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DE MINIMIS RULE WITHIN THE EU INTERNAL
MARKET FREEDOMS:
TOWARDS A MORE MATURE AND LEGITIMATE MARKET ?
Janja Hojnik*
Deriving from the former internal market Commissioner McCreevy’s statement that
the internal market needs to become more decentralised, the article explores to what
degree the de minimis rule applies or should apply to the internal market, discussing
in the process the advantages and disadvantages of the transfer of this rule from the
field of competition to the internal market law. Although there are some conceptual
as well as practical problems related to the application of the de minimis rule to
fundamental freedoms, the author concludes that in the field of the internal market
law the de minimis rule increases the autonomy of national authorities thereby
strengthening democratic decision-making in the EU which is conceived as a multilevel governance system. Through this rule the Member States preserve their
competence in the domain of market law with respect to rules which do not formally
discriminate between domestic and foreign goods, people and services, the aim of
which is not to regulate trade between Member States and whose restrictive effects
on the internal market are too uncertain and too indirect for the measure to present a
breach of the TFEU.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 30
II. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DE MINIMIS RULE ACROSS
LEGAL DISCIPLINES .................................................................................... 31
III. THE DE MINIMIS RULE UNDER EU SUBSTANTIVE LAW .......................... 33
1. De Minimis Agreements between Undertakings ......................................... 33
2. De Minimis State Aids.............................................................................. 35
3. De Minimis Public Purchasing ..................................................................36
IV. DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE FIELD OF THE INTERNAL MARKET
FREEDOMS ................................................................................................... 37
1. Free Movement of Goods ........................................................................... 37
2. Free Movement of Workers ...................................................................... 42
3. Free Movement of Services and Freedom of Establishment .........................43
*
PhD, Associate Professor of EU Law, Faculty of Law, University of Maribor,
Slovenia, e-mail: janja.hojnik@um.si. I am very grateful to Tamara Perišin from
University of Zagreb and the anonymous reviewers of the EJLS for their comments
on an earlier draft.
2013]
De Minimis Rule Within the EU Internal Market Freedoms
30
4. Free Movement of Capital ........................................................................ 44
5. Rocky Road to Define De Minimis in the Internal Market Field ...............45
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADOPTING THE DE MINIMIS RULE
IN THE INTERNAL MARKET FIELD .......................................................... 47
1. The Difference between the Internal Market and Competition Law ......... 47
2. Public and Private Interventions in the Market........................................ 48
3. National Courts’ Concern ......................................................................... 48
4. Fundamental Principles Argument ........................................................... 49
VI. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE
INTERNAL MARKET FIELD ....................................................................... 50
1. Sensible and Mature Market Regulation .................................................. 50
2. Subsidiarity Aspect – More Legitimate Market Regulation ....................... 51
VII. CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................54
I. INTRODUCTION
Over fifty years after the goal of a common market was determined in the
Rome Treaty and twenty years after the deadline for its completion, as
established in the Single European Act, the European Union (hereinafter
EU) is discussing the future of its internal market, which is seen as the
main economic leverage of the EU. With respect to the future
development of the internal market the former internal market
Commissioner McCreevy made an interesting statement in his speech in
Sophia in 2007 by saying that ‘we need to accept that the nature of the
game has changed. […] The Single Market must become more
decentralised […]. We need to improve the ownership in the Member
States. And we must strengthen cooperation between the national and EU
level’.1 On the other hand, the Commission found in the Single Market
Act, adopted in 2011, that the growth potential of the internal market has
not been fully exploited yet.2 On the basis of the latter, as well as on the
basis of other recent internal market documents, it may be concluded that
the aim of the Commission is no longer to adopt a great deal of new
market legislation, but to assure a more legitimate and effective internal
market, where the Member States will play a (an important) part in the
creation of market regulation and will furthermore enforce it in cases of
1
Charlie McCreevy, ‘The Future of the Single Market’, (Sofia University, 14 May
2007)
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/308&format
=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 16 June 2013.
2‘
Twelve Projects for the 2012 Single Market: Together for New Growth’ Press
Release, IP/10/1390.
31
European Journal of Legal Studies
[Vol.6 No.1
restrictions.3
The main objective of the article is to examine how the de minimis rule
might contribute to both abovementioned goals of the future regulation of
the EU internal market – ie legitimacy and effectiveness. According to the
de minimis rule, should it be recognised in the field of the internal market,
only measures (of the Member States and private entities) which
significantly hinder the functioning of the internal market would be
prohibited, while measure that do not would stay within the bounds of
national autonomy. Despite such advantages of the de minimis rule, its
application in the field of the internal market is all but simple.
The article compares the internal market provisions, where the de minimis
rule is quasi absent, with some other EU legal fields, where the de minimis
rule is applied. In this respect the article explores the general
characteristics and functions of the de minimis rule, its current application
in the field of EU competition law and public procurement and also
discusses the application of this rule to the field of internal market
freedoms. It points out internal market judgments in which the
application of the de minimis rule was rejected, as well as a growing number
of the EU Court's decisions ruling quite the opposite. On the basis of
theoretical commentaries on this rule the article discusses the advantages
and disadvantages of the potential application of this rule to the field of
the internal market.
II. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DE MINIMIS RULE ACROSS
LEGAL DISCIPLINES
The de minimis rule derives from Roman law and has two meanings: a
procedural and a substantive one. The procedural aspect is derived from
the ‘de minimis non curat praetor’ principle, in accordance with which the
praetor does not concern himself with trifles. Consequently, court
proceedings do not deliberate about unimportant or petty matters. In such
cases the court dismisses the claim or decides in a simplified proceeding
intended for the so-called ‘bagatelle’ disputes.4 In this sense the de minimis
rule is recognised world-wide. The European Court for Human Rights
3
See eg Commission staff working document; accompanying document to the
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying
down procedures relating to the application of certain national technical rules to
products lawfully marketed in another Member State, impact assessment,
SEC(2007)112.
4
Janez Kranjc, Latinski Pravni Reki (GV Založba, Ljubljana 2006) 66. Kranjc also
refers to a less known version of the rule: Minima non curat praetor.
2013]
32
(ECtHR), for example, held in 2010 in Korolev v Russia 5 , where the
applicant complained about the failure of Russian authorities to pay him
the 22.50 roubles (0.56 EUR), that applications are inadmissible where ‘the
applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto
requires an examination of the application on the merits’. Similarly, in Bock
v Germany6, the applicant, a civil servant with a monthly salary of 4,500
EUR, asked to be reimbursed for a part of the costs, namely 7.99 EUR,
which he paid for magnesium tablets prescribed by his physician. Due to
the length of the proceedings, the case reached the ECtHR, which evoked
the de minimis rule by claiming: ‘The Court shall declare inadmissible any
individual application (…) which it considers (…) an abuse of the right of
application.’ The de minimis rule enables the Court to dispose more rapidly
of unmeritorious cases and to focus on its key role of providing legal
protection of human rights at the European level.7 In a similar sense this
rule is also recognised in the courts of common law, where it is known
through the maxim ‘the law does not concern itself with trifles’.8 In this
respect the rule was used by the English Judge Lord Stowell already in 1818
in the Reward case9, where he held:
The law permits the qualification implied in the ancient maxim De
minimis non curat lex. Where there are irregularities of very slight
consequence, it does not intend that the infliction of penalties
should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation were a mere trifle,
which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the
public interest, it might properly be overlooked.
Similar interpretations of the rule can be found in the case law of the US
courts.10
On the other hand, the substantive meaning of the rule appears from the
maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex’, ie the law does not concern itself with
5
Korolev v Russia, App no 5447/03 (ECHR, 01 April 2010).
Bock v Germany, App no 22051/07 (ECHR,16 February 2010).
