The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account
Transcription
The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account
The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account Author(s): Javier Auyero Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2000), pp. 55-81 Published by: The Latin American Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692042 . Accessed: 04/03/2011 23:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=lamer. . 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The Latin American Studies Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Latin American Research Review. http://www.jstor.org THE LOGIC OF CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA: An Ethnographic Account* Javier Auyero StateUniversity ofNew York,StonyBrook in a shantytown in theoutskirts Basedonethnographic of Abstract: fieldwork studies theworkings clientelism" Buenos thisarticle Aires, ofPeronist "political thewebofrelations thatsomeslum-dwellers amongtheurbanpoor.Itanalyzes toobtainmedicine, to withlocalpolitical brokers establish food,andsolutions themainfunctions Thearticlealso explores ofthe othereveryday concerns. which areresource control andinformation hoard"problem-solving networks," toan underexplored oftheoperaing,andpaysparticular attention dimension tionofclientelism: clients' ownviewsonthenetwork. Thirty-four-year old Normalivesina sluminthecityofCospito,in theConurbanoBonaerense.1 Shehasno stablejob,andherhusbandhasrelosthisas a construction worker. cently Theyhavea handicappedbabygirl and a teenageboy who droppedout of the neighborhood publichigh school.In September storein thefront partof 1996,theyopeneda grocery theirhouse.Normatoldme in ourinterview, "Youknow,thingswerenot office working verywell,so I decidedtoopenan unidadbasica(a grassroots of thePeronistparty)and see whathappens!"Theirdecisioncoincided withtheascendingcareerofGustavoPedele,a Peronist councilman trying tomakeinroadsintotheslumtolaunchhis1998mayoralcampaign.Pedele *Thisresearch was fundedby a grantfromtheJoint Committee on LatinAmericanand CaribbeanStudiesof theSocial ScienceResearchCounciland theAmericanCouncilof LearnedSocieties withfundsprovidedbytheFordFoundation. I wouldliketothankCharles Tilly, DeborahPoole,RobertGay,and SteveLevitsky fortheircritical comments on earlier versions. Draftswerepresented attheColloquiumonArgentine PoliticalCultureattheUniversity ofIllinois,Urbana,and theSeminario Generalat theCasa de AltosEstudiosand the inArgentina. Fundaci6n BancoPatricios I wouldliketothankTulioHalperin, JoseNun,and theparticipants in thoseforums fortheirinsightful criticisms and encouragement. Partsof and Culthisessay were adapted frommyforthcoming book, ThePoliticsofSurvival:Networks tureamongtheArgentine UrbanPoor(to be published by Duke UniversityPress). 1.TheConurbano is theareacomprising thenineteen intheArgentine Bonaerense districts industrial heartland surrounding theFederalCapitalofthecountry. Namesoflocations and personshavebeenchangedtoensureanonymity. LatinAmerican Research Reviewvolume35 number3 ? 2000 55 LatinAmericanResearchReview nowpaysNorma'sutility billsandprovidesherfamily withsmallamounts ofcash.Normais nowPedele'sbroker(hispuntera) and Pedeleis Norma's politicalpatron(herreferente). Everyweek,Norma'sunidad basica (UB) distributes powdered milkfrom thePrograma Materno-Infantil (a nutritional fundedby program thenationalwelfare andfoodfromthelocalmunicipality tomore ministry) thanfifty slum-dwellers. Normaexplained,"Everymonth,at theparty meetings, themayorinforms us [thebrokers ofthe140UBswhousuallyattendthemeeting] ofthedatewhentheyaregoingto giveoutfoodat the BecauseNormais "juststarting municipality...We telltheneighbors." withthispartything,"heraccessto stateresourcesis forthetimebeing restricted. ButNormaadmitted thatshe "compensates" forthislimitedaccess suchas organizing shorttripsfortheslum-dwellers "withotherthings," and otherrecreational activities. CouncilmanPedeleprovidesherwitha bus ortwoandwithbreadandmeatsausages.Oncea month, shetakesapchildrenfromtheslumto a nearbybeachresortor a proximately thirty park."Theyarereallyhappy,"shetoldme.I replied,"Theysurelyare,but isn'tita lotofwork,to getthebusesand thefoodand to takecareofthe kids?"Normarespondedconfidently, "It'snotso difficult toobtaingoods. Youhavetoknowhowtopulltherightstrings, knockattherightdoor.The mostimportant thingis toknowtherightperson."Forthepresent, Norma knowstherightperson,andifCouncilman Pedeleadvancesinthelocalpoliticalfield,shewillsurelyobtainaccesstomoreresources. Ifsheis ableto "mobilizepeople"forherpoliticalpatron(mobilization meansattending Peronist ralliesand votingininternal shewillhavemoregoods elections), andmoreinformation. Whathappenedtoherawhilebackwouldnotoccur again:"Youknow.. ., I missedthePlanVida [fooddistribution program], butI havethePrograma Materno."2 2. ThePlanVida (LifePlan)was inspiredbytheChileanPlan de Alimentaci6n Complementaria and thefunctioning oftheCubanComitesde Defensade la Revoluci6n. ThePlan Vidais thelargestfood-distribution program ofthe currently operatedbythegovernment Provincia de BuenosAires.As a petproject ofthegovernor's wife("Chiche"Duhalde),itwas inoneofthepoorestdistricts launchedfirst oftheConurbano inNovember Bonaerense 1994. According to official figures releasedin November1996,thePlanVidareachesthirty-eight in BuenosAiresthatcontain644poorneighborhoods districts and slums.The programis fundedbystateresources fromtheConsejoProvincial de la Familiay DesarrolloHumano, whichis presidedoverby"Chiche"Duhalde.Sheis alsothepresident oftheRamaFeminina (Women'sBranch)ofthePeronist party. ThePlanVidadistributes milk,cereal,and eggsto almosthalfa millionpreschool children andtopregnant women.Theyliveinneighborhoods thattheofficial "Mapa de la Pobreza"definedas areaswith"unmetbasicneeds."Thedaily distribution ofmilkandtheweeklydistribution ofcerealand eggsarecarriedoutby"block delegates,"who are known as manzaneras(blocks in Buenos Aires are called manzanas).The manzaneras receiveno monetary remuneration fortheirworkexcepta half-liter ofmilkper dayandtheweeklyallowanceofeggsandcerealsallottedtoallbeneficiaries oftheprogram. 