- Graduate Institute of International and Development

Transformations of violence
in twentieth-century Ethiopia:
cultural roots, political conjunctures
Jan Abbink
In his remarkable essay L'Homme révolté of
1951, Albert Camus characterized thé twentieth centuiy as an era of 'premeditated murder', of large-scale and well-planned political violence, whereby philosophy (ideology)
could serve any purpose, even to turn the
murderers into the judges (Camus 1951:13).
This is what bas happened in numerous civil
and régional conflicts in thé years since he
wrote thèse words, from China to Argentina,
from Guatemala to Cambodia. Blissfully ignorant of thé predictable regularities of history, political élites create a discourse and
practice of violence to reshape society in the
mirror of absolutist idéologies, often derived
from religions Systems and political utopias.
Another telling example of this kind is
Ethiopia, which once boasted to have had 'the
only real African socialist révolution' (1974),
but where thé 'revolutionary government'
developed into an unprecedented régime of
terror and violence which paralyzed society
and eut deep into its historical and cultural
fabric. The political and ideological aspects
of the revolutionary period (1974-1991) hâve
received much attention in thé more conventional political and sociological literature over
the past rwo decades (for example Markakis
& Nega 1978, Ottaway 1978, Lefort 1981,
Harbeson 1988, Keller 1988, Clapham 1988).
Obviously, a debate on how 'right' or 'wrong'
the revolutionary leaders were, or how successful in their efforts to advance thé cause
of 'modernization', 'development' or a 'just
socialist society', générâtes only little interest in thé face of thé abject record of failure
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
of the Ethiopian revolutionary state. lts legitimacy and its pretence of public achievements had already dissolved while it was still
in power. But its rôle in violentiy transforming mentality, attitudes and values of the
population not only with regard to the state
and toward politics as a relevant domain of
public life, but also toward fellow Ethiopians
bas been notable, and will be feit for décades
to corne. It is primarily in this sphère that thé
legacy of thé revolutionary period is to be
found, not merely in that of political developments and missed opportunities.1 Thus,
instead of digging out more of the political
developments ofthat time, a cultural and contextual interprétation should be made of the
roots, thé performance and thé effects of violence as a 'language', a discursive form, and
as a relatively autonomous phenomenon with
significant socio-cultural impact. The anthropological définition of violence used hère is
based on D. Riches (1991:295): violence is a
contested activity to forcefully intimidate,
dominate and inflict disabling physical harm
to others, with possible fatal results. The définition should also cover 'psychological violence', the state of terror in thé minds of people which can be thé resuit of the constant
threat of violence. When thé performance,
that is the ideological and instrumental exercise of violence, becomes a fact of life to which
people (hâve to) orient their daily oehaviour
one might speak of an emerging 'culture of
violence'. Although such a concept is problematic, it refers to thé possibility of a graduai
rooting of violence as a pattern and ideology
57
In retrospect, one might say that what makes
the 'Red Terror' period one of the most crucial in modern Ethiopian history is the scale
of thé violence and the aspect of impunity. It
was not only promoted and cultivated from
above, by state leaders and institutions in a
défiant and often public manner, without
impending rétribution. It was also carried out
by common local people who allied themselves with the new power-holders. Neighbours and relatives sometimes became enemies, preying upon each other. The regime
thus generalized the use of violence in society, so that it became a 'fact of life', decisively transforming public perceptions of any
possible legitimacy of the state as a kind of
reflection of the aspirations and wishes of the
population, and undermining the social fabric itself.
The comparatively peaceftü period of reconstruction and restructuring which Ethiopia
seems to go through after May 1991, continues to be marked by this legacy of violence.
Memories of terror and violent death have
been engrained in the minds and bodies of
the population, and are ever-present in the
country's collective memory. This collective
memory can be said to consist of the shared
but unarticulated recollection of expériences
of violence and intimidation, which were internalized by people and muted in expression.
This memory forms a frame of référence
which people recognize among each other,
but which is not openly talked about. lts behavioural effects are silence, caution and escape into the self, into private life. In addition, the public discourse in the Mengistu
years stood apart from the collective memory:
the former was an enforced 'revolutionary'
discourse, the limits of which were imposed
with force, exactly because they were so obvious for every one to see; it had no roots.
Questioning the forms, use and intensity of
violence was impossible: it was taken as an
intolérable criticism of state legitimacy. Thus,
the public discourse - which was no more than
an attempt to impose formai hegemony - was
that of the state, of policy and propaganda,
and suppressed or subsumed the collective
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
memory of violence as a daily practice among
the broad public.
As this collective memory still conditions
much of the behaviour of Ethiopians, it is
necessary to tracé its genesis. Therefore, I also
refer to the historical and cultural origins of
uses of violence in Ethiopian society in its
'traditional', that is pre-twentieth-century
form, its mobilization and transformation by
the revolutionary state, and some of its social
and cultural effects in the post-1991 period
of 'peace and reconciliation', where violence
- at least in the collective ideological form
Camus talked about - is absent.
Violence in Ethiopian politics
and culture
Violence bas been a dominant thème throughout Ethiopian history, as is evident from the
incessant campaigns of conquests and sanctioned looting, violent economie exploitation,
slave-raiding and banditry since circa two
millennia.2 But the perceptions of its legitimacy have varied. For our purposes, the position and attitude of the ruling classes in the
âges just before the twentieth Century is important. (We will direct our main attention to
highland state, which came to dominate the
area as a whole). In the hierarchical society
of médiéval and pre-modern Christian highland Ethiopia, traditional powerholders such
as the emperor, the provincial nobles and the
landowners - while in power and controlling
the means of violence, had a strong independent position - were bent on violently expanding their influence and wealth, and owed
much of their position to the exploitation of
peasant and serf labour. But they were not
above the law. There was a minimal system
of checks and balances, and they could not
get away with the use of arbitrary and indiscriminate violence against subordinates
(peasants, craftsmen, serfs, or vanquished
opponents) in their own domain. Religieus
leaders, especially the Christian monks, who
were often scions of important leading noble
59
families themselves, played an important part
in trying to curb the violent behaviour of
warlords and to instill self-control on these
'secular' powerholders, although often with
limited success. While their blessings and
prayers were also sought by military leaders
and kings, especially when fighting against
non-Christians (Kaplan 1984: 64-5), these
religieus men still upheld a kind of social
norm not to indulge to excesses (although the
médiéval text-sources are not explicit in describing this). As such the religieus holy man
was also a 'mediator' (ibidem: 70 S). Thus,
it appears that in the traditional social order
existed a built-in possibility to negotiate and
to make deals with those in power, in order
to avoid brutal fighting as the only politica!
option. Such an idea of balance in the Ethiopian political System in premodern times
(though not in the form of jurai constitutional
limits on royal power) was effective as well
during the reigns of emperors Tewodros,
Yohannis IV and Minilik II (d. 1913). The
idea was that whoever tried to appropriate
violence and force for his own ends undermined his own legitimacy and was going to
be called to account or would predictably face
rébellion.3 People could always appeal to
higher authorities and demand füll considération of their grievances. There was thus a
strong underlying idea in central Ethiopian
culture of the ultimate supremacy of justice
or law (Amharic: Higg), often expressed as
'the God of Law' (BeHigg Amlak).4 It was
an indigenous notion of fair treatment and
basic 'natural' rights of the person, rooted in
the values of the traditional rural culture.5 It
was supposedly shared by the common people. Any individual could even be called upon,
for example on the roadside, to give bis/her
opinion on matters of dispute, even if coming from another community.6
Gaitachew Bekele (1993: 6) mentions an
interesting story about Emperor Minilik II,
illustrating the same point. When Minilik
unjustly insulted one of the men in his service, the latter - who was in a dependent
position toward the Emperor - resigned,
saying: "Is this the way a king is expected to
60
use his God-given authority and power, to
abuse it as an instrument to the dictâtes of
his émotions instead of using it to adnumster
justice? Such a king does not deserve my service. From this moment I have resigned my
position in the service of the king and I also
curse my children if they should enter the
service of this king". Emperor Minilik shortly
afterwards realized that the mistake was his
own, and tried to reconcile. He sent mediators to the man and offered compensation.
But the latter refused, and never set foot in
the palace again. What the anecdote shows
is, of course, that in the perception and
memory of many Ethiopians, the former
emperors were great leaders and men of
honour, not ruling by blind force but trying
to respect people and to be just and fair in
their administration.
