integration: a Key of Success,
ibidem.
152
ANA BAZAC
48. Energy Data Centre, ibidem.
49. Voir http://www.fusion.org.uk/focus/growth.jpg
50. V.D. Shafranov, On the history of the research
into controlled thermonuclear fusion (2000,
2001), http://fire.pppl.gov/rf_shafranov.pdf En
1956, pendant la visite de Khruschev en Grande
Bretagne, le scientifique russe I.V. Kurtchatov,
qui a déjà organisé en 1955 une conférence
unionale sur la fusion, a tenu une conférence
devant les chercheurs britanniques sur la
possibilité de produire des réactions
thermonucléaires; la même année, une
délégation scientifique de Suède a visité l’institut
de Kurtchatov, et comme réponse des chercheurs
soviétiques allèrent en Suède; en 1957, à Venise
s’est tenu une première conférence internationale
avec des rapports concernant la fusion; les
rapports et les articles de l’institut de Kurtchatov
ont été déclassifiés avant la conférence de
Genève L’atome pour la paix, 1958; en 1961 à
Salzburg a eu lieu la première conférence de
l’Agence International d’Énergie Atomique
(AIEA), en 1965 — la deuxième, en 1968 — la
troisième et en 1970 la direction russe de
recherche (tokamak) devint international.
En 1978 le projet britannique Joint European
Torus (JET) a été lancé comme européen et a
devenu opérationnel en 1983. En 1991 le JET a
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
15
produit pour la première fois une quantité
significative d’énergie et en 1997 le JET a établit
le record. Mais déjà en 1985 le projet de
développer le JET a commencé à prendre
contour.
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor.
Voir http://www.iter.org En 2001 le projet d’ITER
a été prêt pour avancer vers sa réalisation. En
2016 la construction finira et vers 2040 l’énergie
produite par la fusion pourra entrer dans la
production de masse.
Voir http://www.fusion.org.uk/susdev/index.htm
Voir R.A. Ricci, Un anno dedicato alla fisica
(2004), http://www2.sif.it/riviste/nsag/nsag2004-01-02/04.pdf
WEC, ibidem.
Voir http://www.itercad.org et http://www-cad.
cea.fr
Vers la fin du janvier, l’agence Russia News a
annoncé que la Corporation Spatiale «Energhia»
réalisera une base et une liaison permanente avec
la Lune (jusqu’à 2015) pour exploiter, au terme
de 2020, l’isotope Hélium-3 utilisable dans la
fusion. La Russie veut ainsi perpétuer sa position
de monopole en matière d’énergie. Mais les
autres pays développeront la recherche pour
d’autres sources.
RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PUTIN:
THE “CIS PROJECT” RENEWED*
STANISLAV SECRIERU**
Introduction
Since 2000, Russia under Putin pursued coherent and pragmatic foreign
policy with clearly defined priorities and well-structured interests. Recognizing
limits of available resources, Kremlin reduced unnecessary and costly presence
around the world and instead of dreaming of recovery of superpower status
preferred rather concentrating on its immediate neighbourhood, generically
called “near abroad”. Perceiving itself as a regional superpower, Russia during the
last five years via economic, political and military instruments strived to stop
degradation of its influence and to rebuild its power position across ex-Soviet
periphery. Because Kremlin considered regional predominance vital for the
maintenance of its great power status in the world, CIS countries became top
priority of Russian multivectoral foreign policy. Unlike Primakov’s aggressive
multipolarity, Putin’s multivectoral foreign course was called to accommodate
Russia’s interest in development of non-conflict relations and close interaction
with the West and some Asian partners with the desire to play a dominant role
in the CIS space. It was presumed in Kremlin that, once successfully
implemented, this strategy would prepare the restoration of Russia’s power
positions beyond “near abroad” in the long-term.
1. CIS Space and the Question of Russia’s Great Power Identity
For the past three centuries, Russian rulers have viewed their country as a
European/Eurasian/global great power, wielding enormous military strength. It
formed coalitions with other powers in Europe and beyond, but these coalitions
were usually short-lived and did not encroach upon Russia’s strategic
independence. With the end of the USSR, the situation has drastically changed
and Russia for the first time in centuries was weaker than the major powers and
alliances in Europe and Asia. The question in the post-Cold War world was, does
Russia intend to stand-alone, align itself with the West, or attempt to cobble
——————
* First published in UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 10 (January 2006), available at: www.ucm.es/info/unisci
** The author is grateful to anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier version of this article.
154
STANISLAV SECRIERU
2
together an anti-American alliance with China and other states in Asia and the
Middle East?1 The search for a certain answer to strategic dilemmas of postSoviet Russia made Moscow’s foreign policy highly unpredictable. As a result
Russia’s international behavior realigned several times during the 90’s, evolving
from integration into multipolar and institutionalized West to counter-balancing
US hegemony, NATO-centrism in Europe and opposing to “savage” economic
globalization.
Many observers considered that post-11 September cooperation between
Russia and the US in removing the Taliban regime from Afghanistan and
apparently Europe-first approach of Putin was a strategic option for Moscow
that intended to close a “black chapter” in relations with the West and to edify a
definitively new “strategic identity”. In line with this stream of thought experts
argued that President Putin’s policies in 2001 indicated that he wanted to
reconstruct Russia’s identity and foreign policy. In particular it has been
mentioned that topics of multipolarity did not appear in president’s speeches
often, nor did the rhetoric of Russia as a great power; instead, Putin increasingly
talked about Russia’s integration into the world and Europe in particular. In
overall evaluation, together with denunciations of isolation, European and global
integration became the leitmotif of Putin’s most important security and foreign
policy statements.2
But, when the dust settled in Afghanistan after US military operation, Russia
external behavior and not only rhetoric reveled in full Kremlin international
course. Despite the obligatory equivocations, the Kremlin has neither forged an
EU entente against America nor widened its “partnership for peace” with
Washington. Instead, it has demanded concessions for the accession of former
Soviet bloc nations into the European Union, sniped at the West for NATO
expansion, conducted a mammoth nuclear exercise, announced the successful
development of a new ICBM to defeat America’s national missile defense, and
vigorously sought to carve out “imperial” spheres of influence in Moldova,
Georgia, and the CIS.3 All these give solid reasons to think that “integrationist”
interpretation of Putin’s international strategy is one-sided and does not grasp
the continuity of Russian strategic thinking. While unveiling Putin’s strong
desire for inclusion in the international community and selective engagement
with the West, this approach fails to capture the aspects of great power thinking
which guided his strategy from the very beginning. In his “manifesto” Putin
mentioned about derjavnosti4 as one of Russian traditional values on which has
to be based Russia’s revival in the 21st century. Therefore, for Putin, Russia can
revive and successfully develop only as a great power recognized and respected
in the world. In this regard Putin warned the possible opponents to this idea in
international community that it is too early to bury Russia as a great power.5
Having this in mind, integration and internationalization began playing a
double role in Putin’s strategy: the public diplomacy tool aimed to prove Russian
“normality” and defuse any suspicion of the international community in regard
to the possibility of facing a resurgent and very aggressive Russia; facilitator of
Russian economic modernization and means to recover the lost positions in
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155
some sectors of the world economy.6 In parallel with already mentioned rhetoric
of integration and particular course of internationalization, Putin pursues
vigorously a strategy of power concentration7 at home and in the “near abroad”
aimed at reestablishing Russia’s greatness, assuring state “real sovereignty”
which was diminished under the chaotic Yeltsin rule8 and in this way increasing
the great power autonomy in relations with the most significant players of the
international community. In short, combination between internationalization and
power concentration tactics has to assure Russia’s successful integration in
world community on its own terms and secure favorable place in the club of
great powers.
Behind integration/internationalization, on the one hand, and power
concentration, on the other hand, there is reluctance to accept that integration
necessarily entails a certain loss of national sovereignty and freedom of action.
This could be explained partially by Russia’s self-perception for five centuries
as a great power, a vision that did not change radically during the last decade of
political and economic transition. In this regard, Moscow desires the name,
cache and material dividends of economic integration, but not at the cost of being
“just another member” of a larger international community, subject to group dictates.9
Confirmation of this line of thinking could be found in the Medium-Term
Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and
the EU which underlines that as a world power situated on two continents,
Russia should retain: its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and
foreign policies; its status and advantages of a Euro-Asian state and the largest
country of the CIS; independence of its position and activities at international
organizations.10 Therefore, the main foreign policy preoccupation of Russia is
the preservation of the statute of a freestanding actor in the international system
and the recognition of the CIS space as sphere of its vital interests.
Adopting this perspective, the post-11 September cooperation with the US
was regarded rather as a tactical move in order to tackle security problems on its
southern flank and gain more leverage across entire CIS space than a long-term
strategy to align with the West. Putin could not prevent US military deployment
in Central Asia, therefore it was easier to adopt cooperative attitude rather than
to oppose it. In this regard, some commentators expressed the opinion that
Putin’s performance after 11 September attacks was praised perhaps beyond
merit, because it was the quickness of response rather than the quality of
cooperative effort that made the difference. Putin, preoccupied with the “great
power status”, instantly saw a chance to increase international ratings by making
a few symbolic gestures and did not spoil this chance by untimely bargaining.11
More than that, by assuming cooperative attitude in case of the US intervention
in Afghanistan, Russia sought to position itself as a great power in the “global
war on terror”, by presumably fighting already international terrorism in the
Northern Caucasus. From Kremlin’s perspective, such a move has to provide
international legitimacy and support for the so-called “anti-terrorist campaign”
in Chechnya and future Russian government’s tough responses to terrorist
threats inside the country as well as out of its borders. In addition, the US operation
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against the Taliban regime and terrorist networks, opened for Russia a window
of opportunity to diminish, if not totally neutralize, the threat of radical Islam
spreading from Afghanistan in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Supporting the
US with information and the Northern Alliance with arms and other equipment,
Russia contributed to the removal of a significant source of threats and in this
way managed to improve the fragile security in its soft underbelly.
In the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 terrorists attacks, the Kremlin
hoped that the United States would recognize Russia as a “regional superpower”
and provide an appropriate level of support so that Moscow could act as
Washington’s proxy in Eurasia. The principal goal was to ensure that no other
Eurasian state can obstruct Russian engagement with the outside world through
its territory and that no foreign troops were based anywhere in Eurasia unless
such a deployment occurs with Russian blessing.12 The so-called “logic of big
exchange” was also tested in relations with the EU. Putin persisted in his efforts
to improve relations with Brussels and important European capitals, promising
as much oil and gas as Europe needs and selectively opening the country for
European investments in profitable sectors. In the same time, Moscow refused
to subdue its great power autonomy, denouncing any attempt of EU to interfere
in its internal affairs (economic policies or Chechen conflict) and positioning
itself as a Europe’s gateway to the former Soviet Union. In this way, the relation
with EU has been seen like an element that will consolidate Russian positions in
the CIS.13
Overcoming an epoch of normative disarray, Russia under Putin adopted a
view of autonomous and self-asserted international actor struggling to rebuild
faded greatness. In these circumstances, the CIS space has enough substance but
also a significant psychological value for Russian ruling elite. The re-birth of the
“CIS project” meant, from normative point of view, the reproduction of Russia’s
centuries old great power identity and the desire to maintain strategic independence
in relations with other power centres. In practical terms, the renewal of the CIS
initiatives implied Russia’s pro-active engagement in defence of highly challenged
status quo in its periphery. While fortifying its positions, Kremlin intended to
keep safe its own backyard from “unauthorized” interference of outside powers
in the CIS space. Having this in mind, Kremlin has concentrated on institutional
building, Russian capital expansion, strengthening political ties with leaders,
preserving military presence.
The very methods used to exercise influence and recover power positions in
the CIS space were in direct connection with the internal political evolutions in
Russia. Consolidating “managed democracy” in Russia, under the label of strong
state, Putin supported “successor scenario” or re-election of favourable to the
Kremlin leaders in ex-Soviet states. Unlike Western counterparts, Moscow was
less critique in regard to violations of electoral legislation when its favourite was
about to prevail over other candidates. Suppressing all-mighty oligarchs of
Yeltsin era and placing trustful people in big state or even private companies,14
Putin backed Russian business major takeovers of strategic sectors in the CIS
space and often used state monopolies to punish disloyal leaders of ex-Soviet
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republics. Rapid “militarisation” of power elites under Putin15 has also influenced
Russian military strategy in the CIS space. While reducing participation in
military operations around the world, Russia increased substantially expenditures
aimed to upgrade military infrastructure in the regions, considered in Kremlin,
of vital interests for Russia. This is indicated by Moscow’s specific actions
aimed at beefing up military bases and installations in Central Asia, Transcaucasus
as well as in Transnistria, the Crimea, and Belarus.16
In the core of the “CIS project” there is an assumption that even if Russia is
poor and underdeveloped according to Western standards, it remains the
metropolitan power of Eurasia; and as the leading power of the region, it is
committed to a strategy that prevents any outside actor from undermining Russian
interests.17 That is why Russia behaved simultaneously as an old colonial power
in retreat and as a young expansionist state, as a guardian of the status quo and
as a dynamic predator, while its policy style betrayed a fusion of superiority and
inferiority.18
The guiding slogan of this strategy represented the famous quotation of tsar
Alexander III displayed on the wall of the General Staff Academy in Moscow
and that influenced the strategic identity of decision-makers: “Russia has only
two friends in the world, its army and its navy”. The remix version of this
quotation adapted to the new international environment envisaged that Russia
has only three friends in the world, its army, its energy monopolies, and proRussian orientated leaders in the CIS space.
Putin’s vector toward the post Soviet-space is widely accepted among the
country elites and has total support not only of Russia’s great power adherents,
but also in liberal-democratic circles.19 As Russian analyst Andrei Piontkovskii
properly observed: “What unites the entire Russian elite is the idea of domination
or creation of an empire in the ex-Soviet space.”20 The best example is represented
by the leader of the Union of Right Forces and godfather of privatization in
Russia Anatoli Chiubais who declared that the Russia’s ideology in the 21st
century should be liberal imperialism, and the main mission of Russia should be
the creation of a liberal empire. This project can be realized in his view through
the expansion of the Russian business across the CIS space. Only as a liberal
empire Russia can remain a great power and become equal to the United States,
China, and the European Union.21
Thus, the problem of creating a new system of international relations in the
former Soviet space became one of the highest priorities for the Russian
leadership. If we look carefully at president Putin’s annual speeches on the state
of the Federation, we will see that the Commonwealth of Independent States
represents the top priority of the Russian foreign policy. Representative from this
point of view is Putin’s speech on April 18, 2002, which contained altogether nine
paragraphs dealing with foreign affairs, and seven of them were dedicated to the
so-called “near abroad.”22 The same attention is awarded to the CIS countries in
official documents of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National
Defense, being recognized as the main priority of Russian foreign and security
policy and attributing to Russia the role of center of gravitation in the region.23
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During the high profile meeting in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President
Putin sincerely explained in the best geopolitical traditions why the CIS space is
of vital interest for Russian Federation and what has to be done in this area. In
his address to Russian diplomats, President Putin urged them not to be distracted
from events and policies in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States. He declared that Russia was not using its influence to the full, including
the historically formed credit of trust, friendship and strong ties linking our
peoples. In conclusion he affirmed that there cannot be any vacuum in international
relations; the absence of an effective Russian policy in the CIS, or even an
unreasonable pause in this area, will inevitably encourage other, more active
states, to fill this political space energetically. To prevent this scenario all
resources should be directed towards the integration processes in inter-regional
organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union, later Eurasian Economic
Community and the Single Economic Space.24 Thus, the fusion of geopolitical
and geo-economic motives pushed Russia to employ institutional, political,
military and last but not least economic instruments to hold the three-century
border between her and the outside world.