56 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA ofPresDuringthesummerof1989,Normaattendedthelaunching campaigninMardel Plata,themainbeach identCarlosMenem'selectoral timethatNormasaw theocean: resortin BuenosAires.Thatwas thefirst party)paid forherbus (thePeronist "It'sso nice."ThePartidoJusticialista Union'shotelwhere,Normarelated, fare,and shestayedat theTransport "Jwe evenhad hotwater." poofPeronist Norma'sstoryis a typicalexampleoftheworkings mateofextreme In contexts Argentina. incontemporary liticalclientelism operatesas a destitution, la redperonista and sociocultural rialdeprivation reand symbolic a webofmaterial thatinstitutes network problem-solving a safety Itfunctions as a sourceofgoodsand services, sourcedistribution. life,one ofthefewremaining againsttherisksofeveryday netprotecting thatstandsin oppoand a solidaristic community pathsofsocialmobility, sitiontothehardship andexclusionvisitedonthoselivinginpooranddesand depends (monopolizes)information tituteareas.Thisnetconcentrates My goal in thisarticleis toprovidean toa greatextenton stateresources. netproblem-solving oftherelevanceofthePeronist description empirical in BuenosAiresand to analyzeits workwithinenclavesofurbanpoverty tensions, and resources. functions, forms, ofrehas been definedas 'the distribution "Politicalclientelism" holdersorpoliticalcandidatesin sources(orpromiseof)bypoliticaloffice not exclusively-in exchangeforpoliticalsupport,primarily-although hasbeena recurrent theformofthevote"(Gay1990,648).Suchclientelism thelinksbetweenthepoormassesand politicalelitesin themeinstudying LatinAmerica(De la Torre1992;Stein1980;MenendezCarrion1986)and institutions (O'Donnell1996a; ofdemocratic inanalyzingtheshortcomings has been and Puhle1996).Clientelism Diamandouros, Fox 1994;Gunther, betweenpoliticalpartiesand examinedas oneofthepossiblerelationships madebypopularororganizedpopulargroups,witha focuson theefforts ofpoliticalco-optation" mechanisms ganizedgroupsto"bypasstraditional (Cardoso1992,292; see also Escobar1994;Velez-Ibafiez1983).Political and fragmenclientelism has also beenexaminedas a formofatomization tationof the electorateor "thepopularsector"(Rock 1975;O'Donnell 1992).3 Specialistson LatinAmericaand studentsofpoliticalprocessesin imagesofa "captiveclientelist withthestereotypical arefamiliar Argentina has beendeelectorate" conveyedbythemassmedia.Thisphenomenon as in BeatrizGuido'swell-known by novelists, pictedwithmoresubtlety ofthe1930sinFindefiesta ofa politicalboss in theArgentina description or themorerecentobliqueportrayalofthelifeofa Mexicancacique in ina squatter settlement networks analysisofclientelist 3. Gerrit Burgwald'sethnographic resultin do notinevitably and atomization in Quito,Ecuador,showedthatfragmentation clientelism" (Burgwald1996). casesof"collective 57 Review Research LatinAmerican politicshave also been la vida.4Clientelist Arrancame AngelesMastretta's butoutlikeAlcidesGrecainthelittle-known byquasiinsiders, portrayed delComite'. Cuentos standing at the theactualoperationof clientelism Despitesuch attention, To date,underinArgentina. levelsremainslargelyunexplored grassroots based on politicalsubordiofthis"relationship standingoftheworkings rewards"(Fox1994,153)hasbeenderived nationinexchangeformaterial morefrompopularimagerythanfromseriousresearch.No strongevidenceexistsofa quidproquo exchange.Is itpossibletodetectempirically on clientelism porvotos"thatmuchoftheliterature theexchangeof"favores knowthatvotesand loyaltycome How do researchers takesforgranted? a soThecaseanalyzedhereis Peronism, as a resultofgoodsand services? thathasbeeninand outofstatepowerforthe cialand politicalmovement and has genyears,has beena majorpoliticalactorinArgentina, lastfifty amongpopulargroups.In thiscase, identities sociopolitical eratedresilient still.Can analystssingleoutan occasion thequestionis moreproblematic on whichclientsvotedfora givenpatronbecauseofthefavorsperformed byhimorher,and notbecauseoftheirgeneralloyaltyto oridentification withPeronism? a formof socialand political is undoubtedly Politicalclientelism (Fox1994;Bodeman1988;Mouzelis1985;Guasti1977)as wellas a control 1992;see also Scott1977). (Scheper-Hughes formofculturaldomination overtime, takesformand reproduces how clientelism Butto understand mechanisms. logicand itsintricate analystsmustexamineitssociocultural is to resistreA necessary firststepin a rigoroussociologyofclientelism the of exchangeof images and to the stigmatizing prefabricated sorting itsleastknown mustbe approachedthrough votesforfavors.Clientelism the side:theeverydaydealingsofpoliticalbrokers, and leastspectacular the problem-solving and clients, of so-called and perspectives practices and politicalpatrons. brokers, thatlinks"clients," network body tothegrowing Thelargeraimsofthisarticlearetocontribute 1994,1995; clientelism (Gay forms of political on contemporary ofresearch 1997;Fox 1994;Velez-Ibanfez Burgwald1996;Escobar1994,1997;Shefner poland clientelist of 1983)and toshedlighton theconvergence Peronism its in providing of this convergence itics.Theunidadesbasicasarethesites institutions these enough, support.Curiously mostcrucialorganizational Peroninmoststudiesofcontemporary ofpopularlifehavebeenneglected much ofthe that permeates view ofpoliticalaction ism.The constricting unthis overlooked hasconsistently ofpoliticsinArgentina understanding of most cited studies None the of and somehowhiddenrealm. spectacular refield haveconductedprimary Peronism(ormenemismo) contemporary caciques,andothermanifestations ofbrokers, representations 4.Fora reviewoftheliterary see Nason(1973). literature, ofbossisminLatinAmerican 58 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA theplaceswherepoor searchintheareasofhighestsupportforPeronism, bythetoppeoplelive.5As a result, mostofthestudiesarestilldominated to down view thatpermeatedmuchof the researchon the transitions orientation ofcurrent politicalstuddemocracy.6 Giventhestate-centered itis no surprise thateveryday forms of iesbeingdoneon andinArgentina, overlooked.Thisarticleconsticlientelist problemsolvingare habitually tutesa first attempt toredressthisone-sidedperspective. thisarticlecenterson therelaBased on ethnographic fieldwork, in Villa partyand slum-dwellers tionshipbetweenbrokers ofthePeronist Paraiso.The slumis locatedin thecityofCospito,in thesouthern partof the ConurbanoBonaerensebordering theFederalCapitalof Argentina. VillaParaisois one oftheoldestand largestslumsin BuenosAires,with tothelastpopulationcensus somefifteen thousandinhabitants according (INDEC 1993a).The articledrawson materialsgatheredduringa yearof in theslum,in theunidadesbasicasthere,and in theSecretaria fieldwork thefocuscenters ofCospito.Although de AccionSocialofthemunicipality thatthevalidityofthe inoneslum,I am confident on fivepoliticalbrokers Recentresearchundertaken by analysesextendsbeyondthemonograph. thefindings here. otherscholars(Levitsky reported 1996,1997)confirms Fieldworkwas carriedout fromDecember1995to February1996 observation andfrom 1997.Itwas basedonparticipant July1996toJanuary inVillaParaiso.I participated inmanyralliesofthePeronist attended party, localbrokers, and interviewed partyactivists, publicoffipartymeetings, I conducted activists. morethanforty andcommunity cials,socialworkers, lifestoriesfromresidentsof Villa in-depthinterviews, collectedfifteen randomsampleofthree Paraiso,and tooka surveybased on a stratified hundredcases.Thesurvey, interviews, and lifestoriesfocusedon various I interviewed aspectsofindividualand collective problemsolving.Finally, food-distribution all theblockdelegatesof thelargeststate-funded proin VillaParaiso,thePlanVida.Thisarticlealso drawson gramoperating Nadata providedbytheInstituto secondaryresourcessuchas statistical cionalde Estadisticas y Censo(INDEC) andmyreadinga year'sissues(for themainlocalnewspaperofthesouthoftheConurbano 1996)ofLa Union, Bonaerense. 5. See, forexample,Bor6net al. (1995),Palermoand Novaro(1996),and Sidicaroand see Martuccelli view,see Munck(1997).Foran exception, Mayer(1995).Fora sympathetic hasincreased duringthe1990s,according "electoral volatility" andSvampa(1997).Although on theanti-Peronist sideof has occurred almostexclusively to Levitsky, "such'de-freezing' electorate, bothintermsofitssizeand cleavage.... [T]hePeronist thePeronist-anti-Peronist oftheArgenstable"(Levitsky 1997,4). A majority relatively itscomposition, has remained tinepoorcontinue tovotePeronist. have givenlittle noted,manyofthetheoriesofdemocratization 6. As Tillyperceptively maneuvers instead"instrumental place to popularcollectiveactionand have accentuated andbargainsamongelites"(1994,4). 