7
Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, amending the Control System of the Convention, CETS No. 194,
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/194.htm> accessed 16 June 2013. See also
Adrian Mihai Ionescu v Romania, App no 36659/04 (ECHR, 01 June 2010).
8
Translation from French: ‘Les Magistrats ne doivent pas s'attacher à des vétilles’.
9
The "Reward" (1818) 2 Dods 265, 165 ER 1482.
10
See eg The People of the State of Illinois v Daniel Durham, No. 4-08-0448, 25.6.2009
(Steigmann J).
6
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[Vol.6 No.1
trifles.11 Consequently, only matters of wider community relevance are of
concern of the law, while issues which are irrelevant from the aspect of a
community as a whole, are usually not considered by the legislator. This
assures the consistency of the legal system, as intervention into irrelevant
details could disturb the balance within the legal system and diminish legal
certainty.12 In this sense the de minimis rule is particularly widespread in
criminal law, where certain de minimis conducts satisfying the definition of
an offense are nonetheless declared noncriminal, because they ‘‘really’’ do
not violate the legal virtue protected by the law (eg tipping the mailman is
not considered bribery, playing penny poker is not considered gambling,
etc).13 The de minimis rule is further relevant in the field of risk regulation
where it is assumed that risks that are highly unlikely to be realised (eg
where the probability is one in a million) do not need to be regulated.14
The de minimis rule can also be found in copyright law, where it applies
to a violation so trivial that the law will impose no consequence to it
because its effect on the copyright owner is so insignificant as to be
deemed meaningless. In the copyright context, de minimis can also be
applied to the use of a work which does not involve a high enough level of
copying to constitute substantial similarity - a required element of
actionable copying.15
In the following chapters the article focuses on the de minimis rule in the
substantive sense – ie not as an admissibility requirement for judicial
review, but as guidance to determine the most optimal content of the EU
substantive law.
III.
THE DE MINIMIS RULE UNDER EU SUBSTANTIVE LAW
1.
De Minimis Agreements between Undertakings
In the field of EU competition law the de minimis rule requires that
agreements between undertakings must have a considerably restrictive
effect upon free competition in order to be caught by Article 101 TFEU
11
Max L Veech and Charles R Moon, ‘De Minimis Non Curat Lex’, (1947) 45
Michigan L Rev 537.
12
Kranjc (n 5) 66.
13
Indian Penal Code 1860, sec 95 for example provides: ‘Nothing is an offence by
reason that is causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to
cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper
would complain of such harm.’
14
Matthew D Adler, ‘Why De Minimis?’ University of Pennsylvania Law School,
Public Law Research Paper No. 07-26, 2007 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=992878>
accessed 16 June 2013.
15
James B Astrachan, ‘De Minimus Copyright Infringement’ The Daily Record
(Baltimore MD, 2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1625037> accessed 16 June 2013
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34
(ex 81 EC), which prohibits agreements between undertakings; an agreement that
has a negligible effect on competition is not caught by the prohibition of
restricting competition and is as such acceptable. When considering the
illegality of agreements between undertakings, prohibited under Article
101 TFEU, the intensity of competition restrictive effect is thus of vital
importance. As long as agreements, decisions of associations and
concerted practices do not affect trade between EU Member States, they
are not prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU as the effect upon interstate
trade is one of the conditions for its application. Such agreements fall
under national law. Furthermore, Article 101(1) TFEU does not foresee
legal consequences for agreements that affect interstate trade and
competition but have only a marginal effect.16 The de minimis rule applies
to all agreements that restrict competition on the internal market;
however, it is assumed that they do not breach competition law as they
only have a minimal effect on competition and interstate trade.17
The effects of a particular agreement on competition and interstate trade
are determined using economic analysis. The Court, however, refuses to
apply purely a quantitative approach. Hence, for this rule to apply, a very
detailed analysis of the market is needed, determining the potential
market fragmentation, the competitors' market shares as well as the
general annual income of the company concerned.18 Despite meeting the
general criteria for the application of the de minimis rule, Article 101(1)
TFEU nevertheless applies to agreements between competitors, which
have as their object price fixing, limiting output or sales or the allocation
of markets or customers, as well as to agreements between noncompetitors, which determine sale prices or restrict the territory where
the buyer may sell the contracted goods or services. With regard to
agreements, where the competitors operate, for the purposes of the
agreement, at a different level of the production or distribution chain, any
of the abovementioned hard-core restrictions are prohibited.19 According
to Monti, this almost completely diminishes the importance of the de
16
Richard Wish, Competition Law (OUP 2009) 137-142.
Marjana Coronna, ‘Konkurenčno pravo EU in Mala in Srednja Podjetja’ (2002) 5
Podjetje in Delo 767. When considering minimal effect one must take into
consideration the Commission's Notice on agreements of minor importance - The
Commission has issued several such notices, the most recent of which appeared in
2001 – Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not
appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the
European Community (de minimis), OJ 2001/C 368/07.
18
See Martina Repas, Ekonomski Pristop Določanja Upoštevnega Trga v
Konkurenčnem Pravu EU (2010) II(1) LeXonomica 35-65. See Case 30/78 Distillers Co.
Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 2229, para 28 and Case 100/80 Musique Diffusion
Francaise v Commission [1983] ECR 1825.
19
Notice (n 17) point 11(3).
17
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minimis rule.20 On the other hand, Jones and Sufrin find that the exclusion
of agreements containing hard-core restraints from the ambit of the notice
does not mean that these agreements may never fall outside the scope of
Article 101(1) TFEU on grounds that they do not appreciably restrict
competition. Rather, this could reflect the view that where an agreement
contains particularly serious restrictions of competition from an EU
perspective, it will not be considered to be of minor importance unless the
parties’ market shares are considerably lower than set in the notice. Jones
and Sufrin thus conclude that ‘the more serious the restrain the less likely
it is to be insignificant’ and that it seems unlikely that the Commission
would allocate resources to cases in which market shares were small.21
Accordingly, the de minimis doctrine is particularly relevant for small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Agreements between them will rarely
have a negative effect on interstate trade in the EU and will thus fall under
the de minimis rule. 22 This enables the SMEs to avoid provisions of
competition law and the dangers of having an unenforceable agreement,
thereby saving money with regard to administrative costs and having a
better starting position when competing with giant agglomerations,
holdings and trusts.23
2.
De Minimis State Aids
The second area of EU competition law, which recognises the de minimis
rule, concerns state aids. In 2001 the Commission adopted a Regulation on
de minimis state aids whose purpose was to explain the application of the
rule to state aids. 24 Prior to the adoption of this Regulation it was,
however, unclear whether the rule applied to state aids or not, taking into
consideration that Article 107(1) TFEU (ex 87 EC) does not contain direct
grounds for the de minimis rule and that the European Court of Justice was
not very fond of it. Although the Court in 1970 in Commission v France25
implied that the amount of the aid is relevant and as a matter of principle
agreed that insignificant aids do not fall within the scope of Article 107(1)
20
Giorgio Monti, ‘New Directions in EC Competition Policy’ in T Tridimas and
others (eds), European Union Law for the Twenty-first Century: Internal Market and Free
Movement Community Policies, Vol II - Rethinking the New Legal Order. Essays in European
Law (Hart 2004) 187.
21
Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law (OUP 2011) 171-172; also
referring to Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds) The EC Law of Competition (OUP
2007) para 3.164.
22
Notice, (n 17) point 3.
23
Coronna (n 17) 769.
24
Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid [2001] OJ L10/30-32.
25
Case 47/69, [1970] ECR 487.
