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ISPI-12_COVAIT@EST
7-04-2010
14:00
Pagina 1
Osservatorio Internazionale
Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Turkey
di Gülden Ayman
Le strategie di politica energetica dell'Italia. Criticità interne
e opportunità internazionali
di Carlo Frappi e Arturo Varvelli
Documentazione
ISSN 1125-9663
ISBN 978-88-238-6108-4
9 788823 861084
Le religioni nelle relazioni internazionali
Religions and Global Security
di Scott M. Thomas
Religious Revivals as a Product and Tool of Globalization
di Olivier Roy
Il ritorno della religione nelle relazioni internazionali e qualche riflessione
sul caso singolare dell’espansione globale del protestantesimo
di Fabio Petito
Diplomatia: Religione e relazioni internazionali: un inquadramento
metodologico per una diplomazia consapevole
di Pasquale Ferrara
Retreat from the Secular Path: The Democracy-Secularism Debate
in the Muslim World
di John L. Esposito
Religious Diplomacy: Jewish Perspectives
di Ben Mollov
ISPI n. 12 2010 Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali
Dossier - Le religioni nelle relazioni internazionali
ISPI
Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali
Semestrale dell’Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
n. 12 – Aprile 2010
Le religioni
nelle relazioni
internazionali
ISPI-12_COVAIT@INT
1
9-04-2010
8:40
Pagina 1
Editoriale
di Boris Biancheri
3
dossier Le religioni nelle relazioni internazionali
4
Scott M. Thomas
22
Olivier Roy
35
Il ritorno della religione nelle relazioni internazionali
e qualche riflessione sul caso singolare dell’espansione globale
del protestantesimo
Fabio Petito
48
Pasquale Ferrara
50
Retreat from the Secular Path: The Democracy-Secularism
Debate in the Muslim World
John L. Esposito
69
Ben Mollov
84
osservatorio internazionale
85
Gülden Ayman
98
Carlo Frappi e Arturo Varvelli
115
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ISPI-12_VOLAIT@0001-0002#.qxd
2-04-2010
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Editoriale
di Boris Biancheri
Negli ultimi decenni si è assistito a un ritorno del fenomeno religioso nelle relazioni
internazionali. Non solo il prospettato declino della religione come conseguenza
della modernizzazione e dei processi di secolarizzazione non si è verificato, ma la
religione è diventata un fattore di mobilitazione nei paesi in via di sviluppo e di
influenza politica nei paesi industrializzati. Per di più, nelle società occidentali la
questione religiosa è tornata a essere al centro dei dibattiti e delle dinamiche
politiche tanto a livello interno che a livello internazionale. Il revival del fattore
religioso è un fenomeno globale che non conosce confini geografici e culturali e
interessa tutte le religioni.
Negli ultimi anni il ruolo delle religioni si è intrecciato inevitabilmente con i fenomeni della
globalizzazione. In primo luogo, nell’epoca della globalizzazione è venuta meno
l’identificazione geografica delle religioni: la diffusione dell’islam va ben oltre i paesi arabi,
mentre il cristianesimo sta spostando il suo centro di gravità dai paesi industrializzati a
quelli in via di sviluppo. Ciò ha necessariamente eroso il legame tra religione e
appartenenza etnico-culturale. In secondo luogo, assistiamo al passaggio dalle tradizionali
forme di pratica religiosa verso forme di religiosità più carismatiche e fondamentaliste. È
questo, per esempio, il caso dell’evangelismo, del pentecostalismo, del salafismo. Il
fondamentalismo sembrerebbe essere la forma religiosa che meglio si adatta alla
globalizzazione. Tuttavia, sarebbe riduttivo identificare la globalizzazione del fenomeno
religioso esclusivamente con le nuove forme di radicalismo. In terzo luogo, la
globalizzazione, per l’intensificazione degli scambi e delle occasioni di incontro che
produce, ha innescato inevitabilmente dei processi di omogeneizzazione delle pratiche
religiose. È interessante ad esempio notare come religioni anche profondamente diverse tra
di loro facciano riferimento agli stessi benefici per gli individui. In un mondo globalizzato e
post-ideologico, infine, il dibattito sul ruolo delle religioni nelle relazioni internazionali si è
focalizzato sulla dicotomia scontro/dialogo tra le civiltà. Da questa prospettiva, il potere
unificante delle ideologie ha progressivamente lasciato posto a nuovi modelli di
appartenenza nei quali religione, cultura e potere territoriale sono intrinsecamente associati
Quaderni di
Relazioni Internazionali
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editoriale
tra loro. Questo passaggio si è accompagnato evidentemente al rafforzamento della
percezione culturale e, più in generale, del ruolo della religione.
Da un punto di vista teorico la questione del ritorno del fenomeno religioso è stata
affrontata solo di recente. Dopo essere stata a lungo esclusa nella disciplina delle relazioni
internazionali la religione ha riacquistato centralità e importanza. In particolare, gli aspetti
su cui gli analisti di politica internazionale mettono l’accento sono la relazione tra la
crescente instabilità internazionale e il nuovo ruolo politico delle religioni. Le
manifestazioni più esplicite di tale instabilità sarebbero il legame tra terrorismo e
fondamentalismo religioso e la religione come forza al centro dello “scontro di civiltà”. Ciò
ha condotto i teorici delle relazioni internazionali a pensare le religioni quasi
esclusivamente come un fenomeno identitario che, nel momento stesso in cui impone la
scelta tra appartenenze esclusive, traccia un confine tra il noi e l’altro-da-noi, per ciò
identificando come “diversi” quei soggetti portatori di valori e ideali in potenziale conflitto
con i nostri. In questi termini, pertanto, il rapporto tra religione e politica internazionale
viene visto prevalentemente come generatore di instabilità, conflitto e disordine.
Sebbene l’epoca delle guerre di religione sembri rimanere confinata a un passato molto
lontano, sembra che le religioni non abbiano perso il loro carattere di catalizzatore di
conflitti latenti e talvolta addirittura di veicolo per la diffusione di violenza a livello
internazionale (basti pensare allo stretto rapporto fra il fondamentalismo islamico e la rete
terroristica di al-Qaeda). In alcuni casi infatti, soprattutto dalla prospettiva occidentale, il
ritorno della religione nelle relazioni internazionali viene identificato con la manifestazione
più evidente del processo di “rivolta contro l’Occidente”, che ha come contraltare la
rivalorizzazione per l’appunto delle tradizioni religiose.
Se recentemente le religioni sono venute a occupare un posto molto importante nelle
relazioni internazionali e nella determinazione dell’assetto sociale interno di molti stati
del mondo, si pone la necessità di ripensare il loro ruolo, liberandole da un’interpretazione
esclusivamente pessimista e negativa sugli effetti che hanno sulle dinamiche internazionali.
In altre parole, di fronte a una rinnovata rilevanza, si rendono necessarie nuove
interpretazioni e nuove pratiche, nelle quali la religione non sia intesa solamente come
una minaccia alla comprensione reciproca tra le civiltà bensì come elemento chiave
di una società internazionale caratterizzata dal pluralismo religioso e culturale.
In quest’ottica, l’ISPI ha avvito nel 2009 una collaborazione con il Ministero degli Affari
Esteri e la Provincia autonoma di Trento volta a promuovere periodicamente riflessioni
sull’epistemologia, la metodologia e la prassi delle dinamiche tra religioni e relazioni
internazionali. La prima iniziativa, che si è tenuta a Trento
in autunno con la partecipazione di numerosi esperti
mondiali e rappresentanti di diverse religioni, ha ispirato
questo numero della rivista.
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dossier
Le religioni
nelle relazioni
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Scott M. Thomas
SCOTT M. THOMAS
is Senior Lecturer in
International Relations and
the Politics of Developing
Countries, Department of
European Studies,
University of Bath
We live in a world that is not supposed to exist. Religion was supposed to decline with modernization and economic development. Depending on your preferred version of the end of history, Marxist or socialist ideology were supposed
to mobilize the wretched of earth to overthrow capitalism and imperialism, or
capitalism, free markets, and liberal democracy were supposed to transform the
world. Yet over the past thirty years, to the surprise of Western social scientists,
politicians, and policy-makers, a global resurgence of religion has taken place in
international relations1. Religion rather than secular ideology has increasingly
mobilized people in developing countries. It increasingly influences the politics
of developed countries, not only the United States, widely regarded as the most
religious and most developed country, but religion also increasingly influences
the politics of more secular European countries. This article briefly examines
some of the main features of this global resurgence of religion, and what the implications may be for global security.
The Main Features of the Global Resurgence of Religion
A number of central features characterize the global resurgence of religion in
the twenty-first century. First, the religious resurgence is global in a geographic
sense. It is not confined to any particular region of the world, the American
South, Africa, Central Asia, or the Middle East so it is more broadly based than
religious fundamentalism.
Second, the religious resurgence is a key part of the global South, and follows
a massive, general, demographic shift in population from the developed countries in the North – Europe, North America, the lands of the former Soviet
Union – to the developing countries. The North accounted for 32 percent of the
world’s population in 1900, 29 percent in 1950, 25 percent in 1970, about 18 percent in 2000, and it is estimated that the North will account for only 10-12 percent of the world’s population in 2050. Scholars of international relations often
juxtapose terms such as “the Islamic world” and “the West”, with the idea that
“the West”, at least in a cultural sense still represents Christianity. However, the
reality is that Christianity is increasingly a post-Western religion dominated by
peoples, cultures, and countries of the global South, and the West in many ways
is already or is becoming a post-Christian civilization2. Christianity in the twenty-first century is effectively going back to where it was in the first millennium,
when it was a global and non-Western religion, and spread east from Palestine
F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York
2003; S.M. THOMAS, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations,
New York 2005; J. MICKLETHWAIT - A. WOOLDRIDGE, God is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith is
Changing the World, New York 2009.
2
L. SANNEH, Whose Religion is Christianity, Grand Rapids 2003; J.L. ALLEN, The Future Church: How Ten
Trends are Revolutionizing the Catholic Church, New York 2009.
1
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to Iraq, and on to India and China, becoming accepting of, and accepted by, other religions before it was reduced to being a Western and a European religion after the Mongol invasions, when it then became more closely associated with European culture3.
Third, the global resurgence of religion is also taking place throughout the
world in countries with different religious and cultural traditions, including the
non-Christian world religions – Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The
rise in Orthodox Judaism, for example, in Israel and the United States is having
an impact on politics in both countries (displacing more liberal Jewish secularism since conservative Jews – like conservative Muslims and Christians – also
believe children are a blessing from God, and so they have more children than
secular Jews, and so liberal Jews, like religious liberal generally, are literally dying out). Remarkably, given their Marxist pasts, genuine religious revivals are also going on in China and in Russia. Particularly important is the overlap of
Islamic and Christian revivals in some of the world’s most populous countries.
Christianity in China and East Asia
Christianity is exploding in China, which comprises a fifth of the world’s population, and the state now encourages religion, even if it is for its own ends – social order amidst a rapid economic development4. China has one of the largest
numbers of Pentecostal and evangelical Christian populations in the world, particularly among the growing, upwardly mobile, middle class, which highlights the
importance of non-Western Christianity for world politics. Pentecostalism is also at the cutting edge of Christian growth in South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam, all of which have vibrant and significant Christian minorities.
The issue is not whether China is going to become through national conversion a predominantly Christian country: that is unlikely. Rather, it is whether
Christianity will in the coming decades achieve the same degree of cultural permeation of national life in China that it has already achieved in South Korea.
What this possible religious change means for democracy, human rights, and
foreign policy will need to be part of any evaluation of China’s role in international relations in the twenty-first century5.
Revival of Orthodox Christianity in Russia
A genuine religious revival of Orthodox Christianity is also taking place in
Russia after 70 years of suppression, and this suggests how durable some reliP. JENKINS, The Lost History of Christianity: The Thousand Year Golden Age of the Church in the Middle
East, Africa, and Asia – and How it Died, New York 2008.
4
H.H. LAI, The Religious Revival in China, in «The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies», 18, 2003, pp. 4064.
5
D. AIKMAN, Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Transforming China and Changing the Global Balance of
Power, London 20062.
3
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gious identities can be even in a global era. The Russia Orthodox Church’s recent unification of its domestic and overseas hierarchies, a legacy of the Soviet
era, and closer church-state relations, facilitated by “petro-populism” or “oil and
gas nationalism”, has established the religious and political foundations for Orthodox identity politics – a greater role of Russia and Russian Orthodox Church
on the world stage. The Moscow Patriarchate sees reunification as an important
step in spreading its global influence, and the Russian state sees the restoring of
the unity of the entire Russian world – the ties between Russia proper and the
Russian diaspora (in which Orthodoxy is its spiritual foundation), as part of its
quest to regain global influence6.
The Overlap between Islam and Christianity
The world religions where we can really see explosions of religious fervour
are the global Islamic resurgence and the global spread of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity. The global Islamic resurgence is a genuine Islamic revival,
and it is more wide-ranging than Islamic fundamentalism. There is a visible return to Islam – it can be observed, in dress (the veil for women, a beard for men),
prayers, rituals, etc. in various countries that make up the Islamic world. A key
part of this revival, at the grass roots, is that people want “Islam” in some sense
– and, this is what is up for debate, discussion, or more violent conflict – to be
the organizing principle in their lives and also in their society (for example, the
politics over the contested meanings of Islam and secularism in Turkey in 2007
and Iran in 2009). The fact that global Islamic revivalism is often anti-Western
does not detract from the religious reality of Islamic revivalism. Globalization
has facilitated a sense of a wider Islamic identity and concern for foreign affairs
in the Islamic world.
The Islamic world is far larger than
The world religions where we can really see explosions the Arab world, stretching across
of religious fervour are the global Islamic resurgence
non-Arab Central and South Asia
and the global spread of evangelical and Pentecostal
through to Southeast Asia, up to and
Christianity
including Indonesia, which is quite
probably the Muslim country with the largest population (Table 1). In fact, the
largest Muslim countries (and seven of the top 8) are non-Arab, and are mostly
outside the Middle East, which qualifies any quick generalizations about Islam
regarding women, terrorism, democracy, or capitalism. Three of the largest
Muslim countries are in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh), and one (Indonesia) is in Southeast Asia. Turkey (in Europe) is also on the top ten list, so if
Turkey joins the EU, the EU will have as a member one of the largest Muslim
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C. MARSH (ed.), Burden or Blessing? Russian Orthodoxy and the Construction of Civil Society and Democracy, Boston 2004.
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Table 1 – The Islamic World: Muslim Population by Country
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Country
Indonesia
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Turkey
Egypt
Nigeria
Iran
Morocco
Algeria
Sudan
Afghanistan
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Ethiopia
Muslim Population
206,701,580
167,430,805
156,254,615
129,522,232
76,651,912
74,774,582
74,614,545
65,100,698
34,406,192
30,760,369
28,761,477
28,112,040
28,686,633
28,077,287
27,957,846
% Muslim
86.1%
95.0%
13.4%
83.0%
99.8%
90.0%
50.0%
98.0%
98.7%
99.0%
70.0%
99.0%
100.0%
97.0%
32.8%
Source: CIA World FACT BOOK, 2009.
countries in the world. By current projections Nigeria (a country whose population is almost evenly split between Muslims and Christians) will have a larger
population than Pakistan or Bangladesh in 2050, and may be expected to climb
further up the list of countries with the largest Muslim populations. Nigeria’s
Muslim-Christian demographics and (in the Islamic, northern part of the country) the confluence of criminal syndicates and radical Islamist groups have created concerns regarding international terrorism. Osama bin Laden clearly understands the demographics of religion and world politics, and he has called on
his followers to focus on Nigeria since 2003 (as of this writing it is unclear
whether the Nigerian suicide bomber who tried to blow up Northwest airlines
flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit over Christmas 2009 had ties to al-Qaida
as he claims, although his father warned US officials his son had had radical Islamist views).
The global spread of Pentecostalism and evangelical Protestantism is the
most dramatic religious explosion in the world today. It has now replaced the
Eastern Orthodox churches as the largest single group of Christian denominations after Catholicism. It used to be thought that Pentecostal or evangelical
Christianity were mainly private and personal (i.e. their growth would not con-
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flict with perceived trends toward greater secularization), and that its followers
were largely apolitical in their outlook. However, Pentecostalism’s growing numbers indicates it will be a major social force shaping politics and religion in twenty-first century7.
Pentecostalism is rapidly spreading across the world, and is remaking the face
of global Christianity. According to the World Christian Database there may be
as many as 250 million Pentecostals: one-eighth of the world’s 2 billion Christian, and about one in twenty-five of the global population8.
Tables 1 and 2 show that three of the countries with the largest Muslim populations (India, Indonesia, and Nigeria) are also countries with the largest number of Pentecostal Christians and have sizable Christian minorities overall.
The majority of Indians are Hindu (80.5 percent), but this dominance masks
the considerable religious variation across India’s states. Muslims make up the
majority of the population in Lakshadweep (95 percent) and in Jammu and
Kashmir (67 percent). Christians predominate in its small eastern states of Nagaland (90 percent), Mizoram (87 percent), and Meghalaya (70 percent), and are
significant minorities in two southern states, Kerala (19 percent) and Tamil
Nadu (6 percent). Sikhs are the majority in Punjab (59.9 percent). Long-standing tensions within India – notably in relation to caste – also have a significant
inter-religious dimension. In particular, the movement for Dalit rights (i.e. for
the country’s 150 million to 250 million Dalits or “untouchables”) has long featured an undercurrent of Dalit religious conversions, notably to Islam, to Buddhism and, increasingly in recent decades to Christianity. These conversions
have angered Hindu nationalists and have been an on-going source of HinduChristian tensions9.
Table 2 – Pentecostals by Country
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Country
China
USA
Brazil
Nigeria
Philippines
Indonesia
India
Population
72.0 million
20.2 million
15.0 million
13.0 million
9.0 million
7.0 million
5.2 million
% of Country’s Population
5.6
7.0
9.0
11.0
12.0
3.0
0.5
Source: Operation World, 2000; World Christian Database (n.d.), United Nations Population
Fund, 2001.
P. FRESTON, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Cambridge 2001; Spirit and Power: A Ten-Country Survey of Pentecostals, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006; D.E. MILLER - T.
YAMAMORI, Global Pentecostalism: The New Face of Christian Social Engagement, Berkeley 2007.
8
P. FRESTON, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, cit.; D. MARTIN, Pentecostalism:
The World their Parish, Oxford 2002.
9
India Religious and Demographic Profile, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, www.pewforum.org (accessed December 27, 2009); J.L. ALLEN, India is a Rising Catholic Power too, in «National Catholic Reporter», November 25, 2009.
7
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In Indonesia and Nigeria, ethnic divisions can intensify religious conflicts.
Indonesia, although it is the largest Muslim country in the world also has a sizable minority Christian community of 23 million or about 10 percent of the
population. What has led to inter-religious tension is that they are concentrated
in particular ethnic groups in particular regions. In the cities, Christianity is associated with the ethnic Chinese, who are also often merchants – a source of tension in the wake of the economic downturn in the late 1990s. Christian regions
are scattered across some Indonesian islands, including Timor, Sulawasi, Lombok, and Maluku (the Moluccas or Spice Islands). East Timor, which is predominately Catholic, achieved independence from Indonesia after a bitter and
bloody liberation struggle (which Osama bin Laden opposed).
A variety of factors put strains on older traditions of Muslim-Christian, Hindu-Christian, and Muslim-Hindu tolerance in a number of major countries
around the world. These include the spread of Islamic and Christian revivalism,
their doctrines and demographics, and the way ethnicity and poverty (or economic success) often coincide with religious affiliation. Without greater interreligious dialogue and more thoughtful approaches to political theology and to
religion and development, it is possible the future may see more political instability and outbreaks of inter-religious violence.
These developments may also have
significant geopolitical implications. Without greater inter-religious dialogue and more
In particular, as Jenkins notes, China thoughtful approaches to political theology and to
and other countries of East Asia are religion and development, it is possible the future
frequently thought of as the Asian an- may see more political instability and outbreaks
chors of the Pacific Rim, but how of inter-religious violence
much would it change perceptions of world politics and the prospects for conflict in East and Southeast Asia, if, in the wake of increasing Christian influences
on the culture and society of these countries, the Pacific Rim came to be seen as
a “Christian arc” surrounding Muslim Indonesia? The media often cast Islam as
the defining religion of the developing world, but to talk about global resurgence
of Islam without talking about the global spread of evangelical and Pentecostal
Christianity is to miss a key part of the story10.
The global spread of Christianity is shifting its center of gravity from the industrialized countries to the developing world. The majority of Christians in the
world by 2050 will be non-white, non-Western, from the ex-colonized world,
rather than the former colonizers, and will espouse forms of Christianity that
are more emotive and charismatic than those found in the West (which the Pew
Forum’s recent study of Pentecostals indicates is not the same as saying they are
mainly political conservatives like in the United States). What is more, many of
these Christians will be living as minorities under non-Christian and often hos-
10
P. JENKINS, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity, Oxford 2002.
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tile regimes. The demographic shift in Christianity to the global South, the
changing theologies of revivalist forms of Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity, the
demographics of Islam and Christianity will make living with religious diversity and inter-religious dialogue, especially the relations between Muslims and
Christians, but also increasingly relations with Hindus and Buddhists, and the
politics of religious freedom and toleration, increasingly important issues in international politics in the twenty-first century.
Religion and Global Security
The potential consequences for global security of the trends in the global
resurgence of religion examined in the first section can be more clearly seen
through the levels of analysis framework used in the theory of international relations. First, the more over-arching, global level picks up on the impact of economics, technology, and globalization on the religious resurgence. Second, the
inter-state level (the level of analysis of the states in the international system, as
international relations is conventionally defined) examines what these demographic trends mean for diplomacy, statecraft, and the relations between states
more generally. Finally, how these demographic trends may impact religion, politics, and political stability are examined at the state and society level of analysis.
The Global Level of Analysis
The global or world level of analysis seeks to explain the outcomes in international relations in terms of global natural, social, or technological forces that
transcend the relations between states at the level of analysis of the international system (i.e. international relations as it is usually understood). This level is becoming increasingly important because of the integrating and fragmenting effects of globalization on international relations.
Globalization is rapidly dissolving the social and economic barriers between
states, transforming the world’s diverse populations into a more unified world –
global markets, a global youth culture, and an age of global information (e.g.
mobile phone pictures of police brutality in Egypt, vote rigging in Zimbabwe, or
of anti-government protests in Iran). Globalization is also creating a more fragmented and heterogeneous world, facilitating more particular identities. On the
one hand, globalization facilitates or makes it easier for people of a similar identity to come together across time, space, and distance across the globe. On the
other hand, it contributes to the ethnic, religious, and racial hatreds that are
fragmenting the political landscape into smaller and smaller units.
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However, what is really happening is more complicated than this since the
global and the local are becoming more closely linked together in a kind of
“global particularity”. One key example is the rise of “globalized Islam”, in which
types of radical Islam around the world blur the connection between Islam, a
specific society, and a specific territory11. Another example is the transnational
links between churches and denominations that make up global evangelical and
Pentecostal Christianity.
Thus, the global resurgence of religion is not about, nor was it ever only
about, old, primordial, fears and hatreds, but also new ones, in response to the
paradoxical interdependence of these social forces that are unifying and fragmenting the world at the same time12. Therefore, it may be argued that conflict
is not the result, or not only the result, of the existence of “difference” or of cultural and religious pluralism. Conflict is the result of the collapse, or the threat
of the collapse, of difference resulting from the forces of globalization.
How does the global level of analysis help us examine the impact of the The global resurgence of religion is not about, nor was
religious resurgence on global securi- it ever only about, old, primordial, fears and hatreds,
ty? First, globalization is rapidly but also new ones, in response to the paradoxical
changing what religion is, and so interdependence of these social forces
globalization is changing what constitutes religious actors or religious non-state
actors in international relations. In other words, how globalization is changing
religion, and how religion is changing globalization are key aspects of the way social change influences international relations.
Ever since Samuel Huntington popularized the notion of the “clash of civilizations” most accounts of religion in international relations have followed an
analysis of the static and rather well-delineated blocs that make up the main
world religions and civilizations – Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and
Hinduism. However, this assumes stability in the global religious landscape, and
a rather static approach to religious non-state actors that is quite at odds with
the reality of religion and religious change in the twenty-first century.
Second, there is a constantly evolving role of religion in international relations. Rapid religious and social changes are taking place in the Islamic world,
which has produced a variety of the Islamic non-state actors – al-Qaeda, Hamas,
and Hezbollah, etc. – but there are a variety of Islamic non-state actors that are
not terrorist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Islamic political movements that are active in Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and the Sudan).
The missionary organization, Tablighi Jamaat (the Society for the Propagation
of the Muslim faith) is probably the largest Islamic non-state actor in the world,
and is probably the single most important element in the Islamic global resurgence. In other words, the more well-publicized Islamic terrorist groups are not
11
12
O. ROY, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London 2002.
B.R. BARBER, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World, New York 1996;
I. CLARK, Globalization and Fragmentation: international relations in the twentieth century, Oxford 1997.
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the only (or necessarily even the most important) Islamic non-state actors in
world politics.
Third, globalization is helping to create or expand the existing ethnic and religious diaspora communities around the world. Diaspora communities are one
of the most significant types of non-state actors in world politics in the twentyfirst century. Religious diaspora communities have contributed to the changing
nature of conflict, and they can complicate the problems of security and global
terrorism. In fact, this is why, among experts in security and intelligence, the
concept of a global “war on terrorism” is giving way to the wider notion of a
global Islamic insurgency13. Diaspora communities are not new, and they have
been a part of history for a long time, if we think, for example, of the Chinese or
Jewish diasporas, and the Arab diaspora, mainly the Syrian and Lebanese communities in the failed states in West Africa-Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Liberia.
These global links or networks do not just happen; they are not free-floating,
but are social networks, embedded in religious diaspora communities that are a
key aspect of religious transnationalism. Thus, rather than be carried away with
the idea that such social networking is one of the hall marks of globalization and
a significant new feature of international politics, one should remember that
such social and information networks have been part of much of human history, and a part of the main world religions for centuries, and existed long before
the modern international system.
It is these kinds of local-global social networks that allow Al-Qaeda and
Hezbollah in Lebanon to do illicit fundraising and money laundering in East,
Central, and West Africa. Similarly, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia, have become a concern because of their ability, until recent political changes, to contravene UN restrictions on conflict diamonds. In Nigeria, in the northern states, for
example, criminal syndicates and radical Islamist groups have been able to come
together. Al-Qaeda can flourish through local, almost sub-contracted, religious
extremists, such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia. Radical clerics, trained in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or elsewhere, have sought asylum in Europe or North America, to spread more radical, extremist forms of Islam in the West.
Unfortunately, globalization has blurred the lines between religious organizations involved in social welfare and those involved in global terrorism. If Islamic social welfare organizations in the West or throughout the Islamic world
collect money for Palestine, then it can happen that Hamas or Hezbollah can use
these funds for terrorist activities. However, the use of religious social networks
in this way is not a new problem. This is how the Sufi brotherhoods in North
Africa supported the Islamic resistance fighters against the French occupation in
the nineteenth century. The social and charitable networks may fund, or recruit,
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13
D. KILCULLEN, Counter-insurgency Redux, in «Survival», 48, 2006, pp. 222-230.
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suicide bombers, but they also promote and maintain communities. Christianity is growing in urban Africa, and Islam is growing because of the welfare services provided by faith-based organizations. Given the weak states, corruption,
and crumbling social infrastructures, charities and faith-based organizations are
a main source of education, social welfare, and health care in developing countries.
Globalization also enables (or even empowers) people in diaspora communities to create or participate in a variety of new types of global or transnational identities, offering new types of community and political action. There is
nothing wrong with this, and a variety of advocacy or pressure groups –
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and most development NGOs –
rely on this kind of identification for financial support.
However, globalization can enable
people in diaspora communities to Globalization also enables (or even empowers) people
create or participate in new, radical in diaspora communities to create or participate
forms of identity and political action. in a variety of new types of global or transnational
A key current example is what Olivier identities, offering new types of community
Roy calls “globalized Islam”, in which and political action
types of radical Islam around the world are connected less directly to the religion, a specific society, and a territory. Among diaspora Muslim communities in
the West, the revival of Islam may not be a backlash against modernization or
Westernization, but is a consequence of it. Young, rootless, Muslims, living as a
minority in Western societies can become part of a “global Ummah” – a global
Islamic majority, the global Muslim community through videos, the Internet,
and cheap air tickets (to places such as Pakistan, Nigeria, or Yemen). This can
lead to new forms of radicalism ranging from support for Al-Qaeda to the rejection of social integration into Western societies14.
Diaspora communities in which ethnicity and religion can facilitate these
new forms of identity exist in other religion as well. The (Hindu) Tamil diaspora funded and supported the civil war against Sri Lanka’s (Buddhist-nationalist)
government. The middle class Indian diaspora in California’s Silicon Valley has
funded Hindu nationalist parties in India – the RSS and the BJP. In other words,
religious diaspora communities, including those that constitute prominent religious minorities in Western countries, can play important roles in the international politics of ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism.
The Interstate Level of Analysis
The inter-state level of analysis focuses on the implications of global religious
trends for the diplomacy and statecraft of international relations. The concern
14
O. ROY, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, cit.
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here is on how religious identities may influence the conventional dynamics of
interstate relations – allies, alliances, arms races, and the balance of power, as
well the ability of states to influence others. First, consider again the 25 countries
most likely to be the most populous by the mid-21st century (Table 3). The general picture reinforces what has already been said about the future global religious landscape – there is a stagnating population in the developed North, particularly in Europe, and a booming population in the global South, in which religious revivalism and religious demographics reinforce each other as part of the
global resurgence of religion.
Table 3 – The Most Populous Countries in the World to 2025 and 2050
(population in millions)
Nation
1. India
2. China
3. United States
4. Indonesia
5. Nigeria
6. Pakistan
7. Brazil
8. Bangladesh
9. Ethiopia
10. Congo
11. Philippines
12. Mexico
13. Vietnam
14. Russia
15. Egypt
16. Japan
17. Iran
18. Saudi Arabia
19. Tanzania
20. Turkey
21. Sudan
22. Uganda
23. Germany
24. Yemen
25. Thailand
1975
622
918
216
138
59
75
109
76
33
25
44
61
48
134
37
112
33
7
16
41
16
11
79
7
42
2000
1,014
1,262
276
225
123
142
173
129
64
52
81
100
79
146
68
127
66
22
35
66
35
23
83
17
60
2025
1,277
1,464
338
301
205
213
201
178
115
105
122
134
106
136
95
120
88
48
60
82
61
48
85
40
71
2050
1,620
1,471
404
338
304
268
206
205
188
182
154
153
119
118
113
101
100
91
88
87
84
84
80
71
70
Source: P. JENKINS, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity, Oxford 2002, p. 84.
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Second, consider again the 25 countries most likely to be most populous by
the mid-21st century, but this time compare which ones will be predominately
Christian and which ones predominately Muslim (Table 4).
Table 4 – The Religious Balance of Power Among the Largest Countries in the
21st Century
1. Overwhelmingly Muslim
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Iran
Yemen
2. Mainly Muslim with significant Christian minorities
Indonesia Egypt
Sudan
3. Overwhelmingly Christian
USA
Brazil
Mexico
Russia
4. Mainly Christian with significant Muslim minorities
Philippines Zaire/Congo Germany
Uganda
5. Christian and Muslim, with neither a strong majority
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Tanzania
6. Other nations, dominated by neither Christianity nor Islam
India
China
Vietnam
Thailand Japan
Source: P. JENKINS, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity, Oxford 2002, p. 167
According to Jenkins, nine will be wholly or mainly Muslim and eight wholly or mainly Christian, and three deeply divided between the two faiths ((Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Tanzania). With the important exceptions of India and China,
the future centers of global population are mainly in countries that are already
divided between the two of great world religions – Christianity and Islam, and
so state divisions and religious divisions reinforce each other.
Does this matter, and, if so, under what conditions does it matter? Jenkins
thinks the divisions are likely to intensify in the future. «In present-day battles
in Africa and Asia, we may today be seeing the political outlines of the new century, and probably, the roots of future great power alliances»15.
However, before we can accept Jenkins’s proposition regarding religion and
alliance formation, we must understand far more about how culture and reli-
15
P. JENKINS, The Next Christendom, cit.
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gion influence the construction of the collective identities of states and communities in a global era. It is widely agreed in the social sciences that any conception of the “self ” can be worked out only in relation to an “other”. Huntington
offers a robust version of this general proposition: «We know who we are only
when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are
against»16. Others would accept the general self-other proposition regarding the
construction of identity, but argue (in a more neutral vein) that such diversity is
what societies and communities make of it: enemies, rivals, or friends17. What religious leaders and communities make of it given the global pressures on their
local communities depends on a set of factors – certainly their general interpretations of piety, religious ethics, and proselytizing, and their political theology,
but also the way globalization may be helping to shift the social, cultural, political, and economic influence of their respective communities in the states and
societies to which they belong.
Jenkins collapses the most revivalist versions of these religious traditions
with the existence of religious diversity. He seems to assume that the Crusades,
a specific phase in Christian-Muslim relations that took place in the Middle
East, offers the only key to interpreting the collective identities of states or societies based on Islam and Christianity, but this is not the case. In Mali, for example, young, reformist Muslim intellectuals, often trained in Pakistan or Saudi
Arabia, have taken on leadership roles in new Islamic, community-based organizations. They are intent on spreading what they consider to be a purer, less
Malian form of Islam, disrupting the long history of these religious communities, and this is true throughout West Africa.
Culture or religion is often not very useful to predict alliance formation. It is
easy to think of exceptions (most recently the West’s support – against Orthodox Serbia – for Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo), as it is of examples that correspond to faith-based alignment of interests (e.g. Orthodox states such as Greece
and Russia did by in large oppose the bombing of Serbia, and Germany was
pressured by domestic Catholics to recognize diplomatically Catholic Croatia’s
break away from Yugoslavia, and the current hostility between Sunni states and
Shi’ite states). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the religious demographics of states constitute potential flash points for interstate conflict, and
(crucially) that a country’s own debates over culture, religion, and politics
(which is what determines a state’s collective identity) do tend to lead a country
to frame its national interests in a way that influences its general foreign policy
orientation.
Third, another aspect of how religion will influence interstate relations relates to the spread of global Pentecostalism. Notably, some of the countries with
the largest number of Pentecostals in the world – Brazil, India, and China, fea-
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17
S.P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996, p. 21.
A. WENDT, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge 1999.
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ture prominently in the thesis that Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the
“BRICs”) will be the great powers of the future, since their economies are rapidly developing, and by the year 2050 they could eclipse most of the currently
richest countries of the world18. The first section pointed out that Pentecostalism is at the cutting edge of Christian growth in East Asia, in what Jenkins sees
as a potential future “Christian arc” above Indonesia. Each of these BRIC countries is likely to become a leading regional power. Thus, for example, in East and
Southeast Asia there may be more significant religious dimensions to the politics of regionalism and regional integration in the future – developments that
could also affect their relations with other great powers and the Western countries generally.
Fourth, religion is coming back into European politics. Europe has be- Another aspect of how religion will influence interstate
come a mission field for devout Mus- relations relates to the spread of global Pentecostalism
lims and evangelical Christians from the global South. Europe’s seemingly weak
support for its Christian heritage (the debate over the EU Constitution), the
pace of Muslim immigration, and the relative birth rates of religious conservatives in Europe (compared to the birth rates of more liberal and secular Europeans), challenges European political culture, and may make Europe a growing
security risk. These factors undermine the continent’s ability to handle the
volatile mix of religious pluralism, Islamic radicalism, and the missionary activity of Protestant evangelicals coming from the global South. Thus, religious issues are returning to European politics, and to the politics of European identity
– Muslim headscarves, the wearing of religious symbols, the meaning of religious freedom, the EU’s admission of Turkey, and the acceptable boundaries of
the sacred and the profane in a variety of areas in society19.
The State and Society Levels of Analysis
At these levels of analysis identity politics (structured around an increasing
diversity of religious identities) is posing new threats to security, and it is playing an increasing role in influencing both domestic politics and foreign policies.
They consider the types of domestic social, economic, political, and demographic factors that influence political actors, and the wider political culture in
which these actors are embedded as determinants of a country’s domestic and
foreign policies.
First, globalization has complicated multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multifaith relations in the West on a host of social policy issues because these domestic communities are increasingly part of global religious diaspora communities.
Because of globalization multi-faith relations can no longer be handled as singleD. WILSON - R. PURUSHOTHAMAN, Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050, Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper, 99, October 1, 2003, (http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf.).
19
T.A. BYNES - P. KATZENSTEIN (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe, Cambridge 2006; P. JENKINS,
God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious Crisis, Oxford 2007; S. SILVESTRI, Islam and
Religion in the EU Political System, in «West European Politics», 32, 6, 2009, pp. 1212-1239.
18
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country problems within the domestic policy discourses of “race relations”, “minority rights”, or “multiculturalism”.
Social groups that are sometimes identified in terms of race, ethnicity, and
religion often, although not always, have overlapping identities. Members of religious minority groups (such as Canada’s Sikh community, Muslim Algerians
or Moroccans in France and the Netherlands, and Muslim Turks in Germany,
the Chinese and the mainly Christian minorities in Malaysia or Indonesia), often have broader social identities facilitated by globalization and may be said to
form part of transnational religious diaspora communities.
Therefore, globalization has made multi-faith relations one of the new types
of “intermestic issues” in international relations (i.e. issues that symbolize the
merger of domestic and international politics). The domestic Danish cartoon incident in 2005, for example, was transmitted and amplified throughout a global
Islamic sub-culture, stoking violent clashes in places far from Denmark, including between Muslims and Christians across the northern states of Nigeria where
Sharia law is practiced. Politically, local Islamic extremists in many countries
were able to use the global knowledge of the cartoons to bolster their more local,
Islamic, extremist, fundamentalist, credentials.
Second, a number of societies are being embroiled in a kind of Kulturkampf,
a cultural as well as theo-political struggle taking place over the boundaries of
the sacred, the secular, and the political in their common life. This makes identity politics a part of their domestic politics (in addition to colouring their international relations). The first way this may occur is when adherents of one religious tradition seek to declare nation X should be a Muslim or a Christian nation (such as Nigeria or Zambia) or a Buddhist nation (such as Sri Lanka or
Thailand). Zambia’s former evangelical president, Frederick Chiluba, for example, sought to gain favour with this growing constituency by declaring the country to be a Christian nation (in opposition to the mainline churches and the significant Muslim minority). Christian-Muslim tensions were exacerbated in
Nigeria’s decision to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Pressure
exerted by monks in Thailand to have Buddhism recognized as the national religion has fuelled the Islamic insurgency in the predominately Muslim southern
part of the country.
The third way religious identity may contribute to conflict is when countries
have religiously divided populations, in which there is a narrow gap in power
and numbers between two religions. It is in these “torn countries” (Table 5), as
Jenkins calls them, that there have already been intermittent or prolonged Muslim-Christian violence – Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Indonesia. The narrow gap in religious power and numbers has also surprisingly erupted in more recent outbreaks of Muslim-Christian violence in Kenya,
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where such tensions have been intermittent, and in Cote d’Ivoire, where they
were most non-existent until recently.
According to Jenkins, the main potential flashpoints appear to be states with
minorities representing 10 or 20 percent of the population, which is sufficient to
resist policies to promote religious harmonization and enough to sustain military struggles against repressive governments20. Alternatively, as the first section
indicated in relation to India and Indonesia, the narrow religious gap may be located in particular regions of a country, even if one religion is predominant.
Jenkins estimates that Islam and Christianity could divide no less than 10 of the
world’s 25 largest states in 2050. Given current trends, each one could be the
scene of Christian-Muslim conflict.