59 LatinAmericanResearchReview toassesstheexclusion indicators First, I willprovidea fewempirical of VillaParaisoand describethe and hardshipfacedby theinhabitants ofsurvivalandpolitical networks overlapofinformal processofincreasing netproblem-solving intheslum.ThenI willanalyzethePeronist networks establishwith thatsomeneighbors workin theslum,theweb ofrelations local politicalbrokersto obtainfood,medicine,and solutionsto other concerns. everyday of thetwomainfunctions The secondpartofthearticleillustrates networkin VillaParaiso:resourcecontroland infortheproblem-solving a network havehelpedmakethePeronist Bothpractices mationhoarding. Thethirdpartofthearticlefocusesontheclients'pernetwork. domination in elements research central and outlinesforfuture ceptionsofthenetwork ofclientelism. ofthelegitimacy construction theeveryday willpresent thereader Thisanalysisofthesociallogicofclientelism witha paradox.7At a timewhenpublicdiscourseis dominatedby neoofthestatefrommarkets, thatstressesthesalutaryretreat liberalrhetoric one ofthewaysin whichpolitics(and personal myarticlewill illustrate In fact,a forgainingaccessto resources. important ties)are increasingly canbe madeoutofthisparadox:clientelist argument strongfunctionalist thatthe thefunctions becausetheyfulfill precisely networks areimportant stateis abandoning.8 SURVIVING IN THE SLUM: HYPER-UNEMPLOYMENT andmisery, joblessness persistent material deprivation, Widespread neighborhoods economicpressurein the working-class and unmerciful the offactors: havebeencausedbya combination and slumsofArgentina blue-collar of the casualization economy; of the wage-labor languishing 1996;CEB 1995;Lozanoand Feletti1996;Murjobs (Cieza and Beyreuther commisand Feldman1996;Beccariaand Lopez 1996);and theparticular structural adjustby state provoked neglect and binationofmalign benign and mentpolicies(Golbert1996;Lo Vuoloand Barbeito1993;Cetrangolo unWidespread 1997). Golbert1995;PrevotSchapira1996;Lloyd-Sherlock of Villa Paraiso. characteristic defining is themostsignificant employment unemactivepopulationare currently Sixtypercentof its economically and basic needs, about 50percent haveunmet ployedandunderemployed, line.9 poverty 70percent haveincomesbelowtheofficial LARRreviewer. ofoneanonymous inthecomments 7. Thisparadoxwas highlighted analysisofU.S. political in hispathbreaking 8. RobertMertonmadethesameargument machines(Merton1949). ranmysurveybasedona stratified INDEC (1993a,1993b)andfrom 9.Thedatacomefrom and OctoberinVillaParaiso. domsample(threehundredcases),carriedoutinSeptember 60 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA howdo neighbors deproletarianization,10 ofoutright In thiscontext managetoobtain withlittleorno incomeand no pensionorotherbenefits or Arethereanyinstitutions foodand medicine? themeansofsubsistence: personswithintheslumtowhomtheycanturntoobtainhelp?WhatconWhohas contactsdo theyestablishtoobtainthesemeansofsubsistence? tactswithwhom? helpaboundin poor ofreciprocal It is hardlynewsthatnetworks LatinAmerica.Enzo Minand throughout in Argentina neighborhoods by which he means "the combinagione coined the termpopulareconomy, inandforlowmonetary fordirectsubsistence undertaken tionofactivities includeraising come"(Mingione1991,87).In VillaParaiso,theseactivities self-help repairsandbuildings, foodstalls,undertaking animals,operating chains.Familyand neighin subcontracting home-working and industrial "havealwaysmadeitpossibleforthesevariousactiviborhoodnetworks wayoflife"(Mingione tiesto coagulateintoa poorbutsociallyprotected 1991,87).LarissaLomnitzshowedin herstudyofa Mexicanshantytown as a surrogate andkinshipfunction basedonresidence thatsocialnetworks (1975, forindividualsurvivalamongtheresidents systemofsocialsecurity ofrecinetworks 1988).WhatFriedmanand Salguerocalled "proximate elements and kin"(1988,11)arethuswell-studied withneighbors procity thechallengeofsurvivaland how individualsconfront in understanding netthekindsof relationstheyestablishin theprocess.Thoseinformal examinedin LatinAmerica,oftenas the workshave been thoroughly developedby theurbanand ruralpoor sourceofthesurvivalstrategies havealso beenstud(Lomnitz1975,1988;Hintze1989).Politicalnetworks 1981;Burgwald1996; ied in LatinAmericaand all overtheworld(Conniff 1987;Katznelson1981;Knoke1990).ButthereKornblum 1974;Guterbock helpandpoliticalnetnetworks ofreciprocal betweeninformal lationships workshavebeenunderexplored. in theConurIn VillaParaisoand manyotherpoorneighborhoods innetworks ofsurvivaland politicalnetworks informal banoBonaerense, and stateoverlap.Theretheunidadesbasicas,politicalbrokers, creasingly inthe thatcirculate havebecomethesourcesofresources fundedprograms and inawayofpaid formal ofsurvival.Thewithering networks informal had losttheirjobsdurwork(mostofthosecurrently unemployed formal acintheConurbanoin 1995was 22.6oftheeconomically 10.Therateofunemployment amountedto33.8 andunderemployment tivepopulation(843,840 persons).Unemployment percentof thepopulation.In the 1990s,theConurbanoBonaerenselost 5,508industrial jobs(CEB 200,000 eliminated industry plants;andbetween1991and1995,themanufacturing and betweenunemployment 1995;Lozanoand Feletti1996).Due to thestrongcorrelation thisgrowth haveaccompanied andinequality andFeldman1993),poverty (Murmis poverty line"in ofthehouseholdslivedbelow'thepoverty In 1980,11.5percent inunemployment. GreaterBuenosAires.In 1994,20.4percentofthehouseholdswerebelowtheline,and in 1996). (Golbert 1995,25.8fellintothiscategory 61 LatinAmericanResearchReview ingtheprevioustwoyearsand had notbeen able to findnew ones) has drainedtheslumeconomy, causinginformal networks reciprocal tobleed to death.The formerly employed,once able to supporttheirrelatives, friends, orkinwhoweretemporarily jobless,arenowunemployed themselves.Slum-dwellers resorttothelocalstateorthenearestPeronist committeeorbroker(whichalmostamountsto thesamething)toobtainfood or medicine.In otherwords,VillaParaisosurvivalstrategies are increasinglyembeddedinpoliticalnetworks.11 Theexpandingrelevanceofpoliticalnetworks does notmeanthat ofreciprocal networks helphave disappeared,however.In VillaParaiso, theseproximate networks remaincentralin thesurvivalstrategies ofthe slum-dwellers. Twenty-three percentofthoseconsultedin a surveybased on a stratified randomsampleofthreehundredcasesmentioned theirrelativesas sourcesofhelpwhentheyneedmedicine. ofthose Thirty percent interviewed reliedon kinand friendswhenevertheyran shortof food. Thusreciprocal favorsaboundin theslumeconomy, muchas theydo in otherpoorneighborhoods acrosstheAmericas(Stack1974;Edinand Lein 1997;Lomnitz1975).Butwiththeescalationofunemployment and underand thegeneralized reduction ofincome,thesenetworks employment are beingprogressively Theavenuesthatformerly emptiedoftheirresources. linkedtheslumeconomytooutsidewageworkarenowdisrupted, andthe moneythatused to comeintotheslumas thelifebloodofthosereciprocal Whenrejection networks hasbecomea trickle. from thelabormarket ceases tobe temporary and incomereduction affects everyjob thattheunskilled residents ofVillaParaisocanobtain,12 thesocialeconomyoftheslumloses itstraditional function as a buffer thathelpscushiontheimpactsofeconomichardship. oftheslumpopulationreceivefoodforthemselves or Fortypercent theirchildren fromone ormorestate-funded assistanceprograms serving VillaParaiso.Theseprogramsdistribute milk,eggs,noodles,and cereals fromthePlanVida;powderedmilkfromtheProgramaMaterno-Infantil; noodles,cornoil,polenta,yerbamate,lentils,and thelikefromthePlan Asoma; and cheese,vegetables,noodles,cornoil, polenta,and several otherproductsfromthePlan Pro-Bienestar. In addition,someresidents 11.My usage ofpoliticalnetworks followsKnoke (1990) and Granovetter(1973): a set ofreg- ularcontacts orsimilarsocialconnections amongindividuals orgroupsinwhichatleastone ofthoseis a member ofa politicalpartyoran official ofthestate.Survivalstrategies arethus embeddedina politicalproblem-solving network becausetheyareexpressedintheinteractionsbetweenpartyagentsorlocalofficials and slum-dwellers. 