2013]
36
TFEU, in 1987 in France v Commission 26 , the Court decided that
circumstances in which the aid was awarded are of greater significance
than its scale. 27 Ferčič emphasises that in this context particular
importance is given to performance surpluses and to a high level of market
competition, which demand high cost effectiveness and produce low
profits.28
On the other hand, the Commission has recognised the de minimis rule in
the field of state aids already in 1992, providing that certain criteria have
been met. This recognition was legally disputable causing constant
dilemmas, which eventually led to the adoption of a de minimis state aid
Regulation in 2001, 29 which was later repealed by the Regulation
1998/2006 (De Minimis Regulation).30 The Regulation provides the criteria
for a de minimis aid, its legal consequences and control mechanisms. The de
minimis rule determines the amount of the state aid, below which Article
107(1) TFEU does not apply, as well as the respective public measures
which need not to be notified to the Commission. The rule is based on the
assumption that small amounts of aid generally do not affect market
competition and trade between two or more Member States.31
3.
De Minimis Public Purchasing
The third field of EU law applying the de minimis rule concerns public
purchasing. In order to apply EU rules to public purchasing, the ‘European
dimension’ condition must be met, which depends upon the value of
public purchasing.32 Purchasing that does not meet the values (thresholds)
is called ‘sub-dimensional public purchasing’. In this respect the de minimis
principle, as defined in Regulation 1177/2009,33 allows authorities to avoid
26
Case 259/85, [1987] ECR 4393.
Conor Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy (Hart Publishing 2009) 60-61.
28
Aleš Ferčič, Državne Pomoči Podjetje, Teorija, Praksa in Predpisi (Uradni list RS 2011)
67.
29
Regulation on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty.
30
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid [2006] OJ L379 p 510.
31
Ferčič (n 28) 68-69. See also Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of
25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings
providing services of general economic interest [2012]OJ L114/ 8-13.
32
The thresholds are dependent upon the subject-matter of public purchasing and
range between 125.000 (for public sector supply and service contracts) and 4,845.000
EUR (for public works concession contracts).
33
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1177/2009 of 30 November 2009 amending
Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and
27
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an expensive and lengthy tendering and award procedure for low-value
contracts where the costs of the procedure would exceed the public
welfare benefits of increased transparency and competition associated with
the procedure. On the other hand, it is understandable that the de minimis
principle also provides an incentive for authorities to divide contracts into
separate lots for the purpose of avoiding bothersome procedures. Although
this is prohibited by the Directive 2004/18/EC, 34 such avoidance of
procurement law is difficult to detect and enforce and it is thought to be
the main reason behind the low percentage of public contracts published
in the EU Official Journal.35
IV. DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE FIELD OF THE INTERNAL MARKET
FREEDOMS
In contrast to the competition law and public purchasing, the European
Court of Justice has, ever since Van de Haar,36 refused to apply the de
minimis rule in the field of the EU internal market.37 In Corsica Ferries the
Court even made a general statement claiming that ‘the articles of the (…)
Treaty concerning the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital are fundamental Community provisions and any restriction, even
minor, of that freedom is prohibited.’38 However, the Court’s case law of
the past twenty years regarding the topic of minor restrictions to trade has
not been consistent. The following chapters analyse the case-law of the
Court in which it has not expressly accepted the de minimis rule in the field
of the four freedoms, but how it has nevertheless given signs suggesting
that the de minimis rule is gaining ground in the field of the internal market
1.
Free Movement of Goods
Free movement of goods is founded on the removal of charges having
equivalent effect to customs as well as on prohibition of measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. Both concepts have been
interpreted by the Court as incompatible with the de minimis rule. Charges,
of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the
award of contracts [2009] OJ L314/64-65.
34
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March
2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts,
public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114-240.
35
Christopher Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 7172.
36
Joined Cases 177 and 178/82 Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka
de Meern BV [1984] ECR 1797.
37
See eg Case 269/83 Commission v France [1985] ECR 837.
38
Case C-49/89 Corsica Ferries France v Direction Générale des Douanes, [1989] ECR I4441, para 8.
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prohibited by Article 30 TFEU (ex 25 EC), have been defined as ‘any
pecuniary charge, however small and whatever designation and mode of
application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods
when they cross a frontier’.39 The Court consequently prohibited an Italian
statistical levy on goods exported to the other Member States and
explained that ‘the very low rate of the charge cannot change its character
with regard to (…) the legality of those charges’. Similarly broad is the
Court's definition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions prohibited by Article 34 TFEU (ex 28 EC). In Dassonville the
Court explained that ‘all trading rules enacted by Member States which are
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intraCommunity trade are to be considered as measures having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.’40 Considering the broad scope of
the Dassonville formula there was no room for the recognition of the de
minimis rule in the context of Article 34 TFEU.41 This was expressly held in
Van de Haar,42 where the Court clarified this refusal with the following
terms:
Article (34 TFEU), which seeks to eliminate national measures
capable of hindering trade between Member States, pursues an aim
different from that of Article (101), which seeks to maintain
effective competition between undertakings. A Court called upon
to consider whether national legislation is compatible with article
(34) of the Treaty must decide whether the measure in question is
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially,
intra-Community trade. That may be the case even though the
hindrance is slight and even though it is possible for imported
products to be marketed in other ways.43
39
Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193, para 7.
Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837, para 5. Reference to direct
and indirect, actual or potential hindrance to the trade between the Member States
the Court ‘borrowed’ from its first ruling in the competition law field – Joined Cases
56 and 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission
[1966] ECR 429, para 6. In this respect Steiner points out that the ‘effect upon intraCommunity trade’ criteria could serve as a limitation of the scope of Article 34
TFEU – J Steiner ‘Drawing the Line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC’ (1992) 26
CMLR 749.
41
For most recent case law, in which the Court still refers to the Dassonville formula,
see eg Case C-420/01, Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-6445, para 25; Case C-192/01,
Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, para 39; Case C-41/02, Commission v
Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, para 39, and Case C-147/04 De Groot en Slot Allium et
Bejo Zaden [2006] ECR I-245, para 71.
42
Jan van de Haar (n 36). See also Commission v France (n 37).
43
Jan van de Haar (n 36), para 14.
40
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The question of applicability of the de minimis rule has further been raised
in Bluhme. 44 The defendant breached the Danish rules prohibiting the
import of bees to a small island of Læso and some of its neighbouring
islands, the aim of which was to protect the Læso brown bee on the
islands. One of the arguments of the Danish government was that the
measure was not caught by Article 34 TFEU as it was of a de minimis
nature, considering that it only concerned 0,3 per cent of the Danish
territory. The Court rejected the argument.45 Similarly, in Yves Rocher the
Court again affirmed that with the exception of rules having a purely
hypothetical effect on intra-Community trade, Article 34 TFEU does not
draw any distinction, with regard to the degree of effect on trade, between
measures which can be classified as measures having equivalent effect to a
quantitative restriction.46
This position has, however, been refused by Advocate General Jacobs in
his well-known opinion in the case Leclerc-Siplec,47 where he presented his
critical standpoint towards the Keck and Mithouard48 judgment, where the
Court re-affirmed the discrimination principle. In this respect Jacobs
claimed that ‘all undertakings should have unfettered access to the whole
of the Community market’, and concluded that in order to prove a breach
of Article 34 TFEU a ‘substantial restriction on that access’ should be the
relevant factor, even though this amounts to the introduction of the de
44
Case C-67/97 Criminal Proceeding against Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033.
See also Joined Cases C-277, 318 and 319/91 Ligur Carni Srl and Genova Carni Srl v
Unità Sanitaria Locale [1993] ECR I-6621, concerning a prohibition of the
municipality of Genova in accordance with which traders importing fresh meat into
the municipality were banned from using their own means of transport to deliver
their goods within the territory of the municipality, unless they paid a local
undertaking the amount corresponding to the services which that undertaking
provided under an exclusive concession for handling in the municipal slaughterhouse,
transporting and delivering the goods in question. Although the rule was limited to
one municipality, it was found to breach Article 34 TFEU. Similarly, the Court
refused to apply the de minimis rule also in Case 16/83 Prantl [1984] ECR 1299;
Commission v France (n 37); and in Case 103/84 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 1759.