Also in the Chronicle of Abeto lyasu and
Queen Zewditu we find many références to
the value of this implicitly shared traditional
code of law and honour. The wives and
children of soldiers who fought in an
unjustified rebellions battle, should not be
victimized by the government in reprisals
(Gebre-Igziabiher 1994: 317-8). In the case
described, a lawyer on the government side
who showed too much arrogance7 toward the
vanquished was even flogged for his abusive
talk. The same source also records a speech
given by Queen Zewditu in 1916 (ibidem:
361), which emphasizes the values of proper
treatment of the dead: public mourning,
compassion, respect. Numerous références are
also found to the warrior code of fighting to
défend rights and honour instead of retreating
or fleeing (for example ibidem: 368). Members from the opposing parties also used to
praise each other unreservedly if they had
shown bravery and courage (ibidem: 372).
Former enemies were also expected to reconcile. There was no idea of completely crushing
or externünating the adversary: this, as we
will see below, was the achievement of a later era in Ethiopian history.
A possible exception was Emperor Tewodros (r. 1855-1868). He was known as an
extremely violent man, especially in the la-
ter years of his reign.s He was given to vehement and unpredictable outbursts of anger
and violence against his opponents or even
against people on his own side. When the later
Emperor Minilik II deserted him (escaping
thé royal compound under the cover of night),
Tewodros took bloody revenge on thé people
of the Wollo région, whom he perceived to
be Minilik's allies. In a devastating campaign
he killed many people and destroyed villages,
herds and crops. Hostages from Wollo who
were living in his compound had their limbs
eut off, and were then thrown down the
ravines. But Tewodros's behaviour was never
condoned or accepted by thé people in his
entourage - it was rejected as a politica! tactic.
Indeed, it was explained in terms of personal
pathology. Tewodros, it was said, could not
cope with thé death of his wife Tewabech and
with thé personal betrayal of some of his
closest protégés. In his vindictive and
outrageous violence, he thus seriously
transgressée the law, and the setbacks in the
later years of his reign as, well as bis suicide
during thé British punitive expédition in
1868, were seen by many contemporary
Ethiopians as directly related to this,
vindicating thé value of respecting thé proper code of law.
Colonial and domestic violence:
Ethiopia circa 1890-1930
Ethiopia's entry into modem world-history
can be dated to thé battle of Adua in 1896.
Although trade and other contacts between
Ethiopia and Europe had existed long before
that date, the Ethiopian military victory over
the Italian army bent on conquering northem
Ethiopia put the country on thé global map
and emphasized its importance as an
independent politica! entity to be reckoned
with.9 It was also the first large-scale violent
confrontation between Ethiopia and the West.
The nature of this battle is important.
Emperor Minilik n was able to raise a huge
populär army of circa 100,000 men on the
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
basis of the traditional levy method, having
made an effective appeal to the Ethiopian
people for the defence of the motherland and
its culture (see Gaitachew 1993: 24). The
well-armed Italian force of about 30,000 men
was crushed, with thousands made prisoner
of war. However, the survivors were treated
according to an Ethiopian military code of
honour, that is, they were cared for and treated
until they were able to return to their bases in
the Italian colony of Eritrea. They were even
escorted back, and could take all their
weapons. Many Ethiopian and foreign commentators have remarked that this was as an
incompréhensible military mistake: why this
clemency, which the Italians - had they been
victorious - would never have shown, and why
did not Minilik push on to force the Italians
out of Eritrea as well. While this criticism
shows historical incompréhension of the
difficult logistical and political situation in
the area (with the Italians well-entrenched
and heavily armed in Eritrea), the episode
itself certainly indicates a notable différence
in the fighting codes of the two opponents.
However, it must be said that Minilik was
not always that considerate, especially in his
engagement with ethm'cally and politically
different peoples, who did not share a basic
culture, world-view and religious identity as
Orthodox Christians or who were not
interlinked in trade and other economie
networks.10
The traditions of peoples surrounding the
médiéval Ethiopian highland state in the
south, west and east cannot be identified with
those of that state. Certainly many of these
groups, either independent pastoralists in the
lowlands or forming independent kingdoms
or chiefdoms in adjacent areas (cf. Mohammed 1990, Haberland 1993), were equally
marked by violent conflict and raiding and
often had similar warrior traditions as existed
in the Amhara-Tigray-speaking areas. They
did have frequent contacts with the highland
state either through trade, religious contacts,
raiding or war, but were politically not
incorporated. This process got under way in
the years preceding and immediately follow-
tf'-
ing the batlle of Adua. Minilik n then completed the conquest of these régions, begun in
the late 1880s.
This expansion should be interpreted in the
context of the imperialist designs of England,
Italy, Russia and France in Northeast Africa.
Minilik was in a hurry to expand his territory
to reinforce his bargaining position and to
maintain the independence of Ethiopia, but
in the course of this hè changed the nature of
regional power relations and made excessive
use of violence. An important event in this
respect was the incorporation of the kingdom
of Wolayta. This campaign of more than two
months proved to be so bloody and violent
that even army commanders on Minilik's side
were appalled. Wolayta, a rieh and densely
populated région of industrious farmers and
livestock-holders, resisted the conquest by the
Abyssinians led by Minilik, and under their
king T'ona they put up fierce résistance.11
This apparently infuriated the army of Minilik, who personally led the third and last
campaign against them in 1894. The famous
eyewitness account of the Belgian J. G.
Vanderheym says it all (1896). The soldiers
wantonly used destructive violence against
persons and property in a manner which no
longer served any real military purpose. For
the first time, women and children were a
major target, as they were maltreated, tortured
and killed in large numbers. The destruction
or looting of crops, livestock and property and
the enslavement of a large number of Wolayta
people left this kingdom broken, stripped and
subdued. Many people were also converted
tothe Christian faithbyforce. Miniükhimself
seems to have feit embarrassed by the excessive violence, but was either unable or unwilling to stop it.
The violence (conquest by the sword and
the gun, massacres, slave-raiding) used by the
Abyssinians in other campaigns in the south
(for example against the people of Harar, or
against the Gamo, the Ari, the Konso, the
Bench, the Me'en, the Dizi, the Arssi-Oromo,
or the Somali)12 bas undoubtedly contributed
to the problems of national identification and
cohésion which have been characteristic for
Ethiopia in recent decades.13 The manner of
unprovoked and excessive violence in this
conquest in the late nineteenth Century was
not in any way conducive to establish legitimacy or acceptable authority among the subdued groups. Only over time, when economie
and socio-cultural bonds between the various
peoples within the Ethiopian state gradually
emerged, the worst effects of the violence were
mitigated and its memory faded.
This time of conquest of the south, that are
areas outside the Tigrinna- or Amharicspeaking core domain of highland Abyssinia,
shows that the ideas of checks and balances
in the use of violence had its limits. Basically,
it was applied only to the own group: the highlanders, and - spurred by the nature of the
still embryonic Ethiopian state which was
contested and had no well-established institutional structure - it was often circumvented
in regional political conflicts. The peaceful
incorporation of independent chief- or kingdoms (such as Jimma Aba Jifar and various
southern Omotic-speaking areas) was not
uncommon, but more the exception than the
rule.
What is important to keep in mind after the
preceding sections on 'traditional' Ethiopian
ideas about power and violence, however, is
the following. For political and moral authority of either a provincial lord, a regional läng
or an emperor to be accepted as lasting and
legitimate in Ethiopia, he (sometimes she)
could not dérive that authority from thé
sword, let alone ground it in terror and intimidation of thé population at large. The norm
was that a minimum of the deep-rooted traditional customs in thé political-cultural, religious and socio-économie sphère should be
respected (cf. Gaitachew 1993: 194-5). Violence was indeed often used to further political
ends and strengthen power, but was not the
central ideological basis for political authority
and legitimacy. This point becomes clear
when we briefly consider thé use of violence
by thé Italians.
The Italiens 1935-1941
In 1936, Mussolini's Fascist troops, with
Eritrean conscripts (Banda) among them,
invaded Ethiopia. Motivated by the memoiy
of their defeat in 1896, by crude racist ideas
about the inferiority of the Ethiopians and
convinced of their 'civilizing mission' which
was held to legitimize their actions, the
Italians used massive armed force, including
poison gas and areal bombings. In conquered
areas, they terrorized the population, for
instance by cutting off the heads of opponents
and then distributing photographs of such
scènes to the population. Some people were
forced to watch the exécution of a son or
daughter. During their five-year occupation,
there were also random killings and mass
exécutions, for example in the town of Harar
in May 1936. In the same town, the Italians
also killed sixteen old people in front of the
church where they had corne to worship. For
the first time in Ethiopian history, large-scale
rape was used as a war tactic. In 1937, the
massacre in Addis Ababa after an assassination attempt on the 'viceroy' Graziani made
circa 20,000 victims in a few days' time, and
virtually a whole génération of moderneducated Ethiopians was eliminated. The
government also ordered the 'liquidation' of
traditional minstrels and religieus diviners,
and the murder of 320 monks in the famous
Debre-Libanos monastery. While the Italians
introduced unprecedented repressive and terrorist measures of violence, their regime was
short-lived and will not be assessed here in
terms of our thème. The legitimacy or
authority of the Italians as white foreigners
was never accepted by the Ethiopian
population at large, which supported the
struggle of the patriots wherever it could.