12.Jobsindomestic serviceandtheconstruction sectorwerethepredominant occupations inthesesectors amongwomenandmenintheslum.Workers havebeenparticularly hurtby whatKessler(1996)called"theepidemicdisease"ofhyper-unemployment. Thesetwocate13.9percent goriesrepresent oftheemployedpopulation inBuenosAiresand 19.8oftheunemployed(Murmisand Feldman1996). 62 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA de Accion wheretwicea monththeSecretaria go tothemunicipal building, noodles, eightitemsoffoodperperson(sugar,rice,flour, Socialdistributes polenta,lentils,cornoil,and yerbamate).Nearlyhalfthepopulationof carriedoutin knowaboutthisfooddistribution VillaParaiso(46 percent) themunicipalbuilding.Thirtypercentof thosehave gone to obtainthe almosta third kilos"at leastonceduringthelastyear.Formedicine, 11nine Thosewhoare ofVillaParaisorelyonrelatives (31percent). oftheresidents relatedto employed(30 percent)relyon theirobrasocial(socialsecurity thelocalpublichealth job).Othersresortto themunicipality, theirformal or Peronist broker committee or a Peronistgrassroots center(28 percent), (11percent). of the in livingconditions Evidenceof thedramaticdeterioration bytheCatholicChurch. slumpopulationis theopeningofa soup kitchen and womennoweattheirlunchthereeveryweekNearlyninetychildren to note,however,thatthissoup kitchenis funded day.It is important wheremanylocal ofthemunicipality, mostlyby thewelfaredepartment of theCatholic Peronistbrokerswork.Caritas,the charityorganization Everymonth,Caritasassists its activities.13 Church,is also multiplying withfoodand clothes,and italso sellsdonated abouta hundredfamilies clothesat low prices.Mariano,thelocal priest,and Nora,thewomanin chargeofCaritas,agreedthatduringthepreviousyear,demandforfood "In Cariincreased.Marianocommented, and medicinehad substantially forlimitedperiodsoftime,let'ssayfor tas,we used tohelpsomefamilies inwhich situation threemonthsuntiltheywereabletoresolvethedifficult as whentheywerelaid off.Butnowwe don'tstop theyfoundthemselves, helpingthem,and thereare morepeople coming,and we are overwhelmed." AlthoughMarianoand Nora did notfullyacknowledgetheirintheyadmittedthattheirown recreasingdependenceon stateresources, BothconcededthattheCatholicChurchis notkeepsourcesaredecreasing. demandforaid, and theypointto thelocal ingpace withtheincreasing for (UBs)as thesourceofpossiblesolutions Peronist grassroots committees enduredbytheslum-dwellers. scarcity theextreme in theConurbano In VillaParaiso,as in manypoorneighborhoods thepoor'sbasic one ofthemostreliablemeansofsatisfying Bonaerense, thepoliticalpartythathas direct needsforfoodand healthcareis through accessto thestate'sresources-thePeronistparty.As Levitskyobserved, is linkedto at thebase level.... Peronism thisparty"is deeplyentrenched and soccer tradeunions,neighborhood associations, itsmassbase through tothediitsactivities According rapidly. 13.Atthenationallevel,Caritasis alsoenlarging has fedbyCaritasin itssoup kitchen RafaelRey,thenumberofchildren Monsenior rector, thousandin 1993to fourhundredthousandin 1996.See ClarinDigital,19 soaredfromfifty Nov.1996. 63 Review Research LatinAmerican clubs.The partyis also linkedto working-and lower-classsocietyby bosses,who serveas tiesto localand neighborhood meansofclientelistic and Peronistgovernments betweenthemunicipaland provincial brokers 1996,20). themassbase" (Levitsky andslums, squatter settlements, neighborhoods, Inpoverty-stricken a keyplacewherebasicneedscanbe met, theunidadesbasicasconstitute canbe solved.TheseUBsprovideincredible whichbasicproblems through 1998)and arethe forthePeronist party(Levitsky strength organizational brokers siteswherePeronist operate. BROKERS AND THEIR NETWORKS Villa Paraiso countsfivePeronistbrokers(knownas punteros): usuallydo favorssuch Matilde,Juan,Cholo,Andrea,and Norma.Brokers foodand medicinefortheirpotentialvotersand others.14 as distributing Theyare notalone in theirwork,however,becausetheyalmostalways ofhis A brokeris relatedtothemembers havean innercircleoffollowers. parentage, tiesoflong-lasting friendship, strong orherinnercirclethrough localleadBothMatildeandJuan(thetwomostpowerful orfictive kinship. network aroundthem,individualswith thiskindofeffective ers)maintain and intensely. regularly whomtheyinteract Matildehas a circleofmenand womenwhovisitheron a weekly Luciaused tobe Matilde'scleaning basis.Forexample,forty-five-year-old de andMatilde(thentheSecretaria lady.Twoyearsago,Luciahada stroke, AccionSocialofCospito),obtaineda pensionof110dollarsa monthforher. Lucia now receivesdaily medicineforher highblood pressurefrom Centro at theneighborhood's Matilde.She spendsalmosteveryafternoon in thefront Cultural(whereMatilde'sson Paco servesas thepresident), fromtheUB. ThereLuciamakespuppartofMatilde'shouse,a half-block sells or gives away on special occasions that the Cultural Center pets the slum. Adolfo (Matilde'shusbandandtheUnderthe children of among husband a jobat themunicipality. Lucia's ofPublicWorks)got Secretary witha sewingmafashion puppets Antonia Luciaand hercomadre ten chinebelonging tothePlanPais.Launchedalmost yearsago,thisstatein organization" community fundedprogramis intended"to strengthen of throughthesubsidizeddevelopment productive poorneighborhoods In Cospitothebrokers capturedpartofthefundsofthe micro-enterprises. thusacquiringan extrasourcefortheirinnercircles.Matildeobprogram, tainedoneofthesubsidiesand organizeda groupofwomentoworkwith (and for)herat theCulturalCenter.Lucia considersherselfa friendof figas centralarticulating existson theroleofbrokers 14.An extensive classicalliterature systems. See theseminalanalysesofEricWolf(1977),Sydel ofclientelist uresintheoperation (1977),andJohnDuncanPowell(1977). Silverman 64 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA Matilde:"Shealwayslendsyou a hand."Lucia has knownMatildesince Plan Vida. (blockdelegate)of thestate-funded 1984and is a manzanera Matildealso providesherwithfood. hastakenLucia'splaceas Matilde'scleaninglady.Sheis also Brigitte themedicineand whereshedistributes oftheCulturalCenter, thesecretary is also a Brigitte foodpackagesthatMatildebringsfromthemunicipality. a heart suffered recently manzaneraofthePlanVida.15Her grandmother expensivebut and