February 1981

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JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
P.O. Box 57128, Washington, D.C. 20037
(301) 587-7999
Vol. III No. I
February 1981
Israel's Contribution News Briefs
to
U.S. Intelligence
by Yosef Bodansky
Russian dissident Lev Navrozov,
now living in New York, has castigated
the U.S. intelligence establishment for
its lack of information concerning the
Soviet Union (Commentary, Sept.
78). The long period of time between
Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin in the Party's 20th
Congress (February 1956) and the time
the CIA succeeded in bringing it to the
attention of the West (New York
Times, 4 June 1956) is one example he
cites of the "inefficiency" of the CIA.
Navrozov chose the wrong example,
however, since the CIA never did, in
fact, find the speech itself. It is now
clear that it was the Israeli Mossad
which brought the speech to the West,
and in only six weeks. Iser Harel, the
former head of the Mossad, recently
officially disclosed some of the details. The method by which the speech
was brought to Israel was not told,
but it is known that the Israelis had it
while the rest of the Western "services" were only beginning to look for a
source to deliver it. The speech was
given by the Mossad to the CIA as part
of a large scale transfer of information. While Khrushchev's speech was
the most sensational item, the U.S.
received a large amount of "routine
defense-oriented material" of great
importance. It was agreed that Israel
would let the CIA take credit for producing the Khrushchev speech.
After the collapse of Operation
Splinter Faction and the execution of
Oleg Penkovskiy (a Russian Colonel
supplying information to the CIA
and the British SIS from 1960-62),
the Israeli sources remained the most
elaborate and reliable. There is little
doubt that the West has been enjoying
the material obtained through this
channel.
Further, the Israeli contribution
to U.S. knowledge and understanding
of the Soviet military establishment
was far larger and more profound than
the delivering of data.
Since the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian
pact of 1955, the Arabs have received
a large variety of Soviet weaponry.
In the four major wars that followed
that deal, Israel has captured a large
number of Soviet weapon systems as
well as Arab military documents. From
the start, Israel has shared the information gathered this way with the U.S.
Cooperation reached a peak after the
Yom Kippur War. In the past 25 years,
Israel has delivered to the U.S. nearly
every conventional weapon system in
the Soviet arsenal. General George
Keegan, former commander of U.S.
Air Force Intelligence, described Israel's contribution to U.S. national
security as "unique in its magnitude"
and "crucial in its importance."
Over the years, Israel delivered to the
U.S. all of the Soviet tanks, from the
improved version of the WWII T-34
to the then-brand-new and unknown
T-62. Israel supplied most of the Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Armoured
Personnel Carriers and Soft Vehicles,
as well as rear services equipment. Of
special importance were the Combat
Engineers items. These varied from
maintenance kits to complete, operational, bridging equipment and systems. Through Israel, the U.S. was
able to examine a large number of
chemical warfare items. Israel delivered
an almost complete array of Sovietmade artillery systems as well as small
arms. The Soviet-made weapon systems
were delivered in such quantities that
the U.S. Armed Forces were able to
establish a series of demonstration
units using genuine Soviet equipment,
from AK-47s to tanks and Armoured
Fighting Vehicles. New U.S. systems,
such as the A-10 aircraft, were tested
against Soviet systems using live fire.
A situation in which one can test his
own experimental weapon systems
against the other side's front-line
equipment in laboratory conditions
is of prime importance. This was the
first time in modern history that a nation could test its whole new generation
of weapon systems, still under development, against the other side's front
line equipment.
Far more important to the U.S. defense establishment were the Aerospace Electronic systems which were
delivered over the years. During the
past fifteen years, Israel has been able
to capture a large number of either
complete Soviet aircraft, or parts of
those which crashed after air combat.
The most famous of these is the Iraqi
MiG-21, the first to reach Western
hands. Unconfirmed reports mention
Israel as the prime contributer to a
U.S. "Ghost Squadron" which, allegedly, flies genuine Soviet aircraft.
Among the systems that Israel captured, one can find the Soviet AntiTank Missiles. The most lethal, the
AT-3 SAGGER, was captured in such
quantities that Israel could use it in her
own operational units. Among the Surface-to-Air Missiles, Israel captured
the SA-2 (GUIDELINE) of various
models, the SA-3 (GOA) as well as the
man-held SA-7 (GRAIL). In addition,
a large number of electronic systems,
including radar, were captured in a
variety of conditions ranging from
burned items to new systems. Most of
the Soviet Anti-Aircraft guns were
(Continued on page 2)
Afghan Revolutionaries Rebuffed.
Afghan Revolutionaries fighting against the communist regime in Afghanistan and Soviet intervention forces were strikingly rebuffed at the
Third Islamic Summit conference held
at Taif, Saudi Arabia in late January.
According to a dispatch filed by Eric
Rouleau of Le Monde the Afghan freedom fighters or mojahedin were denied
observor status at the Islamic conference while organizations such as
the Philippino Muslim movement were
granted special rights. According to
a mojahedin spokesman in Taif, Saudi
Arabia, the group felt "betrayed" and
"abandoned by everybody."
The Taif conference, which decided
to give massive support to the PLO
and declared a jihad, or holy war,
against Israel also failed to take harsh
action against the U.S.S.R. Instead,
most of it was directed against the
United States. Asked about this, Prince
Saud, chief of Saudi diplomacy, explained the delicate treatment of the
U.S.S.R. as follows: "We are realistic people, We cannot tackle a superpower like the U.S.S.R. in the same
way as we treat Israel. . ."
