China`s Growing Military Power

C H IN A ’S G ROW ING M IL ITA R Y POW E R :
PE R PE C TIV E S ON SE C URITY,B A L L ISTIC
M ISSIL E S,A N D C ONV E N TIONA L
C A PA B IL ITIE S
E dited by
A n drew Scobell
and
L arry M . W ortzel
Sep tem ber 2002
*****
Th e v iew s exp res s edin th is rep ort are th ose ofth e auth ors anddo
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*****
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arm y .m il
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ii
CONTE N TS
F orew ord
A m bas s ador Jam es R. L illey · · · · · · · · · · · · · · v
1. C h ina’s Res p onse to a F irm er A m erica
Andrew ScobellandL arry M . W ortzel · · · · · · · · · 1
PA RT I: PE RSPE C TIV E S ON C H IN A ’S SE C URITY
A N D M IL ITA RY POW E R· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·17
2. Th e V iew from B eijing: U.S.-C h ina Security Relations
from K os ov o to Sep tem ber 11,2001
D av idM . F inkels tein · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 19
3. A V iew from Toky o: C h ina’s G row ing M ilitary Pow er
andIts Significance for Jap an’s N ational Security
H ideakiK aneda · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 6 3
4 . A V iew from M os cow : C h ina’s G row ing M ilitary Pow er
Anatoly V . B oly atko · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 81
PA RT II: C H IN A ’S B A L L ISTIC M ISSIL E S
A N D E A ST A SIA N RE A C TION TO U.S.
M ISSIL E D E F E N SE IN ITIA TIV E S · · · · · · · · · · 105
5 . C h ines e B allis ticM is s ile F orces in th e A ge ofG lobal
M is s ile D efense: C h allenges andRes p onses
M ark A . Stokes · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·107
6 . C h ines e Reactions to New U.S. Initiativ es on M is s ile
D efens e
E ricA . M cV adon · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 16 9
7. E as t A s ian Reactions to U.S. M is s ile D efense: Torn
betw een Tacit Sup p ort andOv ert Op p os ition
Taeh o K im · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 19 9
iii
PA RT III: IM PROV E M E N TS IN PL A
C O N V E N TIONA L C A PA B IL ITIE S: FORC E
PROJE C TION A N D A IR FORC E L OG ISTIC S· · · · ·221
8. Rough but Ready F orce Projection: A n A s s es s m ent
ofRecent PL A Training
Sus an M . Pus ka · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 223
9 . L ogis tics Sup p ort for PL A A ir F orce C am p aigns
K enneth W . A llen · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 25 1
A B OUT TH E C ONTRIB UTORS · · · · · · · · · · · ·307
iv
FORE W ORD
Th e tenor ofU.S.-C h ina relations for m uch ofth e firs t y ear
ofth eadm inistration ofPres ident G eorgeW . B us h w as s etby a
cris is th at need not h av e occurred. H ow th e s ituation w as
h andled and ev entually res olv ed is ins tructiv e. It tells us
about a beleagueredcom m unis t leadersh ip in th e buildup to
m ajor generational transition (s ch eduled for late 2002 and
early 2003) andth e m ettle of a dem ocratically electedU.S.
gov ernm ent tes tedearly in its tenure by a s eries of foreign
p olicy cris es anda carefully coordinated s et of dev as tating
terroris t s trikes against th e continental UnitedStates .
Th e w ay th e A p ril 2001 cris is on H ainan Is land w as
res olv edm us tbech alkedup as a succes s for th eUnitedStates .
Th e key w as W as h ington’s ability to conv ince B eijing th at
h olding th e air crew w as h urting,andnot adv ancing,C h ines e
interes ts . Th at is s om eth ing B eijing s eem s not to h av egras p ed
w h en,w ith out w arning,th e E P-3 suddenly s w ep t dow n onto
th e runw ay in H aikou, bringing a treas u re trov e of
super-s ecret electronics and24 A m ericans ,w h o lookedat firs t
to bev aluable bargaining ch ip s . W ith th e p lane andth ecrew ,
C h ina s eem edto h oldth ebes t cards andbeh av edaccordingly .
Th e top leaders w h o A m bas s ador Jos ep h Prueh er h adtriedto
cultiv ate didnot return h is calls ,andC h ines e Pres ident Jiang
Zem in,after dem anding an ap ology from W as h ington,left for a
L atin A m erican tour. L et th e A m erican s s tew in th is for
aw h ile,Jiang’s m es s age s eem edto be.
B ut W as h ington m anaged to reduce th e v alue of th os e
bargaining ch ip s . Th is w as done,firs t,by m aking clear th at no
subs tantiv econces s ions w ouldbem adeto s ecureth eir releas e;
and,s econd,by p ersuading B eijing th at continuing to h oldth e
A m ericans w ouldbring real dam age to C h ines e interes ts . A s
indignation m ountedin th e UnitedStates , econom icdangers
began to loom on C h ina’s h orizon. Th e B eijing gov ernm ent,
after all,counts on a ris ing s tandardofliv ing to lim it dis s ent,
andev en a brieflos s ofacces s to th eA m erican m arket couldbe
v
dam aging. Nor did A s ian neigh bors rally to s u p p ort C h ina.
Th ey w orry , m os tly in p riv ate, about B eijing’s grow ing
m ilitary s trength andas s ertiv enes s . Th e State D ep artm ent
boy cottedC h ines e em bas s y functions andSecretary ofState
C olin Pow ell, w h ile offering regrets and condolences — ev en
ev entually s orrow ov er th e los s ofth e C h ines e p ilot— s h ow ed
no inclination to cons ider th e ap ology C h ina dem anded.
Th e m os t s ens itiv e nerv e in B eijing, h ow ev er, m ay h av e
been th e Oly m p ics . H av ing th e gam es in th eir cap ital is a
ch eris h edC h ines e as p iration,andw h en m em bers ofC ongres s
began organizing again s t it as th e cris is dev elop ed, th e
C h ines e em bas s y took th e unusual s tep of s ending rath er
snip p y letters to th e offenders . Only releas ing th e h os tages
couldp os s ibly rem ov e th e v ery real th reat,andev en th en not
w ith certainty . H enceB eijing’s decis ion to s endth ecrew h om e,
w h ich ,oncem ade,began th e s earch for a linguis ticform ula to
exp lain it. W as h ington h adnot, in fact, ap ologized, but w e
couldnot p rev ent B eijing from pulling som e ofw h at w e h ad
s aidout ofcontext andp res enting it th rough s tate-controlled
m edia as being, in fact, th e ap ology C h ina’s leaders s ough t.
Th at,p lus th eusual “h um anitarian considerations ,” p rov ided
sufficient cov er to endth e cris is .
A m ericans w ere rem indedth at th eC h ines e are not alw ay s
th eir friends . D es p ite s om ereal econom icp rogres s ,th eregim e
s till often becom es confrontational w ith its ow n peop le and
w ith oth er countries . Th e UnitedStates m us t treat it w ith
p rudence and res p ect, h edging against dangers ev en as it
s eeks to p rom ote p os itiv e dev elop m ent. B y th e s am e token,
C h ina h as been rem indedth at W as h ington cannot be relied
up on to y ield w h en th e tw o s tates collide. Our grow ing
econom icinteres ts in C h ina andour h op es for a futurep os itiv e
relations h ip w ith C h ina w ouldbe negativ ely affectedif our
fundam ental A m erican nationalinteres ts or our com m itm ents
to dem ocratic friends and allies in A sia are ch allenged by
C h ina.
D uring th e p eriodth at th e C h ines e ch angedcours e, from
s eeking conces s ions to s eeking an exit, th e United States
vi
calm ly follow ed p rocedures . F irs t th e A m bas s ador, th en th e
Secretary ofState— andbriefly th e V ice Pres ident— took th e
s p otligh t to deliv er an auth oritativ e “no” to th e dem andfor
ap ology . Skilled State D ep artm ent w ords m ith s cobbled
togeth er a p recis ely craftedletter th at gav e C h ina cov er,but
no m ore. Pres ident B us h ch oreograp h ed all of th is , m os tly
beh indth e s cenes ,andearnedour ap p laus e. Pres ident Jiang
s eem s to h av e concludedth at th e m atter s h ould be h andled
exp editious ly w ith civ ilians,not th e PL A taking th eleadin th e
negotiations. Once th e H ainan Is landIncident w as res olv ed
and s trategic clarity w as em p h as izedon Taiw an, th e U.S.
m ov eds w ifly to p ut econom ics at th e top ofour agenda, and
C h ina’s entry into th e W TO becom e th efirs t p riority .
Th is v olum e,com p ris edofp ap ers originally p res entedat a
conferenceh eldat C arlis leB arracks in Sep tem ber 2001,h elp s
to p ut th e H ainan Is land incident in th e broader context of
C h ina’s s trategic as p irations and its grow ing m ilitary
cap abilities . I am p roud to be a p rim e initiator of th is
conferenceon th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y ,w h ich h as been an
annual ev ent for m ore th an a decade. L as t y ear’s conference’s
co- s p on s ors w ere th e A m erican E nterp ris e In s titute, th e
H eritage F oundation,andth eU.S. A rm y W ar C ollege. F or th e
fourth cons ecutiv e y ear, th e W ar C ollege’s Strategic Studies
Institute is p ublis h ing th e p roceedings . Th e nine ch ap ters in
th is v olum e, all w ritten by leading exp erts ,cov er a div ers e s et
of im p ortant top ics : E as t A s ian p ers p ectiv es on C h ina’s
s ecurity am bitions ,th e s tatus ofth e C h ines e ballis ticm is s ile
p rogram and regional reactions to U.S. m is s ile defen s e
initiativ es ,andC h ina’s ev er-im p rov ing conv entional m ilitary
cap abilities . I com m endC h ina’s G row ing M ilitary Pow er to
y ou.
A M B A SSA D OR JA M E S R. L IL L E Y
Senior F ellow
A m erican E nterp ris e Institute
v ii
C H A PTE R 1
C H IN A ’S RE SPONSE
TO A F IRM E R A M E RIC A
A ndrew Scobell
L arry M . W ortzel
Pres ident G eorge W . B us h m ade it clear as a candidate
for office th at U.S. p olicy tow ardC h ina “w ill require tough
realis m .” Pres iden tial C an didate B us h ’s s p eech on
Sep tem ber 23, 19 9 9 ,at th e C itadel,th e m ilitary college of
South C arolina,fores h adow edh is firm ap p roach to B eijing.1
In th at s p eech ,C andidate B us h recalledfor th e A m erican
p eop le th at “in 19 9 6 , after s om e tension ov er Taiw an, a
C h ines e general rem indedA m erica th at C h ina p os s es s es
th e m ean s to in cin erate L os A ngeles w ith nuclear
m is s iles .”2 B us h follow ed up in a s p eech in Sim i V alley ,
C aliforn ia, w ith th e w arn in g to C h in a th at it is a
“com p etitor,not a s trategicp artner,” th at th eUnitedStates
w oulddeny th erigh t ofB eijing to im p os eth eir ruleon a free
p eop le (Taiw an), andth at th e United States w ould h elp
Taiw an defend its elf.3 H e als o m ade clear early in th e
cam p aign th at h ew ouldp ursueballis ticm is s iledefensefor
th e United States .4 Th us , th e leaders h ip of th e C h ines e
C om m unis t Party in B eijing h ad early notice th at th ey
w ouldnot be dealing w ith a Pres ident W illiam J. C linton
w h o cons idered C h ina to be a “s trategic p artner” of th e
UnitedStates .
F or B eijing, th is w as a v ery different A m erica. Under
C linton,U.S. foreign policy w as generally m ores olicitous of
B eijing. D efense officials ran offto C h ina w ith p ackages of
“deliv erables ” th at th e C h ines e h adcom e to exp ect out of
m eetings in w h ich th e UnitedStates s ough t m ore dialogue
1
andcoop eration betw een th e arm edforces ofeach country .
C linton res p ondedto C h ina’s M arch 19 9 6 m is s ile launch es
off Taiw an w ith tw o A m erican aircraft carrier battle
group s .5 H ow ev er,onceth eTaiw an elections w ereov er later
th at m onth ,C linton dis p atch edNational Security C ouncil
andState D ep artm ent officials to Taiw an to encourage th e
leaders ofth at is landto w ork h arder at getting along w ith
th ePeop le’s Rep ublicofC h ina (PRC ). Th us p olicy s eem edto
v acillate betw een a firm foreign p olicy line tow ardC h ina
andoneth at s ough t to p lacate th eC h ines eleaders h ip w h en
it com p lainedabout th e U.S. p os ition.6
Once B us h took office, B eijing dis p atch eds ucces s iv ely
h igh er- lev el dip lom ats to W as h in gton — form er
am bas s adors , foreign m inis try officials , and adv is ers to
C h ines e Pres ident Jiang Zem in— to gauge th e W h ite
H ous e’s p os ition on C h ina andTaiw an. Th is culm inatedin
th e v is it to W as h ington of V ice Prem ier Qian Qich en on
M arch 20,2001. Th eC h ines ew ere clear on onem ajor p oint:
th ey w orkedh ardto deliv er th em es s age th at th es ale ofth e
A egis -clas s guided-m is s ile des troy er to Taiw an by th e
United States w as “unaccep table” and, in B eijing’s ey es ,
am ounted to th e creation of a new alliance am ong th e
UnitedStates ,Taiw an,andJap an.
Th eB us h p os ition on Taiw an w as clear. H e didnot back
aw ay from h is cam p aign p os ition th at “w e’ll h elp Taiw an
defend its elf.” Th e Pres ident and h is ap p ointees at th e
D ep artm en ts of State an d D efen s e, p oin ting to th e
large-s cale buildup ofballis ticm is s iles on th eC h ines ecoas t
op p os ite Taiw an, als o m ade sure th at B eijing unders tood
th at th e UnitedStates w ouldm eet its com m itm ents under
th e Taiw an Relation s A ct (Public L aw 9 8-6 ) to p rov ide
Taiw an adequate defensiv e arm s ands erv ices to res p ondto
th e C h ines e th reat.
On A p ril 1, 2001, during a m id-air intercep t by th e
C h ines eNav y ,a C h ines eF -8IIfigh ter aircraft collidedw ith
an unarm ed A m erican E P-3 reconnais s an ce aircraft
op erating in international airs p acein th eSouth C h ina Sea.
2
Th e A m erican aircrew w as detainedby C h ina for 11 day s
and subjected to length y and unp leas ant interrogation.
C h ina m ade exp ansiv eclaim s about its s ov ereign territory ,
insis ting th at th e entireexclus iv eeconom iczone,200 m iles
off th e C h ines e coas t, w as its ow n. Th e United States
insis tedth at C h ina’s territorial w aters ands eas extended
out 12 m iles , cons is tent w ith international law . Th is
incident, andth e treatm ent of th e aircrew , p robably did
m ore to conv ince th e Pres ident andth e A m erican p eop le
th at firm nes s w as th e only w ay to deal w ith B eijing th an
any oth er action or s tatem ent from eith er cap ital. F rom th e
p ers p ectiv e ofm any in th e UnitedStates , th e actions and
rh etoricofth e C h ines e gov ernm ent w ere confirm ation th at
B eijing did not h av e frien dly in ten tions tow ard
W as h ington. Th e releas e ofth e crew and,ev entually , th e
aircraft is s een as th e s ucces s ful outcom e of firm nes s
coup led w ith flexibility an d s u p erb in teragen cy
coordination from th em os t s enior officials in W as h ington to
th e m em bers of th e actual negotiating team on H ainan
Is land. In th e face ofth is ,C h ines e truculence gav e w ay to
C h ines e p ragm atis m .7
On A p ril 25 , 2001, after 100 day s in office, Pres ident
B us h res tated th at th e United States w ill h elp Taiw an
defendits elf, andin a telev is ion broadcas t w ent furth er,
s ay ing th at th e UnitedStates w ill “do w h atev er it takes ” to
defend Taiw an against C h ines e aggres s ion. L es t any one
m is interp ret jus t h ow s erious Pres ident B us h w as about
th at s tatem ent, it w as rep eated for em p h as is . In St.
Peters burg,F lorida,on M arch 11,2002,D ep uty Secretary
of D efense Paul W olfow itz, s p eaking to an audience th at
included Taiw an ’s D efen s e M inis ter Tang Yao-m ing,
reiteratedB us h ’s p ledge.
Security Policy .
Under th e C linton adm inis tration, m ilitary -to-m ilitary
contacts betw een C h ina andth e UnitedStates w ere treated
as routine m atters . In a num ber ofw ay s ,th e “E n gagem ent
3
Policy ” ofth e UnitedStates PacificC om m andals o treated
m ilitary contacts w ith C h ina as m ore or les s routine, ev en
des irable,des p iteconcerns exp res s edin th eC ongres s . F rom
C ap itol H ill, m any conserv ativ es exp res s ed concerns th at
such contacts w ere only h elp ing th e Peop le’s L iberation
A rm y (PL A )learn m ore about U.S. defense es tablis h m ent
p lans ands y s tem s , w ith no recip rocity from th e C h ines e
s ide. Th at,too,ch angedw ith th e B us h adm inis tration.
Soon after as s um ing h is p os t, Secretary of D efense
D onaldRum s feldconducteda rev iew ofm ilitary contacts
w ith C h ina. Th at rev iew concludedth at th e UnitedStates
s h ould ceas e pursuing m ilitary contacts or engagem ent
w ith C h ina as a m atter ofroutine p ractice. Instead,future
U.S.-C h ina m ilitary contacts and exch anges w ould be
conductedon a cas e-by -cas e bas is , w ith decis ions in line
w ith U.S. interes ts . C ontacts s h ould benefit th e United
States ands h ouldnot s trength en th e PL A .
B allis tic M is s ile D efense.
One of C andidate B us h ’s s tronges t foreign policy and
defense p os itions during h is p res idential cam p aign w as to
call for a ballis tic m is s ile s y s tem th at w ould defend
forw ard-dep loy ed A m erican forces , U.S. allies , and th e
h om elandofth eUnitedStates . In Sim i,C alifornia,h es aid:
“W e s till, h ow ev er, need m is s ile defense s y s tem s — both
th eater andnational. IfI am com m ander-in-ch ief,w e w ill
dev elop anddep loy th em .”8 Ofcours e,th eim p licit m es s age
in th is w as th at th e A nti-B allis tic M is s ile (A B M ) Treaty
w ith th e Sov iet Union h adto be reexam ined. Tw o y ears
later, in D ecem ber 2001 at th e C itadel, Pres ident B us h
m ade it exp licitly clear th at th e UnitedStates m us t m ov e
bey ondth e A B M Treaty .9 Since June 13,2002,th e United
States is no longer be cons trained by th at treaty . Th is
m eans th at A B M tes ting can go ah eadagainst w arh eads of
any s p eed and w ith intercep tors of full cap ability . Th e
UnitedStates can als o w ork on coop erativ e p rogram s w ith
4
friends andallies as w ell as conduct tes ting at s ea; th ings
th at w ere p roh ibitedunder th e A B M treaty .
C h ina s aw th is com ing,andB eijing’s s ecurity p lanners
w ere not h ap p y about th e turn ofev ents . A t a conferenceon
arm s control in B eijing, C h ina, Sep tem ber 14 -15 , 2000,
rep res entativ es from C h ina’s arm s control com m unity
arguedth at any attem p t at dev elop ing a ballis tic m is s ile
defen s e s y s tem in th e United States “is inh eren tly
des tabilizing andw illfos ter a w orld-w ide arm s race.”10 Th e
C h ines e attendees argued th at C h ina w as th e p rim ary
target ofballis ticm is s iledefenses ,anda UnitedStates goal
w as to s eek “abs olute s ecurity andm ilitary superiority .”11
U.S. ballis tic m is s ile defenses h av e nev er been “aim ed” at
anoth er country . Th ey are aim ed at incom ing m is s iles .
N oneth eles s ,from th e tim e th at th e U.S. C ongres s directed
th eD ep artm ent ofD efense(D oD )to exp loreballis ticm is s ile
defenses in A s ia in th eF is cal Year 19 9 8 “Strom Th urm ond”
D efenseA uth orization A ct,to th e tim e th at Pres ident B us h
as s um edoffice,B eijing rep eatedth es e argum ents in nearly
ev ery internationalandbilateralforum itcould. A y ear after
B us h as s um ed th e p res idency , C h ina’s rep res entativ es
continuedto argue th at th e A B M Treaty constitutes “th e
corners tone ofinternational s trategics tability .”12
F rom th e tim e of th e Pres idential cam p aign, th e
incom ing B us h adm inis tration m ade it clear th at its
ap p roach to C h ina w oulddiffer from C linton’s andp erh ap s
ev en differ from th at ofB us h ’s fath er,th e 4 1s t Pres ident of
th eUnitedStates . A fter th eelection,to th es urp ris eofs om e
in C h ina andth e UnitedStates , Pres ident B us h actually
follow edth rough on th e p rincip les h e h adexp oundedin h is
cam p aign s p eech es . Th is s urp ris ew as th eres ult ofa failure
to recognize th e firm com m itm ent to p rincip les on th e p art
ofPres identB us h ands enior m em bers ofh is adm inis tration
s tem m ing from th eir deep ly -h eldconserv ativ e Realp olitik
beliefs .13 C h ina’s reaction is th efocus ofth ech ap ters in th is
book.
5
C h ina’s Reaction.
Th is book w as dev elop edagainst th e backdrop outlined
in th e firs t s ection of th is introduction. Th e conference
organizers s ough t to cap ture th ech anges in C h ina,not only
in term s ofrh etoric,but als o in m ilitary doctrine,training,
andh ardw arepurch as es ,in res p onse to B us h ’s firm er tone.
Ofcours e,w erecognize th at B eijing h adalready taken note
ofth e dep loy m ent oftw o U.S. aircraft carrier battle group s
to th e v icinity ofTaiw an during th e 19 9 6 Strait C ris is . B ut
as notedabov e, th is s trong m es s age w as s oon dilutedby
m ore conciliatory m ov es from th e C linton adm inis tration
tow ard B eijing. A s a res ult, th e firm nes s dis p lay ed by
W as h ington in early 19 9 6 w as not p erceiv edas a p erm anent
s h ift in institutionalizedap p roach es to A m erican security
p olicy on C h ina.
Th en th ere w as th e accident in B elgrade. D es p ite all of
th e U.S. ap ologies , in v es tigations , an d fact-fin din g
com m is s ions ,m any in B eijing,p articularly in th e PL A and
th e intelligence com m unity , rem ain suspicious th at th e
bom bing ofth e C h ines e em bas s y in B elgrade in 19 9 8 w as
not an accident.14
In th is v olu m e, s om e of th e bes t an aly s ts of
contem p orary C h ina as s es s h ow B eijing h as reacted, and
can be exp ectedto react, to th e ch anges in UnitedStates
foreign p olicy . Th e auth ors exam ine C h ines e p ercep tions of
th eUnitedStates ,A m erican security andforeign policies in
A s ia, andth e effects of th os e p olicies on th e A s ia-Pacific
region.
In ch ap ter 2,D r. D av idF inkels tein,D irector ofProject
A s ia at th e C enter for N av al A naly s es , exam ines s ecurity
relations betw een C h ina andth e UnitedStates from th e
ev ents in K os ov o th ough A m erica’s reaction to th e attack on
th e United States by terroris t forces of th e al-Qaeda
netw ork. F inkels tein argues th at th e United States h as
s erious w orries about C h ina’s activ ities in four v ital areas :
Taiw an, th e p roliferation ofw eap ons ofm as s des truction
6
and deliv ery m eans, th e intentions of C h ina’s m ilitary
m odernization p rogram s ,andw h eth er C h ina is attem p ting
th rough dip lom acy to p us h th e United States out of th e
A s ia-Pacificregion.
In Finkels tein’s v iew , alth ough B us h andJiang w ere
able to im p rov e U.S.-C h ina relations, and to conv ey th e
im p res s ion th at in th e w ar on terroris m at leas t,
W as h ington andB eijing s eeey e-to-ey e,th ere w as not m uch
subs tancein th e B us h v is it to C h ina in October 2001.15 B ut
a reduction in tension h as s om e v alue in and of its elf,
according to F inkels tein, becaus e increas ed ten s ions
betw een th eUnitedStates andC h ina com p licates uch oth er
key U.S. s ecurity concern s as s tability on th e K orean
Peninsula andth e p ros ecution ofth e w ar on terroris m .
F inkels tein concludes th at th ere rem ains deep - s eated
m utual dis trus t betw een C h ina and th e United States ,
p articularly am ong m em bers ofth e s ecurity es tablis h m ent
in both countries . In B eijing, a num ber of influential
s ecurity th inkers ap p ear to h av e concluded th at th e
ultim ate objectiv e of UnitedStates p olicies is to obs truct
C h ina’s ris e as a m ore rich andp ow erful nation. Th erefore,
“U.S. p olicies in th eregion areincreas ingly filteredth rough
a s et of lenses [in B eijing] th at are already calibratedto
ensure s om e dis tortion.” M ore andm ore C h ines e s ecurity
th inkers are concluding th at th e UnitedStates w ants to
“ch ange C h ina,” to “deter C h ina,” andto “collect intelligence
on C h ina.” F inkels tein argues th at th e dep th of th is
m is trus t, w h ich is to a certain extent m utual, is reas on
enough to m aintain som e s ort ofs ecurity dialogue aim edat
dis p elling m is p ercep tions andav oiding conflict.
In C h ap ter 3,H ideakiK aneda,a retiredV iceA dm iralin
Jap an’s M aritim e SelfD efense F orces , addres s es C h ina’s
grow ing m ilitary p ow er and its s ignificance for Jap an’s
national s ecurity . K aneda m akes th e p oint th at C h ina h as
us edits ow n m ilitary s trength to adv anceterritorial claim s ,
w h ile ignoring th e s ov ereignty and juris diction of oth er
nations in th e E as t C h ina Sea andSouth C h ina Sea. H e
7
outlines w h at h e ch aracterizes as a m eth odical effort by
C h in a’s n av y to ev en tually con trol “biological an d
nonbiological res ources in C h ina’s p erip h eral w aters .” Th e
res ources K aneda s ees as th e object of C h ina’s goals are
p rim arily unders ea gas andp etroleum dep os its , but als o
fis h ing grounds to s ecure foods u p p lies .
Th e m ajor s ecurity com p onent ofB eijing’s s trategy is a
“near-w ater defense” ofth e “firs t is landch ain” s tretch ing
from th e A leutian Is lands , acros s to th e K uriles , th e
Jap an es e Is lan ds , th e Ry uky u Is lands , Taiw an , th e
Ph ilip p ineIs lands ,andB orneo. K aneda notes th at m any of
C h ina’s territorial claim s ,th e Senkaku Is lands in th e E as t
C h ina Sea,andth eSp ratly andParacelIs lands in th eSouth
C h ina Sea, fall w ith in th e p erim eter of th is “firs t is land
ch ain.” H e als o argues th at controlofth ew aters w ith in th is
area giv es B eijing not only th e res ources it needs ,but als o
th e s trategic p os ition to bring m ilitary p ow er to bear on
Taiw an w ith reducedfear ofouts ide interv ention.
K aneda believ es Jap an m us t call for m ore tran s p arency
in C h ines e defense p olicy . H e als o argues th at C h ina m us t
be p rep ared to com e to agreem ents th at p erm it joint
exp loitation of unders ea res ources by th e countries w ith
com p eting claim s . A s early confidence-building m easures ,
K aneda s eeks to inv olv eC h ina in regional efforts to p rov ide
for m aritim e s afety , com bat p iracy , s top drug transfers ,
control andendth e trade in p ers ons, andw ork to control
env ironm ental p ollution. H e takes a firm p os ition on
res is ting any exp ans ion by C h ina, andinsis ts th at Jap an
m us t be ready to counter any illegal reconnais s ance efforts
by th e C h ines e nav y in Jap an’s territorial w aters . F inally ,
h e calls for a firm U.S.-Jap an alliance as a counter to
C h ina’s exp ansionary tendencies .
In C h ap ter 4 , A natoly B oly atko ofth e Institute ofF ar
E as tern Studies in Rus s ia dis cus s es h ow in m ilitary
doctrine andexercis es th e PL A h as reactedto th eincom ing
B us h adm inis tration. B oly atko p redicts th at, as joint
m ilitary exercis es areconductedbetw een th eUnitedStates
8
andits E as t A s ian allies in K orea andJap an, andas th e
United States m ov es forw ard w ith a “m is s ile defen s e
s h ield,”C h ina w illreactby p roducing th ous ands ofm is s iles ,
aircraft, andtanks . H e believ es th at such p roduction w ill
s tres s C h ina’s m ilitary -indus trial bas e, but th at s uch
s tres s es can be tolerated by th e C h ines e econom y . H is
conclus ion is th at C h ina w ill s eek to be m ore effectiv e at
force p rojection anddefens e in th e A s ia-Pacificregion and
w ill s trength en its forces against Taiw an,but w ill not s eek
to becom e a w orldm ilitary p ow er,as w as th e Sov iet Union,
w ith th e cap ability to conduct m ilitary op erations outs ide
E as t A s ia.
L ieutenant C olonel M ark Stokes ofth e U.S. A ir F orce
exp lains C h ina’s reactions to th e B us h adm inis tration’s
p lans for dev elop ing a ballis tic m is s ile defense s y s tem to
p rotect dep loy edU.S. m ilitary forces ,A m erican friends and
allies ,andth e U.S. h om eland. A s Stokes notes in C h ap ter 5 ,
C h ina’s cam p aign against th e U.S. w ith draw al from th e
19 7 2 A B M Treaty dates to w ell before th e B us h
adm inis tration took office. B ut as a candidate for office,
B us h andh is s ecurity adv is ers m adeit clear th at th eUnited
States w ouldp urs ue th es e defenses . Stokes s ees C h ina’s
dev elop m ent andm odernization ofits ow n strategicm is s ile
forces as “an integral p art of PRC coerciv e s trategies .”
W h eth er dis cus s ing C h ina’s th eater-lev elm is s ilep rogram s ,
s h ort-range m is s iles , or intercontinental m is s iles , Stokes
believ es th at any A m erican m is s ile defen s es , h ow ev er
m odes t, are p erceiv ed by B eijing as h av ing “s erious
im p lications for th ev iability ofits nuclear deterrent andfor
its exp anding inv entory ofconv entional s h ort andm edium
range ballis ticm is s iles .”
B eijing’s ballis tic m is s ile forces are a p olitical and
m ilitary “trum p card” intendedto s tem any m ov es for m ore
autonom y andinternational recognition from Taiw an,and
als o lim it th e freedom of action of th e United States to
res p ondto contingencies not only in th e Taiw an Strait,but
in th e A s ia-Pacificregion. M oreov er,Stokes notes ,B eijing
fears th at,ifv iable ballis ticm is s ile defenses are dep loy ed,
9
th e com m andand control arch itecture for th es e s y s tem s
couldturn into a “de-facto” allianceifJap an,South K orea,
th e United States , and Taiw an integrate th eir m is s ile
defense p rogram s .
Stokes p redicts th at Taiw an w illadop t a com bination of
p as s iv e defensiv e m eas ures to com p licate PRC targeting,
w h ileC h ines em ilitary p lanners w illdev elop better p lans to
abs orb and recons titute forces after a PRC firs t s trike.
A m erica’s w ith draw al from th e A B M Treaty on June 13,
2002, h ands C h ina’s dip lom ats a defeat of m onum ental
p rop ortions . Rus s ia not only accep tedth e endofth e A B M
Treaty ,but als o agreedto m ajor cuts in th e num bers ofits
offensiv e w eap ons . Th us th e p redictions ofnot only C h ina’s
arm s control com m unity but ofth e s up p orters ofC h ina’s
p os ition in th e UnitedStates ring h ollow . Indeed,ifth ere is
a m is s ilebuildup in reaction to th eendofth eA B M Treaty ,it
w illcom efrom C h ina,s eeking to m aintain w h at Stokes calls
a “trum p card.”
In C h ap ter 6 , E ric M cV adon, a cons ultant on A s ian
s ecurity and form er U.S. D efen s e A ttach e in B eijing,
exp lains in great detail th e p os itions C h ina h as taken in
reaction to th e B us h p res idential cam p aign s tatem ents on
m is s ile defens e and to th e actions taken by th e B us h
adm inis tration in its firs t 6 m onth s in office to addres s
C h ina’s concerns ov er U.S. ballis tic m is s ile defens e p lans.
M cV adon outlines th e efforts by th e PRC arm s control and
dip lom atic com m unity to s o lim it any A m erican defense
efforts th at th ey w ouldh av e no p ractical effect on C h ina’s
nuclear force. C h ina’s negotiators , according to M cV adon,
“couldnot tolerate” an A m erican m is s iledefenseforceof25 0
intercep tor m is s iles , but “m igh t be able to tolerate 10
intercep tors dev oted to th e defen s e of th e A m erican
h om eland.” A ccording to M cV adon, C h ina’s n egotiators
arguedth at onefactor forcing Jiang to takeafirm p os ition is
“p ublicop inion in C h ina.” M cV adon op ines th at th e United
States m us t findw ay s to dem onstrate th at it “w ill not be
h egem onic” andm us t continueadialoguew ith C h ina on th e
10
p urp os e and extent of any U.S. ballis tic m is s ile defense
s y s tem .
A s ia, too, h as reacted to A m erican ballis tic m is s ile
defen s e p lan s , exp lain s D r. Taeh o K im , Senior C h ina
A n aly s t at th e K orean Institute for D efense A naly s es . In
C h ap ter 7,K im acknow ledges th e p rofoundch anges in th e
s trategicenv ironm ent p roducedby th eSep tem ber 11,2001
terroris t attacks on th e United States . K im exam ines
m is s ile defens es as p art ofa m ore com p reh ensiv e effort to
transform not only th e U.S. m ilitary , but als o A m erican
s trategy . H enotes th at th eB us h adm inis tration’s ap p roach
to s ecurity rep res ents a radical dep arture from th at ofth e
C linton adm inis tration. K im p redicts an ap p roach th at h as
nuances in policy andm is s ile defense dep loy m ents in E as t
A s ia,taking into account th ep olitical s ensitiv ities in Jap an,
w h ere s om e are w ary ofgoing bey ondth e res earch s tage,
andin K orea,w h ere th ep opular focus is on North K orea and
its conv entional forces , not on C h ina’s or North K orea’s
ballis ticm is s iles .
C olonel Sus an Pus ka, currently U.S. A rm y A ttach é at
th eA m erican E m bas s y in B eijing,as s es s es B eijing’s efforts
at force p rojection in C h ap ter 8. Sh e as s erts th at C h ina is
m odeling its ow n m ilitary m odernization and efforts to
dev elop adv ancedcap abilities bas edon th e cap abilities of
th e U.S. m ilitary . To increas em ilitary cap abilities ,C h ina is
focus ing m oreon p ow er p rojection in perip h eral areas by its
ow n m ilitary ,w h ile ch anging training m eth ods to increas e
effectiv enes s . Pus ka docum ents new s cenarios for C h ines e
m ilitary training th at focus on m eeting w h at B eijing s ees as
its m ain th reat— th e forces ofth e UnitedStates . Th e PL A
als o s eem s to beconscious ofits ow n relativ ew eaknes s es in
com p aris on to U.S. forces . Th ereforeit is focus ing on w h at it
s ees is th e m ain v ulnerability of th e United States , a
dep en den ce on th e electrom agn etic s p ectru m for
com m unication andth e exch ange ofintelligenceandth reat
data.
11
B eijing is im p rov ing m anagem entin th e PL A ,im p rov ing
th equality ofits ow n m ilitary p ers onnelby better educating
th em andrecruiting m ore qualifiedp ers onnel. Th e PL A is
als o increas ingly able to coordinate and us e effectiv ely
res erv e an d m ilitia forces . Th e C en tral M ilitary
C om m is s ion, th e C h ines e C om m unis t Party ’s leading
m ilitary body ,is als o try ing to reducecorrup tion andw as te.
Pus ka concludes th at today B eijing h as a “rough but ready ”
force p rojection cap ability th at w ill im p rov e ov er tim e and
create greater ris ks andcos ts to any country th at s eeks to
ch allenge C h ina on its p erip h ery .
In C h ap ter 9 ,M r. K enneth A llen,an exp ert on C h ines e
s ecurity at th e C enter for N av al A naly s es , exam ines th e
ch anges in th e PL A A ir F orce(PL A A F )as it m odernizes and
reform s its logis tics y s tem s in order to figh t h igh -tech nology
w ars . In th e 19 9 0s th e PL A A F began transform ing its elf
from a force reliant up on s ingle branch dep loy m ent to one
able to utilizem ultip lebranch es in joint s erv icecam p aigns,
indicating a s h ift in th efocus ofth e PL A A F from a p rim arily
p os itional, defense orientedop eration, to a m ore m obile,
m aneuv erable, p rev entativ e force, able to addres s local
concern s and s trike quickly . A llen analy zes th is s h ift
th rough exam ination of th e PL A A F op erational th eory ,
logis tics s tructureandth eory ,andth ety p es oftraining us ed
to im p lem ent th es e ch anges . A llen th en addres s es th e
s p ecificch anges enactedby th e PL A A F in p rep aration for a
m ilitary confrontation w ith th e UnitedStates . Ov er th elas t
5 0 y ears ,C h ina’s PL A A F h as engagedin only th reeexternal
cam p aigns , in K orea, Taiw an Strait (19 5 8) andV ietnam .
G iv en recent m ilitary h is tory ,th e PL A A F h as realizedth e
needfor a transregional s trike force andh as initiatedth e
training neces s ary to create one. W h ileitis not y etclear h ow
effectiv e th e PL A A F w ould be during a real conflict,
p articularly if facing anticip ated U.S. s trategies s uch as
in terior airfield des truction, th e PL A A F h as m ade
s ignificant s trides in im p rov ing p ilot p roficiency , s ortie
gen eration an d s u s tain ability , logis tical s up p ort,
com m unications, and intelligence. Th us , A llen concludes
12
th at,w h ile th e PL A A F m ay not currently be able to fielda
rap ids trike force ofany th reat to th e UnitedStates , it is
m aking definite p rogres s in th is direction.
E ach ofth e auth ors h as effectiv ely cap turedth e m ain
trends in regional s ecurity in E as t A s ia. Th e terroris t
attacks on th e UnitedStates , andth e subs equent w ar on
terroris m , only increas ed A m erican res olv e to dep loy a
ballis tic m is s ile defen s e. Th ey als o brough t about th e
dep loy m en t of A m erican forces on C h in a’s w es tern
p erip h ery , s om eth ing th at w as not fores een in th e day s
before th e attack on th e UnitedStates . Th e trends outlined
in th is book,th erefore,h av ep erh ap s p lay edth em s elv es out
ov er a m orecom p res s edtim efram e. B ut th eas s es s m ents by
each auth or h old up , and p rov ide s om e fram ew ork for
unders tan ding h ow B eijing m ay react to th e firm er
p os itions taken by th e UnitedStates .
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTER 1
1. G eorge W . B us h , “A PeriodofC onsequences ,” C h arles ton: Th e
C itadel, Sep tem ber 23, 19 9 9 . h ttp :/ / citadel.edu/ p ao/ addres s / p r es_
bush .h tm l.
2. Th e rem arks , w h ich h av e been attributed to G eneral Xiong
G uangkai, w ere m ade in a priv ate conv ers ation w ith a form er U.S.
gov ernm ent official, A m bas s ador C h as . W . F reem an, ands h ouldnot
carry th e w eigh t ofan officialC h inese s tatem ent. M oreov er,according
to Freem an, th ese w ords w ere not couch edas a th reat ands h ould be
ev aluated in th e context of an extended off-th e-record discus s ion
betw een h im s elf and th e C h ines e m ilitary official. See A m bas s ador
C h as . F reem an, “D id C h ina Th reaten to B om b L os A ngeles ?”
Proliferation B rief,V ol. 4 ,M arch 22,2001,av ailable at w w w .ceip .org/
files/ p ublications/ p roliferationbrief4 04 .as p ?from =p ubty p e; and A llen
S. W h iting, “C h in a’s U s e of F orce, 19 5 0-19 9 6 , an d Taiw an,”
International Security ,V ol. 26 ,Fall 2001,p p . 129 -130. In Scobell’s v iew ,
Xiong’s com m ents s h ouldbe seen as p rov iding im p ortant in s igh ts into
th e m indset of C h inese m ilitary elite p ercep tions of U.S. strategic
p riorities andth e exis tence ofan “as y m m etry ofm otiv ation” betw een
B eijing andW as h ington on Taiw an. SeeA ndrew Scobell,C h ina’s Useof
M ilitary F orce: B ey ondth eG reat W all andth eL ong M arch ,N ew York:
C am bridge Univ ers ity Pres s , 2003, forth com ing, ch ap ter 8. Zh u
C h engh u,th en a s enior colonelin th e PL A s erv ing at C h ina’s N ational
13
D efens e Univ ers ity andnow am ajor general,rep eatedth ew arning th at
A m ericans faceth e th reat ofnuclear attack from C h ina in th e ev ent ofa
res p onse by th e UnitedStates to an attack on Taiw an. See Jiefangjun
B ao, February 28, 2000 and L arry M . W ortzel, “Sh ouldth e United
States F eel Th reatenedby C h ina’s G row ing Role in th e International
M ilitary -Political A rena?,” Th e RetiredOfficer,D ecem ber 2000,p . 35 .
3. G eorgeW . B us h ,“A D istinctly A m erican Internationalis m ,” Sim i
V alley ,C A ,Nov em ber 19 ,19 9 9 .
4 . h ttp :/ / w w w .p bs .org/ new s h our/ bb/ election/ 2000debates /
2ndebate1.h tm l.
5 . C h ines eE xercis e Strait 9 6 1: 8-25 M arch 19 9 6 ,W as h ington,D C :
Office ofNav al Intelligence, M ay 19 9 6 .
6 . F or a detailedandcom p reh ens iv e analy sis of C linton’s C h ina
p olicy ,s ee D av idM . L am p ton,Sam e B ed,D ifferent D ream s, B erkeley
andL os A n geles : Univ ers ity ofC alifornia Pres s ,2001.
7. Joh n K eefe,“A Tale of‘Tw o V ery Sorries ’,” F ar Eas tern E conom ic
Rev iew ,M arch 21,2002,p p . 30-33. Significantly ,C h ina als o concluded
th at its h andling of th e incident w as v irtually exem p lary . C h inese
an aly s ts in s is t th at B eijin g h an dled th e s ituation in a m ature,
m easuredw ay and dem onstrated th e effectiv enes s ofC h ina’s “crisis
m anagem ent ability .” See, for exam p le, th e dis cus s ion in “Th inkers ’
F orum : M idair C ollis ion and th e Future of Sino-U.S. Relations,”
Zh ongguo Pinglun (H ong K ong) June 1, 2001, translatedin F oreign
B roadcas t Inform ation Serv ice-C h ina,June21,2001.
8. B ush , “A D is tinctly A m erican Internationalis m ,” Nov em ber 19 ,
19 9 9 .
9 . G eorge W . B u s h , “B us h at th e C itadel,” C h arles ton, SC ,
D ecem ber 11,2001. w w w .cbsnew s .com .
10. E v an S. M edieros, Rap p orteur, US-C h ina Arm s C ontrol and
N onp roliferation C oop eration: Progres s and Pros p ects , M onterey :
M onterey In s titute ofInternational Studies ,October 2000,p . 19 .
11. Ibid.,p . 20.
12. L iD aozh ong,“A n Interp retation ofC h allenges Im p os edby U.S.
Unilateralis m on International M ultilateral A rm s C ontrol Regim e,”
Peace,No. 6 1,D ecem ber 2001,p . 19 .
14
13. See, for exam p le, A n drew Scobell, “C rouch ing K orea, H idden
C h ina: B us h A dm inis tration Policy Tow ardPy ongy ang andB eijing,”
A s ian Surv ey ,V ol. XL II, No. 2,M arch /A p ril2002,p p . 34 4 -34 5 . Scobell
contends th at B us h ap p ears to s ee C h ina not s o m uch as a strategic
com p etitor but rath er w ith uncertainty about w h eth er it is a friendor
foe. Th e Pres ident’s th inking about C h ina m igh t be called“strategic
am biv alence.” Ibid., p p . 36 3-36 4 . Th is am biv alence w as likely only
reinforcedas th eresult ofth ew ar on terroris m andth e tw o face-to-face
m eetings in late 2001 and early 2002 w ith Jiang in Sh angh ai and
B eijing,res p ectiv ely .
14 . On C h ines es us p icion s about th eB elgradebom bing andC h ines e
s u s p icions about U.S. intention s generally ,s ee A ndrew Scobell,C h ina
and Strategic Culture, C arlis le B arracks , PA : Strategic Studies
In s titute,M ay 2002,p p . 18-19 .
15 . Th e auth ors of th is introduction w ould add th at, like th e
Bush -Jiang talks in Sh angh ai and B eijing, th ere w as not m uch of
subs tance th at cam e out ofth e H u Jintao v is it to th e UnitedStates at
th einv itation ofV icePres ident C h eney in May 2002. On th eB u s h -Jiang
talks , s ee,for exam p le,Scobell, “C rouch ing K orea, H idden C h ina,” p.
35 9 .
15
16
PA R T I: PE RSPE C TIV E S ON C H IN A ’S
SE C URITY A N D M IL ITA RY POW E R
17
C H A PTE R 2
TH E V IE W FROM B E IJING :
U.S.-C H IN A SE C URITY RE L A TIONS
FROM K OSOV O TO SE PTE M B E R 11,2001
D av idM . F inkels tein
Introduction.
On October 19 ,2001,Pres idents G eorge W . B us h ofth e
UnitedStates andJiang Zem in ofth e Peop le’s Republicof
C h ina (PRC ) h ad th eir firs t face-to-face m eeting on th e
fringes of th e A s ia-Pacific E conom ic C ouncil (A PE C )
m eeting in Sh angh ai after alm os t a y ear of increas ingly
s trainedbilateral relations. W h at w as originally s ch eduled
to bea full-blow n sum m it m eeting,to includeav is itby B us h
to B eijing, w as curtailedto a h alf-day oftalks due to th e
unfores een andtragicterroris t attacks on th eUnitedStates
on Sep tem ber 11.1
B y all accounts , th e m eetings w ent w ell enough . Th e
official C h ines e p res s ch aracterized th e dis cus s ion s as
“cons tructiv e and fruitful” and h eld in a “friendly and
candidatm os p h ere.”2 In th eir joint p res s conference, B us h
readily agreedw ith Jiang th at th e dis cus s ions w ere us eful
andth at th e tw o m en h ad“a v ery goodm eeting.”3 B oth m en
agreedto im p rov e relations . Jiang calledfor “constructiv e
andcoop erativ erelations ,” as didB us h ,w h o addedth ew ord
“candid” to th e cons truct.4
Th e usual “deliv erables ” th at are as s ociatedw ith and
often anticip atedas a res ult ofth es e ty p es ofU.S.-C h ina
sum m its w ere m odes t. B ut giv en m any m onth s of tense
relations andth e ev ents ofSep tem ber 11,B us h andJiang
19
w ere able to accom p lis h tw o key objectiv es : es tablis h a
bas eline dialogue from w h ich to attem p t to im p rov e
relations ,es p ecially s ecurity relations,andp ublicly p res ent
a “unitedfront” on th eis s ue ofth e w ar on terroris m . In th e
future, th es e tw o th reads m ay becom e increas in gly
interw ov en as op erations in A fgh anis tan continue. Indeed,
for both countries , th e w ar against terroris m w ill only
m agnify th e im p ortance of p lacing U.S.-C h ina relations,
es p ecially s ecurity relations,on an ev en keel.
F or C h ina,th e next few y ears w ill w itnes s a s ignificant
leaders h ip s ucces s ion— th e acces s ion to p ow er of th e
“F ourth G eneration” ofleaders in 2002. Th es e are th e m en
w h o w illh av e to grap p le w ith th eincreas ingly difficult tas k
ofp us h ing forw ardeconom icands tructural reform s ,w h ile
m anaging th e s ocial andp olitical dis locations attendant to
th os e reform s . Th ey w ill h av e to m ov e forw ard w ith th e
dev elop m ent ofC h ina’s w es tern region,tackle th einternal
p roblem s p laguing th e C h ines e C om m unis t Party (C C P),
and m anage th e is s ues as s ociated w ith W orld Trade
Organization (W TO)entry . A llofth is w illbegoing on w h ile
C h ina w ill be increas ingly p lacedunder th e international
m icros cop e in th e lead-up to th e 2008 Oly m p ics . M oreov er,
th e Taiw an is s ue is becom ing m ore com p lex for C h ines e
leaders as p olitical dev elop m ents anddom es tic p olitics in
Taip ei becom e m ore com p licated. A ndnow th at th e United
States is actually p ros ecuting m ilitary op erations in a
country w ith w h ich C h ina s h ares a landborder— alw ay s a
h igh order C h ines e s ecurity concern— B eijing now h as a
s erious s take in not being cut out by W as h ington. C h ina
s im p ly cannot afforda confrontational relations h ip w ith th e
UnitedStates at th is p oint in tim e ifit can be av oided.
N eedles s to s ay , a confrontational relationsh ip w ith
C h ina w ill not s erv e U.S. interes ts eith er. E s p ecially
becaus e of th e cam p aign in A fgh anis tan and th e global
nature ofW as h ington’s w ar on terroris m , s table bilateral
relations betw een th e UnitedStates andC h ina are a m us t.
Th e is s ue ofterroris m notw ith s tanding, s traineds ecurity
relations w ith C h ina s erv es no ends if it can be av oided.
20
In creas ed U.S.-C h in a ten s ion s w ill only u n n erv e
W as h ington’s allies andfriends in th e A s ia-Pacificregion.
A n uns tablerelationsh ip couldh av e a deleterious im p act on
U.S. bus ines s and trade interes ts at a tim e of econom ic
uncertainty . Increas edtensions couldcom p licate key U.S.
s ecurity concerns in E as t A s ia,such as th e m aintenanceof
s tability on th e K orean Peninsula andes p ecially acros s th e
Taiw an Strait. Ov erall,w ors ening bilateral relations w ith
C h ina couldbecom e an unending foreign p olicy dis traction
to a B us h W h ite H ous e th at needs to focus its foreign p olicy
energies on th e w ar against terroris ts .
A t th e s am e tim e,due to a grow ing m utual dis trus t th at
h as ev olv edw ith in th etw o s ecurity es tablis h m ents ov er th e
p as t few y ears ,s ecurity differences betw een th etw o nations
w ill be th e m os t ch allenging area in w h ich to rep air
relations andm ov e th em forw ard.
U.S. concerns v is-à-v is C h ina are w ell know n. F or th e
m os t p art,U.S. w orries on th e s ecurity front h av e rev olv ed
around th e follow ing four key is s ues . F irs t, grow ing
concerns th at B eijing is p rep aredto us e force to res olv e th e
Taiw an is s ue“s ooner rath er th an later,”bas edon a calculus
th at few in th e W es t can claim to unders tand w ith any
degree of certainty .5 Second, U.S. concern about C h ines e
p roliferation beh av ior. Th ird, giv en th e lack of defense
tran s p arency in C h ina,uncertainties in th e UnitedStates
as to th eintentions beh indC h ina’s m ilitary m odernization
p rogram s — conv en tional an d n u clear. A n d fourth ,
ques tions in th e UnitedStates as to w h eth er C h ina w ould
like to s ee th e U.S. m ilitary p us h edout ofth e Pacific,or at
leas t p u lled back. 6 A ll of th es e is s ues are critically
im p ortant to th e regional s ecurity interes ts ofth e United
States . On a 4 -tier s cale ofnational interes ts — (1)s urv iv al,
(2)v ital,(3)m ajor,(4 )p erip h eral— th ey ratein th ev ital and
m ajor categories . Th is is not insignificant.
L ikew is e, in B eijing, th e “U.S. factor” in th e C h ines e
national s ecurity calculus ap p ears to h av e grow n ev en
greater th an in th e p as t. Ov er th e p as t few y ears , th e
21
p erceiv ed“ch allenges ” to C h ines e national s ov ereignty and
s ecurity interes ts p os ed by th e s ecurity p olicies of th e
UnitedStates — real or im aginedon th eir p art— are being
v iew edby a goodnum ber ofC h ines e s ecurity analy s ts w ith
increas ing alarm . W h ereas ,one couldargue, U.S. s ecurity
concerns about C h ina range backw ards from “v ital” to
“m ajor,” m any C h ines e s ee U.S. ch allenges as ranging
up w ards from “m ajor” to “v ital” and, in som e cas es , ev en
“s urv iv al.” Th is trendis extrem ely w orris om e iftrue.
B ecaus em os t A m erican analy s ts arealready w ellaw are
of th e C h ines e s ecurity p olicies th at giv e p aus e in th e
UnitedStates , th e as s ignm ent giv en th is s tudent by th e
con feren ce organ izers w as to iden tify th e C h in es e
concerns— w h ich are not alw ay s s elf-ev ident. Th e auth or of
th is ch ap ter,th erefore,w illrev iew th e grow ing uncertainty ,
concern, and angs t w ith w h ich B eijing h as v iew ed th e
UnitedStates ov er th ep as tcoup leofy ears . H ew illattem p t
to v iew th e w orldth rough C h ines e ey es . H e w ill attem p t to
conv ey th eC h ines eanaly ticfram ew ork v is-à-v is th eUnited
States — an analy ticfram e ofm ind,ify ou w ill— as w ell as
s p ecificp olicy concerns.
Th ebes t w ay to do s o is to rev iew for readers th es erious
national s ecurity debates th at h av e taken p lacein C h ina in
th e v ery recent p as t th at,in m any w ay s ,h av e been driv en
by C h ines e angs t about th e UnitedStates . Th e auth or w ill
p res ent an ov erv iew ofth ev ery s ignificant nationals ecurity
debate th at took p lacein C h ina in 19 9 9 in th e afterm ath of
N A TO’s K os ov o interv ention.7 H e w ill touch briefly on th e
A p ril2001 E P-3incident,andaddres s th e“A m erica debate”
th at w as unfolding in B eijing as ofth esum m er of2001,jus t
p rior to Sep tem ber 11. F inally , th e auth or w ill s p eculate
about th e concerns C h ines e analy s ts m igh t h av e as th ey
v iew th e s ecurity im p lications ofth e A m erican cam p aign in
A fgh anis tan, and, p res um ably , th e w ar against terroris m
bey ond.
A cav eat at th eouts et is in order. It is im p ortant th at th e
C h in es e W eltan s ch auung be fully u n ders tood an d
22
exp lained, es p ecially as it concerns th e United States .
H ow ev er,doing s o does not im p ly agreem ent.
19 9 9 : K os ov o and th e “G reat Peace
andD ev elop m ent D ebate.”
Ov erv iew . F rom M arch 19 9 9 th rough th e late fall of
19 9 9 ,a national s ecurity debate took p lacein C h ina. It w as
rem arkable on tw o counts .
F or th e firs t tim e s ince 19 85 , D eng Xiaop ing’s bas ic
as s es s m ent of th e s tate of th e international s ecurity
env ironm ent— th at “p eace and dev elop m ent” (H ep ing Yu
F azh an) w ere th e trends of th e tim es — w as s erious ly
ques tionedandintensely s crutinized. Ofkey s ignificance,
th e efficacy ofC h ina’s foreign p olicies andth e v alidity of
C h ina’s national defense p olicies w ere es p ecially subjected
to ferv idinternal debate.
Th es econdreas on th at th is w as a rem arkableev ent w as
th at th is w as likely th e firs t tim e s ince 19 4 9 th at C h ines e
foreign p olicy anddefensep olicy w ereop enly dis cus s edand
debatedin th e gov ernm ent-controlledm edia as m atters of
p ublicconcern— to includecriticis m s ofgov ernm ent p olicies
by th e general p op ulace.
Judging from th eC h ines ep res s ,during th eh eigh t ofth e
debate (th e sum m er of19 9 9 )alm os t ev ery literate s ector of
th e C h ina p olity w as ap p arently engaged in a m edia
free-for-all on foreign p olicy and defen s e is s ues . Th is
in cluded in tellectuals , m iddle clas s en trep ren eurs ,
s tudents ,andev en C h ines e gov ernm ent analy s ts w h o took
to th eop -edp ages ,radio call-in sh ow s ,andTV roundtables .8
Public dis cours e rev olv edabout th e s tate ofth e w orld,
C h ina’s p lacein it,th e s tate ofC h ines e s ecurity ,as w ell as
w h at th e gov ernm ent in B eijing s h ould do about th es e
is s ues andabout th e UnitedStates .
Th ep roxim ate caus eofth is debate w as N A TO’s m ilitary
interv ention in K os ov o in M arch 19 9 9 . NA TO’s errant
23
bom bing ofth ePRC E m bas s y in B elgradein M ay addedfuel
to th e debate. H ow ev er, beh in d th es e is s ues w ere
long-s im m ering C h ines e concerns th at th e p os t-C oldW ar
in tern ation al order w as n ot u n folding as C h in es e
international relations th eoris ts h adp redicted.Th edebate,
es p ecially th einternaldebate,w as als o driv en by increas ing
C h ines e concern s about U.S. s trategic intentions and
p olicies in th e p os t-C oldW ar order in general,andtow ards
C h ina in particular.
A t its m os t fundam entallev el,th edebate th at took p lace
in 19 9 9 w as about h ow th e C h ines e gov ernm ent s h ould
as s es s th e s tate of th e unfolding international s ecurity
env ironm ent. B ut m os t im p ortant, it w as about th e
im p lications of th at as s es s m ent for C h ina’s external
s ecurity .
Th e ov erarch ing ques tion w as s im p le: h ad C h ina’s
external s ecurity s ituation fundam entally deterioratedas a
result of N A TO’s interv ention in K os ov o? Th is ques tion
brough t oth ers to th e surface: W h at didoth er global and
regional s ecurity dev elop m ents p ortend? A nds h ouldC h ina
adjus t its dom es tic p riorities , its foreign p olicies , or its
defense p olicies ?
On th e dip lom atic front, for exam p le, ques tions w ere
rais ed as to w h eth er th e C h ines e gov ernm ent h ad been
p lacing too m uch em p h as is on cultiv ating th e “dev elop ed
w orld”— es p ecially th e United States — in s tead of th e
“dev elop ing w orld,” w h ich it h adtraditionally em p h as ized?
Oth ers as ked w h eth er th e gov ernm ent w as becom ing
inv olv edin international affairs th at w ere too far rem ov ed
from C h ina’s traditional, m ore narrow ly definednational
interes ts . In effect,th is ques tion as kedw h eth er th ecentral
leaders h ip w as w alkin g aw ay from D eng Xiaop ing’s
oft-quoteddictum th at in foreign affairs “C h ina s h ouldkeep
a low p rofile andnev er take th e lead.”
On th e is s ue ofnational defense m odernization, s om e
v oicedconcerns th at th e“U.S.-led” K os ov o interv ention w as
ev idence th at C h ina couldno longer affordto continue to
24
subjugate defensem odernization to econom icdev elop m ent.
Indeed, s om e arguedth at it w as now tim e to p lace equal
em p h as is on th e tw o.
A s w e s h all s ee,it w as not jus t th e K os ov o interv ention
th at m ade th is an is s ue. Oth er is s ues s im m ering in th e
backgroundw ere at w ork,andit is im p ortant to p oint out
th at th os e w h o s aw a needfor enh ancedm ilitary defense
w ere not jus t in th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y (PL A ): th ey
w ere as likely to be foundin civ ilian m inis tries andth eir
affiliatedinstitutes .
B ut at th e h eart of th e debate in official circles w ere
ques tions about th e United States as a w orld actor in
general, W as h ington’s s p ecific intentions tow ard C h ina,
andth e future ofU.S.-C h ina relations. Indeed, alm os t all
C h ines e on ev ery s ide ofth e debate w ere able to agree th at
any deleterious ch anges in th e international s ecurity
env ironm ent andany degradation ofC h ina’s ow n security
w ere a function of th e actions and intention s , real or
p erceiv ed,ofth e UnitedStates .
B y m os t accounts ,th e “U.S. ques tion” in particular w as
th e m os t contentious is s ue debatedinternally by C h ines e
gov ernm ent analy s ts andoth er officials . A s oneC h ines eput
it, “Th e C h ines e reaction to K os ov o created th e p olitical
atm os p h ere th at unleas h eda debate by th os e uns atis fied
w ith PRC p olicy tow ardth e U.S.” A t a certain p oint in th e
dis cours e, th e ques tion ofw h eth er confrontation w ith th e
United States w as inev itable becam e th e centerp iece of
dis cours e. Oth er ques tions rev olv edabout h ow to deal w ith
th e UnitedStates andth e tradeoffs betw een coop eration
andconfrontation w ith W as h ington.
In th e lexicology ofC h ines e analy s es ,all ofth es eis s ues
andoth ers w ere cap turedby as king w h eth er “p eace and
dev elop m ent” w as s till “th e key note ofth e tim es .”
To gras p th e s ignificance of th e ques tion, one m us t
unders tandth e im p lications ofques tioning th e v alidity of
“p eace and dev elop m ent” as th e “key note of th e tim es ”
25
(s h idaizh uti). D oing s o requires a s tep back to recall M ao
Zedong’s as s es s m ent andD eng Xiaop ing’s rev ers al ofth at
as s es s m ent. In C h ina th es e as s es s m ents are not m ere
exercis es in th eoretical dis cours e: th ey are th e s tarting
p oint for jus tify ing or rationalizing s p ecificnational p olicy
decis ions . 9 Th erefore, a rev iew of th e differences in
dom es tic,foreign,andm ilitary p olicies jus tifiedby th ev ery
different as s es s m ents m ade by M ao andD eng p rov ides a
h is torical context w ith w h ich to v iew th e debate of19 9 9 .
Th eM aois tL ine: “W ar andRev olution.”In th e19 6 0s and
19 70s ,th e M aois t as s es s m ent ofth e international s ecurity
env ironm ent w as com m only s tatedas “w ar andrev olution”
(zh anzh eng y u gem ing). Th is w as a result ofth e p erceiv ed
m ilitary th reats to C h ina from th e United States and
es p ecially th eSov iet Union after th ebreak betw een M os cow
andB eijing. It w as als o a function ofth e ideological lens
th rough w h ich M ao v iew edth e w orld.
A s a res ult ofth is as s es s m ent,C h ina’s s ecurity p os ture
andits dom es ticp olicies w erech aracterizedby keep ing th e
C h ines e nation andth e PL A on a w ar footing,p erp etuating
“clas s s truggle” w ith in C h ina,andp urs uing a foreign p olicy
focus edon th e“s ocialis tcam p ” andth erev olutionary “Th ird
W orld.” F or th e m os t p art,C h ina rem ained“clos ed” to th e
cap italis t w orld.
A s w e know ,th is as s es s m ent h ada p rofoundim p act on
th e econom y and s ociety . Th e com bined requirem ents of
being on a w ar footing andM ao’s ideological im p erativ es
resulted in an autarkic econom y ; an em p h as is on h eav y
indus tries m ov edinland; th e p erp etuation ofth e p olicies of
th e com m unization of agriculture and indus try ; and th e
near-des truction ofth e national bourgeois ie.
F or its p art,th e PL A w as toldto exp ect“early w ar,m ajor
w ar,andnuclear w ar.” Th is m eant m aintaining a m as s iv e
defen s e es tablis h m ent, rely ing on “Peop le’s W ar” as a
m ilitary s trategy ,anda beliefth at “superior” p olitical w ill
could ov ercom e th e adv anced tech nologies of p otential
26
op p onents . It als o p erp etuatedth eh igh ly elev ateds tatus of
th e PL A in th e C h ines e p olity .
Th e D engis t L ine: “Peace andD ev elop m ent.” In th e late
19 70s andearly 19 80s ,D eng Xiaop ing began taking C h ina
dow n a p ath of bold ch ange. D eng’s reas s es s m ent of th e
“key note ofth e tim es ” p rov ideda critical ideological bas is
for th e m y riadofs ea-ch ange reform s th at w ouldens ue. It
als o w as th ejus tification for a ch angein national p riorities .
B y 19 85 D en g h ad rev ers ed th e M aois t as s es s m en t
com p letely .
W h ere M ao s aw “w ar andrev olution” as th e context for
international s ecurity ,D eng acknow ledgedth e ch anges in
superp ow er relations and C h ina’s ow n pros p ects . D eng’s
reas s es s m ent h eldth at “p eaceanddev elop m ent”(h ep ing y u
fazh an)m ore correctly des cribedth e trends in th e w orld.
Th e D engis t v iew h eld th at, in s p ite of th e continuing
dangers to C h ina p os edby w ars andconflicts ,th ep os s ibility
of a w orldw ar w as rem ote, th e ch ance of a nuclear w ar
betw een th esuperp ow ers w as s ligh t,C h ina didnot faceth e
p ros p ect of im m inent inv as ion, and C h ina w ould enjoy at
leas t2decades ofa p eaceful international env ironm ent.
Th e p olicy ch anges deriv ed from th is as s es s m ent are
w ell know n. D om es tically ,“econom ics as th e central tas k”
rep laced “clas s s truggle as th e key link.” In foreign
relations , C h ina began to s eek contact andgoodrelations
w ith th e cap italis t w orldas w ell as th e s ocialis t cam p ,and
w ith dev elop edcountries as w ell as dev elop ing countries .
“Reform and op ening up ” (gaige y u kaifeng) becam e th e
m ajor th rus t.
In th earea ofdefensep olicy ,th e PL A w as taken offa w ar
footing ands h iftedonto a p rolongedp eriodof“p eacetim e
arm y -building,” th us initiating th e reform s ofth e C h ines e
m ilitary th at p ers is t today : nam ely m ov ing tow ard a
(relativ ely )leaner,but m oretech nologically adv ancedPL A .
Jus t as im p ortantly ,D eng p lacedm ilitary m odernization as
th e las t p riority in h is “F our M odernizations.”
27
A t an en larged m eetin g of th e C en tral M ilitary
C om m is s ion in J u n e 1 9 85 , D en g exp lain ed h is
reas s es s m en t to h is generals . W h ile recognizin g th e
dangers th at p ers is ted,h e as s ertedth at “th e w orldforces
for p eace are grow ing fas ter th an th e forces for w ar.” D eng
toldh is m ilitary leaders to be p atient, to p lace econom ic
construction abov e all els e,andto w ait for at leas t 20 y ears .
A t th at tim e C h ina’s econom ic s trength w ould p erm it a
greater em p h as is on m ilitary m odernization.
F as t forw ardto 19 9 9 . C learly th en, th e critique ofth e
D engis t as s es s m ent during th e K os ov o debate engendered
m ajor im p lications for th ebroads w eep ofC h ines edom es tic,
foreign, anddefense p olicies . If “p eace anddev elop m ent”
w ere no longer th e trend,w h at w as ? D idK os ov o s ignify th e
trium p h ofth e “forces for w ar” ov er th e “forces for p eace”?
Sh ouldC h ina rais edefens em odernization at th eexp enseof
econom ic reform ? Sh ould B eijing turn its back on th e
dev elop edandcap italis t w orldandfocus its foreign p olicies
on th e dev elop ing w orld exclus iv ely ? Is conflict w ith th e
UnitedStates inev itable?
D raconian as th es e ques tions m ay s eem , th e h igh ly
ch arged atm os p h ere in B eijing in th e afterm ath of th e
K os ov o interv ention (and es p ecially after th e erran t
bom bing of th e PRC E m bas s y in B elgrade) p rov ided a
backdrop against w h ich th es e ty p es ofques tions could be
as ked and debated for th e firs t tim e in m any y ears as
C h in es e analy s ts attem p ted to m ake s en s e out of a
p os t- C old W ar in tern ation al order th at, from th e
p ers p ectiv e of s om e, now s eem ed to be m ov ing agains t
C h ines e national interes ts .
Th e degree of angs t in B eijing during th is p eriod is
p artially exp lainedby com p aring C h ina’s s ucces s es in th e
p receding 3y ears ,19 9 6 -9 9 ,w ith ev ents in late 19 9 8 andin
early 19 9 9 .
Prior to 19 9 9 : Riding th e W av es of Self- C onfidence.
B etw een 19 9 6 andlate 19 9 8, B eijing h adev ery reas on to
28
feel new ly confident in its p lace in th e w orld order,
es p ecially in foreign affairs .
?
In th e w ake of th e 19 9 5 -9 6 Taiw an Strait cris es ,
U.S.-C h ina relation s s eem edto beback on track after
th e tw o p res idential sum m its in 19 9 7 and19 9 8. A n
agreem en t to s eek a “C on s tructiv e Strategic
Partners h ip ” w as announced,andPres ident W illiam
C lin ton p ublicly s tated th e “Th ree N o’s ” in
Sh angh ai.10
?
N early 10 y ears after Tiananm en,alm os t all foreign
econom ics anctions against C h ina h adbeen lifted.
?
B etw een 19 9 6 and 19 9 8, a v ery p roactiv e foreign
p olicy s p earh eaded by Jian g res ulted in th e
es tablis h m ent ofa s eries of“p artners h ip s ” aroundth e
globe w ith key dev elop edcountries .11
?
H ong K ong’s retroces s ion to C h ina w as accom p lis h ed,
andM acao’s w as to be next.
?
H um an righ ts is s ues no longer ap p earedto bea m ajor
im p edim ent to C h ina’s foreign econom ic relations.
N ot only h adE urop e s eem ingly los t interes t in th is
is s ue but als o, for th e firs t tim e in m any y ears , th e
UnitedStates in 19 9 8 did not s p ons or a res olution
condem ning C h ina at th e annual m eeting of th e
UnitedN ations (U.N .)H um an Righ ts C om m is s ion in
G enev a.
?
B eijing w as m aking excellent p rogres s in res olv ing
border dis p utes w ith neigh bors , notably Rus s ia and
ev en V ietn am . M oreov er, th e “Sh an gh ai F iv e”
arrangem ent betw een C h ina, Rus s ia, K azakh s tan,
Tajikis tan,andK y rgy zs tan w as w ell under w ay .12
?
C h ina h adreceiv edaccolades from aroundth e w orld
for “res p onsible” beh av ior during th e A s ian financial
cris is , and for th e m om ent th e focus of regional
29
concern in A s ia w as on financial recov ery ,not C h ina’s
ris e as a regional p ow er.
?
On th e Taiw an front, th e PRC s eem edto be on th e
m ov e, andTaip ei ap p earedto be on th e defensiv e. In
addition to obtaining th e “Th ree No’s ” from th e U.S.
Pres ident,C h ina w as p res s uring Taiw an for p olitical
talks andw aging an activ edip lom aticoffensiv eto w oo
th os ecountries th at s tillrecognizedTaip ei. Th elos s of
dip lom aticrelations w ith South A frica in 19 9 8 w as a
s erious blow to Taiw an in th is regard.
D om es tically , th e s ituation w as tolerable. C h ina w as
able to w eath er th e A s ian fin an cial cris is w ith out
dev aluating its currency . G row th w as accep table,ifnot as
great as des ired. Th e s ocial dis locations attendant to
econom ic reform s eem ed m anageable, alth ough concerns
about labor unres t p ers is ted.
19 9 9 : A Year ofD is as ters . Juxtap os edagainst 3 y ears of
relativ ely s m ooth s ailing, th e clos e of 19 9 8 andth e firs t
m onth s of 19 9 9 brough t, from a C h ines e p ers p ectiv e,
om inous dev elop m ents in key areas of concern: Jap an,
Taiw an,andrelations w ith th eUnitedStates . Som eofth es e
ev ents took p lace before th e K os ov o interv ention or th e
E m bas s y bom bing, oth ers afterw ards . Th e net effect,
h ow ev er, w as to rais e fears am ong m any C h ines e officials
andanaly s ts th at s ecurity trends w ere now turning agains t
C h ina’s interes ts . Th es e ev ents p rov idedboth a context for
th e debate of19 9 9 and,in s om ecas es ,new im p etus during
th e debate.
J ap an . Th rough out th is p eriod (1 9 9 8, 1 9 9 9 )
dev elop m ents in Jap an begin to be v iew edw ith increas ing
ap p reh ens ion by th e C h ines e analy ticxitong.
?
In D ecem ber 19 9 8 th e G ov ern m en t of Jap an
announcedits decis ion to join th e UnitedStates in
co-res earch ofth eup p er-tier Th eater B allis ticM is s ile
D efense p rogram .
30
?
In M arch 19 9 9 th e Jap an M aritim e Self-D efense
F orce fired up on N orth K orean v es s els — th e firs t
s h ots fired in anger by th e Jap anes e arm ed forces
s ince th e endofW orldW ar II.
?
Th eJap anes eD iet ratifiedth eRev is edG uidelines for
D efense C oop eration w ith th e UnitedStates in M ay
19 9 9 ,refus ing to s p ecify for B eijing w h eth er Taiw an
w as in cluded in th e am biguous p h ras e “areas
surrounding Jap an.”
?
A ll ofth is addedto concerns about Jap an in th e w ake
ofJiang’s les s th an succes s ful v is it to th at country in
late N ov em ber 19 9 8.
Taiw an. In early July 19 9 9 th en-Pres ident L eeTeng-h ui
is s uedh is “Tw o-State Th eory ,” w h ich resultedin anoth er
“m ini-cris is ” in cros s - Strait relations . E n ough s aid.
United States. To one degree or anoth er, th e United
States , during th e debate, began to be v iew ed by m any
analy s ts in B eijing as th e root caus e ofth e negativ e trends
in Jap anes e andTaiw an affairs in addition to becom ing a
p roblem in its ow n righ t. W h at didC h ines e analy s ts focus
on?
?
In Jan u ary 19 9 9 th e C lin ton adm in is tration
announcedits decis ion to m ov e forw ardon National
M is s ile D efens e.
?
In A p ril 19 9 9 Zh u Rongji’s v is it to W as h ington for th e
exp res s edpurp os e ofnegotiating C h ines e p erm anent
norm al trading relations (PNTR) an d W TO
m em bers h ip endedin failure. Indeed,in late M arch
th ere h adbeen a “m ini-debate”in C h ina as to w h eth er
Zh u s h ouldh av egone at all,giv en th einauguration of
th e N A TO air cam p aign agains t Serbia anda lack of
consens us w ith in th e C h ines e bureaucracy about th e
ty p es of conces s ion s B eijing couldaffordto m ake in
th os e negotiations .
31
?
Th rough out th is p eriod, C h ines e analy s ts began to
as s es s th at th e s o-called“anti-C h ina” v oices in th e
United States w ere gaining th e up p er h and ov er
C h ina p olicy . Som e of th e m ore p rom inent “data
p oints ” th ey cited included th e “C ox C om m ittee
Rep ort” (M ay )andth eL os A lam os es p ionagecas e; th e
tabling of th e Taiw an Security E nh ancem ent A ct
(A p ril- M ay ); th e requirem en t lev ied on th e
D ep artm ent of D efen s e to p ublis h its s tudy on
h y p oth etical th eater ballis ticm is s iledefense(TB M D )
arch itectures in A s ia in clu ding Taiw an ; th e
p os s ibility of th e s ale of TB M D -related radars to
Taip ei (June); andth e concern ov er C h ina’s alleged
future influence ov er th e Panam a C anal (July ).
N A TO andK os ov o. Th en,ofcours e,th ere w as th e is s ue
ofK os ov o its elf. Som e C h ines e s ecurity analy s ts believ edit
es tablis h ed p recedents for m ilitary interv entions in th e
“internal affairs ” ofs ov ereign s tates anddem onstratedth e
“w ill” ofth e UnitedStates (as v iew edfrom B eijing)to us e
force “to m aintain its w orlddom inance.” K os ov o s h ocked
m any C h ines e into ques tioning w h eth er th e global trends
w ere in fact aw ay from w ar an d tow ard C h in a’s
m uch -touted m ultip olar w orld order— th e p rev ious
analy s is .
Th e air cam p aign began in M arch w h ile Jiang Zem in
w as in Italy , a N A TO m em ber, as p art of a th ree-nation
E urop ean v is it. In deciding to interv enew ith m ilitary force,
N A TO sides tep p ed th e U.N . and m arginalized Security
C ouncilm em bers C h ina andRus s ia. Th en,in early M ay ,th e
PRC E m bas s y w as inadv ertently attacked.
Jus t as dis concertin g to th e C h in es e w ere oth er
N A TO-related ev ents . In A p ril, N A TO accep ted Poland,
H ungary ,andth e C zech Rep ublicas n ew m em bers . D uring
N A TO’s 5 0th anniv ers ary celebrations in W as h ington, a
new “Strategic C on cep t” w as declared th at in cluded
out-of-area m is s ions . A ls o aroundth at tim e (June)w as th e
coining ofth e “C linton D octrine,” w h ich w as interp retedin
32
C h ina as es p ous ing th elegitim acy ofm ilitary interv entions
in s ov ereign nations for h um anitarian purp os es . B eijing
im m ediately th ough t of th e im p lication s for Taiw an,
Xinjiang,andTibet,andcarefully w atch eddev elop m ents in
C h ech ny a.13
D om es ticC oncerns. E v en on th edom es ticfront,th efirs t
h alf of 19 9 9 p res en ted is s ues for concern w ith in
Zh ongnanh ai. H igh -p rofile corrup tion cas es continued to
em barras s th e Party ; reform s of th e s tate-ow n ed
enterp ris es w ere becom ing difficult to carry out; and
consum er dem andat h om e w as s low ing. Ifth e H ong K ong
p res s is to be believ ed, large- s cale and often-v iolent
in ciden ts of labor un res t con tinued to p lague local
gov ernm ents on th e m ainland. E v en m ore unsettling w ere
th e ris e in th e p rofile of th e C h ina D em ocracy Party
follow ing th eC linton v is it to C h ina (19 9 8)andth e“s h ock”of
th e F alun G ong p h enom enon beginning in A p ril 19 9 9 and
continuing today .
Ov erall th en, in jus t a few m onth s th e confidence of
C h ines e leaders and th eir analy s ts w as s ignificantly
s h aken. Th ey w ere no longer s o certain ofth eir p lacein th e
w orld order or of th eir as s es s m ent of w orld trends as
fav oring C h ina’s continuedris e both at h om e andabroad.
Th e Results ofth e D ebate. A t th e endofth e day ,after
ream s of analy s is andinces s ant rounds of m eetings , th e
debate re-lookedm any ofth es e key is s ues . A ndby th e tim e
th e B eidaih e m eetings took p lacein A ugus t 19 9 9 th ere w as
closure on m any ofth em : at leas t on an official lev el (ifnot
intellectually ).
Th at closure cam ein th eform ofa new s h orth andfor th e
s tate ofth e international s ecurity s ituation referredto as
“Th e Th ree N o C h anges andth e Th ree N ew C h anges .”
33
Th e “Th ree N o C h anges ” as s ert th e follow ing:
?
Peace an d dev elop m en t rem ain th e tren d in
international relations andth e m ov em ent tow arda
m ultip olar w orldcontinues ;
?
E conom icglobalization continues to increas e; and,
?
Th e m ajor tren d is tow ard th e relaxation of
international tens ions.
B ut th es e th ree p oints w erem odifiedby th e “Th ree N ew
C h anges ”:
?
H egem onis m andp ow er p olitics are on th e ris e;
?
Th e tren d tow ard m ilitary in terv en tionis m
increas ing; and,
?
Th e gap betw een dev elop edanddev elop ing countries
is increas ing.
is
C learly , th es e tw o s ets of s eem ingly contradictory
as s es s m ents rep res enteda com p rom is e p os ition betw een
th os ew h o w ere relativ ely op tim is ticabout long-term trends
andth os e w h o w ere v ery m uch focus edon andconcerned
about near-term negativ e dev elop m ents .
Th e “Th ree N o C h anges ” reaffirm edth e bas ic th rus t of
D eng’s earlier analy s is . C h ina didnot now face “early w ar,
m ajor w ar,andnuclear w ar.” It reaffirm edth e analy s es by
C h ines e international relations th eoris ts s ince th e late
19 80s th at th e w orld w ould ev entually m ov e tow ard a
m ultip olar international order and th at C h ina w ould
becom e one ofth e key p oles . It als o recognizedth e grow ing
im p ortanceofeconom ics in international relations . So,to a
great degree,it accountedfor th ev iew s ofth os ew h o didnot
s ee K os ov o andoth er s ecurity -relatedev ents ofconcern as
requiring a m ajor readjus tm ent ofth eD engis t as s es s m ent.
Th is form ulation h addirect andim m ediate im p lications
for C h ines e dom es ticp olicies . It reaffirm edth ecorrectnes s
34
of “econom ics as th e central task” and p rov ided th e
continued ideological jus tification for th e leaders h ip in
B eijing to p res s forw ardw ith th e next p h as es ofeconom ic
and s tructural reform , to include th e p ursuit of W TO
m em bers h ip . So w h en C h ines e interlocutors s ay th at
“noth ing ch anged” as a res ult ofK os ov o,th ey are not being
dis ingenuous . Th ere w as ,in fact,no decis ion to rev ers e th e
D engis t line andth e direction ofdom es ticreform s .
H ow ev er, s om eth ing did ch ange after K os ov o. Th e
“Th ree N ew C h an ges ” added s erious cav eats to th e
generally p os itiv e long-term trends citedin th e firs t p art of
th e construct.
F or one th ing, th e “Th ree N ew C h anges ” w as an
adm is s ion th at p rev ious C h ines e gov ernm ent analy s es of
th enear-term trends in th einternational s ecurity h adbeen
m u ch too op tim is tic about th e p ace of global
m ultip olarization and m uch too quick to dis m is s th e
p otentially des tabilizing effects th at local w ars and
w orldw ide m ilitary interv entions m igh t h av e on C h ina’s
interes ts .
C learly , B eijing’s m uch -h op ed-for m ultip olar w orld
order w as not around th e corner. In addition, th e new
as s es s m ent certainly undercut th e as s ertion in th e 19 9 8
D efense W h ite Pap er th at “th e influenceofarm edconflicts
andlocal w ars h adbeen rem arkably w eakened.”In fact,th e
“Th ree N ew C h anges ” undercut th e entire tenor ofth e firs t
s ection ofth e 19 9 8 D efens e W h ite Pap er.
Th es econdch angeim p licit in th e “Th ree New C h anges ”
is th e C h ines e as s es s m ent ofth e root caus eofth e p roblem s
facing w orlds ecurity ands tability .
Prev ious ly , B eijing h ads een th e UnitedStates as one
s ourceofs om eofth ep roblem s p laguing w orlds ecurity ,both
econom ic and m ilitary . B ut th ere w ere p lenty of oth er
nations andnon-national actors v iew edas p roblem atic. In
th ew akeofK os ov o anda h os t ofoth er ev ents s ince19 9 8,th e
m ix ofp roblem s rem ainedth e s am e. B ut th e UnitedStates
35
andits p olicies w ere now s tarting to bev iew edas a p rincip al
s ourceofth es e p roblem s ,es p ecially for C h ina. A ndby m os t
accounts th e “Th ree New C h anges ” is about th e United
States alm os t exclus iv ely .
Of equal s ignificance, th e new as s es s m ent, and a
reinforced v iew of th e United States as a s up erp ow er
“h egem on,” s eem edto h av e p ut to res t p rev ious derigueur
in tern al an d academ ic as s es s m en ts th at th e
“com p reh ensiv enational p ow er” ofth eUnitedStates w as in
a s low declin e— an an aly tic “lin e” th at h ad been
com m onplacefor at leas t a decade.14 Th e new line s eem s to
be accom p aniedby an as s es s m ent th at th e UnitedStates
w illm aintain its s tatus as “s ole s up erp ow er” for th enext 20
y ears ,ifnot longer.
A t th e end of th e day , th en, th e degree to w h ich th e
p os t-debate analy s is of th e international and regional
s ecurity env ironm ent, and th e as s es s m ent of th e US,
becam e an official“line”w as reflectedin th eform ulations in
th efirs t s ection ofth eOctober 2000 D efenseW h itePap er.
Th e O ctober 2000 D efen s e W h ite Pap er, C h ina’s
N ational D efen s e 2000, p rov ided a m uch m ore s ober
as s es s m ent of th e trends in international and regional
s ecurity th an h adbeen articulatedin th eJuly 19 9 8 v ers ion.
Som eofth e as s es s m ents from th eim p ortant firs t s ection of
th e O ctober 2000 D efen s e W h ite Pap er are w orth
rev iew ing.15
?
“In today ’s w orldfactors th at m ay caus e instability
anduncertainty h av em arkedly increas ed.”
?
“H egem onis m andp ow er p olitics s till exis t and are
furth er dev elop ing.”
?
“C ertain big p ow ers are p u rs u in g neoin terv en tion is m , n eo-gunboat dip lom acy , an d
neo-econom ic colonialis m . . . w h ich are s erious ly
dam aging th e s ov ereign ty , in dep enden ce, and
36
dev elop m ent in teres ts of m an y countries , and
th reatening w orld p eaceands ecurity .”
?
“Th e UnitedNations’auth ority androle in h andling
international and regional s ecurity affairs . . . are
being s erious ly ch allenged.”
?
“L ocal w ars andarm edconflicts . . . h av e increas ed
again.”
?
“Th ere are . . . new negativ e dev elop m ents ... in th e
s ecurity ofth e A s ia-Pacificregion.”
?
“Th e Taiw an Straits s ituation . . . is com p licatedand
grim .”
F inally ,to unders core increas ing concern ov er C h ines e
s ecurity , th e D efense W h ite Pap er of2000 announcedth e
follow ing:
. . . in v iew ofth efact th at h egem onism andp ow er p olitics s till
exist andare furth er dev elop ing,andin p articular,th e bas is
for th ecountry ’s p eaceful reunification is s erious ly im p eriled,
C h in a w ill h av e to enh ance its cap ability to defend its
s ov ereignty ands ecurity by m ilitary m eans.
Th e Unique Interes ts of th e PL A . If th ere w as any
institution in C h ina th at h ada s ignificant corp orate s take
in th eev ents s urrounding K os ov o,it w as th e PL A . Needles s
to s ay , clos ely w atch ing and s tudy ing NA TO’s cam p aign
agains t Serbia as it unfolded w as a m atter of intense
p rofes s ional interes t. B ut th e PL A h ad an equally large
bureaucratic interes t in th e internal and p ublic debate
triggered by K os ov o. Th e debate p rov ided a w indow of
op p ortunity for C h ina’s m ilitary es tablis h m ent to argue
p ublicly , and likely beh ind clos ed doors as w ell, th at
national defense and m ilitary m odernization des erv ed a
greater p riority in ov erall national dev elop m ent th an h ad
been accordedh ith erto.
37
Th e argum ents s urrounding th e need for a greater
em p h as is on defensem odernization by th e PL A (andoth ers )
gainedm om entum as a res ult oftw o ev ents : th e M ay 19 9 9
bom bing of th e PRC E m bas s y in B elgrade (in w h ich a
C h ines em ilitary attach éw as w ounded),andL eeTeng-h ui’s
es p ous alofth e“Tw o-State Th eory ”in July 19 9 9 . In th ep as t,
such argum ents by th e top PL A leaders h ip in p ublic fora
h adbeen som ew h at p olitically incorrect,alth ough oncein a
w h ile a s enior PL A leader w ould m ake h is cas e. F or
exam p le, in 19 9 6 D efense M inis ter G eneral C h i H aotian
w rote a long article in C C P’s official journal,Seeking Truth
(Qius h i), in w h ich h e s tated, “Th e building of national
defense . . . cannot exceed th e lim itation of tolerance of
econom ic cons truction, nor can it be laid as ide until th e
econom y h as totally p ros p ered.”16 F or th e m os t p art,
h ow ev er, in p ublic, th e top PL A leaders h ip h adfor y ears
dutifully recited th e D en gis t m an tra th at “defen s e
m odernization m us t rem ain subordinate to econom ic
construction.” H ere w as a ch anceto p res s th ecas e for m ore
funding.
It s h ouldbep ointedout,h ow ev er,th at p ublicly th e top
PL A leaders h ip did not ch allenge th is line during th e
debate. A s m entionedabov e, h av ing th e leaders h ip ofth e
C entral M ilitary C om m is s ion,for exam p le,m aketh ecas ein
th e p res s during s uch a p eriod of em otionalis m and
s ensationalis m w as likely s tilltoo s ensitiv efrom a dom es tic
p olitical s tandp oint.17 N ev erth eles s , th ere s eem ed to be
p lenty ofs enior colonels andoth er fieldgrade officers w h o
w ere quite w illing to m ake th e argum ents . C ons equently ,
durin g th e p eriod of th e debate th e PL A ’s official
new s p ap er, L iberation A rm y D aily (Jiefangjun B ao),
carried an unending s tream of “op inion p ieces ” from
in div idual officers th at w arn ed th e n ation of th e
consequences ofignoring nationaldefense,h y p edth eth reat
p os ed by th e United States to international p eace and
s tability , an d, in s om e cas es , argued th at m ilitary
m odernization s h ouldat leas tbeequal to nationaleconom ic
construction.
38
In th es e regards , th e tim ing ofK os ov o couldnot h av e
been better. F or one th ing,w ork on th e10th F iv e-Year Plan
(2001-2005 )w as already under w ay but not y et com p lete.
Th ere w as s tilla ch anceto p res s for an increas ein funding.
M oreov er, jus t 8 m onth s earlier, in July 19 9 8, Jiang h ad
ordered th e PL A to div es t its elf of its com m ercial
enterp ris es — th e largecorp orate em p ire th at it h adrun for
m any y ears w h ich p rov idedth em ilitary w ith a s ourceof(1)
extra-budgetary funds for s oldier “quality of life,” (2)
em p loy m ent for PL A s p ous es anddem obilizedofficers ,(3)
s u p p lem ental op erations andm aintenance (O&M ) funds ,
and(4 )funds for equip m ent p rocurem ent. Not only didth e
PL A los em any ofits corp orateentities ,but it dids o under a
cloud. Th e decis ion to h av e th e m ilitary div es t w as tiedto
ev idence brough t to th e attention of Jiang of large-s cale
s m uggling and corrup tion by s om e m ilitary com m ercial
en tities in th e s outh . C ons equen tly , th e K os ov o
interv ention, and es p ecially th e bom bing of th e PRC
E m bas s y in B elgrade, gav e th e PL A an op p ortunity to
burnis h its im age am ong th e general p ublic by riding th e
cres t ofnationalis t s entim ent as th e defenders ofC h ines e
s ov ereignty .
Th es e p articularis tic interes ts as ide, N A TO’s K os ov o
interv ention als o drov eh om eto m any in th e PL A onceagain
jus t h ow large a cap abilities gap s till exis tedbetw een th eir
ow n arm ed forces and th os e of th e adv anced W es tern
nations , es p ecially th e UnitedStates , ev en after nearly a
decade of p os t-G ulf W ar reform and m odernization. Th e
frus tration of s om e m ilitary officers at th e relativ ely low
p riority ofm ilitary m odernization in th e greater s ch em e of
national dev elop m ent w as articulatedby a general line of
argum ent th at goes like th is : “W e w ere toldth at w e w ould
h av e to bep atient,th at m ilitary m odernization w ouldh av e
to aw ait econom icm odernization. W eh av ebeen patient for
20 y ears . H ow long m us t w e w ait?”