Matildeprovidesherwithpartoftheextremely attack, toldmethatshehopedthatMatildewould mother Brigitte's vitalmedicine. Thehopeofa jobserves forherdaughter. soongeta jobatthemunicipality glue withintheinnercircle.Althoughnoteveryoneis emas important contract thefactthatsomeonegetsa fixed-term ployedatthemunicipality, Iftheothersinthe effect. demonstration ora part-time jobhasan important accordingto circleare diligentand "knowhow to wait" (saberesperar, a sooneror latertheywillbe rewardedwithposts.Alfonsina, Brigitte), memberofJuan'sinnercircle,gotherjob as a cleaningwomanat a public "Whenthere Shetoldmeinourinterview: hisintervention. schoolthrough in anywaypossible.... is a rally,we (thepeopleoftheparty)collaborate butyouhavetobe patient....Yes,I was So maybeyoucangeta jobthere, and withpatienceI gotit...." patient, Matilde'scirclehas othercircleswithinit,like Cholo's network. whatI Cholo explainedthathe "worksforMatilde.... She coordinates havetodo...." MatildeprovidesCholo'sUB withfoodpackagesandmedareaoftheslum.Matilde among"hispeople"inanother icinestodistribute a calla nioqui, hispoliticalpatron.Cholois whatArgentines is hisreferente, partyactivistwhocollectsa paycheckas a ghostemployeeat themunicicontract job thatmustbe renewed palityofCospito.He holdsa fixed-term She also providedhim with of Matilde. months the approval every,three withpipestobuildthesewagesystemin "hisarea." withMatilde,shetoldme "WhenI startedworking Choloreported, thattheUB shouldbe openeverydayoftheyear."Matildegavehima key shemanagedto atthemunicipality, resource tostart.Throughhercontacts installthefirstpublicpay phonein thearea in his UB. Residentsgo to Cholo'sUB to use thephone,to getpowderedmilkfromthePrograma orpainreliever. ortoaskforsomeantibiotic Materno-Infantil, ofthegroup."He is Cholois whatMatildeterms"a keycomponent knownin thearea nearhisUB and has beenpraisedby someas theone whohasdonethemosttoimprovetheslum.Choloalso worksforthePlan thePlanVida's (exceptSundays),Choloaccompanies Vida.Everymorning ofthe emphasize"thepoliticalimpartiality" constantly officials 15.See note2. Although twenty fromthecommunity, emerge"naturally" PlanVidaandthefactthatthemanzaneras partybroker. bya Peronist manzanerasin VillaParaisowererecruited outoftwenty-three wereheldatMatilde'sUB. oftheprogram Mostmeetings 65 LatinAmerican Research Review truckon itsroutethrough theslumand otherpoorneighborhoods ofthe areaadjacenttoVillaParaiso.He andtwoothermendistribute themilk,cereal,and eggsto theblockdelegatesof thePlan Vida. He spreadsnews abouttheplan(suchas a forthcoming inwhich rallytolaunchtheprogram thegovernor orthegovernor's wifewillbe present). Choloalso distributes theprogram's newspaperand providesnewsrelatedtothePeronist party (thetimeofthemeeting fora rally, an invitation toa barbecue, elasadoperonista).Choloreports anyproblema manzaneramighthave(a newmember oftheprogram, a dropout,a complaint abouta shortageoffood)toMimi, Matilde'sdaughter-in-law, whois theareacoordinator oftheprogram. For doingthisjob,he earnsfifty pesosa week.16 In structuralterms,Juan Pisutti'sinner circleis identicalto Matilde's.Yetthenumberof personswho have closerelationships with Juanis smaller, makinghisinnercirclesmaller. His family does notparticipateinhisactivities as Matilde'sfamily does inhers.Alfonsina gotherjob at a publicschoolthrough theintervention ofPisutti, Rosa receivesmedicine forher hemoplegyfromhim,and Carlitosgetspackagesof food As in Matilde'sinnercircle,theseprobthrough Juan'stimelymediation. lemholdersprovideproblemsolverslikeJuanPisuttiwithsomeservicesin return. Theinnercirclehelpsthebrokertosolvetheeveryday of problems slum-dwellers. at thebroker'sunidadbasica Theyrunthesoup kitchens and arenormally in chargeofopening,cleaning,and maintaining thelocale.Membersoftheinnercircleusuallyannouncewhenthebrokerwillbe availableat theUB to theoutercircleand spreadthenewswhenfoodis beingdistributed attheUB orthemunicipal building.UnlikeMatilde,Juan Pisuttidoes nothaveanotherUB workingforhim.His areaofinfluence is muchmorelimitedthanMatilde's,coveringonlythefourblocksthatsurroundhisUB. Membersoftheoutercircle(thepotentialbeneficiaries ofthebrokers'distributive capacities) arerelatedtobrokers ties.17 byweak Theycontactthebrokerwhenproblemsariseor whena specialfavoris needed(a foodpackage,somemedicine, a driver'slicense,thewatertruck, a friend in orfictive jail).Butthoseintheoutercircledo notdeveloptiesoffriendship kinshipwithbrokers. Although theymayattendsomeralliesorgatherings Her 16.Matilde'snuclearandextendedfamilies participate fullyinherpoliticalactivities. twodaughters-in-law aretheregionalcoordinators ofthelargestfood-distribution program in thearea. Her husbandis theUnder-Secretary of PublicWorksin themunicipality of oftheneighborhood C6spito.One ofhersonsis thepresident culturalcenter(whicheffectivelyoperatesas another UB),andherothersonservesas herhusband'sprivatesecretary at themunicipality. InPeronist thispattern isa commonphenomenon. Further research politics, is neededontheoverlapbetweenfamily kinship andpoliticalnetworks-andtheprominent, although subordinated, roleofwomenwithinthem. 17. On thedifference betweenstrongand weakties(in termsofthetime,intimacy, and emotional intensity involvedintherelationships), see Granovetter (1973). 66 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA organizedbythebrokerorevenvoteforhimorherinan internal election, withthebroker. While theydo nothavean everyday intimate relationship thebrokers' tiestotheirinnercirclesaredenseand intense, theirtiestothe outercirclesaremoresparseand intermittent. The bases forthisstrongrelationship are multiple. Thosewho are partofthebrokers'innercirclehaveknowntheirbrokersfora longtime (usuallymorethanfouror fiveyears),and thebrokershave "lentthema I hand"in a timeof extreme hardship.In thelifestoriesand interviews recorded, mostmembers ofan innercirclehighlighted a foundational favor thatinaugurated thislong-lasting and "veryuseful"relationship. Brokers areportrayed as "comingto rescue"themwithoutulterior motives.That foundational favorestablishes a relationship ofmutualhelp.The foundationaltransactions cluster intoties,whichinturnconcatenate intonetworks. Resources andInformation Domination Networks: Controlling One standardEnglish-Spanish definesnetwork as red, dictionary is "net, reticulo. inEnglish.Thefirst hasseveralmeanings malla, Red,inturn, for fishingand fowling,"but anothermeaninggiven is particularly "snare./18 networks areneither frozen timeless structures nor Problem-solving theintendedoutcomeofa politician's calculatedorcynicalaction.Theyresultfrom long-term regularinteractions that,although usuallyinaugurated mustbe continuously and practiced. Much bya founding favor, cultivated likea university intheUnitedStates,JuanPisuttiholdshisoffice professor hoursattheUB twicea week.He spendsmostWednesday afternoons and thestreamofpersonswhoshowup athisUB. Saturday mornings assisting His innercircleis usuallythere,preparingmate,distributing powdered milk,catchingup on recentnews.Juancito takestimeto listento every dwellerwhocomesto hisUB. Althoughmostcometo ask himforsomethingthatis outofhisreach(likejobs),he givesthemsomekindofuseful foodat themunicipality, information: a tipforfinding or theprecisedate whenfoodwillbe distributed at themunicipalbuildingand how to proceedtoobtainthe"ninekilosofmerchandise." Juanalso useshiscontacts atthelocalpublichospitalorhisownhealthinsurance toobtainmedicine inan emergency. Withinthe Peronistproblem-solving network,Peronistbrokers function as gatekeepers, betweentheflowofgoods actingas go-betweens andservices branchofthemunicipal comingfromtheexecutive power(the mayor)and theflowofsupportand votescomingfromtheclients.As in and geographical is'themost manyotherhistorical settings, gatekeeping function important ofPeronist brokers. As CarlosandAndersonobserved, 18.See NewRevised andEnglish Veldzquez Spanish Dictionary. 