Table 5 indicates how many
potential torn countries there are It is the way globalization can threaten the collapse
in the world (those in which there of religious identity and provoke politically motivated
is a minority religious group that religious discrimination, and not the existence
reaches Jenkins’ flashpoint of 10 of religious diversity, that contributes to conflict
to 20 percent of the population). However, what is remarkable is that there isn’t
already greater Christian-Muslim conflict. Clearly, other factors have to be present before demography contributes to religious conflict. These include inequality and religious persecution or discrimination21. Connected to globalization, in
addition, is the way the integrating, homogenizing aspects of globalization can
threaten authentic development (i.e. the development and modernization of
those communities rooted in their own cultural and religious traditions rather
than Western forms of modernization). Thus, it is the way globalization can
threaten the collapse of religious identity and provoke politically motivated religious discrimination, and not the existence of religious diversity, that contributes to conflict. Indonesia provides a counter-example: this Islamic democracy with a free press, a vibrant civil society, and an active Islamic feminist
movement provides a model for a new type of Islamic modernization and development.
Conclusion
Religion is both dividing and connecting the world in new ways that pose
new challenges for both global and domestic peace, security, and prosperity.
Globalization has helped to link the global and the local in countries around the
world, facilitating new identities and reinforcing old ones, including identities
that span and connect different religious diaspora communities across the
world. The global-local linkages and diaspora communities are transforming the
20
21
P. JENKINS, The Next Christendom, cit, pp. 166-167.
J. FOX, Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium, Lanham 2004.
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Table 5 – “Torn Countries”? Christian-Muslim Tensions in a Globalizing world
(Percentage of each of the World Religions)
Country
Albania
Bangladesh
Benin
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central Af. Rep.
Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep
Congo, Rep. of
Cote d’Ivoire
Cyprus
Egypt
Ethiopia
Ghana
India
Israel
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Liberia
Macedonia
Malawi
Mauritius
Nigeria
Russia
Sudan
Tanzania
Zanzibar
Togo29
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Uzbekistan
Zambia
Christianity
Islam
30
70
83
24
40
43
46
84
10
43
40
50
34
70
50
34
82
10
61
64
2
2
9
46
39
40
65
80
32
40
85-90
5
30
-20
9
84
9
50-75
12
50
24
20
15
53
10
2
53
18
90
33
16
13
16
86
47
60
20
33
13
17
50
10-15
70
35
99
89
12
88
24-49*
* includes both Muslim and Hindu.
Source: Source: CIA World FACT BOOK, 2009.
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Hinduism
Judaism
16
Indigenous/
Other
1
33
14
4
40
33
40
35
13
20
48
13
5
6
20
5
80
77
2
48
3
7
1
40
2
7
3
10
-25
35
-51
2
4
3
1
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domestic policy debates over the nature of race relations, minority rights, multiculturalism, multi-faith relations, and immigration. At the same time they provide new types of challenges to global security, since religious diaspora communities and ethnic or religious non-state actors – in a variety of religious traditions – have been able to pursue some of their political objectives through terrorism and funding of religious extremism. In addition to dealing with immediate terrorist threats the long-term challenge for governments in a global era is
to take more seriously the way the politics of religious diversity, and the politics
of religious freedom and toleration intersect with other foreign policy goals –
promoting democracy, human rights, and economic development. Another
challenge is to transform religious diversity into a resource for their foreign policies. Faith-based and multi-track diplomacy, and faith-based approaches to foreign aid and development, since they make use of NGOs, civil society, and religious communities and institutions, rather than merely links between governments, opens up new opportunities for a country’s ethnic and religious minorities to more actively contribute to their country’s foreign policy and to global security.
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Olivier Roy
Religious Revivals as a Product
and Tool of Globalization
OLIVIER ROY
is Professor at the
European University
Institute, Florence and
author of Holy Ignorance.
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The debate on the role of religions in international relations tends to revolve
around the clash or dialogue alternative. Religion is seen either as a part of an
ethno-national culture or as a supra national factor that could threaten existing
nation-states. The same religion may be perceived under both paradigms: for instance, the Catholic church could be seen as a pillar of Irish or Polish national
identity, and conversely, for some Protestant or secularist countries, as a foreign,
supra-national entity, which could unduly call for citizens’ loyalty against the
state (for instance among US and Swiss political elites in the 19th century there
was a creeping critic against the Church not to speak about the secular French
Republic). As an ethno-national factor, religion could turn into a driving political force either for mobilizing large segments of the domestic population (the
Christian right in the US for example) or for enlisting foreign forces in support
of a given foreign policy (for instance both Israel and some Arab states try to stir
up support among Jews or Muslims living abroad, while the Iranian Islamic revolution tried to enlist the support of Shi’a minorities abroad). In this perspective migrants who keep their identity and faith are seen as a possible fifth column of foreign countries (this was true for the Japanese in the US during the
second world war, as well as for Muslim migrants in contemporary Europe).
Many Mediterranean countries (such as Morocco and even “secular” Turkey)
present themselves as legitimate mediators for organizing the religious life of
second generation migrants in Europe. Conversely, the West considers to be its
duty to protect (or claim to protect) Christian minorities in the Muslim world.
Religion, in terms of international relations, is connected to the minority issue here: the possible instrumentalization of a domestic minority by foreign
forces. It is worth reminding the reader that toleration of religious minorities in
the West is not so much connected with the spread of enlightenment as with the
development of international law through treaties, starting from the 17th century. The Westphalian state was certainly not a tolerant state and was based on the
concept of cuius regio, eius religio, which means that subjects had to share their
ruler’s religion; toleration of religious minorities occurred only when such minorities were protected by an international treaty following a military conquest
or annexation (French Protestants from Alsace were protected by the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, and thus not affected by the abolition of the Edict of toleration in 1685), similarly Christian Greeks in contemporary Turkey, as well as
Muslims in Northern Greece, are protected by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923),
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and both minorities are in consequence seen more or less as “foreign” by the
dominant public opinion. In the Ottoman empire, although the status of “protected minorities” (dhimmis) derived from Islamic jurisprudence, this has been
slowly converted into a system of international protection since the establishment of the capitulations system in the early 16th century.
But religion may also be the base of a supranational institution and/or community. The Catholic Church and the Muslim ummah have been or are still referred to as would-be political entities (the Emperor versus the Pope in the Middle Ages, or Muslims’ nostalgia for the Caliphate): the creation of the Vatican as
a sovereign state was a legacy of this confusion. To counter such a perceived
agenda, states are usually eager to nationalize, territorialize and contain this
supra-national movement, either through some sort of concordat or by encouraging “national” churches; it is no coincidence that the French tradition of royal gallicanism (the king being in charge of religion in his kingdom) has been revived, whatever the constitutional regime: Napoleon instituting a central body
of the “Jewish Faith” and Nicolas Sarkozy, as Minister of the Interior, encouraging the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith. Even in liberal countries where the state has no right to interfere with religion, “foreign” religions
tend to adapt to the local patterns in order to be accepted (the “Americanist”
movement among US bishops took place in the 19th century, despite Vatican
reservations, the Reform Judaism movement was born in the US, and nowadays
many local mosques there tend to adopt the congregational model with a professional imam).
In international relations theory, religion is seen as a sort of aggravating element which strengthens other factors (nationalism, separatism, social protest,
imperial expansionism) by giving them new impetus and providing better incentives to fight and die (salvation). In this perspective, converts are ignored or
seen as a lunatic fringe, possibly as traitors or moles working for a foreign group.
When religious groups act as disruptive actors in the public sphere, they are always credited with a “classical” political agenda where the stakes are political
power and territorial control. Bin Laden is said to be driven by nostalgia for a
Caliphate as a territorial entity, and evangelical preachers in Latin America and
West Africa are often accused of preparing the ground for a greater US influence.
If they cannot be credited with such an agenda, they are dismissed as “fanatics”,
as crazy or as historical dinosaurs, expressing nostalgia for a lost culture.
To sum up, the debate on religion
is framed in the clash/dialogue of civ- The debate on religion is framed in the clash/dialogue
ilization paradigm, which considers of civilization paradigm, which considers that religion,
that religion, culture and territorial culture and territorial power are intrinsically associated
power are intrinsically associated,
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whatever conclusions can be drawn in terms of policy implication. A recent
growing trend is reinforcing this cultural perception of religion: namely the impact of the religious factor in the debate on universal values (human rights). Religious actors, with the support of some states (China, Egypt, Singapore and
Saudi Arabia) tend to deny the universality of the human rights as defined by
Enlightenment and the UN Charter. Tension between human rights and religious freedom pervades the debate on the right to wear a veil or burqa, on the
limits of freedom of expression, on same sex marriage and women’s emancipation. This debate tends to reduce the universality of human rights to a recent
specificity of the Western culture. Although religions such as Islam and Catholicism tend by definition to be universalist, they do contribute in their own way
to associate themselves with a given culture and to ascribe other religions to other cultures.
However, from my point of view, the so-called “return of the sacred” or the
more assertive role of religion as a political and strategic factor, is not a return
of traditional, culturally embedded religions; on the contrary, it marks a break
with this culturalist perception of religion. Political actors, and many states, face
a growing problem of handling religious issues because they are confronted with
new paradigms: those religions which are successful on the “global market” are
disconnected with traditional cultures and specific territories. They are both a
product and a tool of globalization, and not the expression of existing political
forces. Instead of providing new impetus to national and ethnic identities, they
tend to bypass these identities and are thus more difficult to deal with through
the traditional political and diplomatic tools of constraints and incentives.
In fact, religious dynamics have nothing to do with traditional competition
between civilizations, such as Christianity and Islam. It is not Islam per se which
is spreading or Christianity per se which is receding; on both sides there are specific shifts towards new forms of religiosity, at the expense of culturally-embedded traditional forms of religion. The fastest growing religious movement in the
world is Christian Pentecostalism, along with Mormonism, but the former has
hundreds of millions of believers. New Protestant movements have been adopted by a third of the Haitian and Brazilian populations, thus altering these countries’ traditional identification with Catholicism. The spread of Islam has been
linked to the growth of Muslim populations rather than to a conversion trend,
however Muslim population growth is experiencing a sudden slowdown as almost all Muslim societies are currently going through a demographic transition
which places them on a par with European fertility levels, or even below them.
Tunisia, for instance, has a lower rate of fertility than France (roughly 1.7%
compared with 1.9%); second generation Muslims in Europe tend to align
themselves to their host-country’s fertility rate (meaning that the “Eurabia” con-
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cept of Europe having a demographic Muslim majority in around 2050 is sheer
fantasy). The dynamism of Islam is no more demographic, but potentially
linked with the success of salafism, a militant scripturalist and anti-culturalist
brand of Islam.
We are witnessing a shift in the traditional forms of religious practice –
Catholicism, Hanafi Islam, classic Protestant denominations such as Anglicanism and Methodism – towards more fundamentalist and charismatic forms of
religiosity (Evangelism, Pentecostalism, Salafism, Tablighi Jamaat, neo-Sufism,
Lubavich). But these movements are relatively recent. Salafism derives from
Wahhabism, which was founded at the end of the 18th century. The Hasidim and
Haredim were born in the 17th and 18th centuries. The various evangelisms belong to the tradition of Protestant “awakenings” which began during the 18th
century, while Pentecostalism dates from the early 20th century. Similarly, the
forms of Buddhism and Hinduism that recruit followers and export themselves
are recent reformulations, from the late 19th to the late 20th century (Soka Gakkai,
Falun Gong and Hare Krishna, as well as the political Hinduism of the Indian
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Sri Lankan theravada Buddhism). Those
movements which the French call sects and the Americans cults, or more academically “NRMs” (New Religious Movements), are thriving: the Mormons and
Jehovah’s Witnesses, which also began in the 19th century, had expanded hugely
worldwide by the close of the 20th century.
In this sense, religious “revival” is merely an optical illusion: it would be more
appropriate to speak of transformation. Religion is both more visible and at the
same time frequently in decline. Rather than a reformulation of religion, we are
witnessing a return to ancestral practices abandoned during the secularist hiatus. These tendencies go hand in hand with a desire for greater visibility in the
public sphere, and even an ostensible break with mainstream practices and cultures. Religion exhibits itself as such, and refuses to be reduced to one symbolic
system among others.
It is the relationship between religion and the public sphere that is Rather than a reformulation of religion, we are
changing, for religious revival in the witnessing a return to ancestral practices abandoned
public sphere no longer takes on the during the secularist hiatus
form of cultural visibility but has become a display of religious “purity” or of reconstructed traditions. Religious conversions in all directions are a sign of this
muddying of the link between culture and religion. But one thing is clear: in all
cases it is the so-called “fundamentalist” or “charismatic” forms of religions that
have seen the most spectacular growth, be it Protestant Evangelism or Muslim
Salafism. There has been a similar increase in hard-line orthodoxy in the
Catholic Church and Judaism, and even in Hinduism. Fundamentalism is the
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religious form that is most suited to globalization, because it accepts its own
deculturation and makes it the instrument of its claim to universality.
Thus the traditional link between a religion and a culture has been eroded:
an Algerian is no longer necessarily Muslim, a Russian Orthodox or a Pole
Catholic. Choices that were once unimaginable have become conceivable, if not
easy. A typical example is Christian proselytism in a Muslim milieu. Why were
there so few conversions to Christianity in the days of colonialism, when conversion was encouraged by the authorities? The secular French Republic supported the missionary activities of the White Fathers. It is no coincidence that
the founder of the White Fathers, Cardinal Lavigerie, was also the rallying force
who sought to reconcile the Catholic Church with the Republic. In Algeria, a
French territory, applicants were not required to abandon the Muslim religion
in itself in order to obtain French citizenship, but as conversion to Christianity
involved the renunciation of personal status, it is clear that it facilitated assimilation so there was a strong incentive to convert. The results were very disappointing, however. Apart from a few families of Kabyle intellectuals (Amrouche,
Regghi), the White Fathers’ proselytizing activities were astonishingly ineffectual. The Catholic Church gradually abandoned its attempts to convert Muslims
and settled for “witnessing” instead (e.g. the monastery of Tibehrine in Algeria);
Father Christian Delorme recently went so far as to declare that they should not
convert the Algerians because Islam was integral to the Algerian identity1.
However, in February 2006, the Algerian Parliament passed a law banning religious proselytism. Why? Previously, such a law would have been pointless as instances were rare. But now, conversions to Christianity are affecting men – and
especially women – in the street, without pressure from the machinery of domination. In 2008, several converts to Christianity went on trial2. Explanations in
terms of acculturation or of political supremacy do not hold water in this case.
Nor is it because religious freedom was suddenly combined with an abundant
supply of religions. On the contrary, most societies, like most governments, are
hostile to missionary activities. This is primarily true of authoritarian Muslim
countries, but in different circumstances many states are hostile to proselytism.
In Russia and India for example, laws to curb conversions were introduced in the
first decade of the twenty-first century (in 2006 in the state of Rajasthan): the
Hinduists are targeting conversions of the lower castes, either to evangelism or
to Buddhism in particular. In France, the Miviludes, a parliamentary mission, is
explicitly monitoring all NRMs. Paradoxically, the proliferation of laws and anti-conversion campaigns demonstrates the success of the new missions.
Much has been written about conversions of Christians to Islam in recent
decades. These conversions swell the ranks of fundamentalist tendencies
(Salafism, Tablighi) and Sufi movements. But it is not as well known that Al Qai-
Non, l'Algérie n'est pas antichrétienne, «Le Monde», 4 juin 2008. Several Catholic leaders protested against
this position.
2
Two computer scientists, Rachid Mohammed Seghir and Jamal Dahmani, were sentenced to prison; the
trial of another convert, Habiba Kouider, was postponed. See Condamnation de deux Algeriens convertis
au Christianisme, in «Le Monde», 3 juillet 2008.
1
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da is the “Islamic” organization which counts the highest number of converts
(10-20% for the group’s internationalists) and is the only one which gives them
responsibilities (so converts are far from being a mere backup force to dupe security checks and stymie “profiling”). Both Islam and Protestantism are making
inroads among North America’s Latino immigrants3. Islam is gaining a strong
foothold among Black Americans, illustrated in 2006 by the election of Keith Ellison, a convert, as the first Muslim American to Congress. As a matter of fact, it
has been observed that conversions in all directions affect the same social milieus: second-generation immigrants, the destabilized working classes, “visible
minorities” (defined by skin-color), and rebellious youths in search of a cause.
In France, there is an 80% overlap between the map of mosques and that of new
evangelist churches (Northern France, the Paris region, Alsace, the Rhône corridor and the Mediterranean rim). Attending an Evangelist or a Jehovah’s Witness
service affords a glimpse of the vast range of ethnic groups involved.
Less trumpeted is the conversion
of European Muslims to Christianity, Conversions in all directions affect the same social
namely Protestantism, of course, even milieus: second generation immigrants, the destabilized
if Catholic Church statistics in France working classes, “visible minorities”, and rebellious
show that in the early years of the youth in search of a cause
twenty-first century, around 400 Muslims ask to be baptized each year, compared with 200 in the 1990s. But, whereas the Catholic Church tends not to
proselytize much, the evangelists have adopted a very aggressive conversion policy. The most famous case in France is that of the minister Said Oujibou, born
in Morocco and President of the Fédération des Nord-Africains Chrétiens de
France (FNACF) – the Federation of Christian North Africans in France – which
claims to have 10,000 members. Mention should also be made of Azedine Bentaïba, the head of Oasis Toulouse, as well as the minister of Saint-Ouen, Amor
Bouaziz (of Algerian origin). They are all evangelists, but a glimpse at the directory of the French Reform Church also shows a number of names of Muslim
origin (Rachid Boubégra, minister in Lunéville in 2005).
As we have seen, clandestine Christian Churches are springing up in Morocco, Algeria and also in most Arab countries. The Algerian authorities have reacted strongly to this, with converts put on trial, priests arrested and missionaries expelled.
In the current climate, it is the question of apostasy in Islam which appears
to be the issue most likely to lead to crises and tension. Many militant secularists, who are outraged at the fate of “apostates” in Islam, are the first to be suspicious of all converts in the other direction, whether their conversion is genuine
or assumed. But the question of apostasy is only one aspect of this general transformation of religion in modern times. It is not just a human rights issue; con-
3
SUDARSAN RAGHAVAN, A clash of culture, faith; Latinas balance Catholic upbringing, adoption of Islam, in «The Washington Post», June 5, 2006.
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version is central to the separation between religion and culture. There is no
longer an automatic connection between culture and religion. The religious
marker is free and floating. Tension will be exacerbated by the increase in conversions and switching between religions in today’s world, until people come to
terms with the divorce between religions and cultures. Conversions are a key to
understand what is happening, but their inevitable growth will also be a sign
that religions now operate outside cultures, and that the famous clash/dialogue
of civilizations, which implies a permanent and reciprocal link between culture
and religion, is a futile illusion.
This globalization of religion is particularly visible among radicals. People
who join Al Qaeda nowadays are first of all globalized young people who identify with a virtual and imaginary Muslim ummah. Their life is often spent in a
triangle: the family comes from one country, they move to a Western country (or
were born there), where they become radicalized and then go to fight in a third
country. In fact, neither Pakistan, Yemen nor Afghanistan is the key place for
radicalization. These terrorists go there after being radicalized in the West or in
a Western environment. And radicalization does not occur in a concrete political praxis with real people, but with a solitary experience of a virtual community: the ummah on the Web. The Nigerian Abdulmutallab studied in an international English school in the French-speaking country of Togo, before going to
Britain. Dhiren Barot came from an African-based Hindu family and was educated in the U.K., where he converted to Islam. English is the language of recruitment and communication. These radicals do not have any permanent links
with a specific country; as with their forerunners of the 1990s, they travel from
one jihad to the other, use training camps where available and have never been
involved in local politics in their countries of training or residence. Their anger
is not the expression of the wrath of a real community, but of a virtual one. The
generational dimension is obvious; most of the radicals have broken away from
their families or become estranged, as illustrated by the puzzlement of many
parents, like Abdulmutallab’s father who informed the US embassy of his son’s
radicalization. Their Islam is reconstructed and not transmitted from the past.
They never refer to traditions or to traditional Islam, and do not mention fatwas
from established clerics. They act on an individual basis and outside the usual
community bonds (family, mosques and Islamic associations). They usually remain aloof from any communal group. They are lonely travelers not involved in
social or political action or even religious predication. They find socialization
through personal bonding with alter egos, either in a local closed group of
friends (the 9/11 pilots and the 2005 London bombers), a training camp in a remote place in Pakistan, or simply by chatting on the Web. After a usual “normal”
life, they suddenly jump into violence. They are psychological losers or uproot-
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ed individuals who can become imaginary heroes of a virtual ummah through
their own deaths.
There is something puzzling with Al Qaeda: while many terrorists are simply
dispensable, like Jose Padilla or Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber” and “one-shot”
strategy deprives the organization of probably bright people who could have
been more efficient in the long run. The case of the Jordanian terrorist who blew
up himself for spectacular but short-term success in a C.I.A. base in Afghanistan
is typical. He would have been far more useful as a mole for the Al Qaeda leadership in the long-term. Suicide terrorism is not a tactic here, it is an end in itself and part of the motivation.
This shows that Al Qaeda does not have a political strategy of establishing an
Islamic state. Al Qaeda does not play a vanguard or a leading role in the conflicts
of the Middle East but is mainly fighting at its periphery. It has a global enemy,
the West, not the local regimes. Instead of promoting a territorial caliphate in
the Middle East, Al Qaeda is committed to a global struggle against the world
power – the United States – in continuation of the radical anti-imperialist struggles of the 1960s and 1970s by the likes of Che Guevara and the Baader-Meinhof gang. This was well illustrated by the wife of the Jordanian terrorist, Humam
al Balawi, who blew himself up in a CIA base in Afghanistan: Defne Bayrak, a
Turkish citizen, wrote a book in support of Bin Laden entitled "Osama bin
Laden: Che Guevara of the East."
Al Qaeda stresses radical but individual action and addresses a wider Al Qaeda does not play a vanguard or a leading role
audience than just the Muslim com- in the conflicts of the Middle East, but is mainly fighting
munity, hence the converts. Ideology at its periphery
plays a small role in the radicalization of the jihadist internationalist youth. They
are attracted by a narrative and not an ideology: that of a global, indistinct suffering ummah. And that of the lonely avenger, the hero, who can redeem a life
he is not happy with by achieving fame while escaping a world where he finds
no room.
Al Qaeda is perfectly adapted to our modern global world, where acting
means making headlines in the newspapers.
But, fortunately, this religious globalization movement is not to be identified
only with new forms of radicalism and extremism. It has other dimensions that
are somewhat ignored by journalists and politicians. The first point is that globalization entails a homogenization of religious practices, from the top as well
from the bottom. Spiritual needs tend to fit into comparable forms: the individualization of faith, a quest for self-realization in this world as well as salvation in
the hereafter, and the creation of a local faith community that brings support
and brotherhood at a time when traditional social bonds seem to be fading. It is
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interesting to see how very different religions put forward the same inventory of
benefits for the individual (to find peace, authenticity and truth). Islamic
preachers now advertize family counselling and advise on bio-ethics, yoga is
used as a spiritual technique by Jews and Christians, rap and rock groups promote different faiths, healing is a motto of Pentecostal preachers etc.
But this homogenization of religious practices is also indirectly encouraged
by courts and state authorities, who need to use comparable paradigms of religions for two different and contradictory goals: one is to ensure control of
the public sphere, the other is to implement freedom of religion. To ensure
state control, governments encourage or push for the clericalization of religions i.e. their transformation into institutional churches. Most Muslim countries have now a “state-mufti”, a state Islamic faculty and tend to allow only
certified clerics to preach. China compels all religions to enter into a national
church. Most states who were former members of the USSR recognized only
registered religious groups. Many countries have restricting laws or administrative practices on proselytism (from Rajasthan in India, to France, Russia
and Algeria). France wants explicitly to ban “ostentatious” or “extreme” forms
of religious practices (e.g. the burqa or veil). Many religious minorities react
either through a process of “ghettoization” or more often abide by liberalizing
their practices (e.g. using the Reform Judaïsm model in the USA). But this
opening up is also the consequence of a shift of attitude among new generations of believers who do not understand the need for old-fashioned practices
(e.g. one issue for young Western Muslims is “hallal dating”, i.e. how to meet a
prospective spouse in a society where parents are no longer entitled to choose
a spouse for their children, but youngsters are forbidden from meeting with
the other sex).
The other dimension of what I call the “formatting” of religion to a Western
paradigm of what a religion is supposed to be, is the need to ensure freedom of
religion on an equal basis. For instance, many Western states have recently decided to enlist a Muslim “chaplain” for the armed forces, thus contributing to the
clericalization and professionalization of the Islamic faith. Courts tend to define
religious practices with a common model as “acceptable” in order to ensure or
restrict freedom of religion: this thus contributes to defining “orthodox” and
non orthodox practices from outside.
Is wearing a burqa a religious right, or is it outside the scope of what Islam
requires from women in terms of “chastity”? Instead of being debated among
believers, the issue is settled by secular institutions (courts and parliaments).
This process of formatting religion contributes to its rooting in a new political
landscape and thus to its deculturation. This is something which went unnoticed in the debate on minarets in Switzerland: the fact that there were only four
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mosques with a minaret in the country shows that minarets were not an issue
for the local Muslims, because they came precisely to make a distinction between
a place of worship and a cultural importation. However, Islam is a very foreign
culture for the majority of Swiss voters, hence non-existing minarets seem more
a threat to them than existing mosques. This de facto integration of Islam in the
West is not perceived, or to be more exact the visibility it entails is seen as a
threat, and not as a sign of “gentrification” of Islam. New mosques are usually
built at the request of representatives of the new Muslim middle classes emerging in the West, so if there are more mosques, it is precisely because Muslims are
more integrated locally and are richer.
One consequence of all these trends is that religions increasingly look similar and compete for the same audience (e.g. the map of newly built mosques in
France fits very well with that of newly built evangelical churches, with one exception: Brittany). This dual relationship involves complicated interaction between religious communities. On the one hand, every religion tends to call for
political authorities to thwart the development of others (it is no secret that the
Catholic church in France opposed the establishment of a state-sponsored faculty of Islamic theology in Strasbourg), while on the other hand different faith
communities ally on a common values-based agenda to oppose the growing secularization of society: Catholics, Mormons, Evangelicals, Muslims and orthodox
Jews join together to oppose same-sex marriages, to ban the gay parade in
Jerusalem, or to defend the privileges of faith-based schools. This conservative
values alliance also has an impact on the standardization of religious paradigms:
some conservative Muslims have embraced the Christian crusade against abortion and evolution, which is a quite new phenomenon in Islam (none of these
topics were salient issues among ulamas).
But in What Direction is the Globalization of Religions Moving?
There are in fact two conflicting views: one that this exemplifies the decrease
of the role of the West in shaping the world religious landscape, and another diametrically opposite view stressing the growing role of US promoted models of
protestant Christianity (including Mormonism). Interestingly enough, all the
“big” religions are on the defensive, which is a paradox at a time of supposed religious revivalism. Islamic preachers are constantly warning their flock of the
deleterious impact of Western culture and values. The Pope as well as Evangelical preachers denounce the “culture of death” of a Western secular culture
turned pagan. Haredim in Israël refuse to recognize their secular fellow citizens
as Jews, and bask in a culture of a minority within a minority. How can this sense
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of being a minority under siege be reconciled with the supposed rise of religious
revivalism in the world? It is probably because the new trends are operating outside the outdated perception of religion adding a spiritual touch to permanent
geo-strategic factors (nationalism, cultural hegemony of the dominant powers,
expansionism of new powers etc.).
The fate of Catholicism is a good example. The centre of gravity of Catholicism has moved south; should this be seen as a cultural change, a different
Catholic culture (as proposed by Philip Jenkins) or on the contrary, the height
of deculturation4? There has been a remarkable “third-worldization” of Christianity, and particularly of Catholicism, as a result not only of the demographic
vitality of the South (and the plummeting birth-rate in traditionally Catholic
countries like Spain and Italy), but also because those with a religious vocation
are growing in number. In 1990, the Company of Jesus had 25,000 members: the
leading country was the United States with 4,724 followers, but the second was
India (2,997); in 1990, the Société des missions de Lyon in France numbered 190
applicants, 79 of them African, 32 Irish and 4 French. Authors such as Philip
Jenkins speak of “African Christianity” and foresee a reverse acculturation of
Christianity, «As Christianity moves southward, the religion will be comparatively changed by immersion in the prevailing cultures of those host countries».
But the question is whether this is indeed acculturation, since the Christianity of
the South has re-exported to the North an orthodoxy that does not fit there anymore. In terms of norms, the Catholicism of the South does not represent different cultural norms but on the contrary, a resistance to changes in morality
that are taking place in the West (e.g. the acceptance of homosexuality). How
can we explain the winning over of an Episcopal parish in a wealthy white suburb of Washington, hardly likely to dance to the sound of the tom-tom, by a
Black Anglican bishop from Nigeria5? How should we interpret conversions carried out by the “dominated” among the “dominators”? The new religiosities are
not specifically African: the use of music and emotions was already a feature of
Western “awakenings”, and it is not religious folklore that attracts recruits but
rather the central issue of orthodoxy and the place of religion in a person’s private life.
The establishment of Christian
The Catholicism of the South does not represent
churches, or off-springs of Christiandifferent cultural norms, but on the contrary,
ity in Africa (African Initiated
a resistence to changes in morality that are taking place Churches), has been described as a
in the West
phenomenon of Africanization typical of Christianity, in other words of reverse acculturation. This was perhaps the
case initially, for these churches were effectively born out of breakaways from the
white missionary churches. But on the one hand the missionary church became
4
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5
P. JENKINS, The Next Christendom, The Coming of Global Christianity, Oxford 2001.
A. COOPERMAN - J.L. SALMON, Episcopal Churches’ Breakaway in Virginia Evolved over 30 Years, in
«The Washington Post», January 4, 2007.
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indigenized and, on the other, “African Churches” such as the Aladura and Celestial Church of Christ became globalized and exported themselves to the West.
Experts who prefer to avoid speaking of acculturation or syncretism as those
terms are ethnocentrist, have successively used the terms “African Independent
Churches” to demonstrate their independence from the foreign missions and
show their determination to be rooted in African culture, and recently “African
Initiated Churches” as Africa is only a starting point and the churches in question are intended to become globalized6. These churches gained a foothold in
Europe in the 1960s, initially recruiting from African immigrant communities,
using English and French, and then spread into a sphere that was no longer that
of immigration, either because they had reached the second generation or people of Caribbean origin, or because they had broken through among the
“whites”. These churches are Protestant and charismatic but multidenominational; they ignore traditional religious affiliations. They define themselves as religious communities, and not as the expression of an ethnic group7. Today, their
strategy is to recruit in non-African milieus, as the major neo-Sufi brotherhoods
and the Buddhist and neo-Hinduist movements do. But they also show an interesting boomerang effect which completely clouds the hybridization and acculturation issue. This phenomenon also affects the “new religions”: the head of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye in the USA, the first incorporated Santeria church (a religious movement born among Cuban black slaves), is a “white”, Ernesto Pichardo, whose bourgeois family in Cuba was converted by a black servant.
Here, the separation of cultural and religious markers is particularly striking
with regard to norms. One of Rome’s traditional criticisms of the African clergy
is of its laxity on the issue of sexuality: the Vatican excommunicated the Zambian Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo, who married a Maria Sung, a Korean
member of the Moon sect in 2001. But the “African Churches” do not claim to
be more tolerant on issues of sexuality; on the contrary, today they claim to be
closer to traditional Christian norms which are gradually being abandoned in
the West, as evidenced by the controversy over homosexuality. It is interesting to
note that nowadays there is talk of the homophobia of the “blacks” (or the Russians etc.), as if tolerance towards homosexuality was a Western virtue, whereas
it is a very recent phenomenon in the West. In fact, the question of norms should
not be thought of in terms of “culture”: the very rapid development of the debate on norms in contemporary Western law illustrates clearly that these norms
are not specific to “Western culture”. This is illustrated by the case of Pym Fortuyn, the gay activist sociology teacher who was assassinated in the Netherlands:
when he embarked on a political campaign opposing Islam, it was not in the
name of defending a Christian Europe, but rather the Europe of the 1960s sexual revolution.
For an overview, see Les Églises africaines se développent en Europe. Entretien avec Afe Adogame, in «Religioscope»,19 janvier, 2003; for a discussion on terminology, see A. ANDERSON, Pluriformity And Contextuality In African Initiated Churches, Birmingham, http://artsweb.bham.ac.uk/aanderson/Publications/pluriformity_and_contextuality_i.html.
7
Les Églises africaines se développent en Europe. Entretien avec Afe Adogame, cit.
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The impossibility to connect the present religious movements with clearly
identifiable geo-political phenomena is highly anxyogenous. It leads to a frantic
quest for supposedly well-known historical paradigms (crusades, jihad, colonialism with the clash of civilizations, but also Andalucía and the Ottoman Empire for dialogue, not to mention the ghosts of Nazism and communism and the
quest for an enemy). The problem is that these paradigms are not only misunderstood and taken out of their historical context, but also they are irrelevant for
understanding the close connection between globalization and contemporary
religious revivalisms. Religion is not necessarily politics in disguise, but it may
also express a genuine adaption to the shaking of traditional ethnic and/or political identities by globalization, or an escape from this.
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Il ritorno delle religioni nelle relazioni internazionali e qualche riflessione sul caso singolare...
Fabio Petito
Il ritorno delle religioni nelle relazioni
internazionali e qualche riflessione
sul caso singolare dell’espansione globale
del protestantesimo
Solo le grandi religioni mondiali hanno la credibilità e la legittimità
per identificare e rifiutare l’idolatria che sembra stare al centro
di questo progetto americano di dominio planetario.
(Richard Falk, 2003)1
FABIO PETITO
è docente di Relazioni
Internazionali, Department
of International Relations,
University of Sussex
Sembra esistere oramai un ampio accordo sulla rilevanza crescente del fattore religioso nelle relazioni internazionali contemporanee2. È sufficiente pensare
al discorso islamista di Al-Qaida, ai riferimenti religiosi nella politica estera dell’amministrazione Bush, ma anche al ruolo delle comunità cristiane nel movimento transazionale contro la guerra in Iraq. Non bisogna nemmeno dimenticare che la religione sembra essere ritornata in modo imperioso nelle dinamiche
politiche interne e al centro dei dibattiti pubblici di molti stati non occidentali,
e non soltanto dell’ipersorvegliato e fortemente mediatizzato mondo mussulmano: si pensi, per esempio, al dibattito sui valori asiatici in Asia orientale, al
ruolo del partito induista in India e a quello dell’ortodossia nella ridefinizione
dell’identità e della missione politica della Russia di Putin. A ciò va aggiunta anche la nuova centralità della questione religiosa nei dibattiti e nelle dinamiche
politiche delle società “moderne e secolarizzate” del mondo occidentale: dal problema del velo islamico nella scuola repubblicana alla riapertura del dibattito sulla laicità in Francia, dalla questione del riferimento all’eredità culturale cristiana
nel preambolo della costituzione europea al ruolo della destra cristiana nelle cultural war d’oltreoceano che in qualche modo rischiano di essere “importate” nello scontro politico nostrano sulle cosiddette questioni eticamente sensibili.
Quest’articolo s’interroga, in primo luogo, sulle sfide teoriche poste dal ritorno della religione agli specialisti delle relazioni internazionali, criticando il loro silenzio o il loro discorso a senso unico sulla politicizzazione della religione.
In secondo luogo, esamina brevemente il caso poco studiato dagli internazionalisti dell’espansione globale del protestantesimo e, riflettendo sulle sue impliR. FALK, La rinascita mondiale della religione nell’epoca della globalizzazione e del terrorismo apocalittico,
in F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (a cura di), Ritorno dall’esilio. La religione nelle relazioni internazionali, Milano 2006, p. 262, trad. di Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York 2003.
2
Si veda ad esempio P. BERGER (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Grand Rapids 1999; F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (a cura di), Ritorno dall’esilio, cit.; J. HAYNES,
Religion in Global Politics, London 1998; D. JOHNSTON - C. SAMPSON (eds.), Religion: the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, Oxford 1994; J.L. ESPOSITO - M. WATSON (eds.), Religion and Global Order,
Cardiff 2000.
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cazioni per la politica internazionale, avanzeremo la tesi della sua “singolarità politica”: benché sociologicamente parte del più ampio ritorno della religione, tale espansione non può essere politicamente associata a ciò che Hedley Bull ha
chiamato la «rivolta contro l’Occidente» e che a me pare rappresentare il quadro
sistemico più convincente di comprensione storico-politica del ritorno delle religioni nelle relazioni internazionali3. Non essendo parte della critica politica dell’ordine occidentale-centrico e liberale della globalizzazione, ma rappresentando piuttosto un vettore della globalizzazione e dell’American way of life, l’espansione globale del protestantesimo resta nondimeno una fonte d’energia politica
che lo specialista delle relazioni internazionali farebbe bene a non sottovalutare,
soprattutto alla luce del presente contesto geopolitico e di una particolare relazione con il politico che queste nuove forme di manifestazione religiosa sembrano intrattenere.
Una questione di metodo: la de-secolarizzazione delle relazioni
internazionali
La natura “globale” del ritorno della religione potrebbe indurci a esaminare
l’ipotesi che qualcosa di fondamentalmente nuovo stia emergendo rispetto alla
relazione tra politica e religione tout court come ad esempio l’idea che la ridefinizione di un concetto di politica “in crisi” passi per un nuovo confronto/relazione con la religione. Ma una tale riflessione filosofica va ben al di là dell’obiettivo di questo articolo. In realtà, ciò che vorrei sottolineare, in primo luogo,
è una differenza. Mentre da tempo la sociologia delle religioni parla chiaramente del ritorno globale delle religioni o della de-secolarizzazione del mondo e fissa la posta in gioco teorica nella comprensione della modalità di tale ritorno, da
parte sua, la disciplina delle relazioni internazionali ha solo di recente iniziato ad
affrontare seriamente la questione del ritorno delle religioni dal punto di vista
teorico e continua a operare ampiamente sotto l’egida incontestata del paradigma della secolarizzazione4.
Ciò non significa un’assenza totale
La disciplina delle relazioni internazionali ha solo
di riferimenti al fenomeno religioso
di recente iniziato ad affrontare seriamente la questione nelle analisi della politica internaziodel ritorno delle religioni dal punto di vista teorico
nale del dopo guerra fredda. Al contrario, esiste, e si è indubbiamente rafforzato nell’era successiva all’11 settembre,
un discorso sempre più esplicito e univoco che mette l’accento sulla relazione tra
H. BULL, The Revolt against the West, in H. BULL - A. WATSON (eds.), The Expansion of International
Society, Oxford 1984.
4
Per una discussione delle diverse interpretazioni del concetto di secolarizzazione si rinvia a R. STARK,
Secularization, R.I.P., in «Sociology of Religion», 60, 3, 1999. La nozione di secolarizzazione qui utilizzata è vicina a quella sviluppata da D. MARTIN, A General Theory of Secularization, New York 1978: secolarizzazione come “differenziazione” e specializzazione di ogni settore sociale. In questo caso si tratta della separazione della politica e della religione nel contesto delle relazioni internazionali. Per un tentativo
di affrontare questo curioso silenzio della teoria delle relazioni internazionali mi permetto di rinviare a
F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (a cura di), Ritorno dall’esilio, cit.
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la crescente instabilità internazionale e il nuovo ruolo politico delle religioni. Tale instabilità si manifesterebbe nell’associazione tra terrorismo e fondamentalismo religioso o ancora nel ruolo centrale e negativo della religione nelle cosiddette “nuove guerre”, o addirittura nelle religioni come la forza al centro dello
scenario dello scontro tra le civiltà5. Questo approccio che ritroviamo spesso implicito in molte analisi empiriche resta, a mio parere, superficiale e incapace di
comprende i cambiamenti profondi nelle strutture portanti della convivenza internazionale che il ritorno globale delle religioni contribuisce a disegnare. La ragione è che il discorso dominante sul ruolo della religione nella politica internazionale assume una versione “adattata” del paradigma della secolarizzazione,
qualcosa di simile a quello che Scott Thomas ha definito «la presunzione westfaliana», ossia la nozione che il pluralismo religioso non sia compatibile con l’ordine internazionale, a meno che non sia accompagnato da un processo di privatizzazione e de-politicizzazione della religione o alternativamente superato da una
etica cosmopolita6.