B ut th e PL A rh etoric s urrounding K os ov o s erv ed
anoth er im p ortant p urp os e. It w as us edto h igh ligh t to th e
C h ines e arm edforces th e im p ortance offollow ing th rough
39
w ith th e w ide-ranging p rogram s ofreform th at h ad been
u n derw ay for th e las t decade. M an y of th es e
reform s — es p ecially in th e areas of force s tructure
dow n s izing and p ers onnel adm in is tration— h ad been
m eeting s om e res is tance below . A s C h ief of th e G eneral
StaffF u Quany ou h adp ointedout a y ear earlier,gras s roots
units h ad to ov ercom e “s elfis h dep artm entalis m and
ov erem p h as is of local interes ts ” and m ov e forw ard w ith
ch angefor th egreater goodofth e PL A .18 E s p ecially in ligh t
of th e s ituation on Taiw an, th e PL A leaders h ip us edth e
K os ov o interv ention andth edebateto lectureits ow n p eop le
th at reform andm odernization ofth em ilitary w as a s erious
undertaking andnot m erely a bureaucraticexercis e.
W h ile it is clear th at m ilitary m odernization w as not
going to s up p lant econom ic construction as th e national
p riority ,or ev en be equal to it in em p h as is , s om e ofth es e
argum ents by th e PL A ,or by oth ers on beh alfofth e PL A ,
p robably h ad an im p act on th e top C h ines e leaders h ip .
C learly ,for v arious internal p olitical reas ons,th econcerns
ofth e PL A couldnot be totally ignored. C onsequently ,not
long after th e PRC E m bas s y bom bing, rum ors abounded
th at th ecentral gov ernm ent h adp rov idedth em ilitary w ith
a large,s u p p lem ental lum p -sum infus ion offunds .19
G iv en th ecall for enh ancednational defens eby th e PL A
andoth ers in th e p os t-K os ov o debate,th e dem is e ofm any
PL A bus ines s interes ts ,th es ecurity as s es s m ent articulated
in th eOctober 2000 D efenseW h itePap er,andth ep olitics of
succes s ion, it w as not too m uch of a surp ris e w h en in
D ecem ber 2000 th e C h ines e F inance M inis ter announced
an increas e of17.7 p ercent for defense s p ending for 2001.
Ov erall th en, th e debate of 19 9 9 w as an occas ion for
B eijing to v ent,anguis h ,andw onder about C h ina’s national
s ecurity andth e future ofU.S.-C h ina relations.
40
Interregnum : D ecem ber 19 9 9 Th rough A p ril 2001.
A t an official lev el,“th e great debate” cam e to a clos ein
late A ugus t 19 9 9 w h en th e B eidaih e leaders h ip m eetings
p rom ulgated th e “Th ree N o C h anges and Th ree N ew
C h anges .” It w as not until D ecem ber, h ow ev er, th at th e
p ublicdebate in th e C h ines e m edia finally cam e to a clos e.
A t th is p oint in tim e, th e central auth orities ap p arently
decidedth at enough publicdebate on th eis s ues ofnational
defense, national s ecurity ,andC h ines e foreign p olicy h ad
taken p laceam ong th em as s es . B y th eendof19 9 9 ,editors of
th e m ajor new s p ap ers w ere rep ortedly no longer accep ting
op -eds from th eir readers h ip s or w riting editorials on th es e
is s ues . Th ere w ere oth er p res s ing is s ues w ith w h ich to
grap p le: W TO acces s ion,th e incep tion in February 2000 of
th e “G o W es t” cam p aign,th econtinuing “Th ree Rep res ents
C am p aign,” anda h os t ofoth er dom es ticandforeign p olicy
is s ues ; not th eleas t ofw h ich w as th ew ork neededto bedone
on th e10th F iv e-Year Plan,th ebeginning ofth es ucces s ion
p roces s , and th e p rep aratory w ork for th e 16 th Party
C ongres s .
B y th e s um m er of2000,h ow ev er,C h ines e foreign p olicy
analy s ts w ere once again running fas t to keep up w ith
ev ents in th e UnitedStates . A ttention w as now focus edon
tw o is s ues : th e ongoing p res idential election cam p aign and
th ep ercep tion th at A m erican m ilitary s trategy w as s h ifting
to A s ia— a C h ines e concern th at surfacedev en before th e
B us h election v ictory and th e s ubs equently p ublis h ed
Quadrennial D efenseRev iew (QD R)is s uedby th e Pentagon
in Sep tem ber 2001.
Th e cataly zing ev ent for C h ines e analy s ts w ondering
about a U.S. “s trategic focus s h ift” (zh anlue zh ongdian
zh uany i)to A s ia w ere new s rep orts th at th e U.S. A ir F orce
des iredto forw ard-dep loy s tockp iles of cruis e m is s iles to
G uam in th e s um m er of 2000. C h ines e concerns about a
“s trategic s h ift” linger today , es p ecially giv en s om e ofth e
language in th e recent QD R docum ent.
41
F or th e m os t p art,h ow ev er,th e C h ines e com m unity of
A m erica exp erts w as fully engaged follow ing election
p olitics in th eUnitedStates andw ondering ands p eculating
about w h at w ouldbe “better for C h ina”— a B us h or a G ore
election v ictory . Th eonly p eop lelikely m orefrus tratedth an
th e A m erican publicat th e tim eit took to decide finally th e
election w inner w as th e corp s ofC h ines e A m erica exp erts
w h o w ere p robably under trem endous p res s ure to exp lain
w h at w as going on,andw h at th e im p lications ofa B us h or
G orev ictory or defeatm eant for C h ina. A n dm any a C h ines e
institute w as tedits funds in h av ing delegations go to th e
United States in late N ov em ber 2000 for p os t-election
fact-finding, only to arriv e w ith out an election decis ion
m ade.
A fter th e B us h election w as confirm ed,argum ents w ent
back andforth in C h ina as to th e im p lications. C autious
op tim is ts p ointed to B us h ’s fath er, “L ao B us h e,” as a
p robable force for am eliorating th e Rep ublican Party
cam p aign rh etoric. E s p ecially dis concerting to B eijing w as
th eexcoriation ofth eC linton-Jiang “C onstructiv eStrategic
Partn ers h ip ” con s truct an d th e s ubs titution of th e
“StrategicC om p etitor” label. Th ey p ointedout as w ell th at,
s ooner rath er th an later,econom icrealities w ouldtrium p h ,
andth e U.S. bus ines s com m unity w ouldev entually w eigh
in. A fter all,B us h ands om e ofh is p rincip al deputies w ere
from corp orate A m erica. Th ey argued as w ell th at all
adm inis tration s s tart out “tough ” on C h ina, and th ey
recalled th e C linton cam p aign s logan about “coddling
dictators .” Th os e on th e oth er s ide of th e argum en t
dis m is s edth es e lines of analy s is as delus ion. Th e trend,
th ey argued,w as already clear: th e UnitedStates is bent on
confronting C h ina on all fronts andth eB us h v ictory m eans
th e as cendance ofth e “anti-C h ina” elem ents . A t th e endof
th eday ,th ey argued,th e UnitedStates w as s tilldeterm ined
to p urs ue a s trategic objectiv e of “w es ternizing and
s p litting” C h ina.
W h en th e E P-3incident occurredon A p ril 1,2001,th es e
argum ents w ere far from res olv ed,but for th em om ent th ey
42
w ere h eldin ch eck as th e PRC G ov ernm ent triedto decide
w h at to do about a s ituation th at couldquickly deteriorate.
It is far too early to ev en attem p t to unders tand(ifw e ev er
can)th ecalculus by w h ich B eijing actedv is-à-v is th eUnited
States during th e 11 day s th e A m erican aircrew w as
detainedon H ainan Is land. B ut for th is s tudent,at leas t,it
w as clear at th e tim e andrem ains clear today th at dom es tic
p olitics in C h ina w ere p aram ount.
Jiang andth e s enior p arty leaders h ip h adlearneds om e
im p ortant les s ons as a res ult ofth e errant N A TO attack on
th e PRC E m bas s y in B elgrade in M ay 19 9 9 . M os t ofth es e
les s ons h adto do w ith th edom es tics cene,not international
relations or U.S.-C h ina relations. It w as clear at th e tim eof
th e E P-3 incident in A p ril 2001, th at Jiang w ould not
countenance a rep etition of th e s ituation th at took p lace
after th e bom bing alm os t 2 y ears earlier.
Th ere w ere th ree v ery clear indicators of th is . F irs t,
Jiang andth e central leaders h ip cam e out “tough ” on th e
United States from th e s tart. Th ere w ould be no room
allow edfor accus ations from any quarter in C h ina th at th e
Party and gov ernm ent w as unw illing or incap able of
defending C h ines es ov ereignty anddignity as w as th ecas e,
s om e h adargued,after th e B elgrade bom bing.
Second,th ere w ould be no s tudents m arch ing th rough
th es treets or gath ering at or bes ieging th e U.S. E m bas s y as
in M ay 19 9 9 . Th is , one s us p ects , w as not s o m uch out of
concern for th e A m ericans as out ofconcern about s tability
on th e s treets ofB eijing and bey ond. Th e s ensitiv e “M ay
4 th ” p eriod w as m uch too clos e at h and, as w as th e
anniv ers ary ofth e death ofH u Yaobang (A p ril15 ,19 89 ),a
s ignificant ev ent for th e s tudent m ov em ent in th e s p ring of
19 89 . A nd,ofcours e,th e F alun G ong p roblem h ady et to be
com p letely res olv ed.
Th ird,unlike th eim m ediate p eriodafter th ebom bing in
M ay 19 9 9 ,th ere w ouldbeno m edia “free for all,” no great
and p ublic debates about national s ecurity p olicy , no
criticis m s of th e gov ernm ent, and no re-op ening of th e
43
“p eace anddev elop m ent” ques tion. A ll th ings considered,
durin g th e E P- 3 in ciden t, th e PRC G ov ern m en t
dem onstratedonce again h ow cap ably it is able to reign-in
th e m edia w h en it ch oos es to do s o.20 Relativ ely s p eaking,
th ere w as no radical editorializing th at couldundercut PRC
gov ernm ent p os itions or s erv e to reop en debates th at h ad
already been res olv ed“officially .”21 A n y bileth at neededto
be v entedin th e p res s couldbe done at th e exp ens e ofth e
UnitedStates th is tim e around.
In oth er w ords , and ov erall, in th e w ake of th e E P-3
incident, th e Party th is tim e s tay ed ah ead of C h ines e
nationalis m andp op ular indignation andw as not ch as ing
after it,as w as th ecas eafter th eem bas s y bom bing in 19 9 9 .
Pos t E P-3andth e Sum m er of2001: Is C h ina th e
U.S.’s N ew E n em y ?
Th eE P-3incident didnot reop en debateon th ep ros p ects
for “p eaceanddev elop m ent”or th es tateofth einternational
s ecurity s ituation. B ut it did reop en th e p ortion of th e
“G reat D ebate of19 9 9 ” th at w as th e m os t contentious and
up on w h ich th ere w as th e leas t consensus at th e tim e: th e
future ofU.S.-C h ina relations .
B eforeth eU.S. E P-3w as returned,andbeforeSecretary
ofState C olin Pow ell ev en confirm edh is v is it to B eijing,a
n ew debate w as u n derw ay am on g th e C h in es e
A m erica-w atch ing com m unity . Since at leas t M ay 2001
th ey h ad ap p arently been engaged in anoth er round of
intense debates , s em inars , m eetings , and conferences at
w h ich th e is s ue of U.S. p olicy tow ard C h ina w as being
dis cus s ed.
Th e E P-3 incident w as th e p roxim ate caus e ofth e new
roundofm eetings anddis cus s ions . B ut it w as not th e s ole
caus e. L ike th e unp recedenteddebate in 19 9 9 , th e debate
th at began after th e A p ril 2001 incident dredged up a
grow ing lis t ofconcerns th at w ere aw aiting ev aluation.
44
B ut th ere w as one as p ect of th e E P-3 incident th at
clearly h ada v ery p rofoundim p act up on analy s ts andth e
general p ublic in C h ina (and, incidentally , up on th e
A m erican p ublic as w ell). Sp ecifically , th e intense new s
cov erage ofth e ev ent in th e W es t andin C h ina m ade v ery
p ublic for p robably th e firs t tim e jus t h ow m uch “cat and
m ous e” activ ity w as going on betw een th eU.S. andC h ines e
m ilitaries .
So as ofth esum m er of2001 th efollow ing ques tions w ere
being exp loredin C h ines e analy ticcircles once again:
?
H ow s h ould C h in a as s es s th e curren t s tate of
U.S.-C h ina relations?
?
W h at “C h ina p olicy ” w ill th e B us h adm inis tration
adop t? and,
?
W h at are th e p ros p ects for future relations?
C entral to th es e oth er ques tions w as “H adth e United
States decidedth at C h ina is th e enem y andth at th is w ill
driv e U.S. p olicy tow ardC h ina andth e U.S. larger s ecurity
s trategy in A s ia?”
A s w as th ecas eduring th edebate in 19 9 9 ,a w ide range
of v iew s am ong C h ines e s ecurity an aly s ts on th es e
ques tions w as allegedly h eld. M oreov er,as w as als o th ecas e
in 19 9 9 , analy s ts of like-m inded op inion could be found
cros s ing institutional and bureaucratic boundaries . Som e
obs erv ers offered th at th e PRC gov ernm ent “learned its
les s on” from th e debate of19 9 9 : alth ough th e debate w as
“activ e andintense,”itw as conductedin a “cool-h eadedand
analy ticfas h ion” andm os tly kep t out ofth e m edia.
N o conclus ions are know n to h av e been reach ed. M any
C h ines e analy s ts believ edth at it w as s tilltoo early to m ake
any conclus ions about U.S. p olicies or intentions tow ard
C h ina. A t th e s am e tim e,m any C h ines e analy s ts w ere s aid
to agree w ith a general as s es s m ent th at th e trends in U.S.
p olicies andactions tow ardC h ina in th e las t few m onth s
45
h adbeen “negativ e.” Th ere w as along lis t ofdata p oints th at
m any C h ines ecitedas indicating a negativ e trendin “B us h
adm inis tration” C h ina p olicy . (A gain, lis ting th es e p oints
does not indicate concurrence.)Th es e included:
?
Th e B us h cam p aign rh etoric p ortray ing C h ina as a
“s trategiccom p etitor,” not a “s trategicp artner”;
?
B us h adm inis tration p lans to m ov e ah eadw ith B M D
(p erceiv edto be directedp artially at C h ina);
?
Th e s trength ening of U.S.-Jap an m ilitary relations
(als o p erceiv edto be directedat C h ina);
?
Th e “loud anti-C h ina v oices ” th at op enly p oint to
B eijing as th e next enem y ,andres earch m onograp h s
by s om e U.S. th ink tanks (w rongly p erceiv ed to
rep res ent U.S. G ov ernm ent p olicy ) th at p rop os e a
U.S. C h ina p olicy op tion term ed“congagem ent”;
?
Th ep ercep tion th at th efocus ofth enew U.S. m ilitary
s trategy is s h ifting from E urop e to A s ia andth at th is
s h ift is directedagainst C h ina;
?
Th e U.S. des ire to m ov e clos er to India;
?
B us h ’s A p ril 2001 rem arks about th e defen s e of
Taiw an;
?
Increas ing arm s s ales to Taiw an and es p ecially
exp anding m ilitary contacts w ith Taiw an (s om e
C h ines e analy s ts argue th e UnitedStates is m ov ing
tow arda defacto m ilitary alliance w ith Taip ei);
?
Th e recent U.S. v is it by L ee Teng-h ui;
?
Th e beliefofs om e C h ines e analy s ts th at th e United
States “p res s ured” Toky o to allow L ee Teng-h ui to
v is it Jap an;
?
Th e U.S. transit ofC h en Sh ui-bian;
46
?
Th e “attitude” of th e Pentagon tow ard m ilitary
relations w ith C h ina s ince th e E P-3 ep is ode;
?
Th e U.S. “attack” on h um an righ ts in C h ina in
G enev a;
?
Th e ap p ointm ent ofa State D ep artm ent coordinator
for Tibetan affairs andth e D alaiL am a v is it; and,
?
Th e general “anti-C h ina” attitudes ofs om e officials
ap p ointedto th e new adm inis tration.
C learly , th ere w ere s om e C h ines e analy s ts w h o w ere
already conv incedth at th e UnitedStates h addes ignated
C h ina as its next enem y . Oth ers believ edth at th e United
States h adalready decidedup on a “tw o-track” C h ina p olicy
th at com bin es “econom ic engagem en t an d m ilitary
containm ent.” Still oth ers arguedth at B us h ’s C h ina p olicy
h ady et to be decided.
N ot allw ere conv incedth at th efutureofrelations w as as
dire as recent ev ents w ould sugges t. Th es e indiv iduals
tendedto argue th at B eijing’s and W as h ington’s m utual
interes t in s table relations for reas ons of s trictly s elfis h
national interes ts w ere s o s trong th at th e “negativ e trend”
w ould be arres ted “at s om e p oint,” th at p ragm atis m in
W as h ington “w ouldev entually p rev ail,” andth at relations
w ouldev entually im p rov e.
F or exam p le, in late M ay 2001 th e C h ina Institute of
C ontem p orary International Relations (C IC IR) h eld a
forum on U.S.-C h ina relations to w h ich v arious exp erts
w ere inv itedto p res ent th eir v iew s . In sum m arizing th e
results of th e conference in th eir journal, C IC IR editors
p ointedout m any ofth e ch allenges from W as h ington. B ut
th econferencesum m ary in th ejournalendedon a relativ ely
op tim is ticnote:
M ost ofth e p articip ants to th eforum tracedth ecurrent s tate
ofaffairs to p olicy guidelines ofPres ident B u s h in des ignating
B eijing a “s trategic com p etitor” and its tilt to th e Taiw an
47
auth orities in s u p p ort of elem ents adv ocating “Taiw an
in dep en den ce.” C h ina h as clearly been th e target of
W ash ington’s current endeav or at strength ening ties w ith its
allies andp us h ing ah eadw ith its NM D p rogram . B ut all th is
does not s ignify th e last w ordin th e B us h team ’s C h ina p olicy
becaus e externalandinternal res traints w ouldm ake th e B us h
adm inis tration return to a relativ ely rational cours e after a
p eriod of reas s es s m ents . B ased on th e abov e analy s is, m os t
p articip ants believ e th at th ere is n o needfor p es s im is m about
th e fu ture of C h ina-US relatio n s h ip . Un av oidable
contradictions and frictions do not neces s arily s p ell los s of
control becaus e th e p rices for conflicts w ouldbe p roh ibitiv ely
h igh for both p arties .22
It is difficult to s ay w ith any certainty th at th e abov e
“op tim is tic” as s es s m ent (“h op eful” m igh t be a better w ord)
w as rep res entativ eofa m ajority ofPRC s ecurity analy s ts or
th at it rep res enteda com m only h eldv iew p oint. Som eofth e
actual p ap ers th at w ere p res entedat th e C IC IR conference
s eem ed,on th ew h ole,les s op tim is ticth an rep ortedabov e.23
Operation “E n during F reedom ”— Sp eculating
A bout PRC Security C oncerns.
Obv ious ly , th e ev ents of Sep tem ber 11 ch anged th e
entire context of th e B us h -Jiang Sum m it. A lth ough th e
B us h v is it to C h ina w as m uch curtailed, th e fact th at th e
A m erican Pres ident w ent to Sh angh aito attendA PE C and
m eet w ith Jiang under th e circum s tances w as clearly a
decis ion w ith p os itiv eim p actboth in C h ina andth rough out
th e region. Th e m eeting clearly p rov idedboth leaders th e
ability to m ov eback on a track tow ardm ores tablerelations.
A n dto th e degree th at both m en h av e been cons trained
s om ew h at by dom es ticp olitics in th eir ap p roach to bilateral
ties , th eir p rofes s ed com m on caus e in th e w ar agains t
terroris m enh anced th e argum ents for engagem ent on a
s trategic lev el.
A t th e s am e tim e, h ow th e United States and th e
coalition cam p aign against th e Taliban— andth e greater
w ar against terroris m — unfolds w ill be w atch edw ith great
48
care by th e corp s of C h ines e s ecurity analy s ts . One can
s p eculateth at th eC h ines ew illbev ery w ary ofth ep otential
negativ e collateral im p act ofth e p os t-Sep tem ber 11 w orld
order for C h ines e s ecurity concerns in general ands p ecific
key C h ines enationals ecurity interes ts in particular. In th is
final s ection,p erm it a bit ofs p eculation about th e negativ e
im p act C h ines e s ecurity analy s ts m igh t s ee in w h at h as
tran s p ireds ince Sep tem ber 11.
Im p act on Pakis tan: A K ey Security Partner. C h ina
claim s th at it h as n o m ilitary alliances ,andin th etech nical
s ense th at is quite true. B ut for m any y ears Pakis tan and
C h ina h av e been v ery clos e s ecurity p artners . Th eir
com m on caus e is bas edon s h areddis trus t ofan enduring
m utual an tagonis t— India. B ut C h in a’s in teres ts in
Pakis tan trans cendth at s h aredanim os ity .
F or B eijing,Pakis tan is one ofm any key Is lam ics tates
th at it cultiv ates in order ach iev e s om e lev erage in th e
M os lem w orld, ow ing to concerns about its ow n res tiv e
north w es t p rov ince of Xinjiang. Pakis tan’s im p ortance to
C h ina h as been on th e ris e s ince January 2001. C h ina h as
n erv ous ly w atch ed as th e B us h adm in is tration h as
re-lookedp rev ious U.S. allegations th at C h ina continues to
transfer m is s ile tech nologies to Is lam abad, and B eijing
analy s ts h av e ev incedconcerns w atch ing th e new im p etus
in th e UnitedStates for rap p roch em ent w ith India.
In th e blink ofan ey e th e ev ents ofSep tem ber 11 h av e
w itnes s edan am azingly quick U.S. return to engagem ent
w ith Pakis tan. F orced to “ch oos e” betw een th e United
States andth e Taliban regim e it h adh ith erto s up p orted,
Is lam abadm ade its ch oice, andC h ines e s ecurity analy s ts
cannot but w onder about th e long-term im p lications ofth e
reem ergenceofU.S.-Pakis tanis ecurity relations for its ow n
equities th ere. M oreov er, s h ould th e gov ernm en t in
Pakis tan undergo its ow n internal dis locations as a resultof
its s up p ort for W as h ington,C h ines einteres ts w illbeop en to
ques tion. H av ing m ov edfrom p roliferating p ariah to activ e
49
p artner in th eU.S. w ar in A fgh anis tan,along-tim eandv ery
clos eC h ines es ecurity p artner now h as a foot in both cam p s .
Im p acton Sino-Rus s ian Relations . Rap p roch em entw ith
Rus s ia is likely th e greates t C h ines e foreign policy s ucces s
of th e p os t-C oldW ar (19 9 1) p eriod. G eos trategically , th e
endofSino-Rus s ian anim os ity h as res ultedin C h ina h av ing
today th e m os t s ecure landborders it h as ev er enjoy ed. In
July 2001,cap p ing 10 y ears ofs teadily im p rov edrelations,
Pres idents Jiang andV ladim ir Putin signeda m ajor treaty
aim ed at institutionalizing th eir “C oop erativ e Strategic
Partners h ip .”
W h ile B eijing and M os cow h av e th eir ow n h is torical
reas ons to look as kanceat each oth er,ev ents ofth e las t few
y ears h av e draw n th em clos er togeth er p olitically . B oth
nation s are fundam entally dis s atis fied w ith h ow th e
p os t-C oldW ar w orldorder h as unfolded. In sh ort,th eglobal
p olitical, econom ic, and m ilitary p row es s of th e United
States h as been an unh ap p y s tate ofaffairs for each . B oth
nations w ant global p ow er diffus ed— w ith at leas t s om e
p ow er accruing to th em — in a m uch -th eorizedm ulti-polar
w orldorder.
Th e conv ergence ofp olitical v iew s betw een B eijing and
M os cow h as been m anifold: op p os ition to th e exp ansion of
N A TO andPartners h ip for Peace; com m on caus e agains t
th e s trength ening ofm ilitary alliances in th e Pacific(read
U.S.-Jap an, U.S.-A us tralia, U.S.-ROK ); op p os ition to th e
U.S. N ational M is s ile D efensep rogram ; m utual s up p ort for
th eir res p ectiv e claim s to s ov ereignty in C h ech ny a and
Taiw an ; con join ed op p os ition to extern al m ilitary
interv entions under th e “p retext” of h um anitarianis m ; a
new -found belief in th e s anctity of th e U.N .; m utual
concerns about instability in C entral A s ia, anda s ecurity
arrangem ent of conv enience in w h ich B eijing p rocures
m ilitary w eap ons an d tech nologies unav ailable to it
els ew h ere in return for p rop p ing up Rus s ia’s failing defense
indus trial com p lex w ith th os e p urch as es .
50
In October 2001, les s th an 3 m onth s after inking th e
m uch -h eralded treaty , Rus s ia s eem ed to be th row ing its
tacit s up p ort beh indth e U.S. m ilitary op erations agains t
A fgh anis tan by not s tanding in th e w ay ofA m erican forces
s taging in form er Sov iet clients in C entral A s ia, and,
rep ortedly ,M os cow began to s tep up its arm s s h ip m ents to
th e op p os ition North ern A lliance forces .
B ut p robably m uch m ore dis concerting from a C h ines e
p ers p ectiv e,Putin began transm itting w h at ap p earedto be
s erious “feelers ” about actually joining N A TO under certain
conditions ofch ange in th at organization. Rus s ia s eem edto
realize th at th e tragic ev ents of Sep tem ber 11 m igh t
actually bean op p ortunity finally to align its elfin a s erious
w ay ,w ith dignity ,as an equal p artner w ith th e W es t after
alm os t 10 y ears ofRus s ian foreign policy lim bo. It m ay jus t
beth at Putin realizedth is w as M os cow ’s op p ortunem om ent
to do s o in a w ay th at couldultim ately res us citate Rus s ia’s
faltering econom y and at th e s am e tim e enh ance its
international p res tige. Indeed,th e B us h -Putin m eeting on
th e fringes ofA PE C in October 2001 s eem edto be rep orted
in th ew es tern p res s as m uch m orerobus t th an th em eetings
w ith Jiang in th e latter’s ow n country . Th e p ros p ects of
Rus s ia “leaning to th e W es t” cannot be a com fortable
th ough t in B eijing, ev en th ough rev iv edRus s ian relations
w ith th eW es tw ouldcertainly not beat th eexp ens eofC h ina
in th e s ense th at such alignm ents w ere p lay edout during
th e C oldW ar.
Im p act on th e Sh angh ai C oop eration Organization. If
rap p roch em ent w ith Rus s ia is likely th e greates t C h ines e
foreign p olicy s ucces s of th e p os t-C old W ar p eriod, th en
B eijing’s s econd is ach iev ing m em bers h ip in th e W TO.
B eijing’s th irdm ajor foreign p olicy s ucces s , alth ough les s
w ell know n, w as s erv ing as th e m otiv e force beh ind th e
creation ofth e Sh angh ai C oop eration Organization (SC O)
in June 2001.
Originally know n as th e“Sh angh aiF iv e,”C h ina,Rus s ia,
K azakh s tan,Tajikis tan,andK y rgizs tan h adbeen w orking
51
togeth er s ince 19 9 6 to res olv e th eir border dis p utes ,
enh ance m ilitary confidence-building m eas ures am ong
th eir arm edforces , and coordinate s ecurity w ork agains t
th e s o-called “th ree ev ils ” of “terroris m , s ep aratis m , and
fanaticis m ” in C entral A s ia. In sh ort, th e SC O rep res ents
oneofth e p os t-C oldW ar w orld’s firs t new regional s ecurity
arch itectures . A n dto th e degree th at C h ina h as been th e
m otiv e force beh indit,it is claim edas a s ucces s .
In June2001 th e“Sh angh aiF iv e”trans form edits elfinto
th e “Sh an gh ai C oop eration O rgan ization ,” added
Uzbekis tan as a s ixth m em ber, an d form alized its
intentions to p ursue m ilitary s ecurity in th eborder regions
in a m ultilateral fas h ion , to in clude es tablis h ing a
counterterroris m center in B is h kek andev en h olding out
th e p ros p ects for com binedm ilitary exercis es in th e future.
Th e im p ortance of th es e initiativ es to C h ina’s s ecurity
interes ts in C entral A s ia is unders coredby th efact th at th is
is th e firs t tim e ev er th at th e PRC h as been a form al
s ignatory to a m ultin ational s ecurity arch itecture.
M oreov er, s h ould com bined m ilitary exercis es ev er take
p lace,it w ill beth e firs t tim e ev er th at th e PL A h as trained
or exercis edw ith any foreign m ilitary in any th ing oth er
th an th e role of “adv is ors ” or trainers — th is is s im p ly
unp recedentedfor C h ina.
E n ter th e ev ents p urs uant to Sep tem ber 11. W h ere
C h ina andRus s ia enjoy eddom inance of p res ence in th is
critical region,th ereis now th eobv ious p res enceofth eU.S.
m ilitary — not m erely as trainers or as p articip ants in
com binedexercis es s uch as C E N TRA ZB A T-9 7— but in force
and p ros ecuting a joint, and likely com bined, m ilitary
offensiv e. To th e degree th at th e SC O s erv edth e collateral
C h ines e interes t of keep ing U.S. m ilitary forces from
ach iev ing a footh oldin C entralA s ia,th at objectiv eh as been
underm inedin a clear, s ignificant, andp rofoundw ay . To
w h at degree th e defacto p res enceofU.S. m ilitary forces in
th e region,andth e obv ious p olitical andeconom icp res ence
in th e region th at w ill p ers is t p os t-com bat,w ill ch ange th e
v iability or nature of th e SC O as an organization is a
52
ques tion th at m us t be getting as kedin C h ines e analy tic
circles . A t a m inim um ,a U.S. p res encein Uzebekis tan in a
p os t-Taliban A fgh anis tan is a real p os s ibility , giv en th e
s ecurity as s urances Tas h kent h as rep ortedly as ked of
W as h ington in return for its v ery activ e s up p ort.
Im p act on Jap an. Toky o’s decis ion to be p roactiv e in
offering th e United States logis tic s up p ort by th e Jap an
M aritim e SelfD efens e F orces in th e v icinity ofth e Indian
Ocean is not going to as s uage B eijing’s concerns about
Jap an’s “real s ecurity as p irations”in th eregion— in s p ite of
Prim e M inis ter Junich iro K oizum i’s as s ertion th at Jiang
exp res s ed h is “unders tanding” of th e rationale beh ind it
during th eir m eeting in B eijing in early October 2001.
A lw ay s on th e alert for any indication of Jap an’s
p otential for an exp anded m ilitary p res ence in A s ia,
C h ines e analy s ts w ill likely v iew Toky o’s s up p ort of
Op eration E N D URING F R E E D O M as a codicilunder w h ich
th e Jap anes e w ill continue w h at th e C h ines e believ e is th e
inexorable m arch aw ay from A rticle 9 of th e “Peace
C onstitution.”(A n dit m ay jus tbeth at B eijing’s concerns on
th is account w ill be buttres s ed by like-m inded th inking
em anating from Seoul.) Jap an’s actions in support ofth e
UnitedStates w ill be s een th rough th e lens ofa continuum
th at includes p erceiv ed Jap anes e s u p p ort for Taiw an
indep endence, concern s about th e Rev is ed U.S.-Jap an
G uidelines for D efen s e C oop eration— es p ecially th e
nebulous p h ras e “areas s urrounding Jap an,” andToky o’s
co-res earch w ith W as h ington on up p er-tier s ea-bas ed
TB M D .
Im p act on B order Security . C learly , th e m os t obv ious
deleterious effect ofOperation E N D URIN G FRE E D O M for
C h ina is th ev ery factth at it is taking p lacein a country w ith
w h ich C h ina s h ares a border. Stability ands ecurity in th e
14 nations w ith w h ich C h ina s h ares com m on borders — not
to m en tion m ain tain in g good relations w ith th os e
countries — is a p riority -one s ecurity is s ue for B eijing.
53
C ontrolling ev ents on its p erip h ery , s tability on its
p erip h ery , and en s urin g th ere is n o s p ill ov er from
in s tability on its p erip h ery are ongoing and h is torical
C h ines e concerns. One m igh t p oint out th at s ince 19 4 9 ,
C h ina h as consis tently v iew edinstability on its p erip h ery
as a s erious th reat,andm os t ofits m ilitary interv entions,
ov ert or oth erw is e, h av e been th e result of th e p erceiv ed
need to s h ap e w ars along its border, p reem p t p os s ible
aggres s ion,or as s ert s ov ereignty along th os e borders .24
Th eim m ediate C h ines econcern w illbeth ep otential for
refugees to s tream acros s th e s m all border it s h ares w ith
A fgh anis tan. C h ina’s s econdconcern w ill be th e p otential
for “blow back” in Xinjiang Prov ince by non-H an Turkic
Uigh urs w h o op p os eC h ines erule. Th e th irdtier ofC h ines e
concern s w ill be longer term — h ow long w ill th e U.S.
cam p aign las t, w h at ty p e of gov ernm ent w ill rep lace th e
Taliban, andh ow long w ill U.S. m ilitary forces rem ain in
th e region after th ecollap s e ofth e Taliban? A n d,ofcours e,
as m entionedalready ,th e im p act ofall ofth e abov e on th e
v iability of th e M us h araf regim e in Is lam abad. Ov erall,
from a C h ines e p oint ofv iew ,it is unlikely th ecurrent U.S.
cam p aign w ill be v iew edas a “goodth ing.”
Im p act on N ational M is s ile D efense. C h ina’s objections
to th e U.S. National M is s ile D efense Program are w ell
know n by now andneedno exp lanation. Sufficeit to s ay th at
B eijing w ill be concerned th at th e attack on th e United
States w ill accelerate th e nuclear m is s ile defense (N M D )
p rogram , not inh ibit it. Th e bes t indicator of C h ines e
concerns along th es e lines is th e analy tic argum ent one
couldreadin th e PRC p res s p os t-Sep tem ber 11 declaring
th at th e terroris t attack on th e UnitedStates “p rov ed” th at
th e greates t th reat to th e UnitedStates is not a s o-called
“rogue s tate” w ith a m is s ile, but low -tech w eap ons usedby
nons tate actors .
Th eefficacy ofth is argum ent as ide,th ere w illbeconcern
th at in th e w ake ofSep tem ber 11 p rev ious dis agreem ents
ov er N M D w ith certain E urop ean allies w ill fall by th e
54
w ay s ide in an ongoing s h ow of s up p ort for W as h ington.
A ls o, th ere w ill be C h ines e concern th at th e v oices in th e
United States citing th e Sep tem ber 11 ev ents as “p roof
p os itiv e” ofth e needfor N M D w ill p rev ail— es p ecially now
th at th e s p ecter of biological w eap on s is n o lon ger
h y p oth etical. B ut m os t dis concerting, from a C h ines e
p ers p ectiv e, w ill be th e p os s ibility th at Rus s ian res olv e on
th e is s ue of th e A n ti-B allis tic M is s ile (A B M ) Treaty w ill
s tart to w eaken.
Ov erall th en,w h ile th e ev ents ofSep tem ber 11 andth e
B us h -Jiang s um m it h av e s erv ed a critical C h ines e (and
U.S.) s ecurity objectiv e— nam ely s tabilizing bilateral
relations — it is not entirely clear,bas edquite adm ittedly on
m y ow n s p eculation,th at th eov erarch ing p ros ecution ofth e
w ar against terroris m w agedby th e UnitedStates andth e
p otential collateral ch anges in th e international s ecurity
m ilieu w illbes een as p os itiv efor C h ina acros s th eboard. B y
th etim eth is v olum eis p ublis h ed,th einternational s ecurity
env ironm ent m ay w ell h av e ch angedandturnedov er once
again,andth e C h ines ecalculus m igh t be quite different in
w ay s th at at tim e of w riting are im p os s ible to s p eculate
about.
C oncluding C om m ents .
One cons tant in th e U.S.-C h ina relations h ip th at w ill
p ers is t andth at w ill trans cend current ev ents , is s im p ly
th is : th ere is am p le reas on in both W as h ington andB eijing
to s eek and s ecure m u tually ben eficial bilateral
relations — es p ecially s ecurity relations .
H ow ev er, th ere is a deep - s eated m utual dis trus t
betw een th e res p ectiv e s ecurity es tablis h m ents on both
s ides of th e Pacific th at w ill not go aw ay v ery s oon,
regardles s ofth e p ragm atics tep s each nation takes on th e
roadto better relations . Th is ch ap ter, by as s ignm ent,h as
focus edon C h ines econcerns. Th eUnitedStates h as its ow n
s et ofm is giv ings .
55
Ifth e trendin C h ines e s ecurity analy s es p res entedin
th is ch ap ter is ev en clos eto being on th em ark,th en it w illbe
v ery difficult to ch ange attitudes in B eijing. C h ines e
concerns about U.S. intentions are beginning to trans cend
s p ecific p olicies in contention, transcending p erh ap s ev en
th eis s ueofTaiw an. In C h ina,analy ticm om entum h as been
building ov er th ep as t few y ears th at argues th at th eUnited
States is inh erently h os tile to C h ina andth at th e s trategic
objectiv e ofth e UnitedStates tow ardC h ina is noth ing les s
th an th e obs truction of C h ina’s ris e as a m ore rich and
p ow erfulnation— des p ites tatem ents by B us h andPow ellto
th e contrary . C ons equently , U.S. p olicies in th e region or
tow ardC h ina its elfw ill be increas ingly filteredth rough a
s et of lenses th at are already calibrated to ensure s om e
dis tortion. Th ep h ras e,“Seeing th e acorn but im agining th e
oak tree” com es to m ind.25
Relations w ith th e UnitedStates m oreandm orep res ent
th e C h ines e leaders h ip w ith a grow ing dilem m a. On one
h and, a s table relation s h ip w ith th e United States is
increas ingly v iew edby B eijing as one p rerequis ite for th e
s ucces s of th e all-im p ortant reform agenda th at faces
Zh ongnanh ai at h om e. A n dto th e degree th at succes s ful
continuing reform at h om eis th ekey to th e longev ity ofth e
C C P,th e “U.S. factor” p lay s as w ell, ev en ifindirectly .26
A t th e s am e tim e, p erceiv ed ch allenges by th e United
States to C h ines e national interes ts — es p ecially th os e
v iew edas ch allenges to s ov ereignty — cannot be ignoredby
th eC h ines eleaders h ip . Oneh ears andreads m oreandm ore
in th e C h ines e p res s about th e needto up h old“th e dignity ”
of th e C h ines e p eop le, not jus t th e s anctity of C h ines e
s ov ereignty .
Th es um m it ofOctober 2001 augurs a h op efulbeginning
for th e tw o nations to renew s erious s trategic dialogue on
th e s p ectrum of is s ues th at h av e been addres s edin th is
ch ap ter. B ut am id th e p ledges by th e tw o p res idents to
es tablis h new m ech anis m s for s trategicdialogue,am idth e
rededication to continue m utually beneficial econom ic
56
coop eration, in th e m ids t ofp res enting a uniteds tandin
dealing w ith global terroris m , th ere w as one s um m it
“bas ket” th at w as cons p icuous by its abs ence— a s tatem ent
about future m ilitary -to-m ilitary relations .
Since at leas t 19 89 th e m ilitary dim ension of bilateral
relation s h as becom e one of th e m os t contentious and
difficult as p ects ofU.S.-C h ina ties . Ith as becom eadom es tic
p olitical is s uein both B eijing andW as h ington. E v en in th e
bes t of tim es , finding a m utually s atis fy ing m ilitary
dim ens ion to bilateral ties h as been a frus trating endeav or
for both p arties due to grow in g m utual s us p icion,
institutional as y m m etries , and com p eting objectiv es . In
tim es of bilateral dures s , m ilitary relations are th e firs t
links to bes us p ended. In th ebes t oftim es ,th ey are th e las t
to be p ut into p lace.
Som e in th e UnitedStates h av e arguedth at, w ith th e
dem is e ofth e Sov iet Union,th ere is no longer a “s trategic
rationale” for th e United States to engage th e PL A . In
B eijing, s om e C h ines e h av e als o arguedth at th e “ris e of
A m erican h egem onis m ”h as likew is eunderm ineda C h ines e
rationale for engagem ent w ith th e U.S. D ep artm ent of
D efense. D etractors of m ilitary relations in th e United
States h av ecom p lainedth at th e PL A does not “recip rocate”
U.S. op ennes s and th at “th e PL A gets m ore out of th e
relations h ip th an does th e UnitedStates .” F or th eir p art,
s om eC h ines e argue th at th eobjectiv es ofU.S. m ilitary ties
andU.S. “op ennes s ” are inh erently “h os tile.” Th e United
States w ants “to ch ange C h ina,” to “deter (s care) C h ina,”
and“collect intelligence” on C h ina by us ing th e m ilitary
relations h ip .27
A llofth es e argum ents m ay v ery w ell betrueofth ep as t.
B ut it is not correct for eith er s ide to argue th at th ere is no
longer a s trategicrationale for a m ilitary relations h ip . Th e
fact ofth e m atter m ay be th at at long las t,for th e firs t tim e
s ince th e endofth e C oldW ar, th ere finally is a s trategic
rationale for m ilitary -to-m ilitary contacts . A n dit is s im p ly
th is : conflict av oidance.
57
It is clear th at th e m ilitary forces ofth e UnitedStates
andofC h ina w ill increas ingly be op erating in p roxim ity to
each oth er. Th is w as s h ow n m os t grap h ically on A p ril 1,
2001,andth es ubs equent E P-3incident. It is als o clear th at
th ere is a grow ing dis trus t betw een th e tw o m ilitary
es tablis h m en ts . It is clear as w ell th at both s ides
acknow ledge (s om etim es quietly , s om etim es p ublicly ) th e
p os s ibility of an unw anted confrontation ov er Taiw an.
Th es ep oints alone are th em os t p res s ing argum ents for th e
resum p tion ofm ilitary contacts ,th eenh ancem ent ofv enues
in w h ich dis cus s ion ofdifferences can take p lace, andnew
v enues aim edat dis p elling m is p ercep tions.
H op efully , as th e m onth s go on, as p olitical dialogue
increas es andth e benefits of s table relations are s een to
outw eigh m utual s u s p icions , th en w is e m en and s ober
th inkers on both s ides w ill s tart s earch ing for new and
realis ticw ay s to m anagedifferences ,andconcludeth at both
th e U.S. A rm edF orces andth ePL A w illh av e a constructiv e
role to p lay .
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTE R 2
1. C ancelledaltogeth er w ere th e Pres ident’s p lanneds topov ers in
Toky o andSeoul p rior to arriv ing in Sh angh ai.
2. Tang H ongw ei, Zh ongguo Xinw en Sh e, F oreign B roadcas t
Inform ation Serv ice (h ereafter F B IS),October 19 ,2001.
3. “U.S., C h ina StandA gainst Terroris m : Rem arks by Pres ident
Bush andPres ident Jiang Zem in in Pres s A v ailability ,W es tern Suburb
G ues t H ous e (Sh angh ai, PRC ),” October 19 , 2001, w w w .w h iteh ous e.
gov / new s / releases (h ereafter,W h ite H ous e).
4 . W h ite H ous e.
5 . Th is is a concern th at h as becom e som ew h at h eigh teneds ince
F ebruary 2000 w h en Beijing is s u edits “Taiw an W h ite Paper” th at
articulatedth e “th irdif.” Sinceth at tim e a com m on ques tion debatedin
W ash ington’s analy tic circles is w h eth er B eijing h as a “tim etable” for
reunification.
58
6 . F or an excellent rev iew ofth e actions andpolicies ofB eijing th at
w illcontinue to giv e p aus e to U.S. G ov ernm ent officials ,s ee B ates G ill,
“Pow ell In C h ina: M odes t Progres s W ill B e better Th an N one,”
International H eraldTribune,July 27,2001.
7. F or a v ery detailed account and analy s is of th e p os t-K os ov o
debate in C h ina, s ee D av id M . F inkels tein, C h ina Recons iders Its
N ational Security : Th e “G reat Peace & D ev elop m ent D ebate” of 19 9 9 ,
A lexandriaV A : Th eC NA C orporation,C ountry A s s es s m ent,D ecem ber
2000.
8. Th e con s truction of th e narrativ e account of th e debate th at
follow s w as p os s ible due to th e h igh ly p ublic nature ofth e debate. Th e
C h ines ep res s w as an inv aluables ourcefor follow ing th edebate. M os t of
th e key C h ines e new s p ap ers dev oteds p ace to reader com m ents on th e
key ques tions under contention after th ebom bing ofth e PRC E m bas s y .
E xam p les are th ePL A ’s L iberation A rm y D aily (Jiefangjun B ao),C h ina
Youth D aily (Zh ongguo Qingnian B ao),B righ tnes s D aily (G uangm ing
Ribao), and Peop le’s D aily (Renm in Ribao). B y m os t accounts , th e
p eriodical th at ran th e colum n m os t readandm os t contributedto by
gov ernm ent s p ecialis ts (andm os t contentious in th at analy s ts took each
oth er on) w as th e G lobal Tim es (H uanqiu Sh ibao), a subs idiary
new s p ap er of People’s D aily . Th e colum n in ques tion w as entitled
“C h ina’s C oun term eas u res and C h oices ” (“Zh ongguo D uice Yu
Xuanze”). I am grateful to D r. A las tair Iain Joh n s ton of H arv ard
Univ ers ity for bringing th is colum n to m y attention. Th is account ofth e
debate w as als o inform edby a goodnum ber ofinterv iew s as w ell.
9 . F or a s uperb p rim er on th e neces s ity in C h ina for h av ing
th eoretical as s es s m ents ofth einternational s ecurity env ironm ent and
th eir ev olution since 19 4 9 ,s ee Ren Xiao,“Th e International Relations
Th eoretical D is cours ein C h ina: A Prelim inary A naly s is ,” Sigur C enter
A s iaPap ers N um ber 9 ,W as h ington,D C : E lliott Sch ool ofInternational
A ffairs ,Th e G eorge W as h ington Univ ers ity ,2000.
10. Th e UnitedStates affirm edits p olicy of: (1)No independencefor
Taiw an, (2) N o “One C h in a, One Taiw an” form ula, an d (3) No
m em bers h ip for Taiw an in international organizations th at require
s tateh oodas a p rerequis ite for m em bers h ip.
11. “C oop erativ e Strategic Partners h ip w ith Rus s ia” (A p ril 19 9 6 );
“C om p reh en s iv e C oop erativ e Partners h ip ” w ith F rance (M ay 19 9 7);
“C ons tructiv e Strategic Partners h ip” w ith th e U.S. (October 19 9 7);
“G ood- n eigh borly Partn ers h ip of M utual Trus t” w ith A SE A N
(D ecem ber 19 9 7); “L ong-term and Stable C ons tructiv e Partners h ip”
59
w ith th e E urop ean Union (A p ril 19 9 8); “E n h anced C om p reh en s iv e
Partners h ip ” w ith G reat B ritain (October 19 9 8).
12. In June 2001 th e “Sh angh ai Fiv e” w as tran s form ed into th e
“Sh angh aiC oop eration Organization” andas ixth m em ber,Uzbekis tan,
w as added.
13. A s rem arkable as itm ay seem from a U.S. p ers p ectiv e,th erew as
a gooddeal ofdiscus s ion in s om e C h ines e analy ticcircles as to w h eth er
th e UnitedStates w ouldinterv ene in C h ech ny a.
14 . In h is excellent v olum e, C h ina D ebates th e Future Security
E n v ironm ent, W as h ington, D C : N ational D efen s e Univ ers ity Pres s ,
2000, M ich ael Pills bury argues th at p rev ious C h ines e p olitical
constraints p recludedanaly s ts from as s erting th at th e “com p reh en s iv e
national pow er” ofth e UnitedStates w oulddo any th ing but ev entually
decline. W h ile th at m ay h av e been th e cas e p rior to 19 9 9 , th e
p os t- K os ov o debatein C h ina clearly rem ov edalltaboos along th is line.
15 . E m p h as es addedby auth or.
16 . C h i H aotian , “Takin g Th e Road of N ational D efen s e
M odernization W h ich C onform s to C h ina’s N ational C onditions and
Reflects th e C h aracteris tics of th e Tim es — -M y Un ders tanding
A cquiredFrom th e Study ofC om radeJiang Zem in’s E xpos itions on th e
Relations h ip B etw een B uilding th e National D efense and E conom ic
D ev elop m ent,” Qiush i,No. 8,F B IS,A p ril16 ,19 9 6 . E m p h as is added.
17. Ofinteres t,h ow ev er,w as a rep rint ofaD ecem ber 19 86 s p eech by
form er D efense M inis ter G eneral Zh ang A ip ing in w h ich th e v enerated
general w arned th at, ev en th ough th e international s ecurity situation
didnot p ortendw orldw ar,th enation neededto rem ain v igilant,m ov e
forw ard w ith defens e m odernization, and recognize th e potential
th reats to C h ina’s s ecurity . In retros p ect, th e s p eech , giv en to an
expandedm eeting ofth e C entral M ilitary C om m is s ion in 19 86 ,can be
v iew edas h av ing cav eatedD eng’s reas s es s m ent ofC h ina’s s ecurity as
es p ous ed in June 19 85 . It w as rep rinted in th e journal Zh anlue Yu
G uanli (Strategy andM anagem ent),publis h edby th e C h ines e Society
for Strategy and M anagem ent, w ith th e p erm is s ion of th e retired
G eneral Zh ang. See Zh ang A ip ing, “National D efense D ev elopm ent in
Peacetim e,” Zh anlueYu G uanli,F B IS,Augus t 1,19 9 9 .
18 F u Quany ou, “M ake A ctiv e E xp loration s , D eep en Reform ,
A dv ance M ilitary W ork in an A ll-RoundW ay ,” Qiush i, No. 6 , F B IS,
M arch 19 9 8. F or an ov erv iew of th e PL A ’s p rogram s of reform , s ee
F inkels tein,C h ina’s N ational M ilitary Strategy .
60
19 . F or exam p le, s ee Joh n Pom fret, “C h ines e M ilitary Us es
A n niv ers ary to Polis h Its Im age,”Th eW as h ington Pos t,October 2,19 9 9 .
A ccording to Pom fret,“In M arch (19 9 9 )andagain ov er th es um m er,th e
arm y is s aidto h av ereceiv edbillion s ofdollars in additionalfunding . . .”
Pom fret’s u s e of th e term “billion s ” is likely an ov ers tatem ent.
K now ledgeableobs erv ers do agreeth at th ere w as a one-tim einfus ion in
th es um m er of19 9 9 andth at itw as about 1.2billion U.S. dollars (USD ).
Th is figure is s ep arate anddis tinct from th e lum p-sum p ay m ent th e
PL A receiv edin D ecem ber 19 9 8 as a result ofth e order to div es tits elfof
its com m ercial h oldings . Th e latter p ay m ent, according to D av id
Sh am baugh , w as about 4 00 m illion USD . See D av id Sh am baugh ,
Reform ing C h ina’s M ilitary , B erkeley : Univ ers ity ofC alifornia Pres s ,
forth com ing.
20. C learly a s cientific s am pling ofth e C h ines e p res s during th is
p eriod w as not m ade by th is s tudent, and I am open to counter
argum ents on th e is s u e ofth e C h ines e p res s during th e A p rilth rough
M ay 2001 p eriod.B ut h av ing jus t com p leteda v ery detaileds tudy ofth e
p os t- K os ov o debate, I fully exp ectedth e E P-3 incident to reop en th e
entire is s ue. It didnot occur.
21. Th ere w ere a few interesting,but rare exceptions . A t least one
p aper triedto reop en th e “p eaceanddev elop m ent debate.” B ut it didso
notby criticizing th ePRC G ov ernm ent,butby criticizing th os eC h inese
analy s ts w h o s till “ch eris h edillus ion s ” about th e UnitedStates . See
“C h eris h ing Illusions A bout C h ina-U.S. Relations W ill B ring H arm To
B oth th e C ountry andth e Peop le,” C om m entary article in G uangzh ou
Ribao,F B IS,M ay 16 ,2001.
22. “F ree D is cus s ion on C h ina-U.S. Relations ,” in C ontem p orary
International Relations , B eijing: C h ina In s titute of C ontem p orary
International Relations,June2001,p p . 7-30.
23. F B IS h as p os teds om e ofth e conference p ap ers in translation.
24 . W erecallK orea (19 5 0),th eF rench -Indoch inaW ar (early 19 5 0s ),
th e Sino-Indian W ar (19 6 2), th e U.S.-Indoch ina W ar (19 6 0s ), th e
n o rth ern clas h es w ith th e Sov iets (es p ecially 19 6 9 ), th e
Sino-V ietnam es e W ar (19 79 ),C h ines e concern s about C am bodia,and,
in a “back to th e future m ode,” C h ines e concerns about th e Sov iets in
A fgh anis tan (late19 70s),not to m ention ongoing C h ines econcern about
Indo-Pakistaniclas h es ov er K as h m ir. W h ileth e C h ines elikely h oldno
brief for th e Taliban, th e p ros ecution of a m ajor cam p aign in
A fgh anis tan— es p ecially one w agedby th e UnitedStates — is not going
to be a reas s uring ev ent from a C h ines e p oint ofv iew .
61
25 . Th is is n ot jus t a C h ines e p h enom enon. It occurs in th e United
States as w ell.
26 . Th is is n ot to s ugges t th at th e UnitedStates is th e “sole” foreign
factor in Beijing’s dom es tic reform agenda. C h ina h as h edgedagainst
th e p os s ibility ofa p rolongedp eriodoftension w ith th e UnitedStates .
Ov er th e pas t few y ears ,it h as w orkedto div ers ify ands trength en its
foreign ties acros s th e dev elop edw orld,ones us p ects ,becaus eitrealizes
th e“danger” ofh av ing all ofits eggs in th e U.S. bas ket w h en it com es to
foreign inv es tm ent,trade,tech nology acquis ition,etc.
27. F or an in dep th s tudy of C h ines e v iew s of th e m ilitary
relations h ip , s ee D av id M . F inkels tein , “E ngaging D oD : C h inese
Pers p ectiv es on M ilitary Relations w ith th eUnitedStates ,A lexandria,
V A : Th e C N A C orp oration,C RM 9 9 -004 6 .9 0,October 19 9 9 .
62
C H A PTE R 3
A V IE W F ROM TOK YO:
C H IN A ’S G ROW ING M IL ITARY POW E R
A N D ITS SIG NIF IC A NC E F OR JA PA N ’S
N A TIONA L SE C URITY
H ideaki K aneda
C H IN A ’S A M B ITION
C h ina’s M aritim e A dv ance.
C h ina h as p ursueda national s trategy ofcons is tent and
activ e adv ancem ent tow ard p erip h eral w aters . C h ina’s
activ ity p atterns, as th ey did in th e 19 70s to th e South
C h ina Sea andin th e 19 80s to th e E as t C h ina Sea, h av e
been to adv anceto s uch areas us ing force,w h ileignoring th e
s ov ereign righ ts and juris diction righ ts of neigh boring
nation s . F inding little or w eak res is tance from th es e
countries ,C h ina s trength enedp res enceth ere by creating a
fait accom p li, ultim ately leading to th e p ractical control of
th es e areas . W h at is th e objectiv e of C h ina’s m aritim e
adv ance? Th e answ er is th e key to des igning Jap an’s
deterrent s trategy against C h ina.
F irs t is th e econom ic as p ect inv olv ed. C h ina aim s to
dev elop andutilizebiological andnonbiological res ources in
its p erip h eral w aters , es p ecially s eabed oil res ources . In
addition, C h ina’s food and energy s u p p ly s ituation is
rap idly deteriorating as a res ult ofits rem arkableeconom ic
grow th s ince th e adap tation of p olicies for econom ic
rev olution andth e op ening ofC h ina’s m arket to th e w orld,
com binedw ith its dras ticp op ulation grow th . In p articular,
C h ina’s energy s ituation is s o s ev ere th at th e w orld’s
63
s ev enth larges t oil p roducing nation can h ardly keep up
w ith th egrow ing dem and,andtoday C h ina th eoil p roducer
h as becom e an oil-im p orting consum er.
F or furth er econom icdev elop m ent,C h ina m us tcontinue
to s ecure foodandenergy s up p lies . Th erefore, it becom es
extrem ely im p ortant for C h ina to p rocurefis h ing grounds in
th e p erip h eral w aters andadjacent s eas , to acquire good
quality s eabed oil res ources , and to s ecure s ea lines of
com m unication (SL OC s ) for oil im p orts from th e M iddle
E as t. D ep endence on th e s eas is a logical consequence for
C h ina in order to m aintain continuous econom icgrow th .
Secondis th eis s ue ofnational s ecurity . In C h ina,nav al
andair forces h av e been built andop eratedas s up p orting
forces to as s is t th e arm y . H ow ev er, th ey learnedfrom th e
h is torical exp erienceofth e Qing D y nas ty w h en,becaus e of
C h ina’s lack ofaw arenes s of th e im p ortance ofs eap ow er
an d m aritim e righ ts , foreign p ow ers us urp ed th eir
s ov ereign an d territorial righ ts . B as ed on th es e
exp eriences , C h ina adop ted a clear m ilitary s trategy of
“near w ater defense,”w ith th es o-called“F irs t Is landC h ain
D efenseL ine”being C h ina’s s eadefenseline,connecting th e
A leutian Is lands ,K uril Is lands ,Jap anes e Is lands ,Ry uky u
Is lands , Taiw an, Ph ilip p ine Is lands , and B orneo. Th e
Senkaku Is lands , claim ed by Jap an, andth e Sp ratly and
Paracel Is lands , ov er w h ich s ev eral South -E as t A s ian
countries claim territorial righ ts ,are includedin th is F irs t
Is landC h ain D efenseL ine. Taiw an als o h as claim s on s om e
of th es e is lands , an is s ue w h ich C h ina calls a dom es tic
m atter. In oth er w ords ,C h ina’s near w ater defenses trategy
includes m ilitary force dep loy m ents to attack Taiw an and
p rev ent counterattacks . One m us t not forget th at th e
m ilitary forces th at are cap able of cros s ing th e w ater to
attack Taiw an andp rev enting counterattacks can certainly
beus edagainst th eSenkaku,Sp ratly ,andParacelIs lands .
W ith th e endofth e C oldW ar,C h ina’s negotiations on
national border is s ues and m ilitary w ith draw al from
borders w ith Rus s ia andform er Sov iet Union countries in
64
C entral A s ia h av ep rogres s eds m ooth ly andth eop p ortunity
for negotiation w ith India to s olv eborder is s ues h as aris en.
C h ina can feel s ecure for th e m om ent regarding its land
borders to th enorth andw es t andcan reduceits arm y forces
dras tically , th ereby generating enough res erv es to s h ift
th eir interes ts andredis tribute res ources to focus on th eir
eas t ands outh ern “oceans .”
Th irdis th e s h ift ofC h ina’s m ilitary s trategy . B y 19 85 ,
th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y (PL A )h adalready attem p ted
th e s trategic s h ift from a “global w ar” to a “local w ar”
orientation,andafter th eendofth eC oldW ar,s h iftedfrom a
m ere “general local w ar” to a “local w ar under h i-tech
conditions” bas edon w h at th ey learnedfrom th e G ulfW ar.
Th rough s uch s trategics h ifts ,th en G eneralSecretary Jiang
Zem in s tarted to em p h as ize th e “defen s e of m aritim e
interes ts ” along w ith th e defens e of s ov ereign righ ts of
territorial lands ,air s p ace,ands eas .
B y October 2000, C h ina h ad conducted large-s cale
exercis es of “all arm y exch ange activ ities to dem onstrate
th eres ult ofs cientific-tech nological training” incorp orating
th e “new th ree attacks and th ree defenses ” (attacks by
s tealth aircraft, ballis tic m is s iles , andarm edh elicop ters ,
anddefense by p recis ion w eap ons, electronic interference,
andreconnais s ance surv eillance),w h ich inv olv edlearning
from
th e K os ov o air- raids as w ell as from
“s cientific-tech nological m ilitary training.” A t th at tim e, it
w as notedth at th eexercis es w ere “attack”orientedw ith th e
ocean s as th e m ain s tage, rath er th an con v ention al
“defense” orientedm aneuv ers .
F ourth is an intention to im p rov eC h ina’s p os ition in th e
in tern ation al com m u n ity . C h in a’s v iew tow ard
international relation s h ip s is to break aw ay from th e
s ituation of “on e s u p erp ow er an d s ev eral p ow ers ”
dom inated by th e United States and to w ork tow ard
“m ulti-p olarization,” w ith C h ina its elfs h aring th e p os ition
ofone ofth e p ow erful p ole leaders . C h ina recognizes th at
th e uns table s ituation ofth e international com m unity w ill
65
p ers is t longer becaus e of ten s ions betw een th e m ajor
countries , C h ina’s ow n conflicts in securing its s p h ere of
interes ts , and increas ed incidents of regional conflicts .
H ow ev er,C h ina as s um es th at s uch a s ituation is m erely th e
transition tow ardth e es tablis h m ent ofa new international
order, and w ill ev entually lead to th e collap s e of U.S.
s in gle- country dom in an ce an d th e em ergen ce of a
m ulti-p olar w orld w ith C h ina, th e United States , th e
E urop ean Union, Rus s ia, andJap an as th e p oles . A t any
tim ein h is tory ,th eC h ina-U.S. relationsh ip h as h ada m ix of
s tability and instability factors , but in p urely m ilitary
term s , th ey are bas ically in a contentious relations h ip .
F rom C h in a’s p oin t of v iew , th e p ath tow ard
m ulti-p olarization m us t go th rough th e p oint ofriv alry and
contention w ith A m erican m ilitary p ow er.
Th e tone oflogicin C h ina th at s tands out th es e day s is
th at th e p ow er th at controls th e ocean is th e one th at earns
th e righ t ofsurv iv al anddev elop m ent. M oreov er, th ere is
m uch ev idence ofth eim p ortance ofcom p reh ensiv e m arine
p ow er andth at th e 21s t C entury w ill be th e “C entury of
Oceans .” Th e s earch to grow from “near w ater” to “op en
ocean” op erations is already underw ay in th e PL A . In a
s ituation ofincreas edconfidencein th eeconom y andlim ited
elem en ts of in s tability in national s ecurity , C h ina’s
ultim ate am bition ap p ears to be p rep aring to s tep bey ond
th e bas ic s trategy of n ear w ater defen s e to s ecure
dom ination ov er th e PacificOcean,w h ich is adjacent to its
p erip h eral w aters .
Jap an’s “D efense W h ite Pap er” of 2001 rep orted th e
recent s triking build-up ofC h ina’s m ilitary p rep arednes s in
th equality andquantity ofboth its nav y andair force. W h at
is th eir ultim ate objectiv e? To s p eak in extrem es , is it not
p os s ibleto put forth a h y p oth es is th at C h ina us es th eexcus e
of cap turing Taiw an to h ide C h ina’s true and ultim ate
objectiv e ofw inning a w ar agains t th e UnitedStates ? W e,
th e Jap an es e p eop le, m us t as certain C h in a’s future
intentions.
66
C h ina Takes a Serious Step tow ard“M ultiPolarization”— E s tablis h m ent ofth e “Sh angh ai
C oop eration Organization.”
On June14 and15 ,2001,th e “Sh angh aiF iv e” countries
ofC h ina, Rus s ia, K azakh s tan, K y rgis tan, andTajikis tan,
w ith th e n ew ly - added Uzbekis tan , es tablis h ed th e
“Sh angh ai C oop eration Organization.” A “Sh angh ai F iv e”
sum m it h as been h eldy early s ince 19 9 6 ,originally for th e
p urp os eofres olv ing border tensions betw een C h ina andth e
C entral A s ian countries th at h adnew ly aris en after th e
collap s e of th e Sov iet Union, w ith C h ina leading th e
dis cus s ion. Since th ey s u cces s fully agreed up on th e
reduction ofm ilitary forces dep loy edto border areas , th e
focus h as s h ifted tow ard coop eration in th e control of
Is lam icextrem is ts ,w h ich h as been th em ajor p roblem ofth e
C entral A s ian countries . M oreov er,in recent y ears ,C h ina
h as us edth e Sh angh aiF iv e forum as a m eans to ch eck th e
United States , as dem ons trated in its ap p eal for ties
betw een Rus s ia and C h ina, es p ecially on international
s ecurity and dis arm am ent is s ues , and against th e U.S.
m onop olis tic control of global p olitical, econom ic, and
m ilitary affairs .
Th e s ignificanceofth is organization for C h ina is ,on th e
s urface, m ulti-national regional coop eration to control
exp anding Is lam extrem is ts . In reality , it is a w ay to deal
w ith th eth reat ofXinjiang s ep aratis m ,w h ich is likeasnake
in C h ina’s bos om , th e s tability ofXinjiang being es s ential
for th e realization ofC h ina’s national p roject ofth e G reat
W es t D ev elop m ent. Reading ev en deep er into C h ina’s
intentions,h ow ev er,one can findth e p os s ibility ofC h ina’s
des ire to tran s form th is organization into an alliance
against th e UnitedStates andits s et ofbilateral alliances
w ith region al countries , w h ich w ill h av e a greater
s ignificance for C h ina in th e future.
O riginally , C h in a w as eager to im p rov e bilateral
relations h ip s w ith th eir continental neigh boring countries .
In June 2001, C h ina concluded th e Treaty of G ood and
67
F riendly Relationsh ip w ith Rus s ia. Th ey als o concluded
bilateral agreem ents w ith each C entral A s ian country as
th e fruit of th e Sh angh ai F iv e p roces s . A m ong m ajor
continental neigh boring countries , only India h as n ot
enteredinto a bilateral agreem ent w ith C h ina. H ow ev er,
C h ina is attem p ting to im p rov eits relations h ip w ith India,
as ev idencedby th e re-op ening ofa Sino-Indian dialogue
th at h ad been h alted s ince India’s n uclear tes t in 19 9 8,
p robably in res p onse to th e recent U.S. ap p roach tow ard
India.
Th e “Sh angh ai C oop eration Organization” is th e firs t
m ultilateral organization begun under C h ina’s initiativ e.
Som e m oderates believ e th is organization w ill dev elop into
a m oderate A s s ociation of South eas t A s ian N ation s
(A SE A N)-ty p e regional forum . Oth ers consider th at th e
current m em ber countries of th is organization aim to
“p rom ote m ultip olaris m ofth e w orld” andoth er countries
s uch as Pakis tan, M ongolia, and Iran w ill s eek th e
op p ortunity to join th eorganization,w h ileNorth K orea and
V ietnam are s aid to s h ow interes t in it. Th rough th is
organization or its adv anced form in th e future, C h ina
p os s ibly w illattem p t to extendits influenceov er a v as t land
andw ater area extending from th e A s ia-Pacific region to
South w es t A s ia and th e M iddle E as t, w ith continental
C h ina andC entral A s ia as th e central force.
In addition,C h ina is likely to us e th is forum to counter
p erceiv ed U.S. containm ent against C h ina, and in th e
future to confront th e exis ting w eb ofalliances centeredon
th e UnitedStates ,w h ile h iding th e p otential to dev elop it
into an organization s im ilar to th eW ars aw Pact at th e tim e
of th e C oldW ar. F or th e m om ent C h ina w ill us e it as a
p latform to elim in ate U.S. in fluen ce by exp res s in g
op p os ition to th e m is s ile defen s e in itiativ e an d
international andregional talks ledby th e UnitedStates ,as
w ell as to exp res s C h ina’s p ers is tent claim th at Taiw an,
w h ich is under th e influence of th e UnitedStates , is an
insep arable p art of C h ines e territory . In th is s ense, h ow
68
C h ina w illreact to th eU.S. res p onse agains t th eSep tem ber
11,2001,terroris t attacks m ay be s ignificant.
C h ina A im s to B ecom e a Regional Sup erp ow er—
Prep arednes s on th e C ontinent andA dv ancem ent
Tow ardth e Oceans.
W h at is th em eaning ofC h ina’s adv ancem ent tow ardth e
oceans, and im p rov ed relations h ip s w ith its continental
neigh bors ? Originally des cribedas “s h ip s in th e South and
h ors es up N orth ,” C h ina is a country th at h as tw o faces :
“C ontinental C h ina” and“OceanicC h ina.”
D es p ite h av ing s om edom es ticp roblem s ,C h ina s eem s to
realize th at it h as s ucces s fully createdan unp recedented
s table s ituation in dip lom atic and m ilitary relationsh ip s
w ith neigh boring countries . M oreov er, C h ina h as grow n
from being a regional p olitical p ow er to becom ing a regional
superp ow er, both in nam e andactuality , in all p olitical,
m ilitary , econom ic,andindus trial as p ects ,andis about to
s ecure a p os ition as one ofth e w orlds up erp ow ers (andth e
s tron ges t in A s ia), cap able of th reaten in g th e U.S.
m onop oly . To ach iev es uch an objectiv e,C h ina cannot afford
to lim it its interes ts to th e continent andm us t h av e th e
s trong m aritim e cap ability ofan “OceanicC h ina.”
In v iew ofth e C h ines e C om m unis t Party ’s p os ition in a
one-p arty -ruledcountry ,it is im p os s ible for C h ina to allow
th e United States to rem ain th e “one ultra-superp ow er”
indefinitely . A tleas t,C h ina w is h es to gain th ep ow er of“not
los ing,” if not w inning ov er th e United States in ev ery
s p ectrum . Th us , C h ina, s tarting w ith s tability on th e
continent,s teadily w ill p rom ote a driv e for th e attainm ent
ofits s ecret am bition to fulfill th e s up rem e p rop os ition of
“confrontation in th e ocean” w ith th e UnitedStates andits
allied countries , w ith in C h in a’s unique tim e s cale,
regardles s ofth eir targetedy ear.
C ertain ly , C h in a n ev er m akes th e m is take of
m entioning th e p os s ibility of direct confrontation at s ea
w ith U.S. m ilitary p ow er. Th ere is no need, for it h as an
69
ap p rop riate andconv enient excus ecalledTaiw an. A t ev ery
op p ortunity , C h ina s ends out a s trong w arning to U.S.
forces against interv ention in relation to th e Taiw an is s ue.
M oreov er,C h ina s tres s es th at it w illnot h es itateto confront
U.S. forces ifany th ing h ap p ens in Taiw an. H ow ev er,th is is
not likely to be C h ina’s true intention. Th ough I us edth e
w ord “h y p oth es is ” earlier, C h in a’s real in ten tion is
confrontation bey ondTaiw an, not w ith Jap an, K orea, th e
A SE A N countries ,or A us tralia,but w ith th eUnitedStates .
To find p roof of th is , one only needs to look into th e
nature of C h ines e m ilitary forces . If C h ina s erious ly
con s iders taking ov er Taiw an at p res ent, w h at is th e
s ignificanceofth e lim itedcap ability ofth e C h ines e nav y to
tran s p ort troop s acros s oceans? Undoubtedly , th ey h av e
troop s andequip m ent w ith a certain cap ability , s o C h ina
m igh t v enture attacks on Taiw an, s h ould th e p olitical
neces s ity aris e. Yetin v iew ofTaiw an’s defensecap ability ,it
w ouldbedifficult for C h ina to s endtroop s to Taiw an’s m ain
is land.Th enatural interp retation is th at C h ina’s cap ability
is only sufficient for a v ery lim itedattack,s uch as ballis tic
m is s ile attacks agains t p art of th e m ain is lan d for
intim idation p urp os es ,or th e attacks on Quem oy Is landand
M ats u Is land, w h ich C h ina could com p lete before th e
UnitedStates couldinterv ene.
On th eoth er h and,v iew ing th erecent direction ofnav al
andair force m odernization ofth e C h ines e arm edforces ,
onecan eas ily notice th at th es e efforts cannot be des cribed
in term s of quality , let alone quantity , as th e rational
dev elop m ent ofequip m ent ands y s tem s p urely to cap ture
Taiw an or defendth e neigh boring s eas . W ouldn’t aircraft
carriers , fleet ballis tic m is s ile subm arines (SSB N s ) w ith
s ea-launch edballis ticm is s iles (SL B M s ),andnuclear attack
s ubm arines (SSN s ) w ith s h ip -launch ed cruis e m is s iles
(SL C M s )under dev elop m ent by th e arm edforces be better
suitedfor confrontation w ith U.S. forces ? A ls o, w h at does
C h ina’s oceanic adv ancem ent into th e Pacific O cean,
including Jap an’s exclus iv e econom ic zone (E E Z), m ean?
Isn’t it logical to interp ret th es e m ov es as C h ina’s efforts to
70
s teadily p rep are to confront th e UnitedStates by building
up a m aritim e op erational cap ability and as s um ing th e
UnitedStates andits allies are p otential enem ies ?
C h ines e W ay ofW ar— “B ey ondL im itedW ar”
(Irregular andA s y m m etric Tactics ).
W e can als o s ee C h ina’s future p ros p ects for th e direct
confrontation w ith th e UnitedStates in its concretem ilitary
s trategy and tactics . Th e book, B ey ond L im ited W ar—
C oncep t ofW ar andTactics for th e Tim es ofG lobalization
w ritten in 19 9 9 by tw o A ir F orcecolonels in activ es erv iceof
th e PL A , is draw ing attention in C h ina and th e United
States . “B ey ondlim itedw ar” m eans “a w ar th at transcends
an y lim itation” or a “w ar w ith out an y norm s an d
regulations.” In oth er w ords , it can be calleda “forbidden
s trategy .” Th eauth ors recom m endedth at C h ina im p lem ent
such a s trategy to confront th e United States . Th ey s ay
“m odern w ar is a h i-tech w ar,andC h ina cannot w in ov er th e
UnitedStates , w h ich h as ov erw h elm ing p ow er, unles s it
confronts w ith th em th rough th is bey ond-lim ited-w ar.”
Th e book recom m ends s eeking “irregular” w ar tactics
th at go bey ondth e nation, territories , m eth ods , andw ar
s cales , including s o-called “illegal” tactics . Th e auth ors
th em s elv es claim ,“F or th ew eaker to confront th es tronger,
th e w eaker does not need to follow th e rules s et by th e
s tronger.” A m ong th e item s of cons ideration in B ey ond
L im ited W ar, w e needto note “as y m m etric tactics .” U.S.
m ilitary forces are troubled w ith th e C h ines e forces ’
inclination to regardas y m m etric tactics as im p ortant. A
form er U.S. A m bas s ador to C h in a indicated, “C h ina
regularly adop ts a unique s trategy to m ake up for its ow n
w eaknes s andto dis p lay its s trength .” Th is concep t h as a
com m on th read w ith th e Sep tem ber 11, 2001, terroris t
attacks on A m erica.
Th is book is s aid to h av e been w ritten w ith out any
instruction from th e C h ines e leaders h ip . Som e obs erv e,
71
h ow ev er, th at th e book h as w on s trong s u p p ort from
C h ines e p olitical andm ilitary leaders .
A s s tatedabov e, C h ina h as learnednum erous les s ons
from th e large-scale conflicts inv olv ing th e UnitedStates in
th e p os t-C oldW ar era: th e G ulfW ar andK os ov o conflicts ,
andC h ina h as p roceededw ith a great s trategicconv ers ion
to “im p rov em ent ofdefensiv e com bat cap ability under th e
h igh -tech conditions,” w h ile exerting efforts to elim inate
functional s h ortcom ings and av oiding any s ignificant
tech nological andop erational gap . In oth er w ords ,C h ina is
exerting efforts to av oids h ow ing any decis iv e w eaknes s of
its ow n,w h ileconsis tently being cons cious ofth ep os s ibility
ofw ar against th e UnitedStates .
H ow ev er, s u ch a s trategy does n ot p rov ide an y
op p ortunity to w in against ov erw h elm ing U.S. m ilitary
p ow er. Th erefore, C h in a p urs u es its ow n areas of
superiority ov er U.S. w eaknes s es andw ill try to s trike th e
w eak s p ots of th e United States . Such s trategies are
“irregular tactics ” and“as y m m etrictactics .” C h ina’s recent
em p h as is on cy ber w ars ,for w h ich it h as m adelittleeffort to
h ide its intentions , is an exam p le. B y taking such dual
s tances , C h ina s eem s to be looking for an op p ortunity to
ensure future v ictory ov er th e UnitedStates .
JA PA N ’S D E TE R R E N T STRA TE G Y A G A INST
C H IN A
C h ina’s Strategy against Jap an.
N ow ,h ow m us t Jap an buildits deterrent p ow er agains t
C h ina? F irs t, let th e United States inv es tigate C h ina’s
s trategy against Jap an bas ed on an analy s is of C h ina’s
p olitical andm ilitary am bitions dis cus s edin th e p rev ious
s ection.
In C h in a, th ere is a group th at p erceiv es th e
Jap an-C h ina relationsh ip m erely as a p art of th e p ow er
balance in th e A s ia-Pacific region. A ls o, it w is h es to let
Jap an rem ain an econom icgiant only . To h av e Jap an as a
72
p olitical superp ow er or m ilitary giant is h ardly accep table
for C h ina,as its greates tw is h is to beth eonly superp ow er in
A s ia.
C h ina’s ultim ate objectiv e is to becom e th e “unitary
superp ow er” in th e region. In North eas t A s ia,four p olitical
p oles cons is t ofRus s ia,C h ina,Jap an andth eUnitedStates .
Th e Sov iet Union us edto be th e th reatening p ow er during
th e C oldW ar but it collap s ed, and its s ucces s or, Rus s ia,
m aintains friendly relations w ith C h ina as th ey s h are th e
bas icp olicy oftaking a h ard-line against th eUnitedStates .
C oncerning Jap an,C h ina anticip ates Jap an’s contribution
to C h ina’s econom ic grow th as a econom ic andtech nology
superp ow er, y et tries to p rev ent Jap an from becom ing a
p olitical andm ilitary s up erp ow er. F or th e UnitedStates ,
C h ina is likely to m aintain a friendly “engagem ent”
relations h ip as long as th e United States ap p rov es of
C h ina’s econom ic dev elop m ent, w h ich is key for C h ina’s
p rom otion ofits national p ow er w h ile recognizing p otential
riv alries in ev ery p olitical,econom ic,andm ilitary as p ect.
F or C h ina’s am bition,to becom e th e only superp ow er in
th eregion,th egreates t barrier w illbeth es tableands trong
alliance betw een th e United States , th e w orld’s unitary
superp ow er,andJap an,a s trong regional p ole. C ons idering
a future confrontation w ith th e UnitedStates , it w ill be
p referable for C h ina to m inim ize th e num ber ofp ow erful
countries alliedw ith th e UnitedStates . C h ina is likely to
takeev ery op p ortunity to break up any Jap an-U.S. alliance
andto attem p t th e alienation ofth es e tw o countries . C h ina
can us e s ev eral m eth ods for th is p urp os e,andth e one w ith
th eh igh es t p robability ofsucces s is C h ina’s s p ecial tacticof
“to w in w ith out figh ting,” th at is “bey ond lim ited w ar.”
F irs t,C h ina w illtry to w eaken or les s en U.S. s entim ent and
consciousnes s to s u p p ort andcoop eratew ith Jap an,th en to
underm ine Jap an’s cap ability andintention to s up p ort th e
UnitedStates . Next,C h ina w illcam p aign in Jap an andth e
United States for th e alienation of th e Jap an-U.S.
relations h ip . In addition,C h ina can m ake “bey ondlim ited
w ar” m ore effectiv e by building a cap ability to figh t an
73
inform ation tech nology (IT)w ar,such as cy ber w ar,tow ard
w h ich C h ina is directing its efforts . Th is is not th e talk of
s om eth ing to com e. Such a figh t h as already begun.
E v en if Jap an and th e United States s ucces s fully
m aintain th eir alliance, it is m os t conv enient for C h ina
w h en Jap an h as as m an y res triction s on defen s e
coop eration w ith th e UnitedStates as p os s ible, like th os e
im p os ed in Jap an today . Th e greater th e num ber of
res trictiv e m easures in Jap an’s defense coop eration w ith
th e UnitedStates , th e h igh er th e ap p reciation in C h ina.
W h at C h ina w ouldlike to s ee is for Jap an to m aintain its
exclu s iv ely defen s e fram ew ork, n ot to ch ange its
constitution including collectiv e s elf-defense righ ts , not to
p roceed w ith w artim e or national em ergency legis lation,
and not to loos en th e actual res trictions under “th e law
concerning m eas ures to ens ure p eaceands ecurity ofJap an
in situations in areas s urrounding Jap an.”
B as ic Strategy against C h ina.
Th en w h at s trategy s h ouldJap an take against C h ina?
Th e bes t ap p roach is a s trategy ofbuilding a v ery p ractical
and m utually beneficial econom ic relations h ip , w h ile
av oiding p olitical as p ects as m uch as p os s ible. C h ina is a
country th at can m aintain clos e econom ic ties ev en w ith
Taiw an . It can n ot ign ore Jap an ’s econom ic an d
tech nological s trength s ,w h ich far exceedth os e ofTaiw an.
In turn,Jap an finds s ufficient ap p ealin th eenorm ous s cop e
ofC h ina’s ev er-grow ing m arket. In oth er w ords ,for Jap an
as w ellas for C h ina,a m utualclos eeconom icrelations h ip is
es s ential.
F rom th e m ilitary v iew p oint, C h ina does not actually
s eem to consider Jap an’s defense p ow er as a true th reat,
contrary to its p olitical p rop aganda claim s ,w h ich at ev ery
op p ortunity refer to “Jap an’s tendency ofm ilitarization.” It
is feas ibleto as s um eth at C h ina h as already factoredinto its
s trategy all th e s h ortcom ings in Jap an’s defense functions:
im p erfection in defense-related legis lation; indep endent
74
defen s e p olicies ; defects in equip m ent; res trictions on
v arious op erations defects from s u ch p olicies ; les s
aw arenes s of th e Jap anes e p eop le and gov ernm ent in
defense m atters ; andth e lack offundam ental s trength to
sustain w ars ,s uch as abas ically w eak defenseindus try and
defenselogis tics s y s tem . Th erefore,onem us t not ignoreth e
p os s ibility th at C h ina m ay m aneuv er Jap an into s om e
conflicts ov er,for exam p le,th e Senkaku Is lands andoth er
territorial andE E Zconflicts ifa s ituation can begenerated
in w h ich th e UnitedStates w ill not (or cannot) interv ene.
Jap an m us t deter s uch p os s ibilities by its elfandes tablis h a
s y s tem th at can res p ondto cris es effectiv ely . It m us t s top
being a nation w ith out any s en s e or p rep aration for
em ergencies as des cribed abov e, and es tablis h its ow n
n ation al s ecurity s y s tem to res p on d agains t C h ina.
Oth erw is e,s uch a tim e w ill com e s om e day .
Securing U.S. andJap an A lliance as an A xle.
F or Jap an,th e bes t p os s ible op tion in national s ecurity
adap table to th e v arious future p ros p ects is a s ecure
Jap an-U.S. alliance. No oth er op tion is conceiv able. In th e
env ironm ent ofth egeo-p oliticals ituation ofN orth eas t A s ia,
Jap an is certainly free to consider oth er op tions s uch as
nonalliance,bilateral alliance w ith a country (ev en C h ina)
oth er th an th e United States , or a m ultilateral alliance
including Rus s ia, C h ina and th e United States . Som e
debates and p rop os itions about such op tions h av e taken
p lacein andout ofJap an. H ow ev er,th es eop tions areeith er
im p laus ible, or lack future p ros p ects . C ertainly after th e
endof th e C oldW ar, th e as p ect ofa p eace div idendw as
em p h as ized, an d s om e ev en ques tioned w h eth er a
Jap an-U.S. alliance w ouldbeneededany longer. Th e joint
declaration of Jap an and th e United States in 19 9 7
redefined th e alliance and identified a clear direction
tow ardan ev en stronger relationsh ip .
F or th e UnitedStates ,th e s ignificance ofa Jap an-U.S.
alliance is , firs t ofall, p rov iding regional deterrent effect
75
th rough th e p res enceofU.S. forces in Jap an,m ainly N av y ,
A ir F orce, an d M arin es . Th e s econ d s ign ifican ce is
dev elop ing accep tables up p ort m ech anis m s th at can satis fy
th e U.S. s tandardin term s ofev ery th ing from s u p p ly and
rep air to m edical s erv ices . F rom a different v iew p oint,th e
UnitedStates is w ell aw are th at its m ilitary w ith draw al
from Jap an w ould p rov ide Jap an w ith a good m otiv e to
fortify its m ilitary p ow er. M oreov er, th e United States
realizes th at th e alliance s erv es to deter any p os s ible
conflicts betw een a unifiedK orea,C h ina,andJap an in th e
future.
W h eth er s uch U.S. aim s are inv olv ed or not, it is
p referablefor th eregion for th eUnitedStates andJap an to
m ain tain a s olid allian ce an d to retain a m utually
com p lem entary relationsh ip ,w h ile th e alliancerem ains as
a linch p in for regional s ecurity ,including Jap an’s s ecurity .
C h ina andNorth K orea do not w elcom e such an alliance.
Rus s ia is no longer like th e Sov iet Union ofth e oldday s .
N orth K orea does not h av e s ufficient p ow er to confront th e
United States . Only C h ina occas ionally h as s h ow n a
w illingnes s to confront th eUnitedStates in m ilitary p ow er,
andit is th e only country th at h as th e p otential to do s o.
Th us th e only op tion for Jap an is to m aintain ands olidify
th e Jap an-U.S. alliance, w h ich not only p rov ides th e
s tability neces s ary for fav orable regional dev elop m ent,but
als o is im p ortant for th es afety ands ecurity ofJap an. A t th e
s am e tim e th e alliance is anticip ated to function as a
deterrent against C h ina.
Th e B us h adm inis tration considers Jap an as th e m os t
im p ortant U.S. ally in A s ia. A n Institute for N ational
StrategicStudies (INSS)Sp ecialRep ort,1 w h ich is s aidto be
th e fundam ental s tatem ent ofth e adm inis tration’s Jap an
p olicy ,exp res s es ,w ith carefully s electedp h ras ing to av oid
th e im p res s ion of p res s uring Jap an, th e s trong w is h to
s ecure andfurth er s olidify th e Jap an-U.S. allianceth rough
Jap an’s efforts to s olv e th ep roblem ofth e righ t ofcollectiv e
s elf-defense.
76
C h in a w ill take ev ery op p ortunity to dis rup t th e
relations h ip betw een Jap an andth e UnitedStates . Jap an
m us t not be influenced by such a m ov e, andm us t exert
ev ery effort to s olidify th e Jap an-U.S. alliance, w h ile
p ers ev eringly elim inating any elem ents th at m igh t alienate
Jap an andth e UnitedStates .
C reation andM aintenance ofD efense Pow er
w ith out F unctional D eficiencies .
W h at w ill h ap p en if Jap an dev elop s effectiv e m ilitary
deterrents against C h ina? B ecaus e ofits national p olicy ,at
leas t, Jap an w ill not becom e a m ilitary superp ow er. Its
bas ic s trategy is to rely on th e deterrent effect of U.S.
s u p p ort bas edon th e Jap an-U.S. alliance. H ow ev er, s om e
futureargum ent m ay dev elop as to w h eth er th eroles h aring
in th e Jap an-U.S. alliance m us t be lim ited to Jap an
p rov iding th e s h ieldandth e UnitedStates p rov iding th e
s w ord.
Th e UnitedStates is currently s tudy ing a new defense
s trategy incorp orating th e m is s ile defen s e initiativ e.
Preceding th is ,a new Quadrennial D efense Rev iew (QD R)
w as announcedon October 1,2001. Th e new QD R,s trongly
reflecting th e s h ocks ofth e Sep tem ber 11 terroris t attacks
on A m erica,abandonedth econv entional tw o m ajor th eater
w ar (2M TW )s trategy andidentifieda p olicy ofs ecuring new
U.S. bas es ,s tations,andfacilities for tem p orary us es ,w h ile
reconfirm ing th e im p ortance of forw ard dep loy ed forces .
Inev itably it w ill becom e m ore difficult to op erate U.S.
arm edforces abroad,and, in s om e cas es , th e s ituation of
redu ced m ilitary cap ability m ay contin u e s em ip erm anently or tem p orarily .
Under such a s ituation, Jap an needs to create defense
forces th at are fully function al qualitativ ely , if not
quantitativ ely , to sustain th e deterrent p ow er again s t
C h ina th at p rev ious ly h as been m aintained th rough th e
Jap an-U.S. alliance. Such a m ov e w ill inev itably bring
ch anges in role-sh aring in th e Jap an-U.S. alliance, but at
77
th e s am e tim e w ill enable Jap an to take on th e role ofa
deterrent against C h ina indep endently . A s s um ing th ecas e
ofU.S. h es itation to exercis e th e articles ofth e Jap an-U.S.
Security A rran gem en t, for exam p le, in th e cas e of
intim idation attacks relatedto th e Jap an-C h ina territorial
dis p ute area ov er th e Senkaku Is lands or m id-range
ballis ticm is s ileattacks on nearby U.S. bas es in Jap an using
conv en tional w arh eads , Jap an m us t effectiv ely and
indep endently deter or defendagainst s uch intim idation or
actual attacks by C h ina andth w art C h ina’s intention. F or
th is , it is neces s ary for Jap an to builds ufficient defense
forces in ev ery s p ectrum ,including cap abilities for ballis tic
m is s ile defen s e, s w ift am p h ibious op eration s again s t
is lan ds by m arines , p aratroop landings , and as s ault
landings by h eliborne troop s . F urth erm ore, p os s es s ing th e
cap ability to attack enem y s trategiccenters by anti-surface
cruis ing m is s iles w ill becom e th e next is s ue. To dev elop
such defense forces ,Jap an needs not only to h av e dom es tic
dis cus s ions,but als o to m ake adjus tm ents w ith th e United
States concerning its s h are ofm ilitary functions .
D ev elop ing Political andM ilitary D ip lom acy
against C h ina,w ith B oth H ard-line andM oderate
Stances .
Jap an m us t take a s tance th at is both h ard-line and
m oderate against C h ina’s p olitical andm ilitary dip lom acy ,
w h ich is bas ed on C h ina’s unique v iew of nations and
v alues .