67 LatinAmericanResearchReview "a politicalbrokercan eitherobstructor facilitatetheflowof demands, favors,goods and servicesto or fromsome constituency"(1981,172-73).Yet stemfrom emergeamong brokers.These differences differences significant theircontrolof resourcesfromabove (goods and services),which in turn determinesthe amount of resourcesfrombelow (human beings) theycan "control." Resources (food and medicine) move fromthe municipalityto the power to do what unidades basicas, wherethebrokershave discretionary theywant with the resources.The informationconcerningfood distribution at the municipalbuilding also circulatesthroughthe UBs, as thebrokerNorma explained.Employmentat themunicipalityand membershipin the Peronistpartyprovidebrokerswiththe access to knowledgeabout resource distribution.Althoughneighborsknow in general about the food distributionat the municipality,they do not know the precise date on which the distributionwill be carried out. Nor do they know the everchangingproceduresto obtainthe"ninekilos."Brokersknowthedates and have the speciallydesigned cards requiredto obtainthefood. These cards are small ticketswith a number on them,indicatingthe date when the holdercan go to themunicipalbuilding.Whetherthegeneralpopulation's ignoranceis "deliberatelycreated"or "justhappens" (Erickson1996)I cannot know.The followingepisode fromone of my firstjournalentriesillustratesthat on occasion, brokersintentionallyconfuse individuals to set between the slum and themselvesup as the only channelsof information themunicipality. of Atthebeginning ofAugust1996,JuanPisuttigotintouchwiththecoordinator inthelocalCatholicChurch, a womennamedNora.He thesoupkitchen operating who "is able to obtaindairyproducts himself as a municipalofficial introduced TheSecretary ofSoforthebetter ofthesoupkitchen." functioning andvegetables cial Welfare does notprovidethesoup kitchenwithmilk,cheese,or vegetables. ofSoattheSecretary NoratoldhimthatsheusuallyasksGraciela(a socialworker Forwhatever ifand whenthesoupkitchen problems needsanything. cialWelfare) NoratellsPisutti,"we getin touchwithGraciela." theyhaveat thesoup kitchen, Pisuttireplies,"it'sexactlythesamething.You can contactme or Graciela."The aboutthisepisode.Shebelievesthatthereis a lotof socialworkerwas indignant the"place"eachone (sheand Pisutti)shouldoccupy. "confusion" concerning This episode depictsthe typicalmovementof Peronistpunterosor referentespursuing the core of brokerage:settingthemselvesup as the (only) channels that facilitatetransactionsor resourceflows (Gould and Fernaindez1989,91).19It also illustratestheobstaclesthattheyhave to conandthe mostlinksbetweenthecommunity toacquireand control 19.Thisconstant effort As Corneliusdeof othertypesofpoliticalbrokers. is a majorcharacteristic government scribedtheMexicanurbancacique,he "seekstomonopolizeall linksbetweenthecommuenvironment" intheexternal structures andpoliticalandbureaucratic nityunderhiscontrol (Cornelius1977,347). 68 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA agents, organization nongovernmental frontin thistask.Social workers, activists areusuallythemostoutspokenopponents and othercommunity brokers.20 ofPeronist createdorjusthappens,itis Whether theignoranceis deliberately nowalmostdevoidofsocialorgainduced.In neighborhoods structurally isolatedfromeach other,indiwheredwellersare increasingly nizations, Brokersand their forobtaininginformation. vidualshave fewnetworks evenvitalinformation. haveaccesstohelpful, incontrast, innercircles, dependon thebrokerforinTo theextentthatmanyslum-dwellers itcanbe asserted resources notavailableelsewhere, andmaterial formation and thus "positionalpower" thatbrokersenjoy"positionalcentrality" locationsimilartoa largebank(Knoke1990,10).Theyoccupya structural positioncan imposeits thatfromitsmonopolistic ingor creditinstitution exercredit.In thisway,brokers forgranting owntermsinitsowninterest byvirtueofa positionofmonopcisewhatWeberwouldcall"domination pursuetheirownpoliticalcareersand trytoaccumulateas oly."'21Brokers andhoard muchpoliticalpoweras theycan.Todo so,theygatherresources vitalto solvingproblems:theybecome"problemsolvers." information theactionsofpoorpeoplewhomustsolve Theydo notcommanddirectly byvirtueof pressingsurvivalneeds(whatWeberwouldcall "domination i.e.,powertocommandanddutytoobey").Yetonlyan approach authority, failsto perceivethestructhanrelations thatfocuseson individualsrather Inpursuing their brokers. inthepositionofPeronist effects turaldomination own interests (ascendingto higherpositionsin thelocal politicalfield), In so doing,theyininsolvingproblems. somebecomequasi monopolists ofproblemholders. thepossibilities creasetheircapacitytoconstrain inner The relationships thatbrokersestablishwiththeirrespective ofthewayinwhichdomination qualification circlescomposean intriguing and goods thatappeal to their is carriedout. By supplyinginformation complianceis securedat low cost. voluntary self-interest, closefollowers' ofa larger Yettheexpectation In thissense,brokers'poweris economical. ofauthority. benefit (likea publicpost)is also presentin thisrelationship politicsand local thissame tensionbetweenclientelist 20. Cardoso(1992)documented in thecase ofGuadalajara,see groupsin Sao Paulo.Fora similarargument neighborhood (1997). Shefner derivedexis "baseduponinfluence thistypeofdomination toMaxWeber, 21.According insomewayandactskillsguaranteed thepossessionofgoodsormarketable clusively from freeandaremotiformally however, whoremain, ingupontheconductofthosedominated, iftheyreally debtors, vatedsimplybythepursuitoftheirowninterests....Thepotential and mustevenguarsubmitto theseconditions mustin theirowninterest needthecredit, Thecreditbanks. . . simplypursue security. collateral bysupplying anteethissubmission persons,actingwithformal and realizethembestwhenthedominated theirown interests ciras theyareforceduponthembyobjective pursuetheirowninterests freedom, rationally cumstances" (Weber1968,943). 