2. The “CIS Project” in Action
In order to prevent further political, economic and military fragmentation of
the CIS space, Russia developed a new and multilevel institutional base, using
mainly the CIS summits only for bilateral talks and as a forum for exchange of
opinions between presidents.
In October 2002 Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan signed the founding documents of a Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), which were ratified later in 2003. The strategic concept
of this organization entailed the creation of three regional groups of forces: the
Western group that includes Russia and Belarus, the Caucasian group composed
of Russia and Armenia; and the Central Asian group consisted of Russia,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.25 Besides traditional military threats,
the Charter of the CSTO stresses the commitment of its members to fight
international terrorism and extremism, illegal trade of narcotics, psychotropic
substances or arms, organized trans-national crime, and illegal migration.26
Also, in security matters, Russia partially used the terrorist threat to advance
its own interests in the CIS space and create new institutional networks. Playing
on security fears in Central Asia connected to the spread of Islamic radicalism,
Russia was pushing with papers and plans for multilateral structures. In 2000,
Putin proposed the creation of the CIS Joint Counter-Terrorist Center based in
Moscow, whose activities were supposed to be supervised by the director of
FSB.27 Later, after the establishment of this centre, the first regional division has
been opened in Bishkek covering Central Asian republics, except the neutral
Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan was not randomly chosen, this republic hosting on its
territory the headquarter of the rapid deployment forces of Collective Security
Treaty and later of Collective Security Treaty Organization in Central Asia. Thus,
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adoption during the CIS summits of common positions on international terrorism
in combination with development of the CSTO and the CIS Joint Counter-Terrorist
Center were seen in Kremlin not only as efficient tools for addressing Russia’s
security concerns, but also as means to prevent the centrifugal process among
former-Soviet republics and to forge homogeneous military-security space under
Russian leadership.
In September 2003, Presidents of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazahkstan
signed a treaty on a Single Economic Space (SES) and the Concept of a Single
Economic Space. The agreement on the creation of a Single Economic Space
envisaged the gradual formation of a highly integrated structure that would
promote a common macroeconomic policy; would harmonize the legislation on
trade, competition, and natural monopolies; and would promote the free movement
of labour force, goods, services and capital.28 All these, according to the Russian
side should culminate with the creation of a monetary union based on a common
currency, presumable the rouble.29
In the same year, Russia has promoted the development of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), bringing together Russia, China and the
Central Asian republics as a more preferable alternative for enhancing collective
security in the region than the US sponsored GUUAM30 grouping.31 Taking in
consideration Russian and Chinese concerns over the spread of radical Islam in
the region, Moscow and Beijing launched the initiative, called to develop the
counter-terrorist dimension inside the SCO.
Neither have been forgotten the separatist enclaves like Transnistria, Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh that organized their own mini-CIS summits
with Moscow’s blessing coordinating actions of resistance to constitutional
authorities, military and economic cooperation. In addition, separatist leaders have
had unlimited access to Russian central authorities that materialized in extensive
exchange of opinions with high-rank officials in Moscow and various forms of
material support which made possible the survival of these out-law entities.
The new Russian institutionalism in the CIS space was doubled by particular
sub-regional policies in Central Asia, South Caucasus and Western Newly
Independent States.
2.1 Central Asia
In order to promote and defend Russian regional interests, Putin launched a
more pragmatic, active and efficient course in relations with the Central Asian
republics. Despite the fact that the new policy was constrained by the reduced
amount of resources, Moscow managed to strengthen its positions in the
region.32 According to the new orientation, Russia pursued the following objectives
in the Central Asia: stability in the region based on cooperation with all five
republics; guarantee for Russia’s access to and transit of resources via the
territory of the Asian republics; creation of a single economic space that will
facilitate economic modernization of Russia; preservation of the geo-strategic
position in the region in order to maintain the great power status; recognition of
Russia’s leading role in the region.33
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Implementation of these objectives is based on three relatively separate
intrigues. One centers on the vast hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian area and
the pipelines that carry oil and natural gas to the world markets; the second
revolves around the military responses available in addressing the challenge of
Islamic terrorism; the third involves building and consolidating a network of
personal ties with the capricious Central Asian rulers.34
On the economic front, especially concerning gas and oil reserves, Russian
policy registered significant success. Actually, Moscow has played the oil game
with a remarkable reserve and an uncharacteristic precision. Gazprom was
effectively playing a leading role for Russian foreign policy in the region,
negotiating deals for the long-term supply of gas through its pipeline system.35
A ten-year agreement was signed with Kazakhstan in November 2001, and
with Uzbekistan in January 2002 for the joint extraction and export of fuels. As
set forth in the agreement with Uzbekneftgaz, by 2010 there should be a
doubling of gas piped from Uzbekistan to Russia; such shipments stood at 5
billion cubic meters in 2003. In May 2002, Gazprom and KazMunayGaz created
the KazRosGaz joint venture for the purchase of gas from Kazakhstan and its
sale in the CIS and beyond. The goal was to dissuade Nazarbaev from building
a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Already in 2002 Russia was trading export pipeline
access to Turkmenistan in return for shares in gas development projects. For
example, the United Arab Emirates’ Dragon Oil and Malaysia’s Petronas were
forced to give some of their shares in Turkmen off-shore gas field to Russia’s
Zarubezhneft and Itera in return for export pipelines access. Russia’s oil majors
have also increased their level of activity in the region. Lukoil has invested one
billion dollars in Kazakhstan. The company owns a 15 percent stake in the
Karachaganak gas condensate field, a 50 percent stake in Turgay venture
(Kumkol field), a 5 percent stake in TengizChevrOil (Tengiz oil field), and a 12.5
percent stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.36 In May 2002 Russia has
struck a bilateral deal with Kazakhstan regarding demarcation of the Caspian
seabed.37 In November 2002 after Russia blessed the brutal crackdown on
opposition which followed the failed assassination against President Niyazov,
the Turkmenbashy rewarded Russia with a 25 year deal to buy Turkmen gas at a
mere $44 per 1000 cubic meters half the price Russia gets for its own gas in
Europe. Moreover, only half of the $44 will be paid in cash, the rest in barter.38
Also Russia invested considerable energy into upgrading the competing
Tengiz–Novorossiisk (TN) pipeline, which opened for business in mid-2001.
Without much emotion, Russian officials continue emphasizing that its capacity
could be doubled by 2006, at only a fraction of the cost of constructing the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline through several conflict-ridden regions. As it became
clear that there was not enough oil in the Azeri sector (contested as its borders
will probably remain), Kazakhstan will be the new focus point in energy competition.
And it is exactly at this point that Russia has several political strings to pull.
Putin’s visit to Astana in January 2004, accompanied by Lukoil President Vagit
Alekperov demonstrated his readiness to expand the existing cooperation and
exemplary personal chemistry between him and Nazarbaev. If indeed Kazakh oil
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flows along the politically convenient and economically efficient Russian lines,
Moscow would have every reason to be satisfied with the outcome of energy
resources game.39
Concerning military issues, Moscow launched a diplomatic offensive to regain
positions weakened by the penetration of the US in Central Asia. Putin himself
visited Kyrgyzstan in December 2002, and in April 2003 met President Nursultan
Nazarbaev in Omsk and President Saparmurat Niyazov in Moscow. The main
fruit of these endeavors was Bishkek’s willingness to grant Russia a military
base, under the auspices of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. On 23 October
2003, Putin personally inaugurated the Russian base at Kant that would house
700 servicemen and about 20 aircraft, operating for the Collective Rapid
Response Forces, at an estimated cost of $150 million a year.40 The military base
in Kant already has been equipped with 10 aircrafts SU-27 and SU-24, 2
transport aircrafts and a few helicopters.41 In this way, Russia intends to counterbalance US/NATO base at Manas. Hence, also the intensification of Russian
efforts to advance arms exports to Central Asia, most notably through the sale of
aircrafts to Kazakhstan42 and opening of the biggest military base outside
Russian borders in the suburbs of Dushanbe in late 2004, an action that subscribed
to Moscow’s efforts to strengthen its positions in the region.43
On the political level and personal ties with the leaders of the Central Asian
republics, Kremlin’s strategy performed efficiently. In spite of the US military
presence, within a few short years, Moscow has recovered most of its lost influence
and even managed to acquire new levels of political control. The institutionbuilding activities (CSO and SES) emphasized strengthening bilateral ties, primarily
at the top level. In addition to official state visits, President Putin consistently
used multilateral gatherings for a series of tête-à-tête meetings, granting the
greatest priority to Kazakhstan, but emphasizing also the value of alliances with
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, paying due respect to Uzbekistan and not forgetting
the self-isolating Turkmenistan. During his first term, he held more than a dozen
personal meetings with each of the Central Asian leaders (with the exception of
Turkmenbashi), expressing criticism neither of their increasingly despotic rule
nor of the legitimacy of the referenda on extending their respective terms in
office.44
2.2 The South Caucasus
Under Putin, Russia has not abandoned the South Caucasus and behaved as
a status quo power. The North and South Caucasus were seen by Moscow as
interlinked security regions. In this sense, ensuring Russian security in the north
(in the context of multiplication of attacks organized by radical Islamic paramilitary
troops in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karaceaevo-Cerkessia and North Ossetia)
demanded an active policy further to the south. However, Russian thinking has
shifted away from the tight association between military presence and protection
of Russian interests. This linkage has not been abandoned entirely, as Russia
retains bases in Georgia and a large contingent in Armenia to freeze the military
status quo. The focus of Russian policy has become increasingly geo-economic
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and the interests have been promoted through active economic and diplomatic
measures.45
Russian policy towards South Caucasian republics has concentrated on three
interconnected issues: first, the terrorist threat (misused to get the desired political
outcomes); second, the interests of Russian state and of the oil companies in the
broader geo-economic perspective (expansion of Russian business); finally,
Russia’s ability to project military force for conflict management (maintenance
of military bases and build up in Caspian Sea).46
The strategic alliance with Armenia, especially after the revolution in Georgia,
has deepened in economic and military terms. Armenia continued to play the
role of the host to a several Russian bases and several thousand Russian troops,
who patrol Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran. During the Georgian
political crisis in November 2003, the Russian and Armenian defence ministers
signed agreements deepening military cooperation, Yerevan remaining in Kremlin’s
opinion the only true ally in the South Caucasus.47
On another front, Russia has staged a takeover of a number of Armenia’s
economic arteries, a move that has not encountered serious obstacles due to an
enormous debt to Russia of $98 million. As a part of debt settlement scheme,
Russia was given productive assets in the military-industrial area. Specifically,
the Hrazdan thermal power plant, the Mars electronic plant, and three researchand-production enterprises: for mathematical machines, for the study of materials,
and for automated control systems.48 Thus, Armenia wiped out entirely its external
debt to Russia.
In February 2003 Russia and Armenia reached a decision to transfer the
financial flow of the nuclear station to UES of Russia. On September 17, 2003
the government of Armenia agreed to turn over the nuclear station to the
trusteeship of the Russian energy holding. And, in August 2003 Armenia signed
an agreement with UES to transfer the property complex of Sevan-Razdansky in
order to cancel debts owed for deliveries of nuclear fuel for the Armyanskaya
Nuclear Station. Thus, almost the entire energy complex of the republic has
passed to the control of UES of Russia.49 In other sectors, Russian financial
institutions, often under ethnic Armenian management, were slowly moving into
Armenia’s banking and insurance segment of economy.50
Putin reoriented Russian policy away from a more or less malign neglect of
Azerbaijan.51 Putin sealed better relations with Azerbaijan during a Moscow
visit by President Geidar Aliev in January 2002. Russia signed a visa-free agreement
with Azerbaijan (unlike Georgians, who require visas to visit Russia since March
2001). As a quid pro quo, Baku leased the strategic Gabala early-warning radar
station to Russia for another ten years and participated in the large-scale naval
exercise organized by Russia in the Caspian Sea. In the past, Moscow had
accused Azerbaijan of sheltering some Chechen rebels, but Aliev promptly
condemned the Nord Ost hostage raid in October 2002 and closed the office of
Chechen rebel president Aslan Maskhadov’s representative in Baku.52
In September 2002 Russia has struck a deal with Azerbaijan regarding the
demarcation of the Caspian seabed and lifted off, al least formally, its opposition
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to the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. As a reward, in 2003
Russian capital has been allowed in the transport system of Azerbaijan; the
former deputy minister of roads and communication, Aleksandr Annenkov has
incorporated Anshil in its joint venture.53 After the death of Geidar Aliev, Russia
quickly expressed its total support for Ilham Aliev who was formally elected as
President in October 2003. In February 2004 the newly elected president paid a
visit to Moscow, during which both heads of states agreed to expand bilateral
cooperation in the military sphere. After the scandal around the failed attempt to
privatize the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), by a group
of Western investors,54 President Putin expressed the interests of Russian state
companies in Azerbaijan’s energy sector. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and Russian one-sided position remains a trouble issue in bilateral
relations between Moscow and Baku.55
In comparison with Armenia or even Azerbaijan, Moscow’s relations with
Tbilisi have evolved in the opposite direction. Seriously alarmed by the US
military deployment in Georgia, Russia has deliberately escalated the terrorist
threat in Pankisi Gorge.56 The crisis reached culmination in September 2002
when Moscow issued an ultimatum to Tbilisi and started planning for military
strikes. The Russian president announced his order to the General Staff to prepare
plans for a military operation against an alleged “safe heaven” for Chechen
terrorists in the remote and inaccessible Georgian region. However, in a couple
of weeks, a face-saving compromise was achieved under considerable international
pressure. Careful examination of that mini-crisis confirms that Moscow was not
so much confronting a terrorist challenge as exploiting to put pressure on
Georgia and to influence the outcome of the predictable chaotic postShevardnadze political transition. The Russian leadership was nevertheless taken
by surprise by the sharp escalation of political crisis in Tbilisi in November
2003, and therefore opted for a cautious line, implicitly encouraging Adzharia’s
separatism and expecting the new leadership (too pro-Western in its option) to
fail to establish a modicum of order.57 Rejecting the myth of a popular and velvet
revolution, Moscow called on the Euro-Atlantic community to avoid rushing to
hail the still untested leadership in Tbilisi. Moscow also denounced the notion
that events in Georgia might be a model for other post-Soviet states, such as
Ukraine.58
Even after the removal in spring 2004 of the local authoritarian leader Abashidze
and reintegration of Adzharia in Georgia, Russian strategy on the preservation of
deadlocks in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts did not change. On the
contrary, during the summer of 2004 Kremlin actively opposed to any attempts
of Tbilisi authorities to bring back two separatist regions. In July 2004, Moscow
openly supported South Ossetia in a mini-crisis with Tbilisi government and was
directly implicated in the presidential elections in Abkhazia in November 2004
that transformed into a disaster. In a desperate move to impose its favorite, Kremlin
introduced sanctions against pro-Russian Abkhazia.59 In the end, opposition leader
Serghei Bagapsha became president and Rauli Hadjimba (Kremlin’s favorite)
vice-president of self-proclaimed Abkhazian republic.