46
Case 126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e. V v Yves Rocher [1993]
ECR I-2361, para 21. See also Case C-292/92 Ruth Hünermund and others v
Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-6787, Opinion of AG
Tesauro.
47
Case C-412/93 Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité [1995] ECR I-179, Opinion of
AG Jacobs paras 195 and 196. See also his opinion in case C-112/00 Schmidberger v
Austria [2003] ECR I-5659, para 65, where he stated: ‘It would seem for example out
of the question that a brief delay to traffic on a road occasionally used for intraCommunity transport could in any way fall within the scope of Article (34). A longer
interruption on a major transit route may none the less call for a different
assessment.’
48
Joined Cases C-267 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097.
45
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40
minimis rule into Article 34 TFEU.49 Albeit Jacobs was aware that the
Court refused to apply the de minimis rule in its previous free movement of
goods case law, he insisted that ‘restrictions on trade should not be tested
against local conditions which happen to prevail in each Member State,
but against the aim of access to the entire Community market. A
discrimination test is therefore inconsistent as a matter of principle with
the aims of the Treaty’.50 In this respect Jacobs was surprised by the fact
that ‘in view of the avowed aim of preventing excessive recourse to Article
(34), the Court did not opt for such a solution in Keck.’ While applying
the de minimis rule to restrictions on advertising, which were at stake in
Leclerc-Siplec, Jacobs suggested that ‘a total ban on the advertising of a
product which may lawfully be sold in the Member State where the ban is
imposed and in other Member States cannot lie outside the scope of
Article (34).’51 Even though Jacobs applied the de minimis test the French
measure was nevertheless found to breach free movement of goods.52 The
Court, however, rejected his proposal altogether. On the basis of this case
law it may be concluded that a state measure can constitute a prohibited
measure having an equivalent effect even if: a) it is of relatively minor
economic significance; b) it is only applicable to a very limited
geographical part of a national territory; and c) it only affects a limited
number of imports/exports or a limited number of economic operators.53
Nevertheless, certain national rules have been found to fall outside the
scope of Article 34 TFEU if their restrictive effect on trade between
Member States is too uncertain and too indirect. In this respect the Court
held in Burmanjer 54 that the national rules at issue, which made the
itinerant sale of subscriptions to periodicals subject to prior authorisation,
had an effect on the marketing of products from other Member States that
was too insignificant and too uncertain to be regarded as being such as to
hinder or otherwise interfere with trade between Member States. That the
restrictive effects on the free movement of goods are ‘too uncertain and
too indirect to be considered to be an obstacle to trade between the
49
See para 42 of the opinion in Case C-412/93 (n 47). See also Rosa Greaves, ‘A
Commentary on Selected Opinions of Advocate General Jacobs’ (2006) 29 Fordham
Intl L J 690-715.
50
Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47), para. 40.
51
ibid para 50.
52
For a comment see Laurence Idot ‘Annotation, Case C-412/93, Société
d’Importation Édouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1’ (1996) 33 CMLR 120.
53
See Van de Haar (n 36); Commission v France (n 37); Commission v Italy (n. 41). See also
European Commission, Free Movement of Goods, Guide to the Application of
Treaty Provisions Governing the Free Movement of Goods, 2010
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/files/goods/docs/art3436/new_guide_en.pdf> accessed 16 June 2013).
54
Case C-20/03 Burmanjer and Others [2005] ECR I-4133.
41
[Vol.6 No.1
Member States’ was further held by the Court in BASF, 55 where the
President of the German Patent Office ruled that a European patent
belonging to BASF was void in Germany on grounds that its proprietor
had not filed a German translation of the patent specification. A similar
decision was also adopted in Krantz, 56 where a German debt collector
seized all the movable property found on the premises of the company in
order to recover a tax debt. The Court ruled that the possibility of
nationals of other Member States hesitating to sell goods on instalment
terms to purchasers because such goods could be liable to seizure by the
collector of taxes if the purchasers failed to discharge its tax debts was ‘too
uncertain and indirect to warrant the conclusion that a national provision
authorizing such seizure is liable to hinder trade between Member States’.57
From this series of cases a conclusion can be made that Article 34 TFEU is
not breached by national legislation which makes no distinction between
the origin of the substance transported, whose purpose is not to regulate
trade in goods with other Member States and whose potential restrictive
effects on the free movement of goods are too uncertain and too indirect
to be regarded as a hindrance to trade between Member States.58
Furthermore, the applicability of Article 35 TFEU (ex 29 EC), which
prohibits trade barriers to export, was narrowed in Italo Fenocchio.59 From
the latter it is evident that with regard to measures with an effect equal to
quantitative restrictions in exports, the de minimis test must be used,
according to which the remoteness of the effect on exports is assessed.
The case referred to a national provision prohibiting the issuance of a
summary payment order in cases where the defendant lived in another
Member State. The plaintiff believed that such a provision restricted
exports but the Court did not agree, explaining that ‘the possibility that
nationals would therefore hesitate to sell goods to purchasers established
in other Member States is too uncertain and indirect for that national
55
Case C-44/98 BASF v Präsident des Deutschen Patentamts [1999] ECR I-6269.
Case C-69/88 Krantz [1990] ECR I-583, para 11.
57
ibid para 11.
58
See eg Catherine Barnard, ‘Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and
Persons Jigsaw’ (2001) 26 European L Rev 52.
See Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para. 24. The case concerned the rules
applicable to the discharge of hydrocarbons and other harmful substances into the
sea. See also Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter v Pelin Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I5009, para. 12 – in this Case a German importer was required to inform the purchaser
of a Yamaha motorcycle that German dealers, authorized by the Yamaha
corporation, often refused to carry out repairs under the warranty for vehicles which
were subject to parallel imports. The test has also been applied in Cases C-266/96
Corsica Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949, para. 31 and C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto
[1995] ECR I-2883, para 41.
59
Case C-412/97 ED Srl v Italo Fenocchio [1999] ECR I-3845.
56
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42
provision to be regarded as liable to hinder trade between Member
States.’60
2.
Free Movement of Workers
Just like in the field of free movement of goods, the Court has also not
expressly recognised the application of the de minimis rule in the field of
free movement of workers. In Bosman61 it was held that free movement of
workers is based on the market access principle. Even though citizenship
played no role in the application of the disputed rules, this did not prevent
the Court from applying Article 45 TFEU (ex 39 EC). Based on this ruling
the Court further held in Graf that ‘(p)rovisions which, even if they are
applicable without distinction, preclude or deter a national of a Member
State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to
freedom of movement […] constitute an obstacle to that freedom (of
movement of workers, N/A). However, in order to be capable of
constituting such an obstacle, they must affect access of workers to the
labour market.’ 62 The Graf case concerned German regulation which
prevented workers from receiving compensation on termination of
employment in cases when it was the worker, as opposed to the employer,
who terminated the employment contract. The Court's ruling is important
from the point of view of application of the de minimis rule to the field of
the internal market, for the Court introduced the test of an ‘uncertain and
indirect’63 restriction to free movement from Krantz and other rulings to
the field of free movement of workers and furthermore decided that such
barriers do not breach Article 45 TFEU. Due to the fact that the
respective national regulation did not deny workers the right to
compensation on termination of employment because they terminated the
employment contract for reasons of finding employment in another
Member State, the Court found that ‘such an event is too uncertain and
indirect a possibility for legislation to be capable of being regarded as liable
to hinder freedom of movement for workers’.64 With this the de minimis
rule was introduced into the scope of this freedom.65
60
ibid para 11.
Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and others v
Jean Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. For comments see Amicam Omer Kranz, ‘The
Bosman Case: The Relationship between European Union Law and the Transfer
System in European Football’ (1999) 5 Columbia J Eur L 431; Stephen Weatherill,
‘Comment on Case C-415/95, Bosman’ (1995) 32 CMLR 991; Jukka Snell, Goods and
Services in EC Law: A Study of the Relationship between the Freedoms (OUP 2002), fn 99.