In altri termini, nell’attuale riflessione sulle relazioni internazionali l’incontro tra “religione” e “politica internazionale” produce necessariamente guerre,
disordine e instabilità internazionale. Tale affermazione, d’altra parte, non è
nuova. Anzi potremmo arrivare ad affermare che sembra essere iscritta nel codice genetico del pensiero internazionalista moderno. Non bisogna dimenticare, infatti, che gli elementi costitutivi dell’insieme di pratiche e istituzioni tipiche della politica inter-nazionale moderna furono stabiliti, o quanto meno consolidati, nell’Europa del diciassettesimo secolo proprio per porre fine alle guerre di religione.
Conosciamo bene la storia: è la pace di Westfalia (1648) che, mettendo fine
alle guerre civili di religione che avevano devastato l’Europa durante la guerra
dei Trent’Anni (ma in realtà, in maniera intermittente, durante un periodo di
più di un secolo, se si considera che gli scontri politico-religiosi attraversarono
l’Europa a partire dell’inizio della riforma protestante nel 1519), istituzionalizza un nuovo modello moderno di coesistenza internazionale fondato sulla sovranità statale e sulla norma del non intervento sancita dal principio del cuius
regio eius religio. “Westfalia” diviene così il modello storico-concettuale di riferimento per il pensiero internazionalista. Ma ai fini della nostra analisi la conseguenza di questo avvenimento storico fondatore che interessa è la seguente:
con “Westfalia” la politicizzazione della religione viene percepita come la minaccia ultima all’ordine, alla sicurezza e alla civiltà internazionale, e quindi, essa non ha diritto di cittadinanza né nella prassi né nella teoria delle relazioni internazionali. In altre parole, il sistema moderno westfaliano assume, manifesta
e istituzionalizza, in nome dell’ordine internazionale, la marginalizzazione o
neutralizzazzione politica delle religioni.
Si veda ad esempio S. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order,
New York 1996; M. JURGENSMEYER, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence,
Berkeley 2000 e M. KALDOR, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge 1999.
6
S. THOMAS, Prendere sul serio il pluralismo religioso e culturale. La rinascita globale della religione e la
trasformazione della società internazionale, in F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (a cura di), Ritorno dall’esilio, cit., pp. 31-69.
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È in questo senso che ho sostenuto che con “Westfalia” le religioni entrano,
metaforicamente parlando, in una lunga fase di esilio7.
Nella misura in cui l’esclusione
Con Westfalia la politicizzazione della religione
della religione non riguarda solamenviene percepita come la minaccia ultima all'ordine,
te la pratica ma anche la teoria delle
alla sicurezza e alla civiltà internazionale
relazioni internazionali, allora ha senso riflettere sulla questione del metodo di studio. Molto prima che l’Illuminismo aprisse la strada a uno studio social-scientifico della politica internazionale (traiettoria che porterà nel ventesimo secolo alla creazione e al consolidamento della disciplina delle relazioni internazionali), le circostanze storiche
summenzionate avevano già prodotto una secolarizzazione del discorso sulla
politica internazionale. In realtà, non bisogna dimenticare che il diritto internazionale moderno, senza dubbio il predecessore della disciplina delle relazioni internazionali, è nato sotto gli auspici della celebre invettiva di Alberico Gentili «silete teologi in munere alieno» (teologi, astenetevi dagli ambiti che non vi
riguardano) che segnava simbolicamente la fine della Respublica Christiana e la
nascita di una nuova epoca, quella dell’era westfaliana nella quale, per l’appunto, la politica internazionale sarebbe stata analizzata da un punto di vista laico
e non più teologico8.
Questo breve riferimento genealogico fa intravedere alcune delle ragioni più
profonde che possono spiegare questa sorta di “disagio” della riflessione internazionalista rispetto alla questione della religione – disagio che come ho accennato si traduce per lo più, nel pensiero internazionalistico contemporaneo, nella forma del silenzio o del discorso “a senso unico”9. Infatti, vorrei suggerire che
tale disagio è fondamentalmente legato alla politica secolarizzante della struttura
dell’autorità all’origine della sintesi westfaliana che ha influenzato il pensiero internazionalista nel senso della neutralizzazione – e di conseguenza della caratterizzazione univoca – dell’elemento religioso. Questa tesi prima di essere una critica rivolta all’internazionalista è un riconoscimento dell’importanza e del peso
del contesto storico nello sviluppo del pensiero politico in generale e internazionalista in particolare; ma allo stesso tempo, è anche una messa in guardia a
non trasformare un’esperienza storica europea in verità assoluta e universale della politica mondiale.
F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (a cura di), Ritorno dall’esilio, cit.
A. GENTILE citato in C. SCHMITT, Il nomos della terra nel diritto internazionale dello «Jus publicum europaeum», Milano 1991 [1950].
9
Per il “silenzio” si veda J. FOX, Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations, in «International Studies Review», 3, 3, 2001, pp. 53-74. Uno studio di quattro riviste mainstream di Relazioni Internazionali («International Organizations, International Studies Quarterly, International Security and
World Politics») mostra che fra il 1980 e il 1999 ci sono stati soltanto sei articoli su circa 600 che hanno
considerato la religione come un fattore significativo. Si veda D. PHILPOTT, Revolutions in Sovereignty:
How Ideas Shape Modern International Relations, Princeton 2001, p. 9.
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La “rivolta contro l’Occidente”, la globalizzazione e l’espansione
mondiale del protestantesimo
Uscire dalla presunzione westfaliana e dal paradigma omogeneizzante della
secolarizzazione, con la loro attuale ossessione sul binomio fondamentalismo/instabilità, ci permette di comprendere una dimensione politica essenziale del ritorno delle religioni nelle relazioni internazionali: e cioè, il ritorno delle religioni come la manifestazione più evidente del processo di “rivolta contro l’Occidente” e, in particolare, come una delle fonti principali delle idee politiche critiche dell’ordine globale, liberale e occidentale-centrico.
Secondo Hedley Bull, la “rivolta contro l’Occidente” è un processo storico di
lunga durata che ha caratterizzato il ventesimo secolo e che ha messo in discussione il dominio euro-occidentale della società internazionale. Le tre fasi più significative della “rivolta contro l’Occidente” sono: la decolonizzazione (o rivolta contro l’imperialismo politico dell’Occidente) che si conclude con la fine degli imperi europei negli anni successivi alla seconda guerra mondiale; la battaglia per lo sviluppo economico (o rivolta contro l’imperialismo economico dell’Occidente) esemplificata negli anni Settanta dalla domanda del Terzo Mondo
per un Nuovo Ordine Economico Internazionale; e, infine, la lotta per la liberazione culturale del mondo non-occidentale (la rivolta contro l’imperialismo culturale dell’Occidente) che ha avuto la manifestazione politica più eclatante nella rivoluzione islamico-iraniana del 1979 e nell’affermarsi a livello mondiale dell’islam politico, ma che è anche evidente, ad esempio, nel crescente riferimento
politico ai cosiddetti “valori asiatici” o nelle rivendicazioni culturali del partito
induista in India.
È proprio nel contesto di questa ultima fase della rivolta culturale contro È proprio nel contesto di questa ultima fase
l’Occidente che va letto il ritorno del- della rivolta culturale contro l’Occidente che va letto
le grandi tradizioni religiose sulla sce- il ritorno delle grandi tradizioni religiose sulla scena
na della politica mondiale. In altre pa- della politica mondiale
role, le tradizioni religiose assumono un ruolo centrale nel processo politico di
ricerca di una nuova “autenticità culturale”. Questi processi di ricostruzione politica hanno spesso un’ispirazione religiosa anche perché denunciano i fallimenti in termini di sviluppo e di democratizzazione delle strategie occidentali di modernizzazione fondate sullo stato laico e la marginalizzazione socio-culturale della religione. In questo contesto, la nuova parola d’ordine è di indigenizzare la modernità, piuttosto che modernizzare le società indigene10. Questa tendenza, a mio
avviso, si è andata ulteriormente rafforzando con la fine della guerra fredda nel
momento in cui veniva trionfalisticamente annunciata la vittoria politica e morale di un modello unico (politico, economico e sociale), quello liberale e occi-
10
S. THOMAS, Prendere sul serio il pluralismo religioso e culturale, cit.
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dentale, destinato ormai a completare la modernizzazione (e occidentalizzazione!) del mondo.
Ecco perché oggi sono sempre più numerosi coloro che sostengono che il disegno della futura struttura normativa della società globale del XXI secolo – tema normativo centrale per le relazioni internazionali post-bipolari che ha assunto una rinnovata urgenza dopo la recente crisi economico-finanziaria globale – non sarà completo se non integrerà le etiche sociali delle grandi tradizioni
religiose e culturali del pianeta11. In altre parole, se la struttura normativa della
futura coesistenza globale vuole essere veramente universale, essa non può essere solamente liberale e occidentale-centrica. Un vero universalismo, che sia nella forma di un ethos cosmopolitico globale o nella più limitata modalità di un
rinnovato diritto internazionale, non richiede la neutralizzazione delle religioni,
bensì una concezione sostanziale e realistica della loro presenza nella politica
mondiale12. Le proposte teoriche del cosmopolitismo liberale, che siano basate
sull’idea di sfera pubblica post-nazionale di Jurgen Habermas o sull’estensione
al livello internazionale della “public reason” di John Rawls, rappresentano dei
modelli troppo restrittivi, poiché fanno coincidere l’etica nella politica con i limiti spaziali stabiliti da concetti laici e non sono capaci di “rendere giustizia alla differenza” e , quindi, di relazionarsi realisticamente con le pratiche delle comunità realmente esistenti, per dirla con un’efficace espressione di Jean Bethke
Elsthain («really existing communities»)13.
Ma come leggere allora il caso specifico dell’espansione globale del protestantesimo nel quadro delle relazioni internazionali contemporanee? Lo studio
della vasta letteratura sociologica prodotta negli ultimi anni sembra confermare la tesi, avanzata dai curatori di una recente opera collettiva sulla globalizzazione della dimensione religiosa, che definisce le variegate forme di protestantesimo che sono esplose negli ultimi decenni, a volte raggruppate sotto la voce di
movimenti evangelici o pentecostali, come «dei movimenti in affinità con la globalizzazione», caso paradigmatico della «religione all’epoca della transnazionalità»:
I pentecostalismi radicalizzano, più che altri movimenti, la logica protestante del leader-imprenditore religioso indipendente, la cui figura è
centrale nel processo della globalizzazione … sono senza dubbio i moSi rinvia ai capitoli di R. FALK - S. THOMAS - F. DALLMAYR, in F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (a
cura di), Ritorno dall’esilio, cit. Si veda anche F. PETITO - M.S. MICHAEL (eds.), Civilizational Dialogue
and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures, Religions and Civilizations in International Relations, New
York 2009.
12
Vaclav Havel ha sviluppato quest’idea con notevole eloquenza: «It is not enough to take the set of imperatives, principles, or rules produced by the Euro-American world and mechanically declare them
binding for all. Different cultures or spheres of civilization can share only what they perceive as genuine
common ground, not something that few merely offer to or even force upon others. The tenets of human coexistence on this earth can hold up only if they grow out of the deepest experience of everyone,
not just some of us». V. HAVEL, The Art of Impossible: Politics as Morality in Practice, Speeches and Writings 1990-1996, transl. Paul Wilson, New York 1997, pp. 195-196.
13
J. RAWLS, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge 1999; J. HABERMAS, The Postnational Constellation, MIT
Press, 2001; and J. B. ELSHTAIN, Really Existing Communities, in «Review of International Studies», 25,
1, 1999, pp. 141-46.
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vimenti che funzionano meglio secondo la logica delle reti transazionali e multilaterali, usando la visibilità mediatica … si prestano all’ibridazione della fede e delle pratiche legate alla transnazionalizzazione
delle religioni … permettendo tanto una rilegittimazione di fatto delle
antiche credenze religiose quanto un distacco dalle tradizioni ancestrali14.
Inoltre, come risulta da numerosi studi empirici sull’espansione del pentecostalismo in diverse parti del mondo, dall’Africa, all’Asia Orientale e all’America
Latina, l’espansione del protestantesimo spesso s’iscrive all’interno di processi
epocali di trasformazione socio-economica e trova un terreno fertile nelle popolazioni che, in seguito alla perdita o alla separazione dal mondo “tradizionale”, sono alla ricerca di rimedi, di senso, d’appartenenza a una comunità15.
Nel caso della Corea del Sud, ad
esempio, è stato notato un legame Dall’Africa, all’Asia Orientale e all’America Latina,
profondo tra l’eccezionale processo di l’espansione del protestantesimo spesso s’iscrive
crescita economica e il ruolo “d’ac- all’interno di processi epocali di trasformazione
compagnamento” che il protestantesi- socio-economica
mo ha giocato in queste trasformazioni socio-economiche16. Nell’Africa occidentale anche il successo del pentecostalismo s’iscrive nelle dinamiche di cambiamento sociale e modernizzazione che investono le società locali: infatti in un
contesto urbano caratterizzato da una degrado delle condizioni di vita dovute a
crisi economica e a politiche di aggiustamento strutturale, le ragioni del successo pentecostale consistono non solo nelle pratiche di “liberazione dal male” e di
guarigione o nella valorizzazione della prosperità e del successo finanziario ma
anche nell’assunzione della costruzione del senso e della ricostruzione dell’identità17. Allo stesso modo nel caso quantitativamente meno rilevante della Russia,
il messaggio protestante evangelico, iscrivendo al centro del dispositivo religioso i bisogni e le scelte individuali, si accorda con i nuovi valori della società post-sovietica e risponde alle sue aspirazioni attuali, in particolare all’interno dell’ambiente studentesco18. Infine, questo legame è palesemente evidente in relazione al vero e proprio business delle “mega-chiese” (mega-churches) latinoamericane che creano attraverso la decima e la leadership imprenditoriale del pastore-proprietario delle vere e proprie reti di consumo e di servizi19.
J.-P. BASTIAN - F. CHAMPION - K. ROUSSELET (dir.), La globalisation du religieux, Paris 2001, pp.
14-15.
15
Si veda P. FRESTON, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Cambridge 2001; D.
MARTIN, Pentecostalism: The World their Parish, Oxford 2002.
16
N. LUCA, L’évolution des protestantismes en Corée du Sud: un rapport ambigu à la modernité, in «Critique
Internationale», 22, 2004, pp. 111-124.
17
C. MAYRARGUE, Trajectoires et enjeux contemporains du pentecôtisme en Afrique de l’Ouest, in «Critique
Internationale», cit., pp. 95-109.
18
K. ROUSSELET, La diversité évangélique en Russie: de la mission étrangère à la surenchère nationale, in
«Critique Internationale», cit., pp. 125-138.
19
J. GARCIA-RUIZ, Le néopentecôtisme au Guatemala: entre privatisation, marché et réseaux, in «Critique
Internationale», cit., pp. 81-94.
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In qualche modo potremmo dire che la sociologia delle religioni ritrova nell’esame della dimensione religiosa della globalizzazione, nella fattispecie di quella protestante, le stesse dinamiche della globalizzazione concepita come “glocalizzazione”: universalismo e particolarismo, individualismo liberale e comunitarismo illiberale, logica di mercato e bisogno d’identità, rete transnazionale e ripiegamento locale20. Di conseguenza, il processo della globalizzazione si manifesta in maniera più contraddittoria e meno lineare rispetto a quanto sostenuto dai
portavoce più recenti della teoria della modernizzazione21: anzi diventa più appropriato analizzare tali processi alla luce dell’ipotesi che essi non riprodurranno un’unica e universale forma di modernizzazione. È questa l’idea delle “modernità multiple”, per utilizzare l’espressione di Shmuel Eisenstadt, che introduce la necessità di interpretare questi processi all’interno dei più ampi framework
delle civiltà e, per quanto riguarda la dimensione religiosa, non assume a-problematicamente il paradigma della secolarizzazione ma si concentra, ad esempio,
sulle possibili nuove configurazioni dell’elemento religioso nel senso di una sua
iper-privatizzazione (individualizzazione e soggettivazione)22.
Questa lettura della dimensione religiosa della globalizzazione è stata criticata da Peter Beyer di ridurre il ritorno della religione alle logiche della globalizzazione, cioè a «qualche cosa che deve essere essenzialmente considerato per la
sua funzione sociale o inserito [nell’analisi] come elemento essenzialmente derivato dalla prima logica»23. D’altra parte, nel caso dell’espansione globale del
protestantesimo, è vero che la tesi dell’“affinità con la globalizzazione” si fonda,
per esempio, sull’identificazione di una vera teologia della prosperità e del benessere che non si ritrova, almeno con la stessa intensità, nelle altre manifestazioni religiose contemporanee. Questo elemento è stato lucidamente sottolineato da Peter Berger che in una recente opera collettiva, curata insieme a Samuel
Huntington, non esita a identificare il protestantesimo evangelista come uno dei
quattro vettori o veicoli privilegiati della cultura “globale” della globalizzazione
insieme “all’internazionale yuppie” dei giovani quadri manageriali, a un’intellighenzia globalizzata e a una cultura commerciale-pop internazionale24. Da questa prospettiva, l’espansione globale del protestantesimo contribuirebbe alla globalizzazione intesa come occidentalizzazione o, più esattamente, americanizzazione del mondo.
A conferma di questa ultima proposizione è stato notato che la rete transnazionale di espansione globale del protestantesimo sembra seguire un modello
detto a hub and spokes (mozzo e raggiera) dove il mozzo, cioè il punto focale di
R. ROBERTSON, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London 1992.
Un caso classico è F. FUKUYAMA, La fine della storia e l’ultimo uomo, Milano 1992.
22
S.N. EISENSTADT, Comparative Civilisations and Multiple Modernities, 2 vols., Leiden, Boston 2003;
Idem, The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of “Multiple Modernities”, in «Millennium-Journal of International Studies», 29, 3, 2000, pp. 591-611. Per la tesi dell’individualizzazione della
religiosità contemporanea si veda D. HERVIEU-LEGER, Le pèlerin et le converti. La religion en movement,
Paris 1999.
23
P. BEYER, English-Language Views of the Role of Religion in Globalization, in P. BEYER (ed.), Religion in
the process of Globalization, Ergon 2001, p. XXVIII.
24
P.L. BERGER - S.P. HUNTINGTON (eds.), Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary
World, New York 2002.
20
21
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emanazione, è chiaramente situato negli Stati Uniti25. Nel caso dell’America del
Sud, è noto come Miami sia la capitale del movimento evangelico latino-americano. Cosi come è risaputo che gran parte delle missioni evangeliche che entrarono nel mondo post-sovietico e, in particolare, in Russia all’inizio degli anni
Novanta provenivano dal sud degli Stati Uniti. Allo stesso tempo, va sottolineato come molti studi empirici sull’espansione del pentecostalismo insistano sulla
ri-appropriazione e re-interpretazione indigena di questi movimenti e, quindi,
sulla maniera in cui la globalizzazione del fenomeno religioso debba essere sempre di più appresa in maniera policentrica, come risultato della crescente proliferazione dei luoghi di produzione e di trasmissione26. Ciò nonostante, a mio parere, la questione delle implicazioni politiche di questa espansione non è stata
sufficientemente studiata e rimane una questione rilevante soprattutto nel contesto delle dinamiche internazionali contemporanee: già solo per il fatto che l’espansione globale del protestantesimo venga percepita come associata a un sistema di valori riconducibili all’American way of life, con il suo accento sul successo individuale, sul linguaggio della performance e su una vera e propria teologia della prosperità, è difficile escludere che ciò giochi nelle complesse dinamiche politiche e che possa anche avere delle rilevanti conseguenze nella presente
congiuntura internazionale.
Relazioni internazionali, sovranità della politica e politicizzazione
della religione
È alla luce di quest’ultima riflessione che per lo specialista delle relazioni internazionali diviene interessante la discussione sull’espansione globale del protestantesimo poiché l’interazione tra globalizzazione, attori transnazionali non-statali e
stati (e, in particolare il più potente di tutti, gli Stati Uniti) è al centro della controversia sulla natura stessa della globalizzazione27. A tal proposito è interessante
leggere il contributo di Bertrand Badie, contenuto nel volume La globalisation du
religieux, che trae delle conclusioni dal punto di vista dello specialista delle “nuove” relazioni internazionali, cioè da un approccio teorico secondo il quale «il sistema internazionale è il sistema dell’interazione totale, illimitata e assoluta» in cui lo
stato è solamente un attore tra una pluralità di attori internazionali e transnazionali28. Questo approccio interattivista-sociologico alle relazioni internazionali, che
secondo Badie richiede per l’appunto un partenariato con la sociologia, nel caso
specifico con la sociologia delle religioni, evidenzia con precisione talune delle di-
Ariel Colonomos ha osservato che in generale «la logica dei networks nella loro variante transnazionale
include molto spesso uno “scalo” negli Usa». Si veda A. COLONOMOS, Eglises en réseau. Trajectoires politiques entre Europe et Amerique, Paris 2000.
26
Si veda C. MAYRARGUE, Trajectoires et enjeux contemporains du pentecôtisme en Afrique de l’Ouest, cit.;
J. GARCIA-RUIZ, Le néopentecôtisme au Guatemala: entre privatisation, marché et réseaux, cit.
27
Per questo dibattito si veda D. HELD - A. MCGREW, The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction,
in D. HELD - A. MCGREW (eds.), The Global Transformation Reader, Cambridge 2000.
28
B. BADIE, Nouvelle approches des relations internationales et du fait religieux, in J.-P. BASTIAN - F.
CHAMPION - K. ROUSSELET (dir.), La globalisation du religieux, cit., pp. 265-7.
25
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namiche in gioco nell’attuale crisi del sistema westfaliano, ma finisce per trattare
il ritorno globale delle religioni come un caso di specie del ruolo e dell’influenza
crescente degli attori transnazionali non-statali. Le religioni interagirebbero nel sistema d’interazione totale della globalizzazione (o delle nuove relazioni internazionali) come delle grandi Ong transnazionali. Questa impostazione non è errata
ma non affronta quello che considero l’aspetto più interessante per lo specialista
delle relazioni internazionali, ossia la religione come fonte di energia politica. Una
considerazione seria di tale fonte di energia politica si scontra, infatti, con la tesi
della fine della politica (e dello stato) che è spesso implicita nelle teorie della globalizzazione e delle nuove relazioni internazionali.
D’altra parte, se c’è qualcosa che abbiamo appreso negli ultimi vent’anni di
proliferazione incontrollata di teorie sulle nuove relazioni internazionali, è che,
per dirla con un’espressione oramai ricorrente nella letteratura specialistica, ideas
do matter. Ed è ormai sempre più riconosciuto che non si tratta soltanto di una
questione di “cultura e identità”, ma anche di religione29. La mia tesi è che al giorno d’oggi la religione come fonte di energia politica gioca un ruolo fondamentale nelle dinamiche di cambiamento del sistema internazionale. Non è una novità storica, se si considera il fatto, argomentato in modo convincente da Daniel
Philpott, che le idee religiose stanno all’origine stessa delle relazioni internazionali moderne. Philpott afferma, infatti, in maniera efficace: «no Reformation, no
Westphalia»30. Questa tesi continua a valere, a mio parere e con le dovute qualificazioni, anche per la recente storia politica dell’Europa bastione della secolarizzazione. È troppo spesso dimenticato, o forse più correttamente non compreso, come due tra gli avvenimenti politici chiave all’origine dell’Europa politica
contemporanea, l’integrazione europea e la fine dei regimi comunisti dell’Europa dell’Est, siano in maniera non secondaria legati proprio alla religione come
fonte di energia politica, rispettivamente nella forma della tradizione democratico-cristiana dei padri fondatori dell’Europa comunitaria (Schuman, Adenauer
e De Gasperi) e nel ruolo delle chiese cristiane come ossatura della società civile dissidente in Polonia e in Germania dell’Est negli anni Ottanta.
Il caso dell’espansione globale del
Al giorno d’oggi la religione come fonte di energia
protestantesimo, che come giustapolitica gioca un ruolo fondamentale nelle dinamiche
mente osserva Scott Thomas nel suo
di cambiamento del sistema internazionale
articolo di questo dossier, rappresenta
Il limite principale delle teorie mainstream delle relazioni internazionali (neorealismo e neoliberalismo)
contro cui la rivoluzione post-positivista degli anni Novanta si è scagliata risiedeva nell’accettazione del
paradigma dell’attore razionale con la conseguente enfasi sui fattori materiali e marginalizzazione di
quelli ideazionali. In risposta, il costruttivismo, gli approcci cognitivi o delle comunità epistemiche, ma
anche gli approcci post-strutturalisti e il ritorno delle teorie normative, hanno come minimo comune
denominatore l’assunto di una centralità del ruolo delle idee nella politica internazionale. Si veda Y.
LAPID - F. KRATOCHWIL, The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory, London 1996. In questo contesto nasce l’idea del volume F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (eds.), Religion in
International Relations: The Return from Exile, Basingstoke 2003. È interessante notare che quest’ultimo
sia apparso in una nuova serie diretta da Y. LAPID - F. KRATOCHWIL intitolata Cultura e Religione nelle
Relazioni Internazionali in cui la sostituzione del termine “identità” con quello di “religione” segnala
chiaramente la presa di coscienza sulla necessità di colmare un vuoto ingiustificato.
30
D. PHILPOTT, The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations, in «World Politics», 52, January
2000, pp. 206-245.
29
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insieme all’espansione globale dell’islam il caso quantitativamente più significativo dell’attuale ritorno della religione, è ormai divenuto un caso direi quasi di
“scuola” della sociologia della globalizzazione ma deve essere ancora, a mio parere, maggiormente scrutinato nelle sue implicazioni e dinamiche politiche, a
volte più sotterranee ma spesso imprevedibili e destabilizzanti. Per esempio, i due
casi menzionati della Corea del Sud e della Russia offrono già qualche spunto di
riflessione interessante sul nesso religione-politica.
Nel caso della Corea del Sud è il contesto della guerra fredda e, in particolare, la necessità politica di una costruzione dell’identità nazionale fondata sulla
demonizzazione del Nord comunista ad aver creato, insieme ai regimi militari al
potere, le condizioni della crescita esponenziale del protestantesimo. In questo
caso, semplificando, si potrebbe dire «senza guerra fredda, nessuna crescita esponenziale del protestantesimo in Corea». D’altronde sappiamo bene quanto durante la guerra fredda la natura dei regimi interni fosse influenzata dal sistema
internazionale, e questo valeva a maggior ragione lungo i due fronti geostrategici principali del confronto bipolare, per l’appunto la Corea e la Germania. Questa ipotesi troverebbe, del resto, una conferma indiretta negli sviluppi post ’89:
proprio nel momento in cui, a seguito della fine della guerra fredda, il processo
di democratizzazione si stava accelerando congiuntamente a una politica di riconciliazione con il Nord, il protestantesimo coreano veniva quasi “magicamente” controllato e limitato. Tali sviluppi e il ritorno a forme di religiosità d’origine cinese potrebbero anticipare, secondo alcuni analisti, il graduale rientro della Corea nella sfera d’influenza, quantomeno discorsiva, di una futura Grande Cina31.
In Russia, la sovranità del “politico” si manifesta attraverso la drastica riduzione del numero di cristiani evangelici occidentali, che erano cresciuti grazie alla strategia “pro-occidentale” dell’allora presidente Yeltsin. Tale riduzione si spiega con la fine della luna di miele russo-americana e con la crescente influenza
politica della tradizione ortodossa nuovamente politicizzata dai governi successivi col fine di riattualizzare l’eredità geopolitica “imperiale” russa. È interessante notare come in questo caso il cambiamento del clima politico – il consenso si
forma oggi intorno al patriottismo – abbia creato le condizioni per la nascita di
un nuovo protestantesimo evangelico russo caratterizzato dall’adesione territoriale e dal patriottismo. In altri termini, il passaggio dalla strategia pro-occidentale di Yeltsin alla nuova strategia contro-egemonica dell’era Putin spiega ampiamente il destino e l’evoluzione del protestantesimo evangelico in Russia negli ultimi vent’anni32.
A questo punto è bene riconoscere che la letteratura, che incentra la sua attenzione sul binomio fondamentalismo/terrorismo, non ha mai dubitato della
natura sovrana della politica nonché della energia politica della religione. La rap-
31
32
N. LUCA, L’évolution des protestantismes en Corée du Sud: un rapport ambigu à la modernité, cit.
K. ROUSSELET, La diversité évangélique en Russie: de la mission étrangère à la surenchère nationale, cit.
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presentazione di Huntington della religione come un fattore decisivo dello scontro tra le civiltà è la prova inconfutabile del ruolo centrale attribuito alla religione come determinante del sistema internazionale. Nella prima parte di questo articolo ho sostenuto che questo approccio si basa su un discorso a senso unico che
accetta, a volte solo in modo implicito, “la presunzione westfaliana”. Il passo analitico seguente, che posso solamente abbozzare, dovrebbe studiare la relazione
complessa tra religione, politica e sicurezza. Si tratterebbe di affrontare la questione della politicizzazione e dell’impatto sulla sicurezza della religione al fine
di ricusare l’accusa più grave: l’idea che la politicizzazione della religione sia sempre una minaccia alla sicurezza, un fattore di mobilitazione violenta nelle guerre tra e all’interno degli stati, nonché il nemico supremo della risoluzione dei
conflitti. Diverse ricerche hanno già iniziato questo lavoro e in questo contesto
non posso che rinviare ai loro inattesi risultati che mostrano il ruolo positivo degli attori religiosi nella risoluzione dei conflitti, nei processi di riconciliazione
successivi a situazioni di conflitto nonché nella prevenzione degli stessi33.
Con riferimento al caso specifico dell’espansione globale del protestantesimo
può essere interessante evidenziare un aspetto del nesso religione-sicurezza che,
a mio avviso, non è sufficientemente riconosciuto. Come ha indicato con finezza Danièle Hervieu-Leger in base alla sua osservazione dell’esperienza delle cosiddette mega-chiese, non c’è alcuna contraddizione tra l’individualizzazione e
la soggettivazione della fede (e quindi una forma di quella che i sociologi chiamano light religion) e l’aumento di un volontarismo comunitario che si manifesta nel “conservatorismo” morale e negli orientamenti politici tipici di una strong
religion:
Gli imprenditori dei servizi simbolici … sviluppano, in realtà, una strategia di richiamo nei confronti dei fedeli perfettamente coerente, utilizzando sia l’omogeneizzazione dei riferimenti religiosi facilmente riconoscibili, sia il bisogno di stabilità normativa della fede e dei comportamenti, resi incerti dagli stessi vaghi riferimenti religiosi34.
In maniera interessante e per l’appunto contro-intuitiva, il teologo protestante evangelista Miroslav Volf, cittadino croato immigrato negli Stati Uniti interpellato sul ruolo del cristianesimo nelle guerre della ex Jugoslavia vissute in prima persona e sul fenomeno del fondamentalismo dei suoi correligionari ameriPer degli approcci ispirati rispettivamente alla teoria della “securitization” e agli studi sulla pace, si veda
C. BAGGE LAUSTEN - O. WÆVER, In Defense of Religion: Sacred Objects for Securitization, in F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, cit., pp. 183225; A. HASENCELVER - V. RITTBERGER, Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to
Impact of Faith on Political Conflict, in F. PETITO - P. HATZOPOULOS (eds.), Religion in International
Relations: The Return from Exile, cit., pp. 137-82. Per un approccio policy-making con diversi casi di studio si veda D. JOHNSTON - C. SAMPSON (eds.), Religion: the missing dimension of statecraft, cit.; per
un’analisi del potenziale di riconciliazione e risoluzione dei conflitti delle religioni si veda S. APPLEBY,
The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, Lanham 2000.
34
D. HERVIEU-LEGER, Crise de l’universel et planétarisation culturelle: Les paradoxes de la «mondialisation» religieuse, in J.P. BASTIAN - F. CHAMPION - K. ROUSSELET (dir.), La globalisation du religieux,
cit., p. 95.
33
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cani, ha sostenuto che la violenza politica ispirata o legittimata dalla religione sia
piuttosto il risultato della politicizzazione di una vaga religiosità intesa come un
fatto esclusivamente privato o come «risorse culturali dotate di un’aura diffusa e
sfocata di sacro»35. In altre parole, contrariamente a quello che si pensa in molti
ambienti accademici e politici, sono le identità religiose che potremmo definire
“deboli” – nel senso di sradicate e banalizzate, per le quali la convalida del credo
non avviene attraverso l’iscrizione a una tradizione e un deposito di fede trasmesso di generazione in generazione – che caratterizzerebbero la violenza politica d’ispirazione religiosa, mentre le identità religiose “forti” identificherebbero
molto più spesso degli attori religiosi capaci di giocare un ruolo positivo in situazioni di conflitto politico36. In questo senso, nella misura in cui l’individualizzazione e la soggettivazione della fede esemplifica secondo alcuni sociologi una
nuova trasformazione della fenomenologia religiosa in consonanza con la frammentazione iper-individualizzante della condizione post-moderna – quella che
Grace Davies ha definito «il credere senza appartenere»37 – quest’ultima non si
tradurrebbe necessariamente nella polis, in apatia politica o in una formula estranea alla violenza politica e predisposta alla pacificazione civile. Al contrario, e al
di là dell’azione mobilizzatrice e scatenante dell’imprenditore politico, il dibattito e la lotta all’interno di ogni tradizione religiosa sul contenuto autentico della
sua etica socio-politica rimangono, a mio avviso, quanto mai determinanti per
l’evoluzione, in un senso o nel suo opposto, della politicizzazione della religione.
Per concludere vorrei ritornare alla citazione di Richard Falk con cui ho aperto questo articolo e che ci riporta al contesto geopolitico di crisi degli ultimi dieci anni caratterizzato, da un lato, da una guerra globale, permanente e a-territoriale contro il terrorismo condotta dalla superpotenza statunitense in nome di
un progetto di pacificazione-dominazione mondiale, e dall’altro, dalla necessità
normativa di costruire quella che lo stesso Falk definisce una nuova «global governance umana» adeguata a una società internazionale sempre più caratterizzata politicamente dal pluralismo culturale e religioso38. In tale contesto, non mi
sembra che riconoscere un ruolo alle grandi tradizioni religiose nella costruzione di un nuovo ordine internazionale possa essere tacciato di “teologia politica”
o di nostalgico idealismo che «cederebbe ai richiami di una specie di radicalismo
nella vita politica … combinato con un ritorno al premoderno»39. Al contrario,
negare oggi un tale ruolo alle religioni a me pare pecchi pericolosamente di etnocentrismo e di mancanza di realismo politico.
M. VOLF, Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a more Peaceful Social Environment, in «Millennium-Journal of International Studies», 29, 3, 2000, pp. 861-77.
36
S. APPLEBY, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, cit.
37
G. DAVIES, Believing without Belonging: Is This the Future of Religion in Britain?, in «Social Compass»,
37, 1990, pp. 455-699.
38
R. FALK, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, University Park, PA 1995.
39
Devo questa espressione a Xavier Gaullier, comunicazione privata in francese: «théologie politique ou
d’attirance pour une espèce de radicalisme dans la vie politique…par un retour au prémoderne»,
Décembre 2003.
35
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Diplomatia: il punto di vista
Religione e relazioni internazionali:
un inquadramento metodologico
per una diplomazia consapevole
Pasquale Ferrara *
Il fenomeno religioso suscita crescente interesse tra gli
analisti di politica internazionale. Esso è oggi largamente considerato un elemento chiave per una corretta e più approfondita
interpretazione degli eventi mondiali. Tale tendenza è in netto
contrasto con l’atteggiamento assunto dai cultori della disciplina delle relazioni internazionali nel recente passato, in quanto la
maggior parte degli analisti occidentali ha per lungo tempo di
fatto escluso la religione dai parametri ritenuti fondamentali per
lo studio della scena internazionale. Dopo l’11 settembre è sorto tuttavia un ricchissimo dibattito sul tema, anche al di là degli
schemi strumentali dello “scontro di civiltà”. La riflessione su
questo tema risente però di tre condizionamenti: in primo luogo, della tendenza a includere la religione nel novero dei fenomeni “culturali” in senso lato; in secondo luogo, dell’inclinazione a “comprimere” la domanda identitaria nel solo fenomeno
religioso; infine, della tentazione di imboccare la scorciatoia di
una (pericolosa) sovrapposizione tra la nozione di civiltà e quella di area geo-politica nella quale una determinata religione risulta professata dalla maggioranza della popolazione.
Tuttavia, anche a prescindere da queste importanti caratterizzazioni, se molti sembrano essere d’accordo sul fatto che la
religione costituisca uno dei fattori che maggiormente e in diversi modi influenzano le relazioni internazionali, non sempre è
chiaro o univoco il giudizio sulle conseguenze (e sul “segno”) di
tale influenza.
Sul versante negativo, si potrebbe menzionare la convinzione che i conflitti religiosi tendono a estendersi oltre i confini nazionali e a trasformarsi spesso in fenomeni transnazionali di impervia soluzione.
Tra gli aspetti positivi di tale complessa equazione, si potrebbe annoverare il ruolo sempre più rilevante svolto dalla religione nella promozione di forme organizzate e istituzionalizzate di collaborazione internazionale, anche al fine di accrescere
la «legittimità» di norme e pratiche della società internazionale.
Un modo per evitare di restare imbrigliati in un complesso
intreccio di interpretazioni (apologetiche o liquidatorie) circa la
funzione della religione nelle relazioni internazionali consiste
anzitutto nel collocarla, dal punto di vista internazionalistico, tra
i fattori strutturali e non tra quelli culturali dello scenario mondiale. Da questo punto di vista, la religione avrebbe la stessa
consistenza strategica della questione della non-proliferazione
nucleare. La teoria delle relazioni internazionali è giunta infatti
oggi a livelli di sofisticata concettualizzazione della problematica nucleare, o di quella attinente alla liberalizzazione degli
scambi mondiali, ma appare poco attrezzata (o poco incline) alla comprensione del fenomeno religioso come di una delle determinanti dell’ordine (o disordine) mondiale.
Uno studio organico del fenomeno religioso nella sua “interpretazione” internazionalistica, con implicazioni di “policy”
utilizzabili anche dagli operatori delle relazioni internazionali (in
primo luogo dai diplomatici), dovrebbe dipanarsi su tre livelli interconnessi: l’analisi dell’evoluzione delle relazioni internazionali di fronte al riaffermarsi delle religioni (momento epistemologico); l’approfondimento del ruolo delle religioni quale strumento di diplomazia preventiva (momento pragmatico); infine,
la considerazione delle ricadute internazionalistiche delle riunioni ad alta visibilità dei leaders religiosi (come quella svoltasi
a Roma in cooperazione con la Cei in occasione del G8, o di altro genere, come la “preghiera per la pace” di Assisi del 1986),
verificando la funzione che esse possono svolgere per la promozione di un clima maggiormente favorevole alla reciproca conoscenza, al dialogo “strutturale” tra le grandi aree religiose e
culturali del pianeta e al rafforzamento delle convergenze su tematiche di carattere globale (momento simbolico).
Integrare la religione nella teoria delle relazioni
internazionali: vantaggi e pericoli
La rinascita globale della religione rappresenta oggi un
aspetto del processo – in atto a livello planetario – di definizione identitaria; un processo che vede coinvolti gli individui come
le comunità, le istituzioni e più in generale le diverse strutture
sociali. Attorno a tali identità culturali e religiose si verificano fenomeni di mobilitazione di massa e si generano situazioni di crisi; da qui nasce l’esigenza di nuove categorie analitiche anzitutto per “decifrare” tali sfide. La disciplina delle relazioni internazionali, in particolare, non può più oggi trascurare le virtù e le
pratiche delle comunità di credenti radicate in una varietà di tradizioni religiose nel mondo.