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In the economic sphere, Russian business aggressively penetrated Georgia,
mainly in the energy sector. UES of Russia bought the Georgian assets of the
American AES Group. These include a 75 percent interests in the Tbilisi energydistributing firm, Telasi, two electric generating stations in Tbilisi (capacity 600
megawatts), 50 percent of shares of AES-Transenergy, which delivers electricity
to Turkey and has management rights in Khramesi. The latter company owns
two hydroelectric power stations (capacity 223 megawatts). Thus, the Russian
holding obtained 20 percent of Georgian market for electricity production and
35 percent of its power distribution system. Significantly, the Russian monopolist
has control over all private and industrial users in Tbilisi, to whom it may now
dictate the terms. In 2003 Gazprom got the right to participate in the management
of Georgia’s gas pipelines. To carry out this task Gazprom and the International
Gas Corporation of Georgia intend to create a joint enterprise for exploiting and
constructing gas pipelines and for operations in other sphere of the gas industry.60
In the financial sector, Russian Vneshtorgbank became the main shareholder of
the biggest commercial bank in Georgia. As for transport, Aeroflot was preparing
a takeover of the Georgian private airline company “Aerzena”.61
2.3 Western Newly Independent States
Russia followed the same patterns of behavior but much more assertive in
relations with WNIS. The transformation of these states in 2004 into immediate
neighborhood of NATO and EU increased the stakes of the game and requested
pro-active political and economic policies in order to keep strong positions in the
WNIS, obstruct engagement of these states with Euro-Atlantic community and
back the government’s project of a Single Economic Space and initiatives inside
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
In accordance to the new strategy, Putin backed the expansion of Russian
business interests in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus to counter balance those of
European and American companies present in these countries and to assure
takeover over profitable and strategic industries. Having the support of the
governments, representatives of Russian business managed to buy on discount price
highly competitive enterprises. This brought not only a number of major deals,
but achieved something more important — control over the strategic sectors of
the economy and infrastructures of the states.
For instance, Russian investors have shown their interest in an enterprise in
the heavy-industry sector — Moldova Cable factory, which was acquired later
in full form by Saint Petersburg’s SevCable for $1.7 million. Another such
takeover in the Moldovan market involved the republic’s agricultural sector,
main sources of state revenues. In early 2003 the Moscow Inter-republican
Wine-making Factory completed its purchase of the wine-related Calaras
complex for $3.7 million. Moscow Inter-republic belongs to Bank of Moscow,
that is, the new owner of the enterprise is the Moscow city government. Another
sector, which attracted attention to the so-called “Russian investors”, was
evidently electric energy and its infrastructure. In October 2003 UES of Russia
headed by Anatoli Chiubais held talks with the government of Moldova and
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Trans-Dniester separatist authorities on taking part in privatization of the Moldovan
electric utility.62
In Belarus and Ukraine, Russia directed its efforts towards the communication
and energy sectors, and heavy industries. Thus, Russian mobile communication
MTS has consolidated 83.7 percent of the Ukrainian market and needed only to
complete the purchase of TDS’s 16.3 percent share to become 100 percent owner
of Ukrainian Mobile Communication. In accordance to its strategy to become
the main supplier of GSM services across the whole of the post-Soviet landscape,
MTS planed to increase its holdings in the Belarus cell phone firm MTS-Belarus
to a controlling interest.63
More obstacles have been encountered by Moscow in privatization of the
energy sector or heavy industries in Belarus and Ukraine. The first controversial
issue represented the privatization of the natural gas transit system in Ukraine.
Initially, Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and the deputy Prime Minister
responsible for energy, Yulia Tymoshenko, initiated the overdue reform on
Ukraine’s gas sector, preparatory for its privatization with both Western and
Russian partners. The Kremlin responded by colluding with pro-Kuchma oligarchic
circles in Ukraine to outset that reformist government and proposed the creation
of a joint venture with a substantial Russian share in it. Needing Putin’s support
for a “successor scenario” and being joined by the Ukrainian faction of oligarchs
in connection to Kremlin, which seemed to favor the gas consortium agreement
in their own interests, Kuchma struck the deal under which Ukraine’s gas transit
system would be turned over to a joint Russian-Ukrainian venture, on a parity
basis with the possibility of involving international capital. The agreement
signed in October 2002 is valid for 30 years, plus a five-year automatic extension
period, with further negotiable prolongation.64 Later, Russian investors took part
in privatization of Ukratatnafta, company Oriana and Krivorojstali, the last one
sparking a huge scandal because of grave procedural irregularities.65
In Belarus, Russian business has not managed to take control of the energy
system, oil refining and petrochemicals and brewing. Only by the end of 2005
Moscow scored substantial gains in Belarus gas sector. Initially Minsk’s refusal
to cede in front of Moscow’s economic offensive provoked in January 2004 a
political scandal between the two states, members of the Union Russia-Belarus.
President Lukashenko refused to sell shares of Beltransgaz to Gazprom for $600
million, declaring that international auditors evaluated the company’s price to $5
billion.66 As a result Russia suspended its gas exports to Belarus. Kremlin
dispatched urgently to Minsk a state commission to negotiate with Belarus
government and after a few days supplies have been re-established. The deal
concerning the privatization of Beltransgaz remained unresolved until 2005. In
December, after several unsuccessful attempts, Russia in exchange of prices
below market rates, barter and debt relief, gained control over Belarus section of
the Yamal-Europe network which delivers approximately 10 per cent of Russian
gas exports to European consumers.
Economic penetration in WNIS was backed by Russia’s diplomatic offensive.
In this regard, definitive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in Russian terms
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should complete Moldova’s transformation into political and economic satellite.
On 3 July 2002 a draft agreement proposing to turn Moldova into a federation
was made public in Kiev during the five-sided negotiations format between
Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. The draft was initially
submitted by the OSCE, but, as it was revealed later on, Russia was the main
author of the agreement. Originating in the Moscow Memorandum conceived in
1997 by Russia’s minister of foreign affairs Yevgeny Primakov, the initiative
sought to place federalized Moldova, internally and externally, under the
oversight of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. However, this arrangement intended
to ensure multiple Russian representations in Moldova. This was due to some
strong reasons: Russia’s veto power in the OSCE; the absence of Western
countries and especially of Romania as a direct neighbor from the mediating/
guarantor group; Russia’s involvement in the conflict on the side of Russian
language minority.67
Later in 2002, Russia proved its ability to influence the OSCE decisions on
the Moldovan issue. At the ministerial meeting held in Portugal in December
2002, the OSCE extended the deadline for the withdrawal of remaining troops
and ammunitions to the end of 2003, but potentially for a longer period, given
the introduction, on Russia’s insistence, of a special clause. In accordance with
it, the withdrawal will be conducted if necessary conditions are in place.68 Also,
the OSCE new document only acknowledged Russia’s intention to withdraw the
troops, not its obligation any longer.
On November 17, 2003, bypassing the OSCE process and with only ten days
before the Maastricht summit, Russia launched its own plan for the resolution of
the Transnistrian conflict. Dmitri Kozak, a senior figure of President Putin’s
staff, promoted the text of this plan diplomatically. The memorandum proposed
the basic principles of a new constitution for what would become the Federal
Republic of Moldova. Kozak’s memorandum envisaged the creation of a political
entity consisting of a federal territory and two subjects of the Federation — the
Transnistrian Moldovan Republic and Gagauzi Yeri. The federal territory would
consist of the rest of Moldova, excluding these two subjects.
On November 24, Moldovan presidential press service announced that
President Putin would visit Moldova on Tuesday December 25, expecting that
the Kozak memorandum would be signed that day by President Voronin. On
November 25, it was announced that President Putin’s visit had been cancelled.
Under internal and external pressure, President Voronin refused to sign the
Russian sponsored plan, marking the first significant diplomatic defeat of Putin
in WNIS.69 It was an important warning to Kremlin, which was contemplating a
successor scenario for the more strategically important Ukraine.
Russia entered 2004 with a huge handicap in bilateral relations with Ukraine
due to the territorial dispute in Kerchy Strait, which connects Black and Azov
Seas and separates in the same time Crimea from the Russian Taman Peninsula.
Invoking ecological concerns, the authorities of Krasnodarsky Kray launched in
September 2003 the project of building of a dam, meant to restore the damaged
seaboard of Taman Peninsula, omitting to say that such a move can incorporate
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the Tuzla Island into Russian Federation’s territory. The order was given from
Kremlin when somebody explained to president Putin that until 1925 there was
no island, but only the Taman Peninsula. Therefore, in order to restore the
“historical justice” and to accompany the move of building a new base in
Novorossiisk, local authorities began their work. In this way, Russia challenged
the territorial integrity of Ukraine and was seeking to obtain a bilateral exercise
of sovereignty over Kerchy Straight, preventing any foreign intrusion in Azov
Sea. Moscow’s unfriendly behavior inflamed spirits in Kiev and as a result the
Ukrainian authorities responded by dispatching military troops on Tuzla Island
and the most extremist voices in the Ukrainian Rada proposed not to ratify the
Agreement on a Single Economic Space so praised by Russian president.
But, a few months before the elections in Ukraine, Kremlin threw all its might
(financial assistance, TV state channels, PR specialists, pop singers, members of
parliament) in support of the Yanukovich camp, backed also by Kuchma. In
August, the Russian government proposed the bill on tax exemption for oil and
gas exports in countries members of the Single Economic Space, reducing in this
way the price of fuels for Ukraine, Belarus, Kazahkstan and causing to Russian
budget a hole in approximately $1 billion.70 The offensive on the Ukrainian
direction was followed by President Putin’s two high-profile forays in Kiev,
openly campaigning for the pro-Moscow Prime Minister Yanukovich. After the
second round of the presidential elections, Putin hurried to congratulate the
latter from Brazil, where he was in visit, before the official announcement of the
election results. Later on, Kremlin refused to consider the elections as a fraud
and denounced in a Cold War style rhetoric the US and EU aggressive
intervention in Ukraine’s internal affairs.71 Neither the deployment of Boris
Gryzlov, speaker of the Russian State Duma, nor the urgent meeting between
Kuchma, in Moscow airport, and Putin, helped Russia to prevent the most
humiliating defeat in the CIS space since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Failure in Ukraine seriously discredited Kremlin’s foreign policy and in
combination with the Georgian revolution and Moldova’s reorientation, put the
“CIS project” under a big question, especially on its European front. From normative
point of view, events in Kiev, which once was the hard-core of the Russian state,
questioned the very idea of Russia’s great power identity. Therefore, despite its
pragmatic nature, Russian multivectorness unveiled for Kremlin at least two
serious challenges related to the CIS space. Firstly, Russia’s assertive behaviour
toward its neighbors was likely to provoke serious political crisis in relations
with the West, which remains essential for Moscow in addressing security
issues, for instance in the Northern Caucasus or Central Asia and economic
problems linked to modernization or accession to WTO. Secondly, mismatch
between even revisited ambitions, reduced to the ex-Soviet area and the amount
of resources available, in combination with the rise of very attractive and
powerful actors in Eurasia, raised serious doubts over the sustainability of the
“CIS project” in the medium and long term. Implementation of Russian military
and economic projects in the CIS space requires a huge amount of resources and
it is hard to imagine how a country with armed forces in rapid degradation and
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an economy based on natural resources could perform successfully the function
of a regional center of gravity.
To understand what went wrong Putin called immediately for the reevaluation of the entire Russian policy in the CIS space. At the beginning of
2005, Kremlin on many occasions announced the conclusions it reached and
adopted measures that put new accents in the implementation of the “CIS
project”.
3. 2005 and Beyond It: “CIS Project” Reasserted
Implementation of the “CIS project” did not go very smoothly, Moscow
constantly discovered obstacles on its way. Since 2003, the Russian project has
been tested externally by much deeper infiltrations of other dynamic regional
players in the Russian “near abroad” and internally by the process of replacement
of power elites in ex-Soviet republics with direct impact over strategic orientations
of these countries. Russian leadership perceived these as a well-organized plot
of the West aimed to weaken Moscow’s positions in the CIS.
Revealing in this sense are the commentaries made by Nikolai Patrushev,
chief of FSB, who accused “certain political forces” in the Western countries of
behaving in the “worst Cold War traditions” and applying double standards to
Russia. According to Patrushev, a man from Putin inner circle, Russia’s opponents
are seeking to “purposefully and consistently” weaken Russian influence in the
CIS, in particular, and in the international arena in general. The recent events in
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, in his opinion, are a clear proof of this
pernicious trend. In the end, he linked the growing rivalry between Russia and
the West to Russia’s increasing economic might and the unwillingness of most
developed countries to let Russia become a “serious economic competitor”.72
Seen in this light, US under the cover of global war on terrorism and spread
of democratic values, seek to undermine Russia’s positions in the former Soviet
republics, encircle it and in this way deny the strategic independence of Moscow
on the world scene.73 Further more, according to Kremlin perception, the EU
behaviour in WNIS and South Caucasus is nothing else than an experiment for
testing mechanisms and efficiency of its Common Foreign and Security Policy
in new neighbourhood.74 Nevertheless, the US and EU “unfriendly” attitude towards
the ex-Soviet republics and the “orange” elites strategic “blindness” do not discourage
Russia, which have to be patient and prepare for long game in the CIS.75
In this sense, Modest Kolerov, the head of the newly created presidential
department for inter-regional and cultural ties with the foreign states, observed
that following the EU’s deep crisis, it became clear that, for the countries in the
western part of the CIS and in the South Caucasus, the chances of joining the
rich bloc even in the long-term are nil. Thus, the gradual crumbling of the
“orange mythology” on the one hand, and Russia’s remaining economic and political
leverage on the other, a window of opportunity will open up for Moscow to
strengthen its positions in the post-Soviet lands.76 This opinion has been echoed
in academic circles, which in their turn appreciated EU’s activities in the CIS for
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the most part as having a “virtual” character and due to systemic crisis expect to
devote less attention from EU to its external surroundings.77
As far as concerns the US involvement in the CIS, Kremlin assumes that
Washington will follow EU’s fate. Due to the US military, political and economic
over-commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington is on the edge of overstretch.
Thus, because the US efforts are totally absorbed by the Greater Middle East, the
former Soviet space could not represent in the long run a top priority for the White
House. Moreover, US feel the necessity to have Russia on its side in anti-terrorist and
non-proliferation initiatives that is why Moscow for the foreseeable future will be a
valuable partner for Washington on various international security issues.
Once these conclusions have been drawn, Kremlin decided at the beginning
of 2005 to pursue the same policy line in the CIS, but this time more vigorously,
punishing for betrayal the “rebel” leaders and rewarding those who are ready to
protect and respect unconditionally the Russian interests. Overcoming the defeat
in Ukraine, Putin created a presidential department, which under the cover of
inter-regional and cultural ties with foreign states, took over the relations with
the CIS countries. Anticipating the further reorientation of Chisinau authorities
towards the West, Russia tried to sabotage the parliamentary elections in Moldova
and promote in power leaders with strong connections in the Russian business
circles. Punishing for political reorientation, Moscow artificially staged the
energy crisis in Ukraine suspending for a few days its exports of oil to this country
and banned the import of agricultural products from Moldova.
Immediately after the popular uprising in Andijan, when Uzbek authorities
have been under pressure for gross human right violations, Moscow rapidly
thrown its support behind Islam Karimov. This move paid off valuable dividends
in the months that followed, Uzbekistan demanding evacuation of US military
base from its territory, concluding extremely favourable economic deals for
Moscow and, in the end sealing a military alliance with Russia, under the terms
of which aggression against one country will be treated as attack on both parties
with all further consequences.78 In order to use the full window of opportunity,
Russia tries to bring Uzbekistan in the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic
Community by 2006.
On the economic front, Moscow successfully completed agreements with
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan until 2010–2015, which give it
virtual control over the export of their products through Russian pipelines.