62
Case C-190/98 Volker Graf [2000] ECR I-493, para 23.
63
French: aléatoire et indirecte; German: ungewiß und indirekt.
64
Volker Graf (n 62) para 25.
65
See also Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP 2006) 491.
61
43
3.
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Free Movement of Services and Freedom of Establishment
As was the case with free movement of goods and workers, the Court has
likewise not expressly accepted the de minimis rule in the field of free
movement of services. In Säger v Dennemeyer66 the Court explained that
Article 56 TFEU (ex 49 EC)
requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against a
person providing services on the ground of his nationality but also
the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction
to national providers of services and to those of other Member
States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the
activities of a provider of services established in another Member
State where he lawfully provides similar services.67
This ruling follows the all-encompassing interpretation of the internal
market freedoms in line with the Dassonville formula. Notwithstanding
this, however, signs suggesting that the de minimis rule is gaining ground
can also be found in the field of free movement of services. In this regard,
Viacom II68 is authoritative. In this case it was disputed whether a special
municipal tax on poster advertising constituted a (part of the) service
which must be paid for by the recipient of the service. The recipient of the
service claimed that such a tax (which amounted to more than two
hundred EUR) was prohibited by Article 56 TFEU (ex 49 EC). Despite the
fact that the tax itself was non-discriminatory, the recipient claimed that it
represented an obstacle to the free movement of services which, taking
into account the rule referred to in Säger,69 should not exist. The Court
held that such a tax
is fixed at a level which may be considered modest in relation to the
value of the services provided which are subject to it’ and that ‘the
levying of such a tax is not on any view liable to prohibit, impede or
otherwise make less attractive the provision of advertising services
to be carried out in the territory of the municipalities concerned.70
Accordingly, the tax was found not to be in contravention of Article 56
TFEU, as it was neither discriminatory nor too high. By applying the latter
condition, the Court has actually introduced the de minimis rule into
66
Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-4221.
ibid para 12.
68
Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor Srl v Giotto Immobilier SARL [2005] ECR I-1167.
69
Säger v Dennemeyer (n 66).
70
Viacom (n 68) para. 38.
67
2013]
44
Article 56 TFEU. 71 Similarly in Mobistar, 72 where municipal legislation
imposing a tax on pylons, mast and transmission antennae for mobile
communication systems was challenged, the Court observed that
‘measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in respect
of the service in question and which affect in the same way the provision
of services between Member States and that within one Member State, do
not fall within the scope of Article (56) of the Treaty’.73 Meulman and
Waele thus conclude that with regard to the service provision, permissible
measures under Article 56 TFEU could in the future be those which would
apply without distinction - either consisting of minor obstacles to market
access or failing that, affecting in the same manner, in law and in fact both,
bilateral and unilateral service transactions. 74 Arnull similarly concludes
that Article 56 TFEU ‘bites only where there is more than a remote or
uncertain effect on freedom of movement’.75
Additionally, the de minimis rule can also be found in the field of freedom
of establishment. In Semeraro Casa,76 which concerned Italian legislation on
closing retail outlets on Sundays and public holidays, the Court decided, in
line with Article 49 TFEU (ex 43 EC), that the legislation in question was
applicable to all traders exercising their activity on national territory; that
its purpose was not to regulate the conditions concerning the
establishment of the undertakings concerned; and that any restrictive
effects which it might have on the freedom of establishment were ‘too
uncertain and indirect for the obligation laid down to be regarded as being
capable of hindering that freedom’.77 Consequently, the Court found that
the freedom of establishment did not preclude national rules from
regulating the closing times of shops.
4.
Free Movement of Capital
A focus on impediments to market access, which tries to be
accommodated with the de minimis test can also be traced in the field of
free movement of capital. A de minimis exception within the ambit of this
freedom has been suggested by the United Kingdom in the golden shares
71
Johen Meulman and Henri de Waele, ‘A Retreat from Säger? Servicing or FineTuning the Application of Article 49 EC’ (2006) 33 L Issues of Economic Integration
226.
72
Joined Cases C-544 and 545/03 Mobistar SA v Commune de Fléron [2005] ECR I-7723.
73
ibid, para 31.
74
ibid. See also Rajko Knez, Prosto Opravljanje Storitev in Razvoj Sodne Prakse do
Leta 2006 – Ali je Zadeva Säger še Pomembna? (2007) 2 Revizor 115.
75
Arnull (n 65) 492, also referring to Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685 and
Joined Cases C-51 and 191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549.
76
Case C-418/93 Semeraro di casa [1996] ECR I-2975.
77
ibid para 32.
45
[Vol.6 No.1
case,78 where the UK government argued that the national measures at
issue were not of such a nature as to restrict access to the market, for they
were too uncertain and too indirect to amount to a restriction on the
freedoms and would thus not be subject to Article 63 TFEU (ex 56 EC).
The Court entered into a substantive examination of the effects of the
national measures, which it would not have done, had it proceeded from
the assumption that such a consideration would be inadmissible with
respect to the free movement of capital. 79 Hindelang states that in
principle any national measure ultimately affects the access of capital to a
market, whereas many do it only insignificantly. By paraphrasing the
Court’s judgment in the UK golden shares case he concludes that a
measure substantially impedes market access when it affects ‘the position
of a person acquiring a shareholding as such’,80 which must be left to the
Court to clarify – in a casuistic way.81
5.
Rocky Road to Define De Minimis in the Internal Market Field
From the above analysis it may be deduced that the Court has never
explicitly applied the de minimis rule to the field of the internal market;
even so, some measures in the field of all four freedoms are considered as
insubstantially restricting market access and are thus not caught by the
articles of the Treaty regulating the freedoms. Since there are different
opinions among commentators whether ‘substantial restriction’ (also called
the ‘remoteness’) test is in fact a form of the de minimis rule or not, it is
submitted that from the author’s point of view there are two aspects of the
‘de minimis’ rule in the field of the internal market:
a) De minimis in terms of quantity: this is de minimis in the sense the
European Court of Justice understands it. When the Court has
ruled in Van de Haar82 that the de minimis rule is not acceptable in
the area of free movement, it has taken more of a quantity approach
– i.e. the number of concerned products. According to the Court’s
view, for a certain measure to be challenged under free movement
rules it does not have to affect a great amount of products (workers,
services or capital flows); it suffices for a natural person to be
restricted when importing a single product and reliance on Article 34
TFEU is already allowable.
78
Case C-98/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-4641, para 36.
Steffen Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment, (OUP
2009) 126.
80
Commission v United Kingdom (n 78) para 61.
81
ibid 127.
82
Jan van de Haar (n 36).
79
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46
b) De minimis in terms of quality: here de minimis is not about the
number of the concerned products, workers, services, capital flows,
but about the intensity of a measure’s effect. 83 If the factors of
production are heavily affected, if the measure has a significant
(certain and direct) effect on the market access, then the measure
will be caught by the principles on fundamental freedoms. If,
however, the effect of the measure is ‘too uncertain and indirect’,
‘too remote’, if it lacks significant effect on the market access, then
it is not caught by the Treaties. The Court recognised this in a
series of cases, eg in Kranz, although in a non-consistent manner and
without detailed explanation what the terms, such as significant,
certain, direct and remote mean.
As the word significant is considerably ambiguous and cannot be expressed
in quantitative terms it is a convenient concept of interpretation for both
advocates of a centralist and decentralist internal market. The remoteness
test is closely related to the question of causality or to the jurisdictional
criteria, according to which measures having no effect on cross-border
trade stay in the national autonomy, whereas those having (any) effect on
trade are within the scope of the fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, the
de minimis rule in this sense is not just about causality, but it requires a
significant effect upon the cross-border trade for a measure to legitimately
fall within the Treaty.