F irs t,Jap an needs to as k C h ina to be “an op en country ”
in m ilitary as p ects as w ell as in oth ers . C h ina recently
s tres s edth at its m ilitary forces arep urely defensiv e. C h ina
p ublis h ed its “W h ite Pap er on National D efen s e,” but
C h ina’s tran s p arency is s till far below th at ofneigh boring
coun tries . In E urop e, th ere is rap id and s ignifican t
p rom otion of confidence-building m easures em bracing
form er W es t and E as t countries , w ith dev elop m ents to
ensure tran s p arency . Recognition of C h ina as a country
th at com p lies w ith th e w orld’s s tandards is w ide-s p readin
78
econom ic and cultural as p ects , as exem p lified by C h ina’s
W orldTradeOrganization (W TO)m em bers h ip andw inning
th e bidfor th e 2008 Oly m p ics in B eijing,des p ite dom es tic
h um an righ ts p roblem s w h ich h av enot been fully corrected.
Jap an m us t take ev ery op p ortunity to as k C h ina to act as a
m oreop en country in th e as p ect ofconfidence-building,and
to try to im p rov e m ilitary tran s p arency .
Second,Jap an m us t as k C h ina to take a m ore p os itiv e
s tance tow ardregional dialogue. C h ina us edto beinactiv e
in regional councils ,but today th ere is a s triking ch ange in
C h ina’s p os ture. C h ina h as begun to p articip ate activ ely in
regional councils , es p ecially on p olitical and econom ic
is s ues . H ow ev er,C h ina’s p articip ation is extrem ely lim ited
in security -relatedm atters ,p robably becaus eC h ina finds it
dis adv antageous in m any cas es ,or it h as les s aw arenes s of
th e needfor tran s p arency .
In term s ofm aritim e is s ues , regional-w ide SL O C s are
th ep rop erty not only ofJap an or C h ina but areals o com m on
to th e region,andto s ecure th eir s afety is a com m on tas k
s h aredby regionalcountries . F or regionaldev elop m ent,it is
im p ortant th at SL O C s afety be ens uredth rough th e joint
efforts ofregional countries andnot beleft under th econtrol
ofany p articular country . W e needto let C h ina realize th at
th e region as a w h ole m us t s h are s uch recognition.
In recent day s ,th e focus ofattention h as been p iracy at
th econv erging p oints ofinternationals earoutes s uch as th e
M alacca Strait. It m ay be im p ortant for Jap an to take th e
initiativ e to create an env ironm ent in w h ich C h ina can
p articip ate, s tarting from th e eas y -to-addres s is s ues of
s afety ,env ironm ent,andh um an righ ts coop eration,andas
a p art ofregional efforts to deal w ith com m on is s ues like
p iracy , drug s ales , th e s lav e trade, and env ironm ental
p ollution,ultim ately andgradually s tep p ing up to national
s ecurity is s ues .
Regarding such p ending p roblem s betw een Jap an and
C h ina as th e m id-linebetw een th em in th eE as t C h ina Sea,
an is s ue relatedto E E Zs ,Jap an m us t abandon its obs cure
79
attitude and initiate a s erious dis cus s ion to es tablis h a
tem p orary border for th e true Jap an-C h ina m id-line.
M oreov er,w h ere both countries claim territorial righ ts ,th e
tw o countries needto agree to tem p orary joint control of
th es e regions and to es tablis h a council to control th em
w h ileim m ediately es tablis h ing guidelines for Jap an-C h ina
joint control ov er th e regions .
Sim ultaneous to s uch negotiations,Jap an m us t p rev ent
any illegal activ ities p erform edby nav al v es s els ands urv ey
s h ip s th at clearly infringe up on Jap an’s juris diction in its
territories andE E Z. Jap an m us t declare th at it w ill take
neces s ary anddecis iv e actions against any illegal activ ities
andadop t effectiv e m easures . A s long as Jap an leav es s uch
territorial is s ues p ending,C h ina w ill undoubtedly p roceed
w ith one act after anoth er to p rom ote its effectiv e control
ov er th e E as t C h ina Sea,as it didin th e South C h ina Sea.
Th e Jap anes e gov ernm ent needs to im p lem ent th es e
actions m eth odically ,m eticulous ly ,andv igorous ly bas edon
a grands trategy . F or th is , w e m us t rem em ber h ow U.S.
dip lom atic s trength in international negotiation h as been
s u p p orted by “brains ” cons is ting of and organized by
international law res earch ers , th ink-tanks and relev ant
auth orities andexp erts in v arious fields rep res entedby th e
D ep artm ent ofState or th e D ep artm ent ofD efense.
C h ina’s oceanic exp ansion is s om eh ow rem inis cent of
U.S. action s . F or Jap an to w in ov er in tern ational
com p etition, it m us t aggregate th e w is dom ofnot only th e
bureaucrats , but als o ofth e p riv ate s ector, anddev elop a
s trong s p irit to launch a national s trategy . Th us , it is
s trongly anticip ated th at Jap an w ill pursue its national
interes ts jointly by p ublic andp riv ate s ectors under th e
s trong leaders h ip ofPrim e M inis ter Junich iro K oizum i.
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTE R 3
1. Th e United States and Jap an: A dv ancing Tow ard a M ature
Partners h ip , Rich ard L . A rm itage, ed., W as h ington, D C : National
D efens e Univ ersity ,October 2000.
80
C H A PTE R 4
A V IE W FROM M OSC OW :
C H IN A ’S G ROW ING M IL ITARY POW E R
A n atoly V . B oly atko
C h ina’s m ilitary doctrine is an outgrow th of B eijing’s
s trategic concep t of national s ecurity , th eir p ercep tion of
external th reats , andth eir es tim ation ofth e likelih oodof
w ar. Th is m ilitary doctrine includes p os itions not only on
th e training ofth e arm edforces ,but th eir com p os ition and
role. Th eleaders h ip ofth e Peop les Rep ublicofC h ina (PRC )
s ees national s ecurity as a p roces s ofelim inating internal
andexternal th reats ,andas a w ay to ach iev e regional and
global objectiv es by es calating w h at C h ina’s s trategis ts call
“th e com p reh ensiv e p ow er of a s tate.” A w ell-dev elop ed
econom y , a h igh lev el of s cien ce an d en gin eerin g
ach iev em ent, internal p olitical s tability , and a s trong
defen s e are cons idered as m ain com p onen ts of th e
com p reh ensiv e p ow er ofa s tate.
In C h ina, m ilitary th reats are s een in connection w ith
p otential ch allenges in th e econom ic and s ocio-political
s p h eres . Judging from C h ines e p ublications , B eijing s till
s ees econom ic grow th as its m ain p riority . A noth er
s ignificant dom es tic concern is th e m aintenance of th e
s ocial-p olitical order and “national unity .” Th is includes
op p os ing w h at B eijing s ees as th e tendencies ofm inorities ,
andTaiw an,to s ep arate from th e C h ines e s tate. B as edon
B eijing’s as s es s m ent of th e contem p orary international
s ituation at th eregional andglobal lev els ,th em aintenance
ofm ilitary s ecurity ranks th irdam ong th e m ajor national
p riorities ofC h ina.
81
Th e PRC leaders h ip ,m eaning th e C h ines e C om m unis t
Party (C C P),C entral M ilitary C om m is s ion (C M C ),andth e
Politburo Standing C om m ittee,believ es th at th e p ros p ects
for an outbreak of a w orld w ar are low . Th erefore, th e
p roces s ofbuilding th e C h ines e m ilitary can be carriedout
m eth odically under conditions th at dep end on long-term
p eace m atch ed w ith th e nation’s econom ic dev elop m ent.
Th us , th e requirem ent for th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y
(PL A )is to increas e s trength acording to m ilitary andciv il
dev elop m ents .1
In th e international s p h ere, C h ines e leaders fores ee a
return to a m ulti-p olar w orldbecaus e of s ev eral regional
conflicts , albeit w ith different duration an d v ary ing
intensity ,andth e increas ing occurrence ofciv il w ars .
In C h ina’s v iew ,th es ecurity s ituation in th eA s ia-Pacific
region is s table, alth ough th ere are s om e n egativ e
dev elop m ents :
?
Th e increas edm ilitary p res ence ofth e U.S. in areas
clos e to C h ina’s borders ;
?
Th e s ch eduled dep loy m ent of th e th eater m is s ile
defense (TM D )s y s tem in E as t A s ia;
?
Th e dev elop m ent ofa bas e ofs u p p ort in Jap an for a
relaxation ofres trictions on m ilitary action in a zone
surrounding Jap an;
?
Increas e in th e s cop e of joint m ilitary exercis es ,
es p ecially betw een th e UnitedStates andits allies ;
and,
?
Instability on th eK orean Peninsula andin South A s ia
andterritorial dis p utes in th e South C h ina Sea.2
Taiw an is a s p ecial concern ofth e C h ines e leaders h ip .
W eakenedby abitterly div idedp olitical leaders h ip ,Taiw an
is furth er subject to th einfluenceofexternal forces ,eas ing
th e w ay for ev entual reunification w ith th e m oth erland. In
82
C h ina’s op inion, certain factors are inim ical to th eir
interes ts in Taiw an:
?
A ctiv ities ofth os e w h o h arbor s ep aratis t as p irations
am ong Taiw an’s leaders ;
?
M ilitary aidfrom th e UnitedStates , w h ich includes
w eap on sales ,w ith th elikelih oodoffutureincreas es if
th e A m erican C ongres s p as s es th e Taiw an Security
E n h ancem ent A ct;
?
Th e p os s ible inclus ion of Taiw an into th e U.S.-led
th eater m is s ile defense s y s tem ; and,
?
Th e p res ence ofU.S. troop s in Jap an,w h ich enables
th e UnitedStates to interv ene in a p os s ible m ilitary
confrontation in th e Taiw an Strait.3
In res olv ing th e p roblem of Taiw an, th e C h in es e
gov ern m en t adh eres to th e p rin cip les of p eaceful
reunification and“one country , tw o s y s tem s .” It h as p ut
forw ard s om e p rop os als on dev elop ing cros s -s trait
relations ,w ith th e ev entual goal ofp eaceful reunification.
C h ina considers th e Taiw an ques tion w h olly an internal
affair andinsis ts th at it w ill do ev ery th ing in its p ow er to
ach iev e p eaceful reunification. H ow ev er,ifev ents result in
a s ep aration ofTaiw an from C h ina under any s logan,C h ina
is w illing to us e force to p rotect its s ov ereignty and its
territorial integrity .4
W ith th is as its im p etus , C h ina h as u p graded its
m ilitary cap ability ,retrofitting its arm edforces in an effort
to transform th em into a p ow erful,m odern arm y . Ideally ,
th e PL A s h ould be able to p rotect C h ina against external
th reats , m ain tain in tern al s tability , an d— if
n eces s ary — guaran tee Taiw an unification w ith th e
m oth erland.
In order to ach iev e its goals , C h ina s eeks to boos t its
tactical cap abilities , including battlefield m anagem ent,
p articularly during radical s h ifts in conditions, as w ell as
83
us age ofm odern tech nology . Th us ,C h ina h as p aids p ecial
attention to im p rov ing th e battle efficiency of its troop s ,
s h ifting th e focus to quality rath er th an quantity . Th is
recent trend of m ilitary im p rov em en ts cam e from a
op erational analy s is of Op eration D E SE RT STORM in
19 9 1. Th is is reflected in th e s olutions p rop os ed by th e
C C P’s C entral C om m ittee in Sep tem ber 19 9 5 andin th e
directiv es of th e PRC Pers p ectiv e D ev elop m ent Program
until 2010, w h ich th e N ational Peop le’s C ongres s (N PC )
Standing C om m ittee ap p rov edin M arch 19 9 6 .5
A t th e endof19 9 8,C h ina’s C M C ap p rov eda s ch edule of
defense m odernization as w ell as a new m ilitary s trategy
and doctrine. In its new m ilitary s trategy , th e PL A is
directedto train for w aging battle in p erip h eral regions of
C h ina,s m all in scale ands h ort in duration,but noneth eles s
intensiv e. Th e p rep aration for such a w ar differs radically
from its p rev ious s trategy w h ich focus edon w aging w ars of
attrition, w h ich w as th e focus durin g its p eriod of
confrontation w ith th e Union ofSov iet Socialis t Rep ublics
(USSR).6
C h ina’s m ilitary s trategy fores ees fiv e m ain ty p es of
local w ars :
?
Sm all s cale w ars w ith in th e territorial boundaries of
C h ina;
?
W ar to control adjacent w ater areas andis lands ;
?
Sudden air attack on s trategic res ources w ith in
C h ines e territory ;
?
D efensiv e op erations against deliberate inv as ions of
res trictedareas ofC h ina; and,
?
C ounteroffensiv e agains t an op p onent’s territory in
retaliation for aggres s ion and to p rotect national
s ov ereignty .7
84
C om m on to allth os elis tedabov eis th ep urs uit oflim ited
p olitical ends ach iev able w ith th e h elp ofa m ilitary ready
for im m ediate dep loy m ent and cap able of routing th e
op p onent. Th e m ain p rerequis ite for ach iev ing s uch an
outcom eis th e effectiv e us e ofm ilitary force. Th us ,B eijing
considers th ereadines s to w agelocal w ars an indis p ens able
tool for ach iev ing lim ited p olitical ends , and th is s h ould
includeeffectiv eintim idation andth e ability to es calate to a
full-s cale w ar.8
Th e s trategic concep ts of reas s es s ing th e s ources of
m ilitary th reats and targeting th e p olitical and m ilitary
leaders h ip to create a new m ilitary p aradigm w as ap p rov ed
in th e doctrine of C h ina. C h ina’s m ilitary reorganization
w ouldallow for a s ufficiently cons trainedm ilitary during
p eacetim e andth edep loy m ent ofa large arm edforceduring
w ar. Th e arm edforces of C h ina s h ould corres p ondto its
econom iccap abilities , ensure s ocio-p olitical unity ,andnot
v iolateth eintegrity ofth ecountry . W ith in th efram ew ork of
p os s iblem ilitary conflicts ,th enuclear forces ofth e PRC are
in v oked to deter aggres s ion agains t C h in a an d th e
conv entional forces are intendedto m anage local w ars .9
Th e m odern C h ines e nuclear s trategy is ch aracterized
by th e follow ing tw o p os itions . D uring p eacetim e, nuclear
forces are intended to deter p otential adv ers aries from
unleas h ing nuclear w ar against C h ina and to guarantee
th at C h ina is free to exercis e an indep endent foreign p olicy .
Th e p urp os e ofnuclear forces during w artim e is to p rev ent
C h ina’s enem ies from turning a conv entional w ar into a
nuclear w ar.
C h ina h as s ev eral h undredw arh eads ,including s ev eral
intercontinental ballis tic m is s iles , s om e of w h ich are
dep loy edon tactical aircraft.
A p p arently ,C h ina h as no intention ofach iev ing nuclear
p arity w ith th e UnitedStates andRus s ia. It h as founda
p h ilos op h y , adop ted in th e 19 80s , of “res tricted nuclear
counter attack w ith th e purp os es of s elf-defense.” Th is
concep t not only takes into cons ideration th e lim ited
85
financial res ources ofth e country ,but als o recognizes th at
th e United States and Rus s ia p lan to retrofit exis ting
s y s tem s or dep loy n ew defen s iv e s y s tem s th at w ill
neutralize any ach iev able C h ines e s trategic nuclear
buildup . Th e calculation dem on s trates th at C h ines e
deliv ery v eh icles are not cap able ofov ercom ing p ros p ectiv e
anti-ballis tic m is s ile s y s tem s and air defense s y s tem s ;
consequently ,th ey w illlos eth eability to p rev ent th e United
States from interfering in C h ina’s p olitical affairs . Th is is
one ofth e m ain potential th reats C h ina faces at th e global
lev el.10
C h ina’s leaders h av e op enly declaredth at th ey w ill not
us e nuclear w eap ons firs t. Furth erm ore, C h ina’s s trategic
nuclear forces op erate on a th ree-com p onent s tructure:
s trategic m is s ile forces , s trategic av iation, and nuclear
subm arines . Th is com p acts tructureofforces is neces s ary to
deter w ars against th eC h ina,to executecom bat m is s ions in
res p on s e to v arious in tern ation al s cen arios , an d to
intim idate th e s m aller h egem onis ts in th e A s ia-Pacific
region.11
It is neces s ary to identify th e inconsis tency betw een
C h ina’s p olitical declarations regarding its no firs t-us e
p olicy andits tech nological cap abilities . Only about a dozen
ofC h ina’s s trategicnuclear deliv ery s y s tem s are locatedin
p rotecteds ilo launch ers . H ence, in term s ofth e th eory of
m utually as s ured des truction, C h ina’s exis ting nuclear
forces h av e neith er a firs t s trike cap ability nor is C h ina
cap able ofunleas h ing a m as s iv e retaliatory s trike to w ip e
out an aggres s or. Th is reality is m entionedin th e m ilitary
doctrine ofC h ina.
H ow ev er, it does allow C h ina to av oidp articip ation in
nuclear w eap ons reduction agreem ents , s uch as th e
s trategic arm s reduction treaties . In 2000, th is auth or
as kedM r. Sh a Zukang,D irector-G eneralofth eD ep artm ent
ofA rm s C ontrol andD is arm am ent ofth e C h ines e F oreign
M inis try ,w h at C h ina’s role w as in th e U.S.-Rus s ian arm s
reduction initiativ es . H e believ es th at C h in a w ould
86
p articip ate in such treaties w h en Rus s ia andth e United
States reduce th eir exis ting ars enal to one-fifth of th eir
current lev els . It is difficult to im agine M os cow and
W as h ington taking th is s tep .
C h ines e battle training and s trategic nuclear-m is s ile
exercis es are contingent on p rop erly m aintained rocket
s y s tem s . Th eC h ines e rockets are tech nologically s im ilar to
th e Sov iet R-5 andR-7. Th es e rockets w ere des ignedin th e
late19 5 0s — a p eriodofcoop eration betw een nuclear-m is s ile
s p ecialis ts in th e USSR and C h ina. Th e extent of th e
Rus s ian-C h ines e exch ange s h ould not be ov eres tim ated.
F ar from th e quotedlev el of$20 billion,a realis ticam ount
lies in th e region of$5 -7 billion per y ear ofw h ich only $1
billion consis ts ofm ilitary equip m ent. A n am ount th is s m all
w ill h av e little s ign ifican ce in in creas ing m ilitary
m odernization. A t th e s am e tim e,th e relationsh ip betw een
Rus s ia andC h ina s h ouldnot be underes tim ated. It takes
tim eandeffortto builda p artners h ip in w h ich th es h aring of
inform ation— es p ecially related to w eap on s — is don e
w illingly . In addition to Rus s ia,C h ina h as receiv edlim ited
m ilitary aid from oth er countries and broad econom ic
as s is tance from w es tern p ow ers — both ty p es of aid are
efficiently incorp oratedinto th e C h ines e p lan for national
m odernization.
It is unlikely th at th e C h ines e ars enal w illp erform w ell
in educational andcom bat-trainer tes ts ,due to th e s m all
v olum e of p roduction and lim ited early tes ting. C h ina’s
tech nological lag beh indth e U.S. m is s ile p rogram bols ters
doubts ofany succes s ful m is s ile firings .
On July 12,2001,U.S. D ep uty D efense Secretary Paul
W olfow itz subm itted a s tatem ent to th e Senate A rm ed
Serv ices C om m itteedes cribing th eunsucces s fultes t launch
ofA m erican Th or (4 of5 ),A tlas (5 of8),andPolaris (6 6 of
123)s trategic m is s iles .12 Sov iet m is s ile tes ting during th e
19 6 0s y ieldeds im ilar results . A p p arently ,C h ina’s m is s ile
exp erim entation h as m et w ith th e s am e outcom e. Th ough
gov ernm ent and indus try forces w ant m ore exten s iv e
87
tes ting of C h ina’s ars enal to elim inate des ign flaw s , th e
h igh cos t offailure h as frus tratedfurth er efforts . A m is s ile
s y s tem m us t be tes ted p eriodically to ensure im m ediate
res p onsein a com bat s ituation. Th elack oftes ting on a large
s cale p os es tw o m ajor p roblem s for th ereliability ofC h ina’s
ars enal: firs t,th ecurrent s tock m ay h av eflaw s ,ands econd,
th e p robability ofa flaw edlaunch increas es th e longer a
m is s ile s its idle andunm aintained.
Th e C h ines e rely on les s ons from p as t conflicts to s h ap e
th eir v iew ofbuilding general-p urp os e forces anddep loy ing
th em into battle. Ofp articular im p ortance in th is res p ect
h as been th e G ulfW ar in w h ich tech nological s up eriority
w as us ed to quickly defeat th e op p onent. Th us , C h ina’s
s trategy h as ev olv ed from th e traditional “grand arm y ”
m odel in fav or of concep ts like “fas t reaction” and“local
w arfare.” Th es e concep ts m andate th at joint s tate and
m ilitary in s titutions be able to quickly and effectiv ely
m obilizein th efaceofcom bat s ituations andth at th e arm ed
forces be p rep ared to im m ediately w age w ar in one or
s ev eral th eaters .
Th enew idealof“fas t reaction”h as fos teredconsiderable
ch ange in battle training, unit organization and unit
form ation as th e m odernization ofth e PL A adv ances . Th e
creation andcontent ofth ePL A battle com p onent s tructure
(“alert forces ” and “fas t-reacting forces ” cap able of quick
decis ion s on em erging is s ues ) h as been recognized as
indis p ensable.
Th e PL A m ilitary com m and is w ell-trained and h as
equip p edbattalions andbrigades to beus edas im p act units
cap ableofquick,retaliatory action. Th es eunits are trained
to execute th e follow ing p rim ary objectiv es :
?
B reakth rough ,
?
Sh ock m is s ions on th ebas ecam p s ofenem y m ilitary ,
?
M as s iv e retaliations w ith th e p urp os e of defeating
op p os ition strongh olds ,and
88
?
Tactics by w h ich PL A troop s flank th e op p onent.13
Units intendedto execute th es e m is s ion objectiv es are
currently trained in each m ilitary dis trict. Th e ch anging
international s ituation, in connection w ith th e endofth e
C old W ar and econom ic concerns, h as induced C h ina to
reduceth eranks ofth ePL A in th es h ortterm . Th earm y w ill
drop to 2.5 m illion m em bers (from m ore th an 4 m illion)and
em bark on a v igorous m odernization effort. Th is effort w ill
clos e a num ber ofbas es andreduce th e num ber ofm ilitary
div is ions andregim ents . H ow ev er,th ep roblem ofup dating
th e arm y to m odern lev els h as not been addres s ed. Th e
p res ent condition ofth e PL A is ch aracterizedby a lack of
m aterials us ed by m ore dev elop ed countries anda great
deal ofobs olete equip m ent andw eap onry .
Th e traditional m ilitary doctrine of C h ina s ince M ao
Zedong h eldth at p eop le w ere indis p ens able to dev elop a
m odern arm y . C urrently , th ough , th is v iew h as been
tem p ered w ith doctrines of exp ediency and cap ability —
concep ts th at s urfacedafter C h ina’s civ il w ars andconflict
w ith Jap an. In addition to th eir ow n exp erience, th e
C h ines e als o “s teadfas tly keep track ofs trategics ituations
in th e w orld and com bine th e bes t tactics from foreign
countries w ith national exp erience.”14 In th e end, th e
doctrine of“Peop le’s W ar under M odern C onditions ” w as
adop ted. Th is doctrin e recogn izes th e in creas in g
im p ortanceoftech nology in w arfare andenv is ions an arm y
w ith a balan ce betw een w eap on ry an d troop s th at
effectiv ely functions in fiv edim ensions: air,land,s ea,s p ace,
andtech nology . In addition,th e p lan calls for th e up dating
ofalready exis ting m ilitary -indus trial op erations.
Sp ecial attention is p aid to th e p rep aration of arm ed
forces in peacetim e to allow for im m ediate res p ons ein cas e
of conflict. A dditionally , h ow ev er, p lans are m ade to
efficiently transform th enationaleconom y ,civ ilair defense,
andnational tran s p ortation defens efrom a p eacefuls tate to
one ofw artim e op erations. L egis lation h as been pas s eds o
th at,ifth es tates o decrees ,alls tate bodies ,p olitical p arties ,
89
firm s , institutes , and citizens are obligated to m obilize
according to enactedguidelines 15 .
D uring th e las t 2 y ears , fundam ental ch anges h av e
taken p lacein th e fieldofdefense education. Th e s tate h as
transform edth ecurriculum to targetallcitizens by training
in broader andm ore general areas . D efense education now
con s is ts of regular, inten s iv e training com bined w ith
corres p ondence andday tim e clas s es .16
It w ill be difficult for th e C h ines e to com bine th e
traditional m ilitary p ractice ofm as s infantry ands im p le
tactical op erations w ith th e us age of new , h igh -p recis ion
w eap onry and aeros p ace tech nology . Undoubtedly , th e
transform ation w ill dem and s ev ere m odifications to th e
exis ting m ilitary infras tructure.
Th e m os t s erious im p edim ents to C h ina’s m ilitary
dev elop m ent are its aging m ilitary bas es and centers of
p roduction. In contras t to th ew ay in w h ich form er C oldW ar
p eriod in s tallations w ere fu n ded, th e curren t
adm inis tration recognizes th e need for a s olid national
econom y andth e im p ortance ofcoordinating econom icand
m ilitary building efforts . C h ines e p rop aganda w orks to
create a unifiedeconom ic s y s tem in w h ich p roduction can
s erv eboth civ ilandm ilitary us es — th eform er during tim es
ofp eaceandth e latter during tim es ofconflict. C reating th e
s y s tem ,h ow ev er,w illbep roblem aticdueto C h ina’s current
lev el oftech nical exp ertis e.
A t p res ent,m ilitary res earch anddev elop m ent is largely
ineffectiv e due, in p art, to p oor s tate financing. C h ina’s
bureaucracy als o h as a h andin th e s low p ace ofm ilitary
R&D . Th e rigid ch ain of com m andoften stifles s cientific
ideas before th ey can reach decis ionm akers . In addition to
p oor organ ization, n egativ e p ublic reactions h am p er
p rogres s w h en new s ofm ilitary dev elop m ent leaks out to
th e p ublic. Sm all gains h av e been realized by s tudy ing
Rus s ian m ilitary equip m ent like s ubm arines , des troy ers ,
aircraft and air defense s y s tem s ; th e know ledge gained,
h ow ev er,is m inim al.
90
Th e m odernization of th e PL A often p roceeds at th e
w h im ofofficials ; ev en th en,it m ov es at a s low p ace due to
th e lim ited defense budget and obs olete equip m ent. Th e
s ectors ofth e m ilitary s latedto adv ance m os t rap idly are
nuclear op erations andrap iddep loy m ent-ty p e landtroop s .
Im p ort purch as es areforgone to boos t s p ending on m ilitary
tran s p ort p lanes as w ell as air-defense troop s . C h ines e
nav al v es s els w ith h igh p erform ance ratings are entered
into s erv ice.
In th e s h ort term , p ros p ects for m ilitary dev elop m ent
w ill res t on C h ina’s continuedeconom icgrow th — currently
8 p ercent p er y ear. H ow ev er, th e current adm inis tration
h as recently as s igneda low p robability to future, external
m ilitary th reats ; th is p laces m ilitary s p ending near th eend
ofth elinefor budget increas es . A t th is p oint,it ap p ears as if
th ebulk ofgov ernm ent s p ending w ill focus on retrofitting a
res earch com p lex, creatin g n ew
arm s w ith
C h ines e-p roduced elem ents , and lay ing th e financial
groundw ork for a m ilitary tech nology bas e.17
Th e p roces s of dev elop ing m arket m ech anis m s in th e
country andobtaining th eexp erienceofcom m ercial activ ity
ledto s im ilar dev elop m ents in th e PL A . Sp ecial attention
w as p aid to m aintaining s cientific and tech nological
dev elop m ent in areas p ertaining to defense building and
rais in g th e s tan dards of engin eerin g to m odern
requirem ents . C h ina h as conducteds tructural reform s to
create a new ,h igh -p erform ances cienceofdefense s y s tem s ,
engineering,andindus tries . A m ong th es e w as th ecreation
ofth e C om m is s ion ofScience,Tech nology andIndus try for
N ational D efensein M arch 19 9 8. Th is com m is s ion op erates
as a leading dep artm ent ofth e State C ouncil andenacts
p olicies , law s , rules , s ch edules , ands tandards in areas of
m ilitary influence. In July 19 9 9 ,fiv em ilitary organizations
th at s p ecialize in nuclear w eap ons, s p acecraft, aircraft,
n av al v es s els , an d w eap on s m an u facturin g w ere
reorganizedinto ten corp orations.18
91
W ith th e h elp of th e n ational defen s e s cien ce,
engineerin g, and in dus try reform s , com p etition w as
introduced into th e m ilitary p roduction sector. Th e w ar
indus try ’s s tructure w as im p rov ed,its ability to trans ition
betw een peace andw ar s tream lined,andp lans w ere m ade
for th e creation of a n ew op en s y s tem of m ilitary
p roduction. 19
Th e current s ty le of battle training focus es on m aking
indiv idual s oldiers p art ofa coh es iv e unit. On th e regim ent
and div is ion s cale, officer drilling th rough com p uter
s im ulation h as largely rep laced th e exp ens iv e, liv e
am m unition training p racticed earlier. Th e com bined
tactical training bas e s y s tem p rov ides a v ers atile training
ground by p rov iding netw orked tactical, w eap on, and
s erv ice s im ulation m odels . A n interactiv e com m and and
control s im ulation, new equip m ent op eration sim ulation,
and com p uter-aided training s y s tem s h av e been w idely
ap p lied.20
Poor m ilitary financing, th e inability to incorp orate
tech nologically adv anced equip m ent w ith current troop s
and th e ev olv ing m odel of s m all-s cale op erations troop s
h av e forced PL A officials to create a num ber of “elite”
brigades and battalions , s p ecially trained for im m ediate
m obilization. Th es e div is ions receiv e th e larger p art of
allottedfunds andare th us better equip p edw ith arm s and
equip m ent,w h ich enh ances th eir training.
Th em ajority ofth e PL A ,PL A res erv eunits ,th eC h ines e
Peop le’s A rm edPolice F orce, andth e m ilitia are p rov ided
w ith few res ources for training exercis es . F or exam p le,an
ordinary PL A A F p ilot ty p ically trains in a Sov iet p rototy p e
jet des ignedin th eearly 19 5 0s . H eonly s p ends 80 h ours p er
y ear in th e air— not enough tim e to m as ter th e com p lex
s kills ofp iloting,let alone gras p th e h andling ofh igh -tech
w eap onry us edin com bat p lanes .
Th e gap betw een current m ilitary doctrine about
m odern w ar andth eactualp ractices ofth e arm edforces h as
resultedin a deficit ofexp erience am ong C h ines e s oldiers .
92
Th ough p olitical rh etoric p rom otes extensiv e training and
increas ed us age of tech nology in com bat op erations, th e
bulk ofth em ilitary h as no m odern equip m ent w ith w h ich to
train. Th e s ituation becam e s o p ronouncedin 19 9 8 th at th e
PRC C M C decidedto train cadres abroadandrecruit foreign
s p ecialis ts to train v arious elem ents ofth e PL A . Th ough
m any C h ines e s oldiers trainedin th e Sov iet Union during
th e19 5 0s ,th is is no longer th ecas e. Th edecreas eddes ireto
learn Rus s ian h as contributedto th e decreas e in num bers ,
w h iles ch ools th at offer E n glis h h av ebecom em ore p op ular.
A lth ough th e C h ines e s till h old conferences w ith th e
Rus s ian m ilitary ,th ey are m os tly res trictedto th e general
h eadquarters anddis trict lev el. Th e m ilitary leaders feel
th at th e im p act of foreigners w ill rais e tech nological
know ledge th rough out th e PL A . Th e p articip ants in th is
new initiativ ew illbeofficers ofh igh andm iddlerank,th os e
w h o receiv ed a broad education, or th os e p os s es s ing
s p ecialized m ilitary know ledge. Pres ident Jiang Zem in
h im s elfs tatedth at “it is better to let th e p rofes s ionals w ait
for w eap on s th an for th e w eap on s to w ait for
p rofes s ionals .”21
Th ep racticeoftraining troop s for battle looks im p os ing,
ev en on p ap er. Th e quan tity of required exercis es ,
m aneuv ers ,andofficer drillings tes tifies to th ech allenging
s tudies ofth e PL A . W ith th e adv ent ofm ilitary reform ,th e
num ber ofexercis es w as increas ed,but th e s ubject content
becam e broader anddis p lay eda deep er unders tanding of
geop olitics and m ilitary s tructure. A fter 19 80 com bined
arm s exercis es becam e m ore com m onplace. Strategies of
en circlem en t, dis em barkation from m arin e an d
air-v eh icles ,andus ageofw eap ons ofm as s des truction w ere
dis cus s edfrom both offensiv e anddefensiv e p os itions. A s
early as 19 84 ,27 div is ions,26 9 regim ents andov er 200,000
s erv icem en w ere trained in th e Sh eny ang and L anzh ou
dis tricts alone. Inv olv edin exercis es w ere 3,6 00 artillery
p ieces , ov er 1,000 tanks and oth er arm ored v eh icles , 13
s h ip s , and 10,000 autom obiles . Th e num ber of aircraft
m is s ions com p leted w as 5 08. Th e m ilitary dis tricts of
93
Sh eny ang,Jinan,andW uh an s aw an increas e ofbattalion
s cale exercis es (1,726 ),regim ent s cale exercis es (5 9 6 ),and
div is ion s cale exercis es (6 7). Strategicop erations exercis es
w ere run w ith th e p articip ation oftens andev en h undreds
ofth ous ands ofs erv icem en.22
E ach ofth e s ev en m ilitary dis tricts ofth e PL A carries
out annual indep en den t s taff and field exercis es in
p rep aration for local w ar. Joint op erations in retaliation for
border s kirm is h es andoth er local incidents are regularly
carried out. Increas ed h os tilities along border regions
fos tered th e des ire th at s uch exercis es s h ould create a
m ilitary zone w h ere indep endent op erations could be
carriedout during certain tim es . Th ecom m ander in ch iefof
a m ilitary dis trict becom es th e h ead of an integrated
com m and. Orders to all attach ed land, air, and, w h en
neces s ary , nav al troop s are s ent from a central com m and
facility in a s eas ide zone.23 A ls o contributing to p eaceful
borders is th e F riends h ip andC oop eration Treaty betw een
th e Rus s ian Federation andth e PRC . A lth ough th e treaty
contains m any m ilitary -support s ounding references like,
“concerning guards ofs tate unity andterritorial integrity ,”
th e agreem ent is effectiv ely a s tatem ent ofm utual s u p p ort
for p olicy concerns ; it falls far s h ort ofa m ilitary alliance.
Until th e endofth e 19 80s , th e m ajority oflarge-s cale
op erations w ere conducted in north ern m ilitary dis tricts
bas edon th e s u p p os ition th at conflict w ouldaris e betw een
C h ina andth e Sov iet Union. In addition, th e G uangzh ou
region als o h os tedlarge-s caleexercis es w ith V ietnam as th e
p otentialop p onent. Sp ecialattention w as p aidto th es elater
exercis es , th ough , for tw o reas ons. F irs t w as th e needto
carry out th e defense ofcoas tal territories ,es p ecially th os e
along th e South C h ina Sea, w ith as m uch efficiency as
p os s ible. Secondw as th e com p reh ensiv e nature— div is ions
from all branch es ofth e PL A w ere us ed— ofth e training
m is s ions. Of s p ecial im p ort w as th e com m ander of th e
coas tal dis trict, w h o als o h adcontrol ofnav al op erations.
Th es kills ofth is leader couldeas ily betransferredto battle
in oth er countries . PRC N av al C om m andw ants to increas e
94
th e battle cap abilities of th e C h ines e fleet to a zone of
op erations of4 00 m iles andenableindep endent op erations
ofth e fleet.24
In th e 19 9 0s ,s p ecializedexercis es com m encedw ith th e
u s e of h igh - tech arm am en t an d equip m en t. Th e
dev elop m ent of electronic w arfare, such as im p lanting
v irus es into enem y com p uter s y s tem s , is cons idered th e
p rim ary goal ofth es e s im ulations . Th e m ilitary dis trict of
Sh ey ang h os tedth es es p ecializedexercis es ,w h ich included
C h ines e s p ecialis ts in electronictech nology .25
D uring th e las t few y ears , th e m ilitary dis tricts of
L anzh ou,Jinan,Nanjing,andG uangzh ou h os tedtraining
m is s ions incorp orating m ultip le branch es of th e arm ed
forces .26
C h ines e m ilitary s p ecialis ts h av e been able to acquaint
th em s elv es w ith th e exp ertis e of oth er countries .
C om bining foreign learning w ith th eir know ledge ofh is toric
conflict, th ey m odify and s h ap e m ilitary s trategy and
doctrine as it relates to tactical op erations and troop
p rep aration.
A s im ilar trend w as s een in Sov iet forces during th e
19 70s and19 80s . D uring th is tim e,Rus s ian prep aration for
nuclear w orld w ar w as com p leted, and in cluded th e
am as s ing ofth ous ands ofrockets andtens ofth ous ands of
nuclear w arh eads . Th ecentral res earch bas eofth ecountry
p rov ideda h uge v ariety of Rus s ian andforeign des igned
arm am ents . In th e adv ent ofanoth er w orldw ar,a m as s iv e
nuclear s trike against th e op p onent couldbeguaranteed.
Th e s ituation becam e m ore com p licated w h en th e
United States and N A TO— follow ed by th e USSR and
countries of th e W ars aw Pact— began p rep arations for
conv entional w arfare in addition to nuclear w ar. Th is
p rep aration resultedfrom th e ch ange in p ers p ectiv e called
th e “antinuclear rev olution in m ilitary affairs .” It ap p eared,
th ough ,as ifth e m inds et h adch angedw ith out a result in
actual p ractice. New ideas becam e w ides p read,such as th e
95
us eofm is s iles ,artillery andair forces to guaranteesucces s ;
m ulti-p oint obs erv ation of op p onents ; and us age of a
div is ion— or ev en an arm y — to flank an adv ers ary . In v iew
ofth e great adv ances in m ilitary engineering, all ofth es e
th ings s eem edp os s ible. In training s im ulations,th e s p eed
ofan offensiv ew as es tablis h edat 5 0 or ev en 100 kilom eters
p er day . W h en ques tion ed on h ow th e n eces s ary
am m unition,fuels ,lubricant oils ,m eans ofop eration,and
battle m aintenance w ouldcom e to be, th e com m on answ er
w as th at in a s h ort tim e th es e “neces s aries ” w ould be
inv ented. Sam p les ofarm s h adalready been created,and
th ere w ere p rom is es of s p reading th em th rough out th e
arm ed forces . On p ap er, th e rev olution h ad already
encom p as s edall as p ects ofm ilitary art. Th e reality ofth e
s ituation, h ow ev er, w as quite different. Th e Sov iet arm y
s im p ly didnot h av e th e p rop er form ations andnum ber of
troop s to carry out th e tactical p lans th ey h ad.
Th e p roblem ofp os s ible transition to th e us e ofnuclear
w eap ons w as s olv edby diagram m ing h undreds ofp otential
nuclear s trikes on cards . E ach drew th e ap p rop riate im p act
zone and es tim ated th e consequences of us ing nuclear
w eap onry . Includedin th e p lans w ere2-3day s to allow th e
effects ofa nuclear attack to clear. Th is p eriod, h ow ev er,
w as not includedin fieldtraining exercis es . Th ere is als o a
decided lack of s kill, ev en in th e elite units , relating to
m aterial s up p ort, logis tics ,andev en th e us e ofs om e form s
ofw eap onry .
It is believ ed th at th e gap betw een PL A ideals like
“h igh -tech local w arfare”and“rev olution in m ilitary affairs ”
and th e actual p ractices of m ilitary units is ev en m ore
p ronouncedth an in th e Sov iet A rm y . A lth ough th e PL A is
linkedto th econcep t of“p eop le’s w ar” th rough w eap ons and
equip m ent des ignedin th e19 5 0-6 0s ,its target ofterritorial
defense creates a foundation ofreliable s ecurity for C h ina.
Th e 19 6 0-70s w ere a difficult tim e for th e PL A as th e
adm inis tration didnot allow m ilitary s p ending on up dating
w eap on s an d en gineerin g. Th ey w aited w h ile oth er
countries w ent th rough 2-3 generations of arm am ents .
96
E v en now , th ere is not enough s u p p ort in th e C h ines e
leaders h ip to funda full s cale m odernization ofth e PL A . I
believ e th at th e C h ines e w ill continue ap p ly ing exis ting
w eap ons to th eir m ilitary th eories for quite s om e tim e.
One area in w h ich th e PL A h as attaineda h igh degreeof
s ucces s is in th e creation of a courageous officer and
executiv e s oldier clas s . Th es e s erv icem en are w illing to
w age w ar in th e nam e ofth eir country des p ite th e arm y ’s
aging equip m ent anduntrainedtroop s .
Th e auth or’s abov e rep res entation ofC h ines e m ilitary
doctrine w as only in brief. Th e ques tion th en aris es as to
w h eth er C h ina’s m ilitary p olicy h as recently ch angeddueto
w arm ing relations w ith th e UnitedStates . Th e answ er is ,of
cours e, negativ e. Th e doctrine and p ractice of battle
training are s tap les ofth e C h ines e m ilitary s tructure and
require trem endous im p etus before alteration.
Th e U.S. h ardening p olicy tow ards C h ina is exp res s ed
firs t in intentions, s econdin p olitical s tep s , andfinally in
m ilitary action. It w ill be interes ting to dis cov er h ow th e
G eorge W . B us h adm inis tration’s n ew foreign p olicy
initiativ es w ill be m et by th e PRC — both p olitically and
m ilitarily .
In C h ina,as in oth er countries ofth e w orld,th e lates t
s tep s ofth e UnitedStates in th e international arena are
p erceiv edas A m erica’s attem p t to as s ert its elfas th e las t
superp ow er anddis rup t th ep res ent w orldorder in th efield
ofinternational s ecurity .
Th e dev elop m ents ofs uch a p olicy include:
?
A p ow er diktat an d th e us e of force w ith out
international ap p rov al;
?
Th e dep arture from th e 19 72 A nti-B allis tic M is s ile
(A B M )Treaty andth eorganization ofa national A B M
and th eater m is s ile defense (TM D ) s y s tem w h ich
up s et th e s trategicbalance andfracturedth e s y s tem
97
ofagreem ents regarding th elim itation andreduction
ofoffensiv e forces andnuclear arm s ; and,
?
Th e exp ansion to th e E as t.
Th edev elop m ents in U.S. foreign p olicy h av elittledirect
im p act on th eA s ia Pacificregion in w h ich C h ina is s ituated.
Th ere h as been,h ow ev er,abuildup ofs m aller incidents like
th e bom bing of th e PRC em bas s y in B elgrade and th e
collis ion ofth e C h ines e figh ter w ith th e A m erican E P-3off
th e is lan d of H ain an . F urth erm ore, th e B u s h
adm inis tration’s s up p ort of Taiw an could subs tantially
com p licateth ep oliticalandm ilitary s ituation in th eregion.
Th is is ,ofcours e,not a fulllis t ofth eev ents instigatedby
th e UnitedStates to ov ertly res train th e concerns of th e
PRC . If continued, th es e ev ents m ay lead to com p lex
op erating m eas ures in both p olitical andm ilitary s p h eres
betw een th e tw o countries .
Th e PRC leaders h ip s trongly reactedto th e ev ents in
Yugos lav ia— to th e extension ofN A TO andth e creation of
an anti-m is s ile defen s e s y s tem . Its reaction s are of a
p olitical anddip lom aticnature: s tatem ent,dem onstration,
consulting and coordination w ith like-m inded countries .
Th ere are als o, h ow ev er, cas es of m ilitary reaction as
ev idencedby th eillegalairs p aceinfringem ent ofth eE P-3.
Th e PRC h as p ut forth a s ch eduleoftransform ation th at
las ts into th em iddle ofth e21s t C entury . Th is p lan cons is ts
of 3 p arts : firs t, econom ic grow th andan increas edliv ing
s tandardfor th e C h ines e p eop le; s econd,th e s ocio-p olitical
s tability ofth ecountry ; andth ird,th eguaranteeofm ilitary
s ecurity andth e territorial integrity ofth e country .
Th e firs t p art ofC h ina’s s trategy allow s little room to
decis iv ely act in th e international arena. M oreov er, any
C h ines e p lans ofm ilitary exp ansion w ill s ev erely dam age
its foreign econom ic relations and s low its n ation al
econom icgrow th .
98
Th e s econdp art ofth e C h ines e p lan is connectedto th e
activ e extraction ofgov ernm ent forces from th e econom y .
O n e of th e fu n ction s of C h in a’s arm ed forces h as
traditionally been to as s is t in naturaldis as ter reliefp rojects
andto rebuilddam agedh ous es . Natural dis as ters s eem to
p lague th e country ands o dis tract th e PL A from training
objectiv es . Furth erm ore, w ith th e s ignificant reduction in
th e arm y (from 4 to 2.5 m illion)andth e continuing call for
dis as ter relief,C h ina m ay h as ten th e rem ov al ofth e PL A
from th e econom y .
Th e th irdp art ofth e C h ines e p lan relies on its m ilitary
p otential andth e m odernization ofth e PL A . Th e p attern
h as been th e gradual des truction of obs olete item s
(including tanks , artillery s y s tem s , aircraft, etc.) andth e
p urch as e anddis s em ination ofnew equip m ent th rough out
th e arm y . Th is p roces s is not th reatening to oth er countries
anddoes not ch ange th e balance ofp ow er on regional or
s trategic lev els .
It s h ould be notedth at, w h en lay ing out its national
goals ,th e C h ines e leaders h ip traditionally th inks in large
categories , in large tim e p eriods , andexh ibits s ignificant
p atience. C h ina nev er enteredan arm s raceby m as s ing its
field troop s or by buy ing exp ens iv e m odern w eap on s
s y s tem s . Sinceth e19 5 0-6 0s ,th e PRC h as bas edits s trength
on ground troop s , alth ough it h as receiv ed and created
s am p les ofnuclear w eap ons ,m is s iles ,aircraft andm arine
v es s els . Subs equently ,C h ina didnot conductbroadretrofits
of its exis ting w eap onry , th ough it w as con s iderably
outdated. It h as only done th e m inim um to ensure m ilitary
s ecurity during th e difficult tim es ofth e 19 6 0-80s during
w h ich m inor confrontations occurredw ith th eSov iet Union
andth e UnitedStates .
C urrently ,th einternational s ituation is m ore fav orable
for C h ines es ecurity . Us ing th econcep t of“p eop le’s w ar,”th e
PL A reliably guards th ecountry ’s borders . C h ina’s nuclear
arm s s erv e only as a deterrent to p otential aggres s ors .
99
C h ina is not p rep aredfor m ajor conflicts outs ide ofits
ow n territory , andth ere h av e been no rum ors ofp lans in
th is direction. E v en th e s tatem ents of C h ines e leaders
regarding th e p os s ibility of forcing Taiw an to rejoin th e
country s h ould be dis m is s edas no m ore th an a p olitical
s h ow . Now ,andin th e near future,an as s ault on Taiw an is
outs ide ofC h ina’s cap ability .
Th is s ituation can be ch anged by large international
p olitical andm ilitary ev ents s uch as :
?
Obs tacles on th e p ath ofreunification w ith Taiw an,
international s u p p ort ofth e Taiw anes e gov ernm ent,
or careles s p olitical andm ilitary m aneuv ers in th e
Taiw an strait;
?
A llow ing th e PRC to build a nuclear ars en al
unres trained; and,
?
D ram aticch anges in th ep oliticalor m ilitary s ituation
in th eA s ia PacificRegion or in th ew orldas a w h ole.
D ev elop m ents ofth is nature m ay forceth eleaders h ip of
th e PRC to rev is e its m ilitary s trategy and p urs ue an
acceleratedm odernization ofth e arm edforces . Th e rap id
econom ic grow th of C h ina and its increas ing m ilitary
p otential— com binedw ith its activ e andfirm m ilitary p olicy
tow ards its op p onents , including th e UnitedStates — m ay
result in an unexp ectedly large th reat, s h ould C h ina be
forcedto th ink outs ide ofits borders .
Sh ouldth es e ev ents occur,C h ina w ill h av e to ov ercom e
considerable difficulties ,including:
?
A w eak tech nical andtech nological bas e;
?
A v ulnerableeconom y ifa dras ticincreas ein m ilitary
consum p tion andres earch anddev elop m ent (R&D )
dem ands occurs ; and,
?
D ecreas ing econom icrelations w ith oth er nations.
100
Th e p ath to w ar is fraugh t w ith econom ic and s ociop olitical difficulties for C h ina, th us th ere is s ligh t ch ance
th e country w ill p ursue it. It h as as an exam p le th e Sov iet
Union, w h ich could not balance th e arm s race w ith its
ov ers trainedeconom y . A t th e s am e tim e, h ow ev er,foreign
p ow ers s h ouldnot exp ect C h ina to take a p as s iv e s tandin
m ilitary op erations. A t a m inim um ,th e PRC can engagein
m ilitary action w ith in its borders .
Ifth eC h ines e tendencies m anifes tedov er th e las t 15 -20
y ears p ers is t,th ePL A w illonly h av eth ep otential to defend
th e PRC . It is difficult to im agine a s cenario in w h ich C h ina
w ouldp os e a real th reat to th econtinental UnitedStates or
ev en to A m erican m ilitary bas es in E as t A s ia.
F or th is reas on,th einternationals ituation ov er th enext
15 -20 y ears w ill be determ inedlargely by U.S. p olicy . If
A m erica s h ow s res traint,does not exces s iv ely increas e its
m ilitary , does not p rom ote unilateral exp ansion p lans in
foreign regions, does not des troy th e p res ent s y s tem of
s trategics tability ,does not engage in an arm s race (under
th ep retext ofdep loy m ent ofA B M s y s tem s ,for exam p le)and
does not p roliferate nuclear andconv entional arm am ents ,
th en C h ina w ill h av e no incentiv e to increas e its ow n
m ilitary cap acity . Riv alry betw een C h ina andth e United
States w ill th en originate only from econom icandp olitical
s ources .
Ifth e UnitedStates andits allies dictate p olitically or
m ilitarily to oth er countries ,it m ay p laceth eUnitedStates
and C h ina on th e roadto a new C oldW ar. W e are now
w itnes s ing th e des truction of a s eries of international
agreem ents regarding th e reduction and lim itation of
nuclear arm am ents . Th e UnitedStates h as term inatedits
p articip ation in th e A B M Treaty of 19 72. U.S. N ational
Security A dv is er C ondoleezza Rice recently com p aredth e
p res ent s y s tem ofagreem ents to th e geocentric concep t of
th e univ ers e; th e future s y s tem of th e w orld to th e
h eliocentric s y s tem . C op ernicus ,th ough ,h adto form ulate
101
h is concep t ofth e cos m os anddem onstrate its consis tency
w ith fact before h e receiv edth e recognition ofth e w orld.27
Rus s ia is often ch argedw ith giv ing C h ina th e m odern
air,anti-aircraft,andm arine arm s th at h elp edincreas e th e
m ilitary p otential ofth e country . M aking th is s tatem ent,
h ow ev er,requires th e follow ing s u p p os itions:
1. Rus s ian arm s s h ip m ents to C h ina w ere m eant as
defensiv e tools to p rotect th e nation’s borders .
2. C h in a does n ot its elf p os s es s th e cap acity to
m anufacture its entire s p ectrum ofm ilitary equip m ent. It
als o tes tifies to th e reluctance ofth e C h ines e leaders h ip to
enter an arm s raceand,in so doing,to becom edep endent on
th e m ilitary -indus trial com p lex.
F orm er Pres ident D w igh t E is enh ow er s p oke of th e
relations h ip betw een a country ’s leaders h ip andits arm s
p roducers in h is farew ell addres s . H e w arn ed of a
m ilitary -indus trial com p lex th at dictates both defense and
econom icp olicies .
N eith er th e United States nor th e USSR could av oid
such a s ituation, h ow ev er. Th e United States h as n ot
exp eriencedth e cons equences ,th ough ,for tw o reas ons: (1)
h igh generaleconom icp otential,and(2)m ilitary -indus trial
corp orations p roducing div ers ified com m odities , s elling
both to th e m ilitary andto civ ilians. In th e Sov iet Union,
th ough , a diktat of th e p roducers of m ilitary equip m ent
resultedin th e econom icw eaknes s ofth e country ’s p riv ate
s ector, a redundancy ofp roduction, andth at p roduction’s
low quality .
Itis p laus ibleto v iew th enationalA B M s y s tem p rop os ed
by th e B us h adm inis tration as a con ces s ion to th e
m ilitary -indus trial com p lex of A m erica, w h ich s tands to
p rofit s ubs tantially from th e undertaking. Th ey p refer not
to s p eak about th e battle effectiv enes s ofth e s y s tem , but
rath er to p oint at th e nonexis tent th reat ofN orth K orean
nuclear w eap ons . C h ina,th ough ,p erceiv es th e creation of
th e A m erican national anti-m is s ile s h ieldv ery differently .
102
Th e m ilitary p olicy ofth e UnitedStates w ill s h ap e th at
ofC h ina. Ifm om entum is giv en to th e m is s ile s h ield,it w ill
p rov oke th e C h ines e to in s titute a full-s cale m ilitary indus trial com p lex cap able of p roducing th ous ands of
rockets , aircraft, and tanks. Sh ould th is occur, it w ill
h eav ily s tres s C h in a’s econ om ic bas e, y et th e
transform ation is p os s ible.
In th e early 19 80s , th e auth or s tudiedat th e M ilitary
A cadem y ofG eneral Staffofth e Sov iet A rm edF orces . H ere
h e learnedth e th ree m ajor s trategiczones ofth e globe: th e
W es t,th eSouth ,andth eE as t. Th eSov iet A rm edF orces h ad
th e res ources an d cap abilities n eces s ary for s uch
op erations . Th e PL A ,on th e oth er h and,does not h av e th e
cap ability to th ink ofth eaters outs ide ofth e A s ia Pacific
Region. I do not th ink th at th e UnitedStates andits allies
s h ouldv iew th e PL A as h av ing such cap abilities — a fact
th at s h ould be taken into account before h ardening foreign
p olicy against C h ina.
Th etransform ation ofC h ines em ilitary doctrine andth e
com bat training ofth eir arm edforces ch aracterizeacountry
try ing to reach a h igh er lev el of conv entional m ilitary
cap abilities . It is obv ious ly neces s ary for C h ina to react
again s t aggres s ors , but not alw ay s th rough m ilitary
op erations . Th efundam entals ofs trategy anddecep tion are
w ith goodreas on th e bas es of“p eop le’s w ar” at th es trategic
lev el.
C H A PTE R 4 - E N D NOTE S
1. Renm in Ribao,October 9 ,19 9 5 .
2. C h ina N ational D efensein 2000,B eijing,October 2000,p. 6 .
3. Ibid.,p p . 6 -7.
4 . Ibid.,p p . 12.
5 . Renm in Ribao.
6 . ITAR-TA SS,B eijing,D ecem ber 9 ,19 9 8.
103
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9 . ITAR-TA SS,B eijing,M ay 23,19 9 6 .
10. K rasnay a Zv ezda,July 11,19 9 5 .
11. Zarubezh noev oennoe obozrenie,9 ,19 9 4 .
12. Paul W olfow itz, Prep ared tes tim ony on B allis tic M is s ile
D efens e, July 12,2001.
13. ITAR-TA SS. B eijing,D ecem ber 9 ,19 9 8.
14 . P. K am ennov ,M ilitary -Tech nological A sp ects ofC h ina’s D efense
M odernization, M oldov a: Intern ational F oundation for E lection
Serv ices ,2001,p. 19 .
15 . C h ina’s N ational D efens ein 2000,p . 18.
16 . Ibid.,p . 19 .
17. P. K am ennov ,“PRC M ilitary C ons truction in 19 9 0s ,” Problem y
D alnego V ostoka,V ol. 3,19 9 7.
18. C h ina’s N ational D efens ein 2000,p . 24 .
19 . Ibid.,p p . 24 -25 .
20. Ibid.,p p .37-38.
21. ITAR-TA SS,B eijing,D ecem ber 10,19 9 8.
22. M ilitary activ ities of contem p orary C h ines e A rm y , Part 2,
B eijing,19 89 ,p . 36 2.
23. Th e C h ina Quarterly ,No. 14 6 ,June 19 9 6 .
24 . Ibid.
25 . ITAR-TA SS,B eijing,D ecem ber 10,19 9 8.
26 . C h ina’s N ational D efens ein 2000,p . 38.
27. Rem arks by C ondoleezza Riceat th e N ationalPres s C lub,July
12,2001.
104
PA RT II: C H IN A ’S B A L L ISTIC M ISSIL E S
A N D E A ST A SIA N R E A C TION TO U.S.
M ISSIL E D E F E NSE IN ITIA TIV E S
105
C H A PTE R 5
C H IN E SE B A L L ISTIC M ISSIL E F ORC E S
IN TH E A G E O F G L OB A L M ISSIL E D E F E NSE :
C H A L L E NG E S A N D RE SPONSE S
M ark A . Stokes
INTROD UC TION
Since th e day s of Sunzi and bey ond, nations h av e
p urs ued defenses against offensiv e w eap ons . Naturally ,
s p arkedby th e adv ent ofth efirs t ballis ticm is s iles in W orld
W ar II,interes t in defending against ballis ticm is s iles ov er
th ep as t s ev eraldecades h as increas eds ignificantly . Today ,
s trategicandconv entional ballis ticm is s iles p os ech allenges
to th eUnitedStates andto its national interes ts aroundth e
w orld. W eap ons of m as s des truction (W M D ) and th eir
m eans of deliv ery p lace s ignificant p ortions of th e U.S.
p op ulation at ris k. Th es e s y s tem s , in th e h ands of
gov ernm ents th at are h os tile to U.S. national interes ts ,
ch allenge th es ecurity ofallies andfriends . No sy s tem exis ts
today th at is cap able ofdefending U.S. territory andonly a
lim itedcap ability exis ts to p rotect allies andfriends ,as w ell
as U.S. forces dep loy edov ers eas .
To addres s th egrow ing p roliferation ofballis ticm is s iles
andW M D ,Pres ident G eorgeW . B us h h as s et out on a p ath
to field ballis tic m is s ile defenses to p rotect th e United
States , its forces ov ers eas , andallies andfriends . A t th e
s am e tim e, th e UnitedStates s eeks to reduce its nuclear
ars enal to th e“low es t p os s iblenum ber ofnuclear w eap ons.”
U.S. m is s ile defense p rogram s are des ignedto counter th e
exis ting and grow ing s h ort, m edium , and interm ediate
range m is s ileth reats to our allies andfriends anddep loy ed
107
forces ; as w ell as th e long-range th reat to A m erican cities
th at is jus t ov er th e h orizon.
Th ePeop le’s Rep ublicofC h ina (PRC )is concernedabout
U.S. p lans to dep loy a global m is s ile defense arch itecture.
F rom B eijing’s p ers p ectiv e, ev en a m odes t m is s ile defense
s y s tem couldh av es erious im p lications for th ev iability ofits
nuclear deterrent and for its exp anding inv entory of
conv entional s h ort and m edium range ballis tic m is s iles
(SRB M s andM RB M s ). B eijing’s anxiety ov er m aintaining
its nuclear deterrent is not new . D ev elop m ent of m is s ile
defen s e counterm eas ures dates back at leas t to th e
m id-19 80s ,w h en a s eries ofres p ons es to th e U.S. Strategic
D efen s e In itiativ e (SD I) w ere contem p lated. Th es e
res p onses included p lans for a s ignificant exp ansion of
C h ina’s nuclear intercontinental ballis ticm is s ile force.
Th e auth or ofth is ch ap ter exam ines th e PRC ’s s trategic
andth eater ballis ticm is s ile dev elop m ent andth e grow ing
role of ballis tic m is s iles as an integral com p onent ofPRC
coerciv e s trategy . U.S. m is s ile defen s e p rogram s are
outlined in order to p rov ide th e neces s ary context for
subs equent dis cus s ion ofth e w ide range ofPRC tech nical
res p onses th at are underw ay . Th es e counterm eas ures are
intendedto undercut th e p olitical andm ilitary utility of
U.S. m is s ile defens e p rogram s .
In addres s ing PRC tech nical res p ons es to U.S. m is s ile
defenses , th ree cav eats are in order. F irs t, th is dis cus s ion
does n ot neces s arily im p ly th at U.S. m is s ile defen s e
p rogram s are m otiv ated by a p erceiv edC h ines e th reat to
th e U.S. h om eland. U.S. m is s ile defense p rogram s are
driv en by rogue nations equip p edw ith lim itednum bers of
relativ ely uns op h is ticated ballis tic m is s iles , as w ell th e
p ros p ects ofan accidentalRus s ian or C h ines elaunch . W h ile
m is s ile defenses are not neces s arily driv en by a p erceiv ed
PRC th reat,B eijing’s track recordofp roliferating ballis tic
m is s ile-related tech nology to rogue s tates — to include
counterm easures — is a legitim ate concern.
108
Secondly ,defense againstballis ticm is s iles ,p articularly
th e s h orter-range th reats ,requires an integratedap p roach
con s is ting of s u rv iv able com m an d, con trol,
com m unications,andbattle m anagem ent s y s tem s ; p as s iv e
defense such as h ardening andrap id recov ery m easures ;
activ eballis ticm is s iledefenses th at des troy m is s iles in th e
boos t,m id-cours e,andterm inal p h as es offligh t; andattack
op erations intendedto s u p p res s th e us e ofballis ticm is s ile
forces at th eir s ource. Th is ch ap ter focus es only on th eactiv e
com p onent ofm is s ile defense.
F inally , C h ina’s op p os ition to m is s ile defenses often is
v iew edth rough th e cognitiv e p ris m ofTaiw an. Th erefore,
s p ecial attention is p lacedon th e relations h ip betw een th e
dev elop m ent ofm is s iledefenses andth eir p otential us ein a
Taiw an Strait conflict, s ince it is w ith in th is context th at
B eijing p erceiv es U.S. dev elop m ent ofm is s ile defens e. Th e
PRC ’s grow ing ars enal of s trategic ballis tic m is s iles and
increas ingly accurate andleth al th eater ballis tic m is s iles
th reatens to dis rup t th e s ecurity s ituation in th e Taiw an
Strait and lim it U.S. freedom of action s h ould th e PRC
res ort to th eus eofforceto res olv edifferences w ith Taiw an.
Th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y (PL A ) of C h ina h as an
exp anding inv entory of conv entional ballis tic m is s iles ,
linkedw ith oth er form s of coerciv e airp ow er, w h ich could
giv e B eijing a decis iv e edge in any future conflict w ith
Taiw an. F rom a p olitical andm ilitary p ers p ectiv e,m is s ile
defenses th reaten to underm ine th e PRC ’s ballis ticm is s ile
“trum p card.”
PRC B A L L ISTIC M ISSIL E D E V E L OPM E NT
Th ePRC relies h eav ily up on its ballis ticm is s ileforces —
th e PL A SecondA rtillery C orp s — for deterrence, coercion,
andw arfigh ting. W ith s om e foreign as s is tance, B eijing is
exp anding andm odernizing its lim itedinv entory ofnuclear
ballis tic m is s iles andis continuing to dep loy increas ingly
accurate andleth al conv entional ballis ticm is s iles op p os ite
Taiw an. Its s m all intercontinental ballis ticm is s ile (IC B M )
109
force p rov ides a m odicum of as s ured retaliation s h ould
C h ina s u ffer nuclear attack. Th e Secon d A rtillery ’s
conv entional ballis ticm is s ile forceis becom ing not only an
im p ortant instrum ent of p s y ch ological intim idation, but
als o a p otentially dev as tating force ofm ilitary utility . Th e
nuclear and conv entional m is s ile buildup is taking p lace
regardles s ofth e s cale ofany future U.S. m is s ile defense
arch itecture or th e p rov is ion ofm is s ile defenses to Taiw an.
A 19 9 8 U.S. D ep artm ent ofD efense rep ort as s ertedth at
C h ina’s s p ace andm is s ile indus try p robably w ill h av e th e
cap acity to p roduceas m any as 1,000 ballis ticm is s iles in th e
next decade.1
Th e PRC ’s s trategic nuclear doctrine is bas ed on th e
concep t of lim ited deterren ce— th e ability to in flict
unaccep table dam age on an enem y in a retaliatory s trike.
C h ina’s nuclear forces generally are believ ed to follow a
counterv alue s trategy th at targets p opulation centers .
C h ina h as s ufficient nuclear w eap ons to h oldap p roxim ately
15 -20 m illion U.S. citizens at ris k,or about 5 -10 p ercent of
th e total U.S. p opulation.2
C h in a’s p rim ary organ ization for ballis tic m is s ile
res earch , dev elop m ent, and p roduction is th e C h ina
A eros p ace C orp oration’s F irs t A cadem y . Th e F irs t
A cadem y , als o know n as th e C h ina A cadem y of L aunch
Tech nology (C A L T), con s is ts of an ov erall des ign and
s y s tem s integration dep artm ent, 13 res earch institutes ,
and7 factories w h ich are res p ons ible for engines , control
tech nology ,inertial s y s tem s ,w arh eads ,m aterials ,tes ting,
andlaunch ers . W ith m ore th an 27,000 p ers onnel,th e F irs t
A cadem y is th e larges t res earch anddev elop m ent (R&D )
organization w ith in th e C h ina A eros p ace C orp oration
(C A SC ). In its w ork on solids y s tem s ,th e F irs t A cadem y is
dep endent up on th e F ourth A cadem y in H oh h ot, Inner
M ongolia,for its s olidm otors . C A L T is als o s up p orted by
institutes andfactories s ubordinatedto v arious bas es deep
insideC h ina. Oneofth es ebas es ,th eSanjiang Sp aceG roup
(06 6 B as e) in H ubei p rov ince, h as dev elop ed its ow n
110
com p lete ballis ticm is s ile s y s tem ,th e 300-kilom eter D F -11
andits 6 00 kilom eter v ariant,th e D F -11A .
Today , th e F irs t A cadem y ’s res earch anddev elop m ent
res ources are dev oted to en s uring its nuclear ballis tic
m is s ileforcerem ains a v iabledeterrent in th efaceofm is s ile
defenses . C A L T andth e 06 6 B as e in H ubei p rov ince are
lev eragin g foreign tech n ology in order to ach iev e
trem endous adv ances in accuracy . A t th e s am e tim e, th ey
are div ers ify ing th e p ay loads ofth eir ballis tic m is s iles to
increas e th eir leth ality . C A L T and th e PL A are als o
exam ining a w iderange ofcounterm easures to ens ure th eir
ballis ticm is s ile force rem ains effectiv e as m is s ile defenses
are in trodu ced in to th e A s ia-Pacific region . K ey
organizations res p onsible for tech nical counterm easures
includeC A L T’s 4 th Planning D ep artm ent (s y s tem s des ign);
th e 1 4 th R es earch In s titu te (w arh ead/p ay load
dev elop m ent); andth e703rdRes earch Ins titute(m aterials ).
C A L T andth e 06 6 B as e are w orking on no les s th an six
res earch anddev elop m ent p rogram s th at w ill increas e th e
range, s ize, m obility , accuracy , and s urv iv ability of th e
SecondA rtillery ’s inv entory of ballis tic m is s iles . M any of
th es e p rogram s h av e been placedon an acceleratedR&D
s ch edule s ince M ay 19 9 9 .3
Intercontinental B allis tic M is s iles
Th e PRC ’s exis ting IC B M forceconsis ts ofliquid-fueled
D F-5 (C SS-4 ) and D F -4 (C SS-3) s y s tem s . M obile, s olid
fueledIC B M s w ill augm ent th es e older s y s tem s ov er th e
next 5 y ears . Th e Second A rtillery currently p os s es s es
ap p roxim ately 20 D F -5 IC B M s th at arecap ableoftargeting
any location in th e UnitedStates . Th is figureis exp ectedto
grow to 24 ov er th e next few y ears . C A L T is w orking on an
im p rov ed v ers ion of th e D F -5 th at could incorp orate
m ultip le indep endent reentry v eh icle (M IRV ) tech nology .
D ep loy m ent ofat leas t tw elv e 6 ,000-kilom eter range D F -4
(C SS-3) IC B M s began in th e m id-19 70s . W es tern s ources
indicate th at th es e tw o s tage, liquid fueled m is s iles are
111
dis tributed am ong th ree brigades under th e 5 4 B as e in
H enan prov ince, 5 5 B as e in w es tern H unan p rov ince, and
5 6 B as e in Qingh aip rov ince.4
C h ina’s liquidfueledIC B M force w ill be augm entedby
m obile,s olidfueleds y s tem s w ith in th enext5 y ears . A tleas t
one s ource alleges th at C h ina coulddep loy up to 100 new
landor s ea-launch edIC B M s ov er th e next 15 y ears . Th es e
new s y s tem s include th e D F-31,an extendedrange D F -31,
anda s ea-bas edv ers ion ofth e D F-31,th e JL -2.5 Th e D F-31
is a s olid-fueled, th ree s tage nuclear m is s ile w ith an
8,000-kilom eter range, s ufficient to s trike targets in
H aw aii,G uam ,A las ka,ands om e p ortions ofnorth w es tern
United States . Tw o s ucces s ful D F -31 fligh t tes ts w ere
conductedin 19 9 9 and2000. Slatedfor dep loy m ent before
2005 , th e D F -31 ev en tually w ill rep lace th e D F - 4
interm ediate range ballis ticm is s ile (IRB M s ). Th e D F-31 is
es tim atedto carry a s ingle w arh eadandcouldincorp orate
p enetration aids ,including decoy s andch aff. A t leas t 10-20
D F-31 m is s iles can be exp ectedto enter th e force ov er th e
next 5 y ears ,sufficient to outfit onebrigade w ith a notional
s tructure of 9 -16 launch ers as s igned to th ree or four
battalions .6
Tw o v ariants ofth e D F-31 als o are under dev elop m ent.
F irs t is an extendedrangev ers ion ofth eD F -31 w ith a range
of at leas t 12,000 kilom eters . Th is longer range m is s ile,
know n as th e D F -31A ,likely w ill be tes tedw ith in th e next
s ev eral y ears and w ill be targetedp rim arily against th e
UnitedStates . Jap anes e obs erv ers note th at th e D F-31A is
in s om e res p ects m ore adv anced th an s om e Rus s ian
s y s tem s , s uch as th e Top ol- M . A s m any as 10 D F -31A
IC B M s could be fielded by 2010. A n oth er v ariant of th e
D F-31— th e JL -2— w ill be launch edfrom subm arines . Th e
JL -2 m is s ile w as s ucces s fully tes ted in early 2001. A
m odifiedTy p e 9 4 s ubm arine th at w ill be equip p edw ith 16
tubes allegedly w ill carry th e JL - 2. Projected for
dep loy m ent by 2005 , th e 8,000-kilom eter range m is s ile
w ould be able to s trike targets in A las ka,H aw aii,andth e
w es tern p art of th e United States w h en op erating in
112
C h ines ecoas tal w aters .7 Indications exis t th at th e tim eline
to fieldth eD F -31,its longer rangev ariant,andth eJL -2w as
acceleratedin M ay 19 9 9 .8
D F -21 M RB M Sy s tem .
Th e PRC ’s p rincip al M RB M is th e s olidfueledD F -21
(C SS-5 ). Res earch anddev elop m ent on th e D F -21 began in
19 6 7 andth e m is s ilew as firs t tes tedin 19 85 . A s s em bledat
th e 307 F actory in Nanjing, th e initial introduction ofth e
m is s ileinto an exp erim entalregim ent took p laceas early as
19 9 1. W ith a 6 00-kilogram w arh eadandan es tim atedC E P
of700 m eters ,th e2,100 kilom eter rangeD F-21 is currently
equip p edfor nuclear m is s ions only . A longer range v ers ion
ofth e D F -21, th e 2,5 00 kilom eter range D F-21 M od 2, is
rep ortedly under dev elop m ent. B oth th e D F-21 M od1 and
M od 2 likely h av e m is s ile defen s e counterm eas ures ,
including endo-atm os p h ericdecoy s th at w eretes tedin 19 9 5
and19 9 6 .9
Th ere are indications th at a conv entionally arm ed
v ariant of th e D F-21— th e D F -21C — h as been underw ay
s ince at leas t 19 9 5 . Th is s y s tem m ay adop t a term inal
guidancep ackageth at us es on-boardcom p uters to correlate
s toredim ages w ith landm arks andth at th eoretically could
ach iev e a circular error p robability (C E P)of5 0 m eters or
better.10 Such a cap ability naturally w ould require a
m aneuv erable reentry v eh icle. Th e reentry s p eed of th e
D F-21C is likely to be fas t enough to p reclude engagem ent
by low er-tier m is s ile defense s y s tem s , such as th e PA C -3.
E quip p edw ith a conv entional w arh eadas large as 1,5 00
kilogram s ,th e D F-21C couldforce defenders on Taiw an to
m ov e tow ardm id-cours e or up p er term inal p h as e m is s ile
defenses ,such as th e Th eater H igh A ltitude A rea D efense
(TH A A D )s y s tem ands ea-bas edm id-cours eintercep tors . A s
m any as tw o conv entional D F-21 brigades could be in
op eration before 2010.11
B ecaus eofth eits w arh eads ize andth e lim itedability of
low er tier m is s ile defense s y s tem s to engage longer-range
113
M RB M s ,incorp oration ofa term inal guidances y s tem could
h av e s ignificant m ilitary im p lications . Th e h igh reentry
s p eeds ignificantly reduces th e footp rint ofth e area th at is
defendedby term inal intercep tors ,s uch th e PA C -3. A h igh
reentry s p eed, com binedw ith a p enetrator w arh ead,als o
could be effectiv e again s t h ardened targets , such as
intelligence facilities and s trategic/op erational com m and
centers . Th e D F-21C could als o range U.S. bas es in th e
region. In addition, a term inally guided s y s tem w ith a
m aneuv ering p ay load could com p licate th e U.S. carrier
op erations in th e W es tern Pacific.12
SRB M s .
Th e dep loy m ent ofth e firs t conv entional SRB M brigade
op p os ite Taiw an in 19 9 4 m arkeda s ignificant dep arture
from th e traditional role and m is s ion of th e Second
A rtillery . C onv entionally arm edSRB M s h av ebecom e a key
tool of PRC s tatecraft. Th e PRC ’s exp anding SRB M
inv entory is intendedto deter or coerce neigh bors s uch as
Taiw an . Sh ould B eijing res ort to th e us e of force,
conv entionally arm ed ballis tic m is s iles , op erating jointly
w ith th e PL A A ir F orce andoth er arm eds erv ices , could
s erv e as critical enablers in gaining inform ation dom inance
an d air an d n av al s u p eriority . Second A rtillery
conv entional doctrine s tres s es s urp ris e anddis arm ing firs t
s trikes to gain th e initiativ e in th e op ening p h as e of a
conflict.13
Th e SecondA rtillery is s aid to be currently equip p ed
w ith 35 0 conv entional SRB M s dis tributed am ong th ree
brigades op p os iteTaiw an. Ones ourceindicates th at during
annual m eetings at B eidaih ein A ugus t 19 9 9 ,C h ina’s s enior
leaders h ip decided to accelerate th e p roduction and
dep loy m ent ofenough ballis ticm is s iles to outfit four SRB M
brigades by 2002.14 W es tern sources believ e th e PL A m ay
dep loy as m any as 6 5 0 SRB M s op p os ite Taiw an ov er th e
next s ev eral y ears , w h ile Taiw an’s M inis try of N ational
D efense s tatem ents indicate th at as m any as 800 SRB M s
114
could be dep loy ed by 2006 .15 Th es e m is s iles w ould be
dis tributedinto as m any as s ev en brigades in th e2005 -2010
tim efram e.16 C h ines e w ritings indicate th at after an initial
s alv o, launch ers w ouldm ov e to new p re-s urv ey edlaunch
s ites w ith in th at brigade’s as s ignedarea of op erations.17
Sh ouldth e PRC decideto us eforce,th ePL A intends to carry
out s y nch ronizedlaunch es from a w iderangeofazim uth s in
order to s tres s activ em is s ile defenses andas s ociatedbattle
m anagem ent s y s tem s .18
To be p olitically and m ilitarily effectiv e, th e PL A ’s
conv entionally arm edballis tic m is s iles m us t surv iv e any
attem p t to intercep t th em is s ilein fligh t; andim p act w ith in
a s et radius th at w ill dam age th eintendedtarget. Th e PL A
is s eeking to m axim ize th e leth al radius w ith m oreeffectiv e
w arh eads andm inim ize its C E P w ith im p rov edguidance
s y s tem s . Such a dev elop m ent s trategy is intendedto reduce
th e num ber of ballis tic m is s iles required p er target and
p erh ap s m inim ize collateral dam age. Until C E Ps reach
5 0-100 m eters ,it is difficult to h it a s ingle p oint. Th erefore,
th e PL A w ouldrequire exp ending a considerablenum ber of
m is s iles p er each target. A s a general rule, tw o ballis tic
m is s iles w ouldberequiredfor a 5 0 p ercent p robability ofh it
ifth ey h av e a 5 0 m eter C E P; th ree w ith a 100 m eter C E P;
andnine w ith a 300 m eter C E P.
In a future contingency in th e A s ia-Pacific region,PL A
w ritings indicate intent to us e h igh ly accurate SRB M s ,
M RB M s , and land attack cruis e m is s iles again s t U.S.
as s ets ,to include key bas es in Jap an andaircraft carriers
op erating in th eW es tern Pacific. C h ines e res earch ers h av e
conductedextens iv e feas ibility s tudies ofth e us e ofth eater
ballis tic m is s iles against aircraft carriers . A naly s ts h av e
notedh ow such a cap ability w ouldrequire four com p onents :
ocean s u rv eillan ce; m id- cours e guidan ce; term in al
guidance; andap p licable control s y s tem s to m aneuv er th e
reentry v eh icle to th e target. Prop onents adv ocate us e ofa
global p os itioning s y s tem (G PS) for m id-cours e inertial
corrections and th e us e of a m illim eter w av e s eeker for
term in al guidan ce. 19 A w are of th e v uln erability of
115
m illim eter w av e s eekers to jam m ing, PL A engineers are
s urv ey ing electronic counter-counterm eas ure (E C C M )
tech niques to ensure effectiv enes s of term inally guided
ballis ticm is s iles .20 In addition to aircraft carriers ,C h ines e
w ritings indicate oth er targets w ould include regional
airbas es ,nav alfacilities ,andkey C 4 Iandlogis ticalnodes .21
D F -15 (C SS-6 ).
Th e D F-15 is a s olid-fueled, 6 00 kilom eter SRB M .
M anufacturedby C A L T,th eD F -15 ’s p ay loadrep ortedly h as
an attitude control m ech anis m th at p erm its s teering
corrections from s ep aration to im p act.22 Th e detach able
w arh ead offers a m u ch s m aller target th an a
surface-to-surfacem is s iles y s tem (SC UD ),andits p otential
m aneuv erability w ould com p licate m is s ile defense radar
tracking, com putation s , and intercep tion. A s s um ing a
nom inal trajectory at a range of5 00 kilom eters ,th e D F -15
w ouldreach an altitude ofabout 120 kilom eters ,ach iev e a
reentry s p eedofabout tw o kilom eters p er s econd,andh av e
a fligh t tim e of only 6 or 7 m inutes .23 Som e rep orting
indicates th e D F -15 currently h as a 100-m eter C E P.24
H ow ev er, th ere are indications th at th e D F-15 h as been
fligh t tes tedto an accuracy ofbetter th an 5 0 m eters .25
To div ers ify its th eater ballis tic m is s ile inv entory , th e
PRC is s aid to be dev elop ing a 1,000 to 1,200 kilom eter
range v ers ion ofth e D F-15 .26 Strong incentiv es likely exis t
to dev elop an extended range v ers ion of th e D F -15 . A n
extended range D F-15 w ould s ignificantly reduce th e
defendedarea or “footp rint” ofland- ands ea-bas edlow er
tier m is s ile defen s e s y s tem s due to its reentry s p eed.
D ep loy m ent of a longer range D F-15 in South eas t C h ina
w ouldelim inateth erequirem ent to tran s p ort m is s ileas s ets
nearer Taiw an,p erm it th e targeting ofOkinaw a from s ites
along th e E as t C h ina Sea,and,ifm atedw ith a term inally
guided p ay load, p otentially force carrier battle group s
(C V B G s ) op erating eas t of Taiw an to m ov e furth er aw ay
from th e area ofop erations .
116
D F -11 (C SS-7).
Th e D F-11— better know n by its exp ort des ignator,th e
M -11 (C SS-7)— is a s olid p rop ellant, road-m obile SRB M
w ith an es tim atedrange of300 km . Th e m ain adv antage of
th e D F-11 ov er th e D F-15 is its ability to carry a larger
p ay load. Som e s ources credit th e 300-kilom eter v ers ion
w ith an 800-kilogram w arh eadanda 15 0-m eter C E P.27 Th e
D F-11 is m anufacturedby th eC A SC ’s 06 6 B as e,als o know n
as th e San jiang Sp ace C orp oration , bas ed in H ubei
p rov ince. Th e D F-11’s 300-kilom eter range p res en ts
ch allenges for activ e m is s ile defenses due to its brieffligh t
tim e of3m inutes . B ecaus e its fligh t w ouldrem ain w ith in
th e atm os p h ere, up p er tier s y s tem s w ould be unable to
engage th e 300-kilom eter D F-11.28 D ep loy m ent of a 6 00
kilom eter extendedrange v ers ion ofth eD F-11,th eD F -11A
(C SS-7 M od2),is rep ortedly underw ay as w ell.29
U.S. M ISSIL E D E F E NSE PROG RA M S
B eijing v iew s U.S. p lans for a lim itedm is s ile defense
cap ability as a th reat to th e v iability of its grow ing
inv entory of increas ingly accurate and leth al ballis tic
m is s iles . W h ile U.S. m is s ile defense p rogram s are not
neces s arily driv en by a p erceiv ed PRC th reat, B eijing’s
ballis ticm is s ile dev elop m ent andexp ort oftech nologies to
rogue s tates h as increas ed regional interes t in m is s ile
defenses . Th e key driv er for U.S. inv es tm ents in m is s ile
defenses is a p otential m is s ileattack by roguenations ,s uch
as N orth K orea,Iraq,or Iran. A lim itednational defenseis
als o neededto defendagainst an accidental or unauth orized
Rus s ian or C h ines e m is s ile launch , w h ich m igh t inv olv e
only one or a few w arh eads . B allis tic m is s ile defen s e
requires lay ered,activ edefens es th at can intercep tballis tic
m is s iles in all p h as es ofth eir fligh t: (1)th e boos t p h as e,(2)
m id-cours e p h as e,and(3)th e term inal p h as e.
117
B oos t Ph as e.
B oos t p h as e begins at launch andlas ts up to 5 m inutes
for a p rim itiv eliquid-fuelIC B M or 3m inutes for s olidfueled
s y s tem s . Intercep t during th e boos t p h as e engages th e
m is s ilew h en it is at its m os t v ulnerables tageoffligh t. B oos t
p h as e intercep t enables des truction ofth e m is s ile before it
is able to dep loy counterm easures and can reduce th e
num ber oftargets th at m id-cours e andterm inal s y s tem s
m us t engage. Th e key boos t p h as e s y s tem u n der
dev elop m ent is th e A irborne L as er (A B L ). E xp erim ental
s p ace-bas ed s y s tem s are under dev elop m ent as w ell.
C h ines es ources note th at th eA B L s y s tem ,s latedfor initial
dem onstration as early as 2003andinitial fielding in 2008,
couldbedep loy edto th e th eater ofop erations in a m atter of
h ours . Th e PRC believ es th at at leas t one op erational
concep t is for a p air ofB oeing 74 7-4 00F A B L aircraft to orbit
ov er friendly territory abov e th e clouds at 4 0,000 feet, 9 0
kilom eters offth eenem y coas t,s canning th eh orizon for th e
p lum e of m is s iles ris ing abov e enem y territory . W ith a
m axim um las er range ofs ev eral h undredkilom eters and
m is s ion tim e of12-18 h ours , each aircraft carries enough
fuel for 200 las er s h ots against m is s iles in th e boos t p h as e
w h en th e m is s ile offers a brigh t, s low target under h igh
aerody nam ics tres s .30
Th e Sp ace B as ed L as er (SB L ) fligh t exp erim ent is a
dem onstration effort to exp lore th e feas ibility ofdes troy ing
ballis tic targets w ith a h igh p ow eredlas er. A ccording to
C h in es e s ources , at leas t on e arch itectu re u n der
consideration includes 30 s atellites , a constellation offiv e
rings w ith s ix s atellites each at 4 0 degree inclinations,and
an altitu de of 1,300 kilom eters . Th e 30 s atellite
constellation can counter m ore th an a 100 SRB M s in a
2-m inute p eriod. Such a s y s tem p rov ides a 24 -h our
intercep t cap ability andw ouldneutralize ballis tic m is s ile
s trikes before im p lem entation of counterm eas ures , to
in clude early releas e s ubm unition s and decoy s . Th e
C h ines e note th at th e SB L als o is h igh ly effectiv e agains t
118
direct as cent anti-s atellite s y s tem s . A n exp erim ental SB L
could be tes tedearly next decade.31 In addition,th ere are
exp erim ents underw ay th at exam ineth efeas ibility ofs p ace
bas edkineticintercep tors .32
M id-C ours e.
D uring th e m idcours e p h as e of fligh t, th e w arh ead
trav els freely th rough s p aceouts ideth e atm os p h ere. F or an
IC B M , th is s tage las ts about 20 m inutes , m aking th e
m id-cours e th e longes t p h as e of m is s ile fligh t. E ngaging
ballis tic m is s iles in th e m id-cours e p h as e offers s ev eral
adv antages for th e defense. M id-cours e intercep t s olutions
offer greater tim e for h igh er lev el decis ion m aking to be
integratedin th e com m andand control s y s tem . M ultip le
s h oot-look-sh oot op p ortunities becom e p os s ible. M idcours e
defenses m ay be bas ed farth er aw ay from th e country
lau n ch in g th e m is s ile, p os s ibly redu cin g s y s tem
v ulnerability . Th ere are at leas t tw o s y s tem s under
dev elop m ent th at w illbeable to engagem is s iles during th e
m id-cours e p h as e offligh t: (1)land-bas edexoatm os p h eric
kill v eh icles to counter longer range IC B M s ; and (2) a
s ea-bas ed m id-cours e s y s tem to counter m edium - and
s h ort-range ballis ticm is s iles .
L and B as ed M id- C ours e. Th e L andB andM id-C ours e
s y s tem is th e p rincip al m id-cours e intercep t s y s tem for
defense of th e United States . Its m is s ion is to intercep t
incom ing ballis tic m is s ile w arh eads outs ide th e earth ’s
atm os p h ere (exoatm os p h eric)anddes troy th em by force of
th e im p act. D urin g fligh t, th e in tercep tor receiv es
inform ation from a battle m anagem ent,com m and,control,
andcom m unications (B M C 3)s y s tem to up date th e location
ofth e incom ing ballis ticm is s ile, enabling th e kill v eh icle’s
onboards ensor s y s tem to identify andh om ein on th etarget.
Th e landbas edintercep tor w ouldconsis t ofa m ulti-stage
s olidp rop ellant boos ter andan exoatm os p h erickill v eh icle
(E K V ). Th ree op tions are being exam inedfor th e boos ter:
th e M inutem an III IC B M ; a com bination ofoth er exis ting
119
s olid-rocket s y s tem s ; and an entirely new boos ter. Until
boos ter dev elop m ent is com p lete, E K V fligh t tes ts w ill be
flow n on th e Pay load L aunch V eh icle (PL V ), w h ich is a
boos ter consis ting of a M inutem an II s econd and th ird
s tage.33
Th e E K V w ouldus e a h igh ly cap able infrareds eeker to
acquire andtrack targets ,andto dis crim inate betw een th e
intendedtarget (i.e.,th e reentry v eh icle)andoth er objects ,
s uch as tank fragm ents or decoy s . Th is enables th e
intercep tor to be launch edagainst a clus ter ofobjects and
subs equently identify andintercep t th e targeted reentry
v eh icle. Th e s eeker w illbeable to dis crim inate p enetration
aids andw arh eads ,th ough it w ouldrequire as s is tancefrom
ground-bas ed radar s y s tem s or s p ace-bas ed s ens ors to
addres s m ore com p lex ands op h is ticatedtargets . Th e E K V
w ould receiv e one or m ore in-fligh t target up dates from
oth er groundands p ace-bas eds ens ors in order to enh ance
th ep robability ofintercep ting th etarget. B as edon th is data
andits ow n s ensors , th e kill v eh icle us es s m all on-board
rockets to m aneuv er s o as to collide w ith th e target.34
In a p rev ious concep t,an initial arch itecture for defense
ofall 5 0 UnitedStates ,know n as “C ap ability 1” (C 1),w ould
h av eincludeddep loy m ent of20 intercep tors in th em iddleof
A las ka.35 A n additional 80 intercep tors couldbe added(100
in tercep tors total) to form a “C ap ability 2” (C - 2)
arch itecture.36 A n ev en m ore adv ancedarch itecture (C -3)
w ouldh av e addedands p readintercep tors betw een tw o or
m ore s ites .37 Today , h ow ev er, th is grow th p lan is under
rev iew . Th e ultim ate s cop e or arch itecture ofa U.S. m is s ile
defense s y s tem h as y et to be determ inedandw ill be bas ed
on th e exis ting or p rojectedth reat at th e tim e a decis ion is
m ade.
Sea- B as ed M id- C ours e. Th e Sea-B as ed M id-C ours e
m is s iledefense s y s tem builds upon th e N av y Th eater W ide
(N TW ) p rogram and th e cancelled Nav y A rea D efense
p rogram . Sea-B as ed M id-C ours e w ill us e a h it-to-kill
intercep tor— th e SM -3L igh t E xo-A tm os p h ericProjectile—
120
insteadof th e p roxim ity fus edSM -2 B lock IV A th at w as
dev elop ed for th e N av y A rea D efense s y s tem until th at
p rogram w as cancelledin D ecem ber 2001. Th e Sea-B as ed
M id-C ours em is s iledefensep rogram is uniquein th at A egis
des troy ers equip p ed w ith th e SM -3 m is s ile can p atrol a
large area to intercep t ballis ticm is s iles w ith out th eneedto
be collocated w ith th e defended as s et. Th e s h ip s can be
p os itioned forw ard of th e defended area allow ing for
exoatm os p h eric m id- cours e or ev en as cen t p h as e
engagem ents after th e m is s ile dep arts th e atm os p h ere. In
doing s o, a s ingle Sea-B as ed M id-C ours e p latform can
defend an area or footp rint th at is tens of th ous ands of
s quare kilom eters . L ike th e TH A A D s y s tem andth e G B I,
th e SM -3 intercep tor is a h it-to-kill s y s tem th at us es an
infrared s eeker and m iniature th rus ters . D ue to s p eed
lim itations (4 -5 km /s ec), th e SM -3 is intendedto counter
p rim arily m edium range ballis ticm is s iles . A n initial N TW
cap ability s h ould be av ailable by th e 2005 - 2010
tim efram e.38
L ow er Tier.