U.S. Arms to Iraq. According to the
Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz American
military equipoment sold to Saudi Arabia and Jordan has been transferred
to Iraq without prior U.S. permission.
The arms transfers are reported to include heavy artillery. Likewise some
French arms were also transferred.
"Third country" transfers are illegal
under U.S. arms sales agreements.
Meanwhile, Western European diplomatic sources have confirmed that
Saudi Arabia has become a conduit
for Soviet-made arms being shipped
to Iraq. Some 100 T-54/55 tanks,
mainly coming out of Poland, have
arrived at the Saudi port Sharm Yanbu
and have been trucked to Iraq. Other
Soviet equipment and spare parts also
have been shipped via Sharm Yanbu,
and some hardware from Yugoslavia
has been sent to Iraq from Saudi Arabia.
French A rms to Iraq. France has begun
shipping Mirage F-I fighter bombers
to Iraq via Cyprus. Some forty such
aircraft have been ordered by Iraq
from France. Other shipments of
French military hardware, most notably tanks, are also expected soon.
The
Christian Science Monitor
reports that France has become the
number three arms manufacturer and
exporter in the world. In the past four
years French arms exports have more
than doubled-from 11.6 billion francs
($2.5 billion) to an estimated 24 billion
francs ($5.2 billion) for 1980. Between
80 and 90 percent of French arms exports go to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya
and the Gulf emirates-helping to pay
25 percent of France's annual oil bill of
some 100 billion francs ($21.7 billion).
In certain cases France is selling weapons it cannot afford for its own military. Its most modern over-the-horizon
naval missiles, for example, are being
sold to Saudi Arabia before they reach
the French navy.
U.S. & Soviet Expenditures. The new
Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci compared Soviet and U.S. defense
spending during his confirmation hearings on Capitol Hill. He said the Soviets are outspending the U.S. 1.5 to I
in investment; 1.8 to I in operating
accounts; 1.2 to I in missions; 1.6 to
I in general purpose forces and slightly over 3 to I in strategic missions.
B-52's & the Gulf. The World-Herald
of Omaha reports that a special B-52
force has been prepared for conventional military operations in the Persian Gulf. Some 28 late-model B52H's are involved. They are organized
to fly low-level bombing missions against targets in the Middle East or
Persian Gulf and are equipped with
special under-wing bomb racks to enable them to carry 51 five hundred
pound bombs. While the B-52's would
be moved from North Dakota, they
would operate from bases nearer to
from
Spain
the targets-possibly
or other airstrips if they are prepared
to land B-52's. Because the wingtips of the B-52's are equipped with
small wheels and must ride on the runway especially wide airstrips are required. In at least one case, a proposal
to enlarge a Middle East airbase for
this purpose was not followed up recent ly.
The B-52's are subsonic, very large
aircraft that could be detected and intercepted by enemy missiles or aircraft. Low level penetration is one
method to try and reduce B-52 losses,
and electronic counter measures are intended to limit the effectiveness of
ground-launched missiles. However,
because of the mix of U.S., Soviet
and European air defense missiles in
the Middle East, the utility of the B52 as a penetrating bomber might be
limited.
It is likely the administration will
move ahead on a new bomber force
because of the service life and vulnerability of the B-52 fleet. But in the near
term, for long range missions, the B52 remains an asset of some significance.
Bomber Penetrations. Soviet Tu95 Bear bombers have penetrated U.S.
air space at least twice in the last few
(Continued on page 4)
Washington InternationalReport
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the weekly news program produced
in cooperation with the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs has
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Advisory Council. In a memorandum
to Community Relations Councils and
Federation executives across the country, Charney Bromberg, Assistant Director of NJCRC called Washington
International Report "a significant
new informational resource for the
Jewish community."
NJCRAC has sent some 400 brochures, endorsements and sample tapes
of Washington International Report
to CRC's and Federations around the
country. Included in the materials was
a letter from Mark Talisman, Director
of the Washington Action Office of
the Council of Jewish Federations.
Talisman said the Report has a "Meet
the Press, Issues and Answers quality
effort. . .which we could not achieve
otherwise. It occurs to me," he said,
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well thought out and produced as is
this broadcast effort." Talisman called
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to assure that the maximum number
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Alan Caplan, Marketing and Cir'ulation Director of the Philadelphia
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Page 2
February 1981
EDITORIAL
Middle East Bases
-
American interest in Middle East bases is back in the news. The new administration in Washington is far from convinced that the plans of the
previous administration for a Rapid Deployment Force that could be
moved from the United States (CONUS) to a Middle East trouble spot is a
satisfactory approach to maintaining the balance of power in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf or thwarting Soviet operations against friendly nations in that region. Nor are they necessarily in agreement with the 'tripwire' concept that underlaid the Carter administration's planning. The idea
was to move a force, no matter what its size, to face a potential Soviet invasion. Its very presence was planned to be a deterrent. Today there is doubt
such a force would slow down a Soviet operation, particularly in a high
stakes game involving oil supplies. There is concern, too, that an American
force rapidly defeated could lead to unpleasant negotiations that might
spell the end of our influence in the Middle East and the disintegration of
the Western alliance system.
