Secure Internet of Things Project

Transcription

Secure Internet of Things Project
Secure Internet of
Things Project
Philip Levis, Stanford
Computer Forum Internet of Things Workshop
April 14, 2016
Stanford University
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The Internet of Things (IoT)
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A Security Disaster
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HP conducted a security
analysis of IoT devices1
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80% had privacy concerns
80% had poor passwords
70% lacked encryption
60% had vulnerabilities in UI
60% had insecure updates
1http://fortifyprotect.com/HP_IoT_Research_Study.pdf
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Securing the Internet of Things
• Secure Internet of Things Project
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5 year project (just started second year)
12 faculty collaborators
3 universities: Stanford, Berkeley, and Michigan
• Rethink IoT systems, software, and applications
from the ground up
• Make a secure IoT application as easy as a
modern web application
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This Talk
• Technology trends: why today?
• Security: why is it so hard?
• Research: what we’re doing
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Architectural principles
A brief overview of talks today
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The EmNets Vision
•  “Information technology (IT) is on the verge of
another revolution… The use of EmNets
[embedded networks] throughout society could
well dwarf previous milestones.” 1
•  “The motes [EmNet nodes] preview a future
pervaded by networks of wireless batterypowered sensors that monitor our environment,
our machines, and even us.” 2
1 National Research Council. Embedded, Everywhere, 2001.
2 MIT Technology Review. 10 Technologies That Will Change the World, 2003.
15.iii.2005
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Stanford Interview Talk
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Two Game-Changers
• ARM Cortex M series
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First released 2004
Ultra-low power 32-bit processor
8-96kB of RAM, 64-512kB code flash
Sleep currents recently dropped <1µA
• Bluetooth Low Energy
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First released in 2006
Send a 30 byte packet once per second,
last for a year on a coin cell battery
Support was weak until Apple
incorporated into iBeacon, now all major
smartphones include it
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Example Part: nRF51822
• Cortex M0+ with integrated 2.4GHz transceiver
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Supports Bluetooth Low Energy
Two models: 32kB/256kB or 16kB/128kB
• DigiKey cost for 25,000: $1.99
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This Talk
• Technology trends: why today?
• Security: why is it so hard?
• Research: what we’re doing
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Architectural principles
A brief overview of talks today
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IoT Security is Hard
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Complex, distributed systems
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103-106
differences in resources across tiers
Many languages, OSes, and networks
Specialized hardware
embedded C
(ARM, avr, msp430)
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Just developing applications is hard
Securing them is even harder
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3G/4G,
TCP/IP
Enormous attack surface
Reasoning across hardware, software, languages, devices, etc.
What are the threats and attack models?
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Valuable data: personal, location, presence
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Rush to development + hard ➔ avoid, deal later
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Ruby/Rails,
Python/Django,
J2EE, PHP, Node.js
Obj-C/C++, Java,
Swift, Javascript/HTML 23
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This Talk
• Technology trends: why today?
• Security: why is it so hard?
• Research: what we’re doing
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Architectural principles
A brief overview of talks today
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Architectural Principles
• Longevity: these systems will last for up to 20
years and their security must too.
• Transparency: we must be able to observe what
our devices are saying about us.
• End-to-end: consider security holistically, from
data generation to end-user display.
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Architectural Principles
• Longevity: these systems will last for up to 20
years and their security must too.
• Transparency: we must be able to observe what
our devices are saying about us.
• End-to-end: consider security holistically, from
data generation to end-user display.
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1995: SSL 0.2
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Flexible Crypto Hardware
• Devices need to be able to support ciphers that
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are used 20 years from now
Add extensible cryptographic accelerator: silicon is
cheap and BLE dominates the SoC
Designing a 20-year crypto processor
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Symmetric crypto: S-boxes and vectors, an instruction set
Public key crypto: several very different constructions
What if quantum computers are real in 20 years?
• There is often unused micro controller die area
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11:20 - 11:40, Kevin Kiningham
CESEL
Symmetric ciphers
Vector arithmetic
MCU Core
(Cortex M)
ECC public-key operations
RNG, atomic counter
RNG/CTR
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Polynomial mult.
Post-quantum public key
Memory bus
ECC
co-processor
S-Boxes
R-LWE
Processor
SHA-2, SHA-3
Fast
hash function
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11:40 - 12:00, Ben Lampert
Random Numbers
Symmetric ciphers
Vector arithmetic
MCU Core
(Cortex M)
ECC public-key operations
RNG, atomic counter
RNG/CTR
Secure Internet of Things Project (SITP)
Polynomial mult.