L ow er tier m is s ile defense s y s tem s intercep t ballis tic
m is s iles in th e term in al p h as e of fligh t, w ith in th e
atm os p h ere at an altitudebelow 100 kilom eters ,during th e
las t 1 or 2m inutes offligh t,dep ending up on th erange ofth e
m is s ile. Th e w arh ead, along w ith any decoy s or ch aff,
reenters th e atm os p h ere. A erody nam icdrag th en produces
different beh av ior for ligh t as op p os ed to h eav y objects .
D ecoy s decelerate s ignificantly andm ay burn up , but th e
w arh ead does neith er. Th us at reentry th e defens e can
dis crim inate th e w arh ead. A t leas t tw o low er tier s y s tem s
are intended to counter s h ort range th reats during th e
term inal s tage of fligh t: 1) TH A A D ; and 2) th e PA C -3
m is s ile.39
TH A A D . Th e TH A A D s y s tem w ill be able to engage
longer range th eater ballis ticm is s ile th reats (i.e.,les s th an
3,5 00 kilom eters ) during th e up p er term inal p h as es of
121
fligh t. A s an es s ential com p onent ofa fam ily of s y s tem s ,
TH A A D can reduce th e num ber of m is s iles th at oth er
term inal defense s y s tem s m us t engage. Us ing h it-to-kill
tech nology to des troy its target, TH A A D can op erate
autonom ous ly , but is required to be interop erable w ith
oth er low er tier defen s es an d external s en s ors . A n
im p ortant feature of th e TH A A D w eap on s y s tem is its
s h oot-look-sh oot cap ability . K ill as s es s m ent w ill determ ine
if a w arh ead is des troy ed, and, if neces s ary , a s econd
intercep tor s h ouldbelaunch ed. Th e TH A A D s y s tem us es a
m obileX-bandgroundbas edradar w ith a detection range of
up to 1,000 kilom eters . Th e intercep tor us es a s taring
infrareds eeker as s em bly ,including an indium -antim onide
focal p lan e array ; cry ogen ic cooler as s em bly ; s ignal
p roces s ing electronics ; and an electro-op tical teles cop e.
TH A A D w ill op eratein th e up p er tier to 15 0 km andin th e
interm ediate tier dow n to around4 0 km .4 0 C h ines e s ources
es tim ate th e TH A A D p robability of kill again s t a
3,5 00-kilom eter ballis ticm is s ile us ing a s ingle intercep tor
at 85 p ercent, and 9 7.7 p ercent if tw o intercep tors are
us ed.4 1
Th e ultim ate p lan is to equip tw o TH A A D battalions to
s u p p ort tw o m ajor region al con flicts . E ach TH A A D
battalion includes four s ubordinate fire units each w ith a
B attle M anagem ent C om m and,C ontrol, C om m unications,
an d In telligen ce (B M C 3I) elem en t, one radar, n in e
launch ers and14 4 m is s iles . D es ign p aram eters callfor each
TH A A D s y s tem to betran s p ortableby land,railor road,s ea
andair (by C -14 1 or larger aircraft).4 2 Th e M ay 19 9 9 D oD
Rep ort to C ongres s on TM D A rch itecture Op tions in th e
A s ia-Pacific Region notes th at only one TH A A D fire unit
w ouldbe neededto p rov ide com p lete cov erage ofTaiw an.
PA TRIOT A dv anced C ap ability 3(PA C -3). Th e m is s ile
defense s y s tem s latedfor neares t term dep loy m ent is th e
PA C -3m is s ile. Sch eduledfor introduction before th eendof
2001, m any in th e A s ia-Pacific region, including Taiw an,
are exp ectedto p rocure th e PA C -3 m is s ile ov er th e next
s ev eral y ears .4 3 Taiw an currently is equip p edw ith PA C -3
122
grounds y s tem s (radar,trucks ,com m andandcontrol)and
th e G uidance E n h ancedM is s ile (G E M ), w h ich h as s om e
m is s ile defense cap ability .4 4 Procurem ent of th e PA C -3
m is s ile w ill com p lete th e PA C -3 G row th Plan th at began
w ith th e initial dep loy m ent ofPA C -3groundequip m ent in
19 9 7. One p rom inent Taiw an journal,D efense Tech nology ,
p os its th at Taiw an ev entually m ay p rocure enough PA C -3
m is s iles andadditional PA C -3 groundequip m ent to outfit
betw een nine to 12fire units .4 5 Th e PA C -3is a m uch m ore
cap able deriv ativ e of th e G E M s y s tem in term s of both
cov erage andleth ality . Th e PA C -3 h as a new intercep tor
m is s ile w ith a different kill m ech anis m — rath er th an
h av ing an exp loding w arh ead,it is a h it-to-kills y s tem . Th e
PA C -3m is s ileis an ev olutionary outgrow th ofth eE xtended
RangeIntercep tor (E RINT). Th ecanis ter is th es am es izeas
a G E M canis ter, but contains four m is s iles and tubes
in s tead of a s ingle round. Selected Patriot launch ing
s tations w ill be m odifiedto accep t PA C -3 canis ters . E ach
launch er m ay beloadedw ith four G E M rounds or 16 PA C -3
m is s ile roun ds if th e lau n ch ers are m odified to
accom m odate th e PA C -3m is s ile.4 6
PL A affiliated s ources as s ert th e PA TRIOT G E M
(PA C -2+) w ill only be able to intercep t 10-20 p ercent of
incom ing m is s iles . Taiw an sources claim th at tw o G E M
intercep tors w ill h av e an 80 p ercent s ucces s rate agains t
PL A s h ort range ballis tic m is s iles .4 7 W ith th e PA TRIOTs
only dep loy edaroundTaip ei, oth er critical targets around
th eis landareunp rotected. Th ere are indications ,h ow ev er,
th at th e m ilitary intends to p rov ide s om e cov erage for
Taich ung andK aoh s iung.4 8
C om m and,C ontrol,C om m unications
andIntelligence.
M is s ile defen s e s y s tem s are reliant up on a s teady
s tream of s p ace- and ground-bas ed com m and, control,
com m unications, and intelligence s y s tem s . C urrent and
future s ens ors include: (1) D efen s e Sup p ort Program
123
s atellites ; (2) Sp ace-B as ed Infrared Sy s tem -H igh ; (3)
Sp ace-B as ed Infrared Sy s tem -L ow ; (4 ) Up graded E arly
W arning Radars ; and(5 )X-B andRadars .
D efense Sup p ort Program Satellites . Th e U.S. exis ting
m is s ile defenses rely on D efense Sup p ort Program (D SP)
s atellites and 19 70s v intage radar s y s tem s for early
w arning purp os es . Th e U.S. D SP s atellites can detect a
launch 5 0-6 0 s econds after launch andth en relay w arning
in form ation about 9 0 s econds after launch . In clear
w eath er,th es e s atellites can detect a m is s ile launch w ith in
10 s econds oflaunch . C ueing a groundbas edradar from
s p acebas eds ensor data can greatly reduceth eairs p aceth at
m us tbes earch edto findth eth eater m is s iles . Such data can
cueballis ticm is s iledefens e as s ets to s earch a s p ecificarea,
allow ing radar acquis ition at th e m axim um range.4 9
Sp ace B as ed Infrared Sy s tem -H igh (SB IRS-H igh ). Th e
SB IRS-H igh s atellites w ill begin to augm ent th e D SP
s atellites as early as 2002. Th e firs t SB IRS-H igh w ill be
p laced into a h igh ly ellip tical orbit for cov erage of p olar
regions . Ofth e s ev en satellites being p rocured,four w ill be
p lacedinto geos y nch ronous orbit abov e th eequator andth e
oth er tw o w illbein th e h igh ly ellip tical orbits . SB IRS-H igh
offers num erous adv antages ov er th e D SP s y s tem . It w ill
h av e a rev is it rate ofonce ev ery few s econds th us enabling
es tablis h m ent ofa track on th em is s ile fligh t bas edon m ore
num erous p lots ofth e m is s ile’s location. Th e SB IRS s y s tem
w illh av ealarger focalp lanearray ,p rov iding a launch p oint
p rediction ofles s th an one kilom eter. Th e s y s tem als o w ill
p rov ide con tinuous cov erage of th e p olar regions .
SB IRS-H igh w ill h av e a “s tare” cap ability th at w ill allow
th em to continuous ly obs erv e a des ignated s ector of th e
earth . Th is tech nology can be p articularly us eful in
countering fas t burn boos ters th at lim it th e tim e av ailable
to determ ine th e m is s ile’s fligh t p ath .5 0
Sp ace- B as ed Infrared Sy s tem -L ow (SB IRS-L ow ). A n
outgrow th of th e SD I, SB IRS-L ow w ill p rov ide p recis e
m id-cours e m is s iletracking andtarget dis crim ination. Th e
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SB IRS-L ow p rogram is a low earth orbit s atellite
constellation th at couldobs erv e th e dep loy m ent ofreentry
v eh icles and p en etration aids im m ediately follow ing
burnout of th e boos ter. Projected for initial dep loy m ent
during th e latter p art of th e decade, 24 SB IRS-L ow
s atellites , op erating in a low earth orbit of about 1000
kilom eters ,w illbeequip p edw ith tw o indep endent s ensors .
F irs t is an op tical s y s tem th at can track th e boos ter and
reentry v eh icle th rough out all p h as es offligh t. Th e s econd
are infrared s ensors th at can detect h eat s ignatures in
v arious p ortions of th e frequency s p ectrum — s h ortw av e
infrared th at can detect targets in th e boos t p h as e; and
m edium and long w av e infrared th at are able to detect
reentry v eh icles in th e m id-cours e p h as e offligh t. Once a
target is acquired, inform ation on th e target w ill be
forw ardedto a teles cop e th at w ouldbe able to track th e
m is s ile after boos ter burnout.5 1
B ecaus e p enetration aids dep loy differently th an
reentry v eh icles , it is eas ier to identify th os e objects th at
m us t be attackedifth edep loy m ent is obs erv ed. SB IRS-L ow
w ill als o be able to p rov ide m is s ile defense op erators w ith
s ufficient tracking data to enable intercep tors to be
launch eds oon after boos ter burn-out andw ell before th e
early w arning radar detects th eincom ing reentry v eh icles .
SB IRS-L ow offers firs t generation p roces s ing cap abilities to
interp ret a target objectm ap th at w as deriv edfrom anoth er
infrareds ensor rath er th an a radar.5 2
SB IRS-L ow is consideredto be a critical factor in any
future decis ion to adap t th e A E G IS-bas ed m id-cours e
intercep tors for us e against longer range IC B M s . A E G IS
radar— th e SPY-1D — h as lim itations th at p roh ibit it from
being us edin an autonom ous m ode. F or exam p le,its range
is lim itedto ap p roxim ately 5 00 kilom eters ,dep ending on
th es izeofth e target andth efrequency at w h ich it op erates
(S-B and: 2-4 G H Z). Th e SPY-1D does not p rov ide as m uch
res olution as th e X-B and radar s y s tem . A E G IS requires
s om e ty p e of external cueing to engage an IC B M in
m id-cours e.5 3
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Up graded E arly W arning Radars . Th e current U.S.
early w arning netw ork relies on ultra-h igh frequency
(UH F )radars (4 30 M H zrange),as w ellas oneL -B andradar
bas edin Sh em y a,A las ka. Th es e s y s tem s w ere des ignedto
p rov ide w arn ing of an in com in g attack, p erm ittin g
sufficient tim e to launch our bom ber force and facilitate
m ov em ent of key gov ernm ent officials . Th ey w ere not
des igned to s u p p ly fire control quality data of s ufficient
p recis ion to guideintercep tors anddis crim inate indiv idual
objects w ith in an incom ing target array .5 4 H ow ev er, th e
UnitedStates intends to up gradeexis ting radars in order to
p rov ide m ore p recis e andtim ely data th at can be us edto
anticip ate a future intercep t area. Th is w ill allow an
intercep tor to be launch edandbegin its fligh t— th e earlier
th e fly out,th e larger th e defendedarea or footp rint. Th es e
Up gradedE arly W arning Radars (UE W Rs )w ouldbeableto
dis crim inate betw een dozens or h undreds of objects th at
couldbein a target clus ter andelim inate objects th at do not
fit th e ch aracteris tics ofa reentry v eh icle.5 5
X- B and Radars. W h ile UE W R s y s tem s w ill p rov ide a
greater degree of accuracy , th ey s till w ill not be able to
p rov ide th e detaileddata neededto dis crim inate th e righ t
objects in a target array th at m us t be des troy edin fligh t.
Th edegreeofp recis ion requires a radar th at op erates in th e
X-B and (8-12 G H z). X-B and radar s y s tem s p rov ide a
detailed“p icture” ofth e target array ,including calculating
th e am oun t of nos e w obble m otion th at w ould be
ch aracteris ticofa reentry v eh icle,m easuring th e diam eter
andlength ofobjects w ith in th e target array ,as w ell as th e
s p in rate,v elocity ,andp os ition ofobjects .5 6 B ecaus e X-B and
radar s y s tem s w illop eratew ith in a fairly broadbandw idth ,
th ey are cons idereddifficult to jam .5 7
One concep t is for one X-B andradar to be dep loy edto
A las ka. H ow ev er,a s ingleradar bas edat th is location likely
w ill not be able to p rov ide radar cov erage ofall p otential
th reats to th e United States . A dditional radar s y s tem s
w ould be needed. X-B andradar s y s tem s s h ould be able to
detect an incom ing target array at a range ofabout 4 ,000
126
kilom eters , alth ough dis crim ination w ill not be p os s ible
until th e target array is at a dis tance of around 2000
kilom eters .
C H IN E SE R E SPONSE S
F rom B eijing’s p ers p ectiv e,U.S. ballis ticm is s iledefense
p rogram s th reaten to undercut th e p olitical andm ilitary
utility of th e PRC ’s grow ing inv entory of s trategic and
conv entional ballis ticm is s iles . Th e PRC p laces a p rem ium
on ensuring its ballis tic m is s ile force w ould be able to
p enetrate any future m is s ile defense arch itecture. D efense
indus try analy s ts are exam ining a range ofs op h is ticated
m is s ile defense counterm easures in order to reduce th e
effectiv enes s of activ e m is s ile defen s e s y s tem s . PRC
collection ofinform ation th at w oulds up p ort dev elop m ent of
effectiv e m is s ile defense counterm easures h as a relativ ely
h igh p riority . W ith a lim itedforcecons is ting ofonly a coup le
dozen IC B M s ,C h ines e analy s ts believ e th at ev en a lim ited
A m erican m is s iledefense s y s tem w ith 20 intercep tors (i.e.,
th e p rev ious “C 1” arch itecture) could reduce or negate
C h ina’s m inim al nuclear deterrent. PRC m ilitary p lanners
h av ebeen contem p lating a w ors t-cas es cenario in w h ich th e
U.S. could launch a firs t-strike des troy ing m os t of th e
C h ines e IC B M s on th e ground becaus e th es e m is s iles
require s ev eral h ours to fuel, arm , and launch . In th e
afterm ath , a lim ited U.S. m is s ile defense s y s tem could
engage th e rem nants of C h ina’s s econd-s trike m is s ile
force.5 8
B ackground
B eijing’s interes t in countering ballis ticm is s iledefenses
dates back to th e19 6 0s . In res p ons e to U.S. m is s iledefense
p rogram s in th e 19 6 0s ,B eijing began to exam ine m eans to
ensure th ev iability ofits incip ient m is s ile force,and,at th e
s am e tim e, dev elop th e bas ic tech nologies th at w ould be
needed to field an indigenous s trategic m is s ile defense
127
s y s tem . Th is effort, know n as th e 6 4 0 Program , w as
cancelledin th e 19 70s .5 9
Interes t in m is s ile defensecounterm eas ures reem erged
in th e w ake ofPres ident RonaldReagan’s M arch 19 83SD I.
Th e C h ines e M inis try ofF oreign A ffairs draftedan initial
s tudy to as s es s th eim p lications ofSD Iin 19 84 . In late 19 84
or early 19 85 , th e cen tral leaders h ip tas ked s ev eral
m inis tries and res earch institutes to dev elop a detailed
exam ination of th e SD I and its im p lications for C h ina.
D uring 19 85 , th e defens e indus trial com p lex s p onsoreda
s eries ofconferences on SD I,anda consens us w as dev elop ed
th at Sov iet and U.S. dev elop m ent of ballis tic m is s ile
defense s y s tem s h ad s ignificant im p lications for C h ina’s
nuclear deterrent. B y 19 86 , C h ines e exp erts generally
agreedth ere w ere th ree p otential res p ons es : exp ansion of
offensiv eforces ; dev elop m ent oftech nicalcounterm easures ,
such as h ardening and s p inning of ballis tic m is s iles , to
p enetrate m is s ile defense s y s tem s ; and dep loy m ent of
anti- s atellite (A SA T) w eap ons to des troy s p ace-bas ed
s y s tem s .6 0
Th e C om m is s ion ofScience, Tech nology , andIndus try
for N ational D efense (C O STIN D ) p lay ed a key role in
form ulating B eijing’s res p on s e to th e “global tech nical
rev olution” p rom p tedby th eU.S. m is s iledefenseinitiativ e.
In Sep tem ber 19 84 ,C OSTIND deliv ereda p rop os al to th e
C entral M ilitary C om m is s ion (C M C ) s ugges ting th at
relev ant PL A bran ch es dev elop defen s e s cience and
tech nology gam ep lans out to th e y ear 2000. W orking in
conjunction w ith th eState C ouncil,C O STIND form ulateda
defen s e tech nology s trategy th at focu s ed on key
tech nologies andp res entedit at a N ov em ber 19 85 m eeting
w ith th e C M C leaders h ip . A fterw ards , in February 19 86 ,
C O STIN D , w ith C M C s up p ort, com m is s ioneda long term
dev elop m ent p rogram th at included th e form ation of 18
s tudy group s to focus on des ignatedcritical tech nologies .6 1
H ow ev er, s om e w ith in th e defense S&T com m unity
believ edC O STIN D ’s p lan w as not sufficient to m eet th e
128
tech n ical ch allenges p os ed by U.S. m is s ile defen s e
p rogram s . In M arch 19 86 ,four ofC h ina’s m os t p rom inent
defen s e engineers p res ented a p etition to th e C entral
C om m ittee calling for es tablis h m ent ofa “H igh Tech nology
Res earch and D ev elop m ent Plan Outline.” Th e p lan,
referredto as th e86 3Program ,w as im p lem entedin p arallel
to C O STIN D ’s L ong Range Plan to Year 2000 and w as
jointly m anagedby C OSTIN D andth e State Science and
Tech nology C om m is s ion. Th e86 3p rogram ,s tilla guide and
funding s ource for num erous p relim inary R&D p rojects ,
focus es on s om e ofth e s am e tech nologies includedin th e
SD I and E urop e’s answ er to SD I, th e E ureka p rogram ,
in clu din g s p ace s y s tem s , h igh p ow ered las ers ,
m icroelectronics ,andautom atedcontrol s y s tem s .6 2
Tech nical.
W ith s tudies and res earch conducted in th e 19 80s
p rov iding th e foundation, B eijing h as em barked up on a
far-reach ing and m ulti-faceted p rogram to en s ure th e
v iability of its ballis tic m is s ile force. Th es e p rogram s
include tech nical counterm eas ures , an exp ans ion of its
m is s ile force, as w ell as as y m m etrical m easures , such as
anti-s atellite op erations. Th e PRC is inv es ting s ignificant
res ources into countering m is s ile defen s e th rough th e
dev elop m ent oftech nical p enetration aids . C ontem p orary
C h ines eliteratureon tech nical counterm eas ures is focus ed
on “tw o categories an d eigh t m ajor p en etration
tech nologies ”(liangdalei,badatufang jis h u): Th es einclude
countersurv eillance (electronic counterm eas ures , s tealth ,
decoy s , and fas t burn m otors ) an d coun terin tercep t
(m ultip le w arh eads , m an euv erin g reen try v eh icles ,
h ardening,ands aturation).
C ountersurv eillance. One tech nical s trategy is focus ed
on deny ing U.S. s ensors th e ability to p rop erly detect and
dis crim inate ballis ticm is s iles andth eir p ay loads . C h ines e
res earch an d dev elop m en t in to counters urv eillan ce
(fanzh ench a)s y s tem s is centeredon four areas : 1)electronic
129
counterm easures ; 2) s tealth ; 3) decoy s ; and 4 ) fas t burn
m otors .
1. E lectron ic C oun term eas ures . F rom C h in a’s
p ers p ectiv e,p as s iv e andactiv e electroniccounterm easures
are a fundam ental y et effectiv e m eans ofensuring ballis tic
m is s iles are able to reach th eir targets . C h ines e literature
cites us e of p as s iv e electronic counterm easures , such as
ch aff,to confus e enem y radar s y s tem s ,such as th e X-B and
and UE W R s y s tem s . C h ines e tes ting h as dem ons trated
th at ballis ticm is s iles can carry a s ignificant am ount ofch aff
th at can affect a large v olum e of s p ace. D ev elop m ent is
focus edin p art on production ofm etallics trip s th at are 1.5
centim eters in length th at can target radar s y s tem s th at
op erate at 10 G H z(i.e.,X-bandradars ).6 3
Res earch als o is underw ay on radio frequency and
infrared counterm easures . C A SC h as conductedtes ts on
activ e jam m ers th at can broadcas t a s ignal des igned to
interfere w ith a radar’s ability to detect th e target object or
corrup t th e s ignal in such a w ay as to caus e th e radar to
receiv e a fals e ech o.6 4 N ational Univ ers ity of D efen s e
Tech n ology an aly s ts h av e exam in ed electron ic
counterm eas u re p ackages on board th eater ballis tic
m is s iles as a m eans to counter m illim eter w av e am p lifiers
us edon th e PA C -3 m is s ile and infrareds eekers on G B I,
TH A A D , and Sea-B as ed M id-C ours e intercep tors .6 5 Th e
PRC als o is inv es ting s ignificantly into ground and air
bas edjam m ers th at couldeffect radar s y s tem s s up p orting
m is s ile defenses dep loy edaroundits p erip h ery .6 6
2. Stealth . In addition to activ e andp as s iv e electronic
counterm easures ,PRC engineers arew orking to reduceth e
ability of early w arning and tracking radar s y s tem s to
detect ballis tic m is s iles in th e m id-cours e and term inal
p h as e of th eir fligh t. Th e intent is to decreas e av ailable
reaction tim e andth us reduce th e p robability ofkill and
footp rint of m is s ile defen s e s y s tem s . One of th e m os t
effectiv e andreadily im p lem entedcounterm eas ures is to
reduce th e radar cros s s ection (RC S)ofth e reentry v eh icle.
130
C A SC des igners already h av e taken sim p le s tep s ,s uch as
s h ap ing th eir reentry v eh icles by bringing th e nos e to a
s h arp p oint androunding th e back edges . Th e D F-11 and
th e D F-15 h av e s h ap edw arh eads th at s ep arate from th e
rem ainder of th e m is s ile body . C h ines e res earch ers als o
h av e exp erim entedw ith com p lex reentry v eh icle s urfaces
th at us eradar abs orbent m aterials th at can counter X-band
radar s y s tem s us ed by TH A A D and th e G B I. E n gineers
h av e taken noteofan adv ancedRus s ian stealth tech nology ,
a p las m a (denglizi) coating th at does not affect fligh t
dy nam ics andcan significantly reduce th e ability ofradar
s y s tem s to detect th e reentry v eh icle.6 7
PRC m is s ile engineers als o are low ering th e infrared
s ign ature of th eir reen try v eh icles . E ngin eers h av e
analy zedin detail th e ty p es ofinfraredfocal p lane array s
th at are intended for us e on th e land- and s ea-bas ed
m id-cours e s y s tem s andTH A A D .6 8 E xp erim ents h av ebeen
conductedus ing “colds creen” (lengp eng) tech nology th at
th erm ally s h rouds th e reentry v eh icle. A n alum inum alloy
is usedto encas e th e w arh eadandliquidnitrogen is p laced
in betw een th e alum inum s h ell andth e w arh ead. In one
exp erim ent, engineers noted th at s y s tem s , s uch as th e
L and- andSea-B as edM id-C ours e andTH A A D , norm ally
couldacquire a reentry v eh icle w ith a fiv e m icron infrared
s ignature at a rangeof3,000 kilom eters . E quip p edw ith th e
colds creen,detection range ofth e reentry v eh iclew ouldbe
reducedto th ree m eters .6 9
3. D ecoy s . C h ines e engineers n ote tw o bas ic decoy
(y ou’er) m eas ures : 1) s aturation; an d 2) decep tion .
Saturation (baoh e) m easures include th e us e of m etallic
balloons or oth er objects th at s im ulateth ereentry v eh iclein
th e m id-cours e or term inal p h as e of fligh t. E ngineers
h igh ligh t th e relativ e eas e ofth is tech nology as w ell as its
low cos t. In 19 9 5 and19 9 6 , th e C h ines e allegedly tes ted
D F-21 endo-atm os p h eric decoy s . 70 D ecep tion m eas ures
under ev aluation include electronic decoy s or tran s p onder
jam m ers th at transm it a radar return sim ilar to th at ofth e
true reentry v eh icle.71
131
4 . F as t- B urn M otors . C h in es e en gin eers h av e
dem onstrated concern ov er p otential dep loy m ent of U.S.
airborne and s p ace-bas ed las ers . A n oth er m eth od under
consideration as an exp licit counterm eas ure to boos t p h as e
intercep tors is a fas tburn boos ter (suran zh utui)for C h ina’s
next generation ofs olidfueleds trategic ballis tic m is s iles .
C h ines e engin eers caution des ign ers about p otential
quality control p roblem s relatedto s tage s ep aration and
accuracy ,andsugges t th is tech nology s h ouldbediv idedinto
th ree s tages bas edon th e p ace offoreign m is s ile defense
dev elop m ents .72
B oos t Ph as e M aneuv ering. One oth er counterm eas ure
th at C h ines e obs erv ers h av e noted is a boos t p h as e
m aneuv er des ignedto fool U.S. D SP s atellites . B y ch anging
directions during th e as cent p h as e of fligh t, th e ballis tic
m is s ile can com p licate th e defense’s efforts to p redict its
fligh t trajectory . W h ile no h ard ev idence exis ts th at th e
C h ines e h av e an activ e p rogram to dev elop a boos t p h as e
m aneuv er, th ere is p otential for coop eration betw een
Rus s ia andPRC m is s ile engineers on tech nology us edon
th e Rus s ian Top ol-M p rogram (SS-27).73
C ounterintercep t(fanlanzai).
Th e s econdm ajor category ofcounterm eas ures s eeks to
deny m is s ile defense intercep tors th e ability to p rop erly
engage th eir targets . Th es einclude: (1)m ultip le w arh eads ,
(2) m aneuv ering reentry v eh icles , and (3) h ardening/
s p inning ofballis ticm is s iles .
1. M ultip le W arh eads . C h ina h as h adth e cap ability to
dev elop anddep loy a m ultip le reentry v eh icle s y s tem for
m any y ears ,including a M IRV s y s tem . A s ofJanuary 19 9 6 ,
C A L T w as in th e m ids t of dev elop ing m ultip le w arh ead
p ay loads , each w ith its ow n guidan ce s y s tem an d
m aneuv ering cap ability .74 Res earch and dev elop m ent on
m ultip le indep en den t reen try v eh icles (M IRV s ) w as
initiatedas early as 19 70. Tech nical difficulties , h ow ev er,
s talled th e p rogram . C A L T ren ew ed res earch an d
132
dev elop m ent in 19 83,s h ortly after th e SD I announcem ent
in M arch 19 83. Th e D F - 5 A , able to s trike targets
th rough out th eUnitedStates ,w as th edes ignatedrecip ient
ofth e M IRV s , alth ough th ere is no ev idence to date th at
th ey h av e been dep loy ed. Th e U.S. intelligencecom m unity
as s es s es th at C h ina coulddev elop a m ultip le RV s y s tem for
th eD F -5 IC B M in a few y ears . C h ines epursuit ofa m ultip le
RV cap ability for its m obile IC B M s and SL B M s w ould
encounter s ignificant tech nical h urdles and w ould be
cos tly .75
C ritical to th is effort is th em iniaturization ofw arh eads ,
a p os s ible objectiv e oftes ts at L op N ur ov er th e las t few
y ears .76 A ccording to C h ines e m is s ile des igners , real and
decoy w arh eads can be m ixed us ing m ultip le w arh ead
tech nology . Real w arh eads can be coated w ith radar
abs orbing m aterials in order to w eaken radar returns and
reduce th e ability ofintercep tors to dis crim inate real from
decoy w arh eads .77
2. M an euv ering Reen try V eh icles . C A L T als o is
dev elop ing m aneuv erable reentry v eh icles in order to
com p licate m is s ile defen s e tracking. M is s ile des igners
believ e m aneuv ering is not only a m eans to com p licate
ballis tic m is s ile defenses , but is es s ential for term inal
guidance p ackages . W h ile v eh icles can m aneuv er at any
tim e during fligh t, C h ines e engineers s ee m os t utility in
p rogram m ing a reentry v eh icle to m aneuv er in its term inal
p h as e, 20-30 s econds before s triking its target. A reentry
v eh icle trav eling a notional range of10,000 kilom eters h as
th e ability to m aneuv er w ith in a lateral range of5 5 6 -9 00
kilom eters . A n oth er m aneuv ering op tion dis cus s ed is to
s endth e w arh eadup to a h igh er altitude after s ep aration
from th em is s ile,s low ly des cending in a glidefor a v ery long
dis tance, andth en finally div e tow ardth e target. M is s ile
des igners h av edem onstrateda s p ecial interes t in th es p eed
control m aneuv er us ed in th e 1,800-kilom eter ran ge
Pers h ing-II.78 C h ines e engineers are addres s ing p roblem s
as s ociatedw ith m aintaining accuracy after exoatm os p h eric
m aneuv ering.79 Th rough m odeling ands im ulation, C A SC
133
h as determ ined th at m aneuv ering is a v iable m eans to
reduce land-bas ed low er tier m is s ile defen s e s y s tem s ’
p robability of kill.80 C h ina allegedly acquired PA TRIOT
tech nology to calibrate an auxiliary p ropuls ion sy s tem on
th e D F -15 reentry v eh icle to enable th e p ay load to
outm aneuv er a PA TRIO T s y s tem as it reenters th e
atm os p h ere.81 A fter com p uter s im ulations and m odeling
exercis es ,C A L T is confident th at its m aneuv erable th eater
ballis tic m is s ile reentry v eh icles can defeat op p os ing
PA TRIOT s y s tem s .82
3. H arden ing. L ookin g ah ead to th e p oten tial
dep loy m ent of boos t p h as e intercep t s y s tem s , s uch as th e
airborn e las er (A B L ), C A SC analy s ts are exam in ing
ballis tic m is s ile s p inning and h ardening. Sp inning th eir
ballis tic m is s iles is intendedto p rev ent concentration ofa
h igh p ow eredlas er on a s ingles p ot.83 C h ines eengineers are
dev elop ing a coating for ballis tic m is s iles th at could
com p licate us e of h igh p ow er las ers . Us ing th eir ow n
indigenous ly dev elop ed h igh p ow ered las ers , C h ines e
institutes h av e tes tedv arious coating m aterials to p rotect
th eouter s h ellofballis ticm is s iles ,a p roces s know n as las er
cladding (jiguang rongfu). L as er cladding,togeth er w ith th e
s p inning ofth eater ballis ticm is s iles ,m ay not m akeballis tic
m is s iles im m uneto boos t p h as em is s iledefenses y s tem s but
could increas e required las ing tim e, th us reducing th e
num ber oflas er s h ots av ailable p er A B L m is s ion. 84
OTH E R .
In addition to th e tech niques des cribedabov e,a range of
oth er tech nical andop erational counterm easures als o are
u n der con s ideration. Th es e in clude: (1) trajectory
tech niques , (2) longer range dev elop m ent of non-nuclear
electrom agnetic p uls e w arh eads , (3) indigenous m is s ile
defen s e dev elop m en t, (4 ) an ti- s atellite (A SA T)
dev elop m ent,and(5 )m ulti-axis s trikes .
1. Trajectory Tech niques . Th e ty p e oftrajectory Second
A rtillery engineers s elect can affect th e ability to p enetrate
134
m is s ile defense s y s tem s . Ty p es oftrajectories include: (1)
fractional orbital bom bardm ent s y s tem , (2) dep res s ed
trajectories , and(3) loftedtrajectories . C h ina conducteda
feas ibility s tudy on a fractional orbital bom bardm ent
s y s tem (FOB S)in 19 6 6 . Th is s y s tem launch es a m is s ileinto
v ery low orbit,ap p roxim ately 16 0 kilom eters abov e earth .
B efore com p letion ofth e firs t orbit, a retro-rocket reduces
th e s p eedofth e w arh ead,w h ich h its th e target w ith only a
few m inutes w arning. C h ines e engineers exp lored th e
p otential oflaunch ing a m is s ile to a p redes ignatedp oint
ov er A n tarctica as a m eans to p enetrate th e w eakes t p oint
in th e U.S. w arning netw ork.85 Still v iew ing a F O B S as an
alternativ e,C h ines e des igners continue feas ibility s tudies
on fractional orbiting m is s iles (bufen guidao daodan).86
C h ines e analy s ts v iew dep res s ed trajectories (y adi
guidao) as anoth er op tion to counter s p ace-bas ed and
m id-cours em is s iledefenses y s tem s . C h ines eengineers note
th at IC B M s often reach altitudes of2,000 kilom eters on a
norm al trajectory . H ow ev er, launch ing a m is s ile at a
dep res s edtrajectory couldallow th e m is s ile to ach iev e only
a 100 kilom eter altitude, com p licating th e ability ofs om e
s p ace-bas eds y s tem s to engage th eballis ticm is s ile. Tes ting
andm odeling h as been done on th e D F -3, w h ich norm ally
h as a range of 2,780km andan altitude of 5 5 0km w h en
fly ing a nom inal trajectory . W ith dep res s edtrajectory ,th e
D F-3trav els 1,5 5 0km at 100km altitude.87
L ofted trajectories (tagao dandao) are anoth er op tion
th at C h ines e m is s ileers m ay cons ider. A longer range
ballis ticm is s ile does not neces s arily m ean th e m is s ile w ill
be us ed at its m axim um effectiv e range. A longer range
s y s tem , fired on a lofted trajectory , can als o s erv e as a
tech nical counterm easure to m is s ile defen s es . L ofted
trajectories can in creas e reen try s p eed, th ereby
com p licating intercep t s olution s for term inal defen s e
s y s tem s or reducing th e footp rint or defendedarea.88
2. E M P w arh eads . PRC engineers als o are conducting
feas ibility s tudies on electrom agneticpuls ew eap ons (E M P)
135
to ov ercom edefenses . E M P s y s tem s ,s uch as a h igh p ow ered
m icrow av e (H PM ) w arh ead, could n egate s p ace or
ground-bas ed s ens ors th at s up p ort a m is s ile defens e
arch itecture. PL A w ritings indicate th at fielding ofan E M P
w arh ead is a relativ ely h igh p riority . H PM dev ices in
p articular are v iew ed as a “natural enem y ” of m ore
tech nologically adv anced m ilitaries and an “electronic
trum p card”(dianzis h as h ou).89 D ueto ch allenges relatedto
w eap onizing a dev icew ith enough p ow er,a firs t generation
C h ines e H PM w arh ead likely w ould only be effectiv e
against radiating targets w ith in th e im m ediate area of
im p act. Radar s y s tem s andcom m unications centers w ould
be th e p rim e candidates . A s th e tech nology p rogres s es ,
h ow ev er,H PM w arh eads couldach iev e w ider effects .9 0 Th e
dev elop ers of th e D F -11 SRB M — th e 06 6 B as e— h av e
dem onstratedth e m os t interes t in H PM w arh eads .9 1
In addition to non-nuclear E M P w eap on s , Taiw an
obs erv ers are concerned about th e p otential us e of h igh
altitude E M P (H E M P) burs ts th at us e an actual nuclear
dev ice. Such a dev ice, detonated at an altitude of 4 0
kilom eters ,w ouldav oidcas ualties on th eground,y etw ould
h av e s ignificant effects on th e is land’s electronic s y s tem s .
Th e s olution, according to Taiw an analy s ts , are m is s ile
defenses , such as th e Sea-B as ed M id-C ours e, th at can
engage th e ballis tic m is s ile in its as cent p h as e andbefore
detonation.9 2
3. M is s ile D efense. B eijing h as an indigenous m is s ile
defense dev elop m ent p rogram intendedto ensure th at at
leas t a p ortion ofits inv entory couldsurv iv e a firs t s trike.
C h ina’s res earch on m is s ile defenses dates back to th e
19 6 0s . Under th e 6 4 0 Program , th e s p ace and m is s ile
indus try ’s Second A cadem y , traditionally res p onsible for
SA M dev elop m ent,s et out to fielda m is s iledefenses y s tem ,
consis ting ofa kinetickillv eh icle,h igh p ow eredlas er,s p ace
early w arn ing, an d target dis crim in ation s y s tem
com p onents . W h ile th is p rogram w as abandonedin 19 80,
engineers as s ociated w ith th is effort are s till activ e.
136
Prelim inary res earch on m is s ile defens es w as res um edin
th e19 80s ,atleas t p artly fundedunder th e86 3Program .9 3
Th eC A SC SecondA cadem y andth eSh angh aiA cadem y
of Sp acefligh t Tech nology are p lay ing a leading role in
m is s ile defens e res earch . W es tern rep orting andC h ines e
tech nical journals indicate th at th e C entral M ilitary
C om m is s ion h as ap p rov ed fu n din g for a 1 0 - y ear
dev elop m ental p rogram for a m is s ile defense s y s tem , to
include s atellites for m is s ile launch w arning. Th e PL A A ir
F orceandC A SC adv ocate a 15 -y ear,th ree-p h as e ap p roach
to m is s ile defense. Th e firs t s tep is to fielda “Patriot-like”
s y s tem , s uch as th e H Q-9 , follow ed by res earch and
dev elop m ent on an extendedrange intercep tor m odeledon
th e PA C -3 m is s ile; and bas ic concep tual res earch on a
TH A A D -like m id-cours e intercep t s y s tem .9 4
C h ines e engineers are focus ed on dev elop m ent of
infrared and radio-frequency s eekers th at could engage
both m edium ands h ort-range ballis ticm is s iles . E n gineers
aredev elop ing s h ort andm edium w av einfraredband(3-12
m icrons) focal p lane array s th at w ouldbe able to engage
reentry v eh icles during th e m id-cours e p h as e ofth eir fligh t
p ath .9 5 In addition to infrareds eekers th at couldbeus edto
counter m edium ands h ort rangeballis ticm is s iles ,th ePRC
h as s tep p edup res earch into m illim eter w av e (K a-band)
am p lifiers s im ilar to th os e us edon th e PA C -3 m is s ile. In
fact,a s p ecial s tate laboratory on m illim eter w av e res earch
w as es tablis h ed in Nanjing to h elp ach iev e tech nological
breakth rough s .9 6 One concep tual des ign for a low er tier
m is s iledefenseintercep tor adop ts an integratedm illim eter
w av e andinfrareds eeker as s em bly .9 7
Th ere als o are indication s th at C h ines e aeros p ace
engineers areexam ining th efeas ibility ofs p ace-bas edearly
w arning. Tech nical w ritings indicate th e s p ace indus try is
w orking to m as ter s p ecific tech nologies as s ociated w ith
m is s ile early w arning s atellites . Th e SecondA rtillery h as
conducted m odeling and s im ulation of alternativ e early
w arning arch itectures .9 8 C h ina h as a w ell-es tablis h ed
137
tech nology bas ein infrareds ensors ,w h ich ,w h en p lacedon
s atellites , can detect a m is s ile alm os t im m ediately after
launch by detecting th einfraredradiation from its engineor
m otor p lum e.9 9 In a p otentially relatedp rogram ,th e C h ina
A cadem y ofSp ace Tech nology is dev elop ing a s atellite bus
for an infrared teles cop e, w h ich , according to des ign
outlines , w ill be p laced in a geos y ch ronous orbit s h ortly
after th e turn ofth e century .100
4 . C ounters p ace. Negating U.S. s p aces y s tem s is anoth er
ap p roach to countering m is s ile defenses . C h ines e res earch
and dev elop m ent on anti-satellite tech nologies h as been
underw ay s ince th e 19 6 0s . Tech nical literature sugges ts
th at a direct as cent A SA T p rogram is underw ay inv olv ing
an as s es s m ent ofv arious des ign p rop os als for s eekers and
p rop u ls ion s y s tem s . A s p art of a m is s ile defen s e
counterm eas ure p rogram , A SA T op erations w ould be
directedagainst s atellites in low earth orbit, such as th e
SB IRS-L ow s y s tem or agains t th eSB IRS-H igh s atellites in
h igh ly ellip tical orbits . Tech nical p ap ers dem onstrates om e
of th e greates t obs tacles in dev elop in g an activ e
counters p ace cap ability are w ith dev elop m ent of a kill
v eh icle and as s ociated term inal guidance. M odeling h as
been carried out on infrared, radar, and im p uls e radar
term in al guidan ce s y s tem s . 101 H arbin In s titute of
Tech nology and B eijing Univ ers ity of A s tronautics and
A eronautics , for exam p le, h av e carriedout m odeling and
s im ulation ofv arious s p ace intercep t control andterm inal
guidance s y s tem s . One concep t introduces s ev eral s m all
s olidm otors for orbital control s tabilization.102 Th ere als o
h av e been unconfirm edrep orts th at th e C h ina A cadem y of
Sp ace Tech nology (C A ST) is dev elop ing nanom eter-s ized
“p aras itic s atellites ” th at could function in an A SA T
m ode.103
E n gineers h av e conducteds tudies to counter s atellite
decoy s as w ell.104 Th e PRC h as s tep p edup its efforts to
dis tinguis h decoy s from real s atellites . One s tudy , carried
out by th e N ational Univ ers ity of D efense Tech nology ,
determ inedth at th is p roblem couldbes olv edth rough us eof
138
at leas t th ree grounds tations using infrareds ensors and
n eural netw orks . 105 C h ina’s exis ting s p ace trackin g
netw ork can detect andtrack m os t s atellites w ith s ufficient
accuracy for targeting p urp os es .106
C h ina’s des ireto fielda direct as cent A SA T as s etm ay be
affiliatedw ith a p rogram intendedto s u p p ort th e launch of
s m all s atellite constellations . A s m all s olidfueledlaunch
v eh icle,m os t likely a deriv ativ eofth eD F-21,w illbeable to
p laces m all p ay loads in orbit at a tim e andp laceofB eijing’s
ch oos ing. C h ina intends to fieldth es e m obile, s olidfueled
launch v eh icles by 2005 . Reduced s ize and com p lexity
allow s for fas ter m anufacturing tim e and p roduction in
s ignificant num bers .107 C h ines e engineers are conducting
concep tual s tudies on a s p ace bas ed s atellite tracking
s y s tem th at w ould s erv e as a p otentially im p ortan t
com p onent ofany A SA T s y s tem .108
B eijing als o is inv es ting in th e dev elop m ent of h igh
p ow eredlas ers th at,under certain conditions , couldaffect
op tical com p onents ofs atellite s y s tem s , such SB IRS-L ow .
Th e 19 9 8 Rep ort to C ongres s on PRC M ilitary C ap abilities
(pursuant to Section 1226 of th e FY9 8 National D efense
A uth orization A ct)s tates “C h ina already m ay p os s es s th e
cap ability to dam age, under s p ecific conditions, op tical
s ensors on s atellites th at are v ery v ulnerableto dam ageby
las ers . H ow ev er, giv en C h ina’s current interes t in las er
tech nology , it is reas onable to as s um e th at B eijing w ould
dev elop a w eap on th at could des troy s atellites in th e
future.”109
5 . M ulti- A xis Strikes . In addition to tech n ical
coun term eas u res , th e PL A is exam in ing op eration al
m eth odologies intendedto p enetrateU.S.,allied,or friendly
m is s ile defense s y s tem s . Th e SecondA rtillery andC h ina’s
s p ace andm is s ile indus try h av e conductedm odeling and
s im ulation to tes t C h ina’s ability to break th rough th e w ide
range of p rojected U.S. m is s ile defen s e dep loy m ents .
M odeling h as been carried out th at inv olv es v arious
139
com binations of surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, s ea-tosurface,air-to-air andnav alair defensem is s iles y s tem s .110
A m ong th em os t im p ortant ares y nch ronized,m ulti-axis
s trikes as a fundam ental p rincip le of Second A rtillery
conv entional doctrine (duodian, duofangxiang, tongs h i
tuji). A s s ociatedare decep tion andtim ing m eas ures th at
could ensure p enetration of at leas t a large p ortion of a
s alv o. Th es e inv olv e coordinated launch es from different
launch azim uth s andus eofinfrared“dis rup tion” to confus e
D SP s atellites and com p licate enem y attack op erations.
A n oth er m eth odology includes clos ely s p aced s alv os th at
could take adv antage of reload tim e. L aunch es from
different azim uth s ,com binedw ith us eofinfraredradiation
“dis rup tion,” couldconfus e enem y s atellite early w arning
s y s tem s andcom p licate enem y attack op erations . A n oth er
concep t inv olv es th e us e of tw o s trike w av es , th e firs t
“s creening” th e s econdexh aus ting m is s ile defenses , before
th ey h av e tim e to reload.111
Anti-Radiation M is s ile D ev elop m ent. A n as y m m etrical
ap p roach to countering m is s ile defenses includes attacking
critical n odes w ith in th e m is s ile defen s e s y s tem ,
p articularly radar s y s tem s . Th e PRC is acquiring and/or
dev elop ing an anti-radiation m is s ile (A RM ), such as th e
Rus s ian K h -31P,th at is intendedto negate early w arning
andfire controlradar s y s tem s th at are ableto detect and/or
track ballis tic m is s iles during v arious p h as es of fligh t.112
Th ere are p ers is tent rum ors ofPL A p rocurem ent or joint
p roduction arrangem ent on th e K h -31P, w h ich C h ines e
engineers note w as s p ecifically dev elop ed to counter th e
PA TRIOT’s M PQ-5 3 radar, and A E G IS SPY-1D p h as ed
array radar. C h in a’s defen s e in dus trial com p lex,
s p ecifically th e Th ird A cadem y w ith s up p ort from th e
H arbin Institute of Tech nology , is aggres s iv ely p ursuing
dep loy m ent ofa long range anti-radiation m is s ile.113
14 0
F oreign C oop eration on M is s ile D efense
C ounterm easures .
Th ere are in dication s of Rus s ian Sp ace A gen cy
as s is tance in C h ines e dev elop m ent of ballis tic m is s ile
defen s e counterm easures , p erh ap s dating back to th e
m id-19 9 0s or earlier. C oop eration betw een C h ina and
Rus s ia in th efieldofs p aceandm is s iles w as form alizedinto
a s eries of agreem ents betw een C A SC and th e Rus s ian
s p ace agencies w h en rep res entativ es from C h ines e and
Sov iet s p ace indus tries s igned an initial agreem ent in
M os cow in M ay 19 9 0 on 10 coop erativ e p rojects .114 Th e
relations h ip w as s olidified w h en C A SC and th e Rus s ian
Sp ace A gency s ignedan official p rotocol for th e s h aring of
s p acetech nology in 19 9 2. Th is agreem ent w as rais edagain
as a deliv erable during Pres ident Yelts in’s v is it to B eijing,
but only after th etw o countries s igneda no-firs t-us ep ledge.
A follow -on agreem ent w as s ignedby C h ines e andRus s ian
s p ace officials . Th e agreem ent included ten areas of
coop eration , in cluding s atellite n av igation, s p ace
surv eillance, p ropuls ion, s atellite com m unications , joint
des ign efforts , m aterials , intelligence s h aring, s cientific
p ers onnel exch anges , ands p ace s y s tem s tes ting. C h ines e
s ources indicate coop eration als o includedcountering U.S.
m is s ile defense p rogram s .115
C ONC L USIONS
Th e UnitedStates h as exp res s edits intent to dev elop
defen s es cap able of defending again s t lim ited m is s ile
attacks from a rogue s tate or from an accidental or
unauth orized launch . U.S. m is s ile defense engineers are
dev elop ing lay ered defen s es , cap able of in tercep ting
m is s iles of any range at ev ery s tage of fligh t: boos t,
m id-cours e, andterm inal. L ay ereddefenses w ouldp erm it
reductions in nuclear forces ,th us contributing to s trategic
s tability . Th es e defenses w ill be introducedincrem entally ,
dep loy ing cap abilities as th e tech nology m atures andth en
adding new cap abilities ov er tim e.
14 1
Since res earch on m is s ile defenses began in th e 19 80s ,
B eijing h as been concern ed about th e p oten tial
underm ining ofth eir lim itednuclear deterrence,and,m ore
recently ,th eir ability to deter andcoerceneigh bors s uch as
Taiw an. To ensure th ev iability ofits nuclear deterrent and
for its exp anding inv entory of conv entional SRB M s and
M RB M s ,B eijing h as im p lem entednum erous m easures to
counter U.S. m is s iledefensep rogram s . Th es em easures are
targetedagainst s ensors th at s up p ort m is s ile defenses and
against m is s ile defen s e intercep tors th em s elv es . Oth er
initiativ es include A SA T dev elop m en t as w ell as an
indigenous m is s iledefensep rogram th at couldens ures om e
m odicum ofas s uredretaliation. A num ber of conclus ions
can be draw n from th e range of m easures underw ay to
underm ine U.S. m is s ile defense p rogram s .
C h ina’s C ounterm easure C h allenge.
C h ines e res earch anddev elop m ent of m is s ile defense
counterm eas ures is exten s iv e and ap p ears relativ ely
s op h is ticated. H ow ev er, counterm eas ures introduce an
added elem ent of com p lexity into an already com p lex
s y s tem . D es p ite s ignificant inv es tm ent, PRC counterm easures on longer-range ballis ticm is s iles are unlikely to
keep p ace w ith U.S. tech nology . W ith m ore th an 30 y ears
exp erience, th e United States is th e w orld’s leader in
counterm easure tech nology . Such exp ertis e naturally is
integrated into countering p enetration aids . C h ines e
engineers w ill face ch allenges as th ey attem p t to p ut into
p ractice m an y of th e concep ts des cribed abov e.
C ounterm easures can be tim e consum ing, andcan reduce
av ailable s p ace andw eigh t. A s a result, p enetration aids
couldlow er p erform ance(i.e. range andaccuracy )or forcea
reduction in pay load(i.e. a trade offbetw een a decoy or a
M IRV ).
Sim p lecounterm easures ,such as ch affandem p loy m ent
of a lim ited num ber of decoy s , likely already h av e been
incorp oratedinto s om em is s iles ,s uch as th e D F -21 M RB M .
14 2
Integration of m ore s op h is ticated coun term eas u res ,
h ow ev er, s uch as balloon decoy s , fas t burn m otors , and
boos t p h as em aneuv ering arelikely to bem any y ears aw ay .
Rus s ian tech nical as s is tance m ay h as ten th eir tim eline.
Regardles s ,as new counterm eas ures com e on line ov er th e
next 10 y ears ,th eUnitedStates s h ouldbeabletokeep p ace,
p articularly giv en th e general requirem ent for C A L T
m is s ile des igners to conduct fligh t tes ts . Th e lay ered
defense ap p roach is p erh ap s th e m os t effectiv e m eans to
redu ce th e effectiv en es s of m is s ile defen s e
counterm easures .
N ev erth eles s ,th e U.S. s h ouldh edge against unfores een
breakth rough s in PRC counterm eas uretech nology . C h ina’s
tech nological p rogres s , Rus s ian as s is tan ce to PRC
p rogram s , and B eijing’s p rop ensity to p rov ide tech nical
as s is tance to rogue s tate m is s ile dev elop m ent all require
careful m onitoring. Tes ting ofnew p enetration aids s h ould
be eas ily obs erv edv ia national tech nical m eans.
It s h ouldbe notedth at am ong th e entire range ofU.S.
m is s ile defen s e p rogram s , PRC s p ecialis ts s eem m os t
concernedabout th e dep loy m ent ofSB IRS-L ow s atellites .
Slatedfor initial dep loy m ent during th e latter p art ofth e
decade(about th es am etim e as th e PRC ’s new generation of
s olid- fu eled exten ded range IC B M s are fielded),
SB IRS-L ow h as th ep otentialto undercut an entire category
ofC h ines ecounterm easures . Sp ecialis ts note th at th e dual
s urv eillan ce an d trackin g cap ability of SB IRS- L ow
(infraredandelectro-op tical)w ouldreduceth eeffectiv enes s
of counter- s urv eillance m eas ures , s u ch as electronic
counterm eas ures , radar s tealth , and th erm al s h rouds .
Th erefore, greater em p h as is m u s t be p laced on
counter-intercep t m eas ures , anda com bination ofdecoy s
andth erm al s h rouds .116
Planned E xp ansion ofPRC B allis tic M is s ile F orces .
Th e dis cus s ion abov e focus es on tech n ical an d
as y m m etricalcounterm eas ures th at th ePRC m ay adop t. To
14 3
augm ent s op h is ticatedp enetration aids ,lim itedexp ansion
ofC h ina’s ballis ticm is s ileforceis to beexp ected,dep ending
on th e s cop e ofth e U.S. m is s ile defense arch itecture. Th e
Second A rtillery ’s ars enal of s trategic and conv entional
ballis ticm is s iles already is exp ectedto grow subs tantially
th rough th e introduction ofm ore s op h is ticateds ilo-bas ed
IC B M s , s uch as th e D F-5 A ; m obile s y s tem s , s uch as th e
D F-31 andth e longer range D F-31A ; andth e JL -2 SL B M .
F u rth er exp an s ion , bey ond curren t p lan s , is to be
anticip ated. H ow ev er,th es cop elikely w ouldbelim iteddue
to B eijing’s des ire to av oidp res enting a th reatening im age
to its neigh bors andeconom icp artners aroundth ew orld.117
If B eijing ch oos es to exp and its nuclear ballis tic m is s ile
force,th em os t likely route w ouldbetoincreas ep roduction,
bey ond current p lans, of th e D F-31 andits longer range
v ariant.
A s dis cus s edabov e,by 2005 ,B eijing is exp ectedto h av e
24 D F-5 IC B M s ; 10-20 D F-31 IC B M s th at s h ouldrep lace
th e SecondA rtillery ’s ap p roxim ately a dozen D F -4 IC B M s ;
andp erh ap s th es am enum ber ofJL -2s ,as s um ing th e Ty p e
9 4 s ubm arine is p roducedaccording to s ch edule. A t leas t
one additional D F-31 brigade (10-20 m is s iles ) could be
fieldedby 2010. Initial dep loy m ent ofth e D F-31A couldbe
exp ectedin th e 2005 -2010 tim efram e,w ith as m any as ten
D F-31A IC B M s os tensibly being in op eration by th e endof
th e decade. W ith as m any as 100 new IC B M s entering th e
PL A ’s inv entory ov er th e next 10 y ears ,th e PRC is in effect
m ore th an doubling its ars enal ofnuclear ballis ticm is s iles
able to range targets th rough out th e UnitedStates . Th is
exp ansion ap p ears to be taking p lace indep endent ofU.S.
p lans to fieldlim itedm is s ile defenses .
Up grading all or a p ortion of th e PRC ’s D F -5 force
s tructure w ith M IRV s is anoth er p otential res p ons e s h ould
a C M C decis ion be m ade to do s o. Th e s p ecific num ber of
M IRV s p er D F-5 can not be determ ined at th is tim e.118
Pros p ects th at a lay ered m is s ile defense s y s tem could
include a boos t-p h as e intercep t cap ability could dam p en
any incentiv e to dep loy M IRV ’s . B oos t-p h as e defen s es
14 4
w oulddes troy th e m is s iles early in fligh t, w h en th ey are
m os t v is ible andbefore th ey can releas e th eir w arh eads .
M is s ile D efenses andB eijing’s Six Sp ecious
A rgum ents .
Since th e early 19 9 0s ,B eijing’s tech nical anddoctrinal
res p onses h av e been supported by a coordinated foreign
p olicy andp rop aganda cam p aign to influenceinternational
op inion ands h ap e th e debate w ith in th e U.S. regarding
m is s ile defenses . A s its nuclear andconv entional ballis tic
m is s ile inv entory grow s , B eijing’s p olitical leaders h ip h as
form ulateda num ber ofargum ents against m is s iledefenses
th at are bas ed on h alf-truth s and ov er-sim p lifications.
F irs t, B eijing argues th at m is s ile defenses w ill caus e an
arm s race. In fact, in th e conv entional m ilitary context,
arm s races generally arecaus edby one s ide’s rap idbuildup
in offen s iv e cap abilities .119 One could argue th at an
acceleratedarm s race h as been underw ay in th e Taiw an
Strait s ince th e early 19 9 0s . Un dercutting B eijing’s
ov erw h elm ing offensiv e adv antage th rough v iable defenses
w ouldenh ance cros s - Strait s tability by rais ing th e cos ts of
us ing force. A ctiv e m is s ile defenses , com binedw ith oth er
ap p roach es , w ouldreduce th e p erceiv edutility of ballis tic
m is s iles as B eijing’s p referredtool ofcoercion.
Secondly , B eijing as s erts th at U.S. m is s ile defen s e
p rogram s w ill v iolate th e A nti-B allis tic M is s ile (A B M )
Treaty . H ow ev er, at th is tim e, th ere is no intention to
v iolate th e A B M Treaty , w h ich w as a bilateral agreem ent
betw een M os cow and W as h ington to h elp m anage and
s tabilize th e s trategic bilateral relations h ip . B ecaus e th e
A B M Treaty is an artifact ofth eC oldW ar,th e treaty needs
to beadjus tedor elim inatedaltogeth er. A dialogueh as been
initiatedw ith M os cow to ensure th at s uch a m ov e w ouldbe
m ade w ith th e consent ofboth p arties .
B eijing als o p os its a m is leading argum ent th at m is s ile
defen s es w ill en courage Taiw an es e in dep en den ce
s entim ent. Th ere are m ore im p ortant factors bes ides
14 5
defenses th at fan th e flam es ofTaiw anes e indep endence.
PRC p olicies th at alienate Taiw an are m os t relev ant.
B es ides , activ e m is s ile defen s es w ould not encourage
indep endence s entim ent any m ore th an oth er w eap on
s y s tem s , s uch as F - 16 figh ters , PA TRIOT G uidance
E n h ancedM is s iles ,or PF G -2frigates . One als o couldargue
th at Taiw an’s indigenous cap acity for defense is only a
m inor factor influencing p ublics entim ent regarding greater
autonom y s ince, according to s om e s ources , Taiw an’s
dom es ticp olity is largely uninteres tedin defens eis s ues .
PRC s p okes m en argue th at activ e m is s ile defenses can
be us edoffensiv ely . M uch to th e contrary ,m is s ile defenses
are defensiv e— th ey th reaten no one. Ifany th ing,building
effectiv e defenses w illreduceth e v alueofballis ticm is s iles ,
and th us rem ov e incentiv es for th eir dev elop m ent and
p roliferation. One couldargue th at conv erting up p er tier
intercep tors to surface-to-s urface m is s iles could enable
s trikes agains t targets at long ranges . H ow ev er, us ing
intercep tors in th is w ay is not cos t efficient due to p ay load
lim itations. It is ch eap er andm ore effectiv e to dev elop a
dedicated ballis tic m is s ile th an to us e a m is s ile defense
intercep tor.
A corollary to th is argum ent is th at m is s iledefenses can
s h ieldoffensiv e as s ets , such as ballis tic m is s iles or s trike
aircraft. Th is s up p os ition blurs th e dis tinction betw een
offensiv e anddefensiv e action— w h eth er or not a s y s tem is
offensiv e or defensiv e dep ends up on th e us er’s intent,
s trategy , and doctrine. B eijing als o argues th at U.S.
p rov is ion of m is s ile defenses to Taiw an w ould transfer
tech nologies us eful to ballis tic m is s ile dev elop m ent. Th is
as s ertion as s um es th at Taiw an does n ot h av e th e
indigenous cap acity to dev elop th e neces s ary tech nology ;
w ould be w illing to v iolate M is s ile Tech nology C ontrol
Regim e-relatedas s urances m ade to th e U.S. gov ernm ent;
andw ouldtake th e trouble to rev ers e engineer p rop uls ion,
guidance,or oth er as s ociatedtech nologies .
14 6
C h ines e argum ents th at m is s ile defenses couldleadto a
m ilitarization of s p ace h av e s om e m erit. H ow ev er, s ince
dep loy m ent of th e firs t reconnais s ance and m ilitary
com m unication s s atellites ,s p aceh as long been exp loitedfor
m ilitary p urp os es . Th ere is a relations h ip betw een m is s ile
defense andA SA T intercep tors . If s up p orted by a robus t
s earch , acquis ition, and tracking netw ork, up p er tier
m id-cours es y s tem s couldbeus edto s trikes om es atellites in
low earth orbit. C h ines e obs erv ers , such as D u Xiangw an
from th e C h ina A cadem y of E n gineering Ph y s ics , h av e
notedth at intercep ting s atellites is eas ier th an engaging
reentry v eh icles .
F inally , th e PRC h as argued th at p rov is ion of activ e
m is s ile defen s es to Taiw an w ould “v iolate” th e Th ree
C om m uniqués . Th e Th ree C om m uniqués are p arallel
s tatem en ts of p olicy th at h av e little s tan din g in
international law . Prov is ion ofm is s ile defenses w ouldnot
“v iolate” th e 19 82 C om m uniqué any m ore th an oth er
w eap on s y s tem s . A s A s s is tant Secretary of State Joh n
H oldridge p ointedout in h is A ugus t 19 82 C ongres s ional
tes tim ony , th e U.S. agreem ent to reduce arm s s ales to
Taiw an w as contingent up on B eijing’s p eaceful ap p roach to
res olv ing th e Taiw an is s ue, generally ch aracterizedby its
m ilitary p os ture directed against Taiw an. A s H oldridge
noted in h is tes tim ony , a ris e in th e m ilitary th reat to
Taiw an th eoretically w ouldbeaccom p aniedby a ris ein U.S.
s ecurity as s is tance, in accordance w ith U.S. dom es tic law
under th e Taiw an Relations A ct.
B eijing argues th at p rov is ion ofactiv e m is s ile defenses
to Taiw an w ouldrev iv e th e U.S.-Taiw an defense alliance,
underm ining th e foundation of U.S.-PRC relations as
s p elledout in th e 19 79 C om m uniqué. Such an argum ent is
bas ed on th e faulty as s um p tion th at a Taiw an m is s ile
defen s e arch itecture w ould require s om e form of
op erational connectiv ity w ith U.S. s p ace-bas ed early
w arning and com m and and control s y s tem s . W h ile D SP
early w arning could enh ance th e effectiv enes s of m is s ile
defen s es , s y s tem s s u ch as TH A A D can op erate
14 7
auton om ous ly again s t SRB M s . E arly w arning radar
s y s tem s can s up p lant th e needfor s atellite early w arning.
M is s ile D efense in th e Taiw an Strait.
A s can bes een from th es eargum ents ,C h ina’s op p os ition
to m is s ile defenses is v iew edlargely th rough th e cognitiv e
p ris m of Taiw an. B allis tic m is s iles are a p olitical and,
increas ingly ,m ilitary trum p cardintendedto s tem p olitical
m ov em ent in Taiw an tow ard greater autonom y . A t th e
s am e tim e, C h in a’s s trategic nuclear force affects
cos t-benefit calculations of regional p lay ers , s uch as th e
UnitedStates andJap an,as th ey contem p lateinterv ention.
In th eory ,W as h ington policy m akers w ouldbe les s likely to
interv eneifth e ris ks ofes calation w ere h igh . B eijing h as a
no-firs t-us e p olicy , but regional actors can not be as s ured
th at B eijing w ould not us e nuclear w eap ons to retaliate
again s t foreign in terv en tion, p articularly if th at
interv ention inv olv ed s trikes against m ilitary targets on
th e m ainlandop p os ite Taiw an.
SRB M s , com bin ed w ith certain ty p es of
coun term eas ures , p res en t Taiw an ’s m is s ile defen s e
p lanners w ith s ignificantch allenges . Th ep otentialfor large
raids izes ; th e s h ort fligh t tim e ofSRB M s (ap p roxim ately 7
m inutes for th e 6 00 kilom eter D F-15 ); andw ide range of
attack azim uth s w ould s tres s an y m is s ile defen s e
arch itecture.
D es p ite th es e ch allenges ,Taiw an’s interes t in ballis tic
m is s iledefenses can beexp ectedto grow w ith th e th reat. A
m odes t m is s ile defen s e arch itecture could reduce th e
effectiv enes s of lim itedPRC us e of ballis tic m is s iles in a
coerciv e air cam p aign. In addition to landands ea-bas ed
low er tier s y s tem s ,th edep loy m ent ofconv entional M RB M s
andextendedrange SRB M s in significant num bers likely
w illdriv e Taiw an’s interes t in sea-bas edm id-cours em is s ile
defense andTH A A D .
14 8
H ow ev er,to defendagainst large-scale raids , exclus iv e
reliance on activ e m is s ile defenses w ill be insufficient to
offs et th e ov erw h elm ing adv antages B eijing h olds w ith its
exp anding ars enal ofballis ticm is s iles . A s a res ult,Taiw an
can be exp ected to adop t as y m m etrical ap p roach es to
augm ent activ e m is s ile defenses . Th es e include p as s iv e
defensem eas ures to com p licate targeting andenh ancing its
ability to sustain or recons titute op erations after a firs t
s trike. E v en m oreim p ortant,Taiw an forcep lanners can be
exp ected to inv es t in activ e defense m easures , such as
s u p p res s ion of enem y air defen s es an d interdiction
op erations th at w ould target critical nodes w ith a
conv entional ballis ticm is s ile organization. 120
Th ePRC is concernedabout U.S. p lans to dep loy a global
m is s ile defense arch itecture. PRC obs erv ers unders tand
th at th e UnitedStates ,s h ouldit s o ch oos e,h as th e ability
ov er th e longer term to dev elop a robus t, lay ered global
m is s ile defen s e arch itecture th at could ch allenge th e
v iability ofC h ina’s deterrent. To ensure th e v iability ofits
deterrent,B eijing is in th e m ids t ofa long-term p rogram to
up grade its s trategicnuclear force,in both qualitativ e and
quantitativ eterm s . M IRV ing ands ucces s in fielding m is s ile
defense counterm easures w ouldbefactors in th e ultim ate
s ize of th e force. B eijing h as th e ability to influence th e
n ature an d s cop e of fu ture U.S. m is s ile defen s e
dev elop m ent, as w ell as th e transfer of th os e s y s tem s to
allies andfriends s uch as Taiw an. Th es cop eofa futureU.S.
m is s ile defense arch itecture h as not been determ inedy et.
Pos itiv e s tep s th at B eijin g could take to m oderate
dev elop m ent, dep loy m ent, and transfer of U.S. m is s ile
defenses include a reduction in PL A m is s ile dep loy m ents
op p os ite Taiw an an d coop eration in lim iting th e
p roliferation of w eap ons of m as s des truction and th eir
m eans ofdeliv ery .
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTE R 5
1. D epartm ent of D efense, Selected M ilitary C ap abilities of th e
Peop le’s Rep ublic of C h ina (Report to C ongres s Purs uant to Section
14 9
1305 of th e FY9 7 National D efens e A uth orization A ct), W as h ington,
D C : U.S. G ov ernm ent Printing Office,19 9 7,p . 4 . Th e report s tates th at
m ost ofth es em is s iles arelikely to bes h ort- or m edium -ranges y stem s .
2. Th is figureas s um es 15 -20 IC B M s (betw een 75 and100 p ercent of
th e PRC ’s current IC B M force) are directedagainst U.S. urban areas
andable to liquidate a m illion p eop le p er city .
3. A s um m ary ofC A SC organization is includedin M ark A . Stokes ,
C h ina’s Strategic M odernization: Im p lications for U.S. N ational
Security ,C arlis le: StrategicStudies Ins titute, Sep tem ber 19 9 9 .
4 . See F ederation ofA m erican Scientists ,W M D A roundth e W orld,
w w w .fas .org; B ill G ertz, B etray al, W ash ington D C : Regnery Pres s , p .
25 0; andU.S. C ongres s ,H ouse ofRep res entativ es,Rep ort ofth eSelect
C om m ittee on U.S. National Security and M ilitary / C om m ercial
C oncerns W ith th ePeople’s RepublicofC h ina (C ox Report),V ol. I,C h ap .
4 , 105 th C ongres s , 2ndSes s ion, W as h ington, D C : U.S. G ov ernm ent
Printing Office, 19 9 9 . Als o s ee Foreign M is s ile D ev elop m ents and th e
B allis tic M is s ile Th reat Th rough 2015 , Unclas s ified Sum m ary of a
N ational Intelligence E s tim ate, D irector of C entral Intelligen ce,
January 2002.
5 . W alter Pincus , “C h ina M ay A dd100 M is s iles Ov er 15 Years,”
W ash ington Pos t,M ay 26 ,19 9 9 ; and“C h ina: L ong Range IC B M C ould
Reach U.S. M ainland,”F ligh t International,A ugus t 14 ,2001.
6 . See F ederation of A m erican Scientis ts w ebp age, w w w .fas.org;
B ill G ertz, “C h ines e M is s ile To Th reaten U.S. B y 2000,” W as h ington
Tim es,M ay 23,19 9 7.
7. D epartm ent of D efense, Proliferation andRes p onse, January
2001, C h ina Section; “C h ina: L ong Range IC B M C ould Reach U.S.
M ainland,”F ligh tInternational,Augus t14 ,2001; “K ongjun y u h aih ang
zh uangbeifazh an” (A ir F orceandN av al M odernization)in Zh onggong
juns h i xiandaih ua (PRC M ilitary M odernization), Taip ei: Ziy ou
Publis h ing,June2000; andSh intaro Is h ih ara,“A n Urgent Th reat,” Th e
Sh ield,V ol. xv iii,No. 2,M arch /A p ril2001. Th erelationsh ip betw een th e
D F -31A andth e D F -4 1 is unknow n. Th enum ber ofTy p e9 4 subm arines
th at w ill bebuiltis unknow n; onecoulds urm is e th at tw o-four h ulls (i.e.,
32-6 4 tubes w ith a like num ber ofJL -2s )is a s afees tim ate.
8. A s eries ofm eetings w ere h eldin th e afterm ath ofth e accidental
bom bing ofth e C h ines e E m bas s y in B elgrade. A total of15 p rogram s
w eredes ignatedfor acceleration. A C A SC com m itteew as form edto p lan
for th e acceleratedtim eline. See “B eiy ue zh axing: w uqiy anzh i jias u,”
15 0
(N A TO B om bing: A ccelerate W eap ons R&D ),Zh ongguo H angtian B ao,
M ay 12, 19 9 9 , p.1. A ttending th e m eetings w ere retired aeros p ace
adv is ors , Xia G uoh ong (C A M E C D irector), Zh eng Quanbao (F irst
A cadem y D ep uty Party C h airm an), Yin Xingliang (SecondA cadem y
D eputy D irector),H uang Ruisong (Th irdA cadem y D eputy D irector),Ye
Peijian (Fifth A cadem y C h iefE ngineer), andH ua L ins en (06 6 B ase
D irector).
9 . Th e 700-m eter C E P is extractedfrom Janes Strategic W eap ons
Sy stem s ,19 9 8. SeeB illG ertz,“New C h ineseM is s iles Target A llofE ast
A s ia,” W as h ington Tim es , July 10, 19 9 7. A lso s ee “D ongfeng-21
zh ongch eng daodan (D F - 21 M RB M ), Sh ijie juns h i luntan (W orld
M ilitary Forum ),January 2000,in Ch ines e; andB ill G ertz,Th eC h ina
Th reat, W as h ington, D C : Regnery Pres s , 2000, p p . 234 -235 ; andB ill
G ertz,B etray al,p . 25 4 .
10. Th econv ersion ofth e D F-21 from a s trictly nuclear m is s ion to a
conv entional rolew as rep ortedas early as 19 9 4 in th e C h ines ejournal,
G uoji H angkong (International A v iation). F urth er indications of a
term inally guidedD F -21 are from dis cus s ions betw een Rich ardF is h er
andan engineer from C A L T’s B eijing Res earch Ins titute ofTelem etry
(704 th Res earch Ins titute) at th e 19 9 6 Zh uh ai A ir Sh ow . E xten s iv e
C A SC tech nical w ritings on term inally guidedth eater ballis ticm is s iles
tendto s ubs tantiate th e engineer’s com m ents . Oth er s ources indicate
th at th econv entional D F -21C p rogram ,referredto as th e D F-21 M od3
by som e s ources ,is influencedin large p art by th ePers h ing-2,entered
th e ap p liedR&D (xingh ao y anzh i)p h as ein 19 9 5 ,andth at th ep rim ary
p ay loadw ill be a p enetrator w arh ead(zuandidantou)for us e agains t
s em i-h ardened facilities s uch as com m and centers . See W ill Young,
“Sh enm idezh ongguo daodan budui”(Th e D ev elop m ent ofth eC h inese
SecondA rtillery ),Sh ijiejuns h iluntan (W orldM ilitary Forum ),internet
edition (w w w .w forum .com ), January 2000, in C h ines e. It is not clear
h ow far engineers h av egonein th eir prelim inary res earch in th is ty p e of
ballis tic m is s ile term inal guidance. F or a dis cus s ion of term inally
guidedballis ticm is s iles,s eeG an C h uxiong andL iu Jixiang,D aodan y u
y unzai h uojian zongti sh eji (G eneral D es ign of M is s iles andL aunch
V eh icles), B eijing: D efense Indus try Pres s , January 19 9 6 , p p . 6 8-6 9 .
A ls o s ee W ang H onglei (Second A rtillery C orp s ), “Op tical Im age
G uidance Tech nology ,” in Zh idao y u Yinxin, in C h ines e A s tronautics
andM is s ilery A bs tracts (h ereafter referredto as C A M A ),V ol. 2,No. 3,
January 19 9 5 ,p p . 34 -37.
11. “K ongjun y u h aih ang zh uangbei fazh an” (A ir F orce andNav al
M odernization ) in Zh onggong junsh i xiandaih ua (PRC M ilitary
M odernization),Taip ei: Ziy ou Publish ing,June2000. One s h ouldnote,
15 1
h ow ev er,th at th ePA C -3couldengagean incom ing M RB M ifth em is s ile
w as targeteddirectly agains t th e fire unit its elf.
12. Us e ofballisticm is s iles in s up p ort ofa nav al blockade andfor
us e against carrier battle group s is a key th em e ofa recent internal
publication on blockade op erations. See H u W enlong (ed), L ianh e
fengs uo zuozh an y anjiu (Study on Joint B lockadeO p erations ),B eijing:
National D efense Univ ers ity Pres s ,19 9 9 . A PA C -3 intercep tor could,
under certain conditions, engage a D F -21C giv en s ufficient early
w arning andifth e m is s ilew as targeteddirectly agains t th e PA C - 3fire
unit.
13. A m ong num erous references on conv entional SecondA rtillery
doctrine,see W ang H ouy ing andZh ang Xingy e, Zh any ixue(C am p aign
Studies),B eijing: NationalD efens e Univ ers ity Pres s ,2000,p p . 375 -385 .
14 . A brigadeconsis ts ofat leas t four battalion s ,probably w ith th ree
to four com p anies each . E ach brigade w ould be equip p ed w ith
ap p roxim ately 100 SRB M s . E ach com p an y likely is res p onsible for at
least onelaunch er. Ifoneas s u m es a notionals tructureoffour battalions
p er brigade w ith four com p anies /launch ers each ,th en a brigade w ould
beableto execute a raids izeofat least 16 SRB M s atonetim e. In a m ajor
cam p aign,s ev en SecondA rtillery brigades notionally couldach iev e a
raids izeofat leas t 112th eater m is s iles . Th ree s alv os w ouldutilize336
m issiles. Rem aining th eater m is s iles in th ePL A ars enalw ouldlikely be
kep t in res erv e for oth er contingencies and/or to s u p p ort nav al
op erations andam p h ibious landings . See B ill G ertz, “C h ina A dds To
M is s iles Near Taiw an,” W as h ington Tim es,A ugus t 28,2001,p . 1; and
W illYoung,“Sh enm idezh ongguo daodan budui,”(Th e D ev elopm ent of
th e C h ines e Second A rtillery ), Sh ijie juns h i luntan (W orld M ilitary
F orum ),internetedition in C h ines e(w w w .w forum .com ),January 2000.
15 . See Tony W alker andStep h en Fidler,“C h ina B uilds Up M is s ile
Th reat,” F inancialTim es,F ebruary 10,19 9 9 ,p g 1; and“Taiw an B oosts
D efens es W ith L iv e F ire Tes t ofPatriot Sy s tem ,”A F P,June20,2001.
16 . L ianh ezh any idierp aobing zuozh an (PL A SecondA rtillery Joint
C am p aign Op eration s ), unp ublis h ed m anus crip t, 19 9 6 , p . 10. Th e
docum ent is believ edto be an internal PL A academ ic p ap er, but its
auth enticity h as not been es tablis h ed. H ow ev er,a num ber ofs ources
h av e corroboratedm uch ofth e p ap er’s content. PL A w ritings indicate
th at th e m is s ion ofth e SecondA rtillery ’s conv entional ballis ticm is s ile
force is deterrence; th e s econd m is s ion is to ach iev e th e “Th ree
Superiorities ”— inform ation dom inance, air s u p eriority ,andm aritim e
superiority .
15 2
17. See W ang Jixiang and C h ang L an, “G uow ai jidong dandao
daodan dim ian s h engcun nengli y anjiu” (Study on Surv iv ability of
F oreign M obileB allis ticM is s iles ),in Xu D azh e,G uow aidandao daodan
jis h u y anjiu y u fazh an (Study andD ev elop m ent of F oreign B allis tic
M is s ile Tech nology ), B eijing: A s tronautics Pres s , October 19 9 8, p p .
9 6 -108. W ang and C h ang are from C A L T’s s y s tem s in tegration
departm ent.
18. L ianh ezh anyidierpaobing zuozh an,p . 17.
19 . Xu M infei,Zh u Zili,andL iYong,“F easibility ofTech nologies for
Us e of B allis tic M is s iles to C ounter A ircraft C arriers ,” G uofang K eji
C ankao,19 9 7,18(4 ),p p .126 - 130,sum m arizedin C A M A . A lso see Feng
Jianbao,“Feas ibility Study ofC onv entionalB allis ticM is s iles A ttacking
A ircraft C arriers,” p ap er p resentedat th e A nnual C h ina A s tronautics
Society UA V Sp ecialis ts C onference,A p ril19 9 8,s um m arizedin C A M A ,
V ol. 6 . No. 1.
20. W ang G uobao,“Initial D is cus s ion on Tactical B allis tic M is s ile
E lectronic W arfare,” H angtian dianzi duikang, A p ril 9 7, p p . 1-7,
sum m arized in C A M A . C h ina’s interes t in m illim eter w av e (M M W )
tech nology is bestexem p lifiedby a C h ines efirm ’s illegalacquis ition ofa
M M W trav eling w av etubeam p lifier in 19 9 6 . A s p ecialM M W laboratory
w as es tablis h edin 19 9 5 .
21. See W ang Jixiang andC h ang L an, p . 107. M os t v ulnerable
w ouldbeK adena A B andYokosuka Nav al B as e in Jap an.
22. D uncan L ennox,ed. Jane’s StrategicW eapon Sy stem s,Issue24 ,
M ay 9 7,Surrey ,E ngland: Jane’s Inform ation G roup .
23. G eorge L indsey , Th e Inform ation Requirem ents for A eros p ace
D efens e: L im its Im p os ed by G eom etry and Tech nology , B ailrigg
M em orandum 27,C D ISS,L ancas ter Univ ers ity ,p . 18. Ifm ov edclos er to
its target,th eD F-15 likely w ouldbelaunch edon a loftedtrajectory th at
w ouldincreas e th e fligh t tim eouts ideth e atm os p h ere, th us increas ing
th e m is s ile’s v ulnerability to up p er tier s y stem s . On th e oth er h and,a
loftedtrajectory couldincreas eth em is s ile’s reentry s p eed,reducing th e
footp rint,or defended area, oflow er tier s y s tem s s uch as PA TRIOT.
24 . Zh ao Yuns h an, Zh ongguo daodan jiqi zh anlue, jiefangjun de
h exin w uqi(C h ina’s M is s iles andStrategy : Th ePL A ’s C entral W eap on),
H ong K ong: M irror B ooks ,p . 232. Oth er s ources credit th e D F-15 w ith
only as goodas a 15 0-m eter C E P. See“M is s iles ! C h ina H as Th em Too!,”
W en w ei po, June 1, 19 9 9 , p . A 5 , in Foreign B roadcas t Inform ation
Serv ice(h ereafter F B IS)-C H I-0016 9 ,June22,19 9 9 .
15 3
25 . B rian H s u,“M -C las s M is s iles ’B ark W ors e Th an B ite: M ilitary ,”
Taip eiTim es,A ugist 16 ,2000.
26 . Zh ao Yuns h an, Zh ongguo daodan jiqi zh anlue, jiefangjun de
h exin w uqi(C h ina’s M is s iles andStrategy : Th ePL A ’s C entral W eap on),
H ong K ong: M irror B ooks ,p . 232. Inform eds ources as s ert th e M irror
(M ingjing)s eries ofbooks h av e a m ixedrecordofreliability . H ow ev er,
dev elop m ent ofa longer rangev ers ion ofth e D F - 15 is also alludedto in
B ill G ertz,“C h ina A dds To M is s iles N ear Taiw an,” W ash ington Tim es,
A u gus t 28, 2001, p . 1. Zh ao s tates th at th e expandedrange D F -15
incorp orates a m ore adv anced p ropellant. Th ere is often confus ing
rep orting on an unidentified1000 kilom eter s y s tem — th e M -18— th at
m ay in fact be th e rum oredextendedrangeD F-15 .
27. Zh ao,p . 234 .
28. D ep artm ent ofD efen s e, Rep ort to C ongress on Th eater M is s ile
D efens e A rch itecture Options for th eA s ia-PacificRegion,W as h ington,
D C : U.S. D ep artm ent ofD efens e,19 9 9 .
29 . See D ep artm ent of D efen s e, Th e Security S ituation in th e
Taiw an S trait (Rep ort to C o n gres s Purs uan t to th e F Y 9 9
A p p rop riations B ill), W as h ington, D C : U.S. G ov ernm ent Printing
Office, 19 9 9 . A ls o s ee B ill G ertz,Th e C h ina Th reat,p . 232.
30. H ui Zh ong, “M eiguo K ongjun Sh is h i Jiguang Fandao Jih ua”
(USA F Im p lem ents L aser M is s ile D efen s e Plan),Zh ongguo H angtian
(C h ina A eros p ace), F ebruary 19 9 6 , p p . 38-39 ; and Zh ang Yap ing,
“Jiguang W uqide Zuozh an Xiaoneng y u Fazh an Qus h i,” (C apabilities
andTrends in L as er W eap on D ev elop m ent),Zh ongguo H angtian,July
19 9 7,p p . 37-4 0. Pres ence oflonger range surface-to-air m is s iles could
force th e A B L to op erate furth er out. A s a h igh v alue as s et, th e A B L
w ouldrequire figh ter es cort for p rotection. Ifbasedon H aitan Is land,
th eS-300/PM U1 cov erage extends out to central andnorth ern Taiw an’s
w est coas t.
31. Ibid.
32. See s p ecial briefing on m is s iledefen s ep rogram s andtes ting by
L ieutenant G eneral RonaldT. K adish ,July 13, 2001.
33. N ational M is s ile D efens e: A C andid E xam ination of Political
L im its and Tech nological C h allenges, C am bridge, M A : Ins titute for
F oreign Policy A naly s is,Inc.,19 9 8,p p . 21-22.
34 . F ederation of A m erican Scientis ts w ebsite, G round based
Intercep tor,w w w .fas.org/ s p p / s tarw ars.
15 4
35 . A ccording to th e Federation ofA m erican Scientis ts , th e bas ic
“th res h old” th reat th at drov e th eC 1 arch itecture is s aidto consis t ofan
attack offiv e s ingle-w arh eadm is s iles w ith unsop h is ticateddecoy s th at
couldbedis crim inated,p lus ch aff,obs curant p articles ,flares ,jam m ers ,
andoth er counterm easures .
36 . A ccording to th e Federation of A m erican Scientis ts , a C 2
arch itecture w ould h av e defended again s t an y auth orized,
unauth orized, or accidental attack by s oph is ticated p ay loads at th e
basicth resh oldlev el,s aidto consis t ofan attack offiv e single-w arh ead
m issiles , each w ith eith er a few (about four)credibledecoy s th at could
not be discrim inated (andw ouldh av e to be intercep ted), p lus ch aff,
obs curant p articles ,flares ,jam m ers,andoth er counterm eas ures .
37. A ccording to th e F ederation of A m erican Scientis ts , th e C 3
arch itecture w ould h av e defended again s t an y auth orized,
unauth orized, or accidental attack by s oph is ticated p ay loads at th e
“objectiv e” lev el. Th e “objectiv e” lev el is s aidto cons is t ofan attack of
tw enty s ingle-w arh eadm is s iles , each w ith eith er a few (p erh ap s as
m any as fiv e)credibledecoy s th at couldnot bedis crim inated[andw ould
h av e to beintercep ted],or a larger num ber ofles s s op h isticateddecoy s
th at could be dis crim inated, p lus ch aff, obs curant p articles, flares ,
jam m ers ,andoth er counterm easures .
38. C h arles Sw icker, “B allistic M is s ile D efense F rom th e Sea: A
C om m ander’s Pers p ectiv e,” NW C Rev iew ,M ay 19 9 7.
39 . A th irdlow er tier cap ability ,th e cancelledNav y A rea D efen s e
s y s tem ,w as to be a near term cap ability for low er tier area defense of
p orts , airfields , andforces ash ore. Th e centerp iece of th e N av y A rea
D efens e Sy s tem — th e SM -2B lock IV A area defens e intercep tor— is an
ev olution of th e Nav y ’s Standard M is s ile and is one of th e B allis tic
M is s ileD efense Organization’s core program s . Th eSM -2B lock IV A is a
h igh s p eed, s olid fueled s y stem w ith a dual m ode (infrared and
s em i-activ e radiofrequency ) h om in g and a blas t-fragm en tation
w arh eads p ecifically des ignedto enh ance th e ballis tic m is s ile defense
m ission. Th ecom bination ofp recis e guidancew ith a p ow erfulexp los iv e
p roxim ity fus ed w arh ead m akes th is intercep tor h igh ly effectiv e
augm entation to th e PA C -3’s kinetic-energy h it-to-kill s y s tem s . Its
footp rint, or defended area, w as larger th an th e PA C -3. Nav al A rea
D efens es y s tem s generally arem os t effectiv eifth ey are locatednear th e
as s ets th ey ares up p os edto p rotect. A t-seates ting w as exp ectedto begin
in late 2003/early 2004 . Taiw an h as reques tedfour A E G IS-equip p ed
des troy ers th at could, in th e future, p rov ide som e lim ited m is s ile
defense s h ouldTaiw an decide to p ursue such a cap ability . H ow ev er,
Taiw an’s currentp urs uit ofA E G IS-equip p eddes troy ers is driv en by th e
15 5
needto defendagainst airbreath ing th reats,such as cruisem is s iles and
s trike aircraft.
4 0. J. R. W ils on, TH A A D : In Th e E y e OfTh e Storm , unp ublish ed
p aper, 19 9 6 ; and B M D O F act Sh eet, “Th eater H igh A ltitude A rea
D efens e (TH A A D ),” h ttp s :/ / w w w .acq. os d.m il/ bm do/ bm dolink/ p df/
th aad, M ay 19 9 9 ; andTH A A D Program Office H om e Page, h ttp s :/ /
lm m g.external.lm co.com / th aad/ .
4 1. See L i F eizh u, “Taikong daodan genzh ong xitong dui tufang
cuosh ide y ingy ong (InfluenceofSp aceandM is s ileTracking Sy s tem on
Penetration M easures ), unp ublis h edC h ina A cadem y of E ngineering
Ph y s ics p ap er,A p ril 19 9 9 .
4 2. J.R. W ils on,TH A A D : In Th eE y eOfTh e Storm ,19 9 6 .
4 3. Statem ent of L ieutenant G eneral Ronald T. K adis h , USA F
D irector, B allis tic M is s ile D efen s e Organization, B efore th e H ouse
A rm ed Serv ices C om m ittee Subcom m ittee on M ilitary Res earch &
D ev elop m ent, Th urs day , June 14 , 2001, h ttp :/ / w w w .acq.os d.m il/
bm do/ bm dolink/ h tm l/ kadish 14 jun01.h tm l.
4 4 . Th eG uidanceE nh ancedM is s ile(G E M )is s om etim es referredto
as th e “PA C - 2+.” Th e G E M incorp orates im p rov em ents to th e front end
ofth e PA C -2m is s ile receiv er to enh anceits effectiv enes s andleth ality
agains t ballis ticm is s iles .
4 5 . Zh ang L ide, “W oguo goujian feidan fangy u y u y uanju gongji
feidan xitong de p inggu,” (A naly s is of Taiw an’s M is s ile D efen s e and
L ong Range A ttack M is s ile Sy s tem s ), in Jianduan K eji, (D efen s e
Tech nology ),M arch 2000,p . 6 6 .
4 6 . F ederation of A m erican Scientis ts h om ep age, PA TRIO T,
(w w w .fas .org).
4 7. L u Te-y un,“A Patriot A nti-M is s ileD efens e Um brellais F orm ing
in th e G reater Taip ei A rea,” L ien-h o Pao, A ugus t 24 , 19 9 8, p . 1, in
F B IS-C H I-9 8-24 6 ; andYuen L in,“Probing th e C ap ability ofTaiw an’s
A n tiballis ticM is s iles ,”K uang C h iao C h ing,A ugust 16 ,19 9 8,p p . 5 4 -6 1,
in F B IS-C H I-9 8-25 2. To counter a D F -15 trav eling at 2km /s ec, M A D S
op erators h av e 25 -4 0 s econds after radar acquis ition to fire and
intercep t th e incom ing m is s ile. W ith cueing data, reaction/intercept
tim e w ouldincreas e to 5 0 s econds or m ore.
4 8. “M ilitary M ay Join Th eater M is s ileD efen s e Project,” Th eC h ina
Post,Nov em ber 19 ,19 9 8,p.1.