L’attuale scena mondiale è caratterizzata dall’emergere di
una crisi strutturale delle relazioni internazionali, accompagnata da una crescente manifestazione di pluralismo culturale. Tutto ciò rende necessaria la formulazione di una nuova e più adeguata teoria politica internazionale dell’ordine mondiale. Quest’ultima dovrebbe ipotizzare una nuova struttura normativa per
*Pasquale Ferrara, Capo dell’Unità di Analisi e Programmazione della Segreteria Generale del Ministero degli Affari Esteri.
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Il punto di vista di un diplomatico
una società internazionale multiculturale e globalizzata. Essa
dovrebbe, inoltre, fornire gli strumenti teorici per analizzare con
maggiore accuratezza il ruolo che la religione si sta con sempre
maggiore forza ritagliando sullo scenario planetario. È evidente
che riconoscere tale potenzialità alla religione implica un rovesciamento della prospettiva in base alla quale le diverse civiltà
del mondo, e con esse le diverse fedi religiose, siano inevitabilmente destinate allo scontro.
Da questo punto di vista, la tesi che considera le religioni
come un fattore intrinseco di conflitto si divide in due filoni fondamentali: da una parte, la concezione «essenzialista e primordiale» della religione, ritenuta, assieme alle contrapposizioni etnico-culturali, come fonte di conflitti; dall’altra, la concezione
«modernizzante e strumentale», che ritiene la religione uno
strumento malleabile a piacimento da parte del potere politico
per ottenere consenso e mobilitazione di massa a scopi di potere. In questo secondo caso, la religione verrebbe a rafforzare
i fenomeni securitari che investono le forme politiche contemporanee [F. Petito - P. Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York 2003].
L’iniziativa «Alliance of Civilizations», lanciata nel 2005 dalle Nazioni Unite, si fonda invece sulla convinzione che la diversità delle civiltà e delle culture sia una caratteristica fondamentale della società umana e una forza utile al progresso umano,
poiché la natura stessa delle diverse civiltà le porterebbe alla reciproca interazione. La religione è indubbiamente da annoverare – in modo non esclusivo – tra i caratteri fondamentali delle
civiltà, che tuttavia non rappresentano affatto dei corpi monolitici senza differenziazioni interne e soprattutto non sono entità
fissate nel tempo e nello spazio una volta per tutte. Da questo
punto di vista, si potrebbe persino ipotizzare che proprio le religioni, nonostante il loro bagaglio dogmatico, rappresentino oggi
uno dei fattori più dinamici (e talvolta critici) di cambiamento e
di mobilità all’interno delle grandi civilizzazioni.
Non va sottaciuto, d’altra parte, il rischio, anch’esso presente, di sovrastimare il ruolo della religione a livello internazionale, enfatizzando eccessivamente l’influenza di approcci normativi tendenti al confronto tra questioni non-negoziabili e il
pluralismo culturale, e ad assegnare improprie funzioni in senso
lato politiche a leaders religiosi. Inoltre, focalizzare troppo l’attenzione sui principi religiosi fondamentali potrebbe far passare
in secondo piano più complesse e articolate interpretazioni di
fenomeni strutturali come la violenza politica, i conflitti armati e
le vaste asimmetrie nella ripartizione delle risorse e delle capacità a livello globale.
Il ruolo della religione nella prevenzione
dei conflitti e nella loro soluzione
La religione può inoltre rappresentare un importante elemento di multi-track diplomacy. È necessario focalizzare l’attenzione sulla possibilità di applicare la tradizione moderna
dell’“etica delle virtù” al mondo “pratico” della diplomazia e delle relazioni internazionali. In situazioni di conflitto e scontro, gli
esponenti delle principali religioni mondiali possono fornire il
“capitale sociale” in termini di networks sociali e di (ri)costruzione della fiducia reciproca, condizione essenziale per creare
le condizioni della “pace sostenibile”. Il processo di peace-building, inteso in modo non-meccanicistico e dinamico, non inizia
o finisce con il lancio o la fine di un’operazione di peace-keeping. In questa fase la religione può svolgere la limitata ma essenziale funzione di fattore di de-escalation del conflitto. Il peace-building è in principio una forma di risposta a cedimenti della struttura sociale e del contesto politico-istituzionale, ivi incluse le radicate contrapposizioni culturali che possono essere alla base di un conflitto. In particolare, il riconoscimento reciproco e la riconciliazione a livello nazionale e transnazionale rappresentano processi, spesso innescati da comunità o leaders
religiosi, che possono contribuire a individuare un terreno comune per far emergere un pluralismo più “profondo” (deeper
pluralism), vale a dire stabile, costruttivo e non oppositivo, e un
“cosmopolitismo radicato” (rooted cosmopolitanism), cioè “non
apolide”, ma anzi saldamente innestato nel tessuto sociale e
culturale locale.
Per cogliere appieno le potenzialità del ruolo della religione
in situazioni di “ricostruzione della pace” è necessaria una riconcettualizzazione dell’idea stessa di pace, che esplori la sua
stretta connessione con le nozioni di giustizia e di riconciliazione. Questo processo di arricchimento semantico dell’idea di pace è alla base di iniziative “bottom-up” di prevenzione e risoluzione dei conflitti, o di ricostruzione post-conflittuale, capaci di
ottenere risultati migliori di quelli raggiunti attraverso strategie
“top-down”, caratterizzate dal proceduralismo e da principi giuridici di stampo (solamente) liberale.
Attori religiosi non statali e transnazionali.
Dinamiche e sfide
Il ruolo degli attori transnazionali nelle moderne relazioni internazionali è materia ampiamente studiata e analizzata. Non lo
è altrettanto la funzione delle organizzazioni e dei leaders religiosi. Il quadro di riferimento generale dovrebbe essere costituito dall’emergere di una “società transnazionale” pluralista e
complessa.
Le interazioni transnazionali tra attori religiosi (sia di carattere personale che nella forma di scambio di idee e comunicazione di “pratiche”) possono implicare varie espressioni di soft
power. Nell’analizzare tali fenomeni si dovrebbe prendere atto
che le unità centrali nella teoria delle relazioni internazionali, vale a dire gli stati sovrani di tipo “westphaliano”, non sono più le
uniche strutture rilevanti per l’ordine internazionale, la stabilità,
la cooperazione e la pace. Il crescente pluralismo degli attori internazionali dovrebbe indurre a tenere in maggior considerazione le potenzialità di nuove “comunità epistemiche globali” che
si dedicano a migliorare la governance globale e in generale a
rafforzare la cooperazione mondiale. In questa chiave di lettura,
la religione dovrebbe cessare d’apparire necessariamente come una minaccia alla mutua comprensione tra le civiltà, per essere considerata invece come uno degli elementi centrali di una
società civile transnazionale pluralistica e culturalmente differenziata. In questo contesto, dovrebbe essere dedicata speciale
attenzione al significato simbolico di eventi come incontri di leaders religiosi mondiali e il relativo impatto sull’opinione pubblica internazionale. Tali incontri servono anche a costruire e consolidare nuove pratiche trasversali di solidarietà, di cooperazione e mobilitazione internazionale, di un “ethos” globale, anche
come risposta alle nuove sfide e alle incombenti minacce planetarie.
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John L. Esposito
Retreat from the Secular Path:
The Democracy-Secularism Debate
in the Muslim World
JOHN L. ESPOSITO
is University Professor
and Founding Director,
Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal
Center for MuslimChristian Understanding,
Georgetown University,
Washington.
In contrast to the past when modernity or becoming modern was equated
solely with a Western secular paradigm, we live in a more cosmopolitan world
today of “multiple modernities” that go far beyond the standard, homogenous
Western secular paradigm for modernization. The conventional wisdom in the
20th century, which assumed the centrality of secularism in a modern state and
viewed religion as only a private affair, has been challenged in much of the Muslim world. The resurgence of Islam in Muslim politics and society signaled a
“Retreat from the Secular Path”. For more than three decades, Islam has been a
major force in public life: in newly created Islamic states and republics, mainstream political and social movements and in major jihadist movements. While
some seek Islamization from above through, increasingly many opt for a process
of Islamization from below, though social change.
Today, social scientists, scholars, and political pundits rethink the meanings
of secularism and its relationship to state and society. Many discuss and debate
the relationship of religion to secularism and democracy. However, too often,
these discussions are “about them”, failing to sufficiently listen to, consider or reflect diverse Muslim voices: religious leaders and intellectuals, Arabs and nonArabs, neo-traditionalists and Islamic neo-modernists or post-modernists. This
discussion will also be placed within the broader context, the realities on the
ground – what majorities of Muslims, the silent and often the silenced majority,
have to say in the Gallup World Poll, the largest, most comprehensive and systematic poll of Muslims from North Africa to Southeast Asia.
Islam and State Formation: The Triumph of Secularism?
In many parts of the Muslim world, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, independence movements employed Islamic symbols, slogans, parties and actors
to legitimate their struggle (jihad) and mobilize popular support. Thus, for example, in North Africa, the Algerian 'ulama calls for jihad and Islamic publications played a prominent role in denouncing French rule and reaffirming Algeria’s Arab-Islamic heritage. In the Indian subcontinent, Muslim nationalism became the raison d’être for the creation of Pakistan with its two wings (West and
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Retreat from the Secular Path: The Democracy-Secularism Debate in the Muslim World
East Pakistan). By the mid-twentieth century, most of the Muslim world had
achieved political independence. The post-independence period witnessed the
emergence of modern Muslim states whose pattern of development was heavily
influenced by and indebted to Western secular paradigms. Few questioned the
accepted wisdom that modernization meant the progressive Westernization and
secularization of society. Modernization was imposed from above by governments and Westernized elites. European languages remained the second, and
among modern elites, often the preferred language.
Saudi Arabia and Turkey reflected two polar positions reflecting the relationship of religion and secularism to the state. Saudi Arabia was established as a
self-proclaimed Islamic state based upon the Quran as its constitution. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) created a secular Turkish republic. The vestiges of the Ottoman Empire – the caliph/sultan, the Sharia,
Islamic institutions and schools – were replaced by European-inspired political,
legal, and educational systems.
The majority of Muslim countries chose a middle ground in nation building,
borrowing heavily from the West and relying on foreign advisers and Westerneducated elites. They ranged from the more secular oriented Tunisia and Iran to
the Islamic republic of Pakistan. Parliamentary governments, political parties,
capitalist and socialist economies and modern (European and American) curricula were the norm. While the separation of religion and politics was not total
(as it is not in fact in many secular countries in the West), the role of Islam in
state and society as a source to legitimate rulers, states, and government institutions was greatly curtailed. Most governments retained a modest Islamic facade,
incorporating some reference to Islam in their constitutions such as that the
ruler must be a Muslim or that the Sharia was a source of law, even when it was
not. The central government also attempted to bring Islamic institutions
(mosques, religiously endowed properties or awqaf, religious courts, etc.) under
state control. However, while most Muslim governments replaced Islamic law
with legal systems inspired by Western secular codes, Muslim family law (marriage, divorce, and inheritance) remained in force. Since family law was regarded as too sacrosanct to eliminate, it was reformed but not replaced. In contrast
to Islamic tradition, in which law was the province of the 'ulama (religious
scholars), modern reforms were the products of governments and parliaments.
In many cases, the 'ulama were excluded or played a marginal role. The pattern
of authoritarian modernizing governments and Western-oriented elites defining
the role and direction of the state and imposing Western models (ideas, values,
and institutions) of development seemed an established fact of life. Many concluded that indeed much of the Muslim role would be played on an unremittingly secular stage.
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Retreat from the Secular Path? The De-Secularization of Society
The global political resurgence of religions in the last decades of the twentieth century has challenged, some might say discredited, the belief, indeed dogma, of the prophets of modernity. The discrediting of secular paradigms has
been particularly vivid in the Islamic world. The Iranian revolution, the emergence of new Islamic republics in Iran, Afghanistan and Sudan, and the use of
Islam by Muslim governments and opposition movements, the participation
and success of Islamic candidates and movements in local and national elections
reaffirm the presence and power of Islamic ideology and discourse in Muslim
politics and societies. Some critics talk of the collapse or bankruptcy of secularism and the need to replace it with religiously based states. Others wish to trim
its sails, to modify modern secular states with an infusion of religious values.
Rethinking the Relationship of Secularism and Religion?
One of the key areas of dispute in the debate about Islam and secularism is
what constitutes the secular state. While a popular definition has been that secularism is the political separation of church/religion and state, history has
proven this process in the Muslim world and elsewhere to be far more complex.
In modern states such as France and Turkey, for example, secularism (or laïcisme) has often represented a distinctly anti-religious or anti-clerical doctrine
seeking to control all religious expression and symbols and abolish them from
the public sphere. Under a regime of “secular fundamentalism”, «the mixing of
religion and politics is regarded as necessarily abnormal (departing from the
norm), irrational, dangerous and extremist»1.
In the Middle East, secularism, a politiWhile a popular definition has been that secularism
cal doctrine that grew out of Christian Euis the political separation of church/religion and state,
rope, has been inextricably linked with a
history has proven this process in the Muslim world
history of foreign colonial invasion and ocand elsewhere to be far more complex
cupation. As we will see, for many Muslims
the efforts of colonial regimes to impose secular political doctrines from above
was the first stage in a far more insidious trend where secularism as a compre-
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1
J.L. ESPOSITO, Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century, in A. TAMIMI - J.L. ESPOSITO (eds.),
Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, New York 2000, p. 9.
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ed most, and at times all of them, and has even penetrated to the farthest and
deepest concerns of our private lives»2.
Proponents of secularism have often seen it as the best mean to promote tolerance, pluralism and fairness in a society in which government is not dominated by any one religious ideology. However, as Talal Asad has warned, secularism
in spite of its origins and history as a reaction to the religious wars that plagued
medieval Europe, does not necessarily guarantee peace and tolerance: «The difficulty with secularism as a doctrine of war and peace in the world is not that it
is European (and therefore alien to the non-West) but that it is closely connected with the rise of a system of capitalist nation-states – mutually suspicious and
grossly unequal in power and prosperity, each possessing a collective personality that is differently mediated and therefore differently guaranteed and threatened»3. Citing India as an example of a liberal democratic state with a secular
constitution that nevertheless suffers from «communal riots», Asad reminds us
that: «A secular state does not guarantee toleration; it puts into play different
structures of ambition and fear. The law never seeks to eliminate violence since
its object is always to regulate violence»4.
Rethinking Islam and Secularism: Muslim Voices of Reform
The issue of Islam and secularism remains one of the most contested debates
in contemporary scholarship and policy circles. An increasing number of Muslim scholars in recent years have utilized rigorous historical and textual analysis
to reexamine the role of Islam in the secular state and related issues like Islamic
conceptions of democracy, pluralism, and religious freedom. In their attempts
to come to terms with the scriptural, political and legal legacy of the Islamic tradition they often use the same evidence to argue contending points of view reflecting very different insights5.
A critical problem that all religious reformers of whatever faith face is the relationship between their reformist thought and what for many is the authority
of tradition, the need to demonstrate some kind of continuity between tradition
and change. The importance of the framing narrative and its repertoire that will
engage the context of its intended audience has been critical to the success and
effectiveness of social movements. For the majority of Muslims, the classical tradition, legitimated by the consensus or ijma of the community (or, in fact, by the
consensus – ijma – of religious scholars), has been normative. While historically the Sunna of the Prophet has controlled understanding of the Quran, religious scholars (ijma) have ruled over the Sunna, representing the source of religious authority. In other words, historically in Sunni Islam, the consensus (ijma)
A. ELMESSIRI, Secularism, Immanence and Deconstruction, in A. TAMIMI - J.L. ESPOSITO (eds.), Islam
and Secularism in the Middle East, cit., p. 52.
3
T. ASAD, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford 2003, pp. 6-7.
4
Ibidem., p. 8.
5
The following analysis draws on J.L. ESPOSITO, The Future of Islam, New York 2010.
2
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of the past is authoritative and overrules everything. Thus, for example, even if
the Quran does not advocate hijab or prohibit women from leading mixed gender prayer and even if some or many hadiths are false, the interpretations and
practices sanctioned by the ijma of the past, the classical Islamic tradition, prevail. Not to follow these practices is to depart from tradition, to fail to establish
a necessary link or continuity between the authoritative ijma of the past and
modern change. This outlook is epitomized by the popular saying: «Consensus
is the stable pillar on which the religion rests». The conservative or neotraditionalist bent of many religious scholars, madrasas and Muslim populations
make this requirement of linking tradition to proposed changes even more necessary. The importance of the framing narrative and its repertoire that will engage the context of its intended audience is critical to the success and effectiveness of social movements.
Many Muslims, in particular IsA critical problem that all religious reformers
lamists, cast secularism as a completeof whatever faith face is the relationship between
ly foreign doctrine imposed on the Istheir reformist thought and what for many
lamic world by colonial powers. They
is the authority of tradition
hold up traditional Islamic society,
particularly during the first century or so of Islam, as an ideal model reflecting
religious principles guiding the community in all areas of life, including politics.
The prominent judge and Arab historian Tariq al-Bishri, for example, rejects the
idea that modernization and secularization must be linked, arguing that
Muhammad ‘Ali’s regime in Egypt was not secular; it took aspects of military science and technology from Europe to aid an essentially Islamic political entity6.
Western ideas did not become pervasive, according to al-Bishri, until the early
20th century due to the spread of missionary schools and pro-Western secularist
print media7. The non-sectarian Islamic movement started to grow parallel to
geographically-based secular nationalist movements until it became clear that
there was a split in society between an inherited and revitalized Islam and a newly-arrived secularism. This initial split, according to Al-Bishri, has amounted to
a fully-entrenched “war of ideas” between the two sides that has continued up to
the present8.
Prominent Islamic religious leaders, intellectuals and activists such as Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Abdelwahab Elmessiri and Rachid al-Ghannouchi
as well as more neo-modernists or post modernists voices, including Mustafa
Ceric, Tariq Ramadan, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdulaziz Sachedina and Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na‘im demonstrate the tensions and conflicts between theory/theology/and law and the political and historical realities in modern states. But what
does the reality on the ground look like? At the same time, an appreciation of
what Muslims think today goes beyond intellectual/religious thinkers and fat-
T. AL-BISHRI, Al-Hiwar al-islami al-‘ilmani, Cairo 1996, p. 12.
Ibidem, p. 19.
8
Ibidem, p. 28.
6
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was. As one scholar has observed «the debate about Islam and its alleged compatibility with democracy/non-violence/pluralism/tolerance is misstated. The
real question is not what Islam is, but what do Muslims believe and want»9.
Therefore, this study also draws on the Gallup World Poll, the most extensive
and comprehensive survey of more than forty Muslim countries, reflecting the
voices of Muslims from North Africa to Southeast Asia10.
Islamic Intellectual-Activists Views
As recent history has demonstrated from Iran and Turkey to Pakistan,
Malaysia and Indonesia, the rise of Islamic movements and the strength of religious sentiment in the Muslim world are ignored at the peril of governments in
the Muslim world and the West. A hallmark of Islamic politics has been the belief that Islamic principles and values govern all aspects of life and that Sharia
acts as a framework for all human activity, whether in public or private realms.
This belief counters the idea that a modern state’s legislation should not be dependent on any religious tradition. Thus, at stake is not only how one understands secularism but how Muslims conceive of the Sharia and its ability to
change and adapt to contemporary concerns and conditions.
For Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, among the most senior and esteemed religious authorities in the world today, the classical Islamic tradition is central and
authoritative. Secularism and Islam, he believes, are incompatible in a country
in which the majority of the population is Muslim. His concerns about secularism are not only religious but are also heavily political, influenced by his former
membership and continued connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist
movement opposed to what they and Qaradawi see as an oppressive and despotic secular Egyptian administration.
Qaradawi also takes issue with secular Muslims who argue that modern
states are not, in fact, faced with the choice between divine rule and human rule
because, from the time of the Prophet, humans who have had to interpret and
apply divine rulings11. Qaradawi rejects the assertion that humans simply interpret the law according to changing circumstances using over-arching principles
such as charity and consultation. While he agrees that there is no “divine rule”
in the sense that the ruler is a human being, he sees the rulings as divine because
they are based on divine sources12. Humans, he argues, have managed to form
rulings, in spite of law school (madhhab) differences, based on divine directives
that are not as ambiguous as they may seem13. For example, the Quranic obligation to cut off the hand of a thief has been specified and qualified by the Sunna
N.A. HASHEMI, Inching Towards Democracy: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, in «Third World
Quarterly», 24, 3, 2003, p. 577.
10
J.L. ESPOSITO - D. MOGAHED, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think, New York
2007.
11
Y. AL-QARADAWI, Al-Islam wa-al-‘almaniya wajhan li-wajh, Cairo 1987, p. 126.
12
Ibidem, p. 143.
13
Ibidem, p. 128.
9
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of the Prophet, but the basic directive has stayed the same and is therefore not
subject to human interpretation14.
However, in contrast to more conservative ulama, Qaradawi’s fatwas on amputation and other matters are also informed by two other principles: his belief,
which he says is based on the Quran and Prophetic traditions, that the purpose
of Islamic jurisprudence is to make things easy for people, not difficult and that
the job of Islamic legal experts is to facilitate change rather than simply cling to
the past and oppose reforms. Thus, in penal law, Qaradawi maintains that the
least rather than maximum punishment should be applied; repentance, for example, is sufficient to rescind the hadd punishment (amputation for theft, stoning for adultery …); and the punishment for drinking wine ought to be regarded as discretionary15.
Qaradawi, like many Islamists and
Many Islamic intellectual-activists understand
secularists, views Christianity and Isand judge secularism in the context of contemporary
lam as fundamentally different in the
political realities and modern dynamics of power
ability to accept the separation of religion from politics. He cites the popular argument based upon Jesus’ command
in the Gospels to give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s as
proof that Christianity accepts the separation of life into two parts: a part for religion and one for the state16. Islam, on the other hand, he asserts, represents an
inseparable unity in a life ruled by God alone, God who is Lord over both the
heavens and the earth17. Secularism, Qaradawi says, seeks to subordinate Islam
and reduce its natural supremacy to one corner of life – an agenda that Islam
must refuse18.
Many Islamic intellectual-activists understand and judge secularism in the
context of contemporary political realities and modern dynamics of power. Invariably, this understanding forces a connection between the secularist doctrine
developed in Europe and European colonial expansion in the Muslim world
with its legacy of non-democratic secular regimes in much of the Middle East
and North Africa. The marginalization and suppression of Islamists, often attributed to many regimes’ “Western secular” orientation and allies, strengthens
the claim that Islam is the solution to all failures and problems in society caused
by secular regimes.
Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the Tunisian intellectual and head of the Nahda (Renaissance) Party, now living in exile in London, is a leading example of an Islamist voice in the political battle between post-colonial secular governments
and their opposition. Ghannouchi has witnessed first-hand the efforts of the
secular Tunisian regime, or, as he terms it, “pseudo-secular” government, to stifle any voice that offers an alternate vision of modernity. Ghannouchi argues
that Turkey’s Kemalist secularism is mild in comparison with the militant secu-
Ibidem, p. 139.
Y. AL-QARADAWI, The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam, Indianapolis 1980, p. 14.
16
Ibidem, p. 103.
17
Ibidem.
18
Ibidem, p. 104-5.
14
15
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larism espoused by «ultra-secularist Arab Maghreb governments» which are no
more than «pre-modern European-style regimes from the age of theocracy and
absolutism»19.
Many Islamists bitterly remember how the Algerian military, supported by
secular elites, intervened and cancelled popular elections in 1992 when Islamist
parties were successful and they recall the military’s subsequent violent crackdown. Reflecting the attitude of Muslim democrats, including many Islamists,
Ghannouchi points out the irony of the Algerian experiment with democracy:
«Alleging that if the Islamists were permitted to gain power through the ballot
box they would put an end to democracy, the purported supporters of secularism justify for themselves the undermining of what they set forth to protect, and
so justify the violation of every single human right»20.
Others, including Qaradawi, have also argued that secularism, as it appears
in the Muslim world, has betrayed its own principles and does not, in fact, represent the will of the people as the democratic ideal demands21. Furthermore,
Qaradawi asserts, secularists call for democracy and free elections when the result suits them, but as soon as an Islamist group does well they reject the result
on any pretext, or even without pretext. So where, he asks, is the tolerance and
fairness?22 The examples of American and European government responses toward the democratically elected Hamas government in Palestine and to Hizbollah’s parliamentary role in Lebanon reflect Qaradawi’s concerns.
Ghannouchi emphasizes that secularism in the Muslim world and despotism
almost always go hand in hand. Authoritarian governments take the worst of
secularist doctrine and use it as a weapon against Islamists by equating Islam
with fundamentalism and extremism and setting secularism as a prerequisite to
democracy23. The brand of secularism that the authoritarian governments of the
Maghreb impose, he maintains, does not promote civil society but rather is «an
impediment to the preservation and development of civil society»24.
Ghannouchi contrasts an ideal, Islamic civil society with that of “pseudo-secular” and “pseudo-modern” regimes. In an Islamic civil society citizens choose
to obey the law because of their faith, not in spite of it. Individuals elect people
to serve the public interest rather than their own selfish desires, not out of fear
of worldly punishment, but to pursue a sense of righteousness and closeness to
God (taqwa) as well as for the promise of eternal reward in the after-life25.
Ghannouchi links secularism with liberalism and sees the failings of Western
secularism, i.e., violence, crime, isolation, and lack of trust and cooperation between neighbors, as undermining civil society: «Allied with liberalism, which is
synonymous for selfishness, greed and individualism, secularism will eventually
R. AL-GHANNOUCHI, Secularism in the Arab Maghreb, in A. TAMIMI - J.L. ESPOSITO (eds.), Islam
20
Ibidem, p. 103.
21
Y. AL-QARADAWI, The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam, cit., p. 86.
22
Ibidem, p. 93.
23
R. AL-GHANNOUCHI, Secularism in the Arab Maghreb, cit., p. 110.
24
Ibidem, p. 119.
25
Ibidem.
19
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do away not only with the notion of civil society but with society itself, turning
it into terrifying isolated islets, conditions which resemble those prevailing in today’s big cities of the West»26.
Rejecting the secularist “assumption” that religion breeds violence and extremism and should therefore be excluded from policy decisions, Ghannouchi
acknowledges that while ideally an Islamic state based on religious principles
would be a peaceful one, this ideal is very difficult if not impossible to achieve
under current circumstances27. Therefore, he concludes that until a true Islamic state can be established based on principles of consultation (shura), the next
best option is a «secular democratic regime which fulfils the category of the rule
of reason, according to Ibn Khaldun» because such a regime is «less evil than a
despotic system of government that claims to be Islamic»28.
Can Muslims be loyal citizens in a secular non-Muslim state?
The fallout from 9/11, has led some in the West to question whether Muslims
can be loyal citizens. On the other hand, some Muslims in the West have also
questioned, for different reasons, whether they could be both good Muslims and
loyal citizens. Can they live in and recognize the legitimacy of “foreign” nonMuslim states whose laws are based upon a Western secular or Judeo-Christian
tradition? More isolationist and militant Muslims tend to speak of Western
countries and societies as kufr, unbelievers to be avoided, converted or attacked.
However, majorities of Muslims in America and to a lesser extent in Europe have
achieved the fuller transition made by other religious and ethnic groups before
them. The road to integration rather than isolation or militancy remains an ongoing process for Muslim immigrants, a transition that benefits from and greatly depends on reformist thought.
Reform in Post-Modernist Islam
A diverse group of Muslim scholars and religious leaders in Europe and
America have proven effective voices in addressing questions of faith and identity, integration or assimilation, religious pluralism and tolerance. Special insights come from European Muslims like Oxford University’s Tariq Ramadan, a
European Muslim intellectual-activist. Mustafa Ceric, the Grand Mufti of
Bosnia-Herzegovina who was educated at Al Azhar University and the University of Chicago and Nurcholish Madjid, the late prominent Indonesian scholar
and public intellectual, rejecting a polarized view of the world that posits “Mus-
Ibidem, p. 120.
R. AL-GHANNOUCHI, Secularism in the Arab Maghreb, in A. TAMIMI - J.L. ESPOSITO (eds.), Islam
28
Ibidem, p. 123.
26
27
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lims” against the “West” or a clash between Islam and Western values and secularism, they advocate a synthesis, an identity based on common values as a basis for citizenship. An “ethics of citizenship” requires that decisions be made in
the name of shared principles such as the rule of law, equal citizenship irrespective of religion, universal suffrage, and the accountability of leaders not solely
based on religious identity29.
Ceric believes that to live in a secular Europe and be a British, German The road to integration rather than isolation or militancy
or French patriot not only does not remains an ongoing process for Muslim immigrants,
negate religiosity, but is in fact a Mus- a transition that benefits from and greatly depends
lim’s religious duty: «I am proud that on reformist thought
Islam defines my European patriotism»30. Historically, Islam was synthesized
with indigenous cultures and therefore developed its unique traditions. As with
Christianity, «Just as differences can be found between Catholics in Poland, Austria or France, or between them and other Christian churches, there are different forms of Islam»31.
For Tariq Ramadan, Muslims in the West, like other Europeans and Americans, share an identity informed by multiple sub-cultures. Muslims are Muslim
by religion and French, British, German, American by culture. Ramadan believes
that embracing secularism and an open society is not a betrayal of Muslim principles for it enables all citizens to live together and the necessary condition for
religious freedom – for Muslims and others. Thus, he calls upon Western Muslims to spread the message at home and abroad: «we live in democracy, we respect the state of law, we respect open political dialogue and we want this for all
Muslims». In agreement, Ceric stresses «If Arabs use Islam to further their national goals, then we in Europe can do the same thing. If an Egyptian has the
right to be a patriot for his country in the name of Islam, then we European
Muslims can also be European patriots in the name of Islam…»32.
What then does it mean to be a European Muslim? Integration, says Ramadan, does not mean wholesale assimilation. Muslims must be allowed to develop their own European Muslim identity and culture just as with other faiths
and ethnic groups have done before them33. Integral to that culture is the acceptance of the constitution, laws and framework of any European country in
which he/she lives. Thus, although Ramadan opposes the French ban on hijab,
Muslims should still respect French law. While «no one should be able to force
a woman to wear hijab or not to wear it», Ramadan suggests that girls try to wear
a bandana for now, in order to respect the law: «A key goal for Muslims is to
T. RAMADAN, Europe's Muslims Show the Way, in «New Perspectives Quarterly», Winter 2005, pp. 29-30.
Interview (with) Mustafa Ceric, The West Does Not Want to Share its Values, in «Qantara.de Dialogue
with the Islamic World», 6 May 2004, 2 November 2006, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-105/i.html.
31
D. CASCIANI, Islamic encounters of the third kind, BBC News, 21 February 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4283717.stm.
32
Interview (with) Mustafa Ceric, The West Does Not Want to Share its Values, cit.
33
T. RAMADAN, Muslim Minorities in Western Europe, Lecture at Georgetown University via satellite,
Gaston Hall, 11 April 2007.
29
30
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show their fellow citizens and Muslims around the world that they respect the
law, even if they disagree with it»34.
Mustafa Ceric, maintains that the successful encounter of Europe and Islam
has two interconnected prerequisites: Muslims must embrace their European
identity and European governments must facilitate Muslims’ integration by accommodating and institutionalizing their religious needs35. Like Ramadan, Ceric counsels Muslims to recognize that the West does not have a monopoly over
values such as democracy and the rule of law, that these are universal values, «if
European-born Muslims look inside their faith for what are presented as Western notions of human rights and individual freedom, they will find them»36. He
believes that European Muslims, if freed from fear and poverty, will not only
succeed but can also become an example to Muslims in the Middle East.
The role of secular European governments in guiding and facilitating Muslim integration through education and the training of imams is a critical and
contentious issue today in Europe and America. Many warn of the intrusion of
the state and a new hybrid: government-sponsored Islam – American Islam,
French Islam, British Islam etc. However, taking a strong stand in favor of government support or what critics would characterize as intervention or engineering, Ceric believes. European governments will only gain the trust of the Muslim community when they institutionalize Islam through state sponsorship of
Muslim schools, state councils, and mosques. He advocates a state institutionalization of Islam that acknowledges that Muslims are loyal citizens and contribute collectively to European culture and civilization37.
Ceric and Nurcholish Madjid, both influenced by their multi-religious societies, advocate a secular democracy incorporating a strong policy of religious
pluralism. They denounce those that oppose multi-cultural, multi-religious,
and multi-national life, noting that the Quran states many times, «If God wanted, he could create you to be one nation, but he wanted you to be different nations ….»38.
Nurcholish Madjid, who played a critical role in the transition to democracy
in Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, provides valuable insights
from this vast multi-ethnic society. His experiences as an Islamic activist student
leader and opponent of both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes but also of the
in-fighting and inability of Islamic political parties to work together led him to
conclude that the mixing of state and religion was counter-productive. As his
well-known slogan says, «Islam yes, Islamic political parties no».
Insisting that no Quranic basis exists for the creation of an Islamic state, Nurcholish warned that modern constructions of an Islamic state reduced Islam to
a profane ideology, easily manipulated by those who want to impose their own
views in the name of religion. He equated it with the sin of polytheism (shirk)
T. RAMADAN, Europe's Muslims Show the Way, cit., p. 30.
Interview (with) Mustafa Ceric, The West Does Not Want to Share its Values, cit.
36
Ibidem.
37
Ibidem.
38
Ibidem.
34
35
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or idolatry39. Thus, he also rejects modern Islamists’ contention that imposing
Sharia as the rule of law is necessary to make Indonesian society more Islamic,
insisting instead that true spirituality and religiosity comes from an inner transformation (individual and national). Rather than imposing Islamic law, what is
needed is a spiritual and cultural path that fosters ethics in society rather than
an Islamic state40. The primary means to this path are education, to transform
individuals and society, and dialogue, an open exchange, to improve relations
between Muslims and other religious communities as well as between the Muslim world and “the West”41.
Madjid was a prominent advocate
of democratization, believing that Rather than imposing Islamic law, what is needed
democracy has Quranic precedents, is a spiritual and cultural path that fosters ethics
implied in Quranic and traditional Is- in society rather than an Islamic state
lamic notions of deliberation and consultation (musyawarah and shura). However, he believed that no single model of government exists or is required; instead different countries need to formulate models appropriate for their environment42. Madjid insisted that religious pluralism and tolerance were not simply a theological issue but a divine mandate, rooted in Quranic passages (2:62;
5:69) that teach that all believers, including Jews, Christians, and Sabians, will be
rewarded equally in the next life. All religions are on a par with Islam and God
gives salvation to anyone regardless of his/her religion43. So too, since all religions are committed to ethical values and social justice, all, not just Islam, have
a role to play in the implementation of religious values such as social justice and
democratic governance in politics and society44.
Sharia, Secularism and the State
As we have already seen, how one projects the future role of Islam in the
modern state depends largely on one’s interpretation of the authority of the
past. Not surprisingly, the question of the place of Sharia and its relationship to
political authority has produced sharp disagreements and contentious debate
between Muslim scholars of the last century. Two prominent Muslim scholars,
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im and Abdulaziz Sachedina, provide diverse alternative post-modernist perspectives.
An-Na‘im’s, a prominent Sudanese-American Muslim scholar and human
rights activist, has been a major voice on issues of Islamic reform, human rights
N. MADJID, The True Face of Islam: Essays on Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Ciputat 2003 (reviewed
by Y. Sikand), http://www.renaissance.com.pk/SeptBore2y5.htm.
40
A. F. BAKTI, Nurcholish Madjid and the Paramadina Foundation, in «IIAS Newsletter», 34, July 2004.
41
G. BARTON, Peaceful Islam and Nurcholish’s lasting legacy, in «The Jakarta Post», 6 September 2005,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/09/06/peaceful-islam-and-nurcholish039s-lastinglegacy.html.
42
N. MADJID, The True Face of Islam, cit.
43
A. KULL, Politics and Piety: Nurcholish Madjid and His Interpretation of Islam and Modern Indonesia,
Lund Studies in History of Religions, 31, 2005, p. 5.
44
N. MADJID, The True Face of Islam, cit.
39
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and the secular state. Intellectually, An-Na‘im is influenced by and draws heavily on the ideas of ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966)45 as well as An-Na‘im’s own
teacher, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha (1909-1985), both advocates of Sharia reform and of a secular state that does not seek to impose any one interpretation
of religious law as the law of the nation. Each suffered for their ideas; al-Raziq
lost his teaching position at Al Azhar and Mahmoud Taha was hanged by the
Gafaar Numeiri government for apostasy. However, it is important to note that
neither was advocating a secular, as in morally neutral, state.
An-Na‘im in his most recent book, Islam and the Secular State advocates a
secular state built on constitutionalism, human rights and citizenship, resources
that he notes «were totally lacking in all societies everywhere until the modern
era»46.
Cognizant of the association of “secularism” with foreign colonial domination
in the Islamic world, An-Na‘im, like Tariq al-Bishri, looks for evidence from premodern and modern Islamic history to support his views. But in contrast to alBishri, he argues that his vision of a secular state, meaning one that is neutral regarding religious doctrine, is «more consistent with Islamic history than is the socalled Islamic state model proposed by some Muslims since the second quarter of
the twentieth century»47. He seemingly ignores the extent to which the notion
that secularism is “neutral” regarding religion is itself a contested issue today.
An-Na‘im asserts that religious and political authority stem from different
sources and require different skills and, therefore, to conflate the two leads to
dangerous confusion. This conflation was only possible, according to An-Na‘im,
during the time of the Prophet, «because no other human being can enjoy the
Prophet’s combination of religious and political authority»48. Since such harmony is no longer possible, religious and political leaders should instead pursue
their autonomy so that each side will be strengthened and not subject to subordination or coercion by the other.
An-Na‘im’s claim that no human institution, such as the state, can implement or enforce religious law contradicts pre-modern Islamic history in which
state-appointed judges carried out a parallel system of rulings at times in agreement with, and at times in opposition to, state authority. Each side, the political
and the religious, relied on the other for moral legitimacy and support.
The noted Islamic legal historian Wael Hallaq describes the delicate balance
of authority: «Our sources reveal that the caliphs and their subordinates generally did comply with the law, if for no other reason than in order to maintain
their political legitimacy. Yet, it appears reasonable to assume that their compliance stemmed from their acceptance of religious law as the supreme regulatory
force of society and empire»49. Or, put differently: «On balance, if there was any
For a taste of ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s views on the authority of the Prophet, see The Caliphate and the Bases
of Power, in J.J. DONAHUE – J.L. ESPOSITO (eds.), Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, New York
1982, pp. 29-38.
46
A.A. AN-NA’IM, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia, Cambridge MA 2008, p.
53.
47
Ibidem, p. 45.
48
Ibidem, p. 53.
49
W.B. HALLAQ, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Cambridge 2005, p. 191.
45
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pre-modern legal and political culture that maintained the principle of the rule
of law so well, it was the culture of Islam»50.
Perhaps the most controversial element of An-Na‘im’s interpretive framework is his understanding of the nature and role of Sharia in Islamic history, especially in the context of his proposed secular state solution. An-Na‘im suggests
that the Sharia must be marginalized in order to save it. More precisely, he asserts that no state has the right to enforce religious law, even if it is the religion
of a majority of its citizens: «By its nature and purpose, Sharia can only be freely
observed by believers; its principles lose their religious authority and value when
enforced by the state»51. Contrary to much of contemporary scholarship on the
origins of Islamic law, An-Na‘im denies that Islamic law included both a divine,
unchanging element (Sharia, principles and values rooted in sacred sources) and
a human interpretation and application (fiqh). He writes: «both Sharia and fiqh
are the products of human interpretation of the Quran and Sunna of the
Prophet in a particular historical context. Whether a given proposition is said to
be based on Sharia or fiqh, it is subject to the same risks of human error, ideological or political bias, or influence by its proponents’ economic interests and
social concerns»52. However, while the human dimension in both cannot be denied, there are significant differences between sacred texts and human interpretation. Failure to acknowledge and to formulate his reformist agenda within the
context of the significant difference between Sharia and fiqh, between revelation
and reason or jurisprudence in Islam, divine law and the human
construction/interpretation that produced Islamic law may prove to be a significant flaw. The acceptance of An-Na‘im’s “interpretative framework” for broadbased reform, which tends to bypass Islamic tradition , faces a significant obstacle to its acceptance as a basis for reform although it will be read and celebrated
by a small elite Muslim and non-Muslim audience.