Which is why there is a new look at the matter of bases. Some urgency
is felt in Washington. A stronger U.S. presence in the Middle East as
soon as possible might help stabilize the situation and certainly would
give us some opportunity to prevent the defeat of our forces should they
be needed.
To say this much invites the question: which bases and where. And that
in turn raises some knotty questions - among them whether the countries in the region will permit the United States to establish bases. The
last administration finessed this matter a little, by seeking "facilities"
instead of bases. However, it was left unclear exactly what a "facility"
was in fact and whether and under what conditions we could use these
assets. During the last days of the Carter administration proposals were
floated to fund facilities in Oman and also at Egypt's Ras Banas base.
However, no formal agreement seems to exist to cover Ras Banas or the
Omani bases, and private 'understandings' are equally murky.
There is much sensitivity about a U.S. presence in the Middle Eastalmost all of it negative. Even Israel, which will give the United States
access to its bases if asked, is not enthusiastic about a U.S. presence.
Does this mean that the search for bases by the United States is bound
to lead to dead ends or shaky arrangements we will not be able to depend
on in a crisis? That need not be so.
There are, after all, a wide range of agreements the U.S. can reach
with key allies to strengthen our position in the area. Some of the agreements do not require a formal presence of U.S. troops or squadrons of
U.S. aircraft. It is not so hard to move either troops or aircraft, after
all. Much more difficult is building the infrastructure we need to do a
job, and having the equipment and supplies on hand for our fighting
men. Certainly we do not have to do all this ourselves.
Israel, for example, has extraordinarily good facilities and excellent
technicians trained to handle U.S. equipment of the most modern kind.
Because she is a stable country unaffected by the caustic intra-Arab
politics that could turn a country like Oman coy at an urgent moment,
making use of Israel as a resource makes sense and saves the American
taxpayer money in the bargain.
Money is saved because we do not have to spend millions on costly
repair equipment or send technicians and specialists enmasse 6,000 miles
from home. We do not have to build fuel storage depots, or train men to
guard installations and keep them well run. All of that is already there.
What we need to do is supplement the facilities already on the ground,
and work out specific agreements covering use. We should, of course,
not expect any of this for free. But it is a lot less expensive to use what is
there.
Working with Israel implies very strongly working with Egypt. Given
the problems in the Middle East and the special politics and sensitivities,
the initial framework of a three-way alliance needs to be put in place. It
is politic today to do this in pieces and parts. It has not, of course, escaped notice that some of the elements are already in place - but it is
the American component that has been lacking.
For the past few years Israel has been treated as a certain embarassment to the United States. That came from disposition and from pressure, especially from Saudi Arabia. Obviously we have to get beyond that
attitude if anything is going to be done to strengthen our strategic hand.
The positive attitude of the President implies strongly that action will
be taken.
Perhaps the old idea of walking before running applies as well as anything else. By analogy, we have been walking, but in an altogether peculiar way. Our first task is to walk regularly. Specific arrangements as
posited above gets us to that plateau. It gives us a grounding from which
the bigger matters such as access to key bases (e.g., Ras Banas, Etzion,
Haifa, Masira) can be worked out to the satisfaction of all concerned.
tion wants to compensate Israel, in effect to preserve the balance of power in the area.
From Israel's point of view the idea of compensation is far preferable
to uncontrolled arms sales to countries hostile to her. Naturally, to match
hardware for hardware is a terribly expensive and burdensome approach,
particularly for Israel-and it is assumed that compensation will involve
financial as well as material offsets.
But when we speak about compensation America must also be concerned about compensating itself. After all, Israel can be expected, first
and foremost, to look to its own defenses in the narrow sense of protecting its perimeter, or developing a counter-threat sufficient to discourage
attack. But in looking at U.S. policy in the Middle East and Persian
Gulf, America has to build relations that assure our ability to respond to
a crisis in the area. In this regard, our self-compensation ought to be
aimed at gaining facilities, installations, and assets in the area that can
help us. Specific arrangements with Israel, as with other countries, ought
to be extremely high on our agenda. The proper time to move is now,
when we do have some potential leverage with the Saudi Arabians, who
want to augment the capability of the F-15's they have purchased. Such
horse trading with ourselves makes sense.
Certainly it takes courage, and requires public support here at home.
But, just as the administration has reasserted the traditional U.S. view
in the United Nations, the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and at Madrid, traditional policy needs to be asserted in the Middle East. The core
of that policy is that Israel is a security asset.
Declassified top secret policy papers, going back to 1949, make that
point clearly and precisely. A study by the Secretary of Defense in that
year said the following: "Should Israel ally herself with the Western
Democracies in the event of war with the USSR, full advantage could
be taken of defensive positions in that country and of Israel's forces for
the defense of the Cairo-Suez area and for land operations to defend or
recapture the Middle East oil facilities. The cooperation of Israel would
be of considerable assistance to the Western Democracies in meeting
maximum Soviet capabilities in the Palestine area."
Israel's Contribution
(Continued from page 1)
captured in large quantities that enabled Israel to utilize them herself, thus
increasing her own air-defense capabilities significantly. It was only natural
that the U.S. received generous samples
of everything. Thus, as a result of
Israeli successes, the U.S. was able to
examine most of the current Soviet Air
Defense Systems, ranging from the
towed DSchK M-46 and ZU-23-2 to
the self-propelled ZSUI-57-2 and the
highly sophisticated ZSU-23-4. The
latter is considered to be the world's
most efficient Anti-Aircraft gun.