The Haile Sellassie period:
faulty modernization, changing
modes of violence
The pattern of checks and balances and of
appeal expressed mainly through the religious
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
and cultural idiom (see section 'Violence in
Ethiopian politics and culture') was changed
only under Emperor Haile Sellassie, especially after nis return in 1941. This reign initiated the third period under discussion. In
his moderaizing drive, Haile Sellassie overhauled the entire political System of Ethiopia. He issued two constitutions (in 1931 and
in 1955), introducing many foreign political
ideas, including, paradoxically, that of the
absolute monarchy. Another notable aspect
of Haile Sellassie's reign was the centralization and graduai depoliticization of the armed
forces, a resuit of the soldiers being turned in
to a national standing army, and no longer a
locally recruited fighting force led by regional
lords who had political ambitions. The traditional intertwining of politics and the military was thus broken (Yohannis 1980-81:1).
This, of course, did not prevent the Emperor from using the new army for crushing
political and social rebellions. In Haile
Sellassie's reign, one saw the use of arbitrary,
sometimes vehement, repressive violence
against régions and peoples who often had
just cause to rebel (Gojjam, Bale, Tigray,
Eritrea, the Afar, the Somali, the Kereyu).
The monarch by-passed the traditional law
of redress and appeal in these cases, enforcing bis will against any forces challenging
his rule. He allowed the use of various new
battle tactics (perhaps taken over from the
Italians) in subduing dissent, for example,
taking innocent hostages as a means of pressure, burning and destruction of villages,
scorched earth, bombing herds of livestock,
burning people alive in houses or mosques,
public hangings, torture of suspected political rebels and their associâtes. This policy of
violent repression of ethno-regional dissent
has to be seen in the context of the Emperor's effort to forge one nation from many, although it did certainly not necessarily follow
from it. Haile Sellassie's absolutism was developed in response to challenges of modernity and national unity, but it was a cramped
response. His personal autocratie rule, developed over and above the traditional ideas of
checks and balances, eut off the graduai de-
velopment of democratie institutions which
could have involved the various sections of
the Ethiopian population into the political
process.
While the Emperor had been actmg as a
kind of progressive in the years before 1936,
when hè centralized the state, subjugated the
regional nobility, introduced technological
and administrative reforms, bureaucratie institutions and tried to stimulate the national
economy, nis policies of modernization after
his reinstatement in 1941 were uneven and
machiavellian. This seriously undermined his
legitimacy and credibility, especially when hè
increasingly chose violent options to solve
domestic problems, like the rébellion in
Eritrea after 1962.
The loss of legitimacy had starled with the
accusation made against him by many Ethiopians, that hè fled his country like a coward
in 1936, when the Italians were winning their
war of conquest (cf. Gaitachew 1993:41-2).
About 350,000 Ethiopians had responded to
his call for mobilization to repulse the invaders, but at the critical moment hè himself
slipped out. According to the Ethiopian military and national code of honour, hè should
have stayed on to fight until his death (like
emperors Tewodros (d. 1868) and Yohannis
(d. 1889) did): in some cases there is, in the
Ethiopian view, nothing more legitimate and
admirable than the use of force for a justified
cause.
A related issue is thé affair of the arbennotch (= patriots), thé Ethiopian résistance
fighters who stayed on after 1936 to fight a
guérilla war against thé Italians in thé countryside. After his return in 1941 with the help
of the British, Haue Sellassie gave a very bad
example by just marginalizing or ignoring
most of these nationalist rebels (except the
patriot leader Abebe Aregay, who was a supporter of the monarch). He saw them as a
threat to his position and political power, because of their greater moral authority based
on their résistance activity. He even had one
of the foremost patriots, Belay Zelleke, publicly executed (Gaitachew 1993:181-2). The
people of Addis Ababa then reacted by spon64
taneously naming a street after Belay (significantly, the one called Prmce of Harar
street, refernng to the title of Haile Sellassie
before hè assumed power).
In his fascmating memoir of the Haile
Sellassie era, Gaitachew Bekele (1993) compares the record of the emperors Yohannis
IV andMimlik II with that of Haile Sellassie.
He finds the latter seriously at fault for breaking with traditional Ethiopian legal procedures and customary law and neglecting mdigenous conceptions of justice and nghleousness and of democratie participation. The only
recognizable remnant of the traditional ideas
of airing grievances and getting redress was
the 'open court' of the Emperor, the Chilot,
where any person could come and submit a
problem. Haile Sellassie also was chiefly motivated by self-interest (Gaitachew 1993: 2;
cf. Bahru 1994: 41-2). He created, or at least
furthered, an imbalance in the power structure of Ethiopian society, reinforced by his
arbitrary application of punishment and rewards. Haile Sellassie neither created a génération of political leaders who could follow
in his footsteps. Instead hè surrounded himself with weaklings, and eut down promising, but potentially threatening personahties.14 Gaitachew (1993: 182) has noted that
"[t]he génération which has succeeded Haile
Sellassie is without history, culture, or foundations". The relevance of this remark, while
somewhat conservative in tone, we will see
later.
The process of political and economie modernization in Ethiopia - which had also led
to the country's definitive entry into the world
capitalist system - did not produce a strong
middle class with democratie traditions, and
which could bring forth leaders and institutional structures. On the one hand, there was
too much dominance offoreign financial capital in the entrepreneurial domain; on the
other, domestic civil society was constantly
stifled by the Emperor. He was indeed the first
monarch who starled to 'rationalize' the administration, to choose people for government
jobs on éducation and ment and trying to
avoid ethnie nepotism. But his autocratie pa-
ternalism and violent suppression of dissent
undermined nis position and even the modenüzation process itself. Discontent with his
regime, often subjacent, became widespread,
as evident from the various coup attempts and
local rebellions after World War II.
In the final instance, the Emperor refused
to face the socio-cultural eflfects of his reform
programmes, as well as their relation to traditional Ethiopian values and institutions,
because hè would then be forced to doubt bis
own absolutist and blindly paternalist style
of governing. The continued backwardness
of the rural sector, partly due to the lack of
serious landreform, stagnating industrial development, and enduring social inequalities
made many Ethiopians believe that only radical solutions would work to solve the country's problems. The most vocal protest movement, that of the Ethiopian students in- and
outside Ethiopia (see Balsvik 1985, Kiflu
1993) came to adopt Marxist socialism as the
only possible panacea, despite the fact that
this modernist ideology did not fit Ethiopian
realities.
Haile Sellassie's policies had also led to
unease and some politica! consciousness in
the army, partly as a response to the problems of modernity mentioned above and to
the protests of the students. The army officers had no well-developed social ideology, but
came to think that they could use their power
position to wrest change. When a wholesale
societal crisis erupted in early 1974, they
stepped in as the only organized force in the
national arena.
The Ethiopian Revolution
The fourth and most important phase of
change in the use and expression of violence
was that of the Revolution. In 1974, the Haile
Sellassie-regime was toppled and a council
of military officers took over. The public airing of their grievances, which started seriously in February 1974, was symptomatic of
the state of crisis in Ethiopian society, feit by
many social groups. There had been an ecoFocaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
nomie upsurge in the late 1960s, but in the
early 1970s the général prospects for economie growth and opportunities were becoming less favourable. The décisive event was
perhaps the big famine in the north of the
country, which drew a very belated and callous response from the government and which
revealed its inadequacy to care for its own
people. After February 1974 public protests
and démonstrations erupted among many sections of the population - not only among students, but also teachers, taxidrivers, and labourers. This opened up the potential for significant political and social change. However,
as we saw, there were no organized political
groups or institutionaî structures which could
step into the organizational and ideological
vacuüm. The one exception was the créature
of the Emperor's own making: the army. The
army, centralized, modernized, and wellequipped by Haile Sellassie, as a national
standing army, was ultimately the only force
in the country, and those who controlled the
means of violence could assert themselves.
During 1974, the military 'hijacked' the
revolutionary ferment and imposed their own
authority on this movement of social protest.