69 LatinAmericanResearchReview In thelattersense,Peronist problem-solving networks resemble theclassic on ofdomination, partymachinesinU.S. cities.Bothare "systems relying in line"(Knoke bothrewardsand punishments to keeptheirentourages 1990,4).Togettheirproblems solved,problem holdersbecomeincreasingly ensnaredwithinthePeronistweb.Thatis to say,brokers'powerderives fromtheirpositionwithinthenetworkand fromthepositionofthenetinthelargersocialstructure workitself oftheslum.ThePeronist problemsolvingnetwork keepsexpandingitsinfluence, spreadingwithintheslum likean oil slickthatdispersesgraduallyinthewater. THE CLIENTS' PERSPECTIVE On delvingintotheintricacies ofgrassroots clientelism, onecandetectcertainregularities thatforma pyramidalstructure of relationsin which"clients," and patronsinteract. Buttounderstand brokers, fullythe logicofclientelist interactions (andtheconundrum oftheirresiliency), one mustfocuson theobjectivemeaningofpractices butalso investigate the inthe subjective purposesoftheactionsoftheactorsinvolved("ensnared") web.Oncetheempirical focusoftheanalysisis notonlyrelations butexperiences,it can be seen thatclientelist problemsolvinginvolvesconand a prostructing personalized ties,an imaginedsolidaristic community, tectiveand predictable of network thatbuffers theharsheveryday reality theslum.The lastsectionofthisarticlewilloutlinekeyelementsofthis side ofclientelism on thebeliefsand evaluations "subjective" byfocusing ofthemembersofbrokers'innercircles,elementsthatrequirefurther research. Niceand HelpfulFriends Relationsofclientelist existin practiceas relations domination that areusefulfrom theclients'perspective forsolvingproblems, obtaining protection withsomeone againsttherisksofeveryday life,andmakingfriends innercircles, are who"reallycares."Tothemembers ofthebrokers' brokers nottheunscrupulous and corruptpoliticians talk whommostneighbors and "sacrificing" about.Theyare"helpful" and "goodpeople"withwhom sometimesdescribedas problemholdershave a personalrelationship butalwaysas worthkeeping. "friendship" BothJuanPisuttiand Matildeare viewedby manyneighborsas who "playtheir "usingthepeople"andthus"bad and corrupt" politicians own game."Theyare sometimesblamedforthelimitedamountof resourcesthatsocialassistanceprograms intheneighborhood bedistribute cause"theyalwayskeepthegoodsforthemselves." Brokers arealwaysaccusedof"deceiving thepeople." 70 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA thatheldby thosewho solve mostof their Thisview contradicts Rosa pointedout a broker'sintervention. lifeproblemsthrough everyday person"JuanPisuttiis: "thewayhetakescareofpeople, whatan "excellent becausethosewhogo there humanbeing.... He suffers heis an exceptional He has a solua solutiontotheirproblems. [totheUB] neverleavewithout Manypeopleaskhimfor adviseseveryone. He willingly tionforeveryone. He nevertellsthemthathe doesn't money... ,and heuseshisownmoney. haveanymoney." himself forthepeopleof sacrifices Accordingto Carlos,"Juancito appliedto arealso characterizations theslum."Helpfuland self-sacrificing happens.""Sheis so good." Matilde:"Sheis alwaystherewhensomething toeverysingledetail." "Matildepaysattention ofinnercirclesabout amongmembers Themainpointofagreement forthedistriburesponsible arepersonally is thatthebrokers theirbrokers a job,orgives thatgrantsa pension,offers tionofthings. Theorganization ornationalgovoutmedicineora foodpackageis notthelocal,provincial, butMatildeorJuan.Theyaretheoneswhoreallycare,who feel ernment forothers,who are theirfriendsand are alwaysavailable.Hundredsof tooneessentialfact:it and fieldnotestestify transcripts pagesofinterview agencybutMatildeor is notthestatethatis perceivedas thedistributing Andbecausetheyaretheoneswho distribute Juanor someotherbroker. at all todo so. Theydo thegoods,theyareviewedas havingno obligation for itbecausetheyreallywantto,becausetheycare,becausethey"sacrifice summarized thisbelief:"PeopartofMatilde'scircle, thepeople."Roberto, She andit'snotan obligation. togiveoutthings, plethinkitsherobligation Whois she?Is sheyour doesitbecauseshewantsto.What'sherobligation? and itseemslikeit Peoplegetconfuseda lot.Youdo thema favor, mother? And it is a favor."And becauseMatildeis theone who is an obligation. whatsoever todo havinganyobligation darestodeliverthegoodswithout cannotinvokeanyrightto thethinggivenor thefavor it,thebeneficiary Thereis no thirdpartytowhichonecanresortinordertoenforce granted. a right(see Tilly1994).Butin a perone'sclaim,or whatmightconstitute outofwhichnothingcan be obtained,no problem sonalizedrelationship canbe solved. PracticalActivity as an Everyday Brokerage whendemands Someslum-dwellers believein "a timeofelections" becausepoliticians can be satisfied quicklyand goodsobtainedpromptly Arare eagerto win theirvotes.As in manyothersettingsthroughout that is "the time for seen as and Latin something politics" America, gentina thatbreaksup theroutineofeveryday occursoncein a while,something 1984and Heredia1996). lifeintheslum(see Hirschman 71 LatinAmericanResearchReview told associations, ofoneofthefewneighborhood Rogelio,president whenthereareelecme:"Matildeshowsup whenit'sthetimeforpolitics, ofone of showup... ." Horacio,president tions.Thatis whenpoliticians [like themanysoccerclubsinthearea,agreed:"Ifwe wanttogetsomething Atthattime,we we willhaveto waitfortheelections. a sewagesystem], ... ; we provideso many[votes]thatwe mightget candemandsomething to in return." Thebeliefthatelectoraltimesarean opportunity something BothRogelioand Hois anchoredinpersonalexperiences. solveproblems beforethepasttwo shortly organizations raciogotaid fortheirrespective we gota plotoflandforthe elections. Horaciorelated,"Throughpolitics, club.... Now we needthebricks,so I willhaveto waitforthenextelecto electoraltimesorlimitedtothemultiplerally restricted tion."Whether activity. Politicsarealso seen days,politicsareviewedas a discontinuous to get as "dirty"and "corrupt":"a lucrativebusiness,""an opportunity and manipulative." thatis "deceitful ahead,"an activity neigharehardlynew.Butin thesamedestitute Suchobservations evaluationsof politicscoexist.Almost contradictory borhood,strikingly "I don'tdo"-by implisharestheidea thatpoliticsis something everyone a unithat"othersdo." All agreethatpoliticsconstitute cation,something versewithitsownrulesand mightservetoimproveone'sownlot,regardcertain aspects highlight lessofthecommongood.Yetsomeslum-dwellers ofpoliticsas worthexploring. do andthemunicipality Someresidents praisetheworkthatbrokers of food,sheetsof fortheneighborhood, especiallywiththedistribution "Thereis a lotofhelp elaborated, As oneinterviewee metal,andmattresses. ..., themunicipality alwayshas an answer,notonlywiththefood.Ifyou needa metalsheet,they'llgiveittoyou.... In a UB,theyusedtogivemilk witha pieceofbread.Here,thereis a lotofhelp,anyonewhosaysthereis no helpis lying.... Whathappensis thatyou haveto go thereand wait. has itsowntime." Everything ofthebrokersof Consonantwiththeperceivedsteadyaccessibility theaid coming not believe that do someslum-dwellers thePeronist party, is an "assistance" increases duringelectionperiods,rather, frompoliticians I of everydaypersonalizedissue.When inquired,"Some yourneighbors replied, toldmethattheaid comesquickerduringelectiontime?"Victoria "No,I don'tthinkso." Adela added,"Frommypointofview,it'salways thesame." Problemsolvingbecomespersonalizedand partof the habitual ofbrokers'innercircles.Thosewhoreceivethings knowledgeofmembers Theyarepart knowthattheyhaveto go ralliesand supporttheirbrokers. as the favorsimplysomeexpectedreturn ofa universein whicheveryday in practice" ruleofthegame,a ruleunderstoodas a "schemeimmanent (Bourdieu1977,38),as a mandatethatexistsin a practicalstate.Relations betweenproblemholdersand problemsolversare "practical"insofaras 72 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA thedistribthrough keptup,and cultivated" "practised, theyareroutinely offavors(Bourdieu1977,38).Attendance utionofthingsand thegranting knowledge. ata rallyis partofthestockofpractical I askedCoca, "So whenMatildegetsthemedicineyou need,does shecomeand tellyou,'Youhavetocomewithmetotherally'?"Coca explained,"No, I knowthatI haveto go withherinsteadofwithsomeone orsomemilk,ora packetofyerbaor else.Becauseshegavememedicine, myobligation sugar,I knowthatI havetogo toherrallyin ordertofulfill thenwhen BecauseifI do notgo toherrally, toher,toshowmygratitude. shewon'tgiveittome.