15 6
4 9 . F or a dis cus s ion on th e p otential im p act of D SP s u p p ort for
PA TRIOT op eration s ,s eeYuen L in,“Probing th eC ap ability ofTaiw an’s
A n tiballis tic M is s iles ,” H ong K ong Kuang C h iao C h ing, Augus t 16 ,
19 9 8,p p . 5 4 -6 1,in F B IS-C H I-9 8-25 2.
5 0. N ational M is s ile D efens e: A C andid E xam ination of Political
L im its and Tech nological C h allenges, C am bridge, M A : Ins titute for
F oreign Policy A naly s is,Inc.,July 19 9 8,p p . 21-22. C h ines e interes t in
th is “s taring” cap ability w as reflectedin at leas t one study ,; s ee Qiu
Yulun,“Staring Focal Plane A rray Im aging for M is s ileE arly W arning,”
K ongjian Jis h u Qingbao Yanjiu (Sp ace Tech nology Inform ation
Studies),M ay 19 9 5 ,p p . 15 0-16 0,in C A M A ,V ol. 4 ,No. 2,19 9 7.
5 1. “Sp ectrum A s tro/North rop G rum m an C om p lete SB IRS L ow
Rev iew ,” Sp aceD aily (internet v ers ion),7 M ay 2001. V ery h ot objects
radiate h igh quantities of s h ort w av e infrared (SW IR: 1-3 m icrons);
w arm bodies radiate s ignificant quantities ofm edium w av e infrared
(M W IR: 3-8 m icrons); coldobjects p rim arily radiate long w av einfrared
s ignal (L W IR: 8-14 m icrons); w h ilev ery coldobjects em itv ery long w av e
radiation (V W L IR: 14 -30 m icrons ). D ifferent options for focal p lane
array s include m ercury -cadm ium -telluride (H gC dTe) or s ilicon bas ed
s ensors . H gC dTe array s , w h ich w ill be us edon SB IRS-L ow s atellites ,
can detect infrareds ignatures up to about 12m icron s (L W IR)but are
v ery difficult to m anufacture and suscep tible to radiation andE M P
effects . H ow ev er,a key adv antage ofH gC dTe array s is th at th ey do not
require cooling to th e extrem e low tem p eratures th at oth er infrared
m aterials do. F or a detailedC h ines e ev aluation ofSB IRS-L ow ,s ee L i
F eizh u, “Taikong daodan genzh ong xitong dui tufang cuos h i de
y ingy ong (Influence of Sp ace and M is s ile Tracking Sy s tem on
Penetration M easures ), unp ublis h edC h ina A cadem y of E ngineering
Ph y s ics p ap er,A p ril 19 9 9 .
5 2. National M issile D efense,p p . 21-22.
5 3. Ibid.
5 4 . Ibid.,p p . 25 -26 .
5 5 . Ibid.,p . 26 .
5 6 . Ibid.,p p . 26 -31.
5 7. Ibid.
5 8. See th e C ox Rep ort (V ol. I, C h ap ter 4 ). A lso s ee L i B in,“Th e
E ffects ofNM D on C h ines eStrategy ,”Jane’s IntelligenceRev iew ,M arch
1,2001.
15 7
5 9 . Joh n W ils on L ew is andXue L itai,“C h ina’s StrategicSeap ow er:
Th e Politics ofF orce M odernization in th eNuclear A ge,Stanford,C A :
StanfordUniv ersity Pres s ,19 9 4 .
6 0. B onnieS. G las er andB anning N. G arrett,“C h ines ePers p ectiv es
on th e Strategic D efen s e Initiativ e, Problem s of C om m unis m ,
M arch -A p ril 19 86 ,p p . 28-4 4 .
6 1. C h ina Today : D efenseScienceandTech nology ,B eijing: National
D efens e Indus try Pres s ,19 9 3,p p . 14 9 -15 0.
6 2. Ibid,p p . 15 2-15 3; als o see Rich ardP. Suttm eier,“C h ina’s H igh
Tech nology : Program s ,Problem s ,andPros p ects ,”in C h ina’s E conom ic
D ilem m a, p p . 5 4 6 -5 6 4 . Th e senior engineers res p on s ible for th e 86 3
Program included W ang D ah eng, a p reem inent op tics expert w h o
p lay eda rolein Ch ina’s s p acetracking netw ork; W ang G anch ang,one of
th efounding fath ers ofC h ina’s nuclear p rogram ; Yang Jiach i,as atellite
attitudecontrol exp ert; andC h en F angy un,an electronics engineer and
leader ofprogram to dev elop C h ina’s s p ace tracking netw ork. To focus
R&D inv es tm ent for th e longer term , H ong K ong m edia s ources
rep ortedth at th e State C ouncil auth orizeda new initiativ e, s im ilar to
th e 86 3 Program , th at os tens ibly w ill em p h as ize s ix key areas : 1)
aeros p acetech nology ; 2)inform ation tech nology ; 3)s trategic defens es ;
4 ) deep s trike tech nology ; 5 ) op tics and las er tech nology ; and 6 )
adv ancedm aterials . Th e p roject, dubbedth e 126 Program , allegedly
w as form ally p rop os edduring th e 26 January 2000 A nnual C OSTIND
National C onference in B eijing. Th e effort, to be ov ers een by W u
B angguo,W ang Zh ongy u,C ao G angch uan,andL iu Jibin,is to funded
ov er th e next 12-15 y ears . See W en Jen, “Jiang Orders H igh Tech
A eros p ace W eapons D ev elop m ent— ‘126 Program SignedandPlaced
Under H u Jintao’s C om m and,” Tai Yang Pao, in F B IS-C H I-004 0,
M arch 21,2000,p . A 19 .
6 3. L u H ongquan andYang L iandong,“Zh anlueh ezh ans h u dandao
daodan de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical B allis tic
M is s iles ),publis h edin an unknow n journalin M arch 19 9 9 . L u andYang
are from th e C h ina A cadem y ofE ngineering Ph y s ics (C A E P); als o s ee
B ai H ande, “G anraodan de zh onglei h e zuozh an fangs h i” (Ty p es and
Op erational Sty les A s s ociated w ith Jam m ing W arh eads ), Xiandai
bingqi(M odern W eap onry ),19 9 5 ,p p . 15 2-15 3.
6 4 . G an C h uxiong and L iu Jixiang, D aodan y u y unzai h uojian
zongti s h eji(G eneral D esign ofM is s iles andL aunch V eh icles ),B eijing:
D efens e Indus try Pres s ,January 19 9 6 ,p . 4 5 .
15 8
6 5 . W ang G uobao,“Initial D is cus s ion on Tactical B allis tic M is s ile
E lectronicW arfare,” H angtian dianziduikang,C A M A ,A p ril 19 9 7,p p .
1-7.
6 6 . “K ongjun y u h aih ang w uqizh uangbeifazh an,” (D ev elop m ent of
th e A ir F orce andNav al A v iation E quip m ent) in Zh onggong junsh i
xiandaih ua (PRC M ilitary M odernization ), Taip ei: F reedom
Publis h ing, June 2000; als o see B ai H ande, “G anrao de zh onglei h e
zuozh an fangs h i” (Ty p es of Jam m ing and O p erational M eth ods )
Xiandai w uqi(M odern W eap onry ),19 9 5 ,p p . 15 2-15 3.
6 7. L u H ongquan andYang L iandong,“Zh anlueh ezh ans h u dandao
daodan de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical B allis tic
M is s iles ),publis h edin an unknow n journalin M arch 19 9 9 . L u andYang
are from th e C h ina A cadem y ofE ngineering Ph y sics (C A E P).
6 8. F or exam p le, C ai Yi, “Status andD ev elop m ent of Tw o C olor
InfraredD etectors ,” H ongw aijis h u,(InfraredTech nology ),19 9 7,19 (5 ),
sum m arizedin C A M A ,V ol. 4 , N o. 6 ,details th e indium -bas ed (InSb)
in frared detectors u s ed o n th e TH A A D m is s ile; an d th e
m ercury -cadm ium -telluride (H gC dTe) detectors th at are p art of th e
Ray th eon E K V sensor sy s tem .
6 9 . L u H ongquan andYang L iandong,“Zh anlueh ezh ans h u dandao
daodan de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical B allis tic
M is s iles ),publis h edin an unknow n journalin M arch 19 9 9 . L u andYang
are from th e C h ina A cadem y ofE ngineering Ph y sics (C A E P).
70. B ill G ertz,B etray al,p . 25 4 .
71. L u H ongquan andYang L iandong,“Zh anlueh ezh ans h u dandao
daodan de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical B allis tic
M is s iles ),publis h edin an unknow n journalin M arch 19 9 9 . L u andYang
are from th e C h ina A cadem y ofE ngineering Ph y sics (C A E P).
72. W ang Jixiang, “Fas t B urn B oos t Strategic B allis tic M is s ile
Tech nology ,” A eros p ace S&T Intelligence Studies A bstracts (2),9 2(4 ),
p p . 6 8-78, in C A M A , V ol 3, No. 6 , 19 9 6 . W ang is from th e B eijing
In s titute of Sp ace Sy s tem s E n gineering (B eijing y uh an g xitong
gongch eng y anjiusuo); als o s eeQin G uangm ing,“A p p lication ofSlotted
Tubular G rain in Fas t Burn SolidM otors ,” B ingong xuebao (Ordnance
Journal),V ol. 18,No. 2,19 9 6 ,p p . 4 1-4 3,in C A M A ,V ol. 3,No. 6 . Qin is
from th e Xian Ins tituteofM odern C h em is try .
73. See National M is s ile D efens e,p . 16 . Th e Top ol- M is believ ed to
ch angedirections during th e las t p h as e ofits as cent.
15 9
74 . G an C h uxiong and L iu Jixiang, D aodan Yu Yunzai H uojian
ZongtiSh eji(G eneral D esign ofM is s iles andL aunch V eh icles ),B eijing:
D efens e Indus try Pres s ,January 19 9 6 ,p . 4 2.
75 . Foreign M is s ile D ev elop m ents andth e B allis tic M is s ile Th reat
Th rough 2015 , Unclas s ified Sum m ary of a N ational Intelligence
E s tim ate,D irector ofC entral Intelligence,January 2002.
76 . Stokes .
77. G an and L iu, p . 4 6 ; G ui Yongfeng, “Penetration of Tactical
B allis tic M is s ile’s D ecoy ,” H ubei H angtian K eji (A eros p ace H ubei),
F ebruary 19 9 4 ,p p . 36 -38,in C A M A ,19 9 5 ,V ol. 2,No. 1; andL iH ong,
“M otion C h aracteris tics of A tm os p h eric Reentry B allis tic M is s ile
W arh eads andTh eir A p p lication s To H eav y D ecoy D es ign,” Jiangnan
H angtian K eji (Jiangnan Sp ace Tech nology ), 19 9 7 (1), p p . 26 -30, in
C A M A ,19 9 7,V ol. 4 ,N o. 3.
78. G an C h uxiong and L iu Jixiang, D aodan y u y unzai h uojian
zongti s h eji(G eneral D esign ofM is s iles andL aunch V eh icles ),B eijing:
D efens e Indus try Pres s , January 19 9 6 . p . 4 2-4 3; andW u G anxiang,
“G uow ai fanjich ang w uqi,” (F oreign A n tirunw ay W eap on s ), in Xu
D azh e, G uow ai dandao daodan jis h u y anjiu y u fazh an, A stronautics
Publis h ing H ouse, 19 9 8, p p . 6 5 -76 . Th e control m aneuv er m ay be
neces s ary to s low dow n th e reentry s p eedto allow acquis ition ofth e
target im age in th e ballis tic m is s ile’s seeker.
79 . G an andL iu,p . 4 3. A ls o seeC aiYuanli,“Res earch on Trajectory
Recov ery in E xo-A tm os p h ericF ligh t,” in D aodan Yu H angtian Yunzai
Jish u (M is s iles andSp ace V eh icles ),M arch 19 9 5 ,p p . 10-15 ,in C A M A ,
V ol. 2, N o.5 ; an d Zh ao H an y uan , “Sim u lation , A n aly s is of
M aneuv erableReentry V eh icles ,” Yuh ang Xuebao,January 1,19 9 7,p p .
9 6 -9 9 , in F B IS-C ST-9 7-012. Zh ao is from th e N ational Univ ers ity of
D efens e Tech nology .
80. Zh ang M inde, “Sim ulation Res earch of D efen s es A gains t
C onv entional B allis tic M is s ile Reentry V eh icles ,” Xitong gongch eng y u
dianzi jish u, V ol. 19 , N o. 4 , 19 9 7, p p . 4 5 -4 9 . Th e s im ulation w as
conducted by C A SC s B eijing Op toelectronic E n gin eering G eneral
D esign D ep artm ent. For general background on s aturation, s ee
H ars h berger,p p . 16 9 -170.
81. D av id Fulgh um , “C h ina E xp loiting U.S. Patriot Secrets ,”
A v iation W eek andSp ace Tech nology ,January 18,19 9 3,p p . 20-21.
16 0
82. Zh ang D em in and H ou Sh im ing, “Sim ulation Research of
Offen s iv e and D efen s iv e C ap ability of C onv entional M anuev ering
Reentry M is s ile,” Xitong G ongch eng Yu D ianzi Jish u, V ol. 19 , No. 4 ,
19 9 7, p p . 4 5 -4 9 , in C A M A , 19 9 7, V ol. 4 , No. 5 . Full tran s lation in
F B IS-C H I-9 7-272. Zh ang is from th e B eijin g E lectrom ech anical
E n gineering D esign D ep artm ent, als o know n as th e C A SC F ourth
Sy stem s D es ign D ep artm ent. A ccording to oneev aluation,PA C -2h as a
p robability of kill of 10-25 percent agains t an unidentified tactical
ballis ticm is s ile. SeeZh ao Yuping,“Probability ofPA C -2Intercep ting a
C ertain Tactical B allistic M is s ile,” pap er pres entedat th e N ov em ber
19 9 7 conference ofNational M is s ile D es igners Sp ecialis t Netw ork, in
C A M A ,V ol. 5 ,No. 3.
83. M eng D aikui,“Sim ulation ofC ontrol andG uidanceofSp inning
M is s iles ,” Xitong G ongch eng yu D ianzi Jish u, V ol. 5 , No. 3, 19 9 4 ,
sum m arizedin C A M A ,V ol. 2,No. 1,19 9 5 ; W an C h unxiong andYang
Xiaolong,“Identification ofF ligh t D is turbances on Sp inning M is s iles,”
Zh ans h u D aodan Jis h u (TacticalM is s ileTech nology ),M arch 19 9 5 ,p p .
1-8,in C A M A ,V ol. 2,No. 3. F or a general asses s m ent on m eth odologies
to protect m is s ile s y s tem s against h igh p ow eredlas ers ,s ee JiSh ifan,
“Protection ofM is s iles A gainst L as ers ,” D aodan y u H angtian Yunzai
Jish u, V ol. 5 , 19 9 6 , p p . 35 -4 2, in C A M A , V ol. 4 , No. 1. Ji’s res earch
concentrated on th e effects of h igh p ow ered las ers on a v ariety of
m aterials andopto-electronics y s tem s .
84 . L iQiang,“CurrentStatus andFollow -On D ev elop m ent ofL as er
C ladding W ear-Res is tance C oatings,” Yuh ang cailiao gongy i,January
19 9 7,p p . 13-18. A t least one ins titute inv olv edin th e testing is H arbin
In s titute ofTech nology . A ls o see JiSh ifan,“L as er Res is tant Protection
ofM is s iles,” D aodan y u h angtian y unzaijish u,M ay 9 6 ,p p . 35 -4 2.
85 . L ew is andH ua,p . 17.
86 . G an andL iu,p . 4 4 .
87. D u Xiangw an,“B allis ticM is s ile D efens e andSp ace W eapon s ,”
in Quanguo G aojis h u Zh ongdian Tus h u, Jiguang Jis h u L ingh uo,
(N ational H igh Tech nology K ey Reference- L as er Tech nology Realm ).
Us eofdep res s edtrajectories m ay incur cos ts as s ociatedw ith accuracy .
88. L u H ongquan andYang L iandong,“Zh anlueh ezh ans h u dandao
daodan de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical B allis tic
M is s iles ),publis h edin an unknow n journalin M arch 19 9 9 . L u andYang
are from th e C h ina A cadem y ofE ngineering Ph y sics (C A E P).
16 1
89 . G ong Jinh eng, “H igh Pow eredM icrow av e W eap on s : A N ew
C oncep t in E lectronicW arfare,” D ianziduikang jis h u,F ebruary 9 5 ,p p .
1-9 . G ong is from th e South w es t Ins titute of E lectronic E quip m ent
(SW IE E ),C h ina’s p rem ier electronicw arfare res earch entity .
9 0. F or a com preh ensiv e ov erv iew of th e tech nologies as s ociated
w ith H PM w eapons , see C arlo K op p , “Th e E -Bom b - A W eap on of
E lectrical M as s D es truction,” in W inn Sch w artau, Inform ation
W arfare,New York: Th under’s M outh Pres s ,19 9 4 ,p p . 29 6 -29 7; A ls o s ee
J. Sw egle andJ. B enford,“State ofth e A rtin H igh Pow er M icrow av es :
A n Ov erv iew ,”p ap er p res entedat th e19 9 3InternationalC onferenceon
L asers andA p p lications , L ake Tah oe N ev ada, D ecem ber 6 -10, 19 9 3.
Sw egle andB enfordp oint out th at th e US, Russ ia, F rance, andth e
UnitedK ingdom h av eH PM p rogram s in addition to C h ina. Zh u Youw en
andF eng Yi,G aojish u tiaojianxia dexinxizh an,(Inform ation W arfare
Under H igh Tech nology C onditions ), A cadem y of M ilitary Science
Pres s , 19 9 4 , p p . 308-310; ”B eam E nergy W eap onry : Pow erful as
Th under and L igh tning,” Jiefangjun bao, D ecem ber 25 , 19 9 5 , in
F B IS-C H I-9 6 -039 ; Outlook for 21s t C entury Inform ation W arfare,”
G uoji h angkong, (In tern ational A v iation), M arch 5 , 19 9 5 , in
F B IS-C H I-9 5 -114 ; “M icrow av e Puls e G eneration,” Qiang jiguang y u
lizish u, M ay 19 9 4 , in JPRS-C ST-9 4 -014 . C A E P’s Institute ofA p p lied
E lectronics ,Univ ers ity ofE lectronicScience andTech nology ofC h ina,
andth e N orth w es t In s titute ofNuclear Tech nology in Xian areth ree of
th em os t im p ortant organizations engagedin th eres earch ,design,and
tes ting ofC h inese H PM dev ices . Th ePRC ap p ears to h av e m asteredat
least tw o H PM p ow er s ources — th e F C G and v ircator. Th e greatest
ch allenge is th e w eap onization p roces s .
9 1. See L iu Sh iquan, “A New Ty p e of ‘Soft K ill’ W eap on: Th e
E lectrom agneticPuls e W arh ead,” H ubei h angtian jish u (H ubei Sp ace
Tech nology ), M ay 19 9 7, p p . 4 6 -4 8. L iu is from th e Sanjiang Sp ace
Indus try .
9 2. C h ung C h ien,“H igh Tech W ar Prep aration ofth e PL A : Taking
Taiw an W ith outB loodsh ed,” Taiw an D efenseA ffairs,October 2000,p p .
14 1-16 3.
9 3. See Joh n W ils on L ew is and Xue L itai, C h ina’s Strategic
Seap ow er: Th e Politics of F orce M odernization in th e N uclear A ge,
Stanford: StanfordUniv ers ity Pres s ,19 9 4 ,for inform ation on th e 6 4 0
p rogram . A s a side note, leading U.S. experts h av e notedth at A B M
s y s tem s generally h av e in h erent cap abilities as A SA Ts , but th e
conv ers e is not alw ay s true.
16 2
9 4 . G ao Fuli, “D ev elop m ent Strategy and Serial Res earch of
A n ti-Tactical B allis tic M is s iles ,” in F oreign M is s ile Tech nology
D ev elop m ent in 2000,October 19 9 4 ,p p . 4 8-5 9 ,in C A M A ,V ol. 2,No. 4 .
Th e th ree p h as e ap p roach (sanbuzou) for C h ina’s m is s ile defen s e
dev elop m ent is als o dis cus s ed in Yang C h unfu and L iu Xiao’en,
“Res earch Study on U.S. B allis tic M is s ile D ev elop m en t Plan,”
A eros p aceInform ation Pap er H Q-9 6 009 ,19 9 6 ,in C A M A ,V ol. 4 ,N o. 2.
9 5 . See Zh u Zh enfu and H uang Peikang, “TB M IR Radiant
Signature, Selection ofO p tim um Operating B andfor Anti-M is s ile IR
Seekers ,” Xitong gongch eng y u dianzijis h u (Sy s tem s E ngineering and
E lectronics ), January 19 9 6 . Zh u is from C A M E C ’s Second A cadem y
207th Research Institute. W u Jianw en, “D o W e H av e TM D ?” Jiefang
ribao,D ecem ber 8,19 9 9 ,in F B IS-C H I-09 87.
9 6 “C enters E s tablis h ed In Univ ers ities Of C h ina,” (no source
lis ted)in F B IS-CH I-09 83-9 5 ,Sep tem ber 9 ,19 9 5 . D irector ofth e s tate
key labis Profes s or Sun Zh ongliang.
9 7. W u G uangh ua,“D ual-M ode M illim eter W av e-IR Seeker for A n
E n do-A tm os p h eric Intercep tor,” D anjian jis h u (Projectile andRocket
Tech nology ),V ol. 9 ,No. 3,19 9 6 ,p p . 15 -20,in F B IS-C H I-9 7-26 1. Th ekey
com p onent is a 35 G H zK a-B andtrav eling w av e tube am p lifier.
9 8. SeeZh ao Jiufen andW ang M ingh ai,“Yujing w eixing duidaodan
y ujing m oxing de fangzh en” (M odeling and Sim ulation of B allis tic
M is s ile E arly W arning Satellites ),G utih uojian jis h u (Journal ofSolid
Rocket Tech nology ),V ol. 24 ,No. 3,2001,p p . 1-3. Th e auth ors are from
th e SecondA rtillery ’s E n gineering A cadem y in Xian.
9 9 . A M S anddefen s eindustry officials consis tently adv ocate m is s ile
early w arning satellites in concepts for a national reconnais s ance
netw ork. L eading ins titutes for infrared detector R&D include B eijing
In s titute of Rem ote Sens ing E quip m ent, Sh angh ai Ins titute of
Tech nical Ph y s ics ,North C h ina Research In s titute ofOp toelectronics ,
K unm ing Institute of Ph y s ics , and Sh angh ai Xiny ue Ins trum ents
F actory . C A ST’s L anzh ou Ins titute of Ph y s ics is a key p rov ider of
cy rogenicequip m ent for cooling th einfrareds ensors . See L iu Jintian,
“H ongw ai Qijian G uoneiw ai F azh an D ongtai” (D ev elop m en tal
Pros p ects of C h ines e and F oreign In frared D ev ices ), Zh ongguo
h angtian,M arch 19 9 2,p p . 4 1-4 5 ; andW u Runch ou,“H angtian lingh uo
h ongw aijis h u defazh an” D ev elop m ent ofSp ace InfraredTech nology ),
Zh ongguo h angtian, M arch 19 9 3, p p . 19 -23. F or oth er references to
C h ina’s s p ace-bas edinfrared/ultrav iolet teles cope des igns , s ee C h en
L ongzh i, “New D ev elop m ents in Sp ace C ry ogenic Op tics ,” D iw en
gongch eng (C y rogenic E n gineering), M arch 19 9 4 , p p . 9 -13, in C A M A ,
16 3
V ol. 1,No. 5 ; andM a Pinzh ong,“W oguo kongjian w angy uanjing fazh an”
(D ev elop m ent ofC h ina’s Sp ace Teles cop e), Zh ongguo h angtian, July
19 9 4 ,p p . 29 -32.
100. F or inform ation on C h inesem is s ile early w arning s y stem s and
as s ociatedtech nology ,s ee L u M ingy u, Yi Kui, Yang Junfa, andD eng
Ruzh en,“D ev elop m ent ofSignal Source for Real-Tim e InfraredE arth
Sens or,” Zh ongguo kongjian kexue jis h u, June 19 9 6 , p p . 6 3-70. in
F B IS-C ST-9 6 -016 ; andQiu Yulun,“Staring F ocal Plane A rray Im aging
for M is s ile E arly W arning,” K ongjian jish u qingbao y anjiu,M ay 19 9 5 ,
p p . 15 0-16 0,in C A M A ,19 9 7,V ol. 4 ,No. 2. One s h ouldnot dis count th e
p os s ibility of Rus s ian as s is tance s h ould B eijing h av e an interes t in
h igh ly ellip tical M olniy a orbits .
101. Stokes , p p . 118-119 . One s h ouldnote th at in th e 19 80s , th e
United States con s idered m odification of th e Pers h ing-2 for A SA T
m issions ,a s y s tem s im ilar to th e D F-21.
102. F or references to controlp roblem s,s eeD eng Zich en,“Problem s
in H igh Precis ion C om p utation for N onlinear C ontrol of Sp ace
Intercep tors ,” Feixing lixue, V ol. 16 ,No. 1,19 9 8,p p . 85 -89 , in C A M A ,
V ol. 5 ,No. 5 . Yang Yingbo,“C ontrol Res earch on a Sp ace Intercep tor in
th e Term inal G uidance Ph as e,” unpublis h edB UA A p aper, M ay 19 9 4 ;
Sh iXiaoing,“Study on Puls e G uidance L aw for Space Interception,” in
Zh idao y u Yinxin,No. 4 ,19 9 4 ,p p . 1-4 ,in C A M A ,V ol. 2,N o. 3. Sh iis from
th e H arbin Institute ofTech nology ’s Sim ulation C enter. D eng is from
N orth w es t Poly tech nical Un iv ers ity . For oth er s tudies , s ee L i
Zh ongy ing,“Study on M id-C ours eG uidancefor A erody nam icC ontrol of
A n ti- M is s ile D efens e,” unpublis h ed p ap er (B H -B 4 774 ), B eijing
Univ ers ity of A eronautics and A s tronautics (B UA A ), M ay 19 9 6 , in
C A M A ,V ol. 5 ,No. 5 ; andL iZh ongy ing,“A p p roxim ativ e E s tim ation of
Op tim al G uidancefor FrontalB allis ticM is s ileIntercep ts,”unp ublis h ed
B U A A p aper (B H -B 4 776 ), in C A M A , V ol. 5 ,N o. 5 ; andL i Zh ongy ing,
“M ath em atical M odeling of Op tim al G uidan ce for A n ti-Tactical
B allis ticM is s iles,”unp ublis h edB UA A p ap er (B H -B 4 85 4 ),M ay 19 9 6 ,in
C A M A ,V ol. 5 ,No. 5 .
103. C h eng H o, C h ina E y es A n ti-Satellite Sy s tem , Sp ace D aily ,
January 8,2000.
104 . Xu H ui and Sun Zh ongkang, “Tem p erature D ifferen ces
B etw een Satellites andSatellite D ecoy s ,” NUD T Journal,V ol 16 ,No. 3,
19 9 4 ; als o s ee L iH ong,Identification ofSatellites andIts D ecoy s Us ing
M ultis ensor D ata Fus ion,” Xiandai fangyu jish u,June 19 9 7,p p . 31-36 .
L iis from th e NUD T E lectronicTech nology D ep artm ent.
16 4
105 . L iH ong’an,W eiXuh ui,andSun Zh angkang,“D uo ch uanganqi
s h uju rongh e s h ixian w eixing jiqi xiliu xiu’er de zh ibie” (M ulti-sen s or
D ata Fusion To D is crim inate Satellites andD ecoy s ), Xiandai fangy u
jis h u (M odern D efense Tech nology ),N ov em ber 19 9 7,p p . 31-36 .
106 . D oD Rep ort to C ongres s , Security Situation in th e Taiw an
Strait.
107. “H angtian guti y unzai h uojian y ouxian gongs i ch engli”
(A eros p ace SolidL aunch V eh icle C orp oration E s tablis h ed),Zh ongguo
H angtian,June2000 (internet v ers ion). Th ecorp oration w ill be jointly
adm inis teredby at leas tfour key entities inv olv edin th edev elopm ent of
th e D F - 21 and its s ea- lau n ch ed s is ter, th e JL - 1 : B eijin g
E lectrom ech anical E ngineering D es ign D epartm ent (4 th D ep artm ent);
A cadem y of Sp ace Solid Rocket E ngine Tech nology (4 th A cadem y );
B eijing Institute ofC ontrol andE lectronicEngineering (17th Res earch
In s titute); Nanjing C h enguang F actory (307 Factory ); andth e C h ina
A eros p aceE lectrom ech anicalC orp oration. For a com p leteh is tory ofth e
D F -21/JL -1 p rogram , see L ew is andXue, C h ina’s Strategic Seap ow er.
A ls o s ee Zh ang D exiong, “G uow ai xiaoxing w eixing de guti h uojian
tuijin xitong” (Solid Rocket Prop uls ion Sy s tem s for Foreign Sm all
Satellites ),in H angtian qingbao y anjiu,H Q-9 3011,p p . 139 -15 5 ; W ang
Zh eng,“Screening Studies andTech nology for A ll-SolidSp ace L aunch
V eh icles ,” G uti h uojian fadongji s h eji y u y anjiu (SolidRocket E ngine
D esign andRes earch ),A p ril 19 9 6 , p p . 6 3-73, in C A M A , V ol. 3, No. 6 ,
19 9 6 ; and Zh ang Song, “D esign and Op tim ization of Solid L aunch
V eh icleTrajectory ,” G utih uojian jish u,V ol. 20,N o. 1,19 9 7,p p . 1-5 ; and
Zh ang D exiong,“C h ina’s D ev elop m ent C oncep t for Sm all SolidL aunch
V eh icles ,” C A SC F ourth A cadem y Inform ation Res earch Rep orts , th e
F ourth E dition,October 19 9 5 ,p p . 1-11,in C A M A ,V ol. 5 ,No. 2.
108. C h eng Yuejin, “Inform ation Transm is s ion Sy s tem of D ata
Relay Satellites,” K ongjian jis h u qingbao y anjiu, July 19 9 4 , p p .
185 -19 3, in C A M A , V ol. 1, N o. 6 . C h eng is from th e Xian Institute of
Radio Tech nology . A ls o s eeTan L iy ing,“Selection ofW av elength Region
for Op tical Inters atellite C om m unication,” H aerbin gongy e daxue
xuebao, V ol. 26 , No. 3, 19 9 4 , p p . 24 -27, in C A M A , V ol. 1, No. 6 ; C h en
D aom ing,“F requency andOrbit ofD ata Relay Satellites,” in Zh ongguo
kongjian kexuejish u,V ol. 16 ,No.1,19 9 6 ,p p . 26 -31,in C A M A ,V ol. 3,N o.
3.
109 . D ep artm ent of D efense, Future M ilitary C apabilities and
Strategy ofth ePeop le’s Rep ublicofC h ina (Rep ort to C ongres s p ursuant
to Section 1226 of th e FY9 8 National D efen s e A uth orization A ct),
W ash ington,D C : U.S. G ov ernm ent Printing Office,19 9 8.
16 5
110. Jin W eixin, “M ath em atical M odeling of Tactical Surface to
SurfaceM is s iles A gainst TM D ,”in Sy s tem s E ngineering andE lectronic
Tech nology ,V ol. 17,No. 3,19 9 5 ,p p . 6 3-6 8,C A M A ,V ol2,No. 3,19 9 5 .
111. Senior C olonel W ang B enzh i, “D idi ch angui daodan h uoli
y uny ong de jige w enti,” (Som e Ques tions Related to th e Us e of
C onv entional Surface-to-Surface M is s ile Firep ow er),in L ianh ezh any i
y u junbingzh ong zuozh an, (Joint Th eater and Serv ice Op erations)
B eijing: National D efens e Univ ers ity Pres s , 19 9 8, p p . 236 -24 1. A s of
19 9 8,W ang w as th eC h iefofStaffofth eSecondA rtillery H uaih ua B ase
(80305 Unit). Th e concep t of s y nch ronized, m ulti-axis s trikes is a
fundam ental p rincip le of Second A rtillery conv entional doctrine
(duodian, duofangxiang, tongs h i tuji). Oth er im portant op erational
concep ts dis cus s ed by W ang from H uaih ua include “xush i bingy ong,
s h engdong xiji,” (literally “us e reality , m ake a noise in th e eas t, but
s trike to th e w est”); and“xiaojiange, duoboci tuji” (literally “cut tim e
and s trike in m ultip le w av es ”). Th e firs t calls for integration of
s im ultaneous launch es from different launch azim uth s and us e of
infraredradiation “dis rup tion”to confus eenem y s atelliteearly w arning
s y s tem s andcom p licate enem y attack op eration s . Th e secondincludes
us e oftw o s trike w av es,th e firs t “s creening” th e s econdby exp loiting
“tim e lags” (s h ijianch a)in m is s ile defens es .
112. G an and L iu, p . 4 5 . A ls o s ee Zh an g D em in, “Study on
Penetration Tech niques on New G eneration B allis tic M is s iles ,” in
Xinjunsh igem ingzh ongdaodan w uqifazh an qianjing,N ov em ber 19 9 6 ,
p p . 18-24 ,in C A M A ,V ol. 4 ,No. 2.
113. Si Xicai, “Res earch on L ong Range Antiradiation M is s ile
Pas s iv e Radar Seeker Tech nology ,” in Zh ans h u daodan jis h u (Tactical
M is s ile Tech nology ), V ol. 2, 19 9 5 , p p . 4 2-5 2; oth er s tudies on s p ecific
ap p roach es to A RM tech nology include Yang H uay uan, “Study on
Superw idebandH igh A ccuracy M icrow av e D F Sy s tem ,” in D aojian y u
zh idao xuebao,F ebruary 19 9 5 ,p p . 7-12. A t least one SecondA cadem y
entity th at h as conducted w ork on anti-radiation m is s ile s eeker
tech nology is th e B eijing Ins titute of Rem ote Sen s ing E quip m ent
(p robably th e C A SC 25 th Res earch Institute).
114 . W ang C h uny uan,C h ina’s Space Industry and Its Strategy of
In ternational C oop er ation, Stan ford Un iv ers ity C en ter for
International Security and A rm s C ontrol, July 19 9 6 , p . 4 ; M arat
A bulkh atin, “Official on Pros p ects for Sp ace C oop eration,” Itar-Tas s ,
October 10,19 9 6 ,in F B IS-SOV -9 6 -19 8; andauth or’s 19 9 4 dis cus s ions
w ith C h ines e s p ace officials res p on s ible for international coop eration.
16 6
115 . ”W ang L ih eng fujuzh ang lutuan fangw en E ’W u liangguo
(C A SC D ep uty D irector W ang L ih eng L eads D elegation to Rus s ian and
Ukraine),Zh ongguo h angtian bao,A p ril11,19 9 4 ,p . 1.
116 . See L i F eizh u, “Taikong daodan genzh ong xitong dui tufang
cuosh ide y ingy ong (InfluenceofSp aceandM is s ileTracking Sy s tem on
Penetration M easures ), unp ublis h edC h ina A cadem y of E ngineering
Ph y s ics p ap er,A p ril 19 9 9 .
117. Th is p oint is m ade by D r. L i B in from th e Ins titute of
International Studies ,Qingh ua Univ ers ity in “Th e E ffects ofNM D on
C h ines e Strategy ,” Jane’s IntelligenceRev iew ,M arch 1,2001.
118. F ederation of A m erican Scientis ts es tim ates th at th e D F-5
couldaccom m odate s ix w arh eads s im ilar in s ize to th os e us edon th e
D F -21 M od2.
119 . See Step h en V an E v era,“Offense,D efens e,andth e C aus es of
W ar,” International Security ,V ol. 22,No. 4 ,Spring 19 9 8,p p . 5 -4 3.
120. U.S. joint doctrine notes th at attack op erations are th e m os t
effectiv e andefficient m eans ofcountering th eth eater ballis ticm is s iles .
Joint C h iefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-01.5 , Joint D octrine for
C ountering A ir andM issile Th reats,W as h ington: G PO,19 9 9 .
16 7
C H A PTE R 6
C H INE SE R E A C TIONS TO NE W U.S.
INITIA TIV E S ON M ISSIL E D E F E NSE
E ric A . M cV adon
INTROD UC TION
Th e auth or of th is ch ap ter des cribes and analy zes
C h ines e v iew s of U.S. m is s ile defense initiativ es , bas ed
largely on interv iew s ,m eetings ,lectures ,andconv ers ations
w ith v arious C h ines e officials , Peop le’s L iberation A rm y
(PL A ) officers , th ink tankers , academ ics , and oth er
s trategics tudies ands ecurity s p ecialis ts in C h ina.1 Th ecore
res earch w as done during 3w eeks on th e m ainlandin July
andOctober 2001,p lus oth er m eetings h eldandm aterials
obtained in th e w eeks before and after th os e v is its . In
general,it w as not neces s ary to rais e th e m is s ile is s uew ith
C h ines e interlocutors ; th ere w as eagernes s am ong th es e
C h ines e contacts to addres s th e top ic, des cribe C h ines e
p os itions ,andrais eques tions . G iv en th es im ilarity ofm any
of th e res p ons es , it w as clear th at th e top ic h as receiv ed
am p le attention,th at th e s am e m aterial h adbeen readall
ov er C h ina, andth at th ere w as univ ers al s u p p ort am ong
officials and academ ics for th e central objections to U.S.
m is s ile defen s e in itiativ es , albeit w ith in teres tin g
m odifications.
PRC V IE W S OF TH E UNITE D STA TE S IN M ID -2001
Som e obs erv ers in th e United States h av e concluded
th at 2001 is a bad y ear for U.S.-C h ina relations, th at
W as h ington’s driv e tow ardm is s ile defense andm ore arm s
for Taiw an,coup ledw ith m any oth er bilateral s trains,h as
16 9
left B eijing unready , ev en unw illing, to deal w ith
W as h ington. C h ines e obs erv ers h av e a different v iew .
C h ines e dip lom ats in W as h ington as s ertedas early as th e
s p ring of2001 th at B eijing is ,at th eouts et ofth eG eorgeW .
B u s h p res iden cy , exercis in g res train t an d bein g
accom m odating— des p ite m an y U.S. adm in is tration
s tatem ents ,including th os e on m is s ile defense, th at m igh t
be cons ideredoffens iv e to C h ina.
Th e frequently exp res s edh op e w as th at th e anticip ated
m eeting betw een Pres idents Jiang Zem in and B us h in
B eijing,coincident w ith th e A s ia-PacificE conom icC ouncil
(A PE C )s es s ion in Sh angh aiin October 2001,w ouldresult
in m uch enh ancedunders tanding anda s teadily im p rov ing
bilateral relationsh ip . Th is exp ectation w as p articularly
ev iden t am on g in terlocutors in C h in a in July an d
encom p as s eda publicly exp res s edw illingnes s ,ev en des ire,
to dis cus s m is s ile defenseis s ues . Th is w as in contras t to an
earlier C h in es e attitude of m akin g righ teous p ublic
p ronouncem ents in op p os ition to m is s ile defense p rogram s
but largely av oiding s erious dis cus s ion,es p ecially any form
ofdis cus s ion th at w ouldsugges t C h ines ebeh av ior m igh tbe
th e s ubject of legitim ate concern or rep roach . A s a
consequenceofth eSep tem ber 11,2001 attacks on th eW orld
Trade C enter andPentagon, th e B eijing m eeting betw een
B us h andJiang didnot occur,andm is s ile defense w as not
p rom inent in th eir brieftalks in Sh angh aion th ep erip h ery
ofth e A PE C forum .
A m ids t th is alleged C h in es e w illin g n es s to
accom m odate2andto aw ait p atiently th eoutcom eofw h at is
s een as a dev elop ing U.S. p olicy for C h ina (and, m ore
broadly ,for A s ia),th ere w eres eem ing contradictions . Th es e
contradictions p rom inently includedth e arres ts andtrials
(andsubs equent dep ortations) ofeth nic C h ines e s ch olars
w ith A m erican con n ection s , th e con tin u in g h ars h
crackdow n on th e F alun G ong m ov em ent, th e s h arp
C h ines e reaction to th e reductions of m ilitary -to-m ilitary
contacts initiated by th e U.S. D ep artm ent of D efense in
2001,andth eh andling ofth eA p ril2001 dow ning ofth e U.S.
170
E P-3 s urv eillance aircraft. Th es e top ics could not be
addres s edfruitfully by th e auth or in m os t op en dis cus s ions
in m id-2001; h ow ev er, p oints w ere m ade by th e C h ines e,
m os tly in p riv ate dis cus s ions , th at th es e s h ould be
unders toodas excep tional s ituations andkep t in context
(th e C h ines e context, of cours e). Th e C h ines e s ide, th ey
s ugges ted, did not link th es e ev en ts to th e B us h
adm inis tration p olicy tow ard C h ina or m is s ile defens e
in itiativ es ; and it w as h op ed th at an A m erican
unders tanding of th e factors inv olv ed w ould insure th at
dis cus s ions of m is s ile defen s e is s ues w ould not be
p rejudicedby th es e unrelatedev ents .
Th e im p lications w ere th at th es e ev ents reflectedth ree
p rim arily dom es tic factors :
1. An obs es s ion w ith th e Taiw an is s ue th at ov errides
cons iderations of h ow it m igh t affect relations w ith th e
UnitedStates . Th es tate s ecurity organs h addoggedly s unk
th eir teeth into th eis s ueofs ch olars “m is us ing” inform ation
about th e m ainland,es p ecially in such m atters as m aking
com p aris ons w ith Taiw an society andth e like. In a w ritten
res p onse to ques tions s ubm ittedto Jiang by th e N ew York
Tim es,it w as as s ertedth at th e s ch olars w ere “m em bers of
Taiw an es p ionage organizations” andh ad“engagedin s p y
activ ities on m any occas ions on th e m ainlandofC h ina.”3
D is cretion ov errode v alor for th os e C h ines e officials w h o
recognizedth e negativ e effects on C h ina of s uch actions.
M oreov er,A m erican reactions to th e detentions andtrials
w ere not giv en h igh p riority in ev aluating th e crus ade; th e
audience for th e actions w as th e body of eth nic C h ines e
s ch olars abroad w h o are inclined to undertake s uch
w ork— andth e C h ines e p ublic. A s Senator Jos ep h B iden,
C h airm an ofth eU.S. Senate F oreign Relation s C om m ittee,
s aidafter m eeting w ith Jiang andoth er officials at B eidaih e
in A ugus t 2001, “Th ey [th e C h in es e] are s en din g a
not-so-s ubtle m es s age. You [A m ericans] h av e a p roblem
w ith [C h ines e actions tow ard]Pakis tan,w ith Iran; w eh av e
a p roblem w ith [A m erican actions tow ard]Taiw an.” B iden
171
s aidJiang ap p earedp reoccup iedw ith th e fate ofth eis land
B eijing regards as a rebel p rov ince.4
2. Paranoia about th eF alun G ong on th ep art ofJiang.
Jiang,p ers onally ,w as s tillfirm ly conv incedth at th eregim e
w as th reatenedby th e F alun G ong “cult,” andno one w ith
influenceth ough t it p rudent or us eful to try to conv inceh im
ofth ecounterp roductiv ech aracter ofth e actions ; m oreov er,
th e cam p aign to dis credit th e m ov em ent andp ersuade th e
C h in es e p eop le of its ev il n ature w as , in deed,
succeeding— s o w h y relent now ?5
3. Insecurity of Jiang about h is future, es p ecially as
C h airm an of th e C M C . Jiang, alth ough m is led by th e
m ilitary as to th e antecedent and p roxim ate caus es and
circum s tances ofth e collis ion betw een th e PL A Nav y F -8
andth e U.S. N av y E P-3,didnot th ink it p rudent to takeon
th e PL A leaders h ip about th e p os t-accident ev ents or th e
th eir anger about th em ilitary relations h ip m ach inations by
U.S. Secretary of D efense D onald Rum s feld. Jiang w as
reluctant to ignore th eir ranting against th e UnitedStates
becaus e th is m igh t com p licate h is exp ectedretention ofth e
p os ition as C h airm an ofth e C entral M ilitary C om m is s ion
after h is u p com ing retirem en t from th e p os itions of
Pres iden t of C h in a an d C om m unis t Party G en eral
Secretary . Th us av oiding confrontation w ith th e m ilitary
leaders h ip is a m ajor p art ofJiang’s effort to ens ure th at h e
retains an influential p os ition andp rotects h is as p iration to
gain “p aram ount leader” s tatus com p arableto th at enjoy ed
by D eng Xiaop ing andM ao Zedong. H e,consequently ,w as
not inclinedto confront th e m ilitary andin both instances
let th e PL A h av e its w ay .
In sh ort, th es e ev ents th at s eem ed to be av oidable
incidents , alm os t gratuitous ly h arm ing th e relationsh ip
w ith th e UnitedStates ,w ere ch aracterizedby th e C h ines e
as Jiang and oth ers p lay ing p rim arily to dom es tic— not
international— audiences . Th ere is anoth er im p ortant
as p ect to th is s om ew h at oblique exp lan ation of
contradictory conduct offeredby C h ines e s p ecialis ts . Th es e
172
com p lications in th e relations h ip w ere not in any w ay a
reaction to U.S. m is s ile defense initiativ es , neith er th os e
again s t long-range nuclear m is s iles n or s h ort-range
conv entional m is s iles ,according to th es e C h ines e s ources .
C h ina Is th e Target ofNuclear M is s ile D efense.
C h in es e s p ecialis ts s ugges t th at, in deed, th eir
gov ernm ent is taking a m easured,reas onable ap p roach to
U.S. m is s ile defense initiativ es . Th ey do, nev erth eles s ,
argue, rath er righ teous ly (as usual),th at U.S. s tatem ents
about national m is s ile defenses not being intendedfor us e
against C h ina’s intercontinental ballis tic m is s ile (IC B M )
force are not credible. One interlocutor p ointed out th at
C h ina h as been a factor in U.S. concerns about defending
its elfagainst or deterring m is s ileattacks s inceth em iddleof
th e las t century . M oreov er, m os t C h ines e exp erts do not
take s erious ly th e exp res s ions of U.S. concern s about
m is s ile th reats from th e “rogue s tates ,” arguing generally
th at North K orean m is s ile forces are not now ,andw ill not
becom e, s ignificant,andth at N orth K orea andoth er rogue
nations h av e been andw ill continue to be deterredby th e
ov erw h elm ing U.S. conv entional andnuclear cap abilities .
Th e geograp h y ofth e p rop os eddefense s ites (in A las ka)
s eem s to th eC h ines eto bea p lacem ent s p ecifically ch os en to
p rotect th e United States again s t C h ina’s long-range
m is s iles — w h ich th ey term a m inim al deterrent ars enal.
B as edon th ep rev alent C h ines e as s ertion th at North K orea
is not a realp res ent or p otential th reat to th eUnitedStates ,
th e argum ent th at th e p lacem ent is to defend against a
Py ongy ang th reat is dis counted,ev en scorned. Th e C h ines e
believ e firm ly and s tate p ublicly w h at s ev eral h aw kis h
A m ericans h av e s tated(s om e m ore p ublicly th an oth ers ):
Regardles s ofw h at is s aid,C h ina is th etargetofU.S. m is s ile
defenses . Ifth eUnitedStates s ucceeds in dev elop ing a s m all
intercep tor force, W as h ington w ill inexorably m ov e to a
larger,m orecap ableforce,th ey as s ert. L es s loudly s p oken is
th at B eijing does not trus t W as h ington as a w orldp lay er
173
w ith s uch a forceany m ore th an W as h ington trus ts B eijing
w ith its s m all (but p robably increas ing) and obs oles cent
(but m odernizing)IC B M ars enal,allegedly us eful only as a
deterrent.
Itall dep ends on W as h ington,as th eC h ines es eeit. In th e
ey es ofth e C h ines e, m uch ofth e to-and-fro on th e m is s ile
defens e is s ue dep ends on th e s tate of th e bilateral
relations h ip andth e degree ofm utual trus t, a factor th at
could erode badly , rem ain s tagn an t, or im p rov e
s ign ificantly . Th ey con s ider th at th e quality of th e
relation s h ip dep ends alm os t w h olly on W as h ington’s
th inking andactions. F rom th eir p ers p ectiv e,an im p ortant
factor is w h eth er W as h ington h as ,indeed,m ade,or is in th e
p roces s ofm aking, a fundam ental ch ange in its s trategic
outlook w ith res p ect to C h ina. A p rom inent C h ines eth inker
in talks in W as h ington in early s um m er 2001 op inedth at h e
th ough t h is gov ernm ent h adtaken a w ait-and-s eeattitude.
F or h im andoth ers ,th ere is th e h op e th at th e U.S. adh eres
to a one-C h ina p olicy andth at th e bilateral relationsh ip
returns to a les s bum p y track,but th ere is no conclus ion y et.
Th e ap p aren t w arm ing of Sino-U.S. relation s after
Sep tem ber 11 and th e cordial, if truncated, B us h -Jiang
m eeting in Sh angh ai,h av e m os t C h ines e w ondering ifth e
enh ancedrelations h ip w ill p ers is t or return to bickering
ov er th e s am e olddis p utes as tim e p as s es .
In m id-2001 anoth er C h ines es trategis t ands p ecialis t in
A m erican s tudies des cribedtw o s ch ools ofth ough t in C h ina
on U.S. s trategy . Oneis th econv iction th at U.S. s trategy is
“aim edat C h ina.” Th e oth er is th at U.S. s trategy is m ore
globally directed (aim ed at m uch m ore th an C h ina). H e
n oted th at, p redating B u s h
adm in is tration
p ronouncem ents ,Pres ident W illiam C linton h ads tatedth e
U.S. s h ift to a focus on A s ia. Th es e and oth er such
argum ents m ade by oth er interlocutors s eem edto h oldout
th ep ros p ect th at U.S. p olicy for C h ina andA s ia w as not y et
in con crete, an d th at it w as s till in th e p roces s of
form ulation, im p ly ing an op p ortunity for th os e in B eijing
andels ew h ere to influenceit. Th is ,coup ledw ith th e ev ents
174
in Sep tem ber andOctober, encourage B eijing’s h op es th at,
des p iteU.S.-Rus s ian deal-m aking,it h as not been relegated
to an altogeth er p as s iv e role on th e m is s ile defense is s ue.
A w ell-connectedacadem icrem arkedth at h earing U.S.
Secretary ofState C olin Pow ell andRum s feldtalk about
is s ues relating to C h ina or about w h ich C h ina w as
concernedw as like lis tening to tw o gov ernm ents . H e m ade
th is obs erv ation on th eday th at Pow ell arriv edin B eijing in
July 2001 to p rep are for th e m eeting betw een th e tw o
p res idents , th en 3 m onth s in th e future. Th e C h ines e are
conv incedth at th ey h av e taken th e rational p os ition and
th at it is th e B u s h adm in is tration, in its early
p ronouncem ents about fav oring Jap an and Taiw an and
being firm er on C h ina,th at w as p roducing uncertainty and
instability in th ebilateralrelations h ip — andcouldreturn to
th at onceB eijing’s s up p ort is s een as no longer neededin th e
w ar on terroris m . Furth erm ore,th e C h ines e do not believ e
th at th eir conduct w arrants s uch h ars h treatm ent and
insulting affronts by W as h ington. Th ey refus e,for exam p le,
to recognize th at B eijing’s firm p os ition on th e Taiw an
p roblem including its refus al to renounce th e us e offorce,
p lus oth er is s ues s uch as h um an righ ts ,m akes W as h ington
conclude th at B eijing is th e culp rit.
C H IN E SE R E A C TION TO D E F E NSE S A G A INST
IC B M S (NM D )
A lth ough th e B us h adm inis tration h as m erged th e
concep ts of national m is s ile defense (N M D ) and th eater
m is s ile defen s e (TM D ) into th e com m on term m is s ile
defen s e s y s tem (M D S)6 , C h ina’s reaction s can bes t be
des cribedandanaly zedw h ile p res erv ing th e dis tinction of
defenses against IC B M s anddefenses against s h ort-range
andm edium -range ballis ticm is s iles (SRB M s andM RB M s ).
F or th em os t p art,C h ina,w h ile acknow ledging th eblurring
ofth e dis tinction,continues to object to th e tw o in different
w ay s andon different grounds ,andth ere are als o s p ecific
175
objections to th e concep t ofM D S— th e m erging ofth e tw o
concep ts into s om e s ort oflay ereddefense ofw ide areas .
M easuredC h ines e Oppos ition.
B eijing is not ranting about N M D . It is n ot us ing
alarm is t exp res s ions andis not engaging in nam e-calling,
as it s o often does on oth er is s ues — andas it didearlier on
th is one. Th ere is little,ifany ,rh etorical exces s ,as w as th e
cas e in th e fall of 2000 w h en th e D efense W h ite Pap er
des cribed th e Taiw an is s ue as “com p licated and grim .”
A bs ent in m is s ile defen s e dis cus s ions are th e term s
h egem onis m andp ow er p olitics, andth e accus ations , like
th os e from th e W h ite Pap er, th at “certain big p ow ers are
p u rs uin g ‘n eo- in terv en tion is m ’ [an d] n eo-gunboat
dip lom acy .” In Jiang’s w ritten res p onses to th e N ew York
Tim es ques tions in A ugus t 2001, th e p oints on m is s ile
defense are only th at (1)C h ina does not fav or th e p rop os ed
U.S. m ov e th at it fears w ouldjeop ardize s trategics tability ,
(2)it w is h es to dis cus s s olutions th at w ouldnot h arm th e
s ecurity ofany s ide, and(3) C h ina needs to m aintain th e
effectiv enes s ofits “s elf-defense” nuclear force.7
NM D C an B e Ov erw h elm ed or D efeated.
Th at w as th e tone s truck by C h ines e interlocutors . In
June, a p rom inent C h ines e th ink tanker w ent s o far as to
sugges t (a bit s im p lis tically )th at C h ina couldtolerate ten
intercep tor m is s iles becaus e th at w ouldnot defeat C h ina’s
20 IC B M s and th at C h ina could, in any cas e, build
additional IC B M s in th e 10 or m ore y ears before s uch a
s y s tem could be dep loy ed— if it w orks . On th e m atter of
N M D efficacy , m any C h ines e s p ecialis ts th ink th at it w ill
not w ork andth at it certainly w ill not w ork s oon. Sev eral
referredto N M D as G reat W all or M aginot L ine th inking. A
PL A general officer,w h o is considereda s trategicth inker,
com m entedon th e analogy th at m is s ile defense is a train
th at h as already left th es tation. H es aidth at m igh t be true
but th at th e tracks are not y et com p lete; effectiv e m is s ile
176
defense,in h is v iew ,s im p ly m ay not be feas ible, es p ecially
in th e s h ort term .
NM D W ill C os t a L ot andNot W ork.
Som e put a p os itiv e s p in (for C h ina)on th is argum ent,
sugges ting th at C h ina w illnot follow th e Sov iet exam p le of
reaction to Pres ident RonaldReagan’s Strategic D efense
Initiativ e (SD I, or Star W ars ) but could eas ily m aintain
s ufficient m is s iles to ov ercom e th e defenses w h ile th e
UnitedStates exp ends enorm ous res ources on its ineffectiv e
obs es s ion. C h ina, th ey s ay , w ill increas e andim p rov e its
IC B M ars enal,but U.S. N M D w ill not be a centralim p etus
for th at undertaking becaus e N M D is not exp ectedto w ork
v ery w ell. Som e C h ines e go s o far as to argue th at few er
res ources th an plannedneednow to be exp endedon IC B M
m odernization becaus eN M D ,by w h atev er nam e,w illnotbe
effectiv e, th at m inor offensiv e ch anges w ill continue to
ov ercom e difficult defensiv e m odifications.
Th e PL A general officer s trategis t, w h en p res s ed,
tem p ered h is argum ent a bit. H e s aid th at alth ough
effectiv e m is s ile defen s es m ay be in feas ible, if th e
tech nology is p res ent, th ey w ould be built; no A m erican
p res ident couldrefus e to do s o. H ow ev er, h e forecas t th at
N M D couldnotbedev elop edbeforeth eendofth is decade,s o
C h ina h as tim e to ensure its n uclear forces are effectiv e. It
is , of cours e, h ard to determ ine if th is th em e of N M D
ineffectiv enes s is m outh ed in order to dis courage its
dev elop m en t or becaus e th e C h in es e h av e, in deed,
conv incedth em s elv es th at it w illnot w ork. Th elatter s eem s
m os t likely .
No Nuclear A rm s Race.
C h ina,it w as s aid,does n ot w ant to exp endres ources on
building up a m uch larger IC B M force; it w ants both
econom ic dev elop m ent anda deterrent. Th at com bination
s eem s feas ible to th e C h ines e s p ecialis ts . A PL A general
officer s ugges ted th at C h in a’s res p on s e w ould be
177
p rop ortional andw ouldnot res ult in an arm s raceor ev en a
p riority item in th eC h ines edefensebudget. C h ina,h es aid,
w ould do extra th ings , but jus t enough ; it w ould not go
ov erboard. Oth ers s aidC h ina w ouldnot react s trongly to
N M D and w ould not build a large num ber of m is s iles .
Nuclear w eap ons,oneciv ilian s p ecialis t argued,arejus t for
deterrence, not real w eap ons . C h ina w ill not w as te its
res ources on a us eles s s y s tem .
Th ere h as abitofgloating am ong s om eofth es p ecialis ts
th at th e UnitedStates w ouldlikely p roceedh eadlong and
s p endan enorm ous am ount ofm oney on a s y s tem not likely
to w ork andth at,p utting a finer p oint on earlier argum ents ,
offensiv e m is s iles andim aginativ e p enetration tech niques
w ere far eas ier and ch eap er to dev is e andp roduce th an
defen s iv e m is s iles and com p lex target dis crim ination
tech nologies . H ow ev er, none of th e interlocutors , ev en in
res p onseto p rov ocativ eques tioning,took a p os ition th at th e
UnitedStates w ouldrue th eday it undertook N M D agains t
th e w is e and w ily C h ines e, or any th ing res em bling th at
p os ition. Oth er th reats andblus ter w ere not offered. Th e
tone of th e conv ers ations res em bled th at taken by Sh a
Zukang, D irector of th e A rm s C ontrol D ep artm ent in
C h ina’s M inis try ofF oreign A ffairs ,in M arch 2001 w h en h e
s aidth at,ev en ifN M D w ere dev elop edby th e UnitedStates ,
C h ina w ould not neces s arily take radical s tep s s uch as
w ith draw ing from th e C om p reh ensiv e Tes t B an Treaty
[im p ly ing als o ending its m oratorium on nuclear w eap on
tes ting],as h adbeen th reatenedp rev ious ly .8
NM D W ould Reduce Security .
Instead,th e gentler sugges tion w as m ade often th at th e
UnitedStates andC h ina m igh t both be les s s ecure as a
result ofN M D . Th e general officer s trategis t anda civ ilian
s p ecialis t in B eijing s aid C h ina is concerned about th e
ram ifications for outer s p ace, fearing a U.S. m ov e to p ut
m is s ile defens es in s p ace w ould inv ite oth ers to em p loy
w eap ons in s p aceor to react unp redictably to onecountry ’s
178
“w eap onizing s p ace.” In th e s h ort term ,th ere w ould be an
increas e in th e cap ability of th e UnitedStates to defend
its elf; but in th e long term th e UnitedStates w ill “rep ent.”
Th e general w ent on to argue th at th e UnitedStates s p ent
m any y ears building a nonp roliferation regim e and now
s eem s to be th row ing all th at aw ay an d in v itin g
p roliferation. Th e crux of h is argum ent w as th at th e
national s ecurity of one country cannot be bas ed on
increas edinsecurity ofoth ers , andth at abs olute s ecurity
cannot be ach iev ed. D efenses , h e sugges ted, s om etim es
inv ite p roliferation rath er th an stop it. A s did oth ers , h e
p oin ted th e fin ger at countries oth er th an C h in a,
forecas ting th at,in reacting to U.S. m is s ile defense, C h ina
w ill do jus t a few th ings ; oth ers w ill do m uch m ore.
Oth ers elaborated on th is th em e. A n arm s control
s p ecialis t s aid s om e countries w ould react to NM D by
dev elop ing an im p rov ed cap ability to p enetrate defenses ;
oth ers w ould turn to oth er m eth ods of deliv ery or to
alternativ es s uch as biological w eap ons . H e th en m ade a
les s fam iliar argum ent. H es aidN M D w ouldleadto a s ense
offals es ecurity . Ifit w ere to w ork,th eUnitedStates w ould
feel s ecure again s t N orth K orea, for exam p le. Yet
W as h ington w ould, in building m is s ile defens es , not only
h av e furth er antagonizedPy ongy ang but als o w ouldh av e
failed to giv e th e ap p rop riate attention to res olv ing th e
underly ing p roblem s in relations w ith N orth K orea— and
p robably furth er exacerbated th em . To bols ter h is
argum ent, h e s aid Py ongy ang h as reacted fav orably to
ov ertures from B eijing andM os cow to curtail its m is s ile
p rogram . A tough m es s age from W as h ington about m is s ile
defense w ouldbecounterp roductiv e, h e argued. A lm os t in
p as s ing,h e addedth at all th is is about a country th at does
not, in th e v iew ofC h ina, p os e a credible nuclear m is s ile
th reat to th e United States — a country th at w ants and
needs better relations w ith th e UnitedStates .9
A s p ecialis t in B eijing gav eit a geop oliticaltw is t. H es aid
th at ifB us h ’s p lan for m is s iledefenses w ere com p leted,th e
w orldw ouldbediv idedinto tw o p arts : th at cov eredby M D S,
179
andth at left uncov ered. Th at returns us to a bip olar w orld.
Th ereal s ecurity p roblem s in th ew orldarebas edon lack of
trus t. M D S w ould exacerbate th e underly ing p roblem of
lack oftrus t betw een v arious countries andw ork counter to
th e concep t of confidence-building m eas ures (C B M s ), h e
argued.
North K orea No Th reat.
A s m entionedp rev ious ly ,th e C h ines e argue frequently
andw ith conv iction th at N orth K orea is not now ,andw ill
not becom e, a th reat to th e UnitedStates . A s one civ ilian
s p ecialis t p ut it, N orth K orea’s territory is too s m all to
dev elop a nuclear w eap on s y s tem th at w ould include
launch ing facilities , force p rotection, etc. North K orea
cannot dev elop th e tech nology to get m is s iles ev en to th e
w es tern UnitedStates , h e as s erted. In any ev ent, N orth
K orea couldonly launch , not surv iv e; it w ould be a real
suicide, h e s aid em p h atically . Sev eral oth ers p ointedout
th at North K orea’s failure to initiate m ilitary action ov er
h alf-a-cen tury m akes th e p oin t th at th e leaders in
Py ongy ang are not irrational. C h ines e p res s th is argum ent
about th e lack of credible th reat from North K orea in
s ignificant m easure to s u p p ort th eir belief th at U.S.
defenses against IC B M s are ultim ately intendedto negate
C h ina’s nuclear deterrent.
Piling On.
One gains th e s ensein talking to C h ines e s p ecialis ts on
th e m is s iledefenseis s ue th at a great deal oftim e h as been
s p ent contriv ing an d cataloguing argum ents again s t
m is s iledefenses ,ap p arently in th ebeliefth at th enum ber of
argum ents m ade w illcount in th e debate. A s an exam p le,a
th ink tanker in B eijing s aidth at C h ina is w orriedabout th e
p ros p ect ofan arm s race but not betw een C h ina andth e
UnitedStates . H e fearedth at,ifth e UnitedStates builds
m is s ile defen s es , oth er countries could build up th eir
m is s ile forces in res p onse andth en later couldturn th os e
180
m is s iles on C h ina, or at leas t th os e m is s iles w ouldbe a
th reat to C h ina. Nev erth eles s , m os t of th e argum ents
offeredare along s im ilar lines andoften em p loy p recis ely
th e s am e w ords and p h ras es , such as th e com p aris on of
N M D w ith th eG reat W all andth eM aginot L inem entioned
p rev ious ly . A t a m inim um , one m us t conclude th at th e
s p ecialis ts h av e all readth e s am e m aterial or h eardth e
s am e s p iel.
Th e Second-Strike Is s ue.
Tw o quite different v iew s w ere offered(quite clinically )
by tw o interlocutors on th e is s ue ofC h ines e interes t in a
s econd-s trikecap ability (after an initial U.S. nuclear s trike
on C h in a). A C h in es e s trategis t s p eakin g (not for
attribution)h ere in th eUnitedStates s aidth at C h ina needs
a s econd-strike cap ability — in addition to th e ability to
ov erw h elm a U.S. defense against IC B M s .10 A B eijing
civ ilian s p ecialis t s ugges ted it w as all m oot. H e argued
p riv ately (and grav ely ) th at C h ines e leaders w ould be
unable to finda s ingle m ajor A m erican city w h ere clos e
relativ es ofim p ortant C h ines e leaders do not now liv e. H e
concludedon th at bas is th at th ere is no realis tic utility to
C h ina’s IC B M s ; th ey h av e only deterrent v alue, no real
v alue as w eap ons . Th is w as offered,not friv olous ly ,but as a
s erious ap p rais al. H eals o notedth at th eUnitedStates h ad,
for v ery different reas on s , elected not to us e nuclear
w eap ons in K orea in 19 5 3,s ugges ting th at neith er country
h as th e s tom ach to em p loy th em .
TH E A B M TRE A TY ISSUE
M os t of th e interlocutors p redicted, in one w ay or
anoth er, th at M os cow w ouldnot, in th e end,s tandfirm ly
w ith C h ina on th em atter ofop p os ition to any m eddling w ith
th e 19 72 A n ti-B allis tic M is s ile (A B M ) Treaty th at m igh t
p erm it m is s ile defen s es des ired by W as h in gton but
p roh ibitedby th e treaty . A t leas t as early as June 2001,a
p rom inent s p ecialis t s aid th at h e exp ected Rus s ia to
181
concede its op p os ition to N M D andth at C h ina s h ould be
ready to go its ow n w ay . A civ ilian s p ecialis t in B eijing,
noting th at Rus s ia m us t for econom ic reas ons reduce th e
s ize ofits nuclear ars enal,s aidin adv anceofth e July 2001
Putin - B us h m eeting in G en oa th at Rus s ia w ould
com p rom is eon th eA B M Treaty is s ue. H eexp lainedfurth er
th at on a s cale of1-10 Rus s ia w as at 10 in its concern about
N M D and5 about TM D ; C h ina w as at 5 on N M D and10 on
TM D . H e translatedth at into an exp ectation th at M os cow
w ould com p rom is e w ith W as h ington andenter into s om e
form ofcoop eration on N M D andw arh eadnum bers .
A fter Rus s ian Pres ident V ladim ir Putin s tatedp ublicly
w ith B us h in G enoa in late July 2001 th at offensiv em is s iles
and m is s ile defense w ould be treated as a s et, C h ines e
s p ecialis ts uniform ly took th ep os ition th at w ew ere later to
h ear from Jiang in h is N ew York Tim es interv iew : th e
m atter couldbe w orked. Pos s ibly th eir concern w as les s
th an m os t A m erican analy s ts exp ected,th ey exp ectedth at
Putin h adanoth er cardup h is s leev e, or B eijing decidedto
p ut th e bes t face on th eir dis ap p ointm ent. A retireds enior
PL A officer now w ith a s trategic s tudies ins titute tolda
s m allinternational audiencein H ong K ong in v ery lateJuly
2001 th at h e h adexp ectedRus s ia to m ake a deal w ith th e
United States on th e m atter, or at leas t th ough t it w as
p os s ible. Not ev en th e B us h -Putin Nov em ber 2001 m eeting
on th is is s ue s eem edto dis courage th e C h ines e.
A w ell-connecteds enior th ink tanker put it th is w ay :
C h ina’s p reference w as to s tand s olid w ith Rus s ia in
op p os ition to ch ange to th e A B M Treaty th at w ouldp erm it
N M D ,but C h ina h ads een v ery early th ep ros p ectfor ch ange
in Rus s ia’s p os ition. H e s aidth at th ere are in th is m atter
“gray areas .” C h ina, h e as s erted, could s till w ork w ith
Rus s ia andtalk w ith th e UnitedStates . Noting th at C h ina’s
form er p rincip al arm s controlofficial,Sh a Zukang,h as s aid
h ew ants to dis cus s m is s iledefens ew ith th e UnitedStates ,
h es aidth ere couldbetalk on th e“m erits ”ofm is s iledefense
an d on ov erall relations ; m ay be th ere is room for
m aneuv ering, h e rum inated. H e concludedw ith th e h op e
182
th at Jiang and B us h , in B eijing in October 2001, w ould
dis cus s th e is s ue and find s om e w ay out. A lth ough th at
m eeting didnot takep lace,it s tills eem s th at B eijing w ants
to fines s eth eis s ue,m aketh ebes t ofit,or at leas t not to giv e
th e im p res s ion th at C h ina is p anicky ov er th e unfav orable
dev elop m ent— w h atev er p recis e form it m ay take as B us h
andPutin continue to talk w ith out a rep res entativ e from
B eijing p res ent.
C H IN A ’S V IE W S ON TH E A TE R M ISSIL E D E F E NSE
(TM D )
TM D to Protect U.S. F orces andB as es Is Okay .
A m bas s ador Sh a Zukang,w h o h as now left h is p os t as
C h ina’s p rim ary arm s control official,h as for h alfa decade
v oicedh is as s ertion th at TM D intendedto s h ieldU.S. forces
andbas es in A s ia w ereunders tandableto B eijing andw ould
not draw a radical reaction from C h ina. H e h as referredto
th is as “p ure” TM D , im p ly ing ap p arently th at it did not
inv olv e Jap an or Taiw an or th reaten C h ines e s trategic
m is s iles . H e rep eated th at p os ition in M arch 2001 in
res p onse to ques tioning about U.S. p lans to dep loy s y s tem s
to p rotect U.S. forces bas edin A s ia. H es aid,“Th ereis a gray
areah ere. C h ina is not op p os edto [th eater m is s iledefense].
. . to p rotect troop s andm ilitary bas es .” Noth ing h as been
h eardfrom a succes s or on th is is s ue, affirm ing or deny ing
th ep os ition. Th is m ay bein p art becaus eofth euncertainty
about w h ere th e UnitedStates TM D p rogram is h eadedas
m ajor ch anges are m adein th e ov erall U.S. m is s iledefense
p rogram and W as h ington’s attention and res ources are
concentratedon th e w ar on terroris m .
F or th e Republic ofK orea (ROK ).
C h ines e officials ands p ecialis ts are generally relaxed
about TM D and South K orea becaus e Seoul h as , s o far,
ch os en not to p articip ate. Th ere is s atis faction am ong th e
C h ines e th at p art of th e reas on Seoul does not w ant to
183
obtain a TM D s y s tem is th at K oreans do not w ant to “p oke
C h ina in th e ey e.” South K oreans h av e exp res s edth e v iew
th at TM D is not an effectiv e defense against th eir bigges t
concern: N orth K orean artillery andoth er forces jus t north
ofSeoul, th at th e N orth K orean th reat m ay in any cas e go
aw ay , andth at th en th e ROK w ouldbe s tuck w ith a v ery
exp ensiv es y s tem s eem ingly suitableonly to defendagains t
C h ines em is s iles . C h ines eare not giv ing m uch attention y et
to th e rum blings am ong s om e ROK m ilitary leaders th at it
w ould be a m is take for th em to get left beh indin m is s ile
defense tech nology — tech nology th at m any th ink w illbean
integralp art ofany m odern arm edforcein com ing decades .
F or Jap an.
C h ina’s objections to TM D for Jap an p ers is t. V arious
concern s are exp res s ed w ith v arious degrees of
s erious n es s .11 Th e earlier argum ents th at TM D w ould
p rov ide a m ilitaris ticJap an w ith th es h ieldbeh indw h ich it
could, in a m atter ofm onth s ,dev elop anddep loy nuclear
m is s iles is h eard infrequently now . Nev erth eles s , th ere
rem ain concerns th at th etech nology s h aredw ith Jap an as a
result ofJap anes e p articip ation w ith th e UnitedStates on
TM D res earch anddev elop m ent w ill aida future Jap anes e
ballis tic m is s ile p rogram . One s p ecialis t p ointedout th at
Jap anes eA egis-equip p eds h ip s couldbeus edin th e Taiw an
Strait,obv ious ly th inking th at h e h adm ade a telling p oint
w h ich w ould caus e ev en A m ericans to recoil at th e v ery
th ough t ofs uch a th ing. Th eC h ines eh av ebeen attentiv e to
th e Jap anes e s ending ofdes troy ers to th e Indian Ocean in
noncom bat s u p p ort of th e U.S. effort in A fgh anis tan. A t
leas t in part becaus e ofth is C h ines e angs t,A egis-equip p ed
s h ip s , alth ough already a p art ofth e Jap anes e M aritim e
Self-D efens e F orce,w ere not dis p atch edby Prim e M inis ter
Junich iro K oizum i.
M ore generally , th e C h ines e argue th at TM D is y et
anoth er A m erican m is take in dealing w ith Jap an. B eijing
argues th at Jap an is th e real future th reat to regional
184
s tability andth at th e UnitedStates is aiding th e p otential
resurgenceofJap anes e m ilitaris m by m any ofth e th ings it
is doing to aid th e Jap anes e Self-D efense F orces (JSD F ).
Th e as p ect ofth eU.S.-Jap an allianceth at h as been seen as
controlling Jap an or curbing Jap anes em ilitaris m h as ledin
th e p as t to C h ines e accep tance th at th e alliance w as , on
balance, fav orable for C h ina,but TM D is s een as p art ofa
s h ift tow ardth e alliance m aking th e JSD F m ore cap able
and m ore likely to th reaten C h ina, ev en to com e to th e
s u p p ort ofTaiw an in som e w ay in a conflict— es p ecially one
w ith U.S. inv olv em ent.
Som e C h ines e interlocutors w ill acknow ledge th at th e
real root ofth eir concern about TM D for Jap an is th at th e
Jap anes e,w h ile w ringing th eir h ands about N orth K orean
Taep odon g m is s iles , are actually looking ov er th eir
s h oulders at C h ines e m is s iles . Th e es s ence ofth e concern,
th en,is th at C h ina w ants to be able to h oldat ris k w ith its
ballis ticm is s iles Jap an and,ofcours e,U.S. bas es in Jap an
andy et does not w ant to m ake loudpublicp ronouncem ents
to th at effect. TM D for Jap an w oulds p oil th at.
F or Taiw an.
B eijing continues to exp res s in th e s tronges t term s its
op p os ition to TM D for Taiw an. It h as s aid it w ill react
h ars h ly to th e transfer ofm is s ile defense from th e United
States to Taiw an. Th ere h as been no dim inution of th is
op p os ition to p rov iding defenses for Taiw an,ev en as B eijing
h as s eem edto takeam orem eas uredoutlook w ith res p ect to
N M D . Th e drum beat h as intensifiedon th e as s ertion th at
TM D for Taiw an is bad enough in its elf but th at th e
introduction of real m is s ile defense th ere w ill m ean far
greater andclos er coordination betw een th e arm edforces of
th eUnitedStates andth os eofTaiw an. Th at is des cribedas
a greater concern by far th an th e acquis ition ofth e v arious
TM D s y s tem s .
Th ere is als o in C h ina now a m oreintens econcern th an
exp res s edp rev ious ly about th e p ros p ect ofth e transfer of
185
Patriot A dv ancedC ap ability 3 (PA C -3) ground-bas edair
andm is s ile defenses to Taiw an. Th is is th e m os t likely real
TM D th at Taiw an m igh t obtain, alth ough it is s till a
rudim entary cap ability agains t s h ort-range ballis tic
m is s iles . Prev ious ly ,C h ines econcerns ov er PA C -3h adbeen
m utedin fav or ofdecry ing th e p ros p ectiv e transfer ofs h ip s
equip p edw ith th e U.S. Nav y A egis air andm is s ile defense
s y s tem ,a s y s tem th at is exp ectedev entually to h av e a TM D
cap ability . Th e C h ines e are s till m ore w rough t up about
A egis th an PA C -3, but now both are of cons iderable
concern.12
A w ell-inform ed C h ines e th ink tanker h as s ugges ted
th at th e dep loy m ent (already ) by C h ina of 300 or m ore
s h ort-range ballis tic m is s iles (SRB M s ) in Fujian, w ith
about 5 0 m ore m is s iles com ing each y ear,m igh t be s top p ed
or rev ers edw ere Taiw an to accep t th e one-C h ina p rincip le.
(H e w ent on to s ay th at B eijing couldnot now m ake s uch a
m ov e becaus e it w ouldredoundto th e benefit of current
Taiw an Pres ident C h en Sh ui-bian and aid h is p olitical
p arty , th e h ated D em ocratic Progres s iv e Party [D PP].13)
Furth erm ore, oth er C h ines e interlocutors n ow at leas t
accep t th e fact th at th es e m is s iles th reatening Taiw an are
indeed being dep loy ed by th eir m ilitary . Th ey now as s ert
th at all s h ould unders tand th at th e p urp os e of th es e
m is s iles is only for deterrence of a Taiw an m ov e tow ard
autonom y ,not for us e as w eap ons. Prev ious ly , ev en s enior
PL A officers h av e often deniedth e m is s ile dep loy m ents or
refus ed to dis cus s th e subject. Th ey s im p ly s aid th at
ev ery th ing concerning Taiw an w as p urely an internal
affair. It is not th at th es e dev elop m ents s ignal th at a
s olution to th eis s ueis at h and,but at leas t,w h en conditions
for rem ov ing m is s iles arerais edandth efact ofdep loy m ents
by th e h undreds is acknow ledged, th e p ros p ects for
reas onable dis cus s ion andev en negotiation are enh anced.
186
M igh t th e D oor B e Open a C rack?
B ecaus e of th e intertw ining of TM D and Taiw an,
B eijing’s concerns about TM D clearly exceedth os e about
N M D . Noneth eles s , C h in es e official an d unofficial
s p okes m en , as h as been des cribed, h av e at leas t
acknow ledged th at TM D for U.S. forces in A s ia is
reas onableandth at th eir SRB M s th reatening Taiw an exis t
andare p art ofth e p roblem andan elem ent in its p os s ible
s olution.
C H IN E SE R E A C TIONS TO TH E M E RG ING
OF NM D A ND TM D INTO M D S
C h ines e C onfus ion: Real or F eigned?
Th ere is am ong C h ines e s p ecialis ts confus ion (or
p rofes s ed confus ion) about th e B us h adm inis tration’s
m erging of N M D and TM D . B ey ond th e uncertainty ,
acknow ledged by Rum s feld, about jus t w h at th e new
concep t of a m is s ile defense s y s tem (M D S) im p lies ,14 th e
C h ines e as k ques tions about Jap an andTaiw an. D oes M D S
m eans th at th eJap anes e TM D coop eration w ith th eUnited
States w ouldh av e, as p art of M D S, an NM D com p onent
agains t C h ina’s long-range m is s iles ? Oth ers rais ed th e
is s ue of w h eth er PA C -3 w ould th en be a p art of M D S,
th inking th at it w as abs olute anath em a to any logical
p ers on to sugges t th at Taiw an (w h ich m ay get PA C -3)could
be a p art of M D S. Underly ing m any of th e concern s
exp res s ed w as th e p rofound w orry : B ey ond th e direct
im p lications for C h ina’s IC B M force, w ould Taiw an be
construedas p art ofM D S,m eaning an ev en greater degree
ofcoordination betw een U.S. andTaiw an arm edforces ? It is
difficult at th is early s tagein th e“M D S m erger” to as certain
th edegreeto w h ich th eC h ines econfus ion is real or w h eth er
th e M D S m atter is being us edas a p eg on w h ich to h ang
m ore C h ines e argum ents against m is s ile defenses andto
offer up m ore concerns about Taiw an.
187
M D S C ould Negate A ll C h ina’s B allis tic M is s ile
A rs enals .
Th ere is inh erent in th is inch oate M D S concep t th e
s p ecter of a w orldw ide s y s tem , including s ea-bas ed and
land-bas ed intercep tor m is s iles of v arious s orts and an
airborne las er (to kill m is s iles in th eir boos t-p h as e as cent),
th at w ouldp ut in jeop ardy C h ina’s IC B M deterrent ars enal,
its SRB M s , and ev en m edium -range ballis tic m is s iles
(M RB M s ). Pow ell’s v is it to B eijing in late July 2001 didnot
as s uageC h ines econcerns on th is is s ue. H is argum ents th at
th e U.S. m is s ile defense s y s tem w ould be lim itedandno
th reat to C h ines e long-range m is s iles w as ,for th e C h ines e,
drow nedout by nois es from els ew h ere outs ide (but clos e to)
th e adm inis tration th at s endoth er s ignals andth e s ilence
w ith in th e adm in is tration , bas ed on acknow ledged
uncertainty ,about h ow th e concep t w ill ev olv e.
Th e Taiw an C om p lication.
A y oung res earch er at a s trategicinstitute in Sh angh ai
s um m ed up th e C h in es e v iew of M D S: Th e B us h
adm inis tration’s blurring ofN M D andTM D is ap p arently a
p rogram to cov er m ore countries w ith a m is s ile-defense
blanket. Th is com p licates th e C h ines e v iew of m is s ile
defens e w ith res p ect to Taiw an and giv es C h ina m ore
reas on to object to any form ofm is s ile defense for Taiw an.
Th is is n ot a p os itiv e dev elop m ent from th e C h ines e
m ilitary v iew p oint. C oup ledw ith th e announcedU.S. focus
on A s ia, th is w ill giv e C h ines e h ard-liners a s tronger
argum ent. A s w ith oth er argum ents concerning Taiw an,th e
s p eaker consideredth at h is p oint h ad been m ade tellingly
w h en h e s aidev en Taiw an m igh t be p rotectedby M D S.
TH E C H IN E SE D E SIRE OR W IL L ING N E SS
TO TA L K A B OUT M ISSIL E D E F E NSE ISSUE S
F or s om e A m erican obs erv ers , it ap p ears th at B eijing
and W as h ington are s o firm ly entrench ed in m utually
188
irreconcilablep os itions th at th ere m igh t s eem to beno h op e
for negotiation ofa p os itiv e outcom e or any oth er form of
res olution. Yet Sh a, th en h ead of th e arm s control
dep artm ent ofth e C h ines e M F A ,in M arch 2001 agreedto
talks on NM D th at h eh op edw ould“narrow . . . differences ,”
andh e w elcom edA s s is tant Secretary ofState Jam es K elly
to B eijing in M ay . In K elly ’s dep arture s tatem ent after
th os e talks ,h e s aidh e h adexp lainedth e ov erall A m erican
s trategy and th at th ere w as agreem ent to a continuing
dialogue.
B eijing W ants B oth E conom ic Progres s
andD eterrence.
A lth ough th is s tatem ent by K elly m ay h av e h ad an
unders tandably op tim is tic tilt, th ere are oth er p os itiv e
s igns . A s is w ell know n,C h ina is already tes ting a m odern
IC B M ,th eD F 31,to rep laceits obs oles cent D F 5 A force,but
B eijing does not w ant to exp end th e res ources to build
h undreds of m is s iles (enough to ov ercom e any N M D
env is ioned)or to greatly im p rov eits m is s iles to m ake th em
les s v ulnerable to intercep t. A s alluded to p rev ious ly , a
res p onsible C h ines e s p ecialis t on th is is s ue h as s ugges ted
th at B eijing m igh t be able to tolerate th e 10 N M D
intercep tors recently m entioned by Rum s feld, but th at
C h ina couldnot tolerate25 0 intercep tor m is s iles . A ccording
to C h ines e s ources , w h en K elly m et Sh a, Sh a did not
indicate a readines s to com p rom is e s o far; h ow ev er, if
C h ina’s core interes t is res p ected“to s om e extent,” C h ina
m ay be flexible, according to th is w ell-inform ed s ecurity
s p ecialis t. C h ina, it w as s ugges ted, w ants both econom ic
dev elop m ent [unfettered by a need for a large nuclear
buildup ] and to m aintain a deterrent. Th is s p eculativ e
tidbit about p os s ible C h ines ecom p rom is eis certainly not a
breakth rough ,but it does reflect,it s eem s ,a des ireby C h ina
to talk andoffers W as h ington a bit ofnegotiating room .
Th e talks w ith K elly w ere v iew edin C h ina as s ucces s ful
only in th at th ey h eldout th e p rom is e offurth er talks . Th e
189
C h ines ew ere ap p arently unh ap p y at th elev elofs eniority —
an as s is tant s ecretary rath er th an th e deputy s ecretary of
s tate w h o h adv is itedoth er A s ian countries (andA us tralia)
on th e tour th at includedK elly . It w as noted th at B us h
adm inis tration v ery s enior p eop le talk to Rus s ia andoth er
countries ,as didth e C linton adm inis tration; but th at th ere
h adbeen,as ofm id-July 2001,no such talks w ith C h ina. A n
arm s control s p ecialis t p ointedout bluntly th at B us h h as
p ers onally s p oken to oth er p res idents on m is s iledefense(by
p h oneandin pers on,h ev olunteered),but h eh adnot,to th at
p oint, s p oken to Jiang on th at top ic. Yet Pow ell w as in
B eijing in late July , h e rep orted th at, alth ough m is s ile
defense w as a m ajor agenda item for h is s es s ion w ith
F oreign M inis ter Tang Jiaxuan,th ereh adbeen no in-dep th
dis cus s ion about m is s ile defense. Th e C h ines e h ad only
“lis tenedandres p ondedw ith a ques tion or tw o.”15
C h ines e Sugges tions about M is s ile-D efense Talk s
w ith th e UnitedStates .
In any ev ent,th e C h ines e w ere,in th e w eeks p receding
th e exp ected B us h -Jiang October m eeting, indicating a
readines s to talk andm aking s ugges tions about h ow th at
m igh t p roceed. Th ey now h av e th e p ros p ect ofa sum m it in
2002, and th e p ros p ect th at Sino-U.S. relations m ay be
m uch im p rov edov er early 2001. Th e arm s controls p ecialis t
in B eijing exp lainedw h at A m erican s s h ouldunders tand
before th e United States talks to C h ina on th e m is s ile
defense is s ue. H e s aidth at A m ericans needto unders tand
m ore fully th e C h ines e p olitical s ituation. Jiang h as to
contend w ith p res s ure from p ublic op inion. H e h as to
conv ince th e C h ines e p eop le andth e C h ines e m edia16 th at
th e UnitedStates is not to be feared.
H e th en sugges ted th at, in dev elop ing an agenda for
talks ,it is im p ortant for C h ina to know w h at form ofm is s ile
defense th e United States contem p lates becaus e m is s ile
defenses are s een in C h ina as a form of U.S. h egem ony .
N ext, talks s h ouldturn to th e th reat m is s iles p os e to th e
19 0
UnitedStates andto C h ina andRus s ia. Op tions oth er th an
m is s ile defenses th at could reduce th e th reat s h ould be
dis cus s ed,as w ell as op tions w ith res p ect to th eis s ue ofth e
A B M Treaty .17 Th en,op tions for m is s iledefense s y s tem s to
be dep loy edw ould be ap p rop riately dis cus s ed. H e added
th at,in th e C h ines e v iew ,th ere is now no real th reat th at
w arrants a national m is s ile defense.
V iew edcy nically ,th is carefully laidout p rop os al for an
agenda illus trates th at w h at C h ina, in th e v iew of th is
w ell-inform eds p ecialis t in B eijing,w ants to do is force th e
UnitedStates to des cribeth econcep t in atleas t s om edetail,
talk about op tions oth er th an m is s ile defense to cop e w ith
th e th reat,andth en argue th at national m is s ile defense is
neith er needednor ap p rop riate andth at abandoning th e
A B M Treaty is unw is e.
A n oth er interlocutor sugges tedth at th e UnitedStates
andC h ina s h ould begin now to exch ange v iew s at oth er
th an th e v ery s enior lev el, th at an early div ers e dialogue
w ould be beneficial. H e s aidth at it is im p ortant to finda
w ay to dis cus s m is s ile defense is s ues s erious ly at s enior
lev els , exp ert lev els , and in Track 2 (nongov ernm ental
ch annels ) or oth er such unofficial v enues . H is reas oning
w as th at, if th e United States dep loy s m is s ile defenses ,
C h ina w ouldh av e to increas e th enum ber andquality ofits
nuclear forces . Th e United States s h ould us e all th es e
div ers e op p ortunities to p ers uade C h ina th at N M D is not
intendedagainst C h ina. [Th is s ugges tion by a s om ew h at
s enior PL A res erv e officer at a s trategic in s titute is
notew orth y p rim arily becaus e h e w as th e only s p ecialis t
w h o s eem edto take s erious ly th e UnitedStates p os ition
th at m is s iledefenses are not ultim ately intendedto beable
to defeat C h ina’s IC B M force.]
D oes C h ina W ant To Sh are in M is s ile D efense?
On th eis s ue ofth e A m erican s p os s ibly offering to s h are
m is s ile defense tech nology w ith C h ina, th ere w ere tw o
div ergent v iew s : A n arm s control s p ecialis t at a B eijing
19 1
institute op ined th at C h ina m ay , contrary to p rev ious
p os itions , be interes tedin h av ing th e UnitedStates s h are
m is s ile defens e tech nology w ith C h ina. C h ina is concerned
th at th e UnitedStates m ay react to a C h ines e attack on
Taiw an w ith a firs t s trike,andth at th eUnitedStates could
th en defeat a C h ines e retaliatory s trike w ith its m is s ile
defenses . H e rus h edto addth at h e did not consider th e
s cenario realis tic,but th at such th eoretical s cenarios w ere
th e s tuffofarm s control s trategicth inking.
Th e oth er v iew w as offeredby a civ ilian s p ecialis t and
form er dip lom at as s ociatedw ith th eState C ouncil. C h ines e
officials ,h es aid,th ink th at th eUnitedStates is not inclined
to s h are m is s ile-defense tech nology w ith C h ina but believ e
th e UnitedStates is m ore likely to s h are th at tech nology
w ith Rus s ia. M oreov er, h e as s erted, th e exam p les of
dis as ter w ith m ilitary tech nology transfers from th eUnited
States in 19 89 ,after ev ents at Tiananm en Square,s erv e as
a les s on for C h ines e w h o m igh t consider a p rogram ofU.S.
transfer ofim p ortant tech nology . A fter m ore th an a decade,
th e Tiananm en sanctions are s till in place. C h ina cannot
ris k coop eration w ith th eUnitedStates ,h es tatedflatly and
w ith out acrim ony .
C h ina W ants To B e H eard.