Unconfirmed reports add a variety
of items to this list. They mention missiles such as the lethal SA-6 and the
AA-2, the Soviet standard Air-to-Air
missile. Other reports go so far as to
claim capture of complete squadrons intact, large quantities of electronic equipment and even Soviet
advisors. None of the above reports
have been confirmed or denied by
Israeli sources.
Clearly, then, during the past 30
years, Israel has been supplying the
U.S. with vital intelligence items. They
range from sensational texts, such as
Khrushchev's speech, to routine supply of Soviet data and captured documents; from complete weapon systems such as tanks and missiles, to
parts of damaged systems. This continuous contribution has the long term
effect of helping form the U.S. perception of the Soviet threat as well as
the development of U.S. present and
future weapon systems.
Selling Additional F-15 Equipment to Saudi Arabia:
Does it Enhance American Foreign Policy?
There is a push on to supply to Saudi
Arabia additional equipment for the
60 F15 fighter bombers that country
has ordered from the United States.
The added hardware-conformal fuel
tanks and multiple ejection bomb
racks-alter the role of the airplane
from interceptor to ground attack
bomber, from an aircraft useful for
keeping Saudi Arabia's airspace clear
of intruders to a weapon that can reach
far beyond Arabia's boundaries. It
affects the balance of power in many
ways. One result is a change in the
warning time for an attack. Saudi Arabia can attack Israel, for example,
without mustering her aircraft at a base
close to Israel's territory. Instead she
can operate from distant bases beyond
the eyes and ears of Israel's early warning network.
life!;"!4 jjjJA
!Airways.
There is, therefore, no doubt that
Israel is negatively affected if Saudi
Arabia actually gets the extra equipment. But there are a number of foreign policy experts and commentators,
opinion makers and leaders, who are
ready to trade off the down-side risk
to Israel because they view the sale
of the additional equipment to Saudi
Arabia as consistent with American
foreign policy goals.
We need not concern ourselves here
either with the hired guns or the apologists. Rather, we must take into account the arguments of specialists who
are pressing for the sale to go through.
Are they right? Does the provision
of this additional hardware to Saudi
Arabia enhance U.S. foreign policy?
In a nutshell their basic argument
runs as follows. Saudi Arabia, they
say, is a large country open to attack
from many directions. The Royal Saudi
Armed Forces must defend this vast
territory and must be able to move
forces swiftly to distant points. There
is a huge airspace to patrol, and there
are vital oil wells, pumping facilities,
pipelines, storage tanks and anchorages
to protect. If the U.S. is prepared to
come to the defense of Saudi Arabia
if it is attacked, then it is reasonable,
in their view, to make available to that
country the hardware to do the job itself.
These analysts contend that we have
a huge stake in Saudi Arabia and we
really have no alternative. They see
Israel as relatively secure because of
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and
the Iran-Iraq conflict. And they see a
(Continued on page 3)
I l; i nr;
Horse Trading
The administration has announced an important change in policy in
connection with its proposed sale of additional equipment for F-15's
already purchased by Saudi Arabia. Israel has been told the administra-
The F-15 Eagle "B" with conformal fuel tanks and multiple ejection bomb racks. This aircraft is carrying 22 five hundred pound
bombs. The Eagle B has not been procured for the U.S. Air Force.
Page 3
February 1981
F-15
(Continued from page 2)
greater congruence
between U.S. -
Saudi policy than U.S.-lsrael policy,
particularly on matters concerning the
stability of the Arab regimes.
But are the experts right? Is our
posture toward Saudi Arabia entirely
correct? Are we serving our interests
by selling the most sophisticated equipment we have to offer to Saudi Arabia?
Are we helping Saudi Arabia and ourselves in the most effective manner?
If the experts and opinion makers
in our country sometimes take pokes
at Israel because her policy diverges
from U.S. policy the fact is there are
some very serious divisions betweenthe
United States and Saudi Arabia. These
divisions only rarely are given any pubrelations
attention-Saudi-U.S.
lic
are delicate and too much sounding off
may make matters worse, not better.
But this general silence tends to hide
real differences from public consideration and that, in turn, stimulates a selfinduced foreign policy blind spot.
A closer look at some of the differences in policy may well help to
prompt a reconsideration of whether
we should go ahead with the sale of additional hardware for the Saudi Arabian FI5's.
The United States and Saudi Arabia
are rather far apart on the question of
international terrorism. We are told
that the traditional regime of Saudi
Arabia feels as threatened by terrorism
as anyone else and is only constrained
by local and regional pressures from
doing anything about it. But this "explanation" does not hold much water
given the actual performance of the
Saudis in recent years. Saudi Arabia
is, after all, one of the major political
and financial backers of the Palestine
Liberation Organization which, on its
own and in cooperation with other international terror organizations, not
only wages war against Israel but also
is involved in operations against U.S.
and Western interests around the
world. Nicaragua and El Salvador are
cases in point. Indeed, the Saudis give
almost blind support to the PLO and
this adds to America's problems in the
Middle East, in Europe and in Central and Latin America. It even backfires on the Saudis occasionally. The
PLO, as is well known, provided considerable support to the Iranian revolution and the toppling of the Shah.