In this respect Jacobs explains that where a measure prohibits the sale of
goods lawfully placed on the market in another Member State (as in Cassis
de Dijon), it may be presumed to have a substantial impact on access to the
market, since the goods are either denied access altogether or can gain
access only after being modified in some way; the need to modify the
goods is in itself a substantial barrier to market access.84 On the other
hand, however, one cannot claim the same for measures applicable without
distinction, which simply restrict certain selling arrangements, by
stipulating when, where, how, by whom or at what price the goods may be
sold. Whether such measures significantly hinder free movement would,
according to Jacobs, depend on a number of factors, such as whether it
applies to certain goods,85 to most goods86 or to all goods87 on the extent to
83
In this sense de minimis is understood, eg, by Arnull (n 65) 491; Hindelang (n 79) 125;
and Christoph Krenn, ‘A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect ‘jigsaw’: Horizontal
Direct Effect and the Free Movement of Goods’, (2012) 49 CMLR 210-212.
84
Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) para 44.
85
As in Case 75/81 Belgium v Blesgen [1982] ECR 1211, in the Case 382/87 Buet [1989]
ECR 1235 or in Case C-23/89 Quitlynn [1990] ECR I-3059.
86
As in Case 145/88 Torfaen BC v B&Q [1989] ECR 3851.
47
[Vol.6 No.1
which other selling arrangements remain available, and on whether the
effect of the measure is direct or indirect, immediate or remote, or purely
speculative 88 and uncertain. 89 Accordingly, Jacobs emphasises that the
magnitude of the barrier to market access may vary enormously: it may
range from the insignificant to a quasi-prohibition. In this respect the de
minimis test could perform a useful function.90 His explicit proposal in
Leclerc-Siplec to introduce the de minimis test to the field of the internal
market freedoms thus understandably led to mixed responses.
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADOPTING THE DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE
INTERNAL MARKET FIELD
Scholars offer various explanations why EU law recognises the de minimis
rule in the field of competition law but not in the field of the internal
market.
1.
The Difference between the Internal Market and Competition Law
Gormley recognises the differences between the two fields, emphasising
that the internal market and competition law have different roles and
subject-matter, which makes the de minimis rule more appropriate to one
field than the other. 91 He particularly highlights that competition law
concentrates on the effects a measure has on patterns of trade between
Member States and not on effects on trade itself, which is a much simpler
concept.92 At the same time competition law, as opposed to the internal
market, does not assist in the removal of national hindrances to trade
between Member States through negative integration. Davies, on the other
hand, with regard to the differences between the two fields, highlights that
competition law is able to build itself around non-legal ideas, as no
competition case is complete without a market survey, while free
movement law lacks enthusiasm for empiricism, particularly because free
movement cases do not tend to pass through the Commission on their way
to the Court, but rather arise from preliminary references by national
courts. Since the Court decides principles rather than facts, which are then
applied by the national courts to the individual facts, claims Davies, the
Court held in O'Flynn93 that in order to establish discrimination it is not
87
Keck and Mithouard (n 48).
As an example Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) refers to para. 15 of the Court’s
judgment in Case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent [1992] ECR I-6635.
89
For example Case C-69/88 Krantz [1990] ECR I-583, para 11 of the judgment.
90
Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) para. 45.
91
Laurence W Gormley, ‘Competition and Free Movement: Is the Internal Market
the Same as a Common Market?’ (2002) 13 Eur Business L Rev 517, 520.
92
Thereby referring to Case 15/79 P.B. Groenveld BV [1979] ECR 3409.
93
Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617.
88
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48
necessary to show an ‘actual’ disparate impact on the internal market, but
merely that a measure is liable to have one.94 Furthermore, since market
surveys cost money, competition law is concerned merely with big
commerce, significant restrictions and important economic players, who
have such money, whereas free movement often concerns small players,
like Bosman. Requiring market investigations in order to determine
whether such small player’s rights to free movement have been breached
would almost certainly mean denying them of their rights. On these bases,
Davies concludes that market language cannot automatically be transferred
from one field to another.95
2.
Public and Private Interventions in the Market
An additional reason for refusing the de minimis rule to enter the field of
the internal market is that the freedoms predominantly concern the
measures of Member States and not those of private entities, as is the case
with competition law. It is the public bodies who should have a greater
responsibility for the functioning of the internal market than private
entities. In this respect Barents observed years ago that ‘state
interventions on the market may be said to have an appreciable effect by
their very nature’,96 whereas Krenn recently proposed a more convergent
approach towards public and private intervention on the market and
argued in favour of introducing the horizontal direct effect of Article 34
TFEU accompanied by a recognition of the de minimis rule97 in order to
prohibit only those barriers of private entities that significantly hinder
access to the market. According to his opinion, most private measures
would not be caught by Article 34 TFEU as there are alternative channels
to market goods; the recognition of the horizontal direct effect of Article
34 TFEU as a matter of principle would, however, bring free movement of
goods in line with the case law in the field of personal freedoms.
3.
National Courts’ Concern
An additional explanation for the refusal of the de minimis rule in the field
of the internal market was given by Advocate General Jacobs, 98 who
pointed out the danger of applying the de minimis test to all measures
affecting trade in goods, as this might induce national courts, who are
primarily responsible for the application of the fundamental freedoms, to
94
ibid para 21.
Gareth Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (Kluwer
2003) 96-98.
96
Rene Barents, ‘Measures of Equivalent Effect: Some Recent Developments’ (1981)
18 CMLR 287.
97
Krenn (n 83) 177-215.
98
95
49
[Vol.6 No.1
exclude too great a number of measures from the scope of the prohibition
laid down by this provision. Similarly, Mortelmans pointed out that the de
minimis test would not assure clear guidelines for the explanation of
judgements by national courts, as it would demand a complete review of
the legal and economic framework,99 while Oliver warned that reliance on
statistical data would lead to depraved results as the legality of a measure
could change on a monthly basis. 100 Oliver thus claimed that the
application of the de minimis rule to the internal market freedoms would
cause practical problems, introduce a new element of legal uncertainty and
consequently make it much more difficult for national courts to apply the
internal market provisions of the Treaty. 101 Finally, Advocate General
Tesauro was of the opinion that ‘to apply a de minimis rule in the field of
trade in goods (…) is, it seems to me, very difficult, if not downright
impossible’.102 Jacobs, who generally defended the application of the de
minimis rule to the field of the freedoms, warned that caution must be
exercised and if the de minimis test is to be introduced, the circumstances,
under which it should be applied, must be carefully defined. 103 He
particularly pointed out that it would not be appropriate to apply the de
minimis test to measures which overtly discriminated against goods from
other Member States; such measures should remain, in line with the per se
prohibition of overtly discriminatory measures, prohibited by Article 34
TFEU even if their effect on inter-State trade is only slight.104 According
to Jacobs, the introduction of a substantial restriction on market access
requirement would therefore only be necessary in relation to measures
which are applicable without distinction to domestic goods and goods
from other Member States.105
4.
Fundamental Principles Argument
The final reason why the Court refused to apply the de minimis rule to the
field of economic freedoms, as is evident from Corsica Ferries, might lie in
the fact that it considers the freedoms as fundamental principles of EU law
99
Kamiel Mortelmans, ‘Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to
Market Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition’ (1991) 28 CMLR 127
and Kamil Mortelmans, ‘Towards Convergence in the Application of Rules on Free
Movement and on Competition?’ (2001) 38 CMLR 626.
100
Peter Oliver, ‘Some Further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28-30’ (1999) 36
CMLR 796.
101
Peter Oliver (ed) Oliver on Free Movement of Goods in the European Union (Hart
Publishing 2010) 92-93, para 6.18.
102
Ruth Hünermund (n 48) Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 21.