Specifically, these agreements represent the virtual completion of Russia’s
successful efforts to organize a gas cartel of producers wherein it would dominate
the export of CIS natural gas and obtain a stranglehold over the economies of the
gas-producing and consuming states in the CIS. This implies that Moscow no
longer will have a competitor who can challenge its price setting capabilities
with regard to natural gas form within the CIS. This cartel also will have
significant repercussions for other major consumers like Europe, China and
potentially India.79
On the institutional level, Russia reenergized its efforts in the implementation
of the provisions of the treaty on the Single Economic Space using the last CIS
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summit in Kazan for a new round of talks and signing documents that allow
upgrading economic relations. The initiative to create a bank inside the Eurasian
Economic Community by 2006 that will finance substantial investments projects,
made some experts to discuss the possibility of using the Russian ruble as a
common currency between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
In the security and military domain, Russia favoured the rapprochement with
China under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, refusing in
the same time the status of observer in the organization to the US. Being
involved in a tug-of-war over military bases in Central Asia, Russia pushed inside
the SCO for member states a common stance against the US military presence
and organized a high-scale anti-terrorist exercise with China, which looked more
as Cold War conventional deterrence in the US address. Also, Kremlin pressed
for an inter-institutional cooperation between CSTO and NATO, instead of an
individual approach promoted by the Alliance in relations with the former Soviet
republics. During last meeting of CSTO foreign ministers in Moscow, has been
signed agreement on establishing joint peacekeeping forces, a body Russia hopes
to develop into mobile forces similar to those of NATO. To encourage partners
Kremlin promised gas and arms on discount prices and offered its assistance in
training of such forces.
Nor have been forgotten the pro-Russian separatist enclaves in the CIS space,
which under the close supervision of Modest Kolerov organized a record number
of summits in 2005. As a response to Georgian and Moldovan efforts to press for
the solution of conflicts on their territory and the withdrawal of Russian troops,
Kremlin used these summits to neutralize any diplomatic initiative that goes
against Russian interests and to coordinate activities that will keep intact
negotiations mechanism dominated by Moscow.
Finally in a tactical move aimed apparently to soothe relations with West,
Kremlin announced intention to set up “civilized” rules for managing ongoing
geopolitical competition in Eurasia between Russia, the United States and the
European Union. By inviting to so-called “civilized” rule of the game over the
heads of the political leaders, institutions and populations of the countries in the
former Soviet space, Moscow intended to discredit and diminish respect for
Western power and influence and in the same time to obtain recognition of
Russian sphere of influence in CIS space. Further more, some experts are
inclined to think that Russian strategy may be to try and constrict the US and
Western interests by shifting Eurasian initiatives through a US-Russian dialogue,
which would flow through the Kremlin.80
Conclusion
Political developments in 2005 proved that despite significant setbacks
provoked by the colour revolutions and the infiltration of many attractive players
in the CIS, Kremlin decided to keep the course and to defend firmly the highly
contested status quo in former Soviet space. Preserving the deeply rooted in
Russian strategic thinking mentality of a fortress under a constant siege, Kremlin
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still rates the “near abroad” as the main foreign policy priority. From this point
of view, hegemony in the CIS space has to prevent the construction of a hostile
“cordone sanitare” around Russia and consequently its isolation. Because for
Russia the “near abroad” is, also, about the reproduction of great power identity, the
maintenance of such a cherished strategic independence and survival in the
super league of world powers, the “CIS project” will remain in the core of the
Russian foreign policy preoccupations for the foreseeable future and will continue
to drain the biggest part of Russia’s resources. However, having enough residual
power to influence the evolutions in the former Soviet republics in the short
term, Russia, due to lack of financial resources and coordination capacity, would
not be able in the medium and long term to develop successfully the economic
or security projects in its immediate periphery. Despite Russia’s determination
to play a dominant role in the “near abroad”, the CIS countries will look more
persistently outward, opening, in this way, the region to a greater influence of
highly dynamic international actors. Consequently, further political, military and
economic diversification of the CIS space will precipitate the decline of
Kremlin’s influence across the former Soviet republics, a fact that will challenge
decisively Russia’s great power identity and its place on the world scene.
NOTES
1. Trenin, Dmitri: ”The Russian Angle”, in Goodby,
James; Buwalda, Petrus and Trenin, Dmitri (eds.)
(2002): A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward a
Euroatlantic Security Community, United States
Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., pp. 35–36.
2. See Zevelev, Igor: “Russian and American
National Identity, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral
Relations”, International Politics, Vol. 39, No. 4
(December 2002), pp. 447–465.
3. Rosefielde, Steven (2005): “The Miasma of
Global Engagement”, in Russia in the 21st Century.
The Prodigal Superpower. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, pp. 112–116.
4. Derjavnosti (great-powerness) means that Russia
was and despite temporary difficulties will remain
a great power.
5. For more on Putin’s vision of Russia in the 21st
century see “Putin, Vladimir: “Rossya na Rubeje
Tysyaceletii” [Russia on the Threshold of
Millenniums], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 December
1999.
6. This is a strategy very similar to the one promoted
by minister of foreign affairs in tsarist Russia
Aleksandr Gorchakov. For more on similarities in
Gorchakov and Putin foreign policy approaches
see Splidsboel-Hansen, Flemming: “Past and
Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian
Foreign Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54,
No. 3 (May 2002), pp. 389–390. In a report
addressed to Aleksandr II, Gorchakov presented
the main priorities of Russian foreign policy
between 1856–1867, among these: to overcome
isolation, create favorable conditions for internal
reforms, to minimize risks for Russia to be
involved in high scale war operations. For more
on Gorchakov’s foreign policy activity see
Lopatnikov, Viktor (2004): Piedestal. Vremya i
Slujenie Kantslera Gorciakova [Podium. Time
and Service of Chancellor Gorchakov]. Moskva,
Molodaya Gvardiya.
7. For more on combination of internationalization
and power concentration elements in Putin’s
international strategy see Tsygankov, Andrei P.:
“Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal
Great Power”, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2
(April/June 2005), pp. 132–158.
8. “Real sovereignty” means that the state is free to
independently determine its domestic, foreign
and defense policies, enter into unions and leave
them, form strategic partnerships or stay away
from them, etc. For more detailed explanations
of the concept and level of Russia’s real
sovereignty see Kokoshin, Andrei: “What is Russia:
A Superpower, a Great Power or a Regional
Power?”, International Affairs: A Russian
Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy &
International Relations, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2002),
pp. 103–104.
9. Lo, Bobo (2003): “The Economic Agenda”, in
Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian
172
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
STANISLAV SECRIERU
Foreign Policy. London, Blackwell Publishing,
pp. 51–71.
Medium-term Strategy for Development of
Relations between the Russian Federation and
the European Union (2000–2010), in http://
www.europa.eu.int/com/external_relations/russi
a/russian_medium_term_strategy/index.htm.
Opinion expressed by Baev, Pavel: “Putin
Reconstitutes Russia’s Great Power Status”,
Ponars Policy Memo, No. 318 (November 2003),
pp. 2–3.
Gvosdev, Nikolas K.: “The Sources of Russian
Conduct”, National Interest, No. 75 (Spring 2004),
pp. 33–35.
Lynch, Dov: “Russia’s Strategic Partnership with
Europe”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, No.
2 (Spring 2004), pp. 99–118.
Among people from Putin close circles who are
in charge of important Russian companies
Alekesei Miller head of Gazprom, Sergei
Bogdanchikov president of Rosneft, Viktor
Ivanov curator of Aeroflot and the Almaz-Antei
air defense systems holding company, Nikolai
Tokarev head of Zarubezhneft, Sergei Chemezov
head of Rosoboroneksport (which acquired
AvtoVAZ), Andrei Belianinov head of the
Federal Arms Procurement Service, Vladimir
Smirnov head of Teknsnabeksport (controls over
a third of the world’s uranium product market).
“Militarisation” of power elites implies huge
influx of ex-militaries or security service officers
in federal or regional power structures. For an
extensive sociological analysis on “militarisation”
of power elites in Russia and consequences of
this process see Kryshtanovskaya, Olga (2005):
Anatomiya Rossiiskoi Elity [Anatomy of Russian
Elite]. Moskva, Zaharov.
Muhin, Vladimir: “Sila kak Instrument
Vneshnepoliticheskogo Vliyanya” [Force as
Instrument of Foreign Political Influence],
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 October 2005.
See Gvosdev, op. cit., p. 34.
Characterization given by Pavel Baev to the
Russian behavior in the North and South Caucasus
fits perfectly the general approach across the CIS
space. Baev, Pavel: “Russia’s Policies in the North
and South Caucasus” in Lynch, Dov (eds.) (2003):
The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU,
Chaillot Papers, No. 65 Paris, EU Institute for
Security Studies, pp. 41–51.
Shevtsova, Lilia (2005): “From Oligarchic
Authoritarianism to Bureaucratic Authoritarianism”
in Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C., Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, pp. 335–336.
Piontkovskii, Andrei: “Imperskii Kompleks”
[Imperial Complex], Fond Liberalinaya Missiya,
30 January 2004.
For more on liberal empire project see Chiubais,
Anatoli: “Missya Rossii v XXI Veke” [Russia’s
Mission in 21st century], Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
1 October 2003.
20
22. Poslanie Prezidenta Rossii Federalinom
Sobraniu [Russian President Address to Federal
Assembly], 18 April 2002, in http://www.
kremlin.ru/appears/2002/04/18/0000_type63372
_28876.shtml.
23. See Kontseptsiya Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [Foreign Policy Concept of Russian
Federation], 28 June, 2000, in http://www.ln.
mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd/; Actualinye Zadaci
Razvitiya Vorujonyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation], October 2003,
in http://www.mil.ru/articles/article5324.shtml.
24. Vstrecya Presidenta Putina s Poslami Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [President Putin Meeting with
Ambassadors of Russian Federation], “Interfax”,
12 July 2004, in http://www.interfax.com/com?
item=Rus&pg=0&id=5739470&req.
25. Muhin, Vladimir: “Bez Stimula Net Integratsii”
[Integration Is Impossible Without Incentives],
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 December 2003.
26. For full text of the CSTO charter see Saat, J.H.:
“The Collective Security Treaty Organization”,
Central Asian Series, 05/09 (February 2005),
pp. 12–19.
27. Baev, Pavel: “Counter-terrorism as a Building
Block for Putin’s Regime” in Hedenskog, Jakob;
Nygren, Bertil; Oldberg, Ingmar and Pursiainen,
Christer (eds.) (2005): Russia As a Great Power:
Dimension of Security Under Putin, London,
Routledge, p. 328.
28. Soglashenie
o
Formirovanii
Edinogo
Economiceskogo Prostranstva [Agreement on
Creation of Single Economic Space], in
http://www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/2003/09/19/174
4_type72066_52478.shtml?type=72066.
29. Declaration of Prime Minister Mihail Kasyanov,
in www.context-ua.com/articles/macroeconomy/
21126.html.
30. In the period between spring 1999 and spring
2002, Uzbekistan was a full member of the
group. While Uzbekistan was a member, the
group operated under the acronym “GUUAM”.
31. See Gvosdev, op. cit., p. 35.
32. Allison, Roy: “Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s
Central Asia Policy”, International Affairs, Vol.
80, No. 2 (March 2004), pp. 277–293.
33. Trofimov, Dmitri: “Russia and the United States
in Central Asia: Problems, Prospects and
Interests”, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol.
19, No. 1 (2003), p. 76.
34. Baev, Pavel: “Assessing Russia’s Cards: Three
Petty Games in Central Asia”, Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2
(July 2004), pp. 269–270.
35. Ibid., pp. 275–276.
36. Rutland, Peter: “Russia’s Response to US
Regional Influence”, NBR Analysis, Vol. 14, No.
4 (November 2003), pp. 48–50.
37. Kovalev, Gheorghii: “Rossisko-Kazahskaya
Delimitatsya” [Russo-Kazakh Delimitation],
21
Politcom.ru, 13 January 2004, in http://www.
politcom.ru/4_kazah.htm.
38. Baikova, Elena: “Gazovie Igriy Turkmenbashi”
[Turkmenbashi Gas Games], Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 22 December 2003; Rutland, op. cit.,
p. 49.
39. Baev, Assessing, op. cit., p. 278
40. Rutland, op. cit., p. 47.
41. Stanovaya, Tatyana: “Vladimir Putin v Kirgizii”
[Vladimir Putin in Kyrgyzstan], Politcom.ru, 27
October 2003, in http://www.politcom.ru/5_
base.htm.
42. Baev, Assessing, op. cit., p. 275.
43. Burmistrov, Vladimir: “I Snova Azia Stanovitsya
Nevestoi” [Asia Again Becomes Wife], Stolicinaya
Jizni, 21 October 2004.
44. Baev, Assessing, op. cit., p. 279.
45. Lynch, Dov: “A Regional Insecurity Dynamics”,
in Lynch, Dov (eds.) (2003): The South Caucasus:
A Challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers, No. 65
Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, pp. 17–18.
46. Baev, Russia’s Policies, op. cit., pp. 41–42.
47. Iskyan, Kim: “Armenia in Russia’s Embrace”,
Moscow Times, 24 March 2004.
48. Socor, Vladimir: “Armenia Drifting From Military
to Economic Dependence on Russia”, The
Monitor — A Daily Briefing on the Former Soviet
States, 4 January 2002.
49. Pinchuk, Denis: “Buy, Russia, Buy”, Agency of
Conflict Situations, 22 September 2003, in
http://www.rosbaltnews.com/2003/09/22/64145.
html.
50. Iskyan, op. cit.
51. Lynch, A Regional Insecurity, op. cit., p. 17.
52. Rutland, op. cit., p. 46.
53. Pinchuk, op. cit.
54. Starting in 1997, Viktor Kozeny, a Czech
businessmen, “acting on his own behalf and as
an agent” of Bourke, Pinkerton and others,
reportedly made a series of bribes to four senior
officials of the Azeri government, SOCAR and
the Azeri State Property Fund. The bribes were
apparently intended to ensure that the president
of Azerbaijan would issue a special decree to
allow privatization of SOCAR and to permit the
investment consortium run by Kozeny to acquire
a controlling stake in SOCAR. However, in
1999, the Azeri government announced that
SOCAR’s privatization plans were cancelled and
the company would stay under government
control. Viktor Kozney has been charged by a
New York district court with grand larceny for
allegedly defrauding clients of the US hedge
fund company Omega Advisors Inc. of $182
million and in the same year his lawyer Hans
Bodmer has been indicted over an alleged
conspiracy to bribe Azerbaijani government
officials in violation of the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. For more on privatization in
Azerbaijan and SOCAR scandal see Gulieva,
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
173
Gulnaz: “Azerbaijan Prolongs Privatization”,
Caspian Bussines Week, 21 July 2004.
Aliev, Yalcin: “Na Konu Karabah” [Karabakh Is
at Stake], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 February
2004.
For a more developed analysis of crisis concerning
Pankisi Gorge see German, Tracey C.: “The
Pankisi: Georgia’s Achilles Heel in Its Relations
with Russia?”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 23,
No. 1 (March 2004), pp. 27–39.
Baev, Russia’s Policies, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
Lynch, Dov: “Misperceptions and Divergences”,
in Lynch, Dov (eds.) (2005), What Russia Sees,
Chaillot Papers, No. 74, Paris, EU Institute for
security Studies, pp. 7–22.
Bagiro, Dmitri: “Rossya Pugaet a Bagapshu ne
Strashno” [Russia Threatens, But Bagapsha Is
Not Affraid], Politcom.ru, 2 December 2004, in
http://www.politcom.ru/7_russia_abhaz.htm.
Pinchuk, op. cit.