The replacement regime led by Khomeini and the Mullahs has tried on
more than one occasion to destabilize
Saudi Arabia by stirring up Shi'a Moslems and dissidents. This, in turn,
has forced the Saudis to take some draconian security measures at home.
Rather than reducing support for the
PLO in light of the negative impact
of PLO activities on Saudi security,
the Riyadh government actually has
been stepping up its backing of that
organization. This became clear most
recently at the Third Islamic Summit
Conference at Taif, where the PLO
was given a prominent role. According
to the distinguished Middle East correspondent Eric Rouleau ("Increased
Support for the PLO" Le Monde
22 January 1981), the Taif conference
resulted in a pledge of economic and
military support for the PLO of between S300 and S400 million. With
such an income on top of the normally
fat PLO collections and backup, training, and arms support from the U.S.
S.R. and Warsaw Pact countries, the
amount and degree of PLO troublemaking worldwide is bound to increase.
This runs against the official policy of
the Reagan administration which has
pledged itself to thwart international
terrorism and it enhances the ability
of the Soviet Union to cause trouble
for the United States and the West.
The experts need to take this into account in evaluating U.S. arms sales
to Saudi Arabia. Giving the Soviets
a relatively free ride does present major problems,
U.S. and Saudi policy have other
major differences. One important one
is the Camp David peace process. Saudi
Arabia is a major factor in trying to
overturn the agreements and the peace
treaty between Israel and Egypt. Much
more is involved than a regional agree-
ment. America's prestige is very much
on the line. The consistent verbal attacks by Saudi Arabia on the agreement, the financing of the opposition,
and the technique of using that opposition as the basis for an "elusive" Arab
unity undermines our most basic objectives in the region. Indeed, it can be
fairly said that Saudi Arabia is trying
to increase its prestige directly at America's expense-but that prestige is being built on top of a tinderbox.
There are other, serious differences.
One involves nuclear proliferation. It
is reliably reported that Saudi Arabia has agreed to finance Pakistan's
three projects aimed at producing
nuclear weapons. While the exact
dimensions of the deal are not known,
the acquisition of nuclear weapons either by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or
both, is sure to bear on superpower
policy in the Middle East. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union
have exercised caution in approaching
the nuclear threshhold in that region,
notwithstanding the alert called in
1973 when the Soviets shipped nuclear
warheads to Egypt. If Pakistan gets
the bomb, this is certainly going to affect Soviet and American policy. The
Soviets may decide to take the bull
by the horns and provoke an IndianPakistani war or destablize Pakistan.
They may speed up other actionstargeting Iran or even Saudi Arabia itself. There are already reports of the
reorganization of Soviet fighting forces near Iran's border, and military
installations in Afghanistan well in
reach of the Persian Gulf are being prepared. Growing local nuclear weapons
preparations may speed up Soviet
planning, despite problems elsewhere
(e.g., Poland). Quite naturally, this
presents problems fo the United States
which is presently unprepared to blunt
Soviet intrusion in the Persian Gulf
-South Asia region. Certainly it
is in our interest to try and convince
the Saudis that it is in neither their
interest nor in ours to promote nuclear weapons proliferation,, particularly at this time. Arms sales to that
country ought to be responsive to the
NEWSLETTER
of the
JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
P.O. Box 57128, Washington, D.C. 20037
(301) 587-7999
The Jewish Institute is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security,
and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.
Board of Advisors
Senator Rudy Boschwitz
Clifford P. Case
I.L. Kenen
Professor Walter Laqueur
Eugene Rostow
Edward Sanders
Richard Schifter, President
Seymour Abensohn
Stanford Adelstein
Rabbi Leon Adler
Herschel Auerbach
Stanley Baruch
Stanley Berenzweig
William Bryen
Clement Caditz
Elliot H. Cole
Brant Coopersmith
Herman Elbin
Herbert A. Fierst
Martin Fridovich
Howard I. Friedman
Norman 1. Gelman
Leon Genet
Dr. Leon Gerber
Douglas Giant
Nathan Golden
Robert Goldmann
Carl Henry
Max M. Kampelman
Rabbi Gilbert Klaperman
Leo Kramer
Mrs. Cecile Landrum
Michael Ledeen
Rabbi Shmuel Lefkowitz
Lewis R. Lehrman
Allen Lesser
Richard Levy
Bryan Littlefield
Theodore R. Mann
Robert B. Meyersburg
General John Vogt (Ret.)
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (Ret.)
Board of Directors
Alfred H. Moses
Steven Penchina
Maxwell Rabb
Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz
Mrs. Susan Rolnick
Steven Rosen
Richard R. Rosenbaum
Lyle S. Ryter
Prof. David Sidorsky
Prof. Seymour Siegel
Saul I. Stern
Bruno Weinschel
Robert I. Widder
Leonard Zax
Marc Zell
Mrs. Harriet Zimmerman
Dr. Stephen D. Bryen,
Executive Director
broader strategic dilemmas facing the
area-and there badly needs to be common ground in formulating, exercising,
and promoting mutual interests. Finally, it cannot be ruled out that locally produced nuclear bombs might one
wind up strapped under the fuselage
of a Saudi F-15.