Post-quantum public key
Memory bus
ECC
co-processor
S-Boxes
R-LWE
Processor
SHA-2, SHA-3
Fast
hash function
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11:00 - 11:20, Amit Levy
Tock: A Secure, Embedded OS
• Written in Rust, a type-safe systems language
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Microkernel design
Kernel has small trusted base of unsafe code
Applications can load safe kernel modules for drivers
• Applications can be written in any language
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System call interface requires applications allocate memory for
kernel calls
Kernel can grant direct register access (CortexM MPU operates
at 32 byte granularity)
• Systems challenges
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Concurrency models
Event-driven memory safety
high address
TRNG
Kernel Stack
App specific
Kernel memory
low address
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Memory Mapped I/O
Second App Memory
First App Memory
Code
App code
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Architectural Principles
• Longevity: these systems will last for up to 20
years and their security must too.
• Transparency: we must be able to observe what
our devices are saying about us.
• End-to-end: consider security holistically, from
data generation to end-user display.
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Model Today
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Transport-layer security (TLS) between
devices and cloud services
Internet applications: we control one end point
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Can install new certificates, observe data
IoT applications: we are a transit network
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Can’t see or control what happens on either end
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Intrusion Detection
• How do we build an intrusion detection system for
our smart home?
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Can’t see what data our devices are transmitting
They could be compromised and we’ll never know
• Enterprises solve this by installing new certificates
on endpoints, allow IDS to look inside TLS, filter
trojan horses from email, etc.
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We don’t control these devices, can’t install new certificates
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10:00 - 10:20, Judson Wilson Keith Winstein
TLS - Rotate and Release
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Transport Layer Security Rotate and Release
A trusted auditor
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can decrypt all traffic
but not forge traffic (hard part!)
Four operating modes that
together are compatible with
all versions of TLS
auditor
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Architectural Principles
• Longevity: these systems will last for up to 20
years and their security must too.
• Transparency: we must be able to observe what
our devices are saying about us.
• End-to-end: consider security holistically, from
data generation to end-user display.
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2:30 - 2:50, Holly Chiang
2:50 - 3:10, Joanne Lo
3:10 - 3:30, Meghan Clark
Applications!
• Applications drive and inform all this research
• Water conservation in a Stanford dorm
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Holly Chiang, 2:30 - 2:50
• Wearable, smart technology in everyday objects
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Joanne Lo, 2:50 - 3:10
• Personal telepresence in the home
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Meghan Clark, 3:10 - 3:30
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1:55 - 2:15, Laurynas Riliskis
Ravel Framework
• Write a distributed model view controller pipeline
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Models, views, controllers. transforms. and spaces
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1:15 - 1:35, Rohit Ramesh
1:35 - 1:55, Luke Hsiao
Device Generation
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Applications involve software and hardware
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Hardware/software boundary is difficult
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Embedded devices are application specific
Refining a design is easier than writing from scratch
Idea: generate a prototype device from
software specification, allow a programmer
to tweak
Two problems
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How does one compile the embedded device?
Compiler must have a library of components to use:
where does it come from?
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10:20 - 10:40, Chang Lan
Securing Middleboxes
• All networks today depend on middleboxes
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Firewalls, optimizers, NATs, intrusion detection
The IoT will be no different
• Outsourcing this functionality into the cloud has
many advantages
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Simplicity, management, aggregation: network as a service
• Is it possible to securely outsource this
functionality (perform it on encrypted data)?
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Day’s Schedule
8:30am - 9:30am
9:30am - 9:40am
9:40am - 10:00am
10:00am - 10:20am
10:20am - 10:40am
10:40am - 11:00am
11:00am - 11:20am
11:20am - 11:40am
11:40am - Noon
Noon - 1:15pm
1:15pm - 1:35pm
1:35pm - 1:55pm
1:55pm - 2:15pm
2:15pm - 2:30pm
2:30pm - 2:50pm
2:50pm - 3:10pm
3:10pm ; 3:30pm
3:30pm - 3:45pm
3:45pm - 4:15pm
4:15pm - 6:00pm
welcome and check-in
Introductions:The IoT Revolution and Our Research in IoT
Secure Internet of Things Project
Auditing IoT Communications with TLS-RaR
Embark: Securely Outsourcing Middleboxes to the Cloud
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Tock, a Secure Embedded Operating System
Hardware Support for Long-Term Cryptographic Flexibility
A Fast, Cheap, High-Entropy Source for IoT Devices
lunch
Embedded Device Generation: Turning Software into Hardware
Automatically Building a Component Library from Datasheets
Programming IoT Applications with Ravel
break
An Energy-Harvesting and Reliable Water Flow Sensor
Incognito Wearables: Seamlessly Incorporating Fashion and Function
The Haunted House:Virtual Shared Living over a Home-to-Home
Network,
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Innovation in a Post Moore's Law World: Another View of IoT
reception
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overview
networks
systems
programs
applications
looking forward
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Why Now?
• Technology has just reached the tipping point
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BLE, iBeacon
Cortex M series
Sensors
Harvesting circuits
• We've been waiting
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Leaders in prototyping, cryptographic computation, IoT
networking, secure systems, analytics, and hardware design
What are the threats? Application attackers?
• But it's still early enough
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Most big applications haven't been thought of yet
Let's not repeat the web (as good as it is for publications)
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Thank you!
State Farm
SystemX Alliance
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