A n arm s control s p ecialis t w h o is currently w orking on
p recis ely th e top ic ofh ow C h ina s h ouldreact to th e B us h
adm inis tration m is s ile defen s e is s ues m ade a h op eful
obs erv ation. H e s aidth at,p rop itious ly ,th ere h av e been no
final decis ions y et by th e UnitedStates on m is s ile defense.
H e exp ects [or m ay be h op es andis ,in effect,m aking a p lea
to A m ericans to w h om h e talks ]th e UnitedStates to talk to
C h ina andnot p res ent C h ina w ith a fait accom p li on th e
is s ue. Itis not good,h es aidp laintiv ely ,for A m ericans to s ay
th at m is s ile defens es w ill be dep loy ed regardles s of th e
v iew s of oth ers , “n o m atter w h at.” A s en ior an d
w ell-connectedfigure at a p res tigious th ink tank s um m ed
up C h ina’s reaction to th e B us h p rogram s ay ing th at C h ina
19 2
w ants to talk m ore on m is s iledefenseis s ues andw ants th e
UnitedStates to leav eroom in its p olicy form ulation for th e
legitim ate concerns of C h ina. C h ina, h e rem inded, h as
s m all but “legitim ate” nuclear forces . If M D S w orks and
th es e forces are neutralized,w h at is C h ina to do? h e as ked,
ap p arently rh etorically ,s eem ing to know th at th ere w ould
be no ans w er forth com ing.
Nurture th e G oodor A ttack th e B ad?
Profes s or Yang Jiem ian at th e Sh angh ai Ins titute for
International Studies us ed th e analogy of W es tern and
C h ines em edicines in exp laining h is v iew ofh ow B eijing and
W as h ington ap p roach th em is s iledefenseis s ueandth eroot
p roblem ofth e th reat ofm is s ile attacks . H e s aidW es tern
m edicineis likem is s iledefensein th at it v igorous ly attacks
a s p ecificas p ect ofth e p roblem ,concentrating p otent,ev en
dangerous ,m edication or th erap y on a certain com p onent of
th e s ituation th at s eem s to bep roducing th e s y m p tom s . B y
contras t, C h ines e m edicine m ore broadly attem p ts to
nouris h th e p os itiv e as p ects ofa s ituation to create s teady
im p rov em ents th at ov ercom eor res olv eth enarrow p roblem
andp rev ent its recurrence.
Prognos is .
It w as m ade quite clear th at a central th em e of any
dis cus s ions th e United States m ay h av e w ith C h ina on
m is s iledefenses w ill be th e C h ines econv iction or as s ertion
th at s u ch a p rotectiv e s h ield, ev en if s ucces s ful
tech nologically andm ilitarily ,w ill ills erv e th eov erarch ing
s ecurity interes ts ofth e UnitedStates ,its allies andfriends ,
and C h ina. If W as h ington w is h es to res p ond to th at
criticis m ,th erep ly w ouldp robably begin w ith an argum ent
th at th e UnitedStates can finda w ay to h av e adequate
m is s ile defenses and,at th e s am e tim e,im p rov e or s us tain
its bilateral an d m u ltilateral relation s h ip s an d
dem onstrate th at it w ill not be h egem onic. Th at argum ent
w ould alm os t certainly fall on deaf ears , becaus e th e
19 3
C h ines e h av e conv incedth em s elv es th at m is s ile defenses
are “fals e s ecurity ,” counterp roductiv e, andev en obs tacles
to res olv ing international s ecurity p roblem s ; m any C h ines e
s trategis ts h av e als o conv incedth em s elv es th at th e United
States in creas ingly acts in an in terv en tionis t an d
h egem onicfas h ion.
N oneth eles s ,it ap p ears th at,ifdes iredby W as h ington,
th ere is a real p ros p ect ofh av ing m eaningful dis cus s ions
w ith C h ina on m is s ile defenses becaus e B eijing is s ending
th eclear s ignal th at it is w illing to talk— or at th ev ery leas t
th at it w ants to be h eard. It w ill be left to th e p atience and
s kill ofth e negotiators andto oth er unp redictable factors
w h eth er av enues for p rogres s andunders tanding w ill op en
during th e talks ,ifth ey areh eld,or w h eth er both s ides w ill
s im p ly bog dow n in th eir deep ly ruttedtracks — or m ay be
th ey s h ouldbe term ed“p res et trajectories .”
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTE R 6
1. A lth ough it is n ot ap p rop riate to m ention th e in div idual
in terlocutors , s p okes m en , an d ques tion ers , th e organ izations
rep res entedin th edis cus s ions included: in B eijing,th eD iv is ion ofA rm s
C ontrol andSecurity Studies at th e C h ina Institute ofC ontem p orary
International Relations (C IC IR),th e Ins titute for StrategicStudies at
th e PL A N ational D efense Univ ers ity , th e Sch ool of International
Studies A m erican Studies C enter at B eijing Univ ers ity , andth e th e
In s titute of W orld D ev elop m ent of th e State C ouncil of th e PRC,
In s titute ofA m erican Studies ofth eC h ines eA cadem y ofSocial Sciences
(C A SS); in H arbin, th e H eilongjiang Prov incial A cadem y of Social
Sciences; in Sh angh ai,th eSh angh aiInstitutefor InternationalStudies
(SIIS), Sh angh ai Institute for E as t A s ian Studies , andth e Sh angh ai
C enter for Rim Pac Strategic andInternational Studies ; in H angzh ou,
Zh ejiang A cadem y of Social Science; in G uangzh ou, C enter for A s ia
Pacific Studies (C A PS) and Ins titute of South eas t A s ia Studies of
Zh ongsh an Univ ers ity ,Institute ofSouth eas t A sian Studies at Jinan
Univ ers ity ,andth eIn s titute ofInternational Studies ofth eG uangzh ou
A cadem y ofSocial Sciences ; in Xiam en, Ins titute ofSouth east A s ian
Studies ofXiam en Univ ers ity . A dditionally , th e top ic w as dis cus s ed
exten s iv ely at th e th ree- day 2001 H on g K ong C on v ention of
In ternation al Studies s p ons ored by th e In ternation al Studies
A s s ociation (ISA )andth e Univ ers ity ofH ong K ong 26 -28 July .
19 4
2. Th ere w as m ore th an rh etoric to th e C h ines e as s ertion th at,
des p ite affronts by th eB us h adm inis tration,C h inaw ouldturn th eoth er
ch eek. F or exam p le, C h ines e officials announcedin early A ugus t 2001
th at C h ina w ouldbuy 36 B oeing 737 jetliners th at couldbew orth up to
$2 billion. M artin F ackler, “C h ina A irlines to B uy B oeing Jets,”
A s sociated Press w ire rep ort, A u gust 9 , 2001. In contras t to th is
announcem ent, C h ina h as in th e p as t m ade decis ions not to buy
A m erican com m ercial aircraft to dem ons trate its annoy ance w ith
W ash ington’s action s on v arious m atters. C h ina quickly offered its
s u p p ort ofth e U.S. res p onse to th e Sep tem ber 2001 terroris t attacks .
Th is likely s tem m edfrom both a desire to enh ance bilateral relations ,
expres s outrage at th e attacks,andgain U.S. s u p p ort (or at leas t m ore
unders tanding andaccep tance ofC h ina’s p roblem s w ith terroris m in
Xinjiang— w h ere it h as long w arned of th e dan gers of Is lam ic
fundam entalis m ).
3. “Jiang’s Res p onses to Ques tions Subm ittedPrior to Interv iew ,”
N ew York Tim es,A ugus t 10,2001.
4 Jerem y Page, “C h ina’s Jiang Preoccup ied w ith Taiw an— U.S.
Senator,” Reuters w ire rep ort,B eijing,A ugus t 9 ,2001.
5 . “Jiang’s Res p onses to Ques tions Subm ittedPrior to Interv iew ,”
N ew York Tim es , A u gust 10, 2001. Jiang as s erted in th e w ritten
res p onse to a N ew York Tim es ques tion th at th e F alun G ong didnot
h av eth ecap acity to beas erious th reat to C h ina. In defending h is h arsh
crackdow n,h efocus edon th eh arm th at F alun G ong does to its follow ers
andC h ines e s ociety . Th e tone andinten s ity ofth e res p onse tends to
confirm , des p ite th e defen s iv e w ords to th e contrary , th at Jiang is ,
indeed,irrationally fearfulofth ep ow er ofth eF alun G ong organization.
It als o reflects h is ap p arentbeliefth ath is anticultcam p aign is w orking,
h av ing th edes iredeffect,s o th at th eC h ines e p eop le areconv incedth e
F alun G ong is an ev il cult th at does h arm ands h ouldbe elim inatedby
gov ernm ent action.
6 . Th e abbrev iation M D S (m is s ile defen s e s y s tem , im ply ing a
m erging by th e B us h adm inis tration of v arious elem ents of m is s iles
defen s es s o as to p rov ide lay ered, w ide p rotection) s h ould not be
confus ed w ith th e abbrev iation G M D S (ground-bas ed m id-course
defense s egm ent), rough ly s y nony m ous w ith th e earlier term N M D —
knocking dow n IC B M s after boos t ph as e andbefore re-entry ,rough ly
put. Som e, s eeing th e letters G M D S h av e as s um edincorrectly th at it
m eant global m is s ile defense s y s tem .
7. Ques tions are askedabout w h y C h ina is concernedabout U.S.
N M D ifit does n ot intendto launch th os e m is s iles against U.S. targets .
19 5
C h ines e m igh t as k th e s am e ques tion about th e UnitedStates andits
IC B M arsenal. M os t A m ericans w ouldansw er as th e C h ines edo: W e
h av eno intention ofattacking any country w ith nuclear m is s iles,but w e
feel w e m us t m aintain a deterrent force.
8. Joh n Pom fret, “B eijing E as es Stand on M is s ile D efens e,”
W ash ington Post,M arch 15 ,2000,p. A 21.
9 . G iv en th e toneofth es e argum ents andp riv ate com m ents offered
after th e terrorist attacks , it s eem s only a m atter of tim e before th e
C h ines e w ill, gently or h ars h ly — dep ending on th e s tate of bilateral
relations at th e tim e, sugges t th at m is s iles defenses w ouldnot h av e
s top p edth e Sep tem ber 11 attacks .
10. W ith th e adv ent ofth e m obile,solid-fueledD ongfeng 31 IC B M ,
and es p ecially th e anticip ated longer-range follow -on v ersion, th e
p roblem ofsurv iv ability ofC h ines e IC B M s (against a first s trike)w ould
s eem to beap p reciably les s ened. B eijing m ay feel adequately confident
th at at leas t s om e of its IC B M ars enal w oulds urv iv e if th ey are not
p innedto a fixed(andprobably know n)location. Us e ofm obile decoy s
could,ofcours e,furth er com p licate U.S. targeting.
11. F or a detailed exam ination of C h ina’s objection to ballis tic
m is s ile defense for Jap an, see th e recently p ublis h ed M ich ael D .
Sw aine, et al., Jap an and B allis tic M is s ile D efense, RA N D , Santa
M onica,2001,p p . 79 -83.
12. Neith er A egis-equip p edsh ip s n or PA C -3m is s iles h av e y etbeen
ap p rov edby th e UnitedStates for transfer to Taiw an.
13. Th e D em ocraticProgres s iv e Party ofPres ident C h en Sh ui-bian
h adtraditionally been know n as a p ro-indep endence party , alth ough
C h en h as n ot em bracedth at concep tduring h is tim e in office.
14 . V ernon L oeb,“Rum s feldin M os cow for Talks ,” W as h ington Post,
A u gus t 13, 2001, p . A 9 . Rum s feldacknow ledged, as rep ortedin th is
article, Rus s ian com p laints th at th ey didnot unders tandth e kindof
m issile s y stem env is ionedby th e B us h adm inis tration andw as quoted
as s ay ing,“It’s n ot know able,w h at w e’regoing to dep loy ,becaus e w e’re
in a tes ting m ode.”
15 . U.S. State D ep artm ent tran s crip t ofa p res s conference h eldby
Pow ell on July 29 , 2001. Th e trans crip t w as entitled “Sec. Pow ell
Outlines Res ults ofV isit to A sia-PacificRegion.”
16 . H e reducedh is credibility a bit by exp laining h ow indep endent
th e C h inese m edia h adbecom e.
19 6
17. Th is arm s control s p ecialis t rais ed a p oint th at no one els e
m entioned. H e s aid th at, rath er th an talk about abrogating or
m odify ing th eA B M Treaty ,unidentifiedE urop eans are sugges ting th at
it w ouldbep referableto try to im p os es om ebroadv ers ion ofres trictions
on m is s iles,p os s ibly s om eth ing s im ilar to M TC R. H ew ent on to des cribe
it rath er v aguely as an “international court” on m is s iles . Th e idea,it
s eem ed,w ouldbeth e establis h m ent ofan internationalbody to im p ose
res trictions or p roh ibitions on th e dev elop m ent and dep loy m ent of
m issiles. Th e concep t, crudely p ut, w as th at, rath er th an building
m issile defen s es ,m is s iles w ouldbe outlaw ed.
19 7
C H A PTE R 7
E A ST A SIA N R E A C TIONS TO U.S. M ISSIL E
D E F E NSE : TORN B E TW E E N TA C IT SUPPORT
A N D OV E R T OPPOSITION
Taeh o K im
In ligh t ofth e Sep tem ber 11,2001,terroris t attacks on
th e UnitedStates h om eland,it is increas ingly certain th at
th eG eorgeW . B us h adm inis tration’s initialp olicy p riorities
an d future v is ion s w ill go th rough a reap p rais al,
readjus tm ent,andreconfirm ation. Itis als o trueth at w ar in
A fgh anis tan, togeth er w ith th e broader international
an titerroris t efforts , h as s ign ifican tly altered th e
adm inis tration’s w orking definition ofits friends andfoes
aroundth e w orld— at leas t for th e tim ebeing. Th ere is als o
littledoubt th at antiterroris m w illrem ain a p riority agenda
in future U.S. foreign policy .
It is equally likely ,h ow ev er,th at giv en its recent origin
an d its v ary in g degrees of s ign ifican ce to oth er
gov ernm ents , th e antiterroris m agenda w ill be s ev erely
contes tedby oth er com p elling U.S. p riorities andbudgetary
concerns th at h av e been p ut on h old during th e w ar in
A fgh anis tan. Th e B us h p res idency ’s initial p olicy p riorities
andfuture v is ions, albeit at a reduceds cale anda s low er
p ace, w ill be back on th e front burner s ooner rath er th an
later.
Ranging from future national s ecurity th reats to th e
UnitedStates to th e future p os s ibility ofarm edconflict in
international p olitics to U.S. relations h ip s w ith such m ajor
p ow ers as R u s s ia, C h ina, and Jap an , th ey — if fully
im p lem ented— w ouldh av e cons tituteda s h arp dep arture
19 9
from th os eofth eW illiam C linton pres idency . In p articular,
th e adm inis tration strongly intendedto not only s las h th e
s ize ofits n uclear ars enal but als o dev elop both defensiv e
andoffensiv e m is s ile s y s tem s .
Th us , m is s ile defense (M D ) s tands tall as a p rem ier
defenseis s uein th e B us h adm inis tration’s larger “m ilitary
transform ation” w ith th e bas is of defense p lanning now
being s h iftedto a future “cap ability -bas ed” ap p roach from
th e p rev ious “th reat-bas ed” one.1 One ofth e key ques tions
for U.S. p olicy m akers is h ow to m es h A m erica’s M D
p rogram w ith E as t A s ian s ecurity — now in th e larger
context ofinternational antiterroris t efforts .
In th is ch ap ter, I argue th at in ligh t of th e p olitical
s en s itiv ities , tech nological ch allenges , and budgetary
constraints as s ociatedw ith U.S. M D ,as w ell as th e div ers e
defenserequirem ents ofm ajor E as t A s ian states ,th ere is no
such th ing as a uniform , “one-s ize-fits -all” ap p roach in
coup ling A m erican M D w ith E as t A s ian security ,andth at
th os e s tates , as th e M D is s ue inch es tow ard th e central
p lacein th eir crow deds ecurity agenda,are h igh ly likely to
take a bifurcatedandp olarizedp os ition w ith s om edifferent
nuances and s h ades — th at is , betw een tacit s u p p ort and
ov ert op p os ition.
A t p res ent and for th e fores eeable future, no s ingle
regional s ecurity is s ue s eem s m ore m ultifaceted and
p otentially div is iv e th an M D . It touch es up on a v ariety of
is s ue areas ranging from regional s tability ,p ow er balance
am ong m ajor s tates ,andarm s control to U.S. alliance ties .
A s s uch , a great m any factors interv ene in each s tate’s
calculus before any actual M D dep loy m ent w ith in th e
region,w h ile an equally great num ber ofconsequences are
p os s ible as w ell. To better un ders tan d th e com p lex
calculations th e regional s tates m us t factor in, it is
neces s ary to identify andp rioritize s om e m ajor v ariables
th at affect th e debate andth e likely cours es ofaction by
indiv idual regional s tates . A t a m inim um , four m ajor
consideration s s tandout:
200
?
Th eir p rim ary s ources of current and likely future
th reat andth e relativ e w eigh t ofM D in th eir s ecurity
calculus ;
?
Th e ev olution of dom es tic p olitics an d th eir
relations h ip s w ith th e United States , including an
as s es s m en t of th e latter’s future role in an d
com m itm ent to regional s ecurity ;
?
Tech n ological feas ibility an d bu dgetary
considerations as th e M D p lan takes a m ore concrete
s h ap e in th e y ears ah ead; and,
?
Pos s ible reactions (eith er p os itiv e or negativ e) by
neigh boring s tates , es p ecially m ajor p ow ers ,to th eir
decis ion to dev elop anddep loy M D .
A m ong th e four,th e firs t factor falls w ith in th e realm of
reas onable p rediction, as it concerns geograp h y , fam iliar
th reats , and th e av ailability of defense m easures . B oth
lateral andv ertical p roliferation ofm is s ileandoth er W M D
tech nologies ov er th e p as t decades h av e alm os t inv ariably
increas edth e needto deter th is ty p e ofs ecurity th reat. Th e
dom es ticv ariable is far m ore com p lex andm ore uncertain
th an th e firs t factor and inv olv es m any unknow ns and
unknow ables dow n th e road. Th e relations h ip w ith th e
UnitedStates ,w h ich w ouldnorm ally betreatedas s ep arate
from dom es tic considerations, is often an is s ue of critical
im p ortance in th e v ortex ofp olitics in Jap an,Taiw an,and
South K orea,as all th ree dep endto a v ary ing extent on th e
United States for th eir s ecurity . Regarding th e th ird
v ariable, a th ick cloud of tech n ical u n certain ties
ov ers h adow th e M D arch itecture, es p ecially national
m is s ile defens e (N M D ), w h ile Jap an, Taiw an, andSouth
K orea,th es o-calledeconom icp ow erh ous es ,now look p alein
th efaceofgrim econom icp ros p ects . Th eregional reactions,
ofw h ich C h ina’s ap p ears th e m os t im p ortant,are likely to
be m ixed,com p licated,andnes teds o th at th ey m ay defy a
201
s im p le p rediction,ev en ifrecent dev elop m ents andexis ting
trends are extrap olated.
A s befits a p rem ier defen s e is s ue in th e B us h
adm inis tration’s “m ilitary tran s form ation,” M D s h av e
attractedenorm ous attention w ith in a s h ort p eriodoftim e
on both s ides ofth ePacificOcean. W h ileth ere h as not been
a s h ortage ofconference p roceedings , editedv olum es ,and
p olicy p ap ers , th ey tend to h igh ligh t certain as p ects of
th eater m is s ile defens e (TM D ) and/or N M D only .2 Th is
m uch m ore brief es s ay is no excep tion. In p articular, as
oth er obs erv ers h av e p ointedout, th e debate h as already
incurred dip lom atic cos ts p rem aturely : E v en if p rogram
feas ibility h as y et to be p rov en by rep eatedtes t results ,
m any obs erv ers h av e as s um edth e m os t effectiv e s y s tem .3 I
w ould furth er argue th at A m erica’s current ad h oc,
on-and-offap p roach to exp lain its M D p rogram ov ers eas is
not sufficient andh as y et to berep lacedby a m ore frequent
and institutionalized one th at aim s at addres s ing each
s tate’s defen s e requirem ents , its p olitical as w ell as
tech nical is s ues , andfinally ,future regional s tability and
p ros p erity .
W ith th e abov e considerations in m ind, th is ch ap ter
th row s s om e ligh t on each of th e four N orth eas t A s ian
p ow ers ’ p ercep tions , reactions, and likely future actions
tow ardm is s ile defense. It is intendedto be a th ink p iece
h igh ligh ting s elect as p ects of th e M D debate in Jap an,
Taiw an, South K orea, and North K orea only , as C h ina’s
p os ition and its likely actions are addres s ed in greater
detailby E ricM cV adon andM ark Stokes in th is v olum eand
by oth ers .4 A s th e auth or is tech nologically uninitiated,th is
ch ap ter w illforgo any arcane talk about th ew orldofs cience
excep t to inv oketh erelev ant auth orities ,but w illaddres s in
s om e dep th South K orea’s p ers p ectiv es , w h ich h av e often
attracteds cant attention. It concludes w ith an as s es s m ent
ofth e p otential regional cons equences ofth e M D p rogram
and a s et of p olicy p rop os als th at m igh t enh ance th e
p ros p ects for coup ling m is s ile defen s es and regional
s ecurity .
202
Japan: L im itedRes earch andD ev elop m ent (R&D )
C om m itm ent andA lliance C ons ideration.
A s an is land nation, Jap an is p articularly concerned
w ith a m is s ileth reat. Th eNorth K orean m is s iles ,es p ecially
th eir currently dep loy ed N odongs, figure p rom inently in
Jap an’s s ecurity p lanning. W h ile th ep os s ibility is v ery low ,
C h ina’s p otential th reat to us e its m edium -range ballis tic
m is s iles (M RB M s )in v arious contingencies als o cannot be
ruledout. F or instance,in th econtext ofan inter-K orean or
a cros s -Straitconflict,Jap an w ouldrem ain w orriedabout a
p otential or actual m is s ile th reat by N orth K orea and/or
C h ina andth e collateral cos t ofbeing a h os t to U.S. F orces
Jap an (USF J)as w ell as a clos e ally ofth e UnitedStates .
A s com p elling as th e p erceiv ed m is s ile th reat is th e
cons ideration of alliance m aintenance. E v en if Jap an’s
decis ion to com m it to a lim itedjoint R&D p rogram on TM D
w as p recip itatedby th eA ugus t 19 9 8 fligh t-tes t ofth eN orth
K orean Taep odong-1, th e A m erican reques t for Jap an’s
p articip ation in M D h arkens back to th e StrategicD efense
Initiativ e (SD I)p rogram in 19 83. A s long as Jap an regards
its alliancerelations h ip w ith th eUnitedStates as v ital to its
national interes t,its lim itedp articip ation in M D s h ouldbe
taken as a m easure to s trength en th eU.S.-Jap an alliancein
th e p os t-C old W ar era. Th us , alliance con s iderations ,
togeth er w ith a p otential m is s ile th reat, cons titute a
p rim ary rationale influencing Jap an’s decis ion to join th e
R&D p rogram , w h ich is als o in line w ith Jap an’s ov erall
s trategictilt tow ardth e UnitedStates in th ep os t-C oldW ar
era.
A t p res ent,Jap an p articip ates in a joint R&D p rogram
on four tech nical areas ofth e N av y Th eater-W ide (N TW )
m is s ile p rogram , bu t h as n ot com m itted its elf to
dev elop m ent or dep loy m ent ofTM D .5 It currently op erates
s ix battalions of24 enh ancedPatriot A dv ancedC ap ability -2
(PA C -2 Plus )fire units ,w h ich ,under th e 19 75 agreem ent
w ith th e UnitedStates ,are p art ofJap an’s air-defense role
for U.S. m ilitary installations. A s ofth e endof2001,Jap an
203
is likely to acquire PA C -3 as p art ofits force im p rov em ent
p lan and/or an up gradedPA C -3C onfiguration-3s y s tem to
fully function as p art of a lay ered TM D arch itecture. In
addition to th e current four K ongo-clas s A E G IS-equip p ed
des troy ers , th e Jap an M aritim e Self-D efen s e F orce
(JM SD F )p lans to acquire tw o additional s h ip s in th e new
M id-term D efense Program (2001-2005 ),w ith th e decis ion
likely in 2003. F or reas ons relatedto Jap an’s requirem ents
ands y s tem ch aracteris tics ,oth er TM D com p onents ,s uch as
th eater h igh altitude area defense (TH A A D )andnav al air
defense (N A D ),are not likely to be s erious ly cons idered.
B efore m ov ing bey ondth ecurrent R&D s tage,h ow ev er,
Jap anes e p olicy m akers needto p ay attention to a h os t of
m ajor dom es ticandexternal factors . F irs t,as th e Jap anes e
econom y suffers from nearly 0 p ercent grow th for a decade,
coup ledw ith grow ing nonp erform ing andunderp erform ing
loans anda record-h igh unem p loy m ent rate of 5 p ercent
th rough out2001,th eJSD F is doom edto engagein an up h ill
battle again s t th e national lev el s ocial p rogram s and
econom ic res toration efforts , as w ell as w ith in its th ree
s erv ices .
Second, Jap an’s M D debate is s ubject to w ell-know n
bureaucratic in-figh ting and legal cons traints . It is th e
com p lex anddiv is iv enatureofM D th at brings to bear up on
th edebate th econtinuedcom p etition am ong th eideological
cam p s (left v s . righ t),interes t group s (anti-C h ina group s v s .
arm s con trol s up p orters ) an d gov ern m en t agen cies
(M inis try of F inance v s . Jap an D efen s e A gency ). Th e
w eakening of th e traditional left and th e new “K oizum i
factor”— as Jap an’s w ider s ecurity role in th e w ake ofth e
w ar in A fgh anis tan dem ons trates — couldm ake a s tronger
cas efor m is s iledefense,alth ough a fragilep oliticalcoalition
andth e ens uing frequent ch ange ofgov ernm entcoulds teer
th e debate back in to a m ore fam iliar bureaucratic
tug-of-w ar am ong th e m inis tries concernedw ith th eis s ue.6
A s Step h en A . C am bone h as p ointedout in a p ercep tiv e
s tudy , th e M D p rogram is s et to s tir dom es tic debate in
Jap an as it touch es upon such s ensitiv e is s ues as th e
204
p eacefulus eofs p ace,th erigh t ofcollectiv edefense,andth e
exp ort ofdefense-relatedtech nologies .7
Th ird,C h ines e reactions w ill h av e an im p ortant role to
p lay . Jap anes e p olicy m akers w ill rem ain concernedw ith
th e negativ e im p act of its M D decis ion on Sino-Jap anes e
relations , ev en if C h ina’s relations w ith both th e United
States andJap an arelikely to bes trainedfor th efores eeable
future regardles s . A s to th e m os t s ensitiv eis s ues inv olv ing
Jap an in th e ey es ofB eijing— th at is ,Jap an’s p otential role
in a Taiw an contingency , Jap an h as no p ractical op tion
oth er th an taking an am biguous s tance. F or th is reas on,
Jap an w ill be v ery cautious and rem ain m indful of th e
s o-called “international s ecurity s ituation,” in w h ich th e
C h ina factor occup ies a central p lace. A s ide from p olitical
dev elop m ents in cros s - Strait and inter- K orean relations
th at m any A m erican officials andanaly s ts often believ e to
beim p ortant v ariables ,th e p os itions by Taiw an andSouth
K orea on TM D acquis ition could s ignificantly affect th e
Jap anes e decis ion as w ell.
F ourth , ev en if th e PA C -3 low -tier and A E G IS-bas ed
N TW up p er-tier s y s tem s w ere ev entually to be acquiredby
Jap an, it w ould leav e no role for th e Jap an G round
Self-D efens e F orce (JG SD F ). Not only does th e arm y s till
rem ain th e m os t dom inant s erv ice in Jap an— as w ell as in
K orea— but inter-serv ice riv alry am ong th e s erv ices , w ith
each try ing to s ecureits res p ectiv ecrow n jew els (e.g.,tanks ,
s h ip s , andaircraft), does n ot bode w ell for TM D funding.
Under such circum s tances a real op p ortunity cos t exis ts
betw een m ajor p latform s andTM D .
F ifth , an d clos ely related to th e fourth factor,
interop erability and com m and and control p roblem s w ill
aris e s ooner rath er th an later. A s th e JSD F is n ot
s tructuredto op erate under a com bined forces com m and
w ith th e UnitedStates ,unlike th e U.S.-Republic ofK orea
(ROK )cas e, it needs to addres s s uch com p lex ques tions as
th e lev el of interop erability , s urv eillance and cueing,
adjus tm ents offorce s tructure, andop erational control.
205
Taken togeth er, th es e is s ues confront Jap an w ith
div ers ech allenges ,w h ich it m us t facebeforem ov ing bey ond
th e current R&D p h as e. IfJap an ev er takes th at cours e of
action,it w ouldtran s p ire in th econtext ofdom es ticp olitics
andan external env ironm ent ch aracterizedby a dram atic
dep arture from th e p as t p atterns. In order to p rep are for
such an ev entuality , as one Jap anes e obs erv er noted, a
p olitical decis ion bas edon th ecriticality ofth eU.S. alliance
as w ell as p ublic education intended to p rov ide a better
unders tan din g of th is arcan e is s ue w ill be a good
beginning.8
Taiw an: In Search ofa Political Sh ield.
A m is s ile th reat from m ainlandC h ina,togeth er w ith a
lim ited nav al blockade, constitutes a p rim ary s ource of
concern to Taiw an, es p ecially at th e op ening s tages of a
large-s cale cros s - Strait conflict. B es ides its longer-range
m is s ile inv entory , C h ina is rep orted to h av e dep loy ed a
m inim um of15 0-200 s h ort-rangeballis ticm is s iles (SRB M s )
op p os ite Taiw an an d doubtles s h as a cap ability to
s ignificantly increas e its exis ting m is s ile ars enal.9 Sh ort
w arning tim e furth er com p licates any m is s ile defen s e
s ch em e by Taiw an.
E v en if Taiw an p os s es s es a lim ited m is s ile defense
cap ability cons is ting ofth ree PA C -2/M odifiedA ir D efense
Sy s tem (M A D S)fire units w ith 200 m is s iles as w ell as of
Tien Kung (Sky B ow )s urface-to-air m is s iles (SA M s ),it by
no m ean s p os s es s es s ufficient m eas ures to counter th elarge
andap p arently grow ing C h ines e m is s ile th reat. F or th is
reas on, Taiw an h as cons idered oth er op tions , s uch as
dev elop m ent of longer-range m is s iles th at can reach th e
targets inside th e m ainlandandh as im p lem entedv arious
p as s iv edefensem easures . Noneofth em arelikely to bev ery
effectiv e against th e C h ines e m is s iles ,h ow ev er.
A s m any obs erv ers in W as h ington,B eijing,andTaip ei
h av e p ointed out, Taiw an’s s earch for a m is s ile defense
cap ability centering on th e UnitedStates is p rim arily aim ed
206
at s ecuring p olitical, rath er th an m ilitary , deterrence. A s
th e needto counter th e m ainland’s th reat andto m aintain
relations w ith th eUnitedStates is a w ell-es tablis h edfact of
lifeam ong p oliticians andth egeneralpublicin Taiw an,it is
natural for Taiw an to consider joining U.S. M D to an extent
andin w ay s th at m aintain stability in th e Taiw an Strait.
Th e danger lies ,according to Th om as J. C h ris tensen,in
th efals es enseofs afety M D m igh tcreate for W as h ington as
w ell as for Taip ei. In h is w ords ,“Th e acquis ition ofm is s ile
defenses th us m ay p erv ers ely m ake th eis landap p ear s afer
th an it actually is in th e ey es ofth e A m erican p ublic and
leaders h ip , to th e detrim ent of Taiw an’s s ecurity .”10
Furth erm ore,as a Stim s on C enter rep ort h as p ersuas iv ely
argued,11 any TM D com p onents transferredto Taiw an th at
areinterop erableandlinkedw ith U.S. forces w ouldnot only
inv ite a s trong reaction from C h ina, including tensions in
th e Taiw an Strait, andin U.S.-C h ina relations, but could
actually s endanoth er w rong s ignal to th e Taiw an p eop le,as
notedbefore.
F or its p art, Taiw an m ade an official call for com m on
defense against th egrow ing C h ines em is s ileth reat to its elf
as w ell as to th e United States and Jap an. In a recent
interv iew , Taiw an Pres ident C h en Sh ui-bian arguedth at
“A PRC [m is s ile]th reat agains t Taiw an is s om eth ing th at
th eUnitedStates ,Jap an andTaiw an m us t jointly dealw ith
th rough th ediv is ion ofres p onsibility andcoop eration.”12 In
a s im ilar v ein,Taiw an’s M inis try ofN ational D efensem ade
clear th at if inv itedit w ould “s erious ly ” cons ider joining
U.S. M D .
W h ile Taiw an’s reactions to U.S. M D w ill v ery m uch
dep endup on th e lev el of m is s ile and oth er th reats from
m ainland C h ina, th e C h ines e leaders h ip , for its p art,
rem ains w orried about any p os s ible connection betw een
U.S. TM D andth e Taiw an ques tion. C h ina’s reactions to
TM D transfers to Taiw an w illbem os t s erious . A s M D w ould
com p rom is eits ability to coerceTaiw an not to m ov ebey ond
th elim its s et by B eijing,th e PRC is v ery op p os edto Taiw an
207
TM D . In p articular, as a recent s tudy by th e M onterey
Institute ofInternational Studies (M IIS)h as p ointedout,a
TM D linkedw ith Taiw an— es p ecially th e A E G IS-equip p ed
des troy ers — w oulds ev erely im p air C h ina’s ability to deter
th eUnitedStates or th eUnitedStates andJap an in a m ajor
Taiw an contingency andw ouldconstitute a quas i-alliance
betw een Taiw an and th e United States .13 It m ay th us
furth er reinforce a circle ofcontainm ent against C h ina.
In ligh t ofboth Taiw an’s n eedfor a p olitical s h ieldin th e
faceofa clear m is s ileth reat andofC h ina’s s trong reactions
against clos er ties betw een Taiw an andth e UnitedStates ,
any v iable future for Taiw an w ould fall betw een th e
op p os ite p os itions. Th is als o p oints to th e fact th at any
res olution in cros s - Strait relations w ill ands h ould be ofa
p olitical, an d h op efully p eaceful, n ature. H ow ev er,
continueds talem ate in th e cros s -Strait talks ,coup ledw ith
th e h igh ly lim ited s cop e of th e M D debate in Taiw an,14
w ould continue to m ake th e is s ue a dorm ant y et h igh ly
consequential one in th e th ree-w ay relationsh ip am ong
B eijing,Taip ei,andW as h ington.
South K orea: Self-reliant Now ,L inked w ith th e
UnitedStates L ater?
C ountering m is s ile th reats in South K orea’s ov erall
defense requirem ents s h ouldbes een in a different context
from th os e of Jap an and Taiw an. F or one th ing, th e
kaleidos cop icch anges in pos t-C oldW ar global andregional
s ecurity notw ith s tanding, th e crux ofth e K orean security
p roblem h as rem ainedrem arkably unch angedto date: a
land-bas edm ilitary th reat from N orth K orea. E v en w ith out
a Nuclear, B iological, and C h em ical (N B C ) cap ability ,
N orth K orea’s conv entional m ilitary cap ability in general
and th e s ize, dep loy m ent, and equip m ent of th e N orth
K orean Peop le’s A rm y (N K PA ) in p articular p os e a
s ignificant th reat to th e defenseofSouth K orea. Not only is
th e N K PA n um erically s up erior and h igh ly m ech anized,
but 6 5 p ercent of its offen s iv e elem ents are currently
208
concentrated w ith in 6 0 m iles n orth of th e D em ilitarized
Zone (D M Z). Since Seoul, th e South K orean cap ital and
h om eof12m illion p eop le,is locatedles s th an 30 m iles s outh
ofth e dem ilitarizedzone (D M Z),th e South K orean forces
w ouldh av elittle s trategicdep th andw arning tim e. W h ileit
is true th at th e South K orean forces ,backedby th e United
States forces andby th eir ow n indus trial infras tructure,do
retain a s ubs tan tial tech nological edge, th e N K PA ’s
quantitativ eandgeograp h icaladv antages couldw ellleadto
unaccep table dam age up on th e South , es p ecially up on
Seoul.15
Th rough out th e 19 9 0s , m oreov er, N orth K orea’s
accum ulation of an NB C cap ability p os ed an additional
th reat to South K orean security . North K orea’s consis tent
efforts to dev elop v arious ty p es of m is s ile s y s tem s w ere
m anifes t in at leas t th ree fligh t tes ts : th e M ay 19 9 3tes t of
th e N odong m is s ile (an im p rov edv ers ion ofScud-C )w ith
th e range of ov er 5 00 m iles ; th e June 19 9 4 tes t of tw o
6 0-m ile an tis h ip m is s iles ; an d th e w ell- p u blicized
th ree-stage Taep odong-1 M edium -Range B allis tic M is s ile
(M RB M ) in A ugus t 19 9 8.16 North K orea is believ ed to
p os s es s 300-5 00 Scud Sh ort-Range B allis tic M is s iles
(SRB M s )ofv arious ty p es andabout 100 N odong M RB M s .
H ow ev er, m os t w orris om e, es p ecially at th e op ening
p h as es of w ar, is th e th reat of barrage tactics by N orth
K orea’s 11,5 00-s trong artillery . In p articular,th e 24 0-m m
M ultip le Rocket L au n ch ers (M RL s ) an d 1 7 0 - m m
s elf-p rop elledguns, w ith a range of6 5 kilom eters and4 5
kilom eters , res p ectiv ely , can literally s h ow er Seoul w ith
th ous ands ofrounds w ith in a few h ours — a fact p ointedly
m ade in an ap ocaly p tics tatem ent in M arch 19 9 4 by N orth
K orean negotiator Park Young Soo w h o th reatened h is
counterp art th at, in cas e ofa w ar, Seoul w ould becom e a
“s ea of fire.” A s an additional rem inder of th is artillery
th reat, th e N K PA ’s tw o artillery corp s are currently
dep loy edbelow th ePy ongy ang-W ons an line. Th us ,it can be
concludedth at N orth K orea’s m is s ilecap ability cons titutes
209
a s ignificant, but not th e p rim ary ,th reat to South K orean
s ecurity .
Th e relativ e w eigh t giv en to m is s ile th reats in South
K orea’s ov erall defense requirem ents w as a m ajor factor in
th e ROK gov ernm ent’s M arch 19 9 9 announcem ent th at it
w ouldnot p articip ate in a U.S. TM D s y s tem on th e ground
th at “South K orea’s geograp h ical ch aracteris tics and its
lim iteds trategic dep th as w ell as our tech nical cap ability
andeconom icconditions w ouldnot allow us to join it at th is
s tage.”17
ROK p olicy m akers arew ellaw are,h ow ev er,th at m is s ile
defense is an is s ue th at couldcritically affect th e h ealth of
its alliancerelations h ip w ith th e UnitedStates . B es ides its
allianceties ,South K orea rem ains central to an ov erallU.S.
M D p lan and its regional com p onents : th e N orth K orean
m is s ile as a p rim ary rationale,th e M utual D efense Treaty
(M D T)-m andated dep loy m ent of U.S. w eap ons in and
aroundSouth K orea,andth ep res enceofU.S. F orces K orea
(USF K ).
It w ould be an exaggeration to s ay , h ow ev er, th at in
South K orea th ere h as been an extensiv e debate on th e M D
is s ue at eith er th e public or gov ernm ent lev el.18 Th e
gov ernm ent’s p os ition h as largely been confinedto th at of
th e M inis try of N ational D efen s e (M N D ), w h ile any
in-dep th dis cus s ions on th ep ros andcons ofm is s iledefenses
in South K orea h av e s o far been h eldonly by a h andful of
p olicy in s titu tes , u n iv ers ities , an d nongov erm en t
organizations (N G Os).19 F rom th os e lim iteddebates ,a few
em erging p ers p ectiv es can be dis cernedth at couldaffect
South K orea’s likely cours e ofaction.
F irs t, h ow could p eace and unification, th e p rim ary
national objectiv eofSouth K orea,bereconciledw ith m is s ile
defenses ? W ould th e p eace p roces s on th e p eninsula be
inv ers ely correlatedw ith U.S. m is s ile defense, as M ich ael
G reen andToby D alton,am ong oth ers ,h av e p os ited?20 Or
w ouldm is s ile defense constitute a p art of South K orea’s
p rep aration for its futures ecurity env ironm entregardles s ?
210
Secondis th e p os s ibility for a ch ange ofgov ernm ent in
th e D ecem ber 2002 p res idential election. Unlike th e
incum bent gov ernm ent, w h ich puts a h eav y em p h as is on
reconciliation w ith N orth K orea, L ee H oei C h ang, th e
current ch airm an ofth e op p os ition G randN ational Party ,
w h o w as defeated in th e 19 9 7 p res idential election by a
narrow m argin, is know n to h av e a m uch tough er p olicy
s tance tow ard N orth K orea in general and tow ard th e
latter’s m is s ile andw eap ons of m as s des truction (W M D )
cap ability in particular.21
It s h ouldals o be notedp arenth etically th at m uch ofth e
confus ion in th e ROK ’s N orth K orea p olicy s tem s from th e
ten s ion betw een a p rogres s iv e gov ern m en t an d
conserv ativ e s ociety in South K orea, w h ile th e op p os ite—
th at is , a con s erv ativ e gov ern m ent an d p rogres s iv e
s ociety — h as long been th ecas ein pos t-w ar K orean p olitics .
Th ird, w h ile th e ROK gov ernm ent decidednot to join
U.S. TM D , it does not neces s arily m ean th at it w ill be
dep riv edofany m is s ile defense cap ability in th e future,a
p oint frequently rais ed by th e inquis itiv e m edia andth e
critical NG Os.
W h ile it is rare for s enior ROK officials to m ake p ublic
s tatem ents on M D ,one ofth e m os t exp licit s tatem ents w as
m adeby th edefensem inis ter in early 2001,w h ich des erv es
a long quotation.
Th eU.S. NM D p lan,w h ich is s tillat a concep tual stage,needs
to cop e w ith tech nical p roblem s , budget ap p rop riation,
cons ultations w ith allies including NA TO, andRus s ian and
C h ines e res p onses andw ill th erefore take s om e tim e to be
fin alized. Th e [R O K ] gov ern m en t, w h en th e B us h
adm inis tration’s N M D p lan becom es m ore concrete, w ill
cautious ly clarify our p os ition after taking a com p reh en s iv e
v iew of our cap ability and oth er s ecurity cons ideration s .
Regarding TM D , th e gov ern m ent is n ot cons idering to
p articip ate in it at th is s tage in ligh t of our geograp h ical
ch aracteris tics , econom iccap ability ,andth e urgency of[our]
res p ons es to N orth K orea’s long-range artillery an d
s h ort-range th reats [Scuds ?]. Ov er th elonger term ,giv en th e
211
curren t North K orean m is s ile th reat and future battle
env ironm ent, w e are rev iew ing to con s truct a m is s ile defen s e
22
s y s tem suitable to our ow n [security ]env ironm ent.
Furth erm ore, th e South K orean m ilitary is now in th e
m iddle of m akin g fiv e m ajor w eap ons p rocurem en t
decis ions: th e F-X, th e A H -X, th e E -X, th e SA M -X, and
K D X-III.23 A m ong th e fiv e big-ticket item s , totaling ov er
$10 billion ($1=1,200 w on), th e SA M -X, th e K D X-III, and
th e E -X (A irborne W arning andC ontrol Sy s tem )p rogram s
are relev ant to an M D arch itecture, ev en if th e ev entual
form of any ROK m is s ile defens e s y s tem is a m atter of
conjectureatth is tim e.24 F or th eSA M -X p rogram th ePA C -3
C onfiguration-3 is a s erious contender, w h ile th e K D X-III
includes tw o des troy ers w ith th e A E G IS s y s tem . A s for th e
rem aining th reep latform s ,it s eem s s afeto s ay th at th ey are
s till being contes ted by A m erican and E urop ean defense
bidders .
W h ile th e gov ernm ent s tillinsis ts — only w h en as kedby
th e inquis itiv e K orean and foreign m edia— on an M D
s y s tem th at fits into South K orea’s n eeds , it begs th e
ques tion ofh ow th eROK w ouldev er acquireandop erateth e
surv eillance, cueing, and B attle M anagem ent/C om m and,
C ontrol, and C om m unications (B M /C 3) cap ability , w h ich
im m ediately p uts a big ques tion m ark on its tech nical
feas ibility and funding av ailability . A t p res ent, USF K
op erates only onebattalion ofPatriot m is s iles w ith s ix firing
batteries , w h ich can barely defendits key ins tallations—
again a p ointedrem inder ofth e ROK gov ernm ent’s future
needfor a larger m is s ile-defense s y s tem .
F inally , like m any oth er s tates in th e region, South
K orea w illals o factor in th eim p act ofits M D decis ion on its
larger n eigh bors , es p ecially on C h ina. Th is is quite
unders tandable,as p eace ands ecurity on th e p enins ula is
as m uch an international is s ue as an inter- K orean one and
th em ajority ofth eSouth K orean publicp erceiv es ,righ tly or
w rongly ,th at C h ina w ill p lay a grow ing andbenign role in
p enins ular affairs in th e future.25 To m ake a long s tory
212
s h ort,h ow ev er,th e C h ina factor,w h ile im p ortant,w ill not
dom inate th edecis ion,as a com bination offactors including
South K orea’s defense needs ,its elite p ercep tions,andth e
em erging s trategic configuration in th e region all p oint to
th e p rolongation of th e exis ting “s trategic p rioritization”
w ith th e UnitedStates in th e decades to com e.
North K orea: A M atter ofRegim e Surv iv al.
B eing s ingledout as a p rim ary rationale for U.S. M D ,
N orth K orea adam antly op p os es th e p lan. N orth K orea’s
v is ceral reaction to M D , h ow ev er, s h ould be s een in th e
context ofits fundam entalgoal: regim es urv iv al. Its nuclear
andm is s ilecap ability is a m ultip urp os e enabler th at h elp s
to keep th e K im Jong Il regim e afloat.26 M ilitarily ,for one
th ing,it deters th eUnitedStates or th eROK -U.S. com bined
forces from attacking th e N orth in cas e ofa contingency as
its Scuds , N odongs , and p os s ibly Taep odongs could
th reaten South K orea, Jap an, and th e United States ,
res p ectiv ely . D ip lom atically , for an oth er, its m is s ile
cap ability h elp s N orth K orea to m aintain its ow n lev erage
andp res tige in th einternational arena. F or s tillanoth er,its
m is s ile cap ability is a m ajor h ard currency earner in its
ov erall declining outs ide trade.
F or th es e reas ons , w h ile taking a “dip lom atic united
fron t” again s t U.S. M D w ith M os cow an d B eijing,
Py ongy ang h as offered th e m os t acerbic p h ras es in its
officialRodong Sh inm un,w h ich s ay s th at th eUnitedStates
h as intendedto “run ov er th e Rep ublic [D PRK ] by M D ,”
“p us h to death th os ew h o do not surrender,” and“aim at th e
w h olew orldas its s trategiccoordinates .”27 Itfurth er argues
th at th e“s o-calledth eory ofth eN orth K orean m is s ileth reat
is an unas h am edcasuis try ,” andth at th e UnitedStates is
now th reatening North K orea by m ilitary m eans andw ould
launch a p reem p tiv e s trike at it at th e righ t m om ent.28
A m ong a long lis t ofnegativ eim p acts ofM D unto its elf,
M D w aters dow n andm ay ev entually neutralize th e utility
of N orth K orea’s n u clear an d m is s ile p rogram as a
213
bargaining ch ip (if it w as ev er intended to be s o) in its
negotiation w ith th e UnitedStates . It is als o p os s ible and
ev en likely ,h ow ev er,th at th eN orth K orean leaders h ip h as
already unders toodth efactth at des p ite its rep eatedh os tile
rh etoric,TM D /N M D is not an is s ue to bebargainedaw ay at
any p rice. North K orea’s p ers p ectiv es andp os itions on M D
are s im ilar to th os e of C h ina in th at it s ees U.S. M D as
h av in g a p olitical m otiv e bas ed on m ilitary an d
tech nological p row es s and th at M D is aim ed at “rogue
s tates ,” “s tates ofconcern,” “m is s ilep roliferators ”— in oth er
w ords ,th e dis likes ofth e UnitedStates .
W h ile th e B us h adm inis tration h as confirm ed th e
resum p tion of negotiations w ith Py ongy ang, th e latter
unders tands full w ell th at unles s its W M D cap abilities ,
m is s ilep roliferation andconv entional forces are addres s ed,
th ere w illbelittleh op efor im p rov edrelations betw een its elf
andW as h ington. Notw ith s tanding Secretary ofState C olin
L . Pow ell’s call for a resum p tion ofU.S.-N orth K orean talks
“any w h ere, at any tim e,”29 th e new U.S. adm inis tration’s
dem and for an “im p rov ed im p lem entation” of th e 19 9 4
G enev a A greem ent, “v erifiable cons traints ” on m is s ile
p rogram s as w ellas th econv entionalforceis s ue— w h ich are
s ignificantly different from th os e ofth e Perry Proces s — are
s een by N orth K orea as tantam ount to giv ing up its trum p
cards .
N orth K orea’s p os s iblereactions to U.S. M D dep loy m ent
andp articularly South K orea’s futureinv olv em ent in it are
by no m eans certain. A lim itedrangeofop tions North K orea
m igh t take, s uch as exp an s ion, im p rov em en t, an d
s op h is tication ofth e exis ting m is s ile ars enal,dev elop m ent
ofnew ty p es ofm is s iles or counterm easures ,andincreas ed
m is s ile s ales , w ould be p roh ibitiv ely cos tly an d/or
dip lom atically unw is e. In th eir s tead, N orth K orea’s
s h ort-term s olution is a dip lom aticclarion call w ith C h ina
andRus s ia,w h ile w aiting for a ch ange ofatm os p h erics in a
recalcitrant W as h ington. A s long as Seoul and Toky o
rem ain v ulnerable to its m is s ileandN B C cap ability ,N orth
214
K orea m ay take a coerciv e op tion com binedw ith s ep arate
negotiations w ith th e UnitedStates andSouth K orea.
It w as , h ow ev er, in th is cons tricted extern al
env ironm ent ofN orth K orea th at th eSep tem ber 11 attacks
interv ened. F or one th ing, North K orea h adnev er h elda
p riority in th e B us h adm inis tration’s long foreign p olicy
agenda— at leas t before Sep tem ber 11. F or anoth er,now is
not th e tim e for N orth K orea to draw w orldattention by
m aking its tim e-p rov en prov ocations or incidents ,w h ich are
noneth eless neces s ary for a continuedflow ofinternational
as s is tance onto its elf.30 F or s till anoth er, as Russia’s
os tensibly m oderate res p ons e to U.S. w ith draw al from th e
A B M Treaty m igh t in dicate, N orth K orea’s s tron g
op p os ition to M D m ay end up w ith a ch orus of one—
arguably th e w ors t s ituation in th e ey es ofPy ongy ang. In
s h ort, N orth K orea’s lim ited m ilitary and dip lom atic
op tions as to M D w ouldlikely res ult in delay ing tactics in
s ep aratetalks w ith th eUnitedStates andw ith South K orea
ov er th e longer term .
C onclus ions andIm p lications for E as t A s ian
Security .
In th e clos ing p ages ofth is ch ap ter,it is ap p rop riate to
sum up th e findings and argum ents w ith res p ect to th e
ques tions rais edat th e outs et. F irs t,in ligh t ofth e v ary ing
consequences ofU.S. M D on regional s ecurity andofequally
div ers e reactions to it by indiv idual s tates , it is critical to
addres s th e s p ecificdefense requirem ents ofU.S. regional
allies andfriends andth eir concerns w ith regardto th eM D
is s ue. Th is is all th e m ore neces s ary becaus e— ev en ifU.S.
regional allies and friends generally s up p ort th e M D
p rogram — th ere w ill be nuances in p olicies , s h ades in
com m itm en t, and delay s in im p lem entation in th eir
reactions.
Second,as th e h igh ly circum s cribednature ofth e M D
debate in th e th ree coun tries — at both p ublic an d
gov ernm ental lev el— s trongly indicates , m ore regular and
215
m ore s y s tem atic efforts on th e U.S. p art are neces s ary to
exp lain its M D p lan to regional s tates . F ocus eddis cus s ions
on th e different lev els ofm is s ile th reat to indiv idual s tates
andcons ideration ofth eir dom es ticp olitics — th e tw o m os t
im p ortant factors driv ing th eir indiv idual res p onses to
M D — w ould be a good s tarting p oint. A n institutionalized
dis cus s ion of th e M D is s ue in regular U.S. defens e talks
w ith its allies w ouldbeanoth er ap p roach enh ancing m utual
unders tanding on th e subject.
Th is als o undergirds th eth irdrecom m endation,w h ich is
th at th e s ooner th e United States cop es w ith th e m ajor
defense ands trategicconcerns ofregional s tates on M D ,th e
eas ier it w ill be to tackle th e s p ecific tech nical andev en
budgetary is s ues later. W ith out a s em blanceofth ough t,for
instance, on th e future p os s ibility of p os s es s ing eith er
indiv idualized M D as s ets or th os e of an in tegrated
N orth eas t A s ian M D s y s tem , th e regional s tates w ould
continue th eir ow n soul-s earch ing w ith s ignificant w as te of
p olitical andbudgetary res ources likely dow n th e road. F or
anoth er,th e C h ina factor,andm ore s p ecifically A m erica’s
unders tanding w ith C h ina on th e M D is s ue, s h ould be
conv ey ed to regional s tates s o as to allay th eir concerns
about C h ina’s p otential reactions to th e M D is s ue andto
th eir res p ectiv e bilateral ties . Th is w ouldbe p articularly
p ertinent as C h in a enters th e critical p eriod of th e
generational ch ange in leaders h ip andofp rojecting benign
im ages to th e outs ide w orld.
F ourth ,w h ile th ere is little doubt in A m erica’s needand
determ ination for a M D p lan, a m ore s ensible andm ore
balancedap p roach is neces s ary to cop e w ith oth er ty p es of
international and regional s ources of th reat. A s th e
Sep tem ber 11 attacks h av ev iv idly s h ow n,a fuller s p ectrum
ofth reats to national s ecurity is now th eorder ofth eday for
m os t nations in th ew orld. Th ey include,but arenot lim ited
to, biological and ch em ical attacks , border/h om eland
in filtration , com p u ter v irus es , an d in ternational
terroris m . 31 In brief, a v iable M D p rogram s h ould
216
com p lem ent, n ot s u p p lant, oth er com p elling defen s e
requirem ents ofa nation.
F inally ,it is trite,but true, to note th at M D ultim ately
intends to enh anceboth U.S. s ecurity andregionals tability .
N eith er goal s h ouldbep urs uedat th e exp ense ofth e oth er.
N or s h ould th e M D is s ue be taken as a litm us tes t for
“m aking or breaking” U.S. bilateral relations h ip s w ith its
allies and friends in th e region. B arring any unfores een
dev elop m ents or regional s h ocks ,it is certainly p os s ible for
U.S. regional allies andfriends to adjus t th eir res p ectiv e
defense requirem ents for th e s ake ofregional s tability and
p ros p erity . W h eth er or not th eM D is s uew illop en up a new
p os s ibility for th is goal w ill h inge on a renew edeffort and
m utual unders tanding on both s ides ofth e A s ia-Pacific.
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTE R 7
1. “M ilitary tran s form ation” is th e key w ordof th e Quadrennial
D efens e Rev iew (QD R)Rep ort releas edby th e Pentagon on Septem ber
30,2001. For th eop erational goals ofth em ilitary tran s form ation,s eep.
30 ofth e QD R Rep ort. See als o K im B urger,“QD R Rep ort B lurs E dges
on Sp ecific Strategy ,” Jane’s D efence W eekly , October 10, 2001, p . 10;
A n drew K och , “QD R A im s to Transform US F orces ,” Jane’s D efence
W eekly ,A ugus t 22,2001,p. 6 .
2. F or a fuller dis cus s ion ofU.S. M D andE ast A s ian security ,s ee
M ich aelD . Sw aine,Rach elM . Sw anger,andTakash iK aw akam i,Jap an
andB allisticM issileD efense,Santa M onica: RA N D C orp oration,2001;
E v an S. M edeiros , ed.,B allis tic M is s ile D efense and N orth eas t A s ian
Security : V iew s from W ash ington, B eijing,and Toky o, M onterey : Th e
Stanley Foundation and th e M onterey In s titute of International
Studies ,2001; M ich aelJ. G reen andToby F. D alton,A s ian Reactions to
U.S. M is s ile D efens e, N B R A naly s is , V ol. 11, N o. 3, N ov em ber 2000;
Th eater M is s ile D efenses in th e A s ia-Pacific Region, W orking G roup
Report N o. 34 ,W as h ington,D C : A H enry L . Stim s on C enter,June2000.
See als o th econferencep ap ers p res entedat th e “Partners h ip for Peace:
B u ilding L ong-term Security C oop eration in North eas t A s ia,”
h ttp:/ / w w w .nautilus .org/ nukep olicy / w orks h op s / s h angh ai-01/ p ap er
s .h tm l, and“E ast A s ian Regional Security F utures : Th eater M is s ile
D efen s e Im p lications ,” h ttp :/ / w w w .nautilus .org/ nukep olicy / TM D C onference/ index.h tm l.
3. See,for exam p le,M edeiros ,p . i.
217
4 . F or C h ina’s official p os itions on M D ,s ee a s eries ofs tatem ents by
A m bas s ador Sh a Zukang at th e PRC F oreign M inis try ’s w eb p age,
w w w .fm p rc.gov .cn. See als o Yan Xuetong, “TM D Rocking Regional
Stability ,”K orean Journal ofD efenseA naly s is,V ol. 11,No. 1,Sum m er
19 9 9 , p p . 6 7-86 ; Xie W enqing, “US TM D andTaiw an,” International
Strategic Studies , Serial N o. 5 7, July 2000, p p . 25 -31; Xia L ip ing,
“Pros p ects for C oop erativ e Security in E as t A s ia: From C h inese
Pers p ectiv es ,” a pap er pres entedat th e“Partners h ip for Peace: Building
L ong-term
Security C oop eration in N orth eas t A s ia,”
h ttp:/ / w w w .nautilus .org/ nukep olicy / w orks h op s / s h angh ai-01/ p ap er
s .h tm l; L i B in, “Th e E ffects of N M D on C h ines e Strategy ,” Jane’s
IntelligenceRev iew ,M arch 2001,p p . 4 9 -5 2.
5 . Th efour areas ofcoop erativ e res earch bas edon th e A ugus t 19 9 9
M em orandum ofUnders tanding betw een Jap an andth eUnitedStates
are th e ligh tw eigh t nos e cone, th e infrared s ensor, adv ancedkinetic
w arh ead,ands econds tage p rop uls ion. SeeD efenseofJap an 19 9 9 ,p . 84 .
6 . M ich ael Sw aine andh is colleagues h av e offeredby far th e m os t
detailedexam ination ofth e Jap anes e bureaucratic actors on th e M D
is s ue. SeeSw aine,etal.,Jap an andB allis ticM is s ileD efens e,es p . ch ap .
3.
7. F or furth er details ,s eeStep h en A . C am bone,“Th eUnitedStates
andTh eatre M is s ileD efencein North -eas t A s ia,” Surv iv al,V ol. 39 ,N o.
3, Autum n 19 9 7,p p . 6 8-6 9 .
8. Th is com m ent is attributedto Satosh i M orim oto in Plutonium ,
No. 33,Spring 2001,in Jap anes e.
9 . Th e m os t recent figure is 35 0 m is s iles . See B ill G ertz, “C h ina
Increas es M is s ile Th reat,” W ash ington Tim es ,A ugus t 28, 2001.
10. Th om as J. C h ris tensen,“Th eater M is s ileD efen s e andTaiw an’s
Security ,”Orbis ,V ol. 4 4 ,No. 1,W inter 2000,p . 89 .
11. Taiw an’s reactions to M D are bes t analy zedin Th e H enry L .
Stim s on C enter, Th eater M is s ile D efenses in th e A s ia-Pacific Region,
es p . p p . 4 1-6 0.
12 Quoted in B rian H s u, “M ilitary Say s US National M is s ile
D efens e an Op tion,” Taip eiTim es ,July 18,2001.
13. M edeiros ,p . 19 .
14 . A series of interv iew s w ith defens e officials and s ecurity
analy s ts conductedin Taiw an indicate th ere is n o s erious p ublicdebate
218
on th e M D is s ue, w h ich is s till regarded as an arcane is s ue of
tech nological andm ilitary nature. Interv iew s ,Taip ei, D ecem ber 2001.
15 . F or a s uccinct y et focus edov erv iew ofth e m ilitary s ituation on
th ep eninsula,s ee “2000 Rep ort to C ongres s : M ilitary Situation on th e
K orean Peninsula,” Sep tem ber 12,2000,av ailable at w w w .defenselink.
m il/ new s / Sep 2000/ korea09 122000.h tm l.
16 . SeeC h os un Ilbo,June16 ,19 9 3; N ew York Tim es ,June1,19 9 4 .
17. See Sis a Journal, A p ril 8, 19 9 9 , p p . 6 4 -6 5 . F or an objectiv e
as s es s m ent on th e relativ e w eigh t of M D in South K orea’s ov erall
defen s e needs s ee Th e H enry L . Stim s on C enter, Th eater M issile
D efens es, es p . p p . 33-39 .
18. In Japan andTaiw an as w ell,any in-dep th dis cu s s ions ov er M D
are confinedto a s m all group ofs ecurity exp erts in s ide andouts ide of
th eir res p ectiv e gov ernm ents andgenerally do not extendto th e w ider
public or th rough out th e gov ernm ent. Interv iew s , Taip ei, D ecem ber
2001. See als o Sw aine,et al.
19 . One ofth e m os t v ocal NG Os is th e C iv ilN etw ork for a Peaceful
K orea. See its w eb p age at w w w .p eacekorea.org,w h ich is av ailable in
both K orean andE n glish .
20. G reen andD alton,p p . 21-25 .
21. W ook-Sh ik C h ung, “W h y Sh ould W e O p p os e M D ?” a pap er
p resented at th e K ID A Policy F orum on “Th e M D Plan and [Our]
Security Interes t,” K ID A ,Seoul, July 13,2001,p . 17.
22. Unofficial trans lation by th e auth or. D efens e M inis ter C h o
Seong-Tae’s s tatem ents on th eROK ’s p os ition on NM D andTM D at th e
218th p rov is ional s es s ion ofth e ROK National A s s em bly ,F ebruary 20,
2001. In a s im ilar v ein, an ROK foreign m inis try official argues th at
South K orea s h ould m axim ize th e “benefit of am biguity ” until M D
feasibility is p rov en,butnoneth eles s s up p ort U.S. efforts in th eend. See
Sh in,K ak-Soo,“Th e Im p lications for South K orea ofth eUnitedStates
M is s ile D efense,” N ew A s ia,V ol. 8,No. 4 ,W inter 2001,p p . 178-207.
23. Th ey are F igh ter- E xp erim en tal, A ttack H elicop terE xperim ental, E arly W arning A ircraft-E xp erim ental, Surface-to-Air
M is s ile-E xp erim ental, and K orean D estroy er- E xp erim ental-III,
res p ectiv ely . See Sh im Jae H oon, “South K orean Projects M ay F ace
Furth er D elay s ,” Jane’s D efence W eekly ,A p ril 19 , 2001,p . 20; D arren
L ake, “South K orea A nnounces RecordH igh B udget,” Jane’s D efence
219
W eekly ,July 4 , 2001; Joh n L arkin,“D ogfigh t ov er Seoul,” F ar E astern
E conom icRev iew ,July 5 ,2001,p p . 16 -18,20.
24 . F or a rep ort th at South K orea plan s to acquire M K -4 1 V L S,s ee
h ttp :/ / w w w .s tate.gov / p / eap / rls / prs/ cfm ?docid=285 6 . For South
K orea’s introduction ofth e 300-km -range A TA C M S B lock-IA SRB M ,
s ee D ong-a Ilbo,January 5 ,2002,p . A 2.
25 . F or details on th e South K orean publicp ercep tion ofC h ina and
its role on th e p enins ula, s ee Taeh o K im ,“South K orea anda Ris ing
C h ina: Percep tions ,Policies , andPros p ects,” in Ian Jam es Storey and
H erbert Yee,eds.,Th eD ragon A w akes: Percep tions andPros p ects ofth e
C h ina Th reat,L ondon: C urzon,forth com ing in 2002.
26 . F or an in-dep th discus s ion ofth e v arious p urp os es ofth e North
K orean m is s iles ,s eeC h ung M in L ee,“North K orean M is s iles : Strategic
Im plication s andPolicy Res p ons es ,”PacificRev iew ,V ol. 14 ,No. 1,2001,
p p . 85 -120; idem .,“North K oreaandIts M is s iles ,”F ar Eas tern E conom ic
Rev iew ,July 29 ,19 9 9 ,p . 26 .
27. Rodong Sh inm un,N orth K orea,A ugus t 15 , 2001,av ailable at
h ttp:/ / w w w .h ani.co.kr/ 20010816 .
28. Ibid., andNorth K orea’s official announcem ents v ia C h os un
C entral N ew s (C h os un jungang tongs h in)andPy ongy ang B roadcas ting
(Py ongy ang bangs ong),at h ttp :/ / w w w .h ani.co.kr/ 20010805 .
29 . See “Transcrip t: Pow ell D is cus s es K orean Peninsula, M is s ile
D efens e,” W as h ington File,N o. 289 0,July 27,2001,av ailable at w w w .
us info.s tate.gov .
30. L . G ordon Flake h as n otedth ecurrent N orth K orean dilem m a
betw een its needto lielow w h en th ecos t for its p rov ocativ eaction is h igh
andits equally com p elling needto draw w orldattention for th es ake of
international as s is tanceandaid. See h is “North K orea’s Op tion s A fter
Sept. 11,”PacNet No. 4 7,Nov em ber 23,2001.
31. A p ercep tiv es tudy is av ailableon th eissueofbalancing M D w ith
oth er defens e requirem ents . See M ich ael E . O’H anlon,“B ey ondM is s ile
D efens e,” B rookings Policy B rief,No. 86 ,A ugust 2001.
220
PA R T III: IM PROV E M E NTS IN PL A
C O N V E N TIONA L C A PA B IL ITIE S: FORC E
PROJE C TION A N D A IR FORC E L OG ISTIC S
221
C H A PTE R 8
ROUG H B UT RE A D Y FORC E PROJE C TION:
A N A SSE SSM E NT OF RE C E NT PL A TRA INING
Sus an M . Puska
Introduction.
Ov er th e las t 3 y ears ,1 th e C h ines e Peop le’s L iberation
A rm y (PL A )h as s ignificantly adv ancedits n ear-p erip h ery
p ow er p rojection cap ability th rough con certed
exp erim entation and adap tation of m odern w arfigh ting
cap abilities during th reat-bas ed training and exercis es
am ong targetedarm y , nav y , air, andm is s ile forces .2 Th is
exp erience bas e now reach es into all s ev en of its M ilitary
Regions (M Rs ),3 andincludes a grow ing num ber ofy ounger,
innov ativ em ilitary th inkers andfigh ters w h o arev ers edin
m odern op erational art.
A gainst a p otential th reat th at clos ely res em bles th e
adv anced cap abilities of th e U.S. m ilitary , th e PL A h as
s h ow n a determ ination, p articularly s ince K os ov o, to
enh ance its confidence and com p etencies w ith th e m eans
andres ources th at are p res ently av ailable. To m axim ize
w h at it h as n ow , th e PL A h as m ore concertedly us ed
training as th e w arfigh ting laboratory in w h ich to dev elop
creativ e w ay s to com p en s ate for its ow n relativ e
w eaknes s es , w h ile it aggres s iv ely andinnov ativ ely s eeks
w ay s to exp loit th e v uln erabilities of an adv an ced,
inform ation-dep endent op p onent.
D uring 2000-01 training, in p articular, th e PL A ’s
w arfigh ting training aim edat m axim izing its offensiv e and
defensiv e op erations w ith in th e PL A ’s area of op eration,
223
including its m aritim e p erip h ery ,th rough a com bination of
th reat-bas edm ilitary training andciv ilian augm entation.
Th eauth or ofth is ch ap ter exam ines th es edev elop m ents
in term s of m obility ; joint op erations; logis tics ; m is s ile
op erations ; coas tal/m aritim e op erations ; com m unications,
electronic w arfare (E W ), and C om puter N etw ork A ttack
(C N A ); ands p ecial op erations. Th e m aterials us edfor th is
exam ination are p rim arily C h ines e national andregional
m ilitary new s p ap ers ,alth ough s om e recent journal articles
andbooks h av e als o been consulted.
B ackground.
Th elas t3y ears h av ebeen a p articularly dy nam icp eriod
in th e m odern ization of th e PL A . Th e res u lts of
exp erim entation andinnov ation during th is tim eh av ebeen
sum m edup in th e s ev enth generation ofm ilitary training
and exam ination program s , w h ich w ill be im p lem ented
during 2002.4 Th es e p rogram s w ill concentrate on s ev en
areas — ground, nav al, and air forces ; Second A rtillery ;
s cientific res earch andtes t units ; res erv e units ; andth e
Peop le’s A rm edPolice.5
D uring th e las t 3 y ears , th e s cop e ofm ilitary exercis es
h as s teadily increas edto include out-of-s ector M R forces
p erform ing increas ingly com p lex tas ks in p arallel and
increas ingly joint op erations. M aritim e (indiv idual and
unit) training h as been stres s ed during th is tim e and
culm inatedin m ajor near p erip h ery exercis es during th e
s um m ers of 2000 and 2001 near D ongs h an Is land in
s outh ern C h ina op p os ite Taiw an.
Th en in th e fall, th e PL A s ough t to s h ow cas e its
accom p lis h m ents in ap p ly ing s cience and tech nology to
training up to th at p ointby conducting concurrent drills and
exercis es on October 13-16 , 2000.6 F orem os t am ong th os e
w as a “grandm ilitary s h ow ” s aidto be th e firs t s ince 19 6 4 ,
w h ich w as h eld near B eijing at th e foot of th e Yansh an
M oun tain . 7 Jian g Zem in , as th e C en tral M ilitary
224
C om m is s ion (C M C ) C h airm an, in s p ected th e B eijing
exercis e on October 13. Th is exercis e w as s aid to
dem on s trate p rim arily defen s iv e m eas ures to counter
s tealth tech nology ,aerial surv eillanceandreconnais s ance,
p recis ion guided w eap ons , and E W . It als o em p loy ed
v arious concealm ent and decep tion m eas ures , s uch as
“infrareddecoy s ,” to interfere w ith enem y op erations and
conceal com bat op erations .8
C oncurrently , s elected ground units trained in Inner
M ongolia,w h ilenav al units conductedtraining in th eB oh ai
Sea,andSecondA rtillery s trategicm is s ile forces exercis ed
in Jilin Prov ince in north eas t C h ina.9 E ls ew h ere in C h ina
on October 13, a C h engdu M R unit conducteda s abotage
raid again s t v ital en em y targets , w h ile a n av al
h elicop ter-borne M arine unit attacked an enem y rear
com m and center. PL A digitized artillery , arm ored corp s ,
andm ech anizedinfantry dem onstrations w ere h eld,w h ile
th e “firs t succes s ful” m ulti-direction airborne op eration
(including p ers onnel andgear, rockets , andv eh icles )w as
conductedagainst an enem y on th e m arch .10
Th rough out 2000-01, th e N anjing and G uangzh ou
M ilitary Regions (M Rs )ledth e PL A for th eir innov ations in
training andop erations. Since both M Rs p lay key roles in
p otentialforcep rojection agains t Taiw an,as w ellas into th e
South C h ina Sea,th eir training ap p ears to h av eh adgreater
em p h as is andp erh ap s ,res ources .
A 2000 as s es s m ent of th e G uangzh ou M R’s training
reflects th e p rogres s its units m ade in training during
2000-01. Th erep ort notedth at M R training in 19 9 9 focus ed
on com p any andbattalion lev el training. D uring 2000, it
p rogres s edto training in Joint Op erations, during w h ich
A rm y , N av y , andA ir F orce units fough t under h igh -tech
conditions.11
Th is as s es s m ent als o obs erv ed th at ach iev em ents in
train in g durin g 19 9 9 dep en ded on in n ov ation s in
equip m en t. In 2000, h ow ev er, ov er on e- h alf of all
innov ation s related to m eth ods of op eration s , m ilitary
225
th eory , and m eth ods of training, accom p lis h m ents th at
dep endup on th e ability ofp ers onnel to ap p ly concep ts and
new ideas . W h ile training in th e G uangzh ou M R s olv ed
“com m on” p roblem s in 19 9 9 , during 2000 th e M R units
could s olv e m ore com p licated and im p ortant p roblem s .
Furth er,m os t ofth e19 9 9 training ach iev em ents cam efrom
com bat units ; w h ile in 2000, th e m ajority of training
ach iev em ents w erein joint logis tics andarm am ent.12
Regarding joint op erations ,th e graduatedm obilization
res p onse (G M R) as s es s m ent des cribed p re-2000 Serv ice
relations in m ilitary exercis es as “friendly s up p ort” or
“gues t p erform ances ” th rough negotiations . B y 2000, th e
training am ong th e G uangzh ou M R’s th ree Serv ices w as
as s es s edas m ore joint andextendedfrom indiv idual lev el
training up to op erational,tactical,andtech nical training,
and,finally ,to unit training.13
A lth ough th e G uangzh ou M R and th e N anjing M R
training h av e been m os t exten s iv e, im p rov em ents in
training w ith in th e oth er fiv e M Rs ,as w ell as th e Strategic
Rocket F orces , h av e als o been significant, p articularly
out-of-sector s u p p ort ands up p ort to cros s - s ea op erations,
w h ich h av e been stres s ed th rough out all s ev en m ilitary
regions .
B uilding on th e2000 p riority on “th rees trikes andth ree
defense,”14 PL A training andop erational p riorities during
2001 concentratedon rap idm obility op erations ,15 including
com bat us e ofh elicop ters ;16 em ergency logis tics s up p ort;17
s p ecial op erations ;18 s ealanding andcros s - s eaop erations;19
m aritim e denial (anti- s ubm arine and blockades );20 air
com bat ands up p ort;21 m obile m is s ile op erations ; andE W
an d counterm eas u res . 22 C ov er an d concealm en t,
p s y ch ological training to counter battle and op erational
s tres s , and enh ancing confidence in PL A equip m ent,
op erationals trategy anddoctrine,w ere als o s tres s ed. B as ed
on C h ief of th e G eneral Staff G eneral F u Quany ou’s
direction,th e training objectiv e during 2001 w as no longer
to s im p ly “figh t” a local regional w ar under h igh 226
tech nological condition s , but “figh t to w in” again s t a
qualitativ ely s up erior forceth at w as bas edon U.S. m ilitary
cap abilities .23
In th eG eneralStaffD ep artm ent (G SD )training p lan for
2001 PL A units w ere s p ecifically as kedto deep en adv ances
in science and tech nology (S&T) training.24 Priority w as
p lacedon th e follow ing guidelines andtas ks :
?
Innov ate in ligh t ofactual conditions ;
?
A ch iev e rap idadv ancem ent in figh ting cap acity ;
?
Furth er up grade th e quality ofofficers andm en;
?
A p p ly res earch results to training;
?
D eep en res earch on m ilitary th eory ;
?
C los ely s tudy adv ers ary op eration al con cep ts ,
equip m ent, and w eap onry and dev elop counterm easures ;25
?
A ccelerateinnov ation in training;
?
C arry out realis tic,w arlike training;
?
E xp andth e us e ofcom p uters ,s im ulators ,andonline
training; and,
?
E xert greater effort in Joint Operations training.
W h ile th e G SD 2001 training p lan continuedto s tres s
th e “th ree s trikes , th ree defenses ,” nigh t training and
p h y s ical fitnes s w ere als o em p h as ized. Op erationally , th e
2001 p lan s p ecifically calledon units to m akegreater efforts
to s olv e p roblem s in th e follow in g areas : defen s e
p enetration and counter-p enetration; des truction and
counter-des truction; s ea and air control; and electronic
w arfare.26
227
Fu, in an addres s to an enlarged p arty com m ittee
m eeting ofth eG SD ,s tres s edth at 2001 m ilitary w ork m us t
be bas edon th e bas ic requirem ent to “w in in battle.”27 H e
s aidth e PL A m us t s trength en studies ofth e international
s ituation,h igh -tech local w ar,andth e ap p lication ofrule of
law to m ilitary m anagem ent during 2001. H e calledon th e
PL A to organize andcoordinate all efforts betw een units ,
s ch ools , academ ies , res earch centers and tes t units . H e
urged th at th e p roces s of tran s form ing res earch
accom p lis h m ents into p olicies ,training,w ar-readines s ,and
com bat s trength be accelerated. H e als o s tres s ed th e
im p ortance of s cience andtech nology to enh ance com bat
cap ability th rough out th eentire A rm edF orces . H ecalledon
th e PL A to en h an ce com m an d an d con trol, Join t
Op erations , and com bat effectiv enes s , and s tres s ed th e
im p ortance of training a large num ber of “new -ty p e”
h igh -quality m ilitary p ers onnel. 28 Th e M arch 2001
N ational Peop le’s C ongres s addeda s ense ofurgency to th e
needto m odernizeth e PL A to conduct “m ilitary s truggle” as
s oon as p os s ible.29
Rap id,L ong D is tance M obility : L and,A ir,andSea.
M ilitary training conductedduring 2000-01 em p h as ized
th eneedfor rap idm obility acros s long dis tances by air,s ea,
andland. A ir m ov em ent,for exam p le,continually s tres s ed
long-range air raids andv arious air com bat m is s ions. In
m id-M arch 2001, a Nanjing air regim ent w as h igh ligh ted
for fly ing 3,000 km acros s fiv e p rov inces to conduct a
surgical raid on enem y radar, guidedm is s iles , andA A A
p os itions , us ing liv e am m unition. Th e unit w as credited
w ith s u cces s fu lly p en etratin g en em y electron ic
interference, radar tracking,andguidedm is s ile attacks .30
In early M arch ,one SecondA rtillery equip m ent in s p ection
regim ent (Zh uang Jian Tuan)dem ons tratedits enh anced
rap iddeliv ery cap abilities during an exercis ein w h ich units
s im ultaneous ly deliv ered equip m ent to s ev eral launch
p os itions ov er long dis tances v ia h igh w ay and railw ay
netw orks .31
228
A B eijing M R m otorized infantry brigade h eld rap id
reactions m aneuv ers th at cov ered1,000 km w ith in Inner
M ongolia during late 2000. Th es e m aneuv ers als o s tres s ed
inform ation counterm eas ures ,coordinatedop erations,field
defense, andcom p reh ensiv e logis tics s up p ort.32
Res erv eunits h av eals o s tep p edup m obility training. On
A p ril 20,2001,for exam p le,a res erv e regim ent on H ainan
Is land h eld a rap id m obilization and as s em bly exercis e
follow ing th e releas eofth eE P-3crew . It w as rep ortedto be
th e firs t ev er res erv e exercis e h eld betw een four p rov inces
an d one au tonom ous region in s outh C h in a. A ll
p re-ap p oin ted officers , s p ecialized tech nical s oldiers ,
dem obilized s oldiers , s quad leaders , an d as s is tan ts
ans w eredth ecallup w ith in 1 h our from notification. A m ong
th em w ere 16 8 res erv is ts w orking in H aikou, Sh enzh en,
andZh uh ai.33
L ogis tics m obility ,w h ich w ill be es s ential to s up p ort of
any forcep rojection,w as als o tes ted. In th eG uangzh ou M R,
for exam p le,m obilecom m and,control,andlogis tics s up p ort
m odules w ere dev elop ed. Th e G uangzh ou M R rep ortedly
inv es ted tw o m illion y uan during 2000-01 to reform its
com m andandcontrol andlogis tics s up p ort in th e field. A t
leas t one unidentified G uangzh ou M R G roup A rm y and
div is ion w ere equip p edw ith m obilecom m ands y s tem s th at
can be dis as s em bledandm ov edw ith in 1 h our. Th e s am e
unit’s logis tics andarm am ent tech nical s u p p ort facilities
als o w ere m ade m obile for field op eration s . M odular
barracks w ere dev elop ed, w h ich can accom m odate ten
bu n k s p res u m ably for com m an d an d op eration s
p ers onnel.34
Joint Operations : A W ork in Progres s .
Joint op erations continuedto dev elop s low ly . Th e PL A
consequently h as not y et realizedth e full p otential ofjoint
op erations . Noneth eles s , subs tantial p rogres s h as been
m ade,p articularly at th e op erational lev el ofeach M ilitary
Region.
229
A t leas t th ree p roblem s in h ibit th e PL A ’s
transform ation to joint op erations s o far. F irs t, th e PL A
v iew s “joint” in unique andflexible term s w h ich allow for
indep endent interp retation th at underm ines s y nergy of
effort. Second,th ere is res is tance,p erh ap s ev en confus ion,
about w h at “joint op erations” m eans andw h y th ey s h ould
beconducted. F inally ,th ecom m andandcontrol ofth e PL A
under a M ilitary Region s y s tem andan A rm y -dom inated
G eneral Staff p erp etuates com bined arm s op erations, at
bes t augm ented by p arallel air, nav y , andm is s ile forces
op erations , rath er th an facilitating joint integration. B ut
PL A leaders and defen s e intellectuals recognize th es e
p roblem s , andap p ear com m ittedto ach iev ing sufficiently
joint op erations to suit th e PL A ’s op erational needs .
To addres s th es ech allenges andenh anceunders tanding
ofjoint op erations w ith in th e PL A , m ilitary s ch olars and
com m anders p ublis h eds ev eral articles andbooks on joint
op erations during 2000 and2001. Yang Zh iqi,director ofth e
G SD , M ilitary A ffairs D ep artm ent, in late 2000,35 for
exam p le, urged th e PL A to accelerate ch anging from a
com bined arm s com m and s y s tem to a joint op erations
com m ands y s tem , w h ich is an es s ential link to realizing
joint op erations. H e arguedth at a joint com m ands y s tem
couldnot be es tablis h edat th e las t m inute during a cris is ,
but m us t be p ut in p lace during p eacetim e. A lth ough Yang
obs erv edth at th e PL A h as m ade s ubs tantial p rogres s to
ach iev e greater joint coordination betw een Serv ices during
op erational lev el training,h e noted,all th eServ ices tendto
figh t in different w ay s once an exercis e begin s . Yang
attributed th is deficiency to a fundam ental lack of an
“auth oritativ e” joint com m and.36
In a N ational D efensePublication entitled,“N ew Th eory
of Joint Op erations ,”37 th e auth ors argue th at des p ite
s im ilarities in its nature to com binedarm s ,joint op erations
rep res ents a great, ev en radical, ch ange for th e PL A .38
Th rough joint op erations ,th ey w rote,th eA rm edF orces w ill
unify com batcap abilities th rough coordination to defeat th e
enem y .39
230
In D ecem ber 2000,a s y m p os ium entitled“W ar Patterns
andW ar Th eory in th e E arly 21s t C entury ” w as h eld in
B eijing.4 0 Th e m eeting w as s p ons ored by th e B eijing
M ilitary Region and th e Strategic Studies D ep artm ent,
A cadem y of M ilitary Sciences (A M S). It w as attendedby
rep res entativ es from th e s ev en m ilitary region s , th e
N ational D efens e Univ ers ity (N D U), and th e A ir F orce
C om m and A cadem y . Th e B eijing M R C h ief of Staff, Yu
C h engh ai,p res idedov er th em eeting,w h ich w as rep ortedto
be th e firs t join t activ ity h eld betw een th e PL A ’s
h igh es t-lev el s trategic s tudies dep artm ent and a th eater
com m and. Th e p urp os e of th e m eeting w as to p rom ote
transform ation ofm ilitary s trategic res earch into com bat
s trength th rough out th e A rm ed F orces . D ev elop m ent
trends in joint op erations w eream ong th etop ics dis cus s ed.
On D ecem ber 29 , 2000, th e N anjing M ilitary Region
p ublis h edan article th at als o s tres s edth e im p ortance of
form ing a joint op erations com m ands y s tem .4 1 Th e article
identifieds ev eral p roblem s th at centeredon com m andand
control. Sp ecifically , it criticized “factionalis m ”
(p aroch ialis m )betw een Serv ices . Th e article arguedfor th e
n eed to es tablis h truly s ep arate units under Join t
Op erations G roup s (JOG ),in order to elim inate com m and
andcontrol interference by th e units ’p arent Serv ices . Th e
article s tres s edth at Serv ices s h ouldonly p rov ide com bat
s u p p ort and coordination to units as s igned to a JOG .4 2
Oth er w ritings dis cus s edth e needto s ignificantly reduce
th e lay ers of com m and— ch anging from a “tree-ty p e”
com m ands tructure to a “flat” one.4 3
Training w ith in all Serv ices of th e PL A h as s tres s ed
join t op eration s . A ir F orce train in g, for exam p le,
increas ingly em p h as izedjoint s up p ort to both groundand
nav y forces . In M arch 2001,a G uangzh ou M ilitary Region
A ir F orce av iation regim ent w as h igh ligh ted for its joint
op erations . Th is unit is equip p edw ith a “new -ty p e figh ting
aircraft” (p robably SU-27) to conduct blue w ater com bat
p atrols ,com bat es cort m is s ions ,andm ilitary exercis es . Th e
regim ent h ad recently s h ifted from tech nical to tactical
231
training on th e new equip m ent. It rep ortedly h adach iev ed
an all-w eath er offensiv e anddefens iv e fly ing cap ability . Its
cap abilities included low -altitude and ultra low -altitude
fly ing, th e ability to attack groundtargets at great s p eed,
liv e bom b op eration s , deep s ea in tercep tion, an d
ov er- th e- h orizon air com bat during electron ic
counterm easures (E C M ).4 4
D uring 2000-01, PL A training focus edon Taiw an-like
s cenarios w ith in all s ev en m ilitary regions. Priority w as
giv en to s ea-cros s in gs , is lan d s eizures , an d s p ecial
op erations beh indenem y lines . Th e th reat-bas eds cenarios
em p loy ed forces th at w ere m odeled on th e adv anced
tech nology of th e U.S. m ilitary , in cludin g arm ed
h elicop ters ; cruis e m is s iles ; s op h is ticatedreconnais s ance;
E W cap abilities ; s tealth tech nology ; an d exten s iv e
m aritim e as s ets .
Th e in ten t of th is train in g s eem s to h av e been
m ultifold— firs t, it gav e PL A units exp erience against a
Taiw an andU.S.-ty p e op p onent, w h ich p rov ideda better
unders tanding ofth es trength s andw eaknes s es ofp otential
op p onents . Second,m orerealis tictraining focus edon likely
s cenarios h elp s to buildconfidence in PL A equip m ent, as
w ell as defensiv e andoffens iv e op erations. F inally , m ore
realis tic training exp os es PL A w eaknes s es th at can be
s olv edor av oidedbefore actual com bat.
L ogis tics : F lexibility andF orw ardSup p ort.
Progres s in th e Joint L ogis tics Sy s tem benefitedfrom
th e s tres s on w ar p rep aration,w h ich rev ealedth e needfor
m ore fieldlogis tics s up p ort andm obility . D uring 2000-01,
con s olidation of com m on garris on function s , s uch as
m ilitary h os p itals ,w h ich h av e been op enedup to civ ilians
as w ell as oth er Serv ices , and con s olidation of key
com m odity item s , s uch as bulk p etroleum , continued.
E m ergency s tockage of generic, dual-us e item s w ere als o
dev elop ed. In s om e cas es , em ergen cy s up p lies w ere
integratedinto civ ilian w areh ous es to p rov ide em ergency
232
and training rep lenis h m ent to m ilitary forces th rough
contractedor oth er s u p p ort arrangem ents .
D uring 2000-01 em p h as is w as p lacedon com p onents of
op erational lev el logis tics , s uch as field feeding, field
m edical s u p p ort,forw ardm aintenance, andon-s ite rep air
andre-s up p ly . Rap idreaction andem ergency s u p p ort units
w ere tes tedto p rov ide m ultip le ty p es ofs up p ort to com bat
forces in near-com bat fieldconditions . Th rough out th e A ir
F orce, N av y , A rm y , and Second A rtillery units , logis tics
s up p ort em p h as ized en h an cem en ts of core s up p ort
cap abilities . In addition, w ith in th e N an jin g an d
G uangzh ou M Rs ,civ ilian augm entation to m ilitary logis tics
w as s tres s ed. Th is s up p ort includedth e coordinatedus e of
th eciv ilian air, land,ands ea infras tructure; acquis ition of
m aritim e v es s els ; acces s to civ ilian telecom m unications;
andacquis ition ofm ateriel ands u p p lies .
W h ile m uch ofth e logis tics s up p ort is m anagedby th e
G eneral L ogis tics D ep artm ent (G L D ), th e new G eneral
A rm am ent D ep artm ent (G A D ), created in 19 9 8,4 5 p lay ed
th e cen tral role in am m unition rep len is h m en t an d
m aintenanceofw eap ons andarm or. L ike SecondA rtillery ,
G A D m ade a concentratedeffort to enh anceth equality and
exp ertis e ofits p ers onnel th rough greater coop eration w ith
civ ilian and m ilitary in s titution s . In Nov em ber 2000,
G eneral C ao G angch uan, director of G A D , noted th at
reform s in arm am ent, n ation al defen s e s cien ce and
tech n ology , an d in du s try now are reach in g an
unp recedented lev el in C h ina. H e encouraged furth er
reform andinnov ation,citing a Party andC M C directiv e to
rais e th e rate ofsucces s in scientifictes ting.4 6
In October 2000,G A D h os tedan all-A rm y s y m p os ium at
th e A rm oredF orce E ngineering A cadem y , com m andedby
M ajor G eneral W ang H on gguang, in C h an gxin dian ,
B eijin g, w ith th e s tated p urp os e of en h an cin g
com p reh ensiv e arm am ent s u p p ort.4 7 D uring October 2000,
G A D initiated a 1-m onth rotational cours e, op en to th e
entire PL A com m andcadre,to take adv antageofp eacetim e
233
to im p rov e arm am ent m anagem ent andrais e th e lev el of
com p reh ensiv e arm am ent s u p p ort for w artim e. Th e m ain
focus ofth is training w as on th e s cience ofarm am ent and
w artim e arm am ent s u p p ort.4 8
In 2000, G uangzh ou M R s et up a “th eater com m and
center for arm am ent s u p p ort,” w h ich w as th e firs t in th e
PL A .4 9 Th e center p rov ides m obile com m andp os ts for field
arm am ent s u p p ort to th e M R,arm y ,anddiv is ional lev els .