In the first months they were seen as a transitional authority, and had substantial support. The slogan of the day was even: 'Let
Ethiopia advance without any bloodshed'
(Amharic: Yale minim dam, Itiop 'ia tik 'dem).
But already after the night of November 2324,1974, this slogan had to be discarded: the
chairman of the Dergue, Aman Andorn was
gunned down (or 'committed suicide') in his
home by soldiers sent by some of his colleagues (partly because of his, in the eyes of
the hard-line section in the Dergue, conciliatory and defeatist approach to the Eritrean
conflict). Later that night, 59 imprisoned
former officials of the previous government
were also shot dead (without being accused,
without trial, and in an appalling manner).15
With these events, the road of violence was
taken. This became characteristic of the revolutionary government all through the various revolutionary programmes and policies
of the sixteen ensuing years.16
65
'Red Terror': the construction
of a collective fantasy of power
and impunity
'•t '
à
The real begmning of the Red Terror - the
official term used by the Ethiopian regime
itself - virtually coincides with the violent
assumption of power by Mengistu Haile
Mariam, an army officer who at the time of
the outbreak of the révolution in 1974 was
sent to be a member of the Dergue (provisional military council) by nis Third Division, stationed in Harar. He gained dictatorial power in February 1977, and largely determined the intransigent and ruthless course
of the révolution until the dismal end in May
1991. From Dawit Wolde-Giorgis's account
(1989), among others, it is abundantly clear
that the Red Terror was largely inspired and
orchestrated by Mengistu and a small group
of close ideological advisors. The victirns of
the Red Terror-'purges' in the years 197778, in Addis Ababa and in the provinces
throughout the country, are minimally estimated to be between 20,000 and 40,000.17
Strangely enough, not much is known in
detail about this period. Human-rights reports
by Amnesty International and Africa Watch
(1991) have indeed sketched the genera! character of the period and documented many
cases, and in a few memoirs (Dawit 1989,
Babile 1989) one finds revealing and useful
information. But in Ethiopia itself the period,
while deeply engrained in the collective mind,
has been suppressed. It was never discussed
in public. After 1991, the new regime, ledby
the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratie Front (an umbrella front of three parties, but dominated by the Tigray People's
Liberation Front)18 has allowed more open
expression of thoughts and émotions on this
period. There have been public hearings, accusations and calls for arrest of perpetrators.
A monument for the first group of 59 victims
of the Dergue (the high officials murdered
on November 24, 1974) was consecrated in
1993. Part of this attention may also be for
politica! ends, that is to define the new gov-
66
ernment's own legiümacy as a successor to
the De/gwe-regime, Süll, there has been reserve and reluctance 'to talk too much' about
the Red Terror and its legacy.
There may thus be a problem m the interprétation of this period. While there are précédents in Ethiopian history in the indiscnminate violence and looting agamst the population (mostly the peasantry; see Caulk 1978
463), the Red Terror violence, due to its ideological content and unscrupulous nature,
marked a new level of performance, even
going beyond Haile Sellassie's practices.
What was the meaning of the violence, how
could it happen, why did so many people participate in it, and with such gusto, as killers
and torturers? Ethiopians starled askmg
themselves what they had become, what kind
of society they had developed.
The political dimension of what happened
in these years - the reasons given for the killing, party rivalries, the ideological bickering
- are not interesüng as éléments of an explanation. The Marxist vocabulary of the day was
as predictable as it was vacuous for an understanding of what happened and why. A
rétrospective analysis of these political debates gives a feeling of surrealist aliénation
to the contemporary reader, post-modem or
not. The 'Red Terror' by the revolutionary
government was declared 'necessary' to meet
the 'White Terror' of the 'counter-revolutionary' political opposition, especially the EPRP
(= Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party,
later also the EDU (= Ethiopian Democratie
Union)), and the MEISON (= All-Ethiopia
Socialist Movement) and any other civilian
political group. When people had been executed by the regime, it was said that a 'revolutionary procedure' had been followed, that
'revolutionary justice' had been meted out to
them, or, of course, that 'class enemies had
been liquidated'. The localk'ebele (= urban
neighbourhood) committees - whose members
did much of the housesearching, raiding, torture, rape and killing and which consisted
mostly by people from the lower social strata
- were officially given the task 'to guard the
Revolution, being alert at all times' (a slo-
gan at the time).19 In a familiär Marxist rhetorical move, the 'Revolution' became the
fetish idea in which ultimate authority was
uncritically vested, the abstract excuse for
every kind of excess.
Some sources maintain that many excesses
were perpetrated, beyond the control of the
central authorities, for example, by the
k 'ebele defence squads, whose members went
on their own semi-criminal killing sprees in
the cities during the night (Lefort 1981:27980; Keiler 1988: 234). Whatever the truth of
this, it stands as a fact that the conditions for
such activities, the emerging culture of violence in Ethiopia, was outlined and stimulated by the politica! leadership, which did
never take any légal action to curb these activities. Red Terror killers who became a liability were simply killed by the Dergue-leadership in the ensuing years.
An important aspect of this effort and most
visible in this Red Terror period was an elaborate theatrïcs of violence. Violence was publicly staged and performed - without hypocrisy so to speak - which in itself had a deeply
intimidating effect. For instance, when
Mengistu, shortly after nis assumption of dictatorial power in February 1977, gave a public address on April 13,1977, hè hadbrought
six bottles filled with blood.20 In the course
of his speech hè crushed them on the ground:
this was to symbolize the coming violent suppression of the 'enemies of the révolution',
foreign and domestic (one bottle for every
enemy, from 'imperialism' to the EPRP;
Legum 1978: B213). Other éléments of the
theatrical enactment of violence were the
elaborate rhetoric of the state media and politica! leaders on the 'necessity' of the killings and the élimination of opponents 'to
défend the Revolution'. Also, at the height
of the violence (in the spring and summer of
1977), the Ethiopian mass media brought
daily news on the killings, and télévision routinely showed shots of the dead and mutilated
bodies of opponents (cf. Legum 1978: B212).
A common practice was to leave the bodies
of murdered victims lying in the streets. Some
bodies of murdered young children received
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
a placard saying "I was a counter-revolutionary" (ibidem: B233, see also Africa Watch
1991: 102 ff).
In the préparations for the recent trials in
Ethiopia (January-May 1995) to bring to justice former Dergue leaders, large quantities
of archivai materials were found which document the killings under the previous regime.
Part of them date from the Red Terror period, and include video-recordings made from
torture sessions and exécutions. That they
were kept may be another expression of the
obsession of the state-sponsored killers with
the autonomous power of violence, and with
its subjacent sexual éléments (as Graziano
(1992:153) also found in the case of the Argentine torturers of the Dirty War period).21
It is difficult but not impossible to make
sensé of this complex of violent acts of this
period. One can ask what was gained by the
torture and killing of children or of students
who were seen as 'guilty' because of being
young and being a student? Why strangle
people with piano wire? Why exposé the bodies of dead youths on the streets of the city
for days, to be eaten by hyenas, and forbid
their burial? How to explain the demand of
the killers to the victims to first dig their own
grave, and then be shot into it? Why were
relatives ordered to look at the eut and bullet-wounds on the body of their dead sons and
daughters, and prohibited, under threat of
torture, to shed tears or to wear black mourning clothes? How to widerstand the demand
of soldiere to the parents of victims to pay a
substantial sum of money to them for the bullets they had fired into the body of their kids?
The list of inventive cruelties is long, and
in many ways not unique to Ethiopia. There
are of course many twentieth-century historica! précédents. But the dramatic aspects of
• this arbitrary production of corpses in Ethiopia at that time revealed one thing: the émergence of another organized and 'rational'
state-terror campaign to utterly dehumanize
the 'opponents' from within its own society,
and a complete intimidation of the bereaved
so as to make them mute, preventing them
from even considering the possibility of ap67
peal or redress. It also constituted a füll négation of central cultural values of mourning, proper burial, and commémoration. The
fact that people were also killed without the
slightest indication of whattheir 'guilt' could
have been, was in itself part of the logic of
theatrical violence: for the state to justify itself in this was superfluous, because acting
in the name of the higher collective ideology
of social révolution, it could not be wrong
All amounted to an ultimate objectification
of the victims, equalling them to disposable
trash which was never of any value. The personal and bodily integrity of civilians was systematically violated by the state and its agents,
and the threat thereof was ever-present, even
in the nünds of those who thought themselves
to be 'on the side of the révolution'. As in all
violence, there was thus a definite 'message',
an imposed définition of reality in the country, a vesting of state power in the symboüsm
of blood and death, which pre-empted any
independent rôle and identity of the Ethiopians, as persons or as human beings.