Novikov, Vladimir: “Kak Rossiyani Reformiruiut
Economiku Gruzii” [How Does Russia Reforms
Georgian Economy], Kommersant, 15 February
2005.
Pinchuk, op. cit.
Ibid.
Socor, Vladimir: “Putin, Gazprom Seek Control
of Ukraine’s Gas Pipelines to Europe”, IASPS
Policy Briefings, 27 October 2002.
Krivorojstali among the biggest steel factories in
Europe has been sold in dubious circumstances
for USD 800 million to a group of businessmen
closely linked to president Kuchma’s clan and
Moscow financial circles. Not surprisingly newly
elected president Victor Yushchenko supported
re-nationalization of factory and repetition of
privatization in much transparent conditions. In
late October 2005 during televised auction,
Krivorojstali has been sold for USD 4,8 billion
to Mittal Steel Company.
Lukashenko on Privatization of Beltransgaz,
“RosBiznesKonsalting analysis”, 16 February
2004, in http://top.rbc.ru/index.shtml/news/
daythemes/2004/02/16_bod.shtml.
Socor, Vladimir: “Federalization Experiment in
Moldova”, Russia and Eurasia Review, July 16
2002.
OSCE Mission to Moldova, “News Digest”, 23
December 23 2002.
Tuchikov, Vladimir: “Diplomaticeskoe Srajenie
za Pridnestrovie” [Diplomatic Battle for
Transnistria], Politcom.ru, 3 December 2003, in
http://www.politcom.ru/5_russia_moldova.htm.
Varduli, Nikolai: “Rossya Priblizitsya k Ukraine
na 34 Miliarda” [Russia Will Be Closer to
Ukraine on 34 Billions], Kommersant, 8 August
2004.
Deputy speaker of the Russian lower house
(State Duma), Valentin Kuptsov said that
interference in Ukraine’s affairs in connection
174
72.
73.
74.
75.
STANISLAV SECRIERU
with the presidential election is inadmissible,
and the entire world should recognize its results.
Deputy Speaker of Duma Commentaries on
Elections in Ukraine, “Itar Tass “, 24 November
2004, in: http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.
html?NewsID=1768383&PageNum=0.
Quoted in Torbakov, Igor: “Russian Pundits
Divided on How to React to the Death Throws of
Post-Soviet World”, The Eurasia Daily Monitor,
20 May 2005.
Shirokov, Aleksandr: “Rossiyu Okrujayut s
Zapada i Yuga” [Russia Is Encircled from West
and South], RBC Daily, 13 May 2005.
Opinion echoed in academic circles. See, for
instance Karaganov, Sergei: “Rossya i Evropa:
Trudnoe Sblijenie” [Russia and Europe: Difficult
Rapprochement], Rossiskaya Gazeta, 1 April
2005; Bordachev, Timofei; Moshes, Arkadii:
“Rossya: Konets Evropeizatsii” [Russia: The
End of Europenization], Rossya v Globalinoi
Politike, No. 2 (Aprili/June 2003), pp. 49–63.
In this regard, some Russian experts mentioned
that most pragmatic political cycles in Russia are
preparing for “long game” in CIS countries. See
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
22
for instance Trenin, Dmitri: “Rossya i Konets
Evrazii” [Russia and the End of Eurasia], Pro et
Contra, Vol. 9, No.1 (July–August 2005),
pp. 6–17.
Quoted in Torbakov, Igor: “Russian Foreign
Policy Experts Mull Strategy Toward PostSoviet Lands”, The Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8
July 2005.
See for example Bordachev, Timofei: “UE
Crisis: What Opportunities for Russia?”, Russie.
Cei. Visions, No. 7 (October 2005), pp. 8–11.
For more on conditions of the treaty see Dogovor
o Soiuznicheskih Otnoshenyah Mejdu Rossiiskoi
Federatsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan, 14
November 2005, in http://www.kremlin.ru/
interdocs/2005/11/14/1934_type72066_97086.s
html?type=72066.
For more detailed analysis see Blank, Stephen:
“Russia Realizes Its Cartel”, Central Asia —
Caucasus Analyst, 30 November 2005.
In this sense see Simakovsky, Mark: “Kremlin
Calls for “Civilized” Rules of the Game in
Eurasia”, Central Asia — Caucasus Analyst, 21
September 2005.
I S P R I ’s A C A D E M I C L I F E
REPORT OF THE RAAS-FULBRIGHT CONFERENCE:
“NEW/OLD WORLDS: SPACES IN TRANSITION”,
THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN STUDIES
Romania, the European Space and America all were subjects of involved and insightful
discussions at the Romanian Association of American Studies (RAAS) – Fulbright Bi-Annual
Conference held at the Center for American Studies at the Faculty of Foreign Languages and
Literatures, the University of Bucharest, 2–3 February, 2006. Opening remarks by Prof. Dr. Rodica
Mihãila, RAAS President; US Ambassador to Romania, H.E. Nicholas Taubman; Secretary of
State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Valentin Naumescu; Director of the Romanian Diplomatic
Institute and Dean of Faculty of History (University of Bucharest), Prof. Dr. Vlad Nistor; Secretary
of State, Ministry of Education and Research, Prof. Dr. Dumitru Miron; Manager, Saatchi &
Saatchi, Radu Florescu, and Executive Director of the U.S. – Romanian Fulbright Commission,
Prof. Dr. Barbara Nelson outlined the vital role of the meeting in articulating and prospecting the
growing integration of Romania with the forces of humane globalization and internationalization.
Participants (which included American Fulbright grantees to Romania for the academic year
2005–2006) hailed from all parts of Romania (from both public and private universities), from
Hungary, from Israel, and from the USA.
Keynote speaker Prof. Dr. John Carlos Rowe of the University of Southern California began
the academic sections of the meting with a detailed critique “Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran:
[A Memoir in Books] in Idaho.” Dr. Rowe provided an extensive background on the author, Azar
Nafisi, and questioned whether the writer’s professed “aesthetic radicalism” provided intellectual
cover for her committed neo-conservative “Pax Americana” foreign policy stance. Following this
challenging opening, a comprehensive roundtable on “re-mapping” the theory of American
Studies by Rodica Mihaila (“Post-Cold War Spaces of Transition in the Reconceptualization of
America”); Marius Jucan (“Questioning Today’s Perspectives on American Exceptionalism”);
Stefan Avadanei (“Critical Thinking/Literary Theory”) and Adina Ciugureanu (“Cultural
‘Hybrids’ or Old Metaphors for New Worlds”) set the nuanced tone for the remainder of the
multiple, sequenced workshop sessions covering the themes “Old/New Mythologies,”
“Transitional Geographies,” “Technologies of Representation”, “Cartographies of Exile” and “The
Politics of Identity.” While this participant could not possibly have attended all the sessions
(numbering thirteen, with over seventy individual presentations), the ones he did attend and/or
participate were marked by papers of a uniform high quality and discussions of depth on the
various intersecting themes of the meeting.
The extensive academic sessions were well complemented by the social program, which
included a cocktail at the newly established Terasa Amsterdam, and an integrated avant grade
performance by “Margento” (led by American Studies Ph.D. candidate Christian Tanasescu) at the
new, expanded site of the American Cultural Center.
The organizers were keen to point out the vital role of their sponsors (the U.S. – Romanian
Fulbright Commission, the Public Diplomacy Office of the U.S. Embassy, Saatchi & Saatchi
(Romania), the University of Bucharest, the “Margento” Foundation and the Sitka-Alaska Foreign
Book Center) in sustaining the meeting.
In summation, this participant can say with assurance that American Studies is “alive and
well” in Romania, and has a definitely bright future, whatever challenges (social, political or
cultural) the exemplar of “the West” faces in the beginning of the 21st century, given the steadfast,
yet critically thoughtful identification of Romania and its intellectual space with the American
(post)modernity “project.”
Eric Gilder
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ISPRI’s ACADEMIC LIFE
2
CONFERENCES, CALL FOR PAPERS, SCHOLARSHIPS, ETC.*
1. International Conferences
International Conference on “Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux?”, Contemporary Europe
Research Centre, The University of Melbourne, 6–7 December 2006
Much more than a simple examination of EU — Asia relations, this major international
conference titled “Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux” examines the European experience of
integration and considers to what extent the European model can provide lessons and inspiration
for East Asian attempts at community building.
Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux is run from the Contemporary Europe Research Centre
(CERC) at the University of Melbourne, Australia and is funded by a grant from the European
Union (Contract number 2005-2762/001-001), with additional support from the University of
Melbourne, the University of Limerick, Keio University and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Paper proposals and enquiries can be emailed to cerc@cerc.unimelb.edu.au.
Although the submission deadlines for the following items have already lapsed, there might
be some interest in attending the events below or in following up presented papers.
International Conference on “Governments & Communities in Partnership: From Theory
to Practice”, Centre for Public Policy, The University of Melbourne (Melbourne), 25-27
September 2006
The conference is organised by the Centre for Public Policy at the University of Melbourne
with the support of the OECD.
The conference will bring together key policy makers, community leaders and researchers
from around Australia, together with leading experts from the UK, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Canada,
the United States and New Zealand. The aim of the program is to deepen the academic and policy
debate about the impact and value of efforts to join-up different public services and related
initiatives to strengthen communities.
The organisers of the conference welcome papers and presentations in the following areas: (1)
why collaboration matters; (2) the role of place; (3) governance models and issues, (4) health,
environment and indigenous collaborations; (5) funding and financing issues; (6) democratic
accountability; (7) evaluating the impacts of local partnerships; (8) leadership and skills for
collaborative governance.
For further information, please visit: http://www.public-policy.unimelb.edu.au/conference06/
call.html. Alternatively you can contact Lauren Rosewarne (Centre Manager) via email at
lrose@unimelb.edu.au.
2. International Seminars and Conferences
NEW! — Conferenec on “Reinventing Poland: International Conference In Memory Of
George Blazyca”Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Paisley
10–11 November 2006.
The deadline for the submission of abstracts is 18 August 2006.
The Centre for Contemporary European Studies and Paisley Business School, University of
Paisley, are organising a conference in memory of Professor George Blazyca. The conference will
be organised around five thematic areas within the general framework of ‘Reinventing Poland’.
These will be the interpretation of Polish history, economic transition, the reinvention of sociology
and culture, the implications of EU accession and regional development, allowing for a
comparison of Poland with Scotland. A number of prominent speakers from Poland and the UK
are likely to attend, including Tadeusz Kowalik, Ryszard Rapacki, Marian Górski, George
Kolankiewicz, John Bates and Aleks Szczerbiak. The organisers are also seeking further offers of
contributions on these thematic areas and there will be a session for research students to present
work in progress.
Paper proposals (up to 500 words) shall be submitted to Martin Myant at the University of
Paisley ( martin.myant@paisley.ac.uk).
———————
* Courtesy of Contemporary Europe Research Centre, The University of Melbourne.
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Further information on the conference will be made available at the following web address:
http://www.paisley.ac.uk/business/cces/new.asp
NEW! — EUSA 10th Biennial International Conference ECPR (European Consortium
for Political Research).
For information on ECPR Joint Session and Conferences, please visit: http://www.essex.ac.
uk/ecpr/ 4th ECPR Conference, Pisa (Italy). 6-8 September 2007.
Further information, including exact dates, will be available in due course.
2008 Joint Sessions, Rennes (France)
Further information, including exact dates, will be available in due course.
International Sociological Association (ISA) — Sociology Conferences
For ISA events in 2005 see the following web site: http://www.ucm.es/info/isa/cforp0.htm
Centre of Economic Policy Research (CPR) — Forthcoming events
For CPR events in 2005 see the following web site: http://www.cepr.org/meets/Diary/
listyear.asp?year=2005
European Sociological Association (ESA) — Conferences
For ESA events in 2005 see the following web site: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/
conferences.htm
Although the submission deadlines for the following items have already lapsed, there might
be some interest in attending the events below or in following up presented papers.
International Conference / Workshop on “Beyond the Crisis of the European Project?
The Political Economy of Europe and the Political Economies in Europe in (post-) disciplinary
perspectives” European Sociological Association Critical Political Economy Research Network
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (The Netherlands) 31 August — 2 September 2006
The workshop brings together critical scholarship on the political economy of the European
Union and European capitalist economies. It seeks to contribute to an understanding of the crisis
of the European project by moving beyond disciplinary and theoretical boundaries.
For further information, please visit ESA Critical Political Economy RN website:
http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/polecon.htm
XIV International Economic History Congress “The Question of the first EEC/EC
enlargement and the other European Countries’ Response, 1961-1973” Helsinki, Finland
21-25 August 2006
The Congress will focus on United Kingdom’s, Ireland’s and Denmark’s membership in the
European Communities, from 1973 onwards. There are already various historical integration
studies dealing with the EC arrangement up to the early 1970s, but the recent opening of the
archival materials on the diplomatic process has given a new impetus to research on the topic. This
Session will gather European historians to discuss this development from a combined political and
economic point of view, based on their research results and ongoing research. It would also be
considered whether it would be appropriate to target to a joint publication on the topic.
For more information, please contact: Tapani Paavonen by email at Tapani.Paavonen@utu.fi
UACES 36th Annual Conference and 11th Research Conference on “Exchanging Ideas
on Europe 2006: Visions of Europe: Key Problems, New Trajectories” Limerick, Ireland 31
August — 2 September 2006.
The invitation for proposals this year is for papers belonging to pre-organised panels, although
individual paper proposals will still be considered. As well as the research panels, there will also
be a range of plenary panels and plenary speakers.
For further information, please visit: www.uaces.org/limerick.htm; or email:
limerick@uaces.org
Interdisciplinary Conference on “Image and Identity in Contemporary Europe”
University of Wales (Bangor, Wales, United Kingdom) 7-9 September 2006.
The expansion of the EU and the re-emergence of regionalisms have stimulated reflections on
issues of identity, citizenship, nationality and globalization. This conference will focus on how
individual states (or national groups within states) perceive themselves and/or are perceived by
others since the Second World War. Whilst speakers may choose to address the construction of
identities through historical discourse, state building, institutional development, music or literary
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forms, the conference would especially like to encourage a debate on the role of visual media, such
as cinema, photography and the internet in the creation/representation of identity.
For further information, please contact: Dr. Laura Rorato (l.rorato@bangor.ac.uk) or Dr Carol
Tully (c.tully@bangor.ac.uk).
ECPR’s 1st Graduate Conference on “Contentious Politics” University of Essex (UK)
7-10 September 2006.
The ECPR is pleased to announce its first Graduate Conference, which will take place at the
University of Essex from 7-9 September 2006 and will run in alternate years. All panels, round
tables, registration and the book exhibition will be located at the University of Essex, and campus
accommodation will be available. This is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to come
together from all over Europe to share their work and experience by presenting papers or by
simply observing, and as with all ECPR conferences, there will be a number of social events.
For further information, please see http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/
index.aspx
Conference on “The EC/EU: A World Security Actor? — An Assessment after 50 Years
of the External Actions of the EC/EU” University of Cergy-Pontoise (North-West of Paris,
France) 14-16 September 2006.
This is one of six conferences to be held before the March 2007 Brussels meeting entitled “The
European Experience: 1957-2007”. This preliminary conference will focus upon external relations
of the EC/EU, and how these have contributed to European security over the period under
consideration. The conference takes the widest interpretation of security: economic, peace,
development, diplomatic and military contributions, and neighbourhood security. The perspective
is largely that of the efforts of the EC/EU institutions, although it is realised that the member states
are also major external players, both independently, and through the EC/EU.