Abdulaziz Sachedina’s The Islamic
Roots of Democratic Pluralism, does «both Sharia and fiqh are the products of human
what An-Na‘im chose not to do; he interpretation of the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet
examines the traditional sources in a particular historical context»
(Quran, hadith, tafsir) in order to build up a case for democratic pluralism from
within an Islamic framework.
Recognizing the importance and hold of the classical tradition, Sachedina
addresses those who would accuse him of imposing modern ideas on traditional sources and, essentially, interpreting them out of context. He counters that the
goal of exegesis (Quranic interpretation) was always to discover the meaning of
the text as a relevant and «living source of prescriptive guidance for the community»53. As a result, Sachedina situates his own pursuit of Quranic and traditional guidance in the areas of democracy, pluralism and human rights within
Ibidem, p. 193.
A.A. AN-NA’IM, Islam and the Secular State, cit. p. 4.
52
Ibidem, p. 35.
53
A. SACHEDINA, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, New York 2001, p. 17.
50
51
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the context of broader debates amongst Muslim scholars, both modern and premodern. Yet his consideration of the interpretations of the traditional exegetes
does not prevent him from suggesting that many of their conclusions are outdated and have done more harm than good in promoting “exclusivist” readings
of scripture. He also criticizes those contemporary scholars who, rather than
taking a fresh approach to the sacred text, continue to uphold dogmatically the
irrelevant interpretations of their medieval predecessors.
Sachedina’s basic (underlying) argument is that the Quran provides a solid
basis for the shaping of a pluralist, just, and inclusive society. He analyzes three
core Quranic concepts: that humanity is one community; people of different religious backgrounds should compete among themselves to do good; and the necessity for compassion and forgiveness. Sachedina affirms that each of the three
principles concerns not only personal convictions or morality, but also the need
to establish an ethical public order consistent with Islam’s role as a «faith in the
public realm»54.
Sachedina takes on some of the most controversial issues in contemporary
Islamic thought: the legal rights of non-Muslims (dhimmi) in a majority Muslim state, the rules regarding apostasy and retribution, and the practice of jihad
and its relation to rebellion and martyrdom. Despite the fact that numerous examples of tolerance and legal flexibility exist in Islamic community, nevertheless, he maintains, Muslim jurists formulated legal codes relating to the status of
non-Muslims that allow for discriminatory practices. These laws are not in accordance with modern conceptions of pluralism and inclusiveness and therefore
must be rejected: «Most of the past juridical decisions treating non-Muslim minorities have become irrelevant in the context of contemporary religious pluralism, a cornerstone of inter-human relations»55.
Sachedina relates apostasy and jihad to freedom of religion and forgiveness
in Islam respectively. Both rest on the key concept of fitra, a human being’s natural predisposition towards justice and the knowledge of good and evil. This inherent morality reinforces a belief “basic to Muslim identity” that «the divinely
mandated vocation to realize God’s will in history was communal as well as individual»56. Fitra not only forms the basis of a «God-centered public order», it
also provides the key to interreligious dialogue because it speaks to the nature of
all humans regardless of creed. Sachedina envisions, therefore, an Islamic theology of religions for the twenty-first century in which law based on God’s revelation acts as an instrument of justice and peace in society57.
Unlike An-Na‘im and others, Sachedina does not believe that, in order to be
truly just, the state must implement a full separation of religious and political
authority. Nor does he accept the type of religious state proposed by the “fundamentalists” in which Islam has an exclusive claim over authority in the com-
Ibidem, p. 24.
Ibidem, p. 68.
56
J.J. DONAHUE - J.L. ESPOSITO (eds.), Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, cit., p. 4.
57
A. SACHEDINA, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, cit., p. 43-44.
54
55
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munity. Rather, Sachedina argues that the Prophet laid the groundwork for a
“universal community” that was subsequently corrupted by the political imperative to subdue people of other faiths and by a reading of traditional sources that
lost sight of their original pluralistic intent58. By reclaiming the belief that all human beings are “equals in creation”, the Muslim community can serve as a model of a religious faith that also calls for justness in society through the creation
of pluralistic, democratic institutions59.
The Hold of Tradition: Sacralization and De-sacralization
As previously discussed the critical issue for all reformers is the hold of tradition. Those who, like An-Na‘im, bypass or ignore the classical tradition fail to
come to grips with the reality on the ground and risk reducing the influence and
impact of their efforts to the bookshelf rather than becoming a catalyst for
change in Muslim societies. The Indonesian reformer Nurcholish Madjid has referred to this phenomenon as the “sacralization” of tradition in Islam and called
for a “de-sacralization” of tradition. However, he does not reject the importance
of tradition but the notion of a fixed, static tradition, arguing that tradition and
consensus or ijma are ongoing and cumulative.
An-Na‘im is not alone in re-examining the relationship of religion to the
state and arguing that a Muslim country can also be secular and rejecting the
blind following of tradition. However, some like Nurcholish Madjid (as well as
Mustafa Ceric, and Tariq Ramadan) recognize more clearly the need to acknowledge the force of tradition even as they proceed to engage in wide ranging
reformist thinking60. Although emphasizing the value/merit of classical Islam
and its legacy, they do not regard it as an absolute reference point or religious
authority but only a tool for solving modern problems61. While neo-traditionalist reformers, muftis with international followings like Ali Gomaa, the Mufti of
Egypt and Qatar’s Yusuf Qaradawi, acknowledge the authority of the classical
tradition but have methodologies to legitimate substantive reforms, modern reformers more freely bypass the classical tradition and go back to the Quran as
the primary basis for fresh understandings and interpretations.
But What Do Muslims Really Think and Want?
In what ways are the issues and diverse views in the current debate among
Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders representative of the world’s Muslims
as a whole? While Muslim rulers and clergy have often cast themselves as
Ibidem, p. 135.
Ibidem, p. 139.
60
G. BARTON, Peaceful Islam and Nurcholish’s lasting legacy, cit.
61
A. KULL, Politics and Piety, cit., p. 2.
58
59
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spokespersons for Islam, a modern educated but Islamically oriented elite and
heads of Islamic movements, both mainstream and militant, attempt to speak
for Islam. What do Muslims believe, what do they want, and what do they really think?
The politicization of political leaders, scholars, experts and media commentators post 9/11 has created a minefield for policymakers, scholars and the general public, faced with contending and contradictory opinions to key questions
about Muslim attitudes towards the West, democracy, Sharia, and human rights.
The data from recent (2001-2007) Gallup polls, in particular the Gallup World
Poll of 2007, of residents from more than thirty-five Muslim majority countries
enables us to more definitively access global representative responses. Altogether, the survey sample includes «more than 90% of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, making this the largest, most comprehensive study of contemporary Muslims ever done»62.
The Gallup World Poll brings to light how majorities of contemporary Muslims view religion and its relationship to secularism and democracy.
Large majorities of Muslims say religion is an important part of their daily
lives and that having a rich spiritual life is essential. The usual response to what
Muslims admire most about themselves is «faithfulness to their religious beliefs». The statement they most closely associate with Arab/Muslim nations is
«attachment to their spiritual and moral values is critical to their progress».
Holding on to their Islamic spiritual and moral values is regarded as a top priority, something that is critical to their progress.
Asked about their attitudes
Large majorities of Muslims say religion is an important towards democracy, the response
part of their daily lives and that having a rich spiritual
from Muslims was overwhelmingly
life is essential
positive. Many respondents said that
political freedoms and liberties are qualities that they admire most about the
West63. Similarly, democracy is among the most frequent responses given as a key
to a more just society and to progress64. Cutting across diverse Muslim countries,
social classes and gender differences, overwhelming majorities in all nations surveyed (94% in Egypt, 93% in Iran, 90% in Indonesia) said that if drafting a constitution for a new country, they would guarantee freedom of speech, defined as
«allowing all citizens to express their opinion on the political, social and economic issues of the day».
However, when asked whether they believe that the US will allow people in
the region to fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct US
influence, the majority in most Muslim countries disagreed. A majority in Jordan (65.8%), Iran (65.6%), Pakistan (54.5%), Morocco (67.7%) and Lebanon
(67.7%) believes that the US will not allow people in the region to shape their
J.L. ESPOSITO - D. MOGAHED, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think, cit., p. xi.
Ibidem, p. 34.
64
Ibidem, p. 47.
62
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own political future without US interference. Similarly, the vast majority of
Muslims believe the US lacks credibility in its campaign to promote democracy
in the Middle East. A majority in Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, and Lebanon said they do not believe the US is serious about
spreading democracy in their region of the world.
Yet, although Muslims don’t believe the US is serious about self-determination and democracy in their region, many say political freedom/liberty and freedom of speech is what they admire most about the West. Large percentages also
associate a «fair judicial system» and «citizens enjoying many liberties» with
Western societies. At the same time, Muslims critique their own societies, indicating that lack of political freedom is what they least admire about the Islamic/Arab world.
It is interesting to note that in spite of the importance that most Muslims give
to political and civil liberties and freedom of speech, those surveyed do not favor wholesale adoption of Western models of democracy and secularism65. So
what, then, is the alternative? Poll data indicate that a majority of the world’s
Muslims would like to see a religious form of democracy in their countries, at
least in the sense that they want Sharia to be “a” source of legislation though not
the only the source66.
Like the majority (55%) of Americans who believe America is a Christian nation and want the Bible as a source of law, Muslims who want to see Sharia as a
source of law in constitutions can have very different understandings. Some, a minority, expect full implementation of classical or medieval Islamic law; the majority want a more restricted approach, like requiring the head of state to be a Muslim, or creating Sharia courts to hear cases involving Muslim family law (marriage,
divorce and inheritance), or prohibiting alcohol. Still others simply want to ensure
that no law is against the principles and values of Islam, as found in the Quran.
The considerable amount of support amongst Muslims for Sharia does not
translate into a demand for theocratic government. On the contrary, significant
majorities in many countries say religious leaders should play no direct role in
drafting a country’s constitution, writing national legislation, drafting new laws,
determining foreign policy and international relations, or deciding how women
dress in public or what is televised or published in newspapers67.
Conclusion
Both Muslim opinion globally and the rethinking of Islam among many Islamic intellectual-activists reflect the current rethinking of the relationship of
Islam to secularism.
Ibidem, pp. 47-48.
Ibidem, p. 48.
67
J.L. ESPOSITO - D. MOGAHED, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think, cit., p. 50.
65
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Influential Islamic intellectual-activists and religious leaders, neo-traditionalists and post modernist, across the Muslim world engage in a process of rethinking Islam’s relationship to secularism and modern Muslim states as well as
issues of Muslim citizenship in the non-Muslim secular countries of Europe and
America.
Citizens in countries in which Muslims are a majority report that, if they had
their way, they would opt for greater political participation, freedoms, rule of
law but not for a totally secular state. Although Muslim perceptions of what the
Sharia represents and the degree to which it is possible to implement its rulings
in society varies enormously, most believers desire a system of government in
which religious principles and democratic values coexist. In other words, most
Muslims do not view religious authority and political authority as mutually exclusive and see a role for religious principles in the formulation of state legislation.
Muslim reformers in the 21st century, whether secular or Islamically oriented, contend with two realities or hurdles for reform: broad-based Muslim public opinion that favors both greater democratization and Sharia as “a” source of
law and the need to address the continued centrality and authority of the classical tradition of Islamic law.
While secular reformers ignore or wish to dismiss the relationship of religion
to the state in arguing that today a Muslim country can also be secular, many
others while admiring and desiring many of the principles and institutions associated with Western secular democracies do not want a Western secular nor an
Islamic/theocratic state. Instead they opt for a state that reflects the importance
and force of Islamic principles and values as they proceed to engage in wide
ranging reformist thinking68. Successful reformers and social movements, from
traditionalist to more liberal orientations, engaged in rethinking Islam and its
relationship to secularism and democracy, will continue to need to give importance to their framing narrative to legitimate and mobilize popular support.
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G. BARTON, Peaceful Islam and Nurcholish’s lasting legacy, cit.
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Ben Mollov
Religious Diplomacy:
Jewish Perspectives
This article will seek to present the outlines of a Jewishly based approach to
the challenge of advancing religious diplomacy. The paper will first set out the
contours of the need for “religious diplomacy” with reference to the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and provide a theoretical framework for navigating that conflict based
on the work of two important Jewish thinkers relevant to international relations
and peacebuilding who were influenced by the Jewish experience, namely Hans
J. Morgenthau and Martin Buber. Finally it will provide some empirical data
pointing to the possibility of religion serving as a common ground for JewishArab understanding in the Middle East with special emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both the substance of religion as it informs national identity and
the role of religious leaders in being part of the process will be addressed.
BEN MOLLOV
teaches at the Faculty
of Social Sciences
and is Research Fellow
of Project for the Study
of Religion, Culture
and Peace, Bar-Ilan
University, Israel
The Challenge of Diplomacy
Diplomacy lies at the heart of efforts to achieve stability in international relations. According to one researcher the essence of diplomacy is to transform
“conflicting interests” to “complementary interests” and “complementary interests” to “identical interests” in international relations1. According to realist international relations theory the political realm is inherently conflictual with power, the central currency of international politics. However such an approach,
while cognizant of the dangers inherent in international relations does not despair of advancing the task of diplomacy in achieving the balancing of interests
between different actors2.
In the wake of the end of the Cold War the international system has been in
flux with the “clash of civilizations” thesis, advanced by Huntington – in which
the clash of civilizational units encompassing states with common cultural backgrounds – has been emerging as a central characteristic of the present day international system3. As noted by Huntington, civilization is deeply rooted in religious identity. Furthermore the heightened attention to the appearance of religion as a factor in international relations has been reflected by a number of
scholars4. Religiously based conflict is even more significant in the Middle East
T. ROBINSON, National Interests, in G.N. ROSENAU (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, New
York 1969, pp. 182-190.
2
For a discussion of both realist principles and approaches to responsible diplomacy see:
H.J. MORGENTHAU, Politics Among Nations, New York 19664, pp. 3-14 and 532-552.
3
S.P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations, «in Foreign Affairs», 1993, 72, 3, pp. 22-49.
4
See for instance: J. FOX - S. SANDLER, Bringing Religion into International Relations, New York 2006; D.
JOHNSTON - C. SAMPSON (eds.), Religion the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, New York 1994; and S.
THOMAS, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations, New York
2005.
1
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as «religious traditions explicitly or implicitly underlie the collective ways of life
and values of both Jews and Arabs, even for many who may not follow strict religiously-observant behavior in their personal lives»5.
Thus the task of advancing diplomacy within the context of the Middle East
in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular ought to encompass efforts
at advancing inter-civilizational dialogue. And the effort to advance inter-civilizational dialogue needs to vitally include efforts at inter-religious dialogue and
diplomacy.
Further relevant to this theme of inter-civilizational dialogue and diplomacy
is the work of Raymond Cohen who has alerted us to the importance of the inter-cultural dimension in international relations and diplomacy. Affirming the
task of diplomacy in transforming “conflicting” and “complementary” interests
between actors (as noted above) he has pointed to the importance of appreciating different communication styles between states rooted in different cultural
backgrounds as an element that can either help advance, or retard efforts at
communication which can help identify common ground6.
The importance of the cultural element in international politics today is further highlighted by the insights of other researchers such as Ross who has described culture as shaping central values which «people consider valuable and
worth fighting over»7.
In developing the contours of religious diplomacy this paper will suggest that
the effort encompasses: the attempt to find diplomatic solutions and understanding between actors motivated by religiously based identity; the effort to involve and enlist religious representatives in the task of diplomacy with commonalities between religions an important tool in this endeavor.
The Cultural Basis of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
The reporting and analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular and
the Arab-Israeli conflict in general usually focuses strictly on the immediate political dimensions of conflict or conflict management. Rarely are the deeper cultural underpinnings of the conflict addressed. However understanding the
foundations of the deeper narratives which motivate the behavior of the parties
to the conflict is essential to appreciating the dynamics of both conflict and potential avenues for conflict management/resolution.
B. MOLLOV - C. LAVIE, Culture, Dialogue and Perception Change in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in
«The International Journal of Conflict Management», 2001, 12, 1, p. 71.
6
R. COHEN, Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communications in an Interdependent World,
Washington, D.C. 1991.
7
M.H. ROSS, The Culture of Conflict: Interpretation and Interests in Comparative Perspective, New Haven
1993, p. 13.
5
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It will be suggested here that the
The modern Zionist movement and the modern Arab
modern Zionist movement and the
nationalist movements were fundamentally motivated
modern Arab nationalist movements
by the effort to revive an earlier “heroic era” of their
were fundamentally motivated by the
histories against the immediate background
effort to revive an earlier “heroic era”
of repression and grievance
of their histories against the immediate background of repression and grievance. In the Jewish case this was the two
thousand year history of anti-Semitism and exile; in the Arab case the decline of
Arab identity and civilization and subjugation to foreign rule and domination.
These earlier “heroic eras” – the period of the Bible in the Land of Israel in the
case of the Jews, and the Arab-Islamic empire during the period of the 7th to 10th
centuries in the case of the Arabs – were largely rooted at core in religiously
based values as the Hebrew Bible was a religious document and the dynamism
of the Arab-Islamic empire heavily influenced by the appearance of the Prophet
Muhammed and the Koran8.
Although the dominant strain of the modern Zionist movement sought to
“secularize” Jewish peoplehood – the collective move back to “Zion” was based
on ancient longings that were ultimately religiously based. The project to revive
the Hebrew language as a modern spoken language was significant as it was the
language of the Bible9. In parallel the Arab nationalist movement although originally catalyzed by Christian Arab intellectuals in the area of Damascus (in the
mid-19th century) sought to revive the Arab-Islamic period of glory10.
Combined with powerful political dynamics in the early part of the twentieth century the two national movements based on opposing narratives clashed
in Palestine. The Arab-Jewish conflict in Mandatory Palestine set the context for
the later Israeli-Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict.
Indeed in a remarkably acute analysis the Peel Commission of 1937 appointed by the British Government responsible for the Mandate offered the following
analysis of the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine, in the wake of anti-Jewish violence during that period. At the core of its analysis was that of the clashing narratives (which led to the operative proposal of partition), presented as follows:
An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within
the narrow bounds of one small country. About 1,000,000 Arabs are in strife, open
or latent, with some 400,000 Jews… The war and its sequel have inspired all Arabs
with the hope of reviving in a free and united Arab world the traditions of the Arab
golden age. The Jews similarly are inspired by their historic past. They mean to show
what the Jewish nation can achieve when restored to the land of its birth. National
assimilation between Arabs and Jews is thus ruled out. In the Arab picture the Jews
could only occupy the place they occupied in Arab Egypt or Arab Spain. The Arabs
A.D. GARFINKLE, Genesis, in D. RUBINSTEIN (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives, New York
1991, pp. 1-33.
9
For an overview of Zionist thought see: A. HERTZBERG, The Zionist Idea: An Historical Analysis and
Reader, Philadelphia 1997.
10
See G. ANTONIUS, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement, New York 1946.
8
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would be as much outside the Jewish picture as the Canaanites in the old land of
Israel11.
The clash of narratives was and still remains fundamental to understanding
the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict. During the time of the British Mandate entrusted by the League of Nations with the task of facilitating the implementation of the Balfour Declaration which endorsed the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, the issues at stake between Jews and Arabs revolved
around Jewish immigration, land purchases and settlement. Understanding further political developments such as the UN Partition Plan of 1947, Israel’s Declaration of Independence and its war of independence against Arab invasions, the
Six-Day and its aftermath up through the Oslo peace process and its breakdown
can ultimately be referred back to the foundation of clashing narratives. True reconciliation between Arab and Jew in the Middle East must ultimately involve a
reconciliation of narratives. In this task inter-religious dialogue and conflict
management strategies related to religious dimensions have a critical task to play.
Thus religious diplomacy must be a vital part of larger diplomatic endeavors.
Combining Hard Power and Soft Power based on Jewish Perspectives
Religious diplomacy to be effective must also operate within the context of
the more general process of diplomacy. The willingness of actors in conflict to
come to negotiated settlements is often predicated on the existence of a “hurting stalemate”12. The motivation to move from “conflicting interests” to “complementary” ones is thus often a function of the high cost of continued conflict.
This was illustrated by the movement by Egypt and Israel towards negotiated
settlements following the Yom Kippur War.
Thus “hard power” is a vital tool in both protecting national security and
promoting the types of balances of power that can serve as the context for movement towards negotiated settlements. The need for hard power in the case of an
actor such as Israel is all the more necessary given the past and continued threats
to its existence. “Soft power” as advanced by Nye13 is gaining more currency in
international affairs, and it will be suggested here that dialogue can serve as a
tool for peace-building which can also contribute greatly to the task of peacebuilding once a stable balance of power between actors is achieved.
The section will offer a framework
The need for hard power in the case of an actor
in which hard power and soft power
such as Israel is all the more necessary given the past
approaches can be combined from a
and continued threats to its existence
Jewish perspective. Recent research
W. LAQUER - B.RUBIN (eds.), The Israel-Arab Reader, New York 2001, pp. 42-43.
See for instance: I.W. ZARTMAN, Ripe for Resolution, New York 1989.
13
J.S. NYE, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York 2004.
11
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has shown how both hard power and soft power rooted in the modern Jewish
experience through the thought and work of two prominent Jewishly influenced
thinkers – Hans J. Morgenthau and Martin Buber can be combined14. Both have
their roots in the rich German-Jewish heritage and experience. Outlines of their
approaches will now be presented.
Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980) was probably the most important theoretician of the modern discipline of international relations. His classic work Politics
Among Nations subtitled the Struggle for Power and Peace15 provided a systematic analysis of the dynamics of international politics founded on the premises of
political realism. In his work he emphasized the conflictual nature of politics
and the need for power to ensure both national survival and advance stable balances of power. Morgenthau’s work and public activities had a great impact on
thinking about international politics and diplomacy in the twentieth century.
Martin Buber (1878-1965) through his classic work I and Thou16 was a champion of dialogue. His philosophy advanced the possibility of men achieving full
revelation of their common humanity with one another (based on the presence
of the divine in all humans) and the transformation of conflicts through the “IThou” encounter. While Buber did not ignore the utilitarian nature of most human encounters (characterized by “I-It” relationships) his approach to dialogue
reflected essentially idealist premises acknowledging the good in men. His philosophy attracted the attention of international statesmen such as Dag Hammarskjöld who felt that Buber’s work had important relevance for promoting
international understanding.
While these two seminal thinkers, Morgenthau and Buber had very different
outlooks and approaches to international politics much of their outlooks were
formed as a result of their common anchor in the German-Jewish heritage
which has been discussed elsewhere17. This experience which has been explored
by various researchers18 can be advanced as a Jewish contribution to conflict
management in terms of premises, outlook and tools. Its different periods gave
rise to two vital thinkers who expressed realist and idealist outlooks respectively based on the characteristics of the formative periods of the two Jewish
thinkers in Germany. An outline of the two formative background of the two
thinkers will now be presented.
Morgenthau was born in Coburg, Germany in southern Bavaria in the early
part of the twentieth century and lived the transition from idealism to realism
with the rise of Hitler occurring during his formative period of life. German-
See: B. MOLLOV - E. MEIR - C. LAVIE, An Integrated Strategy for Peacebuilding: Judaic Approaches, in
«Die Friedens-Warte», 82, 2-3, 2007,pp. 137-158.
15
H.J. MORGENTHAU, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 19674.
16
M. BUBER, I and Thou: with Prologue and Translation by Walter Kaufman, New York 1970.
17
B. MOLLOV - E. MEIR - C. LAVIE, An Integrated Strategy for Peacebuilding, cit.
18
See for instance: S.E. ASCHEIM, German Jews Beyond Building and Liberalism: The Jewish Racial Revival
in the Weimar Republic, Ramat Gan 1995; G. MOSSE, German Jews beyond Judaism, Bloomington 1985;
P.R. MENDES-FLOHR, German Jew: A Dual Identity, New Haven 1999; and B. MOLLOV (ed.), The
Legacy of the German-Jewish Religious and cultural Heritage: A Basis for German-Israeli Dialogue?,
Jerusalem 2006.
14
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Jewry particularly during the 19th century benefited from and greatly believed in
the promise of the German-Jewish enlightenment with its concomitant beliefs
in progress and humanistic ideals. However 20th century Germany, following the
rise of Nazism, crushed the great progress that German-Jewry had made and
shattered the belief in enlightenment ideals following the onslaught of Nazism
and the Holocaust. Morgenthau himself reflected on this theme19. Other circumstantial research has appeared concerning the philosophical transitions in
outlook which affected German Jewry in engendering a movement from idealism to realism20.
Morgenthau was a direct object of anti-Semitism in Germany. He was the
only son of the sole Jewish family in Coburg and described particularly harrowing anti-Semitic experiences in growing up. His witnessing of an early Hitler rally in 1922 and other anti-Semitic experiences, caused within him a complete
rupture with his earlier idealistic impulses in his exposure to the great evil in
men21. His confrontation with the tragic dimensions of human existence and the
inability to believe in progress as a dependable element due to man’s power seeking was heavily influenced by the Jewish experience which has been explored in
depth elsewhere22. This worldview lay at the foundation of his classic works23 in
international relations theory written following his arrival in the US in 1937, after leaving Nazi Germany in 1935. In the US he spent the bulk of his career at
the University of Chicago, with the last phase of his life in New York.
Furthermore Morgenthau, also partly as a result of certain Jewish values was
motivated to be a “scholar-activist” in a variety of public causes including vigorous and public opposition to America’s involvement in the War in Vietnam,
due to, in his evaluation the irresponsible use of power and in fact later on the
betrayal of America’s moral legacy. However, germane to this article is that Morgenthau was also deeply involved in Jewish causes particularly that of Soviet
Jewry and Israeli security24.
In his theoretical works Morgenthau emphasized the centrality of power in
international relations with “hard” (military) power being the bedrock foundation for national security (although not the sole basis of national power). Morgenthau saw Israel’s struggle for survival as particularly intense and clearly saw
the need for hard power in protecting its existence. In particular, Morgenthau was
deeply concerned about Israel becoming a new Czechoslovakia in which its vital
interests could be compromised as part of vain attempts at appeasement25. He argued that imperialistic power dynamics must be countered by superior power26.
H.J. MORGENTHAU, The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism, in «Politics in the Twentieth Century»,
1, New York 1962, pp. 247-256.
20
See for instance: R. BENDIX, From Berlin to Berkeley: German-Jewish Identities, New Brunswick 1986.
21
According to researcher Chris Frei, Morgenthau’s handwriting had even changed, see B. MOLLOV, Power and Transcendence: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience, Lahman 2002, p. 88.
22
Ibidem.
23
See H.J. MORGENTHAU, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago 1946.
24
B. MOLLOV, Power and Transcendence, cit.
25
Ibidem.
26
H.J. MORGENTHAU, Politics among Nations, cit., pp. 52-53.
19
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Interestingly as well, Morgenthau saw the struggle for Soviet Jewry as connected to an ideological/philosophical struggle in which the message of Jewish
existence and its moral essence rooted in the Biblical Prophetic legacy is seen as
a particular ideological threat by Soviet and other totalitarian regimes27. Though
a proponent of a realpolitik approach to international politics his thinking was
not without transcendent liberal elements, aimed at recognizing a higher good
in statecraft.
If Morgenthau was the apostle of power-oriented thinking about international relations and the need for humanity in general and the Jewish people/Israel in particular to protect themselves from hard power threats, Martin Buber
represented the message of the Jewish people/Israel as being an agent of dialogue, social change and belief in reconciliation between peoples. Born over a
half generation prior to Morgenthau he was a product of the 19th century German-Jewish enlightenment. He grew up with exposure to the cultural and spiritual riches of the Jewish heritage and became a leading interpreter to the Western world of the Jewish Hasidic movement28. Given the relatively positive dynamics between Germans and Jews of his period he believed in the possibilities
of German-Jewish cooperation and capabilities for social transformation29. His
classic book I and Thou was described by one scholar as a great statement of Jewish faith30.
An activist like Morgenthau, Buber also fled Nazi Germany, for pre-State of
Israel Palestine, in 1938 becoming a luminary at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. His belief in dialogue and social transformation was expressed by his
vigorous efforts at Arab-Jewish reconciliation and involvement with “Brit
Shalom” directed to Arab-Jewish reconciliation31. Furthermore statesmen such
as Dag Hammarskjöld believed that Buber’s work had definite relevance for efforts to moderate international conflicts such as the Cold War in facilitating understanding rooted in common humanity between the leaders of the rival
blocs32.
The ability to project hard power
in countering an imperialistic strategy Approaches reflecting idealism and realism rooted
in which national survival is threat- in a common German-Jewish heritage can be
ened, while advancing the tools of developed and applied to the context of today’s
meaningful dialogue can provide a challenges which diplomacy in general and religious
highly potent combination of tools diplomacy in particular must address
B. MOLLOV, Jewry’s Prophetic Challenge to Soviet and Other Totalitarian Regimes According to Hans J.
Morgenthau, in «Journal of Church and State», 39, 3, 1997, pp. 561-575.
28
M. BUBER, Hasidism, New York 1948.
29
See for instance: E. MEIR, Reinterpreting Judaism in the German Context: On German-Jewish Thinkers as
Jews and Germans, in B. MOLLOV (ed.), The Legacy of the German-Jewish Religious and Cultural Heritage, cit., pp. 25-35.
30
M. BUBER, I and Thou, cit., p. 35.
31
See P.R. MENDES-FLOHR (ed.), A land of two peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, New York 1983;
and A. SIEGEMUND, German Zionists of Verständigung and their ideas for conflict resolution in Palestine,
in B. MOLLOV (ed.), The legacy of the German-Jewish religious and cultural heritage, cit., pp. 25-35.
32
M. BUBER, Pointing the Way, New York 1974, pp. 220-229.
27
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for Israel in particular and Western civilization in general to protect national security and reach modus vivendi with other civilizations. Approaches reflecting
idealism and realism rooted in a common German-Jewish heritage can be developed and applied to the context of today’s challenges which diplomacy in
general and religious diplomacy in particular must address.
Religion and Culture as a Basis for Dialogue: Empirical Perspectives
To this point we have provided an outline of the developing importance of
religion in international relations, the cultural basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and the contours of a diplomatic strategy employing the work of two thinkers
influenced by the modern Jewish experience. It is a premise of this author that
as the Arab-Israeli conflict is heavily influenced by the religious/cultural background of the Jewish and Arab/Muslim actors, so conflict management activities
as part of diplomatic approaches must also employ religious/cultural elements.
But how can this be achieved?
It is generally assumed that the injection of religion into severe ethno-national conflicts can only serve to escalate such deep seated conflicts. However, we
have suggested earlier in this paper that the Arab-Israeli conflict is deeply rooted in religious and cultural identity and therefore religion is already part of the
conflict and therefore must be addressed as part of conflict management efforts.
A description of field work focusing on Israeli-Palestinian inter-religious dialogue co-initiated by this author has appeared elsewhere with highlights reviewed below. As this article focuses on the theme of “religious diplomacy”, and
track II diplomacy is becoming an increasingly recognized element of the overall diplomatic effort, relevant people to people efforts such as those described
below can be considered germane to this analysis. Furthermore the dynamics evident in micro dialogue can serve as an important microcosm of dynamics
found in the macro conflict and efforts to bridge the conflict.
In 1994 this author was able to co-initiate with a group of Palestinian students and their faculty advisor from the Hebron area, a series of dialogues between those students and Israeli students from Bar-Ilan University an Israeli religious Jewish university. These meetings and activities continued in various
forms (including via internet) till virtually the start of acute Israeli-Palestinian
violence in the fall of 2000, and focused on commonalities between Islam and
Judaism. The eventuality led to a variety of spin-off cooperative efforts, facilitated by the leading partners of the dialogue themselves. Participants reported
on a warm atmosphere in these face-to-face meetings and attributed that
achievement to the discovery of commonalities in the other’s religious culture33.
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33
B. MOLLOV - M. BARHOUM, Building cultural/religious bridges between Jewish and Arab university students, http://meria.biu.ac.il (accessed 1999).
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Specifically it should be noted that approximately 90 students on each side
had at some point been directly involved in the process. The activity led to the
participation and graduation of a Palestinian student from the Beit Ommar village, in proximity to northern Hebron, in Bar-Ilan University’s International
Program in Business Administration. Similarly it facilitated the participation
and graduation of another Palestinian student in the Peace Studies Program at
Notre Dame University.
Family visitations and strong friendships developed during the process between the principle organizers, and they responded to each other during illness
and joy and expressed condemnation and condolences to each other in the wake
of violent events on either side, even during the period of acute Israeli-Palestinian hostilities.
Anecdotally it should be mentioned that at the first meeting held The positive relationships that developed among
between this author and the Palestin- students as they discovered similarities in structure
ian students which preceded the regu- and practices between Islam and Judaism can be
lar student meetings, the very basis considered a crucial first step for conflict management
and legitimacy of the State of Israel processes
and the collective return of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel was questioned by the Palestinian students. This key issue would re-emerge at various
points in the dialogue. The positive relationships that developed among the students as they discovered similarities in structure and practices between Islam
and Judaism can be considered a crucial first step for conflict management
processes. However the deeper issues concerning the attachment to the same
land were confronted at various times in the dialogue.
As the Bar-Ilan – “Hebron” dialogue began as an ad hoc effort under difficult
circumstances, no hard quantitative data was collected to measure perception
changes among the participants, although a more thorough description of the
process and interactions has appeared elsewhere34.
However, working together with Israeli social psychologist Dr. Chaim Lavie,
extensive analysis of various Israeli Jewish subjects at Bar-Ilan University and in
a number of Palestinian universities was undertaken during the late 1990’s concerning their perceptions of the opposite group, through questionnaire based data. These results (which have appeared elsewhere) have yielded data confirming
that religious subjects were far more likely to exhibit more negative perceptions
of Palestinian Arabs or Israeli Jews than secular or less religious Israelis or Palestinians35. This provides affirming evidence to the suggestion that religion can indeed be an exacerbating influence in the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, an Israeli-Palestinian inter-religious dialogue held in Khan Yunis,
Gaza in early 1999 which focused on the subject of prayer rituals in Judaism and
B. MOLLOV, The role of religion in conflict resolution: An Israeli-Palestinian student dialogue, Jerusalem
1999.
35
B. MOLLOV - C. LAVIE, Culture, dialogue and perception change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cit.
34
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Islam afforded the opportunity to further explore the impact of inter-religious
dialogue. In this Friday-Saturday (Sabbath) seminar involving both Israeli/Jewish and Palestinian Muslim/Arab students and academics, Jewish and Moslem
prayer rituals were discussed, the services of both religions were conducted, and
the religious dietary requirements of the Jewish guests were respected. Perception questionnaires in Hebrew and Arabic were distributed before and after the
activity. Results which have appeared elsewhere revealed that Palestinian religious Arab Muslims who held the most negative perceptions of Israeli Jews
among the Palestinian participants as a whole changed to a more positive measurable perception than their counterparts, yielding an empirical basis for the efficacy of the Israeli-Palestinian inter-religious dialogue36.
Other field work has been undertaken and reported on which is relevant to
this analysis. As Israeli Arabs tend to identify with the larger Palestinian narrative (even though they are citizens of Israel) insights gained from dialogue and
interactions between Jewish and Arab citizens of the State of Israel are also very
useful for appreciating the possible contribution of inter-religious dialogue efforts between these two groups. Joint Jewish-Arab courses and a study mission
to Holocaust sites in Poland held in 2004-2005, which included inter-religious
elements, involved both students from the main Bar-Ilan University campus and
satellite regional colleges. Evaluation of these activities also yielded both qualitative (anecdotal) and quantitative data pointing to the favorable impact which
common inter-religious elements can have on mutual perceptions, which have
been presented elsewhere37. Also inter-religious dialogue activities based on
common religious elements between groups of Jewish and Arab women within
the State of Israel were found to also advance positive interactions between the
two groups and have also been described elsewhere38.
Why indeed can the inter-religious encounter serve to promote more positive
perceptions and interactions between Jews and Arabs despite the escalatory potential of injecting religion into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Research in social psychology offers insight into the conditions in which perceptions, interactions and relationships between groups in conflict can change favorably.
For instance Yehuda Amir has written about the conditions for positive contact including “equal status contacts”; “intimate” as opposed to merely “casual
encounters”; “cooperative” as opposed to “competitive” relationships; and “institutional” supports for such efforts39. Furthermore, Rokeach40 and others have
emphasized the importance which the discovery of commonalities in another
Ibidem.
B. MOLLOV - C. LAVIE, The impact of Jewish-Arab encounters and the discourse of the Holocaust on mutual perceptions, Paper presented at Annual Meeting of International Association for Conflict Management, June 2006.
38
B. MOLLOV - C. LAVIE, Arab and Jewish women’s interreligious dialogue evaluated, in Y. IRAM (ed.), Educating towards a culture of peace, Greenwich 2006, pp.247-258.
39
Y. AMIR, Contact hypothesis in ethnic relations, in «Psychological Bulletin», 71, 1969, pp. 319-342.
40
M. ROKEACH (ed.), The open and closed mind, New York 1960.
36
37
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group can have on mutual perceptions41. In addition Pettigrew, has amplified on
Amir’s work and cited the importance of “friendship potential”42 emerging out
of intergroup encounters which is connected to former US diplomat Harold
Saunders’ approach to sustained dialogue and relationship building43. These are
all essential tools in developing dialogue in the overall task of diplomacy in general and religious diplomacy in particular.
As noted earlier in this article, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a function of clashing narratives. How can inter-religious dialogue help to facilitate a reconciliation
of narratives upon which peace must ultimately be based? The inter-religious dialogue involves a number of levels. First the identification of common elements
in Islam and Judaism can offer a basis of common ground to help moderate perceptions between Jews and Arabs and “humanize” each other, supported by social psychological theory cited above. It should also be emphasized here that inter-religious dialogue on this level is not meant to deal with confrontational issues upon which there is no agreement such as “who the favored son of Abraham was – Issac or Ishmael” but rather commonalities in areas such as prayer,
charity, and new bio-ethical challenges.
However from this point of departure, which can facilitate more posi- The identification of common elements in Islam
tive communication and interaction and Judaism can offer a basis of common ground
between Arab and Jew the basic issue to help moderate perceptions between Jews and Arabs
of each side’s attachment to the same land (Land of Israel for Jews, Palestine for
Arabs) can be discussed and addressed. Admittedly there can be a phase of conflict escalation as both sides clearly recognize that they claim the same land. This
is exacerbated by the fact that during the “heroic period” of the Hebrew Bible for
the Jews, Islam did not yet exist, and during the Arab-Islamic empire the Jews
were no longer an active political force in the region. These “heroic periods”
have influenced the collective memory of both sides. This clash of narratives has
been at the root of a century old conflict with several major wars and ongoing
violence with peace efforts interspersed.
Employing the tools of hard power advanced by Morgenthau and the approach of dialogue purported by Buber, both rooted in the Jewish experience
can serve both to anchor Israeli security and advance diplomatic efforts at
peacebuilding. Indeed when both sides realize that they can either continue
fighting to the death or reach the point of a constructive stalemate, further reflection must take place among Arabs and Jews. Can they make room for the
other in their respective narratives? This can lead to the basis of advancing conflicting interests to complementary ones which is at the core of the diplomatic
endeavor.
This connects very strongly to the need for both Jews and Arabs to develop
See: D. BYRNE, Attitude and attraction, in L. BERKOWITZ (ed.), Advances in experimental and social
psychology, 4, New York 1969, pp. 36-89; M. HEWSTONE, The ultimate attribution error? A review of literature on intergroup casual attribution, in «European Journal of Social Psychology», 20, 1990, pp. 311335; T.M. NEWCOMB, The acquaintance process, New York 1961.
42
T.F. PETTIGREW, Intergroup contact theory, in «Annual Review of Psychology», 49, 1998, pp. 65-83.