Apart irom the public, theatrical side of the
violence there was a bidden one: the torture
and rape of the young opponents in the prisons. As Rejali (1994: 13) has noted in nis
historica! study of torture in Iran, modern
twentieth-century torture seems to be private,
not public: bidden firom view. This in itself
may have the effect of keeping the population in permanent suspense as to who would
be the next victims and what would happen
to them. In Ethiopia, the revolutionary discourse allowed the men in power to indulge
in these practices of torture and râpe to an
extent unknown before. In Ethiopian society
the complex values of honour and shame
around sexuality were a very important aspect of traditional culture and highly respected, but in the Red Terror period these
values were rully reversed. Everybody knew
what was going on in the prisons, but the
surviving victims and their families bore the
pain and the humiliation in silence.
Both the public and the private form of violence revealed the ideology of unlimited
power wielded by the state and its representa-
68
tives Through violence, an almost transcendental groundmg of 'revolutionary' authority was attempted, defining itself as beyond
human and societal control, beyond checks
and balances. In reality, it was of course no
more than the construction of a fantasy of
complete and unassailable power, not only of
the state, but also of the group of self-appointed leaders around Mengistu.
The impact of this double-faced violence
and its message was particularly grave on
Ethiopian society because: of a) it being historically without precedent (although it could
in part be seen as a culmination of the violence against civilians instigated by Haile
Sellassie's army during the conflicts in
Eritrea, Tigray, Gojuam, Bale, Ogaden), and
b) it purposively violating central cultural
values of Ethiopian society, such as the nght
to demand legal redress and défense under
the law, the inviolability of the person and
the individual body, the respect for Ethiopian
honour- and shame codes in interpersonal
behaviour (which held for most ethno-cultural
groups, not only the highlanders), the respect
for older people and for religieus dignitanes,
the compassion with children, and the honouring of the dead through proper burial and
mourning. Especially the fact that people were
forbidden to carry out burial and mourning
became symbolic for the contempt of the regime for the population. In Ethiopian culture,
cross-cutting religieus and ethnie divides, the
proper mourning (Amharic: läqso) for the
dead, when relatives and friends are recovering in their homes, and when the deceased is
being praised and commemorated in speeches
and stories, is a core value which should never
be abrogated. Denying people the right to
complete the mourning period is tantamount
to denying their existence, which was of
course the state's purpose in prohibiting it.
For bis modernization drive, Emperor Haile
Sellassie has been blamed with slavishly following the 'ways of the foreigners' and neglecting or bypassing Ethiopian culture. But
the same might be said, with much more reason, of the dictatorial regime of the Dergue,
because of its uncritical acceptance of Marx-
ism-Leninism as the modernist ideology for
nation-building, reforms and development.
This had as its concomitant a purposive lack
of attention for spécifie Ethiopian historical
and societal conditions, an imposition ofeconomically senseless policies and ideological
schemes, an arrogant treatment of native and
ethnie cultures in their many forms (cf.
Donham 1992, Abbink 1994), and unrestricted use of violence to enforce thèse policies. Incidentally, thé adhérence to Marxism
in its dogmatic form was common in leftist
circles in thé West as well as in thé Third
World at thé same time (1960s). The Ethiopian opposition, from the student movement
to parties like the EPKP, shared this ideology
and in 1974-75 they sincerely believed it was
the solution to ail social and économie problems (cf. Kiflu 1993: 1). However, thé
DerçjMe-regime made sure that there was no
public debate on thé merits of applying a
western socialist ideology of collectivist autocratie transformation to an underdeveloped,
largely agricultural society under a ' vanguard
leadership' of one group (the military and its
political front after 1987, the unity party).
There was also an element of génération
conflict. The Dergue, as a body of soldiers
and officers, was also représentative of a
younger génération of Ethiopians, rebelling
against higher authority. When the February
1974 revolt broke out, leading officers had
sent relatively uneducated and rowdy lower
colleagues to be members of the Dergue in
Addis Ababa (for instance, Mengistu Haue
Mariant was about 35 when he was included
in the Dergue). In the beginning of the 1974
revolt, they had also imprisoned their own
gênerais, and after having gained political
power on the national level, they proceeded
to detain, insult and later kill leading figures
of the Haile Sellassie-regime. In these first
years, the rebellious army officers could not
base their legitimacy on their maturity or âge,
nor on political-administrative skills. Neither
were they secure about the extent of their
power, nor about the policy programs to follow, and they purposively contrasted themselves with the preceding génération.22
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
Gaitachew (1993: 195) is not far off the mark
when hè notes that people like Mengistu "...
rose from the rabble", and had no constructive leadership qualities.23
Among the Ethiopian population at large,
there still is the perception that since the days
of the Dergue, the country 'has been ruled by
children', by a génération having fought their
way to power but too young to have the required leadership skills and wisdom for civil
democratie government. This is seen as one
of the root causes of the country's misery.
An interprétation
An interprétation of this bizarre period must
deal with the element of the transformative
rôle of violence, as it was shaped and conditioned by socio-économie conditions and the
cultural assumptions and values of Ethiopian
society. No doubt, the wider background of
the problem of violence in twentieth-century
Ethiopia was its very problematic and incomplete transition to modern forms of politicaleconomie organization. This could be seen
in the lack of urban industrial development,
a lack of agricultural growth, a negative trade
balance, a lack of development of a stable
entrepreneurial stratum, an explosive population growth, ecological détérioration, and
the dogmatic application of idéologies of
modemization and social change which stood
in a tense relationship with traditional values and modes of behaviour. But violence in
itself, as defined in the introduction, should
also be looked upon as an element of human
behaviour which bas an intimidating power,
and once generated, it is extremely seductive
for people to use in the quest for political
power. As a principle of policy, as it was in
the Red Terror period, it can take on a life of
its own, generating its own language and semantic space.
We saw that violence has been used as an
instrument of power politics all through
Ethiopian history. What was new in the
Dergue-penod - also compared to Haile
Sellassie period - was that the military elite
69
it*
peal or redress. It also constituted a füll négation of central cultural values of mourning, proper burial, and commémoration. The
fact that people were also killed without the
slightest indication of whattheir 'guilt' could
have been, was in itself part of the logic of
theatrical violence: for the state to justify itself in this was superfluous, because acting
in the name of the higher collective ideology
of social révolution, it could not be wrong.
All amounted to an ultimate objectification
of the victims, equalling them to disposable
trash which was never of any value. The personal and bodily integrity of civilians was systematically violated by the state and its agents,
and the threat thereof was ever-present, even
in the minds of those who thought themselves
to be 'on the side of the révolution'. As in all
violence, there was thus a definite 'message',
an imposed définition of reality in the country, a vesting of state power in the symbolism
of blood and death, which pre-empted any
independent rôle and identity of the Ethiopians, as persons or as human beings.
Apart from the public, theatrical side of the
violence there was a bidden one: the torture
and rape of the young opponents in the prisons. As Rejali (1994: 13) nas noted in nis
historica! study of torture in Iran, modern
twentieth-century torture seems to be private,
not public: bidden from view. This in itself
may have the effect of keeping the population in permanent suspense as to who would
be the next victims and what would happen
to them. In Ethiopia, the revolutionär^ discourse allowed the men in power to indulge
in these practices of torture and râpe to an
extent unknown before. In Ethiopian society
the complex values of honour and shame
around sexuality were a very important aspect of traditional culture and highly respected, but in the Red Terror period these
values were fully reversed. Everybody knew
what was going on in the prisons, but the
surviving victims and their families bore the
pain and the humiliation in silence.
Both the public and the private form of violence revealed the ideology of unlimited
power wielded by the state and its représenta68
tives Through violence, an almost transcendental grounding of 'revolutionary' authority was attempted, defining itseif as beyond
human and societal control, beyond checks
and balances. In reality, it was of course no
more than the construction of a fantasy of
complete and unassailable power, not only of
the state, but also of the group of self-appointed leaders around Mengistu.