A dditionally ,th eM R h as dev elop eda com m andautom ation
s y s tem for th e G uangzh ou W ar Zone. Th is s y s tem links
inform ation v ertically andh orizontally betw een arm am ent
and s up p ort units and h igh er h eadquarters . It greatly
enh ances com m andand control ov er am m unition as s ets ,
an d facilitates decis ion m akin g an d op erational
m anagem ent.5 0
D uring F ebruary 2001,th eG A D conv eneda s y m p os ium
in B eijing to dis cus s its m ilitary training tas ks for th ey ear.
Th es e included: (1) as s es s training ach iev em ents and
transform th es e into training cap abilities ; (2) s trength en
guidanceandth eoretical s tudies ,andregulateth es cientific
dev elop m ent of m ilitary training; (3) renew training
content, m eth ods an d quality ; (4 ) train h igh -quality
p ers onnel to ach iev e leap froggin g dev elop m en t in
arm am ent; and(5 )s trength en infras tructure construction
and m aintain th e s us tained dev elop m ent of m ilitary
training.5 1
In th e s um m er of 2000, th e Jinan M R conducted an
em ergency logis tics s up p ort drill bas ed on a flood relief
s cenario.5 2 M ateriel, POL , tran s p ortation, and m edical
s up p ort m odules w ere quickly m obilized. Th e s up p ort
m odules w ere bas edon w areh ous es , h os p itals , andoth er
s p ecialized units , and encom p as s ed ordnance, m aterial,
POL , tran s p ortation, m edical, and m aintenance s up p ort.
D uring p eacetim e,th es eunits ares ent on firefigh ting,flood
relief,andoth er m ajor p rojects andop erations . Th ediv is ion
dev elop ednew ap p roach es to conceal s up p ly at fixedp oints ,
234
m an euv er under con cealm ent of s m okes creen s , an d
coordinate logis tics s up p ort w ith nav al andair units .5 3
N anjing M R form ed an “E m ergency M obile L ogis tics
Sup p ort M odel” th at m et th e C M C ’s s tandards to p erform
com bat m is s ion s w ith out p ers on n el an d equip m en t
rep lenis h m ent and p re-battle training (i.e., no notice).5 4
One brigade s p ent ov er th ree m illion y uan im p rov ing its
com p any -lev el com bat-readines s p rov is ions , s tandard
s torage room s ,fieldm edical kits ,com bat-readines s coffers ,
and w artim e ligh t s ets . Th e brigade dev elop ed new
equip m ent, including floating s tretch ers , field kitch en
containers ,andrap idreaction tankers ,andp articip atedin
num erous exercis es w ith th e N av y , A rm y , andA ir F orce
units ov er th e p as t 3 y ears .5 5
G uangzh ou M R dev elop edm ultitube POL tankers for
field refueling th at s ignificantly rais ed field s u p p ort
efficiency . W ater tankers coulds up p ort up to 20 kitch en
units at one tim e. F ield rep air v eh icles could p erform
v arious em ergency rep airs . In addition,s u p p ort equip m ent
for s ea op erations w as als o dev elop edby G M R’s L ogis tics
D ep artm ent andan unidentifiedG M R div is ion.5 6
A lth ough th ere h as been s om eem p h as is on fieldm edical
s u p p ort, m os t m edical s u p p ort im p rov em ents , including
joint logis tics ,h av e focus edon reform s ,as w ell as garris on
andnear-garris on s u p p ort. In th is regard,th e G uangzh ou
M R m edical training objectiv es ,w h ich v ariedaccording to a
unit’s lev el, m ay be rep res entativ e. 5 7 Th e brigade or
regim ent focus es on rap id dep loy m ent of a firs t-aid p os t.
Th e battalion or com p any focus es on res cue of p ers onnel
injuredon th e firing line. M edical units abov e th e div is ion
h os p ital lev el focus on treatm ent of critical cas es and
res earch in traum atology . In recent y ears th e G uangzh ou
M R h as built or renov ated 80 p ercent of its div is ion
h os p itals an d brigade or regim ent m edical team s . 5 8
E m ergency s u p p ort units h av ebeen is s ued“adv anced”field
m obile m edical equip m ent, s uch as fieldsurgery v eh icles
anddecontam ination trucks . Th e G M R rep ortedth at th e
235
m edical w ar-readines s of “key units ” w ith in “key com bat
div is ion s an d brigades ” n ow m eets w ar readin es s
s tandards .5 9
B y early October 2000, tw o-th irds ofall PL A h os p itals
com p letedconstruction of“Project Num ber 1,” w h ich laida
foundation for an “inform ationized” m edical s erv ice s y s tem
th at can be us edby both th e m ilitary andciv ilian m edical
s erv ices .6 0
Th e PL A ’s firs t airbornem edical team s conductedbattle
drills durin g th e s um m er of 2000. 6 1 Th ree p lan es
airdrop p edm edical p ers onnel andm edical s u p p lies onto a
cap turedairfield. Th e m edics boardedair-drop p edv eh icles
ands et up a firs t aids tation. Tw enty m edics ofth e F irs t
A irborne M edical Team p arach ute unit, m ade up of
p ers onnel from th e PL A 4 5 7th H os p ital, landedby p lane.
Th e Second M edical Unit, con s is ting of 5 0 p ers onnel,
arriv edby p lane ands et up a com p reh ensiv e m ultipurp os e
m edical p os t. D uring th e exercis e, trans p ort aircraft
ev acuatedcritical p ers onnel.6 2
Th e N anjing M ilitary Region’s F ujian M ilitary D is trict
als o w orkedh ardto im p rov eits w artim eintegratedlogis tics
s up p ort cap abilities during 2000. Th e m ilitary dis trict
m edical s up p ort forces conductedan exercis e during th e
sum m er th at includedan ev acuation ofcas ualties brough t
in on an unidentifiedv es s el “from dis tant s eas .”
A notablefeatureofth e PL A ’s extendedlogis tical s y s tem
durin g 2000-01 w as th e in tegration of civ ilian fixed
facilities , infras tructure, p ers onnel, and res ources into
contingency op erations and training. Th is s up p ort is
es tablis h ed th rough a com bin ation of p re-arranged
contracts ,legalconfis cation ofs u p p ort andciv ilians,as w ell
as integration th rough local res erv e andm ilitia units . Th e
coordination and integration of civ ilian s and dom es tic
res ources p rov ides a “totalw ar” logis tical m ultip lier to PL A
s u p p ort, es p ecially along C h ina’s coas tal region andin th e
s outh w es t,w h ere th is ty p e ofs u p p ort h as s o far been m os t
em p h as ized. Th e ty p es of civ ilian res ources , including
236
p os s iblefis cal augm entation,are extensiv e andcontinue to
dev elop . In addition to s up p lies , m aterial, andp ers onnel,
th ey als o in clu de airp orts , p orts , rail n etw orks ,
exp res s w ay s , and bridges th at h av e been adap ted to
m ilitary s p ecifications ands up p ort m ilitary m is s ions . F or
exam p le, th e construction of s om e h igh s p eedroads and
bridges w as coordinatedw ith th e m ilitary to include extra
exits andup gradedsurfaces to bear th e w eigh t ofm ilitary
v eh icles , better w ith s tandair attack, andfacilitate quick
rebuildin cas eofan air attack. In certain areas ,such as th e
G uangzh ou M R, th e m ilitary w orks clos ely w ith civ ilian
auth orities to cap italize on civ ilian as s ets andensure th es e
can eas ily be integrated into m ilitary op erations w h en
needed.
W ith a p riority on cros s - s ea op erations and is land
s eizures during 2000-01 training,th eus eofciv ilian m arine
v es s els w as als o tes ted. In som e cas es ,m aritim e exercis es
w ere conductedw ith a m ix ofciv ilian v es s els th at h av ebeen
in tegrated in to w ar p lan n ing. C iv ilian v es s els an d
p ers onnel ev en p articip atedin antis ubm arine exercis es —
s h ow ing th at th e us e of civ ilian as s ets by th e PL A is not
lim itedby eith er im agination or legal res trictions.
In July 2000, th e Nav y h elda 17-day , 4 ,000 nautical
m iles w artim es h ip p ing drillacros s th eB oh ai,Yellow ,E as t
C h ina,andSouth C h ina Seas ,us ing th e N ational D efense
M obilization Sh ip , Sh ich ang.6 3 Th e exercis e w as th e firs t
succes s ful drill of “w artim e em ergency m obilization and
drafting of civ ilian pers onnel v es s els .” Th e exercis e w as
join tly organ ized by th e State N ation al D efen s e
M obilization C om m ittee and th e PL A Nav y . D ozens of
m ilitary andciv ilian s p articip atedfrom th e State Planning
C om m is s ion,F inanceM inis try ,C om m unications M inis try ,
C h in es e A cadem y of E ngin eerin g, G en eral Staff
D ep artm ent, and G eneral L ogis tics D ep artm ent. Th e
exercis e tes ted and enh anced th e efficiency of drafting
civ ilian v es s els into s erv ice in an em ergency .6 4
237
Res erv es andm ilitia als o h av e increas ingly facilitated
local s u p p ort to m ilitary exercis es and op erations. F or
exam p le,in Zh ejiang Prov ince a m ilitia s eaborne refueling
unit w as s etup on A p ril18,2001,at th eZh ejiang Petroleum
L im itedC om p any in Yuh uan. Th e unit w as m ade up of100
m ilitiam en w h os e m is s ion is to s et up p erm anent refueling
p oints at p orts along th eeas tern coas tline andh igh w ay s ,as
w ell as s m all m obile refueling team s on land, to p rov ide
POL s up p ort during p eacetim e andw ar.6 5
M is s ile Operations : C oncealm ent,M obility ,
andQuality .
M is s ile Op erations , w h ich h av e been a p ocket of
excellence in th e PL A for s ev eral y ears ,6 6 continued to
im p rov ein term s ofth equality ofp ers onnel,rap idm obility ,
concealm ent anddecep tion, andlogis tics s up p ort. D uring
2000-2001, Secon d A rtillery p us h ed en h an cem en ts ,
p articularly to addres s key p roblem s in rap idm obility and
inform ation counterm eas ures under h igh -tech conditions .6 7
To im p rov e th e quality andquantity ofits s cience and
tech nology p ers onnel, for exam p le, Second A rtillery h as
activ ely recruitedabout 2,000 univ ers ity s tudents in recent
y ears .6 8 L ike oth er elem ents ofth e PL A , it h as s ough t not
only to deep en th e quality of its p ers onnel, but als o to
encourageinnov ativ eh igh -tech s olutions to its training and
op eration s th rough clos er coop eration w ith civ ilian
institutions ,as w ell as th e recruitm ent ofciv ilian-educated
s p ecialis ts . On M arch 9 , 2001, for exam p le, th e Second
A rtillery E ngineering A cadem y s igned a coop erativ e
agreem ent on res earch and teach ing w ith N orth w es t
Indus trial Univ ers ity .6 9
C oas tal/M aritim e Operations : K ey F ocus .
W ith a concertedeffort to enh ancecoas tal op erations,all
Serv ices em p h as ized s ea-cros s ing and is land s eizure
training. A N anjing M R G roup A rm y h elds ea training on
th e s outh ern Fujian C oas t during m id-July 2000 th at is
238
rep res entativ e.70 Training included infantry and tanks
s eizing beach es ,s couts conducting reconnais s ancefrom th e
s ea, artillery em p loy ed on s h ip s , am p h ibious arm ored
troop s s eizing beach es andcarry ing out fire attacks at s ea;
andengineers clearing obs tacles . Th eG A h as been engaged
in sea training s ince th e beginning of th e sum m er 2000.
M ock up s ofan am p h ibious landing fieldh av e als o been s et
up in garris on s o th at infantry regim ents couldcontinues ea
training y ear round.71
Th e Sh eny ang M R dev elop ed am p h ibious training in
early 2000. On January 22,2000,th ediv is ion exp erim ented
w ith liv e-fire p ractice from a freigh ter,andtes teds ev eral
w ay s to s ecure equip m ent on to v es s els (p res um ably
civ ilian).72 B etw een January andJuly ,th e div is ion trained
in loading equip m ent onto v es s els ,firing arm oredcar guns
ov er w ater, s triking at aerial targets us ing s h ip -borne
anti-aircraft artillery , and s triking beach targets w ith
s h ip -borne artillery .73
In June 2000, a N av al L anding Sh ip Unit th at is
attach ed to PL A unit 3809 1 at H aikou, H ainan Is land,
conductedtraining in nigh t landing op erations w ith troop s ,
arm ored cars , and am p h ibious tanks against an enem y
objectiv e.74 B ecaus e th e unit’s equip m ent w as outdated,it
triedto dev elop innov ativ e w ay s to enh anceits cap abilities
andcom p ens ate for its deficiencies . Th is includedtraining
during th e h eav y fog s eas on (M arch th rough June) in
fis h ing areas and narrow ch annels . A ir defense training
w as als o s tep p edup to “take adv antage” ofh eav y air traffic
in th e area. D uring th efirs t h alfof2000,th eunitconducted
4 2s ingle s h ip drills andeigh t form ation landing drills ,h alf
ofw h ich w ereconductedat nigh t,in h eav y fog,andin oth er
env ironm ents res em bling realis ticw arfare conditions .75
A s ubm arine flotilla th at underes tim atedth ecap ability
of th e enem y and failed a training tes t 2 y ears before
s tep p edup its s tudy ofenem y cap abilities andconsequently
w as able to p enetrate an enem y p ort to enforce a blockade
during a sum m er 2000 drill.76 Th eunit h as focus edits s tudy
239
on subm arine attack of aircraft carrier and des troy er
form ations,ands ubm arine coordination w ith th e av iation
corp s ands urface v es s els to p enetrate an enem y blockade
andlay m ines in a p ort. Th e unit es tablis h eda file on each
enem y v es s el andadjus tedits training to counter enem y
anti-subm arine cap abilities .77
In A ugus t2000,th eB eijing M R rep ortedon an A ir F orce
unit th at h ad p articip ated in sea op erations.78 Th e unit,
w h ich h ad only trained ov er land before, trained for 2
m onth s ov er w ater beginning in A p ril2000. D uring th e s ea
trainin g, s p ecial attention w as p aid to low -altitude
acrobatics ,form ation andnav igation.79
80
C om m unications: C onnectiv ity ,E W ,andC N A .
Th e PL A recognizes th at it m us t enh ance its com m and
andcontrol, E W ,andcounterelectronicw arfare cap ability ,
as w ell as its com p uter netw ork attack andcounterattack
cap abilities ,ifit h op es to figh t to w in a regional w ar under
h igh -tech conditions . C onsequently , th e PL A h as taken
increas edefforts to boos t all of th es e cap abilities . A s an
exam p le,G roup A rm y D ep uty C om m ander Zh ang H etian of
th e Nanjing M R h eldnetw ork w arfare drills 81 on July 11,
2000 in w h ich B lue F orce (enem y ) reconnais s ance and
attacks on RedF orce targets w ere s im ulated. Th e G roup
A rm y ach iev edan initial netw ork cap ability at th e tim e of
th e exercis e, but Zh ang notedth at s om e PL A com m anders
h adnot y et gras p edth e dem ands of“ach iev ing v ictory .”
Th e L anzh ou M R h eldan E lectronic W arfare D efense
W ork M eeting on July 3-4 ,2000,at a G roup A rm y th at h ad
been a p ilot for electronic defense op erations during th e
p rev ious tw o y ears .82 D uring th em eeting,th eM R rev iew ed
th e accom p lis h m en ts in “th ree an ti’s , on e res is t”
(anti-reconnais s ance, anti-jam m ing, anti-netw ork attack,
and res is t des truction). Th e ability of com m anders and
s taffs to organize anddirect inform ation/electronicw arfare
w as rep ortedly s ignificantly enh anced.83
24 0
B eijing M R (B M R) h eld a m ajor electronic w arfare
exercis e in early A ugus t 2000 in conjunction w ith a
com binedarm s op eration.84 Th is w as th e firs t tim e all th e
new andm ain battle E W equip m ent ofth e groundforces
w ere brough t togeth er and com p reh ensiv e as s es s m ents
w ere m ade of th e com bat cap ability of th e equip m ent
s y s tem s and units .85 B M R h as als o dev elop ed online
Op erational F orces (OPFOR)training for electronicw arfare
to enh ance training.86
In th e “South w es t 2000” E xercis e, tw o form ation s
s ep aratedby 5 00 km fough t against each oth er in a “v irtual
reality laboratory ” in C h engdu M R’s firs t online tes t ofits
com m andands taff. Th is dev elop ed from online “ch ecks ”
h eldduring late 19 9 9 . C h engdu M R ap p liedits exp eriences ,
w h ich w ere ah eadofoth er PL A units ,to coop eration w ith
N D U to dev elop a “C am p aign C om m andTraining M odel
Sy s tem ” th at form ally w ent into op eration during th e
South w es t 2000 E xercis e.87
N D U exp erts ch aracterizedth is as th e firs t true “W ar
L aboratory ” for PL A cam p aign train ing. Th e m ain
ch aracteris tics ofth e exercis e w ere:
1. Units in fiv es outh w es tern p rov inces andregions w ere
linked by dozens of local netw orks and s ev eral h undred
term inals .
2. Real-tim e, force-on-force s im ulation th at p rov ided
inform ation on th e cam p aign s ituation, dis p os ition of
orders ,andRedF orce andB lue F orce p os tures .
3. Th e exercis es unfoldeds y nch ronous ly in real-tim e at
num erous cam p aign units andincludeds ound,im age,text,
anddata online, th anks to an em ergency doubling ofth e
transm is s ion cap ability . (4 )Th eexercis eledto a s ignificant
ch angein netw ork arch itecture,re-routing oftransm is s ion
routes , renov ation of equip m ent, and breakth rough s in
ach iev ing s ecure inform ation trans m is s ion under dy nam ic
long-range netw ork ch aracteris tics .88
24 1
Th e PL A A ir F orce (PL A A F )ofth e B M R h eldan online
train in g exercis e in con junction w ith a m eeting on
h eadquarters s cience andtech nology training in m id-June
2000.89 Th is exercis e s im ulated an attack on B eijing by
m ultip les orties ofenem y aircraft fly ing at low altitude. Th e
s y s tem greatly reducedtraining p lanning andp rep aration
tim e and can be us edto acces s inform ation about enem y
aircraft andm eteorological inform ation,as w ell as draw up
p lans for integrateds im ulatedtraining andjoint training
w ith arm y units .9 0
Sp ecial Operations : Strike D eep B eh indL ines .
Sp ecial op eration s forces h av e con cen trated on
enh ancing bas ic s kills to conduct op erations deep beh ind
enem y lines . Th e “C h eetah s ,” a m odel unit com m andedby
C olonel L iu Youch u n , is one exam p le of th e
accom p lis h m ents in recent Sp ecial Op erations training.9 1
Th e 5 6 29 4 unit is a C h engdu M R Sp ecial Reconnais s ance
D adui th at h as m ade notable p rogres s to dev elop s p ecial
op erations s oldiers . C h eetah s oldiers can p erform
m ultis kills including op erating ligh t to h eav y w eap ons,
bas icknow ledge offoreign arm ies ’w eap ons ,andth e ability
to op erate tran s p ort th at ranges from ground,to tank, to
h elicop ter,andto as s ault boats .
Sh en y an g M ilitary R egion lau ded p ers on n el
im p rov em ents in one s p ecial op erations u n it th at is
com m anded by L i Jizh ao, and p olitical com m is s ar, H an
B aos h eng. Th e unit exp ects to train 100 officers in both
com m andandtech nical tas ks , anddev elop 100 p ers onnel
w h o are exp erts in airborne op erations,is land-landing and
s abotage op eration s , p s y ch ological w arfare, enh anced
instructor s kills (w ith th e “four abilities ”), andall-round
s p ecial op eration s s kills .9 2
OneSp ecialOp erations Unit th at h adp rev ious ly faileda
s p ot exam ination in L anzh ou M R w as h igh ligh tedin th e
M R new s p ap er for p as s ing an in s p ection w ith out p rior
notification. No adv ance inform ation w as p rov idedon th e
24 2
subjects to be tes ted, w h ich w as a ch ange from p rev ious
y ears . Th e unit h adp rev ious ly faileds om e tas ks andonly
ach iev edgoodresults in about h alfofth e 23 tes t subjects .
Th e unit h adcons is tently p erform edw ith excellent results
in y early training.9 3 Th e in s p ection reinforcedth e needfor
units to dev elop a no notice cap ability .
Ov erall Im p rov em ents .
PL A train in g h as becom e in creas ingly m ore
s op h is ticated and com p lex, incorp orating ev olv ing joint
op erations and national defense m obilization. Training
w ith in a core of elite an d exp erim en tal u n its is
ch aracterized by us e of m ore p rofes s ional and cap able
Op p os ing F orces (OPFOR);9 4 near-com bat conditions ;
all-w eath er and nigh t op erations; s ea and is land force
p rojection; andlong dis tance dep loy m ents into unfam iliar
terrain.9 5 A ccep tance of “failure” (i.e., defeat of th e Red
F orceby th eB lueF orce),as w ellas m ore op en dis cus s ion of
deficiencies h as als o leadto a m ore realis tic ap p rais al of
s trength s and w eaknes s es , w ith th e p otential for m ore
realis tic m easures to correct s h ortcom ings . In addition,
training is conductedm ore frequently th rough out th e y ear,
rath er th an sim p ly rely ing on end-of-y ear training. G reater
us e ofs im ulation and“online” training are becom ing m ore
w ide- s p readands op h is ticated,p rov iding an augm entation
to fieldtraining in ev ery th ing from com m andandcontrol,to
as y m m etrical w arfare,to m obile op erations,to nuclear and
biological w arfare training.9 6
C onclus ion.
Th e PL A lacks a s ufficient budget to s up p ort fas ter and
m ore exten s iv e m ilitary h ardw are an d tech n ology
acquis ition, and is h andicap p ed by C h ina’s deep - s eated
p reference for indep endent dom es tic cap abilities th at can
be obtain ed th rough rev ers e en gin eering, dom es tic
in n ov ation, or acquis ition of tech nical in form ation .
M oreov er, C h ina needs to sustain an exp ort-ledeconom ic
24 3
s trategy th at couldbeunderm inedifth e region or th eW es t
w ere alarm ed by C h ina’s m ilitary m odernization efforts
before C h ina is ready .9 7 Th e PL A h as been able to m ake a
v irtu e out of n eces s ity by focu s ing on s oftw are
m odernization. A m ong th es e are s tep s : (1) im p rov ing th e
quality of p ers onnel th rough educational and recruiting
reform s and initiativ es ; (2) in s tituting organizational
ch anges th at w ill enh ance efficiency , reduce w as teful
p ractices ,including corrup tion,andw illultim ately enh ance
com bat force cap abilities , s uch as adap tation of joint
op eration s and joint logis tics ; (3) s electiv ely adap ting
relev ant foreign m ilitary m anagem en t p ractices and
m odern (s p ecifically in form ation age) as y m m etric
s trategies ; (4 ) s tream lin in g organ izations ; an d (5 )
intensiv ely s tudy ing andas s es s ing p otential th reats ,w ith
p articular em p h as is on th e United States , and m ore
recently on Taiw an’s m ilitary cap ability .
Rely ing on key units th at s erv e as both th e v anguards
and tes tin g grounds for n ew equip m ent, s tructures ,
tech niques , and s trategies for offen s iv e and defen s iv e
op erations in a h igh -tech env ironm ent,th ePL A h as tes teda
m y riadofequip m ent,m adeop erational im p rov em ents ,and
innov ation s to enh ance its com bat effectiv enes s in a
h igh -tech env ironm ent. Th e PL A is p ois edto cap italize on
th e les s ons learned to enh ance its regular, res erv e, and
m ilitia units . A t th ev ery leas t,th e PL A now h as dev elop eda
s oundbas is for continuing enh ancem ent ofth e PL A ’s force
p rojection cap ability ,andh as es tablis h eda jum p offp oint
for m odernization ofth e entire PL A as res ources increas e,
m odern tech nology is abs orbed, and innov ation and
adap tation furth er dev elop .9 8
W h ile h ardw are an d tech nology acquis ition w ill
continue, th e PL A ’s recent concentration on m odern
th inking,innov ation,andexp erienceofleaders andfigh ters
p rov ides a m ore p otent bas e for acceleratedm odernization.
Th e PL A today p os s es s es a rough but ready forcep rojection
cap ability ,one th at w ill continue to s teadily im p rov e ov er
tim e, w h ich adds greater ris ks and cos ts for p otential
24 4
op p onents in C h ina’s near p erip h ery . Th em odernizing PL A
increas ingly p rov ides th e C h ines e leaders h ip w ith credible
coerciv e s trength — one th at can back up th e th reat ofth e
us eofforceand/or s electiv eem p loy m ent offorceto p rom ote
C h ina’s national s ov ereignty ands ecurity interes ts along
its land,air,andm aritim e borders .
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTER 8
1. Jiefang Jun B ao (h ereafter JJB ),A ugust 10,2001.
2. “M odernization” ofth e PL A m us t be v iew edin relativ e term s .
Th is ch ap ter does n ot argue th at th e PL A h as becom e an “adv anced”
m ilitary in th e p as t 3 y ears ,since m os t PL A equip m ent andw eap onry
s till rem ain s u p to 20 y ears beh indadv ancedm ilitaries. Th is ch ap ter,
h ow ev er,starts from th e firm beliefth at h ardw are-bas edcom paris ons
to adv anced m ilitaries are insufficient to fully as s es s th e grow ing
coerciv e p ow er ofC h ina’s m ilitary in both real andp s y ch ological term s
w ith in th e A s ia-Pacificregion.
3. B eijing, Sh eny ang, Jinan, G uangzh ou, L anzh ou, N anjing, and
C h engdu Military Region s .
4 . JJB ,A ugus t 10,2001.
5 . Ibid.
6 . JJB ,October 14 ,2000.
7. L anzh ou M ilitary Region JundaiB ao (h ereafter RM JD ),October
17,2000; N anjing M ilitary Region Renm in Qianm in (h ereafter RMQX),
October 17, 2000; Rocket Force New s , October 17, 2000; G uangzh ou
M ilitary Region Zh ansh iB ao (h ereafter ZSB ),October 16 ,2000.
8. Ibid.
9 . JJB ,October 14 ,2000.
10. Ibid.
11. G uangzh ou M R ZSB ,October 13, 2000.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
24 5
14 . Recon n ais s an ce and counterreconnais s ance; air raid and
counterair raid; andjam m ing andantijam m ing.
15 . See, for exam p les, JJB , D ecem ber 2000; Sh eny ang M ilitary
Region Qianjin Bao (h ereafter QJB ),A p ril 4 ,2001; JJB ,M ay 7,2001;
B eijing M ilitary Region Zh any ou B ao (h ereafter ZYB), Nov em ber 4 ,
2000; ZYB,Nov em ber 7,2000.
16 . See, for exam p les ,JJB ,M ay 6 ,2001; ZSB ,M arch 6 ,2001; JJB ,
M ay 16 ,2001; RM JD ,A p ril 26 ,2001; ZSB ,M arch 6 ,2001.
17. See,for exam p les ,C h inaN ationalD efenseN ew s,M ay 21,2001.
18. See,for exam p les ,QJB ,A p ril 9 , 2001; JJB M ay 4 ,2001; ZSB ,
M arch 6 ,2001; JJB ,D ecem ber 4 ,2000; QJB ,A p ril9 ,2001; JJB ,M ay 29 ,
2001; ZSB ,M arch 6 ,2001.
19 . See RM QX, M arch 2, 2001; RM QX, A p ril 5 , 2001; RMQX,
Nov em ber 2, 2000; ZSB , Nov em ber 3, 2000; ZSB , M arch 6 , 2001; A ir
F orce N ew s , A p ril 19 , 2001; C h ina National D efense N ew s , M ay 21,
2001; ZSB , M arch 6 , 2001. In addition, s ix ofth e PL A ’s 29 p rop os als
subm ittedat th e National Peop le’s C ongres s in M arch 2001 addres s ed
m aritim e is s ues ,w h ich tes tifies to an increas ing interes t. Th is w as s aid
to be th e larges t num ber ofPL A p ropos als ev er s ubm itted(JJB ,M arch
11,2001). F or coordination ofs ea-landunit coordinatedtraining, s ee
Peop le’s Nav y ,10 A p ril 2001.
20. See, for exam p les, Peop le’s N av y , A p ril 7, 2001. F or People’s
L iberation A rm y N av y (PL A N) s ub-ch as ing training in coordination
w ith PL A arm y ,s ee Peop le’s N av y ,A p ril 12,2001.
21. F or Peop le’s L iberation A rm y A ir Force (PL A A F) Op p os ing
F orces (OPFOR)s u p p ort,s eePeop le’s Nav y ,A p ril5 ,2001; for long range
op erations (up to 3,000 kilom eters ),s eeA ir ForceNew s ,A p ril19 ,2001.
22. See,for exam p les ,ZSB ,A p ril19 ,2001; JJB ,M ay 20,2001; C h ina
N ational D efenseN ew s,M ay 24 ,2001; RM JD ,M arch 15 ,2001.
23. See,for exam p les ,JJB ,M ay 27,2001; ZSB ,M arch 3,2001; JJB ,
M ay 29 ,2001.
24 . JJB ,F ebruary 2,2001.
25 . In C h ines e op en s ource w ritin gs , “op p onents ” are m ost
frequently ch aracterizedin term s ofcap abilities ,w h ich m os t frequently
im plies U.S. m ilitary cap ability . Recently , h ow ev er, m aterials h av e
been increas ingly p ublis h ed th at s p ecifically identify Taiw an m ilitary
24 6
cap abilities as a th reat andnam e th eUnitedStates as an op p onent,or
ev en “enem y .”
26 . Ibid.
27. JJB ,January 12,2001.
28. Ibid.
29 . See ZSB ,M arch 3,2001.
30. A ir Force N ew s,A p ril19 ,2001.
31. RocketF orce New s,M arch 8,2001.
32. JJB ,D ecem ber 28,2000.
33. JJB ,A p ril 28,2001.
34 . G uangzh ou M R ZSB ,M arch 1,2001.
35 . JJB ,October 31,2000.
36 . Ibid.
37. Zh ou Xiaoning,Peng Xiw en,andA n W eip ing,L ianh e Zuozh an
Xinlun,N ational D efens e Univ ers ity Pres s ,B eijing,2000.
38. JJB ,October 10,2000.
39 . Ibid.
4 0. ZYB ,D ecem ber 28,2000.
4 1. RM QX,D ecem ber 29 ,2000.
4 2. Ibid.
4 3. JJB ,January 9 ,2001.
4 4 . A ir Force N ew s,M arch 15 ,2001.
4 5 . D irectory ofPRC M ilitary Pers onalities,October 2000,p . iv .
4 6 . JJB ,Nov em ber 14 ,2000.
4 7. Ibid.
24 7
4 8. C h ina D efense Indus tries ,N ov em ber 9 ,2000.
4 9 . ZSB ,October 20,2000.
5 0. Ibid.
5 1. C h ina D efense N ew s,M arch 1,2001.
5 2. JJB ,A u gus t 9 ,2000.
5 3. Ibid.
5 4 . RM QX,M arch 8,2001.
5 5 . Ibid.
5 6 . ZSB ,M arch 1,2001.
5 7. ZSB ,July 26 ,2000.
5 8. Ibid.
5 9 . Ibid.
6 0. JJB ,October 25 ,2000.
6 1. A ir Force N ew s,A ugus t 17,2000.
6 2. Ibid.
6 3. C h ina N ational D efens eN ew s ,A ugus t 11,2000.
6 4 . Ibid.
6 5 . C h ina N ational D efens eN ew s ,A p ril26 ,2001.
6 6 . F or m ore detailed and auth oritativ e dis cus s ion of m is s ile
m odernization, see M ark Stokes , C h ina’s Strategic M odernization:
Im plications for th e United States, C arlis le B arracks , PA : Strategic
Studies Ins titute,19 9 9 ; and“C h ina’s M ilitary Sp ace andC onv entional
Th eater M is s ile D ev elop m ent: Im p lications for Security in th eTaiw an
Strait,” in Peop le’s L iberation Arm y A fter Next, Susan M. Puska, ed.,
C arlis le B arracks ,PA : StrategicStudies Ins titute, 2000.
6 7. RocketF orces New s,M arch 1,2001.
6 8. JJB ,M ay 10,2001.
24 8
6 9 . RocketF orces New s,M arch 15 ,2001.
70. JJB ,A u gus t 8,2000.
71. Ibid.
72. QJB ,July 10,2000.
73. Ibid.
4 . Peop le’s N av y ,July 8,2000.
75 . Ibid.
76 . Peop le’s N av y ,July 15 ,2000.
77. Ibid.
78. JJB ,A u gus t 8,2000.
79 . Ibid.
80. C om puter Netw ork A ttack.
81. JJB ,A u gus t 8-9 ,2000.
82. RM JD ,July 11 and15 ,2000.
83. Ibid.
84 . JJB ,A u gus t 11,2000.
85 . Ibid.
86 . Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89 . A ir Force N ew s,July 8,2000.
9 0. Ibid.
9 1. JJB ,M ay 4 ,2001.
9 2. Sh eny ang M R Qianjin B ao,A p ril 4 ,2001.
24 9
9 3. JJB ,D ecem ber 31,2000.
9 4 . See,for exam p les ,ZYB ,A p ril 2,2001; JJB ,D ecem ber 1,2000;
Peop le’s N av y , A p ril 7, 2001; C O N M IL IT, October 2000; Renm in
Qianxian, Sep tem ber 9 , 2000; JJB , October 10, 2000; PL A Pictorial,
January 2001; A ir F orceN ew s,M arch 29 ,2001; andPeople’s N av y ,A p ril
5 ,2001.
9 5 . See,for exam p les ,A ir F orceN ew s ,A p ril 5 ,2001.
9 6 . See,for exam p les ,ZY B ,A p ril 24 , 2001; RM JD ,A p ril 21,2001;
Rocket F orce N ew s ,A p ril26 ,2001.
9 7. M ich ael D . Sw aine andA s h ley J. Tellis , Interp reting C h ina’s
G randStrategy ,Pas t, Present,andFuture,Santa M onica,C A ,RA N D ,
2001,p p . 14 1-14 7.
9 8. F inance M inis ter Xiang H uiach eng announcedin M arch 2001
th at th e PL A budget w ouldbeincreas edby 14 1.004 billion y uan,17.7
p ecent. Xiang attributed th is defens e budget increas e to (1) s alary
increas es ; (2) adap tation to dras tic ch anges taking p lace in th e w orld
m ilitary s ituation; and(3)th e needfor th e PL A to p rep are for defense
andcom bat. (See JJB , M arch 6 , 2001). Th is increas e is a cons is tent
trend— in 19 9 8 th eofficialdefensebudget w as increas edby 9 3.4 7 billion
y uan,in 19 9 9 it w as increas edby 107.6 7 billion y uan,andin 2000 it w as
increas edby 121.29 billion y uan.
25 0
C H A PTE R 9
L OG ISTIC S SUPPORT FOR PL A A IR FORC E
C A M PA IG N S
K enneth W . A llen 1
Under today ’s w artim e conditions , av iation troop s m us t be
p rep aredto dep loy quickly acros s borders to a w ar zone andbe
p rep aredto figh tim m ediately . C urrently ,s om eofC h ina’s w ar
zones do not h av e m any first-line airfields , s o th e existing
airfields m us t s up p ort sev eral ty p es of aircraft. Th e PL A A F
m ust als o h ideits aircraftby dis p ers ing th em to fieldairstrip s
andh igh w ay landing strip s . Th erefore,PL A A F logis tics troop s
m usth av eth ecap ability to s up p ortm ultip lety p es ofaircraftat
different ty p es ofairfields .2
L ogistics Sup p ort for M obile Operations ,19 9 7
INTROD UC TION
Th e p urp os e of th is ch ap ter is to exam ine w h at th e
Peop le’s L iberation A rm y A ir F orce (PL A A F ) is doing to
reform its logis tics s y s tem s in order to figh t andw in h igh
tech nology w ars under m odern conditions, em p loy ing all
fiv eofits branch es . M any ofth es ereform s h av ecom e about
as a direct res ult ofcontingency p lanning for a p os s ible w ar
w ith th e UnitedStates ov er Taiw an, but th e reform s are
ap p licable to th e PL A A F as a w h ole.
In th e 19 9 0s , th e PL A A F began th e p roces s of
transform ing its elffrom a forcecap able ofem p loy ing s ingle
bran ch es (av iation, s u rface- to-air m is s iles [SA M s ],
antiaircraft artillery [A A A ],radar,andairbornetroop s )and
s ingle ty p es ofaircraft in p os itional defensiv ecam p aigns to
onecap ableofus ing m ultip lebranch es ands ev eral ty p es of
aircraft in air force com bined arm s , m obile offen s iv e
25 1
op eration s cam p aigns , w ith th e goal of s h iftin g to
op erations in joint s erv icecam p aigns .3In order to reach th is
goal, th e PL A A F h as h adto im p lem ent s om e s ignificant
ch anges in its logis tics s y s tem ,w h ich traditionally h as not
been s tructuredfor s up p orting m obile,offensiv eop erations .
W h ilem any ofth ech anges ares tillunderw ay ,s om eare s till
only as p irational.
Th e ch ap ter is div idedinto four s ections. In Section I, I
w illp rov ide th es etting for ch anges in th e PL A A F ’s logis tics
op erations by dis cus s ing PL A A F op erational th eory . In
Section II,Iw ill define PL A A F logis tics andp rov ide a brief
dis cus s ion ofth ePL A A F logis tics s tructure. In Section III,I
w ill exam ine PL A A F logis tics th eory and w h at ty p es of
training th e PL A A F h as conducted to im p lem ent th is
th eory . In Section IV ,Iw ill p rov ides om econclus ions about
ch anges in th e PL A A F ’s logis tics s y s tem in relation to
p os s ible cam p aign op erations against th e UnitedStates .
SE C TION I: PL A A IR FORC E OPE R A TIONS
TH EORY
PL A A F Pos itional D efen s e.
Th e PL A A F bas ically h as tw o m odes of op erations—
p os itional andm obile.4 Traditionally ,th e PL A A F ’s p rim ary
m is s ion h as been p os itional air defens efor C h ina’s airfields ,
national p olitical and econom ic centers , h eav y troop
concen trations , im p ortan t m ilitary facilities , an d
tran s p ortation sy s tem s .5 A s a result,m os t figh ter airfields
and v irtually all of th e PL A A F ’s SA M s and A A A are
concentrated around C h ina’s large cities . D uring th e its
firs t3decades ,th ety p es ofw eap on s y s tem s th e PL A A F h ad
and th e location of th e airfields m ade it difficult for th e
PL A A F to conduct any oth er ty p e ofop erations.
A ccording to Paul G odw in, th e PL A A F ’s reliance on
p os itional defense becam e ev en m ore ap p arent during th e
late 19 70s , w h en th e core of th e PL A ’s new s trategy of
25 2
“Peop le’s W ar Under M odern C onditions ” w as forw ard
defense.6 G odw in s tates ,
Th is s trategy m eant th at C h ina w ouldbedefendedat s elected
critical p oints as clos e to its borders as p os s ible to p rev ent
Sov iet forces from driv ing deep into C h ina. Pos itional defense
w as not th e p referredop tion for C h ina’s m ilitary s trategis ts ,
w h o w ouldh av ep referreda m oreflexiblem obiledefense. B ut,
th e s up erior arm s andequip m ent ofSov iet forces conducting
joint w arfare granted th em s uch m obility , s p eed, and
des tructiv e p ow er th at th e PL A ’s op eration s could not
realis tically be bas edon a w ar ofm aneuv er.
Th e PL A A F ’s Search for a Strategy .
Serious ch anges in th e w ay th e PL A th ough t about its
future took p lace betw een th e 19 79 border conflict w ith
V ietnam andD eng Xiaop ing’s 19 85 “s trategicdecis ion” th at
directedth e arm edforces to ch angefrom p rep aration for an
“early , m ajor, and nuclear w ar” to p rep aring for “local
lim ited w ars around C h in a’s borders , in cludin g its
m aritim e territories andclaim s .” W h ereas th e PL A Nav y
(PL A N) h ad concep tualizeda ch ange in its s trategy from
coas tal defense to offs h ore defense,th e PL A A F enteredth e
s econdh alfofth e decade s till in search ofa s trategy .7
Th e PL A A F ’s s earch w as driv en,in part,by a des ire to
s eek indep endent m is s ions andto try to break aw ay from its
near total s ubm is s ion to th egroundforces . Th is dep endence
w as exem p lifiedin th e early 19 80s w h en th e PL A began
reorganizing its groundforces into group arm ies , andth e
PL A A F w as tas ked to p rov ide defens e for group arm y
p os ition s . Sp ecific guidan ce from th e G en eral Staff
D ep artm ent (G SD )w as giv en th at “each branch andunit of
th ePL A A F m us tes tablis h th ep h ilos op h y th at th ey s u p p ort
th e needs of th e ground forces and th at th e v ictory is a
groundforce v ictory .”8
25 3
W ang H ai Initiates Sh iftTow ardSim ultaneous
Offen s iv e andD efensiv e Operations.
Under W ang H ai,w h o becam e th e com m ander in 19 85 ,
th ePL A A F began articulating its v iew s on m obile,offensiv e
op erations . F irs t, in a break from th e PL A A F ’s focus on
p os itional defensiv ecam p aigns,W ang laidout a p rogram in
19 87 th at form ally s et forth th e th ough t (s ixiang) of
“building an air force w ith s im ultaneous offensiv e and
defen s iv e cap abilities ” (jianli gongfang jianbei xing
kongjun).9 W ang em p h as ized th at th e com bined arm s
com bat env ironm ent of th e 19 80s required a force th at
“couldm ov e quickly ov er long dis tances , couldfigh t in an
electronicenv ironm ent,couldh av e th ecap ability to attack
an enem y , and could keep th e PL A A F from s us taining
com p lete dam age from an enem y air attack.”
In th elate 19 80s ,th e PL A began exp erim enting w ith th e
concep t of rap id-reaction units . In 19 9 0, th e PL A A F
p ublis h ed an auth oritativ e book en titled A ir F orce
O p erations R es earch th at s tated, “Th e rap id-reaction
s trategy (kuaisu fany ing zh anlue)is bas edon th e p rem is e
th at C h ina w ill only be engaged in local w ars for th e
fores eeable future,andth e PL A m us t s trike to endth e w ar
quickly andm eet th e p olitical objectiv es .”10
G iv en C h ina’s m ilitary lim itations com p aredw ith th os e
of th e Sov iets and A m ericans, th e s tudy adv ocated th e
concep t of dep loy ing air defense forces according to th e
p rincip leof“frontligh t,rear h eav y ” along w ith th ep rincip le
of “dep loy ing in th ree rings .”11 Th e fixed-bas e logis tics
s y s tem th at exis ted at th at tim e m et th e PL A A F ’s
requirem ents for p os itional defense.
Us ing th e “front ligh t,rear h eav y ” concep t,th e PL A A F
s tatedit s h ouldorganize its SA M andA A A troop s into a
com bined h igh -, m edium - and low -altitude and a far-,
m edium -,ands h ort-dis tance air defens e net. Th e air force
w ould als o s et up m any intercep t lines and organize its
av iation troop s into a lay eredintercep t,es p ecially along th e
25 4
enem y ’s m ain routes . In deciding h ow to dep loy its forces ,
th e PL A A F div idedth e battle area into th ree lines , us ing
th e front line ofenem y airfields as th e bas eline. Th e firs t
line w ouldextendto a radius of5 00 kilom eters (300 m iles )
from th e bas eline, w ith in w h ich th e notional enem y w ill
m ainly us eits figh ters andfigh ter-bom bers . Th es econdline
w ouldextendto 1,000 kilom eters (6 00 m iles ), w h ere th e
enem y w ill p rim arily us eits figh ter-bom bers andbom bers .
Th e th irdline extends bey ond1,000 kilom eters ,w h ere th e
enem y w ouldm ainly us eits long-ranges trategicbom bers .
Inform ation from Th e Rep ublic of C h ina 19 9 3- 9 4
N ational D efen s e Rep ort des cribed th e s ituation as
follow s ,12
Th e dep loy m ent of th e A ir F orce is aim ed p rim arily at
defending agains t Rus s ia and s econdarily at defending
agains t th eRep ublicofC h ina andV ietnam . Th eir dep loy m ent
adop ts th e p rincip le th at ‘a m inim um num ber oftroop s are
deploy edon th e front line w h ile th e m ain forces are m obile.’
C urrently (19 9 4 ), w ith in 25 0 nautical m iles (4 5 0 kilom eters )
from Taiw an, M ainland C h ina h as 13 airbas es cap able of
accom m odating m ore th an 1000 aircraft. H ow ev er,th ere are
only about100 figh ters s tationedth ere now . In th es econdline,
w h ich is 25 0-5 00 nautical m iles (4 5 0-9 00 kilom eters ) from
Taiw an, th ere are m ore th an 20 airbas es w ith ov er 15 00
[PL A A F andNav al A v iation]com bataircraft ofv arious ty p es .
Th e Rep ublic of C h ina 19 9 8 N ational D efense Rep ort
s tates ,13“A t p res ent,1,300 aircraft ares tationedat airbas es
w ith in 5 00 nautical m iles ofTaiw an,ofw h ich 6 00 h av e a
radius ofop eration ov er Taiw an p rop er.” Th e2000 N ational
D efense Rep ort s tates , “A lready dep loy ed w ith in 6 00
nautical m iles (1000 kilom eters )ofth e Taiw an p rop er are
about l000 [PL A A F andNav al A v iation]p lanes ofv arious
ty p es w h ich couldundertake op erational m is s ions at any
m om ent.”14 In D ecem ber 2000,Taiw an’s m inis try ofdefense
s tated, “Th ere w ere 14 m ilitary and civ il airfields w ith in
25 0 nautical m iles of Taiw an. Th ey currently h av e 121
figh ters , but could accom m odate 1,279 figh ters , n ot
including Su-27s,on s h ort notice . . .”15
25 5
L ooking at a m ap , th e area out to 1,000 kilom eters
des cribed in Taiw an’s rep orts s tarts at th e Sh andong
Penin s u la, arcs h alfw ay th rough H ubei an d H unan
Prov inces , th en goes dow n to th e L eizh ou Peninsula,
cov ering alm os t all ofth eN anjing M R andabout h alfofth e
G uangzh ou M ilitary Region (M R). A ccording to th e
F ederation of A m erican Scientis ts M ap 1, th ere are 5 0
airfields w ith in 800 kilom eters of Taiw an, including 36
m ilitary airbas es — not all of w h ich are p erm anently
occup ied.16
Source: F ederation ofA m erican Scientists .
M ap 1. C h ines e A irfields w ith in 800 K ilom eters of
Taiw an.
25 6
A ccordin g to Taiw an m ilitary officials , s in ce th e
m id-19 9 0s ,th ePL A A F h as been dep loy ing s m all units from
des ignated rap id reaction units from th rough out th e
PL A A F into s om e ofth e bas es directly op p os ite Taiw an for
6 -m onth fam iliarization dep loy m ents .17 Th e dep loy m ents
h av e giv en th ePL A A F ’s logis tics s y s tem th e op p ortunity to
p ractice s u p p orting th os e forces .
In using th e “ligh t front, h eav y rear” concep t, th e air
force believ ed it w ould h av e to deal w ith tw o im p ortant
p roblem s . Th e firs t p roblem w as th at th e PL A A F ’s aircraft
in th e 19 80s didnot h av e th ecap ability to fly to th e border
from th eir h om ebas es ,loiter for any length oftim e,conduct
an intercep t, and return h om e again. Th is p roblem w as
exem p lifiedduring th e 19 79 border w ar w ith V ietnam . In
addition, th e PL A A F believ ed th at, during any s udden
attack on C h ina,it m us t be able to s cram ble all ofits firs t
line aircraft to m eet th e attack andp rev ent th e incom ing
aircraft from s triking any airfields .
Th e s econd, and contradictory , p roblem w as th at th e
m os t likely anticip ated adv ers aries at th at tim e— th e
UnitedStates andSov iet Union— h adaircraft cap able of
conducting deep s trikes into th e h eart ofC h ina. Th erefore,
th ePL A A F believ edit s h oulds tation m os t ofits air defense
w eap on sy s tem s in th e s econdandth irdlines s o th ey could
intercep t any longer-range aircraft as th ey conv ergedon
key targets . Furth erm ore, th e attacking aircraft w ould
m os t likely not h av e th e p rop er es corts at th os e dis tances ,
andth ePL A A F ’s early w arning radars m igh tbeableto giv e
enough adv ance notice of an attack for th e air defense
s y s tem s to be ready .
Sev eral s im ultaneous forces are p ulling on th e PL A A F
today . A lth ough current PL A A F w ritings do not m ention
th e “front ligh t,rear h eav y ” concep t,th e air forces tillfaces
th e s am e con cerns about air defen s e an d aircraft
surv iv ability at facilities near th ecoas t. Th ey arebeing told
to p rep are for offensiv e op erations, p os s ibly against U.S.
forces , but th ey are als o analy zing th e ty p es ofop erations
25 7
and w eap ons, including long-range cruis e m is s iles us ed
during th e G ulfW ar andK os ov o conflict th at succes s fully
targetedair defense netw orks andairfields .18
Teach ing th e Th eories .
B eginning in th e 19 9 0s , th e PL A A F began training its
m idlev elofficers in s om eofth es enew th eories . A ccording to
an article in C h ina’s A ir Force m agazine:19
Th ePL A A F C om m andC ollege im p lem entedan in-dep th
teach ing reform in 19 9 3 to ch ange th e PL A A F ’s op erating
m eth odology from em p loy ing s ingle branch es and s ingle
ty p es of aircraft to us ing m ultip le branch es and s ev eral
ty p es ofaircraft in an air force com binedarm s cam p aign,
w ith th e goal of s h ifting to op erations in a joint s erv ice
cam p aign. Prior to th en, th e training of m iddle-ranking
com m anders w as aim ed m ainly at directing com bat
inv olv ing a s ingle branch and s ingle ty p es of aircraft in
w arfare under general con dition s . C om m anders w h o
graduated from s uch training w ere good at th e tactical
op erations of th eir ow n ty p es of aircraft and th eir ow n
branch , but th ey didnot know m uch about oth er ty p es of
aircraft or oth er branch es ands erv ices . Th e PL A A F ’s joint
op erations consis ted of aircraft fly ing com bat air p atrols
andattack airp lanes fly ing far ap art from each oth er and
not h av ing m uch to do w ith each oth er.
A s p art of th e reform s to p roduce “trans cen tury
com m anders ,” th eC om m andC ollege als o began focus ing on
th eories s uch as joint com bat op erations, m obile w arfare,
inform ation w arfare, and electronic w arfare.20 Th e new
com bat th eory em bodied“four ch anges ” as follow s :
1. C h ange from s tudy ing air com bat under general
conditions to s tudy in g air com bat under h igh - tech
conditions.
2. C h ange from
offense.
s tres s ing air defense to s tres s ing air
25 8
3. C h ange from air com bat s u p p ortedby joint op erations
w ith th e arm y to air com bat s up p ortedby joint op erations of
arm y ,nav y ,andair force.
4 . C h ange from w arfare inv olv ing a s ingle branch and
s ingle ty p e ofaircraft to com binedarm s w arfare inv olv ing
th e m ultip le branch es andty p es ofaircraft.
Th e PL A A F under L iu Sh uny ao.
W h ereas W an g H ai in itiated th e con cep t of
s im ultaneous offensiv e anddefens iv e op erations in 19 87,it
did not receiv e m uch p ublicity until late 19 9 6 , w h en
C h ines e leaders , including C entral M ilitary C om m is s ion
(C M C )C h airm an Jiang Zem in andPL A A F com m ander L iu
Sh uny ao, began to em p h as ize th e PL A A F ’s needto figh t
offensiv e battles .21 D uring 19 9 7, L iu s tated, “Th e PL A A F
m us t im p rov e its cap abilities in actual com bat by
h igh ligh ting cam p aign andtactical training.”22 H e furth er
em p h as izedth at cam p aign training inv olv es air deterrence,
air interdiction, air s trikes , and p articip ation in joint
exercis es .
In th e F ebruary - M arch 2000 is s ue ofC h ina’s A ir F orce
m agazine,four auth ors p rov ideda candidas s es s m ent ofth e
PL A A F ’s s h ortcom ings andrequirem ents for it to beable to
conduct s im ultaneous offensiv e anddefensiv eop erations.23
Th e article s tated,“Th e PL A A F m us t ch ange th e direction
ofits s trategicth inking from an em p h as is on territorial air
defense,p rim arily becaus e th econcep t ofm odern h igh -tech
w ar h as ch anged. If th e PL A A F does n ot ch ange its
th inking,th en its dev elop m ent w ill be constrainedandfall
beh indw ith th e res t ofth e w orld’s w eak countries .”
Th e article als o s tres s edth at th e ability to attack is th e
PL A A F ’s w eak link. Th is w eaknes s w as a direct res ultofth e
PL A A F ’s p as t op erational th ough t,w h ich w as reflectedin
th e air force’s fligh t training p rogram . Th e auth ors s tated
th at if th e PL A A F w ants to dev elop a s im ultaneous
offen s iv e and defen s iv e cap ability , th en reform ing th e
25 9
training s y s tem is urgent. Som e of th e reform s include
up grading th e p rofes s ional m ilitary education (PM E )
s y s tem , ov erh auling th e p ilot recruitm ent and training
requirem ents ,andfocus ing on realis ticfligh t training.
PL A A F M obile Operations.
A s th e PL A A F acquires better w eap on s y s tem s and
contem p lates using its rap id-reaction units in sim ultaneous
offensiv e anddefensiv e op erations, it h as begun to focus
m ore on m obile op erations. In 19 9 7,th e G eneral L ogis tics
D ep artm ent (G L D )p ublis h eda s eries ofbooks on logis tics
s u p p ort oflocal w ars under m odern h igh -tech conditions.
Oneofth os ebooks ,L ogis tics Supportfor M obileOp erations ,
p rov ides v aluable inform ation on PL A A F logis tics .
Th e PL A A F D ictionary defines m obile op erations as
“A v iation troop s s eizing th e righ t m om ent to m ov e to th e
objectiv e by air, land, or w ater. N orm ally , th is entails
dep loy ing m obile fendui to concealedlocations to conduct
th eir attack.”24 A lth ough th is is th e official definition,th e
PL A A F ’s us e of m obile op eration s is n ot lim ited to
fendui-size forces , not is it lim itedto th e av iation forces .
Today , all fiv e of its branch es ands u p p ort units train in
m obileop erations . A ccording to L ogis tics Supportfor M obile
O p erations , th e PL A A F h as fiv e ty p es of m obile
op erations — long-range, air interdiction,s u p p ort for oth er
s erv ices andbranch es , airborne s u p p ly , andam bus h — as
des cribedbelow .25
1. L ong-range op erations . A ccording to th e PL A A F ’s
v iew of m obile op erations , bom bers and figh ter-bom ber
aircraft are th e p rim ary m ean s for conducting m obile
long-range air attack op eration s . Norm ally , th es e are
p lanned attacks on land or m aritim e targets by aircraft
carry ing s p ecific w eap ons and s up p orted by all ty p es of
es cort aircraft. Th erefore,in order for th e PL A A F to adop t
th is m eth od, it m us t take into cons ideration th e current
condition of its bom ber units . W h en planning th e bom ber
force’s future attacks , th e PL A A F m us t s elect th e righ t
26 0
forw ardbas es . Th erefore,it m us t s trength en th e ability of
th e airfields in peacetim e to s up p ort bom ber op erations
during w artim e. Th e PL A A F m us t p lan on h av ing its
bom ber airfields attacked after th e PL A A F ’s bom bers
conduct th eir attack,s o th e PL A A F m us t carefully s elect its
targets anddecide up on p re- andp os t-attack p rocedures .
B as edon th e PL A A F ’s bom ber andes cort aircraft range
cap abilities ,it m us t determ ine th e ap p rop riate dis tancefor
long-range attacks , s o th at th e attacking tas k force w ill
h av e enough tim e ov er th e target to accom p lis h its m is s ion
andth eelectronics u p p ort aircraft w ill h av eenough tim e to
s u p p ort th em .
2. A ir interdiction op erations. Th e PL A A F us es its
figh ters as th e p rim ary m eth od for air interdiction
op erations . Th is m eth od is used for air superiority , air
defense ov er key p oints ,andair cov er m is s ions. Op erations
during th e G ulfW ar s h ow edth at an attacking forcecannot
com p letely des troy all ofth e op p os ing force’s aircraft on th e
ground, s o th e bes t w ay to keep y our aircraft from being
des troy ed on th e ground is to conduct air interdiction
op erations agains t th e attacking force. In future w ars ,th e
PL A A F w illadop t th efollow ing m eth ods for air interdiction:
concentrate forceby s tres s ing quality andcom bat p ow er to
carry out em ergency (ji), difficult (nan), dangerous (xian),
ands ignificant (zh ong)m is s ions as th e edge ofth e knife;
attack th e aircraft th at are s u p p orting th e attacking
aircraft, s uch as airborne early w arning and jam m ing
aircraft; attack th eenem y atalllev els along th eentire route
as far out as p os s ible; andp ay attention to attacking low and
super low lev el air targets .
3. A v iation Sup p ort for Oth er Serv ices and B ranch es.
Th e PL A A F ’s av iation troop s w ill als o p rov ide s u p p ort for
th e ground and nav al forces , including airborne cov er
m is s ions,airbornefirep ow er s u p p ort,aerialreconnais s ance
and electronic counterm eas ures to degrade th e enem y ’s
ov erall com bat cap abilities . Th is includes th e enem y ’s
cam p aign rear air defense s y s tem ,s econdech elon units (or
cam p aign res erv e forces ), logis tics s up p ort s y s tem ,
26 1
com m unication s s y s tem ,h elicop ters ,andm as s ing forces . It
als o m eans th e PL A A F ’s attacking forcem us t av oidground
or m aritim e corridors andguarantee friendly groundand
nav al forces ’freedom ofm ov em ent.
4 . A irborne drop op erations . Th e PL A A F is res p onsible
for air trans p ort ofs up p lies ,w h ich can beeith er airdrop p ed
by p arach ute or brough t into an airfield. Since tran s p ort
p lanes do not h av eany air defensecap ability ,it is im p ortant
to consider th eir routes andv ulnerability to air attack.
5 . Patrol and am bus h op erations . Th e PL A A F us es its
av iation,A A A ,andSA M troop s as th e p rim ary m eth ods for
th es e op erations. Th es e op erations require a h igh degree of
indep endence,us e little firep ow er,are h igh ly flexible,and
us ually receiv e goodres ults . In order to execute th es e ty p es
of op erations , th e PL A A F w ill dep loy s m all av iation
elem ents or A A A and SA M units to areas w h ere th e
attacking aircraft w illp as s . A A A andSA M s w illbeeffectiv e
against low andsuper low fly ing targets , including arm ed
h elicop ters .
SE C TION II: W H A T IS PL A A IR FORC E
L OG ISTIC S?
Th is s ection begins th e dis cus s ion of PL A A F logis tics
reform s by firs t lay ing out w h at PL A A F logis tics
encom p as s es . B as ically ,th e logis tics s y s tem is res p onsible
for p rov iding all th e PL A A F ’s general purp os e s up p lies ,
construction, h ealth s erv ices , food, s h elter, cloth ing, fuel,
and tran s p ortation, as w ell as m anaging its budget and
exp enditures . Th e PL A A F D ictionary defines air force
logis tics as th e ov erall term for th e logis tics s tructure th at
s u p p orts com bat,training,andair force-building.26 PL A A F
logis tics con s is ts of com m an d, p lus finan ce, h ealth ,
arm am en t, fuel, m aterials , tran s p ortation , cap ital
construction, and airfield m anagem ent s up p ort s erv ices .
L ogis tics is organ ized into four op erational lev els —
H eadquarters A ir F orce,m ilitary region air forces (M RA F ),
air corp s ,andunits . Th e adm inis trativ e s tructure cons is ts
26 2
ofa L ogis tics D ep artm ent at H eadquarters A ir F orce and
each ofth e M RA F andair corp s h eadquarters . In addition,
each ground unit (non-av iation) div is ion, brigade, and
regim enth as a L ogis tics D ep artm ents or L ogis tics D iv is ion.
Th e m os t im p ortan t logis tics organ ization for
op erational av iation units at th ediv is ion andregim entlev el
is th e fields tation (ch angzh an), w h ich is an indep endent
logis tics s up p ort unit under dual leaders h ip of th e air
div is ion andth e M RA F h eadquarters . In th e PL A A F , th e
fields tation director s erv es th e s am e function as a U.S. A ir
F orce(USA F )bas ecom m ander. Prior to F ebruary 19 70,th e
field s tation w as called a bas e, and h ad th e s tatus of a
div is ion.27 Today ,it h as th e s tatus ofa regim ent. Th e field
s tation is res p onsiblefor organizing ands up p ly ing m aterial
andequip m ent,andals o for p rov iding continuous com bined
s erv ice s u p p ort for op erations andtraining. E ach airfield
h ous ing aircraft as s ignedto th e div is ion h as its ow n field
s tation. E ach airfieldgenerally h as 1-2aircraft regim ents ,
w h ich determ ines th e fields tation’s s ize. F or exam p le, a
fields tation at an airfields u p p orting tw o figh ter regim ents
h as about 9 30 p ers onnel, including 170 officers and76 0
enlis tedtroop s .28 A ccording to L ogis tics Support for M obile
O p erations, th e field s tation w ill be augm en ted by
additional logis tics p ers onnel w h en neces s ary .
Th e PL A A F ’s s up p ly dep ot s y s tem is organizedinto a
th ree-tier s tructure— firs t lev el dep ots are located in
v arious m ilitary regions bu t are s u bordin ate to
H eadquarters A ir F orce; s econdlev el dep ots are locatedin
each m ilitary region and are s ubordinate to th e M RA F
H eadquarters ; and th ird lev el dep ots are located at and
s ubordinate to op erational units . 29 F or exam p le, each
airfieldh as a th irdlev el dep ot,andth e s econdlev el dep ots
can s up p ort th e th ird lev el dep ots w h en required. In
addition,firs tlev eldep ots can eith er s up p ly th es econdlev el
dep ots or s enditem s directly to th e unit ifneces s ary .
Th e PL A A F D ictionary s tates th at th e air force’s
s trategicandcam p aign rear area dep ots can bediv idedinto
26 3
com p os ite dep ots , w h ere all ty p es ofm aterials are s tored,
and s p ecialized dep ots for air m ateriel, arm am ent, fuel,
v eh icles ,andquarterm as ter articles , etc.30
In th e p as t,th e PL A A F ’s L ogis tics D ep artm ent h as als o
been res p onsible for s om e w eap on s y s tem s m aintenance.
Th ePL A A F h as alw ay s m adeaclear dis tinction betw een its
av iation (aircraft)andair defense forces (A A A , SA M , and
radar troop s ). Th is can be s een th rough out th e entire
PL A A F ’s adm in is trativ e, op erational, logis tics ,
m aintenance,andtraining s tructure. W h ereas th e PL A A F
h as alw ay s h ada s ep arate firs t lev el dep artm ent th at w as
res p on s ible for av iation m aintenance,31 th e L ogis tics
D ep artm ent h as been res p onsiblefor air defenseequip m ent
m ain ten an ce.32 In 19 9 8, th e L ogis tics D ep artm en t
transferred its s econd lev el A ir M ateriel33 D ep artm ent
(h angcaibu)andA rm am ent D ep artm ent (junxiebu)to th e
PL A A F ’s E quip m ent D ep artm ent. Today , th e L ogis tics
D ep artm ent is res p onsiblefor all general p urp os e s up p lies ,
and th e E quip m ent D ep artm ent is res p ons ible for all
s p ecial p urp os e s u p p lies and all w eap on s y s tem s and
equip m ent m aintenance.34
F inally , th ere are PL A A F academ ies , s ch ools , and
training regim ents and group s to train logis tics and
non av iation m aintenance p ers onnel. In addition, th e
PL A A F h as s ev eral subordinate res earch institutes for
av iation m edicine, fuels ,cloth ing,av iation m unitions,four
s tations (oxy gen generation , com p res s ed air, battery
ch arging, and p ow er s up p ly ) equip m ent, and cap ital
construction. 35
Operational andL ogis tics C om m andPos ts .
Th e PL A A F h as identifieds ev eral ty p es ofop erational
com m andp os ts (zh ih uisuo),s om e ofw h ich are es tablis h ed
only during exercis es and w artim e cam p aigns .36 Th e
PL A A F ’s logis tics s y s tem als o h as a s ep arate s et of
com m andp os ts , w h ich m ay or m ay not coincide w ith th e
op erational com m andp os ts . A ccording to a rep ort in th e
26 4
South C h ina M orning Pos t,th e PL A A F built 100 com m and
p os ts , op erational offices , and av iation control centers
betw een 19 9 4 and19 9 9 .37
O p erational C om m and Pos ts. E ach of th e follow ing
PL A A F h eadquarters h av e op erational com m andp os ts :38
H eadquarters A ir F orce, M RA F h eadquarters ; air corp s ;
av iation div is ions and regim ents ; and A A A and SA M
div is ions ,brigades ,andregim ents . Th es enior s tafffor each
ty p e generally consis ts ofth e follow ing rep res entativ es : a
com m ander, ch iefduty officer, ch iefofs taff,andlogis tics
s u p p ort s taffofficer. D ep ending on th e organization lev el,
oth er s taffofficers includerep res entativ es from th ev arious
s econd lev el adm inis trativ e offices under th e four m ajor
dep artm en ts (h eadquarters , p olitical, logis tics , an d
equip m en t), in clu din g op erations , in telligen ce,
com m unication s , confiden tial (s ecurity for clas s ified
m aterial), nav igation, SA M , A A A , fligh t m anagem ent,
w eath er,radar,p olitical, logis tics ,andm aintenance.
B as ed on th eir m is s ion, com m an d p os ts can be
categorized as m ain (jiben), alternate (y ubei), adv ance
(qianjin), auxiliary (fuzh u), or rear area (h oufang)
com m and p os ts . M ain com m and p os ts are p erm anent
com m and p os ts th at are norm ally es tablis h ed at each
ech elon’s h eadquarters . D uring cam p aigns ,th ecom m ander
is th e s enior officer in th e com m and p os t. A lternate
com m and p os ts are es tablis h ed before th e s tart of a
cam p aign at H eadquarters A ir F orce,each M RA F ,andeach
air corp s w ith th eres p onsibility ofcom m anding units at th e
div is ion andbelow . Th ey are built at th e s am e tim e as a
m ain com m and p os t but are not us ed unles s th e m ain
com m andp os t is no longer functional. A lternate com m and
p os ts can als o bes et up for s p ecial p urp os es or to com m and
low er lev el units .
A dv an ce com m an d p os ts are es tablis h ed in th e
op erational area to as s is t th e m ain com m and p os t in a
general com m androle or to com m andair force units th at
are as s is ting groundandnav al forces . F or exam p le,during
26 5
th e 19 79 border conflict w ith V ietnam , th e G uangzh ou
M RA F H eadquarters es tablis h ed an adv ance com m and
p os t at an unidentified location, w h ich w orked togeth er
w ith th e 7th A ir C orp s H eadquarters at N anning as th e
unified auth ority for th e PL A A F ’s p articip ation. 39 A n
auxiliary com m and p os t is created to as s is t a m ain or
adv ancecom m andp os t in com bat areas w h ere com m andis
difficult. In addition, dep ending on th e ty p e of activ ity ,
com m andp os ts can eith er befixedor m obile,anddep ending
on th eir p h y s ical location, th ey can be on th e s urface,
underground,s h ip borne, or airborne.
W ar ZoneJoint L ogis tics C om m andPos ts. A ccording to
L ogis tics Support for M obile Operations,th e w ar zone joint
logis tics s tructure is th e joint logis tics com m andcenter for
all ofth e v arious s erv ices andbranch es ,andis th e h igh es t
logis tics com m ands tructure for th e cam p aign.4 0 N orm ally ,
th e w ar zone logis tics organization form s th e bas e, w h ich
th en incorp orates p eop le from th e p articip ating nav y , air
force, and s econd artillery cam p aign juntuan logis tics
organization s , and local com m and s tructures th at are
s u p p orting th ecam p aign,as w ell as th e ap p rop riate p eop le
from th e h eadquarters , p olitical, an d equip m en t
dep artm en ts . W h en n eces s ary , th e G L D an d th e
H eadquarters N av y andA ir F orce L ogis tics D ep artm ents
s en d rep res en tativ es to p articip ate. Under n orm al
circum s tances , th e w ar zone deputy com m ander w h o is in
ch argeofrear arealogis tics w ork becom es th ejoint logis tics
center com m ander,andth e w ar zone logis tics dep artm ent
director and each of th e w ar zone s erv ice and branch
logis tics directors are as s ignedas dep uty com m anders .
D ep ending on th e m is s ion,th e joint logis tics com m and
s tructure can organize four oth er ty p es ofcom m andp os ts :
rear area bas iccom m andp os t,rear area res erv e com m and
p os t, adv ance com m and p os t, and a direction com m and
p os t. Norm ally ,a rear area bas iccom m andp os t is locatedin
th e rear area w h ere it is s afe to conduct com p lete,
u n h in dered com m an d of join t logis tics for m obile
op erations .
26 6
A rear area res erv ecom m andp os t is es tablis h edearly to
take ov er from th e bas ic com m and p os t if neces s ary .
N orm ally ,th e res erv e com m andp os t is s taffedby th e w ar
zone dep uty logis tics com m ander, oth er required s taff
officers ,andlogis tics s up p ort fendui. Th eres erv ecom m and
p os t is located to th e flank or to th e rear of th e bas ic
com m andp os t. Th ey m aintain a clos e relationsh ip . In th e
ev ent th at th ebas iccom m andp os t is dam agedor is unable
to com m and th e logis tics units and fendui, th e res erv e
com m andp os t im m ediately takes ch arge.
A rear area adv ance com m and p os t is es tablis h ed to
s trength en th e logis tics com m andfor th ep rim ary direction
or for th eim p ortant op erations . W h en th ew ar zonedep loy s
an adv an ce com m an d p os t, th e w ar zon e logis tics
organization m us t dep loy a logis tics com m andteam to be
p art ofth e adv ance com m andp os t, or it m us t es tablis h a
rear area adv ance com m and p os t in front of th e bas ic
com m andp os t to as s is t th ebas iccom m andp os t in carry ing
out its com m and.
A rear area direction com m andp os t is es tablis h edto
s trength en logis tics com m and for indep endent cam p aign
directions . W h en th ew ar zonecreates a direction com m and
p os t, th e w ar zon e logis tics organ ization s h ould
s im ultaneous ly create a direction com m andp os t com p os ed
of a logis tics dep uty com m ander (uns p ecified from w h at
logis tics lev el h ecom es from )andkey s taffofficers to as s is t
th e bas ic com m andp os t andto com m andth e logis tics for
th at p articular direction. Oth er p ers onnel for th e adv ance
logis tics com m and p os t can com e from logis tics branch
dep artm ents along th e direction, including nav al bas es ,
from th e h igh es t cam p aign juntuan join t logis tics
organization,andfrom th ew ar zonelogis tics organization.
Th e G L D s tres s es th at in order to p rov ide th e bes t
com m and, th e com m and p os ts m us t rem ain surv iv able,
m us t h av e good com m unication s , and m us t h av e good
cam ouflage. A ccording to th e requirem en ts an d
cap abilities ,logis tics m obile com m andp os ts can be p laced
26 7
in fas t, m obile v eh icles , aircraft (including h elicop ters ),
s h ip s ,andtrains . In order to s up p ortcom m andfor tech nical
(m aintenance)s up p ort units andelem ents ,each lev elofw ar
zone logis tics organization s h ouldals o m ake ev ery effort to
create tech nical (m aintenance)branch com m andp os ts .
PL A A F L ogis tics C om m andPos ts . A ccording to th eG L D
book, for future w ars , th e w ar zone air force logis tics
s tructure m us t create a “th ree-tiered com m and s y s tem ”
com p ris edofa w ar zoneair forcelogis tics com m andp os t,air
corp s andbas e logis tics com m andp os ts , andfields tation
bas ic com m andp os ts or fligh t logis tics s up p ort com m and
offices . Th ew ar zoneair forcelogis tics com m andp os t w illbe
th e com m and coordination center. Th e G L D book didnot
indicate w h eth er th is w as p art of th e join t logis tics
com m andcenter. Th e air corp s or bas e logis tics com m and
p os t or air force forw ardcom m andp os t is res p onsible for
m anaging logis tics along th e direction ofth e w ar,andth e
field s tation or fligh t logis tics s up p ort office w ill be
res p onsiblefor th elow es tlev eloflogis tics com m andtas ks .
Th e PL A A F s tres s es th at th ekey to m aking th is s y s tem
w ork during a w ar is com m unications along th e ch ain of
com m and, s ince logis tics is th e link betw een a cam p aign
andth eunits inv olv edin battles . Th ebrigade andregim ent
lev el is th e bas is for th e budui logis tics . Th erefore, w h en
lines of com m unication are dis rup ted, logis tics along th is
ch ain are als o dis rup ted.
SE C TION III: PL A A F L OG ISTIC S TH EORY AND
TRA INING
PL A A F L ogis tics Sup p ort Th eory .
H av ing lookedat th e PL A A F ’s logis tics s tructure, th is
s ection w ill focus p rim arily on logis tics s up p ort th eory and
ap p liedtraining for m obileop erations ,w h ich can beutilized
in both offensiv e anddefensiv ecam p aigns. Th e PL A A F h as
traditionally conductedits com bat op erations as a s eries of
air cam p aigns w ith in th ePL A ’s ov erallcam p aign. Th eterm
26 8
26 9
Th e air force flew 8,5 00 s orties ,us ing 3,131 group s ofaircraft
during th e cam p aign. Trans p ort aircraft p erform ed a v ery
crucial logis tics s up p ort function, fly ing 228 s orties , carry ing
1,4 6 5 troop s and15 1 tons ofm ateriel. Th enum ber ofs orties als o
included a large num ber ofh elicop ter s orties , including th os e
us ed to tran s p ort ov er 6 00 w ounded s oldiers from frontline
h os p itals to Nanning.4 5
Sev eral reas ons contributedto th e lack ofC h ines e air
com bat op erations, including th e fact th at m os t airfields
w ere not near th e V ietnam es e border,th e exis ting aircraft
(p rim arily F-5 s ,F-6 s ,andIl-28s )h ads h ort legs andlim ited
loiter tim e, and th e PL A A F did not train for sustained
s orties , es p ecially from airfields oth er th an th eir h om e
bas es .4 6 E qually im p ortant w as B eijing’s concern th at any
PL A A F air inv olv em ent w ouldes calate th e conflict,w h ich
w as p lannedto las t only 4 5 day s .4 7 B eijing m et its goal of
“us ing its aircraft to deter th e V ietnam es e from es calating
th e conflict,” ev en th ough 20,000 to 30,000 PL A ground
troop s w ere killedduring th e 4 5 -day cam p aign.4 8
Th e PL A A F ’s logis tics forces w ere th orough ly inv olv ed
from th e tim e p rep arations began in th e G uan gxi
A utonom ous Region and Yunnan Prov ince op p os ite th e
V ietnam es e border about 4 5 day s p rior to th e firs t day of
op erations. Th e PL A A F ’s ov erall p rep arations included
es tablis h ing a com m ands tructure; p rep aring airfields to
receiv e aircraft, A A A , SA M s , and ov er 20,000 PL A A F
troop s ; and deliv ering p rop aganda des igned to get th e
troop s andlocal p op ulace ready for th e w ar.
Th e G uangzh ou M RA F com m ander (andfuture PL A A F
C om m ander), W ang H ai, w as p lacedin ch arge ofPL A A F
troop s in th e G uangxi op erations area.4 9 Th e K unm ing
M RA F com m andp os t director,H ou Sh ujun,w as p lacedin
ch arge ofPL A A F troop s in th e Yunnan op erations area.5 0
E ach op eration s area w as furth er div ided into s ev eral
op erational directions,anda com binedcom m andp os t w as
es tablis h edat one s trategically locatedairfieldw ith in each
op erational direction to com m and and coordinate all
m atters am ong differentbranch es andaircraft ty p es w ith in
270
th at dis trict. Th e G uangzh ou M RA F h eadquarters als o
es tablis h ed a forw ard com m and p os t at an unidentified
location, w h ich w orked clos ely w ith th e 7th A ir C orp s at
N an n ing as th e unified auth ority for th e PL A A F ’s
p articip ation in th e conflict.
B efore and during th e conflict, th e PL A A F ’s logis tics
organization s h ad tw o p rim ary m is s ion s — to s up p ort
h ous ing for th os e troop s already s tationedin G uangxiand
to p rep are h ous ing, food, w ater, and electricity for th e
incom ing troop s . Th es e organizations is s uedabout 10,000
m obile beds , ov er 32,000 m eters of w ater p ip e, and 200
kilom eters ofelectric cable; built 4 3,000 s quare m eters of
bam boo s h eds ; andrep airedov er 23,000 s quare m eters of
oldh ous ing. In addition,th e air force us edv eh icles andits
boat troop s to tran s p ort m obile h ous ing w ith th e troop s to
Tiany ang. D uring th e conflict, th e N anning W uxu field
s tation dis p atch edov er 16 ,5 00 v eh icles to p rov ide s u p p ort
for p ortions ofone av iation regim ent andone indep endent
air group .
Th e logis tics organizations als o h ad to acquire and
s u p p ly enough fuel for th e incom ing aircraft. B as ed on
initial es tim ates of th e am ount of fuel required, th e
PL A A F ’s fuel s u p p ly w as totally inadequate, ands ev eral
dep ots w ere alm os t em p ty . Th erefore, durin g th e
p rep aration p eriod,fueldep ots at all ofth eregion’s airfields
w ere filled. Th is included th e dep ot at Tiany ang, w h ich
reliedon w ater tran s p ort for its fuel s up p ly . Som e ofth e
airfields didnot h av e rail s p urs ,s o v eh icles h adto bring in
all th e fuel. In addition,all ofth e com bat readines s tanks
av ailableth rough out th eM R ands om efrom outs ideth eM R
w ere quickly transferredto th e frontline airfields . Th es e
exp andedth e am ount ofav iation fuelby ov er 5 0 p ercent. B y
th etim eth econflictbegan,th eam ount offuels u p p liedto all
th e G uangxiairfields w as 4 .3tim es th e norm al am ount.
Sup p ly ing fuel during p eacetim e in C h ina w as difficult
enough , but it p rov edev en m ore difficult during w artim e.
B ecaus e s om e airfields ,such as N ingm ing,are clos e to th e
271
border, th eir fuel s torage w as p artially underground, and
th e rail lines s up p ly ing th e bas es w ere ov ers ch eduled. A s a
result, th e PL A A F w as concerned th at th e V ietnam es e
m igh t des troy or dis rup t fuel s up p lies . B ecaus e of th is
concern, th e PL A A F took about 4 5 day s to buildov er 5 0
kilom eters of s em ip erm anent fuel p ip es leading to th ree
different airfields .
B ecaus e th e air force did not fly any actual com bat
m is s ions during th e conflict, only about one-fourth ofth e
fueles tim atedfor com bat w as used,andth edifficulties w ith
fuel consum p tion w ere few er th an exp ected. H ow ev er,
s ev eral organ ization al an d facilities p roblem s w ere
h igh ligh ted. F or exam p le, th e fuel dep ot cap acity at th e
PL A A F ’s airfields w as too s m all,andth ere w as no w ay to
s u p p ort s ev eralty p es ofaircraft or th es us tainedcom bat us e
of fuel for s ev eral batch es of aircraft. In addition, th e
refu elin g equip m en t w as deem ed backw ards an d
incom p atible— a p roblem th e PL A A F s tates it grap p led
w ith th rough m os t ofth e 19 9 0s but h as now s olv edfor th e
m os t p art.
W h at L ogis tics C h anges H av e Taken Place?
A s notedearlier,by th eearly 19 9 0s ,th e PL A A F h adnot
p rogres s edsufficiently tow ardcom binedarm s training,let
alone joint s erv ice training. B ecaus e ofth is , th e PL A A F ’s
logis tics s y s tem w as s till not organizedto s up p ort m obile
op erations for long p eriods of tim e. B y th e late 19 9 0s ,
h ow ev er,th at s ituation h adbegun to ch ange.
Th e tes ting ground for th e PL A A F ’s op erational and
logis tics concep ts h as been th e adv ancedtraining center at
D ingxin,G ansu Prov ince,in th e L anzh ou M RA F . In 19 5 8,
th e PL A A F built a large center for tes ting its air-to-air
m is s iles (A A M s ) and SA M s in th e G obi D es ert near
D ingxin.5 1 D uring th e m id 19 9 0s , th e PL A A F began
exp anding th is bas e to include a large tactics training
center, w h ere m ultip le PL A A F units could p ractice th e
tactics dev elop ed at th e Tactics Train in g C en ter at
272
C angzh ou, H ebei Prov ince, andtes tedin indiv idual units
th rough out th e force. Th e PL A A F als o es tablis h ed a
s m aller-scale “joint tactical training bas e” in th e N anjing
M RA F in 19 9 5 .5 2 A 19 9 5 L iberation A rm y D aily article
alludedto th e D ingxin training center w h ile des cribing a
large-s cale exercis e as follow s :5 3
Th eexercis einv olv edth ree categories andsix ty p es ofcom bat
aircraft, including figh ters , attack p lanes , large trans p ort
p lanes , arm edh elicop ters , andtran s p ort h elicop ters . Units
h av e m ade efforts to turn airfieldands u p p ort s tations from
th ose th at p rov idedlogis tic s up p ort for only one category of
com bat p lanes in th e p as t into th os e th at p rov ides u p p ort for
all categories andall ty p es ofcom bat p lanes . Since different
categories and different ty p es of com bat p lanes are to
p articip ate in future air battles in one air fleet, units h av e
w orkedout different ty p es ofs up p ort p lans, renov atedand
transform edexis ting com bat p lanes ’s erv ice equip m ent and
facilities , and im p orted adv anced foreign logistic s up p ort
equip m ent and facilities w ith th e result th at airfield and
s u p p ort s tations can now p rov idelogis tics s up p ort for different
categories anddifferent ty p es ofcom bat p lanes .
Th e m os t im p ortant logis tics ch anges h av e taken place
at th e fields tations , w h ich h av e triedto im p lem ent th ree
bas icch anges in order to s u p p ort m obile op erations. F irs t,
th e fields tations h av e h adto adap t th eir organizational
s tructureto s up p ort th eregim ent(s )h ous edat th eir airfield
w h en th ey dep loy to oth er airfields . Second, th e field
s tation s h av e h ad to organize th em s elv es to s u p p ort
m ultip le ty p es ofaircraft th at dep loy to th eir airfield. F or
exam p le,in M arch 2001,s ev eral aircraft from a G uangzh ou
M RA F bom ber div is ion conducted a long-range m obility
exercis e, inv olv ing “round th e clock fly ing for s ev eral
th ous ands of kilom eters , ands top s at s ev eral unfam iliar
airfields .”5 4 Th ird,th e fields tations h av e h adto p rep are to
s u p p ort op erations from dis p ers al airfields and h igh w ay
landing s trip s .
To as s is t th elocalfields tations,th ePL A A F is als o try ing
to create central fields tations th at act as regional s u p p ort
273
centers . Th e goal ofes tablis h ing central fields tations is to
ch ange th ecurrent s y s tem ofp rov iding s u p p ort for only one
ty p e ofaircraft or one branch to a s y s tem th at can support
m ultip le ty p es ofaircraft andbranch es ,such as A A A ,SA M ,
andradar units in th e area ofan airfield. Th is center w ill
h av e additional fuel, am m unition, and s u p p lies for th e
aircraft.
In order to s up p ort aircraft dep loy ing in or out of a
p erm anent airfield, th e PL A A F began es tablis h ing in th e
m id19 9 0s a rap id-reaction logis tics s tructure organizedof
v arious fenduias follow s :5 5
?
E m ergency m obilefligh t s up p ort fenduiw illdep loy to
field airs trip s , h igh w ay landing s trip s , or to oth er
airfields w h en needed.
?
E m ergency m obile tran s p ortation fendui, equip p ed
w ith large fuel trucks , tow trucks , and container
trucks , w ill dep loy to an area quickly to s up p ly
p ers onnel andm ateriel.
?
E m ergency fieldfuel p ip e fendui w ill be res p onsible
for p rov iding fuel to airfields not s erv icedby rail.
?
E m ergency m obile fieldm edical andres cue fendui.
?
E m ergency m obile rep air fendui w ill be res p onsible
for rep airing s p ecial equip m ent.
?
E m ergency m obileairfieldrep air fendui,cons is ting of
15 0 p ers onnel,w ill augm ent th e central fields tation
rep air runw ay s and do oth er required engineering
tas ks .
?
Th efenduican eith er dep loy to anoth er bas e w ith th e
av iation unit th ey s up p ort, or th ey can dep loy to a
bas e th at requires additional s up p ort for incom ing
aircraft. In addition,th ey can beus edto h elp p rep are
274
ands u p p ort aircraft dis p ers ing to auxiliary airfields ,
fields trip s ,or h igh w ay landing s trip s .
A ccording to a 19 9 5 L iberation A rm y D aily article, th e
PL A m ov ed from th e th eory p h as e to tes ting p h as e for
“group con tin gen cy logis tics s up p ort” to m eet th e
requirem ents of local w ars under h igh -tech conditions.5 6
Th e articles tated,“Th e PL A A F h adalready form edv arious
m obile s u p p ort battalions to be tran s p orted by air, along
w ith creating fields tation contingency s up p ort fendui. A t
th at tim e, ov er 9 0 p ercent ofth e p ers onnel h adrep ortedly
been placed in serv ice and ov er 80 p ercent of th e m ajor
requiredlogis ticequip m ent w as already av ailable.”
A n A p ril2001 articlein A ir F orceN ew s des cribeds ev eral
exercis es th at th e N anjing M RA F h ad conducted s ince
19 9 6 . 5 7 E ach exercis e inv olv ed dep loy ing em ergen cy
s u p p ort team s of100-300 p ers onnel to unoccup iedairfields
to s et up s up p ort op erations for aircraft to p erform com bat
s orties . D uring one exercis e, four aircraft landedandtook
offagain after 15 m inutes ofrefueling andp rov is ioning of
am m unition.
B y th e endof2000,th e PL A A F felt com fortable enough
to begin exp anding th econcep t to larger units . F or exam p le,
at th e endof 2000 th e Jinan M R A F conducted“th e firs t
organ ic dep loy m en t of an en tire av iation div is ion.”
A ccording to a PL A Pictorial article,5 8
A Jinan M RA F av iation div ision receiv edorders for com bat
m aneuv ers and im m ediately w ent into a s tate of com bat
readines s . F our h ours later, s ev eral tran s p orts carry ing an
adv ance ech elon of officers , m en, and all kinds of s up p ort
equip m ent ands up p lies left for th e w ar zone. Th e next day ,
dozens of com bat aircraft took off and flew acros s th ree
p rov inces to th e des ignated area, w h ere s u p p ort activ ities
w ere quickly accom p lis h edandan adv ancecom m andp ost w as
es tablis h ed. Sh ortly after landing, th e com bat aircraft
engagedin exercis e training up to 4 00 kilom eters aw ay . Ten
day s later,th e div is ion returnedh om e.
275
Th e Role ofTran s p ort A ircraft.
A lth ough th e us e of civ il aircraft is not new to th e
PL A A F ,th ere are differing op inions about th ePL A ’s ability
to us eciv ilaircraft,as w ell as m ilitary aircraft,to tran s p ort
s u p p lies andp ers onnel during w artim e. Unlike th e U.S.
m ilitary , th e PL A tran s p orts alm os t all of its troop s ,
equip m ent, and s u p p lies by road or rail. Th e PL A A F ’s
tran s p orts are us ed p rim arily for V IP s u p p ort and to
s u p p ort th e PL A A F ’s 15 th A irborne A rm y . In June 19 89 ,
th e PL A us ed civ il aircraft to tran s p ort troop s to B eijing
p rior to th e Tiananm en as s ault. In D ecem ber 19 9 2, th e
PL A A F usedth ree Tu-15 4 tran s p orts to ferry ov er 10,000
troop s in andout ofXinjiang andTibet during th e annual
troop rotation.5 9 Th eaircraft flew 83s orties andals o carried
15 3.3tons ofs up p lies . In 19 9 5 ,th e PL A A F for th efirs t tim e
ordered th at large tran s p ort aircraft carry s u p p ort
p ers onnel andequip m ent to accom p any large dep loy m ents
ofaircraft in em ergency m obile com bat s u p p ort exercis es .6 0
In addition,m ilitary officials in New D elh irep ortedth at th e
PL A us ed civ il aircraft to ferry troop s to Tibet during a
recent exercis e.6 1 A ccording to a 19 9 9 D ep artm ent of
D efense rep ort, th e PL A A F ’s current com p lem ent oflarge
tran s p ort aircraft is lim itedto about a dozen Il-76 /C andids
andabout fifty Y-8/C ubs , th e rem ainder of th e tran s p ort
force con s is ts of s m aller aircraft like th e A n-24 /C oke,
An-26 /C url, and Y-5 /C olt.6 2 B eijing can be exp ected to
p urch as e a few additional Rus s ian Il-76 s or s im ilarly -s ized
foreign aircraft. Th e ongoing exp ansion of C h ina’s civ il
aircraft fleet w illals o allow th e PL A A F to us e th ecountry ’s
civ il airlines to s up p lem ent its tran s p ort cap ability during
cris es .
In Sep tem ber 2000, Taiw an’s Tung Sen new s quoted
h igh lev el Taiw an m ilitary s ources as s ay ing th at th e PL A
p lans to us eciv ilaircraft,w h ich arecap ableoftrans p orting
20,000 troop s to Taiw an w ith in 24 h ours , to carry out a
firs t-w av e as s ault.6 3 Regardles s of w h at th e PL A does
276
during p eacetim e, th ere are lim its to us ing civ il aircraft to
ferry troop s into a h os tile env ironm ent.
Since th e early 19 9 0s , th e PL A A F ’s 15 th A irborne
A rm y ’s exercis es h av e becom e m ore s op h is ticatedin scop e.