43
H. SAUNDERS, A public peace process, New York 1999.
41
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more inclusive approaches in their religious outlooks. All religions have both elements of exclusivity and inclusiveness, militancy and conciliation depending
on context and choice of accent on different and often conflicting religious texts
in their respective traditions44. The basis of a Jewish approach to greater inclusiveness has been discussed elsewhere45 based on the work of a number of important Jewish scholars46.
Finally as part of this process in which inter-religious dialogue holds a central role in religious diplomacy, there is ideally a third phase. That phase refers
to a transcendent point of contact between Israelis and Palestinians in which
both are able to make room for the other in their respective narratives and find
a similar animating theme in the idea of the “Holy Land”. This is both a specific enough, but also general enough idea under which Israelis do not give up their
state, or Palestinians their aspiration for a state but can provide the basis of a
common ideal for the building of the same land as a basis for cooperation. Such
an approach has already been presented elsewhere by this author including the
venue of an important Muslim country47.
Involvement of Religious Leaders
Up to this point we have dealt with a framework for religious diplomacy
based on the conflict between actors in an identity based conflict with roots in
religion and culture of which the Arab-Israeli is a prime example. Although political leaders must deal with these core issues informed by their religious and
cultural values, the contribution of both local and religious leaders primarily
Jewish and Muslim can be very significant in moderating attitudes and also
strengthening the people to people aspect of Track II diplomacy. The specific involvement of religious leaders in the process of religious diplomacy can serve to
build bridges between leaders with a similar language of faith and can also serve
to provide legitimacy for peace building processes among populations that are
highly dedicated to their national narratives and often as well the most hesitant
or resistant to peace building processes.
Some pioneer work on the ground in Israel encouraged by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel and other interested bodies ought to be noted as examples of
rabbinical figures not previously involved in ongoing dialogue with other religions which are now becoming much more active participants in such process-
See S. APPLEBY, The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence, and reconciliation, Lanham 2000; M.
GOPIN, Between Eden and Armageddon: The future of world religions, violence and peacemaking, New
York 2000.
45
B. MOLLOV - E. MEIR - C. LAVIE, An integrated strategy for peace-building, cit.
46
D. HARTMAN, A living covenant: A living spirit in traditional Judaism, New Haven 1985; R.E. HASSNER, War on Sacred Grounds, Ithaca 2009; N. ZOHAR, Text, power and responsibility: The crucial role of
Midrashic reinterpretation, in B. MOLLOV (ed.), Religion and conflict resolution, Jerusalem 2003.
47
B. MOLLOV, Managing conflict: Can religion succeed where politics has failed? An Israeli addresses a global peace forum in Malaysia, in «Jerusalem Viewpoints», No. 548, 1 November 2006.
44
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es. The involvement of high level religious leaders in dialogue, cooperation and
outreach to the leaders of other faiths can serve to bolster the process of reconciliation between peoples and are a natural component of religious diplomacy.
This can also lead to greater inclusive attitudes towards other religious communities and peoples.
The high profile visit of former
Pope John Paul II to Israel and the The involvement of high level religious leaders
Holy Land in 2000, according to offi- in dialogue, cooperation and outreach to the leaders
cials connected with the process of other faiths can serve to bolster the process
served as an important catalyst for the of reconciliation between peoples
beginning of ongoing institutionalized dialogue between the Chief Rabbinate of
Israel and the Holy See48. This clearly was the beginning of a process in which
previous attitudes of withholding legitimacy to Israel (by the Vatican) and reluctance by the Chief Rabbinate to such contacts given the 2000 year history of
hostility by the Church to the Jewish people have been changing.
This breakthrough effort in ongoing dialogue between the Chief Rabbinate
of Israel and the Pontiff also led to the involvement of the Chief Rabbis of Israel
and other rabbinical figures in dialogue with religious leaders in the Muslim
world. High level rabbinical delegations for instance have met with Muslim religious leaders from the periphery of the Islamic world from areas such as India,
which is a feasible starting point given its greater distance from the day to day
intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict49. Common challenges facing people of faith
in a secular world have been a main basis of initial dialogue.
However there has also been progress in establishing and achieving ongoing
high level dialogue and cooperation between key Israeli Jewish rabbis, Palestinian Arab Muslim Sheikhs and Imams, and Christian clergy operating under the
auspices of their respective highest level religious authorities in the Council of
Religious Institutions of the Holy Land in operation since 2004. Despite the context of dynamic political events on the ground in Israeli-Palestinian relations,
the religious figures have been able to achieve their own areas of discourse in
which pressing political issues are discussed in a more thoughtful manner. Concrete issues such as cooperation in reviewing educational textbooks in an attempt to influence and encourage attitudes of moderation on both sides have
and are being undertaken50.
Israel as a mosaic of peoples in which as a Jewish state about 20 percent of its
population are non-Jewish, is a context in which inter-religious dialogue and cooperation between the leaders of its four main faith communities (Jewish, Muslim, Christian and Druze) can be significant for maintaining inter-group stability and avoiding or moderating violent conflict. This is particularly important as
mixed Jewish-Arab cities and locales have been the site of flash points of conflict
Interview with Mr. Oded Weiner, Director general, Chief rabbinate of Israel, Jerusalem, December 31,
2009.
49
Ibidem.
50
Ibidem.
48
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between Jews and Arabs in Israel. A council of religious leaders comprised of local and national leaders within Israel was established about two years ago to
serve as a framework for cooperation between the leaders of the different communities in Israel with the object to provide a mechanism for inter-religious cooperation particularly during crises51.
This author as a scholar practitioner recently served as an academic consultant and organizer for a more ambitious effort at facilitating and developing ties
between 200 (mostly local) religious leaders focused on discussion of conflict
scenarios and modes of cooperation between such leaders during times of conflict and crisis at the most recent meeting in December 2009 of the council mentioned above. This took place under the auspices of the Druze religious community in their holy site in the upper Galilee overlooking the Sea of Galilee at
the presence of the highest level religious leaders in Israel including the two
Chief Rabbis. Interaction between the religious leaders was very positive and was
an expression of the importance of ongoing frameworks of dialogue on both national and international levels which can lead to “relationship building” and
conflict transformation as advocated by Harold Saunders and John Paul Lederach52. Furthermore anectodal impressions indicated the beginning of processes
in which religious leaders, some of whom had never been to an inter-religious
meeting, began to exhibit “inclusive” attitudes towards leaders of other religions
which is vital in developing a “shared vision” for the Holy Land while distinctive
identities are preserved53.
While much work still needs to be done between elite and local religious
leaders in developing ongoing relationships on the international, regional and
local levels the examples of developing cooperation outlined in this section can
provide the basis for “strategic” cooperation between religious leaders as a vital
element of religious diplomacy relating to both substance and process.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to provide the outlines of an approach to “religious
diplomacy” based upon theoretical approaches and empirical data, and rooted
in Jewish perspectives. As noted at the beginning of this paper diplomacy is essentially the effort to move conflicting interests towards complementary ones,
and complementary interests towards identical ones. In an era in which intercivilizational conflict, rooted in religious identity and culture, has become a major characteristic of the international system, religious diplomacy has an essential task in helping actors particularly in the Middle East, whose identities are
rooted in religious culture, to find common ground. Furthermore, religious
Ibidem.
H. SAUNDERS, A public peace process, New York 1999; J.P. LEDERACH, Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies, Washington, D.C. 1997.
53
See also D. ROSEN, Religious leaders unite for a better future, in «Common Ground News Service», December 23, 2009, (http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=27007&lan=en&sid=0&sp=0).
51
52
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leaders can also be brought into this process, particularly to strengthen track II
diplomacy.
This paper has presented hard and soft approaches to power connected to the
work of international relations theorist Hans J. Morgenthau who emphasized
the centrality of power in international relations, and the eminent social
philosopher Martin Buber who was a proponent of the power of dialogue. Both
were products of the rich German-Jewish heritage and experience which included both the hope of enlightenment and the devastation of the Holocaust
and the conclusions emanating from them. Combining hard power and soft
power, realism and idealism as outgrowths of the Jewish experience represent
highly appropriate tools to navigate conflict towards balances of power and promote dialogue in the Middle East conflict.
Furthermore, the finding of common ground between religiously motivated
actors – as suggested by Huntington – as a means of moderating intercivilizational conflict54, with a focus on the similarities of practice and structure in Islam and Judaism, can be a first step in promoting a deeper grappling with the
mutual attachment of the two sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is a
core issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Eventually both sides of the conflict will
have to make room for the “other” in their respective narratives, a process which
requires a degree of “inclusiveness” in religious thinking that combine both particular and universal aspects of a religious worldview55. While the vision of two
states in the Land of Israel/Palestine would be maintained, and the identity of Israelis and Palestinians secured, the building of the “Holy Land” would be identified as an animating constructive vision.
54
55
S.P. HUNTINGTON, The clash of civilizations, cit., p. 49.
For an important analysis see: J. SACKS, The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilisations, London 2003.
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S. Gulden Ayman
Whether Iran’s rulers have decided
to build nuclear weapons or not still is
an unanswered question. Though Iran
may be one step closer to possessing
nuclear weapons, it is not possible to
claim with certainty that Iran has military aspirations. This article aims at
examining Turkish perceptions and
questioning the role played by Turkey
in nuclear crisis. It questions the close
relationship between threat, capacity
and intent and asserts that Turkey is
not predisposed to perceive a direct
military threat from Iran. After explaining the main features of Turkish response to Iranian nuclear program it
concludes with a discussion on the
constraints and prospects of Turkish
approach with special attention given
to third party roles and Turkish-Iranian divergences over Iraq.
Capability, Threat and Intentions
Iranian nuclearization brings one
of the conventional questions in international relations scholarship and deterrence studies into the fore once
more: whether capability could be regarded as an indicator of intention.
Several studies done in this field show
us that threats are often inferred from
two kinds of evidence: evidence of capability to do harm and evidence of in-
1
tent to do it. Long ago Singer proposed
a quasi-mathematical formula to show
the factors contributing to the perception of threat which is «Threat-Perception: Estimated Capability x Estimated
Intent». As it shows there exists a very
close interaction between capability
and intent in determining threat perception. Mainly two reasons could be
cited to explain this. Firstly, capability
is regarded as a clue to intent since it is
often developed in pursuit of goals.
Secondly, having a capability in many
instances encourages the development
of a goal. In fact, the difference between a country’s ability and its intention is often unclear from an adversary’s perspective1.
The relationship between capacity
and intent is a multi-dimensional and
complex one due to the fact that perceiving a threat is also a matter of perceiving intentions. When certain levels
of trust and good relations exist
among states, capacity building is not
automatically taken as an indicator of
hostile intentions. As opposed to that,
protracted problems – especially those
involving territorial and/or identity
components together with power
asymmetries – often create a predisposition to perceive threat. When we examine Turkish-Iranian relations from
that perspective we see that the absence of sovereignty issues and power
J.D. SINGER, Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma, in «Journal of Conflict Resolution», 2, 1958, p. 94.
S. GULDEN AYMAN
is Associate Professor
of International Relations
at Marmara University,
Istanbul.
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internazionale
asymmetries have been the main
sources of stability in Turkish-Iranian
relations. In other words, structurally
speaking Turkey is not predisposed to
perceive an Iranian military threat.
The disagreement over sovereignty issues is considered to be the main
source of violent conflicts and chronic
crises between states. The situation between Turkey and Iran is just the opposite as the border was agreed in the
Kasr-i Sirin Treaty signed in 1639 and
remained unchallenged since.
The relationship between capacity
and intent is a multi-dimensional
and complex one due to the fact
that perceiving a threat is also
a matter of perceiving intentions
Distribution of power is also an
important element to determine the
nature of relations among neighbors.
An asymmetry of power would cause
difficulties in maintaining stable
relations among neighbors since a
stronger power may try to control a
weaker power or, conversely, a weaker
power may become aggressive out
of fear of domination by a stronger
power.
On the other hand, in symmetric
power situations none of the parties
could easily enforce its will upon the
others. Symmetric power not only creates favorable conditions for mutual
deterrence in the military field but also, by decreasing the concerns of survival, may foster trade and economic
interactions between neighbors.
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Actually, any assessment on Turkey
and Iran’s power would reveal the similarity in both countries’ tangible elements of power (size of territory, population, military power, strategic
depth, etc.). Even though Iran is twice
as bigger than Turkey, Turkey’s population is a little larger than that of Iran.
Proximity gives them some similar topography. Both Turkey and Iran also
possess a diversity of climate conditions. While Turkey has comparative
advantage in basic food production,
Iran is among the world’s leaders in its
reserves of oil and natural gas. With regard to the tangible elements of power
Turkey and Iran enjoy the same kind of
power status, which creates two different effects. On the one hand, it contributes to stability while on the other
hand it provides incentives for both
countries to compete for influence.
In fact, Turkish-Iranian relations
have not been free from tensions.
Turkey and Iran had found themselves
in the opposite camps after the Iranian
Revolution in 1979. Tehran’s efforts to
export the revolution and its attempts
to support the PKK had resulted in a
crisis-prone atmosphere between the
two countries. Despite the fact that
these problems have caused serious
diplomatic confrontation between
Ankara and Tehran, the two neighbors
are not inclined to resort to force as an
instrument of diplomacy.
While Tehran’s policy of playing the
PKK card to weaken Turkey begun to
lose importance with Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988), Iran assumed a more
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sensitive approach on the matter of exporting the revolution when Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami came
to power in 1997. It should be noted
that Ankara’s policy of neutrality contributed to the peaceful coexistence between the two rival regimes. Turkey,
which was ruled by a military administration during that time, advocated the
idea that Iran should not be isolated
but rather be understood within the
context of special conditions, otherwise it might feel compelled to side
with the USSR. Turkey not only
warned against US intervention in the
war and preferred the approach taken
by the UN, as expressed by Security
Council Resolution 598, which called
on both countries to cease hostilities,
but also tried to facilitate efforts at a
dialogue between the warring parties,
and acted as a go-between for the
United States and Iran2. Still Turkey
has no interest to engage a destructive
conflict with Iran. Iran being the second largest gas supplier of Turkey further clarifies the limits of competition
between the two countries.
Dynamics of Cooperation
in Turkish-Iranian Relations
Turkish-Iranian relations are continuously evolving, but in the first half
of 2000s they gained a new momentum. Two factors played an important
role on that development. The first one
was the emergence of a new Middle
East after the US invasion of Iraq in
March 2003, the second one was Justice and Development Party’s (JDP)
coming to power in November 2002.
If we start with the first one we observe that the developments in Iraq,
which have far reaching consequences
for the region’s future, motivated both
parties in order to collaborate to defend the territorial sovereignty of Iraq
and prevent the establishment of an
independent Kurdish state. Security
cooperation between Turkey and Iran
developed dramatically especially in
the domain of their common struggle
against terrorist groups (Iranian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ PartyPKK, The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan – PJAK – is active in Iran) targeting
both countries. Iranian affiliate of the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the
Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK)
is active in Iran3. Washington’s Iraq
policy and its inability to act against
PKK not only fomented anti-Americanism4, but also created a more favorable climate to improve Turkish-Iranian relations. In February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised to help Turkey against the PKK in
her visit to Ankara. The same day,
however, Iran bombed PKK camps inside Iraq. A Turkish newspaper reflected the public attitude on the issue with
these words: «Americans talk the talk
U. GUNDOGAN, Islamists Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological Influences, in
«MERIA Journal», 7, 1, March 2003, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a1.html.
3
PJAK was founded before the beginning of the Iraq war when the PKK split its members among Turkey,
Syria, Iraq, and Iran with the intention of spreading its forces. The two groups overlap in terms of geographical location, cadres and ideology.
4
2007 Transatlantic Trends poll showed only 3 percent of Turks approved President Bush’s handling of
international policies and 83 percent disapproved. See, Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2007, online at
http://www.astrid-online.it/Documenti/Rapporti-t/transatlantic_trends_2007.pdf.
2
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Iranians walk the walk regarding the
PKK»5.
Though Iran and Turkey have not
staged any joint military operations
against the PJAK and PKK, they have
been exchanging intelligence and conducting coordinated, simultaneous operations on their respective borders6.
Turkey and Iran first signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on
security cooperation on July 29, 2004,
three months after PJAK’s inaugural
congress in April 2004 and two months
after the May 2004 decision by the
PKK to return to violence following a
five-year unilateral ceasefire.7 A new
memorandum of understanding
which foresaw a broadening and deepening of security cooperation between
the two countries reinforced TurkishIranian agreement on April 17, 20088.
One of the solid benefits of this cooperation for Turkey has been the increase in the number of PKK terrorists
being arrested and handed over to
Turkey by the Iranian authorities. On 8
June 2007, the day after the Turkish
troops had crossed into northern Iraq
to pursue members of the PKK, Iran-
S. CAGATAY – Z. EROGLU, The PKK, PJAK, and Iran: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations, Policy
Watch, n. 1244, Washington Institute, June 13, 2007.
6
G. JENKINS, Turkey and Iran Expected to Boost Security Cooperation, Jamestown Foundation, April 13,
2008, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33547.
7
The two countries agreed to cooperate for «the region to become a peaceful land which is purified of all
kinds of terror». See, Iran and Turkey Discuss PKK-PJAK, in «Turkish Daily News», April 14, 2008.
8
For more information tight connection between PKK and PJAK see, J. BRANDON, Iran’s Kurdish Threat:
PJAK, Jamestown Foundation, June 15, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=805.
9
In February 2006, Iran handed over 30 PKK terrorists to Turkey, through the Gürbulak border crossing.
There are indications that Iran is preparing to hand over another 45 PKK terrorists, who are currently
in various Iranian prisons.
10
According to the MoU, Turkey will receive 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Iran, which could
be used both for satisfying domestic needs and for reselling to European countries. In addition, Turkey
will be able to obtain Turkmen gas coming through Iranian territory.
11
Turkey, Iran Agreed to Build Three Power Plants, in «Turkish Daily News», August 21, 2007,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=turkey-iran-agree-to-build-three-power-plants-200708-21.
5
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ian aircrafts bombed the camps of the
PJAK, in northern Iraq9.
Cooperation between Turkey and
Iran was not limited to the security
area. Another important area of
coopth
eration was energy. On the 14 of July
2007, Iranian Petroleum Minister
Seyyed Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh and
Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler
signed a Memorandum of Understanding under which Iranian and
Turkmen gas will be exported to Europe via Turkey. Also agreed upon in
the MoU was the development, on a
buyback basis, of part of the giant
South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf10. In August 2007 Ankara and
Tehran consolidated their energy cooperation by signing a Memorandum
of Understanding to build three power stations in Iran using natural gas to
generate 6,000 megawatts of energy11.
The purpose of this deal was to transfer the Turkmen natural gas to Europe
via Turkey and allow Turkey to explore natural gas fields in the Persian
region. The energy cooperation between the two countries was heavily
criticized by the US, who has remind-
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ed Ankara of existing sanctions
against Iran while also stressing a
commitment to trans-Caspian energy
projects that would bypass the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits and
Iranian routes12.
The deepening of multifaceted
relations with Iran besides being an
outcome of the changed conditions
could also be viewed as a product
of JDP’s foreign policy vision
The deepening of multifaceted relations with Iran, besides being an outcome of the changed conditions, could
also be viewed as a product of JDP’s
foreign policy vision that has been articulated in different forums by Ahmet
Davutoqlu, who later became the Foreign Minister. Since coming to power
in 2002, AK party has been pursuing
“zero problems with neighbors” policy
while continuing to maintain traditionally good relations with the West.
This policy in general shows Ankara’s
will and determination to eliminate
long lasting problems and build good
ties with Turkey’s neighbors with a
special importance given to Muslim
Middle East. On the other hand, this
policy also marks a shift from the previous Turkish foreign policy approach
in the sense of not prioritizing Turkey’s
relations with the EU countries as
much as it used to happen in the past.
The following words of Erdoqan clarify Turkish approach: «Turkey attaches
as much importance to cooperation
with Saudi Arabia as she does with its
efforts to join the EU»13.
The disillusionment felt in Turkey
with regard to its EU accession process
contributed to this approach14.
At the core of this new foreign policy vision we can see a strong belief
that cooperation between regional
states is not only desirable but also
possible. Secondly this policy assumes
that Turkey can play an important role
as a regional power and a pivotal country to solve problems and take initiatives to mitigate differences and accelerate dynamics of cooperation in the
region through its soft power that
emerges from its on-the-ground influence, coupled with its political, cultural and economic abilities15. What particularly increased Turkey’s self-confidence is its growing economic power
However this process encountered difficulties because of new demands from Iran on pricing and investment conditions rather than the U.S. interference. Iran, contrary to Turkey’s wishes, did not agree
to share the gas to be found on its own territory and insisted on signing a service agreement with Turkish companies. Gas deal with Tehran not off the table, in «Turkish Daily News», August 19, 2008,
http://www.hurriyet dailynews.com/h.php?news=gas-deal-with-tehran-not-off-the-table-2008-08-19,
and I. TÜRKMEN, Our biggest neighbor Iran, in «Hürriyet», August 19, 2008.
13
Erdoqan Calls for Lifting Visa Requirements with Saudi Arabia, in «Yeni Safak», January 20, 2010, online
at http://yenisafak.com.tr/english/default.aspx?t=20.01.2010&i=236632.
14
According to a survey conducted by the Ankara-based Metropoll Strategic and Social Research Center
on people’s perceptions of the “new face of Turkish foreign policy” nearly 50 percent said they would
vote “yes” if Turkey held a referendum to gauge the nation’s support for its EU bid. Almost 35 percent
of those polled however, do not support Turkey’s aspiration to join the bloc. More than 14 percent said
they are not sure whether to vote yes or no in such a referendum, and 1.3 percent said they had no idea.
In a similar survey in 2008, for example, 62 percent said they would vote yes if a referendum was held
on Turkey’s EU bid. See, Majority applauds AK Party’s foreign policy, in «Today’s Zaman», January 14,
2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-198484-majority-applauds-ak-partys-foreign-policy-poll-finds.html.
15
B. ARAS, Davutoqlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, «SETA Policy Brief», 32, May 2009.
12
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internazionale
leading it to become the 15th largest
economy in the world, and the 7th in
Europe, which consequently elevated it
to be a member of G-20 Group.
Main Features of Turkish
Response
Iran’s nuclearization is not an
alarming development for Turkey.
First of all, Turkey does not directly
perceive a threat from Iranian nuclear
developments and its missile program.
Moreover, Turkey is confident that if
such a threat emerges it would have the
capacity to counter it16. Nevertheless
the ongoing crisis negatively affects
Turkey. Ankara believes that not only
she would suffer because of US decision to use force against Iran17, but she
would also be affected significantly if
harsher sanctions on Iran would be
imposed.
Non-involvement
ly two components. First, to remind
Tehran that it must allow the IAEA to
inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities and
suspend enrichment activities, and
second, to avoid any commitment of
support to American forces in case the
US decide to launch an air attack on
Iran, as it was clarified by former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s words,
«Turkey would not allow any kind of
armed attack over Turkish soil on one
of her neighbors»19. This stance is very
much in line with Turkey’s opposition
to regime change in the Middle East
imposed by external actors, given the
US failure in Iraq. It is observed that
Turkey’s approach to Iran is supported
to a large extend by public opinion.
According to Metropoll’s survey, when
it is asked whether Turkey should object to or support an embargo or attack against Iran due to its nuclear activities, 60.2 percent of Turkish respondents said Turkey should definitely stand against such a move and
only 26 percent said Turkey should
back such an embargo or attack its
neighbor20.
One of the basic features of Turkish
position in Iran’s nuclear crisis is the
principle of non-involvement18. Non- One of the basic features of Turkish
involvement, which means not to side position in Iran’s nuclear crisis
with any party in conflict, has basical- is the principle of non-involvement
For Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoqlu’s comments on Iran’s testing of an upgraded version of
its longest-range missile, the Sajjil-2 see, C. SAQIR, Turkey Dismisses Missile Threat from Neighboring
Iran, in «Today’s Zaman», December 23, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/mobile.do?
load=wapDetay&link=196365.
17
According to Paul Rogers, a US attack aimed at Iran’s nuclear infrastructure may turn into a prolonged
armed conflict which could draw in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and the Gulf countries. See P. ROGERS, Iran:
Consequences of War, Oxford Research Group, Briefing Paper, February 2006.
18
When Iran’s nuclear activities were reviewed during the Turkish National Security Council meeting on
February 23, 2006, it was decided that Turkey should continue its balanced policy towards the US and
Iran. See, At MGK the Issue was Iran, in «Milliyet», February 24, 2006.
19
It is possible to assume that through this statement Gül was also trying to pre-empt possible US demands to use Turkish airspace or territory in a move against Iran. See, We Wouldn’t Let Others Attack
Our Neighbor from Our Land, in «Milliyet», February 10, 2006.
20
Majority Applauds AK Party’s Foreign Policy, cit.
16
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posed on Iraq. Turkey, as a member of
NATO, claims that it enjoys equal
rights to voice its concerns and contributing the debate in NATO circles.
As Foreign Minister Abdullah Davutoǧlu explains «there is a conviction as
if some within the Western alliance are
making decisions and Turkey has to
obey this. We are a part of that organization. We have the right and authority to determine where the axis will
emerge as much as any other country
has. We are within the Western alliance»23.
EU accession process has provided
Turkey certain advantages to display its
diplomatic efforts as well as has increased Turkish capability to act more independently from US pressures.
Turkey, which neither is a decisionmaking authority nor is able to contribute to the substance of negotiations,
Diplomatic Solution
assumed a role in the confidence builFor Turkey diplomacy is the pri- ding process.
mary means to end this crisis. In this
vein, Ankara resists to US and European push for tougher UN sanctions Turkish Facilitation
and advocates «a region free of military threats and sanctions». Similarly
Turkey is actively involved in this
to Turkish rhetoric during Iraq-Iran crisis especially in the sense of opening
war, it is argued that an isolated Iran, communication channels between
which would feel cornered, becomes a Iran and the EU trio: Germany, Britain
source of tension for Turkey22.
and France. Turkey also tried to conWhen this stance is interpreted as a vince Tehran to respond positively to
split in NATO, Turkish government the incentive package offered by the
defends itself stressing that it does not EU and open the way for a direct USwant to become a «loser» again as it Iranian dialogue24. One noteworthy exhappened when sanctions were im- ample of Turkish efforts to revitalize
The only exception with regards to
Turkish foreign policy’s general tendency of not siding with any parties so
far was Turkish Prime Minister
Erdoǧan’s remarks in Washington in
October 2009 and his following statement to Britain’s Guardian newspaper.
Defining Western fears over the Iranian bomb as “gossip” Erdoǧan argued
that «the style with which Iran is approached is not fair because those who
accuse Iran of pursuing acquisition of
nuclear weapons have very strong nuclear infrastructures and do not deny
the fact»21. That could also be interpreted as an outcome of the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli ties since the
December 2008-January 2009 war on
Gaza.
R. TAIT, Turkish PM Exposes Nuclear Rift in NATO, in «The Guardian», October 26, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/26/turkey-iran.
Turkey May Host Iran Nuclear Talks In Bid To Contain Row, in «Turkishny», September 16, 2009,
http://www.turkishny.com/old/en/english-news/15513-turkey-may-host-iran-nuclear-talks-in-bid-tocontain-row.html.
23
C. SAQIR, Turkey Dismisses Missile Threat from Neighboring Iran, cit.
24
Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Tehran on June 24-25, 2006 for talks with Iranian leaders, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and Foreign Minister
21
22
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internazionale
dialogue between the EU and Iran was
the preliminary meeting held on April
25, 200725 between the EU and Iran,
which was the first contact since the
UN Security Council widened sanctions on Iran over its refusal to stop enriching uranium26. In a similar fashion,
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Istanbul in August
2008 was considered as another occasion to give direct messages to Iranian
leadership that his government was on
the wrong path on the nuclear row.
Turkish President Abdullah Gül told
the Iranian leader to avoid getting into
an unwinnable war27.
Besides facilitating a dialogue between Iran and the EU, Turkey has also
facilitated US-Iran talks. Until the beginning of 2007, US had refused to
have dialogue with Iran about stabilizing Iraq. Though the Baker-Hamilton
Report highlighted dialogue as a possible option to end this crisis, the Bush
administration refused this option and
set the precondition of halting the nuclear program in order to start a dialogue process. However, within the
context of a Turkish initiative, “Iraq’s
Neighbors Meetings”, American and
Iranian envoys came together several
times. After the United States led ef-
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forts to toughen UN sanctions on Iran
over its nuclear program and the US
and Iranian envoys again held direct
talks in Baghdad Meeting of Iraq’s
Neighbors Forum on March 11, 200828.
On July 18, 2008, Turkish Foreign
Minister Ali Babacan hosted US National Security Adviser Steven Hadley
and Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki in Ankara.29
Subsequently US decided to send
William Burns, the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, to nuclear
talks with Iran in Geneva on July 19,
2008, which has been interpreted by
many as a shift in Washington’s hardline stance towards Iran30, Turkey’s facilitating role in nuclear crisis was also
acknowledged by US President Barack
Obama during his talks with Erdoqan
on December 7, 2009.
Turkey’s third party potential acquired a new element on November 6,
2009 when International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed
El Baradei offered Turkey to store Iranian uranium as an alternative to an
UN-brokered deal to send Iran’s enriched uranium to Russia. Though
Turkey agreed, new option was not
taken into account because of Tehran’s
demand for a simultaneous exchange
Manouchehr Mottaki. M. KATIK, Turkey Staking Out Mediator Role in Iranian Nuclear Crisis, in «Eurasia Insight», June 29, 2006, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062906.shtml.
25
After a series of contacts conducted by former Turkish Foreign Minister, Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki agreed to hold a preliminary meeting just to see if it would be possible to re-start
the negotiations.
26
S. DEMIRTAS, Turkey’s Secret Diplomacy Results Positive: Iran and EU to Meet, in «Turkish Daily News»,
April 21, 2007.
27
U. ERGAN, Tahran Harab-ül Bagdat Olmasın, in «Hürriyet», August 17, 2008.
28
Baghdad Conference Opens Window for Direct US-Iran Talks, in «The Associated Press», March 11, 2007;
US, Iran Trade Accusations, in «The Associated Press», March 11, 2007.
29
Turkey Hosts US, Iranian Officials, www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/07/18/Turkey_hosts_US_
Iranian_ officials/UPI-19431216413557/.
30
Europeans Welcome US Participation in Iran Nuclear Talks, in «Deutsche Welle», July 18, 2008, www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,2144,3491454,00.html.
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of low-enriched uranium with the 20- Efforts to Strengthen
percent-enriched one31.
Turkey’s Defense Posture
WMD Free Zone
While on the one hand Turkey invites Iran to be transparent about its
nuclear activities and tries to facilitate
EU-Iran and US-Iran dialogue, on the
other hand she supports international
efforts to control Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) in the Middle
East. Turkey endorses the idea to establish an effectively verifiable zone, free
of WMD’s in the Middle East, calls all
the Middle East states to terminate the
efforts for developing such weapons
and their delivery means, and to become party to the non-proliferation
regimes and treaties as soon as possible. Turkey’s self confidence related to
this issue derives from the fact that she
adheres to all major international
treaties, arrangements and regimes regarding non-proliferation32 of those
weapons and their delivery means, and
actively participates and supports all
efforts pertaining to non-proliferation
in NATO. Turkey does not possess
WMD and does not intend to have
them in the future.33
Currently, discussion about measures to increase Turkey’s security attracts more attention due to continued
crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. As a
matter of fact, Turkey has already initiated a long-range missile program to
thwart a possible missile threat that
may come from its neighbors. Questions on air defense modernization of
Turkey came to the fore following a US
Pentagon statement on September 9
revealing that the US administration
has notified Congress of a possible sale
of Patriot PAC-3 antimissile batteries
and related equipment to Turkey34.
Turkish authorities deny claims that
Turkish acquisition intends to target
any country. The Head of the Under
Secretariat for the Defense Industry
Murad Bayar claims that «it would be
wrong to link Turkey’s missile defense
concept purely to today’s strategic environment, since it is a project that
would be developed over the next 30
years». Though, according to these
statements, Turkey does not perceive
Iran as a threat, it seems obvious that
Turkey takes all possible scenarios into
consideration to defend its security35.
IAEA Chief: Iran Should Store Enriched Uranium in Turkey, in «Today’s Zaman», November 9, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-192403-iaea-chief-iran-should-store-enriched-uraniumin-turkey.html.
32
Turkey is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and Export Control Regimes
Regarding WMD and Their Delivery Means, Related Materials and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australian Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee).
33
Turkish General Staff, General Policy on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
and their Delivery Means, http://www.tsk.tr/eng/diger_konular/kitleimhasilahlari.htm.
34
Pentagon Plans Patriot Missile Sale to Turkey, in «Defense News», September 14, 2009, www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4276086.
35
Turkey Preserving the Republic, in «Jane’s Defense Weekly», 9, May 28, 2007, p. 35.
31
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«It would be wrong to link Turkey’s
missile defense concept purely
to today’s strategic environment,
since it is a project that would be
developed over the next 30 years»
The US administration, which
plans to extend the US Ballistic Missile
Defence (BMD) system into Europe,
also offered Turkey to share missile
shield technology in the future, but
this is no more than a statement made
during the NATO Bucharest Summit
on April 2-4, 2008. Originally it was
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
proposal to President Bush in June
2007 to use the Gabala radar station in
Azerbaijan and deploy interceptors in
Turkey or Iraq, rather than the current
plans for the Czech Republic and
Poland «if the aim is really to cope with
the threats emanating from the Middle
East countries like Iran». While the
United States considered the proposal
as complementary, suggesting that
these sites could be part of a wider system of missile monitoring, US Ballistic
Missile Defense falls short of satisfying
Turkey’s security concerns since it is
designed to counter intercontinental
ballistic missiles with minimum ranges
of 5,000–6,000 km36.
94
According to Western news media,
if Iran were not prevented from enriching uranium, then regional countries – including Turkey – would be
compelled to have the same capabilities as they move toward the development of their civilian nuclear power
plants.
Ankara’s current agenda includes
moves for Turkey to become a civilian
nuclear power through building nuclear power stations. Turkey has long
been wary of relying too much on Russia and Iran for its energy needs37.
Does Turkish decision originate
from a desire to reach a balance with
Iran’s nuclear capabilities or not? An
affirmative reply is difficult to support
because discussions about Turkey’s
planned nuclear stations started long
before the crises with Iran, as a result
of Turkey’s attempt to overcome her
energy shortage. Turkey has few energy
reserves of her own and she is dependent on imports of increasingly expensive gas and oil. According to the Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler, «to
meet Turkey’s growing energy demands, nuclear energy is a must rather
than a preference»38.
As Kibaroqlu notes, Turkey is not under threat from a country located that far away. Besides, Turkey
does not want to provoke Russian and Chinese reactions that would weaken their support of the nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles regimes. After the Missile Defense project was put on the agenda in the 1990s, contrary to Turkey’s interests, Russia’s reaction
led to termination of the INF Treaty. See, M. KIBAROQLU, The Missile Shield, NATO and Turkey, ASAM
Web Site, September 4, 2008, www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2563&kat2=2.
37
Turkish economy’s vulnerability became clear after the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad imposed a ban on exports of natural gas «for as long as we are unable to satisfy our internal demand» in
January 2008. Turkey decided to build three nuclear plants with a total capacity of about 5,000
megawatts in hopes of preventing a possible energy shortage and reducing dependence on foreign supplies. The first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu in the southern province of Mersin is expected to become
operational in 2013 or 2014. See, Turkey to Build First Nuclear Plant on Mediterranean Coast: Minister,
in «Hürriyet», November 22, 2008.
38
More Nuclear Power at the Black Sea?, www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr576/i.html.
36
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Turkish attempts are not aimed at
matching nuclear developments in
Iran, but it is also true that the nuclear
crisis in Iran offered to JDP government a much more favorable environment to take bold initiatives towards
obtaining nuclear power stations. It is
also interesting to note that Tehran expresses a willingness to cooperate with
Ankara in various fields including nuclear energy production. Iran asserts
that it has no problem with the idea of
nuclearization of the region “for
peaceful purposes” and will even cooperate if asked.
Constraints and Prospects
Turkish policy is successful in defusing tensions and facilitating dialogue between Iran and the West.
However, Turkey’s efforts are appreciated by Iran not only because they help
in breaking the ice in difficult moments but also because they allow Iran
to buy time and defy those who are
putting pressure on the country for
what they see as a lack of cooperation
on its controversial nuclear program
and scale down pressures. In a similar
fashion, Ahmadinejad’s visit to Istanbul in August 2008 provided Iranian
leadership with an occasion to discard
pressures in a period when the United
Nations, US and Israel39 were considering additional sanctions.
Secondly, though Turkish Prime
Minister Erdoqan frequently advocates
Ankara’s aim to act as a “mediator” between Iran and the West, Turkey neither assumed that role nor it is likely to
do so. Mediation could be broadly defined as an intervention in order to affect, change, resolve, modify or influence the course of conflict between the
parties. Turkey is not in a position to
remove the cause of the conflict or terminate the crisis in a durable way.
What Turkey does is rather acting as
“go between” to assist the start of dialogue when all parties desire but hesitate to take the first step. Moreover,
Turkey’s aspiration to play a mediator
role is not easy to realize. No matter
how much Turkey avoids voicing its
own individual interests and concerns
or use the crisis for its own benefit, its
intervention as an important actor in
the Middle East would not be acceptable for Iran which perceives Turkey
both as a friend and a rival. Indeed,
Iranian leadership objects to the idea
of a Turkish “mediation”40 claiming
that «Iranian stance in the nuclear dispute is quite transparent, therefore it
doesn’t require any interpretation
from third parties»41.
What Turkey does is rather acting
as “go between” to assist the start
of dialogue when all parties desire
but hesitate to take the first step
Ahmadinejad argued that the «Zionist regime is an artificial regime created by bringing people from
other parts of the world and committing massacres. Zionist regime is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths and miserable conditions of 5 million people. Ottomans acted as a barrier to this wave.
But when the Ottoman government collapsed, attacks against the region started. We need to solve the
deep-rooted problems of the Middle East. In the last 60 years, three major wars broke out because of the
Zionist regime». See, Ahmadinejad lashes out at Israel and US, in «Turkish Daily News», August 16, 2008.
40
Ahmadinejad says Turkey engaged in friendly effort, in «Turkish Daily News», August 15, 2008.
41
Iran Rejects Turkish Role In Nuclear Talks, in «Asbarez Armenian News», December 8, 2009,
http://www.asbarez.com/2009/12/08/iran-rejects-turkish-role-in-nuclear-talks/.
39
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At this point one should not disregard the fact that Iranian nuclearization is not actually an independent issue but a part of the developments in
the Middle East after the war in Iraq.
Iranian efforts reflect this country’s demand to be recognized as a respected
country in dealing with Iraq and
Afghanistan as well as its fear and opposition to be encircled by the US42. In
this respect, Iranian nuclear program
holds a value both in deterring possible threats against Iran and guaranteing US interests in negotiating with
Iran. According to Tehran’s perception,
the United States exhibited no interest
in negotiations before the enrichment
program began, and now it is in a position to negotiate with Washington.
Any attempt to understand better
the psychology shaping Iranian strategic behavior has to take into consideration Iranian leadership’s positive expectations regarding the rise of Iran’s power. However, as Ali Shakeri correctly argues, apart from its military program
Iran may be categorized as a “stagnant
power” and even a “falling” or a “failing
power” when economic, political, cultural and social dimensions of power
are taken into consideration43. What
makes Iran perceived as a rising power
has less to do with the rise of its individual capabilities compared with others than the window of opportunities
presented as a consequence of the US’
failures in Afghanistan and Iraq.
See, F. MOKHTARI, No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context, in
«Middle East Journal», 59, 2, Spring 2005, pp. 209-229.
43
According to Shakeri no matter how the “rising power” thesis is questionable it is advocated both by the
sympathizers of Iranian regime as well as its opponents because it suits their approach to Iran. See, A.