The impact of this double-faced violence
and its message was particularly grave on
Ethiopian society because: of a) it being historically without precedent (although it could
in part be seen as a culmination of the violence against civilians instigated by Haile
Sellassie's army during the conflicts in
Eritrea, Tigray, Gojjam, Bale, Ogaden), and
b) it purposively violating central cultural
values of Ethiopian society, such as the right
to demand legal redress and défense under
the law, the inviolability of the person and
the individual body, the respect for Ethiopian
honour- and shame codes in interpersonal
behaviour (which held for most ethno-cultural
groups, not only the highlanders), the respect
for older people and for religious dignitanes,
the compassion with children, and the honouring of the dead through proper burial and
mourning. Especially the fact that people were
forbidden to carry out burial and mourning
became symbolic for the contempt of the regime for the population. In Ethiopian culture,
cross-cutting religieus and ethnie divides, the
proper mourning (Amharic: luqsó) for the
dead, when relatives and friends are recovering in their homes, and when the deceased is
being praised and commemorated in speeches
and stories, is a core value which should never
be abrogated. Denying people the right to
complete the mourning period is tantamount
to denying their existence, which was of
course the state's purpose in prohibiting it.
For nis modernization drive, Emperor Haile
Sellassie has been blamed with slavishly following the 'ways of the foreigners' and neglecting or bypassing Ethiopian culture. But
the same might be said, with much more reason, of the dictatorial regime of the Dergue,
because of its uncritical acceptance of Marx-
ism-Leninism as the modernist ideology for
nation-building, reforms and development.
This had as its concomitant a purposive lack
of attention for spécifie Ethiopian historical
and societal conditions, an imposition ofeconomically senseless policies and ideological
schemes, an arrogant treatment of native and
ethnie cultures in their many forms (cf.
Donham 1992, Abbink 1994), and unrestricted use of violence to enforce thèse policies. Incidentally, thé adhérence to Marxism
in its dogmatic form was common in leftist
circles in thé West as well as in thé Third
World at thé same time (1960s). The Ethiopian opposition, from the student movement
to parties like the EPRP, shared this ideology
and in 1974-75 they sincerely believed it was
the solution to ail social and économie problems (cf. Kiflu 1993: 1). However, thé
Zte/gtte-regime made sure that there was no
public debate on thé merits of applying a
western socialist ideology of collectivist autocratie transformation to an underdeveloped,
largely agricultural society under a 'vanguard
leadership' of one group (the military and its
political front after 1987, thé unity party).
There was also an element of génération
conflict. The Dergue, as a body of soldiere
and officers, was also représentative of a
younger génération of Ethiopians, rebelling
against higher authority. When the February
1974 revolt broke out, leading officers had
sent relatively uneducated and rowdy lower
colleagues to be members of the Dergue in
Addis Ababa (for instance, Mengistu Haile
Mariam was about 35 when hè was included
in the Dergue). In the beginning of the 1974
revolt, they had also imprisoned their own
gênerais, and after having gained political
power on the national level, they proceeded
to detain, insult and later kill leading figures
of the Haile Sellassie-regime. In these first
years, the rebellious army officers could not
base their legitimacy on their maturity or âge,
nor on political-administrative skills. Neither
were they secure about the extent of their
power, nor about the policy programs to follow, and they purposively contrasted themselves with the preceding génération.22
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
Gaitachew(1993:195) is not far off the mark
when hè notes that people like Mengistu "...
rose from the rabble", and had no constructive leadership qualities.23
Among the Ethiopian population at large,
there still is the perception that since the days
of the Dergue, the country 'has been ruled by
children', by a génération having fought their
way to power but too young to have the required leadership skills and wisdom for civil
democratie government. This is seen as one
of the root causes of the country's misery.
An interprétation
An interprétation of this bizarre period must
deal with the element of the transformative
rôle of violence, as it was shaped and conditioned by socio-économie conditions and the
cultural assumptions and values of Ethiopian
society. No doubt, the wider background of
the problem of violence in twentieth-century
Ethiopia was its very problematic and incomplete transition to modern forms of politicaleconomic organization. This could be seen
in the lack of urban industrial development,
a lack of agricultural growth, a negative trade
balance, a lack of development of a stable
entrepreneurial stratum, an explosive population growth, ecological détérioration, and
the dogmatic application of idéologies of
modemization and social change which stood
in a tense relationship with traditional values and modes of behaviour. But violence in
itself, as defined in the introduction, should
also be looked upon as an element of human
behaviour which has an intimidating power,
and once generated, it is extremely seductive
for people to use in the quest for political
power. As a principle of policy, as it was in
the Red Terror period, it can take on a life of
its own, generating its own language and semantic space.
We saw that violence has been used as an
instrument of power politics all through
Ethiopian history. What was new in the
Dergue-penod - also compared to Haile
Sellassie period - was that the military elite
m
fff
tried to make it the basis of policy and authority of the state itself. They deliberately
broke with the past, to ground a new kind of
legitimacy structure derived from a rhetorically powerful western socialist ideology.
Their need for all-embracing authority and
legitimacy was deeply feit especially after the
murders of November 23-24,1974. The military génération which usurped power also had
a profound need to croate an identity for itself, not being able to associate itself with the
old socio-cultural order of the ancien regime
or with the encompassing values of Ethiopian culture. Part of this effort was a campaign against organized religion: Islam and
Orthodox Ethiopian Christianity. But especially against the latter, because it was so
much identified with the regime of Haile
Sellassie and the old leading elites of the
country.24 This attack represented another,
largely unsuccessful, assault on the cultural
fabric of Ethiopian society.25
Thus, seen in the context of Ethiopian culture and history, one transformative effect of
the 'Red Terror' was that of the ultimate demise of the idea of any 'legitimacy of violence'. In this period, the Ethiopian regime
came to defïne and manifest itself through
intimidation, force, and terror. Repression and
coercion became equivalent with the idea of
state itself, whether it was through politica!
détention, forced conscription for the Army,
destruction of rebellions villages in the North,
râpe, mutilation and torture of supposed opponents, agricultural policies of villagization,
collectivization and enforced low priées, or
forced resettlement of famine victims. The
'narrative of révolution' which had opened
up in 1974 never found acceptance among
the Ethiopian populace after the Red Terror.
Another transformative effect was that the
whole structure of Ethiopian society was undermined, and fear and the anticipation of
arbitrary arrest and power abuse became a
fact of life among the population at large.
Dawit (1989: 63) sums up the atmosphère:
"Every one is afraid someone is watching.
All social relationships are corroded by fear".
Violence created a new form of human bond70
age within Ethiopian society, as terror was
the language of the state. lts domination over
people tended to be absolute, reducing personal dignity and independence (which could
still be expressed under Emperor Minilik, cf.
the story when hè insulted one of his men) to
zero. To paraphrase James Scott (1992: 63),
the assertion of human dignity was transformed into a mortal risk.
The Red Terror generalized the performance of violence as a mode of governing. The
actual period of the Red Terror (from late
1976 to late 1978) was thus only the most
intensified form of repression,26 the intimidating and theatrical expression of a violent
fantasy of power of a regime having lost its
legitimacy and public acceptance: it represented the style of governing of the whole
Dergue-penod in a concentrated form, an
imaginary domain of ultimate control. The
practice of violence had been prepared already
in the increasingly bloody wars and terrpr
campaigns against the rebellions north
(Eritrea, later also Tigray and parts of Gondar
and Wollo). In the years following, the reign
of fear and impunity, the notion of the devastating power of the state, and the idea of a
reversai of all values of traditional civilized
life became inculcated in the minds of people. The pattern of arbitrary arrests, forced
conscriptions for the army (often by kidnapping youths from markets and streel corners),
disappearances, torture, terror and killing
went on, though less public, right until the
end in 1991. The violence also continuously
found new domains in which to wreak havoc:
the famine crisis of 1984-85, the resettlement
campaigns of 1986-87, the arrest and exécution of army gênerais and officers who lost
battles or pleaded for policy reform, the arrests and (planned) killings of many Tigray
and Eritrean people in the capital in 1990-91
in the face of impending defeat.
Seeing the Red Terror in perspective, one
concludes that as part of a governmental strategy of control and of imposing societal discipline, the enactment of violence was not only
a self-defeating failure, but also a perhaps
contributing cause of the crumbling of the
Ethiopian state and of the imagination of a
common Ethiopian identity. Predictably, violence bred violence: in its external form, it
led to the émergence of rebel movements
which, in response to the suppression of their
grievances, were seeking redress by armed
struggle. Violence was also 'internalized',
through psycho-social processes of conscious
suppression of fear and anger by the victims
themselves, by the muting of grief, resulting
in the aliénation of people from the state, but
also from each other. In this sense it can be
said that the terror entered the collective mind
ofEthiopians.
Violence moving off-stage:
the political transformation
after 1991
As we saw, a major legacy of violence is insecurity and scepsis about the meaning of
politics, disengagement from public life, distrust of the intentions of the state, and a reluctance to talk about past losses of relatives
and loved ones, habitually grown from the
muting and suppression in the years before.