If there is a divergence in policy
over nuclear proliferation another area
of difference may blossom over Saudi
accomodation of Iraq and, inter alia,
the Soviet Union. America has been
bidding on Iraq for more than three
years, but little in the way of agreement
has been reached. Indeed, the differences are severe and, despite policy
differences between Iraq and the Soviet
Union, those ties remain tight. Furthermore, despite America's complete
lack of leverage with Iran, as the hostage crisis illustrates, the long range
strategic importance of Iran cannot be
be discounted. Iran is the key to the
Persian Gulf, as its long border with
the Soviet Union and the Gulf demonstrates. A temporary rapprochement between Iraq and the United
States may provide some breathing
space, but it is entirely unclear where
such a deal could lead. Policy risks may
well outweight any benefits. Considerable caution is needed.
There is no present evidence of caution when it comes to Saudi-Iraqi
relations. Ideologically the Saudis
feel increasingly close to Iraq, mostly
because both oppose the Shi'a resurgence in the area and both have a keen
dislike of Israel. But there are some
real problems in this arrangement.
One is the kinship of Iraq with the
U.S.S.R. and the fact that Iraq, despite
its protests to the contrary, acts as an
instrument of Soviet foreign policy.
If the Saudis are building a bridge
they must know they will be asked
to do some things that carry serious
risks to their own security.
And they have. On the outbreak of
the Iraq-Iran war, Tupolev bombers
of the Iraqi Air Force were moved to
Saudi air fields so as to be secure
from Iranian air strikes. These bombers
are a type that can carry nuclear wea-
pons and Iraq, like Pakistan, has a
nuclear weapons program underway.
Later, when the Saudis recognized
what they had done, the Tupolevs
were moved to Jordan.
More recently, as reported by Reuters, Saudi Arabia has opened its ports
to Soviet and Eastern European flag
vessels carrying Russian-made arms, including 100 modern battle tanks,
bound for Iraq. After unloading, the
weapons are being trucked hundreds
of miles to Iraq. This arrangement implies that the Soviets and Bloc countries are doing business with Saudi
Arabia. This presents problems for the
United States that cannot be wished
away.
Finally, there are some real U.S. and
Saudi differences on how to counter
the increasing Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia is not helping
the United States in its effort to build
a presence in the region. To the contrary, Saudi Arabia officially opposes
any U.S. presence - in particular it
has no intention of giving the U.S. access to bases on its own soil. In addition, despite the clear recognition by
the United States of Israel as an important strategic asset, Saudi Arabia
is mustering its considerable resources
to break that relationship. All of this
has the affect of complicating further
our already complicated logistical and
military problems in the area. The idea,
pushed by the Saudis, of a local system
of self-defense, perhaps on paper
reasonable, makes no sense in the real
world or, for that matter, in addressing
the Soviet threat.
There is also the "jihad syndrome"
-a policy initiative first kicked off
last summer by the Saudis and put into
cement at the Taif conference, that is
simply inconsistent with the U.S. foreign policy goals and opens up opportunities for the Soviets and their most
radical clients. Jihad means Holy War
and it means it in a way that is characteristically frenzied. Hinging Middle
East politics on jihad is a counterproductive, perhaps irresponsible, action that is bound to have many un(Conlinued on page 4)
GeneralBurke to Speak in
Long Beach
JINSA Board Member Bryan (Whitey) Littlefield will host a reception in
honor of l.ieutenant General Kelly H.
Burke, USAF 14 April 1981 in Long
Members and
Beach,
California.
friends of JINSA in the Long Beach
area will be invited to meet General
Burke, who is deputy chief of staff,
Research, Development and Acquisition at the Pentagon.
General Burke is a command pilot
with more than 8,000 flying hours
including 775 combat hours in a variety
of aircraft. His military decorations
and awards include the Distinguished
Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star
Medal, Meritorious Service Medal
with one oak leaf cluster, Presidential Unit Citation emblem and Air
Force Outstanding Unit Award ribbon
with one oak leaf cluster.
His initial flying assignment was at
Charleston Air Force Base, S.C., where
he was a pilot and aircraft commander
in the C-21 transport. He then transferred to Yokota Air Base, Japan,
as an aircraft commander and instructor pilot flying WB-50 weather reconnaissance aircraft. After serving as operations officer of the 54th Weather
Reconnaissance Squadron in Guam,
Burke was assigned as a legislative
liaison specialist in the Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.
Upon graduation from the Naval
War College in 1968, General Burke
was assigned to Thailand as an EC-
121 aircraft commander with the 553rd
Reconnaissance
Squadron and as
United States Air Force liaison officer
with the United States Military Assistance Command in Bangkok. He was
stationed in England from 1969-1971 as
an exchange officer with the Royal
Air Force, serving as senior United
States Air Force advisor to the Royal
Air Force Staff College, where he also
completed the prescribed curriculum.
In 1971 General Burke was assigned
to the Strategic Air Command for the
first time as assistant deputy commander for maintenance, 410th Bombardment Wing, K.I. Sawyer Air Force
Base, Michigan. In 1972, he served in
a temporary duty status as vice commander, 43rd Strategic Wing, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam. He then returned to the 410th Bombardment
Wing as vice commander. He was assigned as commander of the 379th
Bombardment Wing, Wurtsmith Air
Force Base, Michigan in 1973. He assumed command of SAC's largest
wing, the 2nd Bombardment Wing,
Barksdale Air Force Base, La., in 1974.