[Shewouldsay,]'Go asktheperI needsomething sonwhowenttotherallywithyou."' hasshownthattrust on politicalclientelism Theextensive literature "hopesforthefuture"(Ayata1994),familistic (Roniger1990),solidarity, (Gouldner1977;Scott orientations (TellisNovak 1983),and reciprocity brokers, established amongpatrons, 1977)indeedexistintherelationships and feelings areverbalizedbybothclients and clients.Theseexperiences ontimeandagain whenaskedaboutthem.Theyareremarked andbrokers theirgatepartypresent ofthePeronist inbrokers' publicspeeches.Brokers withthepoor,a relationship as a specialrelationship keepingfunction specialcareforthem,"thelove couchedin termsofdebtand obligation, indifference is tobe elimtheyfeelforthem"tothepointthatbureaucratic traPeronist and enactinga persistent inated(Auyero1999a).Embodying dition-thatofEva Peronas the"bridgeoflove"betweenJuanPeronand theirpoliticalworknotas a job brokers thepoormasses-Peronist present tothepoint butas "a passionforthepeople."Theirworkis "all sacrifice" in thepost.Thebrokers insist,"Wecareaboutthem."Some ofexhaustion careaboutus." Thoseoutsidethenetworks oftheclientssay,"Thebrokers careonlycareaboutthemselves." say,"Thebrokers caring, and reciprocity, solidarity, Thisdiscursive emphasisontrust, services, andprotection Insofar as thesolutions, effects. hopehasparticular providedby brokers(inseparablematerialand symbolicexchanges,in is communicated) and something whicha thingis given,a favorgranted, thatis an unequalbala de factostateofaffairs areinclinedto legitimate theycanbe describedas ideologianceofpower(a domination network), cal machines(following Bourdieu).Theactofgiving,thecaringactionsof (or atand thetrusting responseoftheirinnercirclestransform brokers, (helpingsomeonewho a contingent socialrelationship tempttotransform) We as lasting)relationship: is in need) intoa recognized(acknowledged solveourproblem, and by theway,we recognizeMatildeor Juanas our politunderliesproblemsolvingthrough problemsolver.Thisrecognition companionIn an ideologicalenvironment ofcooperation, icalmediation. balanceof thatfreezea particular tiesareconstructed ship,and solidarity, forces. on theworld Theacceptance thatmembers oftheinnercircleconfer 73 LatinAmericanResearchReview constitutes of problemsolvingthroughpoliticalmediationundoubtedly oftheir itis theexpression position.Ultimately, ofthebrokers' thestrength a majorweakYetatthesametime,suchacceptancerepresents legitimacy. bondbetweenprobis producedbya closeeveryday ness.Thislegitimacy upheld, lemholderand problemsolver,a relationthatmustbe constantly exercised.Keepingup therelationship and directly practiced, personally ofthistie, dependson thecapacityofthebrokerto maintainthestrength on hisor hercapacityto deliver.As itturns largelycontingent something A brokercanget and dependenton otherfactors. out,thiscapacityis finite favors, and assistsomeoneas ifhe or do "essential" jobs,delivermedicine, numberof butonlyfora restricted family, shewerepartoftherecipient's brokerintheslum,Matilde,has no morethan persons.Themostpowerful a hundredindividualsboundto herthroughstrongties,out ofa voting ofmorethanseventhousand.Thebroker'scapacitytomaintain population becauseitdependson thebroker'srelationship eachtieis also contingent toa thirdparty(inthiscase,themayorofCospito),whoprovidesthebrokerwiththegoodstobe distributed. capacitiesbeliethepresumably Thescopeand limitsofthebrokers' politics.The image of an extended characterof clientelist all-powerful bythemedia,and portrayed (stereotypically electorate "captive"clientelist byscholars)is in thissenseempirically adoptedunreflectively sometimes can scarcely althoughsignificant, shaky.The size ofbrokers'innercircles, accountforthe"conquestofthevote"and the"buildingofelectoralcondoesnotmean Yetthisconclusion toclientelism. sensus"usuallyattributed Thistypeofnetpoliticalclientelism. thatscholarsshouldstopstudying and guaranteesa somewhat and inequality domination workreproduces voterswho mightprovedecisivein internal stablenumberof hard-core elections. CONCLUDING REMARKS is variedand extenon politicalclientelism Althoughtheliterature atthe networks of clientelist the actual workings about sive,littleis known nothIn almost America. Argentina Latin in level contemporary grassroots The of poverty.22 in areas high networks Peronist ing is knownabout Peronism between contemporary unidadesbasicas,thesitesofconvergence By focusing and clientelist politics,have neverbeen seriouslystudied.23 22. Levitsky'srecentresearch(1996, 1998) may be the only exceptionto thislack of firsthand knowledge. 23. Bianchiand Sanchis's (1988) studyofthewomen's branchofthePeronistpartyis, to my knowledge, the only serious researchthatincludes some referenceto the unidades basicas duringthe firstand second Peronistgovernments(1946-1955). 74 CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA resources, and dynamicsofthePeronistproblemfunctions, on theform, I havesoughttoprovidean initialanalysisofthepractices solvingnetwork, partof clients.Thefirst ofreal-life brokersand theexperiences ofreal-life hoardingand resourcecontrolas two thearticleexaminedinformation networks. ofclientelist inthefunctioning practices equallyimportant The articlealso exploredthe "subjectivedimension"of Peronist ofclientelism provedtobe a decisiveelement Theexperience clientelism. relations Clientelist socialarrangement. ofthishierarchical intheworkings habitual,and takenforgrantedby a small as legitimate, are experienced thoseclientswithstrongand everydayties portionofbrokers'followers, Thusthestudyhas shownthatthescopeof localpoliticians. withPeronist itappearsthatotherkinds Consequently, is limited. network theclientelist with"clientelist politics"intheconinconjunction ofpoliticsareoperating vote. questofthePeronist reinnetworks in Peronistproblem-solving Engagedparticipation The identities as muchas itprovidesgoodsandfavors. forces sociopolitical innercircles, andstateofficials clients, amongbrokers, structure ofrelations arethebasesfor as wellas thelocationofindividualactorsinthenetwork netProblem-solving and attitudes. perceptions, theirbehaviors, exploring politicalculsupportsoftheheterogeneous worksareoneoftherelational is neededon threeissues:theperresearch turesoftheurbanpoor.Further ceptual and behavioralconsequencesthat the locationwithinthese (and therelationsbetweenpositions)engendersforagentsinnetworks and reconfigtoreproduce volvedin them;thecapacityofthesenetworks ofthis identity"; and theeffectiveness urean alwaysambiguous"Peronist mobilization. ofelectoral as a mechanism arrangement typeofclientelist REFERENCES ACUNA, CARLOS 1995 "Politicsand Economics in the Argentinaof the Nineties (or,Why the FutureNo inLatin Reform andStructural Markets, LongerIs WhatItUsed to Be)." 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