F or exam p le,analy s is ofa 75 -day offensiv e exercis e h eldin
A p ril-M ay 2001 s h ow ed th at “th e PL A n ow h as th e
cap ability to airdrop an organ ic regim en t p lus an
accom p an y ing logis tics s up p ort unit, togeth er w ith
n eces s ary equip m en t an d s up p lies , in on e airborn e
op eration,andto sustain th eop eration w ith reinforcem ents
in succeeding airdrop s les s th an six h ours later.”6 4
In July 19 9 9 , th e L iberation A rm y D aily p rov ided
inform ation about a large-scale airborne op eration in th e
D abie M ountain s in cen tral C h in a. 6 5 Th e article
em p h as izedth at th eexercis eincludedairdrop p ing p ieces of
ligh t artillery , boxes of am m unition, com bat v eh icles ,
com m unications equip m ent, and indiv idual air defense
m is s iles . A ccording to th e article, th is w as th e firs t tim e
h eav y equip m ent andas s ault v eh icles w ere p ara-drop p ed
by th e PL A airborne force, m arking a h is toric leap ofth e
force from s ole p ara-landing op erations to com binedarm s
op erations . Th e rep orters s tated,“Th is em ergency logis tics
s u p p ort unit, oth erw is e called an ‘airborne w areh ous e,’
carry ing tens oftons ofw ar s up p lies ,can be air-drop p edat
any location according to op erational needs . It can be
em p loy ed in a concentrated form in one direction, or
s ep aratedinto s m all s egm ents anddrop p edov er s cattered
locations to p rov ide s u p p lies to th e battlefield in m any
directions .”
F uel Sup p ort.
One of th e m os t im p ortant ch allenges for th e field
s tation is m aintaining s ufficient m aterials , es p ecially fuel,
on h an d before th e s tart of a cam p aign, an d th en
m aintaining enough s u p p lies to s us tain th ecam p aign. Th e
PL A s tates th at th e cos t for fuel p er fly ing h our for th e
PL A A F ’s “com p arativ ely adv anced” aircraft can reach
277
10,000 renm inbi(USD 1,25 0).6 6 A s s um ing th is refers to an
F-8, th e cos t for a regim ent of 24 aircraft w ith each p ilot
av eraging 100 h ours p er y ear, and1.5 p ilots p er aircraft,
m eans th eregim ent’s aircraft w ouldfly 36 00 h ours at a cos t
ofap p roxim ately 36 m illion renm inbi(USD 4 .5 2m illion)p er
y ear. A ccording to th e PL A A F ,6 7
Fuel is 80 p ercent ofth e PL A A F ’s m ateriel. B as edon PL A A F
s tatis tics ,a s m alls calelocalw ar requires 9 0,000 to 14 0,000 tons
ofav iation fuel. G iv en th is large quantity ofus age,it w ouldbe
difficult for th e PL A A F ’s w ater and ground tran s p ortation
s y s tem to s u p p ly th is am ount com p letely today . Th ebes tw ay to
s olv e th is p roblem is to buildap ip elinenetw ork,w h ich w ouldbe
eas y to open, couldtrans fer large quantities offuel, is eas y to
h ide,andits ability to exis t is h igh .
G iv en th e PL A A F ’s h is torical p roblem s w ith refueling
equip m ent, in 19 9 9 ,th e PL A A F rep ortedly dev elop edand
tes teda new airfieldp etroleum , oil, andlubricant (POL )
s u p p ly s y s tem in th e Jinan MR. 6 8 Th e s y s tem is an
em ergency m obile refueling dev ice cap able of s u p p orting
transregional air op erations,andcan bequickly dep loy edto
forw ard airfields . It is m ainly for us e on s od airs trip s ,
res erv e airfields , and on h igh w ay runw ay s op ened for
w artim e op eration. It can als o be us edon fixedairfields in
cas e of dam age to POL installations or p ow er outages .
D uring th e exercis e, th e s y s tem w as brough t in and
w ith draw n after refueling tw o w arp lanes in 15 m inutes . It
can sim ultaneous ly refuel tw o aircraft of any m odel by
grav ity or p res s ure.
Th e im p ortance of th e PL A A F ’s em p h as is on its fuel
s u p p ly andrefueling tech niques w as dem ons tratedduring
an exercis e in Nanjing in A p ril 2000. A ccording to a
L iberation A rm y D aily article,
M inis ter of D efen s e C h i H aotian obs erv eda PL A A F logis tics
exercis e th at focusedon building a fieldoil depot cap able of
p rov iding s u p p ort to s ev eral h undredp lanes . Th e exercis e als o
cov ereds ev eral oth er logis tics tas ks ,including cleaning up after
an enem y air attack on an airp ort, res toring th e airp ort’s
278
s u p p ort cap ability , p rov iding m obile com bat s up p ort by
ground units , im p lem enting cam ouflage and p rotection for
69
aircraft,battle p os itions ,andoil depots .
G iv en th ePL A A F ’s dualconcerns ofs up p ly ing its forces
w ith sufficient m aterial in a tim ely m anner andp rotecting
its s up p lies from being des troy ed,it s tates ,70
B ecaus e th e PL A A F ’s tran s p ortation cap ability is w eak and
requirem ents for s up p ly ing lots ofm aterialduring w artim eis
h igh ,th e m os t m aterial s h ould be s toredat th e p rim ary w ar
direction rath er th an secondary w ar directions . Fuel and
am m unition us edduring battles are p rim ary targets for th e
enem y , s o it is not eas y to s tore lots of m aterial togeth er.
Th erefore,th e PL A A F sh ouldus ecam p aign rear area bases as
th ep rim ary w ith s tores in sev eralp laces . A irfields in th efocal
p oint direction can store s om e com m on us e m aterial,but th e
m os t im p ortant m aterial s h ouldbe s toredandcontrolledby
th e w ar zone PL A A F logis tics organization or by PL A A F
H eadquarters logis tics for em ergen cy p urp os es . W h en
neces s ary , th ey can be air trans p orted to th e com bat area
units .
L ogis tics Sup p ortfor C om bat Sorties .
Th e PL A A F h as es tablis h edp rocedures for w h at it calls
th e “four fly ing p h as es ,” s o th at all av iation ands u p p ort
units train andfigh t from th es am es h eet ofm us ic.71 Th is is
es p ecially im p ortant for th e logis tics s y s tem w h en aircraft
dep loy to a new airfield, or th e receiv ing airfield’s field
s tation does not neces s arily h av e th e p rop er facilities or
exp erienceto s u p p ort th enew ty p eofaircraft or equip m ent.
Th erefore,th e fields tation is requiredto follow es tablis h ed
p rocedures . A ccording to th e PL A A F D ictionary , th e four
fly ing p h as es are as follow s :72
1. A dv ancep rep aration p h as e,w h ich usually takes p lace
th e day before a fligh t.
2. D irect p rep aration ph as e,w h ich occurs th e day ofth e
fligh t.
3. F ligh t im p lem entation p h as e.
279
4 . F ligh t ap p rais al p h as e.
W h ereas th e com m ander determ ines th e m is s ions, th e
p olitical com m is s ar’s res p ons ibility th rough out th e four
p h as es is to ensure th at th e p ilot is trus tw orth y enough to
fly under th e p articular circum s tances . Oth er p eop le are
res p onsible for ensuring th e p ilot h as th e p rop er tech nical
qualifications to p erform a p articular m is s ion,h eis h ealth y ,
andth e fligh t p lan conform s w ith th e reality ofth e p ilot’s
s ituation. In addition, oth ers p rep are th e aircraft for th e
m is s ion.
Sortie G eneration andSus tainability .
Th e key to any conflict for th e PL A A F is s us tained
com bat, and th e PL A A F h as not y et dem onstrated th e
cap ability to conduct sustained,h igh intensity op erations.
Th e PL A A F does not h av e any real w orld exp erience in
p lanning and executing th e kind of h igh inten s ity air
cam p aign th at h as p rov en so s ucces s ful in U.S. andallied
op erations ov er th e p as t decade. A lth ough one s h ouldnot
analy ze th e PL A A F th rough m irror im aging, inform ation
about U.S. andA lliedair force activ ities during th e G ulf
W ar andth e K os ov o C onflict p rov ide a m easure ofcom bat
s ortie generation andsustainability .
D uring th e early s tages ofth e conflict in K os ov o,allied
air forces dep loy edap p roxim ately 4 00 aircraft to th e area.73
B y th e endofth e conflict, th e num ber ofU.S. andN A TO
com bat aircraft p articip ating in s trike deliv ery ros e from
214 to 5 9 0 aircraft.
D uring th e 78 day s ofOp eration A lliedF orce,U.S. and
N A TO aircraft flew a total of 37,4 6 5 com bat s orties — an
av erages ortie-generation rateof4 86 m is s ions p er day .74 Of
th e total, 14 ,006 w ere s trike ands u p p res s ion ofenem y air
defenses (SE A D )m is s ions (10,808 ofw h ich w ere dedicated
s trike s orties ). A ccording to Pentagon inform ation, 23,000
bom bs and m is s iles w ere us ed. In th e early day s of th e
cam p aign, h ow ev er, th e s ortie rate ov er Yugos lav ia w as
280
m ore like 15 0 m is s ions p er day . Th e m axim um intensity of
op erations w as reach edon day 5 7,w h en 1,000 s orties w ere
flow n, 800 of w h ich w ere com bat m is s ions. Th es e figures
com p are to 109 ,876 com bat s orties ov er th e 4 3-day G ulf
W ar,or an av erage of2,5 5 5 m is s ion s p er day . Ofth e total
flow n in th e G ulf, about h alf w ere s trike m is s ions ,
av eraging around1,6 00 s orties p er day . Th es e num bers do
not include noncom bat tran s p ort s up p ort s orties . Th es e
figures dem onstrate th e cap ability neededto ram p up and
m aintain h igh intensity op erations,orch es trate op erations
th rough a unifieddaily air tas king order (A TO), andth e
needto s us tain intense air op erations w h en facedw ith a
determ inedadv ers ary .75
W eath er affectednearly h alfth e s orties during th e G ulf
W ar (in a des ert env ironm ent),andth e air offensiv e agains t
Yugos lav ia groundto a h alt for day s on endw h ile targets
rem ainedobs curedby cloud.76 D uring th e78-day op eration,
th ere w as at leas t 5 0 p ercent cloudcov er for ov er 70 p ercent
of th e tim e. Th e need to m inim ize civ ilian cas ualties
dem anded v isual identification and th e us e of p recis ion
w eap ons. W ith out a reas onably clear op tical p ath ,h ow ev er,
las er-guidedbom bs couldnot be em p loy ed.
N A TO and U.S. forces w ere als o h am p ered by th e
p olitical decis ion to res trict th e op erating h eigh t ofN A TO
attack aircraft to a bas eline of15 ,000 feet for m uch ofth e
w ar.77 W h ile th is kep t N A TO p ilots bey ondth e range of
m os t Yugos lav h and-h eld s urface-to-air m is s ile (SA M )
s y s tem s and antiaircraft artillery (A A A ) ov er K os ov o, it
p laced w h at m any s aw as h igh ly artificial lim its on th e
freedom of air cam p aign p lanners and s trike crew s to
em p loy th e full ran ge of battlefield air interdiction
tech niques for w h ich th ey h adlong been trained. It als o,on
occas ion,ch allengedth ealliance’s ability to identify targets
correctly ,contributing to a num ber oftargeting errors . Th e
w ors t ofth es ew as an attack on a K os ov ar A lbanian refugee
colum n,w h en h igh -fly ing USA F p ilots ap p arently m is took
tractors andoth er civ ilian v eh icles for Serbian arm or. Th es e
exam p les indicate th at res trictiv e rules ofengagem ent w ill
281
m os t likely guide any future air cam p aign by th e U.S. and
p os s ibly th e PL A A F as w ell.
It is clear th at th e PL A A F h as nev er conductedth eh igh
inten s ity s ortie generation cap ability th e allied forces
s h ow ed in th e 19 9 0s . B as ed on an analy s is of C h ines e
literatureandinterv iew s in C h ina,it is ev ident th at PL A A F
p ilots do n ot fly as m an y h ours as th eir W es tern
counterp arts . A ccording to interv iew s w ith PL A A F and
foreign air forceofficials ,th e PL A A F ’s fly ing h ours h av enot
ch angedap p reciably ov er th e p as t 15 y ears ,but th ey h av e
ch anged th eir training tech niques . Since th e end of th e
19 70s ,bom ber p ilots h av econsis tently flow n an av erage of
80 h ours p er y ear; figh ter p ilots 100 to 110 h ours ; andA -5
groundattack p ilots up to 15 0 h ours .78 Th is com p ares to
about 215 h ours p er y ear for USA F bom ber, figh ter, and
attack crew s . USA F p ilots als o conduct num erous h ours
training on adv anceds im ulators .79
Th e PL A A F ’s official m agazine, Zh ongguo K ongjun
[C h ina’s A ir Force], h as p rov ided inform ation on th e
num ber ofs orties certain div is ions h av e flow n,w h ich giv es
a glim p s e of h ow th e PL A A F as a w h ole op erates . Th e
19 9 4 -4 is s ue dis cus s es fligh t activ ity by th e 39 th A ir
D iv is ion in th e Sh eny ang M R for a 5 -y ear p eriod.80 F rom
19 89 -19 9 4 ,th ediv is ion flew 12,15 3s orties in 1,715 ch angci,
equating to 7 sorties p er ch angci.81
A 19 9 5 article in C h ina’s A ir F orcep rov idedinform ation
about a fuels branch as s igned to a PL A A F field s tation
locatedon th eL eizh ou Peninsula. B as edon th einform ation
containedin th e article,th e fields tation is p art ofth e 2nd
A ir D iv is ion in th eG uangzh ou M R ands u p p orts a m ix ofF-6
andF-7 figh ters . Th egis t ofth e articlew as th at th eL eizh ou
Peninsula h as s ev ere th under s torm s 11 m onth s out ofth e
y ear, andth e fuels branch conductedits activ ities s afely
under difficult w eath er conditions. Th e article toutedth e
fuel branch ’s s afety record by s tating th at it s up p orted
5 4 ,5 06 s orties ov er th e 8-y ear p eriodof19 87 th rough 19 9 4 ,
equating to 6 ,813 s orties p er y ear.82 B as edon th e auth or’s
282
calculations ofth es e ty p es ofarticles ov er a 15 -y ear p eriod,
an av erage s ortie las ts from 4 5 -6 0 m inutes . It is not clear
from th e article w h eth er th e fields tation sup p orts one or
tw o regim ents . A s s um ing th e field s tation supports one
regim en t w ith a s tandard table of organ ization and
equip m ent (TO&E )ofat leas t 24 aircraft and1.5 p ilots p er
aircraft (36 p ilots ),th is equates to 19 0 s orties p er p ilot p er
y ear,or 3.6 s orties p er w eek. Ifth efields tation sup p orts tw o
regim ents of4 8 aircraft and72 p ilots , th is equates to 85
s orties p er y ear or 1.6 s orties p er w eek. Ifth ere are m ore
aircraft and p ilots p er regim ent, th en th e s ortie rate is
low er.
A ccording to A ir C om m odore Ram es h Ph adke of th e
Indian A ir F orce,83
Nearly 5 0 p er cent of th e PL A A F cons is ts of ageing and
difficult-to-m aintain F-6 s ,w h ileth e rem aining aircraftbelong
to th e reas onably m odern category . M aintaining op erational
readines s m us t be a difficult undertaking. It w ouldbes afe to
as s um e th at at th e rate of ap p roxim ately 1.5 p ilots p er
aircraft, th e PL A A F w ould h av e to p rov ide a m inim um of
120-15 0 fligh t h ours annually to 4 5 00-5 000 ofits activ eduty
p ilots . A llow ing for th os e em ploy edin s taffandh eadquarters
ap p ointm ents ,it w ouldm ean th at at leas t 4 000 p ilots w ould
needregular fly ing training. A rough calculation w oulds h ow
th at to p rov ide 15 0 h ours of fly ing to 4 000 p ilots at 6 0-70
p ercent rate ofs erv iceability ,th e PL A A F fleet w ouldh av e to
fly s om e285 to 335 h ours p er s erv iceable aircraft p er y ear,or
24 -28 h ours p er m onth , w h ich w ould be a h uge tas k by any
s tandards.
In th e p as t,th e PL A A F triedto ov ercom e th eindiv idual
aircraft s ortie generation gap by h av ing h igh num bers of
aircraft av ailable, such as w h en th e PL A A F dep loy edov er
700 aircraft near th e V ietnam border in 19 79 . A n oth er
reas on for low s ortie generation rate is th at m os t engines
(F-6 ,F -7,andF-8)can only be us edfrom 100 to 300 h ours
before th ey are ov erh auled, th e aircraft av ailability rate
w ouldp robably be reducedconsiderably during p eriods of
sustainedus eduring a conflict. A lth ough th eengines for th e
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Su-27s andSu-30s are m uch better,th e PL A A F s till faces
th e airfram e s erv iceability . Th e PL A A F h as facilities to
ov erh aul all ofits F-6 s ,F-7s,andB -6 s ,andth eir engines ,
but its F-8s m us t s till return to th e Sh eny ang A ircraft
F actory to beov erh auled— a p roces s th at can takefrom 6 -12
m onth s p er aircraft.84 Until th e Sh eny ang A ircraft F actory
h as th e full cap ability to ov erh aul th e Su-27s andSu-30s ,
th e PL A A F m us t s endth es e aircraftback to K om s om ols k to
be ov erh auled. It is not clear w h at th e ov erh aul s erv ice
p eriodfor a Su-27 is ; h ow ev er,as s um ing th eoriginalSu-27s
th at arriv edat th e3rdA ir D iv is ion in June 19 9 2h av ebeen
flow n a m inim um of15 0 h ours p er y ear (1.5 p ilots at 100
h ours each ),th en th os e airfram es h av e at leas t 1,35 0 total
h ours each . Th e PL A A F m us t decide w h eth er to fly th os e
aircraft m oreor les s as tim ep rogres s es . F ly ing les s m eans a
reducedreadines s cap ability , but fly ing m ore m eans m ore
tim e on th e airfram es th at cuts dow n th e tim e before th ey
m us t be ov erh auled.
Th etw o lates texam p les ofPL A A F s ortiegeneration and
m as s ing aircraft com e from th e 19 9 6 exercis e op p os ite
Taiw an andth e s orties flow n in res p ons e to Pres ident L ee
Teng-h ui’s “s tate-to-s tate” com m ents in July 19 9 9 .
Th e PL A A F w as activ ely inv olv ed during th e PL A ’s
large-s cale exercis es op p os ite Taiw an during M arch 19 9 6 .
A ccording to av ailable op en s ource m aterial,“Th e exercis e
in cluded 12,000 PL A A F an d 3,000 N av al A v iation
s erv icem en. M oreth an 280 aircraft dep loy edto th eexercis e
area andconductedtotal 6 80 s orties ,including 82tran s p ort
s orties . Ov er 800 com bat aircraft w ere w ith in a com bat
readines s of5 5 0 m iles or w ereon th e alert.” A n oth er rep ort
s tatedth e PL A dep loy edfew er th an 100 additional aircraft
to th e 13Fujian airfields from oth er bas es ,rais ing th e total
to only 226 aircraft. B as edon abriefing by th e U.S. Officeof
N av al Intelligence, th e PL A conducted a total of 1,75 5
s orties during th eexercis e.85 F urth er p res s rep orting s tated
th at th ePL A A F dep loy edaircraft from its s econdandth ird
line airfields to firs t line airfields , w h ere th ey conducted
th eir exercis e activ ity . It took about 3.5 h ours for th e
284
PL A A F figh ters to p rep are for takeoff,com p aredto th e 10
h ours th ey h adneededp rev ious ly . In addition,th e PL A A F
dem on s trated rap id aircraft s ortie regeneration of 4 0
m inutes , w h ich w as cons iderably quicker th an th e p as t.86
W h at w as not indicatedin th e rep orting is th e num ber of
s orties each p ilot flew p er day andw h eth er th ey flew ev ery
day .
D uring July and A ugus t 19 9 9 , only tw elv e PL A A F
aircraft w ere airborne at any tim e,not allofw h ich w ere ov er
th e Strait,andth e PL A A F flew only about 30 total s orties
p er day .87 Th e air env ironm ent ov er th e Taiw an Strait als o
p rov ides lim itations on th e num ber ofs orties th at can be
flow n. M os t ofth e airs p aceim m ediately north ands outh of
Taiw an,fly ing to/from Taip ei andK aoh s iung,is dedicated
to civ ilair routes ,andov er 1,000 civ ilair fligh ts fly th rough
Taiw an’s airs p ace daily .88 A lth ough th e PL A A F didnot fly
th at m any s orties in th e Strait, B eijing definitely s ent a
clear m es s age th at th e PL A A F couldfly in th e Strait if it
w anted to and p s y ch ologically altered th e v iew of th e
PL A A F in Taiw an.
Th e PL A A F h as clas s ified its fly ing regim ents into
s ev eral categories as an in dicator of th eir com bat
effectiv enes s . Th e h igh es t is C ategory -A (jia lei). In 19 9 7,
L iu s tatedth at 9 0.5 p ercent ofth e com bat regim ens w ere
C ategory - A an d th e n u m ber of p ilots cap able of
“all-w eath er” com bat h adreach ed76 .2p ercent,th e h igh es t
ev er.89 In 19 9 9 ,L iu s tatedth at 9 8 p ercent ofth e regim ents
w ere C ategory -A .9 0
C am ouflage,C oncealm ent,D ecep tion,and
D is p ers al.
Th rough out th e PL A A F ’s w ritings ,th ere are references
to concerns about s ecrecy andearly detection ofits p lans for
offensiv eop erations ,giv en today ’s intelligences atellite and
airborne surv eillance collection cap abilities . PL A w riters
h av e s tated,“M ajor m ilitary op erations cannot es cap e from
s uch an in telligen ce n et,”9 1 s o conductin g frequent
285
m ov em ent anda certain am ount ofdis p ers al is an effectiv e
concealm ent m eth od.9 2 “F orces s h ouldintegrate th e us e of
feints ,cam ouflage,s creening,anddis p ers ion to conceal our
com m an d, con trol, com m unication s , and intelligence
s y s tem s and to deceiv e and jam en em y inform ation
reconnais s ance.”9 3
Th e PL A A F ’s logis tics forces h av e th e p rim ary
res p onsibility for im p lem enting m os t of th e cam ouflage,
concealm ent anddecep tion (C C &D )m eas ures . W h ile s om e
C C &D anddis p ers al activ ities w ill take p lace during th e
cam p aign p rep aration p h as e, oth ers w ill occur during th e
execution p h as e. A s a res ult of th e need to conduct
undetectedoffensiv e op erations , at leas t during th e early
s tages of a cam p aign, y et p rov ide for surv iv ability in a
counterattack, th e PL A A F ’s logis tics forces h av e inv es ted
considerabletim e andm oney into p as s iv eC C &D m easures ,
such as building aircraft cav e s h elters , s m all h angars ,
s ingle aircraft s h elters , fals e targets , and“concealing th e
real and m aking th e fals e obv ious .”9 4 Th e PL A A F h as
identifiedadditional m eas ures th at m us t als o be taken to
ensure s urv iv ability ,such as building h ardenedentrances
to cav es , undergroundcom m and p os ts , aircraft h angars ,
and p ers onnel s h elters , as w ell as fuel, am m unition,
m ateriel, andequip m ent s torage facilities .9 5 Oth er p as s iv e
C C &D m eas ures h av e als o been tried. F or exam p le, in an
October 2000 exercis e,a N anjing M RA F airfieldconducted
a com p lete blackout as th eir aircraft returnedfrom an air
s trike.9 6
Th e PL A A F h as p aid p articular attention to try ing to
en h an ce th es e C C &D m eas u res th rough th e us e of
dis p ers ing its w eap on s y s tem s andequip m ent. Th e PL A A F
s tates th at th e key to gaining air superiority is keep ing
airfields av ailable for op erations . A ccording to L ogis tics
Sup p ort for M obile Operations,9 7
Th e PL A A F m ust h av e a netw ork ofth ree ty p es ofrunw ay s —
p erm anent,field,andh igh w ay . D uring th efirs t ten day s ofth e
G ulf W ar, 4 0 p ercent of th e Iraqi A ir F orce’s aircraft w ere
286
des troy ed.Th em ajority ofth eaircraft s urv iv ed,but th ey w ere
not ableto takeofffrom th eir airfields for com bat,so it w as th e
s am e as not h av ing th em at all. Th erefore,th ebes t w ay to deal
w ith th is ty p e of s ituation is to h ide y our aircraft and air
defense equip m ent by dis p ersing th em to fieldairs trip s and
h igh w ay landing s trip s from w h ich th ey can continue to
conduct th eir com bat op erations . Th e dis p ers al is es p ecially
im portant becaus e airfield p rotection is w eak. C urrently ,
s om e w ar zones do not h av e m any firs t-line airfields, s o
logis tics s up p ort s h ouldbe s trength enedat firs t-line airfields
to s up p ort m ultip le ty p es ofaircraft p rior to or returning from
a s trike,or aircraft s top p ing to refuel en route to th eir h om e
bas es . W h en m obile operations units are m as s ing andth ere
arenot enough airfields,th en th ew ar zonelogis tics m us t op en
up field airs trip s and h igh w ay landing strip s and s up p ort
th em w ith em ergency logis tics s u p p ort fendui.
Ov er th e p as t decade, th e PL A A F h as triedto increas e
th e num ber ofairfields , as w ell as to op en up m any ofits
airfields for civ il aircraft. A 19 9 6 Xinh ua rep ort s tated,“Th e
PL A A F h ad op ened 71 m ilitary airp orts and offered 5 3
res erv e airp orts to civ ilian airp lanes s in ce 19 9 0.”9 8
A ccording to a 19 9 9 South C h ina M orning Pos tarticle,“Th e
PL A A F built 37 airp orts betw een 19 9 5 and 19 9 9 . In
addition, m ore th an 100 large w eap onry and equip m ent
w areh ous es andw ar-readines s facilities h adbeen enlarged
andrenov ated.”9 9 Unfortunately ,th e article didnot p rov ide
a lis t ofth e airfields or s tate w h eth er th ey w ere s trictly for
m ilitary us e or joint civ il-m ilitary us e.
In th e late 19 80s , th e PL A A F began p racticin g
dis p ers ing its aircraft from p erm anent bas es to alternate
runw ay s , including h igh w ay and s od landing s trip s . F or
exam p le, in Sep tem ber 19 89 , th ree F-8 intercep tors from
th e1s t A ir D iv is ion at A n s h an andoneIl-14 tran s p ort us ed
th eSh eny ang-D alian h igh w ay as a dis p ers alrunw ay for th e
firs t tim e ev er.100 Th e F -8s landed s ingly and took off
quickly in a th ree-sh ip form ation. Th e 19 9 6 -4 is s ue of
C h ina’s A ir Force s h ow eds ev eral p h otos ofa logis tics fuel
team s etting up fuelp ip es to s u p p ort a s ingleF-8-2from th e
287
1s t A ir D iv is ion landing on th e Sh eny ang-D alian h igh w ay
during m obileop erations “for th efirs t tim e”in M ay 19 9 6 .101
Th ePL A A F h as es tablis h eds etp rocedures for p rov iding
logis tics s up p ort for dis p ers ing aircraft. A ccording to
L ogis tics Supportfor M obileO p erations,logis tics forces w ill
follow a four-step p roces s to p rep are for aircraft to arriv e at
a fields trip or h igh w ay landing s trip .102Th efirs t s tep is th e
arriv al ofth e adv ance team ,th at w ill coordinate w ith th e
local civ ilians andm ilitia for s ecuring th e area andm ake an
initial ch eck of th e runw ay , ap rons, and facilities . Th e
s econds tep includes th e arriv al ofth efirs tech elon,w h ich is
res p ons ible for s etting up th e logis tics com m and p os t,
clos ing th e h igh w ay to civ ilian traffic, in s p ecting and
clearing th e run w ay an d p arkin g ap ron , as s is tin g
m aintenance p ers onnel p rep are for fligh t op erations ,
s etting up fuel and am m unition storage, and organizing
h ous ing and h ealth facilities . Th e next s tep includes
op ening th e air s trip s and arriv al of additional logis tics
forces . Th e final s tep is arriv al of th e aircraft andm ore
logis tics s up p ort troop s .
A lth ough th is ty p eofdis p ers al training w as rarely noted
in th e op en m edia until th e late 19 9 0s ,an exercis ein A p ril
2000 p rov ides a goodexam p le ofrecent training.103
A t 06 15 , an unidentified PL A A F airfield in th e Jinan M R
initiatedan em ergency dis p ersal exercis efollow ing a s im ulated
cruis em is s ilecounterattack on th eairfield. G iv en th es cenario,
th ecruis em is s ilecounterattack ap p ears to h av eoccurredw h ile
th ePL A A F’s aircraft w erereturning from an attack. Onegroup
ofs u p p ort troop s andov er 5 0 s p ecial v eh icles , including fuel
trucks ,p ow er s up p ly trucks ,andoxy gen trucks ,dis p ersedto a
des ignated h igh w ay landing s trip to s u p p ort th e regim ent’s
takeoff and landings . A t th e s am e tim e, a s econd group of
em ergency s up p ort p ersonnelbegin rep airing bom bedrunw ay s ,
extinguis h ing aircraft fires ,giv ing firs t aidto injuredp ilots ,and
rep airing oil p ip elines .
B es ides us ing em ergency runw ay s for p re- and p os tattack dis p ers al airfields , th e PL A A F h as als o gradually
288
tried to build up th e cap ability to p rov ide logis tics and
m aintenance s up p ort at auxiliary airfields for m ore th an
one ty p e of aircraft ov er a sustainedp eriodof tim e. Th e
PL A A F h as gradually m ov edfrom s u p p orting a few aircraft
ofa s ingle ty p e at an airfieldfor increas ingly longer p eriods
of tim e, to s up p orting m ultip le ty p es . In doing th is , th ey
h av eh adto tackle a num ber oflong-s tanding p roblem s th at
underm ine s up p ort efficiency , including backw ard p lane
refueling tech n ology an d backw ard bom b loadin g
tech nology .104
Sup p ort for Nonav iation Units .
A lth ough m os t ofth e PL A A F ’s rep orting focus es on its
av iation branch , nonav iation units h av e als o conducted
C C &D and dis p ers al op eration s . A Sep tem ber 19 9 9
L iberation A rm y D aily article des cribeda N orth Sea F leet
N av al A v iation radar brigade exercis e, th at m os t likely
rep res ents th e ty p e of activ ity th e PL A A F ’s radar units
w ouldim p lem ent during a cam p aign.105 Th e article s tated,
“On receiv ing orders to s et out, th e brigade took only 4 0
m inutes to dis m antle its nonm obileradar s tation andbegin
a m otorized adv ance of s ev eral h undred kilom eters . On
reach ing th ecom bat area,th e radars w ere quickly s et up to
p rov ide air s ituation rep orts to th e com m and p os t. In
addition,decoy radars andp os itions w eres etup at th es am e
tim e to confus ereconnais s ancep lanes .” In Nov em ber 2000,
a B eijing M RA F SA M div is ion equip p edw ith th ree ty p es of
SA M s us ed “m ixed dep loy m ent, concealing th e real and
dis p lay ing th efals e,andm obile am bus h op erations” during
a liv e-fire exercis e.106
Unan s w eredQues tions.
Th ere are m any ques tions th is ch ap ter w as not able to
ans w er due to th e lack of op en s ource inform ation. F or
exam p le, as s om eone w h o h as obs erv ed C h ina’s defense
indus try for decades s tated,107
289
L ogis tics rev olv es bas ically arounds y s tem s andnum bers. W h at
kindofrelations h ip s does th e PL A A F h av e w ith its s up p liers ?
W h at do w e know about th eir s u p p ly ch ain m anagem ent s kills ?
W h at do w e know about p ackaging— are consum ables s uch as
am m unition andp etroleum ,lubricants andoils (POL )p ackaged
s o th ey can beus edrigh taw ay “out ofth ebox,”or do th ey require
as s em bly and/or proces s ing beforeth ey can beus ed? W h at do w e
know about op erating s tandards and rates , including s ortie
rates , am m unition andfuel consum p tion rates , m aintenance
rates (m anh ours ofm aintenance p er h our offligh t tim e), and
oth er crucial logis tics m etrics ?
Th es eare jus t a few ofth ebas icques tions th at needto be
ans w eredto really unders tandw h at th e PL A A F ’s logis tics
cap abilities are.
A lth ough little op en source inform ation is av ailable
abou t th e PL A A F ’s actual s u p p ly s y s tem , s om e
generalizations can be m adeby looking at th e w ay th e U.S.
m ilitary ’s logis tics s y s tem m anages s im ilar res p onsibilities .
Th e follow ing inform ation is taken from A F SC Pub 1,Th e
Joint Staff Officer’s G uide, 19 9 7. 108 “Th e h undreds of
th ous ands ofitem s in th e U.S. F ederal s up p ly s y s tem are
categorized into one of 10 broad clas s es s h ow n below .
D ep loy m ent p lanning focus es on v ery broadcategories ,but
it does s ubdiv ide th e 10 clas s es into a total ofjus t ov er 4 0
subclas s es . F or exam p le, am m unition is s ubdiv ided into
am m o-air and am m o-ground; subs is tence is div ided into
s ubclas s es for in-fligh t rations , refrigerated rations ,
non-refrigeratedrations,com bat rations,andw ater.”
?
C las s 1: Subs is tence
?
C las s 2: C loth ing, indiv idual equip m ent, tools ,
adm inis trativ e s up p lies
?
C las s 3: Petroleum ,oils ,lubricants
?
C las s 4 : C ons truction m ateriel
?
C las s 5 : A m m unition
29 0
?
C las s 6 : Pers onal dem anditem s
?
C las s 7 : M ajor end item s ; racks , p y lons, tracked
v eh icles , etc.
?
C las s 8: M edical m aterials
?
C las s 9 : Rep air p arts
?
C las s 10: M aterial for nonm ilitary p rogram s
Th e Officer’s G uidefurth er s tates ,“Strategicm ov em ent
ofp eop le,equip m ent,ands u p p lies is only p art ofa com p lex
logis tics p roblem ,w h ereby units m us t m ov e,s up p lies m us t
berequis itionedanddeliv eredon tim e,com bat forceloading
m us t be done according to th e ty p e ofoffloading exp ected,
and th ere are alw ay s com p eting dem ands for tran s p ort
res ources and s up p ort facilities .” B as ed on th e auth or’s
exp erience w ith th e PL A A F andav iation m inis try in th e
late 19 80s andfollow up dis cus s ions w ith av iation bus ines s
rep res entativ es s inceth en,th e PL A A F h as m ov edclos er to
a fully autom ated logis tics s y s tem , but th ere are s till
p roblem s w ith s tandardizing p arts to put into th e s y s tem .
SE C TION IV : C O N C L USIONS
Th e bottom line is w h at th e PL A A F ’s logis tics forces
h av e done to better p rep are th e PL A A F to figh t agains t th e
UnitedStates ifrequiredto do s o. Itis clear th at th elogis tics
forces h av e m ade adjus tm ents in th eir organizational
s tructure andop erational m eth ods to s u p p ort th e PL A A F ’s
s h ift tow ardjoint m obile,offensiv e op erations ,but th ey are
not th ere y et.
Ov er th e p as t 5 decades , th e PL A A F h as only been
inv olv edin th ree m ajor external cam p aigns— th e K orean
W ar,th e 19 5 8 Taiw an Strait C ris is ,andth e 19 79 V ietnam
border conflict.109 D uring th os e cam p aigns, th e PL A A F
dep loy eds ev eral h undredaircraft to a h andful ofairfields
near th eborder,but th eir p er p ilot s ortieratew as m inim al.
29 1
M oreim p ortantly ,noneofth os ecam p aigns inv olv edenem y
attacks again s t targets in s ide C h ina’s borders , s o th e
PL A A F ’s aircraft, airfields , and troop s w ere s afe. Th e
PL A A F h as s tudiedth e G ulfW ar andK os ov o conflict and
know s th at th e next w ar w ill m os t likely be com p letely
different. Th eir av iation andair defense as s ets , not only
near th e front but als o in rear areas ,w ill not be s afe from
attack by A m ericans. s tealth aircraft andlong-range cruis e
m is s iles . Th is is w h y th e PL A A F is concentrating on C C &D
anddis p ers al m eas ures ,andw h y C h ina h as p laceda h igh er
em p h as is on nation al m ilitary and civ il air defen s e
cap abilities th e p as t coup le ofy ears .
Th ecurrent des crip tion for PL A A F figh ter,bom ber,and
ground attack offens iv e air cam p aign op erations can be
sum m arized as “transregional rap id m obility integrated
long-dis tances trikes at nigh t in allw eath er conditions from
m ultip le lev els and different directions under unknow n
conditions. Th es e attacks can beconductedagainst landor
m aritim e targets , andth e nav igation routes can be ov er
landor ov er w ater.” M edia rep orts dis cus s ing th e PL A A F ’s
exercis es h av e m entioned all of th e abov e, but from th e
PL A A F ’s p ers p ectiv e, one of th e s tronges t as p ects of its
training p rogram is th at during exercis es both antagonis ts
are toldw h en a w ar begins,but th ey are not toldth e oth er
s ide’s num ber of s orties , location, or altitude. Th erefore,
th ey m us t decide h ow to ach iev e v ictory in a com p letely
unknow n env ironm ent. A n exercis e conducted by a Jinan
M RA F figh ter regim ent indicates th e PL A A F ’s trend in
training for em ergency m obile transregional op erations.
A ccording to a Nov em ber 2000 rep ortin A ir F orceN ew s,110
A regim ent offigh ters con s is ting ofov er 20 aircraft dep artedits
h om e bas e in th e Jinan M R (w h ich includes Sh andong and
H enan Prov inces)on a rainy nigh t “under concealm ent” in late
October. Th e aircraft flew to an airfields outh ofth eYangziriv er
(p robably in th eNanjing M R),to conduct air p atrols andrender
air s up p ort to th e w ar zone. Th is em ergency com bat m obility
drill s ignified a new breakth rough in its cap ability for
large-fleet, long-range,all-w eath er op eration s at all h ours and
29 2
in all air s p aces . Th eregim ent h olds m onth ly s im ulateddrills
of em ergency take-off and m obility , and ch ange of alert
conditions. It h as s w itch ed to unfam iliar field targets for
target p ractice, andch anges ground m arkers frequently to
enh anceav iators ’cap abilities for indep endent nav igation and
target identification. It flies frequent low - and ultra-low
altitude fligh ts , s om e ov er s ea areas u n der unknow n
conditions. It also subjects av iators to m axim um daily fly ing
tim e training. Training for com p licatedw eath er conditions is
conducted in m inim al w eath er conditions . On th e recent
m an eu v er, th e regim en t als o p racticed electro n ic
counterm easures ,p enetrating enem y defenses from different
directions, coordinatedattacks from h igh andlow altitudes ,
ands im ulatedattack ov er w ater.
Th rough out th is ch ap ter,th ere h av e been references to
th e PL A A F ’s requirem ent during th e 19 9 0s to transform
its elffrom a forcecap ableofem p loy ing s inglebranch es and
s ingle ty p es ofaircraft in p os itional defensiv ecam p aigns to
us ing m ultip le branch es ands ev eral ty p es ofaircraft in air
force com bin ed arm s , m obile offen s iv e op erations
cam p aigns , w ith th e goal ofs h ifting to op erations in joint
s erv ice cam p aigns. W ith in th is goal, th e PL A A F ’s logis tics
forces h av e h adto ch ange th eir op erational s tructure and
m eth ods of op eration from s u p p orting s ingle ty p es of
aircraft at th eir h om e bas e to s u p p orting m ultip le ty p es of
aircraft at th eir h om e or dep loy edbas es for s h ort andlong
p eriods oftim e.
B as edon th e m aterial av ailable to w rite th is rep ort, it
ap p ears th at th e PL A A F ’s logis tics s y s tem h as m ade
p rogres s tow ard reach ing its goal of s u p p orting m obile
forces . Organizationally , it h as es tablis h ed em ergency
m obile fendui to s up p ort dep loy ing aircraft into andout of
airfields . Th es e fendui are als o res p ons ible for h elp ing s et
up m obile op erations at fieldairs trip s andh igh w ay landing
s trip s . A lth ough th e articles rev iew eddis cus s th e needto
p rep os ition adequate m aterial in th ecam p aign areas before
a w ar breaks out, th ey did not dis cus s w h eth er th is h as
actually h ap p ened.
29 3
F rom a training p ers p ectiv e, it ap p ears th at th e
PL A A F ’s logis tics forces are ap p ly ing th eir th eory to
op erational exercis es . Th e exercis es inv olv e rep airing
dam age to airfields after notional enem y attacks ,including
runw ay rep airs ,taking care ofw oundedp ers onnel,putting
out fires ,andp rep aring to recov er aircraft th at areen route
h om e andh av e been dam agedduring th eir m is s ion. A t th e
s am e tim e,th elogis tics forces h av edep loy eds om efenduito
begin prep aring th efieldairs trip s or h igh w ay landing s trip s
for recov ering aircraft or for generating follow -on com bat
s orties .
One ofth e m os t im p ortant is s ues th at is not clear from
th e articles rev iew edis h ow p roficient th e PL A A F w ouldbe
during a real conflict,es p ecially ifs om e ofth e key firs t line
airfields w ere des troy ed— as th e PL A anticip ates w ill
h ap p en in a conflict w ith th e United States . W ould th e
PL A A F ,in fact,be ableto conduct com bat s orties out offield
airs trip s andh igh w ay landing s trip s ,or w ouldth ey m erely
bes om ew h ere to dis p ers e th e aircraft until th ey couldfly to
anoth er op erational airfield? W ouldth e PL A A F op t to m ov e
its aircraft furth er to th e rear as its airfields began
sustaining dam age? W ill th e PL A A F actually be able to
p rov ide logis tics s up p ort to m ultip le ty p es ofaircraft at a
s inglebas e? M any airfields h av e a s ingleregim ent w ith tw o
ty p es of aircraft (generally F -6 s and F-7s), or h av e tw o
regim ents w ith different ty p es of aircraft, s uch as one
regim ent w ith F -7s andonew ith F-8s . Th efields tations are
organizedap p rop riately to s u p p ort m ore th an one ty p e of
aircraft. B ut h ow p roficient w ill th e logis tics forces at firs t
line airfields beifth ey h av e to s up p ort s ev eral regim ents of
differen t ty p es of aircraft? A lth ough bom bers h av e
conducted exercis es w h ere th ey s top p ed at m ultip le
airfields , th e m edia rep orts did not s p ecify th e ty p es of
airfields th ey transitedor th ety p es ofs up p ortth ey receiv ed.
Tw o p robablew eak links for th elogis tics forces during a
cam p aign w ill be com m unications and tran s p ortation.
L ogis tics Support for M obile Op erations s tates th at “w h en
lines of com m unication are dis rup ted, logis tics along th is
29 4
ch ain are als o dis rup ted. Th erefore, th e PL A A F needs to
es tablis h an in dep en den t com m an d com m unication s
netw ork,cons is ting ofradio,landline,andcom p uters .”111 It
is not clear from th e m edia rep orts or th e PL A books
w h eth er th is taking p lace.
A lth ough th e PL A A F h as orderedth at tran s p ort aircraft
s h ould be us edto m ov e logis tics forces during cam p aigns,
roadandrailw ill s till be th e m os t likely m eans. A logis tics
tran s p ortation exercis e conductedduring sum m er 2001 in
th e G uangzh ou M RA F em p h as izedth at th e PL A A F is not
y et p rep aredto op erate under p oor w eath er conditions or
non-s crip tedexercis es . D uring h is critique,th e G uangzh ou
M RA F trans p ortation director em p h as ized“th e key is th at
training s till consis ts ofform w ith out s ubs tance, including
training for s h ow to p as s th e tes t. Som e units w ere th row n
in to dis order w ith jus t th e s ligh tes t ch an ge in th e
p redeterm ineddis p os ition.”112
Ifth e PL A A F does h av e to engage th e UnitedStates in
battle s om etim e in th e near future, th e key s w ill be p ilot
p roficiency ,s ortie generation ands us tainability ,adequate
logis tics s up p ort acros s th eboard,reliablecom m unications
andintelligence,andequip m ent m aintenance cap abilities .
Th e PL A A F h as m ade m uch p rogres s in all ofth es e areas
ov er th e p as t decade, beginning w ith es tablis h ing th e
th eory , th en p rov iding th e training to im p lem ent th e
th eory . It is clear, at leas t from reading PL A A F w ritings ,
th at m uch ofw h at th ey w ant to do is s till as p irational,but
th ey are definitely p utting th e p ieces ofth e adm inis trativ e
andop erational s tructurein p laceto accom p lis h th eir goals
s om etim ein th efuture. Th e PL A A F is als o in th ep roces s of
acquiring th e ty p es ofw eap on s y s tem s th at w illallow th em
to op erate from airfields th at are farth er from th e borders
andto dep loy SA M s w ith ranges th at can reach out bey ond
C h ina’s borders . Th e logis tics forces are als o definitely
ch anging accordingly to s up p ort th es e new s y s tem s .
29 5
E N D NOTE S - C H A PTE R 9
1. Th eauth or w ouldlike to th ank M ajor B ill B elk (USA F R)for h is
as s is tancein gath ering th e F B IS m aterial for th is ch ap ter,andto K en
A s h ley ,JeffG oldm an,andJerem y M orrow for th eir com m ents on early
drafts . Th e auth or w ouldes p ecially like to th ank Rick K am er for h is
as s is tance in identify ing certain PL A A F units by th eir aircraft tail
n u m ber, us in g h is w ebs ite w w w .C h ina- defen s e.com / av iation/
num bering- s y s tem .
2. W en G uangch un, ed., Jidong Zuozh an H ouqin B aozh ang,
[
L ogistics Sup p ort for M obile Op erations], PL A G eneral L ogis tics
D epartm ent H eadquarters D ep artm ent, PL A Pres s , January 19 9 7, p.
184 -185 .
3. Th is des crip tion is a com p os ite ofinform ation taken from H ong
H eping andTian Xia, “H eadto th e New C entury ,” Zh ongguo K ongjun
[C h ina’s A ir F orce]19 9 6 -5 ; andW en G uangch un,ed.,Jidong Zuozh an
H ouqin B aozh ang. Th is is one of s ix books under th e title G aojis h u
Tiaojian Xia Jubu Zh anzh eng H ouqin B aozh ang [L ogis tics Support for
L ocal W ars under H igh -Tech C onditions] th at th e G eneral L ogis tics
D epartm ent com m is s ioned th e National D efense Univ ers ity and all
logis tics organization s to com pile in 19 9 5 .
4 . Th ePL A adds guerilla op erations as th e th irdm odefor its ground
forces .
5 . Teng L ianfu andJiang Fush eng, eds.,K ongjun Zuozh an Yanjiu
[A ir F orce Operations Research ],B eijing: National D efens e Univ ers ity
Publis h ers,M ay 19 9 0,p . 187.
6 . Paul H .B . G odw in,“C h ange andC ontinuity in C h ines e M ilitary
D octrine: 19 4 9 -19 9 9 ,” a p ap er p res ented at Th e C enter for Nav al
A n aly s es C orp oration’s 19 9 9 conference on PL A W arfigh ting. H arlan
W . Jencks p rov idedadetailedcritique ofth is s trategy in “People’s W ar
Under M odern C onditions : W is h ful Th inking, National Suicide, or
E ffectiv e D eterrent,” Th e C h ina Quarterly , No. 9 8, June 19 84 , p .
305 -319 .
7. Th e PL A A F D ictionary defines air s trategy as “Th e ov erall p lan
andguiding p lan for air force building and com bat. It is p art of a
country ’s m ilitary s trategy andconsis ts ofth ree interrelatedparts : air
force s trategic objectiv es , air force s trength , and air force strategic
em ploy m ent.” Zh u Rongch ang, ed., Kongjun D a C idian [
A ir Force
D ictionary ], Sh angh ai: Sh angh ai D ictionary Publis h ing H ous e,
Septem ber 19 9 6 ,p . 6 .
29 6
8. C h engdu Military Region C am p aign Training Office,Jituanjun
Yezh an Zh endi F angyu Zh any i K ongjun de Yuny ong [A ir Force
Utilization D uring th e C am p aign to D efend G roup A rm y F ield
Positions], F ebruary 19 82, p 1. Th is groundforce dom ination is not
surpris ing, s ince ev ery PL A A F com m ander and dep uty com m ander
untilth e late 19 80s h adth eir roots in th egroundforces . Itw as not until
19 73 th at th e PL A A F h adits firs t av iator as a deputy com m ander,and
19 85 untilth e firs t av iator becam e th ecom m ander. E v en so,th e A rm y
s tills elects th e PL A A F s enior officers,andth ere are no air forcegeneral
officers in any of th e four PL A general dep artm ents (G eneral Staff,
Political,L ogis tics ,andE quipm ent D ep artm ents ).
9 . H uaRenjie,C ao Yifeng,andC h en H uixiu,eds .,“K ongjun Xues h u
Sixian g Sh i,” [A ir F orce Art an d Th ough t H is tory ] Jiefangjun
Publis h ers,B eijing,19 9 1,p . 29 4 -331.
10. Teng L ianfu andJiang Fush eng,eds .,K ongjun Zuozh an Yanjiu,
p . 26 1.
11. Ibid.,p . 186 .
12. Th eRep ublicofC h ina 19 9 3-9 4 N ational D efenseRep ort,Taip ei:
L iM ing Cultural E n terp ris e C o.,L td.,19 9 4 ,p . 6 5 -6 6 .
13. Rep ublic of C h ina: 19 9 8 N ational D efens e Report (Taip ei: L i
M ing C u ltural E n terp ris e C o.,L td.,19 9 8,p p . 30-31.
14 , Republic of C h ina: 2000 N ational D efens e Rep ort, Taip ei: L i
M ing C u ltural E n terp ris e C o.,L td.,19 9 8).
15 B riefing from M inis try ofNational D efen s e,D ecem ber 2000.
16 . h ttp :/ / w w w .fas .org/ nuke/ guide/ ch ina/ facility / airfield.h tm .
Th ere are 6 m ilitary airfields w ith in 4 00 kilom eters ,11 m ore betw een
4 00-6 00 kilom eters ,and19 m ore betw een 6 00-800 kilom eters .
17. Interv iew s in Taiw an,D ecem ber 2000.
18. In late 19 9 9 , th e PL A began a p rogram oftraining calledth e
“th ree defens es andth ree attacks ,” including attacks again s t s tealth
p lanes , cruis e m is s iles and arm ed h elicop ters , and defen s e against
p recis ion s trikes, electronic jam m ing, andelectronic reconnais s ance
andsurv eillance.
19 . H ong H ep ing andTian Xia,“H eadto th eN ew C entury ,” C h ina’s
A ir Force,19 9 6 ,No. 5 ,p . 4 -7.
29 7
20. Ibid.
21. Th e tim ing ofL iu’s com m ents on an offen s iv ecap ability cam e as
h etook ov er th ecom m ander’s p os ition in D ecem ber 19 9 6 andas Taiw an
began final p rep arations to receiv e th e firs t s quadron of15 0 F -16 s and
M irages in A p ril19 9 7.
22. Sun M aoqing,“M ake E fforts To B uildM odernizedPeop le’s A ir
F orce: Interv iew W ith A ir F orce C om m ander L ieutenant G eneral L iu
Sh uny ao,” B eijing L iaow ang,A p ril 14 ,19 9 7,No 15 ,p p . 20-21.
23. Yu Xiao,TaiYang,Fu Song,andW ang Jiany un,“W e M ust W in
th e N ext B attle: Tw o F igh ter D iv is ion C om m an ders ’ V iew s of
Sim ultaneous Offensiv eandD efen s iv eC apabilities ,” C h ina’s A ir F orce,
2000,No. 2,p p . 4 -8.
24 . A ir ForceD ictionary ,p . 30. Th e PL A A F ’s units (budui)includes
div is ions ,brigades ,andregim ents . Th e regim ent is th e low es t lev el for
logis tics m anagem ent. B elow th eunitlev elareelem ents (fendui),w h ich
include battalions , p latoons , com p anies , and s quads. Av iation troop
equiv alents of battalions and p latoon s are group s (dadui) and
squadrons (zh ongdui), res p ectiv ely . F endui consis t of th e troop s th at
actually carry out th e logis tics w ork.
25 . L ogistics Support for M obile O p erations,C h apter 1.
26 . A ir Force D ictionary ,p . 274 .
27. Yao Jun, ed., Zh ongguo H angkong Sh i [A H is tory of C h ina’s
A v iation],Zh engzh ou: D ajia Publish ers ,Sep tem ber 19 9 8.
28. K enneth W . A llen,Peop le’s RepublicofC h ina’s L iberation A rm y
A ir Force,W as h ington,D C : D efense IntelligenceA gency ,19 9 1,Section
7,p. 5 .
29 . Ibid.
30. A ir F orce D ictionary , p . 16 5 . C om p os ite dep ots are zongh e ku,
ands p ecialty depots are zh uany eku.
31. In M ay 19 76 , th e A eronautical E ngineerin g D ep artm ent
(h angkong gongch engbu/ konggong),w h ich h adbeen dow ngradedto a
s econdlev el dep artm ent in 19 6 9 ,w as re-establis h edas th e fourth first
lev el dep artm ent and ch anged its nam e to th e E quip m ent-Tech nical
D epartm ent (kongjun zh uangbeijish ubu)in Nov em ber 19 9 2. F ollow ing
th e A p ril 19 9 8 creation of th e G eneral E quip m ent D ep artm ent, th e
PL A A F ch angedth e nam e ofth e E quip m ent-Tech nical D ep artm ent to
29 8
th e E quip m ent D ep artm en t (kongjun zh uangbeibu/ kongzh uang).
A ccordin g to interv iew s w ith PL A officials , th e H eadquarters
D epartm ent trans ferred its s econdlev el E quip m ent D ep artm ent and
Scien tific Res earch D ep artm en t (key anbu) to th e E quip m en t
D epartm ent, s o th at its res p onsibilities m atch edth os e ofth e G eneral
E quip m ent D ep artm ent. A ir F orce D ictionary , p . 14 6 ; Sh ijie Junsh i
N ianjian 19 9 9 [W orld M ilitary Yearbook], p ublis h ed by PL A Pres s ,
B eijing,p . 103.
32. A ir Force D ictionary ,p . 276 .
33. Th e difference betw een m aterial (w uzi) and air m ateriel
(h angcai) is th at th e form er cons is ts of item s s uch as lum ber and
concrete for th e entire PL A A F,andth e latter cons is ts ofitem s only for
th e av iation branch ’s aircraft and av iation troop s . Th e four oth er
branch es (A A A , SA M , radar, and airborne) ands p ecialized s u p p ort
elem ents (com m unications troop s , etc.)do not use air m ateriel.
34 . Interv iew w ith PL A officials . Th e s am e s ituation now exis ts at
th em ilitary region h eadquarters ,w h ereth eJoint L ogis tics D epartm ent
is res p ons ible for general p urp os e s upp lies and th e E quip m ent
D ep artm ent is res p ons ible for s p ecial p urp os e s up p lies and all
m aintenance.
35 . A H is tory ofC h ina’s Av iation.
36 . A ir Force D ictionary ,p . 70-71.
37. Oliv er C h ou, “A ir F orce B uilding Projects Take Off in Pas t 5
Years ,” South C h ina M orning Post,A p ril 17,19 9 9 .
38. Th e term com m and p ost is som etim es confusing, s ince th e
PL A A F h as als o createds ev eral air corp s lev el com m andorganizations
called com m andp os ts . B eginning in 19 9 3, th e PL A A F ch anged th e
nam es ofsix ofits s ev en exis ting com m andpos ts to bas es (jidi)— D alian,
Tangs h an, Xian, Sh angh ai, W uh an, and K unm ing. A p p arently th e
L h as a C om m andPos t didnot conv ert to a bas e.
39 . Title unknow n,G eneral L ogis tics D epartm ent docum ent,June
19 79 ,p . 35 .
4 0. L ogistics Support for M obile O p erations,C h apter 3.
4 1. A ir Force O p erations Research ,p 15 7.
29 9
4 2. Ibid., p 15 2. W ang H ouqing, Zh ang Xingy e (ed.), Zh any i Xue
[Th eStudy ofC am p aigns],B eijing: National D efens eUniv ers ity Pres s ,
M ay 2000,p . 34 6 .
4 3. Ibid. Th e C h ines e is K ongjun zh any i, y ou kongjun zh any i
juntuan dandu h uo zaiqita junbingzh ong peih e xia s h ish idezh any i.
4 4 . L i M an K in, Sino-V ietnam ese W ar, H ong K ong: K ingsw ay
International Publications ,L td.,19 81,p p . 33-35 . Th e PL A A F dep loy ed
F-5 , F-6 , andF-7 figh ters , p lus Il-28 bom bers , to th e border. A t th at
tim e,th e V ietnam es e A ir F orce w as equip p edw ith M iG -21s ,plus U.S.
F-5 A s andA -37 s left ov er from th ew ar. Th eV ietnam es e als o h adSA -2,
SA -3,SA -6 ,andSA -7 SA M s p lus th eform idableZSU-5 7-2s elf-prop elled
AAA.
4 5 . D angdaiZh ongguo K ongjun [
C h ina Today : A ir Force],B eijing:
C h ina Social Sciences Pres s ,19 89 .,p. 6 38. Sinceth e neares t p oint from
Nanning w as 110 km andth efarth est w as 280 km ,each h elicopter trip
took 2to 4 h ours . D uring m os t s orties ,th e h elicop ters couldnot turn off
th eir engines or refuel at th e p ickup p oints. It w as n ot until 19 86 th at
th e PL A A F turnedalm os t all ofits h elicop ters ov er to A rm y A v iation.
4 6 . C h ina Today : A ir F orce,p. 6 38.
4 7. Inform ation on th e PL A A F ’s activ ities during th e 19 79 conflict
com efrom a G eneralL ogis tics D ep artm ent docum ent,[TitleUnknow n],
June 19 79 ,p p . 35 -37.
4 8. K ing C . C h en, C h ina’s W ar W ith V ietnam , 19 79 : Is s ues,
D ecisions , and Im p lications, Stanford, C A : H oov er Institute Pres s ,
19 87,p . 114 .
4 9 . W ang H ai’s autobiograp h y p ublis h edin January 2001 does n ot
ev en m ention th e19 79 conflict. W ang H ai,W ang H aiSh angjiang: W ode
Zh andou Sh engy a [G eneral W ang H ai: M y C om bat C areer], B eijing,
Zh ongy ang W enxian C h uban s h e [
C entral L iterature Publis h ers],
F ebruary 2000.
5 0. On August 1, 19 6 0, th e K unm ing M RA F C P (K unm ing junqu
kongjun zh ih uisuo/ K unzh i) w as form ed and w as res p on s ible for
controlling PL A A F units in Yunnan Prov ince. Th eC h engdu M RA F w as
not es tablis h ed until 19 85 , at w h ich tim e th e K unm ing M RA F C P
becam e s ubordinate to it. Th e K unm ing M RA F C om m and Pos t w as
renam ed th e K unm ing B as e (Kunm ing jidi/ K unji) s om etim e after
19 9 3.
5 1. C h ina Today : A ir F orce,p. 311.
300
5 2. Yuan Zh ong andH ong H ep ing, “A ir F orce C om p letes Joint
Tactical Train ing B ase, F irs t of Its K ind, To Prov ide Sim ulated
B attlefieldE n v ironm ent for C om bat E xercis es B etw een V arious A rm s
ofServ ice,” Jiefangjun B ao [L iberation Arm y D aily ],A p ril 13,19 9 5 .
5 3. Zh ao Xianfeng and Zh ang Jiny u, “L anzh ou M R A ir Force
Im prov es L ogis tics Sup p ort for H igh -Tech A ir B attles ,” L iberation
A rm y D aily ,D ecem ber 6 ,19 9 5 .
5 4 . Th is s am e bom ber regim ent,w h ich is m os t likely th e 4 8th A ir
D iv is ion at L eiy ang,H unan Prov ince (identifiedby Rick K am er),h as
conducteds ev eral “firs t tim e”exercises ov er th ep as t2y ears . In October
19 9 9 ,th e div is ion’s airborne refueling B - 6 s w ere p art ofth e fly ov er of
Tiananm en for th e PRC’s 5 0th anniv ers ary . In October 2000,oneofth e
div is ion’s regim ents conducted“a 4 -h our integratedlong-range m obile
exercis e under unknow n condition s , cov ering a dis tance ofm ore th an
2,000 km acros s four p rov inces. Th e raidw as ledby div is ion com m ander
Yu Jijun.” In D ecem ber 2000 or early January 2001,th es am ediv is ion
conducteda 10-h our m obility exercis e. In M arch 2001,th es am ediv is ion
conducted its “firs t exercis e inv olv ing bom bers and tankers fly ing
togeth er in a com binedtask force (h unch eng biandui). Th e tas k force
im plem entednew cam paign m eth ods (zh anfa),including conducting a
trans regional fligh t w ith s topov ers at s ev eral unfam iliar airfields and
liv ebom bing.” In M ay 2001,th ediv ision im plem entedanoth er “firs t” by
conducting a div is ion-scale reconnais s ance and bom bing exercis e. An
undeterm ined num ber of aircraft from th e div is ion conducted y et
anoth er “firs t” by fly ing a m obility exercis eduring th es econdh alfofth e
nigh t. A ll ofth ese articles s tres s ed th at th e exercis es w ere conducted
during p oor w eath er conditions . W ang D ingh ua and N iu Yingfu,
“G uangzh ou Region A ir F orce’s ‘B om ber’Regim ent C onducts M aneuv er
E xercis e,” L iberation Arm y D aily (Internet), D ecem ber 5 , 2000; Yang
M ingde, W ang D ingh ua,andTang Baiy un,“PRC G uangzh ou B om ber
Regim ent C onducts ‘L ong-D istance’B om bing F ligh t D rill,” Zh ongguo
Xinw en Sh ein Ch ines e,January 5 ,2001; W ang D ingh ua,“A C ertain A ir
D iv is ion Forges L arge A ircraft A s s ault C ap ability ,” L iberation A rm y
D aily (Internet V ersion), Augus t 22, 2001; W ang D ingh ua and Fan
H ais ong,L iberation A rm y D aily (Internet),Sep tem ber 8,2001.
5 5 . L ogis tics Support for M obile Operations, p. 19 1-19 3. Zh ao
Xianfeng andZh ang Jiny u,“L anzh ou M R A ir F orce Im prov es L ogis tics
Sup p ort for H igh -Tech A ir B attles ,” L iberation A rm y D aily ,D ecem ber
6 , 19 9 5 . Sev eral L iberation A rm y D aily articles h av e s tated, “Th e
PL A A F h as s et up a rap id m obile em ergency s up p ort regim ent w ith
centralized com m and organization, to p ractice 11 s p ecial w artim e
s u p p ort tas ks s uch as rus h -rep airing bom bedrunw ay s ,extinguis h ing
301
aircraft fires ,giv ing first aidto injuredp ilots ,andrep airing bom bedoil
p ip elines .”
5 6 . Yang Yang, “Training for L ogis tic Sup p ort Units V iew ed,”
L iberation A rm y D aily ,D ecem ber 29 ,19 9 5 .
5 7. K ongjun B ao [A ir F orceN ew s],A p ril3,2001.
5 8. PL A Pictorial,January 2001.
5 9 . C h ina’s A ir Force,19 9 3,No. 1,p . 4 9 .
6 0. Zh ao Xianfeng and Zh ang Jiny u, “L anzh ou M R A ir Force
Im prov es L ogis tics Sup p ort for H igh -Tech A ir B attles ,” L iberation
A rm y D aily ,D ecem ber 6 ,19 9 5 .
6 1. Interv iew w ith M inis try ofD efen s e officials in New D elh i,M ay
19 9 9 .
6 2. “Th eSecurity Situation in th e Taiw an Strait,”Rep ort s ubm itted
by Secretary ofD efen s eW illiam C oh en to th e U.S. Senateas directedby
th e FY9 9 A p p ropriations B ill,F ebruary 17,19 9 9 .
6 3. “C h ina rep ortedly to trans p ort troop s by civ il aircraft to attack
Taiw an,” B ritis h B roadcas ting C orp oration, M ing Pao (Internet),
Septem ber 26 ,2000.
6 4 . Tan Jun andL i Yundou, “C h iefM ilitary Officers ofa C ertain
Unit ofH ubei-bas edA irborne F orces C arries out firs t M ilitary D rill,”
W uh an H ubeiRadio (Internet),A p ril24 ,2001. Th e airborne forces als o
p aradrop p ed p ieces of ligh t artillery , boxes of am m unition, com bat
v eh icles , andlogis tics s up p lies .
6 5 . “L arge-Scale PL A A irborne Op ex In C entral C h ina,” L iberation
A rm y D aily ,July 21,19 9 9 .
6 6 . L u W en, L ianh e Zh any i Zh anlue H ouqin Zh iy uan [
Strategic
L ogis tics Support in Joint Op erations], B eijing, National D efen s e
Univ ers ity Pres s ,A p ril 2000,p .15 3. Th e p ap er didnot identify w h ich
aircraft w ere being des cribed as com p arativ ely adv anced (bijiao
xianjin),but m os t likely it is th e F-8 and/or Su-27.
6 7. L ogistics Support for M obile O p erations,p . 19 6 .
6 8. A ir Force N ew s,D ecem ber 11,19 9 9 .
302
6 9 . L ian Juntao andZh ang Jiny u,“C h iH aotian W atch es A ir Force
L ogis tic E xercis e A im ed at Prom oting Scientific and Tech nological
Training andL arge-Scale Stage Op era ‘M ats u’in Nanjing,” L iberation
A rm y D aily ,A p ril 14 ,2000.
70. L ogistics Support for M obile O p erations,p p . 19 7-19 9 .
71. Ibid.,p . 214 .
72. A ir Force D ictionary ,p p . 19 5 -19 6 ,234 -235 .
73. Sergey Sokut andIly a K edrov ,“W ar in E urop e: Yugos lav ia: 78
D ay s Under M is s ile andB om bing A ttacks : N A TO’s L im itedW ar W as
Uncom p rom is ing,” M oscow Nezav isim oy eV oy ennoy eObozreniy e,F B IS,
No. 25 ,July 2-8,19 9 9 ,p . 2.
74 . Nick C ook,“W ar ofE xtrem es ,” Jane’s D efence W eekly ,V ol. 32,
No. 1,July 7,19 9 9 .
75 . Sokut andK edrov .
76 . M ark H ew is h , “W aging W ar w ith W eath er,” International
D efens eRev iew ,V ol. 32,No. 12,D ecem ber 1,19 9 9 .
77. Nick C ook,“W ar ofE xtrem es .”
78. K enneth W . A llen, G lenn K rum el, and Jonath an D . Pollack,
C h ina’s A ir F orceE nters th e21s t C entury ,Santa M onica: RA N D ,19 9 5 ,
p . 130. E xam p les offly ing h ours are as follow s : C h ina’s A ir Force,No. 2,
19 9 3,p . 4 3,identifies a PL A A F regim ent com m ander w h o enteredth e
m ilitary in D ecem ber 19 70 andh adflow n 16 00 h ours , equating to an
av erage of123 h ours p er y ear. C h ina’s A ir Force, N o. 6 , 2000, p . 31,
identifiedfour y oung p ilots in th eN anjing MR w h o av eraged15 0 h ours
p er y ear in th e new F -7-3 (identifiedas th e 29 th air div is ion by Rick
K am er). Tw o p ilots w ere s quadron com m anders andtw o w ere deputy
group com m anders . C h ina’s A ir Force, N o. 5 , 19 9 3, p . 5 3, identified a
s econd-grade deputy group com m ander p ilot in th e C h engdu MR w h o
joinedth e PL A A F in 19 82andh adflow n 9 00 h ours ,for an av erage of80
h ours p er y ear.
79 . Robert S. D udney ,“F ifteen in a Row ,” A ir Force M agazine,N o.
25 ,A p ril19 9 9 . Unfortunately ,figures arenot readily av ailablefor oth er
A s ian air forces .
80. C h ina’s A ir Force,No. 4 ,19 9 4 ,p p . 30-31. Rick K am er identified
th e unit bas edon a p h oto ofone ofth e unit’s aircraft.
303
81. A ir Force D ictionary , p p . 276 -277. Th e PL A A F us es th e term
ch angcito rate th elogis tics s up p ort for fly ing— excellent,good,andbad.
A ccording to an interv iew w ith a PL A official,th e term is als o us ed to
des cribe th e num ber offly ing day s or m is s ions p er y ear, bas edon tw o
“fly ing day s ” p er 24 -h our p eriod— one day tim e andone nigh ttim e. Th e
19 9 2-2is s ueofC h ina’s A ir Force,p . 4 8,p rov ides anoth er exam p leofth e
us e ofch angci,th e A ugus t 1s t A erobatics Team ,w h ich is th e PL A A F’s
“Th underbird” equiv alent, conducted 180 ch angci (dem ons trations )
from 19 6 2-19 9 2for 5 8 countries and14 9 delegations . Th is equates to s ix
dem on s trations p er y ear.
82. M o Qiang,L iang W eitong,andZh ang L ianfu,“L eizh ou B andao
Sh angde Youliao B ing” [L eizh ou Penins ula fuel troop s ], C h ina’s A ir
F orce, 19 9 5 -5 , p . 32. Th e unit identification w as m ade bas ed on
inform ation from Rick Kam er from ph otos in C h ina’s A ir Force,19 9 3-3,
p . 24 . Th e 2nd A ir D iv is ion began receiv ing th e PL A A F ’s s econd
regim ent ofSu-27s in 19 9 6 . Th e 3rdA ir D iv is ion at W uh u receiv edth e
firs t regim ent in 19 9 2.
83. Ram es h V . Ph adke, “Peop le’s L iberation A rm y A ir Force
(PL A A F ): Sh ifting A ir Pow er B alance andC h allenges to India,” p ap er
w ritten for th e C enter for International Security and C ooperation,
StanfordUniv ersity ,Sep tem ber 2001.
84 . A B -6 bom ber m us th av eits airfram eov erh auledafter 800 fly ing
h ours . PL A A F A eronautical E ngineering D ep artm ent, H angkong
W eixiu [
A v iation M aintenance],No. 10,19 88.
85 . “C h inese E xercis e Strait 9 6 1: M arch 8-25 , 19 9 6 ,” briefing
p resentedby th e U.S. OfficeofNav alIntelligenceataconferenceon th e
PRC ’s m ilitary m odernization s p onsoredby th e A lexis de Tocquev ille
In s titute,M arch 11,19 9 7.
86 . L o Ping,“It C os ts C h ina 3 B illion Yuan to M ake a Sh ow ofIts
M ilitary Strength ,” C h eng M ing, H ong K ong, A p ril 15 , 19 9 6 . Stev en
M ufs on , “C h in a M as s es Troop s O n C oas t Near Taiw an,” Th e
W ash ington Post,F ebruary 14 ,19 9 6 .
87. State D ep artm ent B riefing w ith Jam es Rubin, F ederal
Inform ation Sy stem s C orp oration, F ederal N ew s Serv ice, A ugus t 3,
19 9 9 .
88. V ictor L ai,“PRC Jets Tw ice C ros s Taiw an Strait C enter L ine,”
C entral N ew s A gency ,A ugus t 10,19 9 9 . A ccording to th is rep ort,about
34 0 international fligh ts and730 dom es ticfligh ts fly ov er th e Taiw an
Strait ev ery day .
304
89 . Sun M aoqing, “PL A C om m ander on M odernizing A ir Force,”
B eijing L iaow ang,F B IS-C H I,A p ril 14 ,19 9 7. Th e PL A A F ’s definition of
fly ing in “w eath er condition s ”is div idedinto “th reew eath er conditions”
(i.e.,day andnigh t v is ual fligh t rules [V F R],andday instrum ent fligh t
rules [IF R]),and“all-w eath er”or “four w eath er conditions ” w h ich adds
nigh t IF R fligh ts . A lth ough th is p articular reference does n ot m ean
being able to fly in p oor w eath er conditions,s om ereferenceto fly ing in
w eath er conditions does m ean exactly th at. Th e exact m eaning is
us ually clear.
9 0. C h ina’s A ir Force,19 9 9 -6 ,p . 15 .
9 1. H uang Xing andZuo Quandian,“H olding th e Initiativ e in Our
H ands in C on ducting Op eration s , G iv ing Full Play to O ur Ow n
A dv antages To D efeat Our Enem y — A Study ofth e C ore Idea of th e
Op erational D octrine of th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y ”, Zh ongguo
Juns h iK exue[C h ina M ilitary Science]in C h ines e,No 4 ,Nov em ber 20,
19 9 6 , p p . 4 9 -5 6 . Senior C olonel H uang Xing andSenior C olonel Zuo
Quandian are res earch fellow s ofth eA cadem y ofM ilitary Science.
9 2. L iu Xuejun andZh ang C h angliu,“Study ofM eas ures To C ounter
Unm annedA erial V eh icles ,” G uoji H angkong [F ligh t International],
M arch 1,19 9 6 .
9 3. Xu Xiangdong, G u G ang, and Yang Jun: “M obilize L ocal
In form ation W arfare Res ources to Particip ate in A n ti- A ir Raid
C om bat,” B eijing G uofang,D ecem ber 15 ,2000,p p . 7-8.
9 4 . C h engdu M ilitary Region C am paign Training Office,Jituanjun
Yezh an Zh endi F angyu Zh any i K ongjun de Yuny ong [A ir Force
Utilization D uring th e C am p aign to D efend G roup A rm y F ield
Positions],F ebruary 19 82.
9 5 . L ogistics Support for M obile O p erations,p p . 19 4 -19 5 .
9 6 . “Th eA v iation Unit Under th e A ir F orce ofth e N anjing M ilitary
Region Takes a New Step F orw ardin Tactical Training,” L iberation
A rm y D aily Internet V ersion,October 8,2000.
9 7. L ogistics Support for M obile O p erations,p p . 19 4 -19 5 .
9 8. “A ir F orce Op ens 71 A irp orts for C iv ilian Fligh ts ,” Xinh ua,
January 18,19 9 6
9 9 . Oliv er C h ou, “A ir F orce B uilding Projects Take Off in Pas t 5
Years ,” South C h ina M orning Post,A p ril 17 19 9 9 .
305
100. H angkong Zh ish i[A eros p aceK now ledge],Nov em ber 19 89 ,p . 3.
101. C h ina’s A ir Force,19 9 9 -6 ,p . 20. Rick K am er h elp edidentify th e
unit as th e 1s t A ir D iv is ion.
102. L ogistics Sup p ort for M obileO p erations ,p p . 229 -230.
103. W ang Jiny uan andJin Zh ifu,“A C ertain Jinan A ir ForceUnit
F ocus es on New ‘Th reeA ttacks andTh ree D efen s es ’to E xp loreW artim e
E m ergency Sup p ort— W arp lan es D o TO L ’s on E xp res s w ay s ,”
L iberation A rm y D aily ,M ay 8,2000.
104 . L iberation Arm y D aily ,M ay 15 ,19 9 7.
105 . Ibid.,Sep tem ber 26 ,19 9 9 .
106 . G uangm ing D aily ,N ov em ber 22,2000.
107. Interv iew w ith Joh n Frankenstein,Res earch A s s ociate,E as t
A s ia Institute,C olum bia Univ ers ity .
108. A F SC Pub1,Th eJointStaffOfficer’s G uide,19 9 7,G ov ernm ent
Printing Office,C h ap ter 6 .
109 . No aircraft w ere us edduring th e 19 6 2 border conflict w ith
India or 19 6 9 w ith th e Sov iet Union.
110. “A ir regim ent h olds trans regional nigh t m aneuv er,” A ir Force
N ew s ,Nov em ber 23,2000.
111. L ogistics Sup p ort for M obileO p erations ,p p . 189 -19 0.
112. Zh ao B o, “Sev en D ay s andNigh ts ofE xercises in th e South
C h ina Sea: Rev elations as G uangzh ou M ilitary Region A ir F orce
M ilitary Tran s p ortation Sy s tem C onducts a C om p reh ens iv e Sup p ort
E xercis e under M odern C ondition s ,” L iberation A rm y D aily ,A ugus t 5 ,
2001,(Internet V ers ion).
306
A B OUT TH E C ONTRIB UTORS
K E N N E TH W . A L L E N is a Res earch A naly s t at th e C N A
C orp oration’s C enter for Strategic Studies . Prev ious ly , h e
w as a Senior A n aly s t at TA SC , Senior A s s ociate at th e
H enry L . Stim s on C enter,E xecutiv e V ice Pres ident ofth e
US-Taiw an B us ines s C ouncil, ands erv ed 21 y ears in th e
U.S. A ir F orce, including as s ignm ents in Taiw an, B erlin,
Jap an, H eadquarters Pacific A ir F orces , C h ina, and th e
D efense IntelligenceA gency . H eh as w ritten extensiv ely on
C h ina’s airp ow er. H e receiv eda B .A . from th eUniv ers ity of
C alifornia at D av is ,a B .A . from th eUniv ers ity ofM ary land
in A s ian Studies , andan M .A . from B os ton Univ ers ity in
International Relations .
A N A TOL Y V . B O L YA TK O joinedth e F ar E as tern Studies
Institute in 19 9 2 andis D irector ofth e C enter for A s ian
PacificStudies at th e Rus s ian A cadem y ofSciences . H eis a
Profes s or of International A ffairs , D octor of Sciences
(m ilitary ) and A cadem ician at th e Rus s ian A cadem y of
M ilitary Sciences . RetiredSov iet M ajor G eneral B oly atko
als o s erv ed as D ep uty C h ief of th e Treaty and L aw
D irectorate ofth e Sov iet G eneral Staffandth e h eadofth e
M ilitary D elegation during th e negotiations th at ledto th e
con clus ion of th e Sov iet- A m erican A greem en t on
Prev ention ofD angerous M ilitary A ctiv ities (19 89 ). L ater,
as h eadof tw o Sov iet m ilitary delegations , h e dev elop ed
s im ilar agreem ents w ith C anada andG reece. H e als o took
p art in th ecreation ofth eSTA RT-1 andC F E Treaties . A fter
a long anddis tinguis h edcareer in th e Sov iet m ilitary , h e
retiredin 19 9 2. H is m os t recent p ublications include Th e
N egotiations on th e Prev ention of D angerous M ilitary
A ctiv ities (19 9 1)andarticles on p roblem s ofinternational
s ecurity in academ icjournals . In 19 9 6 h is m onograp h titled
On Regulating M ilitary A ctiv ities w as p ublis h edin M os cow .
D A V ID M . F IN K E L STE IN is th e D irector of“Project A s ia”
at th eC N A C orp oration’s C enter for StrategicStudies . H eis
307
a retiredU.S. A rm y F oreign A rea Officer for C h ina w ith
exten s iv e joint p olitical-m ilitary as s ignm en ts at th e
national lev el. A m ong th es e as s ignm ents ,h e s erv edas th e
D irector of A s ian Studies , Joint C h iefs of Staff, J-8 and
A s s is tant D efenseIntelligenceOfficer for E as t A s ia andth e
Pacific. A long-tim e s tudent ofC h ines e s ecurity affairs ,D r.
F inkels tein h olds an M .A . and Ph .D . in C h ines e h is tory
from Prin ceton Univ ers ity an d s tudied th e C h in es e
language at NankaiUniv ers ity in Tianjin. D r. F inkels tein
h as w ritten m any articles on C h ines e s ecurity is s ues and
th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y . H is 19 9 3book-length s tudy ,
W as h in gton’s Taiw an D ilem m a, 19 4 9 - 1 9 5 0: F rom
A bandonm ent to Salv ation, w as h ailed in a Pres idential
Studies Quarterly rev iew as “blazing a new trail” ands h ould
“take an im p ortant p lace in th e literature ofU.S. C h ines e
relations in th e m id-20th century .”
H ID E A K I K A N E D A retiredfrom th e Jap an M aritim e Self
D efense F orcew ith th e rank ofV ice A dm iralin 19 9 9 . H eis
currently a Senior Res earch A dv is or for National Security ,
M its ubis h i Res earch In s titute, Inc. H e als o s erv es as
Sp ecial Res earch A dv is or for th e Okazaki Institute anda
m em ber of th e Policy Prop os al C om m ittee for th e Jap an
F orum for StrategicStudy . D uring th e2001-2002academ ic
y ear h e w as a Senior F ellow at th e A s ia C enter andJ. F .
K ennedy Sch ool ofG ov ernm ent,H arv ardUniv ers ity . H eis
th e auth or ofa num ber ofbooks andarticles about s ecurity ,
including “International C onsensus in National D efense of
Jap an,” W orld and Jap an, Toky o, Sep . 2000, “C h anging
Situation ofC h ina’s andJap an’s N ational Security ,” W orld
and Jap an, Toky o, Sep . 2001, “Prop os al for M aritim e
C oalition in E as t A s ia andW es t Pacific Region,” IM D E X,
G erm any ,N ov . 2000,“ Introduction to B M D ,” Th eOkazaki
Institute,Toky o,N ov . 2000,and” Role ofJM SD F in Peace
Tim e,” Securitarian, Toky o, A ug. 2001. A dm iral K aneda
graduatedfrom th eN ational D efenseA cadem y in 19 6 8,th e
M aritim e W ar C ollege in 19 83, andth e U.S. Nav al W ar
C ollege in 19 88.
308
TA E H O K IM is a s enior C h ina analy s t at th e K orea
Institute for D efense A n aly s es (K ID A ),Seoul,K orea,anda
nonres idential res earch as s ociate ofth e M ers h on C enter,
Oh io State Univ ers ity . H e is als o a co-editor of th e
SSC I-lis tedTh e K orean Journal of D efense A naly s is. D r.
K im is th e auth or andco-auth or ofov er ten books , p olicy
rep orts , an d m on ograp h s , in cludin g C h in a’s A rm s
A cquis itions from A broad: A Ques t for “Sup erb andSecret
W eap ons ” (w ith D r. B ates G ill, Oxford Univ ers ity Pres s ,
19 9 5 ), Th e D y nam ics of Sino-Rus s ian M ilitary Relations :
A n A s ian Pers p ectiv e (C A PS,19 9 4 ),andTh e ROK D efens e
Policy after th eROK -PRC N orm alization (K ID A ,19 9 3). H is
m os t recent E n glis h articles include “A Tes ting G roundfor
C h ina’s Pow er, Pros p erity an d Preferen ces : C h in a’s
Pos t-C old W ar Relation s w ith th e K orean Penins ula”
(forth com ing in 2001),“Sino-ROK Relations andth eFuture
of A s ian Security : A D ev elop ing C on tin ental Pow er
B alance?” (2000),“StrategicRelation s B etw een B eijing and
Py ongy ang” (19 9 9 ), “K orean Pers p ectiv es on PL A
M odern ization an d th e F uture E as t A s ian Security
E n v ironm ent” (19 9 8),“A Reality C h eck: Th e ‘Ris e ofC h ina’
andIts M ilitary C ap ability tow ard2010” (19 9 8), “K orean
V iew s on Taiw an-PRC Relations and th e Jap an Factor”
(19 9 7), and“C h ina andV irtual Nuclear A rs enals ” (19 9 7).
H is res earch in teres ts are Sin o-Rus s ian m ilitary
coop eration, C h ines e arm s acquis itions , and C h ina’s
relation s w ith N orth eas t A s ian coun tries , in cluding
Sino-North K orean relations.
JA M E S R. L IL L E Y w as born in C h ina, educatedat Yale
Univ ers ity ,ands erv edfor a num ber ofy ears in South eas t
A s ia. H e w as th e D irector of th e A m erican Ins titute in
Taiw an from 19 82-84 ,th e U.S. A m bas s ador to th e Peop le’s
Rep ublicofC h ina from 19 89 -9 1 andto th eRepublicofK orea
from 19 86 -89 . H e s erv edas A s s is tant Secretary ofD efense
for International Security A ffairs from 19 9 1-9 3 and is
p res ently Senior F ellow at th e A m erican E nterp ris e
Institute. A m bas s ador L illey is th e co-editor of B ey ond
M F N : Tradew ith C h ina andA m erican Interes ts (A E IPres s ,
309
19 9 4 ),C ris is in th e Taiw an Strait (ND U Pres s ,19 9 7),and
C h ina’s M ilitary F aces th e Future (M .E . Sh arp , 19 9 9 ). H e
h as w ritten extensiv ely on A s ian is s ues .
E RIC A . M C V A D ON,retiredU.S. Nav y Rear A dm iral,is a
s enior consultant on E as t A s ian security affairs for A reté
A s s ociates , th e C enter for N av al A n aly s es , and s ev eral
oth er organizations,andD irector ofA s ia-PacificStudies for
N ational Security Planning A s s ociates ,a s ubs idiary ofth e
Institute for F oreign Policy A naly s is . H e w as defense and
nav al attach é at th e U.S. E m bas s y in B eijing,19 9 0-9 2. H is
N av y career in clu ded exten s iv e exp erien ce in
airantis ubm arine w arfare and p olitico-m ilitary affairs ,
including s erv ice as th e N A TO and U.S. Sub-Unified
C om m ander in Iceland,19 86 -89 . H is recent undertakings
in clude w ork on th e Peop le’s L iberation A rm y , th e
C h ina-Taiw an p roblem ,C h ines e attitudes tow ardregional
s ecurity , an d div ers e is s ues in v olv in g th e K orean
Peninsula. H e w rites ands p eaks w idely in North A m erica
andE as t A s ia on security anddefens e m atters . A dm iral
M cV adon’s p ublicly av ailablew ritings include an article on
C h ina andth e PL A in th e A utum n 19 9 6 N av al W ar C ollege
Rev iew an d ch ap ters in th e 19 9 7 N ational D efen s e
Univ ers ity book entitled C ris is in th e Taiw an Strait
(publis h edin E nglis h andC h ines ein th e19 9 9 RA N D book,
Th ePeop le’s L iberation A rm y in th eInform ation A ge,andin
th e 19 9 9 A E I-M.E. Sh arp e, Inc ., book, C h ina’s M ilitary
F aces th eFuture).
SUSA N M . PUSK A is a colonel in th e UnitedStates A rm y
OrdnanceC orp s . Sh e h as s erv edas th e U.S. A rm y A ttach é,
B eijing, Peop le’s Rep ublic of C h ina (PRC ) s ince January
2001. D uring 19 9 6 -19 9 9 , s h e s erv edas a C h ina p oliticalm ilitary officer in th e Office ofth eD ep uty Under Secretary
of th e A rm y , International A ffairs . In 19 9 2-9 4 , s h e w as
as s ignedas an A s s is tant A rm y A ttach éin B eijing,PRC . Sh e
is a graduate of th e U.S. A rm y W ar C ollege, and th e
Univ ers ity ofM ich igan,w h ere s h e w as aw ardedan M .A . in
19 88. H er p ublications include Peop les ’ L iberation A rm y
A fter Next (editor,2000),andN ew C entury ,Old Th inking:
310
Th eD angers ofth ePercep tual G ap in U.S.-C h ina Relations
(19 9 8), both p ublis h ed by th e Strategic Studies Ins titute,
U.S. A rm y W ar C ollege.
A N D RE W SC O B E L L joinedth eStrategicStudies Institute
(SSI)in A ugus t 19 9 9 andis SSI’s s p ecialis t on A s ia. Prior to
th is h etaugh t at th e Univ ers ity ofL ouis v ille,K entucky ,and
Rutgers Univ ers ity ,N ew Jers ey . Since19 88 D r. Scobellh as
p ublis h edarticles in s uch journals as A rm ed F orces and
Society , A s ian Surv ey , C h ina Quarterly , C om p arativ e
Politics , C urrent H is tory , andPolitical Science Quarterly .
Recen t articles an d m on ograp h s h av e focus ed on
C h ina-Taiw an relations, C h ina’s m ilitary m odernization,
and C h ines e s trategic culture. H is book C h ina’s Use of
M ilitary F orce: B ey ondth eG reat W all andth eL ong M arch
w illbep ublis h edby C am bridge Univ ers ity Press next y ear.
D r. Scobell earned a Ph .D . in Political Science from
C olum bia Univ ers ity .
M A RK A . STOK E S is C ountry D irector for th e Peop le’s
Rep ublicofC h ina (PRC )andTaiw an w ith in th eOfficeofth e
Secretary of D efen s e, In tern ation al Security A ffairs
(OSD /ISA ). H e is th e auth or of C h in a’s S trategic
M odernization: Im p lications for th eUnitedStates p ublis h ed
by th e U.S. A rm y W ar C ollege,StrategicStudies Ins titute,
in 19 9 9 . L ieutenant C olonel Stokes h as s erv edas a s ignal
intelligence and electronic com bat s up p ort officer in th e
Ph ilip p ines andW es t B erlin. H e s erv edas an as s is tant air
attach é at th e U.S. D efense A ttach é Officein B eijing,PRC ,
from 19 9 2-9 5 . B efore h is as s ignm ent to OSD /ISA , h e w as
th e A s ia-Pacificregional p lanner w ith in th e H eadquarters
U.S. A ir F orce Op erations and Plans D irectorate from
19 9 5 -9 7. H e h olds graduate degrees in International
Relations andA s ian Studies from B os ton Univ ers ity and
th e N av al Pos tgraduate Sch ool. H e receiv ed h is form al
C h ines e M andarin language training from th e D efense
L anguage In s titute in M onterey , C alifornia, and th e
D ip lom aticL anguage Serv ices in Ros s ly n,V irginia.
311
L A RRY M . W ORTZE L is D irector ofth eA s ian Studies ofth e
H eritage F oundation and a m em ber of th e U.S.-C h ina
Security Rev iew C om m is s ion. H eretiredin Nov em ber 19 9 9
as a colonel in th e U.S. A rm y after 32 y ears of m ilitary
s erv ice. D uring h is m ilitary career, h e s erv edin infantry
and intelligence p os itions in M orocco, K orea, Th ailand,
Singap ore,andC h ina. D r. W ortzel als o s erv edin th e Office
ofth e Secretary ofD efense,th eU.S. PacificC om m and,and
on th e D ep artm ent of th e A rm y s taff. H is las t p os ition
before retiring w as as D irector of th e Strategic Studies
Institute at th e U.S. A rm y W ar C ollege. D r. W ortzel is th e
auth or of tw o books on C h in a an d h as edited an d
contributed to tw o oth er books as w ell as m any journal
articles andm onograp h s . D r. W ortzel earneda B .A . from
C olum bus C ollege, G eorgia, and an M.A. and Ph .D . in
Political Science at th e Univ ers ity ofH aw aii.
312
U.S. A R M Y W A R C O L L E G E
M ajor G eneral Robert R. Iv any
C om m andant
*****
STRA TE G IC STUD IE S INSTITUTE
D irector
Profes s or D ouglas C . L ov elace,Jr.
D irector ofRes earch
D r. Stev en M etz
E ditors
D r. A n drew Scobell
D r. L arry M . W ortzel
D irector ofPublications
M s . M arianne P. C ow ling
Publications Assis tant
M s . Rita A . Rum m el
*****
C om p os ition
M s . K im berly A . Rockw ell