These behavioural responses can also be seen
as survival stratégies, through which people
tried to rebuild their lives from within their
individual and family context.
f A partial recovery and cautions expression
-, of past grief has been possible under the new
1
EPRDF-government, in power since May
1991. This might perhaps be seen as the fifth
and last phase of transformation. People have
been able to relax their private fears, and, in
the first year after the change of regime, demanded punishment or even filed charges
against suspected Red Terror killers. But the
new regime has also used the memory of this
period to advance its own political ends.
There is no systematic expression and discussion yet of all the details of the killings,
nor a balancée assessment of the victims, who
initially were mostly members of the left-wing
political groups such as MEISON and
EPRP.27 Nor have all the perpetrators (some
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
of whom have been enlisted by the new regime) been exposed. It is neither clear who
was really involved nor who was falsely accused (the accusation of having been a participant in Red Terror activities has been used
in the past few years to indict personal enemies. The new regime has often accepted
this, hence blurring the border between those
involved and those innocent).28
On the basis of the ever-present legacy of
past violence, the ambivalent record of the
post-1991 government tends to contribute to
an atmosphère of déception, confusion, and
notable lack of commitment among the large
public to government policy.29 Deep distrust
of politics as a relevant arena for decisionmaking and for the enactment of 'démocratie
rights' is still dominant. Initially, thé new
government was greeted with some cautious
anticipation, because of the fall of the
Mengistu-government and the ending of the
civil war. It indeed tried to make a break with
the past. lts political rhetoric was subdued.
There were many changes in the sphère of
public life: liberalization of the press, freedom of organization, of expression of cultural
différence, and more room for entrepreneurial
activity. But from the start, there were also
sévère critics of the EPRDF/TPLF national
programme, also from within its own topranks. Since May 1991, there is a perception
that the building of représentative institutions
and of creating a transparent political process and an atmosphère of trust and confidence
by the new government has not succeeded.
lts record so far does not fulfil the 'moral
matrix' of legitimate governance (cf.
Schatzberg 1993:450-1). The 'ethniepolicy'
pursued - including the cantonization of the
country in 'ethnie zones' - has led to a new
discourse of division and opposition, where
people are being classified in terms of their
presumed ethnie group, or are stimulated to
follow the directives of an imagined primordial identity. This not only has led to a deemphasis on the element of a common Ethiopian identity, but also, in the past few years,
to numerous local conflicts and violent
clashes. Doubtful policy measures have seri71
ous effects not only in the political but also
in the economie sphère. The problems have
largely been contained up to now, but the
underlying potential for conflict will grow the
longer the policy continues. Many Ethiopians fear it will completely politicize 'ethnie
identity' also in contexts where it is fully irrelevant. In carrying out its policies, the government also keeps strict, and if necessary
violent, control on opponents. There are many
cases of disappearances and extra-judicial
killings, but the big différence is that these
are done off-stage: there is no public exercise
of violence.30 What this use of violence has
in common with Dergue violence is perhaps
orüy the création of arbitrary suspense. It is a
more psychological approach, which has its
effect due to the underlying allusions to, and
parallels drawn with, the expérience of the
Red Terror.
Interestingly enough, the new regime has
also tried to further ground its legitimacy as
a successor regime in the judicial trying of
former Dergue officials and Red Terror-perpetrators. The prosecutors even styled these
trials (which started in January 1995 after
years of préparation) as the African equivalent of the Nuremberg Trials. In addition, in
the sélective treatment of the Red Terror period by the government one can note a subtle
shift in its interprétation and thus in an altération of its meaning. Apart front seeing
this period as a national period of terror
against all Ethiopians, the government view
also présents a view which recasts it as one
of repression by one leading stratum in Ethiopian society (led by the 'Amhara') vis-à-vis
the others, especially the people in Eritrea
and Tigray.
Conclusion
Seen against the background of one Century
of Ethiopian history, the so-called 'Red Terror' -period had a transformative rôle in Ethiopian society. The remuants of any traditional
idea of the supremacy of law, of appeal and
72
redress, was unscrupulously discarded. In the
course of the revolutionär)' period, violence
was a made a political aim in itself, undermining the idea of legitimacy, justified authority and representativeness of government
in the process. It flouted any idea of continuity with the past and with the more valuable
aspects of Ethiopian cultural traditions. Any
rôle for civil society and for the expression of
civil sentiments was denied.
^ The Red Terror was a period of intense
\ physical and psychological violence which bei came rooted in society and had a lasting ef! fect on the collective mind and on social relations among Ethiopians. Because of its violation of central socio-cultural ideals and
codes in Ethiopian society - of the Christian
and Islande highlanders, as well as of minoriry ethnie groups - it decisively undermined any idea of 'social contract' or 'trust'
(fede pubblica; cf. Pagden 1988:129; Gellner
19S8) between the state and the population.
The state did not respect the personal integrity of its randomly chosen victims, negated
their existence as subjects with an identity or
lawful rights. The people, the potential victims, reacted by disengaging, retreating, or
rebelling whenever possible. The idea of
avoiding commitment, suppressing fear and
grief, and silently seeking help only of close
relatives or remaining friends, and hoping
that fate would bypass them, dominated the
population and penetrated the collective
memory, transforming it. Obviously, this
breakdown of trust led to a dissociation of
civilians from national policy and power
structures, and to a serious weakening of overall social cohésion. Trust in this sense was
increasingly vested in the private or kinship
domain and in groups based on an ethnie or
regional basis. The state, in the Ethiopian
context a machine for resource allocation captured by a young génération of dissociated
military considering themselves tree from
normal socio-cultural constraints, came to be
seen as unpredictable and dangerous, capable of turning to violence at any moment,
despite the so-called 'constitutional guaran.31 Through the force of state rhetoric
and through its imagery - for example, its
inscribing of power and humiliation in the
body and mind of victims -, its intimidating
public discourse and its création of arbitrary
suspense, violence became a second reality
for citizens.
In the introduction of this essay the term
'culture of violence' was used, as referring to
a System of ideas, values and représentations
in a society in which the instrumental and
expressive rôle of violence prédominâtes.
Such a culture can be reinforced when groups
of people 'make a living' of exercising violence, owe their position to it, ideologically
perpetuate it, and Institute a pattern of expected behaviour around violent acts. In other
words, they may have the power to prescribe
meaning and to radically thwart core values
of sociality and humanity vis-à-vis others. In
the period of the Revolution there was a tendency toward thé émergence of a culture of
violence, both in rhetorical form and in actual political practice. However, it did not
become universal among thé population at
large, as a way of lue or as a normative frame
of référence, because thé idea of legitimacy
of the state élite and its policy was never accepted, and because thé population was bound
to other socio-cultural frameworks. In thé end,
by persistently violating central tenets of social life and culture the state went asunder:
the violence in thé authoritarian-commumst
form of the Dergue and thé Mengistu-regime
spent itself and undermined its own structure. As said, violence had produced more
violence: the rebel movements ultimately
pushed back the army, assisted by thé refusai
of soldiers and gênerais to fight a senseless
cause for a disgraced régime. In addition, thé
average Ethiopian all over the country was
sabotaging and subverting the government
whenever possible, which contributed to its
base finally being slashed away. A 'culture
of violence' may be temporary by définition.
The effects of the Red Terror will continue
to be feit: its legacy is not laid to rest. Although it is remarkable how indigenous cultural values and norms of the Ethiopian population at large proved to be résilient and
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
helped individuals to restructure their lives
in the private sphère, most of the population
will feel the effects of personal tragedy and
social disruption which brought their society
in a deep crisis of identity and of continuity.
Neither is there yet a renewed affinity with
the state or with the pohtical elites. In the
minds of people, the seeds of suspicion, disillusionment and anger have taken root.
When Ethiopians look to the future, they see
it through the red screen of the past. There is
still deep distrust and cynicism, also vis-àvis the new government. Despite the significant positive changes introduced by it - in
comparison with the former regime - it is
largely seen as authoritarian, divisive and
non-representative. Policy and decision-making processes are non-transparent and unpredictable. However, public violence is indeed
shunned by the government's armed forces which have the explicit order to act with restraint and not to draw attention. There is no
more 'théâtre of violence'. Violence has
moved off-stage: opponents and vocal critics
may disappear, may be kidnapped or can be
arrested and imprisoned without habeas corpus. In the countryside, many of the democratie rights (press freedom, right to politically organize and conduct campaigns for
parties) are not respected at all, and smallscale violent clashes - either between the
EPRDF national army and the local population and rebel groups, or between members
of various ethnie groups among themselves have been a regulär feature of life, with many
fatal casualties. New antagonisms and political confiicts are being created, this time under the guise of an ethnie discourse, presented
as a discourse of'democratie' political rights.