He was assigned to SAC headquarters,
Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., as assistant deputy chief of staff, plans, in
1975 and became deputy chief of staff,
plans in 1977. In October 1978, General Burke was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force as the director
of operational requirements, Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research
Development and Acquisition. He assumed his present duty in November
1979.
Page 4
February 1981
F-15
News Briefs
(Continued from page 3)
(Continued from page 1)
toward consequences. Certainly jihad
belies moderation and foments trouble.
The last thing the West needs in the oil
fields is more trouble.
This partial listing of differences
between the United States and Saudi
Arabia does not liquidate the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United
States, Europe and Japan, but it does
suggest that how we conduct our policy
toward that country is important.
Much more is involved than Israel
-indeed, the future of the Gulf region is at stake. There are experts and
there are experts, and there are some
who believe that important decisions
concerning Saudi Arabia need to be
tempered by policy considerations over
and above responding to demands for
this or that military item. There need
to be tradeoffs and a structure of relations that reflect common political
goals. There is convincing evidence
of differences in outlook much broader
than the Arab-Israeli dispute: differences on assessing the strategic equation. Quite serious matters. Matters
that are on an order of magnitude of
war and peace. Matters that bear
directly on our national security.
Some believe we have to take what
we get because we are dependent on
foreign oil imports and on Saudi oil
particularly. That is the fatalist approach, but it has a following here and
abroad. Others think we have to do
better, and that too much is at stake
merelyto appease big appetities. There
is something to be said for the latter
view.
months and there is one unconfirmed
report of a Backfire bomber overflight
of U.S. airspace. For some time now
there have been frequent Soviet overflights of European airspace. It is generally regarded that these runs are
made to test air defenses, reaction time,
and procedures involved in countering
local defenses. The Bear bombers are
widely regarded to be equipped with
elaborate snooping equipment.
Deployment Temporarily Reduced.
The two-carrier task force U.S. pre-
sence in the Indian Ocean was temporarily reduced to one after the hostage crisis ended. The carrier Independence, cruiser Harry Yarnell and destroyer Charles F.Adams took a temporary leave to Australia. Secretary
of Defense Caspar Weinberger ananounced in early February the U.S.
intention to maintain a two-carrier
battle group in the Indian Ocean.
Windfalls for Defense. The Washington Star proposes using the windfall
profit tax to finance an increased U.S.
defense effort. According to the Star
the current use of the windfall profits
tax is a "rather thoughtless formula. . ." (According to the Star, 60
percent of the tax is used to tax offsets, 25 percent for low income groups,
15 percent for synthetic energy and
transportation investment.) Instead of
repealing the windfall profits tax, the
Star suggests that the approximately
$227 billion to be raised over the next
ten years would more than cover the
increase in defense spending projected
by the Reagan administration over a
similar period. "(The) decade-long
term of the tax," says the Star, "would
JINSA Briefs
SPEAKERS SERIES
JINSA provides
experienced speakers
on national defense subjects
Call 301-587-7999
for information
Film Fest. JINSA's Breakfast Series
in Washington moves to a special format on Sunday, February 22. A special
film fest will be shown for JINSA
members at the new Israeli Embassy
in Washington. The films are: "The
Merkava Tank," "A Question of Survival," and "War Against Terrorism."
Host for the program is Major Shimon
for the program is Major Shimon
Heifitz, Assistant Military Attache at
the Embassy. Other speakers will be
announced.
President Schifter in Geneva. Richard
Schifter, President of JINSA, is currently serving abroad in a diplomatic
post. He will spend six weeks in Geneva
as Associate Delegate to the United
Nations Conference on Human Rights.
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Ship Ahoy. John F. Lehman Jr., has
bcn
confirmed as Secretary of the
Navy. Lehman has been a close friend
of JINSA and was a speaker at JINSA's Pentagon Fly-In held this past
October. Keenly aware of what has to
be done to rebuild our naval forces,
Secretary Lehman stressed, at his first
meeting with the Senate Armed Services Committee, the need to get on with
the job.
NJCRA C Conference. The National
Jewish Community Relations Advisory
Council, an umbrella organization
representing major national Jewish
organizations and community councils around the country, considered and
passed a motion at its recent meeting
in San Diego endorsing the need for a
strong U.S. national defense program.
Dr. StephenBryen, Executive Director of JINSA, spoke at the conference
on behalf of the resolution. NJCRAC
has also endorsed Washington International Report, the weekly radio news
program
produced in cooperation with
JINSA.
Cincinnati Meeting. JINSA was invited
to give a briefing to members of the
Community Relations Council in Cincinatti in January. Other meetings
around the country are planned in coming months.
1
New Board of Directors Members.
The following have been elected to
serve on JINSA's Board of Directors:
2*:
n
2:
P
es
2:
Mike Fridovich (Florida); Leon Genet
(New Jersey); Douglas Giant (Seattle); Rabbi Gilbert Klapperman; Rabbi
Shmuel Lefkowitz (Brooklyn); Lewis
Lehrman (New York); Alfred Moses
(Washington, D.C.); Herman Elbin
(New York); Bryan Littlefield (Long
Beach, Ca.); Stephen Penchina (New
York); Maxwell Rabb (New York);
Stephen Rosen (Gaithersburg, Md.);
Richard R. Rosenbaum (Rochester);
Professor David Sidorsky (New York);
Leonard Zax (Washington, D.C.);
Marc Zell (Washington, D.C.); Harriet
Zimmerman (Atlanta); Herschel Auerbach (Chicago);
York).
r aF
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Carl
Henry
(New
just about see the country through a
period when we need a maximum effort
to rebuild defenses from their depleted
state. . .Apart from the need to assure
that our strategic capacity is indeed
'second to none,' perhaps the most
pressing defense need is to prepare for
any direct challenges to energy supply,
in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. In
that respect, windfall-tax revenues and
defense needs are logically linked,
and the investment of the one in the
other is as plausible and defensible as
any such connection could be."