SHAKERI, Iraq in U.S.-Iranian Relations, American-Iranian Council, http://american-iranian.org/ publications/articles/2007/02/iraq_in_usiranian_relations.html.
44
Ahmedinejad offers to fill power vacuum in Iraq, in «USA Today», www.usatoday.com/news/world/200708-28-iran-nuclear_N.htm.
45
G. PORTER, Khamenei in control and ready to “haggle”, in «Asia Times», May 31, 2006,
www.atimes.com.
42
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In this vein, Ahmadinejad remarks
reflect what might be perceived as
Iran’s eagerness to have an increasing
influence on its neighbor’s political
scene. According to him there is an imminent power vacuum in Iraq, and
Iran was ready to help fill the gap: «The
political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon, we will see a
huge power vacuum in the region. Of
course, we are prepared to fill the gap,
with the help of neighbors and regional friends like Saudi Arabia, and with
the help of the Iraqi nation44».
The past statements of supreme
leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s top foreign-policy adviser Ali Akbar Velayati
who served as foreign minister from
1981 to 1997, further clarify Iranian
perceptions. At a seminar in Tehran on
May 18, 2006 Velayati addressed the
evolution of Iran’s bargaining position
in relation to the United States with
these words: «We have at no time until
now had such powerful means for haggling nor we have the influence we
now have in Iraq and Palestine. Now
that we have the power to haggle, why
don’t we haggle?»45.
Within this context the dynamics of
cooperation between Turkey and Iran
hardly indicates that there remained
no policy differences in both countries’
current approaches to the Middle East.
As President Abdullah Gül once said,
«undoubtedly Turkey differs from Iran
on many issues»46. Today the most im-
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portant challenge originates from Iraq.
Though Iran may desire to see the end
of civil war and chaos in Iraq it is true
that a stable, Western-oriented Iraq expanding its economy through ties to
the Arab Middle East will increase the
isolation of Iran. As stated before,
Ankara’s approach to Iran after the war
in Iraq was largely a product of the
negative perceptions regarding the
consequences of American intervention in the Middle East. In other
words, Iran was perceived through
Turkish concerns and nervousness emanating from the strategic relationship
created between the USA and Iraqi
Kurds. However, after the US and Iraqi
officials had agreed on a plan requiring
Washington to withdraw its forces
within three years, possibility of cooperation between Turkey and Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) on the
PKK problem emerged. The withdrawal of US forces will weaken the position
of Iraqi Kurds and eventually leave
them more dependent on the federal
government and neighboring states.
Erdoqan and his Iraqi counterpart,
Nouri al-Maliki, signed a strategic
partnership agreement in 2008 committing Turkey and Iraq to cooperation in the fields of politics, economy,
energy, water, culture and security.
While outlining the formation of the
high-level strategic cooperation council, the agreement also called for respect for each other’s territories. Following this development, a trilateral
committee has been formed in Bagh-
46
47
dad in November 2008 by senior Iraqi,
Turkish and US officials to combat the
PKK. Two representatives from the
KRG in the North of Iraq also attended to this trilateral meeting. The committee is expected to meet every two
months to exchange intelligence and to
coordinate security measures against
the PKK. The northern Iraqi city of
Arbil was selected to become the headquarters of this committee. Turkey,
who has long blamed KRG for supporting the terrorists in the north, welcomed this positive change. However,
the key issue of Kirkuk remained unresolved. Managing Turkish-American
differences over Iraq will not necessarily change the basic parameters of
Turkish approach to Iran but it will affect them in the long run47.
Presently it seems early to predict
how Turkey’s cooperative relationships
with Iran will evolve in the security
field. Since policies are dynamic by nature, they may be redifined and shaped
in accordance with the changing circumstances. Nevertheless it is important to realize that a lot of things depend on how the political conditions
in Iraq will develop. At this point it
seems that the future of Turkish-Iranian relations would be influenced more
by both parties’ policies towards each
other and towards the region than by
Iran’s possession of nuclear capability.
However, since policies are dynamic by
nature, they may be redefined and
shaped in accordance with changing
circumstances.
Gül denies US pressure in energy deal with Iran, in «Reuters Tehran», August 2008.
Arbil to be center of joint committee between Turkey, Iraq and U.S., in «Hürriyet», January 23, 2009.
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internazionale
Le strategie di politica energetica dell’Italia.
Criticità interne e opportunità internazionali
CARLO FRAPPI
è Research Fellow ISPI
e Research Fellow
dell’European Foreign
and Security Policy Studies
Programme.
ARTURO VARVELLI
è Research Fellow ISPI
e autore del volume L’Italia
e l’ascesa di Gheddafi.
Quaderni di
n. 12 Aprile 2010
98
Il ritorno d’attenzione delle politiche pubbliche sulla tutela della sicurezza energetica rappresenta uno dei più
evidenti sviluppi connessi al superamento del sistema bipolare. La marginalizzazione del rischio di confronto
armato tra gli attori della comunità internazionale nell’area euro-atlantica ha
infatti presieduto alla reinterpretazione del concetto di “sicurezza nazionale”, progressivamente allargatosi sino a
ricomprendere ed incentrarsi su minacce di natura economica, ambientale e sociale. Su questo sfondo, un ruolo
di primo piano nel dibattito internazionale è andato dunque assumendo il
concetto di sicurezza energetica inteso
come «a condition in which a nation
and all, or most of its citizens and business have access to sufficient energy
resources at reasonable prices for the
foreseeable future free from serious risk of major disruption of service»1.
L’aumento della domanda di energia, la volatilità dei prezzi delle materie
prime, la crescente concorrenza internazionale per l’accesso alle risorse e il
crescente uso politico della leva energetica sono tutti fattori che hanno determinato il prepotente ritorno della
tematica energetica al centro del dibattito pubblico internazionale e delle iniziative dei più rilevanti meccanismi di
cooperazione dell’area euro-atlantica,
1
così come delle principali cancellerie
europee.
L’Italia, paese fortemente dipendente dalle importazioni di energia, è
in prima linea nella ricerca di nuove
soluzioni per tutelare la sicurezza nazionale. Scopo del saggio è analizzare le
criticità del sistema energetico italiano
e presentare i meccanismi di tutela
predisposti dalle istituzioni e dalle
compagnie nazionali operanti nel settore.
L’energia come questione politica
e di sicurezza
La riscoperta della centralità della
tutela statale della sicurezza energetica
ha seguito una fase in cui – superate le
crisi degli anni Settanta con il ritorno a
condizioni di abbondanza d’offerta di
energia, bassi prezzi e un clima internazionale di relativa tranquillità nelle
maggiori aree di produzione – i paesi
occidentali si erano orientati verso
l’introduzione di meccanismi di mercato e privatizzazioni delle società del
settore nella convinzione che le cause
delle crisi precedenti fossero strutturalmente venute meno e che l’energia
non rappresentasse qualcosa di molto
diverso da ogni altra merce o servizio.
Recentemente è invece emerso il con-
G. BAHGAT, Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities, in «International Affairs», 82, 5, p.
965.
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Le strategie di politica energetica dell’Italia. Criticità interne e opportunità internazionali
cetto di politica della difesa nazionale,
una formula più morbida di patriottismo o protezionismo, che ha progressivamente sostituito la convinzione,
dettata da “ingenuità tecnocratica”, che
la soluzione a questioni di potenza e di
indipendenza potesse essere affidata al
mercato2. Per molti governi europei le
grandi imprese nazionali sono diventate il principale mezzo per contrastare
il potere negoziale dei paesi produttori
extra europei3. L’energia è dunque ridiventata, come per larga parte del secolo scorso, “una questione squisitamente politica”4.
A presiedere alla progressiva sicurizzazione e politicizzazione della questione energetica hanno contribuito
una serie di variabili che attengono
tanto al mercato internazionale degli
idrocarburi, quanto al crescente utilizzo strategico della leva energetica da
parte dei paesi produttori ed esportatori di energia.
Principale tra questi fattori è rappresentato dal progressivo aumento
della domanda internazionale di energia, spinta verso l’alto dalle crescenti
necessità delle economie emergenti.
Secondo le stime dell’Agenzia internazionale dell’energia (Iea), nonostante
la recente crisi economica e il conseguente calo di domanda da parte dei
maggiori importatori, il consumo di
energia mondiale potrebbe crescere
entro il 2030 di quasi il 40%5. Un’elevata quantità addizionale di energia
cui difficilmente si potrà far fronte al
di fuori del ricorso alle fonti “tradizionali” – carbone, petrolio, gas naturale
ed energia nucleare6.
La diversificazione dei canali
di approvvigionamento energetico
è dunque assurta a pietra angolare
delle strategie di tutela
della sicurezza energetica
L’incremento della domanda di
energia e il conseguente maggior grado
di dipendenza dalle importazioni non
rappresentano tuttavia, in sé stessi, fattori di vulnerabilità per la parte acquirente nei confronti dei fornitori. A
mettere a rischio la sicurezza energetica è piuttosto, su questo sfondo, la
mancanza di una rete di approvvigionamento sufficientemente stabile e diversificata che, sola, può garantire un
livello adeguato di risorse a prezzi ragionevoli nel medio e lungo periodo.
La diversificazione dei canali di approvvigionamento energetico è dunque assurta a pietra angolare delle strategie di tutela della sicurezza energetica, modificando i parametri sui quali
J.P. FITOUSSI, L’Europa e la sfida dell’energia, in «La Repubblica», 7 novembre 2006.
In linea con questa tendenza, nel 2002 una sentenza della Corte di giustizia europea ha ribadito che la sicurezza energetica costituisce un «legittimo interesse pubblico» che consente ai governi di conservare
«una certa influenza sulle imprese inizialmente pubbliche e successivamente privatizzate, qualora tali imprese operino nei settori di interesse generale o strategico». Sentenza del 4 giugno 2002, n. 61999J0483,
Commissione delle Comunità europee contro Repubblica francese.
4
A. CLÒ, Il rebus energetico, Bologna 2008, p. 169.
5
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, OECD/IEA, Paris 2009, p. 42.
6
Rapporto 2020. Le scelte di politica estera, Gruppo di Riflessione Strategica, Ministero Affari Esteri, marzo 2008. Nonostante l’aumento previsto nell’utilizzo delle energie alternative, il loro impatto percentuale sui consumi totali, allo stato attuale delle conoscenze tecnologiche, rimarrà verosimilmente marginale. Se anche le fonti rinnovabili – in particolare l’eolico e il solare – dovessero crescere a tassi elevati nei
prossimi quindici anni, esse costituirebbero ancora solo una piccola parte dell’offerta di energia.
2
3
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internazionale
esse si erano andate fondando nella fase successiva al superamento della crisi
energetica degli anni Settanta. Il perseguimento della sicurezza energetica si è
progressivamente spostato da una prospettiva eminentemente interna e tecnico-normativa, basata sulla regolamentazione e razionalizzazione della
domanda, a una dimensione esterna
che attiene principalmente ai rapporti
del soggetto acquirente con i fornitori,
in funzione dell’assicurazione di un
adeguato accesso alle risorse.
Uno stimolo decisivo verso il concetto di tutela “dall’esterno” della sicurezza energetica, progressivamente inquadrata in un’ottica “geopolitica”, è
giunto dall’evoluzione del dibattito in
seno all’Unione europea e, in particolare, dal ruolo propulsore svolto dalla
Commissione a partire dalla pubblicazione del Libro Verde sull’energia nel
novembre 20007. La questione energetica è difatti assurta a priorità d’azione
della Ue, che rappresenta il secondo
consumatore e il primo importatore di
energia su scala mondiale e il cui sistema di approvvigionamento presenta
rilevanti elementi di criticità8.
Commissione europea, Libro Verde, Verso una strategia europea di sicurezza dell’approvvigionamento energetico, [COM(2000) 769], Lussemburgo, 2001.
8
Le importazioni di energia coprono, secondo la Commissione europea, il 50% del consumo interno all’Unione. Entro il 2030, tale percentuale sarebbe destinata a innalzarsi fino al 65% con un conseguente
aumento del peso delle importazioni sui consumi dall’82% al 93% per il petrolio e dal 57% all’84% per
il gas. Commissione europea, An Energy Policy for Europe, Comunicazione della Commissione al Consiglio europeo e al Parlamento europeo, [COM(2007) 1 final], Bruxelles, 10 gennaio 2007, p. 3.
˜
I giacimenti norvegesi, principale fonte interna di approvvigionamento europeo, sarebbero infatti destinati a esaurirsi, all’attuale ritmo di sfruttamento, nel giro di 10 anni in relazione al petrolio e di 23 al gas.
D’altro canto, l’utilizzo alternativo di fonti rinnovabili di energia – ambiziosamente fissato dal Consiglio
europeo al 20% del totale dei consumi energetici per il 2020 – resta un obiettivo costoso in termini economici e, in ogni caso, non sufficiente a eliminare i rischi connessi alla dipendenza dall’importazione di
petrolio e gas. Cfr. Commissione europea, Libro Verde, 2001, cit., p. 19. Le stime non tengono tuttavia in
considerazione le possibili riserve nel Mare di Barents; Consiglio dell’Unione europea, Consiglio europeo
di Bruxelles, 8-9 marzo 2007, Conclusioni della Presidenza, [7224/1/07 Rev.1], Bruxelles, 2 maggio 2007.
Si veda inoltre: Commissione europea, 20 20 by 2020 – Europe’s climate change opportunity, Comunicazione della Commissione al Parlamento europeo, al Consiglio, al Comitato economico e sociale europeo e al Comitato delle regioni, [COM(2008) 30 final], Bruxelles, 23 gennaio 2008.
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Nel corso degli ultimi decenni, il
gas naturale ha guadagnato una posizione di crescente importanza nei bilanci energetici nazionali dei paesi dell’area euro-atlantica, in ragione della
sua maggiore duttilità, economicità e
minore impatto ambientale – legato ad
un livello di emissioni inquinanti inferiore rispetto a quello generato dalla
combustione degli altri idrocarburi. La
progressiva riconversione dei mix
energetici nazionali a favore del gas
impone tuttavia un livello di attenzione e programmazione strategica più
elevato rispetto ad altre fonti, per caratteristiche tecniche e di mercato della risorsa. I vantaggi economici e ambientali legati all’utilizzo di gas naturale vanno anzitutto bilanciati con la sua
minore “commerciabilità” rispetto al
petrolio. A differenza di quest’ultimo,
che può essere trasportato via terra o
via mare, il gas necessita di un processo di intubazione che, per definizione,
richiede programmazione tecnica e disponibilità all’investimento della parte
acquirente. Scelte programmatiche di
lungo periodo, quest’ultime, necessarie
anche in relazione alla trasformazione
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del gas in Gas Naturale Liquefatto
(Gnl) che ne consente il trasporto senza intubazione. Il processo di trasformazione richiede infatti la costruzione
di degassificatori per il congelamento
della risorsa nei paesi produttori, così
come la disponibilità di rigassificatori
nei paesi consumatori o, in alternativa,
in quelli in possesso di gasdotti funzionanti. Il mercato del gas è, inoltre, meno trasparente di quello del petrolio.
Non esistendo una quotazione internazionale o un cartello di paesi produttori, esso è caratterizzato da rapporti prevalentemente bilaterali e da
accordi di medio e lungo periodo. Anche in ragione della maggior concentrazione dei giacimenti di gas9, ciò garantisce ai paesi produttori o esportatori di metano un maggior potere negoziale che sempre più spesso si tramuta in strumento di pressione politica, contribuendo in maniera decisiva
ad evidenziare le criticità nello schema
di approvvigionamento di gas e, di
conseguenza, alla sicurizzazione della
questione energetica10.
L’Italia e la sicurezza energetica
La crescente attenzione sulla tutela
della sicurezza energetica, progressivamente intesa in termini geopolitici e
nella sua dimensione esterna, è un fenomeno che riguarda direttamente anche l’Italia, paese povero di materie
prime e tradizionalmente dipendente
dalle importazioni nel quale la questione energetica, come già negli anni
Settanta, è tornata al centro del dibattito pubblico e nell’agenda politica dei
principali partiti italiani.
L’Italia importa oggi, al netto delle
esportazioni e della variazione delle
scorte, oltre l’84% del proprio fabbisogno energetico11, collocandosi agli ultimi posti in Europa nella scala dell’autosufficienza energetica. Accanto alla
profonda dipendenza da fonti di approvvigionamento esterno – che, in
mancanza di misure correttive, potrebbe raggiungere il 95% nel 202012 – due
ulteriori elementi contribuiscono a determinare le criticità strutturali del settore energetico italiano. Da un lato vi è
l’elevata incidenza sui consumi del trasporto su strada e, dall’altro, il peculia-
Nonostante le riserve di gas naturale siano ancora abbondanti – il loro indice di vita residua è superiore
ai 60 anni, un quarto di secolo in più rispetto al petrolio – esse sono piuttosto concentrate. Tre soli paesi – la Russia, l’Iran e il Qatar – ne controllano oltre il 55%. Quasi l’80% del gas producibile nei prossimi decenni si trova in Russia e nelle ex-Repubbliche sovietiche, in Medio Oriente, nell’Africa settentrionale e in Nigeria.
10
La “muscolare” politica energetica della Federazione russa – principale fornitore di gas dell’Europa – offre l’esempio più evidente di questa tendenza. Sottolineando il forte e crescente legame tra la strategia
energetica e i più ampi obiettivi di politica estera della Federazione russa, l’Economist si è spinto sino al
punto di rimarcare come Mosca attribuisca oggi al proprio potenziale energetico nazionale quella stessa valenza rivestita, in epoca di contrapposizione bipolare, dal suo apparato militare. In «The Economist», April, 12, 2007.
11
Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico - Dipartimento per l’energia, Bilancio Energetico Nazionale 2008,
Statistiche ed analisi energetiche e minerarie, http://dgerm.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/dgerm/ben/
ben_2008_.pdf (ultimo accesso, 20 gennaio 2010).
12
C. SCAJOLA, Atti del convegno: La politica europea dell’energia: il problema delle reti, Consiglio nazionale
dell’economia e del lavoro, Documenti, 10, 19 novembre 2008, p. 14.
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internazionale
re mix di combustibili utilizzato per la
generazione elettrica, caratterizzato
dall’impiego prevalente del gas naturale, dalla totale assenza del nucleare, dal
modesto ricorso al carbone e da una
quota di rinnovabili in flessione. Il preponderante uso del gas rende l’Italia il
paese che impiega oggi la risorsa, in
proporzione, in quantità maggiore rispetto a tutti gli altri paesi europei, aggravando il problema della sicurezza
degli approvvigionamenti e, come più
volte sottolineato dall’Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas13, contribuendo
a spingere verso l’alto i prezzi dell’elettricità e del gas.
L’Italia importa oggi oltre l’84%
del proprio fabbisogno energetico
Il maggior utilizzo di gas per la generazione elettrica è stato principalmente frutto, nel nostro paese, dell’avvio del processo di liberalizzazione del
settore elettrico14. Questo ha infatti generato crescenti investimenti nelle centrali a ciclo combinato gas-vapore che,
a fronte di costi di gestione contenuti,
garantiscono agli operatori una maggior efficienza, con un consumo minore di combustibile a parità di energia
prodotta. Per questa via, il gas ha progressivamente sostituto l’olio combustibile, largamente utilizzato nel siste-
Si veda, ad esempio, Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas, Piano Strategico Triennale 2009-2011, gennaio 2009, pp. 7-8.
14
La questione energetica, Dossier Farnesina, Supplemento del n. 46 di «èItalia», Milano, luglio-agosto
2007, p. 11.
15
Nel 2008, l’utilizzo di gas per finalità civili e domestiche ha rappresentato il 35% del consumo totale interno. Ministero dello Sviluppo economico - Dipartimento per l’energia, Bilancio Energetico Nazionale
2008, Statistiche ed analisi energetiche e minerarie, cit.
16
International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Information, OECD/IEA, Paris 2009, p. IV.195.
17
Ministero dello Sviluppo economico - Dipartimento per l’energia, Bilancio Energetico Nazionale 2008, cit.
18
Ministero dello Sviluppo economico - Dipartimento per l’energia, Importazioni Gas Mensili per paese di
origine 2002-2008, Statistiche ed analisi energetiche e minerarie, http://dgerm.sviluppoeconomico.
gov.it/dgerm/importazioni/gas/ImportazioniGasMensiliPerPaeseDiOrigine_2002-2008.xls (ultimo accesso 20 gennaio 2010).
13
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ma produttivo italiano a seguito del referendum abrogativo sul nucleare del
novembre 1987. A determinare l’elevato consumo di gas in Italia è inoltre l’estensiva incidenza dell’utilizzo dello
stesso per consumo civile e domestico15.
Il progressivo sbilanciamento del
mix energetico nazionale verso l’utilizzo del gas ha portato la risorsa ad ammontare, nel 2008, a una quota dei
consumi nazionali pari al 39,8%, a
fronte del 26,5% coperto nel 1990 – un
incremento medio annuo di 5 punti
percentuali a fronte di una diminuzione della produzione media annua superiore al 3%. A far fronte alla maggior
domanda di gas è stato dunque l’aumento delle importazioni, che pesano
oggi per il 90% circa dei consumi contro il 52% del 199016.
Sebbene il livello di importazioni di
petrolio presenti valori percentuali
analoghi – pari al 92% sul totale dei
consumi17 – la maggior concentrazione
e la minore commerciabilità delle risorse di gas rendono il loro approvvigionamento dall’esterno una minaccia
più temibile per la sicurezza energetica
nazionale. Nel 2008, i due maggiori
fornitori di gas dell’Italia – Algeria e
Russia – hanno infatti pesato per il
64% sul totale delle importazioni18.
Una simile concentrazione non si ri-
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scontra invece nel settore petrolifero
dove, ad eccezione della Libia che fornisce circa un terzo degli approvvigionamenti dall’estero, la fornitura risulta
maggiormente diversificata19.
Nella nuova congiuntura internazionale, caratterizzata dalla volatilità
dei prezzi degli idrocarburi, da una
crescente concorrenza nell’approvvigionamento di oro azzurro e da una
progressiva sicurizzazione della questione energetica, la “scommessa sul
gas” effettuata dall’Italia rischia dunque di tramutarsi da vantaggio competitivo a punto di debolezza economico
e politico per il sistema paese. Su questo sfondo, un più razionale bilanciamento del mix energetico nazionale è
divenuto uno dei principali punti programmatici rivolti alla riduzione della
dipendenza energetica italiana. La necessità di diversificazione delle fonti
energetiche è così assurta a priorità
dell’azione del governo nel quadro della progressiva formulazione di una
“Strategia energetica nazionale” intesa
quale strumento di indirizzo e programmazione a carattere generale della politica energetica nazionale20.
Accanto alla necessità di promuovere l’efficienza energetica attraverso la
razionalizzazione dei consumi, due sono i punti cardine emersi in occasione
delle audizioni del ministro Scajola
presso le Commissioni riunite X Camera e 10° Senato: sostegno della produzione di energia elettrica da fonti
rinnovabili e rilancio della produzione
di energia nucleare. Il primo dei due
obiettivi, coerente con il pacchetto legislativo “clima-energia” adottato dall’Unione europea, risulta tuttavia di
difficile applicazione nella misura in
cui gli squilibri sistemici del settore
energetico italiano rendono problematico e oneroso il rispetto dei vincoli europei. Si stima infatti che l’attuazione
in Italia del pacchetto possa comportare oneri aggiuntivi compresi tra i 15 e
i 20 miliardi di euro annui fino al
2020, per un totale di almeno 180 miliardi di euro21. D’altra parte, il ritorno
al nucleare rappresenta una decisione
controversa tanto in relazione al sostegno politico quanto alle reazioni dell’opinione pubblica.
Il ritorno al nucleare rappresenta
una decisione controversa tanto
in relazione al sostegno politico
quanto alle reazioni dell’opinione
pubblica
Indipendentemente dal reale impatto che potranno avere nel medio e
lungo periodo le misure rivolte al bilanciamento del mix energetico, un’efficace strategia di tutela della sicurezza
energetica nazionale non può che avere un naturale complemento nella sua
tutela “dall’esterno”, tanto più in relazione al delicato settore del gas. In questa prospettiva – e coerentemente con
le indicazioni fornite dall’Autorità per
l’energia elettrica e il gas22 – si collocano tanto la “Strategia energetica nazio-
Ministero dello Sviluppo economico - Dipartimento per l’energia, Bollettino Petrolifero 2008 - Trimestre
4, Statistiche ed analisi energetiche e minerarie, http://dgerm.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/ dgerm/ bollettino/indice.asp?anno=2008&trimestre=4 (ultimo accesso 20 gennaio 2010).
20
Il compito di definire una “Strategia energetica nazionale” è stato affidato al governo attraverso il decreto legge 112/2008, convertito dalla Legge n. 133, 6 agosto 2008, pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n.
195, 21 agosto 2008.
21
C. SCAJOLA, Atti del convegno: La politica europea dell’energia: il problema delle reti, cit.
19
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internazionale
nale” quanto le richiamate priorità d’azione del governo enunciate al Parlamento dal ministro Scajola, indicando
la necessità per l’Italia di diversificare
le aree di approvvigionamento energetico, di sviluppare i collegamenti esterni all’Ue e, infine, di predisporre terminali di rigassificazione in grado di
consentire un approvvigionamento indipendente e diversificato.
L’evoluzione delle strategie
di tutela dall’esterno
della sicurezza energetica italiana
La necessità di tutelare la sicurezza
energetica del paese attraverso i due
collegati strumenti della diversificazione delle fonti e delle aree di approvvigionamento non rappresenta una novità per l’Italia. Già nella fase successiva al secondo dopoguerra, infatti, la
mancanza di giacimenti di petrolio e
carbone sul suolo nazionale sfavoriva il
sistema paese rispetto ai produttori europei, traducendosi in un pesante limite per il suo coerente sviluppo economico.
A partire dagli anni Cinquanta, tale
svantaggio fu compensato anzitutto
dall’interno, attraverso la scoperta nel
sottosuolo italiano di rilevanti riserve
di gas naturale che, estratte e trasportate verso le industrie del nord Italia,
contribuirono in maniera determinante a quella fase di sviluppo economico
che prese il nome di “miracolo italiano” consentendo, d’altra parte, lo sviluppo di un know-how tecnico che si
22
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sarebbe rivelato fondamentale in fasi
storiche successive. Furono tuttavia le
strategie di tutela “dall’esterno” della
sicurezza energetica italiana che consentirono al paese di supplire alle proprie carenze strutturali, entrando a
pieno titolo tra i principali protagonisti della politica energetica internazionale.
Su iniziativa dell’Eni guidata da Enrico Mattei, l’Italia riuscì infatti a propugnare una politica “nuova” rispetto
a quella praticata dagli altri paesi importatori di petrolio, basata su una più
profonda cooperazione con i paesi
produttori. Capitalizzando la propria
posizione geografica nel cuore del Mediterraneo allo sbocco del canale di
Suez, l’Italia poté così divenire un trasformatore e un esportatore di prodotti petroliferi come la benzina e il gasolio. L’attività delle raffinerie italiane
permise, da un lato, la produzione dell’olio combustibile necessario a un
paese privo di carbone e, dall’altro, l’esportazione della benzina e del gasolio
non assorbiti dal sistema italiano. Si
determinò così una corrente di esportazione che riduceva il costo di importazione del petrolio greggio. Questa
posizione politica di cooperazione con
i paesi produttori, che ebbe inizio con
il periodo storicamente e concettualmente delineato come “neo-atlantismo”, permise dunque all’Italia di assumere una rilevante posizione di cerniera tra l’Occidente e il mondo arabo,
principale produttore di idrocarburi.
Gli effetti benefici della cooperazione rafforzata con i paesi produttori
Sottolinea l’Aeeg: «Per far fronte in modo strutturale alle carenze del settore del gas appaiono sempre
necessari interventi finalizzati al perseguimento di tre condizioni: una capacità di stoccaggio che ecceda adeguatamente la domanda specifica; una rete di trasporto maggiormente capace; un deciso potenziamento delle infrastrutture per l’importazione (gasdotti e rigassificatori, questi anche per favorire la
diversificazione degli approvvigionamenti)». Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas, Piano Strategico Triennale 2009-2011, cit., p. 8.
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nell’ottica della compartecipazione andarono scemando solo nel corso degli
anni Settanta23. Ciò nonostante, i benefici di lungo periodo della politica
energetica italiana degli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta continuarono ad assicurare importanti vantaggi per il sistema
paese e sono evidenti ancor oggi. Anche a fronte della rinnovata disponibilità di risorse energetiche tra la seconda metà degli anni Ottanta e i Novanta, l’Italia è stata infatti capace di mantenere ed approfondire i rapporti con i
paesi produttori dell’area mediterranea – come Libia e Algeria – con la
Russia e con l’Iran. Su questo sfondo
inoltre, dopo le crisi petrolifere degli
anni Settanta e con una maggiore attenzione verso fonti di minor impatto
ambientale, l’Italia ha continuato a sviluppare la propria “specializzazione”
nel settore del gas naturale, importandolo da zone anche molto lontane e
svolgendo un’azione pionieristica nella
costruzione dei grandi metanodotti internazionali24.
Oggi che, come già accennato, le
condizioni internazionali relative all’approvvigionamento energetico impongono rapporti paritari di reciproco
interesse tra produttori e consumatori,
la politica estera ritorna a essere uno
strumento sempre più rilevante delle
politiche energetiche. La capacità di instaurare relazioni internazionali, non
solo di tipo economico, ma anche po-
litico, e principalmente di lungo termine perché sempre più ciò è richiesto
dalla complessità degli investimenti
nel settore del gas, si riflette direttamente sulla sicurezza energetica nazionale. La relazione privilegiata con i
paesi produttori sopracitati torna dunque a rappresentare il principale punto
di forza delle strategie di tutela dall’esterno della sicurezza energetica nazionale.
La proiezione internazionale
verso est: la Russia e l’area
del Caspio
Il rilancio della proiezione internazionale delle compagnie italiane, e in
particolar modo di Eni, è stata principalmente frutto del decreto sull’apertura del mercato interno del gas25 che,
limitando le possibilità di crescita in
Italia, ha spinto più risolutamente le
maggiori compagnie energetiche nazionali verso una strategia di crescita
all’estero. Si è così determinato un circolo virtuoso tra l’esigenza di rafforzare la tutela della sicurezza energetica
italiana dall’esterno e le strategie di investimento del capitale italiano.
Una relazione di crescente importanza nel quadro delle strategie di diversificazione delle aree di approvvigionamento energetico italiano è quella che lega le compagnie italiane, e in
Le cause principali del mancato approfondimento di questa collaborazione furono, da un lato, il forte
aumento dei prezzi che pose dei limiti alla possibilità di manovra e, dall’altro, l’antagonismo tra paesi
esportatori ed importatori generato anche dal tentativo di creazione, su iniziativa statunitense, di un
blocco dei paesi consumatori. Per una analisi storica di quel periodo si veda D. YERGIN, Il premio. L’epica storia della corsa al petrolio, Milano 1991.
24
È il caso, per esempio, del gasdotto Transmed, che collega Italia e Algeria, costruito fra il 1978 e il 1983
a seguito della conclusione di un contratto di venticinque anni tra l’Eni e l’algerina Sonatrach. C.A.
BOLLINO, Il caso Mattei e l’evoluzione energetica del paese, in «Energia Gas Book», 2004, pp. 9-15.
25
Decreto Legislativo 23 maggio 2000, n. 164, pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale - Serie generale n. 142,
20 giugno 2000.
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internazionale
particolare Eni, alla Russia e ai produttori dell’area del Caspio – dove risiedono le più ingenti riserve di gas dell’area
eurasiatica26.
Pietra miliare del rilancio dell’allora trentennale relazione tra Eni e Gazprom, campione russo dell’energia e
primo produttore di gas su scala mondiale, è stato l’accordo per la costruzione del metanodotto “Blue Stream” per
l’esportazione di gas dalla Russia alla
Turchia. Nel febbraio 1999, Saipem,
sussidiaria Eni, si assicurava il contratto per la avveniristica costruzione del
tratto sottomarino del gasdotto che,
inaugurato ufficialmente nel 2005, trasporterà a pieno regime 16 miliardi di
metri cubi annui (mmc/a) di gas – 8
dei quali destinati a Eni.
La partnership tra Eni e Gazprom
è andata progressivamente
rafforzandosi sino a divenire oggi
uno dei più rilevanti fattori
nel panorama della cooperazione
energetica europea
Da allora la partnership tra Eni e
Gazprom è andata progressivamente
rafforzandosi sino a divenire oggi uno
dei più rilevanti fattori nel panorama
Oltre alla richiamata significatività delle riserve russe e iraniane, Azerbaigian, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan e Uzbekistan posseggono, congiuntamente, riserve provate di gas pari a 12,5 trilioni di metri cubi e di petrolio pari a 47 miliardi di barili – rispettivamente il 7% e il 4% circa delle riserve mondiali.
British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, giugno 2009, pp. 6 e 22. Stando all’Iea, le quattro repubbliche potrebbero incrementare la produzione di gas dai 175 mmc/a del 2007 fino a 306
mmc/a entro il 2030. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, 2009, cit., p. 471.
27
Eni, Eni: piano strategico e obiettivi 2006-2009, Comunicato stampa, 1 marzo 2006.
28
Eni, Eni e Gazprom firmano accordo strategico, Comunicato stampa, 14 novembre 2006.
29
Eni, Eni annuncia l’acquisizione di asset Yukos per 5,83 miliardi di dollari. Primo grande passo nell’upstream russo, Comunicato stampa, 4 aprile 2007. Nel maggio 2009, Gazprom ha acquisito il 51% del
consorzio EniNeftegaz – rinominato SeverEnergia – con una conseguente riduzione delle quote di Eni
ed Enel al 29,4% e 19,6%.
30
In questo senso va letto l’accordo sottoscritto nel luglio 2008 da Eni attraverso la controllata Eni Energhia, con il quale la compagnia italiana diventava il primo attore internazionale ad acquisire contratti di acquisto e vendita di gas nel mercato russo. Eni, Eni firma contratti per la vendita di gas in Russia e
diventa il primo player europeo a operare nel downstream del Paese, Comunicato stampa, 8 luglio 2008.
2&
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della cooperazione energetica europea.
Nel novembre 2006, le due compagnie
sottoscrivevano una “alleanza strategica” di fondamentale importanza per il
tentativo della compagnia italiana di
rafforzare la propria leadership nel
mercato europeo del gas, in linea con
gli ambiziosi obiettivi sanciti dal piano
strategico 2006-200927. Significativamente, l’accordo apriva la strada alla
cooperazione tecnologica e alla realizzazione congiunta di progetti nell’intera filiera del gas, garantendo a Eni l’ingresso nell’upstream, midstream e
downstream russo ed europeo28. Su
questa base, nell’aprile 2007, il consorzio EniNeftegaz – partecipato al 60%
da Eni e al 40% da Enel – acquisiva tre
società energetiche liquidate dalla
compagnia russa Yukos, titolari dei diritti di sfruttamento di rilevanti giacimenti di gas siberiani29. L’ingresso di
Eni ed Enel nell’upstream russo segnalava il progressivo rafforzamento del
potenziale esplorativo e produttivo
delle compagnie italiane così come la
capacità di ampliare la prospettiva di
approvvigionamento di gas all’Italia,
rafforzando le relazioni in campo
energetico con la Russia in condizioni
di reciprocità30.
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L’asse portante della collaborazione
energetica italo-russa e, per esteso, della tutela dall’esterno della sicurezza
energetica nazionale, è rappresentato
dal progetto South Stream. Il gasdotto
– frutto di un accordo siglato nel giugno 2007 da Eni e Gazprom alla presenza dell’allora ministro dello Sviluppo economico Bersani e dal ministro
russo dell’Industria ed energia Khristenko – è deputato a collegare i terminali russi di Beregovaya con l’Europa
centro-meridionale attraverso un tratto offshore nel Mar Nero fino alle coste
bulgare e onshore lungo una rotta ancora in fase di studio31. L’iniziale previsione di capacità del South Stream, fissata a 31 mmc/a, è stata aumentata sino a 63 mmc/a a seguito dell’accordo
raggiunto, nel maggio scorso, dai vertici delle due compagnie, alla presenza
dei premier russo e italiano, Putin e
Berlusconi32. Il notevole aumento di
capacità del gasdotto – sulla base del
quale Eni si assicurerà un supplemento
di 12 mmc/a che potrà gestire discrezionalmente – testimonia la profonda
significatività attribuita al progetto,
passibile di rappresentare un efficace
strumento di approvvigionamento di
gas non solo per l’Italia, ma per l’intera Ue.
Lungi dall’essere limitata alla sola
relazione con la Russia, la proiezione
di Eni nell’area comprende investimenti nei maggiori paesi produttori
del Caspio e, in particolare, in Kazaki-
stan. Qui, la compagnia italiana ha assunto un ruolo di primo piano nei
consorzi internazionali per lo sfruttamento di due ingenti giacimenti di
idrocarburi nelle aree di Karachaganak e Kashagan. Nonostante le lunghe
polemiche seguite ai ritardi nello sviluppo dei giacimenti di Kashagan –
che hanno comportato la cessione da
parte di Eni di una quota dell’8,4% del
consorzio per lo sfruttamento degli
idrocarburi alla società petrolifera
pubblica kazaka KazMunaiGaz e la
conseguente perdita del ruolo di capofila unico dello stesso33 – la compagnia
italiana ha di recente confermato il
ruolo di principale partner internazionale del paese nel settore energetico.
Lo scorso novembre, in occasione della visita in Italia del presidente kazako
Nazarbayev e alla presenza del presidente del consiglio Berlusconi, Eni e
KazMunaiGaz hanno siglato infatti un
accordo di cooperazione di ampio respiro per lo sviluppo di attività di
esplorazione, produzione e sviluppo
infrastrutturale in Kazakistan. Un accordo di «matteiana memoria» secondo l’amministratore delegato di Eni
Scaroni, in base al quale le due compagnie condurranno studi di esplorazione nel Mar Caspio, di ottimizzazione
dell’utilizzo del gas nel paese e di valutazione di iniziative industriali – tra le
quali un impianto di trattamento del
gas e uno di generazione elettrica a
gas34.
Per il tratto onshore del South Stream sono allo studio due possibili diramazioni complementari: una
verso nord-ovest attraverso Serbia, Ungheria e Austria, l’altra verso sud-ovest sino all’Italia attraverso
Grecia e Mar Adriatico. In questo contesto, il sostegno assicurato dai governi russo e italiano nella fase
di negoziato sul transito del gasdotto segnala, una volta di più, l’elevata valenza strategica attribuita dai
due paesi al progetto.
32
Eni, Nuova intesa Eni - Gazprom, Comunicato stampa, 15 maggio 2009.
33
Eni, Eni perde la leadership per il giacimento di Kashagan, in «Il Sole 24 Ore», 14 gennaio 2008.
34
Eni, Eni firma accordo di cooperazione con la compagnia petrolifera di stato kazaka KazMunayGas, Comunicato stampa, 5 novembre 2009.
31
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internazionale
Dello stesso tenore, anche i recenti
accordi conclusi dall’Eni con l’Agenzia
di stato per gli idrocarburi del Turkmenistan – paese che ospita i più ingenti giacimenti di gas dell’area caspica. In novembre, innanzi alle massime
autorità italiane e turkmene, i due
partner hanno siglato un accordo per
la valorizzazione del potenziale energetico del Turkmenistan con il quale
Eni ha messo a disposizione il proprio
know how in termini tecnologici, operativi e di sviluppo sostenibile oltre a
impegnarsi a definire un intensivo piano di formazione per il personale locale35.