Incidents of what one would call 'ethnie
cleansing' in ex-Yugoslavia hâve occurred in
various régions (Oromia, thé Somali région,
and Harar, as well as in Eritrea) - not necessarily under government orders, but condoned
by it. Because of its conditionality and its
constant référence to the recent past of the
Dergue, government discourse can, therefore,
also be read as one of threat and of latent
violence.
73
«t*
In genera! terms, the génération of indifférence, detachment, and fear is the result of
the continued absence of institutionalized
democratie rights32 which would enable people to get themselves heard, of the lack of a
senior génération of capable rulers who show
an understanding of the Ethiopian past and
of the cross-cutting bonds between various
sections of the population, and of the breakdown along ethnie lines of Ethiopia as an 'imagined political community'. This is not the
subject of this essay, but this development
shows some of the lingering effects of the Red
Terror, and may in itself again have adverse
effects on the socio-economic development of
a state which already had such a problematic
and Woody transition to modernity.
In these conditions, most Ethiopians perceive that the legacy of the Red Terror is still
there in present 'times of peace', and that a
résurgence of violence may be just around the
corner.
l1
Acknowledgements
This article is partly based on interviews during
1991-1993 with Ethiopians in Addis Ababa and
in the southem countryside. The stories of their
expérience have been woven into this account;
however, without identifying spécifie persons and
events. I dedicate this essay to Baro Deshaya, a
leader of the Me'en people in Kafa (southern
Ethiopia) whose four brothers were killed during
the Red Terror by représentatives of the Mengisturegime.
Notes
1. For instance, books like Haliiday & Molyneux
(1981), or D. & M. Ottaway (1978) with their
hopeful prédictions and naively-optimistic
assessment of the Ethiopian révolution, now
make an eerie impression.
2. See R. Caulk's study (1978).
3. This is reflected in one of the most famous
Amharic novels from the time of the ancien
74
régime Haddis Alemayehu's Eternal Love (m
Amharic Fik'ir iske Mek'abir, Addis Ababa
1967)
4 Dawit (1989 21) mentions the same idea of
law and nght of appeal, translatmg it as 'officiality'.
5. Mesfin Wolde Mariam recently emphasized
its continued importance m contemporary
peasant society in central Ethiopia (1991. 191)
6. Ethiopia before the révolution was also known
as a country where court htigation was developed to great heights, and practised by a very
large number of people.
7. 'Arrogance' m Amhanc: t'igab. This is a core
concept in Ethiopian culture, referring to, literally, the feehng of satiation, more commonly
it means arrogance, self-satisfaction and conceit, acted out toward others People who show
too much t 'igab (which of course always has
a négative connotation) should be eut down to
size.
8. See Crummey (1971)
9. The Italians had started their colonial venture
in Africa with their occupation of the Ethiopian port city of Massawa (now in Eritrea) in
1869.
10. Who also had their own style of violence
against outsiders/opponents Notorious were
the Islamic forces of Ahmed Grau in the sixteenth Century for their devastating scorched
earth and annihilation campaigns against the
Christian populations. Until this day, the Afar
and pastoral-nomadic Oromo (Kereyu, Guji)
are feared for their practice of inflicting génital mutilations on their enemies.
11. It had belonged to the sphère of influence of
médiéval Ethiopia in the sixteenth Century, but
was eut off from it by Oromo conquests in thé
area.
12. The predatory campaign ofAbeto (Lidj) lyasu
(ruler of Ethiopia after Minilik) against thé
Bench (Gimira) people of Kafa is disapprovingly described in the official Chronicle of his
reign, by Gebre-Igziabiher (1994: 335).
13. Cf. Abbas Haji (1993: 15-6) on thé Arssi. Part
of his analysis in this work is, however, seriously incomplète.
14. For one example, cf. Tekeste (1990: 99-100)
on thé animosity between two old-time friends,
Muiugeta Buli (army chief-of-staff) and
Mengistu Neway (head of the Impérial Bodyguard). This was orchestrated by thé Emperor
just to sow dissent between thèse two brilliant and promising men.
15. There was gréât panic and some of the victims were only half shot and slowly died of
blood lass (cf. Dawit 1989: 21). This kind of
exécution of people who had turned themselves in voluntarily when called by thé
Dergue, expecting to be treated according to
traditional Ethiopian rules of law, was new in
Ethiopian history (ibidem: 21).
16. Détails on ideological developments, factional
fights, policy measures and thé émergence of
dictatorship in the first three or four years of
thé révolution can be found in Markakis &
Nega (1978), Lefort (1981), Halliday and
Molyneux (1981) and Dawit (1989).
17. The violence used by the EPRP, which in 1976
made the mistake to opt for a campaign of urban violence directed against ieading members of thé régime, spurred thé Red Terror: it
was the perfect excuse for the Dergue to accelerate its policy of violence.
18. Next to thé TPLF, there are thé 'Amhara National Democratie Movement' and the 'Oromo
People's Démocratie Organization'.
19. Lefort described them as "... la pègre des
faubourgs" (1981: 277), or as: "... la canaille
des bidonvilles" (ibidem: 279). He emphasizes
the element of social revenge among thèse
groups of marginalized misfits and outcasts
rather than that of political ideals or aims. The
thème is also treated in Bä'alu Girma's rather
apologetic novel about thé Red Terror, The
Call ofthe Red Star (1980), where thé main
character (Derrebe, a chairman of a neighbourhood 'defence squad') is a man of humble social origins but depicted as a righteous and
correct revolutionary (See Kapeliuk 1982).
20. Eyewitnesses differ on the kind of bottle used:
Coca Cola or Ambo (the local minéral water).
A Coca Cola bottle would of course have been
more symbolic.
21. All these materials have not yet been studied,
however, but should yield more information
on which people participated and how. Since
thé seventies, thé video-recording of atrocities by thé perpetrators themselves bas become
widespread (cases are known from, for example, Libéria, Angola, Argentina, Iran and Somalia).
22. If one would pursue a psycho-analytic approach
to thé problem, one might say that thé removal
and killing of Haue Sellassie in August 1975
was a typical case of 'father-killing', thé results of which were visited on thé 'children'
later.
Focaalno.25, 1995: pp. 57-77
23. A tragic fact was that the Italians had killed
off virtually the whole Ethiopian intelligentsia in 1937 (educated people from various ethnie groups and régions). The absence of this
first educated class of Ethiopians, which could
have bridged the gap between tradition and
modernity, was painfully feit in post-War
Ethiopia.
24. A mistaken campaign, because Christianity
was deeply rooted and tenaciously adhered to
by a large section of the common people as
well (circa 45%. Adhérents of Islam counted
circa 40-45%).
25. The regime targeted the Church educational
system, and thereby thé transmission of traditional lore, values, musical and textual traditions.
26. The antécédents of thé Red Terror could already be seen in late 1974. Kiflu Tadesse
(1993: 171), a former EPRP-leader, bas even
remarked: "The Red Terror campaign that took
place between mid-1976 to 1978 was being
rehearsed in thé streets and homes of Eritrea
as early as 1974".
27. The EPRP-remnant which retreated to Tigray
in 1978 was virtually wiped out by the TPLF
in an until this day very controversîal military
battle. The héritage of this bad relationship
between thé two groups contributed to thé sélective treatment and only partial récognition
of Red Terror victims by thé présent transitional Ethiopian government. The views of
former members of the EPRP will probably
be presented in more détail in thé forthcoming Part II of Kiflu Tadesse's study (see Kiflu
1993).
28. In thé big trials against members ofthe former
régime which started in early 1995 (prepared
by thé Spécial Prosecutor's Office created by
thé government), only a few thousand higher
officials and policymakers of the Dergue regime stand accused, not the thousands of surviving small-time informera, traitors and killers who mostly did the actual dirty work.
29. Apart from most of the Tigrififia-speaking
population and some affiliated minority
groups.
30. According to Amnesty International and the
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (The Human
Rights Situation in Ethiopia, Seventh Report
oftheEHRC, 26 August 1994).
Sl.Haile Sellassie had two constitutions made,
in 1931 and 1955; the Dergue one in 1987;
and the present EPRDF-government one in
75
1994 (approved without much critical discussion by a Constituent Assembly m December
1994) No constitution has been a sufficient
guarantee for the respect of human rights, because mature institutions upholding the rule
of law are missing.
32. The institutionalization and implementation
of such rights could build upon local-level traditions of democratie decisionmaking and réconciliation which were recognized in many
local Ethiopian societies.
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