103
104
ibid para 43.
105
ibid para 44.
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50
where all barriers should be prohibited, including minor ones106 - much the
same as the de minimis rule cannot be applied to the field of human rights.
On the other hand, the Court also regards Article 101 TFEU to be ‘a
fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the
tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of
the internal market’, 107 but even so this provision is subject to the de
minimis rule. This speaks in favour of a systematic recognition of the de
minimis rule in the internal market field.
VI. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE
INTERNAL MARKET FIELD
1.
Sensible and Mature Market Regulation
According to Greaves, the proposal of Advocate General Jacobs in LeclercSiplec is highly persuasive and has much in its favour as it reflects the
competition law approach to the field of the internal market freedoms.
This makes sense, says Greaves, as the two share a common objective,
which is to integrate national markets into a single market, undivided by
national territorial boundaries, national laws and regulations or private
contractual arrangements.108 In this respect O’Keeffe and Bavasso note
that the aim of creating an internal market constitutes ‘a unifying thread’
between EU internal trade law and competition law and that the ‘common
ancestry’ of competition and free movement can be traced to the fact that
both sets of rules are subject to an assessment of the effect on trade
between Member States.109 Krenn too is of the opinion that excluding
certain insignificant threats from the scope of the freedoms would be a
sign of maturity in the application of the internal market provisions,
allowing efficient control of those measures that do present a significant
peril to the internal market. This is accepted as common sense in
competition law and should, according to Krenn, be accepted also with
106
Corsica Ferries (n 38), para 8; Case C-212/06 Government of Communauté française and
Gouvernement wallon v Gouvernement flamand [2008] ECR 1683, para 52. See Oliver (n
101) 91, para 6.18.
107
Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, [1999]
ECR 3055, para. 36.
108
Greaves (n 49) 696. See also Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker,
‘Die Bedeutung der Wettbewerbsregeln in der Wirtschaftsvefassung der EG‘ in
Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds) Wettbewerbsrecht, Volume. 1
Part 1(Beck, 2007) 26.
109
David O'Keeffe and Antonio Bavasso, ‘Four Freedoms, One Market and National
Competence: In Search of a Dividing Line’ in David O'Keeffe and Antonio Bavasso
(eds) Judicial Review in European Union Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 543-544.
51
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regard to Article 34 TFEU. 110 Krenn furthermore stresses that the
thresholds for the application of the de minimis rule to the field of the
internal market will necessarily differ from the ones in the field of
competition law, thereby advocating the effet utile approach in the field of
the internal market in order to effectively monitor significant threats to
the internal market.111
In this respect Perišin points out that nothing distinguishes the de minimis
rule from other formulas, such as the one for selling arrangements in the
Keck ruling, emphasising that all substantive assessments of a measure leave
a degree of discretion to the adjudicator which can cause legal
uncertainty.112 The latter has been defined by Advocate General Kokott as
the main downside of the de minimis rule in the field of the internal
market,113 however, Perišin states that the de minimis rule is a substantive
criteria and as such much more appropriate than formal criteria, such as
the one in the Keck formula, which, according to Kokott’s opinion, should
also be applied to measures concerning the use of goods.
2.
Subsidiarity Aspect – More Legitimate Market Regulation
Perhaps the most important advantage of the de minimis rule is that it
presents a convenient concept for reducing centralisation in the field of
the internal market and it balances free trade and national autonomy. The
rule addresses questions about the desirable degree of market integration
as well as the recommendable scope of prohibition within the EU law.
These issues touch upon the main problem that is the line between
legitimate and illegitimate national legislation: how many restrictions can
the internal market handle and when do national measures need to be
removed. The establishment of the internal market has brought many
advantages to the EU Member States and can in this respect be considered
as indisputable success. Nevertheless, economic liberalisation has
inevitably also brought costs to the Member States. These are related not
only to the loss of national legislative autonomy far beyond strict market
law, but also to the resulting erosion of national social and cultural values.
This often occurred without discussing various institutional alternatives
that are available when setting legal rules, even though economic analyses
110
Krenn (n 83) 211 – referring to Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio
Monti, European Union Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 754.
111
Krenn (n 83) 211.
112
Tamara Perišin, Free Movement of Goods and Limits of Regulatory Autonomy in the EU
and WTO (T.M.C. Asser Press 2008) 39.
113
Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] ECR I-4273,
Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 46.
2013]
52
pose various issues of democracy.114
The application of the de minimis rule to various fields of EU law reflects
the principle of subsidiarity, which was introduced to the Treaties in order
to increase the flexibility of European governance and to limit
centralism.115 It protects the rights of the national legislators to choose
between various political alternatives within the scope of their
competences and discretions. 116 Each institution entrusted with the
regulation of the internal market needs to protect, according to the
principle of subsidiarity, the appropriate balance between different goals
of EU legal acts. Namely, the main goal of the EU is to achieve optimal
benefits for society by balancing free trade interests with other EU and
Member States' interest. In this respect, the recognition of the de minimis
rule in the field of the internal market is in line with the abovementioned
statement of the former internal market Commissioner McCreevy on the
need of the internal market to become more decentralised. In this regard
the principle of subsidiarity must be taken into consideration when
adopting EU secondary legislation as well as when interpreting the
provisions of the EU Treaties. Substantive market rules (eg the Dassonville
formula) are in fact hidden institutional criteria for the division of powers
between EU institutions and Member States. In line with this the
principle of subsidiarity requires genuine institutional criteria which will
enable the identification of situations where complete unification of
market law is legitimate and where it is not, or in other words, where the
effectiveness of the internal market requires diversity (ie preservation of
various national rules) and where unification is needed (ie common rules).
In this context the de minimis rule presents an important concept for the
enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity in the field of the internal
market. As Perišin points out, it is appropriate, in view of EU's ambitious
aims - primarily the creation of a single market, to go beyond nonprotectionism, which is still the main requirement of the WTO, and even
beyond non-discrimination. She emphasises, however, that times have
114
Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, The European Court of Justice and the European
Economic Constitution, A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Hart Publishing
1998); Neil K Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics
and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press 1994).
115
See art 5(3) TEU.
116
George A Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States’, (1994) 94 Columbia L Rev 332-455; Grainne de
Burca, ‘Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam’, Harvard Jean
Monnet Working Paper, No. 7/1999; Thomas Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the
European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?’, (2012) 50
Journal of Common Market Studies 267-282.
53
[Vol.6 No.1
changed since Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon,117 as it is no longer necessary
for the freedoms to be as broad as to cover all obstacles to trade and that
the Court's review of measures only remotely connected to the internal
market would present an unnecessary burden for national regulatory
autonomy. This would furthermore also endanger the legitimacy of the
EU. In this regard Perišin notices that an approach based on substantial
hindrance of market access seems to be developing and advocates that only
this kind of measures should be caught by the EU Treaties.118
Broadening the concept of uncertain and indirect hindrances to free
movement, which are not prohibited by EU law, is also in line with the
Court's interpretation of Article 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC), considering its
emphasis in the tobacco advertising case119 that recourse to Article 114
TFEU as a legal basis is only possible if the ‘aim is to prevent the
emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious
development of national laws’, adding that ‘the emergence of such
obstacles must be likely’120 and that reliance on Article 114 TFEU is not
legitimate ‘when the measure to be adopted only incidentally harmonises
market conditions within the Community’.121 For this reason the Court
held that Article 114 TFEU cannot be applied to the so-called static
advertising media as the effect on free movement of goods was too ‘remote
and indirect’.122
As an instrument for establishing balance between state and federal
authorities in the field of interstate regulation, the de minimis rule is also
117
Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de
Dijon) [1979] ECR 649.
118
Perišin (n 112) 39.
119
Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, para
86.
120
ibid para 86.
121
ibid para 33.