Eni non è tuttavia la sola compagnia italiana ad aver investito nello
sviluppo di un corridoio energetico
dall’area del Caspio. Diversificazione
delle aree di approvvigionamento e diversificazione dei fornitori di energia
sono gli imperativi che hanno guidato
infatti la proiezione internazionale di
Edison. Progetto portante della strategia della compagnia energetica è l’Interconnettore Turchia-Grecia-Italia
(Itgi), frutto dell’accordo intergovernativo siglato nel luglio 2007 dai ministri competenti dei tre paesi coinvolti36. Il metanodotto consentirà l’importazione di circa 10 mmc/a dall’area
del Caspio – presumibilmente dall’A-
108
L’importanza del gasdotto Itgi
per la più ampia sicurezza
energetica europea è testimoniata
dal sostegno che l’Ue ha garantito
al progetto
L’importanza del gasdotto Itgi per
la più ampia sicurezza energetica europea è testimoniata dal sostegno che
l’Ue ha garantito al progetto, assicurandogli l’etichetta di “progetto di interesse europeo” nel quadro dell’asse
prioritario del gas “Paesi del Mar Caspio – Medio Oriente – Unione europea”38, e avanzando una proposta di finanziamento di 100 milioni di Euro at-
Eni, Eni firma accordo di collaborazione con la Repubblica del Turkmenistan, Comunicato stampa, 25 novembre 2009.
36
Edison, Accordo intergovernativo per lo sviluppo del corridoio di transito del gas Turchia-Grecia-Italia, Comunicato stampa, 26 luglio 2007.
37
Benché la peculiare collocazione geografica della Turchia consenta un sistema di approvvigionamento
multiplo di gas per l’Itgi, obiettivo dei suoi promotori è quello di assicurarsi il gas destinato a essere estratto nella seconda fase di sviluppo del giacimento azero di Shah Deniz – passibile di produrre fino a
16 mmc/a dopo il 2015 – in linea con il protocollo d’intesa firmato dal ministro Bersani e dal suo omologo azero nel dicembre 2007.
38
Decisione n. 1364/2006/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 6 settembre 2006 , che stabilisce orientamenti per le reti transeuropee nel settore dell'energia e abroga la decisione 96/391/CE e la decisione n.
1229/2003/CE, Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea, L. 262 del 22/09/2006, p. 10.
35
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n. 12 Aprile 2010
zerbaigian37 – attraverso gli interconnettori Turchia-Grecia (Itg) e GreciaItalia (Igi). Il primo di essi è stato
completato nel settembre 2007, mentre il secondo sarà costituito da un
tratto onshore, da realizzare in territorio greco a opera della Desfa, e da uno
offshore sino alle coste pugliesi che
sarà costruito da Edison e Depa, tramite la joint venture paritetica Poseidon. L’entrata in funzione del metanodotto è prevista per il 2015 e, in base
agli accordi tra le due società, l’80%
della capacità di trasporto dell’Igi sarà
riservata a Edison, mentre il restante
20% sarà destinato a Depa.
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traverso l’European Energy Programme for Recovery39.
In linea con la “Strategia energetica
nazionale” del governo, Edison ha
inoltre investito nella costruzione di
impianti di rigassificazione del Gnl
che, come sottolineato, permettono
maggiore flessibilità nell’approvvigionamento energetico e la possibilità di
acquisto di oro azzurro anche da aree
logisticamente non collegabili via terra. È questo il caso del Qatar – terzo
paese al mondo per riserve di gas – con
il quale Edison firmava nel 2001 un
primo accordo per la fornitura di gas
naturale liquefatto40. In questa prospettiva la compagnia italiana ha propugnato e partecipato alla costruzione del
terminale “Gnl Adriatico” al largo di
Porto Levante che, inaugurato nell’ottobre 2009, consentirà l’importazione
di 8 mmc/a, – circa un decimo del fabbisogno nazionale – l’80% dei quali saranno riservati a Edison per un periodo di 25 anni.
L’impegno e l’investimento di Edison nella realizzazione della struttura
off-shore rivestono un notevole rilievo
nella misura in cui la dotazione di impianti di rigassificazione potrebbe permettere al nostro paese, una volta di
più, di capitalizzare la propria strategica posizione geografica, attivando un
flusso di importazione di gas in grado
di eccedere la domanda interna e di generare un conseguente flusso di esportazione.
La proiezione internazionale
verso sud: l’area
del Mediterraneo e dell’Africa
La rilevanza energetica dell’area
mediterranea appare evidente tanto
per l’Italia, che ha in Algeria e Libia i
principali fornitori rispettivamente di
gas e petrolio, quanto per l’Europa, che
importa il 45% del petrolio dal Nord
Africa e dal Medio Oriente. Inoltre, la
quota delle importazioni europee di
petrolio e gas libico e algerino potrebbe in futuro aumentare, non solo per
l’incremento dei consumi europei, ma
anche alla luce del fatto che Egitto e Siria diverranno molto presto importatori netti di petrolio e, nel caso siriano,
anche di gas. Le riserve di Algeria e Libia sono virtualmente in grado di
compensare senza difficoltà la scomparsa di questi due paesi dall’elenco
degli esportatori, ma per effettuare valutazioni realistiche occorre tenere in
debito conto le possibilità offerte dalla
logistica, cioè dalle infrastrutture destinate al trasporto e alla distribuzione
di petrolio e gas, e dai progetti di potenziamento di tali infrastrutture che
sono attualmente in fase di studio o di
realizzazione41.
Il gas algerino raggiunge l’Italia tramite il gasdotto Enrico Mattei (già
Transmed), che attraversa la Tunisia e
il Canale di Sicilia. Il gas libico giunge
invece in Sicilia tramite il Green
Stream. Inoltre diverrà presto operati-
Commissione europea, Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a programme to aid economic recovery by granting Community financial assistance to projects in the field of energy, in Call for proposals to aid economic recovery by granting Community financial assistance to projects
in the field of energy, All. A, p. 18, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/grants/docs/eepr/eepr_call_for_ proposals_annex1.pdf (ultimo accesso 20 gennaio 2010).
40
Edison, Edison firma contratto con Rasgas per importare dal Qatar 4,6 miliardi di metri cubi all’anno di
Gnl, Comunicato stampa, 26 giugno 2001.
41
Sulla questione si veda Mediterranean Energy Perspectives 2008, Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie, pp. 171-182.
39
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internazionale
vo un nuovo gasdotto, il Galsi, ultimo
risultato della storica collaborazione
tra Eni e Sonatrach, che porterà il gas
algerino in Italia attraverso la Sardegna. Il gasdotto Galsi rinnoverà la capacità italiana di importazione di gas
dall’Algeria e si svilupperà complessivamente per circa 900 chilometri, di
cui 600 offshore, con una capacità di
trasporto iniziale pari a 8 mmc/a.
La rilevanza dell’Algeria, proprio a
cominciare dall’accordo per la costruzione del gasdotto firmato nel 2007 tra
il governo algerino e il governo italiano
guidato allora da Romano Prodi, è
emersa anche da più recenti sviluppi
cha fanno pensare a importanti passaggi di consolidamento delle relazioni
con il partner nord-africano, ponendo
in essere le condizioni di una sicurezza
energetica di lungo periodo. È del 17
gennaio 2010, ad esempio, la firma di
un contratto di esplorazione e sfruttamento del campo di gas “South-East
Illizi”, in Algeria sudorientale, che vedrà la partecipazione di Enel a un consorzio che comprenderà le algerine Alnaft e Sonatrach, la spagnola Repsol e
la franco-belga Gdf-Suez. Questo contratto segna l’ingresso di Enel nel settore dell’esplorazione e produzione algerina con l’obiettivo di consolidare la
partnership strategica con il paese. Il
gruppo Enel è infatti uno dei più importanti clienti finali del mercato algerino, con una quota del 15% sul totale
delle sue esportazioni, ed è un partner
di primo piano di Sonatrach42.
Sempre in Algeria nel giugno 2009
l’Eni, attraverso la Saipem, ha acquisi-
Enel, Enel firma un contratto di esplorazione e sfruttamento di un giacimento di gas in Algeria in un consorzio con Repsol e Gdf-Suez, Comunicato stampa, 18 gennaio 2010.
43
In «La Repubblica», 5 giugno 2009.
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110
to un nuovo contratto per un valore
complessivo di 580 milioni di dollari.
Insieme alla Sonatrach, la società italiana si è infatti aggiudicata il contratto “chiavi in mano” per la realizzazione
sia del lotto 3 del gasdotto GK3, che di
un sistema di trasporto del gas naturale che collegherà la località di Mechtatine a Tamlouka nel nord est del paese
e da qui proseguirà verso la costa nordorientale algerina. L’opera italiana
permetterà a Sonatrach di aumentare
la propria capacità di trasporto di gas
fino a 9 mmc/a al fine di assicurare
l’approvvigionamento del gasdotto
Galsi, del nuovo treno di liquefazione
di gas naturale di Skikda e di due centrali elettriche43. Anche Edison nel gennaio del 2009 in joint-venture con Sonatrach, Repsol, e Rwe Dea, era pervenuta all’importante scoperta di due
nuovi giacimenti di gas nel deserto algerino.
Le richiamate attività costituiscono
un passo ulteriore nella strategia internazionale degli operatori italiani, volta
a costruire una presenza verticalmente
integrata con accesso diretto alle risorse strategiche, come già delineato nelle
strategie del governo italiano44. In una
logica di sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti del gas, la politica estera dell’Italia nell’area persegue due obiettivi
complementari: da un lato, preservare
i legami con i fornitori storici come
l’Algeria; dall’altro, coadiuvare lo sviluppo di relazioni commerciali con i
nuovi fornitori, in particolare Qatar,
Egitto, Nigeria e Libia, assicurando la
protezione degli investimenti necessa-
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ri. La strategia sottesa all’azione dell’Italia nei confronti dei paesi con i quali
è maggiormente legata dal punto di vista energetico è rappresentata dal tentativo di costruire rapporti politici,
economici e commerciali che favoriscano una maggiore interdipendenza,
promuovendo investimenti in aree
strategiche quali il sistema finanziario,
l’industria di alta tecnologia, le infrastrutture, il mercato elettrico.
Un chiaro esempio di questa politica sono le relazioni italo-libiche. A testimonianza del ruolo di primo piano
rivestito dall’Italia nello sviluppo del
settore energetico del paese, l’Eni è riuscita nuovamente ad assicurarsi, nell’ottobre 2007, contratti di enorme valore sia per il petrolio che per il gas. In
particolare l’Eni ha concordato di convertire i vecchi contratti petroliferi con
la Lnoc (Libyan National Oil Company) nel più recente modello contrattuale denominato Epsa IV, incrementandoli e prorogandoli di fatto fino al
2048. Tra gli impegni dell’Eni in Libia
vi è lo sviluppo dei due più importanti giacimenti del paese, El Feel
(Elephant) e Western Libya Gas
Project, per massimizzare la produzione dei giacimenti attraverso l’applicazione di programmi avanzati e delle
più sofisticate tecnologie per il recupero assistito degli idrocarburi. Lnoc ed
Eni stanno anche continuando a esplorare la prolifica area off-shore Nc 41 e
stanno rafforzando l’hub di Mellitah,
espandendone la capacità di export del
gas da 8 al 16 mmc/a, attraverso il potenziamento della portata del gasdotto
Greenstream di 3 mmc/a e la costruzione di un nuovo impianto da 5
mmc/a di Gnl destinato al mercato
mondiale.
Dall’avvio di Greenstream nel 2004,
la quota di gas importato dalla Libia è
cresciuta in maniera esponenziale, facendo di Tripoli il terzo esportatore
verso l’Italia dopo Algeria e Russia45.
Quella di Eni è una strategia che, con
successo, ha avuto l’evidente obiettivo
di diversificare le importazioni di gas
dell’Italia. D’altro canto ha però finito
per rafforzare ulteriormente la dipendenza energetica italiana dalla Libia,
già primo fornitore di petrolio. L’Italia
ha però saputo parzialmente compensare questi rischi di dipendenza ponendo le basi per una collaborazione
più ampia e interdipendente con il regime di Gheddafi, come evidenziato
dalla chiusura del contenzioso tra i due
paesi avvenuta con la firma dell’Accordo di Amicizia del 2008.
Dall’avvio di Greenstream nel 2004,
la quota di gas importato dalla Libia
è cresciuta in maniera
esponenziale, facendo di Tripoli
il terzo esportatore verso l’Italia
dopo Algeria e Russia
Per ciò che concerne il gas naturale
liquefatto, altri paesi stanno assumendo una posizione importante nella
strategia italiana. Uno di questi è la
Nigeria. Nel febbraio 2007 l’Eni ha firmato un accordo ventennale con la
Nigeria Lng Limited per l’acquisto di
1.375 milioni di tonnellate/anno (pari
Rapporto 2020. Le scelte di politica estera, cit. Nel maggio 2009 Enel in joint venture con Total si era già
aggiudicata un blocco di esplorazione in Egitto, nell’area del delta del Nilo, nell’ambito dell’International Bid Round 2008 di Egas.
45
Dati del Ministero dello Sviluppo economico - Dipartimento per l’energia, DGSAIE.
44
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internazionale
a circa 2 mmc) di Gnl, derivanti dall’ampliamento della capacità di liquefazione del terminale di Bonny in Nigeria, previsto per il 2012. Eni ha inoltre firmato un protocollo di intesa con
Brass Lng per l’acquisto di circa 1,67
milioni di tonnellate/anno (circa 2,3
mmc) di Gnl.
Anche l’Egitto è divento un partner
rilevante per le aziende italiane. Nel
2009 Edison ha chiuso un contratto
per rilevare la concessione di sfruttamento dell’area della Baia di Abu Kir
dove si estraggono ogni anno 1,5 mmc
di metano. Grazie a un ulteriore investimento di 1,2 miliardi di euro, la produzione raddoppierà entro il 2012 a 3
mmc di gas. Le riserve sono stimate in
7 mmc e spettano all’Edison per il
40%, mentre l’altro 60% andrà agli
egiziani46. Tra il 2004 e il 2009, inoltre,
Eni ha raddoppiato la sua produzione
di gas liquefatto nell’impianto di Damietta, sulla costa egiziana vicino a
Port Said, portandone la capacità produttiva a 7,6 mmc/a. Gran parte della
produzione di Gnl non sarà tuttavia
destinata all’Italia per mancanza di
adeguati impianti di rigassificazione –
rimarcando così, una volta di più, la
necessità per il nostro Paese di accelerare e sostenere con un Piano Energetico Nazionale una politica di investimento in infrastrutture dalla profonda
significatività strategica47.
46
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Conclusione: necessità interne
e vincoli internazionali
Accanto alla necessità di razionalizzazione dei consumi, la conclusione di
accordi per lo sfruttamento di giacimenti energetici e l’acquisto di idrocarburi sorretti dallo sviluppo di una
stabile e diversificata rete di trasporto e
dall’ampliamento delle capacità di rigassificazione e stoccaggio sono assurte a chiavi di volta delle politiche
energetiche mondiali e, ancor più, di
quella italiana.
Negli ultimi dodici mesi la crisi finanziaria mondiale e la conseguente
recessione hanno avuto un impatto
drammatico sulle aspettative legate ai
mercati energetici, soprattutto nel breve termine. Complessivamente, la domanda mondiale di energia ha subito
una diminuzione drastica in seguito
alla contrazione economica. La rapidità con cui essa si risolleverà dipenderà in gran parte dalla rapidità di ripresa dell’economia mondiale a cominciare da quest’anno. D’altro canto
la crisi ha gettato un’ombra sulla possibilità di mobilitare tutti gli investimenti necessari a soddisfare il crescente fabbisogno energetico. La riduzione
degli investimenti nelle infrastrutture
energetiche rappresenta una minaccia
all’accesso all’energia elettrica e ad altre forme di energia. Secondo lo Scena-
In «La Stampa», 16 gennaio 2009.
In Italia sono attualmente attivi due impianti di rigassificazione: il terminale di Porto Levante, della capacità di 8 mmc/a, e quello di Panigallia, per il quale è in progetto un aumento di capacità dagli attuali
3,5 a 8 mmc/a. Il ministero dell’Ambiente ha inoltre dato parere positivo alla realizzazione degli
impianti di Brindisi, Zaule (Ts), Porto Empedocle (Ag), Melilli (Sr), Gioia Tauro (Rc), Rosignano Marittima (Li) e Livorno. Tra questi, i progetti di Porto Empedocle (8 mmc/a) e Livorno (3,7 mmc/a estendibili a 4,7) sono stati approvati anche dalle autorità competenti.
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rio di Riferimento dell’Iea, i capitali richiesti per rispondere alla domanda di
energia prevista fino al 2030 sono
enormi, e in termini cumulativi ammontano a 26 mila miliardi di dollari,
equivalenti in media a 1.100 miliardi
all’anno (ovvero l’1,4% del Pil mondiale)48. In particolare il settore elettrico ha bisogno del 53% degli investimenti totali. Date le ridotte aspettative
di un rapido ritorno a un accesso al
credito facile e a buon mercato, finanziare gli investimenti nel settore energetico sarà, nella maggior parte dei casi, più difficile e costoso nel medio termine di quanto non lo fosse prima della crisi.
È questa una considerazione che riveste un valore fondamentale per l’Italia che, accanto alle iniziative rivolte alla razionalizzazione dei consumi e alla
promozione di fonti energetiche alternative, necessita di notevoli investimenti per la creazione di nuove infrastrutture e per il potenziamento di
quelle esistenti. Investimenti tanto più
difficoltosi in ragione della radicata
presenza, nel Paese, della c.d. “sindrome Ninby”49 che rende la prevista costruzione in Italia di rigassificatori e
infrastrutture per lo stoccaggio delle
risorse tanto complessa quanto necessaria. Tuttavia, come sottolineato anche dall’Aeeg, «la grande sfida che non
l’Italia, ma l’Europa intera, ha di fronte nei prossimi anni è contribuire allo
sviluppo di un mercato internazionale
del gas a livelli concorrenziali tali da
rompere la relazione di prezzo con il
petrolio. È questo il motivo di fondo
che impone al nostro paese, favorito
dalla posizione geografica, lo sviluppo
di adeguate infrastrutture, come gli
impianti di rigassificazione e nuovi gasdotti»50.
L’attività internazionale delle maggiori compagnie energetiche italiane
sembra aver, su questo sfondo, generato un proficuo circolo virtuoso con le
esigenze del paese e le linee guida dettate da governo e parlamento. Dotarsi,
sul piano interno, di una adeguata capacità di stoccaggio e rigassificazione
potrebbe dunque permettere all’Italia
di ritornare a svolgere un ruolo di cerniera energetica nel Mediterraneo, generando un surplus tra livelli di importazione e consumo in grado di conferirle un ruolo di hub nello strategico
settore del gas.
In questo quadro d’insieme, la relazione privilegiata con i paesi produttori dell’area mediterranea, con la Russia
e i paesi dell’area del Caspio torna
dunque a rappresentare il principale
punto di forza delle strategie di tutela
dall’esterno della sicurezza energetica
nazionale. Le semplici relazioni economiche e commerciali vengono ad assumere, come è stato per larga parte in
passato, importanti risvolti politici. È
proprio l’obbligatorietà di impegni di
lungo periodo a conferire una connotazione di tipo “politico” al commercio
internazionale di gas. Sottoscrivendo
un nuovo contratto, i produttori deci-
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, cit., p. 43.
Con Nimby (acronimo inglese per Not In My Back Yard, letteralmente “Non nel mio cortile”) si indica
un atteggiamento che si riscontra nelle proteste contro opere di interesse pubblico che hanno, o si teme
possano avere, effetti negativi sui territori in cui verranno costruite.
50
Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas, Possibile evoluzione del mercato energetico italiano, Memoria per
l’audizione informale presso la Commissione attività produttive, commercio e turismo della Camera dei
Deputati, Roma, 18 marzo 2005, p. 3.
48
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internazionale
giormente complesso ed integrato. Pur
tuttavia, la “apertura controllata” alla
Russia, così come le relazioni energetiche con la Libia o l’Iran, se da un lato
assicurano importanti benefici alla sicurezza energetica del paese, dall’altro
non mancano di suscitare critiche, e
pressioni, da parte dei suoi interlocutori ed alleati euro-atlantici51. È questo,
principalmente, il caso degli Stati Uniti che – come di recente evidenziato
dalle dichiarazioni dell’ambasciatore
David Thorne52– mostrano preoccupazione rispetto alle «fughe in avanti»
della politica estera italiana nei confronti di questi paesi.
Oltre che con le criticità interne, la
definizione della strategia energetica
italiana deve dunque fare i conti con le
limitazioni ad essa imposte dalla tradizionale alleanza con gli Usa così come,
non secondariamente, dalla dimensione europea della propria collocazione
internazionale. La crescente collaborazione con Gazprom nei settori del midstream e downstream è infatti passibile
di tradursi in un rafforzamento della
posizione russa nell’approvvigionamento di gas all’Ue e, di conseguenza,
in una maggiore vulnerabilità politica
L’Italia può vantare una forte
per i paesi dell’Europa centro-orientacollaborazione con i paesi
le più esposti alla dipendenza da Moproduttori e un credito che
sca. Solo ribadendo con forza il valore
le deriva dalle scelte compiute
dell’indivisibilità della sicurezza enernegli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta
getica dell’Ue e propugnando attivaall’interno di una più ampia
mente lo sviluppo di una politica costrategia
mune tra i suoi membri l’Italia non
La scelta “neo-atlantica” sembra, in correrà il rischio di erodere quella soliqualche modo, tornare oggi d’attualità darietà intra-europea che costituisce il
in un contesto internazionale mag- fondamento stesso dell’Unione.
dono a chi vendere il proprio gas per i
successivi decenni. Così il clima politico fra il paese produttore e il paese cui
il gas è destinato diviene importante
quanto le motivazioni economiche e
commerciali.
Garantirsi sicuri approvvigionamenti energetici significa instaurare
relazioni più profonde con i paesi produttori, fornendo loro gli strumenti
necessari per lo sfruttamento delle riserve a condizioni ritenute convenienti
da ambo le parti. La disponibilità e la
capacità a questo rinnovato scambio
“risorse per know how”, può influire significativamente sulla sicurezza degli
approvvigionamenti energetici.
L’Italia, da questo punto di vista,
può vantare una forte collaborazione
con i paesi produttori e un credito che
le deriva dalle scelte compiute negli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta all’interno di
una più ampia strategia che prevedeva
di non allinearsi al cartello delle grandi
compagnie petrolifere internazionali e
di agire quindi in maniera indipendente, con un’accentuata sensibilità a
obiettivi politici oltre che economici.
Il 4 febbraio 2010 l’amministratore delegato dell’Eni Paolo Scaroni ha dichiarato che non saranno effettuati nuovi investimenti in Iran, confermando di fatto quanto già affermato da Silvio Berlusconi durante la sua visita in Israele di pochi giorni prima, quando il premier aveva sostenuto che l’Eni ha «già
disdetto» la partecipazione alla terza fase di un importante progetto petrolifero in Iran.
52
In «Corriere della Sera», 16 settembre 2009.
51
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documentazione
La Alliance of Civilizations
L’Alleanza delle civiltà (Alliance of Civilizations, Aoc o Alleanza) è un’iniziativa
internazionale nata nel 2004, che si è innestata sul progetto di Dialogo tra le civiltà (Dialogue among Civilizations) proposto alle Nazioni Unite nel 1998 dall’allora presidente iraniano Mohammad Khatami. Khatami aveva sviluppato la
sua proposta sulla scia della prima pubblicazione nel 1996 di Lo scontro delle civiltà di Samuel P. Huntington. Le Nazioni Unite avevano dato il via, da tempo e
in maniera autonoma, a importanti sforzi per favorire il dialogo tra le culture e
le religioni. Basti citare, tra le altre, la Declaration on the Role of Religion in the
Promotion of a Culture of Peace (1994), la Declaration of Principles on Tolerance
(1995) e la Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001). Tuttavia il Dialogo non è andato oltre la proclamazione ufficiale da parte delle Nazioni Unite dell’anno del Dialogo tra le civiltà (2001) e la costituzione di un istituto per il dialogo interreligioso.
Su questa scia, nel settembre del 2004 José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, neoeletto
primo ministro spagnolo, con un discorso all’Assemblea generale delle Nazioni
Unite propose di fondare «un’Alleanza delle civiltà tra l’Occidente e il mondo
arabo e islamico», esprimendosi favorevolmente in merito alla possibilità che di
lì a poco fosse istituito «un High-Level Group per promuovere l’iniziativa»1. Si
trattava del tentativo di riunire tutti gli stati favorevoli al progetto al fine di scongiurare il ripetersi di attentati simili a quello di Madrid del 11 marzo 2004. Zapatero proponeva di sostituire gli strumenti della cooperazione e del dialogo interculturale alla strategia dell’attacco preventivo e dello scontro seguita dagli
Stati Uniti di George W. Bush dopo gli attentati del 11 settembre 2001.
Nel giugno del 2005 il primo ministro turco Recep Tayyip Erdoqan decise di farsi co-sponsor dell’iniziativa. Un mese dopo il segretario generale delle Nazioni
Unite, Kofi Annan, annunciava la creazione della “Alliance of Civilizations Initiative”, costituendo quel High-Level Group (Hlg) prospettato da Zapatero, formato da venti persone scelte nella società civile o tra esponenti delle maggiori
religioni mondiali. Le personalità provenivano per la maggior parte da stati occidentali (Spagna, Francia, Regno Unito, Stati Uniti) e dal mondo musulmano
(Turchia, Iran, Qatar, Tunisia, Egitto, Marocco, Pakistan). Tra di loro spicca il
nome dell’ex-presidente iraniano Khatami.
All’annuncio del lancio dell’Aoc il segretario generale sostenne che l’iniziativa
avrebbe dato «una risposta a quella vasta consapevolezza condivisa tra nazioni,
culture e religioni che tutte le società sono interdipendenti, e che dipendono le
une dalle altre per il loro sviluppo, per la loro sicurezza, e per il loro benessere
ambientale, economico e finanziario». Obiettivo dell’Aoc sarebbe stato dunque
quello di favorire il dialogo tra le civiltà e le religioni, «gettando ponti tra le società, promuovendo il dialogo e la comprensione reciproca, e plasmando quella
volontà politica collettiva necessaria a far fronte agli squilibri mondiali». Nella
pratica, l’Aoc prendeva le mosse da uno scopo realistico e piuttosto contenuto:
1
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Missione permanente della Spagna alle Nazioni Unite, Statement by the President of the Government of
Spain, HE Mr. José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, at the Fifty-Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (draft), New York, 21 settembre 2004, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/spaeng
040921.pdf .
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quello di fungere da ponte transnazionale tra iniziative e progetti già attivi. Nelle intenzioni di Kofi Annan l’Aoc avrebbe dovuto «coltivare la cooperazione tra
quelle iniziative in essere che si [fossero poste] come obiettivo quello di permettere alla maggioranza silenziosa – che è in buona parte moderata e rifiuta il punto di vista degli estremisti – di porre le proprie istanze all’ordine del giorno»2.
Il Rapporto finale, redatto dal Hlg, è stato presentato in Turchia nel novembre
20063. Il documento illustra la missione dell’Aoc, ne enuclea le aree d’azione e
mette a punto le strategie generali dell’Alleanza.
Come si evince dal Rapporto, l’Aoc si concentra sulle relazioni tra occidente e
mondo islamico, tentando di individuare le cause storiche di rapporti spesso difficili. Poiché l’Alleanza punta a una specifica distensione delle relazioni tra le due
civiltà, è naturale che le organizzazioni internazionali più numerose e importanti con le quali stringere partenariati, firmare memorandum d’intesa o iniziare collaborazioni siano quelle che hanno la loro sede e operano nell’area euromediterranea.
Per raggiungere i suoi obiettivi il Rapporto dota l’Alleanza di una strategia che è
possibile suddividere in tre punti. In primo luogo, per favorire il dialogo interreligioso e interculturale è necessario perfezionare argomentazioni alternative
rispetto a quelle diffuse dai media generalisti e persino dagli analisti politici nel
trattare il fenomeno dell’incontro tra civiltà e religioni differenti. «L’ansia e la
confusione generate dalla teoria dello ‘scontro delle civiltà’ ha distorto i termini
del discorso»; infatti «la storia delle relazioni internazionali non è semplicemente una storia di guerre e attriti. Si basa anche su secoli di scambi costruttivi, contaminazione culturale, coesistenza pacifica» (§1.3). Diversamente dal Dialogo tra
le civiltà, l’Alleanza si propone sin da subito di agire in controtendenza adottando una strategia attiva, utile a coordinare gli sforzi multilaterali comuni dell’Aoc
e degli stati nazionali che collaborano ai suoi progetti. Lo scopo è quello di sottrarre spazio alle argomentazioni radicali di quelle frange estremiste che vorrebbero incompatibili gli ideali delle varie civiltà. Gli ostacoli al mutuo riconoscimento della possibilità di un discorso moderato sono, tra i tanti, il sottosviluppo e la distorsione del messaggio religioso da parte di ideologi fondamentalisti
(§3.2 e §3.8). La seconda parte della strategia dell’Aoc prevede un convinto approccio multilateralista: lo «sviluppo di partenariati (...) con le organizzazioni
internazionali che condividono i suoi obiettivi» (§5.11 e §5.18). Ultima ma fondamentale componente della strategia dell’Alleanza è riconoscere, accanto alla
collaborazione con i governi, «l’importanza centrale della società civile» (§5.17).
Oltre a delineare la strategia dell’Alleanza, il Rapporto finale delimita il suo campo d’azione a quattro vaste aree tematiche – educazione, giovani, migrazione e
media – all’interno delle quali l’Aoc dovrà concentrarsi per far nascere e prosperare quei discorsi moderati atti a promuovere il dialogo tra le civiltà e le religioni, finanziando o sponsorizzando progetti ad hoc. Attorno a questi temi il
Press Release SG/SM/10004, Secretary General announces launch of ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ aimed at
bridging divides between societies exploited by extremists, 14 luglio 2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2005/sgsm10004.doc.htm.
3
Aoc, Report of the High-Level Group, 13 novembre 2006, http://www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG_Report.pdf .
2
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Rapporto imbastisce uno studio dei rapporti tra le civiltà, con l’obiettivo di contribuire allo sviluppo di politiche pubbliche a livello nazionale e internazionale
che, se attuate, possano ridurre a un livello ragionevole l’attrito e le incomprensioni tra religioni e popoli diversi4.
Il Rapporto si chiude con una serie di raccomandazioni di carattere pratico, attuate nei mesi successivi:
• la nomina da parte del Segretario delle Nazioni Unite di un Alto rappresentante per l’Aoc, assieme a uno snello Segretariato;
• la previsione di forum di consultazione annuali, ai quali parteciperà un sempre più nutrito Group of Friends (stati e organizzazioni internazionali che abbiano stretto rapporti fattivi con l’Aoc, generalmente attraverso la firma di memorandum) – oggi sono un centinaio, e risalta particolarmente l’assenza degli
Stati Uniti;
• l’istituzione di un fondo volontario (Voluntary Trust Fund) di autofinanziamento.
In questo modo l’Alleanza si è dotata di una struttura istituzionale permanente,
di un forum periodico di consultazione e di alcuni strumenti che la rendono un
ibrido: sotto l’egida delle Nazioni Unite ma ufficialmente non un’agenzia autonoma, sopravvive grazie alle donazioni volontarie del Group of Friends e di benefattori privati. Inoltre, dal 2007 l’Aoc formula un Implementation Plan biennale che illustra gli impegni futuri dell’Alleanza, descrive gli obiettivi raggiunti
e analizza le criticità dell’organizzazione.
Assieme alla sua istituzionalizzazione nel sistema delle Nazioni Unite e all’ampliamento del Group of Friends, anche le competenze dell’Alleanza sono andate
espandendosi. Anzitutto l’Aoc ha sponsorizzato, finanziato o creato direttamente una serie eterogenea di progetti al fine di favorire il dialogo tra le civiltà e le
religioni5. In secondo luogo, mano a mano che al Group of Friends si aggiungevano paesi lontani dal bacino del Mediterraneo e nonostante l’Alleanza abbia
tentato di salvaguardare il suo focus principale sulle relazioni tra occidente e
mondo musulmano, l’obiettivo è scivolato progressivamente verso il consolidamento «[del]la portata globale dell’Alleanza, approfondendo le sue fondamenta
regionali in Sud America, Africa e Asia» (§17) 6. Infine, è stato dato un seguito all’accento sulla società civile («[t]he commitment and the involvement of (...)
NGOs, voluntary and civic organizations, foundations, local communities,
churches and faith based organizations [...], the private sector», §8), e con esso
ai tanti progetti avviati dai soggetti privati e dalle istituzioni pubbliche in collaborazione con l’Alleanza.
Visti i repentini mutamenti intercorsi nella struttura e nelle competenze dell’orNon sono mancate le critiche al Rapporto finale redatto dal Hlg, provenienti in massima misura dagli
Stati Uniti. Si veda B.D. SCHAEFER, «The U.S. Should Oppose the Proposed U.N. Alliance of Civilizations», The Heritage Foundation.
5
Una lunga lista è accessibile al sito ufficiale dell’Alleanza, http://www.unaoc.org/ , alla sezione “What we
do”.
6
Aoc, Second Implementation Plan (2009-2011), 16 giugno 2009, http://www.unaoc.org/images/090616_second%20aoc%20implementation%20plan%202009-2011.pdf .
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ganizzazione tra il 2006 e l’inizio del 2010, per comprendere lo stato dell’Alleanza oggi occorre rifarsi agli atti dei forum e a quelli dell’ultimo Focal Points
Meeting, tenutosi a Rabat nel novembre 2009, ma soprattutto guardare al secondo Implementation Plan.
Al forum 2008 l’Alleanza ha inaugurato alcune importanti iniziative: Silatech,
un fondo di 100 milioni di dollari a favore dell’impiego giovanile; l’Aoc Media
Fund, un progetto di comunicazione interculturale finanziato con 10 milioni di
dollari; la Aoc Clearinghouse, struttura interna all’Alleanza con l’obiettivo di stilare un accurato catalogo dei programmi di alfabetizzazione informatica dei vari governi; uno Youth Solidarity Fund; e un Rapid Response Media Mechanism.
Oltre a ciò, sin dal 2008 è stata lanciata l’idea di istituire “strategie nazionali e regionali”. Le strategie nazionali (national plans), ad oggi sviluppate da una ventina di stati, sono prodotte dai governi che fanno parte del Group of Friends concentrandosi sulle quattro aree tematiche dell’Alleanza, allo scopo di individuare
«standard minimi di buon governo della diversità culturale» (§58). Fino ad oggi questi piani sono stati approvati da dieci paesi occidentali (tra i quali manca
l’Italia) e da soli cinque stati a maggioranza musulmana (Turchia, Algeria,
Kuwait, Qatar e Albania). Nonostante siano di qualità eterogenea, la maggior
parte dei piani «si sforza di dare visibilità alle iniziative esistenti» e formula programmi «ben articolati, pragmatici e produttivi». Assieme ai piani nazionali alcuni gruppi di stati sono stati incoraggiati a sviluppare delle strategie regionali,
che a tutt’oggi sono in via di estensione definitiva. Una prima Regional strategy
for the South-Eastern countries è stata adottata a Sarajevo nel dicembre 2009,
mentre quella che sembra essere la strategia più importante, la Euro-Mediterranean (§68), verrà discussa a un incontro ad Alessandria d’Egitto nella primavera del 2010.
Attualmente l’Alleanza sta cercando di dare una soluzione coerente e articolata
a tutte «le sfide principali cui è sottoposta a seguito dell’inattesa crescita che ha
subìto negli ultimi [tre] anni». La strategia adottata dal 2009 è stata quella di «allargare e approfondire» (widening and deepening) le relazioni con gli stati nazionali, con le organizzazioni internazionali e con i soggetti pubblici e privati
che collaborano alle sue iniziative (§3).
In vista del forum di Rio, previsto per maggio 2010, l’Alleanza continua a sviluppare le strategie regionali e incoraggia tutti i membri del suo Group of Friends
a redigere e sottoporle i piani nazionali. In parallelo, l’Aoc punta a proporre all’Assemblea generale dell’Onu un progetto di risoluzione che le possa dare maggiore visibilità e che ampli il modello generale delle cooperazioni locali (§22).
In conclusione, considerando la straordinaria propulsione che ha subìto negli
ultimi anni, l’Alleanza sembra avviata a trasformarsi in un ambizioso progetto
multilaterale per la cooperazione tra le civiltà e tra le religioni.
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ISPI-12_COVAIT@INT
1
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Editoriale
di Boris Biancheri
3
dossier Le religioni nelle relazioni internazionali
4
Scott M. Thomas
22
Olivier Roy
35
Il ritorno della religione nelle relazioni internazionali
e qualche riflessione sul caso singolare dell’espansione globale
del protestantesimo
Fabio Petito
48
Pasquale Ferrara
50
Retreat from the Secular Path: The Democracy-Secularism
Debate in the Muslim World
John L. Esposito
69
Ben Mollov
84
85
Gülden Ayman
98
115
ISPI
ISTITUTO PER GLI STUDI DI POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE
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Comitato di direzione
Alessandro Colombo, Paolo Magri
Comitato scientifico
Franco Bruni (Direttore), John Chipman
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Thierry De Montbrial (Institut Français des Relations
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(European Policy Center, Bruxelles),
Jessica T. Mathews (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace,Washington D.C.),
Adalberto Rodriguez Giavarini (Consejo Argentino
de Ralaciones Internacionales, Buenos Aires),
Eberhard Sandschneider (Deutsche Gesellshaft
für Auswärtige Politik, Berlino), Strobe Talbott
(The Brookings Institution,Washington, D.C.),
Yu Xintian (Shanghai Institute for International
Studies, Shanghai), Jaap W. de Zwaan (Netherlands
Institute of International Relations, L’Aja).
L'Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale,
fondato nel 1934, svolge attività di ricerca, formazione
e promozione di eventi nel campo delle relazioni
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La sua azione è caratterizzata da un approccio
interdisciplinare assicurato dalla stretta collaborazione
di specialisti in studi politici, economici, giuridici, storici
e strategici.
documentazione
Comitato editoriale
Boris Biancheri (Presidente ISPI), Franco Bruni (Vicepresidente ISPI), Alessandro Colombo, Mario Deaglio, Massimo De Leonardis, Maurizio Ferrera, Paolo Magri (Direttore ISPI), Alberto Martinelli, Vittorio
Emanuele Parsi, Marco Pedrazzi, Sergio Romano,
Carlo Secchi (Vicepresidente ISPI)
Guest Editor
Fabio Petito
Valeria Talbot
(Coordinamento editoriale)
relazioni.internazionali@ispionline.it
Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali è pubblicato
con il sostegno della Compagnia di San Paolo di Torino
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Per questo numero, in particolare, si ringraziano anche
il Ministero degli Affari Esteri e la Provincia di Trento,
per il loro stimolo e sostegno alla promozione del dibattito
sul ruolo della religione nelle relazioni internazionali
attraverso una molteplicità di iniziative a cui ISPI collabora.
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Periodico semestrale registrato al Tribunale di Milano
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di varia scuola e provenienza. Le opinioni espresse sono
strettamente personali e non riflettono necessariamente
le posizioni dell'ISPI.
La rivista è stata chiusa in tipografia il 6 Aprile 2010.
La riproduzione degli articoli o di parte di essi è vietata
senza autorizzazione scritta
Via Salasco, 5 - 20136 MILANO
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Progetto grafico: M Studio, Milano
Impaginazione: erregi, Milano
Stampa: Mediascan, via Mecenate 76/32, Milano
ISPI-12_COVAIT@EST
7-04-2010
14:00
Pagina 1
Osservatorio Internazionale
di Gülden Ayman
di Carlo Frappi e Arturo Varvelli
Documentazione
ISSN 1125-9663
ISBN 978-88-238-6108-4
9 788823 861084
di Scott M. Thomas
di Olivier Roy
Il ritorno della religione nelle relazioni internazionali e qualche riflessione
sul caso singolare dell’espansione globale del protestantesimo
di Fabio Petito
di Pasquale Ferrara
Retreat from the Secular Path: The Democracy-Secularism Debate
in the Muslim World
di John L. Esposito
di Ben Mollov
ISPI n. 12 2010 Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali
Dossier - Le religioni nelle relazioni internazionali
ISPI
Semestrale dell’Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
n. 12 – Aprile 2010
Le religioni
nelle relazioni
internazionali

cover 9/09

Transcription

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