Al-Qaeda at the Crossroads

UNDERSTANDING ISIS
Dr. Shiraz Maher
Structure of lecture
1. ISIS History & Context
2. What are they doing?
3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation
4. Women within ISIS
5. Potential threat to the West
ISIS History: 2003 - 2010
2003 invasion of
Iraq
Al-Qaeda in Iraq
created
- Led by Abu Musab alZarqawi (2003 – June
2006)
Mujahideen Shura Council
(MSC) created to unite
jihadi Sunni tribes
January 2006
MSC declares Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI) in
October 2006
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi
leads ISI (2006 – April
2010)
Abu Ayub al-Masri is
“military commander” and
“minister for war”
Abu Ayub al-Masri leads
MSC.
He also takes over AQI
after Zarqawi death.
ISIS History: 2010 - Present
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi takes over as
leader of ISI
August 2011
Abu Mohammed al-Golani
authorised to enter Syria.
Jabhat al-Nusrah created
April 2013
Baghdadi announces JN is
subordinate to him and announces
ISIS
June 2014
Announcement of the Caliphate
AQ v ISIS: The battle for control
- Zarqawi began process of recalibrating
balance of power within al-Qaeda
- Letters from Zawahiri to Zarqawi
- Principle of “primacy through proximity.”
- AQI heavily influenced by “the management
of savagery” by Abu Bakr Naji.
- Cleavages of power never properly defined.
- Was AQ subordinate to MSC?
- Who‟s authority did JN exist with – AQ or ISI?
THE STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC CONTROL
How does al-Qaeda survive into the
future?
- Al-Qaeda central inspired by Abu
Musab as-Suri
- AQI heavily influenced by “the
management of savagery” by Abu
Bakr Naji.
MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY
- Calls for a „scorched earth policy‟
- Raise the cost of participation against Islamic
State
- Asymmetry of fear
- Beheadings strategy
- Burning the Jordanian pilot, Muath Kasassbeh
(and UAE withdrawal from the coalition).
- “It behooves us to make them think a
thousand times before attacking us”
Understanding ISIS mindset
- Abu Mohammed al-Adnani speech
- Sees itself primarily as a state
- Explains beheadings rationale too
- Zawahiri subordinate to the state, not the other way around
- Blames Zawahiri for not capitalising on other “Arab Spring”
uprisings
- Primacy from proximity triumphs
- Zawahiri excluded from events
- Battle for legitimacy ensues
- Infighting
- Religious claims: who are the khawarij?
- “Al-Qaeda has always represented the „moderate‟ middle path”
according to them in Ar-Risala (v.2)
HOW DOES AL-QAEDA
BEHAVE IN SYRIA TODAY?
“Shariah is not just hudood. It is a complete System. The Quran contains 6200
verses, but only 6 are about hudood. The hadith are more than 10,000 but less
than 10 relate to the hudood.
The Prophet first taught the people, then he applied the hudood.”
- Abu Firas, Shari’ of Jabhat al-Nusrah.
KEY POINTS OF THE AQ SYRIA STRATEGY
• Hudood can be suspended in times of
calamity and instability.
• Umar ibn al-Khattab suspended hudood
during the famine in 640.
• Sa’d bin Abi Waqqas suspended it during the
battle of Qādisiyyah.
AQ CLAIMS AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE
• Not a proper state because it does not have bayah from
Ahlul Hal Wal Aqd
• Lacks known scholars (and those who support it are
young/unknown e.g. Turki ben Ali)
• Has failed to garner support from (jihadi) ulema
• Islamic State are khawarij
• Al-Qaeda can project itself as a more moderate movement.
Destroying the “grey zone”
ISLAMIC STATE CONTROL
Structure of lecture
1. ISIS History & Context
2. What are they doing?
3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation
4. Women within ISIS
5. Potential threat to the West
WHAT ARE THEY DOING?
• Jihadists have learned the
lessons of Iraq.
– Letters sent to Mali.
• Social welfare provision
– Religious lessons
– Distribution of food
– Utilities
– Guaranteeing food supplies
A sophisticated insurgency
A sophisticated insurgency
Structure of lecture
1. ISIS History & Context
2. What are they doing?
3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation
4. Women within ISIS
5. Potential threat to the West
ABILITY TO MOBILISE FOREIGN FIGHTERS
WHO BECOMES A FOREIGN FIGHTER?
•
•
•
•
Men;
In their twenties;
Of South-Asian ethnic origin (UK);
With recent connections to higher education;
and
• With links to individuals or groups who have
international connections.
WHY DO THEY GO?
• The good fight (earlier phases of the conflict)
• The ‘ummah consciousness’
– An established idea
• Ease of travel & entry
– Particularly from Europe
• They want to be part of the ‘Caliphate.’
• There was a lack of counter-narrative but this has changed now
– Conflict seems less contentious than previous ones.
• And they join ISIS because “tazkiya” easier to obtain
WHAT DO THEY DO?
BECOMING KILLERS
What they really want!
Structure of lecture
1. ISIS History & Context
2. What are they doing?
3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation
4. Women within ISIS
5. Potential threat to the West
Female Foreign Fighters
Trends
• Average age of female fighter is 20.
– This appears to be getting younger, with the youngest
case recorded being 13 years old (French).
• Diverse backgrounds (different ethnicities,
nationalities, and socio-economic circumstances).
Growing numbers of converts migrating.
• Group migration – very common. We see clusters
from UK, France, and Germany.
Radicalisation narratives
• Public discourse around women has been
misleading and is filled with gender
stereotypes.
– Men are viewed as terrorists; women as ‘naïve’ or
‘brainwashed.’
– Denial of agency for these women. They are often
highly intelligent, motivated, and ideological.
• Feminist narratives
– ‘Liberation’ from hyper-sexualised Western
nations towards are more ‘traditional’
environment.
Their Role
• They do not fight
– This can cause frustration
– They often tweet, trying to inspire attacks at
home.
• To populate the land
– Build and develop the Islamic State
• To raise ‘cubs’
– The next generation of mujahideen
‘Cubs’
Structure of lecture
1. ISIS History & Context
2. What are they doing?
3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation
4. Women within ISIS
5. Potential threat to the West
Part 5: Are they a threat?
Assessing the threat level
• Hegghammer study: 1 in 9 foreign fighters become
terrorists. Jytte Klausen says 1 in 4.
What this means:
• A majority (75-90%) will NOT become terrorists.
However:
• Given the scale of mobilisation, there is still a threat.
• Those that do become terrorists are going to be better
terrorists: foreign fighter involvement makes terrorist plots
more viable and lethal (Sageman, 2008; Klausen, 2010;
Hegghammer, 2013)
• Of those that do NOT become terrorists, some are
traumatised and pose risks to society regardless of
ideological motivation.
WILL ISIS THREATEN THE WEST?
• Narrative is becoming increasingly anti-Western
in tone
– Coalition bombing campaign has brought us firmly
within their sights
– But
don’t
overlook
‘Bosnia
effect’
–
blunting/distancing from Western society.
• Repopulation of terrorist network
– ‘The Afghan effect’
• Fighters don’t have psychological support.
Threats to the West
NOT ALL WILL COME BACK
Thank you!
Dr. Shiraz Maher
shiraz.maher@kcl.ac.uk
@ShirazMaher