122
ibid para. 109. It is also worth noting that since the Council Regulation (EC) No
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1-25 entered into force,
argumentation that enforcement of competition law is centralised, whereas
enforcement of the de minimis rule in the field of market freedoms by national
authorities would keep too many (significant) hindrances to the internal market, is
no longer convincing. Regulation 1/2003 provides for a decentralised application of
arts 101 and 102 TFEU by the Commission, national competition authorities and
national courts – arts 4, 5 and 6 of the Regulation 1/2003. See for example Jones and
Sufrin (n 21) 1021 and Michael J Frese, ‘Decentralised Enforcement of EU
Competition Law and the Institutional Autonomy of the Member States: A Case
Commentary’, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 201104.
2013]
54
applied in the USA. In the famous Pike v Church123 case, the US Supreme
Court decided: ‘where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in Hughes v Oklahoma124 that ‘the
range of regulations that a State may adopt […] is extremely broad,
particularly where, as here, the burden on interstate commerce is, at most,
minimal’, and judge Frankfurter noted in H P Hood & Sons125 that ‘[b]ehind
the distinction between 'substantial' and 'incidental' burdens upon
interstate commerce is a recognition that, in the absence of federal
regulation, it is sometimes (…) of greater importance that local interests be
protected than that interstate commerce be not touched.’ Finally, the case
of Jones & Laughlin Steel should be pointed out, where the Supreme Court
warned that competences to regulate interstate trade must be assessed ‘in
the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as
to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that
to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government.’126 This proves the Supreme
Court’s practical orientation towards assuring a workable market, whereas
the refusal to apply the de minimis test systematically in the EU internal
market shows the EU Court’s determination to establish an ideal internal
market, despite the fact that the former judge of the Court Jann
realistically noted that: ‘Discussions must concentrate on the common
market that truly exists and not on the ideal market that has no failures.
The latter simply does not exist’.127
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The de minimis rule is recognised in various legal fields, within procedural
as well as substantive law. Even though this rule is derived from various
laws, executive acts and case law and has broad support by scholars, Adler
emphasises that relying on the de minimis rule is not morally justifiable.
123
Pike v Bruce Church, Inc 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Hughes v Oklahoma 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
125
H P Hood & Sons, Inc v Du Mond 336 U. S. 525, at 567 (1949).
126
301 U.S. 1 (1937) at 37. See also United States v Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) where it
has been decided that: ‘Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce’; and Wickard v Filburn 317 U.S. 111
(1942), where the Supreme Court held that the Congress may regulate activity that
‘exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.
127
Interview with the Judge Peter Jann, Trybunal Sprawiedliwosci i Integracija,
Radca Prawny (12 February. 2002) 100.
124
55
[Vol.6 No.1
According to him, de minimis tests have no basis in the ideal moral theory.
The ideal moral theory provides norms for idealized decision makers, who
are fully rational and motivated to comply with the norms. Although there
are no ideal decision makers, ideal moral theories can be seen as a useful
analytical tool to review legal rules in general, including the de minimis
rule.128 The ideal moral theory ignores the problems of bounded rationality
and imperfect compliance,129 however, Adler finds that none of the moral
theories would direct an idealized government decision maker, who is fully
rational and conscientious in complying with the demands of the theory,
to employ a de minimis test.130
In contrast to these general conclusions about the de minimis rule, one may
nevertheless conclude that this rule has a rather different meaning under
EU internal market law, as it increases the autonomy of national
authorities, thereby strengthening democratic decision-making in the EU
as a multi-level governance system. On the basis of this rule, Member
States keep their competences in the field of market law with regard to
rules which do not formally discriminate between domestic and foreign
goods, people, services and capital, the purpose of which is not to regulate
trade with other Member States and whose potential restrictive effects on
the functioning of the internal market are too uncertain and too indirect
for the obligation which they lay down to be regarded as being in breach of
the EU Treaties. In this respect one may argue that it is immoral (or at
least democratically illegitimate) for EU law to prohibit all Member States’
trading rules, as the European Court of Justice has proclaimed in its 40year old judgment of Dassonville.
As the Court already discovered twenty years ago that the Dassonville
formula was too wide, that Member States did not approve of it and that,
despite its breadth it still did not enable effective enforcement of the
internal market law, the Court narrowed it down by forming a formal
(Keck) test, according to which rules on selling arrangements were left to
national autonomy. By contrast, the de minimis test is a substantive test,
which does not differentiate between rules on certain selling arrangements
and the characteristics of goods, but regardless of the content of a rule it is
judged by its effect on the internal market – in so far as this effect is not
significant, the rule does not breach EU law. Additionally, systematic
recognition of the rule would facilitate the understanding of the horizontal
128
In this respect the latter can be compared to the plea of statute of limitations (or
lapse of time) which, as stated already in Roman law, is predominantly used by
dishonest people.
129
More about these theories in Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (Westview Press
1998).
130
Adler (n 14) 2007, p. 9.
2013]
56
direct effect of the freedoms and enable the EU Court of Justice to accept
the horizontal direct effect in the field of free movement of goods and
capital.131 In accordance with the de minimis rule, insignificant barriers to
free movement imposed by private entities would not present a breach of
the internal market rules, whereas national measures would be subdued to
a ‘remoteness’ test, which would measure how direct the impact of the
rules concerned is on free movement of goods, workers, services and
capital between Member States. In this respect all four freedoms could
prohibit formally (directly) as well as actually (indirectly) discriminatory
measures that significantly hinder access to the market – such as a
complete prohibition of selling certain goods or providing certain
services, 132 whereas national and private measures with an insignificant
effect on the internal market, could remain.
Despite all the advantages of the transfer of the de minimis rule from the
EU competition law to the field of the internal market, the actual transfer
is all but easy. It must foremost be accepted that the rule is not identical in
both fields, as its purpose is not the same. In this respect one cannot count
on having concrete mathematical criteria for defining a significant and an
insignificant (remote, uncertain, indirect) restriction to the single internal
market. One must also recognise that although the de minimis rule would
increase the autonomy of the Member States in the market field and thus
increase the legitimacy of EU law in light of the subsidiarity principle,
most national courts would not necessarily accept such broader
competences with delight. 133 An additional difficulty related to the
application of the de minimis rule by national courts lies in the fact that
even within a single Member State national judges might come to different
conclusions. This is the main concern of advocates of centralism in the
market field as differential application of the rule can lead to
compartmentalisation of the single market. In this respect, the de minimis
rule would firstly have to be interpreted by the EU Court of Justice and
only when sufficient criteria would be developed through its case law, as
131
For the latter see eg Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany (Volkswagen) [2007] ECR
I-8995; on the issue of horizontal direct effect of art 63 TFEU see Siniša Rodin, Ford,
Dodge i Lehtinen – šutnja je Zlato, Banka 24.5.2012.
132
Eg Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen v Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. For a
comment see Perišin (n 112), 41.
133
In this respect some parallels could be drawn between the review of the de minimis
rule and the principle of proportionality. With regard to the latter, the English Judge
Mustill in W. H. Smith Do-It-All and Payless DIY Ltd v Peterborough City
Council, 1990 (2) CMLR 577 asked rhetorically: ‘How could [say] a desire to keep the
Sabbath holy be measured against the free-trade economic premises of the common
market?’ See more in Richard Rawlings, ‘The Eurolaw Game: Some Deductions from
a Saga’ (1993) 20 J L & Society 309.
57
[Vol.6 No.1
was also the case with the principle of proportionality, would it be
reasonable to transfer this competence to national courts.
Considering all the arguments in favour and against the application of the
de minimis rule to the field of the internal market it may be concluded that
this rule probably presents the least worrisome contribution of the EU
Court of Justice (and the Commission) towards the decentralisation of the
internal market regulation and the increase of its legitimacy. Any other
demands made by the Member States for the enhancement of their
autonomy as market regulators would probably have much greater
consequences for the effectiveness of the internal market.

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