For further information, please visit: http://calenda.revues.org/nouvelle5824.html
ECPR Standing Group on the European Union: Third Pan-European Conference on EU
Politics Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey 21-23 September 2006
The ECPR Standing Group on the European Union is organizing its Third Pan-European
Conference. It will be hosted by Bilgi University in Istanbul, Turkey from 21 to 23 September
2006. The Conference will have the following general sections covering major fields of current
research on the EU as well as an open section for cross-cutting and interdisciplinary themes: (1)
Theories of European Integration; (2) EU Institutions and Politics; (3) Political Economy of the
European Union; (4) EU Law and Policies; (5) Equality, Diversity, and European Integration; (6)
EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy; (7) Foreign Policy and External Relations; (8)
Migration and European Integration.
For further information, please see: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/standinggroups/eu/
index.aspx
Russian International Studies Association (RISA) 4th Convention on “Space and Time in
World Politics and International Relations”
MGIMO University (Moscow, Russian Federation) 23–24 September 2006.
Space and time are the basic parameters of politics, as such they set objective framework of
political activity of any kind. Both the objective and subjective features of space and time are
subject to dynamics, they are changing as a result of global processes. The international status of
a state is, first and foremost, its position in space in respect of its partners and opponents. How are
the spatial dimensions of world politics evolving today? How is the spatiality of modern politics
connected to territoriality and sovereignty? The time factor in its turn also affects world politics
and international relations. Where has the “Modernity” begun and when does it end? When has the
“Axial age” in world politics begun and what does this concept imply? These are only some of the
research issues that deal with space and time as significant factors of world politics and
international relations.
For further information, please contact: risa@mgimo.ru
Conference on “European Unity and Division: Regions, Religions, Civilisations” Monash
University Prato Centre (Prato, Italy) 25–27 September 2006.
The conference is organised by the Centre for European Studies, Monash University, in
collaboration with the European University Institute. Recent events have highlighted the ambitions
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and difficulties of an integrative project that aspires to transcend long-standing cultural or
geopolitical boundaries. The debate on divisions has moved beyond an initial focus on states and
nations. It is now widely recognized that the making of Europe can only be understood as an intercivilisational process. The aim of the conference is to explore the complex and changing
relationships between the sources of Europe’s diversity, with particular emphasis on long-term
historical dynamics, but with some reference to present constellations. For further details, please
see: http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/lcl/conferences/european-unity/
3rd Prato International Community Informatics Conference on “Constructing and
Sharing Memory: Community Informatics, Identity and Empowerment”, Monash
University Centre and The Centre for Community Networking Research (Prato, Italy) 9-11
October 2006
The conference organizers are seeking abstracts from academics, practitioners and PhD
students for a conference and workshop event at the Monash University Centre, Prato, Italy. There
are also a limited number of workshop slots available. If you believe that you can offer an
engaging and relevant workshop, please submit a short proposal as soon as possible.
A draft program and further information on the conference topics as well as potential themes for
papers and presentations can be found on-line at the conference web site. A brochure for
distribution and notice boards can also be downloaded from the web site (http://www.ccnr.net/
prato2006). Alternatively, you can email (prato2006@fastmail.fm)
BISA Annual 2006 Conference in Cork (Ireland) & ISA 2007 Conference in Chicago (USA)
Contemporary Research in International Political Theory Panels (CRIPT)
18-20 December 2006.
The Contemporary Research in International Political Theory (CRIPT), a British International
Studies Association (BISA) working group will held its annual conference in Cork (Ireland), and
the 2007 International Studies Association (ISA) conference in Chicago (USA).
This panel will seek to lay some foundations for ongoing research into the resources offered
by complexity theory for the understanding of global politics. The theme for this year’s CRIPT
panels is “The Moment of Complexity? Implications of the Emergence of a New Scientific
Paradigm for the Study of Global Politics”.
For further information, please visit the official BISA website (http://www.bisa.ac.uk/confs/
confs.htm) or contact the organisers at CRIPT@lse.ac.uk
3. International Courses, Workshops, Training Sessions
For more information, please visit the website (www.collegiumminor.org) or contact the
organisers at ingrid@collegiumminor.org
Critical Political Economy Research Network Workshop Workshop on ‘Beyond the
Crisis of the European Project? The Political Economy of Europe and the Political
Economies in Europe in (post-)disciplinary Perspectives’ European Sociological Association,
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam (The Netherlands) 31 August – 2 September 2006.
The workshop brings together critical scholarship on the political economy of the European
Union and European capitalist economies. It seeks to contribute to an understanding of the crisis
of the European project by moving beyond disciplinary and theoretical boundaries.
Invited speakers are: Alan Cafruny (Hamilton College, NY, US); Bob Jessop (Lancaster, UK);
Dorothee Bohle (CEU Budapest, Hungary); Hans-Jürgen Bieling (Marburg, Germany); Magnus
Ryner (Birmingham, UK).
Paper proposals dealing with the topic of the workshop from different thematic and theoretical
perspectives are invited. The abstracts (circa 400 words) should be sent to the network coordinator
at jan.drahokoupil@gmail.com before 31 March 2006.
For further information, please see: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/polecon.htm
ECPR Summer Schools in Methods & Techniques University of Ljubljana (Slovenia)
7 -18 August 2006.
The ECPR is pleased to launch a brand new ECTS accredited Summer School in Methods &
Techniques aimed at graduate students within social sciences and neighbouring disciplines. The
two week intensive courses have been designed to complement participants’ methodological
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training in their home institutions, while also offering the opportunity to engage with
contemporaries and hear evening presentations, podium discussions and debates on contentious
methodological issues.
For further information, please contact Emer Padden (Administrative Assistant) at
ecpr@essex.ac.uk
For further information, please visit: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/summerschools/
ljubljana/index.aspx
For general information on ECPR sponsored summer schools, please visit:
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/summerschools/index.asp
Internships in the Institutions of the European Union
For information on internships, trainee ships and stages in EU institutions, please visit
http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/employment/Internships_europe.htm
European Training Institute
For information on upcoming training programs in EU Public Affairs, please visit:
http://www.eutraining.be
4. Calls for Papers, Articles, Submissions and Prizes
UACES/Routledge Book Series on “Contemporary European Studies”
Proposals are now accepted.
The new UACES/Routledge book series, Contemporary European Studies, is inviting
proposals for high quality research monographs in all sub-fields of European Studies. We are
particularly keen to publish interdisciplinary research, but all proposals will be given serious
consideration.
For further advice and information, or to submit proposals, please contact one (or all) of the
series editors: Tanja Boerzel (boerzel@zedat.fu-berlin.de); Michelle Cini (Michelle.Cini@
bristol.ac.uk); Alex Warleigh (Alex.Warleigh@ul.ie).
Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER) Submissions throughout the year.
The editorial team of the JCER would like to invite scholars and practitioners to submit their work
for publication. The JCER is committed to promoting original research and insightful debate in
European Studies. To this aim, it publishes full-length research articles (7000-8000 words) as well
as shorter comment pieces (3000-5000 words) in the fields of European politics, law, economics
and sociology. JCER aims to provide a forum for emerging scholars of European Studies by
allowing them to present their ideas alongside those of more established academics and
practitioners. Therefore, contributions from PhD students in the advanced phase of their doctoral
research, post-doctoral students, as well as the wider academic and practitioner community are
encouraged. The journal is published biannually in May and November. Please note that the
closing date for submissions for November issue was 30 June 2005.
The contributions should be emailed to the Editor, Lars Hoffman (lars.hoffman@jcer.net).
Should you want to review books in your area of expertise, please send an email to Stijn Billiet
(s.billiet@lse.ac.uk) with your name, institutional affiliation, position and up to three areas of
expertise, and you will be included in the JCER pool of experts.
Further information as well as guidelines for authors are to be found on our web site:
http://www.jcer.net
European Journal of Political Research
Submissions throughout the year.
The European Journal of Political Research, published by Blackwell Publishing on behalf of
the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), would like to invite scholars and
practitioners to submit their work for publication, or offer their services as reviewers. Potential
author and referees are welcome to register at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ejpr
For further details, please visit: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0304-4130
5. Masters programs, positions and scholarships
NEW! — Nepos.net PhD-course catalogue Autumn 2006
NEW! — Nepos.net PhD-course catalogue Autumn 2006
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Nepos.net is a network of Northern European university departments and other PhD educating
institutions within political science, public administration and international relations. The purpose
of the network is the provision of research-oriented specialised Ph.D. courses to Ph.d-students.
The network has recently put on-line an electronic catalogue of PhD courses, which is
available at: http://nepos.net/neposnet_courses_06_2
For further information about nepos.net, please visit: http://nepos.net/about
Fellowships Programs at the European University Institute Florence, Italy
Application deadlines: Ongoing
The European University Institute in Florence, Italy, offers three different fellowship
programmes.
(1) Max Weber Fellowships for junior post-docs who would like to embark on an academic
career and improve their teaching and professional skills. (2) Jean Monnet Fellowships at the
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies with its emphasis on research for junior academics
at an early stage in their professional careers. (3) Senior Fellowships for established academics
with an international reputation for short stays of up to ten months in one of the Institute’s four
departments.
For further information and online application materials, please visit: http://www.iue.it/
Servac/Postdoctoral/; or email: applyfellow@iue.it
PhD Courses at The Danish Political Science Research School
The Danish Political Science Research School (Denmark) Applications close in
January–May 2006 (Dates Vary by Course)
The Danish Political Science Research School offers the following new PhD-courses during
spring 2006: (1) Imperial Ideologies; (2) Interpretive Political Science; (3) Advanced Data
analysis in the Social Sciences using Stata; (4) Institutional Organizational Analysis — Change
and Transformation; (5) Intersectional Analysis; (6) Principles of Social Policy — Challenges and
Reconceptualisations; (7) From Bureaucracy to Entrepreneurial Governance? Person, Ethics and
Organization in the New Public Management.
For further information, please visit: http://polforsk.dk/phdevents/
7. Job Vacancies
NEW! — Fixed-term Departmental Lecturership in Modern Politics and Society of
China, Faculty Of Oriental Studies
University of Oxford (United Kingdom) Applications close on 24 May 2006.
Applications are invited for a one-year Departmental Lectureship in the Modern Politics and
Society of China. This is a fixed-term post, tenable from 1 October 2006 (or as soon as possible
thereafter) to 30 September 2007. Departmental Lecturer Salary is £20,044 — £26,470 P.A.
Applicants should either have, or be near to completing, a doctorate on Modern China in a relevant
social science discipline. Applications shall be sent to the office of Secretary to the Board of
Oriental Studies (see contact details below).
For further information on position particulars, including details of how to apply, please
contact the office of Secretary to the Board of Oriental Studies (Oriental Institute, Pusey Lane,
Oxford OX1 2LE, UK; Fax: 44 1865 278190; Tel. 44 1865 288200; E-mail orient@orinst.ox.
ac.uk), or visit: should be obtained from http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/fp/
NEW! — Teaching Assistant in Politics Department of Politics and Public Administration,
University of Limerick, (Limerick, Republic of Ireland) Applications close on 26 May 2006
(receipt of forms).
The University of Limerick is seeking to appoint a Teaching Assistant in Politics. This post is
tenable for ten months from 1 September 2006. The salary is 28,867 p.a. pro rata.
The successful candidate will have degrees in Politics and/ or International Relations, and
preferably a PhD. (S)He should also have research experience and demonstrated research potential
in one or more of the following areas: international relations, international peacekeeping,
international security, and international organization. The successful candidate should further have
experience of undergraduate teaching in Politics and/ or IR in higher education; experience of
postgraduate teaching is desirable.
182
8
The position involves undertaking lecturing and seminar teaching for modules on:
International peacekeeping; International security; International organization; and International
Relations. Additionally, the job entails the following tasks and activities: maintain an active
research and publications profile in the area of international relations; facilitate the development
of a supportive and collegial ethos within the Department; the College and in the University;
assume other appropriate responsibilities as identified by the Head of Department
For further information, please contact Dr Neil Robinson (Department of Politics and Public
Administration, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland) via phone (353 61 202320), via fax
(353 61 202569), via email (neil.robinson@ul.ie).
NEW! — Senior Researcher in EU Studies
Danish Institute for International Studies (Copenhagen, Denmark)
Applications close on 26 May 2006 (receipt of forms).
DIIS is an independent research institution located in Copenhagen, providing high quality
research in a number of fields.
A position as senior researcher in the field of EU Studies is now available at the Danish
Institute for International Studies (DIIS). DIIS is in a process of restructuring and reframing its
research on the internal dynamics of the EU and the senior researcher will get the opportunity to
influence both direction and content. The position will also involve some management
responsibility. It will be possible to work with researchers with different backgrounds within the
human and social sciences and a diversity of theoretical, methodological and geographical
interests. The vacancy is to be filled as soon as possible and preferably before 1 September 2006.
The successful candidate shall have a strong profile in one or more of the following areas: EU
policy making, sector policies, institutions or the effects of enlargements.
Applicants must submit a presentation of current and future research interests, a CV (including
a list of publications) and three sets of copies of five publications for assessment. Applications
should be addressed to Director Nanna Hvidt (DIIS, Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen K,
Denmark).
For further information on job description and the application procedure, please visit:
http://www.diis.dk/sw23582.asp
NEW! — University Lectureship in International Studies
Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge (United Kingdom)
Applications close on 2 June 2006.
Applications are invited for a University Lectureship in International Studies, to start from 1
October 2006 or as soon thereafter as practicable. Salary: £25,565 — £39,452
The successful applicant is expected to have a strong research record, and/ or potential, in the
study of international organization. The person appointed will also be expected to contribute to the
teaching programs of the M.Phil in International Relations, and the M.Studies in International
Relations (the latter run jointly with the Institute of Continuing Education).
Further particulars of the post may be obtained from Mr Matthew Ham (Administrative
Officer, Centre of International Studies, 17 Mill Lane, Cambridge, CB2 1RX) via phone (01223
767228) or via email (mjh210@cam.ac.uk).
The applications also should be sent to Mr Ham. The applications should include a full CV,
personal statement, the names of two referees, and the University’s Cover Sheet for Employment
(http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/offices/personnel/forms/pd18/). Reference letters shall be sent to Mr
Ham directly, also by 2 June. Candidates should include with their application one example of
their published work, which will be returned after the selection procedure is completed, on request.
Short-listed candidates will be invited to Cambridge on Monday 19 June to give a short seminar
on some aspect of their current research, to be followed by a formal interview.
For further information, please visit the website (www.intstudies.cam.ac.uk) or contact Prof
Christopher Hill (cjh68@cam.ac.uk).
NEW! — Positions in European Governance and Society College of Human Sciences,
University College Dublin (Dublin, Ireland)
The new UCD School of Politics and International Relations incorporated the former
Department of Politics at the Dublin European Institute (DEI) and the Centre of Development
9
183
Studies (CDS). For both the Department of Politics and the DEI, the study of the European Union
has been a central area of undergraduate and graduate teaching and internationally profiled
research. It is the ambition of the School that these existing strengths should be maintained and
developed even further. Of particular interest would be linkages between the study of Europe and
its external environment with a focus on normative power and/or discrete policy areas such as
trade, development and human rights. Another focus of interest would be linkages between Europe
and processes of political and social change; democratisation and democratic revolutions,
enlargement, political integration and constitutional politics.
Expressions of interest from scholars are welcome who have: a) an academic of established
international reputation with a substantial portfolio of published research in peer-reviewed
international journals and with major international publishers who is enthusiastic about bringing
his/her research and teaching experience to UCD Dublin. b) recent doctoral or post-doctoral
graduates with at least one piece of published research in a peer-reviewed international journal or
a single authored monograph with an international publisher who show tremendous promise as
researchers, teachers and colleagues and who wish to establish and develop their careers at UCD
Dublin.