Suggested Reading. Charles C. Moskos
in Public Interest, Fall 1980 "How to
Save the All-Volunteer Force," Martin
Binkin "Military Manpower in the
1980's: Issues and Choices" in International Security Review, Fall, 1980.
-two rather different treatments of
the manpower problem, both tending
toward trying to preserve the "AVA"
or all-voluntary Army.
Budget Committee Report. A study
by the House Budget Committee released in late January calls for a 5 percent real growth in the U.S. military
budget for the next five years. About
half of the increase recommended
would be used, according to the report,
to recruit, train and arm five new U.S.
armored divisions and bring up to
strength the army's 21 divisions. The
second largest expenditure recommended by the report is to build three
new aircraft carriers, bringing the total
number of U.S. carriers to 16. The
study calls for increased compensation
for military men to retain skilled people
and gain new recruits. Under the House
Budget Committee recommendations,
some 200,000 additional men would be
needed for the additional army and
navy slots.
President Reagan on the
Middle East, PLO
(Editor's note. President Ronald Reagan gave a press interview on February 2
to a group of five reporters. We present some excerpts concerning the Middle
East and the PLO.)
Q. Mr. President. .. you've indicated, or I think you hinted, that you would
use arms to prevent any Soviet move in the Persian Gulf to cut off oil to the
United States. My question is, are we capable, now, militarily, of backing up
that threat?
A. Well, no, now. It was the President that said, during the campaign, we'd
use armed force in the Persian Gulf area. And at the timel said that he had to
admit a short time later that we didn't have the force to do this.
What I have called for, and what I think is needed as we refurbish our
capability, is a presence in the Middle East. And I think this is something we
ought to also take up with our own allies in Europe, because there would be
total disaster to the European economy if there was an interference with the
energy supply; they're far more dependent on it than we are.
But what I mean by a presence was that-not the stationingQ. That's what I was referring to, this presence.
A. Yes. Not the stationing of enough American troops that you say we could
stop the Soviet Union if they set out to advance logistically; we know that we
couldn't do that.
What is meant by a presence is that we're there enough to know and for the
Soviets to know that if they made a reckless move, they would be risking a
confrontation with the United States.
Q. Why wouldn't that be-that such a presence, though, if there isn't the
military to back it up-be an empty threat that the Soviets could see through?
A. Well, it's not-you don't just plant a flag in the ground and walk away
and leave it. There would be Americans there. But I think there should be some
kind of American presence. Well, we're doing it right now with the Navy in the
Indian Ocean, But I think we need a ground presence also.
But it's based on the assumption-and I think a correct assumption-the
Soviet Union is not ready yet to take on that confrontation which could
become World War
11I. They would like to be able to continue making gains
without conflict. And I think that a presence there indicates that, all right, this
is of interest to our national security, our presence there. And they're going to
have to take that into their computations.
Q. Mr. President, in Israel there appears to be an accelerating settling of the
West Bank. First, do you approve of that? And, secondly, is yours an evenhanded policy in the Mideast?
A. I believe that we have, Number I, a moral commitment for the present to
see that the state of Israel has a right to continue living as a nation. I believe
that, and think that we're morally bound to that. But beyond that, I think it's
also a two way street.
I think that Israel, being a country sharing our same ideals, I think democratic
approach to things, with a combat-ready and even a combat-experienced
military, is a force in the Middle East that is actually of benefit to us.
But I also feel that morally the United States should do everything it can, in
an even-handed manner, to bring peace to the Middle East.
Now, this, based on our first commitment, means that we have to get over
the hurdle of those nations in the Middle East that refuse to recognize the right
of Israel to exist. Peace will come when that first step is taken. Now a few of
them have-as Egypt did; and Sadat, who I think is one of the great statesmen
for doing that.
As to the West Bank, I believe the settlements there- I disagreed when the
previous Administration referred to them as illegal, they're not illegal. Not
under the UN resolution that leaves the West Bank open to all people-Arab
and Israeli alike, Christian alike.
I do think perhaps now with this rush to do it and this moving in there the
way they are is ill-advised because if we're going to continue with the spirit of
Camp David to try and arrive at peace, maybe, at this time, is unnecessarily
provocative.
Q. Just about the moral obligation toward Israel, do you have any sympathy
toward the Palestinians or any moral feeling toward them and their
aspirations?
A. I know that that's got to be a part of any settlement. I think in arriving at
that, here again, there is the outspoken utterance that Israel doesn't have a
right to exist; there is the terrorism that is being practiced by the P.L.O. I
never thought that the P.L.O. had ever been elected by the Palestinians. Maybe
it is recognized by them as their leadership, but I've never seen that that's been
definitely established.
But, again, it starts with the aceptance of Israel as a nation.