Applications — including your curriculum vitae and a brief statement of intent (up to five
pages) — shall be emailed in confidence to the search committee chair Dr. Ben Tonra.
For further information, please contact Dr. Ben Tonra (Director of the Dublin European
Institute at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin,
Dublin 4, Ireland) via phone (+353-1-716-7615/7634) or via email (ben.tonra@ucd.ie)
Academic and Research Positions in the EU
For information and new entries, please visit: http://www.academicjobseu.com/default.asp
The European Researchers’ Mobility Portal
The European Commission’s “The European Researchers’ Mobility Portal” includes current
grants and fellowships, research job vacancies — in the EU, at national as well as international
level. It also provides practical information on the research activities of the EU (The European
Research Area, Framework Progams, etc.).
The portal is available at http://europa.eu.int/eracareers/index_en.cfm
ECPR Research Market
For information and new entries, please visit: http://www.ecprnet.org/researchmarket/
search.asp
8. Other Items
European studies and research organizations
European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
Website: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/
European Union Studies Association (EUSA)
Website: http://www.eustudies.org/
European Communities Studies association (ECSA)
Website: http://www.ecsanet.org/
The University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES)
Website: http://www.uaces.org/
BOOK REVIEWS
Alexandru Boboc
Formã ºi valoare. În orizonturile filosofiei culturii, Editura Grinta, Cluj-Napoca, 2005, 176 p.
The book Form and value is amongst these rare
books able to answer to certain particular theoretical
and methodological needs, as to the “new requirements
of life and of the new history”. The contemporary
period of time — or, “the entering in a new epoch of
the universal history” — developed in a context of
various difficulties met by a spiritual life, it is, in fact,
a period “of the crisis of the contemporary world”,
and it is identified as a call to a reconfiguration of
both culture and civilization by reconsidering the
value creation. Finding again the culture through this
renewed taste for value and value creation is
considered, in this volume, a new manner to “balance
things… in a crisis situation”. From such a
perspective, “the situation in truth and value, in the
horizon of the conscience of values” is delimiting one
of the main requirements for moral regeneration
nowadays, for instituting normality. For this purpose,
the book is offering the opportunity to enjoy a
restructuring of the essential problematic of the
philosophy of culture in the perspective opened by
the topic of creation and of the accomplished work.
Towards such aims of this cultural approach, the
sense, the style, and the value — as “permanence of
the cultural life” and as “forms of the universal in its
incidence” — represent only a frame of systematization.
Since the creation and the “work of art” (as an
accomplishment of further capitalization) are
understood as a “fortunate meeting” between the
dimension of the sense, the style, and the value, their
situation in the perspective of the philosophy of
culture is presented at once, as a complex meeting
between the significance given to the different
theoretical approaches of the stylistics and the
philosophy of style, of aesthetics and of the
philosophy of art, of the philosophy of the work of
art, the philosophy of value and philosophical
anthropology. In a structural respect, the volume
consecrates separate chapters, in this same order, to
the relationship between culture and history and to
the dispute around “historicism”, to the style and to
the styles — differently put, to the field of stylistics
and to the philosophy of style (especially to the
contributions brought by Nietzsche, Spengler and
Blaga ), to the sense and to the value, as to the dispute
around the “autonomy” of values.
A special chapter is dedicated to the creation and
to the work of art, to the philosophy of the work of art
as an attempt to give new signification to the
ontology of the work by a “return to subjectivity”,
towards “the form of inclusion (in molding) of the
demiurgic man” who, “objectifying his creative forces”,
undertakes the environment as “world”. Through the
shape (that “comes, contextually (in language, work,
action, etc.) as an Idea”) it is also analyzed “the
fixation of the creation in an absolute, unique,
determination”, the shape demarcating “the perception
and the behavior of the creator” and, also, the
“objectifying” of the work of art and its inclusion in
culture. In the final chapter of the book, the work of
art as a “world” in “ontological difference”, the work
in the shape of the “unique work of art” is reflected
as an “insertion of an intentional horizon”, extremely
different from any other horizon (real, imaginary)
because it “ “opens itself” only in terms of value and
not through the limits of the actual “look” of the one
who institutes it”. The author specifies — in an
extremely refined stylistic form, illustrative for the
entire book — “ “World” means, more than a world
of interpretation (“a possible world”), a manner of
being (of a unprecedented level) through an exit of
the concrete time and horizon and through setting all
these in the shapes of the universality: intentionally
and temporality, intentionality and value. These come
along with the created work, but they in themselves
are not created, but they simply “are”, by the way of
being human and by the manner of being of the
human world”(p.174). In the author’s opinion, such a
“world” gains the power of model and the power to
mold under the species of sense and value, under the
species of “aeternitatis”.
The methods considered efficient in such an
approach, in fact, a “ methodological pluralism suigeneris, so adequate ( and inclusive) for any modern
theoretical-methodological architecture”, were the
semantic and logical analysis, the phenomenological
description, the hermeneutics. The clear favorite of
the author is the phenomenological method (“the
phenomenological-hermeneutic
modality
of
investigation”). Yet, the volume represents a
phenomenological-hermeneutic theory, as the
consequence of a phenomenological and ontological
approach. From this perspective, the “ complex
attempt” to understanding a work of art reunites, as
essential, “the aspects phenomenological-hermeneutic
and the ontological aspects”(p.94), while the
application of this method to the study of art finding
an appropriated realm in the “ philosophical
BOOK REVIEW
2
analyses”. The phenomenology is considered also as
a “ radical renewal in the style of the modern
creation”, as a ”break from tradition” which, in the
phrasing of H. Reiner Sepp, is oriented “against the
concept of reality embraced in the 19th century,
especially against the naturalism and historicism”,
against the tendencies “to represent reality as a whole
and to copy reality” situating “together the
representation and what is represented”, not “the
image of reality (p.156). In this particular meaning,
the phenomenology appears as a critique of the
“copy-cat conscience” and also as a projection of the
“intentional conscience” that allows the “orientation
towards what is objective”, towards reality “as it is
noticed”, and not as it “ indirectly appears, in the
image, in the symbol, in the formula, in the inferred
concept, in convention”.
Creation and the work of art as “ cultural
realities” and as “world in ontological difference” in
the perspective or in the “horizon” of the philosophy
of culture are treated as well in general and theoretical
terms, as in the land-mark accomplishments of the
Romanian culture: Mioriþa*, Eminescu’s poetics,
Brâncuºi sculpture. “The world of the ewe lamb”, an
exemplary “world” given the axiological institution
and the stylistic matrix of the Romanian spirituality is
appreciated as “the history of the human fulfillment
within the space of culture, of the human fulfillment
in such a cultural”, “a sui-generis intentionality, to be
perceived in the horizon-shape of its themes and
unitary affirmed by the modality of axiological
structuring a spirituality ( and a historical and cultural
community)”(p.104). Thus, the ewe lamb “world” is
“real”, “it is a cultural reality not only by its meaning
for the human life in a precise spiritual and historical
and cultural context, by the manner in which the
fundamental valorical institution (the objectifying of
the human being through creation) has had the
chance to an exemplary affirmation”(p.106). “The
depth of the ideation” (“the essential message”) and
the poetic beauty of the ballad are interpreted as the
bears of a “world” in which the man and the cardinal
185
values of his fulfillment consecrate the determinate
role of the free will and of human freedom. The study
of Eminescu’s creation, meant to reflect the sense of
the reasons of “placing” Eminescu amongst “the
titans of the universal culture”, in fact, the reasons for
situating “his presence, through the very linguistic
form of the valorical institution, on the map of
universality”(p.131), discloses the poet-philosopher,
especially the temporal and spatial coordinates “of
the modalities of assimilation and reinstitution for the
monadological world” of a Leibnizean inspiration,
the coordinates of the singularity and these of the
opposition eternal-ephemeral, not through a mere
transposition, but through “an inaugural
accomplishment, exemplary ...bearing the seal of a
unique style, impossible to reiterate and inimitable...”
(p.152). The phenomenological-hermeneutical
manner of interpretation is applied as well to the art
of Brâncuºi, an art beyond any “iconicity”, beyond
what, in Cassirer’s expression, is considered to be “a
key for the human nature: the symbol”. “The spiritual
turn” (in the connotation given to this term by
Kandinsky by the turn of the century), related to the
“exterior nature”, to the “forms” born starting from it,
from the “freedom” to mold the forms and the colors
associated to these forms by “ determinate appeal of
an interior necessity”, is presented the case of
Brâncuºi as a form of respect for the “ pure forms”,
for the geometrization of the object and for the
multiple perspective, for the search for “the
unmediated” as an expression of “nearness”, for the
“living being of the material as such, with its
imminent virtues of utterance”(p.169), for the
“totaling simplicity” that makes for “the archetypal
beginnings”. The philosophical perspective of ample
reflexive aspiration — in the spirit in which the
author, Professor Alexandru Boboc, has published
numerous volumes and has contributed at the formation
of many generations of students — is marking in a
definitely manner the phenomenological-hermeneutic
interpretation of the creation and of the work of art
and, through it, he contributes significantly to the
contemporary discussion over this issue.
Gabriela Tãnãsescu**
Ion Goian
Leo Strauss. Arta de a scrie. Itinerarii de lecturã, Bucureºti, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice
ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2005, 177 p., ISBN 973-7745-11-6
The Secret of Political Philosophy
Modern man wants to master the fate right here
and now, being inscribed in a general movement of
distancing himself from the origins, from primordiality
and from its eternity, he is forestalled by the political
philosophy. But these aspects are only a part of the
secret. In order to read as much as possible into this
secret, the solution is to uncover the traces left by the
“ancient ideal in the human conscience”.1 A rich
———————
* In English, The Ewe Lamb, the title of a Romanian popular ballad.
** Translation in English by Henrieta ªerban.
186
BOOK REVIEW
material, well structured and interestingly put in
perspective by the “lecture”, this work opens the neoconservatory perspectives over political philosophy
for a broader public. There is to be noticed from the
very beginning the accent put on well-captured ideas
and on diversified information, the work addressing a
very important area in the political philosophy today,
at once at an universal level, as, especially, at the
level of political science, in Romania.
The book is describing the interpretative
universe of the political philosophy as portrayed by
Leo Strauss, in its pages, structured as it follows: an
argument, ten chapters, an “excursus”, bibliography
and index. The argument of the author is clear.
Exploring something of the locksmith minuteness
shown in the lectures of the ancient philosophers
attuned by Strauss to Hobbes, Machiavelli, etc., the
readers would have the chance to be at once tried and
enriched by an exposure to such exquisite texts,
never neutral, ever demanding.
Each one of the book’s chapters represents an
essential lesson of political philosophy. Here I shall
present these chapters, pinpointing the main ideas
through brief comments. The first chapter is
exploring the erudition proved by Leo Strauss in his
work, under the title “Between Socrates and
Protagoras”, investigating in the same time the
question of modernity circumscribed the crisis
yielded by the failure of the classic ideal of virtue in
political philosophy. Modernity is a sort of settling to
a collective húbris that is, getting accustomed with
all that denotes a collective lack of wisdom. The
second chapter, “Life-Marks and Publications” is
important to inscribe the author in his epoch. The
details given accurately following Leo Strauss’s life
and work are complemented with other details, such
as those documenting the courage of the author in
distancing himself at once from the prejudices and
from the prescribed intellectual routes. For instance,
we find out how his book on Maimonide,
Philosophie und Gesetz published in 1935 at
Schocken publishing house, in Berlin, has been
considered by Walter Benjamin as extremely
dangerous for its author, in the sense that it would
cancel for him the possibility of being recommended
at a department of Jerusalem University. While
modern Judaism remains of interest for the author,
the precautions of a political or religious
fundamentalist Zionist are foreign for him, as one can
understand from the texts gathered aside the studies
dedicated to Spinoza in Le testament de Spinoza.
Ion Goian surprises such aspects, and many
more, in the chapter with the same title. Chapter four
is one of the most interesting in the book. In “The
Persecution and the art of writing” he interprets the
work with the same title signed by Leo Strauss,
identifying here a revolution in the interpretation of
the political philosophy texts, occasioned by Leo
Strauss. Thus, Strauss is interpreting the political
philosophy texts in a complex manner, avoiding any
3
reductionism, in the spirit of a “guide-book of
esotericism of the philosophical text”. In this
complex interpretative spirit are to be understood as
well the famous and confusing quotes from Leo
Strauss that are so often used in the contemporary
attempts of interpretation of the political philosophy
from the perspective opened by Strauss (as it is, for
example, “We shall have to consider whether that
Enlightenment deserves its name or whether its true
name is Obfuscation” from Thoughts on Machiavelli).
In the chapter “Natural Right and History”, Goian
discusses the book of Strauss with the same title,
exploring the generous theme of the human nature in
political philosophy and also the manner in this
human nature wich is reflected in the natural right.
Another dimension of the analysis follows the
perspective of denying the natural right in
historicism. Along a hobbesian tradition of political
philosophy, as Goian shows, Strauss surprises the
replacement of the central classical ideal political
concept in philosophy, politeía, with a modern
political philosophy concept, political power,
potentia or potestas, investigated on either the
“physical”, or the “lawful” dimension”.2 A less
explored Leo Strauss text, but put in perspective in its
right importance in Goian’s book is “Progress or
Return”, investigating the opposition between the
(Greek) classical philosophy and Judaism. All the
ideas developed in this approach are essential for
understanding the cultural bases of the European
civilization and for the most discussed Western crisis
of values, too. Philosophy situates itself beyond the
tremendous shivering fears that are characteristic for
the religious life, anchored in the area of the interest
for the origins, for the prime realities and for
certitude. From such antagonism spring at once the
creativity and the crisis that are Western society
features. The text is published in the Thomas L.
Pangle volume, The Rebirth of Classical Political
Rationalism (1989).
What is political philosophy is as well the title of
a chapter of interrogations addressed to the
relationship between the classical and modern
political philosophy. This relationship could be
described through three aspects. First of all, as
philosophy is, political philosophy is also a search for
universal knowledge and a distinction from the mere
opinions. Second, and in consequence, political
philosophy has to be differentiated from political
thought, given the fact that it refuses the opinions, the
convictions and the beliefs, favoring the pursuit of
knowledge. Third, in a hobbesian tradition, at L.
Strauss the political, le politique, is interpreted from
the human nature perspective – therefore, le politique
is necessary because the domination over the human
being is necessary, given the fact that man is bad by
his nature.
Leo Strauss’s name is related to a renewal of the
perception of political philosophy. This aspect is
attentively approached in chapter nine, “Political
4
BOOK REVIEW
Philosophy and hermeneutics”. As the author
underlines, the interpretation of the philosophical text
imposes the awareness concerning the double context
brought by “the opposing categories of the exoteric
and the esoteric, of the necessary beliefs and of the
true beliefs, of the philosophical education and of the
crowds’ education, of the contemplative life and of
the moral and political life”.3 Such complexity, and
such opening in approaching the political, le
politique, have been bringing Strauss a paradoxical
interest from the ranks of neo-conservative
ideologues. From this perspective, of a “straussian
paradox”, are especially interesting the texts from
“Excursus” related to “Leo Strauss and Neocons”,
and to “A Neo-Plato Vision over the Political Elite”.
187
The rich material capitalized and presented in
this book is the more important as, the author shows
it, “Leo Strauss remains an author far less known as
it should be and, I would say, yet, far less translated
in Romania. Unfortunately, there are only a few
translations from the work of Leo Strauss in Romanian
and, since we are here, there are extremely few copies
of Leo Strauss’s book in the Romanian libraries”.4
The author thanks to École des Hautes Études en
Sciences Sociales (ÉHÉSS) Paris, as well to the Flemish
Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences, and to the
Brussels Catholic University, and, implicitly, to the
Romanian Academy, which has made possible these
interacademic exchanges, opportunities materialized
in this high standard book.
Henrieta ªerban
NOTES
1. Ion Goian, Leo Strauss – Arta de a scrie. Itinerarii
de lecturã, Bucureºti, Editura Institutului de
ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2005,
p.12.
2. Ibidem, p. 78-79.
3. Ibidem, p.121.
4. Ibidem, p. 9. The author inscribes at nuance the
particular matters in the general ones, approaching
the issues critically without limiting intellectual
precautions. Hence, he continues: “There are
very few specialty books, it must be said, in any
field of activity and, paraphrasing a well-known
saying, one could say that, busy as the rulers are
with the Romanian European integration, in the
great public libraries of Romania the dusk is
approaching”.
Cristian-Ion Popa
Teorii ale societãþii moderne. Evaluãri ºi reconstrucþii actuale, Bucureºti, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe
Pollitice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2005, 256 p.
Under the generic title Theory of Modern
Society, the work offers the XIXth century history of
the civil society concept and its «developments» in
XXth century. What we call here a conceptual history
reflects a rigorous selection and a chronological
disposing of the most influential analyses of the
relation state–civil society in the modern thought,
namely: the hegelian dialectical philosophy and
Marx’s critical-radical philosophy, followed by
Ferdinand Tönnies’s theory of capitalist society — (a
society viewed as transition from Gemeinschaft to
Gesellschaft). These theories are investigated starting
with the philosophical and political theories of
modern society from the first half of the XXth
century and from Robert Michels’s theory of
oligarchicall phenomenon and of democratic
principle. The author investigates as well Max
Weber’s theory on the limits of the political
democray in the industrial and bureaucratical society
and the analysis of socialism and its relation with the
specific social order imposed by democracy and
capitalism, as detailed by Joseph A. Schumpeter. The
selection operated in the theories of the second half
of the XXth century aimed at situating in weberian
and schumpeterian extraction: the economical theory
of the politics or the “New Political Economy” and
“the public choice theory”. These are illustrated in
this book, among others, by Anthony Downs, James
M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Albert O. Hirschman
through Public Choice Society, initially Committee
on Nonmarket Decisions and by the sketch of a
philosophy of public sphere proposed by Daniel Bell.
The author has complemented these theories and
concepts with an analysis of the concept of “public
interest”, as a part of political speech and not as a
political science instrument.
The criterion of this selection was that of the
quality of the theories — the theories are considered
innovative, real “pathfinders” — a quality reflected
in their capacity to identify problematical fields, to
elaborate conceptual frames and to formulate keyquestions and answers of “durable importance”. As a
result, the author’s choice was to analyse the
“fundamental theoretical works” with “a spectacular
development”, those that “through their systematic
and time tested exercise..., imposed themselves in the
188
BOOK REVIEW
social and cultural space of our time as true ways of
thinking, of a surprising inner coherence, as
meditations on the historical states and evolutions in
general” (p. 6). Their theoretical altitude was
specified through underlining their quality of
“genuine conceptions as the world” and, in Marx’s
case, the quality of political project for the
improvement of the modern society. The author opted
for “the systematical reconstruction” and “critical
evaluation” of these “exemplary philosophical
works”, subordinating to it “the effort to identify their
logical structure” and “their durable semantic load”,
beginning with the decantation of their fundamental
anthropological suppositions in order to be able to
relieve the primary co-ordinates of human condition
in the modern world, as settled by the authors (ibid.).
The analysis of human condition in the modern
society portrays the man as a private person, “as a
whole”, consisting of natural necessities and of
arbitrary will, and the man as a person which enters
into a general system of social relations, in Marx —
the thinker that occupies, besides Marx, a privileged
position in the economy of this work, the others being
just “the followers” who developed them —, points
author points out to the real separation between the
production and circulation of goods, the social
domain, organized according by the civil law), and to
the political and administrative power. The author
specifies the two directions followed by political
thought by the end of XVIIIth century: 1. the social
theory developed from the political economy
perspective and 2. the modern state theory inspired
by natural law. Based on the latter the author
construes the hegelian theory of the law — “the
theory of modern orders” — as a conceptual
innovation defining the entire ulterior political
philosophy on modern society.
As such, the work presents exemplarily the
essence of the Hegelian conceptual innovation of the
distinction between the civil or bourgeois society
sphere and the political sphere of the state, as
between “the real creation of the modern world”
which “uproots the individual from his traditional
links, to convert him into an independent, singular
person”, and this historical creation, the state which
mediates among particular groups and general
interests of the society. The Hegelian solution of the
state as “the crowning of the entire [social] edificemotivate by the necessity of its “limitated, but
decisive” intervention in the spontaneous unfolding
of the inter-individual connections within the civil
society in order to “set up the state of law” that
removes all “accidental and arbitrary aspects from
the human actions and from the subjective
conscience” —, is presented through what constitutes
the source of theoretical and social — critical
inspiration for Marx. For Marx, the mediation
5
provided by bureaucracy, by the “mandatory”
functionaries of the state in civil society (the
representatives of general interest) and the ones of
the social states (of the corporations) at the level of
the state, which in Hegel assures the identity between
particular and general interest (or what Hegel calls
concrete freedom), represents only an apparent
solution. It doesn’t resolve the separation or the
“essential duplication”, how Marx calls it) between
the “citizen of the state” (“the self as universal
person, a hypostasis in which all the human being are
identical”) (p. 52) and the “individual belonging to
the civil societiy”, or between the man as social being
and the private man (sustained by the principle of
“individualism” as aim of the social existence), the
Hegelian philosophy of the law thus constituting it
self into a (“mystical”) celebration of the private
person, life and property, into “the greatest
achievement of modern constitutional state” (p. 98).
As a result, the fundamental problem posed by “an
upside-down conceptualisation of the Hegelian
theory of law..., essentially, a theory of the modern
arrangements” and the solution for this problem is
built and reflected as a part of a theoretical
comprehensive ensemble that offered one of the most
important classical intelectual source for the critical
social reflection. “The overthrow” realized by Marx
is presented as a research of the “civil society
anatomy” from the perspective of the political
economy and “for the purpose of reconstructing the
whole social existence of the man within this
horizon” (p. 100). Following Jacques Bidet, the
author underlines the “strong contrast between the
acuity of [Marxian] analysis of capitalism, ... and the
weakness of his political project, of his idea of
socialist society” (p. 135).
The comparative analyses of the conceptualized
civil society at Hegel and Marx — in the first place,
and at other thinkers — with specific ideatic
differences and a specific load, has the considerable
merit of emphasizing systematizated arguments in
the favour of constructing civil society as the
“general system of social relations”, a conotation
either ignored or distorted, unfortunately, from even
in select political on political analysis from our
country.
It should be also noticed that the author’s
methodological options and his selection criteria are
the premises for a laborious approach whose
characteristics are the precision of the theoretical
reconstruction, the moderation and the fineness of the
appreciations, the constancy in pointing out at the
novelty and at the value of the studied theory, the
constancy in invoking and making operational the
fundamental bibliographical sources. The rigoeur and
the argumentative sobriety give the measure of this
veritable point of reference in the present editorial
specialized landscape.
Gabriela Tãnãsescu
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, Johns
Hopkins University Press, vol. 27, no. 2, 2005 is a
journal of comparative studies, in the field of
humanist science, social sciences and law.
The studies included in this issue approach a
broad range of themes from the above stated sphere
of the interests for knowledge and research. There is
a distinct interest for the topic of reconciliation (as in
the article of Tim Kelsall), for the problematic
surounding the relationship between promoting
social and economic human rights and promoting the
human rights, in general, in Africa (present in the
article signed by Jonathan Klaaren), for the collective
rights (approached by Miodrag A. Jovanovic), and
for assessing human rights (in the article signed by
Mac Darrow and Amparo Tomas). Katarina
Tomasevski raises inedite questions, important both
for the generality and for the particularities of certain
economic, social and cultural human rights.
The books prezented in the section dedicated to
book reviews are raising also interesting questions
whose stakes are transcending a strictly theoretical
area of social and political research. Good examples
in this sense are the reviews of Kurt Mills’book,
entitled The Refugees Convention. 50 Years On
Globalisation and International Law, edited by
Susan Kneebone, 2003 and of the book signed by
Madeline Davis, Universal Jurisdiction: National
Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under
International Law, edited by Stephen Macedo, 2004.
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Blackwell
Publishing, vol. 67, no. 1, 2005 published under the
aegis of Southern Political Science Association,
stands out through the attention given to the original
studies in all the domains of political science. The
reader notices a special interest for investigating
electoral campaigns — noticeable are the studies
„Strategy, selection and candidate competition in
U.S. House and Senate Elections“, by Jamie L.
Carson, „Campaign Effect and the Dynamics of
Turnout Intention in Election 2000“, by D. Sunshine
Hillygns and „Black Candidates and Black Voters:
Assessing the Impact of Candidate Race ou
Uncounted Vote Rates“, by Michael C. Herron and
Jasjeet S. Sekhon.
There is also interest for the domain of the
political construction of the constitutions, as in the
article signed by Michael Besso. Another important
area of research concerns the analysis of the notion
“global distributive justice” interpreted in the
perspective of actual comments on the ideas of Kant
and Rawls — a good example in this respect is the
article of Brian J. Shaw), but the volume comprises
other studies in important and actual domains of
political science, too.
The volume includes a remarkable section of
book reviews, where there are prezented 19 books on
various subjects: local government and public
management, ecology, public policies, electoral
campaigns, law, racism, feminism, public opinion.
NATIONALITIES PAPERS, a review issued
under the aegis of the Association for the Study of
Nationalities and with the support of the College of
Arts and Sciences of the University of North Carolina
at Charlotte, the College of Arts and Sciences of
Baylor University and from the Shevchenko
Scientific Society in America, comprises in its
number 1, volume 34, March 2006, studies
circumscribed to the research of nationalities
problems, generally and of the political societies in
Tajikistan, Serbia, Turkey and Romania.
In the beginning, in his study on the radical Islam
in Tajikistan, Emmanuel Karagiannis (University of
Pennsylvania, USA) analyzes the complex and
worrying roots (in the Rahmonov regime) of the
largest radical Islamic group in Tajikistan — Hizb utTahrir al-Islami (The Islamic Party of Liberation) —
and of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT),
officially registered as an Islamic political party
(Tajikistan being, as a matter of fact, the only Central
Asian country to officially register an Islamic
political party). The theories used in this analyses are
that of structural-functional, resource mobilization
theory, political opportunity theory and framing
theory. Given the insufficient stress on the
ideological factor in these theories, and the spreading
degree of the radical ideas within the most religious
factions of the Tajik society, “the alternative source
of religious guidance”, is explained through deIslamization of IRPT and through the ideological
Henrieta ªerban
190
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
2
vacuum among religious Tajiks that has been filled
by Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Two main directions in the research of the
political problems of minorities in Serbia are reflected
in the study on the ethnic cleansing (“a recurrent
tragedy”) — as a tool of state building in the
Yugoslav multinational setting and as a means of
security, for instance, from the “first Yugoslavia” in
1918 till the present consequences of the process of
state desintegration and reformation began in the
1990s (Kleida Mulaj, London School of Economics
and Political Sciences) — and, as well, in the study
on the intra-serb challenges to the Serb Democratic
Party (Nina Caspersen, Lancaster University, UK).
Of a particular interest concerning the
documentation, for historical, cultural and linguistic
argumentation and the sensibility for the Romanian
public is Thede’s Kahl (Austrian Institute of East and
Southeast European Studies) research on the islamisation
of the Meglen Vlachs (Megleno-Romanians), having
as a study case the village of Nânti (Nótia) and the
“Nântinets” in the present-day Turkey. This
contribution is more important since, until a few
years ago, the history of the settlement of the Meglen
Vlachs in Turkey was unknown or was assumed as
uncertain. Also, an important contribution is that of
Gheorghiþã Geanã (Anthropological Research
Centre of the Romanian Academy) on the origins of
national consciousness in Romanians, studied
through the Carpathian folk fairs, “mainly economic
but also socio-cultural events” in the three Romanian
principalities: Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania.
The EAST ASIAN REVIEW, no. 1, volume 18,
spring 2006, a publication of the Institute for East
Asian Studies in Seoul, is relevant for the current
debates on North Korea, investigating the
perspectives on the durability and the evolution of its
regime and its position within the Northeast Asian
economic cooperation. The maintaining of North
Korean regime, despite deteriorated economy, natural
disaster, famine, rapid increase of North Korean
refugees, political and diplomatical isolation and
pressures from the U.S., is explained by Yoon MiRyang through its use of physical coercion and other
mechanisms for voluntary compliance, as such
punishment and censorship. One of the most effective
and less costly means for obtaining voluntary
agreement or compliance of the population is the
Juche thought, an important “instrument in providing
a consistent framework for commitment and action in
the North Korean political arena. It offers an
underpinning for the party’s incessant demand for
spartan austerity, sacrifice, discipline, and
dedication... Since the mid-1970s, however, it
appears that Juche has become glorified as an end in
itself along with the great leader kim Il Sung. In this
atmosphere, Juche is the absolute standard for the
people to follow.... The study of the Juche thought
plays a crucial role in educating North Koreans in
learning from the writings and lives of Kim Il-Sung
and Kim Jong-Il that are the major sources for
maintaining political solidarity” (p. 27). “The core
concept of the Juche thought is the independent
stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using
one’s own powers, believing in one’s own strength
and displaying the revolutionary spirit of selfreliance”, that means an ideology which sustains the
independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient
economy, and a self-reliant defense posture. Except
Juche thought, as sources of “political socialization”
appear: the state-run distribution system, the success
of the North Korean regime in the Early Stage, an
adaptation to environmental changes through reforms
and Confucian values. The “most irrational” of the
Confucian values “is the blind obedience based on
customs and internalized traditions... In addition,
because the North Korean people have never
experienced democratic orders, the Confucian and
paternalistic values are still deeply rooted in their
consciousness determining their behavioral patterns”
(p. 29).
The present evolution of the North Korea is
analyzed by Cho Young-Gook (research professor,
Kyungnam University, Seoul) through the July 1st
measures which include some market-oriented
ecnomic policy determined by “the deteriorating
condition of national security due to the nuclear
standoff with the U.S.” (p. 36). The author identifies
the specific of the national development strategy —
reform of the inter-economic system including the
mixture of partial or comprehensive economic reform
and the intermediate character from the socialist
economic reform to the market-based economic
system — and he examines the chances that the
economic North Korean regime would tolerate “the
capitalist intervention”.
The Northeast Asian regionalism is considered
from a cultural perspective (“Cultural Alternatives
for the Northeast Asian Community: Overcoming
Cognitive Obstacles in China, Japan, and South
Korea”, by Kim Myongsob, Yonsei University, and
Lee Dong-Yoon, Sogang University) and from an
economic one (“Northeast Asian Economic
Cooperation
and
Inter-Korean
Economic
Development”, by Lee Seog-Ki, Korea Institute for
Industrial Economics & Trade, Seoul). The review
comprises also an analyse of the inter-Korean
relations in the context of East Asian power relations,
an analyse which sustains the thesis that the progress
for inter-Korean relations will be developed “slowly
but steadily”, for as long as the momentum and the
institutionalization of cooperation are maintained.
Gabriela Tãnãsescu

Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations

Transcription

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